Spinoza's Radical Cartesian Mind

SPINOZA'S RADICAL CARTESIAN MIND

Continuum Studies in Philosophy Series Editor: James Fieser, University of Tennessee at Martin Aesthetic in Kant, James Kirwan Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion, Aaron Preston Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus, Christopher Brown Demands of Taste in Kant's Aesthetics, Brent Kalar Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature, Justin Skirry Descartes3 Theory of Ideas, David Clemenson Dialectic of Romanticism, Peter Murphy and David Roberts Hegel's Philosophy of Language, Jim Vernon Hegel's Philosophy of Right, David James Kierkegaard's Analysis of Radical Evil, David A. Roberts Leibniz Re-interpreted, Lloyd Strickland Nietzsche and the Greeks, Dale Wilkerson Philosophy of Miracles, David Corner Platonism, Music and the Listener's Share, Christopher Norris Popper's Theory of Science, Carlos Garcia The Role of God in Spinoza's Metaphysics, Sherry Deveaux Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue, James Delaney Rousseau's Theory of Freedom, Matthew Simpson Spinoza and the Stoics, Firmin DeBrabander St Augustine andthe Theory of Just War, John Mark Mattox St Augustine of Hippo, R.W. Dyson Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, Alex Hall Tolerance and the Ethical Life, Andrew Fiala

SPINOZA'S RADICAL CARTESIAN MIND

TAMMY NYDEN-BULLOCK

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Continuum International Publishing Group The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX 80 Maiden Lane, Suite 704, New York, NY 10038 www.conti n u u mbooks.com © Tammy Nyden-Bullock 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN-10: HB: 0-8264-8587-1 ISBN-13: HB:978-0-8264-8587-8 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

Typeset by Aarontype Limited, Easton, Bristol Printed and bound in Great Britain by Biddies Ltd, King's Lynn, Norfolk

For Andy, Cole and Jonah

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Contents

Acknowledgements

viii

Abbreviations

x

1

1

Political Divisions: Orangists vs the States-Party

2 Radical Cartesian Pamphlets: van Velthuysen and De la Court

14

3 Radical Cartesian Associates: van den Enden and the Amsterdam Circle

29

4 Spinoza's Radical Cartesianism

51

5 Spinoza's Early Epistemology

78

6 Spinoza's Transitional Epistemology: The TIE and KV

90

7

Spinoza's Mature Epistemology: The Ethics

116

Epilogue

132

Notes

135

Bibliography

148

Index

157

Acknowledgements

The completion of this book depended on the generosity and kind assistance of many people. I would particularly like to thank two individuals without whom this project would not have been possible and for whom I have great admiration. Patricia Easton, my dissertation adviser at Claremont Graduate University, who supported this project from its very inception and taught me the dual importance of historical context and textual analysis. She made my graduate years a pure joy and continues to be a great mentor in academia and in life. I also want to give special thanks to Wiep van Bunge, who patiently introduced me to scholarship on the Dutch historical context and generously invited me to work alongside the research programme at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, 'The Early Enlightenment in the Dutch Republic: Cartesianism, Spinozism and Empiricism, 1650-1750' during the 2001-2002 academic year. In addition to his philosophical mentorship, he kindly helped arrange practical details for my stay, down to the requisite Dutch bike. I will forever be grateful. I would like to thank the Netherland-America Foundation for financially supporting my stay in Holland and the Erasmus University of Rotterdam for providing office space, library privileges and other forms of institutional support. I especially want to thank the research group itself: Wiep van Bunge, Henri Krop, Han van Ruler, Paul Schuurman, Bart Leewenburgh, Michiel Wielema and Gunter Coppens for their kind hospitality, pleasant conversation and collective sense of humour — it was a delight to work with all of you. Thank you to Theo Verbeek for meeting with me in Utrecht, sharing his work on the TTP, and for a very helpful discussion on Spinoza's early works. I am indebted to my dissertation committee for their comments and guidance: Patricia Easton, Wiep van Bunge, Alan Nelson and Nick Jolley; to Claremont Graduate University for a dissertation fellowship; as well as to the Kristeller-Popkin Foundation and Grinnell College for providing additional funds allowing me to continue my research and to rework and build upon the dissertation to form this monograph. I am also grateful to the National Endowment of the Humanities, Steven Nadler and Donald

Acknowledgements

ix

Rutherford for holding the 2004 Summer Institute on 'The Intersection of Philosophy, Science and Theology in the Seventeenth Century'. The discussions from that summer have had a large impact on the further development of this project. Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank Nick Zurko, Ted Recio, Ilan Moscovitz, and Patrick Laine for Proofreading and Julie Owens and Andy Bullock for their invaluable assistance with the index. Some of the material in this book has been previously published in 'Radical Cartesian Politics: van Velthuysen, De la Court, and Spinoza', Studio, Spinozana 15 (2006), pp. 35-65.1 would like to thank the publisher, Konigshausen & Neumann, for their permission to re-publish that material here. I thank the following for permission to use translations: The Collected Works of Spinoza. Vol. I. trans. Edwin Curley © 1985 Princeton University Press. Selections reprinted by permission of the Princeton University Press. All rights reserved. Spinoza, Political Treatise, trans. Samuel Shirley © 2000 of Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Selections reprinted by permission. Spinoza, Theological Political Treatise, trans. Samuel Shirley © 1998 by Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Translation Copyrignt © 1991 by E J. Brill. Selections reprinted by permission of E.J. Brill. All rights reserved.

Abbreviations

CM E Ep KV Med PP PPG TIE

The Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts (Cogitata Metaphysica] Ethics (Ethica) The Letters (Epistola] Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Weil-Being ( Korte Verhandeling) Meditations on First Philosophy (Meditationes de Prime Philosophia) Principles of Philosophy (Principia Philosophiae) Descartes3 Principles of Philosophy (Principia Philosophiae Cartesiarea) Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione] TP Political Treatise (Tractatus Politicus] TTP Theological-Political Treatise (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus] References to the Ethics use the following system: Roman numeral = part A = Axiom ap = Appendix C = Corollary D = Definition d = Demonstration ex = Explanation L = Lemma P = Proposition Prol = Prolegomenon po = Postulate pr = Preface S = Scholium References to the PPG, CM, TIE and KV cite page numbers from the Curley translation (1985). Quotes from the Ethics are also from this translation.

Abbreviations of Spinoza's and Descartes' Works

xi

References to The Letters cite page numbers from the Shirley translation (Spinoza 1995). References to the TP and TTP cite pages numbers from the Shirley translation (Spinoza 1998 and Spinoza 2002). References to Descartes' works cite page numbers of the Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch translations (Descartes 1984-1995). References to the PP, Med, PPG, CM and KV denote the part with roman numerals and the chapter with arabic numerals.

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Chapter 1

Political Divisions: Orangists vs the States-Party

Introduaction Spinoza lived and wrote at a time of profound philosophical controversy in the United Provinces. Holland was witnessing a shift from scholastic Aristotelianism to the new ideas of Galileo, Hobbes and Descartes. Debates in philosophy, theology, politics and religion took place both inside and outside of the academy. These debates, which centred on Cartesianism, form an important context for understanding Spinoza's philosophy and its development. This book traces the development of Spinoza's epistemology in light of this historical and philosophical context. The first section describes the political, theological and philosophical divide of Spinoza's time: that between the Orthodox Calvinist, scholastic supporters of the House of Orange and the freethinking Remonstrant, Cartesian supporters of the States-Party. It contains an examination of some of the popular pamphlets at the centre of the debate and explains Spinoza's political writings as the first systematization of doctrines found within those pamphlets. The second section of this work reconstructs the development of key epistemological and metaphysical doctrines in Spinoza's writings concerning truth, error and falsity, and in the end explains how these developments relate to Spinoza's project of systematizing Radical Cartesian political theory.

History of Cartesianism in the Netherlands Cartesianism had its very beginnings in the Netherlands. Descartes' ideas were first taught by his friend Henricus Reneri (1593-1639), chair of philosophy at the newly established Athenaeum of Utrecht (soon to become the University of Utrecht). Descartes was working on his own natural philosophy at this time and Reneri introduced Descartes' ideas, as well as the natural philosophy of other contemporary thinkers, in his lectures. Reneri died suddenly in 1639, but by this time Descartes' ideas were already drawing attention - and controversy - in both the universities

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and among the leaders of the Reformed Church. Descartes' Discourse and Essays had already been published anonymously in Leiden in 1637. They were a source of concern for orthodox Calvinists but a source of inspiration to those committed to the New Philosophy. The first generation of Dutch Cartesians held their alliance to the New Philosophy, not to Descartes in particular. They respected Descartes' work but saw it as equal in importance to, rather than superseding, other modern works, such as those of Bacon and Gassendi. The earliest Cartesians were an eclectic group that focused on empirical methods, rather than the a priori approach we now associate with Descartes. These empirical leanings reflect the Dutch intellectual culture of the early seventeenth century. A trading nation at war, the emerging Dutch Republic needed the best that technology could offer to fight off major world powers, not to mention Mother Nature and her constant threat of flood. Mathematics was seen as the basis of science and valued for its practical applications in navigation and engineering. This emphasis on the importance of mathematics made Descartes' philosophy attractive to Dutch intellectuals. The practical orientation of Dutch scientists and mathematicians reflects not only a nation at war, but also a typically Renaissance and humanist conception of cooperation between scientists and artisans, a conception that blurred the distinction between practice and theory.2 Aristotelian physics was losing its power of explanation with new observations in astronomy and the questioning of basic Aristotelian concepts. Dutch scientists were ready for an alternative and Descartes' philosophy provided them with a new and useful framework in which to do science. In this way, early commitments to Cartesianism were pragmatic rather than dogmatic or ideological. Early Cartesians were comfortable combining Descartes' ideas with whatever worked, even with philosophies that we now see as contradicting that of Descartes. For example, it was not unusual for Descartes' philosophy to be combined with that of Gassendi. The early Cartesians often blended Descartes' ideas with other modern philosophies, as well as those of scholastic thinkers. The status of Cartesianism had changed by the second half of the seventeenth century. There was an economic boom and an upper class emerged that happened to contain several Cartesians among its intellectual elite. Within these circles, the insistence on a useful science had grown out of fashion.4 Now separating theory and practice, they embraced Descartes' a priori method. That is not to say that they did not see Cartesianism as having practical implications. On the contrary, Descartes' philosophy became central in discussions of politics and religion. What changed was the status of philosophy itself; it was no longer seen as subservient to the higher disciplines.

Political Divisions

3

In the early seventeenth century, philosophy was a preparatory subject, part of a general secondary education, whose purpose was to ready young minds for the study of theology, medicine or law. It was not a subject unto itself. Cartesianism changed that. It provided a new framework in which those higher disciplines could be carried out. Students (many of whom were in the higher faculties) flocked to tutors and professors willing to teach these new ideas. In this way, Descartes' name was no longer just one among the list of modern philosophers. 'Cartesianism5 came to signify the New Philosophy itself.

The Cultural Context of Dutch Cartesianism: Political, Religious and Academic In the early seventeenth century, rulers and ruling elites were not immediately concerned with the merely preparatory subject of philosophy. It was taught in an institutional context in which it was under church supervision and subject to the claims of confessional theology.5 This began to change in the 1640s when the Cartesian controversies emerged within Dutch universities. A debate over the relationship between philosophy and theology ensued. The Cartesians pushed for a separation of philosophy and theology whereas the Orthodox Calvinists insisted that philosophy was the servant of theology and was never to contradict or question theological dogma. This movement to separate philosophy from theology did not originate in Descartes' writings alone. It also resulted from the Cartesians' resistance to the further reformation led by Gisbertus Voetius (1589-1676).6 This change in the status of philosophy caused such turmoil in society - both in and out of the academy - that rulers had to become involved. Confessionally regulated theology, once the stabilizing force responsible for cultural cohesion, increasingly disintegrated in the light of the New Philosophy. By 1650 governments were compelled to try to cope with the various political and theological issues raised by the New Philosophy, philosophy now being 'an integral and essential part of their statecraft'.' Cartesianism became central to three national discussions: republican politics, reformed theology and the problem of how to make Cartesianism fit for use within the Dutch academy. These three issues form the heart of what has come to be called 'Dutch Cartesianism'. When studying Spinoza and his response to Cartesianism, we must keep in mind this Dutch context, for this is what Spinoza was exposed to and to which his philosophy responded.

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Spinoza's Radical Cartesian Mind

Political and Religious Context

There was no official Dutch 'constitution' until 1795. Before then, the Union of Utrecht served this role. This treaty, unifying the northern provinces previously controlled by Spain, contained two contradictory impulses.9 On the one hand, it recognized the States General as a limited central body of government. This assembly consisted of representatives from the seven Northern Provinces and each province had one vote. On the other hand, it proclaimed that the sovereign rights of each individual province stay intact. Such rights were understood in terms of traditional privileges of cities and provinces dating back to Habsburg rule. This tension between states rights and centralized power was quite complicated. The stadholder, another institution from Habsburg rule, was the highest-ranking official and dignitary in each province. It was normal for one man to be a stadholder of several provinces at once. Usually, a member of the House of Orange held the majority of provinces with the remaining one or two going to their Nassau cousins, resulting in a strong centralizing power. This centralizing power was like a monarchy in several respects. In Habsburg tradition, the stadholders were nobles living in a splendid and hierarchical courtly culture. Frederick Hendrik (1584—1647), Prince of Orange, capitalized on these traditions to increase the prestige, authority and dynastic intentions of the House of Orange. He also attempted to enhance his prestige by marrying his son and heir, William II (16261650), to a daughter of Charles I of England, Princess Mary. This was the first time that the House of Orange-Nassau had formed a marriage alliance with a major royal line. Further, the stadholder fulfilled many functions of a monarch. He imposed taxes, oversaw the military, enacted laws for The Netherlands as a whole and maintained the Dutch Reformed Church. The stadholders exercised their centralizing power through their delegates in the States General. Since they held the majority of provinces, they had the majority of votes in the assembly. Decisions often came in conflict with the interests and traditional privileges of individual provinces, particularly Holland. These tensions between Holland and the House of Orange were merged with other divisions in Dutch society: religious divisions between Remonstrants and Orthodox Calvinists and philosophical divisions between Cartesians and Aristotelians. Frederick Hendrik was the stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel during the rise of Cartesianism. He was heir to his brother-in-law Maurits of Nassau (1567-1625) who had taken a very tough stance against unorthodox strands such as Arminianism11 and Remonstrantism.12 Whereas the Arminians claimed that

Political Divisions

5

the spiritual role of the Church was and should be separate from the secular role of government, the Orthodox saw divine law as the only law. They identified any tendency to give the government more say in the affairs of the Church with the Arminian heresy. By siding with the strict Orthodox Calvinists, Maurits secured an important relationship between the House of Orange and the Church.13 Frederick Hendrik, on the other hand, had little sympathy for Counter-Remonstrant theology. He lived at a time when political Arminianism had gained quite a bit of power. Even if he had wanted to adopt his brother-in-law's tough stance he would have been unable to do so and preserve the stability of the state. Instead, he had to find a middle path that would accommodate both the 'Arminian' and 'Counter-Remonstrant' party-factions.14 His approach was to make both sides dependent on him so that they would want and need to co-operate with him. He would dispense favours to both sides, which dissatisfied both parties but left them unwilling to criticize his affairs or challenge his authority.15 And so his rule (16251647) was one of relative religious and philosophical tolerance. That is not to say that there was an end to tensions. Most towns became firmly tied to one of the party-factions. For instance, while Amsterdam and Rotterdam were Arminian, Leiden and Utrecht were solidly Counter-Remonstrant.16 Frederick Hendrik was a politician first and foremost. Throughout his rule his leanings would shift from one party to the other as it benefited his own political career. His most significant shift would occur in 1633. Before this time he tended to side with the Arminians and support Holland. However, the Holland Arminians began to gain too much power. Before the early 1630s they could not challenge Frederick Hendrik because they needed his support to survive. But by 1633 public support had shifted towards the Arminians. They were no longer dependent on the stadholder and were pushing for primacy in the Republic.17 Frederick Hendrik therefore decided to shift his policies to align with the Counter-Remonstrants. It is important to note that this division in Dutch society was not solely based on religion. Military and economic factors played large parts as well. For example, one of the most divisive issues during 1634 was the relationship between France and the United Provinces. An alternative to peace with Spain was an alliance with France, and Louis XIII had made a tempting offer of a close partnership and subsidies. If the alliance were made, The Netherlands would be locked into confrontation with Spain and subordination to France for years to come. An alliance would also increase the power of the stadholder, therefore minimizing the influence of Holland indefinitely. What particularly upset the Arminian towns was a clause in the treaty that the United Provinces must not negotiate with Spain.18 This strongly conflicted with the commercial interests of Holland.

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Spinoza's Radical Cartesian Mind

Frederick Hendrik signed the treaty with France and in May 1635 France declared war on Spain. Under the treaty the States General was required to help France invade the Spanish controlled South Netherlands. If the South failed to break with Spain, the southern provinces were to be split between France and the Northern Provinces once they were conquered. This agreement upset both sides. The Arminian States-Party (those who wanted to maintain a loose confederation of independent provinces and increase the power of Holland) did not like the idea of enlarging the Republic which would in effect enhance the stadholder's power and introduce new commercial competition with Amsterdam. Orthodox Calvinists did not like the fact that in any territory gained the Roman Catholic Church was to be preserved and the Reformed faith would not be allowed. In the end, the French failed to conquer the Spanish territory.19 However, this debate points out just how perilous Frederick Hendrik's position became with both parties. He had abandoned the now strong States-Party and it was clear to the Counter-Remonstrants that his alliances had always been made of convenience, not a deep commitment to orthodoxy. There was no longer any segment of Dutch society that strongly supported him. In 1647 Frederick Hendrik died, leaving his stadholderates to his son, William II. Under the latter's rule the political and ideological lines in Dutch society became clear again. The Counter-Remonstrants strongly supported William II, without the conflicting feelings they felt for his father. The Orthodox Calvinists hated Frederick Hendrik's tolerant policies towards Catholics, Remonstrants and Cartesians. On the other hand, they hated the 'libertine' regents of the States of Holland20 even more, and therefore felt compelled to back the stadholder.21 William II changed all that. The religious and philosophical tolerance of his father's rule quickly came to an end. For the first two years of William IPs rule (1647-1648), the States of Holland were dominant among the northern provinces. In 1648 the Treaty at Miinster was signed, ending the Thirty Years' War with Germany and the Eighty Years' War with Spain. During the last stages of peace negotiations, opposition to Holland arose in the other provinces. While Holland wanted peace, some provinces saw peace as contrary to their economic interests. Zeeland, for example, was afraid that peace would disturb their trade with the southern provinces. Utrecht and parts of Gelderland felt that the Netherlands should stick by the terms of their treaty with France and wait until France and Spain settled their differences.22 Holland was able to put pressure on Utrecht and all of the provinces other than Zeeland voted to ratify the treaty, against the advice of the stadholder. The States of Holland saw this as a victory over the House of Orange and evidence of their predominance within the provinces.

Political Divisions

1

The fears of the other provinces were justified. While Holland generally thrived during peacetime, other provinces were suffering and resentment towards Holland was on the rise. Further, Holland itself became divided between the Orthodox and the regent upper class. Anti-Holland pamphlets were published in 1649-1650 by hard-line preachers blaming the high cost of bread and economic collapse of Zeeland on God's wrath with the regents for not supporting the public Church and for their tolerance of Catholicism and unorthodox Protestantism.23 William II made clear alliances with the Reformed Church. Immediately after the peace, he introduced the Reformation into previously Catholic controlled areas, ordering churches to be stripped of papist adornment, installing Reformed preachers and introducing the State's Bible and Reformed Schools.24 Tensions between the Orthodox (now firmly aligned with the House of Orange) and the States-Party (which became increasingly associated with Cartesianism) grew. The States-Party was concerned about the ever-increasing harshness of the Reformation within the United Provinces. The Orangists criticized the States-Party as being a threat to the public Church. After all, if each province is fully sovereign, then each province could determine its own path, not only in military and economic affairs, but also in regard to church policy as well. Such a system would overturn the Synod of Dordrecht, which gave central authority to the stadholder to preserve the Union. William II developed a plan to break up Holland's power. He focused on the people, using a barrage of propaganda pamphlets to turn the people against the regents. He appealed to their Orthodox beliefs and painted the regents as an elitist, power-hungry class. In this way, the Orangists were the party of the people while the republican20 States-Party represented an aristocratic class. In 1650 William II staged his coup. He had six principal regents arrested while his cousin, Willem Frederick, the stadholder of Friesland, led 12,000 troops of the States General Army to converge on Amsterdam. The burgomasters were alerted just in time to close the gates and to call out the civic guard. The troops waited outside the city until the stadholder arrived. William IPs power was now clear and Amsterdam yielded. William used his power to create tension with Spain and draw closer to France. Whatever his plans were, they were cut short by his sudden death from smallpox in November of 1650. A week after his death his only child (who would become William III of England) was born. This left the House of Orange without an heir who was of age to take on William IPs stadholderates. A Great Assembly was immediately held at The Hague (January 1651) in which the leaders of the

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Province of Holland forced measures through the State's General abolishing the position of stadholder.26 This Act of Seclusion reduced the power of the Orangists (those who wanted central and unified government under the House of Orange), increased the power of individual provinces, especially Holland, and introduced the first stadholderless period (1651-1672). It was during this time that Radical Cartesian politics was born. The States-Party was now at the helm and Johan De Witt (1618-1676) soon emerged as their leader, serving as Grand Pensionary 7 of Holland from 1653-1772. For these two decades Holland dominated the Republic, making De Witt the most powerful man in the United Provinces. De Witt's slogan was 'True Liberty'. It stood for many elements of republicanism. First and foremost was liberty from stadholder-rule, which De Witt and the States-Party perceived as a monarchical element inconsistent with a true republic. Self-rule of the provinces was paramount, and De Witt kept the interests of Holland at the forefront of his agenda, this interest largely being construed in economic terms. For example, he opposed the Orangist foreign policy, which favoured territorial expansion, because it led to war, which was bad for Holland's trading interests. In the same vein, religious tolerance was seen as key, not as a philosophical ideal, but rather as a practical means of encouraging Dutch trade and wealth. De Witt's powerful position was a victory for Cartesianism as De Witt was strongly committed to philosophical liberty and was himself a Leidentaught Cartesian. That is not to say that Cartesianism was given free reign under De Witt. Tensions between Orangists and regents were as high as ever and De Witt, like Frederick Hendrik, had to walk a thin line between outwardly expressing support for Cartesianism and offending the largely Orthodox populace. Further, the nobility remained a force to be reckoned with throughout the northern and eastern provinces and there remained many loyal Orangists throughout the population. Orthodox Calvinists in the lesser provinces continued to criticize Holland for what they considered excessive tolerance and inadequate support of the Reformed Church. The 1660s brought new tensions for De Witt to deal with. The Restoration of the monarchy in Britain gave Orangists hope that Charles II would use his power to help his nephew, William III, take back the stadholderate for the House of Orange. The merchant/regent class also saw the restoration as a positive thing since it might lead to peace in Europe and improve trading conditions. In other words, both parties saw advantages in being friendly with England's monarchy and De Witt became worried about the future status of the States-Party and stadholderless government. Both the Orangists and the States-Party published numerous popular pamphlets. The former stressed the need for a figurehead and the traditions of the House

Political Divisions

9

of Orange. The latter stressed the value of true republicanism (that is, government without the monarchical element of stadholder) and the liberty that goes with it. At the heart of these debates were the nature of a true republic and the true 'constitution5 of The Netherlands. It is within these popular pamphlet debates that Radical Cartesian politics emerged. Many of the pamphlets written attacking the House of Orange were so antagonistic towards the Reformed Church in their support of Cartesian philosophy that De Witt and the regent class could not prudently go along with them publicly. The events under William IFs stadholdership made many Dutch republicans suspicious of the true intentions of the Church and they developed a strong anti-clerical tendency.28 The Radical Cartesians were happy to express this tendency in their pamphlets. Further, their ideas began to clash with what Jonathan Israel terms the elitist, regent republicanism of De Witt. For instance, the Radical Cartesians argued against monopolies and sometimes even for democracy over aristocracy. The Academic Context

Cartesian controversies arose from time to time throughout the Dutch universities, particularly in Leiden and Utrecht. Most universities responded by following Utrecht's example - dividing the chairs between supporters of the 'old' and 'new' philosophies. While this strategy did not put an end to such controversies, it did create a balance and forestalled radicalization so that the university stayed in line with the European tradition and yet remained open to innovation.30 During the 1640s, Leiden became the centre of Cartesianism and the controversies that came with it. Cartesianism permeated the disciplines of physics, mathematics, philosophy and theology, and raised further questions as to the role of philosophy in the academy, particularly its relationship to theology. A new generation of Leiden students, including De Witt and Christian Huygens (1629-95),31 were educated in this environment. Before this time, the main philosophical influence at the University of Leiden was Franco Burgersdijk (1590—1635), a neo-Aristotelian. Burgersdijk was very strict in separating the different disciplines. He kept morality separate from metaphysics and politics and he maintained a strict separation between philosophy and theology. Like many philosophers of the early seventeenth century, Burgersdijk was interested in the organization and simplification of subject matter for the purpose of teaching. He wrote textbooks that became the standard throughout The Netherlands, as well as in England and the New World.33 His textbooks were less rigid and

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dogmatic than most contemporary textbooks, particularly those in logic, moral philosophy and metaphysics. They stood somewhere between Aristotelianism and Ramism,34 embraced eclecticism and an open-mindedness to new ideas.35 He pushed the Aristotelian framework to its limits and, in explaining Aristotle's ideas, he formulated his own, which were seen by himself and most others as being Aristotle's. The primacy of Burgersdijk's philosophy disappeared after the introduction of Cartesianism into the university; however, his philosophy continued to exert a strong influence, which can be seen in the eclecticism of the next generation of philosophers at Leiden. Further, professors continued to assign his textbooks as the epitome of past knowledge that could be mastered quickly before moving on to works in the New Philosophy.37 The Cartesianism that took hold at the University of Leiden (and Dutch universities in general) was not a pure Cartesianism. Professors at the University of Leiden were required to teach Aristotle. And so those who taught Descartes' philosophy presented it as a logical extension of Aristotelianism. This attempt was in keeping with the neo-Aristotelianism of Burgersdijk, which had presented the possibility of a non-Scholastic interpretation of Aristotle. This Aristotelio-Cartesian synthesis was called Philosophia Novantiqua and it reinforced the eclecticism of Burgersdijk and his commitment to the separation of the disciplines. This movement led to the dissolution of the firm bonds that Descartes had established between physics and metaphysics yet reinforced Descartes' separation of philosophy from theology.38 The main representative of the Philosophia Novantiqua movement was Adriaan Heereboord (1614-1661). Heereboord studied at Leiden from 1629 to 1637 and was a student of Burgersdijk. In 1641 he was appointed professor of logic, a modest position given the status of philosophy at that time. He was expected to do little more than teach the basics of logic to students who would continue in the higher faculties. 9 However, Heereboord shared Burgersdijk's view of logic and focused on its utilitarian function. He did not think that teaching logic was a matter of teaching logical principles in and of themselves, but of exercising them. He therefore felt entitled to use any content in class in order to illustrate logical principles. Thus, even though the curators did not honour his request to teach metaphysics, he taught metaphysics in his logic classes. He later published the metaphysical content of this course in his Meletemata Philosophica (1654). Heereboord was the first professor at Leiden who was seriously interested in Cartesian philosophy. He began defending Cartesian positions at the height of the anti-Cartesian campaign in Utrecht and was strongly opposed to the Voetians (supporters of Gisbertus Voetius and his further reformation). While he felt that orthodoxy was important, he did not think that

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theologians had any business interfering in philosophical affairs in order to defend orthodoxy.41 Like Burgersdijk, he called for a strong separation of philosophy and theology. He rejected the doctrine of the two truths (that something can be true in philosophy but false in theology). Rather, he thought that any contradictions resulted from the illegitimate extension of the meaning of words beyond their proper sphere.42 Heereboord taught an eclectic philosophy that included the philosophies of Bacon, Gassendi and Aristotle, as much as that of Descartes. Like his teacher Burgersdijk, he did not think that the Scholastics knew the true Aristotle. But for all of his criticism of the Scholastics, his work had a very Scholastic appearance. His Meletamata Philosophic^ for instance, makes frequent references to the Scholastics and has a table of contents indistinguishable from any Scholastic treatise. Theologians became concerned about the Cartesian theses defended under Heereboord, and the Academic Senate placed limits on what could be defended. On 17 January 1647 Heereboord responded with an oratio de libertate philosophandi, which stated that the primary obligation of philosophy is the renunciation of the idols of the mind. This is what all great philosophers of all times did, including Aristotle. Further, he argued that the theologians had quite enough to do to put their own house in order and they had no business meddling in the affairs of philosophy.44 This, of course, upset the theologians who responded in kind with anti-Cartesian disputations. Descartes himself protested these disputations in 1647 and on 20 May the curators decreed that no mention of Descartes, either for or against, could be made at the university. Neither side obeyed the ruling. Adam Stuart (1591-1654), a recent appointment to the philosophy faculty and an opponent of Cartesianism, held an anti-Cartesian thesis, which condemned Cartesians for saying that the existence of God may be doubted while at the same time admitting ideas of God.45 Johannes de Raey (1622—1707), Heereboord's student, acted as the opponent and called the theses otiose since no one held the positions that were condemned. Otherwise, why wouldn't Stuart mention them by name? Stuart countered that the one he was speaking of was not allowed to be named. De Raey pointed out that the opinions of Descartes were just as much off limits as his name under the 20 May decree and that the opinions Stuart attached were not those of Descartes anyway. At this point Stuart went into a rage, resulting in such an outburst in the audience that the disputations could not continue.16 Disputations continued back and forth until February 1648. On 7 February, Pieter De la Court (1618-85) (Heereboord's brother-in-law) interrupted one of Stuart's disputations, causing a scuffle.47 The curators called them in and ordered Stuart to confine his disputations to the discipline of physics

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and Heereboord to the fields of logic and ethics. They also suppressed the pamphlets occasioned by Stuart's disputation, forbade disputations of metaphysical questions and ordered that all philosophical theses be communicated to all the members of the philosophy faculty.48 Stuart was angry and threatened to involve the Reformed Church. He argued that the orders were in favour of Cartesianism since they could not stop the publication of Cartesian philosophy but did forbid professors from arguing against it. The curators did not take well to the threat and made it clear that if Stuart did involve outside authorities or disobey the decree they would do whatever was necessary to secure peace at the university. Stuart made one last attempt to appeal to the curators. He requested that they have Descartes apprehended and force him to defend his ideas. Stuart said that if he could prove Descartes an atheist, then Descartes should be punished accordingly. They refused to do so and ordered Stuart and Heereboord to refrain from defending any thesis that was 'absolutely theological'.49 By this time, Heereboord was seen as an embarrassment to the Cartesians. In addition to his hot headedness and lack of diplomacy in dealing with the theologians, he had a well-publicized drinking problem and was known to be abusive to his wife. De Witt personally protested to the rector of the university that they needed more tactful sympathizers for the New Philosophy, lest the 'imprudence of one man' would cause the liberty of all reasonable philosophers to be taken away. Heereboord's prominence was soon to fade and to give way to his former student De Raey, who was given a permanent position at the university.50 De Raey was a much more stable character than Heereboord. Further, he was much more committed to Cartesianism. He strongly criticized the eclecticism of Heereboord, and though he too claimed that Cartesianism was consistent with Aristotle, when he came across a conflict, he remained true to Descartes. De Raey said that he did not wish to overthrow Aristotle. He argued that Aristotle and Descartes differed in expression, not in substance, and that the reason people thought differently was the Scholastic distortion of Aristotle.5 De Raey justified his reinterpretation of Aristotle on three grounds. First, he appealed to the humanist tradition in saying that we need to look directly at Aristotle's texts (and not secondary sources by Arab philosophers and Scholastics) to get at the true principles. Second, he appealed to the Reformed anti-Scholastic tradition. He claimed that Scholasticism subjected theology to philosophy, when philosophy should be theology's handmaiden. Third, he claimed the slavish adherence to Aristotle was incompatible with the ideals of Dutch freedom embraced by the regents. This, he argued, was incompatible with the spirit of the University of

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Leiden, which was founded as a celebration of Leiden's independence from the rule of Spain and Roman tyranny.52 De Raey believed in a separation between philosophy and theology. He felt that a pure natural philosophy, which is based on clear and distinct ideas, could not help people with day-to-day life. He saw theology as an experimental science based on the Bible that is carried out in ordinary language.5 He emphasized the limits of philosophy and was appalled by Spinoza and the Radical Cartesians who did not recognize those limits and did not make the distinction between practical and contemplative sciences. He made a point of openly disassociating himself from the Radical Cartesians.54 By the early 1650s the theology faculty at Leiden also became dominated by Cartesians; namely, Abraham Heidanus (1597-1678) and Johannes Cocceius (1603-1669). Heidanus was the first theologian to convert to Cartesianism and Cocceius was the leader of a liberal counter-Voetian movement within the Reformed Church. The movement, called Cocceianism, maintained (contrary to Voetius) that philosophy had an independent status from theology. Both the Cocceians and Voetians wrote pamphlets for the public. Debates took place throughout society, increasing the people's awareness of Cartesian philosophy and its association with certain political and religious blocs.

The End of an Era The economic and cultural boom of the stadholderless era abruptly came to an end in 1672. Louis XIV struck an alliance with England, declared war on The Netherlands and quickly occupied large portions of the country. William III, who until now had been kept out of public office, was quickly appointed army commander and stadholder.55 William III was able to block the French advance where De Witt had failed. De Witt's military loss left the Dutch disillusioned. Soon after he surrendered his position as Grand Pensionary of Holland, he and his brother were caught up in rioting in The Hague. They were beaten, stabbed and shot to death. The mob became crazed and hung the corpses by their feet where they were mutilated, parts being roasted and eaten. This event is well known to Spinoza scholars as it is said to be the only time Spinoza is known to have acted out of raw passion. He made a placard calling the mob beasts and was about to parade it through the city when his landlord, seeing the incredible danger of such an action, forced him to remain inside.

Chapter 2

Radical Cartesian Pamphlets: van Velthuysen and De la Court Introduction to Radical Cartesian Politics Radical Cartesian politics is a phenomenon unique to Holland. As its name suggests, its proponents considered themselves Cartesians and tried to apply Descartes' new philosophy to particular political problems of the day. This fact may seem surprising and even counter-intuitive; after all, one would be hard-pressed to find political philosophy within Descartes' writings. However, we should take note of three things. First, the term 'Cartesian' was often used at this time in a much broader sense, to include the New Philosophy in general, not just the particular ideas of Descartes. Radical Cartesians consciously incorporated the ideas of many thinkers, including Hobbes and Machiavelli. They took an eclectic approach to fighting the traditional Aristotelian, Calvinistic and humanistic political theory taught in Dutch schools. Second, they did not claim to find political doctrines in Descartes' writings. Rather, they took Descartes' approach to understanding the human passions and applied it to politics. Third, while they appealed to philosophical theories, their aim was of a practical nature, namely to support De Witt's republican leadership and try to prevent the reinstatement of stadholder-rule. Their writings were rarely systematic and were often written in the form of Dutch pamphlets meant to persuade the people. The beginnings of Radical Cartesian politics may be found in the writings of Lambertus van Velthuysen (1622-1685). Van Velthuysen was a physician, a politician in Utrecht and a devout Calvinist. He came by Cartesianism through his teachers Adriaan Heereboord and Henricus Regius (1598—1679), and was a member of the medical faculty at the University of Utrecht with a strong interest in Cartesian physics. Van Velthuysen dedicated his career to showing that Cartesianism is consistent with the Reformed faith and to applying the New Philosophy to politics. He was largely responsible for bringing academic debates about Cartesianism to the public's attention, as well as introducing the ideas of Hobbes to the Dutch Republic. There are two factors that contribute to his willingness and

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ability to defend Cartesianism and the highly unpopular ideas of Hobbes. First, he was not a professor and therefore was not limited by the many edicts restricting what could be taught in the universities.1 Second, as a member of the Walloon congregation,2 he was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Dutch Reformed council. In this way he doubly escaped the oppressive power of his opponent, Gisbertus Voetius. However, when members of Voetius's Further Reformation began to question van Velthuysen's faith, he felt compelled to dissociate himself from the movement. He was highly distressed that other Radical Cartesians, Spinoza in particular, had used principles from his own writings to draw conclusions that went against his orthodox beliefs. He dedicated the latter part of his career to arguing against what he saw as their atheistic conclusions. The De la Court brothers were businessmen, members of the States-Party and strong supporters of De Witt. Like van Velthuysen, they were students of Heereboord at Leiden and committed Cartesians. Johan (1622-1660) was a political theorist who opposed the Aristotelian and humanist political tradition taught at the schools. He offered an alternative approach that was influenced by Hobbes, Descartes and Machiavelli, and yet had democratic leanings. We don't know many particulars about Johan's life other than that he died young and his brother Pieter later edited and published his writings. Pieter left his brother's words intact, but added many details and polemics, turning Johan's theoretical treatises into political pamphlets. It is difficult to separate the ideas of the brothers and I follow the convention of most scholars who tend to treat them as one voice. An exception may be that while Johan was a staunch supporter for open democracy, Pieter seems to have amended some of his arguments and preferred a moderate aristocracy. In any case, together they provided an important radical voice in the public debates of the 1660s and, like van Velthuysen, they were an important influence on Spinoza. What ties van Velthuysen, De la Court and Spinoza (as well as Radical Cartesians in general) together is a particular combination of the ideas of Descartes and Hobbes. From Descartes they derive a commitment to understanding the psychology of the passions and the conviction that the passions can and ought to be kept in line with reason. The most important idea taken from Hobbes is that the drive for self-preservation is universal and fundamental to an understanding of human society. However, they understand this drive in terms that go beyond mere physical or material survival and understand the ultimate self-interest as preservation of the soul. Another thing that van Velthuysen, De la Court and Spinoza have in common is that they are committed to religious and philosophical freedom. They argue for a separation of church and state as well as fight the view that

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philosophy is the handmaiden of theology and therefore should be under the supervision and control of the church. Overall, they offer naturalistic and rationalistic approaches to politics that take reason to be the foundation of both personal happiness and the stability of the state.

