Staging Masculinity: The Rhetoric of Performance in the Roman World

Staging Masculinity

THE BODY, IN THEORY

Histories of Cultural Materialism

The Subject as Action: Transformation and Totality in Narrative Aesthetics by Alan Singer Power and Knowledge: Astrology, Physiognomies, and Medicine under the Roman Empire by Tamsyn S. Barton Under the Sign: John Bargrave as Collector, Traveler, and Witness by Stephen Bann Simulacra and Simulation by Jean Baudrillard, translated by Sheila Faria Glaser The Deluge, the Plague: Paolo Uccello by Jean Louis Schefer, translated by Tom Conley Philodemus in Italy: The Books from Herculaneum by Marcello Gigante, translated by Dirk Obbink The Tremulous Private Body: Essays on Subjection by Francis Barker Picturing Silence: Emblem, Language, Counter-Reformation Materiality by Karen Pinkus The Gay Critic by Hubert Fichte, translated by Kevin Gavin The Abyss of Freedom I Ages of the World by Slavoj Zizek / F. W. J. von Schelling, translated by Judith Norman The Body and Physical Difference: Discourses of Disability edited by David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder Constructions of the Classical Body edited by James I. Porter An Utterly Dark Spot: Gaze and Body in Early Modern Philosophy by Miran Bozovic The Pedagogical Contract: The Economies of Teaching and Learning in the Ancient World by Yun Lee Too Cutting the Body: Representing Woman in Baudelaire's Poetry, Truffaut's Cinema, and Freud's Psychoanalysis by Eliane DalMolin Staging Masculinity: The Rhetoric of Performance in the Roman World by Erik Gunderson

Staging Masculinity The Rhetoric of Performance in the Roman World

Erik Gunderson

Ann Arbor

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS

Copyright © by the University of Michigan 2000 All rights reserved Published in the United States of America by The University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America ® Printed on acid-free paper 2003 2002 2001

2000

4

3

2 1

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise, without the written permission of the publisher. A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gunderson, Erik. Staging masculinity : the rhetoric of performance in the Roman world / Erik Gunderson. p. cm. — (The body, in theory) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-472-11139-6 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Speeches, addresses, etc., Latin — History and criticism. 2. Psychoanalysis and literature —Rome. 3. Homosexuality and literature —Rome. 4. Homosexuality, Male, in literature. 5. Body, Human, in literature. 6. Masculinity in literature. 7. Men in literature. 8. Rhetoric, Ancient. 9. Oratory, Ancient. I. Title. II. Series. PA6083 .G86 2000 875'.0109353-dc21

00-059991

DM HHK EG

Preface

EVERYONE KNOWS WHERE BABIES COME FROM. The same cannot be said for men. Presumably they come from babies. The standard recipe is rather vague: just add time. The theorists of ancient oratory were not content to sit by idly and to wait for nature to take its course. They offered their own formula for ensuring that a man became himself and attained to his masculine station. One had to work at becoming a man, and, significantly, this work involved learning how to perform masculinity. This book is a reading of the ancients' precepts. This is a book about rhetoric. It is also a rhetorical book. The text contains numerous examples of anaphora, asydeton, and alliteration: is the author not just reading oratory but also performing it? To some readers, all of this will no doubt seem to be just so much rhetoric, an insubstantial and hollow exercise. I would ask such a reader to consider that this study also asks what it means to declare that an argument or even a style of argumentation is a sham. Scholarship has already provided levelheaded and accurate descriptions of what the ancients said about oratory. Indeed, antiquity itself is filled with just such accounts of its own rhetorical practice. This is a necessary labor: a critical reevaluation of oratory is predicated on the hard work of this sort of research. Ancient authors and some portion of the moderns have warned what divergence from their descriptions and prescriptions would mean: willful folly, crass deception, and worse. Breaking with the familiar account, though, is not necessarily as radical as it might at first seem: the body, gender, and authority show no signs of vanishing in the face of a skewed reading of them. It would be impossible to stage an account of the fringes of the dominant narrative without restaging many of the central issues of that narrative precisely as central. To the extent that my reading seems radical or disruptive, I can only remind the reader that Rome did not fall in a day. Indeed, one perhaps still awaits the collapse. I am implicitly arguing for a renewed study of Cicero and Quintilian as vital

viii

PREFACE

to present purposes. One might justly comment about the conservatism of such a move. This book engages "theory." Such is usually taken as modern or even postmodern. The ancients are often asked to be off there in the past, a stable point that contemporary modes of thought have advanced from and fought against. Surely we have liberated ourselves from that all but forgotten age. Yet antiquity itself has a theory of bodies, perhaps even a theory of the theory of bodies. The ancient discourse on discourse is by no means naive, nor is it some well-wrought statue standing in stony silence, a dead, "classical" piece of workmanship that we might admire as in a museum and then subsequently ignore. It is worth asking, then, how modern are we? The story of becoming a Roman man is not, I would argue, so unfamiliar as some would hope. Nor, for that matter, is this process as automatic as others might pretend. In other words, this book would claim to be neither a piece of antiquarianism nor a postmodern translation of ancient oratory into an alien idiom. If anything, it is a study of the literary critical buzzwords from the past filled with the theoretical jargon of the present. Put positively, this is a discussion of some of the problems involved in producing and performing authoritative knowledge. Whom will we take seriously? What sort of argument do we heed? How are the two related? Two sorts of readers may be expected to take interest in such questions, readers whose paths have perhaps diverged even as they continue to run in parallel. First the student of antiquity will be asked to weigh and consider the arguments of Foucault, Derrida, and Lacan. To what extent should such a scholar take these contemporary classics seriously? What does the classical world offer to their theories in its turn? This is a question particularly worth considering for a second set of readers, those who are perhaps all too familiar with the doings of the French even if they have not engaged with Cicero and his countrymen for some years. I hope to convince each sort of specialist of the value of taking the trouble to puzzle through the seeming obscurity of unfamiliar languages: it is worth the trouble to understand the meaning of both phallologocentrism and ingenium. Rather than having the last word, though, I hope only to encourage others to pursue their own studies down some of the same paths outlined here: the road to Rhetoric is not an easy one, and I do not claim to have reached the summit. Horace once complained that a picture that started as a woman on top and ended as a fish below would make for bad art. Horace's forbidden monster resembles epic's Scylla. Horace was no fool. He knew that there was something to be said for mixing one's media, and some of his more unusual creations attest to this. I hope that I have offered a study whose own outland-

PREFACE

ix

ish form will please rather than offend: the aesthetic of the exotic has an ancient pedigree as well. I wish to thank a number of parties who made this work possible. Without the support, encouragement, and generous funding of the Department of Classics of the University of California at Berkeley I would never have been able to pursue my work and to see it to its completion. I owe a similar debt of gratitude to my colleagues at The Ohio State University for assisting me both intellectually and practically in the labor of reworking and polishing this text. Institutions, of course, are composed of people, and I must thank in particular a number of individuals who were especially generous with their time and ideas. Thomas Habinek, Mark Griffith, Catherine Gallagher, and Judith Butler oversaw this project from its inception. Each offered an inspiring model of scholarship, and I profited from their teachings, which were as varied as they were uniformly excellent. Were panegyric not the most suspect of all of rhetoric's forms I would gladly expatiate on the many details of the kindness of each. I regret that I cannot thank by name the anonymous readers at the University of Chicago and University of Michigan presses. I hope that they note with pleasure the many improvements for which they are responsible without feeling too pained at those errors that they were unable to prevent. Lastly I must offer my sincerest gratitude to Victoria Wohl for reading, rereading, discussing, improving, and generally enduring this project over the span of so many years. I doubt that I shall ever adequately repay her generosity with her time and her ideas.

Contents

Introduction

1

CHAPTER I

Reading and Writing

29

CHAPTER 2

Discovering the Body

59

CHAPTER 3

Self-Mastery

87

CHAPTER 4

Actors

111

CHAPTER 5

Pleasure

149

CHAPTER 6

Love

187

Conclusion: We Other Romans

223

NOTES

231

BIBLIOGRAPHY

251

GENERAL INDEX

261

INDEX LOCORUM

267

Introduction

This study started with this question, but it does not end by answering it with a collection of bodily facts. I offer neither a catalog of gestures nor a script to be used for reproducing the ancient orator. At least, I hope that I do not offer these things: this examination of performances is intended to raise the issue of the implications of theoretical speculation upon performance. It will be useful, though, to begin with a genealogy of the project itself in order both to appreciate the origin of its subsequent concerns and to understand why its original query will remain fundamentally unanswered. The majority of the most important passages that might be used to reveal the truth of the ancient orator's gestures can be found in the pages of this book. If one were to extract and assemble all of the ancient citations, one might swiftly come to appreciate such finer points of the spectacle of rhetoric as the following: the left hand was used sparingly; the orator tends to put his weight on his left foot, though raising up the right foot is bad form.1 As interesting as these tidbits might be, they cannot be simply collected and assembled until a body stands before us, a body patched together from fossilized textual fragments, yet somehow also a faithful representative of the species homo rhetoricus. There is a world of difference separating the quick from the dead, and the orators themselves would be the first to point out the problems of using dead letters to breath life into their practice. But they were themselves no more deterred by this recognition than, in the end, was I. When I began my own inquiries, I felt that though I had read my share of ancient orations, I had long neglected one of the most obvious elements of these speeches, namely, that they were delivered before a public. The performative aspect of ancient oratory is of course but one element among several possible approaches to these texts: in fact, ancient authorities invite the prospective author of an oration to attend to five aspects of a speech, of which delivery is only one. And obviously a reading based on a literary or aesthetic appreciation of any given speech is not only possible but usually WHAT DID ANCIENT ORATORY LOOK LIKE?

2

STAGING MASCULINITY

very rewarding. Likewise, a historical or a sociological reading of a speech can itself yield a variety of fruits.2 But oratory as practice and performance tends to be neglected, or treated only as an afterthought, both in the canonical texts of antiquity and in much modern scholarship on ancient rhetoric. What comes of neglecting performances? And to what extent are other possible approaches to ancient oratory complicated and complemented by the performative aspect of oratory? The following study will hopefully serve as a set of preliminary answers to these questions. I have opted to approach the question of performance in ancient oratory by looking at ancient theorists of oratory such as Cicero and Quintilian. This reading leaves entirely to one side the question of what Cicero actually did with his voice and body during one of his Philippics. This reading also dodges the question of the difference between the preserved written texts of a speech and the version actually performed. The text we have is by no means a simple script for an earlier performance. The most famous example of this is Cicero's own Pro Milone, where the speaker failed in public, only to return to his desk to pen a speech that later generations would proclaim a rhetorical masterpiece. While it would perhaps be a useful exercise to try to imagine a specific performance in detail, one cannot advance very far without falling into mere speculation. Instead of the speculative, then, I have opted for the theoretical. To a certain extent such a choice represents the embracing of necessity: since the preserved speeches are not self-scripting, what was said of performance by contemporary scholars of the craft? A careful reading of the theorists of oratory will help to explain the impossibility of a precise restaging of ancient rhetoric. Our ignorance cannot be wholly attributed to the accidents that can govern the preservation of ancient materials. Ancient rhetorical theory does not serve as a textbook or cookbook for performance. In fact there is often great resistance to explicit and detailed formulations of rhetorical performance: how can a text —mere words on the page —either reflect or instruct such physical elements as gestures or vocal modulations? Ancient rhetorical theory itself puts into question any project that would read a speech and produce from that reading the lived truth of the original performance. Rhetorical theory instead forces the issue of the relationship between texts and bodies in motion or voices ringing through the air. Accordingly, it is not the particular plight of the modern student of ancient oratory that performance is lost to his or her eyes and ears owing to the centuries that separate us from the last of the speakers of antiquity. Antiquity already senses this same loss. Analysis and discussion of speeches in a theoretical light commence with a mourning for the loss of the presence of the living voice and body. In

INTRODUCTION

3

fact, loss of the body in the text is mourned as early as Plato, Phaedrus 276a8, where the living voice (Xoyog E\I\\>V%Oxi xarv xa0 s f]^ag eaTiv, OL

PLEASURE

aQOUQrjg XCXQJIOV TQ8(p6^£VOV.

155

eSo^xev, aXka xi ^evov cpdajxa dpoaco r\ a[x(3Qoaia

Going toward the other road, you will find many others, and among them a certain all-wise and all-beautiful man, a man with a shimmy in his walk, a bend in his neck, a womanly look in his eye, sweet of voice, exuding the scent of perfume, scratching his head with the tip of his finger, setting to good effect his now scant but still curly and hyacinthine locks, some all-soft Sardanapalus or Cinuras or Agathon himself, that lovely poet who wrote tragedy. I am telling you this so that you can know him from these signs and so that you won't fail to note such a divine creature and one so dear to Aphrodite and the Graces. But what am I saying? Even if your eyes were closed and he were to come up and talk to you, opening up that honeyed mouth and letting loose his usual voice, you would learn that he is not one of our sort, we who eat the harvest of the field, but he is some new apparition, reared on dew or ambrosia.] (Lucian, Praeceptor 11) The narrative jumps straight to the physicality of the guide. The easy road's guide is at first hard to spot: this course is crowded with a number of people, one of whom needs to be picked out from the rest. Yet the visual tokens that distinguish this guide are abundant. He is all-wise and allbeautiful. The adjective formations are as precious in the Greek as they are awkward in English. We will also find that the all of the all-beautiful has to be taken in its fullest sense and extended to include illegitimate kinds of attraction.12 He walks with a shimmy, an agitated mincing, if we need to find a more contemporary word for a sexualized step. It should be noted that the dictionary does not translate 5iaaeaaXei^evov thus. Citing this passage as their only example, Liddell and Scott say "negligent, easy" even though the primary meaning for this word and indeed its meaning in other extended senses is based upon the notion of agitation. Yet the lexicographers almost certainly do understand what this guide is all about. In that case, they have turned him into an Oscar Wilde, the invert of their own day. This mincing walk is the gait of a cinaedus, as the Romans might call him. Such a man shakes his genitals and buttocks, drawing attention to them, attracting desire, promising pleasure. Proper Romans despise cmaedi (Richlin 1993; Parker 1997). They brand their enemies with this tag, and the Latin language itself has not even graced this figure a name formed from an indigenous stem: the cinaedus is, by way of linguistic allegation, a Greek perversion. For Lucian, such a man is an "Asian" abomination: perverts always come from somewhere else. The man's neck is bent. I would like to digress and expatiate on this

156

STAGING MASCULINITY

point so that it might be seen how even the slightest details of this body are implicated in the matrix of pleasure and authority that both produces and discredits it. Our usual authority Quintilian has much to say about the neck. In 11.3.82, during his discussion of the body during delivery, he says simply: the neck ought to be straight, not stiff or upturned (ceruicem rectam oportet esse, non rigidam aut supinam). This simple commandment is a resumption of the ideas given much earlier about the head as a whole: Obseruandum erit etiam ut recta sit facies dicentis, ne labra detorqueantur, ne inmodicus hiatus rictum distendat, ne supinus uultus, ne deiecti in terram oculi, ne inclinata utrolibet ceruix. Nam frons pluribus generibus peccat. [One will also have to see the following: the speaker must face his audience; and one must not twist the lips back, gape immoderately when opening the mouth, turn the face up, cast the eyes down, or bend the neck in either direction. For many are the varieties in which one's countenance transgresses.] (Quintilian 1.11.9) The face should be directed forward; it should be kept straight; only then will it be appropriate. Here we find recta in three senses. In 11.3.82 the word means "straight," but here it has also taken on its metaphorical meaning of "proper." Perhaps "legitimate" would be another good translation of the term: the body transgresses, it sins {peccat) when it is bent. Furthermore, straight is understood negatively: it is a conformity to a set of prohibitions, it is the adherence to a bodily hexis that has scrupulously eschewed the illegitimate. Straight, proper, and legitimate: the speaker's body is all of these things at one and the same time. Most importantly for present purposes, though, this illegitimacy has as one of its vital aspects pleasure. At nunc uelut campum nacti expositionis hie potissimum et uocem flectunt et ceruicem reponunt et bracchium in latus iactant totoque et rerum et uerborum et compositionis genere lasciuiunt: deinde, quod sit monstro simile, placet actio, causa non intellegitur. [Instead, like men who have come upon a sports-field, here particularly in their exposition (i.e. in the narratio) they distort their voice, throw back their necks, hurl their arms to their side, and run riot in their material, vocabulary, and style. Then — and it's a monstrous thing — the delivery pleases, but the case is not understood.] (Quintilian 4.2.39)

PLEASURE

157

The voice is bent, not straight, not right. The same is true of the neck. The arms are thrown to the latus, the "side." This part of the body is often a sexually invested site. Here I take it the primary gesture is to the "wildness" of the delivery. But we will see that this want of control actually aspires to an illegitimate kind of pleasure. In the abstracted realm, in the matter of their speech, these speakers run riot (lasciviunt). But they do more, for this word, from which our own lascivious is derived, already can be used in erotic contexts in Latin (Oxford Latin Dictionary, s.v. lascivio 3b). The terse final clause acknowledges the pleasure of this performance and then rejects it. This is the way people speak now; in the past when men followed the large and laborious footsteps of Demosthenes, things were otherwise. Quintilian has been polite. Here he has not sexually discredited these speakers. There is a diffused eroticism to these scenes: the sexuality of words like rectus, supinus, latus, lascivius, and even placet has to be read into the text by the hypersensitive modern hermeneut. Although we will be able to find plenty of overtly sexualized scenes in Quintilian, he is, on the whole, rather genteel. But then again, so is the sexuality of the legitimate speaker. This is not the case with Lucian and the description of this new guide. We know that this guide is sexualized, that his illegitimate oratory is written all over his body. Now we know, by way of appeal to Quintilian, more about the trouble with his neck. And, on the other side, we know more about the latent sexuality of Quintilian. The guide's bent neck is succeeded by a sexually decisive detail: he has an effeminate look in his eye (yuvaixeiov TO |3Aimia). This point stands in precise contrast to the manliness of the other guide's gaze (aQQevoojtoc; TO f&ejjjxa). An equally unambiguous sexual detail is the way in which the guide scratches his head with his finger: to do so is womanish and wanton. The gesture is recorded in Plutarch's Life of Pompey 48 as an insult leveled against Pompey. Clodius arranged that Pompey be jeered with chants that included this insult when the latter entered the courthouse for Milo's trial. Plutarch's On Deriving Profit from One's Enemies repeats the anecdote, but expatiates on the gesture itself in the course of defending Pompey against the slander implicit in it.13 Effeminacy and wantonness: this is a disagreeable association, but one that subtends the whole of our chosen text. The effeminate and the uncontrolled are the antithesis of the manly discipline we seek. When this guide is associated with Sardanapalus, Cinuras, and Agathon, we find him amid a rogues' gallery of effeminate males. Here as elsewhere the best reader of Lucian is one who already has the legitimate and well-grounded education with whose principles this essay plays. A true student of the bad guide could never understand the elaborate web of allusions that is woven

158

STAGING MASCULINITY

throughout the Praeceptor: Cinuras was the mythical Cretan king who founded the cult of Aphrodite there. Sardanapalus was an effeminate king of Assyria, killed out of contempt when a solder saw him carding wool among the women. 14 Contemptuousness is the appropriate response to the sight of an effeminate man in a position of authority. Certainly, this is the stance taken both in Aristotle and in our Praeceptor rhetorum. Finally, we find Agathon, the unmanly poet lampooned for effeminacy in Aristophanes. Aritophanes' Thesmophoriazousai is a particularly apposite text for our purposes, especially verses 130-45, where Mnesilochus tries to figure out whom he has just seen. The final lines of this inquiry read thus: Su x3 ouxog, d) Jtai, Jioxepov obc; avr\Q xpecpei; Km Jtou Jteog; Ilou %Xaiva; Hov Aaxamxai; AIX d)g yvvi] Stye3; Eixa nov xa xixBia; Ti cpf]g; Ti OLyag; 'AXka brtf ex xov (letarug ^Tixcb of, ejtei&r) y3 auxog OV |3ouXei cpQaaai; [Son, who are you? Are you raised as a man? Then where's your prick? Your cloak? Your boots? Or is it as a woman then? So where're your tits? What do you say? Why're you silent? Then from your verse Shall I inquire, seeing that you yourself don't want to say? The body and the contents of the verse again coincide. The cloak is just another version of the prick, and the style is just another referent to that same universal signifier. Agathon's androgyny causes confusion: the exclusive binarism of the question Mnesilochus asks (jtoxepov . . . alX\ . . br\z\ . .) cannot be properly answered. Mnesilochus will appeal to style to know the man. We find similar confusion, androgyny, and bisexuality in our rhetorical guide. In his case we will see that he has assumed and incorporated the feminine, rather than compassed and excluded it, like the first guide and our narrator, his pupil. And much as Agathon must declare his own gender, choose tits or a prick, so must the orator either confess a gender or have it read out of him: his words will be scoured for their gendered truth. Of course, the relationship is circular, and words give you your gender affiliation in their own turn: oratorical style serves as a secondary sexual characteristic. The voice of this second guide is honeyed in the double sense: the sound is honey-sweet (fxeXtXQOv xo epeovrma), but the speaker's own mouth exudes the scent of honey. This is more than the "he smells of perfume" that comes next on the list (^IUQCDV ajiojtveovxa). I am instead thinking of the phrase "opening that Hymettic mouth" (xo CY(LIT)XXLOV exeivo avoi^ag

PLEASURE

159

axo^a), where Mt. Hymettus is an Athenian mountain famed for its honey. The metaphorical pleasure that the guide's voice gives is converted into literal honey. The qualities used to describe the body become actual attributes of that body. And in this case the attribute is picked up and turned into a snide comment: he is some other sort of being who is fed on dew and ambrosia. This, then, is our corporeal introduction to the second guide. We have a guide who is relentlessly bodily. This guide even appears to embrace such a reduction to physicality. He has a self-conscious and cynical relationship to his own body. He is a student of the body and pleasure whose goal is manifest imbecility, affectation, deception, and sensual gratification. The narrator of the text tells the young man that as the student of this guide, he will at once and effortlessly become a conspicuous orator or " 'a king of discourse,' as the guide himself would say" (cog ovojia^et auxoc;, |3aaiA,euc; ev xoig Xoyotg).15 Although he is about to make some further remark about this guide's program of study, the narrator breaks off: xa JtQCOia niv exeiva — \iaXkov Se avxbq ebtdxco JTQOC; ae * y^oiov yap VJIEQ XOIOUXOU QT]XOQ05 8|I8 JTOl£lO0ai XOVC, XoyOUg, CpaiAoV IJJtOXQIXT|V LG035 XCOV XOlOlkoV XCU XTjXlXOUXOOV, |IT] XCXl (XUVXQL'l|)a) KOV

jceaoDV xov fJQeoa 6v imoxQivo|iai. <J>atr| xoiyaQow av TCQOC, ae d)5e jrcog emajraad^ievog orcoaov exi XOLJTOV xf]5 X6|LITI5 xai \mo\xeibiaoaTaxov xaxaxoifxi^ouaa.

182

STAGING MASCULINITY

[You compel unnecessary sexual acts, employing all sorts of machinations and using men as women. For thus do you educate your own friends, at night violating them and putting them to bed for the best part of the day.] (Xenophon, Memorabilia 2.1.30) Again sexual inversion is invoked as the acme of vice. Pleasure leads straight to social, sexual, even temporal chaos. The program of virtue, though, has explicitly eschewed pleasure, setting in its place truth. She begins her description of her path thus: "I will not deceive you with preambles about pleasure, but in which way the gods did actually dispense, this will I recount for you with truth." 47 Her next words come straight from the manly guide's hymnal: nothing good comes without toil (jcovog). The long list of fair ends she recounts all have toil as their chief means. And when one gets to the body, one learns that the way to get anything out of it is to make it serve the will (yv6}\xr\) and to train it with toils and sweat (Xenophon, Memorabilia 2.1.28). The erotic attachment to the first and truly beautiful guide can and must be purchased with a submission to toil. Her body, just like the manly guide's body, is inscribed with a set of virtues that are remote and hardwon. Indeed, their whole message is to win the student into engaging in their project rather than immediately assuming their kind of body. They propose an iterative, toilsome project familiar to us from our examination of Demosthenes a la Quintilian. The body that is the product of this toil is lovely without being the object of base desire. One admires it for its being; it does not condescend to reach out and please its audience. On the contrary, its gesture is, if anything, punishing, the act of a master. With pleasure now so thoroughly discredited, I would like to take one last look at the youthful addressee of the Praeceptor rhetorum. There are two good approximate names we might give him: Hercules and Lucian. As a Heracles the youth stands at the crossroads to oratory, choosing bodies and choosing paths of life. He decides in what manner to use his prodigious talents, whether to pursue pleasure and to give pleasure, or instead to submit to a regime of self-mastery, to become unambiguously masculine. This is how Xenophon read Socrates reading Prodicus speculating about Heracles. And let us add to this literary list Lucian reading Xenophon and making the philosophical musing into a rhetorical one. Moreover, Lucian's reader is likewise invited to participate in the chain, to see the allusion, to savor the fruits of his own difficult education. "Lucian" is also an appropriate name to affix to the youthful addressee of the Praeceptor The narrator can thus be seen as the object of his own address. He instructs a temporally displaced version of himself as to the

PLEASURE

183

validity of his own being and likewise gives tokens to himself of the process of his own constitution. The young man is a sort of hero about to embark on a fateful course. At the same time, he represents the past of the narrator himself. There are accordingly numerous investments in the youth on the part of the adviser. The tale he tells to the youth is part a tale told to himself. The irregularities and lacunae in this narrative, though, point toward serious conflicts and contestations within the structure of assuming the title of orator and accepting the hailing of the discipline and punishment that governs it. The narrator behaves toward the young man as an erastes treats an eromenos, as a sexually interested elder male treats a younger male in need of guidance. There is an erotic exchange, then, proceeding in the inverse direction from the one represented by Pollux. The authorized and authorial voice of the manly sort of oratory decries the overt pleasure-giving rhetoric of a Pollux. But the manly orator has his pleasures. He is an eroticized, bodily creature. His pleasures, though, consist in taking. His is the pleasure of domination: self-domination, domination of the student, domination of the masses. Another literary parallel should be adduced here. Lucian's Somnium (Dream), which has as its alternate title The Life of Lucian, has a strikingly familiar structure. Beyond structural parallels, though, the themes of that essay unpack the bodily politics of the Praeceptor The virility of oratory is once again established, but it is also more clearly predicated upon an initial violence. I do not like the alternate title offered for the Somnium since it seems to require a strict identification of Lucian with the narrator of the text. Even if Lucian were to speak in propria persona, nevertheless this would still be just another persona, a mask of himself in contrast to a "real" Lucian. 48 We are dealing in the Somnium and in the Praeceptor with rhetorical fantasies of the subject, dreamy imaginings of the metaphorical shape of the self. We are presented not with real people but rather with rhetorical claims as to the reality and validity of various subjects. Given that one can read identity as itself an iterated performance of rhetorical claims as to identity, textual repetitions of the same stamp should be retained as rhetorical and not biographical. We should not set a rigid boundary fixing a boarder between life and literature. We must safeguard rhetoric against ontology. In the Somnium, a young boy has just finished learning his ABCs. 49 His father and some friends deliberate on what course of life would be best for the boy to pursue. Toil, time, and cost are weighed against considerations of speed and ease. The boy is sent to be a statue carver, because some of his youthful wax models had shown promise. For these nonscholarly works his teachers had beaten him, but his father had conceived some

184

STAGING MASCULINITY

hopes for a future career.50 The boy is transferred to a workshop run by an uncle; the family has prior generations of sculptors. The sculptor uncle hands the boy a chisel and bids him to start in on a piece. From inexperience the boy's strike is very poor. The uncle picks up a club and beats the child. The youth flees the workshop, sobbing and weeping, covered with bruises. At home he falls asleep, still in tears and thinking of the club. 51 The dream the narrator recounts was remarkably vivid (oikco aacpr] jrdvxa f]v) (Somnium 5). Two women took his hands and started hauling at him in a competition for possession of the youth. He is nearly torn apart by their zealous struggle. The two women turn out to be Craft and Education, TexvT] and nai5eia. They are, naturally, both put into different bodies and compared. Even though the body of Craft is called manly (av5Qixr|) in Somnium 6, its gender is compromised later. Meanwhile the description of Education contains nothing effete in it: she is "very fair of face and becoming in her bearing, and orderly in her dress." 52 While there are many detailed and doubtless controversial points that should be discussed at greater length, I would like to be brief and accordingly leave undiscussed the full scope of the terms of this debate between the two pursuits. Instead we will focus on what education entails. In a long passage of section 13 filled with references to the body the craftsman is scorned for "having his head bent down to his work, being a lover of the lowly, a devotee of the lowly, in every manner low, never lifting his head and never considering a manly or nonservile thought." 53 Thus manliness reemerges as the legitimate principle of domination. And in this case it is used to sanction the mastery of the orator, who again is looked at and marveled at from all quarters. The orator is manly, free, and in charge. He won't be beaten; he won't have to cry. Section 12 of the Somnium is lexically almost identical to the passages of the Praeceptor that discuss the social awe with which the orator expects to be greeted. The orator occupies the position of the true man and the central position of social desire: don't be a grubby laborer, be a sublime speaker. The narrator of the Somnium wants youths to take his biography as an example, to follow in his footsteps, and to be better, at least, than any stonecutter. If we impute a subsequent history to this narrator by comparing him with the narrator of the Praeceptor, and if we accept his claims that he chose the hard path to rhetoric, then our composite narrative voice fled one sort of drubbing only to encounter another. Physical violence has been replaced by psychic abuse. The resentment that drips from the Somnium against the brutal uncle and the violence of his trade is replaced by the mock resentment of the Praeceptor against the folly of taking the hard road to rhetoric. And even when easy, sensual oratory has been discredited, the sorrows of discipline have not so much evanesced as they have been justified

PLEASURE

185

as inevitable. One must submit. The young man of the Somnium is beaten for botching his sculpted body. But when one turns to the Praeceptor, sculpted bodies recur in the educational biography: one's oratory must be like the product of history's finest sculptors. If it isn't, a psychic beating is administered. Egregious failures meet with castration. This violence is addressed not to a stony imitation of the body but to a social and psychological truth of the body. The sovereignty of legitimate speech is won along a trail that begins and ends with pain and hatred. The pain one avoided in the world has become self-imposed in oratory. And where pleasure is admitted to this conceptual framework, it is a whorish and revolting mockery. At the same time, pleasure keeps being admitted to the scene and seems indeed necessary to its very maintenance. The manly orator is husband to and master of the female Rhetoric. He can even, apparently, don the mask of an effeminate and eroticized creature like Pollux. But he maintains a contemptuous stance toward this faculty that can justly be called his own. The persistence of the Asianism and Atticism debate in all of its permutations should provoke in us the suspicion that there is something vital in the assumption of this effeminate persona and its subsequent smashing under foot. A compulsion to repetition of this act of destruction subtends the debate, not some arid positivistic question of style. As Reardon succinctly concluded: "Mais en realite l'Asianisme et l'Atticisme ne sont guere que des mots" (1971, 94). Much as the orator is always prone to confusion with the actor, so is he open to confusion with a woman or the passive homosexual who serves as her conceptual isomorph. To a certain extent, the shoe fits, but the orators refuse to wear it. Even though there may be a sort of melancholy remembrance of the road not taken and the blows endured on the way to masculinity, these narratives of subjection and subjectiviation insist that other bodies and other selves would be nightmarish (cf. Butler 1997b, 132-50). The more fundamental gesture in this talk of bodies and gestures is this very act of renunciation itself. In this ostentatious refusal there is a claim to power that covers both the self and the world. We find a consolidation of the rhetorical subject predicated upon a necessary liminalization of other orders, of the foreign, of the feminine, of the body as productive of pleasure. This act of assumption of the name oratory, though, is always imperfect and never complete. It is a self-wounding as well as a constitutive and subjectivating act. One returns again and again to the scene of the crime and strikes the compact anew. There is an attempt to purchase a kind of being by exiling an "alienness" that has been constituted within and by the very order that one seeks to consolidate. The inevitable misnaming required by such a scenario —a misnaming that includes oneself and the

186

STAGING MASCULINITY

excluded margins in its nominalizing act — generates a supplementary remainder with which the orator is consigned to grapple endlessly. This is the specter of the half-named or doubly named Pollux whom we can find stalking the pages of the Praeceptor from first to last. Indeed Pollux can even be found by other unnameable names in Quintilian, Cicero, and the rest of our rhetorical theorists. Pollux, his body, and his pleasure serve as an incitement to discourse that subtends the long history of the rhetoric on rhetoric. The spectacle of this body repeatedly staged as a doppleganger in the theatrum philosophicum of oratorical theory concludes with a death that secures the viability of the self-mastering master for whom pleasure is mastery. Have the politics of legitimating this pleasure declined and fallen with the Roman Empire?

