Sustainable energy production and consumption: benefits, strategies and environmental costing

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Sustainable Energy Production and Consumption

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally "Advanced Study Institutes" and "Advanced Research Workshops". The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are coorganized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO's "Partner" or "Mediterranean Dialogue" countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses intended to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and re-organised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

Chemistry and Biology Physics and Biophysics Environmental Security Information and Communication Security Human and Societal Dynamics

http://www.nato.int/science http://www.springer.com http://www.iospress.nl

Series C: Environmental Security

Springer Springer Springer IOS Press IOS Press

Sustainable Energy Production and Consumption Benefits, Strategies and Environmental Costing edited by

Frano Barbir FESB, University of Split, Croatia and

Sergio Ulgiati University of Naples Parthenope, Italy

Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Sustainable Energy Production and Consumption and Environmental Costing Naples, Italy 4– 7 July 2007

Library of Congress Control Number: 2008928451

ISBN 978-1-4020-8493- 5 (PB) ISBN 978-1-4020-8492-8 (HB) ISBN 978-1-4020-8494 -2 (e-book)

Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands.

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Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved © 2008 Springer Science + Business Media B.V. No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.

CONTENTS Preface ......................................................................................................... ix 1. Energy and Economic Growth .................................................................1 Robert U. Ayres 2. Win-Win Strategies for Tackling Oil and Natural Gas Constraints while Expanding Renewable Energy Use ...........................25 Michael Jefferson 3. After the Fossil Era ................................................................................43 Luigi Sertorio 4. Biomass or Biomess? The promises and Limits of Bioenergy ..............55 Joachim H. Spangenberg 5. Cost and Environmental Effectiveness of the Climate Change Mitigation Measures ...............................................................................67 Natasa Markovska, Mirko Todorovski, Tome Bosevski, and Jordan Pop-Jordanov 6. Sustainable Environmental Management in Croatia – Waste and Climate Change.......................................................................................75 Daniel R. Schneider 7. Studying the “Addiction to Oil” of Developed Societies Using the Multi-Scale Integrated Analysis of Societal Metabolism (MSIASM)..............................................................................................87 Mario Giampietro 8. Systemic Economic Instruments for Energy, Climate, and Global Security ..............................................................................139 James Greyson 9. Sustainability and Economic Feasibility of Combinations of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) and Fossil Fuels for Production of Heat and Electricity..................................................159 Kiril Popovski and Sanja Popovska Vasilevska v

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10. Third Party Financing: New Financial Tools for Energy Efficiency – An International Perspective ..........................................171 Claudio Ferrari 11.Vital Problems of Human Development, Indicators and Eco-Centric Solutions ..........................................................................185 Alexander Gorobets 12. Lifestyles, Energy, and Sustainability: The Exploration of Constraints.......................................................................................199 Igor Matutinović 13. Approaches to Sustainable Energy Consumption Patterns .................213 Damjan Krajnc, Rebeka Lukman and Peter Glavič 14. Energy, Environment and Security in Eastern Europe.........................227 Oleg Udovyk 15. Capacity Building for Sustainable Energy Access in the Sahel/Sahara Region: Wind Energy as Catalyst for Regional Development ..................................................................241 Khalid Benhamou 16. Bio-diesel and/or Hydrogen in Croatia – Challenge and Necessity ....251 Ante Krstulović and Frano Barbir 17. Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Research for Future Markets........................265 Hanns-Joachim Neef 18. Hydrogen Production from Biomass....................................................273 Mu’taz Al-Alawi 19. PV Large Scale Rural Electrification Programs and the Development of Desert Regions .............................................281 Sifeddine Labed 20. Life Cycle Impacts and Total Costs of Present and Future Photovoltaic Systems: State-of-the Art and Future Outlook of a Strategic Technology Option for a Sustainable Energy System ..293 Marco Raugei and Paolo Frankl

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21. Integrated Systems and Zero Emission Production Patterns in Agriculture, Industry and the Energy Sector – Why “Green” is not Enough ...............................................................305 Sergio Ulgiati, Amalia Zucaro and Stefano Dumontet 22. Biorefinery: Biomaterials and Bioenergy from Photosynthesis, within Zero Emission Framework .......................................................327 Janis Gravitis 23. Geographical Information System (GIS) and Emergy Synthesis Evaluation of Urban waste Management ............................339 Pier Paolo Franzese, Giovanni Fulvio Russo and Sergio Ulgiati 24. Elements of Global Roadmap for Climate Sustainability: Factors Affecting the Reduction of CO2 Emissions .........................................353 Mia Pihlajamäki, Jyrki Luukkanen and Jarmo Vehmas 25. Carbon Management for Secure Communities ....................................361 Nigel Mortimer Author Index ........................................................................................... 369 Subject Index ............................................................................................ 371

PREFACE Energy and environmental security are major problems facing our global economy. Fossil fuels, particularly crude oil, are confined to a few regions of the world and the continuity of supply is governed by dynamic political, economic and ecological factors. These factors conspire to force volatile, often high fuel prices while, at the same time, environmental policy is demanding a reduction in greenhouse gases and toxic emissions. Yet increased growth and demand for welfare by developed and developing countries are placing higher pressure on energy resources. In particular, a large fraction of “new consumers” in developing countries already reached a purchasing power high enough as to be able to access to commodity and energy markets worldwide, thus boosting energy consumption and competition for all kinds of resources. Such a trend, although in principle may represent a progress towards diffuse welfare and wealth as well as much needed equity, is at present contributing to a rush for the appropriation of available resources which are directly and indirectly linked to energy and may contribute to planetary instability if it is not adequately understood and managed. A coherent energy strategy is required, addressing both energy supply and demand, security of access, development problems, equity, market dynamics, by also taking into account the whole energy lifecycle including fuel production, transmission and distribution, energy conversion, and the impact on energy equipment manufacturers and the end-users of energy systems. Issues of energy efficiency and rebound effect must also be taken into proper account. In the short term, the aim should be to achieve higher energy efficiencies and increased supply from local energy sources, in particular renewable energy sources. In the long term, redesign of life styles, further increase of alternative energy sources and shift to new energy carriers such as hydrogen is expected to contribute to solve or alleviate the problems generate by declining availability of fossil fuels. Both points of view must include national accounting procedures that also consider resource depletion and environmental degradation, and questions concerning growth, carrying capacity, sustainability, and inter- and trans-generational equity. An Advanced Research Workshop entitled Sustainable Energy Production and Consumption and Environmental Costing was held at the University of Naples Parthenope 4–7 July 2007, generously supported by the NATO Science for Peace Programme. This book is a collection of papers presented at the Workshop. The following main topics were dealt with at the Workshop: ix

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Energy Efficiency. Increased efficiency (in buildings, in transportation devices and infrastructure, and in production sectors) is a priority which cannot be disregarded. It can be achieved by dealing with several aspects, among which: a) Decentralization of energy production, by generating heat and electricity locally by means of small/medium scale conversion plants, in order to save on energy transportation infrastructure, make use of locally available resources (biomass, residues, small energy storages). Accurate planning may prevent from losses of efficiency compared to large scale plants as well as from environmental damage, thanks to easier management. b) Adequate matching of supply to use, both in terms of quantity and quality. This specially applies to thermal energy demand, which can be easily and safely be met by means of solar thermal and biomass devices in order to meet local demand from household sector and small and medium agricultural and industrial enterprises. c) So called “Zero Emission Technologies and Systems” based on clustering of local production systems in order to ease exchange of energy and unused resources, preventing them from becoming waste heat and matter to be disposed of. Making more with less, a new science and innovation based strategy, in order to generate non-linear business cycles, with reuse and recycling patterns for energy and matter savings. How these strategies for energy efficiency can be put in practice, what is the cost for their implementation and what kind of incentives/regulations are needed for large scale acceptance requires multidisciplinary debate and expertise and cannot, however, be further delayed. Security. Small scale, locally renewable, decentralized systems for energy production and use seem to be more easily manageable as far as risks from terrorist attack or forced discontinuous functioning are concerned. Small/medium size means that such plants and devices are not an attractive object for terrorism, because they do not call for the interest of media and general public, nor their possible damage can be a source of large environmental impact to the surrounding area, nor – finally – their stop for accident would affect significantly the local economy, due to possible replacement of their energy supply by means of energy from other nearby facilities or national grid. They are also less sensitive to fluctuations of energy costs and availability at the scale of international energy market. Renewable energy. Wind, solar photovoltaic and biomass energy have been the forms of renewable energy mainly stressed within the Workshop. Speakers presented theoretical evaluations and applied cases. Large discussion took place about the feasibility and viability of these forms of energy,

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their implementation, their coupling to storage forms and carriers (batteries; hydrogen), their market opportunities, and finally their environmental constraints. Environmental constraints. The need for better understanding of environmental constraints was pointed out by many speakers. The environment is both a source and a sink. It represents a source of energy and resources used in the economies of humans and a sink for by products of economic processes. Energy use is more likely to be curtailed as the result of ecological considerations than as the result of actual resource exhaustion. In fact, although there is partial disagreement regarding the ultimate limitation of resources (i.e. the amount of resources that are actually available and the energy and economic cost of their exploitation), there is wide consensus worldwide about present exploitation of nature as a sink for waste release. As a consequence, there is an urgent need for incorporating environmental constraints into scientific research and policy actions. Editors: Frano Barbir Sergio Ulgiati

ENERGY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

ROBERT U. AYRES* International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis Laxenburg, Austria

Abstract: Since the 1950s, at least, it has been clear that factors other than capital and labor must be responsible for most economic growth. Historical and anecdotal evidence suggests that the substitution of machines powered by fossil energy for human and animal labor must have played a significant or even dominant role in driving growth. The situation is complicated by the coming peak in global petroleum output and the technological transition that must follow. Economists have inconsistent views on these relationships. The most dangerous is the assumption that growth is both optimal and exogenous. This implies that growth is automatic and costless. It also implies that any government intervention is likely to impose costs. Another implication of the standard theory is that economic growth is independent of energy use, so energy consumption is a consequence but not a cause of growth. Some argue also that economic growth is actually a prerequisite for environmental protection, both because the latter is a ‘superior’ good – i.e. a luxury – desired mainly by the rich, and because advanced technology and wealth are needed for purposes of both prevention and abatement of environmental damage. On the other hand, there is much evidence that growth along the historical trajectory itself is a primary cause of pollution and environmental degradation. More realistic techno-economic models are badly needed.

Keywords: Energy, economic growth, neoclassical economic paradigm, exergy, useful work, energy return on investment, GDP.

______ * Robert U. Ayres, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. E-mail: [email protected]

F. Barbir and S. Ulgiati (eds.), Sustainable Energy Production and Consumption. © Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008

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1. Background and Context The natural environment is increasingly threatened by land-use changes and waste products associated with industrial activity and consumption. World population is growing. People must be fed, clothed and housed. Poverty is still widespread. Yet even the poorest and remotest in the “global village” now aspire to middle class lifestyles now enjoyed by Americans, Europeans and Japanese. But those lifestyles involve massive extraction, processing and conversion of natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable, into ‘goods’ that – for the most part – soon become wastes and pollutants. It is now recognized that waste emissions and pollutants constitute a problem because the use of the environment for disposal purposes is largely free to the polluter, although costly to society as a whole. Hence these social costs are externalities, not automatically built into the price of manufactured goods and services. Nevertheless, environmental problems and unpaid social costs associated with all materials/energy intensive activities have already created political pressures in some countries, at least, to ‘internalize’ such externalities. Materials and fuels that are extracted from the natural environment must be physically embodied in the ‘anthropo-sphere’ (as structures or durable goods) or they must be discarded again as waste residuals (Ayres and Kneese, 1969). Wastes and pollutants far outweigh ‘permanent’ additions to the built environment. Combustion products – especially CO2) – are accumulating in the atmosphere. The pre-industrial level of 280 ppm has risen to 360 ppm and will continue to rise to at least 450 ppm, and probably 550 ppm regardless of what countermeasures (if any) are put in place. In addition to carbon, oxides of sulfur and nitrogen are also converted to acids that are precipitated on land and sea, shifting the historic balance between acidity and alkalinity. Acidification has (literally) incalculable long-term ecological consequences. It was thought a few years ago that the availability of “low entropy” exhaustible resources – such as mineral ores and fossil fuels – would constitute near-term, as well as ultimate limits to economic growth. The economist Nicolas Georgescu-Roegen was the best-known advocate of this ‘entropic’ view (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971). The combined impact of resource exhaustion and environmental pollution was emphasized in the famous Club of Rome Report (Forrester, 1971, 1975; Meadows et al., 1972). But mainstream economists took prompt exception to these pessimistic views, largely on the ground that the economic growth depends more on technological innovation and capital investment than on natural resources (Nordhaus, 1973a, b; Dasgupta and Heal, 1974; Solow, 1974a, b; Stiglitz, 1974). As regards the degree to which man-made capital and human technology can substitute for natural resources or natural capital, the debate continues to this day.


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However the debate is already becoming much more specific. In the past few years many petroleum geologists have become convinced that global output of petroleum (and of natural gas soon after) is about to peak, or may have peaked already. This geological scarcity, confronted by rising demand from China and India, and turmoil in the Middle East, is already reflected by rising prices, and more increases are sure to follow in time. The reality has been obscured up to now by sudden but unexplained increases in officially reported reserves in the Middle East in the late 1980s, and uncritical forecasts by Industry figures and overnment agencies (such as the IEA, the USGS and the US Department of Energy) as recently as 2004, suggesting that increasing global demand for the next two or three decades at least, could and would be met at stable prices (Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2004; International Energy Agency, 2004). These optimistic forecasts are strongly influenced by mainstream economists who still argue – as they did in their response to the Limits to Growth book – that there is plenty of oil in the ground and that rising prices will automatically trigger more discovery and more efficient methods of recovery. However, the evidence is increasingly against them. Most non-OPEC oil producing countries are now in decline and very few significant countries, mostly in the Middle East, claim to be able to increase output (Figure 1). Discovery peaked in the US in 1930 and globally in 1960. Total discoveries in a given year have not kept up with depletion since 1980 (except for two

Figure 1. Oil production by major producing countries

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years, 1982 and 1992) and the ratio of discovery to depletion is continuously declining as shown in Figure 2. An influential oil consultancy, WoodMacKenzie, noted in 2004 that oil companies were discovering an average of 20 million barrels/day, while global consumption was up to 75 million barrels/day. The average size of new discoveries has fallen precipitously since the year 2000 although this may be partly due to the war in Iraq. So-called ‘proved resources’ (90% certain) are still increasing (barely) because formerly ‘proved and probable’ resources (50% certain) are being converted to ‘proved’ as existing fields are fully explored. But the latter category is the one that best predicts future supplies – and the two curves are converging (Figure 3). Big publicly traded oil companies are showing increased reserves, but what they do not mention is that this appearance of growth is mostly from “drilling on Wall Street” – i.e. buying existing smaller companies – rather than drilling in the earth. (Because share values supposedly reflect reserves, companies that did not adopt this strategy, like Shell, have faced strong pressures to meddle with their reserve statistics in order to reassure stockholders). The brutal facts are that new ‘oil provinces’ are not being discovered, no ‘super-giant’ field has been discovered since the Alaska North Coast, the North Sea has passed its peak and the western oil companies are now mostly frozen out of the only regions where significantly more oil might be found.1 2. The Neoclassical Economic Paradigm The economic implications of energy shortages in general, and petroleum in particular, are not well understood. The problem is, at bottom, that neoclassical economists still rely on a theory of economic growth that is based on productive capital stock, plus natural growth of the human labor force and exogenous technological progress. Capital stock was generally assumed to grow in proportion to investment, allowing for depreciation, although the underlying investment and depreciation (lifetime) data from which this number might be calculated are extremely scarce and not very reliable. Despite the difficulty of measuring investment (or savings), some economists have worried since the 1880s that people – and societies – might invest too little because of a tendency to discount the future. This phenomenon is known as myopia, which is another word for short-sightedness. In 1920 Pigoumade the idea more precise (Pigou, 1920). He postulated that the rate of capitalinvestment would be insufficient to allow for future consumption, because

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The best source on all this is (Strahan, 2007). For the geological background see (Campbell, 1997, 2003; Campbell and Laherrčre, 1998; Deffeyes, 2001).


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Figure 2. Global oil discoveries minus global oil consumption 1965–2003 (Heinberg, 2004)

Figure 3. The wrong kind of shortage (Strahan, 2007)

of discounting. In 1928 Ramsey found a way to test the Pigou hypothesis (Ramsey, 1928). He worked out how much investment would be required each year to maximize the sum total of utility (equated with consumption) over a

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very long time.2 Ramsay’s optimal growth theory did seem to confirm Pigou’s myopia hypothesis. In the early postwar period the idea of optimal growth was briefly discarded, because it seemed to call for a central planner at a time when central planning was politically unacceptable in the West. However it was later revived when it was realized that optimality could be explained just as well, in principle, as a consequence of the “invisible hand” of the free market. It is a very seductive idea. Today, most academic economic theorists still assume that a free market economy is always in equilibrium and always on an optimal growth path, except when there is governmental intervention. This assumption led naturally to the development of sophisticated mathematical tools to support the calculations, notably so-called “computable general equilibrium” (CGE) models. Unfortunately, there are strong theoretical as well as empirical reasons to believe that the economy is not in equilibrium and not on an optimal path. The theoretical reason is simple: if the economy really was in equilibrium and all technological choices were optimal, there would be no incentive to innovate, and no innovation. Yet, since Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 1912, 1934), innovation and technological progress are generally recognized to be the primary driver of economic growth (see discussion below). The economic explanation for the existence of non-optimal choices is that superior new technologies are frequently blocked by established incumbents enjoying monopoly-advantages resulting from increasing returns to adoption (knownas ‘path dependence’) (Arthur, 1994). There are numerous examples in the literature, of which the best known is probably the QWERTY keyboard (David, 1985) but the most significant may be the legal monopoly over electric power distribution currently enjoyed by the electric utilities (Casten and Ayres, 2007). In 1956 the assumption that only accumulations of capital and labor were needed to explain economic growth was put to an empirical test by several economists, notably Solow. It turned out that actual growth in the US economy (from 1909 through 1949) was many times greater than could be accounted for by the conventional theory. The unexplained difference, called the Solowresidual, was ascribed to ‘technical progress’. It is now known as “total factor productivity” or TFP (see Figure 4). However technical progress, or TFP could not be accounted for within the conventional theory. Something called ‘endogenous growth theory’ evolved in

______ 2 Ramsey did not believe in discounting and he found a clever way to avoid the need to introduce discounting into the calculation. But the details are irrelevant.


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Figure 4. The Solow residual

the 1980s as an attempt to explain TFP, usually in terms of ‘human capital’ or knowledge accumulation. But these theories are difficult to quantify because there is no single measure of human capital that can be justified. Technical progress was – and still is – assumed in all economic growth models to beexogenous, like ‘manna from heaven’. Since future growth is not explained,most economists and almost all economic forecasting models simply assume it will continue indefinitely. It follows from this assumption that “our grand-children will be much richer than we are”. A further logical implication, taken quite seriously by some conservatives, is that, it is irrational and unnecessary to invest now in (supposedly costly) environmental abatement policies. The late Julian Simon and recent Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling (of the Copenhagen Consensus) espoused this view, which has been strongly supported by The Economist magazine. Some have carried the logic even further, arguing that “it would be “like the poor subsidizing the rich”. My view is that economists should refrain from offering strong policy advice based on theories with simplistic and questionable assumptions and a weak empirical base. 3. The Role of Energy in the Neoclassical Paradigm As already mentioned, the standard neo-classical paradigm also assumes that energy demand is driven by this unexplained growth, whereas energy consumption (or demand) plays no role as a driver of growth. Yet simple logic

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suggests that there is a positive feedback between increasing consumption, investment, economies of scale, economies due to experience, lower costs, lower prices and – again – increasing consumption. In fact, the first industrial revolution in the 18th century was unquestionably a direct consequence of the development of the steam engine and its early applications to coal mining, iron smelting and transportation.3 The effect was to initiate a positive feedback loop such that steam power applied to coal mining cut coal energy – and power – costs and led to declining manufacturing costs and prices. These, in turn, cut the cost of coal and iron further and thus stimulated consumer demand and exports (Figure 5).

Figure 5. The feedback loop (simple Salter cycle)

But neoclassical growth theory does not incorporate this feedback mechanism because it does not incorporate any materials or energy conversion relationships. What this means in simple terms is that – according to the accepted neo-classical growth theory – it would be possible to cut fossil energy consumption – and pollution – without affecting economic growth. In fact most environmental economists, having been brought up in the standard growth paradigm, believe that the solution to the emissions problems associated with fossil fuel consumption is, ipso facto, to raise the price of energy, either by taxing carbon, or by some other equivalent device. Their mantra is“get the

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Newcomen’s first practical steam engines were designed to pump water from flooded coal mines, thus replacing expensive horses (which had to be fed) and cutting the cost of coal. One of the first Watt & Boulton steam engines was used to drive an air pump (bellows) for a blast furnace, thus raising the operating temperature and cutting the cost of iron.


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prices right”. Then, by substituting an energy tax or a carbon tax for other taxes, everything else is supposed to resolve itself painlessly.4 However the fundamental problem with the neoclassical view is that it fails to recognize that energy, as much as capital or labor, is an essential resource for which there is no substitute. No matter how small the cost of energy might be in relation to the economy as a whole, the economic impact of a scarcity would be much greater than its cost share. To make this point clear, consider that would happen if petroleum products suddenly became unavailable. The farm machines would stop in their tracks. Farm products (if any could still be planted and harvested) would remain on the farm, without trucks or diesel-electric ocomotives to move them to cities or ports. Any that got as far as the food processors would be undeliverable to shops. And so forth. In fact most transportation activities would stop, except for electric trains or subways that use nuclear power, i.e. that do not depend on power from steamelectric generating stations that burn fossil fuels. Of course, virtually all personal travel would also cease and the manu-facturers of autos and trucks – if they could still operate – would have no markets. The point is, the whole economy would come to a halt. This seems – indeed it is – inconsistent with the neoclassical assumption that energy consumption, or its absence, don’t affect GDP, or GDP growth.5 As noted above, the industrial revolution began with the substitution of steam-powered pumps for horse-drawn pumps in coal mines. In due course, steam powered locomotives replaced horse-drawn canal barges and horsedrawn carriages on roads for passengers and goods. Steam-powered ships soon replaced sailing ships for overseas passenger and goods transportation. The advent of the internal combustion engine and electric power only made the

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For instance, see the book by Weizsaecker and Jesinghous (von Weizsaecker and Jesinghaus, 1992). James Robertson of the New Economics Foundation says “...replacing taxes on employment, incomes and profits ...with taxes on energy use... can yield a threefold dividend: better overall national economic performance; higher levels of employment; and a cleaner environment” quoted in (Anonymous, 2007). The Clinton Administration proposed such a tax, which was fiercely opposed by Republicans as well as some Democrats. Opponents argued that the tax would be economically harmful, inflationary, and regressive, as well as regionally inequitable (Moore, 1993). Some of the more arcane economic issues are discussed in (Bovenberg and de Mooi, 1994; Fullerton and Metcalf, 2001, 1998; Bovenberg and Goulder, 2001). 5 The inconsistency is eliminated in the Ayres-Warr papers cited at the end of the previous section. In brief, the standard theorem that each factor is paid in proportion to its productivity is only true for a single sector model in equilibrium. It does not apply to a multi-sector model. But as soon as an energy sector is identified and payments to it are singled out, the theorem becomes inapplicable. In that case the productivity of each factor must be determined econometrically by finding the marginal productivity parameter or function that gives the best fit. This is what we did.

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substitution of machines for animal and human muscles more rapid. At the meta-level, what happened was that energy (exergy) from fossil fuels replaced energy (Calories) from agricultural products, converted to useful work by animal muscles. Actually the removal of horses and mules from the work-force released land no longer needed to feed them, while the fossil-fuel guzzling machines that replaced them were so much more efficient that large numbers of human laborers were released to move to the cities where they got jobs in factories. This was the primary “engine of growth” in the 19th century US and Europe. It is still applicable in China, India and elsewhere. At the end of the 19th century the steam engine was largely replaced by the more efficient internal combustion engine (ICE), except when steam turbines were was used to drive ships or to generate electric power. In general, it can be said that ‘useful work’ performed by human and animal muscles has been and still is being replaced by useful work performed by machines and chemicals. A brief digression on the “standard” factors of production, capital and (human) labor seems appropriate here. It is worth pointing out, first, that humans no longer perform much ‘work’ in the thermodynamic sense discussed in the next section, although lifting and carrying are still elements of some jobs. Humans contribute to the economic process primarily in a variety of other ways involving hand-eye coordination, judgment, calculation, creativity and empathy. The term ‘labor’ encompasses all of these. The usual measure of labor is man-hours. The term ‘capital’, is generally understood to include machines and other productive equipment, plus infrastructure, but not private housing or durable consumer goods (cars, kitchen appliances, etc.). There is no direct way to measure capital. In economics the most widely used method is known as “perpetual inventory” which starts from an assessment of the total value of capital in some early year and modifies it year-by-year by adding new investment while subtracting depreciation. Of course, depreciation is also not measured directly, so it is calculated by assuming useful lifetimes for different classes of capital, notably machines and structures. The assumed lifetimes are somewhat arbitrary and, in the case of infrastructure, may be significantly too short, resulting in an under-estimate of the capital stock. It is not worthwhile exhibiting capital and labor data for four countries in this short paper, but Figure 6 illustrates some of the difficulties involved. In particular it will be seen that, according to the standard source of historical economic data, the productivity of capital (Y/K) for Japan, and the UK (and probably Austria) were apparently much higher than for the US, during the first half of the 20th century. Yet this seems very unlikely and it is certainly


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Figure 6. Capital productivity (Y/K) Austria, Japan, UK and US: 1900–2005

hard to explain. A possible explanation is that the capital stocks for the UK and Japan were seriously underestimated by the perpetual inventory methodology because much of the industrial infrastructure in those two countries (roads, canals, harbors) was older and had been depreciated to zero by the “lifetime” assumption whereas in 1900 the US infrastructure was relatively new. 4. Exergy, Power and Work in the Economy The term ‘work’, introduced above, is a standard thermodynamic concept, defined in any textbook. The term ‘useful’ is intended to distinguish between work deliberately applied to a function, such as transport or electric power generation, and (non-useful) work that is wasted as friction or some other loss mechanism. Of course, work is performed by utilizing energy (actually exergy) in some machine or process. Exergy inputs (the sum of all fossil fuels consumed plus nuclear heat and so-called ‘renewables’ (including agricultural products) are displayed in Figure 7a, b. Crude exergy inputs, such as coal or flowing water, are converted to useful work in machines or process equipment, such as steam engines or metallurgical processes. The calculations of actual work performed in an economy are not easy, but they have been done since 1900 for the US (Ayres et al., 2003) and more recently for Japan, the UK and Austria (unpublished). The results are

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Figure 7a, b. Exergy inputs for Austria, Japan, UK and US; (a) in exajoules; (b) as index (index in 1900 = 1)

shown in Figure 8a, b. The ratio of useful work (the output) to exergy (the input) is a measure of technology. Since the numerator and denominator both have the same units (energy), the ratio is a pure number that is always less than unity, i.e. efficiency. The calculated efficiency trends for the four countries are shown in Figure 9.


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Figure 8a, b. Useful Work in Austria, Japan, UK and US; (a) in exajoules; (b) as index (index in 1900 = 1)

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Figure 9. Aggregate efficiency, Austria, Japan, UK and US, 1900–2005

It is very tempting to interpret the efficiency variable as a proxy for ‘technological progress’ insofar as it applies to economic growth. There are several ways to do this, but the most straightforward is to introduce useful work as a third factor of production (along with capital and labor) using a traditionalproduction function like the Cobb-Douglas function, the CES function or amore flexible one, such as LINEX introduced by Kuemmel et al. (1985). It turns out that with this innovation it is possible to explain past economicgrowth for these countries with remarkable accuracy (Ayres and Warr, 2005) as shown in Figures 10a–d. It is possible to use the basic model to forecast future growth, by simply extrapolating the three inputs, labor, capital and useful work (Warr and Ayres, 2006). The details are too complex to describe here, but the results in the US case are worth showing (see Figure 11). This is a very shocking forecast since does not correspond to the usual assumption of perpetual growth. On the contrary, it illustrates the consequences of a slowdown in technical progress, as expressed in terms of the efficiency of conversion of exergy inputs to useful work outputs. Moreover, this model forecast does not reflect the possibility of resource scarcity (e.g. the “peak oil”; problem discussed in the first section). Nor does it reflect the likelihood that increasing pollution and climate change will have an adverse impact on agriculture and other sectors of the economy, and consequently on economic growth. I now return to the scarcity issue.


Figure 10a. GDP vs Model Fit for US

Figure 10b. GDP vs Model Fit for Japan

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Figure 10c. GDP vs Model Fit for UK

Figures 10d. GDP vs Model Fit for Austria


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Figure 11. Economic forecast from MEET-REXS

5. Productivity, EROI and the Technological Challenge After the “Oil Crisis” in 1973 some mainstream economists did try to introduce energy as a third factor of production.6 To do so, they estimated the total expenditures for primary energy (i.e. fossil fuels and hydro-power) in the US economy, which amounted to about 4% of all expenditures. On that basis it seemed natural to make the familiar ‘income allocation’ theorem which says that, in a single-sector, single product economy, in equilibrium, each factor of production is paid in proportion to its marginal productivity. Disregarding a few departures from reality, that theorem seems to imply that the marginal productivity of (primary) energy would be 0.04 (as compared with 0.7 for labor and 0.26 for capital). Using these numbers in a standard Cobb-Douglas production function it was easy to conclude – as some economists did in the 1970s – that energy didn’t really matter. What was ignored or not understood at the time is that primary energy sources (coal, oil, gas, etc.) are only the beginning of a chain of conversions yielding ‘useful work’ which, in turn, is utilized – end needed – by all other productive sectors. When all of these conversions are taken into account the costs of useful work are obviously much greater than the 4% attributed to

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Some even went further and introduced a fourth factor, materials, resulting in the so-called KLEM family of production functions. However it is fairly easy to show that all material inputs can be represented as exergy inputs and thus combined with fuels and other energy sources. As it happens, the exergy contributions from all materials (except biomass) are very small in comparison and can be neglected to first order.

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primary fuels. Unfortunately a direct calculation of these costs is difficult or impossible. However, one can get a sense of the marginal importance of useful work as compared to labor and capital, by calculating the so-called output elasticity (which is the ratio of the marginal productivity of each factor to the total productivity of that factor). Total productivities of the various factors, in monetary terms, are ratios of output to input. Marginal productivities are rates of change of output with respect to a change in the input. A very small elasticcity implies a very small marginal productivity, and vice versa. Now consider the example mentioned previously, namely a sudden disappearance of petroleum. Obviously this is not a realistic worry; the “end of oil” is not an immediate threat. But the halfway point, corresponding to peak output, is just around the corner i.e. probably 5–15 years in the future. The mere expectation will drive oil prices up further. Assuming a shooting war for control over the last of the oil reserves can be avoided – by no means certain – this price rise will drive the transition to an economy with reduced supplies and ever-increasing prices of petroleum products (not to mention natural gas). There will be two important consequences. The immediate impact of oil scarcity (or exergy scarcity in general) will be to make materials and fossil energy producers pay more for petroleum products. Thus the more oilintensive products (such as motor fuel) will become more costly to users than less oil-intensive products such as electricity or services such as TV, or personal services such as haircuts. As petroleum prices rise there will be some substitution of natural gas, or coal for petroleum, causing the prices of gas and coal to rise also. This direct substitution is obviously possible where oil has been used for industrial or domestic heating and natural gas is available. Natural gas can be used (and is already being used) for buses and other vehicles, although the need for compression is a problem. It is also possible to substitute coal for oil, wherever heavy oil has been used for electric power generation. Coal can be gasified quite easily by steam reforming (in fact the technology is old and has been phased out as natural gas became available). Coal can also be converted to liquids as was done in Germany during WW II and is still being done in South Africa. Finally, there is the possibility of producing hydrogen (from gas or coal) as a replacement for liquid fuels in fuel cell vehicles. However, all of these fuel substitution possibilities with the possible exception of fuel cells are less efficient than the current system. The next predictable consequence of rising prices will be to encourage users to be more efficient in their use of the more oil intensive products, and to seek alternatives where possible. Some of these efficiency gains will be achieved by being smarter, perhaps by utilizing information technology (IT) more intensively. But most of these efficiency gains in energy (oil) productivity must be achieved – in effect – by substituting labor or capital for


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oil in the production system. Turning off lights, turning down the thermostat in winter or turning it up in summer, using public transportation instead of private cars and insulating houses to reduce the need for fuel oil would all be examples. But energy conservation by end-users has a downside for the economy in the form of reduced consumption of goods and reduced economies of scale for the mass producers of consumer products. This would be reflected in higher prices and further reduced demand, as the ‘feedback loop’ operates in reverse. Thus, reduced demand is generally regarded as desirable by environmentalists – consider the current debate on “sufficiency” – but it has a negative impact on economic growth. Other indirect gains in resource productivity can and eventually will be achieved by extending the useful life of material products by increasing re-use, repair, renovation, re-manufacturing and recycling. Again, these changes will cut demand for new products, with adverse effects on economies of scale etc. Another problem also arises. Petro-optimists, mainly economists, count on the rapid introduction of alternatives to conventional oil, whether from ‘heavy oil’, tar sands, shale, coal liquefaction or bio-fuels, in response to rising prices. Some insist that at a high enough price there is an ‘ocean of oil’ e.g. (Odell, 1983). One can argue about the rate at which these substitutes can be implemented, as many do e.g. (Strahan, 2007). But a more fundamental constraint arises from the declining energy return on investment (EROI) in alternative sources of oil, or other energy sources per se. The problem, in a few words, is that some energy (exergy) and useful work are needed to extract and process either fossil or renewable forms, and this fraction is growing. As long as the EROI was very large, earlier in the 20th century, only a small fraction – as little as 1% – of the gross output was needed to power the chain of extraction and conversion processes. This means that the net output available useful energy too industrial and other consumers is nearly as great as the gross output of primary energy as fossil fuels. However, this ideal situation is abnormal. It existed in the US for a century, more or less, from the discovery of huge amounts of easily extracted oil (relative to current demand) in Pennsylvania and later in Texas and the Persian Gulf. The huge surplus of available exergy in convenient liquid form that existed in those distant days encouraged the creation of several new industries (automotive vehicles and aircraft), as well as highways, industrialized agriculture, and petrochemicals, among others. But as the discovery rate has slowed (as previously shown in Figure 2) the energy and other costs of replacing oil that has already been consumed are now rising fast. The EROI of oil discovered in the 1930s and 1940s was above 100, but for the oil produced in the 1970s it has been estimated as 23, while for new oil discovered in that decade it was only 8 (Cleveland et al., 1984). This was still OK since only 12% of the oil discovered than was needed to discover,

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drill, refine and distribute it. But the EROI for domestic oil currently being produced is estimated as 15 while the EROI for new domestic discoveries since 2000 is probably no more than 10, and possibly much less. What of the possible substitutes for conventional oil? The estimates (from life cycle studies) vary, but they are consistently lower (see Cleveland et al., 1984). For example the EROI for coal liquefaction by some processes is less than unity, meaning that more energy is needed than would be produced. The upper estimate is around 8. The EROI for tar sands is about 4; for oil shale it would almost certainly be less, though reliable estimates are unavailable. Ethanol from corn is a favorite of the US administration, since it seems to benefit politically influential farmers. A number of studies have been conducted, based on a variety of assumptions about process and upstream energy requirements. Here it is important to distinguish returns on renewable energy requirements from returns on non-renewables. Five out of six studies on reviewed showed positive total EROI values ranging between 1.29 and 1.65, although the returns on non-renewables (oil) were significantly higher, in the neighborhood of 4.7 The processes in question are already operational on a large scale and are unlikely to improve dramatically in the future. Studies of the energy returns on ethanol from cellulose, a process that is not yet industrialized, yields EROI estimates of 4.4–4.61, again disregarding the (same) outlier (Hammerschlag, 2006). The EROI for ethanol from sugarcane (Brazil) appears to be around 4. All of these examples are inherently more labor-intensive than the present mix of economic activities. At first glance that appears to be very desirable from the standpoint of reducing unemployment. But increased labor intensity reduces labor productivity, ceteris paribus. Most important, however, lower EROI implies either greater intermediate consumption of exergy within the exergy industry itself, or – if gross output is held constant – less surplus available for other consumers. To be sure, EROI is not a constant of nature. These ratios are measures of the state of technology, but they also imply limits. Improved processes can be developed in some cases. For instance, it is possible to imagine a breakthrough that would cut the energy required to process tar sands or shale by – say – a factor of two, or even three. But even such a remarkable breakthrough, probably not in the cards, would not really affect the overall conclusion that much more energy will be needed within the petroleum products sector itself, than is currently the case. That will leave less surplus for downstream consumers. Of course, this result is likely to be achieved through sharply higher

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The outlier was a study by Pimentel and Patzek that has been widely cited by critics of the corn ethanol program, but which incorporates far more pessimistic assumptions than any of the others (Hammerschlag, 2006).


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prices and lower overall consumption. That, in turn, is a recipe for economic recession, or depression. In conclusion, the “growth engine”, based on declining costs and prices of work, that has functioned for 200 years, is sure to slow down in coming years. In fact, it is very likely to go into reverse, other factors remaining unchanged.

References Anonymous. 2007. Energy tax. http://home.clara.net/heurika/gaia/energy2.htm. Accessed July 3 2007. Arthur, B. W. 1994. Increasing returns and path dependence in the economy. In Economics, Cognition and Society, T. Kuran (ed.). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. Ayres, R. U. and A. V. Kneese. 1969. Production, consumption and externalities. American Economic Review LIX(3): 282–296. Ayres, R. U. and B. Warr. 2005. Accounting for growth: The role of physical work. Structural Change & Economic Dynamics 16(2): 181–209. Ayres, R. U., L. W. Ayres, and B. Warr. 2003. Exergy, power and work in the US economy, 1900–1998. Energy 28(3): 219–273. Bovenberg, A. L. and R. de Mooi. 1994. Environmental levies and distortionary taxation. American Economic Review 94: 1085–1089. Bovenberg, A. L. and L. H. Goulder. 2001. Neutralizing the adverse industry impacts of CO2 abatement policies: What does it cost? In Behavioral and Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy, C. Cararro and G. Metcalf (eds.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Campbell, C. J. 1997. The Coming Oil Crisis. Brentwood, UK: Multi-Science Publishing and Petroconsultants. Campbell, C. J. 2003. The Essence of Oil and Gas Depletion: Collected Papers and Excerpts. Bretwood, UK: Multi-Science Publishing. Campbell, C. J. and J. H. Laherrčre. 1998. The end of cheap oil. Scientific American 278(3): 60– 65. Casten, T. R. and R. U. Ayres. 2007. Energy myth #8: The US energy system is environmentally and economically optimal. In Energy and Society: Twelve Myths, B. Sovacool and M. Brown (eds.). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer. Cleveland, C. J., R. Costanza, C. A. S. Hall, and R. K. Kaufmann. 1984. Energy and the US economy: A biophysical perspective. Science 255: 890–897. Dasgupta, P. and G. Heal. 1974. The optimal depletion of exhaustible resources. Paper presented at Symposium on the Economics of Exhaustible Resources. David, P. A. 1985. CLIO and the economics of QWERTY. American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 75: 332–337.

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Deffeyes, K. S. 2001. Hubbert’s Peak. Hardcover ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Energy Information Administration (EIA). 2004. World Energy Outlook 2003. Washington DC: United States Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. Forrester, J. W. 1971. World Dynamics. Cambridge, MA: Wright-Allen. Forrester, J. W. 1975. New perspectives for growth over the next thirty years. Paper presented at Conference on Limits to Growth ’75, October 20, Houston, TX. Fullerton, D. and G. Metcalf. 1998. Environmental taxes and the double-dividend hypothesis: Did you really expect someething for nothing? Chicago-Kent Law Review 73(1): 221–256. Fullerton, D. and G. Metcalf. 2001. Environmental controls, scarcity rents and pre-existing distortions. Journal of Public Economics 80(2): 249–267. Georgescu-Roegen, N. 1971. The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hammerschlag, R. 2006. Ethanol’s return on investment: A survey of the literature 1900-present. Environmental Science and Technology 40(6): 1744–1750. Heinberg, R. 2004. Powerdown: Options and Actions for a Post-carbon World. Gabriola Island, B.C., Canada: New Society. International Energy Agency. 2004. World Energy Outlook 2004. Paris: OECD/IEA. Kuemmel, R., W. Strassl, A. Gossner, and W. Eichhorn. 1985. Technical progress and energy dependent production functions. Journal of Economics 45(3): 285–311. Meadows, D. L., D. H. Meadows, J. Randers, and W. I. Behrens. 1972. The Limits to Growth, Club of Rome Reports. New York: Universe Books. Moore, S. 1993. Federal Budget Issue: Do We Need an Energy Tax? 127. Dallas TX: National Center for Policy Analysis. Nordhaus, W. D. 1973a. The allocation of energy resources. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 3: 529–570. Nordhaus, W. D. 1973b. World dynamics: Measurement without data. Economic Journal 83: 1156–1183. Odell, P. R. 1983. Oil and World Power. 7th ed. New York: Penguin. Pigou, A. C. 1920. The Economics of Welfare. 1st ed. London: Macmillan. Ramsey, F. P. 1928. A mathematical theory of saving. Economic Journal 38(152): 543–559. Schumpeter, J. A. 1912. Theorie der Wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungen. Leipzig, Germany: Duncker and Humboldt. Schumpeter, J. A. 1934. Theory of Economic Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Solow, R. M. 1974a. Intergenerational equity and exhaustible resources. Review of Economic Studies 41: 29–45. Solow, R. M. 1974b. The economics of resources or the resources of economics. American Economic Review 64(2): 1–14. Stiglitz, J. 1974. Growth with exhaustible natural resources: Efficient and optimal growth paths. Review of Economic Studies 41: 123–137.


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Strahan, D. 2007. The Last Oil Shock. London: John Murray. Von Weizsaecker, E. U. and J. Jesinghaus. 1992. Ecological Tax Reform: A Policy Proposal for Sustained Development. London: Zed Books. Warr, B. and R. U. Ayres. 2006. The MEET-REXS model. Structural Change & Economic Dynamics 17: 329–378.

WIN-WIN STRATEGIES FOR TACKLING OIL AND NATURAL GAS CONSTRAINTS WHILE EXPANDING RENEWABLE ENERGY USE

MICHAEL JEFFERSON* Chairman, Policies Committee, World Renewable Energy Network & Congresses, UK

Abstract: Scenarios modelling possible World energy futures out to the year 2100 take little or no account of the problems of oil and natural gas resource constraints while either making very generalised assumptions about what contribution renewable energy could make. Here a more focussed view is taken both of the recoverable oil and natural gas constraints and what determined efforts to expand the larger potential renewable energy sources – especially concentrating solar power (CSP) – could achieve. Other parameters, such as World population projections and economic growth assumptions have a part to play, but taking energy resources on the one hand and the potential for energy efficiency improvements on the other it is conceivable that by 2100 World primary energy use for a population of around 9 billion could be about the current per capita average in Western Europe. There would need to be some “convergence and contraction” of per capita energy use for reasons of equity. The most significant result could be World primary energy demand no more than double current levels but with renewable energy (excluding hydro) accounting for about 75% of the supply by 2100. Although such a scenario implies cumulative carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use somewhat in excess of 1,000 GtC 2005–2100, this is a figure lower than implied even by the IPCC’s SRES B family of scenarios – especially given the higher (UN medium projection) World population trajectory assumed here. Strategies for promoting these outcomes can rationally be pursued simultaneously by oil and natural gas producers and exporters; by oil and gas importers; and by those concerned

______ * Michael Jeffereson, Chairman, Policies Committee, World Renewable Energy Network & Congresses, Woodside House, Melchbourne, Bedfordshire, MK44 1BB, UK. E-mail: [email protected]


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to expand the use of renewable energy forms. For the World’s energy consumers a satisfactory level of energy service would be achieved for all at a feasible environmental cost.

Keywords: Fossil fuels, recoverable resources, reserves, depletion, energy return on investment (EROI), carbon dioxide emissions, international co-operation.

1. Background The share of the fossil fuels in World primary energy use has been rising so far this century, from almost 81% in 2000 to almost 82% in 2006. The share of coal has risen from 23.6% to 26.5% in the same period, and the share of natural gas has been stable at around 22%. The contribution of oil is the only fossil fuel that has fallen in its share, from 35.4% to 33.3%, although the volume of oil used has risen 10%. Oil continues to supply 33% of the World’s primary energy use and therefore, with natural gas, these two fuels supplied 55% of the World’s primary energy fuel mix in 2006. So far, the World has used about 800 billion barrels of conventional oil, out of a recoverable resource base very likely to be about 2 trillion barrels (indicating remaining recoverable resources of conventional oil in the region of 1.2 trillion barrels). Some higher estimates of recoverable conventional oil exist (there are a few estimates clustered around 3 trillion barrels, and a couple of extremely high estimates around 4 trillion barrels – including the US Geological Survey’s ‘High’). Proved World conventional oil reserves are currently also estimated to be 1.2 trillion barrels, but there are concerns that these reserves estimates are overstated by at least 12.5% (that is, by some 150 billion barrels). The fundamental concern about recoverable conventional oil resources is that if the “Reference Scenarios” of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the US Energy Information Administration (US EIA) are broadly in line with the eventual outcome, then the World will use about 900 billion barrels of conventional oil between 2006 and 2030. If the conventional oil resource base is about 2 trillion barrels then conventional oil resources will be exhausted by the early 2030s. Some may consider these scenarios some-what overstate the likely outcome in terms of oil, and total primary energy, use. The IEA has been severely criticised in some quarters for overstating World primary energy demand to 2030 and understating the role renewable energy forms could play within this period. Others may consider that recoverable conventional oil resources are more likely to be nearer 3 trillion barrels than 2 trillion. But these alternative views are unlikely to

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delay the outcome by much more than a decade. As energy returns on investment (EROI) become more difficult to achieve from conventional and non-conventional oil and natural gas exploitation so the perceived benefits of the more economically rational and technologically feasible will become ever more apparent. World natural gas use more than doubled between 1980 and 2006, from 1,237 Mtoe (million tonnes oil equivalent) to 2,575 Mtoe (18.9 billion boe – barrels of oil equivalent).1 The World’s recoverable conventional gas resources are estimated at about 2 trillion boe, of which some 550 billion boe have already been used. The IEA and the US EIA “Reference Scenarios” anticipate World conventional natural gas use will grow 2% per annum to 2030, a cumulative use of nearly 570 billion boe. Thus by 2030 nearly 60% of the World’s recoverable conventional natural gas resources are likely to have been depleted. As already suggested, these scenario projections may well be on the high side. Rising fossil fuel prices, especially for oil and gas, may moderate the rise in demand for their products. Politically-motivated supply disruptions may also cause price hikes for those fuels where import dependency is high, and accelerate the bringing on stream of alternative fuels. OECD oil import dependency was 70% in the 1970s, fell to 50–55% in the 1980s, but has since risen to over 60%. By 2030 it is expected to be around 85%. The oil import dependency of the USA is expected to be over 75% by 2030, and the European Union’s (EU) over 95%. US conventional natural gas import dependency is rising rapidly. From 10% in 2000, it is expected to exceed 35% by 2010, and 45% by 2020. EU-15 (for the EU-27 the figures are higher) natural gas import dependency was 40% in 2000, and is expected to rise to more than 60% by 2010. By 2020 the import dependency is expected to exceed 80%. Although recoverable coal resources and their use is not a main topic of this paper, a few comments may be made for the sake of completeness. World coal use rose by nearly 50% between 1980 and 2006; by 38% between 1990 and 2006; and between 2000 and 2006 by a massive 31%. China’s use of coal alone accounted for 72% of the latter figure (524 Mtoe of 726 Mtoe). In 2006 China accounted for almost 40% of the World’s coal production, and with 532 large coal-fired power stations being built under the current five-year plan coal use is expected to continue expanding rapidly for several years.2

______ 1

1 metric tonne of crude oil = 7.33 barrels. 1 billion cubic metres of natural gas = 6.29 million barrels of oil equivalent. 1 metric tonne of oil equivalent = 1.5 tonnes hard coal/3 tonnes lignite. For carbon dioxide emissions 1 GtC (1 billion tonnes elemental carbon) = 3.67 GtCO2. 2 China accounted for 19.5% of the World’s carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use in 2006, in contrast to the USA’s share of 21.4%. Much of the former’s recent increase was propelled by its coal use. However, if cement manufacture is included, amounting to 4%

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At current rates of coal use, World recoverable resources of anthracite and bituminous coal can provide sufficient for nearly 90 years; subbituminous coal and lignite for a further 75 years. But, as will be explained later, if there were to be a major switch to coal in the future then, quite apart from the environmental implications and associated costs, the recoverable resource base could be exhausted by 2100. Other major factors that will influence future energy use include population change, economic and technological developments, and climatic change. Population change is of particular importance. Taking the UN’s medium variant (2006 projection), World population is expected to rise from 6.6 billion currently to over 8.3 billion in 2030, and to nearly 9.2 billion in 2050 (this sort of projection usually assumes World population reaches a maximum around 2075, and then falls slightly). The lowest projections suggest World population falls from a peak of around 7.5 billion before 2050 to about 5.5 billion by 2100; the highest projects rises to 14 billion and beyond after 2100. The UN’s medium variant has been taken here. Europe’s population is projected to decline from 730 million now to 707 million in 2030, and to 664 million in 2050. North America’s population is projected to rise from 335 million now (USA 302 million) to 664 million by 2050. Asia’s population is projected to rise from 4 billion now to nearly 5.3 billion in 2050. And Africa’s population is projected to have risen from 950 million now to 2 billion by 2050. Perhaps more significant are the population density projections, especially once the potential impacts of global climatic change with temperature changes in excess of 2°C are factored in (along with more heat waves, droughts, heavy precipitation events, and sea level rises), and their strong incidence in the tropics and near tropics. World population density is currently around 50 persons per square kilometre, with Europe at 32 and North America at 15. In Asia, where the population is projected to rise by a third by 2050, population density is already 125 and is estimated to rise to 165 by 2050. In Africa, where the population is expected to more than double by 2050, population density is currently 31 and is projected to rise to 66 by 2050. Increasing population density, harsher climatic conditions, and slow economic progress are likely to combine to build up huge pressures for outward migration from many of the poorest countries of the World – and are likely in turn to build up strong pressure to counter the resulting immiof the World’s annual anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide, then China (accounting for around 44% of the World’s total carbon dioxide emissions from this source) surpassed the USA in 2006. The USA has 4.5% of the World’s population; China has 20%. Per capita CO2 emissions are about: 20 metric tonnes for the USA; China 5 tonnes; EU-15 10 tonnes. For further information see Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency at: http:// www.mnp.nl/ This paper also draws on BP’s energy and carbon dioxide emissions data (June, 2007).

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gration. As one book put it, writing from the futuristic perspective of 2050: “Increasingly desperate attempts have been made by people in poorer countries to migrate to North America and Western Europe over the past 50 years. At least 130 million have attempted to enter North America and over 60 million Western Europe, without success. Both those who have succeeded in migrating – more often on economic grounds rather than for political asylum reasons – and the much larger who have failed, have caused a siege mentality to emerge in the destination countries. Violent means are now routinely used to halt and deter would-be immigrants” (Jefferson, 2001). There are also, of course, the immediate pressures on the poorer peoples of the World which arise from their dependency on fuel wood, and on agricultural and animal wastes. In sub-Saharan Africa 575 million people are still reliant on traditional biomass, 76% of the total population, of which 93% are rural dwellers and 58% urban dwellers. In India, 725 million people are reliant on traditional biomass (about 65% of the total population), of which 86% are rural dwellers and 23% urban. China has some 450 million people reliant on traditional biomass, Indonesia 150 million, and in the rest of Asia there are around 475 million people in a similar situation. In sub-Saharan Africa over 545 million people do not have access to electricity (58% of rural dwellers, 8% of urban dwellers); in Asia 930 million are without (over 700 million of them in South Asia, where only 52% of the population has access). Even in the Middle East over 40 million people do not have access to electricity. In short, there are grave inequities in access to modern energy services between regions and countries, as well as within countries. This is reflected in primary energy use per head. If in the USA this is taken to represent 10, then in Europe the average is 4.1 (Austria and Germany = 5; Italy = 4.5; Sweden 7.6; Belgium = 8; UK = 4.9). In Russia and Eurasia the figure is 5; in the Middle East 3.6 (but with the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait all well above the US figure); and Asia and Oceania 1.2 (of which China is 1.7). At the bottom of this league table is Africa, with an average of 0.5, but where 20 countries achieve under 0.15. These variations are reflected in data on carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use, especially when considered on a per capita basis. World average per capita CO2 emissions are about 4.25 metric tonnes, and we have noted the USA figure is around 20 tonnes. In the Western hemisphere Canada is 18 tonnes, Mexico 11 and Brazil 1.85. In Europe Luxembourg is the highest at 26 tonnes. The Netherlands is high at 16 tonnes; Belgium is also high at 14.5. Finland is 12 tonnes; Germany 10.5 tonnes; UK 9.5; Austria 8.5; Italy 8.4; Spain 9; France 7; and Sweden an impressively low 6.5. In Eurasia the figure averages 8.9 tonnes; the Middle East 7.3 (but

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UAE 58, Qatar 48, Bahrain 34, and Kuwait 32). In Africa the average is only 1.2 tonnes, and in Asia and Oceania 3 (of which China 5, Japan 10, Australia 19, Republic of Korea 10.5, Taiwan 13.8, New Zealand 9.5, Singapore 30, Thailand 13.7, and India 1.3). Clearly there will need to be “convergence and contraction” in the coming decades to reflect both improved material standards of living and equity, as well as reduced fossil fuel usage. There is no good reason why carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel cannot be reduced by the year 2100 to below 25% of current annual levels – say a maximum of 1.8 GtC. Current levels are around 7.2 GtC per year 2000–2005, according to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report. (IPCC, 2007a). This would imply annual coal use at no more than one-third of current levels, with remaining non-conventional oil and natural gas use contributing about 500 MtC, and 315 MtC, respectively, by 2100. The remaining primary energy supply will need to come, of course, from a range of renewable energy forms and – more controversially – from nuclear (preferably fusion, which has long remained an aspiration just a few decades out of reach). But ‘new’ forms of renewable energy (thus conventionally excluding hydro as well as traditional biomass) still only account for about 2.5% of World primary energy use. If modern biomass is deducted then ‘new’ renewables only account for about 0.55% (and this includes solar, wind, geothermal, tidal and ocean). Because of their low starting points, even 30% average annual increases – as achieved by wind and solar PV – have scarcely made their mark as yet. In many countries, in proportionate though not volume terms, renewable energy accounts for a lower share of electricity generation than it did 30 or 40 years ago. International Energy Association (IEA) Member countries got 24% of their electricity from renewable energy in 1970; but only 14% in 2006. This raises the question: if the primary rationale for the founding and continued existence of the IEA is to respond to energy security issues, why has there been this relative deterioration? Similar institutional questions are posed for the European Union and its Directives from Brussels. Having been in the vanguard of advocating measures to tackle global climatic change and expand renewable energy availability for over 15 years, there should surely be some dissatisfaction with performance in this field. Only two of the EU-15 countries have succeeded in reducing their carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use, and of these two only Germany has succeeded to a significant extent (although renewable energy still only accounts for 11% of its electricity generation, and Germany is still the second largest coal user in Europe, after Russia). The latest Eurostat data for the share of electricity generation provided by renewable energy became available in June, 2007, and actual figures go up to 2005. For the EU-15, renewable energy provided 12.9% of electricity

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generation in 1990, and 14.5% in 2005. Belgium’s share has risen from 1.1% in 1990 to 2.8% in 2005; Luxembourg from 2.1% to 3.2%. By 2005, the share of renewables had crept up to 4.3% in the UK; to 6.8% in Ireland; and to 7.5% in The Netherlands. Between 1990 and 2005 the share of renewable energy actually declined in Austria (from 65.4% to 57.9%). Other apparently strong performers – such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, Finland and Sweden – have changed little since 1990. The only apparent success is Denmark, where the renewables share rose from 2.4% to 28.2%. But even this is qualified by the fact that about three-quarters of Denmark’s electricity generated from renewables comes from wind energy and between 70% and 80% of this is exported – usually at a loss – mainly to Norway and Sweden (a small volume is also exported to Germany). These exports in turn substitute mainly for hydropower (and nuclear in Sweden’s case) thereby not reducing carbon dioxide emissions. What is needed is a greatly accelerated expansion of the availability of renewable energy. For this to occur on the scale required, and in a costeffective manner, focus needs to be on those forms of renewable energy with large volume potential, with sound energy input/output ratios, suited to local conditions and well-sited. This clearly implies that putting 1.5 kW wind turbines on chimney stacks in urban areas, or 125 m wind turbines in areas of relatively low average wind speeds, or solar panels on houses at latitudes over 50° N, are likely to be a waste of resources somewhere along the line, whatever the perversities of policy and interests of manufacturers or developers may be. Much the same can be said of modern biomass where conversion of grains or oils used in food is involved, and where there are pressures from the hungry, from lack of water availability and soil quality. This is a very different matter from converting agricultural – and other – wastes to energy. Drawing on the power of the Sun where its insolation is relatively high, roughly between latitude 40° N and the Tropic of Capricorn, is a huge opportunity for both centralised and decentralised energy systems. This paper focuses on the former, but decentralised uses of solar thermal and solar electric, as well as passive solar, should make a major contribution in the World’s “Sun Belt”. Three forms of renewable energy have the potential to provide very large amounts of energy. If harnessed successfully, they can provide well over two-thirds of the World’s primary energy before the end of this century. These are: concentrating solar power (CSP) drawing on the resource available in areas of relatively high solar insolation (say above 1,600 kWh/ m2/ year); devices drawing on the power of the oceans and near-shore tidal movements (but not tidal barrages, due to their severely adverse environmental impacts in most technically attractive locations); and offshore wind

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turbines, linked together over a wide area to gain the benefits of a range of wind conditions, thus offsetting the intermittency problem (e.g. as proposed for an area from the Western Approaches to the UK, round across the North Sea, and into the Baltic). In the final section of this paper the potential for CSP is explored in more detail. But first, in assessing the needs for renewable energy, the future availability of conventional and non-conventional oil and natural gas resources needs to be considered. 2. Oil and Natural Gas Availability In the previous section it was noted that recoverable conventional oil resources are probably of the order of 2 trillion barrels (but could be nearer 3 trillion), of which some 800 billion barrels have already been used. Proved World oil reserves remaining are ‘officially’ stated to be about 1.2 trillion barrels. In 2006 over 30 billion barrels were produced, and between 2006 and 2030 a number of “Reference Scenarios” suggest that a cumulative total of about 900 billion barrels will have been used. About two-thirds of the ‘official’ oil reserves figure is in the Middle East and North Africa (Table 1). TABLE 1. Location of proved conventional oil reserves, 2006 (billions of barrels) (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June, 2007. (World total = 1,208 billion of barrels.))

Saudi Arabia Iran Iraq Kuwait UAE Venezuela Russian Federation Kazakhstan Libya Nigeria USA China Qatar Mexico Algeria Brazil Norway Angola Total

264 138 115 102 98 80 80 40 42 36 29 16 15 13 12 12 10 9 1,101

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With a World recoverable conventional oil resource base of about 2 trillion barrels, global conventional oil demand cannot be met much beyond 2030. At 3 trillion barrels this demand cannot be met beyond the mid2040s. Even under the highly optimistic 4 trillion barrel assumption, global demand cannot be met much beyond 2050. At the other end of the spectrum of estimates, there are suggestions that global conventional oil demand cannot be met within 10 years – especially as many oil producers have peaked and some experts believe major fields are being ‘over-produced’ and reserves/resources overstated. In an examination of 42 scenarios of the availability of global conventional oil supply against various demand assumptions, one study concluded that in 28 of the scenarios World conventional oil demand would be unmet by 2030. Where a resource base of either 2 or 3 trillion barrels was assumed then 38 of the scenarios indicated demand would be unmet by 2030 (see Hallock et al., 2004; Hall, 2003). How large, then, are the recoverable resources of non-conventional oil which could make up the shortfall? Heavy oil resources are estimated to range up to 1.2 trillion barrels (about 25% of which are located in Venezuela). But of this total only about 300 billion barrels are estimated to be recoverable.3 Tar sands resources are estimated at up to 2.5 trillion barrels, but involve large volumes of energy and hot water in their extraction (for example, natural gas to exploit 80% of the resource represented by Canada’s Athabascan tar sands). The estimated likely ultimately recoverable volume is again about 300 billion barrels. Oil shale resources are estimated at around 3.5 trillion barrels (about 80% of the resource is in the Western part of the USA), but under 600 billion barrels is estimated to be ultimately recoverable. Non-conventional oil resources are not only much more difficult and costly to exploit, but they also represent little more than 10 years of extrapolated unconstrained World oil demand by the middle of this century. But there are other problems associated with oil reserves and resources estimates. One of the biggest is that production of oil from fields tends to increase until about 50% of the original oil has been extracted. Thereafter production has tended to decline exponentially, commonly at 5–8% per annum, the resulting ‘bell’ curve named the Hubbert curve. However, with the growing realisation that oil resources are in scarce supply, price rises may induce a slower rate of decline to capture expectations of higher future prices. To date, non-OPEC oil extraction has peaked and is in widespread decline – in the USA, Mexico, North Sea, and various Russian fields. Many OPEC producers have also ‘peaked’: Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Venezuela, and

______ 3

Many sources have been drawn upon for the estimates appearing in this section. A handy compilation will be found in IPCC (2007b).

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probably Kuwait (where its Burgan field is in decline, but discovery of a ‘new field’ was announced in May, 2007), Nigeria and the UAE. Insufficient investment in exploration and production may have exacerbated this situation in some of these countries. Recent studies have sought to move away from focussing on reserves data, and instead consider the Hubbert curve and estimated ultimately recoverable resources (EUR). The biggest uncertainties surround Saudi Arabia’s recoverable oil resources. Several Saudi fields have already peaked: Abqaiq Queen 1 (1972); Berri Lord (1978); Ghawar King (1980); Zuluf/Marjan Lords (1981); Safaniya Queen II (1981); and Shaybah Lord (2004). North and South Ghawar are believed to be over-producing (and high reservoir pressures cause output to fall faster). By the end of 2006 Saudi Arabia had extracted 114 billion barrels of its oil. Some specialists in this area (for example: Matthew Simmons of Simmons & Simmons International; and Hans Jud of Emeuerbare Energien, Switzerland) believe that Saudi ‘reserves’ have long been between 160 and 170 billion barrels (not 264) and that the remaining recoverable oil resources are only about 40–50 billion barrels. Other specialists (for example, ARAMCO’s former Head of Exploration, Dr. Sadad Al-Husseini; and Obaid Nawaf) believe that the maximum possible Middle East oil extraction is currently about 25 million barrels per day (mb/d), and Saudi Arabia’s maximum 12 mb/d (actual output in 2006: 10.8 mb/d). Thus Saudi Arabia cannot help OPEC achieve 120 mb/d (equal to the expected global oil demand in 2010). Kuwait’s situation is also very uncertain. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly reported in January, 2007, that it had seen internal Kuwaiti records suggesting their oil reserves were about 48 billion barrels (not 99–102 billion). With its Burgan field having passed its peak output in December, 2006, and no details being forthcoming about the claimed discovery of the ‘new’ field announced in May, 2007, Kuwait’s oil prospects are probably bleaker than official figures indicate. Another ‘straw in the wind’ is the way in which forecasts of oil supply since 2003, especially from non-OPEC sources, have been overstated by a number of bodies – including the IEA and Cambridge Energy Research Associates. Meanwhile, a growing number of upstream oil specialists have concluded, Jeremy Gilbert (ex-Chief Petroleum Engineer, BP) among them, that they expect oil output “to peak sometime before 2015”.4 Clarity in these matters is not helped when both Saudi and Kuwaiti Ministers of Oil regard their oil reserves and resources estimates as State secrets (and the former does not even believe in scenarios of possible futures).

______ 4

Quoted in ASPO USA “Peak Oil Review”, May 28, 2007.

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If conventional oil extraction is close to its peak, what then? Nonconventional oil will take years to exploit effectively, will be costly to exploit, will have adverse environmental impacts, and will be insufficient to cover global needs (hence oil output will be in steady decline from the 2050s). Switching even more to conventional, and then non-conventional natural gas resources will be one obvious course of action – but again output of natural gas is expected to be in steady decline from the mid-2050s. Here it is assumed that methane hydrates from melting tundra or the oceans will prove virtually impossible to extract effectively in large volumes. In the previous section, it was noted that World ultimately recoverable conventional natural gas resources are estimated at about 2 trillion barrels of oil equivalent. Other estimates exist, but these are mostly lower. Some 550 billion boe have been used historically up to the present. Current annual World natural gas use is about 18.9 billion boe. This figure rises under the IEA’s “Reference Scenario” to 28.4 billion boe by 2030. Thus between 2006 and 2030, about 570 billion boe will have been used. By 2045, recoverable conventional natural gas resources will probably have been fully exploited. By 2050, under a ‘Hubbert-type’ curve, about 1.44 trillion boe of natural gas is likely to have been used; nearly 2.6 trillion boe by 2075; and over 2.9 trillion boe by 2100. Where is the non-conventional natural gas most likely to have come from? Coal bed methane is believed to offer a World resource of about 1.5 trillion boe, with an estimated ultimately recoverable (EUR) of between 200 and 800 billion boe. Tight gas sands are believed to have a resource base of 1 trillion boe, and an EUR of about 300 billion boe. Gas shale is estimated to have a resource base of 2 trillion boe, with an EUR of between 200 and 500 billion boe. In the next section the tops of the ranges of EUR estimates are used for scenario purposes. As mentioned, although methane hydrates have attracted estimates of a resource base up to 100 trillion boe, their recoverability from melting tundra and the oceans is unknown. However, coal bed methane, tight gas sands, and gas shale could extend the lifetime of natural gas usage to the end of the 21st century. Their exploitation will, of course, be costly. Coal resources are in principle adequate for the 21st century, unless fuel switching to coal takes place on a major scale (some technologists believe that coal gasification offers substantial prospects, and acceptable environmental challenges), but the more general body of opinion is concerned at the implied carbon emissions and the costs, and feasibility on the implied scale, of carbon separation and sequestration. Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use in the earlier part of the present decade have averaged about 7.2 GtC (nearly 26.5 GtCO2) annually. If the World’s resources of both conventional and non-conventional oil and

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natural gas are used, and with the production curve suggested here, then in the year 2050 carbon dioxide emissions from the use of these two fuels alone will be about 11 GtC (40 GtCO2). This figure may be compared with the figure of 85 GtCO2e (23.2 GtCe) which appears in IEA projections and in the Stern Review, but clearly the latter figure includes greenhouse gas emissions from coal use and a wide range of other sources (Stern, 2007). It is clear that the World cannot afford in greenhouse gas emissions terms to use much coal, unless there is comprehensive carbon sequestration. In the next section it is assumed that World carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use peak at below 16 GtC (58 GtCO2) around the year 2050 before going into sharp decline (to around 4 GtC by 2075, and 1.8 GtC in 2100). How is this to be achieved? In the next section a scenario is offered which should be well within the technological and financial capacities of the World to achieve during this century. The scenario’s basis is a greatly accelerated and enlarged effort to expand the use of concentrating solar power (CSP); to harness the power of the oceans; and to use offshore wind energy resources to best effect. Other renewable energy resources – geothermal, biomass from wastes, onshore wind turbines in relatively high average wind speed areas, micro-generation as appropriate to local conditions (solar panels and water heaters, ground/air/water-sourced heat exchangers) – will provide support for these three large potential ‘players’. 3. An Energy Scenario Towards 2100 This scenario assumes that remaining recoverable conventional oil plus recoverable non-conventional resources are exploited, as they are for natural gas. The needs of the transportation sector, and the slow emergence of alternative transportation fuels (perhaps both hybrid electric and fuel celled vehicles supplied with hydrogen from CSP in many cases?), are a primary factor for the former assumption. World primary energy use is assumed to grow to a maximum of about 28,000 Mtoe (about 205 billion boe) around 2075, which is about double the level of 2015. But energy efficiency and technology gains are kicking in, and by 2100 World primary energy use is assumed to fall to 24,000 Mtoe (176 billion boe). Provided a 40% energy efficiency improvement were achieved, the also implied improvement in primary energy use per head would permit everyone access to the same amount of energy as West Europeans today, as well as an improved quality of energy services. This suggests, after some convergence and contraction by heavy users, good potential for a satisfactory level of ‘modern’ energy services for all.

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The scenario, and its assumptions, are consistent with: • Supporting energy security • Extending the lifetime of oil and natural gas export revenues • Increasing access to energy • Improving energy efficiency • Enhancing international and regional co-operation • Helping to meet GHG emissions commitments • Reducing vulnerability to climatic change • Assisting technological transfers • Accepting claims (by Saudi Arabia, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan and others at UNCSD 15, for example) of continuing the dominant role of fossil fuels – for several decades • Acknowledging the complementarity between fossil fuels and renewable energy (as called for by OPEC Member States) • Exploiting own national resources (solar, etc.), which the G77 + China claim is a ‘right’ • Enhancing overseas development assistance • Carbon sequestration and storage possibilities (as pushed by OPEC), although potential storage capacity is believed to be limited.5 Some of the key scenario figures are set out below (Table 2). The scenario implies an Energy supply/demand “gap” between what oil and natural gas can deliver and total World primary energy use, which needs to be filled by coal, or nuclear, or the various forms of renewable energy – or a combination of these. As already pointed out, a major switch to coal would result in coal resource scarcity before 2100 and severe environmental impacts. Nuclear power is a controversial path. Hence the three large-scale renewable energy options referred to above. Other forms of renewable energy will have a contribution to make, but recent experience in a number of countries reinforces the need to ensure renewable energy forms and

______ 5 Carbon storage capacity has been estimated up to 500 GtC in depleted oil and gas wells, and a further 100 GtC in saline aquifers (some very much higher estimates have been advanced, but have not gained wide acceptance). Although estimates of the technical carbon storage capacity of the oceans range up to 1,200 GtC, there has long been concern about, for example, the use of iron filings for this purpose on environmental grounds, which would – it is believed – stimulate deep ocean plankton blooms and thereby carbon absorption. The US company, Planktos, in June, 2007 was reported to be seeking to place iron filings in the Pacific Ocean, not far from the Galapagos Islands.

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M. JEFFERSON TABLE 2. Key scenario figures

Oil Billion barrels Cumulative (trillion barrels) Cumulative (GtC) Natural gas Billion boe Cumulative (trillion boe) Cumulative (GtC) Total primary Energy sought (billions boe)

2006

2030

2050

2075

2100

28.5

41

48

14

0.6

0.8

1.6

2.0

2.75

3.0 345

18.9

29

59

25

8

0.55

1.12

2.0

3.1

3.4 315

85.6

127.5

175

205

175

projects are genuinely cost-effective (not just to developers or landowners, but to energy consumers as well); with sound energy input/output ratios (for example, bringing palm oil from Indonesia or Malaysia – tropical forests first having been destroyed to make way for palm plantations – to Western Europe to be burned for electricity generation in rural locations makes little sense); suited to local conditions (e.g. good average wind speeds, local agricultural strengths, proximity to feedstocks and major transport hubs); and well sited (e.g. in relation to sheer and resistance factors of the local topography). As can be seen from the figures below, the “gap” (of 38 billion boe in 2006) is now filled. But the “gap” widens to 57.5 billion boe by 2030; to 68 billion boe by 2050; and to 166 billion boe in 2075 and 2100. Hence the need for massive scale if renewable energy is to fill the “gap”. 4. Partnerships for Win-Win Strategies For CSP areas of relatively high solar insolation are required: Central America; the Western USA and some parts of the South; parts of South America; southern Spain and Portugal; North Africa; Eastern and Southern Africa; the Middle East; the Indian sub-continent; Australasia and Indonesia. Partnership opportunities present themselves between these areas and further

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to the north in North America; further to the south in South America; with Europe; Eurasia; China and other East Asian countries. These opportunities are by no means confined to North Africa and the Middle East with Europe. The idea of linking North Africa and Western Europe is an old one – building upon even earlier work. For example, that of Auguste Mouchout in France and Algeria in the 1870s and 1880s; of William Adams in India in the late 1870s, who advanced the work done using mirrors for concentrating radiation; by Charles Tellier in France in the 1880s, using solar collectors and developing a solar water pump which he thought would be particularly useful in West Africa; John Ericsson’s development of the parabolic trough for collecting the Sun’s rays during the late 1870s and 1880s in the USA (he died in 1889); Aubrey Eneas’s efforts to commercialise a parabolic reflector in California at the end of the 19th century and early years of the 20th; Henry Willsie’s work in Montana and California to harness the Sun’s rays for desert irrigation, electric light and power, cooling, and pumping – also in the early years of the 20th century; and, perhaps most directly relevant for present purposes, the work of the American entrepreneur Frank Shuman which evolved into a solar pumping station near Cairo, which opened in late 1912. Shuman’s project used parabolic troughs and reflectors, and a simple tracking mechanism. It was visited in 1913 by a number of VIPs, including Lord Kitchener. Unfortunately, the plant was destroyed during the First World War, Shuman died before the Armistice, and the engineers who had worked with him had long gone to war-related tasks. And by then oil was seen as offering a bright future, not least by the British Admiralty. Yet Shuman had talked of building 20,000 square miles of parabolic collectors in the Sahara, which he believed would produce in perpetuity enough energy “to equal all the fuel mined in 1909”. The price of coal in Egypt at that time was such that Shuman’s project was calculated to have a payback period of four years (Butti and Perlin, 1980). Not surprisingly, considerable interest has been taken in CSP in recent times. In particular, the Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy Co-operation (TREC) or DESERTEC concept (see: http://www.trecers.net/ concept.html). The principal objectives of this initiative are to boost the generation of electricity and desalinated water by solar thermal plants and wind turbines in countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and to transmit ‘clean’ electrical power via high voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission lines to Europe. Their time horizon is to start large-scale operations from 2020, with the expectation that transmission losses would only be of the order of 10–15% as a maximum (3% per 1,000 km). HVDC transmission lines (up to 1.5 GW capacity) have been used for many years by companies

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such as ABB and Siemens. By contrast with Shuman’s times, less than 0.3% of the entire desert in the MENA region would need to be used. Using CSP it is estimated that up to 25% of Europe’s electricity could come from MENA’s desert areas by 2050. Germany’s Aerospace Centre (DLR) has estimated that costs (including transmission costs) could come down from 9–22 Eurocents/kWh to about 5 Eurocents/kWh. This application of CSP is regarded as not only technically feasible but already proven (for example at Kramer Junction, in California), low risk, environmentally benign, multiple sourced, and with relatively low vulnerability to disruption. The range of applications runs from electricity production for heating and cooling, to water desalination, and potentially for hydrogen production. There are rising concerns about raw materials’ availability for a wide range of future needs – copper, hafnium, indium, lithium, platinum, tantalum and zinc are among those causing concern. But CSP development should arouse less concern on this ground than solar panel diffusion. In March, 2007, Europe’s first CSP tower plant was opened near Seville, and the first of two solar thermal parabolic trough plants (AndaSol I) has been under construction since July, 2006. In June, 2007 Nevada Solar One, the first large solar thermal plant to be built for 15 years in the USA, began supplying power to the grid. It is located by Boulder City, near Las Vegas. In Algeria an agreement has been signed between a company recently established by the government, New Energy Algeria, and Spain’s Abener Energia Spa to build a 150 MW capacity hybrid solar-gas plant due to come on stream in late 2009. In Morocco the National Electricity Office (ONE) has signed an agreement with Spain’s Abengoa company to build a 470 MW capacity solar thermal power plant, expected to begin operations in early 2009. Things appear to be moving in the direction this paper seeks.6 5. Implications for North Africa, the Middle East, and Europe For the countries of North Africa, the Middle East, and Europe (although the basic ideas are not confined to these countries), CSP and its international transmission offers a win-win strategy for all parties. Several of the North African and Middle Eastern countries are currently strongly endowed with oil and natural gas resources, which in some cases may be overstated. However, even making allowances for a likely overstatement of Saudi and

______ 6

Recent overview of CSP, containing technical and cost data, is: Mehos and Kearney, 2007; A paper more closely oriented to the Middle East and North Africa is: Alnaser et al. (2007).

