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Stability and Justification in Hume's Treatise

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LOUIS E. LOEB

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

2002

OXPORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi Sao Paulo Shanghai Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto and an associated company in Berlin Copyright © 2002 by Oxford University Press, Inc. First published as an Oxford University Press paperback 2005 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Loeb, Louis E. Stability and justification in Hume's Treatise / Louis E. Loeb. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-514658-1; 0-19-518104-2 (pbk.) 1. Hume, David, 1711-1776. Treatise of human nature. 2. Knowledge, Theory of. I. Title. B1489 , L64 2002 128—dc21 2001051030

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper

In memory of my parents


Preface

This is a book about Hume's epistemology in A Treatise of Human Nature. I undertake to present a sustained interpretation of a theory of justification operative in that work. In doing so, I mine sections that have received comparatively little attention. These include I.iii.9 ("Of the effects of other relations, and other habits"), I.iii.10 ("Of the influence of belief"), I.iii.12 ("Of the probability of causes"), I.iii.13 ("Of unphilosophical probability"), II.iii.9 ("Of the direct passions"), and II.iii.10 ("Of curiosity, or the love of truth"). Similarly, my discussions of I.iv.2-5 focus on often neglected detail. More specifically, I draw on Hume's discussions of discomfort when beliefs conflict; of mechanisms that enable us to combine conflicting beliefs into a single judgment; and of unconscious or prereflective efforts to resolve conflicts where beliefs cannot be combined in this way. It is unsurprising that standard treatments have little to say about these broadly psychological matters. It is commonly thought that Hume confuses psychology with philosophy. In any event, his associationism, which is held to be crude, at the least taints passages about mental conflict that I take to be critical to Hume's approach to justification. In my view, the understanding of Hume's epistemology requires renewed attention to his psychological theories. Quite apart from an interpreter's position on associationism and the relations between psychology and philosophy, another factor shapes books on Hume. Exposition and interpretation of Hume's contributions to fundamental philosophical problems—belief, causal inference, necessary connection, the existence of body, personal identity (a list of topics drawn from Book I alone)— can easily consume an entire volume. This does not leave room to address matters that do not fall neatly into this topical scheme. By contrast, my book is not a survey of Hume's epistemology and related topics. A major preoccupation of recent work on Hume has been to understand the relationship between his "naturalism" and his "skepticism." Discussions of

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this matter are difficult to control. Yet, one does want to ask: Are the naturalistic and skeptical tendencies in Hume's thought at odds with one another? If so, why did Hume abide the tension between them? If not, how are Hume's naturalism and skepticism related? Do they comprise answers to different (perhaps empirical and normative) questions? Many have followed Norman Kemp Smith in taking the naturalism to constitute a response to a prior skepticism. I stake out a position in which Hume takes his negative conclusions about the possibility of justified belief to be a product of his naturalism. I contend that Hume subscribes to a naturalistic theory of epistemic justification, a theory that discriminates between justified and unjustified belief with reference to the tendency of belief-forming mechanisms to produce psychological stability in belief. According to Hume, the belief in body does not arise from the belief-forming mechanisms—such as inference about unobserved causes and effects—that the theory of justification seems to legitimate. What is more, the preferred belief-forming mechanisms lead to systematic instability, at least for a reflective person. His naturalistic theory of justification, Hume claims, leads to the pessimistic result that no belief is justified under reflection. I expect that my interpretation with reference to psychological stability and related notions will strike many as one-sided. This is doubtless a just criticism. Hume is not a tidy philosopher; he leaves many loose ends and incongruent parts. My intention is not so much to offer a balanced commentary as to determine the extent to which a stability-based interpretation offers an illuminating and fruitful interpretive perspective. To this end, I do not shy away from reconstructions of the texts. I have nothing novel to say about appropriate constraints on such methods. I like to think that my reconstructions are well grounded. In general, the reconstructions are conservative in that they do not attribute to Hume "anticipations" of current philosophical developments. I have wanted to see how far Humean resources could have taken his epistemological project, had he pursued it more intensely. The first five chapters of this study are interpretive, in the fashion of modest reconstructive history of philosophy. In the final two chapters, I go beyond reconstruction and outline a series of amendments to Book I of the Treatise. In offering the amendments, I do not claim that they are in any way suggested by the texts or even lurking in the recesses of Hume's mind. This is decidedly not the case. The amendments involve omitting wrongheaded arguments and theses to which Hume commits himself. Though Hume claims that stability cannot be achieved, for a reflective person, his arguments for this destructive outcome are far from effective. Similarly, his despairing posture toward the belief in body is premature. The amendments I propose abandon a number of Hume's destructive claims and in some cases remove obstacles to Hume adopting more positive positions. Here there is a governing methodology, in that I seek to keep the amendments to the minimum required to remedy difficulties in Hume's system. I propose the amendments in order to show how a suitably revised version of Book I would have left Hume's constructive epistemological theory in a con-

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siderably stronger position. Seeing that this is the case also illuminates constraints upon Hume's thinking and reveals the degrees of freedom in his system when the constraints are relaxed. I do not wish to claim that the amended version of the Treatise is one Hume might have written. He doubtless would have resisted doing so. Nor do I wish to claim that the version I construct would have been a better philosophical work. Hume's willingness to leave unsolved problems standing is part of the fascination of the Treatise. Hume had a variety of intentions. Some distract him from pursuing his constructive epistemological project; others work at cross-purposes to its success. The Treatise includes arguments Hume accepts but which we need not take at face value as reflecting genuine difficulties. Hume is entitled to his own priorities. My objective is to show that a more favorable outcome was easily within his reach, had that been a more fundamental intention. The amendments thus help to separate reparable from deeper vulnerabilities. I draw on the Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals only insofar as they corroborate or cohere with the Treatise. This is in simple recognition of the vast differences between the earlier and later works. In this regard, I admire Antony Flew's candor in his study of the Enquiries (1961, pp. 4-5,105,243). Flew notes, for example, that the first Enquiry treatment of probability is "cursory": "three pages are the scanty salvage of three full Sections of the Treatise." In addition, "the ninety-five pages of Part IV 'Of the Sceptical and other Systems of Philosophy' are cut down to the mere seventeen of Section XII 'Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy'." Flew allows, "The substantial omissions involved in these drastic abbreviations include several philosophical explorations any one of which provides us with a sufficient ground for refusing Hume's urgent requests to ignore the Treatise." Flew cites the I.iv.2 discussion of the causes of the belief in body as an example, adding, "Considered as a substitute for Book I Part IV of the Treatise the present Section XII... is entirely inadequate." The Enquiries, considered in ways other than as a substitute for the Treatise, deserve study in their own right. It is important to interpret the Enquiries, to compare their doctrines to those of the Treatise, and to consider the philosophical pressures or other forces that led to changes in substance and tone. But one cannot simply commingle passages from the Treatise and the Enquiries as if they were one. Even if the Enquiries are more mature work, it remains that the complexity—both psychological and philosophical—of the Treatise tends to vanish in them. What is more, Hume's views on a number of important topics—for example, the justification for causal inference and skepticism—shift between the Treatise and the first Enquiry. My book is a study of the Treatise. My views have developed over a long period. Central aspects of my interpretation of I.iv.2 were developed in conjunction with Mark D. Tieman in "Coherence, Constancy, and Causation in 'Of scepticism with regard to the senses'," Seventh Hume Conference, Banff, 1978. Early statements of my interpretation of Hume's epistemology include "Permanence in Belief in Hume and Descartes," Hume Society Joint Meetings with the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, Portland, 1988; and "Stability and Justification" and

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"Stability and Moral Judgment," National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute on David Hume, Dartmouth College, 1990. Others have advanced some of my interpretive claims and arguments, perhaps especially claims in Chapter II and in parts of Chapter III. Here and elsewhere, I have tried to be scrupulous in acknowledging in footnotes evidence that others have brought forward. I do not, however, bother to highlight positions as ones I have adopted independently of others. Sorting out lines of influence would be cumbersome and ultimately of little interest. I give an attribution in the main text (together with citations in accompanying footnotes) where I am aware that I have borrowed an interpretive idea. In some instances, my interpretation elaborates views in the literature that have not taken hold—so far as I can see—and indeed are not much addressed. For example, aspects of my interpretation of Hume's theory of belief and justification develop insights published as early as the 1950s. It is distressing to observe the extent to which the literature can fail to absorb, or even engage, important interpretive developments. It would be achievement enough were I to succeed in consolidating lines of interpretation that merit greater attention. I am often direct in criticizing other researchers. This is in the interest of clarity and advancing discussion. I have learned much from those I criticize. I sometimes object to omissions in scholars' discussions. Here I try to abide by fair play, focusing on omissions germane to their interpretations. I have taken care not to misrepresent the positions of others and regret any failings in that respect. I am indebted to David Hills and David Velleman. For many years, both have taken interest in my work on the history of modern philosophy and on Hume. They have provided patient, sympathetic, and penetrating criticism as well as sound advice on matters relating to publication. David Hills has been an invaluable source of textual leads. David Velleman has helped me to clarify many of my interpretive claims. I cannot imagine that this book would have come to fruition without their help and support. I am grateful to Frederick Schmitt for providing detailed comments on the entire manuscript. They improved the book; I only wish I had responses to more of the interpretive and philosophical problems he raised. I have also benefited from the acute comments of anonymous university press referees. I greatly appreciate the care and good humor of Katie McShane, Greg Sax, and Kevin Toh in the painstaking work of verifying quotations and references and reviewing page proofs. A number of former teachers have nourished my interest in seventeenthand eighteenth-century British philosophy, including Thomas Reed, when I was an undergraduate at Wesleyan University, and Michael Ayers (through his lectures), J. O. Urmson, and Michael Woods, when I was a postgraduate student at Oxford. Others have greatly influenced the nature of my interest in philosophy or its history: Kent Bendall and Louis Mink at Wesleyan; John Foster and Basil Mitchell at Oxford; and Paul Benacerraf, Carl Hempel, David Lewis, Gregory Vlastos, and Margaret Wilson, when I was a doctoral student at Princeton. Over the years, I have benefited from discussing Hume with many philosophers. These include Charlotte Brown, Philip Clark, Rachel Cohon, Mark Crim-

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mins, Edwin Curley, Stephen Darwall, Felmon Davis, Richard Dees, John Devlin, Lome Falkenstein, Daniel Farrell, Robert Fogelin, Gary Fuller, Daniel Garber, Alvin Goldman, William Harper, Sally Haslanger, Alan Hausman, Julie Heath, John Immerwahr, Michael Jacovides, James Joyce, Stanley Kaminsky, Jeffrey Kasser, Jaegwon Kim, Arthur Kuflik, Thomas Lennon, Eric Lormand, Jan Ludwig, Edwin McCann, Mary Mothersill, George Pappas, Diana Raffman, Peter Railton, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Lawrence Sklar, Holly Smith, Corliss Swain, William Taschek, Mark Tieman, Wayne Waxman, Michael Williams, Kenneth Winkler, and David Wong. I have benefited from presenting my work on Hume to audiences at Bowling Green State, Michigan State, Ohio State, Smith, Southern Methodist, Union, Wellesley, and Western Ontario. I appreciate all of these opportunities. I completed the manuscript for this book while enjoying a year as a fellow at the Center for the Study of Modern Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. I am grateful to the center and to the Department of Philosophy for gracious support. I owe special thanks to Robert Sleigh and also Vere Chappell, Sylvia Howes, Eileen O'Neill, and John Robison for help in arrangements for my visit. I also wish to express appreciation for their hospitality, as well as that of Bruce Aune, Lynne Rudder Baker, Jack Hanson, and Garreth Matthews at the University of Massachusetts and Ernie Alleva and Nalini Bhushan at Smith. I am pleased to acknowledge the University of Michigan for sabbatical leave and research support. I have enjoyed superb and cheerful support in preparing this manuscript from Sylvia Howes and from Susan London, Linda Shultes, and Michele Smyk at Michigan. I have been fortunate to spend my professional career at Michigan, where I first lectured on Hume more than a quarter-century ago. The department has provided a collegial and stimulating environment, one that has been respectful of teaching as well as supportive of research. Colleagues' expressions of confidence in my work has meant a great deal to me. Extensive portions of the material in Chapters I-V have been previously published, though I have often substantially reworked and rearranged earlier material. (Changes in my view have been flagged in footnotes.) I am grateful for permission to reprint portions of the following articles: "Stability, Justification, and Hume's Propensity to Ascribe Identity to Related Objects," Philosophical Topics, 1991 (incorporated in §§ V.l-2,4-5,7); "Hume on Stability, Justification, and Unphilosophical Probability," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1995 (§§ 1.4-5, III.2, IV.2-3); "Instability and Uneasiness in Hume's Theories of Belief and Justification," British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 1995 (§§ 1.3-5, III.2, IV.5); "Causal Inference, Associationism, and Skepticism in Part III of Book I of Hume's Treatise," in Patricia Easton, ed., Logic and the Workings of the Mind: The Logic of Ideas and Faculty Psychology in Early Modern Philosophy, North American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy 5, Ridgeview, 1997 (§§ II. 1-3), by permission of the North American Kant Society; "Sextus, Descartes, Hume, and Peirce: On Securing Settled Doxastic States," Nous, 1998 (§§ 1.2, 111.4,6); "Hume's Explanations of Meaningless Beliefs," Philosophical Quarterly, 2001 (§ V.6), by permission of Blackwell Publishers; and "Integrating

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Hume's Accounts of Belief and Justification," reprinted with permission from Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (§§ 111.1-2,4-5), copyright © International Phenomenological Society, 2001.1 am also grateful to Oxford University Press for permission to reprint material from the following volumes: © Oxford University Press, 1978, A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch (2d ed.), 1978, by permission of Oxford University Press; © Oxford University Press, 1975, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals by David Hume, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H. Nidditch (3d ed.), 1975, by permission of Oxford University Press; and © Oxford University Press, 1975, An Essay concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, edited by Peter H. Nidditch, 1975, by permission of Clarendon University Press. Words cannot express my debt to my family. My stepdaughter, Sophie Pels, rebound my decrepit, extensively annotated copy of the Treatise and generously offered help with proofreading. My son and wife have been enormously patient and understanding when I have closeted myself in a room or office or been otherwise distracted. Beyond that, Gabriel's exuberance has been a constant source of joy, and Tully's steadfast encouragement has inspired my best work.

Contents

Abbreviations xv I. Contexts for Hume's Epistemological Projects 3 1.1. Hume's Distinction between Calm and Violent Emotions 3 1.2. The Pyrrhonian Background to Hume's Interest in Stability 6 1.3. The Motivational Role of Uneasiness 10 1.4. The Two-Stage Development of Hume's Theory 12 1.5. The Place of a Stability-Based Interpretation in the Literature 20 1.6. A Prospectus 29 II. Causal Inference, Associationism, and the Understanding 38 II. 1. Hume's Commitment to Causal Inference 38 11.2. Hume's Intended Conclusion in I.iii.6 47 11.3. Hume's Reconstruction of Reason within a Faculty of Association 53 III. Integrating Hume's Accounts of Belief and Justification 60 111.1. A Puzzle in Regard to I.iii 60 111.2. Steadiness and Infixing in Hume's Theory of Belief 65 111.3. The Bearing of Hume's Treatment of Education 74 111.4. The Natural Function of Belief 79 111.5. Two Versions of the Stability-Based Theory 87 111.6. A Defense of Attributing the Less Demanding Version to Hume 91 111.7. Further Remarks on I.iv.7 98

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CONTENTS

IV. Unphilosophical Probability and Judgments Arising from Sympathy 101 IV. 1. Degrees of Belief and Justification 101 IV.2. Instabilities Due to Observation of Accidental Conjunctions 105 IV.3. Variations in Degree of Confidence Due to Memory and Causal Inference 111 IV.4. Variations in Sentiment Due to Sympathy 118 IV.5. Variations Due to Psychological Distance as Sources of Uneasiness 124 IV.6. Corrections in Judgments of Probability and Moral Judgments 132 V. The Propensity to Ascribe Identity to Related Objects 139 V. 1. A Pattern of Psychological Explanation in I.iv 139 V.2. The Operation of the Propensity 142 V.3. The Propensity and Instability 147 V.4. The Propensity and Justification 154 V.5. The Propensity and Meaning 162 V.6. Tensions in Hume's Account of the Psychological Properties of the Propensity 172 VI. Constancy and Coherence in I.iv.2 177 VI. 1. A Puzzle in Regard to Hume's Treatment of Constancy 177 VI.2. The Dispensability of the Propensity 180 VI.3. Hume's Satisfaction with the Psychological Adequacy of His Treatment of Coherence 187 VI.4. An Epistemological Obstacle to Subsuming Constancy under Coherence 193 VI.5. A Metaphysical Obstacle to Subsuming Constancy under Coherence 201 VI.6. An Amended Version of I.iv.2 207 VII. Difficulties—Contrived and Suppressed 215 VII. 1. Hume and Paradox 215 VII.2. The Manifest Contradiction and Causal Inference 217 VII.3. The Reduction of Probability "to Nothing" 223 VII.4. The Probability of Causes 230 VII.5. Contrary Beliefs Based on Habit 237 VII.6. Contrary Beliefs Not Based Solely on Habit 245 Bibliography Index 263

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Abbreviations

A An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, in L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., A Treatise of Human Nature, 2d ed., with text revised and variant readings by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1978. BW A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, eds., The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, vol. 2, Nelson and Sons: London, 1949. Conduct John Locke, Of the Conduct of the Understanding, in The Works of John Locke, vol. 3, Tegg: London, 1823. CP Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 6 vols., edited by Charles Hartshome and Paul Weiss, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1931-35. References are to volume and paragraph number (not page number). DCr Thomas Hobbes, De Corpere, in English Works of Thomas Hobbes, vol. 1, edited by William Molesworth, Bohn: London, 1939. DNR David Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, edited by Norman Kemp Smith, Clarendon: Oxford, 1935. DP A Dissertation on the Passions, in T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, eds., David Hume: The Philosophical Works, vol. 4, Longman: London, 1882-86 (reprinted by Scientia Verlag Aalen: Darmstadt, 1964). References to section, part, and paragraph. EHU David Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3d ed., with text revised and notes by P. H. Nidditch, Clarendon: Oxford, 1975. References to section (I-XII) and marginal section number (not page number). EL Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, edited by Ferdinand Tonnies, 2d ed., Cass: London, 1969. References to part, chapter, and section. EPM David Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, in SelbyBigge and Nidditch, 1975 (see EHU). References to section (I-IX) and to marginal section number (not page number).

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ABBREVIATIONS

Essay John Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, edited by Peter H. Nidditch, Clarendon: Oxford, 1975. References to book, chapter, and section. Essays David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, edited by Eugene F. Miller, Liberty Classics: Indianapolis, Ind., 1987. L David Hume, Letters of David Hume, 2 vols., edited by J. Y. T. Grieg, Clarendon: Oxford, 1932. Lev Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, with Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668, edited by Edwin Curley, Hackett: Indianapolis, Ind., 1994. References to part, chapter, and paragraph. LG David Hume, A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh, edited by Ernest C. Mossner and John V. Price, University of Edinburgh Press: Edinburgh, 1967. Mind Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, edited by Timothy Duggan, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1970. References to chapter. M XI Sextus Empiricus, Against the Ethicists, translated by R. G. Bury, vol. 3 of Sextus Empiricus, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1936. PH Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, translated by R. G. Bury, vol. 1 of Sextus Empiricus, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1933. References to book and standard page numbers. Powers Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1969. References to essay number. T David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, in Selby-Bigge and Nidditch, 1978 (see A). Truth James Beattie, An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism, 6th ed., William Creech: Edinburgh, 1778. Page references are generally omitted after the first quotation of a passage in a given section of the manuscript. § This symbol is reserved for references to sections of this study.



I Contexts for Hume's Epistemological Projects

I.I. Hume's Distinction between Calm and Violent Emotions Hume assigns a pivotal role to stability in understanding normativity in a variety of theoretical contexts. Hume's distinction between the calm emotions and violent passions may be interpreted as appealing to a difference in volatility, rather than mere intensity. Artificial justice is a system of conventions in the interest of stability of possession (III.ii.2-3). Moral judgments arise in light of "continual fluctuation" in our situation, "in order... to prevent those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things" (T 581, Hume's emphases). I believe that stability is crucial to Hume's theory of justified belief, as well as to his accounts of the calm emotions, artificial justice, and moral judgment. Hume's distinction between calm and violent emotions provides a nice example of the promise of interpreting key elements of his philosophy with reference to stability. According to a widely accepted interpretation of this distinction, due to Pall Ardal, Hume distinguishes between calm and violent emotions with reference to differences in emotional intensity or disturbance.1 This approach accords well with Hume's summary statement at Treatise 276, as well as comments at 417-18 and 437-38. At the same time, there is much evidence in another direction.

1. Ardal, 1966/1989, pp. 9, 94, 97-98, 104. See also Mercer, 1972, p. 22; Penelhum, 1975, pp. 92-93; Loeb, 1977, p. 397; Neu, 1977, pp. 53-54; Fieser, 1992, pp. 6-7; and Immerwahr, 1992, p. 294. Some commentators take care to contrast two distinctions: between kinds of emotions, where violent emotions generally involve more emotional intensity on most occasions, and individual instances of emotions, where a violent emotion exhibits a high degree of emotional intensity on a particular occasion (Fieser, 1992, pp. 6-7,10,16; and Immerwahr, 1992, p. 295). These are details within Ardal's framework.

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I. CONTEXTS FOR E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L PROJECTS

In the course of drawing a distinction between calm and violent passions, on the one hand, and weak and strong passions, on the other, Hume says: "Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper; but on the contrary, that when a passion has once become a settled principle of action, and is the predominant inclination of the soul, it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation. As repeated custom and its own force have made every thing yield to it, it directs the actions and conduct without that opposition and emotion, which so naturally attend every momentary gust of passion. We must, therefore, distinguish betwixt a calm and a weak passion; betwixt a violent and a strong one. (T 418-19)

This passage is suggestive of a more fundamental distinction than emotional intensity. Insofar as a calm emotion is a "settled principle of action," it tends not to involve sensible agitation; in this respect calm emotions contrast with the violent ones, which are more akin to "momentary" gusts. Hume is not explicating the distinction between strong and weak emotions with reference to a difference between the extent to which emotions are settled. He admits that a momentary passion can be stronger than a settled one (cf. T 419,437). Rather, he is explicating the distinction between calm and violent emotions themselves. D. G. C. MacNabb is on the right track when he writes that Hume contrasts the calm with "the more violent and transitory passions."2 Hume provides illustrations of violent passions as follows: "When I receive any injury from another, I often feel a violent passion of resentment When I am immediately threaten'd with any grievous ill, my fears, apprehensions, and aversions rise to a great height, and produce a sensible emotion" (T 418). The suggestion is that the intensity of these emotions is volatile, likely to be momentary, deriving especially from the proximity of an injury. In the paragraph following this discussion, Hume observes, "What we call strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent" (T 418). Hume does not explain this seemingly important remark, but in context it seems plausible that Hume takes volatility to be a defect that sustains a normative or evaluative distinction between the calm and violent emotions. The availability of the interpretation of violence in terms of volatility has perhaps been obscured by the tendency of commentators to suppose that, at least in his "official" theories, Hume identifies mental states with occurrent or phenomenal conscious states. (This tendency has doubtless been encouraged by Hume's lack of clarity in regard to a distinction between occurrent and dispositional mental states. See § III.2.) Such terms as 'violent' and 'calm' and their cognates are read as referring exclusively to occurrent feelings. This is not the best way to understand the texts. It is not the most natural interpretation of the notion of a "settled principle of action," and it does little to explain the characterization of the violent emotions as "momentary." Furthermore, Hume writes:

2. MacNabb, 1951/1966, p. 165.

1.1. CALM AND V I O L E N T E M O T I O N S

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"Now, 'tis certain, there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, tho' they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind" (T 417). Within the Ardal interpretation, where the distinction between calm and violent emotions is deined with reference to emotional intensity or disturbance, this is not only certain, but a simple definitional truism.3 In the alternative I am proposing, it is a substantive psychological observation that calm emotions, construed as emotions that are not volatile, produce little felt intensity. Similarly, when Hume writes that a passion is a "violent and sensible" (T 437) emotion, the phrase looks redundant in the Ardal interpretation. I take the phrase to mean that the passions are volatile and sensible, and sensible because of their volatility. The calm emotions "produce little emotion" and "cause no disorder in the temper" (T 437) or again, "cause no disorder in the soul" (T 417). A violent emotion causes sensible agitation, thereby requiring that the emotion and the agitation be distinct. They would not be distinct if a violent emotion consists in the agitation.4 A more explicit characterization of a distinction between occurrent and dispositional mental states might help to locate the direction of Hume's thinking. An occurrent mental state is conscious or felt. A dispositional mental state is one in virtue of which there is a tendency to display characteristic manifestations in relevant circumstances, manifestations that are, in part, effects of the dispositional state. These manifestations include external behaviors (verbal as well as nonverbal) and various internal episodes, occurrent states. For example, anger, as a disposition, is a state in virtue of which there is a tendency to display angry verbal and nonverbal behavior but also a tendency to experience the occurrent feeling of anger. Such characteristic feelings are occurrent manifestations of the underlying disposition and are, in part, caused by it. Within this framework, "sensible agitation" and "sensible emotion" are occurrent states. A "principle" of action, the "inclination" of the soul, and certain calm desires and "tendencies" are dispositions. A "settled" principle of action is a disposition that is not volatile. A calm emotion is a disposition that is settled. A volatile emotion is likely to change abruptly, so that volatility—and its absence— are themselves dispositional properties. (Volatility is therefore a dispositional property of a disposition.) "Sensible agitation" or "sensible emotion" is one of the characteristic internal, occurrent manifestations of a volatile emotion. Volatile emotions "occasion," "produce," or "cause" these occurrent feelings. This is best

3. It is not definitional if Hume's point is that there are instances of calm emotions that produce little emotion in the mind; particular instances could be violent. This, however, would be an odd point to make about the calm, rather than violent, emotions. In Ardal's account, it is unsurprising that the calm emotions produce little emotional intensity. In context, Hume is writing about kinds of emotions. 4. This is not to say that Hume does not consider intensity in a mental state a disturbance in and of itself. Hume might well place a premium on moderation in mental states and might have been influenced in this by Cicero and ultimately by Hellenistic philosophy. (See Jones, 1982, pp. 29-43, 149-61; and Immerwahr, 1992, p. 298.) But even in Hume's theory of the passions, a context where we might expect intensity to play a special role, there is a case that stability is the more crucial notion.

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interpreted in terms of a causal relationship between a dispositional state and its occurrent manifestations. I am not suggesting that such terms as 'violent' and 'calm' never refer to an occurrent state. Hume does use these terms in this way, in conjunction with the use of the terms to refer to dispositions. Hume often takes it that we are aware of states that those of us interpreting Hume cannot but construe as mental dispositions. To take a prominent example, in the course of the customary transition from causes to effects, "we immediately feel a determination of the mind" (T 165) to associate a present impression with a lively idea of its usual attendant. The mind feels this associative propensity. This feeling is an occurrent manifestation of the dispositional determination. We can think of the felt determination as constituting one's awareness of that disposition. A single term often does double duty: it refers to a dispositional state or property; it also refers to the feeling, or the occurrent manifestation, that the disposition produces. 'Anger' can refer to a feeling or to a disposition. This is as true in Hume as in ordinary English. In the case at hand, Hume sometimes uses 'calm' and 'violent' to refer to dispositional properties (the properties of being settled and volatile, respectively) and sometimes to refer to an occurrent awareness produced by those properties (felt calmness and felt violence, respectively). We shall see a similar pattern of use within Hume's theory of belief (§ III.2).5 My objective is not to provide a full-dress defense of an interpretation of the calm-violent distinction with reference to volatility. Rather, I want to establish a prima facie case for the fruitfulness of interpreting Hume with such notions as 'instability' and 'stability' in view. Hume's distinction between volatile and settled emotions is an example, one that provides some evidence of the importance Hume assigns to stability in contexts where belief is not principally in question. 1.2. The Pyrrhonian Background to Hume's Interest in Stability In assigning pride of place to stability, Hume is working within a philosophical tradition that emphasizes the desirability of ataraxia, a state of quietude, in which one is tranquil or not disturbed. The skeptic, as represented by Sextus Empiricus, "set out to philosophize with the object of passing judgement on the sense-impressions and ascertaining which of them are true and which false, so as to attain quietude thereby" (PH 1,26). Though the skeptic initially sought to achieve belief as a means to quietude, he "found himself involved in contradictions of equal weight, and being unable to decide between them suspended 5. Baier's writings (esp. 1982, pp. 643—47) are suggestive of an interpretation of the calmviolent distinction with reference to volatility. In her 1991, the 1982 material is included (pp. 15-17) but in a context where only the volatility of contradictory beliefs is at issue. In the 1991 discussion of the passions, the theme of volatility largely drops from view; such terms as 'turbulence' and 'tranquillity' (p. 167) seem principally to refer to felt experiences.

1.2. THE P Y R R H O N I A N B A C K G R O U N D

7

judgement" (PH 1,26). The skeptic thus gave up achieving quietude by aiming for true belief: "The Skeptics were in hopes of gaining quietude by means of a decision regarding the disparity of the objects of sense and of thought, and being unable to effect this they suspended judgement; and they found that quietude, as if by chance, followed upon their suspense" (PH 1,29). The skeptic renounces truth as a means to tranquillity, in favor of suspending belief. Here we have a hallmark of Pyrrhonian skepticism, the claim that the suspension of belief is the only route to tranquillity. Isostheneia, an equipollence of opposing arguments, leads to epoche, suspense of judgment (PH 1,8), which in turn leads to ataraxia, "even as a shadow follows its substance" (PH 1,29; cf. 26,31). Hume has two criticisms of Pyrrhonian skepticism. One is well known: there are beliefs—the belief in body, for example—that cannot be suspended, so that the Pyrrhonian prescription is to no avail in the effort to achieve tranquillity.6 It is important that this is a criticism of the Pyrrhonian technique for achieving tranquillity, not a criticism of the Pyrrhonian commitment to tranquillity as an objective. Formulating the second of the two criticisms requires additional background. Such notions as 'ataraxia, 'quietude', and 'tranquillity' admit of more than one meaning. On the one hand, they can refer to a feeling or an occurrent state—either a calm feeling or, at least, the absence of felt disturbance or irritation. For Sextus, 'ataraxia' had this meaning at least, for he took the fact that disturbances such as cold or thirst are unavoidable to imply that ataraxia cannot be fully achieved. For this reason, the objective of skepticism is ataraxia specifically in matters of opinion and, less ambitiously, the moderation of those disturbances that are unavoidable (PH 1,25). Such moderation can be achieved, if we eliminate the opinion that the disturbances are good or bad (PH I, 29-30; and M XI, 147-50).7 In addition to referring to a calm feeling, such notions as 'tranquillity' can also refer to the settled character of the mental disposition that manifests itself in a calm feeling. This is also an element in the Pyrrhonian notion. Thus we have in Sextus: "'Suspense' is a state of mental rest owing to which we neither deny nor affirm anything" (PH 1,10); "the term 'suspension' is derived from the fact of the mind being held up or 'suspended' so that it neither affirms nor denies anything owing to the equipollence of the matters in question" (PH 1,196). The underlying idea is that the presence of equipollent, opposing arguments constitutes an equilibrium, a settled condition, so that, other things being equal, sustained suspension of judgment and the felt tranquillity that derives from it are possible.8 It is because it constitutes a settled condition that isostheneia can lead

6. See Popkin, 1951, pp. 54, 93-96, and 1952, pp. 78-79; Burnyeat, 1980, pp. 118-19; Norton, 1982, pp. 264—69; Penelhum, 1983a, pp. 35,120-31, and 1983b, p. 298; Burnyeat, 1984, p. 249; Fogelin, 1985, p. 92; Penelhum, 1992, pp. 24–25; and Noonan, 1999, pp. 45–46. 7. See Stough,1969,p. 14; Burnyeat, 1980, pp. 126,132-33; Norton, 1982, pp. 263-64; Burnyeat, 1984, pp. 241-42; and Annas and Barnes, 1985, pp. 166-67.1 owe the reference to M XI to Stough. 8. Burnyeat writes: "If tranquillity is to be achieved, at some stage the skeptic's questing thoughts must come to a state of rest or equilibrium" (1980, p. 139; cf. 148 n. 54). Barnes translates

8

I. CONTEXTS FOR E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L P R O J E C T S

to epoche, and in turn to ataraxia. These latter states—suspense of judgment and tranquillity—themselves require a settled condition which, for Sextus, is ultimately the contribution of the equipollence of opposing arguments. Furthermore, Sextus identifies a battery of ways or modes for achieving equipollence (cf. PH 1,31-186); he is sanguine that a settled condition can be achieved. Hume takes a keen interest in the idea that equipollence gives rise to a feeling of tranquillity, and he thinks that the Tyrrhenian has something right and something wrong. Hume in effect isolates two elements in the idea. One element is that a settled condition feels calm or tranquil (and an unsettled condition disturbing or irritating). Hume thinks this is correct. Settled conditions in our doxastic lives, much as settled conditions in our emotional lives, feel calm. The calm feeling (or the absence of felt disturbance, as the case maybe) just is an occurrent manifestation of the settled doxastic disposition, or our conscious awareness of that state. The second element is that equipollence of opposing arguments constitutes a settled condition. It is here, according to Hume, that the Pyrrhonian goes wrong. Hume's account of why this is so constitutes the second of his two criticisms of the Pyrrhonian. We might imagine that opposing arguments of equal strength invariably cancel each other out, counterbalance one another, or lock in an ongoing standoff for influence on belief or assent. Hume maintains, to the contrary, that opposing arguments often struggle with each other in psychological combat, first one prevailing and then the other.9 The metaphors of combat are Hume's (§ V.3). For example, in I.iv.2, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," Hume maintains that in contradictory beliefs we have "combat" (T 205) and "struggle" (T 215) between "enemies" (T 215) who seek to "destroy" (T 215) the "opposition" (T 206,215) by which they are "attack'd" (T 215). Though we try "sacrificing the one to the other" (T 206), the opposing beliefs can prove equally strong, so that neither "will... quit the field" (T 215). It is helpful to think in terms of Hume's analogy to physical combat. Equally matched combatants are not typically locked in a literal steady state. There is an ebb and flow where one combatant, then the other, temporarily gains the upper hand. Owing to the fundamental equality of the opponents, there is indeed a kind of tie or deadlock, in that neither party can prevail for long; this deadlock, however, manifests itself in an alternating cycle. Applying this model to opposing beliefs, as Hume often does, we do not have the Pyrrhonian picture of a settled condition in doxastic states. We have a picture of one of the opposing beliefs ascending, and then the other. Thus, in I.iv. 1, skeptical reasonings, in the face of "her enemy [reason]" (T 186) are "successively both strong and weak" (T 186). Similarly, in I.iv.7, in response to an opposition beepoche as "standstill" and writes that epoche; "supervenes" where "two sets of arguments exactly balance one another" (1982, p. 1). Patrick, 1899, p. 27; and Naess, 1968, p. 5, take note that stability or equilibrium is involved in epoche and ataraxia, respectively. 9. Baier has nicely called attention to Hume's conception of opposition in belief as dynamic, manifested in alternation over time. See Baier, 1982, pp. 644–47, and 1991, pp. 15-17. But see § IV.5, n. 35.

1.2. THE PYRRHONIAN BACKGROUND

9

tween two "directly contrary" operations of the mind—"a manifest contradiction"—we "successively assent to both" (T 266).10 Hume is explicit that, in a number of instances, opposing beliefs and the considerations that support them result in oscillation in belief, cycles of alternating assent. The language of combat and struggle is not simply picturesque; Hume intends it to describe real psychological processes. The second element of the Pyrrhonian position, the idea that we can achieve a settled condition in the presence of opposing arguments of equal strength, is mistaken. The presence of such arguments can lead to combat, struggle, and alternating cycles of assent, which the Pyrrhonian would regard as a dramatically unsettled doxastic condition. Coupled with the claim that an unsettled condition is disturbing or irritating, equipollence would be an unpleasant state. Though correct that a genuinely settled mental condition feels tranquil, the Pyrrhonian has a hopeless account of how a settled condition can be achieved. This is a deeper objection to the Pyrrhonian than Hume's first criticism, the familiar Humean point that there are beliefs that cannot be suspended. 11 Even if belief could be suspended, tranquillity could not be achieved through equipollence. The skeptic, finding contradictions of equal weight, gave up aiming for truth and sought instead to suspend belief by achieving equipollence. In Hume's view, this gains nothing for the skeptic in respect to tranquillity. As with Hume's first criticism, however, there is no challenge to tranquillity as an objective. This is an objective Hume shares. As Hume sees it, the Pyrrhonian leaves us with the problem of explaining how a settled doxastic condition might be achieved, given that tranquillity does not result from an equipollence of opposing arguments where belief is suspended. Hume's conclusion is that if tranquillity is to be secured, it will have to be within a system of beliefs. One project in Book I of the Treatise is to determine whether settled belief can be achieved. Hume takes this to be a genuine issue, for he thinks that instability is a pervasive feature of our mental life. On the face of it, many stretches of the Treatise— pages 109–10, 147–50, 186–87, 198–216, 219–24, 253–55, 265–68, 439–48, 581–84, 602–3—are given over to the description of doxastic and affective instabilities. Hume is concerned with tranquillity in his theory of belief (T 119, 626) and in his theory of the passions (T 417,423,437,442). Doxastic instability is itself a serious threat to the achievement of ataraxia. It is these Pyrrhonian themes and concerns, and Hume's reaction to them, that stand in the background of Hume's theory of justification.12

10. Superficially, there is another example in I.iv.2, where Hume writes in connection with an opposition of our "successively granting to each [enemy] whatever it demands" (T215). In this instance, however, the assent is not strictly successive; rather, we frame a single hypothesis—that of the double existence of perceptions and objects—in an effort to resolve the contradiction (§ V.3). 11. Cf.Woolhouse, 1988, pp. 146–47; Hookway, 1990,p. 100; and Noonan, 1999,p. 21. 12. But for issues about Hume's understanding of Pyrrhonism, see Popkin, 1951, and 1952, pp. 74-75; and Norton, 1982, pp. 255–69.

10

I. CONTEXTS FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROJECTS

1.3. The Motivational Role of Uneasiness Whereas the Pyrrhonian tends to focus on our seeking to achieve the tranquillity or quietude associated with settled conditions in our doxastic lives, Hume's focus is on our seeking to relieve the disturbance or irritation associated with unsettled states. Instability—whether in the passions, the possession of property, or moral judgment—is unpleasant. This is true of our doxastic lives, as elsewhere. The justificatory status of belief depends upon considerations of stability, much as the calm emotions are to be preferred because they are more settled. Unstable doxastic conditions feel uneasy. In I.iv.2, Hume is explicit that contradictory beliefs give rise to uneasiness: "Any contradiction either to the sentiments or passions gives a sensible uneasiness, whether it proceeds from without or from within; from the opposition of external objects, or from the combat of internal principles" (T 205). Similarly, "uneasiness arises from the opposition of two contrary principles" (T 206). This uneasiness is a form of pain, so that "the mind . . . will naturally seek relief from the uneasiness" or "look for relief" (T 206); we make an effort "to set ourselves at ease" (T 215; cf. 224) or "to set ourselves at ease as much as possible" (T 215). Hume takes quite seriously the motivational aspects of the uneasiness, the psychological discomfort, to which contradictions give rise. He documents the different ways in which we seek relief from uneasiness or try to put ourselves at ease. In some instances, the original contradiction can be resolved (though the resolution sometimes leads to a new contradiction). In many cases, the contradiction cannot be resolved. Hume writes: "Since the uneasiness arises from the opposition of two contrary principles, [the mind] must look for relief by sacrificing the one to the other" (T 206). Frequently, neither belief easily gives way; we run into "reluctance" (T 206) or into a principle that is "obstinate" (T 215). In some such cases, as we have seen (§ 1.2), we fall back on successive assent. In other cases, we wrap the contradiction in "confusion and obscurity" (T 238), in an "unintelligible" (T 220, 224, 254) hypothesis, or in "absurdity" (T 218,238), which serves to "conceal" (T 219) or "disguise" (T 254) the contradiction and thus proves to be "only a palliative remedy" (T 211). In other words, the original contradiction leads to a conflicted resolution. Hume treats a number of metaphysical beliefs on this model: the beliefs in material substrata, the double existence of perceptions and external objects, taste that in its entirety is locally conjoined with an extended object, and immaterial substrata or souls. These beliefs and the propensities that give rise to them—the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects and the propensity to add a new relation to objects united by any relation—are to be condemned. The beliefs I have enumerated are discussed in I.iv.2-3 and I.iv.5-6. The manifest contradiction in play in I.iv.7 (§1.2) is first introduced in I.iv.4. Contradictions that cannot be resolved, and hence uneasiness that cannot be fully relieved, is perhaps the principal thread of Part iv. (I provide detailed case studies in §§ III.4 and V. 1-4.) In sum, uneasiness associated with contradiction motivates efforts to modify one's beliefs. The psychological claims that play a role in Hume's theory of justification have affinities with Leon Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance. According

1.3. THE M O T I V A T I O N A L ROLE OF U N E A S I N E S S

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to Festinger, some "cognitions" are "dissonant" and "psychologically uncomfortable." This discomfort motivates efforts to reduce, if not resolve, the dissonance; there is "pressure" to reduce the dissonance and promote consonance. Festinger characterizes the central notions of his theory in terms that resonate with Pyrrhonian concepts: dissonance can be identified with "disequilibrium"; consonance is a matter of a "balanced" state or "internal harmony." For Festinger, "cognitions" include a wide range of psychological states: beliefs, attitudes, and values. A number of his examples involve dissonance and efforts to reduce dissonance, specifically among contradictory beliefs.13 Festinger allows that dissonance, even among beliefs, is not always a matter of logical inconsistency. Granted, his initial characterizations of consonance and dissonance are couched in terms of "consistency" and "inconsistencies." He is quick, however, to cancel the suggestion that dissonance is a logical matter: "I will replace the word 'inconsistency' with a term that has less of a logical connotation, namely, dissonance." He moves on to a "more formal definition": "x and y are dissonant if not-x: follows from y." Festinger has not lapsed into the position that only logically related beliefs admit of dissonance; he writes that two cognitions are dissonant "if, for one reason or another, they do not fit together," an open-ended formulation. Similarly, he writes: "Vagueness in the conceptual definition of dissonance... lies in the words 'follows from'.... One element may follow from another because of logic, because of cultural mores, because of things one has experienced and learned, and perhaps in other senses too." The conditions under which dissonance is present are to be clarified empirically.14 I believe we can extract from Hume a general account of the conditions under which dissonance—uncomfortable and inharmonious, uneasy and unsettled conditions—is a feature of our doxastic states. The instability and uneasiness in contradictory beliefs is a limited theoretical resource. There are contexts in which Hume needs to claim that we are motivated to modify beliefs that are not parties to literal contradictions. An obvious example occurs within Hume's account of the origin of moral judgment in III.iii. Moral judgments report or express pleasure or pain that arises from the operation of sympathy (T 575-80). Hume raises an objection: "But as this sympathy is very variable, it may be thought, that our sentiments of morals must admit of all the same variations— But notwithstanding this variation of our sympathy, we give the same approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in England" (T 580-81). Why do we give the same approval? Hume's answer is that "in order... to prevent those continual contradictions,... we fix on some steady and general points of view" (T 581–82; cf. 602). But why regard the variations in judgments due to sympathy as contradictions? We can suppose instead that the judgments express 13. The quotations at sentences two through five may be found at Festinger, 1957, pp. 1-3; 9 (cf. 3,18,31,263); 3,7-8,260; and 1, 3, 7,9,11,260. For dissonance among beliefs, see pp. 4-5,14, 22-23. 14. The quotations at sentences two through six may be found at Festinger, 1957, pp. 1-2,2,3 and 13,12,278-79. On clarifying the concept of dissonance, see p. 279. For the state of dissonance theory today, see Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999.

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or report that one has a particular sentiment or feeling from one's perspective at the moment. Construed in this way, as merely expressing or reporting how estimable a quality appears from one's point of view at the time, the variations in judgment do not constitute contradictions. Hume is not in a position to construe the judgments otherwise; that we form judgments impervious to the variations in sympathy is what he is trying to explain (§ IV.4). A similar problem arises in I.iii. 13 in connection with Hume's treatment of variations, due to features of memory and causal inference, in degree of confidence in a belief (§§ IV.3-4). For example, much as "we sympathize more with persons contiguous to us, than with persons remote from us" (T 581), "the argument, which we found on any matter of fact we remember, is more or less convincing, according as the fact is recent or remote" (T 143). Much as the fluctuations in judgments based on sympathy may be construed as reflecting merely apparent moral worth, the variations in judgments based on memory and causal inference may be construed as reflecting how probable an event appears from one's point of view at the time. Hume needs to explain why we are motivated to modify our degrees of confidence based on memory or causal inference, as well as our judgments of approbation based on sympathy, without appealing to the presence of formal contradictions. In § IV.5,1 sketch a Humean response, one that treats the discomfort in contradictory beliefs as a special case of a dissonant—uneasy and unsettled—doxastic condition. The attempt to generalize a theory of dissonance or doxastic discomfort beyond cases of contradictions is perhaps the most ambitious aspect of Hume's project of linking justification to uneasiness and instability.

1.4. The Two-Stage Development of Hume's Theory What are the prospects for relieving uneasiness and achieving stable doxastic states? On this question, Hume presents an enticing series of results, which generates high expectations but ultimately leads us down a path to a despairing conclusion. Hume pursues a constructive epistemological project: to sustain his pretheoretical intuitions about justification with reference to a stabilitybased theory of justification. The pursuit of the constructive project gives rise to a destructive result, a negative assessment of the prospects for stability in belief, and hence for justified belief, at least for the reflective person. We can therefore think of Hume's development of his theory of justification as proceeding in two stages. Before providing an overview of the evidence for this claim, I need to say something more about the character of Hume's theory of justification. Hume's leading idea is that justification depends upon considerations of stability. There are various directions in which this idea could be developed. One approach is to evaluate the justificatory status of a belief with reference to its own stability.15 15. I develop Hume's theory in this direction in my 2001b.

1.4. TWO-STAGE D E V E L O P M E N T

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Hume prefers to determine the justificatory status of a belief with reference to generic properties of belief-forming mechanisms. This approach is similar to aspects of Hume's account of moral judgment. In Hume's view, individual actions are evaluated morally with reference to the "tendency" (T 576, 577, 578, 579,584,586) of an agent's underlying moral character or disposition (cf. T 411, 477, 575) to produce pleasure. This has the result that "virtue in rags is still virtue" (T 584). Similarly, beliefs are assessed epistemically with reference to the underlying intellectual character or disposition that produces them. The justificatory status of a belief derives from the justificatory status of the mechanism that produces it. Hume's adherence to this approach is not without exception. In general, however, his assessments of justification depend upon the properties of kinds of belief-forming mechanisms, rather than features of individual beliefs. For simplicity, I often write of a belief being justified, meaning that it results from a mechanism that we are justified in employing in that it tends to produce stability in belief. Within the first stage of the development of his theory, Hume endorses a number of belief-forming mechanisms. These include perception, memory, intuition, and demonstration. Hume also endorses a variety of belief-forming mechanisms that are inferential though nondemonstrative. These include causal inference, inferences about objects that are causally connected; statistical or probabilistic forms of such inferences (the probability of causes); and related forms of probability, such as the probability of chances and probability due to analogy. Intuition, demonstration, causal inference, and approved forms of probability not strictly subsumed under causal inference constitute "reason" or "the understanding" (T 117-18 n. 1, 371 n. 1). It is perception, memory, and the understanding that Hume endorses. Other belief-forming mechanisms are attributed to "the imagination" in a restricted sense of the term. Taken in this narrow sense, the imagination comprises doxastic states fainter than memory and generated by psychological processes not comprised within the understanding. Here are a few specifics drawn from a comprehensive discussion in §§ II. 1-3. As early as I.iii.6, Hume labels causal inference "just" (T 89). In I.iii.9, Hume first draws a normative distinction between the understanding and the imagination (T 117-18 n. 1). In I.iii.11-13, Hume admits degrees of evidence and probability within causal inference (T 124,130-31,153-54). In I.iii.13, individual causal inferences are "just" (T 144). In I.iii.15, "Rules by which to judge of cause and effects" (T 173), Hume provides eight rules (T 173-75), adding that "here is all the LOGIC I think proper to employ in my reasoning" (T 175). In I.iv. 2, causal inference is again "just" (T 216). There is strong reason to think that Hume's early endorsement of causal inference is pretheoretical in the sense that it is in place independently of any theory of justification. When Hume first labels causal inference "just" at Treatise 89, he does so without obviously offering an explanation of why causal inference enjoys this status. Since causal inference relies on perception and memory, it also appears that Hume has a pretheoretical commitment to these processes. At Treatise 117, Hume does explicitly offer an explanation of why beliefs based

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on education (inculcation), unlike beliefs based on causal inference, are not justified. The explanation—a halting, one-sentence effort—easily reads like an afterthought, intended less to show why beliefs based on causal inference are justified than to dispatch education. (I discuss Hume's treatment of education in §§ 111.3,4, VII.5.) It cannot explain the firmness with which Hume's commitment to causal inference persists: in the discussions of evidence and probability at I.iii.11-13, of rules by which to judge of causes and effects at I.iii.15, and of the renewed claim that causal inference is justified at I.iv.2. The strength of Hume's commitment to causal inference at these stages of the Treatise is out of all proportion to any explicit rationale he has provided for it. In I.iv.7, the "Conclusion of this book," there is a dramatic reversal in Hume's expressed attitude toward the epistemological distinctions he has drawn. At page 225 of I.iv.4, Hume again asserts that one who engages in causal inference "reasons justly." Yet, in I.iv.7, Hume unravels his earlier constructive results. He writes: "I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another" (T 268-69). This does not mean that Hume is ready to suspend all belief; some beliefs are irresistible (T 31,225). It means that Hume is ready to reject all belief as unjustified, at least for the reflective person, even though some beliefs are irresistible. In Part iii, Hume distinguishes degrees of evidence and probability; in I.iv.7, he "can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another." Throughout Part iii and midway into Part iv, causal inference is justified; in I.iv.7, Hume is "ready to reject all belief and reasoning." At pages 268-69, Hume is prepared to renounce epistemic distinctions that he has himself drawn. Here is a capsule summary of the two epistemological considerations that lead to Hume's reversal in I.iv.7.16 In the first place, drawing on a conclusion reached in the final paragraph of I.iv.4, "Of the modern philosophy," Hume claims that "two operations" of the mind are "equally natural and necessary in the human mind, yet in some circumstances they are directly contrary," so that "we thus knowingly embrace a manifest contradiction" (T 266); this leads to successive assent (§ 1.2). Reasoning "from causes and effects" (T 266)—which Hume persistently endorses—is one party to the conflict. In the second place, drawing on conclusions about causal inference in I.iv.l, "Of scepticism with regard to reason," Hume presents "a very dangerous dilemma, which-ever way we answer it" (T 267); "we have ... no choice left but betwixt a false reason and none at all" (T 268). It is in the next paragraph that Hume announces his readiness to reject all belief and reasoning. How are we to account for Hume's contradictory assessments of the tenability of epistemological distinctions he draws? I propose that Hume attempts to systematize and explain his pretheoretical epistemic commitments and sees 16, Hume introduces other considerations. For example, referring to I.iii.14, he claims to be dissatisfied not to have discovered an "energy," "connexion," or "tie, which connects [cause and effect] together" (T 266). I focus on the considerations that, in my view, must carry the burden of Hume's epistemological conclusion at pages 268-69. For inventories of the points Hume raises, see Johnson, 1995, pp. 312-16; Singer, 1995, pp. 598-605; and Garrett, 1997, ch. 10.


15

himself as locating a theory of justification that meets with considerable success. We can think of this as his preferred theory, in the sense that Hume regards the theory he has in view as holding the most promise of sustaining his pretheoretical commitments. The results of this constructive stage, however, require substantial amendment; Hume comes to conclude that normative distinctions to which he is pretheoretically disposed ultimately cannot be sustained with reference to his favored theory of justification. It is this destructive stage that culminates in I.iv.7. John Passmore is an early commentator who attended to a two-stage development in Hume's theory of justification.17 (See § 1.5.) Although Hume embraces a pessimistic evaluation of the program of sustaining his pretheoretical distinctions, the relevant pretheoretical commitments are his own. The first stage of Hume's development of his theory of justification consists of two parts: the setting out of his pretheoretical epistemic commitments together with an attempt to offer a theoretical rationale for them. There is some evidence of this attempt in the truncated discussion of education at Treatise 117. Section I.iv.4 contains perhaps the most conspicuous evidence of Hume's interest in constructing a theory of justification. Hume again asserts that causal inference is just: "One who concludes somebody to be near him, when he hears an articulate voice in the dark, reasons justly and naturally" (T 225). By contrast, "one, who is tormented... with the apprehension of spectres in the dark" (T 225) has beliefs that are natural but unjust (T 226). In the two paragraphs that open the section, Hume explicitly raises the question of the basis for his own epistemic discriminations. Here he distinguishes between "the principles which are permanent, irresistable, and universal; such as the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effect to causes" and those that are "changeable, weak, and irregular" (T 225). (I discuss Treatise 225-26 in § V.4.) The two paragraphs that advance the rationale are confident in tone. When Hume notes that "the modern philosophy pretends to be entirely free from this defect" (T 226)—of relying on principles of the second kind—the suggestion is that the modern philosophy depends upon belief-forming mechanisms that Hume rejects. This would not be a problem for the modern philosophy unless Hume is standing by his theory of justification. Whence the reversal evident in Hume's readiness in I.iv.7 "to reject all belief and reasoning"? If the apparent confidence of I.iv.4 has given way, it must be because Hume has concluded that his best candidate for a theory of justification cannot sustain his pretheoretical commitments after all. Hume does not, however, abandon his theory of justification, which is the most promising he can devise. Rather, he abandons epistemic discriminations he has drawn, on the ground that they cannot be sustained. The two-stage model of Hume's development of his theory thus provides a framework for thinking about the reversal in his expressed attitude toward epistemological distinctions. I later refine the

17. Passmore, 1952/1968, pp. 54-64,99-101. Others who recognize a two-stage development include Immerwahr, 1977; Broughton, 1983, esp. pp. 5-8, 11-14; Schmitt, 1992, ch. 3; Millican, 1995, p. 134; and Singer, 1995 and 2000.

16


account of the two-stage development in light of a distinction between two versions of a stability-based theory of justification (§§ III.5-6). My occasional qualifications to the claim that Hume concludes that no belief is justified—"at least for the reflective person"—are intended as an alert to the preliminary character of the discussion in the present section. In arriving at his readiness to reject all belief as unjustified in I.iv.7, Hume in large measure builds on two sets of earlier conclusions, advanced in I.iv. 1 (T 180-87) and at pages 226-31 of I.iv.4, immediately following the constructive distinction between two kinds of principles or belief-forming mechanisms. In these discussions, Hume lays the groundwork for the destructive conclusion in I.iv.7. The two stages or moments of Hume's development of his theory of justification overlap in his texts. Positions that belong to the first, constructive stage are advanced early in Part iii and remain prominent in I.iv.4 at pages 225-26. Indeed, arguments in I.iv.5 and I.iv.6 rely on the I.iv.4 distinction between two kinds of belief-forming mechanisms. (See §§ V.I—4.) Positions that belong to the second, destructive stage are advanced in I.iv.l, I.iv.4, and I.iv.7. In I.iv. 1 and I.iv.4, Hume develops the resources for the destructive conclusion in I.iv.7, withholding the conclusion itself. Hume must want his reversal to make an abrupt appearance.18 We could imagine that Hume seeks to stun or startle the reader, given that he has dispassionately secured the pessimistic result. But why would Hume seek to take the reader by surprise unless he takes delight in the result itself? Hume's giving a minimum of advance notice simply adds to his relish in securing a destructive conclusion. The supporting arguments in I.iv. 1 and I.iv.4 are among the weakest in the Treatise (§§ VII.2-3). This is evidence that Hume is predisposed to secure a destructive result. There is a part of Hume that has a pretheoretical commitment to epistemic distinctions, but another, somewhat perverse, part of Hume wants to undo what he constructs, at least in its application to the reflective person.19 This psychological hypothesis is ancillary to the two-stage model. To this point, I have invoked the two-stage model of Hume's development of his theory of justification to explain his contradictory assessments of epistemic distinctions. The model also serves to explain the ambivalence evident in

18. Whereas through Part XI of the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, Philo seems intent on demolishing the argument from design, in Part XII he upholds "philosophical assent" to the proposition that "the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence" (DNR 227). Though "Philo's reversal" has a similar quality to that in I.iv.7,1 believe the motives quite different. In Part XII of the Dialogues, we have the prudent Hume, seeking to obscure shocking views; in I.iv.7, we have the impudent Hume, seeking to advance views that startle. For some discussion and references to the debate about Philo's reversal, see Gaskin, 1993, pp. 319-22,341–12 n. 8. 19. I disagree with Singer, who thinks Hume arrives at the destructive results "most likely without either premeditation or glee" (2000, p. 226; cf. 228, 236). We agree that the "epistemological pessimism engulfs Hume suddenly, and fits badly with much of Book I" and that Hume displays "a type of two-mindedness, a split epistemic personality" (Singer, 1995, pp. 597,609). Prichard writes that in the Treatise the "extreme ingenuity... is only exceeded by the perversity" (1950, p. 174), and Walsh that "one of Hume's pleasures is to tease the respectable" (1972, p. 116).


17

some of Hume's epistemological remarks taken on their own. Hume often endorses belief-forming mechanisms (such as causal inference) or commits himself to epistemic discriminations (between the understanding and the imagination, or among degrees of evidence and probability). But Hume often attributes epistemic judgments to "philosophy" and "philosophers": beliefs based on education are not "recogniz'd by philosophers" (T 117) and are "disclaim'd by philosophy, as a fallacious ground of assent" (T118); whereas some "kinds of probability are receiv'd by philosophers, and allow'd to be reasonable foundations of belief and opinion" (T 143), others are "unphilosophical" (T 143, 146, 150), "disclaimed by philosophers" (T 143). In Part iv, the permanent, irresistible, and universal principles "are received by philosophy," whereas the changeable, weak, and irregular principles are "rejected" (T 225). In claiming that philosophy rejects (or receives) various belief-forming mechanisms, Hume does not name the philosophers he has in mind. They are presumably the natural philosophers.20 Since Hume seeks to "introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects" (T xi), we must suppose that he is himself inclined to accept these distinctions. The texts support this supposition. Philosophers reject education but not "reasonings from causes and effects" (T 117), inferences that Hume himself endorses in claiming that causal inference is just, in providing rules by which to judge of causes and effects, and so forth. The kinds of probability that philosophy receives are the ones Hume enumerates at Treatise 142, where he provides an inventory that is of a piece with his discussions of degrees of evidence and probability at pages 124, 130-31, and 153-54. Similarly, the kinds of beliefforming mechanisms philosophers receive at Treatise 225 include "the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effects to causes," inferences Hume frequently endorses. And though Hume contrasts principles that philosophy receives and rejects, he does so in a paragraph whose announced purpose is "to justify myself" in the face of the objection that "I am unjust in blaming the antient philosophers for makeing use of [the imagination]" (T 225). In attributing various epistemic distinctions to "philosophy" and "philosophers," Hume distances himself from his own commitments, holding them at arm's length. This device reflects ambivalence toward these distinctions. The two-stage model of Hume's development of his theory explains this ambivalence, much as it explains Hume's about-face in I.iv.7. On the one hand, Hume thinks he achieves some provisional success in explaining his pretheoretical commitments. On the other hand, he knows he will reject these distinctions when he reaches the conclusion that no belief is justified, at least for the reflective person. With this result in the offing, Hume sometimes distances

20. Stove maintains that at Treatise 143 Hume is merely making claims about how "it is usual to regard" the kinds of judgments in question (1973, p. 123). (This is a contribution to a larger agenda. See § II. 1, n. 18.) Here I begin an extended line of argument against this. I owe the reading with reference to the natural philosophers to Jan Ludwig. For an alternative approach, see W. E. Morris, 2000a and 2000b. For some criticism, see Owen, 2000, pp. 331-33.

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himself from epistemological distinctions to which he himself inclines. He does so even in sections of the Treatise where the constructive stage of his development of a theory of justification predominates, even in some of the very passages where he can be seen to be endorsing specific belief-forming mechanisms. Though the destructive phase does not take center stage until I.iv.7, Hume has both stages in view when he registers ambivalence in regard to epistemological distinctions. The destructive results at times infect the tone of the constructive stage of Book I.21 Hume's posture toward epistemic discriminations in particular passages depends upon a number of factors. These include the state of the accumulated evidence that the distinctions can be sustained. They also include Hume's mood and his fondness for indulging in dramatic effects. The first two paragraphs of I.iv.4 constitute Hume's most explicit attempt to sustain his pretheoretical commitments; five pages later in the same section, he has in place the materials from which he constructs his pessimistic conclusion in I.iv.7 (§ VII.2). Similarly, in a I.iii. 13 passage within the heart of the constructive stage, Hume announces that "the skeptics may here have the pleasure of observing a new and signal contradiction in our reason" (T 150). This is an early intimation, but not a statement, of the destructive results to come (§ IV.2). It is "the skeptics"—not Hume—who may here have this pleasure. Hume allows himself such pleasure only later, in producing the manifest contradiction in I.iv.7. An interpretation will not fare well if it does not give sufficient recognition to either of the two stages of Hume's development of his theory. In his eagerness to demolish skeptical interpretations of Hume, Norman Kemp Smith's 566page book ignores the "very dangerous dilemma" at pages 267-68. Similarly, he works to downplay the "manifest contradiction" at pages 265-66 (§ 1.5).22 It is difficult entirely to overlook the destructive passages in I.iv.7. The error that has perhaps proven easier to commit is to underestimate, even to disregard, the constructive stage. Suppose one sees Hume as a more or less thoroughgoing skeptic, a skeptic, for example, about induction, the external world, and more generally the existence of anything external to the mind's perceptions. From this perspective, the destructive developments that culminate in I.iv.7 look like a kind of piling on of further skeptical difficulties and conundrums, thus seeming to confirm reading Parts iii and iv as an extended series of skeptical arguments. This is the sort of interpretation Kemp Smith attacked.

21. Whereas I maintain that Hume's ambivalence is manifested in his holding at arm's length epistemological distinctions to which he himself inclines, Passmore thinks it manifested in vacillation in Hume's early statements of his theory of belief (1952/1968, pp. 29, 60,63-64). I say something about the difference here in § III. 1. 22. The closest Kemp Smith comes to taking note of Hume's statement of the dilemma is in his discussion of a passage a page later: "I dine, I play a game of back-gammon" at Treatise 269 (1941, p. 544). Stroud, a commentator in the Kemp Smith tradition (§ 1.5), ignores both the contradiction and the dilemma at Treatise 265-66 and 267-68, respectively, in his 1977 book. The closest he comes to considering them is in a brief note on I.iv.l (p. 268 n. 14).


19

There is a difference between recognizing that Hume develops his favored theory of justification in constructive and destructive stages and merely recognizing that there is some discrepancy in tone or substance between Part iii and much of Part iv of Book I. For example, Don Garrett maintains that the bulk of Book I is primarily given over to questions in cognitive psychology about the causes of belief, rather than to questions in normative epistemology about the justification of belief. In Garrett's account, Hume's endorsements of epistemic distinctions are not what they appear to be; they are descriptive conclusions in cognitive psychology. He thus gives short shrift to Hume's Treatise 225-26 discriminations among belief-forming mechanisms. In Garrett's view, Book I consists of a primarily descriptive stage, which is followed by a normative stage addressing general epistemic principles only well into I.iv.7. This is to be distinguished from the view that Hume develops normative conclusions in two stages, constructive and destructive. Garrett allows that in Part iii Hume deploys a psychological theory to explain the conditions under which we approve beliefs.23 I take Hume to be deploying a normative theory of the conditions under which beliefs are worthy of approval. To consider another example, Annette Baier takes note of the dichotomy in Hume's treatment of causal inference in Parts iii and iv of Book I. She maintains, however, that whereas Hume endorses causal inference in Part iii in light of his own epistemological theory, the destructive results in Part iv are ironic, intended by Hume as a reductio ad absurdum of an alternate epistemology. This alternative, according to Baier, is one that relies on "Cartesian," "firstperson," "solitary," "individualist," "solipsistic," "sceptical," "intellectualist," "rationalist" reason or procedures. Part iv shows that Cartesian approaches are selfdestructive. The positive results of Part iii are achieved through "cooperative," "interpersonal," "social" procedures, ones that are not withdrawn. Parts iii and iv proceed from the perspective of radically different theories of justification. In this view, Hume is not abandoning his earlier epistemic commitments in Part iv; he is demonstrating that a competing epistemology could not share them.24 For Baier, unlike Garrett, Parts iii and iv both are devoted to normative epistemology. Even so, they are not both devoted to considering the implications of

23. Garrett observes that, for Hume, reflection on our cognitive processes can lead us to disapprove them (1997, pp. 80, 145, 154) or to improve, refine, and strengthen our commitment to them (pp. 157-58 ,203, 205, 206, 231, 241). In these contexts, Garrett is often discussing passages in Part iii. Garrett takes Hume, in a given passage of this sort, simply to be describing "a matter of psychological fact" (p. 80). For Garrett's distinction between descriptive and normative stages, see 1997, pp. 78, 94, 214-15, 227, 228, 229 (for T 225-26), 230-32. For a similar view, see Owen, 1999, pp. 139-41,146, 189,197, 206.1 do not see how these interpretations can account for the evidence of Hume's epistemic commitments, which I have sketched in this section and review more systematically in §§ II. 1,3.1 discuss this matter in § II. 1, n. 15. For a tension in Garrett's position, see Dicker, 1998, pp. 201-2 n. 16. 24. Baier, 1991, pp. 4–8,12,19,21,106-7,184,284-85. For Baier's Cartesian/cooperative contrast, see 1991, pp. 3-4, 16-21, 24, 27, 29-30, 32-33, 39, 46-47, 106-7, 110–11, 120, 122-23, 138, 141–42,278,280,284-85,287-88.1 criticize Baier's account of the relationship between Parts iii and ivinmy 1994.

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Hume's own favored theory of justification. In sum, Garrett and Baier take positions that are only superficially similar to the two-stage model I develop. Any viable interpretation will have to explain Hume's recurring commitments to a variety of epistemic distinctions in Part iii and well into Part iv, his readiness late in the day to withdraw those endorsements, and the transition from one stage to the other.25 The evidence I have produced in this section for the two-stage model does not rely on attributing a stability-based theory of justification to Hume. Indeed, it does not rely on attributing any particular theory of justification to him. The textual evidence that Hume develops his theory of justification in two stages functions as a constraint on interpretations of Hume's epistemology. We need to extract from the Treatise a theory of justification that Hume, on the one hand, intends to sustain his pretheoretical epistemological commitments and, on the other hand, views as failing to do so, at least with regard to the reflective person. There are different parts to this interpretive project. A particular interpretation might have better success in explaining Hume's constructive epistemological remarks than his destructive ones, or vice versa. The overall success of an interpretation will be a function of its success in connected arenas. I maintain that a stability-based interpretation has a high degree of overall success.

1.5. The Place of a Stability-Based Interpretation in the Literature It has been commonplace, in the aftermath of Kemp Smith's work, to write of "naturalistic" interpretations of Hume. In one sense of the term, this might simply mean that Hume seeks to provide deterministic explanations of human behavior, broadly construed, and to do so without appeal to God or supernatural entities. These objectives are important to Hume, but on this point Kemp Smith does not differ from the interpretation, due to Thomas Reid and James Beattie, in which Hume is an archskeptic, which Kemp Smith opposes.26 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine an interpretation of Hume that denies that his philosophy is naturalistic in this sense. In classifying Kemp Smith's interpretation as naturalistic, commentators usually have something more distinctive in mind. Kemp Smith attributed to Hume a doctrine of "natural belief" that is "irresistible" or "inevitable." The natural beliefs have "Nature's sanctions"; they are "beliefs which ought to be accepted" in that "we have no choice but to accept them; they impose themselves upon the mind." The natural beliefs are thus "removed beyond the reach of our

25. Broughton has a nice discussion of the two stages and their "implications for the structure ofBooklofthe Treatise" (1983, esp. pp. 5-8,11-14), though she thinks that in the end Hume "substitutes a canon of eudaimonism" for "a canon of reasonableness" (p. 14). 26. Kemp Smith, 1941, pp. 3-8,80.

1.5. THE I N T E R P R E T A T I O N AND THE L I T E R A T U R E

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sceptical doubts."27 Kemp Smith attributes to Hume not merely a naturalistic theory of mind and behavior but a naturalistic response to skepticism, one that emphasizes psychological notions such as "irresistibility" and "inevitability." This conception of Kemp Smith's position, however, leaves unstated an important element in his interpretation. According to Kemp Smith, it is not every belief, not even every belief that results from custom, that receives nature's sanction and ought to be accepted. Kemp Smith writes: "It is evident that belief can be evoked by, and is at the mercy of, all sorts of influences which have a source quite other than that of causal connexion." According to Kemp Smith, "Hume's real position is not that custom (or habit) as such is king It is experience— and custom only in so far as it conforms to and is the outcome of experience— which is, and ought to be, the ultimate court of appeal"; "experience in this normative sense is the experience which [Hume] has set himself to define and delimit." Similarly, "it is only causal inferences . . . which ought to be relied upon." Though Kemp Smith does not give much play to Hume's attempt to distinguish epistemically between two kinds of custom at Treatise 117, between the understanding and the imagination at 117-18 note 1, and between two kinds of belief-forming mechanisms at 225-26 (§ 1.4), he does conceive of Hume as attempting to draw epistemic discriminations among different beliefs or beliefforming mechanisms with reference to irresistibility and inevitability.28 Within Kemp Smith's interpretation, "irresistibility" and "inevitability" are characterized psychologically; they are not themselves epistemic notions. We can generalize his interpretation: Hume holds that the justificatory status of a belief depends upon nonepistemic facts (facts that can be characterized without utilizing such notions as 'knowledge', 'justification', and 'evidence') about either beliefs or the processes or mechanisms that generate or sustain beliefs. Naturalism, or a naturalistic theory of justification, taken in this sense discriminates among beliefs with respect to their justifiedness, with reference to nonepistemic facts (and more generally non-normative facts) about the beliefs or the mechanisms that produce them. Kemp Smith's interpretation is thus a special case of an important class of interpretations. Considered at this level of generality, I am in agreement with Kemp Smith.29

27. The quotations in the second through fourth sentences may be found at Kemp Smith, 1941, pp. 87, 455, 486 (and 1905, pp. 152, 161–62); 1941, pp. 486, 388 (cf. 46, 68); and 1941, p. 87 (cf. 486). 28. The quotations at the third through fifth sentences may be found at Kemp Smith, 1941, pp. 382 (cf. 383, 387), 382-83 (Kemp Smith's emphasis), and 388 (Kemp Smith's emphases). For Kemp Smith on passages drawing epistemic discriminations, see 1941, pp. 382, 460–61. 29. In his 1977 book, Stroud does not discuss Treatise 117–18 n. 1 and 225-26. This is symptomatic of a failure to take heed of Hume's interest in drawing normative discriminations. For all one can tell reading Stroud (see also § V.6, n. 39), every "fundamental belief" that Hume considers is "inevitable or unavoidable" (1977, p. 247), notwithstanding the Treatise 225 distinction between "the principles which are permanent, irresistable, and universal" and "the principles, which are changeable, weak, and irregular." Stroud advances a neat picture in which the beliefs in causation, body, the self, and goodness are all not rational, false, and irresistible (1977, pp. 10-16,76,115,119, 245-50). In my view of Hume (for which I cannot argue here), the belief in causation on one con-

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I. CONTEXTS FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROJECTS

My interpretation differs from that of Kemp Smith at the level of the specification of the nonepistemic properties that are basic to Hume's theory of justification. I agree with Kemp Smith that these properties are broadly psychological. For Kemp Smith, however, the basic property is irresistibility; in my interpretation, it is stability. This difference is important. In the Kemp Smith interpretation, the burden of Hume's epistemology is entirely negative. John Lenz, P. F. Strawson, and Barry Stroud have adopted versions of Kemp Smith's view. The common thread among Kemp Smith and others elaborating his interpretation can be put as follows: To say that we ought not hold the natural beliefs is at best pointless, since we irresistibly or unavoidably do hold them, and at worst false, if the claim that we ought not hold them implies that we are able not to hold them.30 Insofar as this is Hume's point, he would not have provided any explanation of why we ought to accept such beliefs. The Kemp Smith interpretation has no explanation of the normative force of epistemic judgments to attribute to Hume. In my interpretation, Hume not only delimits the class of beliefs we ought to accept in naturalistic terms, he also provides a positive account of our epistemic obligation to accept them—with reference to the desire to relieve uneasiness (§ 1.3). In Hume's view, one ought to seek doxastic states that are stable. One ought to do so in order to relieve the uneasiness due to an unstable state. The value that Hume places on stable doxastic states thus has a naturalistic foundation. For Hume, epistemic obligation is naturalized as deriving from the motivational force of the felt uneasiness in unstable doxastic conditions. This is, at least, an important tendency in his thinking. This should not be unexpected. Epistemic judgments are a species of normative judgment. Hume has much to say about a second species of normative judgment, moral judgment. Moral obligation derives from motivation; moral obligation requires "some actuating passion or motive" (T 518; cf. 517, 519, 532). Pain and pleasure provide such motives in light of the general desire for pleasure and the aversion to pain. Moral judgments are appropriately corrected (T 582,585,603) reports (T 469) or expressions (T 471) of either a particular kind of felt pleasure or satisfaction or of felt pain or "uneasiness" (T 469,

struction (as regularity) is irresistible but true, and it is false but resistible on another (as necessity distinct from regularity). (Cf. Winkler, 1991, 561-66.) A similar distinction applies to the belief in the self (as a bundle versus as a substratum). For the belief in body, see §§ VI.1-5. (Bayley, 1936, is clear on Hume's wish to distinguish different versions of these beliefs epistemically.) In a recent discussion, Stroud takes note of Treatise 225 (1991, p. 273) in the course of claiming that, for Hume, "our most important beliefs have a 'trivial' or 'accidental' origin in the sense that our having those beliefs bears no relation to their being true or to our having any reason to believe them" (p. 275). Stroud invokes Treatise 225 to show that the operations that produce these beliefs "are not trivial for human nature; they make it what it is" (p. 273). But it is only the "permanent, irresistable, and universal" principles that are such that "upon their removal human nature must immediately perish" (T 225, quoted by Stroud at p. 273). 30. See Lenz, 1958, esp. pp. 170, 182-85; and P. F. Strawson, 1958, pp. 20-21, and 1985, pp. 10, 11. Cf. Stroud, 1977, pp. 14, 76, 115, 247–8. See also Popkin, 1951, pp. 71-73, and 1952, pp. 78-79. For differences between Strawson and Stroud, see Bell and McGinn, 1990, pp. 399-408.


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470–71, 475, 499). Moral judgments or distinctions are, in this sense, rooted or "founded" (T 466,470,491,546; cf. 608) in pleasure and pain. In Hume's view, both epistemic and moral obligation derive from motivation in the form of particular kinds of felt uneasiness and satisfaction. The Kemp Smith interpretation does not leave room for such resources to come into play in the epistemic case. Kemp Smith also cannot account for Hume's epistemic assessments in particular cases. Contrary to the Kemp Smith interpretation, in Hume's view irresistibility or inevitability is neither necessary nor sufficient for justified belief. Irresistibility would not be necessary were there belief-forming mechanisms that tend to produce beliefs that are stable but not irresistible. Hume, as I interpret him, could take such beliefs to be justified, even though the claim that we ought not hold such beliefs is neither pointless nor mistaken.31 One need not look far for plausible examples. In the case of beliefs produced by custom, irresistibility is the result of sufficient conditioning, for example, repeatedly observing that fire is followed by smoke (T 128,147,225). Hume allows, however, that custom can produce expectations about unobserved events based on a single observation or experience (T 104–5,131). This is possible in virtue of a secondorder belief: that like objects placed in like circumstances produce like effects. This higher-order belief, itself the result of conditioning, serves to buttress belief based on a single instance. It would be surprising were beliefs produced in this "oblique and artificial manner" (T 104, Hume's emphases) to share the irresistibility of beliefs that are directly reinforced by custom. Yet, at I.iii.15, in the fourth rule by which to judge causes and effects, Hume clearly takes such beliefs to be justified (T 173-74). More fundamentally, irresistibility is not sufficient for justification. Here there are two kinds of cases. In the first, Hume calls attention to judgments that are irresistible and unavoidable but that he does not consider justified. One example is variation in degree of confidence that "never fails to take place" (T 143), variation that is a species of "unphilosophical probability" (T 143). There is another example in the sometimes "stubborn and inalterable" (T 582) judgments that report or express variations in sentiment due to sympathy. Hume does not consider the judgments in question to be justified or to have normative pride of place even during the constructive stage of the development of his theory. Hume embraces a doctrine of corrections to these judgments, a doctrine Kemp Smith overlooks (§§ IV.4-6).32 There is a second kind of case in which irresistibility is not sufficient for justification. Hume calls attention to contradictory or strictly incompatible beliefs, where both beliefs are irresistible and result from mechanisms whose operations are unavoidable. In such a case, there would be instability that is inescapable, because neither of the conflicting beliefs could be relinquished. Hume, as I interpret him, would not take such beliefs to be justified. Treatise

31. Cf. Johnson, 1995, p. 239. 32. Kemp Smith does introduce a notion of "correction" in his treatment of I.iv.2 (1941, p. 454), outside the contexts I have mentioned.

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265–66 provides an example.33 Recall that in I.iv.7 Hume identifies a "manifest contradiction" (§§ 1.2—4:). He claims that the contradiction arises from "two operations" that are "equally natural and necessary in the human mind" (T 266), with the result that "successively assent [ing] to both [principles] ... is usual among philosophers" (T 266). Here we have an instance of a contradiction giving rise to cycles of alternating assent (§ 1.2). Philosophers would not engage in such alternation if either of the belief-forming mechanisms were avoidable in its operation or produced resistible beliefs. It is after describing this contradiction and its effects, in combination with the dangerous dilemma, that Hume announces his readiness to reject all belief and reasoning as unjustified (§ 1.4). The Kemp Smith interpretation cannot explain how irresistible beliefs can fail to be justified; in the case of any irresistible belief, it is at best pointless to say that we ought not hold it. But there are circumstances where Hume does consider irresistible beliefs unjustified, where they are parties to ineliminable instability, even though they are irresistible. In Hume's theory of justification, unlike the Kemp Smith account of it, irresistibility is not a sufficient condition for justification. The difficulty is acute because one of the mechanisms that produces the contradiction and alternating assent is reasoning "from causes and effects" (T 266), which Kemp Smith himself regards as "experience in [the] normative sense." Kemp Smith is not oblivious to the problem. His response is that the developments at pages 265-66 constitute "a more sceptical conclusion than is strictly demanded by Hume's philosophy." I have noted that Kemp Smith does not sufficiently recognize the destructive stage of Hume's development of his theory of justification, ignoring the dangerous dilemma at Treatise 267-68 (§ 1.4). We are now witnessing Kemp Smith's attempt to downplay the manifest contradiction at pages 265-66. What Hume ought to have said, according to Kemp Smith's pioneering article, is that the relevant belief-forming mechanisms have "limited range." In his subsequent book, Kemp Smith portrays Hume as himself drawing the conclusion that the relevant mechanisms "are reliable and legitimate only within a strictly limited domain" and that there is "an interdict against the universalising of either of them." This misrepresents Hume's position. Kemp Smith's discussion refers to Treatise"265 ff."34 It is at page 266 that Hume maintains that philosophers do no better than successive assent to the contradictory principles. This differs from the suggestion that the belief–forming mechanisms apply within a limited domain. Furthermore, Kemp Smith provides no delineation of the appropriate domains of the respective principles, much less an explanation of how the unavoidable and irresistible belief-forming mechanisms that generate the contradiction might be interdicted and thus confined within their proper boundaries.35 33. For a discussion of the relevance of this material to the Kemp Smith interpretation, see Butler, I960, pp. 80-81,85. 34. Kemp Smith, 1905, pp. 168 (cf. 1941,128), 169; and 1941, pp. 128, 493-94,493 n. 2. 35. The Kemp Smith interpretation has been criticized on a number of counts; to take two prominent examples: by Norton, as insufficiently sensitive to the positive role that Hume assigns to


25

Although Kemp Smith's solution cannot account for the texts, it is worth noting his motivation for adopting it. Through the "interdict against the universalising" of either of the conflicting belief-forming mechanisms, "Nature preserves in health and equilibrium the complex economy of our human constitution." Thus Kemp Smith writes of "the balancing of each [principle] against the other," so that "they operate ... as balancing factors in a complex mechanism."36 The purported limitation in domain is achieved in the interest of a kind of equilibrium. This is reminiscent of Pyrrhonian notions of mental rest and a settled condition. Ironically, Kemp Smith gives us a glimpse of the importance of stability, seven-eighths of the way through his book, in discussing a passage where Hume is appealing to an ineliminable instability in order to arrive at a destructive result. Passmore, more self-consciously than Kemp Smith, considers the possibility of an interpretation that relies on notions related to stability. According to Passmore, Hume seeks to draw an epistemic discrimination between two kinds of "methodological rules" or methodological principles—"general rules," in Hume's phrase. Passmore asks: "What, for Hume, is the difference between a good 'general rule'... and a bad one?" Passmore maintains that Hume's most promising answer is that the good general rules promote thinking that is "orderly," "systematic," "consistent"; they "enable us to co-ordinate our thinking." The "leading characteristic" of inference based on such rules is "regularity."37 Passmore explains the notion of "regularity" with reference to "coherence," observing that some systems of belief are "irregular, lacking 'force and settled order'" (citing Treatise 108). This suggests that beliefs that arise from "irregular" principles are incoherent and unsettled. Passmore presses the position that we prefer coherent and settled belief: "But why should we prefer regularity to irregularity?" He thinks that Hume's "only answer" is that "'the wise' prefer regularity," an answer Passmore locates at Treatise 150 but finds "question-begging." Passmore concludes that Hume's conviction that some rules or beliefs are more rational than others reduces to a "prejudice." Passmore does not pursue an interpretation with reference to regularity, thinking Hume is at a dead end. What is more, Passmore sees Hume as recognizing this fact, exhibiting "discomfort" in the face of the problem of explaining why all beliefs are not "on the same footing," why "some beliefs are much more rational than others."38 According to my two-stage model, Hume retains his theory of justification even in the face of his destructive results reason (1982, pp. 5-6, 14, 17-20, 208-14), and by Fogelin, as giving "a one-sided emphasis to Hume's naturalism at the expense of his skepticism" (1985, p. xii). My earlier objections to Kemp Smith in connection with Hume's treatment of moral judgments are related to ones raised by Norton. See § IV.6, n. 50. 36. Kemp Smith, 1941, pp. 493-94,543. 37. The quotations in the second through sixth sentences may be found at Passmore, 1952/1968, pp. 54 and 63 (cf. 10,52-53), 63,55 and 63,55 (cf. 64), and 101. 38. The quotations in the first three sentences may be found at Passmore, 1952/1968, pp. 60 (cf. 64), 60, and 64 (cf. 101). For the point about Treatise 150, cf. Brand, 1992, pp. 144–45 n. 3; and Owen, 1999, p. 208. For Passmore on Hume's discomfort, see 1952/1968, p. 61; cf. 60,64.

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(§ III.6). Passmore grants a two-stage development; in his view, however, Hume abandons the theory on the ground that he cannot motivate an epistemic preference for regularity or settled belief. Passmore's judgment in this regard is premature.39 In light of passages where Hume claims that instability gives rise to uneasiness, a form of pain (§ 1.3), it seems hasty to dismiss our preference for settled conditions as a mere prejudice. Uneasiness provides a natural motive to relieve instability in doxastic conditions. Interestingly, Passmore does call attention to material in I.iv.2, where contradiction gives rise to sensible uneasiness, but comments: "Associationism comes to be a special example, only, of a much more general principle, the principle that the mind moves in whatever direction will bring it most ease."40 Passmore offers this observation in the course of an argument to show that Hume's associationism breaks down. I think Passmore here runs into an aspect of Hume's psychological theory that plays a central role in his theory of justification. But this is in Passmore's Chapter VI, after he completes his treatment —principally in Chapter III but also in Chapter V—of Hume's constructive effort to draw normative distinctions. MacNabb is the first commentator I know to hold that Hume supports and does not abandon a stability-based theory of justification. MacNabb applies this idea to a number of contexts—Hume's theory of belief, unphilosophical probability, education, and morality—though briefly in each case. MacNabb notes that Hume takes instability to be unpleasant, something we dislike (though, rather oddly, he does not bother to quote any textual evidence on this point).41 Here MacNabb latches on to Hume's answer to the problem that so exercises Passmore a year later in Hume's Intentions, that of justifying a preference for stability. Leading ideas of my interpretation are therefore to be found in MacNabb's study. More generally, I am developing a line of interpretation that MacNabb and Passmore independently considered in 1951 and 1952, respectively. There are related interpretations in more recent literature. Baier takes Hume to identify normative faculties, mental operations, habits, or rules with those that bear self-scrutiny. She extends this interpretation to normativity in the moral sphere.42 Christine Korsgaard takes Hume to identify normative

39. For another attempt to respond to Passmore, see Noxon, 1973, pp. 84-90. 40. Passmore, 1952/1968, pp. 121,122. 41. For the applications, see MacNabb, 1951/1966, pp. 72-79,96-100,191-93. The interpretation surfaces—but only that—in MacNabb's encyclopedia article on Hume (1967, pp. 81,86). For the point that instability is unpleasant, see MacNabb, 1951/1966, pp. 99,192; cf. Laird, 1932, p. 150. MacNabb does write that "we feel a conflict in our minds" (1951/1966, p. 127) in the context of Hume's I.iv.2 discussion of the constancy of perceptions and mentions "uneasiness or contradiction" (p. 126) in connection with their coherence, though uneasiness plays an explicit role only in the case of constancy (see § V.3). 42. Baier writes: "Successful reflexivity is normativity" (1991, pp. 99-100; cf. 55,93, 97,284). For moral judgment, see pp. 196-97, 277, 285. At times, Baier places the emphasis on reflection in general or bearing one's own survey (pp. 15,58,282). Baier attempts to integrate this approach with her emphasis on Hume's commitment to a cooperative or interpersonal (§ 1.4) epistemology by looking to reflection that is suitably socialized. See § III.5, n. 48.


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judgments with those that issue from a mental operation, or faculty, that delivers a positive judgment when it reflects upon itself, where this is a general theory of normativity applying to the faculty of understanding, the moral sense, and the faculty of taste.43 Let us call these reflexive approval interpretations. For Baier, a faculty's self-scrutiny is "the very essence of 'reflection'." For Korsgaard, "normativity as reflexivity" is a version of a "reflective endorsement account" of normativity. Reflexive approval interpretations identify normativity with the capacity to survive reflective scrutiny. Baier, for example, writes that the inferences "we endorse are the ones that can become successfully reflexive" (emphasis added).44 There is a direct connection between reflexive approval and stability-based interpretations. We need only assume that there is instability where a faculty does not bear its own scrutiny, or that if upon reflection a faculty disapproves of itself this judgment will be destabilizing.45 Though reflexive approval is a kind of stability, my interpretation of Hume differs from reflexive approval interpretations in important respects. As I read Hume, beliefs based on memory and causal inference exhibit variations in degree of confidence that are unstable and unjustified under minimal reflection (§ IV.5). What is more, there are beliefs that are unstable—and unjustified—quite apart from the results of reflection. These include judgments of approval and disapproval of character, which are highly variable due to the operation of sympathy (§ IV.5). They also include contradictory beliefs (§ FV.5), for example, arising from the understanding, on the one hand, and imaginative propensities, on the other (§§ V.l-4). It is true that these beliefs would not be stable under reflection, but this is so because they are not stable even absent reflection. Reflexive approval interpretations can correctly sort or classify these cases (as ones of unjustified belief), but they obscure the source of the instability—in features of our psychology that are independent of reflection—and hence obscure Hume's explanation of why these beliefs are unjustified. Korsgaard tends to focus on "reflective dissonance,"46 but Hume often highlights

43. Korsgaard, 1989, introduction and part 1, and 1996, p. 62. 44. For the quotations at the final four sentences, see Baier, 1991, p. 55; Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 60 and 61 (cf. 49-50); and Baier, 1991, p. 99 (cf. Korsgaard, 1989, part 1). Sayre-McCord is also a proponent of a reflexive approval interpretation (1994, esp. pp. 203-4). Garrett can seem to hold this view (1997, pp. 80,145,154,157-58,205,206,231,241). On the other hand, p. 249 n. 2 and his commitment to the "title principle" (pp. 237^10) seem to count against this. Reflexive approval interpretations can be traced to Kemp Smith: "It is only those customs which can survive reflective scrutiny, which ought to be relied upon"(1941,p. 388). 45. Baier somewhat undercuts her recognition of the importance of stability (1991, pp. 5-6, 16,24,58, 72-74,80,97,107-8,120) when she writes that a Humean "reformed philosopher makes no bogey out of contradiction, but expects to change her mind and be corrected" (p. 26), and "there will, in the nature of the enterprise, be contradictions between various parts of the Treatise" giving rise to "delicate dialectical satisfactions" (p. 27). Here it looks as if it is contradiction and instability that are to be prized. 46. Korsgaard, 1996, p. 55.