Van Velthuysen Van Velthuysen's first publication (1651) introduced Hobbes to the Dutch Republic. Contrary to its title (Epistolica dissertatio de principiis justi et decori, continens apologiam pro tractatu clarissimi Hobbaei De Give], it was not so much an apology for Hobbes, as a presentation of van Velthuysen's own views, which were influenced by the English philosopher. Van Velthuysen agrees with Hobbes that the principal drive of every person is self-preservation, but he understands this drive to be a moral duty proscribed by natural law within a teleological system. According to van Velthuysen, God created the world, humans in particular, for some purpose. In doing so, he also willed the means necessary to that end, those means being reason and the natural appetites that are part of human nature. Therefore, humans are completely justified in using these means. People have the natural right to defend themselves and their property as well as the right to punish those who injure them. However, they do not have the right to take away the natural (Godgiven) rights of others. To do so would be unjust in that it goes against God's purpose in the world.4 For van Velthuysen, self-preservation is the basis of morality5 and particular moral rules are deduced from this fundamental law of human nature.6 This natural instinct is universal and is therefore a moral guide that is accessible to people of any faith.7 It does not depend on Scripture (or any particular interpretation of it). In this way, van Velthuysen moves morality from the realm of theology to that of natural philosophy. This teleological egoism will become the basis of his arguments for religious tolerance and philosophical freedom. Religious freedom is important for both the welfare of the people and the security of the state. Therefore, the sovereign must not be empowered to take it away.8 Every subject has the right to withhold obedience to the ruler if such obedience jeopardizes his own salvation.9 After all, salvation is the ultimate goal of the fundamental drive to self-preservation, the very drive that holds the state together. This idea combines Hobbes' egoism with the Dutch spirit of resistance born out of the revolt against Spanish rule. Another consequence of van Velthuysen's approach is that it shows that a utilitarian perspective does not contradict Christian morality. This

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move makes permissible many merchant activities traditionally condemned by the Reformed Church, such as speculation.10 Self-preservation plays a central role in van Velthuysen's political theory as well. It is the basis of sociability because one helps another best by helping oneself. While there is an element of Hobbes5 social contract here, van Velthuysen's political philosophy is importantly different. First, van Velthuysen's notion of self-preservation goes beyond mere physical survival he is concerned with the well-being of the soul. He links self-preservation with reaching the knowledge of the order of the world, which one calls 'Divine Will' or 'Providence'. This knowledge can be acquired through reason or through revelation. Second, while Velthuysen believes that a sovereign was necessary to maintain the proper functioning of the state, he thought that a sovereign body could do this better than an individual ruler because a sovereign body can better accommodate the divergent needs of the people. Third, he does not agree with Hobbes that the transference of rights to the ruler should be absolute or that power is in essence indivisible. The Epistola Dissertatio also incorporates the Cartesianism that van Velthuysen learned from Regius and Heerebord. It is important to remember that the Cartesianism that took hold in Dutch universities, particularly Leiden, was not pure Cartesianism. Professors at the University of Leiden were required to teach Aristotle. Those who taught Descartes' philosophy presented it as a logical extension of Aristotelianism and combined it with other modern philosophies, like that of Gassendi. This attempt, known as the Philosophia Novantiqua, was in keeping with the neo-Aristotelianism of Heereboord's teacher, Franco Burgersdijk, who took an eclectic approach to philosophy and presented the possibility of a non-Scholastic interpretation of Aristotle. From the Philosophia Novantiqua perspective it is a fact of nature that humans are born as a bundle of passions, not yet under the command of reason. The passions of the newborn are its only means of survival, and therefore not to be derided. Instead, the passions need to be nurtured by a caring parent or teacher. Through experience and education, particularly the development of reason, the child learns to put her passions to the right use in order to attain her goals. On this view, the passions will never be completely overcome or subdued with reason, nor should they be, for passions are necessary to drive humans to action. Reason does, however, have a central role, that is, to guide and to balance the passions. Van Velthuysen starts from this particularly Dutch Cartesianism and builds from it a moral psychology that explains the natural inclination of self-preservation and our rights stemming from it. According to van Velthuysen, God has united the human soul and body in such a way that the

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soul can both feel emotions and be affected by the body. The soul feels pain whenever the animal spirits move in a way that is contrary to this union and it feels pleasure whenever their movement is appropriate to it.15 All passions can be reduced to these two: pain and pleasure. Further, God has linked each passion with a proper object.16 In this way, God has given humans a natural drive to preserve themselves and a natural means to do so. Further, there are basic passions that are universal. While cultures differ in regard to the cultivated passions, they share the same natural passions. Van Velthuysen makes a point of distinguishing passions that are learned (e.g., shame from nudity or polygamy) from passions that follow from natural law. Natural passions, with the guidance of reason, form the basis of morality. In 1655, van Velthuysen published a Dutch pamphlet in response to attacks by Voetius against two newly installed Cartesian professors at Utrecht, Christophorus Wittich (1625-1687) and Johannes Clauberg (1622—1655), which focused on Descartes' Copernicanism. This pamphlet is titled Bewys dat het gevoelen van die genen, die leeren de Sonne Stilstandt en des Aertirycks Beweging neit strydich is met Godts-Woort (Proof that the opinion of those who teach the rest of the sun and motion of the earth is not contrary to God's Word}. The Proof and the ensuing debates were very important for spreading Descartes' ideas because it was published in Dutch before Descartes' writings had been translated into that language. Van Velthuysen was concerned with Voetius's propaganda against Descartes, whose actual philosophy was unknown to Voetius's audience. He wanted to provide the people with an accurate image of Descartes' views. For van Velthuysen, the Proof and his later pamphlets were more than a defence of Cartesianism and Copernicanism. They were also attacks against the Voetian Further Reformation concerning the issue of philosophical freedom. It annoyed van Velthuysen that Voetius used his authority within the church and academia to decry Cartesianism as impious.19 For van Velthuysen, this debate was about Christelijcke vryheyt — Christian liberty. The Proof argues that the Bible does not teach that the sun is still or that the earth is at the centre of the universe. Such an idea is based on a misinterpretation of Scripture. Van Velthuysen goes on to give a theory of Biblical hermeneutics that would avoid such mistakes. Namely, that in order to understand Scripture we have to take into account the circumstances in which they were written, for they were written in the language and context of their time.20 It is important to see how Biblical interpretation was much more than a theological issue for the Radical Cartesians. It was part of a broader discussion about the relationship between philosophy and theology and, ultimately, the need for philosophic freedom. An important

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conclusion of the Proof is that philosophers should study nature and theologians should interpret Scripture (by investigating the circumstances in which they were written). 21 Jacobus Dubois (?-1661), an orthodox minister, was quick to attack the Proof and questioned van Velthuysen's faith in his pamphlet Naecktheyt van de Cartesianische philosophie ontbloot (The Nakedness of Cartesian Philosophy Revealed}. Thus began a fierce pamphlet debate between the two men. It is out of the scope of this paper to go through all of the details of this debate.22 However, we should note that van Velthuysen developed a view that would become an important feature of Radical Cartesianism: theologians have no specific authority in the interpretation of Scripture. He argued that the foundations of Christianity are clear to all readers of Scripture and therefore in no need of interpretation by ministers. As for non-foundational beliefs, people must have the liberty to discuss them.23 As van Velthuysen later argued in 1660, preachers do not have any special authority. Their opinions are those of private individuals whose opinion must rest on evangelical doctrine. 4 This view has important implications for the relationship between church and state. Van Velthuysen argued that the Reformed religion is based on freedom of judgement. This is exactly what makes it different from Roman Catholicism. No one should be forced to accept something as true because the church or a theologian states it. The Reformed Confession itself is true, not because the Reformed Church says so, but because we believe it. When people become members of the church they maintain their Christian liberty. The doctors and pastors of the church have no right to elevate themselves to the level of the Confession. Concerning astronomy and physics, which are not fundamental to Christian doctrine, people have a right to their opinions. When Voetius and Dubois try to make them into a confessional question they display the arrogance of a Roman pope. They reintroduce the very religious constraint against which the Dutch revolt was fougaaht. From this standpoint, van Velthuysen spends much of his career arguing that all legal authority, including the power to punish, belongs only to the political administration, not the church. In fact, the church itself is under the jurisdiction of the state. The important distinction is that the magistrate has domain over external behaviour, whereas the church has domain only over matters of conscience. While van Velthuysen maintained that the magistrate had the right to settle religious disputes, he also maintained that as far as subjects were concerned, they could withhold obedience if they believed the government's decision imperilled their salvation.27 This debate also had important consequences for the relationship between theology and philosophy. Dubois took the traditional view that

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philosophy was the handmaiden of theology. Van Velthuysen vehemently rejected this view. He argued that, to the contrary, natural knowledge reaches into the very heart of theology; further, the issue of whether the sun moves around the earth or not is an exclusively philosophical issue. Van Velthuysen's position on the distinction between the roles of faith and reason led Dubois to accuse him of Socinianism. But van Velthuysen countered that Socinianism replaces Scripture with reason. He, on the other hand, was securing the meaning and authority of Scripture, which requires knowledge of the circumstances from which it came.30 While van Velthuysen's separation between faith and reason is certainly consistent with Descartes' philosophy, this context makes it clear that it is also based on his opposition to the Voetian Further Reformation.31 Eventually the debate died down, but in 1666 van Velthuysen was to find himself once again in the spotlight. Lodewijk Meyer (1629-1681), a key member of Spinoza's circle, anonymously published the Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres (PPSI). The publication of this work marked a turning point in van Velthuysen's philosophical career. Meyer argued that philosophy should interpret Scripture so as to overcome the disputes that plague Christianity and cause major political discord. His view was that religious divisions arise from various interpretations of Scripture. If Christianity could agree on one interpretation, the political discord would be removed.32 In other words, Meyer states explicitly what constantly lurked behind Velthuysen's own writings: the only way to end religious disagreements is by allowing philosophy, that is, reason, to take over Biblical interpretation. Van Velthuysen feared that Meyer's work would be construed as a logical consequence of his own views. The rest of his career was dedicated to redefining his own Cartesianism so as to avoid being associated with Radical Cartesians such as Meyer and Spinoza.33 Van Velthuysen refuted Meyer in his Dissertatio de usa rationis in rebus theologicisetpraesertimininterpretationeS. Scripturae. He claimed that the fundamental difference between reason and faith is that the latter always relies on testimony, either human or divine. Reason is the principal instrument in scriptural interpretation, but it should not be regarded as the only principle of Biblical hermeneutics. While reason will never contradict revelation (because of God's essential truthfulness), reason cannot replace faith. For we will often have to accept on faith particular contents of Scripture that may be obscure or beyond human rationality, such as the double nature of Christ. 5 Four years later, the publication of Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise (TTP) raised van Velthuysen's concern to a new level. Spinoza's work was immediately condemned as atheistic and censored by the Court of Holland as a threat to religion and the church. Anyone found to be involved in its

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printing, distribution or sale was to be severely punished. Van Velthuysen was concerned because Spinoza defended a hermeneutical position that was very close to his own. He was worried because he did not accept Spinoza's rejection of a transcendent God. 7 Van Velthuysen wrote several treatises attacking Spinoza and even corresponded with Spinoza over some of his disagreements. Particularly, van Velthuysen disagrees with Spinoza's philosophy of substance, his intellectualist notion of virtue, denial of free will, his deterministic and materialistic understanding of God and related aspects of his moral philosophy. Theologically, he objected to Spinoza's identification of God's will and intellect, which he saw as leading to Spinoza's determinism.39 In allowing that the light of reason can supply salvation, Spinoza created a horrible controversy between philosophy and theology40 - one that van Velthuysen thought would disturb his own project. Van Velthuysen holds an ironic position in the history of Radical Cartesianism. He paves the way for the movement by introducing the Dutch public to the ideas of Descartes and Hobbes and by providing the first clear articulations of major Radical Cartesian doctrines. However, he was unwilling to follow those doctrines to their logical conclusions and so spent the second part of his career trying to dissociate his ideas from the very movement he unwittingly helped to start. Van Velthuysen's reactions to the works of Meyer and Spinoza are part of a large body of pamphlets that arose against the two Radical Cartesians. In 1674 the second edition of the TTP was anonymously published with Meyer's PPSI as an appendix, purportedly by the same author. Theologians, philosophers and church leaders attacked both works, though for different reasons. Some accused Meyer and Spinoza of 'either perverting or misrepresenting the Cartesian method' and others argued that the TTP and PPSI were typical examples of the sacrilege and philosophical errors that inevitably followed from Cartesianism.41 In other words, the Voetians used these works as ammunition in the battle against Cartesianism; and Cartesians, such as van Velthuysen, scrambled to dissociate themselves with Radical Cartesian figures and ideas.

De la Court De la Court represents a new chapter in Dutch political theory. He does not base his theories on classical authorities like Aristotle or their Christian interpreters.42 Rather, he bases it on an understanding of human nature that, like Velthuysen's writings, combined elements from the new philosophies of Hobbes and Descartes. His writings were neither systematic nor

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theoretical in nature, and yet they present all the major political ideas that will become parts of Spinoza's system. De la Court freely mixed Cartesian, Hobbesian and Machiavellian philosophy with political anecdotes, maxims, historical examples and fables.43 He was clearly familiar with both classical and modern political theories, but his aim was practical in nature. He wanted to justify De Witt's regime and to make policy recommendations for reform.44 He strove to understand human nature and the Dutch situation as they really were and to construct a political system that best served that reality, rather than to discuss Utopias and ideals of what humans ought to be.45 This realism can be seen as one of the ways that Machiavelli influenced his thought. He admired Machiavelli's approach and accepted the Machiavellian idea that a city can only attain greatness if it upholds a free way of life, which requires a republican constitution. However, De la Court differed from Machiavelli in three important ways. First, because of the Dutch context of commercial interests, he was strongly motivated to seek neutrality in international affairs. Second, as was common throughout the Dutch tradition - on both the States-Party and Orangist sides - he wa reluctant to bring about official changes in the form of a written constitution. Rather than tying republican practice to constitutional reform, he tried to interpret Dutch history and its vague constitutional structure so that it favoured republicanism. Third, De la Court did not accept Machiavellian values concerning civic virtue. At that time, discussions of civic virtue were associated with the Orangist and Calvinist political theory taught in the universities.4 De la Court rejects the view that a monarch can be raised from birth with the proper education for ruling, thus instilling him with political virtues. All individuals, no matter which class they come from, are subject to passions and must develop reason in order to keep them in balance. On the contrary, the situation surrounding a monarch's upbringing makes it more difficult for him to become virtuous because it is set up in such a way that it encourages the dominance of the passions. First, the incumbent prince always fears that his successor will want to rule as soon as he is able to do so. So he will purposely keep his successor ignorant. While the courtiers might help the successor in order to gain his favour, they will try to turn him into a weak ruler so that when he takes power they will be able to control him. These two situations lead to the successor being raised in an environment of useless entertainment; meant to distract him from the education he needs to become a strong ruler. Such entertainment encourages his lusts and fails to develop his reason. Therefore, the upbringing of a monarch does not cultivate virtue, but vice.4/

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There are three problems that result from allowing one person raised in such a way to rule the state. First, the prince will need unlimited wealth in order to continue to follow his base passions and continue the entertainment to which he has grown so accustomed. He will procure this wealth by sucking the country dry, raising taxes and engaging in offensive wars.aaaaaaa Second, since the prince would rather follow his lusts than govern, he gives the majority of the responsibilities to courtiers. Such courtiers gain the monarch's ear through flattery and helping the prince pursue his base pleasures. Therefore, these courtiers end up being corrupt as well. In an attempt to keep the centre of power in the court, they will make decisions to constantly replace provincial governors and to keep large urban populations in check with armies.49 Third, there will always be bitter struggles over succession, often resulting in war.5 De la Court's main point is that it is very dangerous to organize a state to depend on 'virtuous' rulers who would put aside their own interests in favour of those of the state. Such 'virtue' is an illusion. The true virtue of an honest person and good politician consists in prudently linking his own advantage to the general interest.51 Strong institutions and policies are needed to force politicians to behave effectively by making the interests of the sovereign necessarily match the common interest of the people. For De la Court, political virtue is not a check on necessity, but rather the consequence of it: A good government is not one in which the welfare or the misery of the subjects depends on the virtue or vice of the rulers, b u t . . . one in which the welfare or the misery of the rulers necessarily follows the welfare or the misery of the subjects. Behind these views on political virtue is the Philosophia Novantiqua approach to the passions that we saw in van Velthuysen. This approach is central to De la Court's understanding of human nature. Humans are vulnerable, needy and weak. Natural drives and strong passions dominate. The strongest human drives are self-love and the desire to further one's own interests, which De la Court characterizes in terms of property, honour and power.53 These two drives determine and shape the goals of individuals. The passions, which De la Court sometimes associates with incorrect judgements, can frustrate the attainment of these goals. In order to escape this situation one must have two things, a strong will and reason. The passions, which De la Court sometimes associates with incorrect judgements can and should be tamed by the development of reason and virtue through education in order to align the passions with our goals. An important general goal of each individual, then, is to develop her reason so as to master passions that would hinder her self-interest.

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De la Court's view on the passions is different from Descartes' Passions of the Soul in two important ways. First, De la Court makes self-preservation absolutely central. Everything, including the quality of friendship, is reduced to the fundamental egoism of humans.04 Second, De la Court has a much more dramatic view of the conflict in the human soul. He draws on the same passions as Descartes, but does not think that those passions can be controlled. Even though De la Court does not think that people can overcome the passions, he does think that people should use reason to whatever extent possible in order to improve their life.55 Notice that for De la Court, reason and virtue do not overcome our selfinterest, but work with it. It is unrealistic to expect even the most civilized and rational person to rise above selfish passions unless he is literally forced to do so. This concept is central to De la Court's political philosophy. The very purpose of the state is to check the passions with reason.57 The best state is one where the passions are reined in most tightly. Johan thought this was most effectively done in a democratic republic where there is no individual 58 power. Power is corrupting and ultimately leads individuals to become slaves to the passions. Just as an individual strives to master the destructive passions with reason, a good state will be set up in a rational way so as to prevent self-destruction at the hands of the passions of individuals. It is dangerous for the state to have to rely on the virtue or rationality of any individual. Instead, it must be set up so as to make its individuals virtuous and reasonable. That is the very purpose of law and the state in general. De la Court's political philosophy is laid out in his three main works: Consider atien van Staat, oftepolitike weeg-schaal (Considerations of State or Political Balance] (1662); Politiehe discoursen (Political Discourses) (1662); and Interest van Holland ofte Gronden van Hollands-Welvaren (Interest of Holland or the Foundation of Holland's Welfare) (1662).59 The Political Balance supports the Act of Seclusion that prevented William III from becoming stadholder. It considers pure monarchical, aristocratic and democratic forms of government in order to determine which form is best for a republic. It concludes, as Spinoza does later, that the highest institution should be an assembly, as is the case in Holland and the United Provinces.60 The Political Discourses is written in the style of Machiavelli's Discoursi and addresses the issue of the distribution of powers between cities within the Dutch republic. The Interest of Holland was published with De Witt as author, even though he only contributed two chapters. The rest was written by Pieter De la Court. This work analyses, in great detail, the consequences for Holland's trading interests of the international situation resulting from the Miinster and Wesphalian peace treatise of 1648, and considers the advantages and disadvantages of forming alliances with France and England. De la Court proposed an

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isolationist stance and an aggressive advocacy of Holland's leadership over the other provinces.61 Further, he argued that given the economic interests of Holland, a republican form of government is far superior to a monarchical one. By 'republican', De la Court means a state wherein an assembly has both the right and the power to come to all resolutions, make orders and laws or break them, and require or prohibit obedience to those laws. 'Monarchy' or 'monarchical' means a state where one person has these rights and powers.62 There are two common Hobbesian themes found throughout these works: absolutism and the view that self-interest is the primary motivation of humans and therefore foundational to political theory. The De la Court brothers came by Hobbes in the same way they came by Descartes, through their teacher and brother-in-law Heereboord. In the 1660s, Hobbes had more influence in Leiden than in van Velthuysen's Utrecht. Heereboord and his fellow Leiden professor Johannes De Raey were very interested in Hobbes' philosophy and passed this interest on to their students.63 While De la Court takes some fundamental elements of absolutism and self-preservation from Hobbes' philosophy, he uses these elements to draw very different conclusions. De la Court was a political absolutist in two senses. He denied that people had the right or power to do anything other than obey the lawful rulers and he argued against mixed government. In other words, he rejected any constitution that combined monarchical, aristocratic and/or democratic elements. De la Court agreed with Hobbes that sovereign power must be indivisible or the disintegration of the body politic would follow.64 Take, for instance, the need of a state to enter into treaties with foreign powers. In order for such treaties to work, it must be clearly stipulated who will maintain that treaty, whether it is one person (monarchy), a small assembly (aristocracy) or everybody (democracy).65 When we consider his Dutch context, it is not so surprising that De la Court used Hobbesian absolutism to argue against monarchy. De la Court's goal was to show how the Dutch republic should be governed without a stadholder. He characterized stadholder-rule as a monarchical element that functioned alongside and above the aristocratic and democratic elements found in the States General and the States of Holland. De la Court rejects such mixed rule out of hand. It was his opponents - the Orangists - who associated themselves with respublica mixta, in order to distinguish their view from both oppressive monarchies and 'stubborn regents'.66 De la Court also used natural law arguments against monarchy. Humans are equal in nature. Nobody is made to rule or to be ruled. He concludes from this that democracy is the most legitimate form of government. For a

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government that is ruled by one or a few is only legitimate if all of the people have given that power to them. While it is conceivable that a democracy would entrust power to a few, it would never give it to one man and his descendents. The origins of monarchy could only be violence and fraud.67 Further, democracy is the most natural, rational and equitable form of government. Since everyone pursues his own interests, when the majority supports a decision it is because the majority of people have concluded that that decision is in his own interests. Such a decision will necessarily result in a decision that is in the interest of the people as a whole.68 At the time most people felt that democracy was an uncertain and unreliable form of government because it was subject to the whims of an immature and irrational populace. De la Court agreed that the masses were ignorant, but he believed this ignorance was a result of poverty and lack of education. Since humans are equal in nature and the intellectual potential between individuals did not vary greatly, such ignorance could be overcome with prosperity and education. That is not to say that De la Court was arguing that Holland should become a popular democracy. He was not looking to destroy the current 'constitution5 and start over. Rather, he was trying to interpret Dutch tradition and the current 'constitution', as vague as it was, as advocating an aristocratic form of government. De la Court's arguments for democracy should be seen as (1) part of his argument against monarchy/stadholder rule and (2) part of his attempt to break up the regents' oligarchy that was gaining power in Holland. De la Court felt the need to point out that aristocracy led by the regent class is only legitimate because it serves the needs of the people. This perspective guides his arguments against the guilds and monopolies of the regents and in favour of free trade.70 De la Court uses the Hobbesian notion of self-interest to argue for economic and religious freedoms. Like Hobbes, De la Court accepts the view that self-interest is the dominant natural drive in human nature. Further, he agrees with Hobbes that sociability derives from this egoistic drive. In the state of nature people live in a perpetual state of war and in constant fear of each other. The state of nature is so bad that it is worse than living in the worst kind of state.71 Anyone living in the state of nature therefore desires to leave it and does so by joining in the social contract. Society therefore arises because of the self-interested desire of individuals to escape the state of nature. Humans continue to be driven by self-interest, so the only way for society to keep from slipping back into the state of nature is to be set up in such a way that the interests of all members of the state, including the ruling elite, be linked by common interest. The Interest of Holland argues that under

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De Witt's rule, 'the inhabitants of Holland, being in a state of freedom, are by a common interest wonderfully linked together .. ,'.72 De la Court understands the common interest largely in economic terms. He points out that Holland is a populous province that supports itself on fishing and trade. It is in the interests of both the people and the rulers (who are merchants) to have a large population with profitable occupations and thriving marketsaa. He describes the situation as follows: One man being a god to another under a good land, that there are so many people in it, who according to the nature of the country are honestly maintain'd by such suitable or proportionable means, and especially that the welfare of all the inhabitants (the idle gentry, and foreign soldiers excepted) from the least to the greatest, does so necessarily depend on one another: and above all, it is chiefly considerable, that there are none more really interested in the prosperity of this country than the rulers of the aristocratical government, and the persons that live on their estates. 4 The reason that the current republic works so well is that the well- or illbeing of the rulers depends on or is joined with the well- or ill-being of the fisherman, the manufactures, and those who convey those goods by land and sea.'5 This joining of interests happens in two different ways. First, the rulers in Holland cannot support themselves on wages from their official positions They therefore must rely on other means of support, such as fisheries, and so on. Second, even those who are independently wealthy are interested in fisheries and trade because that is how their families acquired their money and they want to marry their children to rich merchants. In these two ways the prosperity of Holland benefits its republican rulers.76 This work was written during the height of the Dutch Golden Age. Holland had never seen such prosperity and De la Court warned that this happy situation could be ruined by one mistake in government: However, this excellent and laudable harmony and union may be violated, even to the ruin of all the inhabitants, none excepted but courtiers and soldiers, and that by one sole mistake in government, which is the electing one supreme head over these inhabitants, or over their armies ... God preserve Holland from the fury of a monarch, prince, or one supreme head.77 He warns that if Holland should return to stadholder-rule, it is likely that the prince would curb and obstruct Holland's greatness and power in order to increase his own.

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De la Court thought that Holland's prosperity is largely due to its freedoms. He argues that freedom of the individual is necessary to promote profitable economic activities. It is only by consulting one's self-interest that citizens are able to make the right choices. Religious dogmatism frustrates this freedom and leads the church to interfere with politics in destructive ways. De la Court argues, like van Velthuysen before him, that the clergy should not have any coercive power. Only civil magistrates should be able to command and compel the inhabitants of Holland to perform or omit outward actions; only the magistrates should be able to punish people for disobedience. Religious persecution is very dangerous to the well-being of individuals, the well-being of the state and to the well-being of the Reformed Church itself. Religious persecution harms individuals because it hardens their hearts so that they cannot receive God. Further, those who are persecuted are likely to be changed from sweet-tempered to violent and will adopt the tyrannical maxim, 'as he hath done to me, so will I do to him .. .'.80 Second, religious intolerance harms the state because it causes people to flee and a large population is necessary for Holland's trading interests. Finally, freedom of religion is especially beneficial for the Reformed religion because there is no greater sign of a false religion than its attempt to coerce people. By allowing religious tolerance in Holland, more people will come to Holland from abroad and will see the truth of this religion, which 'may and ought to depend upon its own evidence and veracity'.81 Next to freedom of religion is the need to have freedom for people, including foreigners, to practise their trade of choice. Otherwise, people will not settle in Holland. Free trade is good for the common interest and does not harm others.82 Republics flourish far more in art, manufacture, traffic, population and strength than monarchies. 'For where there is liberty, there will be riches and people.' De la Court champions 'True Liberty' and a free republic, because it excels in the virtues of prudence, industry, truthfulness, peacefulness, education and in the moderation of the passions. 4 Anyone who has read Spinoza's political works will recognize many of Spinoza's ideas in the pamphlets of van Velthuysen and De la Court. We must remember that these pamphlets were published eight to 19 years before Spinoza's TTP. Their ideas were circulating in Holland, specifically, as we will see in Chapter 3, among members of Spinoza's circle. In Chapter 4, we will examine Spinoza's political writings and his Radical Cartesian influences, particularly those of van Velthuysen and De la Court.

Chapter 3

Radical Cartesian Associates: van den Enden and the Amsterdam Circle

Introduction Spinoza's association with Radical Cartesianism goes back to our earliest records of Spinoza's philosophical career, his membership in what is known as the Amsterdam Circle. The group was comprised of educated Cartesians, mostly academics from the Leiden medical faculty including, among others,1 Fransiscus van den Enden (1602-1674), Lodewijk Meyer (16291681), Johannes Bouwmeester (1630-1680), Jarig Jelles (c. 1620-1683) and Pieter Balling (d. 1669). Van den Enden was born and raised in Antwerp, where at the age of 17 he entered the Jesuit order only to be kicked out two years later for unknown reasons. He had similar difficulty in pursuing a religious life when, after becoming a Jesuit priest, he was dismissed for his 'errors'. Of his education, we know that he had Jesuit training in Latin, philosophy, theology and the ancient classics and that he acquired degrees in grammar and medicine.2 He moved to Amsterdam sometime between 1645 and 1650 and opened a small bookshop and gallery in The Nes. In 1652 the business failed and he moved to the Singel and opened his school where he would teach until 1671. The Amsterdam Circle, at least in the beginning, centred around Franciscus van den Enden and this school. Here students (both male and female) learned Latin, classical literature and philosophy, as well as the new philosophy and science. Van den Enden's school was an alternative for parents who did not want to enrol their children in the conservative Reformed schools. Bouwmeester, Meyer, Jelles and Balling came to the school to learn as mature students, as well as to engage in the ongoing discussions about religious freedom. Johannes Bouwmeester was a Leiden-trained physician and a close friend of Spinoza. Spinoza frequented Bouwmeester's home, where the two would discuss Spinoza's ideas and Bouwmeester would give his input on the

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formulation and presentation of those ideas. It is likely that he contributed to the publication of Spinoza's Descartes' Principles of Philosophy (PPG). Meyer came from a Lutheran family, but was not a religious man himself. He attended the Illustrious School of Amsterdam and moved to Leiden in 1654 where he earned doctorates in both philosophy and medicine in 1660. During his time at the University of Leiden he studied medicine with F. de la Boe Sylvius (1614-1672) and was exposed to the philosophies of Heereboord, De Raey and, after 1658, Arnold Geulincx (1624-1669). Further, he would have been familiar with Burgersdijk's ideas through his older brother, Alardus Lodwijk Kok (1616 -1653), the Dutch translator of these most important textbooks. After earning his degrees, he moved back to Amsterdam and was an active member of the Amsterdam Circle. Meyer may have met Spinoza at the University of Leiden, or in Amsterdam during a long school break, or even when helping van den Enden with a play production. In any case they became good friends and collaborators. In 1663 (after Spinoza left Amsterdam for Rijnsburg) Meyer served the role of intermediary between both Spinoza and the Amsterdam Circle and between Spinoza and his publisher Rieuwertsz. Further, Meyer wrote the preface for, as well as editing and supervising, the printing of Spinoza's PPG. He was an important influence on Spinoza, encouraging him to write in the geometric style — which had been used by Professor Geulincx earlier. It was also Meyer who first identified common notions with axioms and postulates.0 For a long time Meyer thought that a geometrical demonstration of Descartes' Principles of Philosophy was needed which would include claims that were better stated in the Optics and Meditations. He started this project himself but became distracted with other work and requested Spinoza to take up the job.6 It is also likely that Meyer was involved in the editing and publishing of the TTP, as it was reissued bound together with the PPSI in 1673 and again in 1674.7 Meyer and Spinoza remained good friends and some think that Meyer was the physician who attended to Spinoza on his deathbed, though there is some disagreement on this issue.8 Jelles, Spinoza's dearest friend, was once an affluent grocer, but withdrew from business in 1653, after a religious crisis, in order to devote himself to the pursuit of truth. While Spinoza and Jelles were quite different in terms of religious beliefs, this 'crisis' experience seems to be something they held in common. Jelles' description of his experience is quite similar to Spinoza's autobiographical beginning to the TIE: Whoever loves this world, which is to say, whoever loves idle fame, pleasure and riches, will pay the highest penalty; he will not be able to inherit

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the Kingdom of God. The kingdom of Mercy, however, which leads to the kingdom of Glory involves achieving dominion over the emotions. And we enter into this kingdom when we are led by the Spirit, by the light of the understanding, by truth.9 Both young men see the folly of spending one's life in pursuit of wealth and honour and the ensuing danger of being ruled by the passions. 'But5, as Spinoza says, 'love toward the eternal and infinite thing feeds the mind with a joy entirely exempt from sadness5 (TIE, 9). What is striking is that while Jelles discusses this eternal and infinite thing in more tradi-tional religious terms, both men see reason as the means to attaining union with it. It is not clear when Spinoza and Jelles became friends, but it could have been quite early, as their fathers were both in the same business (trading dried fruits). Jelles5 father was an exchange broker from 1629-1654 and is known to have had direct dealings with Spinoza's father in the 1630s.10 It is easy to imagine Jelles and Spinoza meeting while accompanying their fathers at the Exchange. As young men, Spinoza and Jelles would have found common ground in that both were moving in directions different from their strict merchant fathers. While Spinoza was moving away from his father5s Jewish beliefs, Jelles was turning away from the harshness of his father's religious views. Although he always remained a devout Mennonite, Jelles joined a Flemish sect which was much more liberal than his father's Frisian one. This is not to say that he did not have puritanical proclivities of his own. He believed in modest dress and frowned on worldly vanities, including academic learning. For instance, Jelles considered it a matter of Mennonite principle that all of Spinoza's works be translated into Dutch, the language of the people.{l Jelles is known to have helped Spinoza financially. It is thought that Jelles subsidized the publication of the PPC12 and that he may have housed Spinoza in his Ouderkerk home in May of 1660, when Spinoza is believed to have first drafted the TIE and KV.13 Spinoza met Balling through the Exchange as well.14 In 1653, Balling acted as a representative for Dutch merchants in Spain and may have worked with the fathers of Spinoza and Jelles when they were importing dried fruits. Balling was an educated man, fluent in Spanish and Latin, and was responsible for translating Spinoza's PPC into Dutch. Balling was a member of the same liberal Menonnite sect as Jelles, and also like Jelles, a Collegiant. The fact that they were Collegiants helps explain the unlikely relationship between these devoutly religious men and the other members of the Amsterdam Circle. The Collegiants held services in homes without ministers or any form of hierarchy. This democratic

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form of worship began as a practical solution to the Synod of Dordrecht, which forbade non-Calvinist ministers from preaching, even in private homes. Rather than go underground (as did the Remonstrants), the Collegiants chose to do away with ministers, thus allowing them to worship without going against the strictures of the Synod.15 They gathered in 'colleges' to read Scripture and hold debates. This new democratic way of worship took on a life of its own and people from many sects, especially other socially marginalized groups such as Mennonites and Quakers, joined. It was accepted and commonplace among the Collegiants to participate in the colleges and still continue one's membership in another religious community. Jelles and Balling were used to associating with non-Mennonites through these colleges and may have enjoyed such relationships as expressions of religious toleration. The Collegiants found theological justification for their democratic beliefs and tolerant practices in early Reformation theology. However, they gave an earlier date to the corruption of the Church than did more orthodox Protestants. The Collegiants maintained that the corruption of the Church went all the way back to when the Roman Empire Constantine officially became Christian and the Church entered into a close alliance with the state.16 This caused the Church to lose one of the two gifts of the Holy Spirit — Heerlijkmaking — glorious union with the Lord, leaving the visible church beyond human reform (and hence beyond the capabilities of the Voetians). While waiting for the second coming of Christ, all humans can do is use the remaining gift of the Holy Spirit — Heiligmaking or holiness. The Collegiant life was built on the latter. Colleges were gatherings of ordinary people with the intent to pursue this holiness together. Jelles and Balling exposed Spinoza and the Amsterdam Circle to these ideas, if not the Collegiant gatherings themselves. Both held Socinian views, emphasizing freedom of the will, and believed that Scripture and reason could always be reconciled. They were particularly concerned to show that their philosophic views (a mixture of Cartesianism and Spinozism) were consistent with their religious beliefs, as other Collegiants sometimes objected that they were incompatible.18 While Spinoza may have begun associating with Jelles and Balling as early as 1654 (two years before Spinoza's expulsion from the Jewish community), it is not clear how they met van den Enden or precisely when the Amsterdam Circle formed. Unfortunately the details of Spinoza's life from 1654 to 1660 are quite murky. For our purposes here, what is important is that we know that by 1656 Spinoza was living with van den Enden and these remarkable individuals were his closest associates.

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Spinoza earned his keep by teaching at van den Enden's school. It is here that Spinoza learned Latin and van den Enden introduced him to the works of Grotius, Machiavelli and Hobbes.19 One of the means van den Enden would use to teach Latin to his students (including Spinoza) was to have them publicly perform plays. While they often performed classical works, such as those of Terrence, they occasionally performed contemporary pieces, some by members of the Amsterdam Circle. Theatre played an important role in the lives of many members of the group. For example, Meyer was the director of the Amsterdam Theatre and in 1669 Bouwmeester and Meyer were co-founders of the literary society 'Nil Volentibus Arduum' (nothing is difficult for the willing) or NVA. This society translated the best pieces of the poetic tradition and prepared them for production in the Amsterdam Theatre. As we will see, they applied their radical Cartesian ideology to their principles of theatre.20 Spinoza kept in touch with members of the Amsterdam Circle long after he left the city, some remaining dear lifelong friends. As time went on, the group became more and more focused on Spinoza's writings and acted as a kind of Spinoza study group, often requesting clarifications of his ideas through correspondence. While members of the group are often characterized as Spinoza's 'followers' or 'Spinozists', we must keep in mind that many of them published works before Spinoza and exerted an important influence on his ideas as well. It is not always clear to what extent their ideas were influenced by Spinoza and to what extent he was influenced by them. Many of Spinoza's later ideas can be found in their earlier writings and many of Spinoza's earlier ideas can be found in their later writings. As in any group of intellectual friends, it is likely that influences went in many directions, both consciously and subconsciously. While it would be an interesting and not insignificant task for Spinoza scholarship to untangle these lines of influence, it is not my undertaking here. Rather, I will argue that Spinoza's close association with these Radical Cartesians provides strong evidence that Spinoza was thinking about the relationships between epistemology, politics and religion throughout his entire philosophical career indeed before, during and after writing the Ethics. This point will be significant for Chapters 5 to 7, where we will look at the development of Spinoza's views on truth, falsity and error, as well as the related changes in his metaphysics. For, as we will come to see, these changes (some being fundamental aspects of his mature philosophy) are motivated, in part, from Spinoza's desire to lay out the best state in which religion and philosophy each play their proper role. In other words, we will come to see the Ethics and TTP as part of the same overall project, an essentially Radical Cartesian project.

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Now that we have met the members of the Amsterdam Circle, it is time to examine the ideas holding this motley crew together, for they not only differed in terms of religious belief and upbringing, but also in regard to their various interests (including politics, theatre, education and scriptural interpretation) . By examining their activities and writings, we will come to see that underlying their various endeavours is a strong commitment to the Radical Cartesian principles of toleration, religious and philosophical freedom and concern for the common interest of the people. It is these commitments that attracted the young Spinoza to this eclectic group of freethinkers and they to him.