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Kuwaiti oil reserves, these still place the Middle East and North Africa with 58% of the World’s conventional oil reserves (67% if no such allowances are made). The region also has between 38% and 44% of the World’s conventional natural gas reserves. But these reserves, and any remaining recoverable resources, are expected to be fully exploited (for all intents and purposes) within about 30 years. Although oil and gas exporting countries can expect to get higher unit export prices for both oil and natural gas over the next few years, they essentially have a rapidly dwindling asset. Nonconventional oil and natural gas resources lie elsewhere in the World. But the region has most of the World’s best solar insolation, which can quite readily be exploited for the heating and cooling, and water desalination, required by the region. It also has a huge capacity to export those benefits to Europe and parts of Eurasia. For the region, too, the problems of being in an arid zone will intensify. Average surface temperatures in the region can be expected to rise between 3°C (IPCC SRES Scenario B1) and 5°C (IPCC SRES Scenario A2) by the end of this century. Fresh water can be expected to become even scarcer, cooling requirements even greater, and food production even more difficult. With these challenges will come greater social, political and economic stresses – including pressures for large-scale emigration. There will be greater and more urgent need for appropriate technologies and investments to meet these challenges and stresses. With oil and natural gas such finite resources for the region, the need to seek other means of meeting requirements for energy and related services is obvious. Due to climatic conditions and latitude, only solar energy in its various forms offers substantial opportunities (harnessing of trade winds in Morocco and Mauretania is likely to be of much more restricted geographical application). Solar-related opportunities range from passive solar (more appropriate building design and materials to cope with extreme heat and to harness such air currents as exist); through CSP – the really big opportunity; to solar panels. There will be opportunities for Middle East and North African countries with significant oil and natural gas export revenues over the next three decades to acquire or sponsor solar energy technologies (for power, heating, cooling, water desalination, hydrogen production, hybrid/electric vehicles, etc.) and advances in electricity transmission and storage efficiency. Middle East and North African countries without oil and natural gas resources will also be able to benefit from solar energy technologies. All these countries are well placed to enter into useful partnerships with countries in Europe and Eurasia. And for the latter, enhanced energy security, lower greenhouse gas emissions, and increased energy supply are goals which point to winwin outcomes for all concerned.

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References Alnaser, W.E., Trieb, F. and Knies, G. (2007) “Solar Energy Technology in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) for Sustainable Energy, Water and Environment”, ‘Advances in Solar Energy’, Vol. 17, pp. 261–304. Butti, K. and Perlin, J. (1980) “A Golden Thread: 2500 Years of Solar Architecture and Technology”, Cheshire Books, Palo Alto, CA. Hall, Ch., et al. (2003) “Hydrocarbons and the Evolution of Human Culture”, ‘Nature’, Vol. 426, 20 November 2003, pp. 318–322. Hallock, J.L., Jr., et al. (2004) “Forecasting the Limits to the Availability and Diversity of Global Conventional Oil Supply”, ‘Energy’, Vol. 29, pp. 1673–1696. IPCC (2007a) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis”, ‘Summary for Policymakers’, 3 pp. IPCC (2007b) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment, Working Group III, Chapter 4 (Energy Supply). Jefferson, M. (2001) “Living in One World: Sustainability from an Energy Perspective”, World Energy Council, 130 pp. Mehos, M.S. and Kearney, D.W. (2007) “Tackling Climate Change in the U.S.: Potential Carbon Emissions Reductions from Concentrating Solar Power by 2030”, in Charles F. Kutscher (Ed.): “Tackling Climate Change in the U.S.”, American Solar Energy Society, pp. 80–88. Stern, N. (2007) “The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review”, Chapter 7. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

AFTER THE FOSSIL ERA

LUIGI SERTORIO* Dept. Theoretical Physics, University of Turin, Turin, Italy

Abstract: In this paper a framework for the description of the incumbent collapse of the energivorous way of existing is presented, using the knowledge of science: physics, chemistry, biology. The author criticizes the common loquacious debates based on the dualism Energy – GNP, arguing that such language can only bring to a vicious cycle. A program of research on “virtuous complexity” is indicated.

Keywords: Solar energy era, fossil era, metabolism, biosphere, energy source, waste sink, complexity.

1. Foreword It is difficult to find a perspective for the description of the events that involve a small part of humankind, the technological nations, and the rest of the entire planet, those events that chronologically can be identified as the birth, the growth, and the incumbent collapse of the fossil energy era. This era covers approximately the time interval of two centuries; this is an infinitely short segment in the scale of the evolution of the biosphere; it is short in the scale of the history of humankind; it is a long time if we consider the social changes that developed as a novelty with respect to the pre fossil time, when society operated instead in accord with the solar or natural dynamics. The fossil energy dynamics incorporated enormous local instantaneous accumulations of money, very fast almost explosive applications of opportunistic technologies. Furthermore the combination of excess money and the relative concentration and control of technologies, implied (and implies) wars motivated by the necessity of supporting the “economic

______ * Luigi Sertorio, Dept. Theoretical Physics, University of Turin, Via Pietro Giuria, 110125 Turin, Italy; E-mail: [email protected]


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growth” and therefore the constantly renewed acquisition of fossil resources. The violence and the global reach of this mix money-technology-weapons, should be compared with the preceding pre fossil historical events: the colonization of the Mediterranean basin by the roman empire and, after the intermission of the middle age, the colonization extended to a much larger reach, the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, operated by the European monarchies and relative wars among them. It is clear that technology alone, economy alone, even superior knowledge of science alone cannot give a view of the future. Technology of which country? Money in whose hands? Science interrogated by whom? In this paper I try to give at least some inputs for meditation. 2. Resources for Life All resources belong to the domain of irreversible physics. In particular we consider two main conditions for the existence of life: •

Thermodynamic stability

•

Available energy for open systems in global steady state.

These are concepts that belong to non equilibrium thermodynamics, a domain of physics which may not be familiar to everybody, but the language is intuitive and can be grasped also by non physicists. In the stellar era resources are the stars; they emit radiation because inside their inner core there are ongoing nuclear fusion reactions which are exothermic. Such process of core combustion and surface radiation emission is extremely slow, the typical time scale being one billion years, therefore we are used to say that the stellar radiation emission is by definition the realization of a flow lasting forever. Notice that a flow is in units of watt per square meter. With stars of second or third generation (namely originated not at the end of the radiation cosmic era but by accretion after a preceding explosion of a star; process in which heavy nuclei are synthesized) there is the possible joint birth of planets. Planets have a complex chemical composition; usually all elements of the Mendeleev table are present in a planet. The surface of a planet often is not in the solid state but is a mixture of solid, liquid, gas. Such mixture is in perennial thermodynamic motion; and such motion is called climate. More precisely the concept of climate implies the existence of a global steady state, and this in turn implies the existence of a favourable star-orbit combination. Under even more restrictive conditions the starorbit combination may be compatible with the existence of life on the surface of the planet. These additional conditions are perhaps exceptional conditions. In fact we know life on Earth, but we don’t have a “theory” for life elsewhere.


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3. Metabolism Each living organism is a standing thermodynamic structure. As such is characterized by a metabolism: energy and molecules coming in and energy and molecules going out. The in and out molecules are different sets. If instead of the single organism we consider the whole biosphere, the sets of incoming and outgoing molecules coincide. Why a standing structure needs a metabolism? Without the metabolic process all molecules, those existing on a given planet and being there as a result of the original “accretion”, would be sitting in the percent mix that satisfies the rule of the minimum Gibbs potential, a law of inorganic chemistry. This concept belongs to classical chemistry, and was formulated at the end of the nineteenth century. The metabolism involves complex organic molecules assembled in cells, in turn assembled in individual organisms. The organism therefore is the realization of “chemical life”. The energy (joule) embedded in an individual organism is not the relevant parameter; the relevant parameter is the power: an organism is characterized by watts. All chemical reactions go on in the forward direction of time if energy is given or energy is released, and this is best understood by quantum molecular physics which governs the transitions among molecular states. This remark explains why molecular biology made such important progresses in the second half of the past century, with the maturity of quantum mechanics. The general conditions that classify the molecular interactions are thermal chemistry and photo chemistry. In thermal chemistry we need an upper “thermal bath” at temperature T1 and a lower thermal bath at temperature T2 with T1 larger than T2. In photochemistry the upper thermal bath is replaced by the incoming photons. Coming from where? From a star. In our case from the Sun. 4. Thermal Life and Photon life Thermal life may exist if thermal disequilibria are maintained in certain special conditions. For instance presence of water and a geothermal heat source. It is possible to conceive a reduction reaction at T1 and an oxidation reaction at T2 producing heat, in such a way that the resulting chemical output returns by liquid flow at the condition T1. It is not proven that such thermal life cycle is realized in nature. Thermal life as a transient instead is an easier concept. Photon life presumably developed on Earth after a transient of thermal life. Photon life uses CO2 and H2O mainly; and this makes sense, because oxygen, carbon and hydrogen (plus nitrogen) are abundant in first generation planets. The photosynthesis operates the reduction reactions in which

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sugars are produced. This happens according to the Calvin cycle which is a photon engine located in appropriate cells. The energy for the maintenance of each organism is produced in the Krebs cycle which is a thermal engine. Both the Calvin and the Krebs engines are present in green plants. On the other hand herbivores and carnivores do not act by photosynthesis and contain only the Krebs engine, therefore function by thermal chemistry only. We see that the green plants are the entrance door of the biosphere: the exit door is the final oxidation performed by the bacteria present almost everywhere in the soil and in the oceans. The photon reaction rate at the entrance door and the oxidation reactions at the exit door must balance. If this happens all molecules coming in are re-obtained as molecules going out, and vice versa: this means cycle of mass. The chemical percent composition of the planet is preserved and life may go on forever. In conclusion, the molecules perform a cycle, the photons do not: the photons come in diluted but spectroscopically hot, and go out non diluted but spectroscopically cold. The Sun keeps shining, the external vacuum keeps being cold (almost zero temperature) and in this way the life of the biosphere may go on forever. Calvin (Nobel prize 1961) and Krebs (Nobel prize 1953). The Calvin cycle is a succession of molecular reactions that repeats itself always with the same molecules (cycle), and is located in certain photoreceptor cells. The cycle captures solar photons plus H2O and CO2 molecules from the outside. The high photon energy is used to separate the oxygen from the water molecule; then at ambient temperature the atoms are reassembled into sugar molecules, made of several unit blocks CH2O; the oxygen is released to the atmosphere, the sugar molecules remain within the green plants. This operation belongs to the reduction, or deoxygenation, category. This is photosynthesis. In the Krebs cycle there is a succession of molecular interactions located into appropriate cells in which the atmospheric oxygen is captured and is manipulated together with the sugar molecules obtaining H2O and CO2 plus work. Work is utilized by the organism, the molecules of H2O and CO2 are released outside. This operation belongs to the oxidation category, and is a thermal cycle. 5. The Trophic Chain The standing cells constituting the organisms live according to chemical events located in the cellular membrane boundary. The chemical reactions operating across the membrane have general features that are understood


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and it is known that they function under appropriate conditions and with a given rate. We can understand therefore that the speed of the metabolism and the mean size of the cells are related. Moreover the organisms are made by several cells, interacting by nearest neighbour forces, all together resulting in the living individual. The result is very complex but in first approximation we may understand that the metabolism of the individual is related to density and size, and therefore is a function of volume or mass. It turns out that the rule is power of metabolism = 1 watt per kilogram of body mass. As the density does not change much from a living organism to another there is a rough relationship between metabolic power and size. For instance for an average man of 70 kilograms the metabolism is around 80 watt. All members of the biosphere come to life, live, and die. In the meanwhile they reproduce themselves according to a scheme which in first approximation is ordered according to a subdivision into species. Along these processes each organism continues to participate to the global metabolism of the biosphere. A small percent of the herbs acts as food for the herbivores, a large percent ends up as food for the final bacteria; the herbivores in turn make food for the carnivores and to the final bacteria, again respectively in small and large percent; the carnivores end up solely in food for the bacteria. In this respect the human species functions as any other carnivore species. 6. Metabolism and External Power The Krebs engine puts into action not only the power needed for the metabolism, the inner standing structure, but also the “external power”. This external power is rather strange: if averaged over the day-night period is small, approximately 2 percent of the metabolism, but it can be very high in short bursts. For instance a man may have average external power of 1.8 watt; this number comes by considering the constant application of power necessary to rise 16 tons at the height of 1 meter (try). A weaker person may have less than 1.8 watt. But a healthy man can produce 400 watt for 10 seconds; then he needs recovery, and cannot repeat the performance too soon and certainly not many times in a day. Green plants have a typical external power output much lower than the carnivores both in average and in bursts. What is the external power for? For the needs of each individual organism, mainly search for food and self defence. But there are also curious behaviours in which the external power seems to express freedom. Running, jumping, diving, just for joy.

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7. The Peculiar External Power of the Human Species The human species has a kind of external power related to the collective actions, a sort of “societal power need” not existing among any other living species. This societal power need has not been target of serious study until now. Its causes and properties are not well known because the social behaviour has been studied with categories like economy, or religion, or civil law, which do not pay attention to thermodynamics. Very recently the issue has been raised under the pressure of the alarm: energy is needed, energy costs too much. The best phenomenological study is due to Hans Bethe in the years around 1970. He examines the energy consumption of the USA, the country which is considered the only country worth studying, in addition to the fact that at that time the data were difficult to get and almost restricted to the USA, the country having control and knowledge of the fossil resources. The Bethe evaluations are averages calculated year by year, and referring to certain sectors for which there are tables elaborated using the kind of accounting that is in the hands of banks, industries, tax offices, customs offices in harbours, representatives of commerce in general, etc. These lumped numbers are additionally classified by energy source, like oil, coal, nuclear, wood, wind, hydroelectricity, solar direct, namely photovoltaic and thermal, or solar heat thermal engines. Such data are in general difficult to get, and the authority of Bethe certainly played a role. In all cases the parameter is “cost” (dollars). Clearly the final outcome of such studies can only be a relationship “Energy-GNP”. You get out what you feed in. In fact, putting together all sectors and dividing by the number of the American citizens it turns out that the consumption per capita is of the order of 10,000 watts per person. Next page one finds the GNP per person: surprise! the two numbers, with an appropriate dimensional conversion factor, are proportional to each other. Moreover, year after year, increasing GNP means increasing energy usage. These are mute numbers, but the only fundamental information, the datum of nature to keep in mind, is the individual human metabolism, no matter if USA citizen or not, which is and remains 80 watt. Such tables became the basic language of every subsequent analysis of the oil peak, of the international economic crises, and the related wars. Also in the years around 1970 appeared the study of Arthur Rosenfeld on energy efficiency, again by sectors. After that time, the general issues have been formulated in the language: how much does a better efficiency cost? Unfortunately the logic money-energy can only produce a vicious cycle.


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8. The Transition from the Past Solar Era and the Fossil Era Before the advent of combustion engines (Carnot, Watt, the end of the eighteenth century) the societal energy came from the Sun and was articulated in various ways. Inorganic •

Well built homes; cities located in sites chosen according to favourable climatic conditions. The understanding of climate was based on experience and was excellent at the time of the ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome, during the Middle Age, the Renaissance

•

Transport by sail boat.

Organic •

Animal servant to man; transport by horse carriage, for instance

•

Man servant to man

•

Conquest of new land plus servile enlistment. The above acquisitions of societal power implied two main features:

•

Hierarchical social organization; monarchic structures, religiousn structures

•

Perennial efforts to enlarge the frontiers of any given nation and consequent wars for desired surfaces of Earth; or escape forward, to external new territories. Very important examples are the flow of Europeans to America, and Australia.

At the end of the ancient solar era the world was organized in powerful nations and their colonial possessions. Terrestrial wars in Europe and maritime wars in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The battleships were for some centuries the masterpieces of technology, and the measure of civilization. It should be remarked that along all this time the technological prostheses were unable to damage the biosphere directly. No excess production of chemical waste. We do not have information about the per capita societal power during the various historical segments of the past solar era to compare with the Bethe numbers. The reason is that the phenomenological connection EnergyGNP that has dominated the mind of the economists, the greediness of the entrepreneurs, the language of the politicians, is a phenomenon of recent times. In the past the circulation of money had some analogies with the present circulation but there where major, profound differences. It is difficult

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to discuss such differences because the language of physics and the language of economy do not have communication windows. 9. In the Vicinity of the Collapse of the Fossil Era Engine servant to man The thermal engine came into a society that was educated with sail boats and carriages for transportation; manpower in manufacture, manpower in domestic services. The thermal engine was inserted into this pre existing social texture. Evidently the marine routes developed a carrying capacity unimaginable before. The military fleets became the major protagonist in the international competitions. The engine in civil industry was introduced first in the textile production and later in the farming hardware, and a little later comes the automobile production for private transportation. There are differences in timing between Germany, England and the USA. Germany and England had a pre existing history of culture, science, technology. The density of population is high, the physical structure of society is fairly rigid. Moreover in Europe the major fossil resource was coal. The penetration of the thermal steam engine was precocious and slow. In America everything was new, and the national resource was oil, much easier to manipulate. The differences in the societal adaptation to the fossil are many, but we consider one example, transportation. The pre existing routes were adapted to the high density of population in Europe, the rail road system and water canal system dominated for a while, and retarded the automobile expansion. On the contrary in America the automobile routes developed together with the automobile industry itself, and became grand business, propelled by the national oil extraction, and this made instant accumulations of money. The car was the symbol of freedom and democracy. At the same time the instant accumulation of money percolated into the political structure producing the realization of the ideal of big money and social happiness. The instability proper to the fast and exaggerated accumulation of money was constantly cured with the medication of growth: leave the errors aside and move to grasp elsewhere. The time scale of the above events is two or three generations, the time to grasp, to enjoy, to begin to make errors. Conclusion. The fossil energy was grafted on the societal organism, and enhanced the pre existing way of life that was articulated according to the old competition-expansion established rule. The insertion of fossil energy did not develop according to a scientific strategy, a vision of the future on the time scale of several thousand years. It developed solely according to chance. We talk of democracy, and we do not


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realize that this is not a philosophy, but a petrol label attached to the initial transition from monarchies to industry. In fact, in the absence of a plan, after few human generations following the initial outburst of money and freedom, the texture of the industrialized nations and their competitions for Energy-GNP, has changed from bonanza to regression. We may close this paragraph saying “Man servant to engine”. 10. The Wrong Complexity The fossil energy extraction and distribution involves heavy technology: from the act of mining, to the act of conveying the energy to the structures able to manipulate it. Nothing is done by the initiative and control of the single individual. The single individual goes to the gasoline station, goes to the generalized supermarket where he gets everything, from housing to food, from information to public health. This one-directional chain is maintained by the technological bureaucracy which operates with choices and methods that are step by step and year by year more lengthy and complex. Parallel to the bureaucracy and not always distinct from it there are additional parasitic sub structures. Some are considered criminal, other are accepted, and both augment the complexity. Larger is the market worse is the bureaucracy. The citizen-consumer does not participate in the process of creating wealth; he is only the physical body turning the wheel that moves the process of production. If production is slowed down, for any reason, the bureaucracy simply changes name and morphology but keeps getting larger. Money does not cure the money disease. GNP does not change the laws of nature. This is the wrong complexity in the final stage when it begins to fall apart. 11. Wars The phenomenon of war belongs uniquely to the human species; nothing similar exists in the natural domain. We call “nature” the inorganic surrounding, or climate, and also the organic surrounding, the biosphere itself. The killing rate of wars is much higher than the injuries coming from the natural calamities. Natural events can be examined scientifically, where the concept of “cause” makes sense; in this way climate and biosphere can be the objective of ever improving research, and progressively the natural harmful events can be explained, partially predicted or cured. Can we use the concept of “cause” for a war? Or we should use “chance”? Who makes the war happen? The last wars that can be attributed to the patent will of a well identified man were the Napoleonic wars. In the past the

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rationalization of war was construed around the concept of hero: Alexander the Great, Augustus, Napoleon. Victory comes by virtue of an exceptional man, the hero, therefore the winner is justified for the bloody battles, and the killing is celebrated. But what we say of the technological wars and the nuclear weapons? Understanding nuclear physics means understanding stellar dynamics and fusion bombs as well; they cannot be separated, is plasma theory. Science is a perennial forward process in search of the causes. On the contrary the decision to build several thousand fusion bombs is an arbitrary act, is not a necessity. The production of bombs, and in particular the nuclear bombs, implies a gigantic unidirectional flow of money, which is subtracted from other options like diversified, healthy avenues of the economic circulation. This is what happened in 1943–1945 when the construction of the huge American nuclear industry begun. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not the act of a hero: Truman was no hero, knew nothing of nuclear physics, was an administrator by training and happened to be in charge of the industrialization program in his tenure as vice president. Chance made him sitting in the oval office when in less than seven days the decision of bombing was taken. Few years later the Soviet Union developed both fission and fusion bombs. Today the nuclear proliferation is reality. Nuclear weapons can be manufactured or purchased if the GNP is big enough. The nuclear risk of humankind is not “destiny” but “purchase”. Why the above remarks? It is to remind that the nuclear military power is an important actor in the terminal phase of the fossil era. The logic of the bombs is something essentially casual; it is a way of playing among the nuclear powers. If money and weapons happen to dominate (quite likely) the final instability of the fossil era there is the possibility that man made calamities occur before the natural constraints become harmful. 12. The Right Complexity The right complexity is when the citizen is actor in the dynamics of society. At first sight this seems a nonsensical utopian statement. Let us discuss the first principles of this utopia. When the individual is actor, metabolism plus well being are obtained trying to be intelligent, cooperative, careful in governing his own extra energy (discussed in Section 6) and tuning it with the extra energy of the other individuals. The individual life is cyclical: working and resting, travelling and returning, and so on in every manifestation of creativity. Individual cycles imply interpersonal cooperation. If two men pull a carriage together they must tune their interaction. Is this obvious? Try to find other examples, there are so many. One cannot throw his own


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waste on the dining table of his neighbour, for instance; again reciprocity and cooperation. Which are the collective activities that necessarily imply long distance interpersonal interactions? Notice that here we talk of interaction, not purchase or disposal. It is in fact well known that today almost every product consumed, and every waste thrown away, has travelled on the average one quarter of the terrestrial circumference. In a society in which the average societal extra power is for instance 100 watts instead of 10,000 watts, the long distance interaction will need to be well conceived in advance rather than invented by chance. Local dynamics – global intelligence rather than global dynamics – zero intelligence. These are hints for the formulation of the anti-supermarket society, the road to the virtuous complexity. Utopian again? Not at all: the biosphere functions exactly in this way and the human species is embedded in the biosphere. The transition to the future is a transition of the mind. Further Reading Luigi Sertorio, The Transition from Fossil to Solar Energy, preprint 2006, [email protected]

BIOMASS OR BIOMESS? THE PROMISES AND LIMITS OF BIOENERGY

JOACHIM H. SPANGENBERG* Vorsterstr. 97-99, D-51103 Cologne, Germany

Abstract: In all oil consumption dependent countries the shift from fossil fuels to bio-based ones plays a prominent role in public discussions and political decision making. However, the discussion all too often singles out biomass as a new energy source without paying due respect to the system aspects and constraints. Biomass can indeed be a valuable element of a new energy mix, but without structural change in the energy system it poses risks to biodiversity and food security. Agricultural energy production either competes with food production on existing agricultural areas, or with biodiversity preservation if pristine areas are used for biomass production. Thus exploiting the potential of biomass for energy generation needs to t environmental and social limits, and must be adapted to the specifics of the local situation if it is to be a part of the solution, and not the source of new problems.

Keywords: Biomass, biofuels, biotechnology, biodiversity.

1. Supply Potential 1.1. SOURCE FUNCTION: BIOENERGY POTENTIAL

The current global energy consumption of about 11 billion tons oil equivalent (BTOE) in 2004 consists of about 80% fossil fuels (oil, gas and coal), about 10% biomass and 5% each hydropower and nuclear energy. Substituting biomass for fossil fuels with constant use efficiency would result

______ * Joachim H. Spangenberg, Vorsterstr. 97–99, D-51103 Cologne, Germany, Tel. +49-221-2168-95, E-mail: [email protected]


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in a tenfold increase in biomass demand to 10 BTOE, equivalent to about 10 kg of dry wood consumption per day per capita of the world population (Schindler and Zittel, 2006). Today, the 1 BTOE biomass use stems mostly from non-commercial use in countries with low per capita energy consumption, and from ethanol production in Brazil, with commercial biomass use rapidly increasing the EU and the USA. The total volume of fossil fuels burnt per year worldwide, about 9 BTOE, is the result of geochemical transformations of biomass containing 4.4 × 1019g carbon (C), more than 400 times the net primary production of the Earth today. Thus replacing fossil fuels by biomass use is a priori limited to marginal quantities – this applies to policy objectives like reducing the dependency on fossil fuels, energy supply security, or energy source diversity. The EU targets of 20% renewable energy in 2020, including 10% transport fuels from biomass would require 70% of the EU agricultural area if produced domestically, while the US government objective of 35 billion gallon biofuels equals converting 100% of the maize and soy harvest. Obviously, the question is not one of 1:1 substitution, but for the role of bioenergy in a new, less energy squandering economic system. Little wonder then that the IEA estimate of 147 million tons biofuel production until 2030 is not even sufficient to cover the projected increase of fuel consumption. For Europe, the EEA has calculated the area available for bioenergy production, under the condition that neither nature and wilderness, nor the environment are degraded.1 With careful management, the primary biomass contribution could rise from 69 MTOE in 1990 via 190 MTOE in 2010 to a maximum of 295 MTOE in 2030. This potential is sufficient to reach the EU bioenergy targets, 15% of the projected energy consumption of the EU-25 in 2030. In Europe, the biggest and fastest contribution is expected from the waste sector, around 100 MTOE; only in the long term, with significant technical improvements, bioenergy crops from agriculture provide the largest potential, with 47 MTOE in 2010 and 142 MTOE in 2030. Environmentally-compatible forestry is estimated to almost constantly contribute 40 MTOE, with a potential increase by 16 MTOE with increasing prices for CO2 emission certificates (EEA, 2006). In Germany, of 17 million hectares agricultural area currently 15%, about 2 million hectares are used for energy plants (maize, sunflower, wheat and

______ 1

The assumptions are that (a) at least 30 of the agricultural land is dedicated to environmentally-orientated farming, (b) Extensively cultivated areas are maintained, (c) 3% of intensively cultivated land is set aside as compensation area, (d) bioenergy crops with least environmental impacts are used, (e) current protected forest areas are maintained, (f) the forest residue removal rate is adapted to the local conditions, (g) complementary feelings are restricted, (h) ambitious waste reduction targets, and (i) climate policy (–40% by 2030) lead to increased certificate costs.

PROMISES AND LIMITS OF BIOENERGY

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rape seed); another 7.5% are unused. The area available for bioenergy production has been estimated to increase by 50% to 4.5 million hectares. However, this assumes a continued trend of industrialised of agricultural production, with continued productivity increases (in 1900, one farmer fed four people, now it is 143. Currently, 0.25 ha of agricultural area are needed per person, in 2030 it is expected to be 0.15 ha). It furthermore neglects the EU policy priorities of extensification and the promotion of organic agriculture. 1.2. SINK FUNCTION: CO2 SEQUESTRATION

Instead of using biomass as energy source, it could be used as carbon sink (as foreseen as one option in the compensation mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol and many “carbon neutral xyz” initiatives). As carbon sequestration – unlike low carbon fuels – at least in principle offers the opportunity not only to limit net CO2 emissions, but even to reduce the atmospheric CO2 content, it is an option not to be neglected when discussing the use of biomass. The technical potentials for CO2 sequestration, according to estimates by the German Federal Government (despite technical efficiencies of about 90%) is realistically at maximum about 1/3 of the global emissions from coal fired power plants, i.e. 1.8 billion tons CO2. As compared to this, the sequestration potential which could be activated by using biomass as a sink has been estimated by the German Chemical Society to be ten times higher, 18 billion tons CO2. However, this would require turning some trends: The current sequestration potential of about 7 billion tons is nearly compensated by forest destruction, causing about 6 billion tons CO2 emissions, a trend which would need to be reversed. In a sustainable land use scheme, with 10–20% protected areas, no conversion of pristine ecosystems for bioenergy production, and with primacy given to food over bioenergy production, the German government’s Scientific Advisory Council for Global Environmental Problems (WBGU) estimates that at best 3% of the global land area could be used for bioenergy production, which would significantly limit the role of biomass. However, if – accepting the restrictions mentioned – not existing productive area is foreseen as location, but the re-afforestation of desertification areas were targeted, the full potential could be exploited. This would require significant investments, but would also provide long-term positive side effects: the carbon fixed in humin soil components is stored for a long time, provides water storing capacity and improves soil quality. The trees provide a local source of energy and construction material, and a carbon free one (as only soil carbon was counted for the 18 billion tons sequestration potential, this is no double counting). Energetically, this is the

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most efficient land use option (afforestation yielding up to 200 GJ/ha, sugar beet about 100, potato 80, maize 50 and wheat 40, and the latter with a negative life cycle energy balance due to the inputs required), and it offers opportunities for rural development in 3rd World countries. Finally, it is an economically attractive option, as afforestation is significantly cheaper (see below). 2. Cost Aspects 2.1. SINK FUNCTION: SEQUESTRATION

Sequestration costs in Germany are estimated by the German Chemical Society to be between 2 and 5 €/ton CO2 stored in the soil (containing 9/10 of the biomass in European forests); 2 € for fast growing trees and 5 € for forests with local species in sustainable forestry, whereas in the South the cost would be below 1 €/ton. This is an attractive solution given estimated costs of 18–60 €/ton CO2 for sequestration plus additional 10–24 €/ton CO2 for transport. 2.2. SOURCE FUNCTION: ENERGY GENERATION

The plants most frequently used in Europe and the US, maize, soy and sugar beet, have a disappointing energy balance, and cannot survive in the market without massive subsidies (production supporting subsidies, the kind to be abolished under the WTO negotiations). Other plant energy sources, like short rotation crops, shrubs or fast growing grasses like the “elephant grass” Miscanthus could be commercially viable with CO2 permission certificate prices of constantly more than 16 €/billion, but would require significant inputs of water and nutrients. The economically most viable (but environmentally not benign) option is fast growing trees, with the wood mostly used for heat and electricity production, and a limited amount of chemical con-version of celluloses to methanol as energy carrier (less risky than hydrogen). Wood heating is already viable today, with an annual surplus of about 750–1,000 € per household boiler and government subsidies supporting the installation of wood heating systems in a number of EU countries. This kind of rather small scale production system might offer significant opportunities for rising farm incomes. The production of biofuels in large-scale agro-industrial systems with centralised refineries, be it palm oil plantations, the Latin American “Soya Republic” or the US maize belt, is not only the least energy efficient, least climate preserving (indeed it is most often counter-productive) and the least job creating alternative, but in the medium and long term the most profitable


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one. The economic benefit, however, will mostly accrue to those involved in refining, distribution and selling the final product. Consequently, upstream venture capital investments increased eightfold 2004–2006. With vertical integration and oligopolistic ownership structures, restricted market entry and limited competition are to be expected, and thus limited opportunities for small holders and the local producers.2 In Brazil, where the agro-business contributes ¼ to the 800 billion $GDP, it is just four families who amongst them share the sugarcane production. and oil, grain, car and bio-industry begin to prepare cross-sectoral conglomerates to prepare for the “biofuel age” (despite the limited production potentials noted earlier). Such vertical integration processes tend to leave little room for the prospect of rural development. Furthermore, these investments are not risk free, despite the expected bio-bonanza. As almost any crop, anywhere can be used, and as bioenergy prices are closely linked to developments in the agricultural and the energy market, the bioenergy market is extremely versatile (Verdonk et al., 2007). 2.3. WARNING

In any case it must be clear that bio-sequestration, and even more so bioenergy production, are no catch-all solutions. To avoid developing into new technological lock-ins as hard to overcome as the current fossil fuel fix, biomass use should always be embedded into an overall sustainable development strategy, with technology assessments for all applications and sustainability assessments for all projects, plans, and policies, evaluating them against economic, social, institutional and environmental sustainability criteria. Such a strategy, to be convincing, also needs an explicit discussion on what should be sustained, for whom and at whose expense. 3. Use Options Biomass can be used for a diversity of purposes – the question is not if, but how to use it for a future-proof strategy, balancing food, feed, biodiversity, climate and energy demands. These diverse interests are not only competing for resources (land, water, …), but also for the hegemony on setting land use criteria. On the one hand, the main objective for CO2 sequestration and biomass production is a maximum yield of dry biomass (for energy use, industrial and construction materials per hectare). On the other, for landscape

______ 2

Although with crude oil process above 80 $/billion, ethanol, producers can offer up to 40 $/tons maize, as external costs are not taken into account.

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preservation, biodiversity protection (including, but not restricted to agro-biodiversity), sustainable food production, the dominant objective is extensification (incl. organic agriculture) and thereby reduced environmental impacts, including the protection of soil and its fertility, ground water etc. The former calls for permanent increase, needs no local contextualisation and is in a process of being organised in large, multinational business coalitions, where-as the latter accepts if not requires limits to yield increases, uses small scale technologies, needs to be embedded in local socio-environmental development strategies and benefits mainly local/rural actors. 4. Global System, Central Use: Biofuels, Biofools Ambitious targets for biomass use, in particular for biofuels, set in the EU and the USA cannot be met by domestic production, but from the outset rely on imports from 3rd World countries, at a time when the IPCC forecasts predict significant reductions of agricultural yields e.g. in Africa, and temporary increases in Europe and the USA (IPCC, 2007). Wolfgang Sachs, a German researcher and author, calls this approach “a reactualisation of colonial-imperial attitudes (Sachs and Santarius, 2007).” The European Commission calls for a “balanced mix” of domestic production and imports, but this would mean to increase the EU’s net land import significantly3 (Spangenberg, 1995), up to 50%, the more the larger the share of imports. And how big this share will be most probably cannot be determined politically, as under the current trade regime measures to restrict imports to keep that balance are hardly legally permitted. A number of 3rd World countries sees this as an opportunity not to be missed; Brazil plans to increase its 16 million litres ethanol production by another 12 million litres by 2015; besides the 6 million hectares used for sugar cane today (equivalent to the combined area of the UK and the BeNeLux countries), another 20 million hectares have been declared “suitable” as of minor value, and opened for commercial development. They include parts of the Mata Atlantica (the coastal forest is home to more biodiversity than the Amazon), the Pantanal (the world’s most important wetland) and the Cerrado – probably the biggest assault ever on biodiversity. According to past experience, the people replaced here would migrate to the Amazon, increasing the already heavy losses of currently 325,000 ha/year and further accelerating biodiversity losses. To become a “world supplier of food and energy”, providing 10% of the world’s fuel demand (HoltGimenez, 2007), besides extended sugar cane plantations, another 12

______ 3

The total area of land outside Europe permanently used to supply the EU (net balance average).


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million hectares are foreseen for the production of bio-diesel from soy beans. In total, the agricultural area is foreseen to grow by half until 2020. A similar development takes place in South-East Asia (in particular Indonesia and Malaysia which plan to cover 20% of the EU diesel demand), where palm oil plantations (as the best available diesel source) have been growing rapidly at the expense of virgin forests. Indonesia is tripling its plantation area – and in the course of the process will loose 98% of its forests (hence the nickname “deforestation diesel”). Production sites and refineries are mushrooming in Malaysia, Singapore, but also in Europe (Rotterdam), with capital from all over the world. Despite its rapid spread, this trend does not at all contribute to reducing the global CO2 emissions – in life cycle perspective, including emissions from felling, draining, planting, fertilising, harvesting, processing and transporting, in particular the emissions from underground stocks in the case of clear felling of forests, and from subsoil biomass degradation in the case of wetland draining, the production of palm oil causes 33 t of CO2 emissions, 10 times as much as the production from crude oil. In this case, accelerated biodiversity loss and enhanced climate change problems go hand in hand. Other problems of this strategy are the high water demand (3–5 l water for 1 l of ethanol) and the nitrogen applied as fertiliser (now 45 million tons/year), which has not only doubled the natural volume of the nitrogen cycle, but also evaporates in particular from tropical agriculture as N2O, a greenhouse gas 300 times as effective as CO2. Maize and soy, used for biofuels, also accelerate erosion, leading to soil losses up to 6.6 t/ha in the USA, and 12 t/ha in Argentina. According to the UK government the impacts of biofuel production constitutes “the main environmental risk” these days, but it sees no chance to limit the damages as – once a market exists, as the one created by the EU biofuel targets – under the WTO regime only the quality of the product, not the impacts of the production process constitute a legal reason for import regulations. Besides the environmental, there are serious social impacts in the making: Whereas 200 ha of land in average provide jobs for about 70 people in tropical countries, it is 20 in palm oil and sugar cane plantations (badly paid), four for eucalyptus plantations, and one for soy (economies of scale will further worsen the relation). Furthermore, as energy prices are driving the food prices upwards, the prices for basic staple food is expected to increase by 1/5 to 1/3 by 2010 and 1/3 to 4/3 by 2020 – a catastrophe for the poor who already spend 50–80% of their household income on food. As with 1% increase of food prices, in average the nutrition of 16 million people becomes precarious, the current trends if unabated would lead to 1.2 billion people in starvation, twice as much as estimated earlier and quite the opposite of the Millennium Development Goals.

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Although promises are made to improve the energy balance of biofuel production by “2nd generation” biofuel production, all improvements foreseeable will not bridge the energy density gap, between ca. 10 W/m² for biomass and 10³–104 W/m² for fossil fuels (the energy intensity of energy consumption in cities is ~10² W/m²) (Smil, 2003). This enhances rather than reduces the environmental impact, as these high yielding plants, in order to realise their potentials, are dependent on intensive, large-scale, mostly monoculture agriculture, with high inputs of water, fertilisers and pesticides, a threat to agro-biodiversity, when it is most needed to manage the adaptation to climate change, and the other environmental impacts known from industrialised agriculture. As it is the system, not the plant causing the damages, using “wild” or “natural” plants within the same cropping system does not make a difference. Outside agriculture, but within the same management approach, large afforestation, in particular with fast growing trees leads to homogenisation of forest areas and thus to loss of biodiversity. Other large-scale plans, based on the same philosophy, like flooding low-laying parts of the Sahara desert and using it for the production of marine algae suffer from the same problem of causing unforeseen detrimental side effects which may well overcompensate the initial gains (in this case by changing the global albedo, enhancing the water vapour content of the atmosphere (an effective greenhouses gas), destroying local cultures and biodiversity, without effectively solving the energy scarcity problem. Each of these proposals implies large transport systems with high energy losses (today 1/4 to 1/3), stabilises unsustainable transport and use structures, and is associated with severe environmental side effects (climate change, erosion, eutrophication, etc.). Another proposal for technical optimisation is based on genetic engineering. On the one hand, modified plants are suggested (trees, fast growing graminaceae/grasses), but besides being dependent ob the intensive cropping systems described above, once deliberately released, they can hardly be contained (due to long-range pollen transport) and will inevitably lead to genetic contamination and additional biodiversity loss. If liability regulations along the polluter pays principle were introduced, insurance costs would make such approaches most likely economically unviable. The same holds true for the long-standing attempt to modify GMOs to degrade lignin, cellulose and hemi-cellulose to industrially usable sugars. The work has been going on since 20 years, progress is scarce, and the risk of unintentional releases significant (similarly as for plants fixing their own nitrogen with fungi genes). These are rather high risks given the fact that even if successful such technologies could only deliver a fraction of the global fuel demand.


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Nonetheless even maximum returns from this strategy, even if ignoring social and environmental concerns, could only substitute a marginal part of the current consumption of fossil fuels (for heating, moving and chemicals production). The benefits of sequestration as described earlier do not apply; on the one hand, because soil carbon stocks are released rather than increased, and on the other as to avoid double counting of CO2 benefits (once for sequestration, once for burning the fuel generated as “carbon free source”); a frequent mistake. Large scale biofuel production is clearly a strategy with high costs and low benefits for the public good (although certain private interests may gain significantly from it, illustrating the divergence of public and private goods). The option of large scale biofuel production as a substitute for fossil fuels is thus economically, socially and environmentally unsustainable, may be supported by vested interests’ lobbying, but only biofools could support large scale biofuels. 5. System Integration Bioenergy is no silver bullet – it may play a part in an integrated system of future energy supply. Given the current consumption levels, bioenergy will not be able to deliver any meaningful contribution unless the reduction of total primary energy use of up to 4/5 becomes reality. Confronted with a competition for land and water, choices have been made, between producing food, industrial chemicals (starch, oil, sugars,…), construction materials (wood, straw), energy, and for biodiversity presservation or CO2 sequestration. In terms of contributing to climate change mitigation, the most effective and cost-efficient use of biomass seems to be carbon sequestration by biological fixation, e.g. by afforestation and establishment of protected areas (both also beneficial for biodiversity preservation). The second-best option in terms of climate impact (and probably the best one in economic terms, limited by the low energy density of the biomass available) is the use of bio-waste as a relevant source of local energy needs, in particular in agricultural areas. Using biomass from biotope management can even enhance the economic viability of biodiversity preservation measures. For reasons of conversion efficiency, to maximise climate protection and minimise other environmental impacts, energy generation should focus on heat, electricity and biogas, and not on biofuels. Technically, the former are typically produced in small scale plants for regional markets, whereas the latter tends to be a large-scale industry with high local impacts and limited benefits, at least in the medium and long term.

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If any, some small scale bio-diesel production for agricultural equipment can be part of a sustainable production pattern, avoiding high intensity agriculture, with annual plants (maize, rape), enhanced vulnerability to erosion, soil compactation, pollutant emission (pesticides, fertilisers), and reduced suitability for species survival. Making biofuel production supportive to local communities requires improved governance on all levels, including integrated land management systems based on local ownership, implying – in particular in many 3rd World countries – agrarian ownership reforms (in Brazil, as mentioned, sugar cane production is in the hands of only four families). Instead of setting ambitious targets for biofuel use in Europe, transport policy must aim at reducing fuel demands (otherwise one international dependency is replaced by another), set standards (e.g. FSC-like socioenvironmental certification) as mandatory for biofuels imported (accepted under the WTO regime – or the regime must be changed) (Verdonk et al., 2007). 6. Conclusion The bio-fuelled world is a fata morgana, an illusion created to pretend that there is a kind of problem solving technical change which requires no real change of economic structures and consumption behaviour. While offering large, vertically integrated conglomerates the opportunity to cash in substantial revenues (in particular with rising oil prices) it is causing a costly illusion, reducing the capabilities for climate change mitigation and adaptation, reducing the local/rural development potentials, and threatening to further accelerate the loss of biodiversity instead of halting it. “Nobody will convince me that it is fruitless to support reason against its enemies. Let us repeat again and again the things said a thousand times before, to make sure they have not been said one time too little in the end.” Berthold Brecht 1952


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References European Environment Agency, 2006, Greenhouse Gas Emission Trends and Projections in Europe 2006, Report 9/2006. Office for the official publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg. Holt-Gimenez, E., 2007, The Biofuel Myths, International Herald Tribune, July 10. http:// www.foodfirst.org/node/1716 IPCC, 2007, IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007. IPCC Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007, Synthesis Report. IPCC, New York, 23 pp. Sachs, W. and Santarius, T. (eds.), 2007, Fair Future – Resource Conflicts, Security & Global Justice, Zed Books, London, 288 pp. Schindler, J. and Zittel, W., 2006, Alternative World Energy Outlook 2006: A Possible Path Towards a Sustainable Future, Advances in Solar Energy, 17, pp. 1–44. Smil, V., 2003, Energy at the Crossroads: Global Perspectives and Uncertainties MIT, Cambridge, MA. Spangenberg, J.H., 1995, Ein zukunftsfähiges Europa – Towards Sustainable Europe. Zusammenfassung einer Studie aus dem Wuppertal Institut. Wuppertal Papers 42, pp. 1–66. Verdonk, M., Dieperink, C. and Faaij, A.P.C., 2007, Governance of the Emerging Bioenergy Markets, Energy Policy, 35(7), pp. 3909–3924.

COST AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION MEASURES

NATASA MARKOVSKA*, MIRKO TODOROVSKI, TOME BOSEVSKI, AND JORDAN POP-JORDANOV Research Center for Energy, Informatics and Materials, Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts (ICEIM-MANU), 2, Krste Misirkov, Skopje, Macedonia

Abstract: A case study approach is applied in order to evaluate climate change mitigation measures in the energy sector in a SEE country with economy in transition. Starting point of the analyses were the findings and recommendations of the Working Group on Mitigation (WG3) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Bangkok, May 2007. The applied evaluating model is GACMO, which compares each mitigation option with the baseline and determines its economic and environmental effectiveness. Almost half of the considered options are shown to be of winwin type, which can be partially explained by the high energy intensity of the national economy, although their environmental effectiveness is relatively low. On the other hand, options with the largest mitigation potential are shown to be most difficult for implementation, mainly due to the lack of financing and low prospects for attracting foreign investments, as well as legislative and administrative barriers.

Keywords: Energy and environment, climate change mitigation, marginal costs.

______ *

To whom correspondence should be addressed: Natasa Markovska, Research Center for Energy, Informatics and Materials, Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts (ICEIM-MANU), 2, Krste Misirkov, Skopje, Macedonia; E-mail: [email protected]


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1. Up-to-date Assessments of Global Climate Change Mitigation The latest elaboration of the scientific, technological, environmental, economic and social aspects of mitigation of climate change is comprised in the WG III contribution to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007). Therein, it was confirmed that the global greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions have grown since pre-industrial times, with an increase of 70% between 1970 and 2004. Moreover, with current climate change mitigation policies and related sustainable development practices, global GHG emissions will continue to grow over the next few decades. On the other side, both bottom-up and top-down studies indicate that there is substantial economic potential for the mitigation of global GHG emissions over the coming decades (short and medium term mitigation, until 2030), that could offset the projected growth of global emissions or reduce emissions below current levels. The specific mitigation costs (carbon prices) range from negative values to over 100 US$/t CO2-eq. Also, all regions and sectors (energy supply, transport, buildings, industry, agriculture, forestry, waste) have the potential to contribute, through implementation of adequate technologies and practices. The macro-economic costs for the GHG emissions reduction, required for achieving the stabilization level of CO2-eq concentration between 535 and 590 ppm, are estimated to 0.2–2.5% reduction in the global GDP. As to the long-term mitigation (beyond 2030), the lower stabilization level assumed the more quickly emissions would need to peak and to decline thereafter. Specifically, the stabilization level of 535–590 ppm which corresponds to 2.8–3.2°C rise in global mean temperature, would require GHG emissions to peak between the year 2010 and 2030 and in the year 2050 to achieve reduction of –30 to +5% compared to the emissions of the year 2000. Mitigation efforts over the next two to three decades will have a large impact on opportunities to achieve lower stabilization levels. For stabilization at around 550 ppm, carbon prices should reach 20–80 US$/t CO2-eq by 2030 or 5–65 if “induced technological change” happens. This highlights the need for more efficient R&D efforts and investment in new technologies during the next few decades, intertwined with the Government support for effective technology development, innovation and deployment through financial contributions, tax credits, standards setting, market creation. All these findings/recommendations are significantly relevant at regional/national level, differing from country to country.

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2. Climate Change Mitigation in Macedonian Conditions The national climate change mitigation assessments, presented in this paper, are based upon the analyses conducted by the authors for the purpose of the national communications under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (ICEIM-MANU, 2003a, b, 2006) and the technology needs assessment in the energy sector (ICEIM-MANU, 2004). As per national GHG inventory (ICEIM-MANU, 2006) the energy sector in Macedonia accounts for about 70% of the total GHG emissions. The main domestic sources of energy are lignite (primarily for electricity generation), and firewood (used by households for heating and cooking). Hydropower is about 8–10% of energy supply. In the last years, over 40% of the energy was imported. In short, the most important problems the energy sector faces are unfavorable energy mix with high prevalence of lignite, strong dependence on energy import, poor condition of the energy systems and high degree of inefficiency in energy production and use. On top is the absence of strategy and long-term lack of strategic planning. All this makes the energy the most important national target sector for implementation of climate change mitigation measures. 2.1. EXAMINED MITIGATION MESAURES

When selecting country-specific mitigation options in the energy sector for economic and environmental evaluation, two criteria were taken into account: prospects for implementation in national conditions and existence and availability of relevant studies and other materials providing input data for the evaluation. Thus, the selected sixteen mitigation technologies include: (1) Introduction of liquid fuel in power generation; (2) New hydro power at Boskov Most; (3) Mini hydro power, 4 plants of 1 MW; (4) Wind power plants; (5) Landfill gas power plant; (6) Geothermal heating for greenhouses and hotels in Bansko; (7) Biogas from sewage water and animal manure in small agricultural industries; (8) Grid-connected photovoltaic systems; (9) Solar heater for hot water in individual houses; (10) Efficient air conditioning; (11) Efficient refrigerators; (12) Large solar heaters for hot water in public buildings and industry; (13) Efficient office lighting; (14) Efficient motors; (15) Efficient boilers; and (16) Replacement of bus diesel motors.

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For each mitigation option the data sources and all necessary input data have been identified. In addition, underlying assumptions (fuel prices, fuel mix, emission factors) have been made, providing the key-parameters for the evaluation of the mitigation measures. 2.2. ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION

Applying the evaluating model GACMO (Fenhann, 1999), specific costs (US$/t CO2-eq) and environmental effectiveness (reduced tons CO2-eq) of the selected mitigation options were determined (Table 1). The basis for the mitigation analysis is a baseline scenario for GHG emissions from the base year to the target year, which is 2010 (mid year of the first Kyoto commitment period). The mitigation scenario combines the emissions from the baseline scenario with the changes (reductions) in emissions introduced by the various mitigation options being evaluated. A unit type for the new technology has been defined, along with the penetration rate of the mitigation technology in the country. The combined representation of reduction/cost indicators is shown by marginal cost mitigation curve (Figure 1), with the achievable reduction in the horizontal axis and the specific cost of the mitigation options in the vertical axis. The total achievable reduction (if all considered options are implemented with the assumed breakthrough rate) in 2010 is estimated to be 3.55 Mt CO2-eq, which is 19.74% of the baseline emissions. The application of efficient industrial boilers (annual reduction of 1.48 Mt CO2-eq) and the introduction of liquid fuel in electricity production (annual reduction of 1.24 Mt CO2-eq) are the greatest contributors to the overall emission reduction. The most cost effective option appears to be the application of geothermal energy in greenhouses and hotels followed by the replacement of old bus engines with more efficient ones, having high negative costs as a result of the very poor performances of the old engines. On the other hand, PVs connected to electric grid is by far the most expensive option due to the present high initial investments. The largest portion of achievable reduction can be realized at price between 20 and 70 US$/t CO2-eq.


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TABLE 1. Costs and environmental effectiveness of the mitigation measures (ICEIM-MANU, 2004) Mitigation option

Specific costs (US$/t CO2-eq)

Unit type

Emission reduction (t CO2-eq/ unit)

Units Emission reduction in 2010 in 2010 Cumulative Per Mt/year Percentage option of baseline Mt/year emissions in 2010 (%)

Geothermal heating –187.15 1 unit 2,269.34 1 0.0023 0.0023 Replacem. bus diesel motors –171.49 1 bus 22.75 2,000 0.0455 0.0478 Efficient lighting –24.98 1,000 bulbs 87.60 200 0.0175 0.0653 Efficient 1 refrigerators –8.63 refrigerator 0.58 150,000 0.0876 0.1529 Hydro power (Boskov Most) –4.09 1 plant 202,195.87 1 0.2022 0.3551 Efficient motors –3.22 1 kW 0.78 25,000 0.0194 0.3745 Landfill gas power –2.85 1 plant 112,232.58 1 0.1122 0.4868 Wind turbines 4.16 1 MW 2,872.98 50 0.1436 0.6304 Mini hydro power 7.21 4 MW plant 12,423.71 1 0.0124 0.6428 Large solar heater 11.70 1 unit 62.16 200 0.0124 0.6553 Resid. solar water heating 19.35 1 unit 1.32 100,000 0.1320 0.7873 Liquid fuel in power generat. 22.71 1 plant 1,238,139.75 1 1.2381 2.0254 Biogas from agro-industry 43.21 1 digester 11,699.89 3 0.0351 2.0605 Efficient indust. boilers 63.93 2 t steam 29,652.40 50 1.4826 3.5431 Air condit. 1 air (residential) 70.51 conditioner 0.16 60,000 0.0094 3.5525 PVs connected to electric grid 398.22 1 kW 1.10 500 0.0006 3.5531 The total baseline emissions in 2010 are projected to 18 Mt CO2-eq.

0.01

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Figure 1. Marginal cost curve for the considered mitigation measures (Section 2.1) (ICEIMMANU, 2004)

3. Conclusions As stated by IPCC WG III, the effectiveness of climate change mitigation depends on national circumstances, design of policies, their interaction, stringency and implementation. Typical for Macedonian conditions is the so-called win-win implementation, as almost half of the considered mitigation options have shown to be with negative specific costs. However, their environmental effectiveness is relatively low, with cumulative potential to reduce the total baseline emissions for 2.7%. These options are good starting point for promotion and reinforcement of mitigation technologies and practices. The rationale behind is the full compliance with the leading role of the economic criteria in the decision-making. Still, the problem of finding financial sources for initial investments remains to be resolved. On the other hand, options with the largest mitigation potential are shown to be most difficult for implementation, mainly due to the lack of financing and low prospects for attracting foreign investments, as well as legislative and administrative barriers. The implementation of these measures can be supported combining administrative policies, which focus on the necessary regulations, with economic policies, which strive to modify the behavior of the stakeholders, and the criteria according to which their energy-related decisions are adopted.


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References Fenhann J., Introduction to the GACMO Mitigation Model, in: Economics of Greenhouse Gas Limitations, Handbook reports, UNEP, Risø National Laboratory, Denmark, 1999, ISBN: 87-550-2574-9. ICEIM-MANU Team, Inventory of Greenhouse Gases Emissions, in: Macedonia’s First National Communication under the UNFCCC, Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning/UNDP, 2003a, pp. 29–46. ICEIM-MANU Team, GHG Mitigation Analysis and Projections of Emissions, in: Macedonia’s First National Communication under the UNFCCC, Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning/UNDP, 2003b, pp. 47–84. ICEIM-MANU Team, Evaluation of Technology Needs for GHG Abatement in the Energy Sector, Final Report, Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning/UNDP, 2004. ICEIM-MANU Team, Inventory of Greenhouse Gases Emissions for the Second National Communication under the UNFCCC, Final Report, Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning/UNDP, 2006. IPCC Working Group III, Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, 2007; http://www.ipcc.ch

SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN CROATIA – WASTE AND CLIMATE CHANGE DANIEL R. SCHNEIDER* Ministry of Environmental Protection, Physical Planning and Construction, Ul. R. Austrije 14, HR-10000 Zagreb, Croatia Abstract: The environmental protection represents the financially most demanding chapter of accession negotiations in the process of the EU accession of Croatia. The costs however do not appear high when compared with the expected benefits such as: better public health, more rational use of natural resources, higher quality of life and others. Some of the areas in which the largest funding is needed are waste management, waste water treatment, industrial pollution prevention and control, and climate change mitigation. According to the new Waste Management Plan, construction of county and regional waste management centers is envisaged where the waste will be processed in a sustainable manner (with material and energy recovery), in order to reduce the quantity of waste that is landfilled and decrease its reactivity. The existing landfills (mainly not in compliance with regulations) will be remedied and closed in five years period. Some of them will become transfer stations or recycling yards. The Republic of Croatia has recently ratified the Kyoto protocol after almost four years of negotiations, mainly about the greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions level in the base year. By doing that Croatia has taken obligation to reduce its overall GHG emissions by at least 5% below the 1990 level during the commitment period 2008–2012. In order to reach that goal Croatia will have to implement different cost-effective measures such as use of renewable energy sources (mainly wind, biomass and solar energy), increase the energy efficiency in industry, service and building sector, introduce biofuels in transport etc. The activities on introducing the national emission trading scheme have already commenced in Croatia.

______ * Daniel R. Schneider, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Physical Planning and Construction, Ul. R. Austrije 14, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia. E-mail: [email protected]


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Keywords: Waste management, climate change mitigation, legislation.

1. Introduction In recent decades two important principles marked the course of a number of national environmental policies and strategies. Those principles are the sustainable management and the integrated environmental management. By definition the sustainable development is the economic and social development of the society which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs and enables long-term conservation of environmental quality and biological diversity. Moreover, the integrated environmental management is a set of interrelated and harmonized decisions and measures the purpose of which is to achieve integrated environmental protection, to avoid and reduce environmental risk and to improve and achieve efficient environmental protection. One of the main advantages of the Republic of Croatia is its very well preserved environment and biodiversity. This fact, along with favorable climatic conditions, long developed coast and convenient geographic position in Europe, gives a sound base for strengthening of tourism as one of the main industries in Croatia. So, among other things, it is crucial to preserve the Adriatic Sea integrity, its coast and islands. Therefore, the Government of Croatia decided that if it wants to keep such environment for the future generations, Croatia should invest heavily in its protection. Another important factor that drives these efforts is the process of the accession of Croatia to the European Union. The environmental protection represents the financially most demanding chapter of accession negotiations. It is necessary to adopt almost 300 different EC directives regarding the protection of environment. The costs of implementation of these directives were roughly estimated to 12 billion euros1. However, these costs do not appear high when compared with the expected benefits such as: better public health, more rational use of natural resources, higher quality of life and others. Some of the areas in which the largest funding is needed are waste management, waste water treatment, industrial pollution prevention and control, and climate change mitigation. 1.1. LEGISLATION

On that track is enactment of the new Environmental Protection Act (Document, 2007a), popularly known as “small environmental constitution”.

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Replacing 13 year old law it gives the basis for all other acts regarding protection of air, water, sea, soil, health of humans, biodiversity, climate change and other issues. In that law different EC directives regarding environmental protection, number of principles (like “polluters pay” and “responsibility for environmental damage”) and institutions from international treaties, conventions and protocols are embedded, such as: ESPO Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, SEVESO Convention on the transboundary effects of industrial accidents, AARHUS Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in DecisionMaking and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, UN/ECE Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment, etc. In the new law the environment is explicitly defined as an asset of interest to the Republic of Croatia which enjoys its special protection. Furthermore, the sustainable development is incorporated as the main principle, quoting: “Environmental protection ensures integrated preservation of environmental quality, conservation of biological and landscape diversity, rational use of natural assets and energy in an environmentally sound manner, as basic conditions for healthy and sustainable development ”. 2. Waste Management Among the highest priorities of the environmental strategy (Documents, 2002a, b) is the waste management. Number of regulations dealing with the management of the packaging waste, waste tires, waste oils, batteries, used cars, medical waste, waste incineration (or waste-to-energy) etc. are already enacted or will enter into the force very soon. The most demanding areas are (Document, 2005): remediation of landfills which are not in compliance with regulations, establishment of waste management centers and remediation and closure of highly polluted Industrial sites inherited from the past times. Currently, the remediation of around 300 official landfills is under way, of which about 10% of landfills are remediated. Also there are around 3,000 illegal dumpsites. Up to now around 220 dumpsite remediations are finished. All existing landfills will be closed in five years period. Some of them will become recycling yards and some will be transfer stations for future waste management centers (WMC). According to the new Waste Management Plan (Document, 2007b) construction of waste management centers are envisaged in which the waste

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will be processed in sustainable manner (with material and energy recovery), in order to reduce the quantity of waste that is landfilled and decrease its reactivity. There are two suggested concepts: county and regional WMC concept. In the first concept (Figure 1) each of the counties of the Republic of Croatia could build its own WMC (only one WMC per each of 21 Croatian counties is permitted, so in total maximally 21 WMC), while according to another concept two or more counties could join to form one

Figure 1. County waste management center concept (Document, 2007b)

regional centre. The preliminary survey showed that it could be 8 regional and 5 county WMC, in total 13 WMC. It is up to the local government (counties) to decide which concept or which technology for waste recovery they will choose. For example, Zagreb county and the City of Zagreb (the capital of Croatia), which together account for almost one third of total waste produced in Croatia, are planning to build waste-to-energy (cogeneration) plant that will burn municipal solid waste and sewing sludge from the city’s waste treatment plant.


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Figure 2. Scheme of mechanical and biological treatment in the waste management center

One of suggested technologies for material and energy recovery of waste is the mechanical and biological treatment (MBT), shown in Figure 2. Municipal solid waste is collected (in the radius of 30 km) and transported to the waste management center. First, waste is mechanically treated in order to separate usable materials such as recyclables and metals (Al, Fe) that could be sold to the market (around 5% of total waste). Then the high calorific part of the waste (around 35%) is used for production of refuse derived fuel (RDF) that is used as a fuel in cement plants and thermal power plants. The methanogenic (biodegradable) part of the waste (another 35%) is first biostabilized and then stored for five years into the bioreactor landfills for biogas production. The biogas, rich in methane, is combusted in gas engines for production of electricity that is used for WMC operation while the rest can be sold to the grid (for which feed-in tariffs are available). One of the byproducts of MBT can also be compost. Possible sources of financing of WMC are: Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency Fund (national fund), local and regional self-government budgets and municipal companies (owned by local self-governments), European funds (IPA pre-accession program, structural funds for member states), bank loans (World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank etc.) and private investments (Private Public Partnership, concessions etc.).

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3. Climate Change Mitigation The Republic of Croatia has recently ratified the Kyoto protocol after almost four years of negotiations, mainly about the GHG emission level in the base year. By doing that Croatia has taken obligation to reduce its overall GHG emissions by at least 5% below the 1990 level during the commitment period 2008–2012 (Figure 3). In order to reach that goal Croatia will have to implement different cost-effective measures such as use of renewable energy sources (mainly wind, biomass and solar energy), increase the energy efficiency in industry, service and household sector, introduce biofuels in transport etc. 44,0

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Figure 3. Scenario for 2012 with projections till 2020 (Document, 2007c)

Croatia has one of the lowest GHG emissions per capita in the EU. The major part of emissions comes from the energy production sector (Document, 2006) (Figure 4). Agriculture and industrial processes contribute in much lesser extent. Also it is noteworthy that half of emissions are removed by land use and forestry. The sudden drop in GHG emissions in the period 1990–1995 is due to very low economic activities during war period and the time of transition towards market economy. Since 1995 the economy is growing, which re-


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Gg CO2 eq 40.000

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Figure 4. GHG emissions and removals in Croatia by sectors, 1990–2004 (Gg CO2eq) (Documents, 2006, 2007c)

sulted in increased emissions. One of the strategic goals is to break that strong correlation between the growth (usually expressed as GDP per capita) and the energy consumption or CO2 emission (currently the factor between these two parameters is one in Croatia), since that is unsustainable in the longer run. Some indicative targets for 2010 for GHG reduction in the energy production sector include: 400 MW of wind power plants, 40 MW of biomass power plants, 80 MW of new cogenerations in industry and 12% energy efficiency increase in oil refining (Document, 2007c). In industry, service and household sector the main goal is to achieve 1% annual energy efficiency increase. Furthermore, all new buildings should have the heat losses below 100 kWh/(m2/year). Every household in Croatia should have at least two fluorescent bulbs. 90% of new domestic appliances should be of the highest EE class (A++, A+, A). 5,000 m2 of solar systems for hot water and heating need to be installed annually. Not all the measures have the same potential for GHG emission reduction (Document, 2007c) (Figure 5).

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Figure 5. Potential of measures for GHG emission reduction in 2010 (Document, 2007c)

Recently, with the Ordinance on the percentage of biofuels in total fuels and the quantity of biofuels that should be put in domestic market in 2007 the Government prescribed that 0.9% of the total energy consumption in 2007 should be replaced by biofuels, which equals 22,000 t of biodiesel (or other biofuels respectively). The goal is to reach 5.75% of biofuels by 2010. Biofuels will be first used in public transport. One of the measures with the highest potential of GHG reduction is in the industry sector i.e. N2O reduction in nitric acid industry, where above 800 Gg CO2eq/year could be reduced. In waste management specific targets to 2010 are: obligatory methane incineration on flare, at least one great MSW power plant, biodegradable waste combustion in cement industry (substitution of at least 20% of fossil fuels).


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In agriculture 90,000–100,000 ha is needed for the biofuels production from rape seed and other oil seeds. For that some structural changes in agriculture are necessary, like concentration of arable areas and modernization in order to increase yield. In the forestry the sustainable forest management is an imperative in order to preserve the current rate of CO2 removals (Figure 4). Some of the measures for GHG reduction do not generate costs but the opposite (Figure 6). Applying the measures of energy efficiency, particularly in household and service sector, it is possible to save money due to the energy savings. Typical rate of return is three to five years. Some of the measures have cost of zero or around zero EUR/tCO2eq. Such are all measures regarding waste (methane incineration on flare, waste-to-energy plants and combustion of RDF in cement plants). Also, very attractive measure having great GHG reduction potential is the selective non-catalytic reduction (SNCR) in the production of nitric acid. Among costlier measures in the range of 30–50 EUR/tCO2eq are wind power plants, and even more biodiesel. The estimation shows that in 2010 the cost of emission reduction will be around 40 million EUR/year, with the average emission reduction cost of 14 EUR/tCO2eq (which is relatively fair, taking into account the price on EU market, which was around 15–25 EUR/tCO2eq). In the Kyoto commitment period the total cost is estimated to 210 million EUR. 550 500

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Figure 6. Possible emission reduction with the differential costs (in respect to referent technology) of measures (Document, 2007c)

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Since the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) showed as the one of the most efficient mechanisms for GHG reduction, the activities on introducing the similar scheme are already commenced in Croatia. First the scheme will come into the life as a national ETS (including around 50–60 installations, above 20 MW, refineries, steel, cement and pulp industry) while in 2010 it will be connected to the European ETS. For that, a number of regulations and instruments is necessary to introduce such as the National Allocation Plan, National Register of GHG etc. On that track is also a new ordinance on CO2 tax (Document, 2007d) that recently entered into the force. All CO2 emitters (stationary sources, above 100 kW of thermal power that corresponds to 30 tCO2/year), which are already paying SO2 and NOX emission fees into the Cadastre of polluters to the atmosphere, will pay the new tax. The Environmental Protection and Energy Efficiency Fund will collect the money and distribute it into the programs and projects of renewable energy and energy efficiency. The benefits of GHG reduction are widely known: decrease of dependency on fossil fuels (annual savings for Croatia will be around 1 million toe of fossil fuels), decrease of vulnerability of economy on sudden peaks in oil prices, security of supply due to greater diversification of energy sources and decrease of dependency on import, new possibilities for entrepreneurship and employment and overall improvement of air quality. Therefore, pollutant emissions harmful for human health and eco-systems will be reduced: SO2 in 2010 for 8,500 t/year (11% reduction), NOX for 5,000 t/year (6.8% reduction) and particles for 250 t/year.

References Document, 2002a, National Environmental Strategy, Official Gazette No.46/02 (2002); http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2002/0924.htm Document, 2002b, National Environmental Action Plan, Official Gazette No.46/02 (2002); http://www.mzopu.hr/default.aspx?ID=4248&Lang=Eng; http://www.nn.hr/clanci/ sluzbeno/2002/0925.htm Document, 2005, Waste Management Strategy of the Republic of Croatia, Official Gazette No.130/05 (2005); http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/2005/2398.htm Document, 2006, Second, Third and Fourth National Communication of the Republic of Croatia under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Physical Planning and Construction (Denona, Zagreb, 2006); http://www.mzopu.hr/doc/CROATIA_National_Communication.pdf Document, 2007a, Environmental Protection Act (draft) (2007); http://www.mzopu.hr/doc/ Prijelog_zakona_zo_19042007.pdf Document, 2007b, Waste Management Plan of the Republic of Croatia (draft) (2007); http://www.mzopu.hr/doc/Plan_gospodarenja_otpadom.pdf


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Document, 2007c, National Strategy and Action Plan for Climate Change Mitigation in the Republic of Croatia (draft) (2007); http://www.mzopu.hr/doc/ Strategij0_UNFCCC_ 05062007.pdf Document, 2007d, Regulation on Unit Charges, Corrective Coefficients and Detailed Criteria and Benchmarks for Determination of the Charge for Emission in to the Environment of Carbon dioxide, Official Gazette No.73/07 (2007); http://www.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeno/ 2007/2280.htm

STUDYING THE “ADDICTION TO OIL” OF DEVELOPED SOCIETIES USING THE MULTI-SCALE INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF SOCIETAL METABOLISM (MSIASM)

MARIO GIAMPIETRO* Institute of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA) Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) Edifici Cn – Campus de Bellaterra 08193 Cerdanyola del Vallès – Barcelona, Spain

Abstract: This paper is organized in three parts. Part 1 introduces relevant concepts used in the rest of the paper. Part 2 presents the approach called Multi-Scale Integrated Analysis of Societal Metabolism (MSIASM), which provides a flexible system of accounting for developing a quantitative analysis of energy conversions and energy flows to study structural and functional changes of socio-economic systems. The peculiarity of this approach is that it makes it possible to handle the epistemological challenge entailed by the metabolism of dissipative systems, which are organized and operating simultaneously on multiple-scales; Part 3 uses the MSIASM approach to study the addiction to oil of developed societies and provides a method to check the desirability and feasibility of potential alternative energy sources to oil.

Keywords: Energy analysis, Multi-Scale Integrated Analysis of Societal Metabolism (MSIASM), Energy Return on the Investment (EROI), alternative energy sources.

______ * Mario Giampietro, Institute of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA) Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB) Edifici Cn – Campus de Bellaterra 08193 Cerdanyola del Vallès – Barcelona Spain. E-mail: [email protected]

F. Barbir and S. Ulgiati, (eds.) Energy Production and Consumption and Environmental Costing . © Springer Science +Business Media B.V. 2008.

