Strike in the West,: The complete story of the Cuban crisis,

$3.50

SITW

STRIKE IN THE WEST The Complete

Story of the

BY JAMES DANIEL

and

Cuban Crisis

JOHN

G.

HUBBELL

WEST is a brilliant recon struction of one of the central events of our time. After years of uneasy, shifting STBUCE IN THE

equilibrium, the two most powerful states in the world the United States and the Soviet Union last fall suddenly found

themselves face to face, without interme diaries, in a contest of power whose out come may well have a decisive effect on the history of this and succeeding genera tions.

Every account of the Cuban crisis up to point has been foreshortened in a peculiar way. Limited both by newspaper and weekly magazine deadlines, as well as an unprecedented policy of govern ment-imposed secrecy, responsible au thors have had to be content, for the most this

part, with reporting tangential aspects of the main events. But here, for the first is an account which links all the sig nificant events of the Cuban crisis: the intricacies of Soviet deception, the unwill

time,

ingness t)f official Washington to recog nize the threat for what it really was, and, finally, the largely untold story of the mas sive American military response after the President made his fateful decision. These will be controversial pages. They are revealing pages. How men and gov ernments react in times of extreme tension always makes engrossing reading, all the (Continued on back flap) Jacket design by

Ben Feder, Inc.

Copyright

1963

by James Daniel and John G. Hubbell i

All rights reserved, including the right to reproduce this

book or

portions thereof in any form.

Published simultaneously in Canada

by Holt, Rinehart

and Winston of Canada, Limited. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 63-13495

A

portion of this book was published in the March, 1963, issue of The Reader's Digest under the title "While America Slept."

First Edition

Designer: Ernst Reichl 81723-0113

Printed in the United States of America

With this

book

is

gratitude

and humility,

dedicated to the

memory

Major Rudolf Anderson,

" li -7 u

rvC/ ,

,

sj

63

6

'/

6

Jr.

of

Make and

a noise in the East,

strike in the

TU

West! YU,

735-812

CONTENTS

3

The Cracked Crystal Ball The Peril In Focus 24 The Compulsion to Act

4

Selecting the Response

1

2

5

6 7 8

9

The Uprooting 76 The Ring 95 The Strategic Umbrella

1

47 57

111

Your Move, Mr. Khrushchev 126 Where Are the Fruits? 156 L'Envoi 172 Index 176

STRIKE IN THE WEST

7

THE CRACKED

CRYSTAL BALL

SUNDAY MORNING, October and

clear over

14, 1962,

most of the United

dawned sunny

ex of October's blue weather. Millions of ample bright Americans took a drive through the country to see the fall foliage or puttered about the States, a perfect

comfortably

house.

In marked contrast, the political climate that day was heavily overcast. After the longest session since the Korean War, and one of the most acrimonious,

Congress had adjourned only the afternoon before.

i

both Republicans and Democrats were point the November 6th elections. Naturally, toward ing each party wished to present itself to the voters as faultless and the opposition as undeserving of either

Now,

respect or support.

doing

would

was

The

tried-and-trusted device for

each side

felt

get the most votes and blandly ignore

any

this

to play

up the

issues

others.

During the afternoon, radio and tuned in on

television listeners

a pre-recorded interview

with President

John Kennedy. In the clipped Boston-Cambridge accents now so familiar, the President said that in his F.

opinion the overriding campaign issue was economic: "Whether this economy of ours can produce at full blast."

But many Republicans were saying that day that the central campaign issue was one of national secu

Whether

this country could tolerate a growing Russian military base on the island of Cuba only ninety

rity:

miles off the shore of the United States.

Asked

what he thought of this, the Cuba could be a issue because Fidel rose Castro to power under party the Republican administration of D wight D. Eisen hower. Besides, he said, his administration was "taking in the interview

President said that he did not believe

a lot of steps to try to isolate Castro is eventually going to fall."

From

the President's remarks

it

who we

believe

would be impossi

ble to discover that the United States at that precise moment was being caught in a gigantic trap cleverly

Moscow. The doors of the trap had all but Yet every essential fact about that trap, except one, was spelled out in minute detail in a dispatch which the New York Times* United Na tions correspondent was typing out that very Sunday devised in

slammed

closed.

afternoon. to the

Timesman, a Soviet bloc spokes man going around saying that Rus sian Premier Nikita Khrushchev planned to come to the United States in the latter part of November to drive a bargain with Kennedy on Berlin. If Kennedy would permit Russia to settle the Berlin issue Russia's way, Khrushchev would not ship offensive weapons capable of attacking the United States to Cuba, Note According at the

UN was

carefully the use of the future tense. should Khrushchev wish to

Why

come

to the

United Nations to put across the deal? The story made even this clear: because advocates of a deal felt that it would be easier for Kennedy to sell out West Berlin there, on neutral ground, than to have Ken

nedy trek

to

Moscow.

The one this:

shocking fact omitted from the story was Russia, in September or earlier, already had in

troduced offensive missiles and bombers, complete with nuclear warheads, into Cuba. She was only wait ing to complete the installation before confronting the United States with this fact. Since mid-July, Russian ships loaded with military equipment had been ar riving in

one

Cuba

at the rate of

one or more a day.

By

estimate, impossible either to prove or disprove,

Russia, out of her limited resources, had expended the equivalent of more than a billion dollars in making

Cuba

a

Russian base.

How could the United States not have known this, considering the relative ease of maintaining espionage activities in a country so close that it can be reached

by a teen-age boy alone in an outboard motorboat? The answer may never be disclosed. Pending a better explanation, the likeliest answer is that the United States did indeed know, or have rea son to suspect, but it simply refused to believe the evidence it was getting. With only one reported ex ception, President Kennedy's Kremlinologists (the experts on Soviet affairs in the State and Defense

Departments and the White House) had volubly as sured him that the Russians had never stationed nu clear

weapons outside

their

home

territory.

And

so,

because they never had, it was confidently assumed that they never would. Any evidence to the contrary, therefore,

was simply no^b^lieved^or

believable.

