Speaking: From Intention to Articulation

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Speaking Willem J. M. Levelt

RELATED TOPICS Linguistics

"Required reading for anyone w orking in the field." -- Joseph Paul Sternberger, Contemporary Psychology

Aug 1993 ISBN 0262620898

In Speaking, Willem "Pim" Levelt, Director of the Max-Planck-Institut für Psycholinguistik, accomplishes the formidable task of covering the entire process of speech production, from constraints on conversational appropriateness to articulation and self-monitoring of speech. Speaking is unique in its balanced coverage of all major aspects of the production of speech, in the completeness of its treatment of the entire speech process, and in its strategy of exemplifying rather than formalizing theoretical issues.

584 pp. "[Levelt] synthesizes the state of the art w ith remarkable breadth, depth, and clarity. In 500 pages of highly readable text and forty pages of bibliography, he integrates, as no one has done previously, many lines of research that have often been pursued in ignorance of one another.... An outstandingly instructive book." -- Dan Sperber, Times Literary Supplement "A w ork of massive scholarship and authority." -- Brian Butterw orth, Times Higher Education Supplement

Table of Contents Preface Acknow ledgments Author's Notes 1 The Speaker as Information Processor 2 The Speaker as Interlocutor 3 The Structure of Messages 4 The Generation of Messages 5 Surface Structure 6 Lexical Entries and Accessing Lemmas 7 The Generation of Surface Structure 8 Phonetic Plans for Words and Connected Speech 9 Generating Phonetic Plans for Words 10 Generating Phonetic Plans for Connected Speech 11 Articulating 12 Self-Monitoring and Self-Repair Appendix: Symbols From the International Phonetic Alphabet, With Examples Bibliography Author Index Subject Index

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) 1- 4. North-Hollanri Lingua92 ( 1994

Preface For many years, the topic of lexical acquisition was a stepchild in linguistic inquiry . While" the acquisition of syntax was acknowledged to be organized according to a set of deep and highly structured innate principles, word meanings were assumed to be acquired by a simple and particularistic associativeprocedure that mapped perceptual experienceonto phonetic entities . We believe this stance was anomalous from the start, as had been pointed out eloquently by Plato and, in modem times, by Quine. Not all words are perceptually based; even those that are map quite abstractly from ' ' perceptual categories; and neither perception nor learning is simple . During the past decade, it has becomeclear from linguistic inquiry that the lexicon is more highly structured than heretofore thopght ; moreover, that much of grammar turns on critical - and universal - links between syntactic and lexical-semanticphenomena. Hence the present volume. The papers grew out of a workshop held at the University of Pennsylvania. Its aim was to bring together psychologists, computer scientists, and linguists whosejoint concern was the lexicon and its acquisition; these researchershave typically worked quite separately and on problems thought to be disparate. The volume is organized in six sections: 1. Nature of the mental lexicon.. The two essaysthat open the collection are from linguists gleaning general perspectiveson lexical learning from the linguistic facts themselves. The first , by Edwin Williams , arguesfrom the real complexity and idiosyncratic nature of the mental lexicon (including lexical phrases) that innate linguistic and categorization principles are not enough, that real children require a learning theory more sophisticated than usually has been supposed. A detailed analysis of English causativealternation verbs by Levin and Hovav eloquently supports Williams on the complexity of lexical structure. 2. Discovering the word units.. To acquire a vocabulary, the learner requires some proceduresfor segmentingthe continuously varying sound wave into word -sizedpieces. Cutler discusses this problem, presentingevidencethat a bias toward rhythmic alternation servesas a powerful bootstrap for infants (and adults , whatever their specific language background) solving this problem. Kelly and Martin then show that , armed with such blases, learners B.V. All riahtsreserved 0024 - 3841 /94/ 507.00 ~ 1994- ElsevierScience SSDI 0024- 3841( 93) EO036- 7

2

Preface

exploit multiple probabilistic cuesto discover the word units: domain-general learning procedurescan be used to discover many domain-specificfacts about language. ' 3. Categorizing the world: The word meaning culled from children s interaction with the world ultimately depends on how they represent their ' observations. A first question is whether children s mental representations (categories, and the theories that bind them) are the same, no matter the age ' of the learner. In her article, Carey makes a strong casefor a ' discontinuity theory, in which the very basis of inference from observation onto meaningidentification changesover developmental time. Keil , in contrast, argues that the mentalities of children and adults hardly differ. For both , his view is that concept and word acquisition involves both the discovery of multiple probabilistic surface factors (reminiscent of Kelly and Martin ) and some theorydriven generalizations. 4. Categories, words, and language: A further set of articles again documents ' how the child usesthe evidenceof observation to decide on a word s meaning. But theseemphasizethe role ~f linguistic principles as an additional determining factor. Thus Markman points out that the learner is biased ' toward a ' whole object assumption - a new word probably namesthe whole animal rather than one of its parts or properties. But then how could a child learn ' nose' or ' white' ? She provides evidence for a linguistic principle ' ' ( mutual exclusivity ) that leads children to avoid two labels for the same object. Waxman shows experimentally that such blases, even in the toddler , are specifically related to the characteristic semantic properties typical of lexical classes- nouns name objects but adjectives name properties. Landau ' ' ' ' shows how the separation and respectivestructures of the what and where systems(as documentedby neuropsychologists) are related, in learning, to the child ' s acquisition of object namesvs. place expressions. All thesearticles are neutral concerning the direction of the causal links here: the extent to which the perceptual- conceptual facts determine lexical class assignment, or the other way round. Bloom takes a stronger view in discussingthe acquisition of nominal subtypes (count vs. mass noun, noun phrase) : He holds that very early in life children consider syntactic form classas relevant to determining a novel word ' s meaning. 5. The caseof verbs: The papers mentioned thus far make a strong case that the form -meaning linkages that typify language design are exploited by children acquiring the vocabulary of their native tongue. Grimshaw ( 1981) and Pinker ( 1984) emphasized, on the basis of these linkages, that children could derive lexical class assignment from experience-based learning of the

Preface

word ' s meaning; Pinker showed further that such a procedure would be ' marvelously useful for the construction of phrase structure ( semantic boots' . Landau and Gleitman 1985 ( ) emphasized that learning might trapping ) sometimes, even usually, be the other way round ; specifically, that syntactic structure plays a necessary role in narrowing the search space for verb ' ' meanings ( syntactic bootstrapping ) . The three articles in this section hotly debate how the semantics-syntax links (specifically, the relation betweenverb argument structures and subcategorization structures) are implicated in the learning processfor verbs. Fisher, Hall , Rakowitz , and Gleitman emphasize the role of syntax in narrowing the range of interpretations made available by experience; Pinker argues that logically the child must work from experience to determine the syntax in the first place; and Grimshaw stalwartly proposes a reconciliation of these two views. 6. Proceduresfor verb learning: The positions just described, even if correct, can suggestonly some boundary conditions on a learning theory for verbs. Fisher et al., asjust described, assertthat some rudiments of syntax are necessaryfor learning the verb meanings. But as Pinker points out , the question then would be: How did the child acquire the syntax if not by exploiting the word meanings themselves? Brent, in the best tradition of computer science, offers a discovery procedure for verb subcategorization that usesstring-local surface cues only , and does surprisingly well. The final article in the volume, from Steedman, was designedas a specific commentary on Brent' s work . But this short article is much more general than that. It strikes a number of sane cautionary notes about current theories of verb learning, of which the most important is that real acquisition is bound to be a messybusiness, with syntactic, semantic, and prosodic cues recruited by the child more or less catch-as-catch-can. Steedmanalso points out , in what we find an appropriately laudatory comment, that it is only in the presenceof ' explicit computational models such as Brent s that the bootstrapping theories can ever be developedand seriously evaluated. It is the hope of the editors that this compendium of topics and views on lexical learning will be of particular use to the linguists who constitute the Lingua audience, in two ways. First , we suppose it will be useful to see the kinds of methodological and substantive contributions that scientific psychology can make to the question of languagelearning - and henceto the theory of language. Second- as we have emphasizedearlier - becausesyntactic and lexical structure are so closely entwined, we expect that the various articles will be informative as to how theselinkages enter into the learning procedure for vocabulary.

Preface

We thank Lingua for the opportunity to air theseworks in this Special Issue, and we particularlythank the LinguaChief Editor, Teun Hoekstra, for this continuingaid and supportof this project. We thank also the National ScienceFoundation which, through an STC grant to the University of Institutefor Researchin Cognitivescience Pennsylvania , madethe Workshop . In that regard, we areespeciallygratefulto the staffof IRCS (Trisha possible Yanuzziand Chris Sandy) and to Carol Miller, Kimberly Cassidy , and Sally Davis (graduatestudentsin the Departmentof Psychology who ran the ) with verve and considerable , efficiency Workshop , good humor. Finally, we thank Stevenand Marcia Roth for a grant to Lila Gleitmanwhichaidedus in the preparationof the Volume.

, June1993 Philadelphia

Lila Gleitman Barbara Landau

Acknowledgments

This book emergedin the stimulating circle of the Max -Planck-lnstitut fiir ' Psycholinguistik and Nijmegen University . Numerous colleagues can t give up educating me in matters linguistic and psycholinguistic, and I would be at a losswithout them. Also , many distinguishedvisitors from all over the world have given me help and advice. I am sincerelygrateful to all of them. Some, from within and without this circle, have taken the effort to read drafts of chapters and to formulate comments, either orally or in writing . Before mentioning them, I must say that each of theseefforts has deeply touched me. Time and again I experiencedit asa great privilege to be taken so seriously and with so much friendship. In alphabetical order, these angelswere Manfred Bierwisch, Melissa Bowerman, Herbert Clark , Anne Cutler , Jane Edwards, Lyn Frazier, Merrill Garrett , Gerard Kempen, Wolfgang Klein , Aditi Lahiri , and John Marshall . I would also like to thank Gerard van Galen, who gave me a specialtutorial on psychomotor theory. Though I typed the manuscript myself with two index fingers on a terminal , finishing toucheshave beenmade by Uschi de Pagter and Edith Sjoerdsma, especiallyin completing the bibliography . Our librarian , Karin Kastens, also helped me on countlessoccasions. Many thanks to all three of them. The graphic work was done by Wil Maas during three months of ideal cooperation.

NiJmegen . February 29, 1988

Author ' s Notes

On Pronominalization in to the present chaos of person pronominalization male whether : conventions , Speakers, English by adhering to the following or . Hearers female , or generic , will receive masculine pronominalization addressees will be treated as female . When there are two or more interlocutors (i .e., speakers/ hearers) , the first one will be male , the second one female , and so on in alternation . General use of these conventions in psycholinguistics will , given the bias for language - comprehension research,

I will contribute

make most person reference female . On Tr ~

ription

I will follow the transcription conventions of the International Phonetic Alphabet . The phonetic symbols used are listed in the appendix .

) 7- 34. North-Holland Lingua92 ( 1994

Remarks on lexical knowledge EdwinWilliams CognitiveScienceLaboratory, Princeton University, 221 NassauStreet, Princeton, NJ08540, USA ' ' The abstractnessof lexical knowledge, and its independencefrom the words of a language, are is the the lexicon that idioms demonstrate . Abstract repository not only generally underestimated of fixed expressions, but of abstract language-particular phrase- and word-patterns as well. Paradigmsare language-particular patternings dimensionedand structured in languageparticular two abstract of these burden . The of with learning languageparticular patterns syncretism ways, but learned features of lexical knowledge falls ouside of what current thinking about language learning would allow.

1. Introduction I will survey two aspects of lexical knowledge which I feel pose special problems for learning. In both casesthe remarks will tend to emphasizethe extensivenessabstractness , and at the sametime the language-particularity of lexical knowledge, and will consequentlymagnify the learning problem. One conclusion that could be drawn from these observations is that intricate structures can be learned, and this learning is not adequately modelled by . either parameter setting or list learning. I t is useful to distinguish two notions of lexicon, one Bloomfieldian and the other grammatical. The Bloomfieldian lexicon is the repository of all of a ' is the linguist' s theory of languages idiosyncracies. The grammatical 'lexicon ' the category of linguistic object we call a word . These are quite different conceptions, but have come to be identified in modern times. The result is a picture of grammar in which we have a clean streamlined syntax, where syntax is the theory of phrase, and a notion of word that entails that words are idiosyncratic and irregular at heart, with partial regularities expressedas ' ' redundancy rules whose name implies low level generalizationswhere exception is the rule. I think that this picture is wrong. A more correct picture is I think given in Disciullo and Williams ( 1986) . In that view, both the word formation and the ScienceB.V. All rightsreserved -3841 0024 /94/$07.00~ 1994- Elsevier -G SSDI0024-3841(93)EOOS9

E. Williams / Remarkson lexical knowledge

' ' syntactic system are clean streamlined systems, independent of the lexicon. The lexicon is the repository of forms about which something specialmust be learned. This certainly includes, for example, all the monomorphemic words, but it also includes composed units of both syntax and word formation , composed units whose properties do not all follow from the rules which compose them. This would include a great deal of words, but also a great deal of phrases. In fact, I now think there are more lexical phrasesthan there are lexical words, but this re~ ains a speculation. In addition , I think that lexical knowledge includes knowledge of complex abstract.structures that cannot be arrived at through parameter setting, and which must be learned from the data in a strong sense. I will discusstwo of these: ' abstract idioms' in section 2, and paradigms in section 3. If my view of theseis correct, the rich structure each exhibits results not from a rich innate predefined linguistic structure, but rather from a richly structured learning strategy. If nothing else, then, the remarks that follow draw attention to the learning problems that might arise if first , more ~f linguistic knowledge is lexical than has been thought, and second, if acquired lexical knowledge is more abstract and structured in language-particular ways than has been thought . I think that the sort of structure that is found in each case reveals the hand of the learning strategy.

2. Idioms

The phrasesin the lexicon are called ' idioms' . We generally think of idioms as ' frozen' expressions. I will use the term idiom to refer to any defined unit whose definition does not predict all of its properties. This will include the phrase kick the bucket, a phrase, whose idiomatic meaning is die, but also transmission, which unpredictably means ' such and such car part ' . We don' t think of transmissionas an idiom , but it will be useful and I believecorrect to include it . It has been commonly assumedthat idioms are well-formed structures, but I think lately this view has been questioned. To say that an idiom is well formed is to say simply that it conforms to the rules of formation for the type that it is. Of course, the idiom does not conform to all of the rules, else it would not be an idiom . What rules do idioms obey? It is useful to consider the rules of ' form ' apart from the rules of interpretation . We find idioms violating both types of rules.

E. Williams I Remarks on lexical knowledge

The idioms that do not obey the rules of interpretation are deviant in meaning. The rules of argument structure are not obeyed in some cases, and in others, the rules of referenceare not obeyed. We might refer to both these ' ' types of idioms as semantic idioms. It is perhaps misleading for me to say that there are idioms which do not obey the rules of form , for it is an overwhelming fact that idioms obey the basic rules of fonn it) a language. For example, all idioms in English obey the ' head-initial ' setting of the head position parameter. On the other hand, there are unpredictable, language-particular exploitations of the formal possibilities ' in a language; we might call theseidioms ' formal idioms. A widely shared set of assumptionsabout idioms is the following : ( 1) usual assumptions: idioms are listed idioms are well-formed phrases idioms have empty parts : The cat has Xs tongue relation of idioms to syntax: insert the idiom , then fill in the parts ' So, for example, The cat has got X s tongue is an idiomatic phrase, fully consistent with the laws of English syntax, which is inserted in a phrase marker for an S position ; further substitution of a referential NP for the position of X will yield an English sentence. These assumptions, though common, lead to some surprising conclusions, or at least some surprising conclusions, or at least some surprising questions. . In particular , they lead to the view that a great deal of what we have called ' ' ' rule' in syntax might really be idiom . To give an example, consider the fact that embeddedquestions in English must begin with a WH word. It is well known that this is not to be describedby making WH movement obligatory in English. What kind of information is it then that [ Wh-phraseS ] is a (potential) embeddedquestion in English? It COULD be that this form is an idiom : ' ' (2) [[ Wh-phraseS ]. , : embeddedquestion Under this conception, (2) could be listed in the lexicon, awaiting insertion into some embedded S position, where it is an embedded question (as the slogan after the colon above indicates) . Further substitution of some wh

E. Williams I Remarkson lexical knowledge

phrase for the wh-phrase position in (2) and of an S for the S position in (2) will complete the sentence, exactly parallel to The cat has got X 's tongue. One does not ordinarily think of this as idiomatic information , even though it is languageparticular ; rather, one thinks of this feature of English as one of the ' parametric' possibilities. (2) is not the ordinary way to encode this information . Example (2) may seem sufficiently different from The cat has got your tongue that it would never be misidentified as an idiom in the same sense. However, I intend to supply enough examplesof casesintermediate between the two ' that I cannot see how it cannot be questioned whether (2) is the correct description or not. 2.1. Idioms are instances of we//- formed structures

The view that I am presentingherewould have large numbersof objects of a sometimesquite abstract character stored in the idiom lexicon of language. This view might then be seenas convergi.ng with severalrecent proposals that . there are 'constructions' in language, a backlash against the principles and parameters model. There is, though, a fundamental difference between the proposal here and those proposals - specifically, I hold that idioms are well formed, and that the rules of well-formednessare simple ' parameterized' rules. 2.1.1. Filmore's examples For example: C. Filmore (p.c.) has sugg~sted to me that while most prepositions in English are prepositions , some are not , and consequentlythe notion that there is a uniform head position in English is not correct ; the most ,:>ne can say is that there are a number of constructions in which the head is leftmost, and some others in which it is not. His candidates for postposition in English are notwithstandingand ago: (3a) John notwithstanding, we will go there tomorrow . (3b) John left 3 days ago. I believe that neither of these is a preposition, and that the notion that English is head initial can be maintained in a strong form . Notwithstandingcan be assimilated to the following constructions:

(4a) John aside, ... That noted, ...

on.lexical E. Williams / Remarks knowledge which are clearly small clauseconstructionsof somekind. The difference and asideis that asidecan appearin other small betweennotwithstanding whereas clauseconstructions , notwithstandingis restrictedto the context indicated: (Sa) put that aside, * notwithstanding . (Sb) We may ~xpress this restriction on notwithstanding by not listing it in the ' ' lexicon on its own , but only as a part of the following idiom :

' ' ]sc S]s: evenwith NP, S (6) [[NP notwithstanding Importantly, (6) is an instanceof a structurewhich is well fonnedin English , namelythe structureof (4) : independently

(7) rNP - AP]- S > >

' ' [ NPnotwithstandingS: even

' I will usethe doublecarat sign' > > ' to mean' hasa well-formedinstance. I think ago as well has a better analysisthan the postpositionalone. Consider: (8a) long (8b) 5 minutes (8c) a few days

ago in the past before the party

It appears that time prepositions in general can take some sort of extent specification; however, this specification in general precedesthe time preposition , as we might expect specifiers to. (8c, d) shows clearly that the extent specification is not a part of the complement structure, as the prepositions in and before have complements to their right . Now , ago differs from these in two ways. First , it cannot have a complement to the right . This however shows nothing except that ago is intransitive. Secondly, in the caseof ago, the extent specification is obligatory . Here, if we think that extent specification is ordinarily outside of the subcategorizational reach of a head, we might appeal to an idiom to capture this exceptional feature of ago:

E. Williams/ Remarkson lexicalknowledge

' I complements right , specs left ' > > assign [(Extent-spec) P (NP)]pp> > [Extent-specago]pp Here, the idiom is a well-formed subinstanceof prepositional phrase, which itself is a ' subinstance' of all the structures that fall under the parametric specializationsof English. In sum then, although the notion of idiom we are employing is quite general, it is at the same time quite restrictive, in that all idioms conform to more abstract (though perhaps parameterizedlanguageparticular) principles. 2.1.2. What rules.do idioms obey? Idioms basically obey the (rules determining the) phrase structure of the language, but not the rules of reference; so for example, kick the bucket is a well-formed VP, but no referenceto any bucket is made. These two observations set someouter bounds. I think a more interestingprobe is theta structure, where it turns out in fact that idioms diff ~r in the extent of their conformity . . It is well known that idioms differ in their syntactic ' transparency' - ' kick the bucket' does not passivize, whereas' cross that bridge when we come to it ' does. Fiengo ( 1974) connected this difference to a further difference, namely, a difference in whether the object can be quantified : ( l Oa) * They kicked the buckets (as an idiom ) ( lOb) We will cross those bridges when we get to them. In (b), ' bridges' refers to ' problems' , and (b) says that we are talking about more than one problem. In (a) on the other hand, it is impossible to refer to more than one death. Is this an arbitrary difference? I do not think so; I think it follows from the fact that the meaning of ' kick the bucket' is intransitive. This intransitivity of meaning meansthat there can not be a correspondencebetweenthe syntactic and semanticargument structures, sincesyntax is transitive here. In (b) on the other hand, the verb cross can be assigneda transitive theta structure, and one of its theta roles can be assignedto bridges. So what is wrong with the meaning of (b) is simply the reference, not the theta structure: cross refers to solve and bridges refers. to problems. But in (a), it is not just reference, but . theta structure itself, which is idiosyncratic. If this is so, then (b) has a transitive theta structure, and its passivizability is no surprise, if passiveis an operation on theta structures, as I believe it is.

E. Wi/Iiams / Remarkson lexical knowledge

And the fact (a) is not passivizableis no surprise either, sincethere is no theta relation betweenthe direct object and the rest of the sentence. If this account is correct, then theta structure is not necessarilyrespectedin idioms, though it may be. A child learning an idiom will aggressivelyassignit as much structure as possible according to its rules. If it can assign it a semanticargument structure basedon its syntactic argument structure, it will , but if not , then the idiom will lack argument structure.

2.2. Abstractidioms 2.2.1. Idioms with instances If we begin with the idea that an idiom is a phrase, and that it can contain empty parts, then we immediately face the question, how empty can an idiom be? Can it , for example, be mostly empty? The question arisessharply for an example like the English noun pants. This noun, as is well known , is an ' ' arbitrary plural ; a shirt , for example, of the same genus topologically (at least when the fly of the pants is unzipped) is singular. This is a trivial piece of .idiomatic , that is unpredictable, information about this noun, that it must be plural. Strikingly , though, this is not true of this noun alone, but in fact of every word that has the meaning that pants has: something worn on the legs in such and such a way : ( 11) pants jeans shorts cutoffs culottes bermudas ... New, made-up terms for lower trunk wear must conform as well. One exception, bathing -suit , is an exception only in that it does not specifically refer to lower - trunk wear, but rather means whatever one wears to bathe in ; it is an accidental fact of current fashion that this refers to lower -trunk wear. Now , what sort of information is this? It is information about a general restriction on form that follows from meaning; specifically, if a noun is going to have such and such a meaning, then it must be plural ;

' ' ( 12) Ns +- : lower trunk wear I .have drawn the arrow from right to left to mean, if an item is going to have the meaning on the right , then it MUST have the form on the left. This is a different sort of idiomatic information from knowing that kick the bucket CAN mean die, and so the different notation.

E. Williams / Remarkson lexical knowledgE

Another example like pants is fish . Fish names , with some exceptions , are all unmarked plurals or have that as an option : trout , bass, perch , bream , yellow tail , mahimahi . The exceptions are not really fish , by and large : whale , guppy , minnow . Other animal families are untouched by this idio syncracy : bee, wasp , ant . As far as I can tell , this is an unpredictable , but ' ' information very general fact about English , and counts as idiomatic about the language . A further case of the same sort is the language - particular patterns of lexicalization identified by Talmy ( 1985) . He found that languages systematically differed in the kinds of verb meanings they allowed . For example , English allows verbs of motion to indicate a means of motion . Float can be used as a directional verb , but at the same time , it indicates the manner of motion : John floated under the bridge can mean that John moved under the bridge by Boating . Spanish and French lack entirely verbs of this kind . F/otter in French and flotar in Spanish ( float ) can mean only to float stationarily , and the restriction is apparently a hard and fast one. Similarly , verbs of posture ( sit , kneel , lie , etc.) differ systematically from language to language , in whether the stative , inchoative , or causative is the basic or underived form ; English , Japanese, and Spanish systematically differ in this choice - see Talmy ( 1985) for details . Again , we have language -particular variation of a quite general sort . ' ' Again , the information is idiomatic , but the question remains , how to ' ' represent it . We might again represent it as an idiom with a hole in it :

( 13a) [inchoative)v +- : posture verb (Japane~ where V is atomic. 13b motion verb]v +- : manner (English ) ( ) [ Now , the representation here I think is not so important as the question of what this sort of information is, and especiallyhow it is acquired. I think that language-particular patterns of the kind that havejust been discussed- pants in English, the motion verbs in Romance, the posture verbs, etc. - fall outside of the ' parametric' core, and yet, they are quite general, and basically exceptionless. This means some sort of general induction , the kind that is meant to extract ' lexical reduncancyrules' , must be capable of acquiring from ' of the rule. Some substitute for the data the ' exceptionlessness negative evidence, such as counting, and statisticking, is required. And somelimitation on the spaceof searches must hold , in order for the induction to remain in the realm of possibility .


The most surprising casesare the casesthat achieveexceptionlessness . The ' idiom is pants exceptionless, in that any noun that means the right thing must participate in the idiom . The presentparticiple is another case: there are no present participles that do not end in -ing whereaspast tense forms, as is well known , are quite varied. The learner learns more than that there are no exceptions; he learns that there can be no exceptions. We will discuss such cases further in sec~ion 4. For the moment, we note that the formalism , though it at the same time proposed suffices to express exceptionlessness hides the learning problem implied by them. '

2.2.2. Formal idioms: Exploited and unexploitedavenues The pants phenomenon just examined is I think more widespread. Formally ' , the grammar permits singular nouns to have the meaning such and ' such a type of legwear , but this avenue is unexploited in English, thanks to ' ' ( 12) . By unexploited avenues I mean possibilities that the formal system would seemto allow , but which it does not use. In identifying such casesone always risks missing the formal explana~ion for the missing possibility, though a case like pants I think clearly shows that there will not always be one. As one example, consider compound terms in English and French. Both languageshave meansof putting together words from further words, or kind denoting terms. In French, the syntactic system is exploited; so, one has compound terms of the following kind : ( 14

)

VP

>

>

V

>

NP

>

V

N

>

>

essuie

'

'

glace

wipe

window

' ,

windshield '

wipers VP

>

>

V

PP

>

>

V

P

N

>

>

laisse

pour

'

'

- conte

left

for

count

,

'

' abandoned

one

Here, the double carat means ' has as an instance' . So, compound terms in French are instancesof syntactic constructions. As word level items they have their own limitations (e.g., no referential material may occur in them, and so, for example, no determiners are allowed) , but they are neverthelesswellformed syntactic objects. English , on the other hand , exploits a different system to form its compound terms :

( 15) [ X Y] y > > [ NN] N

E. WUliamsI Remarkson lexical knowledge

The system exploited here is the affixation system in the lexicon, which is . Ordinarily , Y is a suffix, forming the head of a word. English right -headed ' lets Y be a full noun, giving us compounds. Importantly , both languageshave both resources- English has the same (left -headed) syntax as French, and French has the same right -headedaffixation systemas English; however, they each exploit a different one of thesefor their compound terms. I assumethat this is ' idiomatic ' - that is, language' ' particular , but perhaps not parametric .

2.3. Syntacticidioms English embeddedquestions must begin with a wh-phrase. This is not to say that Wh-movement is obligatory in English, as it clearly is not ; not only do matrix questions not necessarilyundergo Wh -movement, but even a whword in an embeddedquestion need not move, when, for example, another has moved, or the complementizeris already wh, like whether:

( 16) Who wonderswhetherGeorge saw who ? The correct generalization is as stated: a Wh -word must appear at the beginning of an embeddedQuestion. What sort of information is that ? We might describeit as an idiom , in the sensedevelopedherein:

( 17) [wh-phraseS +- : embeddedquestion That is, a sentencewith a Wh-phrase at the beginning is a question, and nothing else is. The arrow goes backwards, as any embeddedquestion must have this form . ' Idiom ( 17) is a good candidate for a ' parameter , in that there is a small number of ways that question words can be dealt with : ( I ) moved to front ; (2) moved to verb (as in Hungarian); or (3) left in situ. However, I think there is good evidencethat idioms just like ( 17) must be countenanced, ones that are not reducible to parametersof variation . One caseis the ' amount' relatives. These have the following form :

) [wh-phraseS] (18a '

> > N what S : Little (amount relatives) [ ] I him food I had. 18b what ( ) gave I him what I had. 19 ( ) give


( 18b) has an implication that ( 19) does not have, namely, that there was little food in question. Now , where does this implication come from ? It does not come from what, which does not have this implication in general, not even in free relatives, exceptin the context in ( 18b) . Furthermore, it does not inhere in free relatives in general. In fact, it occurs only in the structure in ( 18), it is idiosyncratic to that structure. Assuming that there is no parameter to set here, then this is a learned fact about this structure. What is interesting is how formally similar ( 18) is to ( 17) . The only difference is that the semantics of ( 18) is very particular, and therefore plausibly idiomatic , whereas the semantics of ( 17) is very general. But the formal means may be the same in the two cases: a feature of meaning and form are connected in an idiomatic entry in the lexicon. If a learner can induce ( 18), it would seem that ( 19) would be accessible to the same mechanism. A related sort of case arises from Subject Aux Inversion in English; the following is an idiom of English:

(20) [ V S]. +- : matrix yes/no question This is comparable to ( 17) - an obligatory idiom (that is, of the pants variety) has the effect of forcing syntactic rules to apply. More interesting are the casesof inversion which receivea conditional interpretation : (2Ia ) Had I been there, this would not have happened (21b) S > > [ V S]s: conditional > > [ had...]s > > [were...]vp The rule of inversion gives a large number of forms which are ungrammatical in this context :

* (22) Could I write poetry, I would not be a linguist . In fact, inversion in the conditional context works only for the auxiliaries had a~d were. What sort of infonnation is this? Importantly , the casesallowed in the construction are a subset of the casesallowed in general; hence, what is learned is that not all the formally allowed possibilities are realized. We will adopt the following convention for representingthis situation :


(23) Instanceprinciple : If a fonn to which a meaning is assignedhas listed subinstances, then those subinstancesare exhaustive. 2.4. Idiom families

At one end of the language-particular information that a learner must acquire are the completely fixed expressions; at the other end are the broad ' . I have suggestedthat there are intermediate ' abstract typologiCalparameters 0 idioms _ pants and amount relatives, for example, which link theseendpoints with a graded continuum. In compensation for this more complicated situation , and the more complex learning problem that it poses, I have suggested that each level of ' abstractness' must conform to the level above it ; thus we ' ' do not have a wholesale theory of constructions , but still a broadly parametric model. This says that a construction - say, passive must conform to the typo logical pattern that is determined by some parameter but leaves open the possibility 0that not all features of the passive .settings, construction will be determined by this conformation . As further evidence of this view, I will discuss here some idiom families, that is, language-particular idiom patterns. Each idiom pattern has a number of idioms as instances. The principle reason for recognizing the existenceof the idiom family is that somelanguageswill have idioms of a certain sort, and others will lack them altogether, apparently in a way not related to the parametric typology of the languages, though of course one could always be wrong about that for any particular case. The most interesting sort of case I know of was pointed out to me by Martin Everaert (pic.) ; the idioms are of the form :

(24) NyPNy by side The two Ns are meant to be identical tokens of the samenoun, as in side by side. French, English, and Dutch have these idioms, Japaneselacks them ' ' entirely. For this reason, we would want to call (24) itself an abstract idiom of the sort discussedin previous sections. Idiom (24) probably has as its most imniediate instantiations not actual idioms, but further , more concrete, idiom families, one for each P that participates:


(25) Nx P Nx > > Nx by Nx Nx to Nx Nx on Nx Nx for Nx Nx fromNx Someof the manyexamplesof instancesin thesesubfamiliesare:

(26) N to.N > >

hour minute second year

window door station head hand cheek

NbyN > >

minute, hour , etc. ; layer house cave

N for N > > dollar for dollar N from N > > limb from limb Non N > > layer on layer If these are idioms, then we expect them to be instances of well-formed structures in the language. One is at first hard-pressed to identify what structures these are well-formed instances of , but I think the most likely "candidate is the compound prepositional phrases, asfrom . .. to:

(27) John went [from a to b] The compound prepositions generally require both prepositions to be overtly present, but this is not always so, as in the following : (28) I do not know what he is doing [one day to the next] . T1')us the compound prepositions are somewhat like conjunctions, where we find both simple (and) and compound (both ... and) varieties. It so happens that the idiom family so productive in English is a subspeciesof compound prepositional phraseswhere the first preposition is not present. In French, on

E. .Williams I Remarkson lexical know/ed~E

the other hand, both prepositions must be present: depart en part (' limb from limb ' ) ( V. Deprez, p .c. ., T . Hoekstra has pointed out to me the existenceof heurepar heure and cote a cote) . The various subcasesof (24) do not have a common element of meaning. So, for example, cheekto cheekrefers to the pressingtogether of two cheeks, as in dancing; but minute to minute and day by day refers to a seriesof days in sequence . Even the instancessharing a common proposition do not have a completely shared element of meaning, as the two instanceswith to just cited show. Therefore, these forms are not compositional, despite clear patterns in the meaning. On the other hand, from the fact that they are so prevalent in one language, and absent altogether in another, we know that they are present as a group in some sense. It seemsunlikely that there is a parameter for this property alone; perhaps it follows from some other parameters, though it is hard to seehow. An alternative is that the structure in (25)-( 27) is induced from the data of the language. How could this happen? Supposethat at a certain point in the . course of acquisition, some number of forms with the shape NxPNx have been learned. As a class, they conform to the shapeof left headedcompound prepositional phrases, and so do not fall outside of the language altogether. On the other hand, their properties are not entirely explicable in terms of the general principles of the grammar; in particular, the use of bare singular count Ns as the objects of prepositions is not a general feature of prepositional phrases in English. So these remain idiomatic ; however, they are idiomatic as a class, not as individuals. Another family of idioms is illustrated in the following : (29) John hunts bear snares rabbit traps monkey

(a) *John huntsbook * 1 am goingto gradepaper , (b) *Johncountsmonkey (c) * hunt sleepyelephant What is special about this case is the use of the bare singular as object. Normally , this is not allowed for English count nouns, but is allowed here. So, we have an abstract idiom , of the following form :


(30)

N] vp [V + HUNT + ANIMAL

The form in (30) is a special case of the general form of VP (and so, for ' ' ' ' example, is V N and not N V ), and thus conforms to our overall claim that abstract idioms are always instancesof more generalpatterns of the language. The limits of this idiom are somewhat roughly indicated by (b) and (c) - the ) shows verb must be a verb of hunting, and the object must be an animald a further restriction - not only are determiners excluded, but adjectives as ' well (unless"sleepy is a kind of elephant) . One might conclude from this the observation that this construction was ' ' in fact a lexically compound verb - to hunt monkey then would be syntactically intransitive . I doubt this, since English in general disallows compound verbs, and particularly disallows left -headed compound verbs; but even if the conjecture were correct , then the problem posed by these examples is not solved, but simply delivered to the lexicon, with fee still unpaid. I . assume that it is not at all predictable that English would have this pattern ; and in fact, inspection of (b) and (c) might lead one to not expect this pattern . I conclude therefore, that learning ( 30) entails generalizing over exampleslike those in (29), and the limits of the generalization must follow in some way from the actual mechanism of generalization. The existence of these idioms of intermediate abstractness argues that learning languagedoes not reduce to (a) learning parameter settings, and (b) learning the properties of particular lexical items. Rather, there are structures between these two extremes, what I have called abstract idioms , which .can only be learned as language-particular generalizations of particular forms.

3. Paradigms A paradigm is a multidimensional array of linguistic forms - for example, a verb conjugation, or a Latin noun declension. A paradigm is not just a convenient way to display linguistic information ; rather, it is a basic form of linguistic knowledge. It interests here becauseit is highly languageparticular , and at the same time, quite abstract in structure. Paradigmatic structure is also pervasive. Example (a) below is a slice of the Latin verbal conjugation :


(31) Latin : (a) + - finite + - indicative + - passive + - perfective presjimperfjfut + - plural Ij2j3person

(b) amo amamus amas amatis amat amant

The Latin verbal conjugation is 8-dimensional, with the dimensions listed on the left. It is not possibleto say in a general way how many dimensionsa paradigm will have, nor how many points on a given dimension, nor what the dimensionswill ' mean' , or what syntactic or semanticcategoriesthe points on a dimension will be taken as signifying. There are severallevels of abstraction involved in paradigms. At the lowest level, we have word -paradigms, such as in (31b). At a slightly higher level of abstraction, we have paradigms in the traditional sense, roughly speaking, setsof endings: ( 32) - 0 - as -t

-mus - atis - ant

At a slightly greater level of abstraction, one might regard a paradigm as a set of rules which, when applied to a stem, derive a word paradigm, by, for example, adding endings. So there is a rule for forming the past tense, a rule for forming the third person present tense, etc. In fact, though, I believe that a paradigm is even more abstract than that - a paradigm is a patterning which is more abstract than any set of forms, any set of endings, or any set of rules for filling the slots in a paradigm. That the paradigm is a real object, and not the epiphenomenalproduct of various rules, is shown by the phenomenaof blocking, syncretism, suppletion, and paradigm defectiveness , as argued in Halle ( 1973) . To consider only the first of these: if there are two rules for filling a slot in a paradigm, ' only one may be used; thus, we have bit , not bited, and in general, only a single past tense form for a given verb , despite multiple ways to form past tenses. This reveals that there is a target slot to fill , which .is independent of the rules for filling it , and that slot is given by the paradigm .


3.1. Extensiveness

We tend to think of paradigms as a means of displaying inflectional information about the parts of speech. But in fact, the notion of paradigm is much broader than this. To begin with , paradigms must include syntactic items, or phrases, as well as words. To seethis, we need only examine a slice of the Latin verb paradigm: (33)

active passive present amo amor perfect amavi amatus sum

Here the forms are all 1st singular, present-perfective crossed with activepassive. One comer of this square contains a phrase, amatus sum, while the other three comers contain words. This shows that phrases form an inextricable part of paradigmatic information . If we removed the perfective passive form , we would have destroyed the symmetry of the paradigm, which is otherwise perfectly symmetrical. We can see the same thing in an English paradigm, the comparative paradigm:

COMP SUPER (34) A long longer longest compact morecompact most compact better best good The rule is, if an adjective is mono- (or nearly) syllabic, then form the comparative with -er ; if not , then the comparative and superlative are formed ' phrasally. The existenceof this paradigm is what pennits us to speak of the ' of an comparative adjective, even though there are two ways of forming . comparatives Many languageslack any way at all to fonn the comparative; English has two ways, one morphological, the other syntactic. Paradigms include not just inflectional dimensions, but what have been called ' derivational' processes as well. I am sure that there is no distinction be~ween derivational and inflectional morphology , but if there is, then paradigms are found in both morphologies.


3.2. The abstractness of paradigm structure

In general, there is not a one-to- one relation between the slots in a paradigm and the rules for creating the fonDSwhich fill the paradigm. In one circumstance, there are more slots than rules, and therefore, severalslots will be filled with the same form - this is the phenomenon of syncretism. The pattern of syncretism that is found reveals the method of assigningforms to slots. The method consistsof the following : . ( I ) Hierarchalize the dimensionsof the paradigm. Assign forms to nodes in the hierarchy. For example, the English verbal paradigm is 4-dimensional (personX number X present-past X finite), and there are 4 distinct forms. We may hierarchize the tree and assignthe forms to it as follows :

(35)

.

I pres m sg I

2 3*

m pi

I

2 3

V * = run

V' I

I

I

finite I

infinitive I

I

I

I

past.

perf*

infinitive

rfl

rfl

I 2 3

1 2 3

rfl

rfl

I 2 3

1 2 3

* past = ran

3 * = runs

1 2 3 rfl rfl

I 2 3

perf * = run

The tenninal nodes are the actual cells of the paradigm. The starred nodes are the nodes to which actual forms are assigned. By convention, a cell is filled by the nearestspecifiedform above it . The identity of the forms and the points in the tree at which they are mapped are given in (35) . The assignment ' shown is the most economical, as each form is assignedonce. ' We might call the starred nodes entry points' - these are the points at which concrete forms are specified. The tree along with the starred nodes we


' ' might call the pattern of syncretism . This is a pattern which is independent of the rules for creating the forms in the pattern. It is a part of the formal structure of the paradigm. Strikingly , the pattern of syncretism holds generally in a category, not just for particular verbs, as we will see. If we look at the pattern of syncretism for a variety of English verbs, a startling pattern emerges:

V$ I

(36)

I I pres r +- , * sg IA 2 3 r +- ,

. pI I 2 3

finite ~

I

perf *

infinitive

r +- ,

r +- ,

pastS

I 2 3

I 2 3

r +- ,

~

m

IA 2 JA

I 2 3

1 2 3

I

r +- , I 2 J

Entry points : $ modals $* regular; go-went $*" be have, says, does - irregular in 3prsg: * haves Here, marked on the same tree, are the entry points for severalcategoriesof verbs, including irregular verbs. As can be seen, the sets of entry points form a nested set; the verb be shows the most distinctions, and consequently has the most entry points, but all other verbs, including all irregulars, have some subset of the entry points of be. It is far from obvious that such a relation should exist - if a verb is going to be irregular, why should it not be irregular in having a different pattern of syncretism, a different set of entry points ? But this does not happen, even irregular verbs respectthe pattern of the language as a whole. In fact, even suppletive verbs, the limiting case of irregularity , respectsthe pattern of syncretism; the verb go has went as its past tenseform . Things could have been different: went could have been the third past plural form , with goed (or something else) for all the other forms ; but then, go-went would have violated the language-wide pattern of syncretism.

E. Williams / Remarks on lexical knowledge

Hence, the pattern of syncretism is a quite abstract structure, standing above particular words, particular rules, particular suppletive relationships. We can see this further in the noun declensions of Latin . Latin has 5 declensions, each with its own set of endings (we ignore here the genitive and the vocative) : Latin

declension structure :

< 1> 1 .

" s ~

direct r- l -, nom

indirect r - L- ,

acc

< 2>

abl s ~

,

dat

abl

acc

direct r--l --w nom acc

dat

direct r=

nom

nom

indirect . r- L- ,

acc

< 3>

abl s ~

.

nom

I

s ~

: L - ,

acc

direct . r - L- , nom

dat

indirect . r - L- , abl

dat

acc

abl

dat

direct r-- L- , nom

dat


dat

-;Il I I p

I

direct indirect r-- L, r - Li nom acc abl dat

acc

direct r ~ nom

acc


N Ac D Ab

-a - am - ae -a

-IS . - IS

N Ac D Ab

-us -urn -0 -0

-i - os - is - is

etc.

indirect . r - L- ,

I 1 1 -pi

I

abl

acc

< 4>

dat

indirect r-- L- ,

direct r - L- ,

abl

-;I1 I I p

< 2n > ~ ____~ - -- , direct r -- L- ,

indirect . r~

I I I -pi

I

indirect . r-- - L- ,

direct , . J--, nom

-;Il 1 I p

I

dat

-aeas

E. WilliamsI Remarkson lexicalknowledge < 4>

s ,

direct r- l - ,

nom acc

~

-pII

1

,

1

indirect r-- L- , abl

dat

nom

acc

abl

dat

principle syncretisms: 1st decl: pl . indirect (-is) 2nd decl:pl . indirect (is), sg. indirect (-0) neuter: above + direct sg. (-urn). pl . direct (-a) 3rd decl. :pl . indirect(-ibus) 4th decl. :pl . direct (-es) pl . indirect(-ibus) neuter: sg. (direct = indirect) (-0), pl . indirect, pl . direct Here, the nominative and accusativehave beengrouped together as ' direct' , and the ablative and dative as ' indirect ' . The reason for this is that this reflects the patterns of syncretism: nominative and accusative fall together sometimes, and dative and ablative do as well. A striking thread that runs through the entire set of declensionsis the indirect plural syncretism. In the singular, there is an indirect entry point for 2nd and 4th neuter; the plural syncretism holds across the board. Importantly , this generalization is independent of the rules for forming the indirect forms, for in fact there are two different rules for that : in the first and second, -is is affixed; whereasin the 3rd and 5th, -;bus is affixed. Hence, the pattern is more abstract than the rules or affixes. I would suggest that a pattern is abstracted that applies to all the declensions, essentially the tree structure in -< I > . Other declensionswill make further syncretisms, but this one will hold for all. A general conclusion we may draw is that when there are multiple related paradigms, there will be one instantiated paradigm, and all others will have its syncretic structure, and perhaps some more. But no other related paradigm will have a contrary syncretic structure, making distinctions where that one does not. We will call that one paradigm the basic paradigm. For the Latin nominal declension, the first declension is the basic paradigm . For English verbs, the verb to be is the basic paradigm. L,et us now consider Latin verbs. Every finite Latin verb form has a different form , so there is no syncretism at this level. But at the level of stem, there is a paradigm structure with a limited number of entry points. Below is a chart of the stem forms for various classesof Latin verbs:


.. (37) Latin verbstemsuppletion Vx I I . I

perf *

I

I

A imperfect

future .

Z'

.

I

sg ------ ---+- , , 1

partic

I

I pres I

I

I

r

' 3

I

plur - - ------" , 1

2'

3

Entry points for stem : * A' esse edo , * A' volo *A regularized volo * A do * regulars , including fero feri Tull latus x amo

The asterisked positions represent the entry points for the regular verbs of all four conjugations. This alone is striking , for again, there are different rules in the different conjugations for yielding the forms at these entry ' ' points . The first and second conjugation form the future by suffixing -b- , whereas the third suffixes nothing , but switches the conjugational class of the basic stem. Neverthess, that the future is an entry point is common to all the conjugations. The verb essehas the most entry points, and every other verb uses some subset of those entry points. Thus the conjugation of esse is the basic conjugation, to which all the others are related. ' As a final example, we consider Anderson s ( 1984) description of Georgian ' verb conjugation. The system is quite complex; Anderson s account uses blocks of rules, both conjunctively and disjunctively ordered. It is my contention that such a systemwill fail to capture the most abstract patterning of a paradigm, which, as we have seen, is generally independent of affixes or


rules. Someindicationthat this is so can be derivedfrom the following table of affixes(or, to useAnderson's accountmore directly, of rules for adding affixes ) for presentand past: (38) present -en 3pl subj -t pi -s 3rd subjects

past -es 3pl subj -t pi 3rd subject

' ' The rules are.quite similar, and Anderson s remark This -es rule has the same status as the -en rule in this block , and also takes precedenceof the -s and the -1 rules ...' ( 1984: 8) shows I believe that an abstract structure is being replicated in different parts of the paradigm, thus underscoring the independence of that structure from actual rules or affixes. 3.3. Learning paradigm structure We ask at this point , why are these patte .rns of syncretism in language ? Why is a pattern of syncretism replicated accross different modes of realizing paradigm cells? I speculate that it is the acquisition of paradigm structurethat is respon

sible for this arrangement. Pinker has demonstrated how the blocking principle will give rise to the developmentof paradigm structure in the languagelearner. The basic idea is that wheneverthe languagelearner has been forced to posit two items to fill a single cell, he is then motivated to split the paradigm (really, to double it ) so as to avoid violating the blocking principle : (39)

D

The paradigm now has a new dimension, and a whole new set of cells; the ' ' language learner now must learn the significance of the dimension, and fill in the rest of the cells. I think that this algorithm for building paradigms, combined with the notion of paradigm structure I have just outlined, will predict some of the patterns we have observed.

E. WilliamsI Remarkson lexicalknow/edgE

There are two sorts of splitting than can take place - intraand interparadigm ' ' splitting . Given a present tense paradigm for some verb, see, for ' ' ' ' example, the recognition that saw , like see, can be used for the 1st person ' ' singular, leads to a postulation of a past tenseplane, in which to locate saw . This is intraparadigm splitting . The other kind of splitting might be called ' declensional' splitting : given a set of endings, say the endings for the 1st declensionin Latin (-a, -am, -De, -a, etc.), the recognition that the ending -us can signify nominative singular, just as -a does, triggers the splitting of the nouns into (at least) two declensions. The differencebetweenthis and the first caseis that in the first case, a given word will have forms in every cell of the new and old plane, but in the second, a word will have forms in only a single declension. We may neverthelessconsider the splitting to be formally the same in the two cases, and this is supported by the observation that syncretism patterns the samein the two cases. An example of a ' declensional' split is the comparative paradigm in English; the paradigm is a linear three-point paradigm: adjective, comparative , superlative. But there are two modes of forming members, as we have . seen- one for monosyllabics and Simple disyllabics, and another for everything .else. A telling point which showsthat we are dealing with a declensional here is that the same criterion that is used to determine whether the split ' ' comparative is A -er or more A is used to determine whether the superlative ' ' is A -est or most A . This criterion is not therefore a part of the rules themselves , but is rather a general criterion of membership in the two declensions; much as ' feminine' is a criterion for membershipin the Latin 1st declension. Now , supposethat a learner has learned a piece of paradigm structure, and has learned not only the labels for the dimensions, but has also learned the positioning of the entry points, which I have called the pattern of syncretism. Supposefurther that when the paradigm is split, that this abstract pattern of syncretismis replicated along with the cells themselves:

(40)

0 If this is done, then we will expect to seepatterns of syncretismrecurring. The following prediction is made: whatever paradigm is learned first will embody


the most distinctions. This is becausecells which are designated identical by the pattern of syncretism of the first pattern will remain identical in latter versions. There may be fewer distinctions in later folds , but not more. Thus for example when the learner learns the first declension, with its indirect plural syncretism, and then learns that there is a second declension, that same indirect plural syncretism will show up in the second declension as well , copied as a part of the abstract structure of the first declension.

4. Learning .words 4.1. Learning morphemes

The notion of an abstract paradigm, the blocking principle , and paradigm splitting may account for how a paradigm is elaborated, but what accounts for the identification of a (potential) paradigm in the first place? One ordinarily thinks of verbal paradigms, re.alizing person, number, tense reference, etc., as the typical par~digm, but in fact languages have novel paradigms that it is unlikely coul.d be specifically anticipated in UG . Supposethat one component of the learner is a device that usesextra cycles in the child ' s computational life to track down statistical correlations among various properties of its thus far stored linguistic units. What the set of properties is will not detain us here. The child learning English, for example, will discover a correlation betweenwords ending in -yand adjectivehood:

, etc. (4Ia) fishy, lumpy, lucky, speedy

(41b) dainty

, pretty , happy , etc .

Many adjectives do not end in -y , and many words ending in -yare not adjectives, but the probability that a word is an adjective increasesonce one knows that it ends in -yo Note that this is true for a large class of adjectives where the -y does not serve as a suffix (the second group) . Even excluding the caseswhere -y is an affix, there is a correlation. A battery of such correlations could serve the next step: to identify m~rphemes, and assign them properties. In the case of -y - + A , there are sufficient casesto warrant postulating a suffix with the category adjective, and assign it wherever possible - that is, wherever an independent stem exists.


Even where the analysis into morphemesdoes not hold , the information of the correlation has been noted; it seemsunlikely that this information is forgotten once the morpheme has been established. Another example in English of a no- go morpheme is the suffixtude ; most of the 50 or so membersdo not admit an analysis into morphemes:

(42) altitudeattitudeplatitude, And yet, this suffix so strongly marks nounhood that there is not a single verb or -adjective with this ending. The number of examples it takes to establish a correlation between two properties is quite small. For example, the English noun-deriving suffix -af has fewer than 20 instances; and yet, the correlation between suffix and category seemsfirmly established for all speakers, as well as the restriction that the stem must be stressfinal , a separatelearned correlation : (43) betrothal, avowal, approval, removal ... The confidenceof theseidentifications is surprising given the small number of casesinvolved. S6, there are two levels of analysis so far ; first , the identification of correlating properties, and second, the postulation of analysisthat arisesfrom this. Units will be postulated that account for the correlation. There is a further level of analysis, I believe. In somecases, it is detennined by the learner not just that two properties correlate, but that one of the properties is uniquely correlated with the other property . We might suppose that children are built to look for this especially. Severalexampleshave been examined in this paper. One is the idiom Ns : ' ' ' wear on the ' legs ; the property of meaning wear them on your legs is ' ' uniquely correlated with nouns that end in s . Another is the progressive, which is uniquely corellated with V + ing. I believe that the uniqueness has special salience. It is what we might consider the ' ideal' case, and so the first sought and most readily accepted. We know , for example, that the past tense forms of verbs in English are irregular, and some are in fact suppletive. Given this, we are not surprised so much to learn new verbs with irregular past tenses. However, I think we would resist entirely learning a new verb with a suppletive progressive, a progressivethat did not end in -ing.


4.2. Learningsubsystems In orderto geta paradigmgoing, onemustnoticeparallelcorrelations . For , in English, thereis a Latinateparadigm, of the following shape: example (44) verb

adjective

de- verbal noun

de-adjectival noun

conclude conclusive conclusion conclusivity

The strength.of this paradigm is great enough that when a coined word meets the criterion for membership , it immediatelyparticipatesin the entire paradigm: (45) subduct: subductive: subduction: subductivity How do we know that we are dealing with a paradigm here, and not simply with several distinguishable morphological rules? Becausethe correlations amongst the rules striking : for example, 80%' of the words that take -ive to form adjectivestake -ion to form nouns; this is as compared to the baserate of 6% of nouns that take. -ion. Surely speakersnotice this sort of correlation , and use it to construct a paradigm like (44), which can then be exercisedon new forms. The criteria for membership in this paradigm are somewhat rough, but include at least the following :

(46) word = prefix-stem prefix = {trans, sub, super, de, dis, con, etc.} stem= CVC(C). The force of thesecriteria can be seenin the fact that 26% of the nouns that begin with trans- fonn nominalizations in -ion, against the base rate of 6% for nouns in general. Incidentally, this sort of thing is not limited to the English Latinate vocabulary. 39% of the verbs beginning with the causative prefix enencroach , endear, encase , ensnare) form their nominalization in -ment, as opposed to the background rate of lessthan 5% . ' ' We ordinarily think of -ion as an unproductive suffix, compared, say, to the suffixness . However, as we have seen, in the domain of certain classesof stems, -ion approachescomplete productivity , and even becomesapplicable to new forms. The other side of the coin is that -ness is actually not so


productive over the entire set of stemsin English - it is of course only in the adjectives that it shines. So -nessand -ion are equally productive, we might say, over their own classes- the class for -nessis adjectives, and the class for -ion is Latinate verbs. Given this, we might wonder, why isn' t every affix completely productive within some arbitrarily drawn subclassof the lexicon, say the class of things to which it does attach? I think the answer is that subclasses cannot be arbitrary . The Latinate class is productive for -ion precisely becauseit can be identified independently of the occurencesof -ion: it can be identified as the claSsto which -ive attaches, or perhaps it can be identified in some way along the lines of (46) . In either case, we must attribute to the language learner the ability and the inclination to compare subclasses, and look for high matches. When a high match is found , then a dimension of a paradigm has been identified.

References . NLLT 2, 157-218. in morphoiogy . On representation . Anderson , S., 1984 . . On the definitionof word. Cambridge Disciullo, A.M. and E. Williams, 1986 , MA : MIT Press . . Semanticconditionson surfa(:e structure. MIT dissertation Fiengo, R., 1974 . Prolegomena to a theoryof word formation. LinguisticInquiry 4, 3- 16. Halle, M., 1973 . Patternsoflexicalization.In: T. Shopen(ed.), Languagetypologyand language Talmy, L., 1985 . . Cambridge , MA : CambridgeUniversityPress description . On the notions'lexicallyrelated'and ' headofa word' . LinguisticInquiry 12, Williams, E., 1981 245-274.


A preliminary analysis of causative verbs English*

in

BethLevina.and Maika RappaportHovavb . Department , Northwestern , 2016SheridanRoad, Evanston , IL 60208 of Linguistics University 4090, USA . Department , Bar lIan University , RaniatGan, Israel52900 of English This paper investigates the phenomena that come under the label ' causative alternation ' in English, as illustrated in the transitive and intransitive sentencepair Antonia broke the vase/ The vasebroke. Central to our analysis is a distinction between verbs which are inherently monadic and verbs which are inherently dyadic. Given this distinction , much of the relevant data is explained by distinguishing two processes that give rise.to causative alternation verbs. The first , and .by far more pervasiveprocess, forms lexical detransitive verbs from certain transitive verbs with a causativemeaning. The secondprocess, which is more restricted in its scope, results in the existence of causative transitive verbs related to some intransitive verbs. Finally , this study provides further insight into the semantic underpinnings of the Unaccusativity Hypothesis (Perlmutter 1978).

I . Introduction is particularly rich in verbs with both transitive and intransitive . English uses where the meaning of the transitive use of a verb V can be roughly ' ' paraphrased as cause to V- in transit ive . Such verbs are illustrated in ( 1) and ( 2), where the transitive (a) sentences might be paraphrased in terms of the ' ' intransitive ( b ) sentences; that is , as Antonia caused the vase to break and ' ' Pat caused the door to open . . Thiswork waspresented at theWorkshopon theAcquisitionof the Lexiconat the University in January, 1992 . We would like to thank the other workshopparticipantsand of Pennsylvania ' . This work was also , for their comments particularly Tony Kroch, the papers discussant in March at Hebrew , 1992; we are grateful to the audiencefor their University presented . This paperhasalso benefitedfrom the commentsof Mary Laughren comments , StevePinker, . We wouldlike to thankJohnWickbergfor helpingus BetsyRitter, andan anonymousreviewer wassupportedin part by NSF Grant BNSin on-line texts. This research find relevantexamples . 8919884 - 3841/94/$07.00 (Q 1994- ElsevierScienceB.V. All rightsreserved 0024 -9 SSDIOO24-3841( 93) EOO38

B. Levin, M. RappaportHovavI Causative verbsin English

( la ) ( I b) (2a) (2b)

Antonia broke the vase. The vase broke. Pat opened the door. The door opened.

We refer to this alternation as the causative alternation and to verbs with both uses as causative alternation verbs. 1

Such transitive/ intransitive pairs have receivedconsiderableattention from linguists . working in a variety of linguistic frameworks: analyses of this phenomenon have ranged from the primarily syntactic (e.g., Burzio 1986) to the primarily semantic (e.g., Fillmore 1968) and from the wholly lexical (e.g., Wasow 1977, Keyser and Roeper 1984) to the partly lexical (e.g., Borer 1991). 2 There is a sensein which, at least descriptively, the phenomenon is taken to be well-understood, and the same handful of acceptedfacts regarding this phenomenon are frequently cited. 3 Although the analysis of this phenomenon has been the focus of many studies (see, for example, the referencescited in Levin 1993), relatively little has been said about the phenomenonexcept in relation to the multifarious theoretical concernsit has been used to shed light on. It turns out , however, that many important questions about the phenomenon itself remain unanswered. And as long as the phenomenon itself is still not well-understood, a complete analysis of the alternation cannot be devel' causative which is 1 Besidesthe causativealternation. English also has a ' periphrastic . with the verbsmakeor have. asillustratedin Antoniamadethevasebreak. It hasoften expressed ' that entersinto the relationbetweenthe transitiveand beenremarkedthat the notion of 'cause than intransitiveusesof the alternatingverbsallowsfor a morerestrictedrangeof interpretations that found in English periphrasticcausatives . The type of causationassociatedwith the . . manipulative alternatingverbswhicharethesubjectof our studyis termeddirect(or. sometimes allow indirectas well as contact. or immediate . while Englishperiphrasticcausatives ) causation directcausation(Comrie1981 . among . Cruse1972 . NedjalkovandSilnitsky1973 . Shibatani1976 with alternatingverbsin Englishis not others). As we shallsee. the type of causativeexpressed availableto all verbs. contrastingwith the type of causativeexpressedby the periphrastic . In somelanguages both directand constructionin English.whichis generallyavailable causative indirectcausationaremorphologicallyencoded . the two typicallyinvolve . but in suchlanguages distinctmorphologicaldevices . We referto the kind of causativewearefocusingon in this paper of a languageand as the lexicalcausative . sinceit is usuallyformedusingthe lexicalresources showsthe hallmarksof a lexicalprocess( Wasow1977 ). 2 The causativealternationhas also attractedconsiderableattention outsidethe theoretical and child linguisticsliterature. It is the subjectof a numberof studiesin psycholinguistics ) for a reviewof this literature. languageacquisition; seePinker( 1989 3 Two notableexceptions are Pinker( 1989 ). ) and Haspelmath( 1993

verbsin English B. Levin, M. RappaportHovavI Causative

oped. For this reason, before presenting our analysis of the causativealternation , we provide a survey of certain properties of the causative alternation aimed at providing a contribution towards filling this gap in our understanding . This facet of our investigation focuseson two related questions: (i ) Is it possibleto delimit semantically the classof verbs which participate in the alternation? and (ii ) Do all examplesof the causative alternation as defined above represent instances of a single phenomenon? Answers to these questions will not only help us understand the causativealternation itself, but they should also deepenour understanding of the nature of lexical representation and its relation to syntactic structure. In this paper, we hope to show that the phenomenathat fall under the label 4causativealternation' are on the one hand lessidiosyncratic and on the other hand less uniform than is typically believed. We suggestthat much of the data we investigate is explained once we distinguish two processes that give rise to transitive and intransitive verb pairs.4 The first , and by far more ' pervasive process, is the one which forms lexical 4detransitive verbs from some transitive causative verbs. The second, which is more restricted in its sCQpeforms causative verbs from some intransitive verbs. With respect to intransitivity , we hope to provide further insight into the semantic underpinnings of the Unaccusativity Hypothesis, the hypothesis proposed by Perlmutter ( 1978) that the class of intransitive verbs consists of two subclasses, each associatedwith a distinct syntactic configuration . Finally , as in our previous work , we hope to show that if the relevant aspectsof meaning of a verb (or class of verbs) are properly identified, many of the apparent idiosyncratic properties of that verb (or verb class) fall into place.

: The propertiesof the alternation 2. Background that need to This section sets out the properties of the causative alternation that made observation the often be accounted for . We begin by repeating 4 That is, disregarding those verbs which participate in the unspecifiedobject alternation (e.g., the verb eat as in Terry ate her lunch/ Terry ate). In this paper, we also do not discussthe middle construction (e.g., Bread cuts easily) ; this construction involves intransitive uses of transitive verbs which at least on the surface show some similarity to the intransitive variant of the causativealternation. We consider the middle construction to be a distinct phenomenon since it differs from the intransitive variant of the causative alternation in interpretation and other properties (Keyser and Roeper 1984, Ruwet 1972, among others) ; however, seeHale and Keyser ( 1987) for an analysis that treats the intransitive variant of the causative alternation as a special caseof the middle construction.

B. Levin. M . Rappaport Hovav I Causativeverbsin English

there are many verbs in English which occur in the transitive/ intransitive pairs characteristic of this alternation. A preliminary list of such verbs is given below. ( 3) bake , bounce , blacken , break , close, cook , cool , dry , freeze, melt , move , open, roll, rotate, shatter , spin , thaw , thicken , whiten , widen , ...

Furthennore, the counterparts of these verbs in other languages occur in transitive/ intransitive pairs characterized by the same semantic relationship. In some.languages, as in English, the relation is not morphologically mediated ; see the Basque example in (4). 5 In other languages, the relation is morphologically mediated in some way, as in the French example in (5), where the reflexive clitic se is associatedwith the intransitive member of the pair . 6

(4a) Mirenekateaireki duo Miren-NORK door-NOR open3sNOR-have-3sNORK ' Miren

(4b)

(Sa) (Sb)

' opened the door. Atea ireki da. door-NOR open 3sNOR-be ' The door ' opened. Marie a ouvert la porte. ' Marie ' " opened the door. ' La porte s est ouverte. ' The door ' opened.

The existenceof this phenomenonin a wide range of languagessuggeststhat the causativealternation is not idiosyncratic to English. Studies of the causative alternation going at least as far back as Jespersen ( 1927) have suggested that this alternation is found with a semantically 5 In Basque the change jn transitivity is accompanied by a change in the auxiliary accompanying the verb. Simplifying somewhat, the transitive use selectsthe transitive auxiliary ukan ' have' while the intransitive use selectsthe intransitive auxiliary izan ' be' . Thus the difference in , auxiliary reflects general properties of Basqueand not properties of the alternation. The labels ' NO R' and ' NO R K ' are the traditional namesfor the casesassociatedwith the noun phrasesin . the examples. SeeLevin ( 1989) for more discussion. 6 For more on the morphological relationships between the verb forms in the transitive and intransitive variants of the causative alternation, see the discussion of Nedjalkov ( 1969) and Haspelmath ( 1993) at the end of section 4.

B. Levin. M . Rappaport Hovav / Causativeverbsin English

coherent classof verbs. In order to determine whether this suggestionreceives support, we can ask the following rather simplistic questions: (i ) Do all intransitive verbs have transitive counterparts with the appropriate paraphrase ? and (ii ) Do all transitive verbs with a causative meaning have intransitive counterparts with the appropriate meaning? We begin with a discussionof the first question. The following examplesshow that there are undoubtedly intransitive verbs which do not have transitive causativecounterparts. 7 (6a) The children played. * (6b) The parents played the children. (cf. The parents made the children play.) (7a) The actor spoke. (7b) * The director spoke the actor. (cf. The director made the actor speak.) Sa The audiencelaughed. ( ) * (Sb) The comedian laughed the audience. (cf. The comedian made the audiencelaugh.) These examples might suggestthat agentivity is the crucial factor and that agentive verbs do not participate in the alternation , while non-agentive verbs do. As it happens, both suggestionsare wrong. There are agentive verbs which do show the causativealternation, as in (9) and ( 10), and non-agentive verbs which do not , as in ( 11)-( 14) . (9a) (9b) ( l Oa) ( lOb) ( 11a) ( 11b) ( 12a) ( 12b)

The soldiers marched to the tents. The general marched the soldiers to the tents. The horsejumped over the fence. The rider jumped the horse over the fence. The cactus bloomed/ blossomed/flowered early. * The warm weather bloomedjblossomed/flowered the cactus early . The neglectedwound festered. * The heat and dirt festeredthe neglectedwound.

'7 Some English intransitive verbs without transitive causativecounterparts are used transitively in the resultative construction, but in this construction such verbs do not have the transitive causative meaning which the alternating verbs have. Consider the verb laugh in the resultative construction The crowd laughedthe actor off the stage. This construction does not mean that the crowd made the actor laugh, which would be the interpretation that would parallel the intended interpretation of (8b), but rather that the crowd laughed.

B. Levin Hovav/ Causative in English verbs , M. Rappaport

(13a) The jewels glittered/sparkled. (13b) * The queen glittered/sparkled the jewels. (14a) The stream burbled/ roared. (14b) * The rocks burbled/ roared the stream. The examples in ( 15) and ( 16) illustrate a further complication involving the transitive use of agentive verbs of manner of motion : the directional phraseswhich are optional in the intransitive use of theseverbs are obligatory in their transitive use. 8

(:I Sa) (:I Sb) (:I Sc) (:16a) (:16b) (:16c)

The soldiers marched (to the tents) . The general marched the soldiers to the tents. " The general marched the soldiers. The horsejumped (over the fence) . The rider jumped the horse over the fence. ' The rider jumped the horse.

.The behavior of the agentive verbs of manner of motion contrasts with that of non-agentive verbs of manner of motion , which, as shown in ( 17), do not require a directional phrase in either their transitive or intransitive use. ( 17a ) The ball bounced / rolled ( into the room ) . ( 17b ) The boys bounced / rolled the ball ( into the room ) . Although manifested

various

researchers

by agentive

have

verbs of manner

commented of motion

that

the alternation

is qualitatively

as

different

8 There may be some disagreement about whether the directional phrases are absolutely necessaryin the transitive causative usesof these verbs, particularly with a verb like jump . But even if thesephrasesneed not be expressedin certain circumstances, they are always understood in the transitive causative use. A speaker who accepts ( 16c) stin cannot give this sentencethe interpretation that the rider made the horse jump in place; rather this sentencereceives the interpretation involving the directional phrase: the rider made the horse jump over something. We look at this issuein more detail in section 8, where we also discusssome verbs of manner of motion that do not have causativeforms even in the presenceof directional phrases. Verbs of manner of motion are not unique in imposing the directional phraserequirement. The behavior of agentiveverbs of position parallels that of agentiveverbs of manner of motion in that they can have a causativevariant only in the presenceof a directional phrase, which givesthem an ' ' assume . position reading: MDUdestood the baby versusMDUdestood the baby on the table. We do not discussthis data here becausethis classof verbspresentsa number of complications. SeeLevin and Rappaport Hovav (to appear) for more discussionof verbs of position, as well as a discussion of a directional phrase requirementthat surfacesin certain circumstanceswith verbs of emission.

