Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957-85 (St Antony's Series)

To my parents, with gratitude Since I began writing for the public I have hardly written a page in which the word Eur...

Author: Julio Crespo MacLennan

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To my parents, with gratitude

Since I began writing for the public I have hardly written a page in which the word Europe does not appear with symbolic aggression. For me, all Spanish afflictions begin and end with this word. José Ortega y Gasset, El Imparcial, 1909

Contents List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ix

Acknowledgements

xi

Introduction

1

1

Spain and the Early Process of European Integration, 1945–47

9

1. 1. The historical background: the concept of ‘Europe’ in Spain 1. 2. The Franco regime and postwar Europe 1. 3. The role of Europeanism in Spanish politics

9 14 23

2

The Spanish Approach to the European Community, 1957–62

2. 1. The Spanish reaction to the creation of the European Community 2. 2. The reasons for Spain’s application to the European Community and its impact on Spanish politics 2. 3. The application to the European Community and the Spanish reaction 2. 4. The reaction in Europe

3

From the Congress of Munich to the Preferential Agreement, 1962–70

3. 1. The Congress of Munich and its consequences 3. 2. The initiation of negotiations with the European Community 3. 3. An alternative Europeanism 3. 4. The preferential agreement

4

The Crisis of the Franco Regime in European Perspective, 1970–75

4. 1. The enlargement of the European Community and its consequences vii

37 37 40 54 60

65 65 70 81 88

94 94

4. 2. The increasing tension with Europe 4. 3. The democratic opposition and Europe 4. 4. The final crisis of the Franco regime

5

The Spanish Transition to Democracy and the European Community, 1975–77

5. 1. The first government of the monarchy 5. 2. The European Community and the cause of democracy in Spain 5. 3. The first Suarez government 5. 4. The first democratic elections

6

The Negotiations of Democratic Spain with the European Community, 1977–85

98 105 113

121 123 127 136 146

150

6. 1. Beginning negotiations 6. 2. The Spanish political consensus in relation to the European Community 6. 3. The stagnation of negotiations with the European Community 6. 4. The Spanish political crisis and the attempted coup d’état 6. 5. Civil society and the European Community 6. 6. The Spanish Socialist Party in power 6. 7. The culmination of negotiations: Stuttgart, Athens and Fontainebleau

150

Epilogue and Conclusion

180

154 159 165 169 171 174

The European Community as the external factor of change

182

Europeanism as a mechanism of domestic change

185

Chronology

189

Notes

191

Bibliography

208

Index

218

viii

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ACNP AECE AGMAE AP BOE CAP CCOO CDU CEDI CEOE CEPYME CICE

CIU CNT COREPER CSU DSCD EC ECDU ECS ECSC ECTU ECU EDCEE

Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas (National Catholic Association of Propagandists) Asociación Española de Cooperación Europea (Spanish Association for European Cooperation) Archivo General del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (General Archive of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) Alianza Popular (Popular Alliance) Boletín Oficial del Estado (State’s Official Gazette) Common Agricultural Policy Comisiones Obreras (Workers’ Commissions) German Christian Democratic Party Centro Europeo de Documentación e Información (European Centre of Documentation and Information) Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations) Confederación Española de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa Comisión Interministerial para el estudio de las Comunidades Europeas (Interministerial Commission for the Study of the European Communities) Convergencia i unió (Catalan nationalist Christian Democratic Party) Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores (Workers’ National Confederation) Committee of Permanent Representatives German Christian Social Union Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados (Spanish Parliament debates) European Community European Christian Democratic Union German Conservative Party European Coal and Steel Community European Conference of Trade Unions European Currency Unit Equipo Democristiano del Estado Español (Christian Democratic Group of the Spanish State) ix

x

List of Abbreviations

EEC EFTA EPC EPU ETA Euratom FRUS GATT ICFTU OECD OEEC OID MEP NATO PCE PNV PRO PSOE SI SPD UCD UGT UNCTAD UNESCO

European Economic Community European Free Trade Association European Political Cooperation European Payments Union Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna European Atomic Energy Community Foreign Relations of the United States General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade International Confederation of Free Trade Unions Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Organization for European Economic Cooperation Oficina de Información Diplomática (Diplomatic Information Office) Member of the European Parliament North Atlantic Treaty Organization Partido Comunista de España (Spanish Communist Party) Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party) Public Record Office Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) Socialist International Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German Social Democratic Party) Unión de Centro Democrático (Democratic Centre Union) Unión General de Trabajadores (General Workers Union) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

Acknowledgements I have dedicated five years of my life to writing this book. The first four were used to write my doctoral thesis, and the last one to convert this thesis into a book. During this period I have accumulated a considerable number of personal debts. I am indebted to Dr Charles T. Powell, who supervised me until he left Oxford, and continued following my research closely despite the hassle of Madrid academic life and Spanish politics. I would also like to thank him for a long period of friendship, which goes back to 1988, when I arrived at University College, Oxford as an undergraduate. The other major personal debt is to Mr Anthony J. Nicholls, who supervised me for the last year and took the patience to read several drafts of my thesis until he considered it had reached an acceptable level. I would also like to thank Dr Fernando Guirao for a very critical but constructive eight-hour conversation about my thesis. I owe the privilege of publishing with St Antony’s Macmillan series to two people: Dr Eugene Rogan, the general editor of the series, who welcomed the manuscript, and Dr Herminio Martins who wrote a favourable report with very useful suggestions for improving the final version of the book. As far as financial matters are concerned I would like to express my gratitude to the Fundación Marcelino Botín, which awarded me a fouryear scholarship to subsidize the expenses for my research. Last but not least, I am indebted to a very considerable number of friends and colleagues, both at Oxford and Madrid who provided me with academic advice, moral support or simply contributed to many of the happy moments which this period of my life has offered. Although mentioning them all would take too much space, each one knows the place he/she deserves in this thesis. JCM Oxford

xi

Introduction The study of Spain and the process of European integration may initially seem a marginal topic due to the fact that Spain was isolated from mainstream Europe until recent times. An attempt to ascertain the influence of the European Community on Spain’s political development may appear equally discouraging. For a historian dealing with such a recent period, political science and international relations provide useful explanations for the problems encountered in doing research into this field. Regime transformations in southern Europe, and particularly in Spain have received much scholarly attention over the last decades, yet the international factors affecting them have been generally neglected, undoubtedly due to the widespread notion that political changes must be examined within their own context and that the international dimension plays a very limited role. If we refer to the theorists of transitions, neither the functionalist nor the actor-oriented theories of transitions seem to take international factors sufficiently into consideration. Philippe C. Schmitter wrote that one of the firmest conclusions of how transitions to democracy take place was that they were largely to be explained in terms of national forces and calculations and that external actors tended to play an indirect and marginal role.1 Although no one would deny the fact that the key actors involved in democratization may be overwhelmingly internal, their strategies and calculations are strongly shaped by the pressure of externally designed rules and structures. According to Laurence Whitehead, a significant shift of international orientation, perhaps even of perceptions of national identity, is likely to accompany any major regime change from authoritarian rule to liberal democracy. The European Community has acted as a powerful catalyst both of democratization and of national re-definition and modernization in contemporary southern Europe, and this influence has been achieved not through military occupations, but by offering economic and social incentives for changes in group and national behaviour.2 This book will subscribe to this more recent interpretation of the international factors of transitions to democracy, in order to determine 1