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1. Introducing Relevant Concepts 1.1. THE ELUSIVE LINK BETWEEN ENERGY CONSUMPTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

In general terms, there is a clear consensus in the scientific literature that energy plays a key role in shaping the characteristics of human civilizations (Adams, 1988; Allen et al., 2003; Cottrel, 1955; Herendeen, 1981; Debeir et al., 1991; Odum, 1971; Ostwald, 1907; Pimentel and Pimentel, 1979; Slesser, 1978; Smil, 1991; Tainter, 1988; Watt, 1989; White, 1943, 1959; Zipf, 1941). However, the quantification of a direct link between energy use and economic development has proved to be elusive during the first wave of energy analysis in the 1970s and 1980s. In particular, when starting from an economic analysis, both energy inputs and environmental services used by the economy represent only a negligible share of the total GDP of a developed economy. When compared with the relative weight of other factors of production such as labor and capital they hardly seem to play a crucial role in determining the welfare of a society. For this reason, in the second half of last century, several analyses developed within neoclassical economic theory systematically underestimated in their mechanism of accounting the key role that natural resources, energy and environmental services play in determining economic growth (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, 1975; Leontief, 1982; Martinez-Alier, 1987; Mayumi, 2001). Due to the dramatic increase in the price of energy and the general concern for climate change the link between energy consumption and economic growth is finally becoming again a hot topic. This renewed attention for this topic drove into the scientific debate a lot of newcomers, that seem to ignore the large amount of work done in this topic by the pioneers of energy analysis and by those that also in the last decades have been working on this topic. As a matter of fact, there is a consensus among the historic group of energy analysts that studying the link between energy consumption and the performance of an economy requires acknowledging four important points: #1 different energy forms have different qualities depending on the characteristics and the necessities of the given economy – aggregating different energy forms into an overall assessment of PJ can imply loosing valuable information. This means that a quantitative assessment – e.g. 1 MJ referring to a given energy form e.g. coal – cannot be easily reduced to another, in a substantive way, when comparing different types of economies. For example, it is well known that 1 MJ of oil is more useful than 1 MJ of wood for developed societies. On the other hand, for a subsistence society in which farmers do not have tractors but only mules, 1 MJ of hay can result more valuable than 1 MJ of oil (for more see Giampietro, 2006);

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#2 it is crucial to make a distinction between energy carriers (e.g. electricity, fuels) and primary energy sources (e.g. coal mines and oil reserves) when discussing of the performance of an energy sector. This distinction entails acknowledging that there is an unavoidable loss of energy when moving from a MJ of a primary energy source to a MJ of energy carriers. For example it takes 1.2 MJ of oil to make 1 MJ of gasoline accessible to the motorists, and it takes 3 MJ of oil just to generate 1 MJ of electricity (yet to be distributed). Moreover, if the same MJ of electricity is produced using coal or an obsolete power plant the relative cost of conversion can become much higher (e.g. 4 or even 6 MJ/1 MJ). This implies that depending on: (i) the mix of primary energy sources; (ii) the mix of energy carriers used by a society; and (iii) the technology used for the conversion of the primary energy source into an energy carriers, the same amount of primary energy consumed by society can generate a different amount of energy in the form of energy carriers; #3 it is not the amount of energy input (energy carriers) getting into the economy that matters, but the amount of useful work delivered to the economic process. This implies acknowledging that there is a chain of two conversions required to move from the first step “energy source” to the last one “end uses”: (i) primary energy sources are used to generate energy carriers – conversion #1; and then (ii) energy carriers, which are used – at the local scale and outside the energy sector – to fulfill the tasks associated with different end uses of energy (e.g. air-conditioning a house, transporting goods, illuminating streets, producing goods) – conversion #2. This second conversion introduces another degree of freedom over the possible value of the ratio “energy consumption of primary sources” and “output of the economy”. For example, 1 MJ electricity (energy referring to an energy carrier, which implied a given loss of conversion) can generate 20 times more light (lumens) when is used in a high efficient low-pressure sodium lamp rather than in incandescent bulbs – Figure 1a. #4 different economic activities require more or less energy to produce the same amount of added value. This implies that the level of energy intensity of an economy (the overall ratio MJ/$ of an economy) is affected by an additional degree of freedom. Beside the four degree of freedom discussed earlier: (i) the mix of primary energy sources; (ii) the conversion losses associated with the technology adopted to produce energy carriers; (iii) the mix of energy carriers used in the society; (iv) the conversion losses associated with the transformation of energy carriers in end uses; there is another important factor to be considered: (v) the mix of activities used to generate added value. In turn this depends on the profile of end uses adopted by a society (both in production and consumption). Put in another

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way, even assuming the same quality and mix of primary energy sources, the same pattern in the use of energy carriers, the same level of technology for the various conversions, an economy based mainly on metallurgic industries and in a fast period of industrialization (entailing a large investment in building and manufacturing) – e.g. Brazil – will result more energy intensive than an economy based mainly on services and dealing only with the maintenance of its already established infrastructures – e.g. UK – Figure 1b (for more see Ayres in this volume). An overview of the chain of transformations related to energy flows within a socio-economic system is given in Figure 1. As a matter of fact, as soon as these different factors are considered in the analysis (Ayres et al., 2003; Ayres and Warr, 2005; Cleveland et al., 1984, 2000; Hall et al., 1986; Gever et al., 1991; Kaufmann, 1992) the link between energy and economic growth becomes much clearer also in quantitative terms. In relation to this point Cleveland et al. (2000) explain “Together these results suggest that accounting for energy quality reveals a relatively strong relationship between energy use and economic output. This runs counter to much of the conventional wisdom that technical improvements and structural change have decoupled energy use from economic performance”. Obviously, this is not good news. In fact, it implies that a few reassuring concepts adopted in the last decades to characterize the relation between energy and economic growth such as “Environmental Kuznet Curves” or “the dematerialization of developed economies” are misleading in relation to the idea that economic growth has ‘by default’ a benign effect on the environment. As a matter of fact, the changes in energy intensity of developed economies calculated in relation to the ratio “$ (output)/MJ (input)” can be explained by a combination of: (i) Changes in the mix of primary energy sources – economic development has been associated with a move from low quality to high quality energy sources – an increasing consumption of oil has replaced coal and an increasing consumption of natural gas is replacing oil, whenever possible (ii) Changes in the mix of energy carriers – a massive move to more effecttive energy carriers has led to a booming use of electricity. This has made possible a dramatic increase in the efficiency over end uses (conversion #2), which has been capable of compensating the increased cost of production of this more sophisticated energy carrier (conversion #1) (iii) Changes in the mix of end uses in the economy – developed economies transferred the most energy intensive and polluting industries to less developed economies. Rather than producing themselves energy intensive and polluting goods they are now importing those goods.

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Figure 1a. Three categories of energy forms to be considered

Figure 1b. The relevance of the mix of end uses

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When looking at the global level and to the future, the solution adopted by developed economies cannot be easily generalized and repeated all over the world: (i) high quality primary energy sources (oil and natural gas) are finite and the competition for their use will become higher in the future, meaning raising prices. In order to be able to maintain the actual trends the economies of the future will have to find alternative energy sources of the same quality of oil and natural gas (but this does not appear easy for the moment); (ii) the continuous move toward high quality energy carriers (e.g. electricity) will remain unstoppable, due to the high gains in end use efficiency that they make possible. However, this will require a dramatic increase in the demand for high quality primary energy sources (to cover the increase costs of production of electricity) and a large investment for infrastructures associated with the required level of capitalization at the local level (production and distribution of electric power, construction of electric and electronic devices) where the end uses take place; (iii) the trick of externalization (moving the production of energy and polluting intensive industries elsewhere) does not work at the global level. At that level of the whole planet gains of the winners are compensate by losses of the losers. Moreover, developing economies have to build their infrastructure and capitalize their economy and have still to invest their useful work in those sectors that are more energy intensive. 1.2. THE CONCEPT OF SOCIETAL METABOLISM

A holistic view of the influence of and the interrelation among these point can be obtained by adopting the concept of societal metabolism. This concept is based on the idea that human societies have two distinct forms of metabolism (Georgescu-Roegen, 1975; building on Lotka, 1956): (1) an endosomatic metabolism – e.g. food energy converted inside the human body for preserving and sustaining the physiological activity of humans; and (2) an exosomatic metabolism – e.g. energy converted outside the human body with the goal of boosting the output of useful work associated with human activity (e.g. when using tractors, melting metals, moving heavy loads). As a matter of fact, two crucial steps in the history of human civilization – “the discovery of fire” and “the industrial revolution” – can be directly associated with two key changes in the type of conversions of the exosomatic metabolism of human societies. Within this framework “energy security” can be split into two distinct tasks: “food security” and “exosomatic energy security”. The latter requires the compatibility between: (i) the requirement of exosomatic energy of a society (both in quantity and quality), which is associated with the given pattern of production and consumption of goods and services; and (ii) the supply of exosomatic energy

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to a society (both in quantity and quality), which is associated with the operation of its energy sector. The energy sector is the economic sector in charge for carrying out the two tasks: #1 converting primary energy sources into energy carriers; #2 guaranteeing an adequate supply of energy carriers for the given set of end uses (at the local scale). Therefore, an analysis of the metabolism (exosomatic energy security) of a society is analogous to the analysis of the endosomatic metabolism of humans (food security). That is, any nutritionist knows that the “quality” of food energy in the diet cannot be assessed only in generic terms using a single numerical value of “calories/day”. An adequate supply of food to a given population must match the right mix of nutrients (e.g. proteins, fat, fibers), which in turn depends on the gender, age structure and pattern of activities of the population to be fed. This is why any analysis of the exosomatic energy security of a society cannot be done in terms of Joules in/Joules out, but it has to address the characteristics of the energy sector generating the supply of energy carriers and the characteristics of the various sectors consuming this energy carriers for achieving end uses. This is why, the issue of exosomatic energy security can better focus on the “quality” of different energy forms by adopting the concept of societal and/or industrial metabolism (Adriaanse et al., 1997; Ayres and Simonis, 1994; Duchin, 1998; Fischer-Kowalski, 1997; Georgescu-Roegen, 1975; Giampietro, 2000, 2001). This concept entails the existence of systemic properties shared by biological systems, ecosystems and socio-economic systems (all belonging to the class of dissipative systems, which was introduced by the Prigogine school [Prigogine, 1978; Prigogine and Stengers, 1981]). They all require a continuous flow of a specific mix of energy forms and material inputs for expressing their functions and preserving their structures. Within this frame the “quality” of energy sources and energy forms is not substantive (=converter and scale invariant). Any index of quality will depend on: (i) the compatibility with the characteristics of the converter (the user); and (ii) the scale used to represent the conversion. This entails that different forms of energy cannot be easily substitute for each other or aggregated into an overall index (Giampietro, 2006). What is perceived as energy by a virus is not energy for a Jumbo jet. We cannot calculate 1 MJ of chicken meat (which is food energy for humans) as a potential energy carrier to be used for powering cars. To convert chicken meat into an energy carrier for car we have to spend energy and it is not always sure that the overall efficiency of the process is higher than 1. The very definition of energy input and energy carrier can only be given after determining the characteristics of the converter. The main point of this paper is that when adopting this perspective and after considering the characteristics of the metabolism of developed societies (the overall process of extraction, conversion and use of exosomatic energy inputs), it becomes crystal clear that the current addiction to oil

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of human civilization is a serious one. Oil and natural gas have special characteristics as primary energy sources, which are not found in the set of alternative energy sources considered so far. 1.3. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN “HIGH QUALITY” AND “LOW QUALITY” PRIMARY ENERGY SOURCES: THE EROI INDEX (ENERGY RETURN ON THE INVESTMENT)

The discontinuity associated with the industrial revolution was generated by the extreme high quality of fossil energy as primary energy source. This means that to avoid another major discontinuity in existing trends of economic growth (this time in the wrong direction), it is crucial that when looking for future alternative primary energy sources, to replace fossil energy, humans should obtain the same performance, in terms of useful work delivered to the economy per unit of primary energy consumed. This implies looking at the economic process from a biophysical point of view, to characterize the quality of energy sources using the basic rationale of Net Energy Analysis (Gilliland, 1978). In particular, to assess the quality of energy sources this basic rationale suggests to use the following index: *The EROI (Energy Return On the Investment) – it is the ratio between the quantity of energy delivered to society by an energy system and the quantity of energy used directly and indirectly in the delivery process. This index has been introduced and used in quantitative analysis by Cleveland et al. (1984, 2000), Hall et al. (1986), Cleveland (1992), Gever et al. (1991). An overview of the analytical frame behind EROI is given in Figure 2. The total energy consumption of a society depends on its aggregate requirement of useful work (on the right of the graph) which is split between: (i) Net Energy to Society – used for the production and consumption of “non-energy goods and services” – the energy consumption/metabolism of the rest of the society; and (ii) Energy for Energy – used for the internal investment within the energy sector needed to deliver the required energy carriers. This scheme indicates clearly the tremendous advantage of fossil energy over alternative energy sources. In relation to the costs of production of energy carriers, oil has not to be produced, it is already there. Moreover, in the previous century it was pretty easy to get: the EROI of oil used to be 100 MJ per MJ invested! (Cleveland et al., 1984). A very high EROI means that the conversion of oil into energy carriers (e.g. gasoline) and their distribution absorbs only a negligible fraction of the total energy consumption of a society. Basically all the energy consumptions go to cover the needs of society, with very little absorbed in the internal loop “energy for energy”. Moreover, due to the high spatial density of the energy flows in oil fields and coal mines the requirement of land to obtain a large supply of fossil energy carriers is negligible. Finally, waste disposal has never been considered as a major

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environmental issue, until acid rain deposition and global warming forced world economies to realize that there is also a sink side – beside the supply side – in the biophysical process of exosomatic energy metabolism. As a matter of fact, so far, the major burden of the waste disposal of fossil energy has been paid by the environment, without major slash-back on human economies. Compare this situation with that of a nuclear energy in which uranium has to be mined, enriched in high tech plants, converted into electricity in other high tech plants, radioactive wastes have to be processed and then kept away (for millennia!) both from the hands of terrorists and from ecological processes. Conversions related to Energy Security Technology & Infrastructures

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Figure 2. The autocatalytic loop of different energy forms to which the concept of EROI refers to; EROI: the split between (i) energy for energy and (ii) net energy to society

The narrative of the EROI is easy to get across: the quality of a given mix of energy sources can be assessed by summing together the amount of all energy investments required to operate the energy sector of a society and then by comparing this aggregate requirement to the amount of energy carriers delivered to society. This narrative helps visualize the difference that a “low quality energy source” can make on the profile of energy consumption of a society. This is illustrated in Figure 3. The upper part of the figure – Figure 3a – provides a standard break-down of the profile of different energy consumptions over the different sectors of a developed economy. The example adopts an average consumption per capita of 300 GJ/year and an EROI > 10/1. Only less than 10% of the total goes into the energy sector. Let’s assume now that we want to power the same society with a “low quality primary energy source”. For example, let’s imagine a system of production of energy carriers with an overall output/input energy ratio of 1.33.

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The lower part of – Figure 3b (right side) – shows that for 1 MJ of net energy carrier supplied to society the energy system has to generate 4 MJ of energy carriers.

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Figure 3b. An energy sector using “low quality” primary energy sources

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As mentioned earlier, the huge problem with primary energy sources alternative to oil is that they have to be produced using energy carriers. That is, a process of production of primary energy sources must use energy carriers which have to be converted into end uses. This entails a double energetic cost (to make the carriers that will be used then within the internal loop to produce the primary energy required to make the energy carriers). That is, this internal loop translates into an extreme fragility in the overall performance of the system. In fact, the negative consequences of this loop do amplify in non-linear way. A small reduction of about 10% in the output/input ratio – e.g. from 1.33/1 to 1.20/1 implies that the net supply of 1 MJ delivered to society would require the production of 6 MJ of energy carriers rather than 4 MJ (for more on this point see Giampietro and Ulgiati, 2005). The profile of distribution of energy consumptions of a developed society over the various sectors, imagining such a society powered by the “low quality primary energy source” is shown in Figure 3b. Now, if the original level of energy consumption per capita shown in Figure 3a – 279 GJ/year – and the profile of consumption over the various non-energy sectors (90 GJ/year in Final Consumption [residential plus private transportation]; 63 GJ/year in Service and Government; 126 GJ/year in the Productive Sector minus the energy sector) has to be maintained, then the energy sector – with low quality energy sources – would have to consume for its own operations 837 GJ/year per capita. This will bring the total energy consumption of the society at 1,116 GJ/year per capita – an increase of almost four times of the original level of energy consumption per capita! Obviously such a hypothesis is very unlikely. It would generate an immediate clash against environmental constraints, since the industrial and postindustrial metabolism of developed society at the level of 300 GJ/year per capita has already serious problems of ecological compatibility, when operated with fossil energy. But there are also crucial internal factors that would make such an option impossible. Moving to a primary energy source with a much lower EROI would generate a collapse of the functional and structural organization of the economy. In fact the massive increase in the size of the metabolism of the energy sector would require a massive move of a large fraction of the work force and of the economic investments. These hours of labor and investment will have to be moved away from the actual set of economic activities (manufacturing and service sector) toward the building and operation of a huge energy sector, which will mainly consume energy, material and capital for building and maintaining itself.

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1.4. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN “FUND” AND “FLOW” ELEMENTS IN THE REPRESENTATION OF SOCIETAL METABOLISM

In pre-industrial societies the size and number of cities was negligible when compared with the situation experienced now (=almost 50% of world population living in cities!). In fact, the structure of pre-industrial societies was strongly constrained by the ability of rural areas to produce surpluses for the ruling class living in the cities (Cottrel, 1955; Tainter, 1988; Debeir et al., 1991) – Figure 4. The limited ability to generate surplus out of rural activities used to determine the relative size of: (i) “urban-rulers” and “rural-ruled” – calculated in terms of hours of human activity; and (ii) “country-side” and “cities” – calculated in terms of hectares of colonized land – Figure 5. Theoretical ecology has studied the phenomenon of hierarchical organization in natural ecosystems and more in general in dissipative networks (e.g. Odum, 1971, 1996; Ulanowicz, 1986, 1995), based on the effect of reciprocal constraints determined by the structure of the graph of energy conversions. The result of this theoretical work is, that whenever the elements of the networks – the nodes of the network – are capable of maintaining their identity of metabolic elements (=keeping constant in time: (i) the typology of inputs and outputs associated with the conversion; and (ii) the expected range of values for the ratio output/input) then it becomes possible to calculate a series of expected relations between the relative size and level of energy dissipation, energy flows, spatial density over the elements of the network. This property requires the ability of these dissipative, metabolic networks to maintain their own identity simultaneously across different scales – e.g. at the scale of the whole ecosystem, at the scale of the individual species, and finally at the scale of the individual organisms making up a population. This ability is typical of living networks has been described by Rosen (1958) as generating M-R (Maintenance and Repair) networks. These networks generate special properties of their elements – for more see Giampietro (2003) – the identity of each of the lower level elements is affecting the identity of the whole and vice versa in a chicken-egg process (an impredicative loop). Going back to the analysis of the structure of human societies in terms of metabolism, the dramatic discontinuity associated with the industrial revolution can be explained by a dramatic abandonment of this integrated set of relations based on reciprocal constraints. With the massive use of fossil energy, the natural pace of the cycle of nutrients in the agro-ecosystems, which was regulating the possible supply of surplus of energy carriers to the

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Figure 4a. Cities use the surplus of useful energy generated by the countryside

Figure 4b. Agricultural land operates as a fund when generating surpluses

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Figure 5. The hierarchical relation urban/rural, cities/countryside

cities, has been abandoned. The surplus of energy carriers generated by the energy sector is no longer obtained by a given rent associated with available funds, but it is obtained by the depletion of stocks. The clear discontinuity entailed by fossil energy is clearly visible in the graph provided in Figure 6 indicating the changes in: (i) human population; (ii) exosomatic energy consumption per capita; (iii) colonized land per capita; in the last 2,000 years. It is clear, that after the switch to fossil energy humans could get out from the biophysical constraints represented by the limited surplus provided by funds, and were capable of increasing at the same time the population and the consumption of exosomatic energy per capita, while reducing dramatically the amount of colonized land per capita. As a result of this revolution, the flow of energy carriers required to generate useful work is now going from the industrial structure of the societies (the cities) to the rural areas – Figure 7. The difference between Figures 5 and 7 is clear: (1) in pre-industrial societies both the endosomatic and the exosomatic metabolism were dependent on the pace of surplus generated by funds (land, labor, animal power, technical infrastructures such as water mills

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Figure 6. The industrial revolution as a major discontinuity in existing trends due to the massive use of fossil energy

or sailing ships); whereas, (2) in post-industrial societies both the endosomatic and exosomatic metabolism are dependent on the pace of the flows of fossil energy (power and technical inputs are generated using fossil energy) generated by depletion of stocks. A flow-fund model has been proposed by Georgescu-Roegen (1975) for representing, in biophysical terms, the socio-economic process of production and consumption of goods and services. Such a model has the explicit goal to focusing on the distinction between flow coordinates (elements) and fund coordinates (elements). For a more complete explanation of Georgescu’s model see Mayumi 2001, Chapter 6. As explained in the rest of the paper, the concept of a fund-flow model makes it possible to check whether or not an energy sector is viable in relation to the characteristics of the socio-economic process to which it belongs. In fact, an economic system can operate steadily as long as environmental flows of energy and matter are made available by the energy sector to the other sectors, in the necessary amounts, and according to the set of constraints determined by the characteristics of the fund elements.

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Figure 7a. Cities are generating the useful energy used by the countryside

Figure 7b. Agricultural land is no longer a fund when boosted by fossil energy

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2. Presenting the MSIASM Approach Parts of the presentation of the MSIASM approach in this section are based on Giampietro et al. (2007). 2.1. BASIC CHARACTERIZATION OF SOCIETAL METABOLISM OF MULTIPLE SCALES

Building on the insight of Georgescu-Roegen’s flow-fund model, the MultiScale Integrated Analysis of Societal and Ecosystem Metabolism (MSIASEM) approach provides a “bioeconomic” representation of the socio-economic process of production and consumption of goods and services. In fact, it makes it possible to address the biophysical constraints entailed by: (i) the characteristics of each of those economic elements guaranteeing the activities required for both production and consumption; (ii) the process of accumulation of technical capital; (iii) the process of adjustment of demographic variables, and (iv) the environmental loading resulting from the metabolism of society in relation to the supply and sink capacity of the ecosystem embedding it. MSIASM looks at the structure of the human economy in terms of the fund-flow relation over primary productive inputs. An example is given in Figures 8a and 8b, in which the system of accounting is based on: (1) Human activity – which has the characteristics of a fund element, since it provides constraint on what can be done by humans given their limitation of hours of activity per year, and it requires an internal investment of human activity for reproduction and maintenance. This determines a social and biophysical constraint on the supply of labor power. This fund element is measured in hours per year. The total budget of Human Activity represents, on the time scale of one year, the given endowment of hours for which the two complementing compartment of production and consumption compete (it is a proxy of population). (2) Exosomatic energy – which has the characteristics of a flow element, since it disappears over the period of a year. The rate of exosomatic energy consumption in each sector can be assumed to map onto the level of economic activity, at a given level of technology. This flow is measured in Joules per year. The Total Energy Throughput represents, on the time scale of one year, the total energy dissipated by a socio-economic system for supporting the activities of production and consumption of goods and services. For more on the theoretical aspects of this approach see Giampietro and Mayumi (2000a, b), Giampietro (2003), Giampietro and Ramos-Martin (2005).

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Human Activity FUND

population structure

* work load/year * level of education * retirement age * employment

FLOW FUND Metabolic Rate at level n

Level n

Saturation Index of the FUND resource: Human Activity

SIHA7%

EMRSA 12.3 MJ/hour

THE 344 Gh

d

a

Human Activity FUND

Level n-1

HAPW 23 Gh

producing

SPAIN 1999

b

EMRPW 137.7 MJ/hour FLOW FUND Metabolic Rate at level n-1

TET Exosomatic Energy 4,200 PJ FLOW * set of end uses * profile of distribution

g

over end uses

TOET 76%

3,200 PJ ETPW

* efficiency on end uses * mix of energy sources

Technical Overhead on the FLOW resource: Energy Input

FLOW Exosomatic Energy

PRODUCTION – Level n / Level n-1

Figure 8a. MSIASM approach – moving from level n to level n-1 (production)

Societal Overhead on the FUND resource: Human Activity

Human Activity FUND Level n

population structure

SOHA = 93%

* work load/year * level of education * retirement age * employment

THE 344 Gh

d

HAPW

TET Exosomatic Energy 4,200 PJ FLOW

321 Gh Level n-1 Consuming

b

1000 PJ ETPW

EMRHH 3.3 MJ/hour FLOW FUND Metabolic Rate at level n-1

EMRSA 12.3 MJ/hour

a

Human Activity FUND SPAIN 1999

FLOW FUND Metabolic Rate at level n

g SIET = 24%

FLOW Exosomatic Energy

* set of end uses * profile of distribution over end uses

* efficiency on end uses * mix of energy sources

Saturation Index on the FLOW resource: Energy Input

CONSUMPTION – Level n / Level n-1 Figure 8b. MSIASM approach – moving from level n to level n-1 (consumption)

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Getting into the method of accounting: (1) the fund variable – Total Human Activity (THA), the overall size of the fund resource – is equal to the maximum time available per person (24 h × 365 days) multiplied by the population. THA is therefore a proxy for population size; (2) the flow variable – Total Exosomatic Throughput (TET) – is represented in “Joules equivalent” of a particular type of reference energy source (e.g. Oil equivalent) per year used by the economy. These two primary inputs are defined at the level of the whole socio-economic system (level n) in Figure 8a (on the upper right quadrant with a yellow background). In this example referring to Spain in 1999 (data from Ramos-Martin, 2001), the value of THA is 344 Gh (Giga hours = billions hours, which is equivalent to the human activity expressed over a year by 39 million people), whereas the value of TET is 4,200 PJ (Peta joules = 1015 J) of exosomatic energy, which is the energy consumption, measured in Oil Equivalent, of that year. The value of the angle δ can be associated with the value of the Exosomatic Metabolic Rate of 12.3 MJ/h (MJ of exosomatic energy per hour of Human Activity) which was the Societal Average of the pace of exosomatic energy dissipation per hour of human activity in Spain in 1999. This value reflects the specific combination of production and consumption activities taking place in that economy in 1999. The metabolism described in the yellow box as a combination of extensive variables – THA (fund) and TET (flow) -and intensive variable (EMRSA) – the ratio of the two – can be disaggregated further – at the level n-1 – into two lower level compartments: (1) Production – which is measured by the fraction of the total (both of Human Activity invested in the Paid Work sector – HAPW – and Exosomatic Throughput in the Paid Work sector – ETPW). (2) Consumption – which is measured by the fraction of the total (both of Human Activity in the Household sector– HAHH – and Exosomatic Throughput in the Household sector – ETHH). In the example given in Figure 8a, we have that – on the upper left quadrant – the total endowment of THA is reduced 93% because of the “overhead” operating at the societal level on the fund resource Human Activity. That is, the demographic structure (determining a given dependency ratio) and other socio-economic parameters (determining the work load of the economically active population) define the fraction of human activity which is actually invested in the Paid Work sector and an overhead, which is the human activity required to reproduce and maintain the humans outside the Paid Work sector. In the same way, only a fraction of TET is actually invested in the productive sector. In this case, 76% of the TET has

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been used by Spain in the productive sector of the economy, this is the overhead required by the exosomatic compartment for its own maintenance and reproduction. After having calculated for the Productive Sector both the amount of Human Activity (HAPW = 23 Gh) and the amount of Exosomatic Throughput (ETPW = 3,200 PJ), we can calculate the specific Exosomatic Metabolic Rate of that sector – EMRPW = ETPW/HAPW – which in 1999 was equal to 137.7 MJ/h of exosomatic energy per hour of human activity. This level of Exosomatic Metabolic Rate in production (at the level n-1) is much higher than the Societal Average (at the level n). Therefore, we can expect that the other sector associated with the split at the level n-1 – that of consumption – has a lower metabolic rate than the Societal Average. This is confirmed by the analysis provided in Figure 8b. The compartment of the socio-economic system dealing with consumption (the household sector) has a lower level of Exosomatic Metabolic Rate (EMRHH = 3.3 MJ/h) than the societal average. 2.2. THE LINK BETWEEN METABOLIC COMPARTMENTS: THE COMPARTMENTS IN CHARGE FOR PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION MUST COMPETE OVER LIMITING FUND RESOURCES

A simple look at the two set of relations presented in Figures 8a and b clearly indicates a direct link over the values that can be taken by the two sets of intensive and extensive variables defining the metabolism of the two sectors in charge for production and consumption at the level n-1. This direct link is illustrated in Figure 9. On the top, we have the three variables: (i) fund variable (THA); (ii) flow variable (TET); and (iii) the intensive variable determined by their ratio (EMR); all referring to the whole society – what we called the level n. On the bottom, we have the two sets of the same three variables (HAi, ETi, EMRi), which are used to characterize the metabolism of the two sectors PRODUCTION and CONSUMPTION at the level n-1. The link is generated by the fact that the two different couples of angles – α and γ in Figure 9 – which are used to calculate the two levels of overhead on both Human Activity and Exosomatic Throughput on the two compartments of production and consumption are the complement of each other! That is, in order to calculate the reduction of the two extensive variables (fund and flows) when moving from the level n to the level n-1 we can use in one case the tangent and in the other the cotangent of the same two angles. The two compartments of production and consumption – at the level n–1 – compete for the same endowment of the total amount of the two fund and flow variables assessed at the level n.

SOCIETAL METABOLISM FUND variable = 344 Gh METABOLIC RATE = 12.3 MJ/h

Level n THA 344 Gh

321 Gh HAPW

a

EMRHH 3.3 MJ/hour

Level n THA 344 Gh

HAPW

TET 4,200 PJ

producing

b

EMRPH 137.7 MJ/hour

1,000 PJ ETPW

CONSUMPTION

EMRSA 12.3 MJ/hour

d TET 4,200 PJ

Level n-1 23 Gh

g

b

a

a

d

Level n

Total Exosomatic Throughput=4,200 PJ

EMRSA 12.3 MJ/hour

Level n-1 consuming

107

g 3,200 PJ ETPW

PRODUCTION

FUND variable = 321 Gh

FUND variable = 23 Gh

METABOLIC RATE = 3.3 MJ/h

METABOLIC RATE = 137.7 MJ/h

Exosomatic Throughput= 1,000PJ

Level n-1

Exosomatic Throughput= 3,200PJ

Figure 9. The mosaic of representations across two levels (level n/level n-1) considering simultaneously both production and consumption

The existence of this direct link points at a key characteristic of the evolution of the metabolism of human societies. This peculiar characteristic has been addressed by Zipf (1941) when describing nations as “bio-social forms of organization”. Zipf gave a basic principle of socio-economic development: if a given economy wants to be able to produce more, it has to invest more in consuming. In his words, in a developed society, “leisure time becomes a key raw material for boosting the economy”. Here the concept of “investment” refers to the required amount of fund resources (human activity, technical capital and land), which have to be allocated either in producing or consuming to boost the overall ability to produce and consume more. The validity of such an idea was confirmed by the work of the Nobel Prize economist Stone (1961, 1985) when proposing a Social Accounting Matrix, dealing with the characterization of the final consumption sector. This sector can be used as a complement of the Input-Output Matrix of the type proposed by Leontief (another Nobel laureate in economics) to describe the interactions among the various economic sectors in charge for producing. As soon as the coupling is made, the two accounting matrices have to

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change in an integrated way during the process of economic development. This rationale implies that socio-economic development must be based on the ability of reaching a dynamic balance between allocations of fund resources (Human Activity, Technical Capital – exosomatic machines – and Colonized land) over the two socio-economic compartments associated with producing and consuming. 2.3. MOSAIC EFFECT: MOVING THE ANALYSIS ACROSS MULTIPLE LEVELS

The same rationale used when disaggregating compartments across levels (when moving from level n to level n-1), can be used to move from level n-1 to level n-2. In this section we will provide an example of further disaggregation in relation to the compartment of Paid Work – as defined at the level n-1. The PW sector can be further disaggregated, at the level n-2, into three broad sub-sectors: (i) SG = services and government; (ii) PS = Productive Sector (which includes Manufacturing and Energy and Mining); and (iii) AG = agricultural sector (which include forestry and fishery). This can also be done for the household sector (e.g. dividing this sector between rural and urban households, and then by splitting them over different typologies of households associated with income classes), but this is not the aim of this paper. An example of the representation of the metabolism of a society which covers different levels – i.e. moving from level n to level n-2 after splitting the sector PW in sub-sectors – is given on the right side of Figure 10. We can either adopt the representation based on three bars of different size, for each of the three sub-sectors (SG; PS; and AG) the width of the bar is determined by the characteristics EMRi of the sector i – an intensive variable – and the height of the bar is determined by HA i, the amount of hours of the fund variable Human Activity – an extensive variable. The extensive variable ETi is then associated with the area of each bar. Within this system of representation the aggregated area of the three bars describing the three sub-sectors SG, PS and AG at the level n-2 must be equal to the area of the bar representing the sector PW, at the level n-1. Alternatively, when adopting the representation based on the “4-angle figure”, one can move from a level to another (in this example from level n-1 to level n-2) by calculating the reductions of both funds and flow variables when moving across levels, according to their relative overheads (as done in Figure 8 when moving from level n to level n-1).

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Figure 10a and b. The mosaic of representations across multiple levels; Top: only in relation to production; Bottom: production and consumption in parallel

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2.4. IMPREDICATIVE LOOP ANALYSIS: THE FORCED CONGRUENCE BETWEEN THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE “EXPECTED” SUPPLY AND THE “DELIVERED” SUPPLY OF METABOLIC FLOWS

As discussed in Part 1: (i) the characteristics of the requirement of exosomatic energy from the energy sector should depend on what is “expected” by the rest of society, which in turn depends on the specific pattern of consumption – i.e. by the size and the metabolic rate of the various compartments in charge for consumption – see Figure 3; and (ii) the characteristics of the supply of exosomatic energy delivered are determined by the quality of energy resources and technological coefficients adopted in the energy sector. In turn this will determine the amount of working time and the supply of net energy per hour of labor in that sector – the reader can recall here Figure 1. Therefore the check of the compatibility between what expected and what can be delivered requires the ability to characterize the “demand” of society, which refer to the characteristics of the whole – defined at the level n – and “the supply” of the energy sector, which refer to the characteristics of one of the sub-sectors of the Productive Sector – at the level n-3. According to the system of accounting illustrated so far, this implies a jump over three levels of analysis: whole society as the level n; the Paid Work sector (related to the distinction Production versus Consumption) is the level n-1; the Productive Sector (related to the distinction Service and Government versus the set of activities stabilizing both the endosomatic and exosomatic metabolism), is the level n-2; and finally the definition of the Energy Sector, as a sub-sector of PS, is at the level n-3. Establishing a relation of congruence between elements defined and characterized at different hierarchical levels requires the introduction of another conceptual tool. The second conceptual tool of MSIASM presented here is called Impredicative Loop Analysis (ILA). It has the goal of checking the congruence between: (A) the expected power level in the supply of a given flow, which should be delivered from a given fund element (what is expected by “the rest of the society from that given element”). What is expected is determined by the characteristics of higher level compartments; and (B) the actual supply per hour of work of that given flow, that can be delivered by the given element in charge of the supply. What can be delivered by a given fund element is determined by the set of conversions occurring in that element. Therefore an ILA implies checking the feasibility of a dynamic budget in terms of the congruence between two characterizations referring to different hierarchical levels – a demand reflecting the characteristics of the whole and a supply reflecting the characteristics of a part (for more see

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Giampietro and Mayumi, 2003a). This to say that the two characterizations of a given metabolized flow – at the level n – is non-equivalent to the characterization of the biophysical constraints determining the supply of such a flow at a lower level (at the level of the specialized compartment in charge for delivering such a supply) – e.g. at the level n-i. To avoid another long theoretical discussions let’s use the self-explanatory example given in Figure 11.

Figure 11. Impredicative Loop Analysis (ILA) basic rationale. Assessing the internal biophysical constraint on the congruence between requirement of the whole and theability to deliver of the specialized compartment in charge for it – e.g. mail delivery

As a matter of fact, the MSIASM approach is very general and it can be used for studying different types of metabolized flows (e.g. energy, food, water, money). In this example, the ILA is applied to the “metabolism of letters” in a hypothetical society. The meta-model of analysis of ILA follows an approach similar to the Mosaic Effect across levels in Figure 10. That is, on the top right quadrant we have a characterization of the metabolism at the level of the whole society: (1) the fund variable is human activity, related to a population of 1,000 people, which translated into a value of THA of 8.76 Mh/year; (2) the flow variable is the amount of letters sent and delivered per year, which is 24,000; (3) the metabolic rate (the ratio over the two) is equal to two letters sent per person per month,

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which result in a Mail Metabolic Rate of 0.003 letters per hour in this society (this is indicated by the δ angle in the figure). The angle on the top, left quadrant – the α angle – indicates the reduction of Human Activity due to the split between production and consumption (associated with the ratio of HAPW/ THA). In this example only 11.5% of the total Human Activity is available for the sector Paid Work. The next angle to be calculated is the κ angle in the figure. Contrary to what done in an analysis looking for Mosaic Effect, when performing an ILA, this angle must include all the other reductions of human activities, which have to be summed, resulting from a movement down through different hierarchical levels, to arrive to the special compartment in charge for guaranteeing the supply of the particular flow considered in the analysis. In this case, the overall reduction of working hours of Human Activity has to refer to the move from the PW compartment – all the hours of paid work in PW – to the “mail” compartment – the hours of work in the mail sub-sub-sub-sector (Paid Work Service and Government Government Postal Service). That is, the reduction refers to the ratio HAmail/ HAPW. This reduction entails that a limited supply of hours of Human Activity are available for the mail compartment. This value – 6,000 h – is indicated in the lower vertical axes. Therefore, in a four-angle graph referring to an ILA, the vertical lower axis refers still to hours of Human Activity. The lower angle on the right quadrant, the σ angle in the figure, indicates the level of power in the supply of letter (per hour of labor), which must be achieved in the mail sector – let’s call this the level n-4 – given the series of reductions on human activity implied by the previous two angles. This power level is required in order to be able to guarantee the throughput of letter defined – at the level n – on the right top quadrant. After illustrating this example of ILA, it is possible to explain the peculiar name chosen for this analysis. In fact, when working with this fourangle figure there are two possible ways of handling the relative information. #1 – we can look for the viability of a given scenario, by starting with a definition of hypotheses associated with the value of three angles. In this example, this would be: given a structure of the population and social rules (the value of the angle α), the actual profile of allocation of the work force over different compartments of the economy (the value of the angle κ), and a given value for the metabolism of letters (the value of the angle δ) what value of technical coefficients would be required (the value of the angle σ) to reach the compatibility over the dynamic budget? The dynamic budget is determined by the characteristics of the requirement from “the rest of the body” and the characteristics of the supply from “the mail sector”. In this case, the “mail sector” must “shape-in” what is required by the rest of society. In alternative:

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#2 – we can check whether or not in a given real system there is compatibility over the loop. Without this compatibility the system can either: (i) accumulate stocks of not delivered mail if the power requirement is larger than the power supply (the working hours are not enough to have the job done); or (ii) not fully utilize the fund resources (mailmen are sleeping during work time). That is, ILA can be used to check the severity of biophysical constraints in determining a given form of metabolism. When dealing with an ILA of the process of self-organization of adaptive systems, it is impossible to determine a direction of causality over the loop. That is: (i) lower level characteristics may force changes over higher level characteristics – e.g. in our hypothetical society continuous problems in the correct and cheap delivery of mail may result in a reduction of the overall exchange of letters at the level of the society; or (ii) higher level characteristics may force changes over lower level characteristics – e.g. in our hypothetical society the firm commitment of the people to exchange more letters may result in a larger investment of either human activity (hiring more mailmen) or capital (using more and/or better technology) in the mail sector. In conclusion, in relation to the concept of ILA, it is important to keep in mind, that this system of accounting is not deterministic. That is: (i) different analysts can decide to quantify in different ways, the same metamodel used to represent the loop; and (ii) this meta-model cannot be used to make predictions about the future evolution of the dynamic budget. In spite (or better because) of these limits, this approach still represent a very powerful tool for checking the feasibility of the dynamic budget of flows across levels and the reciprocal compatibility of the characteristics and size of the various compartments making up metabolic systems. Going back to the series of Figures 8–10, in relation to the analysis of the exosomatic metabolism of societies using ILA to generate an integrated analysis of scenarios provides two important insights. The mosaic effect analysis given in Figure 9 clearly illustrates that when moving to lower hierarchical levels, when tracking those compartments in charge for guaranteeing the exosomatic metabolism, there is a continuous jump in the level of Exosomatic Metabolic Rate per hour of human activity (Giampietro and Mayumi, 2003b). At the level n, when considering all the activities averaged at the level of the whole society (production and consumption), EMRAS is 12.3 MJ/h. At the level n-1 when considering only the Paid Work Sector (only those activities generating added value), EMRPW becomes more than 10 times higher – 138 MJ/h. At the level n-2, when considering only the Productive Sector (guaranteeing those activities in charge for generating the physical inputs for the metabolism of society), EMRPS becomes 330 MJ/h. In fact, the PS sector includes beside

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the energy and mining sector also the building and manufacturing, which is about making exosomatic infrastructures and machines. This implies another doubling of the pace of the exosomatic rate per hour of work when moving from PW to PS. The Impredicative Loop Analysis indicated in Figure 11 can perform “congruence checks” across different hierarchical levels about the viability of the dynamic budget of the societal metabolism. In particular it is possible to calculate a threshold of “power level” (EMRi) per hour of work in a given compartment referring to: (i) What is the “expected pace of supply” determined by the metabolic characteristics of the elements making up the rest of the society (ii) What is the ability to “deliver a given pace of supply” of exosomatic energy of a given element in charge for the supply. It should be repeated again, here, that these checks are not about the actual compatibility over: (i) current Exosomatic Metabolic Rates, and (ii) the given size of the relative compartments (the approach followed when looking for the Mosaic Effect across levels). Rather an ILA refers to possible scenarios requiring the congruence between: (i) the flow supply per hour expected from the “rest of the society”; and (ii) the flow per hour which can be delivered “by the element in charge for the supply”. 3. Validation of the MSIASM Approach and an Application Useful for a Viability Check on Alternative Energy Sources 3.1. CHANGES ACROSS COMPARTMENTS DEFINED ON DIFFERENT LEVELS MUST BE CONGRUENT OVER THE WHOLE LOOP: THE BIO-ECONOMIC PRESSURE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ENERGY SECTOR

The dynamic relation among the characteristics of the metabolism of the whole and the characteristics of the metabolism of the parts can be associated with the concept of the congruence between Bio-Economic Pressure (BEP) – what is expected from the PS sector by the rest of the society; and the Strength of the Hypercycle (SEH) – what can be supplied by the PS sector. In relation to BEP, the reference to the concept of “pressure” wants to indicate that the growing metabolism of the whole (at the level n), associated with economic development, entails/requires qualitative transformations in the pattern of the exosomatic metabolism. The productive sector – PS – must be able to produce more goods at the very same moment in which a larger fraction of human activity is invested in consumption (either in the household sector or the Service and Government sector). This translates into

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a required boost over the pace of the throughputs of useful work per hour of human activity in the compartments of production of goods – PS (at the level n-2). This pressure will increase further in those sub-compartments in charge for the supply of endosomatic and exosomatic energy carriers: the energy sector and the agricultural sector (at the level n-3). By adopting the MSIASM approach it becomes possible to study the effect of the Bio-Economic Pressure at different levels, by establishing a link between different set of variables that have to be changed in an integrated way to achieve congruence over the relative impredicative loop – when considering compartments operating at different levels. In plain words the bio-economic pressure can be defined as the need of controlling a huge amount of energy in the productive sector PS, while reducing as much as possible the relative hours of work requirement. In fact, the PS sector is the only sector in charge for the stabilization of the whole exosomatic energy consumption of society associated with TET. However, it has to do such a job using a large fraction of the total energy consumed, while using only a small fraction (HAPS) of the available human activity (THA). Economic development entails a continuous increase in the flow of energy consumed by society (TET) and a continuous reduction of the fraction of THA, which is available in PS (HAPS). Economic development is directly related to a boost in the value of BEP (= TET/ HAPS). The forced relation over TET and HAPS can be formalized in different ways using different sets of variables, as indicated in Figure 12 (for more details on the set of possible formalizations to be used in this approach see Giampietro and Mayumi, 2000a, b). Very briefly, the graph on the top of Figure 12 shows the ILA defining BEP. This definition is associated with the double reduction of THA limiting the amount of hours that can be invested in PS. This double reduction implies an Internal Boosting Ratio (on the interface level n (Exosomatic Metabolic Rate of the society as a whole) and level n-2 (the PS sector) of more than 26/1. That is, in the top graph we are looking at the definition of BEP as the “expected” power level of the supply of exosomatic energy from the rest of society. This pressure is determined by the average level of consumption (assessed at the level of the whole society) and the profile of allocation of human activity over the different compartments of the socio-economic systems. As noted earlier, we can look at the same value (TET/HAPS) from a different perspective. We can look at the definition of the ability to “deliver” this power level, which is determined by the technical coefficients achieved within the PS sector. We can study that by using the concept of Mosaic Effect Across Levels. This is illustrated in the lower graph of Figure 12. This graph is similar to the one provided in Figure 8a, with the only difference that when adopting a strict biophysical definition of “production” and “consumption”, the Service

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Population: 1,000

THA

HAPW/THA = 9.5% reduction#1

level n-1

Whole Society level n

HAPW

TET

830 Mh

Paid Work Sector

300 TJ HAPS

Bio-Economic Pressure

330 Mh HAPS/HAPW = 40% reduction#2

900 MJ/hour

Productive Sector

Impredicative Loop Analysis

d

ea

SOHA+1 = THA/HAPS

l ta

h er

Internal Boosting Ratio = 26/1

THA

ov

at the Level n: pace of production and consumption of goods and services

RA

EM

cie

so

‘‘expected’’ power supply per hour of work in PS

level n-2

demographic structure & soci0-economic variables

34 MJ/hour

S

RA EM

8,760 Mh

S

b HAPS

TET a

S

RP

EM

at the level n-2: technical capital in the PS sector

Mosaic Effect Across Levels

ETPS

d ea rh e v depending on: lo ca i * Technology og l no * Quality of resources h c te * Mix of end used

SOET+1 = TET/ETPS

Equation of congruence BEP = a/b = EMRAS x (SOHA +1) = TET / HAPS SEH = a/b = EMRPS x (SOET +1) = TET / HAPS Figure 12. Non-equivalent characterization of BEP ←→ SHE

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and Government sector (even if producing added value in economic terms) has been considered as a net consumer of both exosomatic energy and other physical goods. Therefore, in this analysis SG is aggregated together with the HH sector in a large compartment which is a net consumer of exosomatic energy (and exosomatic devices and technical infrastructures). The two equations of congruence written on the bottom of the figure entail that the values of the variables and parameters determining both BEP and SEH have to change in a coordinated way in order to establish a feasible dynamic budget. Even if this approach is not deterministic, still it provides a set of rigorous constraints on the feasibility of exosomatic dynamic budgets characterized in this way. The popular game of SUDOKU can be recalled here to provide an analogy. Also with the SUDOKU game we deal with a multi-level set of constraints over the possible values. Also the SUDOKU system, at the beginning, is not deterministic (both in the dimension of the grid and in the choice of the initial set of numbers to be used as an input). However, after: (i) having decided the structure of the grid; and (ii) entering a certain amount of “given numbers”, the remaining numbers must result congruent with the constraints determined by the grid size and the numbers already in. This is how the MSIASM approach can be very useful to increase the level of interaction of different analysts, of scientists and the rest of society in sharing meaning about how to represent and assess changes in the metabolism of societies. The validity of the MSIASM approach has been confirmed by checking the following two hypotheses: *Hypothesis #1 – looking at the structure of societal metabolism of different countries of the world, the forced relation of congruence in terms of Impredicative Loop Analysis and Mosaic Effect Across Levels should entail a set of expected relations between: (i) the values of EMRi at different levels; (ii) the values of the two overheads: on the supply of human activity (the fraction of human activity, which is not available for the productive sector, because it is required by HH and SG), and on the supply of technical capital (the fraction of exosomatic throughput, which is not available for final consumption, because it is required by the productive sector). *Hypothesis #2 – because of the constraints associated with the “mosaic effect”, when writing a series of relations over variables belonging to different disciplines and referring to different hierarchical levels of analysis, the values of these variables can only change in a coordinated way. Therefore, in an empirical study of the relation over these different values found over different countries in the world, we should find that this correlation over variables referring to different disciplinary fields hold across the sample.

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3.1.1. Check of the Hypothesis #1 – can we use the value of the angles (EMRi and overheads) as benchmarks of typologies of societal metabolism? IF the rationale of the MSIASM approach is true THEN when performing an empirical analysis over the characteristics of the metabolism of different countries at different levels of economic development, we should find that: #1 the value of BEP should correlate well with the conventional indicators used to describe the different levels of socio-economic development. #2 the values of the benchmarks associated with the different angles (EMRi and overheads – the two complementing angles) should vary in a coordinated way when moving across socio-economic system at different levels of development (when moving across different typologies of metabolism). *The correlation of BEP with indicators of development Such a check was done (Pastore et al., 2000) on a database which includes 107 countries, comprising more than 90% of world population. The study included 24 conventional indicators of material standard of living and development (a selection basically reflecting the set of indicators found in World Bank Tables) divided into three groups: (i) Seven indicators of economic and technological development (ii) Eight indicators of nutritional status and physiological well being (iii) Nine indicators of social development. The result of this empirical analysis fully validated the hypothesis. In fact, BEP shows a good correlation with: (i)

All classic economic indicators of development *average value of r = 0.88 (ranging from 0.77 to 0.92) (ii) All nutritional status and physiological well being indicators *average value of r = 0.78 (ranging from 0.65 to 0.87) (iii) All health and social development indicators *average value of r = 0.76, (ranging from 0.44 to 0.89). A graphical overview of the relationship between BEP and the indicators used by the World Bank is given in the upper part of Figure 13.

SOCIETAL METABOLISM

Figure 13. The correlation of BEP with conventional indicators of development

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*Using EMRi and overheads over fund-variables as benchmarks for comparison An overview of values of the various benchmarks characterizing the exosomatic metabolism for different typologies of countries is given in Figure 14. For example when looking at EMRPW (on the vertical axis) and EMRHH (on the horizontal axis) we look at: (i) the level of biophysical capitalization of the PW sector (the amount of technical devices and fossil energy inputs used to boost the productivity of a hour of human activity invested in this sector); versus (ii) the level of biophysical capitalization of the HH sector – HH is the compartment in charge for the final consumption of goods and services. For example, non-OECD countries have a low level of capitalization for both the PW and HH sector, whereas a few countries such as USA and Canada have a level of capitalization above the OECD average for both sectors. Other developed countries such as Italy, Spain and Japan have a level of capitalization in the average of the rest of OECD countries (when eliminating from the group USA and Canada). Alternatively, it is possible to look at the angles related to the overheads – e.g. the ratio between working and non-working human activity, which is a function of the angle α. In the example given in the lower-right graph of Figure 14 the numbers written on the horizontal axis (the value goes from 5 to 19) represent the ratio between the hours that, within a given society, are spent in consuming per each hour spent in producing. To give a practical example, China, is an outlier due to the enormous work load (per worker) and the very low dependency ratio. Therefore, it has a very small overhead on the supply of 1 h of labor to the PW. That is, investing an hour of human activity in PW implies (has a biophysical cost of) having 5 h of human activity invested in consumption. On the other extreme the characteristics associated with the value of the α angle in Ecuador implies that the supply of 1 h of labor to the PW sector implies (has a biophysical cost of ) 17 h of human activity invested in consumption. By knowing the various factors determining the value of this reduction (referring to the α angle) we can look for explanations behind these differences. In Ecuador, for example, the problem is related to the country’s very young population (because of the baby boom associated with the discovery of oil there and because of massive doses of emigration, Falconi-Benitez, 2001), in China to the aggressive policy of birth control enforced in the past. Finally, this brief overview of the possibility of using this approach for comparing the different metabolic patterns of different types of countries is closed by Figure 15 (Ramos-Martin et al., 2007), where the basic four-angle

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Figure 14. Looking for benchmarks characterizing the metabolism of different societies

analysis is used to provide a comparison of the characteristics of the exosomatic metabolism of OECD countries (in green) and the characteristics of the exosomatic metabolism of China (in red) in the year 1999. In this comparison we can see that the two socio-economic systems do have a similar size in terms of THA. However, they are very different in relation to the metabolized flow of exosomatic energy. The value of TET is almost 220 EJ for OECD countries versus 45 EJ for China: a difference of almost five times. This would imply that if China – plus India and other developing countries – would follow the same path of development of OECD countries (moving toward the same set of characteristic benchmarks for their exosomatic metabolism) we should expect an increase of several times in the aggregate emissions of carbon dioxide. In this case, it is the particular demographic structure of China (the side effect of an aggressive birth control enforced in past decades) which entails a very unusually low dependency ratio (only 40% of dependent population). This peculiarity is coupled to another peculiarity – an unusually high workload per year for workers (2,820 h/year) implies that current percentage relative to HAPW/THA is more than the double in China (18.4%) than the value (9.1%) found in OECD countries.

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This provides China a clear advantage for labor-intensive economic exports in relation to other economies (Ramos-Martin et al., 2007). However, this situation is: (i) temporary (when this cohort of workers will age, China will have a high level of elderly in its population); and (ii) determining harsh conditions for the material standard of living in the HH sector. In fact, the large flow of adults entering into the SG and PS sectors (determined by the huge flows of rural adults getting away from the AG sector) requires that all the surplus generated by the Chinese economy be reinvested there (in producing paid job within PW), rather than used to improve the level of consumption of the household sector (in consuming in HH). 9,779 Gh 10,981 Gh

60% Population economically active 2,820 hours/year workload

CHINA =

SI H

SIHA = 18.4 %

=

=4 .14 MJ /h

EM R

SA

4% 9.

=2 2.3 5M J/h

A

α

OECD

SIHA = 9.4 %

SA

THA

.4 18

A

SI H

EM R

OECD 1999

China 1999

δ 50% Population economically active 1,900 hours/year workload

HAPW Ex

R

PW

Ex M

=

45 EJ

890 Gh

M

Comparison of the characteristics of the exosomatic metobolism of China and OECD countries

TET

2,020 Gh

15 .8 1

PW

32 EJ

β

=

18 5. 4

%

.2

M

J/ h

R

219 EJ

M

γ J/ h

=

T

70

5%

5.

SI E = 7 T SI E

165 EJ EMRHH = 1.51 MJ/h

ETPW

EMRHH = 6.00 MJ/h

Figure 15. Comparison of the characteristics of the exosomatic metabolism of China and OECD countries

3.1.2. Check of the Hypothesis #2 – are the changes in the configuration of the dynamic energy budget (over funds and flows) correlated with conventional indicators of development developed in different disciplinary fields? Another possible application of the concept of Mosaic Effect is illustrated in the top part of Figure 16. Using this rationale it is possible write identities based on variables relative to non-equivalent characterizations of Societal

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Metabolism. The trivial example given in Figure 16 is the identity TET = endo × “exo/endo” (Total Exosomatic Throughput – Joules of primary energy consumption – is equal to the Endosomatic throughput – Joules of consumed food – multiplied by the ratio Exosomatic/Endosomatic metabolism). Because of their redundancy these identities may appear useless. From ILO Statistics 320 Gh 3 MJ/h and demographic data HAHH x EMRHH 1,060 PJ

SPAIN 1995 15 Gh 60 MJ/h HASS x EMRSS 900 PJ 2,280 PJ

ETHH + ETSS + ETPS From Sectorial Statistics

From U.N. Energy Statistics 4,240 PJ

21.6

TET = endo x exo/endo

HAPS x EMRPS 9 Gh 250 MJ/h From technical coefficients within sectors 39.3 million Population x 8760

196 PJ

MF x ABM x FLC x THA 7 kJ/kg/hr 57kg 1.46 344 Gh

F.A.O. statistics 13.8 MJ/day x 365 x 39.3 million Food dissappearing at the household level

Modalities of * Life span food consumption * Distribution on * Nutritional status age classes * Life style

Equation of congruence

BEP = TET/HAPS = (MF X ABM) X (exo/endo) x THA/HAPS Figure 16. Using the redundancy of identities across levels

However, as illustrated in this example, when using a mix of nonequivalent data sources – e.g. those listed in Figure 16 – each one of the terms of this relation can be estimated in different way. This implies that due to the redundant structure of relations we should expect that the values of these variables, even if defined in different scientific fields, have to change in a coordinated way, in order to maintain the overall congruence over the system of accounting. As a matter of fact, it is possible to write the value of BEP as a combination of three different factors, and then check, using different data sources, whether this hypothesis is confirmed: BEP = [ABM × MF] × “exo/endo” × [THA/HAPS] = TET/ HAPS

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(i) [ABM x MF] is the first factor in which “Average Body Mass” (in kg) and Metabolic Flow (in MJ/h of food energy per kg) are variables referring to human physiology (ii) [exo/endo] is the second factor and refers to the ratio between the energy metabolized outside the body (exosomatic energy) and that meta-bolized inside (food energy). In practical terms, due to the relative stability of the value of “endosomatic flow” in comparison with “exosomatic flow”, this ratio is a proxy of the overall consumption of commercial energy for producing and consuming goods and services (it correlates very well with GDP) (iii) [THA/HAPS] is the third factor which reflects social characteristics (demographic structure, level of education, retirement, work load, etc.), determining the split of human activity between short term tasks (e.g. PS sector: producing goods and supplying energy) versus tasks relevant in the long term SG&HH sectors: producing and improving the quality of the supply of the fund resource human activity). Therefore the variables reflecting the characteristics of these three factors refer to three logically independent descriptions of the effects of development, which are based on the adoption of different scales and scientific disciplines. In spite of this fact, there is a very good correlation of the value of BEP and each one of these three factors with the various indicators of development – lower part of Figure 13 (again data from Pastore et al., 2000). This does indicate the existence of a link across levels and non-equivalent representations of different scientific disciplines of the effect of development. As a matter of fact, it is well known that different levels of economic development can be related to different stages of the demographic transition. The relative differences in the structure of population will entail a differrent distribution of individuals over the two categories of human activity “working” and “non-working”. Moreover, if the specific distribution of individuals over age classes is corrected for the relative value of body mass (measured in kg per individual) it is easy to realize that also physiological variables (Average Body Mass and Metabolic Flow of endosomatic energy) are affected by these changes (Giampietro et al., 1993). When considering the correlation of each one of the three factors with BEP over the major indicators of development, we find that each one of these three factors works well as indicator of development – Table 1.

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TABLE 1a, b and c. Looking in variables defined in different disciplines. Correlation between BEP, EXO/ENDO ratio, THA/HAPS, ABM × MF and major indicators of nutritional status, physiological well being

Life expectancy Energy intake Fat intake Protein intake Children malnutrition Infant mortality Low birth weight

log (BEP) r 0.79 0.82 0.87 0.85 −0.71 −0.76 −0.65

log (Exo/Endo) r 0.75 0.81 0.85 0.85 −0.65 −0.74 −0.62

THA/HAPS r 0.63 0.55 0.63 0.57 −0.63 −0.57 −0.49

ABM × MF r 0.59 0.73 0.77 0.72 −0.70 −0.58 −0.63

Correlation between BEP, EXO/ENDO ratio, THA/HAPS, ABM × MF and some major indicators of economic and technological development

Log (GNP) % Agric. on GDP Log (COLAV) %Lab. force in Agric. %Lab. force in Serv. Energy cons/cap Expendit. for food

log (BEP) r 0.92 −0.77 0.92 −0.90 0.90 0.92 −0.86

log (Exo/Endo) r 0.89 −0.73 0.87 −0.81 0.83 0.95 −0.87

THA/HAPS r 0.63 −0.60 0.71 −0.72 0.76 0.53 −0.69

ABM × MF r 0.66 −0.54 0.63 −0.66 0.56 0.67 −0.78

Correlation between BEP, EXO/ENDO ratio, THA/HAPS, ABM × MF and major indicators of social development

Televis./inhab. Cars/inhab. Newspap./inhab. Phones/inhab. log (pop./physician) log (pop./hosp.bed) Pupil/teacher Illiteracy rate Prim. school enroll. Acces to safe water

log (BEP) r 0.89 0.88 0.77 0.87 −0.81 −0.77 −0.77 −0.61 0.44 0.78

log (Exo/Endo) r 0.89 0.91 0.80 0.88 −0.76 −0.78 −0.76 −.058 0.39 0.77

THA/HAPS r 0.62 0.59 0.47 0.61 −0.60 −0.51 −0.51 −0.42 0.38 0.53

ABM × MF r 0.72 0.72 0.60 0.71 −0.67 −0.70 −0.62 −0.44 0.36 0.59

3.2. USING THE MSIASM APPROACH TO OPERATIONALIZE THE ELUSIVE CONCEPT OF EROI

3.2.1. Looking for a Metaphor Useful to Implement the Conceptual Tool of EROI It is time to get back to the discussion of the quality of energy sources and the possibility of using the conceptual tool of EROI to generate substantive

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quantitative assessment. As a matter of fact energy analysis is well known for having a lot of conceptual (epistemological problems) – for an overview see Giampietro, 2006. Within the list of problems discussed in that paper two main points are relevant for the discussion about EROI: #1 different energy forms have different qualities, which in order to be quantified requires a pre-analytical definition of a narrative about “what should be considered as an energy input” in the system of accounting (for which converter?). In the previous statement, the expression “narrative” refers to a pre-analytical definition of what is the useful work which should be achieved with the transformation (for which useful task?) and what should be considered as an energy input (for which converter?). Without an agreed upon useful accounting framework it is impossible to discuss of quantification of energy in the first place (Cottrel, 1955; Fraser and Kay, 2002; Kay, 2000; Odum, 1971, 1996; Schneider and Kay, 1995). This is where MSIASM does provide a major help. In fact, the application of the MSIASM approach requires a pre-analytical definition of a set of categories needed to characterize the multilevel matrix [=the dendogram of splits] of the fund elements across levels. This definition of categories forces the analyst to link the semantics of energy analysis to the chosen syntax. #2 an accounting framework which wants to characterize in quantitative terms energy transformations of an energy input into useful work over an autocatalytic loop must be based on the adoption of at least two different scales, which implies the impossibility of obtaining substantive (reducible) quantifications over the loop. That is, an autocatalytic loop can only be studied by performing simultaneously two non-reducible analyses: (i) the “how” – the structural analysis of the process of conversion of the input into applied power inside the black box (e.g. how gasoline is converted into the movement of a car); and (ii) the “why” – the functional analysis of the usefulness of the work done with the applied power in the interaction of the black box with its context (e.g. how the movement of a car is converted into “utility” for the driver) – Giampietro and Mayumi (2004). Therefore, any quantification of an autocatalytic loop of energy forms, which is the typical pattern of self-organization of metabolic systems (chicken-eggs paradox, impredicative loop) remains necessarily arbitrary depending on the choice made by the analysts about the scale of reference for handling the two nonequivalent accounting frameworks (Giampietro and Mayumi 2004; Mayumi and Giampietro, 2004). In relation to this systemic impasse an important aspect of the approach of MSIASM is that it introduces a dynamic relation between the definition of the characteristics of the energy input and the characteristics of the metabolic system that will use it (Cottrel, 1955; Giampietro and Mayumi, 2004). That is, it makes it possible to address the fact that depending on the

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situation hay is food for a mule but not for an engine, whereas electricity is an energy input for a refrigerator but not for a human being. The second important feature of MSIASM is that it makes it possible to study the relation between two functional parts of a metabolic system: (i) the part that generates the surplus of useful energy (the compartment generating an hypercycle); and (ii) the part that is regulating the instability generated by the hypercycle being purely dissipative. In fact, as observed in Part 1 the metabolism of complex systems such as ecosystems and human societies is based on a network of energy forms controlling each-other via a series of positive and negative feed-backs able to modulate the occurrence of autocatalytic loops (Odum, 1983; Ulanowicz, 1986, 1995). The various elements making up these networks can be defined and characterized on different scales – e.g. organs, individual human beings, households, villages and whole countries – with each element having its own metabolism (Giampietro, 2003). This generates a strong constraint on the compatibility of the characteristics of the various elements – performing different roles at different hierarchical levels – within the same organic whole (Ulanowicz, 1986; Giampietro, 2003). The concept of the forced coupling of a purely dissipative part to a hypercycle in order to get a stable dissipative network has been suggested by Ulanowicz (1986) to explain the stability of ecological systems. The relative concept is easy to understand. In order to be stable in their dissipative function, these networks must have a part which is generating a net surplus of energy (the productive compartments), and a part which is purely dissipative (the final consumption compartment). Without a productive part, making available a surplus of energy input to be dissipated by the whole society, the overall metabolism could not be sustained. On the other hand, without the purely dissipative part a hypercycle out of check would simply blow out. The stronger is the hypercycle, the larger must be the purely dissipative part. This implies that a very strong hypercycle tends to generate more stress on the stability of boundary conditions, requiring a larger investment of the resources consumed by the whole, in adaptability (Giampietro, 2003 – Chapter 8). The concept of a balanced investment between efficiency (to boost the strength of the hypercycle) and adaptability (to explore new forms of interaction with the environment) is at the basis of the analysis of sustainability made possible by MSIASM analysis. To better visualize this discussion let’s consider the uneven profile distribution between the investments of Human Activity (HAi) – fund elements – and the investments of Exosomatic Energy (ETi) – flow elements over the various compartments of the socio-economic process of production and consumption of goods and

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services and reproduction of the fund human activity – Figure 17. In a developed society more than 90% of the Total Human Activity goes into the Household Sector (final consumption), whereas only 24% of the Total Energy Throughput goes there. In the same way, whereas the PS sector is absorbing a very large fraction of TET (54% of the total) it is using only a very small fraction of THA (2% of the total). This explains the need of reaching very high levels of Exosomatic Metabolic Rate (MJ of exosomatic energy per hour of human activity) in the PS sector (e.g. in Spain, in 1996, this was 333 MJ/h of labor in the PS sector). Another view of this uneven splitting of funds and flow resources over the different social compartments is given by the overview given in Figure 18. Here data refers to the exosomatic energy metabolism of Spain in 1996. Due to the dependency ratio (less than 50% of the population is economically active) and the ratio “working time”/“non working time” of the working population (adults work less than 20% of the number of hours in a year), only 7% of THA goes into PW. When considering that only 30% of this 7% goes into the PS sector, we can appreciate the seriousness of the bottleneck affecting the dynamic budget of exosomatic energy of modern societies. A very tiny fraction of THA must be able to guarantee the exosomatic metabolism of the whole society (both in terms of generation of energy carriers and production of exosomatic devices plus infrastructures). EXOSOMATIC ENERGY

Difference in the profiles of consumption/end uses of: (a) exosomatic energy, (b) human activity SPAIN - 1999

108 GJ/year

HUMAN ACTIVITY

8,760 hours/year

THA

TET

CONSUMPTION 24 %

ETHH 22 %

ETSG 54 %

ETPS

93 %

• Sleeping/Pers. care • Education/Leisure

HAHH

3.3 MJ/hour = 8/1 Service Sector & Government

5%

HASG

56 MJ/hour = 130/1 PRODUCTION (Paid Work)

Productive Sectors 330 MJ/hour = 750/1

2%

HAPS

Figure 17. The unbalanced profile of Human Activity and Exosomatic Energy investments (HAi vs. ETi) over different compartments of the society

SOCIETAL METABOLISM

Level n-1 Parts

Household sector

3 MJ/hour

Fund Variable

α

Level of dissipation

Human Activity 344 Gh

23 Gh

Exosomatic Energy 4240 PJ

7 Gh 14 Gh

SG

PS 333 MJ/hour

55 MJ/hour Level of dissipation

12.33 MJ/hour

Intensive Variable

β 2 Gh

1 YEAR

δ

Paid Work

47 MJ/hour

Level n Whole

Spain 1996 321 Gh

AG

129

γ

1 YEAR

Flow Variable

requirement from the environment (outside)

Figure 18. The hypercycle generates by the PS compartment.

At this point we can introduce a useful metaphor that to explain the application of the MSIASM approach to the analysis of the concept of EROI. The metaphor is that of the transplant of a human heart. Human beings are typical examples of metabolic networks. Therefore, as discussed before, they are able to store information about “why” they need a given node – e.g. the heart – in relation to the perspective of the whole network. This definition of the expected function of the heart refers to the higher hierarchical level (the whole) – for more on the concept of network niche see Giampietro et al., 2006; for an application on an analysis of the feasibility of biofuels, see Giampietro and Ulgiati, 2005. Within this narrative, the establishment of a metabolic network across levels and scales requires that whatever structural type is used to realize a given role (e.g. the template used to generate realizations at network node at level n-1) must be able to generate a performance that meets the expectation from that node −the functional type− as defined by the rest of the network (e.g. the mutual information carried by the network at level n about the function of that node). The metaphor given in Figure 19 illustrates that more than one structural type can match the same functional type. Indeed, the function of an effective pulsing heart can be performed by either a natural or an artificial heart. Returning to the issue of the compatibility between the energy sector and a given characteristic of societal exosomatic metabolism, a given definition

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of functional type referring to the expected function from the network (e.g. what a society expects from an energy sector) makes it possible to discuss whether or not a given structural type (e.g. an energy sector based on an alternative energy source to oil) is feasible −does it match the expected set of requirements? − and whether or not it is desirable − is it doing better or worse than the structural type it is replacing (e.g. the energy sector powered by fossil energy)? Put in another way, when dealing with the situation illustrated in Figure 19, is wrong to check: (i) whether it is possible to produce an artificial pump that fits into the assigned size –when applying this metaphor to a check on biofuel, if there is enough land to produce an adequate supply of energy carriers; or (ii) whether it is possible to generate a positive flow of blood – when applying this metaphor to a check on biofuel, if the energy output/ input ratio of the process generating biofuels is greater than 1. Rather one must check: (i) whether the pump of the artificial heart – in the metaphor an energy sector based on biofuels – can provide the required level of blood pressure to match the requirement of the circulatory system. That is if it can guarantee the same performance provided now by an energy sector based on fossil energy. In order to be feasible and desirable an alternative pump has to deliver what the rest of the body is, so to speak, expecting from it.

Figure 19. The rationale behind the quality check on alternative energy sources

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3.2.2. Using a MSIASM to Check the Feasibility and Desirability of Alternative Energy Sources As discussed when commenting the integrated set of constraints illustrated in Figure 12 the characterization of a given supply of exosomatic energy associated with the operation of the PS compartment, can be obtained using two non-equivalent formalizations: (1) BEP as the image of the expected performance of the heart, as seen from “the rest of society”. (2) SEH as the expression of the characteristics of the supply from the PS sector, as seen from “the heart”. This ILA refers to a check of congruence between the requirement expressed at the level n (whole society) and the supply generated at the level n-2 (the PS sector). Within the chosen formalization, then, it becomes possible to look at those factors determining the compatibility between these two values. By using the MSIASM approach it is possible to move to another ILA performing a non-equivalent check of congruence referring to a different choice of hierarchical levels. This alternative ILA is based on a congruence check between the requirement of exosomatic energy referring to the level n (whole society) and the relative supply, which should be generated at the level n-3 by the energy sector. The relative formalization can be written as: (1) Expected Power Level (EPLES) relative to the required supply of energy carriers that society is expecting from the energy sector per hour of work invested in that sub-sector; and (2) the Delivered Power Supply (DPSES), which is relative to the actual supply of energy carriers from the energy sector to society per hour of work. As illustrated in Figure 20 with the MSIASM approach it becomes possible to perform simultaneously two non-equivalent checks referring to two different definitions of “rest of the body” and “heart” associated with two definition of the requirement and supply of exosomatic energy carriers. The first check is about the expected power level called Bio-Economic Pressure (BEP), which has to be matched by the power level in supply, called the Strength of the Exosomatic Hypercycle (SEH) on the interface “whole society” versus “PS sector”. This refers not only to the delivery of energy carriers (e.g. fuels and electricity), but also to the delivery of exosomatic devices and technical infrastructures. It should be noted that the MSIASM approach mixes together exosomatic energy and human activity over the ILA – the dimension of BEP and SEH is Energy/Time). The conceptual definition of EROI in this case

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would require a dimensionless ratio of Energy/Energy. In the MSIASM system of accounting this could be related to the ratio: “total energy consumption (TET)”/“energy consumption in the PS sector (ETPS)”. The ratio TET/ETPS considers as embodied into the energy consumed in PS all the energy spent in the construction of exosomatic devices and infrastructures. In relation to the arbitrariness entailed by the truncation problem, this choice does include the energy used in building capital and infrastructures (in the PS sector), but does not include the embodied energy used for reproducing the fund element of human activity – e.g. labor supply, generation of know-how and services required for the maintenance and reproduction of human activity (in the HH and SG sectors). To by-pass this problem one can analyze the whole Impredicative Loop addressing the relative values of direct and indirect costs in relation to both flow and funds elements. In fact, the check over the congruence of BEP  SEH is referring to a ratio flow (energy)/fund (hour of labor) in the PS sector. Therefore the ILA does address the relative embodied costs of the fund elements on the flows (the two overhead of the human and exosomatic compartments). In addition to this, we can also add to this first check a second check related more directly to the activity of the Energy Sector. That is, we can perform the same congruence check, but at a different hierarchical level, not including the construction of exosomative devices in the accounting. This second check is based on: (i) the Expected Power Level (EPL) of the supply of energy carriers from the energy sector, which associated with a given socio-economic structure (what is expected by “the rest of the body”); and (ii) the actual Supply per Hour of Work (SHW) which can be achieved in the energy sector (what is delivered by “the heart”). Following the example discussed in Figure 11 about the study of possible bottlenecks in the delivery of mail to an imaginary society, an ILA focusing on the energy sector can be used to define the difference in the pace of the flow between: (i) the average level of consumption of a given flow at the level n (the whole society); and (ii) the power level at which specialized sectors in charge for making available that biophysical flow to society (e.g. the energy sector) – at the level n-3 – has to deliver its supply. That is, an ILA defines an Internal Boosting Ratio determined by: (i) the “demand” of society for a given flow (how much the society is willing to consume and the profile of investments of human activity and other fund resources over economic compartments) at the level n; and (ii) the “supply” of the specialized sector in charge for making available that flow (how much flow can be delivered per unit of investment of human activity and other fund resources) at the level n-i.