Cuban refugeesTTa3Teen delD. G, with reports of long-range uging Washington, ballistics missiles in Cuba, information that under less complacent reception would have been regarded as Starting in August,

On

indicative of something very odd. September 14th these reports caused Congressional leaders to gather

for a briefing at the White House where, however, the refugee reports were dismissed as "inconclusive^"

Some

of the so-called missiles, it was said, had turned out to be only sections of sewer pipe. In other eye-

witness accounts, the cylindrical objects being hauled

through Cuban byways

at night

tractors that did not

by

fit

were

said to

be pulled

the horsepower or other

known description of Russian missile-hauling vehicles. But clear voices of warning had been raised. The daily press had been reporting the Soviet military buildup in Cuba since early 1962. According to Gen eral Thomas D. White, former U. S. Air Force chief

who

spent many years in the intelligence business, "Long before October there was enough in formation to be found in the daily press alone to have

of

staff,

led to a military conclusion that the Russians in Cuba were posing a serious threat to the United States." In

other words, the administration did not need a cloakand-dagger intelligence network to be informed. Just a

few

would have sufficed. 1962, David Lawrence

subscriptions

On January 4,

York Herald Tribune port which revealed

cited a State

that

"upward

in the

New

Department

re

of 100 million dol

of military aid has come from the Soviet-bloc countries to the Castro regime Approximately 300 Russian and Czechoslovakian military technicians

lars

.

are in Cuba."

.

.

Mr. Lawrence headlined

his

warning:

SOVIET TAKEOVER IN CUBA

TIME FOR A FULL BLOCKADE?

On

February

reported on

its

5th, the

New

York Herald Tribune

front page that U.S. negotiators at the

Punta del Este conference were armed with reports that "Cuba now has 50 to 100 MIG jet-fighters and

a full panoply of other Red-bloc arms" and that "forth coming shipments of communist-bloc arms may in

clude short-range guided missiles and bombers" On February llth, the National Observer noted that "25 to 30 Soviet-bloc vessels a

month

still

land

in Havana, bringing arms."

New

York's Senator Kenneth B. Keating" (Rep.), however, who was to play the major role in trying to alert the administration and the nation It

was

to the danger on its doorstep. In the late summer, Sen ator Keating repeatedly warned of the Soviet buildup in Cuba.

&

In a post-crisis interview in U. S. News Report, Senator Keating gave this interview:

World

Q. Senator, 'when did you first receive information about the Soviet military buildup in Cuba? A. The information started coming to me in the middle of August.

Q. Did it step up

after that?

speech I made on the subject was on the Senate floor on August 31. I made ten Senate speeches between then and October 12, and made 14 other public statements or speeches in which I urged

A. Yes. The

first

that something be done about the buildup. Q. Senator, what were the sources of

your infor

mation about Cuba? A. The sources were either

(a) sources in the U. S. or (b) other sources less than five per

Government, cent of which were Cuban refugees all of which were verified through official sources of the U. S. Gov ernment before I made any statement.

On August 31st, Senator Keating declared on the Senate floor that he had received information, verified through official sources of the U.S. government, that "between August

3

and August 15

at the

Cuban port

of Mariel, 10 to 12 large Soviet vessels unloaded 1200 troops wearing Soviet fatigue uniforms. .

.

.

Other observers have noted Soviet motor convoys moving on Cuban roads in military formation."

The administration immediately denied having such information.

And when Senator Keating reiterated his data about

NBC

television show, Soviet "troops" in Cuba on an White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger tele phoned interviewer Martin Agronsky, berating him

for Keating's statement which Salinger said was un and sending Senator Clair Engle, Chairman of true the Senate Democratic

the

show as

wrong right.

.

.

later to

Campaign Committee, onto declare that Keating "was just as

he could be.

.

.

.

He

didn't get his facts

.

At virtually the same time President Kennedy con firmed the existence of Soviet military men, material, and anti-aircraft missiles and sites in Cuba. Still the

buildup was termed "defensive." To some individuals in the U.S. intelligence com munity, the picture looked different. These men had

been growing increasingly uneasy since mid-July, when Soviet sea traffic into Cuba had suddenly bur geoned. The intelligence watch on the island had been intensified. It was known that thousands of

Soviet troops purported to be "technicians" had been debarked, and had taken firm command of Cas

armed forces. Refugees

arriving from Cuba were the quizzed exhaustively by intelligence men. Through August, there was no letup in Soviet

tro's

shipping.

The

big ships kept coming; but these,

it

was reasoned, could be carrying any number of things: electronic gear; equipment for monitoring the shoots at

and other nonweapons. President Kennedy was kept ad

Cape Canaveral;

strategic

tanks, artillery,

vised that his intelligence estimators

were looking

and with mounting unease at developments in but that their dominant feeling among his ad Cuba, visers was one of disbelief of the suspicions. By late August the unease had deepened. Newly arriving refugees began reporting ominous shapes missile shapes in remote places. The suspicions of the intelligence experts mounted. Why, in the past weeks, had the Soviets canceled so many private char ters and placed so many shipments to Cuba aboard Soviet ships? Why was nothing ever carried above decks? If these ships were carrying tactical and de closely

fensive

was

it,

weaponry not

only,

why

now in sight on the

so

much

of

island, that

it?

What

would

rate

so bristling a defensive array? What were the Soviets hiding? Early in September the United States Intelligence

the high command of U.S. intelligence met to ponder these questions and to decide it was time

Board

for answers.

The U. rector

S. Intelligence

Board chairman

John McCone. Members

is

CIA's Di

include: intelligence

chiefs of State and Defense, the FBI, Army, Navy, and Air Force. From early August, McCone had been warning the administration that the Kremlin might

Now

try to plant off ensive missiles in Cuba. traveling in Europe, he cabled urgent warnings of increased

danger. But the Board on September 19th unani mously reported to the President that the presump

was against such a move. Nevertheless, surveil lance had to be sharply increased.

tion

The

job

was

a natural for the U-2.