2

Introduction

the European Community’s influence on Spain’s political progress. For this purpose we need not only to examine the Spanish transition to democracy, which is defined as the period beginning with General Franco’s death in 1975 and culminating with the adoption of a new constitution in 1978. We also examine a great part of the Franco regime, as well as a substantial part of democratic Spain. In order to understand what constant aims and interests have driven the Spanish European policy, another fundamental question that is asked is what nations seek in foreign policy and the role they intend to play in the international community. In this aspect as well the theorists of international relations provide some useful insights. Raymond Aron explained that every political regime seeks to make three basic concepts come true in the international sphere: the security of its frontiers, access to basic materials, and the affirmation of its personality and identity in international society,3 and it is in these three fields that foreign policy is elaborated. This theory is applicable to both Francoist and democratic Spain. With regard to the security of its frontiers Spain was most concerned with her relations with the United States, but the EEC was also important from the diplomatic point of view. Spain is reasonably well endowed with basic raw materials, but for commercial reasons the European Community played an essential role to the extent that Spain could not afford to be left out of its economic area. Finally, as far as making its personality felt in international society, membership of the European Community was the most efficient way of providing Spain with an influential internationl role. An analysis of Spain’s relations with the European Community requires a definition about the process of European integration and its historiographical interpretation. The process of European integration can be defined as the attempt to establish economic and political cooperation between European states under the control of supranational authorities. Its initial stage was dominated by several conferences which discussed European cooperation in the late 1940s, and it reached a turning point in 1957, with the creation of the European Economic Community, after which European integration acquired an omnipresent dimension in European affairs. Lack of research into European integration until recent times has led to the propagation of myths about this process, based on the belief that initially certain enlightened European nations agreed to surrender sovereignty to supranational institutions, and that ever since then, there has been a gradual but steady progress towards a united Europe.

Introduction

3

This excessively optimistic interpretation has been recently revised by thorough studies on the field. In the Dynamics of European Integration, William Wallace and a group of international scholars made a bold attempt to prevent the history of European integration from becoming a political pamphlet, explaining the complexity of the process.4 Alan Milward has also revised many of the previously accepted historical explanations of this period. In The European Rescue of the Nation State, he challenges the generally accepted view that the creation of European institutions was driven by the experience of the Second World War and federalist thought, and opens a new approach to European integration, arguing that far from evaporating in the course of integration, the nation state has been strengthened in this process.5 A number of scholarly works under the coordination of Anne Deighton reveal that the early stages of European integration were not a teleological motion towards European unity, and that such motions were based on the perspective of individual states rather than upon particular institutions. They also underline the vagueness of the political aspect of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and that such aims as European unification or common foreign policy were borne in mind at a very superficial level at that time.6 This book will base itself on these new approaches towards European integration and try to prove the following hypotheses. First, that the process of European integration affected Spanish interests, as those of the rest of Western Europe, and that the Franco regime followed it closely from the earliest stages despite its apparent relegation from European affairs. Secondly, that however ambivalent the Treaty of Rome may have been about the aims of political unification, it was its political dimension which constituted an obstacle for Spain’s entry into the EEC. Thirdly, that although the European Community established clearly that only European democracies could become members it did not develop a consistent policy as to how to promote democratization. Strategies for democratization were divided along ideological lines. Socialists proposed that Spain should be totally isolated from the European Community’s sphere of influence until democratization was achieved. On the other hand, conservatives and Christian Democrats argued that it was necessary to establish some kind of economic cooperation with the Franco dictatorship, and then by means of pressures and incentives, promote democratization. In the Spanish case the conservative notion prevailed, as the EEC turned down the association agreement which Spain originally wanted, but

4

Introduction

was willing to negotiate a preferential agreement with an economic content but no political implications. Finally, this book will examine the extent to which political concerns were more important than economic ones when the Community dealt with enlargement towards Mediterranean Europe. The Spanish case shows that despite promises to accept a democratic Spain into the EEC, her membership was to be delayed for several years due to internal Community problems. Spanish public opinion began to demonstrate a high level of interest in the process of European integration long before the country joined the European Community, yet the debate in Spain about Europe has remained superficial. Besides the constant attraction felt by politicians and journalists, the subject of Spain and the process of European integration remains largely unexplored by the academic community. Economists and lawyers have been active in this field over the last decade, but the main focus of attention has been on the impact and consequences of Spanish membership of the EEC rather than the causes and the background of Spain’s integration. On the other hand, few historians or political scientists have yet felt the need to tackle this subject. There are two main reasons for the lack of research into this issue. First, that not all sources are available to do research into such a recent period. Secondly, the assumption that until 1985, and especially during the Franco regime, Spain was marginalized from the hard core of European political influence. Despite the abundant literature both in Spain and in the English-speaking world about the Franco regime and democratic Spain, this misconception has not been sufficiently challenged. An unpublished doctoral thesis on Spain and the European Community written by William Salisbury, constitutes the pioneer study in this field.7 Two decades later some studies have initiated a debate on Spain and the process of European integration. María Teresa La Porte provides a detailed account of Franco’s European policy between 1957 and 1962. Antonio Moreno has written a close analysis of the Spanish attitude towards European integration until 1962. Finally Fernando Guirao has provided a thorough analysis of Spanish foreign economic policy and European economic cooperation until 1957.8 Besides this, with the exception of two excessively autobiographical accounts by two diplomats,9 there have been few monographic studies on the period. The term ‘Europeanism’ requires definition, an analysis of its origins, growth and development, and its image in Spain’s political life. Two Spanish politicians, Fernando Morán and Fernando Alvarez de

Introduction

5

Miranda have attempted to analyse the term.10 Unfortunately in the academic sphere, only a few articles refer to it.11 On the other hand, there is already a substantial literature explaining the European contribution to the emergence of political parties during the transition to democracy.12 Finally, the reason why Spain was the only country to experience a Europeanist consensus within its political spectrum, deserves some research. Lukas Tsoukalis made the first attempt at explaining why Spain experienced a Europeanist consensus, unlike the other two Mediterranean candidates for the EEC, Portugal and Greece. More recently, Berta Alvarez-Miranda, in her doctoral dissertation has provided a thorough explanation for this phenomenon.13 The aim of this book is, therefore, to fill a gap in the literature by paying attention to the single most outstanding external factor determining political change in Spain: the European Community, and to examine the country’s changes from the perspective of its relations with this organization. Simultaneously it pays attention to the often neglected by-product of its relations with Europe, Europeanism, and it tries to estimate how far it has influenced the political development over the period examined. The study of Spain’s relations with the European Community is a large topic and for this reason it is essential to define the aspects of this relationship. In the European integration process politics and economics are intermixed, but usually economic issues create more problems in negotiations than political ones. However, a full explanation of all economic factors affecting relations between Spain and the EEC would in itself require another book leaving aside the political factors affecting it, with which this book is primarily concerned. For this reason, economic issues are dealt with only to the extent that they have a direct bearing on political factors. For the same reason the impact of the Community on the Spanish economy and civil society are only discussed in relation to the country’s political transformation. Bilateral relations with European countries played an important role as well, and these are mentioned whenever it is considered that they played an influential role in Spanish negotiations with the European Community. Finally the other determining external factor, the relationship with the United States, is again dealt with only insofar as it had an influence on Spain’s relations with Europe. This approach has enabled me to isolate Spain’s political relations with the European Community, while bearing in mind the other factors which affected them. This book provides a chronological analysis of the process of negotiations between Spain and the EEC. The account of how negotiations