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As illustrated in the upper part of Figure 12 the Bio-Economic Pressure on PS can be associated with an Internal Boosting Ratio related to the required congruence between the level of consumption of the flow at the level n and the supply of the flow per hour of work at the level n-2 (the PS sector). The same approach can be followed to perform a congruence check that goes a step further down, moving to the interface level n/level n-3. That is, considering the demand of exosomatic energy of the “whole society” and the actual supply of exosomatic energy achieved by the “Energy Sector” (ES) – an analogous for energy carriers of the letters delivered by the mail sector in Figure 11. This additional set of relations is indicated in Figure 20: (i) Expected Power Level in the supply of exosomatic energy (EPLES = TET/HAES)demand from the energy sector; which has to be matched by (ii) Supply per Hour of Work in the energy sector (SHWES = TET/ HAES)supply In this way, different relations can be used to explore the implications of this forced congruence over two non-equivalent ILAs, as illustrated in the bottom of Figure 20 when defining in redundant ways EPLES and SHWES. One of these relations is relevant for the determination of the quality of energy sources. In this way, we can obtain a possible formalization of the EROI over the relation between TET and ETES (TET = ETES x EROI). That is, this formalization of EROI deals with one of the possible characterizations of SOET+1 (see lower part of Figure 8 and upper part of Figure 12). This relation provides one of the possible representations of the constraints affecting the dynamic budget of societal metabolism, as seen from the “heart” side (from below). Finally, when using this approach we can calculate the “expected” value of EROI using the set of relations indicated in the lower part of Figure 20. By plugging into this set of relations the benchmark values typical for developed countries, we can obtain an estimated value of EROI. The resulting value is about 13/1, a value which agrees pretty well with the empirical evidence provided by Cleveland et al. (2000) and Hall and Klitgaard (2006) on the latest value of EROI for fossil energy. The unavoidable arbitrariness of any formalization of EROI entails that any empirical assessment is debatable, even when done by well known energy analysts such as Charlie Hall or Cutler Cleveland. In spite of this disclaimer, the MSIASM approach seems to represent a very useful tool for dealing with such a concept and more in general with a discussion over the feasibility and desirability of alternative energy sources.

M. GIAMPIETRO

134 IMPREDICATIVE LOOP ANALYSIS congruence over power requirement & power supply across levels

BEP (“demand” on PS) TET/HAPS

MOSAIC EFFECT across level congruence over Exosomatic Metabolic Rates EMRSA 12.3 MJ/h

Level n THA 344 Gh

HAPW Level n-1

23 Gh

producing

β

Gh

SEH (“supply” from PS) TET/HAPS PLR (“demand” on ES) BEP x HAPS/HAPS

PS sector

? SHW (“supply” from ES) ETPSx EROI x 1/HAES

“Requirement rest of the body”

γ

HAPW 23 Gh

Level n-1 EMRPW 137.7 MJ/hour

3,200 PJ ETPW HAPS

ETPW

7 Gh

3,200 PJ

Level n-2

15

EMRPS 330 MJ/h

Level n

TET 4,200 PJ

EMRPW 137.7 MJ/hour

PW sector

?

δ

α

Societal Average

EMRPW 138 MJ/h

EMRSA 12.3 MJ/hour

EMRPS 330 MJ/hour

2,300 PJ ETPS

5

Level n-2 PS SG AG 56 MJ/h 330 MJ/h 50 MJ/h

ES sector

Level n-3

Equation of congruence

EPSES = TET/HAES

“Supply from the heart”

SHWES = TET/HAES

# 1 - EPSES = BEP x (HAPS/HAES) = EMRSA x (SOHA + 1) x (HAPS/HAES) # 2 - SHWES = ETES x (EROI x (1/HAES) = SEH x (EROI x (HAPS/HAES)

EROI = (SEH x HAPS)/ETES Typical values for a developed society

BEP = SEH = 900 MJ/hour TET = 300 GJ/year per capita ETPS = 150 GJ/year per capita ETES = 21 GJ/year per capita HAPS = 300 hours per capita HAES = 8 hours per capita

EROI = 13/1

Figure 20. The multi-level congruence check between requirement “from the body” and the supply “from the heart”.

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SYSTEMIC ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR ENERGY, CLIMATE AND GLOBAL SECURITY

JAMES GREYSON* BlindSpot, PO Box 140, Lewes BN7 9DS, UK www.blindspot.org.uk [email protected]

Abstract: Energy security, climate stability, sustainable development, economic growth and national security are codependent goals; either all will be achieved or none. This global security goal-set will remain elusive with prevailing ‘patchwork’ policy-making. Irreversible failure with one or more of the goals may be avoidable with a non-reductionist approach to global complexity, using systems thinking and systemic interventions at leverage points, of which two are proposed. (1). Weapons spending can be deducted from Gross Domestic Product to define a ‘Gross Peaceful Product’ with which nations could align goals for growth and security. (2). Other global security goals can be approached by a preventive insurance scheme. Significant producers would pay an obligatory premium on all products (including fuels) according to the risk that they become waste in the air, land or water. Premiums would be invested in the capacity of nature, industry and society to reduce that risk. This market-based ‘precycling insurance’ would make many prescriptive instruments redundant. In particular, emissions capping debates need no longer delay international climate agreements.

Keywords: Codependence, climate, economic growth, energy security, systems thinking, market-based instrument, policy, Gross Peaceful Product, precycling, precycling insurance, global security, sustainable development, circular economics, conflict.

______ *James Greyson, BlindSpot, PO Box 140, Lewes BN7 9DS, UK, www.blindspot.org.uk E-mail: [email protected]


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1. A Global Security Goal-Set 1.1. CODEPENDENT GOALS

The narrow view of ‘energy security’, of a nation securing enough energy, has in the past been achievable as a largely freestanding issue. In future no nation can be assured of energy security without successfully navigating a broader view of global security which encompasses sustainable development, economic growth, national security and climate stability. Securing enough energy has become codependent upon securing other goals, including goals which appear to be in conflict with each other. In future none of these goals will be achievable anywhere without effective collaboration on a global scale. The codependence of the above goal-set can be illustrated by considering any subset of the goals. What if one of the global security goals cannot be met? Failure to achieve energy security means the lights go out, with rapidly escalating impacts on societal sustainability and economic growth. Failure with sustainable development means that trends in wealth inequality, loss of nature and energy demand for example, are not reversed, making national security, energy security and climate stability unachievable. Failure with economic growth means recession, which is incompatible with the large investments needed for sustainable development and climate stability. Failure with national security means, at best, absence of the international co-operation needed to advance all goals. Failure with climate stabilisation sooner or later means ‘game over’ for civilisation and all its aspirations. Each of these goals requires policy-making that can cope with issues that are interdependent to the point of being indivisible. Either all the above goals will be met together or none will be met at all. 1.2. PATCHWORK POLICY-MAKING

Political statements often recognise the interdependence of goals but governments appear unprepared for codependence in policy or practice. The G8 leaders declared (G8 Summit, 2007), “Complementary national, regional and global policy frameworks…must address not only climate change but also energy security, economic growth, and sustainable development objectives in an integrated approach”, yet their 38 page declaration omitted any further mention of this integrated approach. This G8 policy ‘jigsaw puzzle’ has no picture on the box and no guarantee that the pieces will fit together. Neglect of codependence may underpin the fragmented patchwork policies that

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allow many unsustainable trends to continue worsening decades after they are identified. 1.3. DECOYS TOWARDS FRAGMENTED SOLUTIONS

Continuing unsustainability is popularly viewed as a ‘conspiracy’ between weak-willed politicians and powerful vested interests, as reflected by globally declining trust in both business and political leaders and declining hope for the future (Gallup International, 2007). A less obvious explanation would be that attention from codependence and ‘joined-up’ solutions is diverted by a set of widely-held ‘decoy’ attitudes. Such decoy attitudes include: •

‘It’s not my job.’ Business, government departments and other institutions specialise within remits that cover only patches of the goal-set. Anything outside the remit is someone else’s responsibility.

•

‘Divide and conquer.’ There is a belief that complex problems can be made ‘manageable’ by separately planning for separate goals. The separated competing issues can then be ‘balanced’, ‘prioritised’ and ‘targeted’. ‘Links’ can be explored.

•

‘It’s not realistic.’ Persistent unsustainable development paradoxically lends support both to defeatist views and the illusion that whatever is done will suffice. Ambitious solutions are ‘idealistic’ and small improvements are ‘practical’.

•

‘It’s us or them.’ The above decoys support a strategy of looking after one’s own (family, organisation, region, nation or allies), at the expense of concern for all people (and nature). Security is sought within financial, geographical or organisational ‘bubbles’ where some goals are met for some people.

1.4. PROBLEMS CAN BE SEEN AS THEY ARE

The reductionist view of a world definable into compartments, each controllable by the power and expertise of specialists is so psychologically attractive, even addictive (Glendinning, 1995), as to institute habits of perception. Yet global problems might be soluble only by seeing them as they are, not how they are accustomed to being seen. This requires new habits. Some notes are offered on an approach for handling the complexity of codependence along with two prospective economic instruments. The first instrument supports the creation of global cycles of reduced fear of conflict

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and reduced spending on weapons. The second instrument adapts the current waste-dependent economic paradigm so that capitalism and economic growth cultivate the remainder of the goal-set. With these and other interventions, society may have a chance to rapidly meet global goals, reducing the risk that any combination of problems becomes irreversible. 2. Approaching Global Security 2.1. TRY HARDER OR THINK HARDER?

Policies based upon decoy attitudes rather than codependence have a common feature; they don’t really work. In the past some goals have been met for some people at the expense of disturbances elsewhere and in the future. Many such disturbances have no boundaries (including pollution, conflict, disease, climatic instability, financial market volatility and displaced populations) and there are now no spacial or temporal hiding places. “As the gap between the nature of our problems and the ability to understand them grows, we face increasing perils on a multitude of fronts (Richmond, 1993).” In excess of US$1 trillion annual global military spending is not making a safer world. Over 15 years of political negotiations to cut greenhouse gas emissions has not prevented steadily rising global emissions and accelerating climate instability. The decades-long flood of data and expert recommendations for action has led to a trickle of implementation. Is it enough to know what needs changing? What use are slow solutions for fast problems? 2.2. THINKING ABOUT WHOLE SYSTEMS

The replacement of decoy attitudes is basically a change of mind. The incentive to change could not be greater; the opportunity to sustain all life, including human civilization. Although patchwork policy-making is deeply entrenched, an alternative approach can be demonstrated. The practice of perceiving the world as a whole exists as a cultural thread throughout human history. It was shaped into a ‘systems theory’ by Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1950) and others in the 1950s. Churchman (1979) described a ‘systems approach’ where “…no problem can be solved simply on its own basis. Every problem has an ‘environment’, to which it is inextricably linked.” We live in a world of systems which link every dimension of human experience with the physical and living environment. The complexity of the global system is infinite yet curiously this complexity is not necessarily an obstacle to policy-making for global security. Living systems (both ecology


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and civilisation) require and generate complexity, from which emerges a capacity for self-organisation, resilience and self-correction. Today’s troubled society dwells in complexity, pursuing certainty amongst the details of each problem rather than in the systemic causes. 2.3. BLINDED BY THE GLARE OF ONCOMING ISSUES

If goals can no longer be met singly, and change means changing the ‘system’, then there is the question of where to intervene. Systems thinking distinguishes between symptomatic effects, direct causes and underlying ‘leverage points’. Donella Meadows (1999) defined leverage points as “places within a complex system (a corporation, an economy, a living body, a city, an ecosystem) where a small shift in one thing can produce big changes in everything”. Society typically sees a problem as an existing or predicted symptomatic effect, such as a less stable climate, polluted water, illnesses, terrorist acts, rising population or recession. Each problem is considered to have a distinct set of direct causes. For example climate instability is ‘caused’ by greenhouse gas emissions, which are ‘caused’ by burning fossil fuels. Everyone advises everyone else to reduce their emissions, and large portions of the population believe that stabilising emissions would stabilise the climate (Sterman and Sweeney, 2007) despite cuts well above 50% being needed to allow stabilisation after a time lag of decades (and if runaway change has not been triggered). Climate would not be stabilised by small emissions cuts hence the level of emissions does not appear to be a leverage point for change. This would explain why the international climate debate has not led to emissions cuts. The world seeks its lost climatic stability under the lamp-post of direct causes rather than in the shadows of leverage points. 2.4. GLOBAL LEVERAGE POINTS

Human intelligence is well adapted to finding leverage points within the complexity of everyday life or technical problems. Ingenious solutions are routinely found for obstacles and bottlenecks. By contrast the decoy attitudes outlined above make global leverage points more challenging. If global leverage points were obvious they would have been taken up long ago. Whereas symptomatic problems are increasingly glaring and most of the direct causes are tangible, the global whole is beyond the reach of individual senses. People can understand the world only indirectly, as a mental model. Modeling of parts, symptoms or direct causes is analytical surgery which cuts connections at imposed boundaries. Models of global systems have the advantage of boundaries with a physical reality. Global leverage

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points offer the tantalising prospects of taking action on the scale of the problems and of cascading change. Meadows provided a list of places to look for leverage points, with the most powerful being feedback loops, information flows, system ‘game rules’, self-evolution, system goals and paradigms (shared beliefs). The last two places are probably not directly negotiable though they may be reshaped by events, new language, feedback of information or new game rules. Possible leverage points may be indicated by one or more of the opportunities to: •

Address multiple issues together

•

Scale-up or spread measures globally

•

Resolve apparent conflicts between goals

•

Support synergy between local (individual or group) goals and global goals

•

Build-in a capacity for self-correction

•

Prevent additional worsening of problems

•

Use local knowledge and innovation in place of prescriptive controls

•

Recruit spare matter, energy, skills or wealth.

2.5. CAN THE WORLD SEE ITSELF AS A WHOLE?

If global systemic change is necessary then there is a need for people everywhere to discuss how to do it. The prospects for meeting global goals rise in proportion to the vigour of this dialogue. Dialogues across issues, across institutions and across populations can introduce new perspectives, question decoy attitudes, share visions of the future and build the quality of proposals until they may become usable. Although almost all education instills a habit of working within separated topics, people have an innate ability to join-up ideas and develop multiple future scenarios (Calvin, 1989). Dialogues could encompass the widest range of perspectives and intentionally reduce barriers to participation on both formal and informal fora. Some leverage points, such as local initiatives that spread (e.g. Transition Towns) or imaginative forms of philanthropy (e.g. microcredit), are being led by individuals. Other conceivable leverage points are in the collective hands of governments, which could choose to join or lead dialogues. Multinational organisations are also well placed should they choose authentic dialogue.1

______ 1

See for example Global Sustainability Dialogue. Shell, 2007. www.blindspot.org.uk


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Alternatively public dialogues may be initiated by any institution just by asking questions. Is there any alternative to a future of limits and rules? What happened to sustainable development. Can a world in conflict solve anything? 2.6. WHICH GOVERNMENTS WILL LEAD IN FUTURE?

Systems thinking presents a dilemma for governments, being incompatible with some institutional habits including (in the UK at least) “shared assumptions between politicians and civil servants that command and control is the correct way to exercise power” (Chapman, 2002). However, centralised command and control is restrained by democratic legitimacy and economic competitiveness. More controls risk less public support (fewer votes) and weaker, more constrained markets (less tax revenue). With climate instability for example the use of conventional controls (such as bans, rationing or punitive taxes) at a scale sufficient to halve or eliminate net emissions would strongly affect both public support and markets. Other conventional centralised ‘solutions’ such as mixed waste incineration, nuclear power and military interventions are similarly constrained. Governments wishing to face intensifying challenges and to retain authority have the option of exploring non-conventional institutional responses. Those governments which have been prominent in the past may not choose to lead in future. The following sections are not a recipe for success but a sample of the policies available to all nations. Although other types of leverage points exist, both of the proposed interventions reflect the importance of economics in determining outcomes. Current economic ‘rules’ define a game which could end without winners. 3. ‘Gross Peaceful Product’ – Economic Growth, National Security and Global Security 3.1. RESORTING TO CONFLICT

No-one is surprised at violence in the news. State and sectarian military adventures, terrorist attacks, thuggery and knife-carrying by kids all illustrate a cultural dependence upon combative solutions to problems. Violent international crises have continued occurring at a rate somewhat higher than before World War II and violence continues to grow as the predominant crisis management technique for international conflicts (Cuellar, 2004). As oil dependence collides with climate change, predicted scenarios include

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“political instability where societal demands exceed the capacity of governments to cope” (CNA Corporation, 2007) and “constant battles for diminishing resources” through which “warfare would define human life” (Schwartz and Randall, 2003). A key indicator for cultural dependence upon the use of force is the money spent on weapons. This was recognised in Chapter 26 of the United Nations Charter (1945) where member nations agreed “to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources”. Less weapons spending would mean less weapons available for use and potentially greater investment in non-combative tactics for all aspects of security. 3.2. SHOULD GDP SUPPORT CONFLICT OR SECURITY?

The competing approaches to security were recited in a July 2007 speech by British cabinet minister Douglas Alexander (2007) in Washington DC, “In the 20th century a country’s might was too often measured in what they could destroy. In the 21st century strength should be measured by what we can build together.” Yet despite all efforts to agree disarmament and to promote the wider aspects of security, global military spending is estimated to have risen by 37% in real terms since 1997 to US$1,204 billion in 2006 (Stalenheim et al., 2007). Weapons spending and combative problemsolving has not responded to good intentions and localised efforts. Progress with peace and security now depends upon global systemic intervention. An apparent leverage point is the contribution of weapons spending to economic growth. The growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is seen as an indicator of national success and status, despite increasing weapons spending more accurately indicating poorer prospects. A correction of GDP for security may be easier to implement than broad GDP correction, which is intended to measure concepts of ‘well-being’ or ‘progress’. Broad GDP correction struggles to estimate the unpredictable economic costs of ecological and societal damage, whereas a security correction to GDP need not estimate nor predict damage from weapons. Broad GDP correction can be seen as a threat by politicians accustomed to the way GDP masks problems (see Section 4.9) and is little use for guiding other decision-makers throughout the economy. In general the achievement of well-being or progress requires the economics to be corrected (see Section 4), not the indicators. However in the special case of security, those most concerned with economic growth comparisons (political leaders) also decide the bulk of spending on weapons.


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3.3. A SYSTEMIC INCENTIVE FOR NON-COMBATIVE SECURITY SOLUTIONS

A corrected measure of economic activity, called Gross Peaceful Product (GPP), could be introduced as a replacement for GDP. Weapons-related spending would be deducted from GDP to define GPP. Economic growth would be calculated from GPP not GDP. Nations which foster weapons research and exports would have lower GPP than if they fostered more productive industries. Nations with a high dependence upon combative solutions would have lower GPP than if they prioritised non-combative solutions. Although spending on imports does not show up in GDP or GPP, nations importing large amounts of weapons would still have lower GPP due to domestic spending on procurement, training, storage, maintenance and decommissioning. In addition, all the funds used to import weapons are unavailable for investments which could boost GPP. Reductions in weaponsrelated spending would boost economic growth by releasing public funds to either lower the tax burden or boost government spending on productive activities. 3.4. CYCLES OF LESS WEAPONS SPENDING AND MORE SECURITY

Given that governments aspire to maximise economic growth, the current method of calculating GDP provides an incentive for politicians to spend more on weapons. GPP would reverse this incentive by rewarding the minimisation of weapons spending with higher growth figures. Although GPP does not constrain governments in spending what they believe is needed on weapons, the potential loss of economic growth opens such decisions to greater scrutiny. GPP would stimulate the debates about the relative contributions of combative and non-combative security measures. If security now means global security then there is plenty to discuss. Nations could implement GPP as a diplomatic statement of intent to build a more secure world, as a badge of peace. Even without global adoption, GPP would set a new benchmark for judging the economic growth of all nations in which higher GPP and higher economic growth more accurately indicates future prospects. A cycle of disarmament and reduced cultural reliance on force may be established due to: •

Other nations perceiving a reduced threat

•

Reduced demand for weapons research and sales

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•

Weapons becoming less prolific

•

Lower incidence of conflict

•

More widespread and imaginative efforts with global security

•

Young men seeing governments practice what they preach about nonviolence.

3.5. ENERGY AND TERRORISM

GPP would not guarantee any country adopting a terrorist-resistant (decentralised) energy infrastructure nor would it block military adventures in oil-rich regions of the world. However it would create circumstances to progressively minimise conflict as a factor in energy security and to liberate vast flows of funds from weapons budgets. The argument that taking better care of communities and nature is unaffordable would fade. If GPP succeeds to emphasise non-combative routes to security then terrorist recruiters would lose part of their supporting motives. Other motives such as resource insecurity and ‘decadent’ materialism can be addressed by the following market-based instrument. 4. Preventive Insurance Against Unsustainability – ‘Precycling Insurance’ 4.1. FIXING THE CLIMATE MEANS FIXING THE ECONOMY

The security of both climate and energy supply would benefit from a reversal of historically rising global energy demand. Energy demand is shackled to society’s material metabolism (since movement of matter requires energy). This is driven by an economic paradigm that records a faster metabolism as greater economic growth. So a ‘successful’ economy moves more products (including fuels) faster and further before they add to waste levels and are replaced by new products. This ‘linear’ economic paradigm, defined by its systematic accumulation of waste in ecosystems, underpins modern economics. All nations find themselves competing at linear economics. Energy demand could theoretically be reduced by mandatory emissions limits although this involves a switch from market choice to centralised control that may never be agreeable worldwide. Energy demand could alternatively be cut by phasing out the linear economic paradigm. This is relevant for energy, climate and the other global security goals as explained by Karl-Henrik Robért (1991), “Environmental degradation has many aspects but they are all related to one systemic error – linear processing of natural resources. The processing capacity of natural cycles is now exceeded by


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both the quantity and composition of our garbage. After steadily decreasing during the past billions of years of evolution, toxic substances are again accumulating in the biosphere – reverse evolution. …In short, linear resource processing leads to continuous uncontrolled deterioration of socio-economic and public health conditions. It follows from the laws of thermodynamics that continuous linear processing of resources is compatible with neither wealth nor with life. …The conclusion is unavoidable that we must transform our societies so that they function in harmony with the biosphere.” 4.2. A GLOBAL SYSTEMS VIEW OF WASTE

Waste is a term with a range of understandings that tend to be used interchangeably. Just two of these need be distinguished here; waste for disposal and ecosystem waste. Waste for disposal is an unwanted output from a process, such as waste water, exhausts and rubbish. Ecosystem waste is dispersed matter in ecosystems (land, air or waters) which cannot be reintegrated by biological or geological cycles (being either non-biodegradable or in excess of natural processing capacity). Waste ‘strategies’ devote themselves to the narrow concern of waste disposal, how do we get rid of all that junk? Mixed-waste incineration is commonly used to ‘manage’ mixed rubbish which gives the illusion of disappearing into the air. However all disposed waste becomes either new resources (for people or nature) or ecosystem waste. Due to conservation of matter, wastes in ecosystems rise as natural resources diminish. Climate instability is the highest profile example of the multitude of problems caused by converting natural resources into ecosystem wastes. A systems approach with ecosystem waste as an indicator of sustainability has been described by Azar et al. (1996). Ecosystem waste can be built-in as a factor in market economics, offering a potential leverage point not just for waste disposal problems but for all sustainability issues. 4.3. THE RISK OF RISING WASTE IN ECOSYSTEMS

Conventional insurance works for localised risks. The value of an insured house is protected by a payout in case of damage such as by fire. However, global damage, such as an unstable climate, accumulation of heavy metals or species extinctions, can be irreversible so any insurance would need to work preventively. Today’s pattern of using resources is predominantly linear, from nature to products to ecosystem wastes. A leverage point at which to apply premiums would be on the risk of a product ending up as ecosystem waste – the ‘waste risk’. The vast majority of the technosphere could be covered, since chemicals, fuels, equipment, houses, roads and

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most other human works take part in the economy of products. Even product components and most natural resources are products. Every producer should already know if their product will add to waste levels in ecosystems. Is our product recyclable or biodegradable? Have we contributed towards sufficient industrial and ecological processing so that our product can become a new resource in the market or in ecosystems? Waste risk is not harder to calculate than risks for conventional insurance. Due to complexity it is not possible to account for externalities (ecological and social costs which are neglected by markets) by measuring, predicting and allocating every ecological, social and economic impact. However waste risk serves as a proxy measure of a product’s contribution to unsustainability. This is comparable to the way that risk factors for calculating car insurance premiums serve as a proxy for unpredictable automotive losses. Waste risk provides a sufficient basis for ending the historical neglect of externalities by markets. 4.4. CIRCULAR ECONOMICS – JOINING UP THE RESOURCE LOOP

How could the premiums from a preventive form of insurance be used to reduce the risk of products becoming ecosystem waste? Support is needed for an array of actions that build capacity to make resources instead of wastes. These actions establish a circular pattern of resource use, or ‘circular economics’, as devised by Kenneth Boulding (1966). Boulding’s circular economy takes part in a “cyclical ecological system which is capable of continuous reproduction of material form even though it cannot escape having inputs of energy.” The goal of circular economics may be seen in national policies, for example in China’s 11th five year plan for 2006–2010.2 Attempts to communicate circular economics to the public are typically reduced to simplistic messages (“recycle more”) although the recent short film “The Story of Stuff ” (Leonard, 2007)3 introduces it engagingly. Sustainable development and circular economics may be implemented in practice by ‘precycling’ (O’Rorke, 1988) which is action taken to prepare for current resources to become future resources. Precycling builds economic, social and ecological capacity to prevent ecosystem waste. Premiums charged to significant producers by insurers in proportion to waste risk

______ 2

Cleaner Production in China. National Development and Reform Commission, 2006. www.chinacp.com/eng/cppolicystrategy/circular_economy.html 3 See: Leonard A. The Story of Stuff. Short film. Free Range Studios 2007. www.storyofstuff.com


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would fund precycling. This generalises the ‘recycling insurance’ enacted by the European Waste Electronics Directive (WEEE, 2002), which funds recycling to cut the risk of particular products becoming waste. A generalised ‘precycling insurance’ (Greyson, 2007) could encompass all products, all ways of preventing waste, and all sustainable development challenges. Waste for disposal would be processed into new resources, with the cost included in product prices, rather than in taxes and disposal charges. 4.5. BUILDING CAPACITY TO MAKE RESOURCES NOT WASTES

Ecosystem waste can be prevented in four ways, which between them allow any future product to be ‘precycled’. They cover the same range of opportunities as Karl-Henrik Robèrt’s ‘system conditions’ for sustainable development (Ny et al., 2006). Precycling is action to: 1. Cut dependence on substances from the Earth’s crust that accumulate as ecosystem waste (minerals such as fossil fuels, heavy metals, radioactive compounds and phosphate). 2. Give products (any part of the built ‘technosphere’) a future as a resource for nature or people. Efficiency allows ‘saved’ materials (including fuels) not to become waste. Materials that cannot be recycled or biodegraded can be replaced. The economy can be prepared to handle all other materials cyclically. 3. Expand the diversity and range of ecological habitats (including croplands and protection of existing natural productivity). This raises the capacity to process non-solid emissions into clean ecosystems and new natural resources. 4. Meet more people’s material and non-material needs. Meeting human needs, as distinct from human ‘wants’ (Max-Neef et al., 1991), does not inherently require ecosystem waste. Failing to meet needs, via either poverty or materialism, perpetuates waste. 4.6. INSURING AGAINST UNSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Precycling insurance fulfills an overall aim of insurance which is to avoid being financially ‘wiped-out’ by things going wrong. Although this is a new form of insurance, it follows existing concepts of insurance which include both preventive and obligatory aspects. Fire insurance began in 1680 with preventive investment in fire brigades (Wright, 1982), not payments for damage. Today insurance is still partly preventive, with premiums lowered for example when security measures are installed. Third party liability

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insurance is typically obligatory for vehicles and workplaces, with premiums handled by insurance markets, not government. Precycling insurance would be obligatory for significant producers but also entirely non-prescriptive and producers could chose how and even whether to cut waste risk since global waste risk can be cut both by producer investments and via invest-ments of the premiums. Producers seeking to avoid premiums would invest in giving their products negligible waste risk. This provides the incentive for products to be ‘precycled’ with a ‘cradle-tocradle’ (McDonough and Braungart, 2002) lifecycle. Those who choose to continue making ‘prewasted’ products would pay a premium and find their products less competitive in a market where alternatives are rapidly developed. Precycling insurance would provide strong signals alos to investors and customers about which products and businesses have a future. 4.7. PRINCIPLES FOR INVESTING PREMIUMS

The investment of precycling insurance premiums would bridge the gap between what is being done and what is needed. Many precycling actions cost little or nothing so small per-item premiums could add up to support large-scale changes. If precycled product prices become lower than prices for prewasted products then swift change may be expected. Premiums could be invested either directly by precycling insurers or through intermediaries according to principles which can be foreseen as follows. Investments should: •

Work preventively, for example primarily aiming to stabilise the climate, not to accommodate worsening weather nor to recover from disasters.

•

Aim high, for example by expanding productive diverse ecosystems and designing urban areas that contribute positively to the ecology of their region (Birkeland, 2007).

•

Add to people’s options for living and working, for example by supporting new research, trends, jobs, processes, products, collaborations and hope.

•

Support people’s enthusiasm and engagement, for example by local and sectoral dialogues about the future, including monitoring and proposing investments.

•

Fit together into plans for the future, for example using the Natural Step process (Holmberg and Robèrt, 2000) graphically, to chart what can be done over time.


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4.8. MARKET RENEWAL NOT MARKET CONSTRAINT

Unresolved global-scale problems are expensive. Prescriptive complicated governmental constraints on economic activity are expensive. Both these expenses undermine economic stability and growth prospects yet both may be avoided by allowing the market to fulfill its responsibility for internalising externalities. This is a chance for capitalism to be seen not as a villain to be tied down but as a hero, dashing to save the day. In a renewed market the self-interest of customers and investors would stimulate change faster than any possible attempts to constrain the economy. Governments would legislate, regulate and oversee precycling insurance schemes, but unlike taxes, they would not handle the funds. This division of responsibilities should enable transactions to be accountable to the public, building a level of trust not achievable with any expansion of taxes. Much of the existing patchwork of regulations, fees and taxes could be phased out, with benefits to innovation and growth. Governments would be freed to focus on clearing up past problems, disaster relief, international cooperation, wealth redistribution and other roles beyond the reach of markets. A level playing field for all significant producers could be achieved with global introduction of precycling insurance, with insurers accredited by government, certified systems for investing premiums and web-based information open to public scrutiny. Coordinated international implementation could avoid accounting burdens with cross-border trade. Administrative burdens and regulation would be minimised while prospects for achieving the global security goal-set would be maximised. 4.9. GROWTH OF WHAT?

Many countries have been experiencing relatively stable and positive growth of national income, or Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in recent years. Part of this GDP is spending on the side-effects of linear economics such as; regular upgrading of defences against terrorism, fraud, theft, floods, winds, heat and drought; surveillance, policing and prisons; treatments of polluted water and land, physical and mental illness; involuntary migration and poverty; advertising, sales and servicing of debt; clearance of ecosystems and extraction of diminishing resources; development, stockpiling, use and consequences of weaponry; disposal and replacement of unrecyclable products and infrastructure; over-regulation and costs of compliance; and higher taxes arising from all the other side-effects. From a GDP perspective this can look like a growth bonanza. GDP delivers ‘success’ irrespective of policies or events, which may explain its long-term appeal to politicians. The

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inventor of national income statistics, Simon Kuznets (1934), commenced the critique of GDP in 1934 by reporting to the US Congress that GDP was not designed to measure success, “The welfare of a nation can scarcely be inferred from a measurement of national income…”. Kuznets’ advice to watch what was growing remains relevant. With unproductive activity and economic inactivity growing, global economic growth faces a historically unprecedented end-point. Stern (2007) estimates a 5–20% penalty to GDP in case of failure with the climate stability goal. When combined with failure with other global goals, the potential penalty is harsher and the possibility of continuing growth is removed. Growth based upon linear economics appears to have no future. 4.10. A FUTURE FOR GROWTH

Politicians may be relieved to hear that so long as current problems are reversible over time growth can continue – but not growth as usual. GDP (or more usefully, GPP as in Section 3 above) which preserves the resources on which it depends may expand with no theoretical limit to the quantity of final services that can be produced from a given physical resource input (Ayres, 1998). Growth can be generated not from a faster metabolism rushing to consume more physical resources but from activity which meets needs, prevents rising concentrations of wastes and generates new resources within industrial, ecological and geological cycles. Continuing economic growth may be underpinned by activities which adapt society to a circular economic model. Precycling insurance premiums and their investments would both add to growth. The long-awaited global sustainable development ‘revolution’ would proceed rapidly, adding to growth. Losses to growth, such as less spending on products that become waste in ecosystems would be compensated by gains to growth from a vast expansion of diverse productive activity (see Section 4.5). The outcomes of linear economics, including rising demand for diminishing resources, provide no defense against unstable and escalating prices. Speculative market activity can worsen this volatility. Precycling insurance would counteract this price instability, cut the overall costs of meeting people’s needs and establish the lowest possible long-term prices for all products and services. An economy which protects resources in cycles has prospects for long-term growth, employment, stability and well-being that are unavailable in an economy which creates scarcity and damage by losing resources as wastes.


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4.11. ALL FUELS CAN BE PRECYCLED

A portion of all fuels can be precycled by greater efficiency in resources, energy use and meeting of needs. Materials which are not needed do not require energy inputs. Energy which need not be produced does not make waste. Needs which are met do not require materialism. According to Friedrich Schmidt-Bleek (2004) “The resource productivity in western countries has to be increased by at least a Factor 10, compared to today. A demateralisation of this magnitude will also dampen the energy demand by up to 80%, opening completely new vistas for de-carbonization and for supplying sufficient energy to the 2 billion poor of this world.” Energy security may be assured not by supplying more but by needing less. The consumerist ambition of high energy-demand living standards can be superceded by low energy-demand quality of life. This cultural change may emerge, not by exhortation, but in response to suitable financial signals including precycling insurance. The use of fossil, nuclear or mixed-waste derived fuels all adds unavoidably to waste levels in ecosystems yet all can be precycled by substitution. For fossil fuels the option of carbon capture and storage may become available in future if the carbon remains safely stored over geological time-scales, storage does not release further fossil fuels and the noncarbon elements also do not accumulate as ecosystem waste. Some nuclear power equipment and fuels can be returned as new resources only over geological timescales so these can be precycled only by substitution. Precycling insurance would fund the prevention, reuse or recycling of all wastes for disposal, including two mixed fractions suitable for plasma gasification (for carbon-based materials) or construction (for non-carbon based materials). Mixed wastes would not be available for incineration. Precycling insurance would raise the production costs of waste-based fuel products and subsidise the precycling of fuels. This would direct spending and investment in energy businesses away from waste-based fuels. The focus on products rather than emissions allows the same economic instrument to apply to both fuels and energy equipment. Energy itself is not included since all energy comes either from fuel products or from sources outside ecosystems (geothermal, tidal, solar). Precycling insurance can account for the nuclear power station as well as the fissile fuel, the oil tanker as well as the oil, and all the equipment used for renewable energy. Premiums for biomass and processed biofuels would include the waste risk of fuels used in processing. Premiums would be invested in ensuring that biofuels do not cause loss of diverse ecosystems nor food production.

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4.12. CLIMATE TALKS WITHOUT EMISSIONS CAPS

The tendency of linear economics to omit the costs of preventing problems has led to numerous worsening global problems, including climate change. International political climate talks over the past 15 years have not considered the role of linear economics nor of systemic economic instruments. Instead talks have pursued global agreement on mandatory emissions limits (or ‘caps’). Such agreement remains elusive; the enforcement of any future agreement would be even more elusive. Many politicians understandably worry that an agreement designed to limit emissions from the economy would also limit the growth of that economy. Politicians might also worry that a patchwork of regulatory and economic policies would create unfairness between people, businesses and nations that would potentially inhibit economic growth, climate stability and other global security goals. Top-down controls such as emissions rationing have yet to be fully considered and may prove to be unusable due to lack of public support. International climate talks could usefully consider whether emissions might be cut further and faster by agreement on a new global economic model, rather than agreement on emissions limits. Linear economics should not be constrained, it should be rapidly replaced by circular economics which would operate without rising waste levels in the atmosphere or elsewhere. A transition from linear to circular economics, a sufficient global effort at climate stability and the advancement of global security can be attempted using the systemic economic instruments outlined above. 5. Conclusion – Prepare for the Unexpected 5.1. UNSUSTAINABILITY WILL END ONE WAY…

The proposed instruments are no panacea. Despite many aspects of human progress, a legacy of numerous problematic trends impede progress. These trends may all be reversible though whatever is now done, further difficulties will arise for decades due to time lags in complex systems. Some trends will benefit from further instruments at other leverage points. The codependence of energy security, climate stability, sustainable development, economic growth and national security suggests a role for both Gross Peaceful Product and precycling insurance. If only GPP is applied then conflicts over declining oil reserves, affordable food, clean water and productive land may worsen. If only precycling insurance is applied then vital public funds could continue to be diverted into stockpiling of weapons. If both GPP and precycling insurance are applied then it may be possible to experience eco-


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nomics which more fully engages the human potential for ingenuity and shared endeavour. The pace of change may be surprising. 5.2. …OR ANOTHER

Possible approaches to the complexity of codependent goals may be disregarded by policy-makers who remain comfortable with prevailing attitudes. Society’s attention may be otherwise occupied. The default option of progressively tougher patchwork policies invites an outcome where no goals are met amidst emerging combinations of ecological, financial and societal disruptions. Again, the pace of change may be surprising.

References Alexander, D., 2007, Speech to Council on Foreign Relations, Washington DC, UK Department for International Development, 12th July 2007. www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/ Speeches/council-foreign-relations.asp Ayres, R.U., 1998, Turning Point: An End to the Growth Paradigm. St. Martin’s Press, New York, 154 pp. Azar, C., Holmberg J., and Lindgren K., 1996, Socio-ecological Indicators for Sustainability. Ecological Economics, 18, 89–112. Bertalanffy, L. von, 1950, An Outline of General Systems Theory. British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 1 (2), 134–165. Birkeland, J., 2007, GEN 4: Positive Development: Design for Eco-Services. BEDP Environmental Design Guide, The Royal Australian Institute of Architects, Canberra. Boulding, K., 1966, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth. In: Jarrett H (ed.). Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy, Resources for the Future. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, pp. 3–14. CNA Corporation, 2007, A Study by Eleven Retired US Generals and Admirals. National Security and the Threat of Climate Change. p. 6. www.cna.org Calvin, W.H., 1989, The Cerebral Symphony. Bantam, New York, pp. 301–316. Chapman, J., 2002, System Failure: Why Governments Must Learn to Think Differently. DEMOS, 70 pp. www.demos.co.uk/publications/systemfailure Churchman, C. West, 1979, The Systems Approach and Its Enemies. Basic Books, New York. Cuellar, M.-F., 2004, Reflections on Sovereignty and Collective Security. Stanford Journal of International Law, 40 (211), 226–227. G8 Summit Declaration, 2007, Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy. p. 16. www.g-8.de/Webs/G8/EN/ Gallup International, 2007, ‘Voice of the People’ Survey of 55,000 People in 60 Countries. World Economic Forum.

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Glendinning, C., 1995, Technology, Trauma and the Wild. In: Roszak T. (ed.). Ecopsychology. Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 54 pp. Greyson, J., 2007, An Economic Instrument for Zero Waste, Economic Growth and Sustainability. Journal of Cleaner Production, 15, 1382–1390. Holmberg, J. and Robèrt, K.-H., 2000, Backcasting - A framework for strategic planning. International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology, 7, 291–308. Kuznets, S., 1934, National Income, 1929–1932. 73rd US Congress, 2nd Session, Senate Document no. 124, 7 pp. Max-Neef M., Elizalde A., and Hopenhayn, M., 1991, Human Scale Development. Apex Press, New York. McDonough, W., and Braungart, M., 2002, Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the Way We Make Things. North Point Press, New York. Meadows, D., 1999, Leverage Points: Places to Intervene in a System. Sustainability Institute, Vermont, p. 1. www.sustainabilityinstitute.org/tools_resources/papers.html Ny, H., MacDonald, J., Broman, G., Yamamoto, R., and Robèrt, K.-H., 2006, Sustainability Constraints as System Boundaries. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 10, 61–77. O’Rorke, M., 1988, Public Information Campaign on Precycling. City of Berkeley, California. Richmond, B., 1993, Systems Thinking: Critical Thinking Skills for the 1990s and Beyond. System Dynamics Review, 9 (2), 113–133. Robèrt, K.-H., 1991, The Physician and the Environment. Reviews in Oncology. European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer, 4 (2), 13. Schmidt-Bleek, F., 2004, Systemic Fiscal Reforms for a Future. Presentation at Factor 10 Institute, France, 31st May 2004. www.factor10-institute.org/pdf/mipsfuture.pdf Schwartz, P., and Randall, D., 2003, An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and its Implications for United States National Security. US Department of Defense, Pentagon, pp. 16–17. http://www.ems.org/climate/pentagon_climate_change.pdf Shell, 2007, Global Sustainability Dialogue. www.blindspot.org.uk Stålenheim, P., Perdomo, C., and Sköns, E., 2007, Military Expenditure. SIPRI Yearbook 2007. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 267–297. Sterman, J., and Sweeney, L.B., 2007, Understanding Public Complacency About Climate Change: Adults’ Mental Models of Climate Change Violate Conservation of Matter. Climatic Change. Springer, 80, 213–238. Stern, N., 2007, The Economics of Climate Change: Summary of Conclusions. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1 pp. United Nations Charter, 1945, Chapter 5. San Francisco, www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ chapter5.htm WEEE, 2002, Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment. European Union, Directive 2002/95/EC. www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l21210.htm. Wright, B., 1982, The British Fire Mark: 1680–1879. Woodhead-Faulkner, Cambridge.

SUSTAINABILITY AND ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY OF COMBINATIONS OF RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES (RES) AND FOSSIL FUELS FOR PRODUCTION OF HEAT AND ELECTRICITY

KIRIL POPOVSKI* AND SANJA POPOVSKA VASILEVSKA St. Kliment Ohridski University, Faculty of Technical Science, 1000 Bitola, Macedonia

Abstract: Known advantages of renewable energies use, such as local availability, low environmental impact, etc. cannot always cover their disadvantages (different for different RES), namely: dependence on concrete locality (geothermal energy), variability over the day and year (solar and wind energy), complicate collection and storing (biomass), and difficulties to proof economic feasibility in comparison with fossil fuels on the market (gas and liquid fuels). Main problem is that the most of comparisons are made with intention to completely replace fossil fuels in all the life sectors and particularly in electricity production. That is for sure not possible when taking into account that RES are energy sources in development and fossil fuels already have the development process behind and have an extremely well organized distribution network, excellent industrial background for different applications and state and international capital support for financing projects for resources development and application. This paper suggests a change of the approach. Except “big moves”, i.e. trials to remove the fossil fuels use, it is proposed to try to find optimal use of proven advantages of RES application in combination with decreased or even minimized use of fossil fuels everywhere where possible. Sustainability and economic feasibility of such solutions are illustrated with examples of combinations of different RES with oil and gas and between themselves. Probably that shall

______ *

To whom correspondence should be addressed: Kiril Popovski, Faculty of Technical Science, St. Kliment Ohridski University, 1000 Bitola, Macedonia. E-mail: [email protected] F. Barbir and S. Ulgiati (eds.), Sustainable Energy Production and Consumption. © Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008

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not change the whole situation significantly but shall enable further technological improvements in order to be ready when the next energy crisis comes. Keywords: RES development, sustainability, integration, combinations, economic feasibility.

1. Introduction Taking into account that the civilization of today is “energy” one, energy and environmental security become major problems facing world global economy of today (IEA, 2000). A direct relationship between the level of development and energy consumption can be noticed, resulting with increased growth and demand for welfare by developed and developing countries (WEC, 2006). That’s placing higher pressure on energy resources in order to reach higher level of development. In particular, a large fraction of “new consumers” in developing countries already reached a purchasing power high enough as to be able to access to commodity and energy markets worldwide, thus boosting energy consumption and competition for all kinds of resources. Such a trend, although in principle may represent a progress towards diffuse welfare and wealth as well as much needed equity, is at present contributing to a rush for the appropriation of available resources which are directly and indirectly linked to energy and may contribute to planetary instability if it is not adequately understood and managed, taking into account that known fossil and nuclear energy resources are limited. World energy scenario of the end of 20th century (Figure 1) defined the obligation of strong orientation towards RES over a period of 50 years in order to enable a smooth accommodation of the world economy to the new situation with available energy sources (Figure 2). However, although the worldwide production of renewable energy was supposed to grow quickly, its share of the global energy mix was not significantly increased during the last 10 years, and according to the present situation will hardly increase in near future. Obviously, very strong constraints exist and without their removal no real advance can be reached. It looks that the most important ones are as follows: •

The “story” of finite fossil fuels energy sources is still not accepted seriously.

•

There is still no real answer of the science how and with what to replace fossil fuels, taking into account that the trend of increasing world energy demand shall follow, at least during the next 20–30 years.

SUSTAINABLE COMBINATION OF RES AND FOSSIL FUELS

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Figure 1. World energy scenario 2000–2050 (ISEO, 2004)

TOTAL USABLE ENERGY ON EARTH E

DEPLETION OF FINITE ENERGY RESOURCES

ENERGY [PWh]

200

MAXIMUM

TOTAL ENERGY CONSUMTION INEVITABLE CLIMAX OF NON-RENEWABLE ENERGY

OPTION B OPTION A

SUSTAINABLE ENERGY SUPPLY

100

SOLAR ENERGY DIRECT HYDRO POWER/TIDAL /WAVELENGTH OCEAN & GEOTHERMAL ENERGY BIOMASS / BIOGAS ENERGY AMBIENT ENERGY MUSCLE POWER WIND POWER

SITUATION 1996 HAZARDOUS AND DEPLETION ENERGY CONSUMPTION (FOSSIL & FISSILE)

OPTION 0 (ZERO-SUBSTITUTION)

RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSUMPTION

−1000

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

t 5000 [YEARS]

Figure 2. Long term view on energy sources participation for covering the world requirements (ISEO, 2004)

•

Offered technologies for replacements with RES cannot cover the needs of many life sectors and, therefore, cannot change the general situation. Possibility to do that with wider use of nuclear energy is also not acceptable due to the serious environmental constraints.

At last but not least, civilization of today is strongly based on the energy consumption and any revolutionary change shall be extremely expensive and not possible for major part of the world, at least during acceptable time periods. It can result with strong crisis and unstable political situation (wars).

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2. Are the RES Competitive to Fossil Fuels? Initial approach for introduction of RES sources in different life sectors during the 1970s of last century has been by trials to find alternative solutions to the existing ones, using fossil fuels. That was the reason why RES have been called “alternative energy resources”. That immediately leads to comparisons, which rarely have been positive for the RES, particularly when larger introduction, including different users, has been in question. Even significant advantages of application of each one of RES have been identified (Table 1), final conclusion has been mostly negative due to the list of constraints. That resulted with a gradual lost of interest for RES development until the environmental problems of fossil fuels use put them again in the middle of interest. In order to push their development, and to cover at least the economic constraints, many states introduced different types of support (incentives, removal of taxes, direct co-financing in final energy price, etc.). That resulted with a significant increase of interest and local development of some of RES (wind and solar energy, energy of biomass and heat pumps) but it is far of the expected and necessary one (Figure 2). Still, it is far not possible to cover at least the rate of increase of the energy consumption in the world. Obviously, present constraints and negative sides of RES, in comparison with the fossil fuels use, are to big or the chosen strategies of development are wrong. First of all, it became clear soon that present technologies of production and use of RES do not enable any general reorientation. The whole structure of energy sector should be changed in all the life and economy sectors, and that is not possible during a short period. Probably, more than one century shall be needed to do it. On the other hand, it is clear that according to the present technology level of production and use RES are not really competitive to fossil fuels (with the exception of hydro-energy), and not of such a size to fulfill the total energy needs! When looking into the Table 1, first general conclusion is that each one of the RES has some significant advantage(s) in comparison with fossil fuels but, at the end, advantages of the fossil fuels ones are always prevailing, particularly if neglecting the proven negative environmental impact of their use. The most important advantage is that the supply network is normally very good organized, that technologies of use for any purpose are very much developed and easy for completion and exploitation, either for production of electricity or heat, and that they are cheap. If taking into account that fossil fuels sources are finite in a rather short time period and that environmental issues are becoming one of the most important problems of the civilization of today, it is obvious that it is absolutely necessary to find the way how to change the situation.

Simple but needs regular performance Low. Main influence is of investment costs Significant; changing completely natural conditions

Simple and cheap

Moderate

Electricity and Heat

Simple but work intensive and continual High for Moderate Moderate. High electricity. influence of Moderate for organizational heat costs Minimal & Minimal to Significant controllable significant for (positive & larger units negative) Special organization and measures needed

Simple and cheap

Low. Only Low. Only Low. Only maintenance maintenance maintenance costs costs costs

Electricity

Wind Bio-mas Depending on Depending on bio geogr. location and economy characteristics Changeable Depends on type. seasonally Mainly seasonal

Moderate. Depends on annual loading factor


Solar Depending on geogr. location Changeable seasonally

Electricity

Seasonal

Hydro In concrete locations


Geo-thermal In concrete locations (except for heat pumps) Continuous

Complicated. Depends on the source characteristics Price of Low for heat production. Moderate produced energy for electricity production Environmental Low for heat impact production. Moderate for electricity production

Maintenance

Type of produced energy Production costs

Availability characteristics

Availability

Depends on the fuel in question. Already very much developed practice Accommodated to the strategic interests. In principle it is still low

Low. Depend on the fuel in question

Significant (positive Significant (negative). & negative) Special Special measures needed organization and measures needed

High. Depends on costs of environmental protection Complicated and expensive. Needs special organization Very expensive

Fossil fuels Depending only on economy strength of the user Continual. Does not depend on weather or season Electricity and Heat Electricity and heat (plus transport sector)

Urban waste Depending on economy characteristics Continuous

TABLE 1. Some general comparisons between energy sources

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3. To Find Alternatives for Fossil Fuels or to Increase Res Use in a Sustainable Way? Introduction of alternatives to “universal” fossil fuels uses is very difficult, principally because the later ones have behind a very long period of development, i.e. ready reply to each problem occurring in design and exploitation, developed industry for production of necessary equipment and materials, and developed network for supply of consumers. It is just opposite with most of the RES, i.e. energy production and supply is still in development, as it is the exploitation. However, in many cases economic benefits and positive atmosphere can change the situation. If the state creates a positive atomsphere for development and enough good mechanisms to support it, significant advances can be reached, not with intention to opposite the use of very comfortable fossil fuels but to support the advantages of RES. The question is if such a statement is a realistic one, i.e. do we have some experience proving its feasibility? In general, we can group the successful experiences in: •

Introduction of RES in low developed countries with low financial possibilities for regular supply of fossil fuels and its efficient and cheap distribution.

•

Introduction of RES in some developed countries with good accepted general orientation towards wider use of RES and good organized support enabling it.

The most important factor in the first one, pressing towards as wider as possible use of locally available RES, is of economic nature. It is not the problem only in development of the supply structure of fossil fuels but also of the continual import afterwards (which must be covered by export!). And they are not able to do that due to the fact that being mainly import orientated economies. Therefore, the best solution is to follow the development of fossil fuels use there where it is inevitable (transport sector, electricity for larger urban concentrations, etc.) because, realistically, there is no other alternative choice on disposal. On the contrary, to support maximally development the solutions of independent energy schemes based on RES (improvement of present situation by covering the energy demand in rural and isolated communities). It is proved that such solutions are sustainable because being accommodated to the economic and cultural level of users, more than the expensive and sophisticated ones, conditioning use of developed network for electricity or fuels supply and, later on, payment of very expensive energy, much above their economic possibilities. Except to support the system of low energy price in order to be accessible for everybody


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in order to improve the economy and life conditions in the country, state should keep the real market price of energy and support the development of RES based systems. In that way, import dependence can be decreased and large investments of economically not feasible production and distribution systems avoided. Significant results of such an orientation can be followed in India and China (Bellomonte et al., 2002), where excellent, sustainable to local conditions, simple and cheap completes for cooking (movable or stabile), lightening, washing, fresh water heating and pasteurization, pumping water for irrigation, and food processing RES units are already in wide use and follow to develop. It is of particular importance that also the aid of international organizations and developed countries slowly started to accept such an approach (Scarlat et al., 2006). Except to follow interests of industrial and financial groups (supply side!), interests of the users (demand side!) started to be respected. When the second group of countries is in question, situation is more complicated. Short term interests of local economies press towards keeping the present (convenient for them) situation. They are accommodating to any increase of energy prices (except the rare sudden dramatic ones) by improvements in production and exploitation technologies and by increasing the selling prices. However, the responsible relation to the environmental issues enforced introduction of strong measures to support wider RES introduction. The main driving force is consciousness that the future of mankind depends on the protection of the nature (ISEO, 2004). Unfortunately, it was very soon recognized that implementation of protection measures is very expensive. It is much cheaper to invest in development of expensive but environmentally friendly technologies, particularly when energy production and use is in question. In the moment when that was understood and publicly accepted, road for quicker development has been opened in the countries with responsible governments. Energy users look for possible application of RES for own particular needs and state takes care to make it economically feasible. In that way, also the industry got a new production sector and interest for further development. There is no particular strong pressure for removing fossil fuels in order not to disturb the economy of the country but just opening good chances for wider introduction of RES. Particularly good is experience of Austria (Funk and Riva, 2004), where participation of RES in state balance is already above the targeted one by EC for 2020. Similar approach can be followed also in Germany, and other North European countries.

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4. Some Examples 4.1. SUCCESSFUL SOLUTIONS FOR UNDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Energy needs in undeveloped countries and particularly in isolated and desert communities are mainly orientated towards the needs of cooking, washing, fresh water pasteurization, pumping water for irrigation and lightening. Very simple, cheap and easy for use RES installations have been already developed and successfully introduced in many African and Asian countries. Main problem for a really wide introduction is absence of strategy and large programs for introduction by education and finance support. There, where been properly done, it has been successful. Very interesting is also the production of electricity by means of Hydrogen-PV energy systems. The oxygen produced by the electrolysis process is vented and the hydrogen gas fills a gas holder, which supplies a small generator, producing electricity for lighting or irrigation. Excellent experience, opening very wide possibilities, can be followed in Algeria. 4.2. COMBINATIONS OF RES

4.2.1. Solar Energy and Fossil Fuels Solar energy is free of charge but daily and annually changeable. Therefore it is not convenient for proper production of hot tap water or central heating. However, by introduction of a combination with the already existing electricity use or (better) fossil fuels use (Funk and Riva, 2004), this constraint can be removed (Figure 3). By proper support, state enables covering the additional capital costs in an economically feasible way. 4.2.2. Solar Energy and Biomass Except the use of fossil fuels, it is possible to use biomass, there where is on disposal (Figure 4). 4.2.3. Geothermal Energy and Fossil Fuels Main reason for weak economic feasibility of geothermal energy for heating purposes are the high capital costs for energy source completion and the low annual heat loading factor (Popovski et al., in preparation). By introduction of a cheap fossil fuel or gas boiler for covering the heat requirements of peak loadings, annual heat loading factor can be dramatically increased and price of produced heat decreased (Figure 5).


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Figure 3. Combination of solar energy and fossil fuels for covering domestic heat requirements (Funk and Riva, 2004)

Figure 4. Efficient solar-supported central heating system. It includes the solar thermal system (left), the conventional heating system (middle, in this case biomass) as well the heat distribution system (right) (Funk and Riva, 2004)

4.2.4. Wind and H ydro-energy or Fossil Fuels Production of electricity by use of wind turbines is already very wide accepted, particularly in Europe and has the highest rate of development between all the RES. Variable nature of resource is compensated by connection to the large grids. However, there where grid do not exists, it is possible to use combinations with other RES or fossil fuels. That can be by combination with a small hydro plant or with diesel aggregate. In the later case, produced electricity is cheaper than if produced only with fossil fuel. Also, combination with photovoltaic electricity production is feasible.

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Figure 5. Geothermal district heating system using gas back-up boilers for covering the peak heat requirements (Popovski et al., in preparation)

There is a further list of successful experiences with combinations of RES and fossil fuels use. Which one shall be applied depends on the local combination of influencing factors and concrete needs of the energy user. Their main characteristic is that being sustainable with the economic, cultural and social environment where completed. State is not financing their completion or pushing it by means of restriction of use of other possible solutions. It only creates a positive environment and offers covering of eventual negative difference in the price of produced energy, however based on precise estimations of average local conditions. 5. Conclusions Problems of covering the energy requirements of today is more likely to be curtailed as result of ecological considerations than as the result of actual resource exhaustion, which is still not completely proved. In fact, although there is partial disagreement regarding the ultimate limitation of resources


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(i.e. the amount of resources that are actually available and economic cost of their exploitation), there is wide consensus worldwide about present exploitation of nature as a sink for waste release. A general reorientation of energy production and exploitation, presently principally based on fossil fuels, is simply not possible. However, that does not mean that it is possible to close the eyes to reality – fossil fuels are finite, sooner or later. It is absolutely necessary to begin the process of transition as soon as possible in order to prevent large energy (and therefore economic and social) crisis. As a consequence, there is an urgent need for incorporating environmental constraints into scientific research and policy actions and development strategies all over the world (Scarlat, 2006). In that way, accelerated gradual and sustainable incorporation of RES shall be possible and common responsibility is to create convenient environment for its optimal performance. Convenient solutions are locally dependent and that is the state which should make them economically attractive. At last but not least, that is still cheaper than financing the elimination of consequences of the negative environmental impact of present way of production and use of energy or to come to crisis resulting of absence of energy resources. Finally, already mentioned World Energy Scenario 2000–2050 is obviously a wrong one. Planned reorientation in so short time period is not feasible even in most developed countries and completely not in middle developed and developing countries. It is more realistic to predict the full 21st century as a transition one. RES exploitation shall gradually take a more important part in the world energy balance but also other solutions shall have a good chance, even not being really environmentally friendly (nuclear energy, renewed use of coal, etc. and probably some new ones). Meanwhile, unanswered questions to the consequences of really wide use of any RES should get acceptable answers and much more efficient technologies of production and use should be developed.

References Bellomonte, F., Alonzo, G., Campiotti, C.A., and Liuzza, F., 2002, Integrated Solar Energy for Rural Areas, ISS Oradea, Romania. Funk, K., and Riva, R., 2004, Solar Supported Heating Networks in Multi Storey Residential Buildings, AEE INTEC, Gleisdorf, Austria. IEA, 2000, Energy, Technology and Climate Change, Paris. ISEO, 2004, The Global Mechanism for Bundling the Forces Towards the Transition of the Clean, Sustainable Energy Age, International Sustainable Energy Organization, Presentation publication. Popovski, et al. Geothermal Energy, UNESCO Text-Book (in preparation).

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Scarlat, N., Dallemand, J.F., and Domac, J., 2006, Data Gathering on Renewable Energies for New Member States and Candidate Countries, Proceedings, Dubrovnik, Croatia. WEC, 2006, Proposal of Technical, Environmental and Sociological Performance Indicators for Renewable Energy Sources, World Energy Council.

THIRD PARTY FINANCING: NEW FINANCIAL TOOLS FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY – AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE CLAUDIO G. FERRARI* Esco Italia SpA – Via Nino Bixio, 15 – 53100 – Siena, Italy

Abstract: Issues of energy efficiency are closely linked to financial availability. The latter can be increased by good use of energy due to optimised process management. Third Party Financing (TPF) is an appropriate tool for funding of optimisation strategies without financial charge to the final user. This is due to budget savings from increased energy efficiency and more appropriate allocation of financial resources made available. ESCos (Energy Service Companies) are the new technical and market operators which make the TPF tool available to final users. TPF is regulated by the European Union Directive 93/76/EEC, which is currently being replaced by the more recent Directive 2006/32/EC. Third Party Financing has already been included in the Energy Program of the Italian Government as well as in several Regional Energy Plans. The TPF strategy is strictly related to the White Certificate market (efficiency certificates), which is already regulated by the Italian Ministerial Decree 20/07/2004 as well as by the abovementioned EU Directive 2006/32/EC. Several examples of the application of TPF to fostering energy efficiency in Italy, with a special focus on space heating for the residential sector, are presented and discussed.

Keywords: Energy intensity, energy efficiency, financial instruments, energy audits, energy efficiency certificates, third party financing

1. Introduction Energy is a complex system without limits. Analysing and facing the problems that arise within the energy sector means taking into consideration a

______ * Claudio G. Ferrari, Esco Italia SpA – Via Nino Bixio, 15 – 53100 – Siena (Italy) – www.escoitalia.eu. E-mail: [email protected]


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multitude of aspects, some of which are not apparently connected to it. In fact, we find the following quote from Albert Einstein as being completely appropriate: “We can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them” – in other words, we need to use this approach in an effort to not only involve the energy system, but to improve it. Today’s energy system is characterised by at least two negative factors: an elevated inefficiency of the whole process line (from the production of electricity to its consumption), caused primarily by the utilisation of poor technology and inefficient systems and of actual losses; the generation of high social costs (caused by the utilisation of fossil fuels) which, due to the fact that they are difficult to measure, aren’t taken into account, therefore distorting true data analysis: the so-called externalities. 2. A New Energy Paradigm A primary indicator of the inefficiency of the energy system and, at the same time, of the performance of an economic/territorial system, is the energy intensity that indicates the efficiency in which energy is utilised to produce the added value (the ratio between the Gross Inland Consumption of energy and the Gross Domestic Product). Figure 1 is an elaboration of data provided by the European Commission [1] and shows the progress of energy intensity in various countries and supranational aggregates since 1990. We may notice, in particular, three distinct developments: China’s significant performance (due to its current economic boom); the abatement of approximately 15% recorded at the global level and for the EU-25, the USA, and Denmark (the most exemplary in absolute terms); Italy’s substantial immutability. Various solutions may be identified that may allow us to confront the complexity of the energetic system, but a paradigm shift is certainly necessary, which may include: •

The development of energy efficiency

•

The diffusion of distributed generation, or producing energy where it is consumed

•

The increase of the utilization of energy from renewable sources (Sun, wind, biomasses, etc.).

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Figure 1. The progress of energy intensity

2.1. ENERGY EFFICIENCY

Energy Efficiency is the fulfilment of a project, thanks to the utilization of new technology, by recuperating the efficiency of an existing system. The Directive 2006/32/EC [2] defines energy efficiency as “a ratio between an output of performance, service, goods or energy, and an input of energy” and defines the improvement of energy efficiency as “an increase in energy end-use efficiency as a result of technological, behavioural and/or economic changes”. There are enormous margins for improvement in Energy Efficiency. In fact, the United Nations [3] states: “In order to fulfil the potential of end use energy efficiency improvements, which are estimated to be in the range of 25–40 per cent in residential and commercial buildings, industry, agriculture and transport sectors in all countries, appropriate targets for every five years are needed.” The European Commission [4] sets an ambitious goal of 20% by 2020 as compared with today’s consumption for energy efficiency potential; half of this potential can be realised with adopted legislations. Several studies affirm a technical potential of a reduction of approximately 40%. The International Project for Sustainable Energy Paths (IPSEP) and Italy’s Ministry of the Environment (MATT) [5] affirm that obtainable savings shares of the electricity sector for Italy could be: 26% in the residential sector, 35% in commerce & trade, and 39% in industry.

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2.2. DISTRIBUTED GENERATION

The Authority for Electric Energy and Gas (AEEG), in Relation [6] attached to Resolution 160/06, states that “Distributed Generation consists of the system of production of electric energy composed of a small-to-medium size production unit (from a few dozen/hundred kW to some MW), connected, normally, to distribution systems of electric energy (including indirect systems) installed in order to: a) supply electric charges located close to electric energy production sites (here we may highlight the overwhelming majority of the consumption units that result as being connected to electric energy distribution networks) frequently within cogeneration structures in order to take advantage of useful heat; b) utilise primary energy sources (generally renewable) distributed throughout the territory and not otherwise exploitable through traditional largescale production systems.” Therefore, the definition (consistent with that of the Directive 2003/54/CE [7]) has been adopted, for which the Distributed Generation (DG) is the assembly of the generation systems with a nominal power of less than 10 MVA. The subset of the DG is Microgeneration (MG): the assembly of the systems for the production of electric energy, including cogeneration structures, with an electricity generation capacity not higher than 1 MW. Distributed Generation offers a number of advantages, including: •

Reduction of power-grid losses (transmission and distribution: 9–12%)

•

More efficiency (up to 80% with co-generation, compared to 30–35%)

•

Lower financial risk

•

Environmental and social benefits

•

Wider involvement of territories and stakeholders

•

Flexibility of operation and localization.

The diffusion of Distributed Generation in a number of nations is reported in Table 1.


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TABLE 1. The distributed generation in 2004

3. Finance: The Tool for Energy Efficiency 3.1. THE POWER OF SAVING

Energy saving is the first source in alternative energy. The European Commission [8] estimates savings could represent €100 billion per year. This amount could bring savings from €200 to €1,000 per year for an average household. However, saving energy does not only mean saving money. The same EC estimates other positive consequences: •

The creation of approximately one million jobs

•

The reduction of the waste of scarce resources

•

The strengthening of the security of energy supplies

•

The strengthening of our competitive position

•

The quickest and most effective way of meeting Kyoto Climate Change objectives

•

The securing of 50% of the necessary reductions of CO2 emissions, obtained by saving 20% of energy consumption

•

The reduction of local pollution

•

A stop to the wasting of resources.

In theory, the market will achieve the best results, but there are still many obstacles to take into account, which include:

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Financial obstacles – Lack of information on costs and profitability –

Split-incentives

–

Risk aversion

–

Insufficient regulatory action

–

Reluctance to commit to targets

–

Sub-optimal use of tax and state aid

•

Lack of market for energy efficiency

•

No transparent and cost-reflective prices

•

Lack of information and education.

In particular, the European Commission takes into account possible solutions for the above-mentioned risk aversion, such as: •

Improved and more (targeted) information

•

Global loans and right intermediaries

•

An increased role of Energy Service Companies (ESCos) and possible solutions for the sub-optimal use of tax and state aid, such as:

•

Improved information for decision makers

•

The creation of political will and awareness

•

Better use of tax and state aid

•

The rationalisation of subsidies.

3.2. THE INSTRUMENTS: THE ESCOS, THE ENERGY AUDIT SCHEME, THIRD PARTY FINANCING (TPF), ENERGY EFFICIENCY CERTIFICATES

Having ascertained the existence of an enormous sum of money that is literally wasted every moment, and that also provokes further damage (local and global pollution, climate change, etc.), European (and national) legislation has identified a series of instruments aimed at simplifying, rationalizing, accelerating, and also incentivating the recovery and the reuse of such wealth, redistributing it among all interested parties. These same finances, implicit and hidden within the deformations of the current energy system, may trigger an exemplary mechanism, if appropriately researched and stimulated with specific financial instruments. The legislator has identified four instruments: two operative (ESCo and the Energy Audits Scheme) and two financial (Third Party Financing and Energy Efficiency Certificates). This area is regulated at the European level by the Directive 93/76/EEC [9], which is currently being replaced by the


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more recent Directive 2006/32/EC, while in Italy it is regulated by the Ministerial Decree of 20 July 2004 [10, 11], and by several Resolutions of the Authority for Electric Energy and Gas [12–14]. “The purpose of this Directive (2006/32/EC) is to enhance the costeffective improvement of energy end-use efficiency in the Member States by: (a) providing the necessary indicative targets as well as mechanisms, incentives and institutional, financial and legal frameworks to remove existing market barriers and imperfections that impede the efficient end-use of energy; (b) creating the conditions for the development and promotion of a market for energy services and for the delivery of other energy efficiency improvement measures to final consumers.” (Art. 1) “Member States shall adopt and aim to achieve an overall national indicative energy savings target of 9% for the ninth year of application of this Directive, to be reached by way of energy services and other energy efficiency improvement measures. Member States shall take cost-effective, practicable and reasonable measures designed to contribute towards achieving this target… The national energy savings in relation to the national indicative energy savings target shall be measured as from 1 January 2008.” (Art. 4, c.1) 3.2.1. Energy Service Company (ESCo) The Directive 2006/32/EC defines the Energy Service Company (ESCo) as “a natural or legal body that delivers energy services and/or other energy efficiency improvement measures to a user’s facility or premises, and accepts some degree of financial risk in doing so. The payment for the services delivered is based (either wholly or in part) on the achievement of energy efficiency improvements and on the meeting of the other agreed performance criteria.” (Art. 3 j) “Member States shall ensure that there are sufficient incentives, equal competition and level playing fields for market actors other than energy distributors, distribution system operators and retail energy sales companies, such as ESCos, installers, energy advisors and energy consultants, to independently offer and implement the energy services, energy audits and energy efficiency improvement measures.” (Art. 6, c.3) 3.2.2. Energy Audit Schemes The Directive 2006/32/EC defines “energy audit” as “a systematic procedure to obtain adequate knowledge of the existing energy consumption profile of a building or group of buildings, of an industrial operation and/or

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installation or of a private or public service, identify and quantify costeffective energy savings opportunities, and report the findings.” (Art. 3 l) “Member States shall ensure the availability of efficient, high-quality energy audit schemes which are designed to identify potential energy efficiency improvement measures and which are carried out in an independent manner, to all final consumers, including smaller domestic, commercial and small and medium-sized industrial customers.” (Art. 12, c.1) 3.2.3. Third Party Financing (TPF) The Directive 2006/32/EC recommends that the use of Third Party Financing arrangements is an innovative practice that should be stimulated. In these, the beneficiary avoids investment costs by using part of the financial value of energy savings that result from the third party’s investment to repay the third party’s investment and interest costs. Third Party Financing is a “financial instrument for energy savings” and is defined as “a contractual arrangement involving a third party – in addition to the energy supplier and the beneficiary of the energy efficiency improvement measure – that provides the capital for that measure and charges the beneficiary a fee equivalent to a part of the energy savings achieved as a result of the energy efficiency improvement measure. That third party may or may not be an ESCo.” (Art. 3 k) “Member States shall repeal or amend national legislation and regulations, other than those of a clearly fiscal nature, that unnecessarily or disproportionately impede or restrict the use of financial instruments for energy savings in the market for energy services or other energy efficiency improvement measures.” (Art. 9, c.1) “Member States shall make model contracts for those financial instruments available to existing and potential purchasers of energy services and other energy efficiency improvement measures in the public and private sectors.” (Art. 9, c.2) In Figure 2, the differences between utilising TPF and not using it are represented. In Figure 3, the mechanism and different financial hypotheses are illustrated. 3.2.4. Energy Efficiency Certificates (or White Certificates) The Directive 2006/32/EC defines “White Certificates” as “certificates issued by independent certifying bodies confirming the energy savings claims of market actors as a consequence of energy efficiency improvement measures.” (Art. 3 k)


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Figure 2. The mechanism of TPF

Figure 3. Examples of TPF

“Member States shall: (a) choose one or more of the following requirements to be complied with by energy distributors, distribution system operators and/or retail energy sales companies, directly and/or indirectly through other providers of energy services or energy efficiency improvement measures: (i) ensure the offer to their final customers, and the promotion, of competitively priced energy services; or (ii) ensure the availability to their final customers, and the promotion, of competitively-priced energy audits conducted in an independent manner and/or energy efficiency improvement measures, in accordance with Article 9(2) and Article 12; or

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(iii) contribute to the funds and funding mechanisms referred to in Article 11. The level of such contributions shall as a minimum correspond to the estimated costs of offering any of the activities referred to in this paragraph and shall be agreed with the authorities or agencies referred to in Article 4(4); and/or . (b) ensure that voluntary agreements and/or other market-oriented schemes, such as white certificates, with an effect equivalent to one or more of the requirements referred to in point (a) exist or are set up. Voluntary agreements shall be assessed, supervised and followed up by the Member State in order to ensure that they have in practice an effect equivalent to one or more of the requirements referred to in point (a). To that end, the voluntary agreements shall have clear and unambiguous objectives, and monitoring and reporting requirements linked to procedures that can lead to revised and/or additional measures when the objectives are not achieved or are not likely to be achieved. With a view to ensuring transparency, the voluntary agreements shall be made available to the public and published prior to application to the extent that applicable confidentiality provisions allow, and contain an invitation for stakeholders to comment.” (Art. 6, c.2 ) According to Italian legislation (DM 20/07/2004) the distributors of electricity and gas are obliged to fulfil energy efficiency projects for the enduser or alternatively purchase energy efficiency certificates, or white certificates, from an ESCo. In Figure 4, the mechanisms and processes of White Certificates are illustrated. We may note the roles of the Finance and Public Administration, not as defined subjects, but as pivotal, evoking an order of cause and effect throughout the entire system.

Figure 4. The mechanism and the process of White Certificates


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4. Applied Examples within the Territory Table 2 (the average energy consumption for a private household divided for end-use) demonstrates the potential for energetic and economic savings through the activation of energetic efficiency mechanisms. Several examples of the application of TPF to foster energy efficiency in Italy, with a special focus on space heating for the residential sector, are being planning. Within the Agreement Protocol Federcasa1-ENEA2-Esco Italia, regarding the development of research activity, advancement, demonstration and qualification finalized by energy savings and of the rational utilization of energy, in particular, the transfer of technologies for the rational utilization of energy in the home building sector and its relevant services, we are developing energy efficiency projects for 100–300,000 housing accommodations. We are currently preparing the necessary legislative instruments and energy audits. Diligent research programs specifically designed for optimizing for economic savings for each individual residence are in progress, and need to be consequently followed up by the acquisition of White Certificates. Furthermore, along with Federcasa, we have already obtained a considerable quantity of White Certificates for insulation projects for Social Housing. The Italian legislature offers wide possibilities in this field with the Legislative Decree 192/05 [15], that enforces the 2002/91/CE Directive relative to energy performance in buildings, that “establishes the criteria, the conditions and the manner for improving energy services of buildings with a view to favouring the development, valuation and integration of TABLE 2. The average energy consumption for a private household divided for end-use

______ 1

Federcasa is the association that unites the house-building conglomerates of the Italian ‘Social Housing’ sector. 2 ENEA is the Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy and the Environment. It is a public institution that is involved with research and innovation for the sustainable development of Italy.

