Strategy for victory: the development of British tactical air power, 1919-1943

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STRATEGY FOR VICTORY

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Praeger Security International Advisory Board Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) Thérèse Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Foundation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

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November 21, 2007

STRATEGY FOR VICTORY The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919–1943

David Ian Hall

Praeger Studies in Diplomacy and Strategic Thought B.J.C. McKercher, Series Editor

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL Westport, Connecticut r London

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hall, David Ian. Strategy for victory : the development of British tactical air power, 1919–1943 / David Ian Hall. p. cm. — (Praeger studies in diplomacy and strategic thought, 1076–1543) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–275–97767–2 (alk. paper) 1. Air power—Great Britain—History—20th century. 2. Great Britain. Royal Air Force—History—20th century. 3. World War, 1939–1945—Aerial operations, British I. Title. UG635.G7H316 2008 358.40941 09041—dc22 2007035411 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 2008 by David Ian Hall All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2007035411 ISBN-13: 978–0–275–97767–2 ISSN: 1076–1543 First published in 2008 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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for my parents

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CONTENTS Acknowledgments Preface Abbreviations

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Introduction

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Part I: How the Army Went to War without Adequate Air Support 1. British Concepts of Air Power and Air-Ground Operations, 1918–1933

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2. Army-Air Co-operation and the Prelude to War, 1933–1939

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3. War and Defeat in France

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4. The Search for Responsibility: Post-mortem on the Defeat of the BEF, 1940

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5. Preliminary Campaigns in North Africa

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Part II: How a System of Air Support Was Organised 6. The Army’s Struggle for Air Support

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7. Direct Air Support for the Army in the Western Desert

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8. Debate, Decision, and Policy in 1942

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9. Defeat and Victory in the Western Desert

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10. The Birth of the Tactical Air Force

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Contents

Conclusion

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Appendix: Middle East (Army and RAF) Directive on Direct Air Support Issued by GHQ MEF and HQ RAF ME (30 September 1941)

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Notes

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Select Bibliography

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Index

237 A photo essay follows p. 85.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book, which began life as an academic thesis, owes an enormous amount to the information, wisdom, and guidance that I have been fortunate to receive from many kind and talented people. Professor Robert J. O’Neill, Chichele Professor of the History of War at the University of Oxford, supervised my D.Phil. thesis. His critical comments, his encouragement, and his patience were of the greatest assistance to the development and completion of this work. Professor Brian McKercher, Head of War Studies at the Royal Military College of Canada, read the manuscript while in the midst of many other demanding activities and distractions and was a generously supportive source of helpful criticism and encouragement. It was also through his enthusiastic support for the work that Praeger accepted it for publication. I have been very fortunate in working with Heather Staines and Adam Kane at Praeger, part of the Greenwood Publishing Group, and with Himanshu Abrol and his team of copyeditors Deepak K. Arora and Kakoli Sajwan at Aptara, Inc. Their advice, support, and patience have been invaluable. Many others provided me with the benefit of their knowledge and friendship both during the research and writing phases of this work. Sebastian Cox, Head of the Air Historical Branch, RAF, and Professor Paul MacKenzie, a fellow graduate student at Oxford and now a Professor of Military History at the University of South Carolina, both read much of the manuscript in its most rudimentary form. I also owe a great deal of gratitude and thanks to Klaus Larres, Oliver Haller, John Pepper, Glen Berg, Catherine Gold, Terry Copp, Mike Bechtohold, Carl Christie, Scot Robertson, David Zimmerman, Denis and Shelagh Whitaker, and Kathryn Maitland-Ward for making the long journey to completion rewarding and enjoyable.

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Acknowledgments

No work of this nature would be possible without the help of archivists and librarians who are the custodians of the documents and papers that are the essential tools of historians. I am therefore indebted to many institutions that have supported this work through their generous access to the documents and source materials on which this book is based. To the staffs of the National Archives (Public Record Office), Kew, London; the Air Historical Branch, RAF; the RAF Museum, RAF Hendon; the Imperial War Museum; the Codrington Library at All Souls; the Library of Christ Church, Oxford; the Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall, London; the Institute of Historical Research, University of London; the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London; Churchill College Archive, University of Cambridge; the Library of the House of Lords; the Directorate of History, Canadian National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa; the Massey Library, the Royal Military College of Canada; and the Mills Memorial Library, McMaster University, I owe thanks for their patience and professionalism. My research and writing has also been aided by the high quality of university education that I have been fortunate to receive in both Canada and England. I have amassed a large number of intellectual debts in the course of my studies to a number of brilliant scholars and teachers. I am grateful to Professor Paul Fritz, Professor John Campbell, the late Professor R. H. Johnston, Professor Dominick Graham, the late Professor Francis Cogland, and Professor Sir Michael Howard for teaching me how to be an historian. Finally, I am most grateful to my family whose support has been immeasurable. This book is dedicated to my mother and father. David Ian Hall King’s College London November 17, 2007

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PREFACE The British Army’s lack of air support during the opening campaigns of the Second World War in France and North Africa stands out as one of the great ironies of that conflict. The British, after all, perfected air support during the Great War, and, in 1918, possessed what many at the time believed was the finest tactical air force in the world. Yet, by 1939, co-operation between the Army and the Royal Air Force was minimal at best. A number of historians have attributed the dramatic decline in Army-RAF co-operation to the Air Staff’s so-called “single-minded belief in mass aerial bombardment as a war winner” and the corresponding British defence policy this strategic view produced in the 1930s due to an exaggerated fear of the bomber. Although this is only a partial explanation it is one that has gained a surprising degree of acceptance. Even Sir Maurice Dean, a distinguished historian of the RAF, has written: “Between 1918 and 1939 the RAF forgot how to support the Army.” A cursory look at the early battles and campaigns fought by the British Army in the Second World War appears to support the critics’ claims. From September 1939 to August 1942, the Army rarely won a battle and lost every campaign. One aspect common to all of these early defeats was the lack of adequate air support for the Army. The RAF, it is argued, trained and equipped to fight a separate war, could not give much support to the Army and begrudged what it gave. This story, however, is woefully incomplete. Both before and during the war Britain’s airmen gave a great deal of thought to the subject of air support for an army in the field. To date, existing literature on the war has failed to give a satisfactory account of these efforts, leaving a significant story of ideas, intellectual development, and institutions to be told.

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Extensive analysis of the use and misuse of air forces during the First World War led Britain’s airmen to establish the first principles of air warfare—offensive initiative, air superiority, concentration of force, and the need for centralised command and control— which served them well in their development of theory and doctrine throughout the interwar period and the Second World War. Their advancement of “air power” also led to a bitter rivalry between the Army and the RAF and a fierce political struggle over the proper employment of finite air forces in war, which remained unresolved until the spring of 1943. As a general rule the airmen tended to see a wider strategic application of air power. In a land battle, once command of the air over the intended area of operations had been established, air forces would make their greatest impact through offensive action designed to “isolate the battlefield” from enemy reinforcement and supply. Both training exercises and war experience had convinced the airmen that air attacks in the forward areas of the battlefield were ineffective. They inevitably involved unacceptable losses in aircraft and crews, which could not be replaced quickly and, thereby, undermined the air force’s ability to maintain the all important condition of air superiority. Army officers were unimpressed by this logic. They wanted large numbers of specialised aircraft allocated directly to field commanders in order to shield their men from enemy air attack and to provide offensive air support (loosely described by the soldiers as flying artillery) to destroy enemy armour, artillery, and strong points at the forefront of the battlefield. What was required for these operations, they concluded, was their own army air arm. Anything less, stated the soldiers, was unacceptable. Irreconcilable differences on matters of principle and deep-seated mistrust over intent bedevilled most dealings between the two Services as they struggled to find a mutually acceptable solution. The calamitous Battle of France in 1940 and the early setbacks in the Middle East merely made a bad situation worse. A severe lack of resources and technical problems with aircraft and rudimentary communications systems also hindered the rapid development of a comprehensive, flexible, and quick to respond air support system. But these physical problems were much easier to overcome than the conceptual differences over air-ground co-operation between the Army and the RAF. Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, AOC-in-C Middle East, was instrumental in bringing about a change in army attitudes and developing an effective and efficient system of air support in North Africa. He was assisted in his efforts by the battlefield skill of Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Coningham, the eager and willing co-operation of General Bernard Montgomery, and the political influence and intervention of Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Personality and spectacular battlefield success in the Western Desert during the summer of 1942, combined to produce perhaps the finest air support afforded to any army during the Second World War. The creation of the 2nd

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Tactical Air Force in June 1943 and its performance during the Normandy invasion through to the end of the war attests to this claim. This monograph examines the nature of the interservice crisis and debate over air support from the end of the Great War 1914–1918 to the summer of 1943 and, in this context, the process by which it was settled. Drawn primarily from the rich collection of documents at the Public Record Office (Kew) and other British archives, the analysis traces how the British Army went to war in 1939 without adequate air support and how an effective system of support was organised by the RAF. As such, it is the first scholarly survey of the origins and development of British air support doctrine and practice during the early years of the Second World War.

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ABBREVIATIONS 2nd TAF AA AASC AASF AASGp AC ACBA ACC ACIGS AEF AEFHQ AFHQ AFV AHQ AIL ALO AM AOC AOC-in-C AOP ASC ASCHQ ASSU ASU ATM AVM

2nd Tactical Air Force, RAF Anti-Aircraft Army Air Support Control Advanced Air Striking Force Army Air Support Group Army Co-operation Allied Central Air Bureau Army Co-operation Command Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff Air Expeditionary Force Air Expeditionary Force Headquarters Allied Forces Headquarters Armoured Fighting Vehicle Air Headquarters Air Intelligence Liaison Air Liaison Officer Air Marshal Air Officer Commanding Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Air Observation Post Air Support Control Air Support Control Headquarters Air Support Signals Unit Air Storage Unit Army Training Memorandum Air Vice-Marshal

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BAFF BEF CAS CCOR CCS CID C-in-C CGS CIGS CO COR COS Col CSBC DAK DCAS DCIGS DDMO DD Plans DDSD DMI DMO DMO&I DRC EAF FAC FASL FM FOO Gen GHQ GOC GOC-in-C GSO HMSO HQ HQHF HQME IAF IWM JIC JPC LHCMA L of C

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Abbreviations

British Air Forces in France British Expeditionary Force Chief of the Air Staff Combined Central Operations Room Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee of Imperial Defence Commander-in-Chief Chief of the General Staff Chief of the Imperial General Staff Commanding Officer Combined Operations Room Chief of Staff Colonel Close Support Bomber Control Deutsches Afrika Korps Deputy Chief of the Air Staff Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff Deputy Director of Military Operations Deputy Director of Plans Deputy Director of Staff Duties Director of Military Intelligence Director of Military Operations Director of Military Operations and Intelligence Defence Requirements Committee The Employment of Air Forces in the Field Forward Air Controller Forward Air Support Link Field Marshal Forward Observation Officer General General Headquarters General Officer Commanding General Officer Commanding-in-Chief General Staff Officer His/Her Majesty’s Stationery Office Headquarters Headquarters Home Forces Headquarters Middle East Independent Air Forces Imperial War Museum Joint Intelligence Committee Joint Planning Committee Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives Line of Communication

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Abbreviations

Lt Lt-Col Lt-Gen Maj Maj-Gen MORU MTP NATAF NCO NWAF ORS PRO PUS QMG RA RAC RAAF RAF RASL RE RFC RNAS R/T RTC RTR SASO SHAEF Tac/R TEWT TNA UK USAAF VCIGS WDAR WO W/T ZOAN

Lieutenant Lieutenant-Colonel Lieutenant-General Major Major-General Mobile Operations Room Unit Military Training Pamphlet North-Wet African Tactical Air Force Non-Commissioned Officer North-West African Air Force Operational Research Section Public Record Office, Kew, London Permanent Under Secretary Quarter-Master General Royal Artillery Royal Armoured Corps Royal Australian Air Force Royal Air Force Rear Air Support Link Royal Engineers Royal Flying Corps Royal Naval Air Service Radio Telephony Royal Tank Corps Royal Tank Regiment Senior Air Staff Officer Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force Tactical Reconnaissance Tactical Exercise Without Troops The National Archive (PRO, UK) United Kingdom United States Army Air Force Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff Western Desert Air Force, RAF War Office Wireless Telegraphy Zone des Operations Aeriennes du Nord

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November 18, 2007

Introduction Even before the Frenchman Louis Blériot made his auspicious cross-Channel flight on 25 July 1909, in a “heavier-than-air fixed-wing flying machine,” aviation enthusiasts were straining their imaginations in an attempt to harness the aeroplane’s potential for military use. In Europe, roughly from 1909 to the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914, a few military and naval leaders expressed an interest in aeroplanes because of the enhanced possibilities they offered in observation and reconnaissance. Intelligence gathered by friendly aircraft could provide generals and admirals with early warning of enemy intentions. Commanders who availed themselves of the information acquired by aerial reconnaissance would be able to plot their troop or naval movements accordingly and, during the subsequent battle, ongoing aerial observation would enable them to exploit any combat success achieved. Moreover, in enlightened military circles, there was a steadily growing belief that a strategic advantage of this kind would be an important factor in bringing future campaigns to a quick and decisive end.1 The French Army, in 1910, was the first European army to purchase aircraft. After initial instruction in flying, France’s military pilots trained for reconnaissance missions in support of an army in the field. A year later the experimental flying corps was given official sanction when the Inspectorate of Aeronautical Services was created and placed under the command of General Jacques Rogues. The Germans kept pace with developments in France and created their own Inspector of Aviation Troops. Both armies concentrated on developing a reconnaissance role for aircraft.2 Prior to 1914 air-to-air and air-to-ground combat roles were not part of official air policy in any European army, although practical efforts to make the aeroplane an effective offensive weapon were taking place in a number of

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Strategy for Victory

countries. In France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and the United States of America a variety of pioneering experiments including the mounting of bombs on aircraft and adapting machine-guns for aerial warfare were undertaken by civilian and military engineers alike. There was no lack of inventive endeavour in stretching the limits of existing technology to improve the offensive capabilities of aircraft. Nevertheless, senior military leaders were content to restrict their interest in military aviation to that of a special scouting role. Whether or not their reluctance to explore a combat role for aircraft was based on ignorance, indifference, prejudice, or a realistic scepticism of the impact that frail wires-and-struts aeroplanes—equipped with primitive forms of explosives and small firearms and lacking radios— could make on a modern battlefield, the day was fast approaching when soldiers and sailors who ignored this new form of war in the air would do so at their peril. The advent of war in the third dimension had come. Between 1911 and 1913 the offensive potential of the aeroplane received its first test in several small wars; a number of foreboding portents were exhibited.3 The first of these wars was the Italo-Turkish War of 1911–1912.4 During Italy’s campaign to seize Libya in November 1911, an Italian pilot, who had been despatched on an otherwise routine reconnaissance mission, dropped three small bombs on Turkish defensive positions. This act of aerial bombardment had a negative effect on the morale of front-line Turkish troops wholly out of proportion to the damage caused and the threat presented. As a result of this unanticipated success, Italian planes continued to bomb Turkish troops and positions from time to time until the end of the war. Air bombardment of enemy ground forces by aeroplanes also occurred in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, and later in Morocco where the French Army used aircraft to support friendly ground troops suppress insurgents. In all of the above cases, the offensive air action taken was random, incidental, and often the result of an individual pilot’s initiative. Official procedures or doctrine to guide pilots engaged in air-ground attacks did not exist before the autumn of 1914.5 The British Army’s interest in military aviation was somewhat slower in developing than that of its continental counterparts. Service aviation had its formal beginning in Britain on 1 April 1911 when the Air Battalion was established within the Royal Engineers. Aeroplanes were to be employed on general reconnaissance and aerial survey work. As such they were not part of the mainstream of British military activity or training, or even included in the Army’s general plans for operations of war. In fact, the British Army’s senior ranks were not noticeably impressed by military aviation, which General Nicholson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), regarded as being “largely irrelevant.”6 It took Italian deployment of aircraft at Tripoli, in their campaign of 1911, to stimulate the British government to take further measures to secure an efficient air service for use in war.7

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In November 1911, Prime Minister Asquith appointed Lord Haldane to chair a special sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to investigate and report on the state of military and naval aviation in Great Britain. The committee worked quickly and submitted its report on 28 February 1912. All of its main recommendations were accepted by the government; the most important one being the establishment of a single, unified air service. The committee reasoned that air forces may play an important role in a future war, and that it would be desirable to have a centralised air service so that “ . . . in a purely naval war the whole service should be available for the Navy, while in purely land war the whole should be available for the Army.”8 The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) was thus conceived. Constituted by Royal Warrant, the RFC came into being on 13 May 1912, with a Military Wing, a Naval Wing, and a Central Flying School. The Admiralty administered the Naval Wing and the War Office was responsible for the rest.9 Unfortunately, Britain’s fledgling air service was anything but unified. Difficult questions concerning its administration and control gave rise to acute differences between the Admiralty and the War Office. Unable and unwilling to reach a reconcilable division of authority, the two air wings went their own separate ways. When the Royal Navy announced the formation of its own air service in July 1914, officially recognised as the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), it merely made public what was already an established fact.10 From the very beginning, each Service developed its aviation independently and without reference to the other. Both, however, envisaged employing their aircraft almost exclusively on reconnaissance tasks. Each service also stubbornly regarded such missions as a last resort rather than as a routine action during the initial stages of an engagement.11 When war broke out between the major European Powers in August 1914, military aviation still had only one officially recognised function: to serve as “the eyes of the army.” Four squadrons of the Royal Flying Corps, virtually its entire effective strength, accompanied the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) when it went to France. RFC aircraft flew reconnaissance missions over the advancing German columns and rear areas, gathering intelligence on troop concentrations and movements and the location of depots, dumps, and railheads, all in an attempt to discover the enemy’s main intentions. Reward for their efforts came in the very first week of operations when RFC crews spotted a German Army advancing westward across Northern Belgium. This timely information ultimately enabled the BEF’s beleaguered Commander-in-Chief, General Sir John French, to order a retreat from Mons before the city was enveloped behind enemy lines.12 The initial weeks of the war also presented aviators from both sides with a vast number of “targets of opportunity.” The road network in Northern France and Belgium was severely congested with hundreds of thousands of troops and their artillery and supply trains marching to the front. At first

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pilots attacked enemy columns on their own initiative and with whatever weapons they had at their disposal, such as grenades, small bombs, and even personal firearms. The material damage inflicted by early air attacks was minimal but aerial bombardment did have a spectacularly adverse effect on the morale of ground troops. It was a short step from reconnaissance to armed reconnaissance missions and by October the change was official RFC policy. RFC Headquarters issued a memorandum to squadron commanders in the field, stating that [s]everal instances have occurred lately in which targets suitable for attack have been passed over without any action being taken. In future all aeroplanes carrying out reconnaissances [sic] will carry bombs and whenever . . . suitable targets present themselves they should be attacked by dropping bombs.13

Official recognition of this new combat role for aeroplanes came too late to make any real difference either to the course or the outcome of the early land battles on the frontiers. As the front stabilized, and soldiers took cover in an elaborate complex of underground dugouts and trenches, plentiful and undefended targets of opportunity became rare. Trench warfare did not, however, signal an end to combat aviation; rather it provided a fairly static environment in which the various aspects of war in the third dimension developed. The first two years of the war heralded considerable and unprecedented expansion of specific combat tasks for the aeroplanes that fought over the Western Front. Aircraft employed in their originally conceived roles of reconnaissance and artillery observation soon saw regular service, bombing and strafing enemy troops and positions. Pilots who braved low-level flying reported increased accuracy and enhanced precision in their air attacks on ground targets. It was a new tactic that quickly gained favour at GHQ. Just before the British Army launched its major offensive on the Somme in July 1916, RFC pilots received a directive that made low-flying air attack official policy.14 But well before this date, and even before the end of 1914, the first bombing units appeared over the front. Throughout the winter months of 1915, individual pilots also experimented with air-to-air fighting. Although the use of aircraft as a means of waging war had developed with astonishing speed, the military high commands of the warring armies still regarded air operations as being of minimal importance. Commanders in the field had a somewhat different view. They were beginning to recognise the vital benefits of aerial reconnaissance and close air support to their military operations. Consequently they made increasing demands on their superiors to provide more aircraft to perform these essential tasks. Early command and control arrangements also reflected the battlefield commanders’ concerns and desires. Aircraft were attached to specific army formations at the front. They were under the direct command of the ground force commander, who

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employed them as auxiliary forces in much the same way as he used his artillery. In the British Army one squadron of aircraft was assigned to each army corps. Similar arrangements applied to the French and the German air services.15 As the work aircraft were doing for their various artillery and infantry units increased, army commanders, understandably, wanted similar air advantages denied to their enemy; hence the rise of the interceptor fighter aircraft. At first, the role of fighters was to shield friendly land forces from enemy air operations. Mounting casualties to aircraft employed on army co-operation missions, namely aerial reconnaissance and artillery observation, led quite naturally to the introduction of “protective patrols.” In this capacity fighters were deployed in an altogether new role: escorting observation aircraft to and from the front, and fighting off hostile enemy aircraft. Airmen on both sides were getting their first taste of what would become a long and arduous contest for air superiority. Air-to-air fighting had the additional effect of stimulating the design and manufacture of more sophisticated fighter aircraft. Each side looked to rapidly advancing aeronautical technology to provide it with a decisive advantage in an escalating air war. Technological improvements in aeroplane performance and weapons systems also compelled air commanders in the field to devise new tactics, such as formation flying and staggered waves of attack, in order to press home offensive air operations in the face of increasing resistance. Pursuit of new air combat techniques as well as an ongoing search for alternative targets, especially for the bombing aircraft, which were increasingly reluctant to test the stronger fighter defences over the enemy’s forward positions, served not only to widen the application of aircraft to war but also to expand the battlefield, thereby changing the very nature of war itself. Offensive fighter sweeps were the next stage in the development of air-to-air combat, followed shortly thereafter by independent bombing operations specifically directed at enemy airfields, storage facilities, and aircraft factories. The bombers soon extended their range of targets to include enemy cities and their civilian population. In less than two years airmen had engaged in close air support, direct air support, indirect air support, air superiority work, and independent bombing missions of a strategic nature. By the end of 1916, military aircraft had already performed all of the basic operational roles that would be developed in the years to come.16 For the airmen, the years 1917 and 1918 were characterised by intense efforts to hone their earlier achievements and to devise new tactical methods for prosecuting the air war more vigorously. Besides the experience they gained through trial and error, they also benefited from a steady production of increasingly sophisticated aircraft, which enhanced capability and accounted for much of the progress made. Technological advancements had the additional effect of stimulating more specialised applications over the battlefield.

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In Flanders, during the battles of 1917, both the British and the Germans increased their use of low-flying fighter aircraft in support of ground offensives. On 11 May, at Arras, RFC aircraft were deployed in a co-ordinated operation with ground troops for the first time, strafing German strong points along the front in an attempt to clear a path through the defensive obstacles for the advancing infantry.17 This was not a joint operation as such but rather an operation of combined arms devised by the army commander and his staff. Airmen had no part in designing the plan of attack. They were assigned their air support tasks and performed them for the advancing infantry in the same way that the artillery was assigned and performed its ancillary duties.18 By summer’s end, this rudimentary form of combined air and infantry assault was a regular feature both in pre-planned offensive operations and counter-attacks. Each successive engagement also brought new discoveries and further refinements in technique. Casualties to air forces engaged in supporting a ground offensive continued to mount at a frightening pace, prompting a number of tactical changes. Some airmen began to question whether this form of warfare called for its own specialised types of aircraft and techniques. The French, for instance, thought that it did, and were the first to create separate ground-attack or assault aviation squadrons. Their Division Aerienne was established strictly for ground support missions. It was a specialty force that moved around the front to support French ground offensives where and when air support was needed. In applying their ground assault squadrons in this manner, the French were the first to put into practice an early form of the “concentration of force” concept in air operations.19 German close air support techniques were even more advanced. By the spring of 1918, the Germans had perfected their air-ground assault teams, called Schlachtstaffeln.20 Each “battle” unit was a specialised formation equipped first with Halberstadt CL.II aircraft and later with either Halberstadt CL.IVs or the all-metal Junker J1 and trained in low-level ground attack. A single battle unit constituted four to six aircraft, and several units, up to a maximum of six, could be grouped together for an attack on a specific target. Battle flights were employed in close formation and only against objectives described as being “of the highest priority” to the success of the ground offensive. Their principal targets included strong points in the enemy’s front line (where friendly ground troops were attempting to make a breakthrough), machine-gun positions, artillery batteries, and occasionally rear echelon communication and supply centres. The Germans aimed to commit their special assault aircraft in sufficient concentration when and where their intervention could be decisive. Under no circumstances were they to be distributed singly over the whole front, or left to find their own roles in the battle as was the case with British close support aircraft.21 In a further effort to prevent unnecessary wastage of their aerial shock forces, the German high command published an instruction pamphlet

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for infantry division and corps commanders. Entitled “The Employment of Battle Flights,” it spelt out the approved tactical doctrine for the new battle formations.22 Close support had become a complicated business. The German method of providing close air support for an attacking army was ambitious and sophisticated but it was also rigid and wholly dependent on the successful maintenance of the ground offensive’s timetable. Close support at the forefront of the battlefield demanded considerable co-ordination between the advancing troops and their supporting aircraft to be effective. In an effort to achieve a high level of co-operation, and to offset limitations imposed by unfamiliar tactical techniques and insufficiently developed communications, the Germans relied on detailed instructions drawn up before the battle began to direct their offensive effort. But the very details, which enhanced the success of the specialised ground-attack squadrons in pre-planned attacks, had an equally negative effect once the offensive broke down. They were also totally ineffective when the army was on the defensive.23 British policy differed substantially from that of the French and the Germans in that it emphasised flexibility and a more multi-role approach rather than prescriptive operations and the employment of highly specialised squadrons. Whereas French and German techniques were decidedly proactive, as opposed to reactive, British air support methods could be used with a reasonable degree of success in either offensive or defensive ground operations. Instead of employing specialised squadrons for specific tasks, the RFC preferred to use any nearby squadron for the task at hand.24 This approach was possible because British squadrons, for the most part, were equipped with all-purpose aeroplanes rather than with highly specialised aircraft. Senior RFC officers, and after 1 April 1918,25 Royal Air Force (RAF) commanders, believed that the more squadrons were made interchangeable, the more aircraft there would be to concentrate and apply where and when they were most needed, whatever the task might be. They were encouraged to take this view by Major-General Hugh Trenchard, who made a number of strong pronouncements on the subject. Trenchard’s experience as the head of the RFC in France throughout most of the war, and later as the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), RAF, convinced him that there would never be enough aircraft available to meet every specific assignment. He believed that it was very important, therefore, that air forces avoid the limiting constraints imposed by rigid specialisation. Air forces, he emphasised, must be constructed in a manner that enabled their commanders to concentrate the maximum number of squadrons on whatever task received the highest priority at any given time. In its air support methods as well as all of its other air operations this is what the RAF aimed to do by the summer of 1918. RAF policy rejected specialisation and emphasised speed of response, flexibility of application, and concentration of maximum force at critical times and points in a battle.26

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Air power made a valuable contribution to the overall success of the British Army’s war-winning campaign during the last hundred days of fighting on the Western Front. When the first major offensive began, just east of Amiens on 8 August 1918, over eight hundred RAF aircraft flew in support of the advancing ground forces. The sheer magnitude of this air operation was inconceivable only a summer or two earlier. It also marked the first operational experiment of more centralised control of air forces. Significantly, airmen were included in the staff at General Headquarters for the specific purpose of organising the maximum air effort possible from the squadrons concentrated for the assault. Although no real object was laid down for the air action at Amiens, RAF squadrons first concentrated their efforts on winning air superiority over the battlefield. Afterwards they turned their attention en masse to a purely ground-attack role in order to “break the crust” for the advancing tanks and infantry.27 Unlike the Germans, who selected specific targets for air-toground attack, the British preferred to overwhelm or saturate the enemy’s defences with the total weight of their air offensive. The missions flown in support of the ground forces were many and varied. RAF aircraft were employed as a form of “flying artillery,” attacking targets at the forefront of the battle and extending their offensive efforts back to the range of the German guns. Air action to isolate the battlefield, or to prevent German reserves from reaching the threatened point in their front, was neither planned nor performed; but the potential benefits to be gained from undertaking such missions were already being contemplated.28 As the final year of the war ran its course, considerable disagreement emerged between soldiers and airmen over the optimum role of aircraft when supporting an army in the field.29 In theory and in practice air support had concentrated on two separate categories of targets: objects along the enemy’s heavily defended forward positions, which some generals called “the crust”, and a whole range of targets extending twenty miles and more behind that crust. At the war’s end many airmen held that the chief role of aircraft was to attack objects further back behind the front. Troops on the march, supply depots and dumps, communication centres and headquarters, were just a few of the examples cited. Targets such as the ones listed above were more visible and much more vulnerable to air attack than front-line troops often well protected in elaborate field fortifications. In addition, there was less danger of confusing enemy troops and positions well behind the lines with friendly ground forces. The great land and air battles of 1918 also demonstrated the benefits to be had from centralised command and control of air forces. Moreover, more and more airmen openly favoured this approach. Centralised control accorded well with the mobility of air squadrons, and it also accelerated the prospects of a rapid and massive concentration of force at critical times and points in a battle. Decentralisation, when aircraft were sub-allotted to

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Introduction


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9

army formations, was increasingly regarded as wasteful and inefficient, and more often than not it entailed a dispersion of effort on inconsequential objectives.30 The soldiers, not surprisingly, disagreed with the assessment made by their “upstart air force colleagues.” They wanted to retain “their” military support aviation, and they were not inclined to pursue the development of its wider application.31 The sudden and unexpected armistice on 11 November 1918, brought the war to a conclusion before an agreed approach for the command and control of air forces had been established. Differences of opinion between soldiers and airmen over centralised command of air forces and the selection of their targets were two of the key problems to be resolved in the years of peace, once the lessons of the war had been analysed and digested. As a general rule airmen tended to see the benefits of centralised control while soldiers focused on its shortcomings. Army officers sought the ultimate in close air support—a ground-attack role in the immediate battle zone—to the exclusion of all other forms of combat aviation. Air force leaders despaired at the short-sightedness shown by their former army colleagues, and they increasingly espoused a yet unwritten doctrine that emphasised a more strategic application centred on air superiority, interdiction, and long-range bombing. The growing divergence of opinion over the proper employment of aircraft in war soon became the central core of bitter debates between the two services. Throughout the interwar years, in a climate of strict economy and great uncertainty over the future role of the armed services, the disputes between the Army and the RAF were conspicuous for their intensity and vehemence.

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PART I

How the Army Went to War without Adequate Air Support

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CHAPTER 1

British Concepts of Air Power and Air-Ground Operations, 1918–1933 Britain’s first air war largely had been an army co-operation war.1 The RFC and the bulk of the RAF served as ancillary units to the Army, subordinate to its military campaigns, which were aimed at achieving victory by defeating the enemy’s armies in the field. Aircraft were deployed by their ground commanders as a mere tactical adjunct to the principal fighting arms of the ground forces. Most senior army officers did not concern themselves with any other application of air power outside of the immediate ground battle zone. In fact it was in part the Army’s introspective approach to the employment of aircraft that moved the government to establish a separate air service in the last year of the war. By creating the RAF, and giving it a mandate for a wider, more strategic application of air power, Lloyd George’s War Cabinet also brought out into the open the differences of opinion that were dividing the air enthusiasts and the more traditionally grounded tacticians in the Army over the proper employment of aircraft in war. The soldiers remained unrepentant. They continued to argue that aeroplanes were “tactical instruments.” Aircraft, just like tanks and artillery, claimed the soldiery, provided essential ancillary support for the infantry and the cavalry, the arms that won battles by occupying enemy territory. Four years of relatively successful combat experience with aircraft in this role seemed to indicate that their concept of tactical employment was sound. The airmen, not surprisingly, rejected this “narrow view,” contending that “Air Power” offered a new way of approaching the strategic and operational challenges of war. Air forces, they maintained, were best employed when they were concentrated against targets above and beyond those traditionally selected by army commanders. Aircraft were not flying artillery pieces, and most definitely they should not

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be employed in circumstances of high risk and wastage doing the work of the gunners. Moreover, the airmen emphasised the importance of all officers— land, sea, and air—to develop “air mindedness” to get the most out of the unique qualities of air power.2 With the unexpected collapse of Germany in November 1918, the Royal Air Force was denied the chance to show what benefits might ensue from a strategic application of air forces. Consequently, the airmen were left with their vision of the future of air warfare, based on a promise of the potential of air power, not its realisation.3 Undeterred by their lack of actual experience in conducting a strategic air campaign, the airmen pressed on with their unorthodox theories and plans. Immediately following the cessation of hostilities they set to the task of compiling and evaluating the lessons of the world’s first air war. Their self-professed aim was to establish the “first principles” of air warfare to ensure the proper development of this new and potentially revolutionary way of waging war.4 Results from their efforts were not long in coming. In a little less than two months after the Armistice, on 1 January 1919, the Air Ministry published a synopsis of the British air effort during the 1914– 1918 War.5 It was a short yet detailed document, which highlighted the wide range of actions and roles undertaken by British aircraft and air forces.6 Other far-reaching official documents and pronouncements followed, each one outlining the Air Staff’s views on the air lessons to be derived from the last war and their proposals for the future development of the RAF.7 Whilst there were shades of difference from one announcement or memorandum to the next, all together they emphasised how air power would exert a strategic influence on the conduct of war in the future. As such they implicitly warned that its proper development was essential to Britain’s continued prosperity and security.8 Four main lessons, or “principles,” for the future conduct of air warfare emerged from the Air Staff’s analysis of the air fighting in the Great War. All four principles derived from the conviction, strongly endorsed by the new Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard,9 that success in any major war fought in the future depended upon the attainment and maintenance of “Command of the Air.” To achieve a satisfactory degree of control in the air, the Air Staff advocated strict adherence to the first two principles of air warfare, namely offensive initiative and air superiority.10 Offensive effort conferred initiative and, with it, liberty of action, while at the same time denying these advantages to the enemy. Accepted theory held that by carrying the battle to the enemy at all times air superiority could be obtained. It was won when the enemy air force was forced back permanently on the defensive. The Air Staff viewed air superiority as being an essential prerequisite for success in operations on land, or at sea, and even for most if not all types of air operations, particularly co-operation with an army.11 Its attainment could be achieved through a variety of officially recognised

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British Concepts of Air Power and Air-Ground Operations, 1918–1933 15

methods, such as air-to-air fighting, attacks on enemy airfields and bases, and even bombing operations specifically directed at aircraft factories and their supporting industry.12 Determining the correct method, or combination of methods, for winning air superiority depended upon the specific situation encountered at the time. But whatever the situation, the Air Staff were certain that a co-ordinated and continuous effort was the key to success. To ensure that the best effort was made to achieve the desired results the Air Staff advocated a system of centralised command and control. Concentration of force and centralised command and control made up the Air Staff’s third and fourth principles respectively.13 Based on the lessons drawn from the last hundred days of fighting in 1918, the Air Staff concluded that decentralisation was the major mistake made with the deployment of air forces during the War. Dispersal of effort, in the form of small units of aircraft operated under independent control, negated the special characteristics the element of the air bestowed on aircraft, namely, ubiquity of operations, great flexibility, novel power of concentration, and large opportunities for penetration, all of which combined to give air forces unique offensive power.14 The Air Staff’s analysis of the major battles suggested that the most effective and most economical employment of aircraft had taken place when they were concentrated “en masse” for a single co-ordinated effort.15 Aircraft also enabled commanders to expand the size and scope of the battlefield. By the very medium in which they operated air forces were capable of exerting pressure against objectives that neither armies nor navies could reach. Moreover, air forces could be switched from one task to another more rapidly than the other services. This conferred the greatest flexibility in their handling, and opened up the possibility of swift concentration on a scale unprecedented in war.16 To an equal degree, however, the diversity of air operations and the versatility of air forces also afforded unlimited opportunities for abuse and waste. The Air Staff therefore emphasised the need for clear strategic direction and unity of effort, and this, they suggested, was rendered possible only when air forces were controlled by one central authority. Through a system of central command and control air commanders would be able to employ every aircraft available to them when and where they were most required.17 Britain’s young airmen had made an enthusiastic start on a theoretical basis for the future development of air power. But air theory and strategy were not the only RAF planning developments in the immediate aftermath of the war. The Air Council ended the war with ambitious plans for expansion. It proposed an increase of 154 squadrons above the RAF’s existing establishment for a total peacetime air force of no less than 348 squadrons.18 In addition to the sizeable increase projected in aircraft requirements, the Air Staff had high aspirations for the RAF’s future role in national and imperial defence. The Air Staff envisaged both an independent strike force for home

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defence and an air policing force to patrol and defend the Empire. A broad outline of the RAF’s grand strategic plan was submitted by the CAS to the Cabinet in December 1918.19 By all accounts the future should have looked bright for the new air service with its special contribution to the safeguarding of national interests and the waging of war. After all, the RAF was the only service among the three not bedevilled by tortuous questioning over how the Great War had been fought. Nor did the new Air Staff suffer through the endless accusations of bungling and criminal incompetence, as did their counterparts at the War Office and the Admiralty.20 Nonetheless, the RAF’s future as an independent service was far from secure. The War Office had its hands full with increasing defence commitments in and around the Empire, and the Cabinet showed little interest in the esoteric strategies for the future presented by the Air Staff. Preparing to fight another major war in Europe was not part of the government’s plan.21 In January 1919, Winston Churchill was appointed Secretary of State for both War and Air in Lloyd George’s new coalition government. With regard to the RAF, the new minister was given a simple task. He was to run down the establishment and equipment of the air force.22 A week later the process of dissolution began; before the year ended, the RAF had been cut back in size to a force of twenty-five squadrons and less than 27,000 officers and men.23 Less than a year after the war the RAF teetered on the brink of disbandment. Its future was blighted by a disconcerting lack of established tradition within the defence establishment and by the increasingly unstable economic and political climate in Britain. No matter how admirable the Air Staff’s theoretical endeavours and grandiose designs might have been, they were quite removed from the practicalities of building a modern air force in post-war Britain. Government indifference to the fate of the air force, a nation that was weary of war and impatient with most things military, the prospect of years of impending financial penury for the armed services, and mounting hostility from the Army and the Royal Navy (that sought to regain “their own aircraft” at the RAF’s expense) all combined to threaten the RAF’s permanent establishment. The history of the RAF’s formative years has been covered by many historians in exhaustive detail and need not be repeated here.24 A very brief discussion of some of the main points, however, will help to establish a useful backdrop to the many irritants and issues that precluded effective co-operation on air support for the Army during the years between the wars. Britain’s economic and strategic standing had undergone progressive erosion since the late nineteenth century and the war exacerbated this process of decline.25 Military victory had singularly failed to deliver the much hoped for rewards of peace and a better future, and instead brought in their place increased anxiety and uncertainty. Domestic issues, which had fallen into

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the political background during the war, returned to centre stage with a vengeance. Some politicians even went so far as to question in public the real possibility of popular uprisings and revolution.26 To make matters worse, popular unrest was not confined just to the home constituencies. Insurrection fermented and all too often broke out into the open in colonies and colonial protectorates from the Middle East to the North West Frontier in India. Each new outbreak put an additional strain on the already over-stretched military garrisons responsible for imperial security.27 Overwhelmed by a host of apparently insoluble problems the government can be forgiven somewhat for adopting a number of facile solutions. One of the most pressing problems confronting the first post-war Cabinet was the urgent need to reallocate limited capital resources to deliver on promises made to the British people during the latter years of the war, such as “Homes fit for Heroes.”28 Demobilisation, already noted above in the case of the RAF, released some of the monies needed to fund the new social programmes. But much more was required. It was to come from the swollen budgets of the armed services; a peace dividend of sorts now that a major war against a European opponent was regarded as being increasingly remote. Beginning in August 1919, all three services had to contend with the “Ten Year Rule,” which required them to estimate their needs on the assumption that there would not be a major war for a decade.29 Exactly two years later they also had to justify their programmes before Sir Eric Geddes’s Committee on National Expenditure. This committee was responsible for making cuts in all areas of government spending; and the “Geddes Axe” was to fall particularly heavily on the financial estimates of the armed services.30 If the earlier emasculation of the RAF was not enough of an impediment to its future existence, the new guidelines limiting service expenditure were positively devastating. Gross public expenditure on the RAF, which already amounted to a substantially reduced budget of £52.5 million in 1920, was more than halved in 1921 to £22.3 million. A further deep cut in 1922 saw the RAF’s budget drop to £13.6 million and in 1923 it bottomed out at £9.4 million.31 During the same time period the Army saw its budget decline from £181.5 million to £45.4 million.32 Fierce competition between the three services ensued as they scrambled to secure their “fair share” of the parsimonious defence budget. Consequently, and all too predictably, the Army and the Royal Navy, both stung by their own respective budget cuts, soon conspired to quash the smaller and weaker RAF.33 Trenchard proved to be an able champion for his service against the reactionarism of the Army and the Royal Navy. In RAF circles the story was often told in legendary form and acted out in pantomime. The air force was the beleaguered maiden, the army and the navy were the dragon and its mate, and Trenchard was St. George.34 Sadly, there was a lot of truth behind this imagery. Throughout the 1920s and at least the first half of the 1930s,

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the RAF did wage a desperate fight in Whitehall just to survive. Writing about this period at a much later date, Marshal of the RAF Sir John Slessor wrote: . . . the fact is that during the formative years we were literally battling for the life of the RAF against the forces of military reaction.35

Much of the problem seemed to emanate from the RAF’s lack of established tradition. To begin with the air force lacked nearly all of the permanent installations that the older services possessed. Trenchard, to his credit, saw very clearly that if the RAF were to remain an independent entity it needed not only a strategic justification but also “a separate and distinct spirit and identity.”36 The CAS believed that a permanent infrastructure to engender an “air force spirit” was required. He therefore concentrated the meagre financial resources allotted to the RAF on building lasting foundations, such as training schools and colleges, instead of propping up frontline squadrons. RAF institutions, namely the RAF College Cranwell, the RAF Staff College, and the apprentice technical training programmes, produced a highly skilled cadre of air force professionals for the future.37 Planning for the future was important to the survival of the RAF, but there were other serious dangers of an immediate nature that required urgent attention. During the years 1919 to 1922 the independent status of the air force was threatened continuously by the operational duties assigned to RAF squadrons. Some eighteen squadrons were deployed throughout the British Empire in support of imperial garrisons. Another eleven were stationed at home. The Metropolitan Air Force, responsible for the air defence of the United Kingdom, constituted a mere four squadrons. The remaining seven home squadrons were engaged in duties of a co-operative nature with the Army and the Royal Navy. With slightly less than fourteen percent of the RAF’s strength allocated to a home defence and independent bombing role, and in the absence of anything resembling a credible air threat to Britain, Trenchard found it increasingly difficult to justify the continued existence of a third service.38 The senior services had always assumed that the independent air force was an aberration of the last war and that it had nothing to contribute to the traditional imperial responsibilities of the armed services during times of European peace. Their feelings about the post-war RAF were clear: the sooner it was broken up the better. Trenchard remained defiant. He was determined to keep the RAF one and indivisible. His rationale for maintaining a separate air service rested on a firmly held conviction that neither the War Office nor the Admiralty had either the ability or the desire to advance the development of air power properly. Responding to one of many General Staff memoranda, which claimed that air forces were nothing more than an appendage of the senior services, Trenchard wrote:

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British Concepts of Air Power and Air-Ground Operations, 1918–1933 19 The nation that considers and develops its air forces as an auxiliary arm to the older services will suffer a rude awakening if faced by a nation which has recognised that the air may become a primary medium of war and has developed its air power accordingly.39

In his endeavours to work out the RAF’s salvation, Trenchard found an unlikely ally in Winston Churchill, the very minister appointed to “close up” the new service. Churchill had a keen interest in the British Empire. He also worried about the long-term state of imperial security in the light of the government’s drive for economy and the recent defence cuts. Churchill saw in air power the great possibility of a marriage between economy on the one hand and the maintenance of law and order around the empire on the other. Should it work, he believed, small numbers of aircraft might be substituted for large numbers of expensive ground troops.40 Trenchard had also given serious thought to an imperial role for the RAF. In a memorandum dated 14 August 1919, the CAS pointed out the large scope that existed for independent air forces to carry out small imperial policing operations more economically and more expeditiously than ground forces.41 Over the next four months a series of memoranda passed between Churchill and Trenchard in an attempt to work out the details. Together they produced a scheme for controlling native populations in underdeveloped areas by using small mobile forces that combined aircraft, armoured cars and local levies. By early December their work was complete. A Command Paper was published and Churchill presented its contents to both Houses of Parliament.42 Air control and home defence were to be the twin pillars of the RAF’s peacetime raison d’etre. Trenchard had not given up on the strategic bombing role. It had been at the core of the independent air force’s original mandate and he believed it would play a predominant role in European warfare in the future. In the meantime its development would have to wait. By accepting new imperial responsibilities the CAS had wisely elected to operate within the government’s new guidelines of economy. Success in this role to a large degree preserved the RAF’s independence during the early twenties.43 The RAF’s first opportunity to demonstrate its new imperial policing role came at the end of 1919 in British Somaliland. Since 1900 colonial administration in this protectorate had been threatened by the political ambitions of one Said Mohammed Bin Abdulla Hussan, or as he was more commonly known at the time, “the Mad Mullah.” Before the 1914–1918 War the British Army mounted four campaigns, all of which had proved to be inconclusive, against this religious fanatic and his following of up to 10,000 Dervishes. Each time the Mullah survived to resume his violent practices against his fellow countrymen and British rule alike. In 1919 the British government resolved to settle accounts. The Army, however, was not so

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enthusiastic. Reluctant to become involved in yet another imperial venture, the War Office submitted an exaggerated estimate of the cost of this operation. Sir Geoffrey Archer, the Governor of the Protectorate, suggested an alternative approach.44 He proposed the use of air forces as a cost-cutting measure and as a way to reduce the number of ground troops required for the operation. The General Staff scoffed at his suggestion. They claimed that such a campaign would be a total failure and that ultimately the Army would have to be called in “to rescue [the] aeroplanes and clear up the mess” in extremely unfavourable circumstances.45 Ignoring the complaints made by the War Office, the Air Ministry and the Colonial Office decided to press ahead with their plans for the upcoming campaign. In January 1920 a self-contained RAF detachment, including one flight of six D.H.9 aircraft and a further flight of six aircraft in reserve, concentrated at Berbera under the command of Group Captain R. Gordon. Air operations began on 21 January, and RAF bombers struck a powerful psychological blow against the Mullah’s own headquarters as well as a number of nearby forts. By mid-February the Dervish forces had been rounded up by the troops of the Somaliland Camel Corps and the King’s African Rifles. Although the Mullah himself managed to escape with a few followers into neighbouring Abyssinia he never set foot in the Protectorate again. The campaign had been a complete success and it was accomplished at a cost of only £84,000.46 Less than a month after their victory in Somaliland the RAF was offered five to six million pounds to accept full responsibility for policing Mesopotamia (Iraq). Turkish designs on the region, escalating financial costs of maintaining authority, uncomfortably high casualty returns, and the RAF’s recently proven success, convinced the British government to conduct another experiment with air control. Two years passed before the air force assumed this role. During the interval, however, the British government did not renege on its far-reaching decision to hand over the main responsibility for Iraq to the RAF. The transfer of authority proceeded despite extreme opposition from the War Office, including the General Staff’s desire for a “total and immediate evacuation” of the region rather than accede to the new RAF mandate.47 Actual control by the RAF, under Air Vice-Marshal Sir John Salmond, who was in supreme command of both air and ground forces, was assumed on 1 October 1922.48 The Colonial Office was pleasantly surprised with the results and referred to the policy of air control in Iraq as being “a conspicuous success.”49 This latest triumph with air substitution encouraged the government to pursue further use of the RAF in similar circumstances in Aden, Palestine and Trans-Jordan, Egypt and the Sudan, and the North-West Frontier of India. Although the degree of overall military success enjoyed by the RAF varied considerably from region to region,50 the resultant savings in manpower and treasure was a significant achievement.51

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By successfully establishing for itself a role in Imperial defence, and having persuaded the politicians of its potential value as an economic force, the RAF survived the initial threat to its independence. Nevertheless, as late as 1921, the Army still maintained operational control over a full 75 percent of RAF squadrons;52 and the policy of substitution had so poisoned relations between the two services that the Army was determined to seek the abolition of the separate air force once and for all. The General Staff severely criticised the two major roles claimed for the RAF by the Air Ministry. They insisted that aircraft would be exploited to the full only when grafted onto the wellestablished and war-proven stocks of the older services. They also questioned the financial expense of maintaining a separate Air Ministry, and called for a searching enquiry to review future air administration and expenditure.53 Trenchard fumed with anger over the War Office’s latest attacks. In a draft letter written but not sent to his Minister he vented his frustration with the soldiers: . . . one cannot argue with an Army officer [Field Marshal Wilson] who cannot see beyond the walls of his office, who cannot realise the value of mechanical appliances in substitution of manpower; who thinks in mere masses of men, who has no conception of the value of speed and time. . . .54

Trenchard resisted the strong temptation to confront Wilson directly over the Army’s most recent attacks and instead prepared for the pending financial committee review. Before the Geddes Committee the CAS made sweeping claims for the efficacy of air power. The Admiralty and the War Office countered with their joint claim that eliminating the RAF would provide economies. Sir Eric Geddes disagreed with the senior services and in his report he confirmed the need for maintaining an independent air force. Moreover, whilst the Committee recommended cuts in all three services, those directed at the RAF were less drastic, and they were to come at the expense of army and naval co-operation squadrons.55 The promise of imperial policing “on the cheap” had served its purpose and maintained the RAF’s continued independence until such time as its fundamental role as a defensive, deterrent, and reprisal force, took shape.56 The latter came about quicker than expected in the form of an exaggerated air threat from France.57 Beginning in late 1921, Britain and France moved toward a position of increasing antagonism; and the largely imaginary British fear of air attack rose in importance as a political force.58 The Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) responded by establishing a special subcommittee to examine the diplomatic implications of a continental air menace. Its chairman, Lord Balfour, deeply shaken by the grave nature of the so-called crisis, made little effort to disguise his fear. He publicly expressed his “profound concern” over the extreme peril to which Britain was exposed, and declared that “defence against air attack was the most formidable defence problem

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now before us.”59 This was just the kind of support Trenchard needed to secure the RAF’s permanent independence. Before the Geddes Committee once again in 1922, the RAF was the only service to avoid any cuts to its 1921–1922 strength. The Cabinet also gave Trenchard and the Air Staff an important vote of confidence when it came out strongly against the abolition of the RAF. By the end of the year the Air Ministry gained control over more than 50 percent of its total force, operating seventeen out of its thirty-one and a half squadrons independently.60 Six months later, in June 1923, Lord Salisbury’s National and Imperial Defence Committee recommended the creation of a fifty-two squadron home defence air force to protect Britain against the strongest air force within striking distance. This latest recommendation was a direct consequence of the French air menace and the impact it had made on Britain’s politicians. The Cabinet, and subsequently Parliament, not surprisingly, endorsed the findings of the Salisbury Committee.61 In the end the ambitious air force expansion scheme was never completed. By the mid-twenties the “spirit of Locarno” had intervened. From 1924 through 1933 the government aimed to protect Britain’s national interests through “collective security” and the disarmament conference held under the auspices of the League of Nations.62 Trenchard had nonetheless secured a victory for the third service but he purchased it at a high price. Bitter controversy over imperial substitution and the new priority given to an independent, deterrent bombing role, drove a wedge between the Army and the RAF that effectively curtailed real co-operation during the twenty years of troubled peace. One historian accurately summed up this deleterious state of affairs when he wrote: There was hardly an area of contact between the two departments throughout this period where there was not, at best, friction, or, at worst, open hostility.63

What little co-operation there was took place in the United Kingdom and generally centred on reconnaissance and artillery spotting, tasks that had characterised the early air operations of the Great War. Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s home-based RAF Army Co-operation Squadrons (approximately three to six squadrons of at first eighteen aircraft, and after 1929, twelve aircraft each) participated in the inter-Brigade and interDivisional exercises and manoeuvres held annually in August and September, under War Office direction. Flights of army co-operation squadrons, and occasionally a full squadron, also trained with the regional commands— Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern and Scottish Commands—as well as with formations of the Territorial Army during their annual training on Salisbury Plain. In addition, a few bomber and fighter squadrons, though usually not more than three or four at one time, took part in various large-scale manoeuvres when offensive air operations were requested by the War Office.64

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Whilst neither service was overly enthusiastic about co-operating with the other, considerable experience was gained from their joint exercises. In particular, many of the rudimentary problems associated with co-ordinating air-ground operations were identified. Initial exercises pointed out the need for better liaison in the field between air and army staffs so that each was familiar with the requirements of the other. An agreement was reached whereby each service should establish its field headquarters as close to the other as possible; and the closer both were to air landing grounds the better. The RAF also suggested that further improvement might be had if one of its officers was attached as an adviser to the Army’s field headquarters.65 While this last recommendation was not acted upon at the time, each service continued to assert that the closest co-operation between air and land forces was essential. The problem here was that each service saw co-operation very differently. The War Office believed that co-operation was best when the air squadrons formed an integral part of the land forces, as was the case in continental armies.66 The Air Ministry, citing established air power principles and theory, disagreed. Command and control arrangements for air forces engaged in a land battle were important, but they were not the real impediment to tactical progress. Slow and unreliable communication between army and air headquarters, aerodromes, and the forces in the field had proved to be the greatest stumbling block to establishing set procedures for timely and effective air-ground co-operation. Recent field exercises, especially those with the newly formed Experimental Armoured Force in 1927 and 1928,67 clearly demonstrated that some form of wireless communication was obligatory. This discovery prompted intensified efforts to develop reliable signal equipment—both Morse W/T (wireless telegraphy) and voice R/T (radio telephony). In 1927 air-to-air radio communication had a maximum range of only fifteen miles and the range of ground-to-air was even less at twelve miles. Progress on increasing the range was slow and the new sets constructed were often bulky and difficult to operate in an aeroplane; but, by 1931, the range for reliable R/T had increased to forty miles and that of W/T to just under one hundred miles.68 Joint exercises with the Army’s new “Experimental Armoured Force” also enabled the Air Staff to confirm many of its views on offensive employment of aircraft over a modern battlefield. To begin with, the Air Staff tended to see offensive air support for a British army on a European battlefield as strategic bombing writ small. The primary role established for fighter aircraft was to win air superiority by attacking enemy aircraft in the air.69 Low-flying attacks against deployed and unbroken troops with adequate anti-aircraft defences were discouraged. The Air Staff considered that such attacks were unlikely to produce results that would justify the casualties fighter squadrons would incur, and, moreover, they would jeopardise the maintenance of air superiority upon which all types of aircraft in all support

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duties largely depended. Offensive air support, when it was provided, would come from independently controlled bomber squadrons. Bombers would attack enemy targets well behind the forefront of the battle, such as military headquarters, communications, or hostile troop concentrations in an effort to isolate the battlefield. Enemy forces deployed for battle operations were considered unsuitable targets because they were difficult to hit and because the risks to attacking aircraft were regarded to be too great.70 Opportunities for the development of army-air co-operation at the tactical level diminished completely when the War Office disbanded its Experimental Armoured Force after the training season of 1928.71 The Army reverted to its more traditional infantry training for small wars in and around the Empire and the RAF turned its attention to the primary task of defending Great Britain against a massive air attack. Divergent priorities had an additional effect of producing strong disagreement between the Air Ministry and the War Office over the type or types of aircraft required for future operations. While the Air Staff opted for all-purpose aircraft that were easily concentrated for attack upon the most important objective within their counter-offensive bombing role,72 the General Staff made a number of unsuccessful attempts to obtain their own specialised aircraft for the field force. The General Staff were convinced that the tactics as well as the techniques of executing air-to-ground attacks differed so much from other air operations that a separate army organisation and training system was required. They also feared that in a future war the RAF would concentrate its efforts against distant objects whilst ignoring a decisive land battle that required close air support.73 The debate never seemed to end, and it raged on at varying degrees of intensity both inside the service ministries and outside in the pages of defence journals and periodicals.74 Advocates of separate ground attack or assault aviation argued that only specially trained pilots flying aircraft designed and armed specifically for low-level attack could offer effective close support for land forces. Their opponents argued that such aircraft would suffer prohibitive losses, and their infrequent employment would not warrant keeping such a force. In the end, the Army’s view that the aeroplane was but another weapon on the battlefield, albeit in a third dimension, was never taken seriously. The bomber, argued the airmen, was the desired aircraft for offensive missions of all types; and bombers achieved their maximum potential only when they operated under a system of centralised control and were concentrated against a specific target. The politicians agreed with the Air Staff’s view, less for its strategic merit but more for its economic acceptability. Having taken the position that a major war was to be avoided, it made little difference to finance-conscious ministers if the armed forces were either organised or prepared for the newest requirements of modern war. Nonetheless, unresolved differences over the organisation and method of providing air support for ground troops were not confined to the British

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Army and the Royal Air Force. Throughout the 1920s and the early 1930s all of the major air power nations grappled with similar doctrinal and operational dilemmas. In many respects the arguments put forward by foreign air theorists and army tacticians were the same as those so hotly contested by their service counterparts in Britain. Airmen generally expressed the need for greater independence and flexibility in operations whereas soldiers began from the premise that the main function of air power was to give support to ground forces engaged in the destruction of the enemy’s army.75 Unlike the RAF76 and the Regia Aeronautica,77 which were the only independent and operationally capable air services at the time, all of the other major air forces of the world were maintained as auxiliary arms subordinate to their nation’s land or sea forces respectively.78 Shades of difference in air theory and application existed from one country to another, but there was general agreement that one of the fundamental missions of air forces was to support ground forces. Dissenting voices did come from the ranks of foreign airmen, especially in the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) and the French Air Force, but their views were combated effectively by the overrepresentation of traditional army opinion at the senior decisionmaking ranks of their respective services.79 In each and every case, whether it was the American, French, German, Japanese or Soviet air force, control exercised by ground force commanders was the essential instrument in tying aircraft to the increasingly refined support requirements of the army.80 It should not come as a surprise that in the army-dominated air forces outside of Britain official air doctrine emphasised the provision of close support on the battlefield for front-line troops at the expense of all other aspects of air warfare. Perhaps then, the development of Britain’s unique air support doctrine had more to do with the RAF being the only truly independent air force in the world than with any special British insight into the principles governing the efficacy of air power in a land battle. Much of the material presented in this chapter is undoubtedly familiar to most readers, though it is hoped that the “sign posts” singled out on this latest journey have encouraged some fresh thinking on this complex subject. As previously noted above, co-operation between the RAF and the Army was difficult if not impossible for three specific reasons. First, the two services had a completely different appreciation of “air support.” They also had a different view of the aim of war. Finally, lacking clear and firm direction from the government in the form of a well-defined defence policy, the three services were deprived the unifying force they so desperately needed to give their respective planning the co-ordination it required. Adolf Hitler’s rise to power and, subsequently, the British government’s reluctant acceptance of the fact that war with Nazi Germany was inevitable, brought a heightened sense of urgency to these unresolved matters in the latter half of the 1930s.

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CHAPTER 2

Army-Air Co-operation and the Prelude to War, 1933–1939 By the mid-1930s only the RAF, of Britain’s three armed services, had thought out and developed plans in the event of a future war where Western Europe was the principal theatre of operations.1 In the most general of terms, the Air Staff pinned its hopes on a mass bomber offensive, first to act as a deterrent to prevent war, and second to win it should one occur. The escalating international crisis, following on from the collapse of collective security, Japan’s inchoate belligerence in Manchuria, Herr Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, the collapse of the disarmament conference in Geneva and, finally, the recrudescence of German militarism, compelled a worried British government to modify its views on defence and rearmament. The Ten Year Rule was rescinded in 1932. In November 1933, a Defence Requirements Committee (DRC), consisting of the three Chiefs of Staff, Sir Warren Fisher and Sir Robert Vansittart, representing the Treasury and the Foreign Office respectively, with Sir Maurice Hankey as Chairman, was assembled for the purpose of preparing a programme to meet Britain’s worst deficiencies.2 At the head of the DRC’s list of priorities was the establishment of a rearmament scheme to offset the increasing threat from Nazi Germany. Beginning their inquiry with an appreciation of the role and status of Britain’s armed services and the existing balance of power in Europe, the DRC determined that Germany could directly threaten Britain only through the air.3 The DRC, therefore, recommended that priority in any rearmament programme be given to the RAF so as to strengthen the Home Defence Air Force. This decision along with the DRC’s full report was referred to a Committee of Ministers, known as the D.C.(M) Committee, in May 1934. Finding themselves in general agreement with the rearmament proposals

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before them, the Ministerial Committee, on 2 July, appointed a subcommittee under Mr. Baldwin to examine the Air Programme in order that it might be implemented expeditiously.4 Thus started a process of air rearmament schemes that would last throughout the remaining years of peace and carry on into the war. The initial air rearmament schemes of 1934 and 1935 (Schemes A and C respectively) aimed at reaching numerical “parity” with the expected first line strength of the Luftwaffe by 1939.5 Together these schemes reflected the government’s desire to create a deterrent, which would counterpoise Germany through the threat of immediate reprisal by an air force equal to her own.6 Parity, however, proved to be a rather vague concept, difficult to define, and almost impossible to achieve in practical terms.7 Complicating matters further was the discovery that parity depended as much on the character of the aircraft as on the number produced. Almost from the beginning of the expansion process questions over the proper degree of emphasis that should be given to “quality” or “quantity” produced serious disagreements, with the Air Staff consistently advocating quality and the majority of politicians, civil servants, and aircraft manufacturers arguing for quantity. In addition to this vexing dilemma was the equally contentious issue of trying to determine the correct percentage of bomber aircraft required for an effective counter-offensive and the number of fighter aircraft needed for defence; all to be produced from strictly limited resources. Later air expansion schemes often reflected the impact new technology was having on the development of RAF doctrine and air strategy as well as the various problems the British air manufacturing industry experienced completing old orders and integrating the latest advancements in aviation technology.8 In an attempt to make some practical sense out of the air expansion taking place the Air Ministry, in July 1936, initiated a full reorganisation of its operational command. Air Defence of Great Britain was replaced by Fighter, Bomber, Coastal and Training Commands. A clear distinction was made between attack and defence and, with the government’s full support, the Air Ministry committed itself to a long-term programme aimed at expanding Bomber and Fighter Commands at the expense of all other forms of aerial warfare. The plan was to build up an air striking force consisting of these two complementary formations and to base them in the United Kingdom on a permanent static ground organisation of aerodromes, depots, and signal links. The two Commands were to be operated under centralised control from their bases. As such, they were exceedingly mobile and flexible in the air while absolutely immobile and inflexible on the ground. When the War began in September 1939, though still very weak, these Commands were capable of operating against the enemy.9 With the RAF devoting most of its attention and resources to Bomber and Fighter Commands in the latter half of the 1930s, air support for the Army, as common sense would suggest, had a low priority. Some have

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suggested that Army Co-operation in the years before the war was regarded by the RAF as a professional backwater, and that the RAF completely forgot how to support the Army.10 While this supposition contains some degree of truth, it fails to take into account the indisputable fact that during these same years many of the theoretical principles on which Britain’s Tactical Air Force would be based were conceived in their rudimentary form. For example, in 1928 the Air Ministry issued the first RAF War Manual, which included a number of chapters outlining the principles and the methods for air co-operation with the Army.11 The Royal Air Force Staff College in Andover also included in its syllabus lectures on Army Co-operation in a European War, with specific references to the threat presented by Nazi Germany.12 At the Army Co-operation School, Old Sarum, regular courses were held annually both for air and army officers; and in 1933, the first RAF Manual of Army Co-operation (AP 1176) was published.13 Finally, in 1936, Wing Commander J.C. Slessor published his book, Air Power and Armies,14 a detailed analysis of air operations in the Great War and the general principles deduced from them for future air and air-land warfare. The book was based on a series of lectures Slessor gave at the Staff College at Camberley between 1931 and 1934. Both Slessor’s lectures and his book represent a serious attempt to instil in air and army officers an understanding of how air power was likely to affect the problems of land warfare in the future. As the airmen built up a corpus of material on air support certain basic themes began to emerge. First, air support for any overseas military expedition would be of two kinds: that provided by Army Co-operation aircraft under the direct command of the Army Commander-in-Chief; and, support from Fighter and Bomber squadrons on such a scale as their respective Commands could spare from their own operations.15 In the case of the latter, the degree of support the Army could expect was wholly dependent on what was at the time considered to be the decisive battle. If this were a land operation, and it was of critical importance, then the greatest possible proportion of the whole air force would be concentrated on operations in support of the Army. Once again the airmen emphasised their cardinal principle of concentration of force at the decisive time and place; it was viewed as being of vital importance to the overall success of any air operation undertaken.16 With regard to air support for the Army, in general, it was widely accepted throughout the RAF that the most valuable contribution air forces could make to the success of a military operation was to ensure the greatest possible freedom of action for the Army’s co-operation aircraft, and to deny such freedom to the enemy. The role of the Army’s co-operation squadrons was to provide direct assistance to friendly ground troops in the achievement of their object by means of reconnaissance and observation. As such, the effectiveness of these aircraft would depend upon the degree of air superiority obtained over the battlefield by the “independent air forces” of the RAF.