Van den Enden In addition to teaching, van den Enden was interested in and involved in the political life of Holland. This interest precedes his opening of the school, for he was publishing and printing political pamphlets as early as 165021 and fulfilled several political missions during the 1650s.22 This interest in politics continued into the next decade. For example, in 1662 he wrote a letter to De Witt with suggestions for improving the effectiveness of Dutch ships in war.23 A year earlier, van den Enden was approached by a group, led by Pieter Cornelisz Plockhoy, wishing to form a democratic colony based on Collegiant principles in the New Netherlands (on a section of land along the Delaware River). Van den Enden wrote a series of letters to the city of Amsterdam on their behalf from October 1661 to May 1662. These seven letters, one including a proposal for the colony's constitution, were published together with an introduction to the land in question and a critique of the aristocratic nature of the current Dutch government. This work was published in 1662 and titled Kort Verhael van Nieuw-Nederlandts (A Short Narrative of the New Netherlands]. 4 The colony was founded in 1663 but only survived for a year, after which it, along with the rest of the New Netherlands, was lost to the English. During this time, van den Enden was also working on his second main political work, Vrye Politijke Stellingen (The Free Political Propositions}^ which was published in 1665. He remained interested in politics for the remainder of his life. From 1665-1667 he attempted, unsuccessfully, to sell a secret naval weapon to De Witt. 27 In the early 1670s he moved to France where he was involved in a plot to overthrow the monarchy. Together with Sieur de Rohan and De Latreaumont, van den Enden planned to assassinate Louis XIV, kidnap his heir and cause a rebellion in Normandy, thus allowing them to put in place a free republic.2 The conspiracy was foiled

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and in 1674 Rohan was beheaded, Latreaumont was shot in an attempt to resist arrest and van den Enden, not being a French noble, was hanged in the gallows of the Bastille. All of the time van den Enden was plotting, he was teaching at his newly established Latin school, Hotel des Muses, and making his home an intellectual salon, entertaining the likes of Leibniz and Arnauld.29 Van den Enden read and was inspired by De la Court's writings but he felt that they did not go far enough. As Wim Klever points out, the title of van den Enden's second work betrays this attitude: The Free Political Propositions and Considerations of the State: ... as if the earlier political considerations of the brothers De la Court were not enough oriented on the true freedom of the citizens. The subtitle puts the heaviest possible emphasis on their unimpaired equality: 'done after the grounds of the even-equal freedom (evengelijke rryheits gronden) of the true Christians, leading to a righteous and true improvement of the State and Church ... by a lover of The even equal freedom of all well qualified citizens and who, to their common good, loves most things as they really are. The Wellbeing of the people is the highest law, and, The voice of the people is God's voice.' Like De la Court, van den Enden thinks that the passions and self-interest are the driving force of politics and that religious and philosophical freedoms are necessary for a well-run state. While van den Enden appreciates De la Court's arguments against monarchy, he does not feel that De la Court went far enough in the direction of democracy and equality. This is a key difference between the two Radical Cartesians. De la Court spends a great deal of time providing arguments against monarchy, while van den Enden focuses on providing what he sees as the necessary preconditions for overcoming monarchy: 'reforming education, advancing equality, and enlightening the people'.32 During his trial, van den Enden described his Free Political Propositions as laying out a fourth kind of republic, one that differs from those of Plato. Grotius and Thomas More in that its sole foundation is the 'common best'. Van den Enden understands the common best, or the well-being of a people as a whole, as nothing more than the mathematical sum or aggregate of each individual's particular best interest.33 Further, the will of the people as a whole will necessarily be what is in the true best interest of the state: Nobody, then, can deny that as the whole is greater than its part, so also the whole people's wisdom and knowledge of its best and particular well-being is in all circumstances better and farther reaching than the

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knowledge of one or a few among the same people. And consequently that no wisdom, however great, of somebody in particular among any people, much less of somebody outside the same people, may be pretended, to which a whole people, concerning to the common best, could entrust itself quietly and safely without looking back/ 4 There are two important aspects of van den Enden's notion of common best: (1) equality of all people, that is, no one person's interest is to weigh higher than anyone else's and (2) the form of government that best yields the common best is a democracy. All individuals are driven by passions and self-interest. These drives naturally lead people to mutual sociability. This occurs first from their basic needs and their desire of comfort, but later involves the enjoyment of enhanced pleasures that are only available within a community.35 In the state of nature, people are equal and free, but are unable to meet their needs and desire. Self-interest naturally leads individuals to form the commonwealth, which van den Enden defines as an association of people, based on the foundation of equal liberty, which incorporates laws so that each member will not be weakened but strengthened through the common benefit.36 In joining the commonwealth, individuals do not give up their equality. On the contrary, a good commonwealth takes great measures to ensure the equality of its people. In fact, the first article of van den Enden's constitution states that: The principal basis or foundation for this society will be an equality for which purpose every man over 24 years of age who wishes to enter the society must seriously and earnestly promise that he will never strive for any special power, nor will allow anyone else to make the least efforts in that direction, but resist this with all possible means. Since each individual is driven by passions and self-interest, care must be taken in the state to ensure that no individual attempts to supersede the will of the people, that is, to create inequality. Public affairs must be arranged so that it is very difficult for any member to profit at the disadvantage of the community. Further, the state must institute countermeasures so that appointed leaders, out of fear of personal harm, will not become arrogant or violent against the will of the people. On penalty of death, laws must forbid people from acting or teaching anything contrary to the equality between citizens and common best as the people's council determines it to be.40 Van den Enden denies the possibility that an individual might know the interest of the state better than the collective wisdom of the people.41 on

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... for the people's best there can't be shown or given any more faithful advice nor any more certain judgment and decision than the ordinary deliberation, judgment and resolution of the people itself. And for which reason it will everywhere appear to be clear and true that the voice of people for the same people truly has to be in full considered and hold for the voice of god. Perhaps what is most striking about van den Enden's notion of equality is how far he extended it, much further than De la Court before him or Spinoza after him: I therefore understand, on the foregoing basis of equal liberty, the common best of a community of people to include a correspondingly equal measure of orders, laws and mutual help between more or less reasonable, more or less well-to-do people, male and female, parents and children, servants and served or ruler and ruled, as discovered through reason and experience.43 All people, despite the variations in intelligence, social status and gender have equal rights. Van den Enden condemns the current situation in The Netherlands where, in his view, the magistrates manipulate poor and simple people and neglect their interests.44 In the current stadholderless government, as in De la Court's writings, the interest of the state has come to mean the interest of the merchants, not of the people as a whole. A government of the few leads to the disadvantages of the many. Such an aristocracy could never maintain the natural equality of people. A true democracy is needed. The natural place of power and judgement concerning the common best is the citizens themselves. We should note that van den Enden is not talking about a representative democracy, but rather a state where citizens themselves run local government. His constitution provides that public servants should be elected by the colonists (i.e., by free men 24 years of age who have no debt to the community).45 The elected officials are to work under the supervision and control of the citizens. Further, all laws and ordinances are to be enacted by a two-thirds written vote. Like De la Court, van den Enden is very critical of mixed government. Monarchy and aristocracy both have a character that violates freedom; they clash with the power of the people. Pure democracy, on the other hand, 'when not roguishly and slyly undermined by a variant of monarchy and aristocracy', only perishes from external causes.47 Further, mixed government legitimizes the dominance of some citizens over others, as though

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some are determined by nature to be masters.4 Like De la Court, Van den Enden considered it dangerous to have power in the hands of a few who will be easily corruptible and if not tempered by a power of the people, tend towards their own personal desires: All bodies political which are infected with some kind of high authority, let alone above the authority of the people, are to my judgment, for the above mentioned reason and on account of the natural and essential insatiableness of the human desires afflicted with a languishing moral disease.4 When a mixed government appears to do well, it is on account of the democratic element and in spite of the monarchic and aristocratic ones.50 It should be noted that while women and those in debt may not vote in van den Enden's absolute democracy, their rights are still protected in a way that is extraordinary for the seventeenth century. For instance, the constitution goes into great detail on how a woman may divorce a delinquent and/or abusive husband and rely on the community for support. Further, the elected officials are to appoint commissioners from the colonists who will, at the expense of the community, care for: all needy widows, orphans, the sick, the old; in short all impotent men. women and children, especially within the society, without forgetting however to bestow kindness upon all others who are not yet members, and this not in a stingy way, but very liberally, yea brotherly, in order that the unfortunate will be saved from becoming degraded, but will become instead worthwhile members of our society. Perhaps van den Enden's concern with the downtrodden is best expressed in article 104: Our young and carefully, so that as possible from so that they will standing.53

fragile society will have to be watched particularly the weaker members will always be protected as much oppression by the stronger ones, even to assist them not be deprived of the opportunity to obtain a better

One source of oppression that van den Enden was particularly concerned about was dogmatic religion. Like van Velthuysen before him, van den Enden did not believe that morality was within the domain of religion. He wanted to forbid preachers from the colony because they are 'feeders

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and supporters of sectarian and particular opinions ... and are, therefore, an unavoidable ruinous pest of all peace and harmony in the society'.54 Morality and good government cannot be discovered in authoritarian expositions of Scripture. They are discovered through reason.55 When people are reasonably enlightened, they will understand that the only way to secure and maintain their personal well-being is to care for the common best.56 A society's goodness and morality depends on the reasoning ability of its people, and the development of reason requires freedom, particularly free speech and freedom of religion. Van den Enden pointed to Native American societies as models to emulate. He drew an idealistic picture of Native American culture, based on written descriptions from earlier Dutch colonists,5' and used it to express his ideas of the human ideal. He admired the Native Americans for giving absolute authority to the voice of the common people in all matters of public interest and praises them for their lack of superstition. They alone live according to the laws of nature. At the heart of van den Enden's advocacy of equality and democracy is a firm commitment to education reform. Dutch elementary schools should distinguish between three kinds of knowledge: imagining, believing and clearly knowing.5 The only means to becoming a good citizen and avoiding wrong ways in life is the teaching of infallible divine reason. 11 is in this way that one comes to knowledge or love of God and love of the neighbour or common best.61 This education is the responsibility of the state.62 The young, whose use of reason is found to be much too weak and tender to perceive well and to understand all purposes, contents and power of the laws should be affected by respectability and ceremonies, which stimulate good morals, and by good impression of Rules of firm and evenequal freedom in such a way, that they, coming to their years of discretiony could arrive and pass very easily and lightly to the understanding and pursuit of everything belonging to an even-equalfreedom and common best. In other words, children naturally begin at the level of imagination and so that is where we should begin teaching them, through ceremonies which positively dispose them towards equality and morality. Once they develop their reason, they will accept equality and morality based on rational principles, but in so preparing them, they will all the more easily make that transition. Such an education ought never to rest on appeals to authority. As we have already seen, the wisdom of an individual does not outshine the light of common wisdom. For this reason, the educational system must be devoid of such false authority and any superstition. Van den Enden has great

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confidence in the natural development of understanding. As long as individuals are not deceived or abused by false authorities, they will naturally develop reason as they gain experience in life. In this way they will be able to come to the conclusion, on their own, that they ought to co-operate so as to achieve the common best. There is no need to trick people into this conclusion with superstition or deception. One way to ensure that such deception and abuse does not take place is to remove special prestige among physicians, lawyers, philosophers, theologians and so on. Such subjects should not be taught in Latin and other languages which are solely used to keep information in the hands of the few. Such knowledge should be made readily available to the common people.64 Further, these areas of knowledge, which are most important for the common best, must collectively be taught, practiced and studied. 5 After all, while individuals with special prestige are bound to look after their own self-interest, the people as a collective whole necessarily look after the common best.66 At the heart of these views was an epistemological position that was strongly held by several members of the Amsterdam Circle, and a key point of contention between them and Spinoza: people naturally through the general experience of life and inevitable reflection on that experience and without the need of a particular method, specialized education, and so on — gain wisdom. This is the central idea ofPhilodenius (Lover of Lust), a play written and published by van den Enden in 1657 and performed by the Amsterdam Theatre.67 The play is about Don Juan who at a late age at last attained virtue. Philodenius sketches van den Enden's view of the mind's development towards the highest kind of knowledge. The journey from youth to adult wisdom is not taught by other people, specifically not scientists or technical experts of any kind, but rather through thinking about one's own experiences.69 Life is the teacher. As Klever puts it, Philodenius characterizes: ... the mind as an automatically improving reflector on what goes on in one's heart (animus] as an effect of the impacts on one's body. Schooling of the mind plays no role in the piece.70 Here we see van den Enden's empiricism shining through. It is in the spirit of empiricism that he signed his pamphlets, 'M.V.Z.H.' for 'Meest van zaken houdt' (he who most loves things). Bouwmeester also accepted this empiri cal epistemology. As we will see in the next section, it is on this point that Bouwmeester and Spinoza had a falling out.

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Bouwmeester At one point Bouwmeester and Spinoza were very close and it is clear that Bouwmeester once greatly admired Spinoza. He wrote a poem praising the philosopher, which was included in the publication of the PPG, after Meyer's preface and before Spinoza's text: Whether one calls you the fruit begotten from a better brain Or assumes that you are reborn from Descartes, Precious booklet, this spirit which blows through your pages, Is original and alone yours, never before found elsewhere. Whether I look at your genius or at your statements, I am forced to praise your author and raise him to the stars. What he has achieved, is unprecedented and matchless. I wish you, booklet, to become a starting point yourself. And that what Descartes owes to a certain Spinoza, He, Spinoza, may finally fulfil for himself, This admiration was not to last. Only two years later it appears that the once close relationship was undergoing difficulties. In Letter 28 Spinoza pleas: My very special friend, I don't know whether you have completely forgotten me, but there are many circumstances which make me think so. First, when I was about to set out on my journey and wanted to bid you good-bye, and felt sure, being invited by yourself, that I would find you at home, I was told that you had gone to The Hague. I returned to Voorburg, confident that you would at least call on me in passing; but you if it pleases the gods, have returned home without greeting your friend. Finally, I have waited three weeks, and in all that time I have seen no letter from you. So if you want to banish this opinion of mine, you will easily do so by a letter, in which you can also indicate some way of arranging our correspondence, of which we once talked in your house (Ep. 28, 179). Such expressions of emotion and hurt are very unusual in Spinoza's correspondence and suggest feelings of loss of a valued friendship. What was the cause of this falling out? Klever believes that it had to do with a disagreement over method.73 In Letter 37 (the only other letter remaining from their correspondence), Spinoza answers a question posed by Bouwmeester:

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Spinoza's Radical Cartesian Mind ... whether there is or can be a method such that thereby we can make sure and unwearied progress in the study of things of the highest importance; or whether our minds, like our bodies, are at the mercy of chance, and our thoughts are governed more by fortune than by skill (Ep. 37,211).

Bouwmeester is pointedly asking whether there is a parallel between the determinism of the body and a determinism of the mind and, if so, what consequences it has on the method for acquiring wisdom. Spinoza responds that the intellect is not at the mercy of chance as is the body. Further, there is definitely a method for directing and interconnecting clear and distinct perceptions: This is established simply from the following consideration, that one clear and distinct perception, or several taken together, can be absolutely the cause of another clear and distinct perception. Indeed, all the clear and distinct perceptions that we form can arise only from other clear and distinct perceptions which are in us, and they acknowledge no other cause outside us. Hence it follows that the clear and distinct perceptions that we form depend only on our nature and its definite and fixed laws, that is, on our power itself alone, and not on chance, that is, on causes which, although acting likewise by definite and fixed laws, are yet unknown to us and foreign to our nature and power (Ep. 37,211-12). Spinoza goes on to admit that perceptions which are not clear and distinct do depend on chance. It is therefore necessary to clearly distinguish intellect from imagination (ideas relying on memory). Spinoza's method applies to the former whereas Bacon's method is appropriate to the latter (Ep.37,212). While we do not have Bouwmeester's side of the correspondence, we can infer from his works that he did not agree. He accepted van den Enden's empiricist view that humans naturally attain wisdom through random experience and reflection on that experience. We have two main sources of Bouwmeester's ideas: a novel that he translated and the proceedings from the 'Nil Volentibus Arduum 5 , a theatre group that Bouwmeester belonged to. Bouwmeester was a superb Latinist. In fact, Spinoza requested him to translate some of his work from Latin to Dutch (Ep. 37, 211). Bouwmeester's main publication was a translation from a Latin version of the twelfthcentury Arabic novel by Ibn Tufayl called Hayy ibn Taqzam. While this work is translated, not written, by Bouwmeester, we know from the preface that he approved of the ideas expressed in it. This story tells how a child grows up

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in complete isolation and yet through his experiences alone (without any teaching or contact with other humans) comes to know and unite with God. First, he learns through experience what all things have in common and that all things are necessary. This leads him to contemplate God as an uncaused cause and thus attain pure joy.74 The main points of this work are (1) divine revelation is not necessary for wisdom and (2) all people have the natural capacity to become wise through experience.75 Given these two ideas, the best way to develop one's mind is to enrich one's field of experience and stimulate intellectual reflection on that experience. Theatre provides an excellent means of doing so.76 Remember that Bouwmeester was a co-founder and active member in the theatre society NVA. This group met weekly to discuss the principles of good theatre and their ideas were later published in a collection called Nauwkeurig onderwys in de tooneel-poezy, en eenige andere deelen der kunst, zo we I van de oude als haedendaagsche dichters (Instruction in the Poetics of Drama). 7 This book consists of 40 chapters by ten different authors, including Bouwmeester and Meyer. The group was not satisfied with the manuscript and decided not to publish it. However, it was later published in 1765.7 Within this work, Bouwmeester makes it clear that theatre ought to be applied to the common good. In good Radical Cartesian fashion, members of the NVA understand the desire to promote the common good in terms of self-interest, for Meyer continues: Nobody can avoid to look after his own wellbeing. But the more able my neighbours are to promote my wellbeing and the more I may expect from their help, the more I am also forced to look after their wellbeing, in which their aforementioned capability exists. Well, this is the ground and reason, on which every kind of instruction or whatever else one could do for his fellow-man rests. Nobody will toil and moil for other people if he could not expect to gather fruits for himself from it. For the NVA, theatre was a means of instructing the people by presenting experiences for the audience to have and reflect on - a way, if you will, to influence the experiences of the populace on which their development of wisdom depended. Even though Bouwmeester appears to have had a falling out with Spinoza and to have disagreed with his views on method, in the end he still cared enough for the man and his philosophy to edit Spinoza's Opera Posthuma (along with Meyer, Jelles and other members of the Amsterdam Circle) and to translate it into the Dutch De nagelate schriften.

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Meyer Like van den Enden and Bouwmeester, Meyer was committed to making knowledge available to the people. He was very committed to the idea of translating works into the vernacular and showing that the Dutch language was appropriate for scholarship. In 1654 he edited the second edition of a dictionary which he renamed L. Meyer's Woorden-schat. His substantially updated version of the dictionary (originally written by J. Hofman) was in edition for over 50 years.81 Like van den Enden, Meyer rebuked professionals for preventing the public's acquisition of vast amounts of useful knowledge by using Latin and technical terminology. Meyer saw his dictionary as a means of helping the situation by making technical terms accessible to the people.82 Meyer's own philosophy comes to us from three sources: DeJureEcclesiasticorum, an anonymously published pamphlet believed to be by Meyer;83 Meyer's main publication, the PSSI; and his contribution to the NVA collection on the principles of theatre. De Jure (anonymously published in 1665) claims that only secular power has legitimate public authority. He denies any scriptural basis for ecclesiastical authority, whether spiritual or worldly. He says that any such authority, or indeed property, claimed by the churches or attributed to them is appropriated 'unjustly and in an impious manner'.84 Some saw this tract as a prelude to the TTP and Spinoza's view that the magistrates' power derives from the people and the authority of the clergy from the magistrate, therefore making the ultimate source of any clerical power the people themselves. 5 Meyer's main work, the PSSI, was published anonymously one year later. Meyer sees himself as applying Descartes' method of doubt to theology: ... I have embarked on this work, following in Descartes' footsteps and trying to find out whether, by acting the part of theologian and rejecting in theology whatever can be rejected as doubtful and uncertain, one can arrive at some basic principle which cannot be rejected without involving the total collapse and rejection of theology in its entirety, something that would be the basic principle and foundation of all theological teaching.86 His hope is to find a new method, which leads to the infallible interpretation of Scripture, for the lack of such a certain interpretation is the cause of all of the errors and discord in theology.87 There are three parts to the book. In the first section, Meyer advances and demonstrates his thesis that philosophy is the proper interpreter of Scripture. The second section defends his thesis from objections, and the third

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section argues against his opponents' views that (1) the Church, priests, councils and Pope are the infallible norm for the interpretation of Scripture (held by the Catholics) and (2) Scripture is its own interpreter (held by the Reformed). The first view relies on authority as the arbiter of truth. Meyer alludes to the common early modern arguments against such appeals to authority and goes on to show historical examples of errors and contradictions by the Church and its Popes. The second view, which Meyer deals with at greater length, is problematic because it does not take into account the nature of language. Sentences are made up of words, which are the marks and signs of concepts and things. Further, 'the denotation of every word, and therefore the meaning of the sentence, owes its origin not to Nature but to human convention, and continues to depend on the usage of mankind, in whom is vested the control, the right and norm of language'.89 We learn the meaning of words from speaking and listening or from dictionaries: So when the Reformed maintain that some passages of Holy Scripture are clear and perspicuous through themselves, they cannot mean the sort of perspicuity whereby the principles of the sciences, commonly referred to as basic and common notions, are said to be clear through themselves. For the latter are understood by the natural light without any proof, which cannot be the case with the former, as we have just demonstrated.90 Meyer admits his position leads to a pointed question: ... if philosophy is the norm of interpretation of the Holy Writings in the way we have maintained, the Holy Writings themselves appear to be useless, written and transmitted to us in vain. For if the truths of all the meanings of Scripture, to be elicited and investigated with the help of philosophy, ought to be clear before they were elicited and investigated, what need is there to have recourse to Scripture and to consult it, in order to extract and learn these truths? ... So since in this way, Scripture serves neither to teach truth nor to establish it, it seems to be of no use. Meyer's answer is that Scripture has a very important use: it inspires the reader to think about things that he otherwise might not have. It urges the reader 'towards ideas which he already possesses in his mind in clear and distinct form, to contemplate what is denoted by the words in those books, to compare them and to see whether one is included in or connected with another'. This is where philosophy comes in - to show how 'the predicate is in agreement with the subject, and that the truth of a statement may be extracted, and at the same time its true sense elicited and deduced.' QO

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In a way, what Meyer is offering is a new twist to the Cartesio-Cocceian view that no conclusions of the true philosophy can contradict theology. Just as van den Enden did not think De la Court's Radical Cartesianism went far enough, Meyer thought van Velthuysen's fell short. Meyer goes much farther, in effect, completely merging theology into philosophy. 4 Meyer realizes that he is staking out a new position on the very issue that divides the Christian world: But - and this is the main point - it is not some trivial dogma of no particular importance in religion that is here made public and discussed, but one of such weight that it undoubtedly has a premier role in Christianity next to the authority of the Holy Writings. It is the foundation and base on which rest all the other articles of faith and morals, from which they originate and derive at their source. Since we have shown that on this point all the Churches we know of that adhere to Christ go wildly astray and are far distant from the truth, it must surely happen that some, acknowledging and discarding their error and embracing the truth we have demonstrated will change their opinion; but others who, for the sake of gain or honour, or impelled by hope or blind zeal or obstinacy, cling tenaciously to opinions they have received, will fiercely resent what I say.95 Meyer was right to suspect negative reaction. The PPSI caused quite an uproar throughout the Dutch Republic, indeed throughout Europe - especially in Germany and the Baltic and to a lesser extent in Italy and England among the Cambridge Platonists.96 Everyone wanted to know the name of the author and many wrongly attributed it to van Velthuysen (as we saw in Chapter 2) or Spinoza. Leibniz recounts the controversy in his Theodicy(\7lO): ... I remember that when in 1666 Louis Meyer, a physician of Amsterdam, published anonymously the book entitled Philosophia Scripturae Interpret (by many persons wrongly attributed to Spinoza, his friend) the theologians of Holland bestirred themselves, and their written attacks upon this book gave rise to great disputes among them. Divers of them held the opinion that the Cartesians, in confuting the anonymous philosopher, had conceded too much to philosophy ... Afterwards in Holland people spoke of'rational' and 'non-rational' theologians, a party distinction often mentioned by M. Bayle, who finally declared himself against the former. But there is no indication that any precise rules have yet been defined which the rival parties accept or reject with regard to the use of reason in the interpretation of Holy Scripture.97

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The Cartesio-Cocceians are the 'rationalist theologians' that Liebniz speaks of, the Voetians the 'non-rational'. The PPSI was denounced by Cartesians such as van Velthuysen and Regius in an attempt to dissociate it from Cartesianism. It was also denounced by the Voetians as just another example of heretical Cartesian ideas. The book was condemned throughout the Dutch Republic and often listed as one of the period's four most pernicious works, the other three being Hobbes' Leviathan, Spinoza's TTP and Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum." Our final source of Meyer's ideas is his contribution to the NVA's Instruction in the Poetics of Drama. Meyer wrote Chapter 30: 'On the Passions'. In this chapter, Meyer defines the passions as 'abnormal motions of the heart, caused by the notions of good or evil and perceived by the soul'.100 This view allows for interaction between the mind and body. A perception in the soul of something as 'good' or 'evil' causes the passions or irregular motions of the heart, which are then themselves perceived by the soul. Notice that what is important is the perception, not the reality, of good or evil. Further, Meyer equates 'good' with 'useful' and 'evil' with 'harmful'. This was not received wisdom in the seventeenth century and one only finds these ideas in unconventional writings such as those of Hobbes and Spinoza.101 Like Descartes, Meyer divides the passions into those arising from aversion and those arising from enjoyment.102 However, Meyer's classification is much more elaborate than Descartes'.103 After categorizing the passions, Meyer goes on to apply this modern theory of the passions (greatly influenced by Descartes and Hobbes) to theatre. Here he is departing from the ongoing tradition of appealing to Aristotle's Poetics and Rhetoric. Just as the new philosophy was revolutionizing science, philosophy, politics and theology, it should change the way we view literature as well. For a new theory of the emotions should be the starting point for thinking about the passions in literature.104 Where the ancients limited themselves to pity and indignation, the modern theatre has introduced rewards for the virtuous and punishments for the wicked. Now audiences can leave the theatre in joy, rather than sadness.105 Further, by introducing the audience to causal stories linking virtue with reward and vice with punishment, theatre can teach people in a pleasant way.

Spinoza's Collegiant Friends While Jelles and Balling hold religious beliefs that would prevent them from accepting many of Spinoza's ideas (for example, they rejected Spinoza's 1 C\f\ immanent God and were committed to the world's creation ), they

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maintained that Cartesianism and Spinozism were consistent with Christian faith. This is the central theme to their writings. For example, in the preface that Jelles wrote for Spinoza's De nagelate schriften, he denies that Spinoza was an atheist, refuting Christian objections to Spinoza's philosophy and citing many biblical passages in order to provide a scriptural foundation for a rationalistic religion. Jelle's own rationalistic Protestantism focused on the inner life of the soul and on the role of reason in attaining truth and salvation. He saw Spinoza's epistemology and intellectual love of God as consistent with his own religious views. In his own work, the Belydenisse des algemeenen en christelyken Geloofs, vervattet in een Brief ann JV.JV. (Confession of the Public and Christian Belief in a letter to JVJV.), Jelles provides a theology quite similar to that found in Spinoza's TTP. For instance, he stresses inner religious experience as opposed to both belief based on external authority and outward religious ceremony.107 We find both of these in Spinoza. Notice the Collegiant-like language that Spinoza uses in the TTP: This, then, was the object of the ceremonial law, that men should do nothing of their own free will, but should always act under external authority, and should continually confess by their actions and thoughts that they were not their own masters, but were entirely under the control of others. From all these considerations it is clearer than day that ceremonies have nothing to do with a state of blessedness ... (TTP V, 76, my emphasis). As stated earlier, it is very difficult to know who was influencing whom and to what extent. It is not clear when Jelles started writing the Confession, but we know that he sent a draft of it to Spinoza in 1673108 (three years after the publication of the TTP), and that it was published in 1684 with that letter (the letter to N.N.) as a dedication. In any case, there are clear similarities between Collegiant ideology and Spinoza's philosophy. For Spinoza's Collegiant friends were speaking about religious salvation in rationalistic terms quite similar to Spinoza's own account of intellectual love of God. For instance, Jelles' Confession lays out three stages in salvation: liberation, truth, and free will.109 One must first obtain a negative freedom from external compulsion (e.g., from oppressive governments) in order to exercise their free will. Then one must have knowledge of God or Christ (understood as eternal reason) in order to experience true freedom. Here we see Jelles adopting a Spinozistic (as opposed to Cartesian) understanding of the will. Willing is not a separate activity from knowing. It does not involve desire but is rather the power to affirm or deny. As H.J. Siebrand puts it:

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The only desire the will can entertain is to will the good and true things, which is effected by its immediate cause, viz. the grace of God or the power of Christ. So, in fact, Jelles pictures human life as the sphere of inarticulate actions as long as the divine clarity of natural light has not broken through.110 There are other similarities between the ideas of Spinoza and Jelles. For instance, both thinkers stress the moralizing role of Scripture (as opposed to a source of sectarian dogmas) and vehemently defend religious tolerance.111 Further, both identify the Spirit of Christ with God's wisdom or the 'idea of God'112 and speak of the Son of God as intellect and clear and distinct understanding, known only through the light of reason or the inner light.113 While there are several important similarities between the ideas of Jelles and Spinoza, it is on the exact role of philosophy in biblical interpretation that they differ. Both reject the view of philosophy as the handmaiden to theology and support the new status of philosophy via Cartesianism. However, they disagree as to the role philosophy has in religious matters. Here we see Jelles taking sides with Meyer. While Jelles is similar to Spinoza in stressing the moralizing quality of the Bible, he still thinks of the Bible as a source of truth. As such, the truth that we discover through philosophy should also be found in the Bible. Philosophy then becomes a means of interpreting Scripture. Spinoza, on the other hand, thinks that Scripture is to be interpreted by Scripture alone.115 As we will discuss in the next chapter, Spinoza understands the revelation of Scripture to be of a different nature than the teachings of philosophy in that the first are in the realm of imagination whereas the second are in the realm of reason. Jelles' ideas are very similar to Balling's which were anonymously published much earlier in The Light Upon the Candlestick (1662), a work that was later published together with Jelles' Confession. Scholars generally accept this work to be the first 'Spinozan' publication.116 It quotes almost literally from the KV (probably written two years earlier). This work encourages the reader to turn to the light within: We direct thee then to look within thyself; that is, that thou oughtest to turn into, to mind, and have a regard unto that, which is within thee, viz., the light of truth, the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into the world. Here it is that thou must be and not without thee. Here thou shalt find a principle certain and infallible, and whereby increasing and going on therein, thou mayest at length arrive unto a happy condition .. ,117 (my emphasis).

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Balling explicitly equates this light with Christ, the Spirit and the Word and defines it as 'a clear and distinct knowledge of truth in the understanding of every man, by which he is so convinced of the being and quality of things, that he cannot possibly doubt thereof'.11B This light brings individuals into a 'union with God, wherein all happiness and salvation do consist'. This light is the basis of all religion and has preeminence above Scripture.120 This light (and therefore philosophy) is the judge of Scripture and shows it to be divine because it expresses the truth known through the natural light.121 It is the senses, the memory of the senses and the passions they cause which prevent us from seeing this inner light of reason. We must therefore be steadfast in turning our attention away from the senses and towards the mind. Here we see a divide in the Amsterdam Circle; while van den Enden, Meyer and Bouwmeester were empiricists, Spinoza, Jelles and Balling argued for rationalist methodologies in the search for wisdom. Before moving on to Spinoza's Radical Cartesianism, I again want to stress the difficulty of determining lines of influence within this group and particularly caution against the assumption that Jelles and Balling were merely followers of Spinoza. While it is most likely that Jelles' Confession draws on the TTP and Balling's Light Upon the Candlestick is clearly influenced by the KV, we must remember that these works are largely expressing Collegiant ideas that Jelles and Balling held long before Spinoza entered the picture. After all, remember that Jelles turned away from the market to engage in the life of the mind much earlier than did Spinoza. While it is significant that Jelles and Balling came to understand and express their Collegiant beliefs in Cartesian and Spinozistic terms, nevertheless, it is also significant that Spinoza occasionally adopts Collegiant language and concerns. To put it bluntly, while the biblical hermeneutics in the TTP may seem a strange preoccupation for the Spinoza imagined by contemporary scholars who focus primarily on his Ethics, they make much more sense given the context of his times and the interests of his closest associates. After studying the various members of the Amsterdam Circle and the ideas circulating among them, we come to see that Spinoza was directly exposed to Radical Cartesian discussions throughout his entire philosophical career on issues ranging from politics to theatre to biblical interpretation. Further, the Amsterdam Circle understood these topics to involve important epistemological issues concerning the method for attaining wisdom, the role of experience and imagination and the potential of the multitude, topics on which they did not always agree.

Chapter 4

Spinoza's Radical Cartesianism

Introduction It is significant that Spinoza's political works were written immediately before and after his completion of the Ethics. He was making a concerted effort to make sure that his metaphysical and epistemological system provided the foundations for his political commitments. One might think that it went the other way - that he created his metaphysical system first and then figured out which political views resulted. However, there are two reasons to think that this is not the case. First, the central doctrines of the TTP and the Political Treatise (TP) are all found in earlier Radical Cartesian writings. Spinoza was quite familiar with these ideas from his early days with van den Enden and the Amsterdam Circle and his familiarity with the works of van Velthuysen and De la Court. Second (and the focus of the second part of this book), Spinoza's epistemological and underlying metaphysical systems undergo a great deal of change throughout his philosophical career. Some of the most significant changes occur for the first time in the Ethics itself. These changes not only occur when Spinoza begins to write his political theory but are central to his political system. Further, the metaphysics and epistemology from Spinoza's earlier works - unlike that of the Ethics -just don't have what it takes to ground his politics. It is therefore reasonable to see the development of Spinoza's metaphysical and epistemological systems as part of an overall Radical Cartesian project. This approach will help us see how various aspects of his mature system fit together, providing us with a better overall understanding of Spinoza's philosophy and some of its lesser-known influences.

The Chronology of Spinoza's Political Writings We know from his correspondence that Spinoza interrupted his work on the Ethics in order to write the TTP. At this point, he had just finished Books I and II containing his mature metaphysics and epistemology, which form

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the basis of the hermeneutics and politics found in the TTP. By 1665, he had already developed the main project of the TTP, as he was able to describe it in some detail to Oldenburg (Ep. 30, 185-86). This work argued tha freedom of thought does not harm the stability and security of the state, but in fact, it enhances and strengthens its well-being. He published the TTP anonymously in 1670. During 1674 and 1675, Spinoza turned his attention back to the Ethics, preparing it for publication.1 However, that was not to happen. After seeing the great scandal his TTP caused, he decided not to publish the Ethics during his lifetime. After all, the Court of Holland censored the TTP as a danger to religion and to the church and threatened severe punishment to anyone found to be involved in its printing, distribution or sale.2 Spinoza began his second political work, the Political Treatise (TP), sometime in 1675 or 1676 - after completing books III-V of the Ethics. By 1676 he already had the first six chapters done, as he describes them to a friend in Letter 84. The main purpose of the TP is to argue that liberal democracy is the best form of government. His argument was to build on his mature account of human psychology and human nature given in books III-V of the Ethics? The TP discusses monarchy and aristocracy, but unfortunately for us, Spinoza died before finishing the section on democracy.

Spinoza's Political Writings within the Radical Cartesian Movement Spinoza's library contained works by both van Velthuysen and De la Court4 and both writers had a significant impact on his philosophy. For instance, Spinoza's rejection of teleology is largely a reaction to van Velthuysen's view that God created humans for some purpose. Prior to van Velthuysen, philosophers used teleology in practical morality to form rules for behaviour from the perspective of an ultimate goal or final cause. They held that humans had a duty to do whatever furthered God's purpose for them. Van Velthuysen altered this view. He believed that God gave humans the means necessary to further his purpose for them, i.e., reason and the natural appetites. However, while these are necessary, they are not sufficient to guide practical behaviour. The primary criterion for practical morality is the fundamental law of self-preservation. In other words, van Velthuysen saw both final and efficient causes at work. Spinoza took this thinking one step further. He eliminated final cause altogether. Spinoza discredits final causes by pointing out their ideological function in ordinary behaviour. People appeal to final causes out of ignorance.3 When people

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understand the true causes of things they understand that they are part of Nature and that they are caused to exist and act in a certain determined way. God, or Nature, does not have a special plan or place for humans. Our actions and state of affairs are caused by an infinite series of efficient causes, just as are all parts of Nature. What separates Spinoza's political philosophy from that of other Radical Cartesians, particularly De la Court, is not content, but quality.6 Spinoza's contribution is not that he came up with innovative political doctrines, but rather that he provided the first, and best, systematization of the central tenets that were already held by Radical Cartesians: (1) The method for attaining truth and wisdom is based on reason; (2) The social nature of human beings is an outcome of the more fundamental drive towards selfpreservation; (3) Salvation is intimately connected with knowledge and requires the development of reason; and (4) Preservation of the state requires the rule of reason. This chapter will discuss each of these doctrines as they are found in Spinoza's writings. Method One of the central ideas of the Radical Cartesian political movement is that reason, rather than external authority (such as the church or state), is the true source of wisdom. In Chapter 2 we saw van Velthuysen pave the way by allowing that reason was a source of wisdom compatible with (but not replacing) the wisdom found in the Bible. Further, reason was an important (though not the only) tool for the interpretation of Scripture. Even though he allowed that some of the teachings of the Bible were beyond reason, he was very much opposed to having the power to interpret Scripture in the hands of the state or theologians (particularly the Voetians). Meyer was willing to go further, arguing that all the wisdom found in Scriptures could be found through reason alone. The purpose of Scripture (which is written in a way that is accessible to the masses) is to draw people's attention towards the clear and distinct truths already present in their minds, which could only be accessed through reason. Balling and Jelles held views very similar to Meyers, but spoke of reason in Collegiant terms as the inner light. An important component of this doctrine is the relation between philosophy and religion, in particular, between the disciplines of philosophy and theology. All of the Radical Cartesians defended philosophy as more than the handmaiden of theology. They rejected the traditional view of philosophy as a preparatory subject and saw it as a discipline with its own inherent value. Spinoza too accepted this new, elevated status of philosophy. According to him, philosophy and theology are completely distinct in purpose,

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basis and method. They have nothing in common, do not intrude on each other, and are not ancillary to one another (TTP pr, 7). However, Spinoza's argument differs from his Radical Cartesian friends. He insists that the purpose of philosophy is to find truth and wisdom whereas the purpose of theology is to instil piety and obedience: For the power of reason, as we have already demonstrated, does not extend so far as to enable us to conclude that men can achieve blessedness simply through obedience without understanding, whereas this alone is the message of theology, which commands only obedience and neither seeks nor is able to oppose reason. As we showed in the last chapter, theology defines its religious dogmas only so far as suffices to secure obedience, and it leaves it to reason to decide exactly how these dogmas are to be understood in respect of truth; for reason is in reality the light of the mind, without which the mind sees nothing but dreams and fantasies (TTP 15, 174). The basis of philosophy is universally valid axioms and must be derived only through the study of Nature. Theology, on the other hand, is based on history and language and must be derived only from Scripture and revelation (TTP 14, 169). Van Velthuysen, Meyer, Balling and Jelles did not see the Bible in this way. They did think that the Bible contained truths, though truths always consistent with those learned through reason. Spinoza agreed that reason and Scripture were consistent but from his point of view, this was because religion does not deal with truths but with obedience and acts as a guide for how one ought to live. When Scripture is properly understood, it does not contradict what reason tells us about living the good life (TTP pr, 6), for all tenets of religion boil down to the following: That there is a Supreme Being who loves justice and charity, whom all must obey in order to be saved, and must worship by practising justice and charity to their neighbor (TTP 14, 167). In other words, the teaching of religion consists entirely in loving God above all and in loving one's neighbour as oneself (TTP 14, 164 and TTP 12, 155). As we will see, Spinoza's philosophy concludes that the best means to human blessedness (i.e., loving God intellectually or knowing the true nature of God) is to live well with other people and to act so as to help them further their chances of human blessedness. Living sociably with other humans is necessary not only to our survival, but to the ultimate form of self-preservation - love of and union with God. And so the moral teachings of religion and philosophy are in complete agreement (TTP 15, 176).

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Notice that Spinoza, like van Velthuysen, considers morality to be within the domain of philosophy, not religion (TTP 19, 229). Religion is about obedience, and blind obedience at that, not virtue: For love of God is not obedience but a virtue necessarily present in a man who knows God aright, whereas obedience has regard to the will of him who commands, and not to necessity and truth. Now since we do not know the nature of God's will, while we are quite certain that everything that happens comes to pass from God's power alone, it is only from revelation that we can know whether God wishes to receive honour from men like some temporal ruler. Furthermore, we have shown that the divine commandments appear to us as commandments or ordinances only as long as we do not know their cause. Once this is known, they cease to be commandments, and we embrace them as eternal truths, not as commandments; that is, obedience forthwith passes into love, which arises from true knowledge by the same necessity as light arises from the sun. Therefore by the guidance of reason we can love God, but not obey him: for by virtue of reason we can neither accept divine commandments as divine while not knowing their cause, nor can we conceive God as a ruler enacting laws (TTP 16, 248-19). Religion is, in a sense, about blind obedience because it does not know the causes of things. One does something because God commanded it. Such obedience is important to the welfare of the state, but it is not virtue (TTP 14, 168). Philosophy, on the other hand, teaches why one should be virtuous: because it is in our best interest - not because of some eternal reward or punishment, but because virtue is a reward in itself. Virtue is an increase in our power. Spinoza's views on the relationship between philosophy and religion rest on the distinction he makes between three kinds of knowledge. As we will see in Chapters 5 to 7, this distinction undergoes some changes throughout Spinoza's lifetime with its earliest version coming straight out of van den Enden's Free Political Propositions.8 For now, though, let us look at his mature view, for this is the view found in his political works: 1.

Imagination or opinion: This type is not certain and is the only cause of falsity. 2. Reason: This type is certain and is a necessary step in order to attain intuition. It consists of the common notions. 3. Intuition: This type is certain and is the immediate union of the mind with its object.