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renewable sources and the diversification of energy in an effort to achieving the national objectives of reducing greenhouse gas emissions enforced by the Kyoto Protocol, promoting competition of these most advanced sectors through technological development.” (Art. 1, c.1) “Within a year of the date of entry of the present legislation newly constructed buildings and those in Article 3, comma 2 letter a) are given at the end of that construction and at the discretion of the builder, an energy certificate is to be drawn up in accordance with the criteria and methods in Article 4 comma 2.” (Art. 6, c.1) Finally, with the presentation to the European Commission of the Energy Efficiency Action Plan, until 30th June 2007 (and then in 2011 and 2014) as stated by Directive 2006/32/EC, to which all Member States are obliged, it will be possible to significantly increase the interventions throughout the entire European territory.

References [1] European Commission – Directorate General for Energy and Transport in Co-operation with Eurostat, “European Union. Energy & Transport in Figures 2005”, 2006 [2] Directive 2006/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on Energy End-use Efficiency and Energy Services and Repealing Council Directive 93/76/EEC [3] United Nations – WEHAB Working Group, “A Framework for Action on Energy”, World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg 2002 [4] European Commission, “Green Paper on Energy Efficiency or Doing More with Less”, 2005 [5] Politecnico di Milano – Dipartimento di Energetica – eERG, end-use Efficiency Research Group, Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Tutela del Territorio, “MICENE – Misure dei consumi di energia elettrica nel settore domestico – Risultati delle campagne di rilevamento dei consumi elettrici presso 110 abitazioni in Italia”, 2004 [6] Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica e il Gas, Delibera n. 106/06 “Monitoraggio dello sviluppo degli impianti di generazione distribuita e di microgenerazione. Effetti della generazione distribuita sul sistema elettrico” [7] Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal Market in Electricity and Repealing Directive 96/92/EC [8] European Commission, Directorate General for Energy and Transport, “Green Paper on Energy Efficiency or Doing More With Less as part of the Lisbon Strategy”, The slide presentation, 2005 [9] Council Directive 93/76/EEC of 13 September 1993 to Limit Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Improving Energy Efficiency (SAVE)


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[10] Ministero delle Attività Produttive, Decreto 20 luglio 2004 “Nuova individuazione degli obiettivi quantitativi per l’incremento dell’efficienza energetica negli usi finali di energia”, ai sensi dell’art. 9, comma 1, del decreto legislativo 16 marzo 1999, n. 79 [11] Ministero delle Attività Produttive, Decreto 20 luglio 2004 “Nuova individuazione degli obiettivi quantitativi nazionali di risparmio energetico e sviluppo delle fonti rinnovabili”, di cui all’art. 16, comma 4, del decreto legislativo 23 maggio 2000, n. 164 [12] Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica e il Gas, Delibera n. 103/03 “Linee guida per la preparazione, esecuzione e valutazione dei progetti di cui all’articolo 5, comma 1, dei Decreti Ministeriali 24 aprile 2001 e per la definizione dei criteri e delle modalità per il rilascio dei titoli di efficienza energetica” [13] Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica e il Gas, Delibera n. 200/04 “Adeguamento della deliberazione 18 settembre 2003, n. 103/03 al disposto dei Decreti ministeriali 20 luglio 2004 e della legge 23 agosto 2004, n. 239” [14] Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica e il Gas, Delibera n. 143/05 “Proroga del termine per la presentazione delle richieste di verifica e di certificazione dei risparmi energetici per progetti realizzati nel periodo 2001–2004” [15] Decreto Legislativo 19 agosto 2005, n. 192, “Attuazione della direttiva 2002/91/CE relativa al rendimento energetico nell’edilizia”

VITAL PROBLEMS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, INDICATORS AND ECO-CENTRIC SOLUTIONS

ALEXANDER GOROBETS* Sevastopol National Technical University, Management Department, Streletskaya Bay, Sevastopol 99053, Ukraine

Abstract: In this paper, the global problems of environmental change and human health are analyzed and their interrelated nature and root causes are identified. The inconsistency of the present mode of extensive economic development, intensified by quick population and affluence growth, with the Earth carrying capacity and human health is considered as a major risk of sustainable human development. A new vision of sustainable (harmonious) human development oriented on the integrated psychological, physical, intellectual, social and ethical human development instead of dominating consumerism is proposed. Proportion of healthy population and its average life interval are proposed as the indicators of sustainable human development. The specific institutional (green accounting and auditing) and economic (eco-taxation) policy tools are suggested as the necessary conditions to achieve sustainable development, while the internal human sustainability (mentality) based on the eco-centric rationales (socio-ecological well-being, health) is considered as its sufficient condition that can be achieved through the appropriate social and educational policy. Keywords: Environmental change, indicators, harmonious (sustainable) human development, health, eco-centric policy tools, education, internal sustainability.

1. Introduction Presently, there are many sharp problems of human development which are vital globally and have very dangerous, systematically stable trends:

______ *

Alexander Gorobets, Sevastopol National Technical University, Management Department, Streletskaya Bay, Sevastopol 99053, Ukraine. E-mail: [email protected] F. Barbir and S. Ulgiati (eds.), Sustainable Energy Production and Consumption. © Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008

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1. Environmental – climate change (e.g. global warming, ice melting, extreme weather conditions, natural disasters) (IPCC, 2007), natural resources depletion (e.g. deforestation and fresh water deficit), biodiversity loss, pollution, wastes accumulation (UNEP, 2006) 2. Social – epidemics (e.g. HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis), chronic diseases (e.g. cardiovascular, obesity, depression) (WHO, 2006), poverty, hunger, weapon, people and drugs trade, escalation of conflicts (e.g. terrorism) 3. Technological – arm races (e.g. nuclear weapon expansion), misuse of nanotechnology, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, information technology (e.g. Internet viruses). These problems are inherently interrelated and caused by extensive type of economic development (consumerism, profit motives), high population growth, ego-centric competition for the limited resources (globalization) and deep socio-cultural/ethical crisis – inter and intra-generational cultural, economic and ecological injustice of society (Gorobets, 2006). However, the modern civilization believes in institutional and technological innovations, with their own limits for advancement and a risk of abuse, to cope with these problems instead of changing the philosophy of its development. Therefore, the goal of this paper is to propose the new, natural vision on the problem of sustainable human development, develop its consistent indicator and appropriate policy tools that will be in agreement with the national strategies of sustainable development and millennium development goals: poverty reduction, quality life-long education, environmental sustainability, improved health and reduced HIV/AIDS and other diseases, gender equality, global partnership (UN, 2006). This paper proceeds as follows. In the second section the major biophysical indicators of sustainable development are presented and their trends of development are analyzed. Third section concentrates on the global problem of human health (mental and physical). A new vision on sustainable human development and its indicators are developed in the forth section. Fifth section gives the appropriate policy tools. Finally, the paper closes with conclusions. 2. Biophysical Indicators of Sustainable Development The scale of economic production (material wealth) can be defined mathematically as follows:

Y = t ⋅ Lα ⋅ С β ⋅ N γ ⋅ I δ ,

(1)

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187

where t – technological factor, L – labor, C – capital, N – natural resources, I – institutional factor, 0 < α , β , γ , δ < 1 . It is assumed that there is a possibility for some substitution between all these production factors. In the same time, since the laws of thermodynamics place limits on the substitution of human-made capital for natural capital (Ayres and Nair, 1984), in the long run they are complements. In spite of fast depletion of natural resources (WWF, 2006), economic activity continues to grow extensively, i.e. dY / dt > 0 (World Watch Institute, 2006). Gross world product (in 2005 dollars) has been increased from 18 trillion USD in 1970 to 60 trillion USD in 2005. Approximately 22% of GWP in 2005 belongs to European Union (with 7% of global population), 21% – USA (4.5% population), 14% – China (20% population), 7% – Japan (2% population), 6% – India (17% population), 3% – Sub-Saharan Africa (12% population). In the same period of time (1970–2005) world population has been grown from 3.7 billion to 6.5 billion (average rate is about 80 million per year) and therefore a gross world product per person has been increased from 4,800 USD in 1970 to 9,200 USD in 2005 (World Watch, 2006). However it does not take into account unequal income distribution between and within countries. The evidence shows that world economic growth often comes at the expense of the poor and/or the environment and therefore more priority should be given to better distribution and less to growth (Woodward and Simms, 2006). Furthermore, using gross domestic product as a principal indicator of economic development can be misleading since it counts all economic activity as a positive addition regardless of its potential negative environmental and societal externalities, e.g. costs associated with pollution and resource depletion, family breakdown, crime, etc. The Genuine Progress Indicator (Venetoulis and Cobb, 2004) and the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (Daly and Cobb, 1994) are developed as an alternative measures that internalize these externalities. In 2002, GPI for USA was less than 1/3 of GDP per capita. While GDP per capita grew by 79% in the period 1972–2002, the GPI grew by only 1%. The total impact of human activities on the natural environment is expressed mathematically as: I = P ⋅ F (c, t ) ,

(2)

where I – the total environmental effect or damage, measured in some standard units, P – the population size, F(c, t) – the ecological footprint of the average person which depends on c – per capita consumption and technological factor t.

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Formula (2) assumes that more people cause more environmental damage, i.e. dI / dP > 0 . The Ecological Footprint is the area of biologically productive land and water needed to provide ecological resources and services (e.g. food) to sustainably support human population and absorb its wastes (e.g. heavy metals, carbon dioxide) given prevailing technology. The Earth’s carrying capacity (biocapacity) is the amount of biologically productive area (e.g. cropland, forest, pasture and fisheries) that is available to meet humanity’s needs, ignoring the needs of wild species (WWF, 2006). According to the World Wild Fund (WWF, 2006), the ecological footprint has exceeded the Earth’s carrying capacity since the late 1980s by about 25% in 2003 and it continues to grow (Figure 1). Therefore, the Earth’s regenerative capacity can no longer sustain economic demand caused by population and affluence growth – people are turning resources into waste faster than nature can turn waste back into resources.

Number of Earths

1,4

Humanity' Ecological Footprint

1,2 1

Earth' biocapacity

0,8 0,6 0,4 0,2

Source: WWF, 2006

0 1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Figure 1. Dynamics of humanity’ ecological footprint from 1961 to 2003

It means that humanity is depleting the natural capital – a fundamental base of life existence, causing ecosystems degradation, biodiversity and productivity loss and other severe environmental threats (e.g. climate change, fresh water deficit, natural disasters, etc.) to present and future generations. However, the ecological footprint is distributed unequally in the world regions, developed countries, i.e. USA, European Union, Japan (with excessive consumption per capita) and some developing ones, i.e. China, India (with a large population) are the major natural resources consumers, their footprint is more than 50% larger than their nationally available biocapacity, European Union is using over twice its own biocapacity (WWF, 2006), but the consequences are affecting all countries worldwide.


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Very dangerous state of the biosphere threatening eco-systems and human well-being is presented by the Living Planet Index which measures trends in the Earth’s biological diversity (WWF, 2006). It tracks populations of more than 1,300 vertebrate species – fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, mammals – from all around the world. Separate indices are produced for terrestrial, marine, and freshwater species, and the three trends are then averaged to create an aggregated index. Although vertebrates represent only a fraction of known species, it is assumed that trends in their populations are typical of biodiversity overall. By tracking wild species, the Living Planet Index is also monitoring the health of ecosystems. Between 1970 and 2003, the index fell by about 30% (Figure 2). The inconsistency of the present way of human development with a global public health is shown in the next section.

Living Planet Index 1,2 1 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,2 0 1970

Source: WWF, 2006

1980

1990

2000

2010

Figure 2. Dynamics of living planet index from 1970 to 2003

3. The Global Public Health Crisis 3.1. MENTAL ILLNESS

According to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2006): •

In 2000, approximately 1,000,000 people died from suicide: a “global” mortality rate of 16 per 100,000, or one death every 40 s.

•

In the last 45 years suicide rates have increased by 60% worldwide (Figure 3). Suicide is now among the three leading causes of death among those aged 15–44 years (both sexes); these figures do not include

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suicide attempts which are up to 20 times more frequent than completed suicide. •

At any time, 450 million people worldwide are affected by mental, neurological or behavioral problems and this rate is steadily rising.

•

More than 90% of all cases of suicide are associated with personal mental disorders, particularly depression, schizophrenia and alcoholism. However it is also subjected to many complex sociocultural factors varying in different regions of the world.

Therefore, reducing the global suicide rate means effectively addressing the serious and growing burden of mental illness around the world. Evolution of Global Suicide Rates (per 100,000) 30

Men

25 20 15 10

Women

5 0 1950

Source: WHO, 2006

2000

Figure 3. Evolution of global suicide rates per 100,000 by sex

3.2. CHRONIC DISEASES

Chronic diseases, and particularly cardiovascular disease (CVD), cancer, respiratory disease, diabetes are now the major causes of death and disability worldwide (Figure 4), and increasingly affect people from both developing and developed countries. They currently account for 60% of the 57 million deaths annually and 46% of the global burden of disease and expected to rise to 73% and 60% respectively by 2020 (WHO, 2006). A relatively few risk factors – high blood pressure, obesity, physical inactivity, high cholesterol, smoking and alcohol consumption – independently and often in combination are the major causes of these diseases. According to the World Health Organization (WHO, 2006): •

Cardiovascular disease (mainly heart disease and stroke) – already the world’s number one cause of death, killing 17 million people each year.


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•

Approximately 1.6 billion adults worldwide are now overweight and at least 400 million of these are obese. High body mass index causes more than 2,500,000 deaths globally.

•

Once considered a problem only in high income countries, overweight and obesity are now dramatically on the rise in low and middle income countries, particularly in urban settings.

•

World Health Organization predicts that by 2015, approximately 2.3 billion adults will be overweight and more than 700 million will be obese.

•

An estimated 177 million people are affected by diabetes, 67% of them live in the developing world. Diabetes deaths, which have rapidly become a global epidemic, will increase by more than 50% worldwide in the next 10 years.

The distribution of mortality across the leading risk factors in both developed and developing countries is presented in Table 1 below (WHO, 2002). This reflects a significant change in diet habits, physical activity levels, tobacco and alcohol use worldwide as a result of extensive economic development (industrialization), aggressive marketing, urbanization, competetive, stressful and sedentary way of life, changing modes of transportation and increasing food market globalization. Prevention of these diseases through physical activity and healthy lifestyles, based on strong medical evidence is the most effective and sustainable way to approach positive social development. Main Causes of Death, World, 2005 1.2 million

Diabetes

Source: WHO, 2006

4 million

Respiratory Other Chronic

5 million

Injuries 7.5 million

Cancer Communicable

17 million

Cardiovascular 0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

Figure 4. Main causes of 57 million deaths worldwide in 2005

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TABLE 1. Percentage of mortality attributable to 10 leading risk factors

Risk factors

Underweight Unsafe sex Unsafe water, sanitation, hygiene Blood pressure Tobacco Cholesterol Alcohol Overweight Low fruit and vegetable intake Physical inactivity

Developing countries High Low mortality mortality 14.9 3.1 10.2 – 5.5 1.7

Developed countries – 0.8 –

Global mortality (million) 4 3 2

2.5 2.0 1.9 – – –

5.0 4.0 2.1 6.2 2.7 1.9

10.9 12.2 7.6 9.2 7.4 3.9

7 5 4.5 2 2.8 3

–

–

3.3

2

4. A New Vision on Sustainable Human Development As indicated above, human health depends very much on socio-economic development mode and related to it personal lifestyle (social, physical, and moral life). Among other important factors affecting human health is the state of the environment (also depending on economic pressure). According to the World Health Organization, environmental risk factors play a role in more than 80% of the diseases. Globally, nearly 25% of all deaths and diseases can be attributed to the environment, although for children it is even higher (Prüss-Üstün and Corvalán, 2006). Therefore, in this paper, sustainable development is defined as a permanent livability, based on eco-centric rationale and interrelated environmental and human well-being: •

Eco-systems well-being

•

Health and bodily well-being

•

The necessary material minimum

•

Good social relations, personal security, freedom and choice

•

Conditions for physical, social, psychological and spiritual fulfillment

VITAL PROBLEMS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT •

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Both the intergenerational and intragenerational socio-economic and ecological justice of society (Pearce, 1987).

And in contrast to dominating extensive economic growth, and consumerism development – that is unsustainable socio-ecologically and psychologically (health destructive) (Maiteny, 2000), sustainable development worldwide should be focused on the integrated harmonious human development in the following basic dimensions: •

Intellectual

•

Physical

•

Ethical

•

Psychological

•

Social.

It will allow to discover a personal natural talents and abilities for its further advancement and appropriate career development as one of the major factors of life satisfaction and social, physical and psychological well-being. Therefore, the integrated characteristic of human health (physical and intellectual capacity, life interval, sickness rate, psychological health) is proposed as the principal goal of sustainable human development as it depends on all dimensions of human life: eco-systems well-being, socio-economic development and lifestyle. Proportion of healthy population (with no mental and physical diseases) is proposed as the indicator of sustainable human development (SHDI): SHDI =

HealthyPopulation SickPopulation = 1− TotalPopulation TotalPopulation

(3)

Therefore, theoretical values of SHDI are varying in interval (0, 1)] and its optimal value should approach the upper limit, i.e. 1, that means nil proportion of sick population. The average life interval among healthy population is also informative indicator since it shows an essential progress of human development. To address this concept of sustainable human development the appropriate policy-making tools have to be developed.

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5. Policy Tools The following management tools are developed to achieve a high level of population health: 1.

Integrated legal and institutional responses: •

The reform of institutional decision-making to establish sustainable scientific and ethical control of eco-centric rationales (Gorobets, 2006) and socio-ecological economics (Brown, 2001; Costanza et al., 1997).

•

Creation of the institutes of civil control – community participation in decision making at all levels to achieve transparency and avoid corrupttion.

•

Development of appropriate eco-centric institutions to integrate human activity within natural cycles (e.g. eco-villages and eco-cities).

•

Changing production and consumption patterns through legal regulation, price controls (setting right prices, incl. environmental costs), eco-taxation, adoption of the ‘polluter pays’ principle instead of the ‘consumer pays’.

•

Adoption of System for Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting, aimed at accounting of ecological factors in national economic statistics (UNSTAT, 2006).

•

Obligatory incorporation of environmental auditing in all business sectors (especially industry and transport), and the adoption of international standards ISO14000 and ISO9000.

2.

Integrated economic (technological) responses: •

Restructuring the economy from industrial to knowledge based socioecological economics (e.g. producing bicycles, renewable energy industry.

•

Solar, wind, hydrogen, bio-fuel, recycling, organic agriculture and information technologies) by “green” taxation – heavy taxation of natural resources use and no taxation on intellectual products (Brown, 2001; Daly and Cobb, 1994).

•

Priority of investments in science, education and cultural institutions oriented on the integrated harmonious human development.

•

Transition to a service-sector oriented economy with low materialenergy throughput, including green efficient public transport system (fueled by biogas, hydrogen, ethanol).


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However, these institutional and economic (technological) responses are only the necessary conditions of sustainable development while the internal human sustainability (mentality) based on the eco-centric rationale and qualitative human development (instead of material economic growth) is considered as its sufficient condition (Gorobets, 2006). This can be achieved through appropriate integrated social and educational policy: 1. Development of Educational institutions for local communities to change people’ values, mentality and behaviour from anthropocentrism and consumerism which are unsustainable socio-ecologically and psychologically (Maiteny, 2000) toward eco-centrism (socio-ecological well-being), humanism (altruism) and personal physical, intellectual and ethical development by: •

Upbringing of ethical humanistic culture with emphasis on ver-satile personal development, individual responsibility and active civil position for promoting sustainable lifestyles and widening the network of concerned people (by joining appropriate parties and NGO’s).

•

Raising awareness about the critical socio-ecological state of the world and showing the multiple advantages of new, green lifestyles (particularly, stronger health and eco-systems well-being).

•

Using the mass media to influence individual and community mind-sets toward issues of the environment and sustainable behavioral patterns.

2.

Reorienting existing education programmes. Rethinking and revising education from nursery school through university to include more principles, knowledge, skills, perspectives and values in all dimensions of sustainability – social, environmental, and economic should be done in a holistic and interdisciplinary manner.

3.

The development of specialized training programmes to ensure that all sectors of the workforce (from public to decision makers) have the knowledge and skills necessary to perform their work in a sustainable manner (the United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development) (UNESCO, 2003).

Although these tools can significantly contribute to sustainable human development and environmental security in all countries, especially in developing and transition countries, they should be necessarily complemented by adoption of precautionary and responsibility principles (the best way to solve problem is to prevent problem).

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6. Conclusions In this paper, the inconsistency of the present way of human development with a global public and environmental health is shown and a new vision of sustainable human development oriented on the integrated harmonious psychological, ethical, physical, social and intellectual human development instead of dominating consumerism is proposed. The integrated characteristic of human health (physical and intellectual capacity, life interval, sickness rate, psychological health) is proposed as the principal goal of sustainable (harmonious) human development. Proportion of healthy population (with no mental and physical diseases) and its average life interval are proposed as the indicators of sustainable human development. The specific institutional and economic (technological) management tools are suggested as the necessary conditions to achieve harmonious development while the internal human sustainability (mentality) based on the eco-centric rationale (socio-ecological well-being, meaning in life, happiness) is considered as its sufficient condition that can be achieved through appropriate social and educational policy.

References Ayres, R.U., and Nair, I., 1984, Thermodynamics and economics, Physics Today 37: 63–68. Brown, L.R., 2001, Eco-Economy: Building an Economy for the Earth, W.W. Norton, New York: 352 p; http://www.earth-policy.org/Books/Eco_contents.htm Costanza, R., Cleveland, C., and Perrings, C. (ed.), 1997, The Development of Ecological Economics, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. Daly, H., and Cobb, J., 1994, For the Common Good. Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environment and a Sustainable Future, 2nd ed., Beacon, Boston, MA. Gorobets, A., 2006, An eco-centric approach to sustainable community development, Community Development Journal 41(1): 104–108. IPCC, 2007, The Forth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2007, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Geneva; http://www.ipcc.ch Maiteny, P., 2000, The psychodynamics of meaning and action for a sustainable future, Futures 32: 339–360. Pearce, D., 1987, Foundations of an ecological economics, Ecological Modelling 38: 9–18.


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Prüss-Üstün, A., and Corvalán, C., 2006, Preventing Disease through Healthy Environments: Towards an Estimate of the Environmental Burden of Disease: Executive Summary, World Health Organization, WA 30.5., Geneva; http://www.who.int/en/ UN, 2006, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2006, United Nations, New York; http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ UNEP, 2006, The GEO Data Portal. United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi; http://geodata.grid.unep.ch UNESCO, 2003, United Nations Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2005–2014), Framework for the international implementation scheme, UNESCO 32 C/INF.9. Paris; http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001311/ 131163e.pdf UNSTAT, 2006, Handbook of National Accounting: Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting – An Operational Manual, UNSTAT F, No. 78., New York; http://unstats.un.org Venetoulis, J., and Cobb, C., 2004, The Genuine Progress Indicator 1950–2002 (2004 Update), Redefining Progress, Oakland, CA; http://www.rprogress.org WHO, 2002, The World Health Report 2002—Reducing Risks, Promoting Healthy Life, World Health Organization, Geneva; http://www.who.int WHO, 2006, World Health Statistics 2006, World Health Organization, Geneva; http://www.who.int/whosis/en/ WWF, 2006, Living Planet Report 2006, WWF International, Gland; http: //www.panda.org World Watch Institute, 2006, Vital Signs 2006–2007: The Trends that are Shaping our Future, W.W. Norton, New York; http://worldwatch.org Woodward, D., and Simms, A., 2006, Growth Isn’t Working, New Economics Foundation, London.

LIFESTYLES, ENERGY, AND SUSTAINABILITY: THE EXPLORATION OF CONSTRAINTS

IGOR MATUTINOVIĆ* GfK – Center for market research, Draškovićeva 54, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia (the GfK Group, Nürnberg, Germany)

Abstract: Long term solution to sustainable energy consumption lies in the radical change of consumption patterns characteristic of industrialized economies. Required change may be out of reach under the conditions of global capitalism and huge income inequality among world economies.

Keywords: Energy, globalization, institutions, life-style, sustainability.

1. Introduction There is a growing concern about sustainability of global trends in energy production and consumption. The issues at stake are related to energy availability and affordability, the environmental impact of its production and consumption patterns, and the implications of all these factors on national security. The prospects of global energy demand, consumption, and CO2 emissions in the near future are disturbing: under the “business as usual” scenario they are likely to double by the year 2050 (IEA, 2006). Globalization process provides a strong momentum behind the “business as usual” scenario as it brings more and more economies into dependency on fossil fuels and similar consumption patterns. In facing the sustainability challenge we are left with four major, synergetic, policy directions: improving energy efficiency, increasing the share of renewable energy sources, changing life-styles, and improving global governance in order to prevent

______ * Igor Matutinovic, GfK – Center for market research, Draškovićeva 54, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia, E-mail: [email protected]


199

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I. MATUTINOVIĆ

conflict over resources. In the long run, only change in Western life-styles may achieve absolute reduction in energy consumption and its stabilization on a “temporary” sustainable level. This work addresses medium to long term constraints of this policy option. 2. Autocatalysis Before addressing certain aspects of globalization that are relevant for this work let me briefly explain one of the key concepts that appears in the text – the autocatalysis – which is essential for understanding the dynamics of growth of capitalist economies.1 Autocatalysis refers to any cyclical concatenation of processes wherein each member has the propensity to accelerate the activity of the succeeding link (Ulanowicz, 1997). Autocatalytic networks exhibit seven properties, which are described briefly below. Autocatalysis stimulate competition and selection in the sense that it streamlines preferentially energy and material flows towards more efficient members, be these already inside the network or act at its periphery as potential “new entrants”. In the competitive process a new member who contributes more to the growth of the network may replace a less efficient member. In that sense autocatalysis is autonomous of its microscopic constitution: although individual members can be replaced, the system itself will continue to persist. Autocatalysis imparts organization on a system, which can be recognized, among other things, in the asymmetric distribution of flows among its members. Because of their inner dynamics and openness to the wider system, autocatalytic assemblages exhibit centripetallity in amassing of material and energy from their environment. As a consequence of competition and selection, autocatalysis tends to ratchet all participants towards higher levels of performance. Finally, because of the properties outlined so far, an autocatalytic network exhibits growth, until the system eventually reaches a steady state configuration. As I have discussed in more details elsewhere (Matutinović, 2005, 2006), the capitalist economy may be modeled as an autocatalytic system where a characteristic institutional framework acts as a catalysts for growth and development.

______ 1

Under the term “capitalist” I refer to a historical socioeconomic formation characterized by a distinctive set of institutions which guide economic activities and relations in the process of satisfying material needs of a society: market, private property over means of production, entrepreneurship, and profit.

LYFESTYLES, ENERGY AND SUSTAINABILITY

201

Unlike ecosystems, where autocatalytic processes invariably lead to a mature, steady state with a stabilized energy consumption, it appears that capitalist economies shows the propensity to grow until they exceed the biophysical limits of environment. The inconclusive evidence for this hypothesis is given by the fact that energy consumption of Western economies keeps growing in absolute terms and is projected to continue to grow in the next decades, which is a clear sign of system immaturity. While it is possible that single economies exceed their national biophysical limits by “borrowing” energy and resources elsewhere (as it actually happens to advanced capitalist economies by the measure of their ecological footprint) for the global economy the earth’s ecosystems represent the final limit to growth. There is ample evidence that the health of global ecosystems have been decreasing in the past decades, somewhere to the extreme of their capacity to recover to disturbances caused by anthropogenic activities (Scheffer et al., 2001; Mooney et al., 2005). Hence the hypothesis of the capitalist economy as a perennially immature system, which growth is ultimately controlled by a negative feedback coming from natural system. 3. The Impact of Globalization Process 3.1. INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION

The material growth of the world economic system is driven primarily by globalization. Economic globalization is a process that joins together distant factors of production and markets into a single, interdependent, autocatalytic economic system. I identify the primary motor of globalization process in the spreading of capitalist institutions – from the core2 of leading Western economies outwards, in the single historic unfolding that started with Industrial revolution and acquired its major momentum after the WW II. Two arguments can be laid in support of the above proposition. First, the very mechanism of capital creation provides a powerful momentum for economic growth: financial assets (savings and profits form productive economic activities) must be continuously invested and at least a part of the profits so earned must be reinvested back into the business. This is, obviously, a self-sustaining process of capital formation which translates itself in a material growth of the economic system. The process of long-term growth

______ 2

The “core” comprises those European and overseas countries that industrialized early their economies: the United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, and Italy in Europe, and the US, Canada, and Japan overseas.

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I. MATUTINOVIĆ

is intermittently interrupted by phases of diminished economic activity and depreciation of capital value – a recession – only to regain its momentum in the next expansion phase. It can be demonstrated that institutions of the capitalist economy evolved either spontaneously or by purposeful design to create favorable conditions for sustained economic growth (Matutinović, 2006). Therefore, when a country adopt capitalist institutions as a base framework for organizing its economic activities it becomes able to catalyze the process of characteristic growth and development and to connect it to that of other capitalist economies. This leads to the second argument: the capitalist institutional «interface» is crucial in connecting individual and in many aspects different countries into sustained and self-driven economic exchange. The connectivity of capitalist economies is further enhanced trough the adoption of common institutional framework that regulates exchange of good and services – the WTO multilateral trading system. In short, institutional connectivity is a necessary condition for active concatenation of different and distant economies in a global network of material and capital flows. As more and more countries adopt capitalist institutions, the world economy assumes the features of autocatalytic dynamics equivalent to that at a level of single economies but on an ever larger scale of production, distribution and consumption. As autocatalytic networks have an intrinsic tendency to growth, and material growth implies use of exergy, we would expect that the global entropy production should be increasing over any medium to long period considered. For the purpose of this research, I take the 1980–2005 year period, which encompasses gradual transition of China towards a market economy, market oriented reforms in India, and market transition in the former communist countries of the Soviet block. Indeed, in that period the global entropy production, approximated with the world primary energy consumption, increased by 60%. The extent of this increase is most impressive when we scale it by population: at per capita level, energy use in China grew 2.8 and in India 2.3 times – much above the world average of only 10% increase (see Table 1). In technologically advanced “core” countries, the average per capita consumption of energy increased at the end of the observed period by roughly 10%, and in spite of the increase of GDP by 3.3 times. This is thanks to improvements in energy efficiency in the manufacturing sector and the prevailing share of services in their economies.3 However, the energy use in the “core” economies in 2005 stood still much above the world average –5.8 Toe compared to 1.6

______ 3

In that apparent stabilizing of per capita energy consumption we have to consider the unknown effect of “imported” energy in processed materials and manufactured goods that were purchased abroad.


203

Toe respectively. On average, they increased their total energy consumption by 27% showing, therefore, no sign of stabilization and system maturity.4 In absolute terms, the “core” with only 12% of the world population accounted for 43% of primary energy consumption in 2005. This disproportionate amassing of energy by a single autocatalytic network is consistent with one of the properties of autocatalytic systems – the centripetallity (Ulanowicz, 1997). We see that those regions, in which countries for different reasons5 did not manage to implement consistently capitalist institutions, like most of the African and many of the Central and South American economies, lagged considerably behind China and India in all variables considered. The increase in primary energy use was accompanied everywhere by a nonlinear increase in GDP, which points at the efficiency property of autocatalytic systems. Thanks to economic connectivity enabled by a worldwide adoption of capitalist institutions and the WTO rules, the per capita value of trade exchange rose on the average by 3.5 times, and most in China – by 28 times. TABLE 1. Energy use, material throughput, and trade: 1980–2005 Index 2005/1980 on per capita values Energy

GDP

Trade

Core

1.1

3.3

4.1

China

2.8

4.9

28.4

India

2.3

2.7

6.4

C/S America

1.3

2.0

2.2

Africa

1.2

1.0

1.3

World

1.1

2.6

3.53

Original data sources: Energy: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2006, http://www.bp.com/ Trade and GDP: WTO Stat. Database, http://www.wto.org. Population: UN Population Division, Stat. Database, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/)

3.2. CULTURAL DIMENSION

We have to take into account that institutions of capitalism arise in a wider cultural context – they are based upon a coherent set of values, beliefs and

______ 4

Some economies, nevertheless, managed to stabilize their per capita energy consumption like US and Sweden, or even decrease like Germany and Denmark. 5 For a brief discussion of complexity and intricacy of institutional and biogeographical factors affecting economic success and wealth see Diamond (2004).

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symbols that constitute a characteristic worldview of the Western civilization. The Western worldview is supportive of societal traits like individualism, hard-wired work ethic, materialism, and (economic) rationality (Matutinović, 2007a, b). These cultural traits have been spreading along with capitalist institutions to the rest of the world trough trade, migrations, media, education, tourism, and development and aid programs of international institutions. They provide meaning and consistency to the economic dimension of globalization and contribute to imitation of Western life-styles in recipient countries. The imitation of Western life-styles in all countries that adopted capitalist institutions in the past decades (China, the former Soviet block, and India) opened up vast markets for similar consumer goods and services, and, consequently, fueled economic growth. It also created enormous expectations among their populations of an everincreasing material well-being. In short, along with spreading of capitalist institutions and the Western worldview to other cultures, the West has been expanding its own production and consumption patterns worldwide. The (unintended) consequence of such a process of economic and cultural homogenization is clear: previously diversified economies become more and more dependent on the same types of resources and energy. As these are limited and unevenly distributed, the potential risks of violent conflicts among nations, especially over priority of use of hydro-power and fresh water of rivers and over control of energy sources like oil and natural gas, has been increasing. 3.2.1. Opportunistic L ife-style Switching The imitation of Western life styles worldwide is not uniquely dependent upon the spread of capitalist institutions. It is linked also to the perceived opportunities of material well-being that modernization, as a wider Western cultural phenomenon, brings along to traditional societies. I will try to explain it on the story of a small town, Lubenice, situated in the island of Cres in Croatia, which I see as paradigmatic of what I call an “opportunistic life-style switching”. Lubenice was founded some 4,000 years ago on the 380 m high cliff above the Adriatic see with a breathtaking vista. Its inhabitants sustained their living on fishing, agriculture, and goats for millennia. They achieved what we would call today a “sustainable life-style”, fully within the biophysical limits of the environment and in an apparent harmony with nature. Whoever visits the town will understand that the beauty of natural landscape must have been very important in the selection of this location for the first settlers. However, in the fifties of the 20th century Croatian


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economy embarked on a fast pace of industrialization that drove rural population to the cities. Attracted by the opportunities of urban jobs and modern life-style with all of its material allures, the population of Lubenice started to migrate to the coast and, after a few decades, completely abandoned the town throwing to the history basket the memory of its 4,000 years-long, sustainable life-style tradition. They apparently did not mind to trade the breathtaking vista from the top of the cliff with crowded city streets. Based on this story, which must be common to many places around the world, I advance the hypothesis that most people are likely to trade natural beauty and simple, traditional life-styles, however sustainable they may have been, for a materially more rich and in many aspects more diversified urban way of living. More generally, if there is an opportunity to change from a lower to a higher material standard of living most people are likely to take the advantage and use it, as long as it may endure. Another suggestion of this story is that sustainable life-styles were historically a small-scale local phenomenon, with energy low-intensive and materially simple although resource-diversified life-styles. Small-scale and simple, these societies could have been easily sustained for very long periods of time, providing the absence of major natural changes or disasters. Rural to urban migration is a necessary consequence of industrialization of the Southern economies and economic globalization must have contributed significantly the intensity of this process. Changes in agricultural practices that are shaped by foreign demand, like switching from smallscale subsistence farming to cash-crops and, more recently to bio-fuel farms; employment opportunities opened up by export-oriented greenfield investments in labor-intensive industries are some of the examples. As a consequence of globalization and other factors, like population growth and poverty, the long-term rural to urban migration process reached recently its historic maximum: by mid 2007, half of the world urban population lived in cities. The implications on the reduction of diversity of life-styles and the consequent increases of energy consumption worldwide of this ongoing process of urbanization is both overwhelming and disturbing. 4. Opportunities and Constraints In the long run, sustainability of energy production and consumption depend crucially upon the prevailing life-style and the magnitude of the world population. It is doubtless that the earth carrying capacity could not support

______ 6 The economic growth of ex-Yugoslavia during the fifties was among the highest in the world.

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current population level were its average material consumption close to that of the industrialized economies. If only China, for example, were to achieve developed-world consumption standards, the human resource use and environmental impact would approximately double (Liu and Diamond, 2005). As Western life-styles are taken as a benchmark for industrializing countries it is logical that the West should lead in the change of apparently unsustainable consumption habits. As I have argued in detail elsewhere, the scope of change in consumption and production patterns is hierarchically constrained by institutions and a dominant worldview, so that the latter should change before a substantial reform of the former becomes viable (Matutinović, 2007a, b). This is likely to be a slow process with uncertain outcome. Let us, therefore, explore what kind of behavioral change is viable under the current worldview and capitalist institutions and what are the expected implications on energy consumption patterns. 4.1. CONSUMER ATTITUDES AND MARKETS

By using markets and selective taxation it is possible to increase further energy efficiency of processes and products and to discourage the use of their energy intensive variants. There is a strong economic rationale in reducing the energy intensity of production processes and final products, and the business community has recognized it as a win-win strategy and an avenue to increase medium-term profitability.7 Usage energy efficiency has been improving in nearly all consumer durables categories over the past decades and its potential is probably far from being exploited. However, at least part of the energy saved so far has been lost to the “rebound” effect, especially in the personal transport segment. Persistent education of consumers on potential savings that can be achieved by buying energy efficient products together with minimum standards for buildings and appliances, and appropriate product labeling are among the policies that contribute to the desired workings of markets. Additional energy savings can be achieved by promoting changes in consumer behavior for which there already exist positive attitude among population. For example, recent public opinion research in Germany (GfK, 2007) found out that roughly 80% of consumers are willing to stop keeping

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See for example the policies and case studies of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development at www.wbcsd.org


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electrical appliances on standby and to replace traditional light bulbs with energy saving ones. Roughly 60% of consumers are willing to buy new domestic appliances which use less power and give preference to buy regional products to save on transport energy use. Other, more demanding or more expensive behavioral changes like driving less, eating less meat than before, or installing a more economic heating system won lower support (32%, 21%, and 16% respectively). High awareness and sensitivity on certain environmental and energy related issues can be used for policy makers as motivators for change of consumption behavior and certain aspects of life-styles. For example, a recent public opinion survey in the US showed that over 80% of adult population considers global warming and fuel/energy shortages as “serious”. Eighty percent agree that being dependent on foreign countries for fuel supply is dangerous while 69% agree that we need stronger enforcement of current environmental regulations (GfK, 2005). This and similar motivators present an entirely unexploited opportunity to manipulate consumer demand in a socially desired direction. How far these attitudes can be exploited before they clash with prevailing life-style, like preference for individual transport, remains an open question. However, afore mentioned results of public opinion research also suggest that the potential for behavioral changes may be constrained within a rather narrow range, which may not suffice to bring about substantial reduction of energy consumption. Further research might give more insight in that problem and possibly provide quantitative parameters to model more precisely behavioral changes and energy use implications. 4.2. THE CHALLENGE OF A LEISURELY ECONOMY

Far reaching behavioral change would require decoupling of personal wellbeing from material consumption, which among other things, implies that individuals trade part of their potential incomes for leisure and unpaid activities (Robinson and Tinker, 1997).8 Western economies certainly possess technological capability to reduce significantly the number of working hours on a weekly basis and still deliver enough of the material well-being to the society. More leisure time has been within our reach for some time already. The question is whether this leisure-oriented option clashes with

______ 8 Robinson and Tinker (1997) called it resocialization as opposed to dematerialization process, both of which, they claim, are necessary to achieve sustainable living.

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our worldview and the capitalist institutional framework. A major reduction of working week, from 40 to 28 h for example, would not decrease productivity of labor (output per working hour) but would certainly negatively impact the productivity of capital.9 Less work and lower consumption means, however, lower sales for businesses and unless the redundant productive capacity is closed down or production reoriented towards exports, the burden of unused capital must drive down profitability. Decreasing consumption and, accordingly, overall economic activity is not good news for financial markets, which are likely to respond with sharp, and most probably, prolonged correction. Prolonged decrease of output (i.e. GDP loss) and a bearish market lead inevitably to a recession. Under the current conditions where financial assets and production move freely from country to country, we may expect that capital would most likely fly out because a non-growing economy is not a suitable environment for earning profits. If recession lasts long enough and dives deep in terms of output lost it then becomes a depression, which immediately translates into a hot social, economic and political problem. Consider only that tax revenues decline as output, sales and employment contract and this create problems for the functioning of state-controlled services – from social safety nets, pension system, educational system, to defense. The above is the most likely, although not the unique scenario of the consequences of a significant reduction of working week and material consumption. It is a roughly painted picture which shows that achieving a transition to a more leisurely and less energy-intensive life-style society is far from being a trivial task. Future research is needed to address alternative scenarios of switching to a materially steady-state and less consumptionoriented economy. Suppose now, for the sake of thought experiment, that the “core” group of advanced capitalist economies would somehow manage to reduce and than stabilize its total energy consumption. This would still be far above the world average and would require considerable energy inflows to keep the system running. Would then the rest of the world economies be willing to follow suit? We can hardly expect that to happen in China and India who embarked on the sustained growth path and have over two billions of people who are striving to reach a more decent standard of living. The same can be said for hundreds of millions of people that live below the poverty line in other countries. Thanks to the economic and cultural dimensions of globalization the opportunity to switch to a higher level of material consumption is now perceived by hundreds of millions of people. This opportunity is most

______ 9

I thank Joachim Spangenberg for helping clarify this issue.


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likely to be exploited no matter for how short-lived (unsustainable) it may appear. Therefore, the demand for energy will continue to increase even if the West would be able to reduce and stabilize its own consumption. 5. Conclusions Substantial reduction in energy consumption is significantly constrained by capitalist institutions and Western life-styles oriented towards conspicuous material consumption. Having capitalism as a global phenomenon, and given the huge gap in the material standard of living between advanced countries and the industrializing rest, the competition for energy sources among world economies will become more severe in the future. To obtain some short-term energy savings, policy makers are urged to use selective taxation and competitive markets in concert with public energy-saving educative campaigns based on extant population’s attitudes and motivators. Here it is necessary to emphasize that policies should be mutually consistent and push in the same direction, which is currently not the case: for example, the ongoing policy of energy market liberalization in the EU, which aims at lowering electricity prices, is inconsistent with the goal of achieving energy saving behavior in households and industry. Secondly, it is necessary to increase funding for energy research as a medium-term strategy to improve energy-conversion technologies and bring them as fast as possible to the market. This recommendation must be considered in the context in which funding for energy research has fallen over the past two decades (Nature, 2006) while, by contrast, the world military expenditures in the period 1997–2006 rose by 37% (SIPRI, 2007). Policy makers should make it clear which is the preferred direction in dealing with future energy issues and funding. Finally, following the well argued position of Herman Daly (1999) on the advantages of international versus global trade, policy makers in Western economies should consider abandoning neo-liberal doctrine and revert gradually to international trade system.10 This would immediately damp global economic growth and, consequently, reduce medium-term energy demand, thus allowing more time for major societal adaptations.11 According to a recent public opinion research in the US and selected EU countries, a step

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A regime of nationally controlled movement of goods and capital trough bilateral agreements, which existed before the WTO multilateral agreements scheme became the global standard of trade. 11 In a situation of reduced global trade, fast growing economies like China and India, would have even more room to employ their productive capacities in raising material wellbeing of their populations.

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back from the globalization would have been politically supported by the majority of population.12 However, the long-term solution to global energy issues and to sustainability in general will most probably require a major shift in our worldview and institutions, such that would stimulate a transition to materially less intensive life-styles, at first in the Western economies and then in the major industrialized economies of the South.

References Daly, H.E., 1999. Globalization versus internationalization – some implications. Ecological Economics, 31, 31–37. Diamond, J., 2004. The wealth of nations. Nature, 429, 616–617. GfK, 2005. Survey: GfK Roper Green Gauge 2005. GfK Roper Consulting, GfK Custom Research, New York. GfK, 2007. Survey: the Impact of Climate Change on Consumption. GfK-Nürnberg e.V., Nürnberg. IEA, 2006. International Energy Agency, Energy Technology Perspectives: Scenarios & Strategies to 2050. http://www.iea.org/textbase/papers/2006/scenario.pdf Liu, J. and Diamond, J., 2005. China’s environment in a globalizing world. Nature, 435, 1179–1186. Matutinović, I., 2005. The microeconomic foundations of business cycles: from institutions to autocatalytic networks. Journal of Economic Issues, 39, 4, 867–898. Matutinović, I., 2006. Self-organization and design in market economies. Journal of Economic Issues, XL, 3, 575–601. Matutinović, I., 2007a. An institutional approach to sustainability: historical interplay of worldviews, institutions and technology. Accepted April, 27 1997; to appear in Journal of Economic Issues, 41, 4, 1109–1137. Matutinović, I., 2007b. Worldviews, institutions and sustainability: an introduction to a coevolutionary perspective. International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology, 14, 1, 92–102. Mooney, H., Cropper, A., and Reid, W., 2005. Confronting the human dilemma: how can ecosystems provide sustainable services to benefit society? Nature, 434, 561–562. Nature, 2006. Energy shame. Nature, 443, 1.

______ 12 The opinion poll was conduced in US, Germany, UK, France, Italy and Spain (Financial Times, Globalisation backlash in rich nations, July 22 2007).


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Robinson, J. and Tinker, J., 1997. Reconciling ecological, economic, and social imperatives: a new conceptual framework. In T. Schrecker (ed.) Surviving Globalism: Social and Environmental Dimensions. St. Martin’s Press, New York. Scheffer, M., Carpenter, S., Foley, J.A., Folke, C., and Walker, B., 2001. Catastrophic shifts in ecosystems. Nature, 413, 591–596. SIPRI, 2007. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2007. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Press Release 11 June 2007, http://www.sipri.org Ulanowicz, R.E., 1997. Ecology, the Ascendant Perspective. Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 41–55.

APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABLE ENERGY CONSUMPTION PATTERNS DAMJAN KRAJNC, REBEKA LUKMAN, AND PETER GLAVIČ∗ University of Maribor, Department of Chemistry and Chemical Engineering, Laboratory for Process Systems Engineering and Sustainable Development, Smetanova 17, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia

Abstract: Unsustainable consumption mostly refers to energy resources and materials’ utilization, fostered by human activity. Therefore, energy consumption represents a major challenge when approaching sustainable development issues. Despite many environmental strategies relying on improvements in energy and material efficiency, the World’s energy demand is likely to increase in line with its population. In addition, cultural patterns of human activities are closely related to energy consumption patterns. This paper discusses the relationship between energy consumption and human overpopulation, which is one of the critical issues when approaching sustainability. Furthermore, this paper argues about cultural influences and barriers for the rational use of energy. The paper juxtaposes shallow to deep ecology and stresses the importance of transition to deep ecology, which draws on a wide diversity of ultimate philosophical or religious premises, by seeing Nature and culture as fundamentally intertwined. Education has a crucial role in revising energy consumption patterns. This paper also stresses the importance of education for sustainable development as a required approach to a sustainable society. It argues about those conflicts between different human goals that should be taken into account in educational systems. Universities should act as agents in promoting transformative change towards sustainability. Thus, the importance of incorporating sustainability principles

______ ∗ To whom correspondence should be addressed: Prof. Peter Glavič, University of Maribor, Department of Chemistry and Chemical Engineering, Laboratory for Process Systems Engineering and Sustainable Development, Smetanova 17, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia. E-mail: [email protected]


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into universities’ activities is discussed in the paper. Several activities and projects at the University of Maribor, embracing all departments and their everyday activities, are presented as an example. Keywords: Sustainability, energy consumption, education for sustainable development, sustainable university.

1. Introduction Over recent years, unsustainable consumption patterns world-wide have received great attention, introduced within Agenda 21 and its chapter 4, the “Marrakech-Process”, as well as the Oslo Declaration. According to these documents, unsustainable consumption is the key phenomenon leading to overall environmental degradation, thus having social consequences such as global poverty, illness, inequality, inequity, etc. (Lukman and Glavič, 2006). Unsustainable consumption originates mostly from the harnessing of those resources and materials being fostered by economic activity, also known as ‘business as usual’. As Dias et al. (2004) claim, energy is fundamental for our social and economic development, as well as the stability of any country. Rational use of energy consists of a set of actions that represent the search for a conscious balance between the consumption of energy and the state of the environment. Energy consumption represents a major challenge when approaching sustainable development. Nowadays, primary energy consumption almost exclusively depends on petroleum-based fuels, and their share is still likely to remain high in the future. Oil represents 34% of the World’s primary energy sources, coal 25%, gas 21%, and nuclear fuel 7%. In total, only 13% comes from renewables, of which 11% comes from biomass and 2% from hydroenergy (IEA, 2006). According to the European Union’s statistics, the main consumers of energy within European Union (EU-25) are households and services (41%), followed by transport (31%) and industry (28%) (DG-TREN, 2006). Global energy needs are likely to continue growing steadily for at least the next 25 years and the World’s energy needs will be more than 50% higher in 2030 than today (IEA, 2005). The European Union (EU) thus prioritizes energy efficiency, with the goal of 20% of the energy that the EU would otherwise use by 2020 (EC, 2006). Reliance on a few limited energy sources is detrimental not only to the future stability of World regions but also to the environment. Nature is responding to the ever increasing consumption of fossil fuels and related greenhouse gas emissions with climate change and natural catastrophes, such as

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sea-level rise, extinction of species, floods, storms, droughts, waves heat, fires, etc. The victims of climate change are increasing rapidly. In Europe 2,000 people died in 1990−1999 (200 per year), while 47,000 people died in 2000−2004 (9,400 per year). Across the World, there were 20,000−30,000 victims per year, and 2 millions wounded; 1 million lost their homes annually, each year 140 million had economic and other consequences, which is ten times more than are hit by wars and terrorism (Kajfež Bogataj, 2007). Most of the environmental and resource problems originate because of unsustainable life-styles and consumption patterns, together with other important determinants such as population growth (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van den Bergh, 2004). It is not surprising that many debates and research trends on sustainable development are shifting from the production to consumption aspect of the sustainability challenge. This does not mean that problems connected to production systems are solved and future systems’ innovations and technical improvements are no longer needed. Without changing the levels and patterns of energy consumption, it might be impossible to reach the vision of sustainable development. For instance, the chemical, car, and pulp and paper industries, have significantly improved their energy efficiencies, resulting in reduced energy use per production unit. However, increased consumption in most countries has actually reduced the net effect of technical innovations, thus causing the ‘rebound effect phenomenon’ (Throne-Holst et al., 2007). This paper discusses the relationship between energy consumption and human overpopulation as one of the critical issues when approaching sustainable energy consumption. The central part when tackling the rebound effect is stabilization of population growth. This paper discusses the cultural influences and barriers to the rational use of energy. Many solutions for reducing energy consumption come from technical innovations, but there is also a need for other approaches when tackling this problem. They involve policies, legislation, economic incentives, and education (Jennings and Lund, 2001). The major challenge that humans are faced with is managing sound intellectual control over environmental problems, fostering sustainable culture and systems for future generations, and educating and training the sufficient people-power required for future challenges (Kim, 1999). Educational processes are key players for shifting the trends of energy consumption to more sustainable practices. In the future, universities will inevitably play a crucial role in propagating sustainability principles, acting as agents in promoting transformative change. Therefore, the importance of incorporating sustainable consumption principles into university activities is highlighted in this paper.

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2. Energy Consumption and Population Growth Exploiting natural resources requires energy input and must entail a good return on investment. Technology for the exploitation of natural resources started to evolve drastically with the introduction of fossil fuels. The abundant, cheap energy provided by fossil fuels has made it possible for humans to exploit a staggering variety of resources, effectively expanding their resource base (Price, 1995). By the laws of Nature, species expand as much as resources and other (physical) conditions allow. The availability of fossil fuels has contributed to human population growth, followed by an exhaustion of limited resources. Here, a parallel may be drawn with the yeast in grape broth: the population grows exponentially, but only to a certain limit when nutrients are exhausted or waste products become toxic. Are we destined for a similar fate when extracting all available fossil fuels? Despite severe environmental strategies relying on improvements in energy and material efficiency, the World’s energy demand is likely to increase in line with its population. The World’s population continues to grow at rates that were unprecedented before the 20th century, although the rate of increase has almost halved since its peak, which was reached in 1963. Ninety-five percent of population growth relates to the developing World and more than half of the population lives in Asia (UN, 2007). Human overpopulation, combined with current lifestyle patterns, is one of the critical issues when approaching sustainability. Simultaneous population growth and rising consumption per capita are causing pollution at an ever increasing rate. Needing more space for food and living, mankind is reducing the diversity of species. Deforestation, extraction of raw materials and usage of fossil fuels are expanding, thus exhausting the natural reserves of nonrenewable materials and energy. There are many indications that the Earth’s current population, approaching 7 billion, cannot maintain sustainability at current material consumption levels. The central part of all solutions is to recognize the importance of halting population growth as a major cause of societal problems. Stabilizing populations seems to be a more reasonable approach than spreading ever-dwindling resources among ever-growing populations. However, cautionary approaches are needed because of fear that efforts to reduce population growth may lead to human rights violations such as involuntary sterilization and the abandoning of infants to die. Some human-rights watchers report that this is already taking place in China, as a result of its one-child-per-family policy.


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A system of near equilibrium moves in a stationary, controllable way, but when it is far from equilibrium, stochastic development with bifurcations takes place. Bifurcations (e.g. catastrophes, crises) can be handled by mathematical theory: they introduce a ‘historical background’ concept and evolution into the development. Because of the growing non-equilibrium, bifurcation is expected to happen on Earth in due time, and could result in a disaster of global dimensions. Human evolution is governed by non-equilibrium thermodynamics. Its elements are determining the ever-increasing pollution, endangering mankind by destroying the human race, just in the same way as yeast does when producing ethanol. Only catastrophes can make people act in a different way in regard to reducing the pollution. Although catastrophes are increasing at an exponential rate, it may be too late for action when they have struck strongly enough for mankind to respond properly. Therefore, does our future lie in competition, cooperation, or both? Only society’s global actions and laws can slow down the negative effects of climate change, resource depletion, and biodiversity reduction. Population control, and sustainable production and consumption can slow down development, diminish the increasing nonequilibrium and, thereby, uncontrolled development. 3. Cultural Influence and Barriers to the Rational Use of Energy Approaching sustainable consumption is closely related to the cultural patterns of human activities, which result in the development of technology, art, science, as well as moral systems and characteristic behaviour and habits. Motivation to change one’s lifestyle is based on important issues of personal life. However, people do not behave culturally all the time: mostly they behave naturally, not just only respecting their cultural development. Culture can deny natural laws: religion, law, ethics, morals are all active in this respect. Culture can only be expected, when primary, basic, or vital needs are satisfied, while secondary, non-essential needs are also important. Culture is a loser against evolution: the communist movement tries to ensure equity between people, while capitalistic societies urge on competition and selection, building on differences in salaries, wealth, and respect. An ecologically-sound society may also be a loser against an evolution-oriented one. Therefore, culture can be effective only if accepted by all participants. There are several barriers for achieving this, as taken-up, for example, by the Kyoto agreement made under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. According to Weber (1997), the barriers for efficient use of energy are divided into four instances:

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Institutional: responsibility of the government and local authorities

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Market: uncertainty in the proposals of negotiation during sales of energy or related products

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Organizational: present within organizations, especially firms

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Behavioural: present in individuals, in their values and, consequently, their attitudes.

Other necessary elements for a deeper analysis of barriers are to comprehend how energy conservation is understood by ordinary people. This is an important element when explaining why societies do not have the collective behaviour adequate for the ideas of rationally using energy. In order to understand energy conservation, it is necessary to consider social ideals as comfort maintenance and quality of life, as well as the necessities of production systems. In this context, it is possible to outline the following levels of intervention (Dias et al., 2004): •

Elimination of wastefulness

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Increase in the efficiencies of consumer units

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Reutilization of natural resources through recycling and reduction of energy contents from products and services

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Increased production efficiency

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Discussion about relationships town–suburb, including locations of production and commercial companies, as well as the organization of product transportation

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Changes in ethical and aesthetic standards, from which society could choose less energy-intensive products and services, in order to favour citizenship.

As far as natural laws and historical human behaviour are concerned, there is little chance that cultural behaviour on its own can stop evident environmental disaster in the future. At its basis, the human is a selfish creature, first taking care of his children, then himself and his property, his relatives, local community, nation, etc. Care about the Earth and Nature comes at the end, as long as it does not strongly hurt his family, himself, or his property. Intensified environmental catastrophes as responses to global warming may contribute to peoples’ behaviour changes. A real shortage of fuels, such as happened during the energy crisis of the seventies, and escalation of oil prices, may also contribute to energy consumption patterns. There are some opportunities the mankind to approach sustainability and survive, if:


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Agreement by all the states in the World and controlled by the United Nations

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Underpinned by international laws and efficient courts

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Supported by social sciences and humanities, education, and religions.

4. From Shallow to Deep Ecology and Divergent Problems Another important approach towards sustainable development is transformation from shallow to deep ecology. Naess (1973) coined the terms deep ecology and shallow ecology to juxtapose two radically different approaches for problematizing and responding to the ecological crises. ‘Shallow ecology’ or first order change is currently a more influential approach to environmentalism (Glasser, 2004). It happens within a given system, and is identified by treating the symptoms of ecological crises (pollution, resource degradation), whilst the central concern is for the health and prosperity of people in economically privileged countries. The reform oriented approach is grounded in technological optimism, economic growth, and scientific management – all environmental problems are manageable. The remedy to environmental problems is limited to economic, technological, and managerial reforms, and ‘technical’ solutions to social, political, and ethical problems (Glasser, 2004). On the other hand, ‘deep ecology’ is a second order change – transformation of the system itself, a radical break or logical jump from the status quo. While in no way discounting the exigency of addressing pollution and resource degradation, it adopts a broader, long-term, more sceptical stance. Doubtful about technological optimism, critical about limitless economic growth, and decidedly against valuing Nature in purely instrumental terms, it considers the complexities and insidiousness of problems. Drawing on a wide diversity of ultimate philosophical or religious premises, it sees Nature and culture as fundamentally intertwined. Nature is viewed as mentor, standard, and partner rather than vassal (Glasser, 2004). Sterling (2004) argues that deep ecology and sustainability require higher-order learning, that is epistemic or transformative learning, whereas shift from first level learning ‘doing things better’, through second-level learning ‘doing better things’, to third level learning ‘seeing things differently’ is needed. The transition to sustainability will require learning how to recognize and resolve divergent problems, formed out of the tensions between competing perspectives that cannot be solved, but can be transcended (Schumacher, 1977). These divergent problems are at higher level of culture and can only be resolved by forces of wisdom, love, compassion, understanding and empathy (Orr, 2003). Therefore, acute global problems, such as global climate

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change or poverty, should be observed and perceived as a series of divergent problems within a deep ecology, in order to step on the way towards sustainability. 5. The Importance of Energy Education within Sustainable Consumption Approach In order to achieve sustainability in our economies and lifestyles, our consumption patterns need to be revised (Myers, 2000). Sustainable consumption is a link between economic prosperity and resource conservation. Education has been given a crucial role when shifting from unsustainable to sustainable consumption patterns. Agenda 21 cites that “Education is critical for promoting sustainable development and improving the capacity of people to address environment and development issues. It is also critical for achieving environmental and ethical awareness, values and attitudes, skills and behaviour consistent with sustainable development, and for effective public participation in decision-making” (UN, 1992). Furthermore, Agenda 21 stresses the importance of global climate change and more efficient energy utilization: “the need to control atmospheric emissions of greenhouse and other gases and substances will increasingly need to be based on efficiency in energy production, transmission, distribution and consumption, and on growing reliance on environmentally-sound energy systems, particularly new and renewable sources of energy” (UN, 1992). Education for sustainable development (ESD) as the required approach to a sustainable society should take into account conflicts between different human goals: environmental, economical, social, and cultural, and of maintaining the diversities of these goals. ESD takes responsibility for human development and the fate of the ecosystem, increases action competence, helps to develop moral criteria, and stimulates public participation in decisionmaking. Dias et al. (2004) argue that education is one of the best ways to transform human behaviour towards the rational use of energy. Therefore, universities, educating future leaders, entrepreneurs, engineers, policy makers, should introduce energy education at all levels of education and incorporate it into their own curricula. On the other hand, best energy practices should be included in the everyday activities of universities. In such a way, the need for knowledge within an increasing growth in the energy sector and growing global concerns could be satisfied. Universities should be acting as agents in promoting transformative change to deep ecology and divergent problem solving.


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5.1. ENERGY EDUCATION AND PRACTICES WITHIN UNIVERSITIES

Educational processes, especially in higher education, play a key role in shifting development to more sustainable trends, such as sustainable energy consumption. Therefore, in the future, universities will inevitably play a crucial role in propagating sustainability principles. The importance of incorporating sustainability principles into university activities needs to be stressed. Energy education should be included in higher education from at least three perspectives: (1) curriculum, (2) research and innovation, and (3) everyday practice. Incorporating energy into a higher education curriculum is not a new concept. There have been some studies about renewable energy education for sustainable development (Jennings and Lund, 2001), prospects and proposals for solar energy education programmes (Hasnain et al., 1995), energy education (Dias et al., 2004), etc. Kandpal and Garg (1999) discovered that energy itself cannot be a separate discipline of education. Instead, students of other disciplines (e.g. mechanical, chemical, electrical engineering as well as physics) need to be exposed to the relevant aspects of energy extraction, conversion, transmission and distribution, utilization, etc., as part of their curricula. They suggested some issues by incorporating energy topics into curricula. Energy should address the overall curricula, ensuring a holistic approach to energy-education and synergy between energy and environmental education. Energy-education should be incorporated, based on three approaches: as a content of existing courses, as elective courses, and as programmes or aggregated modules. Any desirable programmes of energy education should have the following objectives: •

Development of students’ awareness about the Nature and causes of energy crises

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Raising students’ awareness regarding various types of non-renewable and renewable sources of energy, their resource potential, harnessing existing technologies, the economics and energetics of these technologies, and their socio-cultural and environmental aspects

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Providing students with the necessary skills to harness various energy sources

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Making the students appreciate the consequences of various energyrelated policy measures

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Enabling students to suggest alternative strategies towards solving the energy crisis and also to provide improvements in the lifestyles of large populations in developing countries, as well as the desired growth of their economies

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Making students appreciative of the energy-environment nexus and enable them to evolve holistic solutions for ensuring sustainability.

Education is a crucial element regarding sustainable development, but other elements must be present, such as research and innovation. Research, as one of the main university activities, must be integrated in its performance. A need exists for sustainability-oriented research, based on an interdisciplinary approach, and the development of products, processes and technologies which enable long-term use with minimal environmental impact (Lukman and Glavič, 2006). Consideration about more efficient energy consumption and conservation practices should be included within every research project. Another important element, innovation, is observed in all systems on Earth (e.g. allotropes and polymorphs in materials, mutants in bio-systems, ideas, inventions, and innovations in social systems). Inventions are stochastic by nature and they are a result of each individual’s research. From early childhood, a human being starts to test his surroundings by interacting with the system, and observing the response of the environment to his actions. Innovation can be accepted or rejected by the system, the response being deterministic. Innovations, science, patents are, therefore, natural behaviour, a must for population to survive. This history of humanity is a history of continuous innovations, e.g.: tools (axe, plough), machinery (steam engine, internal combustion engine, electro-motor, turbine, reactors, etc.), transporttation (animals – horse, carriage, ship, train, car, lorry, airplane, jet, rocket), and arms (infantry, cavalry, artillery, tanks, navy, aviation, biocides, nuclear weapons). 5.2. SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES AT UNIVERSITIES – THE CASE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MARIBOR

The sustainable University as an important step towards a sustainable society has been conceptually fostered from the Tallories Declaration (1990) to the UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development, ESD (2005). The latter deals, in an integrated way, with environmental protection, effective use of natural resources, maintenance of ecosystems, a well-functioning society, and a sound economy. ESD should established and applied in local, regional, national and global contexts, integrated into all teaching and learning levels of the education process, and regarding personal development (formal, informal, lifelong, and continuing). Universities have to take the pivotal role, demonstrating good practice, as well as stimulating sustainable research whilst, however, considering the ethical and moral consequences of their activities in practice. Universities


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should commit themselves to using natural resources and energy reasonably and struggle to become energy saving institutions. Importance must be given to sustainable energy consumption practices. These activities include commuting problems, sustainable energy services, supply-chain management, etc. University employees and students should be aware that many of their seemingly minor actions and decisions can cause everyday actions to blossom into significant improvements in the environmental impact of the organization (Lukman and Glavič, 2006; Perron et al., 2006). The University of Maribor contributes to sustainability efforts by initiating the implementation of higher education for sustainable development as an instrument of social change. Education and research, as bodies of knowledge, act as indispensable and necessary tools for pedagogic action. Continuing education courses can contribute to awareness, and change the attitudes and values of individuals in both the medium and long term. It allows individuals to discover citizenship problems, particularly to questions relating to the rational use of energy and, consequently, mitigating barriers, especially the behavioural (Dias et al., 2004). At the University of Maribor several activities, embracing sustainability issues are at the forefront. Sustainability Council proposed projects, embracing all the departments and their everyday activities, are based on learning by doing. For example, acclimatization (heating, cooling, ventilation) is led by the Mechanical Engineering Department, insulation of buildings (Structural Engineering Department), lighting, and north/south temperature control (Electrical Engineering Department), water, energy, and waste (Chemical Engineering Department), optimum personal transportation (Logistics Department), Corporate Social Responsibility (Economics Department), public awareness at The Earth’s and other Days (Pedagogical Department), environmental management (Department of Organization), health care and nutrition (Medical Department), code of ethics, internal sustainability rules (Department of Law), etc. Furthermore, at the University of Maribor, two programmes including environment and sustainability are at the development phase: Environmental protection at Department of Arts, and Sustainable development and environmental engineering at the Chemistry and Chemical Engineering Department. 6. Conclusions The Earth Charter Commission (2005) states that we stand at a critical moment in the Earth’s history, when humanity must choose its future. The dominant patterns of production and consumption are causing environmental devastation, depletion of resources, and a massive extinction of species.

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The education of people, and future leaders in particular, is vital for approaching sustainability, depending on our will to change our over-consuming lifestyles. Education is the foundation for achieving sustainable development. There are many reasons for including sustainable energy consumption issues in formal undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate engineering curricula. As future decision-makers, planners, designers, engineers, we shoulder special responsibility for environmental protection. If taught imaginatively, moral philosophy helps to genuinely instil environmentrespecting ethical values, especially in the young generation. The purpose of engineering education (or any education for that matter) cannot be and must not be to produce graduates who think or act mechanically in the problem-solving mode (Nath and Kazashka-Hristozova, 2005). Therefore, the elements of evolution, lessons from history, and the skills for survival should be taught. Sustainable universities have important, yet almost contradictory tasks, which will be arduous to realize in the near future. Achieving sustainable development requires respecting the natural laws in the World and cultural relationships in society, while maintaining a balance between them (Lukman and Glavič, 2007). Is sustainable development a real chance or a fictional utopia? Microorganisms in a fermentation broth which cannot stop growth, causing poisonously formed ethanol. The same is true for nations evolving in a polluted World – some of them will perish, with others conquering their land and resources. The exhaustion of Nature will likely continue. When will humanity’s Life Cycle start declining? Degeneration threatens us all, and constantly! Can dilemmas such as cooperation vs. market competition, cultural vs. natural behaviour, be solved? Is education the promising answer to it? Will humanity, socialistic ideas, culture, ethics, and morals join to reduce the nonequilibrium that we are creating, and save Nature for future generations? Science, education, technology, politics, religions, all have to combine efforts and try to achieve a common goal – sustainable development – better sooner than later.

References DG-TREN, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, 2006, Energy & Transport in Figures – 2006 (Part 2: Energy). European Commission in Co-operation with Eurostat. Available Online: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/index_en.html (retrieved on 19. 7. 2007). Dias RA, Mattos CR, Balestieri JAP, 2004, Energy education: breaking up the rational energy use barriers. Energ Policy 32(11): 1339–1347.


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Earth Charter Commission, 2005, The Earth Charter – A Declaration of Fundamental Principles for Building a Just, Sustainable, and Peaceful Global Society in the 21st Century. Available Online: http://www.earthcharter.org/ (retrieved on 24. 7. 2007). European Commission, 2006, Green Paper – A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy, COM (2006) 105 final, Brussels, 8.3.2006. Ferrer-i-Carbonell A, Van den Bergh JCJM, 2004, A micro-econometric analysis of determinants of unsustainable consumption in The Netherlands. Environ Res Econ 27(4): 367–389. Glasser H, 2004, Learning Our Way to a Sustainable and Desirable World: Ideas Inspired by Arne Naess and Deep Ecology. In: Corcoran PB and Wals AEJ (eds.) (2004) Higher Education and the Challenge of Sustainability: Problematics, Promise, and Practice, Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht, The Netherlands. Hasnain SM, Elani UA, Al-Awaji SH, Aba-oud HA, Smiai MS, 1995, Prospects and proposals for solar energy education programmes. Appl Energ 52: 307–14. IEA, International Energy Agency, 2005, World Energy Outlook 2005. Available Online: http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/weo2005.pdf (retrieved on 23. 7. 2007). IEA, International Energy Agency, 2006, Key World Energy Statistics. Available Online: http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2006/key2006.pdf (retrieved on 19. 7. 2007). Jennings P, Lund C, 2001, Renewable energy education for sustainable development. Renew Energ 22(1–3): 113–118. Kajfež Bogataj L, 2007, About the Climate Change (radio interview, in Slovene). Available Online: http://radio.ognjisce.si/novice/zivljenje_radia/20070105554659762107.php (retrieved on 24. 7. 2007). Kandpal TC, Garg HP, 1999, Energy education. Appl Energ 64(1–4): 71–78. Kim KH, 1999, Environmental reforms of material science education in the 21st century. Mater Chem Phys 61(1): 14–17. Lukman R, Glavič P, 2006, Sustainable Consumption at University of Maribor. In: Proceedings: Refereed Sessions II, Sustainable Consumption and Production: Opportunities and Challenges, Launch Conference of the Sustainable Consumption Research Exchange (SCORE!) Network, 23–25 November, 2006, Wuppertal, Germany. Lukman R, Glavič P, 2007, What are the elements of a sustainable university? Clean Tech Environ Policy 9(2): 103–114. Myers N, 2000, Sustainable consumption. Science 287(5462): 2419. Naess A, 1973, The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary. Inquiry, 16, 95–100. Reprinted in G. Sessions (ed.) (1995). Deep Ecology for the 21st Century (pp. 151–155). Shambhala, Boston. Nath B, Kazashka-Hristozova K, 2005, Quo vadis global environmental sustainability? A proposal for the environmental education of engineering students. Int J Environ Pollut 23(1): 1–15. Orr DW, 2003, Four Challenges of Sustainability, Spring Seminar Series 2003 – Ecological Economics. Available Online: http://www.ratical.org/co-globalize/4CofS.html (retrieved on 18. 6. 2006). Perron GM, Cote RP, Duffy JF, 2006, Improving environmental awareness training in business. J Clean Prod 14(6–7): 551–562. Price D, 1995, Energy and human evolution. Popul Environ 16(4): 301–319.

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Schumacher EF, 1977, A Guide for the Perplexed, Harper & Row, New York. Sterling S, 2004, Higher Education, Sustainability and the Role of Systemic Learning. In: Corcoran PB and Wals AEJ (eds.) (2004) Higher Education and the Challenge of Sustainability: Problematics, Promise, and Practice, Kluwer, Dordrecht, The Netherlands. Throne-Holst H, Sto E, Strandbakken P, 2007, The role of consumption and consumers in zero emission strategies. J Clean Prod 15: 1328–1336. UN – The United Nations, 1992, The United Nations Programme of Action from Rio: Agenda 21, UN Department of Public Information. UN – The United Nations, 2007, World Population Prospects – The 2006 Revision (Highlights). Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat. Available Online: http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ wpp2006/wpp2006_highlights.pdf (retrieved on 4. 8. 2007). Weber L, 1997, Some reflections on barriers to the efficient use of energy. Energ Policy 25(10): 833–835.

ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY IN EASTERN EUROPE OLEG UDOVYK* National Institute for Strategic Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine

Abstract: This paper shows the links between energy, environment and security in three East European countries – Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. It is based on the report of the Environment and Security Initiative and incorporates results from more recent research. The paper highlights the importance of recognising the region’s geopolitical positioning between the European Union and Russian Federation, improving energy security without jeopardising the environment, cleaning up obsolete infrastructures and stocks, addressing frozen conflicts and strengthening cooperation over shared rivers and ecosystems. Keywords: Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, energy dilemma, Chernobyl legacy, frozen conflicts.

1. Introduction It is increasingly recognized today that security is not just a military issue, and that the destruction and over-exploitation of natural resources and ecosystems can also threaten the security of communities and nations (Esty et al., 2005; GACGC, 2000; UN/ISDR, 2004; UNDP, 2007; Weinthal, 2004; Yeremienko and Vozniuk, 2005). Here, such challenges in Eastern Europe are described. This region extends from the northern shore of the Black Sea in Ukraine up to the Baltic Sea basin in Belarus. It covers 845,000 km2 and is home to almost 60 million people. These nations share common borders, watersheds, and infrastructure and have many similarities in their geography, history, culture, and economy.