CHAPTER 6

Love

us BACK to the problems of reading, writing, and textuality that we took up in the first chapter. At the same time, this will be the occasion for seeing the good body and good corporeality set against a broader social and intellectual backdrop. The occasion for this conceptual summary and reunion is Cicero's De oratore. And while we will be moving in closer to the problem of the text, we will also be moving back a bit from the close scrutiny of the orator's body in action to examine instead the text itself as a social performance. Where my first chapter saw textuality as both a problem and a ruse in Quintilian, here we will find the text to be an enactment of its own principles. Accordingly the good and legitimate pleasures that have been reserved for the present chapter are not only defined but also enacted by Cicero's work qua text, even as this text decries the idea of the rhetorical handbook. 1 The mise-en-scene and characters of the De oratore, as well as its specific precepts, perform the text's own principles of good rhetorical theory by way of both rule and example. Furthermore, this vision of rhetoric, more than just refusing pleasure and pedanticism, also presents itself as a bond that holds together civil society. And so De oratore becomes a tract revealing and encapsulating homosocial desire. By reading this text as a performance — a paradoxical activity that immediately recalls Quintilian in the first chapter —we will descry the disciplined movements and tones, the actio atque pronuntiatio of pleasing masters of rhetoric, of praeceptores who become models of and for the very precepts they would disparage in a ruleladen handbook. Hence we have a text that performs for us the very manly presence of the vir bonus that our studies have long sought, and in so doing, it concomitantly assaults the idea of the handbook, as being the death of manly presence and thus of elite Roman society itself.2 What follows is intended to serve as more than an exposition of the De oratore and the technique it employs. This long and elaborate text admits of a variety of productive readings. Hall sees De oratore as a highly refined text and one very much concerned with the details of social life.3 MacKendrick THIS CHAPTER BRINGS

188

STAGING MASCULINITY

(1948) reads for a politics of pedagogy in terms of aristocratic propaganda. If we relax somewhat the rigidity of this cold-war phasing, we can translate his argument into an investigation of the elitism and education. Orban (1950) vindicates De oratore as a philosophical dialogue that augments the intellectual status of rhetoric. Kroll (1903) is similarly interested in the union of philosophy and politics that De oratore advocates. Each of these readings examines one or more key threads of the text: Cicero, ever ambitious, has taken on society, politics, education, philosophy, and oratory. I would like to use this work to gather together many of the themes that have previously arisen and to show that Cicero's dialogue canonizes its version of pleasure and textuality in such a way as to legitimate not just Cicero and his rhetoric, but the whole social order that language is meant to help bind together. 4 This reading will, I hope, both round out and advance the work of prior chapters. Such a reading, though, is itself enabled only by keeping in mind those earlier conclusions. If I read Cicero as if he were staging a comedy of Plautus or borrowing from the poetic lexicon of an amorous Catullus, I do so to stage and eroticize the authoritative version of rhetoric whose existence has been predicated on the exclusion of the histrionic, the seductive, and the hedonistic. Such a reading is meant to be more than mere willfulness or perversion on my part, for I will be examining the scars and traces of those prior excisions as oratory is translated into a sublimated reinscription of those same renounced qualities.5 Textuality itself is numbered among these problems that are announced and then overcome, purged and then reinstated. Textuality will thus offer another nexus at which the problems of authority and authenticity that plague acting and pleasure get worked at all over again. The De oratore has been praised lavishly as a rhetorical treatise. Courbaud, the editor of the Bude edition, says of it, "Le De Oratore est un chef-d'oeuvre, en effet, non peut-etre du point de vue de l'art pur (il manque a l'auteur certains des qualites de Platon), mais un chef-d'oeuvre de bon sens, de raison droite et saine, de pensee genereuse et haute. C'est le plus original et le plus interessant des traites des rhetorique" (Courbaud 1967, viii). If the De Oratore is a masterpiece of good taste and rightthinking, the acme of its genre, what, then, has been lost or occluded in this process of sublimation? The answer is that the genre of the handbook itself has been lost, as well as the possibility of direct didacticism. The written depiction of this society of elite peers, their authority and distinction, and of their pleasure constitutes a new antihandbook. This antihandbook posits its authority as emerging from within its own dialogic form and from its imitation of social performance. De oratore as a mere text is itself condemned to be always and only words on a page, but with its written society of good men

LOVE

189

handbook in contradistinction to the precepts of an Ad Herennium, a De inventione, or an Institutio oratoria. Courbaud participates in this line of argument when he rejects detailed oratorical instruction like Quintilian's. From Courbaud's introduction we learn that Cicero is the voice in the wilderness fighting against pedantry and that Quintilian represents the return on a grand scale of this abhorrent practice (1967, xv-xvi). Courbaud praises Cicero's chef-d'oeuvre for its liberation from the schoolhouse: "Qu'enseigne-t-on dans l'ecole? Des regies, rien que des regies; et on croit a l'efficacite souveraine de ces regies. On definit, on classe, on distingue." Courbaud the good scholar on Cicero himself defines, classifies, and distinguishes in the course of his exposition of Ciceronian excellence. There is an ironic aspiration toward the sublimity of a Cicero even as the scholar finds himself in the position of a Quintilian: one seeks to offer a lucid analytic account of something ineffably grand. This same section of Courbaud's introduction goes on to express horror at the sovereignty of rules over "les aptitudes naturelles." This praise of the individual will return in the end of the present chapter in the discussion of Cicero's great individuals and his republic of manly, authentic peers. Courbaud, then, has gotten his Cicero right: one cannot assemble a good man from a list of rules. Courbaud's protest is framed in an idiom that has been carefully critiqued by Bourdieu. Bourdieu remarks that "for a full understanding we have to consider another property of all aristocracies. The essence in which they see themselves refuses to be contained in any definition. Escaping petty rules and regulations, it is, by nature, freedom" (1984, 24). To what extent, then, is the critique of rules that Courbaud lauds in the De oratore implicated in the production of freedom and aristocracy for its readers? And to what mastery must we subject ourselves if we are to aspire to attain the same heights of culture? To recapitulate the various strands of this introduction, let me offer in abbreviated form a set of questions and provisional answers that will guide the interests of this chapter. If there is a legitimate oratorical pleasure, what sort of pleasure might this be? Of what would it consist? What sort of social issues ally themselves to this pleasure? Here we will be picking up decor and similar genteel aesthetic terms from the chapter on discovering the body, complementing them with the image of the manly guide, and affixing these words and images to be specific provisions of De oratore. The social station and roles of these men of good pleasure will all cluster around a cult of individuality and authority that fetishizes the image and roles of the hegemonic Roman male. Next we will ask about the form in which these messages are transmitted. What kind of rhetorical theory corresponds to these men and their version of pleasure? What sort of text encompasses such a theory? What kind of textuality has been lost or excluded? Here we will find

190

STAGING MASCULINITY

This sort of book is the only kind allowed the mature vir bonus, and other varieties are suited only to foreigners, the young, and the inept. And finally, given these men and this text, what sort of world are they intended to occupy? With this last question we will find Cicero using oratory and rhetorical theory to create a fantasy of Roman society, a society seen as on the brink of dissolution and in need of salvation. Cicero's project, though, allows for the simultaneous description, salvation, and successful reproduction of the Roman order. Hence De oratore is no trifling matter of speculation or mere portraiture of rhetoric and its history; it is instead a handbook not just of the self, but also of the world. Let us pause for a word on De oratore itself. As the title indicates, it is a dialogue about oratory and the orator. Cicero completed this work in 55 B.C.E. (Cicero, Ad Atticum 4.13.2 [November 55]). Thus De oratore is a product of the period following upon Cicero's exile in 58 and his restitution in 57, a period during which Cicero withdraws from the courts and public life while the triumvirs dominate Roman politics.6 As Habinek (forthcoming) has shown, though, Cicero's cultural projects are by no means a form of defeatist secession: Cicero uses the works of this period to build a "commonwealth of letters," a literary fiction put to use in the maintenance of aristocratic domination in a period of political discord. The present chapter is meant to complement this thesis by examining in some detail the social consequences of Cicero's account of oratory. Cicero uses his dialogue to harness the full potentialities of rhetorical discipline in order to use them to shore up an unstable Roman social and political climate. The dramatic date of the discussion that the young Cicero supposedly attended, and that De oratore purportedly records, is September 91 B.C.E. The dialogue occupies two days of colloquy and discussion during the Ludi Romani, or Roman Games. This is a time of festival at Rome; there is a cessation of public business and an opportunity for the busy leisure of Cicero's dramatis personae. On the day before the conversation depicted in De oratore, a number of prominent Romans had gathered to discuss the contemporary political crisis, and their discussion lasted until an advanced hour {De oratore 1.3). A summary of political upheaval of 91 can be found in Wilkins' commentary on the dialogue (1892, 5-8). Wilkins is right to remind us of the obscurity of this political crisis that involved the extension of the franchise to the Italian allies. But Wilkins ought also to note that De oratore itself sheds almost no light on this subject. In fact, the opening of book 3 offers the clearest depiction in the dialogue of the events of 91, yet Crassus' swan song is portrayed there as an attack on the Senate's bereavement (orbitas) and as a lamentation of the plunder of its hereditary distinction (patrimonium dignitatis) at the hands of the consul Philippus (De oratore 3.3). Thus the crisis is depicted in terms of a threat to the privilege

LOVE

191

of the Roman ruling class as originating within that class, a threat posed by a consul. In 55 B.C.E., though, Pompey and Crassus, two of the triumvirs and two of the biggest threats to the Roman Senate, were the consuls. I do not wish to advocate a narrow, allegorical reading of De oratore,1 but the parallel sense of political upheaval felt within the dialogue and without it should be borne in mind when the characters within the De oratore are found to be preoccupied with the preservation and reproduction of a ruling class.8 While any commentary, or even most translations, of the De oratore would provide a more comprehensive description of the participants in the dialogue, 9 a few words on some of the men mentioned in the discussion below are in order. The two principal speakers are L. Licinius Crassus (140-91 B.C.E.) and M. Antonius (140-87 B.C.E.). 1 0 Both men had held Rome's hightest office prior to 91, Crassus serving as consul in 95 and Antonius in 99. These men were not only at the forefront of the political class of their era, but they were also considered to be the leading orators of the day. These conjoint attainments by both contribute to their authority (auctoritas), the quality that Cicero singles out when he claims he prefers to record their discussion rather than to repeat readily available Greek precepts (De oratore 1.23). Antonius and Crassus are thus authorities in the fullest sense of the term, and this authority adheres to their persons, not to some abstract maxims. These two elder speakers and statesmen are asked for their opinions on oratory by two young aspiring men of affairs, P. Sulpicius Rufus (124-88 B.C.E.) and M. Aurelius Cotta (born 124; consul 74 B.C.E.). The first is more a student of Crassus, and the second inclines to Antonius. The other two figures who will be mentioned below are Q. Lutatius Catulus (consul 102; dies 87 B.C.E.), a senior politician who knew Scipio and Laelius when he was young, and C. Iulius Caesar Strabo Vopiscus (c. 130-87 B.C.E.), a man of affairs known for his wit in his oratory. One should note how few of the participants in the dialogue survived this turbulent political period. Any Roman reader would recall that it was not just Crassus who would be dead within a few years of this discussion. In any case, all of these men were prominent politicians in their day, good men with solid family and social ties. Before exploring the text of the De oratore as text, I would like to set out a portrait of rhetorical pleasures and social callings. The assimilation of the quality of the man to the quality of his pleasures will serve to bridge the gulf between the society of oratory and the sensuality that has hitherto been found clinging to oratory. Thus the good pleasures of good men become guarantors of legitimate rhetorical pleasures.

192

STAGING MASCULINITY

Pleasure and society in the realm of rhetoric operate via a set of paired associations and implied equations that ultimately yield a vision of social station as truth. In tracing this associative course, truth will first be taken for beauty, then beauty for pleasure, and lastly pleasure for social standing. In other words, the domination of the dominant fraction becomes a fair and pleasing truth. 11 The genteel pleasures of this social mastery are the obverse of the pleasures that texts like Lucian's ostentatiously attempt to extirpate. Decor or "grace" aptly describes the beauty of the martial orator, a beauty set against decadence and on the side of truth. In the De oratore the word decor as such does not appear. Nevertheless, the more abstract moral cognate of decor, decus, appears twice in a pair of revealing passages. Cicero's use of these two reveals a close affinity between manifest elegance and social esteem, and the lexicographer's distinction between the moral and physical translations of the term decus falls apart when the two registers are merged within the De oratore. In fact, it is not clear that we should ever assume a radical division between the two spheres, but rather suspect that the production and maintenance of such semantic divisions within Latin is the result of the very tropes of social mastery and homosocial displacement of the homosexual component of affective life that we are examining. Decus, which is formed from the same verbal stem as is decor, means "honor" or "distinction" in the abstract or again "graceful attractiveness" when physically manifest. Late in the history of the language, Latin grammarians rigidly distinguish the two words. One reads that decus is characteristic of a man's dignity, decor of his physical appearance {decus honoris, decor formae est).12 One of these beauties is sublime, the other earthly. But this schema is rather forced and does not correspond to the early history of these words. In particular, Cicero tells of virtus, or (manly) virtue, sustaining itself by its own decor {suo decore se ipsa sustentat) {De republica 3.40). The physical and the abstract collapse as the spiritual relies upon the physical quality. Additionally, Cicero argues that a quasi-erotic virtus or manly virtue ought to entice a man to true decus with its seductive charms {suis te oportet illecebris ipsa virtus trahat ad verum decus) {De re publica 6.25). The verbal parallel between these two passages is striking: the "beauty" of the first passage rewritten as "charms" in the second, and Cicero's images are resolutely concrete and corporeal as he treats of these abstractions. Masculine excellence spans elegance and honor, the concrete and the abstract. The spell of erotic enchantment cast by masculinity's charms furnishes us with the paradigm of the homosociality that we will constantly find in the De oratore. Prior to examining the specifically physical attractions of rhetoric in

LOVE

193

the De oratore, it will be helpful to pause briefly over the morality of decus. At De oratore 1.199, the study of law is destined for use as a distinction and ornament to Crassus' old age (ad decus atque ornamentum senectutis) .13 When Crassus wonders what could be more resplendent (praeclarius) than such a program and study, we see that, as was the case with the ornament (ornamentum) with which decus is first yoked, here too decus finds itself suddenly ostentatious rather than an abstract "distinction." Decus, then, is part of the legitimate ostentation and showiness of the vir bonus, and it serves as part of his expected social performance. Oliensis offers a succinct portrait of Horace's position that could apply equally to our orators: "Decorum is always an expression of power. . . . Manliness depends on decorum, and decorum depends on manliness."14 The orator is a god among men, a scourge to his enemies, the producer of public virtue, and the extirpator of public vice: Non enim causidicum nescio quern neque clamatorem aut rabulam hoc sermone nostro conquirimus, sed eum virum, qui primum sit eius artis antistes, cuius cum ipsa natura magnam homini facultatem daret, tamen esse deus putatur, ut id ipsum, quod erat hominis proprium, non partum per nos, sed divinitus ad nos delatum videretur; deinde, qui possit non tarn caduceo quam nomine oratoris ornatus incolumis vel inter hostium tela versari; turn, qui scelus fraudemque nocentis possit dicendo subicere odio civium supplicioque constringere; idemque ingeni praesidio innocentiam iudiciorum poena liberare; idemque languentem labentemque populum aut ad decus excitare aut ab errore deducere aut inflammare in improbos aut incitatum in bonos mitigare; qui denique, quemcumque in animis hominum motum res et causa postulet, eum dicendo vel excitare possit vel sedare. [I am not looking to discuss some pleader or shouter or ranting tubthumper, but instead that man who is a high priest of the art. While nature herself gave a grand capacity for oratory to man, it nevertheless seems God-given, so that man's ability, though it is his own, appears not born of us but to descend to us from on high. I am looking for a man who can make his way unharmed even amid the missiles of the enemy, adorned not so much by a herald's staff as by the title orator, a man who can with his speech subject to public odium the crime and treachery of the guilty and secure their punishment, a man who can liberate innocence from legal penalties with his protecting genius, a man who can stir a listless and failing public to glory, lead them from error, enrage them against the wicked, or assuage their wrath toward good men, a man, finally, whose speech can arouse or calm in the hearts of men whatever passion the situation or the case may require.] (Cicero, De oratore 1.202.)

194

STAGING MASCULINITY

This passage reads like a sermon upon the mysteries of oratory. The good orator is a thing almost divine and rigidly segregated from a mere shouter or brawler. Then, as he advances like some invincible soldier, the spears of the orator's enemies fail before his very title. And, lastly, the orator does not so much manifest a social honor/beauty as he actively creates it in a frequently undeserving populace: the epithets "listless" (languentem) and "failing" (labentem) are cutting. Briefly, then, the orator's person is beautiful and honorable. It evinces decor. At the same time, his pursuits and his products are themselves always surrounded by this same noble comeliness. The hand of this godlike being is to be seen at every turn. The social order both radiates and is everywhere permeated by the effects of the orator. The truth of this sociality, though derived from the consequences of the orator's practice, has the higher sanction of nature itself. It seems even to be the dispensation of a divinity. While the body's beauty from earlier chapters fits well with the broader role of decor/decus in the De oratore, beauty and truth also find a complementary pairing of beauty and pleasure: nunc hoc propono, quod mihi persuasi, quamvis ars non sit, tamen nihil esse perfecto oratore praeclarius; nam ut usum dicendi omittam, qui in omni pacata et libera civitate dominatur, tanta oblectatio est in ipsa facultate dicendi, ut nihil hominum aut auribus aut mentibus iucundius percipi possit. Qui enim cantus moderata oratione dulcior inveniri potest? Quod carmen artificiosa verborum conclusione aptius? Qui actor imitanda quam orator suscipienda veritate iucundior? Quid autem subtilius quam crebrae acutaeque sententiae? Quid admirabilius quam res splendore inlustrata verborum? Quid plenius quam omni genere rerum cumulata oratio? Neque ulla non propria oratoris res est, quae quidem ornate dici graviterque debet. [Now I will give you my sincere belief: although it's not an "art," there is nothing more distinguished than a consummate orator. Omitting the utility of speech and its sovereignty in all peaceful and free states, there is such delight in the very capacity for speaking that nothing more pleasing can be perceived by human ears or minds. What song is sweeter than a well-measured oration? What poem better composed than an artfully finished phrase? What actor more agreeable for imitating the truth than an orator for championing it? And then what more precise than a succession of penetrating maxims? What more admirable than a subject illustrated with verbal splendor? What fuller than an oration heaped high with material of every sort? Nor is there any subject inappropriate to an orator, provided that it requires ornate and serious expression.] (Cicero, De oratore 2.33-34)

LOVE

195

Notice that the radiance, honor, and glory of praeclarius appears once again, only this time attached to the speaker himself and not to one of his attendant pursuits. Personal grandeur is next explained (nam) by way of an appeal to the superlative delights of the faculty of speech (oblectatio, dulcior, and nihil iucundius). This transfer of attention from the man to his profession suffuses the former with pleasure and delight in the euphemized register of the latter. There is no Pollux here, no fair body inciting and offering fleshy delights — splendor, ornamentation, and the truth accrue to the orator via his art and not his body. This flashy and sensual vocabulary is directed toward inner and essential qualities of the good male speaker, Cato's vir bonus dicendi peritus, and his calling: remember, the perfect orator (perfecto oratore) was the opening image of this passage, even if his oratory is the subsequent focus of the passage (see Kuhnert 1994, 63-68, again). The sensualism and spectacle rendered here thus safely dodge both the superficial actor and bad pleasure by transforming the praise of the orator into a praise of the art of rhetoric. Keeping with this unspoken and unspeakable pleasure, beauty, and splendor for a moment longer, let me examine it in one last example: the pleasure of Antonius. First there is Antonius the encomiast of eloquence; but there is also Antonius the teacher of rhetoric, or the praeceptor rhetorum, the role he plays vis-a-vis Sulpicius and Cotta. In fact, this teaching will turn out to also be a sort of seduction of these young men, as will be seen below. Within the setting of the dialogue, Antonius' praise of oratory is interrupted by Catulus, who commends the eloquent praise of eloquence as particularly apt (De oratore 2.29). In so doing, Catulus lets us see that all of the beauty and pleasure of eloquence do in fact redound back upon the person of the speaker. In this way, Antonius' speech is a self-praise, and the laurels we would put on the brow of oratory are ones he manages to win for his own. The praise and beauty of an abstraction are once again intimately bound up with a real body and character. A good man ought to be ashamed to solicit or to bestow praise for personal beauty or to bask in the pleasure of his male presence. But forbidden carnal delights are deflected into the aesthetic register even as this realm is suffused with a wholly sensual vocabulary. This same scene in the De oratore, though, will move us from the analysis of beauty and pleasure and into the discussion of pleasure and social station. Catulus' interruption of Antony's praise of oratory, "I can't help but cry out" (non possum quin exclamem), is explicitly taken from Plautus' Trinummus, as Catulus himself signals. In the original for this citation, the slave Stasimon cries out these words and the following at a clever speech of his master's friend:

196

STAGING MASCULINITY

Non enim possum quin exclamem euge. euge, Lysiteles, Jtcdiv. facile palmam habes: hie victust, vicit tua comoedia. hie agit magis ex argumento et versus melioris facit. [I can't help but cry out, "Bravo, bravo, Lysiteles. Encore!" You easily take the prize: he's beat; your comedy wins. Lysiteles plays more to the plot and composes better verses.] (Plautus, Trinummus 705-7) Here the text of the De oratore opens itself up as the text of a performance, the product of a comedy. A metatextual moment from Plautus is rehearsed giving a parallel metatextual event in Cicero's dialogue. The contest between Antonius and Crassus is pushed into the agonistic scene from the Trinummus, and the orators' auditors are here suddenly aligned with the most passive possible Romans, slaves. At the same time, Antonius and Crassus become masters and, in a doubled sense, actors. They are actors putting on a play within a play, staging their own scenes within Cicero's broader drama. As we saw before in the chapter on acting, citations from drama obsessively return to haunt oratory, destabilizing rhetoric time and again by refusing closure and self-identity to the orator and his performance. On the surface of Cicero's dialogue we find self-aware gentlemen politely patting one another on the back, but at another level these same performances of gentility are associated with baser stuff: slaves, mere acting, and fake plots. If it seems an unpleasant and also far-fetched reading of this passage to so rigidly insist upon the theatrical in it, Crassus' own interruption at 2.40 and Antonius response to it do nothing to dispel the sense of staginess that hangs over the text. And these responses also heighten the air of euphemized pleasures and seductions. Crassus is pleased that Antonius' orator now seems more aristocratic and genteel, and he marvels at how today's Antonius has been transformed in the space of a night: he has been polished and returned a human being (hominem). Why should a Roman bother to remark that one of his peers is a human? Let us then pause for a second at homo, the species word for man, as opposed to the gender term for man. In either case, of course, the word is best understood by the set of constitutive exclusions that sustain the concept. 15 To be a man (homo) in this instance is the same but different from all of our prior injunctions to be a man (vir). It is worthwhile to note a Ciceronian parallel from the letters to Atticus that offers a similarly genteel moment: "If you want to be a man (homo), come back to us." 16 In the letter human means "one of us" and is part of our euphemized homosocial world of polite male pleasures.

LOVE

197

Cicero opens by mentioning the manumission of a slave of Atticus' at Cicero's request, and Cicero also includes a discussion of the slave's new name as a freedman, T Caecilius, a name derived from Atticus' own. This name is compared with the name of another slave who became M. Pomponius by way of a combination of Cicero's and Atticus' own names (ex me et ex te iunctus) (Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 4.15.1). This M. Pomponius, a virtual offspring of these two men, their mutual son in name, cements homosocial relations between the two Romans. 17 In this case, it is not a woman who is exchanged; rather it is a slave who is freed by way of becoming the child/dependent/client of Cicero and Atticus. This letter continues, though, with a fear that Atticus will not return hastily because he will be detained by the "grace and charm" (lepos) of Clodius and the learning of Pituanius. Lepos is usually a positive word, but this is only another way of saying that it is genteel and unerotic, a euphemism for beauty rather than patent and suspect beauty. While we are supposed to take lepos as a pleasant social grace and not a physical charm, the society of other men nevertheless produces a quasi-sexual jealousy: "Return, Atticus, to our little family, my lepos, and my learning." The talk of the bond Cicero and Atticus share via their freedmen-children is pitted against the scene of learned charms imagined abroad, and one homosociality is set against another that Cicero as well can furnish: will Atticus choose good lovers or Cicero, a good husband with charms of his own? Shackelton-Bailey's commentary on this letter (1965) notes that this sentiment is insincere since Clodius and Pituanius would have been thought of as boors by both Cicero and Atticus. This detail does not disrupt the structure of Cicero's sentiment, it only makes the protest less earnest: "Of course you will return to me." Thus, homo is not simply a mortal, a nonanimal; nor is it even a simple question of breeding. Instead homo in these contexts means a pleasing man, where this pleasure derives from the good Eros, which is a sexuality put under erasure, though still legible. This is the Eros of good men (homines/ viri boni) and their good society. It is an Eros found not just between Cicero and Atticus, but one that characterizes the society of the De oratore. To return to Crassus' praise of today's Antonius at the expense of yesterday's, yesterday Antonius potrayed the orator as something of a one-trick pony (unius cuiusdam operis), an orator who was like some oarsman or porter (remigem aliquem aut baiulum), a man lacking "humanity" (inopem humanitatis), the quality that separates men from beasts, citizens from savages, cruelty from kindness. This orator was "inurbane" (inurbanum). This critique of Antonius' portrait of the orator is again signaled by Crassus as a line from a comedy, in this case a line from a now-lost play of

198

STAGING MASCULINITY

Caecilius. Apparently Crassus is happy to keep the discussion in the metaphoric register of the comic stage that Catulus first evoked. Crassus' remarks, borrowed from Caecilius or not, build a set of provocative dichotomies. We have yesterday's Antonius versus today's Antonius, rough and inhuman Antonius versus polished and humane Antonius, the oarsman and porter versus the refined and urbane orator. Polished and humane Antonius begs comparison with the civilized and urbane orator. In other words, the depiction of the orator and the speaker who does the depicting are again conflated. This time, though, the issue is not manifestly pleasure, but instead urbanity — though this quality has already been put into some doubt above — and social station, or, more broadly, humanity tout court Of course in this last case humanity stands in as a token that signifies all of the other qualities taken together. Thus humanity is actually a special subset of pleasing sociality. A gentleman is the only human worth being. Although we are not speaking openly of pleasures here, we have hardly left 2.33 and its delights behind. Indeed this whole excursus is provoked by those sentiments. But Antonius' own response to the interruptions of both Catulus and Crassus is itself erotic after its fashion. Strikingly, Antonius tacitly accepts his characterization by Crassus as "less than human" by responding that yesterday he had set himself the task of refuting Crassus and thereby "abducting" his students. 18 This loaded reply puts a new spin on Catulus' implicit charge of dramaturgy and agonism: yesterday was the contest, while today Antonius is sincere. Now we are forced to revise our opinion of Antonius and instead see him as merely a performer in book 1. But with Catulus' interruption, today is a performance as well: the orator is always an actor, but Antonius does not only play one part. Antonius says that yesterday he was playing a role, but Catulus says that he is acting another today. Clearly both characterizations are accurate: Antonius is on stage throughout the De oratore. But let us look more closely at the description of yesterday's performance. Antonius says that the goal was an "abduction" {abducerem). The Latin word is as broad in its meaning as the English and generally includes the simple notion of leading someone off in another direction, but it also can imply the sinister import that abduction has in English: Antonius may mean that he merely sought to lead Sulpicius and Cotta away or astray, but the verb is also appropriate to an erotic abduction. While Antonius' use of "fight" (pugnare) in the next sentence suggests a more narrowly military reading of abducerem, we should not allow Antonius to put the cat back in the bag so easily, especially since in Latin literary rapes a potential seducer expects to encounter resistance and a fight. Thus we can stage the De oratore like a passage from Ovid's Metamorphoses as well as we could stage it as a scene from a comedy of Plautus.