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Spinoza makes it very clear that religion consists in the first kind of knowledge. Revelation occurs through images alone and is therefore not certain (TTP 1, 13 and TTP 2,23). That is to say, prophets perceive the revelations of God with the help of the imagination. Because of this, they may perceive things that go beyond the limits of the intellect: For many more ideas can be constructed from words and images than merely from the principles and axioms on which our entire natural knowledge is based (TTP 1, 21). Further, the teachings of the prophets are in the form of parables, allegories, and are expressed in corporeal form because these are at the level of imagination and this is the level of knowledge at which the multitude functions (TTP 1, 21). Scripture does not explain things through their natural causes. Rather, 'it only relates to those events that strike the imagination employing such method and style as best serves to excite wonder, and consequently to instil piety in the minds of the masses.' (TTP 6, 80). The fact that religion functions at the level of imagination does not make it unimportant. On the contrary, its importance is exactly that it speaks to the masses: I wish to emphasise in express terms - though I have said it before - the importance and necessity of the role that I assign to Scripture, or revelation. For since we cannot perceive by the natural light that simple obedience is a way to salvation, and since only revelation teaches us that this comes about by God's singular grace which we cannot attain by reason, it follows that Scripture has brought very great comfort to mankind. For all men without exception are capable of obedience, while there are only a few - in proportion to the whole of humanity - who acquire a virtuous disposition under the guidance of reason alone. Thus, did we not have this testimony of Scripture, the salvation of nearly all men would be in doubt (TTP 15, 177-8). In other words, if it were not for religion, very few people would act virtuously. While it is better to be virtuous for the sake of virtue alone, it is better to act virtuously out of obedience than not at all. Since the masses are incapable of becoming virtuous through reason alone, religion is a very important means to the functioning of the state. Spinoza says that it is no wonder that the prophets, who considered the common advantage, commended humility, repentance and reverence. When people are subject to these affects they can be guided far more easily than others. In a good state, where the sovereign rules and guides its people

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according to reason, the people ultimately live under the guidance of reason and can become free and enjoy the life of the blessed (E IV P54 S, 576). Nevertheless, we must keep in mind the nature of religion so that we do not confuse it with philosophy. Spinoza warns against accepting everything in Scripture as being the universal and absolute teaching about God. We must keep in mind at all times that Scripture is adapted to the understanding of the masses. Therefore we must take special care so as not to confuse the beliefs of the masses with divine doctrine (TTP 14, 163). For natural divine laws are universal. They are among the common notions, i.e., the realm of reason. They do not require belief in historical narratives. These laws do not enjoin ceremonial rites or actions whose explanation goes beyond human understanding (TTP 4, 53). While religion functions at the level of opinion, philosophy functions at the level of reason. It is concerned with natural divine laws. According to Spinoza, all things, humans included, are determined to act and exist in a definite way by God's essence: Knowing that all things are determined and ordained by God and that the workings of Nature follow from God's essence, while the laws of Nature are God's eternal decrees and volitions, we must unreservedly conclude that we get to know God and God's will all the better as we gain better knowledge of natural phenomena and understand more clearly how they depend on their first cause, and how they operate in accordance with Nature's eternal laws (TTP 6, 76). Philosophy investigates the causes of things. All causes are necessary and this necessity is nothing other than God's eternal nature. It is the nature of reason to regard things under this species of eternity (E II P44 G2, 481). Here Spinoza, like van Velthuysen, is equating natural necessity with God's decree and making reason the means to know that natural necessity. I will discuss intuition, the third kind of knowledge, later on in this chapter. For now it suffices to say two things. First, human blessedness is intuition, i.e., it is the union of the mind with the greatest object: God. Second, the greatest striving of the mind is to know things by the third kind of knowledge and this striving cannot arise from imagination, but only from reason or from intuition itself (E V P25 and P26, 608-609). Before moving on to the second Radical Cartesian doctrine, let us pause to examine Spinoza's elitism, which, as we saw in Chapter 3, is a source of disagreement among him and other members of the Amsterdam Circle. Recall that van den Enden considers God's voice to be the voice of the people. We can now understand why Spinoza rejects this view. Spinoza believes

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that the masses are controlled entirely by emotions and appetites, not reason (TTP 17, 193 and TP 2,43). Very few people can achieve the path taught by reason (TP 1, 36). Spinoza agrees with van den Enden that the humanist ideal of virtue is to be rejected, that is, they both reject the view that virtue is the result of good breeding and manners. Spinoza thinks that the higher classes are just as capable of being slaves to their passions as the lower classes.9 All the same, the majority of people will never be entirely free of that bondage. This fact is the reason that Spinoza is so cautious about who sees his work. He does not want it circulated among those who are prejudiced by superstition, emotions and ignorance, that is, those who are incapable of true understanding. Therefore, he writes his works in Latin, requests that his works not be translated into Dutch, and, after seeing the reception of the TTP, decided not to publish the Ethics. Van den Enden, Meyer, Bouwmeester, Jelles and Balling all write their works in Dutch and have a great respect for the masses. (The first three are empiricists and see all people as capable of reaching wisdom through their experiences, whereas Jelles and Balling are rationalists who view the masses as capable of reason.) Despite Spinoza's differences with the empiricist members of the Amsterdam Circle, he agrees with them that if one wants to teach the people of a nation, not to say the whole of humankind, then one ought to rely entirely on appeal to experience, not logic. For otherwise, Spinoza says, they will not understand (TTP 5, 67-8). This is exactly what van den Enden and the Amsterdam Circle did. One of the main ways they disseminated their Radical Cartesian political ideas was through theatre, what they saw as the classroom of the masses. Sociability is the Outcome of Self-Preservation

The second doctrine of the Radical Cartesian political movement is that the social nature of human beings is an outcome of the more fundamental drive towards self-preservation. As we saw in Chapter 2, van Velthuysen adopts Hobbes' notion of self-preservation as the foundation of the state, understanding 'self-preservation' in spiritual, as opposed to merely physical, terms. Further, van Velhuysen adds a moral dimension and links selfpreservation to knowledge of God. De la Court continues in this tradition, reducing all explanations of human behaviour to self-interest and using this foundational principle of human nature to generate his notion of the common best, which in turn supports his arguments for religious and economic freedoms. Van den Enden takes these ideas even further, expanding the notion of 'common best' beyond the interests of the merchant class, to include all citizens. Spinoza clearly follows this tradition.

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According to Spinoza, all things, including humans, strive to persevere in their existence. In order to survive, humans must come together and form a society. Without mutual aid, people would not have the time and skill to support and preserve themselves to the greatest possible extent (TTP 5, 64). And so people come together by giving up the rights they have in the state of nature and agreeing to obey the laws of the state. Spinoza claims that if people desired only what is prescribed by true reason, then society would not need any laws: Nothing would be required but to teach men true moral doctrine, and they would then act to their true advantage of their own accord, wholeheartedly and freely. But human nature is far differently constituted. All men do, indeed, seek their own advantage, but by no means from the dictates of sound reason. For the most part the objectives they seek and judge to be beneficial are determined only by fleshy desire, and they are carried away by their emotions, which take no account of the future or of other considerations (TTP 5, 64). Therefore society needs government and coercion; it needs laws to control and restrain the people's lusts and urges (TTP 5, 64). The laws must be set up so that, whether they will it or not, people act in the interests of the common welfare. To the extent that men are subject to the passions, they do not agree in nature and are in fact enemies (E IV P32, 561-62 and TP 43). This is the situation in the state of nature. Like Hobbes, Spinoza thinks that people in the state of nature have the right to do whatever they perceive to further their preservation, as long as they have the power to do so1 and that as long as they do not use reason to determine what will best preserve themselves (i.e., peace or the formation of the state) they will live in a state of constant war with one another. * l However, unlike Hobbes, Spinoza does not characterize people as free in the state of nature. According to Hobbes, people are free in the state of nature in the sense that they have no obligation to refrain from doing what their passions dictate. The situation is different in the commonwealth, where people give up rights in order to attain peace and are obliged to obey civil laws, which Hobbes characterizes as 'artificial chains'.13 Spinoza, on the other hand, does not see living according to one's passions and inclinations as a form of liberty, but rather the worst kind of bondage. In the state of nature one is a complete slave to her passions and is thus unable to see what is truly in her interest. Spinoza, therefore, does not see civil law as a type of bondage to endure in order to preserve oneself. Rather, he sees it as a (necessary, but not sufficient) means to escape the chains of the passions.

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In order to be free from the passions, humans must unite together and form a state: In order to achieve a secure and good life, men had necessarily to unite in one body. They therefore arranged that the unrestricted right naturally possessed by each individual should be put into common ownership, and that this right should no longer be determined by the strength and appetite of the individual, but by the power and will of all together. Yet in this they would have failed, had appetite been their only guide (for by the laws of appetite all men are drawn in different directions), and so they had to bind themselves by the most stringent pledges to be guided in all matters only by the dictates of reason (which nobody ventures openly to oppose, lest he should appear to be without capacity to reason) and to keep appetite in check insofar as it tends to another's hurt, to do to no one what they would not want done to themselves, and to uphold another's right as they would their own (TTP 16, 181). For Spinoza it is imperative that the state be ruled by reason. It is impossible for a people to be guided as if by one mind, which is required in a state, unless the laws are prescribed by reason (TP 2, 46). For men agree in nature to the extent that they live according to reason. Therefore, they are most useful to each other when they seek their own advantage (E IV P35 C2,563). A person governed by reason wants nothing for herself that she does not desire for other people (E IV PI8 S, 556). This is because the greatest good of those who seek virtue is to know God and this is a good that can be possessed equally by all people insofar as they are of the same nature (E IV P36 d, 564). Notice that the difference between Spinoza and Hobbes hinges on a very different notion of self-preservation. Hobbes is concerned with the physical preservation of the body while Spinoza, in Radical Cartesian fashion, is ultimately concerned with the preservation of the mind, which he sees as importantly related to knowledge of God. Salvation as Knowledge According to Spinoza, the supreme good and greatest virtue of an individual human being is knowledge and love of God (TTP 4, 58; E IV P28, 559). The highest happiness, or blessedness, of a human is that satisfaction of mind that stems from this knowledge. It is here alone that our hope of eternity lies. Spinoza does not believe in personal immortality. Memory and imagination (the first type of knowledge) perish with the body (E V P34 d and S, 611~12). For these perceptions are particular to an individual body that no longer exists. Ideas that we have through the second and third

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type of knowledge, on the other hand, pertain to God's eternal nature and therefore cannot perish. To the extent that we use reason and intuition, our mind will be eternal (E V P38 d, 613). For Spinoza, then, when we act absolutely from virtue, we do nothing more or less than preserve our being by the guidance of reason, from the foundation of seeking one's own advantage (EIVP24,558). We can now see Spinoza's understanding and acceptance of the third doctrine of the Radical Cartesian political movement: that salvation is intimately connected with knowledge and requires the development of reason. We saw this doctrine in van Velthuysen in Chapter 2 and in Balling and Jelles in Chapter 3. Further, even the empiricists van den Enden, Bouwmeester and Meyer see reason as necessary to salvation - their disagreement with the rationalist members of the Amsterdam Circle is about whether the common notions of reason can derive from experience (the first kind of knowledge). According to Spinoza, in order to preserve oneself in the most basic way, that is, in order to survive, one must enter into a society governed by rational laws and obey those laws. That is to say, she must at least agree to live in accordance with reason. In order to preserve herself in the ultimate way, to make her mind eternal, she must completely develop her reason so that her mind understands God's nature through the common notions, and ultimately is able to gain an intuitive understanding of God. Preservation of the State Requires the Rule of Reason

A state, like all things in Spinoza's system, strives to preserve itself. Spinoza treats the state as an individual body and accordingly treats the state as he treats all individual bodies in his metaphysics. As we will see in Chapter 7. Spinoza says that a body remains the same body to the extent that it retains a certain form - that is, a certain ratio of motion and rest among its parts. It is not enough that its parts continue to exist; they must maintain a certain relationship to each other. He gives the famous example of the Spanish poet who suffers a head trauma and, as a result, has amnesia. He cannot remember writing any of his poems or any aspects of his former life. According to Spinoza, the Spanish poet has died and a new person has been born. The relationship of his body's parts (particularly in the brain) have been altered to such an extent that he is no longer the same body. Correspondingly, the relationship among his ideas has been altered to such an extent that he is no longer the same mind or soul. Spinoza treats the state in a similar way. Every state must preserve its own form and cannot be changed without incurring the danger of utter ruin

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(TTP 18, 218). So when Spinoza speaks of the preservation of the state, he does not simply mean that the state avoids dissolution. After all, he says: ... the quarrels and rebellions that are often stirred up in a commonwealth never lead to the dissolution of the commonwealth by its citizens (as is often the case with other associations) but to a change in its form — that is, if their disputes cannot be settled while still preserving the structure of the commonwealth. Therefore, by the means required to preserve a state I understand those that are necessary to preserve the form of the state without any notable change (TP 6, 64). Spinoza calls the constitution the soul of the state. As long as it is preserved, the state is preserved. He tells us that a constitution can only stay intact if it is upheld both by reason and by the sentiment of the people. If the laws depend solely on the support of reason, they are likely to be weak and easy to overthrow (TP 10, 132). In other words, the rule of reason is necessary to the preservation of the state, but not sufficient. Spinoza takes seriously the power of the will of the people. He notes that no matter how good the constitution or organization of a state, in time of crisis people panic. They will turn to any person they perceive as able to deliver them from the crisis and they set that person free from the laws in hope that he will do so. Spinoza seems to be referring to the panic of 1672. William II was appointed stadholder (against current laws, such as the perpetual edict of 1667) because the people were so afraid of an invasion by France. They were disillusioned with De Witt and the States-Party and saw William IPs military victories as a sign of much-needed strength (TP 10, 133). Spinoza makes it clear that there is no sin or injustice in the state of nature. These are results of religion and human law, and only occur in a society. So a person cannot be said to sin or do wrong unless he lives within a society and fails to obey its laws. Ultimately, the wrong that the person does is to oneself, in that by disobeying the laws of the state he is harming something that is necessary to his own preservation (TTP 16, 185-6). He treats the state in a similar fashion. However, the state itself is always in the state of nature. It cannot do wrong in the sense of civil law (TP 4, 60). We cannot speak of the state doing wrong except in the sense that it causes its own downfall — the state does wrong when it does something contrary to the dictates of reason, for it is when it acts from the dictates of reason that it is most fully in control of its own right (TP 4, 50). The sovereign, that is, as it were, the mind of the state, is bound to observe the terms of the contract for exactly the same reason as the person in the state of nature is - so that he not be his own enemy. The sovereign is bound not by civil law, but by the natural law of

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self-preservation. He must take care not to kill himself (TP 4, 60) . This is the only reason that the sovereign is bound to rule according to reason and to consider the needs of the people. Here we hear echoes of De la Court's concerns about the ability of a monarch to secure the stability of a state. If the sovereign is himself ruled by the passions (which De la Court is convinced will necessarily be the case with a single ruler), he will inevitably cause the collapse of the state. Power of the sovereign

The right of the state or of the sovereign (by which Spinoza means the same thing) is nothing other than the right of Nature itself. It is determined by the power not of each individual, but of a people guided as though by one mind ^TP 3, 48). The individual's natural rights are co-extensive with that individual's desire and power. No one is bound by nature to live according to the desires of others. Each person is the guardian of his own freedom. The only way that an individual can part with this right, according to Spinoza, is to transfer his power of self-defence to another. The one to whom each person transfers his right to live as he pleases together with this power of self-defence necessarily retains absolute control over this right. Therefore: Those who hold the sovereignty possess the right over everything that is within their power and are the sole guardians of law and freedom, and that subjects should act in all matters solely in accordance with the sovereign's decree. However, since nobody can so deprive himself of the power of self-defense as to cease to be a human being, I conclude that nobody can be absolutely deprived of his natural rights, and that by a quasi-natural right subjects do retain some rights which cannot be taken from them without imperilling the state, and which therefore are either tacitly conceded or explicitly agreed by the rulers (TTP pr) . There are two important things to note here. First, no human can give up all of her rights. Second, the sovereign has the right to do whatever is in its power, but its power is to some extent limited. Let us look at these two points in more detail. Spinoza says that a state cannot subsist unless its laws are binding on all of the people (TTP 3, 39). Subjects are bound to carry out the orders of the sovereign, whether they agree with them or not - even if the laws are irrational. After all, the citizen must choose between two evils: obeying a bad law or living in the state of nature (TTP 16, 183). Spinoza understands the sovereign as a single mind that guides the body of the state. Consequently,

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the will of the sovereign must be regarded as the will of all. What the state decides is just and good must be held to be so decided by every citizen (TP 3, 50 and 4, 57). Nonetheless, there is no government that is so mighty that the sovereign has unlimited power to do whatever it wishes (TTP 16, 183-4). Spinoza grants that the sovereign in a sense has the right to govern in the most oppressive way and to execute citizens for the most trivial of reasons, but in doing so they are not acting in accordance with reason: Indeed, since they cannot so act without endangering the whole fabric of the state, we can even argue that they do not have the absolute power to do these and other such things, and consequently that they do not have the absolute right to do so. For we have demonstrated that the right of sovereigns is determined by their power (TTP 20, 231). The Role of religion in the state According to Spinoza, religion only acquires the force of law by the decree of the sovereign (TTP 19, 221). Exercises of piety and religious practice must accord with the peace and well-being of the state. Therefore, the sovereign is the interpreter of religion and acts of piety and outward forms of religion are to be determined by him (TTP 19, 219 and 228, and TP 3, 53-4). Moreover, the sovereign is the sole interpreter. Spinoza explains that in matters of religion, people are particularly prone to go astray and to advance ideas of their own making. He argues that if no one were bound by right to obey the sovereign in matters pertaining to religion, the state's right would inevitably depend on judgements and feelings that vary with each individual. The state would be destroyed. To avoid such destruction, the sovereign, who has the duty of preserving and safeguarding the state, has the sole power to make the decisions that it sees fit concerning religion (TTP 16, 189). Here we see a clear departure from the other Radical Cartesians. Spinoza explicitly says (while they explicitly deny) that the state is to be the interpreter of religion/Scripture. This difference is not as remarkable as it first appears when we consider that it is based on their differing assessments of the nature of Scripture. Remember that the other Radical Cartesians see Scripture as containing truth and wisdom, where Spinoza sees it as about mere obedience. Spinoza agrees that the state cannot be the arbiter of truth, but, in his view, making the sovereign the arbiter of religion is not making it the arbiter of truth. Rather, it is increasing its power to rule by instilling the value of obedience on the people.

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Since religion is so useful to the state by teaching obedience and making people easier to rule, it is important that the masses know biblical narratives. However, Spinoza does not think the people are qualified to judge these narratives themselves. They are more disposed to take pleasure in the stories and any strange happenings than the doctrine implicit in them. Therefore, the people need ministers of the church to instruct the masses in a way suited to their limited intelligence (TTP 5, 69). These ministers are to teach religion as the sovereign determines and interprets it. Notice that the sovereign only has the authority to determine the outward forms of religion of his people. The inward worship of God, that is, personal religious belief, is in the sphere of individual right (TTP 19, 558). People cannot give up their right to believe what they may and no government has the power to control the beliefs of its people. A person's faith is to be regarded as pious as long at it is conducive to obedience, not in respect to its truth or falsity (TTP 19, 558). In this way, Spinoza holds on to Jelles' and Balling's Collegiant separation of inner belief from the external authority of the state. Freedom of the people Spinoza stresses that there is a difference between what the sovereign has the right to do and what the sovereign should do in order to direct public affairs in the best way (TP 5, 61). Since the sovereign only has the power of commanding whatever it wills as long as it retains power, it is therefore in the sovereign's interest to avoid doing things that will make it lose power over the people. It behoves the sovereign to consider the public good (TTP 16, 184). A state that governs men by fear will be free of vice, but never endowed with virtue: Men should be governed in such a way that they do not think of themselves as being governed but as living as they please and by their own free will, so that their only restraint is love of freedom, desire to increase their property, and hope of attaining offices of state (TP 10, 132). People should be granted the freedom to say what they think and to interpret the basic tenets of their faith as they think fit (TP 8, 110). Again, they are only to be judged based on their works. This way all people are able to obey God wholeheartedly and freely, and justice and charity are held in universal esteem (TTP pr, 7). This notion applies to philosophy as well as religion. A person's loyalty to the state, just as his devotion to God, can only be known from his works.

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Therefore, the good state grants to each citizen the same freedom to philosophize as is granted in religious belief (TTP 20, 234). Spinoza thinks not only that such freedoms can be granted without endangering piety and the peace of the state, but also that piety and the peace of the state depend on these freedoms (TTP 20, 232-3; TTP pr, 3). He claims that if the sovereign is to retain its full control and not be forced to surrender to agitators, then it must grant freedom of judgement to the people. It must govern so that the conflicting views that its citizens openly proclaim do not hinder them from living in a peaceful society (TTP 20, 236). It is disastrous when governments do otherwise. When a state attempts to deprive its people of their freedom and the beliefs of dissenters are brought to trial: ... the exemplary punishment inflicted on honourable men seems more like martyrdom, and serves not so much to terrorize others as to anger them and move them to compassion, if not to revenge. Upright dealing and good faith are undermined, sycophants and traitors are encouraged, and opponents of freedom exult because their anger has won the day and they have converted the government to their creed, of which they are regarded as interpreters. As a result, they even venture to usurp the government's authority and right, and they unashamedly boast that they have been chosen directly by God and that their decrees are divinely inspired, whereas those of the sovereign are merely human and should therefore give way before divine decrees - that is, their own. Nobody can fail to see that all this is directly opposed to the welfare of the state. (TTP 20, 237-8). Spinoza thinks that any attempt to force people to speak only as prescribed by the sovereign, without regard to their different and opposing opinions, is sure to end in utter failure (TTP 20, 231). People are of such a nature that they are most resentful when the beliefs they take to be true are treated as criminal and when that which motivates their pious conduct to God and man is treated as wickedness. When this happens they are emboldened to denounce the laws and to do anything to oppose the magistrate. They consider it not a disgrace, but an honour, to stir up sedition and to do the most outrageous actions for this cause (TTP 20, 234). According to Spinoza, the real disturbers of the peace are those who vainly seek to abolish freedom of judgement, which cannot be suppressed (TTP 20, 237). Spinoza states that what cannot be prohibited must be allowed, even if some harm were to result (TTP 20, 234). Since he thinks that it is impossible for the mind to be completely under another's control, freedom of judgement must be allowed.

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A government that attempts to tell its people what they should accept as true and false is tyrannical and infringes on its people's natural rights (TTP 20, 236). Natural rights depend on the laws of Nature, as opposed to civil rights, which depend only on the sovereign's decree (TTP 16, 188—9). It is impossible for a person to give up her natural rights just as it is impossible for a person to cease to be human just because she enters into a social contract. Whether a person lives in the state of nature or in a civil order, she acts from the laws of her own nature and has regard for her own advantage. The difference is that in the civil order people fear the same things and they have the same ground for security, i.e., the same way of life. He who has resolved to obey all the laws of the state, whether through fear of its power or love of tranquillity, is doing nothing other than providing for her own security and her own advantage (TP 3, 49). In summary, Spinoza thinks that the sovereign has the right to determine the outward forms of religion of its citizens (religious rites, public practices, etc.), but the sovereign does not have the right nor the power to take away the citizens' right to freedom of judgement. Further, the sovereign best secures the peace of the state (and its own rule) by allowing the citizens to have freedom of expression. The suppression of free speech will inevitably lead to the factions that will result in the downfall of the state. While the attempt to suppress freedom of judgement is most dangerous for the state, the encouragement of this freedom is most beneficial for both the state and its citizens. Freedom of judgement is necessary to foster the sciences and arts (which are of the utmost importance for the well-being of the state) because free and unbiased judgement is necessary to succeed in these fields (TTP 20, 234). Further, the state of blessedness requires most of all a judgment that is independent and free (TTP 7, 106). If any individual citizens are to achieve intellectual love of God, it is necessary that they live in a good society, that is, one that allows freedom of judgement and expression. For Spinoza, then, the ultimate purpose of the state is not to dominate or restrain men by fear and deprive them of their independence. On the contrary, it is to free every man from fear so that he may live a secure life as far as possible, that is, so that he may best preserve his own natural right to exist and act without harming himself or others: It is not, I repeat, the purpose of the state to transform men from rational beings into beasts or puppets, but rather to enable them to develop their mental and physical faculties in safety, to use their reason without restraint and to refrain from the strife and the vicious mutual abuse that are prompted by hatred, anger, or deceit. Thus the purpose of the state is. in reality, freedom (TTP 20, 232 j .

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Such freedom is the central notion of Spinoza's political (and moral) philosophy. Notice that, like De la Court, Spinoza rejects the Hobbesian notion of human freedom. Humans are not free to the extent that they are free to live out their passions. Rather, Spinoza sees freedom as moral freedom, which can only be enjoyed by rational beings. Therefore, the state of nature, where man is ruled by his passions, is not a state of freedom, but of bondage. Society is necessary for humans to break the bondage of the passions. It is only through obedience to its laws that humans can begin to free themselves from the passions.14 By joining together with other people and form ing societies, people not only gain more resources for combating starvation, the elements, and so on, they also gain the tools necessary in order for reason, as well as the sciences and art, to develop. The freest individual is one who lives in a good state and obeys the commands of the sovereign most closely. For, in a good state, the highest law is the welfare of all. Those who obey such rational laws become free from the passions of the state of nature and are able to live their lives according to reason, thus allowing them to pursue the highest from of freedom: intellectual love of God. This highest form of freedom is human blessedness and results from knowing God's nature. It is important to note that the type of freedom that comes from living in a good society is not necessarily the same thing as human blessedness. Living in a rationally structured society is necessary for achieving human blessedness, but it is by no means sufficient. In order to achieve intellectual love of God, one must overcome superstitious beliefs, such as the belief in free will. For if we understand God's nature then we understand that all things necessarily flow from God's nature, including our own thoughts and actions. Everything is caused, that is, everything is determined. Even so, belief in free will may be helpful in getting individuals to behave within society, even though they will be behaving correctly for the wrong reasons. In other words, inadequate ideas can function as ideology and act as a tool for the sovereign. For instance, when people believe that their actions and thoughts are free (contingent) they feel responsible for those actions and thoughts and can be made to feel shame for choosing certain actions (such as not keeping their promises). For example, ideally one keeps one's promises for rational reasons thus understanding that humans are good for each other and that it is in one's interest to do things that promote social cohesion. In a proper state, even if one does not take action for rational reasons some false beliefs can be useful to the extent that they serve the interests of the state. A state that overcomes superstition and does not rely on it to get its citizens to behave is freer than one that does. But a state that encourages

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some superstition in the name of social cohesion is freer than the state of nature in which man is a complete slave to his passions. The goal of the state is to provide its citizens with the necessary conditions to meet their ultimate goal: intellectual love of God, for if its citizens were to reach this goal, the state would be most secure and able to preserve itself. This requires the development of reason and virtue. States develop virtues in its citizens through its institutions. So political virtue and reason are not the primary means to overcome the disruptive private passions. Rather, it is primarily through constitutions that lay out the political institutions and allow them to be stable over time. We can now understand Spinoza's acceptance of the third doctrine of the Radical Cartesian movement: that the goal of the state is self-preservation and this goal requires the rule of reason. Before moving on to the final doctrine, let us note an interesting feature of Spinoza's political philosophy. In order for individuals to become virtuous, they need to live in a society with the institutions in place that will allow them to develop virtue and reason. However, devising such institutions requires the joint operation of passions and reason. It will often require ideology and imagination. The purpose of philosophy is to move from the first kind of knowledge (i.e., passions and imagination) to the second and third kinds of knowledge (reason and intuition). Therefore, the preconditions for philosophy are exactly those that it attempts to overcome. Democracy is the best and most natural form of government

One of the main goals of Spinoza's political writings, particularly the TP, is to argue the fourth tenet of the Radical Cartesian political movement: that democracy is the best and most natural form of government. In the TTP Spinoza tells us that his task is to frame a constitution so that every person, no matter what her character, will set public right before her private advantage (TTP 17, 193). The TTP and TP both examine the various forms of government and conclude that democracy best meets this task. Spinoza discusses three forms of government: monarchy, aristocracy and democracy. They differ in where their sovereignty lies. Sovereignty is possessed by whoever has charge of the affairs of the state. These affairs involve interpreting and repealing laws, fortifying cities, making decisions regarding peace and war, and so on. In the case of monarchy, this charge is in the hands of one person. In aristocracy, it is in the hands of a council that is restricted to certain chosen members (TP 2, 44). A democracy, on the other hand, is 'a united body of men which corporately possess sovereignty over everything within its power' (TP 2, 44). Spinoza describes what the

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best constitution of each form would be, that is to say, he considers it possible to have a decent state under each form. However, he makes it clear that the bestform is absolute democracy. Let us begin by looking at his arguments for why monarchy is not the best form. According to Spinoza, it is the duty of the sovereign to be familiar with the situation and condition of the state, to watch over the common welfare of all of the people, and bring about that which is to the benefit of the majority of its subjects (TP 7, 77-8). A monarchy is not able to do this well. First of all, one man is not capable of sustaining such a heavy load. A pure monarchy is, in Spinoza's estimation, only an illusion. What is thought to be a pure monarchy is actually an aristocracy because the king requires many advisers and assistants to help him carry out his duties. This is an aristocracy of the worst kind because it is a concealed one (TP 6, 65). Second, the interests of the monarch differ from those of the people. Citizens pose a greater danger to the state than its enemies, for there are but a few good men. The king is therefore most afraid of his citizens and strives for his own safety, not consulting the interests of his subjects, but plotting against them, especially the wise and those who hold power through their wealth (TP 6, 66). Further, kings fear that their heirs will commit regicide out of a desire to rule. Kings therefore raise their children so as not to be a threat to them (TP 6, 702). They do not teach them the best manners of statecraft or the means to best meet the people's needs. From all this it follows that the more absolute the transfer of the rights of the people to the king, the less he is in control and the more wretched the life of his subjects (TP 6, 66). A further disadvantage of monarchy is the instability of its very nature. Since the king's will is civil law itself and the king is the commonwealth itself, the death of a king is, in a sense, the death of the state and civil order reverts to natural order subjects (TP 6, 702j. Spinoza says that a people can preserve a considerable degree of freedom if the king's power is determined only by the power of the people and depends on the people for its maintenance (TP 7, 94). In the TP Spinoza lays down a constitution with a mixed monarchy that can meet this requirement. In this constitution, the king has counsellors who acquaint him with current issues, give him advice and act as his deputies. These counsellors are appointed, some from each class of citizens, so that any proposal which receives the majority of votes in this council will be in the interests of the majority of the subjects. The role of the king is simply to settle any disputes in this council and to make rapid decisions when necessary (as in times of war). These rights are the only ones that are transferred from the people to the king. He is not at liberty to make any decrees or judgements against the views of the entire council (TP 7, 79). In this constitution, the king will

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always either ratify the opinion with the most votes or he will reconcile the differing opinions submitted to him. He will do so whether he is motivated by fear of the people, his desire to win over the greater part of an armed populace or a nobility of spirit. Under this constitution the king is most fully sovereign when he has the most regard for the welfare of his people (TP 7, 81—2). For the king is in great danger if he is not desired by his own soldiers or if he angers those most near him. For this reason, the council should be large in number so no particular counsellors will gain so much power as to endanger the king by transferring his sovereignty to another (TP7,83). Even though Spinoza thinks that his proposed monarchy (a mixed form of government) would result in a decent state, he warns The Netherlands against taking up this form. That is to say, he warns Holland of the dangers of bringing back the role of the stadholder. First, Spinoza says that a state cannot temporarily turn into a monarchy without endangering its republican constitution (TP 10, 129). Second, he says that the monarchy that he proposes is only good when established by a free people. A people accustomed to a different form of government will not be able to get rid of the traditional foundations of their state, changing its entire structure, without the greatest danger of overthrowing the entire state (TP 7, 89-90}. All in all, an aristocracy is a much better form of government than a monarchy. Kings are, after all, mortal. Councils, on the other hand, are everlasting. For this reason, an aristocracy never reverts to the people, but. as we discussed earlier, the rule of the king is precarious. The king is subject to illness, old age and death. Further, the will of one man is very changeable and inconsistent. A large council is not (TP 8, 97). A democracy is an even better form of government than an aristocracy. Spinoza explains that people are impatient at being subject to their equals. It is therefore best if the entire population holds the reigns of government as a single body. This way, no one is required to render obedience to his equal (TTP 5, 65). The difference between a democracy and an aristocracy is that in an aristocracy a person is made a patrician solely by the will of the supreme council. In a democracy, all the citizens have a right to vote on who is to be in the supreme council and all citizens have the right to undertake offices of the state (TP 11, 135). Since the people choose and participate in the council, they will not have anger, jealousy or suspicion towards it. A second reason that democracy is better than aristocracy is that it is difficult to take away freedom from people who have already had it. A state should devise laws so that people are influenced not so much by fear as by hope of some good that they urgently desire. In this way the people will be

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eager to do their duty. Aristocracy will have a difficult time doing this if the people are not already used to submitting to the rule of others. In a democracy, it is not a problem because one is equally free no matter how many laws there are because the people rule themselves and are not ruled by another (TTP 5, 65). A democracy has less chance of its government acting unreasonably because it is very unlikely that the majority of a single assembly, if it were of some size would agree upon a ridiculous law (TTP 16, 184). Further, in this form of government those in charge are most dedicated to and most familiar with the needs of the people. In this sense, democracy is absolute sovereignty and therefore the most stable form of government (TP 8, 96—7). Spinoza declares democracy the most natural form of government because it approaches most closely the freedom that Nature grants each person: For in a democratic state nobody transfers his natural right to another so completely that thereafter he is not to be consulted; he transfers it to the majority of the entire community of which he is part. In this way all men remain equal, as they were before in state of nature (TTP 16, 185). Democracy, then, is the form of government most in line with human nature and most able to meet the goal of the state and enable its people to meet their goal: self-preservation. Spinoza's concern with laying out the best form of government is not a mere theoretical exercise. He sees the difficulties in seventeenth-century Holland as resulting from a poor constitution. In response to those who argue for the need of a stadholder and the waste of time inherent in the debates that took place among the aristocratic class during the stadholderless period, Spinoza says: Now if anyone retorts that the state of Holland has not long endured without a count or a deputy to take his place [this was the function of the s tadholders] let him take this for a reply. The Dutch thought that to maintain their freedom it was enough for them to abandon their count and to cut off the head from the body of the state [Philip II of Spain]. The thought of reorganising it in a different form has never entered their minds; they have left all its limbs as they had previously been, so that Holland has remained a county without a count, like a headless body, and the state without a name. So it is not surprising that most of its subjects have not known where its sovereignty lay. And even if this were not so, those who in fact held the sovereignty [the States of Holland/States General] were far too few to be capable of governing the people and suppressing their

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powerful opponents. As a result, the latter have often been able to plot against them with impunity and finally have succeeded in overthrowing them. Therefore the sudden overthrow [in 1672 with the murder of the de Witt brothers] of this same republic resulted not from waste of time in useless deliberations but from the defective constitution of that state and the fewness of its rulers (TP 9, 126). Spinoza accepts the Radical Cartesian political position that the problems with the constitution of The Netherlands are twofold: it is not absolute, and two, it is not representative of the majority of the people. This is precisely the radical nature of this political movement - it not only condemned monarchy but also criticized the government made up of the regent class during the stadholderless period. In arguing for democracy, it went well beyond what either the Orangists or the States-Party had to offer.

A Radical Cartesian System When reading Spinoza as part of the traditional canon it is easy to see novelty in his political ideas, for he seems to voice Enlightenment ideals of liberal democracy and religious toleration well before their day in the sun. When we examine the Radical Cartesian context of his work, we come to see that he did in fact hold extraordinary views for his time, but he was not alone in holding these various views, nor was he the first. As stated earlier, his contribution was to provide the first philosophical system to unite and ground these already existing Radical Cartesian ideas. This system not only unites the politics of De la Court and van den Enden with van Velthuysen's and Meyer's views on the relationship between philosophy and religion and with Balling and Jelles' views on knowledge and salvation, it also grounds these various ideas with a unified metaphysical and epistemological system. This is Spinoza's amazing contribution. When Spinoza's overall project is viewed in this way, we come to see the Ethics, TTP and TP as mature expressions of a unified project and Spinoza's earlier works as attempts to put that difficult puzzle together. From this point of view, Spinoza's earlier 'failed5 attempts can be quite instructive for gaining insight into how Spinoza put the system together and consequently give us a better understanding of that system. I believe that Descartes' metaphor of the tree of knowledge for the unity of knowledge has subconsciously had a great impact on the way scholars have approached Spinoza's corpus. According to Descartes, metaphysics are the roots of the tree. They must be well established before they can provide a strong foundation for the rest of philosophy. Physics is the trunk built upon

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those roots. Medicine, mechanics and morality are fruits of the tree and can only appear after the trunk is firmly in place. This view seems to be confirmed when the Ethics is viewed in isolation: Book I deals with God and metaphysical questions, Book II deals with the associated epistemological issues (with a slight diversion into physics) and the rest of the book goes on to introduce Spinoza's ethical account. We might assume that it is only after this system is in place that Spinoza could turn his attention to politics and that what we find in his political works is an afterthought, a logical outgrowth from the roots, trunk and main branch established in the Ethics. But as we have seen, Spinoza was thinking about politics from his earliest days as a philosopher and epistemological issues were always at the forefront. It is therefore reasonable to think that some of the significant changes that occur in his metaphysics and epistemology were motivated by his attempt to systematize Radical Cartesian politics and to build a complete philosophical system - a consistent and integral account of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and politics. The claim of an intimate connection between Spinoza's epistemology and political theory should not be surprising because his own writings make this connection clear. As we will see in Chapter 6, the goal of Spinoza's epistemology is not to fight off scepticism or to attain certainty. Rather, it is to discover what human blessedness is and how to attain it. The TIE tells us that the human blessedness is knowledge of the union of the mind with the whole of nature and that it can only be attained once a certain type of society is formed (TIE 11). The Ethics picks up on this theme by clarifying four ways that Spinoza's philosophy helps us to attain blessedness (salvation). First, it teaches us that knowledge of God or Nature alone is our greatest happiness or blessedness. This knowledge leads us to do only those things that love and morality advise. For it shows us that virtue is not to be done for the sake of something else. On the contrary, virtue is truly its own reward (E II P49 SIVA, 490). Second, it teaches us to expect and bear calmly both good and bad fortune. For both follow from God's decree with the same necessity as the rules of geometry (E II P49 S IV B, 490). Third, it contributes to social life in that it teaches us not to hate, mock, envy or be angry with other people. It teaches us to be content with what we have and to be helpful to our neighbours 'not from unmanly compassion, partiality, or superstition, but from the guidance of reason, as the time and occasion demand' (E II P49 S IV C, 490). Fourth: ... this doctrine also contributes, to no small extent, to the common society insofar as it teaches how citizens are to be governed and led, not

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so that they may be slaves, but that they may do freely the things that are best(EIIP49SIVD,491). In other words, Spinoza sees his epistemology as showing us four things: the nature of human blessedness, its personal and social advantages, and the kind of state and government that is needed in order for people to attain it. Before examining the developments and changes in Spinoza's philosophy, let us first examine some of the principles that he needed in order to ground his Radical Cartesian politics. Epistemological and Metaphysical Foundations for Spinoza's Political Theory

As we have seen, there are four central tenets to Radical Cartesian politics: 1. The method for attaining wisdom and true knowledge requires reason. 2. The social nature of human beings is an outcome of the more fundamental drive towards self-preservation. 3. Salvation is intimately connected with knowledge and requires the development of reason. 4. Preservation of the state requires the rule of reason. Let us look at each of them in turn. The method for attaining wisdom and true knowledge requires reason

Spinoza founds this doctrine on the equation of natural necessity with God's decree. The TTP tells us that God's decree is nothing other than the chain of natural events (TTP 3, 37). Underlying this equation is Spinoza's identification of will and intellect (God's decree/will is the same as God's intellect) and Spinoza's parallelism between mind and body (the ideas in God are identified with the bodies in Nature). We come to know the true nature of bodies and ideas through reason and ultimately the true nature of God through intuition. Consequently, the means to knowing truth and God is philosophy, not religion, for religion operates at the level of opinion and teaches only obedience. The social nature of human beings is an outcome of the morefundamental drive towards self-preservation

Doctrines 2, 3 and 4 all involve the notion of self-preservation. The Ethics says that all things must strive to preserve themselves:

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... no thing has anything in itself by which it can be destroyed, or which takes its existence away (by P4). On the contrary, it is opposed to everything which can take its existence away (by P5). Therefore, as far as it can, and it lies in itself, it strives to persevere in its being (E III P6 d, 499). This principle of self-preservation is referred to as the conatus. Further, the Ethics tells us what it is for both individual bodies and individual minds to preserve themselves. Individual bodies preserve themselves as long as they maintain a certain relationship among their component parts, i.e., a certain ratio or form. A body does this to the extent that it is free (active), but fails in this task if external bodies overpower it. A human body can only avoid being overpowered by external bodies (e.g., avoid falling victim to the elements or the aggression of others) by joining forces with other humans and forming a state. And so humans, in their desire to preserve themselves, are social. Spinoza's political notion of self-preservation is not new, but his philosophical systematization of it is. This systematization heavily relies on Spinoza's theory of mental individuation. As we will see in Chapter 7, it is Spinoza's parallelism between mind and body that allows him to account for mental individuation by modelling it on his theory of physical individuation. Salvation is intimately connected with knowledge and requires the development of reason According to Spinoza, an individual mind preserves itself by having adequate ideas, which are eternal. Adequate ideas do not perish but have eternal existence in God. To the extent that a human mind has adequate ideas it participates in God's infinity and preserves itself forever. One attains adequate ideas through reason and intuition (for which reason is a prerequisite). Therefore, the means to self-preservation of an individual human is reason. Notice the important role of adequacy. The concept of adequacy is introduced as early as the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (TIE). However, it is not worked out until after the parallelism principle is in place. Only Spinoza's mature notion of adequacy can explain how humans are able to unite to God through knowledge (i.e., to know their union with the whole of nature). For as we will see in Chapter 7, it is not until the Ethics that Spinoza is able to say that an adequate idea represents the object of that idea as it truly exists.

Preservation of the state requires the rule of reason Spinoza treats the state as one individual body.16 The state can best preserve itself or maintain its form of government (the relation among its parts) if the

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sovereign rules with reason. As we have seen, Spinoza thinks that irrational and tyrannical actions of the sovereign will inevitably result in factions and eventually a change in the form of government. This doctrine, like doctrines 2 and 3, depends on Spinoza's notion of physical and mental individuation and identity and therefore relies on the parallelism principle. It is significant that the metaphysical and epistemological foundations for the concepts underlying Spinoza's systematization of Radical Cartesian politics (the parallelism principle, the theory of conatus, the principle of mental and physical individuation and the notion of the adequacy of ideas) are part of Spinoza's mature philosophy of mind, but are lacking (or significantly underdeveloped) in his earlier works. When we examine all of his writings, we find a gradual development of these concepts. It is ironic that while Spinoza's philosophy of mind is original and always differed from that of Descartes, this gradual development takes Spinoza further and further from Descartes' philosophy of mind and yet this development stems from his attempt to systematize views from a political movement that considered itself to be based on Descartes' psychology. The remainder of this book will examine the development of Spinoza's philosophy of mind, dividing it into three periods: Spinoza's early theory of mind (Chapter 5), the transitional works: the TIE and Short Treatise (KV) (Chapter 6), and Spinoza's developed view as found in the Ethics (Chapter?).