What was

needed was the

clearest possible look at the widest possible field of vision: powerful cameras, plenty of altitude. Still, U-2 operations were always risky. If

the Soviets were

up to something really important in U-2 went down, the U.S. was certain to take a propaganda flaying that would at least match that of the spring of 1960. A new "U-2 incident" would draw pious fire from neutrals, would be used to create angry dissensions in the Western Alliance, and would provide the Communists with valuable am

Cuba and

a

munition in their campaign to take over Latin Amer ica. Aside from putting some serious crimps in the U.S. diplomatic posture, it could set back our intelli gence effort for crucial months. Nevertheless, security in a nuclear age required that some risks be taken. Since former President

Dwight Eisenhower had severed U.S. diplomatic re lations with Cuba, there had been two U-2 flights per

adequate; no im could escape early de portant military deployment tection. While the estimators still could not bring

month made over Cuba. This was

themselves to believe that a strategic arms buildup in Cuba, intelligence indicators now insisted that the U-2 risk be doubled to four flights

was underway

per month. President Kennedy quickly agreed. faint note of apprehension now became appar ent in the statements President Kennedy made about

A

Cuba.

On

September 4th, in answer to

Kennedy

ics,

crit political stated his firm belief that Soviet arms

shipments to Cuba consisted entirely of defensive

weaponry which posed no

threat to the

Hemisphere. But, he added: "Were wise, the gravest issues On Qnuiliiii 29th a

would

U-2

it

Western

to be other

arise."

had disclosed an alarming detail in Ae San Cristobal area in western Cuba. There, phbtographs showed the Russians had installed clusters of surface-to-air, anti-aircraft mis flight

capable of a "slant" range of twenty-five miles. These missiles, or SAM's as they are called, are believed

siles

weapon with which the Russians downed Francis Gary Powers' plane over Russia in 1960, providing Khrushchev with an excuse to blow up the Paris Summit Conference. They are formidable weap to be the

ons indeed.

To an intelligence analyst, the haste to put such mis siles

in

Cuba could support

either of

two hypotheses

or both simultaneously. They could be, as the Cas Cubans and Russians were claiming, only for the

tro

10

purpose of defending Cuba against a feared U.S. in vasion. Or they could be installed near San Cristobal to protect offensive missiles capable of reaching tar in the United States, which logically would not gets be installed until after the anti-aircraft defenses were

in place. Their very presence to discourage U-2 overflights

was obviously intended

by

creating a grave risk

that a U-2 plane would be shot down. If so, Russia would say that the United States was preparing to at U-2 flew again September 5th. tack little Cuba.

A

Another U-2 flight was planned for the following week; but on September 9th, the plan went awry. A Nationalist China U-2 was shot down over Red China. The United States Intelligence Board grounded all U.S. U-2's while this event was evaluated. By September llth the Kremlin was aware of growing U.S. suspicions. That day, Khrushchev de clared that so powerful were the rockets designed to carry the Soviet Union's nuclear warheads that there was no need to search for sites for them beyond the

boundaries of the U.S.S.R.; no need to shift them to any other country, "for instance," he said, "Cuba."

The weapons

being provided for Cuba, he insisted,

were purely defensive

in nature.

As

usual,

he in

Any U.S. attack on Soviet shipping Cuba would unleash nuclear war.

cluded a threat: or on

In response to reporters' questions at a September 13th news conference, Kennedy, ignoring this threat, seemed to accept Khrushchev's assurances concern character of the weapons; but ing the solely defensive 11

he outlined the U.S. position in

specific terms: "If at

any time the Communist buildup

in

Cuba were

to en

danger or interfere with our security, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal,

our missile and space the lives of

Cuba

activities at

Cape Canaveral, or

American

citizens in this country, or if should ever attempt to export its aggressive

pur

poses by force or the threat of force against any nation in this Hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity

Union, then

done

this

country

to protect its

The warning

'will

-for

do whatever must be

own security and that

could not have been more

By September

the Soviet

of

its

allies"

explicit.

15th, the intelligence estimate of the

China U-2 shot was completed. U-2's normally would have flown during the next three or four days but cloud cover was considered excessive for picture-

The U-2

taking.

flights thereafter

were

either

around

the perimeter of the island, to avoid those menacing anti-aircraft batteries, or over less-protected

SAM

parts of the island, avoiding the area that turned out to be critical. The Cuba photographed on these flights

remained reassuringly innocent of strategic weapons. Meanwhile, Navy photo-reconnaissance aircraft were busy. Using aircraft carriers on "routine ex ercises' in the Caribbean as their base, they were tak '

ing low-level looks at ships inbound to Cuba. September 28th these aircraft cameras took

On

photo

graphs of two Soviet freighters, carrying above decks 12

heavy cargoes of large crates. (A set of these photos was mislaid for eleven days.) There were ten long, thin crates on one ship; a number of familiarly oddthey looked

like huge bolts of lightning the crates on other. Older, similar photos were brought from the files and compared. Careful measurements

shaped

were made. They coincided. In 1958, U. S. Naval In telligence had followed crates of precisely the same sizes and shapes into other Soviet spheres. Out of those crates had come et bomb

IJ^3K^Slij^2S^'

j

750 miles; payloaiocapaSnty: nuclear. Furthermore, late in September, five or six Soviet ships with no deck cargo, but queer outsized hatches ers;

range:

capable of taking missiles up to seventy feet long, docked at night under conditions of extraordinary secrecy.

Yet, while the Soviets had indeed supplied other nations with the fifteen-year-old IL-28, they never had distributed nuclear warheads even to the Warsaw

Pact nations, the Soviet counterpart to NATO. Pres ident Kennedy's advisers reasoned that it would be absurd to think the Kremlin would transfer a nuclear capability, either missile or aerial, to the domain of a volatile madman like Castro, who had never even

been admitted to the

Warsaw

As they saw

Pact.

*

it, from the beginning the U.S. and both realizing that responsible govern ments simply do not do things secretly with nuclear weapons had deployed these armaments with gin-

the U.S.S.R.

13

gerly, judicious care; both had always avoided tam which pering with the delicate weapons status

quo

assured that a nuclear exchange would never occur the in of face some vital challenge. Thus, the except

United

States never had placed nuclear weapons on the territories of other nations except openly and un der elaborate treaty arrangements. And the U.S.S.R.

never had placed such weapons on any soil other than own. Since they owned 9.5 million square miles of Europe and Asia, it had not been necessary. Surely the Kremlin would not disregard the certainty that the United States would never tolerate a nuclearits

weapons buildup in an area, the Caribbean and Latin America, where its vital interests were so deeply con cerned. Even so, bombers could not be described as anything other than offensive weapons.

Cuba?