LOVE

199

One way or the other, Antonius in book 2 of the De oratore recasts the Antonius of book 1 as a man who was putting on an enticing spectacle. If yesterday Antonius offered specious enticements and if according to Catulus he is still performing today, why the change? Antonius' answer to this question: Today Catulus and Caesar are present, older men than the youthful Sulpicious and Cotta, and two dignified peers. Changes in the circumstances of the performance alter the erotic economy of the performance of a speech on oratory. Every good orator already knows that he varies his act with varied situations. But the playful seductions offered the youths yesterday do not vanish with the arrival of these additional men. Nor should we imagine a suspension of performativity, which is always a histrionics denied or under erasure, acting. Just as the orator is never really an actor, though he routinely varies his performance, so also does this love that is never really love reveal itself in a variety of forms. In fact, if we change around the proper names of this scene and make them into Atticus, Clodius, and Pituanius, the scene of the De oratore becomes the same one Cicero imagines for himself in the letter to Atticus: a contest of mutual enticements among peers, the pleasure of learned men. Who will best entice and captivate the others? Pleasure, beauty, and splendor have begun to drift toward a fourth term on our itinerary: station. When Antonius gives the presence of Catulus and Caesar as a cause for his changed behavior, he immediately reminds us that the De oratore as performance is obsessed with the propriety of its own performance. In fact, book 2 started in 2.17 with a discussion of the adjective ineptus, which we can translate as "gauche." This discussion of inappropriate acts and performances continues on through to 2.28 before the De oratore can get started with Antonius' own performance. A number of questions subtend this discussion: What sort of man rightly speaks? when does he? for whom? This opening of book 2 contains a good deal of mutual admiration, and this admiration ends by revealing that everyone present is a good man. Likewise it concludes that it would be appropriate for them to hold the very discussion that comprises the text of the De oratore. The text thus sets out rules for a rhetorical community and then approves of its own community within these terms. In this context, then, I would like to focus on one term that has repeatedly crept into this whole section: "free" (liber). From Catulus' interruption and the discussion of the passage from the letter to Atticus, it is already clear that we are watching a play by and about free men, men who are not slaves. Yet, it is not just the men who are free, but their city as well. Back in 2.33, the orator is lord in every peaceful and free state (qui in omni pacata et libera civitate dominatur). Where the state is free (libera), the orator is master (dominus). The statement offers a paradox of the

200

STAGING MASCULINITY

vocabulary of Roman slavery: liberty is a function of subjection to the orator. Wilkins' commentary (1892) pauses to correct any possible confusion in this place: he insists that Cicero — confusing as usual the author with the speakers in dialogue —is speaking of how things should be. Given this interpretation, the subjunctive mood might be more expected, bland and generalizing in this clause, but Wilkins wants to convert the vivid indicative's statement of fact into a potentiality. Of course such a reading is allowed, but it detracts from the vigor of the passage and tends to obscure the degree to which this is a very real and lively fantasy of oratory. As will be discussed below, both the Rome of the dramatic date of the dialogue and the Rome of the date of the dialogue's composition are imagined as being on the brink of political collapse and in need, therefore, of the mastery of rhetoric and the masterful freedom it brings. Grammar's statement of fact conflicts with the anxieties about political realities shared by both author and his dramatic characters. As with the state, though, so with the man. For both parties liberty and pleasure are united. The orator's speech brings delight (oblectatio) to the state whose master is the orator; or rather, speech in general brings delight. These words follow immediately upon the description of the orator-master. But the orator too is himself engaged more directly with delight and freedom: he must himself produce for his audience a "liberal" delight, the delight appropriate to freedom (libera oblectatio) (De oratore 1.118). While freedom and delight may accrue to the city from the mastery of the orator in 2.33, here the producer of this delight requires scrupulous care and is the occasion of both anxiety and snide exclusions familiar from earlier chapters: Sed quia de oratore quaerimus, fingendus est nobis oratione nostra detractis omnibus vitiis orator atque omni laude cumulatus. Neque enim, si multitudo litium, si varietas causarum, si haec turba et barbaria forensis dat locum vel vitiosissimis oratoribus, idcirco nos hoc, quod quaerimus, omittemus. Itaque in eis artibus, in quibus non utilitas quaeritur necessaria, sed animi libera quaedam oblectatio, quam diligenter et quam prope fastidiose iudicamus! Nullae enim lites neque controversiae sunt, quae cogant homines sicut in foro non bonos oratores, item in theatro actores malos perpeti. [But since we are asking about the orator, we need to imagine in our own speech a flawless orator and one crowned with praise. Even if the mass of disputes, the variety of cases, or the rabble and forensic barbarity afford a place for even the worst orators, we shall not abandon our project because of this. In those arts in which one seeks not some practical use but some liberal intellectual pleasure, note how careful

LOVE

201

and almost finicky we are when we pass our judgments! For there are no cases or quarrels that can force men to endure bad orators in the forum any more than they would put up with bad actors in the theater.] (Cicero, De oratore 1.118) Crassus's oration on the orator requires of its auditors that they suspend their notions of how things often are in favor of a vision of the sublime ideal. Crassus advocates that the orator become master of himself and deploy his techniques of self-mastery if he is to find pleasure and freedom for himself and the world. Oratory can be an ugly affair, and it is our job to labor to ensure that we hold fast to the straight and narrow: we will find thereby the public good and liberal pleasure united in one and the same man. The erasures required to sustain the vision of excellence offered by this and similar passages have already been described at length in earlier chapters. In this passage one is merely assured that, despite the oft-realized potential for bad oratory, men (homines) detest it. The world longs for a good orator. I will get back to the orator's "freedom for himself" in a moment, as it has perhaps not been perfectly justified by the arguments that immediately precede it. First, though, I would like to assemble at long last the full collection of notions this section set out to explore. Truth and beauty had added to them beauty and pleasure. To beauty and pleasure were added pleasure and station. Treated as a transitive set of propositions, all of the terms play off and against one another: truth is associated with station, station with beauty, and so forth. This field of terms is the garden of earthly delights for which oratory is intended. But note that this paradise of oratory is still haunted, provisional, and incomplete. The painting of this Edenic portrait could not proceed without reference to actors, slaves, and barbarians. We started this whole discussion by noting the orator's performative physical decor and quickly found ourselves amid a textual performance that gave us a vision of good pleasure by locating this pleasure either in oratory itself/herself or in the community of orators who exchange Rhetoric as some bride to cement their own mutual relations. But where did we end? Back at self-mastery, back with a Demosthenes before his mirror. Antonius the gnarly bodied praeceptor gives way to Demosthenes the eternal student, seeking impossible perfection. The good love of the De oratore, the amor bonus of the vir bonus, never fully suffuses the community of men so as to allow the text to stand fully as an example of its own teaching; but instead this love is ultimately transmuted into self-mastery's quasi masochism. The dialogue may seem to be a

202

STAGING MASCULINITY

gentlemanly enactment of a sort of masculine performative sublime, but it remains a text that has to be transformed by its readers into utterances that would themselves aspire to be performative of their own ethos. The whole erotic vocabulary that surrounds the orator elsewhere in the De oratore has to be associated less with simple beauty and pleasure than with selfmastery. Love is a question of proper discipline. Rhetorical sexuality in the De oratore comes in a variety of forms. We will next deal with two special cases drawn explicitly from the lexicon of Eros: love (amor) and shame (pudor). In the case of amor, we already have the pleasures and attempted seductions above. These, in conjunction with the unshakable association of performance, pleasure, and mastery, prepare us for the explicit attachment to self-mastery of forms of the verb meaning "to love" (amo).19 And so when the orator's love finally does dare speak its name, it still speaks obliquely, and we find again the special case of the love of self-discipline as we have come to know it from earlier chapters. When Cotta the student asks Crassus the praeceptor what is needed beyond certain natural capacities if one is to become an orator, Crassus answers with a smile (adridens), "What do you think, Cotta, except application and a certain passion of love? Just as in life, so certainly in this that you are after, nobody will ever attain to anything exceptional without it." 20 An excellent and less literal translation of the crux of this answer is given by the Bude edition: to be an orator one needs "la zele, la flamme, la passion." This zeal and passion of love is a love felt for the learning of oratory, the student's love of his task. This special kind of love is required to segregate oneself from the common herd of men, for such is the pastoral etymology of the adjective egregium, "exceptional." And, as was seen above, this distinction from other men is the mastery of them. Again, mastery and self-mastery are yoked, this time under the sign of the love promulgated by the De oratore. An additional Eros will round out our portrait of love before we complicate it with shame. Cicero twice uses forms of the verb adamare in the De oratore. The Oxford Latin Dictionary tells us to translate this word as "to love or admire greatly," "to conceive a sexual passion for, fall in love with," or "to form a desire to possess." The Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, noting that the word is not found before Cicero, shows more reserve in translating it: "to be affected by a love of a thing (later of a person)" (amore rei [postea hominis] affici). The Oxford lexicographers should take the palm in this case despite the German reluctance to make this word as strongly sensual and worldly as they might. For example, note that Verres, routinely sexualized by Cicero, falls for some gorgeous statues (pulcherrima) and is impelled by his cupidity (cupiditate — a fiscal and erotic word

LOVE

203

here) to acquire them at In Verrem 2.85. Thus, even when adamare indicates a passion for a thing, it is a strong passion for it, a passion readily compared to an erotic one. At De oratore 3.62 and 3.71 two such powerful passions are conceived, the first a love for philosophy and the second a love for some philosophical orators. Yet these passages not surprisingly mention more than intellectual captation. In the course of a history of philosophy, Crassus mentions the philosopher Antisthenes' relation to Socrates. While this clause is just one fragment among many elements of a long exposition on the history of philosophy, the particular image used on this occasion should give us pause: Antisthenes "fell in love with the endurance and hardiness in Socrates' discourse {patientiam et duritiem in Socratico sermone maxime adamarat)" (De oratore 3.62). Socrates himself is famous from Alcibiades' account in Plato's Symposium — a dialogue dedicated to the question of love — for his personal endurance and hardiness. These qualities formed part of the attractions of Socrates for Alcibiades and contribute to the young man's love for the older philosopher. In fact, Alcibiades is kind enough to offer us a frank confession, or at least an ironic confession, that lets the mask slip from a truth otherwise concealed in the paradigm of ancient homosexual love. Alcibiades' courtship of Socrates, wherein Alcibiades plays the active part of the erastes and Socrates is passively pursued as the eromenos, shows in detail an erotic attraction to an older and authoritative male and his self-mastery induced in a younger male. Antisthenes, then, falls for Socrates all over again, and he is truly smitten (maxime). Where Alcibiades had both the body and the philosophy of Socrates to admire, Antisthenes needs only the words themselves to provoke his Eros. But what does this excursus have to do with our orators? As has already been hinted, this vocabulary fits perfectly into the rhetorical context. These terms could easily describe Lucian's rough praeceptor who is himself only the embodiment of a certain manly philosophy and sexuality of rhetoric as set against an effeminate one. Similarly, the erotic economy of the De oratore in general and in particular the details of Antonius' courtship of his audience can be seen as a sexual gambit that invests the discourse on rhetoric with a desire never segregable from the author of that discourse. Men thus feel a "philosophical" love for one another while scorning carnality. This philosophy is not pure and abstracted, but it is instead specifically attached to the man who speaks it. The place of the precious individual and the conjoint assault on handbooks comprised of "regies, rien que des regies" will be explored below. First, though, let us make the rhetorical parallel explicit by adducing another passage from just a few paragraphs later:

204

STAGING MASCULINITY

Sin veterem ilium Periclen aut hunc etiam, qui familior nobis propter scriptorum multitudinem est, Demosthenem sequi voltis et si illam praeclaram et eximiam speciem oratoris perfecti et pulchritudinem adamastis, aut vobis haec Carneadia aut ilia Aristotelia vis comprehendenda est. [But if you want to emulate Pericles of old or Demosthenes, who is better known to us because of his abundant writings, and if you long for that glorious and exalted splendor and beauty of being a consummate orator, you must embrace either the "force" of Carneades or Aristotle.] (Cicero, De oratore 3.71) By now it is not so much Demosthenes who is familiar to us as it is the vocabulary of this scene. Following Pericles or Demosthenes means falling in love with an exquisite image and beauty. Going down the harsh guide's path means falling in love with him and seeing his very harshness as fair. One then gladly embraces philosophy and its discipline, embracing its violence, even.21 The Latin after all nowhere says philosophy but instead gives us vis, "force," or, stronger still, "violence." I understand that this aggressive translation of vis is unusual, but I choose it to highlight the aspect of violence that accompanies rhetorical love: the process of selfmastery is a symbolic violence that justifies worldly hegemony. One can compare 3.143, where the learned orator (doctus orator) is identified with the philosophical orator (philosophies). Thus all rhetorical learning aspires to the condition of philosophical force (vis), and there is no space left between philosophy and rhetoric. 22 So also in 3.79-80 Crassus makes the contrast between the vulgar orator and the philosophical orator. Philosophy is thus elitist in a social sense: the common herd has its oratory, and philosophical oratory belongs to a self-mastering hegemonic social class. Furthermore, there is literally no space in the social body for the vulgar oratory. It is impudent, and Crassus when he was censor purged Rome of its praeceptores (3.92 and 3.94).23 If we assume that an adamare relative to this bad rhetoric would associate itself with a sexualized impudence in the homosocial field of rhetoric, we can say that Crassus rids society of Pollux and his breed. Of course the expulsion of the Latin Rhetores is not described as an erotic event. Yet the vocabulary of this event, by invoking the term impudentes, is entirely consonant with the erotic investment and exclusion we have routinely encountered in the field of oratory. Thus this expulsion of the teachers of rhetoric participates fully in the rhetoric of rhetoric's own constitution; and as this "impudent" oratory is cleared away, a sublimated homoerotic oratory is thereby

LOVE

205

benefited. As Butler has argued of the deployment of the "gays in the military" crisis, that refusal of homosexuality can actually be reread as an utterance that performs a more profound psychic truth of the form, "We must not have our homosexuality in order to have our homosexuality" (Butler 1997a, 110). Similarly, even if we are prohibited by scrupulous readers from locating any "real" sexual content in the expelled rhetoric, this rhetoric nevertheless participates in and helps promote the erotics under erasure of the censorious dominant rhetoric that expelled the queer rhetoric of a man like Pollux. Getting back to 3.71 and its vis, though: another "perfect orator" is sighted and occasions another logical displacement. It is as if only after this impossible name of perfection has been uttered that the eroticism of a word like adamare breaks out onto the scene: that is, this true love has no real, worldly referent in such a formulation. And while love remains "unreal" or genuine only when and as denied, discipline or philosophical "violence" (vis) fills the space evacuated by the exile of explicit sexuality. If love is explicit only when denied or when deferred onto a love for some attributes possessed by a man rather than expressed as a love for the man himself, we should not be surprised to find a sexuality of shame and repression, a sexuality that is itself denied. This shame suffuses the scene of a speaker performing. After all, it is in performance that one will have the most trouble avoiding falling for the speaker himself as opposed to what he represents. In performance we find love, good or bad. And we have seen that the good is never radically distinct from the bad whose exclusion enables its sublime virtues. We have already seen the unchaste version of the performative scene with Pollux, the shameless panderer. On the other hand, good oratory will provide good pleasure: it is just that there must be no slippage, and the qualifying adjective good (bonus) must be sustained even though it is Active. Indeed it is a vital fabrication. Such a vulgar, sensual reading of orators, though, is expressly written out of the De oratore. Yet like anything put under erasure, the legibility of the effaced sign subverts the intention that would eradicate it: "So let our orator be magnificent and charming — nor could it be otherwise — such that he shall have a firm and austere charm, not one that is sweet and overripe." 24 The magnificence and pleasantness of the orator are necessary qualities: the name orator apparently cannot be thought without these terms. The pleasure of his pleasantness, though, must be hard and rugged, not sweet and like an overripe fruit.25 This virile sexuality is, however, as chaste and blushing as a maiden: the word that governs the characterization of the moment when Crassus is about to begin speaking is pudor, "shame, modesty, decency."26 This is a highly moralized Latin term and very often has a sexual aspect to it. It is

206

STAGING MASCULINITY

not at all clear at first glance why Crassus chose this term rather than something like timory "fear." Certainly Antonius takes Crassus as if he had said something more like fear, and he grounds his own concurring explanation of Crassus' feelings by addressing the causes of a speaker's initial fears.27 While fear may play a vital role in Crassus' conception of his difficulty at the beginning of a speech, it will be more useful to ask first why Crassus chose such a morally and sexually provocative way to express his fear. The answer must be that Crassus fears both that he will be desired and give pleasure, and that he will not. This shame is appropriate to the chaste gratification of the homosocial audience, and this gratification includes making them admire the splendor, ornamentation, et cetera of one's oratory and not one's body. So also does this shame correspond to a fear of displeasing them and being cast out of their number for having thwarted their desire. The passage at 1.119-20 contains several different stages of shame and fear whose articulation needs to be examined closely. Thus, although Crassus ends in fear and trembling (exalbescam . . . contremescam) (De oratore 1.121), this is not where he began. Crassus begins with a commandment that the orator provoke admiration {admirabilis esse). The orator then will avoid being the bad orator rejected by a critical audience as was discussed just before in 1.118. Next Crassus moves on to silence, or rather to the breaking of a silence that perhaps ought not be broken (quod adhuc semper tacui et tacendum putavi). Crassus speaks out only because he is in a community of intimates (homines familiarissimos). From what follows, though, it is not clear why Crassus' criticism should require silence when so many other reproaches and praises of a similar general cast have been freely spoken. What makes him hesitate before speaking? And why does he seem almost ashamed to speak of shame? It will turn out that this silence and shame are indicative of a performance of the very themes under discussion. Both silence and shame suffuse and subtend this dialogue and its pretensions to be a performance of good men experienced at speaking. Crassus says that no matter how fluent (facillime) and magnificent (ornatissime) speakers may be, if they do not approach the prospect of speaking with trepidation (timide) and if they are not perturbed as they start speaking, he thinks them brazen and shameless (impudentes). Next Crassus disavows that a truly good speaker could ever not be perturbed. Thus Crassus apparently obviates the need for his whole preceding statement if we take this protestation seriously and no longer allow magnificence to coexist with shamelessness. If we readily accept Crassus' second sentence, this would clearly help to naturalize the association of magnificence and an accompanying sense of shame. For a moment in that first sentence, it seemed possible to be both disgusting and magnificent: this

LOVE

207

moment is not long-lived. Shame and splendor are yoked institutionally, and this is one such passage where the association is reiterated and consolidated. Beauty and its enticements require shame, while for its part shame preserves beauty. Crassus next gives the opposite and negative formulation of his first positive version: ut enim quisque optime dicit, ita maxime dicendi difficultatem variosque eventus orationis exspectationemque hominum pertimescit; qui vero nihil potest dignum re, dignum nomine oratoris, dignum hominum auribus efficere atque edere, is mihi, etiam si commovetur in dicendo, tamen impudens videtur; non enim pudendo, sed non faciendo id, quod non decet, impudentiae nomen effugere debemus; quern vero non pudet, — id quod in plerisque video — hunc ego non reprehensione solum, sed etiam poena dignum puto. [The better a man speaks, so much more does he fear the difficulty of speaking, the various possible outcomes of an oration, and men's initial expectations. But if a man can produce nothing worthy of the case, of the title orator, or of the ears of men, even if he gets upset when speaking, he seems shameless to me: one should avoid being branded with the label shameless not by feeling shame but by not doing anything inappropriate. Now he who feels no shame —and I see this in a lot of people —I think that he doesn't deserve just reproach, but even punishment.] (Cicero, De oratore, 1.120-21) Crassus invokes dignity obsessively: shamelessness, it turns out, originates in a violation of dignity. Conversely, shame ought to involve the preservation of dignity. This shameless indignity, however, comes from an indecorous performance. And here decet should remind us of decor and decus as discussed above. Thus there is a crypto-sexuality to the good performance, and a sexual failure where performance fails. The shame of such an impropriety, though, counts for nothing if ignoble deeds have already been done: one's decor and splendor have been lost and the crowd's desire has been turned to outrage. One thus feels appropriate shame at the thought of failing the audience, and this shame turns into fear.28 The best orator should and must always feel fear even if he never fails, while the failed orator should feel fear as he fails: his failure is equated with shamelessness and the good Eros of good performance is forever lost. The fear of performative failure is thus also a fear of a sexual failure: will he have too much of one kind of sex or too little of the other? Will he suffer from priapism or impotence? Crassus' shame is thus doubly sexual but tends in

208

STAGING MASCULINITY

contrary and contradictory directions. I am not seeking to reduce oratory to sex, and I do not insist upon real arousals or a specific eroticism that is "really" at the bottom of oratory. The orator is not simply some version of a closeted homosexual. This account is instead productive and expansive in the sense of revealing the ways in which gender, pleasure, and social status participate in the construction and modulation of a broad array of human activities. If we read Crassus' shame more generally, we find a shame felt at various outcomes {varios eventus) because one knows that the performance will be a sexualized event whether a success or a failure. One feels shame at men's expectations {expectationem hominum) because an orator does not know what will become of him when he meets their desire: will he live up to it? Will he satisfy other men in the wrong manner? And most generally, it is a shame felt at the brushing up together of homosexuality and homosociality. When this shame merges into fear we have a moment of paranoia: the rejection of the expression "I love him" transmutes it into the thought "He hates me." 29 For the orator, this is a fear of rejection by one's peers. It is also a shame felt even at the notion of homosocial love, a disgusting, vile love like Pollux'. Thus the fusion oipudor and timor is entirely appropriate: the two notions participate fully in the process of the eroticization and the sublimation of oratory, and these words ensure the reproduction of a certain brand of desire written under prohibition. The repressed homosexual desire returns as a homosocial desire, and technical rhetorical literature ensures the repetition of this scene of sexual threat and resolution. One could characterize the whole of the Praeceptor rhetorum or the moment just before Crassus begins a speech as particularly vivid examples of this negotiation of desire into proper relations with polite society. Crassus blushes. Because of this we know him to be upright and chaste, even as he is about to enter the field of love: "Crassus had a truly striking sense of modesty (pudor). It was by no means a hindrance to his oratory; instead it even helped by giving him an upstanding air."30 This break in the narrative for an evaluative aside moves Crassus' precepts from the universal and into the particular: again the generic idea finds its highest truth when applied to the body of the individual who delivers it. The authority of the messenger underwrites the validity of the message. This recognition of Crassus' shame is also marked with another word that has a twofold valence: probitas can mean either general uprightness or specifically sexual continence. Crassus felt ashamed. He hesitated to break his silence and tell his truth. Even though he did perform for his peers, they agree with one another that his shame has always been a chaste shame, that his performances are not shameless. Remember that shamelessness (avaioxvvxia) and daring (TOAJIT]) came in second only to

LOVE

209

ignorance as requisites for Pollux' students. Thus Crassus is in word and deed the anti-Pollux, a hardy and manly orator, one fully implicated in an elaborate set of careful sexualized postures and refusals. The De oratore does not just preach such manly virtues, it enacts them, using the drama of a dialogue to portray the society its doctrines would produce. This, though, is the society of a censorious Crassus, a society from which impudent desires have been cast out and for which sublime ones are crafted. The De oratore offers a pleasure of homosociality felt via oratory as an abstraction like the lady Rhetoric from Lucian. Only this is a Rhetoric who is never somatized because somaticism is precisely the problem. How can one write about oratory without going astray if the body is an implied referent in all discourse? The good love of the good man is a love in action, an Eros performed after a moment of shamed hesitation. The action of this love unfolds in the process of reading the De oratore as a drama. In the subtle details of the illusion of self-presence proffered by these characters, we see a model of good actio, the acting of the part of the good man, the role one is born to and always strives to live up to. The portrait of Crassus has consequences that extend out to the problem of the De oratore as an authoritative rhetorical text in its own right. There is a striking unanimity with which the commentary on the passage draws parallels with Cicero's own biography and Cicero's professed difficulty in beginning a speech. Wilkins, Sorof, and Harnecker variously compare this passage to the Pro Rege Deiotaro, to Divinatio in Caecilium 41, Pro cluentio 57, Academica 2.64, and to the famous failure of the first version of the Pro Milone, in each instance indicating some sort of personal performative difficulty on Cicero's part. Strangely, none of these commentators seems eager to take the opening of the Pro Rege Deiotaro as a rhetorical commonplace rather than as a heartfelt sentiment: "While it is usual for me to be greatly moved at the start of all weighty cases . . ." 31 Despite the rhetoricity of the passage I am myself in no haste to declare this opening to be an example of pure art over nature, of cura against natura. On the contrary, the confusion of the two is important to my argument throughout this study. However, it is worth noting that these scholarly cross-references implicitly support reading the De oratore as a documentary text that expounds what Cicero actually thought, and not as a handbook or a set of rhetorical precepts. On the other hand, it would perhaps be misleading to consider Cicero's speeches to be fully explained by the precepts he gives for speaking in his theoretical works since these latter are not themselves unambiguous or unliterary texts. 32 Reading the speeches through the technical literature produces an

210

STAGING MASCULINITY

authenticity triumphant and the apotheosis of the De oratore such that a work that contains numerous precepts of the sort found in handbooks becomes instead an authentic, true performance of Cicero's spirit. And this truth of the text in turn validates the authenticity of Cicero's orations. As is clear from the first chapter, this decoding of Cicero, which is also a nonreading of Cicero, begins as early as Quintilian, our first major commentator on Cicero. See, for example, 10.3.1, where Quintilian explicitly identifies Cicero with Crassus, or 10.5.2, which allows for the confusion of their personae. With the commentators' help, Cicero thus slides unimpeded into the role of actor of truth and writer of truth while the perils of performativity and textuality evanesce. In this manner, then, we can take Crassus' fear in a broader sense: it is indicative of a moment where both the authenticity of texts and the authenticity of rhetorical actors is on the line. Rather than grant the identity of the voice of the text and the truth of Cicero the man, it is time to look instead into the problems of textuality that themselves preoccupy the De oratore. If the text is more a theater piece than a rulebook, what then is the relationship of the De oratore to writing in general and rhetorical rules and strictures in particular? How does the relationship of the De oratore to writing impinge upon the themes of pleasure, performance, self-mastery, the authenticity of the vir bonus, and the visibility of his social world? After some preliminary remarks on writing in general, these questions will be approached via two other questions. First, according to the De oratore, what are the limitations of writing? And second, how is oratory transmitted? Crassus goes over a course of diligent exercise (exercitatio) by which an aspiring orator may hope to improve his oratory in general and practice to make it perfect.33 In addition to prescribing much and varied speaking, Crassus sets as the chief requisite for a student's progress writing as much as possible: caput autem est, quod, ut vere dicam, minime facimus (est enim magni laboris quern plerique fugimus) quam plurimum scribere. Stilus optimus et praestantissimus dicendi effector ac magister. [The most important task and one that, truth be told, we hardly do — for it is a question of great effort and most of us avoid toil — is to write as much as possible. The pen is the best, the preeminent producer and teacher of speaking.] (Cicero, De oratore, 1.150) While here the pen is the best teacher of speaking (magister dicendi), in the discussion that follows anyone professing the title of teacher of speaking

LOVE

211

will be derided. The title denied the man is bestowed upon the student's pen. The hidden agency, or nonagency, of writing and its mode of education and inculcation represents a triumph of reproduction for a hypostatized Rhetoric by a participant in the field of rhetoric: rhetoric is learned by doing, not by subjection to grubby teachers. And, significantly, writing is a practical and necessary exercise for a speaker. The distinction between writing and speech becomes a hierarchy of writing over speech. In fact, Crassus presently goes on to describe the triumph of careful writing over mere reflection and especially over extemporaneous speech: you can't speak well without the power of writing to back you up. 34 This image is a foretaste of and a bridge to a more extensive depiction of writing as power. Rather than being untrue or specious, writing is, if anything, more true than speech. Like many a truth before this, the present truth of writing first requires labor, discipline, and meditation. Furthermore this writing is portrayed as itself being a version of disciplined speech and not radically distinct from it. One speaks oneself more truly and best learns to give voice to oneself via the pen, not via spontaneous expression nor by subjection to rhetorical precepts. The man who speaks, then, speaks best to the extent that his speaking is informed, shaped, and trained by writing. Even where a prewritten script is wanting, the practice and labor (exercitatio and labor) of writing should have left their stamp on the orator's speech. There is no magister dicendi here, only the self-realization of an oratory mastered by the mediation of inscription. Writing, though, is more than a simple matter of auto-affection and self-realization, and the mastery of writing is not confined to domination of another (ill-informed) speaker. Writing is also master of the subject matter, a subject matter that yields itself up to writing's wit and contemplation {acumen): Omnes enim, sive artis sunt loci sive ingeni cuiusdam ac prudentiae, qui modo insunt in ea re, de qua scribimus, anquirentibus nobis omnique acie ingeni contemplantibus ostendunt se et occurrunt; omensque sententiae verbaque omnia, quae sunt cuiusque generis maxime inlustria, sub acumen stili subeant et succedant necesse est. [All the opportunities for arguments, whether they arise from art or some cleverness and prudence, provided they are contained within that matter of which we are writing, show and offer themselves to us as we inquire and consider with every "point" (acies) of our intelligence; and all the most brilliant ideas and words of every sort necessarily come under and before the intelligence (acumen) of our pen.] (Cicero, De oratore, 1.151)

212

STAGING MASCULINITY

The translation of acumen as intelligence rather than point or tip is intended to elicit the cerebral quality of this scene of writing. Writing is prudent speech. A prudent speech masters an impudent (unwritten) one, and a prudent speech knows fully and intimately its subject. It masters its subject by knowing it. Likewise, this is a full and complete knowledge that offers itself in its entirety to the writer and his pen-point as intelligence and authorship merge. Much as writing is more than mere self-presence, so also the subject of writing, the subject who appears via writing and who guides the pen, is a more elaborate creature than one might at first guess. Let us look more into the power of writing. In these preliminary arguments about writing, a potentially dangerous split in the nature of writing presents itself. If writing is power and mastery, one may justly worry about illegitimate forms of writing. Bad writing would imply illegitimate authority. Improper rhetorical handbooks, handbooks composed of endless and tedious rules and regulations, would promote and embody illegitimate power. Set against and constraining this vision of the superlative power of writing are depictions of writing's limitations. Such limitations may be seen as correctives to or assaults on illegitimate writing. If writing is power, it is not at the same time the principle of its own authority. Writing remains incomplete in itself, and there is something left over, a power anterior to writing. This is clearly the case at the opening of book 3, when Cicero is reflecting on the character of Crassus before presenting the last acts of his own drama, the De oratore. Cicero hopes to give Crassus his due even as Cicero is sure that this record will fall short of the intelligence of his original (De oratore 3.14). Readers of Plato are supposed to be familiar with this problem: despite the superlative writing of Plato, "nevertheless, one suspects that there was more to (Socrates) than what was written (tamen maius quiddam de illo> de quo scripta sunt, suspicatur)"35 Cicero hopes, then, that his own readers will harbor similar suspicions of Crassus after reading the De oratore. Neither the point of Cicero's pen (acumen stili) nor the insight of his intelligence (acies ingenii) can compass Crassus' intelligence and character (ingenium). The writing that could both master and explore all now fails to capture the principle of its own origin, the ingenium. According to Cicero's Crassus, writing is necessary to good performance and to mastering the contents of a speech. And speech, of course, is meant to be a performance of the self as vir bonus. But when Cicero himself writes up his community of good men, writing cannot master and cannot comprehend them: something greater is left over. Beauty and pleasure sneak back into this mystified point of origin when the ingenium is identified with decus in another of Cicero's rhetorical