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Oleg Udovyk, National Institute for Strategic Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine. E-mail: [email protected]


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Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine are nations with recent sovereign statehood. They are positioned between an enlarging EU and a historically influential Russia. The area’s unique position and history have played a large part in the overlapping of environmental and security issues, which have evolved over three distinct periods: the Soviet years of intensive industrialization, a difficult period of political and economic transition, and the recent economic recovery with its new challenges. 2. The Regional Context Following the sudden disintegration of the USSR, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine immediately faced a historic challenge for which they were ill equipped. Outsiders often fail to appreciate their problems but are quick to notice poverty, corruption and other negative phenomena in Eastern Europe (Anonymous, 2006; TI, 2007; UNAIDS, 2005; UNDP, 2007; UNPD, 2007). Despite these challenges the three countries have achieved significant successes. The region has negotiated the difficult transition years without suffering violent conflict of the kind that paralysed the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Eastern Europe gained much sympathy by deciding not to preserve military nuclear capacity and transfer weapons inherited from the Soviet Union to Russia. Furthermore disagreements between Russia and Ukraine regarding the status of the Soviet Black Sea fleet have been satisfactorily managed and largely resolved, sparing Europe a major security risk (McFaul, 2001; Polyakov, 2004). However there are plenty of regional security issues reaching beyond the borders of Eastern Europe to feature on the security agenda of the whole continent. The Transnistrian conflict in Moldova is one example. Difficult are also issues of supply and transit of Russian fuel (Meacher, 2005). The key challenge for the three countries is still to strengthen contemporary state institutions, so that they can fully address economic, social, demographic, environmental and security problems (UNDP, 2007). The legacy of the Chernobyl disaster – almost synonymous for the outside world with environmental problems in Eastern Europe –epitomises the difficulties involved in dealing with all these problems at the same time. In the early hours of 26 April 1986 a violent explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, near the Ukrainian-Belarusian border, destroyed the reactor and started a large fire that lasted ten days. During the explosion and the fire a huge amount of radioactivity was released into the environment, spreading over hundreds of kilometres into Belarus, Ukraine and beyond. For the last 21 years, millions of Ukrainians and Belarusians have been living on contaminated land. Compulsory resettlement out of the more

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dangerous areas shattered the lives of hundreds of thousands. Many more chose to voluntarily abandon the environmentally unsafe and economically depressed region. Its mounting health problems and a catastrophic demographic situation were compounded by accelerating outward migration by young and able people. Prohibitions pervade the everyday lives of a whole generation of people still living in the contaminated areas. They can never again graze their cattle in meadows; pick berries and mushrooms in surrounding forests, or till their own fields (Kinley, 2005). Chernobyl affected one-fifth of Belarus territory and a quarter of its population. In the early 1990s as much as 20% of the national budget was spent on remediation efforts, which would result in economic meltdown even in a stable, healthy economy. The economic, social and environmental burden of Chernobyl was no lighter in Ukraine, which had to deal with the safety of the destroyed reactor as well. The disaster also clearly demonstrated that an accident in one country may threaten human lives and health all over a continent. Twenty one years after the disaster the influential Blacksmith Institute still lists Chernobyl among the 10 most polluted places in the world. Given this legacy, the recent announcements of plans by the governments of Belarus and Ukraine to expand the use of nuclear power reflect the dramatic challenges facing these countries. Their current dependence on energy imports is seen as one of the key security concerns. The region does not have sufficient energy resources of its own, but energy is critically important for both social stability and economic development, particularly with such high energy-intensity economies. The energy issue is all the more important because Eastern Europe stands at the crossroads of east-west and north-south energy corridors linking Russia to Western Europe, and the Black Sea to the Baltic (Ukraine, 2006; Kupchinsky, 2005; Mulvey, 2006; Rosenkranz, 2006; Vasylevska, 2006). The quest for secure energy supplies by whatever available means may have serious implications for the environment in Eastern Europe, already up against acute problems. While some of these are inherited over from the Soviet era, others are caused by the decline in state control during the transition years. A third category is related to the recent economic upturn and newly spurring industrial activities. But at the same time the region has significant natural resources which, if wisely used, may support its long-term economic prosperity (Yeremienko and Vozniuk, 2005).

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2.1. THE GEOPOLITICAL POSITION

Despite common borders and many similarities, the three countries of Eastern Europe do not constitute a region in the sense of political community. Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine have not yet developed visible capacity and projects for regional integration. On the contrary, Eastern Europe is a zone of geopolitical attraction among major powers, including the Russian Federation to the east, and the European Union to the west. Eastern Europe’s pivotal location at the intersection of strategic transport corridors, such as between Russian and Caspian producers of fuel and European energy consumers, further amplifies such influence. After expanding eastwards over the last decade, the EU seems to be experiencing “enlargement fatigue”. Its capacity to absorb additional members was compromised, in particular, by the failure in 2005 to ratify a new European constitution. The EU is also the most important trade partner for all three countries. It is therefore still important for the EU to have friendly, politically stable and economically prosperous countries on its doorstep, forming a solid bulwark against unwanted migration, terrorism and other threats such as drug, arms and human trafficking. Ukraine and Moldova are the only two European countries among the “top ten” sources of illegal migrants to the EU. EU’s most comprehensive attempt to deal with Eastern Europe is through its Neighbourhood Policy which aims at strengthening stability in the region and cross-border cooperation (EC, 2004). On the eastern side, Eastern European countries must forge new relations with Russia with which they share strong historic, cultural and social ties. Russia is keen to maintain secure transit routes through Eastern Europe while retaining the ties of the past and developing political and economic cooperation. Travel to and from Russia is still visa free. Simplified border regulations and cultural affinity facilitate the transfer of several million Eastern European migrant workers in Russia, and other economic ties. Russia remains a key market for Eastern European products and the most important energy supplier for all three countries. As is the case with the EU, this economic cooperation makes relations with Russia extremely important and political disagreements – for example regarding the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova – very painful. Russian security interests are also related to the presence of its military facilities in Moldova (Transnistria) and Ukraine (Crimea) (Anonymous, 2006; McFaul, 2001). Since the disintegration of the USSR, various international bodies involving part of post-Soviet states have been set up. The first of these, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established in 1991. The CIS currently includes 12 former Soviet republics. Among further initiatives the most notable was the Collective Security Treaty signed


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in Tashkent in May 1992 between all CIS countries excluding Moldova and Ukraine. An economic integration initiative, the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), was started in 2000 and currently involves six former Soviet republics (including Russia and Belarus) as members, and Ukraine and Moldova as observers. EurAsEC aims to offer free trade, a common customs policy, and, in the long term, monetary union. Also notable in the region is the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development—GUAM, which includes Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova (Anonymous, 2006). 2.2. INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

Internal problems and tensions are no less important than geopolitical challenges. Not only may they weaken young states and increase their vulnerability to external factors, but they may also present security challenges in their own right. Not surprisingly such internal security factors feature prominently in the national security doctrines of all three countries. Many of the internal developments are common to other post-Soviet states. Though expanding, the region’s economies still lag behind most of their neighbours, with Moldova one of the poorest European countries in terms of per capita GDP. All the countries suffered economic decline in the 1990s followed by some recovery over the last five years. However, this recovery has gone hand-in-hand with painful economic restructuring. In the past Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova were intricately linked to the rest of the Soviet economy. The collapse of the USSR and economic liberalisation opened up local markets, increased competition and severed some of the ties with former Soviet republics. However access to Western markets, especially in the EU, has been very limited and often conditional on political or further economic reform. Moreover the new patterns of trade with Europe have increasingly consisted of exports of raw materials in exchange for imports of manufactured goods. Finally it has proven difficult to restructure the old heavy industry which was often the mainstay of the Soviet-era economy (Ukraine, 2006; Kupchinsky, 2005). Economic restructuring has consequently not delivered on its promise of universally higher living standards and political stability. The decline in agricultural production contributed to increased poverty and further deterioration in the basic infrastructure of rural areas in all three countries. Social problems have also become more acute in some heavily industrialised regions. In certain cases this has coincided with tension and conflict. Here again, the most striking example is Transnistria, home to almost all Moldovan industry with traditionally strong ties to the former Soviet economic space.

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Another example of a region suffering from economic restructuring is the heavily industrialised Donbas region in Ukraine where economic and social problems mesh with issues of environmental and energy security. The economic and social problems of rural and heavily industrialised areas are aggravated by demographic trends, severely affected by the declining birth rates which are now below the replacement level in all three countries. The populations of Ukraine and Belarus will shrink significantly, with Ukraine expected to lose 9–15 million people over the next 50 years. Outgoing labour migration makes the situation even worse, hitting Moldova particularly hard, with an estimated 1,000,000 Moldavians (i.e. 40% of the active population) working abroad. Other serious, in some cases severe, problems include the spread of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (UNAIDS, 2005). The rate of increase in HIV/AIDS infections in the region is among the highest in the world, though significant differences between the countries have been reported. Ukraine, with an adult infection rate of 1.4%, is the hardest-hit country in Europe. The governments of the three countries are making a considerable effort to attract international attention and obtain assistance in addressing this serious problem. Coping with these difficulties requires effective, resourceful and committed state government. However, government bodies in the region are not always able to implement reform of social welfare, health care and education. They themselves are often in need of reform, to effectively deal with public sector corruption (TI, 2007), for example. Internal and external security challenges are closely linked. On the one hand internal weaknesses increase vulnerability to external threats, and on the other hand external pressures often shape economic and political reforms with their social, environmental and other security repercussions. Energy, among other issues, is at the core of both internal and external security challenges in the region. 2.3. THE ENERGY DILEMMA AND CHERNOBYL LEGACY

Given tragic Chernobyl legacy, why are both Belarus and Ukraine currently considering expanding their nuclear energy generating capability? The answer lies in the special role played by energy and energy security in Eastern Europe (Kinley, 2005; Kupchinsky, 2005; Lieven, 2006; Mulvey, 2006). Energy is vital for the internal and external security of all three countries. A secure, affordable domestic energy supply is critical to economic development, particularly in energy hungry industrial sectors. It is also essential to meet social needs (heating, transportation, etc.) especially for vulnerable


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groups. Since the region’s own energy resources and production capacities, especially in Moldova and Belarus, are insufficient, a significant proportion of energy has to be imported, primarily from Russia. This is, in turn, a major factor in the external security of Eastern Europe. Another factor is the location of the region at the crossroads of major energy transport corridors linking producers in Russia and the Caspian region with consumers in Central, Western and Northern Europe. In the context of rising global demand for energy and higher hydrocarbon prices, the stability of oil and gas transportation routes is becoming increasingly important for Russia, the EU, the United States and other countries. A good illustration of the external aspect of energy security was the heated debate over arrangements for the supply of Russian natural gas to Belarus and Ukraine, tariffs for transporting gas across these countries, and ownership of gas transportation facilities. Belarus, a traditional Russian ally, was purchasing Russian gas at $47 USD a cubic meter until the end of 2006. From 2007, the price of the gas was increased to more than $100 USD a cubic meter. In the context of price negotiations, Belarus also agreed to sell 50% of shares of Beltransgaz – the Belarus national gas distribution and transportation company – to Russia’s state-owned Gazprom. The dispute between Russia and Ukraine over gas prices in early 2006 resulted in disruption of gas supplies to Western Europe sparking a strong reaction from the EU that had worldwide resonance. While most observers considered that Russia was exerting political pressure by increasing gas prices, others pointed out that before the 2006 deal Gazprom had been supplying Ukraine at a fifth of the market price, equivalent to Russia subsidising the Ukrainian economy by $3–5 billion a year. A similar dispute over tariffs on export of Russian oil and its products to and through Belarus resulted in a brief disruption of oil supplies. Imported energy is important to fuel economic development, particularly energy-hungry heavy industry, such as machine building and steel production in Ukraine and fertiliser and chemical production in Belarus. Refining of oil products in Mozyr and Novopolotsk used to be a key sector in the Belarus economy, but profits may drop substantially after Russia imposed tariffs on the export of oil to Belarus in January 2007. The survival of much of the metallurgy and machine-building industry in the Donbas depends directly on a cheap, secure supply of natural gas currently imported from Russia, or on finding an alternative such as electricity from Ukraine’s domestic power sources. Most of heavy industries were inherited from the Soviet Union and are often located in environmentally and socially stressed areas, while forming the mainstay of the existing economy. It may not be economically feasible to restructure them to improve energy security. Moreover these

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industries are socially (and politically) important, as they constitute the main source of employment in densely populated areas with a poorly diversified economy. There are many other ways in which energy is linked to social and ultimately political issues. Even with current tariffs often below costrecovery levels, heat and electricity bills are a burden for poor people. In 2006 utility bills (primarily electricity) represented 40% of an average pensioner’s income in Moldova. Raising tariffs to cost-recovery levels may render heat and electricity virtually unaffordable for many. Throughout the difficult 1990s, the energy supply in Eastern Europe remained relatively secure due to the slowdown in industrial activity and substantially under-priced imports of oil and gas from Russia and Central Asia. Recently energy demand in the region has reached and surpassed the 1991 level at the same time as the world oil prices have increased dramatically. Russia, for its part, has started a reappraisal of the political and economic costs and benefits of providing indirect energy subsidies. These factors are forcing the three countries to urgently rethink their energy supply options. The need is so pressing that Belarus and Ukraine are turning to nuclear power to solve their energy problems. Belarus plans to build a domestic nuclear power plant by 2015, while the Energy Strategy (Ukraine, 2006) adopted by Ukraine proposes new nuclear reactors and extending the service life of existing ones. This raises obvious technological challenges locating reactors and finding adequate water resources for cooling, particularly in Ukraine which is already short of water in many areas. But the deployment of nuclear power is also associated with various security challenges ranging from enforcement of non-proliferation to concerns about terrorism, the operation of reactors and radioactive waste disposal. In addition it may aggravate social and political tensions, already reflected in the hostile response by Ukrainian NGOs, opposed to plans to expand the nuclear power base. On the other hand Ukraine and Belarus are determined to increase energy efficiency and implement cleaner energy technologies. The need to increase energy independence has focused fresh attention on the coal sector which currently provides up to a half of all energy, and fuels up to a quarter of electricity production in Ukraine. Belarus also has substantial deposits of brown coal. The importance of coal to the region could potentially increase, but would require major capital investment. Much as nuclear power it could result in significant environmental risks though new technologies may ensure cleaner (albeit more expensive) coal-based energy generation. Other domestic energy supply options, such as hydropower or using wood


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and other bio-fuels are associated with environmental, social and security impacts too (e.g. the impact of newly-built hydropower facilities on downstream areas). Whatever the strategic choices, restructuring of the energy sector in Eastern Europe will continue, and will have a major impact on the economy and social stability as well as the state of the environment. As long as the key lessons of Chernobyl remain on the agenda, these impacts need to be fully understood and integrated into policy-making (Vasylevska, 2006; Weinthal, 2004; Yeremienko and Vozniuk, 2005). 2.4. ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES FACING THE REGION

The Chernobyl disaster is the foremost, though by no means the only, example of the region’s major environmental problems, largely associated with past disregard for the environment and the rapid industrialisation and modernisation of the USSR. Much of this legacy did not receive sufficient attention during the difficult transition years, when declining living standards, and political and economic instability took precedence over environmental issues. The transition and recent economic recovery created new environmental challenges, many of which interact with energy and security issues at the local, regional and national level (Figure 1). Major environmental problems inherited from the Soviet era are often located in and around large industrial centres. This is a result of intensive industrialisation in compact areas, inefficient use of energy and natural resources, and disregard for local environmental concerns. Air and water pollution, accompanied by degradation of the landscape and ecosystems, is acute in the industrial zones in Ukraine and Belarus. The wetland areas of Polesie in southern Belarus are another type of territory under stress; intensive drainage and deforestation carried out to recover land for farming having damaged ecosystems and ultimately caused a drop in agricultural productivity. Serious environmental degradation also threatens the ecosystems of the Carpathian Mountains and the Azov and Black seas. Environmental degradation often goes hand-in-hand with the declining health of local people. This overlaps with more recent economic and social problems which have often hardest hit the very same heavily industrialised areas that have the most serious environmental problems. In turn, social and economic difficulties shift attention and resources away from the environment, further aggravating the situation and creating a vicious circle that poses an additional threat to social stability.

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Figure 1. Energy, environment and security priority areas in Eastern Europe

While some forms of environmental damage were reduced during the transition, others became much worse. The positive effects of transition included improved resource efficiency resulting in more realistic pricing of


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natural resources, new foreign and domestic investment in cleaner technologies, and a cutback in subsidies for heavy (particularly military) industry. On the down side, deregulation associated with market liberalisation resulted in laxer environmental controls. The economic and political difficulties distracted the attention of the public and policy-makers from environmental issues. The increasing focus of business on profit-making encouraged more intensive exploitation of natural resources. Environmental degradation around large industrial facilities was often made worse by chronic under-investment in their maintenance. In addition, trade liberalisation in some cases resulted in shifts toward more pollution and resource-intensive industries. The allpervading commercial propaganda that accompanied the rise of market economies strengthened consumerist behaviour among those fortunate enough to be able to consume. Strong, dynamically-adaptive environmental protection agencies are needed to tackle this legacy and meet new challenges. Substantial progress in this field has been achieved in all three countries, particularly in view of the fact that at the time of independence even the ministries in charge of environmental protection were barely functional. In addition to progress at home, the three countries have played a remarkable part in international agreements and European processes, such as Environment for Europe, with Kyiv hosting the fifth Ministerial meeting in 2003. Progress in drafting modern environmental legislation has been boosted by the countries’ commitment to bring environmental norms in line with EU directives. At the same time, environmental bodies in the region are still generally weak compared to their Western and Central European counterparts (reflected, in particular, in the relatively low Environmental Sustainability Index scores of all three countries). Institutional development is particularly hampered by the insufficient priority given to the environment by the political agenda and mass media. Global environmental issues such as climate change, biodiversity conservation and unsustainable consumption attract little public attention. At the same time environmental problems causing direct health, social or economic impacts (contamination by hazardous substances, safety of water or land degradation) continue to generate significant public interest in the region (Yeremienko and Vozniuk, 2005). 3. Conclusion The single most important external factor shaping the future security of Eastern Europe is the interplay of political and economic interests in the pan-European region. Many in Eastern Europe are attracted by Western models, but drawn East by historic, cultural and linguistic affinities, and,

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last but not least, by close trade and energy links. Most probably the three countries of Eastern Europe will continue to search for a balance between the two poles. However, the three states themselves are not passive objects in a geopolitical game, but active players, and much of the regional security architecture will depend on the ability of Chisinau, Kyiv, Minsk and other capitals to seek mutual understanding and reach compromises. The countries consequently have a long way to go before state institutions mature and a culture of dialogue and democratic representation is firmly established, a necessary precondition for developing long-term solutions to strategic challenges, including those related to the environment. Unless they are at least partly resolved, for example the tensions such as those found in Moldova’s Transnistrian region and security-linked social issues in Crimea, they will continue to work against stabilization and democratic transition. Over the next decade, and perhaps for longer, the region will continue to face tough challenges modernizing its economy and radically reforming its energy systems, while building sustainable democratic societies. Such simultaneous political and economic transformation is only possible with strong external stimuli and support of the type provided by the EU to its candidate countries in Central Europe and the Baltic States. Yet the EU, with its current “enlargement fatigue”, has certain constraints in helping in a substantial way. How does this affect interaction between energy, environment and security? We still do not know whether Eastern European economies will stagnate, decline or grow, and if so in what way; nor whether growth will be based on resource- and energy-intensive industries, or technology- and labour-intensive activities and services. Nor is it clear how continuing transition will define the political landscape of the three countries. But these factors will certainly be featured among the forces defining the environmental agenda in the region, influenced in their turn by environmental and security limitations. There is obviously an urgent need to mitigate threats and strengthen cooperation on Eastern Europe’s external and internal borders. International institutions can make a meaningful contribution by easing tension, solving environmental problems, supporting energy security, boosting regional stability and promoting stewardship of global ecosystems – but to do so they must cooperate with one another systematically in a drive to untangle the complex of relationships between energy, security and the environment.


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References Anonymous, 2006, Europe, Russia and in-between, Economist, October 26. EC – European Commission, 2004, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, COM, 373 final, Brussels. Esty, D., M. Levy, and T. Srebotnjak, 2005, Environmental Sustainability Index: Benchmarking Environmental Stewardship, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, New Haven. GACGC – German Advisory Council on Global Change, 2000, World in Transition – Strategies for Managing Global Environmental Risks, Berlin. Kinley, D. (ed.), 2005, Chernobyl Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-economic Impacts and Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna. Kupchinsky, R., 2005, Problems in Ukraine’s Coal Industry Run Deep, RFE/RL, Prague. Lieven, A., 2006, The West’s Ukraine Illusion, International Herald Tribune, January 5. McFaul, M., 2001, Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY. Meacher, M., 2005, One for Oil and Oil for One, The Spectator, March 5. Mulvey, S., 2006, Ukraine’s Strange Love for Nuclear Power, BBC News, April 26. Polyakov, L., 2004, New Security Threats in Black Sea Region, NATO Summer Academy Reader, June. Rosenkranz, G., 2006, Nuclear power—Myth and Reality, Nuclear Issues Paper 1, Bern.TI – Transparency International, 2007, Corruption Perception Index 2006. Ukraine, 2006, Energy Strategy of Ukraine until 2030, Order № 145-р, accepted by Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 05.03.2006. UN/ISDR, 2004, Living with Risk—A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives, New York and Geneva. UNAIDS – United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS), 2005, 2005 AIDS Epidemic Update. UNDP – United Nations Development Programme, 2007, Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis, Human Development Report 2006, Palgrave Macmillan, New York. UNPD – United Nations Population Division, 2007, World Population Statistics. Vasylevska, O., 2006, The Cost of Recycling: Ukraine to Build a Nuclear Dump, The Day, 6 June. Weinthal, E., 2004, From Environmental Peacemaking to Environmental Peacekeeping, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington. Yeremienko and Vozniuk, 2005, Ukraine: Environmental Overview, Kiev, Ukraine, July 26–29.

CAPACITY BUILDING FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ACCESS IN THE SAHEL/SAHARA REGION: WIND ENERGY AS CATALYST FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

KHALID BENHAMOU* Sahara Wind Inc., 32 rue Lalla Meryem Souissi Rabat, 10100 – Morocco

Abstract: Having been exposed to extremely weak grid absorption capacities while installing one Africa’s first 50 kW hybrid wind-diesel system in 1994, and because of the rather limited and decentralized grids of the countries located in the Saharan region (Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Chad), the author of this paper is engaged in a broad ranging bottom-up capacity building strategy. The aim of this strategy is to provide or improve local energy access solutions relying on the region’s knowledge centers, universities, and local business in order to address the global challenges of climate change, environmental degradations and rampant desertification on largely agricultural based societies currently under high demographic pressure. While addressing a key brain drain issue due to mass migration, this program highlights the possibilities for synergies that a technology such as wind energy can provide when integrated and picked up by local industries.

Keywords: Energy security, distributed energy, wind-electrolysis, carbon-free, hydrogen, capacity building, Sahara, trade winds, climate change, mitigation mechanisms.

1. Energy Supply, Energy Access a Development Imperative Tackling the global consequences of climate change, environmental degradations and rampant desertification on largely agricultural based societies

______ *

Khalid Benhamou, Sahara Wind Inc., 32 rue Lalla Meryem Souissi Rabat, 10100 – Morocco. E-mail: [email protected] F. Barbir and S. Ulgiati (eds.), Sustainable Energy Production and Consumption. © Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008

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currently under high demographic pressure is a key social priority, as they do generate economic distress leading to mass migration. Being net exporters of immigrants, Morocco and Mauritania are located on the main routes of migrant populations from Sub-Saharan Africa which together, constitutes a significant security threat to the stability of the region and that of NATO countries. Within such context, granting basic access to energy services such as electricity is essential to develop local, sustainable economic activities capable of preventing and fixing migrant populations. With a 96% energy dependency from fossil fuel imports absorbing most of Morocco’s export revenues, the impact of such dependency on budgetary spending is quite significant. Since over 30% of National budgets are dedicated to education in the region, one can easily understand how critical the development of sustainable energy consumption schemes can be. While Mauritania enjoys a slightly improved situation regarding its energy dependency, its scarce population is distributed over a vast territory in which access to electricity is virtually impossible to grant through conventional grid infrastructures. Wind-electrolysis for grid stabilization offers great possibilities in absorbing large quantities of cheap generated wind electricity to produce hydrogen as a valuable fuel resource or chemical feedstock, while maximizing the renewable energy uptake of the weak grid infrastructures of the region. Wind-electrolysis for hydrogen production can be used for grid stabilization, power restitution/backup and as fuel or feedstock for specific uses in remote locations. The equipping of both labs in Morocco and Mauritania in the first 6 months of the program will enable us to utilize the full length of the program (36 months) to geographically spread field measurements and extend this cooperation to other countries in the region. Countries like Senegal, Mali, Niger and Chad dispose of extremely limited electric generating capacities (120 MW on average) with a need to cover vast territories. 2. Wind Power, a Social Energy Economy Initially encouraged to provide employment in the relatively poor North Sea regions of Germany, the wind energy industry has emerged in the last 10 years, as a major business providing the most competitive prices of electricity even when operated under marginal European wind conditions. The trade winds that blow along the Atlantic coast from Morocco to Senegal represent the largest and most productive wind potential available on earth. Because of the erratic nature of winds however, wind energy cannot be integrated locally on any significant scale unless a coordinated research is initiated towards far ranging, more advanced energy alternatives. As both countries dispose of this vast wind energy source, and as they face similar social pressure from domestic and sub-Saharan migrant populations fleeing

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deteriorating environmental conditions, fostering collaboration on applied research in clean and more sustainable energy technologies for tackling energy access on a regional base seems quite relevant. Collaboration between Morocco and Mauritania’s educational and scientific communities could provide focus and a broader sensitization effect on the development of local technical alternatives that can address the economic consequences of high energy dependencies or limited energy accesses. Both countries dispose of skilled human capacities and scientist pools that would gain significantly in coordinating such research programs as their respective energy challenges are quite complementary. Building regional scientific capacities, and developing a common vision that can generate economic growth in integrating an environmentally friendly and sustainable energy industry (wind energy has 25% growth rates worldwide focused essentially in Europe) could in the long term, become an alternative in fixing migrant population, and contribute to their social integration. Developing hydrogen energy perspectives will bring North Africa’s scientific communities to take a comprehensive look at energy systems and adopt a holistic, integrated approach to energy technologies which are linked to development issues that have been driven thus far mostly by external market forces providing unsuited ready made solutions. Indeed, experiences in North Africa have clearly shown that efforts aimed at introducing (new) wind energy technologies in these developing countries amounts ultimately to the simple import of turn key equipments through concessionary sources of financing and export credit packages. These policies have done very little in terms of local impact for a technology that could have been promising in terms of economic returns, in addressing energy access, energy security, and the creation of an accessible integrated industrial activity. 3. Wind Power and Electric Grid Saturation The saturation of the African continent’s largest electricity grids to further wind developments due to grid stability problems will quickly highlight the need to develop a more comprehensive and integrated approach. While relying on a highly interconnected grid, Denmark, the world wind energy leader has not managed to cover more then 25% of its domestic energy consumption through wind before encountering major grid stability problems. The country has frozen its wind development activity for the last two years although Wind turbine manufacturing remains Denmark’s main industrial employer. The export of expensive European made wind turbines to lucrative markets (such as in the USA) is not meant to provide a solution to Africa’s electricity access challenges. Although 25% of Denmark’s domestic electricity consumption may be quite significant, the same proportion (if achievable…)

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in the Saharan or Sub-Saharan context will translate into very little quantities of wind turbines installed. Limited numbers of large wind turbine and their remoteness will make maintenance issues extremely difficult to handle. Indeed, with about 120 MW of total installed capacities, decentralized and distributed over territories that are twice the size of France, countries like Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad to name a few, will hardly make it possible for any conventional wind energy technology to become commercially viable. Developing alternative wind energy technologies to feed smaller electricity markets could be essential for tackling the region’s decentralized energy access issues and enable the development of a local, viable wind energy industry which could be essential for tackling the regions economic challenges currently under pressure from Sub-Saharan migrant populations (Figure 1).

Figure 1. A vast renewable resource potential: global trade winds over North West Africa

Since this region is located on the edge of one of the largest electricity grids (EU grid), its large renewable energy potential could be used to produce significant amounts of cheap wind energy that could ultimately end up supplying larger electricity markets. This however, will require an effect of scale. Developing mechanisms to initially firm this energy locally is very


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important as it lies in the critical path of major alternative, sustainable energy developments. Further integrating hydrogen production within regional mining and fertilizer industries could optimize local chemical processing capabilities, while research in fuel cells applications could contribute to improve decentralized electrification prospects in providing site specific alternatives. 4. Environmentally Friendly, Sustainable Energy Production It is important to mention that current alternatives of hydrogen production through natural gas reforming processes represent today over 80% of the world’s hydrogen production, which without any sequestration technologies emits 6 tons of CO2 per ton of hydrogen in the process. The production of hydrogen through Wind-electrolysis is carbon free as this process can be duplicated over a very large scale in Morocco and Mauritania’s trade wind regions. In generating both electricity and hydrogen at competitive costs and without CO2 emissions significant environmental security concerns can be addressed. As natural gas supply disruptions to NATO countries have recently highlighted, the dependency on a single source of energy relying on fixed infrastructures that required hefty investments is a highly sensitive matter. Taping on such natural gas resources to produce hydrogen, would strain these issues even further. Thus the need to diversify the production of hydrogen away from natural gas, whose demand is likely to grow even further, is of paramount importance to the collective energy security of all NATO countries. The production of hydrogen through wind-electrolysis is carbon free as this process generating both electricity and hydrogen can be duplicated over a very large scale in Morocco and Mauritania’s trade wind regions. In providing large amounts of electricity and hydrogen at competitive costs – without CO2 emissions – significant environmental security concerns can be addressed. The advent of a carbon free hydrogen economy provides an entirely new environmental dimension that is sustainable in terms of resources. Hydrogen provides a valorization of renewable energies that relying on sound economics based on capacity building and local value added processsing industries. 5. Current Energy Economics versus Newer Energy Alternatives The global competition for fossil fuel supplies has created an oil and gas frenzy which generated hefty oil and gas revenues for oil producing countries that often times cannot integrate these incomes into their own economies.

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Since prices keep-on soaring, this has created the perverse effect of discouraging oil suppliers to expand further their hydrocarbon potential, offsetting critical investments needed to keep up with high demand. Under the same token, long term gas deliveries and contracts are also being disrupted, leaving energy transit and consuming nation with very little room to maneuver or renegotiate. The advent of a carbon free hydrogen economy provides an entirely new economic dimension into the energy debate as the resource is renewable, hence non-speculative, and provides significant local capacity building advantages. The social dimension of such a new energy economy underlines a fundamental energy security issue for NATO countries as it opens much needed energy diversification perspectives and alternatives from the current natural gas resources and infrastructure paradigm. Recent energy security propositions triggered for that matter, an almost existential debate on the role and functioning of the alliance during the recent NATO summit in Riga. Seen the conjuncture, these issues are likely to be further exacerbated in the future. Upstream project development activities relative to the Sahara Wind Energy Development Project make it relevant to establish carbon free hydrogen production perspectives, in encouraging countries with similar potentials to collaborate and exchange expertise, through excellence centers located in their universities. It may be sensible to mention that wind-electrolysis for grid stabilization, hydrogen production and energy storage enables an integration of wind energy systems within weak grids through small, medium and large integrated applications. Initiated by Sahara Wind Inc. the NATO Science for Peace SfP-982620 project intends to support a comprehensive strategy aimed at fostering an integrated wind resource utilization and development program within weak grid infrastructures to try and tackle both the social causality (energy access) and the effects of illegal immigration issues through synergies and the creation of local wind energy industries. In developing a bottom-up regionally integrated capacity building process through an effective collaboration between Morocco and Mauritania’s main scientific communities, this project aims at addressing energy access issues, utilizing tools and resources mobilized within an integrated energy strategy to support a long term vision. The region disposes of a qualified pool of university professors, engineers and scientists that are well networked but currently lack appropriately equipped research infrastructures. Being located on the edge of the world’s largest desert, Morocco and Mauritania’s largely agricultural based societies are most exposed to global environmental challenges that induces land degradation and desertification which combined with demographic pressure on their largely agricultural based societies tends to generate economic distress. Even if Mauritania has


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recently discovered an Oil field off-shore (3,000 ft deep well at a depth of 3,000 ft below sea level), the production of the offshore platform has proven so far to be below expectation, as a single well is producing less then 30,000 barrel per day instead of the initial forecasted 200,000 barrels per day. Even so, these rather limited oil sources found in Mauritania do not appear to be sustainable in the long term. For that matter, the policy of the government is precisely to invest these revenues into education and other long term value added sectors. The renewable wind energy source is much more appealing because it is widely available, evenly distributed whether solar or wind energy and can enhance the country’s energy access problematic in a significant way. Cooperation between Morocco and Mauritania in renewable energy technologies is bound to become successful as both countries dispose of a widely untapped wind energy potential with similar difficulties to address for harnessing them. The problematic of renewable energy uptake maximization within weak grid infrastructures is predominant in both Morocco and Mauritania. Developing an upstream strategy within education centers could be essential in building capacities to handle such technical challenges. Emulation between both countries is possible where research institution and different human resource potentials can be mobilized. Morocco disposes of a larger scientific community then Mauritania, however many of the countries challenges in rural electrification are effectively not being addressed by academia, but rather by utilities or agencies that do not conduct research programs. Through this NATO SfP-982620 project, scientific research and educational institutions of the region have the possibility to initiate a comprehensive bottom-up sustainable energy applied research program further into hydrogen production in order to integrate it within their country’s main industrial activities. 6. Improved Energy Access, Communications and Security Although energy access, security and basic services remain a fundamental responsibility of authorities and governments in these regions, it is important to mention that least cost solutions and adequate support systems have to be provided for local populations that are distributed over vast areas. Conducting applied research within Morocco and Mauritania’s research institutions with the involvement of local industries is critical in initiating synergies among developing countries as they face common security threats in loosely controlled remote areas. Areas of great economic importance are lost due to security considerations, particularly in the Sahel region where states rarely dispose of material means to secure their vast territories. It is therefore important that

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local scientific communities integrate the security costs that the lack of alternatives represents to their own economies. Energy access solutions and applications are indeed relevant to communication infrastructures and permanent power supply systems in remote sites. Mobile phone networks and basic security infrastructures do rely heavily on permanent power systems that have to be deployed within broad areas. The development of these infrastructure services and systems enhance the prevention of security related problems which ultimately falls in the responsibility of sovereign states and governments. Indeed, in the Sahara desert, Mauritania is twice the size of a country like France as are Mali, Niger, Chad and other Saharan countries further to the east. This makes any logistics very challenging to deploy through most conventional means. Utilizing wind or any other intermittent renewable energy source to generate fuels in the form of hydrogen that can power everything from electronics to life support systems or even vehicles can open promising endogenous distributed fuel and power generation possibilities in the future. Mobilizing academia in fulfilling these objectives may be appropriate, since complex hydrogen energy and hydrogen related technologies are likely to have a great importance in the future. Providing access in exposing researchers, Engineers and PhD students to these technologies may open a realm of opportunities for them, as well as for their countries. Besides preventing any technological gaps to widen in time, fields of specialization and excellence can be developed regionally, provided a targeted support and appropriate focus can be put on such installations (Figure 2). The NATO SfP-982620 project makes it relevant to develop carbon free hydrogen production perspectives, in encouraging countries with similar potentials to collaborate and exchange expertise, through excellence centers located in their universities. The region disposes of a qualified pool of university professors, engineers and scientists that is well networked but nevertheless lacks appropriately equipped research infrastructures. As most of the NATO SfP budget is dedicated towards co-development and the building of prototypes, this project will enable Morocco and Mauritania’s main scientific communities to dispose of research hardware and develop applied research topics recognized to be on the very edge of what’s being done worldwide. In co-developing solutions alike a variety of other prestigious


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Figure 2. Example of a wind hydrogen fuel cell test bench configuration (NATO SfP982620)

institutions are (alike NREL1 in the USA, or CEA2 in France) researchers originally from Morocco and Mauritania located abroad (mainly in NATO countries), will be keen on collaborating within such platforms relevant to their home country’s challenges. While their motivations are high, the tremendous networking potential of ‘African expatriated scientists’ will likely alleviate a rather resentful brain drain issue that currently affects most scientific communities in sub Saharan Africa. The fact that this project represents NATO’s first bilateral Science for Peace project in the region is quite indicative of the importance of the themes such energy access, energy security, capacity building, science and sustainable development that a strategic multilateral partnership such as NATO may be interested in fostering.

______ 1

NREL: National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 1617 Cole Blvd., Golden, CO 80401, USA. 2 CEA: Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique, 25 rue Leblanc, Paris, France.

BIO-DIESEL AND/OR HYDROGEN IN CROATIA – CHALLENGE AND NECESSITY

ANTE KRSTULOVIĆ* University of Split, Faculty of Natural and Mathematical Sciences, N. Tesle 12/III, 21000 Split, Croatia FRANO BARBIR University of Split, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering and Naval Architecture, R. Boskovica bb, 21000 Split, Croatia

Abstract: This paper evaluates a potential for production and use of biodiesel produced from rape-seed in Croatia to offset increase in transportation fuel consumption, to reduce imports, and to help meet Croatian obligations in decreasing the greenhouse gases emissions. Preliminary results indicate that there is potential (in terms of climate conditions and arable land availability) to grow the rape seed in Croatia, but to produce diesel oil new production capacities would need to be installed. Arguably, a part of the investment planned for modernization of oil refineries could potentially be re-directed in production of biodiesel. On the other side hydrogen produced from renewable energy sources is considered in this study as a long term solution for transportation fuel. Hydrogen has a potential to completely substitute all of the otherwise imported oil and oil based transportation fuels. Present cost of both renewable energy and hydrogen makes such a proposal prohibitively expensive. Nevertheless, Croatia should join the research, development and demonstration efforts in the rest of Europe and develop its own hydrogen strategy and roadmap.

Keywords: Rape-seed, biodiesel, transportation fuel, Croatia, hydrogen, energy return on investment.

______ * To whom correspondence should be addressed: Ante Krstulovic, University of Split, Faculty of Natural and Mathematical Sciences, N. Tesle 12/III, 21000 Split, Croatia. E-mail: [email protected]


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1. Introduction Designing a long term energy policy for any country is an extremely complex task because of the local, regional and global events that cannot be predicted. Over the last four decades we have witnessed several failed predictions about solutions for long term energy supply from oil to nuclear to energy conservation to natural gas to renewable energy sources. Although these predictions related to a global scale they have impact on all countries. It is hard to deny that the fossil fuels on its bell-shape life curve are in their mature stage and a decline in their supply is in sight. Because of this fact further emphasized by environmental concerns on one side and a need for long term sustainable development on the other resulted in several international treaties or protocols strongly impacting international and national energy policy and planning. EU has binding plans on increasing the share of renewable energy accompanied by subsidies for use of renewable energy sources. Kyoto protocol on drastic decrease of greenhouse gases significantly affects energy planning. The effects of carbon dioxide, one of the most significant greenhouse gases, emissions are long lasting and in order to stabilize its content in the atmosphere emissions should be reduced to a level far below present rate. Even if it would be possible to significantly reduce or eliminate CO2 in developed countries, such measures would impede the growth of developing economies. Regardless on the accuracy of predictions of global warming consequences it will be necessary to develop and apply new technologies that would result in lower consumption of energy, or use energy carriers produced from renewable energy sources and/or sequestrate and dispose carbon dioxide from carbon based fuels (the later hardly being sustainable on the long term but it may be a bridge allowing a new energy infrastructure to be developed). Biodiesel, which is a fuel known as long as the internal combustion engines, is considered to be one of those alternative fuels that may be produced from renewable energy sources and use the existing infrastructure for its delivery, distribution and utilization. It is considered to be carbon dioxide neutral as the carbon dioxide it releases in combustion is taken from the atmosphere by the plants used to make biodiesel in the first place. Another fuel that can be produced from renewable energy sources and used in almost any application where fossil fuels are used today is hydrogen. Production of hydrogen from renewable energy sources does not involve CO2 and end-use of hydrogen (which does not have to be combustion – fuel cells offer direct conversion of hydrogen to electricity through electrochemical reactions) results in water vapor emissions only.

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And finally, electricity is such an energy carrier that can be (and is) produced from renewable energy sources and its production and end-use does not generate any CO2 emissions. The only difficulty with electricity is that its large scale storage is heavy and bulky and therefore not very practical for transportation, particularly not for urban public transportation which requires on-board energy storage of some 1–2 MWh. A three year project has recently commenced in Croatia with a goal to evaluate biodiesel and hydrogen as potential fuels for urban public transport in Croatia. In order to come up with recommendation regarding these alternative fuels, their life-cycle must be analyzed from their production to the wheels, taking into account energy efficiency, as well as energy inputs, land requirements and availability, emissions, and economics. This paper provides only preliminary findings of this project and gives directions for future research and multicriterial synthesis of the results. 2. Greenhouse Gases Emissions in Croatia Croatia signed on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Changes (UNFCCC) in 1966. Kyoto protocol, however, was just recently (in 2007) ratified due to a legitimate dispute about the baseline. Between 2008 and 2012 Croatia has to reduce its greenhouse emissions by 5% based on 1990 emissions. Only after the first national report on climate change to UNFCCC (in 2002), Croatia began addressing climate changes issues (Jelavic et al., 2002). Total greenhouse gases emissions in Croatia in reference year 1990 was 31.6 Mt eq. CO2. Between 1990 and 1995, emissions of greenhouse gases dropped by 45% because of reduced industry activities and energy consumption due to the war. From 1995 to 2001 emissions of greenhouse gases grew by an average rate of 3.2% per year so by 2005 Croatia exceeded its Kyoto Protocol quota. The most important greenhouse gas, CO2, makes about 75%, followed by methane and N2O with approximately 12% each and HFCs with less than 1% (Jurić et al., 2003a). As expected the biggest contributor to CO2 emissions is energy sector which includes activities related to consumption of fossil fuels (power generation, heating and transport) and their production, conversion, storage and distribution. Agriculture is the main source of N2O and methane. CO2 emissions resulting from the transportation sector are second largest source of greenhouse gases in Croatia (similar also in EU) contributing about 20% of total emissions in 2000 (Jurić et al., 2003b). A trend of increasing greenhouse emissions from transportation sector typical for transition economies is also noticeable in Croatia. Economic recovery, increase in Industrial activities and significant increase in number of tourists visiting Croatia

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are the main “culprits” for this transportation related increase in greenhouse gases emissions. Croatia as an attractive tourist destination is annually visited by almost 10 million tourists, great majority only during the summer season and mainly along the coast and on the islands. Majority of these tourists use road transportation, and as a result 2.3 million cars and 50,000 buses cross Croatian borders (Djuric, 2005). An increase in CO2 emissions is also caused by reduced public transportation as more people use private cars. 3. Brief History, Legislation and Applications of Biodiesel The very first vehicle with an engine run on vegetable oil was exhibited at the 1900 World Exhibition in Paris. The engine was made by Rudolph Diesel and it used peanut oil. However, with plentiful and cheap diesel fuel from petroleum there was no need for vegetable oil as transportation fuel. It was only after the oil shock of early 1970s that the use of vegetable oils as automotive fuel started to be investigated. One of the main problems, its high viscosity, has been successfully solved. Today a mixture of conventional mineral diesel with methyl esther of vegetable oil (biodiesel) is widely used. Biodiesel can be produced from different vegetables, but mostly from rapeseed and sunflower. The use of biofuels in the World increased from 111,000 t in 1991 to 3,500,000 t in 2004 (Korbitz, 2002). 3.1. EUROPEAN UNION

European Union recognized the importance of renewable energy sources and through numerous documents comes up with the programs to stimulate their use. The key documents showing EU commitment to the use of renewable energy are the White Paper on Energy Policy (1996), on renewable energy (1997), and the Green Paper on strategy for security of energy supply (2000). The regulations or recommendations thereafter typically refer to either the White Paper or the Green Paper, and give the goals and measures for programs implementation (EC, 1996, 2000). The Green Paper recommends the wider use of renewable energy as one of the ways toward more secure energy supply. It lists as one of the goals to have 20% of fuel for road transport replaced by alternative fuels such as biofuels, natural gas and hydrogen. A regulation on the use of biofuels in transport (2003) lists liquid and gaseous transportation fuels produced from biomass as bioethanol, biodiesel, biogas, bimethanol, bio-dimethylether, and bio-hydrogen. The EU countries must have 5.75% (by energy content) of the total transportation fuel (diesel and gasoline) on the market in the form of biofuels. In 2004, EU has come up with standards for biodiesel. Germany have had those standards since 1997 and U.S. since 2002. These standards


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precisely define the properties and composition of biodiesel, such as density, viscosity, Cetane number, shares of methanol, esther, monoglycerides, triglycerides, etc. Almost all EU member countries, including the transition countries, during the last century and some even earlier have started production of biodiesel and bioethanol, and this trend will undoubtedly continue in the future. The main producers are Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Any radical change in fuel supply or engine technology creates problems and resistance. The owners and the users of vehicles are not willing to pay more and freight transport demands economic competitiveness from each newly proposed fuel. Biofuels, because of their properties do not require significant changes in engine design nor in distribution patterns. EU, realizing the potential for introducing biofuels immediately or in the near term proposes two measures: prescribing minimum share of biofuels in the market and allowing each member country to reduce the taxes for biofuels. The EU energy policy goals may be summarized in the following points: •

Satisfy Kyoto Protocol requirements for reduction of CO2 emissions by 8% from the 1990 reference year. This goal should be achieved by 2008–2012, but even more stringent measures are being adopted, in light of more evidence supporting global climate change and its potentially calamitous consequences.

•

Increase the share of renewable energy in total energy consumption to 12% by 2010.

•

Increase energy efficiency by 18% by 2010 from 1995.

•

Maintain security of energy supply.

These goals are very ambitious, but each country has its own strategy taking into account the available renewable energy on national and even on local level. Some countries have introduced measures targeting promotion of growing “energy” crops and production of biofuels as well as tax breaks for use of biofuel. 3.2. CROATIA

Croatia has introduced several laws that include energy efficiency and environmental protection as early as 1991. Currently Croatia, as a EU candidate country, is synchronizing its entire legislation including the energy related laws and regulations with EU.

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The New Environmental Protection Act replaces 13 year old law. It gives the basis for all other acts regarding protection of air, water, sea, soil, health of humans, biodiversity, climate change and other issues. Different EC directives regarding environmental protection (e.g. IPPC), number of principles (like “polluters pay” and “responsibility for damage”) and institutions from international treaties, conventions and protocols are embedded. This law specifically states: 1. The environment represents an asset of interest to the Republic of Croatia and enjoys its special protection. 2. Environmental protection ensures integrated preservation of environmental quality, conservation of biological and landscape diversity, rational use of natural assets and energy in an environmentally sound manner, as basic conditions for healthy and sustainable development. Strategy of Energy Development of the Republic of Croatia from 1998 envisioned 4–8% of bio-diesel in transportation fuel by 2030 (Granic et al., 1998). One of the national programs developed in parallel with the Strategy was BIOEN, which also included domestic production and of course use of biodiesel. A feasibility study of introduction of bio-diesel in Croatia, released in 2001, clearly showed technical and economic justification for production and use of biodiesel in Croatia (FAUZ, 2001). Recently, with the Ordinance on the percentage of biofuels in total fuels and the quantity of biofuels that should be put in domestic market in 2007 the Government prescribed that 0.9% of the total energy consumption in 2007 should be replaced by biofuels which equals 22,000 t of biodiesel (or other biofuels). The goal for biofuels is to reach 5.75% of total transportation fuels by 2010. This has already resulted in private initiative – two bio-diesel factories (Ozalj, Virovitica) plus a bio-ethanol plant have been opened in Croatia. Following a feasibility study by EKONERG (2006) ten bio-diesel buses have been introduced in service in Zagreb in 2007 (Pandzic, 2006; Anon., 2007). Annual need for biodiesel for the buses in Zagreb would be some 13.2 million liters. A portion of it may be covered by collecting waste cooking oil from the restaurants and households, and then processing it in one of the biodiesel factories. It has been estimated that some 0.6–3.0 million liters of oil could be collected (Anon, 2006). 4. Prospects for Biodiesel Production in Croatia Biodiesel has properties very similar to regular mineral diesel fuel. It is produced from vegetable oil (rape seed, sunflower, soybean, palm tree, etc.) by estherification with methanol. In Croatia the most important oil producing


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crops are soybean, sunflower and rapeseed. They occupy approximately 10% of all agricultural sown areas, but they are useful in crop rotation. Soybean is important for animal food production and it makes about 50% of all oil production crops in Croatia, and rapeseed contributes about 15%. Climate and soil conditions are most favorable for rape seed production in Panonian Valley region of Croatia. The capacity of the existing vegetable oil refineries are not fully utilized due to imports of vegetable oil and export of rape seed and sunflower. Nevertheless, these refineries need to be modernized. The bio-diesel plants are typically built with capacity ranging from several thousands to several hundred thousands tons per year. The economics of bio-diesel greatly depends on the plant capacity. Production of biodiesel from rapeseed is energy intensive. In Croatian continental climate the expected yield could be between 900 and 1,300 l of biodiesel per hectare, corresponding to 30–43 GJ/ha. This corresponds to an energy efficiency of 0.07–0.1% referring to the solar energy input. However, additional energy, and most of it in the form of fossil fuels biodiesel is supposed to replace, is required in each manufacturing step, namely in agriculture, seed processing, pressing, oil production and finally in the estherification process (see Figure 1). Roughly, 25–35 GJ/ha of energy is required in this process, resulting in an energy return on investment (EROI)

Energy in agriculture 15-21.6 GJ/ha

Energy in oil production 5.5-7.9 GJ/ha

Methanol 4.7-6.8 GJ/ha Bio-diesel

Agriculture seed processing

Solar Energy

seed

Oil production

oil

Estherification 900-1300 l/ha 30-42 GJ/ha

43000 GJ/ha glycerine straw 41.1-59.4 GJ/ha

cake 7.3-10.6 GJ/ha

7.8-11.2 GJ/ha

Figure 1. Energy diagram of biodiesel production process (based on 1,200 kWh/m2/year solar insolation)

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coefficient of less than 1.2. It is true that the byproducts of this process, straw, cake and glycerine, have an energy value but they are not used as energy and definitely not as replacement for mineral diesel, and therefore their energy content should not be used in evaluation of energy intensity of the biodiesel production process. A more detailed analysis of the energy inputs and outputs is required. If Croatia becomes a part of EU by 2010 its citizens will have to use some 50,000 tons of biodiesel. That means that more than 50,000 ha should be used to grow rape seed. That is five to seven times more than it is used today to grow the rape seed or one third of all non-cultivated land. Demand for oil based fuels in Croatia is on the rise. In 2006. consumption was 4.5 million tons and it is expected to increase up to 6 million tons by 2010. The consumption in the transportation sector will continue to increase while the consumption for heating will decrease. On the other side, domestic production of petroleum is expected to fall from 1.37 million tons in 2000 to 0.6 million tons in 2010 to 0.4 million tons in 2030 (Vuk et al., 2006). Diesel fuel consumption, primarily in transportation is about 1 million tons. The refineries have capacity of some 6 million tons of raw petroleum, thus satisfying the domestic market and even exporting (some 20%). The oil refineries need modernization in order to satisfy stringent EU regulations for products quality and environmental protection. Investments in modernization of oil refineries may be better used utilized for generation of biodiesel from rapeseed, and would be beneficial for both trade balance and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Because of its properties, namely biodegradability and lower emissions of combustion products, biodiesel may be particularly useful as fuel for agricultural vehicles, urban public transportation, logging vehicles, construction vehicles in water reservoir areas, tourist vehicles, etc. Economic analyses of different models of biodiesel production and use in Croatia show the following (Fijan-Parlov et al., 2003): Rapeseed production requires subsidies in the amount of 210 €/ha for 2,000 ha and yield of at least 3 t/ha. Production cost of biodiesel greatly depends on the plant capacity, but other factors that must be taken into account include the subsidies for rapeseed agriculture, income from selling the byproducts (straw, cake and glycerol), and taxes. For a plant capacities of 5,000 and 10,000 t/year the resulting cost of biodiesel is 0.4 €/l and 0.5 €/l respectively. This does not include taxes. If the value added tax is included the selling price of biodiesel would be between 0.53 €/l and 0.66 €/l. For comparison, the price of mineral diesel at the time this study was completed (2003) was 0.63 €/l, and the study concluded that production of biodiesel in Croatia could be a profitable activity.


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Environmental impact is one of the main criteria for evaluation of any project related to energy. Transportation sector besides the electricity generation sector is most responsible for the emissions and the state of the environment. Internal combustion engines, which dominate the road transport, emit many polluting gases, chemicals, and particles. Therefore any reductions in emissions from transportation sector are always desirable. The results of biodiesel evaluation, both in laboratory and in practice are encouraging. Biodiesel combustion results in lower emissions as compared to mineral diesel. It has no negative effects on the engine and its performance. In addition, biodiesel is less flammable, and less harmful for the health and it is biodegradable. Transport of biodiesel is less dangerous – it can be transported as vegetable oil. Modern diesel engine is amongst the most efficient heat engines converting heat in mechanical energy. Better efficiency means less fuel consumption and lower emissions for the same power output. Application of biodiesel in such efficient engines would result in further benefits for the environment. Biodiesel is CO2 neutral – the CO2 emissions resulting from its combustion are the same as CO2 taken from the atmosphere in photosynthesis during the growth of the rapeseed. Biodiesel emits only 0.916 kg CO2-eq. as compared with 4.01 kg CO2-eq. from mineral oil (Fijan-Parlov et al., 2003). If biodiesel is produced from waste cooking oil its greenhouse gases emissions are even lower (the emissions related to the agricultural processes should not be accounted for). 5. Hydrogen as Transportation Fuel and Prospects for Its Production and Use in Croatia Hydrogen is considered as one of the main candidates as fuel or energy carrier in not so distant future. Hydrogen, just like electricity, is not an energy source but rather a form of energy that can be generated from virtually all available energy sources and be delivered to the users in acceptable way. Hydrogen and electricity complements each other very well and together may satisfy all the energy needs. Both hydrogen and electricity can be produced from renewable energy sources. In the long term, a conjunction of renewable energy sources and hydrogen and electricity as energy carriers would result in a sustainable energy system enabling sustainable development. Croatia has a potential to become one of the leading countries in Europe for demonstration and implementation of these energy technologies. Developed countries support development and demonstration of hydrogen energy technologies including fuel cells, a technology for conversion of hydrogen to electricity with a high efficiency and without any emissions.

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Reducing greenhouse gas emissions, improving security of energy supply and strengthening the European economy are the main drivers for establishing a hydrogen-oriented energy economy. The European Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Platform (HFP) has been established to facilitate and accelerate the development and deployment of cost-competitive, world class European hydrogen and fuel cell based energy systems and component technologies for applications in transport, stationary and portable power. EU has spent 275 million Euros in Framework 6 for hydrogen and fuel cells related projects and it is estimated that at least that much has been spent on national and regional level, particularly in Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy. The budget significantly increased in Framework 7 where hydrogen and fuel cells related research, development and demonstration activities will be conducted through a public-private partnership called Joint Technology Initiative Hydrogen is a very good transportation fuel. Its use in internal combustion engines results in efficiency improvements by as much as 20%, however the same engine running on hydrogen will have ~15% less power than when operated with gasoline (Barbir et al., 2001). Fuel cells are even more efficient than internal combustion engines. This is particularly significant at partial power where the road vehicles operate most of the time. It has been estimated that a fuel cell vehicle is about twice as efficient as an equivalent vehicle using an internal combustion engine (Barbir, 2002). Fuel cell buses have been successfully demonstrated in service in major European cities (Stolzenburg, 2007). Hydrogen may be produced from various sources (Barbir et al., 2001). Production of hydrogen from hydrocarbons neither helps in improving the energy efficiency nor in reducing greenhouse gases emissions. It may be considered only in a transition period to help establish the hydrogen infrastructure. Hydrogen may be produced from water using renewable energy sources through various processes such as electrolysis, photolysis, photochemical, photoelectrochemical or photobiological processes, out of which only electrolysis is commercially viable (Barbir, 2005). Hydrogen production from solar energy can be accomplished with today’s technologies in two steps – production of electricity by photovoltaic panels and use of this electricity for production of hydrogen by electrolysis of water. As shown in Figure 2 some 1,700 GJ of hydrogen could be produced annually from 1 hectare, assuming 1,400 kWh/m2 annual solar insolation (available in Southern Croatia), 50% land coverage, 10% average efficiency of PV panels, 75% efficient electrolyzers and 6 kWh of electrical energy for compression of 1 kg of hydrogen. Production of hydrogen from solar energy has much better efficiency than production of biodiesel from

BIO-DIESEL AND/OR HYDROGEN IN CROATIA energy to make equipment

Solar Energy

Photovoltaic Array

electricity 2500 GJ/ha

water

Electrolyzer

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energy to make equipment

hydrogen compresso r

1700 GJ/ha

50000 GJ/ha

Figure 2. Energy diagram of hydrogen production from solar energy (energy flows are per year)

biomass (considering solar energy as the input for both processes). This means that it would require much smaller land area to produce hydrogen as transportation fuel. So far there have been no activities regarding hydrogen production or use as transportation fuel in Croatia. Recently, Firak (2007) proposed hydrogen refueling infrastructure in Croatia to meet anticipated demand by European tourists visiting Croatia by 2020. This concept envisions that some 1 million kilograms of hydrogen could be produced annually by electrolyzers distributed at 43 refueling stations along the major highways using off-peak electricity (at night). At the same time, 54.2 GWh of electricity would be produced by 19 PV fields distributed strategically in the regions with sufficient solar insolation and located near the major electro-distribution lines. The PV panels would cover only about 1.35 km2 (Firak, 2007). 6. Conclusions Out of all alternative fuels biodiesel has the best chances of being quickly accepted and implemented. Biodiesel has no negative effects on performance of modern diesel engines and it is CO2 neutral. Its only draw-back is that it is more expensive than the mineral diesel fuel, although with ever increasing prices of raw oil this may become a non-issue soon. Croatia has relatively good conditions for biodiesel production from rapeseed. When Croatia joins EU it will have to use biodiesel anyway. In addition, Croatia is a popular tourist destination, and the motorized tourist visiting Croatia will demand biodiesel.

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Croatia has plans to invest in modernization of oil refineries – a part of this investment could potentially be re-directed in production of biodiesel. Impacts on foreign trade imbalance and on the environment should be a sufficient reason for replacing a part of the mineral oil imports with domestically produced biodiesel. For Croatia, where significant area of arable land is not used there should be no dilemma whether to produce food or fuel – there are needs and possibilities to produce both. On the other side, hydrogen produced from renewable energy sources is an ideal fuel for transportation, but in a longer term. It has a potential to completely substitute all of the otherwise imported oil and oil based transportation fuels. However, this would require not only new type of engines and vehicles but also a completely new fuel supply infrastructure. Present cost of both renewable energy and hydrogen makes such a proposal prohibitively expensive. Nevertheless, Croatia should join the research, development and demonstration efforts in the rest of Europe and develop its own hydrogen strategy and roadmap. Decision on whether and which fuel should be produced from renewable sources cannot be based solely on efficiency or economics of the processes. Other criteria should also be considered such as environmental effects, land use, quality and availability of land, social impacts, national security, availability and economics of conventional fuels etc. Various multicriterial analysis are needed, such as “well-to-wheels,” “life-cycle,” “emergy” analysis, etc., in order to evaluate sustainability of the options being considered as well as other alternatives. This will be conducted in the subsequent phases of this research project.

References Anonymous, 2006, Croatia: Bio-diesel Production Starts, Croatian World Network, 15.05.2006. http://www.croatia.org/crown/articles/6039/1/E-Bio-diesel-Production-Startsin-Croatia.html Anonymous, 2007, Zagreb: u promet pusteno prvih 10 autobusa na biodizel, Suvremena.hr, 01.06.2007. (in Croatian) http://www.suvremena.hr/3775.aspx Barbir, F., 2002, Vehicles with Hydrogen-Air Fuel Cells, in Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS) (online), UNESCO/EOLSS, Oxford, UK. (http://www.eolss.net) Barbir, F., 2005, PEM Electrolysis for Production of Hydrogen from Renewable Energy Sources, Solar Energy, Vol. 78, No. 5, pp. 661–669. Barbir, F., Sherif, S.A., and Veziroglu, T.N., 2001, Fundamentals of Hydrogen Energy Utilization, in Advances in Solar Energy, Y. Goswami and K. Boehr (eds.), Vol. 14, pp. 67–100, American Solar Energy Society.


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Djuric, M., 2005, HAK Journal, No. 124, Sept. 2005. (in Croatian) EC – European Commission, 1996, White Paper: An Energy Policy for the European Union, COM 682, Final, January 1996. EC – European Commission, 2000, Green Paper: Towards a European Strategy for Security of Energy Supply, COM 769 Final. FAUZ – Faculty of Agriculture, University of Zagreb, 2001, PROJECT BIODIESEL – Introducing the Biodiesel Fuel Production in Republic of Croatia, A Feasibility Study, Zagreb. (in Croatian) Fijan-Parlov, S., et al., 2003, Korištenje biodizela iz otpadnih jestivih ulja u vozilima javnog gradskog prijevoza Grada Zagreba kao jedne od mjera za poboljšanje kakvoće okoliša, EKONERG Institut za energetiku i zaštitu okoliša, Zagreb. (in Croatian) Firak, M., 2007, Conceptual Basis of Introducing Hydrogen as the Motor Fuel in Croatia, 4th Dubrovnik Conference on Sustainable Development of Energy Water and Environment Systems, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 4–8 June, 2007. Granic, G., et al., 1998, Strategy of Energy Development of the Republic of Croatia, Energy Institute Hrvoje Pozar, Zagreb, (in Croatian) Jelavić, V., et al., 2002, Prvo nacionalno izvješće Republike Hrvatske prema Okvirnoj konvenciji Ujedinjenih naroda o promjeni klime (UNFCCC), Ministarstvo zaštite okoliša i prostornog uređenj, Zagreb. (in Croatian) Jurić, Ž., et al., 2003a, Emisija/uklanjanje stakleničkih plinova na području Republike Hrvatske za razdoblje od 1996. do 2001. godine, EKONERG Institut, Zagreb, 2003. (in Croatian) Jurić, Ž., et al., 2003b, Republic of Croatia Projections of GHG Emissions, EKONERG Institute, Zagreb. Korbitz, W., 2002, New Trends in Developing Biodiesel Worldwide, Proc. Power Crops for the Americas, Miami, May 2002. Pandzic, I., 2006, Zagreb biodizelom stedi 4 milijuna kuna godisnje, Poslovni Dnevnik, 27.09.2006. (in Croatian) http://www.poslovni.hr/22978.aspx Stolzenburg, K., 2007, Lessons Learned from the CUTE Bus and Infrastructure Project, 4th Dubrovnik Conference on Sustainable Development of Energy Water and Environment Systems, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 4–8. June, 2007. Vuk, B., et al., 2006, Energy in Croatia 2004., Annual Energy Report, Ministry of Economy, Labour and Enterpreneurship, Republic of Croatia, Zagreb.

HYDROGEN AND FUEL CELL RESEARCH FOR FUTURE MARKETS

HANNS-JOACHIM NEEF* Project Management Jülich (PtJ), Research Centre Jülich D 52425 Jülich, Germany

Abstract: The hydrogen economy is regarded as a vector to increase energy and environmental security. Hydrogen and fuel cell technologies could be an element of a coherent energy strategy. Industrial competitiveness could be achieved by investing in these technologies. A possible shift to hydrogen as an energy carrier in addition to the presently used electricity, heat, natural gas, gasoline or diesel needs strong efforts by the private and public sectors in research, development, demonstration and market introduction measures to achieve at a competitive market share. The paper describes future market expectations and national, European and international programmes and initiatives to fulfill such expectations. Keywords: Hydrogen economy, hydrogen and fuel cell R&D and markets.

1. Why Hydrogen and Fuel Cells are Important Hydrogen, like other secondary energy carriers electricity, heat, gasoline or diesel, has to be produced from primary energy carriers with different technologies. Hydrogen is being produced in small distributed units using steam reforming of fossil fuels and to a much smaller degree by electrolysis. In future, larger quantities of low carbon hydrogen can be produced from fossil resources in central plants with carbon capture and storage (CCS), from nuclear and from renewables. Hydrogen can be generated by photobiological and photo-electrolysis processes or thermo-chemical water splitting. ______ * Hanns-Joachim Neef, Former Head of Energy Technology Division, Project Management Jülich (PtJ), Research Centre Jülich D 52425 Jülich, Germany. E-mail: [email protected]


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Hydrogen can be transported and stored. Hydrogen can be used in fuel cells (some fuel cells can use hydrogen-containing fuel directly), in internal combustion engines, and in gas turbines. And, most important, hydrogen can replace oil derived fuels and natural gas and thus contribute to energy security and independence from imports. The transition steps to a hydrogen economy will follow the growing demand for hydrogen: •

Decentralised production of hydrogen from fossil fuels and electrolysis

•

Demonstration of hydrogen technology with the aim of market preparation and market introduction

•

Hydrogen from fossil fuels with CCS

•

Hydrogen from renewables (and nuclear?).

Hydrogen and renewables seem to be the ideal twins when discussing the hydrogen economy. Hydrogen from CO2-free processes like electrolysis with electricity from renewables or with photo-biological and photo-electrolysis processes could be the source for fuel cell cars in the future. However, preference is given today to the utilisation of electricity from renewables as such. The large-scale conversion of renewable electricity to hydrogen by electrolysis and the subsequent use of hydrogen are not competitive yet. In addition, the economic potential of advanced photo-biological and photoelectrolytic processes cannot be judged today. Here more basic research is necessary. Therefore, if the hydrogen economy will become a reality, hydrogen will first be produced from fossil fuels by known and improved technologies – and to a lesser extend by electrolysis. When the hydrogen technologies have demonstrated their market maturity and when the industry is prepared to invest in large factories for products using hydrogen as fuel, the development of technologies to produce hydrogen from fossil fuels with CCS will be ready and larger amounts of hydrogen with low carbon emissions can be produced. And finally, the expectation is that CCS will be a transition technology (for electricity as well as for hydrogen) and that renewables will take over the hydrogen production. The schedule is uncertain. Realisation depends on technical development and policy incentives. For example, CCS is not expected to become commercial before 2020, and will only be used when there is a sufficiently high value for avoided CO2. Whether the nuclear option to produce hydrogen will be employed depends on political restrictions. And these can vary with time and legislation periods. Fuel cells are electrochemical energy conversion devices. They produce electricity and heat from the reaction of a fuel (hydrogen or hydrogen

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containing fuel) with an oxidant. In the residential application fuel cells replace oil/gas central heating systems and reduce the amount of electricity taken from the grid. Larger systems with stationary fuel cells replace combined heat and power plants with fossil fuels. In the transport sector fuel cell systems replace internal combustion engines running on gasoline and diesel. Three goals call for international cooperation to accelerate the transition to a hydrogen economy: local and global environmental protection, diversification of energy supply and enhanced energy security – especially in the transport sector replacing imported oil by domestically produced hydrogen. New products are developed by industry on the basis of innovative ideas from the science sector and supported with public money according to national, European and international subvention rules. New jobs are being created, old business is transformed into new opportunities and industrial competitiveness is increased on a regional or national basis. When it comes to products for the international market, competition might outweigh cooperation. Safety aspects, codes, standards and regulations as well as international agreement on policies for market introduction are still a wide field for successful activities in international affairs. Policy always plays (or should always play) an important role in the cycle from basic research, via applied research and development (R&D) and demonstration to the market. This cycle is rather independent from a specific technology. Basic research will feed into applied R&D and the interaction between demonstration projects and R&D will create the next generation of technology ready for further demonstration or the market. Demonstration projects will serve a second purpose, to prepare the market by showing the consumer the advantages of a new technology. There are several main technology challenges for the hydrogen economy: •

Fuel cell cost and durability

•

Hydrogen storage and driving range

•

Hydrogen cost for different production pathways, includes delivery.

Large cost reductions are needed if hydrogen fuel cells are to fulfil their potential. Mass production alone will not be enough to reduce cost to a competitive level. Breakthrough R&D and even basic R&D results are necessary for new design concepts and new materials used for fuel cells and hydrogen storage. However, technology progress is not enough. Economic and institutional challenges exist as well: •

Hydrogen infrastructure

•

Safety, codes and standards

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Market transformation

•

Education (safety and code officials, local communities, state and local governments, students, general public).

The arrangement for the hydrogen infrastructure is of great importance for the transport sector. The cost of hydrogen production depends very much on using centralised or distributed generation systems. However, cost for hydrogen distribution and refuelling stations has to be added to the generation costs. 2. Hydrogen and Fuel Cell R&D, Demonstration and Future Markets The European Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Platform (https: //www. hfpeurope.org/) was created in 2003. Since then the strategy for implementing the hydrogen economy has been refined and in the beginning of this year (2007) the so-called “Implementation Plan” was agreed upon by a large number of experts from industry, science and policy. Four areas of innovation and development were looked at in much detail: •

Hydrogen vehicles and refuelling stations

•

Hydrogen production and supply

•

Fuel cells for combined heat and power generation

•

Fuel cells for early markets.

For the period until 2015 a total amount of €7.4 billion was calculated for R&D and demonstration activities in the four areas. The total sum includes private and public funds. Public funds include money from the 7th Framework Programme, from the member countries of the European Union and its regions. Taking into account the budgets already spent in Europe for hydrogen and fuel cell activities in the past, the increase of the budget seems to be achievable. However, coordination of activities in Europe is required. As the European Implementation Plan shows, R&D activities are included in all areas and at all times to achieve the market goals in 2020, the so-called “snapshot 2020.” •

0.1 million fuel cell units for early applications sold per year

•

250 million micro-fuel cells sold per year

•

0.1–0.2 million fuel cell systems for combined heat and power plants sold per year

•

0.4–1.8 million European hydrogen vehicles per year.


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In addition, continuous activity in basic research is necessary to improve the technology and to achieve breakthroughs for markets beyond 2020. The main goals of the German “National Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Innovation Programme,”1 adopted in 2006, are: •

To bridge the gap between R&D and market development

•

To prepare hydrogen and fuel cell applications for commercialisation

•

To maintain and expand Germany’s good starting position.

Implementation of the programme is foreseen through private-publicpartnership based on an average public funding of 50%. The focus is on demonstration and lighthouse projects, accompanied by basic research and applied R&D projects with a close link to European and international activities. The present National Development Plan (April 2007) describes in some detail the programme of work until 2015, based on additional public funding totalling €500 million for R&D as well as the demonstration and commercialisation of hydrogen and fuel-cell technology. The total budget is calculated to be more than €2 billion and represents bottom-up calculated (target) figures not real budgets. The budget includes public (EC, federal ministries, state ministries) and private funds. The US2 annual budget for hydrogen and fuel cell activities has increased over the last years, the request for 2008 is at US$309 million (or €236 million at current exchange rate). Most of the budget is administered through the US Department of Energy in different budget lines, including fossil energy, nuclear energy and basic science. The request for basic science is especially high for 2008, 59.5 compared to US$36.5 million in 2007. Reducing cost and increasing durability of fuel cells are two of the biggest challenges, not only in the US programme, but also in the programmes of other countries. The US programme, like the activities of other countries, has made technical advances that led to cost reduction and increased durability. Demonstration projects are aimed at technology validation to obtain valuable data on fuel cell vehicles and hydrogen stations. In Japan,2 basic research is of high importance in the programme. In 2005, a national laboratory basic fuel cell R&D, the “Polymer Electrolyte Fuel Cell Cutting-Edge Research Center” (FC or FC-cubic) was established. ______ 1

Homepage of National Coordination Office for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells (NKJ): http: //www. nkj-ptj.de/contains German “National Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Innovation Programme, Berlin 8 May 2006”, and “National Development Plan 2.1, 30 April 2007”.

2

Homepage of the International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy: http: //www. iphe.net contains information on national hydrogen/fuel cell programmes

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In 2006 the “National Laboratory for Hydrogen Material R&D” (HYDROGENIUS) followed and a further national laboratory for hydrogen storage is under development. In the large-scale stationary fuel cell demonstration project 1 kW fuel cell systems for residential use have been installed in many places with different climatic and environmental conditions throughout Japan. At the end of FY2006, Japan had already installed 1,200 stationary 1 kW fuel cell systems and had monitored their performance, environmental adaptation as well as reliability. In FY2007 Japan is going to install about 900 small fuel cell systems. By increasing the number of installations, various types of data are gathered about their performance to identify operational problems that have arisen, including component-level technical issues, in order to improve the reliability of residential stationary fuel cell systems. This is a really ambitious programme with a world wide leading number of more than 2,000 installations. The Japanese programme aims at early commercialisation of fuel cell vehicles as well. 50,000 fuel cell vehicles are foreseen for 2015 and 5 million for 2020. Compared to the other countries’ targets this seems to be rather ambitious. Both China and Korea have strong programmes2 in hydrogen and fuel cell R&D, demonstration and market preparation. As an example of the relation to industrial activities, it should be noted that China and Korea are already today number 4 and 5 in the automotive industry. However, who can anticipate the structure of the world wide automotive industry in 2020, and predict the time for mass-market roll-out of hydrogen cars? Korea’s aim for 2040 is the replacement of 54% of automobile fuel by hydrogen energy; the Chinese programme has strong R&D components and consists of ongoing fuel cell city bus and passenger car projects. The Olympics 2008 in Beijing will provide an opportunity to showcase these technologies. Other non-OECD countries like Russia, Brazil and India show increased activities in their hydrogen and fuel cell programmes. The “International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy” (IPHE) (http://www.iphe.net) brings together 16 partner countries and the European Commission to serve as a mechanism to organize and implement effective, efficient, and focused international research, development, demonstration and commercial utilization activities related to hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. It also provides a forum for advancing policies, and common codes and standards that can accelerate the cost-effective transition to a global hydrogen economy to enhance energy security and environmental protection. Through participation in IPHE a deeper and more detailed insight in the programmes of the partners is achieved. All IPHE countries have substantial, long-term resource commitments to hydrogen and fuel cell


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technology research and development activities and a well-defined vision and national strategy to advance technology deployment and infrastructure development. The private sector development of the hydrogen economy is a strong element of the IPHE strategy. 3. Global Market: Fuel Cell Vehicles In 2006, the Governing Board of the International Energy Agency accepted an analysis as follows: “Based on the most optimistic assumptions about technical progress and government policies to promote low carbon vehicles, market uptake of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles could start after 2020 and can achieve 30% penetration of the global stock by 2050. Using less optimistic assumptions, fuel cell vehicles may never reach critical mass for market uptake. Other technologies with lower infrastructure costs may play a larger role.” For 2020, the projected total stock of light duty vehicles is estimated to be slightly more than 1 billion vehicles. With the 2020 targets from the EU and Japan and the estimate that the US and other countries will catch up, about 1–2% of the market (or 10–20 million cars) will be hydrogen vehicles. The future for fuel cell vehicles is difficult to predict. However, vehicle manufacturers will only produce cars that people want to buy. 4. Conclusion: The Role of Policy Policy support for basic research, R&D and demonstration is a pre-requisite for a successful transition to the hydrogen economy: •

Basic research and applied R&D

•

Demonstration for technology validation

•

Link between R&D and demonstration

•

Synergy with related programmes (material technologies; renewables; carbon capture and storage; …).