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dissonance that is unreflective (§ 1.3). In my interpretation, normativity is not tied specifically to instability that is due to reflection but rather to instability due to the operation of belief-forming mechanisms, whether reflective or not. Taking Hume to place a premium on stability, rather than reflection, puts Hume's destructive conclusions in Part iv in a particular light. Calling attention to I.iv. 1 and I.iv.7, Korsgaard observes that in Hume's view, "the harder we press the question whether we ought to believe our beliefs..., the more the degree of our conviction ... will tend to diminish"; "the more we reason about whether reasoning is likely to lead us to the truth, the less confidence in the results of reasoning we will end up having." The understanding thus fails the test of reflexive approval. What assures us that this is the test Hume intends to apply?47 As Korsgaard writes, "The understanding, when it reflects on its own operations, falls into doubt about and so subverts itself" (emphases added). From the perspective of a stability-based interpretation, Hume takes the considerations in I.iv.7 to show that it is full reflection that is to be condemned, on account of its instability. This turns Korsgaard's diagnosis of I.iv.7 on its head. She maintains that "skepticism about the understanding is in order" for Hume because the understanding fails the reflexive approval test.48 I maintain that skepticism about reflection is in order because intense reflection fails the stability test. Whatever the philosophical merits of reflexive approval accounts of normativity, I think them antithetical to what Hume takes to be one of his main results: the calling into question of the normative standing of reflection (§§ 1.4, III.6). The normative role that Hume assigns to stability is an outgrowth of his theory of belief and of his psychological theory. In Hume's view, steadiness is essential to belief (§§ III.2-3), and the natural function of belief is to provide a steady influence on the will (§ III.4). Instability disrupts this natural function and is uneasy, motivating efforts to relieve the discomfort by securing more stable doxastic states (§§ 1.3, IV.5, V. 1-4). These features of Hume's accounts of belief and human psychology are central to his linking justification to stability.49 The stability-based line of interpretation I favor received some play in the early 1970s, twenty years after the work of MacNabb, in work by W. H. Walsh. At about the same time, James Noxon gave a brief statement of the idea in application to religious belief and superstition. A number of more recent commentators anticipated my emphasis on stability in interpreting Hume. John Immer-

47. Stephen Darwall has called to my attention a difficult passage for reflexive approval interpretations. Hume writes to Hutcheson in 1743: "You seem here to embrace Dr. Butler's Opinion... that our moral Sense has an Authority distinct from its Force and Durableness, & that because we always think it ought to prevail. But this is nothing but an Instinct or Principle, which approves of itself upon reflection; and that is common to all of them" (L 1, 47). 48. The quotations may be found at Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 62–63 (cf. 1989, part 1). Somewhat similarly, Singer claims, "The extreme skeptic's reaction has a claim to priority because it involves rigorous unrestricted reflection" (1995, p. 612). 49. Baier has things to say about steadiness and uneasiness in Hume, but they are muted. On steadiness, see 1991, pp. 72-74, 80; on uneasiness, see p. 22, and my 1994 review essay, p. 472.

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wahr discussed the importance of a notion of tranquillity outside Hume's epistemology. Patrick Maher discussed the importance of stability in Hume's theory of probability. Robert Fogelin and Don Garrett took some note of the importance of a notion of stability in Hume's epistemology. For the most part, they offered remarks about stability somewhat in passing and in the context of particular epistemological discussions without marshaling them in the service of a systematic stability-based interpretation of Hume's theory of justification. Barbara Winters brought to bear a number of key passages in proposing a general statement of this approach.50 1.6. A Prospectus In not offering a more comprehensive development of the place of instability in Hume's thinking about justification, commentators are following Hume's lead. Hume does not systematically explain how he thinks justification relates to instability and uneasiness.51 There are two reasons for this. One is that Hume has a much keener interest in elaborating an associationist account of psychological phenomena. The Treatise carries the subtitle "An ATTEMPT to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into MORAL SUBJECTS" (T xi). Hume seeks "to explain the principles of human nature,... in effect proposing] a compleat system of the sciences" (T xvi), to construct a "science of MAN" (T xv; cf. A 645), a "science of human nature" (T xvii-xviii; cf. A 646). He writes at I.i.4 that the imagination must be "guided by some universal principles, which render it, in some measure, uniform with itself in all times and places" (T 10). These principles of connection, union, or association constitute "a kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural" (T 12-13; cf. 289). Associationist mechanisms are implicated in much of the large-scale structure of the Treatise. Book I, especially Part iii, is principally devoted to the association of ideas by the relation of cause and effect; Book II, to association by the double relation of ideas and impressions and to associative connections among the direct passions; and Book III, to sympathy, an associative mechanism that converts a lively idea into an impression. Hume writes at the first page of Book III: "I am not, however, without hopes, that the present system of philosophy will acquire new force as it advances; and that our reasonings concerning morals

50. See Walsh, 1972, pp. 107-8; Noxon, 1973, p. 183; Immerwahr, 1992; Maher, 1981; Fogelin, 1985, pp. 60-62, 75, 83, 92; Garrett, 1997, esp. p. 80; and Winters, 1981. Walsh, however, thinks Hume's science of human nature inconsistent with his drawing normative distinctions among operations of the understanding (1972, pp. 106,108,110). Uneasiness plays no role in Winters's interpretation, which she applies to a restricted range of topics. Owen, though unsympathetic with my stability-based interpretation (1999, pp. 139-40 n. 8), assigns a role to stability in his discussion of the dangerous dilemma in I.iv.7 (1999, pp. 203,205,211,213-14). 51. Burton writes, "The Treatise is among the least systematic of philosophical works" (1846, p. 66) and suggests that "its author appears to have composed it in separate fragments" (p. 93).

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will corroborate whatever has been said concerning the understanding and the passions" (T 455). Hume's point is that Book III will corroborate the associationism in Books I and II.52 Hume writes in the introduction that his account of "the principles of human nature" is "built on a foundation almost entirely new" (T xvi); that foundation is an associationist psychology. Confirming associationism is the dominant aim of Book I (§ II.3). Questions about justification tend to arise incidentally to this project; Hume's views about justification are somewhat recessive as a result. Hume's pessimistic conclusion in I.iv.7 about the possibility of sustaining his pretheoretical epistemic distinctions is another factor that inhibits him from systematically developing his theory. Considerations of stability seem in play in Hume's appeal to the manifest contradiction and the dangerous dilemma (§ 1.4). We "successively assent" to both sides of a contradiction that arises from unavoidable and irresistible principles (§ 1.5). Here we have ineliminable instability. The dilemma points in the direction of a more systemic obstacle to stability in belief: either the faculty of causal inference operates in conjunction with "trivial suggestions of the fancy" (T 267) to secure belief but at the expense of introducing "absurdities" (T 268), conflicting belief and instability, or the faculty of causal inference operates on its own, subverting itself and destroying all belief. This is the "choice ... betwixt a false reason and none at all" (T 268). (I provide interpretations of the contradiction at Treatise 265-66 and the dilemma at pages 267-68 in § III.4.) In sum, two independent considerations suggest that stability in belief cannot be achieved. Hume's response is not to abandon his theory of justification but to conclude that the distinctions between justified and unjustified beliefs cannot be sustained, at least for the reflective person. Hume is more concerned to secure this destructive result than to develop the stability-based theory itself (§ 1.4). If I am correct, Hume's interest in the theory of justification is secondary to his project of confirming an associationist psychology, and fully articulating his approach to justification takes a back seat to Hume's pessimistic conclusion about the possibility of justified belief. Hume did not develop his account of justified belief in a detailed way, so that it constitutes more an epistemological orientation than a systematic theory. (For ease of exposition, I often write of Hume's "theory of justification" when I refer to the way of thinking about justification that emerges from my interpretation of his position.) This helps explain why commentators have not provided more comprehensive treatments of stability and uneasiness in Hume's theory of justification. There are many leads on the face of Hume's text, but even these are easily overlooked absent unambiguous formulations of Hume's general view. Hume gestures in the direction of a general theory in the remarks condemning beliefs based on education at page 117 of I.iii.9 (§ 1.4). He introduces this one-sentence explanation, however, in order to motivate an epistemic dis-

52. For a different reading, see Baier, 1991, pp. vii-viii, 158,173,174,272. For a response, see my 1994.

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tinction between two kinds of conditioning: inculcation and causal inference. The belief-forming mechanisms that Hume rejects, comprised in the imagination in the narrow sense, include ones that have no foundation in custom at all. Hume explicitly addresses the basis for his epistemic discriminations at pages 225-26 of I.iv.4, material that is difficult to interpret taken on its own (§ V.4). Fortunately, a theory of justification is implicit in Part iii of Book I, a theory that provides guidance for the interpretation of Treatise 225-26 and other passages. In my most important single line of argument, I locate a stability-based theory of justification in Part iii of Book 1.1 argue that attributing a stabilitybased theory to Hume provides the best explanation of the interconnections in sections 5–10 between Hume's endorsements of epistemic distinctions, on the one hand, and his account of belief, on the other. I advance this central argument in Chapter III. The overall case for my interpretation depends upon its power to organize a range of passages. I discuss Hume's exploration of constructive applications of his theory to a variety of psychological processes. These include mechanisms whose products fall short of belief, such as poetical enthusiasm and the relations of contiguity and resemblance (§§ III.2, IV.3); and mechanisms that produce belief, such as causal inference (§§ III.1-2), education (§§ III.3, VII.5), and the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects (§§ V. 1-6, VI.2,6). I also discuss varieties of causal inference comprised under "probability," both "philosophical" and "unphilosophical." The former includes the probability of causes (§§ IV.l, VII.4). Unphilosophical probability includes beliefs based on the observation of accidental constant conjunctions (§ IV.2), as well as variations in degree of assurance arising from memory and causal inference (§§ IV.3,5-6). These variations have an analogue in Hume's treatment of moral judgments based on the operation of sympathy (§§ IV.4-6). I maintain that Hume's discussions of all of these topics are significantly controlled by a stability-based picture of justification. Though I try to impose some structure on Hume's thinking, it should be said that his reliance on stability in different sections of the Treatise is to some extent a matter of theme and variation. A summary statement might help to underscore claims made to this point, to introduce additional elements in my interpretation, and to indicate the scope and structure of this book. Within the present introductory chapter, I rely on an intuitive understanding of some central concepts taken in context. In §§ III.2, III.4, and IV. 5,1 explain my understanding of key notions, such as "steadiness," "stability," and "settled belief," which play a role in my interpretation of Hume's theory. The summary indicates in parentheses the sections especially relevant to particular theses: (A) Locke confines sensitive knowledge to objects we presently perceive or that we remember perceiving. Hume's claim that the relation of causation extends assurance beyond memory and present perception is a constructive attempt to remedy this severe limitation in the scope of Locke's third degree of knowledge. In I.iii.6, Hume's objective is to show that inferences about unobserved causes and effects of objects that have been perceived are due to a faculty of association rather than to "reason," which is there

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I. CONTEXTS FOR EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROJECTS construed as a nonassociative faculty. (More generally, he seeks to attribute justified as well as unjustified beliefs to associationist mechanisms.) He is not there advancing a skeptical position, as even Beattie recognized. Throughout Part iii and well into Part iv of Book I, Hume endorses causal inference and distinctions among degrees of probabilistic evidence (Chapter II). (B) These and related commitments—to intuition, demonstration, perception, memory, the probability of chances, and probability due to analogy —are pretheoretical; they are independent of a theoretical account of which features of the specified belief-forming mechanisms confer justification on the beliefs they produce. Hume also has pretheoretical commitments in regard to the justificatory status of a number of particular beliefs. These include the beliefs in material substrata, immaterial substrata or souls, and the "vulgar" belief in "body" (§§ 1.4, II. 1-3, V. 1, VI.4). (C) Hume has a constructive epistemological project: to systematize or explain his pretheoretical distinctions among belief-forming mechanisms and thereby to sustain those distinctions with reference to a general theory of justification. He thus attempts to distinguish two components of the imagination or faculty of association: the understanding, the set of belief-forming mechanisms Hume endorses, and the imagination in the narrow sense. Throughout Part iii and in a number of sections of Part iv, Hume sees himself as having some success in locating a theory of justification, which in conjunction with claims about the properties of relevant belief-forming mechanisms explains his pretheoretical commitments (§§1.4, II. 1,3, Chapters III-V). (D) Hume, however, comes to maintain that his favored theory of justification, combined with some additional properties of belief-forming mechanisms, has the consequence that his pretheoretical commitments cannot be sustained with reference to the theory after all. No belief is justified, at least for the reflective person. These destructive results, advanced in I.iv.7, depend upon arguments in I.iv.l and I.iv.4 (§§ 1.4, III.4-5,VII.2-3).

This first set of theses—A-D—comprises the idea that Hume develops his theory in constructive and destructive stages, with opposite results (§ 1.4). A second set of theses—E-O—comprises main elements of Hume's theory of justification itself. Much of the evidence for these two sets of theses is inextricably intertwined. At the same time, it is worth taking note of the distinction between them. In principle, I might be correct that Hume develops a stabilitybased theory of justification but wrong in thinking that he does so in two stages. Or I might be correct that he develops a theory of justification in two stages but wrong about the character of the theory he develops. Claims about the content of Hume's theory of justification include the following: (E) Hume holds that an explication of justification with reference to stability in belief is the best candidate for a theory that will systematize his pretheoretical commitments in regard to justification (Chapters I-V). A belief is stable if it is steady in its influence on thought, the will, and action

1.6. A PROSPECTUS (§ III.4). The justificatory status of a belief is evaluated derivatively, with reference to the tendency of the belief-forming mechanism that causes it to produce stability in belief (§ 1.4). (F) Contradictions and, more generally, a variety of related unstable doxastic conditions give rise to discomfort or uneasiness, a form of pain. Hume can thus take epistemic obligation, or the normativity of epistemological distinctions, to derive from the motivational force of the aversion to such discomfort. Hume's stability-based theory provides a positive rationale for favoring some belief-forming mechanisms over others—in the interest of the relief of uneasiness associated with the instability that some mechanisms tend to produce (§§ 1.3,5, IV.5, V.4). In subsequent sections prior to § IV.5, however, I develop Hume's normative claims as far as possible without relying on his positions about uneasiness. (G) Interpreting beliefs as lively ideas cannot accommodate Hume's claims that vivacity is insufficient and that steadiness is essential for belief. In Hume, beliefs are infixed by repetition and hence are best identified with steady dispositions to display characteristic occurrent and behavioral manifestations. Lively ideas constitute occurrent beliefs only when they manifest steady dispositions (§§ III.2-3). (H) In I.iii.5-10, Hume's treatment of the nature, causes, and effects of beliefs—his announced topics—includes claims about the justification of belief, which seem out of place. The explanation is that stability has a dual role. Stability, in the form of steadiness, is essential to belief, and justification itself depends upon considerations of stability. A belief, though steady in that it is infixed, might nevertheless be unstable—unsteady in its influence on thought, the will, and action—owing to the presence of other beliefs that undermine its influence. Beliefs are nature's provision for a steady influence on thought, the will, and action. In his theory of justification, Hume has in view circumstances that undermine the natural function of belief. To establish that the states produced by a psychological mechanism are steady in that they are beliefs is to establish that they are justified, other things being equal. This generalizes to claims about degrees of evidence. To establish that the states produced by a psychological mechanism are steady to a given degree is to establish that they are justified to that degree, other things being equal (§§ III.2—4, IV. 1). (I) These claims about justification are ambiguous. In a strong version of the stability-based theory, to say that a belief is justified, all things considered, is to say that it would be stable within the belief system of a fully reflective person. In a weak version, to say that a belief is justified, all things considered, is to say that it is stable within the belief system of the person who holds the belief, given the actual degree to which the person is reflective. These versions entail different understandings of the bearing of the destructive conclusions of I.iv.7 on the constructive stages of the Treatise. I attribute to Hume the weaker version, in which beliefs can be justified though unable to survive reflection (§§ III.5-6, IV.5, V.4). (J) Circumstances that can undermine the natural function of belief include the presence of contradictory beliefs, which compete for influence. In these cases, the beliefs alternate in their effects, thereby reducing each

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I. CONTEXTS FOR E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L PROJECTS other's influence on thought, the will, and action. Circumstances that undermine the natural function of belief also include the presence of second-order beliefs that call into question the truth of first-order beliefs. In these cases, one is less inclined to maintain the first-order belief, thereby reducing its influence (§§ III.4, IV.2-3,5). (K) In his discussion of the fourth kind of unphilosophical probability, Hume attends to cases where we observe that As are followed by Es, where As are "superfluous" or "accidental" circumstances. Such observations can lead to contradictory beliefs. Suppose we also observe that Ds are followed by not-Es, where this is a nonaccidental generalization and Ds are genuine causes. Should we observe the presence of both an A and a D, we are led to believe that it will be followed by E and that it will be followed by not-E. Hume's response is that stability can in principle be restored by appeal to higher-order generalizations about the success of classes or kinds of lower-order generalizations. Hume's "general rules" are typically secondorder beliefs that stabilize, or destabilize, sets of first-order beliefs (§ IV.2). (L) At J and K, I consider cases in which Hume's concern with stability might be explained independently of any appeal to uneasiness. There is, however, an additional layer to Hume's theory. Hume holds that contradictions give rise to uneasiness and that they do so because they are parties to oscillation and hence sudden change. This enables Hume to generalize his account of the conditions under which beliefs are uneasy. Beliefs can be unsettled, so that we are less inclined to maintain them, in circumstances in which they are neither parties to strict contradictions nor undermined by second-order beliefs that directly call into question their truth. This is possible because some beliefs are susceptible to variation or fluctuation, owing to changes in the extent to which we are psychologically remote or distant from the object of belief. These changes resemble the sudden changes in contradiction. Fluctuations and variations in belief due to changes in our point of view feel like contradictions in that they are a source of discomfort and uneasiness (§§ 1.3,5, IV.5). (M) The fluctuations in judgments that report or express sentiments arising from sympathy (fluctuations due to changes in one's relationship to the object of evaluation) are a source of discomfort or uneasiness, which we seek to relieve. Similar variations (variations due to changes in the remoteness of an event and related factors) and unease infect degrees of confidence arising from memory and causal inference. Hume thus identifies a psychological pressure that leads us to supplant the variable judgments with stable judgments. The variable judgments, as Hume puts it in the case of memory and causal inference, are "unphilosophical"; the more stable judgments win normative approval. Retrospectively, we can view them as reflecting the actual probability of a proposition or the actual degree to which a quality is virtuous and thus as correcting the variable judgments, which reflect how probable a proposition appears or how virtuous a quality appears—from one's point of view at the time. These latter judgments, however, feel like contradictions when we hold them (§§ IV.3-6).

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(N) In Treatise I.iv, a propensity that relies on resemblance and operates independently of causal inference—a propensity to ascribe identity to related objects—figures in a recurrent pattern of explanation. The propensity leads to a belief; perception, memory, and intuition lead to a contradictory belief. Here, the uneasiness in strict contradiction plays a crucial motivational role. The mind's effort to relieve the attendant uneasiness results in the beliefs in the continued existence of perceptions, the double existence of perceptions and external objects, material substrata, and immaterial substrata or souls. These are typically conflicted resolutions, which do not remove the underlying instability. Since the propensity tends to produce unstable doxastic states, and since its operation can be resisted or suppressed, the resulting beliefs are not justified; the identityascribing propensity is an operation of the imagination in the narrow sense (§§V. 1-4). (O) Hume forges a close link between his account of the epistemic status of such imaginative propensities and his theory of meaning. The conflicted resolutions rely on conceptual confusions to obscure the underlying conflicts; the metaphysical beliefs are defective in meaning, though not devoid of content. This position removes the tension between Hume's tendency to declare the metaphysical beliefs meaningless and his commitment to providing a psychological explanation of how these beliefs arise, which seemingly presupposes that they have content (§ V.5).

Theses A-O summarize the book through § V.5. Section V.6 and Chapters VI and VII take a different turn. Whereas the earlier sections are primarily interpretive, devoted to a reconstruction of Hume's epistemological position, a main aim of the remainder of the book is to assess some of Hume's results. (P) Unfortunately, Hume does not provide a uniform account of the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects in the various contexts in which it operates. In producing the belief in material substrata, the operation of the propensity is weak and avoidable. In producing the vulgar belief in body, the propensity is irresistible and unavoidable. This asymmetry threatens to ruin Hume's explanation—at N—of why it is the propensity, rather than the mechanisms that contradict it (perception, memory, and intuition), that is not just (§ V.6). (Q) Hume subscribes to a bipartite explanation of the vulgar belief in body. The propensity to attribute identity to related objects produces this belief insofar as it arises from the "constancy" of perceptions. Insofar as the belief arises from the "coherence" of perceptions, it is produced by mechanisms allied with causal inference. Furthermore, Hume was satisfied that he had located a psychologically adequate explanation in the case of coherence. Since constancy is a special case of coherence, Hume could have subsumed his treatment of constancy under the psychological mechanisms operative in conjunction with coherence. There is a twofold explanation of why he did not do so. Convinced by considerations of double vision and perceptual relativity that the vulgar belief is false, Hume sought to consign the belief to the imagination in the narrow sense; in this

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I. CONTEXTS FOR E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L P R O J E C T S respect, invoking the identity-ascribing propensity served him well. Hume was also in the grip of the metaphysical thesis that only changes have causes, so that he could not contemplate a role for causal inference in the cases of constancy or unchanging objects (§§ VI. 1-6). (R) These obstacles to a unified account of the belief in body are misguided. We can thus construct an amended version of the Treatise—relinquishing the argument about double vision and perceptual relativity and relaxing the stricture that causation requires change—in which the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects plays no role in the explanation of the vulgar belief in body. These amendments facilitate a more favorable view of the justificatory status of this belief, which can be seen to result from the understanding, rather than from an unjustified imaginative propensity. The amendments also remove the asymmetry—at P—in Hume's account of the psychological properties of the propensity (§§ VI.6, VII. 1). (S) In I.iv.7, Hume overreaches. His claim in I.iv.4 that causal inference is implicated in an ineliminable manifest contradiction draws on a highly artificial version of an argument from perceptual relativity. Hume's statement of a very dangerous dilemma draws on a mistaken argument in I.iv. 1 for the conclusion that all probability, including evidence based on causal inference, reduces "to nothing." Though aspects of Hume's associationist treatment of probability (his identifying vivacity both with degree of confidence and with statistical frequency or likelihood) contribute to the error in I.iv.l, in I.iv.7 Hume's desire to seek a destructive result runs out of control. Hume constructs and leaves standing arguments that would have no place in a more dispassionate investigation (§§ VII.1-3).

Theses P-S relate to deficiencies in Part iv that can be addressed. Hume need embrace neither the pessimistic result in I.iv.2 about the justification of the belief in body nor the highly general conclusion of I.iv.7 that no belief is justified. Theses T-U, by contrast, point in the direction of difficulties that cannot so easily be removed from the Treatise: (T) Hume's theory of justification requires an account of the conditions under which contradictory beliefs continue to oscillate or eventuate in a conflicted resolution, rather than canceling out. Hume's disparate treatments of the probability of causes highlight the problem. We frequently observe different effects to follow the same cause. It would seem that we are thus conditioned to expect each of two different effects in a new case. In the mood that predominates in I.iii, Hume maintains that we extract a single judgment about the likelihood of a given effect, a judgment based upon the proportion of that effect in the observed sample. In the mood that predominates in Il.iii, Hume maintains that we alternate between the conflicting expectations. We can go some way toward reconciling these accounts if we take the uneasiness in the alternation to provide the motive for extracting a single judgment. This is a further application—beyond those at M—of Hume's claim that fluctuation gives uneasiness. Hume should also allow that we can extract a single judgment in cases of inductive inconsistencies, where the observation of two constant conjunctions (both nonaccidental) produces conflicting beliefs (§§ VII.3-4).

1.6. A PROSPECTUS

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(U) The degrees of freedom reflected in the two moods—at T—are nevertheless worrisome and prove symptomatic of related difficulties, which Hume does not confront. According to Hume, contradictory beliefs compete for influence, often leading to a conflicted resolution or persisting instability. In I.iii, however, we extract a single, stable judgment from conflicting empirical evidence in the probability of causes. Why do we not extract from education, which produces maxims that are "frequently contrary to reason, and even to themselves" (T 117), a single judgment about the probability that a belief is true? Similarly, why do we not extract a single judgment from contradictions between demonstration and other belief-forming mechanisms? These questions prove difficult to answer on Hume's own terms (§§ VII.3-6).

Theses T-U point in the direction of lacunae in the psychological claims that engage Hume's stability-based theory of justification. Taking a large-scale view of the book, Chapters I-V document both the constructive and destructive stages of Hume's development of his stabilitybased theory of justification. Chapter II establishes Hume's pretheoretical epistemic commitments. Chapter III extracts a stability-based theory from Treatise I.iii. Chapter IV treats instabilities that arise within perception, memory, and causal inference, belief-forming mechanisms that Hume endorses, as well as instabilities due to the operation of sympathy. Chapter V provides an exposition of instability infecting the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects, an imaginative propensity that Hume condemns. Chapters VI-VII propose ways in which Hume could have achieved a less destructive outcome in a number of sections in Part iv. Chapter VI demonstrates that Hume could have provided a more positive account of the vulgar belief in body. Chapter VII shows that, contrary to Hume's own assessment, his stability-based theory of justification has little to fear from the manifest contradiction and dangerous dilemma. On the other hand, Chapter VII examines some underlying psychological issues that Hume fails to address.

II Causal Inference, Associationism, and the Understanding

II. 1. Hume's Commitment to Causal Inference In Part iii of Book I of the Treatise, as well as in much of Part iv, Hume endorses inferences based on the relation of cause and effect. The evidence of Hume's approval of causal inference at these stages of Book I is overwhelming.' Yet, Treatise I.iii.6 has been considered the locus classicus of the skeptical "problem of induction." There is no doubt that Hume discovered the materials used to formulate the problem of induction familiar to twentieth-century philosophy. Hume did not, however, intend the argument of I.iii.6, as deployed in the Treatise, to have any skeptical weight or force.2 In denying that causal inference is due to "reason," he is not defending a skeptical point but rather denying that causal inference is due to a nonassociative faculty. Hume's objective in I.iii.6 is to show that causal inference is a product of a faculty of association (§ II.2). Whereas Hume endorses causal inference, there are associative transitions that Hume does not endorse. Hume distinguishes between justified and unjustified transitions or inferences within the faculty of association (§ II.3). The evidence

1. A number of discussions note Hume's favorable attitude toward causal inference: Moore, 1909, pp. 149-51, 154-55; Price, 1940b, pp. 28-30; Kemp Smith, 1941, pp. 382-88; Passmore, 1952/1968, pp. 54,60-62,101; Price, 1969, esp. pp. 173-75; Robison, 1973, pp. 90,99; Beauchamp and Mappes, 1975; Connon, 1976, esp. pp. 135-37; Immerwahr, 1977, esp. pp. 58-63; Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 1981, pp. 52-55; Broughton, 1983; Baier, 1991, p. 12, and ch. 3, esp. pp. 56-57, 65-66; Schmitt, 1992, p. 55; Millican, 1995, pp. 124-27; Garrett, 1997, p. 78; Wilson, 1997; and Quinton, 1999, p. 19 (but cf. 18). Broughton was perhaps first to take into account a wide range of evidence. Noonan, 1999, is a recent, systematic account (pp. 116-31). 2. Though I draw on evidence from other works, my conclusions are restricted to the Treatise; Hume's position in the first Enquiry is different and requires separate discussion. For commentators who take care in this regard, see Broughton, 1983, pp. 4,15-16; and Cummins, 1999, pp. 45-46.

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will show that Hume's epistemological project has a constructive bent over large stretches of the Treatise, certainly including the whole of Part iii.3 It is useful to read the early stages of I.iii against the background of Locke's discussion of sensitive knowledge in An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Locke imposes a limitation on this third degree of knowledge: In fine then, when our Senses do actually convey into our Understandings any Idea, we cannot but be satisfied, that there doth something at that time really exist without us, which doth affect our Senses— But this Knowledge extends as far as the present Testimony of our Senses, employ'd about particular Objects, that do then affect them, and no farther. For if I saw such a Collection of simple Ideas, as is wont to be called Man, existing together one minute since, and am now alone, I cannot be certain, that the same Man exists now.... And therefore though it be highly probable, that Millions of Men do now exist, yet whilst I am alone writing this, I have not that Certainty of it, which we strictly call Knowledge. (Essay IV.xi.9, some emphases added and deleted)

Sensitive knowledge extends only to the "present Testimony of our Senses ... and no farther." Two sections later, Locke liberalizes his account to allow sensitive knowledge mediated by memory: As when our Senses are actually employ'd about any Object, we do know that it does exist; so by our Memory we may be assured, that heretofore Things, that affected our Senses, have existed. And thus we have knowledge of the past Existence of several Things, whereof our Senses having informed us, our Memories still retain the Ideas; and of this we are past all doubt, so long as we remember well. But this Knowledge also reaches no farther than our Senses have formerly assured us. (Essay IV.xi. 11, some emphases added and deleted)

If I perceive an object now, I know that it exists now, and if I remember perceiving it at noon yesterday, I know that it existed at noon yesterday. Strictly speaking, however, I do not know that it existed prior to noon yesterday, that it existed in the interval from noon yesterday until now, or that it will exist at any time in the future.4 Locke's limitations on sensitive knowledge remain severe. I suggest that Hume's familiarity with this disappointing result led him to write in the first Enquiry.

3. This needs modest qualification, owing to Hume's claim in I.iii.13 to uncover "a new and signal contradiction in our reason" (T 150). See §§ 1.4 and IV.2. 4. It is possible to interpret Locke as holding that "sensitive knowledge," even at its best, does not strictly qualify as "knowledge." At Essay IV.ii. 14, the third degree of knowledge "passes under the name of Knowledge," so that we "allow" sensitive as well as intuitive and demonstrative knowledge (cf. Quinton, 1973, pp. 131-32; and Loeb, 1981, pp. 55-57). For the view that Locke does hold that sensitive knowledge "deserves the name of Knowledge" (Essay IV.xi. 3), see Ayers, 1991,esp.pp. 93-94, 156-57.1 need not take a position on this question. In saying that, on the account of IV.xi. 11,1 do not know that the object exists at times that I have not perceived it, I mean that our beliefs about the object's existence at times that it has not been perceived do not even qualify as the third degree of knowledge, whatever the ultimate status of "sensitive knowledge."

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II. CAUSAL I N F E R E N C E AND ASSOCIATIONISM It may... be a subject worthy of curiosity, to enquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory. This part of philosophy, it is observable, has been little cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns. (EHU IV, 21)

The problem is to determine how assurance extends beyond the point where Locke says it leaves off, beyond memory of what has been perceived and "the present testimony of our senses," a phrase that also appears at IV.xi.9 of Locke's Essay.5 Hume states his answer in the first sentence of the following section: "All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses" (EHU IV, 22). Hume is proposing a causal theory of assurance of those matters of fact that do not result from memory or present perception alone. Inference based on the relation of cause and effect includes inferring an unobserved cause from an observed effect, an unobserved effect from an observed cause, and a collateral effect from an observed effect of a common cause (EHU IV, 22). I suggest that Locke set the problem that led Hume to formulate the causal theory of assurance of matters of fact that are not based on memory or present perception alone.6 Hume's causal theory offers a potential solution. One can infer an object's existence at times it has not been observed, as the cause (or the effect) of its existence at times that it has been observed. Hume read Essay IV.xi.9-11, saw the disconcerting gaps in Locke's discussion of sensitive knowledge, and proceeded to inquire how they might be repaired.7 Hume's entree into this territory in the Treatise is idiosyncratic. In I.i.5, Hume identifies seven sources of philosophical relations (T 13-15). In I.iii.l, Hume maintains that four of the relations—resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity or number—"depending solely upon

5. This is not to say that Locke saw the restrictions on sensitive knowledge as a problem. He is content to assert that it is "highly probable, that Millions of Men do now exist" (Essay IV.xi.9), though this probability does not constitute sensitive knowledge. It might be objected that Hume also saw existence that goes beyond present perception and memory as a matter of probability rather than knowledge. Yes (at T 118 n. 1) and no (at T 124), where "one wou'd appear ridiculous, who wou'd say, that 'tis only probable the sun will rise to-morrow." See below in this section and § II.3. More important, Hume advances a much more elegant account of how we advance beyond perception and memory than what Locke has on offer in Essay IV. 15. 6. One might think Berkeley's doctrine that to be is to be a collection of ideas in the mind sets Hume's problem. Berkeley's problem, however, is to give an account of what the existence of objects consists in at times they are not perceived. Hume's problem, at this stage of his inquiry, is to see how we come to believe that objects exist at times when they are not perceived, and whether those beliefs are justified. 7. Fraser, 1894, p. 336 n. 2; and Gibson, 1917, pp. 175-76, are unusual in taking note of Locke's limitations on sensitive knowledge. Similarly, the Hume literature does not take note of the relationship between Hume's inquiry into our knowledge of matters of fact and Locke's discussion of sensitive knowledge. Fraser, in the note cited, does draw some connection between Locke's discussion and that of Hume. Owen cites IV.xi.9, but for a different purpose: to introduce Locke's conception of probability (1999, pp. 52-53).

I I . 1 . C O M M I T M E N T TO CAUSAL I N F E R E N C E

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ideas, can be the objects of knowledge and certainty" (T 70). These four relations "are the foundation of science" (T 73). In I.iii.2, Hume examines the remaining three philosophical relations—identity, situations in time and place, and causation—relations that do not depend solely upon ideas (T 73). Hume writes: All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a comparison, and a discovery of those relations, either constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear to each other. This comparison we may make, either when both the objects are present to the senses, or when neither of them is present, or when only one. When both the objects are present to the senses along with the relation, we call this perception rather than reasoning. (T 73)

Hume turns to the case where only one of the objects is present to the senses: We ought not to receive as reasoning any of the observations we may make concerning identity, and the relations of time and place, since in none of them the mind can go beyond what is immediately present to the senses, either to discover the real existence or the relations of objects. 'Tis only causation, which produces such a connexion, as to give us assurance from the existence or action of one object, that 'twas follow'd or preceded by any other existence or action; nor can the other two relations be ever made use of in reasoning, except so far as they either affect or are affected by it. (T 73-74)

The second sentence formulates the causal theory of assurance. In context, however, the claim is more specialized: of the three philosophical relations that do not depend solely upon ideas, only causation gives us assurance of the existence of unobserved objects. Hume thus writes: "Of those three relations, which depend not upon the mere ideas, the only one, that can be trac'd beyond our senses, and informs us of existences and objects, which we do not see or feel, is causation" (T 74). There is an echo of these formulations in the first Enquiry, which drops the enumeration of philosophical relations: "By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses" (EHUIV,22). 8 Though the relationship of Hume's problem to Locke's discussion of sensitive knowledge is especially evident in the first Enquiry, Hume is addressing the same problem in the Treatise. Hume writes: "My memory, indeed, informs me of the existence of many objects; but then this information extends not beyond their past existence, nor do either my senses or memory give any testimony to the continuance of their being" (T 196). Statements of the causal theory in I.iii.4 and I.iii.5 make it clear that, as in the first Enquiry, the relation of causation extends assurance beyond present observation and the memory of past observation: "The mind in its reasonings from causes or effects carries its view beyond those objects, which it sees or remembers" (T 82); "all our arguments concerning causes and effects consist both of an impression of the memory or senses,

8. On this latter point, see Kemp Smith, 1941, p. 355 n. 1.

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II. CAUSAL I N F E R E N C E AND ASSOCIATIONISM

and of the idea of that existence, which produces the object of the impression, or is produc'd by it" (T 84). Hume is explicit that association by the relation of cause and effect constitutes an "inference" (T 78, 82, 83, 86, 88, 89, 92, 94, 97 n. 1, 103, 105). At page 83, Hume allows that inference based on the relation of cause and effect includes chains of inferences from beliefs in causes and effects that have themselves been inferred. In the same passage, he subsumes testimony under causal inference, a point that is reiterated in I.iii.9 (T 113).9 In these passages and elsewhere in the Treatise—in I.iii.6 (T 87,89), I.iii.9 (T 107-8), and as late as I.iv.2 (T 193,212; cf. 198,216, and A 649)—Hume claims that all assurance of matters of fact that is not based upon present observation or upon memory of what has been observed is based on causal inference, inference about objects that are causally related.10 This is the same causal theory of assurance as in the first Enquiry, and it responds to the same problem in Locke. The version in the Treatise, however, is formulated somewhat technically, as a thesis about which of the seven philosophical relations can serve as the foundation of assurance about the unobserved. (This observation will play a role in § III.3.) Hume's initial response to the problem facing Locke is constructive. Hume offers the causal theory of assurance as an account of what does assure us of the existence of objects that we have not perceived. Considering what Hume does not say throws the constructive character of his response into even better relief. Hume does not challenge Locke's claim that the senses and memory do supply knowledge, however fragmentary, of the existence of external objects. Hume does not, for example, challenge Locke's claim that "the present Testimony of our Senses" generates knowledge of the present existence of external objects. Though such an attack would not have been difficult to mount, challenging Locke's confidence in sense perception and memory is not what Hume is about

9. In the first Enquiry, Hume pays some heed to contrary intuitions: "One may deny [testimony] to be founded on the relation of cause and effect." Hume respon Is: "I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony" (EHU X, 88). The issue, however, is not verbal. If arguments based upon the inductive accreditation of sources are not instances of causal inference, we would seem to have a counterexample to the causal theory of assurance. Passmore takes Hume to task here: "The inference from the rule to a particular case— from 'witnesses of the type T are reliable" to 'W is reliable'—is certainly not a causal inference" (1952/1968, p. 34). This objection is too strong for its purposes. No inference from a generalization (e.g., fire burns) to a particular case (this fire will burn) is causal in virtue of its form. What matters is that the fire is a cause of the burning. A person's testimony can be either the effect of the person's observation of the state of affairs to which the person testifies or the testimony and that state of affairs can be collateral effects of a common cause. 10. Hume's causal theory of assurance has much in common with the causal theory of knowledge due to Goldman. Assuming that perception, memory, and inference are causal processes, both theories require that one's belief in an observed event be causally connected (where causal connections include causes and their effects, collateral effects, and chains of such connections) to the event. Goldman, unlike Hume, imposes a requirement that the person who holds the belief correctly reconstruct the main elements of the causal connection (1967, pp. 363, 369). For reasons for taking Hume's theory to be a causal theory of knowledge, see § III. 1.


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in Part iii of Book I.11 Hume's interest in Part iii is in ascertaining what does assure us of the existence of objects that we have not perceived. Hume is explicit, even within I.iii.6, that causal inference is justified: "The only connexion or relation of objects, which can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses, is that of cause and effect; and that because 'tis the only one, on which we can found a just inference from one object to another" (T 89).12 If Hume does intend his argument in I.iii.6 to have skeptical force, we should expect to have seen the last of the claim that causal inference is "just" or justified. This is not what we find. In I.iii. 13, Hume discusses the effect of "a long chain of connected arguments" (T 144). The individual arguments, where the "inference is drawn immediately..., without any intermediate cause or effect" (T 144), maybe "just and conclusive in each part" (T 144). In the course of his I.iv.2 discussion of the philosophical system of the double existence of perceptions and objects, Hume writes: "I have already shewn, that the relation of cause and effect can never afford us any just conclusion from the existence of qualities of our perceptions to the existence of external objects" (T 216). In context, Hume is reviewing some "particulars of this system, wherein we may remark its dependence on the fancy" (T 216); he is offering criticisms specifically of the philosophical system. There would be no room for the point about limitations on inference by the relation of cause and effect unless Hume has in view a contrast with circumstances in which causal inference can afford us just conclusions. In I.iv.4, "Of the modern philosophy," Hume considers an example of "the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effects to causes" (T 225): "One who concludes somebody to be near him, when he hears an articulate voice in the dark, reasons justly and naturally" (T 225). The just reasoning here is causal inference; the presence of an unobserved person is inferred as the cause of the observed voice. The claim that causal inference is justified appears in I.iii.6, recurs at I.iii.14 and I.iv.2, and remains in place at I.iv.4, midway through Part iv.13

11. It might be said that Hume does challenge Locke's position, insofar as he attacks "the philosophical system"—representative or indirect realism. Though this is the case, Hume's attack at that stage presupposes the causal theory of knowledge of matters of fact. Cf. T 193,198,212,216. 12. See Anderson, 1966, pp. 147-48; Walsh, 1972, p. 106; and Wright, 1983, pp. 12-13. Norton and Norton annotate this material: "Hume repeats the claim that only the causal relation provides a satisfactory ('just') foundation for inferences" (2000b, p. 452) from the observed to the unobserved. If this were all that Hume is claiming, we should expect the passage to read:" "Tis the only one, on which we can justly found an inference from one object to another." In any event, my reading coheres with the other occurrences of 'just' (and its cognates) that I cite. 13. For a related inventory of texts, see Schmitt, 1992,pp. 55,243-44 n. 5. See also Beauchamp and Mappes, 1975, p. 127. Owen claims that Hume's application of 'just' and its cognates to reason and inference at T 72 and 89 should be construed to mean that reason and inference "explain the production of a state [belief] we take to be true" (1999, p. 140 n. 38); to "reason justly" is to reason to a belief; a "just inference" is an inference to a belief. At pages 225-26, however, the causal inference to the presence of a human is just, in contrast to the same belief based on torment and apprehension (§ V.4). In Owen's account, there is no room for this contrast. Granted, I am citing a passage from I.iv.4, and Owen maintains, "Hume does not really address anything like our modern concerns with justi-

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At pages 107-8 of I.iii.9, there is an extended restatement of the theory that all assurance in matters of fact is based on perception, memory, and causal inference. Hume describes two systems of beliefs or "realities": Of these impressions or ideas of the memory we form a kind of system, comprehending whatever we remember to have been present...; and every particular of that system, joined to the present impressions, we are pleas'd to call a reality. But the mind stops not here. For rinding, that with this system of perceptions, there is another connected by custom, or if you will, by the relation of cause or effect, it proceeds to the consideration of their ideas. ... It forms them into a new system, which it likewise dignifies with the title of realities. The first of these systems is the object of the memory and senses; the second of the judgment. "Tis this latter principle, which peoples the world, and brings us acquainted with such existences, as by their removal in time and place, lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory. (T 108)

The first system of beliefs or realities is based on the senses and memory alone; these are beliefs based solely on the resources of Locke's sensitive knowledge. The second system supplements the first and is based on custom, or the relation of cause and effect. These are the additional beliefs based on causal inference. Hume writes approvingly of both systems of beliefs and attributes the second system, beliefs based on causal inference, to "the judgment." Hume seems satisfied that he has repaired the gaps in Locke's analysis of sensitive knowledge. Hume's discussion of the two systems of realities is important, and I return to it in §§ II.3 and III.l. Beyond the claims that causal inference is just and due to judgment, there is extensive evidence of Hume's epistemic endorsement of causal inference. In I.iii.13, Hume writes: "We shall afterwards* take notice of some general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects" (T 149). Hume's footnote is to I.iii. 15, titled "Rules by which to judge of cause and effects," where Hume writes that "it may be proper to fix some general rules, by which we may know" (T 173) when objects cause one another. He proceeds to provide eight such rules (T 173-75), said to constitute "all the LOGIC I think proper to employ in my reasoning" (T 175).14 Hume's language—"rules" that "ought to regulate our judgment," that are "proper" for ascertaining causes and effects, and that constitute a "LOGIC"—is hardly what we would expect had he concluded, fewer than ninety pages earlier, that no inference based on the rela-

fication until after section I of Part 4" (p. 140 n. 38). I see no reason to think there is a discontinuity in Hume's use of 'just' with respect to carrying normative import. Owen himself provides an inventory of occurrences of cognates of 'just' that includes passages in I.iii as well as T 225 (p. 176 n. 1). 14. Beauchamp and Mappes, 1975, p. 125; Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 1981, pp. 52-53; and Baier, 1991, p. 56. Wilson places great weight on this section in emphasizing Hume's commitment to the rationality of causal inference. See the references at his index entry "rules by which to judge of causes" (1997, pp. 436-37).


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tion of cause and effect is justified. Hume's approval of causal inference is manifest in his discussions of the two systems of realities in I.iii.9 and of rules by which to judge causes and effects in I.iii. 15. All of this is inexplicable in an interpretation that takes Hume to intend a skeptical result in I.iii.6.15 Also inexplicable, in a skeptical interpretation of I.iii.6, is Hume's commitment to the existence of degrees of probabilistic evidence in Liii.11-13. The epistemological force of the skeptical problem of induction is to show that there can be no justification whatsoever for believing the conclusion of a nondemonstrative argument, and hence that all nondemonstrative arguments have the same evidential force—none at all. In I.iii. 11-13, however, Hume draws a number of epistemic distinctions or discriminations within nondemonstrative inference.16 Some preliminaries will help to explain the import of these sections. "Probability," broadly construed, contrasts with knowledge based on the comparison of ideas (T 124), intuitive and demonstrative knowledge (I.iii. 1). Sections I.iii. 11,12, and 13 treat "Of the probability of chances," "Of the probability of causes," and "Of unphilosophical probability," respectively. In order to see what Hume has in mind by "the probability of causes," we need to consider his contrast between "imperfect" (T 131) and "perfect" (T 134,135) experience. Perfect habits derive from perfect experience, experience that consists in the frequent observation of a constant conjunction. Imperfect experience is experience that is not perfect. There are two cases: first, probability based on a conjunction that is infrequently observed (T 130-31), and second, probability based on "contrary causes," a conjunction that is not constant, observed regularities that are merely statistical (T 131-41). (Sometimes, as at Treatise 142, Hume reserves the term 'imperfect experience' for the first of these two cases.) We arrive at beliefs about unobserved causes and effects on the bases of imperfect experience, of the two kinds described, and perfect experience. What is Hume's epistemic assessment of the various inferences in question?

15. Commentators who think that Hume is not making normative claims in Part iii (§ 1.4) must explain away the contrary evidence. Garrett contends that, if Hume did not draw epistemic distinctions among different sources of belief, "he would provide a counterexample to his own psychological theory" (1997, p. 80), which "arguably... entails ... that we will, on the whole, continue to approve epistemically of our engaging in [such inference], so long as [it] continues to succeed" (pp. 79-80). According to Garrett, "That is because projecting the observed success of observed instances of induction onto unobserved instances—and thereby coming to approve of inductive inferences—would itself be just another instance of the unavoidable cognitive mechanism of induction" (p. 80). It is unclear that Hume thinks that second-order inferences (about induction's observed success) are unavoidable. But suppose they are. The conclusion of such an inference—that reliance on first-order inductive inferences will be successful (lead to a true conclusion) in unobserved cases—has no normative content. Even if it did, the psychological unavoidability of Hume approving causal inference does not imply the unavoidability of persistently committing such approval to paper in writing the Treatise. Appealing to an analogy to Roman augury, Owen takes the normative claims in Part iii to reflect criteria internal to a practice, rather than an endorsement of the practice itself (1999, pp. 137-40, 189, 205-6), a question deferred to Part iv (pp. 139-40). But Hume writes in I.iii. 13: "Here is all the LOGIC I think proper to employ in my reasoning." 16. Hendel, 1925, p. 193; Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 1981, p. 53;and Baier, 1991, pp. 87-88.

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At I.iii.ll, Hume divides probable reasoning, broadly construed, into "proofs" and "probabilities" (T 124). Proofs are "arguments from causation [that] exceed probability, and may be receiv'd as a superior kind of evidence" (T 124). Hume states that the distinction between proofs and probabilities serves not only "to preserve the common signification of words" but also to "mark the several degrees of evidence" (T 124). Hume shares the "common" (T 124) view that some arguments from causation—those that are based on a perfect experience—constitute a superior degree of evidence.17 Hume's examples are that "the sun will rise to-morrow, or that all men must dye" (T 124). He designates these arguments "proofs," in distinction to "probabilities," so that Hume has a broad and a more circumscribed sense of the term. Hume proceeds to examine probability, nondemonstrative arguments that fall short of proofs, at I.iii. 11-12. Section I.iii.ll deals with the probability of chances. Section I.iii. 12 deals with the probability of causes, causal inferences based on imperfect experience, whether infrequent observation or contrary causes (observation of conjunctions that are not constant). In the final paragraph of I.iii. 12, Hume discusses "these two species of probability, which are deriv'd from an imperfect experience and from contrary causes" (T 142), together with a third species of probability, which arises from analogy. In the first paragraph of the next section, I.iii. 13, Hume writes: "ALL these kinds of probability are receiv'd by philosophers, and allow'd to be reasonable foundations of belief and opinion" (T 143). Even causal inference based on infrequent experience or contrary causes is justified; causal inference based on a frequent experience of a constant conjunction must be at least as justified as that based on imperfect experience. What is more, in I.iii. 13, Hume distinguishes between the kinds of probability that philosophers receive as "reasonable" and "unphilosophical probability" (T 143).18 Sections I.iii. 11-13 thus provide further evidence of Hume's willingness to draw epistemic discriminations within causal inference. Hume's endorsement of causal inference is confirmed in the penultimate paragraph of I.iii. 13, at Treatise 153-54. Hume is explaining the notion of probability, or judgment that falls short of demonstrative knowledge. He distinguishes kinds of belief with respect to "degree of evidence." Memory provides the highest degree of evidence. The relation of cause and effect, based on a per-

17. For proofs and probabilities, see Beauchamp and Mappes, 1975, p. 126. For discussion of the distinction in its historical setting, see Ferreira, 1986. Stove takes the passages I am discussing to be entirely nonevaluative (1973, pp. 39—40). The question turns, I think, on the considerable body of evidence of Hume's commitment to causal inference. 18. Broughton, 1983, pp. 4,6-7; and Mura, 1998, p. 304. Stove's relegation of I.iii.11-13 to an appendix (1973, pp. 28 n. 1,118-25) is integrally linked to his enterprise of attributing to Hume a skeptical problem of induction (cf. 34-35). (Cf. Mura, 1998, pp. 303-4.) Stove writes: "Hume's assessment ... of the degree of conclusiveness of the inferences here discussed, is ... a sceptical one. For ... it will hardly be suggested that Hume regarded the inductive inference from mere frequent conjunction, for example, as being more conclusive than that from constant conjunction" (1973, p. 123). This is the right thing for Stove to say, on his assumption that Hume puts forward a skeptical problem in I.iii.6. But what Hume says gives reason to reevaluate that assumption.

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feet experience, constitutes the strongest degree of evidence, apart from that provided by memory. Causal inference based on infrequent experience or contrary causes, together with inference based on analogy or resemblance, fall next in line.19 For all Hume claims in Part iii of Book I, causal inference based on perfect experience, probability based on infrequent experience or contrary causes, and analogy provide justified belief. In sum, far from claiming that there is a skeptical problem of induction that obliterates distinctions between good and bad nondemonstrative arguments, Hume is committed in Part iii to a number of such distinctions.20

II.2. Hume's Intended Conclusion in I.iii.6 As we have seen, Hume introduces the causal theory of assurance of matters of fact as early as I.iii.2. In I.iii.4, "Of the component parts of our reasonings concerning cause and effect," Hume identifies a role for perception and memory, which are further discussed in I.iii.5, "Of the impressions of the senses and memory." In I.iii.6, "Of the inference from the impression to the idea," Hume asks how we make the transition to the idea of the unobserved cause or effect. Hume's interest is in how we advance beyond present perception and memory of what has been perceived. Section I.iii.6 provides his basic answer: assurance about matters of fact that have not been observed is the product of a faculty of association.21 To clear the way for this positive claim, Hume also makes a negative one: causal inference is not due to a presumed nonassociative faculty of "reason."

19. Garrett takes the view that Hume uses 'evidence' "as equivalent to 'belief, 'assurance', 'vivacity'," not "as a term of epistemic evaluation," not "to mean the belief-worthiness or support of a proposition" (1997, p. 228). In light of Hume's repeated recognition that causal inference is "just" or involves reasoning "justly" (T 89,144,216,225), it is unclear why Hume would reserve'evidence', its cognates, and related terminology (such as 'probability' and 'certainty') for degrees of belief. In §§ III. 1-2,4 and IV. 1,1 argue that, for Hume, there is a close connection between belief (evidentness, assurance, etc.) and belief worthiness or justifiedness. Similar points apply to Johnson, 1995,p. 190; and Owen, 1999, pp. 86 n. 4,184-89. 20. Moore, sensitive to the tension here, is somewhat guarded in locating skepticism in I.iii.6 (1909, pp. 154-56,160).Winters, 1981, and Winkler, 1999,pp. 200-209, are commentators who attribute to Hume a skeptical position in I.iii.6 and squarely face the problem of reconciling this with Hume's evident discriminations among inductive inferences. Also cf. Millican, 1995, esp. pp. 127-35,and,forsome recognition of the problem,W. E.Morris, 1988, pp. 73-74. Winters's constructive position is similar to my own. 21. For this sort of interpretation, see Connon, 1976, esp. pp. 129-35; Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 1981, ch. 2, esp. pp. 41-57; Baier, 1991, esp. pp. 54-56, 65-70; Schmitt, 1992, p. 245 n. 11; Garrett, 1997, ch. 4, pp. 76-95; Noonan, 1999, pp. 110-31; and Owen, 1999, esp. pp. 66, 74-76, 139, and ch. 6. I believe I provide supporting evidence that goes beyond these discussions. The growing consensus that Hume does not intend a skeptical conclusion in I.iii.6 has come under attack in Penelhum, 1992, pp. 107-13; and Winkler, 1999. Much of Winkler's evidence that Hume does intend a skeptical result in I.iii.6 (1999, esp. pp. 193-97,200,203-9) derives from the first Enquiry. I discuss other aspects of Winkler's view in notes 24 and 35.

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In Part i of Book I, Hume lays the groundwork for his contrast at I.iii.6 between reason and association. At I.i.3, the imagination is identified with the faculty that forms ideas fainter than perceptions of memory (T 8-9).22 At I.i.4, "Of the connexion or association of ideas," Hume introduces a number of associative principles to explain how perceptions fainter than those of memory are formed. In doing so, he treats the association of ideas by resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect as the principles of the imagination (T 10-13). In Part i, the imagination is explicitly an associative faculty. This sets up the contrast between reason and the imagination that is operative at I.iii.6 and leads to the conclusion that causal inference is due to association.23 Central features of the structure of the argument of I.iii.6 can be summarized against this background. This section of the Treatise consists of sixteen paragraphs. At paragraphs one through three, Hume argues that the inference from an observed cause to an unobserved effect, or from an observed effect to an unobserved cause, requires experience of a constant conjunction. After summarizing this result at the beginning of paragraph four, Hume announces: "The next question is, Whether experience produces the idea by means of the understanding or of the imagination; whether we are determin'd by reason to make the transition, or by a certain association and relation of perceptions" (T 88-89). Hume contrasts reason or the understanding, on the one hand, and the imagination or an association and relation of perceptions, on the other. Hume proceeds to this "next question." Paragraphs four through seven, at pages 88-90, contain the core of Hume's answer. In paragraph four, Hume argues that to produce an idea of an unobserved object, reason would require a general principle about the uniformity of nature (T 89). At paragraph five, Hume argues that demonstrative argument cannot establish such a principle (T 89). At paragraphs six and seven, he argues that probability cannot establish such a principle: "The same principle cannot be both the cause and effect of another" (T 90). The heart of the argument is now complete. At paragraphs eight through eleven, Hume considers—and rejects—a last stand on behalf of the view that such a principle can be established by demonstrative argument (T 90-91).24

22. Prior to I.iii.4, perceptions of memory are ideas (T 8,9,12). At I.iii.4,"ideas of memory... are equivalent to impressions" (T 82). Perceptions of memory are often identified with impressions thereafter (e.g., T 83, 86, 88, 89). These differences in formulation do not matter for my purposes. 23. Owen takes Hume's target to be a Lockean conception in which reason generates probable arguments by the intervention of intermediate ideas (1999, esp. ch. 6). My own sense is that Hume's target is much broader and—as with his attack on necessary connection—more amorphous. For useful discussions, see Connon, 1976, pp. 129-35,137^1; Craig, 1987, esp. pp. 77-90; Millican, 1995, esp. pp. 130-38; and Winkler, 1999, pp. 185-90 (but see n. 21). 24. The suggestion to be rejected is that after experiencing a constant conjunction, we reason that the conjunction derives from a "power of production" and that "power necessarily implies the effect," so that "there is a just foundation for drawing a conclusion from the existence of one object to that of its usual attendant" (T 90). It is noteworthy that Winkler's main evidence internalto I.iii.6 for attributing skepticism to Hume derives from paragraph ten (1999, pp. 191-92), where Hume is considering this objection to his main argument.

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Hume's question is whether the idea of the unobserved object is produced by the understanding or reason, or by the imagination or association. He divides the possibility that reason produces the idea into two cases and rejects both; neither demonstrative nor probable argument produces the idea of an unobserved object. In light of the question he has formulated, we should expect Hume to conclude that the idea is produced by association. So he does, at paragraph twelve, immediately following the last stand in defense of a role for demonstrative argument: Reason can never shew us the connexion of one object with another, tho' aided by experience, and the observation of their constant conjunction in all past instances. When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the idea or belief of another, it is not determin'd by reason, but by certain principles, which associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the imagination. Had ideas no more union in the fancy than objects seem to have to the understanding, we cou'd never draw any inference from causes to effects, nor repose belief in any matter of fact. The inference, therefore, depends solely on the union of ideas. (T 92)

Hume's conclusion is that the idea of an unobserved cause or effect is produced by an association of ideas, by the imagination.25 This conclusion says nothing about the justificatory status of the inference. The first few sentences of paragraph twelve might seem to count against this interpretation: We have already taken notice of certain relations, which make us pass from one object to another, even tho' there be no reason to determine us to that transition; and this we may establish for a general rule, that wherever the mind constantly and uniformly makes a transition without any reason, it is influenc'd by these relations. Now this is exactly the present case. Reason can never shew us. . . . ( T 92)

Causal inferences are made for "no reason" and "without any reason." Does this not license the inference that causal inference is unreasonable?26 To see that it does not, we need to keep our focus on the terminology Hume introduces in paragraph four. He asks whether the idea of an unobserved object is produced 25. A number of commentators recognize that in I.iii.6 Hume seeks to establish that causal inference is due to the imagination or association, while insisting that he has a skeptical aim. Fogelin agrees that any problem of induction in Hume "occurs as a step leading to the conclusion that causal inferences (so called) are the product of the imagination" (1985, p. 56), a "development in the text which is, if anything, more important for following the main lines of Hume's thought" (p. 53). Fogelin insists, however, that I.iii.6 is skeptical in intent (cf. 1985, pp. 6—7, 13, 48, 152-56). (Fogelin, 1993, is more cautious, maintaining at p. 114 n. 4 that the problem of induction "is at least foreshadowed in Treatise 1.3"; also cf. his n. 6.) See also Bennett, 1971, pp. 293-95, 299-304; and Stroud, 1977, pp. 52-53.1 do not see how these interpretations can accommodate the extensive evidence that in Part iii and well into Part iv Hume regards causal inference as justified (§ II. 1). 26. Stove, for example, assumes that it does (1973, p. 34). For criticism of his position, see Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 1981, pp. 67-75. For the position I develop, cf. Baier, 1991, p. 66.

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by reason or by association. As we have seen, paragraph twelve provides the answer: the idea is produced by association rather than reason. Taken in context, Hume's statements that causal inferences are made for "no reason" and "without any reason" mean that they are not due to a faculty of reason that is nonassociative. (I say more about this passage in § II.3.) Indeed, it is in paragraph seven of I.iii.6 that Hume describes causal inference as "just" (T 89). Hume has argued in the preceding paragraph that no demonstrative argument to establish the uniformity of nature is available to reason. Hume's statement that causal inference is "just" occurs in the second of the two paragraphs in which he rejects the possibility that reason establishes the uniformity of nature by a probable argument. These paragraphs complete the heart of his answer to the question of whether causal inference results from reason or from association. If Hume conceives of his argument as having a skeptical outcome, it is difficult to understand why he would characterize causal inference as "just" with the argument well under way, indeed, in the fourth and final paragraph of the heart of the argument. We can hardly regard that as a slip or a courtesy extended in passing to the view under attack. Hume also takes causal inference to be justified at Treatise 144, 216, and 225; more generally, Hume's characterization of causal inference at page 89 coheres with his treatment of this topic throughout Part iii of Book I: the discussion of two systems of realities in I.iii.9, the commitment to degrees of probabilistic evidence in I.iii. 11-13, and the rules by which to judge of causes and effects in I.iii. 15 (§11.1). Furthermore, in I.iv.7, at the second stage of the development of his theory of justification (§ 1.4), Hume takes the constructive results in Part iii to unravel. Hume announces that he is ready to "reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another" (T 268-69). In reaching this conclusion, Hume refers at Treatise 266-67 to a number of earlier sections—"Of the idea of necessary connexion" (I.iii.14), "Of scepticism with regard to reason" (I.iv.l), and "Of the modern philosophy" (I.iv.4)—but not to I.iii.6 (§ I.4).27 This is unaccountable if Hume intended a skeptical conclusion in that section. James Beattie's reaction to Hume's position on causal inference is instructive. In An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, Beattie famously treats Hume as an archskeptic. Beattie accuses Hume of skepticism (Truth 14,15,23, 30) and attacks him on several fronts: Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas (Truth 242-48) and his account of the nature of belief with reference to vivacity (Truth 93-99); Hume's view that the vulgar fail to distinguish perceptions and objects (Truth 249-54) and his account of the external world (Truth 53,133,217,259); Hume's bundle theory of personal identity (Truth 82, 217,255-59); Hume's treatment of miracles (Truth 134–38) and belief in God (Truth 115-20); and Hume's account of virtue and moral distinctions (Truth 407-19). On topics related to the metaphysics of causation, Beattie attacks

27. Broughton, 1983, pp. 4, 11-14. See also Arnold, 1983, pp. 31,32, 50 n.21.

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Hume's argument that it is possible for something to begin to exist without a cause (Truth 100-115) and also Hume's view that there is no power, energy, or efficacy in causation (Truth 254-55,294-308). Beattie takes a markedly different tack in his section devoted to "Probable or Experimental Reasoning." He writes: "In all our reasonings from the cause to the effect, we proceed on a ... presumption of continuance" in "the course of nature" (Truth 121). Beattie agrees with Hume that inferences about unobserved causes and effects do not result from "abstract intuition" (121) or from "any proof or demonstration whatsoever" (121); they are "by no means a logical deduction of a conclusion from premises" (123). Indeed, according to Beattie, "If reasoning be at all employed, it is only in order to give us a clear view of our past experience...When this view is obtained, reason is no longer necessary" (121-22; cf. 125). The inference to the unobserved object results, Beattie says, "immediately, and without the intervention of any argument" (123). The idea that the inference proceeds "immediately" (T 93, 97 n. 1,102,103), "without any new operation of the reason or imagination" (T 102), is basic Humean doctrine. Beattie attributes these inferences to "an irresistible and instinctive impulse" (Truth 123). He exhibits no temptation to see Hume's position on causal inference, or his own version of it, as having skeptical implications. To the contrary, conclusions about unobserved objects have "moral certainty" (121); we believe them "with full assurance, or at least without doubt" (122). Beattie's first two examples of morally certain beliefs in laws of nature—"that all men will die" and "that the sun will rise to-morrow" (122)—are Hume's examples of proofs at Treatise 124. Beattie follows Hume in allowing that there are "degree[s] of probability" (Truth 127), udegree[s] of conviction in reasoning from causes to effects" (121), with the "inferior degrees" (121) based on "experience of the past [that] hath not been uniform nor extensive" (123). These correspond to Hume's "contrary" and "infrequent" experience (§ II. 1). By Beattie's lights, Hume's view that causal inference is not founded on reason poses no skeptical problem; Beattie deems quite adequate an instinctual foundation for causal inference. Beattie's reaction to I.iv.7 is also instructive. Though the considerations in I.iii.6 do not impugn causal inference, whether proofs or probabilities, at pages 268-69 Hume is no longer prepared to distinguish degrees of probabilistic evidence; indeed, he is ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and hence causal inference. Hume does reach a point in Book I, though only in the final section of Part iv, where a generalized pessimism asserts itself. Beattie understood the distinction here. Beattie sees no skeptical problem in I.iii.6, and he derisively quotes Hume's I.iv.7 announcement of his readiness to reject all belief and reasoning and attacks Hume's basis for it (Truth 165–66,218). My interpretation of I.iii.6 provides an answer to an interesting puzzle. We have seen that, in Part iii, Hume does not respond to Locke's account of sensitive knowledge by calling into question beliefs based on the senses or memory. The puzzle arises for those who think that Hume intended I.iii.6 skeptically. If so, how could he have overlooked the analogous skeptical problem about memory? To see the force of this question, it is important to recognize that Hume

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nowhere expresses systematic or global doubts about memory.28 To the contrary, he repeatedly conveys a general confidence in memory beliefs: Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty. (T 9) [The associative relations] are therefore the principles of union or cohesion among our simple ideas, and in the imagination supply the place of that inseparable connexion, by which they are united in our memory. (T 12) 'Tis impossible for us to carry on our inferences in infinitum; and the only thing, that can stop them, is an impression of the memory or senses, beyond which there is no room for doubt or enquiry. (T 83) It be a peculiar property of the memory to preserve the original order and position of its ideas, while the imagination transposes and changes them, as it pleases. (T 85) At the same time, the skeptical problem about memory is obvious. Beliefs based on memory would seem to require a general principle to the effect that memory beliefs are usually preceded by the states of affairs they report. Demonstrative argument cannot establish such a principle.29 Any probable argument to establish such a principle would rely on memory, thus begging the question. How could Hume have overlooked this? My answer is that I.iii.6 was not intended to generate skepticism about causal inference. Hume's objective was to show that causal inference is due to association. Hume saw no need for an analogous argument in the case of memory; he took the picture of memory as an associative process to be uncontroversial. Hume does not develop an associationist account of memory in detail, but it is implicit in his view that decay in the vivacity of a memory belief explains the diminishing degree of assurance or confidence in a memory belief over time (cf. T85,144,154,426). Here Hume could rely on predecessors. Hobbes, writing in Leviathan ninety years earlier, also appeals to the image of memory as "fading" (Lev I.ii.3; cf. EL I.iii.7 and DCr XXV.8). Indeed, Hobbes had denned 'imagination' as "decaying sense" (Lev I.ii.3; cf. DCr XXV.7). He maintained "that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for diverse considerations have diverse names" (Lev I.ii.3; cf. DCr XXV.8). Locke had advanced the view that ideas in memory "fade," are subject to a "constant decay," and "are laid in fading Colours" (Essay II.x.4-5). Degradation in vivacity is a characteristic of associationist transitions, as conceived in Hume's formulaic pronouncements about the nature and causes of belief. In association founded on the relation of causa-

28. At Treatise 265, Hume does raise a concern about memory but as a special case of a general worry about any belief that depends upon enlivening. 29. For a statement of the skeptical argument about memory, to this point, see Russell, 1921, pp. 159–60.

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tion, for example, vivacity is lost in the transition from a perception to the associated idea (T 98,144). Though Hume sometimes characterizes the imagination as the faculty that operates on perceptions fainter than those of memory (T 117-18 n. 1, 371 n. 1), he writes at I.iv.7 that "the memory, senses, and understanding are, therefore, all of them founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of our ideas" (T 265). A central picture for Hume is that all belief is to be explained with reference to vivacity, which is transmitted associationistically.30 Memory lends itself so naturally to the associationist framework that Hume need not argue for an associationist treatment of that faculty; it was sufficient to advance it. It would have seemed pointless to Hume to use an argument analogous to the problem of induction to show that memory, like causal inference, must be associative. II.3. Hume's Reconstruction of Reason within a Faculty of Association Hume's failure to put forward a skeptical problem of memory and Beattie's reaction to the account of causal inference in I.iii.6 provide indirect evidence with respect to Hume's own understanding of this section. In § II. 1,1 have laid out direct evidence that Hume does not intend a skeptical result in I.iii.6. There is additional evidence of Hume's endorsement of causal inference, and of a constructive epistemological project, in terminological shifts that Hume effects in Part iii. After arguing in I.iii.6 that causal inference is due to a faculty of association rather than to "reason," construed as a nonassociative faculty, Hume proceeds to attribute causal inference to "reason" nevertheless. The effect is to maintain the favorable assessment of causal inference while rejecting any nonassociative account of its operation. As we have seen, Hume's identification of the imagination with a faculty of association in Part i prepares his contrast between reason and association in paragraph four of I.iii.6 (§ II.2). In paragraph twelve, causal inference is made for "no reason" and "without any reason" (T 92), in the sense that it is not due to a nonassociative faculty (§ II.2). Subsequent to this passage, Hume proceeds to co-opt the terminology of "the understanding" and "reason."31 Just one page later, in the fifteenth and penultimate paragraph of I.iii.6, Hume is writing of

30. I say "picture" because, as I shall argue in § III.2, we cannot consistently ascribe to Hume the view that belief is a sufficiently vivacious idea. 31. Cf. Laird, 1932, pp. 104–6; Winters, 1979; Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 1981, pp. 41–42; Baier, 1991, pp. 60-61; and Millican, 1995, esp. pp. 130-38. Winters provides an especially forceful statement of the position that Hume operates with different conceptions of reason at different stages of the Treatise. She shows that this shift is required to account for features of Books II and III, as well as Book I (1979, pp. 21-23, 33). My position differs from that of Winters in important respects. Whereas she thinks it is a specifically Cartesian conception of reason that is under attack (cf. 26-29), I think it is any nonassociationist conception. Also, she seems to maintain that, in Hume's view, causal inference based on association is not justified (cf. pp. 30,32).

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"reasonings" (T 93) based on the relation of cause and effect; in the final paragraph of I.iii.6, "we are able to reason upon" (T 94) the relation of causation. These passages are within I.iii.6, after the argument to show that causal inference is a product of association. Similarly, Hume writes in I.iii.7 of "reasonings from causes or effects" (T 94) and "reasonings from causation" (T 95); in a footnote in the same section: "We infer a cause immediately from its effect; and this inference is not only a true species of reasoning, but the strongest of all others" (T 97 n. I). 32 Later in the footnote, Hume writes that causal inference is one of a number of "acts of the understanding" (T 97). In the final paragraph of the text of I.iii.9, "reason" is identified with "abstract reasoning or experience" (T 117). In I.iii. 15, at the fourth of the rules by which to judge of causes and effects, the principles of no plurality of causes and no plurality of effects are "the source of most of our philosophical reasonings" (T 173). Hume can title I.iii. 16 "Of the reason of animals" because animals engage in causal inference utilizing associationist mechanisms. If the understanding or reason is nonassociative and if causal inference is associative, how can causal inference be a species of reasoning or an act of the understanding? There is no inconsistency. Causal inference is not due to "the understanding" or "reason," construed as a nonassociative faculty. Our response, Hume thinks, should be to adopt an alternative conception of the understanding or reason, regarding it as associative, and hence an operation of the imagination. This should be our response precisely because causal inference is justified. Such terms as 'reason' and the 'understanding' convey favorable epistemic assessments, ones Hume thinks appropriate to apply to causal inference. It would be gratuitously paradoxical to deny that causal inference is due to reason; the better course is to reject a nonassociative conception of reason. So far is this from skepticism that the entire rationale for the shifts in terminology is to retain the favorable connotations of cognates of'reason' in application to causal inference. In sum, the conception of the understanding or reason as a nonassociative faculty that governs Hume's argument in I.iii.6 is replaced by a conception of reasoning that embraces an associative process, causal inference itself. Hume explicitly consolidates this shift in terminology in I.iii.9. It is at pages 107-8 that Hume writes approvingly of the two systems of beliefs or "realities" the first based on the senses and memory alone, the second based on custom or the relation of cause and effect (§ II. 1). He attributes beliefs based on causal inference to "the judgment" (T 108). He contrasts the beliefs that comprise the two systems of realities with those that are "merely the offspring of the imagination" or "mere fictions of the imagination" (T 108). Though causal inference is due to reason, construed associationistically, not every associative process is the product of reason. Hume distinguishes within the imagination between two classes of beliefs: those, such as beliefs based on the relation of cause and effect,

32. See Anderson, 1966, p. 148; Beauchamp and Mappes, 1975, p. 121; Winters, 1979, p. 24; and Beauchamp and Rosenberg, 1981, pp. 43,63.

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that deserve epistemic approval and those that are to be condemned as mere offspring of the imagination. These discriminations call for a distinction drawn within the imagination itself. Hume writes in a footnote to the final sentence in I.iii.9: As our assent to all probable reasonings is founded on the vivacity of ideas, it resembles many of those whimsies and prejudices, which are rejected under the opprobrious character of being the offspring of the imagination. By this expression it appears that the word, imagination, is commonly us'd in two different senses... When I oppose the imagination to the memory, I mean the faculty, by which we form our fainter ideas. When I oppose it to reason, I mean the same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative and probable reasonings. (T 117-18 n. 1)

Hume identifies the imagination in a wide sense with the faculty by which we form ideas fainter than perceptions of memory. This is the faculty of association—as introduced in Part i of Book I—a faculty that includes association by resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect (§ II.2). It is the faculty—"the imagination" (T 88), which is "a certain association or relation of perceptions" (T 89)—with which Hume contrasts the understanding or reason for the purposes of his argument in I.iii.6. In the footnote at I.iii.9, Hume identifies "demonstrative and probable reasonings" with "reason." In a parallel footnote in II.ii.7, he identifies "demonstrative and probable reasonings" with "the understanding" (T 371 n. 1). In both notes, he identifies the imagination in the narrow sense with the imagination in the wide sense, exclusive of reason or the understanding (cf. T 371 n. 1). The imagination in the wide sense, therefore, is composed of "the understanding" or "reason"—that is, demonstrative and probable reasonings—and the imagination in the narrow sense. Since the imagination in the wide sense is an associative faculty, "the understanding" or "reason," as now defined, is itself an associative faculty, a faculty within the imagination in the wide sense. (The terminology has the consequence that demonstrative reasoning is itself associative.)33 This usage is confirmed in I.iv.7, where the "understanding" is "founded on the imagination, or the vivacity of our ideas" (T 265) and identified with "the general and more establish'd properties of the imagination" (T 267).34 The footnote at I.iii.9 draws a distinction between two components of the faculty of association: reason or the understanding and the imagination in the

33. I do not know whether Hume has an account of intuition and demonstration that could sustain this claim. For relevant discussions, see Pears, 1963b, pp. 26-30; Stroud, 1977, pp. 239-45; Hausman, 1982; Echelbarger, 1987-88; and Owen, 1999, esp. ch. 5. For a version of the problem, see Broughton, 1983, pp. 8-11. (Also see §VII.6.) 34. For a useful discussion of T 117-18 n. 1 and related matters, see Furlong, 1961. Norton and Norton provide a helpful history of the two notes (2000b,pp. 458, annotation to I.iii.9, par. 19, and 515, fourth annotation to II.ii.7, par. 6). Hume wrote the note in II.ii.7 first. After Book I had been printed, Hume expanded the note and, utilizing a revised leaf or cancel, relocated it in I.iii.9. Norton and Norton also comment that at Treatise 265 Hume "treats reason or the understanding as

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narrow sense. The discussions of the two systems of realities and the two senses of 'imagination' are located ten pages apart within a single section of the Treatise. When Hume writes at page 108 that beliefs not based on perception, memory, or the relation of cause and effect "are merely the offspring of the imagination," he has in mind the imagination in the narrow sense—otherwise there would be no room for a contrast with "the judgment." Beliefs based on causal inference, the ones that Hume approves and attributes to "the judgment," are due to the understanding or reason, as characterized at this stage of the Treatise, and are thus due to a faculty of association.35 (In the I.iii.9 footnote, "probable reasonings" include proofs, as well as the probability of causes and the probability of chances. It is only subsequently, at I.iii.ll, that Hume introduces a circumscribed sense in which probability excludes proofs, arguments that exceed probability. See §11.1.) The terminological preferences that are implicit beginning at Treatise 93, when Hume writes of "reasonings" from the relation of cause and effect, are now explicit. The footnote in I.iii.9 makes official Hume's co-option of such terms as 'understanding' and 'reason' within his associationist psychology and for his own epistemic purposes.36 From this point on, Hume's official terminological commitments are relatively stable. Before documenting this, I take note of an exception. Hume writes: Let men be once fully perswaded of these two principles, That there is nothing in any object, consider'd in itself, which can afford us a reason for drawing a conclusion beyond it, and, That even after the observation of the frequent or constant conjunction of objects, we have no reason to draw any inference concerning any object beyond those of which we have had experience; I say, let men be once fully convinc'd of these two principles, and this will throw them ... loose from all common systems. (T 139; emphasis in original)

a form of the imagination, a rhetorical turn of events we are not entirely prepared for by [the note in I.iii.9]" (2000b, p. 489). But the note simply makes explicit a terminological shift that sets in as early as Treatise 93. 35. Winkler argues for a skeptical interpretation of I.iii.6 on the grounds that Hume assigns causal inference to the imagination at Treatise 225 and 265-66 and that "Hume deliberately contrasts imagination with reason in an important footnote [on pp. 117-18].... To assign [inductive] expectations to the imagination, as Hume does, is to cancel any prospect of their justification" (1999, p. 191). To sustain this argument, it needs to be shown that Hume assigns causal inference to the imagination in the narrow sense. This is clearly not the case at page 225, where Hume distinguishes among the principles of the imagination that are "permanent, irresistable, and universal; such as the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effects to causes" and those that are "changeable, weak, and irregular." At Treatise 231, causal inference is an instance of "reason." At both 231 and 265-66, causal inference is contrasted with the principle that convinces us of the continued existence of external objects; it is the latter, noncausal, principle that is attributed to the imagination in the narrow sense. Of course, Winkler might cite passages in I.iii.6 that attribute causal inference to "the imagination"; I have argued that in this context the term is used in the wide sense. 36. I do not see how Garrett, who maintains that "Hume uses the term 'reason' quite univocally" (1997, p. 94), can account for the shifts in terminology I have identified. For criticism of Garrett on this point, see Millican, 1998, pp. 145-47, 154 (including n. 13); and Owen, 1999, pp. 132-34.


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Here, reason is again a presumed nonassociative faculty, as in I.iii.6. The context provides the explanation. The passage occurs in I.iii.12, "Of the probability of causes," where Hume seeks to confirm the results of I.iii.6. This is explicit later in the paragraph I have cited: "These [two] principles we have found to be sufficiently convincing, even with regard to our most certain reasonings from causation: But I shall venture to affirm, that with regard to these conjectural or probable reasonings they still acquire a new degree of evidence" (T 139). In other words, Hume has shown in I.iii.6 that beliefs that constitute proofs are due to a faculty of association. In I.iii.12, he sets out to confirm this in the case of probable reasoning (§ VII.4). So the use of 'reason' at page 139 is an exception that proves the rule.37 Hume's willingness to see causal inference as a species of reason is prominent in Part iv. In I.iv.2, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," Hume asks whether the belief in body is produced by the senses, reason, or the imagination (T 188). Hume rules out reason (T 193), on the ground that the belief in body cannot result from an argument based on the relation of cause and effect (§ VI.4). Similarly, in the last paragraph of I.iv.4, reason is explicitly identified with "those conclusions we form from cause and effect" (T 231).38 To appreciate what Hume is trying to accomplish, we need once again to return to Locke. A contrast between reason and association, much as the apparatus of the theory of ideas in Part I of the Treatise, would have been familiar to Locke's readers. In Essay II.xxxiii, "Of the Association of Ideas," Locke contrasts ideas that "have a natural Correspondence and Connexion one with another" (Essay II.xxxiii.5) with ideas that are "not ally'd by Nature" (II.xxxiii.6) but by association. The connections of ideas that are "Natural, depend upon our original Constitution, and are born with us" (II.xxxiii.7). It is "the Office and Excellency of our Reason to trace" (II.xxxiii.5) the ideas that have a natural connection. The association of ideas is due to "Chance or Custom" (II.xxxiii.5) or to an "accidental Connexion" (II.xxxiii.7), resulting in an "undue" (II.xxxiii.8) or "wrong" (II.xxxiii.9) connection of ideas. Locke introduces association to account for opinions and reasoning that are "Extravagant" (Il.xxxiii. 1), in "opposition to Reason" (II.xxxiii.4; cf. II.xxxiii.3), and characterized by "Unreasonableness" (II.xxxiii.1,3). In Of the Conduct of the Understanding, section 41, Locke "inquire[s] into the remedies that ought to be applied to" (Conduct 276)

37. Treatise 139, though cited to support the claim that Hume is propounding a skeptical problem (see Stove, 1973, p. 34; and Millican, 1995, p. 127), provides no evidence in this regard different in kind from that at I.iii.6. 38. Pears writes, "Our system of causal beliefs really does deserve this courtesy title ['rational']" (1990, p. 184), but also "it is not reason but imagination that lays the foundations [of causal inference and of our belief in body], and so it is only by a kind of insincere courtesy that these thought-processes can be called 'rational'" (pp. 183-84). I do not think Hume intends his application of cognates of 'reason' to some associative processes to be a "courtesy," much less an "insincere" one; it is at the center of his epistemological project.

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association. In light of Locke's texts, it is a familiar observation that he confines the province of associationism to belief that is unjustified.39 Considered in relation to Locke, Hume seeks to expand the territory in which associationism is recognized as holding sway. In particular, Hume seeks to extend the domain of associationist mechanisms to justified as well as to unjustified belief. As we have seen, Hume both attributes causal inference to association at I.iii.6 (§ II.2) and regards causal inference as justified throughout Part iii and well into Part iv of Book I (§§ II.1-2). Whereas Locke sees the role for associationism as limited to the explanation of ways of thinking that require "remedies," Hume holds that many beliefs that arise associationistically are epistemically respectable. For Locke, reasonable belief is nonassociative and unreasonable belief associative. For Hume, the distinction between justified and unjustified belief is drawn within the faculty of association.40 This is the crucial difference between Hume's associationism and that of Locke. I have suggested in § 1.6 that Hume's overarching project in the Treatiseis to confirm associationism as a general theory of the operation of the human mind. This project is implicated in the structure of Book I and the structure of the Treatise as a whole. In the final section of Part i, Hume is already putting on display what he takes to be the resources of associationism in providing an underpinning for a Berkelian position on abstract ideas (T 20-24). Sections 4–10 of Part iii are principally devoted to association by the relations of contiguity, resemblance, cause and effect, and other forms of habit; sections 11–13 to an associationist account of various forms of probability; and Part iv to association by the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects (§§ V.l-3). One can hardly overestimate the importance to Hume of confirming associationism. Focusing on Hume's associationism, however, can serve to obscure a related project. Hume is deeply committed to putting forward an associationist psychology, but he is also committed to drawing normative distinctions among different psychological mechanisms, endorsing some as "just" and rejecting others. Hume wants to provide an associationist account of causal inference, but he also wants to draw epistemic distinctions within the faculty of association. It is this epistemological project, not the associationism characteristic of

39. See Brett, 1921, pp. 262-63; Warren, 1921, p. 5; Gibson, 1917, pp. 22, 236; Laird, 1932, pp. 39-40; Aaron, 1937, p. 141; Ayers, 1991, pp. 112, 254; Yolton, 1993, pp. 21-22; and Aarsleff, 1994, p. 269. 40. I am indebted to David Hills for bringing to my attention the point about expanding the associationist domain. See Laird, 1932, p. 41; Aaron, 1937, p. 141; Wright, 1983, pp. 153–54; Yolton, 1993, pp. 21-22; and Aarsleff, 1994, p. 269. For the influence of Malebranche here, see Hendel, 1925, pp. 77-86. Hobbes clearly contemplated association having a role in causal inferences that are justified: "He that foresees what will become of a criminal re-cons what he has seen follow on the like crime before, having this order of thoughts: the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows" (Lev I.iii.7). Elsewhere, the same example is invoked to illustrate the principle that "after a man hath been accustomed to see like antecedents followed by like consequents, whensoever he seeth the like come to pass to any thing he had seen before, he looks there should follow it the same that followed then" (EL I.IV.7). In his use of associationism, Hume is returning to a path set by Hobbes, a path from which Locke strayed. Cf. Gibson, 1917, pp. 235-36.


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the entire Treatise, that is distinctive to Book I. Indeed, the shifts in terminology that I have documented are symptomatic of Hume's commitment to epistemic distinctions, within the faculty of association, between reason or the understanding and the imagination in the narrow sense. Only some associationist mechanisms are "just" and deserve attribution to "reason" or "the judgment"; others are "rejected under the opprobrious character" of being "the offspring of the imagination." For ease and clarity of exposition, I generally adhere to the following terminological conventions. I refer to the imagination in the wide sense as the faculty of association. This enables me to reserve the term 'imagination' for the imagination in the narrow sense, the locus of belief-forming mechanisms that are not justified.41 I use the term 'understanding' to refer to the component of the faculty of association that Hume indifferently calls "reason" or "the understanding." My selection here is based on the consideration that 'understanding' has fewer misleading connotations and is also more stable in its meaning in Hume's text. We have encountered abundant evidence of Hume's epistemic endorsement of causal inference: repeated claims in Parts iii and iv that causal inference is just, admission of distinctions between degrees of probabilistic evidence, the rules by which to judge of causes and effects, the extended restatement of the causal theory of assurance in the I.iii.9 two systems of realities passage, the accompanying distinction within the faculty of association between the understanding and the imagination, and the shift in the use of the term 'reason'. I have argued that these endorsements reflect a pretheoretical commitment to causal inference, a commitment that is independent of an account of why causal inference is justified and, more generally, why the understanding, but not the imagination, is a source of justified beliefs (§ 1.4). Formulations of the causal theory of assurance occur as early as I.iii.2, the first section within "Of knowledge and probability" that does not deal with demonstrative knowledge. Hume is committed to causal inference out of the gate. Though Hume's endorsements of causal inference and related beliefforming mechanisms are pretheoretical, he must contemplate a theoretical basis for his epistemic distinctions. He must hold that there is some account of justification that explains his pretheoretical distinctions between justified and unjustified beliefs. At least, he must have in view a favored epistemological theory, in the sense of a theory that he considers the best prospect for systematizing his pretheoretical distinctions among belief-forming mechanisms. Hume's attempt to locate such a theory constitutes his constructive epistemological project. I extract Hume's theory from some notable features of Hume's early endorsements of causal inference, which, for all their clarity, frequently occur in surprising contexts, unannounced. I turn to this matter in Chapter III.

41. Noonan, adopting this interpretive framework on the basis of my 1991,1995a, and 1995b, writes of the "narrow imagination" (1999, p. 43; cf. 42, 98-99, 124–27).

III Integrating Hume's Accounts of Belief and Justification

III.l. A Puzzle in Regard to I.iii In this chapter, I argue that a stability-based interpretation of Hume's theory of justification resolves a puzzle in regard to Treatise I.iii. To begin, I present a significant textual phenomenon in Part iii: Hume's claim that association by the relation of cause and effect produces belief is often intertwined—though without his remarking on this fact—with the claim that belief based on causal inference is justified. To explain this, I offer the hypothesis that, in Hume's view, stability plays a double role. Whether belief is justified depends upon considerations of stability, and (a species of) stability is also essential to belief itself. In § III.2,1 show that, for Hume, any belief is stable, in that it is steady or infixed. To establish that a state is a belief is thus to establish that it is stable, other things being equal. In § III.3,1 factor in Hume's treatment of education. In § III.4,1 observe that a belief, though steady in that it is infixed, might nevertheless be unstable in its influence on thought, the will, and action, owing to the presence of other beliefs with which it conflicts. I argue that the point of Hume's distinction between justified and unjustified belief is to call attention to circumstances in which a belief, though steady, is unstable in its influence, all things considered. I then show that this perspective is useful in understanding Hume's readiness at I.iv.7 to reject all belief, including belief based on causal inference, as unjustified. In § III.5,1 distinguish two versions of my stability-based interpretation. The issue is whether Hume takes the justification of a belief to be a matter of stability within the belief system of the person who holds the belief or to depend on the belief's stability within the belief system of a suitably reflective person. I address this and related issues in §§ III.6-7. The titles of sections 5-10 of Part iii of Book I include "Of the nature of the idea or belief," "Of the causes of belief," and "Of the influence of belief." In any interpretation, these sections have for their subject matter the nature, causes, and effects of belief. These topics remain central at sections 11-12, where Hume

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extends his treatment to the probability of chances and the probability of causes, beliefs that fall short of proofs (§ II.l). There are also numerous passages in I.iii.5-10 and neighboring sections that register Hume's epistemic approval of beliefs based on causal inference (§§ 11.1,3). In I.iii.6, Hume allows that causal inference is "just" (T 89). In I.iii.9, he attributes causal inference to "the judgment" (T 108) and introduces a general contrast between the understanding and the imagination, making official his willingness to apply'reason' and its cognates ('reasoning', 'reasonable') to association by the relation of cause and effect. In I.iii.ll, and again in I.iii.13, he distinguishes degrees of probabilistic evidence (T 124,153-54). In Part iii, the claim that causal inference is justified thus arises in tandem with the claim that causal inference results in belief. Yet, Hume does not give due recognition to the fact that these claims are different. This phenomenon emerges in Hume's early statements of the causal theory of assurance (§ II.l). According to Hume's first statement of the theory in the Treatise, causal inference is the only relation that provides "assurance" (T 73; cf. EHUIV, 23) of the existence of objects that one does not perceive or remember. Similarly, causal inference "carries [the mind's] view" (T 82; cf. EHU IV, 22) beyond the objects of perception and memory. These formulations straddle a distinction between versions of the causal theory that advance a claim about the source of belief in the unobserved and versions that advance a claim about the source of knowledge of the unobserved. Since Hume is discussing the "nature" (T 94) and "causes" (T 98) of belief at pages 94–106, we might expect that, at this stage of the Treatise, the causal theory is advanced as a theory of the sources of belief in the unobserved. Yet, the formulation with respect to "assurance" is immediately preceded by the claim that relations other than cause and effect cannot "discover" (T 73) the existence of unobserved objects; this implies that the relation of causation can discover such existence. Similarly, cause and effect is the only relation that "informs us of existences and objects, which we do not see or feel" (T 74) and that can "lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses" (T 89). These formulations connote success, what we call "knowledge," not mere belief.' So there are passages that favor the stronger version of the causal theory, an impression that is reinforced by the other evidence of Hume's endorsement of causal inference. It is surprising that the formulations that suggest knowledge emerge in a context where the official topic is (mere) belief and that Hume does not call attention to or signal this discrepancy. Hume's discussion of the two systems of realities in I.iii.9, "Of the effects of other relations and other habits," provides a striking instance of Hume's unacknowledged intermingling of claims about belief and claims about knowledge. The section discusses the relations of resemblance and contiguity. Hume grants 1. What "we"—in more recent epistemology—call "knowledge." Hume's "proofs" (§ II. 1) fall within the scope of the term as I am using it. Though Hume officially reserves 'knowledge' for belief arising from the comparison of ideas (T 69-70, 124), he allows in the Abstract. "No matter of fact can be proved but from its cause or its effect. Nothing can be known to be the cause of another but by experience" (A 654). See also the uses of cognates of 'know' at T 103, 104, 148.