B. Levin. M. Rappaport Hovav/ Causative verbsin English

from that shown by verbs such as break (Cruse 1972, Hale and Keyser 1987, among others), we include this alternation among the data that needsto be accounted for since the general form of the alternation is the same: the transitive and intransitive usesof theseverbs differ with respectto the notion of ' cause'. Aside from Pinker ( 1989), previous researchershave taken the central property of these verbs to be that when intransitive they require agentive subjects, noting that this property appears to be carried over to the object of their transitive causative use. This work disregards the change in status of the. directional phrase. In contrast, we believe that the directional phrase is the key to explaining why theseverbs show the alternation. On the other hand, the contrast between ( 15)-( 16) and ( 17) suggeststhat , although there are agentive verbs which participate in the alternation as we have initially defined it , this alternation may be an instance of a different phenomenon , as we propose in section 8. Jespersen ( 1927) calls the classof causativealternation verbs the ' move and ' change verbs, becauseit includes a variety of verbs of motion and verbs of change of state. The list of alternating verbs presented in (3) can easily be divided into two subclasses along theselines: ( 18a) bake, blacken, break, close, cook, cool, dry, freeze, melt, open,

shatter, thaw, thicken, whiten, widen.

(ISb) bounce, move, roll, rotate, spin,

...

To the extent that verbs of motion involve a change of position (though not ' ' necessarilya translation through space), the set of move and change verbs ' ' might be given the unified characterization verbs of change. . This semanticcharacterization, although on the right track , is nevertheless inadequate. As we will see, change of state verbs do constitute the core of the class of intransitive verbs which alternate. However, to the extent that verbs of manner of motion like run are verbs of motion , it remains to be explained why they cannot appear in this alternation without directional phrases (in contrast to non-agentive manner of motion verbs like ro//). There are also verbs manifestingthe causativealternations which cannot be readily characterized as verbs of change. These include verbs of sound and light emission and verbs of position . ( 19a) The bell buzzed/rang. ( 19b) The postman buzzed/rang the bell. (20a) The flashlight beamed/shone.

B. Levin Hovav/ Causative verbsin English , M. Rappaport (20b) We beamed/shone the flashlight. (21a) Tony hung the laundry on the clothesline. (21b) The laundry hung on the clothesline. Furthennore, different classesof verbs participate in the alternation to varying degrees, a fact which itself is in need of an explanation. Verbs of change figure most prominently and most regularly in the alternation. Some, though by no means all , verbs of emission - whether they describe the emission. of sound, light , smell, or substance - can alternate. We have presented examples that show that among the verbs of light emission, the verbs beam and shine alternate, but the verbs glitter and sparkle do not. Similarly, among verbs of sound emission, the verbs buzz and ring can alternate, but the verbs burble and roar do not. Verbs of position allow the alternation rather freely. Not only hang, but also the verbs lean, sit , and stand allow the alternation, although a few verbs of position, including slouch and loom, do not. The behavior of slouchis particularly interesting since this verb is rather close in meaning to lean. (22a) (22b) (23a) (23b) (24a) (24b)

The ladder leaned against the wall. 1 was leaning the ladder against the wall. The surly youth slouchedagainst the wall. * 1 slouched the surly youth against the wall. The bear loomed over the sleepingchild. * The giant loomed the bear over the sleepingchild.

To summarize, our discussion so far has focused on the first question: whether all intransitive verbs have transitive counterparts with the paraphrase appropriate to the causative alternation. We have seenthat the intransitivity of a verb is not sufficient to ensureits participation in the alternation. Nor is the semantic notion 'change' sufficient, since although verbs of change are generally found in this alternation, intransitive verbs of other types differ in their behavior with respectto the alternation, even when they are membersof the same semantic class. Some other properties besides intransitivity and ' ' change must be found, and presumably the properties isolated will help to explain the behavior of the verbs in the different classes. We turn now to the second question: whether all transitive verbs whose ' ' meaning involves a notion of cause have related intransitive usesthat lack this notion . Again , the answer is ' no' . There are verbs which meet the semanticcriterion , but which do not have related intransitive uses. Examples

B. Levin, M . Rappaport Hovav I Causativeverbsin English

include the verb cut, which Hale and Keyser ( 1987) define as in (25), or kill , which has been defined - albeit controversially - as ' cause to die' (Lakoff 1970, McCawley 1968, among others).

in materialintegrity (25) cut: [x cause[y developlinearseparation ], by sharpedgecominginto contactwith latter] : (10 (HaleandKeyser1987 (26a) Thebakercut thebread. ' ' (26b) *Thebreadcut. (on theinterpretationThebreadcameto becut) . (27a) Theterroristkilledthepolitician * 27b The killed . ( ) politician Verbs close in meaning to cut such as slice or carve do not show the alternation ; neither do verbs related to kill , such as murder and assassinate.

(28a) Thechiefsliced / carved the turkey . . (28b) *Theturkeysliced /carved (29a) The terroristassassinated /murderedthe politician. (29b) *The politician assassinated /murdered. Moving to other domains, verbs of creation also do not participate in the alternation, although creation is sometimesdescribed as ' cause to exist' or ' causeto come to be' e. . ( g , Dowty 1979: 91) . (30a) (30b) (3Ia ) (3Ib )

Anita Brookner just wrote a new novel. * A new novel wrote. The contractor built another house. * Another house built .

Even more interesting is the fact that many morphologically complex English verbs formed with the suffixes -ize and -iff lack intransitive counterparts ' ' , 9 although these suffixes can be consideredto be causative affixes. (In fact, -iff comes from the Latin word for ' make/ do' .) Consider the examples below: .(32a) The farmer homogenized/pasteurizedthe milk .

/pasteurized (32b) *Themilk hom0genized

9 This property of -;ze is also noted by Keyser and Roeper ( 1984).

B. Levin, M . Rappaport Bovav I Causativeverbsin English

(33a) Carlahumidifiedher

. apartment * ( 33b) Her apartment humidified . However , some of these : type: counterparts of the appropriate

(34a) (34b) (35a) (35b)

complexverbs have intransitive

I solidifiedthe mixture. The mixturesolidified. The cook caramelizedthe sugar. The sugarcaramelized .

The behavior of -ify and -ize verbs contrasts strikingly with that of English verbs formed with the suffix -en. The suffix -en is also arguably a causative suffix, but verbs with this suffix appear to show the causative alternation rather more freely.

./ Thebana~as ripened. (36a) I ripenedthe bananas . (36b) I loosenedthe rope./ Theropeloosened ./ Thesaucethickened. (36c) John thickenedthe sauce (Lakoff 1968: (37a), (4a As part of a study that attempted to identify causative alternation verbs automatically in a machine-readable version of the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (Procter et al. 1978), Fontenelle and Vanandroye ( 1989) found that only 14 out of the 82 -ify verbs in that dictionary participated in the alternation , contrasting with 46 out of the 84 -en verbs. Unfortunately , they did not provide figures for -ize verbs, but an examination of the machine-readable version of a comparable dictionary, the Oxford AdvancedLearner's Dictionary (Hornby 1974), suggeststhat 14 out of the 78 -ize verbs listed as headwords in this dictionary participate in such pairs. 10 The contrasting behavior of these morphologically complex verbs formed with ' causative' suffixes again calls into question the existenceof a correlation betweenthe presenceof a notion of 'cause' in a verb' s meaning and a verb' s ability to show the alternation. It appears that neither intransitivity nor a ' ' meaninginvolving cause is sufficientto ensureparticipation in the alternation. 10 Thesmallnumber of -ify and-izeverbslistedin thesedictionaries canbeattributed to their intended function : thesedictionaries arerelativelysmalldictionaries for learners of designed . However examination of a moreextensive list of suchverbssuggests that . a preliminary English thenumber of alternating verbsreallyis notthathigh.

B. Levin, M. RappaportBovav/ Causative verbsin Englisll

Before presenting our own account of the alternation, we turn to an examination of an additional factor that intervenesin determining participation : selectionalrestrictions. The shared semantic relation betweenthe transitive and intransitive variants of causative alternation verbs has sometimes beendemonstrated via the existenceof selectionalrestrictions that are shared by the subject of the intransitive use and the object of the transitive use (Fillmore 1967, among others) . For example, only physical objects with certain characteristics can break, a property reflected in the set of possible objects of transitive break and possible subjectsof intransitive break. (37a) (37b) (38a) (38b)

Antonia broke the vase/ the glass/ the dish/ the radio. The vase/the glass/ the dish/ the radio broke. * Antonia broke the cloth the / paper/ the innocence. * The cloth the the innocence broke. / paper/

Assuming that selectional restrictions reflect the meaning of a verb, then this pattern of selectional restrictions reflects the fact that both variants share a common core of meaning. However, the extent to which selectionalrestrictions are shared acrosssuch pairs is not as great as is often thought . Smith ( 1970), whose study of the factors that determine participation in this alternation we come back to in section 3, points out that some intransitive verbs that typically do not enter into such alternations may enter into them for certain specific choices of subjectsof the intransitive use, as shown in the following examples.

(39a) (39b) (40a) (40b) (4Ia) (4Ib) (42a) (42b)

The baby burped. The nurseburpedthe baby. (Smith1970 : (36a The doctor burped. *The nurseburpedthe doctor. (Smith1970 : (36c The bell buzzed . The postmanbuzzedthe bell. The beesbuzzed . *The postmanbuzzedthe bees.

The exampleswith the verbs burp and buzz show that selectional restrictions need not be identical for the corresponding arguments in the transitive and intransitive uses. In theseexamples, the set of possibleobjects of the transitive use are a subsetof the set of possible subjectsof the intransitive use.


The lack of common selectional restrictions is even more pervasive. There are also instances of the reverse phenomenon: a verb which when used transitively is found with a set of objects that is larger than the set of subjects the sameverb allows when used intransitively . To take one example, consider the verb clear, a deadjectival verb that presumably means ' cause to become clear' . This verb is found in causativepairs as in (43), yet, although one can clear a table or a sidewalk, the table and sidewalkcan' t 'clear' , as shown in (44). (43a) (43b) (44a) (44b)

The wind cleared (up) the sky. The sky cleared (up). The men cleared the table/ the sidewalk. * The table the sidewalk cleared. /

A similar example involves the verb peel. This verb does not alternate at all in its most literal sense' remove peel from a fruit or a vegetable', although it can be used intransitively to describethe removal of skin - a ' peel' -like covering from a body part . The intransitive use ~f peel seemseven to be preferred in .the use in (46) . 11 (45a ') (45b) (46a) (46b)

1 peeledthe orange. * The orange peeled. 11peeledmy nose. My nose was peeling.

The examplesin (43)-(46) show that for some causativealternation verbs the selectional restrictions on the object of the transitive and the subject of the intransitive do not always coincide exactly. 12 The transitive object or the intransitive subject may show narrower restrictions. Presumably, for those choicesof arguments where these do not have transitive or intransitive uses, they lack them for the same reason that some verbs never have them. To summarize, an account of the causative alternation as defined in the broadest sensemust explain why someverbs show this alternation freely, why 11 This examplewas inspired by a similar examplein Rothemberg( 1974 ), a study of a comparablephenomenonin French, which includesmany examplesof divergingselectional restrictions . 12 It is possiblethat a closerexaminationof a widerangeof verbsmayshowthat theselectional restrictionsdo not coincidefor any verb. For instance and Ritter , as pointedout by Brousseau of the verb breakwherethe overlapis not complete : H~ brokehis ( 1991 ), thereare evensenses promisebut * His promisebroke.

B. Levin, M.

Hovav / Causativeverbsin English

someverbsdo not showit at all, and why someverbsshowit underrestricted circumstances . Finally, such an account must grapple with the issue of whetherthe data discussed in this sectionrepresenta unifiedphenomenon or not.

3. Towards an account of the alternation

The phenomenon we are dealing with falls under the general rubric of diathesis alternations, alternations which involve changes in the syntactic expression of the arguments of a predicator as well as in its adicity (the number of arguments it requires) . Therefore, our account of the alternation should ideally be embeddedin a generaltheory which accounts for the adicity of predicatesand the expressionof their arguments. We follow much current researchon the lexicon (Jackendoff 1990, Rappaport et al. 1988, Rappaport and Levin 1988, Hale and Keyser 1986, 1987; Pinker 1989, among others) in assuming that the properties of diathesis alternations in general can be predicted from the formulation of appropriate lexical semantic representations for the alternating verbs together with a set of linking rules (Carter 1988), rules which determine the syntactic expression of arguments of a predicate. As assumedin much of this literature, we postulate two levels of lexical representation. The first is a lexical semantic representation, a representation of the syntactically-relevant aspectsof verb meaning, which probably takes the form of a predicate decomposition. The second is a lexical syntactic representation or argument structure, which encodesthe syntactic expressionof the arguments of a verb. We assumethat the lexical syntactic . representationis derived from the lexical semantic representationby a set of linking rules. Since the causative alternation verbs can be found with either one or two arguments, a question which arises in the context of determining the lexical semantic representation of these verbs is whether they are basically one argument or two argument verbs. That is, are the causativeusesformed from the non-causative ones or vice versa? We assumethat the basic use of the verb will impose less stringent restrictions on its arguments than other uses since the conditions associatedwith a derived use might impose additional co~straints on the arguments of the verb. In those instanceswhere there are different selectionalrestrictions on the transitive and intransitive uses, the use with the looser selectional restrictions, if there is one, is the basic one. This means that given the data discussed above, for the verb buzz it is the

B. Levin, M. RappaportHovav / Causativeverbsin English

intransitive use that is basic, but for the verb peel it is the transitive use that is basic. The question to be asked in such instances is what aspect of verb meaning determines that peel is basically transitive, while buzz is basically intransitive. The selectionalrestriction criterion still leavesopen the issueof those verbs that appear to have similar selectionalrestrictions for both the transitive and intransitive uses, such as break or open. (Although given the comment in footnote 12, it is possible that for all verbs the selectional restrictions in one variant are looser than those in the other.) In order to isolate the meaning components which determine the (in )transitivity of a verb, we compare verbs like break that permit transitive and intransitive uses, to verbs such.as laugh, cry, or glitter that permit only intransitive uses (except perhaps under very special circumstances). (In section 6 we will address the issue of what distinguishes the break verbs from transitive verbs like cut and write, which have only transitive, but not intransitive , uses.) The question is what makes verbs like break on their intransitive use different from these other verbs? Here we draw on Smith' s ( 1970) insightful discussionof the semantic factors that playa part in determining which verbs that can be used intransitively have transitive causativeuses. Smith characterizesthe difference between those intransitive verbs which ' do and do not have transitive causativeusesby meansof a notion of external ' control . Verbs like break, Smith proposes, denote eventualitiesthat are under the control of some external causewhich typically brings such an eventuality about. Such intransitive verbs have transitive usesin which the external cause is expressedas subject. Verbs like laugh and cry do not have this property : ' ' the eventualities each one denotes ' cannot be externally controlled but can ' ' be control led only by the person engaging in it ; that is, control cannot be ' ' relinquished ( 1970: 107) . Smith takes the lack of a causativetransitive use for these verbs and other verbs such as shudder, blush, tremble, malinger, and hesitate, to be a reflection of the presenceof internal control ; we return in section 4 to the question of why verbs of internal control should have this property . (47a) (47b) (47c)

Mary shuddered. * The green monster shudderedMary . The green monster made Mary shudder.

: (35a-c (Smith1970

Similar distinctions have been recognized in other work on English (e.g ., Hale and Keyser 1987) and other languages (e.g ., Guerssel1986 on Berber ) .

B. Levin, M . Rappaport Hovav / Causativeverbsin English

For reasons which we explain below, we will not use Smith' s notion of 'control' for distinguishingamong intransitive verbs which do and do not have causativeuses. Rather, we use a related notion, distinguishing between' inter' ' ' nally and externally caused eventualities. With an intransitive verb denoting an internally causedeventuality, someproperty inherent to the argument of the verb is ' responsible' for bringing about the eventuality. On this approach, the concept of internal cause subsumesagency. For agentive verbs such as play , speak, or work, the inherent property responsiblefor the eventuality is the will or volition of the agent who performs the activity . However, an internally caused eventuality need not be agentive. For example, the verbs blush and tremble are not agentive, but they, nevertheless , can be consideredto denote internally causedeventualities, becausethese eventualities arise from internal properties of the arguments, typically an emotional reaction. 13 Verbs with an inanimate, clearly non-agentive subject, may also denote internally causedeventualitiesin the sensethat theseeventualitiesare possible becauseof inherent properties of their subjects. In particular , the notion of internal cause can be straightforwardly e~tended to encompass verbs of emission. It is an internal physical property of the argument of such a verb which brings about the eventuality denoted by the verb. This property is reflected in the strong restrictions that these verbs impose on possible subjects. For example, only very few things have the properties that are necessary to sparkle, and the same holds for other verbs of emission. Consistent with the classification of theseverbs as internally causedis the fact that , as mentioned in section 2, verbs of emission generally do not have causativecounterparts, as illustrated in (48) . (We return in section 7 to cases in which they do.) * (48a) The jeweller sparkled the diamond . ' * (48b ) Max glowed Jenny s face with excitement . * (48c) We buzzed the bee when we frightened it . * (48d ) The cook bubbled the stew. 13 The verbsshudder andshake , whichat first glanceappearto havethe samemeaning , present an interestingminimalpair. Only shake , and not shudder , showsa transitivecausativeuse. Our accountwouldsuggestthat shakingis externallycausedandshudderingis internallycaused . This . The proposalreceivessupportfrom an examinationof the thingsthat can shakeand shudder tw~ setsarenot co-extensive ; thesetof thingsthat shudderis to a largeextenta subsetof the set of thingsthat shake . Thingsthat shudderusuallycan be thoughtof as havinga ' self-controlled' include ; , animals , and, perhapsby forcedextension , the earth or a car. In body they people contrast, leaves , teacups , or furniture can only shake. This difference , like the internal versus externalcausedistinction, reflectsthe way weconceptualize the world.

B. Levin, M . Rappaport Bovav I Causativeverbsin English

Since verbs of emission pattern with other verbs without causative counterparts , we use the notion internal versusexternal causerather than the notion of control . It seems inappropriate to attribute control to the inanimate emitter argument of a verb of emission. In contrast to internally caused verbs, verbs which are externally caused inherently imply the existenceof an external cause with immediate control over bringing about the eventuality denoted by the verb: an agent, an instrument, a natural force, or a circumstance. Thus something breaks becauseof the existenceof some external cause; something does not break solely because of its own properties. Some of these verbs can be used intransitively without the expressionof an external cause, but , even when no cause is specified, our knowledge of the world tells us that the eventuality theseverbs denote could not have happenedwithout an external cause.

(49a) The vasebroke.j Antonia broke the vase. .jPat openedthe door. (49b) The door opened .We thus assume that the intransitive verbs which have transitive uses are externally caused, while those intransitive verbs which do not are internally caused. A closer look at the class of alternating verbs will bear out this suggestion. The change of state verbs that figure prominently among the alternating verbs describe changes in the physical shape or appearanceof some entity that can be brought about by an external cause, be it an agent, a natural force, or an instrument. Many of theseverbs are deadjectival; they are based on stage-level adjectives which describe properties of entities that can be caused to change, such as their physical characteristics, color , and temperature (Dixon 1982) . Some examples of such deadjectival verbs taken from Levin ( 1993) are given below in (SO); these verbs fall into two major groups, one in which the verbs are zero-related to adjectives, as in (a), and the second in which the verbs are formed from adjectivesthrough the use of the affix -en, as in (b) . ( 50a) brown , clear, clean, cool, crisp, dim , dirty , dry, dull , empty, even, finn , level, loose, mellow, muddy, narrow , open, pale, quiet, round , shut, slack, slim, slow, smooth, sober, sour, steady, tame, tan, tense, thin , warm, yellow, ... (SOb ) awaken, blacken, brighten, broaden, cheapen, coarsen, dampen, darken, deepen, fatten, flatten, freshen, gladden, harden, hasten,

B. Levin. M. RappaportHovav I Causativeverbsin English

heighten, lengthen, lessen, lighten, loosen, moisten, neaten, quicken, quieten, redden, ripen, roughen, sharpen, shorten, sicken, slacken, smarten, soften, steepen, stiffen, straighten, strengthen, sweeten, tauten, thicken, tighten, toughen, waken, weaken, whiten, widen, worsen, ... The verb smarten provides a particularly interesting illustration of the constraints on the adjectives that can serve as the base for verbs. Although the ' ' ' , intelligent and well and fashionably adjective smart has two senses ' dressed, the verb smarten is related to the second adjectival sense, reflecting the fact that it is typically only in this sensethat the adjective denotesa stagelevel property, and, hence, a property that might be causedto change. l4 That is, individual -level properties are typically not acquired as a result of an external cause, whereasstage-level properties are. The distinction between internally versus externally causedeventualities is not relevant only to verbs of change. l 5 It also explains the behavior of verbs of position with respect to the causative alternation. As noted above, verbs like hang, lean, sit , and stand have causative uses, but verbs like loom and slouchdo not. It seemsto us that the differencebetweeninternal and external cause is the key to their differing behavior. Looming and slouching are postures that are necessarilyinternal caused, unlike hanging, leaning, sitting, or standing, which are postures that can be brought about by an external cause. Many studiesassumethat the intransitive variant of a causativealternation verb is basic and the transitive variant derived. This assumption probably seemsjustified becausethe meaning of the transitive verb includes that of the 14

Betsy Ritter has pointed out to us the expressionSmarten up! Here the verb is related to the ' ' adjectival sense intelligent , but interestingly the verb is related to a stage-level use of the . It that this adjective appears adjective, like rnany other basically individual -level adjectives, can sornetirnesbe used as a stage-level predicate. Dowty ( 1979: 129, fn. 4) discusses other instancesin which deadjectival verbs lose sorneof the sensesof their baseadjective. For exarnple, he notes that although the adjective tough can rnean ' ' either ' difficult or ' resistant to tearing , the verb toughencannot rnean ' rnake difficult ' . We think that the stage-level versusindividual -level distinction could be responsiblefor at least sorneof the differencesin available sensesthat Dowty cites including the toughenexarnple. 15 There seernsto be a gap in the English verb inventory : there appear to be no agentive verbs of changeof state. We do not have an explanation for their absence. In fact, we are aware of very few internally causedverbs of changeof state at all , and those we have found , such asflower and blo.r.rom, and, in sorne languages, blush are non-agentive. We discuss this type of verb in Levin and Rappaport Hovav (to appear) .

B. Levin, M. RappaportBovavI Causative verbsin English

intransitive verb. For example, while transitive break means' causeto become broken' , intransitive break means ' become broken' . We suggest that this is not the case. A scrutiny of the range of verb classesin Levin ( 1993) reveals that there are no externally causedverbs without a transitive variant. That is, all externally causedverbs have a transitive causative use, but not all of them need have an intransitive use in which the external causeis unspecified(e.g., write or murder) . Given this generalization, we offer the following analysis: internally caused verbs are inherently monadic predicates, and externally causedverbs are inherently dyadic predicates, taking as arguments both the external cause and the passive participant , which is often referred to as the patient or theme. The adicity of the predicate is then a direct reflection of a semantic property of the verb. Externally caused verbs only detransitivize under specific circumstances; we discuss the circumstances that license the non-expressionof the causeargument of externally causedverbs in section 6. But it is important to stress that on our analysis externally causedverbs do not undergo a processof causativization - they are inherently causative- but rather a processof detransitivization. Since the majority of causativealternation verbs are externally caused, it is the processof detransitivization that is most pervasive in English. The following lexical semantic representationsfor the two types of verbs reflect the type of distinction we suggest. BROKEN ]] ( 51) break-transitive: [x CAUSE [y BECOME ( 52) laugh: [x LAUGH ] The representation for a verb like break is a complex lexical semantic ; it represents the meaning of representation involving the predicate CAUSE such verbs as involving two subevents, with each of the argumentsof the verb associated with a distinct subevent. The representation for an internally caused verb such as laugh does not involve the predicate CAUSE ; such verbs have only one subeventand are taken to be basically monadic. We discussthe rules that determine the syntactic expressionof the arguments in theselexical in the next section. However, it is clear that the semantic representations ' intransitive fo rm of break involves an operation which prevents the external cause from being projected to the lexical syntactic representation (the argument structure) . We do not discussthis operation in this paper, but seeLevin and Rappaport Hovav (to appear) for discussion. In light of the discussion above, certain facts about the formation of causativesacross languagescited by Nedjalkov ( 1969) are not surprising. In


this study, which is basedon a survey of 60 languages, Nedjalkov looks at the morphological relation between the causative and non-causative uses of the verbs break and laugh (as well as two other verbs) in each of theselanguages. Nedjalkov points out that in the majority of his sample, the transitive causative form of the verb break is morphologically unmarked, with the intransitive form being identical to the transitive form ( 19 out of 60 languages ) or derived from this form (22 out of 60 languages). If verbs such as break are appropriatelycharacterizedas denoting externallycausedeventualities , then the monadic use is in some sensederived and indeed morphological marking has a function : it is needed to indicate the non-expression of the external cause. 16 Nedjalkov also considers the verb laugh. As a monadic verb which is internally caused, the verb laugh does not denote an eventuality that involves an external cause and can, therefore, be assumed to be basically a single argument verb. lit fact, Nedjalkov does not cite any languagesin which this verb has a transitive counterpart which is identical in form to or morpho logically less complex than the intransitive and which receives a causative 17 interpretation . Nedjalkov reports that in .54 of the 60 languagessurveyed, the causative form is morphologically more complex than the non-causative form ; seealso Hale and Keyser ( 1987) for discussionof some similar data. ' Haspelmath ( 1993) follows up on Nedjalkov s study and discusses verbs which tend not to show consistent patterns cross-linguistically . For example, verbs corresponding to English melt tend to be basically transitive in most languages, with the intransitive form being the derived form , but the opposite pattern is found in a few languages. It is likely that this variability arises becausethe meaning of a verb such as melt is consistent with classification as either internally or externally caused. 18 Pinker ( 1989) also points out that 16 Of course a is usedto create wherethereverse , therearesomelanguages typeof morphology 's in Nedjalkov . 9 of the60languages fromthemonadic sample predicate dyadiccausative predicate 's themorpheme . However showthisproperty , it is difficultto tell fromNedjalkov paperwhether in thelanguages in general of causatives breakisthatusedfor thederivation usedto formtransitive thatin the to hispapersuggests citesin theappendix concerned , althoughthedataNedjalkov . the causative of used to form the it is at least not the of laugh morpheme languages majority 17 Nedjalkov and wheretheverblaughhasbothtransitive ( 1969 ) notesthatin thoselanguages ' ' ' intransitive uses , this verbis likelyto mean'laughat ratherthan makelaugh whenused . transitively 18 Nedjalkov , burnandboil, findingthat theirbehavior ) alsolooksat two otherverbs (1969 thanthatof break wasmuchmorevariable formation across to causative withrespect languages withtheverbmelt, could observes . Thisvariation andlaugh . likethevariationthatHaspelmath . classification of theseverbs alsobeattributedto thevariable

B. Levin. M. RappaportBovavI Causative verbsin English

there are certain classesof verbs which denote eventualities which can be construed on cognitive grounds to be either internally or externally caused. It is precisely with respect to these kinds of verbs that cross-linguistic variation is expected. In fact, appropriately formulated linking rules should predict which kinds of verbs are most likely to exhibit cross-linguistic variation . The distinction betweeninternal and external causation seemsto do just this, and we take it to corroborate our approach.

4. Formulatingthe linking rules Although the number of arguments that a verb requires in its lexical semantic representationis determined by whether it describesan internally or an externally causedeventuality, we must also posit linking rules that ensure that these arguments have the appropriate syntactic expression. As we describein Rappaport et al. ( 1988), we seelinking rules as creating the lexical syntactic representation or argument structure of a verb from its lexical ' semantic representation. As we also outline in that paper, a verb s argument structure in turn relatively straightforwardly determines the d-structure syntactic configuration that the verb is found in. We propose that the following linking rules are among those that determine the lexical syntactic representation of a verb: (53) Immediate CauseLinking Rule: The argument of a verb that denotes the immediate cause of the eventuality denoted by that verb is its external argument. ( 54) Directed ChangeLinking Rule: The argument of a verb that denotes an entity undergoing a directed changedenoted by the verb is its direct internal argument. We have stated theselinking rules in tenDs of the argument structure notions ' ' ' ' external argument and direct internal argument ; these argument structure ' ' positions are then projected into syntax as the d-structure grammatical relations of subject and object, respectively. In the next section we explain why we have stated these rules in tenDS of argument structure notions that correspond most closely to d-structure grammatical relations rather than to sstructure grammatical relations. In this section we discuss the linking rules and their application to the data we have discussed.

B. Levin, M . Rappaport Hovav I Causativeverbsin

Englisll

The Immediate Cause Linking Rule is intended to apply to the argument that causesthe eventuality denoted by both internally and externally caused verbs. First , we consider internally caused verbs such as laugh or play . The verb laugh' s single argument is the cause of the eventuality that the verb denotes and will be expressedas an external argument as a consequenceof the Immediate Cause Linking Rule. This rule will also explain why laugh and other internally caused verbs do not have a simple transitive causative use. Such a use would involve the introduction of an additional cause, external to the eventuality denoted by the verb. Such an external causewould have to be expressedas the external argument due to the Immediate Cause Linking Rule. The external causewould thus compete with the verb' s own argument for external argument. As a verb has only a single external argument, such causative useswould be ruled out. On this account, the lack of a causative variant for an internally caused verb receivesan explanation in terms of the properties of argument structure; this explanation only indirectly appeals to the semanticsof the verbs involved. 19 The only way to introduce an external causeis to expressthe causative use of internally caused verbs periphrastically. And across languages, verbs like laugh, cry, speak or play are causativized through the use of a causative affix or verb. ( 55a) (55b) (56a) (56b) ( 57a) ( 57b) (58a) ( 58b)

* The clown

laughed me. The clown made me laugh. * The bad news cried me. The bad news made me cry . * The director spoke the actor. The director made the actor speak. * The parents played the children. The parents made the children play .

Following Baker ( 1988), Marantz ( 1984), S. Rosen ( 1989), and others, we assumethat the causative morpheme or verb comes with its own argument structure, so that the Immediate Cause Linking Rule does not have to 19 Pinker ( 1989 ) points out that internally causedverbs are not expectedto have causativeuses becausethe eventuality they denote cannot have an external causewhich is at the same time an immediate cause; that is, such eventualities cannot be construed as being directly caused. Although this property is probably implicated in the non- causativizability of such verbs, the existenceof ii1;ternally causedverbs which do causativizeunder certain syntactic conditions, such as those discussedin section 8, suggeststhat syntactic factors enter into the explanation as well.

verbsin English B. Levin. M. RappaportBovav/ Causative

associate two arguments from a single argument structure with the same argument structure position . General principles will determine that in languages with causativeaffixes or verbs the introduced causewill be first in line for being chosen as the external argument in its clause. The Directed Change Linking Rule is similar in spirit to familiar linking rules which associatea patient or a theme (or an equivalent notion ) with the direct object grammatical function (Anderson 1977, Fillmore 1968, Marantz 1984, among others) . Our formulation is meant to give specific semantic content to the notions ' patient' and ' theme' . The Directed Change Linking Rule is meant to apply to verbs of change of state and verbs of change of location. This second class includes verbs of directed motion such as come, go, rise, andfa // but NOTverbs of manner of motion such as roll , run, jog , and bounce. This difference follows because, although the action denoted by a verb of manner of motion inherently involves a kind of change, it is not a directed change. Tenny suggeststhat there are certain kinds of changeswhich can be characterized ' ... as a change in a single parameter or a change on a scale' ( 1987: 189) . We call such changes' directed changes'. Tenny. arguesthat an argument denoting an entity which is specifiedto undergo such a changeis realized in the syntax as a direct object. This property distinguishes a change of state verb like dry from both agentiveand non-agentive verbs of manner of motion like walk and roll . The verb dry specifiesa change characterizable in tenDS of a single parameter, dryness, whereas walk and roll do not specify such a change. In contrast, for verbs of directed motion there IS a directed 2o change: a movement in a particular direction. The argument of a nonagentive manner of motion verb such as roll will be a direct internal argument, as we will see, but this linking will be effected by another linking rule. The justification for this will be given in section 7. The linking rules we have formulated also ensure that when a verb like break is used transitively, the external cause will be the external argument, and the patient, since it undergoes a specified change, will be the direct internal argument. When a verb like break is used intransitively with only the patient argument, the Directed Change Linking Rule will apply, and this 10 As fonnulatedherethe DirectedChangeLinking Rule, unlikesomeother proposedlinking rulesthat aresimilarin scope , suchas widenor cool. , will applyto certainatelicverbsof change We arguethat this propertyis desirablein Levin and RappaportHovav (to appear ), wherewe Rule with other a more detailed of the Directed linking comparison ChangeLinking provide rules, especiallythosewhichmakereferenceto conceptssuchas telicity. We alsocompareour ' ) which makesuseof the rather similar notion of approachwith one such as Dowty s ( 1991 ' incrementaltheme'.


. argument will be the direct internal argument. Since these verbs have sstructure subjects when intransitive , this argument must assumethe subject grammatical relation at s-structure, presumably as a consequenceof independent syntactic principles. The typical GB -framework account of the expression of the arguments of such verbs makes reference to the Case Filter , Durzio' s Generalization, and the Extended Projection Principle (e.g., Burzio 1986); we do not go into details here. 21 Together the Immediate Cause and Directed Change Linking Rules can be used to predict whether the membersof the verb classesthat we discussedin section2 will have causativeusesor not. Verbs of changeof state are inherently dyadic verbs, so they will always have causativeuses, although not as a result of causativization; in section 6 we elaborate on the circumstancesin which these verbs can have monadic ' detransitive' uses. Internally caused verbs are not expectedto have causativeuses, explaining the behavior we observedfor verbs of emission; we discuss in section 7 why some verbs of emission neverthelessdo have causatives. Agentive verbs of manner of motion , as internally causedverbs, are also not expected~o have causativeuses. As seenin section 2 these verbs do not typically have causative uses in isolation; we discussin section 8 why theseverbs may have causativeusesin the presenceof a directional phrase. We attribute the mixed behavior of verbs of position to a split in the class: some of theseverbs are internally causedand others are not , and the internally causedverbs are not expectedto have a causativeuse. These linking rules leave open the question of what happens with an argument that falls under neither of the linking rules introduced in this section. Here we make the assumption, which we justify in Levin and Rappaport Hovav (to appear), that an argument that is not linked by one of these two linking rules will be a direct internal argument rather than an external argument.22 ( 59) Default Linking Rule: An argument of a verb that does not fall under the scopeof the other linking rules is its direct internal argument. 21 SeeBresnanand Zaenen( 1990 ) for an accountwithin LFG. 22 In Levinand RappaportHovav(to andexistence ), wearguethat verbsof appearance appear requiretheir own linking rule. We formulatean additionalrule that appliesto theseverbs, linking the argumentwhoseexistence is asserted to directinternalargument . The DefaultLinking Ruleis supposedto apply to thoseargumentsthat do not fall under the scopeof any linking rule, whetherit is this additionallinking rule or the previouslyfonnulatedrules, the ImmediateCause and DirectedChangeLinking Rules.


The Default Linking Rule will apply to the theme (located) argument of transitive sit , stand and other externally caused verbs of position, since this argument neither causes the eventuality denoted by the verb nor does it 23 undergo a specified change. We return to the Default Linking Rule in sections7 and 8, where we illustrate its applicability more fully .

5. The Un8ccaativeHypothesis We have introduced a distinction between internally and externally caused eventualities. As we discussin greaterdetail in Levin and Rappaport Hovav (to appear), the two classesof intransitive verbs describedhere are preciselythose that are implicated in phenomenawhich fall under the rubric of the Unaccusative Hypothesis ( perlmutter 1978). Since the linking rules do not make referenceto the adicity of a predicate, they predict that a verb like break, even when the external causeis not expressed , still takes a direct internal argument, as can be seenfrom the application of the linking rules to the representations we introduced above for the two classesof intransitive verbs. With intransitive break, only the y variable in (51) is expressed ; as the argument undergoing a directed change, it will be a direct internal argument, and hencead -structure object in the syntax. In contrast, the x variable in (52), as an immediate cause, will be an external argument, and hencea d-structure subjectin the syntax. The syntactic expressionof the argumentsof thesetwo verbs is given below.

-intransitive : - [vpV NP] (60a) break NP : 60b ( ) laugh [vpV] Given the definitions of unaccusativeverbs as verbs taking a single direct internal argument and unergative verbs as verbs taking a single external argument, the linking rules proposed in section 4 will receivesupport if there is evidencethat internally caused verbs are unergative and externally caused . tive diagnostics . tive. We review two uoa(x:usa verbs, when monadic, are una(x:usa ; see Levin and discussion this claim for further be used to that can ; support Rappaport Hovav (to appear) . 23 Wedo notdiscuss of of theapplication theseverbsfurtherin thispapersincea full account in their the linkingrulesto theseverbswouldrequireus to introducecertaincomplications Hovav(to appear in LevinandRappaport . Wediscuss thesecomplexities behavior , ). However verbsof position caused thattheexternally wewouldliketo pointout thatouraccount suggests . transitive shouldbebasically


Work on the Unaccusative Hypothesis has establishedthat the resultative construction can be used as an unaccusativediagnostic (Hoekstra 1984, Levin and Rappaport Hovav (to appear), Simpson 1983, among others) . Although both unaccusativeand unergative verbs are found in this construction, they pattern differently due to an interaction of verb type with a syntactic constraint requiring the resultative phrase to be predicated of ad -structure object. What matters for our purposes is that when an unaccusativeverb is found in the resultative construction, the resultative phrase is predicated directly of its surface subject, as in (61), but a resultative phrase cannot be predicateddirectly of the surface subject of an unergative verbs, as in (62a). A resultative phrase may only be predicated of the subject of an unergative verb ' ' through the mediation of what Simpson ( 1983) calls a fake reflexive object, as in (62b). Alternatively , a resultative phrase may be predicated of a nonsubcategorizedobject found with an unergative verb, as in (63), an option not available to unaccusativeverbs, as shown in (64) . 24

(61) (62a) (62b) (63) (64)

The bag broke open. *We yelledhoarse. We yelledourselveshoarse. The dog barkedthemawake. *The bag broke the groceriesall over the floor.

Thus the different patterns of the resultative construction correlate with the status of a verb as unaccusativeor unergative: a monadic verb which allows a resultative phrase to be predicated directly of its subject is unaccusative, while a monadic verb which allows such a phrase to be predicated of an object - either a ' fake' reflexive or a non-subcategorizedobject - is unergative. The closely related X ' s way construction is also an unaccusativediagnostic. This construction, in which a resultative phrase is predicated of the subject of a verb through the use of the phrase ' X ' s way' in object position, is found with unergative. verbs, but not with unaccusative verbs (Jackendoff 1990, Marantz 1992) .

(65) They workedtheir way to the top. (66) *The Arctic explorersfroze their way to fame. 24 SeeLevin and Rappaport Hovav (to appear) for an explanation of the differential behavior of the two classesof verbs in the resultative construction, and Hoekstra ( 1992) f~r an alternative account.


The resultative and X 's way constructions distinguish internally caused verbs from externally causedverbs as predicted. An examination of the set of tokens of theseconstructions we have collected over the last few years shows that internally causedverbs like laugh, play , and work are regularly found in the X 's way construction and the unergative resultative pattern, while instances of monadic externally caused verbs are attested only in the unaccusative resultative pattern. The behavior of verbs of emission in the resultative construction is of particular interest since the classification of these verbs has been the subject of controversy. Perlmutter ( 1978) originally classifiedtheseverbs as unaccusative , but this classification has been challenged (see for example Zaenen 1993) . We have classified these verbs as internally caused verbs, and hence, we predict that they will pattern with unergative verbs in general, and in the resultative and X 's way constructions in particular . The examples below verify this prediction . 25

(67a) The beaconsflared the newsthrough the land. (HendersonI 92;

cited in K.-G. Lindkvist, A Comprehensive Study of Conceptions of , 1976, p. 89, sec. Locality, Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm, Sweden 233, 4) ' (67b) ... you cant just let the thing ring itself to death, can you? (Observer ; TraceThat Call No More!, New York Times, March 8, 1989 ) (67c) The very word was like a bell that tolled me back to childhood summers... (Hers; Child' s Play, Women's Sway, New York Times, July 17, 1988) (67d) Then he watchedas it gurgledits way into a whiskeytumbler. (M. Grimes, TheFive Bellsand Bladestone , Little, Brown, Boston, 1987, . 200 ) p (67e) To counterthe uneasethat was oozing its way betweenthem. (P. Chute, Castine , Doubleday, GardenCity, NY , 1987, p. 214) In Levin and Rappaport Hovav (to appear) we look at a wide range of tests and find that they corroborate the results of the two tests that we have discussedin this section, further supporting the linking rules formulated in 25 Given their unergative classification. we would not expect these verbs to pattern as unaccusativeverbs with respectto the resultative construction. In actual fact. some of theseverbs are found in the unaccusativeresultative construction. but as we discussin Levin and Rappaport Hovav (to appear) their unaccusative behavior correlates with a shift in meaning. with the additional meaning being one that is typically associatedwith an unaccusativeclassification.


section 4. In that work , we also show that there are some verbs which are compatible with both internal and external causation. Theseverbs include the non-agentive verbs of manner of motion such as roll and bounce and the verbs of position . As we show in that work , with such verbs external causation is correlated with unaccusative status, while internal causation is correlated with unergative status.

6. When can an externally causedverb detransitivize? The next question we addressis the following : if externally causedeventualities are basically dyadic, when can verbs denoting such eventualities turn up as intransitive , and why is this possibility open to some verbs only for ' certain choices of arguments? Again we draw on the insights in Smith s ( 1970) paper to reach an understanding of this phenomenon. In trying to identify the factors that permit detransitivization (that is, the non-expressionof the external cause), it is useful to look at the characteristics . of the subjects of externally caused verbs. Among the verbs that never detransitivize are verbs that require an animate intentional and volitional agent as subject, such as the verbs murder and assassinateor the verbs of creation write and build. / murdered the candidate. (68) The terrorist assassinated wrote a letter to the editor of the local newspaper. 69a ( ) Tony (69b) That architect also built the new high school. Smith proposesthat the verbs of change that may be used intransitively are ' precisely those in which the change can come about independently in the ' sensethat it can occur without an external agent ( 1970: 102) . She identifies independenceand external control - the notion which we have subsumed under our notion external cause - as the two features which characterize verbs of change. Independence allows for the possibility of intransitive counterparts, and external control or causation allows for the possibility of a ' transitive causativeuse. Smith s observation can also be recast as follows : the transitive verbs that detransitivize are those in which the eventuality can happen spontaneously without the volitional intervention of an agent. We believe that this property is reflected in the ability of such verbs to allow natural forces or causes, as well as agents or instruments, as external. causes, and, hence, as subjects, as illustrated with the alternating verb break.

B. Levin, M. RappaportHovav/ Causative verbsin English ( 70) The vandals / the rocks / the stonn broke the windows .

Verbs such as break contrast with verbs such as murder, assassinate , write. and build. These four verbs, as well as any other verbs which, like them, denote eventualities that require the participation of a volitional agent and do not admit natural force subjects, will not detransitivize, despite the fact that their meaningsinvolve a notion of ' cause'.

(7]a) (7] b) (7]c)

*The candidateassassinated / murdered. *The letter wrote. *The housebuilt.

In fact , these four verbs are among those that require an agent in the strongest sense: they do not even allow an instrument as subject .

thecandidate . (72a) *Theknifeassassinated /murdered (72b) *Thepenwrotetheletter. cranebuilt thehouse . (72c) 11The A verb like cut shows that the set of verbs that do not detransitivize is not limited to verbs which restrict their subjects to volitional agents. Although this .verb does not typically allow natural force subjects, it does allow instruments in addition to agents as subjects. 26

(73) The baker/that knife cut the bread. Sentence(74), however, cannot be used to describe the bringing about of a separation in the material integrity of some object. ' ' (74) * The bread cut. (on the interpretation The bread came to be cut ) The behavior of a verb like cut can receive an explanation. Its meaning includes a specification of the means involved in bringing the action it denotes about, which in turn implies the existence of a volitional agent. Specifically, the very meaning of the verb cut implies the existenceof a sharp instrument that must be used by a volitional agent to bring about the change 26 SeeBrousseauand Ritter ( 1991) for further discussionof the circumstancesthat allow verbs to take both instruments and agents as subjects.

B. Levin, M . Rappaport Bovav / Causativeverbs"in English

of state denoted by the verb. If the samechange of state were to come about without the use of a sharp instrument, then it could not be said to have come about through cutting , showing that the choice of instrument makes cutting cutting . Perhaps the same considerations can explain the behavior of the verb remove, which does not have an intransitive form . Its non-existence might seemsomewhat surprising since at a first approximation this verb' s meaning ' ' might be paraphrased as cause to become not at some location . A closer look at the verb remove's meaning reveals that the eventuality it denotes is brought about by a volitional agent, as shown by the oddnessof the examples in (75), which have inanimate non-volitional subjects. (75a) ??The wind removed the clouds from the sky. (cf. The wind cleared the clouds from the sky.) (75b) ??The water removed the sand from the rocks. (cf. The water washed the sand from the rocks.) We assume that the same factors explain why most morphologically complex verbs formed with the suffixes -ize and -iff cannot typically detransitivize, as the data repeatedhere illustrates.

(76a) The fanner homogenized/pasteurizedthe milk . (76b) * The milk homogenized/pasteurized. (77a) Carla humidified her apartment. (77b) * Her apartment humidified. Most of theseverbs cannot detransitivize, we propose, becausethey describe eventualities such as being pasteurized or homogenized that cannot come about spontaneouslywithout the external intervention of an agent. It appears to be preciselythose -ify and -ize verbs which allow for this possibility that do detransitivize. (78a) I solidified the mixture./ The mixture solidified. (78b) The cook caramelizedthe sugar./ The sugar caramelized. Again , the -iff and -ize verbs that do and do not permit intransitive uses contrast ,with respectto the range of subjectsthey permit when transitive. The verbs that resist detransitivization show a narrower range of subjects when transitive ; specifically, they appear to exclude natural force subjects.

B. Levin, M . Rappapor ' Hollall I CausativelIerbsin English

(79a) * The rainy weather humidified the apartment. (79b) The intense heat caramelizedthe sugar. If we look more closely at some of the alternating verbs in -iff and -ize listed in (80), we see that many of these verbs, such as intensify or equalize, are deadjectival and are very similar in meaning to the previously mentioned alternating deadjectival verbs in (50) . (80a) acetify, acidify , alkalify , calcify, carbonify , emulsify, gasify, intensify, lignify , liquefy, nitrify , ossify, petrify , putrefy, silicify, solidify, stratify, vitrify , ... (80b) caramelize, carbonize, crystallize, decentralize, demagnetize, depressurize , destabilize, equalize, fossilize, gelatinize, glutenize, harmonize, ionize, magnetize, neutralize, oxidize, polarize, pulverize, regularize, staQilize, vaporize, ... Other alternating -iff and -ize verbs are denominal; their meaning may be ' paraphrasedroughly as causeto turn into the substancenamed by the noun that the verb is based on' : caramel for caramelize, powder for pulverize, gas for gasify, and so on. The non-alternating -iff and -ize verbs also include some denominal verbs whose stems are nouns that name substances: zincify , carbonize, and lodize. But -what is interesting is that the meaning of these non-alternating verbs is different from that of the alternating verbs: it could be paraphrased as ' ' ' process or treat using the substance rather than cause to turn into the ' substance. We suggest that due to this difference in meaning, these verbs require an agent and hence do not detransitivize. In fact, if zincify meant ' turn to zinc' rather than ' ' processwith zinc , we would predict that the verb could alternate, and our own intuitions , as well as those of others we have consulted, is that it would. A preliminary examination of a wider range of non-alternating -iff and -ize verbs suggeststhat many describe changesthat involve a particular type of processing or treatment, as with the previously cited verbs homogenize and pasteurize or as with the verbs sterilize or vulcanize. Other non-alternating verbs involve changesof state that only come about through the active intervention of an agent, such as legalizeor sanctify. The constraint on detransitivization also explains why some verbs have intransitive usesonly for certain choicesof patient : it is only for thesechoices of patient that the change can come about without the intervention of an agent. For instance, in section 2 we noted the following contrasts involving the verb clear:

inEnglish verbs Hovav B. Levin , M. Rappaport I Causative (8Ia) (81b) (82a) (82b)

The menclearedthe table/ the sidewalk. *The table/ the sidewalkcleared. The wind cleared(up) the sky. The sky cleared(up).

Our knowledge of the world tell us that tables and sidewalks are things that are cleared (of dishes and snow, respectively) through the intervention of an animate agent. The sky, however, can clear through the intervention of natural forces, such as the wind . Thus the difference in the possibility of intransitive counterparts. Similarly, peeling - causing an entity to lose an outer layer is typically brought about through the actions of a volitional agent, particularly if a fruit or vegetable is involved. However, there are certain entities that lose their outer layers due to natural causesrather than through the action of an agent, and in these instancesthe verb peel can be used intransitively , as in the case of the loss of skin from a person, as illustrated in (84) .

(83a) (83b) (84a) (84b)

I peeledthe orange. . The orangepeeled . 'II peeledmy nose. My nosewaspeeling.

The verblengthencanbe usedto presentanothercontrastof the sametype: (85a) (85b) (86a) (86b)

The dressmaker lengthenedthe skirt. *The skirt lengthened . The mad scientistlengthenedthe days. . The dayslengthened

Typically skirts are only lengthenedthrough the intervention of an agent, and 27 hence the verb lengthen as applied to skirts is not found intransitively . Days, on the other hand, become longer as the earth progresses through a certain part of its orbit around the sun, something that happens without the intervention of an outside agent. And lengthenas applied to days is typically used intransitively, although in a science fiction context where artificial Z7 Of course, it is possible to construct contexts in which a skirt might be lengthenedby being washed. As Mary Laughren has pointed out to us, the intransitive use should be possible in such circumstances.


manipulation of the length of days is possible, transitive usesare also found , as in (86a) . These examplesshow yet again that detransitivization is possible precisely where an externally causedeventuality can come about without the intervention of an agent. In this sense, detransitivization is a productive process, since it appearsto be possible wherever this condition is met. In trying to pin down a verb' s transitivity , we have suggestedthat verbs can be categorized according to whether or not they denote an eventuality with an external cause and according to whether or not they denote an eventuality which can occur spontaneously. Since these two distinctions are rather similar, we might ask whether there is any need to distinguish between them. In fact, Haspelmath ( 1993) has independently developed an analysis similar to the one we present here, except that he does not make a clear distinction between the two notions. Although Haspelmath is not explicit about this, it appears that he takes the likelihood of spontaneousoccurrence ' for an event to be the opposite of external causation for that event. It seems to us that there is evidence favoring our approach, which takes the two notions to be distinct. Haspelmath links the likelihood of spontaneous occurrenceto intransitivity , without distinguishing betweenunaccusativeand unergative intransitive verbs as we do. For Haspelmath, those verbs which denote events which are likely to occur spontaneously will have an intransitive form , while those which are not likely to occur spontaneously will have only .a transitive form . However, Haspelmath does note that acrosslanguages certain intransitive verbs like break tend to be the morphologically marked member of a causative alternation pair of verbs, while others like laugh tend to be the morphologically unmarked member. It turns out , as he notes, that those verbs which, like break, are both spontaneously occurring and externally caused, are the ones which tend to have the intransitive form as the morphologically marked one. Those which, like laugh, are spontaneously occurring and internally caused tend to have the transitive member of a causative alternation pair morphologically marked. This difference justifies the retention of both notions. In some sense, Haspelmath' s study provides cross-linguistic corroboration of the results we obtained from the in -depth study of a single language.

7. Why can some intern aBy caused verbs have a causative use?

We now return briefly to the question of why some internally causedverbs sometimeshave causative uses. For instance, in section 2 we discussedhow


the verbs burp and buzz, which we have seen are internally caused, can be used transitively for certain types of arguments, as in the examplesbelow.

(87a) (87b) (88a) (88b)

The nurseburpedthe baby. *The nurseburpedthe doctor. (Smith1970 : (36a,c The postmanbuzzedthe bell. *The postmanbuzzedthe bees.

This phenomenonis sparselyand unevenly distributed acrossthe English verb inventory . For instance, the verb burp may be the only bodily process verb with a causative transitive use. The existenceof causative transitive uses is somewhat more widely attested with verbs of emission, particularly verbs of sound emission. This property might be attributable to the fact that , unlike verbs of bodily process, verbs of emission are typically predicated of inanimates ; therefore, some verbs of emission can describe either internally or externally causedeventualities. Among the verbs of emission that can be used transitively are a few verbs of light emission, including beam and shine, and a somewhat larger number of verbs of sound emission, including buzz, jingle , ring, and rustle. The verb buzz describesa type of sound that is emitted by certain animals - bees - or by certain types of devices- bells and buzzers. This verb can only be used transitively when the emitter of the sound is a device, and only if the device can be causedto emit the sound through direct manipulation by an external cause. Similarly , the verb of light emission beam may be used transitively when the object of the verb is a flashlight, again a ' 28 manipulatable device, but not a person s face. (89a) He beamedthe flashlight in the dark . (89b) * He beamedher face with satisfaction. The following generalization appears to hold of all the verbs of emission with causative transitive uses: they can be used transitively only with an emitter that is directly manipulated by an external cause, and when used in this way, the interpretation must be one in which the emission is directly brought about by an external cause. There are fewer verbs of light emission 28 StevePinkerhaspointedout to us that the transitiveuseof verbsof light emissiongenerally ' hasa meaningwhich includes' aimingin a particulardirection, renderinga directionalphrase that . He suggests perhapsthe analysisof these eitherobligatorily presentor at leastunderstood verbsshouldbe similar to the one we proposefor the causativeformsof the agentiveverbsof mannerof motionin the nextsection.

B. Levin, M. RappaportHovavI Causative verbsin English

with transitive causative usesthan there are verbs of sound emission since in most instances the entities of which verbs of light emission are predicated emit light without the intervention of an external cause, unless theseentities are devices. More verbs of sound emission than verbs of light emission are predicated of entities which emit a sound only under manipulation by an external cause. Some verbs of emission, such as sparkle and burble cited in section 2, never have causative transitive uses. It is unclear to us at this point whether some verbs of emission lack causative uses because they denote eventualities in which causation simply cannot be assumed by an external cause - that is, they are necessarily internally caused - or because, even though external causation may be possible, the set of verbs denoting eventualities compatible with both internal and external causation is explicitly learned from examples. We can now propose an explanation for why burp is apparently the only verb denoting a bodily processwith a transitive causative use. One of the few feasible instances of external causation of a bodily process is burping as it applies to babies. Babies are incapable of burping by themselves, so that the person caring for the baby must assumecontrol of the burping . Thus the verb burp can be used transitively only when babies are involved. We propose then that the eventualities denoted by a small number of English verbs are compatible with either internal or external causation, giving rise to both an intransitive use and a transitive causative use of these verbs. Sincethe causativeuse, when available, is associatedwith direct manipulation of the emitter by an external cause, we assume that in such instances the emitter is no longer viewed as the causeof the eventuality, and that the only cause is the external cause which manipulates the emitter. The Immediate Cause Linking Rule will apply to the external cause, so that it will be the external argument. The Default Linking Rule will apply to the emitter, since it does not meet the conditions on the other linking rules, and it will be the direct internal argument. As mentioned earlier, certain verbs of manner of motion have meanings compatible with either internal or external causation. These verbs include the set of verbs of manner of motion which are not necessarilyagentive, such as swing, bounce, or roll . In Levin and Rappaport Hovav (to appear) we provide evidence that a verb like roll is in fact unaccusativewhen predicated of an inanimate entity, as in The ball rolled ( on the floor ) , but unergative when used agentively, as in The dog rolled ( on thefloor ) . This behavior is just what our analysis predicts. When internal causation is involved, the Immediate Cause Linking Rule will ensure that the single argument, as the internal

verbsin English B. Levin. M. RappaportHovavI Causative

cause, will be the external argument, and the verb will be unergative. When external causation by an agent or a force, such as a push or gravity, is involved but no overt cause is expressed, the single argument will be the direct internal argument due to the Default Linking Rule, and the verb will be unaccusative. (The Directed Change Linking Rule does not apply since there is no directed change; the verb roll is atelic in the absence of a directional phrase.)

8. The interaction of directional phrasesand tr88itivity In this section we return to the last type of causatives rnentioned in the survey in section 2: the causativeusesof agentive verbs of rnanner of rnotion such as march and jump , illustrated in exarnples( I Sb) and ( 16b), which are repeatedbelow. (90a) The general rnarched the soldiers to the tents. (90b) The rider jumped the horse over the fence. These verbs are internally caused monadic predicates. By the linking rules, their single argument should be an external argument; therefore, contrary to fact, these verbs are not expected on our analysis to have the transitive causativeuseswhich some of them do manifest. In this section we provide an account of why some members of this set of internally caused verbs have causativeuses. In the process, we will also provide an answer to another question that is posed by the linking rules that figure in our account of causatives. We have formulated two linking rules which associatearguments with the notion of direct internal argument, and one which associatesarguments with the notion of external argument. Since one of the rules linking arguments to direct internal argument is a default rule, a natural question to ask is why we need the other rule that links arguments to direct internal argument, the Directed ' Change Linking Rule, at all. Couldn t the Default Linking Rule alone yield the same results? For example, if we dispensed with the Directed Change Linking Rule, the Default Linking Rule could be applied to the verb break with the desired result. This section explains why both linking rules are needed. We illustrate the necessityof the Directed Change Linking Rule using the behavior of agentive verbs of manner of motion with respectto causativization.


We propose that the key to understanding the unexpectedbehavior of the agentiveverbs of manner of motion is the fact that in English, such verbs can be used as verbs of directed motion in the presenceof a directional phrase ( Talmy ] 975, ] 985, among others) . (9Ia ) The soldiers marched to the tents. (91b) The horsejumped over the fence. When an agentive verb of manner of motion is used in a directed motion sense, then both the Immediate CauseLinking Rule and the Directed Change Linking Rule are applicable to the agentive argument. If we assumethat the Directed Change Linking Rule takes precedenceover the Immediate Cause Linking Rule - something that a default linking rule could by definition not do - then the single argument of a verb like run would be a direct internal argument when the verb is usedin a directed motion sense. And indeed many studies of unaccusativity have established that English agentive verbs of manner of motion are unaccusativein the presenceof a directional phrase. 29 Given the unaccusativityof theseverbs with directional phrases, it is possible to give an explanation for why agentiveverbs of manner of motion may have a transitive causative use when they are unaccusative: there is no external argument, so that the external causecan be linked to external argument. Since this alternative linking, which allows us to explain the existenceof the causative use of these verbs, cannot be accomplished by a default rule, we do not dispensewith the Directed Change Linking Rule. This account also explains why a directional phrase is neededor - at the very least - understood when agentiveverbs of manner of motion are usedcausatively. The presenceof such a phrase sanctionsthe alternative linking of the theme argument that permits the introduction of an external cause, explaining the contrasts below. (92a) (92b) (93a) (93b)

The general marched the soldiers to the tents. " The general marched the soldiers. The rider jumped the horse over the fence. * The rider jumped the horse.

Theexamplein (94)I shows that a phrasewith a directionalinterpretation.and not any type of locative phrase, is needed for the causative use. 29 We do not repeat this evidence here; see Hoekstra ( 1984), L. Levin ( 1986), Levin and " Rappaport Hovav ( 1992), C. Rosen ( 1984), among others.

verbsin English B. Levin, M. RappaportHovav/ Causative ( 94) 111ran the mouse around the box .

This example is unacceptable on the locative interpretation, which would involve the mouse running aimlessly around inside the box, but it improves on the directional interpretation where the mouse runs around the perimeter of the box. The constraint against locative phrasesreflects the fact that only directional phrasesallow for a directed change. The process which makes manner of motion verbs into verbs of directed motion is fully productive in English. Therefore, we would expect that the process which transitivizes these directed verbs of manner of motion to be fully productive as well, so that all class members should have a transitive causativeuse in the presenceof a directional phrase. 3o In fact, a wide variety of agentive verbs of manner of motion are attested in causative uses with directional phrases. 31 (95a) ... severalstrong Teamsters... shuffled Kit out of the room ... (L . Matera, A Radical Departure, 1988; Ballatine, New York , 1991, p . 79) " (95b) ... I promised Ms. Cain I would ride her around the ranch . . ." (N . Pickard, Bum Steer, Pocket Books, New York , 1990, p . 92) However, some of theseverbs do not seemto have such causatives. (96a) (96b)

* The trainer logged the runners to the finish line. * The leader climbed the team to the summit.

30 This account leavesunexplained the fact, noted also in Pinker ( 1989), that verbs of directed motion which are not verbs of manner of motion do not have causative counterparts: . She arrived the package ( at the store) . We believethat the lack of causativeswith theseverbs may not be a problem for our accou~t of causativesof verbs of motion . We suspectthat theseverbs are best not characterized as verbs of motion for several reasons, but rather they should be considered verbs of appearance. Interestingly, verbs of appearance, for reasons that we do not . fully understand, do not permit causative uses: The magician appeareda dove (from his sleeve) . Pinker suggeststhat the semantic conditions we formulate here are only necessaryconditions for participation in the alternations. He proposes that membership in lexically specified semantic subclasses of verbs determinesthe sufficient conditions for participation indiathesis alternations in general. These subclasses are implicated in what Pinker caDs narrow-range lexical rules. It remains to be seenwhether the lack of causative usesfor certain classesneeds to be stipulated lexically as Pinker suggestsor can be shown to follow from more general principles. 31 It is clear from the context that in (9Sb) the riders are actually on separatehorses; that is, the exampledoes not have the accompanimentinterpretation found in sentencessuch as I walkedmy dog, which might be argued to instantiate a distinct phenomenon from the phenomenon being discussedhere.

B. Levin. M. RappaportHovavI Causative verbsin English

The unavailability of certain causativescan be attributed to the Immediate Cause Linking Rule itself, which is fonnulated in tenDS of immediate causation . All of the sentenceswith transitive causativeusesof agentive manner of motion verbs imply somesort of coercion (a fact also noted in Pinker 1989). In fact, in the absenceof a particular context, these verbs sound best when the subject is human and the object is an animal, or else when the subject is someonein a position of authority and the object is under that authority . We attribute thesepreferencesto a need to construe such examplesin a way that the subjectcan be interpreted as the immediate causeof the eventuality. Some verbs of manner of motion describe types of motion that do not lend themselvesto an interpretation involving coercion, and such verbs are unacceptab in the causativeuse. This additional condition on causativizationis illustrated by verbs that describeaimlessmotion , such as stroll , mosey, meander and wander. Typically aimless motion cannot be brought about by coercion and, indeed, theseverbs appear not to have a causativeuse.

However, a search of text corpora did yield the following example of a causative use of stroll , suggestingthat in the right circumstanceseven these verbs can causativize, although a reviewer found this example unacceptable, as our analysis would suggest. (98) Julie Smith will stroll you through the Garden District , in New

OrleansM Durning...

(NewYorkTimes )

On this account, agentive verbs of manner of motion enter into a real ' ' processof causativization , in the sensethat the causativeform is the derived form. The account of the causativeforms of theseverbs contrasts with that of the causative forms of verbs like break, which we have argued are basically dyadic and enter into a process of detransitivization. This analysis, as we mentioned in section 3, is corroborated by the fact, noted in Hale and Keyser ( 1987), that cross-linguistically it is the causative form of such verbs which tends to be morphologically marked. 32 32 Another fact which suggests that the pr~ involvedwith verbsof mannerof motion is differentfrom theoneinvolvedwith verbsof changeofstatc is pointedout by Reinhart( 1991 ). She notesthat the introducedsubjectin a transitiveuseof a verb of mannerof motion must be an agent, not an instrumentor naturalfon:e. CompareTheriderjumpedthehorseoverthefencewith . Thewhip/thelightningjumpedthehorseoverthe fence. Thispropertyis alsonotedin Cruse( 1972 )

verbsin English B. Levin, M. RappaportBovav/ Causative

Our account of the transitive use of verbs of manner of motion is different from our account of the transitive use of verbs of emission. We have claimed that certain verbs of emission can be construed as being externally caused; becauseof that, a directional phraseis not required to effect a changefrom an unergativeto an unaccusativeverb. In contrast, verbs of manner of motion are never really consideredexternally caused, so that a directional phrase must be introduced to effect t.hechangein the classificationof the verb from unergative to unaccusative. The introduction of the new external causeis constrained in that the external causemust somehowbe construed as an immediate cause. In fact, as we discuss at greater length in Levin and Rappaport Hovav (to appear), even with certain inanimate emitters, the emission of the sound does not come about by direct manipulation of the emitter, so that causativesare only possible in the presenceof a directional phrase (e.g., The driver roared/ screechedthe car into the driveway). That is, the situation reducesto precisely the situation observedwith agentiveverbs of manner of motion. The crucial part that the directional phrase plays in sanctioning the causative use of agentive verbs of manner of motion is brought out by comparing the behavior of the verbs run and roll . The verb roll , although a manner of motion verb, is not necessarily agentive and falls rather into ' Jespersen' s ' move class. As discussedat the end of section 7, the type of motion that roll denotes can be either internally caused OT, when brought about by an agent or a force such as a push or gravity , externally caused. Depending on whether the verb roll is understood as internally or externally caused, monadic roll would be predicted to behave either as an unaccusative or as an unergative verb. When the verb takes an animate agentive argument, it would be expectedto show unergative behavior since the rolling would be internally caused. In fact, when the verb takes an animate subject, it can be found in the prepositional passive construction, a construction that Perlmutter and Postal ( 1984) argue is only possible with unergative verbs. (99) This carpet has been rolled on by three generationsof children. When its argument is inanimate, the eventuality denoted by the verb would be externally caused. The argument would be an internal argument by the Default Linking Rule, since neither of the other two linking rules would be applicable, and the verb would be expected to show unaccusativebahavior. In fact, the verb cannot be found in an unergative type resultative construction with an inanimate subject, as shown in ( I OOa), though it can be found in an unaccusativetype resultative construction, as shown in ( l00b ) .

B. Levin HovavI Causative verbsin English , M. Rappaport ( I OOa) * The bowling balls rolled the markings off the floor . (cr. The basketball players dribbled the markings off the floor .) I ( OOb) The door rolled open/ shut. This account of why roll can be unaccusativedoes not make referenceto a directional phrase, contrasting with the account of why run can be unaccusative . However, like unaccusative run, unaccusative roll should allow for a causativecounterpart, though again without the necessaryaccompanimentof a directional phrase. As predicted, the verb roll can be used causatively even in the absenceof a directional phrase. ( I Ola) The bowling ball rolled (into the room ) . ( I Olb) The bowler rolled the bowling ball (into the room) . The contrasting behavior of the verbs roll and run supports our account of thesetwo verbs.

9. Conclusion

In this paper we have unravelled someof the puzzlesconcerningthe causative alternation. Central to our analysis is the distinction betweenverbs which are inherently monadic and verbs which are inherently dyadic. This distinction is related to - but not reducible t033 - the distinction betweenunaccusativeand unergativeverbs. With respectto the phenomenathat havecome under the label 'causativealternation' we have , suggestedthat the more productive processin 'detransitive' verbs from lexical transitive causative is one which forms English verbs, as in the case of the verb break. Some verbs, such as buzz have both transitive and intransitive usessincethe meaningof the verb is compatible with both internal and externalcausation; this phenomenonis restrictedonly to those verbs which are indeedcompatible with both interpretations. Transitivization of agentiveverbs of manner of motion involves the introduction of an agent to an inherently monadic verb when, due to the presenceof a directional phrase, the verb no longer takesan externalargument. We hope that this study of causative verbsin English will help to illuminate our understandingof the much discussed , still elusive notion of . , though transitivity 33 We argue in Levin and Rappaport Hovav (to appear) that verbs of inherently directed motion such as arrive are unaccusativeand monadic.