Why

offen

Why

would the Soviets defy weapons the President's clear warnings? Were there, in fact, bombers in those crates? An urgent intelligence order sive

went

As

in

out:

Follow the

crates; find out

what's in them.

ordered, the crates sighted at sea

on September

28th were followed to a long-unused airfield. It was observed that numerous barricades, which had stood across the abandoned airstrips, were gone,

and that anti-aircraft-missile batteries were being in stalled around the The field was perimeters. being made operational. By October 15th, they were ready;

moved the crates up to broke them open. Out of the long, the Russians

runways and thin crates came

the

the fuselages; out of the bigger, odd-shaped crates

14

came the wings. The parts were quickly mated. The M assembly was an IL-28 strategic bomber. If the Russians were sending to Cuba planes capa ble of dropping nuclear bombs, then there was no final

longer any good reason to suppose they might not also be sending in missiles able to hurl nuclear war heads deep into the United States at will.

Accordingly, a decision was made on October 3rd

San Cristobal area again. nothing effective was done for the following

to try to photograph the

Why

eleven perilous days to carry out this decision question that only a Congressional

a

is

investigation

is

ever likely to disclose. Meanwhile, one reason given to newsmen by White House sources is demonstrably false.

The

was:

"The weather

explanation, as published in

major newspa news and magazines, pers, syndicated columns, and since repeated by high-level White House spokesmen, layed flights for a

intervened. Hurricane Ella de

week and then

a cloud cover

blocked high-level surveillance."

The

flaw in this

is

that Ella did not

become

a tropi

storm until October 15th and did not turn into a hurricane until October 16th, long after the period under consideration. Official U. S. Weather Bureau cal

maps show clear weather over western Cuba for October 5th through 9th, with some afternoon shower activity. A detailed report prepared for Con gress, and at hand as this is written, indicates picturetaking weather prevailed on the mornings from October 10th through October 14th, with the after15

noons of October 10th and llth questionable. At no time in the period covered by the official explanation was Hurricane Ella a -factor in the weather over west ern Cuba.

On

October 14th, for example, Ella was a mere gleam in the weatherman's eye, a low-pressure area a thousand miles away somewhere northeast of the Ba hamas. Although it is true that Cuban weather during October is more than usually likely to follow the tropical pattern of clear mornings and afternoon showers, there was no continuous cloud cover or general weather system preventing aerial surveillance throughout the first half of October. Similarly, ac cording to U. S. Weather Bureau sources, there was nothing in the Cuban weather picture to support later face-saving explanations that the Russians took ad vantage of weather to move their missiles out of hiding and into place. If a hurricane had anything to do with the sched ule of high-level

U-2

over Cuba (which are cloud cover is less than fifty per flights

authorized as long as cent) it was the storm kicked up on October 10th by Senator Kenneth Keating of York, He had ,

New

"fully confirmed," he said in the Senate, the fact that were under construction in

six missile-launching sites

Cuba, "pads capable of hurling missiles into the heart land of the United States and as far as the Panama Canal Zone." a highly respected U. S. Senator not for careless talk, who has honorably served

Keating

known his

is

country in uniform in two wars. But

now

he got

only the contemptuous treatment official Washington circles reserve for crackpots. In a story datelined October the New York Times' 14th, Washington, State

Department correspondent quoted "authorita Cuban govern ment has been extremely careful in recent weeks to avoid any chance of conflict with the United States." tive sources" as disclosing that "the

"Extremely thorough" U.S. reconnaissance, the correspondent went on, had yielded no evidence of "illegal arms shipments from" [sic] Castro's Cuba, not even a "water pistol, as one official put it." Further more, "Dr." Castro was reliably reported to be living in fear and dread of assassination. Lacking any good

ground or reason for

direct intervention in Cuba,

U.S. policy, therefore, was to "play the breaks," hope that Russia would soon realize that the high cost of shoring up Cuba's economy would not pay "com mensurate returns in the spread of revolution or sub version in this hemisphere." Deadpan, the Times page-oned the story under the ironic heading:

CASTRO ADOPTING A CAUTIOUS POLICY U.S.

NOTES EXTREME CARE BY CUBA TO AVOID INCIDENTS THAT COULD BRING WAR

(The

New

plenty of false

York Times, it should be said, had company in taking such a calamitously

view of Cuba.

On

October

17

9th,

widely syndi-

cated author Walter Lippmann, reputed to be Presi dent Kennedy's favorite columnist, was writing:

"The

present Cuban military buildup is not only not capable of offensive action, but also it is not

capable

of

action against the United was being written, RussianCuba may well have been capable

defensive

States."

While

manned

bases in

this

of incinerating forty million Americans within sixty to a hundred and eighty seconds, depending on tar

get distances.)

The this

how

soundly America slept on Sunday, October 14th, was obvious to any So final

proof of

viet intelligence agent in the ornate Sixteenth Street Soviet Embassy a few blocks due north of the White

House who tuned to the

ABC

in at three o'clock that afternoon

television

As announced and Sunday

program, Issues and Answers. Washington Post

in that morning's Star, the guest of

ABC commentator Ed

ward P. Morgan was McGeorge Bundy. The was Cuba.

topic

Presidential adviser

Bundy is a forty-four-year-old former Harvard Dean of Arts and Sciences who is Special Assistant to the President for National Se curity Affairs and, as such, the man through

whom

intelligence information funnels to President Ken nedy, and who has the obligation to be sure that the all

informed of the concerns of the U.S. in telligence community. Frequently mentioned for Sec retary of State, he wields the authority of a Sherman Adams in matters affecting the world position of the

President

is

18

United States. Bundy is personally a tough, brilliant administrator and a dedicated American. But even the most competent and patriotic men are sometimes guilty of gross errors in judgment.

Morgan had asked Bundy

;

to

comment on

a "point

which seems to be worrying a lot of people. That

is,

/the interpretation of the military installations in Cuba which the administration emphasizes are defensive in

1

nature and not offensive. Isn't

it

possible that these

could be converted into offensive weapons virtually overnight?" Bundy replied: "Well, I don't myself think that

any present I know there is no present evi dence, and I think there is no present likelihood that the Cubans and the Cuban government and the So viet government would in combination attempt to in there

stall

is

a major offensive capability."