6

Introduction

progressed is combined with the examination of how relations with the EEC affected Spanish political life. At each stage of negotiations the governing élite became increasingly aware of the importance of being part of the Common Market and also within the domestic and exiled opposition the concept of Europe became a symbol of political change and the recovery of Spain’s prestige in Europe. Thus, the concept of Europeanism is examined emphasizing how it gradually contributed to foster a belief in democratic Spain, and led to the cooperation of political groups that were previously irreconcilably opposed to each other. As far as the period examined is concerned the boundaries are clearly marked, as the process of Spanish integration into the European Community officially began with the application for association in February 1962 and ended with the signing of the adhesion treaty in June 1985. However, these two dates are fictitious. In order to understand the reasons why Spain applied for association to the EEC it is necessary to examine the Franco regime’s foreign and economic policy since the formation of the new government in 1957, which coincides with the establishment of the European Economic Community, and this is done in the second chapter. Furthermore, to understand the Spanish reaction to the creation of the EEC, an examination of the situation of the Franco regime in post-war Europe is required, as well as the Spanish reactions to the first stages of European integration. It is also necessary to place the debate on the concept of Europe in Spain in historical perspective. Chapter 1 deals with these issues. One of the central arguments of this book is that the veto placed by the European Community on the Franco regime was a catalyst for the country’s political evolution towards democracy. For this reason, it could have ended in 1977, when the Community’s veto on Spain was removed, paving the way for negotiations for membership. However I thought it essential to examine the final stage of negotiations until 1985, which coincided with the period of consolidation of democracy. During the last years of negotiations, the European Community acquired mythical dimensions which symbolized the modernization of the country as well as a permanent anchor for democracy, a fact which explains why the whole political spectrum was unified behind this aim. Any scholarly study of contemporary history faces the problem of archives that are not always available for research, but this obstacle is compensated for by the fact that on the whole sources are diverse and abundant. In the case of this study a combination of manuscript,

Introduction

7

published and oral sources has been used. The main primary source has been the archive of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which documents are available until 1972, following the 25-year rule. Here I have examined the diplomatic correspondence between Spain and the European Community member states, as well as diplomatic reports on the development of European integration and the strategy that Spain should follow. I have also examined reports of the Diplomatic Information Office containing press cuttings of news related to Spain in the world. The archive of the Spanish Presidency of the Government containing drafts of the Francoist Council of Ministers has also been useful. Another important archive has been the Public Record Office, in which I have examined reports of the British Embassy about Spain, as well as certain aspects of the British attitude towards European integration. The foreign relations area of the United States documents has been useful in examining American relations with Spain. As far as the European Community is concerned the main sources have been the European Commission reports published by the Bulletin of the European Community. As regards the Europeanist activities, the archive of the Spanish Association for Cooperation with Europe, AECE, has provided essential information. The press has been the second main source. I have examined the most important Spanish newspapers. The non-Spanish press has also been very useful for studying how Spain was seen by Europe and the reactions to Spanish intentions in relation to the EEC. Specialized journals in Spain have been useful in assessing the opinion of the academic and intellectual élites who wrote on political and economic issues related to European integration. As regards the activities of the exiled opposition, the Communist and Socialist dailies, Mundo Obrero and El Socialista, have been essential. Finally, for following the negotiations between Spain and the European Community the EEC press agency, Agence Europe has been crucial, reporting on the negotiations in detail as well as the reactions of EEC member states and institutions to Spain’s intentions. Other important sources have been parliamentary debates and reports. In the case of the Spanish Parliament it has enabled me to examine individual opinions in relation to the EEC and assess the extent to which the issue was debated. The papers of the European Parliament as well as those of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe have been extremely useful, as these bodies debated the Spanish political situation in depth. The OECD annual reports on

8

Introduction

Spain provide the most complete information on Spain’s economic performance and other official publications by the Ministry of Commerce have been used for trade statistics. For the opinions of Spanish civil society and pressure groups, I have used the sources of the official Community sociological publication, Eurobaromètre, which periodically carried out surveys among the candidate countries. Memoirs and writings of politicians, diplomats or intellectuals who were involved in Spain’s relations with the European Community are a very important source, since despite the alleged subjectivity of each account, they provide details and impressions of the whole period that only someone who has lived through it is capable of providing. In the same way, because the period of time I have dealt with is very recent, oral history is an important source to take into consideration. I have thus interviewed several of the most important personalities related to my subject of study. Finally, some thoughts on the writing of history. In the specialized age we live in, there is a tendency to know more and more about less and less. If a long period is covered, the writing is dismissed as superficial and only very detailed work is considered valid. Secondly, concern with documents has led to the rise of documentary history, in which the need to prove every statement by reference to a document often leads to a loss of the wider perspective. Generally, historians give more thought to their own debates than to the problems encountered by their long-suffering readers. In view of this, although the period of time covered by this book is quite lengthy, I have tried not to be too detailed in my approach nor too superficial. Secondly, I have attempted to base all my arguments on documentary evidence, but without allowing my obsession with documents to make me lose my grasp of the issue. Finally I have tried to make the book readable, ensuring that my analysis and conclusions are properly transmitted.

1 Spain and the Early Process of European Integration, 1945–57

1. 1. The historical background: the concept of ‘Europe’ in Spain Spanish participation in the process of European integration was not only obstructed by her political situation in the wake of the Second World War. More complex historical problems led Spain to maintain an uneasy relationship with the continent, preventing her full incorporation into mainstream Europe. For this reason it is necessary to put the debate of Spain’s relations with Europe in historical context. In the next section we shall examine briefly the role played by Spain in modern Europe and secondly, how the concept of Europe evolved in Spanish political thought and the impact it had on the country. Spain’s role in modern Europe is one of gradual decline from hegemony as the first world power to minor significance. In the sixteenth century Spain enjoyed supremacy with an immense overseas empire and a large proportion of Europe under the sovereignty of Charles I and Philip II. By the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Spanish ambitions in the constitution of the new concert of Europe were dismissed as those of a cour secondaire. 1 A century later at the Peace Conference in Paris, which put an end to the First World War, Spain was not even represented. In this process of decline, a black legend about Spain spread across Europe which portrayed her as a closed society anchored in past glories and resistant to modern ideas. European travellers to Spain were struck by her different culture and some of them even insisted on situating her beyond the pale of European influence. Spain impressed Edmund Burke as being ‘a great whale stranded on the shores of Europe’.2 The Duke of Wellington, commented in 1820 that there was 9

10

Spain and European Integration

no other continental country ‘whose manners and habits are so little congenial with those of other nations in Europe’.3 Traditional historiography has often been misled by myths of the black legend, portraying an excessively negative picture of Spain. The German historical philosopher Oswald Spengler divides the history of Western civilization into two cycles: the old regime of Western Christendom, spanning the Middle Ages to the eighteenth century, and modernity, the era of science, industrialization, and democracy, from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries onwards. He explains that the height of old regime culture was achieved in seventeenth-century Spain, but thereafter she proved incapable of playing an important role in the modern era.4 Many historians have followed similar lines of interpretation. Obsessed with backwardness, they have asked themselves exhaustively what went wrong in Spain’s progress and why she was so politically unstable.5 As a result of this misconception Spain was perceived as a country that had missed the opportunity to join the course of progress in Western Europe, leading towards industrialization, higher standards of living, and parliamentary democracy. This approach has been challenged by more recent historiography. Raymond Carr points out that the changes of the nineteenth century were dramatic and far-reaching, but also sporadic in incidence, a characteristic which was to produce economic imbalance and underlie civil war.6 More recently, the historians Juan Pablo Fusi and Jordi Palafox have revised the contemporary history of Spain, revealing that Spain’s situation was far from unique and that her problems were similar to those of any modern European society.7 The role of Spain in Europe and the effects of European events on the country is an issue that attracts Spain’s political thinkers. During the late eighteenth century, while the French Revolution deposed the established order of the greatest continental power, in Spain the power of the ancien regime remained largely unchallenged, and the three pillars of the crown, church and aristocracy obstructed the penetration of new ideas and the country’s economic development. The invasion of Spain by Napoleon’s forces in 1808 was to constitute an important challenge to her political order. Some Spaniards concerned with progress joined the enemy in a desperate conviction that Napoleonic modernization might introduce the reforms so urgently needed by the country, hoping that the principles of the French Revolution would overthrow those of absolutism. This association of some Spanish reformers with the French invaders gave their conservative opponents the convenient propaganda weapon