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It followed that the first duty of the Fighter and Bomber squadrons was to gain air superiority in the locality of the most important military operations. Once an adequate degree of air superiority had been achieved, the Bomber squadrons would intervene, striking the enemy’s command and communications centres, marshalling yards and supply depots, and transportation networks, in an attempt to “isolate” the enemy army from reinforcement and supply. The use of aircraft over the battlefield itself, however, was ruled out by the Air Staff. Bombers were a poor substitute for artillery; and war experience had convinced the airmen that air attacks in the forward areas of the battlefield inevitably involved unacceptable losses in aircraft and crews, neither of which could be replaced with speed.17 Future battle experience in North Africa, Italy and North-West Europe ultimately confirmed the two general concepts subscribed to by the Air Staff. Air superiority and “interdiction of the battlefield,” by severing the enemy’s reinforcement and supply routes, were of the first importance in providing effective air support for ground forces. During those anxious days of uncertainty between the summer of 1939 and May 1940, however, their ideas were untested and untried. Joint, large-scale exercises were not conducted with the Army, there were very few aircraft available for service in an air support as opposed to an army co-operation role, and plans for co-ordinating any such co-operative operations did not exist. Long-established strategic priorities, production schedules, and the nature of the aircraft available, all imposed further limitations on air support for the Army. When the war began in September 1939, it was too late to switch the RAF’s main effort to the production of specifically designed tactical air forces, even had it been considered desirable to do so, which, at the time as well as throughout the war, it certainly was not.18 While the Air Ministry can be criticised for its lack of enthusiasm about organising air support for the Army, it does not deserve the entire blame. Such an accusation, made by some historians,19 is a gross simplification of both the state of affairs that existed between the two services at the time and their independent preparations for a future war. The War Office, as late as 1939, did not have any plans or even the semblance of an army for a war to be fought on the continent against a first-class power.20 Rather, it was equipped and trained for its long-established and traditional role of garrison duty around the Empire, as well as more substantial Imperial commitments in India and the Middle East. A continental role was listed as the Army’s very last responsibility, and, accordingly, it received the least amount of attention.21 Even the lessons the Army had learned in the 1914– 1918 War were not codified and put down on paper until 1932; and they were not published until April 1934.22 The Army, for better or for worse, seemed content to return to regimental soldiering and its traditional role as an Imperial police force.23 For most soldiers, air support, if it was considered by them at all, was not essential to the Army’s ability to fulfil its Imperial

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responsibilities. There were, of course, repeated attempts made by the War Office to repossess the air forces that it had lost in 1918 when the Royal Air Force was established; but a method for employing these forces, should they be regained, was not considered by the General Staff until 1938. The Army’s vision of air support was put forward in a pamphlet issued by the War Office on 28 September 1938, entitled: “The Employment of Air Forces in the Field” or EAF for short. Co-authored by Group Captain John Slessor24 and Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Nye, it was based upon the lessons of the Great War and, more recent RAF operations in India and the Middle East. This pamphlet set out in general terms the doctrine and organisation of an “air component” to be placed under any British Army that took the field. The air component referred to in EAF included army co-operation aircraft, as well as bomber and fighter squadrons. Its task was to assist the Army in defeating both the enemy army and air force. To accomplish its objectives the air component would provide reconnaissance by day and by night, air superiority, and attacks on military targets by means of air bombing and low-flying attack.25 In keeping with earlier RAF writings on the subject of air support, EAF stated that the principal duty of the air forces was to create and maintain an air situation that would enable friendly ground forces in the field to work with minimal interference from enemy air action. The EAF pamphlet, however, differed from the RAF’s view on method by proposing that fighter cover as well as bomber support should be provided by squadrons incorporated in the air component. Hence all of the supporting air forces would be under the direct control of the military commander. This air component was, in theory, designed to be self-sufficient, but it was admitted in EAF that further assistance from the Independent Air Forces might be required from time to time. Part of this extra support, it was suggested, would come from an air striking force also deployed in the field though not under the command of the army commander-in-chief. The strategic air forces, in accordance with the general war plan of the government, would, on certain occasions and for certain periods, be placed directly at the military commander’s disposal in the furtherance of the ground campaign.26 The distinction, which EAF made between what later came to be known as “tactical” and “strategic” air forces, was one of its most important contributions to the development of the theory and practice of air support in Britain. By making this distinction, the Army implicitly acknowledged the RAF’s long standing claim to its independent role: the command and control of the air striking force. Yet the War Office’s repeated attempts to secure a positive claim upon some share of the so-called strategic effort, in the form of fighter and bomber squadrons attached to an army air component, also fostered a departmental dispute that grew in acrimony throughout most of the war. This latest proposal from the War Office for a self-sufficient air component was tantamount to a request for a separate army air force. The

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Air Staff in turn responded promptly to the recommendations set out in EAF, and resolutely insisted that only army co-operation aircraft were to be placed under army control. Army co-operation, as opposed to air support for the army, they asserted, was reconnaissance, pure and simple. The Army’s business was not with bomber support or fighter protection, both of which would be provided by the strategic air forces under their independent commands. EAF contained much to be commended but, as with most dealings between the two services on questions of air support, irreconcilable differences on matters of principle, and deep-seated mistrust over intent, tended to overshadow the practical issues where meaningful progress might have been made. This was indeed the case with pre-war attempts to establish a workable system of offensive air support for ground troops in the field. The same fate befell new and important subjects such as air transport and parachute troops, which had received scant attention or interest before the outbreak of the war.27 With the Government’s decision in February 1939 to equip an army for service on the continent, questions concerning the provision of air support for this army quickly brought the War Office and the Air Ministry into open conflict yet again. The General Staff were concerned that apart from a few squadrons, which were designated for reconnaissance work, provision of any form of offensive air support had not been made. Moreover, they feared that the air striking force would be unavailable to assist the Army in its land campaign because it would be off conducting its own bombing operations. The General Staff also noted that even if bomber squadrons were available, their aircraft were unsuitable, and the personnel were deficient in training for the tasks the Army wanted performed. Throughout the spring of 1939 the General Staff addressed these questions and many others under the broad heading of services required from the RAF for the Field Force. Their deliberations led to the writing of a comprehensive report that, when circulated, sparked off a heated row between the War Office and the Air Ministry.28 In writing their report the General Staff sought to initiate a full reorganisation of air support arrangements for the Army. Their main points of concern centred on the Army’s requirements, namely aircraft, both in number and design, and the organisation and administration of the air component tasked to support a BEF despatched to the continent for operations in Belgium and France. The General Staff was worried that, under the existing arrangement, the necessary aircraft for army support would not be available in war. They therefore strongly urged that bomber and fighter squadrons, under the direct command of the Army Commander-in-Chief, be attached to the Field Force in addition to the existing intercommunication and reconnaissance squadrons. The General Staff believed that recent developments abroad, mainly the wars in Spain and China, showed the value of aircraft operating in close support of the Army—not only in reconnaissance, but also

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in an offensive role. They pointed out that it was not without significance that specifically designed bombers, as well as reconnaissance aircraft, for the close support of an army, formed part of the air forces of France, Italy, Japan, the United States, and the USSR.29 On this evidence the General Staff stated that the time had come for the British Army’s air support requirements to be modified and increased on a substantial scale if it were to fight on at least equal terms against a first-class power.30 Having first established the need to reorganise air support for the Army, the General Staff then expounded on the changes they wanted made. They began from their accepted premise that air support was as essential to the operations of the field force as any other form of support; and that the Army should be able to demand what it required from the Air Ministry, with the Air Ministry being compelled to provide it. The air services foreseen were numerous and wide ranging. They included strategic and tactical reconnaissance, artillery spotting, photographic intelligence, intercommunication, air transportation, low-flying attack with machine-guns and light bombs against enemy targets in the forward battle line, short range bombing attacks against enemy concentrations and command centres, long-range bombing attacks on communication and transportation systems so as to isolate the battlefield, and fighter aircraft cover to defend against enemy air attack while simultaneously clearing the way for offensive air operations against the enemy. In listing the air tasks they thought were necessary for success in a modern land campaign against an equally matched enemy, the General Staff demonstrated, at least to a partial degree, broad acceptance of air power as an important factor in the fighting of any future war.31 To perform the wide range of air support tasks envisaged, with a reasonable degree of success, the General Staff advised that specialised aircraft operated by crews trained in military matters were essential. Following on from this they noted that adequate provision and preparation could be ensured only if the War Office had direct and ongoing consultation with the Air Ministry on matters concerning the design and production of new aircraft, and training for operations. Finally, with regard to command and control, the General Staff maintained that the Army, as the “user” service, should exercise operational control not only in war but also during times of peace for the purposes of combined training. The Royal Air Force, as the “provider” service, would continue to be responsible for the technical training and administration of air units as well as for the provision and maintenance of aircraft and other materials. By way of conclusion the General Staff pointed out that the system they had in mind was already set out in the EAF pamphlet. Providing the RAF were prepared to adhere to the recommendations as set forth in their report and EAF, the General Staff were willing to concede that it was unnecessary to establish an Army Air Arm at this point in time.32

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Most of the army’s senior officers readily agreed to the basic proposals put forward in the General Staff’s report. A small number of those directly involved with its final preparation, however, namely Major General H.R.S. Massy (the Director of Military Training), Brigadier W.C. Holden (the Deputy Director of Staff Duties), and Colonel W.J. Eldridge (GSO I, Anti-Aircraft Corps), who had recently served on the Directing Staff of the RAF Staff College, voiced their concern over various passages in the report that might give offence to the Air Ministry. They recommended that a number of amendments be made so that the paper would not be dismissed out of hand as being “the thin end of the wedge to split the RAF once more into Naval and Military Wings,” and consequently raise unnecessary opposition to its otherwise “sound proposals.”33 Their prescient advice to avoid antagonisms unfortunately fell on deaf ears, for the General Staff’s report, very much in its original draft form, was circulated under the name of the CIGS for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 14 June 1939.34 Just as the War Office’s dissenting critics had surmised, the Air Ministry responded to the General Staff’s Report in a hostile and highly defensive manner. It was viewed as being little more than yet another blatant and self-serving attempt by the soldiery to regain control over the aircraft they had lost at the end of the last war. Now at issue, the Air Staff were quick to point out, was the whole basis of collaboration in war between the Army and the Air Force. In a note addressed to the Chiefs of Staff, Group Captain J.C. Slessor, then the Air Ministry’s Director of Plans, gave the Air Staff’s official reply to this latest attack.35 Slessor stated that the General Staff, through their most recent report on air support requirements, demonstrated that they had “learnt little or nothing from the lessons of the Great War, and had absorbed several false lessons from recent campaigns, especially those in Spain and China.” He also went to great lengths to point out that the War Office’s insistence on the “definite and permanent” allotment of aircraft “as an integral part of the Field Force” was a negation of the principles of flexibility, concentration, and centralised control—fundamental principles that the Air Staff firmly held to as the basis for obtaining the most efficient use out of their limited air resources. In short, the General Staff’s proposals were categorised as being made “quite regardless of practical considerations and tactical requirements.” It was an uncompromising rebuttal but one that Slessor was justified in making given the War Office’s own Intelligence reports on the development of air support concepts and practice in foreign armed forces.36 Slessor concluded his note by inviting the COS to accept the CIGS’s memorandum for what it was: a regrettable revival of the old idea “that when the soldier talks about cooperation between Air Force and Army he really means the subordination of the Air Force to the Army.”37 Slessor’s note was sharp and succinct, but it was not merely a spiteful response brought on by the realisation that the Army was up to its old tricks

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once again. Rather it was a strong statement founded on the firm conviction that the General Staff had little if any conception of the employment of air power in modern land operations. Therefore, throughout the month of May, Slessor and other members of the Air Staff had busily produced memoranda in order to reassert the RAF’s position on the principles of air warfare in general, and, more specifically, the preferred method of providing air support for an army in the field. Three papers stand out. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, led the way with a paper that emphasised the principle of concentration: where the maximum air forces possible were deployed and directed at the decisive time and place. He noted that many valuable opportunities were missed between 1914 and 1918 through neglect of this principle. The RAF in the field had grown up on the basis of integration of its units within the Army, and because, with the exception of the German heavy bomber force, air power had not evolved to the point at which it could be used to great effect in an independent strategic role. Newall then referred to the current Anglo-French strategic air situation, in which they had to defend a line extending from Scapa Flow to North Africa. Vast air resources would be necessary if aircraft were to be tied to the ground forces and operated under the direct command of area army commanders. If effective air defence was to be provided along this expansive front with the existing aircraft at hand, noted the CAS, then all air resources must be organised and administered to concentrate at the decisive point of battle. This, he stated, could be accomplished only if the air forces were operated under the central control of the Air Staff. To emphasise the strength of his point further, the CAS noted that the Germans had reached a similar conclusion. Luftwaffe training regulations stated that army formations not taking part in the decisive fight must do without aircraft.38 Armed with this knowledge, the CAS believed that he had the most compelling evidence available to support his argument: RAF aircraft, properly employed, must not be integrated within the ground forces.39 Slessor developed this theme in more detail with reference to the general plans for operations. In memoranda on the nature and the role of the RAF Component of the Field Force, after repeating the broad points of principle set out by the CAS, Slessor outlined the Air Ministry’s position on the provision of offensive air support for armies in the field. He began by defending the RAF’s refusal to delegate command and control of aircraft to army commanders, citing the enhanced flexibility and economy of force to be obtained through centralised control. This, he pointed out, was the principal lesson learnt from the Great War, where decentralised command of air resources resulted in the bombing of targets that more often than not had little or no influence on the course of the war. Applying the lessons learned from recent campaigns, bombers, Slessor argued, should be concentrated in order that “the maximum possible striking force is directed on that task and at that

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point which is the most decisive at the time.” Hence, only reconnaissance aircraft providing the Army with information from “the other side of the hill” should be put under the direct command of the Army. The RAF would provide offensive air support in direct support of the land battle, Slessor confirmed, if it were viewed as being of critical or decisive importance. The Air Staff thought that such a situation was unlikely in the early stages of a future European war, but, Slessor reiterated, in this event, the RAF was prepared to concentrate and use as much of the resources of Bomber Command as possible to ensure the Army’s success.40 The desired method for providing this air support was described by Air Vice-Marshal W. Sholto Douglas (Assistant Chief of the Air Staff) in his memorandum entitled “Air Attack in Direct Support of the Field Force.”41 It proved to be an august and influential document. Just twelve pages in length, it formulated what came to be the accepted Air Staff view on air support for the Army until the advent of the fighter-bomber in 1942–43. Douglas distinguished three forms of offensive air support for the ground force. First, indirect support could be provided by Bomber Command operations against objectives in the enemy’s home territory, such as war industries, government offices and control facilities, and public support for the war effort. Second, direct support42 operations would strike targets of more immediate importance to the field force, such as, the movement of troops and vehicles by road or rail, marshalling points, supply and ammunition dumps, enemy airfields, headquarters, and communications. Thus the Air Staff hoped to isolate the battlefield, or, as it was described at the time, “to hold the ring,” while the ground forces achieved their objectives. As most if not all of the preferred objectives for air attack in support of friendly ground troops were to be found well back behind deployed enemy combat formations, the proper aircraft for carrying out these attacks, stated Douglas, was the bomber. The fighter’s primary function was the destruction of enemy aircraft in the air, either in defence against air attack or to establish the air superiority necessary for successful offensive operations.43 Third, close support operations could be executed against enemy forces directly in contact with one’s own or allied armies. These, Douglas argued, were often incorrectly thought of by many British Army officers and soldiers as exclusively low-flying attack by fighters or bombers against targets in the forefront of the battlefield,44 and had long been rejected by the Air Staff as an acceptable method of utilising aircraft. Douglas reaffirmed the Air Staff view, pointing out that close support was “seldom if ever justified because of the high losses sustained in such operations compared with their disappointing results.” He supported this conclusion with a detailed examination of the German air experience in the Spanish Civil War. German air units, fighting on behalf of the Nationalists, undertook low-flying attacks against the poorly trained and equipped Republican troops. Initially these attacks had a very positive effect against enemy morale, although they did

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not achieve great material destruction. The Germans discovered that all too often targets offered in the battle line were small, dispersed, and comparatively invulnerable. Furthermore, once the Government Forces obtained light anti-aircraft guns in increasing numbers, the Germans were compelled to abandon their low-flying attacks because of the increasing losses they incurred. Douglas concluded his analysis by stating that aircraft were not an effective substitute for artillery. Nor were they just “another weapon” in the Army’s arsenal, condemned to some inapposite, ancillary, and subordinate support role. But, if properly employed, in indirect and direct support as articulated by Douglas, air power would enhance the Army’s freedom of action and its ability to exploit the initiative.45 Taken collectively the Air Staff’s memoranda analysed in considerable detail both the principles and the operational concepts of air support for the Army. They ultimately enabled the Air Staff convincingly to reject the War Office’s increasingly frequent and substantial demands for additional fighter, bomber, and army co-operation squadrons. Their completion at the end of May could not have come at a better time for it coincided with another War Office demand for a sizeable increase in the number of RAF squadrons to be made available for service with the Field Force.46 The War Office also advised the Air Ministry that the Army Council wished to propose changes in the composition and equipment of army co-operation squadrons, and sought a meeting of a joint Air Ministry and War Office Committee at an early date to consider them.47 Spurred on by the War Office’s latest and wholly unrealistic demands, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS), Air Vice-Marshal Richard Peirse, suggested to the CAS, that the whole nature of air support for the Army be explored forthwith. He also urged that the Air Ministry, in its talks with the War Office, must maintain the RAF’s position of avoiding integration with army formations in the field. The CAS agreed, and ordered the Air Staff to hold a conference on this subject.48 A fortnight later, on 12 June, senior members of the Air Staff, along with Air Vice-Marshal Sutton, AOC No.22 Group (Army Co-Operation), assembled in the CAS’s room at the Air Ministry to discuss the Royal Air Force Component of the Field Force. Before them were the various memoranda produced by the Air Staff in May, the War Office’s letter of 30 May requesting a substantial but as of yet unspecified increase in army co-operation squadrons, and Air Intelligence summaries on the respective policies of armyair co-operation adopted by France and Germany. The CAS proposed that they should discuss consecutively the role of army co-operation, bomber, and fighter squadrons in support of the field force. He suggested that they should take a line of approach that emphasised co-operation with the War Office without giving way to excessive demands. This was accepted, and while showing a general willingness to provide effective air support for the Army, the airmen remained firm in their conviction that army co-operation aircraft

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should be limited to reconnaissance, and that collaboration of bomber and fighter squadrons with the Army should be undertaken according to its potential decisiveness, not the size of the army in the field. The War Office’s proposal to tie bombers and fighters to the Regular Field Force was rejected as wholly uneconomical, contravening the principle of concentration.49 In order to clear up the existing confusion surrounding the Army’s vaguely stated requirements, as well as the two services’ differing perceptions of air support, the airmen thought it wise to confer with the War Office as soon as possible. They concluded their conference by unanimously endorsing a proposal to invite the War Office to participate in a joint committee to talk over the air requirements of the field force and how they were to be met. Two days later, on 14 June, the CIGS submitted his controversial and inflammatory memorandum on air support to the COS. Already prepared to discuss this subject, though not in such a contentious manner, the Air Staff nevertheless followed through with their intended plan; but now with an additional suggestion that the CIGS’s paper should also be considered in detail by a joint Air Ministry-War Office Committee.50 The Joint Committee proposed by the Air Staff assembled quickly, and held its first and only meeting at the Air Ministry on 30 June. The committee itself was conspicuous for the proven ability of its members. Representing the War Office were Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Adam, Major-General H. Massy, and Brigadiers W.C. Holden and J.N. Kennedy, while the Air Ministry participants were Air Vice-Marshals Richard Peirse and Sholto Douglas, Air Commodore R.P. Willock, and Group Captain John Slessor. AVM Peirse, in the chair, stated that in his view the Committee’s objective was to produce agreement on matters of principle, whereupon separate subcommittees could then consider the details of army co-operation, bomber and fighter aircraft. This was agreed, but the initial discussions revealed wide differences over the interpretation of “close support.” Anxious to avoid deadlock and failure at such an early stage of their deliberations the problem of defining close support was referred to the Bomber Sub-Committee.51 Other divergences emerged over the command and control arrangements for bomber and fighter aircraft. Command and control was duly acknowledged as being the most difficult of the Joint Committee’s problems. The Air Staff emphasised the desirability of a unified Command, underscoring the flexibility it would confer on the employment of a numerically limited force of bombers and fighters engaged in rapidly changing circumstances. They also gave details on how the Army could expect to benefit from this particular method of command organisation. Lt-Gen. Adam noted with approval that the theatre organisation suggested was similar to a local COS Committee in the field. Having come to this meeting expecting strong resistance from the Air Ministry, the Generals were surprised by the willingness the airmen showed towards meeting the Army’s needs. In this new spirit of cooperation, the Committee, as a whole, agreed in principle with the Air Staff’s

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view of a unified command. All that remained was for the subcommittees to work out the practical details necessary for operations. Unfortunately, only the Army Co-operation Sub-Committee concluded its deliberations before the outbreak of war, and with it, the work of all of the joint committees went for nought. Events in Poland quickly overtook in importance the work of the joint committee and its subcommittees—committees that, regrettably, also lacked official standing since their work was neither sanctioned nor approved by the Chiefs of Staff, either individually or collectively.52 With the German Armed Forces heavily engaged in their invasion of Poland, and the expiration of the British government’s ultimatum, both the Air Ministry and the War Office set to the task of getting their respective forces across the Channel and into some form of operational readiness. Small, woefully under-equipped, and with no real plan of action beyond the firm decision to send four divisions to France, the advanced parties of the BEF along with the RAF Component were despatched by the government to the continent without a Commander-in-Chief to direct their efforts. Confusion was the order of the day at the War Office, and three days would pass before General Viscount Gort was appointed C-in-C BEF.53 Shortly after his arrival in France several disconcerting despatches, expressing grave reservations over insufficient air forces at his disposal, began arriving at the War Office.54 Gort was desperately worried that the twelve squadrons of Lysanders, Blenheims, and Hurricanes that made up the Air Component were insufficient for the BEF’s needs. His apprehension was strongest over the inadequate scale of fighter protection, the complicated and involved arrangements for requesting and receiving additional air support from Bomber and Fighter Commands, and the lack of assurance of obtaining bombing support for offensive operations. Moreover he was convinced that any process of obtaining agreement to switch squadrons from RAF control to the Army would be too slow to take advantage of fleeting opportunities or to prevent a critical set-back from turning into a wholesale defeat. In the coming battle with the German Army, Gort believed it was essential to have squadrons working with the Army, available immediately at call, to attack ground targets chosen by the military commander.55 The view held by the War Office before the war began was that the German Air Force existed primarily to help the Army gain ground and to carry out its tasks. This outlook seemed to be confirmed by the General Staff’s own reading of accounts of German success in Poland, which emphasised the great value of a strong air force operating in close co-operation with land forces. They concluded that the German tactics of supporting their ground attack with large numbers of low-flying bombers, whose effort was directed against targets in and behind the firing line, confused and overwhelmed Polish resistance. While the War Office’s assessment of Poland’s defeat did not give proper credit to the Luftwaffe’s deep bombing operations against Polish

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communications, the importance of air power to the ultimate success of a major campaign against a first class opponent was not lost on the soldiers. For the British General Staff, German operations in Poland demonstrated to an alarming degree that co-operation between the German Army and Air Force was wholehearted and complete. Moreover, they were all too aware of the shortcomings that existed in their own preparations for co-ordinated action on and above the battlefield; though, as the War Office was all too prone to do, the blame for this state of affairs was placed squarely on the RAF.56 Three weeks into the war Major-General Massy, now DCIGS, wrote a comprehensive report on “Co-operation between Air Forces and Armies in the Field.” He used intelligence gathered on the Polish campaign, albeit selectively, to compare and contrast German practice with the Air Staff’s theory and policy. The essential difference between the two, Massy noted, was the method of control. According to his report, the Germans enjoyed unified control of their land and air forces operating together under Army command, whereas the British employed separate commanders for ground and air.57 For the British method to work efficiently, Massy argued, perfect co-operation and agreement must be assured and, in the fog of war, such efficiency is always in doubt. Massy suggested that a number of changes be made before it were too late, the same changes that had been suggested by the War Office many times in the past. Massy requested specially designed aircraft operated by Army trained personnel under the direct control of Army commanders for work in close co-operation with the Field Force. His own contribution to the long debate was his request for an agreement in principle on the basis of the War Office’s views on close support and the unity of command.58 The CIGS, General Ironside, sent Massy’s report to Leslie Hore-Belisha, the Secretary of State for War, along with a covering note urging him to take up the matter of “an Air Arm under Army control” with the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet. But before the political option was exercised, Ironside made one last attempt to convince the Air Staff to comply with the War Office’s demands. In a meeting with the CAS, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, Ironside outlined the main points in the DCIGS’s report. He then stated his own firm belief that the Army was not equipped to take its place in modern warfare without the assistance of close support aircraft, and such aircraft should be under the direct command of the Army.59 Newall could not agree with the CIGS’s conclusion. The air forces Ironside asked for, and the kinds of operations being considered by the General Staff for the BEF, did not conform to the government’s general war strategy at the time. More dangerous still, in Newall’s opinion, was that the War Office’s plans did not take into account the existing strain on both training facilities and the production of war materials for the limited operations already approved by the War Cabinet. To do more at the present time was

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just not possible. He therefore rejected Ironside’s demand for a large number of close co-operation aircraft placed at the sole disposal of the Army. Such specialised aircraft, he noted, would be useless for any other purpose, and this was counter to the Air Ministry’s long-established policy to manufacture a few types of general multipurpose bombers and fighters, which could be easily concentrated for mass operations. As had been stated for the War Office’s benefit many times before, the RAF planned to have as many bomber aircraft as possible available for maximum use where and when the occasion warranted, in accordance with the direction of the War Cabinet. Bomber Command, thus deployed, could mount a strategic offensive directly against the German homeland, or could be used to attack objectives such as headquarters, communications, and assembly areas well back behind the front in an attempt to isolate the battlefield; this latter option, noted Newall, was what the Luftwaffe had done so successfully in Poland.60 Newall’s reply made it clear that the War Office and the Air Ministry had drawn almost diametrically opposite conclusions on German air operations in Poland. The former emphasised the use of the Luftwaffe in short range work to provide covering fire for attacks by friendly ground units. The latter claimed, on the contrary, that the primary role of German air operations was to destroy objectives in the rear of the Polish Army thereby separating it from its communications and source of supply. The differences that divided the two services over the nature of air support, however, were far greater than the mere tactical applications under discussion, heated though it was. At issue was the very nature of the strategy of the war, and who, or what service, would be responsible for waging it. The General Staff were adamant in their belief that armies supported by air forces would decide the outcome of the war. Germany’s main weapon, they pointed out, was a vast, lavishly equipped Army supported by a large air force specifically designed to ensure the success of her land forces. The Polish campaign was cited as confirmation of this view. Hence, the General Staff were convinced that victory could be won only if the German Army was attacked and defeated on land. The General Staff, at every opportunity, was quick to point out that this was the strategy that ultimately produced victory in 1918, though admittedly at enormous costs. Faced with roughly similar circumstances, the General Staff were reluctant to tamper with a strategy of proven effectiveness, even if it were numbingly unimaginative. A natural unwillingness to co-operate, exacerbated by uncertainty over the marked differences between the “old way” and the “new,” precluded the development of a workable air support policy at the start of the war. Because the two services were unable to reach an acceptable compromise, army-air co-operation quickly became the first inter-service dispute to come before the War Cabinet in the autumn of 1939.

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CHAPTER 3

War and Defeat in France Aircraft and advanced parties of the 1st Echelon of the Advanced Air Striking Force, RAF (AASF) moved by air to their war stations in the Reims district of France on 2 September 1939, exactly one day before Britain formally declared war on Nazi Germany. This expeditionary air force, though admittedly at reduced strength, was ready for operations the following day. By the end of September the AASF had completed its relocation and was listed as being fully operational.1 The start of the war in Europe produced a temporary though short-lived lull in the inter-service rivalry between the Army and the RAF. Both services had more immediate problems to deal with, such as getting their respective forces ready for war and then deployed at their pre-arranged positions. In carrying out these preparations, however, new and more alarming grievances over the organisation and scale of air support for the BEF began to emerge. The war itself on the western front, from September 1939 until early May 1940, may aptly be described as “the phoney war,” but in Whitehall a battle over how this war would be fought and who would control the sparse resources available for fighting it was just heating up. Plans for the employment of British air forces in France, in the eventuality of war against Germany, had been worked out during a series of AngloFrench Staff talks held throughout the spring and summer months. It was decided that the RAF would provide two separate air formations to carry out operations, and two Air Missions to co-ordinate higher air policy with the French Government and the French Air Force. The AASF was one of the two air formations agreed upon; the other was the Air Component of the Field Force.

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The AASF, under the operational command of Air Vice-Marshal P.H.L. Playfair, had originally been conceived as a temporary “outpost of Bomber Command.”2 Equipped with the ten Fairey Battle squadrons3 of No.1 Group, the AASF was to mount daytime strategic bombing missions against Germany. In particular, it was to concentrate its attacks against heavy industry targets in the Ruhr. Only in the event of an emergency were these bombers to be diverted from strategic targets to direct support for friendly ground forces.4 It was the comparatively short range of Britain’s light and medium bombers that had made the establishment of the AASF and its subsequent deployment on forward airfields in eastern France essential. The Fairey Battle was a slow, single-engined, obsolescent bomber, woefully deficient in range for operations directed against targets in Germany if flown from airfields in England. Whilst the Bristol Blenheim had two engines it was not much better. By operating from permanent airfields located behind the supposed security of the Maginot Line the effective range of these aircraft was extended. Forward deployment did not, however, alter their strategic mission. AASF operations were to correspond closely with those of the other home-based groups of Bomber Command. Consequently, the executive control and direction of the AASF was to remain under the AOC-in-C Bomber Command and the Air Staff.5 The Air Component,6 whose AOC was Air Vice-Marshal C.H. Blount, was a mixed force consisting of four fighter squadrons equipped with Hurricanes, four tactical reconnaissance or Army Co-operation squadrons with Lysanders, and four strategic reconnaissance bomber squadrons armed with Blenheims. Its mission was to provide direct air support for the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), including all forms of air reconnaissance, fighter protection and close support. Operational control of these air forces rested with the C-in-C BEF, General Lord Gort, with Blount serving as his chief advisor on air operations. An agreement made between the British and French Chiefs of Staff, however, extended the range of the Air Component’s duties. While the BEF would continue to have first call on its resources, the new agreement stipulated that the Air Component “should be available to the Allied Armies as a whole.” This mainly applied to the Air Component’s fighter squadrons, which were to provide air defence for all Allied ground forces located in their sector, as well as deal with enemy bombers intent on attacking strategic targets in the Low Countries, North-East France, and even in South-East England. At the end of September, the headquarters of the Air Component were established at Maroeuil, near Arras, so as to be in close proximity to GHQ, BEF. A joint army/air headquarters to control operations was not established. General Gort thought it was unnecessary.7 Aircraft of the Air Component began their move to France on 8 September. Ground personnel and motorised transport followed between 15 and 30 September, and the force was ready for operations in early October. Unlike the AASF, which was to operate from permanent airfields, the Air

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Component planned to operate on a mobile basis. It did not have sufficient transport of its own for all units to be fully mobile, but it was able to share the Army’s rearward services and to use its line of communications. In fact, many of the Air Component’s requirements, including signals, were provided by the Army. By the spring of 1940 this inter-service co-operation “on the ground” would prove its worth under the test of battle.8 To ensure that the operational effort of Britain’s air forces overseas was in harmony with the activities undertaken by the other Allied forces in the theatre, two British Air Missions were despatched to France. Mission No.1 was headed by Air Marshal Arthur Barratt. He represented Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, the then Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), in France. Barratt had the dual task of maintaining continuous liaison between the CAS and his counterpart in the French Air Force, General Vuillemin, and of conducting discussions with the French on all matters of higher policy affecting joint action by the two air forces. No.2 Mission was led by Air Commodore F.P. Don, who represented Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, the then AOC-in-C Bomber Command. Don was responsible for the detailed co-ordination of Allied bombing policy with the French air forces, which were located on the north-eastern front under the command of General Mouchard. Both Barratt and Don served as senior RAF liaison officers to the French and neither was intended to exercise operational command. In the event of certain exceptional circumstances, however, such as a sudden German attack on France through the Low Countries, the Air Staff empowered Barratt to issue orders for immediate action directly to the Advanced Air Striking Force.9 Both Missions were entrusted with the delicate task of turning vaguely defined agreements on air policy arrived at with the French into workable arrangements for active operations. It was onerous work, plagued by the regular intrusion of divergent national interests. Already we have seen some of the problems that developed with regard to establishing the offensive objectives of the AASF, and the War Office’s displeasure with the increasing responsibilities imposed on the Air Component’s few fighter squadrons. Complicating matters further, in September 1939, the French High Command decided to reorganise their air forces stationed on the eastern frontier into separate geographical zones of operation. Three zones, North, East, and South, were established before the end of the year. The North Air Zone, the “Zone des Operations Aeriennes du Nord” (ZOAN), under the command of General d’Astier, with headquarters at Chauny, covered a front that stretched from the North Sea to the south-east corner of Luxembourg. Allied ground forces in this zone included General Billotte’s 1st French Army Group and the BEF, thus making it the most important zone of the three as far as the British were concerned. Air Marshal Barratt, therefore, took it upon himself to establish the closest liaison with this new French air formation.10

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After consultation with both British and French higher authorities, Barratt established a joint Anglo-French air organisation on 9 October at Chauny, known as the Allied Central Air Bureau (ACAB). In the beginning the ACAB was nothing more than a signal organisation, built on a series of landlines with wireless (W/T) back up, and a joint operations room. Various exercises were held during the autumn and the early winter months to test and perfect the organisation for the reception, assimilation, and dissemination of information required to fight a major air-land battle effectively and with speed. Though viewed with a fair degree of scepticism by army officers in the BEF, including its Commander-in-Chief,11 this organisation would prove to be one of the very few positive developments to come out of the fighting against the Germans the following spring.12 Taken altogether much of the work accomplished by the Allied air forces in France during the autumn of 1939 was a remarkable achievement, especially when one considers the deleterious state of Allied as well as interservice co-ordination and planning that preceded the outbreak of war. Nevertheless, the War Office and the C-in-C BEF remained dissatisfied with the air support arrangements made for British ground troops. They believed that the BEF’s air support requirements were poorly served, both with regard to the types of aircraft allocated and the scale of the air forces deployed. Gort also complained that the practice of having independent air commanders in the field would make operations unnecessarily complicated. The soldiers therefore pressed for the provision of “suitable” close support aircraft to act under their direct command and control.13 At the end of September, General Ironside circulated a letter to senior army officers informing them that the War Office had put up a paper “asking for an Air Arm under direct Army control and fit to co-operate with the field force either in offence or defence.”14 The paper the CIGS referred to had been produced by the DCIGS for use by the Secretary of State for War, Leslie Hore-Belisha, in his work with the Land Forces Committee, a subcommittee of the War Cabinet established in early September to identify and make good the Army’s most serious deficiencies. The War Office were asking for an Air Arm of sixty-two squadrons of all types—where each squadron was assumed to consist of twelve first-line aircraft—for an army of twenty divisions in the first year of war. An additional one hundred and twenty squadrons in the second year, for an army approaching fifty-five divisions, was also requested. These numbers were later reduced in scale to forty-four and eighty-five squadrons respectively during the first two years of the war.15 It should be remembered that the BEF at this same point in time consisted of only one effective corps of two divisions. The Secretary of State for War made a few minor adjustments to the DCIGS’s air requirements paper and then submitted it as his own memorandum to the Land Forces Committee on 17 October 1939. In addition to the request made for a substantial increase in aircraft for the field force, he

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challenged the existing policy governing the separate and independent air commands in France. The present arrangements, whereby the C-in-C BEF approached the RAF with a view to obtaining additional air support if and when prevailing circumstances allowed, were not at all acceptable to the General Staff. The Army, Hore-Belisha stated, “required their own [bomber and fighter] aircraft for direct support.” After all, the Germans, according to the Secretary of State, had demonstrated the intrinsic value of army air forces in their victorious Polish campaign. The British Army, therefore, deserved nothing less when it went into battle. Hore-Belisha concluded with the claim that he was “not raising in any general way the question of a separate Army Air Arm.” Rather he was attempting to establish the principle that the Army must be directly responsible for the command of and ultimately for the training for and maintenance of its “direct support” aircraft, just as in the case of any other of its supporting arms, for example, artillery or tanks.16

The degree of distinction made here, between the creation of a separate army air arm, and co-operation between the Army and the RAF, was one that only a politician could make or, presumably, understand. Expecting the worst from the Air Ministry in reply to his memorandum, the Secretary of State set out to increase his chances of obtaining a favourable response to his numerous demands as well as his newly raised “point of principle.” On the same day that he tabled his memorandum, Hore-Belisha sent a secret and personal telegram to General Gort requesting the C-in-C BEF’s immediate support in the form of an urgent plea for more aircraft under direct army control. The telegram read: Please stress need for considerable number close support aircraft under Army Command. Allocation of aircraft for support of specific land operations NOT (repeat NOT) good enough.17

Two days later, at the War Cabinet’s daily morning meeting, the Secretary of State informed his Cabinet colleagues of the work presently being done by the Land Forces Committee18 to ensure the Army’s requirements for air support were met. This was the first time that the subject of “air support” had been raised at War Cabinet level. The Cabinet took note of the Secretary of State’s report, and then authorised the Land Forces Committee to proceed with its examination and report back in due course.19 The War Cabinet’s conclusion led directly to a flurry of notes and memoranda exchanged between the Air Ministry and the War Office covering a whole range of issues on air support for the ground forces, the aim of the army and the air force in the present war, and the very nature of war itself.20 Detailed memoranda on air requirements for the Army produced by

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the Secretaries of State for War and Air were considered by the Land Forces Committee at its fourth meeting on 23 October with the general aim being to reach a consensus agreement on a new policy. Each service restated its respective position, which had changed little since the subject of air support for the field force was last contested so bitterly in June. The meeting, which ended in dismal failure, merely confirmed the irreconcilable positions of the two services. The Secretary of State for Air, Sir Kingsley Wood, even refused to acknowledge the conclusions reached by the Land Forces Committee.21 Deadlocked, the issue of air support was left to the War Cabinet to decide. Three new papers were submitted for discussion at the 8 November meeting. Sir Samuel Hoare, the then Lord Privy Seal, was the author of the first paper under consideration. He outlined very briefly the fundamental difference of opinion that had arisen between the War Office and the Air Ministry. The War Office’s position, which was derived from its analysis of the recent German offensive against Poland, was that the Army must have under its direct command large numbers of specially designed close support aircraft. The Air Ministry, on the other hand, stated that bomber aircraft of any type could only be provided to the Army at the expense of the counter-offensive bomber force, thereby depleting it to a perilously low degree. Bombers must, therefore, remain part of a concentrated air striking force, and be placed at the disposal of the Army only by consent of the Air Ministry, or alternatively, by decision of the War Cabinet.22 Memoranda by the two Secretaries of State argued the respective cases of the Army and the RAF. Neither paper, however, added anything new to the debate, which had become stale and tiresome. Hore-Belisha, in fact, even seemed to lose sight of the question under discussion, preferring instead to launch a bitter and personal attack on the Secretary of State for Air. The best he could do with regard to air support was to make a petulant plea for the establishment of an army air arm, which, ironically, he had firmly denied was his aim less than a month earlier.23 In contrast, Sir Kingsley Wood, the Secretary of State for Air, provided a dispassionate summary of the immediate history of this inter-service dilemma and offered a sound proposal for an acceptable and joint way forward. After restating the Air Staff’s belief in the efficacy of a homogeneous bomber force, he asked the War Cabinet to instruct the General Staff and the Air Staff jointly to devise measures for providing the Army with the greatest possible air support of all kinds within the existing organisation and system of co-ordination and control.24 The Air Ministry, he concluded, was anxious to do all in its power to provide the Army with effective air support but the RAF could not do this, with a clear conscience, if it meant abandoning the whole basis of the accepted air policy. At issue were two main questions. The first was a broad and somewhat theoretical question of basic principle regarding the control of the aircraft involved. The second question, centring as it did on what air support the

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Army would receive for its operations, was mainly a question of resources available and procurement and production policies during the early stages of the war. The War Cabinet decided that no useful purpose would be served by raising at the present time the question as to whether in principle the Army should have its own air arm. Rather, in the present circumstances, it was accepted that the whole of the bomber force should be available for whatever purpose the strategic situation might require. Subject to maintaining a strategic force to bomb Germany, however, the Army was entitled to full assurances of receiving the air support it required for operations. The War Cabinet concluded the discussion by instructing Lord Chatfield,25 the then Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, to work out, in association with the two Services, a scheme for obtaining agreed types and numbers of aircraft thought necessary for future operations.26 The Air Staff, having breathed a collective sigh of relief that the War Cabinet did not break up the bomber force into separate commands, were determined to set out in the clearest terms possible their views on bomber support for the Army. “The true function of bomber aircraft in support of an army,” Slessor wrote on 21 November, “is to isolate the battlefield from reinforcement and supply.” Bombers would be used to block or delay the movement of reserves and to create a state of chaos and confusion behind the enemy front by bombing communications, headquarters, marshalling areas, and supply services. Offensive air power, noted Slessor, had equal application in attack and in defence: In the attack their object is to solve the most difficult problem of modern war— turning the break-in into the break through; in the defence, the reverse—to prevent the enemy exploiting success. In the latter case bombers should be used closer in, since the enemy will have massed his reserves closer to the point selected for attack. But neither in attack nor defence should bombers be used on the battlefield itself, save in certain exceptional circumstances . . . . All experience of war proves that such action is not only very costly in casualties, but is normally uneconomical and ineffective. . . .27

Bolstering his argument with “empirical facts,” Slessor cited examples from the Great War 1914–1918, Spain, and the recent German air campaign against Poland, as proof that bombers should be organised, trained, and directed as a single homogeneous force. Slessor’s “bomber support memorandum” was a cogently written document. Moreover, it became the Air Staff’s official view on the subject, a view that remained substantially unaltered throughout the war. Satisfied that they had established their position on the optimum method for employing bombers in support of ground forces, the Air Staff went on to examine the practicalities of commanding bombing aircraft located in the field. It had been apparent for some time that unified command of the RAF’s forces in

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France was not only desirable but also essential if their maximum effort was to be achieved. Air Marshal Barratt had strongly advocated a reorganisation of a theatre air command in France shortly after he had established ACAB and had gained much-needed experience from its signal exercises. The AOC-in-C Bomber Command, Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, also stated that a central, co-ordinating headquarters was needed to “button up the divergent or convergent requirements of the French and British Forces, the Air Component, the A.A.S.F., and Bomber Command.” Furthermore, the Air Ministry realised that if specific responsibilities concerning the provision of army-air support were assigned to the commander of a unified air force in the field, then the War Office might be willing to drop its demands for large numbers of bombers placed directly under army control.28 This was the position taken by the DCAS, Air Marshal Peirse, when he negotiated a new air support arrangement with the War Office. When Peirse first met with the DCIGS, Major-General Massy, to work out a joint agreement on the Army’s air requirements in France, it hardly seemed likely that they would succeed. The differing positions adopted by their two services gave every appearance of being more rigid than at any time before. As far as the War Office was concerned, the only satisfactory solution was for Army formations to receive their own air forces acting in intimate close support. The soldiers argued that a modern army, without an adequate number of bomber aircraft to act in support, either in attack or defence, lacked an essential weapon system. Army commanders in the field, therefore, required suitable aircraft permanently under their command rather than “merely in support.” Only in this way, so their argument went, would the ground forces have sufficient aircraft at their disposal for their day-to-day needs.29 General Staff calculations put the BEF’s minimum offensive air support requirements at two hundred and fifty bombers. In addition to numerical requirements, the General Staff questioned the suitability of the Fairey Battle and the Bristol Blenheim to carry out “specialised” close support tasks. It was their view that special aircraft should be designed and mass produced for the Army. Pilots for these aircraft would be recruited from within the Army because teaching a fully trained soldier how to fly an aeroplane was regarded as being much easier to achieve than giving an RAF pilot “sufficient military training.”30 Frustration at the War Office over recent failures to secure specific numbers of bombers and special types of air support aircraft paled in comparison to the General Staff’s resentment over the existing arrangements for obtaining bomber support. The C-in-C BEF was to apply for air support, beyond that provided by the Air Component, through three different channels, each one specified in accordance with various preconceived circumstances. The ambiguity inherent in the arrangements as they stood, not surprisingly, failed to convince the General Staff that the Army’s bomber support requirements

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would be met in a sufficient and timely manner. The General Staff also queried the Air Ministry’s “good faith” to provide air support for a decisive land battle when the potential for a decisive air battle co-existed. Prompt and effective air support, they argued, was more likely if there were only one arrangement for its provision; and this should be organised under direct Army command.31 Oddly enough it was the two services’ mutual concern, albeit from widely differing perspectives, over the complicated and unwieldy command and control of Britain’s air forces in France that provided the common ground necessary for a settlement. Air Marshal Peirse led the way when he proposed the creation of a single air command to co-ordinate the operations of all Royal Air Force units in France. The new formation would include all the Bomber squadrons of the AASF and the aircraft of the Air Component. It would be commanded by an Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, whose position would be similar to that of the C-in-C BEF, and would be called British Air Forces in France (BAFF). Most important for the Army, however, was the decision to make the BAFF responsible at all times for the air support needs of the ground forces. Accordingly, the BAFF’s bomber squadrons could be placed at the C-in-C BEF’s disposal whenever necessary.32 General Massy and the Army Council were satisfied that the new “control” arrangements for providing the Army’s air support requirements in France, as put forward by the DCAS, were the best possible under the present circumstances. Consequently a detailed draft of the joint DCIGS/DCAS Memorandum was drawn up at the end of November and forwarded to Lord Chatfield for his consideration; on 8 December the proposed agreement was debated before the War Cabinet.33 Lord Chatfield told his Cabinet colleagues about the recent goodwill between the two services that had resulted in the agreement now before them. He also had great praise for the document’s co-authors Air Marshal Peirse and Major-General Massy.34 The War Cabinet examined the proposal point by point and, after a lengthy discussion, agreed that the Memorandum should be accepted. The only dissenting voice was that of the Secretary of State for War, who said that while he was prepared to accept the agreement, “he could not conceal his view that the proper solution to this problem was the creation of an Army Air Arm.”35 Hore-Belisha’s dissatisfaction notwithstanding, the War Cabinet directed the Air Ministry to form a Royal Air Force Command in France. Air Marshal Barratt was appointed AOC-in-C BAFF with executive control over both the AASF and the Air Component.36 His initial orders conferred two special responsibilities: the BAFF was to ensure that British ground forces received full assurances regarding their air support requirements and, whenever possible, the air resources of the command were to be used to the best possible effect in support of the Allied armies as a whole. Barratt established his headquarters at Coulommiers, east of Paris, on 27 January. An advanced

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operational headquarters was set up at Chauny, built up around the already existing ACAB. A second operations room, similar to the one at Chauny, was established at Coulommiers and a third was formed at Nancy in case the RAF had to support the French eastern zone (ZOAE). As such, the BAFF was what three years later would be called a Tactical Air Force, affiliated with an Army Group, in a designated theatre of operations.37 Training for the newly formed unified air forces throughout the winter months was hampered by a number of factors, besides the confusion brought on by a sudden reorganisation of the command system. Many of the airfields the French had allotted to the RAF were unsuitable and others became unserviceable during one of the harshest winters the region had experienced in years. Signals exercises continued with mixed success, although the creation of a special ground reconnaissance unit, composed of a joint army/air mission, code-named Phantom,38 brought with it immediate improvements in the collection and rapid dissemination of information for BAFF operations. It was the pilots and flight crews, however, who truly suffered during this period of change and inactivity. When inclement weather did not ground training flights, rigid French Air Defence Regulations often ruled out or greatly restricted flying in the RAF’s area of operations. Barratt spent an inordinate amount of time during most of February and all of March negotiating with the French to lessen their restrictions. As a result of his repeated requests some concessions were granted and the AASF were able to engage in extensive flying training, including some night-flying exercises, throughout April and the beginning of May.39 On the eve of the German offensive against France and the Low Countries, the BAFF’s front-line strength had changed very little from that of the combined air forces of the AASF and the Air Component back in October. The AASF held eight squadrons of Battles, two of Blenheims, and two of Hurricanes, and the Air Component had four Lysander, four Blenheim, three and a half Hurricane squadrons, and one flight of Gloster Gladiators—the RAF’s last biplane fighter.40 In addition to these forces, six Blenheim squadrons of No.2 Group Bomber Command, based in England, were on standby for the BAFF. Once the German invasion began four additional Hurricane squadrons were despatched to France between 10 and 12 May.41 French air forces numbered some 4,862 aircraft of all types with more than half of them being fighter aircraft. Taken at face value these are impressive numbers but they also are very misleading. France’s modern front-line aircraft numbered only 523 fighters, 37 bombers, and 118 reconnaissance aircraft, of a bewildering number of aircraft types.42 Opposite this Allied air force, of questionable quality, was a formidable German air force numbering 5,142 modern aircraft, with 3,824 of these in combat-ready condition.43 The Luftwaffe that fought in the west in 1940 was a powerful, wellbalanced air force.44 Its battle doctrine, in many respects, was no more complicated than that of a simple two-phased plan, which began with

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independent air action to establish air supremacy and gradually shifted to the provision of overwhelming air support for the ground forces. Air operations began at first light on 10 May with virtually the whole of the Luftwaffe taking part. Long-range bombers attacked Allied airfields and communications centres. Reconnaissance aircraft searched far and wide for enemy ground forces and fighters covered the advance of the German army groups.45 The Germans had in fact put into practice an integrated air-land battle plan, where each service pursued relatively independent objectives, which, when taken all together, converged on a common theatre-specific goal. The Luftwaffe’s general aim, always in accordance with the strategic objectives and timetable of the western campaign, was to seize the initiative and throw the enemy off-balance, thereby forcing him into an undesirable and inextricable position of impromptu reaction to Germany’s irresistible force of arms. This was accomplished by saturating the battle area with air power.46 Aircraft were concentrated for attacks on specific targets and directed by a centralised air command. Only after Allied air resistance had more or less collapsed did the Luftwaffe send squadrons on roving commissions free to choose from a wide selection of targets.47 The end results were plain enough to see: German air operations had a demoralising effect on Allied soldiers and airmen alike and they exerted a decisive influence on the rapid and successful conclusion of the Wehrmacht’s offensive. Events in France between 10 May and 18 June (the day marking the final withdrawal of all British forces in France) revealed a number of defects in the BAFF’s system of air support. But one glaring weakness overshadowed all others, and that was numerical inferiority. There were never enough RAF aircraft in France to perform the many and varied tasks envisaged for them, and substantial reinforcement was never a serious option. Fighter squadrons were in short supply and, in any case, home air defence requirements tended to dominate decisions taken regarding the deployment of Britain’s comparatively small air force.48 Consequently the BAFF fought its battle with little more than its original resources. The BAFF’s operations divide neatly into three distinct phases.49 First, there was the air support provided during the BEF’s advance into Belgium. Unopposed by the Germans, who were both astute and polite enough not to hinder their enemy when he was making a fatal mistake, the air support system gave a good account of itself. Insufficient resources, however, meant that many of the Army’s requests were not met. Three days into the advance, Barratt switched his offensive bomber support from the comparatively quiet British sector to help the French stop a threatened breakthrough at Sedan. Tragically most of the AASF’s operational strength was sacrificed in a series of inconsequential daylight attacks.50 The second phase dates roughly from 21 May to 3 June, from the German breakthrough toward Abbeville to the BEF’s evacuation from Dunkirk. The BEF and the Air Component were on the north side of a gap that was created

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when von Kleist’s Panzer Group destroyed the French 9th Army directly to the south in the Allied line. As a result, the Allied First Army Group in Flanders, of which the BEF was a part, was effectively cut off from direct contact with BAFF Headquarters. Deprived of BAFF’s main signal links and “Phantom,” the Air Component had to rely on RAF Hawkinge, in southeast England, for its communications and to co-ordinate its air support operations. A series of rapid withdrawals forced upon the BEF from 15 through 19 May also resulted in the loss of the Air Component’s aerodromes and advanced airfields, and eventually culminated in the evacuation of the Air Component on 21 May. From hastily prepared stations in and around Hawkinge the Air Component provided what air support it could until the BEF itself was evacuated.51 The third phase concerns the operations of the BAFF from 21 May to 17 June, when finally it too was withdrawn from Nantes. Forced to exist throughout this period on its own dwindling resources, the BAFF was in no position to alter an ever-worsening military calamity. It did, however, demonstrate that its administrative and signals systems worked surprisingly well, even under some of the most difficult circumstances. BAFF headquarters maintained continuous contact with its airfields, the French High Command, army formations not cut off by the German “dash to the coast,” and the Air Ministry. This was achieved mainly by making full use of France’s trunk cable system and the command’s own W/T network, including two heavy mobile W/T stations, called Blue Trains. The BAFF’s performance during this phase gave every impression that it was well organised for war and could have fought successfully had its air resources been adequate.52 Lack of resources was a recurring theme in the many reports produced by the War Office and the Air Ministry during June and July as they attempted to explain the recent defeat in France. But this was not the only revelation. General Gort, in his official despatch, emphasised the superior fighting power of an army lavishly equipped with air and armoured forces. “The campaign,” he wrote, “proved the offensive has once more gained ascendancy in modern war.” He also noted, with, it seemed, some degree of surprise and embarrassment, the accelerated pace of operations brought on by the partnership of offensive air power and modern mechanised forces. Gort argued that immediate steps should be taken to provide future British armies with secure communications over long distances, strong anti-air and anti-tank defences in depth, and sufficient aircraft—both fighters and bombers—under the direct command of the Army commander.53 Gort’s despatch was short, and remarkably composed, especially for a man who had just presided over one of the worst beatings administered to a British Army. Not surprisingly he put much of the blame on the French. He also criticised the RAF: first for failing to provide the proper type of air support, and second for the woefully insufficient number of aircraft deployed. Gort did not offer a suggestion for improvement here but what

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he wanted, and he did not leave his readers in any doubt as to his feelings on the subject, was something on the lines of the German Air Force for the British Army.54 Barratt’s despatch, on the other hand, did not betray any signs of being written by a recently defeated commander-in-chief. He wrote a lengthy document that described the operations of the BAFF in detail, and he offered a number of suggestions aimed at improving an air support system, which, he believed, was theoretically sound. Barratt agreed with Gort that fighting a major battle without large reserves, in this case, squadrons of each aircraft type, was a grave mistake. But he strongly disagreed with the General over the efficacy of the air support system employed. Barratt was convinced that events in France illustrated “a prima facie case for regarding the initial air plans as entirely successful, both in their inception and in their application.” The system of ground and air reconnaissance in the field sending information by W/T back to BAFF Headquarters, where it was evaluated then used to issue air support orders to appropriate squadrons, had proved its worth, especially during the long retreat to St. Nazaire and Cherbourg after the BEF was evacuated. The main problem, according to Barratt, was that the C-in-C BEF should have had comprehensive air representation at his headquarters, principally in the form of a joint air/land command. Gort had rejected this, preferring direct control in his own right. In the end, Gort accepted the compromise solution reached in December that led to the creation of the BAFF.55 Barratt’s despatch was warmly received by the Air Staff. Based on their own cursory analysis of the campaign, the Air Staff were convinced that the Army had failed to recognise the new approach being taken on land: one of lightning thrusts and sudden rushes designed to overwhelm the enemy’s forces through dislocation rather than wholesale destruction. In the recent conditions of mechanised warfare on land and in the air the Air Staff found confirmation for their belief in the general application of air power. Once again the battle lines were drawn between the War Office and the Air Ministry over the arrangements for meeting the Army’s air support needs. A new section at the War Office, known as MO7, consisting of three officers, had been established in January 1940 to study this subject.56 Surprisingly, prior to MO7’s creation, no individual or group at the War Office had specific responsibility for dealing with air support. During the summer of 1940, MO7’s first head, Lt-Col. F.W. Festing, was determined to make up for lost time. Lessons from the debacle in France were compiled quickly and studied for the purpose of enacting wholesale changes before the Army was called upon to fight again.57 Papers on principle, general policy, and plans for the immediate future, were turned out at a remarkable rate.58 All of this work aside, MO7’s conclusions could not be described as enlightening or even as a surprise. The RAF’s system, as used in France, Festing proclaimed, had to be scrapped. He argued that the Army needed

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Strategy for Victory a balanced air force at the entire disposal of the military commander, so constituted as to be capable of rapid sub-allotment to a sub-ordinate commander when it became impossible for the C-in-C to provide the hour-to-hour direction which had been abundantly proved to be the only way of ensuring to the front-line troops intimate air support.59

This time, so the soldiers believed, they would not be denied “their air support.” Whether this would in fact be the case remained to be seen.

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CHAPTER 4

The Search for Responsibility: Post-mortem on the Defeat of the BEF, 1940 Slightly more than a third of a million Allied soldiers were evacuated from the beaches at Dunkirk to the relative safety of the United Kingdom by the time Operation Dynamo ended on 4 June.1 It was the best news to have arrived at Horseguards throughout the cataclysmic spring of 1940. Heroic and impressive as the naval rescue effort was, however, the General Staff had little time to celebrate their merciful and unforeseen good fortune. The Army was defeated and thoroughly disorganised. It also suffered from enormous deficiencies of every kind. Almost all of its armoured fighting vehicles, artillery and motorised transport had been left behind on the continent.2 Moreover, with the German Army occupying the Channel coast of France, invasion became a real and immediate threat. This was the inauspicious scenario that confronted General Ironside, the newly appointed C-in-C Home Forces, and his fellow generals at the War Office as they struggled to reorganise and re-equip the Army during those anxious summer months of 1940. The process of reconstituting the Army had its beginning during the midst of the BEF’s evacuation. On Saturday, 1 June, Lord Gort appeared before the War Cabinet at its regular late morning session. After receiving the Cabinet’s warm congratulations for having succeeded in extricating the BEF from near certain destruction, the general was invited to give his account of the recent operations. Gort availed himself of this unusual opportunity, in the presence of his political masters, to “set the record straight”: the record, that is, as far as he and the War Office were concerned. He delivered a detailed narrative of events, one that emphasised the many military shortcomings of Britain’s allies, namely the Belgians and the French, and the devastating effect German dive-bombers and tanks had had on the course of the campaign as well as on the morale and fighting ability of all allied soldiers.3

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When asked by Neville Chamberlain, the Lord President of the Council, whether British equipment had been satisfactory, Gort replied that it “had done extremely well,” especially the “I” or infantry tanks. Nothing was said about British aircraft supporting the Army or, more poignantly, the regrettable lack of them. Nonetheless, Gort’s strongly held opinion, implied on this particular occasion through deliberate silence, that the BEF had been let down by the RAF’s failure to provide close air support similar to that enjoyed by the Germans, did not escape the War Cabinet’s attention. Already, at this early date and at the highest military and political levels in Britain, the general’s message was being heard: significant improvements aimed at increasing the Army’s fighting potential, particularly in the air, must be made before it took the field again. At another War Cabinet meeting, held six days later on 7 June, General Sir John Dill, the CIGS,4 informed his cabinet colleagues that the War Office had established a committee of senior officers to examine the lessons to be learnt from the recent fighting in France.5 General Sir William Bartholomew had been appointed to chair this committee. The Bartholomew Committee was given specific yet wide terms of reference to guide it in its work. First, it was to analyse the recent operations in France with regard to the Army’s equipment, organisation, and training. Its second task was to suggest all conceivable modifications, which could be made quickly, to shore up the Army’s most glaring weaknesses before the enemy attempted an invasion.6 After the two recent military debacles in Norway and France, the decision to review the Army’s methods was timely indeed. In selecting General Bartholomew to head this important investigation, however, the War Office could scarcely have chosen a less suitable senior officer. Bartholomew’s “wire-pulling” and his distaste for combined service solutions to defence problems in the years before the war, evinced during his tenure as the Commandant of the new Imperial Defence College (1929–1931), soured inter-service relations so much that the War Office posted him to India in order to get him far away from Whitehall.7 His undisguised hatred of the RAF also thwarted his prospects of becoming CIGS in the mid-1930s.8 Approaching retirement at the end of 1940, and serving out his commission as ADC General to the King, Bartholomew was to have one last opportunity to champion sectional interests in the War Office and to reveal the obsolete nature of his military thinking. Bartholomew was assisted in his new task by two major-generals, two brigadiers, and a secretariat of three junior staff officers.9 Oral evidence was taken from thirty-seven officers who served with the BEF in France, most of brigadier rank or higher, and written testimonials were submitted by three more officers of general rank. All but one of the forty contributors were soldiers.10 Air Vice-Marshal C.H.R. Blount, AOC RAF Component, BEF, was the lone airman interviewed, and there is little evidence to suggest

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that his experiences were reflected accurately in the report’s conclusions and recommendations.11 The final report itself was neatly divided into three parts: a comparison between the German “way of war” and the British Army, the major lessons of the campaign, and the committee’s recommendations. Part one is particularly instructive for the military analyst or historian because of its failure to distinguish the seminal features of the Wehrmacht’s new Blitzkrieg tactics. After stating the obvious differences between the British and the German armies in terms of methods, respective units, arms and materiel, the authors of the report agreed that the British Army’s “organisation as planned and its tactical conceptions as practiced have on the whole stood the test of battle.”12 Their conclusion, however, suffered from a grievous misreading of the evidence—“no frontal attack against the BEF succeeded in breaking through”—which was accepted, without any critical analysis, as proof of British military prowess. The committee failed to comprehend that German tank tactics, put simply, eschewed attacks on enemy strong points, and opted instead to exploit gaps or weaknesses in the opposing defence system. Deployed “en masse,” German armoured forces, inclusive of tanks and motorised infantry, were to bypass concentrated enemy resistance and carry their attack deep into the enemy’s rear, attacking both his lines of communication and his command and control network. The speed and surprise of the tanks, it was anticipated, would give the attacking army the potential of achieving a quick and decisive victory (more through dislocation rather than destruction).13 In the battle for France these tactics worked almost exactly as planned. Having failed to discern the essence of the new operational method and the new tactics employed by the German Army, the Bartholomew Committee compounded its initial mistakes in judgment with a further fatuous claim, stating that the British Army would win if only it could fight the Germans on its own terms. While this may have been true, had the Germans willingly dispensed with their huge operational and tactical advantages, it was, of course, never possible so long as the Germans maintained the initiative. The British Army’s outmoded and ponderous 1918-style, infantry-dominated warfare was no match for Guderian’s Blitzkrieg.14 The Bartholomew Committee report was severely flawed from the outset because of its reliance on an unsubstantiated premise—the British Army’s organisation and methods were sound and all that was required was the infusion of new and better equipment on a greater scale—but the second part, covering the major lessons of the campaign, did provide a fairly accurate picture of the recent fighting. The committee identified and advocated improvements in four major areas: mobility, fire-power, communications, and air support.15 Noting what went wrong in France was the first important step in correcting the Army’s many shortcomings, but determining the appropriate action

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to be taken for the future was a skill that remained well beyond the ability of the committee’s members hindered as they were by their limited understanding of the changing nature of modern war. Their recommendations, such as they were, began with a general statement exhorting all ranks “to show more initiative and resourcefulness.” What was required, they divulged, if the Army were to fight with confidence and success, was “the inculcation of a fiercer, aggressive offensive spirit.” It was a curious and disturbing recommendation. The Army was encouraged to show more enthusiasm for the war, but what of “sans doctrine les textes ne sont rien”? On practical subjects, such as organisation, tactics, and training, neither revisions nor new ideas were forthcoming.16 Tangible improvements for the Army invariably centred on grafting new weapons and equipment in increased numbers onto an old, unrepentant, and unchanged organisation. The committee emphasised the need to increase “battlefield” mobility, specifically the mobility of commanders and their headquarters in the field. More efficient use of motorised transport was advocated to facilitate a quicker response in strength to enemy initiatives, as was the development of an air transport system similar to that employed with such success by the Germans. The committee also wanted substantial improvements made in field communications. Wireless communication of much higher quality, they urged, should be provided on a greater scale and operated by superior trained personnel using streamlined codes. Completing their list of improvements in matériel was a strong plea for large increases in the scale of tanks and anti-tank weapons as well as anti-aircraft guns allotted to front-line units, to help them deal with the enemy’s armoured formations and close support aircraft, namely, the dreaded dive-bombers.17 Air support, or rather the lack of it in the BEF’s case, was the most dominant theme in the committee’s report. There was widespread belief amongst the officers they interviewed that the German victory had been due, in no small measure, to the air superiority won by the Luftwaffe and, in particular, to the intimate co-ordination between the air operations undertaken and the strategic objectives of the ground forces. “The outstanding value of air attack,” noted the committee, “was as supporting fire to cover the assault of armoured and, at times, infantry formations.” While the statements are accurate enough in themselves, the manner in which the committee applied them in their post-battle analysis demonstrated a dangerous lack of understanding, both of simple air terminology and of a realistic sequence of events in which the German air objectives were accomplished. Air superiority, for this committee, was not the multifarious struggle to control the skies over and around the battlefield but the visual presence of low-flying aircraft at the forefront of the ground battle. In addition, their entire summary of the recent air operations was a gross distortion of the actual course of events.18 The Bartholomew Committee’s interpretation of the close co-operation achieved between the enemy’s army and air force was also subject to fantasy

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and wishful thinking. They deduced from an uninformed and one-sided examination of the evidence that the Luftwaffe’s raison d’être was to fulfil the needs of the army. Strategic air operations to win air superiority and measures to isolate the intended battlefield, equal if not more important than flying ground support missions in achieving the Wehrmacht’s recent success, were never considered. Nor did the committee demonstrate any understanding of the German concept of inter-service co-operation where, in theory at least, two services of equal stature worked together in harmony to achieve the strategic goals of the campaign both independently and in close co-operation.19 The committee based its entire working knowledge of German air support arrangements on the fragmentary observations, coloured by deep emotions, of beaten and embittered soldiers. They heard the same story over and over again: in every defeat or withdrawal, the unfortunate British soldier “saw swarms of enemy bombers escorted by fighters and [always] suffered from their attack.” Strongly moved by the impact of this vivid, personal evidence, the committee made a strong recommendation that, in the first instance, “it [was] imperative to ensure forthwith that a system comparable to that of the Germans should be introduced into [Britain’s] Army and Air Force,” where the air force was compelled to co-operate with the army in pursuit of its operational tasks. They also advocated early provision of suitable close support aircraft, in the form of divebombers, together with the organisation and training to use them. The Army, in accordance with the committee’s deeply held beliefs, required its own aircraft.20 Thoroughly pleased with the findings of the Bartholomew Committee, the Army Council informed the Air Ministry that the field force needed its own dive-bombers to support any future land operations. Anthony Eden, the new Secretary of State for War, added his authority to the debate, advocating the immediate ordering of dive-bombers from the United States. His suggestion received unequivocal support from Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of Aircraft Production and a member of the War Cabinet, who noted that by purchasing specially designed ground attack aircraft from the Americans, the Army could obtain what it required without affecting existing RAF production schedules.21 Air Ministry support for the Army Council’s proposal was not forthcoming.22 Group Captain R.V. Goddard, the then Deputy Director of Plans (D.D.Plans) refused to accept the “rather naive and simplistic lessons” drawn by the soldiers from the air fighting in France as the basis for buying a large number of American dive-bombers of uncertain value. Goddard acknowledged that improvements in the organisation and provision of air support for the field force were required, but he also stated, categorically, that the recent defeat of the BEF did not justify the Army assuming control of its own specially designed aircraft under the command of the military

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field commander. In short, the creation of a separate army air arm was not the answer.23 Anticipating resistance from the Air Ministry and, in any case, not predisposed to rely on the authority of one report to secure the radical changes desired, the War Office eagerly sought more evidence to bolster the legitimacy of its air support demands. Lieutenant−General C.J.E. Auchinleck, in his official despatch on the lessons to be learned from operations in Norway, noted that “the predominant factor” was air power. “The enemy,” Auchinleck stated, “had complete initiative in the air, and used it, first, to support his troops.” After a detailed description of low-flying attacks, and their impact on the course of the fighting, Auchinleck declared “the first general lesson to be drawn is that to commit troops to a campaign in which they cannot be provided with adequate air support is to court disaster.”24 The general’s sentiments were echoed by others in the BEF who had recently returned from France. Brigadier Greenslade, Deputy Quartermaster General at BEF HQ, restated Auckinleck’s lesson and added his own solution to the problem. In his official report, Greenslade wrote “it is axiomatic that it is impractical to attempt to fight without there being adequate air forces under the operational control of the Army.”25 Bitterness amongst the soldiery, over “negligible and sporadic” RAF fighter cover and bomber support, was on the rise. Because most British soldiers had been conscious of friendly air support only when they came under the intermittent “fighter umbrella” at Dunkirk, it was natural for many of them to suppose that the RAF’s system had failed, and that it should be replaced with a new method similar to that employed by the Germans. This was the view taken by Lieutenant-General Brooke who, based on his experience in France with 2nd Corps, claimed that “pre-war conceptions of air-army co-operation were at fault.”26 Brooke advocated an immediate and thorough overhaul of the existing system. He believed that troops in the field required both a fighter umbrella for defence and divebombers for close offensive support.27 Moreover, his was not a lone voice. Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. Festing and his small staff in MO7, the War Office department responsible for army-air co-operation, delivered one of the most vitriolic indictments yet seen against the airmen in this increasingly heated debate.28 On 18 June Festing sent a memorandum, which he had prepared with assistance from Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall, Chief of Staff (CGS), BEF, to the CIGS for transmission to the Secretary of State for War. It was a damning account of the ineffectual co-operation between the RAF and the BEF in France during the period 10 to 31 May 1940. Following a brief and conspicuously self-serving summary of operations, Festing concluded that under the test of battle, the RAF’s army-air support system was a complete failure. Battlefield reconnaissance and artillery spotting, he asserted, became impracticable due to the preponderance of enemy fighter aircraft operating over the whole front. He also pointed out that “in very many instances”

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calls by British front-line commanders for offensive air support experienced “delays of upwards of two to three hours thus precluding advantage being taken of targets of opportunity.” Festing cited the BAFF’s complex system of command and communications as the principal cause behind the problem. He also noted, with the conspiratorial passion of a seriously aggrieved soldier, that the air control system completely collapsed during the rapid advance of the enemy.29 Festing continued his memorandum with a cursory examination of the Luftwaffe’s operations. He concluded that “The primary role of the German Air Forces,” in contrast to British air forces in the field, was “to get the Army forward.” It was a statement bereft of any empirical evidence. Festing freely admitted as much, but, given the appearance of fluid organisation, and the Luftwaffe’s ability to concentrate air strength quickly where and when it was required, he declared that “it is probable that [German] armies and possibly corps have direct command.” Consequently he urged the inauguration of a new air policy where British commanders had “Air Resources at [their] disposal, which are adequate for the operations in hand.” He also demanded that all army commanders receive full control over whatever air resources were allotted to them, along with the “unquestioned right to order the Air Force to undertake a task.”30 What Festing wanted was balanced army air forces, consisting of fighters, reconnaissance and specialised bomber aircraft, sub-allotted to ground commanders (at Corps and Divisional levels) who were involved in the immediate fighting. Only in this way, in this new era of rapidly moving operations, Festing claimed, would the Army receive the air support it required, and be assured of getting it in a timely manner. He advised the CIGS accordingly, stating that the future aim of the War Office “should be to provide all British Armies that are liable to take the Field with fully adequate Air Forces under their immediate command.” “This aim,” Festing warned, “must be achieved before any confidence can be felt in the ability of the British Army to defeat the enemy.”31 Once again, the traditional air force belief in unified air power was under attack. The Air Staff responded quickly: Festing’s “ill-considered” proposal was out of the question. Recent war experience, noted the airmen, confirmed that success on the ground depended on superiority in the air. “No carefully balanced force of reconnaissance, bomber and fighter squadrons forming an integral part of each Corps and Army,” they stated, “could ensure the success of the land campaign.” Effective air support was dependent on a high degree of air superiority. To win it, required an air force superior in strength to the enemy’s air forces immediately opposite; not, as the Army was inclined to believe, vast numbers of close support bombers tethered to the ground forces.32 The Air Staff’s own analysis of the recent air fighting produced neither new nor original conclusions. In November 1939, Slessor had advised both

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the Air Ministry and the War Office that the German dive-bomber—the Ju.87—was obsolete. It could be used effectively, he added, only if the troops facing it lacked adequate training and anti-aircraft defences.33 If the Army persisted in taking chances without command of the air, which they did to an alarming degree both in Norway and in France, what else could they expect? Fighters, and plenty of them, not specialised army co-operation aircraft, were the essential factor in providing successful air support. Yet understandably after the BEF’s disaster in France, many army commanders were unwilling to accept Air Ministry theories of air support, which postulated that “everything is possible in a region where air superiority exists.” The War Office tended to view such Air Ministry pronouncements, both old and new, with incredulity.34 The Army was, however, less conscious than the RAF of the broad concept of air superiority and this explained, in part, the War Office’s justified but untutored emphasis on close support bombing and its demand for divebombers. In a well-reasoned minute written on 24 June, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS), Air Vice-Marshal Sholto Douglas, cut to the heart of the current problem. We appear to have forgotten more completely than I would have believed possible one of the plainest lessons of the last war. During the brief periods where the Germans enjoyed air superiority we found ourselves unable to carry out normal Army Co-operation work.