(Bundy here confuses evidence with proof. There was considerable evidence the Russians and Cubans were installing a major offensive capability. The administration simply refused to accept statement continued:)

"Now

it is

'defensive/ if

true that these

you

it.

Bundy's

words 'offensive' and them precisely to

try to apply

every single item, mislead you. Whether a gun is of fensive or defensive depends a little bit on which end

you

are on."

(This was precisely the nonobjective which Russian strategists had counted on

19

analysis in high

Washington policy

circles as essential to the success

of their Cuban plans. For weeks, Khrushchev had been sending private messages to President Ken nedy making the point that whether weapons were offensive or defensive depended on one's purpose in and using them, assuring Kennedy that Russia was not sending any weapons to Cuba to be used to at tack the United States. Russian intelligence agents listening to in disbelief

ception

Bundy undoubtedly pinched themselves when they saw how successful their de had been. The Russians were not "misled"

by the semantic nonsense about "offensive" and "de fensive." McGeorge Bundy and the administration clearly were.)

Continuing his broadcast, Bundy let slip the fact that the United States expected the Russians to send still

more weapons

"that the

into Cuba. "It

is

true/'

he

MIG fighters which have been put in

said,

Cuba

for more than a year now, and any -possible additions in the form of aircraft, might have a certain marginal for capability moving against the United States. But

we have to bear in mind the relative magni The United States is not going to be placed in

I think

tudes.

any position of major danger to its own security by Cuba, and we are not going to permit that situation to develop. That, I think, is what the administration has been trying to make clear." At the time Bundy was speaking, the United States had been placed in a position of immediate, mortal danger.

20

Bundy bestowed

Finally,

what might

still

on and on

a blanket exoneration

the Russian military buildup in

Cuba

to date

be coming. "So far," he

said,

"every

thing that has been delivered in Cuba falls within the categories of aid which the Soviet Union has pro vided, for example, to neutral states like Indonesia,

and

Egypt or

1 should not be surprised to see addi

tional military assistance of that sort. That is not go ing to turn an island of six million people with five or

thousand Soviet technicians and specialists into a major threat to the United States, and I believe that six

most of the American people do not share the views of the few who have acted as if suddenly this kind of military support created a mortal threat to us. It does not."

comparing direct Russian military opera tions in Cuba with Soviet advisory activities in Egypt and Indonesia, Bundy himself failed to bear (In

mind critically significant relative magnitudes. Numbers alone put Cuba in a totally different

in

class

from any other Communist free-world probe

anywhere.

The

intelligence briefs

Soviet-bloc

and

all

latest

show

technicians

published U.S. that the total number of

available

technicians

other Communist countries

from Russia

operating in

all

underdeveloped non-Communist countries in the first half of 1960 amounted to only 5,680. The coun tries with the highest number of Soviet-bloc techni cians were Afghanistan, 1,140, Yemen, 1,130, and Indonesia, 1,100.

The

presence of even a small

21

number of Soviet

military "technicians" in Cuba was cause for alarm. little more than a thousand Soviet-bloc tech

With

nicians, civilian as well as military, Indonesia

mounted

airborne and amphibious attacks on Dutch West Guinea and carried out guerrilla operations in side that part of the island which subsequently forced

New the

Dutch to surrender

to Indonesia.

And

this

and turn it over major conquest was carried

this vast area

out with only one-fifth as many Soviet technicians as Bundy admitted were in Cuba.) Actually, Bundy's October 14th estimate of five or six thousand Soviet technicians and specialists in Cuba

was a

vast understatement. Subsequent calculations, based on the number of Soviet military units known

to be in

Cuba

at the

Bundy spoke, have Bundy himself, that the time

estab

Soviet according to Cuba could easily have been fifteen or even twenty thousand. The bulk of these still remained in lished,

forces in

Cuba three months later. So matters stood on a peaceful Sunday, October 14th in the year of our Lord 1962, the point in time where this story begins. Americans were going

On this lovely morning, while

to church or reading the pa a or pers packing picnic basket or giving the lawn a final mowing to reduce the spread of crab grass, two U.S. Air Force pilots at a Strategic Air Command

base somewhere in the southwestern United States

were getting ready to fly a dangerous mission over Cuba. Within twenty-four hours the horrifying in formation obtained during their mission would con22

vert the soapbox talk about Cuba into the necessity of facing the gravest crisis experienced by the American

people since the Nuclear Age was born in a clap of cosmic thunder and a blaze of primordial light over

Alamogordo proving ground

23

in 1945.

THE PERILIN

two

FOCUS

whose routine performance of duty were Air Force Majors Rudolf Anderson, Jr., and Richard S. Heyser. Both were reconnaissance pilots with long years of

was

pilots

to have such far-reaching results

training in flying aerial information-gathering mis sions. Both were born in 1927 Anderson at Spartan-

burg, South Carolina; Heyser at Battle Creek, Michi gan. Both attended Southern colleges Anderson at

Clemson Agricultural College, Clemson, South Caro lina; Heyser at the University of Florida at Gaines24

Both joined the Air Force in 1951 Heyser directly from college, Anderson after working briefly as a cost accountant. Continuing the parallelism, both also served in the Far East Anderson with the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron in Korea, from ville.

of 1953 until the spring of 1955, Heyser in Japan, in 1953 and 1954. the

fall

On

this

Sunday both were assigned

to fly

U-2

high-level reconnaissance planes to photograph that mysterious western end of Cuba. The planes they

were assigned

The U-2

to fly deserve a separate introduction.

one of the most extraordinary specialpurpose aircraftV^dreained up in the entire marvelis

histoof^

Slled

a

with a stubby 49 l/i -foot ^^{u ^....w g^^^^^mf',^' ^^,^^,, of bot great grace and wing span /

.

I^cEEe"e3-developed

^

,

.........

.

^^

A"'

M

1

,

s ^

^^^^ and black

the deep purple

.**k, .**,

^

or outer

shades off into **^.*^^ r *- -^-r .