LOVE

213

works, the Brutus, Cicero the narrator tells his addressee, Brutus, "for as a man's distinction is in his character, so is eloquence the illumination of the character itself (ut enim hominis decus ingenium, sic ingeni ipsius lumen est eloquentia)" (Cicero, Brutus 59). The illumination of the ingenium may be eloquence, but the eloquent text of Cicero can only hope to reflect dimly the beauty and beautiful characters (decor atque decus)7*6 of its participants as it posits the beautiful authenticity of the ingenium as an ultimately ineffable and inexplicable quality. Eloquence brings to light the beauty that is the character of the good man, but it does not thereby explain it. This ingenium, intelligent character and character of intelligence, can be read as presence or as the authenticity of the ego. Thus the De oratore assumes at its center the very principal of self that a performative theory of identity would place always elsewhere, a subject built via mediation, discourse, abjection, and iteration. While any theory predicated on the death of the subject would suffice for a critique of the good man's genius, an emphasis on performance is particularly apt as performance necessarily inheres within the core of rhetoric itself as well as within a text on rhetoric, and most particularly within this dialogue on rhetoric. There is a sleight of hand whereby writing fails Cicero the author of the De oratore, even as the text's Crassus promises that writing provides mastery and self-fulfillment. In the first case, writing stages a performance that one feels has a supplement left over, a character that transcends representation. In Crassus' version, an opposite movement is effected: writing forges the very genius that eludes written representation. How can these two versions be reconciled? Elsewhere in our rhetorical studies we have always found that the orator is an incomplete creature. He needs constant self-surveillance and discipline so that he may sustain his own privileged identity. This image of the ingenium assumes the existence of that point to which the orator strives, but it is again a position that neither performance nor writing as surparole will ever reach or comprehend. Once again failure produces iterative performance as its consequence if not its self-representation. This failed presentation of the ingenium thrives on its own failure. That is, Cicero posits a sense of superabundant interiority as he represents good men in the act of discussing good men: "Yes, they were great men, greater than their writing or my writing can ever fully indicate." This rhetorical trope of inadequacy itself furnishes us with a triumph of authorship, not a textual defeat since the ineffable authenticity of the orator is just what the argument of the De oratore seeks to establish at every turn. In the second case, that of Crassus' writing, writing again produces interiority by completing the deficiencies of spontaneous performance. This supplementation and mediation of unreflective speech allows for a discourse that is more masterful and more real. Crassus believes that writing is genius' best means to self-fulfillment, its

214

STAGING MASCULINITY

means of best articulating a discourse designed to reveal and to propagate one's thoughts. For both Cicero the author and Crassus the embedded character, writing is the occasion for a production, reproduction, and mediation of interiority and presence. Thus the De oratore may be a failed drama in the sense that its good men are not "really there" in the text; but once again we have a fertile failure. As the De oratore itself would put it, the right direction has been indicated (see 1.204 and 2.150). A student of the text now knows where to turn and how to act, even if he will never exactly have what he seeks. Cicero has written an account of the necessity of reading and writing. He tells of a self mediated by writing, a self discovered within his own rhetorical handbook even as this handbook refuses to see itself as akin to others. The subject of writing and the handbook loses its predicate and becomes simply the subject: there is a true character and genius at work here. Writing forges this genius even as writing itself fails to compass it. This is a subject always in progress: the occasions for performances are innumerable, and in each case a pause for reflection and hence for written reflection will be the best course. Cicero, then, performs himself in this text. Much as speeches are venues for the authentic performance of the self as good man, so too is this dialogue on speaking an opportunity for discovering with the pen's clever point the "true" Cicero. He illuminates his own eloquent genius even as we acknowledge that it extends beyond what can be gleaned from reading these pages. We cannot make a rigid distinction between self-production and a written claim of self-production: the self has been posited as a sublime performative inscription. This self is a self-citation: writing alludes to genius just as genius furnishes that which is clever about writing. Cicero's writer-speaker thus lives a very rich version of Butler's thesis on performativity as citationality. In his case, the law cited is that of his own ingenium. Writing has something incomplete to it, it imitates or alludes rather than giving the thing itself. Yet the De oratore pleads the case of the virtues of imitation. Imitation is a vital mode of rhetorical training. Imitation replaces rhetorical rulebooks and completes the task they can never finish. In fact, imitation and practice are the first two rules of Antonius' advice to his students: "My first rule is to point out a model, then the student applies himself to imitation." 37 Naturally one has to be careful to pick a model well, not to imitate failings, and to imitate more than superficially (De oratore 2.91-92). Antonius uses his principle of imitation to explain why an age tends to produce more or less a single style of speaking (De oratore 2.92). Thus there are masters and schools, but there are no textbooks or vulgar precepts, only models and copies. Furthermore Antonius detects imitation by reading others' writings,38 and he argues that successful imita-

LOVE

215

tion entails practice performing and writing like one's model (De oratore 2.96). Selective imitation and the succession of generations of mortal men thus explain the history of oratory. This history is not a theoretical or philosophical investigation, it is a raw genealogical investigation that effaces a sociological one: who were the fathers? who the sons? In some cases, though, imitation offers an inadequate rubric within which to explain an orator's style. There are great individuals who imitate no model and follow their own natures. 39 Similarly the idea of imitation from this portion of the text apparently does not conflict with 3.34-36, where it is argued that there are as many styles as there are orators. The title orator presupposes a nature, a character, and a beauty (natura, ingenium, decor/decus). The agglomeration of these mystified categories produces an individual whose individuality may not be reduced to some function of vulgar schoolhouse training. These passages privilege the idea of nature as the origin of the orator's distinctive character. In 2.98 some orators seem unique —their natures made them do it —and in 3.34-36 effectively all orators are unique. Taken to its extreme, this idea of nature obviates imitation. We can get by this impasse by denaturalizing the category nature: these two models are complementary to the extent that one's nature is culturally produced. A nature offers an imitation of a socially viable and recognized essence. It performs a citation of the notion of the individual within the confines of the social laws of the subject. In this scene, then, nature is another name for a successful, self-effacing copy. Antonius' theory thus embraces two modes of origin: spontaneous generation and mimetic reproduction. 40 In the course of summarizing Bompaire 1958, Reardon uses a telling phrase in this regard. Discussing the relationship between education and imitation, Reardon writes, "On entend par Mimesis non point 'pastiche' (quoiqu'il ne manque pas d'exemples d'imitation assez etroitement con?u) mais plutot 'reference . . . au patrimoine litteraire' represents par les grandes chefs d'ouvre" (1971). Paternity and patrimony, identity and the textbook coincide in the mimetic reproduction of good men as good men via "great books." In fact, Crassus as Cicero writes him expressly likens his own instruction to that of a father, even to that of any father: "I have told you everything I thought. If you had gone up to any head of a house and drawn him aside from some conversation, he probably would have given you the same answers." 41 Neither mode of paternity, though, neither spontaneous generation nor mimetic filiation, has room for handbooks or detailed precepts like Quintilian's. One is not told how to fold the toga as in Quintilian, one imitates the fold of another's toga.42 This desire expressed through mimesis can be read as part of a more profound psychic economy: imitation allows one to desire the father and to have the father by becoming him (see Silverman 1992, 194).

216

STAGING MASCULINITY

Such identificatory social reproduction not surprisingly would oppose explicit technologies of rhetorical reproduction. Rhetorical rules disrupt the mysteries of oratory on several levels. First, rules allow for impersonal oratorical reproduction that bypasses the homosocial ties that mimetic paternity forges. Similarly, any diligent schoolboy might claim the right to the title orator and entry into the top and exclusive ranks of hegemonic Roman society without first making the right connections and working his way up the social and political ladder. Thus the structure of the community of orators as a whole is threatened. Next, rules can dispel the illusion of presence and authenticity upon which the doctrine of the good man is predicated. As has been discussed in prior chapters, only where cura is yoked to natura can rules be integrated into the project of legitimate reproduction. Bare rules threaten to produce a Pollux, the wretched student of a teacher whose instructions were few, abundantly clear, and easy to follow. The threat of nonmimetic reproduction thus threatens the orator and his community on a variety of levels. Nowhere is there space for the parvenu. Or, if a new man {novus homo) does appear, his legitimate right to occupy a position amid such peers is guaranteed by a notion of rhetorical inculcation that proves that he really is a good man and that he has not stumbled upon a trick of seeming one. Cicero himself was a new man or novus homo and not a person born into the elite ranks of Roman politicians and speakers. Cicero was merely son of an elite family of the city of Arpinum. Thus his attachment to the Roman aristocracy represents an ascent on Cicero's part into a social position homologous to his original one, but this time on a grander scale. Naturally, not all Romans were eager to embrace Cicero the arriviste into their ranks. If he is to have any hope of being taken seriously, the new man must enter into the symbolic order of legitimate rhetorical discourse by finding a father to whose law he has fully acceded: he must become a good son with an authoritative patrimony. Imitation itself is a difficult question: it must extend beyond mere mimicry. Copying the fold of a toga is a slight thing, and a student may justly fear that this is all he has done. Thus the young Sulpicius interrupts Crassus to lament that he may not have imitated Crassus well enough: Turn ille "tu vero, quod monuit idem, ut ea, quae in quoque maxima essent, imitaremur; ex quo vereor ne nihil sim tui nisi supplosionem pedis imitatus et pauca quaedam verba et aliquem, si forte, motum." [Then he said, "Yes, you can (find fault with me) because he advised us to imitate whatever is the greatest in each. Accordingly I am afraid

LOVE

217

that I have imitated nothing of you except the stamp of your foot, some few words, and perhaps a bit of your gestures."] (Cicero, De oratore 3.47) Sulpicius worries that he offers mere mimicry of delivery and word choice. If actio is supposed to be an imitation of the self and the playing of one's own persona, Sulpicius fears that he is merely histrionic and that his performed self is not at its core enough a Sulpicius derived from Crassus. Crassus responds to this fear by advising Sulpicius that the younger man has gone beyond superficial imitation. Crassus says that provided he has the time he will tell Sulpicius later what his student has taken from himself and what from other places. Crassus thus accepts Sulpicius but withholds from him the keys to self-knowledge. Perhaps this is not too surprising. Such a description on Crassus' part would involve the complete writing of his own ingenium as well as that of Sulpicius: the text would have to be too explicit. We also know that this task of complete writing is an impossible one, though it is ever in progress. It is in progress, of course, in the very performance Crassus is giving of himself, even if this performance never wholly encompasses his self. This performance already has something written to it because the pen and genius are never radically disjoint: good speech has a written quality to it. And, obviously, this is also a written Crassus, not the man speaking for himself. When Crassus returns to his narrative from Sulpicius' interruption, though, he charts a course that ought to both unsettle and reassure his young disciple. Crassus refuses to give a puerile doctrine (puerilis doctrina) of speaking "good Latin" {Latine) (De oratore 3.48). The idiomatic usage of Latine conflates speaking the language well with speaking it at all; "in Latin" gets confused with "in good Latin." The sense of this word then encapsulates the whole process of constitutive exclusions involved in oratorical training: you are either on top or you are nowhere. Crassus himself offers a similar sort of gloss upon the word. Crassus describes how failure to speak Latine leads to derision (De oratore 3.52). Crassus himself commands that his auditors deride (deridite) those students who have only embraced oratorical "force" (oratoriam vim) — and here a comparison with philosophical force/violence as discussed above is necessary — by way of rhetoricians' precepts (praeceptis rhetorum) as opposed to the true orator's (vero enim oratori) vast and exhaustive human experience (De oratore 3.54). Crassus says, "On my authority deride and disparage" (me acutore deridite atque contemnite), and we find here instruction on how to read Lucian's Praeceptor rhetorum: under the guidance of a good authority, we learn how to react with scorn for the cheap and easy. Apparently

218

STAGING MASCULINITY

precepts produce a subphilosophical vim and hence an illegitimate force. On the other hand, the experiences of the legitimate orator drift into philosophical oratory and philosophical force. In other words, an elite Roman's social practice and habituation, his habitus a la Bourdieu, become a philosophical proposition, a truth in and of oratorical performance. This same theme is hammered home throughout the section on philosophy. Crassus next yokes philosophy and rhetoric and eventually gets to the adamare of 3.71 discussed above. Finally, Crassus in 3.91-95 condemns self-professed teaching instructors (dicendi magistros) as vulgar and forensic, and he tells of the banishment of the Latin rhetoricians when he was censor. In each of these cases as well, Sulpicius learns not to trust explicit training and to instead rely on his initiation into the higher mysteries of oratory via his association with men like Crassus and his participation in the elite lifestyle of the orator. The condemnation in 3.92 of vulgar oratory as forensic is likewise telling. Once again, the oratory we are speaking of is not a simple functional affair. Antonius may have given this impression in book 1, but we know from the opening of the second book and his disavowal of his prior stance that the orator is no grubby, workaday functionary (operarius).43 Oratory and the orator are philosophical and metaphysical objects, not practical ones. Good oratory here transcends the narrow confines of the forum. Good oratory is everywhere where there are good men (yiri boni). This text performs a scene of good men performing their goodness; it reveals their rhetoric on the goodness of rhetoric; it enacts their own enaction of their virtue. Poor Sulpicius is accepted by Crassus as an orator but is simultaneously deprived of a sure knowledge of the nature and extent of his mimetic success. Sulpicius is also deprived of any recourse to precepts of diction or rules of performance. As will be said later in 2.232, there is no art of oratory, just an "observation" (pbservatio) of it.44 In fact, even simple imitation as a means of oratorical success is itself parodic. Instead Sulpicius has left to him a deeper imitation — whatever that may be — philosophy, and love. Intimate familiarity with the life and workings of elite Roman society and a profound psychological attachment to one's peers, and especially older peers, produce the good man experienced at speaking. Sulpicius must become a Crassus, but he has no sure route to this goal left to him. He should cultivate a cathexis to the discipline of philosophy and to the enticing attributes of oratory, the euphemized love depicted above. If Sulpicius needs to love Crassus, Crassus has a profound need of Sulpicius as well. Cicero's Orator, a book written about nine years after the De oratore, contains a telling scene in this regard. Cicero informs the younger Brutus who plays Sulpicius to his Crassus: "When I say 'me,'

LOVE

219

Brutus, I am saying 'you': for whatever was going to happen in my case has long since come to pass; you, though . . ,"45 This moment identifies master with student. They are differentiated only along the axis of time. Rhetorical training is a technique of social replacement and reproduction that is both homosocial and narcissistic. This is a movement waiting to ensue upon the introduction of the theme of imitation. The identities of both master and student are implicated in their mutual relations of identification. The whole social order is hereby implicated in this model of oratory: the older man takes the younger man as a version of himself just as the younger man aspires to be the older one and tries to see himself in him.46 As a silent observer within the dialogue of the De oratore, Cicero is most like Sulpicius, the student in search of a father and an identity as an orator. Thus one should note again the problem of the confusion of Crassus with Cicero as discussed above. Taking Crassus for Cicero implies accepting the son as the father: Cicero the author now begets the man whose model enables Cicero's own rhetorical engendering. Mimetic reproduction locks Crassus, Cicero, Sulpicius, and Brutus in a mutually determining relationship of fathers and sons who each vouch for the legitimacy of the other. In its fashion, this circular relationship of paternity and filiation in which Cicero finds himself implicated is fully complementary to that other mode of reproduction advocated by Crassus, spontaneous generation. Like Napoleon, Cicero can proclaim himself to be his own ancestor. Authentic oratory and legitimate society here find texts in the Orator and the De oratore that accommodate themselves to their principles. In each case Cicero's text reminds us that this is not a handbook, this is a book of love, a book of the love felt between men and between fathers and sons. Oratorical training is depicted as the mode par excellence of this identificatory sociality. Identification, desire, and performance are all lodged in rhetorical theory, but these same principles constitute the key elements of the practice of social life. Moreover we have seen that pleasure, beauty, love, mastery, and violence everywhere permeate the social world of oratory. The text intervenes to supplement this social life —this life held together by imitation and identification, and a life that transcends its own depiction — both by portraying it all over again and by offering regulations to constrain the conceptualization and practice of social life: thus we could say that the text offers a portrait of habitus rather than habitus itself. The distinction between a representation of autonomous practical sense and that sense itself indicates a vital distance from the purely sociological mode of a Bourdieu. The De oratore offers a technology of the self preached by one of the products of this same technology. Such a text thereby serves as a handbook of the self, the world, and the self in the world even as it denies closure and

220

STAGING MASCULINITY

completeness to any of these and even to itself. This denial, though, is itself the locus at which the techniques of iterative performance and self-mastery are inculcated. This acknowledged incompleteness thus occasions techniques of reproduction of the social order. These techniques ensure the reproduction of this order as an order characterized by a certain kind of desire and a certain kind of text. Furthermore this social order, while never closed, is always in the process of having various movements, pleasures, and souls exiled from it as if it would thereby become complete. Such texts then call upon the machinery of abjection as one of the corollary instruments of subjectivization and as processes concomitant to those of performance and self-mastery. Against such a text as the De oratore and its techniques, rules and rulebooks can never aspire even to the presentation of this textual failure and the invocation of the supplement of interiority and self-presence. Those books cannot cite some authentic and authoritative good man like a Crassus who both resides within and beyond their pages. The De oratore makes a second gesture complementary to the exclusion of unauthorized texts: it excludes the sort of folks who are alleged to need these texts. Accordingly, the assault on instruction that is impersonal and nonimitative, the instruction of rhetorical precepts, is by no means isolated to 3.54. In fact, rhetorical precepts are universally derided in the De oratore. By rhetorical precepts we can understand any explicit instruction, but especially any codified and transcribed dictates. Examples of such would be the Rhetorica ad Herennium, Cicero's own De inventione,41 and Quintilian's Institutio oratoria, even if Quintilian does see himself as Cicero's heir. Such rules and regulations, incompatible with the doctrine of great individuals and imitation, are scorned as beneath Cicero's orator. Who needs a handbook? Anyone who is lacking in authority in some manner. Nor will the handbook make up for these crippling defects, as such a text cannot guarantee authority. Even the best text, the De oratore, which contains the personality of the good man rather than mere instructions, has something greater (maius quiddam) left over after it has been read. The De oratore is filled with binarisms that put its characters and their society on one side while maligning the opposite pedantic pole. Antonius contrasts his words to those a teacher gives to boys (2.180). The material of the De oratore is subtle and not obvious like others' teachings (2.84). A similar pairing of difficulty and ease makes for a frequent point of contrast that occurs variously in 2.69, 3.38, and 3.98. This notion of ease and familiarity also has national origin added to it in 1.23: authoritative Romans are set against Greeks commonplaces. The text reads ilia pateant in promptuque sint omnibus. One can translate pateant variously, but I would take the sentence as saying that the Greek material is both intellectually

LOVE

221

and physically accessible, where in promptu implies that it is easy to get your hands on one of these books and pateant signifies that the precepts are easy to understand. 48 Conversely, the society of good men such as is depicted in the De oratore does not admit any and all. We may not arrive at their table unbidden, nor may we readily read and comprehend the sublimity of the textual representation of such company. As far as the Greeks go, their ineptitude and gaucheries are highlighted in a discussion of ineptus {De oratore 2.17-18). The Greeklings are literally ill-fitted to Roman rhetorical society. The savoir faire of the Romans finds a kindred contrast in 2.247, where the good orator's control is compared to scurrilous license. Permissiveness is precisely what the company of good men cannot allow. Good men are moderate, judicious, and self-controlled. Good taste and judgment are offered the highest praises: the orator stands out as celestial, and he is no mere pleader (cansidicum) (De oratore 1.202); he is a god among men (3.53). And so we can now add to our formula equating the man to his pleasure, a corollary expression: as is the man, so his text and doctrines. The latter half of this formula is nearly a commonplace: "You hear it on the streets, and for the Greeks it's proverbial: Men's oratory was as their lives."49 License, foreignness, ease: the exiled terms are familiar. The abjections that enable this variety of text parallel the refusals from earlier chapters. The text that performs models for imitation does not give precepts without a praeceptor firmly placed within the elite social field. In fact, the apotheosis of the orator is itself predicated on these same rejections. Any and all of these exiled terms were found in the discussions of Lucian, actors, self-mastery, and the constitution of the body. The whole discourse of the body in the world converges with the discourse of the text in the world. This process is facilitated by Cicero's merging of writing and the authentic voice. The authentic self-presence of writing helps produce a self-present text in the De oratore. The presence recorded by this text is likewise the presence of the social world that its readers are invited to enter. Put differently, the De oratore is itself both imitation, being the imitation of a conversation from the past, and performance. Furthemore, it imitates performance and performs imitation. The De oratore "enacts" the bodies and the doctrine of good men. Cicero substitutes a performative inscription for Austin's (1962) performative utterance. This substitution is facilitated by the assertion that speech is written and that writing is speech. For Quintilian in particular this second proposition proved vital to his own textual performance. Cicero's text performs the good body and the goodness of discipline while purging the world of bad bodies and bad texts. The ironies of Cicero's own political and practical difficulties at this period only underscore the notion that what the world needs is to be more like good

222

STAGING MASCULINITY

literature. The readers of Cicero's text have by and large agreed with this proposition. Habinek has taught us to expect to find in Roman literary and cultural products strategies for the maintenance of aristocratic domination. In the De oratore we find an invocation of a community of orators discussing oratory as part of their own reflection on the political and social crisis of their day. The techniques of the De oratore, though are far more sophisticated than a simple nostalgic yet resonant invocation of a Roman past could muster. The De oratore presents the apparatus of aristocratic domination in its full splendor. The De oratore encapsulates all of the prior themes and interests of this study while going beyond them as well. In Cicero the problem of the text is exacerbated relative to "mere" handbooks, and overcome relative to this authoritative staging of Romans. This dialogue inscribes, enacts, and brings to life the insufficient body constructed via rhetorical discourse and the discourse of self-mastery. The De oratore contains all of the constitutive exclusions that acting and hedonistic precepts h&d elicited, but it counters these with its self-present text and speakers with their sublime joys displaced into the social field and onto their shared art. In the De oratore, then, aristocratic domination is maintained by way of a commandment to an endless iteration of the performance of an aristocratic self. This self is always almost grounded by its own performance, but always also stuck in the process of becoming, a process that also entails the active exclusion of other bodies, performances, and texts. This has been the study of a particular mode of being. This being is enacted in performance {actio), but this being is also commanded in rhetorical literature. This is an aristocratic, aggressive, masochistic, and narcissistic mode of being, one filled with pleasure, shame, and fear while bought at the expense of both the orator and the rest of the world. Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown. I hope to have offered a study of the structure and function of such unease and of who stood to gain from it.

Conclusion: We Other Romans I WISH TO END WITH A READING of a reading of rhetoric. I have chosen as an example a piece by a leading scholar on Roman oratory. This essay is worth reading because its author is the master of a prevalent scholarly mode that others often only imperfectly execute. The work is charming, the style seductive, the scholar an authority in his field. In other words, I hope to examine the work of a legitimate heir to Cicero and the De oratore and to ask what it means to reproduce so faithfully one's patrimony. The air of tactlessness that hangs about my own reading itself indicates the extent to which one still writes within a certain rhetorical milieu. What emerges here, then, is not an attack on a person and a corresponding bid for my own fame — a young Roman's first public forensic act was traditionally a prosecution — but rather this critique is intended to call attention to styles of scholarly self-presentation. Harold Gotoff (1993) has written an excellent essay on Cicero as a performer of rhetoric. He starts with the page, and he retrieves from it a number of important insights into rhetoric as a living practice. This essay perhaps offers to many sufficient answer to my own initial query, "What did ancient oratory look like?" Gotoff's piece also necessarily confronts several of the key themes of the present study. Gotoff realizes the problems of textuality, he engages the ironies of acting as a metaphor for oratory, and he even addresses the question of performances of authority. The argument, the text, and the textual performance, though, reproduce in a striking manner many of the very problems of oratory that have preoccupied the present study as a whole. Gotoff emphasizes theater in Cicero. He praises Cicero as a master showman and rightly complains that too few readers of Cicero think of his dramaturgy. Gotoff furnishes welcome arguments against dreary technocratic readings of Cicero whereby the text of a speech is fed through the rulebooks on oratory. Gotoff overcompensates, though: he instead argues that every aspect of the speech is instead a function of the exigencies of the performance, and that the performance's only real end is victory, not

224

STAGING MASCULINITY

veracity, coherence, or sincerity. Some critics believe almost everything, Gotoff nearly nothing. Gotoff thus seems an ardent partisan of Demosthenes' alleged position that performance was everything, even as he subsumes the notion of performance within the broader category of illusion.1 "The fact is," he concludes, "that the orator of a judicial speech is concerned entirely with the momentary effect."2 Gotoff then reads a number of speeches for their effects. The ensuing discussion resembles in form and content the researches of Quintilian. A number of ambiguities arise within Gotoff's treatment of the theatrical metaphor. Gotoff imagines a Cicero asking himself, "Will he use his own auctoritas as a substitute for argument?" (1993, 292). Why should authority and argument be seen as mutually irreconcilable? As should be clear from my own earlier observations, every performance invokes the authority of the good man and plays within a carefully circumscribed and sanctified stage. Admittedly, Gotoff himself does insist that Cicero "has introduced himself as a character in the drama that is the speech" (1993, 312), that an oration is also very much about the orator. In fact, Gotoff sees Cicero the advocate as an agglomeration of characters, as "a variety of personae invented and portrayed by Cicero the orator" (312). Gotoff ends his essay with a veritable fugue on the illusory in and as oratory: In the drama of a Roman trial [Cicero] is merely his own protagonist. For when a man gets up to speak, his intention is clear and simple: to persuade. And in order to persuade he will say, do, become whatever is necessary to accomplish his aim. Verisimilitude is more important than truth; and the critic would be well advised never to trust the absolute sincerity of the man's words or the persona he presents. The only exception, of course, is when a scholar gives a public talk. (313) This is a clever ending. It is an urbane and self-aware gesture on the part of the author inviting his readers to savor a juicy irony. This text, we learn in the footnote that actually concludes the essay, was once itself a speech. The note naturally does not indicate the changes required to move from the verbal performance into the textual. At a minimum one supposes that Gotoff did not read his own footnotes to his original audience: he doubtless performed his authority with a minimum of citations from other authorities. In any case, Gotoff s conclusion invites a confusion of written text with delivered speech. It also invites us to wonder about the question of authority over reasoned argumentation. Gotoff would doubtless see himself as a highly reasonable man: and his authority, it augments the argument, doesn't it? This speech become text and text that gestures toward speech per-

WE OTHER ROMANS

225

forms a specific version of authority. As with any article from a prestigious journal, there are abundant footnotes. Gotoff cites; he interprets; he attributes. His opinions are based upon solid readings of his texts: he furnishes abundant tokens of authorities both ancient and modern to support his position. This is not an exercise designed to produce momentary effects or conviction at any price. Gotoff comes across as good man, experienced at writing. Gotoff thus performs the Roman rhetorical ideal even as he writes an essay on the mechanics of Roman rhetorical performance. Like a Quintilian he reads the speeches of Cicero and mines them in order to produce an authoritative commentary. One even requires Gotoff if we are to read Cicero: the endless fictions of the Roman orator require an interpreter to cut through the illusions. Unlike Quintilian, though, Gotoff adds in two very Ciceronian moments wherein he gestures to the community of good men for which his own work is destined. First, Gotoff recounts the following anecdote as an example of the techniques of extemporization: "I remember Professor Roger Mynors shortly before delivering the first Jackson lecture at Harvard, excusing himself with the words, T v e got to go polish my ad libs' " (1993, 304). The personal recollection might have come straight from Cicero's De oratore: "When I was younger, I remember the great Antonius once said . . ." Gotoff's reference to Mynors sets our author within an authoritative tradition of Latin scholarship. The specification of the lecture and the university only reinforces the effect. The ancient version might go something like this, U A number of us were chatting at Crassus' house in Tusculum . . . " Given their relative ages I suspect that Mynors' lecture may even have been given when Gotoff was a graduate student at Harvard: a young Cicero indeed. Gotoff's finale contains another such moment. The note that closes the last paragraph reads: "A version of this paper was delivered as a James Loeb Classical Lecture at Harvard University on October 30,1991" (1993, 313 n. 66). Harvard again: this was once a performance of scholarly authority given not in some provincial backwater but in Rome itself. Gotoff was invited to speak. Furthermore Gotoff has become Mynors; and the scholar of a prior generation has been succeeded by a member of the next who lectures and provides urbane fare to that same learned community different only in its actual composition. Once again, parallels could be drawn to the myth of rhetorical succession embodied by the De oratore. Some might justly condemn this reading as ungentlemanly, but it does emphasize the extent to which classical scholarship tends not just to interpret but also to reproduce the spirit of its objects of study. When it comes to writing and lecturing one performs a by-now familiar variant upon the good man experienced at speaking: good scholarship, a solid knowledge of