“Building more and better fighters and regaining air superiority over the battlefield,” he noted, “overcame this difficulty.”35 Unfortunately, in the summer of 1940, RAF fighters were in very short supply. Group Captain H. Fraser, Director of Military Co-operation at the Air Ministry, was less generous than the DCAS in his criticism of the soldiers’ most recent solution to their air support dilemma. He attacked Festing and MO7 for their failure to appreciate the broader strategic picture. Beginning with an appraisal of the RAF’s deployment, to demonstrate that the Army’s air requirements were not “totally ignored,” Fraser noted that more firstline fighters were deployed on French soil than on British, even before the battle of France began. Once it started, he added, a further 150 RAF fighters were sent across the Channel to render assistance in the land battle, in spite of the fact that the German Air Striking Force could have, at any moment, switched the main weight of its attack against England.36 Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, C-in-C Fighter Command, had questioned the wisdom of this reinforcement policy throughout the latter half of May. He believed, correctly, that his fighters would be employed more effectively defending England with the aid of their early warning and fighter control systems, than wasted away in fighting the enemy blindly over France. While the bombers of the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) gallantly sacrificed themselves in a

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futile effort to halt the Germans on the River Meuse, Dowding “prudently refused to throw away” his few precious squadrons of Hurricanes and Spitfires in what had become a hopeless cause.37 Lack of aircraft, not the BAFF’s system of control, Fraser claimed, with good justification, explained why the Army did not receive sufficient air support. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Carrington, an army liaison officer serving with the RAF Component (South Violet), supporting the 51st Highland Division at Rouen, reached the very same conclusion in a report he wrote in mid-June.38 During June and July the division of opinion between the Air Ministry and the War Office over air support arrangements for a land battle seemed greater than ever. The Air Staff held firm to their belief that air superiority over the battlefield would enable bombers, not necessarily designed specifically for a battlefield role, to provide all of the Army’s offensive air support needs. Only at great expense to a powerful air striking force for all strategic purposes, cautioned the airmen, could a specialised army support air force be provided. Likewise, the War Office clung to its point of view. The soldiers declared that once the army was in battle the military commander must be able to dispose of all his resources, including an adequate allotment of aircraft, as he saw fit. In addition to this, they demanded that army commanders in the field must be in no doubt that the air forces allotted to them would always be available for their own purposes, and would be as highly trained in a battlefield role as are any of the other arms under their command.39 Again, the soldiers wanted their own army air arm and the airmen had no intention of providing one. Tensions ran high between the two services and tended to work against any efforts aimed at reaching a mutually acceptable solution. Nonetheless, the Air Staff, due in part to a prudent assessment of their own long-term self-interest, found the necessary incentive to press on with a series of new initiatives. The Air Staff was determined to head off yet another War Office attempt to establish a separate army air arm, the creation of which would have to be at the expense of the operational strength of existing RAF commands and the future expansion of British air power. Consequently, between July and October 1940, they gave serious attention to the problem of how best to meet the Army’s air requirements. An Air Staff note circulated near the end of July, to a select group of air officers intimately connected with army co-operation, put forward a recommendation that was to have long-term beneficial consequences for both services. The Air Staff advocated the creation of an RAF Army Co-operation Command, to study and develop all forms of air support for the army.40 The new command, as the Air Staff envisaged it, was to concentrate on two main subjects: reconnaissance and close support bombing (which was defined as “intervention by aircraft on the battlefield”). It would undertake experiments on tactics and techniques, and examine the myriad of problems confounding effective signals communications and inter-service

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ground support. Devising the best and quickest method of providing these services would be the new air command’s first task, and training the officers and men responsible for carrying them out, both airmen and soldiers alike, one of its principal duties. As for aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft were to be drawn from existing army co-operation squadrons, and special arrangements were proposed with Bomber Command for a number of medium bomber squadrons to undergo intensive training with the army in the close support role. Procurement of specialised ground attack aircraft, condemned according to the Air Staff to being “locked up” in close support packets, was discouraged. They insisted on the retention of a single homogeneous yet flexible bomber force that could be allotted as necessary for both general and particular tasks.41 Group Captain R.V. Goddard, D.D.Plans, with special responsibilities for military co-operation at the Air Ministry, agreed. Aircraft had an essential role to play in modern land operations, but what form this air support should take, and how it was to be provided, were the two underlying questions that required an immediate answer. Goddard had spent most of July examining the War Office’s point of view with regard to bomber support, and he expressed certain reservations about reaching a mutually acceptable policy with the Army. In a memorandum written near the end of the month, he claimed that the Army was not prepared to accept the consequences to its own organisation and tactics, which flowed from the recognition that air assault was the road to victory. The War Office, he continued, believed the war could not be won until the German Army was defeated on land. Hence their intractable position: “No matter what the present strategic policy may be, we must place an Army on the continent and have another Waterloo.”42 Goddard was convinced that the Army had been blinded by its own fundamental belief in the “Primacy of the Land Battle.” Fixation on a particular style of fighting also explained why the soldiers were unable to appreciate any other alternative to that of having an air component of bombers, specially suited for a battlefield role, entirely under military control. “The converse point of view, that the conduct of combined operations on the continent should take the form of powerful air operations,” Goddard noted, “in which the Army was concerned with securing base areas, is not one which is acceptable to the War Office.” This essential difference in perception, on a general strategic approach to the war, represented an obstacle that would take some time to overcome. Nevertheless, D.D.Plans strongly encouraged continued efforts to find a “modus vivendi.”43 Sholto Douglas, however, offered a much more uplifting comment on the subject: “Army Co-operation? There’s nothing in it. All you need is willingness to co-operate and good signals.”44 Once the Air Staff were clear on their own ideas about air support, the Air Ministry proposed a joint meeting with the War Office to consider all aspects of future army air requirements. The War Office accepted the invitation

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and, on 2 August, delegations from both services met at the Air Ministry. A number of papers were discussed, and substantial progress was made in many areas (although the Air Staff’s idea of a new army co-operation command was not mentioned). First of all, an important distinction was made between “Direct” and “Close” support, which had the immediate effect of enabling the two services to understand each other better. The term direct support denoted air action designed to isolate the battlefield, and close support meant “tactical support or intervention by aircraft on the battlefield itself.” Agreement was reached also on the type of bombers to be used in the respective support roles. All existing RAF bombers were declared “suitable for direct support operations,” and the Blenheim was accepted for use in close support. Taking into account War Office interest in American dive-bombers—Vultee 72, Brewster, and Vought 156—it was agreed that a joint committee would examine the operational requirements of the close support bomber, then approach the Ministry of Aircraft Production (MAP) to determine the most expedient means of obtaining the best aircraft.45 The most important and ultimately far-reaching agreement was the joint committee’s decision to conduct a series of close support experiments in Northern Ireland. Lieutenant-Colonel J.D. Woodall, who had been Gort’s representative and Barratt’s military staff officer at BAFF headquarters, and Group Captain A.H. Wann, were entrusted with joint command of the trials. Their objective was to ascertain “the most appropriate methods both tactical and technical for the development of air bombardment in close support of land forces.” Woodall already had submitted a plan for a series of signals exercises, both with and without troops, to discover the best means of co-ordinating the action of forward troops and supporting bombers. On 12 August, the joint committee adopted his plan with slight amendments. In addition to an examination of close support communications and control, Wann and Woodall were to determine the appropriate tasks of close support bombers including operational limitations, the tactics to be adopted, equipment requirements as well as the desired establishment of air force and army personnel, future training programmes, and the most suitable form of organisation. Troops from the 53rd Division and No. 75 Bomber Wing (RAF), made up of two medium bomber squadrons equipped with Blenheims, were detailed to the trials for their duration.46 In a further effort to give some overall direction to Wann and Woodall, the Air Ministry and the War Office issued a joint statement, on 2 September, on the “Task of Close Support.” They agreed, “as a preliminary” starting point, that aerial bombardment was a normal method of supporting land forces, but, when considering its use on the battlefield, “it should be an accepted principle that recourse to close support bombing should not normally be made if the task can be carried out effectively and in time by artillery or other means.” It was further agreed that in the “set piece” battle, the “attack role of the Royal Air Force would probably be ‘direct’ and not ‘close’ support.”

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As such, this agreement was very much in keeping with earlier Air Staff views on the subject. Close air support still was restricted to special circumstances; but, when support by artillery or other army means had either failed or could not be obtained, it was now accepted as an appropriate method of support. This change in interpretation—brought about by the rapid pace of modern war—represented a significant shift in the Air Staff’s thinking.47 Discussions between the Air and General staffs continued throughout August and into October on a whole range of subjects related to close support.48 Not all of their meetings were as friendly or as productive as the one held on 2 August, but their progress was encouraging enough to lead Anthony Eden to write to Sir Archibald Sinclair, his ministerial counterpart responsible for air matters, about how pleased he was that the two services had been able to resolve so many of their outstanding differences.49 Sinclair was equally cordial in reply. He thanked Eden for his kind words, and he also made a point of telling him that he “can rest assured that the Air Staff are very fully alive to the need to give the Army the fullest possible support.”50 Yet just when real co-operation between the Air Ministry and the War Office seemed attainable, the General Staff panicked, and harked back to many of its old beliefs and demands. It is difficult to determine whether or not their change of heart was a negotiation ploy or something else entirely but on 22 August, before any of the recently agreed measures with the Air Ministry had been implemented, the General Staff circulated a memorandum that spelt out its “future air requirements.” Citing the importance of offensive air support in the recent fighting, the General Staff demanded “the provision of bomber aircraft in place of or in addition to the army’s heavy artillery.” Such aircraft, in addition to reconnaissance and fighter aircraft, the memorandum continued, were required as an integral part of any future army destined to take the field. They also stated that the exact strength and composition of the air component was dependent on the nature of the military forces it supported, the intended campaign, and the geographic situation. Other more relevant criteria, such as the composition and strength of enemy air forces likely to influence the prospective campaign, were not taken into account.51 Eden sent Sinclair a copy of the General Staff’s memorandum with a covering letter in which he emphasised “the absolute necessity for the provision of close air support for any army that may have to take the field.” He further pressured Sinclair by telling him that a copy of both the letter and the memorandum had been sent to the Prime Minister.52 Ten days later, Sinclair wrote back to the Secretary of State for War, to remind him that the entire Air Ministry was “very keenly aware of the importance of adequate air support for the army.” Offensive air support for the Army, as the new joint service agreement stipulated, was no longer questioned. “The Army’s requirements,” Sinclair confirmed, “will be fully met under flexible arrangements which will provide for even greater support if necessary.” Dividing the

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air force up into “penny packets,” however, to be parcelled out to military commanders, was not an option the Air Ministry was willing to consider.53 Eden and Sinclair continued their correspondence for a further four weeks without reaching an understanding on how or in what form the Army should receive its air support. The Secretary of State for War wanted an air arm developed and trained solely for the purposes of the Army. Lord Beaverbrook made a similar recommendation to the War Cabinet. He advised “that the Army should be equipped with a force of aircraft earmarked for military use.”54 The Air Ministry disagreed, and the Prime Minister decided not to intervene. A compromise seemed to be the only remaining solution and, on 23 September, Eden made the first move. He produced a memorandum in which he admitted that the War Office, at this stage of the war, “could not, starting from scratch, raise, train and maintain an Army Air Arm before 1942 at the earliest.” What was required, he advised, was “a co-operative effort.” Eden therefore proposed “the creation by the Air Ministry of an Army Co-operation Command comparable in status to the Coastal Command.” Sinclair gave the proposal his immediate support “in principle,” and advised Eden that it would be discussed formally at an Air Ministry conference scheduled later that week. On 3 October the Air Staff met to discuss Eden’s proposal, which was strikingly similar to their own ideas on the subject as discussed earlier in July. Support, therefore, for Eden’s initiative was almost a foregone conclusion, and over the ensuing six weeks the various details affecting its implementation were worked out.55 On Monday, 18 November, the Air Ministry and the War Office announced their joint agreement to establish an RAF Army Co-operation Command on 1 December. Its primary function was to develop all forms of air support for the Army, determine and conduct the necessary training, and foster a common understanding of inter-service co-operation. Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt was appointed AOC-in-C, with Woodall, recently promoted to Brigadier, serving as his senior army staff officer (SASO). All other officers were to be appointed in roughly equal numbers from both services. The new command consisted of Nos. 70 and 71 Groups (RAF), and its headquarters was located at Bracknell.56 With the agreement to form a new Army Co-operation Command another Army-RAF crisis seemed to be averted. Nevertheless, whether anything beneficial would come out of it, or any of the other recent joint service measures, was a question that could be answered only with the passage of time. During the late summer and autumn of 1940, time was a luxury that Britain did not appear to have.

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CHAPTER 5

Preliminary Campaigns in North Africa On 10 June 1940, Italy joined Germany in the war against Britain and France. Benito Mussolini, fascist leader and Italian dictator, was eager to share the spoils of victory won by his new military ally—in particular, south-eastern France—and to expand his own imperial domain in Africa and the Mediterranean. His grandiose machinations posed serious dangers to British interests in these regions and in the Middle East, but they did not catch British defence planners either by surprise or unprepared. In 1938 the COS ordered local commanders to re-examine and devise a defence scheme against the eventuality of Italian aggression.1 Egypt was the crux of British security in the Middle East as well as a main link in the chain of imperial communications. Trade with India, the Far East and Australasia, passed through the Suez Canal, as did life-supporting supplies of Middle East and Persian oil for home-based industry and domestic consumption. In war, Egypt’s geographic position made it a vital base for operations, second in importance only to the British Isles. Alexandria provided the Royal Navy with indispensable naval facilities at the eastern end of the Mediterranean and, along with Port Said, both were essential ports for the reinforcement and supply of Britain’s air and land forces stationed in Egypt, throughout eastern Africa and the Levant. Egypt’s defence, therefore, was of crucial importance to British as well as Imperial security. During much of the inter-war period it had been, for reasons of economy, largely a commitment of the RAF.2 The RAF’s importance in Egypt did not decline during the year or two prior to Italy’s declaration of war, but substantial redrafting of the region’s defence plans did usher in a new and surprisingly positive chapter in armyair force co-operation. Headquarters Middle East (HQME) produced a plan

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in 1939, known as the Combined Plan,3 which, amongst other things, called on the air and land forces to co-ordinate their over-stretched resources for a combined defensive effort against Italian forces of vastly superior numbers.4 A noteworthy aspect of this joint service plan was its specific instructions on air support for the Army. For the very first time in the war, British military commanders were granted the right to request and receive close air support. Though probably unexpected, there was nothing incongruous about this decision. It was, in fact, in keeping with accepted strategic principles: the decisive battle for Egypt, and with it, control of the Nile Delta and the Suez Canal, was expected on land and along Egypt’s western frontier. All British forces, therefore, were to direct their efforts toward winning this battle (or at least halting the anticipated Italian offensive). Obvious weaknesses in all three Services compelled them—both in their planning and subsequent operations—to co-operate in a manner to which they were unaccustomed.5 The same considerations, which fostered the need for better co-operation, also placed strict limits on the form it would take. A warning was issued to both army and air force commanders that, “owing to the difficulty, if not impossibility, of replacing crews and aircraft, the available force was to be employed with the greatest economy” and only against targets of strategic importance.6 The army’s right to close support, therefore, was not unlimited, and the air force was not relegated to auxiliary status. What then accounts for the sudden rise in prominence of air support for the army in Egypt? One historian claims that it was the “stress of war,” nothing more and nothing less.7 More will be said about the particular characteristics of this “stress” later on in this and subsequent chapters. The RAF Middle East Operational Plan called for a centralisation of the air effort, beginning with the establishment of a bomber group headquarters to control both long-ranged bomber and reconnaissance squadrons.8 All aircraft in this group had the dual task of assisting the army against a major ground offensive and conducting independent bombing raids on Italian air stations and advanced landing fields (the latter being a “strategic air offensive” of sorts against the Italian air force, its bases and supply lines). Priority for either task would vary according to the dominant strategic situation at the time. A similar centralised organisation was also introduced for the fighter squadrons. Operating under the direction of HQME, the fighter wing’s first obligation was to provide air defence for Alexandria and Cairo. Its second, but equally important task, included escort duties and offensive sweeps in support of army co-operation (reconnaissance) and close support (bombers engaged in ground attack) squadrons operating in the Western Desert.9 In addition to centrally controlled bomber and fighter squadrons, an Advanced Wing (composed of one fighter and four bomber squadrons) was established. Its main responsibility was to provide direct support in the forward battle area, and it worked closely with the mobile division. The GOC

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Mobile Division also had an Air Component, consisting of one tactical reconnaissance squadron equipped with Lysanders, under his operational control; although its administration, as was the case with all of the other air forces located in the Western Desert, was the responsibility of the AOC Advanced Wing.10 Increased emphasis on the army’s air support requirements did not condemn the RAF in the Middle East to a position of ancillary status. Its operational control, for example, did not revert to direct military command. AOC-in-C Middle East, Air Marshal Sir William Mitchell, and his successor as of May 1940, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore, still determined the objectives, the method of employment, and the strength of the air forces to be allotted for each role. Actual operations in the defence of Egypt— whether they were air superiority, direct support, distant bombing, or air defence—were the responsibility of AOC Egypt, Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw. From his headquarters in Cairo, Collishaw exercised general operational control. This enabled him to co-ordinate the air effort as a whole, with the flexibility to switch any proportion of it rapidly from one requirement to another at a moment’s notice.11 Co-ordinating the air effort with the actions of the ground forces was the task of the officer in command of the Advanced Wing. His headquarters were established in the field near that of the GOC Mobile Division, and he exercised a similar degree of control over the various types of squadrons allotted to him, as did Collishaw over the RAF in Egypt. Even closer coordination was facilitated by the attachment of a senior air staff officer (SASO) to the GOC’s divisional headquarters. The SASO was to keep abreast of both the air and the ground situation; he was to advise the GOC “at any moment” on what air support could be expected, and warn the commander of the Advanced Wing of both anticipated targets for air attack and vital areas that required air defence.12 The connecting link provided by the SASO was a useful and welcomed step forward in closer air/ground collaboration, but it did not go far enough and create the kind of integrated joint service command that was required for intimate and mutually supporting operations like those being contemplated by HQME. The development and subsequent implementation of such a command and control system, still unforeseen in its full and sophisticated form, remained a couple of years off in the future. Nonetheless, at this early stage, even more direct contact between the commander of the Advanced Wing and the GOC was both desired and encouraged.13 Between June 1939 and June 1940, several modifications were made to the new air support organisation to streamline its administration and increase effective inter-service liaison. The most influential change took place just before hostilities began in the Western Desert. On 9 June 1940, Longmore ordered Collishaw to move his headquarters (newly designated No.202 Group) forward to combine with the Advanced Wing, thereby consolidating

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the air striking force. Collishaw’s move, from Cairo to Ma’aten Bagush, where the army’s forward headquarters (HQ 13 Corps) already had been established, had the added benefit of eliminating one link in the chain of air and air/ground command. It released the commander of the Advanced Wing from his wider duties at the front and made him available for full-time liaison with the Mobile Division.14 The next most noteworthy adjustment was the posting of a small army liaison section, called Air Intelligence Liaison (AIL), to each of the single army co-operation and fighter squadrons of the Air Component.15 Each AIL was composed of army officers, who were to brief and interrogate the pilots in their respective squadrons before and after every sortie. Reconnaissance in the forward area was controlled by the Corps commander (as noted above in the original arrangements made for the Combined Plan) but, by June 1940, it was undertaken on the advice rendered by his RAF staff.16 Effective co-operation was enhanced even further by the increased willingness of both air and ground commanders to co-operate, and by the employment of an independent signals network free from competing priorities (and hierarchical delay). A direct telephone line linked each squadron of the Air Component to the divisional or corps headquarters with which it worked. Squadron commanders also made every attempt to locate their field headquarters within a ten-mile radius of that of their respective army counterpart.17 By June 1940, the organisation of British air forces in the Western Desert was very similar to that agreed to earlier between the BAFF and the BEF in France. The army commander had his own air component for reconnaissance work, and the bomber squadrons of No.202 Group were “on call” for any required air support. Additional support was available, if and when it was needed, from the long-range bomber squadrons stationed on rearward airfields in the Nile Delta. There was, however, one very significant difference. Unlike the BAFF and the squadrons of the Metropolitan air force, burdened as they were by an uncertain number of conflicting responsibilities, the RAF in Egypt was committed to providing “full support [for] the British Army in whatever operations [were] in progress.”18 Air operations aimed at holding the Italians on the western frontier were also seen as a way to provide extended air defence for the Nile Delta.19 The two objectives were not mutually exclusive. This clear commitment to the land forces was a logical choice, or “common sense” assessment of the prevailing conditions in the Middle East. The recent reorganisation of the RAF in Egypt made it possible; the air force, severely constrained by inadequate resources,20 could not have met its many responsibilities either all at once or one by one with its pre-war configuration and complement. Functional commands similar to those in Britain— Bomber, Fighter, Coastal, and Army Co-operation Command—would have exacerbated an already precarious situation by further weakening the RAF

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through administrative decentralisation. The airmen, therefore, had little choice but to concentrate their whole available force for employment against what was judged to be the most pressing threat. Flexibility and rapidity of action in response to a wide variety of crises would, they hoped, offset both numerical and qualitative inferiority. The RAF’s solution, as we have seen above, was to combine all types of aircraft and squadrons into one command under the operational control of one commander. Two distinguished historians, John Terraine and Humphrey Wynn, go even further, stating that the RAF in the Middle East was not just a Command but a complete air force in its own right, composed of all types of aircraft: day and night fighters, light, medium, and heavy bombers, ground-attack aircraft, reconnaissance, maritime, and transport aircraft.21 In the Egyptian desert, the RAF was a unified air force: one that would fight as a single unit, applying the full weight of all its resources on the principal task at hand. That task, in June 1940, was to provide support for the army along the border between Egypt and Libya. On the morning of 11 June British forces in Egypt immediately responded to Italy’s declaration of war with a limited offensive along the Libyan frontier. Light tanks and armoured cars of the Mobile Division surprised a number of Italian outposts and inflicted a severe psychological blow on the enemy in addition to not insignificant losses in materiel. No.202 Group (RAF) provided the army with full and unstinted assistance. Air operations consisted chiefly of reconnaissance, bombing Italian air bases to win local air superiority, and low-level attacks on enemy ground forces. In almost every case the air operations undertaken were pre-planned and conducted independently, but the spirit of co-operation between the air and ground forces—engaged as they were in a common cause—was high.22 A similar spirit of co-operation existed between air and naval forces in the region. On 12 June the RAF bombed Tobruk as part of a larger combined operation with the Royal Navy to destroy the harbour and its shipping. The raid was not an overwhelming success. Only seventeen of the twenty-nine bombers despatched reached the target, and co-ordination with the navy was erratic. Nonetheless, the attack on Tobruk, along with the other opening air and ground operations, struck a telling blow against the Italians. The phlegmatic British had stolen the initiative and in doing so had established a moral ascendancy over their enemy. Italy’s numerically superior forces, confused by incessant harassment and suffering a crisis of confidence, found themselves forced onto the defensive.23 Despite an impressive start, British forces in the Western Desert were not in any position to press their advantage further. All offensive action had to be weighed up against the need to conserve slender and, during the summer and early autumn of 1940, virtually irreplaceable resources.24 France’s defeat and subsequent occupation increased the imminent danger to Britain

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of a German invasion, which, not surprisingly, greatly impinged on British planning in other theatres of operation. With regard to the Middle East, the War Cabinet postponed its decision on a definite plan for reinforcement until the invasion crisis had passed.25 A few fighters reached the RAF in the Western Desert through Malta, and the Takoradi route was being urgently developed,26 but the trickle of aircraft that arrived merely replaced wastage and did not increase front-line strength. Existing forces still had to be employed with the utmost economy. It was agreed between the army and the air force that the former should not call for air attack on land targets except in the event of a major enemy offensive.27 Only strategic objectives were to come under air attack. Longmore advised Collishaw accordingly, urging the offensive-minded Canadian commander to restrict his air operations in support of the army (and the navy) to those of strategic importance. Aircraft losses under any circumstances were unsustainable. Hence, Longmore would not countenance the loss of even a few aircraft on sorties of merely tactical significance. The point was made somewhat more strongly in early July, after a pilot was wounded and an observer killed in a low-level attack against a column of Italian motor transport. Longmore cautioned Collishaw: Whilst fully appreciating the initiative and spirit shown by the squadrons under your command in the Western Desert, I must draw your attention to the urgent necessity for conserving resources; instances are still occurring when Blenheims are being used for low level machine gun attacks. . . . I consider such operations unjustified having regard to our limited resources of which you are well aware.28

Collishaw heeded this reprimand and, at least temporarily, curbed his enthusiasm for the more audacious forms of tactical support. Grave concerns over shortages of matériel (especially serviceable aircraft) established a lasting pattern, which influenced Britain’s operational strategy in the Western Desert throughout most of the North African campaign. Caution along with co-operation became the guiding principles. Nine days after the British foray began the Army withdrew to temporary positions on the Egyptian side of the frontier. Collishaw dispersed No.202 Group’s squadrons—in order to minimise their vulnerability to Italian air attacks— from their forward airfields at Sidi Barrani and Mersa Matruh to smaller satellite landing grounds. These changes did not have an adverse effect on inter-service co-operation (at least not immediately, and not when operations were pre-planned). During the last ten days of June, the army and the air force combined their efforts in a number of attacks against enemy strong points that threatened a safe withdrawal of British forces from the frontier. RAF Blenheims from No.113 Squadron bombed troop concentrations at Bir el Gubbi while aircraft from other forward-based squadrons supported the

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army in its capture of Sidi Azeiz. Both Wavell and Longmore took pleasure from the smooth collaboration achieved by their respective forces but it was early days yet. British initiatives had met with little resistance; they experienced only favourable results under conditions of their own choosing.29 It took the Italians nearly two months to recover their nerve after suffering a series of demoralising setbacks in Cyrenaica. But by the end of July they had moved up some four divisions and reinforced their air effort in preparation for an assault on Egypt. Another six weeks would pass before the overly cautious Marshal Graziani gave the order to attack. On 13 September six divisions and an armoured group numbering approximately 200 tanks crossed the Egyptian frontier. Two days later—against only token resistance from British forces—they ground to a halt fifteen miles south of Sidi Barrani. After laying a minefield belt along the forward edge of their advance, the Italians built a series of fortified camps in which they seemed content to wait for fresh supplies and reinforcements.30 In the lead-up to this offensive Italian aircraft had stepped up their attacks against forward positions along the British line. Sidi Barrani and Buq came under regular bombardment. The latter, an important advanced landing ground for Collishaw’s bomber squadrons, had to be abandoned due to extensive damage. On 9 and 10 September, RAF reconnaissance detected large concentrations of enemy forces stretching from Derna to Tobruk all moving eastward. Forewarned of the imminent Italian offensive, and eager to avoid a large-scale battle in the relative open spaces of the frontier, Wavell ordered the army to withdraw to supposedly stronger positions at Mersa Matruh. This withdrawal, however, greatly angered the RAF. It meant the loss of No.202 Group’s forward airfields in and around Sidi Barrani, and seriously compromised air operations over Cyrenaica. The increased distance and flying time of air operations, a direct result of this move backwards, hindered reconnaissance, deprived both bombers and army support aircraft of muchneeded fighter protection, and placed many important targets beyond the reach of all but the RAF’s few long-range bombers.31 Wavell’s decision to retire rather than resist Graziani’s advance in strength did have one unexpected future benefit. It illustrated the intimate connection between air and land operations, serving as the first portent in the desert “that modern war might take the form of a war for aerodromes.”32 On 19 September, Longmore wrote to Portal: You will appreciate that the consequences of the rapid and extensive retirement of our Army eastwards most seriously reduces the effectiveness of our air operations and any further retirement will hamper the operations of even my few long-range aircraft. I have therefore deemed it advisable to bolster up the Army defences to the full extent of my available air resources and I must continue to do so until such time as the GOC-in-C [General Wavell] is better able to resist the Italian advance.33

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Longmore showed catholic insight in his assessment of recent events. In ordering Collishaw to deploy No.202 Group in the Western Desert, Longmore concentrated his limited resources where they would best be able to support the army and provide forward air defence of the Nile Delta. Wavell too recognised the value of air support to the overall success of his operations, but he failed to appreciate the importance of consulting with the airmen before he determined his plan of action. Unfortunately, fighting for and then maintaining advanced airfields, in order to extend the range and strength of air operations, was a lesson the army would take a little longer to learn. The recent crisis in the Western Desert—coupled with the receding threat of a German invasion of the United Kingdom—prompted the War Cabinet to reinforce the Middle East. A number of regular infantry battalions and the 2nd Armoured Brigade were withdrawn from the Home Defence Force for immediate despatch to Alexandria. By the end of November over 72,000 British troops had left England for the Middle East: another 53,000 were scheduled to arrive before the New Year. The RAF Middle East also benefited from substantial reinforcement during this period. Fighter Command released eighty-seven Hurricanes from home squadrons and Bomber Command contributed forty-one Wellingtons and eighty-five Blenheim IVs. These aircraft meant an immediate and tangible increase in quality for front-line squadrons, although numerical strength did not rise because existing repair facilities and stores (spare parts) were not organised for the new modern types.34 The early autumn months of 1940 were quiet ones in the Western Desert while both sides built up their respective forces. Graziani’s reluctance to resume the offensive, however, along with the arrival of British reinforcements, especially the new infantry tanks and modern aircraft, prompted HQME to mount a counter-attack. Code-named Operation Compass, the British plan aimed to drive the Italians out of Egypt. Yet no sooner had the Commanders-in-Chief started to plan their bold venture when they were distracted by a series of crises flaring up on their other widely dispersed fronts. The most alarming was the outbreak of war between Italy and Greece at the end of October; the Greek government invoked Britain’s guarantee of support, which Churchill felt honour-bound to uphold.35 Longmore, acting on his own initiative and praised later by Churchill for doing so, immediately sent a mixed squadron (No.30) of Blenheim bombers and fighters. Two more Blenheim bomber squadrons (Nos.84 and 211) and a Gladiator fighter squadron (No.80) followed in November. A second Gladiator squadron (No.112) was despatched in December. Altogether these air units were little more than a token force, but their redeployment in Greece meant a temporary postponement of Operation Compass.36 While the intervention in Greece was both frustrating and untimely for the Middle East Commanders-in-Chief, it was not the only distraction to bedevil

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their plans or to make claims upon increasingly over-stretched resources. Italian forces in East Africa threatened to exploit British weaknesses in the Sudan, Somaliland, and Kenya, thereby necessitating reinforcement. Other worries included the danger to Palestine from Vichy-held Syria and growing civil discontent in Iraq. British air forces in all these regions were small and their operations produced few lessons affecting the development of army air support. The sudden and unanticipated increase in operations did, however, weaken the main body of British forces in the Western Desert.37 Chronic shortages in front-line aircraft and the transfer of squadrons to far-flung regional conflicts delayed offensive operations in Libya, and compromised the attainment of the objective; but they also had the hidden benefit of compelling British air and ground forces to co-operate in a manner seldom before considered, let alone practised. After much delay Operation Compass began during the second week of December 1940. It was the first truly co-operative enterprise undertaken by the army and the air force in the war. Real support for this combined air-land action came from the top down. Wavell and Longmore were committed advocates, and their battlefield commanders Major-General Richard O’Connor and Air Commodore Raymond Collishaw—both aggressive spirits—were enthusiastic exponents. From the initial planning of the operation onwards there was a cordial atmosphere of co-operation between the two services and their senior commanders. Objectives were set through joint staff planning, and O’Connor and Collishaw established their respective headquarters on contiguous sites. Out of this first British combined effort, one historian (Richard Bickers) boldly asserts, grew the whole concept of modern tactical air power. His claim is not without foundation.38 Willingness to co-operate, as practised by the British army and the RAF in the form of joint planning and jointly conducted operations (though admittedly in its most rudimentary form at this juncture in the war), was the first of three vital elements necessary for the perfection of effective and sustainable army-air co-operation.39 The other two—tactics and communications—would evolve slowly after much trial and error, in battle in North Africa and through technical experiments conducted in the United Kingdom. But the whole process of discovery began with the campaign against the Italians in Cyrenaica and the Western Desert of Egypt. A detailed narrative of the campaign is unnecessary, especially since this information is readily available in a wide variety of sources.40 There are, however, a number of tangential points that will benefit from further explanation. First and foremost among these is the RAF’s quest for air superiority, the essential prerequisite for decisive army air support. A simple counting of numbers directed the whole process. Air support for Operation Compass came from a mixed force of fighters, medium bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft, stationed on forward airfields in the Western Desert.41 Under Longmore’s command, but also available to

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Collishaw, were four squadrons of long-range bombers based in the Nile Delta and a fifth squadron operating out of Malta. Altogether this force numbered some 220 aircraft. Facing it was an Italian air force whose strength British Intelligence put at 250 bombers and 250 fighters. While this estimate later proved to be an exaggeration, the Italians did enjoy a substantial numerical advantage.42 Collishaw therefore concentrated his initial air operations on the attainment of air superiority. The RAF attacked enemy airfields over a wide area, damaging or destroying many aircraft on the ground and driving the Italian fighter force onto the defensive. Over 400 sorties were flown in the first week and, by 9 December, the first day of the ground offensive, the Regia Aeronautica was down to 140 bombers and 191 fighters and ground attack aircraft. RAF losses during this time were six aircraft and three pilots. Once again, as in June, Collishaw’s small but plucky air force—through bold offensive action—established complete moral ascendancy over its opponent.43 Air support came second to preliminary air superiority operations, but it was not ignored. Reconnaissance planes photographed Italian positions; ports, fortified camps and lines of communication were subjected to intensive day and night bombing; and low-level attacks were made against Italian motor transport. Offensive fighter patrols also covered the 7th Armoured and 4th Indian Divisions’ seventy miles approach march around the southern flank of the Italian minefield.44 Unobserved and unimpeded by enemy air activity, General O’Connor was able to execute his ground offensive against the unprotected rear of the Italian defences, taking them completely by surprise.45 His success was both swift and great. On 11 December, British troops not only overran Sidi Barrani (taking 38,300 Italian and Libyan prisoners, 237 guns and 73 tanks) but advanced along the main coastal road beyond Buqbuq. Sollum was captured five days later. In just seven days the Italians had been driven out of Egypt.46 Grateful for the RAF’s invaluable assistance throughout the winning of this comprehensive victory, O’Connor gave high praise to the desert airmen: Since the war began you have consistently attacked without intermission an enemy air force between five and ten times your strength . . . until finally he was driven out of the sky. You have co-operated to the full in carrying out our many requests for special bombardments, reconnaissances and protection against enemy air action, and I would like to say how much all this had contributed to our success.47

Wavell, too, acknowledged “the magnificent support given by the Royal Air Force,” further asserting that it had been a triumph of inter-service co-operation.48

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Flushed with success, Wavell and O’Connor did not want to stop at the Libyan border. They were eager to exploit Graziani’s disorganised withdrawal, and their desire to push on was unhesitatingly backed by Longmore and Collishaw. Both airmen pledged their full support. Apart from anything else, they coveted the Italian air bases around Benghazi (in order to drive the Regia Aeronautica out of range of the Nile Delta). What began as an important counter-attack, limited to throwing the Italians out of Egypt, quickly became a full-scale offensive deep into Cyrenaica. On 3 January combined British Empire army and air forces attacked the heavily defended port of Bardia. The assault was planned from air photographs. Medium bombers prepared the way for the ground troops with sustained attacks on pre-selected targets and fighter patrols gave protection against enemy air action. Nearby enemy landing grounds were also bombed to prevent interference from the Italian air force.49 Bardia fell after three days fighting, yielding 45,000 prisoners. Tobruk followed suit a fortnight later after a similar combined effort by British air and ground forces. A successful pattern had been established and the same fate befell Benghazi and Beda Fomm in early February. By the time Operation Compass ended some ten Italian divisions had been destroyed. Over 130,000 men had been taken prisoner, and nearly 400 tanks and 850 guns captured. British casualties, including killed, wounded, and missing, numbered less than 2,000 men. The RAF’s air victory was equally spectacular. Italian aircraft losses from all causes—combat, abandoned, and captured— numbered more than 1,200 compared with RAF combat losses of 26 planes. The Regia Aeronautica never recovered from this defeat; it was a spent force for the remainder of the war.50 By all accounts the British victory in Cyrenaica was an impressive one; but how effective was the co-operation between the army and the air force? Post-battle analysis reports produced by HQ RAF Middle East and the War Office highlighted the valuable practical experience obtained by all air and ground personnel who took part in the operations. In particular, they praised the way airmen and soldiers worked together “in close co-operation with arms of the Service other than their own.”51 They also acknowledged the RAF’s great contribution to the overall success of the offensive (implicitly suggesting that the recent victory could not have been attained without air support). These same reports, however, strongly cautioned against applying the lessons of the campaign “rigidly or unimaginatively in future circumstances which may prove very different from those encountered, especially in the case of a more resolute opponent,” namely the Germans.52 There was much wisdom in this assessment. Successful air support was possible against the Italians because the RAF attained air superiority at the outset; superiority the RAF never relinquished at any point in the campaign, despite its substantial inferiority in numbers. Two reasons account for this: the Hurricane proved to be a vastly superior

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fighter to the Italian CR42, and the few Hurricane squadrons available to Collishaw were sufficient to dominate the air war against an enemy who displayed little courage, initiative, or determination, and who gave way to demoralisation as soon as he suffered the slightest reverse.53 All other RAF operations owed much of their success to the lack of opposition offered by the Regia Aeronautica. And, perhaps of near equal importance, most air support operations were pre-planned against relatively static targets. When the ground offensive was more fluid and unpredictable—after the preliminary thrust around the Italian defensive positions in Egypt, and later when British forces overcame enemy strongholds in Bardia, Tobruk, and Benghazi—it became increasingly difficult to provide the army with the close support it desired.54 Insufficient numbers of aircraft severely limited close support over the rapidly changing and enlarging battlefield. There was very little either air force or army commanders could do to rectify this problem quickly. But there were a number of organisational and technical shortcomings—clearly discernible during battle—that also made it nearly impossible for the RAF to co-operate closely with the forward troops. Bomber and fighter squadrons were insufficiently mobile to keep pace with the rapid advance of armoured and motorised formations, and the RAF lacked the expertise, personnel, and transport to establish forward landing grounds quickly. Transport loaned from the army, and the use of captured vehicles, partially improved the RAF’s ability to move forward, but this was a temporary and a not entirely satisfactory solution. RAF Headquarters also frequently lost contact with the furthermost and recently established landing grounds. Inadequate communications caused additional delays. Signals arrangements lacked systematisation, and the few telephone lines allotted solely for air support were continually congested. When aircraft were available, and in a position to provide offensive support, the aircrew often struggled to distinguish targets from friendly ground forces. Hence, while the will to support the army was present, the techniques to do so were not sufficiently developed.55 Army attitudes and practices also hindered effective co-operation. Often during the campaign forward echelons went long periods without identifying their positions, objectives, or lines of advance. One Air Intelligence report notes that over a period of thirty-six hours on 11/12 December the RAF’s only knowledge of the army’s progress came from either its own strategic reconnaissance or from enemy intercepts.56 Calls for immediate assistance frequently were the first indication of a ground unit’s position. Without accurate and regular reports on the army’s whereabouts and intentions, the air force could not provide efficient close support. This was a lesson the army would take some time to learn. The army also had a lot to learn about the value of tactical reconnaissance (Tac/R). On more than one occasion army commanders, who were unaccustomed to either requesting or receiving air reconnaissance, ignored reconnaissance reports provided by the experienced

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pilots of No.208 Army Co-operation Squadron in favour of less reliable and fragmentary information acquired from ground sources.57 Not all of the lessons learned, however, were negative ones. The Hawker Hurricane established itself as a very useful and versatile battlefield weapon. In addition to its successful performance as an interceptor and escort fighter, it excelled at ground attack work (strafing enemy land forces and undertaking a little dive-bombing) as well as artillery co-operation and reconnaissance, both visual and photographic. Recent experience in both France and the Middle East had shown that the Lysander—the RAF’s standard army co-operation aircraft—required a strong fighter escort for reconnaissance tasks over territory contested by enemy fighters. Lacking sufficient fighter resources to protect the slow and vulnerable Lysanders in the Western Desert, single Hurricane fighters were despatched on army co-operation sorties. Fast and able to defend itself, the all-metal multi-gunned mono-wing fighter demonstrated that it could meet the army’s reconnaissance demands with more certainty and economy. This new role for fighters was a change in practice, which originated out of expediency, but its merits were quickly noted and a more formal implementation of the procedure soon followed. The fighter was on its way to becoming the dominant tactical aircraft of the war.58 Co-operation with the Blenheim medium bomber squadrons was also cause for much optimism. Prior to the campaign each squadron received an Air Intelligence Liaison (AIL) section. Made up of army officers, the AILs kept the bomber pilots fully informed about military operations and targets selected for air attack to further the ground offensive. So successful were the AILs that immediately after the campaign the two Services agreed to post an air liaison officer (ALO) to all squadrons supporting the Army, especially fighter squadrons operating in a close support role.59 Two other recommendations of import included ensuring the AILs had sufficient ground transport to follow their aircraft from landing ground to advanced landing ground, and providing the Armoured Division with an RAF liaison officer (equipped with his own wireless set) to inform friendly aircraft of its location and movement as well as direct air attacks on to enemy opposition.60 Both suggestions had merit and received favourable hearings. But before new equipment could be requisitioned and a training programme initiated, many of the forward squadrons and ground troops were withdrawn from Cyrenaica for operations in Greece. Fear of direct German military intervention compelled the Middle East Commanders-inChief to do all they could to prevent their new Balkan ally from being overrun.61 By the end of March 1941, the RAF’s contribution to this effort amounted to eight front-line squadrons and approximately 280 aircraft.62 The Greek diversion and the subsequent campaign to retain Crete63 not only ended in disaster but also had an important effect in reversing the victory won by O’Connor and Collishaw in the Western Desert. British forces

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in Cyrenaica were considerably weakened by the build-up of forces for these ill-fated ventures at the same time that German forces were assembling in strength in Tripolitania.64 The RAF was reduced to a shadow of its former self. Collishaw’s headquarters (No.202 Group reconstituted as No.204 Group) was withdrawn to the Canal Zone and replaced by a small staff in Barce (approximately fifty miles east of Benghazi on the main coastal road) under the command of Group Captain L.O. Brown. No.202 Group, newly referred to as RAF Cyrenaica, consisted of a mere four squadrons: one Lysander (No.6 Army Co-operation), one Blenheim IV bomber squadron (No.55) and two Hurricane fighter squadrons (Nos.73 and 3 RAAF). The army did not fare much better; the 7th Armoured Division was replaced by the inexperienced 2nd Division and the 6th Australian (sent to Greece in early March) was succeeded by the recently arrived and under-equipped 9th Australian Division. When the Axis forces began their advance from El Agheila on 30 March, the overmatched British and Empire forces were forced to withdraw. By 10 April they were back at the Egyptian frontier; except for Tobruk, isolated and under siege, all of the earlier territorial gains had been lost.65 With only one bomber squadron for close support, it is not surprising that the RAF was incapable of slowing down Rommel’s advance. As the army’s withdrawal degenerated into an undignified retreat, Air Marshal Tedder urged Brown to use his fighters (in low-level machine-gun attacks) against enemy transport columns.66 The two available fighter squadrons were already overworked and, while they performed well in their new ground attack role, they made little difference to the overall outcome of the battle. Tactics alone—even new and effective ones—could not reverse the deleterious consequences brought on by a grave inferiority in numbers. It was not an orderly retreat. Ground units frequently lost touch with each other and with their air co-operation flights. In some cases the soldiers retired without declaring their intentions, leaving their air support to be overrun. False deductions made from air reconnaissance had equally negative results for the retreating forces. On two occasions the RAF attacked and destroyed British petrol supply columns; on 3 April the 2nd Armoured Division virtually crippled itself when it destroyed its main supply and petrol dumps at Msus after tactical reconnaissance mistakenly reported a “large enemy force of armoured fighting vehicles” in the vicinity. Recriminations followed, as did renewed bitterness.67 The army claimed “the fault lay with partially trained pilots and an ineffective signals system,” and demanded a more efficient system of air support (under its own direct control). Naturally the RAF was incensed by what it believed were wholly unjustified criticisms, and cynical and selfserving recommendations. In just a few short weeks, months of apparent harmony and success had been swept away by yet another ignominious defeat.68

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At the root of this recent inter-service disagreement was the now familiar difference in perception held by airmen and soldiers on the air force’s role in a land battle. The soldiers criticised the RAF for giving too much attention to attacking enemy lines of communication and airfields in the rear. They wanted a fighter “umbrella” to shield them from enemy air attack and also offensive air support (loosely described by the soldiers as free-ranging artillery) to destroy enemy armour, artillery and strong points at the forefront of the battlefield. Both were concepts long rejected by the RAF; they were uneconomical and unsound (especially during the lean days of 1941 without favourable conditions of numerical supremacy to obviate tactical principles). Nonetheless, Air Vice-Marshal Tedder, the newly appointed AOC-in-C, RAF, Middle East,69 was predisposed to avoid arguments over points of principle at this critical juncture. Wavell was busy making plans to relieve Tobruk and regain the initiative in the desert (Operation Brevity), and Tedder was eager to give him all the air support of the type he wanted. After the recent debacles in Cyrenaica, Greece, and Crete, where both sailors and soldiers believed the air force had “let them down,” the AOC-in-C insisted—for the sake of better inter-service relations— that the air plan for the upcoming battle be made with the army’s full agreement.70 Operation Brevity ran from 15 to 17 May. It proved premature, was inadequately mounted, and ended in failure. Spectacular outbursts of effrontery followed as both air and army commanders blamed each other for the breakdown of army-air co-operation. Collishaw and Brigadier W.H. Gott argued over the correct use of close support; Gott wanted the RAF to attack enemy tanks and Collishaw insisted that aircraft should concentrate against enemy communications and lines of supply. War experience already obtained in North Africa supported the airman’s point of view. Tanks and troops deployed for battle were poor targets. Repeated attempts by the Italian air force to disrupt the 7th Armoured Division’s advance in December—by bombing its forward elements—produced negligible results. Anti-aircraft guns also made fixed defences difficult to attack, as well as unacceptably hazardous for low-flying aircraft. Moreover, there was the problem of distinguishing friend from foe when the opposing ground forces were in close proximity to each other. Fortunately both Wavell and Tedder viewed the air support shortcomings revealed in Operation Brevity with equanimity. Together they set about planning another joint-service operation for mid-June (Operation Battleaxe), incorporating the lessons learned with detailed instructions for support.71 During the ground offensive phase of Battleaxe (15–17 June 1941), Wavell insisted that the RAF perform two main tasks. The fighters were to cover British troops with an air defence umbrella while the bombers were to be ready and waiting to answer army calls for close support. Tedder was opposed to this rigid employment of his air forces. But the AOC-in-C was prepared to carry out the General’s requests in order to foster closer coordination in this combined operation, and because the air units involved

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were required only for a short time.72 Once again, as in Operation Brevity, the main purpose was to relieve Tobruk and to drive the Axis forces west of the besieged port. Unfortunately, Rommel was both forewarned and well prepared; Operation Battleaxe ended in dismal failure.73 Predictably defeat led to more recriminations.74 Once again the soldiers (though wrong in their belief that the RAF had ignored the army’s needs and pursued its own objectives instead) chafed at being let down by the airmen. They were angry because the fighter umbrella did not provide complete protection from air attack, and the bombers did not eliminate enemy ground opposition. Wavell claimed the breakdown began with the RAF’s failure to achieve sufficient air superiority over the battlefield. He also criticised the RAF’s existing methods of close support, contending that the air force was not properly organised to provide the type of support enjoyed by the Germans. It was generally thought that German troops, when they were in difficulty, immediately summoned the Luftwaffe to deal with ground opposition. Quite naturally British soldiers asked why they did not have a similar arrangement.75 In a series of recommendations to the War Office, Wavell emphasised “the importance of the air factor” in desert operations, and demanded the creation of an army air component. Before mounting his next offensive, he wanted “adequate and suitably trained air components at the disposal of the Army for all its needs, including fighters, medium bombers, tactical reconnaissance and close support on the battlefield.”76 Both the general’s view of the recent air operations and his recommendations were severely criticised by Tedder and the Air Ministry. Tedder agreed with Wavell on one point: air operations in Battleaxe were not a good example of effective air support. But he stressed that both fighter defence and offensive operations had proved effective (even if the tactics agreed with the army were extremely questionable). Over the three days of fighting very few enemy aircraft penetrated the fighter screen, and on 17 June—during the retreat from Sollum—air attacks halted a column of German tanks that threatened to envelop British troops. In Tedder’s opinion, insufficient information from the army and the failure of the communication system were the main reasons for the breakdown of co-operation.77 Prior to the battle, detailed provisions were made for prearranged signals communication between air and ground forces and an air-to-ground recognition system. Despite these arrangements, however, British troops in contact with the enemy asked for air support only once. On 15 June a request was made for an air attack on an enemy artillery position near Halfaya. A Hurricane destroyed the intended target but the fighter and its pilot were also lost. The army’s explanation for not requesting more close support was that British troops were situated too close to enemy troops for effective air intervention to be possible. Tedder disagreed. In his opinion, many opportunities for close support were lost because the army was insufficiently

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trained, particularly in signals communication. Besides breakdowns in wireless communication between ground and air forces, forward troops regularly lost contact with their own headquarters. Lacking accurate position reports, Army Headquarters found it difficult to give the RAF even a conservative bomb line. The close support the army said it desperately needed, and which the RAF made available, virtually went unused.78 On a broader level, Tedder worried that “the three Services were not really working together.”79 Effective combined operations demanded a degree of co-ordination that still was sadly lacking in the desert. Tedder wanted major improvements in communications techniques (both inter-service and intraservice) and much closer liaison between the army and the air force on the battlefield. Additional support for the AOC’s recommendations came from Lieutenant-General Sir Noel Beresford-Pierce, commander of the land forces in Battleaxe, “who considered that a grave drawback had been the situating of his headquarters and the Headquarters of No.204 Group some eighty miles apart.”80 Proper training, rather than the creation of an army air component, was Tedder’s answer to the air support dilemma. The army’s criticism of the RAF in Battleaxe convinced him that most soldiers still did not understand the essential character of air participation in a ground battle. Tedder appreciated that aircrew also needed further training in combined operations, mainly in the recognition of ground targets and tactical methods. But these were technical matters, which could be dealt with easily enough. Altering the army’s attitude would be a more difficult task. He therefore proposed a series of joint experiments using No.253 Army Co-operation Wing (consisting of one squadron each of fighters, bombers, and army co-operation aircraft) and experienced army co-operation instructors from the United Kingdom to investigate, develop, and initiate training on common lines.81 The Prime Minister agreed with the AOC, and this time it was a soldier who paid the price for failure. General Sir Claude Auchinleck replaced Wavell. Churchill also wasted no time in making his views on air support clear to the new GOC-in-C Middle East. He wrote: I feel that for all major operational purposes your plan must govern the employment of the whole Air Force through the Middle East, bearing in mind that the Air Force has its own dominant strategic role to play and must not be frittered away in providing small umbrellas for the Army as it seems to have been in the Sollum battle (Battleaxe).82

While the air force was to direct its full power to winning the land battle it was neither subordinate to nor under the operational control of the army. The two services were to work together as equals in pursuit of a common objective; each service was to draw on and enhance the other’s strengths.

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Tedder and Auchinleck worked well together.83 They agreed that the techniques of tactical air support for the army, particularly in the areas of communications and combined staffs, required drastic overhaul. On their recommendation, an inter-service committee was formed in July to study the whole question of air support. Optimism ran high during the summer months of 1941, but beneath this revived spirit of co-operation lurked the fear that Rommel—impetuous and unpredictable—might deny the joint committee sufficient time to institute the long-overdue reforms.

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Joint Army/RAF forward wireless unit. Courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (AHB), Royal Air Force (RAF).

Joint Army/RAF forward wireless unit. Courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (AHB), Royal Air Force (RAF).

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‘On Patrol’– Hurricanes of the Western Desert Air Force, RAF. Courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (AHB), Royal Air Force (RAF).

RAF fighter-bombers attacking a column of German vehicles. Courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (AHB), Royal Air Force (RAF).

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‘Desert Graveyard’ – collection of burnt out German vehicles destroyed by the Western Desert Air Force, RAF. Courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (AHB), Royal Air Force (RAF).

‘Scarring the Ground’ – denying favourable position for an Advance Landing Ground. Courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (AHB), Royal Air Force (RAF).

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Formation of Bristol Blenheim bombers with a Hurricane escort. Courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (AHB), Royal Air Force (RAF).

German motorised columns under air attack by Blenheims of the Western Desert Air Force, RAF. Courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (AHB), Royal Air Force (RAF).

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Desert Roads Are Very Dangerous – German vehicles and tanks destroyed by RAF Close Air Support. Courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (AHB), Royal Air Force (RAF).

Inspecting the Damage – German vehicles destroyed by RAF Close Air Support. Courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (AHB), Royal Air Force (RAF).

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Axis transport destroyed by RAF Close Air Support outside Mersa Matruh. Courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (AHB), Royal Air Force (RAF).

Column of German vehicles under air attack. Courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (AHB), Royal Air Force (RAF).

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‘It’s safer to walk’ – abandoned vehicles during the Axis retreat from El Alamein. Courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (AHB), Royal Air Force (RAF).

Tedder and Coningham. Courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (AHB), Royal Air Force (RAF).

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Tedder and Churchill. Courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (AHB), Royal Air Force (RAF).

Joint Air/Land Planning – Coningham and Montgomery. Courtesy of the Air Historical Branch (AHB), Royal Air Force (RAF).

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PART II

How a System of Air Support Was Organised

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November 22, 2007

CHAPTER 6

The Army’s Struggle for Air Support One of the main lessons of the Battle for France was the importance of air power in modern warfare. Commenting on his nation’s recent defeat, Pierre Cot, the former Minister of Aviation in the pre-war Popular Front government, stated bitterly and sadly that “an army can do nothing without the support of an adequate air force.”1 On this point both the British Army and the Royal Air Force agreed. Air support was an essential prerequisite for success in a land campaign against a well equipped and highly mobile enemy. Beyond this generalisation, however, the two services were divided. What constituted an adequate air force, what tasks would it perform in support of the land forces, how would they be performed and by what types of aircraft and, most important of all, how and by whom would these air operations be commanded and controlled? These are just a few of the questions over which the two services failed to achieve any degree of unanimity in 1941. The Battle for France had confirmed the Air Staff’s belief that success in a land battle began with and depended on air superiority. Neutralising the enemy’s air force was the first priority in providing effective air support and it entailed a wider application of air power than was generally understood by most soldiers at this time. The Army was concerned almost exclusively with air operations that were closely related to the battlefield. This marked difference in approach was complicated further by the legacy of a harmful inter-service rivalry; one negative result was that the War Office tended to view the Air Staff’s advice with deep suspicion. For the soldiers the inherent risks of the Air Force pursuing its own strategic objectives at their expense were too great to ignore. The General Staff therefore insisted that each Corps and Army have its own carefully balanced and specialised force of reconnaissance, bomber, and fighter aircraft under the respective ground

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commander’s command and control.2 It was a proposal that took no account of either the changing strategic direction of Britain’s war effort or the air resources that were available.3 During the winter of 1940–1941, fundamental differences over numbers and types of aircraft, as well as organisation and method, plunged the Air and General Staffs into yet another embittered and long-lasting controversy over the Army’s air requirements and how they would be met. Fortunately for Britain the Army had less influence in the formulation of air policy than had been the case in France.4 Following the evacuation of British and allied forces from Dunkirk, the Army lost much of its leverage in the political debate over the allocation of RAF aircraft for future operations. The Army’s strategic importance had been reduced to home defence, small-scale operations overseas (such as in the Middle East), and the tacit promise of becoming an invasion force for a return to the continent sometime in the distant future. Meanwhile, the RAF was engaged at full-stretch on operations to defend the United Kingdom from the German bomber offensive, protect vital merchant shipping in home waters, and strike back at the Axis Powers. Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that the requirements of Fighter, Coastal, and Bomber Commands received first priority. Building up air forces to provide the Army with close support for hypothetical military operations at an unspecified date in the future was not an urgent necessity.5 With the War Cabinet’s approval the RAF concentrated its efforts after June 1940 on expanding and re-equipping its operational commands, first to defend Britain from enemy attack and second to wage a strategic bomber offensive against Germany.6 The Air Staff did not disguise its opinion that air support for the Army was a tertiary task. In fact many airmen believed that allocating aircraft to the Army, whilst they were fighting the battle and the soldiers were not, would be an unconscionable waste. Such presumption on the part of the airmen, along with the increase in competition over finite resources and the unresolved matters of principle, contributed to an acute sense of grievance in the Army. The War Office quite naturally believed that its legitimate air requirements were being ignored. Yet despite inimical interservice relations, considerable advances were made in the development of organisation and technique during the last three months of 1940. The most notable achievements were the creation of a Combined Central Operations Room at GHQ Home Forces, the adoption of Close Support Bomber Controls following extensive experiments and trials in Northern Ireland and, on 1 December, the formation of Army Co-operation Command.7 The prospect of a German invasion8 in the autumn of 1940 led the Army and the RAF to set up a Combined Central Operations Room (CCOR) at GHQ Home Forces to co-ordinate air support for the defending ground troops. The CCOR contained a small staff of air and army officers who maintained maps and provided invasion information to the War Cabinet and the Home Commands of the three services. A smaller but similar

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Combined Operations Room (COR) was also established at the headquarters of each army command (Scottish, Northern, Eastern, Southern, and Western) to keep GHQ Home Forces appraised of the land situation and their air support requirements. Liaison officers were posted to the various air and army headquarters and army wireless links were established between the army commands and Nos.1 and 2 Groups, Bomber Command.9 In the event of a lodgement by enemy troops, the C-in-C Home Forces was to make his request for air support directly to the AOC-in-C Bomber Command through the CCOR. Under a recent joint service agreement the Army’s anti-invasion air support would come from the light bomber squadrons of Nos.1 and 2 Groups, operating from their permanent bases and under the centralised control of Bomber Command (it was assumed that Fighter Command would be fully engaged in the battle for air superiority and therefore unable to contribute directly to events on the ground). Except for the few tactical reconnaissance machines of the AC squadrons attached to the Army’s five home commands no RAF aircraft were placed under direct army control. Even the targets selected for air attack were subject to the agreement “in general terms” of the two commanders.10 The arrangements made between GHQ Home Forces and Bomber Command were little more than hasty improvisations intended to meet the immediate threat of invasion at the enemy’s main point of attack. Bombing in support of the ground troops was restricted to the enemy’s landing areas at the water’s edge; there were no provisions in the autumn of 1940 for air attacks on inland targets however deep an invading force may have penetrated. Other difficult questions such as how should a comprehensive and flexible system of air support be organised, and who would be responsible for ordering bombers to attack targets in Britain, were also left unanswered.11 The rudimentary structure of the CCOR was, however, the first step in the right direction to providing both answers and a solution. It provided a direct communications link between the C-in-Cs of the anti-invasion air and land forces and, theoretically at least, increased the likelihood of executing future combined air/land operations with greater speed and efficiency. It also initiated a pattern for co-operation on a joint tactical objective without subjugating one service to another (a concern of long-standing for the Air Staff).12 The simple beach targeting plan did not address the wider aspects of policy, nor did it establish the techniques required to co-ordinate air support against both pre-arranged targets and those of a more elusive and unpredictable nature. These matters were left to others to consider, and the process began with the exceptional work of Group Captain A.H. Wann and Colonel John Woodall.13 From 5 September to 28 October 1940, Wann and Woodall directed a series of joint service experiments and trials in Northern Ireland to determine “the most appropriate methods both tactical and technical for the development of air bombardment in close

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support of land forces.”14 Their aim was to devise an air support system (comparable to but not a slavish imitation of the Germans) that was equal to the diverse challenges and rapid pace of modern military operations. Consequently, they examined a wide range of issues. These included the types of assistance that could be provided for the army (direct and close support),15 the identification and selection of targets, army and air force communications, bombing tactics, the time factor, the location of the support aircraft and their airfields, and the effect likely to be obtained from the number of air support aircraft in the RAF’s order of battle. The last point was of particular importance because of the acute shortage of specialised aircraft in Britain for army support. As such Wann and Woodall placed a premium on flexibility and speed of response. But the main problem, on which the entire undertaking depended, was the method of control—not only at the point of attack but also the higher command. In their final report Wann and Woodall emphasised the considerable advantages of a joint army/air headquarters in the field.16 Their experiments confirmed that air support was provided in a more effective and timely manner when air and land commanders had direct and immediate access to each other. Decisions were taken quickly and aircraft were despatched without delay on the most appropriate tasks. Consequently Wann and Woodall recommended the creation of a combined battle headquarters. The air commander was to have a double role. He would control all of the allotted air forces— reconnaissance, fighter, and bomber support—and he would be the army commander’s air advisor. Under the Wann-Woodall proposal the RAF commander was also under the operational command of the GOC-in-C (a throwback to the old “Air Component” procedures that were set out in the pre-war manual “The Employment of Air Forces in the Field”). But when their recommendations were incorporated in the Western Desert Air Force’s (WDAF) operational procedures during the summer and autumn of 1941, this hierarchical division was ignored. In the western desert the air and land commanders worked together as equals, neither being subordinate to the other.17 Despite the later adjustment to overall control, Wann and Woodall correctly ascertained the value of a unified command that drew on the expertise of each service. For them it was the necessary first step in creating their innovative Close Support Bomber Controls (CSBC).18 Located at the combined headquarters, the CSBC was a sophisticated joint army/air signals network that linked the two commanders directly with the Army’s forward units as well as the RAF’s advance landing grounds and rearward aerodromes.19 Very briefly, army signal officers in light vehicles equipped with W/T (wireless telegraphy) sets accompanied the leading troops. Their task was to signal both battle information and requests for air support to the control centre at the combined battle headquarters. Once a decision was made on either meeting or rejecting the request the CSBC controller would inform the

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forward army unit of the action to be taken. If air support was approved the controller would notify the closest available airfield of the operation it was to execute. The support aircraft could also receive additional information from either the control centre or the forward army signal unit (called army tentacles) at any time throughout the mission. Moreover, signal trials in Northern Ireland had confirmed that support could be provided in less than ninety minutes from the time the request was made if the forward troops could identify their target, all communications links were maintained, and the airfields were not more than a hundred miles away.20 Wann and Woodall recognised that the provision of effective and timely air support was a communications problem. Air Marshal Sholto Douglas had said as much a few months earlier. “Army Co-operation? There’s nothing in it,” he claimed. “All you need is willingness to co-operate and good signals.”21 The Wann-Woodall concept of a combined headquarters inclusive of a fully functional CSBC was in fact the theoretical embodiment of the air marshal’s assertion. The two services, each suitably impressed by the results of the trials in Northern Ireland, agreed to test the system further. But turning ideas into practice meant overcoming a series of technical difficulties and entrenched service prejudices. Progress was, unfortunately, agonisingly slow. Nonetheless, the proposals themselves did foreshadow a number of war-winning developments to come.22 The formation of Army Co-operation Command23 in December 1940 was another positive step toward the establishment of close and effective co-operation between the two services. This new RAF command brought together under one central organisation all of the army co-operation squadrons, schools, and training establishments. Its main tasks were to develop all forms of air support for future operations both at home and overseas, and to train the various army and air units concerned. Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt, the former C-in-C of the British Air Forces in France (BAFF), was appointed AOC-in-C; John Woodall, who served on Barratt’s staff at BAFF, and recently had been promoted to Brigadier, became his senior air staff officer (SASO). RAF and Army officers in roughly equal numbers also split the remaining posts at both Command and Group Headquarters. The Command itself consisted of two groups: No.70 (Training) Group was responsible for the development of policy and administering new training programmes, and No.71 (Operations) Group controlled all Army Co-operation (AC) squadrons allotted to Home Forces. To ensure that ACC’s aircraft were utilised in the most profitable manner an advanced headquarters was located along side GHQ Home Forces. This increase in centralised command conferred on No.71 Group’s commander the dual responsibility of exercising operational control and advising the C-in-C, Home Forces on all air matters.24 By the end of 1940, real progress had been made in a number of areas concerning the future air requirements of the army. The positive momentum that

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accompanied these developments was, however, short-lived. The exigencies of war, some unsatisfactory army/air training exercises during the winter and spring of 1941,25 and a series of heated misunderstandings between the Air and General Staffs all conspired against a rapid and smooth solution to the Army’s air support problems. The downturn in inter-service relations began in February when the CAS, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, advised the VCIGS, Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Haining, of the Air Staff’s intention to reduce the number of aircraft in the army co-operation squadrons from twelve to eight. A one third reduction in their operational strength would release sixty pilots for active duty with Bomber and Fighter Commands. On its own this was not an unreasonable request, especially at this stage of the war. But when combined with the heavy demands of RAF operations on the light bomber force, which supposedly was intended for the Army’s close support in the event of an invasion, the War Office was unwilling to give its unreserved acceptance to Portal’s request.26 As the spring invasion season quickly approached, the soldiers were confronted with the unpleasant fact that their air support was little more than hypothetical. No.1 Group (equipped with obsolete Fairey Battles) was in the process of converting to heavy bombers for strategic operations against the Ruhr. Consequently No.2 Group (equipped with obsolescent Bristol Blenheims) was the only force of light bombers left for army support; and increasingly it was engaged on operations against enemy invasion ports. Wastage commensurate with these operations, along with the Air Staff’s twin decision not to replace casualties and to redeploy new Blenheim squadrons in the Middle East, quickly depleted the group’s strength. A plan to build up No.2 Group with American Bostons also foundered when the first shipment of these aircraft was diverted to Russia and the remainder were kept by the Americans to meet their own requirements. As a result very few aircraft were available to train and operate with the Army’s home defence forces. Despite these shortcomings, however, No.2 Group was a willing participant in the CSBC trials conducted between January and March.27 Unfortunately, this willingness largely went unnoticed by GHQ, Home Forces. Most of the joint training exercises were either restricted to signal trials or used reconnaissance aircraft to simulate bomber operations. Unfavourable weather conditions throughout most of the spring also limited the use of bombers. By the middle of March only forty-five light bomber sorties had been flown on army support exercises. To many army officers (though mistaken in their assessment) the absence of large formations of aircraft at Home Forces exercises merely confirmed their suspicions that the Air Staff was disingenuous about its commitment to provide the Army with adequate air support.28 The problems of insufficient aircraft, the continual use of obsolete and obsolescent types, and the uncertainty that shrouded their replacement, were compounded further by GHQ Home Forces’ increasing disenchantment with

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Army Co-operation Command. Despite its significant contribution in the area of communications between air and ground forces, Army Co-operation Command controlled only twelve severely understrength Lysander reconnaissance squadrons; and there was little prospect of it receiving either new or more aircraft in the immediate future. There were many days, even according to its supporters, when “there were more staff officers at Air Marshal Barratt’s H.Q. than serviceable aircraft under his command. . . . ”29 General Brooke, C-in-C Home Forces, was of the strong opinion that adequate air support for the Army could be assured only—both in terms of resources and organisation—by the creation of a separate army air force that was made up of specially-designed aircraft, flown by carefully trained pilots, and controlled by the army commander-in-chief in the field. Lt-Col Festing, head of the War Office’s new directorate for air support, had said as much six or seven months earlier in a series of memoranda he produced immediately after the Army’s ignominious return from France in June 1940.30 Brooke, along with many senior officers at the War Office, was of the opinion that the Army’s air support would be built up in Army Co-operation Command. This was not the Air Staff’s intention. They regarded ACC as a training and development unit. A fundamental difference in outlook therefore divided the two services. Whereas the General Staff considered it “essential to earmark and train air forces for support of the army long in advance of the time when they would be required,” the Air Staff held to their concept of the flexibility of air forces and strongly resisted all attempts to divert aircraft from ongoing operations to training exercises “until the need for doing so became more apparent.”31 Dissatisfied with this arrangement Brooke appealed to the CIGS, General Sir John Dill, to make “a fresh approach to the Air Ministry.” The C-in-C Home Forces wanted an air component that regarded air support as its primary role, was made up of all the necessary types of aircraft, and would form an integral part of army formations. Brooke presented his case in what became his first of many army/air requirements papers.32 It was a detailed document, which specified the organisation, scale, and general tactical method desired by the Army for a comprehensive air support capability. On 31 May 1941, Dill submitted this paper under his own name to the COS for their consideration.33 Portal responded to the CIGS’s memorandum saying only that the Air Staff would study it carefully. Not all members of the Air Staff were as circumspect. Slessor seethed with anger at the prospect of the Army commanding a large air component. On 15 June he wrote: . . . the rising generation of soldiers (with about two exceptions) are quite unfit to command air forces, by training and tradition—they are only just adjusting their mentality from 4 to 30 miles per hour, and it will take them another generation to adjust it to 400. . . . 34