References Anderson . Commentson the paper by Wasow. In: P. Culicover, A. Akmajian, , S.R., 1977 T. Wasow(eds.), 1977 , 361- 377. Baker, M., 1988 . Incorporation: A theory of grammaticalfunction changing . Chicago , IL : . Universityof ChicagoPress -inchoativealternation: A casestudyin parallelmorphology . TheCausative Borer, H., 1991 . The LinguisticReview8, 119- 158. Bresnan . Deep unaccusativityin LFG. In: K. Dziwirek, P. Farrell, . J. and A. Zaenen , 1990 E. Mejias-Bikandi (eds.), Grammaticalrelations: A cross-theoreticalperspective , 45- 57. Stanford, CA: CSLI, StanfordUniversity. Brousseau . A non-unifiedanalysisofagentiveverbs. WCCFL 10. , A.-M. and E. Ritter, 1991 -Bindingapproach Burzio. L., 1986 . Italian syntax: A Government . Dordrecht: Reidel. . On linking: Papersby RichardCarter. (LexiconProjectWorking Papers25, Carter, R., 1988 editedby B. Levinand C. Tenny.) Cambridge , MA : Centerfor CognitiveScience , MIT . . Languageuniversalsand linguistic typology. Chicago Comrie, B., 1981 , IL : University of .' ChicagoPress Cruse. D.A., 1972 . A noteon Englishcausatives . LinguisticInquiry 3, 522- 528. Culicover . Formal syntax. New York: Academic . P., A. Akmajianand T. Wasow(eds.), 1977 . Press Dixon, R.M.W., 1982 . Wherehaveall the adjectivesgone? In : R.M.W. Dixon, Wherehaveall the adjectives ? and syntax, 1- 62. Berlin: Mouton. gone and otheressaysin semantics . Word meaningand Montaguegrammar. Dordrecht: Reidel. Dowty, D.R., 1979 . Thematicproto-rolesand argumentselection . Language67, 547- 619. Dowty, D.R., 1991 Fillmore, C.J., 1967 . The grammarof hilling and breaking . In: R. Jacobs , P. Rosenbaum (eds.), Readingsin Englishtransformationalgrammar, 120- 133. Waltham, MA : Ginn. Fillmore, C.J.. 1968 . The casefor case. In: E. Bach, R.T. Harms(eds.), Universalsin linguistic 1 88 . New York: Holt, Rinehartand Winston. , theory Fontenelle . Retrievingergativeverbs from a lexical data base. , T. and J. Vanandroye , 1989 DictionariesII , 11- 39. . On Berberverbsof change: A study of transitivity alternations Guerssel . (Lexicon , M., 1986 , MA : Centerfor CognitiveScience , MIT . ProjectWorkingPapers9.) Cambridge Hale. K.L. and S.J. Keyser . Sometransitivity alternationsin English. (LexiconProject , 1986 7. , , MIT . ) WorkingPapers CambridgeMA : Centerfor CognitiveScience Hale, k .L. and S.J. Keyser, 1987 . A viewfrom the middle. (LexiconProjectWorkingPapers10.) , MA : Centerfor CognitiveScience , MIT . Cambridge . More on the typology of inchoative . In: , M., 1993 /causativeverb alternations Haspelmath B. Comrie(ed.), Causatives : Benjamins . and transitivity. Amsterdam Hoekstra . Transitivity. Dordrecht: Foris. , T., 1984 . Smallclauseresults. Lingua74, 101- 139. Hoekstra , T., 1988 Hoekstra . Aspectand thetatheory. In: I.M. Roca(ed.), 1992 . T., 1992 , 145- 174. . Oxford advancedlearner's dictionary of current English. Oxford: Hornby, A.S. (ed.), 1974 . Oxford UniversityPress . Semanticstructures Jackendoff . Cambridge . , R.S., 1990 , MA : MIT Press Jesperse n, 0 ., 1927 . A modemEnglishgrammaron historicalprinciples : , Volume3. Heidelberg Carl Winters.

B. Levin, M. Rappaport Hovav/ Causative verbsin English . On the middleandergativeconstructions in English. Linguistic , 1984 Keyser,S.J. andT. Roeper Inquiry 15, 381- 416. Lakoff, G., 1968 . Someverbsof changeand causation . (Report NSF-20.) Cambridge , MA : Aiken ComputationLaboratory, HarvardUniversity. Lakoff, G., 1970 . Irregularityin syntax. New York: Holt, Rinehartand Winston. Levin, B., 1989 . The Basqueverbalinventoryandconfigurationality . In: L. Maracz , P. Muysken : The typologyof asymmetries , 39- 62. Dordrecht: Foris. (eds.), Configurationality Levin, B., 1993 . Englishverbclasses . Chicago and alternations : A preliminaryinvestigation , IL : . Universityof ChicagoPress Levin, B. and M. RappaportHovav, 1992 . The lexical semanticsof verbs of motion: The from unaccusativity . In: I.M. Roca(ed.), 1992 , 247- 269. perspective Levin, B. and M. RappaportHovav, to appear. Unaccusativity : At the syntax-lexicalsemantics interface . Cambridge MA : MIT . Press , Levin, L., 1986 . Operationson lexicalfonDS: Unaccusative rulesin Germaniclanguages . PhiD. thesis , MIT . Marantz, A.P., 1984 . On the natureof grammaticalrelations.Cambridge . , MA : MIT Press Marantz, A.P., 1992 . The wayconstructions in English. In: and thesemantics of directarguments T. Stowell, E. Wehrli (eds.), Syntaxand semantics , Vol. 26: Syntaxand the lexicon, 179- 188. New York: AcademicPress . . Lexicalinsertionin a transfonnationalgrammarwithout deepstructure. , J.D., 1968 McCawley CLS 4, 71- 80. Reprintedwith notesin: J.D. McCawley , 1973 , Grammarand meaning , 154166. Tokyo: Taishukan . . Nekotoryeverojatnostnye universaliiv glagol'nom slovoobrazovanii . In: Nedjalkov, V.P., 1969 ' I.F. Vardul (ed.), Jazykovyeuniversaliii lingvisticheskajatipologija, 106- 114. Moscow: Nauka. . The typologyof morphologicaland lexicalcausatives . Nedjalkov, V.P. and GiG. Silnitsky, 1973 In: F. Kiefer (ed.), Trendsin Soviettheoreticallinguistics , 1- 32. Dordrecht: Reidel. Perlmutter . Impersonalpassives and the Unaccusative . BLS4, 157- 189. , D.M., 1978 Hypothesis Perlmutter . The I -AdvancementExclusiveness Law. In: D.M. , D.M. and P. Postal, 1984 Perlmutter , C. Rosen(eds.), 1984 , 81- 125. Perlmutter . Studiesin RelationalGrammar2. Chicago, IL : , D.M. and C. Rosen(eds.), 1984 . Universityof ChicagoPress Pinker, S., 1989 . Learnabilityand cognition: The acquisitionof argumentstructure.Cambridge , MA : MIT Press . . Longmandictionaryof contemporaryEnglish. London: Longman Procter, P., et al. (eds.), 1978 Group. . Semantics and the lexicon. Dordrecht: Kluwer. , J. (ed.), 1993 Pustejovsky . What to do with theta-roles. In: W. Wilkins(ed.), Syntaxand , M. and B. Levin, 1988 Rappaport semantics . , Vol. 21: Thematicrelations, 7- 36. New York: AcademicPress . Lexique7, . Niveauxde representation lexicale , , 1988 RappaportM., B. Levinand M. Laughren 13- 32. Appearsin Englishas: Levelsof lexicalrepresentation . In: J. Pustejovsky , (ed.), 1993 37- 54. . Lexicalpropertiesof ergativity. Paperpresented Reinhart, T., 1991 at the Workshopon lexical and lexicalinsertion, December9- 11, 1991 . Utrecht, The Netherlands : Research specification Institutefor Languageand Speech , Universityof Utrecht. Roca, I.M., 1992 . Thematicstructure: Its role in grammar. Berlin: Walterde Gruyter.


. The interfacebetweensemanticroles and initial grammaticalrelations . In : Rosen , C., 1984 D.M. Perlmutter , C. Rosen(eds.), 1984 , 38- 77. . Argumentstructureand complexpredicates . BrandeisUniversity. (PhiD. Rosen , S.T., 1989 thesis .) . Lesverbesa la fois transitifset intransitifs en Fran~ s contemporain . , M., 1974 Rothemberg The Hague: Mouton. . Theoriesyntaxiqueet syntaxedu Fran~ is. Paris: Editionsdu Seuil. Ruwet, N., 1972 . The grammarof causativeconstructions : A conspectus . In: M. Shibatani Shibatani , M., 1976 , Vol. 6: Thegrammarof causativeconstructions , 1- 40. NewYork: (ed.), Syntaxandsemantics . AcademicPress . Resultatives . In: L. Levin, M. Rappaport , J., 1983 , A. Zaenen(eds.), PapersinLexicalSimpson FunctionalGrammar, 143 --157. Bloomington , IN : IndianaUniversityLinguisticsClub. ' classand causativeverbs in . Jesperse n's ' move and change Smith, C.S., 1970 English. In : M.A. Jazayery , E.C. Palome , W. Winter (eds.), Linguisticand literary studiesin honor of ArchibaldA. Hill , Vol. 2: Descriptivelinguistics , 101- 109. The Hague: Mouton. of motion . In : J.P. Kimball (ed.), Syntaxand semantics L. 1975 . Semantics and , syntax Talmy, , . Vol. 4: 181-238. New York: AcademicPress . Lexicalizationpatterns: Semanticstructurein lexicalforms. In: T. Shopen(ed.), Talmy, L., 1985 and the lexicon, , Vol. 3: Grammaticalcategories Languagetypologyand syntacticdescription . : CambridgeUniversityPress 57- 149. Cambridge . PhiD. thesis . Grammaticalizing , MIT . aspectand affectedness Tenny, C., 1987 . Transformations and the lexicon. In: P. Culicover, A. Akmajian, T. Wasow Wasow , T., 1977 , 327- 360. (eds.), 1977 . In: J. Pustejovsky(ed.), . Unaccusativityin Dutch: An integratedapproach Zaenen , A., 1993 1993 , 129- 161.

Section 2

thewordunits Discovering


Segmentation

problems , rhythmic

solutions *

Anne Cutler . . MedicalResearch Council.AppliedpsychologyUnit. 15 ChaucerRoad. Cambridge CB22EF. UK Thelexiconcontainsdiscreteentries,whichmustbe locatedin speechinput in orderfor speech to be understood ; but the continuity of speechsignalsmeansthat lexicalaccessfrom spoken . The speechenvironmentof prelinguistic input involvesa segmentation problemfor listeners infantsmaynot providespecialinformationto assistthe infant listenersin solvingthis problem. Maturelanguageusersin possession of a lexiconmight be thoughtto be able to avoid explicit segmentationof speechby relying on information from successfullexical access ; however , evidencefrom adult perceptualstudiesindicatesthat listenersdo use explicit segmentation -specific . Theseproceduresdiffer acrosslanguagesand seemto exploit language procedures . structure Efficient as these are not have been rhythmic procedures , they may developedin responseto statisticalpropertiesof the input, becausebilinguals, equally competentin two onerhythmicsegmentation . Theorigin of rhythmic , apparentlyonly possess procedure ;languages ' segmentation may thereforelie in the infant s exploitationof rhythm to solvethe segmentation . Recentevidencefrom speechproduction problemand gain a first toeholdon lexicalacquisition and perceptionstudieswith prelinguisticinfantssupportsthe claim that infantsare sensitiveto . rhythmicstructureand its relationshipto lexicalsegmentation

I . Introduction: Using the lexicon in listening to speech The lexicon, which is the focus of the present collection of papers, is assumed to be an essential component of every language user' s linguistic apparatus. The contents of a lexicon are so patently language-specific that it goeswithout saying that a lexicon cannot be inborn - it must be acquired, on the basis of linguistic experience. Such experienceusually consists of hearing utterances, which typically are many words in length. But we can safely . Financialsupportis acknowledged from the Human Frontier ScienceProgram. Thanksas with whom the many and variedexperimentssummarised herewere alwaysto the colleagues carriedout: Sally Butterfield, David Carter, Giyoo Hatano, PeterJusczyk , JamesMcQueen , JacquesMehler, Dennis Norris, TakasmOtake and Juan Segui. For discussionsand other with this paperthanksto MelissaBowerman assistance , Sally Butterfield, Mike Kelly, James . , JacquesMehler, DennisNorris and Ann Peters McQueen . . AnneCutler is now at Max PlanckInstitutefor Psycholinguistics , P.O. Box 310, 6500AH . , The Netherlands Nijmegen - 3841/94/507.00 @ 1994- ElsevierScienceB.V. All rightsreserved 0024 -A SSDIOO24-3841( 93) EOO39

A. Cutler/ Segmentation problems

assumethat complete utterancesare not what lexicons consist of. The number of utterances is potentially infinite , so that to store all the utterances we might ever hear our lexicon would also have to have infinite capacity. Even if we set an arbitrary length limit , the number of possible utterances is enormously large; for instance, Miller ( 1967) calculated that there must be at least 1020possible English sentencesof twenty words or less - a total which, he drily added, would take considerably longer than the estimated age of the earth to speak. Instead, we assume that the contents of a lexicon consist of sound-tomeaning mappings in discrete chunks. ( Wecan refer to lexical entries by the shorthand term ' words' , although of course not aU lexical entries necessarily correspond to what would be written as a single separate word. Some subword forms such as affixes or stem morphemes may well have lexical representation, as may particles which are conjoined with other words in writing ; likewise, multi -word idiomatic expressionsand frequently occurring phrasesmay be representedby a single entry .) Thus using a lexicon requires the separation of utterances into the lexically relevant chunks of which they are made up - producing speechrequires the languageuser to string together lexical entries to make a whole utterance, and recognising speech requires division of an utterance into units which can be looked up in the lexicon. Likewise, acquiring a lexicon eventually involves acquiring the ability to use it in theseways. The present contribution focusseson the very start of lexicon-building : how the infant might find out what words in the input languageare like , and might assemblean initial stock of known words. The initial task is perceptual. What exactly does it involve? For instance, does it involve (as mature useof a lexicon in speechrecognition involves) division of multiword utterancesinto lexically relevant chunks? And if so, how difficult is this task? To answer thesequestions we need to consider the nature of the speechinput with which the infant is most likely to be confronted. Comparative studies of various types of speechare consideredin the next section.

2. Stylesof adult - directetl

speech

Most of the speechany listener hears is spoken spontaneously- the speech signalswhich occur in the majority of everydaysituations have beenconceived and composed by their speakerseven as they are uttered. For most listeners, spontaneous speech is encountered far more often than other styles such

A. Cutler / Segmentationproblems

as rehearsed speech (heard in the theatre or on radio or television, for example), read speech (in news broadcasts, or , too often, in lectures) or computer-synthesisedspeech. Whatever the style of speech, words in isolation occur only rarely - nearly all utterances are multiword . A lot is known about the phonetics of multiword utterances, and a fair summary of our knowledge is that words are strongly affected by the contexts in which they occur; moreover, these contextual assimilation processes operate to obscure word boundaries, with the result that there are few reliable cues in a continuous speechsignal to where one word ends and the next begins. Klatt ( 1989) provides a telling overview of the problems which this causesfor the lexical accessprocess so essentialfor speechrecognition. Nevertheless, the majority of such phonetic studieshave beenconducted on speechproduced in laboratory situations, which is normally read speech. Is this a fair representation of the speech which most listeners usually hear? Motivated by this question, speechscientists have undertaken a number of studies aimed at describing spontaneous speech, and becauseof the underlying motivation , most of the studies have been comparative: spontaneous speech has been contrasted with read speech. These studies have revealed systematic differences between the two types of speech. Some of these differences might render the listener' s problems even worse in spontaneous than in read speech. For example, casual spontaneousspeechis particularly prone to phonological elisions and assimilations (G. Brown 1977, Labov 1972, Milroy 1980) and to syntactic simplifications and, occasionally, incompleteness (Cheshire 1982, Labov 1972) . Other differences, however, might make life easier for listeners to spontaneous speech. These are principally differences in the prosodic domain. Thus spontaneous speech tends to be produced at a slower rate than read speech(Barik 1977, Johns-Lewis 1986, Levin et al. 1982), and to have longer and more frequent pauses and hesitations (Barik 1977, Crystal and Davy 1969, Kowal et al. 1975, Levin et al. 1982) and shorter prosodic units (Crystal and Davy 1969) . Listeners can distinguish spontaneous utterances either from read speech (Levin et al. 1982, Remezet al. 1985, Blaauw 1991) or from rehearsedspeech (Johns- Lewis 1987) ; their judgements are most likely based on prosodic aspectsof the speech, becauseaccuracy is still high when the speechextracts have been low-pass filtered (Levin et al. 1982), while the distinction can not be as accurately made on written versions of the text (Johns- Lewis 1987) . Fluent spontaneous speech can be identified as accurately as disftuent (Blaauw 1991).

A. CullerI Segmentation problems

The prosodic differencesbetweenspontaneousand read speechhave consequences for the way speechin each mode is processedby listeners. McAllister ( 1991) examined word recognition in spontaneousand read speechusing the gating task, in which listeners hear successivelylarger fragments of a word. She found that word identification (in context) occurred earlier for a word stressedon the first rather than on the secondsyllable in spontaneousspeech, but not in read speech. In a word -by-word gating study of spontaneous speech Bard et ale ( 1988) and Shillcock et ale ( 1988) similarly found that words containing strong syllables were easier to identify than words which were realised as weak syllables. Mehta and Cutler ( 1988) investigated phoneme detection reaction time in spontaneous and read speech, and compared in particular the relative strength in the two speech modes of a number of previously established effects. They found no overall difference in responsetime between the two speech modes, and also no difference between the two modes on the one semanticvariable in the study, the effectsof the transitional probability of the target-bearing word. However, four other effects differed across modes. In read speechbut not in spontaneous speech, late targets were detected more rapidly than early targets, and targets precededby long words were detected more rapidly than targets preceded by short words. In contrast, in spontaneous speechbut not in read speech, targets were detected more rapidly in accentedthan in unaccentedwords and in strong than in weak syllables. Mehta and Cutler explained these differencesin terms of prosodic differences betweenthe two speechmodes. The greater frequency of hesitations in spontaneousspeech, for example, results in shorter prosodic units, which in turn reduces the average span over which rhythmic predictability will hold. So becauseprosodic units are long - generally clause-length - in read speech, but usually short in spontaneous speech, the opportunity for rhythmic prediction in the latter case is much smaller. Mehta and Cutler thus argued that position in the sentence is not , strictly speaking, what affects target detection time ; rather, the effective variable is position in the prosodic unit . Similarly, becausehesitations tend to be more frequent and longer in spontaneous speech,,it is much more likely that a particular target-bearing word will be precededby a hesitation in the spontaneousthan in the read mode. Where a target is immediately preceded by a hesitation, any effects of incomplete processingof the previous word will be nullified by the extra processingtime provided by the hesitation, so that effectsof precedingword length, which are held to reflect just such processinghangovers from the preceding word , will be lesslikely . Finally , becauseaccent patterns in spontaneousutteranceswere


more varied and less likely to expressdefault accenting than those in read utterances, and the acoustic differences between strong and weak syllables were greater in spontaneousthan in read speech, there was greater opportunity for processing effects of both sentence accent and syllable stress to appear in the spontaneousthan in the read speech; this would account for the finding of significant facilitation due to sentenceaccent and syllable stressin the fonner but not in the latter. The results of the gating studies described above provide similar evidenceof the perceptual importance of syllable stress in spontaneousspeech. These findings speak to the majority case for speech processing. Most speech that adult listeners hear is spontaneously produced. Such speech is characterised by a fairly slow overall rate of speech, short prosodic units, frequent pausesand, in English, a clear opposition betweenstrong and weak syllables. These factors affect the way the speechis processed.

3. The infant's speechenvironment Is the infant ' s speechenvironment the sameas that of an adult listener? In one respect it is not , becausespeechdirected to the infant as chosen listener exhibits a pattern which is systematicenough to warrant calling it a separate speechstyle. This conclusion emergesfrom a number of studies which have investigated the characteristics of speech addressed to young children at various stagesof development; again, the studies have mainly been comparative , with infant -directed spontaneousspeechbeing typically contrasted with speechfrom the same speakersto adults. In European languages, infant -directed speech tends to be spoken at a slower rate, to have more frequent stresses, shorter continuous sequencesand longer pauses, and to be higher in pitch than adult-directed speech(Fernald and Kuhl 1987, Fernald and Simon 1984, Fernald et al. 1989, Garnica 1977, Stern et al. 1983) . Slower rate, more frequent prosodic demarcation, and longer pauses, it will immediately be noted, are the primary factors which the review in the previous section revealed as distinguishing spontaneous from ' non-spontaneousspeech. To the present author s knowledge thesetwo literatures have not been directly compared; there would seemto be a defensible case, however, for considering adult-directed and it:tfant-directed spontaneous speechin terms of a single continuum , with infant ~directed speechoccupying a more extreme position on most measures.

A. CutlerI Segmentation problems

The one exception is that infant -directed speechis reported to have higher pitch and a wider fundamental frequency range ( Fernald and Simon 1984, Garnica 1977) . In contrast, the fundamental frequency range of spontaneous speechhas been reported in at least some studies to be relatively narrow , at least in intimate conversation (Johns-Lewis 1986, Blaauw 1991) . Pitch is a particularly important dimension of infant -directed speech, since the fact that infants prefer to listen to this style of speech(Fernald 1985) has been found to be principally due to its pitch characteristics (Fernald and Kuhl 1987, Sullivan and Horowitz 1983) . Ohala ( 1983, 1984) has argued that raised pitch is an ethologically universal signal of smallness, ingratiation and non-threatening attitude. From such a perspective it would be possible to argue that raised pitch might not be a phonologically relevant manipulation in speechto infants, but might simply arise from universal expressionof affection or nurturance on the part of an adult to an infant . Against this conclusion, on the other hand, might be cited the more recent findings that the pitch manipulations found in infant -directed speech in American English and related languagesare apparently not universal . Although rising contours predominate in infant -directed speechin the stresslanguagesEnglish (Sullivan and Horowitz 1983) and German (Fernald and Simon 1984), falling contours are more prevalent in the tone languages Mandarin (Grieser and Kuhl 1988) and Thai (Tuaycharoen 1978) . In a comprehensive review of the literature on pitch in infant -directed speech, Shute ( 1987) concluded that pitch modifications are not only clearly not universal across languages, but may also differ within one language as a function of sex of the speaker, age of the child addressee , frequency of the ' s interaction with children and other factors. speaker In fact a recognisablestyle of infant -directed speechis itself not universal, contrary to the confident expectations of researchersin the 70s that it would prove not only to be universal (Ferguson 1977) but absolutely necessaryfor successfulacquisition (R. Brown 1977) . It is now clear that there are cultures where infants are exposedto much normal adult speechbut no speechin any special infant -directed mode (Heath 1983, Schieffelin 1985, Schieffelin and Ochs 1983) . Even where infant -directed speech appears to conform to the pattern obserVedin English and like languages, this may not constitute a specialisedmode; thus infant -directed speechin Quiche Mayan has relatively high pitch , but so, in this language, does adult -directed speechfrom the same informants (Bernstein-Ratner and Pye 1984) . Thus it is reasonable to conclude that infants in the earliest stages of - and for some language acquisition receive at least some of their input


infants, perhaps all of their input - in a fonn that at least closely resembles nonnal spontaneous speech between adults. One of the characteristics of spontaneousspeech, it will be recalled, is the high frequency of phonological elisions and assimilations (G. Brown 1977, Labov 1972, Milroy 1980) . Some studies have reported that child -directed speech, too , is replete with such distorting processes (Bard and Anderson 1983, 1991; Shockey and Bond 1980), which is consistent with the view that this style of speechlies on a generalcontinuum with adult-directed casual speech. Other studies, however, have reported lower frequency of distorting phonological transformations in speechto infants than in speechto adults (Bernstein- Ratner 1984a,b) . In an attempt to resolve this apparent contradiction , Stoel-Gammon ( 1984) transcribed five hours of speechto one-year-olds; her results strongly support the view of a continuum , since she effectively discovereda continuum within her own data, from very clear articulation (e.g. releaseof word -final stop bursts, clear articulation of unstressedvowels) to very casual forms (frequent vowel reduction, omissions of whole syllables such as [sko] as a pronunciation of ' let s go) . Stoel-Gammon concluded that the phonological characteristics of speech to children depend on such factors as contextual redundancy, the function of the individual utterance, and the situational context - the same factors that determine the phonologicalforms of adult spontaneous speech (Liebennan 1963, Cheshire 1982) . There is to my knowledge no evidence, from any culture, of a greater incidence of isolated words in speech to children than in other forms of speech. Even though phrases may be short, they are still phrases. Thus a speechsegmentationproblem, as describedin the introductory section to this paper, seemsto exist for the infant as for the adult languageuser. The speech ' that the infant hears is continuous; much of the speech of the infant s environment will be speech among mature language users; in perhaps a majority of cultures speechaddressedspecifically to the infant would fonn only a small proportion of the input ; even then, such speech may not necessarilybe clearly articulated. The problem is compounded for the infant by the necessity of compiling a lexicon, and this added difficulty does not trade off against reduced segmentation difficulty in the input . In fact, the scaleof the segmentationproblem in the structure of the input is remarkably similar for the infant and for the adult.

A. CutlerI Segmentation problems 4. The segmentation problem for adult listeners

The adult listener typically hears continuous multiword utterances, and must therefore segmentthe speechstream in order to understand them. The importance of this segmentation problem has long been acknowledged, and many, widely varying, experimental approaches have tackled the question (e.g. Hayes and Clark 1970, Wakefield et al. 1974, Pilon 1981) . But the adult ' s situation differs from that of the child becauseas a mature language user the adult is already in possession of a lexicon. This has led some researchersto claim that the adult listener has no need of explicit segmentation procedures, since the successfulrecognition of a word will ensure that whatever immediately follows that word will be known to be word -initial . For example, Cole and Jakimik ( 1978) proposed that recognition of spoken utterances proceeds in strictly temporal order, and ' one word ' s recognition ' automatically 'directs segmentationof the immediately following word ' ( 1978: 93) . We could call such a model ' segmentationby default' . On closer inspection, though, it becomes obvious that segmentation by default could not work , at least for English. Firstly , the model relies on listeners being indeed able to determine where a word ends. It is true that sometimesphonetic sequenceconstraints will be of use in this. Somesequences of phonemes- [au k ], [m g] , [ai S] , for example - never occur word -internally in English (Lamel and Zue 1984, Harrington et al. 1987) ; thus a sentencelike How comeGuy shaved? should prove very easyto segment. But unfortunately such helpful sequencesare rare. As McQueen and Cutler ( 1992) have recently demonstrated, the English vocabulary contains few totally distinct words ; most long words have other words embedded in them (as reconciliation contains wreck, reckon, sill , silly , ill , etc.), while most short words occur within longer words (as late can be found in latency, collate, belated, ' translatability, etc.) . Moreover, McQueen and Cutler s computations showed that the majority of such overlaps occur at the beginnings of the longer words, a particular problem for segmentationby default. Of course, in typical English speechthe majority of words are monosyllabic Cutler and Carter 1987), which will certainly reduce the problems causedby ( such embeddings. But most monosyllabic English words do not become unique until at or after their final phoneme (Luce 1986) ; and in fact many words - especially monosyllabic words - can not be recognised until after their acoustic offset. Post-offset recognition has been demonstrated both with laboratory -produced (i.e. carefully read) speech (Grosjean 1985), and with spontaneously produced speech(Bard et al. 1988, Shillcock et al. 1988) . If


words cannot be recognisedtill after their ends then segmentationby default would lose its very basis. Secondly, models such as segmentationby default are far from robust ; they assumethat prelexical processingof the speechsignal will be accurate. But in practice speechsignals are not always fully clear. Background noise, distance between speaker and listener, distortion of the speaker's vocal tract , foreign accents, slips of the tongue - all these, and similar factors, conspire to make the listener' s phonetic interpretation task harder. A much more robust model is neededto account for what is obviously true, namely that human speech recognition is extremely successful even under noisy conditions or with previously unfamiliar voices or accents.

S. A solutionfor English: Rhythmicsegmentation In fact there is a good deal of evidencefrom human speechrecognition in English that explicit segmentationprocedures.are employed by adult listeners. Cutler and Norris ( 1988) suggestedthat the characteristic rhythmic structure of English could form the basis for an effective segmentation procedure, becauseEnglish speech shows a systematic relationship between rhythmic patterns and word boundary locations. The rhythm of English is based on stress, with syllables of the language being either strong or weak; strong syllables contain full vowels, while weak syllables contain reduced vowels (usually schwa) . Cutler and Carter ( 1987) demonstrated that English lexical words are far more likely than not to begin with strong syllables - in a -word phonetically transcribed dictionary (the MRC Psycholinguistic 33,OOO Database: Coltheart 1981, Wilson 1988), 73% of all entries had strong initial syllables. But the frequency of occurrenceof individual words differs widely; lexical, or content words, are sometimesvery common (e.g. people), but more often are very rare (e.g. peon, steeple), while some words which inrunning speech are usually realised as weak syllables - grammatical, or function words, such as of or the - occur very frequently. Cutler and Carter examined -word natural speech sample, the Corpus of English Conversation a 190,OOO Svartvik and Quirk 1980), using the frequency count of this corpus prepared ( by Brown ( 1984) ; they found that in this corpus 90% of the lexical words have strong initial syllables. However, the grammatical words in the corpus were actually in the majority , and they were virtually all weak monosyllables. Cutler and Carter computed that about three-quarters of all strong syllables in the sample were the sole or initial syllables of lexical words, while more


than two-thirds of all weak syllables w~re the sole or initial syllables of grammatical words. This means that a listener encountering a strong syllable in spontaneous English conversation would seem to have about a three to one chance of finding that strong syllable to be the onset of a new lexical word. A weak syllable, on the other hand, would be most likely to be a grammatical word. English speech should therefore lend itself to a segmentation procedure whereby strong syllablesare assumedto be the onsetsof lexical words. Cutler and Norris interpreted results of an experiment they ran as evidencefor such a procedure. They used a task which they called word -spotting, in which listeners were asked to detect real words embeddedin nonsensebisyllables; detection times were slower to the embeddedword in , say, mintayf (in which the second vowel is strong) than in mintef (in which the second vowel is schwa) . Cutler and Norris interpreted this as evidence that listeners were segmenting mintayf prior to the second syllable, so that detection of mint therefore required combining speechmaterial from parts of the signal which had been segmentedfrom one another. No such difficulty would arise for the detection of mint in mintef, since the weak second syllable would not be divided from the preceding material. Further evidence for such a procedure was produced by Cutler and Butterfield ( 1992), who investigated the way in which word boundaries tend to be misperceived. In both spontaneousand experimentally elicited misperceptions they found that erroneous insertions of a word boundary before a strong syllable (e.g. achievebeing heard as a cheap) and deletions of a word boundary before a weak syllable (e.g. bird in being heard as burgling) were far more common than erroneous insertions of a boundary before a weak syllable (e.g. effective being heard as effect oJ> or deletions of a boundary before a strong syllable (e.g. were waiting being heard as awaken) . This is exactly what would be expected if listeners deal with the segmentation problem by assuming that strong syllables are likely to be word initial , but weak syllables are not. As Cutler and Norris point out , the strong syllable is defined by the quality of its vowel (full , in comparison to the reduced vowels of weak syllables) ; thus spotting strong syllables cannot provide a complete solution to the segmentation problem since word boundaries actually occur prior to the onset of syllables. A strong syllable spotter must be supplementedby some means of estimating actual syllable onset; Cutler and Norris suggest that more than one alternative realisation of such a device would be feasible. Assuming that a rhythmically based segmentation procedure is indeed prac

A. Cutler I Segmentationproblems

tical , its advantages are considerable. For instance, such a procedure is obviously not going to be affected by the frequency of words embedded within other words in speech, or by the relative frequency of monosyllables versus polysyllables. Only where polysyllabic words contain strong syllables in non-initial position will the procedure produce a non-optimal result (i.e. it will signal a word boundary but this will be a false alarm) . However, polysyllabic words with non-initial strong syllables occur relatively rarely (Cutler and Carter 1987), and in only a small minority of them will a false alarm actually produce a real word unrelated to the embedding word (e.g. late in collate; Cutler and McQueen, in press). Thus rhythmic segmentationis a relatively efficient procedure for English. It is also quite robust - in fact, it is precisely with uncertain input that rhythmic segmentation proves particularly useful. R.esearchersin automatic speechrecognition (e.g. Shipman and Zue 1982) have developed systematic representationsof phonetic uncertainty, namely transcriptions in which only general classesof phoneme are provided (e.g. glide, nasal, stop consonant, etc.). Two studies using uncertain input of this kind have produced further evidence in favour of rhythmic segmentation. In the first study, Briscoe ( 1989) implemented four segmentation algorithms and tested their performance -word on a (phonetically transcribed) continuous input , using a 33,OOO lexicon. The algorithms postulated potential lexical boundaries: (a) at the ' ' end of each success fully identified word ( segmentation by default ); (b) at each phoneme boundary; (c) at each syllable onset; and (d) at each strong syllable onset (the rhythmic segmentation proposal) . The measureof performance was the number of potential lexical hypothesesgenerated (the fewer the better) . With completely specifiedphonetic input all algorithms naturally performed quite well. However, significant differencesbetweenthe algorithms emerged when some or all of the input was phonetically uncertain; most affected were ' segmentationby default' and the phonemic algorithm , both of which generated huge numbers of potential parses of incomplete input . Far better results were produced by the algorithms which constrained possible word onset positions in some way, and the more specific the constraints, the better the performance: the rhythmic segmentationalgorithm performed best of all with the uncertain input . In the second study, Harrington et al. ( 1989) compared the rhythmic segmentation algorithm with a segmentation algorithm based on permissible phoneme sequences(Lamel and Zue 1984, Har rington et al. 1987), using as a metric the proportion of word boundaries correctly identified in a 145-utterance corpus. With phonetically uncertain , but the rhythmic segmeninput, sequenceconstraints proved virtually useless

A . Cutler I Segmentationproblems

tation algorithm still performed effectively (in fact it correctly detected more word boundaries in uncertain input tharl the phoneme sequenceconstraints had detectedin completely specifiedinput) . The efficiency and robustness of rhythmic segmentation therefore suggest that listeners profit from employing an explicit segmentation procedure of this kind . A striking fact about this procedure, however, is its languagespecificity: as described for English, the procedure is based on stressrhythm , i.e. the opposition of strong and weak syllables. Clearly, it therefore cannot be a universal strategy, becausemany (indeed most) languagesof the world do not have stress rhythm . However, all languages have rhythm - speech rhythm need not be stress-based. In the next section alternative forms of rhythmic segmentation are described, supported by the results from experiments in languageswhich do not have stressrhythm .

6. Rhythmicsegmentation in French and Japanese Mehler (e.g. 1981) and his colleagues(e.g. Segui 1984) have used a variety of psycholinguistic tasks to demonstrate processing advantagesfor syllables in speech comprehension. In one experiment, which launched a series of cross-linguistic comparisons, Mehler et al. ( 1981) had French subjects listen to lists of unrelated words and press a responsekey as fast as possible when they heard a specifiedword -initial sequenceof sounds. This target was either a consonant-vowel (CV) sequencesuch as ba- or a consonant-vowel-consonant (CYC) sequencesuch as hal- . The words which began with the specified sound sequencehad one of two syllabic structures: the initial syllable was either open (CY ), as in balance, or closed (CYC ), as in balcon. Mehler et al. found that responsetime was significantly faster when the target sequence corresponded exactly to the initial syllable of the target-bearing word than when the target sequenceconstituted more or less than the initial syllable. Thus responsesto ba- were faster in balancethan in balcon, whereasresponses to bal- were faster in balcon than in balance. Mehler et al. claimed that this result supported a syllabically basedsegmentationstrategy in speechrecognition in French. Similarly, Segui et al. ( 1981) found that listeners are faster to detect syllable targets than to detect targets corresponding to the individual phonemeswhich make up those samesyllables. Further evidencefrom French that polysyllabic words, whether they are heard in isolation or in connected speech, are analysed syllable by syllable came from studies by Segui ( 1984) and by Dupoux and Mehler ( 1990) .


If speechsegmentation in French proceedssyllable by syllable, there is an interesting parallel to the results from English reported in the previous section. Just as use of the opposition between strong and weak syllables in ' segmentingEnglish exploits the English languages characteristic stress-based rhythmic pattern, so does use of the syllable in segmenting French exploit rhythmic patterns, since the characteristic rhythm of French is syllable-based. Recent results from studies of speech segmentation in a third language, , confinn the connection between segmentation and speechrhythm . Japanese In Japanese , speech rhythm is based on a subsyllabic unit called the mora which can a vowel, an onset-vowel sequence be ( , or a syllabic coda). Otake et al. ( 1993) conducted an experiment in Japanesewhich was directly analogous to the French experiment by Mehler et al. ( 1981) ; they compared detection of CV (e.g. la-) and CVC (e.g. tan-) targets in Japanesewords beginning with open ( tanishl) versusclosed ( tanshl) syllables. In both words the first mora is ' the initial CV sequence ta ; and detection of CV targets was equally fast in both words (had the Japanesesubjects been using a syllabic segmentation procedure, the CV targets should have been harder to detect in closed than in open syllables) . CVC targets constitute two morae, and correspond to the first two morae of the words with initial closed syllables; however, they do not correspond properly to a mora-based segmentation of words like tanishi (CV-CV -CV) . Indeed, the Japaneselisteners respondedto the CVC targets in words like. tanshi, but usually failed to respond in words like tanishi. Thus rhythmic segmentation seemsto be quite a widespread phenomenon across languages, with the nature of the rhythmic processing being determined ' by the nature of each languages characteristic rhythmic structure: stress-based, syllabic, or moraic rhythm can all be used in speechsegmentation by adult listeners. However, there turn out to be strict limitations on the way any listener can exploit speech rhythm in segmentation; and these limitations may illuminate the questions with which we started this chapter, namely those pertaining to how the prelinguistic infant first solves the segmentationproblem.

7. Limits to rhythmicsegmentation First of all , the cross- linguistic differences in speech segmentation are characteristics of the listeners and do not simply follow from the nature of the speech input . English monolinguals do not use syllabic segmentation in performing the target detection task with either English or French ( Cutler et

A. CutlerI Segmentation problems

al. 1986) ; neither English nor French listeners use moraic segmentationwhen performing the same task with Japanese(Otake et al. 1993). In other words, syllabic segmentationseemsto be specific to French listeners, moraic segmentation to Japanese listeners. (In fact the French listeners segmented both English and Japanesespeechby syllables, just as they segmentFrench!) Moreover, under appropriate conditions listeners can be seen to abandon the rhythmic segmentation procedures characteristic of their language community . When responding very fast, French listeners can base their responseson subsyllabic units (Dupoux 1993) . CVV sequencesare apparently less conducive to application of moraic segmentation by Japaneselisteners than the (more common) CVCV and CVN sequences(Otake 1992). The failure to find processing disadvantages for English words beginning with weak syllables when the words are carefully read, reported in the second section of this paper, may reflect a similar case: if the input is very clear, stress-basedsegmentationmay not need to be called into play. Thus it is quite clear that none of the rhythmic segmentation procedures constitutes an ' absolutely necessarycomponent of adult listeners speechprocessing. The strongestevidencethat this is so comes, however, from studiesof bilingual . Cutler et al. ( 1992) testedFrench-English bilinguals with the techniques processing which had demonstratedsyllabic respondingin French listeners(Mehler et al. 1981) and stress-based responding in English listeners(Cutler and Norris 1988). Their subjectswereas bilingual as they could find - eachhad learnedboth languagesfrom the earlieststagesof acquisition, spokeboth languagesdaily, and was acceptedas a native speakerby monolingualsin eachlanguage. Yet these bilinguals did not necesarilyproduce the pattern of results which monolinguals had shown on each previous experiment. Instead, their response patterns could be predicted from a measureof what Cutler et al. called ' ' language dominance , which amounted in essenceto a decision as to which of their two languagesthe bilinguals would be most sorry to lose. On Mehler et alis target detection task with French materials, only those bilinguals who ' chose French as their ' dominant language showed a syllabic pattern of responding; the English-dominant bilinguals showed no trace of syllabic ' effects. On Cutler and Norris word -spotting task, in contrast, a stress-based responsepattern appeared only with those bilinguals who chose English; the responsesof the French-dominant bilinguals were unaffected by the rhythmic pattern of the embedding nonsense word. Apparently , these maximally competent bilinguals had available to them in these tasks only one rhythmic segmentationprocedure - either that which was characteristic of one of their native languages, or that which was characteristic of the other, but not both.


Of course, it should be rememberedthat this conclusion is based only on the results of laboratory experiments, and may not reflect the full extent of the resourceswhich bilinguals can apply to the processing of , for example, spontaneous speech; as earlier sections of this chapter described, different ' speechstyles may call differentially upon a listener s processing repertoire. However, the experiments undeniably show that in the laboratory some bilinguals can exploit a given rhythmic segmentation procedure, and do exploit it , while others certainly do not exploit the same procedure, and possibly cannot do so. A claim that , for example, French-dominant FrenchEnglish bilinguals are capable of stress-based segmentation, but abandon it when processing laboratory speech, ought therefore to be accompanied by an account of why Eoglish-dominant bilinguals, and monolingual English speakers, do not abandon this procedure in the laboratory . On the basis of the laboratory results alone, it would surely appear that bilinguals simply do not have available to them the segmentationprocedure characteristic of their non-dominant language. This is a remarkable finding in the light of the undoubted competenceof these bilingual speakersin both their languages. The English-dominant bilinguals spoke and understood French just as well as the French-dominant bilinguals did , and the latter group spoke and understood English just as well as the former. For those bilinguals who used stress-based segmentationwith English, the apparent unavailability of syllabic segmentation for use with French seemed to have no adverse effect on their linguistic competence; likewise, for those bilinguals who used syllabic segmentationwith French, the unavailability of stress-based segmentation seemednot to reduce in any way their demonstrated competencein English. These results may therefore indicate that the rhythmic segmentation procedures are not a necessarycomponent of a languageuser' s processingmechanism; one can demonstrate native competencewithout them. This in turn would imply that rhythmic segmentation procedures are not simply developed in responseto experiencewith the statistical properties of the native language, as the arguments made by, for instance, Cutler and Carter ( 1987) with respectto stress-basedsegmentationin English contended. There is no doubt that stress-based segmentation does work efficiently with English; but despite having been exposedto English since their earliest years, and despite using English with native competenceall their lives, the Frenchdominant bilinguals neverthelessdo not , in the word -spotting experiment, show evidenceof segmenting by stress. The question must be posed, therefore , of how the rhythmic segmentation procedures could arise, if it is

96


arguably the casethat they may not result automatically from experiencewith the statistical properties of the native language. A possible answer to this question, proposed by Cutler et al. ( 1992) and by Cutler and Mehler ( 1993), is discussedin the next section.

Supposethat the rhythmic segmentati.on proceduresused by adult listeners exist not for purposes of adult processingat all , but are simply traces which remain from a peri.od when the segmentationproblem dominated the infant ' s language processing. Perhaps it is precisely the characteristic rhythm of the input languagewhich offers the infant a first toehold into lexical acquisition, by suggestinga possible segmentation of the continuous speechstream into discrete units. In the caseof the syllable in French, in fact, just such a model has been put forward by Mehler et al. ( 1990) . More generally, Cutler and Mehler ( 1993) have suggestedthat the infant enters the world already armed with what they have called aperiodicity bias' . The task of lexical acquisition is primed in that the infant expects that meaning will map to form ; the task is made possible by the fact that this expectation is targeted towards a particular kind of form : input which is periodically structured. Speechsignals have periodic structure, and for the majority of children speechwill be among the most salient forms of input available. In the first few months and even days of life infants prefer to listen to speech rather than to other auditory input (Colombo and Bundy 1981, Glenn et al. 1981). The contrast between the periodic structure of speech as opposed to random noise is only one level of structure, however; regular periodic structure in speechexists at several levels. At the level of the speechsound, some sounds are relatively ' more periodic' than others - for instance, vowels are relatively steady-state sounds, while consonants are often more transient. As Cutler and Mehler ( 1993) point out , this could account for the findings that infants acquire language-specific vowel prototypes at about six months of age (Kuhl et al. 1992), well before they acquire the consonantal phonology of their language ( Werker and Polka 1993) . At a higher level again is the rhythmic structure of language discussedin the preceding sections. It is not unreasonableto propose that at some point during the infant ' s prelinguistic period this level of rhythmic structure is also attended to , and that the processing that goes on at that point is intimately connected with lexical


segmentation- dividing the continuous speechinto lexical units. Nor need the rhythmic structure be exclusively expressedin the auditory domain ; as Pettito and Marentette ( 1991) demonstrate, gestural language acquisition by congenitally deaf infants follows a developmentalpath with noticeable similarities to spoken languageacquisition. Because , as we have described, rhythmic structure differs even across spoken languages, the infant exposed to stress rhythm will focus upon a different regularity than the infant exposed to , say, syllabic or moraic rhythm . As Cutler et al. ( 1992) argue, this can be conceived of as the infant attending to the smallest level of regularity occurring in the spoken input . What is remarkable about this processis that it seemsto happen only once, if the evidence from the bilingual studies is reliable. That is, exposure to two differing rhythmic regularities (syllabic and stressrhythm , for instance) does not result in the ability to use both types of rhythm in speechsegmentation; a language user appears to be able to command only one rhythmic segmentation procedure. This type of all-or -none instantiation of a languageprocessing procedure is distinctly reminiscent of the notion of parameter-setting in syntactic processing(e.g. Wexier and Manzini 1987) .

9. Prosodyandthe preHnguisticinfant The notion of rhythmic segmentation by infants as a ' bootstrap' into the beginningsof lexical acquisition has not been directly tested. In this concluding section, however, researchon prosodic processingby prelinguistic infants will be reviewed in an attempt to discover whether there is evidence which could support the notions proposed above. First , though , it should be acknowledged that involvement of speechprosody in this level of language acquisition has been proposed by others in several forms. The suggestionby Gleitman and Wanner ( 1982; seealso Gleitman et al. 1987) that words are initially identified as units via their stressedsyllables is closely related to the application of the present proposal to languages with stress rhythm , for instance. Likewise, Jusczyk (e.g. 1993) has suggestedthat prosodic structure is the dimension which infant listeners exploit to accomplish speechsegmentation . In a series of experiments Jusczyk and his colleagues have shown that infants are sensitive to prosodic marking of syntactic structure, with sensitivity to clausal prosody emerging by four to five months of age (Hirsch -Pasek et al. 1987) , and sensitivity to phrasal prosody by nine months (Jusczyk et al. 1992); Jusczyk interprets this pattern as


evidenceof infants' exploitation of utterance prosody to structure speechinto interpretable units. Indirect evidencefor the present proposal can be found in both perceptual and production evidencefrom prelinguistic infants. For instance, it has been shown that the characteristic rhythmic pattern of speech is salient to the newborn child. Condon and Sander ( 1974) found that neonatesare able to synchronise their movements with speech structure, whether the speech is spoken directly to the child or played from a tape recorder, and whether it is in the parental languageor a foreign language. ( Tapping sounds, on the other hand, did not invoke synchrony in the infant ' s movement.) The ability to discriminate the contrasts involved in rhythmic patterning appearsearly ; thus two-month-olds can discriminate rhythmic groupings of tones (Demany et ale 1977) . These early discriminatory abilities also apply to the particular contrasts involved in speech rhythm : very young infants can discriminate stresscontrasts (Spring and Dale 1977, Jusczyk and Thompson 1978, Karzon 1985), and neonatescan make discriminations based on number of syllables (Bijeljac-Babic et ale 1993) . Speech to infants tends to have more regular rhythm than speech to adults, as evidenced in English by more frequent occurrenceof stresses (Garnica 1977) and more regular alternation of vocalisation and pause (Stem et ale 1983); however, the relevanceof this is unclear given that durational features of infant -directed speechdo not appear to be involved in infant preferencesfor this speechstyle (Fernald and Kuhl 1987) . More important would seemto be recent evidenceof rhythmic patterning in the speechproduction of prelinguistic infants. Cross-linguistic studies of babbling have pointed to increasing language-specificity in babbling during the secondhalf of the first year of life (e.g. de Boysson- Bardies et al 1984, de Boysson-Bardies and Vihman 1991, Halle et ale 1991, Blake and de BoyssonBardies 1992), including language-specificity in prosodic structure (Whalen et ale 1991) . Rhythmic structure is one of the language-specific patterns which appear in speechat this age. Levitt and Wang ( 1991) and Levitt and Utman ( 1992) found that reduplicative babbling of infants from French-speaking homes showed a gradually increasing regularity of timing of non-final syllables across the first year of life , while the speechof infants of the same age from English-speaking homes showed a gradually increasing variability of syllable structure and timing . This suggeststhat the characteristic rhythm of ' speechis incorporated into infants linguistic competencebefore they acquire their first words. It appears that infants also become aware of the characteristic word prosody of their language before acquiring their first words. Jusczyk et ale


( 1993) found that nine-month -old infants acquiring English preferred to listen to lists of bisyllabic words with initial stress (crossing, former , cab/e) than bisyllables with final stress (across, before, decay), although no such preferences appeared with six-month-olds. Even when the lists were low-pass filtered to remove most of the segmental information , nine-month -olds still preferred the initial -stress lists, suggestingthat their preferenceswere based on prosodic structure. Jusczyk et ale argued that during the second half of their first year, infants exercisetheir ability to segmentspeechwith the result that they acquire knowledge of the typical prosodic structure of words in the input language. At later ages, language-specific exploitation of rhythmic structure by children is established: children learning English use stressrhythm in segmentation (Gerken 1991, Gerken et ale 1990, Peters 1985) ; children learning French and other languageswith syllable rhythm use syllables (Alegria et ale 1982, Content et ale 1986) ; children learning Japanese use morae (Mann 1986). The hypothesis proposed here is that language rhythm is also what allows infants to accomplish their very first segmentation of speech. An ability to processrhythm is inborn . By using this ability , infants are enabled to overcomethe segmentationproblem and hencetake their first step towards compilation of their very own lexicon.

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. The time courseof lexicalprocessing : The syllabichypothesisrevisited . In: Dupoux, E., 1993 G.T.M. Altmann, R.C. Shillcock(eds.), Cognitivemodelsof speechprocessing : The Sperlonga . MeetingII , 81- 114. CambridgeMA : MIT Press . Monitoring the lexiconwith normal and compressed : Dupoux, E. and J. Mehler, 1990 speech Frequencyeffectsand the prelexicalcode. Journalof Memoryand Language29, 316- 335. . Baby talk as a simplifiedregister . In : C.E. Snow, C.A. Ferguson(eds.), , C., 1977 Ferguson : CambridgeUniversity , 209-235. Cambridge Talkingto children: Language input andacquisition Press . Fernald, A., 1985 . Four-month-old infants prefer to listen to motherese . Infant Behaviorand 8, 181- 195. Development Fernald, A. and P. Kuhl, 1987 . Acousticdetenninantsof infant preference for motheresespeech . Infant Behaviorand Development10, 279- 293. ' Fernald, A. andT. Simon, 1984 . Expandedintonationcontoursin mothers . speechto newborns 20, 104- 113. Developmental Psychology -Bardiesand I. Furui, 1989 Fernald, A., T. Taeschner .A , J. Dunn, M. Papousek , B. de Boysson ' and fathers' cross-languagestudy of prosodicmodificationsin mothers speechto preverbal infants. Journalof Child Language16, 477- 501. Garnica, 0 ., 1977 . Someprosodicand paralinguisticfeaturesof speechto youngchildren. In: C.E. Snow, C.A. Ferguson(eds.), Talkingto children: Languageinput and acquisition , 63- 88. : . Press CambridgeCambridgeUniversity Gerken, L., 1991 . The metricalbasisfor children's subjectless sentences . Journalof Memoryand Language30, 431- 451. Gerken, L., B. Landauand R.E. Remez . Functionmorphemes in youngchildren's speech , 1990 . and 26 204 216 . , perception production Developmental Psychology Gleitman, L.R. and E. Wanner, 1982.Languageacquisition:The stateof the stateof the art. In: E. Wanner, L.R. Gleitman(eds.), Language : acquisition:Thestateof theart, 3- 48. Cambridge . CambridgeUniversityPress Gleitman, L.R., H. Gleitman, B. Landauand E. Wanner, 1987 . Wherelearningbegins: Initial for languagelearning.In: F. Newmeyer(ed.), TheCambridgelinguisticsurvey, representations : CambridgeUniversityPress 150- 193. Cambridge . Glenn, S.M., C.C. Cunningham and P.F. Joyce, 1981 . A study of auditory preferences in ' nonhandicap . Child Development52, 1303 ped infants and infants with Downs Syndrome . 1307 Grieser . Maternalspeechto infantsin a tonal language : Supportfor , D.L. and P.K. Kuhl, 1988 universalprosodicfeaturesin motherese . Developmental Psychology24, 14- 20. . The recognitionof wordsafter their acousticoffset: Evidenceand implications , F., 1985 Grosjean . Perceptionand Psychophysics 38, 299- 310. -Bardiesand M.M. Vihman, 1991 Halle, P., B. de Boysson . Beginnings of prosodicorganisation : Intonation and duration patternsof disyllablesproducedby Japanese and Frenchinfants. Languageand Speech34, 299- 318. . The applicationof phonemesequence Harrington, J.M., I. Johnsonand M. Cooper, 1987 constraintsto word boundaryidentificationin automatic . , continuousspeechrecognition of the First EuropeanConference on Speech , Edinburgh,Vol. I , 163Proceedings Technology 167. Harrington, J.M., G. Watsonand M. Cooper, 1989.Word boundarydetectionin broadclassand phonemestrings. ComputerSpeechand Language3, 367- 382.

A. CutlerI Segmentation problems . Experimentson the segmentation of an artificial speech Hayes, J.R. and H.H. Clark, 1970 . In : J.R. Hayes(Ed.), Cognitionand the developmentof language , 221- 234. New analogue York: Wiley. Heath, S.B., 1983 . Wayswith words: Language . , life and work in communitiesand classrooms : CambridgeUnivenity Press . Cambridge Hirsch-Pasek , K., D.G. KemlerNelson, P.W. Jusczyk , , K.W. Cassidy , B. Drussand L. Kennedy . Clausesare perceptualunits for younginfants. Cognition26, 269- 286. 1987 . Prosodicdifferentiationof discoursemodes Johns-Lewis, C., 1986 . In: C. Johns-Lewis (ed.), Intonationand discourse , 199-219. London: CroomHelm. Johns-Lewis, C., 1987 . The perceptionof discorusemodes . In: M. Coulthard(ed.), Discussing discourse . Universityof Binningham: DiscourseAnalysisResearch MonographNo. 14, 249271. . How word recognitionmay evolvefrom infant speechrecognitioncapaci, P.W., 1993 Jusczyk : The tien. In: G.TiM. Altmann, R.C. Shillcock(eds.), Cognitivemodelsof speechprocessing . SperlongaMeetingII , 27- 55. CambridgeMA : MIT Press . Perceptionof a phoneticcontrast in multisyllabic , P.W. and E. Thompson , 1978 Jusczyk utterances 23, 105- 109. by,2-month-old infants. Perceptionand Psychophysics . Infants' preference for the predominantstress , P.W., A. Cutler and N.J. Redanz , 1993 Jusczyk . 64 675 687 . of words Child , Development patterns English , L. Kennedy , A. Woodwardand J. Piwoz, , P.W., DiG. KemlerNelson, K. Hirsch-Pasek Jusczyk . Perceptionof acousticcorrelatesof major phrasalunits by young infants. Cognitive 1992 24, 252- 293. Psychology . Discriminationof polysyllabicsequences Karzon, R.G., 1985 by one- to four-month-old infants. . Journalof ExperimentalChild Psychology39, 326- 342 . In: W.D. Manlen-Wilson . Reviewof selectedmodelsof speechperception Klatt, D.H., 1989 . and process , MA : MIT Press , 169-226. Cambridge (ed.), Lexicalrepresentation of readingaloud . Temporalaspects Kowal, S., D. O' Connell, E. A. O' Brienand ET . Bryant, 1975 88, 549- 569. : Threeexperiments . AmericanJournalof Psychology and speaking . Linguistic Kuhl, P.K., K.A. Williams, F. Lacerda , K.N. Stevensand B. Lindblom, 1992 255, 606- 608. alten phoneticperceptionin infantsby six monthsof age. Science experience Press . . Sociolinguistic Labov, W., 1972 , PA : UDiversityof Pennsylvania patterns.Philadelphia within wordsand acrossword . Propertiesof consonantsequences Lamel, L. andV.W. Zue, 1984 and Signal on Acoustics . Proceedings of the 1984InternationalConference boundaries , Speech 42.3.4. 42.3.1 Processing . Theprosodicand paralinguisticfeaturesof reading Levin, H., Schaffer , C.A. andC. Snow, 1982 and tellingstories. Languageand Speech25, 43- 54. of Englishand . From babblingtowardsthe soundsystems Levitt, A.G. and JiG.A. Utman, 1992 French: A longitudinaltwo-casestudy. Journalof Child Language19, 19- 49. . Evidencefor language Levitt, A.G. and Q. Wang, 1991 -specificrhythmic influencesin the . Languageand Speech34, 235infants and of French learning English babbling reduplicative 249. . Someeffectsof semanticand grannnaticalcontexton the productionand Lieberman , P., 1963 . Languageand Speech6, 172- 187. of perception speech . . A computationalanalysisof uniqueness Luce, P.A., 1986 pointsin auditoryword recognition 39, 155- 158. Perceptionand Psychophysics . Cognition24, 65-92. : Therole of readingexperience . Phonological awareness Mann, V.A., 1986

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. of lexicallystreSsed . Theprocessing speech McAllister, J., 1991 syllablesin readandspontaneous 1 26 . 34 Languageand Speech , . . Wordswithin words: Lexicalstatisticsand lexicalaccess , J.M. and A. Cutler, 1992 McQueen on SpokenLanguageProcessing , Banff, of the SecondInternationalConference Proceedings Canada , Vol. I , 221- 224. . PhilosophicalTransactionsof the . The role of syllablesin speechprocessing Mehler, J., 1981 , B295, 333- 352. RoyalSociety : The onsetof . Constrainingmodelsof lexicalaccess Mehler, J., E. Dupouxand J. Segui, 1990 : Psycholinguistic . In: G.TiM. Altmann(ed.), Cognitivemodelsof speechprocessing word recognition . , MA : MIT Press and computationalperspectives , 236- 262. Cambridge ' and J. Segui , 1981.The syllables role in speech Mehler, J., J.-Y. Dommergues , U. Frauenfelder . Journalof VerbalLearningand VerbalBehavior20, 298- 305. segmentation . and readspeech in spontaneous . Detectionof targetphonemes Mehta, G. and A. Cutler, 1988 . 156 31 135 and Language Speech , . . London: Penguin . The psychologyof communication Miller, G.A., 1967 . . Languageand socialnetworks.Oxford: Blackwell Milroy, L., 1980 . Cr,?ss-languageuseof pitch: An ethologicalview. Phonetica40, 1- 18. Ohala, J.J., 1983 . An ethologicalperspectiveon commoncross-languageutilization of FO of Ohala, J.J., 1984 voice. Phonetica41, 1- 16. . . Paperpresentedto the of Japanese . Morae and syllablesin the segmentation Otake, T., 1992 of Psychology , July. XXV InternationalCongress , Brussels in . Mora or syllable? Speechsegmentation Otake, T., G. Hatano, A. Cutlerand J. Mehler, 1993 378 . 358 32 and of . Journal , Language Memory Japanese : Operatingprinciplesfor the perceptionand analysis . Languagesegmentation Peters , A.M., 1985 , Vol. 2: . In: D.I Slobin (ed.), The crosslinguisticstudy of languageacquisition of language . Erlbaum NJ: Hillsdale . 1029 1067 Theoreti~ 1issues , , . Babbling in the manual mode: Evidencefor the Pettito, L.A. and P.F. Marentette , 1991 - 1496. . Science251, 1493 ontogenyof language . Journal of Psycholinguistic of speechin a foreign language . Segmentation Pilon, R., 1981 Research10, 113- 122. utterancesand intonationin spontaneous . Sentence Remez , R.E., PiE. Rubin and S. Ball, 1985 l09th of America Acoustical to the , Meeting, text. Society Paperpresented fluently spoken Austin, Texas, April. . The acquisitionof Kaluli. In: D.I. Siobin(ed.), The crosslinguisticstudy Schieffelin , B.B., 1985 of languageacquisition , Vol. 1: The data, 525- 593. Hilisdale, NJ: Erlbaum. on the transitionfrom prelinguisticto . A culturalperspective Schieffelin , B.B. and E. Ochs, 1983 The transition from prelinguisticto ed. R.M. Golinkoff . In: ( ), linguistic communication . : Erlbaum . London 131 115 communication , linguistic . In : H. Bouma, Segui, J., 1984. The syllable: A basic perceptualunit in speechprocessing . Hillsdale, NJ: 165 181 10 Vol. and . Attention , , D.G. Bouwhuis (eds), performance Erlbaum. . Phonememonitoring, syllablemonitoringand , J., U. Frauenfelderand J. Mehler, 1981 Segui 72 of . BritishJournal Psychology , 471- 477. lexicalaccess . Someprosodiceffectson human word . G. Bard and F. Spensley , 1988 Shillcock, R.CE of SPEECH' 88 (SeventhSymposiumof the . Proceedings recognitionin continuousspeech of Europe), Edinburgh, 819- 826. Federationof AcousticSocieties

A. Cutler/ Segmentation problems . Propertiesof large lexicons: Implicationsfor advanced , D.W. and V.W. Zue, 1982 Shipman isolatedword recognitionsystems . Proceedings of the 1982InternationalConferenceon Acoustics , Speechand SignalProcessing , Paris, 546- 549. . Phonologicalprocess , L. and Z.S. Bond, 1980 es in speechaddressedto children. Shockey Phonetica37, 267- 274. Shute, H.B., 1987 . Vocalpitch in motherese . EducationalPsychology 7, 187-205. . Discriminationof linguisticstressin earlyinfancy. Journalof SpringD .R. and P.S. Dale, 1977 20, 224- 232. Speechand HearingResearch Stem, D.N. S. Spieker . The prosodyof maternalspeech , R.K. Barnettand K. MacKain, 1983 : Infant ageand context-relatedchanges . Journalof Child Language10, 1- 15. Stoel-Gammon,C., 1984 . Phonological . Phonetica41, 208- 214. variabilityin mother-childspeech Sullivan,J.W. and F.D. Horowitz, 1983 . Theeffectsof intonationon infant attention: Theroleof the risingintonationcontour. Journalof Child Language10, 521- 534. Svartvik, J. and R. Quirk, 1980 . A corpusof Englishconversation . Lund: Gleerup. . The babblingof a Thai baby: Echoesand responses , P., 1978 Tuaycharoen to the soundsmade . by adults. In : N. Waterson , C. Snow(eds.), The developmentof communication , 111- 125. Chichester : ~ iley. Wakefield , J.A., E.B. Doughtie and B.-H.L. Yom, 1974 . The identificationof structural in an unknownlanguage . Journalof Psycholinguistic components Research 3, 261- 269. Werker, J.F. and L. Polka, 1993 . Developmental : New challenges changesin speechperception and newdirections . Journalof Phonetics21, 83- 101. Wexier, K. and R. ManziniParameters and learnabilityin bindingtheory. In: T. Roeper , E. Williams(eds.), Parametersetting, 41- 76. Dordrecht: Reidel. Whalen, D.H., A.G. Levitt and Q. Wang, 1991 . Intonationaldifferences betweenthe reduplicative babblingof French- and English-learninginfants. Journalof Child Language18, 501- 516. Wilso~, M.D., 1988 . MRC psycholinguistic database : Machine-usabledictionary, Version2.0. BehaviorResearch Methods, Instrumentationand Computers20, 6- 10.


Domain -general abilities applied to domain -specific tasks: Sensiti vi ty to probabilities in perception , cognition , and * language Michael H . Kelly and Susanne Martin , Philadelphia , PA , 3815WalnutStreet , University of Pennsylvania Department of Psychology -6196 19104 . USA Perceptual and cognitive abilities that are species- and domain-specific may nonethelesshave componentsthat are widespreadacrossspeciesand apply to numerousdomains. For example, all theories of sentenceparsing are constrained by the operations of a limited -capacity memory that is a generalcharacteristic of cognition . This paper discussesanother ability that is general across speciesand, within a species, across numerous cognitive and perceptual domains. We review evidencefrom the animalleaming and human cognitive literature that animals (a) possessfinegrained sensitivity to probabilistic patterns in their environment and (b) usemultiple probabilistic cues to solye particular problems. Such sensitivity is advantageousbecausethe structure of the environment itself can often be characterized as probabilistic . The chancesof successat solving various problems, from foraging to depth perception, would therefore increaseif animals were sensitiveto probabilistic cues and could determine whether multiple cuesconvergeon a solution. We discussthe implications of theseclaims for languageprocessing, and argue that the domaingeneral ability to detect and exploit probabilistic information is brought to bear on numerous language-specific problems.