226

STAGING MASCULINITY

Latin, and careful interpretation readily insinuate themselves into the ancient formula. Styles of argumentation and subject matter are carefully attended to; so too, naturally, does one notice who speaks when and where, as well what university has trained and what employed the scholar who writes/speaks to us. I am by no means arguing that Gotoff is "wrong." On the contrary, he is as "right" about Cicero as is the De oratore itself "right" about Ciceronian practice. His is a reading to which one is invited. Indeed, his is a thoroughly Ciceronian interpretation of Cicero. This brings us to the question of style. The style in which my own text is written is difficult: the reader has been asked to endure dead languages and modern neologisms placed side by side. Worst of all, each discourse is bent to accommodate the other: the postmoderns lie next to authors with whom one might have thought they had made a break. And poor Quintilian, suddenly he is a commentator not only on Cicero but also on Derrida and Lacan. There are numerous obvious tropes, and rhetoric is generally in evidence. Is this good philosophy? Is it bad theory? Is it all bad philology impressed into the service of theory for its own sake? Is it neither fish nor fowl, but just, as Gorgias might rhyme in, offal? Perhaps one would be wiser to try to avoid facile antithesis and to ascend to a point beyond good and bad. Take, for example, the case of Nietzsche. Derrida begins his own commentary on Nietzsche's styles with a fragment from a letter that includes the remark that the publication of The Birth of Tragedy had made him "the most scabrous philologist of the present day."3 The remark was made in November 1872. Nietzsche was at the time teaching his seminar on ancient rhetoric (Nietzsche 1989). Upon reading Nietzsche's lecture notes, though, one is surprised not at the outrageousness of their content but at their fidelity to the Greeks and the Romans. There is little here that would not or could not be found in a conservative course of the same title were it offered today. For example, the account of delivery occupies less than one page. 4 This discussion consists of two brief citations from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, some Cicero, the Demosthenes anecdote about the importance of delivery, and a few other ancient commonplaces. Where is the scabrousness? Or, better still, why had Nietzsche been scabrous in his book if, as his lectures reveal, he clearly knew better? This must have puzzled Nietzsche's peer Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf. Wilamowitz would himself eventually author a seminal essay on ancient styles (Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1900). More importantly, though, Wilamowitz is widely recognized as one of the founders of modern philology, a textual ancestor whom one seeks to reproduce mimetically if not spontaneously. Nietzsche marks a point of divergence: acknowledged as a father of so-called postmodernity, he was nevertheless trained and for a while em-

WE OTHER ROMANS

227

ployed as a classical philologist.5 Within his original profession Nietzsche has become something of a Remus: most who hold similar degrees and positions today aspire to be like Wilamowitz. What would it mean to imagine a different study of the city of Romulus? Nietzsche did not just know how to translate Greek and Latin, he knew how to mistranslate it. He did not merely understand ancient rhetoric, but he knew how to give a rhetorical account of his own thinking. In fact, Nehamas (1985) argues that questions of rhetoric become deeply philosophical issues for Nietzsche throughout his writings. Nietzsche was not "wrong" about tragedy: he was not just summarizing what antiquity explicitly said of the genre, but he also went well beyond the representation of tragedy offered up ready-made by Aristotle and his successors.6 Nietzsche labors — and clearly it is something of a labor — to offer a description that exceeds the "Apollonian" perspective. When Nietzsche repents of the errors of this youthful text, he regrets failures to make a decided enough break with the philosophical and so too the philological traditions. 7 An account of rhetoric need not be narrowly Aristotelian either. Of course, an account of rhetoric cannot help but be somewhat Aristotelian given the pride of place Aristotle's Rhetoric held within antiquity in general and particularly within Cicero's own thinking. Still, a philosophy of rhetoric or even a taxonomy of rhetoric can only go so far and no further. Such techniques of reading reveal structures and functions, patterns and ploys. They are necessary tasks, but not exhaustive ones. The Aristotelian tradition has difficulty grappling with more protean questions: what of the sociology of rhetoric? what of the psychology of rhetoric? what of the rhetoric of rhetoric? 8 Indeed, even the question of the philosophy of rhetoric remains double difficult in the absence of an extensive and self-aware account of the rhetoric of philosophy. Philosophers have long presented the orators as their antithesis: against the discourse of truth to which philosophy aspires the orators offer anything that will please, any argument that will win the day. Clearly, though, the orators were themselves frequently exercised by questions of truth and meaning: Cicero and Quintilian both aspire to train an orator who can be what he seems, who can speak what is, and whose words will not just be true but also have the power to produce truth in the world. In this version the orator becomes something of a philosopher-king. Nietzsche again becomes useful: he too is the rhetorical philosopher; and, disturbingly, he too argues for a discourse that is virile and masterful. Zarathustra's version of wisdom as a woman waiting to be won thus recalls Lucian's teacher of rhetoric (Nehamas 1985, 114-15). A ccontemporary genealogical reading needs always to guard against itself proceeding according to the rules of masculinist ontology and teleology. We must be wary of

228

STAGING MASCULINITY

reproducing the good man within our own critique of masculinity.9 Nevertheless, the genealogy itself indicates the manner in which it would be impossible to dispense with this figure with a flourish of the pen. What would it mean to perform a philosophy of rhetoric, to enact a true oratory? A question such as this hovers about the pages of the rhetorical literature we have been reading. In order to find himself good and true, the orator produced a universe of unlivable bodies and souls. These bad subjects became the stuff of subjection: they were to be mastered by the orator both in the world and in himself. The orator's psyche becomes a microcosm for the logic of the world: as goes the mode of self-knowledge for the hegemonic man, so too flows the authoritative logos of the world. And this logos may perhaps be decried as mere rhetoric, a hypostasis with no basis in reality, something produced by the orator, by the rhetorical theorist, and even by the critic of oratory. But such a resistance already acknowledges a point this study has long maintained: the text of the world is performed and iterated; it is not closed, finished, or perfect; rhetorical claims are not ontological ones; utterances are not divinely performative. The orators themselves knew this. Their entire self-imposed regime is predicated upon such a realization. Their discourse may not be the truth of the world, but it comprises a vital would-be truth, a fiction with the power to produce lived reality. Moreover even if we imagine queer, radical, nasty subjects who live some sort of alternative and subterranean life apart from the orators, we produce a portrait already anticipated by the good men themselves. They have not only sketched the outlines of virtue, but they have constrained the sort of space that vice itself can occupy: crazy emperors like Nero offer one version of a subversive parody enacted from within the confines of the rubric of the good man. One would have to be madder even than they to pretend that the world of the good man vanishes so soon as one loses interest in it. The "truth" of Rome remains doggedly elusive. Students of Roman women have long struggled with the difficulties of depicting their experience in objective terms. 10 How can we separate the masculinist account from historical truth? Yet the discourse of Rome keeps reproducing the qualities goodness and virility as subjective structures with objective effects. Furthermore the rhetorical texts themselves train their readers in the means whereby the reader too might imbibe excellence, speak authoritatively, and perform the excellence and decorum of their learning. As was mentioned in the introduction and subsequently argued in the body of this study, when the orator acquires his knowledge he simultaneously reinscribes the legitimacy of virile authority.

WE OTHER ROMANS

229

Scholars today must attempt to avoid being such good students of ancient rhetoric that they reproduce even the relations of appropriation for which an elitist text like the De oratore argues. In fact, to the extent that the Ad Herennium and the work of C. Julius Victor are seen as "base" examples of their genre when compared to Quintilian, or, more importantly, the great Cicero, critics reveal their own desire to prove the blueness of their blood, to claim to understand fully the authors of these already exclusive texts within a genre invested with the highest social capital. In short, the need to prove that one's Latin really was as good as Cicero's can itself be a sign of a complicity with the aristocracy of the culture of rhetoric. Cicero becomes a Bloomian strong poet, and the weak fall before his pen, so much mightier than his sword (cf. Bloom 1973,11). Rhetorical criticism can itself then become a sort of prose poetry written by a "deep reader" where the scholar offers not just exegesis but also an argument in favor of his own claim to filiation with the master (Bloom 1973, 95-96). Your author has perhaps overstepped his bounds. It would be possible to accuse him of any number of crimes: ingratitude, incompetence, malice. Or perhaps this is all mere braggadocio, youthful excess, something he will grow out of. Undeniably he is something of an inheritor, trained traditionally, and a card-carrying member of the community of commentators. If all goes well, he will cast aside his Asiatic youth and grow into Attic maturity much as did Cicero himself. A variety of other possible readings of my reading are already contained in the preceding pages: all the jargon damages and even conceals the honeyed truths of Attic simplicity; this is Asiatic excess, effeminate fluff, with a mere ten Attic words sprinkled atop a pile of ignorance; the author was too lazy to climb the hard road; this is the gaudy exposition of a pandering body of knowledge designed to seduce the ignorant into believing either that theory is significant to a philologist or perhaps even that Latin might be relevant to a theorist. Let's not even talk about the implications for the author's "thing" even if phallicism is very much the thing to ponder when reflecting upon my own report upon the condition of knowledge (cf. Lyotard 1984). As with Gotoff, so here too: one even needs Gunderson if we are to read Cicero. The claims of the commentator are ever bold. I would ask, though, that the reader read more carefully rhetoric, theory, and the theory of rhetoric. I would ask that the commentary on performance be seen as a sort of performance in its own right. I wish to argue against the happy acceptance of the crown to which we as scholars have an inherited and an acquired claim. It is possible, then, to see in these pages not an Asiatic excess but rather a new Atticism. Now one must be master of more discourse, must know more bodies than ever before, must perform an even

230

STAGING MASCULINITY

more elaborate rhetoric of knowing. Perhaps I only offer a new version of mastery. Perhaps I reproduce at the next level of abstraction the theory effect that I critique in the ancients. It would be unwise to become distracted by an endless ascent of the metatheoretical ladder: it makes for an effective rhetorical climax, not a logical one. Furthermore such a recursive labor would itself perform the very subjection to theory and abstraction that I would resist in the final instance. No productive end is served by further reifying the theoretical: it is already all too material Instead I would argue for more and better students of oratory and performance, actors whose agency struggles against and not with the ontological consequences of reading, writing, and enacting. Finally, I hope that my own play has been the thing to catch the conscience of the king.

Notes

Introduction 1. Maier-Eichhorn 1989 offers a useful, straightforward reading of Quintilian, and she includes two appendices illustrating specific gestures. 2. For the sociology of rhetoric, one can see, for example, Habinek 1995; Sinclair 1995a, 1995b. Examples of a more historical approach might be the reading of Cicero's Pro Archia in Narducci 1997 or the readings of the fragmentary speeches of Cicero offered by Crawford 1994. Obviously, though none of these scholars is solely concerned with one sort of inquiry over the other. 3. See Derrida 1981 and Ferrari 1987, 208-10. Charles 1992 provides a Lancanian reading of this dialogue. Also, it should be noted that Cicero's De oratore is itself heavily influenced by the Phaedrus. 4. See Lloyd 1993 for an account of the maleness of reason in Western thought as a whole. Irigaray revisits Plato's cave and describes the problems of speculative hysteria to be found therein (Irigaray 1985, 243-364). 5. On melancholic identification, see Butler 1997b, 132-50. The problems of heterosexuality and the gendering of speech to which Butler's reading of melancholy gives rise will be discussed in subsequent chapters. 6. ut cognoscas quae viri omnium eloquentissimi clarissimique senserint de omni ratione dicendi. De oratore 1.5. 7. atque ego in summo oratore fingendo talem informabo qualis fonasse nemo fuit non enim quaero quis fuerit, sed quid sit Mud quo nihil possit esse praestantius. Oratori. 8. On the formal aspects of the Brutus as an "Aristotelian" dialogue, see Büchner 1964, 324. 9. Cato, De rhetorica fr. 14; preserved in Seneca Maior Controversiae l.pr.9. 10. The bibliography on the vir bonus is extensive. On the persistence of Cato's formulation in Roman thought see Kennedy 1972, 56-57. Michel 1960,1516 highlights the social usefulness of the good man. Winterbottom 1964 argues that Quintilian's use of the vir bonus is a reaction to delatores, men who turned a profit by accusing the politically vulnerable. Gwynn 1926, 230 — 41 explains Quintilian's phrase by way of a general moral reaction against his age. Michel 1960, 19-38 covers the morality of oratory in general. Laughton 1961, 28 insists upon the Romanness of such a rhetorical morality. Brinton 1983 relates Quintilian's good man to Platonic thought.

232

NOTES TO PAGES 7-14

11. For a much fuller account of morality and education that encompasses both Greek and contemporary thought, see Too, forthcoming. 12. In both Greek and Latin, the terms for child, παις and puer, can also mean slave. Hence the opposition between man and "boy" revolves around the issue of either being in power and authority or being subject to someone else's power and authority. Compare Golden 1985. 13. Walters 1997 offers a detailed analysis of the semantic and social field covered by the Roman term vir. See also Santoro L'Hoir 1992. 14. See Hellegouarc'h 1963, 489-90 on the mercurial use of the term boni. The appellation reflects partisanship, not a fixed content. 15. For the political reading of bonus and the Latin words with which it is associated, see Hellegouarc'h 1963,184-95. Sinclair 1993 covers the social status of the orator as leading citizen. 16. The Oxford Latin Dictionary cites Plautus, Captivi 583: "It's characteristic of the down-and-out to be spiteful and to envy good [i.e. affluent] men" {est miserorum ut malevolentes sint atque invideant bonis). 17. This formulation expressly picks up on a definition of gender offered by Butler 1990b, 270-71. Her arguments concerning gender and performance will be discussed in more detail below. 18. Gleason 1995, xxv. For habitus, see Bourdieu 1990, 52-65, and, as Bourdieu's predecessor in such a use of the term, Mauss 1973, 73. 19. A critique of psychoanalysis is put in these terms. See Bourdieu 1990, 77. 20. Bourdieu 1990, 26. Bourdieu is himself quoting from others. 21. Lausberg 1990 comes close to complete objectivist complicity, though. Similarly, Fantham 1982 might be described as heavily influenced by a subjectivist approach. Gotoff 1993 is also highly intentionalist. 22. "Reflexive sociology" is Bourdieu's name for his project as a whole. See Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992 for an overview. 23. See Rhetorica ad Herennium 3.16.19ff. The text asserts that delivery is an overlooked department of oratory, but compare the next example. 24. Aristotle, Rhetoric 1403b20ff. Compare 1413b9, where the so-called writ­ ten style and the spoken style of composition are contrasted relative to their amena­ bility to effective public delivery. On Aristotle's place in the history of performance see Solmsen 1941, 45-57. 25. Corax and Tisias as handbook writers: Quintilian 3.1.8.; Cicero, De inven­ tane 2.2.6, De oratore 1.20.91, and Brutus 12.46. Compare Kennedy 1963, 58-59, and see also Wilkins' introduction to his edition of Cicero's Orator: it becomes clear that almost everyone wrote τέχναι (Wilkins 1895, 27-29). 26. Foucault's answer centers around practice and self-mastery or self-posses­ sion (ασκησις and εγκράτεια). See Foucault 1990b, 33-78. Foucault's focus in this work is, broadly speaking, the philosophy of fourth- and fifth-century Athens. That his work should be so readily transferable to later Greek thought and to Roman thought is further indicative of the stability of the set of problems in which rhetorical performance participates. Rhetorical performance, then, neither inaugu­ rates nor completes this eternal crisis in ancient masculinity. 27. Jarratt (1991) also gives a reading of contemporary theory with and against ancient rhetoric. Her focus, though, is upon the Sophists, thinkers who appear before the canonical version of ancient rhetoric is instituted and men whose thoughts may even be said to have provoked a conservative reaction in that very act

NOTES TO PAGES 15-21

233

of canonization. I am interested in showing the extent to which canonical ancient rhetoric invites its own radical rereading in the course of offering its bodily tenets. See also Poulakos 1994 for a poststructuralist reading of Gorgias' Helen in a manner that deconstructs aristocratic presence in and through rhetoric. 28. Leo 1913, 21-46, offers a traditional account of the historical development and interconnectedness of writing, speech, and the law in Rome. 29. Brown 1974 provocatively argues for the relevance of psychoanalysis in the study of Rome; but Brown is more interested in pointing out areas of importance than in following up either on Freud or the Latin. Janan's work on Catullus (1994) offers a compelling example of systematically engaged Lacanian criticism as applied to Latin literature. The first chapter of that book has been noted as a valuable primer on psychoanalysis for students of antiquity (McMahon 1995). Other examples of psychoanalytic criticism of Latin literature can be found in Leach 1993 and Leach 1999. 30. See, for example, his mother's castration threats (Freud 1976, 49) and the constant examination of the boy for his sexual theories by his father. 31. This proposition is fundamental to Lacan's reading (1994) of the case as a whole. 32. See Freud 1963b. Compare Lacan 1988a, 129-42, where pathogenesis is removed from the foreground of the discussion. See Butler 1990a, 35-78, for a genealogy of the prohibitions that produce homosexuality as a pathology by way of and within the terms of the psychic apparatus. Butler 1997b revisits these questions in greater detail. 33. On the homosexual aspect of everyday life and social virtues, see for example Freud 1970a, 112; 1963c, 113, 162-65. The last passage, in particular, is useful for seeing the connection between a pathologized relationship to homosexuality and the mechanism of paranoia. The ancient orator himself often evinces signs of this same affliction. For a critique of Freudian theory as resistant to homosexuality even where it posits a primary bisexuality, see Butler 1990a, 61. 34. Freud 1970a, 107. Compare Freud 1970b, 167-71, which covers much of the same ground. 35. The countertransference receives more discussion in Freud 1970. 36. Compare Lacan 1988a, 237-46, where the transference is put into the field of speech. 37. Freud 1970a, 162. Compare Lacan 1988b, 89-90, the exact relevance of which will be discussed shortly. 38. See Lacan 1977,1-8. But note that Lacan 1988a, 74, offers a substitute for the mirror stage with a new illustration and that Lacan 1988b, 102, expressly states that the original essay is getting long in the tooth. In fact, the discussion to be found in Lacan 1981 offers even further elaboration and development of this same theme. All of these subsequent accounts revolve around optics and cameras and leave to one side the baby before the mirror of the original formulation. See especially Lacan 1988a, 73-88; 1988b, 235-36; and 1981, 67-119. Rose 1986 provides a valuable gloss on many of these issues. See also Silverman 1992 for commentary upon Lacan's eleventh seminar in particular. 39. The symbolic function is presented as complementary to arguments about the gaze in Lacan 1981, 105, where the process of the gaze is appropriated by the symbolic. 40. Lacan 1988b, 29. Notice, for example, that even in the chapter entitled

234

NOTES TO PAGES

22-29

"The Wolf! The Wolf!" where the infant's life initially seems to be aligned with the real —the order that resists signification and is therefore radically exterior to the symbolic —nevertheless this child's extremely limited vocabulary already puts him within the symbolic. This child who has a two-word vocabulary allows for a view of the symbolic in initio. See Lacan 1988a, 96-106 (especially 104). Hence, of course, the infantile sexuality to which I refer above is already structured by the symbolic and should not be seen as a fundamentally other or revolutionary state. Lacan 1994 discusses at length the child's movement into the world of language and of Oedipus. 41. Compare the case of Hans, who is asked to find health in a subjection to father, Freud, and God. Lacan 1994 offers extensive commentary on this issue. 42. For "failure," see especially the so-called failure of the prison system and prison reform as detailed in Foucault 1979, 268-72, or the so-called failure of certain sexual prohibitions in Foucault 1990a, 41. 43. Foucault 1990b, 1988a. Foucault 1988b makes it clear that antiquity was a persistent concern for him throughout the last period of his career. 44. Foucault began to be important to classicists in the 1980s. Halperin, Winkler, and Zeitlin 1990 offers a seminal collection of essays influenced by Foucault. A prominent trend at present, though, is a critique of Foucault, his methods, and even his qualifications. A key moment in this debate came with Richlin 1991. More recently, see the articles collected in Larmour, Miller, and Platter 1998. Skinner 1996 surveys the Foucault debate within classics. Even though the relationship to Foucault can be strained, it is clear that his questions have proven to be the ones around which much of the contemporary debate on ancient sexuality is oriented. 45. Foucault 1990a, 8, 11. The latter passage focuses on the "putting into discourse of pleasure." 46. Foucault 1979, 138-40. Compare Foucault 1979, 197, where discourse's power relies on techniques of analysis. See also 1980b, 56-60. 47. Foucault 1979,189. In Foucault 1988, 42, disclosure and renunciation are fused in Christian confessional techniques. Here again, the orator can be evoked: he as well discovers in himself traces that he simultaneously refuses and engages in a technique that chronically produces such unpleasant discoveries. 48. See Butler 1997b, 83-105, for a much fuller discussion. 49. Butler 1997b reengages with Althusser in a move that seems designed to forge a similar link. 50. For performative as citationality, see Butler 1993,12 and 14. 51. See Bourdieu 1990, 52-65, for "structuring structures."

Chapter 1 1. See Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 3.3 for an overview of the problem as it stood in his time. 2. The Rhetorica ad Herennium 1.3; Cicero, De inventione 1.9; Quintilian 3.3.1; and C. Iulius Victor (Giomini and Celantano 1980, 1.16) all champion the same five divisions. The first text is the earliest Latin rhetorical handbook we have, while the last is among latest. Giomini and Celantano 1980, iv explain the evidence in support of assigning Victor to the fourth century C E . It should be noted that there is no standard reference system for citing Victor. Future references to him will come from this edition, which supersedes Halm 1863, though it does give Halm's page numbers in its own margins.

NOTES TO PAGES 29-39

235

3. Kroll 1940, 1075, identifies Theophrastus as the source of this mode of analyzing performance. Cicero's relationship to Theophrastus is examined in both Runia 1989 and Fortenbaugh 1989. 4. On Roman social concerns over access to and the dissemination of rhetori­ cal training see Habinek 1998, 60-61 and 109. 5. Nobody believes the work to be Cicero's. Its uncertain authorship has also left its dating in doubt. Achard 1989, v-xxxiv gives an excellent summary of these problems. It most likely dates from some time shortly before Cicero's own writings, or else it is contemporaneous with Cicero's earliest works. 6. Pronuntiationem multi maxime utilem oratori dicerunt esse <et> ad persuadendum plurimum valere. Nos quidem unum de quinque rebus plurimum posse non facile dixerimus. Ad Herennium 3.19. 7. It is, of course, impossible to give real "page numbers" for a text originally written on a number of book rolls. I only seek to indicate the scale of the discussion and of the text in terms familiar to a modern reader. The 192-page edition to which I am referring is Marx 1894. 8. Compare Pucci 1991 on Augustine and Horace. 9. de gestu scripserunt. Quintilian 11.3.143. 10. sed de his nequaquam nobis existimo laborandum; neque enim docemus ilium qui loqui nesciat, nee sperandum est qui Latine non possity hunc ornate esse dicturum, neque qui non dicat quod intellegatur, hunc posse quod admirandum sit dicere. Giomini and Celentano 1980, 82.5-9. 11. sin contendemus per continuationem, bracchio celeri, mobili vultu, acri aspectu utemur. Ad Herennium 3.27. 12. See for example Cicero, De oratore 1.94 and 1.78, which include the phrase aut vero si esse posset [or indeed if he could exist]. 13. This thesis will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter. 14. Some editors follow Spalding and delete "or concede" (aut concedere). Winterbottom 1970 retains it; Cousin 1979 deletes. 15. The passages are Aeneid 3.620 in the first example and 1.335 in the second. 16. See Graf 1991 on the social aspects of Roman gestures. 17. Derrida 1976 is the locus classicus, although Derrida engages with these questions throughout his oeuvre. One might compare in particular the essays of Derrida 1978 and the whole of Derrida 1987. 18. "It is necessary that something written be easy to read and easy to speak" (όλως δέ δει εύανάγνωστον είναι το γεγραμμένον και εΰφραστον). Aristotle, Rhetoric 1407bll. 19. Svenbro 1993, 3. Compare Svenbro 1993, 45. Svenbro 1993, 196-97 re­ veals how erotically charged the bodily politics of such texts could be. My own discussion of sex and the schoolmaster will come in later chapters. 20. Quintilian 9.4.19: "First, there are two kinds of style, one is taut and tightly woven, the other is lax as in conversation and letters, except where they deal with something of a higher nature such as philosophy, the state, and the like" (Est igitur ante omnia oratio alia uincta atque contexta, soluta alia, qualis in sermone <et> epistulis, nisi cum aliquid supra naturam suam tractant, ut de philosophia, de re publica similibusque). We find here a consistent blurring of the vocabulary of genre, style, and literature and the diction of spoken language. Thus oratio means both style and speech; and sermo means both a discussion and a literary dialogue. 21. The passages are from, respectively, Aeneid 1.78, Eclogues 3.25, Aeneid 1.617, and Aeneid 11.383.

236

NOTES TO PAGES

40-52

22. See Martindale 1993 for a detailed analysis of this question both as it relates to Romans reading Romans and our reading them. Martindale is also particularly interested in (re)readings of Vergil. 23. Gotoff 1993 offers a reading of Cicero the performer by way of his texts. Goldhill 1989 grapples in a very self-aware fashion with the variety of problems that arise when reading Attic tragedy for its staging. The essay represents an advanced moment in an ongoing debate on performing tragedy. 24. See Rademacher 1971, 433-37, for a staggering list of references. 25. For a general study of the relationship between Quintilian and Cicero, see Guillemin 1959. Cousin 1936 is quite exhaustive on the same topic. Cousin 1936, 100-101, touches in passing on the issue of actio, and Cousin 1936, 618-31, covers it more carefully. Yet both passages omit any discussion of the problem of inheriting performance via a written text. Fantham 1982 offers a detailed study of Quintilian's borrowings and originality vis-à-vis Cicero in the course of his discussion of performance in the Institutio. 26. These phrases come from Cicero, Pro Ligario 1.2, Pro Cluenio. 5.11, Pro Cluentio 5.14, In Verrem 1.30.76. 27. Compare Quintilian 9.2.32: "It is impossible to compose spoken dialogue without composing the speech of a character" {nam certe sermo fingi non potest, ut non personae sermo fingatur). Behind all speech there lies a speaker. 28. nonne ad singulas paene distinctiones quamvis in eadem facie tarnen quasi vultus mutandus est? 29. omnia sine remissione sine varietate, vi summa vocis et totius corporis contendo ne dicebam. Cicero, Brutus 313. In the same dialogue one can catch glimpses of other orators, who are branded as uniformly slow, calm, excited, et cetera. Some speakers clearly thought it worth sticking to particular varieties of delivery. 30. quod notavi, ut apparerei, non solum in membris causae, set etiam in articulis esse aliquam pronuntiandi variatatem, sine qua nihil neque maius neque minus est. 11.3.51. 31. Ausonius, in Miloniam 36. The published revised version of the speech opens with an ironic reminder of this moment "Did I fear . . . " (etsi vereor . . .). 32. Quintilian is citing Cicero, Pro Archia 1.1. 33. femur ferire, quod Athenis primus fecisse creditur Cleon . . . Quintilian 11.3.123. 34. ut in tanta per omnes gentes nationesque linguae diversitate hie mihi omnium hominum communis sermo videatur. Quintilian 11.3.87. 35. Inventio in sex partes orationis consumitur: in exordium, narrationem, divisionem, confirmationem, confutationem, conclusionem. Exordium est principium orationis, per quod animus auditoris constituitur ad audiendum. Narrano est. . . Ad Herennium 1.3.4. 36. quid est orator? vir bonus dicendi peritus. Fortunatianus, Ars rhetorica 1.10 (Halm 1863). 37. Sinclair 1993, 570-71. Sinclair 1995b offers even more extensive analysis of the community of the sententia. 38. Sententia est oratio sumpta de vita, quae aut quid sit aut quid esse oporteat in vita, breviter ostendit. Ad Herennium 4.24. 39. Again, Sinclair 1993 offers a thorough study of the sociology of the Ad Herennium (see especially 563). In general, Sinclair believes that the author is quite aristocratic. While rhetorical training is never lowbrow, I find these "accessible"

NOTES TO PAGES 55-63

237

rules much less elitist than other alternatives. Compare MacKendrick 1948. For a discussion of the author as a "populist" (popularis) see Ungern-Sternberg 1973, which follows up on Marx 1894. Of course, "popular" in this context should only be read as less elitist than the most extreme Roman positions: advocating certain policies beneficial to the lower classes did not imply believing that anyone other than gentlemen ought to be the people's champion and spokesman. 40. Kennedy 1972, 114-38, discusses this work in general. Grube 1962, 23738, and Bonner 1977, 79, talk about its pedantic style. Cicero disparages this work at De oratore 1.5. The refusal of the simple prescriptive style is thus an opening gesture in the move toward dialogue. 41. MacKendrick 1948 also reads Cicero's theoretical texts as written for "insiders." On the other hand, Ruch 1958 emphasizes the international quality of Cicero's thought. Hence the elite of ability or culture need not be narrowly conceived as necessarily Romans or necessarily members of certain families. Cicero thus makes room for relative arrivistes such as himself while also requiring complete submission to the dominant cultural paradigm. The perils and pitfalls of such strategies are covered in Bourdieu 1984.