,

oFup^to four thousanct 1Me?r^gjit^4ee5' .,...:'

"

'

r

^hen

1

-

t

carrying extra tanks,

all

^./nwr^^'*^ **^"^

.

r

IT

^^ idles most of the time. Just anjjgpangine ** barely n ^v* ///'v^^^*PgWWMV *^^ *" ""*'

1 %*'**"'

rfi

1

"' ii '

'***** plied, ". . . the 'paper tiger* has nuclear teeth." FurtKeri^Tie7tKe~United States hasTghnen the world a

clear

demonstration that

conventional

military

power, operating under a shield of retaliatory nuclear power, can repel aggression. The United States hopes to convince its

Western Europe

NATO

that

it

should strengthen

forces to the point where not dare to provoke a fight there.

conventional

Russia would Perhaps the most important and clearest lesson to emerge from the Cuba crisis is that the American peo ple and their allies will not panic under Russia's nu clear threats. Throughout the crisis, the risk was not,

Khrushchev

foolishly supposed, that the people of

the free world

would crumble and sue for mercy, world of Communist uniformity to

as

life

in a

preferring the perils of freedom. Quite the opposite. On full authority, the authors can say that the American

had sunk even one U.S. ship, public pressure to strike back at the Soviets might quickly have become overwhelm ing. The people of the United States realized that leaders are convinced that if the Russians

170

Khrushchev and Castro were a menace try's security

faced the

coun

long before their leaders in Washington

facts.

now known, the Central In Agency's John McCone began warning re

In early August, telligence

to their

it is

the temptation to Khrushchev sponsible officials that to plant attack missiles in Cuba would be almost irre that time, Soviet ships had been landing massive quantities of war materiel and troops in Cuba. sistible.

At

But Washington's Kremlinologists could not bring themselves to believe that Russia would do what it did until they saw the U-2 pictures. If the test of "hard been this "hard," no pre intelligence" had always cautions against aggression would have been taken at any place and at any time prior to the develop

ment of photo-reconnaissance techniques

War

in

World

II.

we

expected that he [Khrush chev] would put the missiles in Cuba, because it would have seemed such an imprudent action for him to take, as it was later proved. Now, he obviously "I don't think that

must have thought that he could do it in secret, and that the United States would accept it." So President Kennedy summed up the lesson of the Cuban crisis in 17, 1962. If Washto advance the will igton underestimated the Soviet Communist world cause by action "imprudent" by

a televised interview of

December

Khrushchev even more misjudged The United States did not "accept" Red missiles in Cuba; it did act, however Western freedom. belatedly, to preserve Western standards,

the democratic will to resist.

L'ENVOI

beginning of this account, the overriding importance of the reconnais sance photographs taken on October 14th, the authors

IN STRESSING, in the end

as at the

wish to acknowledge a debt that has been largely overlooked in every assessment of the Cuban crisis. This is the debt they and every other American owe to Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., whose aerial photo graphs finally aroused the government to take action in the nick of time. As the only American in fact, the only

man

killed in

combat in what might 172

easily

have turned into the ultimate in wars, Major Ander son occupies a unique place in history.

On

Sunday morning, October

28th, the

town

of

Greenville, South Carolina, read in the papers that Major Rudolf Anderson was missing in action. What the townspeople didn't realize as yet was that lanky, quiet Rudy Anderson had done a hero's job. They

thought of him as a nice-boy-next-door, the star center-fielder on a championship Softball team, an en still

gineering student at Clemson College, a young man who attended the Buncombe Street Methodist Church

with

his father

and mother. As an Air Force

officer,

a

veteran of Korea with several medals, they were proud of him in the vague way a small town is proud

of a worthy son.

Even

in their shock, however, his parents knew done something big. that he was

Word

that he had

come directly from General SAC's Commander in Chief. And Power, the General had said he was recommending Rudy for

missing in action had

Thomas

S.

the Distinguished Service Medal.

What had he done? His flying duties were secret; Rudy never talked about them. There was only one

When

he had brought his wife and two young sons to Greenville during an August leave, he had given his father a model of an airplane he had carved himself it was a U-2. Secre Then, on Wednesday night Oct. 31st, Thant appeared on television to tell tary General the world about his discussions with Castro in clue:

UN

U

173

vana. Just about all of Greenville was watching when he said that Castro, for "humane reasons," would

send back to the United States the body of an Ameri can pilot shot down over Cuba. That was how the

town

learned that

They

Rudy Anderson was

dead.

learned that he had died a hero's death

following Tuesday noon,

on the

when General Power

flew

from Omaha for his funeral. Stepping out of his jet at Donaldson Air Force Base, Power said, "Major Anderson gave his life while performing one of the most vital and hazardous duties connected with the in

Cuban

crisis. It is

because of

men

like

Major Ander

country has been able to act with de termination during these fateful days. He and Major

son that

this

Heyser were the two reconnaissance pilots who, on October 14th, obtained the first conclusive evidence of the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba." Richard

S.

Anderson's wife,

his parents, his friends, the

hun

dreds of townspeople who came to Woodlawn Me morial Park an hour later had that to think about as six of his

fellow officers carried his casket to the

graveside.

A flight of F-101's flew in tribute overhead

with one plane missing from the formation. The minister of Buncombe Street Methodist Church read the simple service: ". In my Father's house are many man sions ." Then a thoughtful hush settled over the .

.

.

.

gathering as the SAC honor guard fired three volleys into the soft, misty afternoon and taps sounded for Rudy Anderson for the last time.

174

To

you, gallant Major Anderson, we, the living, Peace. say: May the grass soon grow green and the birds sing

sweetly over your grave. Rest in the knowledge that

you

are gratefully

remembered.

And may

survive, never forget that so long

munism lance

is

we,

as militant

who com

stalks the earth, the price of a lapse of vigi

death.

175

INDEX

Acheson, Dean,

65, 66, 140, 141,

Bastista, Fulgencio, 61

Bay of Pigs

142, 143-144

Adams, Sherman,

Agronsky, Martin, 7 Alliance for Progress, 129-130 Alsop, Stewart, 44 American Broadcasting Com

Billingslea, Brig.

pany (ABC), 18 American Railroads, Association George

W.,

100-101 Jr.,

24-

25, 27, 39, 68, 153, 158, 172-175

Atomic Energy (AEC), 9, 59 George,

156

C., 105

165

Adm.

Anderson, Maj. Rudolf,

Ball,

Gen.