1. Introduction

A common theme in evolutionary biology concernsthe distinction between inherited and specific adaptations. Both structures may aid an organism, but ' the former derive from the organism s ancestry whereas the latter may have evolved to suit its specific needs. Consider the duck-billed platypus, for example. These strangest of all mammals possess numerous anatomical . Preparationof this paper was supportedby National Institutesof Health Grant I R29 Mehler, and Bob Rescoriafor helpful HD23385to M.H. Kelly. Thanksto AnneCutler, Jacques commentson earlierversionsof this paper. - 3841/94/507.00 @ 1994- ElsevierScienceB.V. All rightsreserved 0024

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structures that assist their aquatic lifestyle. Thus, waterproof fur helps to insulate the platypus from the cold waters in which it normally swims and its famous bill is actually a highly-developedsenseorgan that is used in foraging. However, the history of these two adaptations is quite different. Whereas the bill seems to be a specific adaptation of the platypus and monotreme relatives, the fur , of course, is a general mammalian trait that the platypus inherits (seeGould , 1991, for further discussion). This trait is general in two ways. First , many speciesshare it and, second, it is relatively general purpose. Thus hair is not only involved in insulation, but also in sensationsof touch and the transduction of sound in the inner ear. As Darwin emphasized in many of his works, the same evolutionary concepts that apply to anatomical structures can also extend to thought and behavior. Thus, some of our own cognitive and perceptual abilities are inherited from our ancestors(and henceit is no coincidencethat we can learn something about, for instance, our visual system by studying the visual systemsof other animals - they are branches from the same tree) . Still other structures might be unique to the evolutionary history of human beings. Language is, of course, the most obvious human duck-bill , and much ink has been spilled over the years in arguments over whether this obvious intuition should really be believed. That controversy will be avoided here. Instead, we will focus on the following general theme: Whatever the evolutionary history of the language faculty , language processing must involve cognitive and perceptual abilities that are domain-general in nature. For an example, consider the parsing literature. Both linguists (e.g., Frazier and Fodor 1978) and psychologists (e.g., Just and Carpenter 1992) have devoted considerable attention to how listeners identify sentenceconstituents and their grammatical relations. Radically different viewpoints are often proposed about how these tasks are accomplished. However, throughout all the controversy, one unifying point stands clear: The parser is fundamentally a slave to a limited capacity short-term (or working ) memory system. Thus, parsing preferences from Kimball ' s ( 1973) ' fast phrase closure' to Frazier and Fpdor ' s ( 1978) ' minimal attachment' are all justified by reference to constraints on shortterm memory capacity. Indeed, potential individual differences in parsing blaseshave recently been related to individual differencesin memory capacity (Just and Carpenter 1992) . In sum, then, a system that is shared by other animals, namely a limited capacity memory, is critically involved in a systemprobably unique to human beings, namely language. Furthermore, an understanding of this ancestral memory system is crucial to a full understanding of how linguistic compe-

M .H . Kelly , S. Martin / Domain-general abilities

tence gets put to use in perfonnance. Finally , since this ancestral system is shared with our non-human relatives, we could gain insights into the human systemthrough memory experimentswith animals as well as experimentswith human beings. We will extend these claims here to another domain potentially shared with non-human animals. This domain is reflected in the old adage that death and taxes are the only certainties in life. In less depressing tenDs, much of the information that animals learn during their lives, and which must be used to guide behavior, is probabilistic in nature. Should the human being bet on the Flyers to win the NHL championship now that they have signed the Michael Jordan of hockey in Eric Lindros ? Is the breeding seasonpromising enough for a bird to raise two clutches of young rather than just one? Will the squirrel find more nuts foraging by this tree or that one? Should a listener who hears ' The fruit flies ...' assumethat ' fruit ' is a noun and ' flies' is a verb? Though these questions vary in their subject matter and importance, they all nonethelesscontain some level of uncertainty, and the types of information that could be used to decide a course of action are probabilistic in nature. Historically , attention to probabilities and their use has been either ignored or looked upon with aversion bordering on plain disgust. Thus, mathematical treatments of probability are relatively recent developments, and were fonnulated in the dubious area of gambling. Even physics, the ' paragon of scientific certainty, has not escapedfrom the clutches of probability , and the probabilistic component inherent to quantum mechanicsdrove Einstein to exclaim that God could simply NOT be a closet gambler. One possible reason for negative views of probability could be an implication that the world is full of mass confusion that cannot lead to anything ' beyond ignorance. However, an animal s environment is not a homogeneous ' ' soup, although it rarely provides sure things . The basic fact of the matter is that the world is awash with stuff best described as ' tendencies', ' maybes', ' estimates' and ' ' , generally-speakings. Furthermore, thesetenDs characterizea wide array of domains, from foraging to parsing, and must be confronted by creatures from aardvarks to zebus. Finally , animals must often make rapid decisions while minimizing the likelihood and severity of errors. These considerations lead to the following conclusion: Animals that have the capacity to detect probabilistic patterns and exploit them will have an advantageover those that do not. Furthermore, confidencein the solution to a problem should increaseif multiple cues converge on that solution. Hence, one might expect to see widespread sensitivity to multiple probabilistic infonnation sources in the animal kingdom . Since many aspects of the

-generalabilities M.H. Kelly, S. Marlin I Domain

environment are characterizedby probabilistic relations among variables, one would also expect this sensitivity to be relatively domain-independent. Indeed, such sensitivity might permeate the activities of specializedabilities, including language. In the remainder of this paper, we will attempt to justify these claims. We will begin by highlighting some phenomena in the area of animal learning and cognition that support the view, perhaps surprising, that rather precise sensitivity to probabilistic information is prevalent in many species. In fact, it seemsto be a rather everyday, ho-hum ability . We will then turn to human perception and cognition , and review some evidencein nonlinguistic domains suggestingthat , like rats, human beings exploit probabilistic information in a variety of tasks. Furthermore, even when sufficient information exists to apparently deduce the solution to a problem, human beings still use additional , probabilistic information that might also be present. We will discuss some of the possible advantages to this strategy. Finally , we will summarize evidencefrom the domain of languageprocessing that also supports widespread sensitivity to probabilistic relations among linguistic variables, as well as the types of tasks that could be assisted by exploiting this information . The researchhere will suggestthat , just as human memory is critically involved in areas ranging from visual pattern recognition to parsing, so the ability to learn and exploit probabilistic information is widespreadin perception and cognition, including traits that might be highly specializedand species-specific. 2. The ' statistical ' rat

Since the cognitive revolution , the once dominant area of animal learning has become of peripheral interest to many experimental psychologists. This major shift of both theoretical and experimental emphasiscould be attributed to a variety of factors, ranging from the development of symbolic computing devices to Chomsky' s critique of stimulus- response accounts of language. Hence, in the cognitive sciencesin general, and languagestudies in particular , traditional investigations of animal learning and their possible implications for human cognition have been virtually , if not completely, ignored. (For some recent exceptions, see Alloy and Tabachnik 1984, Estes 1985, Gluck and Bower 1988.) We believe that this abandonment of animal learning is a sad state of affairs. Certain basic processes of learning are clearly homologous across speciesranging from insects to human beings, and suciJ universality should hardly be of peripheral interest to cognitive scientists. Our

M .H . Kelly , S. Martin I Domain-general abilities

purpose here is not , however, to instigate a general rapprochement between divorced parties. Rather, we will attempt to direct attention to certain fundamental abilities that animals apparently must possessin order to behave the way they do in learning experiments. These abilities can be characterized as a keen sensitivity to the rate at which certain probabilistic events occur in the animal' s environment. 2.1. Behavioral decisionsbasedon detectionof rate information Consider the following situation : On each of a series of trials , a rat is placed in the long axis of a T -shaped maze. If the rat traverses down the correct arm of the T , it will receivea morsel of food as a reward. The correct arm varies from trial to trial , but the right arm is biased to be correct 70% of the time, with the left arm correct 30% of the time. Across a wide range of studies, the results of this situation are clear: The rat will distribute its choices in accord with the particular probabilistic bias establishedby the experimenter . In this case, the rat will travel down the right arm 70% of the time and the left arm 30% of the time. If the probabilities changeto , say, 85- 15 or 6040, then the rat ' s choices will adjust accordingly. The rat ' s behavior reveals precisesensitivity to the rate of reward in the two arms (seeGallistel, 1990, for more extensivediscussion) . ' Despite this sensitivity to rate information , the rat s behavior in this paradigm seemsparadoxical. After all , in order to optimize its food intake, the rat should always choose the side with the higher rate of return. 1 Although this conclusion is true in the laboratory , where the animal facesno competition for the food resource, it is not true in the wild . Supposethat two food patchesexist in a local habitat , with one of them being twice as rich as the other. If all of the animals went to the richer patch, then selection pressureswould favor animals who would exploit the food -poor , but competitorless patch. Evolutionary biologists have argued that , in the long run , the most stable evolutionary strategy would involve dividing one' s time between the two food patchesin accord with their rates of return. Investigations of the spatial distributions of animals while foraging indicates that this strategy is indeed used in the natural environment (seeGallistel , 1990, for summary) . Of course, as Gallistel emphasizes , this strategy presumesthe ability to detect the I For instance, supposethat the probability of reward on the right arm is 75%. In 100trials , the rat on averagewould receivea reward on O.75( 100) + 0.25(0), or 75, of the trials if it always chose the right arm. If it choosesthe arms in accord with their reward probabilities, then the rat can expect reward on 0.75(75) + 0.25(25), or only 62.5 of the trials.


rate of food return in different parts of the environment. Both laboratory studiesand natural observations indicate that a range of species, such as rats, pigeons, ducks, and fish possessthis ability . This sensitivity to probabilistic patterns reveals itself in a variety of behaviors besides the choice of where a food resource might be located. .Furthermore, the pervasivenessof this sensitivity across speciesis shown by the fact that different speciesproduce analogous results in the same task. Consider, for example, the speedwith which an action is performed after a stimulus is perceived. Gradual increasesin the likelihood of a certain event leads to corresponding decreasesin the time neededto react to that event. A notable example in the field of language researchis the inverse relationship between word frequency and the reaction time needed to make judgments about a word. However, numerous events vary in their frequency of occurrence, and animals generally become faster at reacting to more frequent events. Indeed, procedures have been developed to test human beings and other animals in very similar circumstances, and the relationship between frequency of an event and speedof responseis virtually identical across the speciesgroups (Pang et al. 1992) . Such results clearly imply that (a) a learning mechanism exists that permits adaptive adjustments to the likelihoods of different events, (b) the mechanism is domain-general in that it appears for -general, and numerous eventsand behaviors, and (c) the mechanismis species so representsa basic aspect of animal learning, including learning by human beings. 2.2. Catching the contingencies

In the famous learning experiments conducted by Ivan Pavlov, a dog was presented with a neutral stimulus, such as a tone, paired with food. As a result of these pairings, the dog began to salivate when the tone was presentedalone. In the technical terms of the field, an unconditioned stimulus (US), the food , normally elicits an innate unconditioned response (UR ), salivation. By pairing the tone with the food , the former becomesa conditioned stimulus (CS) that produces a conditioned response(CR ), in this case salivation. Thousands of subsequentexperiments, involving a huge assortment of stimuli , responses , and specieshave verified that this type of learning is quite basic throughout the animal kingdom . Extensiveresearchhas tried to understand the mechanismsthat are responsible for learning in the Pavlovian paradigm. We will focus here on one theme that has emergedfrom this research. This theme is, in many ways, reflectedin

M .H . Kel/y , S. Martin I Domain-general abilities

the description of Pavlovian conditioning with which we opened this section. This description, which is commonly used in introductory psychology texts, assumesthat learning dependson explicit pairings betweenan unconditioned stimulus and a conditioned stimulus. Various predictions follow from this assumption. Thus, learning should increase with the number of CS-US pairings, and learning should not occur in the absence of such pairings. However, as Rescorl.a ( 1988) has emphasized, this assumption and its empirical consequencesare untrue. Under certain conditions, even multiple pairings of a CS and US will not causethe animal to assumethat the CS predicts the US. On the other hand, learning can be achieved without a single CS-US pairing . Thus, CS-US pairings are neither sufficient nor necessaryto produce learning. These facts, and the conditions that create them, have led to major revisions in learning theory over the past two decades, and indicate that animals have far more sophisticated learning abilities than were previously imagined. In a series of classic experiments, Rescoria ( 1968) demonstrated that animals are sensitivenot to the raw frequency of CS-US pairings, but rather the general contingency between the variables. In his studies, rats were first trained to press a bar for food. In the next phase, the animals received a number of pairings betweena tone and a mild electric shock. To measurethe extent of learning, the rats were then permit ted to press the food bar once again. During this period, the tone was occasionally presented, and the animal' s behavior monitored. If the animals learned that the tone signals shock, they would decreasetheir levels of bar pressingand hold a motionless posture. Slight levels of learning would produce slight decreasesin the rates of bar pressingwhereashigher levels of learning would produce correspondingly greater suppressionof the bar presses. The critical manipulation in the experiments concerned the likelihood that the shocks in the second phase occurred in the absence of the tone. That is, in addition to the explicit pairings between the tone and shock, a number of other shocks could be administered without a corresponding tone. Traditional learning theory would predict that these additional unpaired shocks would be irrelevant to the learning process since the number of US-CS pairs would be unaltered. However, instead of responding just to explicit pairings of the CS and US, supposethat the rat is sensitiveto the appearanceof the US in the absenceof the CS. If the animal can detect these general contingencies between the shock and tone, then the signaling power of the tone should decreaseas higher rates of independent shocks are encountered. Indeed, a certain point should be reached at which the shock and the tone are statistically indepen-


dent. That is, given the overall base rate of shocks, one would expect a certain number of tone-shock pairs JUST BY CHANCE . Given that such encountersare mere coincidences, one should make no conclusion about the relevanceof the tone to the shock, and hence the tone should be ignored in the final test phase. Rescorla's results strongly supported the contingency interpretation of learning. As the predictive power of the CS dropped, so did the effectsof the tone on the rats' bar pressing. When the tone and the shock reached statistical independence , the presenceof the tone had no effect on behavior. In sum, Rescorla' s experiments refute the traditional belief, and one still generally held outside of the animal learning field, that the number of CS-US pairings is the crucial variable in learning. Rather, animals are sensitiveto the statistical relationship between the variables. If no statistical relationship exists, then even the presenceof numerous CS-US pairings will not causethe animal to assume that the CS predicts the US. Furthermore, statistical relationships can exist and be learned even in the absence of any CS-US ' pairings. For instance, supposeRescorla s experiment is repeated, but with all of the scheduled tone-shock pairs removed. Thus, the rat would receive a number of shocks, but none accompaniedby the tone. Since no CS-US pairs are presented, the stereotyped view of Pavlovian conditioning would predict that the animal would learn no relation betweenthesevariables. However, the rats do in fact learn something useful in this situation , namely that the presenceof the tone predicts the absenceof the shock. Hence, the rats treat the tone as a safety signal and actually show lessfear reactions when the tone is present than when it is absent (Rescoria 1969) . So far , we have discussedsome evidence that animals are sensitive to the probabilistic relationship betweena single CS and a US. However, numerous experimentsdemonstrate that animals can attend to multiple predictors of an event. For example, suppose that an animal has learned that a tone and a light both signal shock. If the stimuli are now presentedtogether, then, up to a certain point , the animal will exhibit a stronger fear reaction to the joint ' than to the separatepresentation of the stimuli. 2 Thus, an animal s behavior Z The' up to a certainpoint' phraseturnsout to becrucial. If two stimuliarestronglypredictiveof another , canactuallyreduce , evenif coupledwith US presentation , thenrepeated joint presentations of theCSs. As Uebennan( 1990 thereactionto individualpresentations ) pointsout, this apparently . One might expectthat joint makessensefor the followingreason counterintuitive phenomenon the US or strengthof the US. If of an increased the CSs would of probability signal presentation . These are not confirmed theseexpectations , then they must be adjusteddownwardaccordingly of theCSs. in reactionsto theseparate canthenbe observed downwardadjustments presentations


in a particular situation is best predicted by what it has learned about the set of informative cues present in its environment rather than any single cue examined in isolation. Indeed, what an animal learns about a novel stimulus will depend on what it has learned about other stimuli present at the same time. Consider, for example, the following situation. An animal learns that a tone is associatedwith a mild shock. After this relationship is established, the animal now is presentedwith two stimuli - the original tone and a novel light . No shocks are experiencedduring this phrase of compound stimulus presentation . Later, the light can be presented alone, and the animal' s behavior monitored to determine what , if anything, has been learned about the light . A number of possibilities are conceivable. Since the light was never experienced with the shock, one might expect that the former would later be perceivedas a neutral stimulus. Alternatively , some of the fear induced by the tone might spread to the light . However, the animal actually treats the light as a safety signal, and the strength of the safety reaction varies with the strength of the fear associatedwith the tone (seeRescoria and Wagner, 1972, for summary) . In learning about the impact of the light , the animal apparently takes into consideration its knowledge about the tone. Given that the latter normally signals shock, the absenceof the latter becomes associated with the novel ' light . As Rescoria and Wagner ( 1972: 73) state, The effect of a reinforcement or nonreinforcement in changing the associative strength of a stimulus depends-upon the existing associativestrength, not only of that stimulus, but also of other stimuli concurrently present' . In sum, then, numerous experiments in animal learning indicate (a) widespread sensitivity to probabilistic relations betweenevents and (b) the use of multiple cues in identifying the probable course of imminent events, and the types of behaviors neededto deal with them. Nonetheless, we must emphasize that even though animals behave in accordance with statistical patterns in their environment, this behavior does not lead to strong conclusions about the underlying mechanismsthat support it . Animals might reveal sensitivity to statistical patterns without actually representingor manipulating probabilistic data. For example, each learning trial could lead to the adjustment of the association strength between a CS and a US. This association strength would be increasedwhen the US appearswith the CS and decreasedwhen the US appears without the CS. Over time, the probability of a CS-US pairing would become more and more correlated with the association strength, though the probability itself would not be representedby the animal. Thus variations in the probabilities of different eventscould produce behavior that is attuned to those probabilities without entailing that these values are


explicitly represented or that the animal even remembers each individual learning trial . In fact, the most influential model of Pavlovian conditioning over the past two decadesdoes reproduce apparent sensitivi~;Y to statistical patterns by using trial by trial updates of association strengths betweena US and potential CSs (Rescoria and Wagner 1972) . But regardlessof the exact nature of the mechanismsthat underlie it , animals clearly have evolved some form of sensitivity to probabilistic patterns in their environment, and this sensitivity is finely tuned to the actual probabilities of various events.

2.3. Someimplications for languagelearning Let us translate some of theseanimal learning studies into a more familiar setting, though with controversial implications. During languageacquisition, children must learn the subcategorization privileges of the verbs in their ' ' language. Thus, English children must learn that give can appear in both ' ' prepositional (e.g., John gave the money to the charity ) and double object ' ' ' dative structures (' John gave the charity the money ), but that donate can only appear in the prepositional form . How do children learn these relationships ? The ' give' caseseemsstraightforward in that the child will observe the ' verb in both structures and conclude that ' give is legal in those frames. Thus, the child makes conclusions based on positive evidence. However, caseslike ' donate' seemto create more problems for languageacquisition. One possibility is that general principles of learning could apply to the linguistic domain. ' ' Thus, if children get explicit reinforcement that donate is ungrammatical in the double object form , then such negative evidencecould help them to learn ' ' syntactic restrictions on donate . However, numerous studies have documented that children do not get such explicit negative evidence(see Pinker, 1989, for review) . Given the lack of reinforcement coupled with successful learning, the dominant conclusion has been that general principles of learning will not apply to languageacquisition. This argument rests on incorrect assumptions about current theoretical views in animal learning, or the experimentson which those views are based. As the preceding discussion has emphasized, animals can readily learn not only that tones predict the presenceof shock, but also that tones can predict the absenceof shock. They need no additional feedback for justification or refutation of their conclusions. If learning is considered, at least in part , as the detection of statistical regularities in the environment, then children might ' learn that ' donate systematically predicts the absenceof double-object structures in the same manner as rats can learn that tones systematically predict

-generalabilities M.H. Kelly, S. Martin I Domain

the absence of shocks. Just as a species-general memory system can be -general learning abilities, in critically involved in languageparsing, so species this casethe ability to detect the statistical texture of the environment, could be involved in languagelearning. Referencesto statiscial sensitivity have recently grown in critiques of the negative evidence problem (e.g., Liberman 1991). However, we believe that prima facie incredulity over the potential of this approach, or even the mere existenceof the statistical sensitivity, would decline if animal learning studies such as those reviewedabove were more seriously consideredin discussionsof language learning. The evidence from the animal literature is now quite conclusive in that speciesafter specieshas been found not only sensitive to probabilistic information , but even to the precise quantitative nature of this information (bearing in mind once again that the exact mechanismsresponsible for this sensitivity must be identified) . Furthermore, they show such sensitivity in a variety of learning situations that use quite arbitrary stimuli , suggestingthat the ability is domain-general, and not tied to information that the animal is biologically prepared to learn. 2.4. Objections

Numerous objections could, of course, be raised against the conjectureswe have just made. We do not pretend to have definitive answers to these problems, but the problems themselveshave not beenworked out in sufficient detail to determine their scope or their resistanceto repair. ' 2.4.1. How to define what s missing? For a language learner to determine that a verb has not appeared in a structure, and that this absenceis statistically meaningful, the nature of the expected structure must be defined. As Pinker ( 1989) has pointed out , the structures cannot be individual sentencetokens, becausethere are an infinite number of such structures, and the odds that one of them would be encounteredin the corpus of speechheard by the learner is vanishingly small. ' Thus, the items that enter into the learner s statistical tabulations must be . Hence reference to the statistical more abstract than individual sentences structure of the environment will not be sufficient to characterize learning since the nature of the environment is partly defined by how the learner categorizes items within it . Furthermore, these categories may in fact be intrinsically linguistic in nature. Hence we are back to a basic problem in language learning : What notions about the nature of language do children


bring to the task at hand? Referenceto statistical regularitieshas not eliminated this problem at all. We believe this characterization of the learning task is correct, but note that it is not specificto languagelearning. The useof statistical regularities by animals also depends on abstracting away from individual tokens. Furthermore , the categoriesinvolved in this abstraction processmay depend on the learning domain in question. For example, suppose a rat learns that a tone signals the absenceof shock. Each instance of a tone is a unique event, and yet the animal must abstract away from this uniquenessto similarities across the various tokens. What counts as similar may depend on the nature of the auditory system just as what counts as similar in language learning may depend on the nature of a species-specificlinguistic system. As we emphasized at the beginning of this paper, the use of some general purpose abilities (e.g., memory) in a particular task (e.g., parsing) does not preclude the important role of domain-specific factors. A complete account of the task will require a specification of the general and the specific, along with how they interact. 2.4.2. Outcomesimilarity despiteinput variability Given that languagelearning will depend in part on the statistical structure of the input , why is the outcome of the learning so robust in the sensethat all normal children attain the same basic level of competencedespite (probably) wide ' variations in what they have heard? One answer could focus on the domain-specific languagefaculty , which makescertain assumptionsabout the nature of the language (in statistical terms, the population) from which the sample was drawn (e.g., all of the sentencesin the language are either right branching or left-branching) . We would also suggesta statistical answer as an accompaniment. In particular , the learning is robust becauseof the robust nature of statistical sampling. One of the fundamental theoremsof statistics is that as the size of a sample increases, it reflects the actual nature of the population from which it was drawn with greater accuracy. Hence, one can make reliable conclusions about the population (which is too large to be examined in its entirety) from a relatively small sample. Although no two samples from , such a population will be alike, they demonstrably will 3 convergeon the sameconclusionsgiven a sufficiently large sample size. Note 3 Here is an easy way to dernonstrate this statistical principle : Instruct your cornputer to generate sarnples of randorn nurnbers between 0 and 100. Start off with two sarnples. each containing 5 cases. The rneans of these sarnples will probably differ greatly. Now continue generating sarnple pairs. but increasethe nurnber of casesin each pair . As the nurnber of cases

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117

that such an account would predict that the greatest variability in linguistic judgments should occur for relatively rare constructions, where the idiosyncrasies of the sample will have a much greater impact on learning. 2.4.3. Going beyondidiosyncrasies Instead of relying on some general learning mechanism, such as one that involves feedback regarding ungrammatical sentences , children might be able to exploit regularities about the sentenceframes that verbs could take (Pinker 1989). For example, the absenceof ' donate' from double-object datives is not an isolated fact. Rather, polysyllabic English verbs and verbs with certain stresspatterns are, in general, barred from double-object dative structures. If children could learn such regularities, they could then generalizethem to new instances. In fact, Gropen et al. ( 1989) have found that children learning English were re.luctant to generalize polysyllabic nonsense verbs from a propositional dative to a double-object dative, though they were more willing to do so for monosyllabic nonsenseverbs. This effect of syllable number did not extend to other syntactic frames, suggestingthat the children had learned about the blasesconcerning the English dative. Although Pinker ( 1989) casts the general learning and regularities approaches as conflicting alternatives, we see them as quite similar. Englishspeakingchildren may in fact detect regularities in the structure of English by being sensitive to the systematic absenceof certain verbs from double-object datives. They would , of course, have to recognize dative structures despite variations in their lexical content, and they would have to recognize that certain phonological properties of verbs are correlated with the dative structures . As noted above, some of these classification abilities may derive from characteristicsof the child ' s native linguistic capacity. However, granted that theseclassification abilities exist, the results found by Gropen et al. ( 1989) are quite consistent with the claim that children are sensitive to statistical patterns in their linguistic environment. The children in the Gropen et al. , rather than discrete. experiments were also probabilistic in their responses That is, although they were biased against generalizing polysyllabic words to double-object datives, they nonethelessdid so. This pattern follows from the fact that the English restriction is also probabilistic in nature (e.g., ' offer' can appear in the double-object dative) . Given a probabilistic input , a probabilistic output is expected. This leads to the next point . , convergingon a valueof 50. Yet getslarger, the meansof the sampleswill moveclosertogether the sampleswill obviouslydiffer in their exactsequence of numbers .

-generalahiliti P.~ M.H. Kelly, S. Marlin I Domain

2.4.4. Probabilistic responsesinherent to the useof statistical patterns Two items might both be members of a population , but the use of finite samplesto infer characteristicsof the population could lead to some differences in how they are treated. Confidencein the membershipof item I might be lessthan confidencein the membership of item 2. When applied to language, this aspectof statistics means that two sentencescould, in fact, be grammatical in the language, but speakersmight differ slightly in their opinions. One of the sentencesmight be judged more strange than the other, or rated as grammatical more slowly than the other. In fact, when subjectsare asked to rate sentenceson scalesof grammaticality, they find the task fairly easy, they do rate items as somewherebetween grammatical and ungrammatical, and they agree among themselveson these ratings (e.g., Fisher et al. 1991) . 2.4.5. Contradictory evidencefrom the domain of human decisionmaking Over the past two decades, voluminous evidence has been gathered that human beings are actually very poor in statistical reasoning (seeNisbett and Ross, 1980, for a summary) . For example, they often ignore base rate information , have incorrect ideas about randomness, and do not realize that large samples provide better estimates of a population than small samples. Given thesewell-documented problems, how could human beings use statistical information as an effective learning tool ? We will offer two parries to this objection. First , lack of explicit understanding of statistical principles does not entail lack of some type of richer implicit knowledge. This knowledge might be relatively inaccessibleto conscious access , and yet still be useful in perception and action. For instance, human being have a very poor understanding of physics when problems are presentedin a verbal format (e.g., McCloskey 1983) . Thus, they often believe that certain impossible descriptions of moving objects are, in fact, accurate statements. However, when presentedwith computer-generateddynamic displays , they now correctly recognize the natural and unnatural motions (Shannon 1976) . Of course, we normally base our actions on visual perception of actual motion rather than verbal descriptions of it . Second, the manner in w~ich the statistical information is presented in the decisionmaking experiments differs markedly from the way that information is normally experienced. In the former , information about base rate (i.e., frequency of occurrence) is given as an explicit sum. Thus, subjectsmight be told that a city contains 100cabs, with 80 being blue and 20 green. However, we rarely receive explicit information about frequency, and animals literally never receivesummary data tables. Instead, most of the frequency knowledge

M.H. Kelly, S. Martin / Domain-generalahiliti2.!

that we and other animals have is probably obtained through numerous encounters with individual objects or events. Hence, we cannot use experiments in decision making as a strong basis for conclusions about human sensitivity to statistical patterns, especially since studies have found differences in the way people treat the samedata when presentedin summary format or as a seriesof events(e.g., Wassermanand Shaklee 1984) . Rather, we must examine direct investigations of human sensitivity to frequency information , and the potential roles of such knowledge in solving problems in language and other domains. We turn to theseissuesin the following sections.

3. The useof multipleandprobabilisticinformationsourcesby humanbeings As the precedingdiscussionillustrates, non-human animals have well-documented ' abilities to detect the statistical texture of their environment. Such statistical sensitivity has been documented in numerous species and in a variety of settings, ranging from highly constrained laboratory environments to open field situations. The evolution of these abilities along with their speciesand domain generality should not be surprising given their obvious use in a variety of tasks such as foraging. In this section, we will turn to human beings and summarize some of the evidencethat we also are sensitive to and rely extensivelyon probabilistic information from multiple sourcesin order to solve a variety of problems. This section will focus primarily on nonlinguistic domains, with the next section turning to implications for language processing. The topics that we will discuss here should not be considered exHaustive, but instead viewed as a sampling from the available evidence. 3.1. General sensitivity to frequency information

In order to effectively use probabilistic infonnation , human beings must, of course, be sensitive to the relative frequencies of various events. Numerous experimentsacrossthe past four decadeshave establishedthat human beings possess this prerequisite ability (though controversy continues over the mechanismsthat might underlie it , cf. Hintzman 1988, Jonides and Jones 1992) . Furthennore, this frequency sensitivity seemsto be general in nature, as it extends across numerous domains (see Hasher and Zacks, 1984, for a more detailed review) . For instance, studies have shown that people are quite sensitive to the relative frequencies of right and left -handers (Coren and Porac 1977), encounters with different people (Saege~ et al. 1973), the


lethality of different events (Lichenstein et al. 1978), and even fast-food restaurant chains (Shedier et al. 1985) . This frequency sensitivity appears not only across domains, but also across tasks. Whereas some studies explicitly ask subjects to rate items in terms of frequency, others use more indirect probes. For instance, in numerous experiments, Zajonc ( 1968) has found that the more frequently something is experienced, the more it is liked (even though the subjectshave no control over theseexperiences ) . Hence frequency sensitivity can be revealedby subjective evaluations. As with fast-food restaurants, numerous experiments have shown that human beings are sensitive to the relative frequencies of many linguistic events, such as words (Shapiro 1969), syllables (Rubin 1974), and letters (Attneave 1953). 4 Indeed, this sensitivity to frequency is quite strong. For example, Attneave asked subjectsto estimate the frequency of English letters per thousand tokens. He found that fully three-quarters of the variance in the ' subjects responsescould be accounted for by the actual frequencies of the letters in English text. Using different techniquesand word frequency as the object of study, Shapiro ( 1969) found that over 85% of the variance in judgments of word frequency could be accounted for by measuresof actual 5 frequency. In fact, this frequency sensitivity might be even stronger than these experimentsindicate, given that our measuresof actual frequency are subject to typical errors of sampling. These errors will be particularly apparent for low frequency items. For example, Gernsbacher ( 1984) points out that the words ' boxer' , ' icing' , and 'joker ' have the samefrequencies(namely, one per million ) as ' Loire ' , ' gnome' , and ' assay' in the two most widely used frequency norms for English. However, there is clearly no doubt that the former words are ' really' more commonly encountered, and that a sufficiently large sample of English would confirm these intuitions . In fact, the validity of the 4 Thesevariablesare, of course , correlatedin that relativelycommonsyllablestend to contain . However . , the variablescan be statisticallyseparated relativelyfrequentlettersand phonemes Thus, Rubin ( 1974 aresensitiveto syllablefrequencyindependently ) foundthat Englishspeakers of phonemefrequency . 5 Thestrengthof thesecorrelationscan, of course , beinfluencedby the rangeof materialsused. ' and ' zinc' were If only the words' the' , ' house , judged, the correlationbetweenratedand actual frequencywould obviously(and trivially) be perfect. SinceAttneaveusedall the lettersof the , the resultsfrom his experimenton letter frequencycannot be criticizedas Englishalphabet artifactsarisingfrom the typesof lettersselected . Shapiro( 1969 ) used60 words for his adult . Using455 , and theserangedfrom very high throughintermediateto low frequencies subjects wordsin a lexicaldecisiontask, Gemsbacher found that ratedfamiliarity accountedfor ( 1984 ) . morethan 71% of the variancein reactiontime.


intuitions in this casesuggeststhat human ratings of frequency might in fact be more useful in experiments than listings in word frequency norms, and Gemsbacher ( 1984) found that subjects agreed quite well on their ratings of word familiarity , and that these ratings were better predictors of reaction times in a lexical decision task than supposedmeasuresof ' actual' frequency. Given that human beings are sensitive to frequency, sampling considerations might lead one to expect that their frequency judgments would be more accurate than current frequency norms. After all , the Francis and Kucera frequency norms are based on an analysis of one million word tokens, which is a relatively small sample. Given conservative assumptions (speech/reading rates of ISO words per minute along with an eight-hour sample per day), a typical person will be exposedto a million -word sample in about two weeks. In sum, human beings are sensitiveto frequency information in a variety of domains. This domain-independencesuggeststhat this sensitivity is a general ability and hence might be exploited in a variety of domain-specific tasks. Nonetheless, we must emphasizethat human beings are far from infallible in their frequency judgments. For example, .they tend to overestimate the frequency of rare events and underestimate the frequency of common events (seeBaron, 1988, for a summary) . In addition , frequency estimatesare based at least in part on factors other than frequency. For instance, one category is often consideredto be larger than another if instancesof the former class are more easily retrieved from memory. Now , these retrieval effects might be correlated with actual frequency, and so be reasonably accurate. However, they also might reflect aspects of memory organization itself. Thus, people ' ' generally and falsely believe that more English words begin with r than have ' r ' as the third letter. Theseintuitions probably reflect the fact that the mental lexicon is organized by first rather than third letter and/ or phoneme, and henceexemplars of the former class are more easily retrieved from memory. however, despite these inconsistencies, the evidence as a whole supports the view that human beings, like other animals, can learn probabilistic patterns in their environment. We will now turn to a sample of some areas where multiple , probabilistic information sourcesare available and might be used to solve particular problems in perception and cognition . 3.2. Depth perception One of the fundamental questions in the history of visual perception concerns how we perceive a three-dimensional world based on a two- dimensional image. Centuries of research on this question have focused on two


issues, one optical and the other psychological. First , what types of optical patterns exist in the two-dimensional image that are correlated with the threedimensional world that reflected the image to the eye? Second, which of these information sourcesare actually used in visual perception, and how are they weighed? The second question becomes particularly important given that numerous potential cues to depth exist, such as those listed in table I .

TableI Somevariablesthat arecorrelatedwith distance Variable

Description

Binocular disparity Motion parallax Accommodation Relative size Height in picture plane Texture gradients Occlusion

Differencesin the image of an objected projected to the two eyes The relative velocity of imagesacross the retina Changesin the shape of the lens The size of an image on the retina The location of an image along the vertical axis The e , shape, and densityof textureelementslike pebbles , tiles on a floor An object blocking the view of a more distant object

Of course, these cues vary in their range and predictive power. Thus accommodation is not effective beyond 10 feet, and height in the projection ' place can easily be violated (e.g., a person s head will be higher in the projection place than the feet, yet is not further away from an observer) . Nonetheless, many cuesare simultaneouslyavailable, and hencean important issueconcernshow the various cuesare weighedand whether an available cue might even be used. The situation could be complicated further becausethe weights given to a set of cuesmight vary with context. Consider, for example, the caseof textural cuesto depth. Many surfacesconsist of textured elements, such as pebbles along a path or tiles in a room , that have roughly the same size and shapeand are distributed randomly . However, becausethe elements can systematically vary in their distance from an observer, their projected imageswill vary also. As distance from the observer increases, the images of the texture elements will decreasein size, compress in shape, and become more densely packed. Investigations of these variables have found that human observers(a) are sensitive to all three dimensions, but (b) respond to some dimensions more strongly than others, and (c) change their weightings with context (Cutting and Millard 1984). In particular , for flat horizontal surfaces, the size gradient had the greatest effect in creating impressions of depth, followed by the density and shape gradients. However, for curved surfaces, the shapegradient dominated over the other variables.


Given that cues vary in their effectiveness , one might consider the extreme whether some cues case, and inquire , though present, might receivea weight of zero, and hence be totally ignored. Such total neglect might appear most clearly when another more powerful cue is present. In such a situation , visual processing might engage in what Bruno and Cutting ( 1988: 162) call cue ' selection' in which ' observers ... use the , single most effective available ' . For instance a static information source and the others , , pictorial [ ] disregard cue to depth, like height in the image plane, might become ignored when motion parallax is present, given that the former is lessconsistently predictive of distance. However, using a variety of experimental methods, Bruno and Cutting examined the impact of motion parallax, height in the image plane, occlusion, and relative size on distancejudgments, and found that all of these variables contributed significantly to those judgments. Such results indicate that human beings use a variety of cuesin three-dimensional perception, even cuesthat are not completely reliable.

3.3. Categorization When subjectsare asked to judge the truth fulness of category membership statementslike ' An x is a V ' , where Y is a category term and x is a possible member, their time to respond consistently varies depending on x (cf. Smith and Medin , 1981, for summary) . For example, subjects take longer to ' ' ' ' ' ' respond true to An ostrich is a bird than to A robin is a bird . These reaction time patterns can be predicted by examining the extent to which an es features typically associatedwith the category in question instance possess e. . Rosch and Mervis 1975). In the case of birds, these might be flight ( g, capacity, relatively small size, song, etc. This interpretation of the reaction time phenomenaindicates that numerous information sourcesare used in the processof categorization. Indeed, some have claimed that the reaction time (and other) data indicate that membership in categories is not discrete, but rather continuous, or that human beings believe that category membership is usually fuzzy. However, subsequentresearchhas cast serious doubt on these conclusions. For example, the status of an integer as even or odd is clearly discrete. A simple, straightforward definition sufficesto unambiguously classify any integer as even or odd. If the classification decision data reflect the fact that human beings typically lack knowledge of category definitions and/ or believe that category membershipis generally fuzzy, then the decision data should look rather different if subjects have to classify integers as even or odd. If subjects know the mathematical definition and explicitly admit that

M .H . Kelly , S. Marlin I Domain-general abililies

category membership is completely and unambiguously determined by that definition , then all integers should be classified as even or odd with equal speed, so long as confounding variables like word frequency are control led. However, Arm strong et al. ( 1983) found that some numbers are in fact classified as even or odd faster than other numbers. Indeed, for a range of categoriesthat had clear, agreed-upon criteria for membership, Arm strong et al. found that some members were consistently classified faster than others. Given these results, Arm strong et al. argue that , whatever the reaction time data indicate, they do not imply that items are members of categories to varying degrees, or that people believe in graded category membership. We agree completely with the rationale for the Arm strong et al. experiments and their conclusions. However, we nonetheless believe that the reaction time data reflect certain aspectsof the processof categorization. In particular , even when a criterion exists that is necessaryand sufficient for category membership, people cannot help but weigh other factors that are correlated with membership, though in the final analysis such features are irrelevant. For instance, prime numbers are almost always odd (2 being the only counterexample). This feature is, however, neither necessarynor sufficient for being classified as odd. Still , the feature might be weighed in classification, with prime numbers being classified as odd faster than nonprime . Consideration of such other factors might be beneficial by speedingup decision times while keeping error rates low. This advantage might also be illustrated in the following phenomenon. 3.4. The word superiority effect

' ' Suppose subjects view a clearly printed letter k either by itself or in a ' word , and they must identify whether a ' k or some other letter was presented. Numerous experiments using variations on this task have repeatedly found that subjectsidentify the target letter more accurately if it appears in a word than if it appears by itself (e.g., Reicher 1969, Johnston 1978) . ' ' Thus, ' k ' would be identified more accurately in the context of work than alone (or in a string of letters that do not form a word ) . Why is the word context advantageouseven though the letter in isolation is clearly printed ? One possibility concerns the high speedswith which skilled readers process orthographic material. Given that the context in which a letter appears is perceptual partly predictive of its identity , observers could bypass complete ' encoding of a letter, and use partial information about a letter s appearance plus partial information about the identity of surrounding letters to speed


overall processing while minimizing error rates. Thus, observers could circumvent the usual tradeoff between speed and accuracy by using multiple sources of information about letter identity . Of course, this additional information is probabilistic in nature, given that words other than ' work ' ' ' ' ' ' ' begin with wor , such as word and worm . Nonetheless, human beings are apparently sensitive to this probabilistic information , and use it to increase processingspeed.

4. Probabilisticinformationandlanguage process ina In this section, we will review some evidence that multiple , probabilistic information sourcesare used to solve various tasks in language processing. We will focus on phoneme perception, word boundary identification , and the assignmentof words to grammatical categories. Other potential examplesalso exist, such as word identification in sentencecontexts and assignmentsof words to agent and patient roles. SeeMassaro ( 1991) for discussion of these and other cases, along with mathematical models of some of these phenomena . 4.1. Speech perception

As in the case of visual depth perception, numerous acoustic cues for phonemeidentification exist. Indeed, Lisker ( 1978) lists fully sixteen variables that could be used by listeners to determine whether a / b/ or /p/ is present in ' ' . Furthermore numerous rud , experimentshave shown that listenersweigh in variables multiple speechperception. Many of these experiments exploit the possibility of trading relationships between different acoustic cues for phonemecategories. In particular , supposethat the values along two acoustic dimensions could be used to distinguish between two phonemesA and B. If these two dimensions are in fact weighed by the listener, then shifts in the value of one dimension toward the B category should be offset by compensatory changestoward the A category in the value of the other dim ~nsion. This paradigm has been used to document the existence of a variety of trading relationships. For example, both voice onset time ( VOT) and r~lative aspiration are potential cues for distinguishing voiced from voicelessstop consonants . With amplitude of aspiration held constant, a particular VOT value can be identified as the approximate boundary betweena voicelessand voiced stop consonant. However, if the aspiration amplitude is then raised, thus


increasing the evidence for an unvoiced consonant, the VaT boundary betweenthe two phoneme classeswill shift toward shorter VaTs . Hence, an ' ' aspiration value that indicates unvoiced can be offset by a suitable VaT ' ' indicating voiced . Such results indicate that both VaT and aspiration are weighed in distinguishing voiced from voiceless consonants (Repp 1979) . Similar trading relations have been found for formant transition duration and the duration of the following vowel, which are used to distinguish jbj from jwj (Miller and Liberman 1979), silence duration and Fl onset frequency, ' which are involved in the distinction between ' say' and ' stay (Best et al. 1981), and many other contrasts (seeRepp, 1982, for summary) . Furthermore experimentsindicate that infants as well as adults weigh multiple variables in speechcategorization (Miller and Elmas 1983) . The huge mass of this speech ' perception evidence leads to the conclusion that listeners will make use of ' any cue for a given phonetic distinction (Repp and Liberman 1987: 98) . Even further , listeners will combine multiple cues to identify phonetic segments. The search for multiple information sourcesin speechperception has been driven in large part by the failure to find invariant relationships between acoustic structure and phoneme categorization. If such invariants did exist, then they would presumably be sufficient in themselvesto distinguish between phonemes. Other, probabilistic cues, though present, might then be considered superfluous. One possible invariant that has been identified and explored over the past decadeinvolves the spectral shapeof a stop consonant release burst. Blumstein and Stevens ( 1979) have argued that place of articulation distinctions among stop consonants are invariantly signaled by this variable. For example, alveolar stops exhibit a gradual rise in amplitude as frequency increases, whereas labial stops show a falling or flat amplitude pattern. Experiments have, in fact, shown that listeners are sensitive to this information (Blumstein and Stevens1980) . However, even if this information is invariant , its presenceapparently does not eliminate the effects of other, probabilistic cues for stop consonant identity . Indeed, when the invariant and probabilistic information conflict , the latter dominates (Walley and Carrell 1983). These results are analogous to the literature in visual depth perception, in which probabilistic cues to depth are exploited even if more powerful cues are also present. They also emphasize the danger of assuming that the measuredstrength of a cue will map directly onto cue weights in perception. 4.2. Identification of word boundaries Identifying

word boundaries in continuous

speech is one of the major

M.H. Kelly, S. Martin / Domain-generalabilities

problems in speechperception, languageacquisition, and the development of speechrecognition devices. In contrast to our intuitions regarding our native language, invariant cuesto word segmentationdo not appear to exist. Hence, our impressionsof an unfamiliar languagemight better capture the true state of affairs in the sound stream: Words seemto be tightly knit together, with no obvious seamsthat can be used to teasethem apart . In fact, errors in word ' segmentationoccur in learning and listening to one s native language, testifying to the difficulties involved in this task. Segmentationproblems are wellattested in the acquisition literature (e.g., Gleitman et al. 1988), and uncertainties ' ' ' over whether ' a napron or an apron was spoken may have caused the former to have lost its initial / n/ over the course of English history . Despite its clear difficulties, listeners nonethelessbecome quite skilled at word segmentation, and numerous researchershave tried to identify the types of cues listeners can and do use to solve this problem. These investigations have uncovered cues that exist at various levels of language structure, from constraints on phoneme sequencesto patterns in the prosody. None of these cuescan guarantee successin word segmentaition, either alone or in concert, but their joint effectsmay conspire to make word segmentationby and large successful. 4.2.1. Phonemesequences Languagesoften have restrictions on phonemesand/ or phoneme sequences at syllable, morpheme, and word boundaries. Some of these restrictions are strong constraints, such as the impossibility of obstruent + nasal sequences within English syllables. However, large-scale corpora analyses might also reveal probabilistic relationships between the distributions of phonemesand various boundary types. Speakersdo appear to have some knowledge of such probabilistic relations. Thus, Cutler et al. ( 1987) have shown that English speakers have learned that English consonant vowel sequencesare more likely to follow a CVCV than a CVCC pattern . Experiments on human sensitivity to frequency information have found that people are not only sensitiveto the frequenciesof individual letters (Attneave 1953) and syllables (Rubin 1974), but also to letter combinations (Underwood 1983) . Given that letter combinations will be correlated with phoneme combinations, such data indicate that speakers also have knowledge of the relative frequencies of . However, experiments need to be performed to see if phoneme sequences not just to the overall frequency of phoneme sequences sensitive , are speakers but also to significant interactions between those frequencies and syllable, morpheme, and word boundaries.


4.2.2. Syllable cues Individual syllables may vary in the likelihood with which they signal word boundaries. In a recent analysis, we examined four common English syllables - / 9~/, / b /, / m/, and / ~/ - and estimated their probability of occurring before a word boundary . For example, / ~/ occurs before a word boundary in ' a . maze' and ' Louisiana cooking' , but not in ' amaze' or ' astounding' . The analysesrevealed that / 9~/ and / b / almost always appear just prior to word boundary, followed by / ~/ and then / m/ . As a result, it is far easier to find ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' English words like increase, invade , applause, and approach than words ' ' ' ' like today and topeka . We recently conducted an experiment to test whether English speakershave knowledge of theserelationships. This experiment used a one-word / two -word judgment task. In this procedure, subjects hear a sequenceof two syllables and must judge as rapidly as possible whether the sequencecorrespondswith one word or two. The critical items consisted of quadruplets such as ' the mind ' , ' a mind ' , ' to mind ' , and ' in mind ' . In thesecases, a monosyllabic open class word is precededby one of four monosyllabic closed class words, with the closedclasswords varying in the likelihood with which they signal a word boundary. If English speakers have learned these probabilities and exploit them in word segmentation, then we would expect faster ' two -word ' judgments for those syllablesthat most reliably correspond with word boundaries. In addition , listeners should make fewer errors with these items. The filler items consisted of disyllabic words such as ' typhoon ' . All of the disyllabic words had stresson the secondsyllable, and so matched the stresspatterns of the two-word cases. This control prevented the subjects from using stress pattern as a guide to the correct answer. The results from this experiment are presented in table 2. Statistical analysesrevealedthat subjectswere significantly faster and made fewer errors for the / 9~/ and / b / conditions than for the / ~/ and then / m/ conditions. In Table2 Mean reactiontimes(in msec ) and error rates(pereight items) to identify a disyllabicpattern ' ' (e.g., the mind) as two wordsdependingon the initial word in the pattern


addition , I ~I was significantly easierthan Iml on both the speedand accuracy measures. The 19~1 and Ibl conditions were not significantly different. We are currently planning a secondexperiment involving Ib / , I ~/, and Im/ . The same one-word/ two -word task will be used, but in this case, the target syllableswill ' ' ' ' ' ' actually be part of a word as in tomorrow , abandon and infection . The ' ' correct answer here is one word , but the predictions are exactly the opposite ' of those made for the samesyllablesin the ' two word context. Now , listeners should be fastest and make the fewest errors with Iml items and be slowest and make the most errors with the Ib / items. 4.2.3. ~rosodic structure Cutler and her colleagueshave recently argued that the distinction between strong and weak syllables, which is a major characteristic of English prosody, can provide powerful cues to word segmentation. Whereas strong syllables have a full vowel, weak syllables have a reduced vowel, which is typically though not exclusively realized as a schwa. In extensive analysesof English speechcorpora, Cutler and Carter ( 1987) found that over 70% of strong syllables coincided with a word boundary. Our own unpublished analysis of parental speechto children between 12 and 25 months of age is even more strongly marked. Across the 14 mothers in our sample, strong syllables corresponded with word boundaries 95% of the time, with 93% being the LOWEST value in the corpus. 6 Hence, a productive word segmentation strategy for English would divide an utterance at the beginning of each strong syllable, and submit the resulting units to a lexical search. In general, these units will match words in the lexicon, and the failures can be subjected to some type of re-analysis. Current evidence indicates that listeners do, in fact, use some version of this strategy. First , Cutler and Butterfield ( 1992) predicted that when listeners make word segmentationerrors, they should remove weak syllables from the beginnings of words and attach them to the ends of words. Analyses of 6 Of course, the mothers are not deliberately making their speech more predictive of word boundaries so as to assist their children in acquiring English. Rather, parental speechcontains a strikingly high percentageof words that refer to concrete objects and easily perceivableevents, for the good reason that children are more interested in these entities rather than more abstract themes like religion or politics . Given that the vocabulary of everyday objects contains a high proportion of monosyllabic words and is drawn from a core Germanic lexicon that is character ized by polysyllabic words beginning with strong syllables, a greater correspondencebetween strong syllables and word boundaries will appear in parental speech than in speech between adults.


naturally -occurring and experimentally-induced segmentationerrors supported thesehypotheses. For example, a listener misheard ' bought a Mercedes' as ' Mortimer Sadies' , which involved detaching the weak initial syllable of ' Mercedes' and ' ' appending it along with the weak a to the strong first syllable. (Of course, some phoneme misperceptionsoccurred as well.) Second, Cutler and Norris ( 1988) found that listeners took longer to identify the real word 'mint ' in ' mintayf ' than in ' mintef' . Cutler and Norris argued that since ' mintayf ' contains two strong syllables, listeners would initially segmentthe syllablesinto separateword-units after the In/ . As a result, the listenerswould have to overrule the initial word boundary and reunite the It I with the ' preceding syllable. In mintef' , on the other hand, no word boundary would be inserted between the Inl and It I since the final syllable is weak. Thus, the subjectswould not have to rectify incorrect word boundaries in this case, and their reaction time would be faster. Finally , although Cutler and Carter' s corpus analysis indicated that a strong syllable generally marked a word boundary, numerous segmentation errors would still be made with a simple heuristic that always and only placed word boundaries before strong syllables . However, Cutler and Carter point out that most of the errors in this case would involve closed-class items as these are the principal words that violate the strong syllable heuristic. Indeed, they systematically violate the heuristic becauseword boundaries generally appear before weak syllables of closed class words but strong syllables of open class words. If English speakershave learned this pattern, and supplementedtheir word segmentation strategies with it , they could further reduce the chances of a missegment . In fact, segmentationerrors themselvesprovide some evidence that English speakershave learned these prosodic patterns. Although Cutler and Butter worth ( 1982) found that segmentationerrors tended to place word boundaries before strong syllables, some did in fact occur before weak syllables. However, most of these casesposited a closed-classword immediately after the boundary.

4.3. Parsing In determining the grammatical structure of . a sentence, listeners and readers are often faced with local ambiguities. For example, in a sentence ' ' beginning with The judge knew the law ... , the final noun phrase could be ' ' the direct object of knew or the subject of a complement clause. In attempting to understand how such ambiguities are dealt with , two major questions have been intensely investigated: What information is brought to


bear on the ambiguity , and when is that information available? Over the past two decades, the dominant answershave claimed that only a restricted range of information contributes to initial parsing decisions, with other classesof information only coming into play later to rectify errors in the first parse (e.g., Frazier and Fodor 1978, Frazier and Rayner 1982, Ferreira and Clifton 1986, Ferreira and Henderson 1990) . In particular , preferencesfor certain phrase structure geometries are used to guide initial parsing, such as a preference to create the simplest phrase structure tree consistent with the preceding input . These preferences are reputedly blind to other types of information , such as the identity of the verb in the sentence. The impenetrability of certain information classesto parsing mechanisms createsvery interesting predictions. Consider, for example, the sentences' The student forgot the solution was in the back of the book ' and ' The student ' ' , the hoped the solution was in the back of the book . In both sentences ' ' solution is the subject of a complement clause. However, a complement clauseinterpretation would create a more complex phrase structure tree than an interpretation that initially categorized' the solution ' as the direct object of the respectiveverbs ' forgot ' and ' hoped' . Hence, upon reaching ' the solution ' , a reader might opt initially for the simpler direct object parse, which would have to be rejectedwhen later disconfirming information is encountered. Still , one might entertain the possibility that the identity of the verbs themselves could affect theseinitial parsing blases. Although ' forgot ' can be followed by an NP object or an object clause, ' hoped' cannot appear with the former structure. If such facts about verb argument types can influence the earliest stages of parsing, then one would predict that readers would not posit a direct object interpretation for ' hoped' , and so would not need to reject such a hypothesis when subsequentportions of the sentenceare read. One would therefore predict that reading times for the disambiguating areas of the sentencewith ' hoped' would be faster than those for the same areas of the sentence with ' forgot ' . This prediction and analogous ones using other dependentmeasuresand experimental procedureswere supported in a set of studies by Trueswell et al. (in press b) . The results could not be attributed to ' ' ' ' generally faster processingof forgot than hoped becausethe reading time differencesbetween the verbs were significantly reduced in control sentences ' ' containing the complementizer that , which made the sentencesunambiguous . Although some studies have been reported that did not find effects of verb subcategorization preferenceson parsing (e.g., Ferreira and Henderson 1990), Trueswell et al. argue that thesestudies have a number of methodological flaws. For instance, the verbs used by Ferreira and Henderson ( 1990)


did not differ very much in their preferencefor noun phrase versus sentential objects. Consequently, their methods were not sensitive enough to detect differences. In sum, then, the experiments conducted by Trueswell et al. (in press b) indicate that subcategorization information about a verb has immediate effects on parsing (see also Shapiro et al. 1993), contrary to models that severely restrict the class of information available to parsing mechanisms. Indeed, Trueswell et al. argue that a wide range of information sources contribute to parsing decisions. As one final illustration , Trueswell et al. (in press a) have recently provided evidence that semantic properties of the sentencesubject can influence parsing. They contrasted sentenceslike ' The defendant examined by the lawyer turned out to be unreliable' with ' The evidenceexamined by the lawyer turned out to be unreliable' . Parsing models that rely solely on syntactic preferenceswould claim that readerswould have ' difficulty with these sentencesbecausethey would initially treat defendant/ ' evidenceexamined to be the subject and verb of the main clause. Although such syntactic preferencesmight exist, Trueswell et al. explore the possibility that they could be modified by the relative prototypicality of the preceding nouns as the subject for the verb. Although ' defendant' is a reasonable ' ' ' ' subject of the verb examined , evidence is not , and Trueswell et al. provide evidence that readers weigh such information in their initial parsing processes. Thus, like visual depth perception, parsing appears to proceed by considering multiple sourcesof information , which may range from general syntactic preferencesto properties of the specific lexical items composing a sentence. 4.4. Grammatical category assignments

One problem that listeners must solve during language comprehension is the assignmentof words to the correct grammatical classes , such as noun and verb. These assignments must be made rapidly given that conversational speechproceedsat about 150 words per minute (Maclay and Osgood 1959). What types of information might listeners exploit in order to make these categorizations? Both semantic and syntactic factors are certainly available. Semantically, nouns tend to denote concrete objects whereas verbs tend to denote actions. These patterns are not invariant , but children do show sensitivity to them in experiments (e.g., Brown 1957) . Syntactically, words from different grammatical classesvary in their distributional requirementsin sentences . Thus, English nouns, but not verbs, can appear in the sentence


stole the base' whereas verbs, but not nouns, can appear in the ' the base' . sentence The runner While not disputing the important role of semantic and syntactic information for grammatical class, we would like to explore a relatively neglected domain of information . In particular , a large number of phonological cuesto grammatical classexist, and experimentshave repeatedly shown that speakers are sensitiveto them. For example, nouns and verbs in English differ in stress pattern, syllable number, duration , vowel characteristics, and other phonolo' gical dimensions (see Kelly , 1992, for a review) . English speakers have revealed their sensitivity to these and other correlations in a wide range of tasks. For instance, if listeners hear disyllabic pseudowords that differ in stressand are asked to use each of these words in a sentence, they will use words with first syllable stress more often as nouns and words with second syllable stressmore often as verbs (Kelly 1988b) . Another set of experiments took advantage of the fact that English words often develop uses in " other ' ' grammatical categories. Thus, police originated in English as a noun, but ' ' subsequentlydevelopeda verb use, whereas fumble originated as a verb, but later developed a noun use. Despite the frequency with which these lexical extensionsoccur, blasesagainst certain types of extensions exist (Clark and Clark 1979). Although the cited blases tend to be based on semantic and pragmatic factors, Kelly ( 1988b) speculatedthat the phonological characteristics of nouns and verbs could influence the easewith which they develop uses in the other category. In particular , if English speakers have learned the correlation between stressand grammatical class in English, then they might ' ' use this knowledge as a measureof fit betweena current noun and possible verb use and vice versa. Thus, they might consider nouns to be better verb candidates to the extent that they have the prototypical verb stress pattern. This possibility was tested by presenting one group of subjectswith pairs of disyllabic nouns that differed in stress but were control led for other factors , ' The

7 Although thesecorrelationsare well- documented . However , their originsmay seemmysterious evaluated . , explanationsfor someof thesepatternshavebeenproposedand experimentally For example , Kelly ( 1992 ) hasarguedthat threefactorsmight be involvedin the evolutionof differ phonologicalpredictorsof grammaticalclass: ( I ) Wordsfrom differentgrammaticalclasses . (2) Thesedistributionaldifferencesmay havephonological in their distributionsin sentences in the waywordsfrom various with them, whichcreatecontextualdifferences reflexesassociated . (3) Overtime, listenersviewthesecontextualeffectsas classes are pronouncedand/or perceived . This accounthasbeenappliedto the Englishnoun-verb context-freepronunciations permissible stressdifference(Kelly I 988a, 1989 ), and might be ) and duration difference( Daviset al. 1992 of other, currentlyunknownphonologicalcorrelates usedas a heuristicto predictthe existence with grammaticalclass.


such as word frequency (e.g., llama and gazelle) . Another group of subjects were presented with pairs of disyllabic verbs that differed in stress (e.g., grovel and beseech ) . None of the words had uses in the other category as determined by the most recently available Webster's Collegiate Dictionary . Subjects in the two groups were asked to select one noun (verb) from each pair and use it as a verb (noun) in a sentence. The choices were significantly affected by the stress patterns of the words, as nouns with second syllable stress were used as verbs more often than nouns with first syllable stress whereas verbs with first syllable stress were used as nouns more often than verbs with second syllable stress. These patterns are not simply a laboratory artifact . Analyses of the history of English also found the same patterns in actual grammatical category extensions down through the centuries (see Kelly , 1988b, for details) . Although such experiments demonstrate that English speakers possess implicit knowledge of the noun- verb stressdifference, and that such knowledge may even have affectedthe history of English, they do not entail that the initial identification of a word as a noun or verb is at all affected by stressor other phonological variables. That is, the subject might have recognizedthat ' ' ' ' gazelle is a noun just as easily as they recognized llama . Stressthen came into play only later as a metalinguistic variable, but did not affect initial categorization of the words. In order to determine whether stress actually affects grammatical category assignmentsearly in speech processing, Kelly and Martin ( 1993) recently conducted a noun- verb categorization task that we will summarize here. The task was straightforward : On each trial , the subjectsheard a word that they had to classify as a noun or a verb as quickly as possible. The words were disyllabic and differed in stress, with half of the nouns and half of the verbs having first syllable stress and the other half having second syllable stress. In addition to varying a phonological correlate to grammatical class, we also manipulated a semantic cue. Given that nouns generally denote concrete objects and verbs readily perceived actions, we selectedour words such that half of the nouns and half the verbs had the prototypical meanings of their class, whereas the other half denoted abstractions. It is conceivable that the phonological cue to grammatical classwould only influence grammatical category assignmentswhen the semantic cue is absent. Given that the semanticcue is universal whereasthe phonological cuesare languagespecific, one might expect the former to be more basic and perhaps completely eliminate effects of the phonological cue. The results indicated that both semantic and phonological factors affected the subjects' judgments. Nouns


and verbs were classified faster if they had meanings typical of their classes. In addition , the phonological variable of stressinteracted with grammatical classsuch that nouns were classifiedfaster if they had first syllable stressbut verbs were classified faster if they had second syllable stress. Most importantly , the phonological effects were not eliminated for words that had concrete meanings. Indeed, these effects were significantly magnified by the presenceof semantic features that convergedon the samecategorization. The effect of concretenesswas likewise magnified by the presenceof appropriate phonological features. For example, concrete nouns with first or second syllable stress were classified faster than abstract nouns with either stress pattern. However, the differencebetweenthe concrete and abstract nouns was larger for items with first syllable stress. For verbs, on the other hand, the concrete/ abstract difference was larger for items with second syllable stress. Thus, listenersappear to use a conspiracy of cues to identify the grammatical category of a word . These cues can either be language-universal, like the semanticcue to grammatical class, or language-specific, like stressin English. Finally , the language-specific cues are not overwhelmed or even damped by the language-universal factors. Instead, they mutually reinforce one another.

5. Conclusions

In this paper, we have submitted arguments and evidencefor the following claims: ( I ) Multiple sources of information are available to solve problems in perception and cognition . 2 ( ) These information sources, though plentiful in number, are often probabilistic in nature. Nonetheless, if multiple probabilistic sourcesconverge on the solution to a problem, that solution is likely to be correct. Reliance on multiple cues should therefore produce greater successthan reliance on an individual cue. 3 ( ) Given ( 1) and (2), one would expect to see widespread sensitivity to probabilistic information throughout the animal kingdom . Furthermore, since many problem domains are characterizedby probabilistic solutions, sensitivity to variables such as frequency and rate of return should be a domain-general ability . This general ability could, like memory, be involved -specificproblems that have domain- dependentcharacteristics in species . The current evidence from the human and non-human animal literature strongly supports the hypothesis concerning sensitivity to pro -


babilistic information . Its domain-independence and interactions with -specific abilities need to be heshed out in much species greater detail, however. (4) Sensitivity to multiple sources of information for solving particular problems should be widespread and domain-independent. We have reviewed some areas, such as visual depth perception, where this claim appears to be correct. Language appears to be no different from other domains in this regard as numerous studies have shown that speakersare sensitive to statistical regularities in their language, even though some of these patterns are quite subtle. Extensive research remains to be performed to determine if such knowledge is actually exploited in language acquisition, comprehension, and production . In conclusion, over the past few decades, cognitive scientists have moved away from t ~e position that general principles operate across cognitive and ' perceptual domains. Instead, research and theory ranging from cognitive development (e.g., Chi 1978, Keil 1989) to animal learning (e.g., Seligman 1970) have emphasizedthat domain- dependentprinciples might constrain the ways in which human beings gather, organize, and draw inferences from different kinds of information . This approach recognizes that organisms confront many problems whose solutions require specific kinds of information that must be manipulated in highly constrained ways. As a result, the manner in which, say, migrating birds solve their navigational problems will probably not provide us much guidance in determining how children acquire the meaningsof words in their language. However, the value of the domainspecific approach should not causeus to neglect the fact that similar types of problems are in fact encounteredacross domains, and hencedomain-general solutions might have evolved to deal with them. The inherent probabilistic nature of an animal' s environment is one such invariant , and sensitivity to probablistic patterns appears to permeate perception and cognition, even in areas like language that seemto be highly constrained by domain-dependent principles.

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Fra2ier . Makingandcorrectingerrorsduringsentence , L. andK. Rayner : Eye , 1982 comprehension movements in theanalysis of structurallyambiguous senten ~ . CognitivePsychology 14, 17S - 210. Frazier, L. andK. Rayner, 1987 . Resolutionof syntacticcategoryambiguities : Eyemovements in . Journalof Memoryand Language26, 505- 526. parsinglexicallyantbiguoussentences Gallistel, C.R., 1990 . The organizationof learning. Cambridge . , MA : MIT Press Gernsbacher . Resolving20 years of inconsistentinteractionsbetweenlexical , M.A., 1984 . Journalof Experimental : , concreteness , andpolysemy familiarityandorthography Psychology General113, 256- 281. Gleitman, L.R., H. Gleitman, B. Landauand E. Wanner, 1988 . Wherelearningbegins: Initial for languagelearning. In: F.J. Newmeyer(ed.), Linguistics : The Cambridge representations : CambridgeUniversityPress . survey, Vol. 3, 150- 193. Cambridge Gluck, M.A. and G.H. Bower, 1988 . From conditioningto categoryleaming: An adaptive networkmodel. Journalof ExperimentalPsychology : General117, 227- 247. Gould, S.J., 1991 . Bully for brontosaurus : Reflectionsin naturalhistory. New York: Norton. . The learnabilityand Gropen, J., S. Pinker, M. Hollander, R. Goldbergand R. Wilson, 1989 acquisitionof the dativealternationin English. Language65, 203- 257. Hasher,L. and R.T. Zacks, 1984 . Automaticprocessing of fundamentalinformation: Thecaseof - 1388 . AmericanPsychologist 39, 1372 . frequencyof occurrence Hintzman, D.L., 1988 . Judgmentsof frequencyand recognitionmemoryin a multiple-trace Review95, 52S-551. memorymodel. Psychological Johnston . A testof the sophisticated . Cognition , J.C., 1978 guessingtheoryof word perception 10, 123- 153. Jonides . Direct coding of frequencyof occurrence . Journal of , J. and C.M. Jones , 1992 : Learning, Memory, and Cognition18, 36S-378. ExperimentalPsychology Just, M.A. and P.A. Carpenter . A capacitytheoryof comprehension : Individualdifferences , 1992 in workingmemory. Psychological Review99, 122- 149. Keil, F.C., 1989 . Concepts . Cambridge . , kinds, and cognitivedevelopment , MA : MIT Press . Rhythmicalternationand lexicalstressdifferences in English. Cognition30, Kelly, M.H., 1988a 107- 137. . Phonologicalblasesin grammaticalcategoryshifts. Journalof Memoryand Kelly, M.H., 1988b Language27, 343- 358. . Rhythmand languagechangein English. Journalof Memoryand Language Kelly, M.H., 1989 28, 690- 710. . Using sound to solve syntactic problems : The role of phonologyin Kelly, M.H., 1992 . Psychological Review99, 349- 364. grammaticalcategoryassignments . Phonological cuesto grammatical . Unpublished class . KeUy,M.H. andS. Martin, 1993 manuscript Kimball, J., 1973 . Sevenprinciplesof surfacestructureparsingin naturallanguage . Cognition2, 15- 47. . It ' s frogsall the waydown. Cognition15, 75-93. Levy, Y., 1983 Liberman, M., 1991 . Colloquiumpresentedto the Departmentof Psychology , Universityof . Pennsylvania Lichenstein, S., P. Slovic, B. Fischoff, M. Laymanand B. Combs, 1978 . Judgedfrequencyof lethalevents . Journalofex~ rimentalPsychology : HumanLearningand Memory4, 551- 578. Lieberman . Learning. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth . , D.A., 1990 Lisker, L., 1978 . Rapidvs. rabid: A catalogueof acousticfeaturesthat maycuethe distinction. HaskinsLaboratoriesStatusReporton SpeechResearch , SR-54, 127- 132.