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Dill wanted 109 army support squadrons (54 for home use and 55 for overseas). Half of the squadrons were to be equipped with fighter-reconnaissance aircraft and the other half with “high performance” bomber-reconnaissance aircraft that could cover long distances with a bomb-load of 1,000 pounds. Dive-bombers were preferred, even though the CIGS had agreed with the CAS on 19 February that “no more dive-bombers need be ordered”.35 In addition the CIGS asked for twelve squadrons (each of twelve aircraft) for artillery observation, one squadron of communication aircraft for each theatre in which the Army operated, and sufficient air transport both in the UK and the Middle East to drop 2,400 parachute troops in one trip and transport one brigade group of 5,000 men with light tanks, light artillery, motor transport, and other essential equipment. The scale of this air component was not related to any particular campaign; it was the General Staff’s “ultimate aim” to ensure that the Army had sufficient air support for any tasks it might be called upon to undertake. Dill’s request amounted to some 3,888 fighters, bombers, transports, and other specialised types: a total number that exceeded the RAF’s entire first-line strength by approximately 300 aircraft.36 Three weeks passed after Dill first presented his memorandum and still the COS was waiting for the Air Staff’s reply. On 21 June, Churchill intervened. He asked the COS what was being done to establish immediate and intimate co-operation between the Army and the RAF.37 The COS could say only that the “whole problem was under review” and it would report on the matter shortly. Five days later the CAS put before the COS the Air Staff’s counterproposal.38 It was a long and complex document that highlighted the principal issues of the recent dispute between the two services and presented a detailed proposal for providing the Army with maximum air support when it encountered the enemy. Portal correctly reduced the problem to its main points of contention: the question of operational command and control, and the allocation of scarce resources. He told the committee that an air force of the size and composition proposed by the CIGS could be produced and maintained only at the expense of air power. “Neither the training organisation nor the productive capacity available,” Portal cautioned, “would permit the force to be superimposed on the planned expansion of the Bomber, Coastal and Fighter Commands.”39 Its creation, therefore, would be fatal to the strategic air offensive, and counter to the War Cabinet’s directive to establish air predominance as the first step in its plan to defeat Germany through “a crushing measure of air superiority.”40 Valuable corroborating evidence for the CAS’s position came from the various supply departments, which the COS had consulted directly.41 Portal also pointed out that the General Staff’s plan, as presented, would also fail to achieve the Army’s own narrow objectives. Air superiority was an essential prerequisite for the successful provision of all forms of air support and the War Office programme to allot air forces

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to small army formations was in direct contravention of this fundamental principle.42 German air support, the provision of which seemed to baffle too many British generals, was not provided by large specialised air forces attached to army units.43 The Germans achieved their success by overwhelming the opposing air force and establishing local air supremacy over the battlefield. Close co-operation between the Army and the main elements of the German Air Force, and an efficient system of intercommunication and control, had enabled the Germans to concentrate superior forces at a time and place of their own choosing. In this way the Germans obtained a strategical and tactical advantage. Following a quick and inexorable offensive to establish air superiority, large numbers of aircraft were retasked to provide direct assistance to the ground forces. Portal therefore emphasised the importance of building up in the RAF a force of bombers and fighters designed to defeat the enemy in the air and secure air superiority over the area where the British Army planned to fight. Once this had been achieved, Portal stressed, “the whole weight of the Royal Air Force can be employed to assist the Army to land in France, to march toward, and to occupy Germany.”44 The CAS proposed a comprehensive system of air support for the Army in the UK. It covered the period before the air expansion programme was completed and afterward once air superiority had been won. Dealing with the latter period first, Portal outlined the air support that would be available for continental operations by the spring of 1943. It consisted of an Air Component of army co-operation squadrons (bomber and fighter reconnaissance) under the operational control of the army commander; an Air Contingent made up of bomber and fighter squadrons detached from the Metropolitan Air Forces for direct support operations; and general support from the bomber and fighter squadrons of the Metropolitan Air Force. Squadrons from the Metropolitan Bomber and Fighter Forces would concentrate on securing local air superiority and isolating the battlefield from enemy redeployment and supply. Bomber and fighter squadrons of the Air Contingent were to be organised and trained with the Army to provide ground attack in the battlefield area. Operational control of these squadrons would be exercised by an AOC-in-C, who was to work in close consultation with the Army C-in-C to ensure that the ground troops received the maximum degree of air support.45 Whilst the amount of support provided by the main units of the Metropolitan Air Force was subject to the nature and area of operations as well as the overall strategic situation, the CAS did specify the numbers and types of aircraft that would comprise both the Air Contingent and the Air Component. The Air Contingent would consist of fifteen squadrons of standard fighter aircraft drawn from Fighter Command, specially trained for tactical reconnaissance and ground attack. Nine squadrons of bombers (probably American B.26 Martins) would come from operational squadrons of

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Bomber Command; but they also would have been trained to attack precise targets in support of friendly ground troops. A total of 240 fighters and 144 bombers would form the initial equipment allotted to this force. The Air Component would consist of ten squadrons of fighters (either a British or American fighter replacement for the U.S. Tomahawk) and ten squadrons of light bombers (American Bermuda or Vengeance dive-bombers). When added together, the Air Contingent and the Air Component, the Air Staff had allocated 44 squadrons or 624 aircraft for army support. In addition to this combined force of reconnaissance and attack aircraft, the CAS outlined how the Air Staff planned to meet the transport and airborne requirements specified by the CIGS.46 Until production and delivery schedules in Britain and America, as well as strategic circumstances, allowed for the creation of the air support forces just proposed, Portal promised to build up Army Co-operation Command for the Army’s immediate needs. The Air Staff aimed to increase the number of aircraft in each AC squadron from eight to twelve, and, in addition, build up the existing fourteen squadrons of Army Co-operation Command to full strength before December 1941. Portal also pledged to expand the command from fourteen to twenty squadrons by the following summer. Training for the fifteen fighter squadrons allocated to the Air Contingent would not begin until the spring of 1942 due to the pressing demands on Fighter Command; but the Blenheim medium bomber squadrons of No.2 Group, the CAS confirmed, would be withdrawn immediately from operational duties to train with the Army in anti-invasion exercises at every feasible opportunity. The Army’s stated requirements for airborne forces and air transport, however, could not be met without serious interruption to ongoing air operations. They would, Portal said, be provided in an emergency if the War Cabinet authorised a change to the present air policy.47 Portal’s paper and Dill’s memorandum were discussed by the COS on 30 June. The CIGS acknowledged that the Air Staff’s proposals were encouraging, but from the Army’s point of view they focused on the future at the expense of the present. What was needed in the next month or so, urged the CIGS, was “intimate co-operation between Home Forces and the RAF . . . to repel invasion.” Dill claimed that this could be achieved only if the air forces the Army required formed an integral part of the formations they were meant to support. Portal flatly rejected the CIGS’s conception of both the Army’s and the nation’s needs. All of the medium bomber squadrons were engaged in active operations either in the Middle East or against enemy shipping and naval targets in home waters. The CAS said it would be a mistake to switch them from the vital work they were doing to a long period of training in army co-operation. Moreover he thought the CIGS’s view of the intimate and extensive training bomber and fighter squadrons required with the Army was excessive. The Air Staff believed that efficient army air support was contingent on “the training of the Ground Staffs and

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the perfection of the organisation and control”—which Army Co-operation Command was actively engaged in through the CSBC trials. Aircrews given intensive training, Portal continued, could attain the necessary level of proficiency in a relatively short time immediately before army operations began. Portal suggested that an anti-invasion exercise be held to test the standard of training, and he also offered to have the Air Staff examine the question of specialised training for No.2 Group’s Blenheim squadrons.48 The CIGS agreed to Portal’s last two suggestions but he still was not satisfied with either the short- or the long-term Air Staff proposals for meeting the Army’s requirements. Dill restated his position that the Army could not conduct extensive and successful operations without adequate air support. He urged the CAS to allocate to the Army the 109 air support squadrons the General Staff said it required. He also implored the CAS to organise and train this force with air support as its primary role. Once this air contingent was established those squadrons not actively engaged on army co-operation tasks could, Dill insisted, from time to time, be made available to the RAF for other forms of employment. It was painfully obvious that the positions of the two Chiefs of Staff were poles apart. The CAS made one final critical remark before the meeting adjourned. He said the number of aircraft requested by the General Staff was unjustifiably high. Desultory discussions between the two staffs continued through the summer; and their failure to resolve this contentious issue resulted in further delays in meeting the Army’s air requirements.49 Whilst these talks on the larger issues of principles and policy were going on another inter-service crisis flared up over the re-equipment of Army Co-operation Command’s obsolete Lysander squadrons. At a meeting attended by the Minister of Aircraft Production and the Secretaries of State for Air and War at the end of May, the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Archibald Sinclair, agreed to replace the Lysanders of AC Command with eleven fighter-reconnaissance squadrons equipped with American built Tomahawks. He also suggested that three Lysander squadrons be retained for bomber-reconnaissance until the Bermuda dive-bombers arrived from the United States sometime toward the end of October. Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for War, wanted all of the Lysanders replaced immediately. He received support for his request from Lord Beaverbrook, who said there was a surplus of Blenheims in the Air Storage Units (ASU) and neither Bomber nor Coastal Command would suffer if thirty of these aircraft were allotted to Army Co-operation Command. Sinclair objected to this proposal but he was overruled by Beaverbrook. Using his authority as chairman, Beaverbrook advised the Prime Minister that the Blenheims should be delivered to Army Co-operation Command forthwith.50 The following day Churchill received a plaintive letter from the Secretary of State for Air. Sinclair protested the folly of Beaverbrook’s recommendation. He said the Blenheims were needed for the Battle of the Atlantic

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and the Middle East, and that planned operations for the rest of the year would not only exhaust the ASU’s but would produce a deficit of some 168 aircraft. Another sixty to seventy aircraft (30 initial equipment and another 30 to 40 for wastage) would have to be added to this prospective deficit if the Army were to receive the Blenheims. Sinclair also pointed out that it would take two months to train Lysander pilots on twin-engined aircraft; by the time the new Blenheim-reconnaissance squadrons were operational the single-engined Bermudas would have arrived and the conversion process would have to start all over again. Churchill was not convinced. He wrote back to Sinclair and said that “the Army must be given the modest force they require,” and that Army Co-operation Command should receive the Blenheims.51 Over the next six weeks a heated and almost hysterical correspondence ensued. Churchill was bombarded with letters from the CAS, the Secretary of State for Air, Lord Beaverbrook, and the CIGS, each arguing their respective case with increasing passion. Churchill did not want to impose a decision on this matter, but his patience with the Air Staff clearly had diminished. On 8 July, following yet another unsuccessful attempt to resolve this issue, Churchill asked the CAS to get together with the CIGS and find an immediate solution. Churchill also reminded the CAS that he himself was in favour of the Army Co-operation squadrons being re-equipped with Blenheims. Not surprisingly, the Army were awarded their desired aircraft the next day.52 This recent unpleasantness between the Air and General Staffs did nothing to improve the former’s reputation of being neither helpful nor willing to meet the Army’s basic air requirements. Nor did the joint anti-invasion exercises held first in July and again in September (Exercise Bumper) involving the Blenheims of No.2 Group. These exercises were intended to test and perfect the ground organisation and communications, the procedures for obtaining and using air reconnaissance, and the means best suited to provide the Army with offensive air support. Decentralisation of air reconnaissance to small army units and a series of breakdowns in the Close Support Bomber Controls (CSBC) communication system led to much confusion and frustration. As a result, the joint army-air staff at the Combined Central Operations Room (CCOR) seldom received sufficient information to advise the GOC and AOC on how best to employ their support aircraft; and many opportunities were lost. Consequently, without instructions from Army Headquarters and the CSBCs, the squadrons of No.2 Group turned to Bomber Command and their own communication system and method of acquiring air reconnaissance in order to carry out ground-support operations. In addition to the lack of intimate co-operation with No.2 Group, comparatively few requests for support came from the Army’s forward units (which were unaccustomed to using the CSBC tentacles allotted to them).53 These serious shortcomings, claimed the General Staff, illustrated “very clearly the inadequacy of the present organisation.” Not surprisingly they also

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reiterated their demand that the Army be provided with its own air support: organised, equipped, and trained for this purpose, and under the operational command and control of army commanders in the field.54 The Air Staff’s reply was equally predictable. They strongly rejected the General Staff’s notion that large numbers of bomber and fighter squadrons should form an integral part of the Army. Furthermore, they criticised their army counterparts for confusing a lack of co-operation with a lack of means and technical expertise. Shortages in aircraft and inexperience in method were not, in the Air Staff’s opinion, sufficient argument for changing their system. The Air Staff was encouraged by the recent exercises—even if the Army was not—that effective air support could be provided by regular, though specially trained, RAF bomber and fighter squadrons, once the ground organisation and communications were sorted out.55 Another impasse had arisen, and once again the Prime Minister felt compelled to intervene. On 11 July, Churchill wrote to the CAS about a series of complaints he had recently received from General Wavell at Middle East Headquarters over ineffective air co-operation; and on 14 July he wrote to the Secretary of State for Air expressing his concern over the deleterious relationship between the Army and the RAF in the UK.56 This led to a sharp exchange of minutes between the CAS and the Prime Minister. Churchill outlined his deep concern over “the lack of effective and intimate contact between the air and the ground forces” to the CAS, and the urgent need to “end this lamentable breakdown in the war machine.” He also expressed his strong desire that the RAF meet the needs of the Army in a helpful spirit because “if the Army is not well treated in the future, the Air Ministry will have failed in an essential part of its duties.”57 Portal was eager to dispel all notions that the Air Staff was responsible for the recent problems in meeting the Army’s air requirements. He assured the Prime Minister that the Army was, and would continue to be, “as well supported in the air as [the RAF’s] resources and other duties allowed.”58 Churchill, however, was not so easily persuaded. He responded with an even more ominous admonition: I have certainly sustained the impression that the Air Ministry in the past has been most hard and unhelpful both to the Army and to the Navy in meeting their special requirements. . . . I trust the Army’s grievances and complaints will be met.59

The RAF, however, was not the only object of Churchill’s displeasure. He was distressed by the Army’s fixation on narrow points of principle, usually manifested in a poorly disguised attempt to secure greater operational control over RAF aircraft, and too often at the expense of its more immediate and practical air requirements. This was the case in the Middle East where the Army had suffered a series of disappointing reverses in the spring, and now blamed the RAF for these failures. With a major offensive about to

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begin in the desert, Churchill was anxious to ensure that inadequate armyair co-operation did not precipitate another disaster. On 5 September he issued a Directive to the C-in-Cs Middle East in which he spelt out his views on the general provision of air support during a land battle. His instructions bore a very close resemblance to the recommendations made by the AOC-inC, Middle East, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, after the botched attempt to relieve Tobruk (Operation Battleaxe) in June.60 Churchill’s directive had an additional benefit of breaking the deadlock between the two services in the UK. At the end of October the Air and General Staffs reached an agreement on the methods and organisation for air support. Their conclusions were published in Army Training Instruction No.6. The new policy on air support reflected Air rather than General Staff opinion. Air support would be provided by an Army Co-operation Force (reconnaissance) under Army control and by bomber and fighter squadrons operating under a separate RAF command. The GOC and AOC (RAF) were to locate their operational headquarters adjacent to one another to ensure uninterrupted co-operation in the field. Offensive air support, which would be provided by regular though specially trained squadrons drawn from the main RAF Commands, was divided into three principal areas. Listed in their order of priority these were: air superiority, isolating the battlefield, and attacks against “tactical targets” on the battlefield itself. Examples of preferred targets were given, with strong emphasis being placed on targets selected according to a prearranged joint army/air plan. As such, enemy headquarters, signal communications, troop concentrations and artillery positions were singled out as being more vulnerable to air attack than deployed troops and armoured fighting vehicles. Opportunity and spontaneous targets both on and off the battlefield were not, however, ignored. They would be selected and attacked through the new Army Air Support Controls (AASC), which was the old CSBC system expanded and revised following No.2 Group’s summer and autumn trials with Home Forces.61 The new doctrine as it was set out in Army Training Instruction No.6 represented a significant advance in organisation and method over all previously agreed air support arrangements. It also provided the theoretical basis from which future operational technique developed; but in the autumn of 1941, it “represented the beliefs of the time, and not the confused and ineffective actuality.”62 One of the chief problems still unresolved was the scale of support the Army would receive. At the end of October the CIGS once more presented the General Staff’s case before the COS. He argued that a force of 109 squadrons—organised within the framework of the Army and equipped and trained with air support as its principal role—was essential to the Army’s ability to fight and defeat the enemy. “What is required now is that the basic principle underlying the General Staff conception of Air support for the Army,” Dill implored, “should be accepted and with it, in principle, the Army demands in the matter of numbers of squadrons

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required.”63 Portal, not surprisingly, disagreed. He restated the Air Staff’s recent proposals to meet both the short- and long-term needs of the Army, and he pledged that “no effort [would] be spared to make them a success” if the General Staff was willing to accept them.64 A quick agreement was not forthcoming, and a final decision eluded the Chiefs of Staff Committee. It was decided, therefore, to review this issue again in a fortnight’s time. At a meeting held on 13 November the respective positions of the CIGS and CAS were discussed, but once again a decision was deferred to a future date.65 Dill was not prepared to accept Portal’s compromise solution and the CAS could not offer anything more without altering the strategic direction of the war effort. Despite their inability to resolve this bitter dispute tempers cooled quickly. Matters of principle gave way to urgent practical concerns. Japan’s dramatic entry into the war and the collapse of Operation Crusader near Agedabia, both occurring in December, relegated the subject of army air support to the bottom of COS’s list of priorities where it languished until the spring of 1942.

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CHAPTER 7

Direct Air Support for the Army in the Western Desert Allied and Axis forces in the western desert of Egypt and Cyrenaica spent the summer months of 1941 building up their strength for what was expected to be the decisive encounter of the Desert War. The besieged port of Tobruk was the immediate focus of their attention: Rommel intent on capturing it and Auchinleck determined to relieve it. Their respective preparations, however, proceeded neither as quickly nor as smoothly as planned. Critical shortages in matériel necessary to sustain an offensive was a persistent hindrance. German supply convoys suffered heavy losses crossing the contested waters of the Mediterranean;1 whereas British reinforcement, dependent on the long journeys round the Cape of Good Hope and the Takoradi air route, often experienced lengthy delay. As such, neither side could, with confidence, set a firm date for their desired operations. Both commanders, therefore, had little choice but to bide their time until their logistics needs were met. Their respective forces, anxious with anticipation of the fated clash, trained for battle. For the British Army and the RAF it was time well spent. A War Office draft narrative of the Second Desert Campaign, written in 1945, describes this lull in the fighting as a period that was chiefly remarkable for the changes brought in command and organisation of both the army and RAF forces in the Western Desert, and the building up of air strength to a point at which it outnumbered the Axis air forces in everything except reconnaissance and transport aircraft.2

When the British offensive, Operation Crusader, began on 18 November 1941, total RAF air strength numbered some 657 aircraft of all types (the vast majority being of modern design although not of the most recent

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specifications) of which 554 were serviceable. German air strength was 244 (all types) but only 121 were fit for operations. The Regia Aeronautica contributed another 296 aircraft to the Axis order of battle: an estimated 192 were ready and available for combat.3 From these numbers it is clear that the British forces began the autumn battle with a sizeable advantage in air strength. The course of the battle, however, revealed that numerical superiority (while it provided a positive advantage to the side that enjoyed it) was not enough to ensure victory. Nonetheless, air operations were beginning to show signs of their potential decisiveness. For the RAF Middle East, the days of improvisation and subterfuge were slowly coming to an end. Out in the arid wastes of the Libyan desert a uniquely British system of integrating the efforts of the air and ground forces in battle was finally taking shape. The brief and unsuccessful attempt by British air and ground forces to relieve Tobruk in June (Operation Battleaxe) highlighted the unequivocal need for better joint training and a clearer understanding of the essential character of air participation in a land battle. Moreover, the urgency of meeting this requirement before the start of the next major battle was not lost on either the AOC-in-C or the GOC-in-C, Middle East. Both Air Marshal Tedder and General Auchinleck recognised the importance of air warfare in determining the eventual victor. Both commanders-in-chief were also eager and willing to work together in search of a solution to the problem of providing the army with effective air support. On their initiative an inter-service committee was formed in July to examine the whole question of the employment of air forces in support of a land offensive. In addition to the new committee’s inquiries, a series of joint practical experiments were conducted throughout July and August by No. 253 AC Wing and Eighth Army.4 The first exercise—Western Desert Exercise No. 3—took place over two days, on Friday and Saturday 11–12 July.5 Both offensive and defensive contingencies were studied. In either role the fundamental objective remained the same: to determine the most suitable targets for air attack and the ideal method of reconnoitring, engaging, and destroying them. Ground strafing methods using machine-guns and cannons, and bombing procedures ranging from level bombing at medium altitude (6,000–8,000 feet), through shallow dive, low-level (1,000–3,000 feet) and ground-level (below 50 feet) attack, employing a variety of types and weights of bombs, were examined. Fighter and light and medium bomber aircraft were also tested against each other in order to determine the most effective aircraft in any given air support role.6 By the end of August enough practical experience had been gained from No. 253 AC Wing’s summer trials for the inter-service committee to call a joint conference. At it the committee hoped to determine the policy for future joint army-air operations in the Middle East. The conference was held in Cairo on 4 September, and the first order of business was to set agreed terms of reference. A number of key phrases and words were redefined in an attempt to establish some degree of precision—accepted and

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understood by both airmen and soldiers—about the subject. It was agreed that from this date forward “action by the RAF in conjunction with the army [would] be known as Air Support.” The term was then subdivided into “Indirect Air Support” and “Direct Air Support”: the former being loosely defined as strategic air support that had an effect, though not necessarily an immediate one, on the battle between the opposing ground forces within a theatre of operations. Direct Air Support was defined as “air action having an immediate effect on the action of our own ground forces in battle.” It was this latter form of support that the army was most interested in, and, therefore, the one to which members of the joint committee devoted most of their attention. The term “close support” (offensive air support in close proximity to friendly ground troops in direct contact with enemy forces) was dropped from use owing to the confusion it had caused in the past over the impossibility of defining its accepted use and limitations.7 Henceforth the term Direct Air Support covered both offensive and defensive operations. Offensive support was that which assisted the army in attack by destroying enemy ground forces on the battlefield. Defensive support was air action designed to protect the army from enemy dive-bombers, and to impede or halt an enemy ground offensive. Both types of direct support could be either pre-planned (prearranged) or impromptu: both presupposed the existence of favourable conditions of air superiority to limit enemy air interference. Another precondition of the new support operations was that all aircraft so engaged were to be employed against “the most suitable and vulnerable targets.” Under no circumstances were aircraft to be scattered about the area of the ground operations in a haphazard fashion attacking targets of questionable consequence to the general outcome of the battle. Moreover, as in the past, strict observance of the principles of concentration and economy of force was emphasised.8 Provision of prearranged support did not present any particular difficulties. Targets and the timing of attacks would be decided in advance of the ground force’s operations through joint planning by the military and air commanders. Providing effective impromptu air support was much more problematic. Fluid operations, especially those of armoured formations on a nonlinear battlefield,9 put a premium on the speed of response of the supporting air forces. Identifying friend from foe from the air was another real obstacle still to be overcome. Both problems underscored the high degree of co-ordination that was required between the air and ground forces, and this in turn drew attention to the need to first devise, then institute, an efficient organisation and communication system (not to mention effective joint training and unremitting goodwill between the two services). In its search for a solution to this command and control dilemma, the Air Support Committee looked to the Wann-Woodall report10 for inspiration and guidance. The results of their deliberations were published on 30 September,

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and formed the basis of the system that controlled air support operations during Crusader.11 Before reaching this pivotal stage in the development of a truly cooperative, effective and flexible air support system, the committee struggled with the problem of devising a mutually agreed policy for the army’s defence against enemy dive-bombers. The soldiers wanted a fighter umbrella maintained over their positions. Once a dive-bomber attack began, they argued, there was insufficient time to call in fighter support. This view found little favour among the airmen, who concluded correctly that standing patrols were an extremely wasteful means of providing air defence. Moreover, even if they were willing to comply with the army’s wishes, the RAF in the Middle East did not possess anywhere near enough aircraft for such matérielintensive operations. The best solution, they countered, was fighter-sweeps scheduled to coincide at the time German bomber attacks were most likely. Continuous protection, if it were to be provided, would have to come from the army itself using anti-aircraft guns.12 As the respective positions of the airmen and the soldiers in the Middle East hardened, an agreement between them seemed increasingly unlikely. A similar situation unfolded in London, where Churchill, in his capacity as Minister of Defence, discussed the subject of air support and air defence for the ground forces with the Chiefs of Staff. After much debate, and a private consultation with the Chief of the Air Staff, Churchill drafted the following instruction: Nevermore must the ground troops expect, as a matter of course, to be protected from the air by aircraft. If this can be done it must only be as a happy make-weight and as a piece of good luck. Above all, the idea of keeping standing patrols of aircraft over moving columns should be abandoned. It is unsound to distribute aircraft in this way, and no air superiority will stand any large application of such a mischievous practice.13

In addition to his sharp comment on the army’s unrealistic expectations of what the RAF could provide in the way of defence from air attack, Churchill ordered 250 Bofors anti-aircraft guns sent to General Auchinleck immediately. They were to be employed in the general area of the army’s offensive operations, where they would provide air defence for troop assembly points, fuel and ammunition dumps, and columns on the move. Churchill’s memorandum spelt out the policy to be adopted for the army’s protection from air attack, but it did not stop here: he further used this opportunity to set forth his views on the general provision of air support during a land battle. In doing so, not only did Churchill provide executive guidance for the air support arrangements that would be used in Crusader but he also established an authoritative definition of the general precepts of the “combined operation,” which the Army and the RAF adhered to

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throughout the rest of the war. Because of their fundamental importance, Churchill’s views are quoted here in full: Upon the military Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East announcing that a battle is in prospect, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief will give him all possible aid irrespective of other targets, however attractive. Victory in the battle makes amends for all, and creates new favourable situations of a decisive character. The Army Commander-in-Chief will specify to the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief the targets and tasks which he requires to be performed, both in the preparatory attack on the rearward installations of the enemy and for air action during the progress of the battle. It will be for the AOC-in-C to use his maximum force on these objects in the manner most effective. This applies not only to any squadrons assigned to army co-operation permanently, but also to the whole air force available in the theatre. Bombers may, if required, be used as transport or supply machines to far-ranging or outlying columns of troops, the sole object being the success of the military operation. As the interests of the two Cs-in-C are identical it is not thought that any difficulty should arise. The AOC-in-C would naturally lay aside all routine programmes and concentrate on bombing the rearward services of the enemy in the preparatory period. This he would do not only by night, but by day attacks with fighter protection. In this process he will bring about a trial of strength with the enemy fighters, and has the best chance of obtaining local command of the air. What is true of the preparatory period applies with even greater force during the battle. All assembly or refuelling points for marching columns of the enemy should be attacked by bombing during daylight with strong fighter protection, thus bringing about air conflicts not only of the highest importance in themselves but directly contributing to the general result.14

Churchill issued his instructions as a Directive to the Army and Air Force Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, on 5 September. He emphasised the paramount importance of “local command of the air” (air superiority) and he specified the desired roles of bombers and fighters in direct support operations. More than this, his concept of the combined operation was very similar to that already advocated by Tedder, following the shortcomings revealed during Operation Battleaxe. As such, he cleared the way for the Air Marshal’s suggestions to become the basis of the new accepted policy. Churchill confirmed the RAF’s independence as a separate service on equal terms with the Army and the Royal Navy. He also decreed that future co-operation was to come from a combined plan of action drafted by the services working together as equals. Unity of purpose would be their guide: “air support would be the function, not of ‘special’ aircraft designed and allocated for the purpose, but of ‘the whole available air power’” concentrated to achieve a common objective.15 Consequently, Churchill’s directive gave renewed impetus to the work of the Middle East inter-service committee on Air Support. The committee

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laboured throughout September turning principles and theory into practical instructions for operations. By the end of the month their task was completed, and on 30 September the Middle East (Army and RAF) Directive on Direct Air Support16 was issued under the signatures of the joint Commanders-in-Chief. New techniques for target selection, recognition, and attack were spelt out in detail, as were procedures for the transmission of information between the Army and the RAF up and down the entire chain of command in the field, briefing aircrews, and maintaining the state of readiness of aircraft tasked to the support role. In the course of the development of army air co-operation, it was perhaps the single most important directive issued during the war. It incorporated the agreed definitions of terms from the committee’s first meeting of 4 September, the recommendations that came out of No.253 Army Co-operation Wing’s joint exercises with the army, and Churchill’s directions. But its seminal contribution to the development of British air support technique was the introduction of an innovative joint command structure—Air Support Control (ASC)—to control the combined air-land operations that lay ahead.17 The Air Support Control system was devised to ensure direct air support was obtained when and where required from the available aircraft in an active theatre of war. An ASC was allotted to each corps and armoured division to meet, modify, or reject requests for support: its headquarters being established as part of the headquarters of the corps or armoured division to which it was attached. Each ASC—which was fully mobile—contained an army and an air force component consisting of a small staff and an intricate wireless organisation. Two-way wireless telegraphy (W/ T), called a tentacle, linked the ASC to each brigade. An RAF team, known as a Forward Air Support Link (FASL), was also attached to each brigade headquarters. FASLs were equipped with two-way radio telephony (R/ T) to control supporting aircraft and to talk with aircraft on tactical reconnaissance sorties. Rear Air Support Links (RASL) using two-way R/ T connected both airfields and advanced landing grounds with ASC headquarters (ASCHQ). The RAF staff at ASCHQ also had two-way R/ T with the support aircraft and one-way R/ T with tactical reconnaissance aircraft to listen in on their communication with the FASLs.18 By means of this new system, forward troops could make air support requests that would be considered immediately and, if granted, met promptly. ASCHQ would receive them from three principal sources: tactical reconnaissance aircraft on routine patrol, reconnaissance aircraft sent by ASC on special tasks, and brigade commanders by way of the tentacles allotted to them. Each request was evaluated by the ASC in accordance with the overall picture of the battle, the suitability of the target, and the availability of appropriate aircraft. If accepted, the RAF commander at ASCHQ would notify the appropriate landing ground over the RASL. The army formation would be told, via the tentacle, that its request was either accepted or refused; if

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the former, the ground commander would be told the proposed time of attack and the number of aircraft despatched. Standard types of codes and abbreviations were adopted to minimise the time taken in transmitting calls for air support, and to avoid misunderstandings that might result from the vernacular peculiarities of each Service.19 Once an air support mission was ordered, aircraft were directed to their target in one of three ways: they were given the exact location before leaving their landing ground, they were met by a reconnaissance aircraft and led to the target, or they were guided from the ground by the FASL at the army formation’s headquarters. Bomb lines were expressed as ground features, and ground markings as well as coloured flares and Verey lights were used to distinguish friend from foe. During operations, 50 percent of the aircraft available for support were maintained at “instant readiness.” Another 25 percent were to be ready within two hours: the remainder were held back in reserve.20 These procedures were tested, and proved satisfactory, in No.253 Wing’s summer trials.21 The system thus outlined represented a great improvement over the communication, command, and control arrangements employed during Operation Battleaxe, and much of the later success can be attributed to decisions taken just prior to Crusader.22 The first two ASCs were created on 8 October. Further exercises led to some modifications in organisation,23 but the ASC, very much unaltered, proved itself in battle to be the first really efficient method of controlling the air side of a land campaign. Operation Crusader, or, as it is sometimes called, “the Winter Battle,” was not inordinately different in its conception from earlier British offensives in the desert. The general aim was to engage and defeat Axis forces occupying Cyrenaica. The RAF was [t]o gain air superiority and if possible destroy the Axis air forces in Cyrenaica, thus providing the Eighth Army with assistance and the maximum protection against enemy air interference during its concentration and advance.24

In practice, this meant an initial air battle to establish RAF dominance over the contested ground (fought by fighters) and attacks on enemy rear areas (medium and heavy bombers). Preferred targets for the bombers included enemy airfields, headquarters, supply depots, and troop concentrations. Both fighters and bombers had their own specific responsibilities and in general they fought as separate formations.25 During the battle for air superiority, the few fighter-bomber and light bomber squadrons specifically assigned to direct support waited in readiness for the moment the army needed them. General Cunningham (GOC Eighth Army) and Air Vice-Marshal Coningham (AOC Western Desert Air Force) agreed before the battle that local air superiority was of first importance, and that provision of direct support should never jeopardise this essential

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requirement. They also agreed that support, when it was provided, would be directed against vulnerable targets such as thin-skinned vehicles: attacks by enemy tanks were the army’s responsibility. ASC, as it was originally conceived, allowed for decentralised deployment of support aircraft (theoretically to give the army quick results). But both Coningham and Cunningham recognised that the entire bomber force might be required on occasion to operate against a single target. Centralised command and control was therefore necessary to ensure that all available aircraft could be concentrated in the event of such an eventuality. With Cunningham’s consent, Coningham retained operational control of all air support. Two days before Crusader began, Coningham established his advanced air headquarters next to Cunningham’s “Battle Headquarters” in the Khamsa area.26 This change effectively reduced the operational authority of the ASCs at corps headquarters, and limited their role to passing messages received from reconnaissance aircraft and forward army formations to the AOCin-C WDAF for his decision on the appropriate action. Support squadrons were kept informed of the various requests being made by means of the RASLs, thereby reducing to a minimum the time taken to put the AOC-inC’s decisions into effect. Four essential conditions emerged out of this late modification: the Desert Air Force retained its flexibility of response, the army was not shortchanged in terms of the direct support it could receive from the RAF, the AOC-in-C was in a good position to view the battle as a whole, and intimate relations between the two services were established at the highest command level at the very front of the battle. When the ground phase of Operation Crusader opened on 18 November 1941, there was every reason for optimism. The two services had at last constructed not only a theoretically sound but also a practical, working partnership. Air operations as devised and executed during Crusader revealed a pattern that quickly became the standard method of applying air power in support of a land campaign. Bombing attacks on enemy rear areas and the battle for air superiority (to cover the ground forces’ move forward) were followed by ASC directed support against enemy troops. All types of aircraft were employed in “round-the-clock” operations of maximum effort. Surprise, the intensity of the air effort and, on this occasion, waterlogged Luftwaffe airfields at Gazala and Gambut—where most of the German fighter force was stationed—all contributed to RAF dominance in the air. Favourable conditions and successful preliminary operations also enabled the light bombers and fighter-bombers of the army co-operation squadrons to contribute to the land battle from the outset. They enjoyed appreciable success against concentrations of thin-skinned vehicles and severely restricted enemy movement on and around the battlefield. In particular, the hard-pressed British armour received invaluable assistance from the RAF in checking Rommel’s bold counterattack across the Egyptian frontier. From 24 to 27 November the light bombers averaged over seventy “effective sorties”27 per day

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in direct support.28 Rommel, with his Panzers badly mauled, was forced to withdraw. The “marked feature of operations to date,” wrote General Auchinleck in a congratulatory telegram to Tedder, “has been our complete air supremacy and excellent co-operation between ground and air.”29 Tobruk was relieved on 10 December, and the army once again continued to drive westward to Tripolitania. Co-operation between land and air forces was beginning to work, and to work well. Similar to their predecessors a year earlier, Coningham and Cunningham (and as of 25 November, Cunningham’s successor, Major-General Neil Ritchie)30 shared a healthy desire to co-operate: the difference during Crusader being that a comprehensive system was in place to command and co-ordinate the air support effort. In the unforgiving arena of battle a number of new ideas and practices turned in successful results. “Not only has the fighter force provided almost complete protection” noted Ritchie in a letter to Coningham, “but time and again the Bomber Striking Force has seriously disorganised the enemy, often in answer to calls from my troops. . . . ”31 The ASCs were a clear advance over previous arrangements and Army-RAF communications were maintained throughout the battle without any serious breakdown.32 Fighters also demonstrated their exceptional versatility as support aircraft. In addition to their speed and ability to defend themselves in a reconnaissance role, they served as fighter-bombers and as gun platforms (using their cannon and machine-guns) strafing enemy vehicles. The fighter was distinguishing itself as a real alternative to the accurate but slow and vulnerable dive-bomber.33 Coningham’s decision to break his tactical reconnaissance squadrons into three mobile, self-contained, and self-sustaining parts, in order that flights could “leap-frog” forward to new landing grounds while still maintaining continuous cover, proved to be another stroke of genius.34 The new air support system was indeed a real improvement over past technique, but it would be unrealistic to think that it could work perfectly from the first test in battle. As is the case with most new procedures, especially farreaching ones that are hastily implemented, a number of problems emerged that required more thought and attention. Impromptu requests were not met quickly enough, and the support control system required streamlining. Throughout the campaign there was an average time lag of two and a half to three hours between the call for support and the time the aircraft attacked the target. Unfamiliarity with new methods accounted for much of the trouble though not all. There were delays in the relay of messages between the ASC at corps headquarters and battle headquarters, as well as in briefing pilots. Additional time was lost when bombers rendezvoused with their fighter escorts, when they attempted to find their targets in the featureless desert and, toward the end of the campaign, when bomber airfields were as many as 200 miles behind the advance line of operations.35 These were serious deficiencies, but they could be solved easily enough (as most were by the

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spring of 1942) with minor adjustments and further joint service practice.36 The same could not be said of meeting the army’s needs at the forefront of the battle once the offensive unfolded and confusion on the battlefield increased. The familiar difficulty of identifying enemy and friendly forces remained unresolved: the most striking failure taking place south of Gazala between 13 and 16 December. Despite unchallenged air supremacy, RAF bombers remained “at call” on their landing grounds while one of the great opportunities to defeat the Germans in detail slowly slipped away. For four days Rommel’s battered armour was concentrated near Sidi Breghisc where it was in constant danger of encirclement and destruction. First a lack of petrol immobilised the 7th Armoured Division, thus preventing it from blocking Rommel’s retreat; second, poor army communications made it difficult to determine the exact location of friendly forces in close proximity to the enemy. Neither Eighth Army nor 13 Corps headquarters were able to establish a bomb line beyond which targets could be attacked without endangering British troops. Consequently, not a single bomb was dropped. Coningham reported his “sense of deep frustration with the army’s ineptitude” to Tedder. For the airmen, explanation for the lamentable state of affairs was very clear: until the army exercised better control over its own operations, RAF support would be restricted to attacks on the enemy’s vulnerable rear areas (which was undertaken with notable success) rather than on the battlefield.37 In addition to learning new skills for combined operations with the RAF, Eighth Army had much to learn about armoured warfare. Neither Cunningham nor Ritchie had experience commanding tanks or operating against enemy armour. British tactics were noteworthy for their sheer amateurism, especially when compared with German techniques.38 This shortcoming received added emphasis in December when Ritchie’s forces (13 Corps) chased Rommel’s retreating army to Benghazi and beyond. At the end of the month, the Germans halted near Agedabia, where they administered a severe beating to the 22nd Armoured Brigade. On 28 December thirty-seven British tanks were destroyed, and two days later another twenty-three out of sixty-two were lost. Germans losses totalled fourteen tanks (from a maximum force of sixty) during the three-day engagement. Following their tactical victory the Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK) withdrew to prepared positions at El Agheila to reorganise and refit. No requests were made for air support by the beleaguered British armour, which also fought this battle without essential infantry support. Yet despite the Eighth Army’s recent setback, Crusader accomplished its objectives (albeit a month later than projected) and, of perhaps greater importance, was a victory for the new air support system. More than 12,000 effective operational sorties were flown by the WDAF during the course of the land offensive, and slightly more than 70 percent of this effort was devoted to direct support.39

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By mid-January British forward patrols occupied positions similar to those they had reached with such high hopes a year earlier. But prolonged operations against a tenacious enemy and the exigencies of desert warfare— bad weather, protracted distances, sand, and interminable maintenance troubles—left the Eighth Army and the Western Desert Air Force enervated and ill-equipped to complete their victory. Once again British forces in the Western Desert had overreached themselves. Substantial reinforcement was necessary if the offensive was to continue, and it was not immediately forthcoming. Japan’s entry into the war on 7 December, when carrier-based aircraft attacked and severely damaged the U.S. Pacific Fleet in port at Pearl Harbor, threatened British colonies and protectorates in Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma, and India, not to mention Australia and New Zealand. Reinforcement that otherwise would have proceeded to the Middle East was diverted to the Far East. Tedder was also compelled to send 450 of his own aircraft to the Pacific theatre. For the WDAF this depletion in strength could not have come at a worse time. In addition to making up combat losses in aircrews and aircraft, RAF Hurricanes and Tomahawks were outclassed by the Luftwaffe’s Me109F, and their replacement was a matter of some urgency. Tedder, therefore, had good reason to be concerned about the weakened state of his air forces.40 Analysing and assimilating the lessons of Crusader was another essential matter relegated to a later date by unanticipated events. On 21 January 1942, Rommel surprised his opponents with a reconnaissance in strength. “The improbable occurred,” wrote General Auchinleck, “and without warning the enemy began to advance.” Two unmolested Axis convoys had reached Tripoli earlier in the month. They provided the German general with muchneeded reinforcement, especially in tanks, aircraft, and fuel. Aided by bad weather, which severely curtailed RAF operations, Rommel’s replenished forces advanced some eighty miles on the first day and seized Antelalat. The WDAF was forced to abandon its advanced landing grounds and withdraw to Msus and Gazala: the new extended range of operations further limiting the air force’s ability to contribute to the battle.41 By the end of the week the Germans were back in Benghazi. Perhaps the men of the retreating British forces experienced an ominous sense of déja` vu during their sudden withdrawal eastward; if they did, then they should be forgiven for their pessimism as well as for harbouring even the darkest of thoughts. They had been in this unenviable situation before, eventually ending up back in Egypt battered and defeated. History would repeat itself in the spring of 1942, but there would be one distinct difference from the previous year’s reversal: the RAF, more confident and comfortable with its new air support system, was able to fight effectively going both backwards and forwards.42 Despite depleted strength, bad weather, and the disruption caused by the withdrawal, the WDAF gave effective support to the Army during its retreat to the Gazala-Bir Hacheim line. On 5 February, while the soldiers hastily

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prepared defensive positions, RAF aircraft (flying out of Gambut and El Adem) destroyed over 100 Axis vehicles. Short of supplies, and with most of his transport burning behind him, Rommel’s impromptu attack ground to a halt. In the fortnight since the enemy offensive began, the WDAF had flown just over two thousand sorties. Coningham’s efforts to ensure both greater mobility of forward squadrons and uninterrupted control through the new signals arrangements had indeed returned positive results.43 Once again a lull descended over the desert battlefield as the two armies, exhausted by the intensity and pace of twelve weeks of fighting, endeavoured to build up their resources for the next engagement.44 It was an opportunity also to adjust establishments and organisations. In particular, the RAF set to the task of incorporating the lessons learnt from the recent battles. But, unlike previous periods of post-battle analysis, this time the airmen were not encumbered with either recriminations from the soldiers or tortuous interservice discussions over points of principle: they were free to concentrate their efforts on revising operational and tactical procedures. Their main objectives were to tighten up the ASC system, improve navigation and target identification techniques, and reduce the response time of support operations. A series of amendments were incorporated in Middle East (Army and RAF) Training Pamphlet No.3—Direct Air Support, which was re-issued as No.3A in March 1942.45 Foremost among the changes was the official endorsement of Coningham’s improvisations to ASC command and control.46 Immediately before Operation Crusader, Coningham centralised all air support allocated for the land campaign under his command at Combined Army/Air Battle Headquarters. The two services had agreed on the governing principle: “Air support to be effective required the employment of concentrations of aircraft.” Unified command and control enabled the AOC to allocate an appropriate proportion of fighters and bombers for direct support in accordance with the general air situation and the progress of the ground offensive. An additional amendment, garnered from the recent campaign experience, eliminated the ASC link at corps as a conduit that relayed air support requests from forward ground units to the ASC at Combined Headquarters. Forward tentacles were to present their requests direct to ASCHQ to expedite the provision of impromptu support. The air liaison system was also expanded, enabling all wings supporting the army to have direct military representation.47 Additional steps were taken by the army to assist pilots with air ground recognition and to solve the vexed problem of establishing a bomb line. During Crusader some British vehicles displayed a white St. Andrew’s Cross painted on a black background. This had not been entirely satisfactory and the RAF suggested the army change its “marking” to the RAF roundel since it was “a sign for which all pilots were on continual watch in the air.” Eventually the RAF roundel was adopted but not before the next active phase of land operations. Two other recommendations found more immediate

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favour. Forward ground formations expecting air support were to mark their positions. By day landmarks took the form of bold letters of the alphabet (20 yards in length), and by night lighted petrol cans (a large inverted V sign with sides 100 yards long) pointed directly toward the enemy. The army also agreed to pass hourly forecasts of the positions of its forward troops to ASC. These adjustments proved their value in subsequent operations and enabled direct support to be given with a greater degree of accuracy.48 By the summer of 1942 much had been accomplished to improve the tactical method of direct air support, including in May the conversion of No.239 Fighter Wing to a fighter-bomber unit equipped with the new American-built Kittyhawks.49 Still, Tedder worried about the continued uncertainty surrounding the establishment of truly effective co-ordination between the two services. Direct support was a joint-service venture. Did the army understand that its actions and operations had as much to do with the successful provision of air support as the efforts of the air force? Tedder was not convinced that it had. He believed that the soldiers ignored this precept to an alarming degree. The solution to better air support, Tedder counselled—and not for the first time—rested “on better control of the land force which depends on better communications plus training.”50 These were not shortcomings the air force could redress on its own. The most recent period of reflection came to an end on 26 May when Rommel recommenced his offensive. Fast-moving German columns swept the combined British and Empire forces off the Gazala line and drove them back to El Alamein, nearly 220 miles inside the Egyptian frontier. During five weeks of heavy fighting—some of the most bitter fighting of the desert campaigns—the British armour was defeated in detail, Tobruk was captured (29 June), and the intimate air support link between the Army and the RAF was shattered.51 As one British historian aptly wrote, this defeat “marked the nadir of Britain’s military fortunes during the war.”52 The air support system that had taken so long to establish, and on which so much had rested, collapsed under the strain of the army’s steady disintegration. By the third week of June the WDAF was fighting independently, selecting its targets on the basis of its own reconnaissance. Casualties were high, especially in the fighter force, which lost some 202 aircraft in a desperate attempt to check the enemy’s advance.53 Though makeshift, it was this independent air support that enabled the Eighth Army to retreat “virtually unmolested” to the Alamein Line—thirty-eight miles of featureless desert between the Mediterranean coast and the Qattara Depression—where it prepared for a final defensive stand west of the Nile Delta.54

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CHAPTER 8

Debate, Decision, and Policy in 1942 On 10 March 1942 the question of air support for the Army returned to the COS Committee’s agenda with a vengeance. The CIGS, General Sir Alan Brooke,1 reopened the debate by demanding the immediate provision of the Army’s minimum air requirements as set out by the General Staff almost a year earlier in May 1941. Increased slightly, Brooke said it amounted to 111 squadrons of specialised aircraft designed solely for close co-operation with the land forces, and another 207 squadrons of transport aircraft modified to meet both the Army’s airborne troops and airlift needs. This proposed force would form an “integral component” of the Army and would be under its operational control. Any additional support, namely fighter protection and air attack against enemy troops by bombers, still would come on allotment (in the form of a contingent) from the “independent air forces.” At the standard number of twelve aircraft per RAF squadron (initial equipment), however, the CIGS had asked for some 4,101 aircraft to be assigned permanently to limited and specialised army/air support roles; it was a demand that exceeded the first-line strength of the entire RAF.2 Despite the extravagance, Brooke’s demands appeared justified to many senior army officers. The indecisiveness of Operation Crusader in the Middle East, the fall of Singapore, and the lamentable course of the fighting in the Far East were cited by the General Staff as proof that the Army had been poorly provided with essential air support. “The outstanding lesson of the war,” Brooke declared, was that “land forces inadequately supported from the air are doomed to failure” when they are confronted by a first-class enemy who is well supported by a modern air force.3 Brooke also expressed his frustration with the Air Staff for its failure to build up Army Co-operation Command to twenty full-strength squadrons (as Portal had promised in

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November) and for the deplorable state of No.2 Group, whose effective strength had dissipated over the winter months of 1941–1942 through a combination of neglect and intense operations. The plight of 2 Group was all that more poignant for the soldiers as evidence mounted against the effectiveness of the strategic air offensive.4 Worrisome doubts about its efficacy did not, however, lead to a major shift in British strategy. Churchill and the War Cabinet maintained their enthusiasm for an all-out bombing campaign against Germany. As such, aircraft production continued to concentrate on producing large four-engined heavy bombers that had little application to army co-operation. With the entry of the United States into the war, and American pressure for an early invasion of the continent, it seemed increasingly unlikely that the British Army in the UK could participate in a major campaign at an early date. Consequently, Brooke warned the COS Committee that if the General Staff’s requirements were not met quickly, “there will be no alternative but for the Army to be given its own Army Air Arm. . . . ”5 Portal, in an erudite and exhaustive memorandum written to the Defence Committee on 1 April, presented the Air Staff’s official reply to the War Office’s most recent accusations and demands.6 He challenged the CIGS’s charge that the Air Ministry had failed to deliver on its promises to build up Army Co-operation Command and No.2 Group (proposals that the General Staff had neither accepted nor rejected), and that it had deliberately ignored the Army’s air support requirements not only in the UK but also in both the Middle East and the Far East. There was a disturbing tendency at the War Office, Portal noted, “to confuse lack of co-operation with lack of means to co-operate.”7 The Air Ministry, Portal restated, did not dispute the need to provide the Army and the Royal Navy with full air co-operation, and he assured the CIGS that when the Army engaged in major continental operations it would have the maximum support of the whole Metropolitan Air Force. Critical shortages of aircraft, Portal noted, for all commands not just Army Co-operation Command and No.2 Group of Bomber Command, was a harsh reality of an “acutely difficult period” of the war. Supply did not meet demand. Furthermore, the growing importance of air strength in all its forms exacerbated the hard-pressed aircraft supply position and contributed toward making a bad situation worse. If the Air Ministry met the CIGS’s demands for large, highly specialised air forces under direct Army control, and provided the navy with coastal commands all around the world, Portal cautioned, then an independent RAF capable of concentrating to achieve strategic objectives would cease to exist. Careful management was what was required to derive the maximum benefits from finite air resources; and for both Portal and the Air Staff this meant employing an effective system of centralised control, not dividing the air force up into specialised army and navy components.8 Portal’s criticisms then turned personal. He inveighed against the CIGS for his ludicrous assertions that the Air Ministry had been in a position to

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support the Army in the Far East but chose not to do so. Once again, the chief problem hinged on the question of supply. Resources were insufficient to meet the air support needs of both the Middle and the Far East. The decision to give priority to the former rather than the latter was made by the Defence Committee and not, as the CIGS had implied, the Air Ministry. Portal also made the point that the effectiveness of the air support available in the Far East “was severely compromised by the speed with which our aerodromes were over run.”9 Similar problems had been a regular feature in the Western Desert whenever the Army was forced to retreat. The soldiers tended to withdraw without informing the airmen of their actions and consequently exposed RAF advanced airfields to sudden attack and capture. A year earlier Portal debated many of these same issues with General Dill. Then, and now with Brooke, he reduced the impasse over the Army’s air requirements to its two basic issues: the provision of larger air forces for co-operation, and their organisation when fighting with an army in the field.10 On this occasion, however, Portal could draw on clear and recent empirical evidence to support his case. The first problem over the provision of air forces had been tackled by the Air Ministry in a series of detailed proposals at the end of 1941; proposals that the War Office still had neither accepted nor rejected. Over the preceding four years the various arrangements and concessions offered by the Air Ministry to meet the Army’s air requirements—and there were many—were never embraced by the War Office as being quite enough to satisfy its ever-changing demands. Every Secretary of State for War and CIGS from Hore-Belisha and Gort through to and including Grigg and Brooke used each major inter-service disagreement as a justification to call for the creation of a separate army air arm. Moreover, their demands not only demonstrated a blatant disregard for all other applications of British air power but also revealed a serious professional failure to grasp the efficacy of them. An agreed joint-service solution to the air support dilemma, therefore, seemed unlikely as long as the General Staff held out hopes of attaining its ill-advised and parochial ends. It was a grave situation, particularly at this stage of the war, but the likelihood of attaining a solution in the immediate future was not as bleak as the deadlock in London appeared to suggest. Out in the Libyan desert the recent fighting revealed a possible answer. Operation Crusader was the first truly combined British operation of the war where sufficient aircraft were present to achieve decisive results. Air superiority was established from the start and never lost. Subsequently, air reconnaissance and air attack on enemy ground targets proceeded more or less unimpeded and with positive effect. The favourable results were a testament to the effectiveness of the new air control system established just prior to the start of Crusader. Conceived by Tedder, imposed by Churchill, and practised by Coningham with Auchinleck’s support, the full weight of the RAF Middle East fought alongside the

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Army not as an ancillary arm but as an independent air force working with the ground forces to achieve a common strategic objective.11 War experience proved that general air superiority was the first priority of air forces assisting an army in battle. Portal therefore advised the members of the Defence Committee that when fighting with limited air resources against an enemy of comparable quality and strength “only a centralised and flexible organisation can achieve . . . the air situation in which naval and land forces can operate [successfully].” Crusader had confirmed Tedder’s deduction. Consequently Portal urged the committee to adopt the principles of the Middle East system as the basis for developing future army support.12 Additional and indirect endorsement of Portal’s recommendation came from the British Press, which chided the Army for its poor showing to date in the war. Leading letters in the national quality papers referred to the Army high command as a collection of “blimps and bone-heads, barren of strategical conceptions, thinking in terms of the last war, devoid of powers of leadership and incidentally of guts.”13 Such vitriol was both unkind and unfair, but it reflected a real sense of public dissatisfaction with the Army’s performance and the fatuous excuses often made by its senior officers for repeated defeats in the field. Three and a half years was an awfully long time for the generals to blame allies, the RAF, and virtually everyone else for the Army’s consistent and all too predictable failures without taking any personal responsibility.14 The Army did need more tanks and aircraft, in addition to other essential equipment, but no amount of modern weaponry on its own could obviate systemic deficiencies in basic doctrine and operational procedures. With some justification military correspondents, such as Frank Owen of the Evening Standard, claimed that the British Army did not know how to fight and win a modern war. Owen wrote that success in battle depended on the co-operation of all arms and services working together to exploit their unique capabilities, not one being ancillary to another. He came to this conclusion after reading a recent German manual on infantry regulations,15 but he would have reached the same one had he been able to read Portal’s memorandum to the Defence Committee. Portal’s memorandum was circulated but not discussed at the Defence Committee. Nevertheless, Churchill directed a minute to the COS arising out of it on 8 April. The Prime Minister had two objectives in mind. First, he made his own views on the creation of a separate army air force clear when he unequivocally rejected Brooke’s demands. “The requirements of the General Staff for the Army appear to be out of all proportion to existing or prospective resources,” Churchill told the COS, “and if satisfied would be destructive of the principle of an independent Royal Air Force.” Aircraft, Churchill correctly judged, were far too valuable to Britain’s war effort as a whole to be allotted permanently and in large numbers to Army units for their exclusive use. Second, the Prime Minister wanted the divisive matter of the Army’s air support resolved quickly. He saw in Portal’s paper both

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a convenient and a useful starting point. Churchill, therefore, urged the COS to give the Air Ministry’s proposal “careful consideration.” He saw no justification for the Army’s exorbitant demands, and he urged the General Staff to re-examine the Air Staff’s proposals “with a view to accepting fair points and minimizing differences.”16 Churchill’s instructions were not well received at the War Office and Brooke, in particular, chafed at the rebuke he and his General Staff colleagues had just received from the Prime Minister. The situation was made worse by Brooke’s own obsession with turning his view on what constituted adequate air support for the Army into reality. He was adamant that the Army should have its own specialised aircraft, trained and organised with support as their primary role, under its operational command.17 Anything less was unacceptable. Brooke arrived at this conclusion innocently enough after his experiences during the debacle in France in 1940, but by the spring of 1942 he had become a fanatic.18 He was convinced that the RAF wanted to fight its own separate war, and that Air Staff policy conspired against meeting the Army’s legitimate needs. Numerous entries in Brooke’s diary during the spring of 1942 reveal his increasing frustration with the Air Staff and the strategic direction of the war (namely the strategic air offensive), and his single-minded belief that the creation of an army air arm was the only possible solution to the air support dilemma. Nothing the Air Staff either did or said dissuaded him from his increasingly intractable conviction. Even after a series of informal meetings and lunches with Portal, Freeman,19 Sinclair, Grigg, and Churchill—specifically held to find a mutually acceptable solution to the problem of the Army’s air support—Brooke was unwilling to change his position. Summing up yet another failed attempt to reach a settlement, Brooke wrote in his diary on 18 May: We make no headway at all, and are exactly where we were before. The situation is hopeless and I see no solution besides the provision of an Army Air Arm.20

On 19 May the debate returned once again to the more formal arena of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Two supplementary papers restated the respective positions of the CIGS and the CAS;21 and the meeting itself started inauspiciously with a heated argument between the two service Chiefs.22 Despite the initial difficulties, Portal and Brooke reached an agreement on a number of points. Army Co-operation Command was to be built up to twenty bomber and fighter squadrons of modern types by 1 September 1942. No.2 Group, Bomber Command, was also to be built up to twenty squadrons (subject to overseas commitments and the delivery of American bombers) for army support, and fifteen of Fighter Command’s cannon-fighter squadrons (the RAF’s answer to the German dive-bomber and the tactical inadequacies of its own light bombers) were to be made available to train and operate

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with the Army. They were unable to agree, however, on the relationship between No.2 Group and Army Co-operation Command, the scale of army co-operation squadrons allotted to army commanders in the Middle East, and a programme to produce transport aircraft in the United Kingdom. Excluding the question of the transport aircraft, the main disagreement between the CIGS and the CAS was what it had always been—a dispute over organisation and control.23 Brooke wanted No.2 Group transferred to Army Co-operation Command. It would increase GHQ Home Forces’ air component to forty squadrons, all under its operational command and readily available for training purposes. Portal rejected this request, citing the Air Staff’s view that it was wrong to withdraw squadrons from operations for full-time training with the Army until there was a definite prospect of them undertaking support missions. Considerable training, Portal said, could be done without removing No.2 Group from its regular bombing operations. The two service Chiefs also disagreed over a similar issue on the Eighth Army’s control of aircraft in the Western Desert. Six fighter reconnaissance squadrons had been allotted to the military commanders whilst the remainder of the RAF Middle East’s available aircraft24 —under the command of the AOC-in-C Western Desert Air Force— provided direct support for the ground troops in accordance with the terms of the Prime Minister’s directive of August 1941. First tried in Crusader, these arrangements provided the Army with the highest standard of air support yet achieved. The General Staff, however, believed that intimate air/land co-operation required a substantial increase in the number of squadrons devolved to direct army command and control. Fifteen fighter and bomber reconnaissance squadrons were cited as being the Eighth Army’s minimum requirement; a figure, not surprisingly, rejected by the Air Staff. The COS discussed both of these issues on 23 May, and again on 12 July, but failed to resolve the outstanding differences between the CIGS and the CAS and secure an agreement. In between these two meetings the General Staff put forward another proposal, this time drafted by Air Commodore Henry Thorold and Colonel Claude Oxborrow, two senior staff officers at GHQ, Home Forces. Within the auspices of Army Co-operation Command and therefore under the control of GHQ Home Forces, the War Office now sought the formation of a new RAF Army Air Support Group (AAS Gp)—a composite group that included fighter-reconnaissance and bomberreconnaissance aircraft organised on a mobile field-force basis. Initially, the Group would consist of twelve squadrons of bombers and fighters specially designed for ground attack; it was a number considerably less than the Army’s previous demand for fifty-four home-based squadrons under direct military control. The new Group would train with the Army for all its future operations, establish standard operating procedures for the training of other RAF squadrons periodically allocated to Army Co-operation tasks, provide

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a guaranteed minimum quantity of effective air support when the Army went into battle, and, perhaps most important of all, affirm the existence of an RAF organisation whose primary responsibility was to solve the problems of army air support. In addition, as if to sweeten the bargain, the War Office hinted at its willingness to agree that No.2 Group should remain a part of Bomber Command and not, as Brooke had requested earlier, be incorporated into Army Co-operation Command.25 Much of the “Thorold” paper met with the Air Staff’s general approval, but the CAS was not predisposed to give his assent to a plan that called for more and permanent decentralisation of RAF resources, particularly on the eve of major combined operations on and over the continent. Centralised command, seen as essential for the rapid concentration of force, was an RAF principle that the Air Staff was unwilling to violate. It was a position that received an unequivocal endorsement from the Joint Planning Committee (JPC). In the JPC’s report of 21 May on air support for Operation Round-Up, the Allied cross-channel invasion of the continent, the committee concluded: Under the existing set-up there are too many RAF Commands concerned. . . . For Round-Up we must have a single air force command. The nucleus of this command must be established now.26

Portal, therefore, enjoyed the security of an established starting point when he embarked on what amounted to a radical reorganisation of RAF Commands in Britain to meet the new challenges of supporting continental operations. On 21 July, he presented his plan, commonly known as the “Slessor” Paper27 to the COS. Whereas the Thorold plan prescribed a general system of air support without a specific battle or campaign in mind, Slessor’s paper was a comprehensive and precise proposal to meet the air requirements of opening a second front in Europe. Slessor suggested the creation of a mixed force of fighters, light bombers, army support and reconnaissance squadrons organised in Groups all under the command of a single AOC-in-C. Thus constituted, Slessor’s force would provide the Army with support in the widest sense. Its organisation was similar to the Luftwaffe’s Fliegerkorps, and as such it represented an entirely new concept for the RAF. It renounced the functional basis of the Metropolitan Air Force—Bomber, Fighter, Coastal, and Army Co-operation Commands—in favour of what would become the 2nd Tactical Air Force.28 Flexibility of action and the ability to concentrate the maximum air effort from one part of the battle to another at a moment’s notice were, for the Air Staff, the twin requirements of any organisation responsible for supporting continental operations. Thorold’s system, just like the old British Air Forces in France (BAFF), dependent as they both were on a number of different functional commanders of bomber, fighter, and army support groups, all interposed in the chain of command, was viewed by the Air Staff as being too

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cumbersome to meet the disparate demands of a complex and rapidly changing battle. One air commander, “who could see the air situation as a whole and co-ordinate support and reconnaissance operations with fighter operations to maintain the air situation,” was the Air Staff’s preferred solution. In the United Kingdom, only Fighter Command’s existing system of communications could provide the centralised control both desired and advocated by the Air Staff. Slessor therefore proposed to use 11 Group Headquarters (Fighter Command) in southeast England, suitably expanded and extended, including the deployment of Air Support Signals Units (ASSUs perfected in North Africa) once advanced landing grounds had been secured in France, to co-ordinate all of the Army’s air support requirements. In this way the RAF would use the entire Metropolitan Air Force, minus those squadrons of Coastal and Fighter Commands engaged in a normal security role, and not just the twelve new army air support squadrons proposed in the Thorold plan, to support the Army.29 In Army circles, opinion on the Slessor Paper was mixed. The CIGS and some staff sections30 at the War Office were not in favour of Fighter Command replacing Army Co-operation Command as the Army’s principal provider of air support. The former, they feared, would have two conflicting responsibilities: the air defence of Great Britain and army co-operation for the field force. Under such a system, and especially during a crisis, Brooke cautioned, the Army’s needs would be relegated to the bottom of the priority list. The concerns raised by the CIGS were not shared by General Sir John Kennedy, the Director of Military Operations, or by General Sir Bernard Paget and his senior staff at GHQ Home Forces. Kennedy and Paget both urged a compromise with the Air Staff as the first step to an early settlement of the air support question. GHQ Home Forces also made clear proposals to achieve practical results. A draft paper written in part by Colonel Oxborrow, one of Paget’s most influential staff officers,31 recommended prompt recognition of Fighter Command as the foremost organisation for army air support and the disbandment of Army Co-operation Command. Oxborrow surmised correctly that any undertaking by the War Office to increase the status of Army Co-operation Command would meet with hostility and determined resistance from the Air Ministry. The energies of both services, he predicted, would be expended “in a domestic struggle to the detriment of practical progress.”32 Moreover, Oxborrow judged the indirect, thirdparty arrangement with Army Co-operation Command as being unlikely to produce the favourable results that were probable when contact was direct between soldier and airman as it was in the Middle East.33 In spite of the arguments in favour of accepting the Slessor plan, “the CIGS turned the scheme down flat.”34 Brooke’s personal experiences of being let down by the RAF during the retreat from Brussels to Dunkirk, the Dunkirk episode itself, and as C-in-C Home Forces, convinced him that the Army would receive its necessary and proper air support only when

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either the Army obtained its own Army Air Arm or when there was an RAF Command whose sole task was to provide air support for the Army. Brooke strongly believed that neither of these conditions were met in the Slessor plan. He therefore urged the COS to approve “the immediate formation of an Army Support Group of some 12 squadrons and an RAF Headquarters which would proceed overseas with Army GHQ as a step toward the air component envisioned in the Army’s proposals” and modified in the Thorold plan.35 Brooke’s argument seemed to acquire added authority after Operation Jubilee (the Dieppe Raid) on 19 August, when sixty-seven squadrons of various types under 11 Group’s control fought a highly successful battle “almost without reference to the slaughter on the beaches below.”36 Conveniently left out of the CIGS’s criticism of the RAF at Dieppe was the fatal decision made by Combined Operations Headquarters to forgo deployment of the Air Support Signal Units (ASSUs); it precluded the provision of effective and spontaneous air support for the assualt forces on the ground.37 This did not stop the War Office from restating recriminations of the past, and both correspondence and discussion between the CIGS and CAS dragged on through the summer months without reaching a solution. The Air Staff had no intention of yielding to Brooke’s demands. Dissipating its limited resources in small formations of aircraft under the command of numerous Army commanders in the field, with each one pursuing an independent plan, was neither practical nor sound military practice. At the end of August, Portal tried once more to make the Air Staff’s case. He asked Brooke to grant an interview to Sholto Douglas, the AOC-in-C of Fighter Command. Under Douglas’s authorisation all seventy-five day-fighter squadrons had received training in army support in 1942, and forty were at a sufficiently high standard to operate with the Army “at a moment’s notice.”38 Brooke refused to see Douglas. On 2 September, in a memorandum to Portal, the CIGS restated his preference for army support squadrons to form and train within Army Co-operation Command39 ; it was an increasingly untenable position that even the Secretary of State for War could no longer support. “If I had been consulted before your letter of the [2nd] September was written,” Grigg admonished Brooke on 14 September, “I would have expressed the view that the [Slessor] plan was the right one in the present circumstances.”40 At the same time Grigg also wrote to the Prime Minister to solicit his assistance in breaking the deadlock. Grigg sent a memorandum to Churchill, which he in turn asked the Prime Minister to send to both himself and the Secretary of State for Air. The memorandum asked what had been done over the preceding five months to solve the army air co-operation problem.41 Churchill was taken by surprise by Grigg’s request, and he referred it to a member of his staff in the War Cabinet Secretariat, Brigadier Hollis, for his comments before taking any action. Hollis summarised the recent controversy and concluded that it seemed to be resolved: co-operation between

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the Army and the RAF in the Middle East was on a very high level, and, in the UK, despite some rancorous discussions between the CIGS and the CAS, an acceptable solution had been found for both combined training and the development of appropriate tactics, techniques, and equipment.42 This assessment was perhaps too optimistic, and after a further exchange of letters between Churchill and Grigg, Hollis was asked to clarify the War Office’s rejection of the Slessor plan. On 19 September, Hollis presented the Prime Minister with a long and candid paper covering the history of the inter-service dispute from June 1940 to date. The War Office and, in particular, the CIGS (General Brooke), Hollis contended, were convinced that the Army would receive its proper air support only when it had its own air forces under its own command and control. A compromise solution had been reached in the autumn of 1940 when Army Co-operation Command was established. But it was, in Hollis’s opinion, a retrograde step: . . . it enabled the rest of the RAF to wash their hands of the business. Moreover, it gave little satisfaction to the Army, because they felt that Army Co-operation Command was the Cindrella [sic] of the Air Force, and because they saw how meagre were the resources placed at its disposal.43

The Slessor plan, as the Secretary of State for War correctly stated, offered real co-operation on a significant scale. Slessor’s “Air Fleet” system would enable the entire RAF to support the Army in battle. This was not possible under the present organisation, and Hollis criticised Brooke for his obsessive commitment to Army Co-operation Command. “A more far sighted policy on the part of the Army,” Hollis concluded, “would have been to try and interest Fighter Command to the maximum extent.”44 Hollis was sure this would have been achieved if the Slessor plan had been accepted. Churchill was eager to see this problem resolved. He favoured a solution that would preserve the operational integrity of an independent air force yet also provide maximum air support for the Army. With Hollis’s briefing as his guide, Churchill chaired a special COS meeting on 5 October devoted to settling the air support controversy.45 The meeting began with statements from the Secretaries of State for War and Air and continued with a long discussion on a number of technical concerns of both the CAS and the CIGS. Churchill listened throughout in relative silence. At the end of the deliberations he told the committee that he would like to give the matter further thought before making a decision.46 Two days later he wrote to the two Secretaries of State: Whenever our Army is established on land, and is conducting operations against the enemy, the system of organisation and employment of the Royal Air Force should conform to that which has proved so successful in the Western

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Desert. The characteristics of this system are that the whole Air Force will be under command of one Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, whose relationship to the Army Commander-in-Chief will be that laid down in . . . my [Middle East] Directive of 7th October 1941. This fact must be the starting point in our investigation of the part to be played by the Royal Air Force in Continental operations based on the United Kingdom.47

The Slessor plan had received the Prime Minister’s general support. Churchill now directed the Secretaries of State for Air and War to work out the details and report back to him with an agreed policy. On 14 November the Secretaries of State submitted their joint statement on the “Organisation of Air Support for the Army in Continental Operations.” The old system of an Army “component” supported by an RAF “contingent” (the Brooke and Thorold concepts of air support) was abandoned in favour of a unified air force of various types of aircraft all under the command of a single air officer who was to “afford the Army all possible support irrespective of other targets.” Working from a joint headquarters, specific objectives were to be indicated by the GOC-in-C and executed by the AOC-in-C in the manner that the latter deemed most effective. This was the RAF Western Desert system under Air Vice-Marshal Coningham. A brief outline of its organisation and methods was provided by the Secretaries of State, which, they agreed, should serve as the basic principles for the development of air support arrangements for the Army in the United Kingdom as it readied itself for future continental operations. The deadlock had been broken.48 There had been a number of agreements before, which had, in the end, come to nothing. This one was different; it was the product of the Prime Minister’s direct intervention and the loyal implementation of his decision thereafter by the two services.49 It also benefited from the recent battlefield success enjoyed by the Army and the RAF against Rommel at First Alamein, Alam Halfa, and Second Alamein. Some thirty-nine months into the war this bitter controversy had finally come to an end. The real work, however, of turning policy into practical method for operations, was about to begin.