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that these relations can enliven an idea and intensify an existing belief while insisting that they do not produce belief (cf. T 107-10). In the second paragraph of the section, Hume summarizes some previous results: I have often observ'd, that, beside cause and effect, the two relations of resemblance and contiguity, are to be consider'd as associating principles of thought, and as capable of conveying the imagination from one idea to another. I have also observ'd, that when of two objects connected together by any of these relations, one is immediately present to the memory or senses, not only the mind is convey'd to its co-relative by means of the associating principle; but like-wise conceives it with an additional force and vigour, by the united operation of that principle, and of the present impression. And this I have observ'd, in order to confirm by analogy, my explication of our judgments concerning cause and effect. (T 107)

In the continuation of the paragraph, Hume raises a difficulty: But this very argument may, perhaps, be turn'd against me.... For it may be said, that if all the parts of that hypothesis be true, viz. that these three species of relation are deriv'd from the same principles; that their effects in inforcing and inlivening our ideas are the same; and that belief is nothing but a more forcible and vivid conception of an idea; it shou'd follow, that that action of the mind may not only be deriv'd from the relation of cause and effect, but also from those of contiguity and resemblance. B u t . . . we find by experience, that belief arises only from causation. (T 107)

The third paragraph begins: "This is the objection; let us now consider its solution" (T 107). The second paragraph sets the problem initially under discussion in I.iii.9. To respond, Hume needs to explain why causal inference, unlike resemblance and contiguity, produces belief. This explanation occupies the third through seventh paragraphs. Paragraphs three and four discuss belief based on the senses, memory, and the relation of cause or effect. Paragraphs five and six discuss resemblance and contiguity. Paragraph seven compares the relation of cause and effect to these other relations. In the third and fourth paragraphs, Hume introduces the two systems of "realities." I have provided a preliminary discussion of aspects of this material in §§ 11.1,3. Recall that the first system is based on the senses and memory alone; the second is based on custom or the relation of cause and effect and extends or supplements the first. In the discussion of the two systems, Hume seems to be saying not only that the relation of cause and effect, unlike resemblance and contiguity, produces belief, but that the relation of cause and effect produces justified belief. The evidence for this is considerable. Hume writes that the mind "dignifies" the second system, as well as the first, "with the title of realities" (T 108). He writes, more directly, that the second of the two systems is "the object... of the judgment" (T 108). He also contrasts the ideas belonging to the second system with those "which are merely the offspring of the imagination" (T 108). This

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discussion is naturally read to suggest that Hume approves epistemically of beliefs based on the relation of cause and effect. It is difficult not to be sympathetic with Passmore's comment on the passage: "The fact is that 'reality'... has a[n] honorific sense."2 To reply to the objection at hand, Hume only needs to show that the relation of causation produces belief. Yet, Hume claims that causal inference produces justified belief. Hume seems to change the subject and to do so without notice. One could go a certain distance toward avoiding this reading by taking the two-systems passages in relative isolation. It might be thought that in saying that the mind dignifies the objects comprised in the second system "with the title of realities" Hume simply means that we believe those objects exist. And it might be thought that when Hume writes of the second system as "the object... of the judgment," he simply means that they are the objects of belief. There is substantial evidence against the view that Hume thus confines his claims to belief. In the first place, there is a parallel development in the fifth and sixth paragraphs, where Hume explains why resemblance does not produce belief. (Here and elsewhere, I use 'resemblance' to stand for the relations of resemblance and contiguity.) Hume grants that resemblance produces a state that has affinities with belief, in which we "feign" the existence of an object. In the sixth paragraph, he offers epistemic claims: "such a fiction is founded on so little reason, that nothing but pure caprice can determine the mind to form it" (T 109), and "we... form a general rule against the reposing any assurance in those momentary glimpses of light, which arise in the imagination from a feign'd resemblance and contiguity" (T 110). These epistemic assessments seem curiously out of place. In the context of the objection he is considering, Hume needs to show that resemblance does not produce belief. In one compressed discussion, he also claims that the states that resemblance does produce are not justified.3 In paragraphs five and six, the states that fall short of belief are unjustified, much as in paragraphs three and four, where the states that constitute belief are justified. In the second place, there is recalcitrant material internal to the discussion of the two systems of realities:" 'Tis this latter principle [judgment], which peoples the world, and brings us acquainted with such existences, as by their removal in time and place, lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory" (T 108). "Brings us acquainted" implies success, implies that judgment leads to knowledge, not mere belief, about objects that lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory. This is of a piece with the handful of formulations cited above, which suggest that Hume subscribes to a causal theory of knowledge. In the third place, in the footnote at pages 117-18, which closes I.iii.9, Hume reinforces his contrast between beliefs based on causal inference and those "which are merely the offspring of the imagination." This is the note in which Hume contrasts "probable reasonings"—attributed to "reason" (T 118

2. Passmore, 1952/1968, p. 101 (cf. 61-62); cf. Kemp Smith, 1941, pp. 383-85. 3. As Fogelin notes, "Here Hume's approach is part descriptive and... part normative" (1985, p. 58).

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n. 1) or the understanding—with "those whimsies and prejudices, which are rejected under the opprobrious character of being the offspring of the imagination" (T 117 n. 1). The note repeats language in the two-systems passage contrasting states that "are merely the offspring of the imagination" (T 108) with the products of perception, memory, and causal inference. The footnote is evidence that Hume intends the two-systems passage to have a place in a sustained contrast between justified and unjustified belief. In the fourth place, Hume's approval of causal inference in the two-systems passage is continuous with his favorable discussion of causal inference throughout Part iii and well into Part iv of Book 1.1 have documented the evidence for this in § I.I. In the second paragraph of the present section, I reviewed evidence located in the immediate vicinity of Hume's discussion of the nature and causes of belief, including probabilistic belief. In addition, there is the I.iii.15 discussion of "rules" that are "proper" (T 173) for ascertaining causes and effects and that constitute a "LOGIC" (T 175). Also, Hume reiterates that causal inference is justified in I.iv.2 (T 216) and I.iv.4 (T 225). In sum, though Hume's ostensible purpose in I.iii.9 is to explain why the relation of cause and effect produces belief, there is substantial evidence, within I.iii.9 and the surrounding sections, that Hume takes the relation of cause and effect to produce knowledge. Other commentators have observed that Hume seems to run together a theory of belief and a theory of justified belief. Passmore writes: "What set out to be a theory of belief, in something like the ordinary sense of the word, has become, with no explicit acknowledgment of that fact, a theory of what it is 'rational' to believe."4 In this view, what is initially a theory of belief—with belief resulting only from association by the relation of cause and effect—is ratcheted up to a theory of justified belief. The textual phenomena that bother Passmore are real enough. In reading Part iii, one easily gains the impression that Hume's claim that belief arising from the relation of cause and effect is justified is somehow yoked to his claim that the relation of cause and effect produces belief. The question is how we are to explain this puzzling feature of Part iii. Passmore maintains that Hume "vacillates" among different theories of belief. I believe there is substantial textual evidence against this, but there is room for a different worry. According to Passmore, Hume begins with a liberal definition, in which belief is a lively idea. Hume tries to explain why some beliefs so characterized, those arising from the relation of cause and effect, are more rational than others, and he concludes that no adequate explanation is forthcoming. Why does Hume then redefine 'belief, as a lively idea arising from the relation of cause and effect? In Passmore's account, finding himself unable to

4. Passmore, 1952/1968, pp. 62-63. Price is perhaps fastening on to this puzzle when he writes that Hume "want[s] to stick to his original definition of belief as a lively ... idea associated with a present impression by a relation of experienced constant conjunction," but that Hume "now wants to say that it is a definition of reasonable or sensible or sane or intelligent belief" (1969, p. 174). See also Walsh, 1972, pp. 104-6.

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distinguish between justified belief arising from causation and unjustified belief, Hume privileges lively ideas arising from causation by another means, declaring that they are the only genuine beliefs. This maneuver, were it Hume's, patently dodges the alleged difficulty. This is reason to reexamine the claim that Hume takes the problem of explaining why some beliefs are more rational than others as "unanswerable" (§§ 1.3,5, IV.5, V.3).5 The key to the puzzle is to suppose not that Hume identifies belief with justified belief but that, in Hume's view, establishing that the states produced by a psychological mechanism are beliefs is to establish that they are justified, other things being equal.6 On what grounds could Hume maintain this? It is easy to see, at least schematically, what is required. We need to locate a property that is necessary for the states produced by a psychological mechanism to constitute beliefs, such that to establish that the states are beliefs and thus have this property is also sufficient to establish that the beliefs are justified, other things being equal. In other words, there must be a property that plays a twofold role. The presence of the property must constitute a necessary condition for belief. In addition, establishing that the beliefs produced by a psychological mechanism have that property must constitute a sufficient condition for establishing justification, other things being equal. My claim is that stability is the property that plays this dual role, one within Hume's theory of belief, the other within Hume's theory of justification.7 In light of this, I proceed in two stages. In §§ III.2 and I1I.3,1 show that, in Hume's view, stability is a necessary condition for belief. In § III.4,1 address the nature of Hume's interest in stability in the context of his theory of justification.

III.2. Steadiness and Infixing in Hume's Theory of Belief I begin with a sketch of the role of stability in Hume's theory of belief. Tradition in Hume interpretation has it that beliefs are lively ideas. In my interpretation, beliefs are steady dispositions. It is a commonplace that Hume uses a cluster of closely related terms—'vivacity', 'vividness', 'intensity', and 'liveliness'—to characterize belief. This vivacity cluster, however, is prima facie distinct from a second cluster of terms—'firmness', 'solidity,' and 'steadiness', together with 'fast', 'firm', 'settled', 'solid', and 'steady' (T 97,105,106,108,116,121, 624,625, 626,

5. On vacillation, see Passmore, 1952/1968, p. 29. On distinguishing between rational and irrational beliefs, see pp. 62,64,101. The quotation is at p. 62. 6. There is an ambiguity in the parsing of this key claim. I take up this matter in § III.5. 7. Noting that "[Loeb] thinks that, in explaining how beliefs are produced, Hume produces an account of their justification," Owen objects: "When [Hume] has explained the production of belief, he has explained the production of a state we take to be t r u e . . . . But this is a much weaker claim than modern claims about justification" (1999, p. 140 n. 38). (See§ Il.l.n. 13.) But in my interpretation, Hume's theory of justification is linked to beliefs qua stable or steady.

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627,629,631)—that also has a prominent role in Hume's discussion of belief.8 For ease of exposition, I use 'steadiness' (and its cognates) to stand indifferently for all of the terms in this steadiness cluster. (A number of other terms—'force', 'strength', and 'vigor'—at least in some of their occurrences, perhaps belong in this cluster as well.) Although Hume suggests that the terms in the two clusters may be used interchangeably (T 629), we need to disentangle them in order to attribute to Hume a coherent theory of belief. Hume contrasts steady ideas with ideas that are "momentary" (T 110), "floating" (T 116), and "loose" (T 97,106, 116,123,595,624,625; cf. 110). The terms in the steadiness cluster often refer to a kind of staying power. I suggest that steadiness plays a more fundamental role than vivacity in Hume's theory of the nature of belief.9 As I do not wish to deny that the vivacity cluster is entrenched in Hume's texts, some stage setting might be helpful. I am sympathetic with Stroud's suggestion that Hume "takes for granted the theory of ideas," "a theory that he adopts... from his predecessors," though "he never gives any arguments in support of it." It is a central component of this theory that "thinking and mental activity generally consists in the presence before the mind of perceptions," so that they are identified with occurrent mental states. As Stroud notes, the theory of ideas exerts considerable pressure on the direction in which Hume develops his theory of belief. What is more, as I view matters, Hume seeks to integrate his associationist ambitions (§ 1.6) into the tradition's theory of ideas, with the result that he takes associationism to involve the transmission of an occurrent property (vivacity or liveliness).10 Hume's most self-conscious thinking about the nature and causes of belief proceeds within an associationism grafted onto the theory of ideas. This framework determines the character of much of the text— not only Hume's formulaic summaries of his theory of belief but also the more extended applications of that theory and the related development of his associationist psychology. (Such textual phenomena explain the allure of the tradi-

8. In the Oxford Philosophical Texts edition of the Treatise (Norton and Norton, 2000b), which follows the Clarendon critical edition (Norton and Norton, forthcoming) in incorporating Appendix passages into the text of Book I, references to pages 628-29 and 630-32 may be found at the penultimate paragraph of I.iii.7 and the final three paragraphs of I.iii. 10, respectively. In the latter case, the first twelve words at the first of the three Appendix paragraphs are identical to those at the final paragraph of I.iii. 10 (at T 123) as originally published. These two paragraphs, though similar thematically, diverge thereafter. In 2000a, Norton and Norton write that the Appendix "addition makes the [original, final] paragraph . . . redundant and thus it has been omitted [in 2000b]" (p. 252), though it will be included in the critical apparatus of the Clarendon edition. (There is no notice of the omission in 2000b.) As a consequence, the passages I quote at T 123 in my discussion of poetical enthusiasm below in this section are not included in Norton and Norton, 2000b. 9. For commentators who place some emphasis on steadiness, see Laird, 1932, p. 88; Wolff, 1960, pp. 112-14, 128; Pears, 1990, pp. 12, 36, 44; Baier, 1991, pp. 72-74, 80; and Johnson, 1995, p. 171. See also the references to MacNabb at n. 20. 10. The quotations may be found at Stroud, 1977, pp. 9, 17 (cf. 10 and 27), and 23 (cf. 26). (Cf. Johnson, 1995, pp. 37-38.) For the pressure on the theory of belief, see pp. 72-73,224-26. Note that Stroud tends to treat Hume's associationism as a component of the overall theory of ideas (1977, pp. 8-9,35-37).


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tional interpretation of Hume's theory of belief.) At the same time, Hume develops a position in which beliefs are steady dispositions.11 The theory of ideascum-associationism, however, so permeates his thinking as to impede Hume's appreciation of the role he assigns to steadiness. The psychological hold of the inherited theory of ideas explains the centrality of vivacity in Hume's discussions even as he advances a view that breaks out of this mold.12 In providing an interpretation of Hume's position, I will first show that beliefs are steady and then show that they are dispositions. Hume's conception of steadiness is closely connected to his discussions of the ways in which ideas are infixed. There is ample evidence that when an idea is infixed, the result is a belief. At Treatise 86, 109, and 225 (cf. T 99, 121), ideas are infixed with force or vigor, or enlivened, and Hume's formula—though it proves inadequate—is that belief is a lively or forceful idea. Furthermore, Hume writes that in belief the mind "fixes and reposes itself" (T 624) on its conceptions, or "fixes and reposes itself in one settled conclusion and belief" (T 625). I suggest that infixing is a process that produces steadiness and hence belief. In the course of the Treatise, Hume specifies particular mechanisms as ones that infix belief. In I.iii.5, Hume maintains that "belief or assent... always attends the memory and senses" (T 86). He writes of "custom and habit having... the same influence on the mind as nature, and infixing the idea with equal force and vigour" (T 86; cf. 225). In context, "nature" refers to the senses and memory, so that custom, in addition to the senses and memory, produces steady ideas and hence infixes belief. In a similar vein, Hume writes of "the eternal establish'd persuasions founded on memory and custom" (T 632).13 Hume identifies "CUSTOM" (T 102) or "habit" (T 105) with "every thing... which proceeds from a past repetition, without any new reasoning or conclusion" (T 102). In the case of inference based on the relation of cause and effect,

11. Here I diverge from Stroud, who sees Hume as focusing on what must be "added to" the theory (1977, p. 9; cf. 11}. Stroud thinks Hume overlooked the possibility of a dispositional account of belief. Seen. 22. 12. Hume thus often seems oblivious to the disparity between his treatments of belief both as a lively idea and as a steady disposition. For example, in the final paragraph of I.iii.7, he claims that someone who reads a book "as a true history" has "a more lively conception" than someone who reads it "as a romance" (T 97-98). At the same time, he directs that the material at pages 628-29 of the Appendix—a passage with clear dispositional elements—be inserted just before this paragraph. 13. I cannot accept the emendation to "external establish'd" (Norton and Norton, 2000a, p. 253) persuasions to be adopted in the Clarendon critical edition of the Treatise (Norton and Norton, forthcoming). Though not citing any textual basis for this change, Norton and Norton maintain that it is "even less likely that [Hume] meant to speak of 'eternal' [rather than "external"] persuasions" (p. 253). They suggest that in context an "internal/external" contrast makes "good Humean sense" in that the external beliefs "arise from experience" (p. 253); however, one can remember one's own internal states. They also note that Hume distinguishes internal and external perceptions at T 190, but this is in I.iv.2, a specialized context dealing with the belief in body. Nothing there suggests that memories might be external perceptions. In any event, there is no problem to solve; "eternal" is rhetorical flourish. In the Appendix, Hume is contrasting genuine belief with the "mere phantom of belief" (T 630) that arises from poetical enthusiasm. In this context, he exaggerates the steadiness of memory and custom.

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the repetition consists in the frequent observation of resembling pairs of objects (T 109). Custom also includes the repetition of a mere idea (§ III.3). Repetition produces and thus explains steadiness. Hume writes that a "principle [that] has establish'd itself by a sufficient custom" also "bestows an evidence and firmness on any opinion, to which it can be apply'd" (T 105, emphasis added). In the Appendix, Hume observes that "it must be allow'd, that the mind has a firmer hold, or more steady conception of what it takes to be matter of fact, than of fictions" (T 626). He adds in the next paragraph that by the association of "frequently conjoin'd" objects "we can explain the causes of the firm conception" and that these causes "exhaust the whole subject" (T 626). Hume appeals to a higherorder habit (T 104-5; cf. 131,173-74) to defend this hypothesis against the objection that it is not compatible with our forming a belief based on a single experience (§ 1.5). Repetition or frequent conjunction—as well as the senses and memory—give rise to firmness or steadiness in belief. My claim that beliefs are steady may be strengthened on the basis of I.iii.7, "Of the nature of the idea or belief." Hume writes: "We may mingle, and unite, and separate, and confound, and vary our ideas in a hundred different ways; but 'till there appears some principle, which fixes one of these different situations, we have in reality no opinion" (T 96). We have not achieved opinion unless we have fixed on a particular idea; the infixing of an idea is essential to belief. Since infixing is a process that results in steadiness, steadiness must itself be essential to belief. There is confirmation of the role of steadiness in belief in II.iii.10, where Hume offers observations about the relationship between uncertainty or doubt and certainty or belief (§ IV.5). These include claims about the "nature" of doubt and belief. Hume writes:" 'Tis the nature of doubt to cause a variation in the thought," so that doubt involves "instability and inconstancy" (T 453). By contrast, belief or certainty involves "fixing one particular idea in the mind, and keeping it from wavering in the choice of its objects" (T 453). In this passage, Hume treats belief and certainty as the opposites of doubt and uncertainty. If it is of the nature of doubt to cause "variation," "instability," and "inconstancy" in thought, then the property of "fixing one particular idea in the mind, and keeping it from wavering" must be of the nature of belief. It is in the nature of belief, unlike doubt, to be infixed and steady. To this point, I have been writing as if steadiness is a property of an idea. If ideas are conscious or occurrent states, however, they are obviously unsteady— they come and go, or change, abruptly. At the same time, there is substantial evidence that steadiness is crucial to Hume's account of belief, evidence that will be reinforced as this section proceeds. What is needed is a framework that can accommodate steadiness as a property of belief. Steadiness, I suggest, is best construed not as a property of an idea but as a property of a disposition. Hume often invokes mental dispositions or propensities that cannot plausibly be identified with occurrent states. John Bricke observes that in the context of Hume's moral theory a person's character is a "durable" (T 575) quality, which may exist in the absence of its typical effects (T 411, 584, 585). In the course of this study, we encounter the mind's propensity to attribute identity to


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related objects (§§ V. 1-2), to add new relations to related objects (§§ V.3-5), and to continue in a train of thought (§§ VI.1–3). Indeed, as Robert Paul Wolff has argued, the association of ideas by the relation of cause and effect is a secondorder disposition, a disposition to develop under specified conditions a firstorder disposition (for example, to expect fire to be accompanied by smoke).14 Hume's I.i.7 development of Berkeley's position on abstract ideas relies on a "power" or "readiness" (T 20) to call up any of a number of related ideas. To return to the case at hand, Hume's tendency to treat belief as a disposition, as well as an occurrence, is well known. For example, a passage in the Appendix begins on a tack that invites taking belief to be an occurrent or conscious state: "An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness" (T 629). The passage continues: "This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind, which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination" (T 629; cf. EHU V, 40-41,46, and A 654). Here, belief is characterized with reference to its effects. This suggests a dispositional account. There are a number of similar passages: belief "gives [ideas] more force and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; infixes them in the mind; and renders them the governing principles of all our actions" (T 629), and the mind "is more actuated and mov'd by" beliefs than by states that fall short of belief (T 624).15 Such notions as "steadiness" apply more naturally to dispositions than to occurrent states (§ I.I). Much as a calm emotion is a "settled principle of action" (T 419), indeed such that "repeated custom and its own force have made every thing yield to it" (T 419), we can take the claim that it is essential to belief that it is infixed, and hence steady, to apply to dispositional beliefs. This fits nicely with Hume's explanation of steadiness, as the result of repetition or conditioning. Dispositions that are not infixed do not qualify as beliefs (cf. T 453,629). A dispositional belief is a steady disposition to characteristic manifestations or typical effects on thought (hence including occurrent or conscious states), the passions, and action (verbal and nonverbal).16 Such steadiness is a species of stability, the stability of a disposition that is infixed.

14. Bricke, 1980, p. 50; and Wolff, 1960, pp. 105-6. For the general point about invoking mental dispositions, cf. Stroud, 1977, pp. 167-68; and Bricke, 1980, pp. 46-52. 15. My interpretation of Hume on belief has been influenced by MacNabb, 1951/1966, esp. pp. 71–81. Everson, 1988, adopts a related "causal" and "functional" interpretation. Price credits Hume with "a hint or suggestion" of a dispositional account (1969, p. 187;cf. 165,188). Armstrong maintains that Hume "wavers" between dispositional and occurrent analyses of belief (1973, p. 71). For others who attend to the dispositional passages, see Basson, 1958, ch. 3; Bricke, 1980, pp. 121-22 (cf. 30-31, 46–58); and Pears, 1990, pp. 50-51. 16. There is an intermediate hypothesis, that beliefs are lively ideas that are steady in their influence on the thought, will, and action—that lively ideas, when they exist, have uniform effects. Given that ideas come and go, this hypothesis does not explain the steadiness in those effects.

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Construing beliefs as dispositions is not incompatible with Hume's associationist ambitions. Hume invokes association among dispositions at pages 204-5 of I.iv.2 (§ V.2). Fogelin notes that though "ideas are natural candidates to be the subject of associational laws," "Laws of Association do not have to be applied to ideas—they can also be applied to dispositions."17 Association might serve in the first instance to strengthen dispositions and precipitate their characteristic effects, so that the occurrence of enlivened or intensified occurrent states is a by-product of associative mechanisms operating on underlying dispositions. Hume can also admit occurrent beliefs, in the sense of conscious manifestations of a dispositional belief. These occurrent manifestations include lively or vivacious ideas. Though these lively ideas are not steady, steadiness is located at the level of the underlying dispositions that they manifest. In this account, liveliness or vivacity is one of the characteristic manifestations of belief. (One, but only one. My interpretation does not imply that a steady disposition merely to have an idea, which thus recurs, constitutes belief; there must be a disposition to the full range of effects on thought, the passions, and action characteristic of belief.) It is here, in application to occurrent beliefs, that terms in the vivacity cluster have their proper home. An occurrent belief, strictly speaking, is an occurrent manifestation of a dispositional belief. H. H. Price takes note of an apparent contradiction in Hume's statements of his theory of belief. Hume holds that the liveliness in belief derives from a relation to a present impression, but also that an idea can be lively or forceful when it is not related to a present impression at all.18 Specifically, Hume holds that poetical enthusiasm does not result in belief, even though it can produce ideas that are as lively and vivacious as occurrent beliefs: How great soever the pitch may be, to which this vivacity rises,... 'tis still the mere phantom of belief or persuasion.... A poetical description may have a more sensible effect on the fancy, than an historical narration.... It may seem to set the object before us in more lively colours. (T 630-31)

If belief is a vivacious idea, how can the lively products of poetical enthusiasm fail to count as beliefs? The answer is that the verbal and nonverbal behaviors and internal episodes that manifest dispositional belief can also arise from other sources, thereby mimicking belief. In these cases, we have pseudobeliefs, what Hume calls "counterfeit belief" (T 123) or "the mere phantom of belief or persuasion" (T 630). Hume writes that "the least reflection dissipates the illusions of poetry" (T 123).19 This is a point about the steadiness of the underlying

17. Fogelin, 1985, p. 3. 18. Cf. Price, 1969, pp. 172-73. Price appeals to examples other than poetical enthusiasm. My response derives from MacNabb, who also uses the terminology of "pseudo-belief" or "quasi-belief" (1951/1966, pp. 76,79). I extend his treatment to poetical enthusiasm, a topic he does not discuss. I reserve the terminology of'quasi belief for a different use, in § V.5. 19. I do not think Hume can be taken to identify belief with a persistent occurrent idea token that has a stable vivacity. A poetical enthusiasm can be sustained and thus satisfy this condition.


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dispositions. Lively ideas, no matter how intense, constitute occurrent beliefs only when they manifest a steady disposition. This dissolves Price's apparent contradiction. My interpretation does not preclude Hume's use of terms in the steadiness cluster to refer to occurrent states. We have seen that Hume uses 'calm' and Violent' both to refer to the properties of being settled and volatile, respectively, and to refer to the occurrent awareness produced by those properties, felt calmness and felt violence (§§ 1.1-2). Hume's theory of belief follows a similar pattern. In his discussion of the influence of belief (T 118-19), 'unsteadiness' refers to a dispositional property, staying power. Often, however, terms in the steadiness cluster are used to refer to an occurrent experience or feeling. In this usage, perhaps most explicit at Treatise 629 ("An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea"), steadiness is a phenomenal property. These two usages are connected in an obvious way. Many of the terms in the steadiness cluster do double duty, at times referring to a dispositional property of an idea and other times referring to the way that property feels when manifested in consciousness. Indeed, Hume's tendency to suppose that we are introspectively aware of mental dispositions can obscure the role of dispositions in his analysis of belief.20 Hume is not himself attentive to his tendency to treat belief both as an occurrence and as a disposition. He often runs together terms in the steadiness and vivacity clusters (for example, at T 97,106,629), taking terms from the different clusters to refer to "the same quality," whatever we "call it" (T 106), so that they are "intended only to express" the same "act of the mind" (T 629). This is not surprising. An occurrent belief is itself a manifestation of a dispositional one. Furthermore, such locutions as "something felt by the mind" (T 629) invite an identification of belief with the feeling that manifests the disposition. These locutions do not, however, require the identification; the occurrent feeling can be taken to be the awareness of a dispositional belief. Finally, there is room to confuse distinct conscious states: vivacity or liveliness, on the one hand, and steadiness, on the other. The confusion is perhaps sustained by Hume's use of additional terms—'force', 'strength', Vigor', 'intensity'—that are sufficiently ambiguous to be construed either in terms of steadiness or vivacity.21 Beyond the general influence of the theory of ideas, these more specific factors are obstructions to greater clarity on Hume's part about his position. My distinction between the two clusters of terminology regiments distinctions required by Hume's views. (A term that is typically associated with the steadiness cluster might, on a particular occasion of use, function as if it belonged to the vivacity cluster, and vice versa.) To provide a consistent interpretation, we must distinguish the concepts represented by the two clusters, and we must pay more than lip service to dispositional strands in Hume's theory. We must systematically identify beliefs with steady dispositions and distinguish

20. On steadiness and occurrent states, cf. MacNabb, 1951/1966, pp. 77-78. 21. Price suggests that even 'lively' and 'vivacious' can be construed causally or dispositionally (1969, pp. 186-87).

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between dispositional beliefs and their manifestations, occurrent and otherwise. Absent such a regimentation of Hume's texts, there is no prospect of making sense of his discussions of poetical enthusiasm, where vivacity is held to be insufficient for belief. Also, there is no prospect of plausibly explaining how fixity and steadiness are essential to belief.22 Hume's I.iii.9 discussion of the effects of the relations of resemblance and contiguity fits nicely with the interpretation in which beliefs are steady dispositions. At paragraph six, Hume begins an examination of resemblance when it operates "single" (T 109), on its own. Resemblance produces only "momentary glimpses of light" (T 110), and "there is no manner of necessity for the mind to feign any resembling and contiguous object; and if it feigns such, there is as little necessity for it always to confine itself to the same [idea], without any difference or variation" (T 109). Hume sums up: "That principle being fluctuating and uncertain, 'tis impossible it can ever operate with any considerable degree of force and constancy" (T 109). Resemblance produces an underlying disposition that is fluctuating or unsteady and hence fails to constitute belief.23 Hume takes care to contrast the effects of association by the relation of resemblance with those of association by the relation of cause and effect. He has already noted in the discussion of the second system of realities that "by their force and settled order, [ideas] arising from custom and the relation of cause and effect... distinguish themselves from... other ideas" (T 108). This observation immediately precedes the explanation at paragraphs five and six of why resemblance does not produce belief. Hume returns to the contrast at paragraph seven: The relation of cause and effect has all the opposite advantages. The objects it presents are fixt and unalterable. The impressions of the memory never change in any considerable degree; and each impression draws along with it a precise idea, which takes its place in the imagination, as something solid and real, certain and invariable. (T 110)

Again, notions related to steadiness are prominent. Whereas the effects of resemblance are "momentary," "fluctuating," given to "variation," and lacking in "constancy," the effects of the relation of cause and effect are "fixt," "settled," and "invariable."241 have previously reviewed evidence that the repetition that un22. Stroud cites passages where Hume discusses belief's "effects on the mind" but comments: "Hume seems never to have entertained the idea that this connection between belief and the passions and the will might constitute the very difference he seeks between belief and mere conception" (1977, p. 74). Similarly, Pears takes note of Hume's "remarks about the effect of belief on action" in the course of criticizing Hume for "treating [belief] ... as a mental event or occurrence" (1990, p. 50). Overlooking the insights—see n. 15—of Armstrong, MacNabb, and Price during the period 1951-71, many recent commentaries do not even acknowledge dispositional elements in Hume's account: Bennett, 1971, pp. 294-95; Fogelin, 1985, pp. 53-58; Waxman, 1994, pp. 33-42; Garrett, 1997, pp. 27-28,143,208-15; and Mounce, 1999, pp. 35-37. 23. Rather than allowing that resemblance can intensify a belief, Hume should say that resemblance can result, strictly speaking, only in a pseudointensification of belief. 24. Cf. Baier, 1991, pp. 72-74.


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derpins causal inference has the advantage of giving rise to steadiness. Hume's comparison of the relation of resemblance to that of cause and effect confirms that steadiness is essential to belief. Our original puzzle is to explain why the claim that causal inference results in belief and the claim that causal inference is justified frequently find themselves in close conjunction with each other in Part iii, though Hume does not explain the connection between them (§ III.l). What begins as a causal theory of assurance is reformulated as a causal theory of knowledge, though without Hume calling attention to the difference. An explanation of why causal inference, unlike resemblance, produces belief brings with it the claim that causal inference, unlike resemblance, produces states that are justified. Again, Hume does not call attention to the difference in these claims. To make sense of these phenomena, we must locate a property that Hume ascribes to belief and that Hume might take to be germane to justification. The only salient candidate is steadiness. Hume extensively discusses the steadiness of belief in I.iii.5-10 (T 84—123) and associated material in the Appendix. Within these sections, Hume claims that infixing is essential to belief, that custom infixes belief, and that custom or repetition gives rise to steadiness. The steadiness that results from the senses, memory, or repetition is necessary for belief. This interpretation is required to make sense of Hume's repeated statements that beliefs result from a process of infixing and that they are fast, firm, settled, solid, and steady. It is also required to explain how the results of poetical enthusiasm can exceed belief in vivacity and yet amount only to pseudobelief. These grounds for taking Hume to hold the view that stability, in the form of steadiness, is essential to belief are independent of his theory of justification. In the second of its roles, stability is connected to justification. The causal theory of belief is thus also formulated as a causal theory of knowledge. The claim that causal inference is justified—that it "brings us acquainted" with objects we have not perceived and is due to "judgment"—accompanies the claim that causal inference is due to custom or repetition. This discussion is followed by the explanation at paragraphs five and six of why resemblance does not produce belief, an explanation that stresses the unsteady character of dispositions arising from this relation and hence confirms the role Hume assigns to steadiness. In the course of this discussion, Hume writes that there is "little reason" (T 109) to feign objects based on this relation and that we form a "general rule" (T 110) against doing so. When Hume writes in paragraph seven of I.iii.9 that, in comparison to the relation of resemblance, "the relation of cause and effect has all the opposite advantages," the "advantages" he has in view are twofold, reflecting stability's interrelated roles in his theories of belief and justification. Justified beliefs result from mechanisms that tend to produce stability in belief, and beliefs are steady dispositions. This account serves to explain the intimate connection between claims about belief and claims about justification in Part iii. The explanation is that to establish that the states produced by a psychological mechanism are beliefs, and hence stable in the sense that they are steady or infixed, is sufficient to

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establish that they are justified, other things being equal (§ III. 1). My claim that whether a belief is justified depends upon considerations of stability thus integrates Hume's theory of justification with his theory of belief. In §§ III.4-6,1 consider in more detail the role of stability in Hume's theory of justification and its relationship to the steadiness of belief.

III.3. The Bearing of Hume's Treatment of Education Section I.iii.9 is titled "Of the effects of other relations and other habits." Hume discusses the effects of other relations, relations other than cause and effect—resemblance and contiguity—at pages 106-15 (§ III.2). He discusses the effects of other habits, habits other than those based on the frequent observation of conjunctions, at pages 115-17, in the final four paragraphs of the section. Hume effects the transition to this material as follows: "The present hypothesis will receive additional confirmation, if we examine the effects of other kinds of custom, as well as of other relations" (T 115). The present hypothesis consists in Hume's views regarding the "nature" (T 94) and "causes" (T 98) of belief, the respective topics of the preceding two sections, I.iii.7 and I.iii.8. Hume has defined "custom" as "every thing... which proceeds from a past repetition, without any new reasoning or conclusion" (T 102). Hume observes that "custom... may operate upon the mind... after two several ways" (T 115), so that there are "two kinds of custom" (T116). One way in which custom operates on the mind is in producing belief based on causal inference, where "in all past experience we have found two objects to have been always conjoin'd together" (T 115-16). Hume turns to "examine the effects of other kinds of custom" (T 115). Custom includes the repetition of a mere idea, as well as the repeated observation of resembling pairs of conjoined objects. Hume thus invites us to suppose that "a mere idea alone... shou'd frequently make its appearance in the mind" (T 116). Such an idea "must by degrees acquire a facility and force; and both by its firm hold and easy introduction distinguish itself from any new and unusual idea" (T 116). It will "distinguish itself" just as ideas based on the relation of cause and effect "distinguish themselves" (T 108), that is, it will be a belief. This confirms Hume's hypotheses about the nature and causes of belief. Both kinds of custom involve repetition, which produces a "firm hold" on its object.25 Hume has previously introduced an example of custom due to the repetition of a mere idea. In I.iii.5, he writes of liars, "who by the frequent repetition of their lies, come at last to believe and remember them, as realities; custom and habit having in this case, as in many others, the same influence on the mind as nature, and infixing the idea with equal force and vigour" (T 86). In the case of liars, frequent repetition infixes an idea and results in belief. In I.iii.9, "liars, by the frequent repetition of their lies, come at last to remember them" (T 117).

25. Falkenstein is clear on this point (1997, pp. 33,40-41).

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Though Hume reminds the reader of the case of liars, the I.iii.9 discussion of other habits has for its focus the repetition of an idea in education. Here Hume has in mind the mere repetition of ideas, without the source of the ideas being an accredited or corroborated authority for the person who receives the education.26 Were the source accredited, we would have an instance of "testimony," as described by Hume just a few pages earlier in I.iii.9 (T 113)—a species of causal inference, which can establish facts about human veracity (§ II. 1). If education were an instance of testimony, it would be an example of cause-andeffect reasoning, rather than an example of "other habits" or "other kinds of custom." The contrast is clear when Hume writes that the "influence" of education "on many occasions prevails over that which arises from the constant and inseparable union of causes and effects" (T 116). Hume's "education" should not be assimilated to testimony; it is best thought of as inculcation. What is the influence of education? Here again, "the frequent repetition of any idea infixes it in the imagination" (T 116) and thus produces "belief "(T 116) and "opinions" (T 116, 117). These claims are also implicit in I.iii.10, where Hume writes that "education infixes... opinion" (T 121).27 In sum, Hume's general discussion of a second form of custom, repetition of a mere idea, confirms that fixity is essential to belief and that repetition explains the presence of fixity. Even putting aside issues about whether belief is dispositional, standard formulations of Hume's theory of belief are not fully general. It is not apt to say that belief (apart from belief that arises in perception and memory) is associated with a present impression by the relation of cause and effect. This formulation leaves out the cases of liars and education. Hume holds that belief arises from any repetition. This is the maximally determinate or specific formulation that does not exclude cases of genuine belief. Hume provides this formulation, unsurprisingly, in I.iii.9: "belief is an act of the mind arising from custom" (T 114), that is, "which proceeds from a past repetition." Cast in terms of the dispositional account, belief is a disposition, arising from any repetition, to characteristic manifestations, including lively ideas. Beliefs can arise from repetition directly—as with liars and in education—or indirectly, triggered by a present impression against the background of an observed repetition or constant conjunction.28 (As we shall see in § V.2, Hume relies in Book iv of Part I on a highly

26. MacNabb, 1951 /1966, p. 79; Passmore, 1952/1968, p. 62; and Baier, 1991, p. 75. At Treatise 117, Hume devotes a paragraph to a number of "instances" that he takes to be "parallel" to education. See § IV.2, n. 7. 27. Laird reads Hume as placing education in the same category as poetical enthusiasm and resemblance, as mechanisms that do "not usually produce full conviction" (1932, p. 114). He writes that for Hume education "might acquire a force even stronger than actual experience" (p. 113). This does not do justice to Hume's position at Treatise 116 and 121. 28. Price observes that the requirement of association to a present impression would have the effect of restricting Hume's theory to beliefs about particular matters of fact, excluding general empirical beliefs (1969, pp. 179-81). As the cases of liars and inculcation show, even particular beliefs need not be related to a present impression. An advantage of taking belief to arise from repetition is that it allows a unified treatment of particular and general beliefs; both are dispositions, though the

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elastic understanding of the sense in which "repetition" or "custom" must be implicated in producing belief.) The theory that belief arises from any repetition is an extension of the theory that belief arises specifically from repeated observation of resembling pairs of conjoined objects. The generalization is important to Hume; the "other kinds of custom" provide "additional confirmation" of "the present hypothesis." Consideration of education confirms Hume's account of the nature and causes of belief.29 The point of the discussion of other kinds of custom is to confirm that beliefs are steady and infixed by repetition. The repetition of a mere idea, like the repeated observation of resembling pairs of objects and unlike the relation of resemblance, produces belief. If belief arises from any repetition, what are we to make of Hume's repeated assertion that all assurance about the unobserved arises specifically from causal inference (§ II. 1)? There are a number of points to make here. In the first place, the I.iii.9 discussion of the effects of other habits provides an explicit generalization of the theory that belief arises from repetition in observing resembling pairs of objects. As we have seen, Hume writes that "belief arises only from causation" in the two-systems passage at pages 107-8, just nine pages before the discussion of education in the same section. Education confirms the role of repetition, confirmation that is more dramatic insofar as it has not previously been discussed. This helps explain why in earlier material Hume by and large sticks to the causal theory of assurance and to the claim that belief must be related to a present impression. In the second place, recall that the causal theory of assurance is introduced in a technical sense in the Treatise (§ II.2). The thesis, strictly speaking, is that of the three philosophical relations that do not depend solely upon ideas (identity, situations in time and place, and causation), only causation gives us assurance of the existence of unobserved objects.30 This is Hume's clear meaning at pages 73-74, one that carries over to a number of subsequent statements of the thesis, including, "the only connexion or relation of objects, which can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses, is that of cause and effect" (T 89), and "the relation of cause and effect... is the only one that can assure us of matter of fact" (T 193). Now, suppose an object is present to the senses. Suppose further that one believes on the basis of education, in the sense of inculcation, that another (kind of) object is its usual attendant. One might then believe that an instance of the other kind of object is also present. This belief, however, does not arise from one of the relevant philosophical relations. In

general beliefs are dispositions to form particular beliefs under appropriate conditions. See MacNabb, 1951/1966, p. 77; and Price, 1969, pp. 181-83. 29. Cf. Baier, 1991, p. 76; and Owen, 1999, pp. 206-7. I do not agree with Passmore that Hume "now substantially abandons the pretence of giving a general theory of belief, admitting, for example, that 'education' produces in us 'beliefs' which are not associated with impressions" (1952/1968, p. 100). 30. Noonan is careful to note the context here (1999, pp. 96-98).

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the case of sheer inculcation, the testimony bears no philosophical relation to the object present to the senses. This case thus falls outside the scope of the initial thesis about the relation of causation. This helps explain Hume's insensitivity to apparent inconsistencies in his text. There is a third point, apart from this textual detail. I have stressed that Hume's claim that all "assurance" about the unobserved arises from the relation of cause and effect is ambiguous between a causal theory of belief and a causal theory of knowledge (§ III.l). At the same time, a number of formulations— where the relation of cause and effect can "discover" (T 73), "lead us" (T 89) to, "informs us of" (T 74), and "brings us acquainted with" (T 108) objects that have not been observed, matters of fact that can be "proved" (A 654) by that relation—clearly imply a thesis about knowledge, not mere belief. This is what we should expect in a constructive response to Locke's account of the limitations of sensitive knowledge (§ II.1). If we read Hume's statements of the theory in terms of a claim about knowledge, rather than mere belief, there is no inconsistency when Hume allows that education produces belief. As we shall see shortly, Hume does not think inculcation produces knowledge. It is worth noting that in describing the products of the repetition of an idea, Hume writes of "belief" (T 116), "opinions" (T 116,117), "assent to any opinion" (T 118), and infixing "opinion" (T 121), but not of "assurance." The fact that Hume's statements of the causal theory of assurance straddle claims about mere belief and about knowledge is one manifestation of the textual phenomenon that set the problem for this chapter. In Part iii, the claim that causal inference is justified seems interconnected with the claim that causal inference results in belief, though Hume does not take note of any gap between these claims. My hypothesis is that we should attribute to Hume the view that establishing that the states resulting from a psychological mechanism are beliefs in the sense that they are steady or infixed is to establish that they are justified, other things being equal (§ III.2). This hypothesis implies a significant asymmetry in the requirements for establishing that a belief is justified, other things being equal, and establishing that a belief is not justified, all things considered. Once it has been established that a state results from a mechanism that produces belief, no separate or additional argument is required to establish that the belief is justified, other things being equal. The explanatory power of my hypothesis derives from this implication, for what is puzzling is that Hume moves, without further argument, from the claim that causal inference produces belief to the claim that it produces justified belief.31 By contrast, establishing that a belief is not justified, all things considered, carries a heavier argumentative burden. In cases where Hume seeks to establish that a belief is not justified, all things considered, he will need to provide a separate or additional argument, beyond an argument for its status as the product of a belief-forming mechanism.

31. Of course, argument is required to establish the operative theory of justification. I am attempting, however, to locate the theory of justification implicit in Hume.

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This is precisely Hume's procedure in the case of education. In the final sentence of I.iii.9, Hume offers a basis for distinguishing the epistemic status of belief due to cause and effect and belief due to education: But as education is an artificial and not a natural cause, and as its maxims are frequently contrary to reason, and even to themselves in different times and places, it is never upon that account recogniz'd by philosophers; tho' in reality it be built almost on the same foundation of custom and repetition as our reasonings from causes and effects. (T 117)32

Similarly, Hume writes in the first sentence of I.iii.10 that education is "disclaim'd by philosophy, as a fallacious ground of assent to any opinion" (T 118). In these passages, Hume does distance himself from the claim that beliefs based on education are unjustified, attributing this view to "philosophers" and "philosophy." This is the first instance of this device, which we also find at Treatise 140 and 225.1 have offered an explanation of the ambivalence in these texts. Hume comes to conclude—in I.iv.7—that his favored epistemological theory cannot sustain his own pretheoretical epistemological distinctions. In anticipation of this later result, Hume sometimes distances himself from epistemological distinctions to which he himself inclines (§ 1.4). At the same time, Hume does set out a list of the grounds on which philosophers reject beliefs based on education, while recognizing beliefs based on cause and effect. Though his discussion is decidedly cryptic—confined to a single sentence—Hume treats the grounds he cites as if they might well suffice (were it not for the destructive results down the road in I.iv.7) to support the philosophers' distinction. For all his argument shows at this stage, he is himself in the company of the philosophers who reject education. Though Hume distances himself from the philosophers' views about education, he has provided no rationale for doing so. The final sentence of I.iii.9 sets out grounds for rejecting beliefs based on education (T 117-18 n. 1). It is in the footnote to this sentence that Hume consolidates his own normative distinction between the understanding, the approved associative mechanisms that underpin demonstrative and probable reasoning, and the imagination, associative mechanisms that Hume holds in disfavor (§ II.3). The constructive project of sustaining epistemic discriminations thus survives Hume's brief discussion of the grounds for rejecting beliefs based on education. Hume has in place a general account of belief, as arising from any repetition, together with a commitment to vindicating discriminations between justified and unjustified belief. Hume argues at pages 115-16 that education produces belief and appends a separate argument at page 117 to explain why beliefs based on education are not justified. At a stage where Hume wants to establish that a class of beliefs is not justified, all things considered, he explicitly recognizes a distinction between belief and justified belief. The overall structure of Hume's treatment of

32. In Norton and Norton, forthcoming, "our reasonings" will read "our experience or reasonings." See Norton and Norton, 2000a, p. 252.

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education thus provides new data in support of attributing to Hume the view that to establish that the states produced by a psychological mechanism are beliefs is to establish that they are justified, other things being equal. Hume's I.iii.9 discussion of kinds of custom other than that involved in causal inference confirms my interpretation of Hume's theory of justification and my account of his theory of belief. III.4. The Natural Function of Belief It remains to consider in more detail the role of stability in Hume's theory of justification and its relationship to the steadiness of belief. Why does stability, other things being equal, matter to Hume? In the second and third paragraphs of I.iii.10, "Of the influence of belief," Hume explains why steadiness is important: Nature... seems to have carefully avoided the inconveniences of two extremes. Did impressions alone influence the will, we should every moment of our lives be subject to the greatest calamities; because, tho' we foresaw their approach, we should not be provided by nature with any principle of action, which might impel us to avoid them. On the other hand, did every idea influence our actions, our condition would not be much mended. For such is the unsteadiness and activity of thought, that the images of every thing, especially of goods and evils, are always wandering in the mind; and were it mov'd by every idle conception of this kind, it would never enjoy a moment's peace and tranquillity. Nature has, therefore, chosen a medium, and has neither bestow'd on every idea of good and evil the power of actuating the will, nor yet has entirely excluded them from this influence. Tho' an idle fiction has no efficacy, yet we find by experience, that the ideas of those objects, which we believe either are or will be existent, produce in a lesser degree the same effect with those impressions, which are immediately present to the senses and perception. The effect, then, of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions. (T 118-19)

Were we moved to action only by sense impressions and memories, we could not make inferences to future events and thus could not make plans to avoid prospective pain or to enjoy prospective pleasure. Were we moved to action by every idea of pain or pleasure, we would not pursue a coherent plan of action over time, since our mental activity is unsteady, our ideas wander.33 Nature therefore provides a medium between these two extremes, so that some—but not all—ideas influence the will and action. These ideas are beliefs, nature's provision for a steady influence on the will and hence on action. Hume's conception of the natural function of belief helps to explain the importance he attaches to the distinction between establishing that belief is

33. Winters also draws on Treatise 118-19 to make this point (1981, pp. 640-41). Though Passmore dismisses Hume's preference for coherent and settled belief as a prejudice (§ 1.5), he does not cite Treatise 118-19, much as he overlooks the potential role for uneasiness in this context.

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justified, other things being equal, and establishing that belief is justified, all things considered.34 As we shall see in § III.5, this distinction is critical to understanding the relationship between Hume's favorable attitude toward causal inference in Part iii and his negative or pessimistic assessment of causal inference in I.iv.7. Any belief is steady in its influence on thought, the passions, and action in the sense that it is infixed or steady in virtue of the mechanism that produces it. It does not follow that the belief is steady in its influence, all things considered. A belief might fail to be steady in its influence owing to the presence of beliefs with which it conflicts, beliefs that reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of its characteristic manifestations or its typical effects, which reduce its influence on the will and action. In Hume's view, the point of a distinction between establishing that belief is justified, other things being equal, and establishing that belief is justified, all things considered, is to call attention to the kinds of circumstances in which belief, a steady disposition, might nevertheless be unsteady in its effects. The "other things being equal" qualification is thus cashed out substantively, with reference to conditions in which states are infixed but nevertheless unsteady in their influence due to the operation of other mechanisms. Hume's concern is with circumstances that undermine the natural function of belief. Hereinafter, I use the term 'stable' as a shorthand for "steady in its influence on thought, passions, and action." There are a variety of circumstances in which beliefs produced by a mechanism, though steady in that they are infixed, could be unstable, unsteady in their influence. In one class of cases, a belief might be unstable owing to the presence of a contradictory belief. In I.iv.2, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," Hume discusses two related sets of contradictory beliefs. Hume characterizes "contradiction" as an "opposition" or "combat" (T 205-6); "contradiction" involves "struggle and opposition" between "two enemies" in an effort to "destroy" (T 215) one another (§§ 1.2, V.3). The language of psychological conflict is not merely metaphorical or figurative; the conflicts have identifiable effects. For example, we find that we "successively assent" (T 266) to both sides of a contradiction (§ 1.2). In holding contradictory beliefs, we are conflicted at the level of our underlying dispositions. These contradictory beliefs typically alternate in their influence, with one combatant, then the other, temporarily gaining the upper hand. These dispositions are infixed and steady, but—owing to the presence of the opposing belief—neither is stable.

34. One could press Hume in the direction of bringing evolutionary or biological considerations to bear on justification. Cf. Schmitt, 1992, esp. pp. 67-72. (See also § IV.5, n. 36.) For discussions of protoevolutionary views in Hume, see Pike, 1970, pp. 176—82; and Monteiro, 1976. The latter includes helpful references to a wide body of literature. I think Pears overstates the distance between us and Hume owing to the development of Darwinian theory. See his 1990, p. 68, though cf. 98. In claiming that, according to Hume, operations of the imagination "are found to be only trivially or accidentally connected with the truth of the beliefs which are their effects" (1991, p. 274), Stroud seems to overlook the possibility that Hume takes many beliefs to result from mechanisms that are adaptive. Also see § 1.5, n. 29.

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Hume's treatment of education provides an example of this sort of case. It is important that "education," in Hume's sense, is inculcation, not inductively accredited testimony (§ III.3). In the final paragraph of I.iii.9, Hume explains why beliefs based on education are not justified. In the first paragraph of I.iii.10, he reiterates that "education infixes... opinion" (T 121). Hume's explanation of why beliefs based on education are not justified, though brief, contains a number of strands. We should expect Hume's conception of the natural function of belief, developed in the following two paragraphs, to be germane to his treatment of education. Hume observes that education's "maxims are frequently contrary... even to themselves" (T 117). Different unaccredited sources can inculcate "contrary" beliefs in a single person. Education tends to give rise to states that are beliefs and hence infixed, yet unsteady in their influence—owing to the presence of contradictory beliefs.35 In bringing forward these considerations, Hume establishes that education is not justified, all things considered. (I say more about Hume's treatment of education in § VII.6.) The influence of a belief might also be undermined by the presence of second-order beliefs that one takes to call into question whether a first-order belief is true. An example would be a belief system that includes contradictory beliefs and also the second-order belief that one believes this contradiction. To take another example, suppose one believes that p and also holds the secondorder belief that p results from a belief-forming mechanism that is unreliable, leading to false beliefs more often than not. In these and related instances, one takes one's second-order beliefs to indicate that some of one's beliefs are not true, or not likely to be true. Hume, I suggest, holds that reflection on such second-order beliefs unsettles the first-order beliefs that are called into question, so that one is less inclined to maintain them. The first-order beliefs remain sufficiently infixed to constitute belief but are like a steady performer who becomes shaken or rattled or suffers a loss of confidence. To say that the secondorder belief "unsettles" the first-order belief is to say that it unsteadies it—in the sense that its steadiness is somewhat reduced.36 The unsettled belief is less likely to produce its typical effects, less likely to influence the will and action. Here we have a second class of cases in which a belief might be unstable owing to the presence of beliefs with which it conflicts. Cases of this sort play a crucial role in I.iv.l, I.iv.4, and I.iv.7. This second source of instability has an important feature, in that considerations with respect to truth undermine stability in belief. This might seem paradoxical. It is a familiar thought that "belief aims at truth." In my interpretation, Hume maintains that stability is the natural function of belief. We might put this point by saying that nature endows us with belief in order to achieve stability, a steady influence on thought, the will, and action. But if stability is the

35. Cf.MacNabb, 1951/1966, pp. 79,96,99. 36. Here I prefer 'unsettle' to 'unsteady' because the latter admits an alternative reading, such that to unsteady a belief is to render it not steady, sufficiently unsteady that it no longer constitutes belief.

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natural function of belief, how can there be room for belief to aim at something else, something other than stability, and at truth in particular? It thus might be thought that in my interpretation of Hume justification is a matter of stability rather than truth. The possibility of the second source of instability shows that this would be a mistake. It remains to understand why. To make headway, it will be helpful to consider the sense in which belief aims at truth. Belief exhibits two kinds of characteristics. In the first place, belief is typically associated with a first-order disposition (or set of dispositions) to display particular manifestations in relevant circumstances. These manifestations include other internal states, as well as verbal and nonverbal behavior. In the second place, belief is typically associated with a second-order disposition to regulate one's belief that a proposition is true, and hence the first-order dispositions involved in belief, by (what one takes to be) evidence or indicators of truth. The characterization of this disposition provides the sense in which belief "aims" at the truth; when we believe a proposition, we accept it as true with the aim that whether or not we believe it should be responsive to its truth, with the aim that belief should be sensitive to what is really true.37 There is room for controversy about the relationship between these features of belief. It might be held that possession of the first-order disposition to display characteristic manifestations is sufficient for belief, so that one could believe a proposition even in the absence of the second-order disposition to regulate one's first-order dispositions by (what one takes to be) evidence of the truth. Alternatively, it might be held that the second-order disposition is constitutive of belief, so that the presence of the first-order disposition is not sufficient for belief unless the second-order disposition is also present.38 An example will serve to make vivid the differences between these conceptions of belief. Suppose someone possesses the first-order dispositions involved in belief that p. We present strong evidence that the belief has been acquired and sustained by a highly unreliable method. The person appreciates this evidence, but is not moved or bothered by it, and indeed continues to possess the firstorder dispositions. If a second-order, regulative disposition is not required for belief, then the person possessing the first-order dispositions maintains the belief that p. If a second-order, regulative disposition is required for belief, the person's attitude toward p is not belief, but rather something else. Let us call it blind faith that p; the person regards p as true without possessing the second-order disposition to regulate his first-order dispositions by (what the person takes to be) evidence of their truth. Where does Hume stand with respect to these two conceptions? I have argued that Hume holds that beliefs are steady dispositions to particular manifes37. I owe the central distinction in this paragraph to David Velleman, in conversation. The formulations are based on Velleman, 1992, pp. 13-15 (including n. 24), and 1996, p. 709; and Leon, 1992, pp. 299-302. Note that the claim that belief aims at truth is not the simple tautology that to believe that p is to believe that p is true. 38. This position is found in Velleman, 1992,pp. 10-15,and 1996, pp. 707-11. See also Humberstone, 1992, pp. 73-75; and Kobes, 1992.


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tations (§§ III.2-3). Hume thus takes the first-order dispositions to be essential to belief. It does not follow that Hume holds that a (steady) disposition to display characteristic manifestations is all that is required for belief. Whether he does hold this depends on his view about the role of the second-order, regulative dispositions. Short of compelling evidence, we ought not suppose that a historical figure would deny that, in having belief, we seek to regulate what we regard as true by (what we take to be) evidence of truth. Even if such an aim is not constitutive, or of the essence, of belief, it seems closely associated with it. Consider the example of the person who has blind faith that p. At the least, we are inclined to look for some special psychological explanation of his indifferent response to evidence. Perhaps, for example, the person is so invested in regarding p as true as to fall into self-deception about the evidential state of affairs. In that event, however, the person does not take the unreliability of the method used to acquire the belief to be evidence against the truth of p after all.39 There appears to be an important connection between belief and the second-order, regulative disposition. We ought not suppose that Hume would deny this. To the contrary, Hume is well aware of this connection. In I.iv.l, Hume observes that "our reason must be consider'd as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect; but such-a-one as by the irruption of other causes, and by the inconstancy of our mental powers, may frequently be prevented" (T 180). Hume is explicit that reflection on the degree to which a faculty is fallible or unreliable can unsettle a belief and undermine its influence: Having thus found in every probability, beside the original uncertainty inherent in the subject, a new uncertainty deriv'd from the weakness of that faculty, which judges, and having adjusted these two together, we are oblig'd by our reason to add a new doubt deriv'd from the possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truth and fidelity of our faculties. (T 182)

Similarly, Hume writes: "When I reflect on the natural fallibility of my judgment, I have less confidence in my opinions" (T 183). These claims presuppose that belief aims at truth. There is a loss of confidence in a belief precisely because one reflects on the degree to which a faculty ("my judgment") is fallible or unreliable, unlikely to lead to truth.40 Reflection on second-order beliefs that one takes to call into question the truth of first-order beliefs would not unsettle the latter beliefs unless one sought to regulate belief by what one takes to be

39. I owe this point to David Velleman. 40. As evidence that Hume subscribes to a reliabilist theory of justification, Schmitt writes: "A systematic review of Book I shows that Hume is persistently concerned to judge the reliability of our operations"; the passage I quote from Treatise 180 is one of Schmitt's examples (1992, p. 56). Schmitt draws on a range of evidence, but it is important that the sorts of passages he cites do not immediately explain the nature of Hume's concern for reliability. A coherentist, and hence an internalist, could be concerned to assess reliability, in the service of incorporating into a belief system second-order beliefs about the success of belief-forming mechanisms, beliefs that increase overall coherence.

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evidence of truth. We might put this by saying that considerations of stability absorb considerations of truth; the regulative disposition operates through its impact on stability. Hume does not say whether the second-order, regulative disposition of "aiming at truth" is—like the steady first-order disposition to display particular manifestations—essential to belief; however, he regards the second-order disposition to regulate one's beliefs by what one takes to be evidence of truth as generally characteristic of belief. What happened to the claim that stability is the natural function of belief? Belief, for Hume, is a steady disposition to particular manifestations, typically associated with a second-order disposition to regulate the first-order disposition by what one takes to be evidence or indicators of truth. (In virtue of this regulative disposition, belief aims at truth.) Belief, so characterized, is nature's provision for a steady influence on thought, the will, and action. Stability is the natural function of belief; the first-order dispositions to display characteristic manifestations and the second-order, regulative disposition are the means for achieving stability, so that belief can serve its natural function or purpose. Within this framework, the aim of truth and the natural function of stability are wheels that engage one another; reflection on considerations with respect to truth can undermine stability. This is what happens in the second class of cases in which a belief is unstable owing to the presence of second-order beliefs.41 Much as it seems plausible that contradictory beliefs will alternate in their influence, it seems plausible that first-order beliefs will be unsettled by the presence of second-order beliefs that question their truth. In §§ IV.3-5,1 extend Hume's account of sources of instability to cases that are less straightforward. At this stage, I turn to some chief examples of instability owing to the presence of second-order beliefs with which a belief conflicts. Part iv of Book I contains a number of case studies of reflections that call into question the truth of one's beliefs. Here I have in view considerations Hume raises in I.iv.l and I.iv.4 and elaborates in I.iv.7. The first of these, at Treatise 266, involves "a manifest contradiction" (§§ 1.4—5). Hume writes in the final paragraph of I.iv.4,"Of the modern philosophy": "There is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses; or more properly speaking, betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect, and those that persuade us of the continu'd and independent existence of body" (T 231). (I examine Hume's grounds for this conclusion at § VII.2.) Hume claims that the senses lead us to believe that matter has a continued and independent existence but that causal reasoning shows that this belief is false. Hume appeals to this contradiction between the senses and causal reasoning in I.iv.7: 'Tis this principle [the imagination, or the vivacity of ideas], which makes us reason from causes and effects; and 'tis the same principle, which convinces us of the continu'd existence of external objects, when absent from the senses. But

41. For additional discussion of the relationship between truth and stability, with applications to Sextus, Descartes, and Peirce, see my 1998, esp. pp. 205-9.


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tho' these two operations be equally natural and necessary in the human mind, yet in some circumstances they are *directly contrary. (T 266)

Hume's footnote is to I.iv.4. The passage continues: "How then shall we adjust those principles together? Which of them shall we prefer?" (T 266). Arising from "equally natural and necessary" principles, the contradiction is ineliminable (§ 1.5). Hume writes that we "successively assent to both" (T 266), describing the cycle of alternating influence that can occur in the presence of opposing, equipollent beliefs (§ 1.2). There is, moreover, an additional source of instability once a contradiction is recognized. Reflecting on the contradiction, we have a need to "adjust those principles together"; we are disposed to adjust our principles or beliefs. Though these beliefs are steady in that they are infixed, when one considers the contradiction one is less inclined to maintain the dispositions in question. In I.iv.l, "Of scepticism with regard to reason," Hume also introduces a consideration that calls into question the truth of one's beliefs. Indeed, he claims to identify a systemic source of instability. Hume argues that "all knowledge," even demonstrative knowledge, "degenerates into probability" (T 180). "Probability" is "that evidence, which we employ in common life" (T 181), evidence based on causal inference. As we have seen earlier in this section, Hume argues that judgments of probability are subject to correction in light of the fallibility of judgment. Furthermore, this correction takes the form of a reduction in the estimate of probability, and the new judgment of probability is itself subject to correction and reduction, ad infmitum. The result of such a series of reductions, he claims, would be "a total extinction of belief and evidence" (T 183); it would "at last reduce [the original evidence] to nothing" (T 184).42 (I examine Hume's grounds for this conclusion at § VII.3.) Hume takes up this material in I.iv.7. At page 267, he frames "a very dangerous dilemma" (§§ 1.4,5). We can rely on the understanding—demonstrative and causal inference—alone, subjecting probability judgments to repeated corrections. Or we can rely on the understanding together with "seemingly trivial" (T 268) properties. Hume writes of the first alternative: "I have already shewn,* that the understanding, when it acts alone,... entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition" (T 267). Hume's footnote is to I.iv. 1,43 If, however, we admit the trivial propensities, we embrace "manifest

42. Owen contends that Hume's "concern is not about justification, but about truth" (1999, p. 189). In most any account of justification, there is some connection between justification and truth. This observation also bears on Garrett's position that the line of development at I.iv.l and pages 267-68 of I.iv.7 unfolds entirely within cognitive psychology, rather than normative epistemology (1997, pp. 222-27). The corrections are for the likelihood of "error" (T 180,182) in light of "our fallible ... faculties" (T 180). For related criticism of Garrett, see Fogelin, 1998, p. 168. 43, There is the suggestion that the argument that probability reduces to zero is directed at non-Humean conceptions of belief: "If belief, therefore, were a simple act of the thought, without any peculiar manner of conception, or the addition of a force and vivacity, it must infallibly destroy itself" (T 184). This suggestion is canceled, twice over. First, Hume writes in the next paragraph:

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absurdities" (T 268). Recognizing this dilemma—much as in the case of noticing a contradiction—we have a need to adjust our faculties and beliefs: "What party, then, shall we choose among these difficulties?" (T 268). And much as Hume cannot find a way to revise his beliefs when he attends to the contradiction between the senses and causal inference, he writes of the present dilemma: "For my part, I know not what ought to be done in the present case" (T 268). As it stands, the dilemma is artificial. It is not open to us to adhere to the understanding alone. The extinction of belief depends upon the assumption that the principles by which we correct probability judgments are "apply'd to every new reflex judgment" (T 184). It is only when adherence to the understanding is "steadily executed" (T 267) that belief is extinguished. Hume has argued that repeated correction of probability judgments "becomes forc'd and unnatural" (T 185), "the attention is on the stretch: the posture of the mind is uneasy" (T 185), and "we enter with difficulty into remote views of things" (T 268). Though we might "take a resolution" (T 267) to adhere to the understanding alone, this is not a resolution we could keep. The extinction of belief depends on a series of corrections and reductions that does not take place. Hume's point, I suggest, is that the considerations in I.iv.l generate the second-order belief that were we to subject judgments of probability to repeated corrections, the probability of the original judgment would reduce "to nothing." This second-order belief calls into question the truth of probability judgments and thereby unsettles them. When one considers that a series of corrections would reduce to zero the probability that first-order beliefs are true, one is less inclined to maintain one's current probability judgments.44 As we have seen, the second-order belief that we hold contradictory beliefs, based on the senses and causal inference, about the existence of matter also unsettles belief. In sum, I.iv.7 may be read as calling attention to the unsettling effects of some second-order beliefs, which call into question the truth of other beliefs one holds. Hume takes the instabilities that emerge in I.iv.7 to bear negatively on the justificatory status of the beliefs that are unsettled. He discusses the unsettling effects of considerations introduced earlier in Part iv at pages 265-68 of I.iv.7. At page 268, Hume writes: "I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning" (§§ 1.4, II.2). Thus we find in Hume the judgment that no belief, not even belief based on causal inference, is justified. The considerations that lead Hume to this result are ones that call into question the truth of his beliefs, thereby unsettling them. This reduces the steadiness in influence these beliefs would otherwise have, in

"But here, perhaps, it may be demanded, how it happens, even upon my hypothesis [that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures], that these arguments above-explain'd produce not a total suspense of judgment" (T 184). Second, at Treatise 267 Hume appeals to I.iv.l to support a general result about the subversion of belief. Cf. Lynch, 1996, esp. pp. 100-101; and Owen, 1999, p. 198. 44. I provide a somewhat different treatment of this material in my 1991, pp. 261-68; 1995a, pp. 103-12; and 1995b, pp. 323-27. The interpretation in the text is closer to that of my 1998, p. 222.

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virtue of being infixed, and thus undermines the natural function of belief. This is, at least, one reading of I.iv.7, Hume's difficult "Conclusion of this book."45 A stability-based interpretation provides a fruitful account of the relationship between Parts iii and iv of Book 1.1 have argued that the interpretation explains why the claims that causal inference results in belief and that causal inference is justified are entwined in I.iii.9 and neighboring sections (§§ III. 1-2). Whereas Hume registers epistemic approval of causal inference throughout Part iii, in I.iv.7 he is "ready to reject all belief and reasoning." Whereas Hume provides an extended account of "the several degrees of evidence" (T 124; cf. 153-54) in I.iii.11-13, in I.iv.7 he "can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another" (T 268-69). Hume's destructive conclusions in I.iv.7 reverse his attitude toward causal inference in comparison to Part iii of Book I. To establish—as Hume does in Part iii—that the states produced by a psychological mechanism are beliefs, and hence steady in their influence in that they are infixed, is to establish that they are justified, other things being equal. To establish—as Hume does in Part iv—that the beliefs produced by a psychological mechanism are unstable is to establish they are not justified, all things considered. Hume's readiness to reject all belief as unjustified, at least for the reflective person, emerges in light of his claim that beliefs based on causal inference are unstable. My interpretation thus both accommodates the destructive conclusions in Part iv and explains the favorable results of Part iii.

III.5. Two Versions of the Stability-Based Theory There is an ambiguity in my account of the relationship between Part iii and Part iv. I have said that the instabilities that emerge in I.iv.7 "bear negatively" on the justificatory status of beliefs based on causal inference. Would Hume want

45. Garrett maintains that Hume endorses a normative epistemic principle in I.iv.7: "Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does not, it never can have any title to operate upon us" (T 270). Garrett thinks this "Title Principle" (1997, p. 234) avoids the first horn of the dilemma (§ III.4) because the repeated reflection required to subvert belief is strained rather than lively and mixed with some propensity (p. 235). That is fair enough, but we need not strain to reach the higher-order belief that were we to subject judgments of probability to repeated corrections, the probability of the original judgment would reduce to "nothing." Also, the title principle cannot show us a way around the manifest contradiction. Garrett thinks that at Treatise 265-66 Hume is merely addressing difficulties that arise specifically for modern philosophers (p. 220). Garrett does not mention the first sentence of the following paragraph: "This contradiction wou'd be more excusable, were it compensated by any degree of solidity and satisfaction in the other parts of our reasoning" (T 266). Hume introduces the dangerous dilemma in the next paragraph, which suggests a continuous normative argument; he finds nothing to mitigate the epistemic problems the manifest contradiction raises for parts of "our reasoning." In addition, the title principle, which appears but once in the Treatise, is wedged between his discussions of periods of amusements at Treatise 269 and the description of the return of a reflective posture at 271 (§111.7). The title principle thus itself seems to reflect a momentary mood, rather than Hume's considered epistemic view. Cf. Winkler, 1999, pp. 198-200. See also Singer, 1995, pp. 609-12.

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to say that belief based on causal inference is never justified because it is susceptible to the instabilities he identifies in Part iv? Or might beliefs based on causal inference be justified, even though susceptible to these instabilities, provided they are not in fact infected by them? These questions are closely related to an ambiguity in my distinction between establishing that a belief is justified, other things being equal, and establishing that a belief is justified, all things considered. Let us say that a person who searches for contradictions among beliefs, examines the reliability of belief-forming mechanisms in producing true beliefs, considers the results of methodical application of the cognitive faculties, and so forth is (fully) reflective. There are degrees of reflectiveness. For the present purposes, it will suffice to group together persons who are not fully reflective as "unreflective." With this classification in hand, we can explain the ambiguity I have in mind. Before doing so, it will be helpful to recall that Hume prefers to evaluate the justificatory status of a belief derivatively, with reference to the tendency of the beliefforming mechanism that causes it to produce stability in belief (§ 1.4). This can make for cumbersome formulations. Such shorthand locutions as "a belief is justified if it is stable" are to be construed to mean "a belief is justified if it results from a mechanism that tends to produce stable beliefs." In one interpretation, the beliefs produced by a psychological mechanism are justified, all things considered, if they tend to be steady in their influence for a reflective person, that is, for a person who fully examines beliefs in the ways I have characterized. To say that the beliefs are justified, other things being equal, is to say that for all that has been shown, they would tend to be steady in their influence for a reflective person. In this interpretation, to establish that the states that result from a psychological mechanism are beliefs is to establish other things being equal, to establish provisionally, that they are justified. Any gap between establishing justification other things being equal and establishing justification all things considered is a gap in our knowledge of what a reflective person's belief system would be like. In the second interpretation, the beliefs resulting from a psychological mechanism are justified, all things considered, if they tend to be steady in their influence given the actual degree to which the person who holds the belief is reflective. To say that the beliefs are justified, other things being equal, is to say that they are steady, in that they are infixed by the senses, memory, or repetition. Such beliefs might nevertheless tend to be unsteady in their influence, all things considered, owing to the operation of mechanisms that tend to produce conflicts within the belief system of the person who holds the belief. In this interpretation, to establish that a psychological mechanism produces states that are beliefs is to establish that these beliefs are justified other things being equal, that they possess prima facie or defeasible justification. Any gap between establishing justification other things being equal and establishing justification all things considered is a gap between the steadiness that accrues to beliefs in virtue of being infixed and the steadiness in their influence of beliefs that do not conflict with other beliefs one holds. Though a mechanism might tend to produce beliefs, other mechanisms that operate (given the actual degree to which the per-

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son is reflective) might tend to produce conflicts that render such beliefs unsteady in their influence. It is in this way that defeasible justification can be undermined. In light of Hume's conclusions in I.iv.7 (§ III.4), the two versions of a stability-based interpretation diverge in their epistemic assessments of the unreflective person. In the first version, the stable beliefs of an unreflective person are unjustified because they would be unsteady in their influence under reflection. In the second version, the stable beliefs of the unreflective person are justified because, given the degree to which the person is reflective, they are steady in their influence; it is the reflective person who is in the grip of instability. Both versions assign a crucial role to considerations of stability; they differ in what that role is. In the second version, justification depends on whether a belief is stable given the actual degree to which the subject, the person who holds the belief, is reflective. This version imposes a requirement of stability under the subject's de facto degree of reflection, stability for the actual subject. In the first version, justification depends on whether a belief would be stable under (full) reflection, stable for a reflective subject. This requirement of stability under reflection is more demanding or stringent than that of stability under the subject's actual degree of reflection.46 It might be helpful to consider the character of the second version of Hume's theory, where the requirement for justification is stability for the actual subject. According to this version, the fact that a mechanism generates beliefs goes some way in conferring justification. A belief-forming mechanism is a psychological mechanism that regularly produces, or tends to produce, beliefs. It follows from Hume's account of belief that the products of a belief-forming mechanism tend to be steady in their influence in that they are infixed, and hence stable, other things being equal. In the second version of Hume's theory, to say that beliefs are justified, other things being equal, is to say that they are stable, steady in their influence, simply in virtue of being infixed by the mechanism that produces them. It follows that the products of a belief-forming mechanism are automatically justified, other things being equal, simply in virtue of resulting from a belief-forming mechanism; they automatically possess prima facie or defeasible justification.47

46. The first version of a stability-based interpretation has affinities with reflexive approval interpretations due to Baier and Korsgaard (§ 1.5). The second version, however, allows that an unreflective person holds beliefs that are justified though they would not survive self-scrutiny or reflection, so that this less demanding theory is not an instance of a reflexive approval view. 47. The second version of the stability-based theory does not imply that beliefs are justified, other things being equal, simply in virtue of being beliefs. A belief might not result from a beliefforming mechanism because it does not result from any mechanism or because it results from a mechanism that only infrequently produces beliefs. (Perhaps association by the relation of resemblance occasionally produces belief.) Rather, the requirement of stability for the actual subject implies that those beliefs that result from belief-forming mechanisms are automatically justified. In my 200 Ib, esp. sec. 4,1 develop an interpretation where the justification of a belief depends upon its own stability, rather than the tendency of the mechanism that causes it to produce stable belief. Elaborated in this way, Hume's position does imply that justification, other things being equal, is an

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The two versions of the stability-based theory lead to different understandings of the relationship between Parts iii and iv of Book I of the Treatise. Let us begin with the first and more demanding version, which requires stability under reflection. In this interpretation, when Hume registers epistemic approval of beliefs based on causal inference in Part iii, he is claiming that, so far as he has examined causal inference, he has not uncovered any considerations to suggest that beliefs based on causal inference would be unstable if subjected to greater reflection. The only considerations in play in Hume's discussion of the nature and causes of belief are ones that relate to custom or habit, the mechanism that produces, and infixes, the dispositions that arise from causal inference. Indeed, as of I.iii.10, Hume has not fully scrutinized custom or repetition itself; in I.iii.12, he introduces a distinction between "imperfect" (T 131) and "perfect" (134,135) habits (§ II.l). What is more, as of the close of Part iii, Hume has not yet considered the methodical application of causal inference, the belief in body, the relationship between causal inference and the senses, and so forth. Hume defers such questions to Part iv. In I.iv.7, he appeals to the instabilities located in I.iv.l and I.iv.4 in route to his destructive conclusions about justified belief. Thus, an interpretation in which Hume holds the more demanding theory provides a natural reading of the recurrent claim in Part iii that causal inference is justified. This is a provisional judgment; for all Hume has shown at that stage, beliefs based on causal inference are stable. So far, so good. Once the considerations advanced in I.iv.7 are in view, this provisional judgment is withdrawn in favor of the "all things considered" judgment that belief based on causal inference is unjustified. Such belief is unjustified because it would be unstable for a reflective person.48 This is a reading of the relationship between Parts iii and iv from the perspective of an interpretation that ascribes to Hume the requirement of stability under reflection. The interpretation that attributes to Hume the less demanding theory, requiring stability under the subject's actual degree of reflection, can also make sense of the developments in Part iv that I have reviewed. If Hume's requirement is stability for the actual subject, we can think of his discussion of the two systems of realities—based on the senses, memory, and custom—as exhibiting

intrinsic property of belief. This thesis is characteristic of a "negative coherence theory" of justification, in the sense of Pollock, 1979, esp. pp. 105-11, and 1986, esp. pp. 72-73, 83-87. I am indebted to Frederick Schmitt for helping me distinguish the implications of the two developments of my position. 48. Proponents of reflexive approval interpretations want to contain this result. Baier, I believe, would look to reflection that is suitably socialized (1991, pp. 284-85,119-20), but I do not see how the element of cooperation can avoid the subversive results of the reflections in I.iv. 1 and I.iv.4. See my 1994, pp. 473-74. Korsgaard takes note of the problem (1996, p. 63 n. 31), referring to a Hume Society Conference paper. As I read this unpublished work, Korsgaard takes Hume to allow that under full reflection we approve beliefs held unreflectively, e.g., beliefs that we will hold unreflectively in the future. This approach enables Korsgaard to interpret Hume as retaining the full reflection test, by applying such reflection to unreflective beliefs. But if under reflection we disapprove of our beliefs held reflectively, would we under reflection approve of the same beliefs held unreflectively?

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a specimen belief system that someone might hold. The beliefs it contains are automatically justified, other things being equal, simply in virtue of resulting from belief-forming mechanisms. Given that the subject does not engage in the sorts of reflections characteristic of Part iv, there is no tendency to instability in belief, which would undermine the prima facie or defeasible justification within this belief system, so that the beliefs it contains are also justified, all things considered. This is different from the upshot of attributing to Hume the more demanding theory. If justification requires stability under reflection, as of Part iii, beliefs based on the senses, memory, and causal inference are merely justified for all that has been shown. Since instabilities would emerge upon reflection, the beliefs are not justified, all things considered. In the less demanding reading, if there is no tendency to instability in the specimen belief system, all the considerations relevant to that person's belief system have been taken into account; the other things being equal condition is satisfied, and the person has justified belief, all things considered. In sum, Hume's claim that to establish that states produced by a mechanism are beliefs, and hence steady, is sufficient to establish that they are justified, other things being equal, admits of two interpretations. Both afford a natural resolution of the original puzzle: to explain why the claim that causal inference is justified arises in tandem with the claim that causal inference results in belief. In the more demanding reading, to establish that the products of causal inference are beliefs, and hence steady in that they are infixed, is to establish that they would be steady in a reflective person's belief system, for all that has been shown; the claim in Part iii that causal inference is justified is provisional. In the less demanding reading, to establish that the products of causal inference are beliefs, and hence steady in that they are infixed, is to establish that these beliefs are justified, other things being equal. I believe one must adopt one or the other of these interpretations—interpretations that link justification to stability—in order to explain the textual phenomena in Part iii. III.6. A Defense of Attributing the Less Demanding Version to Hume I have argued that the fact that instabilities that infect causal inference emerge upon reflection in I.iv.7 does not in itself adjudicate between the two readings of Hume's theory of justification. Is there reason to believe that Hume subscribes to one version of the theory rather than the other? My claim that Hume develops his theory of justification in two stages, constructive and destructive (§ 1.4), is a useful starting point for considering this question. If justification requires stability under reflection, no belief is justified. The more demanding version of the stability-based theory thus readily explains Hume's reversal in his expressed attitude toward the epistemological distinctions he has drawn. But we are left to wonder why Hume abandons his pretheoretical epistemic commitments rather than the theory that fails to sustain them.

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I think it fair to respond that Hume has evidence for taking a stability-based theory as giving the most promise of sustaining his pretheoretical commitments and that he has no more promising theory in view. After all, the more demanding theory has a great deal of provisional success; it explains Hume's pretheoretical intuitions about causal inference (§§ 111.2,5) and also, as we shall see, explains his epistemic judgments relating to the probability of causes (§ IV.l), "unphilosophical" probability (§§ IV.2-6), and beliefs resulting from associative propensities other than causal inference (§§ V.l-4). At the same time, attributing to Hume the less demanding version of the theory does a better job of explaining Hume's reversal in his epistemic judgments, without thereby seeming to mandate abandonment of the stabilitybased theory. If justification requires stability given the actual degree to which the subject is reflective, it is open to Hume to refine his pretheoretical commitments in light of the developments in I.iv.7. The less demanding version overturns those commitments only insofar as they are construed as epistemic assessments of the beliefs of the reflective person; it sustains the commitments construed as assessments of the stable beliefs of unreflective persons. This asymmetry leads to a qualified reversal, with Hume retaining the less demanding version of the theory in light of its success in systematizing his pretheoretical distinctions in their application to unreflective persons. The less demanding theory offers a more nuanced account of Hume's reversal. Hume's remarks in I.iv.7 subsequent to pages 268-69 confirm this interpretation. If Hume inclines to the more demanding theory, his position is that no belief is justified, for either the reflective or the unreflective person. It is unclear, however, that Hume has any epistemic objection to the stable beliefs of the unreflective person. At page 272, Hume writes of landholders: "Honest gentlemen, who being always employ'd in their domestic affairs, or amusing themselves in common recreations, have carried their thoughts very little beyond those objects, which are every day expos'd to their senses" (T 272). We can think of these unreflective persons as confining their beliefs to the senses, memory, and everyday causal inference. Hume's discussion continues: "And indeed, of such as these I pretend not to make philosophers, nor do I expect them either to be associates in these researches or auditors of these discoveries" (T 272). Far from criticizing the beliefs of the landholders, Hume writes that "they do well to keep themselves in their present situation" (T 272). This has an approving ring.49 The less demanding version of Hume's theory—in which beliefs are justified provided they are steady in their influence given the degree to which the subject is reflective—can account for this. The belief system of the unreflective person is not infected by the instabilities endemic to the beliefs of someone who

49. Flew describes Hume as "commending" the landholders (1986, p. 115). As Hookway notes, "The condition of a country gentleman ... may be enviable but is not available to everyone" (1990, p. 101). The point that the condition is not available to those who are more reflective is as close as Hume comes to objecting to it.

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is more reflective. Treatise 272 thus supports attributing the less demanding theory to Hume.50 There is, however, an important line of objection to interpreting Hume in accordance with the less demanding version of the stability-based theory. The worry is that if justification depends upon the actual degree to which a person is reflective, justification comes too easy. It would seem that beliefs arising from dogmatism, deference to authority, and ignoring evidence—to take some leading examples—could be stable. If justification simply requires stability under the subject's actual degree of reflection, such beliefs could be justified. Furthermore, the objection proceeds, Hume surely wants to condemn the beliefs in question. I believe this worry to be more limited in scope than its general formulation suggests. In considering this point, it is instructive to observe that the objection can also be pressed against C. S. Peirce. Hume's emphasis on stability and infixing belief has affinities with Peirce's contention that the goal of inquiry is the settlement of opinion or fixation of belief (CP 5.375,377). For Peirce, as well as for Hume, an unrefiective person can achieve settled belief. Tenacity, authority, and the a priori method—three of the methods for fixing belief Peirce discusses—are unsettled by reflection. In particular, one must reflect on the consideration that it is a "mere accident" (5.380) or "accidental" (5.383) that they have led us to form particular beliefs and not others—that these beliefs have been "determined by [a] circumstance extraneous to the facts" (5.383). As Peirce writes: "A man ... wishes his opinions to coincide with the fact, and ... there is no reason why the results of those three first methods would do so" (5.387). Beliefs resulting from methods other than the method of science are unsettled by second-order reflection on truth (§ III.4). But not everyone engages in the reflection necessary to unsettle such beliefs: A man may go through life, systematically keeping out of view all that might cause a change in his opinions, and if he only succeeds... I do not see what can be said against his doing so. It would be an egotistical impertinence to object that his procedure is irrational, for that only amounts to saying that his method of settling beliefs is not ours. (CP 5.377)

Much as Hume has no epistemic objection to landholders' stable beliefs, Peirce has no criticism of an unrefiective person who succeeds in using the method of tenacity or authority to maintain settled belief.51 50. Fogelin attributes to Hume "perspectivism": "What we believe and what we think it appropriate to believe is a function of the level of investigation we are indulging in" (1998, p. 164, emphasis added). Consider the stronger position: that what we believe and what is appropriate to believe is a function of the level of investigation. Fogelin seems to reject this interpretation: "Hume's writings exhibit a radical form of epistemological, or better, doxastic perspectivism" (p. 164). On the other hand, Fogelin suggests the stronger position in his remark that in Hume's writings there is "normativity reflecting the scene that progressively unfolds as the investigation develops" (p. 168). The stronger form of perspectivism falls out of the less demanding version of a stability-based theory. 51. For additional discussion of Peirce, see my 1998, pp. 205—9. For additional affinities between Peirce and Hume, see § IV.5, n. 34.

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This is not to say that Peirce has no response to the objection that justification comes too easy. He accepts the consequence that the stable beliefs of unreflective persons are justified. His strategy is to seek to mitigate the difficulty by contending that there are few actual cases of this sort. The reflection required to unsettle the methods of tenacity and authority is likely to occur. Peirce writes of the method of tenacity, for example: This method of fixing belief... will be unable to hold its ground in practice. The social impulse is against it. The man who adopts it will find that other men think differently from him and it will be apt to occur to him, in some saner moment, that their opinions are quite as good as his own, and this will shake his confidence in his belief. (CP 5.378)

Owing to the social impulse, one is likely to find that others—in one's own community or "in other countries and in other ages" (CP 3.381)—hold different opinions. This discovery tends to stimulate the unsettling reflection that one's method of attaining belief is sensitive to accidental circumstances extraneous to the facts. Peirce has no epistemic objection to settled belief in cases where we successfully "make ourselves hermits" (5.378), but he contends that such cases are infrequent. Hume is in a better position than Peirce to maintain that such beliefforming mechanisms as tenacity, dogmatism, and deference to authority are unlikely to sustain settled belief. In III.iii.2, "Of greatness of mind," Hume appeals to the operation of sympathy (as introduced in Il.i.l) to ground a social source of instability: So close and intimate is the correspondence of human souls, that no sooner any person approaches me, than he diffuses on me all his opinions, and draws along my judgment in a greater or lesser degree. And tho', on many occasions, my sympathy with him goes not so far as entirely to change my sentiments, and way of thinking; yet it seldom is so weak as not to disturb the easy course of my thought. (T 592)

The disturbance to thought results in an internal "commotion" (T 593), an unstable condition that would not arise if other persons' beliefs remained "conceal'd" (T 593) from us. When we acquire beliefs about the opinions of others, sympathy "draws along... judgment" (T 592; cf. 316,319,365), "in some measure" making those beliefs "our own" (T 593). In cases where we also hold contrary beliefs, "the evident conflict" (T 593) takes the form of an internal contradiction, which unsettles the beliefs with which we began (§ III.4).52

52. Brand calls attention to the III.iii.2 passages for a different purpose (1992, pp. 88-89). Though she does not cite Treatise 592-93, Korsgaard relies on this doctrine in her interpretation of Hume's moral theory (1999, pp. 24-26). See notes 32 and 40, in §§ IV.4-5. We can wonder whether Hume should allow that sympathy strictly results in belief (Ardal, 1966/1989, pp. 46-48; and Jenkins, 1984, pp. 93-97). Hume might try to treat the operation of sympathy as akin to perception or memory in that it infixes belief without a past repetition.. Or he might treat it as akin to poetical enthusiasm and resemblance in producing pseudobeliefs that do not manifest a steady disposition


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In the essay "Of Parties in General" (first published in 1641), Hume observes that this disturbance occurs "even in the most speculative and indifferent opinions" (Essays 61): Two men traveling on the highway, the one east, the other west, can easily pass each other, if the way be broad enough: But two men, reasoning upon opposite principles of religion, cannot so easily pass, without shocking.... Such is the nature of the human mind, that it always lays hold on every mind that approaches it; and as it is wonderfully fortified by an unanimity of sentiments, so is it shocked and disturbed by any contrariety. (Essays 60-61)

The mere fact that one becomes familiar with "opposite" (T 593) opinions unsettles beliefs that arise from dogmatism and deference. For Hume, unlike Peirce, the unsettling effects of awareness of opposing opinions do not require reflection. (I elaborate in § IV.5 on nonreflective mechanisms that unsettle belief.) Hume advances psychological theses that can be exploited to support the claim that the range of actual cases in which unreflective persons achieve stability is narrow. Hume has an additional account of why dogmatic adherence to belief and deference to authority typically become unsettled, even absent second-order reflection on their reliability. These mechanisms lead to beliefs that conflict with causal inference. It is difficult to imagine actual cases where persons confine themselves to dogmatism or deference. That many beliefs arise from dogmatism or deference does not preempt or prevent the operation of custom. Habitual causal inference will tend to produce beliefs that are in opposition to those based on dogmatism and deference. As a result, contradiction and instability (§ III.4) will infect the belief systems of unreflective persons who are dogmatic or deferential, quite apart from the social source of instability. Hume's criticism in I.iv.4 of beliefs based on superstition proceeds along these lines (§ V.4). These considerations again point in the direction of concluding that cases in which dogmatism or deference lead to settled belief are rare. In thinking about the unsettling effects of conflicts with causal inference and of encountering persons with different opinions, it is important to bear in mind that justification depends upon the tendency of a belief-forming mechanism to produce stable beliefs. In assessing justification, we identify the degree to which the subject is reflective. We then consider whether the belief-forming mechanism tends to produce stable beliefs in persons who are reflective to a similar degree. The fact that an individual's beliefs are stable does not in itself imply that they are justified, for they might result from mechanisms that do not tend to produce stable beliefs (§§ 1.4, III.5). There is, in this way, an imperfect match or looseness of fit between stability for a person and justification. This leverages the import of Hume's arguments to show that stable beliefs resulting from dogmatism and deference are infrequent.