Chapter 5

Spinoza's Early Epistemology

Introduction Spinoza's theorizing about error, truth and falsity can be divided into three stages: a 'Cartesian' stage, represented by his Appendix containing Metaphysical Thoughts (CM); the 'transitional' stage, represented by the Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect (TIE) and the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being (KV); and the 'mature' stage, represented by the Ethics. This chapter will examine his 'Cartesian' stage. First, I will lay out Spinoza's account of error in the CM, giving special attention to will and its relationship to intellect. Then I will discuss Spinoza's early understanding of truth and falsity, as well as address the related issues of the role of doubt and clear and distinct ideas in the discovery of true ideas. Before doing so, however, I will address why I do not include the PPG among the above three stages. First, the PPG does not define truth or falsity. Second, while the PPG contains some implicit as well as explicit criticisms of Descartes' philosophy, everything it says about error is faithful to Descartes. According to the PPG, error occurs because we use our free will to assent to things we perceive confusedly. We prevent error by restraining our will so that it only assents to ideas that we perceive clearly and distinctly (PPG I Prol, 235). This means only assenting to ideas that we cannot doubt. Further, error depends solely on the use of the will, for we do not err insofar as we perceive things. We can, for example, perceive a winged horse and not err as long as we do not judge it to exist, that is, as long as our will does not affirm that idea (PPG I PI 5, 257). Notice that this account of error requires that the will be free and that it is in some sense distinct from the intellect. For modes of thinking can be divided into two kinds: 'modes of perceiving (like sensing, imagining, and purely understanding) and modes of willing (like desiring, shunning, affirming, denying, and doubting)' (PPG I PI5, 257). What distinguishes these two faculties is that the will is infinite while the human intellect is finite (PPG I PI 5, 257). This discrepancy provides the conditions for error:

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... we should never fall into error (by PI 4) if either the intellect extended itself as widely as the faculty of willing, or if the faculty of willing could not extend itself more widely than the intellect, or finally, if we could contain the faculty of willing within the limits of the intellect (PPC I PI 5, 257). It is because the will can extend beyond the intellect that we can affirm ideas we do not clearly and distinctly perceive. In addition to providing a Cartesian treatment of error, the PPC remains true to Descartes on two related issues: the method of doubt and the status of clear and distinct ideas. Spinoza summarizes the method of doubt as follows: Descartes, then, in order to proceed as cautiously as possible in the investigation of things, attempted 1. 2. 3. 4.

to lay aside all prejudices, to discover the foundations on which all things ought to be built, to uncover the cause of error, to understand all things clearly and distinctly.

That he might be able to attain the first, second and third of these, he sought to call all things into doubt, not as a Skeptic would, who has no other end than doubting, but to free his mind from all prejudices, so that in the end he might discover firm and unshakeable foundations of the sciences. In this way, if there were any such foundations they could not escape him. For the true principles of the sciences must be so clear and certain that they need no proof, that they are beyond all risk of doubt, and that nothing can be demonstrated without them. And after he had discovered these principles, it was not difficult for him to distinguish the true from the false, to uncover the cause of error, and so to put himself on guard against assuming something false and doubtful as true and certain (PPCIProl,231). Spinoza goes on to explain that the one thing that Descartes was unable to doubt was his own existence, for to doubt one must exist (as a mind): So in whatever direction he turns in order to doubt, he is forced to break out with these words: I doubt, I think, therefore I am. Hence, because he had laid bare this truth, he had at the same time also discovered the foundation of all the sciences, and also the measure and rule of all other truths: Whatever is perceived as clearly and distinctly as that is frw(PPCIProl,233).

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The fact that the PPC remains true to Descartes' position on clear and distinct ideas is significant because Spinoza's other writings - including the CM (as we will see later in this chapter) - do not. A third reason I do not include the PPC among the stages of the development of Spinoza's theories of error and falsity is that in previous correspondence Spinoza rejects some of the things that the PPC says about error. First, we know from Letter 13 that Spinoza wrote Part I of the PPC (the part that deals with error) in April 1663. In this letter, Spinoza tells Henry Oldenburg that he wrote Part I within two weeks at the request of his friends so that it could be published along with Part II, the fragment of Part III and the CM, which were already written. Second, in Letter 2 (September 1661) Spinoza tells Oldenburg that Descartes has failed to understand the true nature of the human mind and has never grasped the true cause of error; the central problem in Descartes' account being the view that human will is free and more extensive than the intellect. According to Spinoza: ... the will differs from this or that volition in the same way as whiteness differs from this or that white object, or as humanity differs from this or that human being. So to conceive the will to be the cause of this or that volition is as impossible as to conceive humanity to be the cause of Peter and Paul. Since, then, the will is nothing more than a mental construction (ens rationis], it can in no way be said to be the cause of this or that volition. Particular volitions, since they need a cause to exist, cannot be said to be free; rather, they are necessarily determined to be such as they are by their own causes. Finally, according to Descartes, errors are themselves particular volitions, from which it necessarily follows that errors — that is, particular volitions - are not free, but are determined by external causes and in no way by the will (Ep 2, 63). This letter shows that Spinoza himself did not accept the Cartesian concept of will (to which the PPC is faithful) as early as 1661. Further, we know that Spinoza maintained the above criticism after 1663 because it is repeated in Part II of the Ethics, P48, its Demonstration and Scholium. We can therefore be confident that he did not accept the account of will, and therefore the account of error, in Part I of the PPC in 1663 when he wrote it. If this were not enough, Meyer writes in his Preface, which was written the same year as Part I of the PPC (i.e., 1663), that Spinoza believes: ... the faculty of affirming and denying is a mere fiction; that affirming and denying are nothing more but ideas; and that the rest of the faculties, like Intellect, Desire, etc., must be numbered among the fictions, or at

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least among those notions which men have formed because they conceive things abstractly, like humanity, stone-hood, and other things of that kind (Meyer's Preface to the PPG and CM, 230). We can conclude that the PPG does not represent Spinoza's own epistemology since we have no reason to believe that Spinoza changed his thinking and reverted to earlier opinions only to change his mind again. Let us now turn to the CM.

The 'Cartesian' Stage of Spinoza's Epistemology Unlike the PPG, the CM does provide an epistemology distinct from that of Descartes' and one, I will argue, representing Spinoza's own view. We should note that while Spinoza published the CM with the PPG in 1663, he wrote the CM earlier and it is most likely his earliest surviving work, possibly dating from or before 1660.1 This section will examine the theories of error, truth and falsity put forward in that work. Error

On the surface, it may look like the CM represents Descartes' (not Spinoza's) theory of error. It is true that the account given here is much more Cartesian than that given in his later works. However, a closer look will show that the theory of error in the CM is Spinoza's own. The CM accepts the Cartesian view that error is the result of extending the will beyond the scope of the intellect (CM II XII, 344; Med IV, 4041). This involves accepting two Cartesian views that Spinoza vehemently rejected in the Ethics: (1) that the will is free (CM II XII, 344) and (2) that the will is distinct from the intellect (CM II VII, 326). However, the CM breaks with Descartes' definition of the will and his understanding of the will/intellect distinction. According to Descartes: The will simply consists in our ability to do or not do something (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather, it consists simply in the fact that when the intellect puts something forward for affirmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, our inclinations are such that we do not feel we are determined by any external force (Med IV, 40). An important part of Descartes' understanding of the will is that it is indifferent in cases where the intellect is wholly ignorant, that is, when the intellect presents a confused idea the will is not more inclined to affirm or to

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deny it (Med IV, 41). However, Descartes does not think that the will is essentially indifferent. When an idea is clear and distinct, the will cannot help but affirm it. Ironically, the will is most free when it is compelled in this way by the clarity and distinctness of the idea. According to Descartes, the will is active and the intellect is passive. The intellect presents an idea and the will affirms, denies, doubts, desires or shuns it. Further, the two are distinguished in that the power of the will is infinite but that of the intellect is finite (PP I P35, 204). While the human intellect is quite limited, the human will can affirm any idea, whether or not we clearly perceive it. This discrepancy is the source of error. Therefore, the way to avoid error is to affirm only ideas that are clearly and distinctly perceived and to withhold judgement on the rest, that is, to confine our will to the limits of our intellect. The CM defines the will differently. It is nothing but the mind itself (CM 11X11,344): We have said that the human mind is a thinking thing; it follows, accordingly, that, from its own nature alone, considered in itself, it can do something, viz. think, i.e., affirm and deny. But these thoughts are determined either by things existing outside the mind, or by the mind alone. For it is a substance from whose thinking essence many acts of thought can and must follow. But those acts of thought which recognize no other cause of themselves than the human mind are called volitions. And the human mind, in so far as it is conceived as a sufficient cause for producing such actions, is called the will (CM II XII, 343). Here we see Spinoza accepting Descartes' view that the will is free and that the will is distinct from the intellect. But at the same time, he shifts the idea of freedom and willing in the direction of the analysis found in the Ethics.2 For Spinoza, freedom is self-determination; that is, it consists in being wholly active. We are free to the extent that we are the cause of our own actions, that is, to the extent that our actionsfollow from our own nature or essence and not from outside causes. Spinoza accepts the Cartesian distinction between an active will and passive intellect in the CM, but by that he understands that the ideas in the intellect have external causes (perceptions through the body) while the acts of thought which we call volitions are produced by the mind itself. Truth In chapter VI Spinoza says that 'true3 and 'false' are only extrinsic denominations of things and are only attributed to things metaphorically. When we

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say that an idea is true or false, we do not refer to some 'thing' within the idea itself, but rather a property the idea has. Truth is to the true idea what whiteness is to a white body (CM I VI, 312). Just as we call a body white by virtue of it having certain properties - for example, a white object reflects all the colours of the spectrum - we call an idea true by virtue of it having certain properties. The properties of a true idea are that it is clear and distinct, and that it removes all doubt, that is to say, that it is certain (CM I VI, 313). Here we see Spinoza accepting the Cartesian view that certainty is the privation of doubt (Med IV, 104). Spinoza also accepts Descartes' view that all ideas that are clearly and distinctly perceived are true (Med I, 24 and PP, 204). However, in the CM Spinoza does not accept Descartes' view that all true ideas have objects really existing outside of the mind (CM I III, 308).3 This is an important difference between Spinoza's and Descartes' theories of truth and it is evidence that the CM is more than just a mere summary of Descartes' philosophy. For Descartes, the objects of our perception are either things which have some existence (things or affections of things) or 'truths which are nothing outside of our thought' (eternal truths) (Med V, 45). For example, Descartes does not consider propositions like 'nothing comes from nothing' as really existing or as a mode of a thing. Rather, they are eternal truths, which reside only in the mind. These truths are sometimes called 'common notions' or 'axioms' (PP I P49, 209). However, all other true ideas are of real things that exist outside of the mind and they represent the thing as it really is outside of the mind. Descartes does not think we can have clear and distinct ideas of things that do not exist or are incapable of existing outside of the mind because that would make God a deceiver. This is because Descartes understands clear and distinct ideas to be innate, put in our minds by God: Every clear and distinct perception is undoubtedly something, and hence cannot come from nothing, but must necessarily have God for its author. Its author, I say, is God, who is supremely perfect, and who cannot be a deceiver on pain of contradiction; hence the perception is undoubtedly true (Med IV, 43). Spinoza, on the other hand, says in the CM: ... if we were to conceive the whole order of nature, we should discover that many things whose nature we perceive clearly and distinctly, that is, whose essence is necessarily such, can not in any way exist (CM I III, 308 j .

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The difference sterns from the introduction of Spinoza's idea of necessity. A thing is necessary in one of two ways: either in respect to its essence or in respect to its cause. God exists necessarily in respect to his essence, for essence and existence are not distinguished in God. However, created things are necessary in respect to their cause: Tor if we consider only their essence, we can conceive it clearly and distinctly without existence' (CM I III, 306). After all, the essence of created things does not involve existence. Here we see the first account of Spinoza's own epistemology and an important departure from Descartes. Certainty about the existence of any particular finite thing involves clear and distinct ideas about its causes, not just its essence; and so we may have a clear and distinct idea about the nature of a certain object and yet it still be impossible for that object to exist. For though when considered in itself its nature is clear and distinct, when we consider the world as a whole we see that there is nothing that could cause that object to exist, and so it is impossible. Descartes makes a distinction between ideas which contain necessary existence (i.e., the concept of God) and those that contain contingent existence (i.e., our concepts of finite things) (PP I P15, 198). In doing so he agrees with Spinoza that God exists necessarily in respect to his essence. However, Descartes does not say that finite things exist necessarily in respect to their cause. For Descartes, all finite things are contingent. Spinoza's view is quite different. Even at this very early stage in his career, he suggests that there is a necessity in all things, infinite and finite. We see an example of this difference in Spinoza's argument that if God had made a different nature of things, he would have had to give us a different intellect: ... the whole natura naturata is only one being. From this it follows that man is part of Nature, which must be coherent with the other parts. Accordingly, it would also follow from the simplicity of God's decree that, if God had created things in another way, he would at the same time have constituted our nature so that we would understand things just as they had been created by God (CM IIIX, 333). For Spinoza, there are necessary causal connections between all finite things in such a way that all finite things taken together make up one being: Natura naturata. The CM is consistent with Spinoza's later works on the point that both Natura naturans and Natura naturata contain necessity. Further, this necessity not only applies to the material world but the mental world as well. As we have already seen, Spinoza says that thoughts are determined either by things existing outside of the mind or by the mind alone (CM II XII, 343). When thoughts are determined by the mind itself, they are not Tree' in the sense that all thoughts are possible or that

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whatever thoughts are produced are somehow contingent. Rather, they are free in the sense that they follow from the mind's essence with necessity (CM II XII, 343-44). Falsity

Descartes says that an idea in and of itself cannot be (formally) false. Formal falsity exists only in judgements which require both the intellect (to present the idea) and the will (to affirm or deny it). As Descartes puts it: [W]hen I look more closely at myself and inquire into the nature of my errors (for these are the only evidence of some imperfection in me), I notice that they depend on two concurrent causes, namely on the faculty of knowledge which is in me, and on the faculty of choice or freedom of the will; that is, they depend on both the intellect and the will simultaneously Now all that the intellect does is to enable me to perceive the ideas which are subjects for possible judgments; and when regarded strictly in this light, it turns out to contain no error in the proper sense of the term (Med IV, 39). We make false judgements, or error, when we allow the will to extend beyond the limits of the intellect. Spinoza cannot coherently accept this account of falsity. First, it depends on there being two different faculties (will and intellect) which work together to produce judgement. Spinoza does not hold this view. He says that the will is distinct from the intellect, but only in the sense that the will is the mind when it is active (the cause of its acts of thought) and the intellect is the mind when it is passive (when it is not the cause of its acts of thought). Second, given his view of the will and intellect, it doesn't make sense to speak of one extending beyond the other. Therefore, Spinoza does not accept Descartes' theory of formal falsity in the CM. Descartes also speaks of material falsity. Material falsity is attributed to ideas, not judgements. It is when the will is inclined by something outside of the mind. Materially false ideas represent non-things as things (Med III, 30): For example, the ideas which I have of heat and cold contain so little clarity and distinctness that they do not enable me to tell whether cold is merely the absence of heat or vice versa, or whether both of them are real qualities, or neither is. And since there can be no ideas which are not as it were of things, if it is true that cold is nothing but the absence of heat, the idea which represents it to me as something real and positive deserves to be called false; and the same goes for other ideas of this kind (Med III, 30).

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Spinoza cannot accept this understanding of falsity either. For it contradicts his very definition of the will. Spinoza defines will as the mind when it is active. It would be impossible for will in this sense to be inclined by something outside of the mind (which would make it passive). Therefore, Spinoza cannot coherently accept the Cartesian notion of material falsity.

The CM: Spinoza's Own Epistemology At this point we can see that the theory of mind in the CM is not a mere summary of Cartesian doctrine. But one might argue that this in itself does not show that the CM represents Spinoza's own theory of mind. The places where the CM departs from Descartes' view of the mind might, after all, be summaries of scholastic or neo-scholastic theories of mind, or perhaps summaries of the Philosophia Novantiqua theory of mind so prominent at Leiden. Not a Summary of the Scholastic/Neo-Scholastic Epistemology

It is true that there are significant scholastic influences in the CM. For instance, the very structure of the work is scholastic in nature.4 Further, the CM sometimes directly quotes Burgersdijk.5 Such influences have led some scholars to dismiss the CM as a summary of scholastic philosophy and not Spinoza's own views.6 However, the presence of these scholastic and neo-scholastic influences, as strong as they may be, does not indicate that the places where the CM departs from Descartes' theory of mind are therefore summaries of scholastic or neo-scholastic thought. The CM's treatment of the will, for instance, is not Aristotelian at all. In fact, it is presented in opposition to scholastic views. Spinoza criticizes his scholastic opponents for following their master (Aristotle) in defining the will as an appetite for what seems good. He says that in doing so they confuse the will (which 'is the affirming that this is good, or the contrary') with the appetite the soul has after it has affirmed or denied something (CM II XII, 344). Spinoza makes it clear that the will is not to be confused with wanting. The Aristotelians claim that the will can will contrary to the last dictate of the intellect, that is to say that the appetitive part of the soul and the rational part of the soul can conflict, precisely because of this error. Further, Spinoza states that the attribute of thought should not be separated from the thinking thing itself. He thinks that these are to be only distinguished by reason. 'Our opponents do make this separation when they strip the thinking thing of every thought and feign it as that prime matter of the Peripatetics'(CM I XII, 346,.

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Not a Summary of the Philosophia Novantiqua Epistemology

Neither should we suppose that, since the CM combines strong Cartesian influences with strong scholastic influences, it is a summary of the epistemology held by proponents of Philosophia Novantiqua. Spinoza specifically criticizes Heereboord's understanding of the will as something other than the mind itself. Spinoza directly quotes Heereboord's argument that, contrary to Descartes, the will is determined by something other than itself (CM II XII, 344-45). He then states: These are the very words of Professor Heereboord of Leiden. They show plainly that he understands by will, not the mind itself, but something else either outside the mind or in the mind, like a blank tablet, lacking all thought, and capable of receiving any picture whatever. Or rather he conceives it as a balance in a state of equilibrium, which is moved in either direction you like by any weight whatever, as the added weight is determined [in a certain direction], or finally, as something that neither he nor any mortal can grasp by any thought (CM II XII, 345). For Spinoza, the will is nothing other than the mind itself and it has an equal power of affirming or denying (CM II XII, 345). We must remember that in the CM, one has free will to the extent that one acts from one's own nature or essence. Freedom of the will is not, as Heereboord maintains, a freedom of indifference. The CM Compared to Spinoza's Later Writings

We have seen that the CM does not summarize the positions on error and falsity of Descartes, the scholastics or neo-scholastics, or the Philosophia Novantiqua movement, but that is not to say that the status of the CM as representing Spinoza's own views is unproblematic. As mentioned earlier, in Letter 2 (believed to be from September 1661) Spinoza says th Descartes has 'failed to understand the true nature of the human mind' and has 'never grasped the true cause of error' (Ep 2, 62). In particular, he attacks the Cartesian principle that the human will is free and more extensive than the intellect. This passage is interesting because it repeats what the CM says about the relationship between the will and particular volitions. What differs is that in this letter, Spinoza says it follows from this relationship that particular volitions cannot be free and hence error cannot be caused by free will. The fact that this letter was written in 1661 may indicate that the CM was written before that time and Spinoza had not yet drawn

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these inferences when he wrote the CM. If this is the case, however, we are still left to wonder why Spinoza would publish the CM in 1663 when clearly by this time his view of error was different. After all, we know that changes were made to the CM before publication (e.g. Meyer's additions of references to the PPG). Spinoza could have easily changed the passages on free will and the will/intellect distinction before sending it to press. Further, in Spinoza's discussion of error in the CM he refers to Med IV as if he agreed with it: ... although the soul is determined by external things to affirming or denying something, it is not so determined as if it were compelled by external things, but it always remains free. For no thing has the power of destroying its essence, So what the soul affirms and denies, it always affirms and denies freely, as is explained sufficiently in the fourth Meditation (CM II XII, 343-4) [emphasis mine]. Did Meyer add this reference as well or was it in the original? In any case, we know that Spinoza approved the CM before it went to print. And so we must ask ourselves, why would Spinoza allow the publication of a work that contained some of his own views on falsity and error, but clearly went against others? Remember that Letter 13 tells us that Spinoza sees himself as testing the waters with his publication of the PPG/CM. In doing so, he only exposed the parts of his current theory that would not upset the authorities. By the time the CM was published, Spinoza had already worked out in the TIE and KV conclusions from the premises found in the CM that would have been more controversial at the time. The reception of the CM would give him a good indication of how the authorities might receive those works. The question then remains whether the CM represents a self-censured portion of Spinoza's views in 1663 or an earlier version of his own thinking that in 1663 he recognizes as less controversial than his current views. In either case, study of the CM is valuable for the understanding of Spinoza's early development, for it provides a bridge between Descartes' and his own philosophy that he recommended to the Cartesians of his day. Whether Spinoza is pointing out the particular bridge that he traversed at an earlier date, or trying to provide the easiest route for his contemporaries, he sees important connections between his own thought and that of Descartes. What is important for this study is that even if the CM is a self-censored version of Spinoza's early theory of mind, it still contains Cartesian doctrines that (1) are his own at some point in his career, and (2) are rejected in the Ethics. For example, the CM says that:

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The mind can exist without the body (CM II VII, 341). The will is free (CM II VII, 343). Lack of doubt is the indicator of clear and distinct, and therefore true, ideas (CM I VI, 313). A passive intellect is distinct from an active will (CM II VII, 326).

We know that the young Spinoza accepted these views because he continued to assert these doctrines in the TIE and KV, two works undisputedly representing Spinoza's philosophy. As we will see in Chapter 6, these two works represent a transitional stage in Spinoza's theory of ideas, where we see a middle ground between the CM and the Ethics on the four above doctrines.

Chapter 6

Spinoza's Transitional Epistemology: The TIE and KV

Introduction As we have seen in Chapter 5, the accounts of truth and error found in the CM, while strongly influenced by Descartes5 philosophy, represent an early stage in the development of Spinoza's own epistemology. Spinoza's later writings confirm this view: the TIE, KV and Ethics repeat and continue to develop the notions of will and necessity and their relation to the concepts of truth, falsity and error as expressed in the CM. This gradual development moves further away from Descartes' epistemology and involves the formation and fine-tuning of Spinoza's own understanding of the mind—body relationship and his famous monistic ontology, which ultimately provides the philosophical foundation of Radical Cartesian politics. This chapter will examine two works that represent transitional epistemologies somewhere between those found in the CM and Ethics: the TIE and KV. The first part of this chapter will examine the accounts of error, truth and falsity found in the TIE. We will see that the TIE adds an in denomination of truth, that is, the concept of adequacy; it asserts that human minds are part of a[nother] thinking being; and it expands on the notion of clarity and distinctness found in the CM. The second part of this chapter examines the KV, which further develops Spinoza's understanding of the will-intellect relationship and mind—body union — two developments which are central to understanding Spinoza's theory of truth, which more and more begins to resemble a correspondence theory.

The Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect Goals and Method of the TIE

The TIE describes the highest perfection of a human being and the means to attain it. In speaking of this perfection, Spinoza says:

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Whatever can be a means to his attaining it is called a true good; but the highest good is to arrive - together with other individuals if possible - at the enjoyment of such a nature. What that nature is we shall show in its proper place: that it is the knowledge of the union that the mind has with the whole of Nature (TIE 10-11). Spinoza believes that we ought to focus all of our actions and thoughts towards achieving this perfection. The first step in meeting this goal is the emendation of the intellect, the focus of this work. The TIE attempts to put forward a method for such emendation, and in the process continues to develop the notions of truth, falsity and error found in the CM. Before examining these developments, we should note a few points about this text. (1) The TIE is Spinoza's first work to equate the goal of man with knowledge. His purpose is not merely to describe how the mind works, how to achieve true ideas or to overcome doubt. Rather, the goal of his epistemology is human perfection, what he will later describe in the KV and Ethics as blessedness. This is an important difference in the philosophies of Descartes and Spinoza, not to mention an important point of agreement between Spinoza and the other members of the Amsterdam Circle. Whether understood as Balling's notion of salvation or van den Enden's more secular third kind of knowledge, all three men take the union of God through knowledge to be the fundamental goal of epistemology. (2) For Spinoza this perfection is the knowledge of the union of the mind with the whole of nature. Here we see Spinoza connecting the goal of the individual person with the metaphysical issues of the relationship between mind and body and that between the whole of Nature and its parts. The TIE, however, does not adequately work out these connections. It alludes to, but does not explain, the mind-body union. We must remember that the TIE is an incomplete work. Perhaps it was Spinoza's struggle with the metaphysical issues of his epistemology that made him put it aside. In any case, the KV, Spinoza's second transitional work, takes up these issues, attempting to provide the metaphysical foundations needed to ground his developing epistemology. (3) The TIE connects the individual's goal of human perfection with the need to form a certain type of society: This, then, is the end I aim at: to acquire such a nature, and to strive that many acquire it with me. That is, it is part of my happiness to take pains that many others may understand as I understand, so that their intellect and desire agree entirely with my intellect and desire. To do this it is necessary, first to understand as much of Nature as suffices for

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It is now clear that while the TIE focuses on epistemological issues, Spinoza already sees these issues as having important connections to the goal of the individual, the nature of a good society, the mind—body relationship and the relationship between the whole of Nature to its parts. These issues form an important philosophical background to his development of mind. The KV will start to address these issues, but, as we will see in Chapter 7, it is not until the Ethics that Spinoza finally ties all these aspects of his philosophy together. Four Types of Perception

The focus of the TIE is providing a method for the emendation of the intellect. Spinoza says that we must investigate the nature of a true idea by distinguishing it from the rest of the perceptions. Then we can train the mind so that it understands everything according to that standard (TIE 18-19). In his attempt to examine the nature of a true idea, Spinoza distinguishes between four types of perceptions: 1. Those that come from report or conventional signs. 2. Those that come from random experience. 3. Those that occur when the essence is inferred from something inadequately. 4. Those that occur when a thing is perceived through its essence alone, i.e., adequate ideas (TIE 12-13). In order to choose the best type of perception we must keep in mind the means necessary to achieve our end of human perfection: To know exactly our nature, which we desire to perfect, and at the same time, [to know] as much of the nature of things as is necessary, to infer rightly from it the differences, agreements, and oppositions of things, to conceive rightly what they can undergo and what they cannot, to compare [the nature of things] with the nature and power of man (TIE 15). In other words, the criterion for choosing among these kinds of perceptions is not truth. The best kind of perception will be a true idea, but that is not why it is to be included in the method. We choose it because it is the best means to our achieving human perfection.1

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Perceptions of Properties (First and Second Types)

The first two types of perceptions are very uncertain. They only acquaint us with the accidental properties of a thing (what Spinoza calls propria], not the essence of the thing (TIE 15-16). These perceptions are very uncertain because without knowing the essence of a thing we cannot understand its true properties (TIE 39). The second type of knowledge includes imagination and memory because they come to us through the senses and only tell us of accidents. Imagination does not arise from the power of the mind. Rather, it comes from external causes as the body receives various motions through interaction with other bodies (TIE 37). Memory consists in impressions on the brain together with the thought of a determinate duration (TIE 36). In this way, it too result from random sensory experience (which made the impressions on the brain). Therefore, imagination and memory, like all perceptions of the first and second kind, can only provide us with knowledge of the circumstances of a thing, which is different from the inmost essence of a thing (TIE 41 Therefore, the method excludes these types of perception. Perceptions concerning Essences (Third and Fourth Types)

When discussing the third and fourth types of perception, Spinoza says: Concerning the third, on the other hand, we can, in a sense, say that we have an idea of the thing, and that we can also make inferences without danger of error. But still, it will not through itself be the means of our reaching our perfection. Only the fourth mode comprehends the adequate essence of the thing and is without danger of error. For that reason, it is what we must chiefly use (TIE 16) [emphasis mine]. Both the third and fourth types of perception involve an idea of the essence of a thing. However, they are different in that the fourth type involves an adequate idea of that essence while the third type does not. Three questions arise from Spinoza's distinction between the third and fourth types of perception: (1) What is the difference between an adequate and inadequate idea?; (2) In what sense does the third type of knowledge contain an idea of the thing and make inferences free of error?; (3) Why is adequacy important for attaining knowledge of the union that the mind has with the whole of Nature (that is, why is adequacy important for the attainment of our goal - human perfection)? We will return to questions 2 and 3 later. For now, let us begin with question 1. Spinoza says:

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Spinoza's Radical Cartesian Mind But if it is - as it seems at first — of the nature of a thinking being to form true, or adequate, thoughts, it is certain that inadequate ideas arise in us only from the fact that we are a part of a thinking being, of which some thoughts wholly constitute our mind, while others do so only in part (TIE 33).

This passage makes several important points. First, Spinoza equates true thoughts with adequate thoughts. Second, Spinoza thinks that we are part of a thinking being. Third, inadequate ideas are partial ideas whereas adequate ideas are whole. All confusion results from the fact that the mind knows only in part a thing that is a whole, or composed of many things, and does not distinguish the known from the unknown (TIE 29). When one has an inadequate idea of X, it is because one's particular mind only contains part of the idea of X as it is in the Thinking Thing of which all individuals are part. The idea of X as it exists in that particular mind is 'mutilated and maimed' (TIE 32). Adequate ideas, on the other hand, are complete. A mind has adequate ideas to the extent that it contains the idea as it is contained within the Thinking Thing. Notice that the terms 'adequate' and 'inadequate' refer to the nature of an idea as it exists in a. particular mind, that is, whether that mind contains that idea completely or partially. Here we see an important development in Spinoza's concept of truth since the CM. Remember that, according to the CM, 'true' and 'false' are only extrinsic denominations of things and only attributed to things metaphorically (CM 312). 'Truth' and 'falsity' are only names or designations for a class of things having certain properties - those properties being clarity and distinctness and the removal of all doubt. This understanding of'true' and 'false' is an extrinsic denomination of ideas in that it refers to properties of the idea (propria) and not the nature of the idea itself. This differs from the TIE, which says: As for what constitutes the form of the true, it is certain that a true thought is distinguished from a false one not only by an extrinsic, but chiefly by an intrinsic denomination (TIE 31) [emphasis mine]. We apply the intrinsic denomination of 'true' to ideas that are adequate and 'false' to ideas that are inadequate. Adequacy is intrinsic in that it is something real in ideas through which one distinguishes true from false ideas (TIE 31).

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The method for making this distinction is reflexive knowledge (TIE 31). In reflexive knowledge, the object of an idea is another idea (not a body). Spinoza makes a distinction between the objective essence and the formal essence of an idea. He provides an example to clarify this distinction. Suppose that a person named Peter formally exists. That is, Peter is something real. A true idea of Peter is an objective essence of Peter. Such an idea is real in itself and completely different from Peter himself. That is to say, the objective essence of Peter has its own formal reality as an idea and is distinct from the formal reality of Peter. This formal reality of the idea of Peter (Peter's objective essence) can itself be the object of another idea, and so on. Reflexive knowledge then consists in ideas about ideas. This method involves examining our ideas in themselves, not in relation to external things: ... the form of the true thought must be placed in the same thought itself without relation to other things, nor does it recognize the object as its cause, but must depend on the very power and nature of the intellect (TIE 31). In other words, this is not a correspondence theory of truth. For instance, if the mind perceives some new being which never existed (and therefore could not have been caused by any object) and legitimately deduces other ideas from that perception, those ideas are true, even though they are not determined by an external object (TIE 32). Spinoza provides an example: ... if some architect conceives a building in an orderly fashion, then although such a building never existed, and even never will exist, still the thought of it is true, and the thought is the same, whether the building exists or not (TIE 31). An idea is not true for Spinoza because it corresponds to some reality. (The idea of the building is true even though the building does not exist.) Further, an idea can be false even though it does correspond to a reality external to the mind: ... if someone says, for example, that Peter exists, and nevertheless does not know that Peter exists, that thought, in respect to him is false, or if you prefer is not true, even though Peter really exists. Nor is this statement, Peter exists, true, except in respect to him who knows certainly that Peter exists (TIE 31).

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So the fact that an idea does or does not correspond to an external reality does not make it true or false. As Spinoza puts it: ... what constitutes the form of the true thought must be sought in the same thought itself, and must be deduced from the nature of the intellect (TIE 32). Spinoza gives an example. Suppose that he forms the concept of a sphere by feigning a cause at will. He imagines a semicircle rotated around a centre, thus producing a sphere. This idea is true, even if no sphere was ever produced this way. The affirmation of the rotating semicircle would be false if it were not joined to the concept of a sphere, or to a cause determining such a motion, that is, if it were isolated in the mind. If that were the case, the mind would only tend to affirm motion to the semicircle, and nothing else. However, motion is not contained in the concept of the semicircle nor does it arise from the concept of the cause determining the motion (TIE 32). Spinoza concludes that: Falsity consists only in this: that something is affirmed of a thing that is not contained in the concept we have formed of the thing, as motion or rest of the semicircle (TIE 32). Notice that, for Spinoza, error occurs when an affirmation of an idea extends beyond what is contained in that idea. This means that the power of the mind to perceive does not limit the power of the mind to affirm. This view is consistent with the CM, i.e., the view that the cause of error arises 'from the fact that the will extends more widely than the intellect5 (CM II XII, 344). The TIE does not discuss the nature of the will or intellect. However, it is clear that this work distinguishes between having an idea and affirming that idea. Further, it sees the mind as free to affirm beyond the limits of its perception. Using the language of the CM, we might say that the will is free in that it is not limited by the intellect. Let us now address the second question: In what sense does the third type of knowledge contain an idea of the thing and make inferences free of error? Remember that Spinoza defines the third kind of perception as what we have 'when the essence of a thing is inferred from another thing, but not adequately' (TIE 13). He tells us that this can happen in one of two ways. First, we can infer the cause from some effect. Spinoza footnotes: When this happens, we understand nothing about the cause except what we consider in the effect. This is sufficiently evident from the fact that then

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the cause is explained only in very general terms, e.g.. Therefore there is something, Therefore there is some power, etc. Or also from the fact that the terms express the cause negatively. Therefore it was not this, or that, etc. (TIE 13). In this case, then, we have an idea concerning a thing and we only affirm what is contained in that idea, but that content is so limited that this 'true5 idea amounts to no more than the general judgement that something exists. The perception does not include the nature of the particular thing that exists. Our inference that a thing exists is free from error in that we do not affirm anything beyond the content of our ideas. However, our idea of the essence of the particular thing is incomplete and therefore not adequate. The second way we can have a third type of perception is 'when something is inferred from some universal, which some property always accompanies' (TIE 13). In this case we clearly conceive something of a cause on account of its effect. However, what we conceive is not the essence of the thing, butpropria (TIE 13). This type of judgement is free from error in that it only affirms the contents of our idea (that a thing has certain properties), but again, our idea of the essence of the particular thing is inadequate. The third type of perception occurs, then, when we have an inadequate idea of a particular thing's essence, but remain free from error in that we do not affirm anything beyond our limited knowledge of that particular thing. In this sense, the third type of perception is true or free from error. However, this type of knowledge cannot lead us to our goal of human perfection since it does not involve adequate ideas of the essences of particular things. It may be a true idea that something exists or a true idea of some very general property of the thing that exists, but it is not a true idea about the thing's nature or essence. Here we find the answer to the third question: why is adequacy important for attaining knowledge of the union that the mind has with the whole of Nature? Spinoza says that we can perceive that the soul is united to the body through a third kind of perception. That is, once we clearly perceive that we feel a certain body, and no other, then we can infer that the soul is united to the body, this union being the cause of the sensation. However, we cannot completely understand from this perception what that sensation and union are (TIE 14). Even though the conclusion that the mind and body are united is certain: It is still not sufficiently safe, unless we take the greatest care. For those who do not take such care will immediately fall into errors. When things are conceived so abstractly, and not through their true essence, they are

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immediately confused by the imagination. What in itself is one, men imagine to be many. For to the things they conceive abstractly, separately, and confusedly, they give names which they use to signify other more familiar things. Hence they imagine these things in the same way as they are accustomed to imagine the things to which the names were first given (TIE 14). The abstract nature of the third type of perception places the mind in danger of error. Imagination takes over and we begin to confuse a thing's propria with its true essence. We must remember Spinoza's warning against such confusion. He notes that while it does not matter much concerning geometric figures and other beings of reason: It matters a great deal concerning Physical and real beings, because the properties of things are not understood so long as their essences are not known. If we neglect them, we shall necessarily overturn the connection of the intellect, which ought to reproduce the connection of Nature, and we shall completely miss our goal (TIE 39). The best means to our goal is the fourth type of perception: adequate ideas of the essences of things. If we have an adequate idea of the essence of the soul we will know from that perception that the soul is united to the body (TIE 14). Remember that the TIE says that what distinguishes a true thought from a false one is 'not only by an extrinsic, but chiefly by an intrinsic denomination' (TIE 31). That is to say, both extrinsic and intrinsic denominations distinguish the false from the true. Notice, that while the fourth type of perception is true in an intrinsic sense (i.e., it is an adequate idea), it is also true in the extrinsic sense discussed in the CM, i.e., the fourth type of perception has the properties of clarity and distinctness. The third type of perception is a clear and distinct idea as well. The 'extrinsic' difference between the two types is that the third type of perception is a clear and distinct perception of something very general. For example, we may perceive clearly and distinctly that 'something exists which is the cause of X'. We may know the truth of this general statement beyond a doubt. However, we do not have a clear and distinct perception of the cause of X itself. The fourth type of knowledge, on the other hand, is a clear and distinct perception of the particular cause. The third type of perception only contains a confused perception of the nature of the cause, whereas the fourth type contains a clear idea of the cause. This is because the more particular an idea is, the more distinct and therefore the clearer it is (TIE 41).

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As we have seen in Chapter 5, the CM holds that a thing is necessary in one of two ways: either in respect to its essence or in respect to its cause. The TIE expands on this view. First, the TIE distinguishes between having a clear and distinct idea of something's essence and having a clear and distinct idea of its causes. As long as we have a clear and distinct idea of a finite thing's essence but not its causes and we do not attribute existence to it, then that idea is only a.fictitious idea, not a false idea. Since fictitious things do not exist, we cannot have clear and distinct ideas of their causes and therefore should abstain from affirming their existence (TIE 29). We have a false idea when we affirm the existence of a finite thing whose causes we do not clearly and distinctly perceive. Therefore, the affirmation of the existence of a fiction is a false idea, even though we may have a clear and distinct perception of its essence. Further, the TIE shows how this view of necessity informs how we should go about avoiding error. We can avoid confusing a fictitious idea with a true one by keeping in mind the following before attributing existence to something. First, if we clearly perceive something through itself then it is an eternal truth and we cannot feign anything concerning such a thing (TIE 30). In Spinoza's metaphysics there is only one idea that fits this category of eternal truths,2 the idea of Substance or God. Substance is the only thing whose essence is self-caused and perceived through itself. Since Substance's essence involves existence, there is no room for error here. Second, if it is not an eternal truth, then we need to take care to compare the existence of the thing with its essence, and at the same time to attend to the order of Nature (TIE 30). In other words, if our idea is of a finite thing, we must have a clear and distinct perception of its essence, but that is not enough to assure us that the thing exists. WTe must also have a clear and distinct idea of its proximate causes. It is in this sense that a true idea of a finite thing is adequate: it is complete in that it contains both knowledge of its essence and of its causes. Third, as long as we break a thing into its simplest parts and examine them, we will not err because the simplest thing cannot be feigned (TIE 30). Ideas of the simplest things are necessarily adequate because it is only possible to know them as wholes and not as parts (TIE 29). The TIE also expands on the notion of clarity and distinctness found in the CM by giving a more detailed account of certainty and doubt. Clear and distinct ideas are the most certain ideas (TIE 35). Further, 'Certainty is nothing but the objective essence itself, i.e., the mode by which we are aware of the formal essence is certainty itself (TIE 18). No other sign is needed for the certainty of a true idea other than having the true idea itself. In order to know what the highest certainty is, one must perceive an

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adequate or objective essence of some thing (TIE 18). For doubt does not and cannot arise through the thing itself concerning which one doubts. Doubt always involves another idea, particularly, a confused idea about the idea being doubted, i.e., a confused reflexive idea. Spinoza understands doubt to be the suspension of the mind concerning some affirmation or negation, which it would affirm or deny if this second confused reflexive idea did not interfere (TIE 35). Therefore, if there were only one idea in the mind there could be no doubt (TIE 34). To summarize, the TIE contains substantial developments of the theories of truth, falsity and error found in the CM. It reiterates the theory of error found in the CM and gives a method for how to avoid it. It introduces the notion that truth is something about the intrinsic nature of an idea (i.e., whether or not the idea is adequate or complete), and expands on the extrinsic properties of an idea (i.e., its clarity and distinctness and its certainty or lack of doubt). For all of this, there is one important thing that the TIE fails to do. Towards the end of the work, Spinoza summarizes what we now know of a true idea: (1) A true idea is simple or composed of simple ideas (TIE 37). (2) A true idea shows how and why something is or has been done (TIE 37). That is, it contains knowledge of the proximate causes of that thing. (3) Its objective effects proceed in the soul according to the formal nature of its object (TIE 37). In other words, the cause-effect relationships contained in that idea correspond to the cause—effect relationships in the object itself. The problem lies in number 3. The TIE does not explain how or why the cause-effect relationships contained in a true idea correspond to the cause—effect relationships in the object itself. There is a bit of irony here. The TIE does not explain the cause of an idea's correspondence to its object. In other words, the TIE only provides a third type of perception of the mind-body union. It says mind and body are united but does not discuss the nature of that union. Such a discussion will not take place until the KV. The TIE fails to meet the very criteria it sets forward and therefore provides only a very confused account of how the mind is to know anything about physical things. Spinoza leaves the reader wondering how the mind is united to the whole of nature. This is very problematic since the professed goal of the work is to emend the mind so that it can know this union for itself.