Boggs, Representative Hale, 149 Bohlen, Charles E. ("Chip"), 140 Bolshakov, Georgi, 42-45 Brady, Lt. Cmdr. Robert, 163,

of, 105-106

Anderson,

invasion, 1961, 50, 55,

64, 67, 68, 90, 93 Berlin, 3, 51-52, 69, 87, 124,

18

Commission

48, 49, 65, 70, 127-

128 Bartlett, Charles, 44-45

Brown, Lt. Robert G., 81 Bruce, David K. E., 144-145 Buie, Rear Adm. Paul R., 102 Bundy, McGeorge, 18-22, 32,

34,

38-41, 45, 48, 49, 73, 168 Burrows, Charlie, 79-80

Capehart, Senator

Homer, 90

Cape Canaveral, 8, 12, Carroll, Lt. Gen. Joseph

176

113, F., 31

121

Carter, Lt.

Gen. Marshall

S., 31,

Castro,

Fidel,

2,

8,

10,

13,

96, 97,

112,

132,

131,

133,

142, 145, 160, 165, 168, 171, 173,

174 Central

(CIA),

Agency

Intelligence

Gaitskell,

Columbia Broadcasting (CBS), 36-37

System

Georgios,

Capt.

166

John E., 107

Cuban refugee

W.,

93

145

UN,

35, 63

Gilpatric, Roswell, 31, 49

Goodwin, Richard, 129-130 Gromyko, Andrei, 71-72, 86,

122-

123

Guantanamo Bay

60, 91, 141, 171

China. See Nationalist China, Red China. Collins, Brig. Gen. William, 105

Conger, Col.

Hugh,

General Assembly,

9, 28, 31, 32, 35, 49, 59,

Condorrigas,

J.

17,

18, 30, 33, 55, 61, 62, 64, 81, 88,

89,

Frost, Robert, 55

Fulbright, Senator

49

base, 12, 76-79, 80, 82, 105, 106, 169-170

Hagerman, Capt. G.M., 81 Haines, Brig. Gen. Ralph E., 106 Halleck, Charles A., 93-94

Harriman, W. Averell, 155 Heyser, Maj. Richard S., 24-25, 27, 39, 68, 158, 174

reports, 4-5, 6, 8,

32, 60, 168

Jr.,

Hilsman, Roger,

33,

35,

36,

48,

153-154

Davies, Richard, 155 Defense, Department of,

4, 9, 28,

Howze, Lt. Gen. Hamilton, 105 Humphrey, Senator Hubert, 94 Hurricane

31, 32, 37, 41, 49, 59, 65, 66, 67,

86, 91, 98, 113, 126-127, 147, 148,

158

DeGaulle, Charles, 140-142 Dennison, Adm. Robert L.,

99,

D wight D.,

2, 9,

138

Fay, Paul, 83 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 9, 59

Thomas K.,

140-141

United

59

(ICBM),

Missile

32, 51, 53-54, 119, 120,

157

Intermediate-Range

Ballistic

Mis

135 Answers, 18, 39

sile, 30, 51, 53, 59, 121,

Issues

and

Lyndon

B., 49, 63, 90,

91

Elizabeth II, 143, 144 Engle, Senator Qair, 7

Finletter,

11,

Intercontinental Ballistic

Johnson,

Eckert, Cmdr. William, 109 Edinburgh, Duke of, 144

Agency,

136

Intelligence Board, United States, 8-9,

Diefenbaker, John, 159 Dillon, Douglas, 41, 49, 65 Dobrynin, Anatoli, 71-72, 86, 114, 127 Donovan, James B., 90 Dorticos, Osvaldo, 34

Eisenhower,

Information States,

100, 102, 163, 164

Ella, 15-16, 96, 97

Johnson, U. Alexis,

32,

48

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31, 32, 49, 64, 73, 100 Justice, Department of, 66

Keating, Senator Kenneth B., 6-7, 16-17, 35, 63, 83-85, 89

Kennedy, Caroline, 40, 49, 74 Kennedy, Mrs. Ethel, 83

177

Kennedy, Mrs. Jacqueline,

40, 70,

MacKercher,

74

Lt.

Cmdr. John

C.,

96-98

Kennedy, John

F., 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9,

10, 11-12, 13, 14, 18, 20, 32, 33,

Macmillan, Harold, 145 McNamara, Robert, 37,

38, 39, 40-42, 43, 44-45, 47, 48-

158

55-56, 58, 62-63, 64, 65-66, 67, 68-74, 75, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86-

MacSweeney, John, 155

87, 88, 90, 91-92, 93-94, 95, 97,

Martin,

50,

140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147,

(MRBM),

Jr., 40,

74

45, 49, 50, 65-66, 70-71, 72, 83 3, 10, 11,

Cmdr.

Mikhalevsky,

Nicholas,

166

37, 41, 43, 44,

43, 44-45 Doctrine, 88, 89 Monroney, Senator Mike, 90-91 Morgan, Edward P., 18, 19

Mikoyan, Anastas, 20,

27-28, 34, 42, 43-44, 45, 50-51, 55, 56, 62-63, 64, 67, 71, 88, 92, 93, 111-112, 114, 115, 119, 125, 126, 129, 130, 133, 134, 136, 137139, 140, 145, 146, 147, 150-152,

153, 154-155, 157, 167, 168, 170,

171

Anna Louise,

Missile

29, 30, 51, 52, 53, 59,

121, 135, 157, 169

158, 162, 168, 170, 171

Khrushchev, Nikita,

33-35, 48, 49,

Mass, Lt. j.g. Edward, 167 Medium-Range Ballistic

148, 149-150, 154, 155, 156, 157,

Kennedy, John F., Kennedy, Robert,

Edwin M.,

72, 130-131

98, 101, 103, 109, 111, 112, 115,

120-125, 126, 127, 128, 136, 138,

49, 65, 66,

67, 70-71, 91, 93, 147, 148, 149,

Monroe

National Broadcasting

(NBC),

7,

Company

39

National Photographic Interpre tation Center, 28-31 Nationalist China, 11, 12

80

Kitdeson, Kitdeson, Mrs. Louise H., 80 Knox, William, 136-139 Kohler, Foy D., 136, 155 Korea, 72, 91, 107, 173

National Observer, 6 National Security Council, 50-52,

58-59, 67, 69, 70, 72, 82 55-56,

62-63,

Kremlinologists, 4, 95, 171

New York Herald Tribune, 5 New York Times, 3, 17, 84

Capt.D.L., 163 Lawrence, David, 5 LeMay, Gen. Curtis, 95

Norstad, Gen. Lauris, Norstad, Mrs., 144

Lassell,

tion 67,

31, 49-50,

65,

Rhodam Y.,

106-107, 108, 109, 163

140,

13,

141,

52,

56, 63,

142,

143-

6th elections, 2, 51, 71, 73,88,91 Nunez Jimenez, Dr. Antonio, 6162

91, 171

McElroy, Rear Adm.