(§ III.2). Hume's main point is to emphasize that sympathy creates a disturbance, commotion, or conflict; pseudobeliefs could fulfill this role.

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The case of ignoring evidence is somewhat different. To address it, we could attribute to Hume an account of justification with reference to comparative stability: a person's belief is justified if it results from a belief-forming mechanism that tends to produce stable belief, provided there is no alternative beliefforming mechanism that is available to the subject that has at least as great a tendency to produce stable belief and that would lead the subject not to hold the belief.53 ("Availability" would have to be characterized narrowly, in keeping with the spirit of the requirement of stability under the de facto degree of reflection.) Consider, for example, Part V of the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. The proponent of the argument from design argues from the similarity of the universe to machines and from the observation that machines are the product of intelligent design to the conclusion that there is a single God who designed the universe. In observing that "a great number of men join in building a house or ship" (DNR 167), Hume is making the point that the proponent of the argument is overlooking available evidence—that the universe resembles complex machines designed by teams of intelligent beings. This evidence is far from recherche; it is readily available to anyone who has access to the premises for the argument from design. Recognizing such evidence would lead one to withhold belief in a single designer. Furthermore, a belief-forming mechanism that takes such evidence into account presumably tends to produce beliefs that are at least as stable as those produced by ignoring such evidence. A comparative stability account therefore implies that persons who ignore obvious facts about the design of complex machines are not justified in believing in a single designer on the evidence of the design argument. As we shall see, there are contexts in the Treatise where it is fruitful to suppose that a comparative stability account comes into play (§ IV.2). I have sketched a number of resources at Hume's disposal for blunting the claim that justification comes too easy on the less demanding version of the stability-based theory. We still need ask whether Hume does wish to condemn the beliefs of the unreflective person insofar as they are stable. The textual evidence that he does wish to condemn them as unjustified is inconclusive. We have seen that Hume is unwilling to criticize "honest gentlemen." The less demanding theory can account for this. Hume takes the position that the stable beliefs of the unreflective person are justified while observing that these beliefs would not be justified were the person more reflective. What about Hume's treatments of religion in "Of Miracles," "Of a particular Providence and of a future State," and the Dialogues? We need not read these discussions as impugning beliefs based on dogmatism and deference in an unreflective person. By and large, these works can be interpreted as calling attention to what a person would believe on these topics upon reflection. In other words, we can take Hume to combine a favorable epistemic assessment of some stable beliefs of an unreflective person with the observation that the beliefs would not be stable, and hence

53. Comparative reliability theories (see Schmitt, 1992, esp. pp. 185-98) provide the model for this condition.


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would not be justified, were the person more reflective. We need not take Hume to find the permissive epistemic evaluations of the less demanding theory to be unacceptable. Whatever the case in Hume's later publications, we are in a position to explain why he adopts the less demanding theory in the Treatise. The observation that the stable beliefs of the unreflective person would not be fully justified, were the person sufficiently reflective, raises the question of how reflective a person ought to be.54 As we have seen, Peirce is a notable proponent of a stability-based theory who is not prepared to claim that the person who clings tenaciously to belief ought to be more reflective or ought to adopt a different method. Peirce seems unable to assign pride of place to higher levels of reflection, even though he thinks that reflection leaves one method of fixing belief— the method of science—standing. Similarly, in discussing the landholders, Hume does not suggest that unreflective persons ought to be more reflective. Within a framework that prizes belief-forming mechanisms insofar as they contribute to stability or settled belief, it is difficult to locate a rationale for saying that justification requires stability under reflection. Hume's position in the Treatise compounds the difficulty of setting stability under reflection as a requirement for justification. This more demanding requirement assigns reflection a privileged epistemic status. Hume cannot derive this status for reflection from its contribution to stability, since he concludes in Part iv that reflection is deeply destabilizing. In this respect, Hume parts company with Peirce. For both Hume and Peirce, an unreflective person can achieve settled belief, albeit belief that would be unsettled by greater reflection; Hume, however, does not share Peirce's optimism that heightened reflection, should one engage in it, leads to a better method of settling belief. To the contrary, he claims that reflective persons cannot achieve stability in belief. This is a philosophical obstacle to Hume adopting the more demanding theory in the Treatise.55 (The systemic source of instability in I.iv.7—the dangerous dilemma deriving from I.iv. 1—vanishes from the first Enquiry.) The less demanding version, by contrast, does not require any argument that reflection is epistemically privileged. In the Treatise, Hume can more readily motivate the requirement of stability under the de facto degree of reflection. This explains why Hume declines the opportunity to criticize the beliefs of "honest gentlemen" and instead writes of these landholders approvingly. The less demanding theory has a noteworthy implication. The stable beliefs of the unreflective person are justified, whereas the beliefs of the reflective person are unstable and hence unjustified. The beliefs of the unreflective person occupy a preferred epistemic status. I believe that securing this paradoxical result was among Hume's intentions in the Treatise. Hume seeks to show that an epistemic preference for reflection is a prejudice. As a matter of temperament, I

54. For a comparison of Hume and Peirce on this question, see my 1998, pp. 221-24. 55. Hume thus seems precluded from adopting the more demanding theory. This elaborates the difficulty for reflexive approval interpretations noted in § 1.5.

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suspect, Hume took delight in disparaging intellectual reflection (§§ 1.4, VII. 1). Part of the evidence for this is the dramatic fashion in which Hume introduces reflection's unsettling effects. There is but the barest hint of the destabilizing character of reflection in Part iii (§ IV.2). And though I.iv.l and I.iv.4 develop the materials for this result, Hume withholds his destructive conclusion about reflection until I.iv.7 (§§ 1.4, VII. 1-3). I contend, in addition, that Hume is overzealous in signing off, in I.iv.7, on arguments for the claim that reflection is destabilizing (§§ VII.2-3). It is because he contends that reflection is destabilizing that Hume has no grounds for criticizing the stable beliefs of unreflective persons. This is a box of Hume's own making, one that puts the more demanding version of a stability-based theory out of reach.56 My procedure, in the remainder of this study, is to adopt the less demanding of the two stability-based interpretations, while remaining alert for new evidence in this regard (§§IV.5,V.4). III.7. Further Remarks on I.iv.7 According to Hume, even the reflective person can escape reflection's unsettling effects for periods of time. The instabilities dissipate when one dines, plays a game of backgammon, makes merry with friends, or enters into some other amusement (T 269). Would Hume wish to say that the reflective person has justified belief at least during such relaxed periods? Michael Williams finds an affirmative answer tempting. He is inclined to attribute to Hume a contextualist approach to justification, where "context includes features of the doxastic as well as the external environment." Let us focus on the doxastic environment, one's other beliefs. Williams writes that "knowledge is subject to quite different substantive constraints" in different contexts. In Williams's interpretation, a person can have justified belief in an everyday context and lose that justification in a reflective context. There can be a "transient" or "temporary" loss of knowledge, but only that, within the context of reflective periods.57 The results of reflection do not undermine everyday justification and knowledge. The more demanding version of a stability-based interpretation is incompatible with Williams's position. The requirement of stability under reflection has the consequence that our beliefs during relaxed periods are not justified because they would not be steady in their influence during reflective periods. But I have rejected this interpretation, so I should evaluate Williams's position in light of the requirement of stability under the de facto degree of reflection. Williams takes knowledge to require, at least, justified, true belief. Williams wants to attribute to Hume the view that knowledge is unstable because justification is unstable; standards for justification depend upon context, and skepti-

56. I am indebted to Frederick Schmitt for suggesting some of the arguments in this section. 57. The quotations may be found at Williams, 1991, pp. 352,359,356,358 (cf. 355-59).

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cal contexts raise the standard. Williams's paradigm for skepticism is "modern or 'Cartesian'" skepticism, that is, skepticism with respect to our knowledge of the external world.58 Such global or radical skepticism relies on the availability of a hypothesis systematically incompatible with the truth of our beliefs in the relevant domain. Perhaps there is no material world and all of our sensory experiences are the product of a dream or deceiver. The skeptic's point is that there is no non-question-begging argument to show that belief in the external world is more probable than the skeptical hypothesis. The skeptic does not claim that there is any positive reason to believe his hypothesis. Cartesian hypotheses give us no reason to think that our belief in the external world is false or even probably false. Hume's arguments in I.iv.7 are not Cartesian in Williams's sense. At Treatise 265-66, Hume claims to identify a manifest contradiction between reason and the senses, such that one belief we hold (upon reflection) must be false. This is a kind of antinomy; Hume's strategy is to show that the belief in matter is inconsistent with another belief (§§ III.4, VII.2), not that a skeptical hypothesis undermines its justification. The discussion of the dangerous dilemma at pages 267-68 depends upon the prior result that, if subjected to repeated corrections, the probability that any first-order judgment is true reduces to zero. This is again different from showing that there is no reason to prefer an everyday hypothesis to a merely possible skeptical alternative; the argument for rejecting all belief proceeds from the premise that the understanding is in fact fallible. Both sets of considerations, unlike Cartesian hypotheses, purport to show that beliefs we hold are false or probably false. It is therefore misleading to assimilate the developments in I.iv.7 to Cartesian skepticism. Any interest that Hume might have in Cartesian skepticism about the external world is not in play; no global skeptical hypothesis to raise the standards for justification is operative in I.iv.7. In Hume's view, his reflections in the "Conclusion of this book" give us positive reasons to reject beliefs we hold; this seems far removed from having justification cut out from under us.59 For this reason, I am not sympathetic with attributing to Hume a "contextualized" variant of the requirement of de facto stability. The more reflective moods of interest to Hume do not so much raise the standards for justification as introduce new substantive considerations, which Hume takes to tell against the truth of other beliefs one holds. There is a point of a different sort. Consider the reflective person during relaxed periods in comparison to the landholder at any time. From the perspective of Williams's interpretation, both would seem to have justified beliefs, since

58. For the claims in the first three sentences, see Williams, 1991, pp. 48; 353, 355-56, 358; and 1,47-51. 59. Williams does not discuss the manifest contradiction. His brief treatment of the dilemma (1991, pp. 5–6) focuses on the difficulty in sustaining the series of corrections, whereas 1 focus (in § III.4) on the higher-order belief that performing the series of corrections would reduce probability to zero. Broughton is clear about the difference in character between Cartesian arguments and those of I.iv.7, which do "not turn simply on the possibility that my belief may be false, consistent with what I observe" (1983, p. 16).

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both are in an unreflective context. There is, however, a difference between the landholder and the reflective person during relaxed periods. Hume insists that these periods will give way to renewed reflection; after engaging in everyday amusements, "I am uneasy to think I... decide concerning truth and falshood, reason and folly, without knowing upon what principles I proceed" (T 271). We should expect this to lead to a new round of reflection and attendant instability.60 A relaxed posture cannot itself be sustained once the reflective posture has been achieved. A person who has attained a reflective posture can relax, but the reflective dispositions will reassert themselves in periods of renewed reflection. Hume could allow that reflective persons are justified during unreflective periods by tinkering with the time frame for stability. It remains the case that someone who has entered into the reflections of I.iv.7 will oscillate between periods in which beliefs are unsettled by reflection and those in which they are not. Though reflective persons can achieve periods in which their beliefs are not unsettled, these periods contain the seeds of their own destruction. This is the point Hume wishes to emphasize, whatever we say about the status of the beliefs of the reflective person during relaxed periods.61

60. Williams would agree on this (1991, pp. 8-9). See also Laird, 1932, p. 179; Hookway, 1990, p. 103; Johnson, 1995, pp. 323,325; and Singer, 2000, pp. 237-38. For a different reading, see Baier, 1991, esp. p. 22. 61. In Fogelin's interpretation (n. 50), the results of every level of investigation are on a par (1998, pp. 164-69). This parity would be epistemic, on the stronger version of perspectivism. I am inclined to think that, in Hume's view, what it is appropriate for us to believe depends upon the most reflective level of investigation the actual subject has achieved. Fogelin cites Treatise 272 (p. 164): "We shou'd yield to that propensity, which inclines us to be positive and certain in particular points, according to the light, in which we survey them in any particular instant." I am reluctant to put too much weight on this passage, where Hume is facing the immediate problem of how he can proceed to Books II and HI, in the aftermath of the destructive results of I.iv.7. But I think that the force of his answer at 273 is that we can proceed insofar as we manage to focus on "particular points" rather than the sorts of general reflections that undermine them.

IV Unphilosophical Probability and Judgments Arising from Sympathy

IV. 1. Degrees of Belief and Justification Hume discusses probability in I.iii.11-13. Within these sections, he writes of circumstances that "weaken ... belief" (T 142), of "degrees of belief and assurance" (T 143; cf. 130, 144, 153), and of degrees of "conviction" (T 144,145) and "confidence" (T 153). Repetition, fixity, and steadiness admit of degree. Following Patrick Maher, I think Hume has both an absolute and a relative notion of belief.1 On the absolute notion, a belief is a sufficiently infixed or steady disposition, one whose steadiness meets or exceeds a specified threshold (§ III.2). On the relative notion, there are degrees of belief that consist in degrees of steadiness. In the sections on probability, a conception of belief that admits of degrees takes center stage. Hume also writes of degrees of belief as degrees of evidence (§ II.l). Probability is one of "the several degrees of evidence" (T 124). After providing an inventory of different degrees of "opinion," "confidence," or "assurance" and giving examples of "the next degree of these qualities," Hume writes that "below this degree of evidence there are many others" (T 153). The economical interpretive hypothesis is that the degrees of evidence at pages 124 and 153 constitute epistemic distinctions, both between causal inference and other beliefforming mechanisms (such as demonstration) and within causal inference itself. Were this not the case, there would be an odd divorce between Hume's claims about evidence and justification. In providing inventories of the degrees of evidence, Hume ranks "proofs"—causal inferences conditioned by frequently observed constant conjunctions, where the present perception exactly resembles the observed

1. Maher, 1981, p. 140. Maher, however, thinks Hume characterizes these notions with reference to vivacity.

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instances (cf. T 124, 130-31, 153)—at the top (apart from demonstrative knowledge, perception, and memory). Proofs "are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty" (T 124); they "exceed probability, and may be receiv'd as a superior kind of evidence" (T 124). Hume places proofs on a scale of "evidence," ranked below arguments based on the comparison of ideas (demonstrative knowledge) and ranked above probability. Here probability includes causal inference that does not amount to proof, that is, the probability of causes. Causal inference in general—and proofs in particular—are unequivocally justified at Treatise 89, 144, 216, and 225 (§ II.l). Hume's discriminations among degrees of evidence elaborate more fine-grained distinctions between justified and unjustified belief.2 Hume's treatment of degrees of belief and evidence constitutes another example of his running together claims about belief and claims about justification—the textual phenomenon that set the puzzle for Chapter III. As early as I.iii.2, Hume reformulates a causal theory of assurance as a causal theory of knowledge; in I.iii.9, Hume's explanation of why causal inference, unlike resemblance, produces belief also serves as an explanation of why causal inference produces states that are justified (§ III.l). In I.iii.11-13, degrees of belief are equated with degrees of evidence or justification. According to the stability-based theory of justification, to establish that the states produced by a psychological mechanism are beliefs, and hence infixed, is sufficient to establish that the beliefs are stable, steady in their influence, and hence justified, other things being equal. Attributing this theory to Hume explains his equation of degrees of belief with degrees of evidence. Beliefs are steady dispositions to display characteristic manifestations. It is repetition— custom or habit—that produces and explains steadiness (§ III.2). Repetition can be more or less extensive, so that steadiness and fixity admit of degrees. There are thus degrees of belief. From the perspective of the stability-based theory, we should expect degrees of justification to be a function of degrees of belief; we should expect that to establish that the dispositions produced by a psychological mechanism are steady or infixed to a given degree, and hence stable to that degree, is to establish they are justified to a proportional degree, other things being equal. This is precisely the feature of I.iii.11-13 to which I have called attention. The stability-based interpretation neatly predicts that Hume should regard different degrees of belief as constituting different degrees of justification.3

2. In arguing against Garrett's view that Hume's use of evidence' is not normative (§ II.l, n. 19), Meeker, 1998, p. 38, calls attention to a first Enquiry passage: "A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence" (EHU X, 87). It is worth noting that Hume writes in the preceding paragraph: "One, who in our climate, should expect better weather in any week of June than in one of December, would reason justly, and conformably to experience" (EHU X, 87). Here there is a continuous argument connecting 'evidence' and justification. For further discussion relevant to Garrett's view, see below in this section, n. 3, and § II.l, n. 19. 3. The evidence for the stability-based interpretation thus counts against Garrett's contention that Hume does not use cognates of 'evidence' as terms of epistemic appraisal.

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The intimate connection between degree of belief and degree of justification is especially perspicuous in Hume's I.iii.12 treatment of probability based on a constant conjunction that is infrequently observed, one of the two kinds of imperfect experience that constitute the probability of causes (§ II.l). Degree of belief or steadiness is proportional, other things being equal, to the number of past repetitions or observed constant conjunctions. In other words, repetition has a cumulative or progressive steadying effect. Hume writes: As the habit, which produces the association, arises from the frequent conjunction of objects, it must arrive at its perfection by degrees, and must acquire new force from each instance, that falls under our observation. The first instance has little or no force: The second makes some addition to it: The third becomes still more sensible; and 'tis by these slow steps, that our judgment arrives at full assurance. (T 130)

Hume is explicit that "assurance" or degree of belief is proportional to the number of past repetitions. The continuation of the passage makes the point with reference to probability and evidence: "But before it attains this pitch of perfection [full assurance], it passes thro' several inferior degrees, and in all of them is only to be esteem'd a presumption or probability. The gradation, therefore, from probabilities to proofs is in many cases insensible" (T 130-31). These passages serve to explain why probability due to infrequent conjunction is an inferior kind of evidence (cf. T 124). In the case of infrequent experience, degree of belief and degree of evidence are both proportional to the frequency with which the conjunction has been observed, to the extent of the repetition. The stability-based interpretation must explain Hume's distinction between unphilosophical and philosophical probability, as well as his commitment to degrees of evidence. Hume writes at the beginning of I.iii. 13: "ALL these kinds of probability are receiv'd by philosophers, and allow'd to be reasonable foundations of belief and opinion. But there are others, that are deriv'd from the same principles, tho' they have not had the good fortune to obtain the same sanction" (T 143). The first sentence refers to the kinds of probability discussed in the preceding two sections: the probability of chances and of causes and arguments from analogy. We can say they constitute "philosophical probability." The kinds of probability that are not "receiv'd by philosophers" are the topic of I.iii.13. Hume proceeds to enumerate four species of unphilosophical probability. One species faces "the opposition of philosophy" (T 143); another is "disclaimed by philosophers" (T 143). At page 143, Hume attributes the distinction between philosophical and unphilosophical probability to "philosophy" and "philosophers." My explanation of Hume's employment of this device, which we first encounter in the discussion of education at Treatise 117, is now familiar (§§ 1.4, III.3). Hume develops his theory of justification in two stages, with opposite results: first, in order to sustain his pretheoretical distinctions between justified and unjustified belief, and second, to show that these distinctions ultimately cannot be sustained, at least insofar as they are applied to the beliefs of the reflective person (§ III.5). Hume does explicitly associate himself with the claim that beliefs based on

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causal inference are justified, and with other normative distinctions, when he wishes to emphasize his constructive project (e.g., T 89, 107-8, 124, 144, 149, 173-75, 225-26). At other times, Hume wishes to emphasize his destructive conclusions, his readiness to reject all belief, at least all beliefs held by the reflective person, as unjustified (T 268-69). Attributing claims about justification to philosophy or philosophers (as at T 117-18,143,225) allows Hume to discuss epistemological distinctions without either unqualifiedly owning or disowning them. At the same time, Hume's endorsements of causal inference occur in I.iii.15 (T 173-75), I.iv.4 (T 225-26), and even within I.iii.13, where proofs are "just" (T 144). In distancing himself from the distinction between philosophical and unphilosophical probability at Treatise 143, Hume is holding at arm's length a distinction he himself seeks to sustain. In the penultimate paragraph of I.iii.13, Hume reviews the kinds of probabilities he has discussed: proofs, the probability of causes, analogy, and the four species of unphilosophical probability. In each case, "'tis by habit we make the transition from cause to effect" (T 153-54), though probabilities, as distinct from proofs, result from a habit that is weak or imperfect (cf. T 130-31,133,142,153-54). Philosophical and unphilosophical probability are "deriv'd from the same principles" in that they arise from repetition, from custom, or from the relation of cause and effect. On what basis are some probabilities based on causal inference rejected as unjustified at this stage of the Treatise'? The stability-based interpretation suggests an explanation. Hume seeks to show that unphilosophical probability is unjustified in comparison to philosophical probability. Unphilosophical probabilities, degrees of belief that are not justified, derive from instabilities that are due to the very belief-forming mechanisms to which Hume assigns normative pride of place: perception, memory, and causal inference. These instabilities, however, are relatively modest. In addition, they can in principle be removed, or at least mitigated.4 For these reasons, unphilosophical probability does not undermine Hume's endorsement of causal inference. Hume's treatment of unphilosophical probability belongs to the constructive stage of the development of his theory of justification. In the remainder of this chapter, I consider the bearing of Hume's theory of justification on his I.iii.13 discussion of the four species of unphilosophical probability. This provides a case study, or a set of interrelated case studies, of the fruitfulness of my interpretive framework. In § IV.2,1 consider the application of the stability-based interpretation to the fourth kind of unphilosophical probability, one "deriv'd from general rules" (T 146). One upshot of the interpretation in this and subsequent sections is the thesis that "general rules" are

4. Baier's remark that "all species of 'unphilosophical probability". . . are here subjected to gentle disapproval" is sensitive to the texts (1991, p. 87). In the course of this chapter, I try to explain why it is appropriate for Hume to adopt this posture.

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often second-order beliefs that serve either to destabilize or to stabilize systems of first-order beliefs.5 I introduce the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability at § IV.3. These involve, for example, variations in degree of confidence due to the remoteness of a matter of fact we remember. Instabilities due to the operation of sympathy are a parallel phenomenon: variations in sentiment are due to the remoteness of persons with whom we sympathize (§ 1.3). A full understanding of unphilosophical probability therefore requires an excursion into Hume's account of moral judgment. I pursue this analogy in §§ IV.4-6. Instances of the variations in sentiment and in degrees of confidence are uneasy and unsettling. (General rules, second-order beliefs about the variations, serve to generalize this motivation beyond cases where the variations have been experienced.) This psychological discomfort motivates efforts to replace the variable judgments about probability and virtue with ones that are more stable and that thus have normative standing. These are judgments that correct for variations due to remoteness and due to point of view more generally. I also contend that Kemp Smith's overlooking of Hume's doctrine of corrections is damaging to his interpretation of Hume as subscribing to the doctrine of "natural belief" (§ 1.5).

IV.2. Instabilities Due to Observation of Accidental Conjunctions Hume discusses the fourth kind of unphilosophical probability at pages 146-50. He begins with an example: "A fourth unphilosophical species of probability is that deriv'd from general rules, which we rashly form to ourselves, and which are the source of what we properly call PREJUDICE. An Irishman cannot have wit, and a Frenchman cannot have solidity" (T 146). As at pages 153-54, Hume attributes the rash general rules to "those very principles, on which all judgments concerning causes and effects depend," to "habit and experience" (T 147). "Rashly" cannot simply mean "based on too small a sample." Hume allows that generalizations based on a single experience can be justified (cf. T 104—5, 131,175).6 Then why is the probability derived from general rules "unphilosophical"? The following passages suggest an answer: "Tho" custom be the foundation of

5. Hearn, 1970 and 1976, are classic papers on general rules. Brand, 1992, is perhaps the best existing account. For additional literature, see n. 6. 6. For previous discussions of the fourth kind of unphilosophical probability, see Hendel, 1925, p. 204; MacNabb, 1951/1966, pp. 97-99; Passmore, 1952/1968, pp. 54-64; Hearn, 1970, esp. pp. 405-14; Passmore, 1977, esp. pp. 83-84; Fogelin, 1985, pp. 60-63; Brand, 1992, esp. ch. 2; Martin, 1993; Johnson, 1995, pp. 196–98; Loeb, 1995a, pp. 112-19; Falkenstein, 1997, pp. 37-38,39-40, 42^3,47-49, 50-51; Garrett, 1997, pp. 144-45; and Wilson, 1997, pp. 136–39. My argument here counts against Fogelin's account of a "rash" generalization as based on too small a sample (1985, p. 61).

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all our judgments, yet sometimes it has an effect on the imagination in opposition to the judgment, and produces a contrariety in our sentiments concerning the same object" (T 147–48). Hume elaborates: We shall afterwards take notice of some general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects.... By them we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes; and when we find that an effect can be produc'd without the concurrence of any particular circumstance, we conclude that that circumstance makes not a part of the efficacious cause, however frequently conjoin'd with it. But as this frequent conjunction necessarily makes it have some effect on the imagination, in spite of the opposite conclusion from general rules, the opposition of these two principles produces a contrariety in our thoughts, and causes us to ascribe the one inference to our judgment, and the other to our imagination. The general rule is attributed to our judgment; as being more extensive and constant. The exception to the imagination; as being more capricious and uncertain. Thus our general rules are in a manner set in opposition to each other. When an object appears, that resembles any cause in very considerable circumstances, the imagination naturally carries us to a lively conception of the usual effect, tho' the object be different in the most material and most efficacious circumstances from that cause. Here is the first influence of general rules. But when we take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding, we find it to be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most establish'd principles of reasonings; which is the cause of our rejecting it. This is a second influence of general rules, and implies the condemnation of the former. (T 149-50)

As we have seen (§ 1.2), elsewhere in the Treatise Hume describes contradictions as involving "opposition," "combat" (T 205-6), and "struggle and opposition" between "two enemies" (T 215). With these passages in view, I take the language of psychological conflict at pages 147-48 and 149-50—"opposition" and "contrariety," principles that are "destructive," and philosophy being "subverted" (T 150)—as evidence that considerations about stability are central to Hume's treatment of the fourth kind of unphilosophical probability. The details of Hume's account are nevertheless unclear; the roles of accidental circumstances and of the two "influences" of general rules require explanation. At page 148, after remarking for the first time that custom can produce contrariety, Hume calls attention to the observation of accidental conjunctions. It is helpful to formulate the explanation schematically. Suppose there is an observed constant conjunction both between the circumstances A and C and between A and C and some subsequent effect E; that C is the "efficacious," "essential" (T 148), or genuine cause of E; and that it is "by accident" (T 148) that A is constantly conjoined with C and hence with E—the presence of A is "superfluous" (T 148) to the production of E.7 In saying that C, but not A, is the

7. In the penultimate paragraph of I.iii.9, Hume draws attention to beliefs that are "parallel" (T 117) to education (§ III.3) in that they are based upon habits other than causal inference. Some

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genuine cause of E, Hume is offering an intuitive judgment about the sorts of examples he has in mind; he is not describing the implications of a theory of causation. Hume points out that upon the observation of a new instance of A, even in the absence of an instance of C, custom leads to the belief that an instance of E will occur. This belief may be mistaken, but Hume has not yet exhibited any "contrariety" in beliefs. What is required is the supposition that the new instance of A is also accompanied by an observation of an instance of some circumstance D, such that there is an observed constant conjunction between D and the nonoccurrence of E. Under these conditions, we will have the inclination to believe both that an instance of E will occur and that an instance of E will not occur. Hume's example at page 148 of "a man... hung out from a high tower in a cage of iron" can be adapted to this schema. Suppose the man has observed that whenever he sees a precipice and has not been suspended, he has fallen. His not being suspended (C) was the genuine or efficacious cause of his falling (E), and his seeing the precipice (A) was superfluous; it is by accident that in his experience seeing a precipice is constantly conjoined with his falling. Suppose the man has observed that whenever he is suspended (D), he has not fallen (not-E). Suppose that for the first time the man both sees a precipice (A) and is suspended (D). He will have the inclination to believe both that he will fall and that he will not fall, so that there is "a contrariety in [his] sentiments concerning the same object."8 Here we have the presence of contradictory beliefs, which is a source of instability (§111.4). This conflict results from two observed conjunctions: (la) "whenever I have seen a precipice (A), I have fallen (E)," and (Ib) "whenever I have been suspended (D), I have not fallen (not-E)." Although la, unlike Ib, is accidental, both generalizations result from custom and contribute equally to the instability. The problem is to find a principled way of explaining why generalizations conditioned by observation of accidental conjunctions are unjustified.9 It is of no help that Hume's psychological theory allows that belief is more strongly conditioned by a greater number of instances. There is nothing to preclude the possibility of observing equal numbers of instances of two constant conjunctions, one accidental

of the cases seem better assimilated to the fourth kind of unphilosophical probability. For example, "After the death of any one, 'tis a common remark of the whole family, but especially of the servants, that they can scarce believe him to be dead, but still imagine him to be in his chamber or in any other place, where they were accustom'd to find him" (T 117). The person's previous biological state is the genuine cause of continued life; the presence of the person's chambers is conjoined with this cause by accident. 8. For a similar analysis of the example, see Brand, 1992, pp. 38–47, esp. pp. 40-41. 9. It is a stock objection to Hume that he offers a regularity analysis of causation but fails to consider counterexamples deriving from accidental conjunctions. Stroud writes, "The distinction between accidental and law-like generalizations ... is one [Hume] never makes" (1977, p. 66); Fogelin that "the counter-examples to Hume's regularity definition, however obvious they may seem to us now, simply did not occur to him" (1985, p. 52). Hume is surely evincing some concern with accidentality at Treatise 4,104-5,146-50,175. See n. 13.

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and one not. Hume's strategy is to maintain that the method for removing the instability favors the nonaccidental generalizations. It is here that the discussion of the two "influences" of general rules comes into play. Hume is appealing to different levels or orders of beliefs about observed conjunctions. First-order generalizations are extrapolations from observed conjunctions between the members of resembling pairs of objects. These generalizations are sometimes falsified by subsequent observation. Second-order generalizations are extrapolations from the observed success of classes of first-order generalizations in avoiding falsification.10 The first and second influences of general rules derive from beliefs based on first- and second-order generalizations, respectively. The second influence of general rules thus arises "when we take a review of [the] act of the mind" that constitutes the "first influence of general rules." Similarly, at page 148, there is a role for "reflection" on the "circumstances" in which we have a propensity to rely on accidental generalizations. In order to see the relevance of the two influences, it is helpful to consider that, for Hume, generalizations are habits of expectation. Generalizations of different orders are habits of expectation of different orders. The strength of a habit of expectation is, ceteris paribus, proportional to the number of observed instances on which the habit is based. The strength of a habit can be affected by higher-order habits. For example, a second-order habit of expecting the chemical composition of an ingested substance to be correlated with changes in health tends to steady a first-order habit of expecting an arsenic ingestion to be followed by death. Or suppose some poison has a distinctive color. A second-order habit of expecting that the color of an ingested substance is not correlated with changes in health conflicts with a first-order habit of expecting an ingestion of a substance of the distinctive color to be followed by a death.11 (This is the sense in which "the first influence of general rules" can "be of an irregular nature, and destructive of all the most establish'd principles of reasonings." They can conflict with second-order generalizations that are "more extensive and constant" in that they are about classes of first-order generalizations.) As in the case of conflicts between two first-order generalizations, first- and second-order generalizations implicated in such conflict arise from custom.12 In these cases, the second-order habit tends to weaken the first-order habit. This mitigates the conflict, so that it is only "in a manner" that first- and second-order general rules are "set in opposition to each other" (T 149). 10. Here I disagree with MacNabb's claim that "general rules [of the second sort] are ... not generalisations, as far as Hume here suggests, about the successfulness or the reverse of different kinds of expectations" (1951/1966, p. 98). 11. Quine relies on second-order inductions for a similar purpose, to revise innate standards of similarity or of natural kinds in order to achieve scientifically more sophisticated groupings (cf. 1969, esp.pp. 127-29). 12. I do not agree with Hearn that the contrast between the first and second kinds of general rules is that the latter are essentially reflective in the sense of being "consciously formulated and adopted" (1970, p. 410). Neither kind need be reflective, and either can be reflective. Similarly, the second kind of general rule is not essentially "directive" (p. 411) or regulative.

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Conflicts between first-order generalizations can be resolved because firstorder habits tend to be strengthened, or weakened, in the presence of relevant second-order habits. This is the second influence of general rules, that is, the effect of second-order generalizations. In the case of the suspended man, the conflict between la and Ib can be resolved by locating a second-order generalization that will either weaken or strengthen one of the first-order generalizations. Suppose, for example, the man suspended in the cage believes the second-order generalization (2): "first-order universal generalizations relating resemblances in height (without reference to systems of suspension) to resemblances in fall or descent are falsified." (The man might believe this on the basis of his experience with modest heights or with the fall of objects other than his own body.) He will then experience two conflicts: between his inclinations to believe la and Ib and between his inclinations to believe la and 2. In the presence of 2, however, both conflicts will be resolved (or at least mitigated), for 2 will tend to weaken the inclination to believe the accidental first-order generalization, la, which is a party to both conflicts. There is an asymmetry between la and Ib, in that stability is restored when la is weakened. The cases of prejudice also involve the observation of accidental conjunctions. The first-order generalization "all Irishmen lack wit" can be weakened by the second-order generalization "universal generalizations relating resemblances in national origin to resemblances in intellectual characteristics are falsified." Accidental generalizations give rise to conflicts with nonaccidental generalizations, and hence to instability. Hume maintains that the accidental generalizations will be weakened and the nonaccidental generalizations strengthened by higher-order generalizations, so that the conflicts to which accidental generalizations give rise are resolved in the presence of relevant second-order generalizations.13 This account coheres with much that Hume says elsewhere. He appeals to a higher-order habit to explain how the experience of a single instance of a conjunction can produce beliefs about unobserved instances (§ 1.5). Hume considers reliance (under appropriate conditions) on this higher-order habit justified. The higher-order habit enables us to "attain the knowledge of a particular cause" (T 104), and it is "the source of most of our philosophical reasonings" (T 173). Hume also appeals to higher-order habits to explain how we form judgments about minute differences in probability. In this context, the higherorder habits are explicitly associated with "general rules" (T 141^12). At page 142, Hume notes that "these general rules we shall explain presently," that is, at pages 146-50.14

13. What is to rule out the existence of an accidental higher-order generalization that strengthens an accidental generalization, or weakens a nonaccidental generalization, of p lower order? Hume might contend this is improbable. Or we should perhaps associate Hume with the tradition (see Lewis, 1973, pp. 72-77) in which nonaccidental regularities are identifiedwith those that occupy a place in a suitably ideal theoretical system of generalizations. 14. Martin writes, "A method of judgment formation that can provide a system of orderly and stable beliefs is rationally preferable to one that cannot" (1993, p. 256). My interpretation, unlike Martin's, is integrated with Hume's account of the role of steadiness in belief. Martin (pp. 249-52)

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This takes us a good distance in understanding Hume's discussion. But to locate a method for removing instability does not in itself explain why beliefs conditioned by accidental conjunctions are unjustified. The fourth kind of unphilosophical probability gives rise to conflicts—such as that between la and Ib—within the belief systems even of persons who are not fully reflective (in the sense of § III.5). Hume does not wish, on that account, to impugn the justification of causal inference generally. Hume writes, "Custom... sometimes... produces a contrariety in our sentiments concerning the same object" (T 147-48); the conflicts at hand arise at the margins. It remains the case that causal inference tends to produce sufficiently stable sets of beliefs to qualify as justified. The overall level of stability, however, could be enhanced through reliance, or greater reliance, on the relevant sorts of second-order generalizations. Hume notes, "The vulgar are commonly guided by the first [influence of general rules], and wise men by the second" (T 150). I take this to mean that wise men are commonly guided by the second influence in conjunction with the first influence of general rules. Utilizing second-order generalizations would increase the overall level of stability within one's belief system, thereby achieving a greater degree of justification. We could thus suppose Hume operating with a comparative version of his theory of justification (§ III.6). Reliance on relevant second-order generalizations has a greater tendency to produce stable belief but would lead one not to hold beliefs based on accidental conjunctions; the availability of this belief-forming mechanism therefore undermines the justification of such beliefs. This completes my reconstruction of Hume's treatment of the fourth kind of unphilosophical probability, though in § VII.51 extend Hume's account to a closely related problem, that of inductive inconsistencies. In his treatment of the fourth kind of unphilosophical probability, Hume uncovers instability within causal inference but also undertakes to show how such instability can be removed. The results of his discussion thus belong to the constructive stage of his project, a stage that remains prominently on display at Treatise 173-75 and 225-26. Indeed, at page 149, Hume notes, "We shall afterwards* take notice of some general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects." Hume's reference is to I.iii.15, where he enumerates rules designed, in part, to help distinguish "superfluous" from "essential" circumstances where there is a "complication of circumstances" (T 175)—phraseology that appears at page 148 in I.iii.13. These observations lead

and Falkenstein (1997, esp. pp. 4849) assign a role to second-order rules; Brand's "regulative rules of the understanding" or "U-rules" (1992, p. 163, index entries under "Rules... of type I and of type U") have a similar function. Martin takes the rules by which to judge causes and effects to be examples (1993, p. 250). Though these rules are germane, they do not themselves constitute substantive generalizations about the success of kinds of first-order generalizations. Falkenstein writes of a "'second' general rale to the effect that our 'first' general rules ought only to draw on the truly efficacious qualities of the object" (1997, p. 49). But such a second-order rule directs us to the problem without solving it. Brand, writing earlier (1992, esp. pp. 53-54), combines elements found in Martin and Falkenstein. In contrast to these accounts, I take the second-order rules to be generalizations about the success or failure of classes of first-order generalizations. Falkenstein comes to this view at p. 51.

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to a residual question, though one of some importance. Having offered a solution to the problem of removing instabilities due to the observation of accidental conjunctions, why does Hume write: "The sceptics may here have the pleasure of observing a new and signal contradiction in our reason, and of seeing all philosophy ready to be subverted by a principle of human nature, and again sav'd by a new direction of the very same principle" (T 150)? We are in a position to flesh out my earlier suggestion that the answer relates to the tensions in Hume's own attitude toward the epistemological distinctions he draws (§ 1.4). The notions of "contrariety," "opposition," "destruction," and "subversion" play a role in Hume's description of the fourth kind of unphilosophical probability at pages 149-50. These notions are also important in Hume's discussion of instabilities at pages 265-69 of I.iv.7 and in the sources of these discussions at I.iv.l and I.iv.4 (T 184, 231). At I.iv.7, Hume concludes that stability cannot be achieved, at least within the belief system of a reflective person. The fourth kind of unphilosophical probability, however, is a locus of eliminable instability; philosophy is "ready to be subverted" but can be "sav'd" (T 150). The second influence of general rules can contain the "destructive" influence of the first. Yet, Hume is determined, at pages 146-50, to take the oppositions in I.iii.13 as an opportunity to prepare the ground for the destructive stage of his development of his theory of justification in I.iv.7. It is "the sceptics," rather than Hume, who are said to "have the pleasure of observing a new and signal contradiction in our reason" (T 150). It is Hume, however, who chooses to seize the discovery of an eliminable instability as a harbinger of the ineliminable instabilities, the "manifold contradictions and imperfections" (T 268), which he will bring forward in I.iv.7. Although Hume's epistemological commitment to causal inference is evident well into Part iv, as early as page 150 he intimates the pessimistic conclusion that will emerge at I.iv.7.15

IV.3. Variations in Degree of Confidence Due to Memory and Causal Inference I turn to an inventory of the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability, discussed by Hume at pages 143–6.16 First, we have a greater degree of "assurance"

15. Noxon offers similar observations: "Although the conflict between judgment and imagination is resolvable on Hume's doctrine, he cannot resist the rhetoric of paradox" (1973, p. 87). Fogelin (1985, pp. 60-62) notes that Treatise 150 "foreshadows some of the extreme developments in Part IV" (p. 60), though "the contradiction ... is rather lame by Humean standards" and "here Hume over-reaches" (p. 62). Hume's reflections, however, do not so much "lead him to a radical conclusion" (p. 60) as lead him to attribute one to "the sceptics." Passmore asks rhetorically, "But can a sober moral scientist have the same pleasure [as the skeptics] in observing [the contradiction]?" (1952/1968, p. 64). I think Passmore mistaken in the presupposition that there is a genuine contradiction to be observed. For other discussions of Treatise 150, see Walsh, 1972, pp. 110-11; and Cummins, 1999, pp. 46–47. 16. Discussions tend to be brief: Hendel, 1925, pp. 203-4; Laird, 1932, p. 91; MacNabb, 1951/ 1966, pp. 96-97; Passmore, 1952/1968, pp. 59–60; Fogelin, 1985, p. 60; Martin, 1993, pp. 248^9;

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(T 143,144) in the memory of a recent experience than in the memory of a more remote experience; degree of confidence in memory beliefs tends to diminish gradually over time. Second, a causal inference based on memory of a recent experience is more "convincing" (T 143) than a causal inference based on memory of a remote experience. This kind of unphilosophical probability is parasitic on the first. The difference in the degree of confidence resulting from causal inferences founded on memories of events differing in remoteness is due to the difference in the degree of confidence of the memories themselves. For this reason, I reverse the order of Hume's discussion; what is for Hume the "first" kind of unphilosophical probability, is, in my discussion, the second.17 In the penultimate paragraph of I.iii.13, Hume describes unphilosophical probability as arising from habit or custom. This is not quite accurate. Unphilosophical probability arises from memory or custom; it arises within the first and second systems of beliefs, which Hume describes in the two systems of realities passages at pages 109–10 (§§ II. 1,3, III. 1). Habit is the source of the third kind of unphilosophical probability: in a chain of connected causal inferences, conclusions at later parts of the chain produce less "conviction" or "persuasion" (T 144) than those earlier in the chain. Hume is calling attention to what he takes to be empirical phenomena that can be described nonassociationistically: other things being equal, remote memory produces less confidence than recent memory, and, other things being equal, long chains of causal inferences produce less confidence than short chains. Fogelin has noted that there are similarities among the phenomena Hume discusses under the rubric "unphilosophical probability" (T 143) and those identified by Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky.18 My position is that both Hume and the recent empirical studies call attention to a variety of psychological biases or distortions. As will become apparent in §§ IV.4-6, part of Hume's project is to explain why we come to regard the resulting probability judgments as biased or distorted. In the two cases involving memory, degree of confidence is inversely proportional to the remoteness of the event, to temporal distance. In the case of the

Falkenstein, 1997, pp. 38, 51; and Wilson, 1997, p. 136. Also see the relevant index entries in Garrett, 1997, and Owen, 1999. 17. Why does Hume present first a kind of unphilosophical probability that is parasitic on the one he presents second? My best explanation is that Hume wants to begin with a case that readers will find original; a picture on which memory degrades or decays was familiar (§ II.2). (I here abandon my explanation at 1995a, p. 121 n. 26.) In any event, Hume fails to note a generalization of the second case. Memory is less vivacious than sense perception (T 8), and vivacity is Hume's formulaic measure of degree of belief. It follows that a causal inference based on memory of an event produces a lower degree of confidence than does causal inference based on perception of the same event. 18. Fogelin, 1985, pp. 178-79 n. 6. Fogelin writes: "In recent years cognitive psychologists have studied the curious phenomenon that subjective probability assignments are often at variance—sometimes widely—with values we would assign using standard a priori or statistical procedures. Hume saw this as well, and invoked his theory of belief to explain this phenomenon" (1985, p. 60). In the cases Hume considers, however, a priori statistical procedures, Hume's "probability of causes" (T 130), are not in play.

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third kind of unphilosophical probability, where "the imagination is carry'd thro' a long chain of connected arguments," the vivacity of the original perception "must gradually decay in proportion to the distance" (T 144). "Distance" refers to the number of inferences in the chain, to the length of the argument; degree of confidence is inversely proportional to argumentative distance. Degree of confidence diminishes as what I call psychological distance increases, where argumentative length and remoteness of memory are two sources of psychological distance. Hume intends his associationist principles governing the degradation of vivacity to explain this general empirical phenomenon. If we step outside of Hume's formula that belief is a lively idea in favor of the interpretation developed in § III.2, we can think of the associationist principles as having counterparts that govern the degradation of fixity or steadiness. Hume owes us, in addition to his psychological account of why the variations in degrees of confidence occur, an account of the presumptive basis for considering them unphilosophical. Hume comments, with reference to the second kind of unphilosophical probability: "The difference in these degrees of evidence [is] not receiv'd by philosophy as solid and legitimate; because in that case an argument must have a different force to day, from what it shall have a month hence" (T 143). The argument that fire accompanied a particular instance of smoke generates less confidence ten months than ten weeks after the fire. Hume writes, with reference to the third kind of unphilosophical probability: "A man may receive a more lively conviction from a probable reasoning, which is close and immediate, than from a long chain of consequences, tho' just and conclusive in each part" (T 144). Consider a large number of inferential transitions, each "infallible" (T 144) on its own; Hume has in mind causal inferences that constitute "proofs" (§ IV. 1). If such inferences are constructed into a long chain of connected arguments, one will have relatively little confidence in the conclusion. Since the degree of confidence in a conclusion is a function of the degree of confidence in each step of an argument, an inference that is infallible on its own is not infallible when connected in a chain. The degree of confidence generated by a causal inference embedded in an argument varies with the number of preceding steps. Hume's general claim is that the same argument has a different force, produces different degrees of confidence, at different times or on different occasions of use. The first three kinds of unphilosophical probability are to be rejected for this reason. This is as close as Hume comes at pages 143–46 to an explicit suggestion about why the first three kinds of probability are "unphilosophical." As the suggestion stands, however, it will not take Hume far. The observation that "an argument must have a different force to day, from what it shall have a month hence" has no bite unless the two arguments are the same. Presupposing that the arguments today and a month hence are the same is question begging. Hume's claim is correct if we think of an argument as simply consisting of a set of propositions comprising premises and a conclusion. The claim is incorrect if we think of an argument as including a set of premises together with the degrees of confidence with which the premises are believed. The first three kinds of unphilosophical probability arise in circumstances where there

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are variations in this confidence. Why should arguments not have a different force on different occasions, if they differ in the degree of confidence associated with the beliefs in the premises? I do not complete an answer to this question until § IV.5. In the present section, I propose an initial account, with reference to the role of second-order generalizations that have affinities with "general rules" in the context of the fourth kind of unphilosophical probability (§ IV.2). In § IV.4,1 introduce difficulties for the preliminary account. In § IV.5,1 supplement this account with additional resources.19 This procedure will serve to highlight the need for the most distinctive feature of Hume's position. Aspects of my preliminary explanation of why the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability are unjustified are modeled on Hume's treatment of poetical enthusiasm and of the relation of resemblance. Hume cannot raise the issue of whether beliefs arising from resemblance and poetical enthusiasm are unjustified. Beliefs are steady dispositions to display characteristic manifestations. Resemblance can enliven an idea, but it cannot produce belief (cf. T 107-10); poetical enthusiasm enlivens ideas (cf. T 123, 630-32) but results merely in "phantom" (T 630) or "counterfeit belief" (T 123).20 Resemblance and poetical enthusiasm result in pseudobeliefs (§§ III. 1-2). These are unsteady dispositions that produce many of the verbal and nonverbal behaviors and internal episodes (including vivacity, and hence occurrent pseudobelief) that manifest genuine dispositional belief (§ III.2). At the same time, Hume has an objection, broadly speaking an epistemic objection, even to pseudobeliefs. Here "general rules" come into play. In the context of the fourth kind of unphilosophical probability, general rules are (general) second-order beliefs, (general) beliefs about beliefs. In the present context, general rules are (general) beliefs about pseudobeliefs. For ease of exposition, I call (general) beliefs both about beliefs and about states that mimic beliefs second-order beliefs. To appreciate the role of general rules, we need to remind ourselves of Hume's tendency to suppose that we are introspectively aware of mental dispositions (§§ 1.1-2, III.2). This tendency is at work in the present context. In I.iii.9, Hume writes: " 'Tis impossible [the relation of resemblance] can ever operate with any considerable degree of force and constancy. The mind forsees and anticipates the change; and even from the very first instant feels the looseness of its actions, and the weak hold it has of its objects" (T 109-10). In an Appendix passage for insertion at page 123 of Liii.10, Hume writes of the effects of poetry: "The ideas it presents are different to the feeling from those, which arise from the memory and the judgment. There is something weak and imperfect amidst all that seeming vehemence of thought and sentiment, which attends the fictions of poetry" (T 631). Hume is describing what he takes to be a feeling or

19. The richer account goes beyond the one I provide in 1995a, pp. 119–31. 20. For complications in regard to references to Treatise 123 and pages 630-32 of the Appendix, see § III.2, n. 8.


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awareness of unsteady dispositions produced by resemblance and poetical enthusiasm. The "looseness" (cf. T 106,116,123,595,624,625) of these unsteady dispositions is an "imperfection," in comparison to the fixity of dispositions that arise from the relation of cause and effect. Hume claims that this imperfection gives rise to a distinctive "feeling," indeed that "this imperfection is very sensible in every single instance" (T 110). The felt imperfection functions as a marker or signpost of pseudobeliefs. In these cases, we will also observe that the pseudobelief is "fluctuating" (T 109) or "momentary" (T 110). We are thus able to form a generalization to the effect that pseudobeliefs are fleeting. Here we have a general rule. Hume raises the possibility that the general rule contributes to the feeling of imperfection: "We shall afterwards have occasion to remark both the resemblances and differences betwixt a poetical enthusiasm, and a serious conviction. In the mean time I cannot forbear observing, that the great difference in their feeling proceeds in some measure from reflection and general rules' (T 631). Hume has told us in the preceding paragraph that we feel "something weak and imperfect amidst" (T 631) poetical enthusiasm. The imperfection we feel is the looseness or lack of fixity, that is, the unsteadiness of the disposition. How could it be that the difference in feeling between belief and poetical enthusiasm "proceeds in some measure" from a general rule? The answer is that the general rule further unsettles an already unsteady disposition. Hume is explicit that this possibility is realized in the case of the relation of resemblance: And as this imperfection is very sensible in every single instance, it still encreases by experience and observation, when we compare the several instances we may remember, and form a general rule against the reposing any assurance in those momentary glimpses of light, which arise in the imagination from a feign'd resemblance and contiguity. (T 110)

On the basis of experience of several instances, we form the belief that the occurrent manifestations (such as increases in vivacity or occurrent pseudobeliefs) that follow the feeling of imperfection are fleeting. This second-order belief is a general rule.21 The general rule heightens the feeling of imperfection by increasing the unsteadiness of the disposition. How is this accomplished? My treatment of this question elaborates an account due to MacNabb.22 Let us say that both beliefs and pseudobeliefs are putative beliefs. Consider the following set of doxastic states, where pseudobeliefs, as well as beliefs, are counted among doxastic states: (PI) one has a putative belief that p; (P2) one believes that this putative belief follows the feeling of imperfection; (P3) one believes that putative beliefs following feelings of imperfection are fleeting; and (P4) one believes that one's present putative belief that

21. Falkenstein assigns a role to general rules in this context but takes these rules to be about the reliability of the relevant mechanisms (1997, pp. 47–48); reliability plays no role in my treatment of these sources of pseudobelief. 22. See MacNabb, 1951/1966, p. 96.

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p will be fleeting. 'P' is a mnemonic for the case of pseudobeliefs, as we will consider parallel sets of beliefs below. Here, P3 is a second-order belief, a general rule that can arise from custom. The belief at P4 follows from P2 and P3 by causal inference. There is some plausibility to the claim that, as an empirical fact, reflection on the belief P4 (further) unsettles the putative belief. One believes that one's present putative belief that p will be fleeting, and when one considers that one will soon abruptly let go of the putative belief, one is (even) less inclined to maintain it.23 Here we have a possible mechanism for increasing the unsteadiness of putative beliefs. The association of ideas by resemblance produces dispositions that lack fixity, so that the putative belief that p at P1 is likely to change abruptly. This unsteadiness is due entirely to characteristics of the process that produces the putative belief, to the lack of repetition in the association of ideas by resemblance. In the absence of P3 and P4, there is no further tendency for PI to change, no further tendency to change owing to conflicts within the set of doxastic states. By contrast, there is an unsettling effect in the presence of the second-order beliefs P3 and P4. Consideration of the set of doxastic states that includes P3 and P4 inclines one to revise the set by relinquishing PI; the second-order beliefs render PI even less steady, more imperfect. Though Hume states that we "form a general rule against the reposing any assurance in those momentary glimpses of light, which arise in the imagination from a feign'd resemblance," we need not take the "general rule" to be a regulative principle governing belief formation. The presence of a feeling of looseness triggers the second-order habit P3, and we form the belief P4, the expectation that the putative belief that p will be fleeting. Consideration of the set of doxastic states that Includes this belief generates instability. Since the belief at P3 is infixed, instability can best be removed by relinquishing the loose disposition that constitutes the putative belief. Similar remarks apply to the case of poetical enthusiasm. An element in this account of why pseudobeliefs are epistemically defective consists in locating second-order beliefs that generate instability. These second-order beliefs are instances of general rules. I can now offer a preliminary explanation of why Hume considers variations in degree of confidence in the context of the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability to be unjustified. On the basis of experience, we acquire the second-order belief that degree of confidence diminishes as psychological distance increases. Hume must take it that a belief along these lines has unsettling effects. Suppose one believes the following, where 'U' indicates the context of unphilosophical probability: (Ul) that some proposition p is true, where one holds that belief with degree of confidence k, (U2) that one's belief that p arises from memory or causal inference; (U3) that degree of confidence diminishes as psychological distance increases; and (U4) that one's present degree of confi-

23. The case in which resemblance intensifies belief admits an analogous treatment, substituting 'putative intensification of belief (see § III.2, n. 23) for 'putative belief in P1-P4 and in the accompanying discussion.


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dence that p would vary with changes in psychological distance. The belief at U4 follows from U2 and U3 by causal inference. It seems plausible that, as an empirical fact, reflection on the belief U4 unsettles the belief Ul. When one considers that one's degree of confidence in p would be diminished if the distance were greater and would be increased if the distance were less, one is less inclined to maintain one's present degree of confidence in p. The point is not that one will be inclined to have a lower (or higher) degree of confidence in p; the point is that reflection on U4 disinclines one to adopt any determinate degree of confidence that the relevant proposition is true. Here we have a possible mechanism for undermining any particular degree of confidence in a belief arising from memory or causal inference. In the case of pseudobeliefs produced by resemblance, the second-order belief generates a conflict that magnifies an existing instability. In the context of the first two kinds of unphilosophical probability, where p is a memory belief, the second-order belief generates instability. In the absence of beliefs U3 and U4, one's first-order beliefs are steady, albeit gradually decreasing over time in the extent to which they are infixed. As the event one remembers becomes more remote, one's degree of confidence in the memory diminishes. This gradual reduction in degree of belief results entirely from the process that produces U1. In the absence of U3 and U4, there is no further tendency for Ul to change, no tendency to change owing to conflicts within the set of doxastic states. By contrast, there is conflict that unsettles the belief Ul in the presence of the second-order beliefs U3 and U4.24 This preliminary explanation of Hume's reasons for regarding the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability to be unjustified assigns a role to second-order beliefs or general rules. There is a textual basis for this interpretation, even though Hume gives no examples of second-order beliefs and makes no mention of general rules in the course of discussing the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability at pages 143-46. Hume is explicit in assigning a role to general rules in his treatments of resemblance at page 110 of I.iii.9 and of poetical enthusiasm at page 631. In the final paragraph of this portion of the Appendix, Hume writes: "A like reflexion on general rules keeps us from augmenting our belief upon every encrease of the force and vivacity of our ideas" (T 632). In Hume's formula, vivacity represents degree of confidence. Hume's comment at page 632 invites us to import general rules into contexts involving variations in degree of confidence due to sources other than resemblance and poetical enthusiasm. Hume marks this portion of the Appendix for insertion at

24. Matters are somewhat different with the third kind of unphilosophical probability. Once a causal inference with the conclusion that p is embedded in an argument someone produces, the degree of confidence in p, a function of the number of preceding steps, is fixed. The variations in degree of confidence in p are hypothetical: one's degree of confidence in p would have been diminished (increased) had the inference come after a longer (shorter) series of steps. Instability results from the consideration of these hypothetical differences, not (as in the case of memory) from consideration of variations that in fact occur.

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page 123 of I.iii.10 (T 630). The discussion of the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability begins three sections and twenty pages later. (The intervening sections, I.iii. 11-12, are devoted to philosophical probability.) Furthermore, Hume explicitly invokes general rules in his discussion of the fourth kind of unphilosophical probability (§ IV.2) and concludes his discussion of the two influences of general rules: "The following of general rules is a very unphilosophical species of probability; and yet 'tis only by following them that we can correct this, and all other unphilosophical probabilities" (T 150, emphasis added). General rules are implicated in the first three kinds of unphilosophical probabilities, as well as in the fourth.

IV.4. Variations in Sentiment Due to Sympathy The matter of unphilosophical probability proves more complex than in the account in the preceding section. General rules turn out to be a part of the story but not the whole of it. We can see why more is required by considering an objection to my explanation of why variations in degree of confidence are a source of instability. The difficulty is a variant of the objection I have raised against Hume's own suggested explanation of why the variations are unphilosophical. Hume maintains that were philosophy to approve the differences in degree of confidence, the same argument would have a different force on different occasions. This does not explain why we should count the arguments as "the same," given that we have different degrees of confidence on the occasions when they are advanced (§ IV.3). My interpretation seems to face a similar problem. Consider the belief that U4: one's present degree of confidence that p would vary with changes in psychological distance. Why should this belief unsettle one's actual degree of confidence that p is true, unless one regarded oneself as in possession of "the same argument" and hence "the same evidence" even when psychological distance, and hence degree of confidence, changes? The unsettling effects seem to depend on construing the available argument or evidence at different psychological distances as the same. The felt force, one's experienced degree of confidence, varies. For this reason, construing the available argument or evidence as the same on different occasions seems to require a distinction between the apparent force and the actual force of an argument, between the apparent evidence and the actual evidence. The apparent evidence is a function of the degree of confidence with which the premises are believed at the time, whereas the actual evidence is impervious to variations in actual degree of confidence. What entitles Hume to rely on this distinction? A similar problem arises for Hume's treatment of moral distinctions. This is because the operation of sympathy produces variations in sentiment, much as memory and causal inference produce variations in degree of confidence. My strategy is to defend a solution to the problem in the context of Hume's moral theory, where the issues are more familiar. I then develop a solution along the same lines in the context of the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability.

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Moral judgments extend to actions, sentiments, and characters (T 471,475). Though the evaluation of character is fundamental (T 575), for the purposes of my discussion I treat actions as the objects of evaluation. Moral judgments report (cf. T 469) or express (cf. T 471) pleasure or satisfaction, pain or uneasiness, of a particular kind (T 469-71,475,499), "when a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest" (T 472).25 Moral judgments, according to Hume, are "founded" (T 466,470,491,546) on the pleasure or pain that results when we sympathize with persons affected by an action under evaluation (T 582-83,591,602). The degree to which a character or action is virtuous or vicious depends on the intensity of the relevant pleasure or pain. In the Treatise, sympathy is an associative mechanism that converts the lively idea of a feeling of another person into an impression of the feeling, into the feeling itself (T 316-20, 385-86). Following Stroud, we can relax this account, so that sympathy converts the lively idea of a feeling into a feeling with the same general affective quality.26 Sympathy operates in virtue of the resemblance among all humans (T 318). Various relations can strengthen the intensity of the feelings produced by sympathy: proximity in time or place; resemblance in manners, character, country, language, and so forth; and causation, and hence relations of blood and acquaintance (T 318,581). Hume writes: "We sympathize more with persons contiguous to us, than with persons remote from us: With our acquaintance, than with strangers: With our countrymen, than with foreigners" (T 581). Here is an empirical phenomenon, one that can be described nonassociationistically, to be explained: We have less of a tendency to feel what others feel when they are psychologically distant from us. The variations in the intensity of feelings due to sympathy are reminiscent of the variations in degree of confidence due to the remoteness of a memory and the length of a chain of causal inferences. The variations in our tendency to share the feelings of others and the variations in degree of confidence in the context of the first three species of unphilosophical probability are special cases of a general phenomenon: The strength of various psychological reactions or effects diminishes with psychological distance. Hume thus subsumes the different sources of variations in sentiment under the rubric of "distance or contiguity" (T 581) and "nearness and remoteness" (T 582; cf. 603). The variations in sentiment due to sympathy lead Hume to consider an objection to his account of moral judgment (§ 1.3): "As this sympathy is very variable, it may be thought, that our sentiments of morals must admit of all the same variations.... B u t . . . sympathy varies without a variation in the esteem. 25. I intend my interpretation of Hume's theory of moral judgment to be neutral on the question of whether these judgments are best taken as reporting or as expressing sentiments or feelings. For more complex variants of these interpretations, see Broad, 1930, pp. 90-91, 108-9; Harrison, 1976, pp. 113-15; Mackie, 1980, p. 73; and Snare, 1991,esp.pp. 18-24. 26. Stroud, 1977, pp. 197-98. Darwall, n.d., surveys recent empirical literature on psychological phenomena in the region of Humean sympathy.

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Our esteem, therefore, proceeds not from sympathy" (T 580-81). There is a kind of moral assessment or evaluation—what we might call distinctively moral judgment—that exhibits much less variation than the sentiments that result from sympathy and hence much less variation than judgments that simply report or express those sentiments individually. Hume needs to explain why this is so. Here is part of his "answer" (T 581): "In order, therefore, to prevent those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, we fix on some steady and general points of view" (T 581-82, Hume's emphases; cf. 602).27 Similarly, "we seek [a] standard of merit and demerit, which may not admit of so great variation" (T 583), and we "form some general inalterable standard" (T 603). It is clear that achieving stable judgments is important to Hume's explanation of why we adopt a steady and general point of view. We can flesh out this explanation so that Hume is again calling attention to a set of conflicting judgments. Consider the following beliefs, where'S' indicates the context of judgments based on sympathy: (SI) that some action is virtuous (or vicious) to degree z; (S2) that the belief S1 reports or expresses the intensity of the feeling of pleasure (or pain) that arises from sympathy; (S3) that the intensity of the feeling that arises from sympathy varies inversely with one's psychological distance from the persons with whom one is sympathizing; and (S4) that one's belief about the degree to which an action is virtuous (or vicious) will vary with changes in psychological distance. The Humean claim is that, as an empirical fact, reflection on the belief S4 unsettles the belief S1. When one considers that one would believe that the action possesses a greater or lesser degree of virtue if one's psychological distance from those involved were different, one is less inclined to maintain one's present belief that the action is virtuous to degree i. We thus have a set of beliefs exhibiting a psychological structure similar to that involved in beliefs U1-U4 in the context of the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability (§ IV.3). This provides a preliminary account of the motivation for avoiding the variations in moral judgments due to sympathy: the belief at S4 is unsettling. Is this an adequate interpretation of Hume's position? We adopt a steady and general point of view"in order... to prevent [the] continual contradictions" arising from sympathy. Suppose we take the notion of "contradiction" at face value. Hume is supposing that moral judgments report the intensity of sentiments produced by sympathy. Consider two such judgments. J. L. Mackie contends that it would be misguided for Hume to base the need for a steady and

27. Hume applies the notion of "contradiction" to both intersubjective variations in judgment and infrasubjective variations over time (T581).I do not directly consider the extent to which Hume must rely on the former (but see n. 40). It seems worthwhile to see how far Hume can secure the "general point of view" from intrasubjective variations. I also want to pursue the analogy to unphilosophical probability, where Hume confines his discussion to variations in degree of confidence for a single person. For discussions that do more to track the two cases or place more emphasis on intersubjective variations, see Atkinson, 1976, pp. 33-44; Bricke, 1996, pp. 137-39; and Korsgaard, 1999, pp. 23—25. For differences between the Treatise and the second Enquiry, see Cohon, 1997, pp. 847–48; and Darwall, n.d., at the close of part 1.

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general point of view on the claim that these judgments are contradictory.28 This is because there is no need for an evaluator to regard the relevant judgments as contradictory in the first place. It is open to an evaluator to construe different judgments merely as reports or expressions of sentiments produced under different conditions. This is an important problem. Let me elaborate Mackie's criticism. Suppose an evaluator construes the content of the judgments in the following way: the agent's action appears virtuous to degree i to me at the moment, given the degree to which I am psychologically distant from the agent. Construed in this way, any apparent contradiction in different judgments vanishes. For example, an evaluator holds that the action appears to him, from the psychological distance he occupies at the earlier time, virtuous to one degree; he later holds that the same action appears to him, from the psychological distance he occupies at the later time, virtuous to a lesser degree. These claims are not contradictory. There is a genuine contradiction if the evaluator's judgments convey that an action is (or was) virtuous to one degree and also is (or was) virtuous to a lesser degree. Mackie's point is that Hume is not in a position to claim that we avoid variations in our moral judgments in order to avoid contradictions.29 This is similar to my objection to Hume's claim, in the context of the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability, that "an argument"—the same argument—"must have a different force" on different occasions (§ IV.3). Hume is not entitled to construe the variations in confidence as constituting judgments about the actual rather than the apparent evidence. It seems that my reconstruction of why the variations in sentiment due to sympathy are sources of instability is susceptible to Mackie's objection, even though I do not explicitly appeal to contradictions. Consider the belief S4: that one's belief about the degree to which an action is virtuous will vary with changes in psychological distance. In my interpretation, the presence of this belief is a source of conflict; for any determinate degree of virtue, the presence of S4 undermines any inclination to believe that the action is virtuous to that degree. The belief S4 would have no tendency to undermine such inclinations were we to construe the belief SI, that an action is virtuous to a determinate degree, as meaning merely that the action appears virtuous to that degree from a particular psychological distance. If moral beliefs are construed merely as reports of how virtuous actions appear, the fact that such beliefs vary with psychological distance should have no tendency to undermine inclinations to hold

28. Mackie, 1980, p. 122. Penelhum raises a similar objection: "[Hume] really needs to account for our willingness to be objective, which is itself a moral attitude. What he offers [in his doctrine of corrections] is merely an account of how we achieve objectivity when this attitude is already taken up" (1975, p. 143). For recent discussions, see Sayre-McCord, 1994, pp. 216—17;Cohon, 1997, pp. 828,834-35; and esp. Korsgaard, 1999, pp. 14-17. 29. Mackie takes Hume, given his theoretical resources, to be at a dead end (1980, pp. 122-23; cf. 68, 71-72,125), one that "is rather devastating for Hume's theory. For it means that his natural virtues are, after all, a further set of artificial virtues" (p. 123). Mackie contends that Hume cannot avoid the result that moral judgments in regard to the natural virtues constitute a set of conventions, adopted owing to their utility.

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them. Mackie could object that Hume can no more appeal to unsettling conflicts to explain why we avoid variation in our moral judgments than he can appeal to contradictions. This complaint is similar to the one I have raised, at the beginning of this section, to my appeal to U1-U4 in the context of unphilosophical probability. If judgments along the lines of Ul are construed merely as reports of the degree to which a proposition appears to be probable, the belief that such estimates vary with psychological distance should have no tendency to undermine inclinations to hold them. It seems that Hume could no more appeal to unsettling conflicts among U1-U4 to explain why the variations in degree of confidence are unphilosophical than he can appeal to the claim that the same argument has a difference force on different occasions. Mackie's objection to Hume's appeal to "contradictions" in the context of Hume's moral theory strikes me as hasty. At the least, it obscures an important feature of Hume's project. In IILiii. 1, Hume is trying to explain what causes common persons to adopt a steady and general point of view.30 In this respect, there is an analogy to Hume's project in I.iv.2, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses." Hume there sets out to explain "What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?' (T 187). In the first instance, the "us" in question are the "vulgar"; the "philosophical system" only arises out of the vulgar belief in body (T 211-16). Hume observes, prior to his discussion of the philosophical system, that "I here account for the opinions and belief of the vulgar with regard to the existence of body" (T 202). In I.iv.2, it is characteristic of the vulgar that they "confound perceptions and objects" (T 193). Hume means by this that the vulgar do not distinguish between perceptions and objects: "Now we have already observ'd, that however philosophers may distinguish betwixt the objects and perceptions of the senses; which they suppose co-existent and resembling; yet this is a distinction, which is not comprehended by the generality of mankind" (T 202). In explaining the beliefs of the vulgar, Hume cannot help himself to ways of construing ordinary beliefs that depend upon distinctions that the vulgar do not draw. A distinction between perceptions and objects emerges only in response to conflicts or psychological pressures internal to the vulgar viewpoint (§§ V.1,3). I suggest that Hume takes it to be characteristic of a vulgar viewpoint not to recognize distinctions that philosophers draw. In Ill.iii, Hume is trying to explain why common persons adopt a steady and general point of view. Such persons do not distinguish between the claim that an action appears, from their current perspective, virtuous to one degree and the claim that an action is virtuous to that degree. In Hume's view, the vulgar no more distinguish these claims than they distinguish claims about internal impressions and claims about external objects.31 This point undermines Mackie's objection to Hume's claim that

30. I do not mean that this is all that Hume is trying to explain. For some useful distinctions in this regard, see Korsgaard, 1999, p. 4. 31. I do not, however, want to press an analogy between the projects in I.iv.2 and Ill.iii too far. Hume has little use for the philosopher's distinction between perceptions and objects (§§ V.3-5,

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we adopt a steady and general point of view in order to avoid contradictions. The objection is that reports of individual sentiments due to sympathy are not contradictory, if construed merely as reports of how an action appears. I am suggesting, however, that such a construal of these reports, though available to philosophers, is not available within the vulgar viewpoint. Mackie might reply that, by the same token, reports of individual sentiments due to sympathy cannot be construed as reports of the degree to which an action is virtuous. After all, this construal, which sustains the appeal to a contradiction, is also not available from the vulgar viewpoint. This reply would miss my point. I am not defending the claim that Hume is entitled to view the reports of sentiments due to sympathy as genuine contradictions. The common person does not construe reports of individual sentiments either as reports of the extent to which actions are virtuous or as reports of the extent to which actions appear virtuous. The common person does not embrace the first of these alternatives, since he does not draw the relevant distinction; for this same reason, the common person does not reject the second of these alternatives. The position of the common person is thus amorphous, indeterminate with respect to the philosopher's distinction between two kinds of reports about sentiments. This leaves room for a possibility that Mackie does not consider. Even though the common person does not recognize the variations in judgment due to sympathy as genuine contradictions, the common person might experience these variations as disconcerting or disquieting in something like the way that contradictions common persons can recognize are sources of uneasiness. I can preserve my claim that S4 undermines S1 along the same lines. Mackie would object that the belief that one's belief S4 about the degree to which an action is virtuous varies with changes in psychological distance has no tendency to undermine beliefs such as SI, construed merely as reports of how virtuous actions appear. The common person, however, does not construe these beliefs as reports either of how virtuous actions are or of how virtuous actions appear. This leaves room for reflection on S4 to cause a common person amorphous discomfort or uneasiness, which unsettles beliefs such as SI. Mackie writes: "If moral judgments were understood to be immediately expressive of sympathy, their differences would not be felt as contradictions." Mackie's point is that the differences would not be felt to be contradictions. But perhaps they would feel like contradictions and thus be unsettling.32

VII. 1), whereas distinctions between judgments about apparent and actual degrees of virtue and between judgments about apparent and actual probability are legitimate. My point is that none of these distinctions are contained within the vulgar viewpoint. 32. For the quotation, see Mackie, 1980, p. 122. My position has affinities with that of Korsgaard, insofar as she holds that Hume is calling attention to circumstances that "cause commotion and a sense of contradiction" (1999, p. 24; cf. 35); these are "like a contradiction" (p. 25) in that they involve "tension," "conflict," or "opposition" that "must be quieted" (p. 25), though there is no contradiction "in the strict sense" (p. 39 n. 21). I try to take matters further in offering an explanation of why these situations feel like contradictions. For more on Korsgaard's position, see n. 40.

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IV. 5. Variations Due to Psychological Distance as Sources of Uneasiness If the variations in reports or expressions of sentiments due to sympathy feel like contradictions, it must be because these variations are similar to contradictions in a relevant respect. We know (§ 1.3)—and shall see in more detail (§ V.3)—that Hume maintains that contradictory beliefs give rise to "uneasiness" (T 205,206; cf. 215). Why is this so? We have seen, on the evidence of I.iii.7 and II.iii.10, that steadiness is essential to belief and that "variation," "instability," and "inconstancy" are essential to doubt (§ III.2). This fluctuation "gives uneasiness" (T 453); as Hume writes in the preceding section, "uncertainty alone [on its own] is uneasy" (T 447). This is not a claim about the nature of doubt but about its contingent psychological effects. Similarly, belief, in virtue of its fixity, prevents fluctuation. It follows that belief prevents the uneasiness that arises from doubt. These claims are also in place in the Appendix. In belief, unlike doubt, the mind "fixes and reposes itself in one settled conclusion" (T 625); whereas doubt is associated with "agitation" (T 626), and hence uneasiness, belief is pleasant, involving "tranquility and repose" (T 626).33 Hume holds independently that there is a general desire for pleasure and an aversion to pain (T 118-19,414,438-39,574-75). The uneasiness in doubt, therefore, provides a motive for its own removal. Hume elaborates on the uneasiness in doubt: Tis a quality of human nature, which is conspicuous on many occasions, and is common both to the mind and the body, that too sudden and violent a change is unpleasant to us, and that however any objects may in themselves be indifferent, yet their alternation gives uneasiness. As 'tis of the nature of doubt to cause a variation in the thought, and transport us suddenly from one idea to another, it must of consequence be the occasion of pain. (T 453)

Sudden change gives uneasiness. Variation and wavering is of the nature of doubt, so that doubt gives uneasiness.34 I suggest that the principle about sudden change lies in the background of Hume's view that contradictions give rise to uneasiness. Hume maintains that contradictions give rise to oscillation in belief or cycles of alternating assent

33. On our liking steadiness, see MacNabb, 1951/1966, p. 99; and § 1.5 (including n. 41). Though they put forward the general claim that doubt is uneasy, the discussions at II.iii.10 and the Appendix emerge for specialized purposes: to explain the source of "curiosity" (T 448,453) and to defend the claim that belief is a modification of an idea, respectively. The Appendix adds a related doctrine: There is a positive "satisfaction and pleasure" in the transition or "passage" (T 626) from doubt and uneasiness to repose. Though belief is not an impression distinct from an idea, a feeling distinct from an idea is a by-product of the transition from doubt to belief. 34. There are affinities here with Peirce in "The Fixation of Belief": "Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of belief; while the latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid" (CP 5.372; cf. 2.210,5.384,394, 397,510,605). See my 1995b, esp. pp. 311-16, and 1998, esp. pp. 216-18.

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(§ 1.2).35 We can refine this aspect of Hume's position in light of the distinction between dispositional and occurrent beliefs (§ III.2). Both sides of a contradiction are beliefs and hence infixed dispositions. These cannot themselves oscillate, though they compete for influence. The oscillation occurs at the level of the beliefs' manifestations, verbal and nonverbal behaviors, as well as internal episodes, occurrent or conscious states. For simplicity, we can focus on alternation in occurrent beliefs, that is, in occurrent manifestations of dispositional beliefs. When we hold contradictory dispositional beliefs, our occurrent beliefs alternate. This involves sudden change, which gives uneasiness. The principle that sudden change gives uneasiness, in conjunction with Hume's contention that contradictory beliefs lead to oscillation, explains why contradictions give rise to uneasiness. In § III.4,1 introduced two classes of cases where beliefs are unstable, unsteady in their influence. The first involves the presence of contradictory beliefs. The second involves second-order beliefs that one takes to call into question the truth of a first-order belief. For example, one might hold the second-order belief that two of one's first-order beliefs are contradictory. Since belief aims at truth, this second-order belief would unsettle the first-order beliefs that are called into question, so that one is less inclined to maintain them. What if one does not hold the second-order belief, does not recognize or attend to the contradiction? According to Hume, reflectively taking notice of a contradiction among one's beliefs is not necessary in order for the contradictory beliefs to be unsettled. Sudden change gives uneasiness, a principle that applies to the oscillations in the manifestations of contradictory beliefs. One seeks to relieve the uneasiness by modifying one's beliefs (§§ 1.3, V.3), so that one is less inclined to maintain them. This is a Humean mechanism for undermining belief that bypasses second-order beliefs that call into question the truth of first-order beliefs. These are cases where a psychologically uncomfortable and unsettled condition— cognitive dissonance (§ 1.3)—tends to arise without any special reflection or attentiveness. Since belief is nature's provision for a steady influence on the will and action (§ III.2), we might put this point by saying that, in Hume's view, nature does not leave it to chance that contradictory beliefs tend to feel uneasy.36 According to Hume, our psychological makeup is such that contradictory beliefs tend to be unsettled.

35. Baier claims that, for Hume, contradictions and "contrariety in beliefs is ... essentially a matter of threat of mutual destructiveness" (1982, p. 645; cf. 644-47). (There are traces of this posiposi-tion in her1991, Hume defines 'contrariety' as a relation of ideas that is "discoverable at first sight" (T 70) and "susceptible of certainty and demonstration" (T 463). At the same time, Baier is on the right track; Hume's real interest is in "a more dynamic conception of destructive psychological force" (1982, p. 645). 36. The uneasiness due to sudden change is thus nature's means for trying to rectify conditions that undermine the natural function of belief. Similarly, Harmon-Jones suggests that the psychological discomfort that motivates dissonance effects is adaptive (1999, pp. 92-93). Hume certainly admits a sense of "natural" as "agreeable" with respect "to health" (T 226). Developed in this

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The principle that sudden change gives uneasiness has the potential to shed light on Hume's discussions of instability in a variety of contexts. For example, Hume places evaluative weight on his distinction between calm and violent emotions, where the latter are volatile (§ I.I). Festinger applied the notion of dissonance to a wide range of psychological states (§ 1.3). We can perhaps think of the "momentary" character of gusts of passion as themselves giving rise to uneasiness or psychological discomfort. In this section, however, I focus more narrowly, on doxastic states. My strategy is to show how Hume might generalize his conclusion that contradictions give rise to uneasiness by applying the principle that sudden change gives uneasiness in instances of doxastic states that are not strictly contradictory. To accomplish this, we need only apply the general principle that sudden change in doxastic states gives uneasiness. We thus suppose that any doxastic states that fluctuate—not only contradictions—give rise to uneasiness, which we seek to relieve, so that we are less inclined to maintain them.37 We seek to relieve the discomfort by modifying our beliefs, thereby undermining them. Sudden change in doxastic states thus undermines or unsettles belief without the mediation of second-order beliefs. The upshot is that we have encountered two ways in which beliefs are undermined, or rendered less steady, in the presence of other beliefs. In cases where doxastic states suddenly change, the fluctuating states give rise to uneasiness, inducing disequilibrium among first-order beliefs themselves. In cases where a second-order belief calls into question the truth of a first-order belief, the second-order belief undermines the first-order belief by engaging the disposition to regulate belief by what one takes to be evidence of truth. Here there is disequilibrium among first- and second-order beliefs.38 In both sorts of cases, our doxastic states are unsettled; they thus stand in contrast to the Pyrrhonian state of quietude, mental rest, or harmony (§ 1.2). Where a second-order belief

direction, my interpretation begins to merge with Schmitt's suggestion that, for Hume, justified beliefs are those that result from adaptive belief-forming mechanisms (1992, pp. 68-72). Schmitt rejects this (pp. 70-71), attributing a reliabilist theory of justification to Hume and maintaining that the plausibility of an adaptivist interpretation derives from the fact that adaptiveness is an indicator of reliability (pp. 71-72). (For an earlier reliabilist interpretation of Hume's first Enquiry, see Dauer, 1980.) My preference for a stability-based interpretation derives, in part, from the consideration that discussions that focus on stability are more prominent in the Treatise than ones that focus on either protoevolutionary concepts (see § III.4, n. 34) or issues about reliability. 37. Citing Treatise 109-10 and 150, Garrett maintains that it follows from Hume's psychological theory that "we are uncomfortable with the reflection that... sources of our beliefs are variable, impermanent, and unstable" (1997, p. 80), so that we will disapprove of them. As far as I can see, Garrett does not identify the feature of Hume's psychological theory that implies this. Perhaps Garrett's idea is that we disapprove of these sources because they do not "succeed" (p. 80) or are seen as not "constituting the best way to the truth about matters of fact" (p. 158). This approach, with reference to attaining truth, does not generalize to the parallel case of moral judgment. 38. In § III.4,1 write of the second-order belief as unsettling or undermining the relevant first-order beliefs. It would be more accurate to say that all of the members of the relevant set of beliefs are unsettled.

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calls into question the truth of a first-order belief, the disposition to regulate belief by evidence of truth carries explanatory weight. Perhaps in these cases we do feel uneasy, but it is not clear that this supposition is required to explain why our beliefs are unsettled. By contrast, in cases of sudden change, uneasiness has a prominent role in the explanation of why we are inclined to modify our beliefs. It is time to consider the fruitfulness of the principle that sudden change in doxastic states gives uneasiness. I begin with Hume's treatments of poetical enthusiasm and the relation of resemblance (§§ III.2-3). In these cases, no contradiction, not even contradictory pseudobeliefs, need be in the offing. In the contexts of poetical enthusiasm and resemblance, we are also not dealing with cases of doubt. Belief is a steady disposition and hence admits of degrees. Whereas Hume identifies doubt with a degree of belief short of full certainty (§ III.2), the pseudobeliefs that result from poetical enthusiasm and resemblance are not infixed at all. At the same time, pseudobeliefs, both dispositional and occurrent, are momentary or fleeting. Poetical enthusiasm and resemblance thus have a feature in common with contradiction and doubt; all are sources of sudden change, and hence of uneasiness. The variations in pseudobelief are thus unsettling. Consider Hume's treatment of moral judgment.39 The variations in sentiment due to sympathy often involve sudden change. This is because some of the relations that strengthen or weaken the effects of sympathy can themselves change abruptly. Though the relation of proximity in time must change gradually, such relations as proximity in place, resemblance in country, and acquaintance can change rapidly. Hume has these rapid changes in view: "Our situation, with regard both to persons and things, is in continual fluctuation; and a man, that lies at a distance from us, may, in a little time, become a familiar acquaintance" (T 581). Such fluctuations will be accompanied by sudden changes in sentiment and in the reports or expressions of these sentiments. The common person does not construe the fluctuations in reports of sentiments to be contradictory judgments about the degree to which an action is virtuous but also does not construe them merely as reports about the degree to which an action is virtuous (§ IV.4). Within this amorphous viewpoint, the principle that sudden change gives rise to uneasiness can come into play. Since it is this same principle that applies to the sudden changes due to the presence of

39. MacNabb has the idea of applying dislike for variation in the moral context: "The motive to adopt this general distant viewpoint and the calm and steady passions it arouses, is the dislike we have for the constant fluctuations and contradictions which arise in our sentiments" (1951/1966, p. 192; cf. 197). He also sees that a related principle about our disliking instability is important in I.iii (cf. 94-100, esp. 99, including n. 1). There is a fleeting statement of a parallelism between sympathy and unphilosophical probability in Garrett, 1997, p. 203. Brand appeals to Hume's doctrine of uneasiness in I.iv.2 in the context of moral judgment (1992, p. 120), but he seems to ignore the difficulties discussed in § IV.4 in Hume's talk of "contradictions" (cf. 68, 118-24). Bricke stresses that Hume thinks the variations in sentiment due to sympathy constitute "turmoil," which we find "intolerable" or "distressing" (1996, pp. 137,139,144), without offering any explanation of the source of the distress.

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contradictions, variations due to sympathy will feel like contradictions—psychologically uneasy and uncomfortable—even though they are not recognized as contradictions. This explains how, in central cases, the variations in moral judgment can be unsettling even though they are not regarded as constituting contradictions (§ IV.4).40 I suggest that Hume would offer a similar response to the objection I raised at the beginning of § IV.4 to my interpretation, byway of U1-U4, of Hume's position on unphilosophical probability. I claim that the belief that U4—one's present degree of confidence that p would vary with changes in psychological distance—unsettles one's actual degree of confidence in p. Against this, the belief that U4 would not be unsettling if we construed the belief Ul—that some proposition p is true, where one holds that belief with degree of confidence k— as meaning merely that, on the evidence one possesses, the proposition appears probable, to degree k. The undermining effects set in only if the belief Ul is construed as a judgment about the degree to which p is probable, on the evidence one possesses, rather than as a judgment about the degree to which p appears probable. This line of objection, like the Mackie-style objection to my reliance on S1-S4 to understand how variations in sentiment produce instability, obscures Hume's project. In his treatment of the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability, Hume is trying to explain psychological phenomena that arise within the vulgar viewpoint. The common person does not construe beliefs along the lines of Ul either as judgments that a proposition appears probable, on the evidence the person possesses, eras judgments that it is probable, on that evidence. This point undermines the objection to Hume's claim that we reject the variations in degree of confidence in order to avoid the result that the same argument has a different force on different occasions. The common person does not construe the arguments on different occasions as different arguments about

40. I have noted (n. 27) that Hume appeals to intersubjective as well as intersubjective variations to explain why we adopt a steady and general point of view. Festinger maintains that the belief that another person holds a "contrary" opinion is a source of dissonance (1957, p. 262). This effect depends only on the other person being "generally like oneself" (p. 262), not upon the belief that the other person has special expertise. Brand makes a nifty observation that might be brought to bear here. He cites Treatise 592 (1992, p. 88), where Hume maintains that the operation of sympathy extends to opinions (§ III.6). Brand further observes that our "sympathetically inherited [belief] ... triggers a kind of disturbance or 'commotion' between the belief which is 'natural' to us and our sympathetic belief (T 592)" (p. 88). Korsgaard, 1999, elaborates an interpretation along these lines. Sympathy, an important element in a Humean explanation of dissonance due to differences with others, could thus be invoked in the interpersonal case. My discussion, unlike Korsgaard's (though see her p. 26), focuses on the case of intrapersonal variations. As far as I can see, Korsgaard does not explicitly say what is required for variations in one's own earlier and later sentiments to result in a sense of contradiction. In the interpersonal case, it is through sympathy that "the two sentiments are both active in you" (p. 25). We can ask, with respect to the intrapersonal case, whether sympathy with the sentiments of my former self is required for two differing sentiments to be active in me now. Hume nowhere suggests this. In my interpretation, the mere variation is disquieting; sudden change causes uneasiness.