Chapter 2 1. A shorter version of this chapter appeared as Gunderson 1998. 2. Bremmer and Roodenburg 1992; Bourdieu 1990; Schmitt 1984; and Boltanski 1971 offer useful sociological analyses of bodies and gestures. Mauss 1973 remains a classic within this realm. Graf 1991 investigates Quintilian from this perspective. Tuite 1993 examines the semiotics of gestures. Butler 1989 and Lash 1984 examine the body from within critical theory. Jackson 1983 attempts to describe a body that is anterior to all signs and radically independent from language. The present analysis focuses on the production of meanings of the body and the regulation of a bodily-ego within such processes. 3. An excellent discussion of later and mostly Greek material on performance can be found in Gleason 1995. Fantham 1982 examines Quintilian's relationship to earlier authors' discussions of performance. 4. See Bardon 1952, 2:111-12 for some discussion of these lost works. 5. Boltanski 1971, 214-16, argues for an increase in somatic knowledge and observation as social class rises. 6. Foucault 1979, 268-72. Or see Foucault 1990a for his investigation of sexuality not as a fact or substance but as a story that has to be repeatedly and endlessly discovered and told. 7. See Cicero, Pro S. Roscio Amerino 84, Pro Milone 32, and Philippicae 2.35. 8. The whole of Quintilian's twelfth book engages the question of whether one can be a good orator without being a good man. 9. See Butler 1997b, 31-62, especially 59-62. Her commentary centers on Hegel 1977, 111-19, and I have borrowed the idiom of Hegel as well. 10. Such knowledges could be connected with Foucault's call for other economies of pleasure (1990a, 158-59). 11. Compare Isocrates' Antidosis and Against the Sophists. See also the discussion of authentic performance in the chapter on actors. 12. Verum Uli persuasione sua fruantury qui hominibus ut sint oratores satis

238

NOTES TO PAGES

64-73

putant nasci: nostro labori dent ueniam, qui nihil credimus esse perfectum nisi ubi natura cura iuuetur. Quintilian 11.3.11. This section will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter. 13. ideoque in Us primum est bene adfici et concipere imagines rerum et tamquam ueris moueri. 14. See Derrida 1976 and my arguments in the preceding chapter and in the introduction. 15. Compare Lucian, De saltatione 63. The arguments there, even if they become hyperbolic, depend upon the legibility of dance. In an extreme case, a man performing the madness of Ajax seems to go as crazy as his subject: he nearly kills the person performing Odysseus. On another occasion a dancer is brought along as an interpreter by a commanding general out among unknown peoples. See De saltatione 83 and 64. 16. (gestus) qui et ipse uoci consentit et animo cum ea simul paret. 11.3.65. 17. in intimos penetret adfectus. 11.3.67. 18. Subsequent chapters will study these two special cases. 19. Compare also Seneca, Epistulae morales 114 for a long fugue on body and stylistic criticism. The spirit and the body's movements are made to coincide, and then the dissolute life and speech of Maecenas are read through this thesis. A philosophical regulation of the soul thus becomes necessary for any moral speaker. One can think as well of Dionysius of Halicarnassus' On the Ancient Orators, where the Asiatic and Attic styles are made into bodies. 20. See Foucault 1979, 184, for the conjoint constitution and extraction of knowledge that takes place in examination. See also Foucault 1979, 305, where "knowable man" is a product of "analytical investment," a process whereby theoretical analysis produces the object of its inquiry. Foucault calls this "dominationobservation." 21. This passage is discussed in more detail when the topic of actors in general and their relationship to orators is taken up in the chapter on acting. 22. The Latin phrase appears in Quintilian 11.3.1, which is referring to Cicero, De oratore 3.222. Bodily eloquence, eloquentia corporis, also mentioned in 11.3.1, is taken from Cicero, Orator 55. 23. Against Quintilian's version see Fortunatianus, Ars rhetorica 2.1. This author boldly claims to exhaust the topic of characterization with his twenty-one divisions (persona quot modis consideratur? viginti et uno). His discussion is an agreeable and unconvincing jumble of attributes that makes a muddle of divisions such as Quintilian's. It may be said in Fortunatianus' favor, though, that his student is assured of ready comprehension of other souls and indeed even of his own. 24. Further discussion of these terms can be found in the final chapter. 25. Compare Cicero, Brutus 171 for "urbanity" (urbanitas) as an ineffable quality. This passage seems to restrict itself to the opposition between the Roman and the provincial, but I would like to read the urbane more fully. Urbanity is the quality possessed by the sophisticated and socially prominent man of the city. He is a man of authority, and one recognizes his hegemony, but cannot exactly say from whence it comes. Quintilian's cruel take on urbanity will be discussed below. 26. See Quintilian 11.3.138-39, and compare 11.3.69 and 11.3.159 on the body and head. Everywhere Quintilian requires propriety and straightness: there is a double play on the Latin rectus. 27. Thalmann 1988 and Rose 1988 argue that the sociology of this scene is

NOTES TO PAGES 74-84

239

complex and that the reactions that it would engender in its audience are by no means univocal or aristocentric. See also Bourdieu 1991, 109. 28. Marius uero, sine quibus trunca esset actio ac debilis, uix dici potest quot motus habeant, cum paene ipsam uerborum copiant persequantur. 11.3.85. 29. hae, prope est ut dicam, ipsae locuntur. 11.3.85. 30. Maier-Eichhorn 1989 provides both a commentary and a set of useful illustrations. 31. Est admirationi conueniens Me gestus, quo manus modice supinata ac per singulos a minimo collecta digitos redeunte flexu simul explicatur atque conuertitur. 32. Est et ilia caua et rara et supra umeri altitudinem elata cum quodam motu uelut hortatrix manus, a peregrinis scholis tarnen prope recepta tremula scaenica. Rara is to be taken in the sense offered by the Oxford Latin Dictionary, s.v. rarus I.e. Compare Maier-Eichhorn 1989, 95: "mit weit gespreizten Fingern." 33. manus cum sensu et ineiperet et deponeretur: alioqui enim aut ante uocem erit gestus aut post uocem, quod est utrumque deforme. 11.3.106. 34. 11.3.107. Compare the discussion of Antonius' use of his hands in Cicero, Brutus 141: "his hands kept to the general tenor of his speech, but they did not express its ideas word-for-word" {gestus erat non verba exprimens, sed cum sententiis congruens). 35. These last are clearly the same beats as Cicero's "more subtle rhythm" (cantus obscurior). See Cicero, Orator 57. 36. Praecipuum uero in actione sicut in corpore ipso caput est, cum ad ilium de quo dixi decorem, turn etiam ad significationem. 11.3.68. 37. Plerumque tarnen et uox temperata et gestus modestus et sedens umero toga et laterum lenis in utramque partem motus, eodem spectantibus oculis, decebit. 11.3.161. 38. One can also compare 11.3.70, which tells how the head should follow the gestures. 39. See Needham 1973, which brings together a number of classic essays on the sociology of the left and right. His selection includes Lloyd 1962, which covers classical philosophy. 40. Compare Graf 1991, 47, on bodily and spiritual self-control in Quintilian's gestures. 41. Gleason 1995 gives an excellent discussion of the sociology of the voice during the Second Sophistic. 42. Quare uocem delictis non molliamus, nee inbuatur ea consuetudine quam desideratura sit, sed exercitatio eius talis sit qualis usus . . . sedfirmetur consuetudine. 43. Longissime fugienda mollis actio, qualem in Titio Cicero dicit fuisse, unde etiam saltationis quoddam genus Titius sit appellatum. 11.3.128. Dancing was a notoriously erotic, undignified, and effeminate activity. 44. firmitas corporis, ne ad spadonum et mulierum et aegrorum exilitatem uox nostra tenuetur. 11.3.19. 45. quod ambulatio, unctio, ueneris abstinentia, facilis ciborum digestio, id est frugalitas, praestat. 46. Compare Butler 1997a, 28-38, for a reading of the "injurious action of names" as it relates to iteration, interpellation, and the necessary vulnerability to being named that structures the conditions of becoming a subject at all. 47. Winterbottom 1976, 59, highlights the adversarial aspect of urbanitas. Ramage 1961 recognizes the exclusionary tactics inhering within urbanity. Ramage

240

NOTES TO PAGES

84-95

1963 traces the historical variations in the semantic field of urbanitas from the period of Cicero to Quintilian. Ramage 1973 is broader still. See Desmouliez 1952, 170, for the connection between urbanitas and the elitist Attic style. The aggressive side of urbanitas is also clear from Quintilian's use at 6.3.104 of the definition of urbanitas formulated by Domitius Martus, where urbanitas is described as "very well suited to defense or assault" (maxime idonea ad resistendum vel lacessendum). Quintilian's comment on Domitius' ideas notes that Domitius' full definition of urbanitas is virtually identical to Quintilian's own concept or oratory. See the discussion of this passage in de Saint-Denis 1939. De Saint-Denis believes that Cicero and Quintilian use the term in the same manner. 48. Foucault said the same of the prisoner caught in the panopticon (1979, 202-3).

Chapter 3 1. See Fantham 1982 for the issues of traditional and original material in Quintilian 11.3. 2. Kühnert 1994, 163-68, discusses the relationship of the vir bonus to the perfect orator (perfectus orator). 3. See Bourdieu 1991,127-36, for the practical politics of the "theory effect" whereby description becomes prescription. 4. See Aristotle, Rhetoric 1408a23-35, which makes a similar argument about how an enthusiastic speaker communicates his excitement to his listeners. But Aristotle's version is made more as a cutting aside than as a part of an exposition of the mechanics of performance and the soul. 5. Michel 1981, 116, points out that for Cicero as well heart and tongue should coincide. Michel situates this position within ancient philosophical disputes. 6. The English of this sentence loosely translates Quintilian 11.3.6: Demosthenes, quid esset in toto dicendi opere primum interrogatus, pronuntiationi palmam dedit, eidemque secundum ac tertium locum, donee ab eo quaeri desinerei, ut earn uideri posset non praecipuam sed solam iudicasse. This same anecdote as preserved in Cicero's De oratore is the starting point for Wöhrle's discussion of actio. See Wöhrle 1990. 7. This is the Aristotelian problem of ήθος. Grant 1943 summarizes Cic­ ero's thoughts on character and oratory. He adds the observation that prior knowl­ edge of the orator by his audience was important in Cicero's thinking (1943, 474). This idea turns the whole of a man's life into a performance. Grant's documenta­ tion of Cicero's emphasis on sincerity in oratory offers a useful parallel to Quintil­ ian here and below. 8. The image is specifically musical; for example, the striking of the chords of a lyre. The body is an instrument, the orator a virtuoso player. The good performer necessarily "plays from the heart." 9. Kroll 1924, 93-95, examines the authority of antiquity in oratory as dis­ cussed by Quintilian and other theorists. It is worth noting, though, that the distinc­ tion between Quintilian and his foes turns on the self-consciousness of this relation­ ship to the past. Against Quintilian, though, see Ramage 1961, 486, for Cotta's affecting rusticity as a positive virtue. 10. The transmitted text is unclear as to the possessor of this license. If ludorum is sound, then a "licentious" festal scene is being invoked and talarium,

NOTES TO PAGES 96-110

241

"of ankles" (?!), conceals the name for a specific festival. There have been a variety of interesting guesses: Rademacher 1971 suggested but did not print ludo rum saltatoriorum. Cousin 1979 documents other efforts. Cousin himself accepts Lydorum et Carum licentiay "the licence of the Lydians and Carians," and he notes the association of these peoples with the exotic rites of Cybele. Winterbottom 1970 accepts the text as it stands. 11. See Gunderson 1997; Riggsby 1995; and Leach 1990 for more on Pliny's letters and aristocratic ethos. 12. This debate persists up to the present: see Butler's rereading of Althusser (1997b, 106-31). 13. Sinclair 1995b, 124, also reads this scene for its aggressive contest over membership in the aristocratic community. 14. Why, for example, is the De corona evoked so often, with the Philippics appearing to come in second place? What are the consequences of this selected reading of the remnants of Demosthenes' work? 15. McCarty 1989 surveys mirrors in antiquity but omits any Lacanian observations despite some efforts at explaining the psychoanalytic implications of his material. For mirrors and Roman women see Wyke 1994. 16. The wealth of other possibilities for a reading of a passage about truth and vision can be appreciated by referring to the encyclopaedic Jay 1993. See Rose 1986 for Lacan, vision, and the sexual subject. 17. This is derived from Lacan 1988b, 243, and Lacan's subsequent commentary on the illustration. 18. Lacan 1988b, 321, assigns the death instinct to A 19. See Kristeva 1982. Butler 1993 and 1989 are also useful here. 20. Silverman 1992, 15-51. Silverman's rereading of the Lacanian screen as historical, ideological, and cinematic allows for an extremely productive extension of Lacan's thought along the lines indicated by Althusser. Butler 1997b also engages many of these same issues. 21. See Butler 1997b, 31-62 for a reading of Hegel's "unhappy consciousness," the body, and subjection. 22. Lacan 1981, 79-90. This can be fruitfully compared to Jay 1993, 275-98, and his discussion of Sartre, the mirror, and the gaze of the other. Jay (288) cites François George's pithy summary of the Cartesian cogito à la Sartre: "l'Autre me voit, donc je suis." 23. Compare the prisoner who becomes the principle of his own subjection within the optical apparatus of the panopticon. See Foucault 1979, 202-3. 24. An account of such transgressions and the policing of oratory against their effects will occupy the next two chapters. 25. The Latin words surrounding these terms would be virilitas, adfectus, auctoritas, and fides. The text of Quintilian is saturated with these words and their cognates. 26. The following are merely examples. Provincials: latent in all uses of urbanitas such as at 11.3.30; barbarism: 11.3.69; animals: latrare non agere: "that's barking, not pleading a case" (11.3.31: a citation from Cicero). 27. An image more native to the antique scene might be brigandage or piracy. These nonsocial societies are often represented as bound together by complicity in a horrible crime such as human sacrifice, cannibalism, et cetera. This pure fantasy of an alien social order is perhaps more telling of the sort of symbolic violence at the foundation of the "legitimate" order. See Habinek 1998, 69-87.

242

NOTES TO PAGES

111-21

Chapter 4 1. Acting figures heavily as a guiding metaphor for Roman politics in Dupont 1985 and Bartsch 1994. On the Roman theater in general, see Dénès 1977 and Grimal 1973. Cousin 1973 and Dumont 1973 discuss the relationship of Quintilian and Cicero to the theater. 2. See Edwards 1993, 98-136, and Green 1933 on the morality of acting. On actors, orators, and gestures, see Graf 1991. 3. Wiseman 1995 engages the numerous ambiguities and difficulties of Remus. 4. Compare Edwards 1997 for the cultural logic of "infamy" at Rome as it related to prostitutes, actors, and gladiators. The actor's legal and social position was among the worst at Rome. 5. Butler 1997b also engages Althusserian subjectivation as it relates to the performative self. 6. This is a modification of Silverman 1992, 46: "Female subjectivity represents the site at which the male subject deposits his lack." Compare Rose 1982, 4044, on feminine sexuality as a masquerade mobilized by a fundamental reference to a male sign. 7. Michel 1971; Büchner 1964, 212-13; and Schulte 1935 discuss the phrase veritatis ipsius adores. Cicero's relationship to the intellectual traditions laid down by Isocrates and Plato figures prominently in each of these accounts. On Cicero and Isocrates, see Laughton 1961 and Smethurst 1953. See Douglas 1973, 95, for a critique of such investigations, which he characterizes as "narrow and mechanistic." Likewise, Hobsbawm 1983 ought to make us wary of all traditions and careful to always search out more proximate explanations for traditional arguments here and elsewhere. Douglas 1973,108-15, also offers a useful critique of any simple version of truth in Cicero and Quintilian as it relates to the arts: truth (veritas) must include beauty (pulchritudo). Truth, the imitation of truth, and the production of truth are never simple questions of accuracy. 8. Gotoff 1993 even embraces the metaphor as a means of reading Cicero's speeches. See 1993, 306, for an ironic instance of Cicero claiming that an actor was pleading (agere) on his behalf in the Pro Sestio. 9. The "easiest" words can provoke the most difficulty. Compare with the problem of agere, "to do," the difficulties of amare, "to love" (Gunderson 1997). 10. Silverman 1992, 5. Butler also adopts the bodily ego for her project (1993, 58). Both Butler and Silverman are reflecting on the early pages of Freud's The Ego and the Id. 11. Butler 1993, 110, speaks of the erotics of prohibition. The phrase "Critically Queer" provides the title to Butler's last chapter, a politicized finale to the whole of Bodies That Matter. 12. Bonner 1949, 20-21, reviews the passages in which stage training is said to aid in declamation. 13. Compare Cicero, De officiis 1.130, where dignity is to attractiveness as male is to female within the realm of beauty. The Latin terms are dignitas, venustas, and pulchritudo. The pleasure of effeminate beauty attaches itself to the male body only after being first sanctioned by mastery and pain. Gonfroy 1978 explicitly links these themes to homosexuality and social status. 14. It is very unusual to see διάθεσις as delivery. But Liddell and Scott 1968,

NOTES TO PAGES

126-46

243

s.v. διάθεσις I.2.b, cites this passage and gives Longinus, Ars rhetorica 104 (ed. Hammer) as a parallel. Ordinarily one would be tempted to see διάθεσις as "dispo­ sition" and as indicative of the order of one's words. However, the point of this passage is narrowly directed toward performance, and so too would rearranging the word order of a piece of poetry render it unmetrical and hence less pleasing. 15. See Gotoff 1993, 312-13, for the variety of Cicero's dramatic personae; but one must note as well the masks Cicero will not assume. 16. Politically pudor is yoked to integrity (integritas) and severity {severitas) and opposed to brazenness {audacia). But these words have a sort of sexual ethics to them in addition to their political aspect. On the political use of pudor and its associated terms, see Hellegouarc'h 1963, 288. 17. Krenkel 1981 surveys Roman slurs against fellatio. Parker 1997 offers a structuralist account of Roman sexual norms as they relate to the distinction be­ tween the active and the passive. 18. For Hortensius the outlandish, "Asiatic" speaker, see Cicero, Brutus 325 and Grube 1962, 248. 19. And see Hellegouarc'h 1963, 174-75 for Studium as political attachment. It should be recalled that the study of letters is a political study after its own fashion. 20. Translators of this passage are well aware of the prejudices against acting. Indeed they are so conscious of them that they can force Cicero to be critical rather than positive or, at worst, euphemistic. Hendrickson in Hendrickson and Hubbell 1962 offers, "his delivery and gesture even a little too studied for the orator." Martha 1960 reads, "Dans sa tenue et dans son geste il y avait un art étude, trop étudie pour un orateur." Kytzler 1970 is far closer to the original phrasing: "in Bewegung und Haltung zeigte er für einen Redner übergenug Kunst." 21. For example, recall the transgressions of Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 11.3.57 and 90-91. 22. The Oxford Latin Dictionary, s.v. latus l.C. offers a variety of references. Catullus 6.13 is not mentioned there, but it is quite explicit: with its latera ecfututa, that is, "fucked-out flanks." 23. Silverman 1996,133. "Unapprehensible" is cited from Lacan. 24. Compare Habinek 1998, 69-87. Habinek explains that because "the legitimacy of the state and its elites was always open to contestation" (69), the fantasy of banditry was mobilized as a means of defining a legitimate Rome in the face of a competing antisociety of rogues. 25. The text is corrupt at this point. Becher suggested μωκωσαν, from μωκασθαι, an uncommon word that means "to mimic" and hence also "to jest or ridicule." 26. Cicero says that Antonius' delivery had gestures that fitted with the words but did not express them (Brutus 141). 27. Actually, Quintilian is almost certainly thinking of the Greek phrase μέτρον άριστον. Nevertheless, the idea and the epigrammatic phrasing are closely related to "nothing in excess." Compare Alexander, De figuris 28.3 (Spengel). Cleobulus, one of the Seven Sages, was said to have been the author of this quot­ able quote. 28. Silverman 1992, 195. Compare Rose 1986, 181. See also Silverman 1992, 192, for the close affinity of conventional subjectivity and moral masochism. 29. Compare Silverman 1992, 142-43, on Fassbinder's film Ali: Fear Eats the Soul: "The look foregrounds the desiring subjectivity of the figure from whom it issues, a subjectivity which pivots upon lack, whether or not that lack is

244

NOTES TO PAGES

149-57

acknowledged. In the scene involving Emmi's co-workers, the look attempts to deny the void upon which it rests both through a sadistic identification with the gaze, and through the projection of insufficiency onto Ali." The theoreticians of rhetoric, as their name implies, would here be like the German coworkers who look upon the Arab's body in fascination, and the actor corresponds to Ali.

Chapter 5 1. Compare the imagery of Quintilian l.pr. 18-20. 2. Jones 1986, 6-8, provides a brief biography of Lucian. Jones' work care­ fully documents Lucian and the world in which he lived, and it argues for an author whose interests were as timely as they were literary. The literary aspect has tradi­ tionally dominated Lucian scholarship. Moreover, ever since Bompaire 1958 the question of imitation or μίμησις has virtually monopolized scholarly interest in Lucian. 3. Deferrari 1969 offers an exhaustive study of the Attic morphology of verbs in Lucian. 4. Bowersock 1969 provides the seminal study of the social and political context of intellectuals who were part of the so-called Second Sophistic. More recently, Anderson 1985 and 1993 offer insights into this same milieu. 5. One can compare Fitzgerald 1989, which explores pleasure and literary expression in Horace. His invocation of Nietzsche's class-inflected readings and of the master-slave relation in Horace's writings offers the most overlap with the present investigation of bodies, politics, and literary pleasure. 6. ώς άμαχον είναι και ανυπόστατον. That is, ώς with the infinitive ex­ presses the result in objective terms rather than as a subjective intention. 7. See Bardon 1940, 51, for a brief summary of the ambiguity surrounding the degree of professional and practical activity indicated by the term rhetor in various Latin authors. 8. This same image of fulfilling a request is very common: Cicero's De ora­ tore, Brutus, and the Orator use it, as do Tacitus' Dialogus and Seneca the Elder's Controversiae. See Janson 1964 for a discussion of the trope. 9. One might object to this reading of the passage that it privileges the association between όνομα and είναι while ignoring the qualification of "seeming" as implicit in δόξαις. But here one only needs to note that seeing is itself yoked to the "being/becoming" of γένοιο. 10. Tò μεν ούν θήραμα ου σμικρόν ουδέ ολίγης της σπουδής δεόμενον, άλλα εφ3 οτω και πονησαι πολλά και άγρυπνησαι και πάν ότιουν ύπομειναι άξιον. Praeceptor 2. 11. Altius tarnen ibunt qui ad summa nitentur quam qui praesumpta desperatione quo uelint euadendiprotinus circa ima substiterint. Quintilian l.pr.18-20. 12. Wyke 1994, 137, explains the illegitimate politics of male cosmetics. See also Richlin 1995 on Roman cosmetics. Note especially Richlin 1995, 204-5 for the example of an orator using cosmetics in Pliny, Epistulae 6.2. As was the case with singing, the prohibition indicates that there were real practitioners of the "abomination." 13. Plutarch advises us that we can learn from the abuses of our enemies if they contain some note of truth, like the insult that reproached "Pompey for scratch-

NOTES TO PAGES

158-69

245

ing his head with one finger, though he was totally removed from effeminacy and wantonness" (και Πομπήιον το ένί κνασθαι την κεφαλήν δακτυλω πορρωτάτω θηλύτητος και ακολασίας οντά, 89el). 14. This example of καταφρόνησις is taken from Aristotle, Politics 1312al. For a fuller account of Sardanapalus' womanly life, see Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae 12.37-39. 15. See Jones 1986,106: this was the title given Herodes by his pupils. 16. As was mentioned in the introduction, Foucault 1990b and 1988a have shaped much of the subsequent discussion. Halperin 1990 underlies most discus­ sions within classics. Within Roman studies, see the essays collected in Hallett and Skinner 1997. Skinner's introductory essay is a valuable overview of Roman thought. 17. Lucian is not alone: Gonfroy 1978 sees femininity, passive homosexuality, and servility as a conceptual knot in Cicero as well. 18. See Quintilian 11.3.58-60, which argues from passages of Cicero. 19. For an account of the polite ideal, see Schottlaender 1967. Compare Grube 1965,177-78; 1962, 243, 246. 20. It starts in earnest with Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1900. 21. Against Kennedy's nontheorized position, compare Gabba 1982, 52, where he sees the Asiatic style as self-consciously populist. Laugh ton 1961, 32, argues that certain habits of metaphor and clauses betokens Asianism. Hence it would be easy to adopt a conscious course of study that emulated Demetrius of Phalerum or Hegesias of Magnesia. For Cicero's peer Hortensius as Asiatic, see Cicero, Brutus 325 and compare Grube 1962, 248. 22. μαχαιροποιοϋ υίον και άλλον 'Ατρόμητου τινός γραμματιστου ζήλουν άξιων. Praeceptor 10. 23. οία τα της παλαιάς εργασίας εστίν, Ήγησίου και των άμφί Κριτίον και Νησιώτην, άπεσφιγμένα και νευρώδη και σκληρά και ακριβώς άποτεταμένα ταις γραμμαις. Praeceptor 9. 24. Leen 1991 argues from the art and statues at Cicero's villa that sculpted bodies are routinely deployed as extensions of their owner's own decorum. 25. Compare Romm 1990 on Lucian's complex relationship to sculpture rela­ tive to plastic arts: this passage is thus typically ambiguous. 26. The translation is a bit forced, though: a γράμμα is a character or letter and is formed of lines. Each line is a γραμμή. The line and the letter are closely related, but not properly confused where lines (γραμμαί) represent something like penmanship. See Plato, Protagoras 326d for this. Nevertheless, writing retains an affinity to the visual arts in a practical and etymological sense. 27. Yet see Romm 1990, 78, and the discussion of the irreverence with which Lucian treats Phidias' work in his Pro imaginibus. 28. See Wohl 1996 for the ambiguities of these statues of elites as symbols of Athenian democracy. 29. This Pollux may even be the Pollux whose Onomasticon still survives. See Jones 1976, 108. Anderson 1976, 68 n. 22 offers additional bibliography on the topic. His own arguments can be found at 70-71. 30. Compare Richlin 1993 on outlaw sexualities at Rome and the problems involved in reading for them. 31. Dover 1978 remains a classic study. Dover's own hesitations in the face of various erotic possibilities fall very much in line with the account of homosexuality

246

NOTES TO PAGES

170-83

to which most ancient literature invites its readers. See Veyne 1982 and MacMullen 1982 for brief overviews of homosexuality at Rome. Many of the essays contained in Hallett and Skinner 1997 offer more detailed analyses of these questions as they relate to Latin letters. 32. Liddell and Scott 1968, s.v. πήχυς VI: these are the cubits of inundation that come with the Nile's flooding. 33. A comic sequel to the marriage to rhetoric can be found in Lucian's Bis accusatus. Rhetoric complains that her Syrian husband has been unfaithful. The groom's desertion is provoked by the wantonness of his wife, and he leaves her in favor of a homosexual affair with Dialogue. See Bis accusatus 31. Branham 1989, 34-37, summarizes the moves in the case and relates them to Lucian's biography. 34. Compare Petronius, Satyricon 2 for Egypt's role in the death of painting. In Petronius the decline is directly compared to the death of rhetoric at the hands of fantastic contemporary "Asiatic" tastes. 35. Wyke 1994, 141, examines feminine adornment, foreignness, and male panic. 36. For race, see Fanon 1982 and Memmi 1965. For women, see Kristeva 1982; Irigaray 1985; and Butler 1993, 38-42, on Irigaray and Plato. 37. τους δε άρχοντας μεν άρχομένοις, αρχόμενους δέ άρχουσιν ομοίους ίδια τε και δημοσία επαινεί τε και τιμά. Plato, Republic 562d. 38. Compare Wöhrle 1990, 43, on Aristotle and Cleon: "Die maßlose ύπόκρισις ist Begleiter und damit zugleich Signum einer schlechten politischen Verfassung." Aristotle, Rhetoric 1403b34ff complains of rhetorical success by way of delivery alone and blames it on the depravity (μοχθηρία) of the masses. See also Fortenbaugh 1986 and Lossau 1971,156-58, on this topic. This moral matrix of actors, audience, and aloof aristocrats should be familiar from the preceding chapter. 39. Compare Lacan on the psychoanalytic force of "I see myself seeing my­ self" (1981, 79-90) and its role in the preceding chapter. 40. Οι φίλοι δέ άναπηδάτωσαν αεί και μισθον των δείπνων αποτινέτωσαν, ει ποτέ αϊσθοιντό σε καταπεσούμενον, χείρα όρέγοντες και παρέχοντες εύρειν το λεχθησόμενον εν τοις μεταξύ των επαίνων διαλείμμασι. Praeceptor 21. The μισθόν των δείπνων presumably corresponds to the Latin sportula. 41. ύπομειδία δέ τα πολλά και δήλος γίγνου μη άρεσκόμενος τοις λεγομένοις. Praeceptor 22. 42. Τοιαύτα μέν τα φανερά και τα έξω; Praeceptor 23. 43. One can again refer to Aristophanes' Thesmophoriazousae: the depilation of Mnesilichus that is a precursor to his playing a woman provokes a panic and horror that is in its turn supposed to elicit a laugh from the play's audience. 44. Richlin 1984 explores the ancient anxieties relating to female genitals and their relation to satirical literature. 45. See Branham 1989, 38 and notes, for even more parallels than those that follow. 46. This ambiguous naming occurs only at the end of the figure's own narra­ tive. See Xenophon, Memorabilia 2A.26. 47. ουκ εξαπατήσω δε σε προοιμίοις ηδονής, αλλ' ήπερ οι θεοί διέθεσαν τα οντά διηγήσομαι μετ3 αληθείας. Xenophon, Memorabilia 2.1.27. 48. Compare Branham 1989, 28, for a more directly autobiographical reading of this scene.

NOTES TO PAGES

183-91

247

49. Ά ρ τ ι μεν έπεπαύμην εις τά διδασκαλεία φοιτών ήδη την ήλικίαν πρόσηβος ών. Lucian, Somnium l. 50. Romm 1990, 95-98, examines Lucian's use of wax as a more potent image than stone for his own artistry. Youthful play and plasticity figure more prominently than rigid classicism. This is a much more optimistic reading of Lucian than the one that follows. But whatever freedom we allow Lucian as author, the sexual and social milieu within which he finds this liberty remains uniformly harsh. His liberty is born of a sort of servitude whose traces are more than still legible: they are reinscribed time and again in his work. 51. έπεί νύξ έπήλθεν κατέδαρθον ετι ενδακρυς και την σκυτάλην εννόων. Somnium 4. 52. ή έτερα δε μάλα ευπρόσωπος και το σχήμα ευπρεπής και κόσμιος τήν άναβολήν. Somnium 6. Compare the description of Rhetoric in the Praeceptor, where "fair of face" (ευπρόσωπος) is also used. 53. κάτω νενευκώς εις το έργον, χαμαιπετής και χαμαίζηλος και πάντα τρόπον ταπεινός, ανακύπτων δε ουδέποτε ουδέ άνδρωδες ουδέ ελεύθερον ουδέν έπινοων.