Spain and Europe, 1945–57

11

of calling them traitors and afrancesados or Frenchified, warning that all modernizing projects were foreign and anti-Spanish. The ‘real’ Spain was defended by reactionaries as an immutable social hierarchy dominated by the established order. Any attempt to challenge the status quo would be condemned as the sinister manoeuvres of national apostates and foreign agents: the so-called afrancesados and ‘Europeanizers’.8 In this way the term Europeanism began to drive a wedge between the reactionary and liberal forces in Spain at the crossroads between traditionalism and modernity. The Spanish liberals, who briefly established at Cadiz in 1812 the most liberal constitution on the continent, believed that Europe would be the solution to the country’s problems. With the restoration of Ferdinand VII, the conservatives refuted such ideas advocating a return to the old order. The dilemma of Europeanism versus traditionalism was to confront Spanish politics throughout the tumultuous reign of Isabella II, leading to her downfall in 1868. After a frustrated new monarchy under Amadeus of Savoy and a brief First Republic in 1873, the Bourbon monarchy was restored in 1874, and Spain recovered stability under a constitutional monarchy worthy of European standards. However, this political system was doomed to failure by the 1898 Spanish-American war in which Spain lost the last vestiges of her empire, Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. This defeat caused great commotion in Spain. The so-called 1898 generation, a group of intellectuals reflecting on the causes of Spain’s decadence and what her role in the future ought to be, constantly referred to the issue of Spain’s relations with Europe. The historian Américo Castro, for example explained that ‘the Spaniards lived alongside Europe, but ultimately they were alien to it’.9 The debate on Europe divided these intellectuals into the so-called casticistas and the europeístas. The leading exponent of casticismo was the philosopher Miguel de Unamuno, who dismissed foreign recipes and believed that the solution to the country’s problems lay in the recovery of Spain’s soul.10 Ramiro de Maeztu in his Defensa de la Hispanidad and Angel Ganivet in his Idearium español followed similar lines, emphasizing the need to Hispanicize Europe.11 On the other hand the europeístas espoused the cause of Europeanization as the solution to the country’s problems. For the polymath Joaquín Costa, Europeanization provided the sole ‘key for opening the future of the country’.12 Besides the casticistas and the europeístas, there was a third category within this generation, the americanistas, who argued that the key for Spain’s regeneration was Hispanic America. Joaquín Sanchez de Toca

12


was a leading representative of this group. In 1898 he wrote that a great nation needs a cardinal and transcendental thought to orient it, and that in the Spanish case the great Hispano-American patria constituted the orientation.13 Shortly after the loss of the last American colonies, this comment was more the product of nostalgia than of rational analysis. Ever since 1898, there were occasional references to the links with Latin America but for all realistic thinkers, it became clear that Spain’s future was not in an American but in a European setting. The reflections of these intellectuals proved powerless against the turbulent times of the reign of Alfonso XIII. Isolated from Europe, Spain did not intervene in the First World War, and consequently did not play any significant role in the debates on the new world order after 1918. There was no reason for Spain to intervene in the war; in fact she benefited economically from neutrality. Yet, isolation from the continent was the subject which provoked more discussion within a new generation of intellectuals, the so-called 1914 generation. The leading exponent of this generation was José Ortega y Gasset, the most important Spanish contemporary philosopher. The whole career of Ortega y Gasset is dedicated to the creation of a modern Spain, fit to take her place among the most advanced European nations. Ortega inherited many Europeanist ideas of the 1898 generation, but he was more categorical in his advocacy to Europeanize Spain. His Europeanist stance led him to a confrontation with the patriarch Unamuno in 1909. Unamuno published a letter in the newspaper ABC, in which he referred to ‘the suckers’ who were bewitched by Europeans. Ortega replied to this letter in the following terms: I am fully and unreservedly one of those suckers: since I began writing for the public I have hardly written a page in which the word Europe does not appear with symbolic aggression. For me, all Spanish afflictions begin and end with this word.14 Under the threat of political and economic crisis the Primo de Rivera dictatorship was established in 1923, inspired by the Fascist movements which were then spreading across Europe. This dictatorship was to invalidate the efforts at consolidating a constitutional monarchy based on principles of social justice and universal suffrage which Restoration politics had attempted, and led to the downfall of the monarchy in 1931. The founding fathers of the Second Republic intended to transform Spain into a modern democratic society based on the values which


13

they believed to have brought progress to Europe. The Republic initially counted on the participation of those intellectuals who had espoused the cause of Europeanization. Ortega y Gasset together with other eminent liberal intellectuals, founded the Agrupación al Servicio de la República, with the aim of making the professional élites contribute to the development of the Republic. The new Spanish Republic was defending the principles of liberal democracy in an unfavourable European context – the post-depression days of the early 1930s – when the liberal democracies were losing ground to fascism.15 The Socialists were particularly aware of this countercurrent in Spanish politics. As the Socialist deputy Francisco Largo Caballero put it ‘our struggle is international as well as national. If we overthrow the monarchy, fascism will die in Europe.’16 Foreign affairs was an aspect in which the Republic was to put into practice the idea that Europe was the solution to Spain’s problems. Prime Minister Manuel Azaña stressed that the new regime ‘must overcome the spirit of shrinkage and withdrawal’17 which had characterized Spanish foreign policy over the last century. The Republic maintained an active foreign policy, with the aims of encouraging cooperation among European democracies and maintaining peace in the continent, and its diplomatic activity was particularly relevant at the League of Nations.18 The indisputable protagonist in this field was the eminent writer, and diplomat, Salvador de Madariaga. Madariaga represented Spain at the League of Nations from 1922 to 1929, and can be considered as the first Spaniard to familiarize himself with the early attempts of European integration.19 The Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939, became a contest between the ideologies that divided Europe at that time, democracy, communism and fascism. Western democracies led by France and Great Britain opted against intervention, thus undermining the cause of democracy, and leaving the republicans exclusively dependent on the Soviet Union for military aid.20 On the other hand, the nationalist troops received not only political support but also military aid from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, leading them to victory. The nationalist forces, an amalgam of Catholics, traditionalists, monarchists and Falangists – the Spanish version of European Fascism – stood against all principles advocated by the Republic, particularly liberalism and socialism. Franco himself described in April 1937 the Spain shaped by the nineteenth-century liberals as ‘bastard, Frenchified and Europeanizing’.21 The Franco regime defended the return to the principles which they believed to have made Spain the

14


most powerful nation in Europe. When it referred to Europe it claimed an allegiance to the new European order: Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, nationalist-totalitarian systems which would overthrow the decadent ideas of liberal democracy. But even the identification of the Franco regime with the Fascist European order is rather ambiguous. The Falangists felt fully identified with it, but the rest of the political groups behind Franco were more sympathetic to Spain’s conservative tradition which implied a refutation of all European influences. The Franco regime in its initial stage was above all anti-Europeanist and sympathetic to reactionary political thought in Spain. During the early years of the Second World War, the Franco regime officially identified itself with the Axis, hoping that in Hitler’s new European order Spain would recover her past grandeur. In 1941 Spanish neutrality was substituted by non-belligerency, but Franco cunningly avoided entering into war. Moreover, as the victory of the Axis became unlikely, Spain adopted a low profile on the support of her erstwhile allies and returned to neutrality status. However, this apparent neutrality was not sufficient to hide the fact that the Franco regime was a product of the Fascist system. When the war ended and Hitler and Mussolini were defeated, Franco was left alone in Europe at the mercy of the victorious European democracies.