Short Treatise on God, Man and His Weil-Being As discussed in Chapter 5, the order in which Spinoza worked on the TIE and KV is unclear. However, we do find substantial developments in the

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KV that seem to pick up where the TIE left off. For example, the KV provides accounts of the relationships between will and intellect and between mind and body. These accounts are necessary in order to make sense of his developing epistemology, but, as we have seen, are sorely lacking in the TIE. Further, the KV explains how the mind is united to Nature as well as how one is to become aware of this union. In doing so, it completes the project of the TIE. Before looking at the KV, we should note that this work, like the TIE, i rife with problems. Where the TIE is an unfinished work, lacking discussions of issues central to its overall project, the KV is an unpolished work containing several inconsistencies and redundancies, indicating that this work was never fully prepared for publication. I believe that these textual problems, as well as the 'middle ground' positions we find in these works, constitute a transitional stage in Spinoza's development. They are extremely valuable in suggesting how he arrived at the mature view found in the Ethics. By indicating Spinoza's struggles to make his philosophy complete and consistent, the TIE and KV provide insight into how Spinoza saw aspects of his system fit ting together. As we will see later in this chapter and in Chapter 7, Spinoza's unique account of the relationship between body and mind is central to his understanding of truth, falsity and error, as well as his understanding of the ultimate human goal. Denial of Free Will

The KV makes up for what the TIE does not say about will. The KV continues to assert that will and intellect are universals, or beings of reason. They are not real beings or faculties (KV II 16, 122). There is no separate faculty in the mind that wills. Rather, there are in the mind particular willings. Further, the KV distinguishes between willings and desires. A desire is an inclination the soul has towards something that it considers good. In order to contain such a desire, then, the mind must already affirm that something is good. Such an affirmation is a particular willing (KV II 16, 121). However, the KV makes an important shift from his understanding of will in the CM and TIE: Spinoza now denies the freedom of the will. Remember the CM said: We have said that the human mind is a thinking thing; it follows, accordingly, that, from its own nature alone, considered in itself, it can do something, viz. think, i.e., affirm and deny. But these thoughts are determine either by things existing outside the mind, or by the mind alone. For it is a substance from whose thinking essence many acts of thought can and

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must follow. But those acts of thought which recognize no other cause of themselves than the human mind are called volitions. And the human mind, in so far as it is conceived as a sufficient cause for producing such actions, is called the will (CM II 12, 343). But the KV says: This or that will of man must also have an external cause by which it is necessarily produced (for the will's existence does not belong to its essence) (KV I 6, 86) [emphasis mine]

and: The question now is whether this affirmation of ours happens freely or by necessity, i.e., whether we affirm or deny something of a thing without any external cause compelling us to do so. But we have already proven that a thing which is not explained through itself, or whose existence does not belong to its essence, must necessarily have an external cause, and that a cause which is going to produce something must produce it necessarily. So it must also follow that the particular willing this or that, the particular affirming or denying this or that of a thing, must proceed from some external cause; and the definition we have given of a cause is that it cannot be free (KV 11 16, 122). These passages are the first in Spinoza's texts to deny the freedom of the will. Interestingly, this denial is based on an understanding of necessity that is found as early as the CM. As we have seen, the CM explains that things are necessary in one of two ways: in respect to their essence or in respect to their cause (CM I 3, 308). God's existence is necessary in respect to his essence because his essence cannot be conceived without his existence: [Other] things - e.g., material ones - are called either impossible or necessary in respect to their cause. For if we consider only their essence, we can conceive it clearly and distinctly without existence. Therefore, they can never exist by the power and necessity of their essence, but only by the power of their cause, God, the creator of all things. And so, if it is in the divine decree that some thing exists, it will necessarily exist; but if not? it will be impossible that it should exist. For it is evident in itself that if a thing has neither an internal nor an external cause for existing, it is impossible that it should exist (CM I 3, 307). The KV applies this view of necessity to humans, who are, after all, finite beings and therefore not necessary in respect to their essence. What

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makes this change so critical is not that he says external things have causal powers over humans, but that he extends this principle to human minds as well as human bodies - something Descartes and the early Spinoza would not be willing to do. The idea that the mind, like the body, is determined, is not completely new to the KV. There is a hint of it in the TIE, which, when speaking about true knowledge, says that the soul acts according to certain laws, 'like a spiritual automaton' (TIE 37). But it is not until the KV that Spinoza applies causation to the mind in general. If the mind is not the cause of the affirmations that it contains, what is? As Spinoza puts it: The object is the cause of what is affirmed or denied of it, whether it is true or false, i.e., because we perceive something coming from the object, we imagine that the object affirms or denies this of itself as a whole (even though we perceive very little of it). This occurs most in weak souls which very easily receive a mode or idea through a slight action of the object on them (KV II 16, 125). We gather two things from this passage. First, the object, not the human mind itself, is the cause of the volition, that is to say, the object acts on or causes the mind. Second, false ideas result from the fact that the object affirms or denies itself only partially (as opposed to the infinite Thinking Thing, which contains an affirmation of the complete object and its causal history). The finite human mind does not recognize its affirmation as partial. but mistakenly imagines that it has the whole story. It therefore affirms as true an inadequate idea. Spinoza appears to be presenting his view of the will in opposition to that of Descartes. For example, he argues that on the continuous creation view, the will cannot be free: I have no desire to bring up all the objections I have against positing a created finite substance. But I shall only show briefly that Freedom of the Will is completely inconsistent with a continuous creation, viz., that the same action is required in God to preserve [a thing] in being as to create it, and that without this action the thing could not exist for a moment (KV II 16, 123). Spinoza argues that if God continually creates (as Descartes holds) then nothing can be attributed to the human will, which cannot possibly produce volitions since it cannot even preserve itself while it exists. Spinoza concludes:

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So because there is no thing which has any power to preserve itself or to produce anything, the only conclusion left is that God alone is, and must be, the efficient cause of all things, and that all Volitions are determined by him (KV II 16, 123). Descartes would be unwilling to accept this conclusion. To summarize, Spinoza views the will as a universal that is instantiated with particular willings. These willings are not caused by the mind itself, but by objects external to the mind. Spinoza explains that the reason some people think that the will is a faculty with the power to produce volitions is that they confuse beings of reason with particular things that are truly in nature (KV II 16, 123). This is interesting because the CM sees the will as free (it defines will as the mind insofar as it freely produces volitions) but it does not make Descartes' mistake of seeing the will as a particular faculty existing in the mind. For the CM says that the will is nothing but a universal. Perhaps Spinoza sees himself as correcting his own inconsistencies in the CM. Will/Intellect Relationship in the KV

The KV also contains developments of the will—intellect relation. As we have seen, the TIE continues to maintain that the will and intellect are universals, not real beings. In the KV, a new argument emerges against the view that a real being, called will in man, is the efficient cause of a particular willing, that this will is free and that it can do nothing without another real being in man called the intellect. Spinoza argues that even if the will and intellect were real beings, one would have to grant that a volition is a modification of the will, and an idea is a modification of the intellect. This would make will and intellect different and really distinct substances since only substances can be modified, not modes themselves. If one were to say that the soul governs these two substances, then one must admit of a third substance. Spinoza says that such a view confuses things so that it is impossible to have a clear and distinct perception of will and intellect. After all, ideas are in the intellect, not in the will. Since modes of one substance cannot pass into another substance, no love can arise in the will (KV II 16, 122-23): For it involves a contradiction that one should will something the idea of which is not in the power which wills. If you say that the Will, because of its union with the intellect, also perceives the same thing the intellect understands, and therefore also loves it, [the reply is that] because perceiving is also a concept and a confused Idea, it too is a mode of the intellect, and according to the preceding,

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cannot be in the Will, even if there were a union like thatofsoul and body. For assume that the body is united with the soul, the body never senses, nor is the soul extended. For then a Chimera, in which we conceive two substances, would be able to become one. And that is false (KV II 16, 123) [emphasis mine]. It is interesting that Spinoza brings up the mind-body relationship when discussing the will-intellect relationship, for the Ethics asserts both that mind and body are one and the same thing (E II P7S) and that will and intellect are one and the same thing (E II P49C). These two claims will not occur until the Ethics and, as we will see in Chapter 7, they are both integral parts of Spinoza's developed theories of truth, falsity and error. In the KV, we see a big move in the direction of denying the will—intellect distinction. While the KV continues to claim that the intellect is passive (KV II 15, 120) - something Spinoza will reject in the Ethics - the KV does not contrast that passivity to the activity of a free will, for it denies that the will is free: The intellect is wholly passive, i.e., a perception in the soul of the essencea and existence of things. So it is never we who affirm or deny something of a thing; it is the thing itself that affirms or denies something of itself in us (KV II 16, 124). The KV is the first time that Spinoza says both the mind's ideas and the mind's affirmations are externally caused. Spinoza must explain how it is that external objects cause the mind to contain ideas and affirmations. This requires him to give an account of the mind-body relationship and this account makes a big move in the direction of saying that mind and body are one and the same thing. Here again we see the KV providing what the TIE does not. The Mind-Body Relationship in the KV

We saw the Spinozistic understanding of mind, or soul, emerge in the TIE But it is not until the KV that we begin to see Spinoza's view of its relationship to God, body, and Nature. The TIE says that the human mind is part of a Thinking Thing, i.e., part of a greater whole. The KV adds the notion that the human mind consists of modes (KV II 1, 96) i.e., of perceptions. Hence the human mind is both part of a whole and a whole consisting of parts. Further, the KV says that a particular soul (or mind) is an idea of a particular body (KV I pr, 94). So our soul is an idea in the Thinking Thing of this body of ours (KV I pr, 95). 'The soul, being an Idea of this body, is so united

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with it, that it and this body, so constituted, together make a whole' (KV II 19, 132). This whole is the human being, which is finite. A human is not a substance. What a human has of thinking are only modes of the attribute of thought. What a human has of form, motion, etc., are only modes of the attribute of extension (KV II pr, 94). The human mind consists of perceptions of its body and the things with which its body interacts. Further, Spinoza defines body as a certain proportion of motion and rest (KV II pr, 95). Once external bodies destroy a human body, i.e., once they disrupt or change a human body's particular ratio of motion and rest, the human soul is destroyed insofar as the soul is an idea of a body with that particular ratio KVIIpr,96). We see here two important aspects of the KV's understanding of the mind-body relationship. First, Spinoza already accepts the basic notions of substance, attribute and mode that are found in the Ethics, notions that are importantly different from Descartes' use of the same terms. Second, we see the seeds of what is perhaps Spinoza's most crucial break with Cartesianism: his Parallelism Principle. Let's look at each of these in turn. Substancey attribute and mode While we find the beginnings of Spinoza's immanent philosophy in both the CM and the TIE (for example, that the human mind is part of the Thinking Thing), the KV is his first attempt to provide a metaphysical account of this immanence. Spinoza does not separate God from his creation, but rather distinguishes between two ways of looking at the one substance, which he interchangeably calls 'God' or 'Nature' (KV I 2, 68 and KV I 7, 91). We can understand substance as Natura naturans or Natura naturata. Natura naturans is a conception of substance as active, as 'a being that we conceive clearly and distinctly through itself, without needing anything other than itself (KV I 8, 91). It is God as God, that is a 'being, of which all, or infinite, attributes are predicated, each of which is infinitely perfect in its own kind' (KV 12,65). An attribute is that through which we know what God is (KV I 7, 89). God's true attributes express God's essence or nature and should be distinguished frompropria, or properties, of God, such as eternity and immutability, which though true of God, do not express God's nature or essence (KV I 2, 73). As humans we only have access to two attributes: thought and extension (KV I 2, 73). Natura naturata, on the other hand, is substance conceived as acted upon. It consists in all the modes of substance that depend on God (KV I 7, 91). There are two types of modes - universal and particular both expressed through each attribute. The universal modes are matter in

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motion (expressed through extension) and intellect in the thinking thing (KV I 9, 91). Particular modes are singular things produced by universal modes (KV I 8, 91). These are, respectively, singular bodies (which are particular ratios of motion and rest) (KV ap II, 155) and singular souls (which are ideas of singular bodies) (KV II pr, 95). The difference between universal and particular modes is how God is their efficient cause. The universal modes depend on God immediately (KV I 8, 91). Further, 'God is properly a cause of those effects he has produced immediately, through his attributes alone, without any further circumstances, and that these therefore cannot perish so long as their cause endures' (KV I 2, 78). On the other hand, God is, 'in a sense, the remote cause of all particular things' (KV I 3, 81), for God produces particular things through the infinite modes. Singular things are finite, their existence is distinct from their essence. While their essence is produced through the eternal universal modes, the proximate cause of their existence is other finite modes, in an indefinite causal chain. This difference is key, for while Spinoza says the 'effect of an internal [immanent] cause cannot perish so long as its cause endures' (KV I, second dialogue, 78) and God is the immanent cause of all the modes, God is the immanent cause of only the essence of particular modes (through the mediating universal modes). This essence is eternal. However, the cause of the existence of particular things is transitive - other singular things. They will therefore perish unlike universal modes, whose essence and existence are caused immanently by God. We will see similar ideas expressed in the Ethics with one very significant change: the introduction of a third kind of mode. This new introduction will serve as a middle ground between the KV's universal and particular modes. This new introduction will be key to making Spinoza's account of the mind-body relationship consistent by securing parallelism at the level of singular things. Seeds of the parallelism principle A second important feature of the mind-body relationship in the KV is that it foreshadows the parallelism of the Ethics. First, the KV says that there can be no causal interaction between modes of different attributes. However, this work is not consistent on this point. The KV states that no mode of thinking can produce motion in a body (KV II 19, 131) and that bodies and their effects cannot act on souls other than to make themselves known as objects. That is to say, bodies do not affect the soul as bodies, but only insofar as they are objects (KV II 19, 133). However, the KV also says that a soul can move its body:

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For if the body receives one mode, such as, for example, Peter's body, and again another, such as Paul's body, the result of this is that there are two different ideas in the thinking thing: One Idea of Peter's body, which makes the soul of Peter, and another of Paul['s body], which makes Paul's soul. So then, the thinking thing can indeed move Peter's body, through the Idea of Peter's body, but not through the Idea of Paul's body. So Paul's soul can indeed move his own body, but not that of someone else, such as Peter (KV II 22, 137). The KV does not have the mind-body relationship worked out, as this and other inconsistencies on the issue of interaction show. As we will see in Chapter 7, the Ethics is consistent in its claim that minds and bodies can have no causal interaction. Further, the Ethics explains why minds and bodies cannot interact: not only are Nature and God one and the same thing (i.e., the same substance expressed under two different attributes), a finite body and its mind are one and the same thing. Since a body and its corresponding mind are not two different things, they cannot interact. An important part of the Ethics' understanding of this non-causal relationship is a thoroughgoing parallelism: 'The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things' (E II P7). The order and connections of ideas must be the same as that of bodies because ideas and bodies are really just different expressions of the same modes. The KV does not contain an explicit statement of parallelism or a consistent understanding of the relationship between the modes of thought and the modes of extension, but it does contain important seeds of these views. In particular, the KV contains the notion that there is a parallel relationship between a soul and its body. The KV understands the mind-body union to be a whole in the sense that 'the soul, being an Idea of this body, is so united with it, that it and this body, so constituted, together make a whole' (KV II 19, 132). There is a certain balance in this notion, for just as human ideas are modes of the attribute of thought, human bodies are modes of the attribute of extension. Further, we already see that the nature of this union is such that the duration of and any changes that occur to a body will also occur in the soul: The Soul is an Idea which is in the thinking thing, arising from the existence of a thing which is in Nature. From this it follows that as the duration and change of a thing are, so also the duration and change of the Soul must be (KV II 23, 140-41). Now since the Idea proceeds from the existence of the object, then if the object changes or is destroyed, the idea itself also changes or is destroyed

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in the same degree; this being so, it is what is united with the object (KVapII, 154). Spinoza even gives an example of what he means by this 'parallelism': So this existing proportion's objective essence in the thinking attribute is the soul of the body. Hence when one of these modes (motion or rest) changes, either by increasing or decreasing, the Idea also changes correspondingly. For example, if the rest happens to increase, and the motion to decrease, the pain or sadness we call cold is thereby produced. On the other hand, if this [increase] occurs in the motion, then the pain we call heat is thereby produced (KV ap II, 155). Note that at this point in the KV we do see a parallelism between modes of thought and extension in the mind-body union, but we do not yet know if all bodies, or just human bodies, participate in such a union. Therefore, it is not yet clear that the order and connection of [all] things is the same as the order and connection of [all] ideas. This development will not occur until the Ethics. While the KV does not make it clear if all finite bodies participate in a mind-body union, its second appendix introduces a mind—body union, and consequently a parallelism, of a different sort: ... since Nature or God is one being, of which infinite attributes are said, and which contains in itself all essences of created things, it is necessary that of all this there is produced in thought an infinite Idea, which contains in itself objectively the whole of Nature, as it is in itself (KV ap II, 53) [emphasis mine]. In other words, there is an idea that has the whole of nature as its object. We know from KV II 22 that the whole of nature is one unique infinite being (139). Further, we know from KV II 18 that man is part of this unique infinite being (127). There is a parallelism between the idea that man is part of the whole of nature and that man's mind is part of a Thinking Thing. The KV does not say whether the Thinking Thing of which we are part is the same thing as the idea of the whole of nature. In other words, it does not tell us that the thinking thing of which we are part is a mind united to the whole of nature in the same way that a human mind is united to its body (i.e., as an idea of that object). Further, the KV does not provide the ontological status of the whole of nature or the Thinking Thing of which we are part. Are they universal modes or particular modes? The KV does say that the

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infinite idea of the whole of nature is 'a creature created immediately by God' (KV ap II, 153). Therefore, the idea of the whole of nature must be a universal mode, for Spinoza defines universal modes as those things that depend on God immediately (KV I 8, 91). Further, he seems to equate the idea of the whole of nature with intellect in the Thinking Thing (KV ap II, 153). We will return to this 'second sort of parallelism', i.e., a parallelism of infinite beings, in Chapter 7. As we will see in that chapter, while the Ethics presents a much more developed account of the mind—body union, Spinoza never provides a consistent account of what the Ethics calls 'infinite modes'. How does all this bear on Spinoza's theory of error? As we will see in the next section, and more fully in Chapter 7, Spinoza's understanding of the types of modes and the relationship between mind and body are central to his mature account of perception and the method for avoiding error. Four Types of Perception

In the KV, as in the TIE, Spinoza distinguishes between different types of perceptions. However, he makes some significant changes. The first thing to note is that the KV is not consistent as to how many types of perceptions there are. It vacillates between three and four. For instance, in Chapter aaa Spinoza says there are three types: Perceptions acquired simply through 'belief, that is, either from report or from experience (which he calls 'opinion'). Perceptions acquired through a true belief (which he calls 'reason'). Perceptions acquired through a clear and distinct concept (which he calls 'immediate knowledge') (KV II 1, 97). However, in Part II, chapter IV he says there are four types: Perceptions acquired Perceptions acquired Perceptions acquired Perceptions acquired

through report alone. through experience. through belief. through clear knowledge (KV II 4, 104).

This difference is not too problematic in that it lies in whether he treats report and experience as one or two categories and, in any case, as we wil see, they have the same epistemic value. It does, however, make commentary messy by causing confusion when referring to the 'third' or 'fourth' type of perception. For this reason, I will avoid such labels and refer to 'true belief/reason' or 'immediate knowledge/clear knowledge'.

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'Opinion5 consists of perceptions acquired through report and experience. These perceptions involve guessing or speculation and are subject to error. They are not certain (KV II 2, 98). The effects of this kind of perception are 'all the passions contrary to good reason5 (KV II 2, 99). That is to say, passions arise from the error of opinion (KV II 4, 102). Note that for Spinoza the proximate cause of the passions of the soul is knowledge or perception, not the animal spirits as Descartes maintained (KV II 2, 99). True 'belief5 consists of things we grasp through reason because we do not see them, but know them only through a conviction in the intellect that it must be so and not otherwise (KV II 2, 98-99). This type of knowledge shows us only 'what it belongs to the thing to be, but not what it truly is5 (KV II 4, 102). In other words, this is knowledge of the properties of a thing, but not of its essence. He gives an example to make this clearer. Imagine a person presented with a series of four numbers. Because he has used multiplication and division, he says that the four numbers are proportional; however, he is not able to say what that proportionality is. This is an example of true belief or reason. The person "speaks about it just as of a thing that is outside him5 (KV II 4, 103). Reason is useful in that it makes us perceive intellectually things that are outside of us. Reason provides us with knowledge of good and evil, which are beings of reason. The term 'good5 refers to all things that we perceive as good for us, that is, as increasing our power, while the term 'bad5 refers to all those things we perceive as bad for us. Because reason shows us what is good and bad for us, it shows us all the passions that should be destroyed (KV II 4, 103). However, reason is not able to destroy all of them on its own; clear knowledge is necessary, but reason is essential in that it leads us to clear knowledge. For in showing us what is good for us, reason creates in us good desires, the ultimate good desire being for human perfection or blessedness. As Spinoza puts it: Reasoning is not the principal thing in us, but only like a stairway, by which we can climb up to the desired place, or like a good spirit which without any falsity or deception brings tidings of the greatest good, to spur us thereby to seek it, and to unite with it in a union which is our greatest salvation and blessedness (KV II 26, 147). We know from the TIE that the 'union which is our greatest salvation and blessedness5 is the union of our mind with the whole of Nature. Now that we have a better understanding of the mind-body relation and the modes of substance we can begin to understand what this union is and how the mind can come to know it. We can only achieve blessedness or human perfection through clear knowledge: an immediate perception that allows us to unite to its object.

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Clear knowledge does not come from being convinced by reason; rather, it conies from being aware of and enjoying the thing itself (KV 112, 99). That is to say, it is an immediate manifestation of the object itself to the intellect (KV 1122,138-39). A human soul is united to its body in this way. We perceive our body immediately, not through reason. To the extent that we gain clear knowledge of any other thing, we unite to it in the same way that we are united to our body, that is, that object and our soul make one whole. The effect of clear knowledge, including a clear perception of our body, is true and genuine love (KV II 2, 99). Love arises from the perception we have of a thing and will be greater the more magnificent the thing shows itself to be. We get rid of love by either having a perception of a better object or by perceiving that the object brings with it misery (KV II 5, 104). An important concept in Spinoza's mature philosophy is conatus, that is, the view that each thing strives to preserve its own being. The KV's definition of'Providence' seems to be talking about the same thing. The KV says that Providence is: ... that striving we find both in the whole of Nature and in particular things, tending to maintain and preserve their being. For it is evident that no thing, through its own nature, could strive for its own destruction, but that on the contrary, each thing itself has a striving to preserve itself in its state, and bring itself to a better one (KV I 5, 84). A human soul, like all things, strives to preserve itself and improve itself, so it will strive to unite to the most magnificent object possible. Reason plays an important role in helping us determine which type of object is most worthy of love, that is, which object will improve us by uniting to it. Spinoza discusses three categories of objects: Some objects are corruptible in themselves, others, through their cause, are not corruptible; but there is a third [object] which, solely through its own power and capacity, is eternal and incorruptible. The corruptible, then, are all the singular things, which have not existed from all time, or have had a beginning. The next are all those modes which we have said are the cause of the singular modes. But the third is God, or what we take to be one and the same thing, the Truth (KV II 5, 105). The first category refers to particular modes ofNatura naturata. These have not existed from all time, but rather other particular modes create and

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destroy their existence. The second category refers to universal modes of Natura naturata\ these are the modes that produce the (essences of) singular modes (KV 18,91). The third category refers to God or substance itself, that is, Natura naturans. Uniting to particular modes does not strengthen our nature at all, but is even harmful to us. After all, they are corruptible in themselves (KV II 5, 105). Therefore, a human soul that is united only to its body, that is, a soul that has clear and immediate perceptions of nothing other than its body, will necessarily perish. After all, it is to that extent only an idea of body and has no existence separate from that body. Therefore, the death of the body will be the death of the soul. The only way then for a human soul to be eternal is to unite with something eternal. It is impossible for a soul to unite with universal modes. We cannot properly understand a mode without understanding the being on which it immediately depends (KV II 5, 107). Therefore, we cannot know universal modes without knowing God as their cause. However, upon knowing God we would necessarily love and unite to God because there is nothing more magnificent. The soul never has a chance to unite with universal modes, for the moment it would do so it would know God, and because it now knows (and therefore loves) something more magnificent, it would no longer love the universal mode. Therefore, God is the object our soul ought to desire. For God is eternal and incorruptible solely through his own power and capacity (KV II 5, 105). We have seen that Spinoza understands God and Nature to be the same thing. We can now make better sense of the TIE's notion of human perfection as a unification of the mind with something of which we are part. The TIE says this unification is with the whole of nature. Now the KV says that blessedness is the unification of the mind with God through clear and immediate knowledge. Let us sum up with Spinoza's own words: The first thing the soul comes to know is the body, the result is that the soul loves the body and is united to it. But since, as we have already said, the cause of love, hate, and sadness must be sought not in the body, but only in the soul (for all the actions of the body must proceed from motion and rest), and because we see clearly and distinctly that the one love is destroyed by the perception of something else that is better, it follows from this clearly that if we once come to know God (at least with as clear a knowledge as we have of our body), we must then come to be united with him even more closely than with our body, and be, as it were, released from the body (KV II 19, 133).

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By uniting to God, we make our soul eternal and free, achieving human perfection or blessedness. The way we avoid error, then, is to stick to the third and fourth types of perception. For, in all four types of perception, our affirmation of an idea is caused, but in the third and fourth types of perception the essence of the mind is a partial cause. The essence of the mind is a partial cause of the third type of knowledge because reason belongs to the essence of the human mind. The essence of the mind partially causes the fourth type because it occurs immediately through a unification of the essence of the mind with the essence of the object. This fourth type of perception is the means to our improvement. The more perfect the object of clear knowledge, the more perfect we become through uniting to it. The ultimate perfection therefore would be to unite with God through this fourth type of perception (KV II 4, 104). This idea of unification with the object of the idea comes out of Spinoza's new understanding of the mind-body relationship. At first, clear knowledge as a unification with its object may seem very different from the fourth type of knowledge in the TIE. Rather than seeing the KV's notion of clear knowledge as a new development, I see it as aaaaaa fleshing out of the TIE's notion of an adequate idea of a thing's essence. For the mind to have an adequate idea of a thing, the mind must contain clear and distinct perceptions of both its essence and its proximate causes. For the mind to move from an inadequate idea to an adequate one. it must expand, if you will, so that it contains the objective essence of the object of the idea completely. We can just as easily understand this expansion as a unification with something that was once beyond its perceptions. Nonetheless, this 'fleshing out' has significant consequences for Spinoza's theory of mind. Truth, Falsity and Error

The KV keeps the theory of error found in the TIE. The method is still thaa same: only accept adequate ideas, whether they be adequate ideas of the properties of things (reason/true belief, or what the TIE calls the third type of perception) or adequate ideas of things themselves (clear/immediate knowledge, or what the TIE calls the fourth type of perception). However, there is a change in Spinoza's theory of truth and falsity. Due to developments in the mind-body relationship and the soul's unification with the object of clear knowledge, we see Spinoza's understanding of truth and falsity appears on the surface to be a correspondence theory:

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Truth, then, is an affirmation (or denial) which one makes concerning a thing and which agrees with the thing itself. Falsity is an affirmation (or denial) about a thing which does not agree with the thing itself (KV II 15, 119). This is very different from the TIE, which holds a containment theory of truth, not a correspondence theory. For the TIE gives examples of both a true idea that does not correspond to formal physical reality as well as a false idea that does (TIE 31). The reason I say it 'appears on the surface' to be a correspondence theory is that Spinoza's account in the KV is very different from what people usually mean by that term. Spinoza is talking about the correspondence between, for example, Peter's idea of X and the objective essence of X with X's proximate causes. Perhaps the Spinoza of the KV thinks that the objective essence of X must necessarily correspond to some formal physical reality X, but the KV does not explicitly say so, nor does it have the foundation to do so. We will see a correspondence theory in this sense in the Ethics. Before Spinoza's containment theory of truth, that is, his notion of adequacy, can support such an account, he must have a thoroughgoing parallelism, which does not occur until the Ethics. A correspondence theory cannot follow from his containment theory of adequacy unless (1) it is the case that every body has a mind (which is the idea of that body) and every mind has a body for its object and (2) it is the case that the order and connection of those minds are necessarily the same as the order and connection of those bodies.

Chapter 7

Spinoza's Mature Epistemology: The Ethics

Introduction As we have seen in Chapter 5, while Spinoza never accepted Descartes' epistemology outright, to a reader of the Ethics, his earliest writings appear surprisingly 'Cartesian'. In Chapter 6, we saw a 'middle' Spinoza moving even further away from Descartes' epistemology, but lacking the ontology to click into place each aspect of his own developing system. In this chapter, we will examine Spinoza's Ethics, which represents his mature epistemology and the metaphysics needed to support it. We will begin by examining two features of parallelism - the linchpin of Spinoza's mature system. First, we will examine the developments in his understanding of the mind-body union that makes such a thoroughgoing parallelism possible. Next, we will describe Spinoza's mature ontology given that parallelism. The second section will examine important changes in Spinoza's epistemology that result from this parallelism and new ontology: the collapse of the will—intellect distinction and his mature theories of error, falsity and truth.

Parallelism The second part of the Ethics contains what scholars call Spinoza's parallelism principle: 'The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things' (E II P7). The order and structure of Natura naturata, understood through the attribute of thought, will mirror, but not causally interact with, the order and structure of Natura naturata, understood through the attribute of extension. As we will come to see, this concept holds together Spinoza's intricate philosophical system. While hints of this parallelism are present in the earlier writings, it is not until the Ethics that Spinoza applies this parallelism to all modes of Natura naturata. His modified understanding of the mind—body union makes this shift possible.

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The Mind-Body Union The Ethics contains three significant developments in the mind—body union: it consistently denies mind-body interaction; it extends the mindbody union to all bodies; and it takes the mind—body relation to be an identity. In other words, it presents a thoroughgoing parallelism. First, the Ethics makes it clear that there is no causal interaction between attributes (E II P6). For two things to causally interact they must have properties in common and attributes do not (E I P3). While this notion is in the KV, that work inconsistently allowed some interaction between human minds and bodies. In particular, a mind can move the body with which it is united (KV II 20, 137) and a body is the cause of what the mind affirms of it. The Ethics explicitly denies such possibilities: The Body cannot determine the Mind to thinking, and the Mind cannot determine the Body to motion, to rest or to anything else (if there is anything else) ( E I I I P 2 ) . Second, the Ethics continues but expands upon the KV's notion that the mind is an idea of body (E II PI 1 and PI 3): From these [propositions] we understand not only that the human Mind is united to the Body, but also what should be understood by the union of Mind and Body. But no one will be able to understand it adequately, or distinctly, unless he first knows adequately the nature of the Body. For the things we have shown so far are completely general and do not pertain more to man than to other Individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate. For each thing there is necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause in the same way as he is of the idea of the human Body. And so, whatever we have said of the idea of the human Body must also be said of the idea of any thing (E II PI 3 S) [emphasis mine]. This passage shows us two important developments of the Ethics. First, all bodies are animate, the mind-body union is not unique to humans - for every body, there is an idea of that body which is a mind. Second, an adequate understanding of the nature of body is prior to an adequate understanding of the nature of the mind. There is a critical connection between Spinoza's physical account and his mental account, explaining the interruption of a book on the mind with the physical digression (E II P13-P14). This physical digression gives an account of physical individuation and identity that provides the model for mental individuation and identity.

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Third, the Ethics treats mind and body as one and the same thing. The KV did treat God and Nature as the same thing, but the Ethics takes this identity to the level of the modes: ... the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, also a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways (E II P7 S). These three modifications culminate in a thoroughgoing parallelism, found not only in the human mind—body union (as the KV would have it), but throughout Naturanaturata. This parallelism is a central feature of Spinoza's mature ontology, which gives a new and significantly different account of the modes ofNatura naturata.

A Modified Ontology While the KV divided Naturanaturata into two types of modes, universal and particular, the Ethics divides Natura naturata into three types: (1) Infinite immediate modes, which follow immediately from the absolute nature of some attribute of God. They exist necessarily and are infinite (E I P21 and I P23 d). (2) Infinite mediate modes, which also exist necessarily and are infinite, but they follow immediately from the infinite immediate modes, and only mediately from the absolute nature of God (E I P22 and I P22 d). (3) Finite modes, which are singular things. They are finite and have determinate existence. Further, a finite mode cannot exist nor produce an effect unless it is determined to exist or produce an effect by another finite mode, and so on to infinity (E I P28). That is to say, they are contingent. There is nothing in their essence that posits or excludes their existence (E I P24 j . The infinite immediate modes of the Ethics are like the universal modes of the KV in that they depend on God immediately (KV I 8, 91). The finite modes are like the KV's particular modes in that they are determinate and 'in a sense' remotely caused by God (KV I 3, 81). That is to say, other finite modes cause their existence, but God produces their essence (E I P25). What is new is the addition of infinite mediate modes, which occupy a middle ground between the universal and particular modes of the KV. They are infinite particulars. The Ethics does not give examples of each type of mode. However, it is clear that the finite modes of extension are finite individual bodies and their actions, which obey the laws of physical causation, are the concern of physics. All individual bodies are composed of simpler bodies (that is to say. there are no atomic simples) and the form of an individual body consists of

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the union of these parts, particularly the ratio of motion and rest among those parts. An individual retains its nature as long as it retains this ratio of motion and rest (E II L4 d and L5). The finite modes of thought are singular ideas and their actions, which obey the laws of mental causation, are the concern of psychology. Recall that minds are ideas of bodies and there is an idea for every body. The result is that parallel to every finite individual body is a finite individual mind and vice versa. Further, the essence of each individual, whether mind or body, is its conatus, that is, its striving to persevere in its being (E III P7). The very essence of an individual body, then, is its striving to preserve the particular ratio of motion and rest among its parts and the striving of an individual mind is to affirm that particular ratio of motion and rest (E III PlOd). Spinoza's understanding of the infinite modes, particularly the mediate modes, is less clear. His contemporaries must have thought so as well because one of them, G.H. Schuller, asked Spinoza to provide '... examples of those things immediately produced by God and of those things produced by the mediation of some infinite modification' (Ep 63, 296—97). Spinoza responded: The examples you ask for of the first kind are: in the case of thought, absolutely infinite intellect; in the case of extension, motion and rest. An example of the second kind is the face of the whole universe, which, although varying in infinite ways, yet remains always the same. See Scholium to Lemma 7 preceding Prop. 14, II (Ep 64, 299;. It is significant that Spinoza refers Schuller to E II L7, which does not use the term 'the face of the whole universe', but rather 'the whole of nature'. Further, it defines 'the whole of nature' as 'one Individual whose parts, i.e.. all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change of the whole Individual' (E II PI 3 L7). Since (1) this definition is the same as Spinoza's description of'the face of the whole universe' - that which varies in infinite ways but always remains the same — and since (2) Letter 64 refers the reader to Spinoza's definition of the whole of nature, I take Spinoza's terms 'the face of the whole universe' and 'the whole of nature' to refer to the same thing. Letter 64 tells us that the immediate modes [like the universal modes in the KV] are motion (and now rest) in the attribute of extension and absolute infinite intellect in the attribute of thought. Further, this letter tells us that the face of the whole universe, i.e., the whole of nature, is the mediate mode of extension. This is very interesting since we saw the difficulty in the KV of determining the ontological status of the whole of nature, which as one unique individual (KV II 22, 139) seems to be a particular mode, but as an

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infinite being (KV II 22, 139) seems to be a universal mode. Here we see the Ethics solve a problem with the KV's ontological structure. A new category of infinite mediate modes (infinite particulars) is needed. Spinoza never identifies the infinite mediate mode of thought. However, given his new understanding of the mind-body relation and the resulting thoroughgoing parallelism, it must be an idea of the whole of nature. Remember, there is an idea of every body, and every mind is an idea of a body. Every idea and its object form a 'union5, which is really an identity — one thing understood through two different attributes. Since these are really one and the same thing, there is no interaction between the mind and body it is united to. Further, the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. This parallelism holds between all modes of extension and all modes of thought, including infinite mediate modes. Like the infinite mediate mode of extension, the infinite mediate mode of mind must be an infinite particular being composed of infinite finite modes. All minds are ideas of particular bodies and this infinite mind must be an idea of an infinite particular body. The only infinite body is the whole of nature. Therefore, the infinite mediate mode of thought must be the idea of the whole of nature. As we have seen in Chapters 5 and 6, there are forms of this idea in Spinoza's earlier works, for example: If we attend to the proportion of the whole of nature, we can consider it as one being, and consequently there will only be one idea of God, or decree concerning Naturanaturata (CM I 7, 329). That is to say, the whole of nature is one particular being and likewise there is a 'parallel' idea that is one particular being in the attribute of thought. Earlier works also capture the notion that just as the human body is part of a greater infinite body - the whole of nature - human minds are part of a greater Thinking Thing (TIE 33 and KV II 23, 140-41). However, the Ethics is the first work to provide an ontological status for such infinite particulars.

Spinoza's Mature Epistemology How do these metaphysical developments affect Spinoza's epistemology? Spinoza's thoroughgoing parallelism — applied both to infinite mediate modes and the finite modes of which they consist - results in (1) a new identification of will and intellect and consequently significant changes in his theory of error and (2) a theory of truth that takes on the appearance of

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correspondence theory in that all true ideas agree with their objects. This section will reconstruct the Ethic*'s account of the will—intellect relationship and the three types of knowledge, as well as the new approaches to error, falsity and truth to which they give rise. Will-Intellect Relationship The Ethics continues to maintain that will and intellect are universals: These and similar faculties are either complete fictions or nothing but Metaphysical beings, or universals, which we are used to forming from particulars. So intellect and will are to this or that idea, or to this or that volition, as 'stone-ness3 is to this or that stone, or man to Peter or Paul (EIIP48S).

and. In the Mind (by P48) there is no absolute faculty of willing and not willing, but only singular volitions, viz. this and that affirmation, and this and that negation (E II P49 d). Notice that up to this passage, the Ethics contains the term 'will5 (as does the CM and KV). After P49, the Ethics contains the term 'volition' (as does the TIE). 2 The Ethics takes will, or volition, to be the affirmation or denial that something is true or false - rather than desire or aversion. Here Spinoza is making a distinction between volition, which belongs to the attribute of thought, and desire or appetite, which he ascribes to man as a mind-body union. When speaking about the mind's conatus, that is, its striving to preserve its being, Spinoza says: When this striving is related only to the Mind, it is called Will; but when it is related to the Mind and Body together, it is called Appetite. This Appetite, therefore, is nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature there necessarily follow those things that promote his preservation. And so man is determined to do those things. Between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that desire is generally related to men insofar as they are conscious of their appetite. So desire can be defined as appetite together with consciousness of the appetite (E III P9 S [emphasis original] He continues by saying that we do not desire things because we judge them to be good; rather, we call them good because we desire them (E III P9 S).