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. Hesitationphenomena in spontaneous . Word , 1959 Maclay, H. andC.E. Osgood Englishspeech IS, 19- 44. . The acquisitionof morphonology . Monographsof the Societyfor , B., 1978 MacWhinney Research in Child Development 43 ( 1/2), 174. . Languageprocessingand informationintegration. In: N.H. Anderson Massaro , D.W., 1991 (ed.), Contributionsto informationintegrationtheory, Vol. I : Cognition, 259- 292. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. . Intuitive physics . ScientificAmerican24, 122- 130. , M., 1983 McCloskey . Studieson thecategorization of speechby infants. Cognition Miller, J.L. and P.D. Elmas, 1983 13, 135- 165. . Someeffectsof later- occurringinformation on the Miller, J.L. and AiM . Libennan, 1979 . Perceptionand Psychophysics 25, 457- 465. perceptionof stopconsonantand semivowel : Strategiesand shortcomingsof human . Human inference Nisbett, R.E. and L. Ross, 1980 -Hall. judgment. EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: Prentice . Expectancyand stimulusfrequency :A Pang, K., F. Merkel, H. Egethand D.S. Olton, 1992 . Perceptionand Psychophysics 51, 607- 615. comparativeanalysisin rats and humans . Lemabilityand cognition. Cambridge . Pinker, S., 1989 , MA : MIT Press . Grammaticalelementsof languagein the speechof preschoolchildren. In : , M.I., 1973 Popova C.A. Ferguson , 269- 280. NewYork: , D.I. Siobin(eds.), Studiesof child language development Holt, Rinehart, &; Winston. of stimulusmaterial. Reicher . Perceptual , G.M., 1969 recognitionasa functionof meaningfulness 81, 275-280. Journalof ExperimentalPsychology -initial stop . Relativeamplitudeof aspirationnoiseasa voicingcuefor syllable Repp, B.H., 1979 . Languageand Speech22, 173- 189. consonants evidencefor . Phonetictradingrelationsand contexteffects:New experimental Repp, B.H., 1982 ' modeof perception . Psychological Bulletin92, 81- 110. a speech . Phoneticcategoryboundariesare flexible. In: S. Hamad Repp, B.H. and AiM . Libennan, 1987 : Cambridge : The groundworkof cognition, 89- 112. Cambridge (ed.), Categoricalperception . UniversityPress . Probabilityof shockin the presenceand absenceof CS in fear conditioning Rescoria , R.A., 1968 66, 1- 5. . Journalof Comparativeand Physiological Psychology W.K. . In: . inhibition of fear R.A. 1969 Conditioned Rescoria , , Honig, N.J. Mackintosh(eds.), . issuesin associative Fundamental learning. Halifax: DalhousieUniversityPress . Pavlovianconditioning: It 's not what you think it is. AmericanPsychologist Rescoria , R.A., 1988 43, 151- 160. . A theoryof Pavlovianconditioning: Variationsin the Rescoria , R.A. and AiR. Wagner, 1972 . In : A.H. Black, W.F. Prokasy(eds.), of reinforcementand nonreinforcement effectiveness 2: research and Vol. Current aassical conditioning , theory, 64-99. New York: AppletonCenturyCrofts. : Studiesin the internal structureof Rosch, E. and C.B. Mervis, 1975. Family resemblances 7 . 573 605 . categoriesCognitivePsychology, . Perception andPsychophysics . Thesubjective estimationof syllablefrequency Rubin, D.C., 1974 16, 193- 196. : A contributionbased of inflectionin child language . On the emergence Ruke-Dravina, V., 1973 on Latvian speechdata. In : C.A. Ferguson , D.I. Siobin (eds.), Studiesof child language , 252- 267. New York: Holt, Rinehart, &; Winston. development

-generalabilities M.H. Kelly, S. Martin I Domain . Exposure , S., W. Swapand RiB. Zajonc, 1973 , context, and interpersonalattraction. Saegert Journalof personalityand SocialPsychology 25, 234- 242. . On the generalityof the laws of learning. PsychologicalReview77, , M.E.P., 1970 Seligman 406- 418. Shannon . Aristotelianism , B., 1976 , Newtonianism , and the physicsof the layman. Perception5, 241- 243. . The subjectiveestimationof relativeword frequency . Journal of Verbal Shapiro, B.J., 1969 Learningand VerbalBehavior13, 638- 643. . Preferences for a verb's complements andtheir Shapiro, L.P., H.N. Nageland B.A. Levine, 1993 usein sentence . Journalof Memoryand Language32, 96- 114. processing Shedier . Availability: Plausiblebut questionable . Paper , J.K., J. Jonidesand M. Manis 1985 at the 26thannualmeetingof the Psychonomic , Boston, MA. presented Society Smith, E.E. and D. Medin, 1981 . Categories andconcepts . Cambridge , MA : HarvardUniversity Press . Trueswell and S.M. Garnsey on parsing: , J.C., M.K. Tanenhaus , in pressa. Semanticinfluences Useof thematicrole informationin syntacticambiguityresolution . Journalof Experimental : Learning, Memory, and Cognition. Psychology Trueswell and C. Kello, in pressb. Verb-specificconstraintsin sentence , J.C., M.K. Tanenhaus -paths. Journalof Experimental : Separating effectsof lexicalpreference from garden processing : and . , , PsychologyLearning Memory Cognition . Attributesof memory. Glenview Underwood . , B.J., 1983 , IL : Scott, Foresman ' Walley, A.C. and TiD. Carrell, 19.83. Onsetspectraand formant transitionsin the adult s and child' s perceptionof placeof articulationin stopconsonants . Journalof the AcousticalSociety - 1022 of America73, 1011 . -outcomerelations: The role of E.A. Wasserman and H. Shaklee . Judging response , , 1984 outcome outcome and method of informationpresentation . , , respense contingency probability Memoryand Cognition12, 276- 286. . Attitudinal effectsof mere exposure . Journal of Personalityand Social Zajonc, R.B., 1968 2 Part 2 1 28. , PsychologyMonographSupplement 9( ),

Section 3

the Categorizing

world

-Holland 92(1994 - 167 . North Lingua ) 143

Does learning

a language

require the child to reconceptualize the world ? Susan Carey Instituteof Technology , Massachusetts , 77 Massachusetts Departmentof Brain and CognitiveScience Ave., 25-406, Cambridge . MA 02139 , USA Sortslconcepts with a count/massdistinction, provide , lexicalizedascountnounsin languages ' ' criteriafor individuationandnumericalidentity. This paperexamines Quines andPiagets claims that babiesand youngchildrenlack the logicalresources to representsortalconcepts . Evidenceis marshalledagainstthe Quine/Piagetposition, in favor of a view that evenyoung infants representat least one sortal concept , physicalobject, which providesspatiotemporal criteriafor individuationand identity. Evidenceis alsoprovidedthat babiesbelow II monthsof agemay not representmore specificsortalssuchas cup, animal, bottle, or book. Rather, they theseentitiesin a waycloselyrelatedto Quine's hypothesis . mayconceptualize

1. Intr04uctio D

Many students of language acquisition and cognitive development argue that the continuity hypothesisshould be the default, to be defeatedonly in the face of extraordinary evidence (e.g., Pinker 1984, Macnamara 1982). The continuity hypothesis is that representational format is constant throughout development; that the child has innately the logical and conceptual resources to representhis or her world as do adults. The continuity hypothesis denies ' stage changesof the sort envisioned by Piaget, denies changesin the child s ' linguistic representations such as the putative semantic category/syntactic ' category shift posited some years ago. According to the continuity hypothesis , language learning is a very complex mapping process; the child must learn which syntactic devices his/ her language employs, and which of a universal set of semantic distinctions are expressedin the syntax of his/ her language. What the child need not do, on the continuity hypothesis, is construct genuinely new representationalresources. Of course, whether the continuity hypothesis is true or not is an empirical question, and to examine it , one must entertain possibilities as to what types -3841 Science B.V. All rightsreserved 0024 /94/$07.00@ 1994- Elsevier -F SSDI0024-3841(93)EOOS8

S. Carey / Reconceptualizingthe world

of discontinuities could possibly obtain in the course of development. If evidence for discontinuities is found , several further questions are then licensed, including : ( 1) by what mechanism is the change effected (e.g., maturational , learning by some other process than currently understood parametersetting or hypothesis testing methods) . (2) What is the relation betweenthe discontinuity and languagelearning? Is somechange in representational resources required as a prerequisite to some aspect of language learning? Alternatively , does language learning playa role in causing the change? ' Here I examine an important discontinuity proposal of Quine s, versions of which are endorsed by thinkers as diverse as the British empiricists and Piaget. Quine, Piaget, and others maintain that early representationsof the world are formulated over a perceptual quality space(Quine, the empiricists) ' or sensori -motor representational system (Piaget) . On both Quine s and ' Piaget s views, the baby is not capable of formulating any representations with the properties of adult concepts such as object, dog, table. ' Quine s proposal is that the ontology that underlies language is a cultural construction . ' Our conceptual firsts are middle -sized, middle distanced objects, and our introduction to them and to everything comesmidway in the ' cultural evolution of the race (Quine 1960: 5). Before the child has mastered ' this cultural construction, the child s conceptual universeconsistsof representations of histories of sporadic encounters, a scattered portion of what goes ' on. Quine speculatesas to the representationsunderlying the toddler s usesof ' ' ' ' ' ' ' the words water , red , and Mama . His first learning of the three words is uniformly a matter of learning how much of what goes on about him counts as the mother, or as red, or as water. It is not for the child to say in the first ' ' ' case, ' Hello , Mama again , in the secondcase Hello , another red thing , and ' ' in the third case, Hello , more water . They are all on a par : Hello , more ' Mama , more red, more water (Quine 1960: 92) . The child mastersthe notion of an object, and of particular kinds of objects, in the course of getting the ' ' hang of what Quine calls divided reference, and this through the processof ' ' ' mastering quantifiers and words like same. The contextual learning of these various particles goes on simultaneously, we may suppose, so that they are gradually adjusted to one another and a coherent pattern of usageis evolved ' matching that of one s elders. This is a major step in acquiring the conceptual schemethat we all know so well. For it is on achieving this step, and only ' then, that there can be any general talk of objects as such (Quine 1969: 910) . And in another place he finishes the same idea with a bootstrapping metaphor, underlining the degreeof conceptual changehe thinks is occurring :

S. Carey/ Reconceplua Ilzing lhe world

' The child scrambles up an intellectual chimney, supporting himself against each side by pressureagainst the others' (Quine 1960: 93) . Quine also states that once the child has masteredthe notion of an object, and got the trick of divided reference, he goes back and reanalyzes' Mama ' , so that it is now the name of a unique enduring person. ' Quine s view can be schematizedas follows. Imagine a portion of bottle experience that we adults would conceptualize as a single bottle. Babies respond to bottleness or bottlehood also, and can learn many things about bottlehood ; for instance, they can come to associatebottlehood with milk , or with the word ' bottle' . Now imagine a portion of bottle experiencethat we would conceptualizeas three bottles. The infant would also expect to obtain milk (indeed, more milk ) from this bottleness and could also refer to it with the word ' bottle ' . Note that shape is important to the identification of bottlehood, just as the shape of the individual grains is important for distinguishing riCefrom spaghetti from macaroni. Similary, even if Mama is a scattered portion of what goes on, shape is important for distinguishing Mama from Rover or from Papa. That shape is important for distinguishing what scattered portion of experienceconstitutes bottlehood does not mean that the baby is capable of representing' a bottle ' , ' two bottles' , or ' the same bottle I had yesterday'. Thus, demonstrations that toddlers are sensitive to shape in inductions of word meanings when new words are ostensively defined over objects (e.g., Landau, this volume) do not bear on Quine' s proposal. In this discussion I will not make contact with Quine' s radical philosophical views such as the indeterminacy of translation. I assumethat we can characterize the adult ' s onto logical commitments, that these include middle' sized physical objects, and that words such as ' table' , ' dog' and ' person , ' function as sortals in the adult lexicon, in Wiggins ( 1980) sense. Sortals refer to kinds of individuals (i.e., divide reference), providing conditions for individuation (establishing the boundaries of entities) and for numerical identity (establishing when an individuated entity is the same one as one experiencedat someother time, or in somecounterfactual world ) . One way of ' stating Quine s hypothesis, as I construe it , is that babies and toddlers represent no sortal concepts, no concepts that provide conditions of individuation and numerical identity , no concepts that divide reference. Two reviewers of this paper raised the objection that representations of shapes presuppose representations of individuals that have those shapes, ' claiming therefore that Quine s proposal (at least as construed above) is ' incoherent. This is not so. Pleasedwell on the spaghetti, macaroni case. It s

S. Carey I Reconceptualizingthe world

true that if the contrast between the two types of stuff is basedon the shape differencesof individual pieces, then some representationof those individual pieces must enter into the representation of shape. But our concepts of spaghetti and macaroni (and the words spaghetti, macaronI) do not quantify over those individuals. Similarly , we can represent the shape of a scattered portion of sand, arranged, for example, into an S, and when we refer to it as ' ' ' 'a portion or an S we are quantifying over that individual . But when we ' ' think of it as sand, we are not. Quine s proposal is that the child s conceptual/ linguistic system has only the capacity to represent the world in terms of ' concepts like furniture , sand, bottlehood. Of course the child s perceptual system must pick out individuals in order to represent shape, to determine what to grasp, and so on. This is part of what Quine meant when he claimed ' ' that the child is inherently body minded (Quine 1974) . Piaget, like Quine, believed that that baby must construct the concept of enduring objects, although he differed from Quine as to the' mechanismshe envisioned underlying this construction. Quine saw the child s mastery of the linguistic devices of noun quantification , the machinery by which natural languagessuch as English manage divided reference, as the' processthrough ' which the child s ontology comes to match his or her elders . Piaget held that the baby constructs the concept object during the course of sensori -motor development by the age of IS-months or so, and that this construction is the ' basis for the child s mastery of natural language. Since Piaget did not frame his discussion in terms of an analysis of the logic of sortals, it is not clear when he would attribute full sortals to the child. 1 ' The Quine/Piaget conjecture about the baby s representational resourcesis a serious empirical claim, and as I will show, it is difficult to bring data to ' bear on it . In what follows , I first consider Quine s views, contrasting his hypothesis that children come to represent sortals only upon 'learning the' linguistic devicesof noun quantification with what I will call the Sortal First hypothesis. The Sortal First hypothesis is that babies represent sortal concepts, that toddler lexicons include words that expresssortals, and that these representations underly the capacity for learning quantifiers rather than resulting from learning them. I then turn to early infancy, and explore the contrast betweenthe Quine/Piaget hypothesis and the Sortal First hypothesis as regards the earliest phases of word learning. A preview of my conclusions: whereas the Sortal First hypothesis is ultimately favored, evi1 For example, Piaget thought that the logical prerequisitesfor representingthe adult concepts all and someare not acquired until after age S.

S. CareyI Reconceptualizing theworld

147

denceis presentedfor a decidedly Quinian discontinuity in infant conceptual development.

's mastery Thetoddler

of

syntax

' Quine s hypothesis is that the child masters the logic of sortals through a processof adjusting the meanings of nouns and of natural language quantifiers to each other (scrambling up an intellectual chimney, the walls of which are the child ' s currently worked out representationsof the quantifiers he/ she knows). To address Quine' s conjecture experimentally, we must first know when in the child ' s life the putative scrambling is going on. Even by age 3 the child is not producing all the quantifiers that constitute the sides of Quine' s chimney. The very beginnings of the English count/ mass distinction are masteredin the months leading up to age 21/. 2. Many children age 2:0 produce nouns with no determiners or plurals, but some have begun to produce plurals and a few determiners and quantifiers (usually possessivessuch as ' ' ' ' ' ' my , plus a and the ) . Many 2-year-olds beginning to use determiners do not distribute them differently according to the noun' s count/ mass status in the adult lexicon. They still omit many determiners, and use others like ' the' and ' my' that do not differentiate count nouns and mass nouns. By 21.J2 ' virtually all children distinguish in some ways the syntactic contexts in which words like ' table' and ' dog' appear from those in which words like ' water' and ' playdoh' appear (Gordon 1985, Sola et al. 1991) . Gordon ( 1982) showed that between 21/. 2 and 3 years of age the distinction becomes marked in ' syntax, as the child s speechabruptly comes to reflect the arbitrary rule that detenniners are obligatory for singular count nouns, but not for mass nouns ' ' ' .' (that is, one can say I like juice , but not 1 like dog ) . The developmentalfacts summarizedabove determine the relevant agesfor an empirical test of Quine' s speculations. Data bearing against Quine' s claims could be of several types: e.g., data showing children age 2 or under take proper nouns to refer to individuals of a kind or that they take count nouns to refer to kinds of individuals. But, as already mentioned, the trick is ' ' ' figuring out how we can know whether toddlers Mama refers to entities ' ' they conceptualize as individuals or whether their bottle divides reference, referring to each individual of a certain kind , as opposed to bott/ehood. Another type of evidencecould be relevant. If it can be shown that upon first learning ' a' or the plural ' -s' , toddlers interpret them correctly, as signalling an individuated entity of a kind or a plurality of individuals of a

148

theworld S. CareyI Reconceptualizing

kind , respectively, this would tell against Quine. This is becausetheseare the first relevant quantifiers the child learns. If he or she interprets them correctly from the beginning, the interpretation could not have been acquired through an adjustment process involving the entire set of quantificational devices of noun syntax. This last point is important . In the beginnings of language ' learning, on Quine s view, children will not interpret those few quantifiers in their lexicons as adults do. The scramble will have just begun. Data showing ' that children use ' a' and plurals will not be itself relevant to Quine s hypothesis; it must be shown that such quantificational devicesare doing the samework as they do in the adult language.

3. The composition of the toddler lexicon

' A large proportion of the baby s first words are words for middle-sized ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' physical objects, such as bottle , book , dog , cup , and banana . But that babies have words in their lexicons that refer to object kinds in the adult lexicon tells us nothing of what these words mean to the babies. Many have argued that the earliest words are often complexive (e.g., Bowerman 1978, Dromi 1987, Vygotsky 1962). That is, children appear to extend words to new referentson the basisof any of the salient perceptualproperties of the original experiencesin which the word was heard. These complexive uses often cut ' ' across what are for adults distinct ontological categories, as when paper apparently refers to the act of cutting, the act of drawing, to pens and pencils and to paper (Dromi 1987). If such complexive uses reflect unconstrained (from the point of view of adult lexical categories) projection of word ' meanings, Quine s views receivesupport . But it is important to seethat such ' complexive usesare not necessaryfor Quine s conjecture to be correct. Indeed, others deny that toddlers construct complexive meanings; Huttenlocher and Smiley, 1987, for example, presentevidencethat from the beginning ' ' babiesuseeach word for middle-sizedobjects appropriately: bottle to refer to bottles, ' book' to books, and so on. But even if Huttenlocher and Smiley are ' right , this fact .does not disconfirm Quine s conjecture. In fact, Quine presupposes that the baby usesthe words in contexts adults would. His point is that, ' evenso, the baby might not be individuating the words referentsas we do. The baby could refer only to what we conceptualize as bottles when she uses ' bottle' but could be , referring to bottlehoods. She could be using the word to refer to a scattered portion of what goes on, determined by perceptual ' ' similarity to the portions of her experiencewhen adults use bottle .

S. Carey I Reconceptua/izing the world

4. Toddler se. itivity to noun syntax

Children as young as 17 months (at least girls that young) are sensitive to the syntactic context in which a new noun is heard in their projection of noun meaning (Katz et al. 1974, Macnamara 1982) . Specifically, if ostensively taught a new word in a count noun context, referring to an unfamiliar doll . ( See this. This is a dax. Can you touch the dax? Can you put the dax on ' your head ... ), they assumethat other dolls of the sametype are also daxes. But if taught in a proper noun context (.Seethis. This is Dax. Can you touch Dax. Can you put Dax on your head ...' ), they assumethat other dolls of the sametype are not Dax , reserving ' Dax ' for the original doll only . Do thesedata establish that young children distinguish kinds from individuals , and use count nouns to achieve divided reference? Certainly not. They do establish that toddlers are sensitive to the syntactic distinction between nouns following determiners and those not following determiners, but this distinction could be signalling a different semantic distinction than that between individuals and kinds. For a sample Quinian interpretation : babies ' ' ' ' could take nouns without determiners such as ' Dax , ' Rover , and Joan , to refer to portions of experiencedefined by a stricter similarity metric than that referred to by nouns with determiners. Supposea Quinian baby, Alice , has a ' ' ' ' brother whom she hears called both Rupert and a boy . Supposealso that she relies on shape to determine Rupertness and boyness. She could have ' ' learned from others' usage of the words that to be called Rupert , a given portion of experiencemust be very similar in shapeto the original portions of ' ' experienceto which the term was heard to refer, whereasto be called a boy , ' .the boy , something need look only somewhat like the original referent. A ' ' ' ' generalization of this pattern of distinction , across Alice and a baby , ' and so on could .Rover' and ' a , , underly the patterns of projection dog , found by Katz et al., 1974, and subsequentreplications. This interpretation of the Katz et al. data attributes to the baby a different ' ' ' ' ' ' meaning for a from the adult as well as different meaningsfor bottle , boy , ' ' . Rupert . This is, of course, Quine s position . On his view, it is only in the course of learning other quantifiers, plural markers, and so on, and adjusting to all the contrasts in usage they mark (the process of scrambling up the ' ' intellectual chimney cited above) that the baby works out the meaning of a , ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' . ' .the another some more all , , many , same,2 etc. , , , 2 Bloom. personal communication, provides the following argument against the Quinian ' interpretation of the Katz et al. data. Among children s very first words are some pronouns (e.g.,

In several studies, my colleaguesand I have attempted to addressQuine' s ' proposal by comparing children s representations of solid physical objects, such as cups, with their representationsof non-solid substances , such as sand . is since adults or gels or creams Our idea that conceptualize the former as kinds of individuals (i .e., in terms of sortals that divide reference), but do not conceptualize the latter in this way, we might be able to find evidence that infants and toddlers respect the quantificational distinction between the two as well. In the first studies, Sola et al. ( 1991) compared 2-year-olds' projection of newly learned :words ostensively defined by reference either to novel solid physical objects (e.g., a brass plumbing T) or novel non-solid substances(e.g., a hair-settin$ gel with grapenuts embeddedin it ) . The objects were made of unfamiliar materials and the non-solid substanceswere presentedformed.into distinctive novel shapes. The child was introduced to the novel entity and ' ' ' ' provided a word for it (e.g. blicket for a novel object; stad for a novel nonsolid substance). The child was then presented two new sets of stimuli and asked to give the experimenter the blicket or the stad. For each object trial , the choicesconsistedof another object of the same shapemade of a different material (e.g., a plastic plumbing T) or three small pieces of the original material (brass) . For each substance trial , the choices consisted of a new substanceformed into the original shape, or three small piecesof the original substance. Figure I shows the design for one trial of each type. There were four object trials and four non-solid substancetrials. Of course, which words were assigned to which entities varied across subjects, but for expository ' ' ' ' clarity I will use blicket as my sample object name and stad as my sample non-solid substancename. ' ' ' he' ' it ' and thesearetreatedfrom theonsetas , ) belongingto the samecategoryas Rupert and ' ' not as dog . Childrendo not usethemwith determinersor modifiers(Bloom 1990 ). The adultlike , denote analysisworks well in accountingfor this finding; pronouns, like proper names individuals. But the Quiniananalysisfails, sincea far broaderrangeof referentsare called' it ' or ' he' than are called'dog' . I agreewith this argument, as I rejectthe Quinian proposalin . However, Quinecould reply that the child hastwo setsof favor of the Sortal First hypothesis words: wordslike ' dog' and wordslike ' Rupert', and a few singularitieslike ' he' , eachtagged with someof the syntacticcontextsin which they appearand eachtaggedwith prototypical . Comingto recognizethat the syntactic referentsand a similarity metric that determinesusage contextsin which ' he' appearsare the sameas those for ' Rupert' might be part of the . scramblingprocess

S. Carey /

the world 8U~ dCEftW .

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' Sola et al. carried out two analysesto assesswhether children s representations of the referents of the words were influenced by the status of their knowledge of count/ mass syntax. First , they collected production data and assignedeach child a value corresponding to the degreeto which count nouns and mass nouns appeared in selective syntactic frames (e.g., ' a NO U N ' , ' NO UNs ! ' ' too much NO U N ' . Scores ran from 0 to near 1.0. Second , they ) introduced the new words in two different ways. In the neutral syntax condition , no syntactic information as to the count/ mass status of the word was provided ; the words were introduced as ' my blicket , my stad' and ' ' subsequentlyappearedin the context the blicket , the stad . In the informative ' ' syntax condition , the words were introduced as a blicket , some stad , and ' further differentiated syntactically, e.g. another blicket , some more stad' . As figure 2 shows, children at age 2:0 and 2:6 used different basesfor their projection or words for the two different types of entities. They projected ' biicket' to the other whole object the sameshapeas the original referent and ' stad' to the scattered portion of substancethe same texture they projected and color as the original referent. For object trials , children were sensitive to matchesin shapeand number; for non-solid substancetrials , children ignored matchesin shapeand number. Performancewas more adult-like on the object trials, but performance on both types of trials was better than chanceat both ages. Also apparent on figure 2, the syntactic context made no difference. The children were no more likely to interpret ' blicket' as the word for a kind of individual when it was heard in a count noun context. Similarly , hearing

S. Carey / Reconceptualizingthe world % choicesmatchingreferentin shapeandnumber

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' stad' in a massnoun context made them no more likely to conceptualizestad as a substancethat can appear either in scatteredor singly bounded portions . Further , the child ' s productive control of count/ masssyntax did not influence the pattern of projection : children with differentiation scoresof 0 showed the samepattern as those with differentiation scoresclose to 1. ' We can conclude from these results that an entity s status as a solid physical object (or not ) influences which of its properties are salient in determining what other entities are referred to by the sameword. We can also conclude that this distinction between objects and non-solid substances predates mastery of count/ mass syntax. These data are consistent with the ' ' ' Sortal First hypothesis, for they are consistent with the child s taking blicket ' ' to refer to each individual whole object of a kind , and stad to refer to a kind of substance, conceptualized as a non-individuated entity . But the data are ' also consistent with the following more Quinian interpretation of the child s representationsof the blicket and the stad. ' Babies, being ' body-minded (Quine 1974) could be sensitiveto the perceptual experiencesthat determine objecthood: boundedness, rigidity , coherence through motion . Whenever theseare detected, they could heavily weight such . Shape would features as shape in their representation of these experiences

S. CareyI Reconceptua/;zing the world

thus be a salient feature of the blicket , but not of the stad, for non-solid substancesdo not maintain their shapeswhen manipulated. For non-solid substances , properties such as texture and color might be salient, for these constant over experienceswith substances . In other words, the two -yearstay old could be using ' blicket' to refer to blicketness, and recognize blicketness by shape. The differential patterns of projection do not establish that the toddler is using ' blicket ' to refer to any individual whole object of a certain kind , that the toddler divides the referenceof ' blicket ' . One detail of the data from figure 2 favors the Sortal First over the Quinian interpretation, and that is that toddlers performed more like adults on the object trials than on the substancetrials. Quine' s interpretation of this would have to be ad hoc, perhaps that the baby has had more object experiencethan substanceexperience. But the Sortal First hypothesispredicts this asymmetry. To seethis, supposethe Sortal First hypothesis is true, and ' ' suppose that upon first hearing the word blicket the child assumesthat it refers to each individual object of a certain kind . The choicesfor testing how the child projects ' blicket ' included another si.ngle object, and 3 small objects. Even if the child isn' t exactly sure of which features of the blicket establish its kind , the child can rule out that the 3 small objects are a blicket , for under no interpretation can they be an individual object of the same kind as the original referent. Children should then be at ceiling on the object trials , which ' ' they are. .The substancetrials are another story. If upon first hearing stad , the child takes it to refer to the kind of substanceof the original referent, then scatteredportions have no different status from unitary portions . There is no clue from number of piles which of the choices on the test trials is the stad. If children are not certain what properties of the original sample of stad determine the kind stad, they might do worse on the stad trials. And indeed, they do. The key issue here is the role of number in determining how to project ' blicket' . If the Quinian interpretation of the data is correct, the baby should ' blicket' on the basis of project shapesimilarity , no matter whether the choice that does not match in shapeconsists of one object or three objects. That is, the baby should succeedon an object trial as on figure 3 as well as on an object trial as in figure 1. The Sortal First interpretation predicts that performance on the object trials will fall to the level of performance on the substancetrials if the cue from number is removed (figure 3) . In an object trial such as that on figure 3, ' blicket' is ostensivelydefined as before, but the choicesfor projection are changed: another blicket of a different material (as before) and another whole object of . a different kind made of the same

S. Carey / Reconceptualizingthe world NAMBO B' nMULV8:

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trialin Sola(1987 ). Fig. 3. Object material as the original referent (instead of the three small objects) . Now the child has no clues from number of objects as to which is the correct choice. Performanceshould fall to the level of the substancetrials , and indeed, this is what happens(Sola 1987) . Apparently , the child uses the information provided by number on the object trials , but not on the substancetrials. We take this as evidencethat the child conceptualizessomeentities as individuals (such as kinds of objects) and conceptualizesother entities as non-individuated (such as kinds of substances ) . These distinct ways of conceptualizing objects and substancespredates ' ' mastery of count/ masssyntax. Toddlers do not merely project blicketness on the basis of shapeof individual piecesof blicketness, as we determine whether somepasta is spaghetti on the basis of the shapeof individual pieces. Instead, ' ' the pattern of projection suggeststoddlers divide referenceof blicket , and take it to refer to any individual of a certain kind .

' ' ' ' ' 6. Toddlers understand i Dgof 8 , someNOUN_ I take the data reviewed in the previous section to show that by age 2:0 children take ' blicket ' to refer to individual objects of a certain kind and ' stad' to refer to non-solid substancesof a kind and that the toddlers' , representationsof blickets and stads have the same quantificational structure ' ' as would adults . ' Blicket is a sortal term. These data disconfirm Quine only on the assumption that the baby did not acquire these representationsfrom

S. Carey / Reconceplualizinglhe world

learning English noun quantifiers. This assumption seemswarranted, given that as a whole toddlers at 2:0 do not produce quantifiers, and given that the pattern of projection was independent of whether the individual subjects produced any noun quantifiers selective for count nouns. A worry , though , is that babies may have better comprehension than production of the quantifiers. We attempted to address that possibility by manipulating the syntactic context in which the word appeared. As mentioned above, the syntactic environment in which the new word appeared had no effect in Sola et alis experiments, even at age 2!j2 when many children did produce quantifiers differentially for what are count and mass nouns in the adult lexicon. The Quinian interpretation of this fact is that quantifiers like ' a' , ' another' , ' some NOUN _ ' , ' some more NOUN _ ' do not yet signal the distinction between individuated and nonindividuated entities, just as the child is not projecting ' blicket' and ' stad' on the basis of that distinction . The Sortal First interpretation : objects are naturally construed as individuals of a kind and non-solid substances are naturally construed as non-individuated entities, even by toddlers, as shown by performance in the neutral syntax condition . Informative ' syntax merely reinforces the child s natural construal of the two types of entities. A study by Sola ( 1992) decided betweenthesetwo interpretations, and also establishedthat our production data did not underestimatetoddlers' interpretation of the quantifiers. Sola taught toddlers words for the objects and substancesin a new condition : contrastive syntax. ' Blicket' was introduced in a mass noun context ; ' stad' in count noun context. That is, when shown a novel solid object, the child was told , ' Here' s some blicket ... Would you like to seesome more blicket?' And when shown a non-solid substancefashioned into a distinctive shape, the child was told , ' Here' s a stad ... Would you like to seeanother stad?' As can be seen from figure 4, at both ages 2 and 2!j2' the pattern of projection was markedly different from that seenin the neutral and informative syntax conditions (figure 2) . At both ages, the syntactic context ' some NOUN _ ' , ' some more NOUN _ ' made children slightly less ' ' likely to construe blicket as referring to an individual whole object of a kind . There was a slight tendency towards interpreting it to mean something like brass. The syntactic context ' a stad' made children significantly less likely to construe the non-solid substance as a non-idividuated entity . Rather, they interpreted the word as meaning something like s-shapedpi /e. Wait , you might say, doesn' t this show that children at theseagesdo know the force of ' a' , ' another' , and so might have learned to represent sortal


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concepts in conjunction with bootstrapping the meaning of the quantifiers? No , becauseof one further aspectof the data. At the younger age, sensitivity to conflicting syntax was shown solely by those children who had differentiated count and mass nouns in their production . Those whose differentiation scoreswere low performed just as did toddlers in the informative and neutral conditions, projecting ' blicket' to the other object of the same kind as the ' ' original referent and stad to the other substanceof the same kind as the ' ' original referent. This shows that the interpretation of blicket as a sortal ' ' ' ' predateslearning the meaning of a , another , and presumably underlies the latter achievement, as predicted by the Sortal First hypothesis. ' ' These data tap the very moment children first learn the meaning of a . 's They have only begun the scramble up Quine chimney, and have not had ' ' time to adjust their interpretation of ' a' to many other quantifiers. Yet , a signals an individuated entity of some kind . Together these data provide converging support for the Sortal First hypothesis. The child naturally

S. CareyI Reconceptualizing the world

157

construes physical objects as individuals in distinct kinds , and naturally construes non - solid substances in terms of kind of non - individuated entities . These natural construals support adult - like projection of word meaning (figure 2), and support adult - like interpretation of newly learned quantifiers ' ' ' ' like a , some and plurals .

YGungerinfants ' Altogether the data support the Sortal First hypothesis over Quine s conjecture, but they do not establish when the child first begins to represent sortal concepts. As noted earlier , it is not clear when Piaget would attribute sortal concepts to children , but it is certain that he would deny them to young infants . The argument I have developed so far does not bear on Piaget' s claims about the representational capacities of infants , as it concerns children age 24 months and older . Of course, a demonstration that young infants represent sortal concepts would defeat ' ' ' Quine s conjecture as well as Piaget s characterization of the infants conceptual resources. Studies by Cohen and his colleagues(e.g., Cohen and Younger 1983) show that quite young babies will habituate when shown, for example, a seriesof distinct stuffed dogs, and that they generalize habituation to a new stuffed dog and will dishabituate when shown a stuffed elephant. Similarly , when shown a seriesof distinct stuffed animals, babies of 8 or 9 months habituate, generalize habituation to a new stuffed animal, but dishabituate to a toy truck. Do thesedata not show that babies of that age representconceptssuch as ' dog' and ' animal?' Certainly not. Babies may be sensitive to dog shapes or animal shapes; babies may be habituating to doghood or animalhood. To credit the baby with sortals such as ' dog' , or ' animal' , we must show that such concepts provide the baby with criteria for individuation and identity . My discussion of this question has two steps. First , I argue that babies represent at least one sortal , object. Second, I present some recent data from my lab that suggest that as late as 10 months of age, the baby may have no more specific sortal concepts - not cup, bottle, truck , dog, animal .... Thus, a Quinian interpretation of the above habituation data may well be correct.


8. Principles of individuation : Yo UDger infants

' ' Piaget s characterization of infants cognitive capacitieswas basedon tasks in which the baby must solve some problem, often involving means- end ' analysis, and often involving planning some action. For example, Piaget s conclusions that babies do not represent objects as continuing to exist when out of view were basedon the robust finding that babies under 8 or 9 months ' cannot remove a cover to get a hidden object. The babies failure might be due to their failure to realize the object still exists, as Piaget thought , or equally might be due to their inability to carry out one action (remove a cover) to achievesome other goal (obtain the object). What is neededis some reflection of the baby' s conceptualization of the world that relies on behaviors well within the repertoires even of neonates. Over the past 15 years or so, such a method has been developed and is now very widely used. It relies on babies' ability to control what they attend to. The basic idea is simple. Under most circumstancesbabies will look longer at what is unfamiliar or unexpectedcompared to what is familiar or expected. Researchersuse this fact to diagnosehow the baby representssome situation , especiallywhat the baby considers surprising given his or her current state of physical knowledge. The selectivelooking paradigm has been usedextensively to probe babies' representations of objects, and the data from a subset of thesestudies can be recruited to bear on the question at hand. They establish that by four months of age the baby representsat least one sortal concept the concept of a physical object. The baby has criteria for individuation and for numerical identity of objects. Spelke and her colleagueshave shown that babies establish representations of objects on the basis of criteria which individuate them - an object is a coherent, bounded, entity that maintains its coherenceand boundaries as it moves through space(seeSpelke, 1990, for a review) . The baby predicts the motion of objects according to principles such as that one object cannot pass through the spaceoccupied by another (Spelke et al. 1992, BaillargeoD 1990) . Most relevant to the present discussionare studies showing that babies count objects. These are of two types. In the first , babies are simply presentedwith arrays containing a fixed number of objects, say 2 of them, one after another. For example, two cups, followed by two shoes, two bottles, two hats, two pens, and so on. The pairs of objects are never repeated, so the arrays have nothing ' in common but twoness. The baby s looking is monitored , and after a while, ' s attention to each new the baby , relative to his or her array decreases


original looking time. The baby is getting bored. After looking time has decreased to Y2 its original level, the baby is presented with an array containing one object, or three objects. In both cases, looking time recovers to its original level. The baby notices the difference between two objects, on the one hand, and a single object or three objects, on the other. This result, or one very like it , has been obtained with neonates(Antell and Keating 1983) . In fact, the baby' s capacity to detect similarity in number across distinct arrays serves a methodological wedge into the problem of how babies individuate objects. The baby can be habituated as described above, to two objects, and then presented with an array as in figure 5, consisting of two distinct objects sharing a common boundary. Babies dishabituate to this array, showing that they perceiveit as one object, rather than two. Thesedata support the conclusion, derived from other types of data as well, that babies are not sensitive to shape or texture regularity in individuating objects; they needpositive evidenceof distinct boundaries, such as one object moving with ' respectto the other, or the objects being separatedin space.

..:..~ .111 ,.:~ ;1 ~ : 111111 . ~

Fig. 5. Test~timulu ~ of two adjacentblocksof different size, texture and color .

A second source of evidence that babies count objects derives from data showing that babies can add and subtract. Wynn ( 1992) showed four -month olds events in which a secondobject was added to an array already containing one object. An object was placed on an empty stage while the baby watched and then a screen was raised that covered the object. A hand carrying a second object was shown going behind the screen and returning empty. The screenwas then lowered, revealing either one object (unexpected outcome, even though that was what the baby had last seen) or two objects (expectedoutcome, if the baby knows I + I = 2) . Babies looked longer at the unexpectedoutcome. A further experiment showed that babies expected exactly two objects, rather than simply more than one object. In this study, the expectedoutcome was two objects, as before, but the unexpected outcome was three objects. Again , babies were bored at seeing two there, and looked longer at the

S. Carey / Reconceptualizingthe world

unexpectedoutcome of three objects. Experiments of the same sort demonstrated that babies expected3 - I to be 2, and 2 - I to be I . Whereas these studies were performed to explore the baby' s concept of number, they bear on our question as well. Babies, like anybody, cannot count unlessthey have criteria that establishindividuals to count. Babiesclearly have criteria that establishsmall physical objects as countable individuals.

That babies individuate and count objects does not show that they trace identity of objectsthrough time, that they have the representationalcapacity to distinguishone object seenon different occasionsfrom two numerically distinct similar objects. However, there are now two demonstrationsof but physically ' this capacity in infants age 4 months or younger. Spelke( 1988) showedbabies , screenA to objectsmoving behind and r~ erging from two separatedscreens the left of screenB (figure 6). An object emergedto the left of screenA and returned behind it, and then an object emergedto the right of screenBand returned behind it. At any given time, at most one object was visible, and no object ever appeared in the space between screensA and B. Under these conditions, 4-month- olds inferred there must be two objects, as shown by the fact .that when the screenswere removed, revealing two objects (expected outcome), they looked less than when the screenswere removed revealingone object (unexpectedoutcome). Baillargeon ( 1990) showedinfants two objects at once, one on either side of a screen. The babiesthen used the existenceof two numericallydistinct objectsto make senseof what would be an impossibleevent if only one object were involved. Togetherthesestudiesshow that babiesusetwo spatiotemporalprinciples to individuate and trace identity of objects: one object cannot be in two placesat the same time, and one object cannot go from one p}a(' e to another without tracing a spatiotemporallycontinuous path. In sum, infants have a concept physical object that functions as a sortal ; they have at least one concept that divides reference, that provides criteria for individuation and numerical identity . These criteria are spatiotemporal.

differencebetweenyounginfantsandadults 10. A majorconceptual Adults also look longer at the unexpected events in the experiments described above. Further , they ask how the magic tricks are done. This is

S. CareyI Reconceplualizing lhe world DiscontinuousCondition

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becauseadults use spatiotemporal information in just the sameway as do the infants. But adults use other types of information in establishing individuals and tracing their identity through time: property information and membership in kinds more specific than physical object. We use property information - if we see a large red cup on a window still , and later a small green cup there, we infer that two numerically distinct cups are involved, even though we have no spatiotemporal evidenceto that effect. And , as philosophers point out , our identity judgements are relative to sortals more specific than object (Wiggins 1980, Hirsch 1982, Macnamara 1986) . Imagine a junk car, consigned to the crusher. The process of crushing is a spatiotemporally continuous ' , gradual process. Any changes in the car s properties are also continuous ; it changesshapecontinuously, for example. Yet we say that at a certain point the car goes out of existence, and is replaced by a lump of metal and plastic. We trace identity relative to kinds more specific than object, kinds

S. Carey I Reconceplualizingthe world

such as car, person, tab/e. Such concepts (sortals), typically lexicalized as count nouns in languages that have a count / mass distinction , provide additional criteria for individuation and identity to the spatiotemporal criteria that apply to bounded physical objects in general, and to the general ' assumption that an object s properties stay stable over time, or change continuously. When a person, Joe Shmoe, dies, Joe ceasesto exist, even ' though Joe s body still exists. The sortal person provides the criteria for ' ' identity of the entity referred to by the name Joe Shmoe . In collaboration with Fei Xu , I have been exploring the question of whether babies represent any sortals more specific than object, or whether babies can use property/ kind information to individuate and trace identity of objects ( Xu and Carey 1993) . Consider the events depicted in figure 7. An adult witnessing a truck emerge from behind and then reenter a screen and then witnessing an elephant emerge from behind and then reenter the screen would infer that there are at least two objects behind the screen: a truck and an elephant. The adult would make this inference in the absence of any spatiotempotal evidence for two distinct objects, not having seen two at once nor any suggestion of a discontinuous path through space and time. Adults trace ' ' ' ' identity relative to sortals such as truck and elephant and know that trucks do not turn into elephants. Xu and Carey ( 1993) have carried out four experiments based on this design. Ten-month -old babies were shown screensfrom which two objects of different kinds (e.g., a cup and a toy elephant, a ball and a truck ) emerged from opposite sides, one at a time. Each object was shown a total of four times. After this familiarization , the screenwas removed, revealing either two objects (expected outcome) or one object (unexpected outcome). In all four studies, babies looked longer at the expectedoutcome. They could not use the difference between a cup and an elephant to infer that there must be two objects behind the screen. Another group of IO-month -olds was run in a parallel version of this study basedon Spelke's design (figure 6) . That is, babies were shown two identical objects emerging from the two screensa total of four times each, and the timing of the eventswas the samein the one screen/two kinds studies. Babies succeeded , looking longer at the unexpectedoutcome of one object. Apparently , babiescan use spatiotemporal information to individuate objects before they can use kind information . We have ruled out severaluninteresting interpretations of the failure in the property/ kind conditions of these studies. For example, it is not that babies

S. Carey I Reconceplualizillgthe world Different

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Object 2 returned

do not notice the difference between the two objects. In one version of the study, babies were allowed to handle each object (one at a time of course, for we didn ' t want to provide spatial information that there were two ) before beginning the events. This made no difference to the results. In another, we compared looking time to the familiarization events when the objects are of different kinds (e.g., a cup and an elephant) to looking times during familiari zation in a condition where the objects emerging from each side of the screen are of the same kind (e.g., two elephants) . Babies habituated much faster in the latter condition . That is, they noticed that the elephant and the cup are different from each other. After habituation, we removed the screen, revealing either one object or two objects. Babies in both conditions (cup/elephant; elephant/ elephant) looked longer at the outcomes of two objects (unexpected in the elephant/ elephant condition ; expected in the elephant/ cup condition ) . The preference for two objects was equal in the two conditions. Thus, although babies notice the difference between the elephant and the cup, they


simply do not use this information to drive the inference that there must be two numerically distinct objects behind the screen. In appears, then, that in one senseQuine was right . Very young infants have not yet constructed concepts that serve as adult -like meanings of works like ' bottle ' , ' ball ' , and ' dog' . How are the babies representing these events? We can think of two possibilities. First , the babies may actually establish a representation of a single individual object (O BJECTi ) moving back and forth behind the screen, attributing to this object the properties of being yellow and duck-shaped at some times and white and spherical at other times. The basis for such a representation could be spatiotemporal : the infants may take the oscillating motion as a single, continuous , path . A second possibility is that the baby is making no commitment at all concerning whether the objects emerging to the left and right of the screen are the same or different. That is, the baby is representing the event as OBJECT emerging from the left of the screen, followed by OBJECT emerging from the right of the screen, and represents these neither as a single object (O BJECTi ) nor as distinct objects (O BJECTi , O B JECTj ) . Supposeyou seea leaf on the sidewalk as you walk to class, and you seea leaf on roughly the same place on the sidewalk as you return from class. That may be the same leaf or it may not ; your conceptual system is capable of drawing that distinction , but you leave the question open. If the infant is leaving the issue open in this case, then why does he/ she appear surprised when the screens are removed and two objects are revealed? On this hypothesis, the longer looking time at two objects is a familiarity effect; the infant has been familiarized with instances of single objects, and thus seeing ' ' two objects is different . After all , babies can be habituated to oneness by being shown a series of objects, one at a time. Even if you were not sure whether that leaf was the same as the one you had seen earlier , if you returned to the classroom later in the day and encountered two leaves on the sidewalk, you would see this state of affairs as different from ones in which you encountered casesof single leaves on the sidewalk. We do not know which possibility is correct. The baby actually may be representing the events as if a duck-shaped object is turning into a ball shaped object (possibility one) or simply may be failing to establish representation of two distinct objects (possibility two ) . The take-home message is the samewhichever possibility is correct ; IO-month -old infants do not use the property/ kind differences between a red metal truck and a gray rubber elephant to infer that there must be two numerically distinct objects involved in the event.

S. Carey/ Reconceptualizing the world

At II months , about half of the babies we test succeed at our task. When babies do succeed, are they doing so on the basis of kind information or property information ? That is, are they representing the events as do adults , as involving a duck and a ball , or are they individuating the objects on the basis of property differences? Further experiments could bear on this question . For example, habituation studies show babies to be sensitive to color changes and size changes, but color and size are not the types of properties that signal kind differences, at least in the adult conceptual system. Would babies of the age succeeding at this task be as likely to infer two objects when shown a blue and red cup, or a big and small cup , emerging from either side of the screen, as when shown a blue cup and a blue elephant of equal sizes emerging from either side of the screen? A difference in success rate favoring the latter pair would be suggestivethat babies, just like adults , come to represent kinds of objects, and individuate objects relative to kinds . These experiments together would provide information about the developmental course of this repres ~ntational capacity . It is significant that babies begin to comprehend and produce object names at about 10 to 12 months of age, the age at which they begin to use the differences between cups and elephants to individuate objects. Again, this pattern of results is consistentwith the Sortal First hypothesis. That is, babies do not seemto learn words for bottlehood ; they begin to learn words such as ' bottle' just when they show evidencefor sortal concepts such as bottle which provide conditions for individuation and numerical identity . Current studies in our lab are exploring the relations between specific words understood and successat individuation basedon the kinds expressedby those words. It is not surprising that babies use spatiotemporal information before kind information to individuate and trace the identity of objects. All physical objects trace spatiotemporally continuous paths; no physical object can be in two placesat the same time. However, what property changesare possible in a persisting object depends upon the kind . An apparent change of relative location of the handle to the body of a ceramic cup signifies a different cup; an apparent change of relative location of a hand to the body of a person does not signify a different person. In sum, these data suggest that babies have at least one sortal concept innately - physical object. Their object concept provides spatiotemporal conditions for individuation and numerical identity . They can use spatiotemporal information to identify individuals in their environment, and can then learn more specific sortals for kinds of theseobjects. Exactly how this is

166

S. Carey uaJizing theworld I Reconcept

is the big question, of course. The presentdata suggeststhat accomplished most of their first yearof life on this accomplishment . they spend II . A few

eRne ' odin! remarks

Where does this leave us vis-a-vis the continuity assumption? The major discontinuity posited by Quine and Piaget does not receive support; there is no reason to think that babies lack the logical resourcesto representsortals, and indeed, object functions as a sortal at least from 4 months on. But if the interpretation of the Xu and Carey data suggestedabove is correct, then an important Quinian discontinuity is supported. Babies may be setting up a representation of an object which sometimesis round , white, and styrofoam and at other times red, metal, and truck -shaped. This is a representational systemvery different from yours and mine. My story is not complete. I do not know if Xu and I are interpreting our data correctly. Also , we have as yet no account of the mechanism by which babies might begin to acquire specific sortals at around 11 months. But as I am convinced important conceptual changes occur later in life (cf. Carey 1991, Carey and Spelke, in press), I would not be shocked to find interesting discontinuities in the conceptual histories of infants, even in arenasso closely implicated in languageas the conceptual underpinnings of count nouns.

References Antell , S. and DiP. Keating, 1983. Perception of numerical invariance in neonates. Child Development 54, 695- 701. ' Baillargeon, R., 1990. Young infants physical knowledge. Paper presented at the American PsychologicalAssociation Convention, Boston. Bloom, P., 1990. Syntactic distinctions. Child Language 17, 343- 355. Bowerman, M ., 1978. The acquisition of word meaning: An investigation into some current

conflicts. In: N. Waterson . New York: . C. Snow (eds.). Developmentof communication Wiley. . Knowledgeacquisition: Enrichmentor conceptualchange ? In: S. Carey. Carey. S.. 1991 R. Gelman(eds.). The epigenesis of mind: Essaysin biology and cognition. Hillsdale. NJ: Erlbaum. . Domain specificknowledgeand conceptualchange . In: L. . in press Carey. S. and E. Spelke Hirschfeld. S. Gelman(eds.). Cultural knowledgeand domain specificity . Cambridge . UK : . CambridgeUniversityPress . Perceptual Cohen. L.B. and B.A. Younger. 1983 in theinfant. In: E.K. Scholnick categorization . 197-200. Hillsdale. NJ: Erlbaum. (ed.). New trendsin conceptualrepresentation

ua/izint. the world S. CareyI Reconcept . . Early lexicaldevelopment . London: CambridgeUniversityPress Dromi, E., 1987 . Theacquisitionof syntacticcategories : Thecaseof thecount/massdistinction. Gordon, P., 1982 Instituteof T~ hnology, Cambridge , Massachusetts , MA. Unpublisheddoctoraldissertation . Evaluatingthe semanticcategorieshypothesis : The caseof the count/mass Gordon, P., 1985 distinction. Cognition20, 209-242. . Hirsch, E., 1982 . The conceptof identity. New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress . Cognitive . Earlyword meanings : Thecaseofobj ~ t names Huttenlocher , J. and P. Smiley, 1987 . 19 63 89 , Psychology . What's in a name? A studyof how childrenlearn Katz, N., E. Bakerand J. Macnamara , 1974 . Child Development 45, 469- 473. commonand propernames . Namesfor things: A study of humanlearning. Cambridge Macnamara , MA : MIT , J., 1982 Press . . Macnamara . A borderdispute. Cambridge , J., 1986 , MA : MIT Press . Cambridge Pinker, S., 1984 . Languageleamabilityand languagedevelopment , MA : Harvard . UniversityPress . . Word and object. Cambridge , MA : MIT Press Quine, W.V.O., 1960 W. V . . New York: ColumbiaUniversity .0 . 1969 Onto and other , , Quine essays logicalrelativity . Press . . New York: ColumbiaUniversityPress . The rootsof reference Quine, W.V.0 ., 1974 ' inductionof world . UnpubN.N. 1987 . constraints on 2 olds Onto , , meanings logical year Sola Instituteof Technology , MA. , Cambridge .Ilsheddoctoraldissertation , Massachusetts . Inferences aboutthe meaningsof nouns: The relationshipbetweenperception Sola, N.N., 1992 29- 45. and syntax. CognitiveDevelopment . Ontological categoriesguide young children's , 1991 Sola, N.N., S. Carey and E.S. Spelke : Objecttermsand substance terms. Cognition38, 179-211. inductionsof word meaning . In: L. . Weiskranz(ed.), Thoughtwithout E.S 1988 The of , , Spelke : origins physicalknowledge . , 168- 184. Oxford, UK : Oxford UniversityPress knowledge . CognitiveScience14, 29- 56. . Principlesof objectperception , E.S., 1990 Spelke . . Origins of knowledge Macomber and K. Jacobson E.S. K. J. , 1992 , , , Spelke Breinlinger Review99, 605- 632. Psychological . . Cambridge . Thoughtand language , MA : MIT Press Vygotsky, L.S., 1962 . MA : Harvard Press . and substance . D. 1980 Sameness , , , University Cambridge Wiggins . Addition and subtractionby humaninfants. Nature358, 749- 750. Wynn, K., 1992 . Infant metaphysics : The caseof numericalidentity. MIT Centerfor Xu, F. and S. Carey, 1993 . Science Occasional Paper Cognitive


Explanation , association , and the acquisition of word meaning * FrankC. Keil , CornellUniversity , 223 Uris Hall, Ithaca, NY /4853-760/ , USA Departmentof Psychology A newly emerging view of concept structure, the concepts-in -theories view, suggeststhat adult conceptsare intrinsic mixes of two different sorts of relations: (a) those involving domain-general tabulations of frequenciesand correlations and (b) those involving domain-specific patterns of explanation. Empirical results from early cognitive development suggestthat , by the time first words are acquired, most concepts have this intrinsic mix even though changesin the nature of the mix can produce marked developmental changesin apparent concepts, word meanings, and their use. . The concepts-in -theories view suggests that the sorts of constraints needed to model the representation and acquisition of concepts cannot be based solely on either perceptual or grammatical bases; they must also arise from blases given by specific patterns of explanation, patterns that may depart from standard notions of intuitive theories. These in turn suggest different views of possible constraints on the acquisition of word meaning.

I . Introduction

Categorization is one of the most common and salient of human cognitive activities, and many of the categoriesso fonned appear to be shared among individuals, a pattern that is highlighted by the use of common words to refer to those categories. In experimental psychology, the distinctive aspects of mental life that enable each categorization are usually thought of as concepts. Sharedmental structures are assumedto be constant acrossrepeatedcategorizations of the same set of instances and different for other categorizations. When I think about the category of dogs, a specific mental representation is assumedto be responsiblefor that category, and roughly the same representation for a later categorization of dogs by myself or by another. The . Much thanksto two anonymousreviewersand to Dan Simonsfor extensivecommentson . Muchof the research earlierdraftsof this manuscript reportedon in this paperwassupportedby . NIH grant numberROl-HD23922 - 3841/94/$07.00 @ 1994- ElsevierScienceB.V. All rightsreserved 0024 SSDI 0024- 3841( 93) EO049- D

F.C. Keill Wordmeaning

phenomenonof categorization, coupled with the notion that repeatedcategorizations of the samesort are basedon the samemental representation, is the launching point for most psychological investigations of what conceptsare. Categorization, however, must not be equated with heuristics and other procedures that provide rough and ready identification of instancesabove a modest confidence level. Although one might use hair length as a rough means for identifying human sex at a certain confidence level, a careful and deliberative categorization of humans by sex would make little note of such an attribute . Careful, consideredjudgements of membership may emphasize different aspectsof mental structures than the fastest and loosest means of identifying members of categories. In this paper, these different facets of categorization behaviors are considered together in terms of their implications for models of the acquisition and representation of word meaning. Psychologicalresearchon concepts in the last three decadesstarted largely with the phenomenonof categorization, first with teachingartificial categories , and later with the study of more naturally acquired ones. But psychological viewsof conceptshave undergonetwo dramatic shifts, initially as a consequence of uncoveringmore details on categorizationbehavior, but increasinglyalso as a , measuresthat are starting to consequenceof using other behavioral measures raise questionsabout what conceptsare in the first place. My purpose here is to explore the consequences of the most recent shift for word meanings. I will argue for the following points : ( I ) The currently emerging view, the concepts-in -theories view, must ultimately characterizeadult conceptsas intrinsic mixes of two different sorts of relations: (a) those involving domain-general tabulations of frequencies and correlations, such as done by associative models and many connectionist systems, and (b) those involving domain-specific patterns of explanation, usually of a causal nature. 2 ( ) Empirical results from early cognitive development and first word meanings suggestthat by the time the first words are acquired, most if not all conceptshave this intrinsic mix even though changesin the nature of the mix can produce marked developmental changes in apparent concepts, word meanings, and their use. 3 ( ) The intrinsic mix and its early appearancesuggestsa different kind of ambiguity in word meaning, wherein largely overlapping setsof instances have the same label .applied to them but have different meanings, allow different patterns of induction , provide different categorizationsof critical test cases. Unlike classical lexical ambiguities there is no dramatic change in the class of referents even as there is a discrete change in meaning.


(4) In consideration of thesefirst three points, the sorts of constraints needed to model the representation and acquisition of conceptscannot be based solely on either perceptual or grammatical bases; they must Also arise from blases given by specific patterns of explanation that emphasize different causal roles for the same properties in different domains. These conceptual constraints in turn suggest different views of possible constraints on the acquisition of word meaning.

The emergence of the concepts-in- theories view of concept structure

In the past three decades, models of categorization and concept structure have evolved through three stages. It is useful to briefly describe this history as a way of better understanding the current view. The first view tried to specify concept structure as lists of singly necessary and jointly sufficient features. Conceptssimply consistedof compartmentalized sets of features that were accessedas a cluster by a processing agent. Not surprisingly, this sort of representational theory of concepts was easy to model in a variety of computational systems. In addition , the first view fit nicely with some early feature-based models of word meaning, where again, each word consistedof a set of features that were singly necessaryand jointly sufficient (e.g. Leech 1974) . In psychology, these feature-list views survived far beyond their natural lives by focusing on laboratory learning of arbitrary ' ' ' ' concepts such as bliks being large blue triangles. Such learning tasks uncoveredsome strategiesused to encodearbitrary conjuncts and disjuncts of meaninglessattributes, but provided little insight into the acquisition and representation of natural concepts. The necessary and sufficient features model still has limited appeal becausesome word meaningsseemto logically entail others in a way that suggestsan underlying concept structure with necessityrelations; but several other models of concepts and word meanings can capture such entailments without embracing the idea of concepts being solely comprised in that manner (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990) . The first view yielded to a family of views collectively known as the probabilistic approach, in which concepts were said to reflect real world correlational structure and feature frequency (Rosch and Mervis 1975) . That approach spawned a huge body of studies arguing that concepts themselves are ill -defined probabilistic representations, consisting of weighted features, samplings of exemplars, or even combinations of dimensional values (Smith and Medin 1981) . Even as these studies collectively embraced probabilistic

F.C. Kei/ / Word meaning

accounts and were united in focusing on such phenomenaas instanceshaving different goodness of membership in a category, they began to diverge on what concepts actually were. Feature-based models" tended to be like the earlier necessaryand sufficient feature view except that they added weights to each feature representingits relative importance in detennining membership. Importance was usually derived from how often a feature co-occurred with members of the category in the real world . Correlations between features were also often included in these representations. One consequenceof these weightings was that a much larger number of features could be included in a representation and thresholds could be set up for excluding features with sufficientlylow weights. Thesethresholdscould also be adjustedas a function of contexts (as in Lakotrs hedges' technically speaking' and ' loosely thinking ' , which were thought to raise and lower the threshold respectively ( Lackoff 1972). Nonetheless, these views continued to compartmentalize concepts as distinct from ,the rest of knowledge. Certain phenomena related to typicality of instances were considered central to understanding conceptsand were shown to be strongly interrelated. These included: intuitions that membership in a category is not all or none but graded such that some instances are better members than others, intuitions that some entities were at the borderline and their membership in a category was indeterminate, and reaction times to identify instances(it takes longer to verify membership of an atypical vs. typical member). All of these responsesseemedto convergeon mental representationsthat encodedfeature frequenciesand correlations. This second view required more subtle refutations than the first. Concepts still seemed to have components that were different from their merely probabilistic parts; and demonstrations appeared showing that people could easily think about typical and atypical instances for completely well-defined categories, such as odd numbers. Such findings suggest that typicality and well-definednessare not mutually exclusive for the sameconcept (Arm strong et al. 1983). Indeed the probabilistic phenomena associated with concepts were sometimes relegated to the realm of ' identification procedures' for picking out instancesof concepts rather than to the concepts themselves. Additional concerns came from demonstrations of illusory correlations in the social and clinical psychology literature. That is, people will see nonexisting feature correlations when they follow from prior beliefs (Chapman and Chapman 1969) . Simple tabulations of feature frequenciesand co-occurrences in the world are not enough. In developmental research as well, conceptsemergedin ways not explainable by mere shiftings of either feature

F.C. Keitt Wordmeaning

frequencies or correlational weights. Thus, one set of studies show how developmental shifts in what are regarded as legitimate members of a kind , such as being a tiger or being an uncle, cannot be plausibly modeled by shifting probabilistic weights on features or changing global criteria of what frequenciesare to count as important (Keil 1989) . Other problems were seenin adult processingstudies in which two concepts with the same highly typical feature nonetheless placed greatly different emphasison those features becauseone played a much more central role in patterns of causal explanation. Thus, bananas and boomerangs were judged to be equally typically curved, but straight bananaswerejudged to be a much better new member of the class of bananas than straight boomerangs in the classof boomerangs(Medin and Shoben 1988) . This particular shapechange seemsto influence what it meansto be a boomerang to a much greater degree than a banana and does so in a way not predictable from feature frequencies or correlations. Problems of this sort with probabilistic models have led to what is known as the concepts-in -theories view (Murphy and Medin 1985) . A closer look at categorization, and increasingly at other phenomenathought to be related to concepts and their structure, has put a central emphasis on notions of explanation, mechanism and cause. People do not simply note feature frequencies and feature correlations ; they have strong intuitions about which frequencies and correlations are reasonable ones to link together in larger structures and which are not. Without theseintuitions , people would make no progressin learning and talking about common categoriesgiven the indefinitely large number of possible correlations and frequencies that can be tabulated from any natural scene. These intuitions seemmuch like intuitive theories of how things in a domain work and why they have the structure they do , hence the concepts-in -theories label. One on the most frustrating drawbacks of the current concepts-in -theories view is the lack of consensuson what theories really are and how they are mentally represented. Theories might be sets of propositions with causal connectivesinterspersedamong various logical connectives, all interconnected by deductive chains. Alternatively , theories might be more like mental models, with image-like notions of mechanism. Or , theories might not need any notions of cause whatsoever, just a more general senseof explanation; indeed some have decried the appearance of causal relations in any wellspecified theory (Hempel 1965, Russell 1924) . These controversies, however, should not blur a simple fact : some notion of explanatory coherence does have a powerful and overarching influence on almost any behavioral measure

F.C. Keill Word meaninR of concept structure. Above and beyond the details of representationalformat lies the common realization that our concepts for dogs, diners, and dandelions emphasizesome features and relations over others becauseof their fit within broader explanatory patterns.

3. Hybrid vigor

The increasedimportance of explanatory systemsin concept structure has suggesteda complementary need for uninterpreted probabilistic tabulations as part of concepts, resulting in a hybrid structure. For all but the most contrived cases, concepts may be intrinsic mixes of both systemsof explanation and atheoretic tabulations of properties. Any detailed account of the theories or explanatory systemsthat embed conceptswill end up confronting the same issue, regardlessof their particular approach. Such systemscannot fully interpret the raw data of experience, yet must rely on it . The limitations of explanatory systemsor theories in organizing properties and concept are best understood by a concrete example. Consider someone who has had a limited exposureto birds ; let us call him Icarus. Becauseof his limited experience, Icarus' s explanatory knowledge specific to birds is modest. In addition to knowing many general things about animals that apply to birds .as well, Icarus only knows explanatory reasons for properties corresponding to two sorts of bird category contrasts: flightless vs. flying birds and predators vs. prey. Thus, Icarus understandswhy flightless birds tend to have much smaller wings compared to body size than flying birds and why their legs tend to be bigger and more muscular; and he understandswhy predators have many properties that help them catch prey and why prey have many features that help them avoid predators. In this way explanatory knowledge helps order the conceptual space and helps influence intuitive inter -birds similarities, inductions about new properties, and categorization. Moreover, this knowledge helps constrain which correlations are first noted for novel instances. There is, however, a problem with birds that occupy the same spot in this two-dimensional spaceout which are easily distinguishable in terms of surface feature probabilities and correlations and which Icarus can in fact distinguish, such as a robin vs. a wren. They occupy the same place in Icarus' s explanatory matrix and yet Icarus stores additional information about them so as to be able to distinguish them. This information may well be largely associative and guided by broad hunches laid down by Icarus' s theory of animals and


175

perhaps some general hunches about birds. Those hunches insure that even the associatively organized features will not include whether a bird was first seenon a tree with an odd vs. even number of branches, or whether it was facing left or right , or whether it was old or young. But , within those general constraints, many other regularities must indeed be stored purely in terms of correlations and frequencies. In this way, associative structures in concepts can persevere. This perseveranceis inevitable, simply becausewe can never have explanations for all regularities that we observe. It is tempting to try to exclude frequency and correlation information from the concept proper and say that they are only part of heuristics and identification procedures having to do with concept use; but such a move fails to explain why our beliefs are often directed specifically towards explaining those correlations; the correlations form an integral part of the system. Only in special caseswhere we have conventionally defined concepts with accidentally correlated features, such as the concept odd number, do the two aspectsbecomemore fully separable. There must be not only explanatory structures that narrow down an indefinitely large number of features and feature relations to a manageablenumber but also mechanismsfor storing information that is outside the ken of current explanation. We could never acquire new explanations if there were not some way of storing information external to current explanations. " These issueshave often led to proposals of a core- periphery distinction in concept structure, wherein typicality information is relegatedto the periphery (see discussions in Arm strong et al. 1983 and Rey 1983) . Although this distinction may imply that the periphery is less important , or even optional , the relation between the two facets of concepts may be more symbiotic. Explanations do not amount to much if they do not have anything to explain, and raw tabulations quickly overwhelm any informati ~n gathering system if it does not partially order that information in terms of explanatory usefulness. A parallel casecan be made for scientific theories. Scientific theories are sometimes presented as a set of tightly connected laws linked through deductive chains (e.g. Hempel and Oppenheim 1948), but in practice, they start with sets of regularities that they seek to explain, regularities that are noticed and remembered often before the fledgling theory has any way of incorporating them. The atheoretical component of concepts should therefore not be relegated to a ' periphery' that is not part of the concept proper . There is no general way to justify such a move despite those cases of a few formal and conventional terms where a clean distinction is possible. However, even as the

F. C. Keill Word meaning

atheoretical component must be part of the concept itself, it remains distinct. There is not an association-to- theory continuum consisting of increasingly strong and reliable correlations and frequencies. Such a continuum could not explain caseswhere high frequenciesand correlations are clearly understood as explanatorily irrelevant to membership in the category, whether it be hair length and gender or economic value and type of chemical element. Although explanatory systems may always need some reserves of correlational and frequency based information for interpretation, not all of the information in such reservesis always found meaningful, even when broad hunches suggest it might be.

4. Theorigi- of the hybrid The idea that most adult conceptshave a hybrid structure has not led to a consensuson how this relation comes about in development. Two sharply contrasting views predominate: ( 1) The earliest concepts are independent of theories and are therefore pure casesof the probabilistic models. The earliest concepts are constructed solely by tabulations of feature frequenciesand correlations presumably with the help of low -level, domain-general perceptual and cognitive blases. Early word meaningsat this time would be similarly basedon such tabulations. (2) Even the earliest conceptsmay be subject to organizational principles that go beyond tabulations of features. Primitive systems of explanation embed concepts even in infancy and certainly by the time of the first words ; or at least young children' s concept-related behaviors are only understandable by imputing to them mental structures like our own explanatory systems. This debate has proved difficult to resolve. Recent studies would seem to favor the explanations-from -the-start alternative as younger and younger children' s judgements are shown to apparently be governed by such explanations . Yet , advocates for the opposite view need merely claim that the acquisition of such explanatory systems occurs very early on in infancy (McClelland , forthcoming), a reply that becomesincreasingly difficult to test as ever younger infants are needed. But the tension between these views has resulted in an important empirical discovery. There has been a rapid downward march of the ages at which concepts are endowed with explanation, from five-year-olds postulated as purely associative beasts ( Vygotsky 1962,

F.C. Kei/ l Wordmeaning

Werner 1948, Quine 1977), to preschoolersbeing in such a state, and now to infants before their first words. Indeed, a strong casecan be made that four month-old infants categorize aspects of their physical and social worlds in ways only understandableby attributing to them domain specific systemsof causal explanation (e.g. Spelke et al. 1993, Leslie, in press) . The debate continues about even earlier origins (e.g. Slater 1993), but there is now little ' doubt that the child s first words must be sensitive to the same sorts of relations that have causeda dramatic shift in how adult conceptsare viewed. In my first attempts to understand how word meaningsmight changewith ' ' development, I posited a characteristic-to -defining shift in the acquisition of word meaning (Keil and Battennan 1984) . Following decades of vaguer claims about shifts from such things as holistic to analytic meanings, accidental to essentialfeatures and the like , one more testable possibility seemedthat early word meanings are very much like the probabilistic views of concepts, ' ' but then shifted to be more defining such that a simple principle characterized meaning. The predominant method was to present scenariosin which an instance had either all the characteristic features associatedwith a category but lacked critical defining ones or in which instances had all the critical defining features but had many highly uncharacteristic ones as well. Being an ~uncle' was asked either of friendly , gift giving , middle-aged men unrelated to ' one' s family or of brothers of one s parents who were still children and ' ' distinctly unfriendly . Being an island was asked of peninsulaswith beaches, palm trees and burled treasures or of cold , forbid ding beachless places ' surrounded by water on all sides. Children s judgements of instancesdid shift with age and on a domain by domain basis as shown in figure I (Kei I1989 ) ; but it becameincreasingly clear that a true characteristic-to -defining shift was not and could not be occurring. Even the youngest children were never simply tabulating up all salient feature frequenciesand correlations. No child thinks that uncles must have glasseseven if all the uncles they happen to have seen wear them. The features selectedby even the earliest word learners were always constrained by somenotions of reasonablenessfor the kind of thing in question. A second problem was that true definitions are rare occurrences in word meanings. Only a handful of words even approach clear simple definitions. Putnam ( 1975), estimated a few hundred in English, and even these are under contention (Lakoff 1987) . Thus, although the developmental changeis robust and easy to produce experimentally, it cannot really indicate a shift from one representational format to another. Rather, it appears to be two related phenomena: ( I ) There are increasing elaborations of explanatory systems

F.C. Kei/ I Wordmeaning

~ + d ",~-~-"+ . I C / u c / + d ~ /,-~-~-"-+ _ c / ~ + d ,K ~ ~ . . + c / ~ -..-".'~ c + / d ,:;.-< ' " ( ' + c / ~ K -

Moralterms

Mealterms

Tool terms

Kinshipterms

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-

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-to- definingshift in the acquisitionof word Fig. I . Illustration of an apparentcharacteristic . The y-axesrepresentthe extent to which eachdescribedentity wasjudged to be a meaning . Thex-axesrepresent threegradeschoolclasslevelsandadults. legitimatememberof thecategory The graphsshowthat thereis a developmental shift in whetherthe + characteristic / - defining + defining ones are taken to indicate membersof the descriptionsor the - characteristicl . In addition, the shifts occur at different times on a domain by domain basis. category .) (Adaptedfrom Keil 1989 with age such that explanations play ever more extensive roles in constraining what features and correlations are noticed . Thus , as explanation - based knowledge becomes more and more elaborated , default tabulations of information in associative terms are less common . ( 2) There are shifts in understanding which explanatory system is most relevant to a class of phenomena . A child might realize that ' uncle ' is better understood in terms of set of biological relations that comprise kinship and not in terms of social relations that govern

F. C. Keill Wordmeaning

friendship; the social explanation is discovered to generate more serious mistakes and is abandoned (Keil 1989, 1992) . A similar change of perspectivehas occurred with tenDS for natural kinds. For example, young children assert that zebras who are surgically transformed to look and act like horses are no longer zebras but truly horses. Older children declare the animal to still be a zebra, suggestingadevelop mental shift from a phenomenalsimilarity spaceto a theoretically driven one. After many follow -up studies conducted both by my research group and other groups, a different story emerges(Keil 1989) . Younger children may never be total phenomenalistshelplessly buffeted about by correlations and frequencies. There invariably seemsto be an understanding of deeper relations that allows them to go beyond what would reasonably be considered phenomenal similarity . Thus, even for three-year-olds, tigers can only be changed into lions if you use a mechanism of change that' is reasonably related to being a member of the two kinds. Younger children s beliefs about such mechanismsmay differ , but they have them nonethelessand will use them to override associativeinfonnation . At any age most natural concepts have a mix of associationistic tabulated information and systemsfor interpreting , explaining and guiding the pickup of that information . There can be dramatic developmental change, but not from one kind of representational system to a dramatically different one. Instead,- the predominant change is in how extensively the child is able to interpret and explain the raw data of association. As those explanations become more and more elaborated over time, the child has to fall back less and lesson the associativecomponent to make judgements. ' Following the Icarus example offered above, suppose a child s initial . understanding of birds involved only notions of what properties supported flight and thereby clusters of features corresponding to flightless vs. flying birds but did not understand how to organize the features that clustered around predator vs. prey. Some more general principles about animals may bias the child to associatively store frequenciesand correlations concerning featuressuch as feet shape, beak shape, eye location in head and typical diet ; but these properties may be stored largely in tenDS of associative relations until the predator/prey insight comes to dramatically organize those features and shift similarities accordingly, thereby shifting induction and categorization . Note that the developmental studies also support the essential hybrid structure of concepts. Even as these studies show that the youngest children never rely solely on brute force tabulations of feature frequencies and correlations, they also show that something like an associativecomponent is

F. C. Keil / Word meaning

also present that shrinks with age in each domain in the face of more elaborated explanation. Although the characteristic:-to -defining change in development is not strictly correct, the changesthat do occur support both aspectsof the hybrid .