Chapter 6 1. Compare Frank 1930, 30-31. Also see Frank 1930,160: "[R]ules were for dull minds that required the aid of rules." 2. Winterbottom 1964 argues for a reaction by Quintilian against contempo­ rary explicit instruction. And here explicitness recalls the ethical problems of actors from earlier chapters. Of course, relative to Cicero, Quintilian seems most explicit. 3. Hall 1996. Hall owes a large debt to the work of Leeman, and more broadly to Ramage 1973. 4. More generally, see Habinek 1998, 34-68, on the invention of Latin literature. 5. Compare Gunderson 1997 on Catullus and Pliny as writers on literary love. 6. Cicero, Ad familiäres 1.9.23 (September 54) describes both Cicero's retreat and his composition of the De oratore. 7. The problem of allegory and the conflation of Cicero with Crassus will be discussed below. Here let it be said that accepting the invitation to identify the two figures has important political consequences for reading Latin literature in general, not just reading the De oratore. 8. An interesting discussion that offers some parallels to this can be found in Leach 1993. Leach's use of Derrida and Lacan to examine the problem of absence and desire in Cicero's De amicitia is not unlike the problem of political loss and bodily inscription in the De oratore. 9. Commentaries: Leeman 1981; Wilkins 1892; Piderit 1886-90; and Sorof 1875. Translations and editions: Courbaud 1967 and Rackham 1942. See also Kennedy 1972, 80-90, on Antonius and Crassus in the history of Roman oratory. 10. Jones 1939, 317-29, assays the accuracy of characterization in the De oratore. But Jones verifies this dialogue by repeated appeals to Cicero's Brutus: one text vouches for another. Grimal 1995,198, offers a view that is somewhat more subtle than ones that require more accuracy of characterization. Grimal sees Cicero as

248

NOTES TO PAGES

192-208

offering a mélange of traditional Roman biographical fidelity and broader Platonic philosophical inquiry. This view still limits the question of character to one of genre. 11. Compare the Greek καλοκαγαθία. 12. Gramm. 7.520.4. Compare Isidore, diff. 1.163. Also see Gramm. 7.530.27 for the idea that decor itself is abstract relative to bodily beauty: decor is a quality of one's bearing, beauty is a quality of individual parts (decor in habitu est, species in membris). 13. Kroll 1903, 568-70, examines ornamentation in the De oratore and its relationship to the rest of the rhetorical tradition. 14. Oliensis 1991, 107. She then goes on to explore Horace's attacks on fe­ male sexuality as a means to shore up his own virile decorum. As we have seen, the orators employ the same tactics relative to women, foreigners, and slaves. 15. Santoro L'Hoir 1992 offers a thorough study of vir and homo. Despite the usefulness of her discussion, she seems to overstate matters: from what follows it will be clear that I cannot agree that homo is primarily a negative term while vir is positive. Instead I only agree that vir is highly positive and that homo is therefore available for numerous other uses including uses that are frequently negative, pas­ sive, or apolitical. Crassus cannot be implying that Antonius is passive, private, or lowly by using homo of him: the passage actually has the inverse meaning. 16. si vis homo esse, recipe te ad nos. Cicero, Epistulae ad Atticum 4.15.2. 17. See Gonfroy 1978 for slavery and homosexuality. 18. heri enim inquit hoc mihi proposueram, ut, si te refellissem, hos a te discipulos abducerem. De oratore 2.40. 19. Hellegouarc'h 1963, 142-51, covers the purely political use of amare and related words in Cicero's time. 20. quid censes, Cotta, nisi Studium et ardorem quendam amoris? sine quo cum in vita nihil quisquam egregium, turn certe hoc, quid tu expetis, nemo umquam adsequetur. De oratore 1.134. 21. The learned speaker or doctus orator figures prominently in Kroll 1903 and Orban 1950. 22. De oratore 3.108-43 is largely dedicated to shoring up the rift between philosophy and rhetoric, restoring them to a prior unity attributed to them. See Barwick 1963, 69-71. The doctus orator is discussed there as well. 23. See Habinek 1998, 60-61, on the social politics of the expulsion. 24. ita sit nobis igitur ornatus et suavis orator—nee tarnen potest aliter esse—ut suavitatem habeat austeram et solidam, non dulcem atque decoctam. De oratore 3.103. Once again Courbaud's translation captures the spirit of the passage right down to its sexuality: "Que l'orateur ait donc du brilliant et du charme (sans ces qualités, il ne serait pas orateur), mais un charme viril et réel, qui ne soit ni douceâtre ni fade." 25. See also Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.41 for an attack on Epicurean suavitas. 26. Fowler 1909, 177-78, imagines pudor as prominent in the old, hardly prerhetorical education of Roman elites. 27. See pertimesceret in De oratore 1.123. 28. The equation of shame and fear is also evident from agitation (commovetur) as contrasted with shamelessness (impudentes). 29. See Freud 1963 [1911], 162-64. Compare the "allegorical" reading of Freud in Butler 1997a, 108-10.

NOTES TO PAGES 208-21

249

30. fuit enim mirificus quidam in Crasso pudor, qui tarnen non modo non obesset eius orationi, sed etiam probitatis commendatione prodesset. De oratore 1.122. 31. cum in omnibus causis gravioribus . . . initio commoveri soleam. Fear in the opening of this speech is analyzed in Botterman-Göttingen 1992, 326-27. 32. Craig 1993, which follows up on methods expounded in Classen 1981, is a useful exercise that reads the speeches through the technical literature. Gotoff 1993 shows what is missing from such accounts. 33. De oratore 1.149ff. To this passage one should compare 2.96. In that place Antonius expresses a shorter but very similar philosophy of writing. 34. For speech and writing as mutual supports in ancient rhetoric, see Bahmer 1991,77-97. 35. De oratore 3.15. Compare 1.16, which concerns oratory as a whole: "Assuredly this is something greater than men believe it to be" {sed nimirum maius est hoc quiddam quam homines opinantur). The description of the art and the artist again echo one another. This passage, though, is done in the author's own voice and is not delivered by any of the participants in the dialogue. 36. Michel 1981,120, traces the movement in Cicero from το πρέπονIdecet to το καλόν Idecor, or from the appropriate to abstract beauty. The Latin language invites the slippage between registers. 37. Ergo hoc sit primum in praeceptis meis, ut demonstremus, quern imitetur; turn accédât exercitatio . . . De oratore 2.90. 38. ex quorum scriptis. De oratore 2.92. 39. Atque esse tarnen multos videmus, qui neminen imitentur et suapte natura, quod velini, sine cuiusquam similitudine consequantur. De oratore 2.98. 40. Compare the advocacy of imitation in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On the Ancient Orators 4.2. Hidber 1996,56-74, offers a commentary on the passage and a summary of the problem of imitation in antiquity as well as a discussion of the modern bibliography on the topic. Bonner 1969, 39-58, offers a speculative reconstruction of Dionysius' fragmentary On Imitation and its relationship to other works by Dionysius. 41. Effudi vobis omnia quae sentiebam, quae fortasse, quemcumque patremfamilias adripuissetis ex aliquo circulo, eadem vobis percontantibus respondisset. Cicero, De oratore 1.159. 42. Compare Quintilian 11.3.137ff. with Cicero, De oratore 2.91. MacKendrick 1948, 344-45, highlights the elitism of the relationship of the De oratore to explicit instructions. 43. This term is used in a complaint of Crassus' from 1.263. See also the discussion above of the different Antonii on different days. 44. The problem of oratory's status as an art is actually one of the main themes of the dialogue. See, for example, 1.107-10, 1.135, 1.205-8, 2.29-30, and 2.201. This theme is the natural counterpart of the denigration of precepts. 45. cum dico me, te, Brute, dico; nam in me quidem iam pridem effectum est quod futurum fuit; tu autem . . . Cicero, Orator 110. 46. Compare the "allegorical" readings of the various essays of Lucian from the preceding chapter. 47. This treatise was written around 87 B.C.E. and is disparaged in De oratore 1.5. See also Grube 1962, 237-38. 48. Oxford Latin Dictionary, s.v. patere. Entries 3, 5, and 6 allow for such a

250

NOTES TO PAGES 221 -28

reading, and the other passages from Cicero suggest that we should insert this theme here as well. 49. Hoc quod audire vulgo soles, quod apud Graecos in proverbium cessit: talis hominibus fuit oratio qualis vita. Seneca, Epistulae morales 114.2.

Conclusion 1. For actio as only a part of his interests, see Gotoff 1993, 289 n. 1. 2. Gotoff 1993, 297. Compare the arguments of Gotoff 1993, 290-91. 3. Derrida 1979, 35. Nietzsche's phrase was "der anstößigste Philologe des Träges." 4. Nietzsche 1989,164-66. The text is in German with an English translation on the facing page: hence this reference is to "less than one page." 5. Wilamowitz in his attack on The Birth of Tragedy, though, questioned whether Nietzsche ought to be employed at all. The text for him displays nothing but the grossest ignorance. Wilamowitz complains that Nietzsche has eschewed the tone of the "wissenschaftlicher Forscher" in favor of a hollow rhetoric cloaking abject ignorance (Wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1969, 29). For a summary of the argument and a call for more who would follow in the footsteps of Wilamowitz see Groth 1950. 6. Nehamas 1985,13-41 argues for a hyperbole as the essence of Nietzsche's style. 7. See Nietzsche 1956, 3-15. These paragraphs are from part 4 of his Zarathustra and have been reprinted as material introductory to The Birth of Tragedy. 8. Goldhill 1995 calls for such a project and indicates the extent to which classical scholars are beginning to investigate metarhetorical issues. He laments, though, that works like Kennedy 1994 and Gleason 1995 remain incomplete in this regard. Wardy 1996 engages metarhetoric, but it avoids rhetorical handbooks and remains deeply skeptical of the feminist critique of philosophical reason. Goldhill lists both Jarratt 1991 and Poulakos 1994 among his examples of progressive rereadings of rhetoric. 9. Nietzsche himself warns that the genealogist must be suspicious of himself as well (1956, 276). 10. See, for example, Hallett 1992 for a meditation of problems of method.

Bibliography

Achard G. 1989. Rhétorique à Herennius. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Althusser, L. 1971. "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)." Lenin and Philosophy. New York: Monthly Review Press. 127-86. Anderson, G. 1976. Luciani Theme and Variation in the Second Sophistic. Lugduni Batavorum: E.J. Brill. . 1985. Philostratus: Biography and Belles Lettres in the Third Century A.D. London: Croom Helm. . 1993. The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire. London: Routledge. Austin, J. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Austin, R. 1960. M. Tulli Ciceronis Pro M. Caelio Oratio. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bahmer, L. 1991. Antike Rhetorik und kommunikative Aufsatzdidaktik: Der Beitrag der Rhetorik zur Didaktik des Schreibens. Hildesheim: G. Olms. Bardon, H. 1940. Le vocabulaire de la critique littéraire chez Sénèque le rhéteur. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. . 1952. La littérature latine inconnue. 2 vols. Paris: C. Klincksieck. Bartsch, S. 1994. Actors in the Audience: Theatricality and Doublespeak from Nero to Hadrian. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Barwick, K. 1963. Das rednerische Bildungsideal Ciceros. Berlin: AkademieVerlag. Bloom, H. 1973. The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boltanski, L. 1971. "Les usages sociaux du corps." Annales: Économies sociétés civilisations 26:205-33. Bompaire, J. 1958. Lucien écrivain, imitation et création. Paris: E. de Boccard. Bonner, S.F. 1949. Roman Declamation in the Late Republic and Early Empire. Liverpool: University Press of Liverpool. . 1969. Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Amsterdam: Hakkert. . 1977. Education in Ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny. London: Methuen. Bottermann-Göttingen, H. 1992. "Die Generalabrechnung mit dem Tyrannen: Ciceros Rede für den König Deiotarus." Gymnasium 99:320-44.

252

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bourdieu, P. 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Trans. R. Nice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. . 1990. The Logic of Practice. Trans. R. Nice. Stanford: Stanford University Press. . 1991. Language and Symbolic Power. Trans. G. Raymond and M. Adamson. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard. Bourdieu, P., and L. Boltanski. 1975. "La fétichisme de la langue." Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales 4:2-32. Bourdieu, P. and L. Wacquant. 1992. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Bowersock, G.W. 1969. Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Branham, R.B. 1989. Unruly Eloquence: Lucian and the Comedy of Traditions. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Bremmer, J. and H. Roodenburg, eds. 1992. A Cultural History of Gesture. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Brinton, A. 1983. "Quintilian, Plato, and the vir bonus." Philosophy and Rhetoric 16:167-84. Brown, N.O. 1974. " R o m e - a Psychoanalytical Study." Arethusa 7:95-102. Büchner, Κ. 1964. Cicero; Bestand und Wandel seiner geistigen Welt. Heidelberg: C. Winter. Butler, J. 1989. "Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions." Journal of Philosophy 86:601-7. . 1990a. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge. . 1990b. "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phe­ nomenology and Feminist Theory." Performing Feminisms. Ed. S.-E. Case. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. . 1993. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex." New York: Routledge. . 1997a. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York: Routledge. . 1997b. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. Stanford: Stan­ ford University Press. Charles, C. 1992. "A Horse Is a Horse." Literature and Psychology 38(3):47-70. Clark, D.L. 1957. Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education. New York: Columbia Uni­ versity Press. Clarke, M.L. 1963. Rhetoric at Rome; a Historical Survey. London: Cohen and West. Classen, C. 1981. "La théorie de la rhétorique chez Cicéron: Éloquence et philosophie." Éloquence et rhétorique chez Cicéron: Sept exposés suivis de discussions. Ed. W. Ludwig. Geneva: Fondation Hardt. 109-47. Courbaud, E. 1967. Cicéron. De Vorateur. Collection des universités de France. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Cousin, J. 1936. Études sur Quintilien. Vol. 1. Paris: Boivin et Cie. . 1973. "Quintilien et le théâtre." Associative Guillaume Budé. Actes du IXe Congrès. Rome 13-18 avril 1973. 459-67. . 1979. Quintilien. Institution Oratoire. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Craig, C.P. 1993. Form as Argument in Cicero's Speeches: A Study of Dilemma. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

253

Crawford, J. 1994. M. Tullius Cicero: The Fragmentary Speeches. An Edition with Commentary. American Classical Studies 33. Atlanta: Scholars Press. de Saint-Denis, E. 1939, "Évolution sémantique de urbanus—urbanitas." Latomus 3:5-24. Deferrari, R. 1969. Luciaris Atticism. Amsterdam: Hakkert. Dénès, T. 1977. "Le théâtre des Romains de l'antiquité. Précis et révision." Revue d'histoire du théâtre 1:7-29. Derrida, J. 1976. Of Grammatology. Trans. G. Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. . 1978. Writing and Difference. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. . 1979. Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. . 1981. "Plato's Pharmacy." Dissemination. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 65-171. . 1987. The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Desmouliez, A. 1952. "Sur la Polémique de Cicéron et des Atticistes." Revue des études latines 30:168-85. . 1955. "Comparaison entre le style et le corps humain." Revue des études latines 33:59-61. Douglas, A.E. 1973. "The Intellectual Background of Cicero's Rhetorical Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt 1(3): 95-138. Dover, K. 1978. Greek Homosexuality. London: Duckworth. Dumont, J. 1973. "Cicéron et le théâtre." Association Guillaume Bude. Actes du IXe Congrès. Rome 13-18 avril 1973. 424-30. Dupont, F. 1985. L· acteur-roi, ou, Le théâtre dans la Rome antique. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Edwards, C. 1993. The Politics of Immortality in Ancient Rome. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . 1997. "Unspeakable Professions: Public Performance and Prostitution in Ancient Rome." Roman Sexualities. Ed. J. Hallett and M. Skinner. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 66-95. Fanon, F. 1982. Black Skin, White Masks. Trans. C. Markman. New York: Grove Press. Fantham, E. 1982. "Quintilian On Performance: Traditional and Personal Elements in Institutio 11.3." Phoenix 36:243-63. Ferrari, G.R.F. 1987. Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato's "Phaedrus." Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fitzgerald, W. 1989. "Horace, Pleasure, and the Text." Arethusa 22:81-103. Fortenbaugh, W. 1986. "Aristotle's Platonic Attitude toward Delivery." Philosophy and Rhetoric 19:242-54. . 1989. "Cicero's Knowledge of the Rhetorical Treatises of Aristotle and Theophrastus." Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos. Ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh and P. Steinmetz. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers. 39-60. Foucault, M. 1979. Discipline and Punish. Trans. A. Sheridan. New York: Vintage. . 1980a. "Prison Talk." Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. Trans. C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mepham, and K. Soper. Ed. C. Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books, 37-54. . 1980b. "Body/Power." Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. Ed. C. Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books, 55-62.

254

BIBLIOGRAPHY

. 1980c. "Two Lectures." Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. Ed. C. Gordon. New York: Pantheon Books, 78-108. . 1988a. The Care of the Self Trans. R. Hurley. Vol. 3 of The History of Sexuality. New York: Vintage. . 1988b. "Technologies of the Self." Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault. Ed. L.H. Martin, H. Gutman, and RH. Hutton. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 16-49. . 1990a. An Introduction. Trans. R. Hurley. Vol. 1 of The History of Sexuality. New York: Vintage. . 1990b. The Use of Pleasure. Trans. R. Hurley. Vol. 2 of The History of Sexuality. New York: Vintage. Fowler, W. 1909. Social Life at Rome in the Age of Cicero. New York: Macmillan. Frank, T. 1930. Life and Literature in the Roman Republic. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Freud, S. 1963c. "Psychoanalytic Notes upon an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia {Dementia Paranoides)." Three Case Histories. Ed. P. Rieff. New York: Collier Books. 103-86. . 1963b. "On Narcissism: An Introduction." General Psychological Theory: Papers on Metapsychology. Ed. P. Rieff. New York: Collier Books. 56-82. . 1963a. "Mourning and Melancholia." General Psychology Theory: Papers on Metapsychology. Ed. P. Rieff. New York: Collier Books. 164-79. . 1970a. "The Dynamics of Transference." Therapy and Technique: Essays on Dream Interpretation, Hypnosis, Transference, Free Association, and Other Techniques of Psychoanalysis. Ed. P. Rieff. New York: Collier Books. 105-16. . 1970c. "Further Recommendations in the Technique of Psychoanalysis: Recollection, Repetition, and Working Through." Therapy and Technique: Essays on Dream Interpretation, Hypnosis, Transference, Free Association, and Other Techniques of Psychoanalysis. Ed. P. Rieff. New York: Collier Books. 157-66. . 1970b. "Further Recommendations in the Technique of Psychoanalysis: Observations in Transference-Love." Therapy and Technique: Essays on Dream Interpretation, Hypnosis, Transference, Free Association, and Other Techniques of Psychoanalysis. Ed. P. Rieff. New York: Collier Books. 167-80. . 1976. "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy." The Sexual Enlightenment of Children. Ed. P. Rieff. New York: Collier Books. Gabba, E. 1982. "Political and Cultural Aspects of the Classicistic Revival in the Augustan Age." Classical Antiquity 1:43-65. Giomini, R., and M. Celentano. 1980. C. lulius Victor. Ars Rhetorica. Leipzig: Teubner. Gleason, M. 1995. Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Golden, M. 1985. "Pais, 'Child,' and 'Slave.' " L'Antiquité classique 54:91-104. Goldhill, S. 1989. "Reading Performance Criticism." Greece and Rome 36:172-82. . 1995. "Sophistry, Rhetoric, History." Bryn Mawr Classical Review 95:6-19. Gonfroy, F. 1978. "Homosexualité et l'idéologie esclavagiste chez Cicéron." Dialogues d'histoire ancienne 4:219-65. Gotoff, H. 1993. "Oratory: The Art of Illusion." Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 95:289-313. Graf, F. 1991. "The Gestures of Roman Actors and Orators." A Cultural History of

BIBLIOGRAPHY

255

Gesture. Ed. J. Bremmer and H. Roodenburg. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 36-58. Grant, W.L. 1943. "Cicero on the Moral Character of the Orator." Classical Journal 38:72-78. Green, W.M. 1933. "The Status of Actors at Rome." Phoenix 28:301-4. Grimai, P. 1955. "De Lucilius à Cicerón. Caractères généraux du dialgue romain." L'information littéraire 7:192-98. . 1973. "Le théâtre à Rome." Association Guillaume Budé. Actes du IXe Congrès. Rome 13-18 avril 1973. 249-305. Groth, J. 1950. "Wilamowitz-Möllendorf on Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy." Journal of the History of Ideas 11:179-90. Grube, G. 1962. "Educational, Rhetorical, and Literary Theory in Cicero." Phoenix 16:234-57. . 1965. The Greek and Roman Critics. London: Methuen. Guillemin, A.M. 1959. "Cicéron et Quintilien." Revue des études latines 37: 184-94. Gunderson, E. 1997. "Catullus, Pliny, and Lover-Letters." Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 127:201-31. . 1998. "Discovering the Body in Roman Oratory." Parchments of Gender: Deciphering the Body in Antiquity. Ed. M. Wyke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 169-89. Gwynn, A. 1926. Roman Education from Cicero to Quintilian. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Habinek, T. 1995. "Ideology for an Empire in the Prefaces of Cicero's Dialogues." Roman Literature and Ideology: Ramus Essays for J. P. Sullivan. Ed. A.J. Boyle. Bendigo, Australia: Aureal Publications. 55-67. . 1998. The Politics of Latin Literature: Writing, Identity, and Empire in Ancient Rome. Princeton: Princeton University Press. . Forthcoming. "The Commonwealth of Letters." Hall, J. 1996. "Social Evasion and Aristocratic Manners in Cicero's De Oratore." American Journal of Philology 117:95-120. Hallett, J. 1992. "Heeding Our Native Informants: The Uses of Latin Literary Texts in Recovering Elite Roman Attitudes toward Age, Gender, and Social Status." Echos du monde classique 11:333-55. Hallett, J., and M. Skinner, eds. 1997. Roman Sexualities. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Halm, C. 1863. Rhetores Latini Minores. Leipzig: Teubner. Halperin, D. 1990. One Hundred Years of Homosexuality. New York: Routledge. Halperin, D., J. Winkler, and F. Zeitlin, eds. 1990. Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the Ancient Greek World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Harnecker, Ο. 1965. Cicero. De Oratore: Für den Schulgebrauch. Amsterdam: Hakkert. Hegel, G.W.F. 1977. Phenomenology of the Spirit. Trans. A. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Heldmann, K. 1980. "Dekadenz und literarischer Fortschritt bei Quintilian und bei Tacitus." Poetica 12:1-23. Hellegouarc'h, J. 1963. Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la République. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

256

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Hendrickson, C , and H. Hubbell. 1962. Cicero. Brutus, with an English translation by G.L. Hendrickson. Orator, with an English translation by H.M. Hubbell. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Hidber, T. 1996. Das klassizistische Manifest des Dionys von Halikarnass: Die Praefatio zu De Oratoribus Veteribus. Stuttgart: Teubner. Hobsbawm, E. 1983. "Introduction: Inventing Traditions." The Invention of Tradition. Ed. E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Irigaray, L. 1985. The Speculum of the Other Woman. Trans. G. Gill. Ithaca, Cornell University Press. Jackson, M. 1983. "Knowledge of the Body." Man 18:327-45. Janan, M. 1994. When the Lamp Is Shattered: Desire and Narrative in Catullus. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Jarratt, S. 1991. Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Jay, M. 1993. Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Jones, C.P. 1986. Culture and Society in Lucian. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Jones, R.E. 1939. "Cicero's Accuracy of Characterization in His Dialogues." American Journal of Philology 60:307-25. Kennedy, G. 1963. The Art of Persuasion in Greece. Princeton: Princeton University Press. . 1972. The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 300 B.C.-A.D. 300. Princeton: Princeton University Press. . 1994. A New History of Classical Rhetoric. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Krenkel, W. 1981. "Tounging." Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Wilhelm-PieckUniversität Rostock 30:37-52. Kristeva, J. 1982. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Trans. L. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press. Kroll, W. 1903. "Studien über Ciceros Scrift De Oratore." Rheinisches Museum 58:552-97. . 1924. Studien zum Verständnis der römischen Literatur. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung. . 1940. "Rhetorik." Real-encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. Ed. W. Kroll and K. Mittelhaus. Stuttgart, J.B. Metzler. Supplementband 7:1039-1138. Kühnert, F. 1994. Bildung und Redekunst in der Antike: Kleine Schriften. Jena: Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Institut für Altertumswissenschaften. Kytzler, B. 1970. Cicero. Brutus. Munich: Heimeran Verlag. Lacan, J. 1977. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Α. Sheridan. New York: Norton. . 1981. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. Trans. Α. Sheri­ dan. New York: Norton. . 1982. Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the École Freudienne. Trans. J. Rose. New York: Norton. . 1988a. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book I. Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-1954. Trans. J. Forrester. New York: Norton. . 1988b. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory

BIBLIOGRAPHY

257

and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955. Trans. S. Tomaselli. New York: Norton. . 1994. Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan. Livre IV La relation d'object. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. D. Larmour, P. Miller, and C. Platter, eds. 1998. Rethinking Sexuality: Foucault and Classical Antiquity. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Lash, S. 1984. "Geneology and the Body: Foucault/Deleuze/Nietzsche." Theory, Culture, and Society 2:1-19. Laughton, E. 1961. "Cicero and the Greek Orators." American Journal of Philology 82:27-49. Lausberg, H. 1990. Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik: Eine Grundlegung der Literaturwissenschaft. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. Leach, E. 1990. "The Politics of Self-Presentation: Pliny's Letters and Roman Portrait Sculpture." Classical Antiquity 21:14-39. . 1993. "Absence and Desire in Cicero's De Amicitia." Classical World 87: 3-21. . 1999 (forthcoming). "Ciceronian 'Bi-Marcus': Correspondence with M. Terentius Varro and L. Papirius Paetus in 46 B.C." Transactions of the American Philological Association 129. Leeman, A. 1981. M. Tullius Cicero. De Oratore Libri III. Heidelberg: Winter. Leen, A. 1991. "Cicero and the Rhetoric of Art." American Journal of Philology 112:229-45. Leo, F 1913. Geschichte der römischen Literatur. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung. Liddell, H., and R. Scott. 1968. A Greek-English Lexicon. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Lloyd, G. 1962. "Right and Left in Greek Philosophy." Journal of Hellenic Studies 92:56-66. Lloyd, G. 1993. The Man of Reason. "Male" and "Female" in Western Philosophy. 2d ed. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Lossau, M. 1971. "μοχθερία των πολιτειών und ύπόκρισις. Zu Arist. Rhet. 3.1.1403b34f." Rheinisches Museum 114:146-58. Lyotard, J. 1984. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. MacKendrick, P. 1948. "Cicero's Ideal Orator." Classical Journal 43:339-47. MacMullen, R. 1982. "Roman Attitudes to Greek Love." Historia 31:484-502. Maier-Eichhorn, U. 1989. Die Gestikulation in Quintilians Rhetorik. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Martha, J. 1960. Cicéron, Brutus. Paris: Les belles Lettres. Martin, J. 1974. Antike Rhetorik: Technik und Methode. Munich: Beck. Martindale, C. 1993. Redeeming the Text: Latin Poetry and the Hermeneutics of Reception. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marx, F., ed. 1894. Incerti Auctoris De Ratione Dicendi ad C. Herennium Libri IV. Leipzig: Teubner. Mauss, M. 1973. "Techniques of the Body." Economy and Society 2(1): 70-87. McCarty, W. 1989. "The Shape of the Mirror: Metaphorical Catoptrics in Classical Literature." Arethusa 22:161-96. McMahon, J. 1995. "Review of Janan, When the Lamp Is Shattered."'' Bryn Mawr Classical Review 95:7-13.

258

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Memmi, Α. 1965. The Colonizer and the Colonized, Trans. H. Greenfeld. New York: Orion Press. Michel, A. 1960. Rhétorique et philosophie chez Cicéron; essai sur les fondements philolosophiques de l'art de persuader. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. . 1971. "L'originalité de l'ideai oratorie de Cicéron." Les études classiques 39:311-28. . 1981. "La théorie de la rhétorique chez Cicéron: Éloquence et philosophie." Éloquence et rhétorique chez Cicéron: Sept exposés suivis de discussions. Ed. W. Ludwig. Geneva: Fondation Hardt. 109-47. Narducci, E. 1997. Cicerone e l'eloquenza romana: Rhetorica e progetto culturale. Rome: Laterza. Needham, R., ed. 1973. Right and Left: Essays on Dual Symbolic Classification. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Nehamas, A. 1985. Nietzsche: Life as Literature. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Nietzsche, F. 1956. The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals. New York: Doubleday Anchor. . 1989. Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language. Ed. S. Gilman, C. Blair, and D. Parent. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Oliensis, E. 1991. "Canidia, Canicula, and the Decorum of Horaces's Epodes." Arethusa 24:107-38. Orban, M. 1950. "Réhabilitation de la parole dans le 'De Oratore' de Cicéron." L'antiquité classique 19:27-44. Parker, H. 1997. "The Tetragonic Grid." Roman Sexualities. Ed. J. Hallett and M. Skinner. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 47-65. Piderit, W., éd. 1886-90. De Oratore. Für den Schulgebrauch. Leipzig: Β.G. Teubner. Poulakos, T. 1994. "Human Agency in the History of Rhetoric: Gorgias' Enco­ mium of Helen." Writing Histories of Rhetoric. Ed. V.J. Vitanza. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. 59-80. Pucci, J. 1991. "The Dilemma of Writing: Augustine, Confessions 4.6 and Horace Odes 1.3." Arethusa 24:257-81. Rackham, H., ed. 1942. Cicero. De Oratore. Loeb Classical Library, 349. Cam­ bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Rademacher, L. 1971. M. Fabi Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae Libri XII. Pars Secunda Libros VII-XII Continiens. 2d ed. Leipzig: Teubner. Ramage, E. 1961. "Cicero on Extra-Roman Speech." Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 92:481-94. . 1963. "Urbanitas in Cicero and Quintilian: A Contrast in Attitudes." Ameri­ can Journal of Philology 84:390-414. . 1973. Urbanitas: Ancient Sophistication and Refinement. Norman: Univer­ sity of Oklahoma Press for the University of Cincinnati. Reardon, B. P. 1971. Courants littéraires grecs des Ile et Hie siècles après J. C. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Richlin, A. 1984. "Invective against Women in Roman Satire." Arethusa 17:67-80. . 1991. "Zeus and Metis: Foucault, Feminism, Classics," Helios 18:160-80. . 1993. "Not before Homosexuality: The Materiality of the Cinaedus and the Roman Law against Love between Men." Journal of the History of Sexuality 3:523-73.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

259

. 1995. "Making Up a Woman: The Face of Roman Gender." Off with Her Head! The Denial of Women's Identity in Myth, Religion, and Culture. Ed. H. Eilberg-Schwartz and W. Doniger. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 185-213. Riggsby, A. 1995. "Pliny on Cicero and Oratory: Self-Fashioning in the Public Eye." American Journal of Philology 116:123-35. Romm, J. 1990. "Wax, Stone, and Promethean Clay: Lucian as Plastic Artist." Classical Antiquity 21:74-98. Rose, J. 1982. "Introduction —II." Feminine Sexuality, Jacques Lacan, and the École Freudienne. Ed. J. Mitchell and J. Rose. New York: Norton. 27-57. . 1986. Sexuality and the Field of Vision. London: Verso. Rose, P. 1988. "Thersites and the Plural Voices of Homer." Arethusa 21:5-25. Rubin, G. 1975. "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex. Toward an Anthropology of Women. Ed. R. Reiter. New York: Monthly Review Press. 157-210. Ruch, M. 1958. "Nationalisme culturel et culture internationale dans le pensé de Cicéron." Revue des études latines 36:187-204. Runia, D. 1989. "Aristotle and Theophrastus Conjoined in the Writings of Cicero." Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos. Ed. W.W. Fortenbaugh and P. Steinmetz. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers. 23-38. Santoro L'Hoir, F. 1992. The Rhetoric of Gender Terms: 'Man/ 'Woman/ and the Portrayal of Character in Latin Prose. Mnemosyne. Supplementum 120. Leiden: Brill. Schmitt, J.-C. 1984. "Gestures: Introduction and General Bibliography." History and Anthropology 1:1-28. Schottlaender, R. 1967. "Der römische Redner und sein Publikum." Wiener Studien 80:125-46. Schulte, H. 1935. Orator; Untersuchungen über das ciceronianische Bildungsideal. Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann. Sedgwick, E. 1985. Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire. New York: Columbia University Press. Shackleton-Bailey, D.R., ed. 1965. Letters to Atticus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Silverman, K. 1988. The Acoustic Mirror: The Female Voice in Psychoanalysis and Cinema. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. . 1992. Male Subjectivity at the Margins. New York: Routledge. . 1996. The Threshold of the Visible World. New York: Routledge. Sinclair, P. 1993. "The sententia in 'Rhetorica ad Herennium': A Study in the Sociology of Rhetoric." American Journal of Philology 114:561-80. . 1995a. "Political Declensions in Latin Grammar and Oratory, 55 BCE-CE 39." Roman Literature and Ideology: Ramus Essays for J. P. Sullivan. Ed. A.J. Boyle. Bendigo, Australia: Aureal Publications. 92-109. . 1995b. Tacitus the Sententious Historian: A Sociology of Rhetoric in Annales 1-6. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Skinner, M. 1996. "Zeus and Leda: The Sexuality Wars in Contemporary Classical Scholarship." Thamyris 3:103-23. Solmsen, F. 1941. "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric." American Journal of Philology 62:35-50. Sorof, G. 1875. M. Tullii Ciceronis De Oratore Libri Très. Berlin: Weidmann.