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Spinoza understands desire to be the essence of man, i.e., his conatus (E III P59 S and E IV PI 8 d) and appetite to be the end for the sake of which we do something (E IVD7). In Chapters 5 and 6, I showed that Spinoza made less and less of the distinction between will and intellect from the CM to the KV. The Ethics gets rid of this distinction entirely: The will and intellect are nothing apart from the singular volitions and ideas themselves (by P48 and P48 S). But the singular volitions and ideas are one and the same (by P49). Therefore the will and the intellect are one and the same, q.e.d. (E II P49d). In removing this distinction, Spinoza makes his most radical departure from the Cartesian theory of error. As we saw, Descartes argued that error occurs when the will extends beyond the intellect. While Spinoza's early writings portray will and intellect differently than does Descartes, both Descartes and the pre-Ethics Spinoza hold that the mind is able to affirm beyond the contents of its ideas and this ability is the cause of error. Spinoza no longer holds this view in the Ethics. Spinoza is aware of this consequence of removing the will—intellect distinction (E II P49 SI). He even anticipates four objections that Cartesians might raise. First, his opponents think that the will extends more widely than the intellect because they know from experience that they can assent to infinitely many more things than they perceive without requiring a greater faculty of affirming or denying. However, they would need a greater faculty of understanding in order to perceive things other than they do. Therefore, they conclude that the will is infinite and the intellect is finite (E II P49 SIIIA(i)). Spinoza says two things in response. First, he grants that will extends more widely than clear and distinct ideas, but will does not extend more widely than the intellect. That is to say, when he says 'human intellect5, he is not speaking only of clear and distinct ideas, but all perceptions in the mind. It is impossible that the mind affirms an idea that it does not conceive. Second, he does not see why: ... the faculty of willing should be called infinite, when the faculty of sensing is not. For just as we can affirm infinitely many things by the same faculty of willing (but one after another, for we cannot affirm infinitely many things at once), so also we can sense, or perceive, infinitely many bodies by the same faculty of sensing (viz. one after another) (EIIP49SIIIB(i)). 3

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The second objection his opponents might raise is to say experience tells us that we can suspend our judgement so as not to assent to something that we perceive (E II P49 SIIIA (ii)). Spinoza's response to this objection is to reject that people are free to suspend judgement. When we say someone suspends judgement, we say nothing other than that they perceive that they have an inadequate idea. Therefore, the 'suspension of judgement5 is not an act of free will, but rather a perception (E II P49 SIIIB(ii)). The third objection is that there is a difference between will and intellect because one affirmation does not seem to contain more reality than another, but one idea does have more reality, or perfection, than another idea. His opponents cite that it does not seem to require a greater power to affirm that a true idea is true than to affirm a false idea is true (E II P49 SIIIA(iii)). Spinoza thinks this objection arises from confusing universals with singulars. He reminds the reader that the term 'will' is a universal predicated of all ideas and signifies only what is common to all ideas, i.e., affirmation. Singular affirmations, on the other hand, differ from each other just as much as singular ideas differ from other singular ideas. Spinoza goes on to deny that affirming the truth of a true idea takes an equal power of thinking as affirming that a false idea is true. For, as we will discuss in the next section, there is nothing positive in false ideas insofar as they are false. Falsity is a privation and affirming truth of true and false ideas does not require the same power of thinking (E II P49 SIIIB(iii)). The fourth and final objection that Spinoza deals with concerning his claim that the will and intellect are one and the same thing is the question: if the will is not free, what will happen if a man is in a state of equilibrium, like Buridan's ass? Spinoza responds by saying outright: ... I grant entirely that a man placed in such an equilibrium (viz. who perceives nothing but thirst and hunger, and such food and drink as are equally distant from him) will perish of hunger and thirst. If they ask me whether such a man should not be thought an ass, rather than a man, I say that I do not know - just as I also do not know how highly we should esteem one who hangs himself, or children, or fools, and madmen, etc. (EIIP49SIIIB(iv)). The Ethics, like the KV, denies that the will is free. Only God is a free cause (E I PI7 C2). Nothing can act on God because nothing is outside of God. All things are in God, for nothing can be nor be conceived without God (E I PI7 d). Singular things, like volitions in a human mind, on the other hand, are determined to exist and act as they do by other singular things (E I P28). Each volition is only a certain singular mode of thinking:

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And so (by P28) each volition can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined by another cause, and this cause again by another, and so on, to infinity. Even if the will be supposed to be infinite, it must still be determined to exist and produce an effect by God, not insofar as he is an absolutely infinite substance, but insofar as he has an attribute that expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought (by P23). So in whatever way it is conceived, whether as finite or as infinite, it requires a cause by which it is determined to exist and produce an effect. And so (by D7) it cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary or compelled one, q.e.d. (E I P32 d). The Ethics is very clear that there is no free will (E II P48). Spinoza explains that people think there is free will because they are aware of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined to do those actions (EIIP35S). In speaking about Descartes' theory of mind, Spinoza says: 'Finally, I pass over all those things he claimed about the will and its freedom, since I have already shown, more than adequately, that they are false5 (E V pr). Once parallelism is brought to the level of finite modes, ideas (which are volitions and vice versa) must be determined as are the bodies to which they are united. Three Kinds of Knowledge

The Ethics distinguishes between three types of knowledge: opinion or imagination, reason and intuitive knowledge. The first type of knowledge is the only one to consist of inadequate ideas and is therefore the only cause of falsity (E II P41). Reason and intuitive knowledge, on the other hand, consists of true and adequate ideas. Before looking at the three types of knowledge in detail, let us review Spinoza's concept of adequacy and see what he says about it in the Ethics. Remember from the TIE that a mind has an adequate idea of a thing when it has a complete idea of that thing. The Ethics tells us that all ideas are adequate in God (E II P36 d). Further, ideas are only inadequate insofar as they relate to a singular [finite] mind (E II P36 d). We can explain this idea in terms of the Ethics* new tri-modal ontology. All ideas are in God insofar as we consider God as an infinite mediate mode of thought. A human mind is but one of these ideas. A human mind itself contains ideas, and so, these ideas are in the infinite mediate mode of thought. When Spinoza says that a human mind perceives something, he is saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is an infinite mediate mode, but insofar as he is explained

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through the nature of that particular human mind, that is, insofar as he constitutes the nature of that human mind, has this or that idea: and when we say that God has this or that idea, not only insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human Mind, but insofar as he also has the idea of another thing together with the human Mind, then we say that the human Mind perceives the thing only partially or inadequately (EIIP11C). These are inadequate ideas in a human mind because that human mind is only a partial cause of them. Ideas outside of that human mind are also a partial cause of such inadequate ideas (E III PI d). The mind forms inadequate ideas, or the first kind of knowledge, when it perceives things insofar as it is determined externally from random experience (E II P29 S). The ideas of the affections of body are necessarily inadequate because these ideas involve the nature of the parts making up the human body that interact with external bodies. An adequate idea of such affections must involve adequate ideas of the causes of those parts, i.e., external bodies, and while such ideas are in God, they are external to the human mind (E II P28). This explains why we can only have a confused idea of our body and its parts (E II PI 3 S). The existence and duration of a particular human body, let us call it Body X, is caused by finite bodies external to Body X. The existence and duration of Body X depend on the common order of nature and the constitution of other finite bodies, not on the essence of Body X or on God's absolute nature. There are adequate ideas in God of the duration and existence of Body X, but this is only insofar as God (understood as the infinite mediate mode of thought) has adequate ideas of all finite things(EIIP30d). The mind does not only perceive the affections of its correlate body, but also the idea of those affections (E II P22). Imagination occurs when the mind perceives bodies external to its correlate body through such reflexive ideas(EIIP26C): If the human Body is affected with a mode that involves the nature of an external body, the human Mind will regard the same external body as actually existing, or as present to it, until the Body is affected by an affect that excludes the existence or presence of that body (E II PI 7). Images are the affections of the body whose ideas present the external object as actually existing, whether or not they reproduce external things as they are. The mind imagines when it regards bodies through the ideas of these

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affections (E II PI 7 S). We imagine singular things most distinctly and vividly (E V P6 S). However, the mind can only imagine distinctly at one time as many images as can be formed in the body at the same time. Universals such as 'dog5 arise because so many images of dogs are formed at one time in the human body that they surpass the power of imagining to the point that the mind cannot imagine slight differences between the singular dogs nor their determinate number. The mind can only distinctly imagine the affections that all of them make on the body. This occurs because the properties common to all dogs most forcefully affect the body. After all, each singular dog has affected the body with these properties. Such universal notions will differ among men as their experiences with dogs will differ. Each person will form universal images according to the dispositions of her own body (EIIP40S1). Just as we form universal notions from singular things represented to us through random experience, we also form universal notions from signs E II P40 S2). That is, we remember things from when we have read or heard certain words, form universals from them, and imagine these universals to be truly existing things. Spinoza includes memory in the first type of knowledge. Spinoza defines memory as a certain connection of ideas regarding the nature of things that are outside of the human body, that is to say, memory is a connection that is in the mind according to the order and connection of the affections to the body (EIIP18S). The second type of knowledge is reason. These perceptions follow from the fact that we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things (E II P40 S2). Common notions are certain ideas that are common to all men. These ideas are of properties that all bodies have - from the whole of nature to each of the finite bodies within it (E II P38 and P38 C). Note, however, that they do not constitute the essence of singular bodies (EIIP37). Common notions are common to all people because, since they are ideas of properties that all bodies have, and all minds are ideas of their correlate bodies, all minds necessarily contain ideas of things with these properties. To the extent that the mind is determined internally and regards a number of things at one time, perceiving their agreements, differences and oppositions, the mind has adequate ideas. This perception of the connection among ideas happens according to the order of the intellect, or reason, which is the same in all people (E II PI8 S). This is why these notions are 'common' notions. They are different from the first kind of knowledge, which perceives a connection among certain ideas from the common order of things, i.e., from the order and connection of the affections of the human

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body. Opinion and imagination differ from person to person because different people have bodies that are affected in different ways. Reason, by its nature, perceives things under a species of eternity (E II P44). That is to say, reason conceives things to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. It does not perceive things to exist in relation to time and place (E V P29 S). Ideas known through reason are adequate ideas in that they are internally determined. They are determined or caused by the properties common to all of the ideas of bodies within the mind. However, the mind's essence itself is not what determines ideas known through reason. Spinoza says that what is common to all things, and which are equally in the whole and in the part, do not constitute the essence of any singular thing (E II P37). This must be the case given Spinoza's strict definition of essence. For Spinoza a thing's essence is that which a thing cannot be conceived without and that which can neither be nor be conceived without the thing (E II P10 S). Therefore, the properties that are the objects of the common notions cannot constitute the essence of a human mind. After all, the objects of the common notions can and do exist without any given singular mind. On the other hand, the essence of the particular mind does determine the third type of knowledge. Spinoza calls this type of perception intuition. These ideas proceed 'from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attribute of God to the adequate knowledge of the formal essence of things' (E II P40 S2). Intuition depends on the mind as on a formal cause (EVP31): The Mind conceives nothing under a species of eternity except insofar as it conceives its Body's essence under a species of eternity (by P29), i.e., (by P21 and P23), except insofar as it is eternal. So (by P30) insofar as it is eternal, it has knowledge of God, knowledge which is necessarily adequate (by II P46). And therefore, the Mind, insofar as it is eternal, is capable of knowing all those things which can follow from this given knowledge of God (by II P40), i.e., of knowing things by the third kind of knowledge (see the Def. of this in II P40 S2); therefore, the Mind, insofar as it is eternal, is the adequate, or formal, cause of the third kind of knowledge (by III Dl), q.e.d. (E V P31 d). Further, the second type of knowledge consists of a universal knowledge of the properties of singular things, not the essences of singular things. Intuition is knowledge of the essences of things. It therefore has a much more powerful effect on the mind than reason. How does the third type of knowledge arise out of the second type? Well, we cannot conceive a singular thing without God because all singular things

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have God for a cause insofar as God is considered under the attribute of which the things are modes. Therefore, their ideas must involve the concept of their attribute and an attribute is an eternal and infinite essence of God (E II P45 d). This knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence in each idea is adequate and perfect. It is a common notion in that it is common to all ideas, the infinite mediate mode of thought and all the finite modes of which it consists (E II P46 d). Therefore, it is also common to the minds of all people. In other words, we can know it through reason. Once we know, through reason, God's eternal and infinite essence, 'we can deduce from this knowledge a great many things which we know adequately, and so can form that third kind of knowledge' (E II P47 S). The third type of knowledge brings us joy accompanied by the idea of oneself, and consequently includ the idea of God as its cause. Therefore, the third type of knowledge necessarily produces what Spinoza calls 'intellectual love of God'.4 It is a love for God insofar as we understand him to be eternal (E V P32 d and V P32 C). The third type of knowledge is the greatest striving of the mind (E V P25). This is because the more the mind knows things by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the more active it is and the greater the part of it that is immune from affects contrary to our nature (E V P38 d). It is in this sense that the mind can be said to be eternal. Imagination and memory will die when the body dies, but the ideas that are acquired through reason and intuition are in God, not only insofar as he is considered as a particular mode of thought (e.g., a human mind), but also insofar as he is considered as an infinite mediate mode of thought. These ideas are therefore eternal and so is the part of a human mind that contains them. The striving to know things by the third type of knowledge cannot arise from opinion or imagination. It only arises out of reason and intuition itself (E V P26). Intellectual love of God is our salvation, blessedness or freedom (E V P36 S). That is to say, it is complete activity or freedom from the passions. Remember that the human mind is a complex idea composed of simpler ideas, some of which are adequate and some of which are inadequate (E III P3 d). Spinoza defines actions of the mind as those desires that follow from the mind itself insofar as it has adequate ideas. That is to say, actions are desires caused internally. Passions are desires that are not related to the mind except insofar as it has inadequate ideas. These reveal our mutilated knowledge and lack of power (E II All). 5 Therefore, we are necessarily acted upon insofar as we imagine or have the first kind of knowledge (EIIIP56d). It is possible to turn passions into actions. This involves moving from the first kind of knowledge to the second or third types of knowledge. For instance, we can separate affects from the thought of an external cause and

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join them to other thoughts, i.e., the universal knowledge of reason. In doing so, we destroy the love or hate that one feels toward the external cause, as well as the vacillations of the mind that arise from these affects (E V P2). In other words, we can turn an affect that is a passion into an action by forming a clear and distinct idea of it (E V P3). In this way, reason can restrain the affects. However, it does not have absolute dominion over them. This requires intuition: From what we have said, we easily conceive what clear and distinct knowledge - and especially that third kind of knowledge (see II P47 S), whose foundation is the knowledge of God itself - can accomplish against the affects. Insofar as the affects are passions, if clear and distinct knowledge does not absolutely remove them (see P3 and P4 S), at least it brings it about that they constitute the smallest part of the Mind (see PI 4). And then it begets a Love toward a thing immutable and eternal (see PI5), which we really fully possess (see II P45), and which therefore cannot be tainted by any of the vices which are in ordinary Love, but can always be greater and greater (by PI5), and occupy the greatest part of the Mind (by PI6), and affect it extensively (E V P20 S). Since both reason and intuition concern ideas that are common to all minds, we might wonder how it is that not all people possess the second and third type of knowledge. In fact, it seems that very few people ever attain this goal. Spinoza explains: But that men do not have so clear a knowledge of God as they do of the common notions comes from the fact that they cannot imagine God, a they can bodies, and that they have joined the name God to the images of things which they are used to seeing. Men can hardly avoid this, because they are continually affected by the bodies. And indeed, most errors consist only in our not rightly applying names to things (E II P47 S). Falsity and Truth

Error occurs in the first kind of knowledge. Error is not caused by imagination itself or by anything positive in imagination. Rather, the mind errs insofar as it lacks an idea that excludes the existence of those things that it imagines to be present to it (E II PI 7 S). Spinoza uses the following example to illustrate. When a person looks at the sun, he imagines it to be about 200 feet away from him. He only errs as long as he is ignorant of the true dis tance. Once he learns the true distance, he removes the error, but not the imagination, that is, not the idea he has of the sun insofar as the body is

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affected by it (E II PI S). In other words, there is nothing positive in imaginations, or the ideas of the images in the body, that makes them false (E II P33). Rather, falsity consists in the privation of ideas that inadequate ideas involve (E II P35). Adequacy, on the other hand, is the intrinsic denomination of truth (E II D4). It is a perfection or completeness of the idea. That is to say,'... the true is related to the false as being is related to nonbeing' (E IIP43 S). As we have seen, a mind corrects an error by regarding the same thing through the second type of knowledge instead of the first. In other words, we can correct a false idea by adding knowledge to it, thus making it a true idea; for there is nothing positive in false ideas that is removed by the presence of a true idea insofar as it is a true idea (E IV PI). The false idea turns into a true idea by adding to it, thus destroying the privation. For example, in the case of our imagining a unicorn we add the knowledge that unicorns do not exist. The imagination remains, but is overpowered by this new idea so that we no longer posit the unicorn as present. Spinoza says that the mind is necessarily certain of adequate ideas (E IV P27 d). He tells us to imagine a human mind that contains an adequate idea, let us call it Idea A. There is necessarily an idea in God of Idea A. (For, as we have seen, there is an idea of every idea in God.) Idea A is related to God insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind (because it is adequate), therefore, the idea of Idea A must also be related to God insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind. The idea of idea A is therefore an adequate reflexive idea in the human mind. Further, a person who has an adequate idea must at the same time be aware of the truth, completeness or perfection of the idea. This is why the mind cannot help but be certain of adequate ideas. Notice that for Spinoza, certainty is something positive (an adequate reflexive idea). It is not a lack of doubt (E II P49 S and E III D15 ex). Doubt is a vacillation of the mind caused by two contrary affects (E III PI 7 S). In the case of adequate ideas, on the other hand, there are no contrary ideas within that same mind that could cause such vacillation. Therefore, a mind cannot doubt an adequate idea. Falsity, on the other hand, is the privation of certainty (E II P49 S). Certainty is nothing more than the having of an adequate idea (and therefore an adequate reflexive idea) and falsity is nothing more than the privation of an adequate idea. In addition to discussing the intrinsic denomination of truth, i.e., adequacy, the Ethics discusses the extrinsic denomination of truth. It is here that we see Spinoza's theory of truth take on the appearance of a correspondence theory. For a property of all true ideas is that they agree with their objects (E I A6):

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What is contained objectively in the intellect must necessarily be in nature. But in nature (by PI4 Cl) there is only one substance, viz. God, and there are no affections other than those which are in God (by PI5) and which can neither be nor be conceived without God (by PI 5). Therefore, an actual intellect, whether finite or infinite, must comprehend God's attributes and God's affections and, nothing else, q.e.d. (EI P30 d). Nothing can be in an idea whether infinite (the infinite mediate mode of thought) or finite (e.g., Peter's mind) other than what is in nature (i.e., substance understood through the attribute of extension). Since the order and connection of ideas is the same as things, we know that adequate ideas (i.e. ideas that are complete) will correspond to the complete bodies that are the objects of those ideas. That is to say, Peter's idea of X will correspond with the actually existing body X. Inadequate ideas do not correspond to the object they are supposed to represent. When Peter's mind has an inadequate idea of X, his mind only contains a part of the idea whose object is X as it is found in the infinite mediate mode of thought. Notice that this is a correspondence theory only in the sense that all true ideas contain their objects. Spinoza does not hold the causal theory that is usually a central feature of seventeenth-century correspondence theories of truth. Objects do not cause their ideas. Rather, ideas are caused by God himself, insofar as he is a thinking thing (E II P5), i.e., insofar as he is understood as the infinite mediate mode of thought or, what is the same, the idea of the whole of nature. After all, according to Spinoza, there is no causal interaction between attributes.

Conclusion The Ethics represents the final stage in the development of Spinoza's epistemology, which identifies will and intellect, offers a thorough rejection of Descartes' theory of error, takes falsity to be a privation and metaphysically grounds the distinction between the intrinsic (adequacy) and extrinsic (correspondence) denominations of truth. These new developments constitute a thoroughgoing parallelism among both infinite and finite modes; a thoroughgoing parallelism possible given significant changes in Spinoza's understanding of the mind-body union and the addition of infinite mediate modes.

Epilogue

It is interesting (not to mention ironic) that while Spinoza's philosophy of mind is original and always differed significantly from that of Descartes', Spinoza's political theory is surprisingly unoriginal and takes its central doctrines from a political movement that considered itself to be based on Descartes' psychology. This fact, along with other historical and textual evidence, gives us reason to believe that Spinoza's political theory, which has its foundations in Spinoza's mature epistemology, was not an afterthought to that epistemology. First, we know that Spinoza would have been familiar with Radical Cartesianism from an early point in his philosophical career (well before working out his mature philosophy of mind, if not before his first philosophical writings). His association with the Amsterdam Circle, particularly van den Enden, would have undoubtedly led him to think about the political consequences of epistemological doctrines such as the differences between opinion, reason and intuition. We know that Spinoza's disagreements with the other members of the group on the ability of the common person to achieve wisdom and the consequent methods of attaining a wise and virtuous society must have sparked some conversation over the years. Van den Enden published on these subjects as early as 1662, and this topic later caused a falling out between Spinoza and Bouwmeester. However, through all their disagreements about how to attain the good state, they agreed that the good state is democratic and allows for religious and philosophical freedom. Further, they agreed that the method of attaining the good state must be based on an understanding of the level of knowledge of the masses and how the people are best able to come to that knowledge. Further, we know that Spinoza was familiar with, and in fact owned, many of the political writings of van Velthuysen and De la Court. We cannot know with certainty when he acquired these writings, but we do know that he owned editions that date from as early as 1661. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, it is clear that these writings greatly influenced Spinoza's notion of self-preservation. After all, Spinoza, like van Velthuysen and De la Court before him, accepts a form of egoism that, unlike Hobbes' egoism, focuses on

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the inward well-being of individuals, not merely their physical survival. Further, all three see reason as necessary to the preservation of the individual person and of the state. A central part of Spinoza's mature theory of mind is the concept ofconatus. The Ethics metaphysically works out the radical Cartesian notion of selfpreservation found in van Velthuysen's and De la Court's political theory. It takes their notion of self-preservation and its connection to reason and places it within a philosophical system. Here we see an important way that Spinoza's commitment to radical Cartesianism influences and motivates the development of his philosophy of mind. The intimate connections between Spinoza's epistemology and political theory should not surprise us because his own writings make this connection clear. As we discussed in Chapter 5, the goal of Spinoza's epistemology is not to fight off scepticism or to attain certainty. Rather, it is to discover what human blessedness is and how to attain it. The TIE tells us that human blessedness is knowledge of the union of the mind with the whole of nature and that it can only be attained once a certain type of society is formed (TIE 11). The Ethics picks up on this theme by clarifying four ways that mature epistemology helps us to attain human blessedness. First, it teaches us that knowledge of God or Nature alone is our greatest happiness or blessedness. This knowledge leads us to do only those things that love and morality advise. For it shows us that virtue is not to be done for the sake of something else. On the contrary, virtue is truly its own reward (E II P49 SIVA). Second, it teaches us to expect and bear calmly both good and bad fortune. After all, both follow from God's decree with the same necessity as the rules of geometry (E II P49 SIVB). Third, it contributes to social life in that it teaches us not to hate, mock, envy or be angry with other people. It teaches us to be content with what we have and to be helpful to our neighbours 'not from unmanly compassion, partiality, or superstition, but from the guidance of reason, as the time and occasion demand' (E II P49 SIVC). Fourth, this doctrine also contributes, to no small extent, to the common society insofar as it teaches how citizens are to be governed and led, not so that they may be slaves, but that they may do freely the things that are best (EIIP49SIVD). To summarize, Spinoza sees his epistemology as showing us four things: what human blessedness is, its personal and social advantages and the kind of state and government needed in order for people to attain it.

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It is significant that the philosophical foundations for the concepts underlying Spinoza's systematization of Radical Cartesian political theory (for example, the three types of knowledge, natural necessity, self-preservation, freedom and the individual) are part of his mature theory of mind, but are lacking in his earlier works. When we examine all of his writings, we find a gradual development of these concepts, a development that leads Spinoza further and further away from Descartes' own metaphysical and epistemological views. Further, Spinoza is unable to attain a philosophy that coherently systematizes these concepts until his introduction of the parallelism principle to finite modes. This move does not occur until Part II of the Ethics, and Spinoza most likely wrote this section immediately before the TTP. In other words, Spinoza would have been actively thinking about his political theory at the time. My point is that we should not think of the political theory found in the TTP and TP as something that Spinoza concluded after having completed his epistemological system. As a Radical Cartesian, Spinoza was committed to the central tenets found in these works before his mature system was worked out. His metaphysics and epistemology provide the foundation needed to systematize his political views and this project partially motivated their development. Further, a crucial moment in this development, one that allowed Spinoza to make his philosophy of mind coherent with itself and ground his political theory, was the introduction of a thoroughgoing parallelism.

Notes

Chapter 1 1. 2.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12.

W. Van Bunge, From Stevin to Spinoza: An Essay on Philosophy in the Seventeenth-Century Dutch Republic (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 36. Ibid., pp. 21-32; H. Siebrand, 'Spinoza and the Rise of Modern Science in The Netherlands', in M. Grene and D. Nails (eds), Spinoza and the Sciences (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1986), p. 63. T.A. McGahagan, Cartesianism in the Netherlands, 1639-1676: The New Science and the Calvinist Counter-Reformation (Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1976), p.209. Van Bunge, From Stevin to Spinoza, p. 55. J. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650—1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 24. McGahagan, Cartesianism in the Netherlands, p. 109. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, p. 24. H. Rowen, John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, 1635-1672 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 68-92. R. Prokhovnik, Spinoza and Republicanism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). pp. 158-59. J. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 306. Arminianism was a reaction to Calvinist orthodoxy that followed the teachings of Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609), an Amsterdam preacher. Arminianism held that Christ died for all people, not only for the elect, that people have free will and are saved through repentance and faith (not pre-election). In addition to being a theological movement, Arminianism became a political movement in response to Maurits's policies, which took substantial power away from the province of Holland. Political Arminianism promoted toleration, attempted to reassert Holland's predominance and resisted the aspirations of the public Church. Ibid., p. 488. The Remonstrant Church separated from the Reformed Church in 1619 as a consequence of theological debates between the liberal theology of Arminius and the strict orthodox theology of Franciscus Gomarus (1563-1641). The Remonstrant Church was able to emerge into the open in the late 1620s. It is important to note that while many Arminians joined the Remonstrant Church, many did not. Some

136

13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26.

27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

Notes preferred to remain outside any formal church body and to do without clergy and a fixed confession of faith. An example of the latter are the Gollegiants of Rijnsburg. Ibid., p. 395. R. Vermij, The Calvinist Copernicans: The Reception of the New Astronomy in the Dutch Republic, 1575—1750 (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Weten Schappen, 2002), pp. 274-75. Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 486-90. Ibid., p. 491. Ibid., pp. 493-94. Ibid., p. 524. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 527-28. The States of Holland was an assembly consisting of representatives from each of Holland's cities. Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 595. Ibid., p. 596. Ibid., p. 598. Ibid., p. 600. The Republicans argued that the Orangists wanted a monarchy, not a republic. From the Orangist perspective, the United Provinces did constitute a republic, albeit one that needed a head, as Italian republics had their doge. Ibid., p. 608. Note that Johan de Witt (1618-1676, the Grand Pensionary of Holland during the first stadholderless era) did not attempt to reform or formalize the constitutional structure to reflect Holland's current dominance, and so the constitutional ambiguities remained in place. Prokhovnik, Spinoza and Republicanism, p. 159. The representatives in the States of Holland came exclusively from the families ruling the cities. They were not elected but rather determined by rules regulating the distribution of offices among the patricians. The States of Holland had few salaried officers. Of them, the most important was the Grand Pensionary who was the counsellor of the nobility and as such acted as chairman of the States of Holland and their committees. Further, the Grand Pensionary was the leader of Holland's deputation to the States General. The Grand Pensionary was not himself a nobleman; his influence, rather, came from his role as spokesman of the urban patriciate to which he belonged. E.H. Kossman, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic: Three Studies (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 2000), p. 15. Vermij, The Calvinist Copernicans, p. 276. Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 788. Van Bunge, From Stevin to Spinoza, p. 46. Frans van Schooten (1615-1666), a mathematician and close friend of Descartes, was their teacher. H.W. Blom, 'Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas. Burgersdijk's Moral and Political Thought', in E.P. Bos and H.A. Krop (eds), Franco Burgersdijk (15901635): Neo-Aristotelianism in Leiden (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993), pp. 121-22.

Motes

137

33. His logic textbook, for instance, was required reading at Oxford and Harvard. 34. Ramism (named after Pierre de Ramee, 1515-1572) was a movement whose main principle was to do away with Aristotle's distinction between a logic that deals with certainties and a dialectic that deals with probabilities. It attempted to establish a single art of discourse for conveying information. According to Ramism, the effective ordering of arguments depended upon a suitable classification of knowledge. They applied this approach to many different topics. Ramism appealed to those who were dissatisfied with the Scholastics and to theologians challenging the authority of the Roman Church. M J. Petry, 'Burgersdijk's Physics', in Bos and Krop (eds), Franco Burgersdijk (1590-1635): Neo-Aristotelianism in Leiden, p. 88. 35. M. Feingold, 'The Ultimate Pedagogue, Franco Petri Burgersdijk and the English Speaking Academic Learning', in Bos and Krop (eds), Franco Burgersdijk (15901635): Neo-Aristotelianism in Leiden, p. 154. 36. Blom, 'Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas', pp. 119-21. 37. Feingold, 'The Ultimate Pedagogue', p. 154. 38. McGahagan, Cartesianism in the Netherlands, p. 109. 39. Ibid., p. 219. 40. Ibid., pp. 219-20. 41. Ibid., p. 231. 42. Ibid., p. 229. 43. Ibid., p. 223. 44. Ibid., p. 234. 45. Ibid., p. 236. 46. Ibid., p. 236. 47. Ibid., p. 237. 48. Ibid., p. 237. 49. Ibid., pp. 239-41. 50. E. Ruestow, Physics at Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Leiden (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 47 and 243. 51. McGahagan, Cartesianism in the Netherlands, p. 247. 52. Ibid., pp. 245-46. 53. Van Bunge, From Stevin to Spinoza, p. 56. 54. T. Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch: Early Reactions to Cartesian Philosophy (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), pp. 72-73. 55. J. A. Kossman-Putto and E.H. Kossman, The Low Countries: The History of the Northern and Southern Netherlands (trans. J. Fenoulhet; Lauwe, Belgium: Stichting Ons Efrdeel, 1987), p. 34. 56. Israel, The Dutch Republic, p. 803.

Chapter 2 1.

T. Verbeek, 'La Philosophic Cartesienne a travers la litterature pamphletaire'. XVIIeSiecle 196.2 (1997), p. 240.

T

Notes

2. The Walloon congregation was an alternative Orthodox Calvinist Church that was founded by French refugees during the Dutch revolt against Spain. It had a separate hierarchy and leadership from the Dutch Reformed Church. 3. E.H. Kossmann, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic: Three Studies (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 2000), p. 70. 4. L. van Velthuysen, Des principes du juste et du convenable: Une apologie du De Give de Hobbes (1651-1680) (trans. Catherine Secretan; Caen: Universite de Caen, 1995), pp. 68-70. 5. Van Velthuysen, Des principes dujuste et du convenable, p. 55. 6. C. Secretan, 'Une Morale pour le Siecle d'Or Hollandaise: Le Traite de Principes du Juste et du Convenable (1651) de Lambert van Velthuysen', Bulletin de la Societe del'HistoireduProtestantismeFranc,ais 145.1 (1999), p. 17. 7. Van Velthuysen, Des principes dujuste et du convenable, p. 67. 8. Ibid., pp. 124-25. 9. Kossmann, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic, p. 15. 10. Secretan, 'Une Morale pour le Siecle d'Or Hollandaise', pp. 21-24. 11. Ibid., pp. 17-20. 12. H.W. Blom, Causality and Morality in Politics (Utrecht: University of Utrecht, 1995), p. 191. 13. W. Schoneveld, Intertraffic of the Mind: Studies in Seventeenth-Century Anglo-Dutch Translation With a Checklist of Books Translated from English to Dutch, 1600-1700 (Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1983), p. 37. 14. Blom, Causality and Morality in Politics, p. 177. 15. Van Velthuysen, Des principes dujuste et du convenable, p. 87. 16. Ibid., p. 74. 17. T. Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch: Early Reactions to Cartesian Philosophy, 1637-1650 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), p. 79. 18. Verbeek, 'La Philosophic Cartesienne a travers la litterature pamphletaire', p. 241. In a later pamphlet (L. van Velthuysen, Nader Bewys Dat noch de Leere van der Sonne Stilstandt, En des Aertryx Beweging, noch degronden van de Philosophie van Renatus Des Cartes strijdig sijn met Godts-Woort [Utrecht, 1657], p. 23), van Velthuysen explained that he wrote the Bewys for those who did not read Latin and whose curiosity was peaked by the preaching of ministers against the motion of the earth. R. Vermij, The Calvinist Copernicans: The Reception of the New Astronomy in the Dutch Republic, 1575-1750 (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Weten Schappen,2002),p.272. 19. Ibid., p. 279. 20. L. van Velthuysen, Bewys dat het gevoelen van die genen, die leeren de Sonne Stilstandt en des Aertirycks Beweging neitstrydich is met Godts-Woort (Amsterdam, 1655), p. 9. 21. W. Van Bunge, 'Van Velthuysen, Batelier and Bredenburg on Spinoza's Interpretation of the Scriptures', in Paolo Christofolini (ed.), The Spinozistic Heresy: The Debate on the Tractatus Theologico-politicus, 1670—1677 (Amsterdam: APA-Holland Press, 1991), p. 51.

Notes 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40.

41.

42. 43.

139

Cf. ibid, and W. Klever, Verba et sententiae Spinozae or Lambertus van Velthuysen (16221685) on Benedictus de Spinoza (Amsterdam: APA-Holland University Press, 1991). L. van Velthuysen, Bewys dan noch de Leere van der Sonne Stilstandt en des Aertrycx Bewegingh, noch degronden van de Philosophie van Renatus Des Cartes strijdig zijn met GodtsWoort Gestelt tegen een Tractaet van J.du Bois, Predikant tot Leyden. Genaemt Naektheyt van de CartesianischePhilosophieonbloot (Utrecht, 1656), p. 78. L. van Velthuysen, HetPredick-Ampten'tRechtder Kercke (Amsterdam, 1660), p. 83. Verbeek, 'La Philosophie Cartesienne a travers la litterature pamphletaire', p. 238. Klever, Verba et sententiae spinozae, p. 15. Kossmann, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic, p. 59. Van Velthuysen, Nader Bewys Dat noch de Leere van der Sonne Stilstant, pp. 37-38. A certain form of anti-Trinitarianism that challenged the divinity of Christ. Van Bunge, 'Van Velthuysen, Batelier and Bredenburg on Spinoza's Interpretation of the Scriptures', p. 53. T.A. McGahagan, Cartesianism in the Netherlands, 1639—1676: The New Science and the Calvinist Counter-Reformation (Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1976), p. 140. W. Van Bunge, From Stevin to Spinoza: An Essay on Philosophy in the Seventeenth-Century Dutch Republic (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 99. Van Bunge, 'Van Velthuysen, Batelier and Bredenburg on Spinoza's Interpretation of the Scriptures', p. 54. Ibid., p. 55. L. van Velthuysen, Dissertatio de usa rationis in rebus theologicis etpraesertim in interpretationeS. Scripturae, (Utrecht, 1667), pp. 55-56. M.L. Morgan, 'Introduction', in Michael L. Morgan (ed.), Spinoza: Complete Work (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2002), p. 676. Van Bunge, From Stevin to Spinoza, pp. 111—12. See Spinoza's correspondence, Letters 42 and 43; L. van Velthuysen, Tractatus moralis de naturalipudore et dignitate hominis; in quo agitur de incestu, scortatione, voto coelibatus, conjugtOy adulterio,polgamia & divortiis &c (Utrecht, 1676). Van Bunge, From Stevin to Spinoza, pp. 111-12. H. Siebrand, 'Spinoza and the Rise of Modern Science in the Netherlands', in Spinoza and The Sciences, ed. Marjorie Grene and Debra Nails (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1986), p. 85. Lee C. Rice and Francis Pastijn, 'Introduction' to Lodewijk Meyer, Philosophy as the Interpreter of Holy Scripture (trans. Samuel Shirley; Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2005), p. 11. Schoneveld, Intertraffic of the Mind, p. 28. W.R.E. Velema, '"That a Republic is Better than a Monarchy", AntiMonarchism in Early Modern Dutch Political Thought', in Republicanism: A Shared European History, ed. Martin van Gelderen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 14.

140 44. 45. 46. 47.

48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

Notes R. Prokhovnik, Spinoza and Republicanism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 97. De la Court, The True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republick of Holland and WestFriesland (London, 1702), p. 312. Prohovnik, Spinoza and Republicanism, p. 101. [De la Court, J. and/or P.V.H.], Consideratien van Staat, oftepolitike weeg-schaal :waar in met veele reedenen, omstandigheden, exempelen, enfabulen wert overwogen; welkeforme der regeeringe, in speculatiegebout op depractijk, onder de menschen de beste zy, 3rd edn (Amsterdam, 1662), pp. 59—69; and [Dela Court, J. and/or P.D.C.], Politiekediscoursenhandelende in ses onderscheide boeken, van steeden, landen, oorlogen, kerken, regeeringen en zeeden, 3rd edn (Amsterdam, 1662), pp. 145-50; cited in Velema, ' "That a Republic is Better than a Monarchy" ', p. 16. De la Court, Consideratien van Staat, pp. 70-73 and Politieke discoursen, pp. 138-42; cited in Velema, 'That a Republic is Better than a Monarchy', pp. 17-18. De la Court, Consideratien van Staat, pp. 86-92 and Politieke discoursen, p. 156; cited in Velema, 'That a Republic is Better than a Monarchy', p. 17. De la Court, Consideratien van Staat, pp. 133-37. E.O.G.H. Mulier, The Myth of Venice and Dutch Republican Thought in the Seventeenth Century (trans. Gerard T. Moran; Assen: Van Gorcum, 1980), p. 132. De la Court, Consideratien van Staat, p. 34; translation in Velema, 'That a Republic is Better than a Monarchy', p. 15. Velema, 'That a Republic is Better than a Monarchy', p. 14. Kossmann, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic, p. 63. Ibid., p. 64. Velema, 'That a Republic is Better than a Monarchy', p. 14. Mulier, The Myth of Venice, p. 131. Kossmann, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic, p. 65. In 1702 an English translation of this work was published as The True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republick of Holland and West-Friesland, Prokhovnik, Spinoza and Republicanism, p. 98. Ibid., p. 99. Dela Court, The True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republick of Holland and WestFriesland, pp. 312-13. Schoneveld, Intertragic of the Mind, p. 37. Velema, 'That a Republic is Better than a Monarch', p. 15. De la Court, Consideratien van Staat, pp. 23-26. Blom, Causality and Morality in Politics, p. 52. De la Court, Consideratien van Staat, pp. 36-39. Kossmann, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic, p. 69. Ibid. De la Court, The True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republick of Holland and WestFriesland, pp. 60-61. De la Court, Consideratien van Staat, pp. 13 -23.

Notes 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84.

141

De la Court, The True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republick of Holland and WestFriesland, p. 31. Blom, Causality and Morality in Politics, p. 91. De la Court, The True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republick of Holland and WestFriesland, p. 36. Ibid., p. 312. Ibid., pp. 318-20. Ibid., p. 37. Blom, Causality and Morality in Politics, p. 91. De la Court, The True Interest and Political Maxims of the Republick of Holland and WestFriesland, p. 51. Ibid., p. 70. Ibid., pp. 53-55. Ibid., pp. 57-59. Ibid., p. 6. De la Court, Consideratien van Staat, p. 215.