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CHAPTER 9

Defeat and Victory in the Western Desert The RAF historian, Sir Maurice Dean, identified three vital elements necessary for the perfection of effective army-air co-operation. Listed in their order of importance they are the willingness to co-operate (goodwill), sound principles and tactics, and reliable communications.1 By the summer of 1942, the RAF Middle East evinced all three. Over the preceding twelve months, Cyrenaica and the western desert of Egypt formed the crucible in which British tactical air power doctrine and technique were forged.2 Battle experience in the desert taught the RAF and the Army the principles of effective air action, as well as the methods for achieving success in the air; but of near equal importance to the development of a new air support doctrine was the recent history of co-operation between the two services overseas. Though not always smooth and congenial, Army/RAF co-operation in the Middle East predated Operation Compass in the autumn of 1940, and it was one of the vital factors that contributed to the Anglo-American victory in the spring of 1943. Operation Crusader, fought during the autumn and winter of 1941–1942, was an indispensable part of a difficult and lengthy learning process. If Crusader achieved no other tangible result, it provided irrefutable evidence that integrated planning between air and ground forces worked. Army and air commanders learnt at firsthand that land and air operations reinforced each other when planned and conducted in the closest consultation. Direct and continuous collaboration familiarised each service with the strengths and limitations of the other, with the concomitant effect that the planning and the expectations of future joint operations became more realistic and the objectives more attainable. Protracted co-operation also had another unforeseen yet timely and fundamental benefit. By the spring of 1942, ideas, equipment, and technique merged together and fashioned

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not only a formidable air weapon to support the army but also something entirely new: tactical air power. Flexible for either attack or defence, the RAF Middle East was organised and trained to fight in equal partnership with land and sea forces, as well as to fight in its own separate element to command the air above North Africa and over the Mediterranean.3 The sine qua non of success in the desert war, indeed of all the major campaigns in the Second World War, was air supremacy. “Apart from the immunity from enemy air attacks which air superiority will provide to a greater or lesser degree,” noted the Air Staff in a memorandum distributed widely throughout the Army and the RAF, “the effectiveness of all other forms of air activity is governed to a high degree by the freedom or otherwise from enemy interference in the air.”4 There was nothing new in this premise: it was an essential part of the RAF’s pre-war literature on the principles and theories of air warfare.5 Recent battle experience had restored its prominence. Once again, attainment and retention of air superiority over the battlefield was an essential prerequisite for an effective contribution by air forces to land operations. As such, all other tasks, namely isolating the battlefield from enemy reinforcement and supply, reconnaissance, and attacking targets in forward areas close to friendly ground forces, were secondary until a favourable air situation was established. If the army was to take full advantage of the air effort it would, on occasion and under certain circumstances, have to adapt both the timing and the location of its operations on the ground. Air superiority and air support for the land forces were not separate and antipathetic tasks. Once a satisfactory air situation was secured, the whole air force with all of its available strength could be switched to direct support, in effect saturating the battlefield with air power.6 These were the basic guidelines, simple and sound, which were the essence of the Tedder and Coningham doctrine for combined air/land operations. The process of formulating the new doctrine began during the spring and summer months immediately preceding Operation Crusader. From recent battle experience and training exercises in the desert Tedder deduced that the whole Middle East campaign was a combined operation which called for the utmost inter-service co-operation. The co-operation he envisaged involved more than one service drawing up a plan and then approaching the other two services for assistance. Tedder regarded every operation from its inception as a combined one that must be worked out on that basis. The army and the navy had to co-operate with the air force in winning air battles just as the air force would co-operate with these services in winning land and sea battles. With regard to fighting a modern land battle, Tedder concluded that a combined land and air plan was a necessary if not an essential prerequisite for success. Army and air commanders, he counselled, must work together throughout all stages of drafting, planning, and executing their operations. To this end he urged both services to maintain intimate contacts at all

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relevant levels of command, both at HQME and in the field. This form of co-operation offered the additional benefit of strengthening the unity of purpose of the two services’ respective actions. Tedder firmly believed that integrating both the army and the air force into the larger strategic mission was the key to success.7 With regard to the Middle East theatre of operations, the war being fought across the Libyan desert was a war for airfields.8 Control of these airfields, especially those congregated around Benina, just outside Benghazi, enabled the side that possessed them to move men and supplies forward by sea and on land in reasonable safety. Conversely they were forward bases from which aircraft could strike at the enemy’s vital lines of communication and supply. Tedder made the important correlation between airfields and victory in the desert war at a time when strategic clarity escaped the notice of many military commanders and political leaders.9 Accordingly, his input was instrumental in reorganising the RAF Middle East for combined operations with the Army; but also, and perhaps more important, for creating a new doctrine which addressed the larger strategic factors in the North African theatre of operations.10 Tedder believed the best way to win the war in Libya was to combine the unique offensive power of the air force—its flexibility, ubiquity, power of concentration, and ability to penetrate—with the power of the army to contain and occupy. The army would occupy and defend forward landing grounds whilst the air force would strike further afield, thereby assisting the army’s forward movement. As such, the fighting services were interdependent. Their success in battle therefore depended in large measure on the degree to which they assisted each other. Consequently, Tedder insisted on instituting a new air policy. Henceforth, when critical land operations were in progress the ground forces would receive air support not just from squadrons that specialised in army co-operation but from the whole available air force—every aircraft type and every function.11 Tedder was the thinker who conceived the new air support system but Coningham was the practitioner who made it work. Coningham realised that attaining both the flexibility to shift aircraft rapidly from one task to another and the ability to concentrate superior air strength at the decisive time and place was the essential precondition to turning Tedder’s theory into operational practice. He also understood that air forces had to be controlled by one central authority if the maximum value was to be drawn from their unique offensive character. Coningham, therefore, to his considerable credit, took the abstract concepts of centralised command and concentration of force and devised a comprehensive and systematic tactical air doctrine which exploited them.12 During Operation Crusader the AOC-in-C Western Desert Air Force established his headquarters beside that of the army commander. By collocating both air and army staffs, and creating a combined Army/Air headquarters

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in the field, Coningham was ideally placed to view the battle in its entirety and to take rapid executive action in response to changing circumstances and operational requirements. Previous experience had taught the WDAF that air operations had to be continuous and widespread to be effective. This demanded detailed planning and co-ordination. The AOC-in-C therefore assumed direct command over all air operations. He commanded what amounted to a unified air force inclusive of all types of bombers, fighters, fighter-bombers, and reconnaissance aircraft, centrally co-ordinated, in a broad combined plan of employment. Concentrating on battlefield air attack (excluding air transportation and operations by airborne forces) the air forces contributed to land operations in three ways: first by establishing and maintaining air superiority, second by isolating the battlefield, and third by providing direct support for the ground troops. Selecting specific objectives prior to and during the battle was a joint responsibility of the two C-inCs, who were equal in status. The selection of targets and the methods of attacking them were left to the discretion of the air commander.13 As was the case in every other theatre of operations, operational air strength depended on a wide range of factors. The number of serviceable aircraft available, the number of airfields that could be used, the estimated enemy air opposition and the size and scope of the operation all determined the number and type of aircraft employed. Similar considerations applied when determining the composition and strength of the air force required to support a land operation; and not, as the Army had often insisted, on the size and configuration of its own land forces in the field. From Crusader onwards, WDAF support for a land battle included all available fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance squadrons. Coningham’s capacity to fight an air/land battle was improved considerably by the introduction of two innovations: Air Support Controls (ASC) and the Hurribomber (subsequently supplanted by the Kittyhawk and Tomahawk fighter-bombers). The intricate communications links of the ASCs were the physical means by which the AOC could monitor and control the air battle. If the signals network was the nervous system of the new tactical air support system, then the fighter-bomber was its talons and teeth. Flying from advanced airfields close to the battlefront, fighter-bombers provided air support independently, with a shorter reaction time than ordinary bomber and reconnaissance aircraft. They could also immediately revert to their original role as fighters when circumstances demanded. As such, the problems of providing fighter escorts and the time-consuming delays of co-ordination became obstacles of the past. Accurate in ground attack and adept at air-to-air combat the fighter-bomber, as it was developed by the WDAF in the spring of 1942, was the long sought-after answer to the German “Stuka” (Ju87 dive-bomber).14 In tandem the ASCs and the fighter-bombers bestowed on Coningham a flexible air weapon which in turn enabled the WDAF to seize the tactical initiative.15

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The WDAF’s altogether new air-land doctrine proved to be far superior to the German Blitzkrieg concept as it had evolved by the middle years of the war. Both in Russia and North Africa the Germans increasingly subjugated their air forces to the demands of the land commander, who wrongly insisted on the provision of close support at the expense of air superiority: the one vital element to sustained offensive initiative now in both air and land operations.16 From 1942 through to the end of the Libyan campaign the WDAF’s concept of operations began with the attainment and retention of air superiority. Coningham, more than any other RAF officer, eventually convinced his counterparts in the Eighth Army that air forces could make a decisive contribution to the outcome of a land battle in many ways, the least of which was as flying artillery at the ground force’s point of attack. But it was a lengthy and painfully slow education.17 Both Auchinleck and Ritchie accepted the general precepts of the Tedder and Coningham system, which were codified in Middle East (Army and Air) Training Pamphlet No.3A—Direct Air Support.18 Published in March 1942, this document, theoretically at least, resolved two long-standing irritants: the matter of operational command of air forces in the field and the criteria governing their allotment and deployment. This pleased both services. The army was to receive substantially more support than it would have from a small and vulnerable army co-operation force, and the air force—its independence and integrity maintained—was better able to exploit its inherent flexibility and ubiquitousness while still concentrating on the principal strategic aim of the operation as established by the combined plan.19 Achieving true co-ordination between aircraft and forward elements of the army was, however, more problematic. Most ground commanders quite naturally viewed their leading role on the battlefield as a matter of tradition. They were, as Tedder and Coningham discovered, “instinctively antagonistic” to shared operational authority, especially with an airman. They also found it difficult to accept the fact that they did not have “a divine right to command [their] own private air forces.”20 One Brigadier even told Coningham and Air Commodore Thomas Elmhirst (Coningham’s administrative officer) that “what a Corps Commander really wants is a squadron at his disposal to come up on his call and bomb something in front of him.”21 His candid comment betrayed a deeply rooted bias about aircraft being auxiliary weapons for the army: one he shared with many other Corps, Division, and Brigade commanders.22 It revealed too the soldier’s ignorance not just of the multifaceted contribution made by air forces to land operations but of the military campaign’s strategic objective as a whole. More than any other obstacle, it was the lack of conceptual commonality—strategic, operational, and tactical—between soldiers and airmen that was the most difficult problem still to be overcome. But, just as it was with a number of the earlier impediments, the harsh test of battle both exposed the flaw and provided the solution.

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Rommel’s spring offensive against the Gazala positions began with brilliant success on 26 May and ended in stalemate forty-two days later at El Alamein, nearly 220 miles inside the Egyptian border.23 The attack did not come as a surprise. Ultra decrypts not only warned Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff in London but also confirmed HQME’s own Intelligence assessments that the Germans would attack anytime after the third week in May. Yet despite the warning, the Eighth Army seemed totally unprepared when the fighting began, and it performed badly throughout.24 A rough comparison of the opposing numbers of tanks and aircraft reveals that the British had a substantial numerical advantage on the ground whilst the Germans had a similar edge in the air. The Eighth Army had 850 tanks in the field (of which 400 were the American-built Grants whose 75mm gun was significantly more effective than the 50mm guns of the best German tanks) and another 420 in reserve. Against it the Axis forces could muster only 560 tanks—and 230 of them were obsolete Italian variants. In the air, the Germans and Italians had a total of 704 aircraft in Tunisia and Tripolitania, of which 497 were serviceable (120 of them being the high performance Me109F, the foremost fighter aircraft at the time operating in North Africa). They could also draw on nearly 1,000 serviceable aircraft stationed in Greece, Crete, Sicily, and southern Italy. The WDAF had only 290 aircraft of all types fit for operations. Another 739 serviceable aircraft were stationed elsewhere in the Middle East. The numbers, however, do not lend themselves to a simple explanation of the campaign’s course and actual outcome. Despite an impressive advantage in armour, the Eighth Army in mid-1942 lost every tank battle it fought. The WDAF, on the other hand, outfought the enemy air forces and inflicted severe losses on Rommel’s supply columns.25 Some 200 enemy vehicles were destroyed by Coningham’s squadrons after the first six days of fighting alone.26 Lack of air support for the army was not the chief problem. Commenting later on the vital contribution made by the WDAF, General Auchinleck said: Our air forces could not have done more than they did to help and sustain the 8th Army in its struggle. Their effort was continuous by day and by night and the effect on the enemy was tremendous. . . . had it not been for their devoted and exceptional efforts, we should not have been able to stop the enemy on the El Alamein position.27

Enemy war diaries corroborate the General’s view. Repeated entries lament the “continual raids by night and day [that] are seriously hindering the troops,” the grave state of the supply situation, especially ammunition and fuel stocks, and the lack of fighter defence.28 The problem, such as it was for the British in the Middle East, was the systemic weaknesses of the army in the field.29

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Tedder was incensed at the army’s defeatist attitude and its poorly coordinated response to the German offensive. He did not doubt either the bravery or the courage of the British soldier, but he harboured serious misgivings over the lack of leadership exhibited by the army’s senior officers. With the exception of Auchinleck, whom Tedder liked, even though he questioned the General’s judgment concerning command appointments, and possibly Gott, Tedder considered all of the army’s senior commanders in North Africa to be “useless ‘good fellows.’”30 General Neil Ritchie, the Eighth Army’s commander, was the worst of all.31 Ritchie’s lack of experience in commanding armour, and his ill-conceived tactics, negated every advantage that should have gone to his numerically superior force. Rommel, however, was elated over his own good fortune. He wrote in his diary: “Ritchie had thrown his armour into the battle piecemeal and had thus given us the chance of engaging [and defeating] them on each separate occasion with just enough of our own tanks.” Amid scenes of indescribable confusion—with British commanders uncertain of the location of their troops and intercommunication between units fragmentary at best—a rapidly disintegrating army fell back to its last remaining line of defence at El Alamein.32 The inherent weaknesses in the Army’s organisation were exacerbated by the confusion and strain of the retreat: a pernicious combination unlikely to improve the performance of the fledgling army-air co-operation system. Under enemy pressure the Eighth Army—retreating all too often in headlong panic—demonstrated a fundamental disregard for the air support arrangements previously worked out with the WDAF. Forward units withdrew without disclosing their intentions to the commanders of advanced landing grounds they were supposed to protect. Fighters and fighter-bombers were therefore needlessly exposed to enemy ground attack and capture. On at least three occasions, at Gambut, Sidi Barrani and Mersa Matruh, only a thin screen of RAF armoured cars stood between the advancing enemy tanks and Coningham’s forward landing grounds. Coningham was also obliged to rely almost entirely on his own tactical reconnaissance in order to give the Army any support at all. Consequently he found the Army Staff’s ‘complacent ignorance’ about the positions and movements of its forward troops quite infuriating.33 Auchinleck empathised with Coningham’s legitimate grievances, but he seemed powerless to rectify the situation. Moreover, even after he dismissed Ritchie and took over direct control of the ground battle himself, Auchinleck made the mistake of establishing his tactical headquarters some fifty miles away from the nearest airfield, and thus foolishly severed the joint army-air command organisation. When Tedder and Coningham learnt of this change they were outraged. “Such a complete failure on the part of the Army, even at this stage, to understand some of the most elementary principles of modern warfare,” wrote Tedder, “frankly defeats me.”34

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Effective co-operation, as the historian John Terraine has stated, depends entirely on how well the parties involved work together: “the system fails if one party to it collapses, which is what the Eighth Army too frequently did in the face of the Afrika Korps.”35 The WDAF could not be expected on its own to produce the desired victory. Nevertheless, it was instrumental in preventing a catastrophic defeat. In spite of the army’s operational shortcomings, and the unhealthy mixture of frustration and pathos emanating from the airmen, the WDAF heroically supported the army throughout its tragic battles and the long retreat back to the Nile Delta. During the crisis of the first days of the enemy’s assault Coningham’s fighters abandoned their primary task of securing air superiority and provided instead the closest support possible for the beleaguered ground troops. Successful low-level attacks were carried out against the advancing German columns but at unsustainable costs. Over forty fighters were lost in four days of fighting: about 20 percent of the fighter force. On 1 June, with its reserves exhausted and few replacement aircraft available, Coningham’s fighters returned to operations on more normal lines. An immediate drop in casualty figures accompanied this switch in tactics. The WDAF, however, continued to attack Rommel’s forces; but it concentrated on his more vulnerable and less well defended road convoys and airfields immediately behind the ground battle. In the absence of close tactical co-ordination with the army, Coningham was forced to fight what amounted to an independent air battle, which aimed to isolate the battle area. Coningham deployed every available aircraft on the twin tasks of disrupting Rommel’s supply lines and protecting the Eighth Army from enemy air attack. Throughout what was a very intense air battle the WDAF never lost the initiative. Moreover, the WDAF accomplished its general objectives: the Eighth Army was able to retreat “virtually unmolested” to El Alamein and the fighting strength of the Axis forces was eroded by unrelenting air strikes to a point where a final and lasting victory was beyond the enemy’s capability.36 The combined German and Italian armies reached the British positions at El Alamein at the end of June. Despite the pounding his troops received from the WDAF, Rommel was eager to attack immediately. He believed it would be his final, triumphant assault against a beaten and demoralised enemy. Rommel said as much in his situation report to Berlin: “there was practically no opposition of importance left and . . . [his] Army would be in Cairo in ten days.” Luftwaffe Marshal Albert Kesselring disagreed. Furthermore, he cautioned Rommel to wait and not rush in against intact air bases until he had sufficient air cover of his own. The Luftwaffe was exhausted after its great efforts at Bir Hacheim and Tobruk.37 Aircrews needed rest and the number of serviceable aircraft was alarmingly low. Rommel was undeterred. He ignored Kesselring’s advice and, with Hitler’s personal approval, commenced his attack on 1 July. It was a decision he would regret bitterly. Co-operation from air forces was of decisive importance in a modern land

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battle. The first battle of El Alamein provided a stark illustration of this point.38 In July 1942 Rommel’s dazzling run of success came to an abrupt end. Without air support his Panzerarmee could not dislodge the Eighth Army from its defensive positions; meanwhile the Axis ground troops were subjected to a powerful and punishing air assault. During the first week of July alone the WDAF flew 5,458 sorties against Rommel’s force.39 Halifax and Liberator bombers recently arrived from England, Spitfires from Malta, Beaufighters from the Royal Navy, and both Spitfires and Hurricane IIs intended for India were added to the WDAF’s order of battle. Additional assistance came from the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) in the form of nearly 120 bombers and 80 fighters.40 As was the case during the latter stages of the Eighth Army’s retreat into Egypt, Coningham fought an independent air battle, selecting targets on the basis of his own reconnaissance. Auchinleck, despite his genuine belief in the importance of air support, maintained a separate army headquarters throughout the battle. Whilst the joint system, so carefully devised over the previous nine months, clearly had broken down, the overwhelming might of Allied air power under the dual leadership of Tedder and Coningham proved too much for the overextended Afrika Korps. On 4 July, Rommel informed Berlin that he was suspending the offensive and taking up defensive positions.41 During the stalemate which followed, both sides struggled to build up their forces for the next and possibly final battle. HQME also used the lull in the fighting to deduce the lessons of the recent debacle. At an Army Commanders meeting on 16 July, Tedder was questioned about the RAF’s supposed failure to provide close support. He responded with a detailed account of the WDAF’s recent accomplishments noting “without which [the army’s] retreat would have become a shambles.” Effective direct support, Tedder restated, depended on both services helping each other. Too often this was not the case. The WDAF was forced to collect its own information on the battle, and it seldom received adequate bomb lines from the troops it was tasked to support. Unimpressed with this explanation a couple of generals confronted Tedder after the meeting and said “it was about time there was some plain speaking on the subject.” Tedder could not have agreed more, but he also noted that “to try and make an impression on the Army was rather like hitting a wall of cotton wool.”42 In a private letter written to Portal at the end of July, Tedder accurately attributed the Army’s main failings—just as they had been in the past, especially during Crusader—to its “lack of inspired leadership.” From Auchinleck on down the army’s commanding officers repeatedly failed first to grasp the essential character of and second to exert effective control over the battle. Tedder believed that the Army needed a commander and a staff who were “alive and young,” men who could “infuse some life, inspiration and fire

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into an army that was dying for the lack of it.” “Surely,” Tedder concluded, “the Army has men like that amongst its galaxy of Generals?”43 The army’s senior commanders in the Middle East had also lost the confidence of the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet in London. On 3 August, Winston Churchill and General Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, arrived in Egypt to see for themselves what was wrong with the Eighth Army. Two days later, Churchill, accompanied by Brooke, Tedder, and Coningham, visited Auchinleck at his forward headquarters. Churchill was unimpressed with the General’s spartan living conditions and his equally cheerless assessment of the situation. Auchinleck said he could not resume the offensive until 15 September at the earliest. Churchill wanted something positive done almost at once. By the end of this meeting Churchill had seen and heard enough; he decided that “drastic and immediate” changes were needed. But before he appointed a new commander, Churchill asked Tedder for his views. Tedder’s response was frank and honest. He told the Prime Minister that “failures must be analysed and exposed” and that the selection, promotion, and removal of commanders should be made entirely on the basis of performance and not, as in the past, on seniority, personal friendships, old school ties, and other equally fatuous criteria. The appointments of General Sir Harold Alexander as theatre commander and Lieutenant General Bernard Law Montgomery as leader of the Eighth Army indicated that Churchill agreed with his air commander’s advice.44 Montgomery brought to the Eighth Army an immediate and infectious winning attitude. His first order, issued on 13 August, two days prior to the scheduled changeover in command, was that the army forthwith would hold its ground. In the event of an enemy attack there would be no withdrawal. Instantly, Montgomery instilled a sense of purpose and direction in the army, something which had been absent for far too long. “Orders no longer formed ‘the basis for discussion,’ but for action.” Montgomery’s personal doctrine of command and his military creed were simple and easy to understand. He firmly believed that “command must be direct and personal.” He also believed that a commander must plan his operations thoroughly in advance. In short, he must decide how he will fight the battle before it begins. Once he has determined his “master plan,” he must, whilst retaining sufficient flexibility to adjust to the changing tactical situations, “be utterly ruthless in carrying it out and forcing it through to success.” This approach served Montgomery, the Eighth Army, and British fortunes in North Africa, from August 1942 onwards, very well.45 The WDAF also felt Montgomery’s presence with advantage. Coningham met Montgomery on 16 August and was most impressed with the new general. They held similar views on the benefits of a commander exercising personal control over his forces in battle. They also talked about the importance of air superiority, as a prerequisite for both effective air support and victory in a land battle, and the merits of a joint command system.

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Montgomery listened. Before their meeting ended Montgomery agreed to move his headquarters immediately to Burg el Arab to be beside Coningham. The Advanced HQs of both services were also joined together (and remained this way for the duration of the campaign). Tedder happily reported this news to Portal, noting that army/air relations had improved greatly under the leadership of Alexander and Montgomery. He further praised the Eighth Army’s new commander for placing “co-operation with the RAF first in the order of priority.” Of course it should not be supposed that all of the difficulties associated with army air co-operation ended at this time. Nonetheless, it was an auspicious day for the Allies. Montgomery did what no previous British general in the desert had been willing to do: he worked out his plans and fought his battles together with the air force.46 Almost immediately Rommel tested the calibre of this new partnership formed by Coningham and Montgomery. Ultra Intelligence warned the Middle East commanders on 17 August to expect a German offensive in nine days time.47 Forewarned of Rommel’s plans, Coningham initiated his own counter-offensive against Axis airfields and sources of supply. The WDAF’s successful raids, particularly against enemy fuel supplies, forced Rommel to limit the objectives of his attack, and delayed its start until the night of 30 August.48 From 26 August onwards there was “a spirit of quiet confidence” at the joint Army/Air Headquarters.49 Together Montgomery and Coningham had worked out a combined plan to co-ordinate and direct their impending operations. The army aimed to fight a static defensive battle from the strongly fortified positions on the Alam el Halfa ridge, whilst the WDAF would provide the “offensive punch.” The air force was to follow the now familiar triple-tasked pattern of establishing and maintaining air superiority, attacking communications and lines of supply (to isolate the battlefield), and “round-the-clock” bombing of enemy ground troops.50 Coningham’s squadrons were at full strength and they were concentrated on forward airfields. A reliable network of telephone lines linked the landing grounds directly to the AOC at Combined Headquarters. In addition, the Air Support Control system was fully operative with a full disposition of tentacles to cover the battle area and rear links to all fighter and bomber wings. With their preparations in order, Montgomery and Coningham waited impatiently for the enemy attack to begin.51 The Battle of Alam el Halfa (30 August–6 September) was Rommel’s last attempt to conquer Egypt. He tried to fight an armoured battle without first establishing air superiority, and he was defeated decisively.52 Similar to the pattern of his defeat at El Alamein two months earlier, Rommel could not move the Eighth Army off its strong defensive positions. Meanwhile, his own ground forces, fighting without appropriate air support,53 were decimated by the WDAF’s unrelenting air attacks.54 On 1 September, Rommel was compelled to break off his offensive. Early the next day he ordered the

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Afrika Korps to begin a westward withdrawal. His bold gamble had ended in failure. Afterward a despondent Rommel wrote: “anyone who has to fight against an enemy with air superiority fights under the same handicaps and with the same chances of success as a savage against modern European troops.”55 Moreover, Rommel recognised in Alam el Halfa a portent of defeats to come.56 The Battle of Alam el Halfa, records an official RAF monograph, “was the climax of army/air co-operation in the Western Desert and one in which, broadly speaking, the seal was set on the procedure and organisation for air support.” It exemplified “the use of air power on efficient and economical lines, when used in direct support of an army in the field.”57 The success achieved is correctly attributed to the system devised by Tedder and Coningham, but the system alone was not antecedent to successful operations. Continuous and intimate collaboration between Coningham and Montgomery accounts for the triumphant application of air power in the recent battle. In this regard the personalities involved were as instrumental to the success attained as the new procedures themselves. Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt, AOC Army Co-operation Command in England, was present at the Combined Battle Headquarters during the first three days of fighting. In his report to the Air Ministry he described the close and mutually beneficial working arrangement between Montgomery and Coningham. Each evening the GOC had a personal meeting with the AOC. He [Montgomery] gave him the clearest possible appreciation of the situation, the information as he knew it, what he intended to do himself, and what he expected the enemy to do. The AOC then said what he could do himself, and a general air plan was agreed upon. A further conversation took place the following morning as a result of events, ground and air, during the night.

Coningham later told Barratt that “never had he had such a clear and concise exposition of the military situation and needs during his experience in the Western Desert.”58 Montgomery also instantly recognised the additional power created when air and land forces worked in close co-operation. He attributed his recent victory to the combined plan drawn up with Coningham and the joint army/air headquarters from which they fought the battle together. The battle proved the RAF’s theory: air action was integral to the army plan and not an ancillary afterthought, and air superiority was the key to success both in the air and on the ground.59 August 1942 was the turning point in the Desert War. Rommel’s forces were exhausted and gravely weakened by the recent battles. In contrast, Allied forces grew larger and stronger. Lavish reinforcement of men and materiel (including the build-up of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF) in the Middle East) soon gave the Allies a crushing numerical superiority;60

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it was an advantage that ultimately proved to be the deciding factor in this theatre of operations. Vigorous and systematic attacks from both Malta and Egypt on Axis supply lines further exacerbated Rommel’s perilous position. There was renewed excitement and optimism at HQME. Few participants, on either side of the battle lines, doubted that the impending British offensive would signal the beginning of the end for the Axis in North Africa.61 Even before the defensive battle at Alam el Halfa had run its course Coningham and Montgomery started detailed preparations for their own full-scale offensive. Close and willing co-operation was a marked feature of this and all subsequent plans and operations aimed at driving the Axis forces out of Egypt and Cyrenaica.62 Once again, this time at El Alamein, the Coningham and Montgomery partnership produced a devastatingly successful result.63 When the Eighth Army began the ground phase of the battle on 23 October, the WDAF had already established air superiority and initiated a heavy bombing programme against the enemy’s artillery, concentrations of troops and tanks. So considerable was the WDAF’s ascendancy over the Luftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica that the bombers—flying in standard close formation of eighteen aircraft—were able to operate in daylight with increasingly injurious effect.64 Preliminary air operations had followed the now standard procedure of extensive attacks against enemy airfields to achieve air superiority and supply lines to isolate the battlefield. After 24 October direct support in the immediate battle area was planned on “a day-to-day and frequently an hour-to-hour basis” in accordance with the pattern established by the two C-in-Cs at the Battle of Alam el Halfa. The close control and the high degree of co-ordination attained were further enhanced by the smooth and uninterrupted service provided through the ASC system. Its level of performance greatly exceeded that of all previous air-land operations.65 Ten days of intense fighting naturally took its toll on both armies, but it was the Germans who broke under the strain. On 2 November Rommel ordered a general withdrawal; the scale of attrition was beyond what the Afrika Korps could sustain. The following day, the bombers, fighters, and fighter-bombers of the WDAF flew over 12,000 sorties (another 125 sorties were flown by the USAAF): definitely the busiest and perhaps the most successful day of air operations during the battle. Hundreds of burnt-out, westward-facing enemy vehicles littered the coastal road between Ghazal and Fuka, confirming the magnitude of the Afrika Korps’ failed attempt at escape. Six days later, on 8 November, British and American forces landed in Algeria and Morocco (Operation Torch). The tide had indeed turned.66 The Second Battle of El Alamein, the immediate pursuit of Rommel’s forces, and the remainder of the campaign in the North African Desert are well documented.67 With regard to the development of army-air cooperation—in both theory and practice—recounting these events would not add anything new to the story. From the Battle of Alam el Halfa through to

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the victorious end of the campaign at Tunis in May 1943, the air support system established by Tedder and Coningham was accepted and implemented by the Eighth Army. Air superiority was the key to success and its attainment received priority.68 Under Montgomery the Army accepted the fact that direct support was only a part, and often a small part, of the critical support provided by air forces during a land battle. This is not to say that all army-air collaboration went smoothly. Friction arose between Montgomery and the senior air commanders as the general’s supreme self-confidence changed into arrogance. There also were major disagreements over the pursuit. Both Coningham and Tedder recommended a vigorous offensive characterised by long swift moves to keep Rommel’s forces under continuous pressure. They wanted to keep “the Hun on the run” and thereby deny Rommel every opportunity to establish strong defensive positions.69 Montgomery was more cautious. He preferred a deliberate and methodical approach which better suited the inevitably slow pace of the British infantryman.70 But neither the disputes over tactics nor the increasingly rancorous personal relationships prevented the army and the air force from working effectively on close terms.71 Sadly this was not the case with the Torch landings and the early operations in North-West Africa.72 Operation Torch was the first major attempt made at joint-service coalition warfare by the American and British allies. American General Dwight D. Eisenhower was the Commander-in-Chief. His task-force commander was British Lieutenant-General K.A.N. Anderson, whom commanded all allied troops in Algeria. An overall air commander did not figure in the Torch plan. General Carl A. Spaatz, Eisenhower’s deputy and the senior American airman, advised against the creation of a centralised and unified air command. British and American air forces were to operate separately and in different geographical areas.73 No provisions were made for liaison between the two air forces and they formed their plans without reference to each other. In addition to the rigid demarcation lines for operations, which negated the RAF’s first principles of air power, namely concentration of force and flexibility of action, the Torch planners gave Army and Corps commanders clear operational control over their supporting air forces.74 In North-West Africa the air force was subordinate to the ground force. The Torch planners, later to their regret, ignored the hard-earned lessons learnt by the RAF Middle East. Neither the Tedder and Coningham command system nor the combat-proven procedures and techniques of the WDAF were taken into account. Instead the Anglo-American air planners looked to an untried American doctrine, outlined in Field Manual FM 31–35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, for their air-ground policy. On paper it offered a comprehensive tactical air control system: a central Air Command, a sophisticated network of air support control centres and various levels of communications between the ground and the air forces.

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FM 31–35’s emphasis on Corps-level air support, however, was inclined to foster the dispersion and subordination of the air force to the narrow close support interests of the ground commanders. All other air operations, which often were more important to the outcome of a land campaign, were left unattended. It was, as one historian has concluded, “the kind of system the British Army wanted in 1939–1941.”75 Another historian, John Terraine, blames Portal and the Air Staff for allowing these “inexcusable” shortcomings in air support doctrine and planning to go forward. Others, however, rightly point out that burgeoning American influence, in particular that of Eisenhower and Spaatz, was responsible for the Torch air plan.76 Both in concept and in execution the air support provided for Operation Torch was woefully inadequate. Bombers and fighters were kept “on call” by senior army commanders who insisted on receiving continuous protection from enemy air attack and on having aircraft immediately available for local ground assault tasks.77 British and American air commanders were quick to criticise this “improper employment” of their forces. But their remonstrations fell on deaf ears. A wider application of air power—to disrupt the enemy’s communications and supplies, isolate the battle area, and establish air superiority—seemed to be well beyond the experience and the limited understanding of the soldiers. In the words of one American fighter group leader, “the army generals did not care two hoots about air superiority.”78 Furthermore, the gross misuse of Allied air power in North-West Africa enabled the numerically inferior Luftwaffe to secure local air superiority and successfully attack Anglo-American ground troops on a frequent basis. Less than a month after the Allied landings the advance on Tunisia had slowed to a virtual crawl. Eisenhower was learning the hard way that victory on the ground depended in large measure on the effective employment of air power. Not long afterward he accepted a complete overhaul of his air arrangements.79 Help first arrived at the end of November when Tedder visited Eisenhower’s headquarters in Algiers. The two commanders enjoyed a number of candid discussions on the growing crisis in air support and the many difficulties revealed in the Torch setup. Tedder was “deeply disturbed” by what he saw and heard.80 In addition to the tactical heresy being committed by the ground commanders,81 he observed that communications for all of the Services were practically nonexistent, landing grounds were wholly inadequate in both number and location (the most advanced fighter airfield was more than one hundred miles behind the forward troops), and there was not even the semblance of a Combined Headquarters to control air operations.82 Altogether these shortcomings negated the possibility of achieving a high standard of concentrated air effort.83 These were familiar problems. Their remedy, also from the recent past, depended on a complete reorganisation of the control of air operations.

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Effective and efficient air support was, for Tedder, contingent on proper organisation and control. It was a problem of executive decision making as much as or even more than one of tactical co-ordination and execution in the field. In North-West Africa the problem was complicated further by the indeterminate political considerations of coalition warfare. This last potential barrier was the crucial element because, in Tedder’s opinion, the solution to Eisenhower’s air support problem was a unified Anglo-American air force under a single command with operational responsibility for all of North Africa and the Mediterranean. Only the RAF had the experience and the expertise to create and run such a command. Moreover, American acceptance of British ideas and procedures was by no means certain. Tedder knew this. He also knew that endorsement of his proposal required both careful management and tact. After a series of preliminary discussions involving Eisenhower, Tedder, Portal, and the Chiefs of Staff (COS) in London, the COS on 1 December proposed that all of the Torch air forces be integrated under Tedder’s command. In his capacity as AOC-in-C, he would also serve as Eisenhower’s air adviser.84 Eisenhower had some reservations but in general he agreed with the recommendation for a unified command system. The radical changes proposed, however, meant that numerous practical details had to be resolved before anything could be implemented. Not until the Casablanca Conference in mid-January 1943, in the presence of President Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Combined (British and American) Chiefs of Staff were all of the various arrangements finalised. Even then it was not until 17 February that Tedder’s appointment as AOC-in-C, Mediterranean, took effect, and the North-West African Air Forces (NWAF) were constituted. Eastern Air Command and the 12th U.S. Army Air Force combined to form the North-West African Air Forces (NWAF) under the command of General Spaatz.85 The Americans also accepted the RAF concept of dividing air operations by function rather than by geographic zones. NWAF was subdivided into the NorthWest African Strategic Air Force under General Doolittle, the North-West African Coastal Air Force under Air Vice-Marshal Sir Hugh Pugh Lloyd and the newly created North-West African Tactical Air Force (NATAF) under Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham.86 The debacle at Kasserine,87 which coincidently occurred at the same time that the Allied air forces were reconstituted, led to further and even more radical changes in American air doctrine. Coningham arrived at the front on 18 February, and immediately changed the air support arrangements. He discontinued American methods (prescribed in FM 31–35) and replaced them with his own WDAF organisation and system of command. Centralised control was the fundamental premise. Coningham therefore assumed direct command of all tactical air units (No.242 Group, RAF, and XII Air Support Command, USAAF) and ended the odious practice of soldiers controlling aircraft. Corps and Division commanders now made their requests for air

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support through the highest army commander (General Sir Harold Alexander, C-in-C 18th Army Group) who shared a joint headquarters with Coningham and his air staff. Communications, as in Egypt and Cyrenaica, were handled through an ASC network.88 On 20 February Coningham issued his first “General Operational Directive” to NATAF. He emphasised first the establishment of air superiority and second the isolation of the immediate battlefield. Henceforth, air support would be proactive and offensive. The practice of standing fighter patrols (air umbrellas) to protect friendly ground troops was replaced by offensive fighter sweeps against the enemy air force at or near its bases. Ground attack missions would also focus on targets in the rearward areas, namely troop concentrations and columns of soft-skinned vehicles, rather than tanks and enemy troops deployed at the battlefront. Close support (the American term), or direct support of ground forces, became a minor duty of the air forces. Its decline in importance was not, however, a rejection of the army’s needs; rather it was a prudent shift in accordance with established and proven RAF doctrine. Except for the Battle of El Hamma, from 3 to 9 April, when the NATAF flew more than 3,000 sorties and dropped over 1,500,000 pounds of bombs in direct support of forward elements of the army, the campaign in North-West Africa did not lend itself to major close support operations.89 To their considerable credit the Americans accepted Coningham’s idea of independent air support. During the spring of 1943, Eisenhower established a study group to examine the lessons of Kasserine and to make recommendations for a new field manual to replace FM 31–35. He also sent his air operations officer, Brigadier General Laurence S. Kuter, back to Washington to promote the new air-ground relationship. Air Force Generals H.A.P. Arnold and Carl Spaatz were equally enthusiastic about the British concept and, in July 1943, the U.S. Army published FM 100–20. It specified three phases of an air campaign and listed them in order of priority: to gain and maintain air superiority, to isolate the battlefield, and to support the ground forces.90 In short, the Americans adopted the British doctrine in toto.91 What the British Army had failed to do after three and half years of war, the Americans did in less than nine months. They not only proclaimed air power and land power equal and interdependent—neither being an auxiliary of the other—but also accepted it as such. In future land campaigns control of all available air power would be exercised through the air force commander, who would work with rather than for the ground commander.92 Montgomery, of course, was an exception to the rule. His was a lone yet forceful voice in the British Army hierarchy which supported both the idea and the practice of independent air support. Drawing on unpublished papers written by Coningham, and a presentation the Air Marshal made to Eisenhower and senior Allied officers on 16 February,93 Montgomery produced a pamphlet entitled “Air Power in the Land Battle.” He summarised

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the major conceptual developments of the last twelve months (the ideas of duality, where air and army officers recognised and accepted the difference, the equality, and the need to co-operate as a single united entity) and emphasised their acceptance as a guide for future joint operations. The following are a selection of the main points and principles: Any officer who aspires to hold high command in war must understand clearly certain basic principles regarding the use of air power. The greatest asset of air power is its flexibility and this enables it to be switched from one objective to another in the theatre of operations. So long as this is realised then the whole weight of the available air power can be used in selected areas in turn; this concentrated use of the air striking force is a battle-winning factor of the first importance. It follows that control of the available air power must be centralised and command must be exercised through Air Force channels. Nothing could be more fatal to successful results than to dissipate the air resources into small packets placed under command of the army formation commanders with each packet working on its own plan. The soldier must not expect or wish, to exercise direct command over air striking forces. All that is required is that the two staffs, Army and Air, should work together at the same headquarters and operate their respective forces in accordance with a combined Army/Air plan, . . . in complete harmony and with mutual understanding and confidence [otherwise] you will be done.94

Although the original document was Coningham’s, Montgomery nevertheless did the RAF and the USAAF a great service by publishing it under his own name.95 The most successful general in the British Army publicly admitted that the complexities of air warfare demanded an independent air force organisation. “The first and great principle of war,” stated Montgomery, “is that you must win your air battle before you fight your land and sea battle. . . . ” Generals, he declared, were not qualified to command highly specialised air forces pursuing various and often inter-related operations.96 “The handling of an Air Force is a life-study,” Montgomery cautioned, “and therefore the air part must be kept under Air Force command.”97 This was well-founded advice. Discussing the major land campaigns and their outcomes with a friend over lunch at Claridge’s immediately after the war, Montgomery confirmed his point: “Air power decisive as always.”98 Back in England during the winter of 1943, the doctrine of Army-Air operations was still “confused and the subject of considerable ill-feeling”; but this too was about to change.

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CHAPTER 10

The Birth of the Tactical Air Force Fighter Command’s interest in army co-operation began in 1942, and it derived from a rather indirect set of circumstances. Two years had passed since the heroic performance of Dowding’s squadrons in their vital role of air defence during the Battle of Britain, and new missions were required if Fighter Command was to retain both its prestige and its claim on air resources. In 1941 No. 11 Group, Fighter Command, initiated a series of “shallow penetration” raids along the channel coast of France aimed at drawing the Luftwaffe into combat. These “Rhubarb” and “Circus” operations were not as successful as Sholto Douglas, the AOC-in-C, Fighter Command, had hoped; the Luftwaffe no longer showed much interest in contesting the air space over either southern England or northern France unless there was a concurrent threat of RAF bomber attacks. Small groups of bombers borrowed from No. 2 Group, Bomber Command, attacking soft targets along the French coast, were often used as bait to entice the Luftwaffe to come up and fight. But this method too was not entirely satisfactory. No. 2 Group’s participation could not always be counted on; it had its own operations to undertake, especially bombing enemy shipping and mining the Channel for the Royal Navy. Consequently, Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, the commander of No. 11 Group, ordered a series of trials to test the feasibility of modifying some Hurricane fighter aircraft to carry bombs on wing-racks. Sholto Douglas gave Leigh-Mallory his full support, and this experiment resulted in the establishment of the first “Hurribomber” squadrons. Some of these new fighter-bomber squadrons were despatched to the Middle East in time for Operation Crusader, where they distinguished themselves as a real alternative to the slow and vulnerable German divebombers. Encouraged by his initial success, Leigh-Mallory pressed on with

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his efforts to develop the fighter-bomber. He even convinced Sholto Douglas to endorse his proposed modifications to the new Hawker Typhoons entering service at the end of 1941. Their combined efforts proved to be perspicacious; the Typhoon, if not the most, was one of the most effective fighter-bombers of the war. Fighter Command, for reasons quite unrelated to army co-operation, developed the weapon that would provide the Army with its most effective air support throughout the latter half of the war.1 In the spring of 1942, when the COS began discussions on the AngloAmerican invasion of the continent, many of the air support problems that would confront the planners had already been tackled by Fighter Command. No.11 Group had both the experience and the signals to control large numbers of aircraft over northern France. It also had the new fighter-bombers, which could do double service as air superiority fighters and ground attack aircraft. On 3 January 1942, Sholto Douglas issued the first of a series of training memoranda that would have all the day fighter squadrons trained to support the Army nine months later.2 The Slessor Paper of July 1942 and Portal’s desire to organise the Army’s air support in Fighter rather than Army Co-operation Command were official pronouncements of what was already going on at Fighter Command Headquarters. Leigh-Mallory’s appointment as AOC-in-C Fighter Command (succeeding Sholto Douglas), in November 1942, was the clearest indicator yet of Fighter Command’s shift in emphasis from the air defence of the United Kingdom to offensive operations in support of the Army.3 Over the course of his RAF career Leigh-Mallory had acquired considerable experience working with the Army. He ended his service in the First World War commanding No.8 Squadron in support of the Royal Tank Corps. Between the wars he served as the Commandant of the Army Cooperation School at Old Sarum, and he was a frequent guest at the Army Staff College where he lectured on army-air co-operation. In Leigh-Mallory the Army had a senior air officer who possessed both experience in co-operation and empathy for its requirements.4 Fighter Command’s interest in attacking ground targets, however, was not seen by GHQ Home Forces and Army Co-operation Command as an entirely positive development. Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt, the AOCin-C Army Co-operation Command, feared that the progress painstakingly made by his Command and GHQ Home Forces over the previous two years, to establish effective army-air liaison in the field and work out the complicated signals system for providing direct support, might be lost if a struggle for the control of air support was allowed to develop between two competing RAF commands. His concerns were echoed by Lt-Col Ralph Stockley, the Army liaison officer at Fighter Command. “Two Commands are at present studying Army Air Support—Fighter Command and Army Co-operation Command,” Stockley lamented in a letter to Air Vice-Marshal C.R. Carr, AOC at Eastern Command Headquarters (Home Forces), “[b]oth

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are carrying out research almost independently with resultant waste of effort and confusion.”5 Their apprehensions, however, were ignored by the Air Staff, which supported wholeheartedly Fighter Command and its air support experiments.6 From January through August 1942, Fighter Command co-ordinated a series of exercises that were designed to familiarise air and army personnel with the methods of air support. Day fighter squadrons trained directly with army units in their local area; the main thrust was on acclimatising soldiers and airmen to a joint command headquarters and adapting both Group and sector signals systems to the new demands of army support. Not to be outdone, Army Co-operation Command also conducted field manoeuvres, as well as command, staff, and signals exercises with GHQ Home Forces. One of the more important exercises was Dryshod, held from 4 to 8 August in Ayrshire. Each of the two exercising armies had its own Air Staff and an Army Air Support Control (AASC). Much was learnt about the complex communications system and its limitations, target identification and recognition, the passing of information between the two services, and establishing clear lines of authority and responsibility. Particularly gratifying, especially for the airmen, was the performance of 2 Group’s bomber squadrons. On one occasion, 114 Squadron caught opposing land forces by surprise and was judged to have destroyed the 6th Armoured Division in an air attack directed by an AASC.7 Despite growing tension between the Air Staff and Fighter Command on one side and GHQ Home Forces and Army Co-operation Command on the other, both continued to pursue with considerable success their own ideas on what constituted the proper form of air support for the Army. Fighter Command offered an extensive though static signals network and substantial numbers of exceptional aircraft whilst Army Co-operation Command provided the AASC system that first enabled and second increased both the speed of response and the mobility of air forces in the field. Once the AASC system was incorporated in the new air support organisation developing within Fighter Command, a powerful and effective mobile system of support would accompany British and Canadian troops on continental operations. This was the Air Staff’s proposed solution, and it received official approval in December 1942 following the summer and autumn victories of the Western Desert Air Force and Eighth Army, the Prime Minister’s Directive in October, and the new principles agreed to by the Secretaries of State for Air and War in November. The first staff and signals exercise to test the Air Staff’s concepts was held in January 1943, and it was followed in March by Spartan, a large combined field exercise involving No.11 Group, an extemporised Composite Group inclusive of fighters, fighter-bombers, light bombers, and fighter reconnaissance aircraft for each of the opposing sides, and two armies at war strength drawn from Home Forces.8

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Exercise Spartan ran for twelve days from 1 to 12 March. It was the last of the grand Home Forces exercises: a major rehearsal for a crossChannel invasion with specific emphasis on testing the RAF’s new concept of air support for the Army. When it was over the clear advantages of the Composite Group and its control organisation had been demonstrated. The two main attributes of the RAF system were a unified command and the concentration of various types of aircraft under the control of a single air commander who could see the air situation as a whole and co-ordinate support and reconnaissance operations with fighter operations to create a favourable air situation.9 Following the pattern of planning and conducting combined army/air operations in the Western Desert, the AOC-in-C and the GOC-in-C shared a joint headquarters from where they directed the battle together. The two commanders were equal in status. Direct and immediate contact also enhanced their ability to exploit the unique capabilities of each service in a partnership aimed at achieving a common objective. Focusing on the air portion of the exercise, the inherent flexibility of centrally controlled air forces enabled the air commander to concentrate his fighters for a series of largescale attacks on enemy airfields. With a marked degree of air superiority attained in the first few days, the heavy bombers joined the action to isolate the battlefield. Enemy communications, command centres, rearward areas, and the main routes of approach were the principal targets. Fighter-bombers directed by air reconnaissance also exploited the favourable air situation and provided the ground troops with immediate support in the forward battle zone. Even Air Marshal Barratt, AOC-in-C Army Co-operation Command, praised the RAF’s performance in Spartan.10 Portal was exuberant. The new RAF air support system—though more experience and improved mobility were required—was a success. Consequently, the CAS notified the COS on 23 March of his desire to form a Composite Group with its own Headquarters, on a permanent basis, within Fighter Command. This seemed to catch the General Staff by surprise. Brooke still favoured developing the Army’s air support in Army Co-operation Command. Lt-General Nye, the VCIGS, also voiced his concern at the daily meeting of the COS the following day. He wanted the War Office’s views to be taken into account before anything was done to change the existing air support organisation, including any reorganisation of Army Co-operation Command. Portal, in an effort to reassure the Generals of the RAF’s genuine desire to provide the Army with the most effective air support, said the Air Staff was still collating the results of Spartan along with its analysis of Middle East operations. He also said the Air Staff was prepared to share this information with the War Office before a new policy was drafted: a commitment that was met.11 More than a month passed before the Air Staff produced their plan. During this time Army opinion had shifted in favour of the RAF’s position.

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In addition to direct and productive joint-service consultation, both Montgomery and Coningham had been giving lectures to senior British and American air and army commanders on the merits of the Middle East system. Montgomery also published a pamphlet in which he renounced the old War Office belief that army commanders should control their own supporting air forces. “The soldier,” he wrote, “must not expect, or wish to exercise direct command over air striking forces.”12 Tedder gleefully noted the ironic importance of the General’s pronouncement in a letter to Portal: . . . I suggest CIGS is now caught in a cleft stick. He cannot disown Monty, but he must choose either to repudiate Monty’s views, which are founded on battle, or himself be a minority voice.13

But on this occasion a high-level inter-service confrontation did not transpire. The VCIGS was the first to have a change of heart. He knew that accepting the Air Staff’s proposal would mean the demise of Army Cooperation Command. Nonetheless, on 5 April he wrote to the CIGS and recommended that the War Office “ . . . jump at the proposal, since it seems to meet the requirements for which we have been pressing.”14 Brooke relented and acted on this advice; to have done otherwise would have invited professional censure for hubris. On 29 April Portal presented the Air Staff’s plan on the reorganisation of the RAF for continental operations to the COS. He recommended the formation of a Composite Group for each British and Canadian Army taking part in the invasion and subsequent operations.15 Each group would contain fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance aircraft, but their allotment would not be bound to a prescribed “fixed strength.” The AOC-in-C was free to move aircraft from one group to another as circumstances and opportunities dictated to exploit the inherent flexibility and concentrating power of his force. Command arrangements were to conform closely to those that had been employed so successfully in the Middle East between the GOC-in-C Eighth Army and the AOC-in-C Western Desert Air Force. Mobile Operations Room Units (MORU), an expanded and more sophisticated version of the AASU control system, would link GHQ/AHQ to joint army/air headquarters along the entire chain of command right down to the most forward units. All air support requests would be evaluated by the AOC with priority going to those objectives vital to the overall success of the ground operations. In this way, air support would not be frittered away on attractive yet inconsequential tasks.16 Detailed arrangements were also suggested for studying all aspects of air support, as well as planning and training for actual combined operations. These were the main tasks of the new Air Expeditionary Force Headquarters, which was to form up within Fighter Command. Once the new command was established, Army Co-operation Command would cease to exist. But

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the latter’s staff and training organisations were to be incorporated within Fighter Command Headquarters so that the valuable knowledge and experience accumulated over the past few years was not lost.17 The COS approved Portal’s proposed Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) on 1 May; four days later Churchill gave his assent to the RAF reorganisation scheme.18 In the end, both services can claim a tangible victory in the final resolution of the dispute. The RAF successfully avoided turning over operational control of large air forces to the Army, and thereby maintained both its independence and its inviolable principles of air power. On the other hand, the Army received air support on a very large scale, and the whole organisation of Army Co-operation Command was absorbed and utilised.19 This was, after all, what was required if the Army was to fight and defeat the Germans. Perhaps it was the inevitable compromise. The tragedy is that it took so long. Further details on the formation of the AEF (renamed the Tactical Air Force for security reasons) were issued by the Air Staff throughout May and June. No.83 Composite Group had already formed in Fighter Command. No.2 Group was transferred from Bomber Command and No.38 Wing and No.140 Squadron were also added to the order of battle. All together they formed the 2nd Tactical Air Force,20 which established its headquarters at Bracknell on 1 June with Air Vice-Marshal J.H. D’Albiac as its first Commander.21 The 2nd Tactical Air Force would grow considerably over the ensuing months.22 As a consequence, British and Canadian Armies were the beneficiaries of perhaps the finest air support provided by any air force during the war.23 A large part of the success enjoyed by British forces that began at Normandy on 6 June 1944, and ended a little less than a year later with Germany’s unconditional surrender, was owed to the hard work and persistence of Portal, Tedder, Coningham, Slessor, Barratt, Leigh-Mallory, and Sholto Douglas. It was not a coincidence that British fortunes in combined air-ground warfare exhibited dramatic improvements once the enlightened ideas of the men in light blue formed the basis of policy and operational technique rather than those of their colleagues in khaki.

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Conclusion With the formation of the 2nd Tactical Air Force on 1 June 1943, an agreed policy between the Army and the Royal Air Force on the most effective and efficient means of providing air support for British armies in the field had been achieved. From this point in the war to its end the Army received substantial air support in its battles with the enemy. As for the RAF, its independence and inveterate principles had been preserved, and its concept of air warfare in support of land forces was both accepted and practiced. This marked the end of a long and tortuous dispute between the two services that dated back to the last years of the First World War. At its heart were vexing differences over the essential character of air warfare and a bitter struggle over how and who would manage limited air forces during a war. Airmen in the Royal Flying Corps (RFC), fighting in France in 1916 and 1917, learnt through trial and error that all air operations in support of the army were more effective when first they achieved air superiority over the battlefield. They also recognised that a system of centralised command, to concentrate air forces at the decisive place and time, was a necessary prerequisite to attaining air superiority. But this was not possible in the RFC on a regular basis. The Army viewed aircraft as auxiliary forces, similar to artillery and the new tanks, which were attached to army formations at the front and under the army commander’s direct control. Decentralised command precluded air forces from exercising a strategic impact on the battle. But this was not their purpose in army planning. The Army used aircraft as “flying artillery” to attack enemy guns and strong points at the forefront of the battlefield in order to help the infantry advance and achieve a breakthrough; air forces were subordinate to army operations, and senior army commanders were not concerned with the wider application of air

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forces outside of the immediate battle area. This, in part, was a major reason for the creation of the Royal Air Force in 1918. Under the direction of Sir Hugh Trenchard, the new, independent RAF emphasised speed, flexibility, and concentration of force as the three main pillars of its policy for planning and conducting air operations. The Battle of Amiens, in August 1918, was the first mass experiment using aircraft under centralised command and control in a land battle. Though only a qualified success, the battle demonstrated the enormous potential that air forces had to isolate a battlefield and make a decisive impact on operations taking place on the ground. Air power, Trenchard concluded correctly, had the ability to exert a strategic influence on the conduct of war in the future. After the war, British airmen codified their experiences and published a series of principles to guide the proper development of air power. During the interwar years of service rivalries, caused in large measure by increasingly parsimonious defence budgets, the RAF and its new theories on war were regular targets of the Royal Navy and the Army. A severe lack of resources made it difficult for all three services to develop new doctrines that incorporated the most recent technology and theories of war. The avaricious nature of inter-service relations also precluded real and effective co-operation between the young RAF and the two older services. When war broke out again in Europe in 1939, Britain’s armed forces were not only under-equipped for battle but they were unprepared for the close co-operation demanded by modern mechanised warfare. The calamitous Battle of France and the early setbacks in the Middle East exacerbated the long-standing animosity and poor working relationship between the Army and the RAF. The War Office claimed that defeat in France proved their point: the army required its own specialised air forces, sub-allotted to ground commanders (at Corps and Divisional levels) who were involved in the immediate fighting. Only in this way, professed the soldiers, would the army receive the air support it required. The Air Ministry disagreed. Effective air support was dependent on a high degree of air superiority. To achieve this superiority demanded an air force superior in strength to the enemy air force opposite: a unified air force under centralised command with the flexibility to switch from one task to another as the strategic circumstances dictated. It would not be vast numbers of aircraft tethered to the ground forces. Lack of aircraft and essential matériel accounted for the reverses suffered, and not the RAF’s air support system as the War Office believed. More aircraft, more mobility for air forces on the ground to advance and withdraw with the army, and better communications to co-ordinate the efforts of both services in the field were what was required to turn defeat into victory. During the late summer and autumn of 1940, the two services searched for answers to the air support dilemma. The War Office established a

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special committee under General Sir William Bartholomew, renowned for his enmity toward the RAF, to study the problem and make recommendations for a new policy. After hearing oral evidence from a number of senior army officers who had fought in France, and one airman, the committee recommended that the Army receive its own independent air arm. It was the RAF system that was at fault. The conclusion was hardly a surprise. It did, however, reveal the parochial nature of army thinking and the failure of the British General Staff to comprehend the character of combined air and armoured warfare. Whilst the Army was blaming others for its battlefield defeats, the Air Staff promoted a series of joint army-air signals experiments to determine the most appropriate methods for developing close co-operation between air and ground forces fighting a land battle. The product of these investigations was one of the most momentous developments of the war. Group Captain A.H. Wann and Colonel John Woodall devised a system of joint army-air command in the field supported by a sophisticated signals network that linked forward ground troops with a combined battlefield headquarters and advanced airfields. Once fully developed, it would provide effective air support during both offensive and defensive operations. Expanded and refined by Air Marshals Sir Arthur Tedder and Arthur Coningham, the WannWoodall system was eventually employed with great effect in North Africa. Frustrations brought on by a lack of resources, rudimentary technology, and the implementation of new procedures, were compounded by the difficulties that the Army and the RAF experienced when working together. Generals Archibald Wavell and Claude Auchinleck never appreciated fully the interdependence of air-ground operations in the Western Desert. The army was “instinctively antagonistic” to shared operational authority. Tedder also questioned its grasp of the essential character of modern war and the quality of its leadership. Both of these elements, he concluded, required substantial improvement before the enemy could be engaged and defeated on a regular basis. Even the intervention of Prime Minister Winston Churchill, through his seminal Middle East Directive, which established official policy for Army-RAF co-operation for the rest of the war, did not produce an immediate and lasting solution. The desired change came about with the appointment of General Bernard Montgomery as commander of the Eighth Army. Montgomery grasped both the essential character and importance of air operations in support of a land battle. Consequently, he worked closely with Coningham at all stages of drafting, planning, and executing integrated air-ground operations. Success in battle depended on the degree to which the army and the air force assisted each other, not as ancillary to the other but as equals in pursuit of a common objective. Together, Montgomery and Coningham achieved a high degree of co-operation, and they enjoyed its commensurate success.

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Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, drew on the recent lessons of the Desert War when he proposed to provide air support for the Anglo-American invasion of the continent, and all subsequent ground operations, along the lines of the Western Desert Air Force system. This proposal did not meet with the War Office’s approval. In particular, General Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, still held out for the creation of an independent army air arm. The deadlock, however, was broken by a combination of factors: the battlefield success achieved by Montgomery and Coningham in the Western Desert from August 1942 onwards; Churchill’s personal intervention in October 1942 when he restated the terms of the Middle East Directive on Air Support for the benefit of the Army and the RAF in the UK; Fighter Command’s development of air support techniques; and Exercise Spartan, the last of the great Home Forces exercises, which illustrated the clear advantages of a unified air force under centralised command and control over all other methods of meeting the army’s air support needs. Reluctantly, the General Staff acquiesced in the insurmountable pressure and accepted the Air Staff’s methods for providing air support. A victory of intellect and procedure had been achieved, but at considerable cost both in time and lives lost. Air power had a substantial impact on the conduct of military operations throughout the Second World War. The lack of a detailed study on the RAF’s development of air support theory and practice has meant that our understanding of the war—and in particular the development of operational art in the third dimension—has been incomplete. A broader view of the contribution of the RAF to effective joint army-air operations is not a definitive history; rather, it is only the beginning of a major reinterpretation of the land war fought by the Western Allies. This reinterpretation must be set in the widest possible terms and based on new investigations using the wealth of primary documentation that is now available. Only then will we have a better understanding of who were the true architects of victory.

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APPENDIX

Middle East (Army and RAF) Directive on Direct Air Support Issued by GHQ MEF and HQ RAF ME (30 September 1941) 1. Action by the RAF in conjunction with the army will be known as Air Support. The use of the term ‘close support’ is leading to confusion owing to the impossibility of defining its limitations; the term will therefore not be used. Air Support can be sub-divided into Indirect Air Support and Direct Air Support. 2. Indirect Air Support included air action against the approaches to a theatre of war such as sea communications and ports, land communications, base installations, etc., within a land theatre of war. It is in fact strategic air support directed against any target which has an effect, though not an immediate effect, on the battle between ground forces. 3. Direct Air Support implies air action having an immediate effect on the action of our own ground forces in battle. It can be divided into: (a) Pre-arranged support. (b) Impromptu support. 4. Pre-Arranged Support does not present any particular difficulties. Targets and target areas can be selected before the action starts and the timing of attacks on them can be settled beforehand. 5. Impromptu Support presents a far more difficult problem, especially in fluid operations and particularly in support of armoured formations. 6. Air Superiority. It cannot be too strongly stressed that the general air situation will affect the possibility of giving direct air support to the action of ground forces, in that aircraft detailed for air support are particularly susceptible to attack by enemy fighters and a high degree of protection against enemy air attack must be provided.

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Appendix

7. Protection of Land Forces against Air Attack. The Germans, who have perfected the means of giving air support, did not neglect to study the counter measures available to defeat air support if used against themselves. Consequently a very high degree of protection in the shape of anti-aircraft guns of all sorts is provided in the German Army to those units and formations which are likely to present suitable targets, and consequently it must be taken into account, that the casualties likely to be suffered by our own aircraft when attacking the Germans, will amount to considerably more than would be the case if a similar attack was carried out on our own forces. There is a real need for a careful study of defence against air attacks and of the provision of suitable weapons and personnel to make such attacks costly. 8. Morale. The importance of the moral aspect of air attack on ground troops needs stressing. For troops in defensive positions it is not of vital importance, but its effects on troops in the open can scarcely be exaggerated. It must be borne in mind that the weight of air attack will usually not be very heavy and the accuracy of the attack will depend on the degree of opposition which the enemy are able to put up, whether by means of fighter defence or fire from the ground. The main effect of air support is therefore likely to be moral rather than material, and air support not only destroys the morale of the enemy, but also raises that of our own troops. It is the experience of those who have been subjected to serious air attack, that there is scarcely anything better calculated to raise the morale of the troops than seeing our own aircraft in the air, and most of all seeing enemy aircraft shot down. It is a matter which has a very direct bearing on troops in battle, the moral effect being out of all proportion to the material effect produced. ASPECTS OF DIRECT AIR SUPPORT 9. Direct Air Support includes: (a) Defensive Support to impede or halt the enemy’s ground offensive in general and to counter his dive bombers in particular. (b) Offensive Support aiming at the destruction of enemy ground forces with the intention of facilitating the offensive of the military forces on the battlefield. Defensive Support 10. Against Enemy Ground Offensives. The principle should be that the available air support is employed against the most suitable and vulnerable targets. These targets will normally be outside the range of ground observation. They should therefore be selected by the RAF by observation from

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the air. A tentacle system is, however, needed as a second means whereby commanders of leading brigades can rapidly communicate to the air their wants in Air Support. But the main responsibility for deciding on the employment of the available air support resources must depend on a joint plan of the military and air commanders. 11. Against Enemy Dive Bombers. In its biggest aspect, this is achieved by maintaining complete air superiority. Complete protection in any lesser degree than this is difficult to attain. It is obviously useless, however perfect the available inter-communication resources, for the Army to expect that they can get fighter support in time, by calling for this support after a hostile attack has started. By the time the fighters arrive, the enemy dive bombing attack will have finished. The only alternative is the provision of standing fighter patrols, but these must of necessity be so uneconomical as to be out of the question. One solution is to have fighter sweeps in the air during the periods when enemy bombing attack appears likely. The German is prone to be regular in his habits; for instance, experience in France, in Crete and in Greece shows that he nearly always employs dive bombers immediately after first light. Complete fighter protection against dive bombers cannot be expected, but it should be possible, by the judicious employment of our fighters, often to have fighter cover at times when hostile dive bombers are operating. More than this we cannot expect; our energies should be employed in perfecting our ground AA defences and in the art of concealment, camouflage and deception.

Offensive Support 12. It is in this sphere that the RAF are able mostly to assist ground operations, but it must be recognised that we do not possess suitable aircraft for dive bombing. 13. Fighter Attack. In this type of attack, something akin to dive attack on the German pattern is possible. Suitable targets and their relative positions on the battlefield are similar, with minor exceptions, to those for bombers considered below. The exceptions are that attack on AFVs by fighters with cannon are sometimes ‘worth while’, and fighters can attack by ground strafing methods targets nearer to our leading ground elements. It is difficult to assess the relative value of this type of attack [sic.] probably has the greater moral effect. But the fighter is the main weapon in the battle for air superiority, and to employ fighters against ground targets in a direct support role must inevitably be drawing them off from the main issue. Thus, though direct support by fighter aircraft is probably more effective than that by bomber aircraft, this type of direct support, however, desirable it may be, cannot normally be expected until a considerable degree of air superiority has already been attained.

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Appendix

14. Bomber Attack will normally take the form of: (a) Level Bombing from Medium Altitude (6,000–8,000 ft.). In this form of attack, sticks of bombs falling at predetermined intervals are released automatically, the bomb-aimer of the leading aircraft sighting for the whole formation. Aircraft are above light AA fire at this height. (b) Shallow Dive Attack. Aircraft dive from medium altitudes to approximately 2,000 ft., level out and carry out stick bombing as in (a) above. The pilot or bomb-aimer in the leading aircraft can sight in this attack, aircraft bombing in formation or singly according to the situation. (c) Low Level Attack (1,000–3,000 ft.). Aircraft maintain constant height at low altitude during the approach, actual bombing, and ‘get-away’. The pilot normally aims and releases bombs, aircraft attacking individually. This form of attack is only carried out when ground opposition is expected to be small. (d) Ground Level Attack (below 50 ft.). Aircraft never climb above 50 ft. throughout the entire raid. The object is to obtain complete surprise, and every use must be made of topographical features in the approach. Unless the exact position of the target is known, and the target itself is clearly discernible from low level, this form of attack is useless. Furthermore, unless complete surprise is achieved, casualties may be expected to be very high. Generally, ground level attack is unsuitable for direct air support targets. 15. Bombs and Fuzes. In Direct Air Support Bombardment, the effect on morale is as important as material effect, and therefore, a 250 lb. bomb will produce better results than an equal weight of 40 lb. or 20 lb. bombs. The majority of targets in Direct Air Support call for a heavy type of bomb, the 40 lb. bomb only being of use against concentrations of troops and vehicles, and in these days of air attack, troops are learning to avoid such concentrations. It is considered that the 250 lb. G.P. Bomb fuzed Instantaneous is the most suitable for Direct Air Support Bombardment, except for ground level bombing, where an 11 seconds delay fuze must be used. 16. The Characteristics of Direct Air Support Bombing must be fully appreciated if maximum use is to be made of this type of support. (a) It is possible with Direct Air Support Aircraft to develop suddenly a very considerable volume of fire to assist formations who have outdistanced their artillery. (b) As there will normally be targets in excess of the capacity of the available aircraft, the latter should not be used when other support, such as artillery and mortars, are sufficient for the purpose. (c) Unlike artillery, it will generally be impossible for Direct Air Support aircraft to sustain their attack for any length of time; neither does the attack tend to become more accurate as it proceeds.