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how probable the conclusion appears at the time. By the same token, the common person does not reject the view that the arguments are the same, that they are arguments about the actual probability of the conclusion. The common person does not draw the relevant distinction. This somewhat amorphous and indeterminate viewpoint leaves room for the possibility that the variations in degree of confidence are experienced as disconcerting or disquieting. The source of the uneasiness, however, cannot be fully parallel to that in the context of other cases we have considered: doubt, genuine contradictions, poetical enthusiasm and resemblance, and variations in sentiment. These cases all involve sudden change.41 The first three kinds of unphilosophical probability, at least those deriving from the remoteness of memory, involve gradual variations in degree of confidence. Gradual changes, however, accumulate into large differences. In other contexts, Hume maintains that such disparities matter. For example, in I.iv.3, "Of the antient philosophy," Hume's explanation of the origin of the belief in material substrata relies on the point that it is possible to consider a succession of related, though changing, sensible qualities in either of two ways (§ V.I). One way is by "traceing [the succession] gradually thro' the successive points of time"; another is to "survey at once any two distinct periods of its duration, and compare the different conditions of the successive qualities" (T 220). Considering the object in the first way makes for an "easy transition" and a "smooth progress of the thought" (T 220). Considering the object in the second way, "the progress of the thought is broke," and "the variations, which were insensible when they arose gradually, do now appear of consequence" (T 220). Similarly, there are two ways to view the gradual changes in degree of confidence, either surveying the changes gradually or focusing on instances separated by a considerable interval. The latter method of viewing the changes results in discomfort. This account invokes a variant of the principle that sudden change gives uneasiness, which thus plays an explanatory role in a variety of contexts. In the case of the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability, we do not experience the abrupt changes associated with contradictory beliefs, fleeting pseudobeliefs, and fluctuations in sentiments due to sympathy, but we are able to consider the disparities in degree of confidence that have occurred, or would occur, after a considerable interval. I suggest that Hume would take reflection on such disparities to cause discomfort and uneasiness.42

41. What about cases where variations in sentiment due to sympathy are gradual? Hume encounters a similar problem in his discussion of the probability of chances. In Hume's formula, probability is a function of vivacity; yet, our judgments of probability make discriminations where corresponding differences in vivacity are not discernible. Here we rely on a "general rule"; we transfer to cases where differences in vivacity are insensible the same kinds of difference in judgment that we make when the differences in vivacity are large and discernible (T 141-42). 42. The fact that some reflection is required does not undermine my claim that Hume is trying to explain phenomena that arise within the vulgar viewpoint. That the vulgar do not recognize philosophical distinctions (§ IV.4) is compatible with the vulgar noticing differences or comparing

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The uneasiness, and its unsettling effects, however, are relatively modest, since the disparities do not arise abruptly, over short intervals. This helps to account for Hume's tempered disapproval of the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability. We can now return to my discussion in §§ IV.3-4 in regard to the role of general rules in Hume's accounts of unphilosophical probability and moral judgment. The sudden changes associated with contradictions, pseudobeliefs, and sentiments due to sympathy do not go unnoticed; they tend to be sources of uneasiness or discomfort in any instance in which they arise. In the case of the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability, a common person need not notice the gradual variations in degree of confidence. It is nevertheless the case that in particular instances where the common person does make comparisons that reveal significant disparities in degrees of confidence, uneasiness will arise. The disparities in degree of confidence due to memory and causal inference are sources of uneasiness in any instance that we take notice of them. If uneasiness and unsettling effects can arise from particular instances of sudden or accumulated change, what is the contribution of general rules: P3 and U3 in § IV.3 and S3 in § IV.4? The answer is that the second-order beliefs supply a fully general formulation of the regularities governing the variations relevant to each case. Whereas unsettled conditions arise from first-order beliefs alone in individual cases, the second-order beliefs permit inferences about variations that have not been experienced, sudden changes and disparities to come, in accordance with the schema P4, U4, and S4. The prospect of these changes will cause uneasiness. Hume allows that we can feel uneasiness reflecting on a situation that, were we to experience it, would be disagreeable (T 414,585-86). More generally, the general rules unsettle the results of the various beliefforming mechanisms systematically rather than instance by instance. This is why the second-order beliefs, though they are empirical beliefs arising from habit, amount to general rules "against the reposing" of certain kinds of belief and judgment. There is a final point in regard to the two versions of a stability-based interpretation (§§ III.5-6). The first three kinds of unphilosophical probability need give rise to uneasiness and an unsettled condition only when one notices disparities in experienced degrees of confidence due to variations in psychological distance. For this reason, the variations in degree of confidence do not automatically infect the belief system of common persons. They do so only insofar as the variations are accompanied by the required comparisons. If justification requires stability under (full) reflection, then these beliefs are not justified. If justification requires stability given the actual degree to which the person who holds the belief is reflective, then these beliefs may be justified, to the degree that they are stable. Which of the two versions of the theory does Hume have in view in his discussion of unphilosophical probability? At the close of I.iii.13, Hume includes the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability in an inventory of the different degrees of confidence and evidence (T 153-54). How can these degrees of confidence be justified and constitute "evidence," if variations in confidence are a source of instability and hence


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"unphilosophical"? Relative to the requirement of stability under (full) reflection, the variations in degree of confidence are unjustified. The less demanding of the two versions of the stability-based theory, however, allows justification to depend upon the degree to which the person who holds the belief is reflective. In the cases of the sudden changes associated with contradictions, pseudobeliefs, and sentiments due to sympathy, uneasiness arises without any special reflection or attentiveness. These cases contrast with variations in degree of confidence, which are unsettling only for persons who compare instances after a considerable interval. We can thus suppose that when Hume maintains that the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability constitute "evidence," his point is that they are justified within the belief system of a person who does not make such comparisons. When he maintains that they are "unphilosophical," his point is that they are not justified within the belief system of a person who is sufficiently attentive to the relevant disparities—not justified in such a belief system, that is, unless stability is restored (§ IV.6). Hume's discussion of the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability thus supplies some evidence (beyond that at § III.6) that Hume favors the weaker of the two stability-based theories.43 In this section, I have outlined a Humean account of the doxastic conditions, short of formal contradiction, that are unsettled and uneasy. This interpretation generalizes Hume's explicit claim that contradictions cause uneasiness. It can be applied to a variety of contexts where contradictions are not strictly in play: doubt, pseudobeliefs due to poetical enthusiasm and resemblance, variations in reports of sentiment due to sympathy, and variations in degree of confidence due to memory and causal inference.44 (In § VII.4,1 introduce a further application of the principle that sudden change gives uneasiness—to the probability of causes.) The interpretation rescues Hume from the difficulties, discussed in § IV.4, that beset his explanatory project in his accounts of unphilosophical probability and moral judgment, and it is consistent with Hume's appeal to general rules in the contexts under consideration. Hume's account may be crude, but he has ventured into a difficult area, the psychological study of dissonance (§ 1.3). Hume's theory of dissonance, given that beliefs are in place, does not depend on vivacity or enlivening in any essential way. This is an area where further psychological investigation on Hume's part might have been productive.

43. These points are relevant to Garrett's argument for his claim that 'evidence' is not epistemically evaluative (§ II.1, n. 19). Appealing to I.iii.13, Garrett writes that Hume "refers to one species of unphilosophical probability as 'weakening the evidence' of past instances, at the same time that he specifically refuses to grant that it ought to do so" (1997, p. 228). There is no difficulty if we attribute the less demanding theory to Hume. If the person is not sufficiently reflective to notice disparities in degree of confidence, there is no instability; the degrees of confidence with which the person holds beliefs are justified, given the actual degree to which the subject is reflective. 44. As in his moral theory, Hume focuses on uneasiness "of a particular kind" (§ IV.4). Perhaps I will feel uneasy if I have the fully infixed belief that there will be a nuclear disaster. In such a case, the uneasiness is due to the content of the belief, not to fluctuation in doxastic states.

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IV.6. Corrections in Judgments of Probability and Moral Judgments Hume takes variations in degree of confidence due to memory and causal inference and the variations in reports of sentiment due to sympathy to cause uneasiness. This uneasiness motivates efforts to modify one's beliefs (§ IV.5). In the case of moral judgment, Hume is explaining pressures within the vulgar viewpoint, one that does not rely on a distinction between apparent and actual degree of virtue, in the direction of a "steady and general" point of view (§ IV.4). Similarly, in the case of unphilosophical probability, Hume is explaining pressures within a viewpoint that does not rely on a distinction between apparent and actual probability, in the direction of probability judgments that diverge from ones about experienced degrees of confidence. In both cases, it remains to explain how the instabilities that exert pressure on ordinary beliefs might be removed. When Hume uncovered a similar source of instability in connection with pseudobeliefs, he claimed that we restore stability by relinquishing the states resulting from resemblance (§ IV.3). Hume cannot propose a parallel solution in connection with unphilosophical probability. First, insofar as we are able to relinquish beliefs based on memory and causal inference, the result would be to sacrifice beliefs that comprise the two systems of realities, discussed at Treatise 107-8.45 These beliefs, attributed to the "judgment" and "understanding," are preeminently justified at I.iii.9 (§§ II.1, III.l). Second, in I.iii.13, Hume does not claim that any belief based on causal inference or memory is unphilosophical. It is the variations in degree of confidence that are the source of instability. These points suggest that, rather than eliminate beliefs based on memory and causal inference, we should seek to moderate the influence of the variations that lead to instability. There is, however, an obstacle. Hume holds that some beliefs based on causal inference (T 128,147,225) and memory (T 31,153) are irresistible. What is more, in connection with the first kind of unphilosophical probability, the variation in degrees of confidence (that is, the variation due simply to psychological distance) "never fails to take place, tho' disclaimed by philosophers" (T 143). This suggests that variations in degree of confidence take place even when they are disclaimed by philosophy, even in the presence of general rules—that they are unavoidable. It appears that the source of the instability cannot be removed. The text under consideration is inhospitable to the Kemp Smith interpretation (§ 1.5), at least if we extend the interpretation to degree of belief. From the

45. MacNabb writes that Hume rejects beliefs based on resemblance and education in favor of "sticking to experience" (1951/1966, p. 96) and that "in the section 'Of Unphilosophical Probability' [Hume] deals with various other phenomena on the same lines" (p. 96). These phenomena cannot be treated exactly "on the same lines"; unphilosophical probability does arise from experience—from perception, memory, and causal inference.

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Kemp Smith perspective, the variations in degree of confidence ought to be justified; it is pointless or mistaken to say that the variations ought not occur. Hume wants to say that the variations are not justified nevertheless. I do not see any natural way for the Kemp Smith interpretation to deal with this difficulty. It is perhaps no accident that Kemp Smith does not discuss unphilosophical probability either in his pioneering 1905 articles on Hume or in his 1941 book, even though he includes a chapter-length discussion of the probability of chances and causes.46 How can instability be addressed if the variations in degree of confidence are unavoidable? It is instructive to return to Hume's treatment of moral judgment. Variations in psychological distance generally—in the context of both probability judgments and moral judgments—are sources of instability. How are the instabilities arising from variations in sentiment due to sympathy to be removed? We know that we are to fix on a "steady and general" (T 581) point of view, but how does doing so help?47 Hume cannot intend that we relinquish the sentiments produced by sympathy, any more than he can intend that we relinquish beliefs based on memory and causal inference. First, relinquishing the sentiments, were we able to do so, would be to abandon the core idea that moral judgments are founded on sentiment (§ IV.4). Second, Hume does not claim that any belief based on sentiment is incompatible with a steady and general point of view. It is the variations in sentiment that are the source of instability and hence out of alignment with our distinctively moral judgments. These points suggest that adopting a steady and general point of view moderates the variations in sentiment due to sympathy. (The Tyrrhenian, faced with the difficulty that some disturbances are unavoidable, introduced techniques for their moderation. See § 1.2.) As in the context of unphilosophical probability, there is an obstacle. Much as the variation in degree of confidence "never fails to take place," sentiments due to sympathy are sometimes "stubborn and inalterable" (T 582). To address this difficulty, Hume relies on an analogy with corrections of perceptual judgments about size. Hume introduces the analogy in the paragraph where he first writes of fixing on a steady and general point of view in comparing moral to aesthetic judgment:" 'Tis evident, a beautiful countenance cannot give so much pleasure, when seen at the distance of twenty paces, as when it is brought nearer us. We say not, however, that it appears to us less beautiful" (T 582).48 Hume applies the analogy to moral judgment in the next paragraph: In general, all sentiments of blame or praise are variable, according to our

situation of nearness or remoteness, with regard to the person blam'd or 46. Kemp Smith, 1941, ch. 19. Stroud, 1977, an interpreter in the Kemp Smith tradition (§ 1.5), is similarly silent on the topic of unphilosophical probability. 47. In the material that follows, I offer a different solution to this problem than in my 1995a, pp. 129-31. 48. For comparison of Hume's aesthetic and moral theories, see Jones, 1976, and 1982, pp. 123-32; and Sayre-McCord, 1994, esp. pp. 220-22. At pp. 211-12, Sayre-McCord discusses the analogy to the senses.

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IV. U N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P R O B A B I L I T Y AND SYMPATHY prais'd But these variations we regard not in our general decisions, but still apply the terms expressive of our liking or dislike, in the same manner, as if we remain'd in one point of view Our servant, if diligent and faithful, may excite stronger sentiments of love and kindness than Marcus Brutus, as represented by history; but we say not upon that account, that the former character is more laudable than the latter. We know, that were we to approach equally near to that renown'd patriot, he wou'd command a much higher degree of affection and admiration. Such corrections are common with regard to all the senses. (T 582)

With regard to the senses, we "correct the momentary appearances of things" (T 582). Similarly, in the moral case, we correct the feelings "which arise from our particular and momentary situation" (T 587). Hume returns to the perceptual analogy in his discussions of sympathy in III.iii.3 (T 603). He also takes it up in the second Enquiry (EPM V, 185), where sympathy is a sentiment of humanity or benevolence rather than an associative mechanism; it nevertheless varies in intensity due to psychological distance. In the case of the senses, Hume writes of "correcting the appearance by reflexion" (T 603; cf. 582). Hume cannot intend that we literally change the sensory appearance or impression. What is corrected is the judgment based on the appearance, a correction for the spatial distance from which we view the object. There are corrections to the senses in that we judge the size of the object with reference to the size that it would appear to have if viewed from a standard spatial distance. Thus, in the aesthetic analogy, where Hume focuses on variations due to spatial distance, "we know what effect [a beautiful countenance] will have in such a [nearer] position, and by that reflexion we correct its momentary appearance" (T 582). Just as we cannot change sensory appearances themselves, there is no general method for literally changing our feelings, the pleasures and pains that sympathy generates: "Experience soon teaches us this method of correcting our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our language, where the sentiments are more stubborn and inalterable" (T 582). Similarly, our passions or sentiments do not always "follow" (T 583, 585) and do not "often correspond entirely" (T 583) to corrected judgments (cf. T 603, EPM V, 186).49 Moral judgments involve

49. Bricke takes the view that Hume's theory is "one identifying what seem to be moral beliefs with specifically moral desires and affections" (1996, p. 159). It is thus the sentiments themselves that must be "corrected" (cf. 136-37,139-40). Bricke does not quote any of the passages to the effect that sentiments sometimes prove recalcitrant. He does quote Treatise 582 but omits the qualification beginning "or at least" (p. 145). I do not think it would help to suggest that we think of "corrected sympathy in terms of a disposition to sympathize similarly" (p. 147) with various individuals and desires; Hume's point is that we are not psychologically disposed to do this. Baillie also holds that a sentiment results from correction (2000, p. 135) but does not quote any passages about recalcitrance in his extended discussion of the matter (pp. 189-99). Blackburn plays down Hume's comparison of moral judgments to color judgments: "In the latter case we have only a judgement about what we would perceive were the light different.... Whereas in the ethical case, we ... have a genuinely moral sentiment emerging from the process, another original existence" (1993, p. 275). In light of the passages I have cited, I disagree with the second of these claims.

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corrections for psychological distance. Distinctively moral judgments about the degree to which an action is virtuous or vicious report or express the intensity of the pleasure or pain we would feel if we sympathized with persons affected by the action under evaluation from a standard psychological distance. Hume writes: We blame equally a bad action, which we read of in history, with one perform'd in our neighborhood t'other day: The meaning of which is, that we know from reflexion, that the former action wou'd excite as strong sentiments of disapprobation as the latter, were it plac'd in the same position. (T 584)

Hume thus refers to "the standard of virtue and morality" (T 591) and to "the only point of view" (T 602) from which distinctively moral judgments proceed. Much as Kemp Smith does not discuss unphilosophical probability or Hume's claim that the variation in degrees of confidence "never fails to take place" (T 143), he is silent on Hume's discussion at pages 580-85 and 602-3 of a method for correcting our moral judgments. Hume's position in these passages is an embarrassment to the spirit of the Kemp Smith interpretation. Hume writes repeatedly that our sentiments or feelings do not in general respond to the method for introducing corrections. It would seem that, within the Kemp Smith framework, the variations ought to be "justified," appropriate, or endorsed, since it is pointless or mistaken to say that the variations, or the corresponding judgments, ought not occur (§ 1.5). Yet, Hume's position is that we ought to introduce a system of corrected judgments. I have argued that the rationale for introducing these corrections is similar to that for correcting variations in degrees of confidence due to memory and causal inference. Kemp Smith may be right that Hume's theory of morality determined his theory of belief, but he neglected a fundamental aspect of Hume's theory of morality in the first place.50 Hume's account gives up any simple, one-to-one relation between actual moral sentiments and distinctively moral judgments. The latter neither report nor express a sentiment one experiences at the time of the judgment. Hume does not, however, divorce the corrected judgments from the set of sentiments we experience, due to sympathy, over time. The same action will produce feelings of different intensities when evaluated from different psychological distances. The variations in intensity due to sympathy are regular or systematic. The experienced sentiments constitute a system in that they accord with the principle that the intensity of a feeling decreases as psychological distance increases. This is an important point. Were the variations not regular, we would have a motive for evaluating actions from a standard psychological distance, but

50. The chapters in Kemp Smith, 1941, where the doctrine of corrections would be most relevant are 6, 7, and 9. Norton observes that Kemp Smith is also silent on the role of corrections in Hutcheson (1982, pp. 128-30; also see pp. 68,75, together with Kemp Smith's chapter "Hutcheson's Teaching and Its Influence on Hume," 1941, pp. 23-51). For Kemp Smith on the relations of Books I and III, see his 1905, pp. 149-58, and 1941, ch. 1.

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evaluation from such a distance would itself yield variable sentiments. The psychological drive to form judgments about the actual degree to which an action is virtuous would thus be frustrated.51 The intensity of this hypothetical sentiment, and the degree to which an action is taken to be virtuous in our distinctively moral judgments, is thus a function of the intensities of the sentiments we actually experience from a variety of psychological distances. This is a good sense in which moral distinctions are based on, founded on, or arise from sentiment (§ FV.4). It is also compatible with Hume's insistence that "reason alone" (T 413,414,457,462; cf. 463) or "of itself" (T 457) cannot influence the will, and hence that moral distinctions cannot be derived from reason alone. Reason, in the sense of causal inference, plays a role in ascertaining what one's sentiments would be, from the standard distance.52 The corrected judgments, however, are motivationally effective owing to their foundation in a set of actual moral sentiments governed by general psychological principles. This helps explain why the corrected judgments "serve sufficiently to regulate our abstract notions, and are alone regarded, when we pronounce in general concerning the degrees of vice and virtue" (T 585). I suggest that Hume assigns a similar role to corrected judgments, in the context of unphilosophical probability, to explain how we address the instabilities due to variations in degree of confidence, given that the variation "never fails to take place." Our response to the apparent changes in size that accompany changes in spatial distance is the key motivating analogy for Hume's treatment of corrections in moral judgment. Hume appeals to the same analogy in the Appendix discussion of poetical enthusiasm (§ IV.3), where he observes that "the understanding corrects the appearances of the senses" (T 632) in regard to the size of objects. Two sentences earlier, Hume writes, "A like reflexion on general rules keeps us from augmenting our belief upon every encrease of the force and vivacity of our ideas" (T 632). Hume designates this portion of the Appendix for insertion at page 123 of I.iii.10 (T 630). We have seen that general rules play a role in I.iii.9,10,12, and 13 (§§ IV.2,3). The use of the analogy to correcting ap-

51. Miller suggests that we construe the corrected judgments "dispositionally," e.g., "as a readiness to say publicly that the two men [a compatriot and a foreigner] are equally worthy" (1981, p. 55). This fits nicely with my claim that, for Hume, all belief is dispositional (§ III.2) and helps meet the difficulty raised by Shearer that the corrected judgments "are but devices of language" (1915, p. 82; cf. 83). More work needs to be done, however, to link a dispositional account with the idea that we are reporting or expressing a hypothetical sentiment. 52. Stroud takes the view that Hume's treatment of corrections "puts considerable strain on his official theory of the role of feelings in morality" (1977, p. 189). (Also cf. Capaldi, 1989, pp. 215-35; and Snare, 1991, p. 302.) Citing Hume's claim that morality is "more properly felt than judg'd of" (T 470), Stroud writes, "Such a view would seem to require an actual feeling for every moral judgment" (p. 191). This is precisely what Hume denies, at Treatise 580-82 and 602-3 and in the second Enquiry (EPM V, 185-86). It is not as if Hume writes that "sentiment alone" influences the will and gives rise to moral distinctions; he denies that "reason alone" plays these roles, that moral judgments arise "merely by reason" (T 467, 470). Cf. Norton, 1982, pp. 108-9. Why not regard the "official straightforward theory" (Stroud, 1977, p. 192) as a preliminary formulation of Hume's final position? Cf. Norton, 1982, ch. 3; and Swain, 1992.

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pearances of size to play a heuristic role in I.iii as well as Ill.iii is evidence of Hume's intention to graft a doctrine of corrected judgment onto his account of the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability. How might this be accomplished? In the case of unphilosophical probability, we need not literally adjust or change our experienced degrees of confidence, any more than we change our sentiments due to sympathy. Rather, we correct our probability judgments for variations in psychological distance. The variations in degree of confidence are regular or systematic in that they accord with the principle that the degree of confidence decreases as psychological distance increases. The corrected judgments report the degree of confidence we would have were our judgments of probability made from a standard psychological distance. Such a system of corrections is our best recourse in the face of the instabilities associated with unphilosophical probability and moral judgment. This is the outline of a Humean response to the present difficulty. What is the standard psychological distance from which we assess probability? Suppose we select a remote distance, fixing, in the case of memory, on the degree of confidence we would have were our judgments of probability made, say, from a distance of eighty years, or fixing, in the case of causal inference, on the degree of conviction an argument yields when embedded in a lengthy chain of inferences. The result would be tantamount to relinquishing our memory beliefs and beliefs based on causal inference, a proposal we have rejected. The only salient alternative would seem to be to fix on the degree of confidence we would have were our judgments of probability made from the smallest possible distance. In the case of memory, this would be the degree of confidence at the time the memory belief was first acquired; in the case of causal inference, it would be the degree of confidence in the conclusion when the inference is the only step, or the first step, in an argument. The effect of adopting this standard is to retain, other things being equal, the highest degree of confidence associated with a memory or causal inference and hence not to lose or shed evidence.53 The rationale for the standard, however, is that it is the only salient one and hence the only alternative to relinquishing belief that will eliminate the variations in degrees of confidence. We are now in a position to collate and review some results of §§ IV.4—6. In the case of vision, we begin with judgments based on our "momentary" (T 582) spatial distance from an object; we arrive at judgments, based on some standard spatial distance from the object, that correct for variations due to momentary distance. In this example from the senses, Hume does not bother to explain the psychological dynamics of the transition; he takes it as obvious that the first sort

53. I owe this suggestion to Julie Heath. A full discussion would consider the methods for correcting for variations in perceptual, aesthetic, and moral judgments. Explaining which point of view constitutes the appropriate standard for evaluating character is one of the principal theoretical problems in Hume's moral theory. Hume addresses the issue at Treatise 581-91 and 602-3. There are few extended treatments but see Penelhum, 1975, pp. 142-43; Atkinson, 1976, esp. pp. 33-44; and, more recently, Korsgaard, 1996,pp. 55-56, and 1999,esp.pp. 8-15,23-26,30-32.

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of judgment gives way to the second. Retrospectively, we can say that we began with judgments about apparent size and arrived at judgments of actual size. In the case of moral judgment, we begin with judgments based on our "momentary" (T 587) psychological distance from an action under evaluation; we arrive at judgments, based on a standard psychological distance from the action, that correct for variations due to momentary distance. Hume has an account of what drives the transition: The sudden changes in psychological distance and hence in uncorrected judgments are a source of uneasiness; they are psychologically uncomfortable, so they unsettle the uncorrected judgments. We can think of the uncorrected judgments as unjustified, because unstable, and the corrected judgments as justified, because more stable. In the moral context, this terminology doubtless seems unnatural. The essential point, however, is that the judgments that correct for variations in sentiment due to sympathy have normative pride of place. These are what I called "distinctively moral judgments" (§ IV.4). Retrospectively, we can say that we began with judgments about apparent degree of virtue and arrived at judgments about actual degree of virtue. We do not, however, draw such a distinction from within our viewpoint prior to the transition. In the case of probability, we begin with judgments based on our momentary psychological distance from our highest degree of confidence; we arrive at judgments, based on a standard psychological distance from our highest degree of confidence, that correct for variations due to momentary distance. Hume has an account of what drives the transition: Reflection on the large disparities in degree of confidence in uncorrected judgments is a source of uneasiness, which unsettles the uncorrected judgments. The uncorrected judgments are unjustified, because unstable (once we compare instances after a considerable interval), and the corrected judgments are justified, because more stable. Retrospectively, we can say that we began with judgments about apparent probability, on the evidence we possess, and arrived at judgments about actual degree of probability, on the evidence we possess. Once again, no such distinction is implicit in the vulgar viewpoint prior to the transition. Hume's project is to explain the psychological forces that drive us to judgments about actual degrees of probability.

V The Propensity to Ascribe Identity to Related Objects

V.I. A Pattern of Psychological Explanation in I.iv In Part iv of Book I, Hume appeals to a propensity to ascribe identity to a succession of related objects in order to explain the belief in the continued existence of perceptions insofar as this belief arises from the constancy of perceptions (I.iv.2), the belief in material substances or substrata (I.iv.3), and the belief in immaterial substances or substrata, that is, in souls (I.iv.6). These discussions occupy pages 199-210,219-20, and 253-55 of the Treatise. The propensity also plays a role in Hume's explanation of the belief in the double existence of perceptions and objects at pages 211-18. In I.iv.2, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses," Hume sets out to explain the common or vulgar belief in body. Hume characterizes a "body" as an object that has a continued existence when not present to the senses and an existence distinct from the mind and perception (T 188). Hume intends this characterization to be neutral with respect to the vulgar and the philosophical belief in body. Philosophers distinguish between perceptions and objects and hold that it is the latter that have a continued and distinct existence. The vulgar believe that the objects they immediately perceive—objects that are in fact perceptions—have a continued and distinct existence (§ IV.4). The propensity to ascribe identity to related objects makes its debut within Hume's explanation of the vulgar belief in body. Hume maintains that identity, in a strict sense, requires an object that is uninterrupted and unchanging or invariable through a supposed variation in time (T 200-201).1 The objects at 1. Here I bracket issues about how one acquires the idea of identity in the first place. See Price, 1940a, pp. 38-40; Kemp Smith, 1941, pp. 474-76; Wolff, 1960, pp. 122-23; and Fogelin, 1985, pp. 70-73. The reference to a "supposed" variation in time will prove of some relevance but not until §VI.5.

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hand are perceptions; though the vulgar do not distinguish perceptions and external objects, in fact the objects they immediately perceive are perceptions (T 202). According to Hume, there is a propensity to ascribe identity to a succession of perceptions exhibiting "constancy"—such as the perceptions of a mountain, or the perceptions of furniture in the chamber, before and after we shut our eyes or turn our head (T 194-95)—perceptions that are perfectly resembling or invariable, though interrupted (T 204). At the same time, the interruption in the perceptions makes us consider them different objects (T 205). We are thus involved in a "contradiction" (T 199,205,208). In order to "reconcile" (T 205) the contradiction, we suppose that perfectly resembling perceptions have a continued, and hence distinct, existence at times when they are not perceived (T 199,205-10). Such an object would be a "body," in Hume's sense. In I.iv.3, "Of the antient philosophy," Hume provides an explanation of the belief in material substrata. As before, identity requires an invariable object (T 219-20). It is possible to consider a succession of related, though changing, sensible qualities in either of two ways. Tracing the sensible qualities gradually through time leads us to ascribe identity to the succession (T 219-20). Surveying or comparing the sensible qualities before and after an interval during which they undergo considerable change or variation makes us consider the qualities diverse (T 220). The result is "a kind of contrariety in our method of thinking" (T 220). In order to "reconcile" (T 220) such "contradictions" (T 219, 220), we suppose the existence of an "unknown and invisible" object thought "to continue the same under all these variations" (T 220)—a substratum for sensible qualities, a material substratum.2 Hume's explanation of the belief in immaterial substrata or souls is contained in I.iv.6, "Of personal identity." Once again, identity, in a strict sense, requires an object that is uninterrupted and invariable (T 253, 255). There is a propensity to ascribe identity to a succession of perceptions that are related f T 254) and hence to the succession of perceptions in our minds. We are also inclined to consider this succession of related perceptions as variable and interrupted (T 254). In the end, we suppose "some new and unintelligible principle, that connects the objects together, and prevents their interruption or variation" (T 254); "thus we... run into the notion of a soul, and self, and substance" (T254). The three explanations conform to a general schema.3 In the case of the belief in body, we experience successive sensible objects that are invariable, though

2. Much of my discussion carries over to Hume's structurally similar explanation of the belief in the simplicity of a material substratum (T 221). There are few discussions of the belief in substrata. See Hendel, 1925, pp. 228-29; Kemp Smith, 1941, pp. 116-19; Fogelin, 1985, pp. 83-89; Flage, 1990, pp. 61-68; Johnson, 1995, pp. 273-74; and Livingston, 1998, pp. 83-86. 3. Stroud recognizes the parallelism in the cases of souls and body (1977, pp. 119,260-61 n. 2) and Fogelin in the cases of souls and material substrata (1985, pp. 99-100). Commentators who recognize the parallelism in all three cases include Yolton, 1984, pp. 173-80; Flage, 1990, pp. 61-65, 130—37, 106-9, and the index entries under "doxastic pathology," p. 195; and Noonan, 1999, pp. 201-3.

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interrupted; in the case of the belief in material substrata, we experience successive sensible qualities that are uninterrupted, though variable; and in the case of the belief in souls, we experience successive perceptions that are both interrupted and variable. In each instance, experience of a succession of related objects that are interrupted or variable triggers a three-stage psychological reaction: (1) we ascribe—or have an "inclination" (T 208) or "propension" (T 253) to ascribe—identity to the successive objects due to a propensity to ascribe identity to a succession of related objects (T 199,203-5,220,253-54); (2) the interruptions or changes in the related objects induce us to regard them as different or diverse (T 199, 205, 220, 254) because identity, in a strict sense, requires an object that is uninterrupted and invariable (T 14, 200-201, 219-20, 253,255); and (3) in an attempt to resolve or remove the contradiction (T 199, 205,208, 219,220,253-54), we suppose that there exists an object that is uninterrupted and invariable, and hence identical in the strict sense. In the case of the belief in body, we suppose that perceptions have a continued as well as invariable existence during the interruptions when they are not perceived (T 199, 205-6,207-8); in the case of the belief in a material substratum, we suppose an unknown and invisible object that, unlike the experienced sensible qualities, is invariable as well as uninterrupted (T 220); in the case of the belief in a soul, we suppose a substance that, unlike the experienced perceptions, is both uninterrupted and invariable (T 253-55). As we shall see (§ V.3), in the case of the belief in body there is an extension of the psychological reaction, which leads to the philosophers' belief in external objects that cause perceptions. The propensity to ascribe identity to related objects thus plays a role in Hume's explanation of four metaphysical beliefs: the continued and distinct existence of the objects we perceive, the double existence of perceptions and objects, material substrata, and souls. Whereas causal inference is the focus of Part iii of Book I, the three-stage reaction involving the propensity to ascribe identity to a succession of related objects is the most prominent beliefforming mechanism in Part iv. This propensity, and the belief-forming mechanism that comprises the associated three-stage reaction, therefore provides an essential case study for any account of Hume's theory of justification. It is clear from the general tenor of Hume's text that he wants to show that the beliefs that he invokes the propensity to explain are unjustified. The operation of the propensity at stage 1 depends upon a mistake and an illusion (§ V.2). The propensity ultimately leads to metaphysical beliefs that are conflicted attempts to resolve underlying contradictions (§ V.3), are dependent upon trivial belief-forming mechanisms that can be suppressed (§ V.4), and are defective in meaning (§ V.5). Hume does not shrink from these results. He ridicules those who believe in an immaterial substratum or self: He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself, tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me. But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions. (T 252)

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Prior to explaining the belief in material substrata, Hume writes, "The fictions of the antient philosophy, concerning substances, and substantial forms, and accidents, and occult qualities" are "unreasonable and capricious" (T 219); after providing the explanation, Hume writes of other "instances, wherein the Peripatetics have shewn they were guided by every trivial propensity of the imagination" (T 224). The vulgar belief in body is a "gross illusion" (T 217) and the hypothesis of the double existence of perceptions and ideas a "monstrous offspring" (T 215) of contrary principles. In § V.2,1 provide a more detailed account of the psychological mechanism that accounts for the operation of the propensity, consider the propensity's capacity to generate belief, and show that its operation falls within the imagination. In § V.3,1 document Hume's claim that the propensity tends to produce unstable doxastic states. In § V.4,1 argue that this claim constitutes Hume's reason for holding that beliefs produced by the propensity are unjustified. In § V.5, I show that Hume relies on the propensity to forge a connection between defects in justification and defects in meaning. In § V.6,1 highlight some tensions in Hume's account of the propensity.

V.2. The Operation of the Propensity In light of the importance of the propensity to attribute identity to related objects, Hume devotes considerable energy and ingenuity to explaining its operation and effects. Not surprisingly, Hume's first discussion of the propensity's operation is the most detailed. He devotes eleven pages to the explanation of the vulgar belief in body insofar as it arises from the constancy—as distinct from the coherence—of impressions. (The full paragraph at page 199 contains a preliminary summary of the extended discussion at pages 199-210.) Hume devotes no more than three pages each to the explanations of the beliefs in material and immaterial substrata. Within the discussion of constancy, Hume writes that it is an "illusion" (T 200, 217) or "deception" (T 202) to ascribe identity to perfectly resembling though interrupted perceptions. This illusion is implicated at stage 1 of the three-stage reaction (§ V.I). Hume intends to provide an explanation of the source of this illusion: "To enter, therefore, upon the question concerning the source of the error and deception with regard to identity, when we attribute it to our resembling perceptions, notwithstanding their interruption; I must here recall an observation, which I have already prov'd and explain'd*" (T 202). Hume's footnote is to I.ii.5, "Of the ideas of space and time." In I.ii.5, Hume maintains: "We may establish it as a general maxim in this science of human nature, that wherever there is a close relation betwixt two ideas, the mind is very apt to mistake them" (T 60). Hume provides an extended physiological explanation of the propensity. In order to excite an idea, the mind dispatches spirits to the cell of the brain where the idea is placed; since the motion of the spirits is seldom direct, they often excite the contiguous traces of related ideas (T 60-61). Hume adds: "This change we are not always sensible of;

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but continuing still the same train of thought, make use of the related idea, which is presented to us, and employ it in our reasoning, as if it were the same with what we demanded" (T 61). In this regard, Hume singles out the relation of resemblance: Resembling ideas are not only related together, but the actions of the mind, which we employ in considering them, are so little different, that we are not able to distinguish them. This last circumstance is of great consequence; and we may in general observe, that wherever the actions of the mind in forming any two ideas are the same or resembling, we are very apt to confound these ideas, and take the one for the other. (T 61)

The propensity to mistake an idea for a related idea is strongest when the ideas are related by resemblance, as distinct from causation or contiguity. This is because there is a double resemblance and association: a resemblance and an association between the resembling ideas and also a resemblance and an association between the resembling actions or dispositions of the mind in considering the resembling ideas. The mind has a propensity to confuse any two ideas that place it in similar dispositions. In cases where ideas are related by resemblance, this propensity reinforces the general propensity to mistake an idea for a related idea. Hume adds: "Of this we shall see many instances in the progress of this treatise" (T 61). These passages provide the background for the discussion of constancy, 140 pages later. The paragraph that carries a note to I.ii.5 recapitulates the earlier claims about the double resemblance and association (T 202-3). Hume concludes: "This circumstance I have observ'd to be of great moment; and we may establish it for a general rule, that whatever ideas place the mind in the same disposition or in similar ones, are very apt to be confounded" (T 203). Hume proceeds "to apply this general maxim" (T 203), that there is a strong propensity to mistake ideas related by resemblance, to the ideas of identity and diversity. The idea of an object that is uninterrupted and unchanging, the idea of identity, resembles the idea of a succession of related objects, the idea of diversity (T 253). This gives rise to a double resemblance and association: a resemblance and an association between two ideas—that of an uninterrupted and invariable object and that of a succession of related objects—and a resemblance and an association between two actions or dispositions of the mind, one in considering an uninterrupted and invariable object and the other in considering a succession of related objects (T 203-5; cf. 220, 253-54). This double resemblance and association underpins the propensity to ascribe identity to a succession of related objects, the identity-ascribing propensity. The "illusion" of identity at stage 1 of the three-stage reaction is due to the propensity to ascribe identity to a succession of related objects. This is itself an instance of the propensity to mistake an idea for a resembling idea. The identity-ascribing propensity is therefore a propensity to "mistake" (T 202, 204; cf. 204-5 n. 1) the idea of diversity for the idea of identity, so that the two ideas are "confounded" (T 203) or confused. Our discussion contains a number of indications of the importance Hume attaches to his explanation of the illusion of identity. In the first place, I.ii.5

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provides elaborate stage setting for his appeal to the illusion at I.iv.2. In the second place, the propensity to ascribe identity to a succession of related objects is the bottom tier in a three-tiered hierarchy of increasingly general propensities. The hierarchy includes, at the next level, the propensity to mistake an idea for a resemblingidea and, at the most general level, the propensity to mistake an idea for a related idea. This is Hume's attempt to give theoretical power to his psychological diagnosis of the source of the illusion of identity. In the third place, it is striking that Hume combines the psychological theory with a physiological explanation of the most general of the three psychological propensities. Hume notes in I.ii.5 that he abstained from an examination of the causes of the association of ideas in introducing the topic at I.i.4 (T 60). Hume does not provide a physiological explanation of inferences about causes and effects due to custom. In sketching a physiological explanation of the propensity to mistake an idea for a related idea, Hume violates his "first maxim, that we must in the end rest contented with experience" (T 60). In the case of mistaking an idea for a related idea, however, Hume tells us that "this phaenomenon occurs on so many occasions, and is of such consequence, that I cannot forbear stopping a moment to examine its causes" (T 60). How does the identity-ascribing propensity produce belief? Hume often writes of the propensity as leading to the "supposition" (T 198,208) or "fiction" (T 205,209) of the continued and distinct existence of objects; in thus "supposing" (T 199), we "feign" (T 208,209) continued and distinct existence. Similar language recurs in the discussions of material and immaterial substrata: the ancient philosophers "feign" (T 220) the existence of a material substratum and "suppose" (T 220) it to remain unchanging; this is one of a number of the "fictions" (T 219,222,224,226) of the ancient philosophers. The belief in the existence of a soul is also a "fiction" (T 254,255); we "suppose" (T 253) ourselves to possess a continued and invariable existence and "feign" (T 254) the existence of something to prevent the observed interruption and variation. I suggest we are encountering technical terminology. In the Appendix, a "fiction" is any idea that falls short of belief: "I conclude, by an induction which seems to me very evident, that an opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from a fiction, not in the nature, or the order of its parts, but in the manner of Us being conceiv'd" (T 628; cf. 123,626-27,629,631). In the immediate context, Hume is contrasting belief with ideas of "the fancy alone" (T 629), that is, all the other ideas of the "imagination" (T 629) in the wide sense, the faculty of association (§ II.3).4 Hume's discussion in I.iv.2 coheres with his use of'fiction' and 'feign' in the Appendix. As of pages 207-8, Hume has explained "the supposition of the con-

4. In this context, a fiction or "fictitious idea" (T 629) lacks steadiness: "the mind has a firmer hold, or more steady conception of what it takes to be matter of fact, than of fictions" (T 626; cf. 629 and EHU V, 39). Similarly, in I.iii.10, madness or folly produces a "loose fiction" (T 123), ideas that are not steady or infixed. These passages confirm that fictions lack the steadiness essential to belief (§§111.2-3).

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tinu'd existence of sensible objects or perceptions" (T 208). His discussion continues: "But as we here not only feign but believe this continu'd existence, the question is, from whence arises such a belief" (T 208, Hume's emphasis). The propensity to ascribe identity to related objects, as discussed to this point in I.iv.2, accounts only for our "supposing" or "feigning" the continued and distinct existence of perceptions. Additional resources are required to explain why the supposition constitutes belief. At pages 207-8, a "fiction" is either an idea that falls short of belief or a belief considered qua mere idea (an idea insofar as it falls short of belief). (Hume employs 'fiction' in a second sense, even within his discussion of the identity-ascribing propensity. See § VI.4.) I have noted that Hume's conception of the role of repetition in producing steadiness would prove somewhat elastic in Part iv (§ III.3). This elasticity emerges in Hume's explanation of how we come to believe, and not merely feign, the existence of body. Hume observes: "I survey the furniture of my chamber; I shut my eyes, and afterwards open them; and find the new perceptions to resemble perfectly those, which formerly struck my senses. This resemblance is observ'd in a thousand instances" (T 204). Hume makes this point prior to the part of his discussion that explains how the identity-ascribing propensity leads specifically to belief, preparing us for his use of these resources to explain the belief in body: Our memory presents us with a vast number of instances of perceptions perfectly resembling each other, that return at different distances of time, and after considerable interruptions. This resemblance gives us a propension to consider these interrupted perceptions as the same; and also a propension to connect them by a continu'd existence, in order to justify this identity, and avoid the contradiction, in which the interrupted appearance of these perceptions seems necessarily to involve us. Here then we have a propensity to feign the continu'd existence of all sensible objects; and as this propensity arises from some lively impressions of the memory, it bestows a vivacity on that fiction, or in other words, makes us believe the continu'd existence of body. (T 208-9)

The extra impetus to take us from a supposition to a belief is provided by the memory of "a vast number of instances" of perfectly resembling but interrupted perceptions, by the memory of repeated instances of interrupted sets of perfectly resembling perceptions. In terms of Hume's formula, this (remembered) repetition provides the additional vivacity required for belief; in terms of the theory of belief I attribute to Hume, this repetition provides the additional steadiness required for belief (§§ III.2-3). Hume can apply the same account to the beliefs in material substrata (where we remember repeated cases of uninterrupted and resembling perceptions) and souls (where we remember repeated cases of interrupted and resembling perceptions). Hume's appeal to remembered repetitions to explain how the identity-ascribing propensity leads to belief enables him to preserve his position that belief requires repetition. It is important that causal inference, association by the relation of cause and effect, plays no role in the operation of the identity-ascribing propensity

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in conjunction with remembered repetition. The operation of the propensity at stage 1 depends upon the double resemblance and association between resembling ideas and between resembling actions of the mind. This leads at stage 3 to a supposition. The remembered repetition has a role, but it is only to reinforce, or steady and infix, this supposition or inclination; it plays no role in determining the content of the belief, content that is in place courtesy of the propensity. By contrast, association by the relation of cause and effect accounts both for a belief and its content, the idea of a particular unobserved object. Hume takes care to insist that the identity-ascribing propensity is not an operation of the understanding. At page 188, he sets out to "consider, whether it be the senses, reason, or the imagination, that produces the opinion of a continu'd or of a distinct existence." Since the faculty of association includes reason, "reason" and "the imagination" would not be alternatives unless the latter is construed as the imagination in the narrow sense, the faculty of association exclusive of reason or the understanding (§ II.3). The senses are dispatched at pages 188-93. Hume considers the role of reason in a single paragraph. He writes, in part: As long as we take our perceptions and objects to be the same, we can never infer the existence of the one from that of the other, nor from any argument from the relation of cause and effect; which is the only one that can assure us of matter of fact. Even after we distinguish our perceptions from our objects, 'twill appear presently, that we are still incapable of reasoning from the existence of one to that of the other: So that upon the whole our reason neither does, nor is it possible it ever shou'd, upon any supposition, give us an assurance of the continu'd and distinct existence of body. That opinion must be entirely owing to the IMAGINATION: which must now be the subject of our enquiry. (T 193)

Hume constructs a dilemma to show that causal inference cannot establish the existence of body—whether we treat body and perceptions as the same or distinguish them. (I address the dilemma's cogency in § VI.4.) In light of Hume's identification of reason or the understanding with demonstration and causal inference, it follows that belief in body is due to the imagination. Hume's discussion of the role of constancy begins on the next page. Hume's constructive project is to sustain his pretheoretical commitments in regard to the justificatory status of beliefs based on particular belief-forming mechanisms. Specifically, only beliefs based on perception, memory, and reason or the understanding—causal inference and demonstration—are justified (§§ 1.4, 111.1,3). The identity-ascribing propensity relies on elements of the imagination, psychological mechanisms not included within the understanding. My interpretation thus predicts that Hume should regard beliefs based on the propensity as unjustified, that he should regard the operation of the propensity as unjust. Section I.iv.2 confirms these expectations. In preliminary comments prior to the discussion of constancy, Hume writes that belief in the continued exis-

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tence of perceptions is "entirely unreasonable" (T 193). We find this in the penultimate paragraph of I.iv.2: I cannot conceive how such trivial qualities of the fancy, conducted by such false suppositions, can ever lead to any solid and rational system. They are the coherence and constancy of our perceptions, which produce the opinion of their continu'd existence; tho' these qualities of perceptions have no perceivable connexion with such an existence. The constancy of our perceptions has the most considerable effect, and yet is attended with the greatest difficulties. (T217) In introductory and concluding remarks in I.iv.2, Hume maintains that the belief in body is unreasonable, at least insofar as it arises from constancy. Similarly, in the opening paragraph of I.iv.3, Hume announces that he is supplying"a criticism of the fictions of the antient philosophy, concerning substances, and substantial forms, and accidents, and occult qualities," fictions that are "unreasonable" (T 219; cf. 222). It remains to consider Hume's grounds for his claims about the epistemic status of the metaphysical beliefs to which the propensity gives rise.

V.3. The Propensity and Instability I have argued that Hume holds that an explication of justification with reference to stability in belief is the best candidate for a theory that will systematize his pretheoretical distinctions among kinds of belief-forming mechanisms. Justified beliefs result from mechanisms that tend to produce stable doxastic states. In this section, I document Hume's contention that the identity-ascribing propensity tends to lead to instability. At stage 1 of the schematic three-stage reaction (§ V.I), we ascribe identity to a series of related objects. At 2, we regard the objects as diverse. Once 2 has been reached, we are in the grip of a contradiction. In the course of explaining the belief in the existence of body, Hume provides an account of the psychological dynamics of the transition from stage 2 to 3. Hume begins with a description of the psychological effects of the contradiction: Nothing is more certain from experience, than that any contradiction either to the sentiments or passions gives a sensible uneasiness, whether it proceeds from without or from within; from the opposition of external objects, or from the combat of internal principles— Now there being here an opposition betwixt the notion of the identity of resembling perceptions, and the interruption of their appearance, the mind must be uneasy in that situation, and will naturally seek relief from the uneasiness. (T 205-6) Here we encounter the language of conflict: "combat" or "opposition." The contradictory beliefs compete for influence; the alternation and sudden change in the effects of the contradictory beliefs give rise to a "sensible" or felt "uneasiness." Since felt uneasiness is a form of pain, and we have a general aversion to

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pain (T 438-39,574-75), the mind "will naturally seek relief from the uneasiness," thus unsettling the contradictory beliefs, so that we are less inclined to maintain them (§ IV.5). Stage 3 results from an effort to relieve the uneasiness by removing the contradiction. Hume's description continues: "Since the uneasiness arises from the opposition of two contrary principles, [the mind] must look for relief by sacrificing the one to the other" (T 206). Suppose we seek relief by sacrificing the belief at 1: "But as the smooth passage of our thought along our resembling perceptions makes us ascribe to them an identity, we can never without reluctance yield up that opinion" (T 206). Suppose we seek relief by sacrificing 2: "But here the interruptions in the appearance of these perceptions are so long and frequent, that 'tis impossible to overlook them" (T 206). Though in the end we do overlook the interruptions in favor of the opinion that our perceptions "are identically the same after an interruption" (T 209), Hume describes a psychological struggle in which neither party easily yields. Hume must hold that key psychological features of the transition from stage 2 to 3 in the case of the belief in the continued existence of perceptions are also present in the transition to the beliefs in material substrata and souls. He writes at page 204, echoing Treatise 60 (§ V.2): "We shall afterwards see many instances of this tendency of relation to make us ascribe an identity to differentobjects." Hume intends his subsequent discussions of the identity-ascribing propensity to be read against the background of the initial discussion of the propensity at I.iv.2. It is at pages 205-6 of I.iv.2, the section immediately preceding "Of the antient philosophy," that Hume claims that the contradictory beliefs at 2 are unstable and give a sensible uneasiness from which the mind seeks relief. Hume can make do with a relatively brief discussion of the propensity's role in producing the beliefs in substrata; they closely parallel the three-stage reaction that produces the belief in the continued existence of perceptions, discussed at length at pages 199-210. Furthermore, Hume writes in I.iv.2, "any contradiction either to the sentiments or passions gives a sensible uneasiness" (T 205, emphasis added). Hume writes that the ancient philosophers' belief in occult qualities is an attempt to "set themselves at ease" (T 224). In the case of the belief in material substrata, 2 involves "contradictions" (T 219,220) and "a kind of contrariety in our method of thinking" (T 220). Hume must take the contradictory beliefs at 2 to be parties to struggle, combat, and a source of uneasiness in the case of the beliefs in material substrata and souls, as well as in the case of the belief in body. Any doubt on this point should be removed by observing Hume's own recognition that, in the case of the two beliefs in substrata, the instability at 2 persists even after 3 has been reached. Stage 3 of the psychological reaction results from a desire to relieve sensible uneasiness by resolving the contradiction that emerges at 2. We can ask whether the belief at 3 succeeds in removing the contradiction. Hume writes that belief in a material substratum is simply "the means by which we endeavour to conceaT (T 219, emphases added and deleted) the contradictions to which we have been led. Similarly, the belief in a soul functions "to disguise the variation" (T 254, emphasis added) in our perceptions. In

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both cases, postulating substrata tends to conceal or disguise, rather than resolve, the contradiction to which it is addressed. Though Hume does not pause to explain why the belief in a substratum fails to resolve the contradiction, it is not difficult to see what he has in mind.5 Consider the belief in a material substratum. The identity-ascribing propensity is triggered by an observed succession of related sensible qualities, so that at 1 we are inclined to ascribe identity to the observed sensible qualities. The belief in a material substratum at 3 locates the identity in an "unknown and invisible" object (T 220), a wholly unobserved object. Similarly, in the case of the belief in souls, the propensity is triggered by an observed succession of related perceptions, so that at 1 we are inclined to ascribe identity to the observed perceptions themselves. The belief in a soul at 3 locates the identity in "something unknown and mysterious" (T 254; cf. 255).6 In these cases, the mind retreats from the belief at 1 without entirely giving it up. The belief in the identity of the observed qualities survives in the form of belief in the identity of an unobserved substratum. Belief in a substratum goes some way in satisfying the original inclination, by ascribing identity to something, but it does not fully satisfy the inclination; belief in a substratum mislocates the identity that we are inclined to ascribe to observed objects, placing it instead in an unobserved object. For this reason, the belief in a substratum is an unstable resolution of the contradiction. A doxastic system that includes this belief is perhaps more stable than the system that gives rise to it: the belief does conceal or disguise the contradiction. (We shall see in § V.5 that there is a price to be paid for this increased stability.) The conflicting inclinations that emerge at stages 1 and 2, however, remain in place even in the presence of the belief in substrata at 3. In these circumstances we can expect residual conflict and uneasiness. The thought that a belief can function to conceal the persistence of a conflict, and hence underlying instability, is also explicit in Hume's discussion of

5. Fogelin notes, without explanation, that the conflict is "speciously resolved" (1985, pp. 88-89). 6. Stroud thinks Hume compromises his attempt to distinguish the imagination and the understanding: the imaginative reaction has "a very strong 'intellectual' or 'cognitive' flavour. The belief is represented in effect as an elaborate hypothesis we somehow think up in order to resolve a conflict in the mind" (1977, p. 108). Stroud has in view belief in the continued and distinct existence of perceptions, but he takes Hume's approach to be "characteristic of his general strategy" (p. 108). The operation of the propensity, however, is unlike the understanding in that it is not a form of causal inference (§ V.2), not even construed broadly to include inference to the best explanation. In the case of substrata, the so-called hypothesis conceals rather than resolves a conflict and does nothing to explain the observations that generate it. Similar points apply to Collier, who thinks the operation of the propensity "is in tension with Hume's portrayal of the automatic and implicit character of the imagination.... The ... account requires the imagination to perform a metajudgment—the resolution of conflict between judgments of unity and diversity—that should belong to the reflective faculty of the understanding" (1999, pp. 156-57). Such reflective metajudgments would undermine beliefs that obscure the conflict; stage 3 arises from 1 and 2 unreflectively.

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whether taste admits of local conjunction with matter.7 Hume claims that smells, sounds, and tastes do not have spatial location, but that they seem to be spatial (T 235-36). Hume observes that the taste and the figure of a fig are related by "causation, and contiguity in the time of their appearance" (T 237). Hume maintains that "when objects are united by any relation, we have a strong propensity to add some new relation to them, in order to compleat the union" (T 237). In the light of this propensity, we "endeavour to give [the taste and the figure of the fig] a new relation, viz. that of a conjunction in place" (T 237). This yields a stage 1, the belief that the taste is conjoined in place, conjoined spatially, to the fig. This is a mistake or an "illusion" (T 237) due to the propensity to add a new relation to related objects. Reflection, however, shows that the local conjunction of taste with matter is "unintelligible and contradictory" (T 238). This gives rise to a stage 2, the belief that the taste is not conjoined with the fig's extension. Hume's discussion continues: Here then we are influenc'd by two principles directly contrary to each other, viz. that inclination of our fancy by which we are determin'd to incorporate the taste with the extended object, and our reason, which shows us the impossibility of such an union. Being divided betwixt these opposite principles, we renounce neither one nor the other.... We suppose, that the taste exists within the circumference of the body, but in such a manner, that it fills the whole without extension, and exists entire in every part without separation. (T 238)

Here we are genuinely "divided"—torn or conflicted. We cannot simply say that the taste is conjoined with the extension; reflection shows this to be incoherent. The propensity to add new relations to related objects nevertheless has a strong pull on us. So we retreat from 1 far enough to obscure the contradiction. This effort to relieve the uneasiness results in a stage 3: we believe that the taste exists in every part of the fig and that it does so in its entirety. The upshot is that we "involve the subject in such confusion and obscurity, that we no longer perceive the opposition" (T 238). (I say more about this example in § V.5.) The discussion of taste at I.iv.5, sandwiched between the discussion of material substrata at I.iv.3 and the discussion of souls at I.iv.6, is germane to beliefs based on the identity-ascribing propensity. The propensity to add a new relation to objects united by another relation, like the identity-ascribing propensity, gives rise to a psychological reaction in which we are "divided betwixt... opposite principles," which in turn leads to a conflicted resolution of the contradiction. There is, in the present respect, a difference between the beliefs about taste and (material or immaterial) substrata and the belief in the continued existence of perceptions. In producing each of the beliefs in body, material substrata, and souls, the operation of the identity-ascribing propensity is triggered by an ob-

7. For discussion, see Kemp Smith, 1941, pp. 319-24; MacNabb, 1951/1966, pp. 143-44; and Brand, 1992, pp. 33-35. This material has played a role in the literature on Hume on personal identity. See Fogelin, 1985, p. 106; and Garrett, 1997, pp. 177-78.

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served succession of related objects. In the case where the observed objects are interrupted but unchanging perceptions, the propensity leads to the belief in their continued existence. A contradiction arises because the interruption in the perceptions makes us consider them distinct. In order to remove the contradiction, we suppose that the perfectly resembling perceptions have a continued existence at times when they are not perceived. This supposition enables us to ascribe identity to the observed perceptions, the very objects whose observation triggers the operation of the propensity; it does not mislocate the identity in some wholly unobserved object. Hume is aware of this difference between belief in substrata and the belief in the continued existence of perceptions. The belief in a substratum is, unreservedly, an attempt to "conceal" or "disguise" a contradiction. Compare Hume's preliminary summary of the discussion of constancy: When we have been accustom'd to observe a constancy in certain impressions, ... we are not apt to regard these interrupted perceptions as different, (which they really are) but on the contrary consider them as individually the same, upon account of their resemblance. But as this interruption of their existence is contrary to their perfect identity,... we find ourselves somewhat at a loss, and are involv'd in a kind of contradiction. In order to free ourselves from this difficulty, we disguise, as much as possible, the interruption, or rather remove it entirely, by supposing that these interrupted perceptions are connected by a real existence, of which we are insensible. (T 199, emphases added)

Hume again writes at the close of his extended discussion of constancy that "we may remove the seeming interruption by feigning a continu'd being" (T 208, emphasis added). Hume uses similar language two paragraphs later: This resemblance [between interrupted but perfectly resembling perceptions] gives us a propension to consider these interrupted perceptions as the same; and also a propension to connect them by a continu'd existence, in order to justify this identity, and avoid the contradiction, in which the interrupted appearance of these perceptions seems necessarily to involve us. (T 208-9, emphasis added)

In the following paragraph, Hume writes that the belief in a continued existence "has no other effect than to remedy the interruption of our perceptions, which is the only circumstance that is contrary to their identity" (T 209, emphasis added). The wording and tone of these passages suggests that the belief in the continued existence of invariable perceptions, unlike those of material substrata and souls, does genuinely "remove," "avoid," or "remedy" the contradiction at 2. There is another passage along these lines at Treatise 254. The supposition of a soul, considered strictly, arises in two phases. This is because the attribution of identity to the successive perceptions at stage 1 is contradicted twice: first, the perceptions that are impressions of sense are interrupted, and second, the perceptions generally are variable. In response to the first contradiction, we suppose that the perceptions of sense are uninterrupted. This is similar in function to the

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supposition, in the context of the belief in body, that invariable though interrupted perceptions have a continued existence. In this first phase "we feign the continu'd existence of the perceptions of our senses" (T 254) in order "to remove" (T 254, emphasis added) the interruption. In response to the second contradiction, we suppose the existence of an object that is invariable as well as interrupted. This is similar in function to the supposition of a material substratum. In this second phase, we "run into the notion of a soul, and... disguise the variation" (T 254, emphases added and deleted). We have thus uncovered a disparity in Hume's treatment of the three-stage reaction in its application to the vulgar belief in body and to material and immaterial substrata. In the latter two cases, the belief in substrata at stage 3 conceals or disguises the contradiction at 2, so that the underlying conflict and instability remain in place. By contrast, the belief in the continued existence of perfectly resembling perceptions genuinely removes the conflict to which it is addressed. There are additional disparities to come. I return to these matters in §§V.4-6. Hume does not conclude that the belief in the continued existence of perfectly resembling perceptions is stable. Although this belief, unlike that of a substratum, is stable qua resolution of the conflict at 2, it stands in contradiction with another belief. Hume claims that after "a very little reflection and philosophy," indeed "the plainest experience" (T 210; cf. 214,215), we arrive at a fourth stage: (4) reflection on the phenomena of double vision and perceptual relativity shows that perceptions do not have an existence independent of the mind, and hence do not have a continued existence when not perceived (T 210-11, 214,215). Philosophers are thus involved in a contradiction with the belief at 3, that perfectly resembling perceptions do have a continued existence. In order to relieve the discomfort due to the contradiction, (5) they suppose "the double existence of perceptions and objects" (T 211,215). Philosophers distinguish between internal perceptions and external objects and suppose that, although perceptions have an interrupted existence, external objects have an uninterrupted existence (T 211). They also suppose that external objects cause (T 217) and resemble (T 213,216-17) internal perceptions.8 They thus come to embrace the "philosophical system" (T 212,213), indirect or representative realism. Whereas the beliefs in substrata and in the continued existence of perfectly resembling perceptions are direct effects of the identity-ascribing propensity via the threestage reaction, the belief in the double existence of perceptions and objects is an indirect effect. In this way, Hume also traces this fourth belief to the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects. The contradiction that emerges at stage 4 and the belief that arises at 5 reenact a familiar pattern of instability, uneasiness, and a conflicted resolution of the opposition. Hume begins:

8. There is a lacuna here: Hume never provides an explicit psychological account of the specifically causal aspect of the hypothesis of double existence. It is an interesting question why he does not do so.

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But as a little reflection destroys this conclusion, that our perceptions have a continu'd existence, by shewing that they have a dependent one, 'twou'd naturally be expected, that we must altogether reject the opinion, that there is such a thing in nature as a continu'd existence, which is preserv'd even when it no longer appears to the senses. The case, however, is otherwise. (T 214) Here is Hume's description, two paragraphs later, of the psychological effect of the contradiction at 4: But tho' our natural and obvious principles here prevail above our study'd reflections, 'tis certain there must be some struggle and opposition in the case.... In order to set ourselves at ease in this particular, we contrive a new hypothesis, which seems to comprehend both these principles of reason and imagination. This hypothesis is the philosophical one of the double existence of perceptions and objects; which pleases our reason, in allowing, that our dependent perceptions are interrupted and different; and at the same time is agreeable to the imagination, in attributing a continu'd existence to something else, which we call objects. This philosophical system, therefore, is the monstrous offspring of two principles, which are contrary to each other, which are both at once embrac'd by the mind, and which are unable mutually to destroy each other. . . . The contradiction betwixt these opinions we elude by a new fiction, which is conformable to the hypotheses both of reflection and fancy, by ascribing these contrary qualities to different existences; the interruption to perceptions, and the continuance to objects. (T 214-15) The language of conflict—"struggle" and "opposition" between two principles that seek to "destroy" one another—makes it clear that Hume takes the set of contradictory beliefs at 4 to be unstable. He is explicit that in these circumstances we attempt to set ourselves "at ease." We cannot secure relief by sacrificing one of the opposing beliefs to the other. The philosopher, as well as the common person, is in the psychological grip of the propensity that leads to 3: "Nature is obstinate, and will not quit the field, however strongly attack'd by reason" (T 215). At the same time, "reason is so clear in the point, that there is no possibility of disguising her" with respect to 4. Neither party to the conflict will give way: "Not being able to reconcile these two enemies, we endeavour to set ourselves at ease as much as possible, by successively granting to each whatever it demands, and by feigning a double existence" (T 215). As is the case with the beliefs in substrata, the belief in the double existence of perceptions and objects at 5 is a conflicted resolution, a "pretext" (T 216) by which we "elude" the conflict. The belief in double existence only " seems to comprehend both these principles of reason and imagination" (emphasis added). By ascribing continued existence to some objects, albeit ones that have not been observed, the belief in double existence goes some way toward satisfying the inclination to ascribe identity to the unchanging but interrupted perceptions. Yet, belief in external objects cannot fully satisfy the inclination to ascribe identity to observed perceptions. Belief in external objects mislocates the identity that we are initially inclined to ascribe to the perceptions, placing it instead in objects

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that are unobserved.9 The belief in double existence is "only a palliative remedy" (T 211). We would have no inclination to embrace it (T 215-16) "were we fully convinc'd" (T 215) of either 3 or 4. The belief is a symptom, rather than a resolution, of a conflict that persists even after 5 has been reached. In the case of the belief in the continued existence of perceptions, the contradiction at 2 is resolved by the belief in the continued existence of perfectly resembling perceptions, but this belief leads to a new contradiction, which does not admit of a stable resolution. In each context that Hume discusses—the beliefs in body, material substrata, and souls—the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects eventually leads to an unresolved conflict or instability. In the case of (material and immaterial) substrata, the conflict at 2 remains unresolved at 3; in the case of body, the conflict at 4 remains unresolved at 5.1 take Hume to be suggesting, on the basis of the cases he considers, that the identity-ascribing propensity leads to instability that cannot be resolved. Each of the beliefs in the double existence of perceptions and objects, material substrata, and souls is a by-product, and hence a symptom, of underlying instability.

V.4. The Propensity and Justification The justificatory status of a belief depends on the tendency of the beliefforming mechanism that produces it to lead to stability in belief. The propensity to ascribe identity to related objects leads to beliefs that are not stable. We should therefore expect that Hume considers the propensity a source of unjustified belief. Hume indeed writes that the belief in the continued and distinct existence of objects and the belief in substrata are "unreasonable" (§ V.2). It would be well, however, to locate a direct textual link between such assessments and considerations of stability. The epistemic status of the identity-ascribing propensity receives its most extended discussion in conjunction with the belief in material substrata. The fictions of the ancient philosophers are condemned as unreasonable in I.iv.3 (T 219; cf. 222). At the first two paragraphs of I.iv.4, Hume sets out to provide a theoretical rationale for this assessment (§ 1.4). The first paragraph begins: BUT here it may be objected, that the imagination, according to my own confession, being the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy, I am unjust in blaming the antient philosophers for makeing use of that faculty, and allowing themselves to be entirely guided by it in their reasonings. In order to justify myself, I must distinguish in the imagination betwixt the principles which are permanent, irresistable, and universal; such as the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effects to causes: And the principles, which are changeable, weak, and irregular; such as those I have just now taken notice of. The former are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions, so that upon

9. Hume goes too far when he writes that "each [of nature and reason] may find something, that has all the conditions it desires" (T 215, emphasis added).

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their removal human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin. The latter are neither unavoidable to mankind, nor necessary, or so much as useful in the conduct of life; but on the contrary are observ'd only to take place in weak minds, and being opposite to the other principles of custom and reasoning, may easily be subverted by a due contrast and opposition. For this reason the former are received by philosophy, and the latter rejected. (T 225) Hume is classifying principles of the imagination in the wide sense, which includes reason or the understanding, and hence causal inference. The "principles" are belief-forming mechanisms apart from the senses and memory, since the imagination is the faculty of ideas fainter than perceptions of memory (§ II.3). Hume divides these mechanisms into those that are "received" by philosophy and those that are "rejected." In the passage at pages 225-26, Hume takes some care to distance himself from the distinction he is drawing; one set of principles is received and one set rejected "by philosophy." I have suggested that this is a device—also invoked in the context of education and unphilosophical probability—that enables Hume to hold these distinctions at arm's length, in light of his ambivalence toward them. His constructive project is to ratify his pretheoretical commitment to the understanding and hence causal inference; in the end, Hume maintains that he fails in this regard, at least with respect to the beliefs of the reflective person (§§ 1.4, III.3,6, IV. 1). Notwithstanding this ambivalence, much of the discussion at pages 225-26 is in Hume's own voice. For example, he writes that he is trying to "justify myself" against the charge that "I am unjust in blaming the antient philosophers." This is especially striking since the collapse of his constructive project comes just three sections later, in I.iv.7.1 think this is partly for dramatic effect (§§ 1.4, VII.2), but it also reflects the strength of Hume's pretheoretical commitments. Hume is concerned here with justified belief. The first paragraph continues: One who concludes somebody to be near him, when he hears an articulate voice in the dark, reasons justly and naturally; tho' that conclusion be deriv'd from nothing but custom, which infixes and inlivens the idea of a human creature, on account of his usual conjunction with the present impression. But one, who is tormented he knows not why, with the apprehension of spectres in the dark, may, perhaps, be said to reason, and to reason naturally too: But then it must be in the same sense, that a malady is said to be natural; as arising from natural causes, tho' it be contrary to health, the most agreeable and most natural situation of man. (T 225-26) The inference from the sound of an articulate voice to someone's presence is a causal inference, due to custom. This belief is just or justified much as immediate causal inferences are "just and conclusive" at page 144, and association by the relation of cause and effect is a "just inference" at page 89 and founds a "just conclusion" at page 216 (§§ 1.4, II. 1). Causal inference thus stands in contrast to torment and apprehension. I will refer to the latter source of belief as superstition.

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Earlier in the paragraph, Hume cites causal inference—"the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effects to causes"—as a beliefforming mechanism that philosophy receives. He proceeds to cite a belief resulting from the operation of causal inference, when one hears the articulate voice, as an example of a justified belief. A belief resulting from the operation of superstition, when one is tormented or apprehensive, is his example of an unjustified belief. In using the same belief—that somebody is nearby—Hume makes the point that the justificatory status of a belief depends upon the mechanism that produces it. Hume has the identity-ascribing propensity in view as a source of unjustified belief. At the first paragraph of I.iv.4, the belief-forming mechanisms that philosophy rejects are "those [principles] I have just now taken notice of" (T 225). These are the belief-forming mechanisms, which involve the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects and which are described in the preceding section, "Of the antient philosophy." This intended application is explicit in the second paragraph of I.iv.4: The opinions of the antient philosophers, their fictions of substance and accident, and their reasonings concerning substantial forms and occult qualities, are like the spectres in the dark, and are deriv'd from principles, which, however common, are neither universal nor unavoidable in human nature. The modern philosophy pretends to be entirely free from this defect, and to arise only from the solid, permanent, and consistent principles of the imagination. Upon what grounds this pretension is founded must now be the subject of our enquiry. (T 226) The belief in substrata is no more justified than the belief in specters.10 I have quoted the first two paragraphs of I.iv.4 in full. The fact that the identity-ascribing propensity depends upon an illusion plays no direct role in Hume's theoretical account of why the propensity is a source of unjustified belief. Hume is attempting to offer a general account of justification that extends, for example, to beliefs based on education and superstition. A variety of beliefforming mechanisms are sources of unjustified belief, and there is no reason to think these ultimately depend upon the propensity to mistake related ideas or on other propensities that give rise to illusions. In order to understand the theory of justification at pages 225-26, we need to locate some aspect of the identity-ascribing propensity that might plausibly be thought to generalize to other belie-forming mechanisms that are sources of unjustified beliefs. 10. Pears is silent on Treatise 225-26, which does not support his view that "it is only by a kind of insincere courtesy" (1990, p. 183) that any associative mechanisms may be deemed rational (§ II.3, n. 38). Baier merely mentions one bit from this passage (1991, p. 104), which is not consonant with her view (§ 1.4) that I.iv is a reductio of Cartesian approaches to knowledge. One might also question the extent to which 225-26 supports Baier's view that justification is a matter of bearing reflexive self-scrutiny (§ 1.5). Finally, Garrett discusses 225-26 only in passing, noting that it is supplanted by the dangerous dilemma in I.iv.7 (1997, p. 229). The effect of this is to downplay leading evidence that Hume is addressing general normative questions, as distinct from questions in cognitive psychology, prior to I.iv.7 (§ 1.4). Also see § 1.5, n. 29.


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The difficulty in interpreting the material at pages 225-26 is that Hume at once says too much and too little. He says too much in the sense that he suggests so many possible explanations of why some belief-forming mechanisms confer justification: such mechanisms are said to be permanent, irresistible, universal, the foundation of thought and action, unavoidable, necessary, useful in the conduct of life, solid, consistent, agreeable to health, and so forth. He also says too little: too little by way of explaining each of these features, too little by way of explaining which features are fundamental to his account of justification, and too little by way of explaining the interrelationships among the features.11 I take the following to be a crucial passage: "The latter... being opposite to the other principles of custom and reasoning, may easily be subverted by a due contrast and opposition. For this reason the former are received by philosophy, and the latter rejected" (T 225). There are two claims here: first, that the two sets of belief-forming mechanisms—those philosophy receives and those it rejects—are "opposite" to each other, and second, that there is an asymmetry such that the beliefs that philosophy rejects can be subverted by those it receives. It is in virtue of this asymmetry that one set of mechanisms is received and one rejected.12 Let us consider the first claim in more detail. I understand the contention that the two sets of belief-forming mechanisms are "opposite" to each other against the background of the instabilities that I have described in the preceding section; the two sets of mechanisms generate doxastic states that are in "opposition" (T 206, 215; cf. 238) and hence unstable. In the first paragraph of I.iv.4, Hume's example of a belief-forming mechanism that is received by philosophy is "the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effects to causes." It is not surprising that causal inference is prominent in a context where Hume is providing a theoretical account of the distinction between the understanding and the imagination—causal inference is the central nondemonstrative component of the understanding (§§ 1.4, II.2-3). Hume provides an example where causal inference is in conflict with superstition. The inference from the articulate voice to somebody's presence is "deriv'd from nothing but custom." Similarly, there is an observed conjunction between the conditions that produce

11. Aspects of Winters's treatment (1981, pp. 637-40) are similar to my interpretation below. For other discussions of Treatise 225-26, see Bayley, 1936, ch. 8; Price, 1940b, esp. pp. 28-33; Passmore, 1952/1968, esp. pp. 55-64; Lenz, 1958, esp. p. 179; Wolff, 1960, pp. 107-8, 126; Immerwahr, 1977; Wright, 1983, p. 154; Yolton, 1984, pp. 176-77; Fogelin, 1985, pp. 89-92; Winkler, 1991, pp. 561-62; Schmitt, 1992, esp. pp. 67-72; and Noonan, 1999, pp. 128-30. 12. Popkin maintains that our beliefs are "founded on the irrational psychological quirks of the imagination ..., but even worse, these natural psychological factors ... compel us to have conflicting views on the same subjects"; he asks rhetorically, "how can we ever choose one set as preferable to another?" (1951, p. 70; cf. 1952, pp. 76-78). Popkin does not make any reference to Treatise 225-26, material antithetical to the idea that all belief-forming mechanisms are "irrational" and that "we have no criterion whatsoever for preferring one belief to another" (1951, p. 70). The conflicts Popkin considers (1951, pp. 64-65) require closer analysis. I try to provide this with reference to a number of his examples: external objects (§§ V. 1-6, VI. 1-6), primary qualities (§ VII.2), and the self (§§ V.l-6). For a critique of Popkin's treatment of the belief in body, see Coleman, 1984.

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superstitious apprehension and the absence of any being. The inclination to believe, on the basis of superstition, that a being is present will conflict with the inclination to believe, on the basis of causal inference, that a being is not present. Causal inference and superstition are, in this way, opposite to each other. I have argued that in his theory of justification Hume's concern is with circumstances that undermine the natural function of belief (§ III.4). Hume's attention at pages 225-26 to belief-forming mechanisms that are "opposite" to each other, together with some of the other contrasts he draws in the course of his discussion, is related to his description of the natural function of belief at I.iii.10. Belief is nature's provision for a steady influence on the will and hence on action. Recall Hume's explanation: Did impressions alone influence the will, we should every moment of our lives be subject to the greatest calamities; because, tho' we foresaw their approach, we should not be provided by nature with any principle of action, which might impel us to avoid them. On the other hand, did every idea influence our actions, our condition would not be much mended. For such is the unsteadiness and activity of thought, that the images of every thing, especially of goods and evils, are always wandering in the mind; and were it mov'd by every idle conception of this kind, it would never enjoy a moment's peace and tranquillity. (T119)

This gives a sense in which steady dispositions are "useful in the conduct of life" and indeed "the foundation of all our thoughts and actions." How does the claim that sets of belief-forming mechanisms are opposite to each other apply to the operation of the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects in the context of the ancient philosophy? The unstable set of doxastic states consists in (1) our ascribing identity to a succession of uninterrupted, though changing, sensible qualities, and (2) our considering the successive qualities as distinct. The identity-ascribing propensity generates 1. What is the mechanism that generates 2? The best answer is that the belief at 2 is due to perception and memory in conjunction with intuition. Hume writes that judgments of identity, where all the objects under consideration "are present to the senses along with the relation" are based on "perception rather than reasoning" (T 73). Here I take "reasoning" to refer at least to intuitive and demonstrative inference. In the case of the judgments of difference or diversity, the relevant objects are not all present to the senses, at least not at the same time. So memory must play some role. I suggest that intuition is also required. Difference in number is the absence of the relation of identity (T 15). I take this, like resemblance and contrariety, to "fall... under the province of intuition" (T 70).13 Stage 2 is not due to the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects. The conflict is

13. Wolff and Stroud both write that the objects are "obviously" not identical (1960, p. 124; and 1977, p. 101, respectively). Fogelin takes the nonidentity to be a matter of "immediate inspection" (1985, p. 75). I concur with these accounts, but I am trying to describe matters in terms of Humean faculties.


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between the identity-ascribing propensity at 1, and intuition (operating on materials provided by perception and memory) at 2. The same analysis would apply to stages 1 and 2 of the three-stage reaction in the contexts of the belief in souls and the continued existence of perceptions. At page 226, Hume contrasts the mechanisms that produce the ancient philosophy with those that are "solid, permanent, and consistent." This suggests that the identity-ascribing propensity, perhaps together with related principles, itself leads to inconsistency or contradiction. Hume does hold that some beliefforming mechanisms are internally inconsistent; he has claimed of education that "its maxims are frequently contrary... even to themselves in different times and places" (T 117) and that "trivial suggestion^] of the fancy... are often contrary to each other" (T 267). As far as I can see, however, I.iv.3 lays no foundation for the claim that the identity-ascribing propensity generates contradiction on its own, without the aid of one or more belief-forming mechanisms that are received by philosophy. At page 225, Hume is explicit that the principles that philosophy rejects are "opposite to the other principles of custom and reasoning," principles that philosophy receives. Taking these other principles of reasoning to include intuition, this description of the source of the inconsistency seems apt in the case of the identity-ascribing propensity. If my account of the source of the instability that leads to the belief in material substrata is correct, we need to refine my earlier formulations of Hume's theory of justified belief. The propensity to ascribe identity to related objects gives rise to one side of the contradiction, and intuition gives rise to the other side. Hume wants to maintain that beliefs based upon intuition—but not beliefs based on the propensity—are justified. Neither one of these belief-forming mechanisms has been shown to generate unstable beliefs on its own, so that Hume's epistemic assessments must depend upon considerations about sets of belief-forming mechanisms. At the same time, both mechanisms tend to generate unstable beliefs when they operate jointly, so that Hume must locate some epistemically relevant asymmetry between the two mechanisms. The problem with the joint operation of the identity-ascribing propensity and intuition is that it tends to produce unstable doxastic states. The identityascribing propensity, however, cannot operate on its own, that is, in the absence of the operation of intuition. This is because the operation of demonstration, and hence intuition, is "irresistible" (T 31), and the operation of intuition is unavoidable in that it is "discoverable at first sight" (T 70). Intuition, like "the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effect to causes," is irresistible and unavoidable. Though we can perhaps imagine a set of belief-forming mechanisms that does not include beliefs based on intuition, such a set is not genuinely available to human thinkers. By contrast, the operation of the propensity is classified as "weak," rather than irresistible, and avoidable. The operation of the propensity can be "subverted" by principles opposite to it. Here we have the kernel of truth—apart from offering an interpretation of Hume's theory of justification as naturalistic—in the Kemp Smith tradition of Hume interpretation. Hume does appeal to the relative strength of beliefs, to such psychological properties as irresistibility, unavoidability, and inevitability,

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to draw epistemic discriminations with respect to belief-forming mechanisms whose joint operation results in instability. Even allowing analogous complications within Kemp Smith's framework would not disarm the examples to show that irresistibility is neither necessary nor sufficient for justification (§ 1.5). It is in this regard that Hume's second claim at page 225—that there is an asymmetry such that the beliefs that philosophy rejects can be subverted by those it receives—comes into play. The asymmetry is psychological in character. The joint operation of the identity-ascribing propensity and intuition produces the instabilities that lead to the belief in material substrata. These instabilities can be eliminated by suppressing the weak inclinations to believe that result from the propensity. What is suppressed is not the contradiction or attendant instability; rather, it is one of the inclinations that gives rise to the contradiction. Hume envisions this sort of suppression in the final paragraph of I.iv.3: But among all the instances, wherein the Peripatetics have shewn they were guided by every trivial propensity of the imagination, no one is more remarkable than their sympathies, antipathies, and horrors of a vacuum. There is a very remarkable inclination in human nature, to bestow on external objects the same emotions, which it observes in itself; and to find every where those ideas, which are most present to it. This inclination, 'tis true, is suppress'd by a little reflection, and only takes place in children, poets, and the antient philosophers ... by these fictions of sympathy and antipathy. We must pardon children, because of their age; poets, because they profess to follow implicitly the suggestions of their fancy: But what excuse shall we find to justify our philosophers in so signal a weakness? (T 224-25)

It is in the next paragraph that Hume discusses his distinction between the principles that philosophy receives and rejects. The discussion of sympathies and antipathies confirms that Hume is thinking in terms of the suppression of the inclinations to believe generated by the principles that philosophy rejects.14 The upshot is that the unsuppressed propensity to ascribe identity to related objects need not be a mechanism on which we rely. We can say that a belief-forming mechanism or set of belief-forming mechanisms is just if and only if it is a member of a set of belief-forming mechanisms that is available and that tends to produce stable doxastic states. In this account, the (unsuppressed) identity-ascribing propensity and the joint operation of the identity-ascribing propensity and intuition are not just; any available set of belief-forming mechanisms of which they are members tends to produce unstable beliefs. Intuition, however, may well be just; for all that has been shown, there is an available set of belief-forming mechanisms, one in which the identity-ascribing propensity is suppressed, that includes intuition and does not lead to unstable beliefs. This sort of analysis also applies to superstition. Even if superstition does not tend to produce conflict operating on its own, it

14. The asymmetry is briefly noted by Lenz, 1958, pp. 185-86. For the relevance of Treatise 224, cf. Winkler, 1991, pp. 563-64.

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does tend to produce conflict in conjunction with causal inference, and causal inference, unlike superstition, is irresistible and unavoidable.15 Similar results apply to the propensity to add a new relation to objects united by another relation (§ V.3). This propensity in conjunction with reflection or reason produces conflict (§ V.5). It is important that causal inference is not a component of the operation of this relation-adding propensity. In the case of taste, the propensity adds a new relation (local conjunction) to objects united by causation and contemporaneous appearance, but the superimposition of this new relation is not itself the product of causal inference. We add the new relation "in order to compleat the union" (T 237). It seems clear that Hume's larger aim in Part iv is to point in the direction of a class of propensities that does not depend upon causal inference, that he attributes to the imagination and considers unjust.16 I call these imaginative propensities. It remains to ask whether Hume's discussion of the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects supports the weaker or the stronger version of a stability-based theory of justification (§ III.5). Does justification depend upon stability within the belief system of a sufficiently reflective person, or simply upon stability given the degree to which the person who holds the belief is reflective? I attribute the weaker requirement to Hume (§§ III.6, IV.5). In the present context, Hume's treatment of the vulgar belief in body is the main obstacle to this interpretation. Recall the disparity uncovered in § V.3. The beliefs in material and immaterial substrata disguise persisting instability, even for an unreflective person. The belief in the continued existence of perceptions genuinely resolves the conflict to which it is addressed; it gives rise to instability only upon further reflection on double vision and perceptual relativity. It might seem, then, that in order to maintain that the vulgar belief in body is unjust, Hume must appeal to the fact that the operation of the propensity leads to instability under reflection, thus invoking the stronger version of the theory. It is important to bear in mind Hume's preference for determining the justificatory status of beliefs with reference to generic properties of belief-forming mechanisms (§ 1.4). Mechanisms are evaluated with reference to their tendency to produce stable beliefs; the epistemic status of an individual belief is evaluated derivatively. The belief in the continued existence of perceptions, unlike the beliefs in material and immaterial substrata, is stable within the belief system of an unreflective person. Even so, based on Hume's sampling of cases, the identityascribing propensity tends to produce instability within the belief system of the unreflective person. This enables Hume to condemn beliefs resulting from the

15. Suppose a set of belief-forming mechanisms tends to produce instability, but that a particular member of the set does not contribute to the instability. We should perhaps not penalize that mechanism. This suggests that a belief-forming mechanism or set of belief-forming mechanisms is just if and only if it is a member of an available set of belief-forming mechanisms and does not contribute to any instability in the doxastic states that the set tends to produce. 16. A full discussion would require consideration of the role of the relation-adding propensity in I.iii.14 via Hume's analogy in that section to I.iv.5 (T 167, including n. 1). See my 2001a, esp. pp. 159-64.

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propensity as unjust even on the weaker version of a stability-based theory of justification. Still, the belief in the continued existence of perceptions stands as a significant exception to the identity-ascribing propensity's tendency to produce instability in the absence of reflection. This is unsatisfying but also parasitic on the disparity between Hume's application of the propensity to the case of body and the cases of substrata. I argue in § V.5 that the disparities multiply, and in § VI.6 that they could be removed in a suitably amended version of the Treatise. In other words, the amendments would allow Hume to maintain that the identityascribing propensity uniformly leads to instability, even in the belief system of an unreflective person. Let me summarize the direction of Hume's thinking. In a number of instances, the operation of the identity-ascribing propensity gives rise to beliefs that contradict ones arising from the operation of perception, memory, and intuition. (Similarly, contradictions arise from the operation of superstition and causal inference.) Furthermore, contradictory beliefs are unstable in that they oscillate in their manifestations or effects (§§ 1.2, IV.5); these alternations are a source of uneasiness, which we seek to relieve, thus causing further instability by unsettling the contradictory beliefs (§ IV.5). None of these psychological processes depends upon reflection. The propensity leads to instability, which infects even the unreflective person. There are beliefs, the beliefs in material and immaterial substrata (and beliefs based on superstition) among them, that Hume wants to condemn independently of instabilities that might arise upon reflection. There is a further question in regard to Hume's treatment of the identityascribing propensity. The beliefs in material and immaterial substrata disguise persisting instability. Yet, doxastic systems that include these stage 3 beliefs are more stable than systems composed of stages 1 and 2, contradictory beliefs absent the conflicted resolution of the underlying opposition (§ IV.4). The propensity leads to instability but also to uneasiness, which gives rise to stage 3, at least somewhat reducing the instability at 2. Would Hume then say that a doxastic system that includes a conflicted resolution at 3 is more justified than a system composed of the contradiction at 1 and 2? The answer to this question requires an excursion into Hume's theory of meaning.

V.5. The Propensity and Meaning In this section, I consider the relationship of the identity-ascribing propensity and the instabilities that attend its operation to Hume's empiricism about meaning. The propensity leads to four metaphysical beliefs (§ V.I). In three of the cases, Hume provides an argument to show that we possess no idea of the key notions, so that the terms 'material substrata', 'souls', and 'external existence' are meaningless. These arguments to meaninglessness are too strong for Hume's purposes.17 The psychological explanations of why we believe in the 17. Johnson, 1995, p. 321.

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existence of entities that fall under the meaningless expressions presuppose the meaningfulness of the relevant terms. In this section, I propose a solution. I begin by documenting the arguments to meaninglessness. Hume argues at I.i.7 that the idea of a substratum, a substance supporting accidents, is meaningless: I wou D fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident, and imagine we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be deriv'd from the impressions of sensation or reflexion? If it be convey'd to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner?... But I believe none will assert, that substance is either a colour, or sound, or a taste. The idea of a substance must therefore be deriv'd from an impression of reflexion, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflexion resolve themselves into our passions and emotions; none of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it. (T 15-16)

Hume produces similar considerations in I.iv.5, writing of "the case of the mind" as well as "matter and body" (T 232) and applying a version of the I.i.7 argument to immaterial substrata: I desire those philosophers, who pretend that we have an idea of the substance of our minds, to point out the impression that produces it, and tell distinctly after what manner that impression operates, and from what object it is deriv'd. Is it an impression of sensation or of reflection? Is it pleasant, or painful, or indifferent? (T 233)

Two paragraphs later, Hume also declares that "we have... no idea of inhesion" (T 234). Hume returns to the theme at I.iv.6: "Nor have we any idea of self, after the manner it is here explain'd. For from what impression cou'd this idea be deriv'd?" (T 251). External existence of the sort required by the supposition of the double existence of perceptions and objects fares no better. Hume writes in I.ii.6: Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are deriv'd from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows, that 'tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and impressions.. . . We never . . . can conceive any kind of existence, but... perceptions. (T 67-68)

In the next paragraph, Hume refers the reader to I.iv.2 for a fuller discussion. Early in that section, Hume writes: "For as to the notion of external existence, when taken for something specifically different from our perceptions, *we have already shewn its absurdity" (T 188). This footnote refers to I.ii.6. The point is advanced in the course of the I.iv.2 discussion of the supposition of double existence: "We never can conceive any thing but perceptions" (T 216); "'tis impossible for us distinctly to conceive, objects to be in their nature any thing but exactly the same with perceptions" (T 218). There is a similar discussion in I.iv.4

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(T 241). Hume mounts arguments against the meaningfulness of'material substrata', 'immaterial substrata', and 'external existence'. Hume does not advance a destructive argument about meaning in connection with the idea of a perception that has a continued and distinct existence. Hume characterizes a "body" as an object that has a continued existence when not present to the senses and an existence distinct from the mind and perception (§ V. 1). Hume has no quarrel with the meaningfulness of this notion, when bodies are taken to be perceptions.18 Here there is a difference between the vulgar belief in body and the philosophical system of the double existence of perceptions and objects, with its commitment to external existence. Hume finds only three of the four beliefs to which the identity-ascribing propensity gives rise susceptible to charges of meaninglessness. This is another disparity in Hume's application of the three-stage psychological reaction to the continued existence of perceptions, on the one hand, and to substrata and external existence, on the other (§§ V.3-4). I return to this matter in § V.6. Hume's reliance on arguments about meaning raise a number of puzzles. Hume maintains that the operation of the identity-ascribing propensity invariably culminates in a belief that is meaningless—either the belief in material or immaterial substrata at 3 or the belief in external existence at 5. This looks as if it is a matter of sheer coincidence. Why is it that an argument to meaninglessness is apt in each instance? This is a puzzle about the relationship of the operation of the propensity Lo the availability of an argument to meaninglessness. There are also puzzles in regard to Hume's deployment of his theory of meaning. In the first place, his destructive arguments to meaninglessness are cursory in character; they tend to occupy single paragraphs, often filled with rhetorical challenges but lacking in sustained argument.19 Hume's brevity leaves the arguments vulnerable. For example, he writes in I.iv.5: These philosophers are the curious reasoners concerning the material or immaterial substances, in which they suppose our perceptions to inhere. In order to put a stop to these endless cavils on both sides, I know no better method, than to ask these philosophers in a few words, What they mean by substance and inhesion? And after they have answer'd this question, 'twill then be reasonable, and not till then, to enter seriously into the dispute. (T 232)

Berkeley thought he had answered this question for immaterial substance. Yet, in proceeding to consider "the case of the mind," Hume does not even acknowledge Berkeley's suggestion that the "inhesion" of an idea in a substance is to be understood as a spirit perceivingthe idea (BW 2,104—5,231-34).20 There are other manifestations of Hume taking a short way with his empiricism about meaning. For example, according to Locke, complex ideas are derived from simple ideas by combining or compounding, comparing or relat18. Craig observes that the belief in continued and distinct perceptions is an "intelligible" fiction (1987, pp. 125-26). 19. Cf. Craig, 1987, pp. 91,123-28. 20. MacNabb, 1951/1966, pp. 139-41.