1. 2. The Franco regime and postwar Europe In order to understand the Spanish attitude towards the early stages in the process of European integration it is necessary to explain the nature of the Franco regime, what its situation was in the postwar years and what its aims were. At the end of the Second World War the Franco regime was treated by the Allies as a relic of Fascist Europe and it received the unanimous condemnation of the new world order. On 4 March 1946 a Tripartite Declaration of the United States, Great Britain and France announced that: as long as General Franco continues in control of Spain the Spanish people cannot constitute a full and cordial association with those nations which have by common effort brought defeat to German Nazism and Italian Fascism.22 On 12 December 1946 the United Nations General Assembly recommended the banning of Spain from all international organizations


15

and the withdrawal of ambassadors from Madrid. However, the limits of the declaration lay in the statement that ‘there is no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Spain. The Spanish people themselves must in the long run work out their own destiny.’23 It seemed clear from this point that, despite the widespread hostility towards the Franco regime, measures against it would not go beyond economic and political isolation. The reaction of the Franco regime to this international embargo was to challenge ostracism with demonstrations of resistance against the enemies of Spain, described as a conspiracy of Freemasons and Communists propagating a black legend about Spain. However, Franco decided that the shift in European balance of power required changes in the regime in order to guarantee its survival and a series of constitutional reforms were carried out in order to placate Western public opinion. A low profile was adopted on the Falangist symbols and Franco’s personal rule, and a constitution was worked out with less dictatorial institutional elements. The aim was to create an authoritarian state of administration based on law.24 In 1945 the Fuero de los Españoles was decreed as a Bill of Rights, though with considerable restrictions stating that all Spaniards could freely express their opinions provided they did not attack the principles of the State. Particularly influential was the 1947 Ley de Sucesión, by which Spain was constituted as a monarchy with Franco himself as the life regent. The Cortes, the Spanish Parliament was elected through the natural representatives of society, the family, council and syndicate, creating the so-called organic democracy which according to the Franco regime was an improved version of the inefficient liberal democracy, as it represented the interests of society rather than the selfish interests of individual voters.25 Although this ‘cosmetic constitutionalism’26 may have reduced the totalitarian elements of the Franco regime, it did not succeed in improving its image, particularly in Europe, where hostility towards Franco’s Spain was to continue unabated. On 5 June 1947 the American Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced the launching of the European Recovery Programme, aimed at the economic recovery of the continent. Initially no European country was excluded from the Marshall Plan, but soon political matters were to render Spain ineligible. At the request of the French, Spain was excluded from the Paris conference called for 12 July 1947 to discuss the programme. The exclusion was described as provisional and would be lifted if Spain changed her political system. Exclusion from the Marshall Plan was the severest blow received by

16


the Franco regime at a time when Spain was in desperate need of foreign economic aid. Had it not been for the credits and exports of food products provided by the Argentinian dictator General Perón, it is difficult to think how Spain could have survived. Spain was also excluded from the security plans of the West. When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO was established on 4 April 1949, Spain was not invited to join. This exclusion was particularly distressing since Portugal under the Salazar dictatorship was accepted into the organization on the grounds that it had maintained strict neutrality during the war. Despite this setback the international scenario was soon to pave the way for Spain’s recovery of respectability in the West. Spain had several assets which were useful for the Allied cause in the early days of the Cold War. It had a privileged strategic position, constituting the rearguard of Western Europe and controlling the entry into the Mediterranean, and the Franco regime was fervently anti-Communist. Western European hostility towards Franco prevented it from seeing these advantages but the United States was soon to exploit them. On 24 October 1947 US policy planning staff sent General Marshall a report recommending the normalization of US relations with Spain.27 In January 1948 Franco was informed that the State Department had expressed its desire to see an American ambassador in Madrid. Certainly, had it not been for the British and French governments, Spain would have been included in the Marshall Plan. Aware of the advantages that an alliance with the first world power could offer, the Francoist diplomacy concentrated on this aim. The Spanish lobby in America had its first triumph when, on 9 February 1949, the Chase Manhattan and National City Bank of New York made a loan of $25,000,000 to the Spanish government.28 Shortly afterwards, on 4 November 1950 the General Assembly of the United Nations authorized the return of ambassadors to Madrid.29 Based on the same principle that the recognition of a regime did not imply a judgement of its internal policies, Spain was admitted to the Food and Agriculture Organization. The process of normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States was completed in January 1951 with the arrival of Ambassador José de Lequerica in Washington and that of Ambassador Stanton Griffiths in Madrid. Finally, on 26 September 1953 Spanish–American relations were to culminate in the Pact of Madrid by which it was agreed to establish US bases in Spain and grant a loan of $226 million.30 Recent historiography has revised the importance


17

of the American aid arguing that its amount was not enough to prop up the Spanish economy, and that Spain continued to depend on trade links with Europe.31 Be that as it may, the diplomatic importance of the treaty with this powerful nation is indisputable, as it opened not only the path to realignment, but it also paved the way for Spain’s participation in the major international organizations. While negotiating with the United States, the regime eagerly pursued the official recognition of the Vatican by means of a new concordat. The concordat was signed in August 1953, providing full recognition of the Franco regime by the Vatican. The fact that it coincided with the pact with the United States, established the concordat as another major step in the international recognition of the regime. Shortly after this double success in foreign policy on 17 November, Spain was admitted to UNESCO. Finally in December 1955, Spain joined the United Nations Organization, thus consolidating the process of normalization of relations with the international community. The fact that the United States played the most important role in returning Spain to the international arena has led historians to neglect the European dimension, assuming that Western Europe remained so hostile to the Franco dictatorship that it led Spain to pursue her interests outside the continental sphere. The next section will challenge these assumptions by examining the reaction of the Franco regime to the early process of European integration. It is difficult to establish which of the various conferences where the issue of the cooperation of European nations was mentioned constituted the definite catalyst for the process of European integration. The Franco regime, desperately seeking international recognition, would have gladly sent representatives to any international conference on Europe’s future. However, it was obvious that European unremitting hostility prevented the participation of Francoist Spain in any events of such a nature. The International Committee of Movements for the Unification of Europe called a congress at The Hague from 7–10 May 1948. This congress passed a series of resolutions in favour of European cooperation. The committee became known as the European Movement. It was particularly annoying for the Franco regime that Spain was exclusively represented by members of the exiled democratic opposition. Salvador de Madariaga and Enrique Adroher Gironella, who were founding members of the European Movement, invited the Socialist leader Indalecio Prieto as well as the monarchist José María Gil Robles to the congress. The latter who lived in Spain, had his passport confiscated by the government to prevent him from attending.32

18


The next major step in the construction of Europe was taken at a congress in London on 5 May 1949 in which the European Assembly for the Council of Europe was founded. This bedrock of the Europeanist movement did not include Franco’s Spain. The Council of Europe, concerned above all with the political and moral principles on which the new Europe should be based, could not omit a declaration about the Spanish political situation. On 10 August 1951 the following resolution was passed: The Assembly expresses the hope that in the near future the Spanish people may be able to hold free elections and set up a constitutional regime, whose members will be eligible to serve as representatives in this Assembly.33 In this way, for the first time a European institution was establishing the condition for changing the political system in Spain – that is, for rendering her eligible for full membership. This conditional veto which was to provoke so many political disputes in Spain over the next decades did not make any impact on the Francoist establishment at that time. Political obstacles were also precluding Spain’s participation in the Marshall Plan or NATO which at that time were deemed essential for the country’s future. The Council of Europe established a special committee to ensure that those nations which could not become full members would still be considered in the economic plans.34 It also classified under two different sections the European nations which were not members. Some were classified as ‘under Soviet domination’ and others as ‘other non-member European nations’. Among the latter, a distinction was made between the democratic ones (Finland) and the non-democratic ones (Yugoslavia, Portugal, Greece and Spain). These were eligible for participation in certain activities, such as the technical committees, concerned with agriculture, science and so on. The political philosophy behind these resolutions was to set a precedent on how European institutions should deal with non-democratic nations on the continent: democracy was the sine qua non condition for membership of European organizations, but also, they should allow these nations to participate in the economic and other nonpolitical European projects, on the grounds that isolating these countries totally from the European activities would be immoral and counter-productive. For Spain this principle was quite appropriate, since the Franco regime was not willing to comply with the political