In addition to support of technology development, a joined-up policy framework has to be developed and as far as possible integrated into an international context: •

Support of market transformation

•

Technology neutral integrated approach

•

Co-ordinated with innovation and knowledge transfer

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Creating new supply chains

•

Accelerating business investment.

The policy framework has to support market transformation. The cost of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles will be significantly higher compared to conventional vehicles for a long period of time. Without initial, and most likely longer-term support programmes it will be difficult for hydrogen fuel cell vehicles to enter the market. A policy framework with logically interacting elements (a joint-up policy framework) need to be developed, based on experiences with the market introduction of other new technologies like renewables or new energy efficiency technologies. As an example, the market introduction of wind energy in Germany was achieved by a “renewable energy law” which costs all electricity consumers more than €3 billion per year. International collaboration could accelerate the transition to a hydrogen economy, both in the technology area, but also on a policy framework to bring the hydrogen and fuel cells into the market place all over the world. Bilateral collaboration and multilateral collaboration such as under the framework of the International Energy Agency (IEA) (www.iea.org) or the International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy (IPHE) (http://www. iphe.net) are important and could even be better used in the future. However, two conflicting items have to be observed: collaboration and competition. Collaboration is fruitful and can save resources and bring about common results which then can be used to achieve a competitive position on the world market. Finally, we need a balanced portfolio of technologies reaching from energy efficient light bulbs to fusion technology and a mix of energy sources. Hydrogen technologies and fuel cells as efficient energy converters are important elements in the technology portfolio and will broaden the mix of energy options especially in the transport sector.

HYDROGEN PRODUCTION FROM BIOMASS

MU’TAZ AL-ALAWI* Mu’tah University, Jordan

Abstract: Hydrogen is considered as a novel fuel for the twenty first century, mainly due to its environmentally benign character. Production of hydrogen from renewable biomass has several advantages compared to that of fossil fuels. A number of processes are being practiced for efficient and economic conversion and utilization of biomass to hydrogen. This article updates the developments of various hydrogen-production processes from biomass. Several developmental works are discussed, with a brief outline of different technologies employed therein. A comparative study of existing processes is given on the basis of their relative merits and demerits. Keywords: Hydrogen energy, production, biomass.

1. Introduction It is widely acknowledged that hydrogen is an attractive energy source to replace conventional fossil fuels, both from the environmental and economic standpoint. It is often cited as a potential source of unlimited clean power. When hydrogen is used as a fuel it generates no pollutants, but produces water which can be recycled to make more hydrogen (Figure 1). The future widespread use of hydrogen is likely to be in the transportation sector, where it will help reduce pollution. Vehicles can be powered with hydrogen fuel cells, which are three times more efficient than a gasolinepowered engine. As of today, all these areas of hydrogen utilization are equivalent to 3% of the energy consumption, but it is expected to grow significantly in the years to come.

______ * To whom correspondence should be addressed. Mu’taz Al-Alawi, Mu’tah University, P.O. Box 3, Karak 61710, Jordan; Tel: +962-795340079, Fax: +962-3-2375540, E-mail: [email protected]


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electricity generation water vapor

H2 water

transportation

residential commercial industry primary energy sources

energy carrier

water

energy consuming sectors

Figure 1. Hydrogen energy system (International Association of Hydrogen Energy)

Biomass, as a product of photosynthesis, is one of the most versatile nonpetroleum renewable resource that man be utilized for sustainable production of hydrogen. Therefore, a cost-effective energy-production process could be achieved in which agricultural wastes and various other biomasses are recycled to produce hydrogen economically. The objective of this article is to present an overview of different production technologies of hydrogen from biomass. Attempts have also been made to give a brief comparative analysis of different processes on the basis of their relative advantages and disadvantages. 2. Biomass as Renewable Resource As an energy source, biomass has several important advantages. Renewability is obviously a key feature. It also has unique versatility. The list of plant species, byproducts and waste materials that can potentially be used as feedstock is almost endless (Table 1). Major resources in biomass include agricultural crops and their waste byproducts, lingo-cellulosic products such as wood and wood waste, waste from food processing and aquatic plants and algae, and effluents produced in the human habitat. Moderately-dried wastes such as wood residue, wood scrap and urban garbage can be burned directly as fuel. Energy from water-containing biomass such as sewage sludge, agricultural and livestock effluents as well as animal excreta is recovered mainly by microbial fermentation. Moisture, ash content and gross calorific values of different solid biomass feedstock are given in Table 2.


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TABLE 1. Some biomass feedstock used for hydrogen-production Biomass feedstock

Major conversion technology

Almond shell Pine sawdust Crumb rubber Rice straw/Danish wheat straw Microalgae Tea waste Peanut shell Maple sawdust slurry Starch biomass slurry Composted municipal refuse Kraft lignin MSW Paper and pulp waste

Steam gasification Steam reforming Supercritical conversion Pyrolysis Gasification Pyrolysis Pyrolysis Supercritical conversion Supercritical conversion Supercritical conversion Steam gasification Supercritical conversion Microbial conversion

TABLE 2. Moisture and ash content and gross calorific value of different biomass feedstock (Arbon, 2002) Biomass

Moisture (%)

Ash (%)

CV (MJ/kg)

Bagasse Bagasse pith Spent bagasse Sawdust Rice husk Rice straw Deoiled rice bran Coffee husk Peanut shell Coconut shell Coir pith Cotton stalk Soya straw

50 40 40 35 10–15 6 16 11–14 10 10 8 7 7–8

1–2 2 10 2 15–20 16 16 2–5 2–3 1 15 3 5–6

9.2 7.5–8.4 12.5 11.3 12.6–13.8 14.4 11.3 15–17.5 16.75 18.8 16.75 18.4 15.5–15.9

3. Production Processes of Hydrogen from Biomass Different process routes of hydrogen-production from biomass can be broadly classified as follows: 1. Thermochemical gasification coupled with water gas shift 2. Fast pyrolysis followed by reforming of carbohydrate fractions of bio-oil

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3. Direct solar gasification 4. Supercritical conversion of biomass 5. Microbial conversion of biomass. 3.1. THERMOCHEMICAL GASIFICATION COUPLED WITH WATER GAS SHIFT

Gasification coupled with water gas shift is the most widely practiced process route for biomass to hydrogen. Feedstock include agricultural and forest product residues of hard wood, soft wood and herbaceous species. Thermal gasification is essentially high-rate pyrolysis carried out in the temperature range of 600–1,000°C in fluidized bed gasifiers. The reaction is as follows: Biomass + O2 → CO + H2 + CO2 + Energy. Other relevant gasifier types are bubbling fluid beds and the highpressure high-temperature slurry-fed entrained flow gasifier. However, all these gasifiers need to include significant gas conditioning along with the removal of tars and inorganic impurities and the subsequent conversion of CO to H2 by water gas shift reaction. CO + H2O → CO2 + H2. A number of references are available on hydrogen production by gasification of municipal solid waste (Wang et al., 1998; Wallman et al., 1998). Most of these focus on pretreatment of municipal solid waste to prepare slurry of suitable viscosity and heating value for efficient hydrogenproduction. Hydrothermal treatment at 300°C and mild, dry pyrolysis with subsequent slurrying are also highlighted. 3.2. FAST PYROLYSIS FOLLOWED BY REFORMING OF CARBOHYDRATE FRACTION OF BIO-OIL

Pyrolysis produces a liquid product called bio-oil, which is the basis of several processes for the development of fuel chemicals and materials. The reaction is endothermic: Biomass + Energy → Bio-oil + Char + Gas.


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Catalytic steam reforming of bio-oil at 750–850°C over a nickel-based catalyst is a two-step process that includes the shift reaction: Bio-oil + H2O → CO + H2. CO + H2O → CO2 + H2. The overall stoichiometry gives a maximum yield of 0.172 g H2/g bio-oil (11.2% based on wood). CH1.9 O0.7 + 1.26 H2O → CO2 + 2.21 H2. The first step in pyrolysis is to use heat to dissociate complex molecules into simple units. Next, reactive vapours which are generated during the first step convert to hydrogen. The Waterloo fast-pyrolysis process technology carried out at 700°C is used for the steam gasification of pine sawdust using Ni–Al catalyst at a molar ratio 1:2. Methanol and ethanol can also be produced from biomass by a variety of technologies and used on board reforming for transportation. Caglar and Demirbas (2001) have used pyrolysis of tea waste to produce hydrogen. 3.3. DIRECT SOLAR GASIFICATION

Antal et al. (1974) examined the feasibility of using solar process heat for the gasification of organic solid wastes and the production of hydrogen. Walcher et al. (1996) have mentioned a plan to utilize agricultural wastes in a heliothermic gasifier. 3.4. SUPERCRITICAL CONVERSION OF BIOMASS

Many researchers have investigated the aqueous conversion of whole biomass to hydrogen under low temperature but supercritical conditions. The earliest report of supercritical gasification of wood is by Modell (1985). He studied the effect of temperature and concentration on the gasification of glucose and maple sawdust in water, in the vicinity of its critical state (374°C, 22 MPa). No solid residue or char is produced. Hydrogen gas concentration up to 18% (v/v) is reported. The first report of extensive work on supercritical conversion of biomassrelated organics was given by Manarungson et al. (1990), where glucose at 550°C and 340 bar (5,000 psig) has been converted largely into hydrogen and carbon dioxide.

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3.5. MICROBIAL CONVERSION OF BIOMASS

Highly concentrated organic waste water is one of the most abundantly available biomass which can be exploited for microbial conversion into hydrogen. A new and unique process has been developed when substrates such as carbohydrates are fermented by a consortium of bacteria; they produce hydrogen and carbon dioxide. Municipal solid wastes and digested sewage sludge have the potential to produce large amount of hydrogen by suppressing the production of methane by introducing low voltage electricity into the sewage sludge. Fascetti and Todini (1995) have reported on the photosynthetic hydrogen evolution from municipal solid wastes. Batchwise and continuous experiments show that the acidic aqueous stream obtained from such refuse is a good substrate for the growth of R. sphaeroides RV. The substrate from the acidogenesis of fruit and vegetable market wastes gives higher hydrogen evolution rates (about threefold) compared to synthetic medium. Mixed culture of photosynthetic anaerobic bacteria provides a method of utilization of a variety of resources for hydrogen-production (Miyake et al., 1990). Hydrogen production from whey by phototropic bacteria like R. rubrum and R. capsulatus has been discussed by Venkataraman and Vatsala (1990). Cow dung slurry (Vrati and Verma, 1983), and bean-product waste water (Liu et al., 1995) are among other liquid biomass which are extensively used for hydrogen production. 4. Comparative Analysis A comparison of different process routes for hydrogen production on the basis of their relative merits and demerits is given in Table 3. In all types of gasification, biomass is thermochemically converted to a low or mediumenergy content gas. Air-blown biomass gasification results in approximately 5 MJ/m3 and oxygen-blown 15 MJ/m3 of gas. However, all these processes require high reaction temperature. Char (fixed carbon) and ash are the pyrolysis by-products that are not vapourized. Some of the unburned char may be combusted to release the heat needed for the endothermic pyrolysis reactions. For solar gasification, different collector plates (reflectors) like parabolic mirror reflector or heliostat are required. In supercritical conversion, no solid residue or char is produced in most of the cases. A wide variety of biomass is nowadays being used to produce hydrogen using supercritical water. In microbial conversion of biomass, different waste materials can be employed as substrates. These wastes are also treated simultaneously with production of hydrogen.


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TABLE 3. Merits and demerits of different processes of biomass conversion to hydrogen Process Thermochemical gasification

Merits Maximum conversion can be achieved

Fast pyrolysis

Produces bio-oil which is the basis of several processes for development of fuels, chemicals and materials Good hydrogen yield

Solar gasification Supercritical conversion Microbial conversion

Can process sewage sludge, which is difficult to gasify Waste water can also be treated simultaneously. Also generates some useful secondary metabolites

Drawbacks Significant gas conditioning is required Removal of tars is important Chances of catalyst deactivation

Requires effective collector plates Selection of supercritical medium Selection of suitable microorganisms

5. Purification of Hydrogen Hydrogen produced from biomass in all these processes mostly contains different gaseous impurities like O2, CO, CO2, CH4 and some amount of moisture. Sometimes, presence of these gases lowers the heating value of hydrogen, in addition to posing some problems in efficient burning of fuels. CO2 acts as a fire extinguisher and it is sparingly soluble in water. Scrubbers can be used to separate CO2. Fifty per cent (w/v) KOH solution is a good CO2 absorbent. Monoethnoamine can also be used as a CO2 absorber. The presence of O2 in the gas may cause a fire hazard. Water solubility of O2 is less compared to that of CO2. Alkaline pyrogallol solution can be used as an absorbent of O2. Another important problem is the presence of moisture in the gas mixture. It must be removed; otherwise the heating value of hydrogen will get reduced. This can be achieved by passing the mixture either through a dryer or a chilling unit (by condensing out vapour in the form of water). Nowadays, different membrane separation systems are being utilized efficiently for gas purification.

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6. Conclusion Hydrogen is currently more expensive than conventional energy sources. The production efficiency (the amount of gaseous energy recovery from the feedstock used to produce hydrogen) must be improved and an infrastructure for efficiently transporting and distributing hydrogen is to be developed. There are different technologies presently being practised to produce hydrogen economically from biomass. However, it is too early to predict which of these biomass-conversion technologies will be ultimately successful. Biohydrogen technology will play a major role in future because it can utilize the renewable sources of energy.

References Antal, M.J. Jr., Feber, R.C., and Tinkle, M.C., 1974, Proceedings 1st World Hydrogen Energy Conference, Miami Beach, FL, pp. 1–20. Arbon, I.M., 2002, Worldwide use of biomass in power generation and combined heat and power schemes, J. Power Energy (Part A) 216 (1), 41–57. Caglar, A., and Demirbas, A., 2001, Hydrogen-rich gaseous products from tea waste by pyrolysis, Energy Sources 23 (8), 739–746. Fascetti, E., and Todini, O., 1995, Rhodobacter sphaeroides RV cultivation and hydrogen production in a one- and two-stage chemostat, Appl. Microbiol. Biotechnol. 44 (3–4), 300–305. Liu, S.J., Yang, W.F., and Zhou, P.Q., 1995, The research on hydrogen production from the treatment of bean products wastewater by immobilized photosynthetic bacteria, Environ. Sci. 16, 42–44. Manarungson, S., Mok, W.S., and Antal Jr., M.J., 1990, Advances in hydrogen energy. Hydrogen Energy Progress VIII, IAHE, FL, Vol. 1, pp. 345–355. Miyake, J., Veziroglu, T.N., and Takashashi, P.K., 1990, Hydrogen Energy Progress VIII. Proceedings 8th WHEC, Hawaii, Pergamon Press, New York, pp. 755–764. Modell, M., 1985, Gasification and liquefaction of forest products in supercritical water. Fundamentals of Thermochemical Biomass Conversion, Elsevier Applied Science, Amsterdam, 95–119. Venkataraman, C., and Vatsala, T.M., 1990, Hydrogen production from whey by phototropic bacteria, in Veziroglu, T.N., and Takahashi, P.K. (eds.), Hydrogen Energy Progress VIII, Vol. 2, Pergamon Press, New York, pp. 781–788. Vrati, S., and Verma, J., 1983, Production of molecular hydrogen and single cell protein by Rhodopseudomonas capsulata from cow dung. J. Ferment. Technol. 61, 157–162. Walcher, G., Girges, S., and Weingartner, S., 1996, Hydrogen Energy Progress XI, Proceedings of the 11th World Hydrogen Conference, Stuttgart, Vol. 1, pp. 413–418. Wallman, P.H., Thorsness, C.B., and Winter, J.D., 1998, Hydrogen production from wastes, Energy, 23 (4), 271–278. Wang, D., Czernik, S., and Chornet, E., 1998, Production of hydrogen from biomass by catalytic steam reforming of fast pyrolysis oils: Special section on hydrogen as a fuel, Energy Fuels, 12 (1), 19–24.

PV LARGE SCALE RURAL ELECTRIFICATION PROGRAMS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF DESERT REGIONS

SIFEDDINE LABED* Centre de Développement des Energies Renouvelables Route de l’observatoire- BP 62 – Bouzaréah – Alger (16340) – Algérie

Abstract: This paper overviews two original large scale experiences: ‘The 20 villages PV rural electrification program’ and ‘The Maghreb PV Pumping Program’. The in-depth analysis of the reported data focused on the technical aspects of both programs and many relevant key issues have been extracted in order to pursue or no in the direction of large-scale PV programs. It is concluded that both experiences may be reproducible in other areas with similar geographical and cultural conditions such as the Arab ountries. Furthermore, VLS PV combined with hydrogen production is likely to be a feasible and a viable future option for the Euro Mediterranean region. The lessons drawn from these experiences and the expected technology developments open wide perspectives for mass electricity production by mean of large scale PV plants in these desert regions. Keywords: Photovoltaic, hydrogen, VLS PV, electricity generation.

1. Introduction The access to electricity and thus to a better a life standard is still problematic for at least 1/3rd of the world population, concentrated basically in developing countries. The rural world that composed generally of lowincome inhabitants remains the main target of most national development programs. Despite that very often PV solar energy is well suited and economically viable, but still the financing part is considered as one of the major

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Sifeddine Labed Centre de Développement des Energies Renouvelables Route de l’observatoire- BP 62 – Bouzaréah – Alger (16340) – Algérie. Tél. : 213.21.901503, E-mail: [email protected] F. Barbir and S. Ulgiati (eds.), Sustainable Energy Production and Consumption. © Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008

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penetration barriers. Many international organizations have attemptted by mean of famous electrification programs worldwide to solve such paradox, i.e. bringing electricity to population unable to pay such service. In addition to this, the proposed technical solutions (Luque and Hegedus, 2002) have to cope with a diversity of climatic conditions even in the same country: hot arid zones, high mountains, humid regions…etc. Algeria with its huge desert territory and its solar potential is a good case study. Its National Electrification Programs (NEP) has brought electricity to very isolated regions. As a consequence, the present grid is already saturated and the electricity company cannot go further in extension. In particular, the southern regions are basically powered with Diesel Gensets that are no more viable given the high maintenance costs and long distances for fuel supply. Since many years, PV solar energy has proved its economic competitiveness with respect to other energetic options. Nevertheless, the move to large scale PV rural electrification programs requires the development of a reliable engineering well adapted to the peculiarities of each region (geographical and social). Conscientious of this situation, decision makers has launched many PV rural electrification programs in the southern provinces and in the Atlas Mountains of Algeria in the early 1980s such as: the 11 schools of Batna, the PV power plant of Mellouka….etc. Another remarkable PV national program has also been realized during the 1990s by the CDER and targeted at least 30 villages: Matriouane, Ain Belbel, Fendi, Hassi Mounir…etc. Lately, the Sonelgaz (Electricity and Gas Company) entered the scene by realizing an ambitious PV rural electrification program of 500 kWp (SONELGAZ, 2000; Labed et al., 2004). On the other hand a regional water pumping program has also been achieved in the Maghreb region. The program has been funded by EU, in the frame of Meda SMAPII program and the national governments: Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. A total power of more than 250 kWp, i.e. 42 standardized water pumping PV systems (1.5, 3.0, 4.5, 8. kWp) have been installed in these countries (Narvarte et al., 2005. Among the technical enhancements introduced it is worth to mention the use of a frequency inverter to drive the motor-pump. The last enables reaching high pumping heads (>100 m). In what follows, the main aspects of both programs will be described and analyzed. This serves as basis to explore a wider PV electricity production with the so called ‘VLS PV ’ plants in desert regions. Finally, the hydrogen route will also be explored at the light of further technology developments and expected module’s cost reduction.

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2. Large Scale PV Programs The dissemination of large scale PV solar energy requires as a pre-requisite the achievement of many rural electrification demonstration programs, in order to gain experience and to test the design and the material’s conformity in harsh climates. Such feedback is important not only to correct certain malfunctions but also to identify relevant parameters that were not fairly considered at the design stage. In this regard, the Algerian desert has been an open laboratory at least for two interesting PV demonstration programs. We report herein some of the main aspects and the lessons learned: 2.1. THE 20 VILLAGES PROGRAM

The ambitious PV rural electrification program of 500 kWp has been realized by the national electricity and Gas Company (Sonelgaz). The latter has targeted a huge surface territory of 1.4 million square kilometers that composes the four southern provinces of: Tamanrasset, Illizi, Tindouf and Adrar. In total more than 1,000 houses have been electrified as well as the social and educational infrastructures (health centres, schools, administrations…etc.). The adopted electrification scheme was based on PV mini grids, i.e. modular and extendible PV systems of 1.5, 3 and 6 kWp nominal power. The following are the relevant aspects that may serve to further large scale programs. 2.1.1. Climatic Conditions The climatic conditions are the first parameter to be considered in any design process of a PV system. Most of worldwide desert regions have a well established climate that is characterized by a dry air temperature, high level daily temperatures (spring and summer) and rapid daily temperature variation (autumn and winter). Solar radiation may reach also high levels. At the exception of the Tassili region (Tamanrasset, Illizi…etc.), all southern Algeria desert obeys to the same topology. Typical values of such climate are resumed in Table 1. Thermal aspects are also other important parameters for PV systems especially those operating in desert conditions. At the exception of PV modules all the system’s components have to be protected against large fluctuations of ambient temperature. Figure 1 shows the daily seasonal variations of both ambient and cell temperatures. In the case of the Algerian Sahara, one can expect a diurnal variation of 50°C for the cell temperature during spring and summer while such variation is reduced to 30°C during autumn and winter.

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TABLE 1. Average climatic*values of Southern Algeria

Data range (Min–Max)

Southern Algeria

Tassili region

Geographical location (degrees)

Latitude : 18–33 Longitude: –3–10

Latitude : 22–27 Longitude: 5–9

Elevation (m)

140–1,400

600–1,400

Relative humidity (%)

15–50

15–30

Ambient temperature (°C)

Winter: 5–17 Summer: 30–46

Winter: 5–19 Summer: 28–35

Hours of sun/year

3,000–3,600

3,200–3,600

Average solar horizontal irradiation (kWh/m2)

January: 3.0 July: 7.7 Year: 5.6

January: 3.6 July: 7.0 Year: 5.6

*All indicated data are extracted from past experiences field realities

2.1.2. PV Conversion and Cell Temperature The module is the most reliable equipment of a PV system even in an aggressive climate such as desert arid regions. Today’s module technology has reached a high degree of reliability and consequently such device can be guaranteed for at least 15 years or even more. But still its performance is dependant on cell temperature given its physical properties, especially those with Si material. Thus, one has to seriously consider the effect of such parameter on the module’s efficiency. Figure 2 depicts this relationship for a 6 kWp PV system in the region of Tamanrasset. It shows clearly that the module’s efficiency is quasi linearly dependent on cell temperature. The average negative slope has been estimated to be 0.2%/°C which means that 5°C cell temperature variation will induce a drop of 1% in the module’s efficiency. 2.1.3. Reliability and System’s Performance The reliability of a PV system may have a different significance depending on who is the reference (Munro and Blaesser, 1994). For the user, the PV system is reliable if it delivers all the necessary power and energy whatever the load and the period of time. For the electricity company, the indicator is rather the number of maintenance acts and their corresponding costs. While for the designer, the judgment leans on a specified technical language: Loss


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Typical daily variation of ambiant (Ta) and cell (Tc) temperatures (Spring - Summer) 80

Tc

°C

70

Ta

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 0:00

6:00

12:00

18:00

0:00

(a) Typical daily variation of ambiant (Ta) and cell (Tc) temperatures (Autumn - Winter) 70

(°C)

Ta

Tc

60 50 40 30 20 10 0 0:00

6:00

12:00

18:00

0:00

(b) Figure 1. Typical daily seasonal ambient and cell temperatures

of load probability, LLP, Mean Time Between Failures, MTBF…etc. En theory, a reliable PV system should take into account all the abovementioned references. Quantitatively speaking, the performance of a PV system can be expressed in terms of well known indices of merit (or figures of merit) such as: Lc (capture losses), Ls (system losses), YF final yield, PR performance ratio.

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η PV(%)

0,16 0,14

- 0,2%/°C

0,12 0,10 0,08 0,06 0,04 0,02

Tc(°C)

0,00 20

30

40

50

60

Figure 2. Effect of cell temperature on the PV generator efficiency

10 kWh/kWp 9 8 7

MLY TAM

Yf Ls Lc

6 5 4 3 2 1

Month

0 10 11 12 1

5

6

7

8

9

Figure 3. Indices of merit of two installations (6 kWp)

Figure 3 shows the performance of two installations of the 20 villages program. The effect of cell temperature during summer time on the final yield is clearly shown. At the opposite an increase of the final yield due to lower cell temperature can be seen during the cold season.


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2.2. THE PV PUMPING PROGRAM –MEDA/SMAPII:

This photovoltaic program was developed in the frame of a tight collaboration between the EU and the Maghreb countries. It supplies potable drinking water to villages of around 500 inhabitants by mean of PV water pumping installation (from 1.5 to 8.5 kWp), and with a distribution network that brings water to houses. Up today the programme delivered millions of cubic meter of water, and is considered as a reference in the photovoltaic pumping state of the art, essentially because of the following reasons: •

Excellent technical working in the installations (all the systems are working properly since their first installation).

•

Very good practices in the system’s maintenance which have lead to:

– A great availability of the working data (daily volume of pumped water in each village, monthly volume of water consumption in each house). – The payment for water consumption, according to fares fixed with the inhabitants allows tackling the installation’s maintenance. These photovoltaic pumping systems include also a water purification system (chlorine injection). The chlorine is injected at the end of the pump, before the way into the tank, and an appropriate selection of chlorine dosage has contributed to their social success. Table 2 resumes the considered PV system sizes of the program TABLE 2. Standardized water pumping PV systems – Meda program

Morocco

Algeria

Tunisia

PV system size (kWp)

Daily service m4 (HTE xQd)

MEDA 1

5

0

3

1.5

840

MEDA 2

10

4

5

3.0

1,740

MEDA 3

5

1

1

4.5

2,610

MEDA 4

9

5

4

8.5

5,500

It is worth to emphasize that in the case of this program a new approach regarding the inverter topology has been included. It consists in the use of a frequency inverter directly connected to the motor-pump system. The advantage of such technique is basically to reach easily high HMT heights in addition to the improvement of the overall system’s yield. The old technique was based on the fabrication of a proper inverter for a given PV pumping system. This way of doing was a real barrier for a wider dissemination of PV pumping systems.

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The added value of the program or the economic outcome is also very important to mention since the program’s main target, i.e. providing potable water to a wide population, has been largely surpassed. Its use in agriculture (as illustrated in Figure 4) or in pastoral tracks has boosted the economic activity in many villages and thus has increased the population life standard. 3. VLS PV Electricity Production Massive renewable energy production would require large spaces to supply the needed electricity for a sustainable development and also for facing a constant world population increase. Desert regions are thus directly designated to host such large systems (Kurokawa et al., 2007). Many experts consider Very Large PV Systems as one of the future potential techniques because of their competitiveness on medium term given the expected combined effect of reduction in module’s cost and further increase in module’s efficiency. The Algerian desert with more than 2 million square kilometers represents nearly a ¼ of the total surface of the Sahara (8.6 million square kilometers). Moreover the solar potential is also one the highest in the world. Such combination suggests its use on a very large scale to provide

Figure 4. Typical Meda 1 PV pumping system installation in the high plateaux (Djelfa)


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electricity not only for the country but also for the Euro-Mediterranean region. In addition the establishment of new policies for developing markets, expanding financing options and developing the required capacity are crucial in the incorporation of goals of sustainable development within new policies. A judicious combination of bulk electricity production and extensive agriculture will certainly have positive impacts on economic and environmental levels. In order to estimate to which extent such a view may be economically viable a rough calculation has been made for the electricity generation cost. To this end two normalized PV systems of 01 kWp each have been considered (one fixed at the latitude’s site and the second with a 02 axis tracking system). The used modules are Si-mono with a 15% nominal efficiency and a 47°C NOCT. The results of the levelized life cycle cost analysis shown in Figure 5 indicates clearly that for sunny regions of the Algerian desert PV electricity cost production are still not comparable to today’s grid electricity cost. Nevertheless, the gap can be narrowed if we consider further technology developments, economy of scale and module’s efficiency improvements. These results are also comparable to those obtained in other references as shown in Figure 6.

0,25

Tilt= Latitude

2 Axis-Tracking

($ /k W h )

0,20 0,15 0,10 Grid electricity cost lines: Industrial - Residential

0,05 0,00 4

4,5

5

5,5

G H(kWh/m2)

Figure 5. Cost comparison of PV electricity generation

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Figure 6. Cost generation of VLS PV in world desert regions (IEA)

A quick comparison for the case of the Sahara (with more than 2,800 kWh/m2/year) gives quite the same generation cost of approximately 0.16 $/kWh. If the module’s unit cost were to drop in the future than one may expect the electricity generation cost via VLS PV to fall within the competitive area with grid electricity cost. In this case PV would be preferred given its positive impact in terms of environmental costing in comparison with fossil electricity production. Such situation is not utopia at all if we follow the latest in PV technology advances especially the improvements in cells for PV concentration (500X and above) and the new generation of organic cells developed by Spectrolab lately that announced a 40% efficiency solar cell. 4. Future Energy Options: The Hydrogen Route In a scenario of fossil reserves depletion most of energy experts bet on the combination of: renewable energies – hydrogen. Independently if we are with or against such vision we have to recognize that many indices play in favour of such future option. At least from the environmental point of view the impact in terms of costs cannot be denied. Today, most of famous car makers have invested in the hydrogen option and have developed many prototypes and, a non declared competition has already started. Moreover, pre-industrial production of many hydrogen powered devices has also been launched thanks to consequent investments and a tremendous effort in R/D activities.


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In this context Algeria is expected to play an important role in the projection of large scale hydrogen production. In addition to its assets: high solar radiation levels, large desert areas, important underground water reservoirs, it has also a well established gas industry that go beyond its geographical borders. In fact, the country is exporting large amounts of Natural gas and LPG and many other industrial gases. Such situation may be suitable also for mass production of hydrogen that may be transported via the most economic option: pipelines. Such scenario is not utopia; it already exists in many countries in the world. In total, more than 3,000 km of pipeline are disseminated in certain countries. We may cite some examples: 1,000 km in United States, more than 800 km in the Benelux region (France, Belgium…etc.) and more than 200 km in Germany. In order to explore such track we have calculated the production cost of the hydrogen produced with the above mentioned normalized PV systems (fixed and two axis tracking). The calculations have considered only the production stage, i.e. a system composed of: a PV generator, a turn key electrolyzer and hydrogen and oxygen compressors. For the purpose of the analysis two situations have been considered: today; with a module’s cost of approximately 5 $/Wp, and in the future with a module’s cost of 1 $/Wp. The obtained results (Figure 7) especially those of the sunny regions of Algeria give an average production cost of 5.5 $/kg H2. Meanwhile, if the second scenario (future) the production cost of hydrogen may drop to approximately 3.5 $/kg. It is worth to mention that today’s production cost via Steam Methane Reforming (present cheapest option) is roughly 3.6 $/kg according to market prices of industrial gases. Tilt=Latitude

2 Axis Tracking

8,0 5$/Wp

$/kg H2

7,0 6,0 5,0

1$/Wp

4,0 3,0 4

4,5

5

5,5

GH (kWh/m2) Figure 7. Cost estimation of PV hydrogen production

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But in the same time no one can guarantee that future gas prices will stay stable given the volatile situation of oil and gas markets. In this case hydrogen production via renewables in general, or PV in particular (in other countries it may be wind energy), will be totally viable. Even in case of slightly higher generation costs of renewable energies, the added value and the environmental costing of PV may counterbalance such difference in generation costs. 5. Conclusions This article has overviewed two large scale PV experiences: a national rural electrification program and, a regional water pumping program. The analysis of the gathered technical data has shown not only the high level of feasibly of such programs but also that many key issues play in favour of their reproduction in other similar regions. Despite the economic argument that advantages solar PV in desert regions, it also the high adaptability of PV systems to fit with any complicated situation either when a decentralised, or a centralised electricity production is considered. Algeria, with its large desert area and its high level solar potential has all the necessary ingredients to exploit the VLS PV track. Moreover, the country may also be projected in future option such the hydrogen route. The last opens wide perspectives to mass production of hydrogen that can be transferred via pipelines to the Euro-Mediterranean region in the frame of a tight cooperation. Such option is thus suitable and may be shared by many countries to ensure a sustainable regional development.

References Kurokawa, K., et al., 2007, Energy from the desert – Practical proposals for very large scale PV systems, edited by IEA. Labed, S., et al., 2004, The 500 kWp Algerian PV electrification program – First results 19th E.C PV Solar Energy Conference & Exhibition Paris, June 2004, pp. 3265–3268. Luque, A., and Hegedus, S., 2002, Handbook of PV science engineering, Wiley. New York. Munro, D.K., and Blaesser, G., 1994, The performance of PV systems and components in the THERMIE programme, Renewable Energy, Volume 5, Issues 1–4, pp. 172–178. Narvarte, L., Lorenzo, E., and Aandam, M., 2005, Lessons from a PV pumping programme in south Morocco, Progress in Photovoltaics: Research and Applications, Volume 13, Issue 3, pp. 261–270. SONELGAZ R/D, 2000, Internal Report, Programme de Démonstration solaire PV – Electrification Rurale des villages du sud, May, 2000.

LIFE CYCLE IMPACTS AND TOTAL COSTS OF PRESENT AND FUTURE PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEMS: STATE-OF-THE ART AND FUTURE OUTLOOK OF A STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY OPTION FOR A SUSTAINABLE ENERGY SYSTEM MARCO RAUGEI* Ambiente Italia Research Institute, Rome, Italy PAOLO FRANKL International Energy Agency, Paris, France

Abstract: This paper provides a wide-ranging up-to-date literature review on the current state of the art of photovoltaic systems, in terms of market penetration, costs and environmental performance. It then goes on to draft three alternative scenarios for the next few decades, highlighting the four key factors influencing PV growth, i.e. cost reduction, efficiency increase, building integration and storage networks. Lastly, preliminary results are presented for greenhouse gas emissions of selected PV technologies in the years 2025 and 2050. In the light of the findings presented here, photovoltaics can be considered an inherently advantageous option for the production of “green” electricity, which may be looking at a rosy future provided that a few key conditions are met.

Keywords: Photovoltaics, life cycle analysis, costs, scenarios, NEEDS.

1. PV Today In recent years, photovoltaic electricity is increasingly being looked upon as the quintessentially “green” energy option for the future, entailing virtually no emissions during its use phase, and larger and larger energy returns on investment. However, it still suffers from some non-negligible limits,

______ *

To whom correspondence should be addressed: Marco Raugei, Ambiente Italia s.r.l., Via Vicenza 5a, Roma, Italy; E-mail: [email protected] F. Barbir and S. Ulgiati (eds.), Sustainable Energy Production and Consumption. © Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008

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namely comparatively high capital costs and low social acceptability because of poor aesthetics. Four types of PV installations can be identified, i.e.: grid-connected centralised (large power plants); grid-connected distributed (smaller rooftop and façade systems); off-grid non-domestic (power plants and industrial installations in remote areas); off-grid domestic (mainly stand-alone rooftop systems for houses in remote areas). These four types of installations greatly differ in their requirement for Balance of System (BOS) components, the main discriminating aspect being the requirement for battery storage in the off-grid systems. The rapid, exponential growth of cumulative installed capacity in Europe, Japan and the USA (the three largest World markets for PV) is illustrated in Figure 1. In the same figure, the vast preponderance of grid-connected distributed installations in Europe and Japan is also apparent. In the USA, on the other hand, more than half of the total installed power is still represented by off-grid systems. This can be at least in part explained by the lower population density of the United States, where PV has often been used as the most practical means of providing remote houses and towns with electricity, rather than a way to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels.

Figure 1. Cumulative installed capacity of PV systems (IEA-PVPS, 2005)

PV systems can be classified according to the type of solar modules employed. A block diagram of the technologies that are currently available is illustrated in Figure 2.

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Figure 2. PV technologies

The longest-standing family of PV technologies is that based on silicon as semiconductor, which has been around for several decades and can be considered the most mature. Single-crystalline Si (sc-Si) wafers are the most energy intensive to produce, and are obtained through the re-melting of scraps of high-purity electronic grade silicon (EG-Si) and subsequent mechanical slicing. This is also the traditional route for multi-crystalline Si (mc-Si) wafers, the production of which omits one final re-crystallization step. In the last decade, a new, less-energy intensive production method for mc-Si has also been introduced, in which a lower purity solar-grade silicon (SoG-Si) feedstock can be produced directly from metallurgical-grade silicon (MG-Si). Lastly, an innovative type of Si-based modules is being introduced on the market, in which a thin layer of mc-Si is directly deposited on the glass panes of the PV module, thus doing away with the lossy wafer cutting stage (“ribbon-Si modules”). Amorphous Silicon (a-Si) modules makes use of a thin layer of hydrogenated silicon deposited on glass; these are essentially lower-spec, lower cost modules that are primarily employed in the consumer electronics sector. Non-silicon-based PV modules (CIS and CdTe) make use of extremely thin (few µm) layers of binary semiconductors electro-deposited on glass panes. These are comparatively new technologies, which only began to hit the market in the early 2000s.


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Under the label “New Concept Devices”, three main families of technologies are grouped: ultra-low cost, low-medium efficiency organic-based modules (based on Dye Sensitized Cells, Extremely Thin Absorbers, organic polymer cells, etc.); ultra-high efficiency modules (based on Quantum cells and nano-structured devices); and solar concentrator systems (in which arrays of PV modules are mounted onto large movable structures which are continuously aimed at the sun). With the partial exception of solar concentrator systems, all these “third generation” PV technologies are still at the prototype stage and have yet no place on the market. The current market shares of the different PV technologies are illustrated in Figure 3, and current average technology specification data for the available PV module types are reported in Table 1.

Figure 3. PV technology market shares (EPIA, 2006) TABLE 1. PV technology specification Cumulative installed capacity Technology

Crystalline Si layer thickness Module efficiency Module technical lifetime Installed capacity Share of market

GWp

µm

% years GWp %

3

sc-Si 250

14%

Crystalline Si mc-Si ribbon 250 300

13% 25 2.7 90%

11%

a-Si

10%

Thin films CIS CdTe N/A

10% 25 0.3 10%

9%


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Looking at life cycle energy consumption and environmental impact of PV systems, there has been a marked reduction thereof over the last two decades. As illustrated in Figure 4, for instance, greenhouse gas emissions of PV electricity today are already one order of magnitude lower than those associated with the average European electricity mix, and less than 5% of those from a modern coal-fired power plant.

Figure 4. GHG emissions of PV electricity compared to the UCPTE mix and coal-fired and natural gas combined cycle power plants (ETH-ESU, 1996; ExternE, 2003; Fthenakis and Alsema, 2006; Raugei et al., 2007)

As regards the economics of PV, at present one installed solar Wattpeak on the market costs about 5 €, which translates into 0.30 and 0.60 €/kWh for PV electricity, respectively in typical southern European and northern European solar irradiation conditions. These figures are to be compared to the average 0.20 €/kWh for utility peak power across Europe. Detailed break-downs of the costs for two typical complete grid-connected PV systems are reported in Table 2. 2. What Future for PV? In trying to draft possible future scenarios for PV, both in terms of costs and of environmental performance, four key factors must be considered. •

Cost reduction. PV costs have been declining steadily over the last two decades, with an average Progress Ratio of 80% (i.e. a cost reduction of 20% every doubling of production). As illustrated in Figure 5, it can be predicted that if a similar trend is maintained, PV electricity may

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become economically competitive with utility peak power as early as 2010 in southern Europe, and by 2020 in northern Europe, too. Of course in order for this to become possible, it is mandatory that the current subsidizing schemes be maintained long enough. TABLE 2. Average PV costs (year 2006) Centralized power plant size installations: PV modules Electrical BOS Mechanical BOS TOTAL COST

3.0 €/Wp 0.4 €/Wp 1.3 €/Wp 4.7 €/Wp

Distributed rooftop installations: PV modules Electrical BOS Mechanical BOS TOTAL COST

3.0 €/Wp 0.7 €/Wp 1.6 €/Wp 5.3 €/Wp

Figure 5. Cost of PV electricity vs. utility peak and bulk electricity •

Efficiency increase. Even if the energy return on investment of photovoltaics is already quite good, a further efficiency increase is feasible and desirable for all PV technologies (Figure 6). In particular, based on the extrapolation of past trends, a target efficiency of around 25% is foreseeable for the mid-term future of both crystalline Si and thin films technologies; ultra-high efficiency third generation devices are then expected to significantly exceed this figure by the middle of the twentyfirst century.

•

Building integration. Enhanced structural integration of PV systems in new buildings as well as during restoration and/or renewal of older buildings will significantly contribute to the reduction of the BOS energy and monetary costs in all decentralized installations. Building integration of


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PV on a large scale also raises the further issue of social acceptability. This is especially relevant in the case of historically relevant sites and city centres, the likes of which are often encountered in Europe. However, innovative design and engineering solutions are being developed in order to facilitate the visual integration of PV into existing buildings, even including historical monuments. A noteworthy example of such design efforts is represented by the demonstration objects resulting from the EU project PVACCEPT.

Figure 6. Predicted efficiency increases for the different PV technologies (Goetzberger, 2002) •

Storage network. Integration of PV with large energy storage systems will be mandatory in order to warrant the necessary stability of the network if PV is ever to provide more than 10% of the total electricity supply. One option that is currently being considered in this sense is represented by electrolytically produced hydrogen gas. The latter could be used as an energy buffer whereby to store the surplus energy generated by PV systems during peak irradiation hours, only to be converted back to electricity by means of fuel cell devices when the need arises. Other available energy storage options are pumped hydroelectric and compressed air energy storage (CAES); progress is also being made in the development of efficient high-speed flywheel systems whereby electric energy is converted into kinetic energy in a cylindrical or ringed mass, levitated by magnets and spinning at very high speeds (~10,000–20,000 rpm) in a vacuum chamber.

Within the framework of the on-going EU project NEEDS (“New Energy Externalities Developments for Sustainability”), the authors have attempted to draft the following three alternative scenarios for the future development of the PV sector up to 2050.

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1. “Pessimistic” scenario. This first scenario essentially mirrors the “best case” scenario drafted by IEA and OECD in their “Energy Technology Perspectives 2006” report (IEA/OECD, 2006), wherein it is assumed that PV will at best cumulatively account for approximately 2% of the overall world electricity supply by 2050 (the latter being estimated by IEA at 35,000 TWh/a). This comparatively pessimistic scenario essentially corresponds to assuming that the current incentives for PV will not be supported long enough for the technology to ever become competitive with bulk electricity. The gains in module efficiency are also expected to be slow, with both c-Si and thin films struggling to improve significantly upon their current levels of performance by 2025, and eventually only reaching 18% efficiency by 2050. Of course, this prediction reflects low R&D funds likely to be invested in these technologies in the event that they are not supported long enough for them to become economically competitive on a large scale. 2. “Optimistic/Realistic” scenario. In this intermediate scenario, the predictions for the growth of the world PV market made by the European Photovoltaic Industry Association together with Greenpeace in their latest Solar Generation Report (EPIA, 2006) are assumed to be valid all the way through to 2025, when the annual installed capacity is expected to reach 55 GWp. After that date, a transition is assumed to a less steep annual growth rate, eventually leading to a linear trend, whereby the cumulative installed capacity will keep growing steadily, approximately doubling each decade to eventually reach 2,400 GWp in 2050. This latter assumption is in good accordance with the predictions made in the latest report by the European Renewable Energy Council (EREC, 2007). 3. “Very Optimistic Scenario”. In this third scenario, bold annual growth rates are assumed from as early as 2010, and the trend is expected to keep growing in a quadratic fashion all the way through, topping out at almost 9,000 GWp in 2050. As already mentioned above, what this growth scenario implies is that by the mid-2030s at the latest a largescale energy storage infrastructure will have to have been developed. This last scenario is also dominated by the predicted very rapid expansion of PV systems based on third generation technologies after 2025 (following what can be referred to as a major “technological break-through”). These novel technologies are expected to grow as much as to eventually account for approximately 50% of the total PV market in 2050. One may argue that the shift itself from a still limited share of total electricity production (3%) in 2025 to a very large diffusion of PV as a whole in 2050 (largest contributor among renewable energy technologies; 35% of total electricity production) heavily depends on the realization and diffusion of such new concept PV devices.


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The predicted worldwide cumulative installed capacities according to the three scenarios are illustrated in Figure 7, and the associated trends in direct capital costs (including BOS) are illustrated in Figures 8 and 9, respectively for grid connected centralized (power plant size) and distributed (rooftop) installations.

Figure 7. Predicted cumulative installed capacities according to the three scenarios

Figure 8. Predicted direct capital costs of large grid-connected centralized PV systems according to the three scenarios

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Figure 9. Predicted direct capital costs of building integrated grid-connected de-centralized PV systems according to the three scenarios

3. Preliminary LCA Forecasts In order to provide estimates of the future environmental performance of PV systems based on the different available technologies, the authors have drafted individual parametric Life Cycle Inventories (LCI) based on the current state of the art for each technology. The future material and energy requirement data can thus be predicted by setting reasonable targets reductions for the years 2025 and 2050, which are consistent with the scenarios discussed above. These present and predicted inventory data are currently being sent to external experts (EPIA, companies, researchers) for review and approval, and will form the basis for the following Life Cycle Impact Assessment (LCIA) step, eventually resulting in the calculation of selected environmental performance indicators. As a preliminary indication of the expected results, Figure 10 illustrates the calculated Global Warming Potential of selected PV technologies for the years 2025 and 2050, compared to that of sc-Si PV today. As can be seen, marked reductions in equivalent life-cycle CO2 emissions are expected to take place for both silicon-based and binary thin film technologies. Low cost third generation devices (i.e. DSC) are also expected to fare comparatively well, in spite of their inherently lower efficiency.


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Figure 10. Preliminary LCIA results in terms of Global Warming Potential for selected PV technologies in the years 2025 and 2050

4. Conclusions The first and foremost conclusion stemming from the current literature data is that the environmental profile of PV electricity can already be considered very good when compared to that of the average European electricity mix (UCPTE). If economically supported through suitable incentives and feed-in tariffs for at least another decade, PV is then likely to outgrow its current market niche and become a major payer in the global electricity scene, significantly contributing to the lowering of the carbon intensity of future economies. Decentralization of bulk electricity production and availability of large energy storage networks are however two further necessary requisites for such large scale PV scenarios to become a reality. If all these conditions are met, cumulative installed capacity may skyrocket, and Si-based PV will likely lose its preeminence to a widespread diffusion of thin film technologies and, at a later stage, third generation devices.

References EPIA, 2006. Solar generation – Solar electricity for over one billion people and two million jobs by 2020. Greenpeace and European Photovoltaic Industry Association, The Netherlands/Belgium. EREC, 2007. Energy [r]evolution – A sustainable world energy outlook. Global energy scenario report. Greenpeace and European Renewable Energy Council, The Netherlands.

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ETH-ESU, 1996. Ökoinventar von Energiesystemen. Eidgenössischen Technischen Hochschule, Energie-Stoffe-Umwelt, Switzerland. ExternE, 2003. European Commission, Directorate-General for Research. External costs. Research results on socio-environmental damages due to electricity and transport. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 92-894-3353-1, EUR 20198. http://www.externe.info Fthenakis, V., and Alsema, E., 2006. Photovoltaics energy payback times, greenhouse gas emissions and external costs: 2004 – early 2005 status. Progress in Photovoltaics: Research and Applications, 14:275–280. Goetzberger, 2002. Applied solar energy. Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems (FhG/ISE), Germany. IEA-PVPS, 2005. http://www.oja-services.nl/iea-pvps/pv/index.htm IEA/OECD, 2006. Energy technology perspectives 2006. Scenarios and strategies to 2050. IEA Publications, Paris. NEEDS. http://www.needs-project.org PVACCEPT. http://www.pvaccept.de Raugei, M., Bargigli, S., and Ulgiati, S., 2007. Life cycle assessment and energy pay-back time of advanced photovoltaic modules. CdTe and CIS compared to poly-Si. Energy, 32:1310–1318.

INTEGRATED SYSTEMS AND ZERO EMISSION PRODUCTION PATTERNS IN AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY AND THE ENERGY SECTOR – WHY “GREEN” IS NOT ENOUGH SERGIO ULGIATI*, AMALIA ZUCARO AND STEFANO DUMONTET Department of Sciences for the Environment, Parthenope University of Napoli, Italy

Abstract: Energy shortage as well as shortage of material resources are day by day source of large concern for scientists and economists, business people and managers, governments and people. The problem is two-fold, since it involves actual material and energy scarcity as well as price increase due to competition for scarce resources by many potential users in developed and developing countries. An additional kind of scarcity is embodied in the excess exploitation of environmental services (fresh water, clean air, topsoil, material cycling) as well as in the decreased ability of the environment to act as a sink of pollutants released by human activities. We deal in this paper with a much-needed shift away from linear production and consumption patterns, towards a reorganization of economies and lifestyle that takes complexity (resources, environment, economy) into proper account. After dealing with the existing constraints to energy exploitation and use, we analyze the potentiality of photosynthesis to become the new source of materials and energy for a growing world population. For this to be possible, a reorganization of production and consumption patterns within a zero emission framework is absolutely needed, for optimum exploitation of resources and decreased pollution. Keywords: Integrated systems, zero emissions, EROI.

______ * To whom correspondence should be addressed: Sergio Ulgiati, University of Naples Parthenope, Centro Direzionale, Isola C4, 80143, Napoli, Italy. E-mail: [email protected]


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1. Introduction Hubbert (1956) pointed out that all finite resources follow the same trend of exploitation. Exploitation is first very fast due to abundance and availability of easily accessible and high quality resources. In the progress of the exploitation process, availability declines and production is slowed down. Finally, production declines, due to both lower abundance and lower quality. This trend allows to forecast a scenario for each resource, based upon estimates of available reserves and exploitation trends. New discoveries of unknown storages will shift the scenario some years into the future, but it cannot ultimately be avoided. In 1956, Hubbert predicted the year 1970 for oil production to peak in the US. He also predicted the year 2000 for oil to peak on a planetary scale (Hubbert, 1968). He was right in the first case and it seems he was not very far from right in the second prediction, based on recent estimates (Bardi, 2008). Campbell and Laherrére (1998) predicted the end of cheap oil within the next decade after their paper was published, based upon geological and statistical data. Oil price is now around 100 $/barrel and is very likely to steadily increase further. It is important to underline here that they did not predict the end of oil production but only the end of oil production at low cost, with foreseeable consequences on the overall productive structure of our economies running on fossil fuels. As an immediate consequence of their alarming report, the ASPO-Association for the study of Peak Oil and Gas (www.pickoil.net) was established, with a mission to support and stimulate scientific research and information about the consequences of peak oil and needed and possible solution strategies. In spite of higher price of fossil fuels, a general consensus about the fact that energy availability is going to be a limiting factor for the stability of developed economies has not yet been reached. Still available fossil fuels, coupled with energy-conservation strategies, as well as new conversion technologies (among which coal gasification and gas reforming for hydrogen production, use of fuel cells) might help delay the end of the fossil-fuel era, allowing for a transition period at higher costs. The transition time may be long enough to allow for a redesigning of economic, social and population growth strategies in order to come out of the fossil-fuel era in an acceptable manner. It is still under debate whether the new pattern will be characterized by additional growth supported by new discovered energy sources or will be a global and controlled downsizing of our economies, which was anticipated by H.T. Odum as a “prosperous way down”. (Odum, 2001, 2006).

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Other kinds of scarcity, especially economic and environmental factors, are also likely to be strong constrains on energy use. We have already pointed out that an increase of the energy price is a kind of scarcity factor. Indeed, it affects availability of energy for those economies and individuals who are not able to afford higher costs. The economic cost of energy is closely linked to development, jobs creation and possible use of other energy sources that could not compete in times of cheap oil and might provide alternatives for future development in times of reduced fossil-fuel use. On the other hand, environmental concerns related to global warming (IPCC, 2007), water scarcity, urban air quality, desertification, among others, affect societal assets in many ways. All of these issues call for correct and agreed upon procedures of energy-sources evaluation, energy-conversion processes, sustainable consumption and production patterns. 2. How Much Energy is Needed? The world average energy consumption per capita is around 1,700 kg oil equivalent per person per year (United Nations, 2005; IEA, 2006; WRI, 2007). Average yearly consumption in Europe is estimated at 3,700 kgoe/person, in Northern America 7,800 kgoe/person, in Southern America 1,100 kgoe/ person, in China 1,400 kgoe/person, in India 500 kgoe/person. Finally, average yearly energy consumption of developing countries is 900 kgoe/person. Assuming a 10% yearly increase at world level, the net yearly increase would be in the order of magnitude of 1.1 × 1012 kgoe/year. Assuming that China and India increase their yearly average energy consumption up to the world average, the net yearly increase would be about 2.0 × 1012 kgoe/year (a non-negligible 17% of yearly world consumption). Assuming finally that China and India reach the energy consumption of European countries, not to talk of Northern America, there would be an annual increase of 6.6 × 1012 kgoe/year, i.e. an impossible annual increase of 60% of the present world energy consumption. Of course, it’s well known that such an increase cannot be reached at present and will be impossible for a while, because consumption increase requires first an increase in the dissipative structure of a country’s economy (infrastructures, vehicles, modern cities, etc.). However, the present trend of economic growth of China, India and several other countries in the so-called developing world is in the range of 6–10% GDP increase per year, with a consequent huge pressure on the world resource basis (Myers and Kent, 2004). Peak oil, coupled to peak-like trends of several important raw resources (copper, aluminium, among others), as well as the apparently exponential growth of the economies of most developing countries, are very likely to boost, in the short run, the global energy

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and resource consumption up to unsustainable levels. Since the choice of constraining the economic growth of still developing countries cannot be defended from any point of view (ethics, equity, economic freedom, actual feasibility), this will require a major readjustment of the present production and consumption patterns in the already developed nations, where competition of developing countries is already boosting prices up and decreasing the availability of primary resources. 3. The Search for Alternatives Since the energy problem is real and urgent, and since energy trade and price affect political and financial equilibria worldwide, the search for alternatives is one of the main concerns of governments, scientists and business people worldwide. Other resources are also crucial (fresh water, arable land, food), but the awareness of their importance has not yet reached the level of attention that fossil fuels and related climate problem are presently facing. We will therefore focus on energy resources, but the same rationale can be applied to all other primary resources worldwide. The end of cheap fossil fuel era is often believed to make alternatives much more feasible. In short, if the cost of a barrel of oil goes up, solar energy, biomass fuels, wind energy, tar sands, nuclear energy etc., are expected to become competitive very soon. The goal of the present paper is not to investigate the technical feasibility of such alternatives in the short run (i.e. the possibility of quick growth of industrial production potential as well as the availability of primary resources – e.g. copper or rare earths) nor the different environmental problems generated by new technical processes, nor even the financial problems mainly consisting in the fact that construction of new infrastructures and devices requires investments. We will give all of these problems for granted and solved. What we are going to investigate is the characteristics that an energy sources must possess in order to be able to replace an existing one, namely fossil fuels. Failure to do so would immediately require a different social and economic structure less dependent on large energy input. 3.1. ENERGY RETURN ON ENERGY INVESTMENT (EROI)

For an energy generation process to be feasible, the energy it provides must be higher than the energy it requires. When the energy cost of recovering a barrel of oil becomes greater than the energy content of the oil extracted, production is discontinued, no matter what the monetary price may be. This involves the concept of “Net Energy” and definition of an “energy cost” of


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energy, and the introduction of the so-called EROI (Energy Return on Energy Investment, Cleveland et al., 1984; Cleveland, 2005; Figure 1). Energy Investment Ein,2

Energy Investment Ein,1 Ein Resource in the ground

Extraction process

Extracted resource

Refining process

Refined resource

Eout

Figure 1. Definition of EROI – Energy Return on Investment

These concepts are easily quantified by the following Equations: Net Energy = Eout – Ein EROI = Eout / Ein Net-to-Gross Ratio = (Eout–Ein)/Eout = 1 – 1/EROI In short, the EROI is defined as the ratio of the energy that is obtained as output of a given energy extraction process to the total energy that is invested for its extraction, processing, and delivery, including the energy embodied in the goods and machinery used. The lower the EROI, the smaller the net advantage provided by a given energy source. Investing one joule in a source with high EROI, provides a net return of many joules in support of the investor’s economy. Fossil sources provided high EROI’s in the past, up to 100:1, but values have been declining down to the present 20:1 and less, as shown by Cleveland (2005), due to the exploitation of the most favourable and higher quality fossil reservoirs, and are expected to decrease further. Figure 1 also defines the net energy of a source and shows the relation of EROI to the net-to-gross ratio, the latter being the fraction that the net energy is of the total energy delivered by a process to the investor. A net-to-gross ratio lower than one means that a source does not deliver any net energy. Such a ratio can be used as a measure of the ability of a source (or a fuel) to support societal activities. Society needs energy to run economic (agriculture, industry) and service (transportation, education, health sectors, etc.) activities. A high EROI allows society to run more activities out of a small investment in the energy sector. When EROI’s of energy sources decline, the same gross energy expenditure translates into a smaller net, after subtracting conversion

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losses and energy investment. Figure 2 describes four scenarios of different EROI values. The higher EROI (20:1) in the figure characterizes the present situation of fossil fuels, the lower ones (2:1 and 1.2:1) characterize the present situation of most biofuels from food crops (oilseeds, cereals, sugarbeet). Renewable energy sources such as wind electricity and solar photovoltaic electricity seem to fall within a range of values around 5:1, and the same is expected for biofuels from cellulosics (so-called second generation biofuels), when several existing technical conversion problems will be solved. 250

Net energy

Mtoe/yr

200

23

67

150 100 50 0

107

166

53

100

40

10

20:1 Energy investment

33

130 60

11

5:1 Conversion losses

2:1

1.2:1

EROI

Figure 2. Comparison of the energy investment needed and net energy available for Italy, year 2004. A total energy expenditure of 200 Mtoe/year is assumed and evaluated according to four different EROIs (Energy Return on Investment). The higher EROI (20:1) characterizes the present situation of fossil fuels, the lower (1.2:1) characterizes the present situation of most biofuels

It clearly appears that the net energy available to a society running on low EROI values would be much smaller (23 Mtoe/year out of 200 Mtoe/ year of gross energy expenditure in Figure 2) and therefore not much would be left to support development and growth. Of course, it may be possible to decrease conversion losses, use resources more effectively, increase recycling patterns, decrease luxury consumption, reverse population trends, and still keep a life style at an acceptable level (Odum and Odum, 2001, 2006) even running on lower EROI sources. However, Figure 2 together with a careful look at the breakdown of modern societal energy consumption in the different sectors (health and education, primary production,


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transportation) indicates that EROI values lower than 4:1 are unlikely to support a developed society. 4. Bioenergy Fuels from biomass are most often proposed as substitutes for fossil fuels, in order to meet present and future shortages. Although the scientific literature on biofuel production techniques is abundant, comprehensive evaluations of large-scale biofuel production as a response to fossil energy depletion are few and controversial. The complexity of the assessments involved and the ideological biases in the research of both opponents and proponents of biofuel production make it difficult to weigh the contrasting information found in the literature. Moreover, the dubious validity of extrapolating results obtained at the level of an individual biofuel plant or farm to entire societies or ecosystems has rarely been addressed explicitly. Hoogwijk et al. (2003), after performing a thorough review of a large number of studies for biofuel production from cereals, sugar and oil seed crops as well as cellulosics worldwide, reach the conclusion that “it is therefore not ‘a given’ that biomass for energy can become available at a largescale”. Berndes et al. (2003), based on the same set of data conclude that “The question how an expanding bioenergy sector would interact with other land uses, such as food production, biodiversity, soil and nature conservation, and carbon sequestration has been insufficiently analyzed... It is therefore difficult to establish to what extent bioenergy is an attractive option for climate change mitigation in the energy sector”. Furthermore, the world context changed abruptly in the last two years. Price of cereals increased all over the world, due to increased price of fossil fuels, increased demand for food by an increasing population and increased use of cereals as animal feedstock. Moreover, the increased attention of Governments for the environmental problems generated by CO2 emissions translated into increased implementation of biofuel production programmes (everywhere, but mainly in the United States, Brazil, European Union, Canada), thus affecting scarcity of cereals for food and feed. The previously isolated critical voices towards biofuel production (Pimentel et al., 1981, 1988, Pimentel, 1991; Giampietro et al., 1997; Ulgiati, 2001) found larger audience and gave rise to a much deeper evaluation of pro’s and con’s of such a business and its consequences on world agriculture, land management and food supply. The United Nations General Assembly discussed the topic of the right to food, based on an alarming Report submitted on August 2007 by the Special UN Rapporteur on the right to food, Jean Zigler (United Nations, 2007). In his report, “the Special Rapporteur is gravely concerned that

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biofuels will bring hunger in their wake. The sudden, ill-conceived, rush to convert food – such as maize, wheat, sugar and palm oil – into fuels is a recipe for disaster. There are serious risks of creating a battle between food and fuel that will leave the poor and hungry in developing countries at the mercy of rapidly rising prices for food, land and water. If agro-industrial methods are pursued to turn food into fuel, then there are risks that unemployment and violations of the right to food may result, unless specific measures are put in place to ensure that biofuels contribute to the development of small-scale peasant and family farming.” The Report also highlights that “there has been little production and investment in what are known as ‘second-generation’ cellulose-based fuels which could convert non-food crops and agricultural wastes (for example, the fibrous stalks of wheat) for production”. Finally, the Alternative Energy Working Group at the International Forum on Globalization (IFG, 2007) analyses the feasibility of biomass fuels from a variety of substrates and the social, environmental and economic consequences of such a strategy, and concludes that Governments are putting “a policy priority on an energy source with little if any net energy return, which contributes to climate change rather than alleviating the problem, and which contributes to several other serious environmental problems... It is also having a devastating impact on traditional farm communities and indigenous peoples around the world. None of this unfortunate transition would be possible without massive government subsidies”. The IFG Report makes “the important distinction between large-scale and smallscale, locally operated and owned biofuels activities which can be relatively benign in their impacts and useful in local economic situations… Focus is on the largescale, industrial biofuel operations, run by global megaagriculture corporations that bulldoze local economies and food systems…”. 4.1. TO WHAT EXTENT WOULD A LARGE SCALE BIOFUEL PRODUCTION REALLY BE ABLE TO REPLACE FOSSIL FUELS?

The terms biomass and biofuels are most often used as synonyms, as if liquid transportation fuels were the only way to extract energy out of photosynthetic substrates. “Biomass” indicates all kinds of organic materials (mainly compounds of carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen and oxygen) derived from photosynthesis, including the whole metabolic chain through animals and human societies, yielding animal products and all kinds of waste materials from the use and processing of organic matter use. While it is not always true that the main value of biomass relies in its actual energy content, it cannot be disregarded


Biochemical conversion

Thermochemical conversion Combustion

Pyrolysis Liquefaction HTU

Gasification

Gas

Steam

Gas Oil

Steam Gas turbine, Methanol/ turbine combined hydrocarbons/ hydrogen cycle, engine synthesis

Fuel cell

Heat

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Digestion

Charcoal

Diesel

Electricity

Extraction (oilseeds)

Distillation

Esterification

Ethanol

Bio-diesel

Biogas

Gas engine

Upgrading

Fermentaion

Fuels

Figure 3. Biomass to energy conversion patterns (Turkenburg et al., 2000)

that biomass can be converted to energy via several conversion patterns, including processing to biofuels (Figure 3). “Biofuels” in general indicates liquid products from biomass processing, to be used for transportation purposes. The same term sometimes also refers to gaseous compounds (biogas). It clearly appears that biomass (including waste materials) is a substrate generated via photosynthetic or metabolic processes, while a biofuel is only one of the possible products of biomass processing (together with heat, biogas, electricity, chemicals). Misunderstanding the difference between biomass and biofuels leads to erroneous estimates about the potential of energy biomass in support to human activities. Processing biomass into biofuels for the transport sector requires specifically-grown substrates and several conversion steps, each one characterized by its own efficiency and conversion losses. Instead, direct biomass conversion to heat or waste biomass conversion to biogas is most often characterized by better performance, and is therefore more likely to provide a contribution to at least a small fraction of the energy requirement in sectors other than transportation systems. A correct understanding of the role of biomass would help meeting the EU and international demand for increased share of biomass energy, without competing with food production (cropping for energy) and wilderness conservation (energy forest plantations).

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4.2. AN OVERVIEW OF SELECTED RESULTS FOR BIOFUELS

Published literature is rich with estimates about biofuels. The above cited Hoogwijk et al. (2003), and Berndes et al. (2003), provide an exhaustive overview of many of them. Table 1 shows an estimate of the energy investments and costs of biofuel production in Italy, years 2002–2005 (Giampietro and Ulgiati, 2005). The Table also shows four different options for the calculation of the EROI depending upon use of residues as progress energy source as well as upon possible energy credit for use of DDGS (Distillers Dried Grains with Solubles) as animal feedstock. TABLE 1. Global energy performance of selected biofuel systems in Italy, 2002–2005

Substrate production (wet matter) Oil equivalent demand per unit of g/g substrate Biofuel production Oil equivalent demand per unit of biofuel Net energy yield Energy efficiency Energy output/(direct and indirect) energy input for substrate Energy output/(direct and indirect) energy input for biofuel: (a) Use of residues as energy source, credit for feedstock (b) Use of residues as energy source, no credit for feedstock (c) No residues as energy source, credit for feedstock use (d) No residues as energy source, no feedstock credit

Corn

Sunflower

Wood

0.09

0.24

0.05

Ethanol

Diesel

Methanol

g/g 0.60 0.82 0.108 MJ/ha 1.89E + 04 4.88E + 03 1.40E + 03 Corn

Sunflower

Wood

3.82

2.59

4.24

Ethanol

Biodiesel

Methanol

1.50

1.21

(n/a) 1.10

1.15

0.98

0.65

1.51

(n/a)

0.58

1.16

(n/a)

Figure 4 shows values of the EROI of corn bioethanol calculated between 1995 and 2005 by several authors (NCGA, 2006). Some of the results in the Figure provide EROIs lower than one, or in other terms no net energy yield. Disregarding the most “pessimistic” estimates, the average EROI is shown to be around 1.30:1, while it drops to 1.13:1 if such estimates are taken into account. Figure 4 is in good agreement with Giampietro and Ulgiati (2005), where ranges 0.58–1.51:1 are shown. Finally, a more


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Figure 4. Comparison among selected results for corn production worldwide (National Corn Growers Association, www.ncga.com, 2006)

recent estimate (Pimentel et al., 2007) sets the EROI of ethanol from corn around 0.70. Studies about bioethanol from sugarcane are mainly based on the Brazilian experience and show EROIs around 3–4:1 (Ulgiati et al., 1997) However, the environmental problems (competition for arable land, deforestation, soil erosion, air pollution from burning, water pollution from conversion process), amplified by the large scale of the Brazilian case, are well known and place a significant concern on the sustainability of the whole process (NATB-FHB, 2006; Comar and Gusman Ferraz, 2008). An estensive literature is also available for bioethanol from intensive short rotation woody crops (SRWC) and other cellulosic materials. EROIs in the range 4–7:1 and higher are reported by several Authors on the basis of test experiments and simulations, but conversion of lignocellulosic material is still limited by very difficult hydrolysis and fermentation steps. For example, Cardona and Sanchez (2006) provide results from a simulation with Aspen Plus, that yields an EROI in the range of 7:1. Further values for crops and cellulosic materials are available at http://www.joanneum.at/ biomitre/. A review of selected published papers and reports is found in

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Elsayed et al. (2003), who provide a standardized comparison of several published analyses of biomass use for thermal and biofuel purposes. In general lignocellulosic biomass is still mainly used for thermal conversion to steam or electricity. Moreover, other uses (e.g. pulp and paper production) compete for cellulosic materials. Large amounts of cellulosic materials can be obtained from industrial or urban residues and wastes, although their collection, drying and pretreatment is not easy and requires additional energy expenditures. The latter seems to be, at present, the most interesting source of primary materials for conversion to bioenergy, also favored by an energy credit from avoided energy investment for waste disposal. It is worth noting that there is still large uncertainty about data, conversion coefficients and results with bioenergy production worldwide, also significantly relying on the energy credit assigned to co-products and residues. Hoogwijk et al. (2003) extrapolated a final evaluation of biomass potential up to the year 2050. These authors, who are not in principle negative to bioenergy, point out that “the main conclusion of the study is that the range of the global potential of primary biomass (in about 50 years) is very broad quantifed at 33–1,135 EJ year−1.” (Hoogwijk et al., 2003). Such a large range indicates, in our opinion, how uncertain a biomass based development is. The same authors identify the reasons for the uncertainty by underlining that “crucial factors determining biomass availability for energy are: (1) the future demand for food, determined by population growth and diet; (2) the type of food production systems that can be adopted worldwide over the next 50 years; (3) productivity of forest and energy crops; (4) the (increased) use of bio-materials; (5) availability of degraded land; (6) competing land use types, e.g. surplus agricultural land used for reforestation.” 5. New Strategies Needed The constraints placed on biofuels by land, water, environmentral problems are strictly linked to their low EROI. Similar constraints are found when analyzing other renewable energy sources and carriers, such as wind, hydro, photovoltaics, hydrogen, among others. In fact, most of the proposed alternatives, if used on a large industrial scale, might themselves operate at relatively low “net energy” ratios, providing only modest energy return for the energy invested in producing them. As a consequence, we are forced towards the adoption of several different strategies, other than just providing additional energy sources or trying to replace the ones that decline.


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In short, it is urgent and mandatory to act from different sides: (a) User side. Implementing patterns for sustainable use, among which adopting conservation measures, minimizing wasteful and luxury habits, consuming more local products and decreasing unnecessary global trade. Such goals can be achieved by means of a mix of cultural, technological and economic changes. Creating awareness of the way down ahead (Odum and Odum, 2001, 2006), imposing energy and matter efficiency standards, favoring consumption of local products, incentiving research for and application of advanced energy saving technologies, are all tools at hand of Governments and international Institutions. (b) Supply side: larger share of renewables. Once awareness about the need for conservation and efficiency measures is strengthened, introduction of renewables will be easier and more likely to be successful. Due to their lower EROI and lower concentration, renewables operate within constraints that do not allow large industrial scales and therefore it is very likely that their economic cost will not compete with fossil fuels in the short run. Due to the impact of oil price on the price of transport and commodities, a price increase of fossil energy might also make the price of renewables to increase, in spite of expectations and hopes. As a consequence, renewables will be affordable in the long run only if coupled to measures that decrease energy and material demand. (c) Optimization of production and use patterns. Ecosystems recycle every kind of waste. The concept itself of “waste” is no longer appropriate for ecosystems. The products from one component or compartment are always a useful resource for another component or compartment. The detritus chain in ecosystems is a clear example of this statement. Human dominated ecosystems should be reorganized according to the same principle, for maximum material and energy resource use and zero emissions (Schnitzer and Ulgiati, 2007a). In traditional linear production systems resource are processed and passed on to the next step and unused wastes are released to the environment. As a consequence, the energy and material cost of the product is higher and the efficiency lower, as well as a higher load is imposed on the environment in the form of emissions. It is very unlikely for such systems to be successful in medium and long-term competition, when resources become scarcer. While a large literature exists about points (a) and (b), less research is performed on the topic (c). “Eco-efficiency”, the current industrial buzzword, has provided for a first notion that production can be “cleaner”,

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energy consumption can be reduced and water can be saved. However, the application of the concept of eco-efficiency will neither save the environment nor foster ingenuity and productivity. Environmental management systems can install the concept of cleaner production and active compliance in a company’s culture: these management systems however are apparently unlikely to lead to the radical innovations which are considered necessary to approach sustainable business models and do hardly utilise the possibilities that lay in cooperation between companies. In general, they also fail in “making the world’s problems the company’s problems”, like fighting climate change, unemployment and social inequity. So radical changes towards sustainable products and a clean and safe system of production have yet to be developed and implemented in all sectors of industry. In order to make production more environmentally and socially compatible, four main strategies are needed (Schnitzer and Ulgiati, 2007b): (a) Minimising natural resources and energy consumption, by means of: •

Focus on more efficient production systems, machines, industrial processes and plants

•

Development of extended enterprises, knowledge-based supply chains and production networks, virtual manufacturing and methods to increase overall effectiveness and making optimal use of resources

•

Shift from depleatable fossil resources to renewable ones.