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ing, and separating (Essay Il.xii). By contrast, Hume consistently treats complex ideas as formed only by compounding parts (T 2; EHUII, 13-14, V, 39). Hume's version of the simple/complex distinction seems to be a retrogression on Locke's account in that Hume allows fewer resources, in the form of permissible psychological operations, for deriving complex ideas. What is more, in his destructive arguments to meaninglessness, Hume sometimes writes as if he is bent on rinding a single perception from which a target idea is derived.21 (By a target idea, I mean an idea whose existence is in question.) In route to the claim that we have no idea of the self or soul, he observes: "It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference" (T 251). In this passage, Hume seems to overlook the possibility that the idea of the soul is complex. Every simple idea is derived from a simple impression that it exactly represents (T 2-7). Complex ideas, however, "may be distinguished into parts" (T 2) and are "formed" (T 4) from simple ideas. It is the simple constituents of complex ideas, not the complex ideas themselves, that need to represent simple ideas exactly. To the extent that Hume searches for a single impression that is the source of the target idea, he neglects his own distinction between simple and complex ideas.22 We can imagine Hume fleshing out these arguments, but as they stand they are crude. Why is Hume content to advance destructive applications of his empiricism about meaning that are so perfunctory? Here one might try to press into service Stroud's observation (§ III.2) that Hume "adopts [the theory of ideas] without criticism from his predecessors" and that this accounts for his "quick, not very careful or thorough, exposition of the theory."23 In this spirit, it might be suggested that Hume can make do with a truncated version and streamlined applications specifically of a Lockean theory of meaning. Locke's empiricism about meaning would be familiar to readers. Hume could rely on Locke's work without providing detail that would otherwise be necessary. There is a second and more fundamental puzzle, the one introduced at the beginning of this section. Hume's psychological explanations of the causes of the beliefs in substrata and external existence work at cross-purposes with the claims that the beliefs in substrata and external existence are meaningless. How can Hume consistently set out to explain the psychological causes of beliefs that are without meaning or content in the first place?24 It would seem that there is 21. Aune,1991,p. 62. 22. Craig notes, "Hume spends no time on an issue that must surely be absolutely vital to his argument: whether the idea of the self might not be a complex idea" (1987, p. 119). The puzzle is not simply that Hume does not consider whether the idea is simple or complex, but that he seems to assume it is simple. If so, Craig's explanation (p. 120), that Hume's real concern is with the evidence for the belief, and hence for the existence of an actual impression (whether simple or complex) of the self, is not fully responsive to the problem. 23. Stroud, 1977, p. 17; cf. Johnson, 1995, pp. 37-38. 24. As Fogelin writes: "What is the content of the false philosopher's belief in substance? Hume's answer seems to be that it is contentless, but then what does the belief amount to?" (1985, pp. 11-12; cf. 7). With reference to Hume's Appendix discussion of immaterial substance, Craig

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no content for the suppositions of substrata and external existence and a fortiori no content for the corresponding beliefs (§ V.2). This second puzzle about Hume's reliance on empiricism about meaning cannot be dismissed on the ground that Hume is relying on Locke's results. It involves an apparent inconsistency in Hume's system: He declares the terms 'substratum' and 'external existence' meaningless, while providing psychological explanations of why some philosophers believe in material substrata, souls, and external existence. The difficulty is to understand how there is room for the belief in a substratum at 3 or external existence at 5 in light of Hume's claim that we have no idea of substratum or external existence and that these terms are meaningless. This is a critical question in understanding the relationship between Hume's "empiricism about meaning" and his "naturalism."25 Granted, Hume might try to explain why, for example, the ancient philosophers believe that their belief is meaningful. Fogelin observes that Hume does try to explain this: "It naturally happens, that after the frequent use of terms, which are wholly insignificant and unintelligible, we fancy them to be on the same footing with [significant and intelligible terms]" (T 224). This is fine as far as it goes, but Hume also offers an explanation of why the ancient philosophers hold the belief that substrata exist; if the term 'substratum' is "wholly insignificant and unintelligible," it is not possible to identify the belief that Hume seeks to explain.26 The terms 'material substratum', 'soul', and 'external existence' must have sufficient meaning so that the suppositions and beliefs that substrata and external objects exist have at least some sort of content—sufficient content to make room to explain how we come to have the beliefs. Another way to see this point is to consider that all contentless concepts are the same, just as there is only one null set. Yet, Hume provides different psychological explanations of the beliefs in the existence of material substrata, souls, and external existence. The pattern of explanation is the same, but the observed features of perceptions that trigger stage 1 of the pattern are different in each case. The differences in the explanations could be appropriate only if the beliefs somehow differ in content, but

observes, "These two claims, that we have no notion of something, cannot form any conception of it, and that it does not exist, sit rather oddly together" (1987, p. 114). Stroud stresses another instance of the problem: "If we can have no idea of necessity as something residing in objects,... then we cannot even have the false belief that necessity is something that is objectively true of the connections between objects or events in our experience" (1977, p. 83). 25. Recent interpretations that attribute to Hume the position that it is meaningfulto believe that external objects and/or necessary connections (construed as causal connections that cannot be reduced to regularities) exist, or claim that Hume believes in the existence of external objects and/or necessary connections, though we do not know they exist, must show that he makes room for at least the meaningfulness of these beliefs. Thus, for example, G. Strawson calls attention to an apparent "meaning tension" in Hume (1989/1992, pp. 120-22 and the relevant entries at p. 290 of his index). For an excellent critical review of this literature, see Winkler, 1991, esp. pp. 552-61. See also Blackburn, 1990; Pears, 1990, pp. 194-96; Broackes, 1993, pp. 104-7,110; and O'Shea, 1996, pp. 300-306. A recent anthology—Read and Richman, 2000—is devoted to the issues. 26. For the quotations, see Fogelin, 1985, p. 12, and 1993, p. 111.


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they do not differ in content if the key concepts are meaningless.27 Perhaps strict meaningfulness requires ideas derived from experience in accordance with Hume's principle that every simple idea exactly resembles a simple impression and that complex ideas are compounds of such simple ideas. When Hume writes that the various beliefs involve "absurdity" (T 218) or are "unintelligible" (T 220, 254) or "incomprehensible" (T 222; cf. 224), he is calling attention to a defect in meaning or content. The relevant concepts must nevertheless possess some surrogate for meaning or some contentlike features— quasi content—if Hume's psychological explanations of these beliefs are themselves to make sense. I believe we can extract an account of quasi content from the psychological reaction to which the identity-ascribing propensity gives rise (§ V.I). After his explanation of the belief in material substratum is complete, Hume still writes in a deprecating way about the concept of substratum as an "unintelligible something" (T 220) and "incomprehensible" (T 222; cf. 224). Hume is here calling attention to a defect in meaning or content.281 suggest that the mistake or illusion at 1 is transformed or transmuted under the pressure of the conflict and uneasiness at 2 into a conceptual confusion. Once stage 2 is reached, the mind seeks relief. Unable to remove or resolve the conflict, we "endeavour to conceal" (T 219) or"to disguise" (T 254) the contradiction. The concept of material substratum, so far as we have it, emerges at the same stage, 3, as the belief in material substratum. We do not first form or acquire the concept and then the belief.29 Rather, the concept and the belief are of a piece. What I have called "quasi content" arises together with the belief at 3 that obscures the contradiction; the quasi content and the belief result from the same set of psychological pressures. The same account applies to immaterial substratum. Similarly, in the case of external existence, the conflict and uneasiness at 4 transform the belief at 3, itself derived from the illusion at 1, into the conceptual confusion at 5. In thinking about the explanation of quasi content I am attributing to Hume, it is important to distinguish the initial mistake or illusion and the subsequent conceptual confusion. In the case of (material and immaterial) substrata, the illusions at 1 consist in ascribing identity to related, but interrupted or changing, objects that we observe. The conceptual confusions set in at 3, when we

27. Pears finds "two separate thrusts in Hume's strategy, one against the meaningfulness of his opponent's views and the other against their credibility" and takes Hume "to attribute equal importance to each of them" (1990, p. 10). When Pears is in this frame of mind, I think he is insufficiently sensitive to the tensions between the two thrusts. 28. Craig takes it that Hume started with "a theory of the thinkable and then found himself happy to transform it into a theory of the knowable" (1987, pp. 126-27), so that epistemic considerations supplant semantic ones. I do not think this does justice to the persistence of Hume's expressions of misgivings about meaning. 29. In his I.iv.2 treatment of another product of the identity-ascribing propensity, Hume provides an explanation of why our idea of the continued and independent existence of body also constitutes a belief (T 208-9), but his point is not that we first form the idea and later form the belief. See § V.2.

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ascribe identity to objects as best we can conceive them, thus postulating something "unintelligible" and "incomprehensible." The confused conceptions at stage 3 are thus a by-product of the illusion at 1. Hume's discussion of the belief in souls is clear on this point: Thus the controversy concerning identity is not merely a dispute of words. For when we attribute identity, in an improper sense, to variable or interrupted objects, our mistake is not confin'd to the expression, but is commonly attended with a fiction, either of something invariable and uninterrupted, or of something mysterious and inexplicable, or at least with a propensity to such fictions. (T 255)

The attribution of identity at 1 of the three-stage reaction might be considered a merely verbal mistake, did it not generally lead to a fiction, or to a propensity to a fiction, "something mysterious and inexplicable."30 In these instances, quasi content arises from an illusion in an attempt to conceal or disguise attendant conflict and instability. The confused conception of substratum, for example, has contentlike features insofar as it is the by-product of a contentful illusion at 1. Similarly, in the case of external existence, the initial illusion consists in ascribing identity to related objects; the conceptual confusion sets in at 5, in ascribing continued existence to unobserved objects as best we can conceive them. It might be objected that Hume is not entitled to the claim that stages 3 and 5 yield any form of content.31 As Hume views them, 3 and 5 go some way toward resolving the conflicts to which they are addressed, which requires that they possess a kind of content. How does Hume preclude the possibility that at 3 and 5 we enter into some psychological state that simply squelches the uneasiness in the way that a pill or a drug might squelch tension or discomfort? Such states would reduce uneasiness, though they lack any sort of content. I take Hume to be assuming that the outcome of the psychological reactions is belief, or something like belief; this is a datum to be explained. This helps us to understand why Hume holds that the psychological processes he describes issue in quasi content. My account of quasi content generalizes beyond the identity-ascribing propensity. Considerations of meaning also come into play in Hume's discussion of taste (§ V.3). The propensity to add a new relation to objects united by another relation results in a stage 1, the belief that taste is conjoined in place with body. Reflection rushes in to uncover a contradiction in 1. Does the taste only exist in some part of the fig, or in every part? The taste cannot only exist in some part of the fig, for every part has the same taste; and the taste cannot exist

30. Stroud writes: "The fiction of a substance is also unintelligible, according to Hume, since it requires us to have an idea of something of which no idea can be formed Furthermore, we do not need the notion of substance in order to explain how we come to attribute identity to things" (1977, pp. 120-21). But Hume does need some notion of substance to explain how we come to believe in the existence of a soul. We cannot avoid the need to locate quasi content even in this case. 31. I owe this objection, and the response to it, to William Taschek. (I am not sure he endorses the response.)


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in every part of the fig, for in that case, Hume says, the taste would be extended (cf. T 238). The belief at 1 is thus meaningful but internally inconsistent. These reflections give rise to 2, the belief that the taste is not conjoined in place with the fig's extension. The belief in the local conjunction of taste with matter has sufficient meaning that its incoherence can be exposed. Under the pressure of the conflict and uneasiness, we suppose that 3, the taste in its entirety exists in every part of the body; since the entire taste is in each part, the taste is not extended. Hume observes that this amounts to saying "that a thing is in a certain place, and yet is not there" (T 238). It amounts to this because we deny extension to the taste even though it is everywhere in the fig. We thereby "involve the subject in ... confusion and obscurity" (T 238). Conceptual confusion or quasi content is thus associated with the propensity to add a new relation to related objects as well as with the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects. We have encountered a recurrent pattern of explanation in Hume.32 My general thesis is this: For Hume, quasi content is the product of a retreat, under the pressure of a conflict and attendant uneasiness, from an illusion to a conceptual confusion required to possess a belief that obscures the conflict. Differences in quasi content are a function of differences in the initial illusions that give rise to them. This thesis generates responses to our earlier puzzles. How can Hume consistently set out to explain the psychological causes of a belief that is strictly meaningless? The answer is that such a belief has a surrogate for meaning: quasi content in the sense explained. How can it be appropriate for Hume to give different explanations of a number of strictly meaningless beliefs? The answer is that the beliefs differ in quasi content owing to differences in the illusions at stage 1. Focusing on the identity-ascribing propensity, there are the illusions of the identity of a succession of unchanging but interrupted objects (in the case of the belief in body), of changing but uninterrupted objects (in the case of material substrata), and of changing and interrupted objects (in the case of souls). My account thus explains how the suppositions and beliefs at 3 and 5 can have at least some content, and indeed differential content, in the cases of material substratum, soul, and external existence.33 Quasi content is

32. In my 2001a, esp. pp. 159-64, I extend this account to Hume's treatment of necessary connection. 33. My position should give no comfort to commentators who maintain that Hume thinks the idea of external existence tolerably meaningful. These commentators contend that Hume admits "external existence" as a "relative" idea. We have meaningful concepts of internal perceptions and we have a meaningful concept of causation; external existence is whatever it is that causes perceptions. (See, for example, Livingston, 1984, pp. 80-81, 155-57; and G. Strawson, 1989/1992, pp. 49-58, and the index entries for "'relative' ideas" at p. 291. For critical discussion of this sort of view, see the references at n. 25.) I do not think this reading consistent with the tenor of passages about external existence reviewed earlier in this section. (See Blackburn, 1990, pp. 239^11.) More fundamentally, Hume's treatment of external existence parallels his treatments of substrata and of the local conjunction of taste with matter. In each case, the relevant concept arises in the service of obscuring a conflict rooted in a deception; conflict and uneasiness transmute an illusion into a quasi content inherent in a supposition that provides a confused resolution of the contradiction. This is not a sympathetic account of the origin of the idea of external existence.

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determined by the content of the initial illusion and associated contradiction, together with the psychological principles that govern the mind's retreat from the initial belief. What are we to make of Hume's perfunctory applications of his empiricism about meaning, for example, his losing sight of the possibility that the target ideas are complex? Hume's destructive arguments to meaninglessness are merely intended to generate a presumption that a would-be concept is not strictly meaningful, not derived from ideas in accordance with his account of the relation of ideas to simple impressions. Since Hume has an explanation of the (quasi) content of the concepts, these presumptive arguments can be brief. His overall argument is not complete until he supplements the presumptive argument with an explanation, with reference to a specific illusion, of how the relevant quasi content arises. This places a double burden on those who think the target ideas more contentful than Hume allows: They need both to criticize the presumptive argument and to show that his explanation of the quasi content is deficient. My responses to the puzzles about meaning emphasize that quasi contents are not derived from experience in accordance with Hume's strictures on the origin of ideas that possess strict content. This leads to an important objection from the quarter of the traditional interpretation of Hume's theory of belief: If beliefs are lively ideas, and if quasi contents are not ideas derived from simple impressions that copy experience, then we cannot have genuine belief in these cases. I have no objection to taking the psychological reactions to yield a state that falls short of genuine belief, quasi belief. If one insists that, for Hume, beliefs are lively ideas, the best course is perhaps to identify quasi contents with quasi ideas, thus allowing for quasi belief. It would be preferable, however, to locate an alternative to the admission of quasi ideas. The pressure in the direction of saying that the psychological reaction yields quasi belief arises from the interpretation that identifies beliefs with lively ideas. In this interpretation, the propositional attitude of belief has a mental vehicle—lively ideas—whose constituents determine the content of the attitude. Lively ideas are thus the so-called language of thought for belief. Applying this model to quasi content, we have the problem of identifying a lively idea, or a constituent of a lively idea, that corresponds to a quasi content. Hume's Lockean empiricism about meaning, however, makes this problem intractable. In my view, in order to provide a consistent interpretation of Hume—quite apart from the issues discussed in this section—we must construe beliefs as steady dispositions (§ III.2). Genuine beliefs are steady dispositions to characteristic manifestations or typical effects on action, the passions, and thought, including lively ideas. Lively ideas are, for Hume, the occurrent thoughts in which (dispositional) beliefs are sometimes manifested. Lively ideas thus retain a role within the dispositional account of belief, giving the traditional interpretation its due. The dispositional account of belief makes room for quasi beliefs associated with quasi contents. Within the dispositional framework, lively ideas are the vehicle of occurrent thoughts that manifest (dispositional) belief, though not the


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vehicle of dispositional belief itself. Lively ideas are one, but only one, of the characteristic manifestations of genuine (dispositional) belief. Quasi beliefs are steady dispositions to characteristic manifestations, apart from lively ideas.34 Quasi beliefs have a variety of typical effects on thought, the passions, and action, but lively ideas are not among them. There is one element missing from my account. Hume should allow that quasi beliefs are sometimes manifested in occurrent thoughts, even though these thoughts cannot consist in lively ideas. It is here that Hume's remarks at page 224 can play an important role: For it being usual, after the frequent use of terms, which are really significant and intelligible, to omit the idea, which we wou'd express by them, and to preserve only the custom, by which we recal the idea at pleasure; so it naturally happens, that after the frequent use of terms, which are wholly insignificant and unintelligible, we fancy them... to have a secret meaning, which we might discover by reflection.

Strictly meaningless terms serve as place holders for ideas we do not possess. Hume can appeal to the subvocalization of terms or expressions (such as 'material substratum') that do not stand for ideas, in the company of other, meaningful words. Such inner speech serves as an occurrent manifestation of quasi belief. Furthermore, the expression 'material substratum', for example, is associated with the quasi content at stage 3 in virtue of being employed in the context of the observations (of a succession of uninterrupted and gradually changing sensible qualities) that activate the propensity that gives rise to the illusion at 1. In this way, different expressions—'material substratum', 'immaterial substratum', 'external existence', 'taste conjoined in its entirety with matter'—though not strictly meaningful, are associated, in both outer and inner speech, with different quasi contents. Which quasi content is in play depends upon the context in which these expressions are placed or used. This explains how we can express different meaningless concepts and different meaningless beliefs. This completes a sketch of how quasi content and quasi belief fit into Hume's theory of belief. I turn to the remaining puzzle: the connection of the identity-ascribing propensity to the availability of arguments about meaning. Why should the propensity's operation invariably culminate in a (quasi) belief that possesses mere quasi content? Hume takes it that the propensity tends to produce, at stages 2 and 4, conflicts and instabilities that cannot be removed or resolved. (There is a further question as to why, in the context of I.iv.2, conflict happens to be waiting in the wings at the fourth stage. See §§ V.3,6.) It is these same irresolvable conflicts that transmute the illusions at 1 into the confused quasi contents integral to the suppositions of substrata and external existence. It is therefore no coincidence that the conceptions required for these suppositions 34. In my usage, quasi beliefs are distinct from pseudobeliefs, as discussed in § III.2. Pseudobeliefs possess strict meaning but are not steady or infixed; quasi beliefs are steady or infixed but lack strict content.

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possess confused quasi content rather than strict meaning, so that they are susceptible to destructive empiricist arguments about meaning. In the cases of material substrata, souls, and external existence, semantic and epistemic defects are linked. The identity-ascribing propensity gives rise to (quasi) beliefs that possess mere quasi content. Furthermore, the identityascribing propensity involves an illusion and tends to produce instability that cannot be removed or resolved, uneasiness that cannot be fully relieved; beliefs resulting from the propensity are therefore not justified. The conflicts and instabilities at 2 and 4 account for both these semantic and epistemic features. The quasi contents and the unjustified beliefs are inseparable products of the same psychological mechanism or dynamic.35 This result enables us to take up the question posed at the close of the preceding section. Are the beliefs at 3 and 5 more justified, because more stable, than the contradictory beliefs they obscure? The response is that the additional stability comes at a cost. The relevant beliefs are defective in meaning; they involve confused concepts, which result from the illusion and attendant instability. Any gains in epistemic standing are offset by losses in semantic status.

V.6. Tensions in Hume's Account of the Psychological Properties of the Propensity We have encountered a number of disparities between Hume's application of the identity-ascribing propensity to the belief in the continued existence of perceptions, on the one hand, and to the beliefs in material substrata, souls, and the double existence of perceptions and objects, on the other. First, whereas the latter three beliefs merely disguise or conceal a conflict, in the case of the belief in the continued existence of perceptions the underlying instability is genuinely removed (§ V.3). Second, though the belief in the continued existence of perceptions does lead to a contradiction, via reflection on double vision and perceptual relativity, these considerations are extraneous to the operation of the propensity (§ V.3). Third, in the case of the belief in the continued existence of perceptions, considerations about meaning do not come into play at stage 3 of the psychological reaction (§ V.5). These three differences have a root source. Consider the cases of material and immaterial substrata. An illusion underpins the operation of the identityascribing propensity. This leads the mind to ascribe identity to successive objects. Intuition shows these objects to be distinct. This results in conflict, instability, and uneasiness. In seeking relief from the uneasiness, the mind transmutes the original illusion into quasi content, which provides a kind of content, however confused, for the new belief. This quasi content and the associated belief are by-products of the illusion that gives rise to the conflict and insta35. Pears allows that Hume's thrusts against meaning and against credibility (see n. 27) are "closely interdependent" (1990, p. 46). I believe the interdependence tends to conform to the general schema I have outlined.

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bility in the first place. Thus, in the substrata cases, the contradiction arises from features that derive from the original illusion. Hume's reliance on the identityascribing propensity to explain the belief in the continued existence of perceptions is an odd man out in these respects. The belief in continued existence genuinely resolves the conflict to which it responds, and Hume does not subject it to charges of meaninglessness. Of course, in the end, at 5, we have quasi content and a disguised or concealed conflict. But it seems fortuitous that the considerations with respect to double vision and perceptual relativity are waiting in the wings to contradict the belief in the continued existence of perceptions. Perhaps the case of belief in the continued existence of perceptions is simply different and Hume is right to respect the differences. Unfortunately, there is a further disparity that cannot thus be dispatched. The identity-ascribing propensity is a "trivial propensity of the imagination" (T 224), one capable of being "suppress'd by a little reflection" (T 224). Similarly, the propensity is "weak" and not "unavoidable," so that it "may easily be subverted" (T 225). It would seem, however, that the identity-ascribing propensity must be irresistible and unavoidable in its operation to produce the belief in body. Hume's stated purpose in I.iv.2 is to determine the causes that induce persons to believe in the existence of body (T 187-88). Hume writes in the final paragraph of the preceding section that "nature breaks the force of all sceptical arguments in time" (T 187). The theme continues in the first paragraph of I.iv.2: THUS the sceptic ... must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, tho' he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nature has not left this to his choice.... We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence of body? but 'tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings. (T 187)

It is pointless to ask whether or not body exists; the belief in the existence of body is inescapable. This fact about the psychological properties of the belief generates a constraint on Hume's account: The mechanism or mechanisms that produce the belief in body must be both unavoidable and irresistible. There is a second route to this conclusion. The belief in the existence of body is universal. Its universality is most naturally explained on the hypothesis that the mechanisms that produce the belief are unavoidable and irresistible and that they are activated by features of experience that are themselves universal. According to Hume, the relevant belief-forming mechanisms are triggered by qualities of impressions (T 194), by their constancy and coherence (T 19495). Objects, such as mountains, are constant insofar as they appear the same, even upon interruptions in observation. Changes, such as the burning down of a fire, are coherent insofar as they exhibit a regular dependence on one another, notwithstanding interruptions in observation. (I discuss constancy and coherence in detail in §§ VI. 1-2.) Hume proceeds "to examine after what manner these qualities give rise" (T 195) to the belief in body. As we have seen, Hume details the explanation of the belief, insofar as it arises from constancy, at pages 199-210 (§V.2).

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The belief in body is presumably inescapable insofar as it arises either from the coherence or from the constancy of impressions. Belief in the existence of an unchanging mountain during intervals when it is not perceived is no less inescapable than belief in the existence of a changing fire during intervals when it is not perceived. Insofar as the belief in body arises from the propensity to attribute identity to related objects, the propensity must be irresistible and unavoidable. Hume might avoid this result, if he held that the mechanism that operates in the cases of coherence reinforces and strengthens the operation of the identity-ascribing propensity in the constancy cases. If anything, however, Hume believes the reverse.36 He writes of the mechanism that operates in the coherence cases: But whatever force we may ascribe to this principle, I am afraid 'tis too weak to support alone so vast an edifice, as is that of the continu'd existence of all external bodies; and that we must join the constancy of their appearance to the coherence, in order to give a satisfactory account of that opinion. (T 198-99)

Similarly, Hume writes, "The constancy of our perceptions has the most considerable effect" in producing the opinion of the continued existence of perceptions (T 217). There is a tension in Hume's account of the psychological properties of the identity-ascribing propensity. The propensity is resistible and avoidable in its operation to produce the belief in material substrata, irresistible and unavoidable in its operation to produce the belief in body. If this result is allowed to stand, Hume's application of his epistemological theory to particular beliefs and belief-forming mechanisms is in jeopardy. For the purposes of his "criticism of the fictions of the antient philosophy" (T 219) and his account of why he is not "unjust in blaming the antient philosophers for makeing use of [the imagination]" (T 225), the propensity to attribute identity to related objects must be resistible or avoidable (§ V.4). For the purposes of his psychological explanation of the origin of belief in the existence of body, the propensity must be unavoidable and irresistible. In this respect, his psychological project of explaining the inescapability of the belief in body is in conflict with the epistemological project of explaining why the belief in material substrata is unjustified.37 Does Hume have resources to explain why the identity-ascribing propensity should differ in its degree of resistibility and avoidability in different contexts of operation? Hume's explanation of the belief in the continued existence of perceptions in the cases of constancy appeals to the fact that "this resemblance is observ'd in a thousand instances" (T 204) and that "our memory presents us with a vast number of instances of perceptions perfectly resembling 36. Thus commentators have been tempted to attribute to Hume the view that constancy reinforces coherence. See § VI.3, n. 18. 37. Noonan appeals to I.iv.2 to support the claim that the psychological mechanism in play is unavoidable "after all" (1999, p. 130). This is an odd way to put matters, since the mechanism must be avoidable if it is to serve Hume's purposes in I.iv.4.

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each other" (T 208). Perhaps this repetition explains the belief's irresistibility. Hume makes this point, however, to explain the extra impetus required to convert the supposition of the continued existence of perceptions to belief (§ V.2). Presumably, the memory of such repeated observations of resembling perceptions also explains how the supposition of a substratum is converted to belief. If the repetition of earlier instances explains irresistibility, the belief in material substrata would itself be irresistible, contrary to Hume's intentions. Hume might take another tack, one that focuses on the kinds of resemblances that are repeatedly observed. There is a propensity to mistake an idea for a related idea. This propensity is strongest when the ideas are related by resemblance, owing to the double resemblance and association between resembling ideas and resembling actions of the mind (§ V.2). This mechanism is at work in all contexts where the propensity operates (T 202-4,220,253-54). Resemblance is a matter of degree. Perhaps the propensity operates with a greater degree of unavoidability and irresistibility insofar as the succession of objects that triggers its operation has a greater degree of resemblance. This seems plausible within Hume's associationist framework. The issue is whether the differences in the degree of avoidability and resistibility in the operation of the propensity can be made to match differences in the closeness of the relation between the successive objects that trigger the operation of the propensity. To the extent that Hume has no general account of the degrees to which a relation is "close" (T 60), the answer is indeterminate. We can nevertheless make some headway by considering cases. Let us return to material substrata and the continued existence of perceptions. In the case of the belief in body, the propensity is triggered by a succession of unchanging, though interrupted, perceptions. In the case of the belief in material substrata, the propensity is triggered by a succession of uninterrupted, though changing, sensible qualities. Hume holds that the operation of the propensity is irresistible and unavoidable in the former case, resistible and avoidable in the latter. It is difficult to see why unchanging, interrupted objects should be more closely related than uninterrupted, changing objects. Identity, strictly speaking, requires an uninterrupted and unchanging object. In the case of body, the transition is facilitated by the perfect resemblance and hindered by the interruptions; in the case of material substrata, the transition is facilitated by the absence of interruption and hindered by the imperfection of the resemblance. In the cases of both body and material substrata, one element of strict identity is missing (uninterruptedness and invariableness, respectively) and one element is present (invariableness and uninterruptedness, respectively). This looks like a toss-up in terms of the closeness of the observed relation. There are no differences here to suggest the radical asymmetry in the degree of resistibility and avoidability that Hume attributes to the operation of the propensity in the two cases.38 38. In the case of immaterial substrata, the operation of the propensity is triggered by the observation of a succession of related perceptions that are both interrupted and changing, a succession that falls short of strict identity on two counts. The resemblance of this succession to strict identity

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The original problem remains: Hume has no uniform account of the psychological properties of the propensity to attribute identity to related objects. This difficulty is not peripheral to Hume's concerns in I.iv. The identityascribing propensity is central to Hume's explanation of the belief in body (insofar as it arises from the constancy of impressions), material substrata, and immaterial substrata or souls; it plays an indirect role in Hume's explanation of the belief in the double existence of perceptions and objects. It is the most prominent associationist principle in Part iv of Book I. Furthermore, much as causal inference due to custom is Hume's example of an unavoidable and irresistible mechanism at pages 225-26, he there has the propensity in view as a chief example of an avoidable and resistible belief-forming mechanism. The psychological features of the mechanism are essential to Hume's criticism of the ancient philosophers, to his explanation of why he is not unjust in blaming the ancient philosophers for relying on the propensity.39 These difficulties are at the heart of Part iv of Book I. In the next chapter, I suggest that Hume might have avoided them by dispensing with the identity-ascribing propensity in explaining the belief in body.

would seem to be less close than in the case of either constancy or material substrata. We should therefore expect that the operation of the propensity would here be the weakest and most avoidable. Yet, Hume regards the propensity as quite strong in this context: "Our last recourse is to yield to it, and boldly assert that these different related objects are in effect the same, however interrupted and variable" (T 254). Hume's ground for blaming the ancient philosophers for making use of the propensity is that they need not yield to it. I do not want to make too much of this discrepancy. I suspect Hume feels a need to explain why the belief in immaterial substrata is more widespread than that in material substrata. He might be better served were he to appeal to some supplementary mechanism, such as the fear of death. 39. The difficulty nevertheless tends to be overlooked. (Immerwahr, 1977, esp. pp. 60-63, 65-66, is an exception.) This is in part because the identity-ascribing propensity is avoidable when it operates to produce the belief in material substrata, and Hume's criticism of the ancient philosophy itself tends to be overlooked (see n. 2). For example, Pears treats the conviction of "genuine identity through time" in the context of I.iv.6 as "unavoidable" (1990, p. 136) but does not address the analogous conviction in I.iv.3. More fundamentally, Hume's treatment of material substrata is not congenial to interpretations invested in unavoidability and irresistibility. Kemp Smith treats the belief in material substrata as inevitable (1905, pp. 159-60; cf. 1941, p. 117). Wolff identifies the propensity at work to produce belief in the continued existence of perceptions in the context of constancy (1960, p. 128) but fails to note that it is a special case of a propensity that produces the beliefs in substrata. This is convenient, in light of his desire to interpret Hume's theory of mental activity as anticipating Kant's table of categories (pp. 99-100, 128). Wolff twice cites Hume's Treatise 225 description of principles that are "permanent, irresistable, and universal" (pp. 126, 128) but never mentions the contrast with principles that are "changeable, weak, and irregular." Similarly, though Stroud is aware that the identity-ascribing propensity operates to produce the beliefs in substrata as well as body (1977, pp. 119,260-61 n. 2), Stroud's Hume maintains that beliefs in a variety of fictions or illusions are inevitable or unavoidable (1977, pp. 245-50). See also § 1.5, n. 29.

VI Constancy and Coherence in I.iv.2

VI. 1. A Puzzle in Regard to Hume's Treatment of Constancy In this chapter, I examine the role of the propensity to attribute identity to related objects (§§ V. 1-2) in Hume's overall argument in "Of scepticism with regard to the senses."1 In particular, I discuss a puzzle internal to I.iv.2 in regard to Hume's reliance on the propensity in explaining the vulgar belief in body. A "body" is an object that has a continued existence when not present to the senses and an existence distinct from the mind and perception (§ V. 1). The vulgar believe, of the objects they immediately perceive, that they have a continued and distinct existence. These objects, in Hume's view, are in fact perceptions, so that the vulgar belief is true only if perceptions have a continued and distinct existence (§§ IV.4, V.I). By the vulgar belief in body, I mean the belief that perceptions have a continued and distinct existence, and hence are bodies. (I often drop the adjective 'vulgar'; no other form of the belief in body is under discussion in this chapter, except briefly in § VI.4.) It is the constancy and coherence of impressions that give rise to the belief in body (T 194—95). In the preceding chapter, I discussed Hume's explanation of the belief insofar as it arises from constancy (§ V.2). I have not discussed Hume's explanation of the belief insofar as it arises from coherence. I contend that Hume could have subsumed his explanation of the belief in body, insofar as it arises from constancy, under his explanation of the belief insofar as it arises from coherence—thereby dispensing with any reliance on the identityascribing propensity in I.iv.2. The puzzle is that he does not do so. Hume writes of "mountains, and houses, and trees," "fire," "the motion of a door," a "porter," "stairs," the receipt of a "letter," the "continu'd existence of

1. The arguments of §§ VI.3 and VI.5 derive from Loeb and Tieman, 1978.

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posts and ferries" (T 194-96), and so forth. Hume is explicit in regard to the intended construction of such terms: I here account for the opinions and belief of the vulgar with regard to the existence of body; and therefore must entirely conform myself to their manner of thinking and of expressing themselves.... Those very sensations, which enter by the eye or ear, are with them the true objects.... In order, therefore, to accommodate myself to their notions, I shall at first suppose; that there is only a single existence, which I shall call indifferently object or perception,... understanding by both of them what any common man means by a hat, or shoe, or stone, or any other impression, convey'd to him by his senses. (T 202)

Though Hume conceives of this as a terminological convention, it is one that runs the risk of introducing claims to which he is not entitled.21 nevertheless follow Hume's lead, rather than rely on such cumbersome locutions as 'perceptions-of-a-mountain' or 'impressions-as-if-of-a-door.' Hume writes in his preliminary discussion of constancy and coherence at pages 194-95: Bodies often change their position and qualities, and after a little absence or interruption may become hardly knowable. But here 'tis observable, that even in these changes they preserve a coherence.... When I return to my chamber after an hour's absence, I find not my fire in the same situation, in which I left it: But then I am accustom'd in other instances to see a like alteration produc'd in a like time, whether I am present or absent, near or remote. (T 195)

Suppose four-log fires burn at the rate of one log per hour. If Hume observes a four-log fire and then observes the fire two hours later, he will observe a two-log fire; this is true whether or not he observes the fire during the two-hour interval. The coherence of impressions consists in their conforming to a regularity in their temporal sequence irrespective of any interruptions in their observation. In an influential discussion, H. H. Price calls this characteristic "gap-indifference" "indifference to the occurrence of gaps." Somewhat more generally, the regularities or patterns in the temporal series are indifferent to the occurrence, distribution, and duration of gaps.3 Constant impressions are also coherent in the indicated sense. Hume writes in the preliminary discussion of constancy and coherence: These mountains, and houses, and trees, which lie at present under my eye, have always appear'd to me in the same order; and when I lose sight of them by shutting my eyes or turning my head, I soon after find them return upon me without the least alteration. My bed and table, my books and papers, present themselves in the same uniform manner, and change not upon account of any interruption in my seeing or perceiving them. (T 194-95)

2. See the references at n. 10 for discussion of the difficulties. 3. SeePrice,1940a,p. 60; and MacNabb, 1951/1966, p. 126.

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If Hume observes a mountain at some time, then if he observes the mountain two hours later, he will observe an impression "uniform" with the first, that is, the earlier and later impressions will be perfectly resembling. This is true irrespective of any gaps in his observation of the mountain during the interval. This point is reiterated in the main discussion of constancy at pages 199-210: "The perception of the sun or ocean, for instance, returns upon us after an absence or annihilation with like parts and in a like order, as at its first appearance" (T199). The constancy of impressions consists in the conformity of perfectly resembling impressions to a regularity in their temporal sequence irrespective of any interruptions in their observation. Constancy is monotonous coherence.4 Hume does have a tendency to characterize coherence with reference to change: "Bodies often change their position and qualities, and after a little absence or interruption may become hardly knowable. But . . . even in these changes they preserve a coherence" (T 195). Relative to this characterization, constancy is not a special case of coherence, but this does not affect my basic point. If change is built into the notion of coherence, both coherent and constant impressions would nevertheless be special cases of conformity to a regularity of sequence irrespective of interruptions in observation. For simplicity, I will write of constancy as a special case of coherence. (Hume's characterization of coherence with reference to change, however, will prove significant down the road,in§VI.5.) I distinguish between constancy being a special case of coherence and Hume treating constancy as a special case of coherence for the purposes of his psychological explanation of the belief in body. Treating constancy as a special case of coherence would consist in subsuming the explanation of the belief as it arises from constancy under the explanation of the belief as it arises from coherence. If constancy is a special case of coherence, it seems plausible that Hume could treat constancy as a special case of coherence. Yet, the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects, which is essential to Hume's explanation of the belief in body in connection with constancy, plays no role in his explanation of the belief in connection with coherence. Furthermore, as we shall see in § VI.2, Hume maintains that the belief in body arises from the coherence of impressions due to "a kind of reasoning from causation" (T 195) in which custom cooperates with the imagination and operates "like a galley put in motion" (T 198). This psychological galley plays no role in Hume's account of the belief as it arises from constancy. The puzzle is to understand why Hume does not subsume his explanation of the belief in body as it arises from constancy under his explanation of the belief as it arises from coherence, given that constancy is a special case of coherence.5 4. Price, 1940a, pp. 37,50,59-65. For other commentators who agree with Price on this point, seeMacNabb, 1951/1966, pp. 129-30; and Bennett, 1971, p. 323. The use of the term'monotonous' is due to Price, 1940a, pp. 47-48,60. 5. As Price insists, Hume holds that constancy and coherence "affect the imagination in quite different ways" (1940a, p. 37), that his treatment of the belief in body in the two cases is "irreducibly different" (pp. 60, 71), though "[Hume] could very well have reduced the two principles to one"

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In § VI.2,1 examine the nature of the cooperation of custom and the psychological galley operative in cases of coherence in order to show that Hume could have subsumed his treatment of constancy under the same mechanism. In § VI.3,1 argue that Hume's failure to do so is not due to dissatisfaction with his explanation of the belief in body as it arises from coherence; Hume was generally satisfied with the role he attributes to custom and the galley. This result deepens the original puzzle. In § VI.4,1 argue that Hume, holding that the vulgar belief is patently false, sought to locate an explanation of the belief within the imagination rather than within the understanding, the locus of causal inference. Since custom in cooperation with the galley has affinities with causal inference, treating constancy as a special case of coherence would have undermined Hume's achieving this objective. In § VI.5,1 argue that, in addition, a metaphysical view of Hume's blinded him to the possibility that the continued existence specifically of an unchanging object involves causal dependence; he thus did not consider the possibility of explaining the belief in body as it arises from constancy as a kind of causal inference. In § VI.6,1 outline an amended version of I.iv.2, which unifies Hume's discussion by subsuming his treatment of constancy under his treatment of coherence. I also review the capacity of this approach to remove difficulties discussed in the previous chapter, tensions and disparities in Hume's reliance on the propensity to attribute identity to related objects.

VI.2. The Dispensability of the Propensity In order to document the puzzle—that Hume does not offer a unified explanation of the vulgar belief in body—we need to consider the details of the mechanism that operates to produce the belief in cases of coherence. Hume writes that "coherence... is the foundation of a kind of reasoning from causation, and produces the opinion of their continu'd existence" (T 195) and that the conclusion from the coherence of impressions "arises ... from custom in an indirect and oblique manner" (T 197). The belief in body in the coherence cases "can never be the direct and natural effect of the constant repetition and connexion, but must arise from the co-operation of some other principles" (T 198). In order to understand what Hume has in mind, we will have to examine his treatment of coherence in detail. The main discussion of coherence begins at the final paragraph of page 195 and occupies three paragraphs. In the first paragraph, a lengthy one running from pages 195 to 197, the fire is again an example of coherence. Hume also introduces two additional examples: hearing a noise as of a door opening and the receipt of a letter. When Hume hears the noise, he concludes that it was pre-

(p. 37). Price comments: "It certainly seems rather curious that Constancy and Coherence should affect the imagination so differently" (p. 59).

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ceded by the presence of a moving door, a porter who opens it, and stairs to the door. At this stage, Hume describes these conclusions as resulting from causal inference as discussed in I.iii: "I never have observ'd, that this noise cou'd proceed from any thing but the motion of a door; and therefore conclude, that the present phenomenon is a contradiction to all past experience, unless the door, which I remember on t'other side the chamber, be still in being" (T 196). Hume claims that he has observed a constant conjunction such that the noise as of a door opening has always been preceded by the motion of a door. In this new instance, Hume observes only the noise and infers the presence of a moving door as its cause. Similarly, when Hume reads a letter that states that it is from a friend two hundred leagues distant, he supposes "the effects and continu'd existence of posts and ferries" (T 196). Within the first paragraph of the main discussion of constancy, Hume also states that the case of the porter "gives occasion to many new reflexions and reasonings" (T 196): "To consider these phaenomena of the porter and letter in a certain light,... I am accustom'd to hear such a sound, and see such an object in motion at the same time. I have not receiv'd in this particular instance both these perceptions" (T 196). Hume notes that although he has observed a constant conjunction such that the noise as of a door turning has always been preceded by the motion of a door, "in this particular instance" he has perceived only the noise. Hume's claim that the case of the door and letter "are contradictions to common experience, and may be regarded as objections to those maxims, which we form concerning the connexions of causes and effects" (T 196) must be treated with care. Whatever "objections" Hume has uncovered are applicable to any instance of causal inference. As Hume writes later in the paragraph, "There is scarce a moment of my life, wherein there is not a similar instance presented to me" (T 197). The cases of the door and the letter, as described to this point, may as well be paradigmatic cases of causal inference as treated in I.iii: inference from belief in an observed object to the belief in an unobserved cause of that object, against the background of an observed constant conjunction. Where the constant conjunctions are frequently observed, such inferences constitute "proofs" (§§ II. 1, IV. 1). Even under the most favorable circumstances for causal inference, the object inferred to exist is unobserved at the time of the inference. Hume's objection could have been raised when causal inference was first introduced in Part iii.6 Hume responds to his new reflections: These observations are contrary, unless I suppose that the door still remains, and that it was open'd without my perceiving it: And this supposition, which

6. Cf. J. W. Smith, 1960, p. 72. Note that when the inference is to the existence of an unobserved cause, as in the cases of the porter and the letter, the cause will never be observed; the cause is an unobserved object as it existed at a previous time. Where the inference is to the existence of an unobserved future effect, the inferred effect might come to be observed. Even in that case, however, there has been no observed constant conjunction at the time of the inference.

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was at first entirely arbitrary and hypothetical, acquires a force and evidence by its being the only one, upon which I can reconcile these contradictions. (T 196-97) Hume views the inference as removing a contradiction. Strictly speaking, there is no contradiction between the experience of an observed regularity and the occasion for a causal inference.7 The fact that the noise is not observed to have been preceded by the motion of the door in a given case is not an exception to the regularity that, in observed cases, the noise always has been observed to be preceded by the motion of the door. Perhaps the "contradiction" is between the customary expectation that there is a moving door and the failure to observe such a door. Hume does state: I am accustom'd to hear such a sound, and see such an object in motion at the same time. I have not receiv'd in this particular instance both these perceptions. These observations are contrary, unless I suppose that the door still remains, and that it was open'd without my perceiving it. (T 196-97) Even here, there is no contradiction between the belief that there exists a moving door and the failure to observe such a door. What is Hume's point? The noise has always been observed to be preceded by the motion of the door, except in the case that serves as the occasion for the causal inference. For that reason, the observed conjunction of the noise and the motion is not, strictly speaking, constant. If we infer the existence of the unobserved moving door as the cause of the observed noise, we can maintain, consistently with what we have observed and inferred, that the motion always precedes the noise. We can maintain this even though we have not observed the door's motion in every instance in which we heard the noise. The claim that the motion always precedes the noise is distinct from the claim that the motion always has been observed to precede the noise. If we decline to infer the existence of the unobserved moving door, we cannot maintain that the motion of the door always precedes the noise. The effect of the inference to the existence of the moving door is to enable us to maintain (insofar as this is compatible with what has been observed) that objects possess a greater degree of regularity than they have been observed to possess, and a perfect regularity in particular. This fits nicely with a remark earlier in the paragraph: "External objects... require a continu'd existence, or otherwise lose, in a great measure, the regularity of their operation" (T 195-96). Even proofs, cases of causal inference that take place against a background of frequently observed constant conjunctions, have the effect of attributing to objects a greater degree of regularity than they have been observed to possess. Hume is explicit that the new reflections about causal inference are relevant to the explanation of the belief in body. He writes in the final two sentences of the paragraph:

7. Bennett, 1971, p. 324.

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There is scarce a moment of my life, wherein there is not a similar instance presented to me, and I have not occasion to suppose the continu'd existence of objects, in order to connect their past and present appearances— Here then I am naturally led to regard the world,... as preserving its existence, even when it is no longer present to my perception. (T 197)

The language echoes Hume's own question: "Why we attribute a CONTINU'D existence to objects, even when they are not present to the senses?" (T 188). Any causal inference, according to Hume, involves such an attribution or belief. These reflections about causal inference in the first paragraph of the main discussion of coherence prepare the ground for claims that follow. The first sentence of the second paragraph of the main discussion introduces a difficulty: But tho' this conclusion from the coherence of appearances may seem to be of the same nature with our reasonings concerning causes and effects; as being deriv'd from custom, and regulated by past experience; we shall find upon examination, that they are at the bottom considerably different from each other, and that this inference arises from the understanding, and from custom in an indirect and oblique manner. (T 197)

Why are the conclusions based upon causal inference and those based upon the mechanism activated by coherence "considerably different"?8 The answer begins to emerge at the sentence running from page 197 to 198: "We remark a connexion betwixt two kinds of objects in their past appearance to the senses, but are not able to observe this connexion to be perfectly constant, since the turning about of our head, or the shutting of our eyes is able to break it." The present instance of hearing a noise as of a door opening is not the only exception to an observed regularity between the noise and the motion. There is no observed constant conjunction even prior to the present instance. Just as, in the present case, Hume does not observe the motion of the door, there have been previous occasions when he has heard the noise but not observed the motion— because he turned his head, shut his eyes, and so forth. In the first paragraph of the main discussion of coherence, Hume has made the point that any occasion for a causal inference itself destroys an observed constant conjunction, if that conjunction is supposed to extend to the occasion for the inference itself. In the second paragraph, he makes the additional point that—owing to interruptions in our observations of objects—occasions for causal inference typically do not occur even against the background of an observed constant conjunction. It will be useful to have a name for this phenomenon. Let us say, adapting Price's terminology, that observed conjunctions that 8. Bennett suggests that Hume sees causal inference as going "from the observed to the notyet-observed" the inference from coherence "as a move from the observed to the never-observed" (1971, p. 330). (Pears, 1990, p. 174, tries the same tack.) Causal inference, however, sometimes is a move to the never-observed; it is always such a move when it is an inference to an unobserved cause of an observed object. See n. 6.

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are not constant owing to interruptions in observation are gappy regularities. What is gappy are the regularities as observed. Of course, perhaps there exists a constant conjunction between the noise and the motion, though observation supplies only a gappy regularity. The belief in such a constant conjunction, however, involves the belief in unperceived objects and thus presupposes the belief in body that Hume is trying to explain. It might be objected that the role for gappy regularities does not in itself explain why the inference from coherence to the existence of body is "considerably different" from causal inference as described in I.iii. Whereas proofs are based on observed constant conjunctions, Hume allows causal inference based upon the observation of "contrary effects" or a "contrariety of past events" (T 133), so that "the conjunction of any two objects is frequent, without being entirely constant" (T 132). Such statistical regularities, which give rise to probability (§ II.1), are the main topic of I.iii. 12, "Of the probability of causes." Hume writes: "As past experience regulates our judgment concerning the possibility of these effects, so it does that concerning their probability" (T 133). Specifically, we believe the likelihood or probability of each of the contrary events to be equal to the ratio of that event to the total number of observed cases (T 140, 154; cf. 133); we extrapolate observed frequencies. Do not the gappy regularities differ in name only from the statistical regularities in play in cases of contrary causes? On some occasions, the impression of noise as of a door moving is preceded by the (visual) impression of a door turning; on other occasions, the impression of the noise is preceded by observation of some mental imagery in a daydream or the dark field we experience when our eyes are shut.9 This suggests that Hume should assimilate gappy regularities to statistical regularities, to the probability of causes, a relatively straightforward species of causal inference. This is a suggestion Hume must try to resist. Suppose it is the case that on one-third of the occasions that we have heard the noise as of a door turning, we have not previously seen the motion of the door. (Perhaps we easily become drowsy sitting by the fire.) If the mind treats this as a case of the probability of causes, we would believe that there is a two-thirds likelihood that the motion preceded the sound. This is not what we believe; we believe that it is overwhelmingly probable, with a likelihood approaching one, that a door moved there a moment ago. This is not the result if one extrapolates observed relative frequencies, as we do in cases of the probability of causes. For this reason, Hume must hold that the gappy regularities cannot be assimilated to the statistical regularities in the probability of causes.10 9. These are cases where, in our observation, an effect is not uniformly preceded by a given cause. In I.iii.12, Hume has in view cases where, in our observation, a cause is not uniformly followed by a given effect. The account of probability applies in both cases. 10. This is not to suggest that Hume can sustain this position. The gaps need not be periods in which impressions are absent, in which no observation takes place (sound sleep or a coma); they include periods where Hume turns his head or shuts his eyes (T 194,197-98). What is interrupted

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Hume is clear that the observed statistical regularity does not itself support the strength of our belief in the case of the porter and the door. The following material intervenes between the first sentence of the second paragraph of the main discussion of coherence and the observation that turning one's head or shutting one's eyes destroys any observed constant conjunction: "Tis not only impossible, that any habit shou'd ever be acquir'd otherwise than by the regular succession of [the mind's] perceptions, but also that any habit shou'd ever exceed that degree of regularity. Any degree, therefore, of regularity in our perceptions, can never be a foundation for us to infer a greater degree of regularity in some objects, which are not perceiv'd; since this supposes a contradiction, viz. a habit acquir'd by what was never present to the mind. But 'tis evident, that whenever we infer the continu'd existence of the objects of sense from their coherence, and the frequency of their union, 'tis in order to bestow on the objects a greater regularity than what is observ'd in our mere perceptions. (T 197)

This is immediately followed by Hume's observation that the inference to the moving door takes place against the background of a gappy regularity. Hume concludes, in the final sentence of the paragraph: "The extending of custom and reasoning beyond the perceptions can never be the direct and natural effect of the constant repetition and connexion, but must arise from the co-operation of some other principles" (T 198). The third paragraph of the main discussion of coherence contains Hume's account of the "other principles" that cooperate with custom: The imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even when its object fails it, and like a galley put in motion by the oars, carries on its course without any new impulse— The same principle makes us easily entertain this opinion of the continu'd existence of body. Objects have a certain coherence even as they appear to our senses; but this coherence is much greater and more uniform, if we suppose the objects to have a continu'd existence; and as the mind is once in the train of observing an uniformity among objects, it naturally continues, till it renders the uniformity as compleat as possible. The simple supposition of their continu'd existence suffices for this purpose, and gives us a notion of a much greater regularity among objects, than what they have when we look no farther than our senses. (T 198)

is one's observation of the door or the fire. Can this phenomenon be described without presupposing the continued existence of objects? It is no good to say that hearing the noise as of a door turning is preceded by seeing the motion of the door whenever my head is facing the door and my eyes are open. This is not a regularity among impressions, the only resources available to Hume to explain the belief in body. Price tries to address the difficulty (1940a, pp. 20-22,35-36,62-63). Pears takes a related problem to ruin I.iv.2 (1990, pp. 169-72,176,182-83). I see no evidence that Hume was aware of the problems here. For a discussion of difficulties that beset both Hume and twentieth-century phenomenalism, see Williams, 1977, pp. 128-44.

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VI. CONSTANCY AND COHERENCE IN I.IV.2

This passage concludes the main discussion of coherence. The inference from the coherence of impressions to the existence of body arises from custom in cooperation with the galley. Hume's remarks are sufficient to fill in his sketch of the contribution of the galley. In cases where Hume's head is turned or his eyes shut, he has not observed that a door is absent; rather, he fails to have a visual impression of a moving door preceding the noise.11 The essential content of the cooperation of the galley with custom is that the imagination supposes the continued existence of objects, insofar as this is compatible with what has been observed, in the service of the belief that the actual degree of uniformity or regularity among objects exceeds that of the gappy regularities that have been observed. The imagination bestows upon objects a greater degree of regularity than they are observed to possess.12 To return to an earlier illustration, suppose that one's hearing the noise as of a door turning is preceded by one's seeing the door moving two-thirds of the time. When custom cooperates with the galley, the imagination leads to the belief—if there are no contrary observations—that all noises one has heard as of a door turning have been preceded by the door moving. This imaginative supplementation of gappy regularities requires that the door have a continued existence when not perceived. We infer the door's moving, the unobserved cause of the observed noise, and take the door's moving to be overwhelmingly, rather than merely two-thirds, likely. This completes my exposition of the cooperation of custom and galley that accounts for the belief in body in the coherence cases. I sometimes call this mechanism custom-and-galley. It would appear that the operation of custom-and-galley could be triggered by the constancy of impressions as well as by their coherence. Suppose that one's seeing a mountain is preceded by one's seeing a perfectly resembling mountain one hour earlier two-thirds of the time. If causal inference were to cooperate with the galley, the imagination would lead to the belief in the greatest degree of past regularity that is compatible with what has been observed; it would lead to the belief (if there are no contrary observations) that all impressions of a mountain are preceded one hour earlier by the presence of a perfectly resembling mountain. We infer the mountain's earlier existence, the unobserved cause of its later observed existence, and take the mountain's earlier existence to be overwhelmingly probable. The supposition of the continued existence of the mountain, just as the supposition of the continued existence of the door, bestows

11. My discussion assumes that Hume can reconstruct, solely with reference to impressions, the difference between observing the absence of an object (such as the door) and not observing the object. Seen. 10. 12. Commentators who emphasize the regularity-enhancing function of the galley include Price, 1940a, pp. 53-55; Kemp Smith, 1941, p. 472; Wolff, 1960, pp. 119-20; and Brand, 1992, pp. 29-33. Bennett emphasizes that the enhanced regularity is in the service of explanatory power (1971, pp. 323-27). See also Ayer, 1980, p. 45. Hume's own emphasis is much more on prediction (including retrodiction) than explanation. Price has dubbed the psychological galley "the inertia of the imagination" or the "Inertia Principle" (1940a, pp. 54,55).

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upon objects a greater degree of regularity than they are observed to possess. It is thus possible to appeal to the cooperation of custom and the galley in the cases of both coherence and constancy to explain the belief in the continued existence of objects.13 Why does Hume not do so? Custom, and hence custom-and-galley, depend upon repeated observations. Perhaps Hume supposes that in cases of constancy the belief in body arises from the (interrupted) observations of a single series of unchanging impressions, so that custom-and-galley does not come into play. The texts contain clear evidence against this. Hume writes in the preliminary discussion of constancy: "These mountains, and houses, and trees, which lie at present under my eye, have always appear'd to me in the same order" (T 194, emphasis added). It is the fact that the perfect resemblances have been "observ'd in a thousand instances" (T 204) and on "a vast number" (T 208) of occasions that explains the conversion of mere supposition to belief in the constancy cases (§ V.2). The operation of custom-and-galley depends upon repeated observations of gappy regularities. These repetitions are prominent in Hume's discussion of the constancy cases. Hume does not, however, draw on custom in cooperation with the psychological galley in connection with constancy. Treating constancy as a special case of coherence would have required a single paragraph. Whereas the main discussion of coherence at pages 195-98 occupies fewer than four pages, the main discussion of constancy at pages 199-210 occupies more than ten pages. Customand-galley plays no role in the discussion of constancy. Hume attributes the belief in body insofar as it arises from constancy to the identity-ascribing propensity, a propensity that has no role in the coherence cases. There is a bifurcation in the two explanations. This is puzzling. We expect Hume to take advantage of the possibility of a unified explanation of the belief in body in the coherence and constancy cases.

VI.3. Hume's Satisfaction with the Psychological Adequacy of His Treatment of Coherence What accounts for Hume's failure to treat constancy as a special case of coherence? One hypothesis is that Hume was not satisfied that the mechanism of custom in cooperation with the galley (§ VI.2) supplies a psychologically adequate explanation of the belief in body in the coherence cases.14 On this dissatisfaction hypothesis, whether or not custom-and-galley could be applied to constancy, Hume considered the explanation psychologically inadequate even in 13. Collier contends that connectionist models of cognition both vindicate a Humean treatment of coherence and allow constancy to be treated as a special case (1999, pp. 160-66). But see n. 40. 14. A number of commentators adopt this interpretation: Laird, 1932, p. 149; Price, 1940a, pp. 37-38,65-67; Bennett, 1971, pp. 329-30; Wright, 1983, p. 64; and Collier, 1999, p. 159. Also cf. Stroud, 1977, pp. 259-60 n. 4.

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cases of coherence. Hume's failure to subsume constancy under coherence therefore would be no surprise. From the perspective of his project of providing a science of human nature, he would have welcomed an alternative mechanism for the constancy cases. The paragraph that effects the transition from the main discussion of coherence to the main discussion of constancy provides the principal textual impetus for the dissatisfaction hypothesis. It begins: But whatever force we may ascribe to this principle, I am afraid 'tis too weak to support alone so vast an edifice, as is that of the continu'd existence of all external bodies; and that we must join the constancy of their appearance to the coherence, in order to give a satisfactory account of that opinion. (T 198-99)

This passage has perplexed commentators.15 In one interpretation, Hume is stating that he takes the role he has assigned to the galley in cooperation with custom to be an ad hoc attempt to remedy the impotence of custom in explaining why we ascribe a greater degree of regularity to objects than what is perceived. Hume has admitted that "a habit acquir'd by what was never present to the mind" is a "contradiction" (T 197) and that "all reasoning concerning matters of fact arises only from custom, and custom can only be the effect of repeated perceptions" (T 198). His discussion of the psychological galley in this context is confined to a single paragraph, as if he recognized that there is little to be said on its behalf. This final paragraph of the main discussion of constancy is followed, rather abruptly, by the transitional paragraph. Against this background, Hume's claim that custom-and-galley is "too weak to support alone so vast an edifice" can suggest that he considers reliance on the galley ad hoc, so that he was not satisfied that he had supplied an adequate explanation of the belief in body in the coherence cases. Here and elsewhere in this section, an "adequate" explanation should be construed specifically as a psychologically adequate explanation. I concede that Hume was aware that his appeal to the galley was at risk of appearing ad hoc.16 Hume writes in the third and final paragraph of the main discussion of constancy: I have already* observ'd, in examining the foundation of mathematics, that the imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue, even when its object fails it, and like a galley put in motion by the oars, carries on its course without any new impulse. This I have assign'd for the reason, why, after considering several loose standards of equality, and correcting them by each other, we proceed to imagine so correct and exact a standard of that relation, as is not liable to the least error or variation. The same principle makes us easily entertain this opinion of the continu'd existence of body. (T 198)

15. See Price, 1940a,pp. 37-38,65; and Bennett, 1971, p. 329. 16. It certainly has appeared ad hoc or lame to some commentators. See MacNabb, 1951/1966, p. 127; and Wright, 1983, p. 64. This does not seem to me an apt assessment of the textual developments I review. Also, the regularity-enhancing function of the galley is of real philosophical interest. Cf. Bennett, 1971, pp. 327-30.

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Hume's footnote is to I.ii.4 (pages 48-49 are especially relevant). He is reminding the reader of a previous employment of the psychological galley in his discussion of the standards of equality. Hume's point in introducing this material is precisely to deflect the charge that his appeal to the galley is ad hoc.17 If he takes his reliance on the galley to be ad hoc, we should expect an explanation of why it is so, given his own assertion that the galley has application in other contexts. No such explanation is forthcoming. Furthermore, the main discussion of coherence includes a sustained attempt to motivate the psychological galley. To see this point, it is important to distinguish the immediate topics of the first and second paragraphs of the main discussion of coherence. In the first paragraph, Hume is considering cases of causal inference that take place against a background of an observed constant conjunction; in the second paragraph, he is considering inferences that take place against a background of a gappy regularity (§ VI.2). It is important to keep this distinction in view. Hume's new reflections about causal inference in the first paragraph prepare the ground for the galley (§ VI.2). The most favorable cases of causal inference, those that amount to proofs, involve the belief in the continued existence of objects. Even in these cases, the belief in continued existence bestows a greater regularity on objects than they have been observed to possess. Any occasion for causal inference is an exception to an observed constant conjunction; there is no observed constant conjunction, if we include the occasion in question. If the present occasion is the sole exception, our estimates of likelihood are a direct effect of custom. In the cases of gappy regularities, our estimates of likelihood are an indirect and oblique effect of custom, an effect of custom in cooperation with the galley. Hume's strategy is to motivate the psychological galley by showing that it contributes to an effect—bestowing on objects a greater degree of regularity than they have been observed to possess—that is present even in the cases of causal inferences that amount to proofs. The theme of attributing to objects a degree of regularity beyond what has been observed is a constant refrain throughout the main discussion of coherence. Hume writes in the first paragraph, in the course of his new reflections on the most favorable cases of causal inference: "Those [external objects] require a continu'd existence, or otherwise lose, in a great measure, the regularity of their operation" (T 195-96). He writes in the second paragraph, in the course of explaining why the inference from coherence is "considerably different" from customary inference: "But 'tis evident, that whenever we infer the continu'd existence of the objects of sense from their coherence, and the frequency of their union, 'tis in order to bestow on the objects a greater regularity than what is observ'd in our mere perceptions" (T 197). He writes in the third paragraph, in the course of explaining the cooperation of custom and the galley: "The simple

17. D. F.Norton suggests, "In the course of the Treatise we find [the galley] displaying itself in a tendency to form general rules" (Norton and Norton, 2000b, p. 63). I think general rules are due to custom alone.

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supposition of their continu'd existence ... gives us a notion of a much greater regularity among objects, than what they have when we look no farther than our senses" (T 198). Hume mounts a sustained effort to motivate appeal to the galley as a natural extension of his treatment of causal inference. In addition, there is a textual difficulty for the dissatisfaction hypothesis. The transitional paragraph is followed by the more than ten-page discussion of constancy. After completing his explanation of how the constancy of impressions produces the belief in body, Hume has nothing new to say about how the belief arises from coherence. (Hume returns to the topic of coherence only briefly in the penultimate paragraph of I.iv.2.1 discuss this material below.) The identity-ascribing propensity explains the belief in body in cases of constancy, such as the mountain, where impressions are interrupted but invariable. The propensity is irrelevant to the coherence cases, such as the fire and the porter, where impressions are interrupted and variable. If Hume is dissatisfied with the psychological adequacy of custom-and-galley, what is his account of the belief in the continued existence of objects in the coherence cases? The most promising answer takes its cue from a statement in the transitional paragraph: "We must join the constancy of their appearance to the coherence, in order to give a satisfactory account of" the belief in body. This might be taken to suggest the following picture. Hume is not satisfied that he has provided an adequate explanation of the belief in body insofar as it arises from coherence; he considers the psychological mechanisms "too weak." The mechanism that operates in the constancy cases activates or reinforces the cooperation between custom and the galley, leading to belief in body in the cases of coherence as well as constancy.18 Unfortunately, no such activating or reinforcing mechanism is discussed in Hume's texts. When the main discussion of constancy is complete at page 210, Hume has nothing more to say about coherence until the penultimate paragraph of I.iv.2: "They are the coherence and constancy of our perceptions, which produce the opinion of their continu'd existence" (T 217). Even here, Hume has nothing new to say about coherence. Hume does say that constancy "has the most considerable effect" (T 217). This need not mean that the mechanism operative in cases of constancy activates or reinforces the mechanism operative in cases of coherence. It may simply mean that there are more cases of constancy than coherence. Objects in our visual field are by and large constant in the sense that they are not perceptibly inconstant: "We find by experience, that there is such a constancy in almost all the impressions of the senses, that their interruption produces no alteration on

18. This suggestion can be found in Price, 1940a, p. 38; and MacNabb, 1951/1966, p. 127; see also Stroud, 1977, p. 100. Hookway writes: "By positing unobserved events, and allowing that much occurs while unperceived, we are able to find more order in the world than is actually experienced— The natural assumption that this might be the source of our belief in unobserved existence is denied by Hume" (1990, p. 96). Perhaps Hookway has the "so vast an edifice" passage in view. The only passage he cites in the immediate context—that habits cannot "exceed [the] degree of regularity" (T 197) in observation—leads Hume to claim that custom cooperates with the galley, not to reject his explanation of the belief in body in the coherence cases.

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them, and hinders them not from returning the same in appearance and in situation as at their first existence" (T 204). Features of Hume's preliminary discussion of constancy and coherence also reflect his recognition that constancy is exhibited in "almost all" of the impressions of the senses. Constancy is discussed first. Hume introduces coherence as follows: "This constancy, however, is not so perfect as not to admit of very considerable exceptions. Bodies often change their position and qualities" (T 195). The cases where impressions are merely coherent, without being constant, are the exception rather than the rule. These passages suggest an alternative interpretation of the transitional paragraph. Hume is satisfied with his explanation of how the coherence of impressions produces the belief in the existence of body; the first sentence of the transitional paragraph does nothing more than signal that Hume is turning to the explanation of how constancy produces the belief in body. The cooperation of custom and the galley is "too weak" to explain the belief in "the continu'd existence of all external bodies," simply because not all objects exhibit coherence; indeed, most objects exhibit constancy rather than coherence. Subsequent to the transitional paragraph, Hume never reconsiders coherence, apart from the cursory reference in the penultimate paragraph of I.iv.2. The dissatisfaction hypothesis faces three unpalatable alternatives. One is to suppose that Hume intended to return to coherence but forgot to do so.19 The second is to suppose that Hume, in his own view, failed to provide an adequate explanation of the belief in body in the coherence cases, and hence that he provides only a partial answer to the question of what induces persons to believe in body. If this is Hume's position, his summary at the penultimate paragraph is strangely silent about it. The third is to suppose that Hume was concerned only to explain the belief in the existence of some bodies or other. Pleased with his explanation for the constancy cases, he sees his task as complete. This seems quite unlikely in light of Hume's attention to the belief in "all external bodies" (emphasis added). The interpretation in which Hume is dissatisfied with his treatment of coherence is hard-pressed to explain why he does not complete his explanatory project.20 There is, in addition, direct evidence that Hume was satisfied with his treatment of the coherence cases. Coherence "produces the opinion of... continu'd existence" (T 195). The language of the transitional paragraph—where coherence cannot support the belief in "all external bodies"—would be a misleading way for Hume to make the point that he is not satisfied with his explanation of the belief in body even in the coherence cases. The more natural reading is that he is satisfied with this explanation, but that it remains to account for the belief in the constancy cases. This is confirmed in the final sentence of the transitional 19. Price is a proponent of the dissatisfaction interpretation who seems to opt for this alternative (1940a, pp. 37-38,65). 20. There is a fourth alternative: Hume's project is not so much to account for the belief in objects with a continued and distinct existence as for the origin of the idea of such objects. The latter project is necessary for the former, but unless Hume has badly misrepresented himself, his main concern is to account for the belief in body.

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paragraph: "This inference from the constancy of our perceptions, like the precedent from their coherence, gives rise to the opinion of the continu'd existence of body, which is prior to that of its distinct existence, and produces that latter principle" (T 199). There is an inference from coherence that does give rise to the belief in the continued, and hence distinct, existence of objects. Hume expresses no reservations about the inference, treating the discussion of coherence as complete or self-contained. I conclude that there is substantial textual support for the view that Hume held that he had provided a psychologically adequate explanation of the belief in body in the coherence cases. The main obstacle to rejecting the dissatisfaction interpretation is that it leaves the original puzzle in place (§ VI. 1). Constancy is a special case of coherence, and the cooperation of custom and the galley is applicable to coherence. Subsuming constancy under coherence has the advantage of providing a unified explanation of the belief in body in the coherence and constancy cases. If Hume felt that he had provided a psychologically adequate explanation of the belief in body in the coherence cases, why did he fail to secure these advantages by treating constancy as a special case of coherence? In order to complete the argument for rejecting the dissatisfaction hypothesis, it is necessary to provide an alternative explanation of Hume's failure to treat constancy as a special case of coherence. A number of commentators who reject the dissatisfaction interpretation have addressed this question. Copleston suggests, "Though coherence may give rise to the supposition of the continuous existence of objects, the idea of constancy is needed to explain our supposition of their distinct existence." This explanation cannot be correct. Hume holds, rightly, that "if the objects of our senses continue to exist, even when they are not perceiv'd, their existence is of course independent of and distinct from the perception" (T 188).21 Also, there is Hume's statement that "this inference from the constancy of our perceptions, like the precedent from their coherence, gives rise to the opinion of the continud existence of body, which is prior to that of its distinct existence, and produces the latter principle." Kemp Smith also appears to reject the dissatisfaction interpretation, offering the following explanation of the need for a lengthy discussion of constancy: "Coherence concerns perceptions in their absence rather than in their presence, but since it is upon appearances as actually experienced that our 'inferences' must ultimately rest, it is to their constancy that we must look if we are to find the answer to our main question." I do not understand this; constancy also "concerns perceptions in their absence." Finally, Bennett speculates that Hume is simply indulging himself in producing a second account of the belief in the continued existence of objects applicable to the constancy cases.22 But Hume turns to constancy because coherence does not account for belief in the continued existence of "all" external bodies. In any event, Hume's text gives no hint that it might be possible to explain the belief in the constancy cases with 21. I am not endorsing Hume's problematic inference (T 188) from distinct existence to continued existence. Cf. Bennett, 1971, p. 315. 22. See Copleston, 1959, p. 296; Kemp Smith, 1941, p. 473; and Bennett, 1971, p. 329.

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reference to custom-and-galley. I try to show in §§ VI.4-5 that a proponent of the satisfaction interpretation can do better. VI.4. An Epistemological Obstacle to Subsuming Constancy under Coherence One would like to identify a philosophical explanation for the total course of Hume's argument. My position is that an aspect of Hume's metaphysics combines with an aspect of his epistemology to prevent his subsuming constancy under coherence, even though he was satisfied with the psychological adequacy of his treatment of coherence. I discuss these epistemological and metaphysical obstacles to treating constancy as a special case of coherence in this and the following section. Hume sets out to "consider, whether it be the senses, reason, or the imagination, that produces the opinion of a continu'd or of a distinct existence" (T 188). Hume argues by elimination. The belief in body is due neither to the senses (T 188-93) nor to reason (T 193). Hume concludes that the "opinion must be entirely owing to the IMAGINATION: which must now be the subject of our enquiry" (T 193). Hume treats the senses, reason, and the imagination as exhaustive and mutually exclusive alternatives. It is critical to get a proper fix on Hume's terminology. In the course of discussing the possibility that the belief in body is due to reason, Hume argues, as we shall see shortly, that the belief cannot be due to the relation of cause and effect. Recall that, beginning at pages 93-94 of I.iii.6, there are shifts in Hume's terminology, so that causal inference—association by the relation of cause and effect—is due to "reason." At that stage, reason emerges as an associative faculty. Hume consolidates this usage at the footnotes in I.iii.9 and II.ii.7, where he distinguishes two components of the faculty of association, the imagination in the wide sense, identifying "reason" or the "understanding" with demonstrative and probable inference, in contrast to the imagination in the narrow sense (§ II.3). In the remainder of this chapter, I continue to use 'imagination' to mean this latter faculty. The distinction between the imagination and reason or the understanding is a distinction between different kinds of associative mechanisms. Furthermore, Hume's constructive epistemological project (§§ 1.4, II.3) is to vindicate the honorific title "reason," on the one hand, and such pejorative descriptions as "the mere fictions of the imagination," "merely the offspring of the imagination" (T 108), and "the opprobrious character of being the offspring of the imagination" (T 117 n. 1), on the other. Hume has these terminological distinctions and the associated normative enterprise in view in I.iv.2.23 After arguing that the belief in body is not due to 23. Bennett is clear about the normative thrust of the terminology: "Having rejected [the senses and reason], Hume concludes that The Belief'must be entirely owing to the imagination', which I take to imply... that it is illegitimately derived from ... the deliverances of the senses. That is, Hume will explain The Belief in a manner which, he thinks, will condemn it" (1971, p. 320). I

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the senses, he turns to "reason." In the course of discussing this second possible source of the belief, Hume declares that the belief is "entirely unreasonable," that it "must proceed from some other faculty than the understanding" (T 193). Since Hume is arguing eliminatively, he means that the belief must be due to the imagination. Hume provides an argument for the claim "that upon the whole our reason neither does, nor is it possible it ever shou'd, upon any supposition, give us an assurance of the continu'd and distinct existence of body" (T 193). Here, as elsewhere in I.iv.2 (T 216; cf. 198,212), Hume reasserts his recurrent thesis (§ II. 1) that "the relation of cause and effect... is the only one that can assure us of matter of fact" (T 193). To show that causal inference does not produce the belief in body, he distinguishes two cases: one where we identify the objects we immediately perceive with external objects, the other where we distinguish perceptions and external objects. This latter case applies to the philosophical system of the double existence of perceptions and objects. Hume maintains, "Even after we distinguish our perceptions from our objects, 'twill appear presently, that we are still incapable of reasoning from the existence of one to that of the other" (T 193). The reason for this is explicit within the extended discussion of the philosophical system at pages 210-17: The only conclusion we can draw from the existence of one thing to that of another, is by means of the relation of cause and effect But as no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions; it follows that we may observe a conjunction or a relation of cause and effect between different perceptions, but can never observe it between perceptions and objects. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that from the existence or any of the qualities of the former, we can ever form any conclusion concerning the existence of the latter, or ever satisfy our reason in this particular. (T 212)

This is about as sound as an argument can be on Hume's own terms. (Hume refers to the argument at T 216 and it appears again at EHU XII, 119.) What about the first case, the vulgar belief that fails to distinguish between perceptions and external objects? Hume writes: "As long as we take our perceptions and objects to be the same, we can never infer the existence of the one from that of the other, nor form any argument from the relation of cause and effect; which is the only one that can assure us of matter of fact" (T 193). The inference is precluded because perceptions and objects are taken "to be the same." The issue here, however, is not whether the existence of external objects can be inferred from perceptions; it is whether the existence of perceptions absent from the mind can be inferred from the existence of perceptions present to the mind. Hume's argument at page 193 does not speak to this.24 cannot agree with Stroud that "Hume does not concern himself with the truth or reasonableness of [our belief in the "external world"] at all" (1977, p. 96). 24. Bennett places an exclamation point at the end of his quotation of the argument (1971, p. 321), registering his recognition of its weakness. For an extended discussion of misgivings along


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The argument to show that the vulgar belief cannot be based on causal inference is put forward in a single sentence. The argument overlooks the possibility that observed conjunctions between different types of perceptions could sustain a causal inference to the existence of an unobserved perception. More generally, whereas Hume devotes a little more than five pages (T 188-93) to showing that the senses do not give rise to the belief in body, his rejection of the understanding, and hence causal inference, as a source of the belief is confined to a single paragraph. Hume seems in a hurry to secure the paragraph's ultimate conclusion: "that opinion [of the continued and distinct existence of body] must be entirely owing to the IMAGINATION" (T 193). At page 193, prior to any discussion of the constancy or coherence of impressions, Hume consigns the mechanisms that produce the vulgar belief to the imagination, to the set of belief-forming mechanisms that produces beliefs that are not justified. Why the rush to this result? The answer, I suggest, is that Hume is convinced that the vulgar belief is patently false. In light of this conviction, he seeks to locate an explanation of the belief that will have the consequence that it is unjustified. My point is not that Hume thinks the belief is unjustified because it is false. Rather, Hume feels that in light of the belief's patent falsity, it ought not to result from belief-forming mechanisms that confer justification.25 This is not a consequence of his theory of justification but rather a constraint upon it. Hume's view that the vulgar belief in body ought to be unjustified is pretheoretical in a double sense. It is independent of his advancing any particular theory of justification. It is also independent of an investigation into the psychological origin of the belief. Hume appeals to a two-step argument to establish that the vulgar form of the belief in body is false. The vulgar believe of those objects they immediately perceive or that are present to the mind that they have a continued and distinct existence. The two-step argument is as follows. First, though the vulgar do not distinguish between perceptions and external objects, the objects that are present to the mind are in fact perceptions: '"Tis universally allow'd by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas" (T 67). The claim that only perceptions are present to the mind is reiterated within I.iv.2,1.iv.4, and I.iv.5 (T 191,193,197,226-27,239). Hume writes at this last citation: "The most vulgar philosophy informs us, that no external object can make itself known to the mind immediately, and without the interposition of an image or perception." It is a consequence of this first step that, for Hume, we are not directly or immediately aware of external objects.

the lines I raise, see Pears, 1990, pp. 164-67, who finds the deficiencies in the argument "very baffling" (p. 167). In the remainder of this section, I try to address this aspect of Hume's position. 25. Cf. Dicker, 1998, pp. 165-66. Dicker observes that Hume, in a discussion internal to his treatment of constancy, also "is prepared to argue that since a given belief is false, it cannot be based on reason" (p. 205 n. 6): '"Tis a false opinion that any of our objects, or perceptions, are identically the same after an interruption; and consequently the opinion of their identity can never arise from reason, but must arise from the imagination" (T 209).

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VI. CONSTANCY AND COHERENCE IN I.IV.2

Second, Hume maintains in I.iv.2, "A very little reflection and philosophy is sufficient to make us perceive the fallacy of [the] opinion" (T 210) that perceptions have a continued existence. Perceptions have a continued existence only if they have an existence distinct and independent from being perceived.26 An argument from "the plainest experience" (T 210)—the phenomena of double vision and perceptual relativity (T 210-11)—shows that objects do not have an existence independent of the mind. (I consider the soundness of the argument in § VI.6.) It follows that perceptions do not have a continued existence when not being perceived. According to the first step of Hume's argument, it is perceptions that are present to the mind; according to the second step, perceptions do not have a continued existence. The vulgar opinion that the objects they immediately perceive do have a continued existence is an "error" (T 202,210) or "fallacy" (T 210). Although Hume does not argue for this conclusion until pages 210-11, it conditions his discussion throughout I.iv.2.27 Hume writes early in the section: "And we shall see afterwards, that our conclusions from experience are far from being favourable to the doctrine of the independency of our perceptions" (T 191). Hume has in view the argument at pages 210-11. More dramatically, Hume helps himself to the conclusion of that argument in the middle of the paragraph to show that the belief in body is not due to reason. Hume maintains that "every thing, which appears to the mind, is nothing but a perception" (T 193). This is the conclusion at the first step of the two-step argument. In addition, these perceptions are "interrupted, and dependent on the mind" (T 193). This is the conclusion of the second step. Similarly, the next paragraph proceeds on the assumption that "all impressions are internal and perishing existences" (T 194). The first of these claims is "pretty obvious," and "philosophy informs us" (T 193) of the second. Hume makes these points even before arguing that the belief in body is not due to causal inference. Thus, "this sentiment [that the very things we see have a continued existence], then, as it is entirely unreasonable, must proceed from some other faculty than the understanding" (T 193). Hume considers the vulgar belief clearly false; philosophical reflection easily establishes its falsity. I suggest that, in these circumstances, Hume deems it intolerable that the vulgar belief should be justified. Hume's thought is that the belief ought to be unjustified, in the sense of not deriving from the understanding, because it is patently false. This hypothesis accounts for the disconcerting features of Hume's discussion of the possibility that the vulgar belief in body is due to the understanding: the brevity of the one-paragraph treatment; the midparagraph declaration that the belief is "entirely unreasonable," even before explicitly considering a role for causal inference; the failure of the one-sentence argument to show that, if we do not distinguish perceptions and objects, causal inference can have no role; and the readiness, before investigating and identify-

26. Hume is not relying on the problematic claim that objects have a distinct and independent existence only if they continue to exist when not perceived. See n. 21. 27. Cf. Wright, 1983, p. 41.


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ing the psychological mechanisms that produce the vulgar belief, to attribute them to the imagination. The character of the discussion at page 193 manifests Hume's determination to locate the psychological explanation of the vulgar belief outside causal inference and the understanding. Hume has decided in advance how he wants the vulgar belief to come out, with respect to justification. When Hume turns, at his next page, to the constancy and coherence of perceptions, he is not a disinterested scientist of human nature investigating the mechanisms that produce the belief. He is actively seeking an explanation that locates these mechanisms within the imagination. This objective of attributing the belief in body to the imagination applies to Hume's treatment of coherence as well as to his treatment of constancy. It is only perceptions that are immediately present to the mind, whether in the context of cases of constancy or coherence. Perceptions do not have a distinct or independent existence, whether they exhibit constancy or coherence. The considerations of double vision and perceptual relativity carry equal weight in their application to coherent and to constant impressions. Hume writes: "Reflection tells us, that even our resembling perceptions are interrupted in their existence, and different from each other" (T 215, emphasis added). His point is that interrupted perceptions that are perfectly resembling do not have a continued existence and that a fortiori perceptions that are interrupted and not perfectly resembling, as in the coherence cases, do not have a continued existence. The belief is no less patently false and no less "entirely unreasonable" in the context of coherence than in the context of constancy. He thus sets out to examine how "COHERENCE and CONSTANCY ... give rise to so extraordinary an opinion" (T 195) as that of the continued existence of body. We can inquire into the extent to which Hume's discussions of coherence and constancy are successful from the perspective of his commitment to the thesis that the vulgar belief in body is due to the imagination. Hume's treatment of constancy is, in this regard, an unequivocal success. The propensity to attribute identity to related objects rests on a double association of resembling ideas and resembling dispositions, a mechanism distinct from demonstrative or causal inference (§ V.2). The propensity, and the consequent conflicts and efforts to resolve those conflicts, are not contained within the understanding. The belief in body, insofar as it arises from the constancy of impressions, clearly is due to the imagination. Turning to Hume's treatment of coherence, it is important to distinguish two questions. One question is whether Hume was by and large satisfied specifically with the psychological adequacy of his explanation of the belief in body insofar as it arises from coherence. I have argued that he was satisfied (§ VI.3). The present question is whether Hume's treatment of coherence is successful from the perspective of his desire to attribute the belief to the imagination. Hume is successful, in this sense, only if he locates a plausible mechanism that is not contained within the understanding. Hume's own assessment in I.iv.2 is ambiguous. On the one hand, causal reasoning and the inference to the continued existence of perceptions exhibiting coherence "are at the bottom considerably different from each other" (T

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197). This is correct, in the sense that the cooperation of custom and the psychological galley does not reduce to association by the relation of cause and effect based on custom or repetition. On the other hand, the coherence of impressions "is the foundation of a kind of reasoning from causation" (T195). The inference from coherence "arises ... from custom in an indirect and oblique manner" (T 197); it "can never be the direct and natural effect of the constant repetition and connexion, but must arise from the co-operation of some other principles" (T 198). This could mean that the inference has its roots in custom, though the principles that cooperate with custom fall within the imagination. Or it could mean that the inference arises within the understanding, albeit indirectly or obliquely. Hume does not say, within the course of the main discussion of coherence, whether or not custom-and-galley is contained within the understanding or spills over into the imagination (§ VI.3). So Hume still has not settled the classificatory question. This is perhaps surprising. Hume's official position ought to be that the mechanism that produces the belief in body in connection with coherence is not an operation of the understanding; the discussion of coherence, as well as the discussion of constancy, ought to vindicate the perfunctory argument to show that the belief in body is due to the imagination. Hume cannot quite bring himself to rehearse this official position within the discussion of coherence. Custom-and-galley has affinities with causal reasoning as described in I.iii. Indeed, Hume's discussion of coherence stresses that proofs based upon causal inference are similar to the inference from coherence in that both attribute to objects a greater regularity than we observe (§§ VI.2-3). Both causal reasoning, as described in I.iii, and the cooperation of custom and the galley are in the service of enhancing observed regularity. At the least, the mechanism Hume locates in the case of coherence is a threat to the thesis that the belief in body is "entirely unreasonable" and "entirely owing to the IMAGINATION." Insofar as Hume desired to locate the explanation of the belief outside the understanding, this result must have been unwelcome.28 I have suggested that Hume could have subsumed his explanation of the belief in body in connection with constancy under his explanation in connection with coherence, thereby providing a unified explanation of the belief in the

28. Section I.iv.5 contains a curious, seemingly gratuitous, footnote attached to the following text: "Thus we may establish it as a certain maxim, that we can never, by any principle, but by an irregular kind* of reasoning from experience, discover a connexion or repugnance betwixt objects, which extends not to impressions" (T 242). The footnote reads: "Such as that of Sect. 2, from the coherence of our perceptions" (T 242). Kemp Smith suggests that the inference to body from coherence is irregular because " indirect and oblique" (1941, p. 472). I do not think we can uncritically follow Hume in his after-the-fact assessment. In I.iv.2, the belief in body in connection with coherence indeed arises from custom indirectly, but the appellation "irregular" to this mechanism is new. In I.iv.5, Hume does seem to associate custom-and-galley with the "changeable, weak, and irregular" (T 225) principles of I.iv.4, rather than the understanding. It is as if Hume is retrospectively trying to degrade the epistemological status of custom-and-galley. This mechanism, however, is obviously not changeable and weak.


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existence of body (§§ VI.1-2). Suppose he had done so. In that event, the entire vulgar belief would have been attributed to the cooperation of custom and the galley. This result would have jeopardized Hume's claim that the belief in body is due to the imagination rather than the understanding. It would have been far from clear that Hume would have met his own objective of locating the explanation of the belief in body within the imagination.29 From this perspective, Hume would not have welcomed the unified explanation of the belief in body. By contrast, attributing the belief in the continued existence of constant perceptions to the identity-ascribing propensity decisively yields the result that the belief is not justified in these cases. This welcome result did not obviate the need to provide a psychological explanation of the belief in the coherence cases. It was not open to Hume to unify his explanation of the belief in body in favor of the mechanism operative in the constancy cases. That explanation is of no use in the context of coherence, where there are no perfectly resembling impressions to activate the identity-ascribing propensity. The science of human nature requires an explanation in the cases of coherence. Hume ingeniously obliges with the cooperation of custom and the psychological galley, without explicitly addressing whether this is a mechanism proper to the understanding. There is a perspective from which Hume should have found his reliance on custom-and-galley congenial. It is a persistent thesis of Book I that all assurance in, and indeed knowledge of, matters of fact that have not been observed is based upon the relation of cause and effect (§§ II. 1, III.l). Hume might have taken the affinities between custom-and-galley and custom on its own, as described in I.iii, to confirm the central intuitions that stand behind a causal theory of knowledge of matters of fact. Hume does not pursue this, with the result that a valuable intuition about the role of causal inference in knowledge of matters of fact is sacrificed to the altar of the commitment to the thesis that the vulgar belief in body is not justified. The dialectical situation generates tension in Hume's discussion of coherence. On the one hand, he must provide a plausible psychological explanation of the belief in body in connection with coherence as well as constancy. To satisfy this explanatory requirement, Hume emphasizes that the cooperation of custom and the galley is akin to causal inference in that both attribute to objects a greater regularity than we have observed. On the other hand, he cannot allow custom-and-galley unequivocally to fall within causal inference. To satisfy this epistemic requirement, Hume emphasizes that this mechanism is different from the operation of custom as described in I.iii in that it cannot fully be explained by habit. He accomplishes all this in three-plus pages, ditches the discussion of coherence, and embarks on the more than ten-page discussion of constancy, where the negative conclusion about the epistemic status of the belief in continued existence is clear-cut. Many commentators note that Hume

29. The mere fact that the belief in body insofar as it arises from constancy could be subsumed under custom-and-galley does not mean that it is due to the understanding or justified; justification depends upon the mechanism that actually produces a belief.