89,

November

B., 140, 141, 142

9,

(NATO), 86,

144, 151, 170

Lloyd, Mrs. Jacqueline, 76-77, 81 Lloyd, Lt. Cmdr. Jim, 81 Lovett, Robert, 65

McCone, John,

142-144

North Atlantic Treaty Organiza

Lenin, Nikolai, 45-46 Lippmann, Walter, 17-18, 151 Lloyd, Brian, 81

Lyon, Cecil

86,

49,

64-

O'Brien, Lawrence F., 87 O'Donnell, Adm. Edward J., 80 Organization of American States (OAS), 56, 93, 129-131

178

Paris

Summit Conference,

Pentagon, 104,

115,

10

140, 141, 147, 150, 153-154, 155,

31, 60, 70, 73, 85, 98,

154,

163

Power, Gen. Thomas

S., 116, 118,

120, 173, 174

Powers, Francis Gary. See U-2. Fraud a, 136 Prejean, Mrs. Matilda, 78 Preston, Maj. Gen. Maurice A., 104

169 Stevenson, Adlai, 62, 65, 132-135 Strategic Air Command (SAC), 22, 24-25, 27-28, 32, 54, 113, 115-120, 158, 161-162, 173, 174 Sweeney, Gen. Walter C., Jr., 67-

68 Tactical Air

Command (TAC),

67, 95, 104, 112, 160

Red

China, 11, 12, 170 Reston, James ("Scotty"), 83-85 Rich, Maj. Gen. Charles W. G., 105

Rio Pact, 1947, 88 Rivero, Vice Adm. Horacio,

65, 70-71

Thant, U, 139-140, 173

Thompson, Llewellyn, 95,

96,99 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 66 Ruggles, Maj. Gen., John F., 105

Rusk, Dean,

Tass news agency, 42, 136, 151 Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 31, 49,

L.,105 Tojo, Eiki, 65 Treasury, Department

of, 41, 49,

65

33, 35-37, 48, 49, 51,

71-72, 73, 86, 91, 93, 114, 127, 128-129, 137, 169 Russell, Lord Bertrand, 139 Russell, Senator Richard B M 88,

65

Throckmorton, Maj. Gen. John

Truman, Harry S, 70, 91 Turkey missile bases, 52, U-2, 9-10,

92-93

89, 151

11, 12, 16, 25-28, 32, 35,

37, 44, 47, 48, 50, 59, 90,

128,

130, 131, 135, 141, 142, 145, 153,

154, 171, 172, 173

Salinger, Pierre,

7, 40, 44, 69, 74,

85,87 Saturday Evening Post, 44 Schirra, Cmdr. Walter M., 49

U-2

United Nations (UN),

Jr.,

132

Schroeder, Gerhard, 35-36, 37, 69 Security Council, UN, 63, 132135

Smedberg, Vice Adm. William R., HI, 99

Adm. Page, 145 Socarras, Carlos Prio, 61

Smith,

Department

62, 89,

See also General Assembly, Se curity Council

UPI photo service, 61-62 US. News & World Report, 6 USSR, 42 Vienna meeting, 1961,42, 111

Sorensen, Theodore, 49, 70, 73 State,

3,

93, 132, 133, 134, 135-136, 139, 151, 152, 155, 173

Schirra, Mrs., 49

Schlesinger, Arthur,

"incident," 9, 10

Ulbricht, Walter, 71

of, 4, 5, 9, 17,

Vietnam, 87 Vila, Dr. Herminio

Portell,

60

18, 28, 32, 33, 34, 35-36, 41, 48,

49, 50-51, 59, 60, 65, 66, 71-72, 73, 75, 82-83, 84, 86, 91, 114,

Ward, Vice Adm. Alfred Gus-

126-127, 129, 130, 131, 137, 139,

179

("Corky"), 98-100, 101102, 103, 104, 160, 166, 167

tave

Warsaw Pact,

13,

39-40, 41, 44, 45, 48, 50, 70, 71, 86, 87, 91, 130,

89

Washington Post, 18 Washington Sunday Star,

72, 74, 82, 85,

White House,

132, 140, 146, 149-150, 151, 153 II, 57, 65, 66, 74, 85,

18

Wesley!.Billy, 76 Wesley, Mrs. Denise, 78 White, Gen. Thomas D., 5 4, 7, 15, 18, 32, 33,

World War

105, 107, 153, 167, 170, 171

Zorin, Valerian A., 63, 134-136

180

(Continued from front -flap)

more so when the events are still so fresh and pertinent, and when our own fortunes as a nation and as individuals are as inti mately bound up with the outcome, as they are in this case. STRIKE IN THE WEST will fascinate the student of politics, of the cold war, and of history, but, more than that, it will hold the general reader irresistibly as he fol lows the story behind the Cuban crisis.

James Daniel has been a reporter for years, having worked as the city editor of the Washington Daily News, been assigned to the national reporting staff of Scripps-Howard, and then joined

many

the writing staff of Time. After taking his Nieman Fellowship at Harvard, Mr. Dan iel served overseas with the OWI in the China-Burma theater. He has since writ ten many magazine articles, and has been a Roving Editor with The Readers Digest since October of 1961. dale, New York.

He

lives in Scars-

John G. Hubbell served with the Navy in II. For the past twelve years he has written on military affairs and cov ered military events for The Readers Di gest, having become a Staff Writer in 1955 and a Roving Editor in 1961. He was the

World War

first

civilian ever to

Command

make

a Strategic Air

jet-to-jet refueling flight. Mr. lives in Minneapolis, Min

Hubbell now nesota.

Holt, Rinehart

and Winston,

383 Madison Avenue

New York 17, N.Y.

Inc.