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(d) The accuracy of the attack will depend on a number of factors, of which the chief are: (i) Absence of enemy opposition both from the ground and in the air. (ii) Good visibility. (iii) A Target which can be Clearly Recognised by the Airman. In general, except when there is little or no enemy opposition to the aircraft, and except in the case of ground level attacks, accuracy will be of a considerably lower order than that attained by artillery. In these conditions aircraft cannot be expected successfully to engage targets in close contact with out leading troops, nor, in fact, is it here that the best targets are likely to be found. Selection of Targets for Direct Air Support 17. The selection of targets will be governed by one or more of the following factors: (a) The degree of natural or artificial cover of which the enemy is making use. (b) The amount of dispersion which it has been possible to achieve. (c) Whether destruction of personnel or material is desired. (d) The distance of the target from our own leading troops. If accidental bombardment of our own troops is to be avoided, targets selected should not be within 500 yards of them. (e) The extent to which ground fire can be directed into enemy targets. (f) The ease of locating the target from the air. It must have some distinctive feature by which it can be recognised from the air. In the face of enemy opposition either ground defences or fighters, it is impossible for the pilot to cruise round until he finds it. 18. Generally speaking the larger the target which presents itself, the easier it is to attack it effectively, and at the same time the farther it is likely to be from our own troops. It must therefore be expected that the target will be found in areas not actually in contact with our leading troops, because land forces tend to become more and more dispersed the nearer they get to the enemy. 19. No comprehensive list of targets can be laid down, any more than they can be laid down for artillery, but the commander who is allotted aircraft to assist him, will be entitled to use those aircraft on targets which he considers will enable him to achieve his object, provided always that the target is one which is suitable for air attack. 20. Suitable Targets for Direct Air Support aircraft will include: (a) Any concentration of troops or vehicles which can be surprised in close formation and which would have difficulty in dispersing. Concentrations can be caused by the blocking of suitable defiles.

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(b) Headquarters and Signal centres where these can be accurately located and are not under cover. (c) Artillery positions in the open. The effect will probably be only to kill or temporarily disperse the personnel and not to damage the guns to any extent. (d) Supply echelons, particularly petrol and rations, without which vehicles cannot continue to function and men cannot continue to fight. (e) Crossing points over obstacles. Such targets will normally be outside the range of ground observation, in which case they must usually be selected by air observation. 21. The following targets are not suitable for air attack: (a) Dispersed Infantry or vehicles. (b) Any troops, guns, etc., which are well protected either by the nature of the country, or by the protective works which the enemy has been able to provide. (c) Columns on the L of C which can rapidly disperse and maintain considerable distance between vehicles.

APPLICATION OF DIRECT AIR SUPPORT The Air Support Control System 22. Owing to the flexibility of air power, the proportion of effort devoted to Indirect and Direct Air Support will never be constant, but will vary in accordance with the plans of the higher command during the progress of any battle. Before an operation, a plan for air support to assist the land forces is made. This plan will envisage a proportion of the air effort being employed during a given period in a Direct Air Support role. 23. In order to ensure that the maximum effort is obtained from the available Direct Support aircraft, an Air Support Control is used to meet, modify or reject the requests for support received form various sources. 24. It may be argued that it would be better to simplify Direct Air Support by allotting Squadrons or Flights to Brigades or Battalions in the same way as Batteries are allotted. This system would inevitably lead to such a wide dispersal of air forces that the small number of aircraft available for each particular mission would accomplish little or nothing. 25. Air Support to be effective requires the employment of concentrations of aircraft; such concentrations can only be achieved by some form of control.

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Organisation of an Air Support Control 26. Headquarters or RAF formations which may be called upon to give Direct Air Support will be organised with one or more mobile advanced Headquarters, which combined with an Army element will be known as Air Support Controls (Air SC). The two elements will comprise: (a) Army. Two staff officers plus a small staff. A wireless organisation which consists of: (i) Seven forward links known as Tentacles for communication to the Control HQ. The Tentacles can be allotted to those lower formations which the higher commander decides should be given the means of calling for Air Support. (ii) Three wireless sets at the Control HQ for communication to Tentacles. (b) Royal Air Force. The Formation Commander or his deputy, plus a small operational staff. A wireless organisation consists of: (i) Eight sets known as Forward Air Support Links (FASLs) for controlling Air Support Aircraft in the air and for listening to Reconnaissance Aircraft. (ii) Two wireless sets known as Rear Air Support Links (RASLs) for communicating directly to four Landing Grounds. (iii) Four wireless sets for use at four Landing Grounds. 27. A diagrammatic layout of an Air Support Control is attached at Annexure ‘A’. 28. In addition to the RAF Formation Commander or his deputy, two operations officers working watch are sufficient to maintain the records and the state of readiness board. Until such time as the Air Support Control is put into operation, they will normally be employed in the Operations Room of the RAF Formation HQ. Allotment of Air Support Controls 29. It is the intention in the Middle East to provide Air Support Controls on the basis of one to each Corps and one to each Armoured Division. For the present, it is not intended to provide the Army element of an Air Support Control allotted to an Armoured Division since all HQs in such formations already have suitable operational wireless channels, which can be used for passing requests for Air Support. The HQ of the Air Support Control will be established adjacent to, in fact as part of, the HQ of the formation which is fighting the battle; this will normally be a Corps HQ or an Armoured Division HQ.

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Allotment of Tentacles and FASLs 30. Tentacles and FASLs will be allotted to Brigades of Infantry Divisions to enable forward commanders to call for Direct Air Support. Experience has shown that there are serious difficulties in moving tentacles from formation to formation during continuous operations; reserve brigades should therefore receive their tentacles before operations start as far as the number of tentacles will allow. 31. Tentacles and FASLs for listening purposes should also be allotted to Infantry Division HQs. Operation of the Air Support Control 32. The organisation of an Air Support Control allows requests for Air Support to be received from: (a) A Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft which may happen to observe a suitable target during a normal reconnaissance. (b) A Support Reconnaissance Aircraft, i.e., an aircraft sent out on orders from the Air Support Control HQ to look for suitable Air Support targets. (c) Forward Formation Commanders by means of Tentacle allotted to them. 33. It appears, from the reasons given earlier, that better and more numerous targets are likely to be seen by reconnaissance aircraft than by forward troops. Whereas the procedure described in the following paragraphs may therefore be more normal, it is essential to have in addition the organisation by which forward troops can call for Direct Air Support when required. Selection of Targets by Air Reconnaissance 34. The military commander will explain to the RAF formation commander, or his deputy at the Air Support Control HQ, the enemy’s dispositions, his own plan and the probable trend of events; and will indicate to him the likely areas for Direct Air Support targets. 35. Acting on this information, the RAF Commander will arrange for air reconnaissance of these areas to be carried out with the object of locating suitable Air Support Targets. As the operation progresses, the military commander will be able to supplement the original information, and to indicate new areas of reconnaissance. 36. Requests for Air Support on selected targets will be made by R/T by the Support Reconnaissance aircraft to the Air Support Control HQ. The Control Staff decide whether the request shall be accepted or refused, and the aircraft is informed accordingly. Control HQ will also inform a formation if

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action is being taken against targets on its front. This should be considered the normal method of applying Direct Air Support. Selection of Targets by Forward Troops 37. Requests from Forward Troops for Air Support will be made by W/T from Tentacles. These messages will be received at the Air Support Control HQ by the GSO 2 who is the representative of the Commander fighting the battle. 38. The Control Staff accepts or refuses the request according to the suitability of the target for air attack and the availability of aircraft. The formation originating the request is notified. 39. In cases of acceptance, the requests are passed directly by the RAF Commander over the RAF signals system to the landing ground selected for the task. Allocation of Effort 40. It can be seen that requests for air support against a large variety of targets will be received from a number of sources at Air Support Control HQ. It is essential therefore, that the Commander should indicate very clearly the principles of which the priority of targets is to be decided, and that the Control staff should adhere to these principles closely. 41. In addition to allocating effort by exercising judgement at the Air Support Control HQ, there is the method of pre-allotting a proportion of the total effort to Support Reconnaissance sorties and to lower formations, so that each sortie and each formation to which a tentacle has been given, knows in advance how many Air Support sorties are at its disposal. 42. In theory, this method can readily be applied, since it is but a matter of the higher commander promulgating in his orders as a result of the plan the number of sorties or proportion of the available effort sub-allotted. Then, if the Air Support Control HQ knows in terms of sorties the allotment to reconnaissance aircraft and tentacles, it can, provided the total number allotted does not exceed the number of first sorties available, ensure, subject to weather and enemy action, that demands are met. 43. In practice, however, it has been found that this method presents many difficulties, since not only is it extremely difficult to forecast what lower formations may require as the battle proceeds, but it is also impossible to allot in advance any but those first sorties at immediate readiness. As the situation develops, the needs of forward formations change, and the aircraft available fluctuate, thus it will be necessary to adjust allotment. It will often be impossible to make this adjustment in sufficient time to be effective.

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44. In these circumstances, the Air Support Control HQ will have to exercise discretion in responding to or rejecting demands, and it is for this reason that the Air Support Control HQ should be located as shown in para. 29 and must contain a representative staff officer. State of Readiness 45. The problem of state of Readiness for Direct Air Support aircraft differs in some respect from that of Fighters. Whereas a fighter squadron has to be ready to meet any emergency day in, day out, Direct Air Support Squadrons are required to operate at maximum intensity only over certain periods of time, which may vary from day to day. The necessity for developing maximum intensity at a stated time may well have priority over emergency calls. 46. Any system of readiness devised must be flexible. A system which has been satisfactory in trials consists of having 50 per cent of aircraft at Instant Readiness, 25 per cent at 2 hours and 25 per cent released, unserviceable aircraft being included in the percentage of released aircraft. Aircraft at instant readiness despatched on a mission are replaced, in so far as the number permits, by bringing up to instant readiness the aircraft at 2 hours notice. 47. The period of two hours as a state of readiness is an arbitrary figure, but experience in operations has shown that anything less than 2 hours virtually amounts to Instant Readiness. This period allows certain essential maintenance inspections to be carried out. 48. The State of Readiness described above should be allotted to aerodromes or Wings, and to Squadrons. This allows a certain amount of flexibility in the Wing organisation, as the state of Readiness can be varied between Squadrons. It also simplifies procedure at the Control HQ dealing in Wings rather than Squadrons, for keeping the record of available aircraft. Availability of Aircraft 49. Direct Air Support requirements will probably entail more than one sortie for each serviceable aircraft each day. Some system is therefore necessary to enable the Control to know at any time, the number of aircraft available at Instant Readiness and at two hours notice. 50. Wings or Aerodromes will report, one hour after the return of a mission, the number of aircraft that have returned and are available for further sorties. The interval of one hour is allowed for inspection, refuelling and re-arming. 51. The signal to the Control HQ can be very brief, and need contain only the reference number of the Control HQ’s signal ordering the mission, followed by the number of aircraft that are available for a further mission,

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i.e., ‘Five stop Eight aircraft’. It is understood that available aircraft reported also include crews. On receipt of this signal the Control HQ can readily determine from its records the numbers at Instant and Two Hours Readiness. Form of Message Requesting Air Support 52. In order to reduce to a minimum the time taken in transmitting calls for air support, a standard type of message will be used. 53. The number of aircraft required for any task will not be inserted in the message at the Tentacle. This figure is decided at the Control HQ and is dependant on the type of target, availability of aircraft and other demands. 54. The target will be described by means of the Reconnaissance Code and authorised abbreviations. 55. Map Reference and Time Codes. As the location of our troops and the time of attacks and times of meeting at RVs must appear on the message, it is necessary to use simple map reference and time codes throughout. Such codes will be originated by the HQ of the formation to which the Air Support Control is allotted. Owing to the form in which figures are sent in the message, these codes must be figures codes as opposed to letter codes. 56. Bombline. It has been stated earlier that medium, low level and shallow dive attacks cannot produce results as accurate as those obtainable from dive bombing attacks. It is therefore necessary to lay down a bombline beyond which it is safe to bomb. Bomblines will be expressed as ground features whenever possible, and not as Gridlines. 57. Information Required by Tentacles. The minimum time taken between support being demanded by a Reconnaissance Aircraft or a Tentacle, and Air Support Aircraft being over the target will depend on a number of factors, and will vary with local conditions. The minimum prevailing time must be known to Tentacles. When an Air Support Control accepts a request for support from a Tentacle, it will inform that tentacle of the time at which support can be expected and of the number of aircraft that will carry out the attack; the commander on the ground can then adjust his plan accordingly. 58. Briefing of Crews. Briefing of crews must be simple and quick. Without further experience it is not possible to lay down any particular method as being the best; one of the methods given in Annexure ‘B’ should be used. Indicating the Target to Support Aircraft 59. The various methods of indicating the target to Support Aircraft are: (a) They can be met at a RV by a Reconnaissance Aircraft and led to the target.

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(b) They can be directed from the ground by: (i) Ground Strips. (ii) R/T from a FASL. (c) They can be given the target location before leaving the Landing Ground and receive no further aid. 60. RV Method. When a reconnaissance aircraft is to lead Support Aircraft from a RV, the location and height of the RV will be arranged before the Reconnaissance aircraft leaves on the sortie. 61. The Control HQ, on accepting the request for Air Support from a Reconnaissance aircraft, will arrange the time at the RV and insert it on the message form. Control HQ will, at the same time, inform the Reconnaissance aircraft by R/T that his request has been accepted. 62. There may be occasions when the Reconnaissance aircraft selects a target towards the end of a sortie and when he has not sufficient endurance to wait and lead the Support Aircraft to the target. In such a case, Control HQ will decide whether the description of the target and its location are sufficient information for the Support Aircraft, or whether the Reconnaissance aircraft should land and refuel before leading the attack. 63. Indication of Target by Ground Strips. Signals displayed by our own troops to indicate the position of the target are of great value when operating against an enemy whose defences are not strong. Against fighter opposition or strong defences, it may not be possible to reconnoitre for such signals. 64. Leading troops will indicate a target to Support Aircraft by displaying ground strips in the form of a ‘V’ pointing to the target, with bars beneath to indicate distance. A ‘V’ will only be displayed on orders from the formation or units controlling the Tentacle from which a call for support has originated. Therefore, only one ‘V’ will be displayed on any Brigade front at any one time. Details of the procedure are given in Annexure ‘C’. 65. Indication of Target by R/T from FASL. In addition to ground strips, assistance in guiding Support Aircraft to a target can be given by R/T from a FASL, preferably in view of the target. Direction can be given in the form of bearing and distance from ground strips or ground features. Recognition Signals 66. An efficient recognition system between aircraft and ground forces is essential for the satisfactory working of Direct Air Support. The system given is based on a flying height of 6,000 feet. The principle of the system is that both aircraft and ground forces must attract the other party’s attention to the area in which a recognition signal will eventually be displayed, by showing a bright light. Once observation has been drawn to the correct

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area, it will be possible to see less visible signals. Details of the system are contained in Annexure ‘C’. 67. Aircraft calling for signals from ground forces in a certain area will make the necessary signals at a distance of 4–5 miles from the area. Every effort must be made by ground forces to make answering signals as quickly as possible and before the aircraft have arrived immediately overhead; thus aircraft will avoid having to circle the area in search of ground signals. 68. It is necessary for aircraft and ground forces to repeat light signals at short intervals to ensure that the signals are seen. 69. Ground Indicators will be carried by all HQ down to and including Unit HQ. These indicators will be the same shapes as those now in use, but will be increased in size and will have a black background. 70. Ground Strips will be issued in sets of five to sub-unit HQ down to RAC Tps., Inf. Coys., Motor Platoons. They will be 12 ft. by 2 ft. 6 ins. and have a black background. 71. The RAF Signal Manual Part V (Ground Signal Codes) with strips and discs will be retained in addition to the above ground signs for use as required. 72. Air Sentries. All HQ down to Companies and equivalent sub-units will have an Air Sentry on permanent duty during operations. Air Sentries with dismounted units will be responsible for carrying and exhibiting the ground strips; they will be armed with a revolver in place of a rifle.

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ANNEXURE A

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ANNEXURE B Briefing of Crews 1. It is not intended to lay down any one method for briefing crews until further experience has been gained. One of the methods given below should be used. 2. Crews of aircraft at instant readiness can be kept standing by near the Operations Room and be briefed there. Transport should be available to take crews to dispersal points immediately after briefing. 3. In certain circumstances it may be possible for crews to receive a preliminary briefing in anticipation of the receipt of a call for support. Crews can then be sent to dispersal points and stand by at the aircraft. When the call for support is received, aircraft can be warned by a signal from the Operations Room. While aircraft are warming up, final instructions (a copy of the pro-forma) can be sent to crews now in the aircraft by written message. 4. The briefing of crews by R/T in their aircraft or by telephone at dispersal points is not recommended since misunderstandings tend to occur calling for lengthy explanations, which can be shortened when the Operations Officer and crews can study points together over one map. ANNEXURE C Recognition Signals 1. Air to Ground Signals (a) An aircraft calling for a Formation of Unit HQ to disclose its position will fire: (i) A cartridge illuminating—to attract attention. (ii) A two star cartridge giving the same two colours (Red Red or Green Green). (b) An aircraft calling for forward troops (including Sqn./Coy. HQ) to identify themselves will fire: (i) A cartridge illuminating—to attract attention. (ii) A two star cartridge giving two different colours (Red White or Green White). (c) These signals will be repeated until a reply is received from the ground. 2. Ground to Air Signals (a) Formation and Unit Headquarters (i) Formation and Unit HQ will answer a call from an aircraft by: (a) Firing a White cartridge illuminating—to attract attention. (b) Showing a ground indicator.

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(ii) Visual signals will be repeated every minute for three minutes.

(b) Forward Troops. (i) RAC Sqn. and Tp. HQ and Inf. HQ will answer a call from an aircraft by: (a) Firing a White cartridge illuminating—to attract attention. (b) Firing a Verey light of the odd colour of the three (Red, White, Green) that has not been fired by the aircraft. (c) Displaying a ‘T’ ground sign with the cross piece of the ‘T’ nearest the enemy and parallel to the front. Aircraft will assume that the forward line of troops is not more than 500 yards distant from the line of ‘T’ ground strips. Light signals will be repeated every minute for three minutes. (ii) Foremost line of troops will flash tin discs. 3. Indication of Targets. A forward HQ wishing to indicate a target to an aircraft will display a ‘V’ ground sign as an arrow pointing to the target in place of a ‘T’. Three extra strips will be supplied to be placed as bars beneath the arrow, indicating distance in accordance with a pre-arranged code. Bars will be placed three feet apart. A ‘V’ ground sign will only be displayed by a forward HQ on orders from the formation which originated the call for support. Thus only one ‘V’ will be visible in an area among a number of ‘T’s. A ground flare will be displayed at the ‘V’ to assist in attracting the pilot’s attention. 4. Acknowledgement by Aircraft. An aircraft will look for signals when flying straight or on a left hand turn. An aircraft will acknowledge signals when the situation allows, by flying on a right hand turn. 5. Ground Indicators will be the same shape as those laid down in (a) Employment of Air Forces with the Army in the Field; (b) RAF Manual of Army Co-operation; (c) RAF Signal Manual Part V (Ground Signal Codes). They will have minimum dimensions of 12 ft. by 2 ft. 6 ins. and will have a black border of 2 ft. 6. Ground Strips will be issued in sets of five to: HQ of RAC Sqns. and Tps. HQ of Motor Coys. and Pls. HQ of Inf. Coys.

Strips will be 12 ft. by 2 ft. 6 ins. and have a black border of 2 ft.

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NOTES INTRODUCTION 1. Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, “Aircraft: A New Factor in War,” History of the First World War, v.1, no.3 (London, 1969), pp. 70–77. 2. Peter C. Smith, Close Air Support (New York, 1990), p. 5; and Peter Mead, The Eye in the Air (London, 1983), p. 39. 3. Lee Kennett, “Developments to 1939” in B.F. Cooling (ed.) Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support (Washington, 1990), pp. 14–15; and Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1919– 1945, v.I, “Preparation” (London, 1961), pp. 6–7. 4. For an Italian account of air operations in Libya see Angelo Lodi, Storia Delle Origini dell’ Aeronautica Militare 1884–1915: Aerostieri, Dirigibilisti, Aviatore dell’ Esercito e della Marina in Italia nel Periodico Pionieristico (Rome, 1961), pp. 93– 146. Cited in Lee Kennett “Developments to 1939.” 5. On air operations in the Balkan Wars see Henri Mirande and Louis Olivier, Sur la Bataille. Journal d’un Aviateur Francais a l’Armee Bulgare, au siege d’Adrianople (Paris, 1913); and for French air activity in Morocco see Serge Laine, “l’Aeronautique Militaire Francaise au Maroc (1911–1939)” Revue Historique des Armees, v.5, no.4. (Paris, 1978), pp. 107–119. Cited in Lee Kennett, “Developments to 1939.” 6. Alfred Gollin, The Impact of Air Power on the British People and their Government 1909–1914 (London, 1989), p. 12. 7. Trenchard Papers: MFC 76/1/357 Role of the RAF in War. Lecture XII, “Foundation of British Air Service,” p. 1. 8. The National Archives (henceforth TNA) CAB 17/19 Development of aviation for naval and military purposes (1911–1912), Report of the Standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 28 February 1912. See also Memorandum on Naval and Military Aviation issued by the War Office, 11 April 1912. Quoted in Trenchard Papers: MFC 76/1/357, Lecture XII, p. 1.

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9. Special Army Order 131 of 23 April 1912. Quoted in Trenchard Papers: MFC 76/1/357, Lecture XII, p. 1. See also Sir Walter Raleigh, The War in the Air, v.1 (Oxford, 1922) chapters IV and V; Peter Mead, The Eye in the Air chapters 5 and 6; and Malcolm Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power (London, 1986), pp. 1–12 for a detailed account of the early years of service aviation in Britain. 10. Sir Maurice Dean, The Royal Air Force and Two World Wars (London, 1979), pp. 7–8; Geoffrey Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy 1914–1945 (London, 1979), pp. 111–112; and Malcolm Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power, pp. 7–8. 11. Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire Power (London, 1982), pp. 3, 48; and Malcolm Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power, pp. 18–19. 12. TNA AIR 1/2182/209/15/1 and 3 Mons Retreat, September 1914; Richard Holmes, The Little Field Marshal: Sir John French (London, 1981), pp. 205, 210, 219; Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War 1914– 1918 (Cambridge, 1986), p. 44; and Sir Walter Raleigh, The War in the Air, v.1, pp. 298–303. 13. TNA AIR 1/2144/209/3/23 Register of operation orders and intelligence reports (August 1914–March 1915), HQ RFC Memorandum to Major Maurice Musgrave (RFC, France), October 1914. 14. H.A. Jones, War in the Air, v.II, pp. 200, 210, and 235. 15. Lee Kennett, “Developments to 1939,” pp. 15–16; Malcolm Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power, p. 15; and Sir Walter Raleigh, The War in the Air, v.1, p. 331. 16. For a comprehensive account of the evolution of military aviation during the Great War 1914–1918 see S.F. Wise, “Canadian Airmen and the First World War,” The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, v.1 (Toronto, 1980); see also W. Sholto Douglas, Years of Combat: A Personal Story of the First World War in the Air (London, 1963); and Denis Winter, The First of the Few: Fighter Pilots of the First World War (London, 1982). 17. H.A. Jones, The War in the Air, v.III, p. 378. 18. Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire Power, pp. 20–21; and J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies (Oxford, 1936), pp. 87–88. 19. Lee Kennett, “Developments to 1939,” p. 17; and Peter C. Smith, Close Air Support, p. 8. 20. More thorough treatment of the development of the Schlachtstaffeln is provided in Georg P. Neumann, Die Deutschen Luftstreitkrafte im Weltkrieg (Berlin, 1920), pp. 453–455; see also Lee Kennett, “Developments to 1939,” pp. 18–23. 21. See J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies, p. 165. 22. A translation of this German document is reproduced in H.A. Jones, The War in the Air, v.IV, Appendice XII, pp. 433–438. 23. H.A. Jones, War in the Air, v.IV, Appendice XII, pp. 433–437. 24. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Douglas, a pilot in the RFC at the time, has written that British flyers and their aircraft were “jacks-of-all-trades.” See W. Sholto Douglas, Years of Combat, pp. 106–107. 25. Increasing demands for large numbers of aircraft from 1916 onward, and the difficulties encountered in producing them, gave rise to acute differences between the Admiralty and the War Office over the direction of Britain’s air effort. As each service struggled to obtain its own separate and highly specialised air support the wider development of a comprehensive air policy suffered. The picture is

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complicated. During the summer of 1917, however, daylight raids on London by German “Gotha” bombers brought the whole unhappy history of inter-service cooperation on air matters to the attention of the general public and the politicians alike. In response to the shock of Germany’s bold and indiscriminate air attacks on the nation’s capital, the government took action to improve the deleterious state of administration and organisation of Britain’s air forces. Acting on the recommendations made by General Jan Christian Smuts, presented in two reports that it commissioned, the government established a single independent air service with its own ministry and air staff, which was responsible for all aspects of war in the air. The Royal Air Force was created on 1 April 1918, and it was given a broad mandate to pursue the strategic and operational roles of British air forces in war. See Malcolm Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power, pp. 42–70, 97–107; Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, v.I, pp. 36–37; Trenchard Papers: MFC 76/1/357, Lecture I: “Policy 1917– 1923,” pp. 1–2; and H.A. Jones, The War in the Air Appendices, pp. 8–14 for the entire text of Smuts’ second report: The Second Report of the Prime Minister’s Committee on the Air Organisation and Home Defence against Air Raids, 17 August 1917. 26. Trenchard Papers: MFC 76/1/357, Lecture XII, pp. 2–3. 27. J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies, pp. 165–167; and Peter C. Smith, Close Air Support, p. 11. 28. For a detailed summary of RFC operations at Amiens, from 8 to 11 August 1918, see H.A. Jones, War in the Air, v.VI, pp. 437–468; and J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies, pp. 165–199. 29. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, v.I, pp. 36–37. 30. TNA AIR 5/299 The RAF’s first official attempt to codify the lessons of the 1914–1918 war in the form of an air doctrine began in 1922 with the publication of RAF Operations Manual CD 22 (sometimes referred to as Air Publication (AP) 882, and later reissued with revisions in 1928 as the RAF War Manual Part I—Operations, AP 1300). 31. Malcolm Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power, pp. 27–41; Sir Maurice Dean, The Royal Air Force and Two World Wars, pp. 21–23; and H.A. Jones, The War in the Air Appendices, pp. 92–110.

CHAPTER 1 1. Sir John Slessor, Air Power and Armies (Oxford, 1936), p. 1. 2. Two of the leading participants in this debate were Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard and Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. For a detailed account of their respective arguments see Derek J.P. Waldie, “Relations Between the Army and the Royal Air Force 1918–1939,” Ph.D. Thesis (University of London, 1980), pp. 7–33. See also Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, “Aspects of Service Aviation” The Army Quarterly v.2, no.1, April 1921, pp. 10–21. 3. Malcolm Cooper has written extensively on this subject. He claims that the airmen were unfoundedly optimistic in advocating the decisive potential of strategic air power, and therefore wrong to press for an independent service to carry out this form of air warfare. Cooper contends that the Air Staff’s desire to forge a strategic

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offensive role for the RAF was pursued unconscionably at the expense of other more attainable and, in the long run, militarily beneficial applications of Britain’s young air force. While this author accepts the Air Staff’s tendency to exaggerate during this period, he disagrees with Cooper’s analyses and conclusions because of their implicit reliance on the course and outcome of future events, hence incorrectly looking down the history arrow instead of up. Cooper’s work deserves careful reading nonetheless for it provides a detailed account of the early strategic debate in Britain on the efficacy of air power. See Malcolm Cooper, “Blueprint for Confusion: The Administrative Background to the Formation of the Royal Air Force, 1912–1919,” Journal of Contemporary History v.22 (1987), pp. 437–453; The Birth of Independent Air Power (London, 1986); “British Air Policy on the Western Front, 1914–1918,” D.Phil. Thesis (University of Oxford, 1982); “A House Divided,” The Journal of Strategic Studies v.3, no.2 (September 1980). 4. Plans to establish a permanent “school of thought” for the RAF began in earnest in the autumn of 1919. Air Marshal Trenchard and Winston Churchill, at this time the Secretary of State for Air, were successful in convincing the Cabinet of the merits of establishing an independent RAF Staff College. Stringent financial budgets caused some delay but by 1921 the RAF station at Andover had been selected and prepared to house the new college. The first Commandant (Air Commodore H.R.M. Brooke-Popham) was appointed in November 1921 and the first course (twenty students, including Squadron-Leader Charles Portal, a future Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), and a number of other young officers who were destined to become famous RAF commanders in the Second World War) commenced in March 1922. See Brooke-Popham Papers VIII/6/52, IX/10, 12–14; R.A. Mason, The Royal Air Force Staff College 1922–1972 (RAF Staff College Bracknell, 1972); and A.D. English, “The RAF Staff College and the Evolution of RAF Strategic Bombing Policy 1922–1929,” M.A. Thesis (The Royal Military College of Canada, 1987). 5. The RAF’s early efforts to codify the lessons of the War compares very favourably with those of the Army, which were not committed to paper until 1932. See: TNA WO 32/3116 General W. Kirke’s Report on the Lessons of the Great War; and WO 32/3115 Lessons of the 1914–1918 War. 6. TNA AIR 8/13 Cmd. Paper 100: Synopsis of British Air Effort During the War (1919). 7. Three of the more important RAF statements on policy and service direction during this period include: AIR 8/6 Cmd. Paper 467: Churchill-Trenchard Memorandum on Air Power Requirements, 11 December 1919; Air Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, “Aspects of Service Aviation” The Army Quarterly v.2, no.3, April 1921, pp. 10–21. (The substance of this article came from an earlier address on the subject delivered by Lord Trenchard at the Air Conference on 14 October 1920); and TNA AIR 5/299 RAF Operations Manual CD 22 (1922). This last document, sometimes referred to as Air Publication (AP) 882, was revised and reissued in 1928 as the RAF War Manual Part I—Operations, AP 1300. 8. See George Williams, “Statistics and Strategic Bombardment: Operations and Records of the British Long-Range Bombing Force During World War I and their Implications for the Development of the Post-War Royal Air Force, 1917–1923,” D.Phil. Thesis (University of Oxford, 1987) for the most recent scholarly work in this area.

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9. Trenchard succeeded Major General Sir Frederick Sykes in April 1919. Sykes was the first and only CAS prior to Trenchard’s appointment since the formation of the RAF in April 1918. 10. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany v.1, p. 47; and Trenchard Papers: MFC 76/1/357—Lecture VIII “Principles of War.” 11. Trenchard Papers: MFC 76/1/357—Lecture VII “Air Strategy,” p. 5; H.A. Jones, The War in the Air v.II, p. 144; and Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany v.1, pp. 20–22. 12. Trenchard Papers: MFC 76/1/357—Lecture XII. 13. TNA AIR 8/13 Cmd. Paper 100: Synopsis of British Air Effort During the 1914–1918 War; and Trenchard Papers: MFC 76/1/357—Lecture VII “Air Strategy.” 14. Trenchard Papers: MFC 76/1/357—Lecture VII “Air Strategy,” p. 2. 15. TNA AIR 5/299 RAF Operations Manual CD 22 (AP 882); and J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies, pp. 183–195. 16. Trenchard Papers: MFC 76/1/357—Lecture VI “Strategy,” pp. 4–5. 17. Trenchard Papers: MFC 76/1/357—Lectures VII “Air Strategy,” pp. 4–5; VIII “Principles of War,” pp. 3–4; and XII “The Value of a Centralised Air Force,” pp. 1–3. See also TNA AIR 5/299 RAF Operations Manual CD 22 (AP 882); and J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies passim. 18. TNA AIR 6/13 57th Meeting of the Air Council, 4 November 1918. 19. TNA CAB 24/71 Memorandum on the Air Power requirements of the Empire from the CAS to the Cabinet, 9 December 1918. 20. D.C. Watt, Too Serious a Business (London, 1975), pp. 19–20, 31–3, 66. For a more passionately argued account, perhaps noted more for its acerbity than its argument, but nonetheless worthy of attention because it illustrates the depth of bitterness in this debate, see Alan Clark, The Donkeys (London, 1961). The Army receives more empathetic treatment in Brian Bond (ed.) The First World War and British Military History (Oxford, 1991). 21. Michael E. Howard, The Continental Commitment (London, 1971), pp. 74– 74; and D.C. Watt, Too Serious a Business, pp. 32–34, 47. 22. Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy Between the Wars (Oxford, 1984), p. 22. 23. Air Force List, January 1920; Brooke-Popham Papers: VII/22 “RAF History— The First 25 Years” (1943); and Andrew Boyle, Trenchard (London, 1962), p. 354. At the end of the First World War, the RAF mustered almost 300,000 personnel and some 22,000 aircraft. See: Malcolm Cooper, The Birth of Independent Air Power, p. xv. 24. See Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany v.I, pp. 1–65; Norman Gibbs, Grand Strategy v.I (London, 1976) chapters XIV and XV; John Terraine, The Right of the Line (London, 1985), pp. 3– 36 (much of the material presented in Terraine’s book was drawn from unpublished RAF Narratives held by the Air Historical Branch (RAF) London); Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy Between the War; H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars (London, 1976); and Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue (London, 1956), chapters II and III. The studies listed above are but a small fraction of the large number of works that have been produced on this subject. They have been noted here because of their lasting quality and favourable acceptance by many military historians. A more critical examination of the inter-war RAF is W. Scot Robertson,

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The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine 1919–1939 (Westport, CT, 1995). 25. Brian Bond and Williamson Murray, “The British Armed Forces, 1918–1939” in A. Millett and W. Murray, Military Effectiveness v.II (Boston, 1988), pp. 98–99. 26. Michael E. Howard, The Continental Commitment, pp. 74–75, 77–78; D.C. Watt, Too Serious a Business, pp. 45–46; and David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control (Manchester, 1990), pp. 40–43. 27. Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980), p. 14; and Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment, pp. 74–77. 28. Philip Abrams, “The Failure of Social Reform: 1918–1920,” Past and Present no.24, April 1963, pp. 43–64. 29. On the “Ten Year Rule,” see Norman Gibbs, Grand Strategy v.I, pp. 3–6; and H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars, pp. 59, 277. 30. Norman Gibbs, Grand Strategy v.I, pp. 44–64; Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy Between the Wars, pp. 23–24; and John R. Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy 1919–1926 (London, 1989), pp. 83–90. 31. These figures were taken from B.R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1962), p. 400. 32. B.R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, p. 398. 33. For detailed scholarly accounts of the deep and unrelenting bitterness toward the RAF from the Army and the Royal Navy during the inter-war period, see John Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy 1919–1926; Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy Between the Wars; H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars; Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars; Geoffrey Till, Air Power and the Royal Navy 1914–1945; and Derek J.P. Waldie, “Relations Between the Army and the Royal Air Force 1918–1939,” Ph.D. Thesis (University of London, 1980). A much shorter, clear, and erudite account is Sebastian Cox, AHB (RAF), “Strategy and Doctrine in the Royal Air Force 1918–1941” (unpublished conference paper given at the U.S. Navy War College, Carlisle, 1990), pp. 12–22. 34. Sir M. Dean, The Royal Air Force and Two World Wars, p. 34. 35. Liddell Hart Papers 1/644: “Some Personal Reflections by MRAF Sir John Slessor” (September 1964), p. 6. 36. Sebastian Cox, “Strategy and Doctrine in the Royal Air Force 1918–1941,” p. 12. 37. For Trenchard’s plan regarding the peacetime organisation of the RAF see TNA AIR 9/5 CAS Memorandum on Air Power Requirements, 25 November 1919 (Draft of Cmd. Paper 467); and AM Sir H. Trenchard, “Aspects of Service Aviation,” The Army Quarterly v.II, no.3, April 1921. 38. TNA AIR 41/39 Air Historical Branch Narrative: The RAF in the Bombing Offensive Against Germany v.I, “The pre-war evolution of Bomber Command 1917 to 1939,” p. 22; Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy Between the Wars, p. 174; and H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars, p. 74. 39. TNA AIR 8/2 Remarks by the Chief of the Air Staff on War Office Memorandum, 30 May 1921. 40. Martin Gilbert, Winston Churchill v.IV, 1917–1922 (London, 1975), p. 197; see also David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, pp. 16, 19–21. 41. Trenchard Papers: MFC 76/1/35—Memorandum by CAS on Air Power and Imperial Defence, 14 August 1919.

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42. Cmd. Paper 467, 19 December 1919. 43. TNA CAB 24/131 and 132 Interim Report of the Committee on National Expenditure CP3570, December 1921 and Geddes Report CP3692; Air Commodore C.F.A. Portal, “British Air Control in Underdeveloped Areas,” in Eugene Emme (ed.) The Impact of Air Power (New Jersey, 1959), pp. 351–362; Jafna L. Cox, “A Splendid Training Ground: The Importance to the Royal Air Force of its Role in Iraq 1919–1932,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History v.8, no.2, January 1985; and David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, pp. 21, 29. 44. TNA AIR 2/12 Reports on Air Control (1920–1933); and AIR 10/1367 Notes on the History of the Employment of Air Power (1935). 45. Wilson to Trenchard in Andrew Boyle, Trenchard (London, 1962), p. 367. 46. TNA AIR 5/846 Operations Against the Mullah in Somaliland, chapters 1–2; Trenchard Papers: MFC 76/1/357—Lecture III “Operations 1919–1919— Somaliland and the North West Frontier,” pp. 1–2; John Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy 1919–1926, pp. 63–64; H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars, pp. 90–91; and David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, p. 15. 47. Jafna L. Cox, “A Splendid Training Ground: The Importance to the Royal Air Force of its Role in Iraq 1919–1932,” p. 165. 48. Trenchard Papers: MFC 76/1/357—Lecture IV “Operations 1919–1939— Aden and Iraq,” pp. 2–5; John Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy 1919–1926, pp. 66, 74, 87; and David E. Omissi, Air Power and Imperial Control, pp. 29–37. For a short account of Salmond’s imaginative use of air power in Iraq, see H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars, pp. 120–127. 49. Leo Amery, Colonial Secretary, in Jafna Cox “A Splendid Training Ground,” p. 175. 50. Derek J. P. Waldie “Relations Between the Army and the Royal Air Force 1918–1939,” chapters 2, 5–7; and David E. Omissi, Air Power and Colonial Control, chapters 5–8. 51. In 1928, Winston Churchill, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, described air substitution as “a great achievement,” in H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars, p. 229. 52. John R. Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy 1919–1926, p. 83. 53. TNA CAB 5/4 CID Paper 150-C, 28 September 1921. 54. TNA AIR 9/5 Letter from the CAS to Secretary of State for Air, September 1921. 55. TNA CAB 24/131 and 132 Interim Report of the Committee on National Expenditure, CP3570, December 1921 and Part I of the Geddes Report CP3692; and John R. Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy 1919–1926, p. 90. 56. David E. Omissi, in his book Air Power and Colonial Control, has argued that the Air Staff’s motive for advocating an extension of air control in Imperial Defence policy was based on the sole desire to secure the survival of the RAF at the direct expense of the Army. As such his thesis ignores the real and important differences that divided the two services over the future development of air power. While the Army only desired specialist air forces for close support, the Air Staff strongly urged the adoption of a more general application, which took into account both progress in aviation technology and changing national policy interests. Trenchard had little

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faith in the ability of his army colleagues to develop air power to its full potential should they win their campaign to have the RAF disbanded. He therefore pursued every opportunity to safeguard the continued independence of the RAF and to ensure the “proper development” of effective air defence for Britain. That he made mistakes in doing so does not support the claim, often made in army circles, that the War Office could have achieved better results. See this work, pp. 14–15 and 17–18. For a critical review of Omissi’s book, see David Hall, review in 20th Century British History v.3, no.2 (1992), pp. 214–216. 57. John Ferris, “The Theory of the ‘French Air Menace’: Anglo-French Relations and the British Home Defence Air Force Programmes of 1921–1925,” The Journal of Strategic Studies v.10 (1987), pp. 66–83. 58. David Hall, “Peering Through the Veil of Uncertainty: British Anti-Invasion Planning, 1940,” M.A. Thesis (University of New Brunswick, 1987), pp. 1–10. 59. TNA CAB 2/3 CID 147th Mtg, 31 October 1921; and John R. Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy 1919–1926, p. 107. 60. John R. Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy 1919–1926, p. 116. 61. TNA AIR 20/32 Review of Air Defence Policy 1924–1935 (Air Ministry, 1936); Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, v.I, p. 54; and Barry D. Powers, Strategy Without Slide Rule (London, 1976), pp. 185, 188–189. 62. TNA AIR 20/32 Review of Air Defence Policy 1924–1935, pp. 1–5; and Trenchard Papers: MFC 76/1/357—Lecture II “Policy 1924–1939,” pp. 1–4. 63. Derek J.P. Waldie, “Relations Between the Army and the Royal Air Force 1918–1939,” p. 296. 64. TNA AIR 9/30 Army Co-operation, 1923–1929. The Air Ministry also published annual army co-operation reports, which outlined training arrangements, the year’s work, and developments in communications and equipment for army cooperation squadrons. See TNA AIR 10/1708, 1759, 1777, 1794, 1827, 2028, 1913, 1914, and 1915. Army Co-operation Reports 1927–1935. 65. TNA AIR 10/ 1708 Army Co-operation Report, 1927. 66. Brigadier A.P. Wavell, “The Army and the Prophets,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, v.LXXV (1930), p. 665. 67. TNA AIR 10/1708 Army Co-operation Report, 1927; and Wing Commander T.L. Leigh-Mallory, “Air Co-operation with Mechanised Forces,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, v.LXXV (August, 1930), pp. 565–577. 68. TNA AIR 10/1759 and 1827 Army Co-operation Reports, 1927 and 1931. 69. TNA AIR 10/1759 and 1794 Army Co-operation Reports, 1928 and 1930. 70. TNA AIR 9/5 Air Staff Paper on the Type of Co-operation likely to be required in a Future War; and AIR 5/299 Air Publication 1300: RAF War Manual Part I— Operations (July 1928). 71. TNA AIR 10/1777 Army Co-operation Report, 1929; Harold Winton, To Change an Army (London, 1988), pp. 72, 94–9, 222–4, 232; and Robert H. Larson, The British Army and the Theory of Armoured Warfare, 1918–1940 (Newark, N.J., 1984), pp. 143–147. 72. Air Vice Marshal E.L. Gossage, “Air Power and Its Employment” Part I, The Aeroplane v.32 (March 1937), p. 249; and Wg Cmd Gossage, “Air Co-operation with the Army,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, v.LXXII (August 1927), pp. 561–578.

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73. TNA CAB 16/47 ND 34, 16 May 1923 and ND 40, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, 8 June 1923; and Lt-Col F.A. Pile, “The Army’s Air Needs,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, v.LXXI (November 1926), pp. 725–777. 74. From 1919 through 1935 editorials and feature articles on the type of air support that should be provided for an army in the field regularly appeared in The Aeroplane, The Army Quarterly, Flight Magazine, and the Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, just to name four of the leading defence-oriented publications of the day. 75. R.J. Overy, The Air War 1939–1945 (London, 1980), pp. 9–11. 76. Following the RAF’s example, two minor Empire air forces, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), founded in 1921, and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), founded in 1924, were also established as independent air forces. For the early development of the RAAF and the RCAF respectively, see John McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence 1918–1939: A Study in Air and Sea Power (Queensland, 1976); S.F. Wise, “Canadian Airmen and the First World War,” The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force v.I, chapter 19; and W.A.B. Douglas, “The Creation of a National Air Force,” The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force v.II (Toronto, 1986), chapters 1 and 2. 77. For a thorough discussion on the Regia Aeronautica and its place in the Italian Armed Forces during the inter-war years, see Brian R. Sullivan “The Italian Armed Forces, 1918–40” in A. Millet and W. Murray, Military Effectiveness v.II, pp. 169– 217. 78. By 1935 two more independent air forces were established, although neither adopted long-range independent bombing as their strategic imperative. The French, in 1933, created a constitutionally independent air force, but it remained tied to the army command in matters of strategic employment and to the army’s view of warfare, which was increasingly dependent on the efficacy of static ground fortifications. German military aviation after 1918 had been proscribed by the Versailles Treaty, although its development was actively pursued surreptitiously through civilian flying and gliding clubs. On 8 March 1935, these clandestine arrangements ended when Hitler unveiled the Luftwaffe to the world through the pages of the Daily Mail. The Luftwaffe was constituted as an independent force, but it was strongly influenced by traditional army thinking. Its political head was General Erhard Milch, Secretary of State for Air; its Commander-in-Chief was Hermann Goering. Almost all of the officers in the new German Air Force were recruited from the Army, a fact that is often cited as the reason why the Luftwaffe had the best army-air relations of all the post-1939 air forces. For further information on the development of the French Air Force from 1919 to 1935, see P. Le Goyet, “Evolution de la doctrine d’emploi de l’aviation francaise entre 1919 et 1939,” Revue d’histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale, v.XIX (1969), pp. 15–32; and for the Luftwaffe see Paul Deichmann, German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army (New York, 1962), pp. 8–42; and Williamson Murray, Luftwaffe (London, 1985). 79. For the divergent opinions on air power in the United States Army Air Force during this period (1919–1935), see W.H. Craven and J.L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II (7 vols., Chicago, 1948–1958) v.1, pp. 17–24, 50–52; Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917– 1941 (Washington, DC, 1955), pp. 14–70; Daniel R. Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint

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Operations: World War II Close Air Support North Africa (Washington, 1987), pp. 6–9; and M. Maurer, Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919–1939 (Washington, 1988). For a similar discussion in the French Air Force, see P. Le Goyet, “Evolution de la doctrine d’empli de l’aviation francaise entre 1919 et 1939,” pp. 15–32; and Robert J. Young, “The Strategic Dream: French Air Doctrine in the Inter-War Period, 1919– 1939,” Journal of Contemporary History v.9, no.64 (October 1974), pp. 57–76. 80. Lee Kennett, “Developments to 1939,” pp. 27–28; and R.J. Overy, The Air War 1939–1945, p. 10.

CHAPTER 2 1. For a thorough discussion of the often confused and tortuous process of British defence planning in the two decades between the World Wars see: N.H. Gibbs, Grand Strategy v.I (London, 1976); D.C. Watt, Personalities and Policies (London, 1965) and Too Serious a Business (London, 1975); M.E. Howard, The Continental Commitment (London, 1972); Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980); Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy Between the Wars (Oxford, 1984); Neville Jones, The Beginning of Strategic Air Power (London, 1987); and Harold Winton, To Change an Army (London, 1988). 2. For a full discussion of the Defence Requirement Committee and its work during this period see D.C. Watt, Personalities and Policies (London, 1965); and Norman Gibbs, Grand Strategy v.I, chapters IV and VII. See also B.J.M. McKercher, Transition of Power: Britain’s Loss of Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930–1945 (Cambridge, 1999) chapter V. 3. The 1923 air programme, which aimed at providing 52 Home Defence Squadrons by 1928, was some ten squadrons short of completion, the result of successive postponements, when the DRC conducted their debates in 1933. See TNA AIR 8/238 British Air Rearmament 1933–1938, pp. 1–2; and AIR 41/39 AHB Narrative: The RAF in the Bombing Offensive Against Germany v.I, “The Pre-war Evolution of Bomber Command 1917 to 1939,” pp. 62–63. 4. TNA AIR 8/238 British Air Rearmament 1933–1938, pp. 2–3; and AIR 41/39 AHB Narrative: The Bomber Offensive v.I, “The Pre-war Evolution of Bomber Command 1917 to 1939,” p. 75. 5. Between November 1933 and March 1938 there were seven air expansion schemes reviewed and voted on by the Cabinet. Detailed accounts of the above, including comparative tables, are available in TNA 8/238 British Air Rearmament 1933–1938; Norman Gibbs, Grand Strategy v.I, chapter XV; and W. Scot Robertson, The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine 1919–1939 (New York, 1995) appendices. 6. Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy Between the Wars, p. 144. 7. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany v.I, p. 66. 8. There is new and strong support for an argument that holds that the government’s financial and industrial policies throughout the 1930s, with regard to aircraft manufacture, severely undermined the credibility, hence the ultimate effectiveness, of Britain’s air deterrent both at home and abroad. See Sebastian Cox, AHB (RAF), “Strategy and Doctrine in the Royal Air Force 1918–1941” (unpublished conference paper delivered at the U.S. Navy War College, Carlisle, 1990) passim; and

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Sebastian Ritchie, “British Military Aircraft Production, 1935–1941,” Ph.D. Thesis (University of London, 1993). 9. Lt.Col. C.E. Carrington Papers, Imperial War Museum, Documents 81/11/6; TNA AIR 8/238 British Air Rearmament Policy 1933–1939; N. Gibbs, Grand Strategy v.I, pp. 264–268, and chapters XIV–XV; and Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy Between the Wars. For a full description of the Air Ministry’s “Western Air Plans”— operational directives for Bomber Command when war came—see Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany v.I, p. 94 and v.IV, Appendix 6. 10. Brian Bond and Williamson Murray, “The British Armed Forces, 1918– 1939,” pp. 110–112, in W. Murray and A. Millett, Military Effectiveness v.II (Boston, 1988); Derek J.P. Waldie, “Relations Between the Army and the Royal Air Force 1918–1939,” Ph.D. Thesis, King’s College, University of London (1980, unpublished), p. 301; Sir Maurice Dean, The Royal Air Force and Two World Wars (London, 1979) pp. 71–73, 99; D.C. Watt, “The Air Force View of History,” The Quarterly Review v.300, no.634, October 1962, and discussions with Professor Watt at London House, Mecklenburgh Square, London WC1N 2AB, 15 November 1989. 11. Draft copies of the RAF Operations Manual had been in existence since July 1921. In the manual’s initial format, chapter nine covered the subject of co-operation of aircraft with the army. The chapter was thirty pages in length, and it included specific sections on the protection of ground troops, reconnaissance, co-operation with artillery, bombing, pursuit, and co-operation with tanks. When the manual was published in 1928, employment of air forces with the army was the subject of chapter twelve. The manual was reprinted three times before the outbreak of the war, in June 1930, May 1935, and June 1937. Beginning with the 1935 issue, a new, expanded chapter on the employment of the air force with the army, inclusive of four appendices, was added as a special amendment. See: TNA AIR 5/299 RAF War Manual Part I—Operations CD 22 (July 1921), AP 882 (December 1921), and AP 1300 (May 1928, June 1930, May 1935, and June 1937); AIR 10/1910 and 1911 RAF War Manual Part I—Operations (1928) and Amendments (1935). 12. R.A. Mason, The Royal Air Force Staff College 1922–1972 (RAF Staff College Bracknell, 1972), pp. 19–20. 13. The first course for senior army officers was held in November 1927. Fourteen officers attended the course, which proved so successful that it was decided to hold it annually. A second army co-operation course, specifically designed for Squadron Leaders and Flight Lieutenants of bomber and fighter squadrons, was introduced in 1929. The object of this course was to familiarise these officers with the work required of their squadrons when co-operating with an army expeditionary force. A syllabus was framed accordingly and, by the end of 1933, the RAF’s first manual of Army Co-operation was published. In 1935 a new specialised course for officers of the Royal Corps of Signals was introduced. See: TNA AIR 10/1759, 2028, 1913, and 1914, Army Co-operation Reports, 1928, 1932–34; AIR 10/1889 RAF Manual of Army Co-operation, 2nd edition, 1937. 14. Wing Commander J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies (Oxford, 1936). 15. Support from the Independent Commands of the RAF might also take the form of an Air Component in the Field, under RAF command, but with the primary task of providing air support for friendly ground forces.

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16. TNA AIR 10/1910 and 1911 Air Publication 1300, RAF War Manual: Part I Operations (1928) and Amendments (1935); and J.C. Slessor Air Power and Armies passim. 17. TNA AIR 10/1910 and 1911 AP 1300, RAF War Manual: Part I; AIR 10/5547 Air Publication 3235, Air Support (1955), pp. 9–11. For the Air Staff’s analysis of air warfare in Spain and China see: AIR 40/219 and 222 Notes on Air Aspects of the Spanish Civil War; and AIR 40/342 and 343 Notes on Air Operations in China. 18. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 8–9. 19. Derek J.P. Waldie “Relations Between the Army and the Royal Air Force 1918–1939,” pp. 289–290, 292; Brian Bond British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars pp. 321–326; and a discussion with D.C. Watt on this subject at London House, Mecklenburgh Square, London WC1N 2AB, 15 November 1989. Also see D.C. Watt, “The Air Force View of History,” The Quarterly Review v. 300, no.634, October 1962. 20. Field Marshal Sir Edmund Ironside, Time Unguarded: The Ironside Diaries 1937–1940 (London, 1962) pp. 51, 53–60; Liddell Hart Papers 1/644: Slessor to Liddell Hart, 13 May 1949. 21. Norman Gibbs, Grand Strategy v.I, pp. 114, 441, 468–469, and 476–477; Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment pp. 114–120. 22. TNA WO 32/3115 Lessons of the 1914–1918 War (1932) and WO 32/3116 General W. Kirke’s Report on the Lessons of the Great War (1934). 23. Harold Winton To Change an Army pp. 8–9, 26–30; and Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham Fire Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904–1945, pp. 150, 166–170. 24. Although Slessor is listed as a co-author of this pamphlet, his role was more that of an advisor than an author responsible for the final product. The EAF pamphlet, when published, did not incorporate Slessor’s well developed ideas on command and control, or on the role of air forces when employed in support of ground troops. 25. War Office Pamphlet, “The Employment of Air Forces in the Field” WO (26/Manuals/1869—September 1938), see C.E. Carrington Papers, 81/11/6. 26. Ibid. 27. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support pp. 7–8; WO 277/34 Army Air Support p. 29; and C.E. Carrington Papers, 81/11/6 Army/Air Co-operation. 28. TNA WO 106/1758 Draft Papers of General Staff Report on RAF Services for the Field Force, March to June 1939. Circulated as COS 924, 14 June 1939. See CAB 53/50. 29. It is curious that the General Staff did not make specific reference to German ideas on air support, or the War Office’s own Intelligence reports on the configuration and projected employment of the Luftwaffe. The Directorate of Military Operations in co-operation with M.I.3.b., of the Directorate of Military Intelligence, produced various appreciation files on German ideas concerning air co-operation with ground troops throughout the 1930s. Many of the conclusions they reached on broad issues of operations and tactics, such as the German concept of air support, their proposed use of aircraft in war, and air targets of a military nature, just to name a few, were quite similar to the views expressed by the RAF on these subjects. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that the General Staff took any of this information into account when they prepared their report on the services required from the RAF for

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a British Army in the field. See: TNA WO 190/92, 387, 414, 435, 626, 865, and 875 Notes on Air Support for the German Army. 30. TNA WO 106/1758 Draft Papers of the General Staff Report on RAF Services for the Field Force, March to June 1939; CAB 21/521 Penultimate Draft Copy of the Report, 12 June 1939, and CAB 53/50 COS 924, Memorandum by CIGS, 14 June 1939. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. TNA WO 193/685 Notes on the General Staff Memorandum on Services Required from the RAF for the Field Force, May to June 1939. 34. TNA CAB 53/50 COS(39)924 Memorandum by the CIGS on the Services Required from the Royal Air Force for the Field Force, 14 June 1939. 35. TNA AIR 8/272 Note by D. Plans on the General Staff Memorandum, June 1939; and WO 190/626 Air Support for the German Army, 29 May 1939. 36. Air warfare in Spain and China had been a subject of extensive inquiry by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) from the winter of 1937 through the summer of 1939. The work of the JIC and its air warfare subcommittees can be found in TNA CAB 56/1 (JIC minutes, papers and reports); CAB 56/5 (Subcommittee on Air Warfare in Spain); and CAB 56/6 (Sub-committee on Air Warfare). War Office Intelligence summaries on the German Air Force before the outbreak of the war are contained in TNA WO 190/92, 414, 435, and 626. 37. TNA AIR 8/272 Note by D.Plans on the General Staff Memorandum, June 1939. 38. TNA AIR 8/272 Air Intelligence Summary, German Air Force Policy: Cooperation with the Army, May 1939. 39. TNA AIR 8/272 Memorandum by the CAS “Employment of Bombers and Fighters in Conjunction with an Army in the Field,” 30 May 1939. 40. TNA AIR 8/272 Memoranda by D.Plans, Group Captain J. Slessor. “The RAF Component of the Field Force,” 21 and 30 April 1939. 41. TNA AIR 9/137 Memorandum by ACAS, Air Vice-Marshal W. Sholto Douglas, “Air Attack in Direct Support of the Field Force,” May 1939. 42. The RAF’s understanding of the term “direct support” was rather different than that of the Army. Whereas the airmen used the term in the context of describing a method of applying air power to a ground operation, the soldiery saw it as a term that defined a system of command whereby a loose grouping of otherwise independent units and weapons systems came under the direct command of the Army Commander responsible for the battle at hand. Confusion over the exact meaning of the words and terms used to describe aspects of air support for the Army intensified the feelings of mistrust each service had about the other’s real intentions, further hindering their early attempts at cooperation. 43. TNA AIR 9/137 Memorandum by ACAS, Air Vice-Marshal W. Sholto Douglas, “Air Attack in Direct Support of the Field Force,” May 1939. 44. TNA WO 106/5162 Development of Close Support Action by Bombers. 45. TNA AIR 9/137 Memorandum by ACAS, Air Vice-Marshal W. Sholto Douglas, “Air Attack in Direct Support of the Field Force,” May 1939; and AIR 8/272 Air Intelligence Report, German Air Force Policy: Co-operation with the Army, May 1939.

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46. The General Staff, in their Memorandum of 14 June on the “Services Required from the RAF for the Field Force,” demanded an excessive number of army co-operation squadrons (including close reconnaissance, long reconnaissance, and artillery observation aircraft). The War Office wanted one army co-operation squadron per division and per corps headquarters, one artillery observation squadron per corps, and six long distant reconnaissance squadrons to be divided equally between three Army Headquarters. For a force of 32 Divisions, as approved by the Cabinet in February, this amounted to 52 squadrons or 624 aircraft. It is interesting to compare this request with the German allotment. British Military Intelligence estimated that the Germans could mobilise 106 Divisions inclusive of five armoured divisions. This force would be served by approximately 600 army co-operation aircraft. Each corps, of three divisions on average, would receive one army co-operation squadron of twelve aircraft. One squadron was attached to each mobile division and one squadron was allotted per Army Headquarters. See: TNA AIR 8/272. 47. AIR 8/272 Letter from the War Office (G.W. Lambert) to the Air Ministry re: Air Requirements of the Field Force, 30 May 1939. 48. TNA AIR 8/272 Minute from DCAS to CAS, 30 May 1939. 49. TNA AIR 8/272 Note of a Conference held in the CAS’s Room on 12 June 1939 to discuss the RAF Component of the Field Force. 50. TNA AIR 8/272 CAS’s Conference of 12 June 1939; and WO 193/678 Review of the Controversy over the Services Required from the RAF for the Field Force, 16 November 1939. 51. TNA WO 106/1599 Meetings of the Joint War Office-Air Ministry Committees on the Air Requirements of the Field Force, June to August 1939. 52. TNA WO 106/1599 Meetings of the Joint War Office-Air Ministry Committees on the Air Requirements of the Field Force, June to August 1939. 53. Sir Edmund Ironside, Time Unguarded, pp. 84–94. See also Sir John Colville, Gort: Man of Valour (London, 1972), pp. 141–150. 54. Sir Edmund Ironside, Time Unguarded, pp. 92–93; TNA WO 106/1597 Air Component of the BEF in France, September to October 1939; WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 14–15. 55. TNA WO 106/1597 Air Component BEF France; Composition; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 14–15. 56. TNA WO 190/865 Air Force Co-operation with the Army in Germany, 29 Sept. 1939; WO 190/875 The German Air Force and the German Army, 21 October 1939; and WO 193/678 Memorandum by DCIGS, “Co-operation between Air Forces and Armies in the Field,” 22 September 1939. 57. In actual fact the system employed by the Germans at this stage of the war was more in keeping with the Air Staff’s method than that desired by the War Office. See General Heinz Guderian’s account of air support arrangements worked out with General Lorzer, commander of the Fliegerkorps, for crossing the River Meuse, May 1940. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (London, 1982), pp. 98–104. For a more recent examination of the principles that governed German army-air co-operation see Michel Forget, “Co-operation between Air Force and Army in the French and German Air Forces during the Second World War” in Horst Boog (ed.) Conduct of the Air War in the Second World War (Oxford, 1991), pp. 422–428. German air operations in Poland in 1939, with reference to the principles that governed them, are described briefly in General der Flieger Paul Deichmann, German Air Force

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Operations in Support of the Army USAF Historical Studies No. 163 (Alabama, 1962), pp. 92–96, 153–155. 58. TNA WO 193/678 Air Requirements of the Army. 59. TNA WO 193/678 Note by the CIGS circulated to Senior Army Officers, 27 September 1939; CAB 92/111 Land Forces Committee, L.F.(39)4th mtg., 23 October 1939. 60. TNA CAB 92/111 L.F.(39)4th mtg., 23 October 1939; and AIR 40/1208 German Air Action against Poland, September to October 1939.

CHAPTER 3 1. ACM Sir Douglas Evill Papers, RAF Museum, RAF Hendon, AC 74/8 “Operations in France, September 1939 to June 1940.” 2. Basil Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom (London, 1957), p. 72. 3. Each squadron was equipped with sixteen first-line aircraft, giving the AASF at this time a total first-line force of one hundred and sixty light bombers. 4. TNA CAB 66/3 W.P. (39) 118 Air Policy. While there was agreement in principle between the British and French governments on the AASF’s operational plans, in the event of German aggression in the west, air bombing operations against the Ruhr required the approval of both the War Cabinet and the Supreme War Council prior to their execution. The French, for their part, were reluctant to sanction any offensive air action, which might produce heavy retaliatory strikes against vulnerable French cities and towns by the German Air Force. Pending final Allied agreement on the desirability of attacking the Ruhr, two separate air plans were prepared for the employment of the bomber forces. The first was for the attack of strictly military objectives, namely troops, lines of communications, and aerodromes, and was not subject to any further government approbation. The second plan, the heavy bombardment of the Ruhr, was to remain subject to the decision of the two governments at the time. A lengthy discussion covering this frustrating dilemma over the employment of the Allied Bomber Striking Force can be found in the Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff from September 1939 through May 1940. See TNA CAB 79/1–4 passim. 5. Evill Papers AC 74/8 “Operations in France, September 1939 to June 1940”; TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 9, 12–13. 6. The Air Component of the Field Force was referred to as the Air Component during the period from September 1939 to the German offensive in the West beginning 10 May 1940, and afterwards as the RAF Component, BEF or just the RAF Component. 7. Evill Papers AC 74/8 “Operations in France, September 1939 to June 1940”; TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 14; and AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 14. 8. Evill Papers AC 74/8 “Operations in France, September 1939 to June 1940.” 9. Ibid. 10. Evill Papers AC 74/8 “Operations in France, September 1939 to June 1940”; and TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 14–16. 11. TNA WO 193/678 Letter from C-in-C BEF General Gort to CIGS General Ironside, 27 November 1939; and WO 106/1597 Lt-Col. Woodall (Gort’s representative at ACAB) reports on early exercises to C-in-C BEF, November 1939. 12. Evill Papers AC 74/8 “Operations in France, September 1939 to June 1940”; and TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 14–16.

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13. TNA WO 106/1688 Correspondence between CIGS and C-in-C BEF, September 1939; WO 193/678 Air Requirements of the Army, Memorandum by DCIGS, 22 September 1939; and AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 14–15. 14. TNA WO 193/678 Note by CIGS, 27 September 1939. 15. TNA WO 193/678 Memorandum by the DCIGS on the Air Requirements of the Army, 22 September 1939. 16. TNA CAB 92/111 LF(39)17, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, 17 October 1939. 17. TNA WO 106/1688 Telegram No. 59169 Secretary of State for War to C-in-C BEF, 17 October 1939. 18. A representative from the Air Ministry was not present at the meetings of the Land Forces Committee until the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Kingsley Wood, was invited to attend its third meeting on 19 September. See TNA CAB 92/111 LF(39) 3rd Meeting, 19 September 1939. 19. TNA CAB 65/1 WM(39) 53rd Conclusion. Minute Number 11, 19 October 1939. 20. For the main arguments of the two Services in this discussion, see: TNA CAB 92/111 LF (39)17, 18 and 19, 17–21 October 1939. 21. TNA WO 193/678 Air Requirements of the Army, Review of the Controversy between the Air Ministry and the War Office over Services Required from the RAF for the Field Force, 16 November 1939; and CAB 66/3 WP(39)110, 111 and 112, 2–3 November 1939. 22. TNA CAB 66/3 WP(39)110, Memorandum by the Lord Privy Seal on Air Requirements for the Army, 2 November 1939. 23. TNA CAB 66/3 WP(39)111, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War on Air Requirements of the Army, 2 November 1939. 24. TNA CAB 66/3 WP(39)112, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Air on Air Requirements of the Army, 3 November 1939. 25. Chatfield wrongly states that “the War Office never pressed a case for a separate Army Air Arm.” For Chatfield’s account of the 8 November debate on air support for the Army and his subsequent involvement in the joint service compromise solution, see: Lord Chatfield, It Might Happen Again (London, 1947) pp. 182–184. 26. TNA CAB 65/2 WM(39) 75th Conclusion, Minute Number 8, 8 November 1939. 27. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, Appendix A—The ‘Slessor Memorandum’ on Bomber Support for the Army, 21 November 1939. 28. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support p. 15. 29. TNA WO 106/1597 War Office Note on “Arrangements for Bomber Support for the Allied Army in France,” 16 November 1939. 30. TNA WO 106/1597 War Office Notes on “Arrangements for Bomber Support for Allied Armies in France,” 16–28 November 1939. 31. TNA WO 193/678 War Office Notes and Notes by CIGS on “Arrangements for Bomber Support for the Allied Armies in France,” 16–28 November 1939. 32. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support p. 16; and CAB 66/3 “Joint Memorandum by the DCIGS and the DCAS on the Air Requirements for the Army,” included as Annex I in WP(39) 127, Memorandum by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, 2 December 1939.