19

conditions of the European organizations but the country’s economic interests made it essential to be linked in some way with them. If isolation from Europe had adverse political implications, from the economic point of view it threatened Spain with bankruptcy. The Franco regime adopted the economic policy of autarchy in the civil war in order to encourage self-sufficiency. In the late 1940s it became evident that the prolongation of this policy would not be beneficial. Spain only achieved her pre-civil war level of exports in 1950 while financial stringency and a negative balance of payments kept the level of imports below that of 1936.35 Spain was in desperate need of international financial aid in order to modernize her economic structure and stimulate growth. The cliché that Spain was living completely outside European economic affairs during the years of autarchy does not seem to correspond to the trading figures. Recent literature on the period has proved that politics and economics went in opposite directions and that despite the political embargo commercial relations with Spain were not interrupted at any time.36 No West European country refused to trade with Spain after the civil war and from 1945 Spain negotiated trade and payments agreements with several European countries.37 The reason for this paradox is twofold, first that an economic embargo was difficult to justify on moral grounds as it would worsen the already poor living conditions of the Spanish population. Secondly, in postwar Europe scarcity of foodstuffs and raw materials was rife, and Spain constituted an important market for these products. Spain obtained maximum benefit from this European flexibility towards the Franco regime in the economic sphere and economics became a useful tool for gaining international recognition. In July 1951 a new government was appointed, with the double aim of improving international relations and overcoming the crisis which an excessively interventionist economic policy had caused. A policy of liberalization and encouragement of foreign trade was adopted for which links with Europe became essential. These changes in the political economy coincided with the appearance of several European cooperation projects which constituted the origins of the European Economic Community. Unfortunately Spain was badly placed to obtain benefits from such projects since economic relations in Western Europe were largely based on membership of the OEEC and the European Payments Union, and Spain together with Finland was the only Western European country to be excluded from these organizations.

20


On 18 April 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community was created, but Spain did not show any interest in it. Besides the fact that no one at that time regarded this organization as the cornerstone of the future EEC, Spain’s steel sector was so isolated from Europe that its effect on the country would be negligible. However, when European integration moved to agriculture, the Spanish attitude changed dramatically. In 1951 France proposed the creation of a European Agricultural Community or Green Pool. Agricultural trade was crucial for Spain and her largest customers were in Western Europe, therefore the choice for the Spanish administration was either to attempt to reduce its impact on the economy or try to be a part of it.38 In the Green Pool Europeans applied the theory of distinguishing between politics and economics and invited Spain to participate in the conversations for the European agricultural organization. In Madrid this news was celebrated as the first success in the European front: for the first time since 1945, a Spanish minister would be able to attend a ministerial meeting to discuss a European project. However, a year later, it was agreed that the Green Pool should be absorbed by the OEEC, and Spain had to negotiate a new agreement which was signed on 28 January 1955, by which she became a full member of the Agriculture and Food Committee of the OEEC. This gave her the right to send an observer to the meetings of the OEEC council. Thus, Spain became linked to the OEEC, a crucial European organization which had vetoed her entry initially.39 Spain obtained another important diplomatic victory in the European transport scheme. The OEEC Council adopted a resolution on 9 December 1952, calling a conference under the auspices of, but not within, the OEEC, for 18 March 1953 in Paris. Under this formula it planned to enable Spain and Yugoslavia to take part in the drafting of an international convention creating a European Transport Organization. Spain was therefore among the founding members of a European organization and obtained a second observation point in the OEEC. Now that Spain was linked to the OEEC the Spanish administration started to consider the advantages of membership of this organization. In July 1955 the Spanish delegation before the OEEC wrote a report recommending the application for membership of the OEEC.40 It included an analysis of the pros and cons of the OEEC and it indicated that in the political sphere it would lead to the normalization of Spain’s relations with the European nations. It concluded that the advantages of being there could be summed up in that the absent one was always wrong.


21

This insistence on membership of the OEEC may also be attibuted to fears as to the impact of the creation of a future trading bloc. In 1956 the six future EEC members were selling 30 per cent of their exports to Spain and importing approximately 33 per cent from Spain. Spain would have to belong to the OEEC in order to consider participation in a future Common Market.41 The European policy of the Spanish government was reasonably successful, bearing in mind the unfavourable context in which it took place. Spain was accepted into various European cooperation projects, and above all the Spanish administration began to understand that the process of European integration was essential for the country’s economy. By 1957 the internal situation in Spain made Franco decide that a new government was needed. The economic reforms of the period 1951–56 did not give the expected results, and the country’s economy needed to be modernized. Also 1956 was a year of acute political unrest, particularly in the universities, something which was largely attributed to the liberal Minister of Education Joaquín Ruiz Gimenez. In these circumstances the sixth government of the Franco regime was formed on 25 February 1957. The key economic ministries were assigned to the so-called Opus Dei technocrats. All of them belonged to the religious Catholic lay organization Opus Dei, founded in 1924 by Monsignor Escrivá de Balaguer. Mariano Navarro Rubio, a representative of the Syndical Organization at the Cortes became Finance Minister, while Alberto Ullastres, a university professor and economist, became Commerce Minister. Laureano López Rodó, had been appointed Minister General Secretary of the Presidency of the Government, in December 1956. The Falangists retained influential posts in the government: José Solís as General Secretary of the National Movement. For the new government the most urgent task was to tackle the economic crisis. Initially it focused on the control of inflation and the deficit, carrying out reforms in the administration in order to improve its efficiency, but the economy showed no major improvement. It soon became evident that the only way of overcoming recession would be by substituting the protectionist philosophy with a liberal economic policy. The fact that West European economic integration was proving to be a success – in 1958 the EEC officially came into existence – convinced Spanish policy makers that Spain’s prosperity lay in cooperation with this area (see Chapter 2).42 The first steps taken in this new direction in 1958 entailed membership of the OEEC, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In 1959 the

22


government launched a Stabilization plan, based on a similar programme to that which France had applied in 1958 in order to tackle her economic recession, consisting of a devaluation of the currency, tax increases and the removal of restrictions on trade with the OEEC countries.43 This plan was a remarkable success, overcoming the economic crisis and giving way to the longest cycle of industrialization and prosperity in Spanish contemporary history. But it also made Spain increasingly dependent on foreign investment and export growth, thus increasing the importance of links with Europe. The success of this plan and the fact that this government presided over the most remarkable changes in contemporary Spanish economy, has led to the propagation of myths about it. The economic ministers gained the sobriquet of ‘the technocrats’, due to the fact that they were experts in their fields, rather than politicians motivated by ideology. On the other hand their liberal and Europeanist mentality has been exaggerated. There is no evidence that the new government had a model for economic reform from the start. In fact, the plans which they carried out were very much the only way out of the crisis seeing that plans for economic autarchy had failed. As far as their Europeanist stance is concerned it would appear that the country’s interests led them to believe in the need to increase links with Western Europe, an idea which the previous cabinet had already begun to accept. Thus, it was economics which led them to support European integration, not any Europeanist ideology. The changes in Spanish foreign policy which the new government introduced have also been the subject of much historical controversy. The new Foreign Minister, Fernando María Castiella, had acquired political prestige as Ambassador to the Vatican and was ideologically identified with the Catholic sectors, although as a Falangist war veteran and author of the imperialist pamphlet Reivindicaciones de España,44 he was also respected by the Falangist sector. During the ten years that Castiella was Foreign Minister, Spanish diplomacy underwent important changes. Castiella carried out an important reform of the diplomatic service, which in accordance with the new spirit of technocracy became more efficient and professional. Aware of the problems posed by the dictatorial nature of the regime he tried to minimize its effects, in aspects such as religious intolerance or relations with the press. As to the aims of his foreign policy, he remained loyal to the universalist nature of Spanish foreign policy, the Mediterranean, Africa and Latin America while focusing on the West and in particular on the improvement of relations with Europe.45