260

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Smethurst, S. 1953. "Cicero and Isocrates." Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 84:262-320. Svenbro, J. 1993. Phrasikleia: An Anthropology of Reading in Ancient Greece. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Thalmann, G. 1988. "Comedy, Scapegoats, and Heroic Ideology in the Iliad" Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 118: 1-28. Too, Y. Forthcoming. The Pedagogical Contract. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Tuite, K. 1993. "The Production of Gesture." Semiotica 93(1-2): 83-105. Ungern-Sternberg, J. v. 1973. "Die populären Beispiele in der Schrift des Auetors ad Herennium." Chiron 3:142-62. Veyne, P. 1982. "L'homosexualité à Rome." Sexualités occidentales. Ed. P. Aries and A. Bejin. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. Walters, J. 1997. "Invading the Roman Body: Manliness and Impenetrability in Roman Thought." Roman Sexualities. Ed. J. Hallett and M. Skinner. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 29-43. Wardy, R. 1996. The Birth of Rhetoric: Gorgias, Plato and their Successors. New York: Routledge. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, U. v. 1900. "Asianismus und Attikismus." Hermes 35: 1-52. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, U. v. 1969. "Zukunftsphilologie! eine Erwiderung auf Friedrich Nietzches 'Geburt der Tragödie.' " Ed. K. Gunder. Der Streit um Nietzsches "Geburt der Tradödie." Hildescheim, Olms. 27-55. Wilkins, Α., ed. 1892. M. Tullii Ciceronis De Oratore Libri Très. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Winterbottom, M. 1964. "Quintilian and the Vir Bonus." Journal of Roman Studies 54:90-97. . 1970. M. Tabi Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae Libri Duodecim. Oxford: Clarendon Press. . 1976. "Review of Ramage, Urbanitas: Ancient Sophistication and Refinement." Classical Review 26:59-60. Wiseman, Τ 1995. Remus: A Roman Myth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wohl, V. 1996. "ευσέβειας ί-νεκα και φιλοτιμίας: Hegemony and Democracy at the Panathenaia." Classica et Mediaevalia 47:25-88. Wöhrle, G. 1990. "Actio: Das fünfte officium des antiken Redners." Gymnasium 97:31-46. Wyke, M. 1994. "Woman in the Mirror: The Rhetoric of Adornment in the Roman World." Women in Ancient Societies: An Illusion in the Night. Ed. L. Archer, S. Fischler, and M. Wyke. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

General Index

Abjection, 80, 97, 106,112,114,135, 142,160,213, 220-21 Accius, 132 Achard, G., 30n. 5 Aeschines, 164 Aesopus, 141,142,146 Agathon, 154-55,157,158 Ajax, 64n.15 Alcibiades, 203 Althusser, L., 25n, 62, 65-66, 97n, 106n. 20,113n Anderson, G., 150n. 4,163,167n Antisthenes, 203 Antonius, 53, 55, 136,139,142-45, 191,191n.9,195-96,196n.15,19799, 201,203, 206, 214-15, 218n.43, 220 Aphrodite. See Venus Aristogiton, 166-67, 175 Aristophanes, 149,158 Aristotle, 12, 31, 38, 85,118,158, 175η. 38,204, 227 Asia and Asianism, 65n. 19, 129n. 18, 155,160,163,164,164n. 21,166, 173,173n.34,185, 229 Atreus, 142 Atticus, 197, 199 Augustine, 31n. 8 Ausonius, 46 Austin,!, 221 Austin, R., 126 Authenticity, 15, 25, 76, 87, 92, 94, 96, 188,210, 213 Authority, 7-8, 13, 41, 54, 57, 66-67, 74, 83, 96, 108, 112, 130, 139, 148, 152,189, 208, 211, 223; of the Law,

26; paternal, 164,171; virile, 14, 22, 95,127,131,228 Bahmer, L., 211n Bardon, H., 41, 59n. 4, 151n. 7 Bartsch, S., l l l n . 1 Barwick, Κ., 204η. 22 Bloom, Η., 229 Boltanski, L., 59η. 2, 60η. 5, 67 Bompaire, X, 149η. 2, 215 Bonner, S., 55η, 118η, 215η. 40 Bottermann-Göttingen, Η., 209η. 31 Bourdieu, P., 9-10, lOnn. 18,19,11, lin. 20,12, 27η, 32, 37, 57η, 59η. 2, 67-69, 72-73, 73η, 78, 80, 88η.3, 97,106,113,174,189,218 Bowersock, G., 150η. 4 Branham, B., 150,172η, 180η. 45, 183η. 48 Bremmer, Χ, 59η. 2 Brinton, Α., 7η. 10 Brown, Ν., 16η Brown, P., 9 Brutus, 6, 55, 213, 219 Büchner, Κ., 8η. 6,115η. 7 Butler, X, ix, 3, 3n. 5, 4, 8n, 17,17nn. 32, 33, 24n. 48, 25, 25n, 26, 26n, 27, 49, 59n. 2, 61, 61n. 9, 66, 69, 83n, 86, 97n, 106nn. 19, 20,107,107n, 109,112-13,113n, 114-15, 116n. 10, 117,117n,135,139-40,147, 173, 173n. 36,185, 205, 208n. 29 Carneades, 204 Castor, 166-67

262

GENERAL INDEX

Castration, 82-83,106,115-16,13435,138-40,147,171,185 Cato, 7, 7n. 9, 8, 60,195 Catullus, 16n, 188,188n. 5 Catulus, 191,195, 198 Celentano, M., 29n. 2 Charles, C , 3n. 3 Cicero, Q., 6 Cinuras, 154-55,157-58 Citationality, 26, 49, 51,113,115 Clark, D., 118 Clarke, M., 32 Classen, C , 209n. 32 Cleobulus, 137n. 27 Cleon,49,175n.38 Clodia, 126 Clodius, Appius, 126 Corax, 12 Cotta, 95n. 9,191,195,198-99, 202 Courbaud, E., 188-89,191n. 9, 205n. 24 Cousin, X, 37n. 14, 41n. 25, 95n. 10, llln.1 Craig, C , 209n. 32 Crassus, 53, 55,118-20,132-33,14243,190-91,191n. 9,193,196,196n. 15,197-98, 201-9, 211,213, 216-18, 218n. 43 Crawford, J., 2n Critias, 165-66 Cura. See Discipline de Beauvoir, S., 96 Decere, 72, 136, 207 Decor, 103,189,192,194, 201, 207, 213, 215 Decus, 192,192n. 12, 193-94, 207, 212-13, 215 Deferrari, R., 150n. 3 Demetrius of Phaleron, 101,123,164n. 21 Democritus, 144 Demosthenes, 5, 20, 30, 33, 48-49, 85, 89, 92,100-101,105-6,118,120-24, 127-29,141-42,154,157,163-64, 167,178-79, 182, 201, 204, 224, 226 Denes, T., l l l n . 1 Derrida, I , viii, 3n. 3,13-15, 20-21, 26, 38-39, 45, 51, 54, 64, 64nn. 14, 15,191n. 8, 226, 226n.3

de Saint-Denis, E., 84n. 47 Desmouliez, A., 84n. 47,165-66 Dionysus, 128-30 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 65n. 19, 215n. 40, 226 Discipline, 5, 60, 64, 67-68, 71, 77-78, 82, 87-111,120,122,140,167,184, 211 Douglas, A., 115n. 7 Dover, K., 169n. 31 Dumont, X, l l l n . 1 Dupont, E, l l l n . 1 Edwards, C , lllnn. 2, 4, 124 Effeminacy, 20, 23, 62, 75, 81-83,106, 109,120,126,128,130-31,133,139, 143,154-55,157,160-61,165, 172, 174-75,179,185,203, 229 Electra, 140-41 Ennius, 132 Epicharmus, 180 Eratosthenes, 100 Euripides, 121 Explicitness, 2, 24, 83,126,128,13234, 217, 220 Fanon,E, 173n. 36 Fantham, E., lln. 21, 41n. 25, 59n. 2, 87n Fatherhood, 9,47,117,183, 214-15, 219; Law of the Father, 113,147, 216; Paternal Gaze, 145-47. See also Authority Ferrari, G., 3n. 3 Fitzgerald, W., 150n. 5 Fortenbaugh, W., 175n. 38 Fortunatianus, 50 Foucault, M., viii, 9,13,13n, 22-23, 23nn. 43-45, 24, 24nn.46,47,25, 60, 60n. 6, 62n, 65n. 20, 72, 74, 84n. 48,109n.23,115,161n. 16 Fowler, W., 205n. 26 Frank, T., 187n. 1 Freud, S., 3,13,16,16n, 17,17nn. 30, 32, 33,18,18nn. 34, 35,19n, 22,116, 116n. 10, 208n. 29 Gabba, E., 164n. 21 Gallagher, C , ix Gallus,P.,31-32

GENERAL INDEX

Gaze, 24-25; and psychoanalysis, 20, 21n, 107-9, 134. See also Theory Gellius, Aulus, 127-29,140-41, 178-79 Gender, vii, 7,13, 85-86, 95,104,106, 112,153,158, 208. See also Vir bonus Giomini, R., 29n. 2 Gleason, M., 8-10, lOn. 18,12, 59n. 3, 81n. 41,105,227n. 8 Golden, M., 7n. 12 Goldhill, S., 41n. 23, 227n. 8 Gonfroy, K, 120n., 161n. 17,197n Gorgias, 14n Gotoff, H., l l n . 21, 41n. 23,116n. 8, 126n, 209n. 32, 223-26, 224nn. 1,2, 229 Graf, R, 37n. 16, 59n. 2, 80n, l l l n . 2 Grant, W., 93n. 7 Green, W., l l l n . 2 Griffith, M., ix Grimal, P., l l l n . 1,191n. 10 Grube, G., 55n, 129n. 18, 162n. 19, 164n. 21,220n Guillemin, A., 41n. 25 Gwynn, A., 7n. 10 Habinek, T., ix, 2n, 30n. 4, 38, 56, 72, llOn, 135n,188n. 4,190,204n. 23, 222 Habitus, 10-11, 14, 32, 41, 47, 69, 79, 96-97,106,113,123, 218-19 Hall, J., 187n. 3 Hallet, X, 161n. 16,169n. 31, 229n Halm, C , 29n. 2 Halperin, D., 23n. 44,161n. 16 Harmodius, 166-67 Harnecker, O., 209 Hegel, G., 61n. 9,107n Hegesias, 164n. 21, 165, 167 Heldmann, K., 33,164 Helen, 171 Hellegouarc'h, J., 7n. 14, 127n, 130n, 202n.19 Hendrickson, C , 132n Heracles, 180-82 Herzfeld,M.,9 Hesiod, 107,168-69 Hidber, T., 215n. 40 Hobsbawm, E., 115n. 7

263

Homer, 53, 72-73 Homosexuality, 13,16-17,17nn. 32, 33,19,117,169,179,185,192, 203, 205, 208 Homosociality, 13,17,117,140,173, 187,192,196-97, 204, 206, 219 Horace, viii, 31n. 8, 193,193n. 14 Hortensius, 128, 129,129n. 18, 130, 140,164n. 21 Irigaray, L., 3n. 4,173n. 36 Isocrates, 63n. 11,115n. 7 Iteration, 69, 213 Jackson, M., 59n. 2 Janan, M., 16n Jarratt, S., 14n, 227n. 8 Jay, M., 104n. 16,108n Jones, C , 149n. 2,159n, 167n, 191n. 10 Kennedy, G., 7n. 10, 12n. 25, 55n, 72, 164,164n. 21,191n.9,227n.8 "Know thyself," 137 Krenkel,W., 129n. 17 Kristeva, J., 106,106n. 19,173n. 36 Kroll, W., 29n. 3, 31, 95n. 9,188,193n. 13,204n.21 Kronos, 168 Kiihnert, E, 88n. 2,195 Kytzler, B., 132n Lacan, J., viii, 13,13nn. 31, 32,14,1718,18nn. 36, 37, 20, 20n, 21, 21nn. 39-41, 22, 25,103-4, 104nn.16,17, 105-6,106nn.18,20, 107-8, 108n, 109,113,116,134,134n, 145-46, 148,171,176n. 39,191n.8, 226 Lamour, D., 23n. 44 Lash, S., 59n. 2 Laughton, E., 7n. 10,115n. 7, 164n. 21 Lausberg, H., l l n . 21, 31 Leach, E., 16n, 96n, 191n. 8 Leda, 166-67 Leeman, A., 183n. 7,191n. 9 Leen, A., 165n Leo, E, 15n Lloyd, G.,78n Lloyd, G(enevieve), 3n. 4 Lossau, M., 175n. 38

264

GENERAL INDEX

Lucian, 209, 217, 219n. 46, 227 Lyotard,J.-E, 229 MacKendrick, P., 52n, 57n, 187, 215n. 42 MacMullen, R., 169n. 31 Maier-Eichhorn, U., In, 74n. 30, 75n. 32 Martha, J., 132n Martin, J., 31 Martindale, C.,40, 40n Marx, E , 31n. 7, 52n Masochism, 89,117, 222 Mauss, M., lOn. 18, 59n. 2 McCarty, W., 103n McMahon, J., 16n Melancholy, 3, 19-20, 185 Memmi, A., 173n. 36 Messala, 59-60 Michel, A., 7n. 10, 91n, 115n. 7, 213n Miller, P., 23n. 44 Milo, 157 Mirror, 5,103, 201; mirror of theory, 147; mirror stage, 20n, 103-4 Mnesilochus, 158,179n Morality, 5, 7, 64, 86-87, 93 Mourning, 3 Muses, 108, 128-29 Mynors, R., 225 Napoleon, 219 Narcissism, 17, 181, 219, 221 Narducci, E., 2n Nature, vii Needham, R., 78n Negative Oedipus Complex, 140,147 Nehamas, A., 227, 227n. 6 Nesiotes, 165-66 Nietzsche, E, 38,150n. 5, 226, 226nn. 3, 4,227, 227nn. 5-7, 228n Nigidius, 31 "Nothing in excess," 137 Odysseus. See Ulysses Oliensis, E., 193,193n. 14 Ontology. See Presence Orban, M., 188, 204n. 21 Orestes, 140-41 Ovid, 198

Pacuvius, 144-46 Paranoia, 17n. 33, 89, 208 Parker H., 17,129n. 17,155 Performativity, 13, 26, 49, 86,112,199 Pericles, 204 Phidias, 166 Piderit,W., 191n. 9 Plato, 3, 3nn. 3, 4, 7n. 10, 38, 144,154, 163-64,173n.36,174-75,203,212 Platter, C , 23n. 44 Plautus, 188,195-96,198 Pleasure, 6,13,19, 23, 64, 82,112, 120,124,133,147,149-86,187-88, 191-92,200-201, 208 Pliny, 96n, 155n, 188n Plutarch, 101, 120-23, 141-42 Pollux, 166-67, 167n, 173-74,176, 180-82,185-86,195, 204-5, 208-9 Polus, 140-41,146 Pompey, 157,157n. 13,191 Potheinus, 166-67. See also Pollux Poulakos, T., 14n, 227n. 8 Presence, 3, 6,12,15-16, 26-27, 39, 46, 49, 52, 57, 60, 78, 80, 86, 112,121,145,147,152,187, 213-14, 221 Prodicus, 180,182 Pucci, J., 31n. 8 Pudor, 127n, 205-8 Rackham, H., 191n. 9 Rademacher, L., 41n. 24, 95n. 10 Ramage, E., 84n. 47, 95n. 9, 187n. 3 Reardon, B., 185,215 Remus, 111, 227 Rhetorica ad Herennium, 30-35, 47, 50-52,54,77,127,188, 220, 229 Richlin, A., 23n. 44,155,155n, 169n. 30,180n. 44 Riggsby, A., 96n Romm, X, 166nn. 25, 27,184n. 50 Romulus, 111,227 Roodenburg, H., 59n. 2 Roscius, 118-20,141-42,146 Rose, I , 20n, 104n. 16,109,115n. 6, 140n Rose, P., 73n Rubin, G., 164 Ruch, M., 57n

GENERAL INDEX

Santoro L'Hoir, R, 7n. 13,196n. 15 Sardanapalus, 154-55,157-58 Sartre, J.-R, 108n. 22 Satyrus, 121,142 Saussure, P., 152 Scaevola, 55 Schmitt, J.-C, 59n. 2 Schottlaender, R., 162n. 19 Schulte,H.,115n. 7 Scylla, viii Sedgwick, E., 173 Seneca, 51 Seneca the Elder, 98 Shackleton-Bailey, D., 197 Silverman, K., 20n, 106,106n. 20, 112, 115n. 6,116, 116n. 10,134,134n, 140,140n,146n,171,215 Sinclair, P., 2n, 7n. 15, 51, 51n. 37, 52n,98n Skinner, M., 23n. 44,161n. 16,169n. 31 Smethurst, S., 115n. 7 Socrates, 180,182, 203, 212 Solmsen, R, 12n. 24, 31 Sophocles, 121,140-41 Sorof, G., 191n. 9, 209 Stasimon, 195 Straightness, 72n. 26, 79,156 Subjectivation, 107,110,114 Suetonius, 31 Sulpicius, 195-98, 216-18 Supplementarity, 11,15-16, 45-46, 49, 57,63-64,66-67,69, 78-79, 94-96, 115,186,213,219 Svenbro, J.,38n. 19,56 Telamon, 144,146 Terence, 138 Textuality, 4-6,10-13,16, 29-58, 63, 188-89, 223 Thalmann, G., 73n Theophrastus, 31 Theory: gaze of, 5,15, 69,109; opposed to practice, 10; as a practice, 86; and self- subjection, 59, 69; and the symbolic, 21; theory-effect, 88n. 3,102; theory-theater, 122,135,186

265

Thersites, 72 Thyestes, 142 Tisias, 12 Titius, 81 Toga, 71,77,162,215,216 Too, Y.,7n. 11 Torquatus, 128-30 Tuite, K., 59n. 2 Ulysses, 53, 64n. 15, 72-73 Ungern-Sternberg, X, 52n Venus, 128-30,132,154-55 Vergil, 35-37, 39-41, 44, 48 Verres, 126 Veyne, P., 169n. 31 Victor, 29n. 2, 32, 50-51 Vir bonus, 6-9, 15-19, 21, 27-28, 3 7 38, 40, 45, 50, 54-55, 59-61, 65-67, 69, 71, 73, 75-76, 78, 80-83, 85, 87, 89,109, 114-15,126,133-34,176, 187,189-90,193,195,197, 201, 206, 210,212-15,218,220-21,224-25, 228 Wacquant, L., l l n . 22 Walters,!, 7n. 13 Wardy, R., 227n. 8 Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, U., 163n, 226-27, 227n. 5 Wilde, O., 155 Wilkins, A., 12n. 25,190,191n. 9, 200, 209 Winkler, J., 23n. 44 Winterbottom, M., 7n. 10, 37n. 14, 84n. 47, 95n. 10,187n. 2 Wiseman, T , l l l n . 3 Wohl,V, ix, 166n. 28 Wohrle, G., 92n, 175n. 38 Writing, 15, 29-58, 63,102, 211-12, 214, 221, 230 Wyke, M., 7,103n, 155n, 173n. 35 Xenophon,180-82 Zeitlin, R, 23n. 44 Zeus, 166-68

Index Locorum

Alexander Defiguris 28.3: 137n. 27 Aristophanes Clouds: 149 Thesmophoriazousai: 179n 130-45: 158 Aristotle Politics 1312al: 158n Rhetoric: 12, 227 1403b20:12n. 24, 31 1403b34:175n. 38 1407bll: 38n. 18 1408a23-25: 90n 1413b4: 38 1413b9: 12n. 24 Athenaeus Depnosophistae 12.37-39: 158n Ausonius In Miloniam 36: 46n. 31 Catullus Carmen 6.13: 133n. 22 Cicero Academica 2.64: 209 Ad Atticum 4.13.2: 190 4.15.1: 197 4.15.2: 196n. 16 Adfamiliares 1.9.23: 190n Brutus: 6, 55-56,136-37,151n. 8 46: 12n. 25 59: 213 141: 75n. 34,137n.26 163:55 171: 72n.25 210: 47 302:130

302-3:131 313: 44n. 29 325:129n. 18,164n.21 De amicitia: 191n. 8 De inventione: 55, 189, 220 1.9: 29n. 2 2.6: 12n. 25 De officiis 1.130:120n De oratore 1.5: 6n. 6, 55n, 220n 1.6: 212n 1.23: 191, 220 1.78: 33n 1.91: 12n. 25 1.92: 54 1.94: 33n 1.107-10: 218n. 44 1.118:200-201,206 1.119-20: 206 1.120-21: 207 1.121: 206 1.122: 208n. 30 1.123: 206n 1.126: 218n. 43 1.129:118 1.129-30: 119 1.134: 202n. 20 1.135: 218n. 44 1.149: 210n 1.150: 210 1.151:211 1.159: 215 1.199:193 1.202:193, 221 1.204: 214 1.205-8: 218n. 44 2.5: 54

268

INDEX LOCORUM

Cicero (continued) De oratore (continued) 2.17: 199 2.17-18: 221 2.28: 199 2.29: 195 2.29-30: 218n. 44 2.30: 54 2.33: 198,199, 200 2.33-34: 194 2.40: 196,198n 2.69: 220 2.84: 220 2.90-92: 214 2.91: 215n. 42 2.96: 215 2.98: 215 2.150: 214 2.180: 220 2.189: 143 2.193-94: 143-44 2.201: 218n. 44 2.232: 218 2.247: 221 3.3: 190 3.14: 212 3.15: 212 3.34-36: 215 3.38: 220 3.47: 217 3.48: 217 3.52: 217 3.53: 221 3.54: 217, 220 3.62: 203 3.71: 203-5, 218 3.79-80: 204 3.85: 120 3.91-95: 218 3.92: 204, 218 3.94: 204 3.98: 220 3.103: 205n. 24 3.108-43: 204n. 22 3.213: 30 3.214: 111 3.220:132 3.222: 67n De re publica 3.40: 192 6.25: 192

Divinatio in Caecilium 41: 209 In Verrem 1.30.76: 42n 2.34.85: 203 5.33.86: 125 5.62.162:125 Orator: 6, 136-37, 151n. 8, 218-19 7: 6n. 7 55: 67n 57: 76n.35 110: 219n. 45 Philippicae: 2 2.14.35: 60n. 7 Pro Archia: 2n 1.1: 48n 8.19: 48 Pro Caelio 33-34: 126 Pro Cluentio 5.11: 42n 5.14: 42n 20.57: 209 Pro Ligario 1.1: 48 1.2: 42n Pro Milone: 2, 44, 45, 46, 98, 209 11.32: 60n. 7 31.85: 48 Pro Rabirio perduellionis reo 6.18: 43 Pro rege Deiotaro 1.1: 209 Pro Sestio: 116n. 8 Pro S. Roscio Amerino 30.84: 60n. 7 Tusculan Disputations 3.41: 205n. 25 [Cicero] Rhetorica ad Herennium 1.1: 6, 52 1.3: 29n. 2 1.4: 50n. 35 3.19: 12n. 23, 30 3.25-26: 127 3.27: 31, 32n. 11 4.24: 51n. 38 Dionysius of Halicarnassus On the Ancient Orators: 65n. 19, 215n. 40 On Imitation: 215n. 40 Fortunatianus Ars Rhetorica 1.10: 50n. 36 2.1: 70n Aulus Gellius Noctes Atticae 1.5.1-3: 127-28, 178 6.5.1-8: 140-41

INDEX LOCORUM

Hesiod Theogony 81-94: 107 Works and Days 22: 168 24: 168 34: 168 109-19:168 Hippocrates Epidemics 2.6.15: 79 Homer Iliad 174 2.212-69: 72 3.217: 53 Isocrates Against the Sophists: 63n. 11 Antidosis: 63n. 11 Longinus Ars Rhetorica 104:121n Lucian Bis accusatus 31: 172n De saltatione 63: 64n. 15 64: 64n.15 83: 64n.15 Praeceptor rhetorum 1: 151 2-3:152-53 4:168 6:170 8:168 9: 163,165n. 23 10:164n,168 12-13:159 14:161 15:161 16: 162 17: 175 18: 173 19:174 20: 174, 176 21: 176 22: 176, 177 23: 178 24:167 Pro imagnibus: 166n. 27 Somnium 1: 183 4: 184 5: 184 6:184 12:184 13:184

269

Petronius Satyricon 2: 173n. 34 Plato Phaedrus, 276a8: 3 Protagoras 326d: 166n. 26 Republic 562d: 175 Symposium: 203 Plautus Captivi 583: 7n. 16 Trinummus 705-7: 195-96 Pliny Epistulae 6.2: 155n Plutarch On Deriving Profit from One's Enemies 89el: 157 Life of Cicero 5.4-5: 141-42 Life of Demosthenes 7.1-6: 120-21, 142 9.4: 101 11.2-4: 123 11.3: 101 Life of Pompey 48: 157 [Plutarch] Lives of the Ten Orators 844d: 101 Pollux Onomasticon 167n. 29 Quintilian Institutio oratoria 1 .pr. 1: 87 l.pr.2: 87 l.pr.4: 87 l.pr.6: 9 l.pr.7:30,47, 87 l.pr.9: 6, 87 l.pr.18-20: 33, 88, 120, 149n. 1, 153n 1.7.34-35: 59 1.11.9:156 1.11.18:80 3.1.8: 12n. 25 3.1.19:7 3.3: 29n. 1 4.2.39: 156 5.10.23-25: 70 6.3.104: 84n. 47 9.2.32: 43n 9.4.19: 38n. 20 10.1.76: 100 10.3.1: 210 10.3.25: 102

270

INDEX LOCORUM

Quintilian (continued) Institutio oratoria (continued) 10.3.30: 101 10.5.2: 210 11.3.1: 67n 11.3.2: 90-91 11.3.5: 92,139 11.3.6: 30, 92n 11.3.10-11: 94 11.3.11: 63n. 12, 69 11.3.14: 90 11.3.19: 82n. 44 11.3.23: 81 11.3.24:81 11.3.30: 109n. 26 11.3.30-32: 82 11.3.31: 109n. 26 11.3.35-36: 36 11.3.47-51: 44 11.3.51: 46n. 30 11.3.54: 101 11.3.57: 125,133n. 21 11.3.58: 95 11.3.58-60:162n. 18 11.3.61:63 11.3.61-62: 93 11.3.62: 91 11.3.64: 81 11.3.65-67: 64, 75 11.3.65: 64n. 16 11.3.67:66, 64n. 17,75 11.3.68: 76n. 36,103 11.3.69: 72n. 26, 80,109n. 26 11.3.70: 37, 77n. 38 11.3.72:74,76 11.3.72-84: 76 11.3.76: 76 11.3.78: 76 11.3.80: 76 11.3.82: 74, 77, 156 11.3.83: 80 11.3.84: 48 11.3.85: 74nn. 28, 29 11.3.87: 50n. 34 11.3.90-91:126,133n. 21 11.3.92: 74 11.3.96-97: 48 11.3.100: 74 11.3.103: 75 11.3.104: 74

11.3.106: 75n. 33 11.3.107: 75n. 34 11.3.108: 48 11.3.112: 80 11.3.114:79 11.3.115:48 11.3.117:83 11.3.120:100 11.3.122: 77 11.3.123: 49n 11.3.125:79 11.3.126: 84, 99 11.3.128: 79, 81n. 43 11.3.129:100 11.3.130-33: 80 11.3.133: 84 11.3.137: 71, 215n. 42 11.3.138-39: 72n. 26 11.3.143: 31n. 9 11.3.144-49: 162 11.3.158:53,73,75 11.3.159: 72n. 26,75, 79 11.3.160: 77-78 11.3.161: 77n. 37 11.3.161-62: 75 11.3.162: 48 11.3.162-69: 42 11.3.169: 43 11.3.175-76: 40 11.3.177: 72 11.3.180-84: 62,137 11.3.183:139 11.3.184: 67 12.1.25: 88 Seneca Epistulae morales 114: 65n. 19 114.2: 221n Seneca the Elder Controversiae: 151n. 8 l.pr.9: 7n. 9 3.pr.l6: 98 Sophocles Electra: 140-41 Suetonius De grammaticis et rhetoribus 26: 32 Tacitus Dialogus de oratoribus: 151n. 8

INDEX LOCORUM

Ternece Eunuch: 140 44-45: 138 Vergil Aeneid: 35, 44 1.1-2: 36 1.78: 39n. 21 1.335: 37n. 15 1.617: 39n. 21 3.620: 37n. 15 11.383: 39n. 21

Eclogues 3.25: 39n. 21 C. Iulius Victor Ars Rehtorica 1.16: 29n. 2 82.5-9: 32n. 10 Xenophon Memorabilia 2.1.20 :180 2.1.22 181 2.1.26 181n 2.1.27 182n 2.1.28 182 2.1.30 182

271