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33. TNA WO 193/678 War Office Notes, 28–29 November 1939; and CAB 65/2 WM(39) 108th Conclusion, Minute Number 6, 8 December 1939. 34. TNA CAB 66/3 WP(39)127, Memorandum by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence on Air Requirements of the Army in France, 2 December 1939. 35. TNA CAB 65/2 WM(39)108th Conclusion, Minute Number 6, 8 December 1939. 36. While the AOC-in-C was made solely responsible for the co-ordination of the BAFF’s operations, some limitations were placed upon his executive control of both the AASF and the Air Component. In certain circumstances the Chief of the Air Staff was empowered to order the AASF to co-operate with Bomber Command in a general air offensive delivered from the United Kingdom, and in that event the operational control of the force was to revert temporarily to the AOC-in-C of Bomber Command. The Air Component, although absorbed by BAFF, was to remain, as before, under the command of an AOC who was to continue to act as air advisor to the C-in-C BEF and under his operational control. The general training of the AASF was to be controlled by the AOC-in-C Bomber Command, except that special training called for in its work in co-operation with the army was to be decided by the General and Air Staffs jointly. See: TNA CAB 65/2 WM (39)108th Conclusion, Minute Number 6, 8 December 1939; and CAB 66/3 WP(39)127, 2 December 1939. 37. Evill Papers AC 74/8 “Operations in France, September 1939 to June 1940”; and TNA WO 277/34 Air Support pp. 14–15. 38. Phantom was set up under the command of a RAF officer with an army officer borrowed from GHQ, BEF as his second in command. The task set for Phantom was to acquire accurate information from the battle zone and get it back to BAFF as rapidly as possible. To perform its task, Phantom was provided with mobile wireless sections, called tentacles, which were sent out to forward positions from which they observed the battle and reported back to BAFF Operational Headquarters. See: TNA WO 277/34 Air Support, pp. 15–16; and C.E. Carrington Papers, 81/11/6 Army/Air Co-operation. 39. Evill Papers AC 74/8 “Operations in France, September 1939 to June 1940”; and Wing Commander Norman MacLeod, “Sacks of Gold: A History of the Royal Air Force in France 1939–1940” (Unpublished Manuscript, RAF Staff College, Bracknell, 1990), Chapter 5—Winter: The Battle Against the Elements. 40. The RAF had 182 first-line combat aircraft in France divided almost equally into 96 bombers and 86 fighters. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support p. 20. 41. Evill Papers AC 74/8 “Operations in France, September 1939 to June 1940.” 42. John Terraine, The Right of the Line (London, 1985), pp. 119–120. 43. The Luftwaffe employed 1,665 fighter, 1,120 bomber, 501 reconnaissance, 342 dive-bomber, 42 ground-attack, and 154 seaplane aircraft in its 1940 campaign against Holland, Belgium, and France. See: General der Flieger Paul Deichmann, German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army, p. 155. For the British and German forces engaged, as organised on 10 May 1940, see: L.F. Ellis, The War in France and Flanders (London, 1953), Appendices I and III, pp. 357–374 and 401–403. 44. See R.H.S. Stolfi, “Equipment for Victory in France in 1940,” History v.55, 1970, for a short yet comprehensive description of the German Air Force. See also James S Corum, The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940

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(Lawrence, Kansas, 1997); and Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933–1945 (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1983). 45. James S Corum, “The Luftwaffe’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918–1941,” The Journal of Military Affairs v.59 (January 1995). For a detailed account of the German air campaign against France and the Low Countries see: Williamson Murray, German Military Effectiveness (Baltimore, Maryland, 1992), pp. 99–100, 115– 119; and Paul Deichmann, German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army, pp. 155–157. 46. John Terraine, “Land/Air Co-operation” in The End of the Beginning Bracknell Paper No.3, 20 March 1992, p. 11; and J. Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 124–125. 47. Evill Papers AC 74/8 “Operations in France, September 1939–June 1940”; and Paul Deichmann, German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army, p. 156. 48. RAF figures put the number of combat ready aircraft in Britain, at the start of May, at 692 aircraft, a total that includes both bombers and fighters. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 20. 49. A thorough discussion of the BAFF’s operations can be found in the Evill Papers AC 74/8 “The Battle of Flanders—The Battle of France,” pp. 10–36; John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 118–165; and Kate Caffrey, Combat Report: The RAF and the Fall of France (Swindon, Wiltshire, 1990). For Allied land operations see: Brian Bond, France and Belgium 1939–1940 (London, 1975; and second edition, 1990); and Alistar Horne, To Lose A Battle: France 1940 (London, 1969). The Official History divides the air campaign into four phases. See L.F. Ellis, The War in France and Flanders 1939–1940 (London, 1953), pp. 307– 314. See also TNA AIR 41/21 The Campaign in France and the Low Countries, September 1939 to June 1940 (1944), pp. 155–185 (early organisation of the BAFF) and pp. 456–481 (BAFF operations). 50. During the week of 10–15 May, the AASF lost 73 aircraft out of 171 sorties flown. In attacks on the Meuse bridges a further 40 aircraft were lost from 87 sorties. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 16; and L.F. Ellis, The War in France and Flanders 1939–1940, pp. 54–57. For a short yet insightful account of German air-land assault tactics in France see Richard P. Hallion, Strike from the Sky (Washington, 1989), pp. 136–148. 51. Evill Papers AC 74/8 “The Battle of Flanders—The Battle of France,” pp. 16–26; and TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 17. 52. Evill Papers AC 74/8 “The Battle of France,” pp. 27–33; TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 17–18; and AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 21. 53. TNA CAB 106/246 “Despatch from the Commander-in-Chief, BEF, General the Viscount Gort,” 25 July 1940. 54. Ibid. 55. TNA AIR 35/354 “Battle of France: BAFF, Despatch by AOC-in-C AVM Sir Arthur Barratt,” July 1940. 56. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 8. 57. TNA WO 106/1763 Various notes and letters initiated by Lt-Col. F.W. Festing, June-July 1940. 58. TNA WO 106/1596 and WO 106/1754 “Air Policy,” June–July 1940. 59. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 18.

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CHAPTER 4 1. After Dunkirk a further 191,870 Allied troops were evacuated from French Atlantic ports. This brought the grand total of men who avoided death or internment at the hands of the Germans to the staggering number of 558,032. L.F. Ellis, The War in France and Flanders, 1939–1940 (London, 1953), p. 305. 2. On 5 June 1940, General Ironside recorded in his diary a short list of some of the military equipment and stores abandoned by the BEF in France: 400 anti-tank rifles, 2,300 artillery pieces, 8,000 Bren guns, 90,000 rifles, 7,000 tons of ammunition, and 120,000 vehicles of all types. Sir Edmund Ironside, Time Unguarded: The Ironside Diaries 1937–1940 (London, 1962), p. 354. See also Basil Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom (London, 1957), pp. 123–124, 127–128. 3. TNA CAB 65/7 WM 151(40)14, pp. 345–349; and CAB 65/13 WM 151(40)14 Confidential Annex, 1 June 1940. 4. On 27 May 1940 General Sir John Dill, the then VCIGS, succeeded General Sir Edmund Ironside as CIGS. At the same time, Ironside replaced General Sir Walter Kirke as C-in-C, Home Forces. 5. TNA CAB 65/7 WM 157(40)2, 7 June 1940. 6. TNA CAB 106/220 Bartholomew Committee Final Report: “Lessons to be Learnt from Operations in Flanders,” June 1940. 7. B.H. Liddell Hart, The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart v.II (London, 1965), pp. 155, 313–314; and Brian Bond (ed.) Chief of Staff: The Diaries of LieutenantGeneral Sir Henry Pownall, 1933–1940 v.I (London, 1972), pp. 21–22, 46. 8. B.H. Liddell Hart, The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart v.II, p. 71. 9. The committee working under General Bartholomew included the following: Members: Maj-Gen. C.C. Malden (Director of Military Training), Maj-Gen. N.M.S. Irving, Brig. D.G. Watson, and Brig. W.C. Holden; Secretariat: Col. R. Gurney, Major C.W.S. Burton, and Capt. R.W.M. de Winton. TNA CAB 106/220 Bartholomew Committee Final Report. 10. A complete list of all the officers who gave evidence to the Bartholomew Committee is attached to the front of the final report. TNA CAB 106/220 Bartholomew Committee Final Report. 11. See pages, 58–59 below. 12. TNA CAB 106/220 Bartholomew Committee Final Report. 13. Major-General Heinz Guderian, Achtung! Panzer! translated by Christopher Duffy (London, 1992), pp. 171–172, 184, 205–207 and Panzer Leader (London, 1952), pp. 20–46; Erich von Manstein, Aus einem Soldatenleben 1887–1939 (Bonn, 1958) passim; and Robert J. O’Neill, “Doctrine and Training in the German Army 1919–1939” in The Theory and Practice of War edited by Michael Howard (London, 1965), pp. 145–164. 14. Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence (London, 1997), p. 108; T Harrison Place, “British Perceptions of the Tactics of the German Army, 1938–40,” Intelligence and National Security v.9, no.3 (July 1994), p. 509; General Sir David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them (London, 1983), pp. 54–55; Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire Power (London, 1982), pp. 193–194, 222–228; Harold Winton, To Change an Army (London, 1988), pp. 30, 111–112, 126; B.H. Liddell Hart, The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart v.I (London, 1965), pp. 135–136; Sir John Slessor, These Remain (London, 1969), pp. 109–113; Charles Messenger, The

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Art of Blitzkrieg (London, 1976), pp. 141–156. H.P. Willmott, The Great Crusade (London, 1989), pp. xi, 81–101 offers a dissenting view, but without reference to any supporting documentation. 15. TNA CAB 106/220 Bartholomew Committee Final Report. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. It is interesting to compare the Bartholomew Committee’s summary of air operations in France with that of the COS. In the COS account, submitted to and approved by the War Cabinet, five distinct phases are identified in the German air programme. Within these phases, air support for the ground forces is secondary to strategic operations aimed first at winning air superiority and, second, at isolating the battlefield. Similar observations are not made by the Bartholomew Committee. See: TNA CAB 106/220 Bartholomew Committee Final Report; CAB 66/8 WP(40)212 Weekly Resume (No.42) of the Naval, Military and Air Situation, 13–20 June 1940, Appendix IV; and COS(40)483 German Air Operations in France, 21 June 1940. 19. TNA CAB 66/8 WP(40)212 Appendix IV “German Air Operations in France” 21 June 1940. For more recent scholarly accounts of the Luftwaffe’s air campaign against France see: Williamson Murray, German Military Effectiveness (Baltimore, Maryland, 1992), pp. 99, 121–122; and General der Flieger Paul Deichmann, German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army (Alabama, 1962), pp. 155–157. For Goering’s close relationship with Hitler and the added status this gave the Luftwaffe see: Robert J. O’Neill, The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933– 1939 (London, 1966), pp. 108–111; and Richard Overy, Goering: The ‘Iron Man’ (London, 1984), pp. 166, 169–170. 20. TNA CAB 106/220 Bartholomew Committee Final Report. 21. TNA WO 106/1763 “Aircraft for Army Co-operation Work” MO7, 11 June 1940; AIR 19/73 “Aircraft Production - Future Requirements,” Correspondence between Sir Archibald Sinclair (S/S for Air) and Lord Beaverbrook (MAP), June 1940; AIR 19/233 Correspondence on the proposed purchase of American Vultee dive-bombers (DB72 type) between Anthony Eden (S/S for War), Beaverbrook and Sinclair, June 1940; and Group Captain E.B. Haslam, “Services Required from the RAF for the Field Forces,” Air Historical Branch (RAF) Position Paper (London, 1976), pp. 8–9. 22. TNA AIR 19/73 “Aircraft Production - Future Requirements,” Correspondence between Sinclair and Beaverbrook, 20 and 28 June, and 1 July 1940. 23. Group Captain E.B. Haslam, “Services Required from the RAF for the Field Forces,” pp. 9–10. For an official synopsis of the Air Ministry’s view on the recent air fighting in France see TNA AIR 41/21 AHB Narrative: “The Campaign in France and the Low Countries, Sept. 1939–June 1940,” pp. 465–466, and 480. 24. TNA WO 233/60 “Report on Operations in Northern Norway from 13 May 1940 to 8th June 1940 by Lieutenant-General C.J.E. Auchinleck,” June 1940. 25. TNA WO 197/111 “Report on the Operations of the BEF by Brigadier Greenslade DQMG, BEF,” 17 June 1940. 26. TNA WO 106/1708 “A Few Lessons to be Drawn from the Fighting of 2nd Corps [BEF], 10–30 May 1940.” 27. Alanbrooke Papers, 12/x/6 Air Co-operation.

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28. TNA WO 106/1754 “Co-operation of the Air Forces with the BEF. During the Period 10th May to 31st May, 1940,” Memorandum prepared by MO7, 18 June 1940. 29. TNA WO 106/1754 “Memorandum on the Co-operation of Air Forces with the BEF. During the Period 10th May to 31st May, 1940,” 18 June 1940; and AIR 20/4447 “Direct Support of the BEF in France,” Memorandum by Colonel F.W. Festing, War Office (MO7), June 1940. 30. TNA WO 106/1754; and AIR 20/4447 (MO7 Memorandum on Army Air Support, 18 June 1940). 31. Ibid. 32. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 23. 33. Air Staff Memorandum “Bomber Support for the Army,” 21 November 1939 in TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, Appendix A. 34. TNA AIR 41/21 AHB Narrative: “The Campaign in France and the Low Countries, September 1939–June 1940,” pp. 465–466; and C.E. Carrington Papers, 81/11/6. 35. Air Vice-Marshal W. Sholto Douglas as cited in Group Captain E.B. Haslam, “Services Required from the RAF for the Field Forces,” p. 10; and Lord Douglas, Years of Command (London, 1966), pp. 59–62, 81–82, and Years Of Combat (London, 1963), pp. 131, 137–138, 146–147. 36. TNA AIR 20/4447 “Comments on Colonel F.W. Festing’s Memorandum,” 20 June 1940. 37. C.E. Carrington Papers, 81/11/6; Robert Wright, Dowding and the Battle of Britain (London, 1969), pp. 100–108; Basil Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom (London, 1957), pp. 108–110; and TNA CAB 65/7 WM(40)124, 16 May 1940. Fighter Command was not alone in stating its desire to retain strong and modern forces in the United Kingdom. On 17 May, the CIGS raised his concern about “maintaining troops of sufficient quality in this country” before the War Cabinet. See: TNA CAB 65/7 WM(40)126, 17 May 1940. 38. “Lessons of South Violet” report written for Colonel Herbert Essame, No.22 Group (Fighter Command) RAF, Old Sarum, June 1940. See C.E. Carrington Papers, 81/11/6 and C.E. Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command (London, 1987), pp. 7–9. 39. TNA WO 106/5161 “Air Ministry Note on the War Office Point of View Regarding Close Support,” 22 July 1940. 40. TNA AIR 20/3706 “Air Staff Note on the Army Air Arm,” July 1940. 41. Ibid. 42. TNA WO 106/5161 “Air Ministry Note on the War Office Point of View Regarding Close Support” by D.D.Plans (MC), Group Captain R.V. Goddard, 22 July 1940. 43. Ibid. 44. Air Vice-Marshal W. Sholto Douglas as cited in C.E. Carrington Papers, 81/11/6; and C.E. Carrington, “Army/Air Co-operation, 1939–1943,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute v.CXV, December1970, p. 39. 45. TNA AIR 20/2809 “Joint Air Ministry/War Office Meeting on Army Air Requirements held at the Air Ministry,” 2 August 1940; and WO 106/5161 “Army Air Requirements” 2 August 1940. 46. TNA AIR 20/2809; WO 106/5161; AIR 20/3706 “The Organisation Necessary to Conduct Experimental Training in Close Support Bombing,” 15 August

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1940; AIR 39/139 “Air Staff Memorandum on the Development of Close Support Action by Bombers,” 19 August 1940; WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 25; and C.E. Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command, pp. 10–11. For the organisation of the joint army/air force trials in Northern Ireland, inclusive of the new techniques to be examined, see AIR 2/7336 “Army Air Requirements” and AIR 2/5201 “Close Support Bombing Trials, Northern Ireland.” 47. TNA AIR 20/3706 “Task of Close Support” statements made on 15 August and 2 September 1940. 48. A select number of the most relevant files include: TNA AIR 2/5224 Close Support Aircraft: Policy; AIR 2/7336 Army Air Requirements; AIR 20/2787 VCAS Correspondence; AIR 20/2809 Army Air Requirements; AIR 20/3705 Army Air Requirements; AIR 20/3706 Army Co-operation Requirements; AIR 39/139 Close Support Policy; WO 106/5160 Notes on future Army Operations . . . and the use of Air Power; and PREM 4/14/9 Army-RAF Co-operation. 49. TNA AIR 2/7336 and WO 106/5161, letter from Eden to Sinclair, 8 August 1940. 50. TNA AIR 2/7336 and AIR 20/3706, letter from Sinclair to Eden, 21 August 1940. 51. TNA AIR 20/3706 General Staff Memorandum on the Army’s Air Requirements up to May 1941, 22 August 1940. See also AIR 2/7336 and AIR 20/2809 Army Air Requirements. 52. TNA AIR 2/7336 and AIR 20/3706, letter from Eden to Sinclair, 23 August 1940. 53. AIR 20/3706, letter from Sinclair to Eden, 2 September 1940. 54. TNA CAB 66/11 WP(40)360, Memorandum by the Minister of Aircraft Production, 6 September 1940. 55. TNA AIR 20/3706 Air Support for the Army, Memorandum by the S/S for War, 23 September 1940; Letter from Sinclair to Eden, 29 September 1940; and Notes from the Air Ministry Conference to discuss the proposal to form a new RAF Command at Home for Army Co-operation, 3 October 1940. 56. TNA AIR 20/2811 and AIR 20/4301 Formation of Army Co-operation Command; AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 24–25; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 28.

CHAPTER 5 1. TNA CAB 53/35 COS(65)JP Egypt: Combined Defence Plan (17 December 1937); CAB 53/36 COS(674)JP Defence of Egypt (4 February 1938); and CAB 53/37 COS(691) Mediterranean, Middle East and North-East Africa Defence Appreciation (21 February 1938). 2. TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I: “Operations in Libya and the Western Desert, September 1939–June 1941,” p. 1; WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 38; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 302–303. 3. The Combined Plan is described in some detail in TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, pp. 3–7; and AIR 8/514 Middle East: Strategy for Operations (August 1940–February 1941). 4. The official history puts British and Empire troops in Egypt at 36,000 men, with another 27,500 in Palestine, and 19,000 in the Sudan, Somaliland, and Kenya

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(facing Italian East Africa). There were 250,000 Italian and Libyan troops in Libya and another 350,000 Italian and native troops based in East Africa. Comparative air strengths of the RAF and the Regia Aeronautica in these regions also favoured the Italians. Maximum RAF strength in Egypt and Palestine numbered no more than 205 serviceable aircraft of all types, and 163 in the Sudan, Aden, and Kenya. The Italians had 313 aircraft in Libya and 325 in East Africa. See I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East v.I (London, 1954), pp. 93–96. 5. TNA AIR 8/514 Middle East: Strategy for Operations (M.E. Operational Plans 1939); AIR 24/1066 HQME ORB Appendices: Middle East Operational Plan (September 1939, reconfirmed 25 May 1940); AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 47; AIR 10/1910 RAF War Manual: Part I “Operations” (1928) and AIR 10/1911 RAF War Manual, Reprinted with incorporated Amendments (1935); and J. Slessor, Air Power and Armies passim. 6. TNA AIR 24/1066 HQME Operational Record Book, Minutes from C-in-Cs Meeting held on board HMS Liverpool at Port Said, 4 May 1940; AIR 34/1051 HQME ORB Appendix 10, 8 July and Appendix 19, 13 August 1940; AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, pp. 4–6; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 39. 7. John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 352. Though Terraine often makes his point in a pejorative manner with regard to RAF willingness, his conclusion— that the stress of war promoted a new spirit of co-operation between the Army and the RAF in North Africa—has become the accepted view. See RAF Historical Society (ed.) The End of the Beginning Symposium Proceedings on Land/Air Cooperation in the Mediterranean War 1940–43, (Bracknell Paper No.3, 20 March 1992). 8. Naval reconnaissance received separate consideration in the Combined Plan. A general reconnaissance group, under the command of the C-in-C Mediterranean, was to monitor the Egyptian coast including the main coastal road as well as provide overseas coverage from Alexandria to a point roughly midway to Malta. See TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, pp. 8–9. 9. TNA AIR 24/1066 HQME ORB September 1939 and 25 May 1940; AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, pp. 6–7; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 38–39. 10. TNA AIR 24/1966 HQME ORB September 1939 and 25 May 1940; AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 47; AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, p. 6; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 38. 11. TNA AIR 8/514 Middle East: Strategy for Operations; AIR 24/1051 HQME, RAF Operational Record Book, 5 August 1940; AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 47. 12. TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, p. 25; AIR 10/5547 Air Support p. 47; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 39. 13. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 47. 14. TNA AIR 26/350 No.253 Wing Operational Record Book, Appendix B, 10 June 1940; AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, pp. 27–28; AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 47; WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 40; and R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945 (London, 1991), p. 16. 15. Prior to Operation Compass, AILs were introduced to the medium bomber squadrons in the Advanced Wing. See below, p. 80. 16. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 40; and AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 47.

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17. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 48; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 40. 18. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 39–40. 19. TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, p. 7. 20. The RAF in Egypt was very much a second-line air force. Besides being small in numbers, it was equipped with an assortment of antique and obsolescent aircraft. See John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 303–304. 21. RAF Historical Society (ed.) The End of the Beginning, pp. 12 and 21. 22. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 40. 23. Detailed accounts of initial operations conducted by British forces in the Western Desert can be read in I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East v.I, pp. 112–119; TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, pp. 33–44; John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 309–312; and Richard Townshend Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, pp. 21–34; Michael Carver, Apostles of Mobility (London, 1979), pp. 70–71; and Barrie Pitt, The Crucible of War (London, 1980), pp. 43–47. 24. TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns, v.I, p. 33; R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, pp. 33–34; and J. Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 307. 25. D.I. Hall, “Peering through the Veil of Uncertainty: British Anti-Invasion Planning 1940,” pp. 110–111; TNA CAB 65/15 WM(40)266 Confidential Annex, 4 October 1940; and R. Wheatley, Operation Sea Lion (Oxford, 1958). 26. A short though useful description of the development of the Takoradi route can be read in John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 305–306. 27. TNA AIR 24/1051 HQME RAF ORB, Appendix 19, 13 August 1940; AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 48; AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, p. 52; and I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East v.I, p. 206. 28. Longmore to Collishaw, 5 July 1940, in TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, p. 44. 29. TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns, v.I, p. 67; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East v.I, pp. 195–197, 205–207; John Connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier (London, 1964), pp. 234–238; and Philip Guedalla, Middle East 1940–1942: A Study in Air Power (London, 1944), pp. 83–87. 30. R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, pp. 39–40; John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 312; Sir David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them, pp. 117–119; and Alan Moorehead, The Desert War, p. 19. For a detailed account of Graziani’s first offensive against Egypt see: I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East v.I, pp. 209–212; and Barrie Pitt, The Crucible of War, pp. 50–54. 31. R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, p. 37; John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 313; TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 48; and AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns, v.I, pp. 50–52. 32. Philip Guedalla, Middle East 1940–1942: A Study in Air Power, p. 100. Cited also in John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 313. 33. TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, p. 59. 34. TNA CAB 65/15 WM(40)266 Confidential Annex, 4 October 1940 and 279 Confidential Annex, 29 October; AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, pp. 65–68; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 314.

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35. On 13 April 1939, Britain and France promised Greece military support in the event of an enemy invasion. Although France was no longer a combatant country when Italian troops invaded on 28 October 1940, Churchill did not shrink from fulfilling Britain’s obligation. With the use of hindsight, the prime minister’s decision has come under severe, though as John Terraine explains, somewhat unfair, criticism. See: W.S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (London, 1949), pp. 472–473. R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, pp. 43, 50–51; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 326–327. 36. TNA AIR 41/28 The Middle East Campaigns v.IV: “The Campaign in Greece”; WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 41–42; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 326–327. 37. Detailed accounts of RAF operations in East Africa, Iraq, and Syria are found in TNA AIR 41/27 The Middle East Campaigns v.V: “Campaigns in East Africa, 1940–1941”; AIR 41/30 v.VIII: “Operations in Iraq, May 1941”; and AIR 41/31 v.IX: “Campaign in Syria, June 1941.” See also John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 318–325, for RAF air support in the East African campaign. In the latter, Terraine overstates the case for the development in Kenya of the future Tactical Air Force’s “cab-rank” technique where air support was “on tap” and not merely provided in a prearranged co-operation programme. There was no fight for air superiority to speak of—an important prerequisite for the provision of sustained tactical air support against a first-rate enemy—and the rudimentary communications and command and control arrangements were more in keeping with the general lack of resources available to British commanders in Kenya than to deliberate planning. While it was a useful experiment in the application of tactical air support under circumstances of air supremacy, it offered little instruction in the way that such favourable conditions for successful operations were achieved and, most important, maintained. 38. R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, p. 45; and discussions this author had with Sir Michael Howard at Oriel College, Oxford, Hilary Term, 1988. See also D. Richards and H. Saunders, The Royal Air Force 1939-1945 v.I, p. 265; Lord Tedder, With Prejudice (London, 1966) passim; Sir Maurice Dean, The Royal Air Force and Two World Wars, pp. 206–207; Interview with Professor and Desert War veteran Major Dominick Graham (Royal Artillery) Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada, 15 September 1988; John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 313–314, 316; and Terraine’s introduction to C.E. Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command, pp. ix–x. Carrington, however, offers a dissenting view. He claims that modern techniques for the practice of tactical air support were developed in the United Kingdom, not in North Africa. In doing so he incorrectly discounts the valuable practical experience learnt in the desert through trial and error. 39. Sir Maurice Dean, The Royal Air Force and Two World Wars, p. 215. 40. A short selection of reliable, detailed accounts, includes: TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaign v.I, pp. 75–94; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East v.I, chapters XIV and XV; Philip Guedalla, Middle East 1940–1942: A Study in Air Power, pp. 95–103; Barrie Pitt, The Crucible of War, pp. 85–117, 483–485; and Field Marshal Lord Carver, Dilemmas of the Desert War: A New Look at the Libyan Campaign 1940-1942 (London, 1986) passim. 41. No.202 Group was composed of two Hurricane fighter squadrons (Nos.33 and 274), one mixed Gladiator/Gauntlet fighter squadron (No.3 RAAF), and three

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Blenheim bomber squadrons (Nos.45, 55, and 113). Under Collishaw’s administrative control, but O’Connor’s command for operations, were a mixed army cooperation squadron of Hurricane fighter/reconnaissance and Lysander reconnaissance aircraft (No.208) and a Lysander squadron (No.6). TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, p. 68; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 314. 42. The Regia Aeronautica’s initial deployment in Cyrenaica numbered approximately 200 fighters and 200 bombers. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 39 and 41. 43. TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, pp. 68–78; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East v.I, p. 272; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 314–316. 44. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 41; and AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, pp. 77–78. 45. As was the case between the RAF and the Regia Aeronautica, the British and Empire army was opposed by a much larger enemy force. O’Connor had roughly 30,000 men against an Italian and Libyan army numbering over 80,000 (although the British general did enjoy a significant advantage in tanks, having 275 to his enemy’s 120). 46. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 49; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East v.I, pp. 268–273; John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 316; and Alan Moorehead, The Desert War, pp. 28, 30–43. Somewhat surprisingly, David Fraser does not mention the air effort at all in his praise of O’Connor’s “impressive victory.” See And We Shall Shock Them, pp. 120–125. 47. General O’Connor as quoted in TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 41. 48. TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, p. 80; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 316. 49. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support p. 49; AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, p. 90; AIR 2/7447 Report on Air Co-operation with the Army During Operations in the Western Desert and Libya, December 1940 - February 1941, pp. 3–5; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 41. 50. TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, pp. 91–92; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East v.I, pp. 352, 362–364; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 317–318. Alan Moorehead, a British war correspondent in the Western Desert during this period, provides an evocative account of the advance from Bardia to El Agheila. See The Desert War, pp. 44–84. 51. TNA AIR 10/4004 War Office Report: Lessons of the Operations in the Western Desert, December 1940; 203 Air Intelligence Section (202 Group RAF) Air Co-operation in the Western Desert, December 1940; AIR 2/7447 Rough Notes on RAF Co-operation with the Army in the Western Desert, 22 December 1940; and Report on Air Co-operation with the Army During Operations in the Western Desert and Libya, December 1940 to February 1941. 52. TNA AIR 10/4004 War Office Report: Lessons of the Operations in the Western Desert, December 1940; and AIR 2/7447 Rough Notes produced by HQ, RAF, Middle East on RAF Co-operation with the Army in the Western Desert, January 1941. 53. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 49–50; AIR 10/4004 War Office Report: Lessons of the Operations in the Western Desert, December 1940; and I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East v.I, p. 272.

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54. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 49; and AIR 2/7447 Rough Notes produced by HQ, RAF, Middle East on RAF Co-operation with the Army in the Western Desert, January 1941. 55. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 41; AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 50; and AIR 10/4004 Air Intelligence Section (202 Group RAF) Air Co-operation in the Western Desert, December 1940. 56. TNA AIR 10/4004 Air Intelligence Section (202 Group RAF) Air Co-operation in the Western Desert, December 1940. 57. TNA AIR 10/4004 Air Intelligence Section (202 Group RAF) Air Co-operation in the Western Desert, December 1940; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 42. 58. TNA AIR 2/7447 Rough Notes on RAF Co-operation with the Army in the Western Desert, 22 December 1940, p. 2; Report on Methods of Reconnaissance in use in the Middle East Command, Spring 1941; Synopsis of Report by AOCin-C Middle East, on RAF Co-operation with the Army in December Operations in Western Desert, 1940; and AIR 10/4004 War Office Report: Lessons of the Operations in the Western Desert, 31 December 1940. 59. TNA AIR 2/7447 Report on Air Co-operation with the Army During Operations in the Western Desert and in Libya, December 1940 - February 1941, p. 6; and AIR 10/4004 Air Intelligence Section (202 Group RAF) Air Co-operation in the Western Desert, December 1940. 60. TNA AIR 10/4004 Air Intelligence Section (202 Group RAF) Air Co-operation in the Western Desert, December 1940; and War Office Report: Lessons of the Operations in the Western Desert, February 1941. 61. F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War v.II (London, 1981), p. 357; W.S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (London, 1950), p. 63; John Connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier (London, 1964), p. 336; and Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, p. 32. German forces invaded Greece on 6 April 1941. 62. TNA AIR 41/28 The Middle East Campaigns v.VI, pp. 54–55. 63. Detailed narratives of the British fiascos in Greece and Crete can be read in TNA AIR 41/28 The Middle East Campaigns v.VI: “The Campaign in Greece, 1940–1941”; AIR 41/29 The Middle East Campaigns v.VII: “The Campaign in Crete, May 1941”; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East v.II, chapters V and VII; and F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War v.I, chapter 13. For some critical comments on the “madness” and “rank stupidity” of those responsible for these operations see: John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 325–334; R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939– 1945, pp. 49–51, 58; and General Sir David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them, pp. 131–147. 64. Alarmed by the general incompetence and sheer military failure of his Italian allies, Hitler ordered German troops to Africa, to save Tripolitania, on 11 January 1941. This force included the 5th Light Division and a Panzer Regiment under the command of General Erwin Rommel, and was supported by the 245 aircraft of General Hans Geisler’s Fliegerkorps X recently deployed in Sicily. On 18 February, Hitler created the Afrika Korps. He sent Rommel a full Panzer Division and instructed the Luftwaffe to increase its strength in North Africa. Shortly before Rommel’s first offensive in Libya, the Luftwaffe mustered only 50 Ju87 dive-bombers and 25 Me110 twin-engine fighters. The Me109 did not begin service in the desert until 19 April

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1941. See TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, pp. 111, 141–142; and Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, and Detlef Vogel, “The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939–1941,” Germany and the Second World War v.III (Oxford, 1995). 65. TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, pp. 128–135; WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 43; and R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, pp. 54– 55. For the official German history of Rommel’s first offensive in Libya see Gerhard Schreiber, Bernd Stegemann, and Detlef Vogel, “The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa 1939–1941,” Germany and the Second World War v.III. 66. TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, pp. 128–129; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 335–336. 67. TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns, pp. 131–136; John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 336; and John Connell Wavell: Scholar and Soldier, p. 396. 68. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 53. 69. Air Marshal Longmore was summoned to London “for discussions” on 1 May. He was superseded by Tedder, whose appointment as AOC-in-C Middle East was confirmed on 1 June 1941. Longmore was the first of many Middle East commanders to be sacked by Churchill in the immediate aftermath of a defeat. See: John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 337–339; Philip Guedalla, Middle East 1940– 1942: A Study in Air Power, pp. 59–61; and Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals, 2nd ed., pp. 71–76. 70. TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, pp. 152–155; AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 51; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 44. 71. TNA AIR 41/44 The Campaigns in the Middle East v.I, p. 155. 72. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 51; and Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 124–128. 73. F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, v.I, pp. 398–399. For a brief account of air support and its failures during Battleaxe see: TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns, v.I, pp. 171–175. See also AIR 8/582 Operation Battleaxe. 74. TNA CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 21–23; and R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, p. 61. 75. TNA CAB 66/17 WP(41)159 11 July 1941; AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 51–53; and Alan Moorehead, The Desert War, p. 151. 76. TNA CAB 80/29 COS(41)417, Annex I. 77. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 52–54; AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, p. 174; and R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939—1945, pp. 61–62. 78. TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns v.I, p. 174; and AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 52–53. 79. Portal Papers, Christ Church College, Oxford, Box C, File 8, Minute: Tedder to CAS, 26 May 1941; and Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, p. 124. 80. TNA AIR 41/44 The Middle East Campaigns, v.I, p. 175. 81. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 53; and Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 127–128, 138–143. 82. P.M. Telegram to C-in-C, M.E. (1527) of 4 July 1941, cited in TNA CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, p. 25. 83. Sir Maurice Dean, The RAF and Two World Wars, p. 212.

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CHAPTER 6 1. Pierre Cot, Triumph of Treason (Chicago, 1944), pp. 274, 301–306. Cot blamed Marshal Petain and the French General Staff for adopting a false air doctrine, which denied France true air power and consequently contributed in a large part to the nation’s defeat in June 1940. Instead of concentrating their air forces for large-scale offensive operations of strategic importance, the Army employed its aircraft in small units and as an auxiliary arm of the infantry. 2. TNA WO 106/1754 M.O.7 Memorandum by Lt-Col F. Festing on Army Air Support, 18 June 1940. 3. A brief appreciation of future British strategy following the fall of France is found in J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy (London, 1957) v.II, pp. 343–345. M.M. Postan, British War Production (London, 1952), especially chapter four, “From Dunkirk to Pearl Harbour,” provides detailed information on the reorganisation and rearmament of the armed services. 4. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 23; and W.A. Jacobs, “Air Support for the British Army, 1939–1943,” Military Affairs (December 1982), p. 174. 5. TNA CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, p. 2; WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 28; C.E. Carrington, “Army/Air Co-operation, 1939–1943,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute v.CXV (December 1970) p. 39; and W.A. Jacobs, “Air Support for the British Army,” pp. 175–176. 6. J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy, v.II, pp. 253; Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, v.I, pp. 144–145; and W.S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 457–461. 7. Alanbrooke Papers, 12/x/6 Air Co-operation, including War Office File: CIGS/BM/9/3685a; TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 28; and see chapter IV above, page 65. 8. The definitive account of the German invasion threat is Ronald Wheatley, Operation Sealion (London, 1958). See also Basil Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom (London, 1957), especially chapters VIII, XI, and XIV; Peter Fleming, Invasion 1940: An Account of the German Preparations and the British Counter Measures (London, 1957); and D.I. Hall, “Peering Through the Veil of Uncertainty: British Anti-Invasion Defence Planning, 1940,” M.A. Thesis (University of New Brunswick, 1987). 9. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 24; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 20. 10. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 24; WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 20–21; and C.E. Carrington, “Army/Air Co-operation, 1939–1943,” p. 39. 11. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 21; and C.E. Carrington, “Army/Air Co-operation, 1939–1943,” p. 39. 12. There is a brief account of the beach targeting plan in Charles Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command, pp. 34–41. 13. Shortly after the war the Army’s own official historian, Lieutenant-Colonel C.E. Carrington, wrote: “There can be few staff papers recorded in the history of the war which have been more generally approved or have had a more lasting effect than the Wann-Woodall Report. . . . It provided a new body of doctrine which was not essentially challenged again during the war.” See: TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 25; and Carrington Papers 81/11/6.

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14. Wann Woodall Report: Statement of the Objective of the Trials. Copies of this report along with critical notes are contained in TNA AIR 39/140 Close Support by Bomber and Fighter Aircraft; and WO 106/5161 Army Air Requirements. 15. Wann and Woodall identified two ways the air force could give direct assistance to an army in the field. They were “Direct Support,” which was defined as “the isolation of the battlefield by air forces” (interdiction in modern terminology), and “Close Support,” which was “the intervention of air forces in [sic] the battlefield itself.” 16. The Wann-Woodall Report was a joint Air Ministry and War Office publication issued in December 1940. See: TNA AIR 39/140 Close Support by Bomber and Fighter Aircraft; and WO 106/5162 Proposed Establishment of Close Support Bomber Control. A synopsis of the report is included in the Air Ministry’s official history of air support AHB AP3235, appendixes 1 and 3. An unabridged copy is also reprinted in the War Office’s 1945 monograph, “Army Air Support,” Appendix C. 17. See Chapter VII below. 18. Close Support Bomber Controls were re-designated Army Air Support Controls (AASC) and, in the western desert, Air Support Controls (ASC). By the time of the Normandy landings in June 1944 they were called Air Support Signals Units (ASSU). 19. Practical measures for operational procedures are discussed in the WannWoodall Report, Annexures 3–5. 20. Wann-Woodall Report, pp. 3–5. See: TNA AIR 39/140 Close Support by Bomber and Fighter Aircraft; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 26. 21. Air Marshal Sir W. Sholto Douglas as quoted in C.E. Carrington Papers 81/11/6. 22. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 26–27; WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 27, 29–30; and C.E. Carrington, “Army/Air Co-operation, 1939–1945,” pp. 39–40. 23. See chapter IV above, page 67. 24. TNA AIR 39/28 Organisation: Army Co-operation Command (November 1940 - February 1941); and AIR 20/3706 Army-Air Co-operation, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, 23 September 1940. 25. In particular, a four-day home defence exercise, Victor I, revealed an overly complicated command system unsuited to the provision of spontaneous support in an emergency. 26. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 31–32; CAB 66/15 WP(41)69 Annex 1; and AIR 20/5840 Bomber Support for the Army (January - March 1941). 27. Even though the aircrews of No.2 Group had little training and the soldiers seldom saw any aircraft, the CSBC exercises during the first six months of 1941 were highly successful in determining effective signal procedures. A few months later the first operational unit was despatched overseas to the Western Desert. See C.E. Carrington Papers 81/11/6; and TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 31 and chapter VI. 28. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 27; WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 30–31; and W.A. Jacobs, “Air Support for the British Army, 1939–1943,” p. 176. An anecdotal account of No.2 Group’s exercises with Home Forces is in C.E. Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command, pp. 42–45.

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29. Memorandum by Captain John Profumo, MP: PM 406/4 as cited in TNA CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, p. 16; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 28. 30. Alanbrooke Papers, 12/x/6 Air Co-operation; TNA WO 106/1596 and 106/1754 “Air Policy” (June-July 1940). In particular, see WO 106/1754 Memorandum by Lt-Col F. Festing, M.O.7, on Army Air Support (18 June 1940); and W.A. Jacobs, “Air Support for the British Army,” p. 174 and ftn. 4. 31. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 53. 32. TNA CAB 80/57 COS(41)89(0) “Army/Air Requirements,” 31 May 1941. 33. Alanbrooke Papers, 12/x/6 Army Co-operation, including WO File CIGS/BM/9/3685a (February 1941); and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 28, 54–55, and Appendix H. Whilst the debate on army/air requirements was a dominant issue before the COS for most of 1941 and 1942 very little has been written about it, even in the official histories. The first (though lamentably brief) published account of this long struggle is C.E. Carrington, “Army/Air Co-operation, 1939– 1943,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (December 1970), pp. 37–41. 34. TNA AIR 20/2809 Letter to D.Plans, 15 June 1941. 35. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 23. 36. TNA CAB 80/57 COS(41)89(0) of 30 May 1941; CAB 80/58 COS(41)119(0) of 26 June 1941; and CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 4–6. 37. TNA CAB 79/12 COS(41)220 Mtg. of 21 June 1941; and W.S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 657. 38. TNA CAB 80/58 COS(41)119(0) of 26 June 1941. A brief synopsis of this paper is in CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 6–11. 39. TNA CAB 80/58 COS(41)119(0) 26 June 1941. 40. TNA CAB 66/15 WP(41)69 Annex 1; and CAB 80/57 COS(41)83(0) 21 May 1941. 41. TNA CAB 79/11 COS(41)200th Mtg. 3 June 1941; and CAB 80/28 COS(41)389 20 June 1941. Alex Danchev, writing on Dill in John Keegan (ed.), Churchill’s Generals (London, 1991), argues that the CIGS strongly disagreed with the Prime Minister over the latter’s strategic direction of the British war effort. For Churchill’s strategic view in the autumn of 1941 see W.S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 501–511. 42. TNA CAB 80/58 COS(41)119(0) 26 June 1941. 43. See TNA CAB 80/58 COS(41)129(0) 6 July 1941. The German system confined the allotment of aircraft for army co-operation to reconnaissance. Bomber and fighter support was provided by the main elements of the Luftwaffe, which included ground attack in its general training programme. The War Office’s desired allotment of 54 army co-operation squadrons (648 aircraft at 12 I.E. per squadron) to the British Army seemed to the Air Staff to be out of proportion to the actual needs, both present and future. For a force of between 150 and 200 divisions, including some 20 armoured divisions, the Germans allocated only 350 army co-operation aircraft. For a force of 10 corps and 8 armoured divisions, the probable size of the future British field force, the Germans would have allotted 162 army co-operation aircraft, whilst the Air Staff proposed to allot 240. 44. TNA CAB 80/58OS(41)119(0) 26 June 1941. Portal did not discuss army requirements overseas because action was already being taken by the C-in-Cs in the Middle East to achieve closer inter-service co-operation. See chapter VII below;

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CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 25–35; and Portal Papers, File 11 No.6 correspondence between Portal and Longmore (30 May 1941). 45. TNA CAB 80/58 COS(41)119(0) and Annex 26 June 1941. See also CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 7–10. 46. Ibid. 47. TNA CAB 80/58 COS(41)119(0) Annex; and CAB 101/136 Army-Air Cooperation, pp. 10–11. 48. TNA CAB 79/12 COS(41)229 Mtg (30 June 1941), 231 Mtg (2 July 1941), and 233 Mtg (3 July 1941); and CAB 80/58 COS(41)129(0) 6 July 1941. 49. TNA CAB 79/12 COS(41)229 Mtg (30 June 1941), 231 Mtg (2 July 1941), and 233 Mtg (3 July 1941); CAB 79/13 COS(41)255 Mtg (22 July 1941), 257 Mtg Annex (23 July 1941); WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 55; and W.A. Jacobs, “Air Support for the British Army,” p. 176. 50. Tank Parliament meeting of 27 May 1941. See TNA CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 16–17. 51. Minute from Sinclair to Churchill (28 May 1941) and Churchill to Sinclair (30 May 1941), TNA CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 17–18. 52. Portal Papers, Folder 2, Nos. 42, 42a, 6, and 6a, Correspondence between the CAS and the Prime Minister on “Lysanders or Blenheims for Army Co-operation Squadrons” (June-July 1941); and TNA CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 18–21. 53. TNA AIR 39/80 Air Aspects of “BUMPER” Exercise: Report by AOC-in-C Army Co-operation Command (October 1941); PREM 3/80 BUMPER (Air-Army Co-operation) Exercise; Carrington Papers 81/11/6; and AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 28–29. 54. TNA CAB 80/60 COS(41)242(0) Annex A (22 October 1941); and CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 37–40. 55. TNA AIR 39/80 Air Aspects of “BUMPER” Exercise; and CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, p. 41. 56. TNA CAB 66/17 WP(41)159 (11 July 1941); and PREM 3/8 Co-operation with the Army: PM to Secretary of State for Air (14 July 1941). 57. TNA PREM 3/8 Minute, PM to CAS (19 August 1941). See also Portal Papers, Folder 2, Nos.18, 18a, b, c, Correspondence between Portal and Churchill (19–27 August 1941). 58. Portal Papers, Folder 2, No.18b, Minute from Portal to Churchill (21 August 1941). 59. Portal Papers, Folder 2, No.18c, Minute from Churchill to Portal (27 August 1941). See also TNA PREM 3/8. 60. Churchill’s Middle East Directive is discussed in greater detail below. See chapter VII. 61. Army Training Instruction No.6 issued on 31 October 1941 is reprinted in its entirety in TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 194–199, Appendix 2. 62. Carrington Papers 81/11/6; and TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 29. 63. TNA CAB 80/60 COS(41)242(0) 22 October 1941; and CAB 101/136 ArmyAir Co-operation, p. 38. 64. TNA CAB 80/60 COS(41)246(0) 4 November 1941; and CAB 101/136 ArmyAir Co-operation, pp. 40–42. 65. TNA CAB 79/15 COS(41)383 Mtg. (13 November 1941).

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CHAPTER 7 1. From 1 June to 31 October 1941 something between one-third and one-half of all enemy shipping on route to North Africa was sunk by the RAF, the Fleet Air Arm and the Royal Navy (with the air forces accounting for slightly more than half of this total). See: Denis Richards and Hilary Saunders, The Royal Air Force 1939–1945, v.II, pp. 169–170; P. Young, World War 1939–1945 (London, 1966), p. 112; B.H. Liddell Hart (ed.), The Rommel Papers, p. 151; and Martin van Creveld, “Rommel’s Supply Problem,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (September 1974), pp. 67–73. 2. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 43. For changes in RAF Middle East command and organisation during the summer and autumn of 1941—Headquarters, Groups, Wings, and their respective commanding officers—see I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.II, p. 294; and R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, pp. 62–64. 3. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 46; R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, pp. 69–70; and I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, pp. 14–15 and 414–419. 4. TNA AIR 20/2996 Minutes of Joint Meetings of the Air Support Committee (10, 11, 18, 21 and 29 August 1941) Appendix C; CAB 101/136 Army-Air Cooperation, p. 26; Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, p. 163; and I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.II, pp. 294–295. 5. TNA CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, p. 26. 6. TNA AIR 26/351 No.253 Wing Operational Record Book, Appendices A-E (4–16 July 1941), and Reports on Training Appendix B (15 July - 15 August 1941) and C (16–31 August 1941); CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 26–28; AIR 20/2996 Middle East: Army Co-operation (August-October 1941); AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 57–61; and Middle East (Army and RAF) Directive on Direct Air Support issued on 30 September 1941 by GHQ, MEF and HQ, RAF, ME, reprinted in full as Appendix 7 in AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 209– 221. 7. TNA AIR 20/2996 Minutes of Joint Meetings of the Air Support Committee (August-September 1941); Middle East (Army and RAF) Training Pamphlet No.3 “Direct Air Support” in AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 57–61; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 345–346. 8. TNA CAB 101/136 Army-Air Support, pp. 26–27; AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 7 and 55; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 44–45. 9. John Gordon, “Operation CRUSADER: Preview of the Nonlinear Battlefield,” Military Review, v.71, no.2 (1991), pp. 48–61. 10. See Chapter VI, pp. 91–93 for a full discussion on the Wann-Woodall Report. 11. See Middle East (Army and RAF) Training Pamphlet No.3 “Direct Air Support” in TNA AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 57–61; and the Middle East Directive on Direct Air Support (30 September 1941), reprinted in full as Appendix 7 in AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 209–221. 12. TNA AIR 2/7447 RAF Co-operation with the Army: Middle East. Report by Inspector-General (RAF) Air Marshal E.R. Ludlow-Hewitt, on the Lessons Learned during Operation Battleaxe, 23 September 1941.

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13. Portal Papers, Folder 2, Correspondence between the Prime Minister and the CAS (19 August to 5 September 1941); TNA AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, p. 20; and I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and the Middle East, v.II, pp. 287– 288. 14. Ibid. 15. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 54–55; John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 347 and 352; and Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, p. 170. 16. This directive was later published as Middle East Training Pamphlet (Army and RAF) No.3 “Direct Air Support.” 17. The Middle East (Army and RAF) Directive on Direct Air Support is reprinted in full as Appendix 1. 18. See the Middle East (Army and RAF) Directive on Direct Air Support (Reprinted in full in Appendix 1. A line diagram of the communications for Air Support Control is included as Annexure A to Appendix 1). See also TNA AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 57–61; AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 56–59; CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 29–32; and I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.II, p. 295. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. AIR 26/351 No.253 Wing ORB, Reports on Training, 15 July to 31 August 1941, Appendices B and C. 22. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 45. Tedder’s tireless efforts to increase the RAF’s mobility in the field, and establish a separate maintenance group to control maintenance, repair and salvage units, and air stores parks also started to produce encouraging returns. The circumstances of the creation of a Chief Maintenance and Supply Officer (CMSO), the arrival of Air Vice-Marshal G.G. Dawson in the Middle East and the immediate benefits seen during Crusader are related in I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.II, pp. 235–237, 292–293. See also TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 60; AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 62, 129; Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 108–109, 189 and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 341–342. 23. TNA AIR 39/20 Army and Royal Air Force Middle East Direct Air Support Training Instruction No.1 (1 October 1941). 24. TNA AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 85–86; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 45. 25. TNA WO 201/363 Operation Crusader: Air situation and diary of events; and WO 201/364 Operation Crusader: Reports. 26. One of the first changes Coningham made upon taking command of the Western Desert Air Force (July 1941) was to move his headquarters beside Eighth Army’s headquarters at Ma’aten Bagush. During Crusader it served as the Rear Air Headquarters WDAF. TNA AIR 24/1051 Middle East Command HQ RAF, Operational Record Book, July 1941. 27. A sortie was judged to be “effective” when the aircraft found and successfully attacked its designated target. 28. For a detailed “day-by-day” account of Operation Crusader with specific emphasis on the air effort see TNA AIR 39/20 Part I of report by Wing Commander A.T.W. Geddes, RAF Liaison Officer to HQ 13 Corps. A general narrative of this campaign is found in AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns,

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v.II, pp. 133–237; and I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, pp. 1–102. 29. Telegram from C-in-C Middle East (Auchinleck) to AOC-in-C Middle East (Tedder) sent after the first week of Operation Crusader. Quoted in TNA CAB 101/136 Army Air Co-operation, p. 35. 30. A succession of advances and withdrawals characterised the initial ground engagements of Crusader, which is generally accepted as being one of the most confusing battles fought during the war. For the circumstances surrounding Auchinleck’s loss of confidence in Cunningham’s ability to press on with the offensive, and his dismissal, see: TNA AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 157–158; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, pp. 60–61; Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, p. 197; Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals, pp. 94, 117–118 and 120; and David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them, pp. 171 and 176. 31. Ritchie to Coningham as cited in TNA CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, p. 36. 32. TNA AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 213–214. 33. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 46; and I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, p. 43. 34. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 47–48; AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, p. 40; and R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, p. 72. 35. TNA AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 213–214; and AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 61–62. 36. TNA AIR 20/5466 Report on Lessons Learned During Air Operations in the Western Desert (August 1941–February 1942) compiled by Group Captain T.W. Elmhirst; and the revised Middle East Training Pamphlet (Army and RAF) No.3A “Direct Air Support” (March 1942) as noted in AIR 24/1055 and 1082 (Appendices) Middle East Command HQ RAF, Operational Record Book, March 1942; and AIR 41/25 Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 297–301. 37. TNA AIR 24/1079 Middle East HQ RAF, Operational Record Book, 13–17 December; AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 61; AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 209, 213, and 230; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, pp. 81–83; and R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, pp. 78–79. 38. For critical analysis of the many shortcomings in the British Army’s tactics, equipment, organisation and, in particular, concept of tank warfare, see: I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, pp. 100–101; B.H. Liddell Hart (ed.), The Rommel Papers, pp. 184–185, 519–520; Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, p. 201; Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals, pp. 136–137; David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them, p. 175; and Cyril Jolly, Take These Men: British Armour in the Desert 1940–1943 passim. 39. TNA AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 134–138, 290–292; AIR 24/1072 Middle East HQ RAF, Operational Record Book, Scale of effort in Operation Crusader (January-February 1942); WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 46–47; and I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, pp. 91–92, 96–99. 40. TNA AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 269–270; WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 47; Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 233–234; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, pp. 122–123; John Terraine, The Right of

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the Line, pp. 361–362, 369–370; and R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, p. 81. 41. On 23 January 1942, Coningham wrote a brief note to Tedder: “Enemy advance to Asedabia and Antelalat quite unopposed and due to serious blunder of Guards brigade which opened road.” See TNA AIR 41/26 The Middle East Campaigns, v.III, p. 16. See also Barrie Pitt, Year of Alamein 1942, pp. 8–12. 42. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 62, 64; AIR 41/26 The Middle East Campaigns, v.III, pp. 16–19, 24–26 and 28; and I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, pp. 139–152. 43. I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, p. 150; and R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, p. 82. 44. On 26 May, Rommel launched a full-scale attack against British positions along the “Gazala line.” During the fifteen weeks that preceded this offensive, from 7 February to 25 May, the RAF Middle East flew nearly 14,000 operational sorties (an average of 130 sorties per day). It was an arduous period for the air force. I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, p. 213. 45. Middle East (Army and RAF) Training Pamphlet No.3A “Direct Air Support” (March 1942) in TNA AIR 24/1055 and 1082 (Appendices) Middle East Command HQ RAF, Operational Record Book, March-April 1942; AIR 41/25 Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 297–301; and AIR 41/26 Middle East Campaigns, v.III, pp. 91–100. 46. Ibid. 47. TNA AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 295 and 297; AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 64–65; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 47. 48. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 65; and I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, pp. 98–98a and 208. 49. I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, pp. 207–208; and AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 64; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 48. 50. TNA AIR 41/25 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, p. 295; and AIR 41/26 The Middle East Campaigns, v.III, p. 15. 51. Numerous accounts of the Battle of the Gazala Line and the Retreat to El Alamein exist in English. The following is just a brief list of reasonably accurate and detailed narratives. TNA AIR 41/26 The Middle East Campaigns, v.III, pp. 127–209; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, pp. 223–297 and 331–360; B.H. Liddell Hart (ed.), The Rommel Papers, pp. 191–236; Cyril Jolly, Take These Men: British Armour in the Desert 1940–1943, pp. 308–324; Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 288–292; Kenneth Macksey, Rommel: Battles and Campaigns (London, 1979), pp. 89–113; Barrie Pitt, Year of Alamein 1942, pp. 28–111; David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them, pp. 216–227; and R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, pp. 86–97. See also Niall Barr, Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein (London, 2004). 52. John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 370. 53. I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, p. 374. 54. TNA AIR 41/26 The Middle East Campaigns, v.III, p. 224.

CHAPTER 8 1. Brooke succeeded Dill as CIGS in December 1941, and he served in this post through to the end of the war.

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2. TNA CAB 80/35 COS(42)164 (10 March 1942); CAB 80/57 COS(41)89(0) (30 May 1941); CAB 69/4 and AIR 8/989 (DO(42)34, 1 April 1942); and J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy, v.III, pt.II, pp. 529–544. 3. TNA CAB 80/35 COS(42)164 (10 March 1942). 4. In August 1941 a comprehensive statistical investigation of the results of British bombing of Germany revealed that only one fifth of the aircraft despatched bombed within a five-mile radius of their specified targets. For details of this study see the Butt Report, reprinted in full in Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, v.IV, pp. 205–213. A brief analysis of this report’s impact on the future direction of the bomber offensive is in John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 292–297. 5. TNA CAB 80/35 COS(42)164 (10 March 1942); CAB 101/136 Army-Air Cooperation, p. 48; WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 56; Alanbrooke Papers 12/x/6 Air Co-operation; and Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, pp. 385–386. 6. TNA CAB 69/4 and AIR 8/989 “Air Forces for Co-operation with the Army and the Navy,” (DO(42)34, 1 April 1942). See also CAB 101/136 Army-Air Cooperation, pp. 50–57; Denis Richards, Portal of Hungerford, pp. 204–206; and W.A. Jacobs, “Air Support for the British Army,” p. 176. 7. TNA CAB 69/4 and AIR 8/989 (DO(42)34, 1 April 1942). 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. TNA CAB 80/58 COS(41)119(0), 26 June 1941; CAB 80/60 COS(41)246(0), 4 November 1941; CAB 69/4 and AIR 8/989 (DO(42)34, 1 April 1942). 11. For the Middle East air support system, and its establishment, see Chapter VII above pp. 199–203. 12. TNA CAB 69/4 and AIR 8/989 (DO(42)34, 1 April 1942). 13. TNA WO 259/64 Criticism in the Press of the Army (February to April 1942). 14. Ibid. 15. Frank Owen, “The Destiny of the British Army,” The Evening Standard, 24–26 March 1942. See also TNA WO 259/64 Press Criticism of the Army, for comments by the Secretary of State for War, Sir James Grigg. 16. PM Minute D.79/2 (8 April 1942). See TNA CAB 101/136 Army-Air Cooperation, pp. 57–58. 17. Brooke was being duplicitous when he claimed, as he did in his diary on 18 and 19 May 1942, that up to then he had “always been strongly opposed to a separate Army Air Arm, and it was only out of despair at seeing nothing done for the Army that [he] reluctantly altered [his] views.” He had demanded the creation of an Army Air Arm in a memorandum delivered to the COS on 10 March 1942, and was the author of a similar memorandum Dill presented to the COS on 31 May 1941. See TNA CAB 80/57 COS(41)89(0) 31 May 1941; CAB 80/35 COS(42)164 10 March 1942; and Sir Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, p. 386. See also Brooke’s 2 May 1942 memorandum to the COS in TNA CAB 80/36 COS(42)246 and Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman (eds.) War Diaries, 1939–1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke (London, 2001). 18. TNA CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 45-47; PREM 3/8 Minute from General Ismay to Churchill (a summary of the controversy between the Air Ministry and the War Office from June 1940) 29 September 1942; C.E. Carrington, “Army/Air Co-operation 1939–1945,” p. 41; and W.A. Jacobs, “Air Support for the British Army, 1939–1943,” pp. 176, 178.

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19. For most of the war Air Vice-Marshal Sir Wilfrid Freeman served at the Ministry of Aircraft Production where he concentrated on the development and production of the heavy bomber force. 20. Brooke believed that this particular lunch party had been organised because it was considered that he “was being obstinate on the question of lack of co-operation on the part of the Air Ministry.” See Brooke’s diary entry of 18 May 1942 as cited in Sir Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, p. 386. See also Denis Richards, Portal of Hungerford, pp. 202–203. 21. TNA CAB 80/36 COS(42)246 2 April 1942; and CAB 80/36 COS(42)263 14 April 1942. 22. Sir Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, p. 386. 23. TNA CAB 79/21 COS(42)155 19 May 1942; CAB 80/36 COS(42)271 Defence Committee Meeting, 20 May 1942; and AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 31. The War Office monograph on army co-operation overstates what was achieved at the previous day’s COS meeting, claiming that “. . . on 20 May the CIGS and CAS were able to report to the Prime Minister that they had come to terms.” See TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 57. 24. At this time the RAF Middle East numbered more than 120 squadrons, including 29 bomber squadrons (3 heavy, 7 medium, and 19 light), and 49 fighter squadrons (35 day, 4 night, 10 long-range). See TNA CAB 80/36 COS(42)271 Defence Committee Meeting, 20 May 1942. 25. TNA AIR 20/2812 Army Co-operation: The “Thorold” Paper (25 May 1942); AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 31–32; WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 58 and Appendix “J”; and C.E. Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command, pp. 83–84. 26. TNA AIR 8/1063 “Command and Planning” (JP(42)517, 21 May 1942). 27. TNA CAB 80/37 COS(42)351 “Continental Operations 1943: Operational Organisation and System of Command of the RAF” (21 July 1942). A copy of the Slessor Paper is reproduced in full as Appendix “K” in WO 277/34 Army Air Support. 28. For a detailed history of the 2nd Tactical Air Force see Christopher F. Shores, 2nd TAF (Reading, 1970). 29. TNA CAB 80/37 COS(42)351 (21 July 1942); CAB 101/136 Army-Air Cooperation, pp. 60–62; AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 32–35; WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 58–59; Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue, pp. 421–422; W.A. Jacobs, “Air Support for the British Army,” p. 177; C.E. Carrington, Private Papers 81/11/6 and Soldier at Bomber Command, p. 84. 30. Three War Office Directorates that supported Brooke on this issue included: the Directorate of Air, the Directorate of Military Training, and the Directorate of Tactical Investigation. 31. Oxborrow later became the BGS (Air) at 21st Army Group Headquarters under General Montgomery. 32. TNA WO 233/60 GHQ Home Forces, draft paper: “Organisation and Control of the RAF in Support of Land Operations.” 33. TNA WO 216/127 GOC-in-C Home Forces to DCIGS (28 July 1942); WO 233/60 GHQ Home Forces, draft paper: “Organisation and Control of the RAF in Support of Land Operations”; W.A. Jacobs, “Air Support for the British Army,” p. 178; and Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue, pp. 423–424.

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34. TNA CAB 80/37 COS(42)364 (1 August 1942); and CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 62–63. 35. TNA CAB 80/37 COS(42)364 (1 August 1942); and W.A. Jacobs, “Air Support for the British Army,” p. 178. 36. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 59. For a detailed narrative of air operations over Dieppe on 19 August 1942 see Norman Franks, The Greatest Air Battle (London, 1979). Land operations are given extensive treatment, as well as a veteran’s personal story, in Brigadier General Denis Whitaker and Shelagh Whitaker, Dieppe: Tragedy to Triumph (Toronto, 1992). A comprehensive study of considerable scholarly merit is J.P. Campbell, Dieppe Revisited: A Documentary Investigation (London, 1993). Much less useful, because of the author’s proclivity toward conspiracy theories, is Brian Villa, Unauthorised Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid, 2nd edition (Oxford, 1989). See also David Ian Hall, “Air Operations at Dieppe. An after-action report by Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory,” Canadian Military History, v.12, no.4 (Autumn 2003), pp. 55–70. 37. Carrington Papers 81/11/6 and “Army/Air Co-operation, 1939–1943,” pp. 40–41. 38. TNA 8/984 Memorandum from AOC-in-C, Fighter Command to CAS on the part played by Fighter Command in co-operation with the Army during recent months (11 September 1942). 39. TNA WO 216/127 CIGS to CAS (2 September 1942). Writing about these events after the war, Slessor recalled that Portal was furious with Brooke’s intransigence. The CIGS, Slessor stated, offered nothing new to the debate. He merely reiterated “his demand for an Army Support Command, saying that the handling of air forces in the field was a matter for the Army commanders . . . all of which, of course, was bound to be totally unacceptable to us.” See Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue, p. 426. 40. TNA WO 216/217 Secretary of State for War to CIGS (14 September 1942). 41. A copy of this undated memorandum from the Secretary of State for War to the Prime Minister is reproduced in full in TNA CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, p. 63. 42. Hollis to Churchill (16 September 1942) in TNA CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 63–64. 43. Hollis to Churchill (19 September 1942) in TNA CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 65–66. 44. Ibid. 45. TNA CAB 79/57 COS(42)138 (0) (5 October 1942). 46. Ibid. 47. TNA PREM 3/8 Prime Minister to Secretaries of State for War and Air (7 October 1942). See also AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 36; CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, p. 70; and WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 59. 48. Agreed Statement Submitted to the Prime Minister by The Secretaries of State for Air and War on 14 November 1942 reproduced in full in TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, Appendix 5. See also TNA PREM 3/8 Organisation of Air Support for the Army in Continental Operations (14 November 1942); CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 70–73; and W.A. Jacobs, “Air Support for the British Army,” pp. 180–181. 49. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 59–60.

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CHAPTER 9 1. Sir Maurice Dean, The Royal Air Force and Two World Wars, p. 215. 2. At a joint RAF Historical Society and RAF Staff College symposium on Land/Air Co-operation in the Mediterranean War 1940–43, held at Bracknell on 20 March 1992, the majority of distinguished presenters and participants agreed: the unique and highly successful British system of Land/Air warfare developed out of the vicissitudes of war on and over the battlefields of North Africa. See RAF Historical Society (ed.), The End of the Beginning (Bracknell Paper No.3). See also TNA AIR 39/20 Wg Cdr A.T.W. Geddes report on his visit to the Middle East, April 1942; Portal Paper, Box C; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, p. 99; John Terraine, The Right of the Line pp. 347–362, 369–389; General Sir David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them, p. 236; Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire Power, p. 275; and Vincent Orange, Coningham (London, 1990), pp. 79–83. 3. TNA AIR 20/2812 “The Organisation, Function and Control of Airforces in Support of the Army in an Overseas Theatre of War” (21 May 1942), pp. 1–2; Ministry of Information, RAF Middle East: The Official Story of Air Operations in the Middle East, from February 1942 to January 1943 (London, 1945), pp. 7, 10; Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 211–12; J. Connell, Auchinleck, pp. 402, 411; and Colonel Andy Tjepkema, “Coningham: The Architect of Ground-Air Doctrine,” Air Clues, v.45, no.6, June 1991, pp. 205–208. 4. TNA AIR 20/2812 “The Organisation, Functions and Control of Airforces in Support of the Army in an Overseas Theatre of War” (21 May 1942), p. 2. See also B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, p. 299; and Denis Richards, Portal of Hungerford, p. 206. 5. TNA AIR 10/1910 (c.1928) and 1911 (c.1935) RAF War Manual: Part I— Operations; AIR 10/1889 RAF Manual of Army Co-operation (2nd ed., 1937) chapters 3 and 4; John Slessor, Air Power and Armies, passim; Sholto Douglas, Years of Combat, pp. 131, 137–138, 146–147, and 324; and Trenchard Papers MFC 76/1/357 Lecture VII: Air Strategy, p. 5; and Lecture XII: The Value of a Centralised Air Force, p. 3. 6. TNA AIR 20/2812 “The Organisation, Functions and Control of Airforces in Support of the Army in an Overseas Theatre of War” (21 May 1942); AIR 20/3213 “The Employment of Bombers and Fighter-Bombers in Co-operation with the Army” (April 1944); Ministry of Information, RAF Middle East, p. 12; and John Terraine, “Land/Air Co-operation,” The End of the Beginning, pp. 11–13. 7. TNA AIR 20/3213 “The Employment of Bombers and Fighter-Bombers in Co-operation with the Army,” p. 2; Portal Papers, File 12, Nos. 4 and 4a, Correspondence between Portal and Tedder (5 and 11 September 1941); Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp.163–164 and Air Power in War (London, 1948) passim; John Terraine, Introduction in C.E. Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command, p.x; and Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire Power, pp. 250–251, 261. 8. Air Marshal Sir Peter Drummond, “The Air Campaign in Libya and Tripolitania,” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (1943), pp. 251–257; and Ministry of Information, RAF Middle East, pp. 10–11. 9. Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 106–107, 163; and Vincent Orange, Coningham, pp. 78, 82, 102. In particular, both Rommel and Hitler failed to appreciate

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the decisive influence of air power in the desert war until it was too late. Rommel’s advance on Cairo before Malta had been subdued and his offensive at 1st Alamein without sufficient air support were two fundamental mistakes that contributed to the Axis defeat in North Africa. See Major General John Strawson, “The Shape and Course of the Mediterranean War 1940–43,” p. 15; Vincent Orange, “The Commanders and the Command System,” pp. 40–41; and Dr. Horst Boog, pp. 87–88 in The End of the Beginning. See also David Fraser, Knight’s Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (London, 1993), pp. 348–350; and I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, pp. 277–278. 10. One historian has written: “I can think of no RAF officer who did more to promote effective Army Co-operation.” John Terraine in C.E. Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command, p.x. It is a view shared by other distinguished historians: namely Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Fire Power, p. 261; Vincent Orange, “The Commanders and the Command System,” The End of the Beginning, pp. 34–45; and in discussion with Sir Michael Howard, Regius Professor of Modern History, University of Oxford, at the BCMH Autumn Meeting, Rhodes House, Oxford, 1987. 11. Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 175–176, 187–190, 443–444 and Air Power in War, pp. 91–92; Portal Papers, File 12, No.5, Tedder to Portal (17 September 1941); Trenchard Papers MFC 76/1/357 Lecture XII: The Value of a Centralise Air Force, pp. 4–6; and John Terraine, “Land/Air Co-operation,” The End of the Beginning, p. 13, and The Right of the Line, pp. 376, 385–386. 12. Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham, “The Development of Tactical Air Forces,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, v.91 (1946), pp. 211–226; Col. Andy Tjepkema, “Coningham,” pp. 205–206, 210; Vincent Orange, “The Commanders and the Command System,” The End of the Beginning, pp. 37–38, 43 and Coningham, pp. 81–83; Trenchard Papers MFC 76/1/357 Lecture XII: The Value of a Centralised Air Force, pp. 3–5; and Lt.Col. Maris McCrabb (USAF) “Drohende Gefahr West,” Airpower Journal, Summer 1994, p. 14. 13. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 64-65; AIR 20/2812 “The Organisation, Functions and Control of Airforces in Support of the Army in an Overseas Theatre of War,” pp. 1–2; AIR 41/25 and 26 The Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 289–292 and v.III, p. 93; Col. Andy Tjepkema, “Coningham,” pp. 205–206; and Richard Overy, The Air War 1939–1945, p. 9. 14. Along with the advent of the fighter-bomber came the final eclipse of the Stuka dive-bomber. As one contemporary and rather picturesque report stated: “The bogy of the dive-bomber had finally been exposed; when opposed by a determined fighter force it proved to be a crow masquerading in an eagle’s feathers.” TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 49; and R. Hallion, Strike from the Sky, pp. 156–157. 15. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 64; WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 48; Ministry of Information, RAF Middle East, pp. 14, 26–27; and Col. Andy Tjepkema, “Coningham,” pp. 207–208. 16. Crerar Collection: Box 103, Air Warfare - Training Instructions (1941–2); and Peter Supf, Luftwaffe von Sieg zu Sieg (Berlin, 1941). See also James Corum, “The Luftwaffe’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918–1941,” The Journal of Military Affairs, v.59, January 1995, pp. 53–76; Capt. G.S. Zehner (USAF) “Obstacles to the Development of Luftwaffe Close Air Support Procedures 1935–1944” (unpublished paper, University of South Carolina, 1994); Ministry of Information, RAF Middle

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East, p. 12; and Vincent Orange, “The Commanders and the Command System,” The End of the Beginning, pp. 35–36. 17. Vincent Orange, Coningham, pp. 131, 137; and Col. Andy Tjepkema, “Coningham,” pp. 205, 207. 18. TNA AIR 24/1055 and 1082 (Appendices) Middle East Command HQ RAF Operational Record Book, March/April 1942; and AIR 41/25 Middle East Campaigns, v.II, pp. 297–301. 19. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 64–65. 20. Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, p. 404. 21. Elmhirst Papers 6/6; and Vincent Orange, Coningham, p. 112. 22. Richard Overy, The Air War 1939–1945, p. 9. 23. James Lucas provides a succinct account of the “Gazala Gallop” in War in the Desert: The Eight Army at El Alamein (London, 1982), pp. 22–27. Detailed narratives can be read in I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, pp. 223–297; and Barrie Pitt, Year of Alamein 1942, pp. 132–145. 24. F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, v.II, pp. 362– 363; Correlli Barnet, The Desert Generals, pp. 144–153; David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them, pp. 224–227; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 370. 25. For contemporary analysis of the air campaign see TNA AIR 41/26 The Middle East Campaigns, v.III, pp. 127–209 and 211–221; and Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 288–317. Shorter accounts can be read in TNA 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 65–68; John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 370–375; R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, pp. 89–93; and Vincent Orange, Coningham, pp. 93– 103. See also P. Guedalla, Middle East 1940–1942: A Study in Air Power, pp. 199– 202; Richard Overy, The Air War 1939–1945, pp. 67–68; and, for the important part played by the RAF maintenance, repair, and salvage units, Humphrey Wynn “The RAF in the Mediterranean Theatre,” The End of the Beginning, pp. 21–25. 26. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 67. See also Ministry of Information, RAF Middle East, pp. 41–43. 27. General Auchinleck’s Middle East Despatch as quoted in AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.IV, pp. 3–6. See also AIR 19/557 Air Ministry Private Office Papers, Minute from the CAS to the PM (4 July 1942); and Vincent Orange, Coningham, p. 103. 28. Extracts from 21st Panzer Division and Afrika Korps War Diaries as quoted in TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support p. 68; AIR 41/26 and 50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.III, pp. 195–197, 202–203 and v.IV, pp. 2–6; AIR 19/557 Air Ministry Private Office Papers; and Portal Papers, File 12, No.9, Extracts from POW statements: The effectiveness of British bombing (12 July 1942). Rommel’s observations on the deleterious effect the RAF’s “continuous round-the-clock bombing” was having on his army can be read in B.H. Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers, pp. 245, 260, 283–286; and Desmond Young, Rommel (London, 1950), pp. 258–259, 272. 29. TNA AIR 41/26 The Middle East Campaigns, v.III, passim; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 370. Terraine restated this point at the RUSI in London (27 May 1993), the RAF Staff College, Bracknell (20 March 1992) and at the RAF Museum, Hendon (29 October 1990). His general conclusion is supported by the published work of Vincent Orange, R.T. Bickers, and R.P. Hallion, cited above. 30. Portal Papers, Box C, File VIII, Nos.14 and 24a, Tedder to Portal (6 February and 26 July 1942); and Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 313–314.