23

The fact that during Castiella’s period in office Europe became the most important aspect of Spanish foreign policy has led some authors to exaggerate his Europeanism. Castiella’s European policy was not original, as it had been partially introduced by his predecessor Martín Artajo, and initially he showed no more sympathy for Europe or for the prospects of European integration than his predecessor. However, Spanish economic policy as well as a more favourable international context led to a dramatic improvement in relations with Europe. From then on Castiella began to make constant references to Europe and to Spain’s Europeanist vocation.

1. 3. The role of Europeanism in Spanish politics From the early stages of European integration, Spanish diplomacy and the high echelons of the administration developed an interest in European cooperation projects. The extent to which this reality was reflected in postwar Spanish politics is more controversial for two reasons: first, because repression prevented an open discussion about Europe or indeed any other subject, and secondly, because in an atmosphere of hostility between Franco’s Spain and Europe it is difficult to imagine a favourable public discourse on Europe. This section will examine how Europeanism, understood as the belief that Spain had a historic vocation for participating in European affairs, was soon to be experienced in certain sectors of the country: the Francoist establishment, professional and academic centres and the first democratic opposition groups, though each group developed a different interpretation of the concept of Europe, depending on the ideology and aims which they pursued. The Spanish apparent lack of interest towards the first stages of European integration is justified by the Francoist writer and diplomat Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora. According to him, Spain’s participation in Europe was impossible, first due to the hostility from both the United Nations and the European nations, and secondly because the process of European integration was anathema to Francoism.46 A very good indication of the reaction of the Francoist establishment to the early stages of European integration is given by the comments of the national press, which was under the close supervision of the government. In general the Spanish press did not devote much attention to the conferences which set the process of European integration in motion. For example, the Zurich conference of 19 September 1946, which was to constitute the origin of the Council of

24


Europe, was mentioned very briefly in some dailies, but no editorial was dedicated to the news. The fact that Spain was an outcast in the new Europe often provoked comments full of bitterness and resentment, and sometimes there were even nostalgic references to the Fascist European order of the 1930s which the Franco regime had originally supported such as the following: The coal from the Ruhr and steel from Lorraine, are the keys to European prosperity. According to Dr Adenauer, ‘this constitutes a considerable progress in Franco-German relations’. This may be true, but this result was not worth a war between two great nations to reach in the economic field the European aims which Hitler proclaimed in 1940.47 When European winds were favourable towards Spain the press treated European integration in more sympathetic terms. For example, on 10 May 1950 a Paris correspondent of a Spanish newspaper asked the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, probably for the first time, the question that was to be so monotonously repeated in the approach to European integration: whether Spain would be able to adhere to the projected economic union and benefit from the same privileges as the rest of the members, to which Schuman replied affirmatively. The correspondent also inquired about his position in relation to the Spanish question at the UN and the French minister assured him that times had changed considerably since the famous resolution was adopted. Not surprisingly, the heading of the article was quite friendly compared to others dedicated to the neighbouring nation at that time: ‘France makes a final effort to save peace.’48 On 19 April 1951, the day after the signing of the Treaty of Paris by which the European Coal and Steel Community was constituted, the daily Arriba minimized its importance and criticized the concept of economic construction of Europe. Other newspapers did not even report the news. On 15 May 1953, on the occasion of the visit of the Portuguese President Craveiro Lopes to Madrid, Arriba published an article under the title of ‘Iberian Presence in Europe’. It pointed out that the process of European integration which Strasbourg was designing was not appropriate as it was doomed to failure by capitalists, liberals and Freemasons. The alternative would be Europe based on its eternal values, and for this reason the participation of Spain and Portugal in it would be crucial.


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A year after the failure of the European Defence Community, European integration was to gather momentum at the conference of Messina in June 1955, in which the six members of the ECSC discussed closer economic cooperation. The Spanish press neglected these events, and only Arriba referred to Messina, contemptuously commenting that the process of European integration had not advanced a single step. The fact that the Spanish press did not cover the news of European integration in depth is not surprising. After all, at that point nobody could predict its importance and most European countries treated these events with scepticism. That the Spanish comments on this process were predominantly hostile is not surprising, bearing in mind that its participants had condemned Franco’s Spain to oblivion. However, despite this official disregard for the process of European integration, the behaviour of the political families of the Franco regime showed an increasing concern with this process, as well as an interest in finding a formula for Spain’s participation in it. Catholicism became not only a basic belief of Franco’s Spain, but also a useful tool for obtaining external support and legitimizing the regime abroad. Ever since the member of the Catholic group Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas Alberto Martín Artajo became Foreign Minister on 18 July 1945, the Catholic faction was to control important segments of power. Politicians like Alberto Martín Artajo or Joaquín Ruiz Gimenez offered ideal assets for the regime’s external policy. They were not regarded as Fascists like the Falangists were, and although they had no democratic credentials they claimed allegiance to the conservative Christian ideals on which European Christian Democracy was based. Christian Democracy played a very important role in European integration, and for this reason Francoist links with this group were particularly useful. At the inaugural conference of the Spanish Diplomatic school in 1948, Ambassador José María Doussinague pointed out that Europe should count on Spain as a great ideological power which had created the first European order in other times.49 Abroad, the Catholics cultivated a similar discourse in their quest of allies for the cause of Francoist Spain. In 1949, while Spanish diplomacy was negotiating the concordat with the Vatican, Martín Artajo travelled to Rome for the opening of the Holy Year. On this occasion he held a cordial interview with the Christian Democrat politician De Gasperi, whom he had first met ten years ago.50 At a subsequent press conference the Ambassador

26


in the Vatican Ruiz Gimenez declared that Spain gladly shouldered her responsibility ‘in defence of Europe and Christianity’.51 The Catholic factor was essential in the creation of the most active Europeanist organization of the Francoist establishment, the Centro Europeo de Documentación e Información, CEDI.52 It was founded in 1952 and directed by a prominent Francoist, Alfredo Sanchez Bella and though it claimed to be independent it was funded by the Foreign Ministry. Most members of this society belonged to the Catholic traditionalist sectors and used the CEDI as a way of keeping in touch with Catholic circles in Europe and of gaining international support for the regime. The ideology of the CEDI was ultra-conservative and Catholic, believing in the construction of Europe based on Christian principles, and its activities combined anti-Communist propaganda with a fundamentalist criticism of Western democracy. Several centres were opened in Europe but only the German one was active, which can be explained by the common historical experience of Spanish and German conservatism. The central figure of the CEDI was José Ignacio Escobar, Marquis of Valdeiglesias. Valdeiglesias was well acquainted with Germany, for in July 1936 he had been responsible for requesting German aid for the military insurrection which provoked the outbreak of the civil war in Spain. In the postwar years he negotiated the granting of political asylum in Spain to the Belgian Fascist Leon Degrelle. Among the other members of the CEDI there were several well-known Catholics, notably the Minister of Education and former Ambassador to the Vatican, Joaquín Ruiz Gimenez, the diplomat Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, and the director of the Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, Manuel Fraga Iribarne. The members of the German section usually belonged to the Abendland circle, an ultra-conservative society. The central figures were Prince George von Waldburg-Zeil, George von GauppBerghausen, and to a certain extent the Habsburg heir Otto von Habsburg. Not surprisingly the CEDI was described by its detractors as an ‘aristocratic club’ or a ‘clerico-Fascist’ conspiracy.53 Most activities of the CEDI aimed at discussing an alternative to the liberal construction of Europe. In February 1954 the CEDI met at Zeil castle in Germany in order to discuss the statutes of the Council of Europe. Two of its members, Eugen Gerstenmaier and Joachim von Merckatz, were members of the Council of Europe. One of the aims of this meeting was to ensure that the Council’s statutes would not ban the entry of Franco’s Spain. The CEDI decided to put Manuel Fraga in charge of an alternative project for Europe, supporting the idea of a