S. Multiple domains andreferentiallyoverlappingambiguities The concepts-in-theories view suggestsmultiple modes of explanation from the start of acquisition of word meaning. At least two domains have been clearly implicated : (a) a physical-mechanical domain that helps explain the properties of kinds subject to mechanical causality; and (b) a folk -psychological domain that helps explain the properties of kinds subject to beliefdesire accounts of causation. These radically different ways of construing the . world result in sharply contrasting assumptions about what properties are central to membersof a kind . Carey ( 1985) was one of the first to make this proposal, and the evidence for early and universal appearanceof these two domains is now strong and ' widespread, ranging from infants clear intuitions about the mechanics of physical objects to findings that autistic children who have excellent intuitions about physical mechanics can be grossly deficient in their understanding of beliefdesire causality. Severalstudies have now shown that high-functioning autistic children can reason about events that do not require beliefdesire inferences, while having great difficulty reasoning about events that do require beliefdesire inferences (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al. 1985) . One recent study suggeststhat the contrast between the two domains might already be under way in the first few months of life. Infants as young as six months have been shown to have markedly different expectations about the causal interactions among social entities as opposed to non-social ones. If they observe events in which a six foot high cylinder rolls towards another, they expect that only physical contact can produce a movement in a second one. If the first cylinder stops, leaving a gap between it and the second one, and the second one th~n moves off as if launched without contact, the infants (and adults) find the event anomalous. If , however, the same events occur with human actors, the infants find launching of the second person without contact to be no more surprising than launching with contact (Spelke et al. 1993) . If the young child initially has only these two fundamental modes of explanation, most concepts must be somehow assimilated into one of these


two ways of understanding the world . This possibility results in predictions concerning not just the nature of early concepts but also how they become linked to the lexicon. If children are presentedwith partial information about a novel kind , they must.decide whether its known and future properties are to be interpreted in belief/ desire terms or in physical/ mechanical terms and ensuinginductions about properties will vary accordingly. For example, it has been argued that biological kinds and their properties are often interpreted in solely behavioral terms. The behavioral aspectsof a property come to be seen as the basis for it . Young children have been shown to attribute properties such as eating and having babies only to animals that are sufficiently psychologically similar to humans so as to have the behavioral and belief/ desirecorrelates of eating and having babies (e.g. feeling hungry and wanting ' food and being nurturant towards offspring) . Worms don t eat becausethey cannot have feelings of hunger and desires for food in any way like humans (Carey 1985). These sorts of misattributions were found not only forproper ties that have salient behaviors associatedwith them but also for unfamiliar ones described on the spot for the child (such as having a spleen) . Young children seemto assumethat even novel properties are likely to be possessed by other animals to the extent that they are behaviorally similar to the one on which they are taught. Only later in development would an appreciation of biological kinds as such emerge and would new properties be based on induction over sets of functional biological relations. It now seemsthat young children might not be so narrowly restricted in their earliest kinds of understanding, that the explanation part of the hybrid has more diversity than just a mechanics and psychology. For example, a wide range of studies now converge to suggest that preschoolers see living kinds as having their own causal patternings distinct from physical mechanics and social behavior (Keil 1992, Inagaki and Hatano 1993, Hatano et al. 1993, Springer and Keil 1991, Gelman and Gottfried 1993) . They understand that both plants and animals tend to have functional /adaptive explanations associated with them that are not seen elsewhere in the natural world and which are distinct from the sorts of functional explanations used with artifacts. For example, preschoolers show a stronger tendency to explain the properties of living things in terms of the purposes those properties serve for those things than they do for non-living things (Keil 1992). Adaptive , or design, explanations have becomerecognizedas a distinct form of explanation linked to the biological sciences , and it now appearsthat salient to young children available and is the same form of explanation (Woodfield 1976, Wright 1976) .

F.C. Keil / Word meaning

One way to show this distinctive pattern of expectationsconcerning living things is to ask preschoolers which of two explanations they prefer as appropriate for explaining the properties of living vs. non-living things. For ' example, the children might be told the following : Two people are talking about why plants are green. This person says it is becauseit is better for the plants to be green and it helps there to be more plants. This person says it is becausethere are little tiny parts in plants that when mixed together give them a green color. Which reason is a better one?' The same question would then be asked about emeralds. Although both the reductionist and functional explanations are appropriate for the plants, children preferred the functional sorts of explanations for living things while at the same time preferring the reductionist explanation for non-living things (Keil 1992). The contrast with artifacts is more subtle, but involves an understanding that most of the properties of non-domesticated living kinds are ultimately self-serving whereas most of the properties of artifacts are other -serving. This seemingly abstract notion appears to be well within the grasp of preschoolers when they are asked to choose between explanations for functional properties that are for the good of the object vs. the good of another entity ; and they show similar understandings for plants as well as animals, ruling out any need to see the living things as . capable of mental goals or desires. The full set of such early modes of construal may be quite small, possibly as few as half a dozen. The earliest modes of construal seemto originate from notions of broad domains of phenomena, such as physical mechanics, folk psychology, and functional /teleological explanations and not local areas of expertise such as dinosaurs or chess. Other possible basic modes include: moral reasoning, notions of ownership and transfer WORD REPRESENTATION SENTENCE / The input to the learning systemis a pair of an s-structure, and a representation of a world situation. This representation will be an interpretation of a perceived event, for example, based on observation, previous observations, surrounding discourse, etc. How then does a learner arrive at the lexical representation for the verb in the sentence, given this kind of learning situation? Two ideas form the focus of a large amount of current researchon the question. The first idea is that analysis of the situation can make it possible to determine the meaning of a word , and that the meaning of a word in turn makes it possible to determine its lexicals Yl:ltax. This type of proposal has been very fully developed by Pinker ( 1989), in an important extension of earlier work , which concentrated on the question of how meaning might play a role in allowing the child to perform an initial syntactic analysis upon which the syntactic system of the languagecould be erected, and on ways in which the meaning of a verb could make aspects of its syntax predictable to a learner; Grimshaw ( 1981), Pinker ( 1984, 1989) . The second idea which has emerged on how linguistic relations play their part in acuisition, is that analysis of the sentencemakes it possible ta determine (parts of) its semantics (seeLandau and Gleitman 1985, Fisher et al. 1991, Fisher et al., this volume, Gleitman 1990) . These two ideas about mapping are sometimes contrasted ' under the rubrics ' semantic bootstrapping' and ' syntactic bootstrapping (but seePinker, this volume, for discussion) . ' ' Semantic bootstrapping has one extremely important property : it makes direct use of the principles mapping from lexical meaning to lexical syntax discussedearlier. I will not illustrate this in detail - the works referred to above contain many examples. Nonetheless, it would probably be incorrect to maintain that an analysis of the situation a/one is the input to the learner. Becauseof the indirect relationship between events and semantic representations of verbs, discussedin the previous section, it is not easy for an observer ' to determine a verb s meaning from an event. Gleitman and colleagues(see Gleitman 1990and Fisher et al., this volume, for examples) have looked into this point , showing that eventstypically have multiple construals, hencemany

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verb meaningswill be compatible with most events. As an example, consider a verb which has a causedchange of state interpretation, with a semantic ' ' representationof the form : x causesy to become- . Such verbs often have a changeof state counterpart, which can utilize the same morpheme, as with melt, or a different morpheme, as in kill / die. The change-of -state version has a semantic representation of the form : ' y becomes- ' .

(3) Wemelted the ice/ the ice melted We killed the dragon/ the dragon died The problem for word learning from world situations is that circumstances that can be described by one member of the pair of verbs, can often be describedequally well by the other: seethe discussion of give and receivein Fisher et al. ,(this volume) for example. The causative entails the change of state, hencewheneverthe causativedescription is true of some state of affairs in the world , the change-of -state description is true also (although not vice versa) . So if a learner guessesthe causative (kill ) when in fact the verb has a change-of -state meaning (die), and if word learning is based on world observation alone, recovery is only possible if some situation tells the learner that even when there is no possibility of construing the event as involving an ' ' agent, die is still used. If a learner choosesthe change-of -state meaning ( die ) ' ' for a: morpheme which is in fact the causative ( kill ), there is no way to correct the mistake, becausethere is no world situation where the inchoative is inappropriate and the causative appropriate. The correct meanings must therefore be assignedto the membersof the pairs by some other means, since learning by world observation seemsat worst to be impossible, and at best to require that juvenile speakershave accessto a disambiguating situation for every pair of meanings like this. But if observation of the world is not enough, other means must be available for lexical learning. This is where key information contained in the sentencein (2) offers the most promising avenue for successfulword learning, very roughly along the lines sketched by Gleitman ( 1990). The fundamental idea is that the linguistics of words itself makes learning words possible. It is the language, and not the world , that supports the processof word learning. Returning to the kill / die problem, although the situations in which the two morphemesare used are not good sourcesof information about the meanings of the verbs, the two are linguistically different in a crucial respect, and this linguistic difference makes word learning possible. What I will for now term, loosely, the ' transitivity ' of kill and causative melt contrasts with the


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' " intransitivity of die and inchoative mell, and this property is correlated with the meaningsin a way that can be exploited by a languagelearner. What aspects of verbal meaning can in principle be deduced from the . syntactic context a verb appears in ? The proposal advanced by Landau and Gleitman ( 1985) is that learners use information about the surface syntax of a clause to determine (aspects of) the meaning of the verb in the clause. Specifically, they suggestthat the subcategorization frame of a verb contains the critical information . It is easyto seethat this idea will be useful in solving the kill / die problem : since kill is subcategorizedfor an NP complement and die is not , a learner who knew the subcategorizationsin advance could use them to choose the right morpheme for the right meaning. (Presumably variability resulting from parametric variation can be factored out of the situation, and a sufficiently abstract view of the subcategorization sets will make it possible to treat the subcategorization of a verb in one language as being the same as the subcategorization of a verb with the same meaning in another language, despite superficial differencesin the syntactic systemsin the two cases.) When the issueis consideredin a more precisefashion, however, a number of considerations suggestthat subcategorization frames are not the optimal source of information . (See Pinker, this volume, and Fisher et al., this volume, for additional remarks on the limitations of frames for learning semantics.) First , -observable context alone cannot determine what the subcategorization frames of a verb are. Arguments figure in subcategorization frames, adjuncts do not. However both occur on the same side of the verb in a languagelike English, hencethere is no positional evidenceto distinguish one from the other. This problem arises wherever adjuncts and arguments have the same form , e.g. with PPs. Consider the examplesin (4) : while write takes an optional PP adjunct, put has an obligatory PP argument. Similarly , last has a temporal argument, while wriggle occurs with a temporal adjunct. (4a) (4b) (4c) (4d)

He wrote a book in his room. He put a book in his room. The performance lasted for an hour. The performer wriggled for an hour.

Without knowing which expressionsare arguments it is not possible to know what frames the verb appearsin , but in order to know which expressionsare arguments it is necessaryto know what the verb means. Thus it is not clear what role the subcategorizationframes could have in the acquisition of verbal

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meanings in cases where there is no clear independent indication of the argument or adjunct status of a phrase associatedwith the verb. A secondkind of limitation arisesbecauseof the existenceof large numbers of many-to -one semantics-to -syntax mappings. For example, the set of verbs which subcategorizesfor NP is both enormous and extremely disparate semantically:

(5a) He weighedthe tomatoes. (5b) He weighed300pounds. (6a) He becamea doctor. (6b) He shot a doctor. (7a) He asked someonethe time. (7b) He asked someonea question. So the fact that a verb takes an NP complement is not very informative as far as its meaning is concerned. (Of course it is not completely uninformative , since it does make it possible to eliminate a number of candidates: ' put ' and ' die' for , example, are not possible meanings for any of the verbs in (5H7 ) .) The reason that the syntax here is comparatively uninformative is that many different meaningsare mapped onto a syntactic expressionlike NP. Syntactic mapping based on a single subcategorization frame will be maximally effective when the mapping is one-to-one or just few-to -one. This is probably the casewith , for example, sentential complements. A verb with a sentential complement must draw its meaning from a relatively small set of possibilities, which include verbs of communication (say, announce, state), verbs of logical relation (entail, presuppose ), and verbs of propositional . attitude (hope, believe) Being aware of the limitations and problems of mapping from subcategorization frames to meaning in cases such as the ones just discussed, the researchersworking on syntactic mapping have investigated the idea that sets of subcategorizationframes, and not just single frames, playa role in the acquisition of verbal meaning (see especially Landau and Gleitman 1985, Fisher et al. 1991, and the discussion of ' frame range' in Fisher et al., this volume) . The learner will examine the set of subcategorizationsthat a verb appearsin , and discover properties of its meaning in this way. Note that one strong disadvantageof this position is that it is not possible to learn a meaning for a morpheme on exposure, even repeatedexposure, to a single sentencetype. Analysis acrosssentencetypes will be required, since the


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entire set of frames that the verb appearsin , or some approximation thereof, must be observedbefore its meaning can be detennined. There is an important precondition for the successof the ' sets of frames' idea. In order for learners to be able to use a verb' s subcategorizationset to determine its meaning, the learner must know in advancewhich set goeswith which meaning. This is possible only to the extent that the subcategorization set/ meaning mapping is cross-linguistically stable, or shows only parametric variation. So the question is whether UG detenninesthe subcategorizationset associatedwith a verb, or not. This issueturns out to be highly problematic the reason is that the total subcategorizationset of a verb is a function of the set of subcategorizationsin which each senseof the verb participates. And the way sensesare distributed acrossmorphemesis not unifonn acrosslanguages. (This point is also made in Pinker, this volume.) Let us consider why this should be so. The relevant principles of UG govern the mapping between the meaning of a verb and its syntax in that meaning. In addition , UG regulates the set of possible semantic alternations that a morpheme may participate in , such as the causative/change-of -state relation. If each morpheme had exactly one sense, or if the alternative senses of a morpheme were always regulated by UG , this would exhaust the situation. But in fact, a morpheme can have severalsenses , each with its own UG detennined syntax. and each participating in alternations in the ways prescribedby UG . UG says little or nothing about the complete set of senses the verb has, and therefore little or nothing about the total set of subcategorilations of the morpheme. UG only detennines the properties of the individual sensesand those that are related grammatically. As an example, consider the verb shoot. It has at least two senses: one exemplified in She shot the burg/ar , and one in The burglar shot out of the room. In the first sense, shoot takes an NP complement, in the second a PP. In both casesthe subcategorizations are highly predictable. shoot- l is like, say, stab, and takes an individual / NP as its complement, while shoot-2 is like , say raced, and takes a directional PP as its complement. The subcategorization of each senseis completely in accordancewith the theory of grammar, but nothing about the theory of grammar determines that shoot will have these two senses . Hence the theory of grammar cannot possibly predict that shoot will have these two subcategorization frames, and a learner could not know this in advance. In caseslike these, the sensesof the verb do not seemto be related by UG at all , even though they are all realized by a single morpheme. Presumably they are related by association, which depends on semantic field and other

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cognitively real but grammatically irrelevant factors. Thus it is probably not an accident that shoot has a verb-of-motion meaning, and stab does not , since shooting involves a rapidly moving bullet. The point is that the relationship is associativein character, and not UG determined. Similarly, consider the case of know as in I know her and in I know that she is here. The two usesof the verb are cognitively close - both are state predicatesand both are psychological . Hence it is presumably much more likely that these two senseswill be clustered together into a single morpheme than that say, eat and one of the two sensesof know will be clustered together. The probabilities involved are not a matter of UG , however, and of course the clustering of sensestogether under a single morpheme is notoriously variable cross-linguistically . The two sensesof know correspond to different morphemes in many other languages: French for one. What is involved in these effects is the spreading of morphemes across meanings. The results range in character from pure ' w here no homonyms significant semantic relation can be seenat all , through relations that seem cognitively natural , and that probably reflect various clustering effects, to relations that are grammatical in character. The point is, though, that the entire subcategorizationset associatedwith a morpheme is simply the sum of the subcategorization sets for each meaning of the morpheme. While it is true that the subcategorization set for each meaning is highly principled and strongly related to the meaning, the same is not true for the entire set. Each individual subcategorization frame reflects the systematicproperties of the form -meaning correspondences , but the entire set of subcategorizationsalso reflects accidental combinations of subcategorizations ' , which result from a single morpheme s appearing in severaldifferent . It follows that there is no stable mapping between the full set of senses subcategorizations that a morpheme appears in and the meaning of the morpheme. The full set of subcategorizationswill depend, not just on UG , but also on the range of meanings that the morpheme assumesin a given language. The conclusion is, then, that a predictable relationship betweensubcategorizations and morphemes does not hold : the predictable relationship is between subcategorizations and a particular sense of the morpheme. It follows that it is not possible to use the entire subcategorization to learn meaning, becausethe entire subcategorizationset is not associatedwith a single meaningin thefirst place. As a result, a learning mechanismbasedon subcategorization setswill give , typically the most common poor results on morphemes with many senses ones. It will predict many errors, or failure of learning. Suppose that the


learning device tracks the syntactic context of the morpheme and attempts to determine its meaning based on t.his information . It will collect up all observed subcategorizationsfor a morpheme, disregarding the fact, which it ' cannot by definition be sensitive to , that verb s meaning differs across these subcategorizations. It will then assign to the verb the meaning that would be assigned to a verb which, under a single meaning, occurred in this set of frames. But this will be incorrect, except in the caseof a verb with exactly one sense. For verbs with multiple senses , if the procedure succeedsin assigninga will at all it one , meaning give meaning to the verb instead of several, and the meaning it gives might well be completely unrelated to any actual meaning of the verb being learned. Without knowing about meaning it is not possible to know which subcategorizationsshould be grouped ,ogether, and which shouldbe kept separate. What of lexical entries in which the relationship betweenthe alternatives is regulated by UG , such as the causative/change of state examples discussed above (e.g. melt/ melt) ? Supposethat there are two subcategorization frames associatedwith each of these verbs, one transitive and one intransitive. Can this set of frames be exploited to learn the meaning of the verb? (Note that the existenceof the alternation cannot be crucial for learning the meaningsof the members, becausemany verbs, such as kill and die do not alternate, but are still learned.) Here again the answer is negative, becausethe two occurrencesof the morpheme have different meanings, under standard assumptions about lexical representation. 1 So there cannot be a single sensespecified by UG as associatedwith this subcategorization set. Note that it also cannot be the casethat the shared meaning, i.e. what the two casesof the verb have in common, is learned from the subcategorization set either, becauseall causative /change of state pairs have the same subcategorization set, even though each pair has its own meaning. Clearly what we must aim for is a learning procedure that uses the alternation as a clue to the semantic analysis of the verbs, that might tell the learner that these verbs have changeand causedchangemeanings. However,

1 However, Grimshaw in work in progress ( 1993) denies these assumptions for all cases of alternations involving no overt morphology , proposing instead that there is only one meaning for ' e.g. melt in its causative and inchoative uses. The ' alternation is just the result of the meaning interacting with clausal structure. Further work is required to seehow this ultimately bearson the ' ' learning questions addressedhere, but it seemsthat in this senseof meaning , observation of the two clause structures associatedwith melt is essential for arriving at the correct analysis. This conclusion will hold for the UG -governed alternations only .

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just observing subcategorization alternations will not achieve this result, becausethere are other transitive/ intransitive alternations like eat and leave.

(8a) We. meltedthe ice. (8b) The ice melted. (9a) (9b) (9c) ( l Oa) ( lOb) ( I Oc)

We left the room. We left. . The room left. We ate the ice. We ate. * The ice ate.

What will guarantee successis to take into account the properties of the arguments, and not subcategorization alone; it is the fact that the subject of one caseof the verb correspondsto the object of the other casesthat reliably distinguishes change/ causedchange pairs from eat and leave. One final point concerning the causative/change-of -state pairs. In fact both are ' transitive' in d-structure, according to the unaccusativehypothesis (Perlmutter 1978, Burzio 1986), which means that technically they both have transitive subcategorizations. Again , this suggests that subcategorization frames are not exactly the right place for the child to look for help in figuring out verb meaning. We can summarizethe conclusionsso far as follows. Mapping from meaning onto syntax can success fully exploit a set of principles of Universal Grammar which relate lexical meaning ultimately to surface syntax. However, determining the meaningjust from observation of the world seemsto require multiple exposuresacrosssituations in many cases, and may be impossibleunder certain circumstances , when the world is particularly uninformative. On the other hand, fully exploit linguistically mapping from syntax onto meaning promises to success encodedinformation about a verb' s meaning. However as formulated so far, it seemsto require multiple exposuresacross sentences , and also may be in is uninformative. cases when , syntax impossible many

4. Reconciliation Clearly then we seeka model which preservesthe advantagesof both kinds of ideas: which makes it possible to use va mapping principles to regulate


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syntax, and to use surface syntax to regulate the semantic analysis. One way in which it is possible to combine the essentialgood effects of both types of mapping gives them different roles in the learning process: the semantics-tosyntax mapping principles provide a predictive mechanism, and the observed s-structure provides a checking mechanism. This is the basisof Reconciliation. (Wilkins 1993 explores a rather similar model for lexical learning, with particular emphasison the acquisition of morphology .) Reconciliation

(1) (2)

(6) ( 7) (8)

The learner interprets a scene or situation , hears a sentence and detects the verb. The learner finds a relationship R among participants in the situation ( entities , propositions etc.) that is sensible given the interpretation of the observed situation . The learner checks that R involves participants consistent with the content of the ( candidate argument ) expressions in the sentence, and rejects an R that does not meet this requirement . The learner constructs a lexical conceptual structure which is consistent with R , and assigns candidate argument expressions in the sentence to argument positions in the lexical conceptual structure . This lexical conceptual structure is fed through the semantics- to -syntax mapping principles of UG in their language particular instantiation . The s-structure predicted by step 5 is compared to the observed s-structure . If they do not match then no learning takes place . If they do match then the morpheme is entered into the lexicon with the hypothesized lexical conceptual structure .

A few comments are required about the steps involved in reconciliation. Step 2 excludes situations where the interpretation of the event is one of throwing , say, and R is a relationship betweenpropositions. Step 3 constrains the device to considering Rs that expressrelationships betweenthe right kind of entitities: if the sentencecontains two NPs, and one is the ball, then a verb ' ' meaning say is not a candidate, since it is not a possible relationship betweena ball and some other entity . Similarly , with the NPs John and the hal/, R cannot be a verb meaning 'dress', although it could mean ' throw ' . Whether this should depend on probabilities given real world knowledge, or only on strictly linguistic selectional restrictions, I leave open. Note that step 3 is one way in which the sentenceconstrains the processof word learning,

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not through the syntactic fonn of the arguments of the predicate but through gross consistency between the (candidate) arguments and the relationship expressedby a candidate R. This step is prelinguistic , in the sensethat it does not rely on the linguistic representation of the arguments, just on their gross meaning. It is quite different, then, from the effects of the linguistic mapping and checking involved in later stages. An interesting question is whether some ' ' of the effectsdescribedin the literature on syntactic bootstrapping are really due to this (non-linguistic) process, see Pinker (this volume) . At Step 4, however, the procedure is now linguistic in character. If R is a causal relationship between two entities, a causative lcs will be constructed. The system is now working with a linguistic representation, rather than just with construals of events, and conceptual properties of relationships and entities. With respect to the final steps, note that an incorrect representation will be entered into the lexicon, if the match discoveredin R6 is accidental. We must assumethat general principles of decay will eventually result in eradication of mistaken entries (cf. Draine 1971), since they will result in matches less often ' than correct entries. Moreover, the notion of a ' match requires further explication. The definition could require identity of fonn between the observed sentence and the predicted sentence, or it could allow for limited inconsistencies , in particular with respect to various ways of reducing the number of arguments that are actually expressedin a clause. Imperatives lack an overt subject, for example, there are elliptical fonns , and there are verbs like wash and eat, which can be syntactically intransitive while apparently ' ' maintaining a two -place semantic structure. Cognate objects (e.g. to die a ' ' peaceful death) and fake reflexives (e.g. to behaveoneself) pose the opposite problem, and a more detailed treatment is required than I will give here. The reconciliation model incorporates aspectsof both semanticand syntactic ' ' bootstrapping . It crucially involves mapping from a posited meaning to a syntactic fonn . It also exploits the surface syntax to constrain solutions. A simple result of the model is that the number, the position , and the fonn of the syntactic arguments of a predicate will constrain the semantic representation it is given. This is becauseof the grammatical principles regulating the lcs- syntax relation. Suppose for example, that a learner hears a sentencecontaining the verb give: Mary is giving the package to the boy, and observesan event in which one individual hands a package to another individual . Suppose the learner interprets the event as involving a three-place logical relationship of transfer . This ' R ' will be consistent with the content of the candidate of possession argument expressionsin the sentence: Mary , the package, and the boy, since


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theseare the right kind of entities to participate in such a relationship. Now the learner constructs an Ics for R (step 4), say x acts to transfery to z, and assignsthe candidate argument expressionsin the sentenceto positions in the lcs of the predicate. Supposethe learner assignsMary to x, the packageto y, and the boy to z. Then given the semantics-to-syntax mapping principles as they work out in English, the predicted s-structure is Mary verbsthe package to the boy. Since this is the observed s-structure, this experienceyields an Ics for give. (Note that the wrong assignmentof candidate argument expressions to lcs positions would not have yielded a match, hence no learning would have occurred.) Suppose, on the other hand, that the learner construes the event as one of holding or getting, interpretations that are equally consistent with gross observation. Now the learner will posit a two-place ' R ' . At step 3 the procedure might already break down, if the learner can decide that all of the candidate arguments in the clausemust be actual arguments, since there are 3 candidate arguments but only two actual arguments. Perhaps this is not so easy, however, since one or other of the phrases might be involved in some adjunct role. Assuming then, that the procedure will not halt at step 3, what ' happens? The learner now constructs one of the two Ics s, for hold or get, and examines the predicted s-structures that correspond to them. Let us assume that the Ics' s are something like : x havey , x come to havey . There is no way for these Ics representationsto yield the observed s-structure. They have the wrong number of arguments and since there is no way to treat the PP to the boy as an adjunct there is no way to reconcile the observed s-structure with the predicted s-structure. In addition , the arguments will be in the wrong ' ' syntactic position . Semantics-to-syntax mapping will place the getter or ' ' holder the ( boy) in subject position , but this will contradict the observed s-structure which has the giver (Mary ) in subject position . In general, the number of arguments in the observedsentencewill have to match the number of arguments of R : if a predicate expresses an n-place relationship it will have n syntactic arguments, and if it has n syntactic argumentsit will be a logical n place predicate. (I set aside here the disruptions to this generalizationmentioned above.) This is, more or less, what the Theta Criterion and the Projection Principle guarantee(Chomsky 1981) : the number of phrasal argumentsin the syntax is the sameas the number of (open) logical positions in the lexical representation of the predicate, and the syntactic derivation cannot changethe number of arguments. By the samereasoningReconciliationresolvesthe kill / die problem discussed above. A learner can conclude that die can be a change-of -state predicate but

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not a causative, that kill can be causativebut not change-of -state, and that melt can be both. This can be determinedjust on the basis of a single observation each for kill and die, and two observationsof melt, one in each complement structure. A verb which means to causesomething to change state must have two arguments, a verb which means to change state must have one. Hence, since kill has two syntactic arguments, it must have two semantic arguments and cannot have a change-of-state meaning. Since die has one syntactic argument it must have one semantic argument and cannot be causative. The syntactic form provides the information that there are two semanticarguments, which provides the necessaryinformation about possibleverb meanings. As we saw in section 3, in order to properly identify instances of the alternation betweencausativeand change-of -state meanings, it is necessaryto take into account the fact that the subject of one caseof the verb corresponds to the object of the other : We melted the ice, The ice melted. The properties of the arguments are essentialto distinguishing theseverbs from verbs like leave and eat. If intransitive eat is mistakenly analyzed as having a change of state meaning, its predicted s-structure will have what is eaten in subject position The ice ate. The observed s-structure will have the eater in subject position We ate. Hence the wrong analysis will be rejected. Similarly , if a learner fails to assigna change-of -state analysis to melt, treating it instead as having an lcs like intransitive leave or eat, the predicted s-structure will have the agent in the subject position ( We melted), while the observed s structure will have melted ice The in ). subject position ( entity undergoing the change of state Once again, the error will be avoided. The syntactic form of an argument will similarly constrain meaning. The the syntactic form dependson the semantic properties of the argument, hence and its semantics about information , can provide syntax of an argument hence about the semantics of a predicate. Sentential complements, for instance , will occur with verbs of propositional attitude (e.g. believe), verbs of ) . Reconciliation logical relation (e.g. entail) and verbs of saying (e.g. announce of errors by certain will fact this that types effect desired the has prevent with a is child a in which one is roughly event playing learners. Supposethe the to mean are that dog or being you dog and an adult says either I think ' ' it thinks learner the and That dog will kill you. If the verb means think ' ' while means kill , the predicted s structure will contain an NP complement . Similarly if the the observed s-structure will contain a clausal complement ' and the learner thinks it means ' think ' , the predicted s' kill verb means structure will contain a sentential complement while the observed s structure will contain an NP.


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In sum, under Reconciliation, the number, position, and form of the arguments of a predicate will all constrain the interpretations that can be assignedto that predicate. Of course, the samegeneral point can be made for many other kinds of linguistic infonnation : hearing a verb in the passive form , in the progressive, with a particular aspectual modifier and so forth , will similarly provide constraining information about the verb' s semantics, eliminating many posited, but incorrect, lexical semanticrepresentations. This captures the essenceof the issue addressed by syntactic bootstrapping : it provides a more precisecharacterization of the idea that the languagecan be used to map from observation to verb meanings. In so doing, however, it makes crucial use of the notions behind semantic bootstrapping, concerning the mapping betweensemanticsand syntax.

S. Conclusion

The important properties of Reconciliation are these: - It does not depend on exposuresto multiple sentence types, in the sense that neither cross-situational analysis, nor cross-sentential analysis is involved in setting up the lcs representations. Therefore the problems posed the variable sensesof a morpheme discussedin section 3 do not arise. by - It usessemantics to predict syntax where Universal Grammar makes this possible. - It usessyntax to eliminate wrong semantic candidateswhere possible. I emphasize again that I have addressed here the question of learning basic lexical semantic representations, and not the learnability problem discussedin much of the literature , which concerns the problem of determining which verbs participate in which ' alternations ' , see especially Pinker ( 1989) and referencestherein. Within the terms of the present discussion we could see this as the question of how the system should proceed when a single morpheme would be assignedmultiple representations, whether multiple Ics' s, or multiple syntactic configurations , but I will not explore the issue here. Also unexplored is the issue of how morphologically complex items are analyzed. Even with a procedure like Reconciliation, which exploits a full set of grammatical principles, there is no way to savea learner from having to learn some word meanings simply from observation. There are many are sets of


words which have absolutely identical linguistics. Such setsinclude the setsof causative verbs (kill , melt, burn) and change-of -state verbs (die, melt, burn) . Semantics-to -syntax mapping guaranteesthat each member of the set will be syntactically indistinguishable (just as the names of animals, cat versus dog for example, are not syntactically distinct ) . So examination of the surface ' syntax will not inform a learner as to whether a verb means to become ' ' ' liquid or to becomesolid . The general situation is that it is possible to use the surface syntax to constrain analysesof the semanticstructure of a verb, but not its semanticcontent: the fact that a verb is a change-of -state verb, but not the fact that it expresses a particular change of state. This is a matter of semanticcontent only and is not reflected in the syntax of a verb at all. Presumably, then, the semantic differences among members of these sets must be learned from observation about the world in some sense. However, this does not necessarilymean that the differencesare perceptual in character. A vast quantity of information about the world can be encodedlinguistically but is not linguistic itself. Thus a child can observe that melt is used of , for example, ice, while burn is used of , for example, paper. This is sufficient for the child to conclude that the meaningsare as they are rather than the other way around. In this way, it is possiblefor a child to know what a word means without ever having observed an event which would count as an occurrence of what the verb describes. Indeed if this were not the case it would be impo'Ssibleto understand how meaning differencesamong unobservableverbs are acquired: think, hope, imagine. For this reason, language is a source of essential information for lexical learning in two respects. As just discussed, languagecan convey information about word meaning which is orders of magnitude more informative than observation of the world can be. Second, by virtue of the grammatical principles that govern it , language constrains the possible representationsof words in ways that learnerscan exploit in word learning. Reconciliationis one way in which this might happen.

References . Syntactictheoryand the projectionproblem, LinguisticInquiry 10, 533- 581. Baker, C.L., 1979 . Chicago, IL : . Incorporation: A theory of grammaticalfunction changing Baker, M., 1988 . Universityof ChicagoPress . Learningthe structureof causativeverbs: A study in the relationshipof Bowerman , M., 1974 . Papersand Reports on Child Language and syntacticdevelopment semantic cognitive, . 8. StanfordUniversityDepartmentof Linguistics Development

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. Mappingthematicrolesonto syntacticfunctions: Are childrenhelpedby Bowerman , M., 1990 - 1289 . innatelinking rules? Linguistics28, 1253 . On two typesof modelsof the internalizationof grammars . In: D. Siobin Braine, M. D.S., 1971 of grammar: A theoreticalsymposium , 153- 186. New York: Academic (ed.), The ontogenesis Press . -bindingapproach . Italian syntax: A government . Dordrecht: Reidel. Burzio, L., 1986 . Learningto expressmotion eventsin Englishand Korean. Choi, S. and M. Bowerdian , 1991 Cognition41, 83- 121. . Lectureson governmentand binding. Dordrecht: Foris. , N., 1981 Chomsky . Language . The notion of sourcein languageacquisition Clark, E.V. and K.L. Carpenter , 1989 65, 1- 30. . On the semanticcontentof subcategorization Fisher, C., H. Gleitmanand L. R. Gleitman, 1991 . CognitivePsychology 23, 331- 392. frames Fisher, C., D.G. Hall, S. Rakowitzand L. Gleitman, this volume. Whenit is betterto receive than to give: Syntacticand conceptualconstraintson vocabularygrowth.. Lingua92, 333- 375 (this volume). . LanguageAcquisition1, 3- 55. . The structuralsourcesof verbmeanings Gleitman, L., 1990 . ForD1 Grimshaw , J:, 1981 , function, and the languageacquisitiondevice. In: C.L. Baker, J.J. , MA : MIT , 165- 182. Cambridge McCarthy(cds.), Thelogicalproblemof languageacquisition Press . Grimshaw, J., 1989. Getting the dative alternation. In : I. Laka and A. Mahajan (eds.), Functional heads and clause structure, 113- 122. MIT Working Papersin Linguistics Volume 10. . Argumentstructure. LinguisticInquiry Monograph18. Cambridge Grimshaw , J., 1990 , MA : . MIT Press . The leastlexicon. Colloquiumof the Institute for Researchin Cognitive Grimshaw ; J., 1993 . Science , Universityof Pennsylvania . Affectedness anddirectobjects: The Gropen, J., S. Pinker, M. Hollanderand R. Goldberg. 1991 in the acquisitionof verbargumentstructure.Cognition41, 153- 195. roleof lexicalsemantics . . Cambridge . Semanticstructures Jackendoff , R., 1990 , MA : MIT Press . Cambridge . Languageand experience Landau, B. and L. R. Gleitman, 1985 , MA : Harvard . UniversityPress . Ms. : At thesyntax-semantics interface . Unaccusativity Levin, B. and M. RappaportHovav, 1992 . Journalof Child Language17, . Childrenusesyntaxto learn verb meanings , L., 1990 Naigles 357- 374. . BerkeleyLinguistic . Impersonalpassives and the unaccusative Perlmutter , D., 1978 hypothesis Society4, 157- 189. . Ms., MIT . and cascades . Zero syntax, Vol. 1: Experiencers , D., 1992 Pesetsky . Cambridge . Languagelearnabilityand languagedevelopment Pinker, S., 1984 , MA : Harvard . UniversityPress . Learnabilityand cognition: The acquisitionof argumentstructure.Cambridge Pinker, S., 1989 , . MA : MIT Press ? Lingua92, 377- 410 . How coulda child useverbsyntaxto learnverbsemantics Pinker, S., 1994 (this volume). . Linguistics of languageacquisition . Catapultsand pendulums : The mechanics Randall, J., 1990 - 1406 . 28, 1381

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Wilkins, W., 1993 . Lexicalleamingby error detection . Ms., ArizonaStateUniversity. . Ms. Williams, E., 1992 . Remarkson lexicalknowledge Williams, E., in press . Thematicstructurein syntax. Cambridge . , MA : MIT Press Zubizarreta, M.-L., 1987 . Levelsof representation in the lexiconand syntax. Dordrecht: Foris.

Section 6

Procedures for verb learning


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Surface cues and ro bust inference as a basis for the early acquisition of subcategorization frames * M.R. Brent Departmentoj Cognitive Science. Johns Hopkins University. Baltimore. MD 21218. USA

How could children possiblyacquiretheir first subcategorization frames? The hypothesis that they directly observethe syntactic structuresof the utterancesthey hear raisestwo . First, how can childrenparseinput utterancesreliably without alreadyknowingthe questions , how do childrensurvivethe ungrammati syntacticpropertiesof all the wordsin them? Second calor misconstruedutterancesthey inevitably encounter ? This paper suggestsa specific inferencealgorithm that substantiallyreducesthe effectsof ungrammaticalor misconstrued , theycan useapproximatecues input. Sincechildrenmusthavesomesuchinferenceprocedure to determinesyntacticstructure. In particular, theycanusestring-local surfacecuesratherthan . Suchcuesmake it possibleto discoverrelevantsyntacticstructurein an global constraints utterancewithout alreadyknowingall the wordsin it. This papersuggests a possiblesetof cues for English subcategorizationframes that assumesonly the ability to detect the ends of utterancesand knowledgeof a few function morphemesand proper names . Simulation on naturallyoccurring, child-directedEnglishshowthat thesecues, combinedwith experiments the proposedinferencemechanism , do surprisingly well at discoveringsubcategorization frames.

1. Introduction

Individual words differ in the syntactic types of the phrases that can representtheir semantic arguments. For example, watch takes a noun-phrase argument while look does not.

( I a) JanewatchedBob ( I b) *Janelooked Bob .

This work benefited enormously from conversations with Bob Berwick, Lou Ann Gerken, Lila Gleitman, Jane Grimshaw, and Elissa Newport . Any remaining faults ... they probably tried to talk me out of. . ScienceB.V. All - 3841/94/ $07.00 ce 0024 > 1994- Elsevier rights reserved SSDJ0024- 3841(93) EO046- A

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Similarly , pretend takes a tensed clause or an infinitive argument while play does not .

(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d)

Jane is pretending to be grown up * Jane is playing to be grown up Jane is pretending she is grown up * Jane is playing she is grown up

Chomsky ( 1965) referred to these properties of words as their subcategorization frames. In general, a word may have several subcategorization frames, just as it may have several syntactic categories. Within a given language, the subcategorizationframes and the meaningsof words are strongly correlated ( Fisher et al. 1991, Levin 1993, Zwicky 1970) . For example, all English words that take three semantic arguments of which " one is realized as a direct object and one as a tensedclause, as in I told him " ' I m happy , are verbs of communication (Zwicky 1970) . Examples include tel/, write, fax , inform, warn, advise, and so on. It has been hypothesizedthat the correlation between subcategorization frames and meanings plays an important role in lexical acquisition. Pinker and colleagues have proposed that children typically learn the meaning of a word first , then exploit the regular correspondencebetween meaning and subcategorization to infer its subcategorization frames (Pinker 1984, 1989) . Conversely, Gleitman and colleagues have proposed that children often learn the subcategorization frame first , then exploit the correspondenceto restrict their hypothesesabout its possible meanings (Landau and Gleitman 1985, Gleitman 1990) . These two proposals are known as the semantic bootstrapping and syntactic boot 1 strapping hypotheses, respectively.

1.1. Theproblem ' Both semanticand syntactic bootstrapping depend on two-year-olds ability to learn the subcategorization frames of some words without relying on their meanings. This is obvious in the caseof syntactic bootstrapping if children are to rely on the subcategorizations of some particular word to infer its meaning they cannot also rely on its meaning to infer its subcategorizations. In the case of semantic bootstrapping, the problem is that languages vary 1 Semanticbootstrapping also refersto the more generalhypothesisthat lexical semantics ' , Pinker 1984 ). providesthe basisfor childrens acquisitionof lexicalsyntax(Grimshaw1981

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substantially in which particular subcategorization frames correspond to which particular meanings. This variation implies that children must learn the language-particular correspondencebefore using it to infer the subcategorizations from meanings. To learn the correspondence they must learn the meaningsand subcategorizationsof some words independently (Pinker 1989, Gropen et al. 1991). Although the semantic and syntactic bootstrap ping hypotheses have generated a substantial literature , no non-semantic procedure by which children might learn subcategorizations has been developed. There have been insightful proposals about the general type of cues that might be exploited in such a procedure, notably prosodic cues to syntactic structure such as voice pitch, pausing, and vowel duration ( Fisher and Tokura 1993, Lederer and Kelly 1992, Morgan 1986, Fernald and Kuh11987, Hirsh -Pasek et al. 1987, Jusczyk et al. 1993, Kemler -Nelson et al. 1989, Mehler et al. 1988) . This proposal, known as the prosodic bootstrap ping hypothesis, holds that children can recover partial syntactic bracketing (but not category labels) from prosodic cues. However, no explicit procedure has been proposed for recovering bracketings nor for extracting linguistic regularities from them on the basis of prosodic cues. It seemsthat young children must infer some of the lexical syntax of their languages- the syntactic facts about individual words - from larger syntactic structures. But it is difficult to see how children could identify syntactic structure in an utterance without already knowing the syntactic functions of some of the words in the utterance. This posesan apparent paradox : to learn lexical syntax, children must recover the syntactic structure of the input ; to recover syntactic structure, they must already know lexical syntax - the bootstraps need bootstraps.

1.2. Hypotheses This paper investigatesthe possibility that children first learn the syntactic functions of a few words that are extremely common and highly informative about syntactic structure, then exploit these words as probabilistic cues to key syntactic structures in the input utterances. The function morphemes - prepositions, determiners, inflection , pronouns , auxiliary verbs, and complementizers - are typically the shortest, most common , and most syntactically informative words in a .language - ideal starting points for learning syntax (Morgan et al. 1987, Valian and Coulson 1988) . The fact that children do not use function morphemes consistently until quite late

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has suggestedto some that young children do not know them. Logically , however, children must know some function morphemes by the time they are learning subcategorization frames - they cannot observe that look subcategorizes for a prepositional phrase without the ability to recognize even one preposition . Further , the next section reviews a substantial body of empirical evidence that English-speaking children know the syntactic privileges of a number of function morphemes before they are two -and-a-half years old . Although function morphemes provide a great deal of infonnation about syntactic structure, they do not provide enough for complete, unambiguous syntactic parsing. This paper investigatesthe hypothesis that young children can learn lexical syntax on the basis of partial and uncertain syntactic analyses of input utterances, and that they can cope with the resulting misconstruals using statistical inference. 1.3. Context and methodology

From one perspective, the current approach resemblesparameter-setting models (Chomsky 1981, 1986; Lightfoot 1991) : it assumesa fixed, finite menu of subcategorization frames from which a lexical entry is selectedfor each verb. For each verb V and each subcategorizationS , the presenceor ' absence of S in V s lexical entry can be seen as a binary -valued lexical parameter. The function -morpheme cues proposed here can be seen as triggers for the subcategorization parameters. For present purposes it does not matter whether the menu of possible subcategorizationframes is innate or acquired- only that knowledgeof the menu is independentof the mechanisms children use to selectfrom it. The statisticalinferencecomponent of the current proposal can be seenas redeeminga promissory note left (often unsigned) by work on parameter-setting models. As Lightfoot ( 1991: 19) puts it : 'We shall need to characterizethe robustnessof the data which may act as a trigger. . One can be sure that Robustnessis presumablya function of saliencyand frequency " " arenot alwayssetby singleevents;that wouldmakethechild too triggerhappy parameters , and inclinedto draw long-tenDconclusions(a metaphor ) from insufficientdata. However than others.' someparameters may requiremoretriggeringexperience A precise algorithm for determining the amount of data required to set ' ' each parameter is represented in section 3 (and in the Appendix ) . This appears to be the first explicit proposal in this domain . This work suggests that weighing linguistic evidence is by no means a trivial problem ; indeed , as

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a major component of any realistic mechanism for language acquisition, robust inference deservesmuch more attention t~an it has received to date. Further , robust inference procedures make available new approaches to languagelearning problems and new methods for evaluating them. Ultimately, this gives the work presented here a character quite different from that of both parameter-setting models and learnability models (e.g. Wexier and Culicover 1980, Morgan 1986). The ability to cope with occasional input errors implies the ability to use probabilistic or approximate cues. In English, for example, the word to followed by a word that can be interpreted as an uninflected verb usually marks an infinitive . However, the sentenceJohn drove to fish markets allover town is an exception to this generalization. If such exceptionsare rare enough (and distributed appropriately) the generalization can still be used as a cue; an inference procedure can discount evidence generated exclusively by the exceptions. The infinitive cue is local, in the sensethat it can be used without regard to the rest of the sentence, if there is a mechanism for handling the resulting errors. It can also be thought of as a surface cue (Kimball 1973). By proposing that children use surface cues, the present model comes closer to contacting the actual input than parameter-setting and learnability models, where it is typically assumed that the input to syntax learning includes bracketeddeep-structure or surface-structure representations . Subcategorization frames can be read directly off the deep structure, so assuming such inputs is tantamount to assumingaway the problem under investigation here. Closer contact with the input makes it natural to test models of this kind by computer simulation on naturally occurring input ( Bever 1991). This paper reports on a simulation using transcripts of the child-directed English from the CHILDES database(~ acWhinney 1991). The resultsof the simulation support the notion that it is possible to learn subcategorization frames without parsing, without knowing much lexical syntax aside from a few function words, and without relying on semantics. As a method of investigation , simulation is quite different from the theoretical arguments presented by Wexier and Culicover , Lightfoot , Morgan , and others. One important difference is that it takes account of the quantitative structure of naturally occurring , child -directed language. It has been suggestedthat the presence of a few, high -frequency syntactic markers like the common function words may be a critical property that makes languageslearnable (Morgan et al. 1987, Valian and Coulson 1988) . For example, if English had fifty equally frequent determiners, fifty verbal inflections , fifty complementizers, and so on , it might not be learnable.

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Simulation experiments are responsive to such quantitative properties of language, while learnability theory is not. Similarly , child -directed speech tends to contain shorter sentencesand more questionsthan adult-directed speech, and to contain repeatsof the same phrase in different contexts (Morgan 1986, Newport et al. 1977) . It has been suggestedthat this may either aid or disrupt language acquisition. In either case, simulation experiments using transcripts of child -directed speechreflect the distributional properties of child -directed sentences , whereas theoretical do not. arguments Although simulation has a number of advantages, no one mode of investigation resolves all questions. While some of the strategies embodied in the cues for English will carryover to some other languages, the cues themselves are necessarilyspecific to English, and this limits the conclusions one can draw from simulation experiments that use them. Further , the present simulation takes as its input orthographic transcripts of child -directed speech. Such transcripts are closer to the input children actually receive than deepstructure trees, but they are much more abstract than an acoustic signal. 1.4. Organization

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the evidence that children younger than two -and-a-half years old are able to recognizespecific function morphemesand to exploit them in understanding, despite their failure to use them reliably in speech. Section 3 develops one possible implementation of the current proposals. Section 4 presents experiments using a computer model and transcripts of child -directed speechfrom the CHILDES corpus. Finally , section 5 summarizes the results of this investigation and draws conclusions. 2. Children ' s resources

One of the major hypotheses advanced here is that children rely on the distribution of function morphemesin the early acquisition of subcategorization frames. This hypothesis is only plausible if young children recognize the syntactic privileges of function morphemes. In addition , the model presented in section 3 assumesthat young children know some proper names by the time they need to learn syntactic frames. Finally , the model assumesthat children can detect the ends of utterances using prosodic cues such as pause

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length, pitch , vowel duration , and volume. This section reviews the empirical basesfor theseassumptions. 2.1. Function morphemesand names The fact that young children do not use function words reliably has sometimesbeenexplainedby claiming their grammarslack function morphemes ' ( Radford 1988, 1991). It has been further proposed that children s putative ignorance of function morphemesresults from a perceptual failure - they do not hear or cannot distinguish function morphemes in most languages becausethey are unstressed(Gleitman et al. 1988) . However, a substantial . body of convergentevidencehas accumulatedagainst eachof thesehypotheses Briefly, it has been shown that : ( I ) Even infants can distinguish unstressed syllables as well as stressed syllables (Jusczyk and Thompson 1978, Williams and Bush 1978) . This refutes the perceptual 4explanation' of children' s putative ignorance of function morphemes. ' (2) Constraints on the metrical and prosodic phonology of children s speech provide better explanationsof their patterns of omission than simple ignorance (Demuth 1993, Gerken and McIntosh 1993, Gerken 1992, Wilnen et al. 1992). This removesthe motivation for the ignorancehypothesis. (3) Children are sensitive to the presence and correct usage of function morphemes in adult speech, as assessedby a variety of techniques (see below). This directly refutes the ignorance hypothesis. The direct evidence that children are sensitive to the presenceand correct usageof function morphemesis summarized below: ( I ) On imitation tasks, young children (age 1; 11- 2;6, MLU 1.30- 2. 00, M = 1.73) omit English function morphemes more often than unstressed nonsense syllables (Gerken et al. 1990) . This effect persists when the sentencesare synthesizedautomatically to control for possible prosodic differencesbetweengrammatical and ungrammatical sentencesspoken by humans (age 2;0- 2;6, MLU 1.57- 2. 60, M = 2. 07), and when the nonsense words are composed of phonemic segmentssimilar to those of English function morphemes (age 2;0- 2;6, M MLU = 2.20) . This indicates that children younger than two-and-a-half distinguish between English function morphemes and similar nonsense syllables - i.e. they know the

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specific segmental content English function morphemes, if not their syntactic and semantic functions. (2) Young children tend to interpret a novel noun as referring to a class of " " objectswhen it is taught with an article ( This is a dax ). When it is taught " " without an article ( This is dax ) they tend to interpret it as referring to a unique individual (Katz et al. 1974, Gelman and Taylor 1984). (GT subjects age2;2- 3;0, mean 2;6. KBM : girls, mean age 1;5.) This indicatesthat young children recognize some English detenniners and that they distinguish betweencommon and proper nouns both syntacticallyand semantically. 3 ( ) Young children understand grammatical English sentencessignificantly more often than sentencesin which the function morphemes are deleted (Shipley et al. 1969, Petretic and Tweeney 1976), or in which function words are replaced by nonsensesyllables (Petretic and Tweeney 1976) (SSG: age 1;7- 2;5 mean 2; 1, median-LV I 1.85. PT: mean age 2;3, MLU 1.07- 1.66) . The effect persists when function morphemes are replaced by others of the wrong category, as in * Find was bird for me, where was is substituted for a determiner (Gerken and McIntosh 1993) . ( Least mature group, MLU < 1.50, M = 1.15, produced no articles during session.) This indicatesthat two-year-olds who almost never usefunction morphemes can neverthelessdistinguish their syntactic privileges. Taken together, these experiments demonstrate that ~hildren younger than two-and-a-half years old, who almost never produce function words, know the segmental, syntactic, and semanticproperties of determinersand auxiliaries. In light of this evidence, there is no reason to doubt that they have similar facility with pronouns and inflectional suffixes.

2.2. Prosody The prosodic properties of a sentenceare linguistically significant properties of its sound including intonation and rhythmic properties like vowel duration , pausing, and volume. These properties are believed to be governed by rules that are distinct from but sensitiveto syntactic structure (Nespor and Vogel 1982, Selkirk 1981) . It has been hypothesized(under the rubric of prosodic bootstrapping) that young children recover a sybstantial amount of syntactic structure, perhaps even an unlabeled bracketing of all major syntactic constituents, on the basis of prosodic information (Morgan 1986). Substantiatingthis hypothesisrequires, at least, establishingthat young children attend to prosody and that it is possible


to recover syntactic structure from the prosodic properties of sentences without already knowing the language. There is ample evidence for the former ( Fernald and Kuh11987, Hirsh -Paseket al. 1987, Jusczyk et al. 1993, Kemler-Nelson et al. 1989, Mehler et al. 1988), but little for the latter. A number of studies have been done, but they used carefully constructed pairs of ambiguous sentences , read aloud ( Lederer and Kelly 1992, Morgan 1986). As Fisher (in press) points out , the prosodic properties of reading aloud may well be different from those of fluent speech, and the syntactic properties of the constructed sentencesare certainly different from those of the very short sentencesthat typify speechdirected at young children. Further , the readers in some of these experiments may have been aware that the sentenceswere ambiguous, and hencetried to disambiguate them prosodically. However, Fisher and Tokura ( 1993) have shown that the boundaries of utterances - sentencesor sentencefragments - can be predicted from the prosodic properties of natural , infant -directed speech in both English and . For each syllable in samplesof natural speechby mothers to their Japanese 8- and l4 -month-old children, they measuredpauseduration , vowel duration , fundamental frequency excursion within each vowel, and average amplitude within each vowel. Each syllable was labeled as utterance-final , phrase-final , word -final , or non-final and a discriminant analysis was performed on onehalf of the sample in each language. When the resulting classification was applied to the other half of the sample, it correctly predicted 61% of all utterance boundaries (false negative error 39% ) . More importantly , 93% of all the utteranceboundariesit predicted were correct (false positive error 7 % ), even though only 28% of all syllableswere utterance-final. Similar resultswere obtained for predicting utterance-final syllablesin Japane~ , using a classification function basedon the Japanesesample. Remarkably, the classifier based on the English sample performed almost as well at predicting utterance-final syllables in Japaneseas did the one based on the Japanesesample. It is possible, then, that a single classification procedure for finding utterance boundariesis innate and universal. When the samemethod was applied to find a classificationfunction for predicting syllablesthat end either an NP or a VP, but not a whole utterance, the results were roughly at chance.

3. An implementation This section describesone possible implementation of a learning strategy based on function morpheme cues and statistical error reduction. This

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implementation servesas a carefully worked out example that clarifies some of the implications of such a strategy. It also servesas the instrument for the simulation experiment presentedin the next section. 3.1. Overview This subsection explains how the model works in general terms ; the following subsections fill in the details . First , note that subcategorization frames , as described by Chomsky ( 1965), do not distinguish between tensed clauses and infinitives - both are described as sentences. Sentential complements are realized as tensed clauses or infinitives as a result of lexical features and transformations . The cues described below , however , recover only the syntactic forms of arguments as they occur in utterances . (Boguraev and Briscoe , 1987, provide evidence that it is usually ' possible to recover the lexical features required in Chomsky s analysis from surface argument types mechanically , but that question is not addressed here.) In addition , this implementation recovers some information that is usually thought of as function word selection , rather than subcategorization . the To avoid confusion , representations recovered in this implementation are referred to as syntactic frames , or simply frames . The syntactic frames inves.tigated here , excluding selection for prepositions and complementizers , are shown in table I . Table I The syntacticframesstudiesin the simulation

SF description

Good example

Badexample

NP only tensedclause infinitive PP only NP & clause NP & infinitive NP & NP NP & PP

greet them ' hope he ll attend to hope attend listen to me ' tell him he s a fool want him to attend tell him the story put it on the table

* arrive them * tell he' ll attend * greet to attend * put on it ' * yell him he s a fool * to attend him hope * want him the story * Iisten him to me

The task of learning follows :

syntacticframes for verbs can be broken down as

M.R. Brent! Surface cuesandrobustinference

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( 1) Collect observations about the syntactic frames manifested in each input utterance: (a) Identify a verb, V , in the utterance (b) Identify phrasesin positions where complementsof V can occur (c) For each potential complement, C, determine whether C is in fact a subcategorizedcomplement of V 2 Make inferencesabout the lexicon by analyzing the observations in such ( ) a way that the effects of ungrammatical and misconstrued input are minimized Step I and Step 2 could be interleaved, so the lexicon is potentially updated after each input utterance, but the implementation presented here draws conclusions only after a body of observations has been collected, since this approach is con,ceptually simpler. The implementation presented here includes cues for collecting observations in English and a novel inference method that can be applied to other cues and to other languages. The cues assumeno knowledge of lexical items except for proper namesand a few function morphemes. Although they refer to categorieslike determiner and pronoun , the initial lexicon of items in each category need not be complete. The cues used for detecting verbs in this implementation have two logically separable components: one that identifies words that can be verbs, and another that excludes occurrencesof such words in contexts where they are unlikely to befunctioning as verbs. As each utterance is processed, any word that has already occurred both with and without the suffixing is assumedto have a verbal sense. All occurrencesof such a word are taken to be verbal occurrencesexcept when preceded by a known determiner or . preposition verbs are very rare in those positions. The cuesusedfor identifying phrasesin this implementationare as follows (see table 3, page450). Proper nouns and pronouns are taken as noun phrases( NPs). (This classof words is called lexical NP, or LNP , hereafter.) Detenniners are also taken as signalingNPs. ( Theclassof detenninersand LNPs is referredto as NPLE , for NP left- edge, in table 3.) Prepositionsfollowed by NPs are taken as PPs. To followed by a word that has alreadyoccurredboth with and without the suffixing is taken as marking an infinitive. A complementizer(such as that) followed by a determineror NP is taken as the beginningof a tensedclause. So, too, is an NP followed by a previouslyidentified verb. Phrasesare only relevant when they are in a position to serve as part of a syntactic frame that the learner is looking for . For example, there is no

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M.R. Brent! Surfacecuesandrobustinference

frame that contains a tensedclausefollowed by an NP , so the implementation does not look for that sequenceof phrases. The problem of whether a phrase is in fact a subcategorizedcomplement of a given verb is resolved in an approximate manner, leaving the errors to be cleanedup by the inferencecomponent. In particular, a phrase is taken to be a complement of a verb if it follows that verb immediately, or if it follows a proper name or pronoun that follows the verb immediately. Further , NPs are taken as complementsonly if they are unlikely to be subjects- specifically, if they are followed by an utterance boundary or a cue for another complement phrase. Although the details of this strategy are specific to English, there appears to be a cross-linguistic tendency for subcategorizedcomplements to occur near their verbs. The statistical inference component takes as input the number of times each verb has occurred with cues for each frame, along with the total number of times each verb has occurred in any context. Thus, the implementation keepstrack of three things as it collects observations: ( I ) Which words have occurred both with and without -inK, not counting occurrencesprecededby a preposition or a detenniner. These words are . treated as having verbal senses (2) How many times each word with a verbal sense has occurred, not c' Ountingoccurrencesprecededby a preposition or a detenniner. 3 ( ) How many of those occurrenceswere followed by cues for each of the syntactic frames. This infonnation is kept in a data structure called an observationstable. An alphabetically contiguous portion of the observations table from an experimental run is shown in table 2. Each row representsdata collected from one of word fonns , an -ing fonn and its stem form . The first column, titled pair V , contains the total number of times the word occurs in positions where it could be functioning as a verb. Each subsequentcolumn representsa single frame. ' CI' stands for a tensed clause argument with that or null Cornple' ' ' mentizer, ' in ' , ' on' , and ' to for PPs headed by those prepositions, inf for ' ' infinitive V Ps, and wh for clauses headed by what or where. The number appearing in each row and column representsthe number of times that the ' row' s verb co-occurred with cues for the column s frame. Zeros are omitted. For example, pretend and pretending occurred a combined total of 14 times, excluding those occurrencesthat followed detenninersor prepositions. Two of those occurrenceswere followed by a cue for a tensedclauseand one by a cue

M . R. Brent ! Surface cuesand robust iliference

445

Table2 Rawobservations , for the first 7Sverbsin alphabeticalorder , beforestatisticalprocessing

V NP NPNPNPclNPinNPinfNPonNPtoNPwhcl in inf on to wh

bring brush button buy call carry catch cheat chew clean close color comb come cook cry cut dance do draw drink drive eat even fall feed feel find fish fix fly forget get give go grow have

-

21 118 17 52 54 25 12 88 19 6 3 13 5 2 1 15 1 10 97 43 99 1 25 6 298 6 19 1 42 5 16 5 21 -

add ask be blow

142418410 23 I 33 4 19 4 254 64 13 46 25 4 55 15 103 34 17 32 15 6 6 I 398 84 3 91 4 8 982 5 3 506 59

2 1 1

2

162 1

1 7

1 3

2

I I 24 113 3 26

3 9

3

3 S6 3

M.R. BrentI Surfacecuesandrobustinference

446

Table2 (Cont.) V

jump keep kick knock

in inf on to wh

32 48 23 27 5 3 24 27 3 34 5 2 17 I 13 7 12 ' 15 6

laugh lay leave lick lie lift listen live look make meet miss move mow

824 4 18342 2 I 31 II 30 5 2

nap open pat pick pitch play pour pretend pull push put rain

123SS 41 28 66 3 2 228 I 12 14 S7 9 I 44 S I 99S46 I 7

18 26

I 12 21

9 I -

hide hold hurt invent

NP NPNP NPcl NPin NPinf NPon NPto NPwh cl

2S

I I 5

for an infinitive . The observations table is the input to the statistical inference procedure. The statistical inference component of this implementation has two parts : one estimatesthe error rate for each frame, and the other usesthis estimate to weigh the evidenceprovided about that frame by multiple occurrencesof each verb. In particular , the latter component considers the number of times the


447

verb occurred with cues for the frame and the number of times it occurred without , much as one would consider the number of headsand the number of tails turned up by a coin to determine whether or not it is fair . The method of estimating the error rate was designed specifically for this implementation, while the method for weighing the evidence in light of the error rate is a standard one. The error estimation procedure is based on some simplifying approximations . First , for each frame , a single source of error dominates all others in terms of frequency. Second, errors from this source are distributed evenly across verbs. Third , verbs that in fact have a given frame occur with cues for that frame with significantly higher probability than verbs that do not have it . Put another way, false alarms are less frequent than true alarms. To the extent that these approximations hold , the verbs with cues for a given frame consist entirely of false whose co-occurrence ' alarms should have a relatively low rate of co-occurrence with those cpes, and their rates of co-occurrence should be distributed binomially . These facts can be used to identify a sample of verbs whose co-occurrence with cues for a frame consist entirely of false alarms, or miscues. This sample can then be used to estimate the error rate. The remainder of this section provides a more detailed discussion of the implementation and the rationale behind its design. Readers interested primarily in the experimental results can proceed to section 4 without loss of continuity . 3.2. Collecting observations

3.2.J. Finding verbs Whyfind verbs? Although verbs are not the only words with subcategorization frames, their syntactic properties are sufficiently different from those of other words that they must be analyzed separately. One important difference betweenverbs and nouns is illustrated in (3) :

(3a) (3b) (3c)

John liked to pretend[cp he wasat the theater] *John liked to play [cp he wasat the theater] John liked the play [cp he sawat the theater]

(3a) is grammatical because the verb pretend takes a tensed clause (CP) argument; (3b) is ungrammatical because the verb play does not ; (3c) is grammatical becauseplay is functioning as a noun and the following clauseis

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a relative clause rather than an argument of play . Any common noun can have a relative clause, so noticing a tensedclauseis not informative about the syntactic frames of a preceding noun, but it is informative about those of a preceding verb. A similar difficulty arises from the fact that , in English, verbs can take NP complementsbut nouns cannot:

' ] [NPthe world s largestbank] (4a) We plannedto [" purchase ' ] [NPthe world s largestbank] wasprofitable (4b) . Our [N purchase Further, the NP complementof a verb tendsto becomea PP headedby of in the verb's nominalization: ' ' (5) Our [N purchase] of [NP the world s largest bank] was profitable Thus if observations of purchase the noun and purchase the verb were not distinguished, they would provide contradictory evidence about whether or not purchasetakes an NP complement. This has consequencesfor nouns that are not ambiguous as well - cues indicating that a word has an NP complement should be disregarded in the presenceof evidencethat the word is a noun. The proposed statistical inference method adds to the importance of distinguishing between nouns and verbs. It is based on the simplifying assumption that miscuesfor a given frame are distributed fairly evenly across words. This assumption is violated if data from nouns and verbs are pooled. To see this, suppose that no discrimination were made between nouns and verbs. Further , suppose that a clause following a word W were taken as evidencethat W takes a tensedclause argument. Example (3) shows that the likelihood of that evidencebeing incorrect is much higher if W is a noun than if W is a verb. Thus, distinguishing betweennouns and verbs is important for obtaining a relatively uniform distribution of errors. This would be true even if there were no lexical ambiguity . Cuesfor finding verbs. In English, there are several function -morpheme cues that provide evidenceabout major category, but none of them is ideal. In general, the simplest cues tend to be either less reliable or less common than more complex ones. For example, a simple, reliable cue is that words following a form of be and ending in - ing (progressives) are very likely to be verbs. Unfortunately , a number of words occur in the progressiveconstruc-

.MR . Brent / Surface cuesand robust inference

449

tion very rarely, if ever. These include some of the most common and most syntactically interesting words in child -directed speech, such as know, want, like and see. The following two-part procedure for identifying verbs is a reasonable compromise among simplicity , frequency, and reliability : first , identify words that occur as verbs ; second, when such a word occurs, assume it is functioning as a verb , except in the presence of evidence to the contrary . All words that can occur as verbs can occur both with and without the final syllableing , and all but a few words with that property can occur as verbs. Even mental state verbs like know, which rarely occur in the progressive, have nominalizations ending in -ing (Knowing how to read a map is useful) . A learner who has identified potential verbs can now proceed by trying to weed out their non -verbal occurrences. Occurrences , prepositions , or non -auxiliary verbs, for example, following determiners ' are unlikely to be verbal . The simulations are based on the -ing cue for potential verbs and the determiner and preposition cues for non -yerbal occurrences.2 However , these cues are not without difficulties . Nominalizations of mental states like knowing, linking , and wanting appear to be rare in child -directed speech, perhaps becausethey are semantically abstract. A second problem is that some ambiguous words occur as nouns more often than they occur as verbs, even when occurrences following determiners and prepositions are excluded. 3.2.2. Identifying potential complements This implementation focuses on four complement types: Noun phrase NP ( ), prepositional phrase (PP), infinitive verb phrase (VP), and tensedclause ' or ' compleinentizer phrase (CP) . Within thesemajor categories, PPs and CPs are distinguished by their head prepositions and complementizers, respectively . For example, a CP headedby that is treated as a separatecomplement type from one headed by what or where. The goal is to find representativesof each complement type that occur frequently in the input , and that can be identified without the need to know a lot of other words. The words that must be known to identify these ' ' 2 In speechthere is only one allomorph of the morpheme ling / . In written English the ing suffix can induce spelling changes at the end of the stem, and the simulation includes some techniques for negotiating those spelling changes. Description of these techniques has been omitted since the orthographic problem they solve does not occur in auralleaming .

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M.R. Brent/ Surfacecues and

robust inference

representatives should be very common and regular, preferably without morphological variation . In terms of these criteria , pronouns and proper names (i.e., lexical NPs) are ideal representatives of the noun phrases. Determiners are also in identifying NPs. Given these NPs, a simple cue for prepositional phrasesis a preposition followed by an NP. The best cues for infinitive V Ps and tensedclauses(CPs) take advantageof the verb list that is being learned from the -ing cue. Specifically, any verb that follows to is interpreted as an infinitive . Similarly , any lexical NP followed by a verb is taken to be the subject of a CP. In addition , a complementizer followed by a lexical NP - as in that he or where it - is taken to head a CP. The complementizer that is frequently omitted , so the first CP cue, which does not rely on explicit complementizers, is important . The English cues outlined above are summarized in table 3.3 NP left-edge (NPLE ) refers to the class of lexical NPs and determiners. Table3 The cues used by the simulation for identifying complements . LNP (Lexical NP) includes . NPLE (NP left edge) includesLNP and the determiners pronounsand personalnames

Phrasalcategory

Cue

NP

NPLE

Example Don' t eat that.

pp VP(inf) CP

P NPLE 10V C NPLE (C) LNPV

Put your toy on die ftoor. Do you like to dance? I hope that you like it . I know you drink vodka.

I sawa eat.