Chapter 3 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Other members were Simon Joosten de Vries (1633/4—1667), Jan Hendrik Glasemaker (1620-82), Adriaen Koerbagh (1632-69), Johannes Koerbagh (d. 1672) and Jan (the elder) Rieuwertz (c. 1616-87). S. Nadler, Spinoza: A Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 104. M. Gullen-Whur, Within Reason: A Life of Spinoza (London: Random House, 2000), p. 75. J. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 199. Gullan-Whur, Within Reason, p. 106. Ibid., pp. 137-38. W. Van Bunge et al. (eds), The Dictionary of Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Dutch Philosophers, Volume I (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2003), s.v. 'Meyer, Loedwijk (1629-81)' by P. Steenbakkers, p. 695. Ibid., and Israel, Radical Enlightenment, p. 301. Translation from G. Hunter, Radical Protestantism in Spinoza's Thought (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2005), p. 37. Gullen-Whur, Within Reason, pp. 39 and 53. Ibid., p. 53. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, p. 164. Gullen-Whur, Within Reason, p. 95. Ibid., p. 54. Hunter, Radical Protestantism in Spinoza's Thought, p. 40. Ibid., p. 41.

142 17. 18. 19. 20.

21.

22. 23. 24.

25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32. 33.

34. 35.

Notes Hunter, Radical Protestantism in Spinoza's Thought, p. 42. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, n. 24, p. 164. Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, p. 111. The NVA also held weekly poetical discourses and published principles of good theatre. A collection of their work was published later in 1765: Nauwkeurig onderwys in de tooneel-poezy 3 en eenige andere deelen der kunst, zjo wel van de oude als haedendaagsche dichters (Leiden: Hoogeveen). A critical edition is by AJ.E. Harmsen (Rotterdam: Ordemn, 1989). W. Klever, The Sphinx: Spinoza Reconsidered in Three Essays (Vrijstad: Docvision, 2000), pp. 143-44. Titled Korte verthooninghe van het recht by den ridderschap, edelen ende steden van Hollandt ende West-Vrieslant (Short exposition of the Right of the Knighthood, Patricians and States of Holland and West Friesland). M. Klever, 'A New Source of Spinozism: Franciscus van den Enden', Journal of the History of Philosophy 29.4 (199 U, p. 628. Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, p. 105. The full title is Kort Verhael van Nieuw-Nederlandts: Gelegentheid, Deuhden, Natuerlijke Voorrechten, en byzondere bequaemheidt ter bevolkingh (A Short Narrative of the New Netherlands: Situation, Virtues, Natural Privileges, and Special Aptitude for Population). This work was republished in 1665 under the title %eeker Vrye Vooralagen en Cersoeken, to bevordering van een bestandigs, voor Hollandt hooghnutte vrye Volk-Uitzetling in NieuwNederlandts. Alsmeed een by-geboeght beknopt verhael van Nieuw-Nederlandts gelegentheit, enz. Het eerst deel. The full title is Vrye Politjke Stellingen, en Considertaien van Staat, gedaen na der ware christenens even gelijke vryheits grondern; strekkended tot een rechtschape, en ware verbeteringh van staat, en kerk (The Free Political Propositions and Considerations of the State, done after the true Christian principles of even equalfreedom, serving to ajust and true improvement of state and church). Israel, Radical Enlightenment, p. 174. Van Bunge, et al., Dictionary of Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Dutch Philosophers, Vol. I, s.v. 'Enden, Franciscus van den (1602-74)' by F. Mertens, p. 297. Ibid. Ibid., and Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, p. 106. M. Mertens, 'Fransciscus van den Enden: Tijd Voor Een Herziening Van Diens Rol in Het Ontstaan van Het Spinozisme?' Tijdschrift voorjilosofie 56.4 (1994), p. 720. W. Klever, 'Conflicting "Consideration of State". Van den Enden's Opposition Against De la Court's Aristocratic Republicanism and its Follow-up in Spinoza's Work', Foglio Spinoziano. http://www.fogliospinoziano.it/articl 7b.htm. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, p. 176. F. Van den Enden, Vrye Poltijke Stellingen, en Consideratien van Staat, gedaen na der ware christenens even gelijke vryheits gronden; strekkended tot een rechtschape, en ware verbeteringh van staat, en kerk (Amsterdam, 1665), p. 6. Ibid. English translation in Klever, The Sphinx, p. 152. M. van Gelderen, 'Aristotelians, Monarchomachs, and Republicans: Sovereignty and respublica mixta in Dutch and German Political Thought, 1580-1650', in

Notes

36. 37.

38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47.

48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.

143

M. van Gelderen (ed.), Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 215; Van den Enden, Vrye Poltijke Stellingen, p. 2. Van den Enden, Vrye Poltijke Stellingen, p. 5. F. van den Enden, Kort Verhael van Nieuw-Nederlandts: Gelegentheit, Deughden, Natue lijke Voorrechten, en byzondere bequemheidt ter bevolkingh: Mitsgaders eenige Requesten, Vertoogen, Deductien (Amsterdam, 1662), p. 50; English translation from L. Leland and M. Harder, Plockhoy from Zjurik-z.ee: The Study of a Dutch Reformer in Puritan England and Colonial America (Newton: Kansas, 1952), p. 189. (The latter work mistakenly attributes the Kort Verhael van Nieuw-Nederlandts to Plockhoy.) Van den Enden, Vrye Poltijke Stellingen, p. 16. Van den Enden, Kort Verhael van Nieuw-Nederlandts, pp. 31 and 35; Klever, 'A New Source of Spinozism', p. 624. Klever, The Sphinx, p. 150. Ibid. Van den Enden, Vrye Poltijke Stellingen, p. 17; English translation from Klever, The Sphinx, p. 152. Van den Enden, Vrye Poltijke Stellingen, p. 5; English translation in Gullen Whur, Within Reason, pp. 130-31. The same sentiments are expressed in van den Enden, Kort Verhael van Nieuw-Nederlandts, pp. 30-31. Klever, 'Conflicting "Consideration of State" ', p. 9. Van den Enden, Kort Verhael van Nieuw-Nederlandts, p. 52 (article 11). Ibid., p. 51 (articles). W. Klever. 'Imperium Aeternum. Spinoza's Critique of Machiavelli and its Source in van den Enden', Foglio Spinoziano (2001) http://www.fogliospinoziano.it/ articl4.htm. Ibid. Van den Enden, Vrye Poltijke Stellingen, p. 167; English translation in Klever, 'Imperium Aeternum', p. 11. Van den Enden, Vrye Poltijke Stellingen, p. 163. Van den Enden, Kort Verhael van Nieuw-Nederlandts, pp. 56-57 (articles 66-74). Ibid. Ibid., p. 60 (article 104); English translation in Leland and Harder, Plockhoy from Zurik-zee, p. 203. Van den Enden, Kort Verhael van Nieuw-Nederlandts, pp. 28-43; English translation in Klever, The Sphinx, p. 148. Klever, The Sphinx, p. 148. Klever, 'A New Source of Spinozism', p. 624. E.g., Breedn-raet by de Vries; Klever, The Sphinx, p. 149. Van den Enden, Kort Verhael van Nieuw-Nederlandts, p. 22. Van den Enden, Vrye Poltijke Stellingen, p. 44. Note these are the exact same categories as given in part II Chapter 2 of Spinoza's KV. Klever, The Sphinx, p. 153. Klever, 'Conflicting "Consideration of State" ', p. 9.

144 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78.

79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

Notes Van den Enden, Kort Verhael van Nieuw-Nederlandts, p. 29. Van den Enden, Vrye Poltijke Stellingen, p. 9; English translation in Klever, The Sphinx., p. 151. Van den Enden, Vrye Poltijke Stellingen, pp. 8-9. Ibid., pp. 7-9. Ibid., p. 16. The complete title is Philedonius: Tonneelspel; slaande op de woorden des Wijzemans: 'in alle uwe werken gedenk uwe uitersten, en ghyzult in der eeuwigheit niet zondigen3. Ten tonnelle gebracht op den Doorluchtigen Schouburch van Amsterdam. Door Franciscus van den Enden, Medic. Doct. ('Lover of Lust3: Theatre play; on account of the words of the Wise Man [Ecclesiasticus V 11/40]' Think in ally our works on the last things, andyou will never sin3. Brought on the illustrious Theatre of Amsterdam by Franciscus van den Enden, Med., Doct.). There is an English translation of about one-fifth of the text of Philedonius in Klever, The Sphinx, pp. 154-67. A full French translation is available: F. van den Enden, Franciscus van den Enden, Philedonius. Edition critique. Presentation, traduction, etablissement du texte, notes etSpinozana, index eticonographie (trans. M. Bedjai; Paris: Editions KIME, 1994). Gullen-Whur, Within Reason, p. 59. Klever, The Sphinx, pp. 154-55. Ibid., p. 167. Gullen-Whur, Within Reason, p. 132. Klever, The Sphinx, pp. 131-32. Ibid., pp. 121-79. Klever, The Sphinx, pp. 139-41. Ibid. Ibid., p. 141. A critical edition is available, edited by A.J.E. Harmsen (Rotterdam: Ordemn, 1989). P. Steenbakkers, 'The Passions According to Lodewijk Meyer: Between Descartes and Spinoza', in Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist (ed. Y. Yovel; New York: Little Room Press, 1999), p. 193. Klever, The Sphinx, p. 144. Ibid., p. 144. Gullen-Whur, Within Reason, p. 85. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, pp. 198-99. Ibid., p. 201. Ibid. Ibid, p. 608. L. Meyer, Philosophy as the Interpreter of Holy Scripture (trans. S. Shirley; Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2005), p. 28. Ibid., pp. 29-30. Ibid., pp. 142-50. Ibid., p. 163. Ibid.

Notes

145

91. Ibid., p. 235-6. 92. Ibid., p. 238. 93. Ibid., pp. 238-39. 94. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, p. 201. 95. Meyer, Philosophy as the Interpreter of Holy Scripture, p. 226. 96. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, pp. 199, 212 and 214. 97. G.W. Leibniz, Theodicy on Project Guttenberg (http://www.gutenberg.org/Jiles/ 17147/17147-8.txt #14} Orig. Theodicy, ed. A. Farrer (London, 1951; repr. Puru, IL, 1993). 98. Israel, Radical Enlightenment, p. 203. 99. A compilation of works published by anti-Trinitarian Polish refugees (sometimes called Unitarians or Socinians). 100. Steenbakkers, 'The Passions According to Lodewijk Meyer', p. 195. 101. Ibid. 102. Gullen-Whur, Within Reason, p. 240. 103. Steenbakkers, 'The Passions According to Lodewijk Meyer,' p. 204. 104. Ibid. 105. Ibid., p. 202. 106. J. Jelles, Professione dellafede universale e cristiana contentuta in una lettera a N.N.: Belydenisse des algemeenen en christelyken Geloofs, vervattet in een Brief aan N.JV. (trans. Leen Spruit; Macertata, Italy: Quodlibet, 2004), p. 22. 107. J. Jelles, 'Preface', reprinted in F. Akkerman and H.G. Hubbeling, 'The Preface to Spinoza's posthumous works, 1677, and its author Jarig Jelles (c. 1619/201683)', Lias, 6 (1979), p. 157. 108. The letter was sent to Spinoza in 1673. 109. H.J. Siebrand, Spinoza and the Netherlander: An Enquiry into the Early Reception of His Philosophy of Religion (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1988), p. 44. 110. Siebrand, Spinoza and the Netherlanders, p. 44. 111. Jelles,'Preface', p. 157. 112. E IV P67 S, p. 585 and Jelles, Belydenisse, p. 44. 113. KVIX, p. 92 and Jelles, Belydenisse, p. 90. 114. F. Akkerman and H.G. Hubbeling, 'The Preface to Spinoza's posthumous works p. 157 and Jelles, Belydenisse, p. 97. 115. Akkerman and Hubbeling, 'The Preface to Spinoza's posthumous works', p. 157. 116. Siebrand, Spinoza and the Netherlander, p. 24. 117. P. Balling, The Light Upon the Candlestick, in William Sewel, The History of the Rise, Increase, and Progress of the People called Quakers, Intermixed with Several Remarkable Occurrences Volume I (Philadelphia, 1871), p. 446. 118. Ibid., p. 447. 119. Ibid. 120. Ibid., pp. 448 and 450. 121. Ibid., p. 450. 122. Ibid., p. 447.

146

Notes Chapter 4

1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

M. Morgan, 'Political Treatise', in Spinoza: Complete Works (ed. Michael Morgan; Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2002), p. 676. Ibid. Ibid., p. 677. The inventory of Spinoza's personal library [printed in J. Preposiet, Bibliographic Spinoziste (Paris: Centre de Documentations et de Bibliographic philosophiques de Besancon, 1967), pp. 339-43] includes: Velthusius de Usu rationis in Theologia [and Velthusius de Liene et Generatione] by van Velthuysen; Politieke discoursen (1662) and Politycke Weegschael (1661) by De la Court. H.W. Blom, Causality and Morality in Politics (Utrecht: University of Utrecht, 1995), p. 195. E.H. Kossmann, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic: Three Studies (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 2000), p. 74. Note that Spinoza's hermeneutics is quite different from the other Radical Cartesians. Spinoza's approach to Biblical interpretation depends on Scripture alone, not on philosophical theories or methods. F. van den Enden, Vrye Poltijke Stellingen (Amsterdam, 1665), p. 44. Kossmann, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic, p. 77. T. Hobbes, Leviathan (ed. A.P. Martinich; Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press), Chapter XIV, p. 98. Chapter XIII, p. 95. Ibid., Chapter XXI, p. 157. Ibid., Chapter XXI, p. 159. Kossmann, Political Thought in the Dutch Republic, p. 81. Blom, Causality and Morality in Politics, p. 238. However, the state is not a natural body. It is formed through language, laws and customs, not Nature (TTP 2? 414 i.

Chapter 5 1.

2. 3. 4. 5.

Curley, 'Editorial Preface' in The Collected Works, p. 222; S. Barbone and L. Rice, 'Introduction', in B. Spinoza, The Principles of Cartesian Philosophy and Metaphysical Thoughts (trans. S. Shirley; Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1998), p. xvii; and W. Klever, The Sphinx: Spinoza Reconsidered in Three Essays (Vrijstad: Docvision 2000), p. 30 ff. Barbone and Rice, 'Introduction', p. xxix. Other than eternal truths. J. Freundenthal, 'Spinoza und die Scholastik', in Philosophische Aufsatze (Leipzig: Feus'sVerlag, 1887), p. 100. G. Coppens, 'La Structure des Principes de la Philosophic de Descartes/CM Regardant les Principes de Monsieur Descartes.' Paper presented at the international

Notes

147

conference on 'le contexte intellectuel du spinozisme' organized by Le Groupe de recherches spinozistes (CERPHI) and 1'Association des Amis de Spinoza. Sorbonne, Paris, 30 March 2002, p. I I . 6. H.A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of His Reasoning (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934j, p. 32. 7. For example, the mind is not free but determined by causal laws.

Chapter 6 1. Theo Verbeek pointed out this distinction in a discussion in Utrecht in 2002 and in an unpublished paper, 'The "Four Kinds of Perceptions" in Spinoza's " Treatise on th Emendation of the Intellect" ', pp. 3 and 28, which also makes this point. 2. I am not saying that there is only one eternal truth for Spinoza; rather, that there is only one eternal truth that fits this category (of being an idea that clearly perceives some thing through itself). There is another kind of eternal truth: reflexive ideas about the relations of things. For example, perceptions of geometric and mathematical principles. There are many instances of the latter type of eternal truths, or what Spinoza calls common notions.

Chapter 7 1.

2. 3.

4. 5.

It is not within the scope of this work to consider what terminology is properly applied to the infinite mediate mode of thought (e.g., absolute intellect or God's idea). Curley notes the transition from 'will' to 'volition' in the Ethics in p. 435, n. 64 of the Collected Works. One might object that Spinoza has a strange understanding of Descartes' position. For Descartes, the power of the will is infinite or indefinite, not the number of things that one is able to will. Spinoza defines love as joy accompanied by the idea of an external cause (E III d VI, 533 i. Spinoza also refers to joy and sadness as passions. 'By Joy, therefore, I shall understand in what follows that passion by which the Mind passes to a greater perfection. And by Sadness, that passion by which it passes to a lesser perfection.'Joy, sadness and desire are the three primary affects of the mind. All other affects of the mind arise from these three (E III PI 1 d, 500-501).

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Index

absolutism, see also mixed constitution 25 Act of Seclusion 8 activity 48, 105, 128 actions 28,48, 49, 53, 57, 66, 68, 77, 82, 91,102, 113, 118, 124, 128 adequacy 76-7, 90, 92-4, 97-100, 114-15,117,124-8,130-1 affects 56, 128-30 affirmation 81, 96, 99-103, 114-15, 121-3 Amsterdam 6, 29-34, 40, 43, 46, 50 circle 29-30, 32-4, 50-1, 57-8, 61,91 illustrious School of 30 theatre 33,40 animal spirits 18, 111 anti-Trinitarian, see Socinianism appetites 16, 52, 58, 60, 86, 121-2 aristocracy 9, 37, 52, 69-71 Aristotelianism, scholastic 1-2, 10-12, 14-15,17,21,47,86-7 Arminianism, Arminians, see Remonstrants Arminian heresy 5 Arnauld, Antoine (1612-1694), French Cartesian philosopher 35 atheism 12,15,21,48 attributes 86, 99, 106-9,116-21, 124, 127-8, 131 authority 38-9,44-6, 48 axioms 30, 54, 56, 83 Bacon, Sir Francis (1561-1626), English philosopher 2, 11,42 Balling, Pieter (d. 1669), member of Amsterdam Circle 29, 31-2, 47, 49-50, 53-4, 58, 61, 65, 73,91

Bayle, Pierre (1647-1706), French philosopher 46 belief 7, 15, 19, 30-2, 34, 47-8, 50, 57, 65-6,68, 110-11,114 Belydenisse (Confession) 48-50 Bewys (Proof) 18-19 Bible, see Scripture Bibliotheca Fraturum Polonorum 47 Blessedness / human perfection 48, 54. 57,60,67-8,74-5,91, 111, 113-14, 128 body 4, 17-18, 21, 25,40,42,47, 60-1. 63, 69, 71-2, 75-6, 82-3, 90-3,95, 97-8, 100-1, 103, 105-18, 120-1, 125-8, 130-1, see also matter; extension infinite 120 bondage 58-9,68 Bouwmeester, Johannes (1630-1680). member of Amsterdam Circle 29. 33, 40-4, 50, 58, 61 Burgersdijk, Franco (1590-1635), Neo-Aristotelian philosophy professor at the University of Leiden 9-11,17,30,86 Calvinism 4, 6, 14, 19, 28-9, 35, 45, see also Church, Reformed Calvinist political theory 22 orthodoxy 3-7,10,15,19 Reformed anti-Scholastic tradition 12 Reformed schools 7 Cambridge Platonism 46 Cartesianism 7, 14, 17-18, 20-1, 32. 47-9 Dutch 1-3,17

158

Index

Radical Cartesianism 8-9,14-15, 18-21, 28-9, 33-5,43,46, 50-4, 57-8, 60-1, 64, 69, 73-5, 77, 90 Cartesio-Cocceianism 13,46-7 Catholicism 6-7, 19, 45, see also Church, Catholic causality 12, 20, 34,41-4, 49-50, 52~3, 55, 57, 63, 66, 79, 80, 82,84-5, 87, 95-100, 102-5, 107-8, 111-19, 122-5, 127-8, 130-1, ceremony 39, 48, 57 certainty 74, 83-4, 99-100, 130, 132, 133 Charles I, King of England, Ireland and Scotland (1600-1649) 4 Charles II, King of England, Ireland and Scotland (1630-1685) 8 Christ 20,32,46,48-50 Christianity 17-21, 32, 35,46, 48 Church 45,65, and state 15-17,19, 28,44, 52-3, 64 Catholic 6, 32,45 Reformed 2-5, 7-9, 12-13, 17-19, 21, 28 clarity and distinctness 13, 42, 45, 50, 53, 78-80, 82-5, 89-90, 94, 98-100, 102, 104, 106,110,113-14,122, 129 Clauberg, Johannes (1622-1655), German, Cartesian professor of philosophy 18 clear and immediate knowledge 110-14 Cocceius, Johannes (1603-1669), German - Dutch Reformed theologian 13 Cocceianism 13,46-7 Cogitata Metaphysica (Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts] (CM) 78, 80-91,94,96,98-102, 106, 120-2 Collegiants 31-2, 34, 47-8, 50, 53, 65 common good, the 23, 26-8, 34-7, 39-40, 43, 56, 58-9, 70 common (or collective) wisdom of the people 36,39 commonwealth 36, 59, 62, 70 conatus/striving 6-7, 57, 59, 75, 112, 119, 121-2, 133

constitution 22, 25-6, 36-8, 62, 69-73 containment theory, see truth, containment theory of Copernicanism 18 correspondence theory, see truth, correspondence theory of counter-Remonstrants 5—6, see also Voetius; Voetians; Second Reformation Court, de la, Dutch political pamphleteers and businessmen, 14-15, 21-8, 35, 37,46,51-3,58,63,67,73 Pieter( 1618-1685) 11, 15 Johan( 1622-1660) 15,24 De Give 16 De Jure Ecclesiasticorum 44 democracy 9, 15, 24-6, 32, 34-9, 52, 69, 71-3 Descartes, Rene (1596-1650) 1-3, 10-12, 14-15,17-18,20-2,24-5,30, 41, 44, 47, 73, 77-91, 103-4, 106, 111, 116, 122, 124, 131 Descartes' Principles of Philosophy (PPC) 31,41,78-81,88 desire 23, 26, 33, 36, 38, 43,48-9, 59-60, 63, 65, 70-1, 76,82, 91-2, 101, 103, 111, 113, 121, 128 determinism 21, 42, 53, 57,68, 80-1, 84,87-8,95, 101, 103-4, 118, 121, 123-7 Dissertatio de usa rationis in rebus theologicis et presertim in interpretatione S. Scripturae 20 doubt 44,50,56,78-9,83,89,91,94, 98-100, 130 Dubois, Jacobus (d 1661) Anti-Cartesian Orthodox Reformed minister 19-20 duration 93, 108, 125 economic concerns 2, 5-8, 13, 58 education 17, 22-3, 26, 28-9, 34-5, 39-40 egoism 16, 24, 132, see also self-interest Eighty Year's War 6 emotions 31,41,47, 58-9 empiricism 40, 42, 50

Index Enden, Fransiscus van den, (1602-1674), central member of Amsterdam Circle 29-30, 32-44, 46, 50-1, 55, 57-8,61,73,91, 132, his Latin school in Amsterdam 24, 29, 33-4 Hotel de Muses (his school in France) 35 England 4, 8-9, 13, 25, 34, 46 epistemology 1, 33, 40, 48, 50-2, 73-5, 77-8, 81,84, 86-7, 90-1, 101, 116, 120, 131 Epistolica dissertatio 16-17 equality 35-7,39 error 1, 21, 29, 33, 44-6, 78-9, 81-2, 85-8,90-1,93,96-101, 105, 110-11, 114, 116, 120, 122, 129-31 essence 17, 57, 82~5, 87-8, 92-3,95-9, 101-2,105-7,109,111,113-15, 118-9, 12-22,124-8 objective 95,99-100, 114-15 eternal truths 55, 83, 99 eternity 57,60, 106, 127 Ethica 33, 50-2, 57-61, 73-8, 80-2, 88-92, 101, 105-10, 115-18, 120-4, 130-1, 133 ethics 11 extension 10-11, 17, 106-9, 118, 120, 131 face of the whole universe 119, see also whole of nature faith 16,20,46,65 falsity 1,11,33, 55, 65-6, 68, 78-9, 80-3,85-8,90-1,94-6, 98-9, 100-1, 103, 105, 111, 114-16, 121, 123-4, 129-31 material 85 France 5-6,13,25,35,62 Frederick Hendrik (1584-1647), Prince of Orange 4-5 freedom / liberty 8-9, 12,15-16, 18-19, 27-8, 32, 35-9,48, 52, 59,63, 65-8, 70-2,82,85, 87, 101-2, 124, 128 freewill 21, 32,48,65, 68, 78, 81,82,85, 87-9,96,101-5,123-4

159

Gassendi, Pierre (1592-1655), French atomistic philosopher 2, 11, 17 Germany 6,46 God 7,11,16,18,20-1,27-8, 31,35,37, 39,43,47-50,52,54-61,65-8, 73-6, 78,83-4,91,99-100,102-6,108-10, 112-14,117-20,123-5,127-31 son of 49, see also God's will government 52, 59, 64-6, 69, 71-6 Grand Pensionary 8,13 Guelincx, Arnold (1624-1669), Cartesian Professor at the University of Leiden 30 Grotius, Hugo (1583-1645), Dutch political theorist 33, 35 Habsburg Rule in The Netherlands (1477-1572) 4 Hague, The 7,13,41 Hayy ibn Yaqzam 42 Heidanus, Abraham (1597-1678), Dutch Reformed theologian 13 Heereboord, Adriaan (1614-1661), Dutch Cartesian philosopher 10-12,14-15,17,25,30,87 Hermeneutics, see Scripture, Interpretation of Hobbes, Thomas 14-17,21-2,25-6,33, 47, 58-60, 67 Holland, The Province of 1, 4-8, 13, 24, 28,52,71-2 human nature 16, 21, 23, 26, 52, 58-9, 72 Huygens, Christian (1629-1695), Dutch natural scientist 18 idea

1-3, 5,8-11, 13-15, 17, 20-1, 27-8, 30-2,37-8,40-5,47-9, 51, 54 56, 59, 62, 66, 71, 73-8, 80-3, 87, 89-98,101-7,111-29 confused 81, 100, 125 false 97,121,128 inadequate 68, 93-4, 103, 114, 123-5, 128, 130-1 ofGod 47 identity 75,115,117 ideology 33,48 imagination 29, 37,40, 47-8, 53-5, 58, 67,91,96,101,122-8

160

Index

immanence 106 individual 4, 7, 16, 23, 27, 33-4, 37, 58-9, 61-3, 65-6, 74, 89-90, 116-17 individuation 76-7, 117 infinity 76, 118,124 intellect 21, 42, 49, 56, 75, 78-82, 84-7, 89-92, 95-6, 98, 101, 104-5, 107, 110-12, 116, 119-23, 126, 131, see also union, will and intellect; will, relation with intellect absolute infinite 119,124 intellectual love of God 39, 48, 54-5, 60, 67-8, 128 Interest van Holland (Interest of Holland) 24, 27 intuition 55, 57, 61, 69, 75-6, 124, 127-9 Israel, Jonathan 9 Italy 46 Jellesjarig (c. 1620-1683), member of Amsterdam Circle 29-32, 43, 47-50,53-4,58,61,65,73 joy 31,43,47 judgment 23, 37-8, 64, 66-7, 70, 82, 85, 97, 123 Klever, Wim 35 knowledge 10, 17, 20, 35, 39, 40, 44, 48, 50, 53-8, 60-1, 69, 73-6, 85, 91, 93, 95, 97-100, 110-14, 121, 124, 127-30 knowledge, kinds of 55,110,121,124, 128,134 first, see also opinion; report 56, 60-1, 69, 93,124-6,128-9 second, see also true belief; reason 60-1, 69,93,126-30 third, see also clear and immediate knowledge; intuition; intellectual love of God 57, 60-1, 69,91, 93, 96-8, 100, 110,114, 127-9 of God 58, 60 Kok, Alardus Loedwijk (1616-1653), Dutch translator 30 Kort Verhael van Nieuw-Nederlandts 34 Korte Verhandeling (KV) 31,49-50, 77-8, 88-92, 100-15, 117-23

Latreaumont, Gilles du Hamel, Seigneur de (1630-1674), co-conspirator of van den Enden's in plot to overthrow Louis XIV 35 law civil 3, 24-5, 35-7, 39, 48, 55, 57; 59-64, 66-72 divine 5,57 natural (Laws of Nature / Physics/ Reason) 16,18,26,39,42, 52, 57, 60,62,66-7,118-19 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1646-1715) 35,47 Leiden 2,5,12,30,43 University of 8-10, 12-13, 15, 17, 25, 29-30, 86-7 Leviathan 47 liberty, see freedom light inner 49, 50, 53 natural 45, 49-50, 56 of reason/truth 49 Light Upon the Candlestick 49-50 logic 10-11 Louis XIII, king of France (ruled 1610-1643) 5 Louis XIV, king of France (ruled 1643-1715) 13,34 love 23, 31, 39, 48, 54-5, 60, 65, 67-8, 74,104,112-13, 128-9 of God 60, see also Intellectual love of toward the eternal and infinite thing 31 Machiavelli, Niccolo (1469-1527) 14-15,22,24,33 Mary II of England (1662-1694) 4 masses, the 53, 56-8, 65 mathematics 2,9 matter 9-10, 22, 31, 62, 69, 71, 86, 98, 106 Maurits of Nassau (1567-1625) 4-5 Meditationes de Prima Philosophia (Med) 30,81-3,85,88 Meletamata Philosophica 10— 11 memory 42, 50, 60, 93, 126, 128 Mennonites 31-2

Index metaphysics 1, 9-10, 12, 33, 51, 61, 73-4,77,91, 106,120 method 2,21, 40-4, 50, 53-4, 75, 79, 91-3,95,100,110,114 Meyer, Lodewijk (1629-1681) member of Amsterdam Circle 20-1, 29-30, 33,41,43-7,49-50, 53-4, 58, 61, 73, 80-1,88 mind 3, 11, 31, 33, 40, 42-3,45, 47, 49-50, 53-5, 57, 60-3, 66, 72, 74-7, 79-131 mind-body relationship 47, 75-6, 105-8, 114, 117, 120, see also union, mind-body mixed constitution/government 25, 37-8, 70-1 modes 78, 83, 93, 99, 103-13, 116, 118-20, 123-5, 128,131 finite 84, 107, 118-120, 124-5, 128 infinite 107,110, 119,131 immediate 118 mediate 118-20, 124-5, 128,131, particular / singular 107, 109, 112-13, 118-19, see also particular/ singular things universal 106-7, 109-10, 113, 118-20 monarchy 4, 8-9, 22-8, 34-5, 37-8, 52, 69,70-1,73 monopolies 9,26 morality 16-18, 39, 52, 54-5, 73-4 More, Thomas (1478-1535) English political thinker 35 motion 18, 96, 106-7, 109, 113, 117, 119 and rest 106, 107,113, 119 multitude 50,56 Naecktheyt van de Cartesianisnsche philosophic ontbloot (The Nakedness of Cartesian Philosophy Revealed) 19 Nagelate schriften, de 43, 48 natura naturans 84, 106, 114 natura naturata 84, 106, 112, 116, 118, 120 nature 2, 45, 53-4, 57, 63, 66, 72, 74-5, 84,91,98-9, 101, 105-6, 108-9,113, 118

161

Nauwkeurig onderwys in de tooneel-poezy (Instruction in the Poetics of Drama) 43,47 necessity 5-7, 23, 74-5, 84, 90, 99, 102, 127 natural 57,75 neo-Aristotelianism/scholasticism9-10, 17,86-7 Netherlands, The, see also Southern Provinces 1,4-6,9,13,37,46-7,71,73 New Netherlands, The 34, 38-9 nil volentibus arduum (NVA) 33, 42-4, 47 obedience 54-6, 64-5, 68, 71, 75 Oldenburg, Henry, (1619-1677) English natural philosopher, correspondent of Spinoza 52, 80 ontology 90,116,118,124 opinion 18-19,41,46, 55, 57, 70, 75, 110, 111, 124, 127-8 Optics 30 oration de libertate philosophandi 11 Orange, House of 1, 4-9, see also Frederick Hendrik; Willem I; Willem II Orangism 7-8, 22, 25, 73 pamphlets, Dutch 1, 7-9, 11,13-15, 18-19,21,28,34,44 parallelism 75-7, 106-10, 115-18, 120, 124, 131 particular things 97,104, 112, see also singular things passions 14-15, 17-18, 22-4, 28, 31, 35-6,47, 50, 58-60, 63, 68-9, 111, 128-9 Passions of the Soul 24 passivity 82, 85-6, 89, 105 perceptions 42,47, 60, 82, 92-3, 105-6, 110-11, 113-14,122, 126 perfection 90-91,93,114,123, 130 Phillip II Habsburg (1527-1598) King of Spain 72 Philodenius (Lover of Lust) 40 philosophia novantiqua 10, 17, 23, 86-7 PhilosophiaS. Scripturae Interpres (PPSI) 20-1,30,44,46-7,50

162

Index

philosophy 1-3,9-13, 29-30, 33,43-55, 57, 65, 67, 69, 73-5, 77 freedom/tolerance of 5-6,8,15-16, 18-19,34-5 relation to theology 3, 9-13, 16, 19, 20-1, 44-6,49-50, 53-5, 57, 65, 73,75 status of 2-3, 9-10, 13,49, 53 physical digression 117 physics 2, 9-11, 14, 19, 73-4, 118 piety 54, 56, 64, 66 Plockhoy, Pieter Gornelisz, Mennonite reformer and leader of a colony in the New Netherlands 34 Politijke Weegschaal (Political Balance) 24 power 53-5, 59-60, 62-5, 67, 69-70 Principia Philosophiae (PP) 30, 82-4 Principia Philosophiae Cartsianae (PPC) 30-1,41,78-81,88 properties 83,93-4,97-8,100,106, 111, 114,117,126-7 prophets 56 propria 93-4, 97-8, 106 providence 17, 112 psychology 15, 17, 52, 77, 119, 132 Quakers

32

Raey, Johannes de (1622-1707) Cartesian philosophy professor at the University of Leiden 11-13,25,30 Ramism 10 ratio of motion and rest 61, 76, 106-7, 119 reason 12, 15-18, 20-4, 27, 31-2, 37-9, 43, 46, 48-50, 52-62, 64, 67-9, 71, 74-7, 80-1, 86, 93, 98, 101, 104, 110-12, 114-15, 124,126-9 reflexive ideas 95, 100, 130 Reformation, the 7, 15, 18, 20 Reformed Church, see Calvinism regents 6-8, 12,25,26,73 Regius, Henricus (1598-1679), Cartesian professor of Medicine at Utrecht 14, 17,47

religion 28, 33, 38,46, 48, 50, 52-7, 62, 64-5, 67, 73, 75 freedom and toleration of 5-8, 15-16, 19, 26, 28-9, 32, 34, 35,47,49, 58; 73, 132 Reneri, Henricus (1593-1639), Chair of philosophy faculty at Utrecht 1 Remonstrants 1, 4-6, 32 political Arminianism 5, see also Counter-Remonstrants, Arminian Heresy Reneri, Henricus (1593-1639), philosophy professor at Utrecht, first to teach Cartesian philosophy report 92,110,111 republicanism 3, 7-9, 14, 22, 25, 27, 71 Restoration, the 8 Revelation 17, 20,43,49, 54-6 Rieuwertsz, Jan (16161687), Dutch publisher 30 rights 16-19, 25, 37-8, 59, 60, 62-7, 69-71 natural 16,63,66-7,72 Rohen, Louis de (1635-1674) co-conspirator of van den End en's in plot to overthrow Louis XIV 35 salvation 16, 19, 21, 48, 50, 53, 56, 60-L 73-6,91, 111, 128 Scholasticism, see Aristotelianism Schuller, G. H., correspondent of Spinoza, 119 self-interest 15, 23-8, 35-6, 40, 43 self-preservation 15-18, 24-5, 52-4, 58-61,63,69,72,75-6 of state 16, 52~3, 61-3, 69, 75-6, see also state, well being of Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well-Being (KV) Scripture 7, 13, 16, 18-20, 32, 39, 44-50, 52-4, 56-7, 64-5 interpretation of 16,18-20, 34, 44-6, 49-50, 52-3, 64 Second Reformation 18, 20, see also Voetius; Voetians Siebrand, H J. 48 singular things, 107, 112, 118, 123, 126-7. see also particular things

Index skepticism 74,79 sociability 17, 26, 36, 53-4, 58, 67-8, 74-6 social contract 17, 26, 67 Socinianism 20, 32, 47 soul 15, 17-18, 24,47-8, 61-2,86, 88, 97-8, 100-1, 103-5, 107-109, 111-14 Southern Provinces, the 6 sovereign 16,17, 23, 25, 56, 62-72, 77 Spain 4-7,12,32 Spinoza Early (Cartesian) stage 77-8, 81, 88 Transitional (middle) stage 78, 89-90,101,116 Mature stage 33, 51, 55, 101, 116, 118 Spinozism 32-3,48 Stadholder 4-9, 13-14, 24-6, 28, 62, 71-2 Stadholderless Era, the First (1650-1672) 8,13,37,72-3 state 5, 15-17, 19, 23-8, 32-7, 39, 55-6, 58-73,75-6, 132-3 well-being of/interest of 28, 36-7, 55, 64, 66-7, 68 state of nature 26-7, 36, 59, 62-3, 67-8, 72

States General 4, 6, 8, 25, 72 States of Holland 4,72 States-Party 1,6-7,15, 22, 73 Stuart, Adam (1591-1654,, anti-Cartesian philosophy professor at the University of Leiden 11 substance 12, 21, 82, 99, 101, 103-4, 106, 108, 111, 113, 118,124, 131 superstition 39, 40, 58, 68, 74 Sylvius, F. de la Boe (1614-1672), professor of medicine at the University of Leiden 30 Synod of Dordrecht 7, 32 teleology 1, 3, 5,9-13, 16,19-21, 29, 32, 44, 46-9, 52-4 theatre 33-4. 43-4, 47, 50. 58 Theodicy 46 theology, see also philosophy, relation to theology 1, 3, 9-13, 16, 20, 29, 44, 46-9, 52-4

163

Thirty-Year's War 6 Thinking Thing, the (of which we are part) 94,103,105-9,110,120 thought 42,48, 52,68,82-7, 91, 93-6, 98, 101-2, 106, 108-9,116, 119-20, 124-5,128,131 Tufayl, Ibn, Arabic novelist (1105-1185) 42 Tractatus de IntellectusEmendatione (TIE) 30-1, 74, 76-8, 88-101, 103-6, 110-15, 120,121, 124 Tractatus Politicus (TP) 51-2, 58-60, 62-5, 67, 69-73 Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TPP) 21, 28, 30, 33, 44,47-8, 50, 51-2, 54-60, 62-7,69,71-3,75, 134 Treaty at Miinster 6 true belief 110-11 truth 1,28, 30-1,33,45-6,48-50,53-5, 64-5, 75, 78-9,81-3, 90-2, 94-5, 98-101, 105,112, 114-16, 120, 123, 129-31 containment theory of 115 correspondence theory of 90, 95, 114-15,121, 130-1 intrinsic denomination of 90, 94, 98, 100, 130-1 extrinsic denomination of truth 82, 94,98,100,130-1 union with God 31-2,43, 50, 54, 57,91, 105, 108,111,113-14 with Nature 74, 76, 91, 93, 97, 101, 111,113 mind and body / soul and body 18, 90-1,97-8, 100, 105, 108-10, 112, 116-18,121,131, 133 mind and its object 120 will and intellect 104, see also will, relation with intellect Union of Utrecht 4 Unitarian. SeeSocianian universals 101, 104, 121, 123, 126, Universities, 9-10, 14-15, 17, 22 see also Leiden; U trecht: Amsterdam

164

Index

Utrecht 1, 5-6, 9-10, 14, 18, 25 anti-Cartesian Gampain 10-11 University of 1, 9-10, 14, 18 Velthuysen, Lambertus van (1622-1685), physician and politician in Utrecht 14-23, 25, 28, 38, 46-7, 51-5, 57-8, 61,73,132-3 virtue 21-4, 55-6, 58, 60, 65, 69, 74 Voetius, Gisbertus (1589-1679), Dutch Reformed Theologian 3, 13, 15, 18-19 Voetians, see also Second Reformation 10, 13,21,32,47,53 Counter-Voetian Movement 13 Volition 57, 80, 82, 87, 102-4, 121-4 Vrye Politijke Stellingen (Free Political Propositions) 34-5,55 Walloon Church 15 will 17, 21, 24, 32,48-9, 55, 57, 60, 65, 68, 71, 75, 80-2, 85-9, 96, 101-5, 107, 116, 120-4, 131 divine/God's 17,21,55,57

infinite 78,82,122 of the people 35-6, 60, 62 relation with intellect, see also union, will and intellect 75, 78,81-2,85, 88,90,96, 101, 104-5,116, 120-3, 131 Willem Frederik (1613-1664), Count of Nassau 7 William II (1626-1650), Prince of Orange 4, 6, 62 William III (1650-1702), Prince of Orange 7-8,13,24 Wittjohande (1625-1672), Grand Pensionary of Holland 8-9, 12-15, 22, 24, 27, 34, 62, 72 whole of nature 74, 76, 91-3, 97, 100,109-13,119-20,126,131, 133 wisdom 35-6, 39-40,42-3,47, 49-50, 53-4, 58, 64, 75 Wittich, Christophorus (1625-1687), Cartesian Professor at Utrecht