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gives special attention to constancy.30 In this they follow Hume's lead, but I think they do so without seeing the sources of the texture of Hume's discussion. Hume's account of the mechanism involved in coherence comes too close for (his) comfort to falling within the understanding. The upshot is that Hume is not in a position to regard his overall treatment of the vulgar belief in body as a complete success. There is a revealing symptom of Hume's differential attitudes toward the mechanisms that operate in the cases of coherence and constancy. I have argued that at pages 207-8, a "fiction" is an idea that falls short of belief (§ V.2). Hume has an additional use for this terminology. Often, a "fiction" is a conception, supposition, or belief that arises from an illusion due to an imaginative propensity (§ V.4). Belief in the existence of a material substratum is one of a number of the "fictions" (T 219,222,226) of the ancient philosophers; our belief in the existence of a soul is also a "fiction" (T 254, 255). Similarly, the "philosophical system" involves the "fiction" (T215)ofa new set of objects, and the vulgar belief in body insofar as it arises from constancy involves the "fiction" of the continued and distinct existence of impressions (T 205,209). All of these beliefs derive from the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects. The term 'fiction', however, does not occur within the discussion of coherence at pages 195-98.31 Why does Hume reserve this term for the belief in the continued existence specifically of constant perceptions? The belief that perceptions have a continued existence is fallacious, whether the perceptions are constant or coherent. "Fictions," in the sense now at issue, even converted to beliefs, are the work of

30. Prichard, 1950, pp. 196-98; Garrett, 1997, pp. 209-13; and Mounce, 1999, pp. 56-57, are commentators who do not discuss coherence (though, at p. 212, Garrett mentions it). Stroud devotes but a sentence to coherence, choosing "to concentrate on the efficacy of... 'constancy' "(1977, p. 100). This is convenient. As noted in § 1.5, n. 29, one of Stroud's themes is that, in Hume's view, causation, bodies, and selves are all fictions (cf. 1977, pp. 245-50). This is doubtless the dominant thrust of Hume's discussion of body, but it overlooks the more constructive element (coherence). Similar points apply to commentators who stress that Hume's treatment of constancy makes the belief in body look like a "nightmare story" (Price, 1940a, p. 45), "altogether unwarranted" (Warnock, 1976,p. 25),"positivelysilly"(Pears, 1990,p. 187),anda"delusion"(Mounce, 1999,pp. 57,59).This is especially unfortunate in the case of Mounce, since he uses the difficulties here as evidence for the failure (pp. 58-59; cf. 30—31), indeed the "bankruptcy" (p. 132), of Hume's empiricism, without offering any discussion of coherence. Coherence deserves a run for its money. 31. Wolff disregards the asymmetry in writing that in the case of the door and the squeak, cases of coherence, the mind creates "the 'fiction' of a continued and independently existing object" (1960, p. 121). For discussion of Hume's use of'feign' and 'fiction', see Craig, 1987, pp. 123-27; Traiger, 1987; and G. Strawson, 1989/1992, pp. 55-56 n. 36. These commentators do not do justice to the predominantly pejorative force of Hume's terminology in some contexts. (Johnson, 1995, pp. 258, 260-61, 363 n. 26, is more on the mark.) None of them note the role of the identityascribing propensity in connection with the belief in the continued existence of perceptions, material and immaterial substrata, and external existence, so that there is no mention of the "illusion," "deception," "error," or "mistake" at the source of the fictions (§ V.2). Craig comes the closest when he writes that in the case of substrata "the mind is caught in the dilemma posed by a gradually changing object" (1987, p. 125).

VI.5. A METAPHYSICAL OBSTACLE

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the imagination. The identity-ascribing propensity is obviously such a mechanism; that causal inference in cooperation with the galley falls outside the understanding is less clear. There is additional evidence in I.iv.2 that Hume was aware of the asymmetry in the epistemological implications of his reliance on custom-and-galley and the identity-ascribing propensity. He writes in the section's penultimate paragraph: "They are the coherence and constancy of our perceptions, which produce the opinion of their continu'd existence— The constancy of our perceptions has the most considerable effect, and yet is attended with the greatest difficulties" (T 217). Insofar as the belief arises from constancy and hence the identity-ascribing propensity, no kind of causal reasoning is involved in the majority of the cases of the belief in body. VI.5. A Metaphysical Obstacle to Subsuming Constancy under Coherence In this section, I discuss a metaphysical obstacle in Hume to treating constancy as a special case of coherence. I suggest that Hume holds that only changes have causes. This metaphysical view stands in the background of his thinking about constancy and obstructs a unified treatment of constancy and coherence. Though this initial statement of the obstacle will require modification, it puts us in the right neighborhood. The principle that only changes have causes has an important consequence. Consider an unchanging object. Intuitively, such an object has temporal parts, stages of the object as it exists at various times. Whereas the initial temporal part is a change, consisting of the object coming into existence, the subsequent stages are unchanging. The principle that only changes have causes implies that these later stages do not have causes, and thus are not caused by earlier stages of the object in particular. In other words, the later stages of an unchanging object have no causal dependence on its earlier stages. Hume's view that only changes have causes precludes his treating constancy as a special case of coherence. In an instance of coherence, where custom cooperates with the psychological galley, we infer the existence of the unobserved moving door as the cause of the noise as of a door turning that we hear (§ VI.2); the latter observed impression is thought to have a causal dependence on the impression whose existence is inferred. Consider a case of constancy, in which an impression has a continued and unchanging existence when not perceived. Since the impression's later stages are unchanging, they do not have causes, and hence are not caused by any earlier impression or earlier stage of an impression, in particular. Since Hume's explanation of the belief in body in connection with constancy is an explanation of why we believe in the continued existence of impressions that are unchanging, causal dependence among these objects cannot play a role in the explanation. If only changes have causes, the belief in body insofar as it arises from constancy cannot be explained as the product of "a kind of reasoning from causation" (T 195). We can thus explain

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Hume's failure to subsume constancy under coherence on the hypothesis that he holds that only changes have causes.32 I know of one passage that might be taken to suggest that Hume denies that only changes have causes. Hume writes in I.iii.2: Tis only causation, which produces such a connexion, as to give us assurance from the existence or action of one object, that 'twas follow'd or preceded by any other existence or action.... There is nothing in any objects to perswade us, that they are either always remote or always contiguous; and when from experience and observation we discover, that their relation in this particular is invariable, we always conclude there is some secret cause, which separates or unites them. The same reasoning extends to identity. We readily suppose an object may continue individually the same, tho' several times absent from and present to the senses; and ascribe to it an identity, notwithstanding the interruption of the perception, whenever we conclude, that if we had kept our eye or hand constantly upon it, it wou'd have convey'd an invariable and uninterrupted perception. But this conclusion beyond the impressions of our senses can be founded only on the connexion of cause and effect, nor can we otherwise have any security, that the object is not chang'd upon us, however much the new object may resemble that which was formerly present to the senses. Whenever we discover such a perfect resemblance, we consider, whether it be common in that species of objects; whether possibly or probably any cause cou'd operate in producing the change and resemblance; and according as we determine concerning these causes and effects, we form our judgment concerning the identity of the object. (T 73-74)

In this passage, Hume maintains that there is some connection between causeand-effect reasoning and judgments about identity. What is the connection? The passage occurs in a specialized context (§§ II.1, III.3). Hume is arguing with respect to identity, situations in time and place, and causation—the three philosophical relations that are not the province of intuition—that only causation gives us assurance of the existence of unobserved objects. Hume's point, I believe, is not that the continued existence of an unchanging object may be inferred as an effect, thereby allowing us to judge the presence of an identical object over time.33 He seems concerned instead with cases where we already believe that some object or objects exist during an interval between the obser32. There is some shortfall. Perhaps Hume affirms, but the vulgar deny, that only changes have causes or vice versa. I find no evidence that Hume distinguishes between his own view and the vulgar view with respect to the principle that only changes have causes. Also note that in instances of constancy, the observed impressions, though unchanging, are interrupted. If the impression does not have a continued existence during the interruption, there is a change, the coming into existence of the later impression. That such a new impression has a cause is compatible with the principle that only changes have causes. The belief in body in cases of constancy, however, amounts to an inference to the continued existence of an unchanging impression, and hence an inference to the existence of an impression that is uninterrupted in its existence. 33. For the reading I reject, see Kemp Smith, 1941, pp. 367-68; and Prkhard, 1950, pp. 180-81. (Kemp Smith's example of a moving body is not germane, since the body is changing its position.) Noonan, 1999, pp. 97-98, is somewhat more congenial.


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vation of perfectly resembling objects, and we are wondering whether the unobserved object or objects also perfectly resemble the observed ones. (If they do, this is a case of identity.) In order to answer this question, we employ causeand-effect reasoning to determine whether any cause operated to change the object during the period in which it was not observed. In Hume's view, we do not argue that it is probable that the earlier stages caused the continued existence of perfectly resembling later stages. Rather, we argue that it is improbable that any factors caused a series of changes that eventuated in an object that perfectly resembles the object one first observed (without being identical to it). Invoking such a procedure does not commit Hume to the view that unchanging objects have causes. The section following the discussion of judgments of identity contains evidence that Hume holds that only changes have causes. In I.iii.3, Hume examines the principle "that whatever begins to exist, must have a cause of existence" (T 78; cf. 79,80). He generalizes the principle to "the necessity of a cause of every new existence, or new modification of existence" (T 79). Hume does not contest that the principle is true but argues that it is neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain. These claims are restricted to new existences and new modifications of existence.34 Hume claims that changes have causes. Though he does not say that only changes have causes, this restriction seems implicit. This suggests a modification in my hypothesis that Hume "holds" that only changes have causes. In I.iii.3, Hume self-consciously affirms that every new existence or new modification of existence has a cause, though he does not self-consciously deny that the later stages of unchanging objects have causes. Hume simply presupposes that only changes have causes, without considering the possibility that this is false. This suggests that it never occurred to Hume that the later stages of unchanging objects have causes. Why might Hume have overlooked this possibility? Here we can appeal to two explanations, individually or in combination. In the first place, Hume observes that the principle that every new existence or new modification of existence has a cause is a "maxim" (T 79), indeed "a general maxim in philosophy" (T 78). John Laird has an interesting account of the source of the maxim: Locke, Clarke and other such philosophers (including all the deists) believed in the existence of an unoriginated God All these authors, therefore, were constrained to deny that everything must have a cause.. .. Accordingly they maintained... only that everything that had a beginning, or, more shortly, that every change, must have a cause.35

34. There is a similar formulation in a letter (cited by Kemp Smith, 1941, pp. 411-13): "I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that any thing might arise without a Cause" (L 1,185). See also LG 22. 35. Laird, 1932, p. 99. The principle that everything that has a beginning has a cause is not equivalent to the principle that every change has a cause. The latter entails the former, thus providing a more general principle to obviate the need for God to have a cause.

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We can suppose that the restriction implicit in the maxim was an unconscious inheritance. I think this plausible, notwithstanding Hume's intense critical scrutiny of the concept of causation. In I.iii.3, Hume's sights are set on a particular component of the maxim, the claim that every new existence "must" have a cause, that there is "the necessity of a cause" (T 79) to every new existence or new modification; he is not focused on the implicit restriction to changes. In the second place, the view that only changes have causes has some independent appeal, insofar as it is grounded in everyday intuitions about explanation. We do not normally seek a causal explanation of why a quality of an object persists. It might be thought to follow that the persistence of an unchanging object does not have a cause. Though I think it a mistake to draw this conclusion, some philosophers hold that the persistence of a quality of an object does not admit of causal explanation.36 Hume perhaps found the intuitions here appealing. The tug of such unarticulated intuitions might have contributed to Hume unconsciously assimilating the restriction implicit in the maxim about causation. It might be felt that I am overlooking an alternative explanation of Hume's failure to treat constancy as a special case of coherence, one rooted in his explicit views about the nature of time and duration. In I.ii.3, Hume maintains that we have no idea of time without change: The idea of duration is always deriv'd from a succession of changeable objects, and can never be convey'd to the mind by any thing stedfast and unchangeable. For it inevitably follows from thence, that since the idea of duration cannot be deriv'd from such an object, it can never in any propriety or exactness be apply'd to it, nor can any thing unchangeable be ever said to have duration.

(T37)

The idea of duration cannot "in a proper sense" (T 37) be applied to an unchanging object.37 Similarly, Hume writes in I.ii.5, "We really have no such idea" as that "of time without any changeable existence" (T 65). Hume relies on this doctrine within the discussion of constancy: "I have already observ'd, that time, in a strict sense, implies succession" (T 200). Hume writes in the next paragraph: "Thus the principle of individuation is nothing but the invariableness and uninterruptedness of any object, thro' a suppos'd variation of time" (T 201). The connection to constancy is as follows. An unchanging object does not, properly or strictly, have duration. This has the direct consequence that an unchanging object does not, properly or strictly, have temporal stages; a fortiori, an unchanging object does not, properly or strictly, have causally dependent

36. For example, Squires contends that if an object o possesses property P continuously through some interval, questions about the cause of o possessing P at times after o has come to acquire Pare (normally) "inappropriate" (1969, esp. pp. 185-90). This is the view that persisting properties of an object do not (normally) admit of causal explanation. Related intuitions explicitly underpin the argument of Harman, 1970, pp. 847-48. 37. There are discussions of this claim in a series of papers in Hume Studies: Neujahr, 1978; Baxter, 1987; and Costa, 1990. Also see the references at § V.I, n. 1.


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temporal stages. Subsuming constancy under coherence requires treating earlier stages of an unchanging impression as causes of its later stages. Hume's views about duration imply that an unchanging object does not have stages. It is thus tempting to think that Hume's views about duration, which are prominent in his treatment of constancy, prevent him from treating constancy as a special case of coherence. Other features of Hume's treatment of duration undercut this explanation. According to Hume, we do apply the idea of time to an unchanging object, by means of a "fiction" (T 37). At I.ii.5, he calls attention to "those appearances, which make us fancy" (T 65) that we have an idea of time without change, giving rise to the idea of "fictitious duration" (T 65). Hume relies on a fiction of the duration of an unchanging object in I.iv.2: "When we apply [the idea of time] to any unchangeable object, 'tis only by a fiction of the imagination, by which the unchangeable object is suppos'd to participate of the changes of the co-existent objects, and in particular of that of our perceptions" (T 200-201). Hume must allow this, because he is trying to explain the belief in the continued existence of unchanging perceptions at times when they are not perceived. Furthermore, the fiction of an unchanging object participating in the changes of coexistent objects, and hence having duration, "almost universally takes place" (T 201). Hume allows that the imagination engages in the fiction that an unchanging object has duration and hence temporal parts. Why should the mind not also believe that the object's (fictional) temporal stages stand in causal relations or dependencies? Perhaps such causal relations inherit the status of fictions from the stages themselves, but this is no objection. Hume is explaining why the vw/garbelieve in body. It is no constraint on the explanation that the vulgar belief be free of fictions. Hume's explanation of the vulgar belief in cases of constancy depends upon the fiction of the continued existence of perceptions (§ VI.4), itself involving the fiction of the "duration" or "succession" (T 200) of an unchanging object. We cannot explain Hume's failure to subsume constancy under coherence with reference to his claim that unchanging objects do not, properly or strictly, have earlier and later stages. Hume could appeal to the cooperation of custom with the galley to explain why the vulgar believe in causal dependencies among (fictional) temporal stages of an unchanging object. Yet, Hume does not even entertain the possibility that the vulgar feign or believe in causal dependencies among the fictional temporal stages of unchanging objects. This is additional evidence that it never occurred to Hume that later stages of unchanging objects are caused by earlier stages—whether the stages be fictional or genuine. This never occurred to Hume, quite independently of his views about time and duration. My interpretation also accounts for features of Hume's stage setting in I.iv.2. The preliminary discussions of both constancy and coherence call attention to gap-indifference (§ VI. 1). In the case of constancy, objects "present themselves in the same uniform manner, and change not upon account of any interruption in my seeing or perceiving them" (T 195; cf. 194). In the case of coherence, "I am accustom'd in other instances to see a like alteration produc'd in a like time, whether I am present or absent" (T 195). Both constant and coherent impressions

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conform to regularities of sequence irrespective of interruptions in their observation. In this sense, constancy is a special case of coherence. At the same time, there is an asymmetry in the preliminary characterizations of constancy and coherence. As we have seen (§ VI. 1), Hume characterizes coherence with reference to changes in impressions: "Bodies often change their position and qualities.... But here 'tis observable, that even in these changes they preserve a coherence" (T 195). Hume immediately adds that these changes "have a regular dependence on each other; which is the foundation of a kind of reasoning from causation" (T 195). Hume builds "dependence" among changing impressions into his initial description of coherence. By contrast, the initial description of constancy contains no causal locutions, no suggestion that perfectly resembling impressions have a dependence on one another.38 At pages 194—95, Hume holds that there exists causal dependence among coherent impressions and restricts coherence to impressions that change. This betrays the unexamined assumption that only changes have causes. Hume's failure to provide a unified explanation of the belief in body in the constancy and coherence cases reflects or replicates an unconscious metaphysical presupposition that infects his preliminary description of the phenomena. Let me collate the results of this and the preceding section. It was Hume's epistemological conviction that the vulgar belief in the existence of body is not justified. In light of this, he sought to locate the origin of the belief in the imagination, rather than in reason or the understanding. In this regard, the treatment of the belief in body insofar as it arises from constancy—as due to the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects—is an eminent success. Treating constancy as a special case of coherence—as giving rise to the belief in body by a kind of causal reasoning—would deprive Hume of this result. He therefore possessed an epistemological motivation for not applying the cooperation of custom and the galley to constancy as well as to coherence. As it happened, Hume did not appreciate the possibility of subsuming constancy under coherence. As we have seen in § V.2, Hume notes that we observe constancy "in a thousand instances" (T 204) or in "a vast number of instances" (T 208). Observed repetition, and hence the kind of causal inference operative with custom-and-galley, are at the ready (§ VI.2). This is a path Hume does not take, since it never occurred to him that the later stages of unchanging objects have causes. The explanation of the belief in body in connection with constancy must thus be sui generis. Epistemologically, this was congenial. Hume wanted to attribute the belief in body in the constancy cases to the imagination, and he did not see that he had

38. Passmore writes: "If'constancy' is simply a form of resemblance, and 'coherence' is causality, and if between them these can account for our belief in external and independent existence, then associationism has proved itself once more" (1952/1968, p. 118). Although Passmore provides no argument that Hume takes constancy to be a noncausal relation among perceptions, Hume's initial treatment of coherence and constancy invites this interpretation.

VI.6. AN A M E N D E D V E R S I O N OF I.IV.2

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any alternative. We should not form a picture of Hume withholding the application of custom-and-galley to constancy in the interest of vindicating his epistemological conviction. His metaphysical thinking prevented him from recognizing the possibility of this application. Furthermore, in light of Hume's conviction about the justificatory status of the belief in body, there was no psychological pressure to evaluate his view that only changes have causes. In sum, there was a happy coincidence between his unconscious metaphysical position and his epistemological objectives. This completes my response to the question that remained unanswered at the close of § VI.3.1 have argued that there is substantial textual evidence that Hume was satisfied with the psychological adequacy of his explanation of the belief in body in the coherence cases. The details of the mechanism invoked for coherence permit its application to constancy. Had Hume been satisfied with the psychological adequacy of his treatment of coherence, he could have dealt with constancy as a special case. His failure to do so calls for an explanation. My explanation is that the aspects of Hume's metaphysics and epistemology that I have identified conspired to bring about Hume's failure to provide a unified treatment of constancy and coherence. The availability of this explanation allows us to remove the chief objection to the interpretation in which Hume was satisfied that his treatment of coherence was psychologically adequate. VI.6. An Amended Version of I.iv.2 We can imagine an amended version of I.iv.2 that does treat constancy as a special case of coherence. Since Hume's epistemological and metaphysical positions prevented him from writing I.iv.2 in this way (§§ VI.4-5), we must think of this revamped I.iv.2 as embedded in a more extensively modified version of the section, and of Book I as a whole, in which these obstacles are not present. What additional amendments would be required? In asking this question, my interest is to consider the extent to which Hume's constructive epistemological project— his attempt to sustain his pretheoretical normative distinction between the understanding and the imagination—can be preserved in virtue of the required modifications. In thinking about how to remove the obstacles to treating constancy as a special case of coherence, I try to construct an amended version of the Treatise that differs as little as possible from the work as we have it. Removing the metaphysical obstacle to treating constancy as a special case of coherence requires, at least, that Hume abandon the metaphysical principle that only changes have causes. Hume allows that an unchanging object has fictional temporal parts, since we suppose such an object to participate in the changes of coexisting objects (§ VI.5). Subsuming the explanation of the belief in body in cases of constancy under custom-and-galley would thus depend upon inferring causal dependencies among these fictional stages. An amended version of the Treatise would best take the further step of abandoning the position that the stages of an unchanging object are merely

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fictional.39 Hume's official position is that we have no idea of time without succession. Without further (beyond my discussion in § V.5) entering into controversy about the way in which empiricism about meaning is at work in Hume, it does seem that Hume's position that the duration of unchanging objects is "fictitious" (T 65) depends upon an inflexible application of Hume's empiricism about meaning (cf. T 34-37,64-65). Hume holds that the idea of time must be derived from "some perceivable succession of changeable objects" (T 35). Suppose this is correct. Hume is prepared to allow that "we apply the idea of time, even to what is unchangeable," by means of a "fiction" (T 37): For we may observe, that there is a continual succession of perceptions in our mind; so that the idea of time being for ever present with us; when we consider a stedfast object at five-a-clock, and regard the same at six; we are apt to apply to it that idea in the same manner as if every moment were distinguished by a different position, or an alteration of the object. The first and second appearances of the object, being compar'd with the succession of our perceptions, seem equally remov'd as if the object had really chang'd. (T 65)

Why not say that, in the presence of successive changing impressions of some objects, we do have perceived, and hence perceivable, successive impressions of an unchanged object? Hume's rigid application of meaning empiricism to duration can be resisted even if an empiricist theory of strict content is retained. This makes way for (genuine) causal dependencies between (genuine) temporal parts of an unchanging object. Hume's conviction that the vulgar belief in body is not justified constitutes the epistemological obstacle to treating constancy as a special case of coherence. This conviction rests on Hume's belief that it is patently false that the objects we immediately perceive have a continued existence. Hume arrives at this view in two steps: first, only perceptions are immediately present to the mind; second, perceptions do not have a distinct and continued existence (§ VI.4). The vulgar are therefore mistaken in their belief, of the objects they immediately perceive, that they have a continued and distinct existence. A version of the Treatise that removes the epistemological obstacle must reject one of the steps in the argument for this conclusion.40 The first step, the denial of direct realism, relies on a claim frequently advanced in Book I, as early as page 67 in I.ii.6; at 191,193, and 197 in I.iv.2; and also at 226-27,230, and 239 in I.iv.4 and I.iv.5. In the first Enquiry, there is a per-

39. I believe, however, that the best explanation of Hume's second thoughts about personal identity in the Appendix relies on his claim that unchanging objects do not, strictly speaking, have temporal parts. See my 1992. 40. Collier seems to suggest that his connectionist reconstruction of Hume (see n. 13) does not require "the imagination ... supposing that impressions exist unperceived"; "impressions cease to exist the moment we lose consciousness of them, but traces of these impressions remain in memory and can be used to fill in gappy sequences" (1999, p. 167). I do not see how this helps. In Collier's account,"The network represents the object as continuing to exist unperceived" (p. 164); the traces constitute a (mistaken) belief in the existence of unperceived impressions.


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functory argument—based on perceptual relativity (EHU XII, 118)—for the claim that the immediate objects of experience are perceptions. In the Treatise, Hume does not provide any argument for this position, presumably because it is an unexamined component of an inherited "theory of ideas" (§ III.2). As Thomas Reid insisted, it was a doctrine common to figures from Descartes through Hume that the immediate objects of experience are perceptions (Mind II.5, VII; Powers II). It is, to say the least, difficult to imagine a version of the Treatise that abandons this assumption.41 By contrast, the role of the second step is confined to I.iv.2. Here is the heart of the argument for it: 'Twill first be proper to observe a few of those experiments, which convince us, that our perceptions are not possest of any independent existence. When we press one eye with a finger, we immediately perceive all the objects to become double, and one half of them to be remov'd from their common and natural position. But as we do not attribute a continu'd existence to both these perceptions, and as they are both of the same nature, we clearly perceive, that all our perceptions are dependent on our organs, and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits. This opinion is confirm'd by the seeming encrease and diminution of objects, according to their distance; by the apparent alterations in their figure; by the changes in their colour and other qualities from our sickness and distempers; and by an infinite number of other experiments of the same kind; from all which we learn, that our sensible perceptions are not possest of any distinct or independent existence. (T 210-11)

Objects have a continued existence when not being perceived only if they have an existence distinct and independent from being perceived. The familiar facts of double vision and perceptual relativity show that it is false that perceptions have an existence independent of the mind. It follows that they do not have a continued existence when not being perceived. In assessing the argument at pages 210-11, it is important to bear in mind that Hume appeals to perceptual relativity in support of a number of theses: (i) that only perceptions are present to the mind (EHU XII, 118); (ii) that external objects do not have qualities that resemble perceptions (T 226-27; EHU XII, 122); and (iii) that perceptions do not have a continued existence (T 210-11). These are distinct theses. The question before us is the force of the considerations in regard to double vision and perceptual relativity specifically with respect to iii. It is widely recognized that Hume's argument for the claim that perceptions do not have a continued existence is mistaken. The mistake will be perspicuous against the background of Hume's claim that it is a metaphysical

41. In light of the availability of the alternative I pursue below, I am reluctant to follow Bell and McGinn in identifying this step as "the root cause" (1990, p. 412) of Hume's difficulties in connection with the belief in body. On the theory of ideas, cf. Stroud, 1977, pp. 17-41, esp. pp. 26-27.

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possibility that a perception has an existence distinct from that of any mind.42 He first makes the point in the course of the main discussion of constancy: Here then may arise two questions; First, How we can satisfy ourselves in supposing a perception to be absent from the mind without being annihilated— We may observe, that what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations.... Now as every perception is distinguishable from another, and may be consider'd as separately existent; it evidently follows, that there is no absurdity in separating any particular perception from the mind; that is, in breaking off all its relations, with that connected mass of perceptions, which constitute a thinking being. (T 207)

Anticipating his claim in I.iv.6 that the mind is nothing but a bundle of perceptions (T 252; cf. 636), Hume argues that a perception can exist distinctly and separately from any mind. Hume is emphatic: "The same continu'd and uninterrupted Being may, therefore, be sometimes present to the mind, and sometimes absent from it, without any real or essential change in the Being itself" (T 207). There is a related argument at page 233 of I.iv.5, where Hume contends that a perception can exist distinctly and separately from any substance. The claim that a perception can exist separately from a mind (whether construed as a substance or as a bundle of perceptions) is distinctive to Hume. Hume is endorsing, in Bertrand Russell's terminology, the possibility of "sensibilia," "objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sensedata, without necessarily being data to any mind."43 Here, "sense-data" are equivalent to those of Hume's "impressions" that are sensed or perceived; "sensibilia" include entities with the same metaphysical status, but which are unsensed or unperceived. The possibility of unsensed perceptions is no part of the theory of ideas and indeed entirely antithetical to the systems of Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, and Berkeley. This possibility is important to Hume. The belief that the objects of perception have a continued and distinct existence could be true, even if they are impressions. Thus, "the name of perception renders not this separation from a mind absurd and contradictory" (T 207). Hume's appeal to double vision and perceptual relativity to show that perceptions do not have an independent existence confuses two different ways in which perceptions might be "dependent" upon the mind. We can distinguish between a perception's existence and a perception's membership in a particular bundle of perceptions, and in turn between a perception depending on a particular bundle for its existence and a perception depending on a particular bundle

42. This claim raises the possibility that minds and bodies are both aggregates (Hume's "bundles") of constituents ("perceptions") whose intrinsic nature is "neutral" between the mental and the physical. See Laird, 1932, ch. 5; Price, 1940a, pp. 23 n. 1, 105-6; Chappell, 1972; Ayer, 1980, pp. 41-42; and Pears, 1990, pp. 158 n. 16,161-63. For useful discussion and references, see Bricke, 1980, esp. pp. 41—43. For a development of Hume along neutral monist lines, see Church, 1935, esp. pp. 157-61. 43. Russell, 1917, p. 148 (cf. 149-50).


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for its membership in that bundle. The phenomenon of perceptual relativity shows that a perception's membership within a particular bundle depends upon conditions internal to that bundle. It does not follow that the existence of the perception (irrespective of its membership in a particular bundle) depends upon those conditions. By way of elaborating this point, we can form the following metaphysical picture: perceptions do have a continued and distinct or independent existence; some perceptions are members of a particular bundle of perceptions at a given time; and that a particular perception is a member of a particular bundle at a given time does depend, in part, on conditions internal to that bundle. In Price's terminology, facts about the perceiver do not generate perceptions, they select perceptions for inclusion in a bundle. Though facts about the perceiver cause perceptions to be members of, to enter, a bundle, the existence of perceptions does not depend upon facts about the perceiver. This picture, in which perceptions do have a continued and distinct existence, is consistent with the "experimental" facts. This seems to me to be decisive in showing that Hume is mistaken in his claim that "a very little reflection and philosophy" and "the plainest experience" (T 210) reveal the fallacy of the claim that perceptions have a continued and distinct existence.44 In saying that Hume is mistaken, I mean that he is mistaken on his own principles, that is, in light of his claims at pages 207,233, and 252 that a perception can exist distinctly and separately from any mind. This is the claim that undermines his argument about double vision and perceptual relativity. The belief that perceptions have a continued existence when not present to the senses and an existence distinct from the mind entails the actual existence of mere sensibilia, unsensed perceptions. I am far from suggesting that such a view, or a Humean version of it, is ultimately defensible. But at pages 210-11 Hume prematurely shuts down consideration of this position, preempting evaluation of its strengths and weaknesses.45

44. On selection versus generation, see Price, 1940a, pp. 114-15, 121; cf. Bennett, 1971, p. 347; and cf. Stroud, 1977, p. 111. Citing Treatise 210, Laird writes, "Hume himself argued that'experience' itself demolished neutral monism" (1932, p. 151; cf. 171). The connections here are double edged; once Hume admits the possibility that perceptions have a continued existence, "experience" cannot demolish the claim that perceptions have such an existence. Cook offers an interesting explanation of how Hume manages to go so badly wrong: Though Hume's official position is that it is conceivable and hence possible that perceptions exist independently of the mind, he nevertheless continues to think of perceptions as logically or necessarily dependent on a perceiver. See Cook, 1968, esp. pp. 3-14. For criticisms of the argument at Treatise 210-11 beyond the one I have elaborated, see Price, 1940a,pp. 105-20; Cook, 1968, esp. pp. 11-14; and Ayer, 1980, pp. 27-28. 45. Though Price thinks Hume's argument at pages 210-11 unsuccessful (see n. 44), he declines to develop the Humean theory that perceptions exist unperceived. Price's ground for this is that the admission of unsensed sensibilia is "inconsistent with [Hume's] Empiricist principles" (1940a, p. 134): "The hypothesis of unsensed sensibilia, he would say, is unverifiable by definition, since to verify it one would have to sense them; and if a hypothesis is unverifiable, not merely de facto (owing to human incapacity) but by definition, then it is meaningless to ask whether it is true" (p. 134; cf. 143, 192). Hume nowhere argues against the meaningfulness of the notion of a

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VI. CONSTANCY AND C O H E R E N C E IN I . I V . 2

Consider an amended version of the Treatise that retains the thesis that only perceptions are immediately present to the mind but abandons the mistaken argument at pages 210-11 for the thesis that perceptions do not have a continued and distinct existence. Relinquishing the second step in the argument for the contention that the vulgar belief in body is patently false removes the epistemological obstacle to treating constancy as a special case of coherence.46 The metaphysical obstacle is removed by denying *:hat only changes have causes and by relaxing the application of the empiricism about meaning to the duration of unchanging objects. Within the amended version, constancy would arise from the cooperation of custom and the galley as a special case; the belief in body in connection with constancy as well as coherence would be due to "a kind of reasoning from causation" (T 195). Furthermore, removing the epistemological obstacle clears the way for Hume to abandon his ambiguous posture toward custom-and-galley (§ VI.4) in favor of explicitly attributing it to the understanding. One upshot is to place the belief that perceptions have a continued and distinct existence on a much firmer epistemological footing.47 The amended version of I.iv.2 enables Hume to provide a unified explanation of the belief in body, rather than treating constancy and coherence as irreducibly different. This is a matter, albeit an important one, internal to I.iv.2. In addition, the amendments enable Hume to avoid a number of difficulties for his reliance on the identity-ascribing propensity in I.iv as a whole. Let me review these further advantages. In the previous chapter, I called attention to a number of disparities in the effects of the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects. The propensity is directly responsible for stage 1 of the psychological reaction that leads to conflict and uneasiness at stage 2, and, in an effort to resolve the conflict and relieve the uneasiness at stage 3, to the fictions of the continued existence of perfectly resembling perceptions, material substrata, and immaterial substrata or souls (§ V.I). The disparities were as follows. In the first place, the belief in the continued existence of perceptions genuinely removes or resolves the conflict at stage 2 that gives rise to the belief; the beliefs in material and immaterial substrata (and external existence) merely disguise or conceal the conflicts to which

perception with a continued existence when not perceived on the ground that such a perception is unobservable (§ V.5). For a development of Hume along the path that Price rejects, see Ayer, 1980, pp. 46-51. 46. This amendment has the consequence that Hume must modify his explanation of the origin of the philosophical system of double existence (§ V.3). The Treatise explanation is that the belief in the continued existence of perceptions conflicts with reflection on double vision and perceptual relativity. Hume will have to say instead that the philosophical system arises because of philosophers' (mistaken) belief that perceptions do not have a continued existence. But that is a mistaken belief Hume needs to explain in any case, since all of his forerunners in the way of ideas hold it. 47. Pears writes: "If we are going to understand Hume's system, we must appreciate that he puts belief in body in a far weaker position than belief in causation or belief in personal identity" (1990, p. 154; cf. 183-84). (Pears has in view Hume's discussion of personal identity in I.iv.6, not the Appendix. See p. 154 n. 6.) Also see n. 30.

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they are addressed (§ V.3). In the second place, though the identity-ascribing propensity ultimately leads to unresolved conflict in the context of the belief in body, it does so at the later stage 4, on the basis of considerations (double vision and perceptual relativity) extraneous to the operation of the identity-ascribing propensity (§ V.3). Finally, in the case of the belief in the continued existence of perceptions, considerations about meaning do not come into play at stage 3 of the psychological reaction; by contrast, Hume produces a destructive argument based on considerations about meaning in the cases of material and immaterial substrata and external existence (§ V.5). I have also argued that these disparities have a root source, in that quasi content that is deficient in meaning is the means by which we conceal or disguise the persistence of unresolved conflict (§ V.5). Thus, the reliance on the propensity to explain the belief in the continued existence of perceptions is an outlier in a number of interconnected respects. Consider the version of I.iv.2 that subsumes the cases of constancy under the cooperation of custom and the galley, thereby dispensing with any reliance on the identity-ascribing propensity. This amendment removes the disparities summarized above. In the amended version of the Treatise, unresolved conflict—and the linked semantic and epistemic defects that result from it—invariably arise from the operation of the propensity, for they arise in both the cases of material and immaterial substrata. This provides a much cleaner account of the epistemic and semantic functions of the identity-ascribing propensity. I have also identified a fundamental tension in Hume's elaboration of his psychological theory and his theory of justification (§ V.6). The belief in body is inescapable, so that for the purposes of Hume's explanation of the belief, as it arises from constancy, the propensity must be unavoidable and irresistible. For the purposes of Hume's "criticism of the fictions of the antient philosophy" (T 219) and for his explanation of why he is not "unjust in blaming the antient philosophers for makeing use of [the imagination]" (T 225), the propensity to attribute identity to related objects must be resistible or avoidable (§ V.4). Here there is a clash between Hume's explanatory and normative projects. The difficulty vanishes within a version of the Treatise that amends I.iv.2 along the lines I have suggested. Subsuming the treatment of constancy under that of coherence, and hence under custom in cooperation with the psychological galley, obviates the need for any reliance on the identity-ascribing propensity in I.iv.2.48 The operation of the propensity would be confined to producing the beliefs in material and immaterial substrata in I.iv.3 and I.iv.6, contexts in which it can safely be deemed avoidable and resistible (§ V.2). In the amended version of the Treatise, there is a uniform account of the psychological properties of the propensity—as

48. Since within his interpretation "natural beliefs" are irresistible or inevitable, Kemp Smith must take Hume to hold that there are "two ultimate forms" (1941, p. 486; cf. 116n. 1,124,455) of natural belief, which underpin causal inference and the belief in body, respectively. Here Kemp Smith simply reflects Hume's stated position that the belief in body is inescapable, yet not due to causal inference, at least insofar as it arises from constancy. The Kemp Smith interpretation could have done without this duality, had Hume subsumed constancy under coherence.

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avoidable and resistible—in different contexts of operation. The propensity can thus fulfill both its explanatory and epistemological functions. At the same time, Hume could attribute custom-and-galley to the understanding, maintaining his intended normative distinction between causal and related inferences, on the one hand, and the imaginative propensities, on the other. To achieve these results, Hume must allow that the later stages of unchanging objects have causes. But that only changes have causes hardly strikes one as a distinctively empiricist principle, and in any event this is not a doctrine with which Hume has been identified. He must also abandon the argument for the claim that perceptions do not have a continued existence, and hence his conviction that the vulgar belief in body is unjustified. But Hume's argument that the vulgar belief is patently false founders on his principle that a perception can exist separately from any mind. The benefits—discussed in this and the preceding section—of the amended version of the Treatise are by and large secured without abandoning principles fundamental to Hume's project.

VII Difficulties—Contrived and Suppressed

VII. 1. Hume and Paradox In the previous chapter, I amended Hume's treatment of the belief in body to achieve a more positive outcome than Hume supplies in I.iv. I do not claim that Hume would have welcomed the alterations. On the one hand, Hume pursues the constructive epistemological project I have identified (§§ 1.4,11.1,3). The amendments I have offered remove some obstacles that lie in the way. On the other hand, Hume relishes paradox. This part of Hume's intellectual personality emerges in the first section of the Treatise. Hume argues for the principle that all simple ideas are derived from simple impressions, which they exactly represent (T 2-6). He introduces a "contradictory phasnomenon" (T 5), the missing shade of blue, only to declare "the instance... so particular and singular, that 'tis scarce worth our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim" (T 6).1 Whether or not he is right to dismiss the counterexample, he passes off the puzzle to the reader. Hume's treatment of the belief in body has a similar character on a larger scale. Hume considers three forms of the belief: direct realism, the vulgar belief that perceptions have a continued and distinct existence, and the philosophical system, indirect or representative realism. In the case of direct realism, Hume rejects the view that the immediate objects of perception are external objects (§ VI.6). In the case of the vulgar belief, he rejects the view that impressions have a continued and distinct existence: epistemologically, the belief in the continued and distinct existence of impressions, in large measure, depends upon the imagination rather than causal inference (§§ VI.1-5); metaphysically, double vision and perceptual relativity show that perceptions do not have a continued and independent existence (§§ V.3, VI.6). In the case of indirect realism, he rejects

1. For some discussion and references, see Garrett, 1997, pp. 42-52.

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the hypothesis of the double existence of perceptions and external objects both as ultimately due to the imagination (§ V.3) and as defective in meaning (§ V.5). For good measure, as we shall see shortly (§ VII.2), he rejects the possibility that matter exists, and hence rejects direct and indirect realism via this further thesis. Hume writes: "Tis impossible upon any system to defend either our understanding or senses; and we but expose them farther when we endeavour to justify them in that manner" (T 218). None of the views is left standing. There remains only the view that there is no body, a position that cannot be believed (§ V.6); there is no position that is stable under reflection. A number of commentators have argued that Hume does prefer or subscribe to one or the other of the theories he considers. (These commentators typically take Hume to favor indirect realism.) Though these discussions are often detailed and nuanced, they tend to leave something important out of account: Hume wants to secure the result that there is no satisfactory formulation of the belief in body. (My claim for the amendments offered in the preceding chapter is not that Hume would endorse them, but that they represent minimal changes that leave one of the views—that perceptions have a continued and distinct existence—intact.) Hume does not want to opt for one of the theories over the others; he wants on one ground or another to condemn them all.2 Once again, Hume leaves the resulting conundrum in the reader's hands. The developments in I.iv.7 are of a piece with those of I.iv.2. In I.iv.2, reflection uncovers difficulties in defending any formulation of the belief in body; reflection undermines justification in the belief in body. In I.iv.7, Hume concludes that no belief is j ustified, at least for the reflective person; reflection undermines justification systematically (§ III.4). Hume's discussions of body in I.iv.2 and matter in I.iv.4 thus contribute to Hume's elaboration of the theme that reflection has no preferred epistemic status, because it is destabilizing (§§ 1.5, III.6). A part of Hume seeks paradoxical outcomes. I do not believe that to this end he employs arguments that he considers inadequate. I do believe that his desire to induce perplexity leads him to overlook difficulties in his arguments, as well as paths in the direction of more constructive results. We have encountered examples in conjunction with I.iv.2. Determined to condemn the vulgar belief in body as unjustified and due to the imagination, Hume overlooks deficiencies in his argument at Treatise 210-11 to show that perceptions do not have a continued and distinct existence (§§ VI.4,6). He also fails to examine—in the interest of providing for the vulgar belief a unified explanation more closely allied with causal inference—the principle that causal dependence requires change (§§VI.5-6). Section I.iv.7 presents a similar pattern. Once again, it is open to us to consider whether Hume might have reached more satisfactory results. Hume arrives 2. For a similar perspective, see Livingston, 1984, pp. 11-15.1 part company with Livingston when he proceeds to interpret Hume as subscribing to the vulgar belief "transcendentally conceived" (p. 19) as "an a-priori framework for interpreting experience" (p. 22). For indirect realist interpretations, see Capaldi, 1975, pp. 203-9; Bricke, 1980, esp. pp. 19-24; and Wright, 1983, esp. ch. 2. Yolton attributes to Hume a distinctive version of the double existence view (1984, esp. ch. 8).

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at a pessimistic conclusion: The theory of justification that gives the most promise of sustaining his pretheoretical epistemological distinctions has the consequence that no belief is justified, at least for a reflective person. The "manifest contradiction" (T 266) and the "very dangerous dilemma" (T 267) are the two main epistemological considerations to which Hume appeals to support this result (§§ 1.4, III.4). Insofar as his argument is based on these considerations, Hume overplays his hand; his pessimism is premature. I discuss the manifest contradiction and the dangerous dilemma in §§ VII.2 and VII.3, respectively. At the same time, there is a more serious threat to Hume's epistemological program, one that he does not much pursue. States that are not infixed do not qualify as beliefs (§ III.2). But beliefs, though infixed, might themselves be unstable, unsteady in their influence, owing to the presence of other beliefs with which they conflict. The epistemological status of belief-forming mechanisms depends upon their tendency to produce stable doxastic states. Oscillation is an important species of instability, and contradictory beliefs are clear examples of states that oscillate (§§ 1.2, III.4, IV.5). Some states that are not contradictory feel like contradictions because they also are susceptible to sudden change (§ IV.5). Hume, however, owes us a general account of the conditions under which conflicting beliefs continue to oscillate or lead to a conflicted resolution rather than simply canceling each other out. I discuss this matter in §§ VII.4-6. As it turns out, this issue is interconnected with Hume's account of probability, which figures in the dangerous dilemma discussed in § VII.3. VII.2. The Manifest Contradiction and Causal Inference I begin with Hume's stated concerns in I.iv.7. MacNabb is blunt: "The sceptical arguments Hume deploys to prove inherent contradictions in our understanding, for instance the 'direct and total opposition between our reason and our senses', the reduction of all probabilities to zero by successive considerations of our fallibility... are sophistries."3 MacNabb leaves us in the dark with respect to how Hume could have committed such errors. My position, in large measure, is that Hume is so eager to reach a destructive conclusion that the mistakes go unnoticed. Hume's treatment of the manifest contradiction provides some clues. Hume is emphatic that causal inference is implicated in the manifest contradiction: "Tis this principle [the imagination, or the vivacity of ideas], which makes us reason from causes and effects; and 'tis the same principle, which convinces us of the continu'd existence of external objects, when absent from the senses. But tho' these two operations be equally natural and necessary in the human mind, yet in some circumstances they are *directly contrary, nor is it possible for us to reason justly and regularly from causes and effects, and at the same time believe the continu'd existence of matter. (T 266)

3. MacNabb, 1951/1966, p. 7.

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Hume claims to locate a contradiction with respect to a fundamental belief, the belief in matter. What is more, Hume contends that the contradiction involves causal inference, just and regular causal inference. Hume's insistence that the contradiction infects the faculty at the core of his constructive project (§§ 1.4, 111.1,3) gives the opposition added bite.4 It is therefore important to understand the contribution of causal inference to the contradiction. To pursue this point, we have to follow Hume's footnote, to I.iv.4, "Of the modern philosophy." Hume writes in the final paragraph of this section: Thus there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses; or more properly speaking, betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect, and those that persuade us of the continu'd and independent existence of body. When we reason from cause and effect, we conclude, that neither colour, sound, taste, nor smell have a continu'd and independent existence. When we exclude these sensible qualities there remains nothing in the universe, which has such an existence. (T 231)

This is a summary of an extended argument in I.iv.4. At pages 226-27, Hume claims that when we reason from cause and effect, we conclude that color and other "secondary qualities" (T 229; cf. 230) do not have a continued and independent existence. He argues at pages 227-31 that once secondary qualities are excluded, the primary qualities must also be excluded, so that nothing remains; there is no matter.5 This latter argument depends upon the impossibility of conceiving primary qualities as existing separately from all secondary qualities. For the present purposes, I focus on the earlier result, the one Hume attributes to causal inference at page 231. The argument at pages 226-27 that secondary qualities do not have a continued and independent existence consists of two paragraphs. In the first, Hume observes: "The fundamental principle [of the modern philosophy] is the opinion concerning colours, sounds, tastes, smells, heat and cold; which it asserts to be nothing but impressions in the mind, deriv'd from the operation of external objects, and without any resemblance to the qualities of the objects" (T 226). Hume adds: "I find only one of the reasons commonly produc'd for this opinion to be satisfactory, viz. that deriv'd from the variations of those impressions, even while the external object, to all appearance, continues the same" (T 226). Hume

4. Cf. Butler, 1960, pp. 80-81. 5. Some commentators take the conclusions about secondary qualities and thus the "direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses" to rely on the arguments at Treatise 210-11: Price, 1940a, pp. 38, 104-6, 122, 220; Kemp Smith, 1941, pp. 127 (including n. 2), 114 n. 3; and Robison, 1973,p. 93.Isee no evidence for this. The arguments at 210-11 attempt to show that perceptions do not have a continued existence, not that external objects do not have qualities that resemble perceptions. Perhaps commentators are misled by the fact that the arguments at 210-11 and 226-27 both have something to do with perceptual relativity and causal dependence. They are nevertheless arguments for different conclusions; 210—11 is directed against the vulgar belief in body, 226-31 against any form of realism. See § VI.6. Bricke is a commentator who keeps the arguments segregated (1980, pp. 9-14,16-24).


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proceeds to an inventory of familiar examples of the relativity of perception to external and internal circumstances. How does causal inference enter the picture? There are, of course, Lockean arguments for the conclusion that no impressions of colors and other secondary qualities resemble qualities of objects. These are arguments from the theoretical dispensability of such qualities, on the ground that they have no causal or explanatory role in our best scientific theories; impressions of color are best explained by the primary qualities of matter.6 This line of argument is not available to Hume in a context where he wants to show that "there remains nothing in the universe, which has [a continu'd and independent] existence"; in I.iv.4, Hume is arguing against the existence of primary qualities—motion, extension, and solidity—and secondary qualities alike. In the second paragraph, Hume produces an argument based on the variations in perceptions: The conclusion drawn from [the variations in impressions], is likewise as satisfactory as can possibly be imagin'd. 'Tis certain, that when different impressions of the same sense arise from any object, every one of these impressions has not a resembling quality existent in the object. For as the same object cannot, at the same time, be endow'd with different qualities of the same sense, and as the same quality cannot resemble impressions entirely different; it evidently follows, that many of our impressions have no external model or archetype. (T 227)

For example, an object appears orange to one person and appears brown to another person at the same time. The object cannot, at the same time, at the same part of its surface, possess qualities resembling both of these experiences. Hume concludes that at least some of the differing impressions of an object do not resemble qualities of the object. So far, so good, but no one would disagree. Hume invokes causal inference in order to generalize the result that at least some of the differing impressions do not resemble qualities of the object. The second paragraph continues: Now from like effects we presume like causes. Many of the impressions of colour, sound, &c. are confest to be nothing but internal existences, and to arise from causes, which no ways resemble them. These impressions are in appearance nothing different from the other impressions of colour, sound, &c. We conclude, therefore, that they are, all of them, deriv'd from a like origin. (T227)

Hume appeals to variations in perceptions to show that some of the differing impressions of an object do not resemble qualities of the object. He then invokes the principle that similar effects have similar causes to show that none of the impressions resembles qualities of the object.

6. See Mandelbaum, 1964, pp. 15-30; and Mackie, 1976, pp. 17-20.

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This is a novel and artificial twist on an old argument. When Berkeley, in the Three Dialogues, wants to show that "there is no such thing as colour really inhering in external bodies" (BW 2,186), he appeals to considerations of arbitrariness: And now tell me, whether you are still of opinion, that every body hath its true real colour inhering in it; and if you think it hath, I would fain know farther from you, what certain distance and position of the object, what peculiar texture and formation of the eye, what degree or kind of light is necessary for ascertaining that true colour, and distinguishing it from apparent ones. (BW2,186) Not all of the impressions of one sense can resemble the object. Philonous, representing Berkeley, challenges Hylas to explain which set of conditions of observation reveals the actual color of the object. Berkeley's claim is that it is arbitrary to select one such set of conditions and hence to suppose that some of the impressions, though not others, resemble the object. This standard version of a perceptual relativity argument makes no appeal to causation. Hume transforms the arbitrariness argument into a causal argument.7 Hume does so, I suggest, because he wants not only to uncover a contradiction but to locate one that specifically implicates causal inference. Hume is intent on showing that the belief-forming mechanism to which he assigns normative pride of place is itself a party to contradiction, which leads us to "successively assent" (T 266) to both sides of a contradiction. It is worth taking note of the remnant of the argument in the first Enquiry. "It is universally allowed by modern enquirers, that all the sensible qualities of objects, such as hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black, &c. are merely secondary, and exist not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions of the mind, without any external archetype or model, which they represent" (EHU XII, 122). Here, Hume claims to locate an "objection ... to the opinion of external existence" (EHU XII, 123), though he has no concern to claim that causal inference grounds the objection. There is additional evidence for taking Hume, in the Treatise, to be concocting a role for causal inference. The fourth rule in I.iii.15 for judging causes and effects is as follows: "The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause" (T173). The principle that like effects have like causes is a generalization of the second half of this rule. It is

7. It is, in this respect, misleading for Fogelin to characterize Hume as "using the standard argument from variability of perceptions" (1985, p. 90). Wright shows some sensitivity to Hume's departure from other versions (1983, p. 109). I do not see, however, why Hume would think his version helps establish the conclusion "that sensible qualities are mere perceptions in the mind" rather than the Cartesian and Lockean position "that there is nothing in objects which resembles ideas of secondary qualities" (1983, p. 109). Russell adopts the Berkelian version of the argument. The different colors that a table appears to have under different conditions all "have just as good a right to be considered real; and therefore, to avoid favouritism, we are compelled to deny that, in itself, the table has any one particular colour" (1912, p. 14). The charge of "favouritism" is the same as that of "arbitrariness."


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presumably for this reason that Hume thinks that the argument at page 227 constitutes just and regular causal inference. Even casual consideration of the argument should make us suspicious of the claim that the inference is just and regular. Hume argues that some impressions are caused by qualities of objects that do not resemble the impressions; all impressions are similar; therefore, no impressions are caused by qualities of objects that resemble the impressions. Parallel inferences look demonstrably objectionable: some deaths are not caused by arsenic; all deaths are similar; therefore, no deaths are caused by arsenic. What is going wrong? Any two deaths are similar, qua deaths. Two deaths could be dissimilar, however, with respect to physiological state at the time of death. So we could argue that since the death that leaves traces of arsenic and a death that does not are dissimilar, the deaths probably have different causes. Doubtless, any two impressions of one sense are similar, qua impressions of that sense. The impressions under consideration in Hume's argument, however, are dissimilar with respect to their qualitative or phenomenal content. For example, one has an orange appearance and one brown; or, to take one of Hume's examples at page 226, one is bitter and one sweet. When Hume writes that "these impressions are in appearance nothing different from the other impressions of colour, sound, d-c.," he is noting that they are similar qua impressions of the same sense; this ignores that they are dissimilar in their determinate color, sound, or taste. Hume's argument appeals to a similarity (qua impressions of color or taste) and ignores dissimilarities (with respect to determinate color or taste).8 Hume not only ignores dissimilarities in the effects, he ignores dissimilarities that are more specific than the similarities he takes into account. Any two objects will be similar or dissimilar in a variety of respects. In applying the principle that like effects have like causes, Hume gives special weight to the more general similarity, at the expense of similarity that is more specific. It is as if Hume has lost sight of the sixth rule for judging of causes and effects: "The difference in the effects of two resembling objects must proceed from that particular, in which they differ" (T 174).9

8. It might be suggested that we can construe Hume's argument as a reductio of the supposition that an object as it exists at a given time causes different impressions of one sense. The object cannot resemble both impressions, so that one of the impressions has the property of not resembling its cause. Then, by the principle that similar causes have similar effects, neither impression has the property of resembling its cause. This argument overlooks the fact that the principle that similar causes have similar effects applies to the total cause. The object is not the total cause of an impression; the other external and internal conditions of perception play a causal role. 9. Garrett notes that it is consistent with the fourth rule for judging causes and effects that "the causes of impressions might vary in their resemblance to the impressions themselves—so long as those causes all had some other feature in common" (1997, p. 219). This is right as far as it goes, but it is important that the feature in virtue of which the causes are similar might be more general than the feature in virtue of which they differ. We can think of Hume as violating Hempel's requirement of "maximal specificity," a principle of "total evidence" applied to inductive explanation (Hempel, 1965, pp. 397-401).

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There is a similar shortcoming in Hume's argument at pages 210-11 for the claim that perceptions do not have an independent existence. We have seen that the argument from double vision and perceptual relativity at most shows that a perception's membership in a particular bundle, not the perception's existence, is causally dependent upon the mind (§ VI.6). Beyond this, Hume's discussion of double vision faces a special difficulty. Hume writes: When we press one eye with a finger, we immediately perceive all the objects to become double, one half of them to be remov'd from their common and natural position. But as we do not attribute a continu'd existence to both these perceptions, and as they are both of the same nature, we clearly perceive, that all our perceptions are dependent on our organs, and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits. (T210-11) The structure of the argument is as follows: at least one of the perceptions in double vision is causally dependent on our organs; both the perceptions in double vision are of the same nature; therefore, both the perceptions are causally dependent on our organs. The suppressed premise is that similar effects have similar causes. The claim that the perceptions in double vision are "of the same nature" plays the same role as the claim at page 227 that impressions of the same sense are "in appearance nothing different from" one another. Both premises function to license the use of the principle that similar effects have similar causes. Hume's procedure is illegitimate in both cases. Perceptions in double vision, much as impressions of the same sense, are similar in some respects but not others. Perceptions in double vision differ somewhat in brightness.10 They also differ in that the new perception, the one that comes into existence when one presses one's eyeball, moves away from the original impression (which maintains a relatively constant position) as one increases pressure on the eyelid. Hume stresses the general similarities at the expense of more specific differences. Hume's facile reliance on the "similar effects, similar causes" principle undermines his argument at 210-11 as well as that at 227. It is noteworthy that the argument from perceptual relativity and double vision is also advanced in a context where Hume is set on establishing a particular result (§§ VI.4,6). Hume's appeal to causal inference in I.iv.4 is far from just and regular. At pages 226-27, he strains to contrive a role for causal inference in the first place. Hume has no serious argument to implicate causal inference in the manifest contradiction. He could at best fall back on the arbitrariness argument. It is difficult to believe that Hume could have overlooked such deficiencies in his employment of causal inference, unless he was intent on alleging a role for just and regular causal inference in the manifest contradiction. Hume wantecl to secure this result, though he sacrificed rigor to do so. 10. Price mentions this difference, though he seems to grant the similarity claim to Hume: "The new impressions are extremely like the old one which existed before I pushed my eye out of place; apart from the doubling there is no discernible difference, unless it be a slight decrease of brightness" (1940a, p. 110). Price, however, agrees that Hume's argument is "brief and airy" (p. 107) and presents a number of criticisms of it.

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Hume also tries to achieve the destructive result in a way that maximizes dramatic effect (cf. § 1.4). Hume insinuates, without establishing, "a new and signal contradiction in our reason" (T 150) in his I.iii.13 discussion of the fourth kind of unphilosophical probability (§ IV.2). At pages 225-26 of I.iv.4, Hume endorses a distinction between belief-forming mechanisms—ones explicitly including causal inference—that are just and those that are unjust (§ V.4). In light of this seemingly constructive development midway through Part iv, seventy-five pages after the "new and signal contradiction," the reader could be excused for losing sight of the Treatise 150 omen of what is to come: the I.iv.7 revelations of ineliminable instability. Hume must have enjoyed the fact that he puts the reader on alert in I.iii.13; lulls the reader into a false sense of security early in I.iv.4; and in the end deploys the manifest contradiction in I.iv.7. There is also the special irony that I.iv.4, the section that draws the constructive distinction between principles that are "permanent, irresistable, and universal" and those that are "changeable, weak, and irregular" (T 225), lays part of the groundwork for the negative result in I.iv.7.

VII.3. The Reduction of Probability "to Nothing" Much as the manifest contradiction draws on I.iv.4, the very dangerous dilemma draws on I.iv.l. The considerations advanced in "Of scepticism with regard to reason" generate the second-order belief that were we to subject judgments of probability to repeated corrections, the probability of the original judgment would reduce to zero. At the first three paragraphs of I.iv. 1, Hume argues that "all knowledge," even demonstrative knowledge, "degenerates into probability" (T 180). At paragraphs five through seven, Hume argues that judgments of probability are subject to correction in light of the fallibility of judgment. Hume thinks this correction takes the form of a reduction in the estimate of probability. Such a reduction results in a new judgment of probability which is itself subject to correction and reduction, ad infinitum. The series of reductions culminates in "a total extinction of belief and evidence" (T 183). Similarly, "these ... principles [of judgment], when carry'd farther, and apply'd to every new reflex judgment, must, by continually diminishing the original evidence, at last reduce it to nothing, and utterly subvert all belief and opinion" (T 184). The conclusion reappears in I.iv.7: "The understanding, when it acts alone,... entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition" (T 267). "Of scepticism with regard to reason" concerns "reason" or the "understanding" in the sense of pages 117-18, note 1, and page 371, note 1, respectively—demonstrative and probable reasonings. It is the sustained operation of the "understanding" (T 182,187) that subverts itself. I have considered the contribution of this argument to the destructive conclusions of I.iv.7 (§ III.4) but deferred consideration of the argument itself. The argument in I.iv. 1 seems mistaken. In order to conclude that the series of corrections would reduce probability to "nothing," Hume confuses probabilities of different orders, taking the probability that a first-order probability estimate is

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mistaken to reduce the original estimate. This line of criticism of Hume is well known.11 (I argue below that this objection is not the whole story.) To appreciate that something is amiss, it is helpful to distinguish between degrees of confidence and estimates of likelihood. Consider a complex calculation that yields the result that the likelihood of an event occurring is 70 percent. Suppose the person performing the calculation believes that errors occur in such calculations 15 percent of the time. This latter belief should reduce the person's degree of confidence in the estimate of likelihood, but it should not reduce that estimate itself. Though the person believes there is a 15 percent likelihood of error, the error could be in either direction; the likelihood of the event is perhaps higher than calculated.12 The most promising line of thought is that Hume should assign to propositions ranges of probabilities, confidence intervals. As the higher-order beliefs ramify, the range of probabilities associated with a proposition widens. Even in this approach, the series of corrections would not lead to a reduction of probability to any determinate value. It would lead to assigning the proposition to the interval between zero and one.13 Perhaps explaining how Hume comes to his mistaken argument is a better approach than seeking to rehabilitate it. Part of the explanation is that he is actively looking for arguments to show that reflection undermines justification (§§ 1.4, VII.1-2). Though the error is not difficult to uncover, Hume's desire to secure a negative result blinded him to it. There is another part to the explanation: This is an instance where Hume's devotion to associationist enlivening takes its toll and fosters the error. A consistent interpretation of Part iii requires that we construe belief as an infixed disposition to characteristic manifestations (§ III.2). If we interpret belief as a lively idea, we cannot make sense of Hume's characterizations of belief as steady and as resulting from a process of infixing. We also cannot explain how, as Hume allows, occurrent states can exceed belief in vivacity and yet not qualify as belief. At the same time, Hume is far from clear about the requirements of his position. We have seen that Hume's associationist ambitions are of great importance in the Treatise (§§ 1.6, II.2). When he self-consciously formulates his associationism, he imports it into the inherited theory of ideas; this

11. See MacNabb, 1951/1966, pp. 100-102; Basson, 1958, p. 83; Hacking, 1978, p. 30; Fogelin, 1985, pp. 16-19; and Johnson, 1995, pp. 235-36. The formulation in the text is closest to that of Hacking. For some earlier objections, see Prichard, 1950, pp. 192-96. 12. See Imlay, 1981, p. 126; Karlsson, 1990, pp. 126-27; and Lynch, 1996, pp. 92-93. 13. Lynch tries to resist this point: "The belief whose (subjective) probability is reduced to zero is the belief that P's original assignment was correct" (1996, p. 94). I cannot see why the repeated consideration of the frequency of miscalculation would not reduce the probability of this belief, as well as that of the initial first-order belief, to the interval between zero and one. Whereas Lynch develops a confidence interval interpretation (pp. 91-98), Hacking, 1978, p. 30, and Fogelin, 1985, p. 19, raise this option without endorsing it. For other attempts to salvage I.iv.l, see Basson, 1958, pp. 84-85; W. E. Morris, 1989, pp. 46-53; Dauer, 1996; Garrett, 1997, p. 225; Wilson, 1997, esp. pp. 307-19; and LoLordo, 2000, esp. pp. 419-38.

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framework encourages, perhaps even demands, the view that association involves the transmission of an occurrent property (§ III.2). When Hume goes about confirming and applying his theory of the nature and causes of belief, as well as summarizing his position in simple formulas, a focus on occurrent states predominates. I will argue that the felt pressure to apply associationist principles specifically to occurrent states, and in turn to explain their operation with reference to vivacity, contributes to the mistake in I.iv.l. It is a familiar point that identifying belief with vivacity is too confining. For example, it does not leave room for a distinction between belief and disbelief or for distinctions between different prepositional attitudes more generally. Problems also arise when one prepositional attitude is embedded in another. Consider the following two states of affairs: (a) believingthat there is an imaginingof a unicorn's existence; and (b) (merely) imagining that there is a believing in a unicorn's existence. If belief is a lively idea, Hume does not have the resources to explain the difference between these states of affairs. On the one hand, the difference between the propositional attitudes of believing and imagining consists in vivacity, so that the vivacity of the idea of a unicorn in state of affairs a must be greater than that of b. On the other hand, the difference in the propositional contents of those attitudes (what is believed or imagined) also consists in vivacity, vivacity of the same "idea," so that the vivacity of b must be greater than that of a by a corresponding amount.14 These differences would seem to wash out. The difficulty is that Hume calls upon vivacity to be the bearer both of propositional attitudes and features of propositional content, even though differences in vivacity reduce to a single dimension: differences in degree.15 These problems recede if we interpret belief and other propositional attitudes dispositionally. Different propositional attitudes are different kinds of dispositions. In the case of belief, we can distinguish content and confidence. Differences in content are differences in characteristic manifestations, assuming equal confidence in the two beliefs.16 Differences in degree of confidence are differences in the extent to which a dispositional belief is infixed or steady. This fits nicely with Hume's claim that steadiness is the result of repetition or custom. It is the natural development of Hume's position when we are taking seriously its dispositional veins (§ IV. 1). Hume's treatment of probability and evidence, immersed in the framework of vivacity and enlivening, constitutes an interesting special case of the difficulty with embedded propositional contents. Consider the following two states of affairs: (A) having a high degree of confidence that an event has a low statistical likelihood, and (B) having a low degree of confidence that an event has a high

14. For distinguishing propositional attitudes, cf. Laird, 1932, p. Ill; and Stroud, 1977, pp. 74-76. For problems related to embedding, see Bricke, 1980, pp. 116-19. 15. LoLordo briefly makes this sort of point (2000, p. 440). 16. The qualification is important. The manifestations of belief in a given statistical likelihood will interact with the degree of confidence in the belief in producing, for example, betting behavior.

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statistical likelihood. Suppose that, when working within the confines of his associationism, Hume treats degrees of confidence along the lines of different prepositional attitudes and estimates of likelihood along the lines of the content of embedded prepositional attitudes—as matters of vivacity in both cases. This would be unfortunate. On the one hand, the difference between degrees of confidence consists in vivacity, so that the vivacity of A would have to be greater than that of B. On the other hand, the difference in estrmate of likelihood consists in vivacity, so that the vivacity of B would have to be greater than that of A. It would thus be impossible to explain the difference between A and B. I will argue that Hume identifies both degree of confidence and estimate of statistical likelihood with vivacity, which yields this result, and that these identifications encourage the mistake in I.iv.l. In his treatment of probability or "uncertainty" (T 124) in I.iii.11-13, Hume sets out to confirm his associationism. In I.iii.12, "Of the probability of causes," Hume considers two kinds of imperfect experience, infrequent experience and contrary experience, a conjunction that is not constant, however frequent (§11.1). Infrequent observation should bear most directly on degree of confidence. The observation of conjunctions that are not constant should bear most directly on estimate of likelihood. Hume treats both kinds of probability as consisting in vivacity: "The probabilities of causes are of several kinds; but are all deriv'd from the same origin, viz. the association of ideas to a present impression" (T 130). This is also clear from Hume's summary statement in I.iii.13. He writes in the penultimate paragraph: "In all these cases the evidence diminishes by the diminution of the force and intenseness of the idea. This therefore is the nature of the judgment and probability" (T 154). Details of Hume's discussions of probability cohere with his summary statements. I begin with infrequent experience. Other things being equal, we will have a lower degree of confidence in a conjunction that has been infrequently observed: As the habit, which produces the association, arises from the frequent conjunction of objects, it must arrive at its perfection by degrees, and must acquire new force from each instance, that falls under our observation. The first instance has little or no force: The second makes some addition to it: The third becomes still more sensible; and 'tis by these slow steps, that our judgment arrives at a full assurance. But before it attains this pitch of perfection, it passes thro' several inferior degrees. (T 130; cf. 105)

Assurance or confidence is proportional to the number of past repetitions. Note that each "instance" is an observation of the conjunction; in other words, there is an observed conjunction—let us suppose a constant conjunction—at each step. Hume proceeds to write of cases that fall short of a frequent repetition as constituting "an imperfect experience" and hence "an imperfect habit and transition" (T 131). Even before reaching frequent observations of the constant conjunction, we would, other things being equal, estimate the likelihood that one object accompanies the other in an unobserved instance as one. Increased repetition does not change our estimate of the statistical likelihood that the objects

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are conjoined in an unobserved instance but rather our "assurance" that the estimate is correct; "assurance" here is the strength of the belief or the degree of confidence. According to the passage at page 130, the habit acquires additional "force" from the repetition. At the close of the preceding section, Hume provides a general associationist principle: "The vivacity of the idea is always proportionable to the degrees of the impulse or tendency to the transition; and belief is the same with the vivacity of the idea, according to the precedent doctrine" (T 130; cf. 142). Since vivacity is proportional to the degrees of the impulse or tendency to the transition, that is, in this case, to the "force" of the habit, the vivacity of the idea is itself proportional to the number of past repetitions. In his treatment of infrequent conjunction, Hume identifies vivacity with strength of belief or degree of confidence. In the second kind of imperfect experience, contrary experience (§§ II. 1, VI.2), one observes an imperfect conjunction, a merely statistical regularity; Cs are sometimes followed by Es, sometimes by not-Es. Such cases are the principal topic of I.iii.12. Our estimate of the likelihood that C is accompanied by E in an unobserved instance equals the proportion of Es in the observed sample (T 140, 154; cf. 133). Hume seeks to explain why we estimate likelihood in this way: A contrariety of events in the past may give us a kind of hesitating belief for the future... by producing an imperfect habit and transition from the present impression to the related idea. When the conjunction of any two objects is frequent, without being entirely constant, the mind is determin'd to pass from one object to the other; but not with so entire a habit, as when the union is uninterrupted, and all the instances we have ever met with are uniform and of a piece. (T 132-33; cf. 135)

An imperfect conjunction produces an imperfect habit. We have seen that an imperfect habit has less force and that the vivacity of an idea depends upon the force of the habit that produces it. The vivacity of an idea will therefore depend on the degree of correlation in the observed cases. On this, Hume is explicit: According to the hypothesis above explain'd all kinds of reasoning from causes or effects are founded on two particulars, viz. the constant conjunction of any two objects in all past experience, and the resemblance of a present object to any one of them. The effect of these two particulars is, that the present object invigorates and inlivens the imagination; and the resemblance, along with the constant union, conveys this force and vivacity of the related idea; which we are therefore said to believe, or assent to. If you weaken either the union or resemblance, you weaken the principle of transition, and of consequence that belief, which arises from it. The vivacity of the first impression cannot be fully convey'd to the related idea, either where the conjunction of their objects is not constant, or where the present impression does not perfectly resemble any of those, whose union we are accustom'd to observe. (T 142)

Vivacity diminishes to the extent that the conjunction is not constant. In this context, vivacity is identified with the estimate of statistical likelihood. This is

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no surprise. Hume's account of the probability of causes rests on the idea that, in cases where we observe contrary effects, vivacity depends upon the proportion of positive instances in the sample (§ VI.2). (I provide additional details in §VII.4.) The degree to which a conjunction is constant, other things being equal, determines the estimate of likelihood. The frequency of observation, other things being equal, determines the strength of belief or degree of confidence. The penultimate paragraph of I.iii.13 confirms that Hume treats both probability arising from infrequent observation and probability arising from contrary experience as consisting in vivacity: "Thus it appears upon the whole, that every kind of opinion or judgment, which amounts not to knowledge, is deriv'd entirely from the force and vivacity of the perception, and that these qualities constitute in the mind, what we call the BELIEF of the existence of any object" (T 153). Later in the paragraph, Hume provides an inventory of different degrees of vivacity. These include circumstances "when we have not observ'd a sufficient number of instances, to produce a strong habit" (T 154): infrequent experience. They also include circumstances "when these instances are contrary to each other" (T 154): contrary experience. In I.iii.13, as well as I.iii.12, Hume identifies vivacity with both degree of confidence and estimate of likelihood. Throughout I.iii.ll—13, Hume takes "probability" and "uncertainty" to be closely interrelated. Proofs and probability are two species of evidence. Proofs —arguments based on frequent observation of a constant conjunction—"are entirely free from doubt and uncertainty"; probability is evidence that falls short of proofs in that it is "still attended with uncertainty" (T 124). The two kinds of probability of causes—based on infrequent observation or observation of a conjunction that is not constant—thus constitute two kinds of uncertainty, so that vivacity is identified with two kinds of "uncertainty" as well as two kinds of'probability." We are now in a position to consider the bearing of Hume's associationist account of probability on his argument that probability reduces "to nothing." In I.iv.l, Hume slides between the two kinds of probability and uncertainty. He writes of our "having thus found in every probability, beside the original uncertainty inherent in the subject, a new uncertainty deriv'd from the weakness of that faculty, which judges" (T 182). The "original uncertainty inherent in the subject," the probability "deriv'd from the nature of the object" (T 182), is related to the estimate of likelihood; the "new uncertainty," the probability "deriv'd from the nature of the understanding" (T 182)—"from the possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truth and fidelity of our faculties" (T 182)—is related to the degree of confidence. This latter doubt or uncertainty "must weaken still further our first evidence" (T 182). This is the critical juncture where Hume mistakenly claims that we must decrease the probability. Let us return to the example where our estimate of the likelihood of an event is 70 percent and we believe that we are mistaken 15 percent of the time in the sort of complex calculation we have employed to arrive at that estimate. The belief that we are mistaken 15 percent of the time ought to

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weaken our degree of confidence in our estimate of likelihood but not reduce the estimate itself. (Even if our estimate is mistaken, it might be too low rather than too high.) In I.iv.l, however, Hume is construing all kinds of "probability" and "uncertainly" on the associationist model of I.iii.l 1-13. In the presence of the belief that we are mistaken 15 percent of the time, the probability (= degree of confidence) ought to be reduced. Hume takes degree of confidence to consist in degree of vivacity. But the only degree of vivacity in sight is the one that constitutes a 70 percent probability (= estimate of likelihood). So Hume supposes we reduce that vivacity, thus initiating the series of reductions. The correction for fallibility must reduce vivacity, and there is only one vivacious idea available for reduction.17 Hume's identifying both differences in degree of confidence and differences in estimate of likelihood with differences in degree of vivacity fosters the mistake. With respect to the subsequent reductions for the repeated corrections, Hume should distinguish his degree of confidence that the probability is 70 percent, his degree of confidence in that first-order degree of confidence, his degree of confidence in that second-order degree of confidence, and so on.18 At each of these stages, there is indeed a confusion of levels of probability. By contrast, at the first step of the argument, Hume runs together estimate of likelihood and degree of confidence; this is less a confusion about levels of probability than about different sources of uncertainty. As in the case of his attempt to implicate causal inference in the manifest contradiction (§ VII.2), Hume had no disposition to backtrack and reexamine his steps. To the contrary, he wanted to secure a destructive result with respect to the impact of reflection.19 Thinking that he had found one, he rested content. Hume's associationist treatment of both kinds of imperfect experience—infrequent experience and contrary experience—helps to explain his propounding a spurious argument in I.iv.l. The dangerous dilemma in I.iv.7 does not generate a significant difficulty for Hume's project; it depends upon the mistaken claim that probability reduces to zero. I conclude that both arguments—I.iv. 1 and I.iv.4—attest more to Hume's temperament than to significant obstacles for sustaining epistemic distinctions within the framework of his favored epistemological theory.

17. Garrett's reconstruction depends upon a contrast between "the actual proportion of positive instances among all the instances in the observed sample with the felt degree of vivacity or belief" (1997, p. 225). For Garrett, Hume assumes that reason would transfer a lower felt probability to the original judgment. Garrett's "actual" probability is better construed as an estimate of likelihood and his "felt" probability as degree of confidence. 18. As Fogelin puts it, these probabilities are "nested" (1993, p. 103). 19. C. R. Morris writes: "When (Hume) found that an unbounded faith in science was not, as far as he could see, justified, he was horror-stricken: and he was ready to believe that he must have made some mistake in his inquiry, though diligent search failed to reveal that mistake" (1931, p. 112). Morris does not cite specific results, but he is not describing the Hume whom I find in sections 1,2,4, and 7 of I.iv. Also see §§ VI.4-5.

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VII.4. The Probability of Causes In the remaining sections of this chapter, I consider some genuine difficulties for Hume's project. The general issue is whether Hume can provide a principled explanation of the conditions under which conflicting beliefs result in persisting instability—either in the form of oscillation or of a conflicted resolution— rather than simply canceling each other out. I discuss a number of versions of this problem. The first, which I discuss in this section, arises from differences in Hume's treatments of the probability of causes in Books I and II. The second arises from differences in his treatments of beliefs based on the probability of causes and beliefs based on education (§ VII.5). The third concerns Hume's treatment of contradictions (§ VII.6). In the Treatise, Hume discusses the probability of causes in I.iii.12-13, Il.iii.l, and II.iii.9. There are interesting differences among these discussions. To bring these to light, it will be useful to begin with an overview of Hume's account of the probability of causes prior to II.iii.9 (pages 438-48). The observation of conjunctions that are not constant is one kind of imperfect experience and one source of an imperfect habit and transition (§ VII.3). In this context, Hume writes of "contrary events" (T 136), "contrary experiments" (T 135,139, 154,403), or "contrary effects" (T 133). In these cases, we observe different effects following the same causes. Section I.iii.12 addresses probability based on such "contrary" observations. Inferences from contrary experiences are of two kinds: unreflective and reflective. In cases of unreflective inferences, "as the custom depends not upon any deliberation, it operates immediately, without allowing any time for reflection" (T 133). Hume devotes a paragraph to the unreflective case. The unreflective inference results in an "imperfect belief" (T 135) derived from an "imperfect habit" (T 132); this is an example of "habits of inferior degrees of force" (T 133). In a case where the belief is backed by frequent observations, the resulting habit is imperfect only insofar as it is based on contrary experiences (§§ II. 1, IV.l); "force" is thus a variable for estimation of statistical likelihood. The upshot is a steady belief that the statistical likelihood of Es following Cs is proportional to the ratio of Es in the observed sample (cf. T 133). Hume's oneparagraph treatment obscures complexities, to which I return in this and the following section. In cases of reflective inferences, "we commonly take knowingly into consideration the contrariety of past events" (T 133). Hume devotes eight pages to such reflective inferences, which are his real interest. Hume's objective is to show that reflection and deliberation on the probability of causes is itself an associationist process.20 This parallels Hume's concern in I.iii.6 to show that causal inference (in the case of proofs) is not due to a faculty of reason, construed nonassociationistically (§§ 11.2,3). The probability of causes presents a

20. For the importance to Hume of providing a psychological account of judgments of probability, see Connon, 1976, esp. pp. 124-25,126-28; and Gower, 1991, pp. 6-7.

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special challenge in this regard; when it proceeds reflectively, we "carefully weigh the experiments, which we have on each side" (T 133). Is not the weighing of evidence an operation of the sort of presumed nonassociationist faculty that Hume has taken pains to reject? A summary of Hume's I.iii.12 account of reflective judgments about the probability of causes will serve to indicate his line of response. Hume writes, "Our reasonings of this kind arise not directly from the habit, but in an oblique manner" (T 133). Fogelin notes Hume's tendency to invoke a "'wage pool' principle for the dispersal of vivacity: there is only so much vivacity to be portioned out between associated ideas."21 Our present context presents a nice example. The "impulse" to expect the future to resemble the past "is here broke into pieces, and diffuses itself over all those images, of which each partakes an equal share of that force and vivacity, that is deriv'd from the impulse" (T 134). (Hume invokes a similar principle at page 129 in his treatment of the probability of chances.) The "images" are "presented by our past experience" (T 134); they are recollections of the individual observations, so that equal portions of vivacity are allotted to each image. The mind thus considers each of the "multitude" (T 138) of experiences of Cs followed by Es. These experiences or "views" (T 138) are "melted together" (T 140); they "unite their forces" (T 138). This "gives them a superior degree of force and vivacity... than what arises from any one alone" (T 138). The "concurrence" (T 138) of resembling experiences or views thus reinforces each other in a single, more vivacious, view. The images or views of experiences of Cs followed by not-Es also unite. This leaves the mind with two "contrary views" (T 138), "antagonists" (T 140) in "opposition" (T 138). These views are "mutually destructive" (T 138) in that "the mind is determin'd to the superior only with that force, which remains after subtracting the inferior" (T 138). Equal amounts of vivacity cancel out, leaving a remainder of vivacity on the side of the stronger of the two views (if one is stronger). In other words, the vivacity of the weaker view reduces that of the stronger, leaving a "ballance" (T 136) on the latter side. As Hume writes in Il.iii.l, "The mind ballances the contrary experiments" (T 403; cf. 186). We thus "extract a single judgment from a contrariety of past events" (T 134; cf. 140). The result is the judgment that the likelihood of Es following Cs equals their proportion in the observed sample (T 140, 154)—the same result, of course, as in the unreflective case. Though we "weigh" the evidence, such reflection or calculation is an associationist process, the strengthening and weakening of vivacity. Maher has neatly demonstrated an interesting consequence of Hume's account. Suppose that vivacities are represented on a scale from zero to one. Hume is committed to identifying a vivacity of zero, after subtraction, with a probability of 50 percent. This follows from two features of Hume's approach. First, the estimate of likelihood is equal to the proportion of Es in the sample. This is the fact that Hume is trying to explain associationistically. Second, the

21. Fogelin, 1985, p. 58 (cf. 58-60).

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estimate of likelihood is identified with the vivacity that remains after "subtracting" (T 138; cf. EHU X, 198) or, in Il.iii.l, "deducting" (T 403), the vivacity of one view (the inferior view, if one is inferior) from the other (cf. T 154). Consider the case where Cs are observed to be followed by Es half the time and followed by not-Es half the time. Since the two contrary views are equally vivacious, reducing one by the amount of the other leaves a vivacity of zero; zero vivacity must therefore represent a judgment of 50 percent likelihood.22 This "principle of subtraction"—that a vivacity of zero, after subtraction, equals a probability of 50 percent—fits other cases. Suppose Cs are observed to be followed by Es 80 percent of the time and followed by not-Es 20 percent of the time. The vivacity apportioned to E and not-E will be .8 and .2, respectively. Canceling out or subtraction leaves a vivacity of .6, and six-tenths of the difference between a vivacity of zero (a probability of 50 percent) and a vivacity of one (a probability of 100 percent) yields a probability of 80 percent. I turn to Hume's treatment of the probability of causes in II.iii.9, "Of the direct passions," a position he reproduces in A Dissertation on the Passions. Hume explains how joy and grief give rise to hope or fear. The certainty of a good or evil produces joy or grief, respectively. Suppose the good or evil is uncertain, merely probable. In these circumstances, the mind rapidly fluctuates between views of the presence and absence of the good or evil, alternately producing joy and grief. Whereas the imagination is "quick and agile" (T 441; DP 1.3.4) in considering ideas, these passions are sluggish, "slow and restive" (T 441; DP 1.3.4), so that the joy and the grief intermingle or unite, giving rise to hope or fear, depending upon the relative probabilities of the two views (T 440-41; DP 1.3.3-4).23 What is the source of the fluctuations in the different views of the object? Hume tells us that the explanation of hope and fear depends on "what I have already advanc'd in the preceding book concerning the nature of probability" (T 440). Hume's II.iii.9 summary of the Book I treatment of probability is as follows: Probability arises from an opposition of contrary chances or causes, by which the mind is not allow'd to fix on either side, but is incessantly tost from

22. Maher, 1981, pp. 137-45. Maher is aware that it is unclear how to represent probabilities lower than 50 percent (pp. 141, 145). (Also cf. Norton and Norton, 2000b, p. 462, annotation on par. 13.) In my view, this is a symptom of the limitations of the associationist account of belief, not an objection to Maher's interpretation of implications within the framework. I have noted, independently of the principle of subtraction, Hume's problems doing justice to the variety of prepositional attitudes (§ VII.3). The problem of representing probabilities lower than 50 percent is related. Also note that if we correlate vivacities with probabilities before the subtraction, evidently the .8 and .2 vivacities associated with Es and not-Es, respectively, equal probabilities of 90 percent (four-fifths of the way from 50 to 100 percent) and 60 percent (one-fifth of the way from 50 to 100 percent)! Maher does not consider this point, which has led me to say that the vivacity of zero represents a probability of 50 percent only after subtraction. 23. For brief treatments, see Glathe, 1950, pp. 80-85; Penelhum, 1975, pp. 95-96; and Neu, 1977, pp. 33-34.


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one to another, and at one moment is determin'd to consider an object as existent, and at another moment as the contrary. The imagination or understanding, call it which you please, fluctuates betwixt the opposite views; and tho' perhaps it may be oftner turn'd to the one side than the other, 'tis impossible for it, by reason of the opposition of causes or chances, to rest on either. The pro and con of the question alternately prevail. (T 440; cf. DP 1.3.2)

Hume continues in this vein:" 'Tis necessary, that the imagination shou'd run alternately from the one to the other" (T 442). Similarly, the probabilities of chances and causes agree in "the uncertainty and fluctuation they bestow on the imagination by that contrariety of views, which is common to both" (T 444; cf. DP 1.5.1). We thus find Hume stressing that probability is a "wavering and unconstant method of surveying an object" (T 444; cf. DP 1.6.1). To my ear, the II.iii.9 discussion is remarkably different in tone from the Book I material that Hume claims to be summarizing. Granted, in Book I, there is an "opposition" (T 138) between contrary views, "antagonists" (T 140) whose influence is "mutually destructive" (T 138). In I.iii.12, however, such locutions seem mere metaphors. The uniting of forces and the subsequent mutual destruction consists in the addition and subtraction of vivacity; opposing arguments simply cancel out. In I.iii.12, Hume does not assign any role to fluctuation and wavering. By contrast, in II.iii.9, the mind "run[s] alternately" and is indeed "incessantly tost" from one view to the other; the two views "alternately prevail." And there is no suggestion that such fluctuation or alternation comes to an end.24 Hume holds that in the case of contradictions, opposing arguments of equal strength lead to cycles of oscillation and alternating assent, rather than canceling out (§ 1.2). The II.iii.9 description of psychological phenomena associated with the probability of causes, unlike that in I.iii.12, seems to assimilate the opposition of contrary experiences to the case of contradiction. The II.iii.9 treatment is welcome from my broad interpretive approach in that it is a further illustration of Hume's intense interest in mental instability.25 As the dual references indicate, many of the key passages in II.iii.9 reappear, almost verbatim, in A Dissertation on the Passions, even though this work is a drastic reduction of Book II of the Treatise. Furthermore, whereas II.iii.9 is the next to last of thirty-four sections in Book II, Hume places the corresponding material first among the Dissertations six sections. It is in any event striking that the details of Hume's II.iii.9 treatments of oscillation in judgments of probability and in the direct passions remain intact in the Dissertation. (This is all the more remarkable if one accepts Kemp Smith's view that, as of the Dissertation, Hume's commitment to associationist processes—such as the double association of ideas and impressions in the account of the indirect passions of 24. The summary of the probability of causes at I.iii.13 is somewhat intermediate between that of I.iii. 12 and II.iii.9. There is but a "contest" (T 154) in which one side prevails, but it does so "at last" (T 154), which is suggestive of prior struggle. 25. As Maher notes, citing passages from I.i, I.iii, and Il.iii (but not I.iv or Ill.iii. 1), "the theory of mental oscillations is entrenched in Hume's philosophy" (1981, p. 152).

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pride and humility—has "markedly cooled." Hume's interest in instability in judgment nevertheless remains in place.) The Dissertation was first published (as "Of the Passions") in 1757 and was frequently reprinted under Hume's supervision.26 We must therefore take seriously the interpretive issues to which II.iii.9 leads. My concern is not to argue that the account of probability in II.iii.9 is inconsistent with that of I.iii.12.1 will consider proposals for reconciling them. My concern is to highlight the malleability in Hume's descriptions of the psychological mechanisms that underpin the probability of causes. In II.iii.9, where Hume seeks to explain the origin of hope and fear, fluctuation plays a critical role. In I.iii.12, where Hume seeks to explain how we extract a single judgment, fluctuation is downplayed.27 The availability of the II.iii.9 treatment raises the question of whether Hume can provide a motivated account of the conditions under which conflicting beliefs eventuate in instability. Hume can evidently press his account of contrary experiences either in the direction of fluctuation or not. Maher offers an ingenious proposal to reconcile the disparate treatments of probability in I.iii.12 and II.iii.9. His idea is that the fluctuations that Hume stresses in the discussion of the direct passions are part of the mechanism for extracting a single judgment; they constitute the vehicle for the subtraction of probabilities in particular. Roughly, Maher's suggestion is that over the course of its oscillations, the amount of time that the mind attends to each of the two contrary views will be proportional to their ratio in the observed sample; the vivacity on each side of the question as the mind oscillates will vary accordingly, and the oscillations will then fuse in accordance with the principle of subtraction.28 As far as I can see, Maher's proposal does nothing to explain why there should be fluctuation or alternation in the first place. In introducing the fluctuations in II.iii.9, Maher writes that "Hume now says" that fluctuation takes place—"now," as opposed to saying this in I.iii.12. But why does Hume say this at all? In I.iii.12, Hume describes a two-stage process: in the first stage, concurring images or views unite, strengthening vivacity; in the second stage, the two contrary views cancel each other out, weakening vivacity. There is no appeal to fluctuation within this second stage. For all Hume says in I.iii.12, the two contrary views coexist, simultaneously cohabiting the mind.29

26. Kruse suggests that the Dissertations reorganization of II.iii.9 has the advantage of dealing with the direct passions before the indirect (1939, pp. 58-59). Immerwahr provides a compelling account of the content and arrangement of the Dissertation with reference to its position, as originally published, between the Natural History of Religion and "Of Tragedy" (1994). For Hume's cooling on associationism, see Kemp Smith, 1941, p. 533 (cf. 533-36). But the extent to which this is the case is controversial. See Passmore, 1952/1968, pp. 127-31. For the publication history, see Mossner, 1954/1980, pp. 224,319-35. 27. Maher notes that the differences in treatment are "at least incongruous" (1981, pp. 150-51). 28. Maher, 1981, pp. 148^9,151. 29. The quotation is at Maher, 1981, p. 148.