3.2.3. Determining subcategorization Once the learner has found a verb and a potential complement phrase, it must detennine whether the phrase is in fact a subcategorizedcomplement of the verb. This implementation takes a phrase P as a complement of a verb V if : ( 1) P is ' near' enough to V , and (2) P is unlikely to be the subject of 3 Thesecuesdo not distinguishbetweenthe headsof prepositionalphrasesand post-verbal " " , like the up in I looked up an obscureword yesterday. Particlescan appeareither particles " betweenthe verband the NP or after the NP, as in I look themup everyday" . In the fonDer casethe cueswould indicatea PP headedby up. It is not difficult to imagineproceduresfor analyzingthe output. of the current systemto discoverthe particle alternation, but such exceedthe scopeof the currentpaper. procedures

M .R. Brent ! Surface cuesand robust inference

anotherclause. P is near enoughto V if P follows V immediatelyor if one lexical NP (LNP ) intervenes. It follows that a verb is recognized as taking two complementsin a singlesentenceonly if the first is an NP. A phraseP is deemed unlikely to be a subject if either, (i) it is an NP followed by an utterance boundary or a cue for another argument phrasetype, or (ii ) if it is not an NP. The sametwo- part strategymay be applicableto many languages , although the specificcriteria for nearnessand non-subjecthoodmay be different. Like all syntactic cues, the nearness criterion is imperfect. Indeed it is incorrect for several types of grammatical sentences , such as: (6) John put [NP the toy Mary wanted] on the floor In (6) the nearnesscriterion classifies ' on the floor ' as a complement of 'anted, when in fact it is a complement of put . The argument-adjunct distinction poses another problem for the nearness criterion. (7a) John wanted ( * in order) to pursuea career in finance [Argument] (7b) John resigned(in order) to pursuea career in finance [Adjunct ] In (7a) the infinitive VP ' to pursue ...' is a subcategorizedcomplement of " 'ant in the sensethat : (i ) removing it renders the sentenceungrammatical, and (ii ) its semantic function as an aspiration is a special lexical property of " 'ant and a few dozen other verbs. Thus, the nearnesscriterion gives the correct result. The infinitive VP in (7b), by contrast, can be removed without affecting the grammaticality of the sentence, and its semantic function as the purpose for which an action was carried out is not special to a small class of verbs. The infinitive in (7a) is called an argument while the one in (7b) is called an adjunct. Purpose adjuncts can be diagnosed by inserting ' in order' before the infinitive - if the infinitive is an argument the result will be very bad. but if it is an adjunct the result will be a perfect paraphrase. The nearnesscriterion fails to distinguish between subcategorizedarguments and non-subcategorizedadjuncts. However, it should be noted that no syntactic analysiscan distinguish arguments from adjuncts, unlessit already knows the syntactic frames of the verbs in question. Although purpose adjuncts can be easily diagnosed in most cases, it is worth noting that there are no satisfactory, necessaryand sufficient conditions for distinguishing between arguments and adjuncts in general (Adams and Macfarland 1991).

M. R. Brent/ Surfacecuesandrobustinference

3.3. Robustinference Children hear ungrammatical utterances, and probably misconstrue some grammatical utterances, but these aberrations appear to have no impact on their ultimate grammars. This would not be possible if they drew irrevocable conclusions on the basis of single observations. This section suggests a method that appears suitable for weighing evidence from multiple observations . It exploits the standard method of hypothesis testing, along with a novel method for estimatizing the necessaryparameters. In the following discussion, verbs whose lexical entries permit some particular syntactic frame S are described as +S verbs; the remainder are describedas - S verbsS verbs may occur with cues for S either becauseof ungrammatical input or becausethe cues are imperfect diagnostics. Both of thesesituations are referred to as miscues. The occurrence of miscuescan be thought of as a random process. Each occurrenceof a verb V has some non-zero probability of being followed by a cue for a frame S, even if V cannot grammatically occur in S. If this model is accurate, the more times V occurs, the more likely it is to occur at least once with a cue for S. The intransitive verb arrive, for example, will eventually occur with a cue for an NP argument, if enough text is considered. A learner that treats a single occurrence of a verb followed by a cue as conclusive evidencewill eventually come to the false conclusion that arrive is transitive. In other words, the information provided by the cues will eventually be washed out by the noise. This problem is inherent in learning from naturally occurring language, since infallible parsing is not possible. The only way to prevent it is to consider the frequency with which each verb occurs with cues for each frame. In other words, to consider each occurrence of V without a cue for S as a small bit of evidenceagainst V being able to occur in frame S. Given a syntactic frame S, the statistical model treats each verb V as analogous to a biased coin, and each occurrence of V as a flip of that coin. An occurrencethat is followed by a cue for S correspondsto one outcome of the coin flip , say heads; an occurrence without a cue for S corresponds to tails.4 The problem is to determine when a verb occurs with cues for Soften enough that all those occurrencesare unlikely to be miscues.

4 Given a verb V , the outcomes of the coins for different S' s are treated as approximately independent, even though they cannot be perfectly independent. Their dependencecould be modeled using a multinomial rather than a binomial model.


453

3.3.1. Binomialfrequency data The statistical model is basedon the following approximation : for fixed S, all - S verbs have the sameprobability of being followed by a cue for S. Let 1l'- s stand for that probability . 1l'- s may vary from frame to frame, but not from verb to verb. Thus, miscuesmight be more common for tensedclauses than for NPs, but the working hypothesis is that all in transitives, such as .\"aunter and arrive, are about equally likely to be followed by a cue for an NP argument. If the miscue rate were known then we could use the standard hypothesis testing method for inference from binomial frequency data. For example, suppose1l'- s = 0.05 - on average, one in twenty occurrencesof aS verb should be followed by a cue for S. If some verb V occurs 300 times in the corpus, and 30 of those occurrencesare followed by cues for S, then V is unlikely to have probability 0.05 of being followed by a cue for S, and henceV is unlikely to be - SoSpecifically, the chance of flipping 30 or more heads out of 300 tossesof a coin with a five percent chance of coming up headseach time is less than three in 10,000. On the other hand, it is not all that unusual to flip 3 or more heads out of 30 on such a coin - it happens almost one time in five. If a verb occurs 30 times in the corpus and 3 of those occurrencesare followed by cues for S, it is quite possible that V is - S and that the occurrenceswith cues for S are explained by the five percent miscue rate of - S verbs. In order to use the hypothesistesting method we need to estimateils , the probability that an occurrenceof a - S verb V will be followed by a cue for S. For now, assumethat ils is known - a method for estimating 1l'_" is described below. Also assumethat, for each +S verb, V , the probability that V will be followed by a cue for S is greaterthan il _" . Other than that, no assumptionsare made about the probability that a +S verb will be followed by a cue for S. For , such as cut and walk, may have quite example, two verbs with transitive senses different frequenciesof co-occurrencewith cuesfor NP. It does not matter what thesefrequenciesare as long as they are greaterthan il - NP' If a coin with probability p of flipping heads is flipped n times, the probability of its coming up heads exactly m times is given by the binomial distribution : P (m,nip) = The probability sum :

n '. pm(lp m! (n - m) !

) n- m

of coming up heads m or more times is given by the obvious

454

M .R. Brent / Surface cuesand robust inference

n P(m+ ,nip) = LP (i ,nip) ism Analogously, P(m + ,nix _s) gives the probability that m or more occurrences of a - S verb V will be followed by a cue for S out of n occurrencestotal . If m out of n occurrences of V are followed by cues for S, and if P(m+ ,nix _s) is quite small, then it is unlikely that V is - So That is, the observeddata would be quite unlikely if V were - S and hencehad probability X- s of being followed by a cue for S. Traditionally , a threshold less than or equal to 0.05 is set, such that a hypothesis is rejected if , assuming the hypothesis were true, the probability of outcomes as extreme as the observed outcome would be below the threshold. The confidence attached to this . conclusion increasesas the threshold decreases 3.4. Estimating the miscue rate

As before, assumethat an occurrenceof a - S verb is followed by a cue for S with probability 1t'- S' Also as before, assumethat for each +S verb V , the probability that an occurrenceof V is followed by a cue for S is greater than 1t'- s' It .is useful to think of the verbs in the corpus as analogous to a large bag of coins with various blases, or probabilities of coming up heads. The only assumption about the distribution of blasesis that there is some definite but unknown minimum bias 1t'- s.s Determining whether a verb appears in frame S is analogous to determining, for some randomly selectedcoin, whether its bias is greater than 1t'- s' The only available evidencecomes from selecting a number of coins at random and flipping them. The previous section showed how this determination can be made given an estimate of 1t'- s' Suppose a series of coins is drawn at random and flipped N times. Each coin is assignedto a histogram bin representingthe number of times it comes up heads. At the end of this sampling procedure bin i contains the number of coins that came up headsexactly i times out of N. Such a histogram is shown in figure I , where N = 40. If N is large enough and enough coins are flipped N times, one would expect the following : ( I ) The coins whose probability of turning up heads is 1l'- s ( the minimum ) should cluster at the low - heads end of the histogram . That is , there 5 If the numberof coinsis takento be infinite thenthe blasesmustbe boundedaboveil -s'

Numbe of Coins 08Numb 16 24 32 40 of Head Flipp M . R. Brent / Surface cuesand robust inference

455

Fig. I. A histogramillustratinga binomiallyshapeddistributionin the first 8 bins.

should be some 0 :$ jo :$ N such that most of the coins that turn up jo heads or fewer have probability ils , and, conversely, most coins with probability ils turn upjo heads or fewer. (2) Supposejo were ' known. Then the portion of the histogram belowjo should havea roughly binomial shape. In figure I , for example, the first 8 bins have roughly the shapeone would expectif jo were 8. By contrast, the first 16 bins do not have the shapeone would expectif jo were 16- their height drops to zero for two stretches before rising signifi"cantlyabove zero again. Specifically , the shapeshould be roughly P( i,Nips ), wherei is the histogrambin, N is the fixed samplesize, and Psis an estimateof ils . (3) Supposeagain that jo were known. Then the averagerate at which the coins in binsio or lower flip headsis a good estimateof 7Lc. The estimation procedure tries out each bin as a possibleestimate of jo , the point of separation between the - S verbs at the low frequency end and the +S verbs at the high frequency end (Item 1) . Each estimate of jo leads to an estimate of ils (Item 3), and hence to an expected shape for the first jo histogram bins ( Item 2). Each estimatej of jo is evaluated by comparing the predicted distribution in the first j bins to the observed distribution - the better the fit , the better the estimate. The actual situation with verbs is slightly more complex than the one outlined above. The total number of occurrencesof each verb in any given input varies widely - look may occur thousands of times in a corpus where jostle occurs only once. Thus, the rates at which - S verbs co-occur with cues for S are not distributed according to a single binomial curve with sample-size N and mean Nx ils .6 Rather, they are distributed accordingto a superposition 6 In the context of machine learning, Brent ( 1993), presents an inference procedure that equalizesthe sample size by going through the input corpus twice, once for estimating it - . , and

456


of binomial curves with different sample sizes N ( V) and means N( V) x X- S' This affects the details of the method but the underlying idea is unchanged: evaluate hypotheses about the :i :S boundary by comparing the observed distribution of - S verbs to the expected distribution for each hypothesized boundary. A formal specification of the estimation procedure is given in the Appendix . Verbs with various numbers of occurrencesin the input can be used to estimate the miscue rates, but there must be some minimum number of occurrencesbelow which verbs are not included in the estimation procedure. If verbs that occur very few times were included then there would be large sampling error and hence the +S verbs and the S verbs might overlap in However their rate of co occurrencewith cuesfor S. , there is no way to know the minimum sample size needed to keep the overlap betweenS and - S verbs acceptably low. On the other hand, the number of observations of each verb increases with time, so the learner can afford to keep raising its minimum . As this minimum is raised the degreeof overlap betweenS andS ' verbs will continue to decreaseand the leamer s conclusions will become increasingly stable and reliable. The learner will not know how stable or reliable its conclusions are at anyone time, but there is no reason to expect that child learners know or care. ' ' Note that the child s inferenceproblem is quite different from the scientists. Scientists need to know whether or not the sample is big enough that the experiment can be stopped and the results published. Children learning language do not face any analogous choice they never stop collecting data and they may draw provisional conclusions as necesary, even when the likelihood of error is not known. This continual raising of the minimum ' samplesize resemblesGold s identification in the limit (Gold 1967), where the learner always convergeson the right grammar but has no way to know when it has done so.

4. Experiment This experiment investigateswhether the implementation described in the previous section, and by extension the hypothesis of surface functional cues once for drawing lexical conclusions. On the first pass, a verb is ignored after some preset sample size has been reached. Multiple passesare not possible for a child leamer, so a new variant of the procedure was developed for the current problem.

M.R. Brent/ Surfacecuesandrobustinference

457

plus statistical inference, constitutes an effective strategy by which two -yearolds could learn subcategorization frames. The method is to simulate the proposed implementation on a computer. The input to the simulation is transcripts of English speechby mothers to their young children. 4.1. Methods

The input corpus for the experiment consists of 31,782 utterancesby adult caretakers to children between 1;0 and 2;6. The utterances were taken from the CHILDES database(MacWhinney 1991). The particular trtanscripts were as follows : all of Bates's ' free play' and ' snack' transcripts, but not the reading aloud transcripts (Bates et al. 1988); all of the Bernstein- Ratner transcripts ( Bernstein- Ratner 1987) ; all of the Higginson transcripts for children betweenages 1;0 and 2;6 (Higginson 1985) ; and the Warren-Leubecker (Warren- Leubecker and Bohannon 1984) transcripts for children 2;6 and younger. In all cases, exactly one adult and one child were present throughout . All lines except the adult ' s speechwere removed. The pause markers ( # ) were left in and taken as utterance boundaries, along with the ordinary punctuation marks. All diacritics between square brackets were removed. Angle brackets (used as scope markers for diacritics) were removed but the words between them were not. A few changeswere made to enforce consistent ' use of the compound marker ' + ' , including the placement of a ' + ' rather than a space between two-part names like Santa Claus and Mickey Mouse. Otherwise, transcription errors were not corrected.

. The observations were collectedexactly as described Collectingobservations in section3. Statistical inference. The algorithm given in the Appendix was used with I = 40 and minsample = 40. Given the estimated error rate for each syntactic frame, verbs are reported as + S if their rate of co-occurrencewith cuesfor S would have probability below 0.02 under the null ( - S) hypothesis. Vocabu/ary . I n order to make use of the cues, the learner needs to know some function morphemes. In this experiment the program made use of an initial vocabulary chosen from the most common words in the corpus '' ' ' ' ' '' (table 4) . Besidesthe four utterance-boundary markers, . , 1 , # , and ! , these include the pronouns you, that, it , this, I , we, he. and they; the determiners the, a, and your ; the complementizerswhat, that, and where; and

458


Table 4

The SOmostcommonorthographicforms in the corpus

the prepositions to, in and on. Auxiliaries and some modals are also common, and these can be exploited by cues. However, one of the goals of this experiment was to determine how little lexical knowledge the child could make do with , so these function morphemeswere not exploited. The demonstrative ' ' pro -PPs here and there were not exploited either, though they would probably be very useful for learning about locative PPs. Interjections, negations , and conjunctions are of little use. The fifty most frequent words also include the open classverbs put , look, want, and like, but the simulation does not know any open class words at the outset. In addition , the simulation started with a lexicon of all 158 proper names that occurred at least twice in the corpus.

4.2. Results This simulation identified a total 126 verbs, of which 76 were assignedat least one syntactic frame. The output of the simulation for those 76 verbs is shown in table 5, while the 50 verbs that were not assignedany frame are listed in table 6. Each row of table 5 representsa single verb. The symbols ' in appearing in each row representthe frames assignedto that row s verb the to stand and in on simulation . The symbol N P stands for an NP complement, , for PPsheadedby those prepositions, wh stands for a tensedwh clause, c/ for a tensed clause with that or a null complementizer, and if for a tensed if clause. When one of these symbols follows NP , it signifies a two -argument frame in which the first argument is realized as an NP. For easy referenceby frame, all the symbols for a given frame are aligned in one column.

~I0

. ~c~ ~] ~t~~

Table5

NPin

NPon NPto

NPwh cl

in

inf

NPwh

ZQZQ

ZZZZ Q ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ Q ZZZZ Q

NPNP

"

z ~0c

ZZQ

ZZZ Q

NPNP

.c

z&0 z!0

NPNP

zzzz ~

:(~ ~

NP

z~0

Z Q Z Q ~~~~-~~ l

The 76 verbs that were assignedat least one syntactic frame

on

to

wh


460

Table5 (Coot .) NP pull

NP

push

NP

put

NP

read

NP

NPNP

NPin

NPon NPto

NPin

NPon

NPwh cl

in

inf

on

to

NPNP

record

wh in

ride

NP

rock

NP

roll

NP

say

NP

set

NP

sew

NP

show

NP

NPNP

sing

NP

NPNP

NPto

NPto

in

sit

on on

sleep smell

NP

spill

NP

splash

NP

in inf

start take

NP on

talk

.

cl

throw

NP

touch

NP

NPto

inf

trot try

NP

turn

NP

understand

NP

wait

NP

inf

wh

in

walk wash

NP

watch

NP

on

wh on

water wear

to

NPwh

NP

tell think

wh

NP

Table6 The 50 words that were identified as verbs but were not assignedany syntactic frames add button clean color come cook dancefraw evenfall fish fly forget grow hide inventjump keep kick knock laugh lay lie move mow nap pick pitch pour rain ring rub run scratch share shavesnow stack stand star step stick swim swing umm wake wavework write zip


These results should be interpreted in light of the fact that the statistical ' or inference technique does not answer 4yes 4no' as to whether a given verb ' or 4noreliable indication of has a given frame. Rather, it answers4yes yes so ' far . It should also be noted that a number of the verbs discovered have auxiliary or modal functions, including be, do, go and have. These are generally omitted from the following discussion, since they have special properties that must in any case be learned by some process that does not directly involve subcategorization frames. Now consider the results for each syntactic frame. Direct object ( N P) . 59 verbs of the 126 verbs were deemed acceptable with a direct object and no other complement (NP ). Most of these are correct. Most common transitive verbs were assignedNP , while most intran sitives, including come, fall , laugh, listen, lie, live, look, nap, pretend, rain, run, .vit, sleep, snow, step, talk and trot , were not. Many other words that are intransitive except in specializedsenses(swim the channel, work the metal) are not assignedNP either. It may be that these sensesare rare in child -directed speech. The only error among the verbs assigned NP is put , which requires a location phrase (typically a PP) . This is caused by extraction in where questions. Cry is assignedNP for the wrong reasons: the cues do not detect " " . inversion ( Oh no, cried Pinocchio) ; and the transcripts are inconsistent ' about pause marks before names used in address( The bug // cry June) . Double-object ( NPNP ) and the dative alternation. Ask, buy, do, give, read, show and sing are deemed acceptable with two NP complements (NPNP ). These are all correct. The other half of the dative alternation is the NPto frame, which is correctly assigned to give, show, bring, roll , and throw. Thus, the dative alternation is observedfor give and show. Bring, feed, roll , throw and read can alternate, but they are assignedonly one of the two frames. Infinitive VP (in/) . Feel, get, go, have, pretend, start , trot , and try are all assignedthe inf frame. Of these, feel is clearly incorrect, resulting from six ' repetitions of the sentenceYou don t know how good it feels to washmy ears and scrub my heels. In fact, feel requires an adjective as well as an infinitive , but the adjective has been fronted with how in this sentence. The inclusion of trot also results from repetition of an unusual nursery-rhyme construction as off we trot to play . The correct analysis of this utterance is not clear. The remaining verbs appear to license an infinitive complement, although in

462


semanticallydiversecapacities. In particular, go, have, and possibly get license an infinitive in their capacity as auxiliaries or modals. Tensedclauses( NPwh, wh, cl) . TeJ/ and ask are both deemedacceptable with both a direct object and a clauseheadedby a wh word , as in Ask Daddy what he wantsfor lunch. As expected, theseare both communication verbs. Find, look, record, understand and watch are deemed acceptable with a clauseheadedby a wh word as their sole argument, as in Look what I 've got ! Look is interesting becauseit is in fact acceptablewith a wh clause but not with a direct object nor with a that clause. Do, make, pretendand think are judged to take a clauseheadedby that or a clausewith no overt complementizer(cl). Pretendand think are canonicalmental state verbs. The relative poverty of such verbs in the output is discussedbelow. Make is mistaken as taking a tensedclausebecauseit takes an NP and a bare infinitive, as in I can't make John eat his peas. Becausethe cues are check , John eat ... is mistaken for a tensed clause. In many casesthis agreement construction could be distinguishedfrom a tensedclause, using either pronoun caseor subject-verb agreement . However, such knowledgewas not provided in the cuesfor this simulation. Finally, do is judged to take a tensedclausebecause inverted questions like Do you know how to swim? are mistaken for tensed clauses . NPin , NPon. The NPto frame was discussedunder the dative alternation. Put .was assignedNPon and NPin , while leavewas assignedNPon. These are correct, though leaveis acceptablewith NPin as well. in , on, to. Go, listen and talk were correctly assignedthe to frame. For on and in it is difficult to determine which cases represent subcategorized argumentsand which representadjuncts. Some usesof on and in clearly mark participants in the action, as in drive in the car and talk on the phone. Others clearly representlocational adjuncts, as in sleepin the baby bed and splash in the pool. A number of exampleswere difficult to classify. 4.3. Discussion

Overall, this experiment suggeststhat syntactic frames can be identified in child-directedEnglish using relatively simplecuesbasedon function morphemes, proper nouns, and utterance boundaries, in combination with statistical inference. However, the cues suggestedin section 3 are slightly too simple to achievehigh accuracy. Specifically, they do not distinguishbetweeninterrogative . This led to the erroneous assignmentof NP to put, and declarative sentences inf to / eel, and cl to do (although do is independentlymarked as idiosyncratic).


Since the declarative/interrogative distinction is clearly marked prosodically, children probably have accessto it . One potential problem is suggestedby the fact that locational adjuncts were sometimesmistaken for arguments in the simulation. However, it is not clear whether anyone can distinguish the two cases reliably in naturally . Until the nature of the argument/adjunct distinction is occurring sentences better understood, it is difficult to seehow the extent of the problem can be assessedand cues for resolving it investigated. In contrast to the generally positive results for identifying complements, this simulation failed to demonstrate that simple cues based on function morphemes can identify all verbs that occur frequently in child-directed English. A number of high-frequency mental state verbs, notably know, want, see, hear, like and love, are missing from tables 5 and 6. Thesewords were not detected becausethey do not occur in the input corpus with the suffixing . Mental state verbsdo not generallyoccur in the progressiveaspectand their nominalizations (e.g. knowing, liking) appear to be very in child-directed speech. The transcriptsusedin this experimentcompriseabout 56 hours of interaction, so it is possible that more text would reveal that nominalizations of mental state verbs are not intolerably rare. Further , for most of the transcripts the child was under 2;0, and it seemslikely that the use of semantically abstract words increaseswith the child ' s age. Nonetheless, the -ing suffix seems a ' precarious basis on which to identify mental state verbs - children s true strategiesfor identifying verbs are doubtless more complex. One possibility is that they use more complex function -morpheme cues that exploit other inflections, auxiliaries, modals, and pronoun case ( Brent 1991) . Since these cues are not without exceptions, it would make sense to posit statistical inferencemechanismfor lexical category cuesas well as for subcategorization cues. In fact, such an inference system would be useful even in the current simulation, where water and even are both erroneously recorded as having verbal occurrences. ( Both have verbal senses , but they do not occur as verbs in the input corpus.) Another possibility is that children understandutterances well enough to recognizethat certain words stand for actions or states, and that they have an innate predispositionto classifytheseas verbs (Grimshaw 1981). The importance of the statistical inference component can be seenclearly by comparing .its input , the raw observation shown in table 2, with its output , the lexicon shown in table 5. The segmentof the observation table shown in table 2 contains a number of caseswhere a verb co-occurs with cues for a frame that the verb does not in fact have in its lexical entry . These include comeand look with a cue for NP , color, come and get with cues for a tensed

464


clause, and come with a cue for an infinitive . As a result of the inference procedure, none of these miscues lead to errors in the lexicon shown in table 5.

5. Summary and conclusions

This investigation began with the question, How could children possibly acquire their first subcategorization frames? Knowing verb meanings does not help until the language-particular correspondencebetween meaning and subcategorizationalternations can be learned. Direct observation of syntactic structures might work , except that it is difficult to imagine how children could parse an utterance reliably without already knowing the syntactic properties Qf the words in it . However, function morphemes are among the most frequent morphemes, and they would seem to provide a good deal of probabilistic information about syntactic structure. Further , English speaking of the to have children appear syntactic privileges of some passiveknowledge -half. The question is how and a individual function morphemes by age two useful the information carried by function morphemes is and how it can be exploited to learn subcategorization frames reliably . To answer that question, a collection of simple cues was devised for English, using a vocabulary of twenty frequent function morphemes, under the assumption that children recognize the common proper names in their environment as NPs and can detect utterance boundaries prosodically . Becausethe information provided by these cues is probabilistic , inferences must be drawn from multiple occurrencesof each verb. Thus, a statistical inference procedure was developed. The cues and the inference procedure were simulated on transcripts of child -directed speech. This experiment showed that probabilistic surface cuescombined with statistical inference can determine syntactic frames with surprisingly high accuracy. Thus, young children could learn subcategorizationframes from sentenceswhosemeanings they do not fully understand. There is no doubt that two- year olds comprehend in some cases. However, many utterances, and this probably helps them parse the current experimentssuggestthat they can also learn from utterancesthey do not understand and cannot parse completely. However, some important questions remain open. Specifically, the hypothesis that young children can use their knowledge of function morphemesas cues for specific phrasal categories remains unproven. Even if they can, one would still want an explanation of how English-speaking children come to

M.R. BrentI Surface cuesandrobustinference

465

know that , for example, to followed by an uninflected verb is usually an infinitive , while I followed by an uninflected verb is not. In the simulation it was assumedthat the learner knows a priori , perhaps even innately, which sequencesof phrasesconstitute possible syntactic frames. To make use of this knowledge, it is not enough to know that , for instance, to followed by an uninflected verb is an instance of some linguistically significant category; rather, it is essentialto know that it is an instanceof the category represented ' . by infinitive in the a priori list of frames. An alternative possibility is that , at least at this early stage, children are simply forming distributional classesof verbs that reflect their ability to co-occur with various sequencesof function morphemes. Thus, English-speakingchildren might not know that to followed by an uninflected verb is an infinitive , per se. Rather, they might know only that co-occurrence with this sequenceis a significant distributional property of verbs, and that it is a different one from co-occurrencewith I followed by an uninflected verb. To put this question in context, however, note that English-speaking children do eventually come to know the relationship between sequencesof function morphemes and syntactic structure. This ' phenomenon needs explanation regardless of one s theory about the early acquisition of subcategorization frames, so the current proposals incur no extra explanatory burden. Finally , note that statistical inferencemechanismsof the sort proposed here have an important role to play in language acquisition research in general. Developing such mechanismsis challenging becausethere is often no .a priori basis for predicting frequency distributions in linguistic domains. This leaves simulation as one of the only tools for determining when an inference mechanism is adequate to a particular language learning problem. More experimentswith inferenceproceduresare neededto help explain the robustness of language acquisition, and to establish that individual learning strategies can be implemented robustly .

Appendix : Error rate estimation

This appendixlays out the procedureusedfor estimatingthe error ratesXI in the experiment. This presentationis designedfor clarity rather than efficiency. Let N( V) be the total number of occurrencesof verb V, and letf ( ViS) be the number of times V co-occurs with cues for S. The relative frequency of V with cuesfor S is the ratiof ( Vis) fN ( V) , a number betweenzero and one. The observed distribution of relative frequenciescan be plotted on a histogram

466

cuesandrobustinference MR . Brent! Surface

whose bins correspond to equal-sized subintervals of the unit interval (e.g. figure I , page 455) . By assumption, there is some bin jo such that verbs in bins jo and lower are - S while those in bins abovejo are +S. The estimated miscue rate is the weighted averageof the relative frequenciesof - S verbs by assumption, the verbs with relative frequency below jo . The procedure ESTIMATE- MISCUE- RATE estimatesthe miscue rate for a frame S by first estimating the :I: S separator, jo , for S. The inputs to the - the list of observed verbs, N - a procedure are S - the frame, verbs function returning the total frequency for each verb, f - a function returning the total frequency of each verb with cues for each frame, bin - count - the number of histogram bins to use in plotting the relative frequencies, and min - sample - the minimum number of times a verb must occur to be used in this estimation. Each bin is evaluated as a possible value for jo , and the one with tl1e highest evaluation is selected. The variable cutoff - bin stores hypothesesabout jo while they are being evaluated. The estimation procedure involves only the - S verbs - by hypothesis, those with relative frequency below cutoff - bin . Thus, the variables total - verb - ocC':urrences and refer to the total counts for verbs with relative total - cue - occurrences bin . Each hypothesis about jo (.stored in frequency below cutoff bin ) generatesa hypothesis about the miscue rate ils , which is cutoff stored in the variable rate . In particular , the miscue rate is hypothesizedto to total - verb - occurren be the ratio of total - cue - occurrences ces , where, again, theserefer only to the - S verbs. This hypothesis predicts the shape of the distribution of relative frequenciesfor - S verbs. In particular , it predicts that the distribution should be a mixture of binomial distributions with a common mean, the miscue rate, but different different sample sizes, corresponding to the number of times each verb occurs in the input . The procedure evaluates each hypothesis about jo (and the consequent hypothesisabout the miscue rate) by comparing the predicted distribution forS verbs to the observeddistribution . The comparison is done by summing the squares of the differences between the observed and predicted distributions of - S verbs at each bin. At bins above cutoff - bin the observed distribution of - S verbs is taken to be uniformly zero. ESTl MATE- MISCUE- RATE( S, verbs , N, f , bin - count , min - sample ) total - verb - occurrences = O, total - cue - occurrences = O best - sum- of - squares = infinity For cutoff - bin = 1 to bin - count observed - dist [ cutoff - bin ] = 0

M . R. Brent I Surface cuesand robust inference Set up the Oth bin of the histogram

of observed co - occurrence

467 rates

For Veverbs

f (ViS ( bin - count * N(V) If ( verb - bin = 0 ) And ( N ( V ) ~ min - sample ) observed - dist [ O] = observed - dist [ O] + 1 total - cue - occurrences = total - cue - occurrences + f ( ViS ) total - verb - occurrences = total - verb - occurrences + N ( V )

verb - bin = roundoff

Try each bin as a hypothesis about the ~ S cutoff For cutoff

- bin

= 1 to bin - count

Add in verbs that were + 8 under the previous hypothesis about the ::i:Scutoff, but are - 8 under the new hypothesis For Veverbs f (ViS N( V ) - bin ) And ( N ( V ) ~ min - sample ) If ( verb - bin = cutoff observed - dist [ verb - bin ] = observed - dist [ verb - bin ] + 1 = total - cue - occurrences total - cue - occurrences + f ( V, S ) = total - verb - occurrences total verb - occurrences + N(V )

verb - bin

= roundoff

( bin - count

Estimate error rate assuming cutoff

- bin

*

is :i:S separator

raet = total - cue -occurrences total verb occurrences - s = rate Compute expected distribution over - S verbs assuming 1C For Veverbs

f (VtS ( bin - count * N(V) ( verb - bin ~ cutoff - bin ) And ( N ( V ) ~ min - sample )

verb - bin = roundoff If

The expected distribution is a mixture of binomials with a common mean, rate , but different sample sizes, N ( V) . Compute probability


distribution for verb V, scale it to bin - count bins, and add it to the mixture. For orig - bin = O toN ( V ) Scale orig

- bin

to the mixture histogram .

- bin t * Orig ) N(V) Add the binomial distribution for rate , and N ( V ) to the mixture expected - dist [ bin ] = expected - dist [ bin ] + - bin N(V) * rateorig l - rate ) ( N ( V ) orig bin ) ( ( ) orig - bin Compareobservedand expecteddistributions, assumingcutoff - bin is the :i:Sseparator sum- or - squares = 0 For bin :: 0 to bin - count sum- of - squares = sum- of - squares + ( expected - dist [ bin ] observed - dist [ bin ] ) 2 If sum- or - squares < best - sum- of - squares best - rate = rate , best - sum- of - squares = sum- or - squares Return best - rate . b in = roun d 0 ff

. ( b incoun

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. Lectureson government . N.. 1981 and binding. the Pisalectures Chomsky , Volume9 of Studies in generative grammar. Dordrecht: Foris. . Knowledgeof language . N., 1986 . Convergence . Westport, cT : Praeger . Chomsky Demuth. K.. 1993 . Issuesin the the acquisitionof the sesothotonal system . Journalof Child Language20. 275- 301. Fernald. A. and P. Kuhl, 1987 . Accousticdeterminants of infant preference of motheresespeech . Infant Behaviorand Development10, 279- 293. Fisher. C.. H. Gleitmanand L.R. Gleitman, 1991 . On the semanticcontentofsubcategorization frames . Journalof CognitivePsychology 23(3), 331- 392. Fisher. C. and H. Tokura, 1993 . Acousticcuesto clauseboundariesin speechto infants: Cross. Manuscript , Departmentof Psychology linguisticevidence , Universityof Illinois. Gelman. S.A. and M. Taylor, 1984 . How two-year-old childreninterpretproper and common namesfor unfamiliarobjects . Child Development 55, 1535 - 1540 . Gerken. L.. 1992 . Young children's representationof prosodic phonology: Evidencefrom ' s weak -speaker . Departmentof Psychology English syllableproductions , SUNY Buffalo. Gerken. L.. B. Landauand R.E. Remez . Functionmorphemes in youngchildren's speech , 1990 perceptionand production. Developmental 26( 2), 204- 216. Psychology Gerken. L. and B.J. McIntosh, 1993 . The interplayof functionmorphemes and prosodyin early . Developmental 29, 448- 457. language Psychology Gleitman. L.. 1990. The structural sourcesof verb meanings . LanguageAcquisition 1( 1), 356. Gleitman, L.R., H. Gleitmanand E. Wanner, 1988 . Wherelearningbegins: Initial representations for languagelearning, 3- 48. New York: CambridgeUniversityPress . Gold. E.M.. 1967 . Languageidentificationin the limit. Informationand Control 10, 447- 474. Grimshaw . Form, function, and the languageacquisitiondevice, 165-210. Cambridge . J., 1981 , MA : MIT Press . . Affectedness anddirectobjects: The Gropen. J.. S. Pinker. M. Hollanderand R. Goldberg, 1991 role of lexicalsemanticsin the acquisitionof verb argumentstructure . Cognition41, 153195.Higginson . Fixing-assimilationin languageacquisition . RiP.. 1985 . PhiD. thesis , Washington StateUniversity. Hirsh-Pasek . K., D.G. Kemler-Nelson, P.W. Jusczyk . Clausesare , K. Write and B. Druss, 1987 perceptualunits for younginfants. Cognition26, 269- 86. . P.W.. K. Hirsh-Pasek , DiG. Kemler-Nelson, L. Kennedy Jusczyk , A. Woodwardand J. Piwez, 1993 . Perceptionof accousticcorrelatesof major phrasalunits by young infants. Cognitive (in press ). Psychology . Perceptionof a phoneticcontrast in multisyllabic . P.W. and E. Thompson , 1978 Jusczyk utterances 23, 105- 109. by 2-month-old infants. Perceptionand Psychophysics Katz. N.. E. Bakerand J. MacNamara . What' s in a name? A studyof how childrenlearn , 1974 commonand propernames . Child Development 45, 469- 73. Kemler-NelsonD.G., K. Hirsh-Pasek . How theprosodic , P.W. Jusczykand K.W. Cassidy , 1989 cuesin motheresemight assistlanguagelearning. Journalof Child Language16, 55- 68. Kimball. J., 1993 . Sevenprinciplesof surfaceparsingin naturallanguage . Cognition2( 1), 15- 47. Landau, B. and L. Gleitman, 1985 . Languageand experience . Cambridge , MA : Harvard . UniversityPress Lederer . Prosodicinformation for syntacticstructurein parental . A. and M.H. Kelly, 1992 . Manuscript . , Departmentof Psychology speech , Universityof Pennsylvania


. Chicago : A preliminaryinvestigation and alternations , IL : . Englishverbclasses Levin, B., 1993 . Press of University Chicago . . Cambridge . How to setparameters , MA : MIT Press LightfootD .W., 1991 . TheCHILDES project: Toolsfor analyzingtalk. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. , B., 1991 MacWhinney .A Mehler, J., P.W. Jusczyk , G. Labertz, H. Halsted, J. Bertonciniand C. Amiel-Tison, 1988 precursorof languageacquisitionin younginfants. Cognition29, 143 178. , and Morgan, J., 1986. Drom simple input to complex grammar. Learning, development . : MIT Press MA . , conceptualchangeCambridge . Structuralpackagingin the input to language Morgan, J., R.P. Meierand EL . Newport, 1987 learning: Contributionsof prosodicand morphologicalmarkingof phrasesto the acquisition . CognitivePsychology19, 498- 550. of language . Prosodicdomainsin externalsandirules. In: H. vander Hulst, N. Nespor, M. and I. Vogel, 1982 , VolumeI. Dordrecht: Foris. Smith(eds.), The structureof phonologicalrepresentations I'd ratherdo it myself: Someeffects . Mother 1977 H. Gleitman and E. L. Gleitman , Newport, , and non-effectsof maternalspeechstyle. In: C.E. Snow, C.A. Ferguson(eds.), Talking to . children: Languageinput and acuisition, 109- 149. NewYork: CambridgeUniversityPress of ? Journal . Does 1976 and RiD. P.A. Petretic production , precede comprehension , Tweeney Child Language4, 201- 209. . Cambridge , MA : Harvard . Languagelearnabilityand languagedevelopment Pinker, S., 1984 . Press University , . Learnabilityand cognition: The acquisitionof argumentstructure. Cambridge Pinker, S., 1989 . MA : MIT Press of the PhilologicalSociety86, 1. Transactions . Smallchildren's smallclauses Radford, A., 1988 43. . The syntaxof nominalargumentsin earlychild English. LanguageAcquisition Radford, A., 1991 I , 195-223. . In: J. Laver, J. Anderson(eds.), . On the natureof phonologicalrepresentation Selkirk, E., 1981 : North-Holland. of speech Thecognitiverepresentation , 379- 388. Amsterdam : Free the . A in 1969 L.R. Gleitman Smith and E.F. C.S. , acquisitionof language study , , Shipley . Language45, 322- 342. to commands responses . Anchor points in languagelearning: The role of marker Valian, V. and S. Coulson, 1988 and of . Journal Language27, 71- 86. Memory frequency : . Intonation patternsin child-directedspeech Warren-Leubecker , 1984 , A. and J.N. Bohannon . - 1385 . Child Development55, 1379 Mother-fatherspeech . Cambridge , MA : . Formalprinciplesof languageacquisition Wexier, K. and P. Culicover, 1980 . MIT Press elementsin . The (non)realizationof unstressed Wilnen, F., E. Krikhaar and E. den Os, 1993 : A rhythmicconstraint.Journalof Child Language(in press ). children's utterances . The discriminationby younginfantsof voicedstopconsonants Williams, L. and M. Bush, 1978 . - 1225 with and without releasebursts. Journalof the AcousticalSocietyof America63, 1223 . 223 233 2 . of manner . In a , A. 1970 speakingLinguisticInquiry Zwicky, ,

-Holland 92(1994 - 480 . North ) 471 Lingua

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of verb categories *

Steedman

, Universityof Pennsylvania Departmentof Computerand Information Science , 200 South 33rdStreet, Philadelphia PA 19104 6389, USA , The paper was deliveredas a commentaryupon Michael Brent's presentation'Acquisition of subcategorizationframes using aggregatedevidencefrom local syntactic cues' to the PennLanguageAcquisitionConference . It arguesin , IRCS, Universityof Pennsylvania , 1992 ' of errorsand supportof usingstatisticaltechniqueslike Brents to minimisethe consequences that the casefor believingthat childrenacquiresubcategorisation , but concludes and misanalyses otheraspectsof syntaxon the basisof semanticand contextualcuesremainsstrong.

1. Introduction

The question of how children acquire lexical entries for verbs, and in particula~ their subcategorisation frames is one of the central questions ' concerning the child s acquisition of syntax. Its importance is enhanced by the recent tendency in theories of grammar to gravitate to a lexicalist position, and the role of verbs as the head of their clause. How do children do it , given the non-determinacy and automata-theoretic complexity of the syntax itself, and the unsystematic presentation and error-proneness of the ' linguistic data that they apparently have to make do with ? Michael Brent s paper in this volume shows how the statistical technique of binomial error estimation can be used to minimise the effect of contamination in the data available to the child languagelearner, arising either from errors in the input itself or errors in the child ' s analysesof the input sentences . The technique is demonstratedby applying it to the sentencesof a corpus of actual adult- child conversations, to derive subcategorisation frames for verbs from analyses basedon imperfectly reliable local syntactic cues defined in terms of sequences of inflectional morphemes, function words and lexical NPs. As Brent . Thanksto Lila GleitmanandJeffSiskindfor readingthedraft. Theresearch wassupportedin , and CISEliP , CDA88-22719 , DARPA grant part by NSF grantnos. IRI90- 18SI3, IRI90- 16S92 -90-J- 1863 no. NOOOI4 . , and ARO grant no. DAALO3-89-COO31 - 3841/94/ $07.00 ~ 1994- ElsevierScienceB.V. All 0024 SSDI 0024- 3841( 93) EO047- B

right~reserved

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points out , these two aspects of the work are quite independent : binomial error estimation could be used to minimise the influence of errors arising from imperfect analysis procedures of any kind at all , including those based on semantic and prosodic information , as well as syntactic . The present paper considers the part that all of these sources of information may play .

2. Syntax The specific application of this technique to low -level syntactic cues, rather than these richer sources of information , in this and related work in Brent ' s ( 1991) thesis can be argued to deliver two further important results. First , it demonstrates a practical technique that actually can be used to automatically build lexicons on the basis of large volumes of text . ' Although this point is not discussed in Brent s present paper, it is worth emphasising. Hand -built dictionaries are inevitably very incomplete with respect to the exhaustive listing of subcategorisation properties that are needed for many computational applications . Techniques base~ on sim' ' plified syntactic properties which probabilistically compile out syntactic' ' and semantic properties of what a linguist would regard as the grammar , and working on the basis of statistical properties of their distribution over a large corpus , may well represent the only practicable possibility for automatically extending such dictionaries . Full -blown deterministic parsing of the corpora of the requisite size using linguistically respectable grammars and/ or semantic interpretations and deterministic parsing , is impracticably expensive computationally , using existing techniques, to the extent that it is possible at all . Second, the present study demonstrates the important fact that the information needed to determine verb subcategorisationsactually is there in the distribution of these very low-level properties in input of the kind that children are actually exposedto. For example, one of the apparent problems for acquisition of subcategorisationframes on the basis of syntactic information alone is the systematicambiguity in all languagesbetweensubcategorised arguments and nonsubcategorised adjuncts, illustrated for English by the following pair of sentences:

( la) We put Harry on the bus ( 1b) We met Harry on the bus

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How can the child avoid erroneously subcategorising meet like put ? Brent ' points out that it doesn t matter if they do, because it is (presumably universally) the case that the relative frequency with which the sequence V N P PPOll occurs will be significantly higher for verbs like put that subcategorisefor NPs and on PPs than for those like meet which subcategorise for NP and only allow PP as an adjunct. Binomial error estimation is able to distinguish the two distributions , and reject the child ' s spurious evidence from analyses suggesting that meet subcategorises for the PP. Similar results seemto follow for spurious occurrencesof subcategorisations arising from extraction, as in who did you put on the bus, which might appear otherwise to suggestthat put might subcategorisefor PP alone. It is therefore reasonableto ask whether the child languagelearner actually makes use of such purely syntactic cues to learn the lexical categories of verbs. Here Brent is extremely cautious, and goesout of his way to acknowledge the possible involvement of prosodic and semanticcuesas well. He notes in passing that there are a number of open questions that need answering before we can be quite comfortable with the assumption that the child is using the closed-class cues. The most important is that both the function words themselvesand the cue sequencesbasedon them are language-specific. The question arisesof how the child can possibly catch on to the fact that it , that and the are cue words, much lessthat the sequenceV it the suggeststhat V is probably a ditransitive verb, while the sequenceV that the suggeststhat V is probably a complement verb. It is hard to see that there is any alternative to knowing , besidesthe set of possible subcategorisation frames, (a) the precisesyntactic significanceof each closed class word as NP , Specof CP, etc., and (b) some statistics about possible corpora, including facts such as that complement-taking verbs are more common than ditransitives. 1 I shall remain equally cautious in the face of such open questions, and certainly would not wish to claim that the child cannot be using such cues. However, as long as these questions remain open, it also remains unclear whether we have escapedwhat Brent identifies as the ' chicken-or -egg problem' of apparently needing to know some syntax to apply this procedure. This suggeststhat there may be some point to asking ourselves what other resources the child could call upon, and in particular whether the two alternatives that Brent mentions, prosody and semantics, can help a child 1 It is not enough to assumethat the child simply looks out for verbs followed by all possible ' ' ' ' of sequences cue words, classifying verbs as ;t + the verbs , that + the verbs , etc. Such a classification does not determine a subcategorisation.

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M . SteedmanI Acquisition of verb categories

learn the first elements of syntax, including their first subcategorisations, in the face of the kind of uncertainties in the input which he identifies.

3. Prosody Although Brent shows how misanalysesarising from the argument/adjunct ambiguity can be overcome, the consequencesof some other quite similar sorts of ambiguity , such as that betweenprepositions and particles illustrated below, are not so easily eliminable by distribution -basedmethods, since verbs 2 subcategorisefor ambiguous items like up in both its guises:

(2a) Werang up the hotel (2b) Weran up the hill In the case of particles and prepositions it seemsintuitively highly likely that prosody disambiguates the two. Lederer and Kelly ( 1991) have shown that adults can reliably identify which of the two a speakerhas uttered. They have shown similar effects for the argument/adjunct alternation. Kelly ( 1992 and this volume) presents results which suggest that a number of further apparent ambiguities are also correlated with prosodic distinctions. It is true that none of theseprosodic discriminators are invariably present. Nor does it seemat all likely that all the relevant ambiguities are marked in this way. For example, I know of no evidence that the V PP sequence arising from extraction in (a), below, differs in any prosodic repect from that in (b) : (3a) Who did you put on the bus (3b) Who did you run up the hill with However, where the information is marked, it may well be reliable enough to be used as evidenceunder appropriate distribution -based techniques such as ' Brent' s own, especially when we recall that adult s speech to children is characterisedby exaggeration of normal intonation contours. Z Brent suggeststhat spurious analyses of verbs like ring as subcategorising for PP can be eliminated by observing sets of subcategorisations, presumably meaning that we can reclassify verbs that have been assigned subcategorisationsof both PP and NP + P. However, this is a distinct (and language-specific) complication to the proposal, and appears likely to conflict with the other usesthat have been proposed for such sets. The prosodic cues discussedbelow would allow this particular complication to be eliminated from his account.

M . Steedman/ Acquisition o/ verb categories

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However, a word of caution is in order here. Adult speakers do not actually use intonation to indicate syntactic structure, but to convey the distinctions of discourse meaning that are variously described in tenDS of ' focus' or of ' ' ' ' , oppositions such as topic/ comment , given/ new and the like. While the elements that are marked in this way correlate with syntactic structure, this is for semantic reasons, rather than for ease of processing. When adults exaggerate intonation contours in speaking to children, it is extremely unlikely that they are using the intonational markers in any very different way. It is therefore quite possible that children use this infonnation as a semantic, rather than syntactic, cue, as part of the third strategy under consideration here.

4. Semantics

As soon as it was appreciated that even quite trivial classesof grammar cannot be learned by mere exposureto their stringsets, and that there appears to be little evidencethat any more explicit guidance is provided by adults, it was obvious that some other source of infonnation , ' innate' in the sensethat it is available to the child prelinguistically, must guide them in acquiring their grammar. As has often beenpointed out , the only likely candidate is semantic 3 interpretation or the related conceptual representation. However inadequate ' o~r formal (and even infonnal ) grasp on the child s prelinguistic conceptualisation of the conversational situation , there can be no doubt that it has one, for even non-linguistic animals have that much. There can therefore be no doubt that this cognitive apparatus, for reasons which have nothing to do with languageas such, partitions the world into functionally relevant ' natural kinds' of the kind investigated by Landau in this volume, individual entities, including events, propositions, and such grammatically relevant notions as actual and potential participants and properties of those events, as well as the attitudes and attentional focus of other conversational participants. Since the main thing that syntax is for is passing concepts around, the belief that syntactic structure keeps as close as possible to semantics, and that in both J In thecontextof modernlinguistics , the suggestion goesbackat leastto Chomsky( 1965: 5659) and Miller ( 1967 ). But of courseit is a mucholder idea. SeePinker( 1979 ) for a reviewof someproposedmechanisms , includingthe importantcomputationalwork of Anderson( 1977 ), and seeGleitman( 1990 ) for somecogentwarningsagainstthe assumptionthat suchsemantic havetheir origin solelyin presentperceptionand thematerialworld in anysimple representations senseof that term.

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M . SteedmanI Acquisition l?f verb categories

evolutionary and child language acquisition terms, the early development of syntax amounts to little more than hanging words onto the preexisting armatures of conceptual structure is so simple and probable as to amount to the null hypothesis. 4 Of course, as Chomsky has repeatedly pointed out , this realisation gets us practically nowhere. We have such a poor grasp of the nature of the putative underlying conceptualstructures that it is difficult to even designexperimental tests of the claim (quite apart from the other difficulties that arise in doing experimentswith prelinguistic childrenS Gleitman and others in the present volume have made considerable headway in the face of thesedifficulties, but there is a long way to go. For similar reasons to do with limitations on current knowledge, it does not seemto constrain syntactic theory in any very ' useful way. Right now (and this is Chomsky s substantive point ), the most reliable entry to the human system of language and symbolic cognition that ' we have comes from the linguists phenomenological grasp of the syntactic epiphenomenon, which has only just begun to look as though it is yielding some insight into the underlying conceptual structure. Nevertheless, the claim that semantics is the precursor of syntax is not without content, and has consequencesfor the question at hand. In particular , it immediately entails that if we are asking ourselveswhy children do not classify meet as subcategorisingfor NP PP on the basis of sentenceslike ( lb ), we met Harry on the bus, then we are simply asking the wrong question. A child who learns this instance of this verb from this sentencemust start from the knowledge that the denoted event is a meeting, and that this involves a ' transitive event concept. It usually never crossesthe child s mind that meet might subcategoriselike put , becausethe conceptual representation usually ' doesn t suggestthat. Once again, taking this position raisesmore questions than it answers. We are only just beginning to make sense of the complex mapping between surfacegrammatical roles like subject and object, and the underlying thematic roles that seemto be characteristic of the conceptual level. (I am particularly thinking of recent work by Grimshaw 1990.) It also raises the question of 4 The use of the words ' little more' rather than ' nothing more' is important . It would not be surprising to find that some part of syntax perhaps the observed constraints upon consistent had its origin elsewherethan in semantics. orders across headsand complements 5 I am not saying that logicians and my fellow computer scientists do not have interesting fonnalisms for representingconceptual structures. In fact these systemsare the main source of fonnal theoretical devices that linguists have to draw on. But as knowledge representation systems, none of them as yet seemparticularly close to the human one.

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' whether the child s conceptual representation really can be used reliably in this fashion , which Pinker ( 1989) has called ' semantic bootstrapping ' , and , if not . how the child can cope with its unreliability .

S. Syntacticandsemantic Gleitman ( 1990) argues very persuasively that the child must often find itself in a situation which is ambiguous with respect to the conceptual representation. To take one of her examples, a child who is being read a story from their picture-book about a fox and a rabbit may have insufficient information from their understanding of the story and from a picture of the fox running after the rabbit to tell whether an unknown verb in an adult sentenceof the form ' The fox is V ER Sing the rabbit ' should be associated with the concept of chasing, or the concept of fleeing. In a number of elegant experiments, she and Landau and their colleagueshave shown that children who are artificially placed in this situation identify whichever conceptual representationis consistent with the syntactic form of the sentence. Since this is the only information that appearsto be available to the children as a basis for the decision, they argue that children are capable of using a process of ' ' syntactic bootstrapping to aid them in learning the subcategorisationsof verbs. Such a processrequires the child to generalisefrom its existing partial ' knowledge of syntax and verbal subcategorisations, perhaps via the linking ' ru1es discussedby Pinker and his colleagues(cf. Gropen et al. 1991). Gleitman' s proposal is in principle entirely consistent with semantic boot' strapping in the senseoutlined here. It is actually quite likely that the child s ' conceptual representation isn t much more underspecifiedthan being ambiguous as to whether this situation is an instance of transitive chasing or transitive fleeing, and a few other equally relevant propositions. That is, we can probably assumethat the child knows what it is to be ' read a story' , that the story is ' about the fox trying to eat the rabbit ' , and a lot of relevant facts such as that ' to eat something you have to catch it ' , ' rabbits don' t like being ' ' eaten , and so on. (If they don t know stuff like this, then they may be in a position to learn the nouns, but probably not to learn the verbs.) In this case, there aren' t likely to be that many other possibilities, and syntactic bootstrapping may well reduce the set to one possible meaning. If so, it may well do so in the face of syntactic complications that are irrelevant to subcategorisations, such as the presenceof modifiers or adjuncts. Their presencewill not prevent the child from acquiring the meaning of the verb, which it must have already

478


as one of a number of alternatives that syntactic bootstrapping correctly disambiguates, if learning is to take place at all. One piece of circumstancial evidence in support of this conjecture is that adults work this way too. There is increasing experimental evidencethat the adult sentenceprocessing mechanism deals with the huge degree of nondeterminism that arises from natural grammars by appealing to meaning, filtering out the myriad spurious paths that the grammar permits on the basis of whether they make sense, both on the basis of sentence-internal semantics, and of reference and extension in the context. This semantic filtering of spurious paths which would otherwise overwhelm the computational resources of the processor has been claimed to go on continually at every point in the parsing process, with very fine ' grain' , probably more or less word by word . (See Steedman and Altmann 1989 and Clifton and Ferreira 1989 for referencesand arguments pro and contra this proposal, which ultimately comes from computer science, particularly in work by Winograd 1972.) Nevertheless, it may well be the case, as Gleitman suggests , that children are frequently much more at sea than this, and may even have much larger sets of propositions in mind , most or even all of which are irrelevant to the adult meaning. However, recent computational work by Siskind ( 1992) shows that a processof intersecting such setson successiveencounterswith the verb can be used to eliminate the spurious meanings. 6 Of course, children are not adults, and neither are they mind readers, and a ' ' meaning that seems appropriate to them over a number of iterations of this ' ' ' ' processmay not be the same as the adult s. The child s concept of chasing ' (we may imagine as an extension of Gleitman s example) may be overspecifically restricted to an activity of attempting to catch by running . In this case, ' ' their own future use may be characterised by undergeneralisation - for example, they may be unwilling to agreethat a similar scenario involving cars is chasing. There is of course a huge literature that has revealedthe fine detail of this process. 7 There are also instancesof overgeneralisation, and possibly 6 Two problems which Siskind leaves open are the problem of polysemous verbs, and the problem that ariseswhen the set of putative meaningsderived from an occurrenceof the verb are all spurious. Both of these eventualities will lead to empty intersections. One simple tactic that might serveto distinguish them and thereby be used to maintain a coherent lexicon would be to respond to an empty intersection by keeping both entries, relying on a tactic like binomial error estimation to distinguish between true polysemous lexical entries and spurious ones on distributional grounds. 1 For example, Brown ( 1973), Bowerman ( 1973) and Clark ( 1973), and Carey ( 1982), the last including an extensivereview.

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' even more bizarre ' complexes, revealed in non-standard lexical meanings. There is also evidencethat children predict new lexical entries that they have not actually encountered, via lexical rules such as the rule that generates causative verbs from certain adjectives, such as cool. This process may on occasiongive rise to non-standard lexical causatives, as in # It colds my hand, either becauseof slightly non-standard lexical rules, or becausestandard rules are applied to slightly non-standard lexical entries. (SeeBowerman 1982and referencestherein.) The way in which children successivelymodify non-standard lexical items to approximate the adult lexicon is the most challenging and least wellunderstood part of the process. But the undoubted fact that the processes of syntactic and semantic bootstrapping appear to iterate in this way suggests that together they may constitute the processby which children gain accessto concepts which are not immediately available to prelinguistic sensory-motor cognition , and may thereby provide the force behind the explosive change in cognitive abilities that coincides, both in evolutionary and in child -developmental terms, with the appearanceof language. 8 Computational models of the kind proposed by Brent and Siskind will continue to provide the only way in which theories of this process, such as syntactic, prosodic and semantic ' ' bootstrapping , can be developed and evaluated.

References Anderson . Inductionof augmentedtransitionnetworks . CognitiveScienceI , 125, John, 1977 157. . Earlysyntacticdevelopment . Cambridge : CambridgeUniversityPress . Bowerman , Melissa , 1973 . Reorganisational . In : Bowerman esin lexicaland syntacticdevelopment , Melissa , 1982 process Eric Wanner, Lila Gleitman (eds.), Languageacquisition: The state of the art, 319- 346. : CambridgeUniversityPress . Cambridge Brent, Michael, 1991 . Automatic acquisitionof subcategorisation frames from unrestricted , MIT , CambridgeMA. English. UnpublishedPhD . dissertation Brown, Roger, 1973 . A first language : The early stages . Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press . . Semanticdevelopment . In: Eric Wanner, Lila Gleitman(eds.), Language , 1982 Carey, Sasan . : CambridgeUniversityPress acquisition:The stateof the art, 347- 389. Cambridge . What's in a word? In: T. Moore (ed.), Cognitivedevelopmentand the Clark, Eve, 1973 . New York: AcademicPress . acquisitionof language 8 SeeVygotsky( 1962 on the natureof this processand its relation ) for someearlyspeculations -motor development to Piagetiansensory . and seeOleron ( 1953 ) for some ) and Furth ( 1961 earlystudiesof the effectsof deprivation. suggestive

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. The young word maker. In: Eric Wanner, Lila Gleitman(eds.), Language Clark, Eve, 1982 : CambridgeUniversityPress . acquisition:The stateof the art, 39()..428. Cambridge . Aspectsof the theoryof syntax. Cambridge . , Noam, 1965 , MA : MIT Press Chomsky Clifton, Charlesand FernandaFerreira, 1989 . Ambiguity in context. Languageand Cognitive Process es4, 77- 104. Furth, Hans, 1961 . The influenceof languageon the development of conceptformationin deaf children. Journalof Abnormaland SocialPsychology 63, 186- 389. Gleitman, Lila, 1990 . The structuralsourceof verbmeanings . LanguageAcquisitionI , 3- 55. Grimshaw . Argumentstructure. Cambridge . , Jane, 1990 , MA : MIT Press . Affectedness and , StevenPinker, MiceileHollanderand RichardGoldberg, 1991 Gropen, Jess direct objects: The role of lexicalsemanticsin the acquisitionof verb argumentstructure. Cognition41, 153- 196. . Usingsoundto solvesyntacticproblems . Psychological Review99, 349Kelly, MichaelH., 1992 364. . Domain-generalabilitiesappliedto domain-specifictasks: Kelly, MichaelH. andS. Martin, 1994 to in . Lingua92, 105- 140. (this , cognition, and language Sensitivity probabilities perception volume). Lederer . Prosodicinformationfor syntacticstructurein parental , Anneand MichaelKelly, 1992 . Paperpresented to 32ndMeetingof the Psychonomic . , SanFrancisco , 1991 speech Society Miller, George . The psychologyof communication . Harmondsworth : Penguin . , 1967 . Conceptualthinkingof the deaf. AmericanAnnalsof th~ Deaf98, 304- 310. Oleron, Paul, 1953 Pinker, Steven . Formalmodelsof languagelearning. Cognition7, 217- 283. , 1979 Pinker, Steven . Learnabilityand cognition. Cambridge . , 1989 , MA : MIT Press Siskind, Jeffrey, 1992 . Naivephysics , eventperception , lexicalsemantics , and languageacquisition . UnpublishedPhD . dissertation , MIT , Cambridge , MA. Steedman . Ambiguity in context: A reply.. Languageand , Mark and Gerry Altmann, 1989 es4, 105- 122. CognitiveProcess . Thoughtand language Lev 1962 . Cambridge . , , , MA : MIT Press Vygotsky . Understanding naturallanguage . New York: AcademicPress . Winogard, Terry, 1972

Appendix -fromthe Symbols Phonetic International with , Alphabet examples

a a .. A aJ au b

I j

st.QP , C2P Im ~ , ~ ther f.@ :t, pl.@ :cid byt, ft.Q.Qd ~ , kite ~ I, h~ , ho,ho ,hoss ~ balo, pi~ go, hag w~ e, rase b.@ :!t, d~ gmong, readily w~ ther, ! DY felt, left So, les hat, how ' Ohio, ahead ~ I, ~ if, remit ~et, can~on

k I

~ , bac -k lip, bill

tl d d3 el ~ f g h h I

m n IJ ou .') 0 .')1 P r s I t 9 6 u u 3r v w x

z 3

man, him ,n.ose, aImoy wi!!,l, sink gQ, SQY1 w.@ .lk , I.@ .w w.@ .Y.t .nt, astron.@ v bQil, .Qice eie, nae rim, parrot .'-imon, bog mip, f~ al lawn, walkeg ! !hiD, mytJ !l!en, wea!lier r.QQf , ft~ l.QQk , fyll bird, wQ!St yoice, giye m , qyail (Spanish ) proteFr , (Dutch) ka~ el ~ I, ~ lealure, garale

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Author

Index

Abbs, J. H., 439, 446, 451 Abercrombie , D., 392 Anderson , J. R., 17, 19- 2I , 73- 75, 77, 93, 154 Anderson , W. G., 414 Appelt, D. A., 124 Arbib, M. A., 446 Arnold, G. F., 307, 310 Aston, C. H., 388 Atkinson, J. M., III Austin, J. L., 58

Boomer , D. S., 23, 247 -Braem , P., 223 Boyes Bransford , J. D., 113 BrazilD., 315 Breskin , S., 127

212- 213 Bauer , L., 185

Bresnan , J., 74, 161- 162. 170, 189, 193, 197, 235, 338 Broadbent , D. E., 21, 119 Brodda, B., 449, 453 Browman , C. P., 320, 327, 445 Brown, G., 23, 36, 112- 113, 147- 148, 307, 400, 403- 405 Brown, G. D. A., 199 Brown, P., 137 Brown, R., 113, 320 Bruner, J. S., 29 Buhler, K., 45- 46, 53- 54, 89 Burkle, B., 51- 52, 156 Butterworth, B., 23, 36, 109, 126, 128, 183, 186, 203, 217- 218, 222, 231 Buttrick, S., 48

, R. de, III Beaugrande Bell-Berti, F., 443 Berg, T., 249 Berko-Gleason , J., 320 Berian, R. W., 414 Bever , T. G., 23 Bierwisch , M., 93, 179, 216, 218, 248 Bleasdale , F. A., 320 Bloem, I., 400 Bock, J. K., 14, 16, 20, 23, 192, 236, 261, 263- 265, 267, 273- 275, 278- 281, 303, 394- 396 Boehme , K., 46 BolingerD ., 165, 307 Bond, Z. S., 471

Calvert , D. R., 425,428,434 Camden , C. T., 461,465,468 Carr, T. H., 20 Carroll,J. M., 196 , 262 Chafe . W. L.. 23, 36, 119 , 138 , 148 , 267 Chistovich , L. A., 23, 35I Choi, S., 52 , N., 305 Chomsky Clark, E. V., 23, 46, 54, 85, 128 , 139 , 200, 213,229,267 Clark, H. H., 23, 43, 48- 49, 59, 65- 67, 85, 94, 120 , 229, , 136 , 148 , 185 , 122 , 128 , 133 267 Clark, J. E., 470- 471 Clements , G. N., 290,292,297

Baars,B. J., 356- 358, 461- 462, 464- 465, 468, 477 , A., 10 Baddeley Barth, M., 74 Barwise , J., 74 Bassett , M. R., 391 Bates , E., 121, 147, 262, 265. 268, 270,

- 128 Beattie . G.. 23. 33.35.68. 126 . 203

Author Index Clifton, C., Jr., 464 Cohen,A., 214, 399 Cole, K. J., 451 Collier, R., 307, 310, 400, 404- 405 Cooper, F. S., 441 Cooper, W. E., 14, 264, 388- 389, 394- 396, 400, 471 Coulthard, M., 315 Craik, F. I., 320 Crompton, A., 327, 329, 336, 340, 346, 348 Cruse, D. A., 187 Cruttenden , A., 307, 310, 314 Currie, K. L., 113, 307, 400, 403- 405 Cutler, A., 35, 165, 171- 172, 184, 186, 199, 214, 247, 255, 307, 326, 344, 348, 355, 372, 392, 396- 397, 462- 464, 477, 495 Daniloff, R. G., 444 Danks, J. H., 24, 27 Danly, M., 388- 389 Dauer, R. M., 393- 394 -Nielson, N., 336 Davidson Deese , J., 65, 306, 316, 386, 390, 393 Dell, G. S., 13- 14, 16, 19- 20, 137, 211, 218, 319, 330- 331, 334, 342, 351- 354, 356- 360, 362- 363, 366, 469, 474- 476 Denes , P. B., 426, 431 De Pijper, J. R., 400, 403 De Rooij, J. J., 381 De Smedt,K., 235, 253, 468, 486 Deutsch , W., 46, 121, 129, 131, 133 Devescovi , A., 262, 268, 270 Diehl, R. L., 444 Dik, S. C., 74 Dixon, R. M. W., 55 Dogil, G., 370, 408 Doherty, M., 102 Donders,F. C., 200 Drew, P., III DuBois, J. W., 485 Dfingelhoff,F. J., 226- 227 DuncanS., 34 Eady, S. J., 394- 396 Easton,T. A., 448 Ehrich, V., 51- 52, 58, 112, 142, 155- 157 Eibl-Eibesfeldt , I., 30, 37 Eriksen,C. W., 414 Erwin, C. 1., 416 Ewan, W. G., 449

540 Fanshel , D., 112 Fauconnier , G., 94 Fay, D., 14, 184, 218, 248, 254- 256, 355,

462 , E., 205 Feigenbaum Fel'dman , A. G., 438 Fillmore , C. J., 46, 48, 53- 55, 90, 97- 98, 103 , 266,272 FiskeD. W., 35 Floresd'Arcais , G. B., 20, 223-224,226, 262,269 Fodor,J. A., 15,20, 22- 23, 74, 94, 201 Folkins , J. W., 439,446 Ford, M., 23, 256-259,282 Foss , D. J., 23 Fowler , C. A., 147 , 438- 440,444- 447, 449- 450,452- 453 Francik , E. P., 136 Francis , W. N., 219 Franck , D., 39 Freud , S., 214,217,234 Friederici , A., 49 Frijda,N., 74 Fromkin , V. A., 184 , 200,214,216,218221,247- 248,325,328,330- 332,335336,338,340,347-350 Fry, D., 24 , 0 ., 332,388- 389 Fujimura , H., 444 Fujisaki Gallistel , C. R., 435 Gardiner , J. M., 320 , E., 307 Garding Garfield , J. L., 22 Garnham , A., 114 , 199 , S. M., 469 Garnsey Garrett , M. F., 14,23- 24, 201,204,216, 218,220- 222,247-249,255,282,303, 324,336,371- 372,378,497 Garrod , S., 119 , 154 Gay, T., 388,439,445,449 Gazdar , G., 41, 63- 64, 170 Gee , J. P., 259,386,390- 391 Gelfer , C. E., 400 , R. J., 43 Gerrig Gerstman , L. J., 127 Gill, J., 259 Glaser , W. R., 226- 227 - 112 Gotrman , E., 111 , 495 ~J. A., 112 Goguen Goldman , N., 205- 206

541

Author Index Goldman, S. R., 263 Goldman-Eisler, F., 23, 126, 128, 203- 204, 259 Goldstein,L., 327, 350, 445 Good, D. A., 128 , H., 320 Goodglass Goodwin, C., 33, 36- 37 Gordon, P. C., 351, 419 Gray, W., 223 Grice, H. P., 30, 39- 41, 43- 44, 47, 53, 59, 66- 67, 69, 123, 129, 133, 148, 158, 213 Grimes,J. E., 23 , F., 36, 259, 386, 390- 391 Grosjean Grosjean - , L., ~86 Grosz, B. J., 112- 113, 119 Gruber, J. S., 90 , J. J., 42 Gumperz Gussenhoven , C., 307

, P., 400 Hagoort Hakes , D. T., 23 Hale,K., 169 Halle,M., 289,291,305,441 , M. A. K., 23, 35, 165 , 271,307, Halliday

- 393 392

Hankamer . G.. 185

, T. A., 122 , 129 , 218,221 Harley Harris,K. S., 439,443 Hart, J. 't, 307,310,399,404- 405 Hassan , R., 271 Haviland, S. E., 120 Hawkins,J., 82, 260 Hawkins. P. R.. 23

. B.. 292 Hayes . A. F.. 330 . 339 . 350 Healy Pc D. c.. 400 J-Jeesch

Henderson , A., 126- 127 Hennan. S. J.. 121 Hemnann, T., 23, S2, 66, 119, 124, 131, I ~~- I~S

Hill. C.. SO . 52 Hill, D. R., 393 Hillier, C. S., 203 Hindle , D., 497 Hockett , C. F., 482

, E., 14, 24- 25, 28, 162, 206, Hoenkamp 235- 237, 240, 244, 249, 252- 253, 275, 282 Holmes,V. M., 23, 256- 260, 282 Holt, K. G., 447 Hoosain, R., 435