(b) Moving towards Zero Waste Production, by: •

Modernising industrial processes through clean production techniques aiming at reduction of gas emissions, effluents and solid residues and contributing to climate and environmental protection

•

Developing products-services through a life cycle approach.

(c) Changing production and consumption patterns, in order to achieve: •

Risk minimisation with a significant improvement in working and living conditions

•

Optimisation and monitoring of resource use and product-service generation over the whole life cycle

•

Recovery, treatment and safe re-use of products and industrial waste.

(d) Learning from nature, i.e. adopting production links and patterns based on: •

Web-like system interaction among process actors and components

•

Development of nature-based processes: “soft” technologies, bacteria, enzymes, green chemistry, renewable substrates.


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In an integrated, “zero-emission” strategy, processes are reorganized and clustered in such a way that unused resources become the raw input to new production patterns. According to Gravitis and Suzuki (1999), while in the conventional way of production the main resources are matter, energy and labor, “zero-emission” patterns rely to a large extent on knowledge, i.e. on better information about needs of and surpluses from each component as well as about technological tools for resource processing and exchange. The Zero Emission concept “represents a shift from the traditional industrial model in which wastes are considered the norm to integrated systems in which everything has its use. It advocates an industrial transformation whereby businesses emulate the sustainable cycles found in nature and where society minimizes the load it imposes on the natural resource base and learns to do more with what the earth produces” (ZEF, 1999). A significant experience in this regard is the so-called Industrial Symbiosis in the Danish town of Kalundborg, (Evans, 1995; Ehrenfeld and Gertler, 1997; http://www.symbiosis.dk/), where a careful planning around a oil refinery/oil power plant system and the local waste management Agency allows huge savings of surface and ground water (3 million cubic meters/ year), fuel oil (20,000 t/year), and decreased SO2 emissions. Due to the interaction of this industrial complex with other local firms, about 80,000 t/year of combustion ashes are delivered to local building enterprises for its use as additive to cement production; hot water is delivered to a large number of smaller users as well as to the city district heating; nickel and vanadium are extracted from ashes and exported; sulphur, fertilizers, enzymes, recycled materials are also extracted in large amounts and marketed. It is important to underline that the Kalundborg Eco-Industrial Park was not initially designed as such, but gradually evolved over a number of decades when the participants discovered that the establishment of energy and waste exchanges resulted in economic benefits for all parties involved. Further information about the development of industrial symbiosis experiences and eco-industrial parks can be found in Gertler (1996), Heeres et al. (2004), Desrochers (2004). If integrated production patterns are implemented, they are expected to contribute to energy and material conservation as well as to improve environmental problems, in that: (a) Less resources would be required to drive the global multi-product process than it would be needed if each sub-process were driven individually (just think of co-generating electricity and hot water). (b) Less resources would be released unused and potentially able to drive undesired environmental transformations; as a consequence, less load

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on the environment is generated or less resources need to be invested for safe disposal of wastes. (c) Synergic effects (i.e. increase of benefits) would become possible, due to exchange and collaboration links among components, with large benefit to the economic activity. (d) The total output would be maximized, since additional products are generated by usefully degrading still usable resources, instead of releasing them unused. 6. Local Integration of Production Activities. The Case of the Campania Region, Italy The Campania region, in Southern Italy, is characterized by fertile land and small-scale high-quality agricultural production. Products are processed by local small and medium food manufacturing enterprises, with interesting follow up on local economy and labor. Due to international market globalization and the high prices of energy, the small local farms and enterprises are hardly able to compete with the low prices of imported commodities, in spite of the high quality of their products. Furthermore, the environmental problems usually linked to production and manufacturing place a higher constraint on production activities. The agricultural and agro-industrial systems is characterized by large amounts of unused waste from agricultural production as well as from food manufacture that cause large energy and financial expenditure for disposal. Due to such expenditures, the practice of non-appropriate or illegal waste management and disposal is also adopted by some entrepreneurs, unable to cope with decreasing incomes. Therefore, environmental and economic problems call for an innovative strategy to ensure further sources of income for enterprise survival and, at the same time, enforced environmental protection. An integrated system is therefore being implemented in selected areas of the region, aimed at exploring the technical, economic, energetic, environmental and social feasibility of Zero Waste/Zero Emission production patterns in the local agro-industry. Six different main production chains were identified in the Region: (a) Olives and olive oil production; (b) grape and wine production; (c) tomato production and manufacture; (d) cattle farms and dairy production; (e) citruses (lemons and oranges) for juice, alcohols and food integrators production; (f) Forest management and forest extraction for timber.


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Inventory of waste generated (and hardly disposed of) was performed, yielding large amounts of: •

Oil stones, husks and wastewater

•

Grape pomace, skin and seeds

•

Tomato seeds and skin, wastewater

•

Wastewater from cattle farms and dairy production, with non-negligible organic matter content

•

Agricultural and forest lignocellulosic residues (straw, prunings).

Figure 5 shows the diagram of the so-called “Parthenope Integrated System”, named after the University where it was designed. Several agricultural, conversion, manufacture, energy generation and recycling steps are designed in order to give rise to an integrated system with exchange of resources among components. The size of each component production unit is being evaluated in order to adjust flows and storages properly and optimize the use of available resources. Developing a local system of productive activities requires high integration among components (farms, SME’s, labs), use of renewable resources, research and technological innovation, and finally, reliance on local expertise and production ability. Expected products are, among others: •

Bulk chemicals for chemical, pharmaceutical and cosmetic industries (cellulose, tartaric acid, tartates, enocianine, essential oils, etc.)

•

Biopolimers (degradable plastics, proteins, textiles)

•

Food co-products (grape-seed oil, proteins)

•

Decentralized Bioenergy production (biogas, biodiesel, heat)

•

Compost, fertilizers

•

Animal feedstock.

Additional expected results, on a macroeconomic scale, are: •

Added value to the main products, in terms of image and decreased production expenses

•

Creation of new jobs in agriculture and food industry, as well as in chemical, biotechnological and bioenergy sectors

•

Additional income from innovative co-products

•

Implementation of a production model which can be exported to other areas and contribute to a different local economic development.

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Electricity & Heat

Figure 5. The diagram of the so-called “Parthenope Integrated System”. Several agricultural, conversion, manufacture, energy generation and recycling steps are integrated for optimized use of available local resources


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7. Conclusion The likely decrease of fossil fuels availability due to competition by recently developing countries and to physical depletion places a huge concern on the future of the world economy. Renewable sources are constrained by low net energy returns and their contribution is not expected to be able to support the present energy-intensive features of world economy, especially if developing nations increase the size of their production and consumption sectors. A radical shift to sustainable production and consumption patterns is urgently needed, not to rely on the false promises of additional unlimited new energy supply, be it renewable or non-renewable. Such a shift requires several integrated strategies at global and local scales to be adopted. We suggest in this paper that local optimization of resource use by means of integrated agricultural and agro-industrial clusters (integrated zero-emission systems) leads to better exploitation of available resources, enforced environmental protection, decreased demand of nonrenewable energy and resources, and finally increase of jobs and business opportunities. Such a local improvement, if implemented as a radically innovative pattern in other areas and countries, is likely to contribute to the efforts of international and national scientific, political and business communities towards designing more sustainable economic strategies for the well-being of humanity and nature.

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BIOREFINERY: BIOMATERIALS AND BIOENERGY FROM PHOTOSYNTHESIS, WITHIN ZERO EMISSIONS FRAMEWORK JANIS GRAVITIS* Latvian State Institute of Wood Chemistry, Dzerbenes iela 27, Riga LV-1006, Latvia

Abstract: Success of up-to-date and efficient technological implementations of biomass conversion becomes particularly important as the deposits of non-renewable resources are being depleted. The products of photosynthesis could be the only available source of chemicals, advanced biomaterials, organic fuels and biopower. Under conditions of severe competition for the carriers of captured solar energy efficient and sustainable consumption of the unique bioresource should be extremely important for the future nonfood products from biotechnological/thermo-chemical biorefineries required to replace the present petrochemical refineries. The main targets are the increase of photosynthesis efficiency and integration of new technologies into clusters of near-Zero Emissions biorefineries. Production of biofuels and ability of using existing infrastructures are significant factors for future biorefineries. Open-system thermodynamics should be applied to strengthen Zero Emissions and Biorefineries concepts. Keywords: Biorefinery, photosynthesis, bioenergy, zero emissions.

1. Biomass and Biorefinery 1.1. BIOMASS

Biomass (more correctly, phytomass) is a very diverse material of no exact chemical formula (Gravitis, 2007a). For average biomass the mole ratio formula of the main elements – C, H, and O (S and N are minors) is:

______

* Janis Gravitis, Latvian State Institute of Wood Chemistry, Dzerbenes iela 27, Riga LV-1006, Latvia; E-mail: [email protected]


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Biomass = CH1.4O0.6 This formula is workable for a large number of tree and plant species in case water and ash are eliminated from the biomass. On the basis of this formula it is possible to write approximate chemical equations for different processes of chemical conversion of biomass. For instance, gasification of biomass would be presented by

CH1.4O0.6 + 0.35O2 → 0.4CO + 0.6H2 + 0.4CO2 + 0.1H2O + 0.2C 1.2. WHAT IS A BIOREFINERY?

The Latvian State Institute of Wood Chemistry defines (Gravitis, 2006) biorefinery as a cluster of technologies integrating biomass conversion into transportation fuels, power, chemicals, and advanced materials within the framework of zero emissions and is based on two platforms (Figure 1). As accented by Kamm and Kamm (2004), “Biorefineries combine the necessary technologies between biological raw materials and industrial CHEMICALS AND MATERIALS

Furfural Levoglucosan Fibers Biodegradable polymers Nano-materials ………

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Biomass co-firing with coal Biodiesel Bioethanol Charcoal

Figure 1. Two platforms of the biomass refinery concept of the laboratory of eco-efficient biomass conversion of the Latvian State Institute of Wood Chemistry

intermediates and final products”. The principal goal in the development of biorefineries is defined as (biomass) feedstock-mix + process-mix Æ product-mix”.

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The biorefinery concept is the analogue of today’s petroleum refineries producing multiple fuels and products from petroleum. Industrial biorefineries have been identified as the most promising route to creation of a new domestic bio-based industry. By producing multiple products, a biorefinery takes advantage of the differences in biomass components and intermediates to maximize the value derived from the biomass feedstock. A biorefinery might, for example, produce one or several low-volume, but high-value, chemical products and a low-value, but high-volume liquid transportation fuel, while generating electricity and heat for its own use and, perhaps, enough of electricity for sale. The high-value products enhance profitability, the high-volume fuel helps to meet the national energy needs, and the power production reduces costs and avoids emissions of the greenhouse gases. By a combination of chemistry, biotechnology, engineering and systems approach, biorefineries could produce food, feed, fertilizers, industrial chemicals, fuels, and power from biomass. Crucial for the development of the biorefinery concept is the view that our planet cannot act as a reservoir of infinite fossil resources or a sink for an infinite flow of waste. For that reason biorefinery should go to the direction of integrated clusters of Zero Emissions technology (Gravitis, 1999). Figure 2 demonstrates biorefineries network as a flow-chart of biobased products (Kamm et al., 2006). The future biorefineries are illustrated in Figure 3. as a combination of different thermo- and bio-technologies (Brown, 2005). 2. Efficiency of Photosynthesis 2.1. ENERGY ASSESSMENT AND THE ROLE OF RUBISKO ENZYME

Assessment of the availability of biomass resource for biorefineries can change with time. Social and environmental factors, political decisions, land use, etc. are not static. Efficiency of photosynthesis is another factor. Some plants in the Nature often have 1–2% energy conversion efficiency. Sugarcane can have almost 8% efficiency. However, many of the natural plants often have only 0.1% energy efficiency. Photosynthesis is bonding CO2 with H2O to make sugars and oxygen O2 using the energy of solar radiation. Some enzymes typically can carry out thousands of chemical reactions each second. The RuBisCo (Ribulose – 1,5 Bisphosphate carboxylase/oxygenase) enzyme, the most abundant enzyme in the world, catalyzes the first major step of the CO2 fixation (Lodish et al.,

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2002). RuBisCo from higher plants and most photosynthetic microorganisms consist of eight large L chains (56 kD) and eight small S chains (14 kD) giving an L8S8 octo-dimer. Unfortunately, RuBisCo is slow, being able to fix only a few CO2 molecules per second and is the prime factor limiting the rate of photosynthesis. Efficiency of plant enzymes may hold the key to global warming. Many genetic engineering efforts are being made to increase the RuBisCo efficiency of carbon fixation and facilitate efficiency of photosynthesis in general.

Figure 2. Model of a biobased flow-chart for biomass feedstock Adapted from Kamm, et al. (2006)

2.2. PHOTOSYNTHETIC ORGANISMS AS BIOLOGICAL MACHINES

Amount of energy consumed by humans is only 10% of the energy converted by photosynthesis. Integration of technologies into biorefineries is some kind of imitation of natural integrated systems exhibiting processes in which entropy is reduced. Systems based on microorganisms have the ability to reduce entropy. Recently the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE, 2005) issued a comprehensive plan (Genomes to life (GTL)) based on genome project investment to help solving of the national environmental and energy challenges. The main actors could be thousands of microbial species.


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“Microbes can be used for processes and products that can serve as an engine for economic competitiveness in the 21st century,” the Secretary of energy Samuel W. Bodman said. The new ambitious plan was formulated over three years with participation of nearly 800 scientists and technology experts.

Figure 3. Types of different biorefineries (Brown, 2005); (a) – whole-grain biorefinery; (b) – lignocellulosic biorefinery with thermo-chemical processing of lignin;(c) – lingocellulosic biorefinery with pure thermo-chemical processing; (d) – lignocellulosic biorefinery with syngas fermentation.

Biological conversions of energy can be divided into two groups. One is photosynthesis by which the energy of solar radiation is converted in the form available for organisms (plants, algae and photosynthetic bacteria) and industry. The second group is biomass conversion into energy. These microorganisms often are non-photosynthetic. It is interesting to note that blue-green algae (cyanobacteria) and photosynthetic bacteria are hydrogen producers. The photosynthetic bacteria can also produce hydrogen. These are new opportunities for hydrogen energetics.

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3. Transgenic Trees 3.1. HOW TO INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY OF FOREST

Renewable biomass production may be advanced by genetic modification (genetic engineering) of trees the genes being added to or taken out of the genome of a particular species using techniques such as recombinant DNA and mutagenesis. Compared with conventional selective breeding or hybriddization genetic engineering is a much faster way to incorporate desired genes. As mentioned by Roger A. Sedjo (2004), “we arrive at the curious situation: the goods (raw wood and wood products from transgenic trees) will likely be widely traded but the important technology (transgenic seeds) may not.” Genetic modification of wood is directly connected with interests of pulp and paper industries. In the USA, the energy-consuming process of turning wood into paper by separation of lignin from cellulose at high temperatures and expenses on water and chemicals costs more than $6 billion a year. Recently, Dr. Vincent L. Chiang’s group of the Michigan Technological University altered a key lignin gene in aspen. The modified variety produces less lignin and more cellulose needed to make paper. Chiang and his colleagues achieved a 50% reduction in lignin by blocking the gene responsible for synthesizing it. The modified trees were also 25–30% taller, with 15% more cellulose. Although the reason for the greater height isn’t clear, Chiang suspects that compounds stimulating growth have been affected by the genetic alteration (Anonymous, 2003). Harvesting such trees would be like harvesting of forest “crops” reducing the pressure on the existing forests and can solve the land use problem. These results extend beyond paper production since they could make more practical producing biofuels, such as ethanol, from wood. 3.2. NANOMATERIALS FROM FORESTRY PRODUCTS

Efficient pre-treatment technologies and new uses of lignocellulosic biomass are needed for future bio-refineries. One of perspective pre-treatment technologies is steam explosion auto-hydrolysis, SEA (Gravitis and Abolins, 2007). Such kind of pre-treatment facilitates separation of the lignocellulosic biomass components providing biofuels, chemicals, and nano-materials in a single course of action. The nano-structures of cellulose and synthesizing nano-machines on the molecular and supra-molecular levels are more or less clear while the


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supra-molecular structure of lignin is still mysterious. However, the properties of wood as a composite material, for example, high strength, water diffusion, etc. tremendously depend on the structure of lignin. Supra-molecular nanoparticles bridge the gaps between isolated monomers and the bulk material of cell walls. The experimentally observed nano-particles that make new modifications of cell walls possessing specific properties manifest the size-dependent properties of the SEA technology. Studies of the natural cell wall nano-structures and dynamics open diverse opportunities for biomimetic learning and transferring the knowledge to modifying of the existing natural products or making artificial nano-systems. It is essential that all cell wall nano-structures are biodegradable. 4. Biofuels 4.1. EFFICIENCY OF PRODUCTION OF DIFFERENT BIOFUELS

In the process of production of biofuels the main problem is the land use efficiency. Efficiency of production of biofuels from the same reference area is different for different crops. A leaflet1 impressively illustrates the statement (Figure 4). Biomethane and Biomass-to-liquid (BTL) are very efficient fuel technologies. The efficiency of rapeseed oil, biodiesel and bioethanol is much lover. However, efficiency of the latter could be improved utilizing their byproducts. Biomethane and bioethanol are used in petrol engines while vegetable oil, biodiesel and BTL are suitable for diesel engines. 4.2. THE BIOFUEL MYTHS?

Not all people agree that biofuels will be useful in the coming oil peak. Holt-Gimenez (2007) writes about four bioufuel myths: •

Myth 1: Biofuels are clean and green.

•

Myth 2: Biofuels will not result in deforestation.

•

Myth 3: Biofuels will bring rural development.

•

Myth 4: Biofuels will not cause hunger.

Unfortunately, the author’s arguments are rather emotional and far from scientific evidence. His statement that “every ton of palm oil generates 33 t of carbon dioxide emissions – 10 times more than petroleum” is simply

______ 1

Leaflet. Fachagentur Nachwachsende Rohstoffee. V. (Distributed at the 15th European Biomass Conference, Berlin, 2007).

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erroneous. The statement that biofuels will increase conflict between North and South is a political presumption. No doubt, we need a discussion of all the pro and con but only based on scientific grounds.

Figure 4. Biofuels in comparison. (Adapted from the leaflet1) Assumption is that fuel consumption: petrol engine 7.4l/100 km, diesel engine 6.1 l/100 km. White sectors of rapeseed, biodiesel and bioethanol show possible increase of biofuel production from utilization of their byproducts. Reference area – 1 ha

5. Could we be Able to Use the Existing Infrastructure? One of the crucial questions in transfer from fossil oil to biomass based production platform is whether we can continue to use the existing infrastructure. One optimistic example is ForesteraTM – Liquefied Wood Fuel Project (Nieminen and Gust, 2002). The process is based on fast pyrolysis (Figure 5). The liquid fractions can be transported by existing systems and the heating system of boilers does not need to be reconstructed (Figure 6). The next example is Brazilian experience with petroleum cars. Now they are using the same cars for bioethanol as the driving fuel. In any case it seems that we could look more optimistic to possible use of the existing infrastructure. Unfortunately, in many cases new engineering solutions are necessary.


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Figure 5. The ForesteraTM fast pyrolysis process (Nieminen and Gust, 2002)

Figure 6. ForesteraTM transportation and heating systems without change of exsisting infrastructure (Nieminen and Gust, 2002)

6. Limitations and Unsolved Scientific Problems 6.1. SKIDDING OF THE CENTRAL DOGMA OF MOLECULAR BIOLOGY

The “dogma” was proposed in the 1950s to explain functions of the double helix. All biological processes are under gene control. DNA codes genetic information. No genetic information can be transferred back to DNA. However, the paradox is that the biosynthetic pathway of lignin, the next abundant polymer after cellulose on the Earth, is not completely genetically controlled, the physicochemical control also playing an important role.

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Genetically controlled is only the monomer level while the polymerization process is out of control by genes (Gravitis, 2007b). 6.2. BIOMASS SYNTHESIS AND CONVERSION COMPLEXITY

The mentioned skidding of the central dogma increases complexity of biorefineries. If we believe that nature (the territory) is complex and laws (the map) of nature are simple (simplicity vs complexity), then, in the case of biorefineries and green chemistry, we would be far from strong science. We neither know our territory nor have an adequate map. From the viewpoint of the second law of thermodynamics, zero emissions are impossible. From the long-term and cosmic-scale perspective, according to the Second Law, we dissipate our resources irreversibly. However, according to Erwin Schrödinger (1944), only biomass by feeding negative entropy avoids the decay and dissipation of materials. The zero emissions biorefineries cluster imitates a natural trophic (food) chains network where there is no “waste”. Of course, analogy between natural biological and industrial networks is rather symbolic. There are many significant aspects that differ in both the worlds. Our ideal is a near-zero-emissions integrated biorefineries cluster. To explain biorefineries we should consider an open system by far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics. This is a future target for description of a biorefinery. We are looking forward to attractive multidisciplinary case studies applying mathematical modeling and computer simulations. However, there is lack of a general theory of zero emissions and biorefineries. Perhaps biocomplexity and nonlinear dynamics are closely related to nonlinear interaction among the biological, physical and social phenomena of the Earth biosphere. In any case, the biosphere is an open system consuming solar energy. So, the order emerging at the edge of chaos and thermodynamics of open systems may be the ground wherefrom to look for a general theory.

References Anonymous, 2003, Transgenic trees hold promise for pulp and paper industries, Science Daily, 8 April. www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2003/04/030408090203.htm Brown, R.C., 2005, The future of biorefining agricultural biomass, farm foundation. http://www.farmfoundation.org/projects/documents/RobertC.Brownpaper.pdf DOE, 2005, Genomics: GTL roadmap systems biology for energy and environment. (Kindly sent by Genome Management Information System Oak Ridge National Laboratory).


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Gravitis, J., 1999, Biorefinery and lignocellulosics economy towards zero emissions. In: Targeting Zero Emissions for the Utilisation of Renewable Resources (Biorefinery, Chemical Risk Reduction, Lignocellulosic Economy), K. Iijama, J. Gravitis, A. Sakoda, eds., Tokyo, Japan, Published by UNU/IAS, ANESC/UT and IIS/UT, 2–11. Gravitis, J., 2006, Green biobased chemistry platform for sustainability. In: Environmental Education, Communication and Sustainability, vol. 23 Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 145–160. Gravitis, J., 2007a, Zero techniques and systems – ZETS strength and weakness. Journal of Cleaner Production, 15(13–14): 1190–1197. Gravitis. J., 2007b, Bio and nano challenges in physicochemistry of lignin. In: Materials of Second International Conference on Physical Chemistry of Lignin. Archangelsk, 12–15. Gravitis., J. and Abolins, J., 2007, Biomass conversion to chemicals and nanomaterials by steam explosion. Oral present. Proceedings of the European 15-th Biomass Conf. Holt-Gimenez, E., 2007, The biofuel myths, International Herald Tribune, July 10. http://www.foodfirst.org/node/1716 Kamm, B. and Kamm, M., 2004, Principles of biorefineries, Applied Microbiology and Biotechnology, 64(2): 137–145. Kamm, B., et al., 2006, Lignocellulosic feedstock biorefinery – combination of technologies of agroforestry and a biobased substance and energy economy. Forum der Forchung, 19: 53–62. Lodish, H., Berk, A., Zipursky, S.L., Matsudaira, P., Baltimore, D., and Darnell, J.E., 2002. Molecular cell biology, 4th edition. W.H. Freeman, New York (Online textbook). Nieminen, J.-P. and S. Gust, 2002, ForesteraTM, pyrolisis and gasification of biomass and waste, 30. Sep. – 1 Oct. 2002, Strasbourrg, France. www.pyne2005.inter-base.net/ docs/472.pdf Schrödinger, E., 1944, What is Life? The physical aspects of living cell. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA. Sedjo, R.A., 2004, Transgenic trees and trade problems on the horizon? Resources, Fall 2004, 9–13. www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-Resources-155-transgenictrees.pdf

GEOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM (GIS) AND EMERGY SYNTHESIS EVALUATION OF URBAN WASTE MANAGEMENT PIER PAOLO FRANZESE*, GIOVANNI FULVIO RUSSO, AND SERGIO ULGIATI Department of Environmental Sciences, Parthenope University of Naples, 80143 Naples, Italy

Abstract: A preliminary assessment of the construction and operation costs of the municipal landfill of Potenza (Southern Italy) is presented. Such an assessment provides a reference for future planned investigations of other existing landfills, in order to quantify the energy, material, and financial investments needed as well as to compare them with improvement or alternative strategies, also taking into account scale factors and waste composition. Geographical Information System (GIS) and Emergy Synthesis (ES) methods are jointly used for the description and evaluation of a managed landfill system in the Province of Potenza (Southern Italy). Focus is placed on the municipal landfill of the town of Potenza, identified as the largest waste management site in the Region. Data about land use, geomorphological structure, existing ground and surface water bodies, and environmental services, were organized within a GIS framework in order to obtain a detailed description of the area and its environmental constraints, providing at the same time suitable data for the emergy evaluation. Results of ES provide a comprehensive understanding of the demand for environmental support to the whole process and may serve as a reference case for GIS-Emergy evaluation of other small and large landfill sites in Italy as well as for needed alternative strategies of waste management. Keywords: GIS, emergy synthesis method, landfill, biogas, waste management.

______ * To whom correspondence should be addressed: Pier Paolo Franzese, Department of Environmental Sciences, Parthenope University of Naples, Centro Direzionale – Isola C4, 80143 Naples, Italy, E-mail: [email protected]


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1. Introduction Developed societies generate increasing amounts of complex wastes that require safe disposal and treatment as an imperative task. In spite of a large existing consensus on the need for waste reduction, reuse, recycling, and conversion to other useful energy forms, waste disposal in landfill sites is still a very common procedure. Landfills are active sites where waste is stored and the dynamics of its degradation is controlled in order to avoid undesired emissions of chemicals to the atmosphere, underground water bodies, and the soil. Therefore, landfills are not the most popular strategy for waste management and a large effort is being made for their reduction and conversion to other types of processing facilities. The prevention of waste production is also being improved by means of eco-design, reuse, recycle and bioconversion strategies, all capable of preventing waste production and delivering to landfills. Neither keeping a landfill active nor converting it into a waste processing plant (for electricity and heat generation) meet the consensus of local populations, due to environmental concerns and high investment costs. For these reasons, it is very important to carefully investigate the investment needed for different waste management procedures, as well as the options for a profitable use of waste management products. Landfill construction and operation is an expensive process from both an economic point of view due to large monetary investments, as well as from a physical point of view due to large material and energy investments. In this paper we present a preliminary assessment of the construction and operation costs of the municipal landfill of Potenza (Southern Italy). Such an assessment provides a reference for future planned investigations of other existing, small and large landfills in Southern Italy in order to quantify the energy, material, and financial investments needed and compare them with improvement or alternative strategies, also taking into consideration scale factors and waste composition. The main releases from a landfill system are biogas and leachate. The greenhouse gas CH4, which is approximately 25 times more effective than carbon dioxide (Jensen et al., 1997, p. 83), represents about 60% of landfill biogas, while the remaining 40% is mainly CO2. Leachate is produced when water passes through the waste in the landfill tank. The water may originate from rain, melted snow, or can be produced by the waste itself. As the liquid moves through the landfill, many organic and inorganic compounds are transported, forming the leachate. It moves by gravity to the base of the landfill tank, where it is finally collected (Bagchi, 2004). Spatially referenced information is a mandatory requirement in several administrative and policy tasks pertaining to local, regional, and national

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government. According to Burrough (1986) and Burrough and McDonnell (1998) a Geographical Information System (GIS) is defined as: “a powerful set of tools for collecting, storing, retrieving at will, transforming, and displaying spatial data from the real world.” Therefore, a GIS was implemented in order to provide an inventory of the active landfills located in the area by means of a georeferenced database, as well as to explore the potential pollution sources related to their technical characteristics, locations, and environmental features. A GIS survey of the whole province was carried out in order to generate a large-scale picture of the waste management system. Then, the resource and energy flows supporting the Potenza municipal landfill were analyzed by using the emergy synthesis method (Odum, 1988, 1996; Brown and Ulgiati, 2004b) in order to calculate the total emergy investment required by the landfill facility during its life cycle and the emergy investment per unit of service provided (i.e., for the safe disposal and treatment of one unit of urban waste). If we consider that about the 20% of the worldwide global emission of CH4 is generated by landfill biogas, which contributes to climate change with a high CO2 equivalence factor, we understand the additional environmental advantage that could be obtained if produced landfill gas were used for energy cost optimization instead of merely released or burned. Recovering energy from landfill gas (as fuel for vehicles, heat production, or electricity generation) could become an interesting opportunity for both avoiding emissions of greenhouse gases and, at the same time, improving the energy balance of waste management processes. 2. Materials and Methods 2.1. THE INVESTIGATED LANDFILL SYSTEM

The Potenza landfill is a multi-tank plant with a total area of about 10 hectares (ha), located in Montegrosso, a village near the town of Potenza, 800 m above sea level. This plant is managed by the Municipal Agency for Environmental Protection of Potenza (A.C.T.A.), which is also in charge of waste collection. The operating landfill tank has a capacity of about 63,000 m3 and it collects, on average, 2.73·1010 g of urban waste per year. Because a complete and optimized waste management system is planned for the whole area, but it is not yet operating, and because, consequently, a sorted waste collection is not yet performed at a significant level, this landfill site collects all kinds of waste material (see percentages in Figure 1 [A.C.T.A. and University of Basilicata, 1999]). This scenario is likely to

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increase environmental problems in several different ways. First of all, landfilling unsorted waste materials does not allow recycling or reusing existing useful fractions of metals, glass, paper, plastic, and organic matter. Moreover, the organic fraction of waste is contaminated by metals and other chemicals, generating a very polluting leachate, which is dangerous for soil quality, the water table, and agricultural activities. 35.0

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For these reasons, an optimized waste management system would require a prior sorting of reusable material, then specific treatment of the organic fraction according to its characteristics (e.g., anaerobic digestion, incineration, composting), only allowing landfilling for the disposal of residual untreated waste. Each landfill tank has a working time of 3 years (the time needed for it to be filled with waste and covered with clay and other materials), but leachate and biogas still continue to be produced over a period of 30–40 years. We must be aware that a landfill is never, and will never, become an inert system. It continues to degrade and release leachate over a very long time frame, after which the landfill should be empty and its content released to the environment in several chemical forms. In this work we assume 30 years as landfill life cycle, since after this period more than 90% of biogas production is carried out, and, consequently, at least part of the necessary safe disposal can be considered accomplished. During the life cycle, leachate is collected from the landfill tank and sent to a special treatment plant in order to minimize environmental pollution, while biogas is collected and burned (or merely released into the atmosphere) very often without any energy recovery (Krzystek et al., 2001; Alfieri et al., 2004). We calculate in this paper the emergy cost (i.e. the environmental support) required to run the landfill as it is, in order to provide


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a reference process and reference performance for designing future improvements of the waste management process in Potenza by means of preliminary material sorting and technological improvement of the whole system. 2.2. GIS ANALYSIS

A GIS analysis was implemented in order to provide an inventory of the active landfills located in Potenza Province (southern Italy), as well as to explore the potential pollution sources related to their technical characteristics, locations, and environmental features. The first step consisted of geo-referencing raster topographic and aerophotographic maps of the whole province. Then, several thematic layers including municipal boundaries, main roads, rivers, landfill sites, contour lines, and quoted points, were vectorized. Next, a first qualitative assessment of the potential environmental load was made by overlaying the vector layers on the thematic maps describing the main environmental features, such as geology, geolithology, permeability, and land use. The system of managed landfills in the Potenza Province was also investigated by means of a geo-referenced database containing information about waste flows, plant management, and meteorological data. The availability of well structured and integrated data allow the implementation of an emergy analysis and synthesis of the whole system, thus shedding light on its demand for environmental support, (i.e., the direct and indirect investment of biosphere activity needed for waste management). Such an evaluation offers a picture of the environmental cost and sustainability of the system of waste management in the area and paves the way to its improvement by identifying the most expensive and less efficient steps of the process, as well as by allowing a qualitative and quantitative comparison with alternative options for waste management. 2.3. EMERGY SYNTHESIS

Emergy synthesis is an energy evaluation method based on irreversible thermodynamics and systems framework. It aims at calculating indicators of environmental performance that account for both natural and economic resources used by human-dominated processes. According to emergy theory (Odum, 1988, 1996) different forms of energy, materials, human labour and economic services, are all evaluated on the common basis of biosphere by converting them into equivalents of only one form of energy, the solar kind, expressed as solar equivalent Joule (seJ). Emergy accounting provides a

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measure of the past and present environmental support to a process, allowing to explore the interplay of natural ecosystem and human activities. Understanding the relationship between energy and the cycles of materials and information may provide insight into the complex interrelationships between society and the biosphere (Brown and Ulgiati, 2004a, b). Based on data provided by the GIS and integrated by other statistical resources, the municipal landfill of Potenza was evaluated by means of the emergy synthesis method. This evaluation allowed the quantitative assessment of both economic and ecological support to the landfill plant on the common basis of solar equivalent energy: the available solar energy used up directly and indirectly to make a service or product (Odum, 1996). Natural and economic flows were calculated. Raw values were multiplied by suitable transformity values and converted to emergy units. The total emergy investment required by the landfill plant over the entire duration of the waste degradation process was estimated and the emergy cost for the safe disposal of unsorted waste (seJ g–1) was calculated in order to provide both a measure of the investment needed for urban waste treatment and a benchmark for future improvement of waste management by means of material sorting and the most suitable designed landfill and technology. The emergy cost (seJ Joule–1) of landfill biogas production was also calculated and compared with the transformity of natural gas and other fossil fuels in order to evaluate the efficiency of the conversion process. In spite of the fact that the upstream sorting of reusable or recyclable waste materials (glass, aluminium, paper, plastic, etc.) is a unavoidable preliminary step urgently needed as the basis of any kind of future improvements of the whole waste management process, in the investigated case organic matter is still collected and landfilled together with other waste categories. For this reason it was not possible to make any distinct evaluation of the emergy cost of recycled and landfilled waste, as they are delivered together to the same final destination. 2.4. EMERGY: THE CALCULATION PROCEDURE

The main steps of the emergy evaluation carried out during this case study were as follows. 1. Identification of the boundaries of the investigated system 2. Modelling of the landfill system by drawing an emergy systems diagram that takes into consideration both economic and natural resources 3. Calculation of matter and energy flows supporting the landfill during its life cycle


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4. Conversion of input matter and energy flows into solar emergy Joules (seJ) by using suitable transformities, updated to the new baseline for biosphere (total emergy driving the biosphere: 15.84 × 1024 seJ year–1; Brown and Ulgiati, 2004b) 5. Balance of the total life cycle emergy investment (seJ life cycle–1) 6. Calculation of the emergy cost for landfill biogas production (seJ Joule–1) 7. Calculation of the emergy cost for safe disposal of one unit of waste (seJ g–1). The formal description of the matter and energy flows driving the landfill system (Figure 2) was made by using the symbolic energy systems language (Odum, 1996), drawing direct and indirect flows and storages of natural capital, materials, energy, human labor, and other services, according to the data provided by GIS and A.C.T.A. (2003). The external boundaries in the emergy diagram (Figure 2) correspond to the boundaries of the landfill system. The role of natural capital in the

SOLID WASTE

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Figure 2. Potenza municipal landfill: emergy systems diagram.(Energy Systems Symbols from Odum, 1996)

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waste degradation processes is highlighted in the emergy diagram, with particular reference to microbial activity. Similar to material recycling in human productive systems, microbial activity provides an ecosystem service in performing a waste degradation process within the detritus food web. While the former is a human-dominated process that requires a cost in terms of energy, materials, and money; the latter is carried out by nature without any further investment except solar energy derived sources. 2.5. EMERGY ALGEBRA IN WASTE MANAGEMENT

The input flow of waste delivered to the landfill was, by definition, assumed to be bearing zero emergy content. This is because mixed waste is not considered a desired product of human activities, but instead an unavoidable and undesired emission, as is CO2 and other pollutants (Ulgiati et al., 2005, 2007) generated by human activities. If waste material is not recycled or processed, but just stored in the landfill, there is no reason for assigning it a transformity. On the other hand, if wastes are treated and re-enter a production process as a substitute material or resource, only the emergy invested in the treatment and recycling process should be assigned to the recycled resource. “Recycling has the same role in the human productive system as the detritus chain in natural systems. Both take a high transformity input at the end of its life cycle, break it down to simpler components, and feed them back to lower hierarchical levels. The recycled component then reenter the same productive cycle through which it had already passed (may be many times)...” (Ulgiati et al., 2005) and therefore it would be double counting to assign it the total emergy previously required for its production from raw material. According to the allocation rules proposed above, only the additional emergy input needed for further processing must be assigned to recycled waste. This implies that, if a sufficiently efficient recycling process exists, secondary materials (derived from wastes) will have lower transformities than the corresponding primary ones, thus highlighting the advantage of recycling. An emergy investment is needed in order to concentrate, process, and convert waste into useful products, or at least in order to achieve a safe disposal. The total emergy invested per unit of waste disposed of and the total emergy invested per unit of useful product generated from the waste can be considered a production cost. As such, it can be used as useful measure of process efficiency and be compared with transformities of the same materials generated by natural cycles.


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All the above considerations are applied to the calculation of the emergy cost of production of biogas in the present case study and will be applied to the same calculation of production cost of sorted or recycled material in the next steps of the present investigation. 3. Results and Discussion According to the results of the GIS survey, the municipal landfill of Potenza was identified as one of the most relevant waste management site for the case study to investigate a landfill system by using emergy synthesis method. Over its whole life cycle the landfill requires an economic and energy investment, mainly due to the need for monitoring and dealing with leachate and biogas production, which still continue to be produced after landfill capping. The economic investment required by the landfill tank during its life cycle accounts for: 5.16 × 105 Euros for plant realization (10% of the total financial investment), 3.27 × 106 Euros for management (64% of the total), and 1.31 × 106 Euros for waste disposal (26% of the total) (Figure 3). 70%

Life cycle economic investment %

64% 60% 50% 40% 30%

26%

20% 10%

10%

0% Cost of landfill plant

Cost of management

Cost of disposal

Figure 3. Potenza landfill: life cycle economic investment (Euros life cycle–1)

Table 1 and Figure 4 show the total emergy investment (9.41 × 1019 seJ life cycle–1) required during the whole landfill life cycle (assumed as 30 years). The total emergy investment accounts for all the flows of matter, energy, and money, as well as waste collection, plant management, natural flows (e.g., solar radiation, kinetic energy in wind, chemical and geopotential energy in rain, geothermal flow), and economic services (Figure 4).

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The potential for energy recovery is addressed by calculating the emergy cost required to produce and collect landfill biogas, which resulted in 1.11 × 105 seJ/J (Table 1). This value was calculated as the ratio between the life cycle emergy investment and the total amount of biogas produced during the life cycle. TABLE 1. Emergy flows supporting Potenza landfill life cycle # Item

Unit

Amount (unit/year)

Emergy intensity (seJ/unit)

Ref. for emergy Intens.

Local renewable input flows Sun J/year 3.86E + 09 1.00E + 00 [a] Wind J/year 8.80E + 10 2.51E + 03 [b] Rain, chemical potential J/year 1.38E + 10 3.05E + 04 [b] Rain, geopotential energy J/year 3.70 E + 10 1.76 E + 04 [b] Geothermal flow J/year 1.73E + 10 5.76E + 04 [b] Non renewable input to waste collection process Water J/year 4.09E + 10 3.05E + 06 [e] Zinc in containers g/year 6.56E + 04 7.54E + 12 [g] Plastic in containers g/year 2.42E + 07 7.21E + 09 [d] Iron in containers g/year 6.77E + 06 5.30E + 09 [f] Diesel J/year 3.56E + 12 9.40E + 04 [b] Vehicles (steel) g/year 1.93E + 07 1.12E + 10 [d] Vehicles (plastic and tires) g/year 2.14E + 06 7.21E + 09 [d] Non renewable input to plant construction, waste management and processing Water J/year 2.96E + 08 3.05E + 06 [e] g 1.23E + 07 1.12E + 10 [d] Material for plant construction (steel) g 6.44E + 09 1.68E + 09 [b] Material for plant construction (sedimentary) g/year 1.26E + 10 1.68E + 09 [b] Material for waste daily covering (sedimentary) Diesel J/year 2.99E + 12 9.40E + 04 [b] Electricity J/year 6.50E + 10 2.51E + 05 [e] Machinery (steel) g/year 1.23E + 07 1.12E + 10 [d] g/year 1.37E + 06 7.21E + 09 [d] Machinery (plastic and tires) Economic services Total cost of landfill plant € 5.16E + 05 2.75E + 12 [c] €/year 1.09E + 06 2.75E + 12 [c] Annual cost for management, incl. labor Annual cost for disposal €/year 4.36E + 04 2.75E + 12 [c] g 8.18E + 10 [h] Safe disposal of waste 1.15E + 09 delivered to landfill J 5.10E + 14 [i] Total landfill gas in 30 1.11E + 05 years (co-product of organic material degradation)

Solar emergy (seJ/year)

Turnover of investment (years)

Life cycle emergy investment (seJ/total life)

3.86E + 09 2.21 E + 14 4.22E + 14 6.51 E + 14 9.99E + 14

30 3 3 3 30

1.16E + 11 6.62E + 14 1.27E + 15 1.95 E + 15 3.00E + 16

1.25E + 17 4.95E + 17 1.75E + 17 3.59E + 16 3.35E + 17 2.16E + 17 1.54E + 16

3 3 3 3 3 3 3

3.74E + 17 1.48E + 18 5.24E + 17 1.08E + 17 1.01E + 18 6.49E + 17 4.63E + 16

9.04E + 14 1.38E + 17

3 1

2.71E + 15 1.38E + 17

1.08E + 19

1

1.08E + 19

2.11E + 19

3

6.32E + 19

2.81E + 17 1.63E + 16 1.38E + 17 9.87E + 15

3 30 3 3

8.43E + 17 4.90E + 17 4.15E + 17 2.96E + 16

1.42E + 18 3.00E + 18

1 3

1.42E + 18 8.99E + 18

1.20E + 17

30

3.60E + 18 9.41E + 19

References for transformities [a] By definition [f] Bargigli and Ulgiati, 2003 [b] Odum, 1996 [g] Odum and Arding, 1991 [c] Cialani et al., 2004 [h] This study. Solar emergy Joule per Joule of landfill gas (seJ/J) [d] Odum and Odum, 1983 [i] This study. Emergy cost per unit of safe disposal (seJ/g) [e] Brown and Ulgiati, 2002 a Working time of landfill is 3 years. Life cycle of waste degradation process is considered 30 years. b Turnover of investment (years) = number of investment repeated in 30 years. c Life Cycle Emergy Investment (seJ/life cycle) is equal to (solar energy) × (number of investment in 30 years).

5.65E + 19


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Figure 4. Potenza landfill: life cycle emergy investment (seJ life cycle–1)

As illustrated in Figure 5, the emergy cost of landfill biogas is higher than the transformities of other fossil fuels, suggesting that, as expected, nature is, by far, more efficient in converting organic matter into reduced carbon (in wetlands and deep reservoirs) and that there is potential for further improvement of the whole chain in order to imitate nature cycles, optimizing the demand for environmental support (emergy) to biogas generation. Even if the human-driven process shows a lower efficiency compared to nature, the generated biogas could be usefully supplied to the upstream steps of the process (transport and electricity generation) thus improving the energy balance of the process itself. As a consequence of both decreased fossil fuel use and decreased mass of residual waste to be disposed of, the whole process would become more sustainable.

Figure 5. Emergy cost of landfill biogas compared to transformity values for fossil fuels

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Considering a biogas average annual production of 8.20 × 105 m3 year–1, a biogas recovery of 60%, a conversion rate of 1.8 kWh per m3, and a market average price of 0.15 Euro kWh–1, an annual income of 130 × 103 Euro could be obtained if the biogas were used for electricity generation. In fact, the needs of Potenza landfill in terms of electricity could be completely fulfilled and the surplus could be sold to the outside market. In so doing, the monetary cost of the electricity power plant could be amortized in only 3.2 years. Emergy-based performance indicators (Brown and Ulgiati, 2004b) would reflect such a recycling strategy. The Emergy Yield Ratio (EYR) would slightly increase, thus indicating a lower use of imported resources. The Environmental Loading Ratio (ELR), instead, would decreease, as a consequence of decreased use of non-renewable input. Finally, the Emergy Sustainability Index (ESI) would also increase due to the combined effect of both EYR and ELR values. The amount of emergy invested in order to obtain the safe disposal of waste materials by landfill practice is very high and translates into a high value of the cost for safe disposal of one unit of unsorted waste (1.15 × 109 seJ g–1) (Table 1). Recycling and reuse of materials would provide additional savings of matter, energy, and money to the larger scale system of waste management, as well as to the economic system of Potenza, (a) by providing cheap material to the productive sectors instead of requiring new import from outside, (b) by allowing lower fossil energy expenditure, and finally (c) by requiring a lower environmental support to the whole area and, in particular, to the waste management system. The present values of emergy production costs for safe disposal (an unavoidable service aimed at making city life possible) and for landfill gas generation (aimed at better energy balance) will be used in the future as comparison figures in order to measure any improvement achieved or achievable by means of better waste management and improvement proposals in the area. 4. Conclusion Environmentally sound waste management requires the identification of some thermodynamic properties able to quantify its residual usefulness. Moreover, in order to choose safe and useful landfill sites, proper size, and appropriate technology, policy makers and technicians should be provided with information far exceeding the mere mono-dimensional analysis based only on economic investment. GIS and emergy synthesis methods provide a significant contribution to expand the focus far beyond just the economic point of view. The combined GIS and emergy approach proves to be a synergic tool for data collection, organization, processing and interpretation


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and can be used for the evaluation of all waste management sites and strategies in order to support choices and policy making within the constraints placed by local natural services and proper resource use. The emergy cost calculated for landfill biogas resulted into 1.11 × 105 seJ Joule–1 (Table 1), a very high – and not unexpected – value compared to fossil fuels. However, it must be considered that a landfill is not the best way for producing biogas. Waste management via pre-sorting of wet fraction and biogas generation in suitable digesters would provide much better performances and lower the energy and emergy costs of biogas generation (Cherubini et al., 2008). This requires suitable technical design and proper procedures, aimed at decreasing the energy and emergy demand for safe disposal and for material and energy recovery.

References A.C.T.A., 2003. Personal communication. A.C.T.A. and University of Basilicata, 1999. Analysis of waste composition in Potenza Province. Municipal Agency for Environmental Protection & University of Basilicata. Technical Report. Alfieri, S.M., Lamberti, M., Franzese, P.P., and Giordano, F., 2004. Un modello matematico per la simulazione del processo di produzione del percolato in discarica controllata. (A mathematical model to simulate leachate production in managed landfill). Biologi Italiani, 10: 74–80. Bagchi, A., 2004. Design of Landfills and Integrated Solid Waste Management. Wiley, New York, 712 pp. Brown, M.T. and Ulgiati, S., 2004a. Energy quality, emergy, and transformity: H.T. Odum’s contribution to quantifying and understanding systems. Ecological Modelling, 178: 201–213. Brown, M.T. and Ulgiati, S., 2004b. Emergy Analysis and Environmental Accounting. In: Encyclopedia of Energy, C. Cleveland (ed.), Academic, Elsevier, Oxford, pp. 329–354. Burrough, P.A., 1986. Principles of Geographical Information Systems for Land Resources Assessment. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 194 pp. Burrough, P.A. and McDonnell, R.A., 1998. Principles of Geographical Information Systems. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 356 pp. Cherubini, F., Bargigli, S., and Ulgiati, S., 2008. Life cycle assessment of waste management strategies: energy performances and environmental impacts. Journal Waste Management, in press. Jensen, A.A., Hoffman, L., Moller, B.T., and Schmidt, A., 1997. Life Cycle Assessment (LCA). A Guide to Approaches, Experiences and Information Sources. Environmental Issues series, n. 6, European Environment Agency, Bruxelles. Krzystek, L., Ledakowicz, S., Kahle, H.J., and Kaczorek, K., 2001. Degradation of household biowaste in reactors. Journal of Biotechnology, 92: 103–112.

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Odum, H.T., 1988. Self-organization, transformity, and information. Science, 42: 1132–1139. Odum, H.T., 1996. Environmental Accounting. Emergy and Environmental Decision Making. Wiley, New York. Ulgiati, S., Bargigli, S., and Raugei, M., 2005. Dotting the I’s and Crossing the T’s of Emergy Synthesis: Material Flows, Information and Memory Aspects, and Performance Indicators. In: Brown, M.T., Campbell, D., Comar, V., Huang, S.L., Rydberg, T., Tilley, D.R., and Ulgiati, S., (eds.), 2005. Emergy Synthesis. Theory and Applications of the Emergy Methodology – 3. The Center for Environmental Policy, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL, 199–213. Ulgiati, S., Bargigli, S., and Raugei, M., 2007. An emergy evaluation of complexity, information and technology, towards maximum power and zero emission. Journal of Cleaner Production, 15: 1359–1372.

ELEMENTS OF GLOBAL ROADMAP FOR CLIMATE SUSTAINABILITY: FACTORS AFFECTING THE REDUCTION OF CO2 EMISSIONS

MIA PIHLAJAMÄKI, JYRKI LUUKKANEN∗, AND JARMO VEHMAS Turku School of Economics, Finland Futures Research Centre, Hämeenkatu 7 D, 33100 Tampere, Finland

Abstract: Contraction and Convergence model provides one transparent solution with equal per capita emissions for the mitigation of CO2 emissions. The model requires considerable emission reductions, which, according to our study, seem to be possible when the changes are analyzed from the point of view of emission intensity development.

Keywords: Contraction and convergence model, decomposition analysis, CO2 emission mitigation, emission intensity.

1. Introduction According to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC a considerable reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is required in order to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Various different approaches have been proposed to allocate commitments regarding the future greenhouse gas emission mitigation for different countries. One of them is the Contraction and Convergence (C&C) model of future GHG emissions (GCI, 2003). The C&C approach defines emission permits on the basis of converging national GHG emission rates to an equal level, which is based on per capita emissions under a contracting global emission profile. In this study we have used a target of 1.8 tons of CO2 per capita, which

______

∗ To whom correspondence should be addressed: Jyrki Luukkanen, Turku School of Economics, Finland Futures Research Centre, Hämeenkatu 7 D, 33100 Tampere, Finland. E-mail: [email protected]


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should be achieved by all countries by a designated year, 2040. This satisfies the requirement set by IPCC to reduce the total emissions by 50–85% from the 2000 level in order to limit the global temperature increase to 2–2.4°C. The purpose of this paper is to analyze what the C&C approach might mean for the examined countries and to analyze the potential changes that are needed in the emission intensities of the selected countries in order to achieve their C&C targets. For further information on the data and methodology used in this study please see GCI (1998, 2003), IEA (2003a, b, c) and UN (2003) for data sources and Luukkanen et al. (2005) for methodology. 2. The Quantitative Analyses of Emission Intensity Change for Selected Countries 2.1. EMISSION INTENSITY CHANGES

The CO2 emissions of an economy can be defined with the aid of the CO2 intensity of production and the production volume: CO 2 =

CO 2 GDP

× GDP

The future development of CO2 emissions in a country can be defined by the estimated CO2 intensity of the future and the estimated change in GDP. The changes in CO2 intensity depend on several factors, but the general development path of an industrializing nation has been increasing intensity in the industrialization phase and decreasing intensity when the economy shifts more towards a service sector dominated system. Industrialization has traditionally based on increased use of energy and when the use of fossil energy grows faster than GDP the emission intensity increases (Schäfer, 2005). A falling trend in CO2 intensity after the first oil crisis in 1973 can be seen in most industrialized countries (Figure 1). However, in the so called Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC), such as Thailand and Malaysia a growing trend of CO2 intensity can be observed. 2.2. PER CAPITA EMISSIONS

If we look at the per capita emissions and the required changes under the C&C regime, we can find some interesting issues (Figure 2). EU15 and

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355

CO2 intensity of GDP, ton CO2/1000 USD

1.4 1.2 1 Italy Malaysia Thailand United States

0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Year

Figure 1. Changes in the CO2 intensity of the economies of Italy, Malaysia, Thailand, and the USA in 1960/1971–2001 (Data source: IEA 2003a,b,c)

Japan are not too far from the right track, whereas in the USA rapid changes are required. Structural change of the economy can considerably ease the change, but in order to reach the C&C target, energy efficiency needs to be improved and special attention should be paid to the transport sector and to a shift from fossil fuels towards renewable energy sources. Industrializing countries like Greece and Malaysia have to change their trends of per capita emissions. Production structure changes and energy efficiency policies will be the main tools for change in these countries. China has still quite low level of per capita emissions and can cope with the requirements of the C&C model, if improvements in energy efficiency continue and CO2 emissions from the transport sector will be controlled. Bangladesh and India can increase their per capita emissions considerably within the C&C framework, due to their very low current level. 2.3. INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES

The past development and the required future changes in the CO2 intensity of the economies of the USA, Japan and the EU15 are shown in Figure 3. In Figure 4, the factors affecting change of CO2 emissions in the EU15 are identified by expanding the previous decomposition equation to include

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components indicating the effect of fuel switch (CO2/TPES), technological change (TPES/FEC), structural change of production (FEC/GDP), and changes in economic activity per capita (GDP/POP) and the amount of population (POP).

CO2 emssions per capita, ton CO2

25

20 Bangladesh China EU15 Greece India Japan Malaysia United States

15

10

5

0 1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Year

Figure 2. Changes in the CO2 emissions per capita in Bangladesh, China, Greece, India, Japan, Malaysia, and the USA from 1960/1971–2001 (Data source: IEA 2003a,b,c) and the required development in 2002–2050 in order to reach the C&C target


1.4 1.2 1 0.8

Japan United States EU15

0.6 0.4 0.2 0 1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Year

Figure 3. Changes in the CO2 intensity of the economies of Japan, the USA and the EU15 from 1960–2001 (Data source: IEA 2003a,b,c) and the required development in 2002–2050 in order to reach the C&C target


357

Figure 4. A decomposition analysis for the factors affecting the CO2 emissions in the EU-15 from 1973 to 2001

The sharp decrease in CO2 intensity in the EU15 after the first oil crisis was due to the increased efficiency of energy use and a shift from oil to energy sources of lower carbon content, mainly gas and nuclear energy. The main driver behind the decreasing CO2 intensity was, however, a structural shift in the production structure, which led to lower energy intensities in the EU15 economies (see Luukanen et al., 2005). In China, previous change in the CO2 intensity of the economy has been quite different from the most industrialized countries. In China, CO2 intensity decreased rapidly from 1970s to 2001 due to fast economic growth and lower growth in energy consumption, which decreased the energy intensity of production. 2.4. INDUSTRIALIZING AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

In Greece and Portugal, CO2 intensity has increased considerably due to the process of industrialization (Figure 5). Switches to fossil fuels, decrease of energy efficiency and increase of energy intensity of production have all been drivers for the trend. The Malaysian case is very similar. Rapid industrialization has resulted a considerable increase in CO2 intensity (Figure 5). In Venezuela, an oil producing country, the increase of energy use has been far more rapid than economic growth. Fast population growth has also increased the number of energy users contributing to increased CO2 intensity.

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1.2

1

0.8 Greece Malaysia Portugal Venezuela

0.6

0.4

0.2

0 1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Year

Figure 5. Changes in the CO2 intensity of the economies of Greece, Portugal, Malaysia, and Venezuela 1960/1971–2001 (Data source: IEA 2003a,b,c) and the required development in 2002–2050 in order to reach the C&C target

The general trend of CO2 intensity in Brazil and Mexico has been quite favourable for reaching the C&C target (Figure 6). Bangladesh and Pakistan could increase their CO2 intensity considerably in the short run due to their very low initial level (Figure 6).


1.2

1

0.8 Bangladesh Brazil Mexico Pakistan

0.6

0.4

0.2

0 1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

Year

Figure 6. Changes in the CO2 intensity of Bangladesh, Brazil, Mexico, and Pakistan from 1971–2003 (Data source: IEA 2003a,b,c) and the required development from 2002–2050 in order to reach the C&C target


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In Brazil, the change in CO2 intensity has been slightly decreasing in the 1970s and 1980s due to successful renewable energy policies. However, the trend changed in the 1990s mainly because of fast economic growth and less successful policies. In Mexico, a decrease in energy intensity in the 1990s has been the main factor lowering the CO2 emission intensity. 3. Conclusions The development of CO2 emissions intensities in selected countries has been calculated and the results show that trends in most industrialized countries immediately after the oil crises could lead to reaching the C&C target. However, the trends in the 1990s have usually not been sufficient due to weaker energy policy measures. On the other hand, the countries experiencing rapid industrialisation will have to lower their CO2 intensity trends significantly to reach the C&C target, while some developing countries can increase their CO2 intensity. Many developing economies are in the industrialising phase as indicated by their increasing emission intensities. According to the C&C model, the emission intensities in some developing countries cannot grow anymore but need to decline rapidly if economic growth is expected to continue. The results indicate that rapid economic growth based on energy-intensive Industrialization processes cannot work in the C&C model, if energy use is based mainly on fossil fuels.

References GCI, 1998, Contraction and Convergence, a Global Solution to a Global Problem. Global Commons Institute, London, UK (Available at http://www.gci.org.uk/contconv/cc.html). GCI, 2003, Database and Version 8.5 of Contraction and Convergence Options Model. Global Commons Institute, London, UK (Available at http://www.gci.org.uk/model/ dl.html). IEA, 2003a, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, 1971–2001. CD-ROM. International Energy Agency. IEA, 2003b, Energy Balances of OECD Countries, 1960–2001. CD-ROM. International Energy Agency. IEA, 2003c, Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, 1960–2001. CD-ROM. International Energy Agency.

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Luukkanen, J., Vehmas, J., Kinnunen, V., Kuntsi-Reunanen, E., and Kaivo-oja, J., 2005, Converging CO2 Emissions to Equal per Capita Levels. Mission Possible? FFRC Publications 2/2005. Turku School of Economics and Business Administration, Turku. Schäfer, A., 2005, Structural Change in Energy Use. Energy Policy 33, 4. UN, 2003, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision Population Database. United Nations, Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, New York (Available at http://esa.un.org/unpp).

CARBON MANAGEMENT FOR SECURE COMMUNITIES

NIGEL MORTIMER* North Energy Associates Ltd., Watsons Chambers, 5–15 Market Place, Castle Square, Sheffield S1 2GH, United Kingdom

Abstract: All communities face serious threats from global climate change. Significant reductions in direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions need to be achieved by all communities. This paper summarises the main approaches used in carbon management for communities with illustrations from the work of North Energy Associates Ltd in the United Kingdom and in China. This includes establishing baseline carbon dioxide emissions for communities, developing future scenarios, identifying energy efficiency potential and local renewable energy resources, evaluating emissions savings, and exploring implementation procedures.

Keywords: Carbon management, CO2 emissions reduction strategies, energy efficiency.

1. Introduction It is widely recognised that sustainable development is an essential solution to creating and maintaining communities, ranging from villages through town and cities to regions and nations, which are secure. There are many aspects to sustainable development and it should not be perceived as only addressing environmental issues. Sustainable development is a holistic approach which must accommodate economic, social, cultural and other dimensions as well as environmental sustainability. This enables communities to become secure by ensuring that, within reasonable expectations,

______ * Nigel Mortimer, North Energy Associates Ltd., Watsons Chambers, 5–15 Market Place, Castle Square, Sheffield S1 2GH, United Kingdom, Tel: +44 114 201 2604, Fax:+44 114 272 7374, E-mail: [email protected].


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they are “future proof” against foreseeable threats. In general, sustainability must enable communities to minimise their contributions to such threats and incorporate measures to mitigate the worst impacts of such threats. Clearly, this is considerable challenge that will require sustained effort and ingenuity. Amongst the many foreseeable threats, there is now almost complete consensus that global climate change is a major priority for immediate action. In the face of this threat, communities will have to respond by implementing practical measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mitigating those climate change impacts which are now virtually inevitable. The essential response to the need to achieve deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions by individuals and communities, companies and nations, is carbon management. 2. Carbon Management The principles of carbon management are developing rapidly as a practical means of identifying greenhouse gas emissions, monitoring their trends over time and determining the potential for their reduction. Whilst clear guidelines are emerging, it would be misleading to suggest that all aspects of carbon management have been addressed, agreed and accepted for widespread application. In particular, most work on carbon management has concentrated on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and on the prominent sources of such emissions, especially fossil fuel combustion. However, sufficient progress has been made with carbon management to enable its current use and to provide a sound basis for future development. In the context of communities, the main elements of carbon management can be summarised as: •

Evaluation of the current baseline of CO2 emissions in adequate detail for subsequent use

•

Investigation of future “business-as-usual” scenarios which indicate likely future CO2 emissions

•

Assessment of energy efficiency improvements and local renewable energy resource utilisation which can reduce future CO2 emissions and

•

Formulation and implementation of strategies to realise and monitor CO2 emissions savings.

Many practical considerations have to be taken into account in the current application of community carbon management. Obviously, it is necessary to define the community in question. Whilst it may be possible to do this in purely physical terms, it is actually more important to base any definition on the decision-making capabilities of the community. This is because it is essential to link current CO2 emissions and future actions to achieve savings

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to those who are responsible to such emissions. In fact, the issue of responsibility should be at the heart of carbon management. This encompasses both individual and collective responsibility. In practical terms, this means that communities are usually defined in relation to organisational structure, such as local, municipal or regional authority boundaries. The concept of responsibility also influences how CO2 emissions are identified, quantified and allocated to a community. This affects such issues as how “imported” CO2 emissions from the provision of goods and services purchased by the community are addressed and how CO2 emissions from transport are treated. For these and other reasons, it is important to specify the scope of carbon management. 3. Baseline Evaluation Once the community has been defined and its scope specified, it is possible to commence the evaluation of baseline CO2 emissions. Many carbon management studies focus on the most prominent sources of CO2 emissions and those which can be linked, fairly directly, to the community in question. This often means that such work only considers CO2 emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels within the community and CO2 emissions from the generation of electricity supplied to the community. There is a tendency to concentrate on fixed sources of CO2 emissions since the allocation of CO2 emissions from mobile sources, such as transport, is notoriously problematic. In particular, it is necessary to ask “to which community should CO2 emissions from transport be allocated (the community at the point of origin, or at the point of arrival, etc.?)”. Obviously, clear, consistent and agreed rules are needed to resolve this. Leaving aside such fundamental conceptual matters, the immediate consideration for community carbon management is data collection and analysis. A significant amount of data is required to evaluate baseline CO2 emissions for a community. For baseline evaluation and all subsequent activities, considerable detail, over and above an estimate of total annual CO2 emissions for the entire community, is required. Normally, it is necessary to determine annual delivered energy consumption, as a measure of energy in fuels and electricity obtained by consumers, broken down by fuel type, sector and end use. Such data can then be converted into CO2 emissions by means of relevant emissions factors. However, it must be appreciated that a substantial amount of time and effort may be involved in collecting and analysing relevant data for a community. Work on the development of baseline CO2 emissions for communities in the Yorkshire and Humber region of the United Kingdom (UK) has

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demonstrated that various methods of evaluation can be devised (Pout, 2007). Different methods are suitable for different sizes of community which can be characterised as follows; village scale = population < 10,000s; town scale = 10,000s < population < 100,000s; and city scale = population > 100,000s. Additionally, there is a “trade-off” between the time, effort and, hence, cost of applying any given method and the comparative accuracy of subsequent results. This is indicated in general terms in Table 1. TABLE 1. Relevance of methods of baseline evaluation to community scale

Method Î Scale Ð Village Town City

A

B

C

D

9 9 9

9

9 9

9 9

E

9

F

? 9

G

H

9

9 9 9

Increasing relative accuracy Î Increasing time, effort and cost Î Notes Method A = National Atmospheric Emissions Inventory Data; application of national statistics available on a 10 km × 10 km basis to the community in question using map grid references. Method B = Community Characterisation and Simulation; specification of the building stock based on site visits converted into delivered energy consumption and emissions using results from simple models building types. Method C = Community Characterisation and Questionnaires; specification of the building stock based on site visits converted into delivered energy consumption and emissions using results from sample surveys of local inhabitants. Method D = Community Characterisation and Energy Use Look Up; specification of the building stock based on site visits converted into delivered energy consumption and emissions using standard results for building types from a national database. Method E = Community Characterisation and Existing Local Data; specification of the building stock based on site visits converted into delivered energy consumption using standard results for building types from a national database, supplemented with local information on specific fuel consumption and/or emissions. Method F = Post Code Data Supplemented with National Pro-Rata Data; combination of emissions statistics for post code area supplemented with delivered energy consumption from national statistics on a pro-rata basis. Method G = Post Code Data Supplemented with Actual Local Data; combination of emissions statistics for post code area supplemented with delivered energy consumption data from local sources. Method H = Monitored Energy Data; actual data obtained from local sources.

It should be noted that some of the methods summarised in Table 1 are specifically relevant to the UK because of the national statistics and databases that have been formulated and published or accessible there. The application of similar methods elsewhere would depend on the preparation of similar national statistics and databases. However, all the other methods,

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365

which are based on some form of local data collection, can be applied generally. The actual effects of applying different methods on the estimated accuracy of baseline CO2 emissions are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. It should be noted that methods which provide relative high accuracy are apparent at both the village and city scales. However, it is difficult to obtain a similar level of accuracy at the town scale (Colne Valley and Isle of Axholme). The level of accuracy is important since it is necessary to be able to register comparatively small changes (± a few %) during subsequent monitoring of CO2 emissions saving strategies. 16 14 12

t CO2/ca.

10 8 6 4 2 0 Method A

Method B

Figure 1. Effect of Choice of Method for Baseline Evaluation on the Accuracy of Total Annual Per Capita Co2 Emissions: Example of Fixed Sources in Appleton-le-Moor and Spaunton, Uk

4. Scenario-Making Having established baseline CO2 emissions for a community, it is necessary to investigate future projections under “business-as-usual” conditions. The reason for this is that, for the purposes of monitoring, it provides a datum against which estimates of the impact of CO2 emissions saving strategies can be measured. The preparation of such projections can be difficult but basic approaches are available which rely, chiefly, on some form of “scenario-making”. This involves identifying the underlying factors which govern delivered energy demand and estimating how these may change over time. Whilst complex modelling may be used at town and city scales, a simpler, “future images” approach can be adopted in smaller communities. This can consist of applying national “business-as-usual” projections at a community level taking account of local circumstances. An example of this

N. MORTIMER

366 15 14 13 12 11 10 t CO2/ca

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Botton (Method H)

Staithes (Method B)

Isle of Axholme (Method A)

Sheffield (Method F/G)

Colne Valley (Method A)

Danby Parishes (Method B)

Appleton/Spaunton (Method B)

Figure 2. Baseline Evaluation of Total Annual Per Capita Co2 Emissions Using the “Best” Method: Example of Fixed Sources in Six Communities in Yorkshire and the Humber, Uk

1500 1450 1400 1350

TJ

1300 1250 1200 1150 1100 1050 1000 2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

Year Low Growth

Medium Growth

High Growth

Figure 3. Future projections of total annual CO2 emissions for Conisbrough and Denaby Communities, UK

is provided in Figure 3 which illustrates work used in a carbon management study for the communities of Conisbrough and Denaby in South Yorkshire, UK (Grant and Kellet, 2001).

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367

5. Reduction Strategies Strategies for reducing CO2 emissions in a community need to accommodate a variety of options including, especially, the introduction of energy efficiency measures and the utilisation of local renewable energy resources. Data collected and analysed for the baseline evaluation of community CO2 emissions are essential for estimating potential savings from these options. In particular, details from the baseline evaluation of delivered energy consumption enable opportunities for energy efficiency measures to be identified and the relative magnitude of their savings to be calculated. Similar details are required to match and compare the energy potentially available from local renewable sources with local demand. Examples of how this can be achieved can be found elsewhere (see, for example, Mortimer and Grant, 2004). Illustrations of results from projects undertaken in the UK and China are provided in Figures 4 and 5, respectively.

Figure 4. Reduction of CO2 emissions from application of energy efficiency measures to the prominent housing type: Appleton-le-Moors and Spaunton Communities, UK

6. Conclusions and Recommendations It should be apparent that methods are currently available to conduct carbon management for communities. However, in order for such activity to become widespread, it will be necessary to formulate routine approaches that are relatively simple and easy to apply. Clear guidelines will be required to ensure that they can be applied in a consistent manner to provide comparable and reliable results. Practical approaches have to be adaptable so that

368

N. MORTIMER

they can be used in communities in different countries. Additionally, effective monitoring procedures must be developed from methods of baseline evaluation so that progress with CO2 emissions reductions can be measured. It is also necessary to expand carbon management to include other greenhouse gases, such as methane and nitrous oxide, and to incorporate important sources other than fossil fuel combustion.

Figure 5. Reduction of Co2 Emissions from Application of Energy Efficiency Measures and Renewable Energy Technologies: Xia Futou, Henan Province, China

References 1. Pout, C., 2007, “Greenhouse Gas Baselines for dCARB-uk Project Areas” Building Research Establishment Ltd for Yorkshire Forward, United Kingdom. 2. Grant, J.F., and Kellett, J.E., 2001, “Baseline Assessment of Energy Use in Conisbrough and Denaby” by Report No. 19/1 for the European Commission’s Conisbrough and Denaby Renewable Energy (CADRE) Project, Resources Research Unit, Sheffield Hallam University, United Kingdom, October 2001. 3. Mortimer, N.D., and Grant, J.F., 2004, “Energy Report for Xia Futou” by Report No. 25/3 for the European Commission’s Sustainable Users Concepts for China Engaging Scientific Scenarios (SUCCESS) Project, Resources Research Unit, Sheffield Hallam University, United Kingdom, September 2004.

AUTHOR INDEX

Al-Alawi, Mu’taz, 273 Ayres, Robert, 1 Barbir, Frano, 251 Benhamou, Khalid, 241 Bosevski, Tome, 67 Dumontet, Stefano, 305 Ferrari, Claudio, 171 Frankl, Paolo, 293 Franzese, Pier Paolo, 339 Giampietro, Mario, 87 Glavič, Peter, 213 Gorobets, Alexander, 185 Gravitis, Janis, 327 Greyson, James, 139 Jefferson, Michael, 25 Krajnc, Damjan, 213 Krstulović, Ante, 251 Labed, Sifeddine, 281 Lukman, Rebeka, 213 Luukkanen, Jyrki, 353 Markoska, Nataša, 67 Matutinović, Igor, 199 Mortimer, Nigel, 361 Neef, Hanns-Joachim, 265 Pihlajamaki, Mia, 353 Pop-Jordanov, Jordan, 67 Popovska Vasilevska, Sanja, 159 Popovski, Kiril, 159 Raugei, Marco, 293 Russo, Giovanni Fulvio, 339 Schneider, Daniel, 75 Sertorio, Luigi, 43 Spangenberg, Joachim, 55 Todorovski, Mirko, 67 Udovyk, Oleg O., 227 Ulgiati, Sergio 305, 339 Vehmas, Jarmo, 353 Zucaro, Amalia, 305 369

SUBJECT INDEX

alternative energy sources, 87 Belarus, 227 biodiesel, 251 biodiversity, 55 bioenergy, 327 biofuels, 55 biogas, 339 biomass, 55, 273 biorefinery, 329 biosphere, 43 biotechnology, 55 capacity building, 241 carbon dioxide emissions, 25 carbon-free, 241 carbon management, 361 Chernobyl legacy, 227 circular economics, 139 climate, 139 climate change, 241 climate change mitigation, 67, 75 CO2 emission mitigation, 353 strategies, 361 Codependence, 139 combinations, 159 complexity, 43 conflict, 139 contraction and convergence model, 353 costs, 293 Croatia, 251 decomposition analysis, 353 depletion, 26 distributed energy, 241 eco-centric policy tools, 185 economic feasibility, 159 economic growth, 1, 139 education, 185

education for sustainable development, 213 electricity generation, 281 emergy synthesis method, 341 emission intensity, 353 energy, 1, 199 energy analysis, 87 energy and environment, 67 energy audits, 171 energy consumption, 213 energy dilemma, 227 energy efficiency, 171, 361 energy efficiency certificates, 171 energy intensity, 171 energy return on investment (EROI), 1, 26, 87, 251, 308 energy security, 139, 232 energy source, 43 environmental change, 185 exergy, 1 financial instruments, 171 fossil era, 43 fossil fuels, 26 frozen conflicts, 227 GIS, 341 global security, 139 globalization, 199 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 1 Gross Peaceful Product, 139 harmonious (sustainable) human development, 185 health, 185 hydrogen, 241, 251, 281 hydrogen and fuel cell R&D and markets, 265 hydrogen economy, 265

371

372

SUBJECT INDEX

hydrogen energy, 273 hydrogen production, 273 indicators, 185 institutions, 199 integrated systems, 305 integration, 160 internal sustainability, 185 international co-operation, 26 landfill, 341 legislation, 76 life cycle analysis, 295 life-style, 199 marginal costs, 67 market-based instrument, 139 metabolism, 43, 87 mitigation mechanisms, 241 Moldova, 227 Multi-Scale Integrated Analysis of Societal Metabolism (MSIASM), 87 NEEDS, 293 neoclassical economic paradigm, 1 photosynthesis, 329 photovoltaics, 281, 293

policy, 139 precycling, 139 precycling insurance, 139 rape-seed, 251 recoverable resources, 26 RES development, 160 Reserves, 26 Sahara, 241 Scenarios, 293 solar energy era, 43 sustainability, 159, 199, 213 sustainable development, 139 sustainable university, 214 systems thinking, 139 Third Party Financing, 171 trade winds, 241 transportation fuel, 251 Ukraine, 227 useful work, 1 VLS PV, 281 waste management, 75, 341 waste sink, 43 wind-electrolysis, 241 zero emissions, 305, 329

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