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31. Commenting on mediocre army officers obtaining field command, the distinguished Australian historian, Chester Wilmot, said he thought it was very strange how often in the British Army a man like Ritchie rose to the highest posts in spite of his stupidity. Chester Wilmot to B.H. Liddell Hart, Correspondence, LHC, London. Quoted in V. Orange, Coningham, p. 101. 32. B.H. Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers, pp. 208, 243; Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals (2nd ed.), pp. 154–176, 179–194; R.P. Hallion, Strike from the Sky, pp. 158–159; and R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, p. 92. 33. TNA AIR 41/26 The Middle East Campaigns, v.III, p. 128; Portal Papers, Box C, File VIII, Nos.18, 18a, 20, Tedder to Portal (21 April and 29 June 1942) and File 12, No.9, Tedder to Portal (12 July 1942); Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 305–306, 309–310; and Vincent Orange, Coningham, pp. 100–101, 104. 34. Portal Papers, Box C, File VIII, Nos.20 and 21, Tedder to Portal (29 June and 16 July 1942); TNA AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.IV, p. 17; Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, p. 306; and Vincent Orange, Coningham, p. 101. 35. John Terraine, “Introduction” in C.E. Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command, p.x.; and RAF Historical Society (ed.) The End of the Beginning, pp. 65–66. 36. TNA AIR 41/26 and 50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.III, p. 208 and v.IV, pp. 19–21; AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 65–69; Ministry of Information, RAF Middle East, pp. 41–43; John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp.371–375; and R.P. Hallion, Strike from the Sky, p. 159. 37. TNA AIR 41/26 The Middle East Campaigns, v.III, p. 197; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 375. 38. TNA AIR 41/26 The Middle East Campaigns, v.III, pp. 224–227; Ministry of Information RAF Middle East, pp. 72–82; AHB Translations of German documents as quoted in Vincent Orange, Coningham, p. 99; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 375–377. For a detailed narrative of the First Battle of Alamein see I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, pp. 331–360; James Lucas, War in the Desert, pp. 29–38; Barrie Pitt, Year of Alamein 1942, pp. 112–114, 202–204; and David Fraser, Knight’s Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, p. 347. Rommel’s own impressions can be read in B.H. Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers, pp. 243–253 and 327–329. 39. John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 376; and R.P. Hallion, Strike from the Sky, p. 160. 40. American air support included a Heavy Bombardment Group (35 B-24 Liberators), a Medium Bombardment Group (57 B-25 Mitchells), a Light Bombardment Squadron (27 A-29 Hudsons), and a Fighter Group (80 F-40 Kittyhawks). See I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, pp. 282–283. 41. TNA AIR 41/26 and 50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.III, p. 226 and v.IV, pp. 3–4, 6; AIR 19/557 Air Ministry Private Office Papers; John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 376–378; Vincent Orange, Coningham, pp. 102–104; and R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, pp. 93–97. For Rommel’s precarious supply situation, the strategic significance of Malta as a base from which to disrupt Axis shipping and the German High Command’s decision to forgo subjugating the island prior to the “final” conquest of Egypt, see: TNA AIR 41/26 and 50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.III, pp. iii, 130–131, 195 and v.IV, p. xxix; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, pp. 277–278, 325–330; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 368–369.

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42. Portal Papers, Box C, File VIII, No.21 (16 July 1942); and Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, p. 312. 43. Portal Papers, Box C, File VIII, No.24a (26 July 1942); Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 307, 314. 44. Portal Papers, Box C, File VIII, Nos.22a and 24a (25–26 July 1942); Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 318–327; Vincent Orange, Coningham, p. 106; Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals, pp. 231–239; and James Lucas, War in the Desert, p. 40. 45. Lord Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. (London, 1958), pp. 80–90, 99–100; Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Making of a General 1887–1942 (London, 1981), pp. 606–625; David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them, p. 234–238; Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals, pp. 257–262; and James Lucas, War in the Desert, p. 41. 46. Lord Montgomery, Memoirs p. 102; Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, p. 347; TNA AIR 20/2106 and 37/760 Report on Visit to the Middle East by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt, AOC Army Co-operation Command (August–September 1942); Vincent Orange, Coningham, pp. 106–107; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 378–379. 47. F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, v.II, p. 412. 48. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 70; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, p. 327; F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, v.II, p. 420; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 381. A detailed summary of WDAF operations is in TNA AIR 24/1662 ORP, Air HQ Western Desert (October 1941–March 1943). 49. Elmhirst Papers, 6/2 (vii, 14); and Vincent Orange, Coningham, p. 107. 50. For the tactics employed by the WDAF see: TNA AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.IV, pp. 161–166; AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 69–70; AIR 20/2106 and AIR 37/760 Report on visit to Middle East by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt; and Arthur Coningham, “The Development of Tactical Air Forces,” p. 214. 51. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 69; AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.IV, pp. 160–164; Lord Montgomery, Memoirs, pp. 108–109; and Vincent Orange, Coningham, p. 107. 52. B.H. Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers, pp. 276–286; Ronald Lewin, Rommel as Military Commander (London, 1968), p. 162; David Fraser, And We Shall Shock Them, pp. 236–237; and Knight’s Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, pp. 357–360. 53. The Luftwaffe frittered away its strength attempting to provide close support without first winning air superiority. See Vincent Orange, Coningham, p. 109; and Col. Andy Tjepkema, “Coningham,” p. 207. 54. For the WDAF’s air operations and their effect on Rommel’s army see: TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 70–72; AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.IV, pp. 177–178, 184–185, 191 and 213–221; Afrika Korps War Diary, AHB 6 Translation; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.III, pp. 387, 390; and B.H. Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers, pp. 276–286. 55. B.H. Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers, p. 285; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 383. 56. B.H. Liddell Hart, The Rommel Papers pp. 286. 57. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 69.

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58. TNA AIR 20/2106 and AIR 37/760 Report on visit to the Middle East by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Barratt. 59. Montgomery Papers, BLM 27, Reel 4; TNA AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns pp. 220-221; AIR 10/5547 Air Support p. 72; and Vincent Orange, Coningham, pp. 108–110. 60. A comparative Order of Battle for the British and the Axis forces in the Middle East in October 1942 is available in I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.IV, pp. 2–3, 7–13; and 35–36. For details on the respective air forces see D. Richards and H. Saunders, The Royal Air Force, v.II, p. 233. 61. Elmhirst Papers, 6/2 (vii, 19); Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, p. 355; Desmond Young, Rommel, pp. 258–259; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 378. 62. TNA AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.IV, pp. 243, 250; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.IV, pp. 3, 6; and Vincent Orange, Coningham, pp. 111–112. 63. Whilst the initial ground assault (Operation Lightfoot) was only partially successful, Montgomery’s revised offensive (Operation Supercharge) did achieve the desired outcome. Throughout both the WDAF maintained a state of overwhelming air superiority over the battle area. See: TNA AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.IV, pp. 258–259, 357–358; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.IV, pp. 77–79; and F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, v.II, pp. 438–448. 64. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 73; AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.IV, pp. 269, 271–272; Ministry of Information, RAF Middle East, pp. 102–111; and I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.IV, pp. 62–63, 78. 65. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 73–74; Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 359–361; Lord Montgomery, Memoirs, pp. 122, 137–138; and I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.IV, pp. 32–33. 66. R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939–1945, pp. 106–107, 111–112; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.IV, pp. 65–75; and W.S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (London, 1951), p. 541. 67. For detailed narratives of these events see I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.IV, chapters III and IV; James Lucas, War in the Desert, pp. 49– 261; Barrie Pitt, Year of Alamein 1942, chapters 8 through 12; Lord Montgomery, Memoirs, pp. 116–169; Niall Barr, Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein; Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 353–417; and C.B. MacDonald, The Mighty Endeavour (Oxford, 1969). Air operations are addressed, in detail, in TNA AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.IV, chapters 8–12; AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 73–91; Ministry of Information, RAF Middle East, pp. 72–143, P. Guedalla, Middle East 1940–1942: A Study in Air Power, pp. 202–214; D. Richards and H. Saunders, The Royal Air Force 1939–1945, v.II, pp. 217–243; John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 378–400; and R.T. Bickers, The Desert Air War 1939– 1945, pp. 105–134. 68. I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.IV, pp. 33–34, 76; MRAF Sir Arthur Tedder, “Air, Land and Sea Warfare,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institute, v.XCI, n.561, February 1946, pp. 59–68; AM Sir Arthur Coningham, “The Development of Tactical Air Forces,” pp. 214–215; and David Fraser, Knight’s Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, pp. 369, 375.

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69. Portal Papers, Box C, File VIII, Nos.29, 30, 31a, 31b, and 32, Tedder to Portal: Middle East Situation Reports (9 September–23 November 1942); and Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, p. 359. 70. TNA AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.IV, pp. 417–421; AIR 23/904 Overseas Command HQ WDAF; Portal Papers, File 12, No.11, Tedder to Portal (22 October 1942) and Box C, File VIII, No.32 Tedder to Portal (15 November 1942); Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 357–360, 366; and Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals, p. 310. 71. The spirit of co-operation continued during the Sicilian and Italian campaigns, although it was less wholehearted in North-West Europe. See Vincent Orange, Coningham, pp. 177–181; and Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (London, 1952), pp. 340–341. 72. John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 391; and I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.IV, p. 313. 73. The RAF component under Air Marshal Sir William Walsh was designated Eastern Air Command. It covered Algeria east of Cap-Tenes and provided support for the newly created 1st Army (a combined British and American force). The US Twelfth Air Force under Major-General James H. Doolittle, entitled Western Air Command, supported Major-General Lloyd Fredendall’s American II Corps in western Algeria and the American forces of Major-General George S. Patton, Jr. in Morocco. See: W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, v.2, pp. 41–66; George F. Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West (Washington, 1957), pp. 32–88; and I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.IV, pp. 110–128. 74. Daniel R. Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations, pp. 53, 56; W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, v.2, pp. 67–85; and David Syrett, “The Tunisian Campaign, 1942–43” in B.F. Cooling (ed.) Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support (Washington, 1990), p. 164. 75. Richard P. Hallion, Strike from the Sky, p. 163. 76. John Terraine, The Right of the Line, pp. 390–391; Daniel Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations, pp. 50–56; and Vincent Orange, Coningham, p. 130. 77. TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support p. 83; Daniel Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations, p. 59; and David Syrett, “The Tunisian Campaign, 1942–43,” pp. 164– 167. 78. Col. Andy Tjepkema, “Coningham,” p. 210. 79. Daniel Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations, pp. 59, 62. 80. TNA AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.IV, p. 471; and Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, p. 369. 81. Daniel Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations, p. 61; and Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, p. 381. 82. Portal Papers, Folder 4, No.1, Trenchard’s Memorandum on United Air Command (20 December 1942) and Box C, File VIII, No.34 Tedder to Portal (16 December 1942); and Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 369–370. 83. Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, p. 381. 84. Portal Papers, Folder 4, Nos.1, 1a (December 1942); Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 370–373; and John Terraine, The Right of the Line, p. 392. See also MRAF Sir Arthur Tedder, “Air, Land and Sea Warfare,” JRUSI, v.CXI, n.561, February 1946, pp. 59–68 and Air Power in War, passim.

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85. General Spaatz was appointed C-in-C of the Allied Air Forces in North-West Africa on 5 January 1943, but not until 18 February was his new command made operational. See I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.IV, pp. 265 and 271. 86. For full details on the restructuring of the Allied air forces in North Africa and the Mediterranean, including the major command appointments, see TNA AIR 8/1035 Combined Chiefs of Staff, System of Air Command in the Mediterranean (20 January 1943); AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 85–88; AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.IV, pp. 469–477; I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.IV, pp. 306–313; and David Syrett, “The Tunisian Campaign, 1942–43,” pp. 165–172. 87. For Rommel’s surprise westward offensive toward the Kasserine Pass and the ignominious defeat of the US II Corps see Martin Blumenson, Kasserine Pass (Boston, 1967). 88. Daniel Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations, pp. 72–73; R.P. Hallion, Strike from the Sky, pp. 171–172; David Syrett, “The Tunisian Campaign, 1942– 43,” p. 74; Laurence S. Kuter, “Goddammit Georgie: North Africa, 1943: The Birth of TAC Doctrine,” Air Force Magazine, v.91 (February 1973); and Vincent Orange, Coningham, pp. 135–142. George Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, pp. 492–495 gives the army view of reorganisation. For details on the creation of the 18th Army Group see I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, v.IV, pp. 303–305. 89. Daniel Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations, pp. 72–73; Arthur Coningham, “The Development of Tactical Air Forces,” pp. 215; and David Syrett, “The Tunisian Campaign, 1942–43,” pp. 174, 178–179. 90. US War Department, Field Manual FM 100–20, Command and Employment of Air Power (21 July 1943), pp. 1, 10–11; Daniel Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations, pp. 77–83; R.P. Hallion, Strike from the Sky, pp. 172–175; and Robert Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force (Alabama, 1974), p. 69. 91. The eminent British diplomatic historian, D.C. Watt, unfortunately is mistaken in his claim that the British copied the American air support doctrine in 1943. See D.C. Watt, Too Serious A Business, p. 69; C.E. Carrington, “Army/Air Cooperation, 1939–1943,” p. 40; Soldier at Bomber Command, p. 11; and Carrington Papers, 81/11/6 Army/Air Co-operation. 92. US War Department Field Manual 100–20, Command and Employment of Air Power (21 July 1943); and William R. Burt, Adventures With Warlords (New York, 1994) pp. 147–148. 93. TNA AIR 23/1709 Overseas Commands: Tripoli—Address by Air ViceMarshal Sir Arthur Coningham to British and American Generals and other senior officers (16 February 1943). Both Eisenhower and Tedder attended Coningham’s lecture. See also Vincent Orange, Coningham, p. 134. 94. TNA AIR 20/4582 “Air Power in the Land Battle” Pamphlet (FebruaryJuly 1943). See also AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.IV, pp. 478– 481. 95. TNA AIR 41/50 The Middle East Campaigns, v.IV, p. 479; Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 397–401; and Vincent Orange, Coningham, p. 134.

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96. Montgomery unfortunately forgot his own pronouncements on this subject during the campaign in North-West Europe. See Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 552–563; and Vincent Orange, Coningham, pp. 199–207, 217–218. 97. TNA AIR 20/4582 ‘Air Power in the Land Battle’ Pamphlet (February–July 1943). 98. Robin Barrington-Ward Papers, Diary entry 17 May 1945. Similar testaments in the published biographies, diaries, and memoirs of a host of senior German commanders, including Kesselring, Rommel, von Mellenthin, and von Rundstedt, just to name a few of the more prominent ones, give more than ample credence to Montgomery’s view.

CHAPTER 10 1. TNA AIR 16/517 Fighters fitted to carry bombs (April 1941–May 1942); AIR 16/695 Hurricane bomber Aircraft (August 1941–February 1943); AIR 16/805 Employment of Typhoon Aircraft (June 1942–December 1943); Carrington Papers 81/11/6; B. Greenhous, S. Harris, et al., The Crucible of War, 1939–1945, pp. 200–201; Sholto Douglas, Years of Command, pp. 159–160 and 162; Lee Asher, Air Power, pp. 119–120; and W.A. Jacobs, “Air Support for the British Army 1939– 1943,” p. 177. 2. TNA AIR 16/776 Memorandum from AOC-in-C Fighter Command, “Army Air Support, Role and Training of Fighter Squadrons” (3 January 1942); and AIR 8/984 Memorandum from AOC-in-C Fighter Command to CAS on “The Part Played by Fighter Command in Co-operation with the Army during Recent Months” (11 September 1942). 3. TNA WO 277/34 Army Air Support, pp. 56–57; and C.E. Carrington, “Army/Air Co-operation 1939–1945,” p. 41. 4. W.A. Jacobs, “Air Support for the British Army 1939–1943,” p. 177; and B. Greenhous, S. Harris, et al., The Crucible of War, 1939–1945, p. 227. 5. TNA AIR 16/776 Stockley, G.1(L) to Carr, (August 1942). 6. TNA AIR 16/552 GHQ Directive on Training in Co-operation with the RAF (30 April 1942); AIR 16/776 “A Summary of Recent Exercises within Fighter Command” (August 1942); and B. Greenhous, S. Harris, et al., The Crucible of War, 1939–1945, pp. 229–230. 7. TNA AIR 20/829 Training the Air Force for Combined Operations (January 1942 - February 1943); AIR 16/852 Exercise “Spartan”: 2 Group Reports (February-March 1943); B. Greenhous, S. Harris, et al., The Crucible of War, 1939–1945, pp. 229–230; and C.E. Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command, pp. 100–101. 8. A total of forty-one squadrons were deployed for Exercise Spartan. For the complete RAF order of battle in this exercise see TNA AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 40. See also TNA AIR 39/91 Exercise “Spartan”: General Arrangements (January–March 1943); AIR 20/2620 Exercise “Spartan”: Composite Group Formation (March–May 1943); WO 199/813 GHQ Exercise: Spartan (December 1942–March 1943); WO 277/34 Army Air Support, p. 60; C.E. Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command, pp. 110–113; and Chapter VIII above, pages 123–127. 9. TNA AIR 16/559 Exercise “Spartan”: GHQ Home Forces Combined Exercise (December 1942–March 1943); AIR 2/7808 GHQ Home Forces Exercise Spartan:

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Reports and Lessons (1943); AIR 39/118 Exercise “Spartan”: Reports (March–May 1943); and C.E. Carrington, Soldier at Bomber Command, pp. 113–114. See also TNA AIR 20/4096 “The Unified Air Force” report by Maurice Dean (1942). 10. TNA WO 199/816 Exercise “Spartan”: Narrative of Events (March 1943); WO 199/234 GHQ Exercise “Spartan”: Lessons (March–April 1943); AIR 39/128 Exercise “Spartan”: Report (March 1943); and AIR 10/5547 Air Support, p. 41. 11. TNA CAB 80/68 COS(43)149(0) (23 March 1943); and CAB 79/26 COS(43)74 Mtg (24 March 1943). 12. TNA AIR 20/4582 “Air Power in the Land Battle” Pamphlet (February 1943). See also Chapter IX above, pages 144–145. 13. TNA AIR 29/2490 Tedder to Portal (17 February 1943). 14. TNA WO 193/679 DCIGS to CIGS (5 April 1943). 15. Corresponding arrangements for American Army and Air Groups, and their relationship with British and Canadian forces, have been left out of this discussion. They can be read in W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, v.2, pp. 631–664; and R.P. Hallion, Strike from the Sky, pp. 188–199. See also Thomas Alexander Hughes, “Air Lines. Anglo-American Tactical Air Operations in World War II,” Air & Space Power Journal, v.XVIII, no.4 (Winter 2004), pp. 34–45. 16. TNA CAB 80/69 COS(43)224(0) 29 April 1943; CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, pp. 75–76; and AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 41–43. 17. TNA CAB 80/69 COS(43)224(0) 29 April 1943; and CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation pp. 75–76. A comprehensive Order of Battle of Army Co-operation Command throughout the war is in TNA AIR 20/327 Army Co-operation Command (1940–1943). 18. TNA CAB 79/60 COS(43)91(0) 1 May 1943; and CAB 101/136 Army-Air Co-operation, p. 76. 19. TNA AIR 16/566 Fusion of Army Co-operation Command with Fighter Command (May 1943). 20. The 1st Tactical Air Force was in fact the Western Desert Air Force, although the title was never used officially. By naming the new UK air formation the 2nd Tactical Air Force, however, the Air Staff honoured the invaluable work of the WDAF in developing an effective air support system. 21. TNA AIR 2/7808 Tactical Air Force Command: Formation in the United Kingdom (1943); AIR 8/988 Tactical Air Force: Formation (May-October 1943); AIR 10/5547 Air Support, pp. 43–45; M.J.F. Bowyer, 2 Group RAF (London, 1974), p. 316; and C.F. Shores, 2nd TAF, pp. 1–2. The Canadian contribution to the formation of the 2nd Tactical Air Force is described in B. Greenhous, S. Harris, et al., The Crucible of War, 1939–1945, pp. 248–264. 22. For a comprehensive Order of Battle of 2nd TAF throughout the war see C.F. Shores, 2nd TAF passim. 23. TNA AIR 37/644 British 21st Army Group Report: “Spectacular Examples of Massed Artillery and Air Bombardment” (March 1945); AIR 20/6344 and 6345 Drafts of Coningham’s Despatch: 2nd TAF’s part in Overlord (1945–1946); AIR 37/760 2nd TAF Miscellaneous Reports; and Lord Tedder, With Prejudice, pp. 585, 606–608, 687–688. See also B. Greenhous, S. Harris, et al., The Crucible of War, 1939–1945, chapters 9 and 10; Vincent Orange, Coningham, pp. 194–238; and L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West, v.I, passim and pp. 484–488, and v.II, passim. With

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the creation of the 2nd Tactical Air Force the conceptual problems of meeting the Army’s air support requirements had been more or less sorted out. Arrangements for the provision of continuous and effective support, and a clash of personalities between some of the leading airmen and soldiers, were two main sources of interservice tension and dispute from the Normandy landings through to the end of the war. For additional critical assessments of RAF air support during this period see: Robert Vogel, “Tactical Air Power in Normandy: Some Thoughts on the Interdiction Plan,” Canadian Military History, v.3, no.1 (Spring 1994), pp. 37–47; Mike Bechthold, “Tactical Air Power: Its Effectiveness During the Normandy Campaign, The Evidence of Operational Research,” Journal of the Canadian Aviation Historical Society Part I (Spring 1993), pp. 12–21; Part II (Summer 1993), pp. 54–59, 68; Ian Gooderson, “Heavy and Medium Bombers: How Successful Were They in the Tactical Close Air Support Role During World War II” and “Allied Fighter-Bombers versus German Armour in North-West Europe 1944–1945: Myths and Realities,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, v.15, no.3 (September 1992), pp. 367–399, and v.14, no.2 (June 1991), pp. 210–231; W.A. Jacobs, “Air Command in the United Kingdom, 1943–44,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, v.11, no.1 (March 1988), pp. 51–78; and Terry Copp and Robert Vogel, “Anglo-Canadian Tactical Air Power in Normandy: A Reassessment,” Virginia: American Military Institute (unpublished, 1987).

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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES (UNPUBLISHED) Government Records, The National Archives (Public Records Office) of the United Kingdom, Kew Royal Air Force Papers AIR 1 – Air Historical Branch (AHB, RAF) Records: Series I AIR 2 – Registered Correspondence AIR 5 – Air Historical Branch: Papers (Series II) AIR 6 – Air Board and Air Council AIR 8 – Chief of the Air Staff AIR 9 – Director of Plans AIR 10 – Air Publications AIR 14 – Bomber Command AIR 16 – Fighter Command AIR 19 – Secretaries of State for Air: Private Office Papers AIR 20 – Unregistered Papers AIR 24 – Operations Record Books: Commands AIR 26 – Operations Record Books: Wings AIR 23 – Overseas Commands AIR 34 – Central Interpretation Unit AIR 35 – British Air Forces in France (BAFF) AIR 36 – Air Component North West Expeditionary Force (Norway) AIR 37 – Allied Expeditionary Air Force and 2nd Tactical Air Force AIR 39 – Army Co-operation Command AIR 40 – Directorate of Intelligence AIR 41 – Air Historical Branch (AHB) Narratives and Monographs AIR 47 – Operation Torch: Planning Papers

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AIR 69 – Papers of the Royal Air Force (RAF) Staff College AIR 75 – Marshal of the Royal Air Force (RAF) Sir John Slessor: Papers

Cabinet Office Papers CAB 2 – Committee of Imperial Defence: Minutes and Memoranda CAB 16 – Committee of Imperial Defence Ad Hoc Committees: Minutes and Memoranda CAB 17 – Committee of Imperial Defence: Miscellaneous Correspondence and Memoranda (1906–1916) CAB 24 – War Cabinet and Cabinet: Memoranda CAB 44 – Narratives for the Official Histories CAB 53 – Chiefs of Staff Committee: Minutes and Memoranda (1924–1939) CAB 56 – Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee: Minutes and Memoranda CAB 65 – War Cabinet Minutes and Conclusions (1939–1945) CAB 66 – War Cabinet Memoranda CAB 69 – War Cabinet: Defence Committee (Operations): Minutes and Papers CAB 79 – Chiefs of Staff Minutes and Conclusions (1939–1943) CAB 80 – Chiefs of Staff Memoranda (1939–1943) CAB 92 – Miscellaneous CAB 101 – Official War Histories (Second World War, Military) CAB 103 – Historical Section: Registered Files CAB 106 – Cabinet Office: Historical Section Files (Archivists and Librarian Series) CAB 120 – Minister of Defence: Secretariat Files

Ministry of Defence Papers DEFE 2 – Combined Operations Headquarters: Reports

Prime Minister’s Papers PREM 1 – Prime Minister’s Private Office: Correspondence and Papers to 1940 PREM 3 – Prime Minister’s Private Office: Operational Papers PREM 4 – Prime Minister’s Private Office: Confidential Papers

War Office Papers WO 32 – Registered Papers WO 33 – ‘O’ and ‘A’ Papers WO 106 – Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence WO 163 – War Office Council and Army Council Records WO 165 – War Office Directorate War Diaries (1939–1945) WO 166 – UK Home Forces War Diaries WO 190 – Directorate of Military Operations: Appreciation Files WO 193 – Directorate of Military Operations: Collation Files WO 197 – War of 1939–1945 Military HQ Papers: British Expeditionary Force in France WO 199 – War of 1939–1945 Military HQ Papers: Home Forces

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WO 201 – War of 1939–1945 Military HQ Papers: Middle East Forces WO 208 – Directorate of Military Intelligence WO 216 – Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) Papers WO 231 – Directorate of Military Training WO 232 – Directorate of Tactical Investigation WO 233 – Directorate of Air WO 259 – Secretary of State for War: Private Office Papers WO 277 – War Office Historical Monographs: War of 1939–1945 WO 287 – Confidential Printed Papers (B-Papers)

Private Papers Air Historical Branch (RAF), London Papers of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor

Christ Church, Oxford Papers of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Viscount Portal

Churchill College Archives, Cambridge University Papers of Air Marshal Sir Thomas Elmhirst Papers of Sir James Grigg

Department of Documents, Imperial War Museum, London Enemy Document Series (EDS) Papers Papers of Field Marshal Viscount Bernard Law Montgomery of Alamein Papers of Lieutenant Colonel Charles E Carrington Papers of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Douglas

House of Lords, London Papers of Lord Beaverbrook

Liddell Hart Centre For Military Archives, King’s College London Papers of Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham Papers of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke Papers of General Sir Lionel Hastings Ismay Papers of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart

Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon Papers of Air Chief Marshal Sir Douglas Evill Papers of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder Papers of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Trenchard

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PRIMARY SOURCES (PUBLISHED) Command Papers Various

Official Histories First World War Raleigh, Sir Walter and H.A. Jones. The War in the Air. 6 vols. and appendices. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1922–1937.

Second World War United Kingdom, Military Series Butler, J.R.M. Grand Strategy. Vol. II. London: HMSO 1957. Collier, Basil. The Defence of the United Kingdom. London: HMSO, 1957. Ellis, L.F. The War in France and Flanders. London: HMSO, 1953. ———. Victory in the West. Vols. I–II. London: HMSO, 1962–1968. Gibbs, N.H. Grand Strategy. Vol. I. London: HMSO, 1976. Hinsley, F.H. British Intelligence in the Second World War. Vols. I–II. London: HMSO, 1979, 1981. Playfair, I.S.O. The Mediterranean and Middle East. Vols. I–IV. London: HMSO, 1954–1966. Webster, Sir Charles and Noble Frankland. The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1919–1945. 4 vols. London: HMSO, 1961.

United Kingdom Civil Series Postan, M.M. British War Production London: HMSO, 1952.

Canadian Douglas, W.A.B. “The Creation of a National Air Force.” The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force. Vol. II. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986. Greenhous, Brereton, Stephen J. Harris, W. Johnston, and W. Rawlings. “The Crucible of War, 1939–1945.” The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force. Vol. III. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994. Wise, S.F. “Canadian Airmen and the First World War.” The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force. Vol. I. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980.

German Boog, Horst, Jurgen Forster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Muller, and Gerd R. Ueberschar. “The Attack on the Soviet Union.” Germany and the Second World War. Vol. IV. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.

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Boog, Horst, Werner Rahn, Reinhard Stumpf, and Bernd Wegner. “The Global War: Widening of the Conflict into a World War and the Shift of the Initiative 1941– 1943.” Germany and the Second World War. Vol. VI. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. Maier, Klaus A., Horst Rohde, Bernd Stegemann, and Hans Umbreit. “Germany’s Initial Conquests in Europe.” Germany and the Second World War. Vol. II. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Schreiber, Gerhard, Bernd Stegemann, and Detlef Vogel. “The Mediterranean, SouthEast Europe, and North Africa 1939–1941.” Germany and the Second World War. Vol. III. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.

United States of America Craven, W.H. and J.L. Cate. The Army Air Forces in World War II. 7 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948–1958.

Official Monographs, Field Manuals, and Reports United Kingdom Air Ministry (A.H.B.). Air Support. Royal Air Force. Air Publication 3235. London, 1955. Ministry of Information. RAF Middle East: The Official Story of Air Operations in the Middle East, from February 1942 to January 1943. London: HMSO, 1945.

United States of America Deichmann, General der Flieger Paul. German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army. USAF Historical Studies No. 163. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University, 1962. Greer, Thomas H. The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917– 1941. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1955, 1985. Kuter, Laurence S. “Organisation of American Air Forces.” End of Tour Report. U.S. Army Air Forces, May 12, 1943. ———. “Lessons in Air Force Organisation Learned from the North African War.” Pentagon Press Statement. Air Force Historical Research Agency. Microfilm 614.505 May 22, 1943. Maurer, M. Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919–1939. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1988. Mortensen, Daniel R. A Pattern for Joint Operations: World War II Close Air Support North Africa. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History and U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987. U.S. War Department. “Aviation in Support of Ground Forces.” Field Manual FM 31–35, April 9, 1942. ———.“Employment of Aviation with the Army.” Field Manual FM 1–5, January 18, 1943. ———. “Command and Employment of Air Power.” Field Manual FM 100–20, July 21, 1943.

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Contemporary Newspapers (United Kingdom) The Daily Mail The Daily Telegraph The Evening Standard The Times

Diaries, Memoirs, Journals, and Accounts Amery, Leo. The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries 1929–1945. John Barnes and David Nicholson (eds.). London: Hutchinson, 1988. Bond, Brian (ed.). Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall, 1933–1940. Vol. I. London: Leo Cooper, 1972. Chatfield, Lord. It Might Happen Again. London: Heinemann, 1947. Churchill, W.S. “The Gathering Storm.” The Second World War. Vol. I. London: Cassell, 1948. ———. “Their Finest Hour.” The Second World War. Vol. II. London: Cassell, 1949. ———. “The Grand Alliance.” The Second World War. Vol. III. London: Cassell, 1950. ———. “The Hinge of Fate.” The Second World War. Vol. IV. London: Cassell, 1951. Cot, Pierre. Triumph of Treason. Chicago: Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 1944. Douglas, W. Sholto. Years of Combat: A Personal Story of the First World War in the Air. London: Collins, 1963. ———. Years of Command. London: Collins, 1966. Guderian, Major-General Heinz. Panzer Leader. London: Michael Joseph, 1952. ———. Achtung! Panzer! Christopher Duffy (trans). London: Arms and Armour, 1992. Guedalla, Philip. Middle East 1940–1942: A Study in Air Power. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1944. Ironside, Field Marshal Sir Edmund. Time Unguarded: The Ironside Diaries 1937–1940. Roderick Macleod and Denis Kelly (eds.). London: Constable, 1962. Ismay, H.L. The Memoirs of Lord Ismay. London: Heinemann, 1960. Jolly, Cyril. Take These Men: British Armour in the Desert 1940–1943. London: Constable, 1955. Kesselring, Field Marshal Albrecht. The Memoirs of Field Marshal Kesselring. London: Kimber, 1953. Manstein, Erich von. Aus einem Soldatenleben 1887–1939. Bonn: Athenaum-Verlag, ¨ 1958. Mellenthin, F.W. von. Panzer Battles. London: Cassell, 1955. ———. German Generals of World War II: As I Saw Them. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977. Mirande, Henri and Louis Olivier. Sur la bataille. journal d’un aviateur françcais a` ´ l’Armée bulgare au siège d’Andrinople. Paris: L’Edition moderne, 1913. Montgomery, Lord. The Memoirs of Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G. London: Collins, 1958.

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¨ im Weltkrieg. Berlin: E.S. Mittler Neumann, Georg P. Die Deutschen Luftstreitkrafte und Sohn, 1920. Portal, Air Commodore C.F.A. “British Air Control in Underdeveloped Areas.” In Eugene Emme (ed.), The Impact of Air Power. Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1959. Rommel, Erwin. The Rommel Papers. B.H. Liddell Hart (ed.). London: Collins, 1953. Slessor, Sir John. The Central Blue. London: Cassell, 1956. Slessor, Wing Commander J.C. Air Power and Armies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936. ¨ zu! Der Luftkrieg in Polen. Berlin: Im Deutschen Supf, Peter Luftwaffe schlagt Verlag, 1939. ———. Luftwaffe von Sieg zu Sieg. Berlin: Im Deutschen Verlag, 1941a. ———. Der Luftkrieg in Polen, ein bilderwerk. Berlin: Junker und Dunnhaupt, ¨ 1941b. Tedder, Lord. Air Power in War. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1948. ———. With Prejudice. The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder. London: Cassell, 1966.

Contemporary Articles Carrington, C.E. “Army/Air Co-operation, 1939–1943.” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute CXV(660) (December 1970): 37–41. Chamier, Wg Cdr J.A. “The Use of Air Power for Replacing Military Garrisons.” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute LXVI(462) (May 1921): 205–216. Coningham, Air Marshal Sir Arthur. “The Development of Tactical Air Forces.” Journal of the Royal United Service Institute XCI(562) (May 1946): 211–226. Drummond, Air Marshal Sir Peter. “The Air Campaign in Libya and Tripolitania.” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute LXXXVIII(552) (November 1943): 249–266. Gossage, Air Vice Marshal E.L. “Air Power and Its Employment.” Part I. The Development of Air Power. The Aeroplane 52(1345) (3 March 1937): 249–250. Gossage, Wg Cmd E.L. “Air Co-operation with the Army.” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute LXXII(487) (August 1927): 561–578. Leigh-Mallory, Wing Commander T.L. “Air Co-operation with Mechanised Forces.” Journal of the Royal United Service Institute LXXV(499) (August 1930): 565– 577. Pile, Lt Col F.A. “The Army’s Air Needs.” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute LXXI(484) (November 1926): 725–727. Samson, Air Commodore C.R. “Aeroplanes and Armies.” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute LXXV(500) (November 1930): 676–680. Tedder, MRAF Sir Arthur. “Air, Land and Sea Warfare.” Journal of the Royal United Service Institute XCI(561) (February 1946): 59–68. Trenchard, Air Marshal Sir Hugh. “Aspects of Service Aviation.” The Army Quarterly 2(1) (April 1921): 10–21. Wavell, Brigadier A.P. “The Army and the Prophets.” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute LXXV(500) (November 1930): 665–675.

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SECONDARY SOURCES Books and Monographs Asher, Lee. Air Power. London: Gerald Duckworth, 1955. Barnett, Correlli. The Desert Generals. 2nd ed. London: Allen and Unwin, 1983. Barr, Niall. Pendulum of War: The Three Battles of El Alamein. London: Jonathon Cape, 2004. Bickers, Richard Townshend. The Desert Air War 1939–1945. London: Leo Cooper, 1991. Bidwell, Shelford and Dominick Graham. Fire Power. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982. Blumenson, Martin. Kasserine Pass. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967. Bond, Brian (ed.). British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars. Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1980. ——— France and Belgium 1939–1940. London: Davis-Poynter, 1975; and 2nd edition, Brassey’s, 1990. ———. The First World War and British Military History. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Boog, Horst (ed.). Conduct of the Air War in the Second World War. Oxford: Berg, 1991. Bowyer, M.J.F. 2 Group RAF. London: Faber, 1974, 1979. Boyle, Andrew. Trenchard. London: Collins, 1962. Bryant, Arthur. The Turn of the Tide 1939–1943. London: Collins, 1957. ———. Triumph in the West 1943–1946. London: Collins, 1959. Burt, William R. Adventures With Warlords. New York: Vantage Press, 1994. Caffrey, Kate. Combat Report: The RAF and the Fall of France. Swindon, Wiltshire: Crowood Press, 1990. Campbell, J.P. Dieppe Revisited: A Documentary Investigation. London: Frank Cass, 1993. Carrington, C.E. Soldier at Bomber Command. London: Leo Cooper, 1987. Carver, Michael T. Dilemmas of the Desert War: A New Look at the Libyan Campaign 1940–1942. London: Batsford, 1986. ———. Apostles of Mobility. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979. Clark, Alan. The Donkeys. London: Hutchinson, 1961. Colville, Sir John. Gort: Man of Valour: The Life of Field Marshal the Viscount Gort, VC, GCB, DSO. London: Collins, 1972. Congdon, Philip. Per Ardua Ad Astra. Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1987. Connell, John. Auchinleck: A Biography of Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck. London: Cassell, 1959. ———. Wavell: Scholar and Soldier. London: Collins, 1964. Cooling, B.F. (ed.). Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1990. Cooper, Malcolm. The Birth of Independent Air Power. London: Allen and Unwin, 1986. Corum, James S. The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1997.

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Cox, Sebastian and Peter Gray (ed.). Air Power History. Turning Points from Kitty Hawk to Kosovo. London: Frank Cass, 2002. Crang, Jeremy A. The British Army and the People’s War 1939–1945. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000. Danchev, Alex and Daniel Todman (eds.). War Diaries, 1939–1945: Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001. Dean, Sir Maurice. The Royal Air Force and Two World Wars. London: Cassell, 1979. Deichmann, Paul. Spearhead for Blitzkrieg: Luftwaffe Operations in Support of the Army 1939–1945. London: Greenhill Books, 1996. Ferris, John R. The Evolution of British Strategic Policy 1919–1926. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989. Fleming, Peter. Invasion 1940: An Account of the German Preparations and the British Counter Measures. London: R. Hart-Davis, 1957. Franks, Norman. The Greatest Air Battle: Dieppe, 19th August 1942. London: Kimber, 1979. Fraser, General Sir David. Alanbrooke. London: Collins, 1982. ———. And We Shall Shock Them. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983. ———. Knight’s Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. London: Harper Collins, 1993. French, David. Raising Churchill’s Army. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Futrell, Robert. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1971, 1989. Gilbert, Martin. Winston Churchill. Vol. IV (1917–1922). London: Heinemann, 1975. . Winston Churchill. Vol. V (1922–1939). London: Heinemann, 1976. . Winston Churchill. Vol. VI (Finest Hour, 1939–1941). London: Heinemann, 1983. . Winston Churchill. Vol. VII (Road to Victory, 1941–1945). London: Heinemann, 1986. Gollin, Alfred. The Impact of Air Power on the British People and their Government 1909–1914. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989. Gooderson, Ian. Air power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support in NorthWest Europe, 1943–1945. London: Frank Cass, 1998. Hallion, Richard P. Strike from the Sky. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989. Hamilton, Nigel. Monty: The Making of a General 1887–1942. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1981. ———. Monty: Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944. London: Hamish Hamiltion, 1983. Holloway, Peter. Desert Wings: A Hurricane Pilot in the Western Desert. Penmaenmawr: Melverley, 2001. Holmes, Richard. The Little Field Marshal: Sir John French. London: Cape, 1981. Horne, Alistar. To Lose A Battle: France 1940. London: Macmillan, 1969. Howard, Michael E. (ed.). The Theory and Practice of War. London: Cassell, 1965. ———. The Continental Commitment. London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1972.

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Howe, George F. Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1957. Hughes, Thomas Alexander. Over Lord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II. New York: Free Press, 1995. Hyde, H. Montgomery. British Air Policy Between the Wars. London: Heinemann, 1976. Ireland, Bernard. The War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943. London: Arms and Armour, 1993. Jones, Neville. The Beginning of Strategic Air Power. London: Frank Cass, 1987. Keegan, John (ed.). Churchill’s Generals. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1991. Larson, Robert H. The British Army and the Theory of Armoured Warfare, 1918– 1940. Newark, NJ: University of Delaware Press, 1984. Lewin, Ronald. Rommel as Military Commander. London: Batsford, 1968. Liddell Hart, B.H. The Memoirs of Captain Liddell Hart. 2 vols. London: Cassell, 1965. ———. History of the Second World War. London: Cassell, 1970. Lodi, Angelo. Storia delle origini dell’ aeronautica militare 1884–1915: aerostieri, Dirigibilisti, Aviatore dell’ Esercito e della Marina in Italia nel Periodico Pionieristico. Rome: Ateneo and Bizzarri, 1961. Lucas, James. War in the Desert: The Eight Army at El Alamein. London: Arms and Armour, 1982. MacDonald, C.B. The Mighty Endeavour. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Macksey, Kenneth. Rommel: Battles and Campaigns. London: Arms and Armour, 1979. Mason, R.A. The Royal Air Force Staff College 1922–1972. Bracknell: RAF Staff College, 1972. McCarthy, John. Australia and Imperial Defence 1918–1939: A Study in Air and Sea Power. St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1976. McKercher, B.J.C. Transition of Power: Britain’s Loss of Global Pre-Eminence to the United States, 1930–1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Mead, Peter. The Eye in the Air. London: HMSO, 1983. Meilinger, Philip S. (ed.). The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Air Power Theory. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1997. Messenger, Charles. The Art of Blitzkrieg. London: Ian Allan, 1976. ———. The Last Prussian: A Biography of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt 1875–1953. London: Brassey’s, 1991. Millett, Allan R. and Williamson. Murray (eds.). Military Effectiveness. 3 vols. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988. Mitchell, B.R. Abstract of British Historical Statistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962. Moorehead, Alan. The Desert War. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1965; Sphere 1989. Mortensen, Daniel R. (ed.). Airpower and Ground Armies. Essays on the Evolution of Anglo-American Air Doctrine 1940–1943. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1998. Murray, Williamson. Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933–1945. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1983.

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———. Luftwaffe. London: Allen and Unwin, 1985. ———. German Military Effectiveness. Baltimore, Maryland: Nautical and Aviation Publishing Co. of America, 1992. Naveh, Shimon. In Pursuit of Military Excellence. London: Frank Cass, 1997. Omissi, David E. Air Power and Colonial Control. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990. O’Neill, Robert J. The German Army and the Nazi Party, 1933–1939. London: Cassell, 1966. Orange, Vincent. Coningham. London: Methuen, 1990. ———. Tedder. London: Frank Cass, 2004. Overy, Richard. The Air War 1939–1945. London: Europa, 1980. ———. Goering: The ‘Iron Man’. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984. Parker, R.A.C. Sturggle for Survival. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Pitt, Barrie. The Crucible of War. London: Cape, 1980. ———. Year of Alamein 1942. London: Macmillan, 1986. Powers, Barry D. Strategy Without Slide Rule. London: Croom Helm, 1976. RAF Historical Society (ed.). The End of the Beginning. Symposium Proceedings on Land/Air Co-operation in the Mediterranean War 1940–1943. Bracknell Paper No. 3, 20 March 1992. Richards, Denis. Portal of Hungerford. London: Heinemann, 1977. Richards, Denis and Hilary Saunders. The Royal Air Force 1939–1945. 3 vols. London: HMSO, 1953–1954. Robertson, W. Scot. The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine 1919– 1939. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1995. Sheffield, G.D. and G. Till (eds.). The Challenge of High Command in the British Armed Forces. London: Macmillan, 2003. Shores, Christopher F. 2nd TAF. Reading: Osprey, 1970. Slessor, Sir John C. These Remain. London: Joseph, 1969. Smith, Malcolm. British Air Strategy Between the Wars. Oxford: Clarendon, 1984. Smith, Peter C. Close Air Support. Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1990. Terraine, John. The Right of the Line. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985. Till, Geoffrey. Air Power and the Royal Navy 1914–1945. London: Macdonald and Jane’s, 1979. Villa, Brian. Unauthorised Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid. (New ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, 1989. Watt, D.C. Personalities and Policies: Studies in the formation of British foreign policy in the twenties. London: Longmans, 1965. ———. Too Serious A Business: European Armed Forces and the Approach to the Second World War. London: Temple Smith, 1975. Wheatley, Ronald. Operation Sealion. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958. Whitaker, Brigadier-General Denis and Shelagh Whitaker. Dieppe: Tragedy to Triumph. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1992. Willmott, H.P. The Great Crusade. London: Joseph, 1989. Wilmot, Chester. The Struggle for Europe. London: Collins, 1952. Wilson, Trevor. The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War 1914–1918. Cambridge: Polity, 1986.

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Winter, Denis. The First of the Few: Fighter Pilots of the First World War. London: Allen Lane, 1982. Winton, Harold. To Change an Army. London: Brassey’s Defence, 1988. Wright, Robert. Dowding and the Battle of Britain. London: Macdonald and Co., 1969. Young, Desmond. Rommel. London: Collins, 1950; Fantana, 1975. Young, P. World War 1939–1945. London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 1966.

Book Chapters Bond, Brian and Williamson Murray. “The British Armed Forces, 1918–1939.” In Allan Millett and Williamson Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness. Vol. II. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988. Forget, Michel. “Co-operation between Air Force and Army in the French and German Air Forces during the Second World War.” In Horst Boog (ed.), Conduct of the Air War in the Second World War. Oxford: Berg, 1991. Hall, David Ian. “Lessons Not Learned: The Struggle between the RAF and the Army for the Tactical Control of Aircraft and the Post-Mortem on the Defeat of the BEF in France in 1940.” In G.D. Sheffield and G. Till (eds.), The Challenge of High Command in the British Armed Forces. London: Macmillan, 2003. Kennett, Lee. “Developments to 1939.” In B.F. Cooling (ed.), Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1990. O’Neill, Robert J. “Doctrine and Training in the German Army 1919–1939.” In Michael Howard (ed.), The Theory and Practice of War. London: Cassell, 1965. Sullivan, Brian R. “The Italian Armed Forces, 1918–1940.” In Allan Millet and Williamson Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness. Vol. II. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988. Syrett, David. “The Tunisian Campaign, 1942–43.” In B.F. Cooling (ed.), Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1990. Terrain, John. “Land/Air Co-operation.” In RAF Historical Society (ed.), The End of the Beginning. Symposium Proceedings on Land/Air Co-operation in the Mediterranean War 1940–1943, Bracknell Paper No.3, 20 March 1992.

Journal Articles Abrams, Philip. “The Failure of Social Reform: 1918–1920.” Past and Present 24 (April 1963): 43–64. Bechthold, B Michael. “Tactical Air Power: Its Effectiveness During the Normandy Campaign, the Evidence of Operational Research.” Journal of the Canadian Aviation Historical Society Part I. 31(1) (Spring 1993): 12–21; and Part II. 31(2) (Summer 1993): 54–59, 68. ———. “The Development of an Unbeatable Combination: U.S. Close Air Support in Normandy.” Canadian Military History 8 (Winter 1999): 7–20. ———. “A Question of Success: Tactical Air Doctrine and Practice in North Africa, 1942–43.” Journal of Military History 68 ( July 2004): 821–851.

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Cooper, Malcolm. “A House Divided: Policy, Rivalry and Administration in Britain’s Military Air Command 1914–1918.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 3(2) (September 1980): 178–201. ———. “Blueprint for Confusion: The Administrative Background to the Formation of the Royal Air Force, 1912–19.” Journal of Contemporary History 22(3) ( July 1987): 437–453. Corum, James. “The Luftwaffe’s Army Support Doctrine, 1918–1941.” The Journal of Military Affairs 59(1) ( January 1995): 53–76. Cox, Jafna L. “A Splendid Training Ground: The Importance to the Royal Air Force of its Role in Iraq 1919–1932.” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 13(2) ( January 1985): 157–184. Ferris, John. “The Theory of the ‘French Air Menace’: Anglo-French Relations and the British Home Defence Air Force Programmes of 1921–1925.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 10(1) (March 1987): 62–83. Gooderson, Ian “Allied Fighter-Bombers versus German Armour in North-West Europe 1944–1945: Myths and Realities.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 14(2) ( June 1991): 210–231. ———. “Heavy and Medium Bombers: How Successful Were They in the Tactical Close Air Support Role During World War II?” The Journal of Strategic Studies 15(3) (September 1992): 367–399. Gordon, John. “Operation CRUSADER: Preview of the Nonlinear Battlefield.” Military Review 71(2) (February 1991): 48–61. Goyet, P. Le. “Evolution de la doctrine d’emploi de l’aviation française entre 1919 et 1939.” Revue d’histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale XIX ( January 1969): 3–41. Hall, David Ian. “Air Operations at Dieppe. An After-Action Report by Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory.” Canadian Military History 12(4) (Autumn 2003): 55–70. ———. “Creating the 2nd Tactical Air Force: Inter-Service and Anglo-Canadian Co-operation in World War II.” Canadian Military Journal 3(4) (Winter 2002/2003): 39–45. ———. “From Khaki and Light Blue to Purple: The Long and Troubled Development of Army/Air Co-operation in Britain, 1914–1945.” The Royal United Services Institute Journal 147(5) (October 2002): 78–83. Hughes, Thomas Alexander. “Air Lines. Anglo-American Tactical Air Operations in World War II.” Air and Space Power Journal XVIII(4) (Winter 2004): 34–45. Jacobs, W.A. “Air Support for the British Army, 1939—1943.” Military Affairs 46(4) (December 1982): 174–182. ———. “Air Command in the United Kingdom, 1943–44.” The Journal of Strategic Studies 11(1) (March 1988): 51–78. Kuter, Laurence S. “Goddammit Georgie: North Africa, 1943: The Birth of TAC Doctrine.” Air Force Magazine 56(2) (February 1973): 51–56. Lainé, Serge. “L’aéronautique militaire française au Maroc (1911–1939).” Revue Historique des Armees 5(4) (Paris, 1978): 107–120. McCrabb, Lt. Col. Maris. “Drohende Gefahr West.” Airpower Journal VIII(2) (Summer 1994): 4–17. Place, T Harrison. “British Perceptions of the Tactics of the German Army, 1938– 1940.” Intelligence and National Security 9(3) ( July 1994): 495–519.

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Saundby, Air Marshal Sir Robert. “Aircraft: A New Factor in War.” Purnell’s History of the First World War 1(3) (London, 1969): 70–77. Stolfi, R.H.S. “Equipment for Victory in France in 1940.” History 55 (February 1970): 1–20. Tjepkema, Colonel Andy. “Coningham: The Architect of Ground-Air Doctrine.” Air Clues 45(6) ( June 1991): 204–211. van Creveld, Martin. “Rommel’s Supply Problem.” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute 119(3) (September 1974): 67–73. Vogel, Robert. “Tactical Air Power in Normandy: Some Thoughts on the Interdiction Plan.” Canadian Military History 3(1) (Spring 1994): 37–47. Watt, D.C. “The Air Force View of History.” The Quarterly Review 300(634) (October 1962): 428–437. Young, Robert J. “The Strategic Dream: French Air Doctrine in the Inter-War Period, 1919–39.” Journal of Contemporary History 9(4) (October 1974): 57–76.

Unpublished Papers Copp, Terry and Robert Vogel. “Anglo-Canadian Tactical Air Power in Normandy: A Reassessment.” Virginia: American Military Institute, 1987. Cox, Sebastian. “Strategy and Doctrine in the Royal Air Force 1918–1941.” Carlisle: United States Navy War College, 1990. Haslam, E.B. “Services Required from the RAF for the Field Forces.” London: Air Historical Branch, 1976. Zehner, Capt. G.S. (USAF) “Obstacles to the Development of Luftwaffe Close Air Support Procedures 1935–1944.” Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1994.

Unpublished Manuscripts and Theses Cooper, Malcolm. “British Air Policy on the Western Front, 1914–1918.” D.Phil. Thesis (University of Oxford, 1982). English, A.D. “The RAF Staff College and the Evolution of RAF Strategic Bombing Policy 1922–1929.” M.A. Thesis (The Royal Military College of Canada, 1987). Hall, David. “Peering Through the Veil of Uncertainty: British Anti-Invasion Planning, 1940.” M.A. Thesis (University of New Brunswick, 1987). MacLeod, Wing Commander Norman. “Sacks of Gold: A History of the Royal Air Force in France 1939–1940.” (RAF Staff College, Bracknell, 1990). Ritchie, Sebastian. “British Military Aircraft Production, 1935–1941.” Ph.D. Thesis (King’s College, University of London, 1993). Waldie, Derek J.P. “Relations Between the Army and the Royal Air Force 1918– 1939.” Ph.D. Thesis (King’s College, University of London, 1980). Williams, George. “Statistics and Strategic Bombardment: Operations and Records of the British Long-Range Bombing Force During World War I and Their Implications for the Development of the Post-War Royal Air Force, 1917–1923.” D.Phil. Thesis (University of Oxford, 1987).

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INDEX Adam, Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald, 37 Admiralty, 18, 21 Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF), 41–43, 49–51, 62 Air Council, 15 Air Expeditionary Force (AEF), 150–151 Air Intelligence Liaison (AIL), 71, 80 Air Ministry, 14, 21, 23, 27, 29–33, 45–46, 52, 59–60, 62, 64–66, 83, 118–20, 124, 154 Air Ministry-War Office Committee, 37 Air Mission, 43 Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief (AOC-in-C), 97; AOC Advanced Wing, 69–70 Air Programme, 27 Air Rearmament Schemes, 27 Air Staff, 14–16, 23–24, 26, 35–36, 47, 53, 61, 63–66, 89–90, 94–95, 98, 99, 118, 121, 123, 125, 148–49 Air Storage Units (ASU), 99–100 Air Superiority, 129 Air Support, 106, 108, 129; Close Support, 66; Direct Support, 65, 106, 110, 157; Indirect Support, 106, 157

Air Support Control (ASC), 109–12, 1115, 131, 138, 140, 144 Air Support Signals Units (ASSUs), 124–25 Aircraft, 96, 110, 112. See also names of specific aircraft Alam el Halfa, Battle of, 138–40 Alexander General Sir Harold, 137, 144 Allied Central Air Bureau (ACAB), 44, 48, 50 American Bostons, 94 Anderson, Lieutenant-General K.A.N., 141 AOC, 131 Archer, Sir Geoffrey, 20 Army Air Arm, 32, 44–45, 67, 125 Army-Air Co-Operation, 16, 23–24, 39–40 Army Air Support Controls (AASC), 102, 148 Army Co-operation (AC) squadrons, 42, 93; Air Component, 38, 49–50, 52, 97–98; Air Contingent, 97–98; AOC No. 22 Group, 36; No. 6 Army Co-operation, 81; No. 253 Army Co-operation (AC) Wing, 84, 105, 109–10; No. 239 Fighter Wing, 116

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Index

Army Co-operation Command, 63, 67, 93, 95, 98–100, 117–18, 121–24, 126, 148–50; No. 70 (Training) Group, 93; No. 71 (Operations) Group, 93 Army Co-operation Sub-Committee, 38 Army Council, 49, 59 Army Training Instruction No. 6, 102 Auchinleck, Lieutenant-General C.J.E., 60, 84, 105, 107, 114, 132–34, 137–37, 155 Balfour, Lord Arthur, 21 Barratt, Air Marshal Sir Arthur, 43, 48–51, 53, 67, 93, 95, 139, 147, 149 Bartholomew, General Sir William 56, 155 Bartholomew Committee, 56–59 Beaufighters, 136 Beaverbrook, Lord Max, 56, 67, 98–100 Beresford-Pierce, Lieutenant-General Sir Noel, 84 Bermuda dive-bomber, 98–100 Blenheims, 42, 48, 50, 65, 80, 74, 98–100 Blount, Air Vice-Marshal C.H.R., 42, 56 Bomber Command, 35, 40, 64, 91, 98; No. 1 Group, 42, 91, 94; No. 2 Group, 50, 91, 94, 98, 100, 102, 117, 121–23, 146 Bomber Striking Force, 112 Bomber Sub-Committee, 37 Bombers, 136 Brewsters, 65 British Air Forces in France (BAFF), 49–53, 61, 63 British Expeditionary Force (BEF), 38, 41–44, 48, 51–53, 55–56, 58–59, 62–63 Brooke, Lieutenant-General Alan, 60, 95, 117–18, 121–22, 124–26, 137, 149, 156 Brown, Group Captain L.O., 81

Carrington, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles, 63 Chamberlain, Neville, 56 Chatfield, Lord E., 47, 49 Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), 16, 18–19, 34, 97–100, 107 Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), 33, 118 Churchill, Winston, 16, 19, 75, 84, 96, 100, 101, 107, 120, 126, 137, 151, 155–56 Close Support Bomber Controls (CSBC), 92, 94, 98, 100, 102 Coastal Command, 9, 27, 94 Collishaw, Air Commodore Raymond, 70, 73, 76–79, 82 Combined Army/Air Battle Headquarters, 115 Combined Central Operations Room (CCOR), 90–91, 100 Combined Operations Headquarters, 125 Combined Plan, 69, 71 Commands; Bomber. See Bomber Command; Coastal. See Coastal Command; Fighter. See Fighter Command Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) 3, 21 Committee on National Expenditure (Geddes Committee), 17 Composite Group, 148–50 Coningham, Air Vice-Marshal Arthur, 110–12, 115, 127, 129–32, 134–41, 143–45, 150, 155 Cot, Pierre, 89 Cunningham, Lieutenant-General Sir Alan, 110–13 Cyrenaica, 74, 76, 78, 140 Defence Requirements Committee (DRC), 26 Dill, General Sir John, 56, 95, 96, 98, 102 Direct Air Support. See Air Support Don, Air Commodore F.P., 43

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Index Douglas, Air Vice-Marshal W. Sholto, 35–37, 62, 64, 93, 125, 146–47 Dowding, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh, 62 Eden, Anthony, 59, 66–67, 98 Egypt, 68–69, 71, 114, 137, 140 Eighth Army, 113–14, 116, 122, 132–37, 140–41 Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 141–44 El Alamein, 136, 140; First Battle of, 136; Second Battle of, 140 Eldridge, Colonel W.J., 33 ‘The Employment of Air Forces in the Field’ (EAF), 33 Exercises; Bumper, 100; Spartan, 148–49, 156; Western Desert No. 3, 105 Experimental Armoured Force, 23 Fairey Battle, 42, 48, 50, 94 Festing, Lieutenant-Colonel F.W., 53, 60–62, 95 Field Force, 31, 39; Air Component, 41 Field Manual FM 31–35 (Aviation in Support of Ground Troops), 141–42, 144 Field Manual FM 100–20, 144 Fighter-bombers, 131 Fighter Command, 75, 97, 121, 123–24, 126, 146–50, 156 Fisher, Sir Warren, 26 Forward Air Support Link (FASL), 109–10 Fraser, Group Captain H., 62 French Air Force, 41 Geddes, Sir Eric, 21 Geddes Committee. See Committee on National Expenditure General Staff, 18, 21, 24, 31–33, 40, 66, 89, 94, 119 German Air Force (Service), 35–36, 39–40, 97, 105–107 German Army 51, 57, 81; Polish Campaign, 38–40

239

GHQ Home Forces, 90–91, 94, 122, 147–48 Gloster Gladiators, 50 GOC Mobile Division, 71–72; Air Component, 70 Goddard, Group Captain R.V., 59, 64 Gort, General Viscount John, 38, 42, 44, 52–53, 55–56 Gott, Brigadier W.H., 82 Greece, 75 Greenslade, Brigadier Cyrus, 60 Grigg, Right Honourable Sir Percy James, 125 Haining, Lieutenant-General Sir Robert, 94 Halifax bombers, 136 Hankey, Sir Maurice, 26 Hawker Hurricane, 42, 50, 63, 78, 80, 114, 136, 146 Hawker Typhoon, 147 Headquarters Middle East (HQME), 70, 75, 130, 133, 136 Hoare, Sir Samuel, 46 Holden, Brigadier W.C., 33, 37 Hollis, Brigadier L.C., 125–26 Home Forces, 93–94, 98, 102, 148–49 Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War Leslie, 35, 44–46, 49 Hurribomber, 131 Hussan, Said Mohammed Bin Abdulla (‘the Mad Mullah’), 19–20 Indirect Support. See Air Support Ironside, General W.E., 39–40, 44, 55 Italian Air Force, 25, 78–79, 105 Italo-Turkish War of 1911–1912, 2 Kennedy, Brigadier J.N., 37, 124 Kittyhawks, 116, 131 Land Forces Committee, 44–46 Leigh-Mallory, Air Vice-Marshal Trafford, 146–47 Liberator bombers, 136 Longmore, Air Marshal Sir Arthur, 70, 73–76, 78

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Index

Luftwaffe, 40, 50–51, 58–59, 61, 83, 111 Lysanders, 42, 50, 80, 95, 99–100 Malta, 77 Massy, Major General H.R.S., 33, 37, 39, 48–49 Mesopotamia (Iraq), 20 Metropolitan Air Force, 18, 97, 118, 122 Metropolitan Bomber Force, 97 Metropolitan Fighter Force, 97 Middle East, 68, 75, 105, 133, 154 Middle East Directive on Air Support, 109 Middle East (Army and RAF) Directive on Direct Air Support, 157–172 Middle East (Army and RAF) Training Pamphlet No. 3 – Direct Air Support, 115 Middle East (Army and RAF) Training Pamphlet No. 3A – Direct Air Support, 132 Ministery of Aircraft Production (MAP), 65 Mitchell, Air Marshal Sir William, 70 Montgomery, General Bernard Law, 137–41, 144–45, 150, 155–56 National and Imperial Defence Committee (Salisbury Committee), 22 Newall, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril, 34, 39, 40 Nile Delta, 75, 77 North Africa campaign, 73 Northern Ireland, 93 North-West African Air Forces (NWAF), 143; North-West African Tactical Air Force (NATAF), 143–44 Nye, Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald, 149 O’Connor, Major-General Richard, 76–78 Operation Battleaxe, 82–84, 102, 105, 110 Operation Brevity, 82–83

Operation Compass, 75–76, 78, 128 Operation Crusader (‘the Winter Battle’), 104, 107, 110, 111, 113–14, 118–20, 128–30 Operation Jubilee, 125 Operation Torch, 141, 142 ‘Organisation of Air Support for the Army in Continental Operations’, 127 Owen, Frank, 120 Oxborrow, Colonel Claude, 122, 124 Paget, General Sir Bernard, 124 Peirse, Air Vice-Marshal R.E.C., 36–37, 48–49 Playfair, Air Vice-Marshal P.H.L., 42 Portal, Air Marshal Sir Charles, 48, 94–99, 101, 102, 117–19, 122–23, 125, 149–51, 155 Pownall, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry, 60 Rear Air Support Links (RASL), 111 Regia Aeronautica. See Italian Air Force Ritchie, Major-General Neil, 112–13, 132, 134 Royal Air Force (RAF); No. 70 Group, 67; No. 71 Group, 67; No. 202 Group, 72–75 RAF Army Air Support Group (AAS Gp), 122 RAF Army Co-operation Squadrons, 22 RAF Cyrenaica, 81; No. 6 Army Co-operation Squadron, 81; No. 55 Bomber Squadron, 81; No. 73 Fighter Squadron, 81; No. 3 RAAF Fighter Squadron, 81 RAF Hawkinge, 52 RAF Institutions; RAF College Cranwell, 18; RAF Staff College, 18 RAF Manual of Army Co-Operation (AP 1176), 28 RAF Middle East, 70, 75, 78, 82, 105, 107–108, 119, 128–30 RAF Middle East Operational Plan, 69 RAF War Manual, 28 Royal Flying Corps (RFC), 3–7, 153

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Index Salisbury, Lord Cecil, 22 Salisbury Committee. See National and Imperial Defence Committee Salmond, Air Vice-Marshal Sir John, 20 Second Desert Campaign, 104 Sinclair, Sir Archibald, 66–67, 99 Slessor, Wing Command J.C., 18, 33–35, 37, 47, 61, 95, 124; Slessor Paper, 123–24, 126–27, 147; Air Power and Armies, 28 Somaliland, 19–20 Spaatz, General Carl A., 141–42 Spitfires, 63, 136 Squadrons; Bomber, 29; No. 3 RAAF, 81; No. 30, 75; No. 55, 81; No. 73, 81; No. 80, 75; No. 84, 75; No. 112, 75; No. 211, 75 Stockley, Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph, 147 Tactical Air Force, 50, 151; 2nd Tactical Air Force, 123, 151, 153 Tactical air power, 129 Tedder, Air Marshal Sir Arthur, 81–84, 102, 105, 114, 116, 129–30, 132, 134, 136–39, 141–43, 150, 155 Ten Year Rule, 17, 26 Thorold, Air Commodore Henry, 122; ‘Thorold’ Paper, 123 Tobruk, 72, 74

November 16, 2007

241

Tomahawks, 98–99, 114, 131 Trenchard, Major-General Hugh, 7, 14, 17–19, 21–22, 154 United States Army Air Force (USAAF), 139–40 Vansittart, Sir Robert, 26 Vengeance dive-bombers, 98 Vought, 65, 156 Vultee, 72, 65 Wann, Group Captain A.H., 65, 91–92, 155 Wann-Woodall Report, 92, 106 War Office, 16, 18, 21, 23–24, 29–32, 35, 36, 39–40, 45–46, 52, 56, 62–66, 78, 89–90, 95, 119, 149, 154; MO7, 53, 60, 62 Wavell, General Archibald, 74–78, 82–84, 101, 155 Western Desert, 69–76, 80, 104 Western Desert Air Force (WDAF), 111, 113–16, 122, 130–38, 140, 156 Western Front, 8, 92 Willock, Air Commodore R.P., 37 Wireless telegraphy, 23, 52–53, 92, 109 Wood, Secretary of State for Air, Sir Kingsley, 46 Woodall, Lieutenant-Colonel J.D., 65, 67, 91–93, 155

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About the Author DAVID IAN HALL has a D.Phil. in modern British history from the University of Oxford. He is a Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department, King’s College London, based at the Joint Services Command and Staff College. In 2001 he was appointed to the Higher Command and Staff Course as an Air Power Academic specialist. He is a founding editor of Defence Studies, the journal of the Joint Services Command and Staff College.

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Recent Titles in Praeger Studies in Diplomacy and Strategic Thought British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900–1936 Phillips Payson O’Brien Defending the Free World: John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and the Vietnam War, 1961–1965 Orrin Schwab Paths Not Taken: Speculations on American Foreign Policy and Diplomatic History, Interests, Ideals, and Power Jonathan M. Neilson, editor From Confrontation to Cooperation: The Takeover of the National People’s (East German) Army by the Bundeswehr Frederick Zilian, Jr. Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts, The United States and China, 1950–1958 Appu K. Soman The Evolution of Special Forces in Counter-Terrorism: The British and American Experiences J. Paul de B. Taillon Incidents and International Relations: People, Power, and Personalities Gregory C. Kennedy and Keith Neilson, editors Witness to Revolution: The Russian Revolution Diary and Letters of J. Butler Wright William Thomas Allison Command and Cohesion: The Citizen Soldier and Minor Tactics in the British Army, 1870–1918 M.A. Ramsay Hijacking and Hostages: Government Responses to Terrorism J. Paul de B. Taillon ´ Money for Ireland: Finance, Diplomacy, Politics, and the First Dail Loans, ´ Eireann 1919–1936 Francis M. Carroll, editor War in the Twentieth Century: Reflections at Century’s End Michael A. Hennessy and B.J.C. McKercher, editors

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