Hopper, P. I., 137 Hotopf, W. H. N., 199, 216, 219- 220 Housum,J., 147 Huijbers, P., 187, 231, 258 , G. W., 230, 232 Humphreys Hurwitz, S., 154 Huttenlocher , J., 225- 226, 230 M. 320 Hyde, , Hymes,D., 42 Irwin, D. E., 263, 265 Isaacs , E. A., 133, 148 lsard, S., 165, 171- 172, 247, 392

Jackendoff , , R., 74, 79, 84, 87, 90, 94, 168 170 Jaffe , J., 127 James , D., 482 James , W., 119 , 320 Jarvella , R. J., 46, 121 Jassem , W., 393- 394 Jefferson , 458 , G., 23, 31, 33, 111 Jenkins , J. J., 216 Johns , C., 315 Johnson , D., 223 Johnson , M. K., 113 -Laird, P. N., 46, 58, 72, 74, 84, Johnson - 114 113 , 195 , 200,207- 209 Jones , H. G. V., 320- 321 , A., 399 Jongman , J., 43 Jorgenson Joshi, A., 119

Kaisse , 302,367- 369,377,408 , E. M., 166 Kamp,H., 114 Kao, H. S. R., 435 Katz, W., 399 Keele , S. W., 416 Keenan , E. L., 194 Keenan , J., 121 Kelly, M. H., 394-396 Kelso , J. A. S., 439- 440,446- 447,449450,452 KelterS., 122 , 221,273,275 , 187 , , 162 , G., 14,24- 25, 28, 121 Kempen 231,235- 237,240,244,249,253,258, 275,282,468,486- 489,491,497 Kenstowicz , M., 166 Kent, R. D., 440 Kenworthy,J., 113 , 307,400,403-405 292 S. J. , , Keyser Kiegl, R., 270

Author Index

Kintsch , W., 74, 121 , P., 286 Kiparsky Kisseberth , C., 166 Klapp,S. T., 410,414- 419,454,473 Klatt, D. H., 330,339-340,350,389 - 137 Klein, W., 46, SO , 52- 53, 89, 112 , 136 , 139 Kloker,D., 389 Knoll, R. L., 417,419-421 Kohler,K. J., 436 Kohn, S. E., 320 Koriat, A., 320 , S. M., 72 Kosslyn Koster , C., 112 , 142 Kowal,S., 391 Kozhevnikow , V. A., 23, 351 Krauss , R. M., 148 Krach,A., 497 Kubicek , L. F., 225,230 Kucera , H., 219 , P. N., 447 Kugler la BergeD., 20 - 112 Laboy , W., 111 , 139 , 143 Lackner , J. R., 471- 472,474 Ladd.D. R.. 165 . 176 . 307.309.385.399 , P., 438 Ladefoged LaHeij, W., 438 Lakoff,R., 57 Lane , H., 386 , S., 320,321 Langford Laver , J. D. M., 14,247,468

Linde,C., 112 , 139 , 143 , J. R., 258 Lindsley Linell, P., 285 -Higgins , H. C., 297 Longuet , F. G., 203 Lounsbury Lovins , J. B., 332 Lubker , J., 439,445 Lucas , D., 320 , J., 44, 46, 55, 57- 58, 62, 197 , 207 Lyons Maassen , B., 16, 162 , 231,258,276-278, 280- 281 , D., 19,331- 332,350-351,353, MacKay 356- 357,462,465,470,474- 477,498 , H., 199 , 203 Maclay MacLure , M., 36 , P. F., 438,442,445- 446,451 MacNeilage , B., 97, 121 , 147 , 265,267, MacWbinney 270,272- 273,344,348 , S., 264 Madigan Makkai,A., 187 Malinowski , B., 104 , R., 131 Mangoid Marshall , J. C., 22 - 148 -Wilson Marslen , W., 35, 147 , 473, 492 Martin, J. G., 203 Martin, J. R., 113 , M., 121 Masling , K., 214,216- 217,248 Mayer , D., 121 Mayhew McNeill,D., 12,23- 24, 74, 94, 285,320 Medin,D. L., 183 Menn,L., 320 , R., 214,216- 217,248,463-464, Meringer 470,478,480 Mervis , C. B., 223 Metzler , J., 72 , A., 353-354,360,409- 410 Meyer , D. E., 351,419 Meyer Mill, A. I. D., 199 Miller, G. A., 21, 43, 46, 48, 58, 74, 119 , 183 , 185 , 195 , 200,207- 209,212 Mittelstaedt , H., 49 Mittenecker , E., 320 Mohanan , K. P., 163 , 289,291 Moll, K. L., 444 Monsell , S., 417,419-421 , R., 74, 77, 79, 88 Montague , W. E., 414 Montague , M., 36 Montgomery Morton,J., 201,203

543

Author Index Motley, M. T., 356, 461- 462, 464- 466, 468- 469, 474, 477 Munro, A., 139 Nakatani, L. H., 388- 390, 392- 393 Neilson, M. D., 451 Neilson, P. D., 451 Nelson, L. J., 471 Nespor, M., 302- 303, 370, 373, 378, 381, 392, 408 Newell, A., 17, 143, 321 Ninnaier, H., 51 Nolan, F. J., 440 Noordman, L. G. M., 212 Noordman-Vonk, W., 183 Nooteboom , S., 149, 273, 350, 357, 387390, 463- 464, 470, 478, 480, 485 Nonnan, D. A., 74 Nunberg,G., 47- 48, 53, 134

-Keenan Ochs . E.. 41- 42 O'Connell . D. C.. 391 O'Connor . J. D.. 307.310 O'Connor . K. D.. 388 Ohala . J. J.. 400 Ohman . S. E. G.. 453 . G. A.. 441 Ojemann Oldfield . 230 . R. C.. 199 Oiler. D. K.. 446 Olson . D. R.. 129 , 199 , 203,267, C. E., 23, 44, 148 Osgood 269,272 Ouweneel , 367 , G. R. E., 166 -Cooper,J. M., 14, 389 Paccia Paivio, A., 264 Pa1enno , D. S., 216 Parker, F., 444 Parkes , C. H., 201 Partee , B., 89 Pearson , M., 35 Pechmann , T., 46, 129- 133, 150, 273 C. Perdue , , 42 Perfetti, C. A., 263 Perkell,J. S., 442- 444, 446, 453, 456 Perry, J., 74 Petrie, H., 126 Pick, H. L., 463 Pierrehumbert , J., 307 Pike, K., 332 Pinker, S., 192, 194, 197- 198 Pinson,E. N., 426, 431

Pollock , M. D., 414 Pols,L. C. W., 432 Posner , M. 1., 20, 73 Power , M. J., 127 Premack , D., 73 Prentice , J. L., 262- 263 Priller,J., 320 Prince , A., 298 Prince , 146 , 148 , E., 114 Pullum , G. K., 375- 376,378,408 , Z. W., 22 Pylyshyn , P. T., 230 Quinlan Quirk, R., 2, 43 Reason , J., 320 Recanati , F., 59 Redeker , G., 148 Reich, P. A., 218, 351, 356 Reichenbach , H., 56 Reinelt, R., 112, 139 Reinhart,T., 98- 99, 137, 265 Remez , R. E., 438, 450, 453 Richardson, G., 438 Riddoch, M. J., 230 RochesterS. R., 113, 259 Rommetveit , R., 262- 263 Rooth, M., 89 Rosch, E., 155, 223 Ross,J. R., 65, 264 Roudet, L., 387 Rubin, D. C., 320 Rubin, P., 438, 450, 453 Rumelhart , D. E., 19, 74 Ryalis, J., 400 Ryave,A. L., III Sacks , H., 23, 31, 33, 35- 36, 39, 111,459 Sadock , J., 63 Saltzman , E. L., 439- 440, 446, 450

Samuels , S. J., 20 Sanford , A., 113 , 119 Schaffer , D., 35 Schank , R. C., 74, 90, 139 , 458, , E. A., 23, 31, 36, 112 Schegioff 460-461,463,497 Schenkein , J., 122 , 273 Scherer , 307 , K., 102 Schiffrin , D., 38 , I. M., 23, 104 Schlesinger , S., 165 Schmerling Schneider , W., 20

S44

Author Index

Schouten , M. E. H., 432 Schreuder , R., 48, 206,212,223-224,226 Schriefers , 227- 230 , H., 188 Schunk , D. H., 65- 66 Scollon , R., III Scollon , S. B. K., III Scott , D., 391 Searle , J. R., 60- 61, 64- 65, 69 - 166 Selkirk , 174 , 176 , 287,289, , E., 165 291-292,298- 299,303- 306,361,373374,379- 380,382- 383,387,391,394, 420 Senft , G., 104 Seuren , 197 , 114 , 118 , P. A. M., 22, 74, 101 , P. H. K., 223 Seymour Sbankweiler , D. S., 441 -Hufnagel Shattuck , S., 319,321,330- 332, 334- 335,338- 343,346,350,357- 358, 360,362 , R. N., 72, 154 Shepard Shitrrin , R. M., 20 Sbillcock , R. S., 199 - 113 Sidner , 119 , C. L., 112 , D., 286 Siegel , G. M., 463 Siegel Silvennan , K., 307 Simon , H. A., 17, 143 Skarbek , A., 126 Siobin , D., 104 Small , L. H., 471 Smith , E., 183 , C. R. R., 20, 73 Snyder Sonnenschein , S., 131 Sorensen , J. M., 400 Sorokin , V. N., 449 Sowa , J. F., 74 , D., 40- 41, 43- 44, 59, 63- 64, 73, Sperber 101 Sridhar , S. N., 148 , 265,267- 270,272-273 Steedman , M. J., 57- 58, 207 , J. P., 218,247,249,256,326, Sternberger 330,332,334,336- 338,344,348,351, 356- 357,371- 372,474 , S., 414,416- 421,454 Sternberg Stevens , K., 432-433,440- 442,446 , W., 203 Strange -Kennedy Studdert , M., 441 - 137 Stutterheim , C. von, 136 Svartvik , J., 2, 43 Tannenbaum , P. H., 203, 262 Tanz, C., 46

Taylor, I., 259 Tent, J., 470- 471 Terken, J. M. B., 132, 147, 149, 273 , H. L., 435 Teulings Thomassen , A. J. W. M., 435 Thorson, N., 307 Toner, H., 166 Treiman, R., 330, 333, 336, 338 Tuller, B., 439, 446, 452, 471- 472, 474 Turner, E., 262- 263 Turvey, M. T., 438- 439, 446- 448, 450 Tye-Murray, N., 471 Tyler, L., 35, 147- 148, 473, 492 Umeda,N., 389 Vaissiere , J., 307, 389 Valian, V. V., 257 Van Bezooijen , R., 102, 307 VandenBroecke , M. P. R., 350 Vander Sandt, R. A., 118 Van Dijk , T. A., 112 VanGalen, G. P., 435 VanWijk, C., 259, 303, 391, 468, 487- 489, 491, 497 Vatikiotis-Bateson , E., 452 Vogel, I., 302- 303, 370, 373, 378, 381, 392, 408 Vorberg, D., 227

Wales , R., 166 Walker , E. C. T., 201 Walsh , T., 444 Walton . D. N.. 112

Warren, R. K., 192, 261, 263- 265 Webber , B. L., 114 Webelhuth , G., 163 Weindrich,D., 135 Weinheimer , S., 148 Weinstein , S., 119 Weissenborn , J., 46, 53 Wells, G., 36 Wells, R., 332 Wessels , J., 35 Whorf, B. L., 103 Wiche, R. T. P., 74 , W. A., 357 Wickelgren Wilkes-Gibbs, D. L., 122, 133, 148 Willems, N., 399 Williams, E., 89 Williams, F., 203, 262 Wilshire, C., 343

Author Index

WilsonD., 40- 41, 43-44, 59, 63- 64, 73, 101 , A., 230,320 Wingfield -Spurk Winterhoff , P., 135 Witten,I. H., 393 Wright,C. E., 417,419-421 Wunderlich , 139 , D., 40, 52, 64, 112 Wundt,W., 23, 26, 28, 96, 119 , 162 , 235, 239,261,275,417 . Wyatt,E. P., 417 , A. D., 320 Yanney , V. H., 36 Yogve YuiUe , J. C., 264 - 113 - 148 Yule,G., 23, 36, 112 , 147

Zubin , D. A., 52 , 367 Zwanenburg , W., 166 - 376 Zwicky . A.. 63. 369 . 375 . 378 . 408

S4S

Subject

Index

Abdominal muscles, 422 Absolutive. SeeCase

Active voice. SeePassive Activation

Accent, 297, 328. SeePitchaccent , Word accent contrastive , 132- 133, 177 default, 177- 178 intonational, 309 andisochrony , 392, 395, 397 nuclear,309 , 309- 310 primary, secondary 147 prosodic, 130, in shifts, 372 , 247, 282, 372 stranding Accentuation , 25, 132, 179, 283, 374. See alsoDe-accentuation of discriminatinginformation, 132 of referentialexpressions , 150 . SeeLexicalaccess Access Accessibility , 236, 260- 261, 264- 266, 275, conceptual 278 lexical, 16, 260, 276- 277 , 281 phonological of phoneticplan, 285 status(index) of referents , 108, 144- 146, 149, 151, 159, 163, 237- 238, 246, 270271, 401 of word fonns, 16, 276 errors), 249 Aa: ommodation(in speech ofcase, 249 in connected , 364, 408, 411 speech metrical, 299 , 364 morphological andallophonic,340, 364 segmental andstranding , 246 . SeeCase Accusative function. SeeDeixis Acknowledging

, 198, 229, 275, 278 conceptual lemma, 181, 195, 197, 200- 201, 219- 221, 232, 244, 280 , 202, 204 logogen , 93, 96, 197, 231- 232 meaning , 7, 231- 232, 280, 320, 397 phonological Activationspreading , 18- 20, 75, 211- 212, 225, 233, 319- 320, 366- 367 theoryof self-monitoring, 465, 467, 474477 erron, 234, 346- 347, theoryof speech 351- 363 Acousticgoals, 441- 442 Actor. SeeThematicroles Adjunct, 169 modeltheory, 45I Adaptive ' Address in discourse model, 99, 118, 146, 151, 152, 159, 260, 271 in form lexicon, addressframes , 165, 187, 191, 321- 329, 335- 337, 344, 346, 348349, 361- 362, 367, 371, 373, 406, 408410, 419 in linearization , 144 Addressingfailures oflemmas, 214- 222 of lexicalform, 162, 331, 346, 349, 351, 358 Adjacencypain, 36 Adjective, 148, 167- 169, 194- 196, 236, 253, 476 affixes , 104 in compounds , 288 eliding, 271 , 178 focusing

Subject Index Adjective(cont.) marked/unmarked , 229- 230 nodes , 476 , 180, 251, 255 phrase andprelexicalhesitation , 203 root, 286- 287 andword accent , 306, 374, 393 Adverbial deictic, 48, 69 modal, 62, 403 temporal,55, 58, 69, 178 Affix, 182- 183, 286, 288- 289, 299 in activationspreading , 352- 353, 355 inflectional , 290 in spelloutprocedures , 324- 331, 344, 349, 352, 362 root (classI , primary), 185, 286- 288, 294, 299 shift, 372 word(classII , secondary ), 286- 289, 294 Affricatives , 434 Agent. SeeThematicrole Agency,270 andsaliency , 268- 269, 276 , 185, 289 Agglutinativelanguage , 438 Agonist/antagonist , 22, 469 Agrammatism Alpha/gammaloop, 436, 437 Allomorph, 301- 302, 317, 325, 331, 364, 367- 370, 375- 377, 406 Allophone, 296- 298, 327- 328, 340- 341, 362, 434 Alternativeplans, 217 , 299, 306, 374, 394- 396 Alternatingstress Alveolarridge, 296, 430, 433, 442 Alveolars,433 Ambiguity andconversational maxims,41, 129 of intentions , 67 of networkrepresentations , 77 in referentialexpressions , 129 repairof, 461, 491 , 295 Ambisyllabicity Amnesticdisorders , 184 Anacrusis , 308, 373, 393- 394, 396 Anaphora, ISO, 176, 271, 283 Anteriorspeech sounds , 296, 340, 433, 443 errors, 347- 348, Anticipationin speech 358- 359, 372, 468 Anticipatoryretracingin self-repairs, 490- 491

548 errorsand repairs, Antonymsin speech 185, 216, 219, 496 , 139, 143 Apartmentdescriptions , 26, 119 Apperception , 119 Apprehension Appropriateness repair. SeeRepair Areafunction, 445 , 337 Archiphoneme Argument , 169- 170, 174- 178, 189, 191-conceptual 195, 245 external, 169, 182 Arousal(emotional ), 469 , 138- 144. See Arrangingfor expression a/so Linearization Article, 167- 170, 203, 238 definite/indefinite,271- 273 in phonologicalwords, 377 in shifts, 371 Articulation, Articulator, 7, 9, 22- 28, 102, 180, 229, 259, 284- 285, 291, 296, 304, 318, 328, 345, 361, 364, 410- 411, 413457, 473, 475, 497 in delayedauditoryfeedback , 477 effort, 408 interruptionof, 13 latencyof, 230, 259, 473 monitoringof, 462, 472, 476 precisionof, 396, 410 Articulatornetwork, 450 Articulatory buffer, 12, 28, 386, 473 , 295, 297, 318, 326, 346, 362, 409 gesture plan, 12- 13, 24, 28, 297, 318, 329, 386 placeof, 296, 472 units, 332 Artificial intelligence , 124, 205, 207 , 424 Arytenoidcartilage Aspect, 55, 57, 100, 102- 103, 106, 165, 183, 191, 233 sounds , 296- 297 Aspirationof speech Assimilation , 369- 371, 406, 408, 411 Assertion , 3, 10, 17, 300 Assertivespeech act. SeeSpeech act . SeeWord asSociation Association Associative intrusions,214- 215, 219, 221, 234 relationsin lexicon, 183- 184, 234 Attention of addressee , 5, II , 35, 59, 68, 108, 110, 136, 144, 147, 150- 152, 270, 311, 316

Subject Index in lexicalretrieval, 21 in monitoring, 9, 28, 463- 467, 471- 473, 487 andpausing , 127 in planning, 20, 28, 82, 89, 119, 126- 129, 158, 257 selective , 463, 465, 467, 498 span, 119 Attentional effort, 157 , 119, 141, 172, 176, 178, 316 focusing lapse129, 145, 487 pointer, 172 resources , 21, 27, 124, 126, 249, 467 's 44 57 61- 63, 90, Attitude(speaker ), , , 101 102, 171, 307, 311- 364, 366, 402, 478. SeealsoCommitment Audition, 9, 13, 475 Auditory feedback , 443- 445, 474, 477. Seealso Delayedauditoryfeedback goal, 442, 444- 445, 456 , 440, 442, 445, 456 targets , 2, 20- 22, 27Automaticityof processing 28, 249- 250, 259, 270, 282, 447- 448, 477 Auxiliaries,7, 57, 193- 194, 197- 198, 253, 299 modal, 197 reductionof, 302, 364, 375, 377- 378, 406 Awareness , 20- 22 BABEL, 205 Backchannelbehavior,36, 430 , 71, 97, 137, 267, 315, 400 Backgrounding , 235, 253 Backtracking Backwardsuppletionof presupposition , 118, 146 Basicclausepartitioning, 256- 257 Basiclevelterms, 223 Basicmetricalpatternof word, 284, 298299, 323, 373- 374, 382, 384 Basicobjectlevel, 223, 234 Beat, 297- 299, 305, 383 demi, 304- 305 movement , 306, 373- 374, 377, 382, 384, 394 silent, 380- 382, 385, 387, 391, 408, 420 Bernoullieffect, 426- 427 Bilabials,370, 432 Biteblockexperiments , 439, 445- 446, 451- 452

549 Blend. SeeErrors , 110- 111, 114, 140, 143 Bookkeeping tone Boundary , 171, 180, 310, 381, 390, 401- 403, 421 Brain, 18, 445- 446 Breakdownpattern, 22 Breakoption for phonologicalphrase , 304- 305, 308, 373, 379- 381, 385- 387, 390, 400, 402 , 413, , speechversusnon-speech Breathing 423, 425, 429, 447- 449, 455 Call hierarchyin lP G, 244, 252, 256- 259 andplanningunits, 257, 259 Canonicalsettingfor speech , 29- 30, 45, 49, 68 55, Case absolutive , 169 accusative , 89, 163, 243, 251, 253- 254, 263 dative, 163, 181, 193, 243, 248- 249, 254 , 168- 169 ergative marking, 161, 163, 169, 179, 235, 248, 254 nominative , 6- 7, 163, 168, 240, 243, 248, 249, 25I , 253 Casualspeech , 368- 369, 406 Categorialprocedurein lP G, 238- 242, 244- 245, 250- 251, 254- 256, 261, 275, 282 of experience , 78, 94- 95 Categories in selfrepairing convention Categoryidentity , 493- 494 Causativeverbs, 54 C-command , 377 , 61 Challenges Changeof state, 62, 268 errors, 346- 347 Checkofffailurein speech , 138Chronologicalorderin linearization 139, 159 Citation formsof words, 364, 373- 374, 382, 405, 407, 411 Classificatory particles, 104 Clause basic, 256- 258, 283, 303 finite, 256- 258, 308 main, 167, 250, 252, 255, 308 subordinate , 254- 256, 258 surface , 23, 256- 257 Clitic, 307, 375, 317- 378 Cliticization, 302, 307, 364, 370- 371, 373, 375- 378, 380, 406- 408, 411

Subject Index

550

Cluster(of phonologicalsegments ), 293Competingplans, 217 294, 319- 320, 325, 332- 338, 340, 342Competitionmodel. 265. 270 344, 348- 349, 360- 361, 363, 369, 409, , 7, 169- 170, 175- 176, 180, Complement 419, 453 238- 239, 242, 250- 251, 255 nounphrase , 327, 335, 337- 338, 344, , 178, 196 composition 348- 349, 361- 363, 409 sentential , 190. SeealsoS-COMP verbal, 169, 190, 197. SeeqlsoV-COMP spellout, 325, 337, 343- 344, 349 . Coarticulation , 7, 370, 490, 438, 443- 444, , 200- 201 Componentiality 454, 457 , 185- 186, 286, 288- 290, 382 Compound Cocktailpartyeffect,462 , 205, 235 Computermodels Coda Conceptual . SeeAccessibility , 379procedurefor phonologicalphrase accessibility 380 , 169- 170, 172, 175- 176, 178, argument of syllable,293, 294, 324- 325, 327- 330, 189- 195, 245 332- 335, 338, 344, 348- 349, 353, 357, core, 212 360- 362, 407- 410 feature,71, 104, 157, 204 function,.79- 82, 189, 241 Cognitive effort, 128, 157, 344 intrusionandspeech errors, 214- 215, 217, 219- 220, 234 , 22 impenetrability load, 128 modification , 82- 83, 196 , 154, 159 stylein linearization , 147, 149- 151 prominence relations, IS, 27, 184, 216 , 73, 202- 204 system Coherence in lemma, 188- 189, 195- 197, specification 200, 217, 233, 237, 241, 245 , 118, 128 conceptual of discourse , 283 , 6, 26, lOS, 181, 186, Conceptualization 205, 209. SeealsoMessage , 275 syntactic generation Cohesion , 236, 271 , 9- 10, 14, 16, 21, 25, 27, 70, Conceptualizer Cohesive 95, 105, 202, 237 Condition/actionpair (in productions , 236, 271, 461 grammaticalencoding ), 10, reference 17, 72, 124- 125, 207, 240 , 271- 273 syntax, 273 , 163, 166- 169, Configurationallanguage Co- hyponym, 183- 184, 219 179- 180, 270 Collaborationin conversation effect , 65, 133 Congruency Color naming, 131, 183, 207 in usingcomparatives , 228- 229 errorsand repairs,463, 466, 496 in topica1ization , 262, 268 -and-executionstagein articulation in questionanswering Command , 273 , 419 , 266 Congruentgrammaticalencoding Commissives . SeeSpeech act Conjunct, 264 Commitment , S, 61- 64, 101- 102, 123, 134, , 82, 167, 194, 276- 281, 367, Conjunction 314, 402 377, 499 Connected , 57, 62- 63, 68, 101 episternic , 284, 302- 319, 323, 325, speech deontic, 62, 64, 68, 101 329, 343- 361, 364- 412 Commonground, 112, 115, 118, 120, 124, Connectionism , 18- 20, 211, 474- 478. See 132, 135, 146 alsoActivationspreading Communicative Connective , 44, 483 goal, S, 11, 107, 115, 128, 136, 282 , 139- 143 Connectivityin linearization intention, 4- 5, 21, 30, 58- 60, 62, 68- 69, principleof, 140 107- 110, 114, 119, 123- 125, 137, 144, Connotation , 183 157- 159. SeealsoIllocutionaryforce Consonant , 183, 187, 234 Comparatives , 295 ambisyllabic cluster. SeeCluster , Compensatory articulatorymovements 438, 439, 443, 445, 451- 452 co-productionwith vowel, 453

Subject Index

551 Convention , 38, 42, 44, 63, 65, 67- 68 in repairing,492- 494 Conventional forms, 6, 65, 315 rules, 38, 41- 43 , degreeof, 66- 67 Conventionality in lexicalaccess , 199- 20I , Convergence 204, 207, 209- 210, 212, 214, 233 Conversation , 1- 8, 27- 46, 53, 56, 58, 6069, 111- 117, 119- 123, 133, 145, 172, 179, 306, 390, 404, 458, 460, 466, 471 from, 31, 33, 36- 37 closing,disengaging , 42, 58, 63, 111- 112 everyday opening , engagingin, I , 31, 36 rulesof, 460 , 36 sustaining skill, 21 , 30- 31, 38Cooperationin conversation 39, 44, 67, 133- 134 Cooperativeprinciple, 39- 40, 53 , exploitationof, 43- 44, Cooperativeness 133 Coordinationandself-repair, 486- 489 Coordinativestructures , 440, 447- 450, 452, 456 457 Coproductionof articulatorygestures , 444- 445 Coremeaning , 212, 214, 216, 219 Coreprinciple, 213 sounds Coronalspeech , 296, 301, 433, 442, 453 , 424 Cricoarytenoidmuscles , 424 Cricothyroidmuscles Cross-linguisticcomparisons , 265, 268, 272, 283 Culture, 37, 42, 44, 62- 65, 104, 139, 497 Currentnodein activationspreading , 353355, 358- 360, 475, 477 -next, 31, 34, 36, 38 -selects Current-speaker , 126- 128 Cyclesin monologues Dative. SeeCase Deaccentuation , 147- 150, 283 Deactivation , decayof activation,234, 3 359 Deafness , 444, 446 Debate, 112, 126 -makingstage Decision , 228 Decisiontable, 207- 210, 213, 233 . SeeKnowledge Declarativeknowledge Declarativemood, sentence type, 101

Index Subject Declaration . SeeSpeech act Declination , 398- 400, 421- 422, 427 , 256 Deepstructure , 23, 259. SeealsoBasicclause Deepclause Defaultaccent , 177- 178 Definite/indefinite , 114, 120, 152, 197 expressions referent , 99, 146, 170, 175, 267, 271- 273 Deictic adverbial , 48, 69 , 29, 44- 46, 102 anchoring characterof speech , 30 - 53, 69, 153, 154 coordinatesystem , 48, SO origin (origo), 46, 48, 50, 52- 55, 58, 69 model, 53 , 137, 153- 155 perspective pronoun, 5, 45 proximity, 103 region, 47, 52- 54 shift, 45 shift of origin, 54, 58, 69 verb, 54 Deicticreference , 51, 53 primary, 48- SO , 49- 51, 69 secondary Deixis functionof, 54- 5~ acknowledging 53 54, 69 by analogy, , 100- 103 anchoringof utterance coordinationproblem, SO delimitationproblem, 52- 53 discourse , 46 identifyingfunctionof, 47- 48 informingfunctionof, 48- 54 , 5, 45 person place, spatial, 45- 55, 58, 69, 103 social, 45- 46 time, 45- 46, 55- 58, 106, 137 typesof, 44- 46 , 477 Delayedauditoryfeedback Demonstrative , 104 determiner , 47 reference , 48, 53 Dentalspeech sounds , 433 Deonticmodality. SeeCommitment Derivation(morphological ), 183- 184, 286- 287, 289, 316, 326, 344 Destination , in lP G, 239- 253, 256, 258, 282, 303 error, 246, 248- 249, 282 functional, 239, 241, 243, 248- 249 , 252- 253, 256, 258, 304 hierarchy

552 Detectionof errors, 463, 471- 472 Determiner , 169, 170, 194, 196- 198, 246247, 271, 299 Diacriticfeatures , 165, 167, 170, 174, 183, 190- 193, 196- 198, 233, 238- 244, 247251, 275, 288- 289, 321- 322, 324, 329331, 343- 344, 352, 362, 365- 366, 373, 377, 382 Diphthong, 338, 409, 432, 434, 440 Direct/indirectspeech act. SeeSpeech act Directionascategoryof experience , 74, 78, 91, 94 Directionalterms, 53, 91, 153- 154, 195 andgazemovement , 153- 154 Directive. SeeSpeech act Discourse coherence of, 283 context, 53, 110, 115, 158, 183, 461, 463 model, 9, 113- 120, 122- 123, 126, 132, 134, 144- 152, 159, 163, 171, 175, 271, 273 record, 8, 10, 111- 123, 146, 172,460 situation, 10, 107, 110 topic, 99, 112- 113, 115, 12I, 152, 158159, 460 type, 111- 112, 126 Discriminatinginformationin object naming, 131- 132, 134 Discriminationnetwork, 205- 207, 210, 233 Distraction, 216- 217 Distinctivefeature,296- 297, 330, 340- 341, 350, 354, 358, 362, 440- 442, 477, 456 Distributed control, 204 , 20 processing , 211 representation Drawl, 34- 35, 420- 421, 455, 477 , 18, 24, 281, 477, 498 Dysftuency Editing, 458- 499 distributed,467- 469 , 459, 478, 482- 484, 491, 494, expressions 496, 498- 499 lexicalbiasin, 465, 477 , 466, 468- 469 prearticulatory semanticbiasin, 465 syntacticbiasin, 465 theory, 465, 467- 468, 470, 476, 498 of taboowords, 461, 468- 469 Editor, 459, 466, 469- 470, 474 of vocaltract, 449, 453 Eigenfrequency Ellipsis, 153, 253- 254, 273

553

Subject Index , 89- 90, 105 Ellipticalmessages Emotion, 38, 70, 102, 171, 307, 311, 316, 364, 366, 403, 410, 469 Empathy,312 , 300, 404 Emphaticstress , 167, 170, 253, 375 Emptyelements Encliticization , 375, 380, 407- 408, 411 . SeeKnowledge knowledge Encyclopedic , 132- 133, 136, Endophoricredundancy ISO . SeeConversation Engaging Epiglottis,424, 428 . SeeCommitment Epistemiccommitment Ergative.SeeCase Errors

in other-producedspeech , 470- 471 402 398 397 394 , , Euphony, Euphonyrules, 384, 394, 396, 411 Eventasconceptualcategory , Event function, 26, 74, 78- I06pass;m, 157, 159, 163, 188- 189, 241 Eventdescription , 261- 262, 267- 270, 272, 277- 278 Eventtimein deixis, 55- 58 Examinations , 111- 112 Excitement , 102 Executivecontrol. SeeControl Exhalation,295, 422, 447 , 295 Exhalingspeechsounds , 132- 134, 136 Exophoricredundancy , 497 Expansions , 422, 472 Expiratorymuscles act . SeeSpeech Expressives functionof prosody, 306- 307, Expressive 317 Exploitationof maxims,43- 44 Externalargumentof verb, 169, 182 Externalloop in monitoring, 472- 474 Extrinsictiming, 436, 444 Eyebrowflash, 37 Eyecontact, 35. SeealsoGaze Facial expression, 68, 430 Falsetto, 424 False vocal chords. 424

Fastspeech , 302,368- 371,385,409,487 , , 1- 2, 8, 12, 18, 24, 28, 30, 34, 128 Fluency - 204,222,239,245,282, - 128 127 , 199

SS4

Subject Index

, 430 Genioglossus Gesamtvonte Uung,23. 26 Gestaltof object/scene . 131- 132. 156. 159 Gesture . 8. 23. 35. 45. 47. 53. 59. 68 articulatory. 291. 295. 297. 318. 326- 327. 346. 362. 364. 388, 409. 414. 434- 435. 438. 440. 444, 446 Giveninformation. 6. 98. 114. 311. 315 Givenness . 99. 100 Glottal speechsounds . 381. 433 Glottal stop. 381 Glottis. 309. 424. 427- 429. 433. 445 Goal communicative . 5. II . 107. 117. 128. 136. 282 elaboration . 127 Grammar. 192. 236 , 70 message IncrementalProduction . 235. 249. 282 LexicalFunctional. 162. 235 of repair. 489 Grammatical . 9. II . 105, 179. 181- 283passim . encoding 375, 422 relations. 15. 27. 161. 179. 285 Grammaticalfunction. 97. 152. 161- 163. 167- 170. 179- 180. 189- 190. 192- 195. 198. 222. 233, 235- 236. 238- 239. 244245, 250. 256. 260- 261. 264- 270. 275. 279. 281. 283 hierarchyof, 192. 194. 233, 260. 266. 269. 275 Gravityanddeixis. 49 Grid. metrical. 298- 299. 304- 305. 317. 323. 366. 374. 378. 380- 384. 411

Galvanicskin response , 469 Gap (pause ), 33, 78 Gaze in convenation, 8, 35, 36, 59, 68 movementanddi~ tional tenDs, 153- 154 tour, in scenedescriptions , 153

Gender , 168 , 231,238 Generic verb,206

Haplology. SeeErron Harmonics . 427 Head/modifierstructures . 79. 82. 89, 96 Head-of-phrasefunction. 167- 168. 238 Head-of-phraseprocedure . 239. 247 lateralization . 22. 154 Hemispheric Henderson graph. 127 Hesitantspeech . 127- 128. 204 Hesitation.5- 6. 203- 204. 257- 259, 460. 484, 494 , 203, 204, 421 prelexical Homonym,208 , 44 Hyperbole

, 183 , 216,220 Hypemym , 201,204,207,210, Hypemym problem 212- 214,233

555

Subject Index I-marker, 23 Idea -motor, 94 sensory unit, 23, 36 Idealdelivery, 128, 384- 385, 391, 402

. SeeDeixis function Identifying - 187 Idiom. 186

Illocutionaryforce, 58- 65, 108, 123- 124,

151 . 157 . 398 . 402

andaccessibility , 264- 266 Imageability - 101 , 106 , , 63- 65, 67, 71, 100 Imperative 171 240 170 144 157 109 , , 403 , , , Implicature conventional, 44 conversational, 41- 44, 66- 67, 124, 138 Inclination of pitch, 404

Incremental , 157 , , 2, 23- 28, 109 production 245 253 235 239 162 , 365 , , - 254 , 284 , , - 384 371 , , 405 , 411 , 398 , 400 , 396 , 373 Incremental Production Grammar , 235,

249 . 282

field.46 Indexical Indignation . 30. 102. 171 Indirect speechact. SeeSpeechact Inferability of referents. 99- 100. Seealso Accessibility Infinitive . SeeTense

Inflection , 198 , 251, , 161 , 165 , 183 , 55, 104 286,288-290,316,322,344

Interference . 217- 218. 227. 229. 234 conceptual plan-internal. 222 Interjectionin repairs.482. 484 Interlinear-toneticnotation. 309- 310 Internalloop in self-monitoring. 472- 473 Internalspeech . 12- 15. 21. 27- 28. 469473. 498 InternationalPhoneticAlphabet. 12. 295. 500 . 63- 64. 67. 78. 100- 102. 106. Interrogative 109. 144. 157. 170- 171. 240. 403 . 28. 112- 113.459. Interruptionof speech 473. 478- 48. 489. 492 . 478. 480. 482. 484. 490- 491 delayed immediate . 479- 480. 495. 498 Main InterruptionRule. 478. 480- 482. 498 within-word. 479- 481. 484 Interview. 3- 5. 111- 112. 126. 158. 391 Intonation. intoning. 15. 18. 23- 24. 33. 62- 64. 102. 108. 165. 166. 171. 179- 180. 255. 290. 306- 307. 315- 317. 365. 368. 406- 407 generationof. 398- 405 Intonational . 102. 171. 312- 317. 366. 405 meaning lexicon. 171. 316 phrase . 259. 303- 304. 306- 311. 314- 317.

clitics versus . 378 asdiacritic feature . 183 . 191 . 256

Junctureof words, 302 Key, 315- 317, 366, 385, 398, 400, 411 Kinaestheticrepresentations , 73 Kinshipterms, 183, 207, 210, 212 Knowledged ~ larative, 10- II , 18, 72- 73, 182, 185, 236

Subject Index Knowledge(cont.) , 9- 10 encyclopedic mutual, shared , 8, 14, 29, 44- 45, 47, 69, 84, 114- 115, 123, 125, 146, 158 mode, 72- 74 , 9- 11, 72, 105, 124- 125, 149, procedural 185- 186, 236 , 72- 74 representation situational, 10, 72 store, II , 28

556

Lemma,6 access , 198- 213, 320 failure, 214- 221 access substitutionin self-correction , 489 , 134- 135 Legitimacyof request Levelsof processing , 231- 232, 234, 319, 321, 330, 343- 345, 361- 362, 367, 369, 468 Lexicalaccess , 186, 199, 200, 205- 206, 213- 214, 230, 234, 277, 468 failureof, 214- 221, 462 Labialspeech sounds theoriesof, 199, 201, 206, 211 , 295, 340, 442 Labio-dentalspeech sounds timecourseof, 181, 222- 232 , 433 Lexicalaction, 208- 210 Languages Cantonese Lexicalbiasin speech errors, 355- 356, 359, , 268 Danish, 307 363 Dutch, 71, 103, 122, 130, 140, 167, 220, editingaccountof, 465, 477 237, 238, 307, 350, 433, 483, 485 activationspreadingaccountof, 356, 359 Lexical Dyirbal, 55 Finnish, 185, 268, 289 , 167, 288 categories French, 231. 238, 297, 302, 307, 367- 368, , 186- 187, 233 encoding 387, 392, 429, 433 entry, 182- 183, 186- 188, 231, 234, 322, German,26, 45, 102, 165, 167, 179, 238, 344 248- 249, 254, 263, 265, 289, 350 error. SeeErrors Hausa, 50 form, 12, 231, 258, 285, 320- 321 Hebrew,268, 433 gap, 209 , 265, 268, 272- 273, 289 , 181, 235 Hungarian hypothesis inflectional intrusion, 184 , 289 Italian, 262, 272- 273 pointer, 165, 167, 174, 180, 193, 195, 344, 362, 373, 375- 378 , 103- 104, 186, 286, 272, 289, 329 Japanese Kannada,269 LexicalFunctionalGrammar, 162, 235 Lexicalrule(passive Kiliyila, 104 , dativeshift), 193 Lexicallydrivenformulation, 181, 198, Malay, 104 235- 236, 282 , 163, 167, 180, 270 Malayalam Lexicon Quiche,497 intonational, 171, 316 Serbo-Croatian, 268 lemma,9, 187, 199 , 53, 102- 104, 268, 392- 393, 433 Spanish mental, 6, 11- 13, 18, 22, 27, 162, 167, Swedish , 307 181- 234, 290, 302, 316 stresstimed~373, 392 393 form, 12, 163, 187, 258, 284- 301, 323, syllable-timed, 392- 393 329, 344, 352- 355, 363, 368. 373. 408 Thai, 497 Turkish, 185- 186, 268, 289 Liaison, 295. 302. 367- 368. 454 Linearization Tuyaluan,497 . 107. 138. 138- 144, 153. 159. 460 Warlpiri, 169 -specificconceptualizing content-relateddeterminants . 138- 139 , 103Language 105, 157 , 138. 140. 143 principles -relateddetenninants of thought, 71, 73- 74, 105 . 138- 144 process Language , 153. 159 ), 2- 3, 33 Lapse(pause strategies sounds , 295, 316 Lip. 295- 296. 413. 428- 430. 432- 434. 436. Laryngealspeech 440. 442, 446. 449- 452 , 295, 413, 423- 430 Larynx, laryngealsystem 30 /rounding. 409. 430. 434. 443 spreading Lecturing,

Subject Index Listingintonation. 386 in turn-taking. 34 Localmanagement Locationprogrammingin articulation. 436. 439- 440. 455 . 82 Logicaloperations Logogentheory. 201- 204. 214. 219. 230. 233 Long-termmemory. 10. 21. 72. 119. 121. 126, 351- 352 Longitudinalthyromuscularis. 424 Lookahead . preview. 18. 24- 25. 28. 235. 373- 385. 389- 390. 396. 398- 400. 402406. 411 Loudness . 7. 22. 108, 309, 364, 367, 369370, 396, 409- 411. 427, 455, 462, 495 Lungs,413, 422- 423 Lying. 40 , 5, 11. 107, 109- 110, 123Macroplanning 144. 152, 157 158 Main InterruptionRule. 478. 480- 482. 498 Main/sidestructure, 136- 137 . SeeErrors Malapropism Mandible,424 Manner , 74, 78- 79, 82- 83, category conceptual 92, 96 maxim. SeeMaxims Marked/unmarkedadjectives , 229- 231 Mass-springtheory, 438- 440, 448, 450, 452, 455- 456 Massetermuscles , 45I Mastication , 413, 430, 448 Maximizationof onset, 294, 335 Maxims, 39- 44, 69, 129, 158 manner,41 exploitationof, 43- 44 floutingof, 43, 124 quality, 40, 43, 60 quantity, 39- 40, 42, 123- 124, 129- 130, 133, 140, 148, 213 relation, 40, 42, 66, 112 Meaning core, 2.12- 213, 216 intended , 6- 7, 13 intonational, 102, 171, 308, 310- 311, 314- 317, 366, 373, 405 lexical, II , 13, 182- 188, 197, 200- 201, 212, 216- 217, 232, 236 , 364 propositional relationsin lexicon, 183- 184, 188, 215

557 Melody of segments , 290 of sentence , 301, , 171 , 180 , 18,63, 102 306- 307,311,317,398.Seealso Intonation Memory limitations , 10 long-term.SeeLong-termmemory , 121 for other-produced speech , 119 primary search , 158 , 126 - 122 , 121 for self-produced speech sentence , 74 . SeeWorkingmemory working Mental . SeeLexicon lexicon load, 259 model , 72, 113 - 154 tour, 142 , 153 , 16, 28, 70, 72, 107 Message generation 160 , 44 Metaphor Metrical grid. SeeGrid , 395 phonology , 304,317,373,397- 399,402, planning 408,410- 411 rules , 299,382 of connected structure , 303- 307, speech 364- 365,372,374,387,408 tier, 290,293,297- 299,301 - 110 , 126 , , 123 , 5, II , 107 MiC ;roplanning - 160 - 129 128 , 132 , 144 of linearization , MinimalLoadPrinciple 143 Minimalnegation , 212 Modalverb,62, 101 , 403 , 198 - 171 - 102 , 180 , 402. , 170 , 64, 100 Modality SeealsoAttitude . See Modeof knowledge representation Knowledge control,445- 447,451Model-referenced 452,456 - 170 , Modification , 79, 82- 83, 88, 96, 169 196 , 22 Modularity Monitoring connectionist theoryof, 459,474- 478 editingtheoryof, 459,467- 474 other-, 470-471,473 self-, 8- 10, 13- 14, 16,21, 28, 70, 458- 478, 498- 499

Subject Index , 126- 128, 147 Monologue Mood. SeeDeclarative , Interrogative , Imperative of verb, 63- 64 , 182, 185- 186, 285, 300- 301, Morpheme 319- 326, 329- 331, 344, 349, 353- 357, 362- 363, 370, 372, 375, 378, 406 affix, 104, 183, 185, 286- 290, 294, 299, 323- 326, 329- 331, 344, 349, 352- 353, 355, 362, 372 prefix, 285, 287, 353- 354, 362 root, 12, 185, 285- 290, 294, 299, 307, 329- 331, 344, 349, 354- 355 Morphology, 12, 15, 100, 102, 104- 106, 163, 169, 182, 193, 248, 271, 273, 286290, 316, 462, 470 /metricalspellout, 321- 324 Morphological , 187, 191, 301- 302 Morpho-phonology Motherese , 368 Motivationof speaker , 8, 20 Motoneurons , 437. SeealsoAlpha/gamma loop Motor controlof speech . SeeControl cyclicityof, 448 hierarchalpropertiesof, 448 Motor controltheories auditorytargets,445- 447, 456 coordinativestructures , 440, 447- 452, 456 locationprogramming , 436- 440, 455 -spring, 438- 440, 448, 450, 452, 455mass 456 orosensory goals, 442- 445, 456 Motor program, 28, 327, 396, 414, 416, 419, 421, 434- 435, 441- 442, 447, 449 Mouth, 13, 424, 429- 431, 435, 439, 445, 448, 451, 455- 456 Muscle-movementnodes , 475 Musclespindle,437, 443, 457 Mutual belief, 133 . SeeKnowledge knowledge Naming, 131, 158, 206, 222, 225- 232, 234, 277, 415, 463, 488 latency,207, 223, 225- 232, 277, 415 Narration, III , 126, 136 Narrativeability, I Narrowfocus, 177- 178 Nasal cavity, 296, 413, 423, 428- 430, 455 sounds , 290, 296- 297, 334, 340, speech 346, 350, 429, 432- 433, 441- 442

558 Nasopharyngeal port, 429 Naturalorder(in linearization ), 41, 138139, 142 principleof, 138, 159 Naturalreference points, 155 Negation,82, 212, 256, 314 minimal, 212 Negationtest, 212- 213 Network articulator, 450- 45I connectionist , 18- 19, 353- 354, 363, 474- 476, 498 . SeeDiscrimination discrimination , 75- 77, 79 propositional spatial, 140, 203 Newinformation, 5, 109, 114, 120, 151, 159, 172, 176. SeealsoGiveninformation Newsvalue, 71, 147, 149- 159, 171- 172, 400 Node-structuretheoryof monitoring, 474478 No-markingerrors. SeeErrors Nominative.SeeCase , 163, 168Nonconfigurationallanguage 169, 179- 180, 270 Nose, 428 Noun common, 196- 197, 199 count, II , 197, 238, 247 mass , 197 proper, 196, 200, 250 Nuanceediting, 482 Nuclear entities/elements , grammaticalencoding of, 97- 98, 152, 260- 271 , 391, 401- 403 pitch movement stress , 176, 179- 180, 306, 383- 385, 389391, 402 stressrule, 305, 308- 309, 382- 384 thematicstructure,96- 97 tone. SeeTone Nucleus of syllable,293, 325, 327- 328, 331- 335, 338, 344, 348- 349, 353- 354, 360- 362, 407- 410 of intonationalphrase , 309- 317, 386, 401, 403- 404 Number, 47, 105, 165, 170, 183, 191, 197, 233, 238, 240, 242, 247, 249- 250, 273, 275, 322 plural, 47, 168, 185, 187, 197, 241, 247249, 288, 301, 324, 326, 331, 344, 378

Index Subject singular,47, 168, 187, 197, 238- 240, 242, 289, 301, 344 Numerals , 104, 273 's 3 ' , , , speakers andaddressee Obligations 20, 31 32, 61, 63 65, 135 Object. SeealsoCase , 223 categorization naming, 130- 131, 158, 232. Seealso Naming orientation,49, 154- 155 , 230 recognition reference , 133- 134 size, 155, 228- 229, 276 Oblique. SeeCase Obstructionof pitch, 300. SeealsoPitch accent, movement Obstruents, 334, 434 Omissions. SeeErrors Onset

- 294 - 344 ofsyllable , 290 , 293 , 299 . 324 . - 349 347 353 354 357 359 362 , , , . 367 .

369, 407- 410 maximizationof, 294, 335 of word. SeeWord Oralcavity, 413, 428, 430, 445, 455 Orbicularisoris, 430 Orderingerrors. SeeErrors . SeeLinearization Orderingfor expression Origin, origo. SeeDeicticorigin Orosensory goals, 442- 445, 456 in objectnaming, 129, Overspecification 158 Overtone , 427 Overtspeech , 2, 9, 12- 14, 16, 21, 27, 469472, 474, 498 Palatalspeech sounds , 433 Palate(hard, soft), 423, 429- 431, 433 sounds Palato-alveolarspeech , 433 Parallelprocessing , 2, 20- 21, 24, 27- 28 in articulation, 449 in grammaticalencoding , 238, 240, 242243, 245- 246, 248- 251, 256, 259, 282 in lexicalaccess , 199- 202, 207- 211, 222, 233- 234, 372 in phonologicalencoding , 355, 363 Parenthetical , 308, 386, 408, 497 Pars-pro-toto principle, 124 Parsedspeech (in monitoring), 13, 26, 470 Particle,64, 375- 376 , 104 classificatory

559 Passive , 169, 181, 262, 268 elicitationof, 261- 264, 266, 268, 488 lemma,245 lexicalrule, 193- 194, 233 syntacticprimingof, 274- 275, 278 truncated , 275 Path, asconceptualcategory , 90- 91, 9496, 178, 189, 195, 237 Pathfunction, 90- 91 Patient. SeeThematicrole Pause , pausing , 23, 33, 35- 37, 126- 128, 203, 236, 257- 259, 305, 308, 364, 366367, 372, 381, 385- 387, 390- 391, 409410, 420, 459, 482 -loop theoryof monitoring, Perceptual 469- 474, 476, 498 Performativeverbs, 64- 68 Perseveration , 331, 347, 358- 359, 468 Personasconceptualcategory , 74- 98, 113- 115, 189, 241 asdiacriticvariable, 191, 197, 233, 238, 240- 242, 250, 273, 289, 322, 331 Persondeixis. SeeDeixis Perspective 's 52 addressee , informational/thematic,5, 11, 70, 96, 105, 109- 110, 132, 138, 145, 152- 159, 260, 269 ' speakers, 94 visual, 226 Pharynx,428- 430 Phonation , 424 Phonationperiod, 127 Phone,292, 294- 297, 328, 346, 362- 363, 438, 440- 441, 444, 472 Phoneme , 22, 211, 292, 298, 301, 320- 363 , 464, 475, 477 passim Phonemic clause , 23 code, 297, 300 similarityconstraint,350, 358 Phonetic feature,295- 297, 316, 350, 428, 432- 434, 440, 442, 455 , plan, 7- 8, 12, 24- 28, 284- 421passim 434- 436, 444, 449, 454- 457, 470, 473. SeealsoArticulatoryplan Phoneticspellout, 319, 321, 324, 326- 329, 332, 335, 338, 344, 348- 349, 361- 363 in connected , 364- 370, 375, 387, speech 389, 400, 405- 412, 417, 436 Phonicduration, 387- 392

560

Subject Index Phonological , 7, 11- 12, 18, 20, 24, 26, 102, encoding 161- 162 , 165, 166, 171, 179, 181, 187, 231, 233, 236, 239- 242, 246, 255, 259, 275- 276, 278- 279, 282- 284, 303, 316, 318- 412pa.rsim, 414, 416, 419- 422, 435- 436, 462, 468- 469 feature,23, 350 , 259, 303- 307, 317, 373, 378- 381, phrase 390- 391, 411, 419- 421, 454, 473 priming, 279- 280, 354 word, 302, 317, 361, 370- 380, 389- 392, 398, 406- 421passim , 454, 473 Phonotactic possibility, 294, 335- 338, 344, 362, 369, 482 rule, 294 PhrasalFocusRule, 174- 176, 178- 179 Phrase . SeeIntonational, Phonological , Phrasestructure Phrasestructure, 163, 166- 167, 169, 179180, 365, 369, 373, 384, 391, 408, 498 Pitchaccent , 7, 12, 100, 149- 151, 166, 174- 178, 237, 244, 299- 300, 306- 307, 310, 315, 317, 323, 364, 374, 382- 386, 389, 398- 400, 404- 405, 410. Seealso Accent, Accentuation andaccessibility of referent , 270, 273 contrastive , 172, 177, 247, 273, 307, 309, 401, 495- 496 default, 177 asdiacriticfeature, 165, 180, 191, 233, 366, 373, 382, 408 andfocus, 100, 174, 243, 246, 496 monitoring, 463 andprominence , 307, 386 andnuclearstress , 308- 309, 384- 385, 402 Pitch-AccentProminence Rule, 382 Pitch-AccentRule, 175 Pitch contour, 7, 171, 255, 300, 307- 310, 316, 364, 366, 373, 398, 405, 411, 427, 498 modulation,413 movement , 298, 309- 310, 327- 328, 367, 372, 381, 385, 391, 396, 399- 405, 409410, 427 obstruction , 300 raising, 113, 315 , 247, 282, 372 stranding withholding , 147 Placefeatures , 295, 316, 350, 443

Planning articulatory , 297, 420- 421 conceptual, S, II , 20, 24, 204. Seealso Macroplanning , Microplanning of connectedspeech, 364- 412 of discourse, 115, 119

, II , 119, 126, 259, 275, 467 message metrical, 304, 317, 373, 397- 399, 402, 4OS , 410- 411 motor, 420, 435, 443- 444 phonetic,296, 31S,321, 329, 341, 343346, 359, 365, 473 prosodic, IS, 364- 365, 396, 405, 410 - I09, 474 speechact, 10S andsyntax, 25S- 259 unit, 23, 256- 257, 259, 420 utterance , 3- 4, IS, 277, 2S2 , 112 Planningdiscourse Pleas , 61 , 61, 64 Pledging Plosivespeech sounds , 290, 413, 433, 441, 472 Plural. SeeNumber Politerequests , 66- 69, 135 Politeness , 3- 6, 21, 30, 37, 65- 69, 124,474 Posteriorspeechsounds , 296, 433 , 39 Pragmatics Prearticulatoryediting. SeeEditing Precisionof articulation, 22, 396, 410, 434, 462 Predication , 70- 71, S9, 90, 9S- 99, 113- 115, 150- 1S4 , 159, 171, 261, 30S Prefix. SeeMorpheme Prenuclear tune, 311- 312, 403- 405 , 4S, 122, 166- 167, 17S Preposition , 192 , 194- 195, 19S , 236, 251, 273, 2SS , 369, 371, 37S,421 Prepositionalobject, 23S,248, 264, 274 , II , 167, 169, 17S Prepositionalphrase , ISO, 192, 195, 23S,266, 26S, 304, 485, 487, 490 Presentatives , 272 in self-repairs,491 Prespecification , 102, 113, 117- 119, 171, Presupposition 175, 212, 216, 219. SeealsoBackward suppletion existential , liS factive, liS Pretonicaccent.SeePrenuclear tune Preverbalmessage , 9, II , 14- 15, 72- 74, 76, 7S, 93, 101, 105, 107- 110, 157, 160, 170, 179- ISI, IS6

561

Subject Index Priming andactivationspreading , 352, 354, 474477, 498 lexical, 221- 226, 230, 275, 476 , 279- 280, 354 phonological - 275 273 , syntactic Principle of connectivity , 140 of contrast, 200, 213 , 39- 40, 53 cooperative core, 213 linearization , 138, 140, 143 naturalorder, 138, 159 of specificity , 213- 214 , 213 uniqueness . SeeKnowledge Proceduralknowledge . SeeCategorial Procedure , Functional Processing capacity,20 , 1- 2, 8, 13- 15, 20- 24, 28, 70, components 365- 368, 468- 469 , 24, 234 stage Procliticization , 376- 377 Productions(condition/actionpairs), 17- 18, 82, 124, 207, 321 Pro-form, 148- 149 units(in turn-taking), 31, 35 Projectable Prominence , 147, 149- 151, 165, 172, 175conceptual 176, 178, 180, 236- 237, 243, 266, 280, 307, 398 contrastive , 158, 172, 176, 307, 398, 496 , 131, 147, 149, 152, 171, 180, prosodic 305- 306, 309, 311, 382, 384, 386, 401402 , 260- 261, 264- 266, 268, 275, syntactic 278 281 , 60- 61, 64 Promising Pronominalization , 99, 149, 271- 273, 283 Propositional format/modeof representation , 71, 105, 108, 110, 144- 145, 152- 155, 159, 188 network, 75 , 145 Propositionalization in articulation, 445, 451 Proprioception , , 323, 365- 412passim ProsodyGenerator 416- 417 Prosodic focus, 171- 172, 176, 271, 496 planning, 18, 364- 365, 396, 405, 410 stress , 132, 273. SeePitchaccent unit, 259, 373, 436

Prototype,84 attitude. SeeAttitude Psychological reality, 79, 124, 206, 257 Psychological Quantifier, 76, 196 , 30- 31, 35, 38, 60, 65- 68, 89, Question 118, 255 , 36, III , 122, ISO, 172, 179, answering 221, 254, 273 intonation, 102,403- 404 tacit, 78, 86 tag, 34, 308, 386 andtopic, 262- 266 wh-, 101, 404 yes/no, 101, 255

Radiotalk, 29, 112 verb, 190 , 250 Raising Rate(speed ) of activation , 35I, 359,366 spreading -

of errordetection , 466, 470- 473, 498 of lexicalaccess , 199- 20I , 206, 225, 228, 233- 234, 277 of grammaticalencoding , 246, 454 of processing , 26, 28 of speech , 22, 108, 199, 222, 306- 308, 316, 355- 359, 363, 366, 368- 370, 374- 375, 385- 386, 389- 391, 392- 393, 407, 410411, 413- 414, 422, 432, 447, 449, 453, 457 Rationality, 41, 67- 68, 158 , 259, 308, 390- 392, 394, 396, 400, Reading 405, 415- 416 Real , 15- 16, 18, 28, 206, -. -timeprocessing 210, 212 intonation, 313, 402 Reassuring Recall(verbatum ), 121- 122, 263- 264 . SeeThematicrole Recipient of conceptualstructure,82, Recursiveness 87 in objectnaming, 129- 132, Redundancy 158. SeealsoEndophoric , Exophoric Reduction , 166, 302, 364, 369- 371, phonological 376- 378, 388, 406, 409, 464 of referringexpressions , 5- 6, 147- 150, 176, 271- 272 Reference deictic. SeeDeixis demonstrative , 48, 53 , 51 geographic intrinsic. SeeIntrinsic

Index Subject

of contribution. SeeContribution ~ time time. SeeReferen Repair, 36, 220, 253, 304, 458- 499pa.rsim . 459, 461, 474, 481, 483, appropriateness 485, 490- 491, 495- 496, 499 covert, 478- 479, 483- 484, 492, 494 error, 459, 464, 490- 491, 496, 499 instant, 490- 492, 495 O(x:aSionof, 490- 491, 499 " on the ," 245, 497, 499 fly overt, 4 ) , 479- 480 prosodicmarkingof, 495- 496 syntaxof, 485- 489 of, 486- 487, 489, 491, well-formedness

562

basicclause , 257- 258, 282 sentence , 165, 166, ISO Rimeof syllable,290, 293- 294, 299, 324325, 332- 334 Ritual, 30, 37 Roaddi~ tion. SeeRoute Role. SeeThematicrole Root. SeeMorpheme Routedirection, 30, 109- 110, 112, 126, 136, 139, 152 Roundingof lips. SeeLip

Subject Index Selectinginformation for expression, S, 128- 137, 158 Selectionalrestriction, 189 Selectiveattention. SeeAttention Self-interruption , 459, 478, 480- 482, 484, 489, 498 Self-monitoring , 458- 478 Self-selectionin turn -taking , 32- 34, 37, III Semantic bias in monitoring , 465 categories, 79, 86, 234 cohort , 232 decomposition, 93- 94, 96 domain, 95, 209 entity, 74- 89 field, 96, 183, 219 function , 71, 87, 93, 102, 105 markedness, 229- 231 opposition, 219 relation , 74- 75, 161, 184, 207, 218- 22(J representation, 73- 74, 77- 78, 94, 105 test, 205, 207 type, 77, 86- 90, 253 unit , 35- 36 Semiotic extension, 94 Semi-vowel, 434 Sensory-analysisnodes, 475

Sentence boundary, 171 . SeeConstituent constituent memory,74, 263 mood, type. SeeMood topic, 98- 99, 194, 265 (versusserial) testing, 199, 206. Sequential 233 Serialorderin phonologicalencoding , 353- 354, 360- 363, 417 Setetfects in monitoring, 477 in naming, 134 Set-system , 96 . SeeKnowledge Sharedknowledge Shift. SeeErrors, Deictic Shriekyvoice, 102 Sideactivity, 37 Sideintention, 137, 159 Sidestructure, 136- 137 Signalingactivation, 359 Silence , 3, 5, 8, 32- 33, 38, 127- 128, 258, 387, 391, 398, 420. SeealsoPause Silent(demi) beat. SeeBeat Simplereaction,200, 214, 416- 418, 473

563 condition, 60- 62, 67 Sincerety . SingularSeeNumber . SeeKnowledge Situationalknowledge Skeletaltier. SeeTier

Subject Index activation. SeeActivation Spreading spreading Spurt, 23 Stackprinciplein linearization , 143 . SeeProcessing Stages Standard linguistic, 30, 410- 411, 418 of conversation , 31, 39, 41, 63, 61, 461 Statefunction, 80, 251 Statusof addressee , 45- 46, 69 Stem, 180, 183- 185, 288, 290, 323- 325, 329- 331, 344, 348- 349, 352, 354, 362, 312, 318 Stimulusonsetasynchrony , 226, 230, 234 Stops,433, 441- 442 Storytelling, 131 . SeeErrors Stranding StressS, 12, 298, 310, 403. SeealsoPitch accent alternation,299, 306, 314, 394- 396 , 298- 299, 306, 325, 382- 384, assignment 390 clash, 299, 306, 314, 381, 384, 394- 396 contrastive , 241 error. SeeErrors group, 420 nuclear.SeeNuclear pattern, 25, 186, 298, 301, 323, 344, 355, . 313, 382, 391- 398 . Prosodic See prosodic rules, 298- 299, 305- 309, 314, 382- 384, 390, 394- 396 strandingof, 241, 312, 282 syllable,291- 299, 306, 308- 310, 311- 318, 320, 325, 328- 329, 332, 341- 342, 344, 359, 369, 312- 314, 381- 390, 392, 391, 404, 408, 411 tertiary, 309- 310 word, 25, 255, 281, 293, 298- 301, 311, 324, 315, 381, 384, 389 Stridentspeechsounds , 296, 30I , 434 , 169- 110, 115, 180, Subcategorization 194- 196 , 399, 422, 421 Subglottalair pressure Submissiveness , 102 . SeeErrors Substitutions Subvocalspeech , 285. SeealsoInternal speech , 12, 295, 291, 316, system Supralaryngeal 413, 422- 423, 428, 434, 455 Surface . SeeClause clause

564 structure.7- 8. II . 15. 17- 18, 24, 26- 28. 161- 180. 191, 198. 217, 222, 235- 283, 284- 285. 299, 302- 303, 305- 308, 317318. 322, 343. 353, 362, 365, 368, 370371. 375- 379. 380- 381, 383- 384, 386. 398, 400- 406 Swallowingreflex, 448, 450 Syllabicity,292, 295, 323, 365. 370- 371,409 , 284, 294, 318, 365, 375, 405. Syllabification SeealsoResyllabification Syllable articulation, 452- 454 boundaries , 22. 292, 294, 300. 332, 481482 coda. SeeCoda . SeeConstituent constituent duration(length), 298, 318. 327, 364. 367. 369- 370. 373, 381, 387- 396. 398, 409411, 416- 417. 436, 449 heavy/weak, 299, 316 inventory, 318, 327 latencyeffect, 414- 419 node, 18- 19, 292, 357- 358, 475 nuclear,309, 313, 325, 402 nucleusof. SeeNucleus omission , 396- 397 onset. SeeOnset program, 319, 327, 361- 362, 417, 436 rime. SeeRime . SeeStress stressed / unstressed tier, 290, 292- 295, 298, 301, 325 unit, 292, 452 -timedlanguage . See / stress Syllable Languages , 447 Synergism , 183, 200, 213, 220, 234, 254 Synonym Syntactic bias281, 465 buffer, 12, 13, 26 , 168, 249, 275 specialist , 23 Syntagma Syntax,26, 35- 36, 182 cohesive , 271, 273- 275 andmeaning , 88

Index Subject Taskvariablesin motor theory, 45 Teeth, teethridge, 430, 433, 439, 445, 455 talk, 29, 37, 66 Telephone Tense function, 87, 157 future, 45, 57, 61, 64, 101, 103, 137 past, 46, 55- 56, 94, 182, 187, 241, 323, 326, 348 perfect,46, 55, 193, 197 , 55- 56 pluperfect 55 , present - 57, 182, 258, 289 presentperfect, 56- 57 primary, 55 Tensedverb, 171, 197, 242 Text-to-grid alignment , 382 Thematicroles, 89, 90- 95, 150, 189, 192, 233, 254, 266 actor, 11, 91- 94, 96, 105, 150, 265, 267 agent, 71, 91- 93, 95- 98, 105, 152, 189, 192- 194, 233, 241, 261, 262, 265- 269, 487 , 4, 6- 7, 92, 96, 190, 250 experiencer goal, 71, 90- 96, 98, 105, 178, 189- 190, 192- 195, 242, 266 instrument , 92, 96 89- 90, 92, 96, 149- 150, 192- 193, , patient . 253, 261- 263, 269 recipient, II , 21, 92, 95- 97, 190, 192, 261- 262, 266, 268, 487 source , 71, 90- 96, 105, 189, 192, 266 theme,90- 92, 94--96, 152, 172, 175- 176, 189, 192- 194, 241- 242, 245, 250, 266 Thematicstructure,70- 71, 90- 97, 105, 283 , 112 Therapeuticdiscourse Thorax, 422 Threshold(in logogentheory), 202- 204, 219 Throat (pharynx), 428- 430 , 424 Thyroidcartilage Tier (phonological ) feature,291, 297, 316 intonational,290, 299- 301 metrical, 290, 293, 297- 299, 301 , 290, 292- 297, 301 segment skeletal(or timing), 290- 294, 301, 316, 323 syllable,290, 292- 295, 298, 301, 325 Timbre, 413, 427- 430, 432, 455 Time adverbials , 58 calender , 58 deictical, 102

565 reference , 55- 56, 94 relevance , 56- 57 , 127 speaking utterance , 56- 57 Timecourseof lexicalaccess , 222- 231 , 405, 416, 436, Timingof motorexecution 439, 442- 444, 449, 473. Seea/soIntrinsic , Extrinsictiming , 188, 231, Tip- of-the-tonguephenomenon 319- 321, 323, 342, 355, 361 To-contraction , 376 Tone, 308, 310- 317, 366, 385, 390, 398405, 410- 411, 421 boundary.SeeBoundary fall-rise, 313- 314, 401 full-rise, 313 high-fall, 312, 404 level, 314 low-fall, 312- 313, 403, 404 low-rise, 313 nuclear,311- 312, 315, 317, 385, 398- 405 rise-fall, 314 Tonegroup, 23 Tonelanguage , 317 Toneunit, 23 Tongue,413, 423, 429- 430, 439- 440, 445446 blade, 296, 433 body, 430, 432, 453 extrinsic/intrinsicmuscles , 430 tip, 442 twister, 341, 343, 471- 472 Topic changeof, 33, 36- 37, 111, 398, 400, 404 discourse , 99, 112- 113, 115, 121, 152, 158- 159,460 encodingof, 260- 270, 283 of message , 11, 71, 97- 99, 108- 109, 120, 151, 238, 245 of sentence , 98- 99, 194 shift, 112- 113, 149 , 138, 144, 152, 233, 265 Topicalization Trachea , 423- 424 Transition-relevance place, 31- 33, 35- 36, 38 Tune, 311- 314, 316- 317, 366, 398, 403405, 410- 411 Turn allocation/assignment , 31, 33- 34 unit, 23, 31, 35 Turn-constructional Turn-taking, 29- 32, 34, 36- 39, 44, III , 133, 306, 373, 390 Turn-yieldingcues,34

566

Index Subject

, 79, 82- 83, 86- 9() Typetheory , 83- 86 Type/tokendistinction Underspecificationin object naming, 40, 130, 133 Uniquenessprinciple, 213 Unit Similarity Constraint , 329- 332, 334,

360- 362 Unitsof processing , 23- 26 Unpackingthemotor program,416- 421, 454 Utterance , passim -final lengthening Utterance , 373, 390 Uvula, 433 Uvularspeechsounds, 433

V-COMP, 169, 190- 191, 197- 198, 250- 253 Vectorsummationin articulation.444- 445 Velarspeech sounds , 433 Velum. SeeSoftpalate Verb, 192- 194,passim deictic, 54 , 64- 68 perfonnative raising, 190, 250

Word-initialconsonant andspeech errors , 321,338,341- 343,464 Wordorder

159 Writing.435

Vowel back, 431 errors. SeeErrors front , 431 lax/ tense, 350 lengthening - , 34, 36, 309. SeealsoDrawl semi-, 434 Vowel space, 431

WeU-formedness of conversation . 37- 38 of message 70 , monitoringof, 14, 498 Rule, 486, 489, 491, 497, 499 of self-repairs,485- 487 of syllable /cluster, 329, 369, 482 of syntax, 282, 468 Wh-movement , 253

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