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In II.iii.9, Hume does provide some argument for the claim that fluctuation occurs. The argument is framed with the probability of chances in view, but Hume takes the probability of causes to be analogous: Some of the chances lie on the side of existence, and others on that of non-existence; which are objects altogether incompatible. 'Tis impossible by one steady view to survey the opposite chances, and the events dependent on them; but 'tis necessary, that the imagination shou'd run alternately from the one to the other. (T 442)

Hume infers fluctuation in view from incompatibility. We need to ask in what sense the contrary views are "incompatible." In I.iii.12, Hume uses 'incompatible' only once: "As to the manner of their opposition, 'tis evident, that as the contrary views are incompatible with each other, and 'tis impossible the object can at once exist conformable to both of them, their influence becomes mutually destructive" (T 138). Here, the incompatibility consists in the fact that no object can be both E and not-E. Granted, Hume appeals to the incompatibility to explain the mutual destruction. The issue, however, is why fluctuation precedes cancellation or subtraction. In II.iii.9, an ontological incompatibility—that the object is both E and not-E—becomes, without argument, a psychological incompatibility. Am I making matters needlessly hard? Contradictory beliefs compete for influence so that there is fluctuation in their manifestations (§ IV.5). Unfortunately, the application of this principle to the probability of causes is problematic. The fusion or concurrence of similar experiences gives rise to contrary "images" or "views." It is not clear (continuing to think about matters in terms of enlivening) that these are sufficiently vivacious to constitute beliefs. The reinforced images or views are a stage on the way to belief, for we do in the end extract a single judgment (T 138), but it does not follow that they are themselves beliefs. We can sidestep this problem if we focus on dispositions. We can most easily consider this approach in the case of unreflective judgments about the probability of causes. In II.iii.9, Hume does not say whether his subject is reflective or unreflective judgments. Let us put reflective probability judgments to the side. Consider the case where we have observed Cs to be followed by Es half the time and followed by not-Es half the time. Perhaps we should think of the repeated observations as resulting, in the first instance, in two habits: one habit of expecting Es to follow Cs and another habit of expecting not-Es to follow Cs. A question arises as to the extent to which these two habits are steady or infixed. Let us suppose that there is a fixed quantity of steadiness to be dispersed over the two habits. This is analogous to Hume's wage pool assumption, in the case of reflective probability, that there is a fixed quantity of vivacity to be dispersed over the images of individual experiences. The steadiness will thus be divided—equally divided in the case under consideration—between the two habits. This would explain Hume's claim that contrary experiences give rise to imperfect habits. In this model, neither habit is fully infixed. Whether or not they are sufficiently infixed to constitute beliefs (in the absolute sense of § IV. 1), both habits

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are somewhat unsteady dispositions to their characteristic effects. These characteristic effects include occurrent assent (a lively idea)—to Es following Cs in the case of one habit, to not-Es following Cs in the case of the other. Since both underlying dispositions are less than completely steady, there will be fluctuation in these and other effects, whether or not the habits constitute beliefs. This accounts for the fluctuation.30 Hume takes such wavering, variation, or inconstancy in doubt or uncertainty to cause uneasiness (§ IV.5). Maher does not make use of this doctrine, though it is developed in II.iii.10, the section following the discussion of the direct passions, and receives some advance notice in II.iii.9 itself (T 447). Uneasiness is unpleasant, a form of pain, and provides a motive for its own removal (§§ 1.3, IV.5, V.3). The fluctuation and uneasiness can be removed by uniting the unsteady habit to expect Es to follow Cs and the unsteady habit to expect not-Es to follow Cs into a single, steady habit to expect Cs to be followed by Es and not-Es in a ratio of one-to-one. The uneasiness that results from the fluctuations provides the motive for uniting habits in this way. In this account, two conflicting, unsteady habits lead to fluctuation and uneasiness, which motivate us to extract a single judgment. We can suppose that this picture stands in the background of Hume's references to "opposition" between "antagonists" in I.iii.12. The account also enables us to go some way toward reconciling the disparities between I.iii.12 and II.iii.9. In II.iii.9, Hume is focusing—in order to provide an account of hope and fear—on the fluctuations that motivate the extraction of a single judgment. This does not fully resolve the inconsistency, because the most natural reading of II.iii.9 is that the fluctuation does not come to an end. Perhaps we should take it that the single, steady habit decomposes under the emotional pressure of joy and grief, so that fluctuation returns. My main concern, however, is to explain how fluctuation might get so much as a foothold in Hume's treatments of the probability of causes. Maher observes that the " raison d'etre for the subtraction of probabilities is plainly the problem of accounting for how we extract a single judgment from a contrariety of past events."31 There is a prior question: Why do we extract a single judgment? Whereas Maher regards oscillation as the mechanism for extraction, I regard the uneasiness in the oscillation as the motivation for extraction. In my interpretation, the mind begins with two separate habits that are both somewhat unsteady, so that there is fluctuation in their effects. By contrast, the single habit of expecting Es to follow Cs half the time is fully infixed and steady—backed by all of the instances that support the separate habits of expecting Es to follow Cs and expecting not-Es to follow Cs. The fully infixed judgment of statistical likelihood is steadier than the two partially infixed nonstatistical judgments from which it arises. This model fits beautifully with the stability-based interpretation of Hume's theory of justification. To establish that the dispositions to characteristic manifestations produced by a psycholog-

30. I am unsure whether this model is applicable in the reflective case—at the stage where all the images have been taken to reinforce one or the other of the two contrary views. 31. Maher, 1981, p. 145.

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ical mechanism are steady or infixed to a given degree is to establish that the beliefs are justified to a corresponding degree, other things being equal (§ IV. 1). The interpretation thus implies that a greater degree of justification accrues to the single habit than to the two conflicting habits. The model also coheres with the motivational role that the stability-based interpretation assigns to uneasiness. The claim that fluctuation is uneasy is explicit in Hume's general account of doubt or uncertainty and also implicated in his account of contradictions. In the contexts of judgments resulting from both sympathy and unphilosophical probability, uneasiness in variations in judgment motivates efforts to replace beliefs that are less stable with those that are more so (§ IV.5). We now find that there is a similar movement toward greater degrees of stability in the case of observation of a conjunction that is not constant. In all three cases, the more stable judgments possess a greater degree of justification, enhanced normative standing (§ IV.6). The supposition that fluctuation and uneasiness motivates extraction has an additional virtue. Hume's account of the probability of causes may be seen, in yet a further respect, to parallel his treatment of the first three kinds of unphilosophical probability and variations in sympathy due to moral sentiment. In I.iii.13 and III.iii.1, fluctuations in degree of confidence or in sentiment due to sympathy motivate corrections to momentary points of view in favor of adopting a stable point of view. In my reconstruction of Hume's account of the probability of causes, fluctuations due to unsteady habits that constitute partial points of view (each based only on a portion of the observations) motivate the adoption of a single, stable point of view or judgment. VII.5. Contrary Beliefs Based on Habit Hume regards beliefs based on contrary experience, as well as those based on infrequent experience, as justified (§ II.1). By this I mean that he approves epistemically of such beliefs, at least prior to the destructive results proffered in I.iv.7. Hume regards beliefs based on education or inculcation as not justified; they are disclaimed by philosophy, independently of the results of I.iv.7 (§ III.3). Hume explains: But as education is an artificial and not a natural cause, and as its maxims are frequently contrary to reason, and even to themselves in different times and places, it is never upon that account recogniz'd by philosophers; tho' in reality it be built almost on the same foundation of custom and repetition as our reasonings from causes and effects. (T 117)

Hume does not demur from these observations about education (§ III.3). We have not, however, evaluated the substance of Hume's explanation, which has a number of strands. MacNabb cites Hume's remark that "education is an artificial and not a natural cause" (T 117) and construes this to mean that "the associations of ideas derived from education depend on the wishes and motives of educators, and

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human wishes have no necessary connexion with what actually occurs." I am unsure what MacNabb has in mind here. Granted, educators' maxims have an "arbitrary nature" in the sense that they depend on wishes and motives. Hume is a determinist, and human wishes may therefore have a causal connection with what actually occurs. Of course, mere education is unaccredited, and hence beliefs based upon inculcation would not involve causal inference about these connections. But it is difficult to see why this impugns inculcation without simply presupposing that only distinctively causal inference is justified. Hume's observation that education's "maxims are frequently contrary to reason" (T 117), that is, to demonstrative and probable reasoning, seems question begging; it does not explain why we should favor reason.32 This leaves Hume's observation that education's "maxims are frequently contrary... to themselves" (T 117). In this spirit, MacNabb also focuses on the "variability" of the maxims of educators. The probability of causes, however, involves a variability and even "contrariety" of events, experiences, or effects (T 131, 132, 135, 403); these are cases where "one observation is contrary to another" (T 131), cases of "contrary" experiments, (§ VII.4). If contrary observations can lead to justified judgments of probability, why cannot contrary pronouncements in education do the same? MacNabb spots the difficulty: "But the observation that educators' maxims are frequently contradicted by experience raises the difficult question why we prefer experience, which, after all, frequently suggests mutually contradictory conclusions, to the authority of educators, prophets, astrologers and the like."33 Hume writes both of "contrary" maxims in education and "contrary" experiences in observation; this suggests that he recognizes that education and the probability of causes have some affinity with each other. Any account of Hume's theory of justification must address this problem. Hume observes that education gives rise to "contrary" beliefs. Since Hume wants to condemn these beliefs as unjustified, the framework of the stabilitybased interpretation generates the expectation that the contrary beliefs would be unstable (§ III.4). Yet, in the case of the observation of contrary effects, we extract a single, steady judgment (§ VII.4). Hume needs to explain the apparent asymmetry in this regard between education and contrary experiences. It is helpful to focus on a concrete example. Consider the case where we have frequently observed that both Es and not-Es follow Cs half the time. Our judgment (whether unreflective or reflective) of the likelihood that Cs are followed by Es will equal the proportion of Es in the observed sample of events following Cs (§ VII.3). Supposing we observe a new instance of the cause, we will accordingly assign it a likelihood of 50 percent. As Fogelin notes, Hume's appa-

32. Cf.Owen, 1999, p. 208. The quotations from MacNabb are at 1951/1966, p. 80. 33. MacNabb, 1951/1966, pp. 96,80. Though MacNabb writes that "this question will be considered later" (p. 80), when he returns to the question he does not—so far as I can see—introduce any new resources to address this problem (see pp. 96 and 99).

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ratus explains how we can derivatively assign a statistical likelihood to Es following C in a particular case.34 We can imagine a program of inculcation that mimics the results of accumulated observations in our example of contrary experiences. Suppose we are frequently told that observed Cs are followed by Es, frequently told that observed Cs are followed by not-Es, and told these things an equal number of times. Alternatively, suppose we are frequently told that the next C will be followed by E, frequently told that the next C will be followed by not-E, and told these things an equal number of times. In these cases, why do we not form a judgment of the likelihood that the next C will be followed by E that is equal to the proportion of instances of being told that the next C will be followed by E in the repeated pronouncements? Hume writes that education and the observation of conjunctions constitute "two kinds of custom," and "their effects on the judgment are similar and proportionable" (T 116). A main point of Hume's treatment of education in I.iii.9 is to confirm his hypothesis about the nature and causes of belief (§ III.3). It would seem that the psychological mechanisms—whatever their details—that underpin unreflective and reflective judgments in cases of contrary experiences could be applied to cases of contrary pronouncements in inculcation. One wants to protest: We do not extract a single estimate of likelihood from beliefs based on the contrary pronouncements in education because beliefs based on inculcation are not justified in the first place; they do not constitute bodies of evidence to which a single judgment might be proportioned. This protest registers our agreement with Hume that custom or experience in the form of the observation of conjoined events—what Kemp Smith calls "experience in [the] normative sense"35 (§ 1.5)—unlike custom or experience in the form of exposure to inculcation, is a source of evidence or justified belief. Hume, however, cannot simply help himself to this distinction. His favored epistemological theory, in my account of it, is an attempt to explicate justification with reference to stability in belief. Such a theory can aim to systematize our pretheoretical distinctions, but it cannot appeal to independent facts about justification in order to explain why some doxastic conditions are not stable. Hume's project is to explain or reconstruct our epistemic distinctions with reference to psychological facts about stability in belief. The direction of explanation cannot run the other way around in difficult cases. So it remains to explain why contrary pronouncements impugn beliefs based on education though contrary experiences do not impugn beliefs based on observation. The example in which education mimics the results of the observation of contrary effects might seem limited in scope. In cases of contrary experiences, we begin with imperfect habits (§ VII.4). Perhaps Hume's point at Treatise 117 is that education, but not experience of conjunctions, can yield perfect habits

34. Fogelin,1985,p. 60. 35. Kemp Smith, 1941, p. 382.

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that suggest contradictory conclusions. This suggestion runs up against cases where experience—the observation of conjunctions of events—itself seems to generate contradictory judgments based on perfect habits. Suppose we have frequently observed that all Cs are Es and also that all Ds are not-Es. Note that this is not a case of contrary experiences as discussed in I.iii. 12, where in our observation different effects follow the same cause. In cases of the probability of causes, observation generates two imperfect habits of expecting Es to follow Cs and not-Es to follow Cs; these imperfect habits give way to the perfect habit of expecting Es to follow Cs with a particular statistical likelihood (§ VII.4). By contrast, the beliefs that all Cs are Es and that all Ds are notEs are based on perfect habits, the frequent observation of constant conjunctions; they constitute proofs, which give rise directly to perfect beliefs that are psychologically irresistible (T 225; cf. 128,147). Suppose some object O is observed to possesses both the features C and D. This is an example of an inductive inconsistency, where two sets of observations support incompatible conclusions.36 In Humean terms, it would seem that the beliefs both that O will be followed by E and that O will be followed by not-E are backed by perfect habits, so that experience of constant conjunctions generates inconsistent beliefs—unless we can extract a single judgment even from perfect habits. Hume comes close to considering this sort of case in his discussion of the fourth kind of unphilosophical probability in I.iii.13 (§ IV.2). Hume supposes that we observe a constant conjunction between Cs, which are genuine or "efficacious" (T 148) causes, and their effects, Es. There is also an observed conjunction between As, which are "accidental" (T 149) or "superfluous" (T 148) circumstances, and Es. (As it happens, in our experience, As have never been observed in the absence of Cs.) Moreover, we observe that all Ds are not-Es. In a case where both A and D are present, we are apparently led to the contrary beliefs that both E and not-E will occur. Two sets of observations result in perfect habits that support incompatible conclusions. This is a kind of inductive inconsistency.37 In I.iii. 13, Hume attends to cases where one of the two bodies of observations (the conjunction of As and Es) constitutes an accidental regularity, albeit one that piggybacks on a nonaccidental regularity: that Cs are conjoined with Es. This situation is a special case of an inductive inconsistency, where one set of observations consists in an accidental regularity. Hume's examples in I.iii. 13 thus run together two problems: accidentally and inductive inconsistencies, addressing them at their intersection.

36. The classic discussion is Hempel's "Inductive Inconsistencies," in his 1965, pp. 53-79. 37. In introductory "Epistemology and Metaphysics" lectures at Princeton University in the early 1970s, Clark Glymour appealed to Philo's comparison of the universe to an animal and to a vegetable in Parts VI and VII of the Dialogues (DNR 170-71,176-78) to suggest that Hume discovered the problem of inductive inconsistencies. In comparing the universe to a machine and concluding that it is due to design, Cleanthes ignores a body of evidence that leads to an incompatible conclusion: that the universe is due to "generation or vegetation" (DNR 217). The examples in I.iii. 13 provide additional evidence of Hume's sensitivity to this sort of problem.

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Hume's response to this hybrid problem is to suggest that we rely on second-order regularities and habits to identify the kinds of properties that have, and have not, led to successful predictions in the past (§ VI.2). Should we lack this sort of background information, Hume offers no solution. Now, consider a pure case of an inductive inconsistency, where both generalizations are nonaccidental. We might again avail ourselves of second-order information; perhaps experience shows that generalizations based on properties like C are more successful than generalizations based on properties like D. What if we lack relevant background information in a case of a pure inductive inconsistency? Hume seems committed to the claim that we should extract a single judgment. Though Hume does not consider a pure inductive inconsistency in the Treatise, in the first Enquiry section on miracles he discusses cases where there is a proof opposing testimony, so that "two kinds of experience are contrary" (EHU X, 98), as well as cases where "there is proof against proof" (EHU X, 90). In both cases, experience gives rise to at least one perfect habit, and Hume maintains that we extract a single judgment. Indeed, Hume explicitly applies the principle of subtraction (§ VII.4) in the first of these cases (EHU X, 98).38 In cases of two perfect habits supporting incompatible conclusions, subtraction yields a 50 percent probability. There is a general principle here. To see this, suppose we believe, based on frequent observations, that 80 percent of Cs are Es and also, again based on frequent observations, that 40 percent of Ds are not-Es (so that 60 percent of Ds are Es). Absent other relevant information, the probability that O is an E, where O is both a C and a D, is the average of 80 percent and 60 percent, that is, 70 percent. It is noteworthy that Maher's subtraction principle can account for the estimate of likelihood, even though there are two full units of vivacity in play, one unit in connection with each of the two perfect habits.39 The examples in the first Enquiry show that Hume allows that we can extract a single judgment, based on the principle of subtraction, from perfect habits that would otherwise lead to contradictory beliefs. We can imagine a program of inculcation that mimics the results of accumulated observations in our example of a pure inductive inconsistency. We are frequently told that observed Cs are followed by Es and frequently told that observed Ds are followed by not-Es. Alternatively, suppose we are frequently told that the next C will be followed by E and frequently told that the next D will be followed by not-E. We then observe that an O is both C and D. It would seem that the psychological mechanisms—whatever their details—that underpin the extraction of a single judgment in cases involving a perfect habit could be applied to these cases of contrary pronouncements. We thus again confront the general problem: How can Hume explain why contrary experiences and education do not operate in parallel ways—whether leading to fluctuation or to a single judgment—so that they stand or fall together as sources of justified belief? 38. Maher, 1981, p. 144. For an extended discussion, see Garrett, 1997, pp. 140-56. 39. E and not-E will be associated with .8 and .4 units of vivacity, respectively. Subtraction leaves a vivacity of .4, and four-tenths of the difference between a vivacity of zero (a probability of 50 percent) and a vivacity of one (a probability of 100 percent) yields a probability of 70 percent.

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When Hume writes that the maxims of education are frequently contrary to themselves, he doubtless has in mind the inculcation of outright contradictions, either that the next C will be followed by E and that the next C will be followed by not-E or that all observed Cs are followed by Es and that all observed Cs are followed by not-Es. There is no analogue to this within the experience of conjunctions. In examples of the probability of causes, which provide the closest analogue, the perfect habits that lead to contradictory beliefs are not themselves contradictory. There is no contradiction between the beliefs that all Cs are followed by Es and that all Ds are followed by not-Es.40 An inconsistency arises when we draw inferences about a new case where an object is both C and D. It is nevertheless a short step from the inductive inconsistency to contradictory beliefs about the new object. If, as Hume allows, we extract a single judgment in the context of inductive inconsistencies, why cannot we extract a single judgment in cases of immediate contradiction between perfect habits? Lome Falkenstein is the only commentator I know who considers the conditions under which, for Hume, conflicting beliefs yield a single judgment. According to Falkenstein, conflicts between education and observed conjunctions do not counterbalance or mitigate one another; Falkenstein contends that education "merely creates a vivacious contrary idea," that is, a belief contrary to one based on observed constant conjunction. Falkenstein extends this claim to cases where education is contrary to itself, taking the repetition of contrary ideas in education to lead to contradictory beliefs. Though this picture is congruent with what Hume wants to say about the epistemic status of inculcation, it does not fit well with his insistence that the repetition in education confirms his theory of belief (§ III.3). Why do we not balance against one another contrary beliefs based on education and observed constant conjunction or contrary beliefs based on education alone, thereby extracting a single judgment? Falkenstein's answer seems to be that the vivacity of belief based on education is nonassociative in that it does not derive from the repeated experience of a conjunction, does not involve the transfer of vivacity from an impression to an idea. The relevance of this answer is unclear. When Hume is thinking associationistically, the extraction of a single judgment—in the case of contrary experiences—must in some way depend on psychological operations on vivacity. In Falkenstein's interpretation, Hume often allows that "conflicting beliefs cancel one another's vivacity." The source of the vivacity seems immaterial. It is of no help to suppose that in the first instance the psychological mechanisms that yield a single judgment apply to conflicting habits rather than to the opposing images or views.41 Education, as well as observed conjunctions, produces habits. It is tempting to think that a generalization of the wage pool principle (§ VII.4) could be pressed into service. Suppose that only one unit of vivacity is available for distribution at a time between formally contradictory beliefs. If ed-

40. Cf.Garrett, 1997, p. 155. 41. The two quotations are at Falkenstein, 1997,pp. 44,43. The other claims discussed may be found at pp. 40-44,69 n. 26.

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ucation produces contradictory beliefs based on perfect habits, each of the two habits will have a claim on this unit of vivacity. There will be insufficient vivacity to go around, resulting, we may suppose, in a competition for it. Since the two habits are of equal strength, the upshot will be oscillation in belief. This is a Humean picture but not one that helps explain why the habits that education induces do not cancel each other out. We know that contradictory beliefs, construed as dispositions, will be unsteady in their influence, since their respective characteristic effects or manifestations are typically incompatible (§ IV.5). The generalized wage pool principle does nothing more than capture this fact about belief within a framework that identifies belief with vivacity. The issue is why the contradictory beliefs do not cancel out, granted that oscillation will occur absent the extraction of a single judgment. An aspect of the I.iii.12 discussion of probability might appear helpful. When we reflectively extract a single judgment, similar views unite and then contrary views cancel out (§ VII.4). The passages I have in mind focus on the first stage. We have a "multitude" (T 138) of experiences of Es following Cs. Hume considers their "concurrence" (T 138), that is, whether these "views" (T 138) remain separate or "unite their forces" (T 138). He answers in favor of the latter option.42 The same result of course applies to the multitude of experiences of not-Es following Cs. Hume returns to the first stage later in I.iii.12: But suppose that this multitude of views or glimpses of an object proceeds not from experience, but from a voluntary act of the imagination; this effect does not follow, or at least, follows not in the same degree. For tho' custom and education produce belief by such a repetition, as is not deriv'd from experience, yet this requires a long tract of time, along with a very frequent and undesign'd repetition. In general we may pronounce, that a person, who woul'd voluntarily repeat any idea in his mind, tho' supported by one past experience, wou'd be no more inclin'd to believe the existence of its object, than if he had contented himself with one survey of it. (T 140)

This suggests the possibility that in cases where the dictates of education are contrary, we do not extract a single judgment from two opposing views because we do not combine the multitude of pronouncements on a given side of the question in the first place. There is no uniting of similar views, so that the process of extracting a single judgment cannot get off the ground. Unfortunately, much of Hume's discussion at page 140 does not apply specifically to education. It is repetition that is voluntary or designed that does not result in the combining of similar views. The relevant distinction is whether the person who is forming beliefs designs the repetition. It is difficult to see why design or voluntariness on the part of the "educator" should matter. Thus, Hume considers "a person, who woul'd voluntarily repeat any idea in his mind, tho' supported by one past experience." Hume is in effect introducing a restriction on his claim that any repetition produces belief (§ III.3); the repetition 42. For discussion, see MacNabb, 1951 /1966, pp. 90-91; and Waxman, 1994, pp. 177-78.

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cannot be the product of design on the part of the person forming the belief.43 Also, Hume's claim that the repetition in education is a kind of custom that does create a habit requires that the similar views in the repetitions coalesce or unite. Were this not so, inculcation would have no tendency to infix belief, thus undermining Hume's appeal to education to confirm his theory of belief (§ III.3). Hume has more to say: Beside the effect of design; each act of the mind, being separate and independent, has a separate influence, and joins not its force with that of its fellows. Not being united by any common object, producing them, they have no relation to each other; and consequently make no transition or union of forces. (T 140-41)

Hume takes himself to be providing a second explanation of why the voluntary repetition of an idea does not result in the uniting of views, an explanation "beside the effect of design." Perhaps the point is that repetitions of an idea must be (or must be believed to be) independent in order to support the uniting of similar views. If so, the principle would leave intact belief based on views produced by independent teachers or sources of inculcation. Perhaps the point is that multiple views combine only if they are united by a "common object, producing them." This explanation, however, does not seem unfavorable to combining multiple views produced by a single educator. The paragraph at pages 140-41 continues: "This phaenomenon we shall understand better afterwards." Hume does not provide a reference. My best hypothesis is that he has in view the II.iii.9 discussion of the direct passions (§ VII.4).44 According to Hume, contrary passions sometimes oscillate, sometimes destroy one another, and sometimes coexist and produce a third passion. They oscillate when they arise from different objects, for example, "when a man is afflicted for the loss of a law-suit, and joyful for the birth of a son" (T 441; DP 1.9.1). They mutually destroy one another when they arise from "the same event... of a mixt nature," "a compound of good and evil" (T 442; cf. DP 1.9.2). They coexist and produce a third passion when an object is probable (T 442-43; DP 1.9.3). Joy and grief giving rise to hope or fear is an instance of this third case. The distinction between the same and different objects is reasonably clear in a context where we are discussing the causes of the passions. It is difficult, however, to see how to apply this notion to cases that involve repetition. Hume needs a prior theory of this matter, since the case where passions coexist and produce a third passion presupposes an account of probability. I conclude that Hume has no explanation of why we do not, in the fashion of the probability of causes, extract a single judgment from the contrary pronouncements of educa-

43. Kemp Smith, 1941, p. 427; and Falkenstein, 1997, p. 41. 44. Norton and Norton suggest that Hume has in view the second part (T 201-5) of his fourpart system to explain the role of constancy in producing the belief in body (2000b, p. 463, third annotation to par. 23). I do not see the connection here.

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tion. Hume's treatment of education is just three sections and thirteen pages removed from that of the probability of causes. We can speculate that Hume had some awareness of his difficulties and that this explains the brevity of his treatment of the epistemic status of education (§§ 1.4,111.3,4). VII.6. Contrary Beliefs Not Based Solely on Habit Hume considers numerous pairs of contradictory beliefs that do not arise within causal inference and education. Most notably, he calls attention to the following contradictions that are not based solely on habit: (a) between the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects, on the one hand, and perception, memory, and intuition, on the other, in I.iv.2,1.iv.3, and I.iv.6 (§§ V.l-4); (b) between belief in the continued and independent existence of perceptions and reflection on double vision and perceptual relativity, in I.iv.2 (§§ V.3,6, VI.4,6); (c) between causal inference and superstition, in I.iv.4 (§ V.4); (d) between the propensity to add a new relation to related objects and reflection or demonstration, in I.iv.5 (§§ V.3,5); and (e) between causal inference and the imagination, in I.iv.4 and I.iv.7 (§§ 1.5, III.4, VII.2). We extract a single habit from the observation of contrary effects, conjunctions that are not constant (§ VII.4). Hume allows that we extract a single judgment in cases of inductive inconsistencies, where observations of two constant conjunctions support incompatible conclusions (§ VTI.5). Why do we not extract a single judgment in cases of contradictory beliefs not based solely on habit? This is a generalization of the issue broached in the preceding section in regard to education. Hume's model of how we extract a single judgment from contrary experiences would seem to generalize to cases 1-5, as well as to conflicts involving education. Within the probability of causes, contrary views reduce each other's vivacity, with equal portions of vivacity canceling or balancing out (§ VII.5). Why are not the mechanisms that produce this effect engaged in 1-5? When Hume is thinking associationistically, he identifies belief with a lively perception. This is explicit in the cases of perception, memory, and causal inference (§ III.2) and education (§ III.3). Hume also takes care to offer an explanation of how the identity-ascribing propensity leads to belief (§ V.2). In addition, he assigns "reason"—demonstrative and probable reasoning—to "the understanding," which is itself an associative faculty (§ II.3). This commits Hume to applying an associationist model to all belief-forming mechanisms. When we extract a single judgment from contrary experiences, contrary views cancel out after similar views unite (§ VII.4). In the cases of perception and memory, intuition and demonstration, and the propensities to ascribe identity to related objects and to add a new relation to related objects, there are perhaps no stages where concurring ideas or views unite or join forces.45 It is

45. Matters are complicated in the case of the identity-ascribing propensity because Hume allows some role for repetition. See § V.2.

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difficult to see why this should matter. The extraction of a single judgment depends upon the mutual destruction of the vivacity of contrary beliefs, and any two contrary beliefs possess vivacity. The problem of explaining why contradictory beliefs not based entirely on habit, unlike beliefs based on contrary experiences, are not mutually destructive is not a mere artifact of Hume's formula that belief is a lively idea. The mutual destruction model need not be applied specifically to vivacity (§ III.2). We could equally apply the model to dispositions, supposing that equal quantities of steadiness cancel each other out. The general issue arises because belief admits of degree (§ IV. 1). This would seem to allow for contradictory beliefs to reduce one another's strength, so that equal degrees of belief cancel out, however degree of belief is represented. Perhaps we can make headway if we focus on a particular subset of the contradictions 1-5. A solution need not extend to 2 or 5. The argument to generate the contradiction at 2 is mistaken (§ VI.6). The argument to implicate specifically causal inference in the contradiction at 5 is strained (§ VII.2). The contradiction, if genuine, nevertheless has some source, albeit one other than causal inference. The contradiction depends, however, on an inconceivability argument adapted from Section 10 of Part I of the Principles of Human Knowledge (BW 2,45), an argument only a Berkelian could accept.46 Though we can hold Hume responsible for explaining the psychological impact of contradictions he identifies, this is of little interest in cases where the contradictions are not genuine. I therefore focus on the contradictions at 1,3, and 4. The examples at 1 and 4 involve contradictions generated by the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects and by the propensity to add a new relation to related objects. These are the distinctive belief-forming mechanisms of Part iv and also mechanisms that lead to a number of contradictions.47 In these cases, intuition or demonstration generates one side of the contradiction (§§ V.4,5), which suggests new avenues to explore. There is a relevant discussion of intuition and demonstration in I.ii.2. After arguing against the infinite divisibility of space and time, Hume anticipates that others will raise difficulties: But here we may observe, that nothing can be more absurd, than this custom of calling a difficulty what pretends to be a demonstration, and endeavouring by that means to elude its force and evidence. 'Tis not in demonstrations as in probabilities, that difficulties can take place, and one argument counterballance another, and diminish its authority. A demonstration, if just, admits of no opposite difficulty; and if not just, 'tis a mere sophism, and consequently can never be a difficulty. 'Tis either irresistible, or has no manner of force. To

46. On the Berkelian character of the argument, see Penelhum, 1975, p. 73; Fogelin, 1985, p. 90; Blackburn, 1993, p. 276; and Garrett, 1997, p. 216. But for some distinctively Humean features, see Passmore, 1952/1968, pp. 139^0; Fogelin, 1985, p. 90; and § VII.2. 47. Falkenstein omits these propensities from his inventory of belief-forming mechanisms in Hume (1997, pp. 32-42), though he subsequently includes a passing reference to "the mechanisms responsible for belief in unperceived existence" (p. 57).


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talk therefore of objections and replies, and ballancing of arguments in such a question as this, is to confess, either that human reason is nothing but a play of words, or that the person himself, who talks so, has not a capacity equal to such subjects. Demonstrations may be difficult to be comprehended . . . but can never have any such difficulties as will weaken their authority, when once they are comprehended. (T 31-32)

In these passages, Hume exempts demonstration from the principle of counterbalancing evidence that applies to proofs and probabilities. Perhaps the nature of demonstration precludes the balancing of evidence. Hume's conclusion—that demonstrations do not cancel out—admits of a weak and a strong claim. The weak claim is that there is no balancing of arguments within demonstration, no balancing of opposing demonstrative arguments. Even this conclusion presupposes that demonstration is internally coherent.48 Were this not the case, letting demonstrative arguments for contradictory conclusions mutually destroy each other might seem in order. In any event, a stronger claim is required to help us understand why we do not extract a single judgment from the contradictions at 1 and 4. In these cases, we have contradictions between propensities of the imagination (§§ V.4-5) and intuition or demonstration (in conjunction with perception and memory); the contradictions are not internal to demonstration. In order to explain why the propensities and demonstration do not counterbalance, Hume needs to claim that there is no balancing of arguments due to demonstration and other beliefforming mechanisms. Hume is perhaps not well placed to make this claim, in light of his contention at I.iv.l that demonstrative knowledge reduces to probability (§§ III.4, VII.3). In the first three paragraphs of that section, Hume argues that "all knowledge resolves itself into probability, and becomes at last of the same nature with that evidence" (T 181).49 This position opens the door to the balancing of probabilistic evidence extending to demonstration. But let us set this aside. How might Hume argue for the strong claim? He cannot maintain that the combination of the understanding and the imagination is coherent; he insists that demonstration and the imaginative propensities conflict (§ V.4). Then why do we not extract a single judgment? As in the case of education (§ VII.5), we cannot say: We do not extract a single estimate of likelihood because beliefs based on the imagination are not justified; they do not constitute bodies of evidence from which a single judgment might be extracted. From the perspective of the stability-based interpretation, the reason such beliefs do not count as evidence is that they tend to eventuate in instability; if we could extract a single judgment, this would not be the case.

48. For just such an assumption in Descartes, see my 1990, esp. pp. 7-12. 49. For discussion, see Laird, 1932, pp. 175-76; Prichard, 1950, p. 194; Imlay, 1981, pp. 122-25; W. E. Morris, 1989, pp. 40-46; Karlsson, 1990, pp. 122-25; Fogelin, 1993, pp. 102-3, 104; Johnson, 1995, pp. 231-33; Dauer, 1996, pp. 211-13; and Garrett, 1997, pp. 222-24.

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What about Hume's observation that a demonstration is "either irresistible, or has no manner of force" (T 31)? Psychological asymmetries in the belief-forming mechanisms do play a critical role in Hume's development of his theory of justification. Some instabilities are eliminable in that at least one of the belief-forming mechanisms that contributes to them is avoidable or resistible; the account of justification is then refined with reference to membership in sets of belief-forming mechanisms that are conducive to stability and available to humans (§ V.4). This elaboration of the theory, however, arises in a context where Hume presupposes that contradictory beliefs—notably the contradictions at 1 and 4—lead to a conflicted resolution in which residual instability persists (§ V.3). We are addressing a prior question: Why does the mind not achieve relief from uneasiness by reducing the strength of one of the contradictory beliefs by the strength of the other, with equal degrees of strength canceling out? Hume cannot appeal to irresistibility to supply a negative answer to this question. It is hard to see what irresistibility comes to, if not degree of belief that meets a requisite threshold. An irresistible belief would have some remaining strength after deducting that of a resistible belief. Rather than precluding counterbalancing, irresistibility should have a role in determining the outcome of any counterbalancing that takes place. Hume recognizes this, as he allows counterbalancing among proofs, which are based on perfect habits and hence irresistible (§ VII.5). There is another approach to conflicts involving intuition or demonstration and other belief-forming mechanisms. Hume maintains that a demonstration implies "the absolute impossibility" of the contrary (T 162; cf. EHU IV, 20-21). Suppose conclusions established demonstratively, truths that depend solely on relations among ideas (T 69-70,73), are necessary truths. On this supposition, the conflicts at 1 and 4 would involve the belief that some proposition p is true and the belief that, necessarily, p is false. For example, in the case of 4, we believe that taste is locally conjoined with matter. Reason "shows us the impossibility of such an union" (T 238), not merely that the belief in the union is false. Similarly, in I.iii.14, in transferring the felt determination of thought outside the mind, we attribute to external objects "a quality which can only belong to the mind," a quality "incompatible" (T 168) with the objects to which it is applied.50 In the examples falling under 1, we believe that changing or interrupted objects are identical and also that, necessarily, they are not identical. Demonstration yields conclusions to the effect that beliefs produced by imaginative propensities are false but also that those beliefs are necessarily false. This might seem to vindicate Hume's position in cases where one side of a contradiction derives from intuition or demonstration: The mind cannot counterbalance beliefs with different propositional contents. Unfortunately, there is a complication. Hume writes: Thus as the necessity, which makes two times two equal to four, or three angles of a triangle equal to two right ones, lies only in the act of the under50. Stroud stresses similar language at Treatise 164 (1993, beginning at p. 255).


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standing, by which we consider and compare these ideas; in like manner the necessity or power, which unites causes and effects, lies in the determination of the mind to pass from the one to the other. (T 166)

Though Hume's point in this enigmatic passage is far from clear, there is the suggestion that "necessity" is less a feature of the content of a proposition than of the manner in which the mind considers it. If so, there is the threat that Hume cannot appeal to differences in content to explain why we do not counterbalance conflicting beliefs based on demonstration and other faculties. Stroud nicely emphasizes that Treatise 166 might be seen as a first step toward a more naturalistic theory of logical necessity and suggests various ways in which such an account might be developed. Though we could speculate about the direction Hume might have preferred, we must acknowledge that Hume has little to offer about the interrelated topics of the nature of necessity, demonstration, and a priori knowledge. That Hume does not have developed doctrines in these areas has seemed excusable; his chief interest is in experimental reasoning, in part because he regards demonstrative knowledge as severely limited in scope.51 Hume does, however, claim that intuition or demonstration conflict with the imaginative propensities. In light of the import that Hume assigns to these and other conflicts, it is pressing to understand why the contradictory beliefs do not counterbalance. Absent an account of demonstration, Hume's ability to explain why demonstration and the propensities are not mutually destructive is an open question. When Hume is thinking associationistically, he regards belief to be a lively perception. Hume's footnotes at Treatise 117-18 and 371 commit him to the thesis that demonstrative reasoning falls within the faculty of association (§ II.3). Yet, Hume does not substantiate this claim; he does not provide an associationist account of intuition and a fortiori does not provide an account of how intuition enlivens ideas.52 So perhaps the mutual destruction of vivacities did not offer itself to Hume as a salient possibility in the case of intuition. He does offer an explanation—however artificial—of how a key propensity of the imagination, the propensity to ascribe identity to related objects, produces a vivacious idea (§ V.2). He offers no such explanation for beliefs based on intuition. Though Hume has a programmatic commitment to the claim that beliefs based on intuition and demonstration are lively ideas, he has no mechanism in view for the production of vivacity in these cases. This might explain why Hume did not take seriously the possibility of mutual destruction of vivacity and the extraction of a single judgment in such cases as 1 and 4.

51. On Treatise 166, see Bayley, 1936, ch. 6; Passmore, 1952/1968, p. 19; and Anderson, 1966, pp. 64-65. Though she does not cite the passage, Broughton is also relevant (1983, pp. 8-11). For steps toward a more naturalistic account, see Stroud, 1977, pp. 239-45. For the point that Hume has little to say in these areas, see Kemp Smith, 1941, p. 349; Hampshire, 1963, p. 8; Pears, 1963b, p. 24; and Stroud, 1977, p. 240. For the limited scope, cf. Broughton, 1983, p. 11; and Owen, 1999, p. 112. 52. Cf. Garrett, 1997, pp. 170,252 n. 2.

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This is again a point that does not hinge on Hume's picture of belief as a lively idea. Hume's deeper theory identifies belief with a steady disposition. Perhaps the mutual destruction of degrees of steadiness also did not offer itself as a possibility. Hume maintains that perception and memory infix belief and that a number of other belief-forming mechanisms have the same influence on the mind (§ III.2). These include the repeated experience of conjunctions (§ III.2) as well as a second kind of custom, the repetition of a mere idea (§ III.3). They also include beliefs based on the identity-ascribing propensity, where Hume manages to find a role for repetition (§ V.2). Steady dispositions result from repetition. Intuition and demonstration, however, are left out of account; Hume does not tell us how beliefs are steadied or infixed, except in the cases involving repetition. Again, this might explain why he did not envision steadiness canceling out in such cases as 1 and 4.53 A similar explanation might apply to a case such as 3; it is not clear how dispositions that result from superstition become infixed. According to the explanation I am considering, Hume does not see counterbalancing as a live option in cases where belief is not explained with reference to some sort of repetition. But it is not as if Hume has an alternative account of belief in these cases. Putting perception and memory to the side, Hume has no psychological account of how either a lively idea or a steady disposition might arise from intuition and demonstration (and perhaps some other beliefforming mechanisms).54 Even if this explains the character of Hume's treatment of counterbalancing in cases involving intuition, it does not provide a rationale for his position. Rather, it points to an important gap in his theory of belief. Absent a richer account of the nature of belief based on intuition, Hume is not well positioned to think about the psychological effects of conflicts between intuition and other belief-forming mechanisms. In the case of beliefs based on intuition and demonstration, Hume has too little apparatus to sustain a position in regard to counterbalancing one way or the other. In the case of the probability of causes, Hume has one or more models of howwe extract a single judgment (§ VII.5). The analogy to education is so strong, however, that Hume is hard pressed to distinguish the potential for counterbalancing in the contexts of education and probability. In discussing the direct passions, Hume writes: "It may... be ask'd, by what theory we can explain these variations [in the effects of the contrary passions], and to what general principle we can reduce them" (T 441). This leads Hume to propose a little theory: If the objects of the contrary passions be totally different, the passions are like two opposite liquors in different bottles, which have no influence on each other. If the objects be intimately connected, the passions are like an alcali and acid, which, being mingled, destroy each other. If the relation be more imper-

53. Pears suggests that Hume might have developed a theory of intuition within the framework discussed in this or the preceding paragraph (1963b, pp. 28-30). 54. For accounts of what Hume has on offer, see the references at § II.3, n. 33.

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feet, and consists in the contradictory views of the same object, the passions are like oil and vinegar, which, however mingled, never perfectly unite and incorporate. (T 443; cf. DP 1.9.4)

In the context of contrary beliefs, Hume wants to say that in some cases conflicting beliefs mutually destroy each other or cancel out, like alkali and acid. In other cases, Hume wants to say, conflicting beliefs oscillate or alternately succeed each other. What he lacks is a general account of these matters. To work out what Hume ought to say requires a mix of considerations. It would be important to investigate empirically the conditions under which conflicting beliefs counterbalance and the conditions under which conflict persists. It would be important to make sure the psychological phenomena are insulated from an independent theory of justified belief, which might lead to circularity in a stability-based interpretation. Since the empirical phenomena can be expected to admit a variety of interpretations, our confidence in this regard would increase to the extent that we possess a psychological theory, perhaps informed by evolutionary ideas, that explains the empirical facts. Such a theory might rely on more sophisticated philosophical and psychological conceptions of belief. Hume went some distance down these paths but not far enough for the purposes of the theoretical role he assigns to stability. This is a crucial point of vulnerability in Hume's development of his stability-based theory of justification. By contrast, Hume need not have been troubled by the arguments he puts forward to show that no beliefs are justified, at least for the reflective person. The manifest contradiction and the dangerous dilemma in I.iv.7 are inadequate to this task. These episodes are based on considerations in I.iv.l and I.iv.4 that do not deserve our respect (§§ VII.2-3), except as reflecting Hume's destructive intentions. In these instances, Hume puts forward arguments that—unlike those of I.iii.6 (§ II.2)—have broadly skeptical intent but that do not secure their intended conclusions. The part of Hume that is predisposed to a destructive result overwhelms his more constructive side, allowing the second stage of the development of his theory to steal the show. There are other respects in which Hume's position could have been improved: by abandoning the mistaken argument for the thesis that perceptions do not have a continued and distinct existence (§ VI.4), by allowing that the states of unchanging objects have causes (§ VI.5), and by unifying his explanation of the vulgar belief in body under the cooperation of custom and the galley principle (§ VI.6). These amendments would ground the vulgar belief in body in causal inference, so that justified belief in the continued and distinct existence of perceptions would remain an option. They would also remove an incoherence in Hume's account of the psychological properties of the central imaginative propensity in Part iv. This would in turn enable Hume to retain a normative distinction between causal (and related) inferences and the imaginative propensities. Hume has not shown that reflection need undermine justified belief in body, much less that it need undermine justification more systematically. We can imagine a version of the Treatise that omits the lines of argument from I.iv. 1

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and I.iv.4 to I.iv.7 and adopts the amendments related to I.iv.2. The difficulties surrounding the extraction of a single judgment (§§ VII.4-6) would remain. Hume has no general account of the conditions under which conflicting beliefs oscillate rather than counterbalance. This is an arena—one connected to the question of the conditions under which sets of beliefs give rise to discomfort or dissonance (§ IV.5)—where the Treatise might have benefited from Hume engaging in more, rather than less, psychological theorizing.

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Index

References to names that appear in footnotes are selective. The index does not include entries for routine bibliographic citations. accidental conjunctions, beliefs based on (fourth kind of unphilosophical probability), 34,104-11,117-18, 240-41. See also inductive inconsistencies; new and signal contradiction; unphilosophical probability accidental vs. nonaccidental generalizations, 34,106-7,109 n. 13,110-11 actual vs. apparent evidence and virtue. See memory and causal inference; sympathy, variations in judgment A Dissertation of the Passions, 232-34 aesthetic judgment, 133-34 aiming for truth, 81-84,125-27 ambivalence (in epistemic assessments), 16-18,78,103-4,110-11,155. See also two-stage model amendments and belief in body, 36,176,180,207-8, 212-14,251-52 and disparities in identity-ascribing propensity, 36,176,180,212-13, 251-52 and pessimistic conclusion, 36,216-17, 251-52 in service of constructive stage, 207, 213-16,251-52 analogy, endorsed, 13, 32,46-47,103-4

ancient philosophy. See material substrata arbitrariness argument, 36,218-22,246 Ardal, Pall, on calm and violent emotions, 3-6 argument against matter, 36,215-22,246. See also manifest contradiction argumentative distance, 112-13. See also psychological distance argument from design. See Dialogues concerning Natural Religion arguments to meaninglessness, 35, 162-72,211-13. See also duration of unchanging objects; quasi content associationism. See also belief, as a lively idea; faculty of association; probability; reduction of probability "to nothing"; repetition and belief applicable to dispositions, 70,112-13 double association of ideas and impressions, 233-34 and education, 74-76,239,242-45 grafted onto theory of ideas, 66-67, 224-25 and identity-ascribing propensity, 142^4 and memory, 52-53,112 n. 17 obscures epistemological project, 29-30,58-59

264

INDEX

associationism (Continued) and probability, 56-57,225-32 and variations due to psychological distance, 112-13,119 automatic justification, 89-91 availability of evidence, 96,110 of sets of belief-forming mechanisms, 159,248 Baier, Annette. See also reflexive approval interpretations on instability, 6 n. 5,8 n. 9,27 n. 45,28 n. 49,125 n. 35 on Parts iii and iv, 19-20,156 n. 10 Beattie, James, 20,31-32,50-51 belief. See also associationism; degrees of probability and evidence; dual role of stability; irresistible belief; pseudobelief; quasi content; repetition and belief; stable belief absolute vs. relative, 101-2,235-36, 246 as aiming at truth, 81-84,125-27 vs. fiction and supposition, 63,144—45, 200-201 fixity prevents fluctuation in doubt, 67-68,124 infixed by senses, memory, or repetition, 33,67-68,75-76 and intuition and demonstration, 249-51 nature's provision for a steady influence, 28,33,79,158 not confined to association by cause and effect, 75-76 particular and general, 75-76 n. 28 vs. poetical enthusiasm and resemblance, 63,70-73,114-15 reduction in steadiness when unsettled, 34,81 steadiness, a species of stability, 69 steadiness, essential for, 28,33,65-73, 124,144 n. 4,224-25 as steady in its influence in that it is infixed, 79-80 and uniting views in probability of causes, 235 whether should allow belief from sympathy, 94-95 n. 52

belief, as a disposition belief identified with a steady disposition, 33,68-73,75-76,82-84,170-71 and corrected moral judgments, 136 n. 51 steadiness, a property of dispositions, not ideas, 68-69,70 n. 19 theory of ideas impedes development of account, 66-67,71 belief, as a lively idea and different or embedded prepositional attitudes, 225 grounded in theory of ideas and associationism, 66-67,224-25 a picture, formula, or official theory, 4, 224-25,245,250 and probabilities below fifty percent, 232 n. 22 and pseudobelief in poetical enthusiasm, 33,70-73,224-25 and quasi content, 170-71 traditional interpretation, 66-67,70,170 vivacity as bearer of prepositional attitudes and content, 225-26 belief-forming mechanisms. See stabilitybased theory Bennett, Jonathan, on constancy and coherence, 192-93 Berkeley, George, 40 n. 6,58,69,164,220, 246 blind faith vs. belief, 82-83 body, belief in. See also argument against matter; double existence; perceptions as objects of experience; vulgar belief in body belief in continued and distinct existence, 139,164,177,192 n. 21 no form of the belief survives reflection, 215-16 Brand, Walter, on sympathy with belief, uneasiness, 94-95 n. 52,128 n. 40 Bricke, John, on dispositions, 68 Broughton, Janet, on causal inference, 38 n. 1 calm and violent emotions, 3-6,126 causal inference. See also causal theory of assurance; constructive stage; contradictions; memory and causal inference; probability; repetition and be-

INDEX lief; rules by which to judge cause and effect; skeptical interpretation of I.iii.6 and collateral effects, inferential chains, and testimony, 40 and custom-and-galley, 179-80, 183-87,197-200 due to an associative faculty of reason, 31-32,48-49,53-59,230-31 as enhancing regularity, 180-82, 189-90,198 extends assurance beyond perception and memory, 31,39-44 and imaginative propensities, 35, 145-46,161 infixes belief, 67-68,72-73,250 irresistible and unavoidable, 159,240 and judgments of identity, 202-3 and manifest contradiction, 14,23-24, 36,84-85,217-23,245-46 and permanent, irresistible principles, 157-58 and reduction of probability, 30,36,85 reversal in attitude toward, 13-14, 51, 87 summaries of endorsements, 13-14,17, 43-47,50,59-61,64 causal maxim, 203-4 causal theory of assurance. See also causal inference; two systems or realities affinities with the galley, 199 and assurance beyond perception and memory, 31,39-44 and philosophical relations, 40-42, 76-77 presupposed in I.iv.2,43 n. 11,194 and repetition in belief, 76-77 straddles claims about belief and knowledge, 61,73,77 causation. See accidental vs. nonaccidental generalizations; necessary connection; thesis that only changes have causes changeable, weak, and irregular principles. See permanent, irresistible, and universal principles cognitive dissonance. See dissonance coherence. See vulgar belief in body, due to coherence comparative stability, 96,110

265

conceptual confusion. See quasi content confidence intervals, 224 conflicted resolutions. See contradictions; imaginative propensities conjunction in place. See taste constancy. See vulgar belief in body, due to constancy constructive stage. See also ambivalence; amendments; causal theory of assurance; two-stage model claims about identity-ascribing propensity, a threat, 35,176 and discussion of education, 13-17, 30-31,78-79,81 and discussion of permanent, irresistible principles, 15-16,19,30-31, 43,155-56,223 gives way to pessimistic conclusion, 12-16,216,251 and the imagination and understanding, 13,31-32,53-59,63-64,193 locations in Treatise, 16-18,43, 50,57, 78-79,110-11 manifested in shifts in 'reason', 53-57, 193 obscured by associationism, 58-59 as systematizing pretheoretical intuitions, 12-17,32,59,147,239 contextualist interpretations, 98-100 contiguity. See resemblance contradictions. See also accidental conjunctions; dissonance; extraction of a single judgment; manifest contradiction; sympathy, variations in judgment; uneasiness between causal inference and dogmatism and deference, 95 between causal inference and superstition, 157-58,245^16,250 and combat, 8-9,80,105-6,147-54, 167-69,232-33,248 and conflicted resolution and confusion, 10,35,148-54,167-69,172-73 dispensability of appeal to uneasiness, 33-34 due to education, 81,237-45 due to imaginative propensities, 139-41,150,158-61 due to sympathy with others' beliefs, 94-95

266

INDEX

contradictions (Continued) and extracting a single judgment, 36-37,230,245-51 and fourth kind of unphilosophical probability, 34,105-7 and occasions for causal inference, 180-82 oscillation in manifestations, 124-25, 235 second-order beliefs about, 81,84—85 and successive assent, 8-10,34,80, 124-25,147-48,232-33 that cannot be resolved, a theme of I.iv, 10 undermine natural function of belief, 33-34,80-81,158 and uneasiness, 11-12,33-35,124-25, 147-48,152-53,167-69 and unreflective instability, 27-28, 94-95,124-25 contrary causes. See also inductive inconsistencies; probability of causes and belief in body due to coherence, 183-85 due to an associative faculty, 230-31 and extracting a single judgment, 230-40,250-51 extrapolates observed frequency, 184, 227-28,230-31,238-39 I.iii.13 treatment, 233 n. 24 II.iii.9, Dissertation assimilate to oscillation in contradiction, 36,232-37, 250-51 principle of subtraction, 231-32,241 uneasiness in unsteady dispositions and extraction, 36,131,235-37 and uniting and balancing views, 231-34,243-46 unreflective judgments, 230,235-37 vivacity as estimate of likelihood, 36, 223-30 Copleston, Frederick, on constancy and coherence, 192-93 corrected judgments, 34,133-38,237. See also moral judgment; psychological distance; reduction of probability "to nothing" counterfeit belief. Seepseudobelief curiosity, 124 n. 33 custom. See causal inference; education;

probability of causes; repetition and belief; vulgar belief in body, due to coherence custom-and-galley. See vulgar belief in body, due to coherence dangerous dilemma. See also pessimistic conclusion; reduction of probability "to nothing" abandoned in amended Treatise, 36,251 contribution of I.iv. 1,14-16,36,85-86, 223-29 intent on securing destructive result, 224,229 not a Cartesian hypothesis, 99 role in reversal, 14-16,30,85-87,223 role of causal inference and understanding, 30,85-86,223 and second-order beliefs, 85-86,223 Darwall, Stephen, 28 n. 47 defeasible justification. See weak version of stability-based theory deference. See dogmatism and deference to authority degrees of probability and evidence. See also memory and causal inference; probability of causes; proofs; reduction of probability "to nothing" and dual role of stability, 33,102,236-37 endorsed, 13-14,17,31-32,46-47, 101-2 rejected in destructive stage, 14,51,87 demonstration. See intuition and demonstration destructive stage. See pessimistic conclusion Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, 16 n. 18,96-97,240 n. 37 direct and indirect realism. See argument against matter; double existence; perceptions as objects of experience direct passions, 232-37,244-45,250-51 disequilibrium. See dissonance; instability; Tyrrhenian skepticism disparities in identity-ascribing propensity. See propensity to ascribe identity dispositions and dispositional states. See associationism; belief, as a disposition; mental states, dispositional and occurrent

INDEX dissatisfaction hypothesis. See failure to subsume constancy dissonance. See also contradictions; instability; uneasiness Festinger's theory, 10-11,126,128 n. 40 Hume's theory, 11-12,34,125,131, 251-52 unreflective, 27-28,94-95,125 distance. See psychological distance distancing. See ambivalence dogmatism and deference to authority, 93-97 double existence of perceptions and objects, belief in. See also argument against matter; imaginative propensities; perceptions as objects of experience and causal theory of knowledge, 43 n. 11,194 explanation in amended Treatise, 212 n. 46 'external existence' and quasi content, 10,166-68,169 n. 33 'external existence' as meaningless, 163-64,215-16 and imagination, 194,215-16 lacuna in the explanation, 152 n. 8 role of contradiction, instability, and uneasiness, 9 n. 10,10,152-54 and three-stage reaction, 35,141,152, 200-201 and vulgar viewpoint, 122-23 n. 31 double vision (and perceptual relativity) argument. See also failure to subsume constancy; vulgar belief in body convince Hume vulgar belief false, 35-36,152,195-97,208-9,215-16, 245 and epistemological obstacle, 35-36, 180,195-99,206-7,215-16 "like effects, like causes" misapplied, 220-22 relinquished in amended Treatise, 36, 212,251-52 undermined by possibility of separate existence, 209-11 doubt. See belief; probability dramatic effects and dramatic reversal. See perversity; two-stage model

267

dual role of stability. See also stabilitybased theory; two systems of realities ambiguity in "establishing justification, other things equal," 88-89 and causal theory of knowledge, 61,73, 77 and degrees of evidence, 33,102-3, 236-37 establishing steadiness and justification, other things equal, 31-33,60, 64-65,74,80 and natural function of belief, 79-80 and resemblance and two systems of realities, 61-64,73-74 and treatment of education, 77-79 and two versions of stability-based theory, 91 duration of unchanging objects, a fiction, 204-5,207-8 education ambivalence in assessments, 16-17,78, 103-4 and associationism and theory of belief, 74-76,81,239,242-45 beliefs parallel to, 106-7 n. 7 vs. causal inference and testimony, 75, 81 as contrary to itself, to reason, and artificial, 81, 159-60,237-38,242 and dual role of stability, 77-79 and extracting a single judgment, 37, 230,238-45,250-51 halting explanation of unjust status, 13-15,30-31,81,237,244-45 and philosophical relations, 76-77 and views that do not unite, 243-44 eliminable vs. ineliminable instability. See instability; manifest contradiction empiricism about ideas and meaning. See arguments to meaninglessness Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals argument for perceptions as objects of experience, 208-9 causal theory of assurance, 39—40 dangerous dilemma absent, 97 differences from Treatise, 38 n. 2

268

INDEX

Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals (Continued) and miracles, 241 and sympathy, 133-34 version of manifest contradiction, 220 epistemic obligation. See naturalistic theory of justification; stability-based theory; uneasiness epistemological distinctions. See constructive stage epistemological obstacle to subsuming constancy under coherence. See double vision; failure to subsume constancy; vulgar belief in body, due to constancy equilibrium. See dissonance; instability; Pyrrhonian skepticism establishing justification, other things equal. See dual role of stability; stability-based theory estimate of likelihood. See reduction of probability "to nothing" evidence. See ignoring evidence; probability evolutionary concepts, 80 n. 34,125-26 n. 36 external existence. See double existence extraction of a single judgment (vs. persisting conflict) and contradictory beliefs, 37,80,230, 245-51 and education, 37,230,238-45,250-51 lack of general account, 36-37,217, 230,249-52 in probability, inductive inconsistencies, and proofs, 36-37,231-42, 248-51 faculty of association (imagination in the wide sense). See also associationism; imagination; skeptical interpretation of I.iii.6; understanding expands scope, 57-58 forms ideas fainter than memory, 48, 55 and intuition and demonstration, 55, 245,249-51 vs. a presumed nonassociative faculty of reason, 47

two components distinguished epistemically, 32,55,59,193 failure to subsume constancy under coherence. See also double vision; thesis that only changes have causes; vulgar belief in body; vulgar belief in body, due to coherence dissatisfaction and satisfaction hypotheses, 187-93 epistemological and metaphysical explanations, 35-36,180,193,206-7 and fictional duration of unchanging objects, 204-5 a puzzle, 35-36,177-80,186-87, 192-93,207 rectified in amended Treatise, 35-36, 180,207,212-13,251-52 Falkenstein, Lome, on conflicting beliefs, 242 felt determination of the mind, 6,248 Festinger, Leon. See dissonance fictions. See also belief vs. belief, 63,144-45 result from conflicted resolutions of contradictions, 167-68,200-201 of unchanging objects, 205 first three kinds of unphilosophical probability. See memory and causal inference fixity. See belief; repetition and belief Fogelin, Robert on associationism and dispositions, 70 on meaningless beliefs, 166 on perspectivism, 93 n. 50,100 n. 61 on probability of causes, 238-39 and stability, 28-29 on unphilosophical probability, 112 on wage pool principle, 231 fourth kind of unphilosophical probability. See accidental conjunctions galley principle and gappy regularities. See vulgar belief in body, due to coherence Garrett, Don on cognitive psychology vs. normative epistemology, 19,45 n. 15,85 n. 42, 156 n. 10 on 'evidence' as nonevaluative, 47 n. 19, 102 nn. 2-3,131 n. 43

INDEX and stability and uneasiness, 28-29, 126 n. 37 on title principle, 87 n. 45 general rules (and higher-order habits). See also accidental conjunctions; instability and beliefs based on one observation, 23,67-68,105,109 and the dangerous dilemma, 86,223 and first three kinds of unphilosophical probability, 34,114,116-18,130 and fourth kind of unphilosophical probability, 34,106-10,114,117-18, 241 and minute differences in probability, 109,129 n. 41 and poetical enthusiasm and resemblance, 63,114-18,130 and rules by which to judge cause and effect, 110 second-order beliefs defined, 114 as stabilizing or destabilizing higherorder beliefs, 34,104-5,108-9,114, 130 and variations in judgment due to sympathy, 119-20, 129 n. 41,130 Glymour, Clark, on inductive inconsistencies, 240 n. 37 Goldman, Alvin, causal theory of knowledge, 42 n. 10 habit. See general rules; probability; repetition and belief Heath, Julie, 137 n. 53 higher-order beliefs. See general rules; instability Hills, David, 58 n. 40 Hobbes, Thomas, on memory, 52 honest gentlemen passage, 92-93,96-97, 99-100 Hutcheson, Francis, 28 n. 47 identity. See also propensity to ascribe identity causal inference in judgments of, 202-3 a philosophical relation, 40—41 an uninterrupted and invariable object, 139-41,175,204 ignoring evidence, 93,96

269

illusions. See double vision; fictions; imaginative propensities imagination (in the narrow sense). See also faculty of association; imaginative propensities and belief in body, 35-36,146,193-95, 215-16 contrasted with two systems, 62-64 faculty of association, exclusive of understanding, 13,32,55,59,63-64,193 vs. judgment, 54—55 locus of unjust mechanisms, 53-59 imaginative propensities (and three-stage reaction). See also propensity to ascribe identity; quasi content; taste belief in body, an exception to conflicted resolutions, 150-52,161-62, 172-73,212-13 contradict intuition or demonstration, 35,140-41,150-52,158-61,168-69, 245-48 enhanced stability linked to semantic defects, 35,141-42,171-72,212-13 give rise to an initial illusion, 140-42, 149-50 inl.iii.14,161 n. 16 include identity-ascribing and relationadding propensities, 10,35,146—47, 161,197 independent of causal inference, 35, 145-46,161 lead to conceptual confusion, 10,35, 141-42,167-69,212-13 lead to conflicted resolutions, 10, 141-42,148-52,167-69,172 lead to instability and uneasiness, 35, 147-54,161-62,167-69 mechanisms distinctive to I.iv, 176,246 result in unjustified beliefs, 10,35, 141-42,154-62 source of metaphysical beliefs, 10,35, 139-41,149-50 immaterial substrata, belief in, 21-22 n. 29,148-52,164-68,175-76 n. 38. See also substrata Immerwahr, John, and stability, 28-29 imperfect experience and habits. See probability of causes inculcation. See education indirect realism. See double existence

270

INDEX

induction. See causal inference; skeptical interpretation of I.iii.6 inductive inconsistencies, 36,110, 239-42,245 ineliminable instability. See contradictions; imaginative propensities; manifest contradiction infixing. See belief infrequent experience, 33,102-3,226-28, 236-37. See also probability of causes inhesion and support, 163-64 inner speech, 171 instability. See also extraction of a single judgment; general rules; manifest contradiction; stable belief; uneasiness; unreflective sources of instability and contrary causes and direct passions, 36-37,232-37,250-51 due to conflicting beliefs, 80,88-89,217 due to contradictions, 33-34,80-81, 105-7,124-25,147-54 due to imaginative propensities, 147-50,160-61 due to momentary and partial viewpoints, 237 due to opposing irresistible and weak principles, 157-58 due to second-order beliefs about variations, 115-17,120 due to second-order beliefs that question truth, 33-34,81-86,125-27 eliminable, 111, 160-61 oscillation between reflective and relaxed periods, 99-100 a pervasive feature of mental life, 9 in violent emotions, 4-6,126 intellectual character, 12-13 intuition and demonstration. See also imaginative propensities as associative, 55,245,249-51 as coherent, 247 degenerate into probability, 85,223 endorsed, 13,32,159 exempted from counterbalancing, 246-47 and extracting a single judgment, 37, 246-51 irresistibility and unavoidability, 159, 248

and necessary truth, 248-49 vs. probability, construed broadly, 45-46 invariable and uninterrupted objects. See duration of unchanging objects; identity; propensity to ascribe identity irregular principles. See permanent, irresistible, and universal principles irresistible belief. See also Kemp Smith, Norman; permanent, irresistible, and universal principles; propensity to ascribe identity and belief in body, 35,173-76,213-14 and causal inference and proofs, 23, 159,240 and intuition and demonstration, 159, 248 and manifest contradiction, 84—85 and the pessimistic conclusion, 14 joint operation of belief-forming mechanisms, 158-61,248 judgment and two systems of realities, 44, 54-55,62-63 justification, other things equal and all things considered. See dual role of stability; stability-based theory just inferences. See causal inference; constructive stage; understanding Kahneman, Daniel, 112 Kemp Smith, Norman (and the Kemp Smith interpretation) anticipates reflexive approval interpretations, 27 n. 44 belief in material substrata inevitable, 176 n. 39 on causal inference and epistemic distinctions, 20-21,239 on cooling of interest in associationism, 233-34 on inference from coherence as irregular, 198 n. 28 and justified, resistible beliefs, 23 kernel of truth in interpretation, 159-60 and manifest contradiction and dangerous dilemma, 18,23-25 on naturalism and skepticism, 20-23

INDEX on relation of constancy to coherence, 192-93 two forms of natural belief, dispensable, 213 n. 48 and unavoidable variations in judgment, 2 3,132-35 and unjust, contradictory but irresistible beliefs, 23-25, 159-60 knowledge. See causal theory of assurance; intuition and demonstration; probability; proofs Korsgaard, Christine, 94 n. 52,123 n. 32, 128 n. 40. See also reflexive approval interpretations Laird, John, on the causal maxim, 203-4 landholder passage, 92-93,96-97,99-100 language of thought, 170 Lenz, John, and Kemp Smith interpretation, 22 liars, 75-76. See also repetition and belief like effects, like causes, 53-54,220-22 lively ideas. See belief, as a lively idea local conjunction of taste and extension. See taste Locke, John. See also argument against matter; arguments to meaninglessness; two systems of realities contrast between reason and association, 57-58 empiricism about meaning, 164-66, 170 on memory as associative, 52-53 on sensitive knowledge, 31,39-43 theoretical dispensability of secondary qualities, 219 Ludwigjan, 17n. 20 Mackie, John L., on contradictions in sentiments, 120-22 MacNabb, D. G. C. on belief and pseudobelief, 69 n. 15,70 n. 18,115-16 on calm and violent emotions, 4 on destructive stage, 217 on education, 237-38 on instability as unpleasant, 26,124 n. 33,127 n. 39 madness, 144 n. 4 Maher, Patrick, 28-29,101,231-37,241

271

manifest contradiction. See also argument against matter; pessimistic conclusion abandoned in amended Treatise, 36, 251 an ineliminable instability, 30,36, 84-85,111,223 causal inference, a party, 14,23-24,36, 84-85,229,245-46 contribution of I.iv.4,14-16,84-85, 217-23,251 and dramatic effects, 223 as implicating just and regular causal inference, 217-22 independent of double vision argument, 218 n. 5 not a Cartesian hypothesis, 99 role in reversal, 14-16,23-24,30, 84-86,216-17,220 and successive assent, 8-9,14,23-24, 30,80,84-86,220 material substrata, belief in. See also substrata belief in simplicity, 140 n. 2 and gradual change, 129-30,140 psychological explanation, 148-49, 167-68 requires weak identity-ascribing propensity, 35,155-59,173-76, 213-14 matter. See argument against matter meaning. See arguments to meaninglessness memory. See also causal inference; memory and causal inference; skeptical interpretation of I.iii.6; two systems of realities as associative, 52-53,112 n. 17 endorsed, skepticism absent, 13-14,32, 44-46,51-52,104,146 as impressions vs. ideas, 48 n. 22 infixes belief, 67,250 role in destructive stage, 52 n. 28 memory and causal inference, variations in confidence (first three kinds of unphilosophical probability). See also corrected judgments; psychological distance; unphilosophical probability biases explained associationistically, 112

272

INDEX

memory and causal inference (Continued) distinctions among three kinds, 111-12,117 n. 24 effects of accumulated disparities, 27-28,34,129-31,237 general rules in initial and final accounts, 114-18,128-30 as judgments of apparent probability, 12,34,118,121-22,138,237 models in pseudobelief, sympathy, 114-16,118 pressure of uneasiness within vulgar viewpoint, 34,128-29,132,138,237 as regular and systematic, 137 and relinquishing beliefs, 132-33,137 stated rationale for rejecting variations, 113-14,118,121 and weak version of stability-based theory, 130-31 mental states, dispositional and occurrent, 4-8,69-70. See also belief metaphysical beliefs. See imaginative propensities metaphysical obstacle to subsuming constancy under coherence. See failure to subsume constancy; thesis that only changes have causes methods of authority and tenacity. See Peirce, C. S. minds, as bundles, 21-22 n. 29,209-11 miracles, 96-97,241 missing shade of blue, 215 modern philosophy, 15. See also argument against matter; manifest contradiction moral judgment. See also corrected judgments; sympathy, variations in judgment of actions vs. sentiments and character, 119 distinctively moral judgment, 22-23, 119-20,138 founded in uneasiness, not reason, 22-23,119,135-36 sympathy and the steady point of view, 11-12,34,119-23,127-28,132,138, 237 natural function of belief. See belief; instability; stability-based theory

naturalistic theory of justification and naturalism, 20-21. See also arguments to meaninglessness; Kemp Smith, Norman; stability-based theory natural philosophers, 16-17 nature, as senses and memory, 67 necessary connection, 14 n. 16,161 n. 16, 169 n. 32 necessity (logical). See intuition and demonstration neutral monism, 210 n. 42,211 n. 44, 211-12 n. 45 new and signal contradiction, 18,39 n. 3, 110-11,223 normativity. See Kemp Smith, Norman; moral judgment; reflexive approval interpretations; stability-based theory; uneasiness Norton, David Fate, and Mary J. Norton on causal inference as just, 43 n. 12 emendation of "eternal" in Appendix, 67 n. 13 on internal reference at Treatise 141, 244 n. 44 on 117 n. 1 and 371 n. 1,55-56 n. 34 treatment of final paragraph of I.iii. 10, 66 n. 8 Noxon, James, and stability, 28 objects of experience. See perceptions as objects of experience obstacles to subsuming constancy. See failure to subsume constancy occurrent states. See belief, as a lively idea; mental states, dispositional and occurrent "Of a Particular Providence and a Future State" and "Of Miracles," 96-97 official theory of belief, 4,66-67,224-25, 245,250. See also belief, as a lively idea "Of Parties in General," 95 paradox. See perversity passions. See calm and violent emotions; direct passions Passmore, John, 14-15,18 n. 21,25-26, 62-65 Peirce, C. S., 93-94,97,124 n. 34

INDEX perceptions, possible separate existence, 209-11,212 n. 46 perceptions as (immediate) objects of experience, 139-40,177,195-97, 208-9,215-16 perceptual relativity, supports various theses, 209,218 n. 5. See also argument against matter; double vision; perceptions as objects of experience permanent, irresistible, and universal (vs. changeable, weak, and irregular) principles. See also constructive stage; superstition ambivalence in assessments of, 16-17, 155 endorsed, 14-17,43,155-56 the galley as irregular in I.iv.5,198 n. 28 oppose and subvert weak principles, 157-61 and status of identity-ascribing propensity, 154—56,176 strength of identity-ascribing propensity, 35,155-59,173-76 persisting conflict. See contradictions; extraction of a single judgment; imaginative propensities; manifest contradiction personal identity, second thoughts, 208 n. 39 perspectivist interpretations, 93 n. 50,100 n.61 perversity. See also pessimistic conclusion and belief in body, 215-16 delight in disparaging reflection, 16, 97-98,216,224,229,251 dramatic effects, 16-18,97-98,155,223 leads Hume to overlook mistakes, 216-17,220-23 relish in destructive, paradoxical results, 16 n. 18,36,215-16 pessimistic conclusion (readiness to reject all belief and reasoning). See also dangerous dilemma; manifest contradiction; new and signal contradiction; perversity; two-stage model and Cartesian hypotheses, 98-99 and degrees of evidence, 14,87 and I.iii.6,50-51 inhibits development of stability-based theory, 30

273

and irresistible belief, 14 and memory and necessary connection, 14 n. 16,52 n. 28 need not embrace, 36,216-17,251 and reflective vs. unreflective persons, 15-16,84-93 philosophers and philosophy. See ambivalence philosophical probability. See causal inference; probability; proofs; unphilosophical probability philosophical relations. See causal theory of assurance; identity philosophical system. See double existence Philo's reversal, 16 n. 18 physiological explanations, 142-44 poetical enthusiasm. See also pseudobelief citations from I.iii.10,66 n. 8 produces pseudobelief and feels imperfect, 70-71,114-15 points of view. See moral judgment; probability of causes; psychological distance prejudice, 105,109 pretheoretical commitments. See also ambivalence; constructive stage as Hume's own, 14-17 qualified in destructive stage, 91-92 reversal in attitude, 13-14,51,87 as sustained by stability-based theory, 12,14-15,32,59,147 ultimately not sustained, 12-16,32, 216-17 Price, H. H., 70-71,178,183-84,211 prima facie justification. See weak version of stability-based theory principle of subtraction, 231-32,241 probability. See also degrees of probability and evidence; general rules; probability of causes; probability of chances; reduction of probability "to nothing"; unphilosophical probability and associationism, 56-57,226 construed broadly vs. narrowly, 40 n. 5, 45-46,56,101-2 and doubt or uncertainty, 228-29 probability of causes. See also contrary causes; infrequent experience; proofs based on conjunctions that are infrequently observed or not constant, 45, 226-28

274

INDEX

probability of causes (Continued) endorsed, 13,46-47,103-4,237 vivacity and impact of associationism, 225-29 probability of chances, 13,32,103-4,231, 235 problem of induction. See skeptical interpretation of I.iii. 6 proofs endorsed, 46-47,51,101-2 as enhancing regularity, 180-82,189, 198 and extracting a single judgment, 241, 248 as knowledge, 61 n. 1 in third kind of unphilosophical probability, 113 vs. probability, construed narrowly, 40 n. 5,46,56,101-2,228 propensity to add new relations. See necessary connection; taste propensity to ascribe identity. See also double existence; identity; imaginative propensities; substrata; vulgar belief in body, due to constancy amendments remove disparities, 36, 176,180,212-14,251-52 and arguments to meaninglessness, 164,171-72 belief in body, an exception to instability, 161-62,172-73 claims about strength threaten epistemic status, 35,176 does not itself generate contradictions, 158-59 due to imagination, 35,142,146-47, 154-55,197 epistemic status, 154-56,159-61, 176 figures in recurrent pattern of explanation, 35,139-41,176 identity mislocated, 149,153-54 irresistible in producing belief in body, 35,173-76,213-14 physiological and psychological explanations, 35,142-44 produces an illusion and fiction, 140-45,167-68,200-201 and reflection, 149 n. 6,161-62

role of repetition, 144-46,174-75,187, 206,245,249-50 source of disparities, 172-73,212-13 strength in producing belief in souls, 175-76 n. 3 8 weak in context of material substrata, 35,141-42,155-61,173-76,213-14 prepositional attitudes. See belief; belief, as a lively idea; blind faith provisional epistemic assessment. See strong version of stability-based theory pseudobelief, 70-73,114-18,127,132,171 n. 34. See also belief, as a lively idea; poetical enthusiasm; resemblance psychological asymmetry. See permanent, irresistible, and universal principles psychological biases. See memory and causal inference psychological combat, discomfort, and pressure. See contradictions; uneasiness psychological distance, variations in judgment due to. See also corrected judgments; memory and causal inference; sympathy, variations in judgment enhanced standing when stabilized and corrected, 34,138,237 as momentary viewpoints, 237 pressure of uneasiness within vulgar viewpoint, 34,122-23,132,138,237 varieties of, 112-13,119,133-34 psychological galley. See vulgar belief in body, due to coherence psychology. See associationism; dissonance; extraction of a single judgment; Garrett, Don; uneasiness putative belief, 115-16 puzzle in regard to arguments to meaningless. See arguments to meaninglessness puzzle in regard to I.iii.5-10. See dual role of stability puzzle in regard to I.iv.2. See failure to subsume constancy Pyrrhonian skepticism, 6-11,133 qualified reversal, 91-92 quasi content (and quasi belief). See also

INDEX arguments to meaninglessness; imaginative propensities vs. belief and pseudobelief, 170-71 conceptual confusion that obscures conflict, 10,35,167-69 and explanations of meaningless beliefs, 35,162-63,166-70 semantic and epistemic defects linked, 35,141-42,171-72,212-13 vs. strict meaning, 166-67,170 rash generalizations, 105,109 readiness to reject all belief and reasoning. See pessimistic conclusion realism. See argument against matter; double existence; perceptions as objects of experience realities. See two systems of realities reason. See also moral judgment; skeptical interpretation of I.iii.6; understanding associative replaces nonassociative conception, 53-56 as a nonassociative faculty, 32,47-48, 56-57,230-31 "no reason" claim, 49-50,53-57,230-31 shifts in 'reason' in constructive stage, 53-57,193 terminological conventions, 59 reduction of probability "to nothing." See also dangerous dilemma abandoned in amended Treatise, 36,251 and causal inference, 30,36,85,223 confuses probabilities of different orders, 36,223-24,229 and corrections for fallibility, 83-86, 223-24 depends upon two roles for vivacity, 36, 223-29 and non-Humean conceptions of belief, 85-86 n. 43 reflection, reflective vs. unreflective persons. See pessimistic conclusion; strong version of stability-based theory; unreflective sources of instability; weak version of stability-based theory reflexive approval interpretations. See also unreflective sources of instability

275

invert relation of stability and reflexivity tests, 28,97 n. 55,216 objections, 27-28,90 n. 48,97 and stability, 26-28,89 n. 46 regularity analysis. See accidental vs. nonaccidental generalizations regularity-enhancing inferences, 182-86, 189-90,198-200 regulative dispositions and principles. See belief; general rules Reid, Thomas, 20,208-9 relation-adding propensity. See taste relations. See associationism; causal inference; identity; resemblance relations of ideas. See intuition and demonstration relative ideas, 169 n. 33 reliabilist interpretations, 83 n. 40,125-26 n. 36 reliability, beliefs about, 81-84 repetition and belief. See also belief; dual role of stability; education; probability of causes beliefs based on one observation, 23, 67-68,105,109 beliefs parallel to education, 106-7 n. 7 and causal theory of assurance, 76-77 and degree of belief, 102-3,246 elastic role of repetition, 75-76,145, 187 exceptions to effects of repetition, 243-44 observation of resembling pairs of objects, 72-76,250 observation of sets of resembling perceptions, 145-46,174-75,187,206, 249-50 repetition explains steadiness, 33, 67-69,73,75-76,250 repetition of mere ideas, 67-68,74-76, 239,242-45 representative realism. See double existence resemblance (and contiguity). See also pseudobelief; two systems of realities and dual role of stability, 63,73-74 a general rule against beliefs based on, 63,116-18 and identity-ascribing propensity, 35, 142-44,175

276

INDEX

resemblance (Continued) intensifies beliefs, 61-62 produces pseudobelief and feels imperfect,61-63,72-73,114-15 'resemblance' used for resemblance and contiguity, 63 reversal in attitude (toward pretheoretical distinctions). See perversity; pessimistic conclusion; two-stage model rules by which to judge cause and effect, 13-17,44-45,53-54,59,110. See also like effects, like causes Russell, Bertrand, on sensibilia, 210 satisfaction hypothesis. See failure to subsume constancy; vulgar belief in body, due to coherence Schmitt, Frederick E, 83 n. 40,89-90 n. 47,96 n. 53,98 n. 56,125-26 n. 36 second-order beliefs. See general rules self. See immaterial substrata self-deception, 83 sense perception. See also perceptions as objects of experience; propensity to ascribe identity; size; two systems of realities; vulgar belief in body endorsed, 13-14,32,104,146 infixes belief, 67,250 and unphilosophical probability, 104, 112 n. 17 sensibilia, 210-11 settled and unsettled mental conditions. See dissonance; Pyrrhonian skepticism; stable belief; uneasiness Sextus Empiricus. See Pyrrhonian skepticism simple and complex ideas, 164-65,170 simplicity of a substratum, 140 n. 2 size, corrections to beliefs about, 133-34, 137-38 skeptical interpretation of I.iii.6,31-32, 38-39,43-50,53-57,230-31 skeptics and skepticism. See causal inference; constructive stage; naturalistic theory of justification; Pyrrhonian skepticism Slovic, Paul, 112 social impulse and social source of instability. See Peirce, C. S.; sympathy

souls. See immaterial substrata specters. See permanent, irresistible principles stability-based theory. See also amendments; dual role of stability; extraction of a single judgment; strong version of stability-based theory; two-stage model; uneasiness; weak version of stability-based theory antecedents in secondary literature, 25-29 and associationism, 29-30 and comparative stability, 96,110 compared to Kemp Smith interpretation, 21-25 compared to reflexive approval interpretations, 27-28,89 n. 46,90 n. 48, 97,216 constraints on explanation of instability, 239,247,251 and intermingling of justification and belief, 31-33,60,64-65,73-74,77, 91,102 lacunae in supporting psychology, 36-37,217,230,249-51 and natural function of belief, 33, 79-80,158 a naturalistic account of epistemic obligation, 21-23 outgrowth of psychology and theory of belief, 28 provisional success, 14-17,32,91-92 with reference to a belief's stability, 12-13,89-90 n. 47 with reference to mechanisms, 12-13, 32-33,88-90,95,154-56,161-62,217 and reversal in attitude, 32,79-80, 86-87,90-92,216-17 and sets of belief-forming mechanisms, 158-61,248 strong and weak versions, 33,87-93 an unsystematic orientation, 29-31 stable belief. See also dual role of stability; instability belief steady in its influence, 31-33,80 steadiness, a species of stability, 69 statistical likelihood. See probability of causes; reduction of probability "to nothing"

INDEX steadiness. See belief; repetition and belief; stable belief steady and general point of view. See moral judgment; sympathy, variations in judgment straddling, 61,77 Strawson, P. R, and Kemp Smith interpretation, 22 strong version of stability-based theory. See also reflexive approval interpretations; stability-based theory objection that reflection is destabilizing, 97-98 and stability for a reflective subject, 33, 87-89 and stable beliefs of unreflective persons, 92-93,96-97 and two-stage development, 88-92 Stroud, Barry account of sympathy, 119 on fundamental beliefs, 21-22 n. 29, 176 n. 39,200 n. 30 on Hume on logical necessity, 248-49 on theory of ideas and belief, 66-67, 165 substrata, belief in. See also imaginative propensities; immaterial substrata; material substrata condemned independently of reflective instabilities, 161-62 a conflicted resolution involving quasicontent, 10,147-52,167-72 as meaningless, 163-64 and pretheoretical intuitions, 32 as unjustified and a fiction, 35,140—42, 146-47,154-55,200-201 subtraction, 231-32,241 sudden change. See uneasiness superstition, 155-58,162,245-46,250 supposition. See fictions suppression of inclinations. See propensity to ascribe identity sympathy, a source of instability in belief, 94-95,128 n. 40 sympathy, variations in judgment. See also corrected judgments; moral judgment explained associationistically, 119

277

and general rules, 119-20,129 n. 41, 130 initial vs. final accounts, 120,127-28, 130 intrasubjective vs. intersubjective, 120 n. 27,128 n. 40 as judgments of apparent virtue, 11-12, 34,121-22,138,237 on Mackie on role of contradictions, 11-12,120-23,127-28 as obstinate or unavoidable, 23,133-35 pressure of uneasiness within vulgar viewpoint, 11-12,34,122-23, 127-28,132,138,237 as regular and systematic, 135-36 similarities to variations in memory, 118,121-22 unstable apart from reflection, 27-28, 125-28 target idea, 165 taste, belief in entire conjunction with matter, 25-26,149-50,168-69. See also imaginative propensities temporal distance. See psychological distance testimony, 42,75,81 theoretical dispensability argument, 219 theory of ideas. See associationism; belief, as a lively idea; perceptions, possible separate existence; perceptions as objects of experience; Stroud, Barry theory of meaning. See arguments to meaninglessness; quasi content thesis that only changes have causes. See also duration of unchanging objects; failure to subsume constancy does not consider possibility thesis false, 35-36,180,203-6,216 and judgments of identity, 202-3 as metaphysical obstacle, 35-36,201-2, 206-7 relinquished in amended Treatise, 36, 207,212,251-52 three-stage reaction. See imaginative propensities Tieman, Mark D., 177 n. 1 time without change, 204-5,207-8

278

INDEX

traditional interpretation of the theory of belief. See belief, as a lively idea trivial propensities, 85-86. See also imaginative propensities truth. See belief; instability Tversky, Amos, 112 two-stage model. See also constructive stage; pessimistic conclusion; pretheoretical commitments a constraint on interpretations, 19-20 explains ambivalent and contradictory assessments, 14-18,78,103-4 independent of stability-based theory, 20,32 overview, 12-15,32 and skeptical interpretations, 18 stability-based theory explains reversal, 32, 79-80,86-87,90-93,216-17 two-step argument, 195-97,208-9. See also double vision; perceptions as objects of experience two systems of realities. See also causal theory of assurance; dual role of stability; resemblance contrast with imagination, 55-56, 62-64 and dual role of stability, 61-64,73-74, 77 endorsed, 44,54-55,59,62-63 and two versions of stability-based theory, 90-91 two versions of stability-based theory. See strong version of stability-based theory; weak version of stabilitybased theory unavoidability. See irresistible belief; Kemp Smith, Norman; memory and causal inference; permanent, irresistible principles; propensity to ascribe identity; Pyrrhonian skepticism; sympathy, variations in judgment uncertainty. See belief; probability unchanging and uninterrupted objects. See duration of unchanging objects; identity; propensity to ascribe identity understanding. See also reason

a component of faculty of association, 53-59,193,245,249 and the dangerous dilemma, 30,85-86, 223 distinguished from imagination and endorsed, 13,32,53-59,63-«4,193 identified with reason, 53-56 and intuition and demonstration, 30 relation to custom-and-galley, 35,17980,183-86,197-200,212-14,251-52 uneasiness. See also contradictions; dissonance; imaginative propensities; instability; Pyrrhonian skepticism; unreflective sources of instability belief prevents uneasiness in doubt, 124 and content of belief, 131 n. 44 in contradictions, a limited resource, 11-12 due to beliefs that feel like contradictions, 34,123,127-28,217 due to contradictions, 27-28,33-35, 124-25,147^8,152-53,237 due to sympathy with beliefs of others, 94-95,128 n. 40 general account as due to sudden change, 33-34,36,124-31,235-37 motivates efforts at relief, 10,22,28,35, 124-25,147-48,235-36 and the natural function of belief, 125-26 n. 36 and second-order beliefs that question truth, 33-34,126-27 source of epistemic obligation, 22-23,33 unjustified beliefs. See imagination; imaginative propensities; stability-based theory unphilosophical probability, 16-17, 45-46,103-7,111-12,117-18. See also accidental conjunctions; memory and causal inference unreflective sources of instability. See also instability; uneasiness due to causal inference conflicting with dogmatism and deference, 95 due to contradictions, 27-28,124-25 due to identity-ascribing propensity, 149 n. 6,161-62 due to sudden change, 27-28,125-27, 131

INDEX due to sympathy with beliefs of others, 94-95 and first three kinds of unphilosophical probability, 27-28,34,129-31 and fourth kind of unphilosophical probability, 105-7 and reflexive approval interpretations, 27-28 unsettled mental conditions. See dissonance; instability; Tyrrhenian skepticism; stable belief; uneasiness Velleman, J. David, 82 n. 37,83 n. 39 virtue and vice. See moral judgment; sympathy, variations in judgment vivacity. See associationism vulgar belief in body. See also body, belief in; failure to subsume constancy; two-step argument amendments enhance status, 36,212, 251-52 argument that not due to causal inference, 194-99 asymmetry in characterizations of constancy and coherence, 206 bipartite explanation, 35-36,177-80, 186-93 constancy as reinforcing coherence, 174,190-91 differential epistemic attitudes toward constancy and coherence, 197-201 does not distinguish perceptions and objects, 122,139-40,177-78 due to imagination and unjustified, 35-36,146-47,154,193-95,215-16 an illusion and fiction, 141^42, 200-201 and pretheoretical intuitions, 32,35-36 verifiability and unperceived perceptions, 211-12 n. 45 vulgar belief in body, due to coherence (via custom-and-galley) amended Treatise attributes to understanding, 212-14, 251-52 and change and dependence, 179,206 dialectical tension in treatment, 199-200 difficulties in formulating coherence, 184-85n. 10

279

and gap-indifference and gappy regularities, 178,183-85,205-6 and I.ii.4,188-89 as irregular in I.iv.5,198 n. 28 no reference to fictions, 200-201 and regularity-enhancing inferences, 182-86,189-90,198-200 relation to causal inference and imagination, 35,179-80,183-86,197-200, 212 relation to constancy, 174,190-91 satisfied with psychological adequacy, 35,180,188-93,197,207 vulgar belief in body, due to constancy (via identity-ascribing propensity) an exception to features of the propensity, 150-52,161-62,164,172-73, 212-13 the belief an illusion and fiction, 141-42,200-201 constancy as monotonous coherence, 178-79,205-6 and invariable but interrupted perceptions, 139-40 no reference to causal dependence, 206 requires propensity to be irresistible, 35,173-74,213-14 role of contradiction, instability, and uneasiness, 139-41,147-48 unequivocally due to imagination, 197-201,206 and weak version of stability-based theory, 161-62 vulgar viewpoint, 122-23,129 n. 42. See also double existence; psychological distance; vulgar belief in body; wise persons wage pool principle, 231,235,242-43 Walsh, W. H., and stability, 28 weak and irregular principles. See permanent, irresistible, and universal principles weak version of stability-based theory. See also stability-based theory defense of attributing to Hume, 92-98 and evidence and unphilosophical probability, 130-31

280

INDEX

weak version of stability-based theory (Continued) and identity-ascribing propensity, 161-62 and prima facie and automatic justification, 89-91 and reflective persons during relaxed contexts, 98-100 and stability for actual subject, 33, 87-89

and stable beliefs of unreflective persons, 89 n. 46,97-98,216 and two-stage development, 90-92 Williams, Michael, and contextualism, 98-100 Winters, Barbara, and stability, 28-29,79 n. 33,157 n. 11 wise persons, 110 Wolff, Robert Paul, on dispositions, 68-69

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