27

confederation of heads of state – preferably monarchs – with an upper chamber under a life-president. However, the economic aspects of European integration were usually ignored by this society.54 Besides the ideological importance attached to its activities, the CEDI was an important diplomatic asset as it kept the Francoist establishment in touch with certain European conservative élites, and was particularly useful in strengthening relations with Germany. For this reason Foreign Minister Martín Artajo was always willing to provide it with all the support that he could give. On the other hand his successor, Fernando Castiella, never considered the CEDI as an important tool of Spain’s diplomacy, and its activity was substantially reduced after 1957.55 Europeanist rhetoric did not play an important role in the propaganda mechanism of the first Francoist governments, in fact it was anathema to most of its members, who regarded Europeanism as synonymous with democracy and liberalism. In the early postwar years Franco always referred to Europe with hostility, which contrasted with the flattering comments he dedicated to his potential American ally. For example on 18 May 1949, Franco delivered a speech at the Cortes attacking the European nations and underlining the importance of relations with both the United States and Latin America. We find the states in Europe so clumsy, so old and divided, and their politics so riddled with Marxism, that inadvertently they impel us to greater closeness and understanding with the people of our stock: America again attracts the historic destiny of Spain.56 As Spain gradually overcame the days of ostracism, the antiEuropean spirit was toned down and Franco started to exploit the role of Spain as a spiritual reserve of the West.57 However, before the Treaty of Rome no public comments were made in relation to the importance of the process of European integration. Despite the fact that Foreign Minister Martín Artajo initiated the Spanish orientation towards European cooperation movements, it had been exclusively due to their economic importance. As he made clear in an article shortly after he left office, he felt no sympathy for the Europeanist cause: A great part of the movements that we study, particularly those of a political content, have a doctrinal component which must be rejected: they have been formed under the banner of socialism. It could even

28


be said, that these attempts at making a supranational Europe, are until now the task of the Socialist parties which would like to transfer to the political order, the programme of the Socialist International.58 Although distrust towards politics of European integration always prevailed, it ceased to be publicly expressed when Spain applied to the EEC. From that moment on Franco and his ministers were to acknowledge the importance of European integration, and insist on Spain’s European vocation. Spain experienced the rise of an alternative Europeanism, that of professionals and academics who believed that Spain could not be left out of European unification. In the academic field the most important contributor to the early Europeanist thought was Jose Larraz. The man who became known as the Spanish Jean Monnet for his interest in Europe, had been Finance Minister from 1939 to 1942, but he was somewhat sceptical about the aims of national economic independence, so popular amongst his contemporaries. On retiring from public life he became dedicated to the study of the process of European integration and in 1949, despite the predominantly hostile atmosphere towards everything European, Larraz introduced the main debates which were then being discussed on the continent into Spanish academic life. During that year he gave two lectures in Madrid and in Zaragoza, in relation to European cooperation projects, warning for the first time that Spain would be inexorably affected by ‘European economic unification’, in view of which, he stressed the need to pay attention to it.59 He personally supported the process of European economic unification under a political federation of European nations. In order to promote the systematic study of European integration Larraz decided to found a society, but it was necessary to find a formula which would not arouse the government’s suspicions. Finally the Society for Spanish and European Economic Studies was created. This new society attracted political and economic experts who produced 80 monographic studies, published between 1951 and 1961, under the collective heading of ‘Studies about European Economic Unification’.60 Several associations were founded during this period with the aim of researching into European themes. In 1949 the Institute for European Studies and the Spanish Committee for the European League of Economic Cooperation were founded in Barcelona. Three years later the Institute of European Studies was founded at the University of Zaragoza. These organizations followed European events


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with special emphasis on economic and cultural events, and deliberately omitting the political dimension of European integration, so as to avoid a confrontation with the Francoist authorities. During this period several publications appeared which treated European issues, the most important being Revista de Estudios Políticos and Revista de Política Internacional, both belonging to the recently founded Institute of Political Studies. During the postwar years, as in other difficult moments for Spain, any serious discussion of the country’s situation inevitably led to comparisons with the rest of Europe. In 1949 the humanist doctor Pedro Laín Entralgo wrote a series of articles on Spain under the title ‘Spain as a Problem’. In this book he put forward the thesis that the problem which had prevented the country from being more successful had been the incompatibility between the traditional Hispanic world and European modernity.61 The Catholic intellectual Rafael Calvo Serer presented a rival thesis in 1951, ‘Spain without Problems’.62 He explained that since 1939 Spain had ceased to be a problem as the internal divisions which had caused so much trouble in the past had been eradicated by the present regime. As far as the country’s relations with Europe were concerned, Calvo Serer pointed out that the issue no longer concerned what was to be learnt from Europe but rather how to play an influential role in the continent. He admitted that Spain was economically inferior to Europe but this could be compensated for by her cultural superiority. Europe was being corrupted by capitalism and Marxism, and for this reason Spain, which had maintained her Christian roots intact had a very important mission to play. The Spanish cultural world experienced an important Europeanist activity. The fact that Catholicism monopolized Spanish culture at this time explains why Europeanism was interpreted as a phenomenon of Christian civilization. This interpretation enabled the recovery of the term ‘European’, which had too often been associated with contemporary democratic ideas. In accordance with this concept, Franco’s Spain could also be included in this political-cultural tradition without discrimination. This type of idea was often expressed in Punta Europa, a periodical founded in 1956, with a monarchist and traditionalist viewpoint. Parallel to the first European institutions, continental academic circles began to debate the definition of Europe in its political and cultural dimension. The first Spaniard to respond to this current of thought was Salvador de Madariaga, who as a founding member of the

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European Movement was very active in all Europeanist political and cultural spheres. In his book ‘Europe, a Unit of Human Culture’, he attempted to define continental cultural and spiritual unity within its diversity. He concluded that until then all attempts at European unification had taken place under the predominance of a certain nation or culture, whereas the present process of European integration recognized diversity, which could lead to unification by consensus and through the mechanism of liberal democracy.63 The academic debate on Europe also permeated Spanish frontiers. In 1954 Luis Díez del Corral published an influential book, ‘The Rape of Europe’. He traced the most important stages of European civilization, from ancient Greece to modern liberalism, concluding that it had been the dynamism of European culture which had determined its central role in the world. Its decadence was caused by what he defined as the rape of Europe, aggressive nationalism and totalitarian systems which had characterized the twentieth century.64 This book constituted an important challenge to the official interpretation of Europe. It defined Europe as a rich variety of cultures with common roots, avoiding the approach excessively based on the contribution of nation states. Its claim that Europe should recover its essence and learn from the most recent mistakes was implicitly a defence of the liberal concept of Europe. Besides Europeanist activities in official Francoist and academic spheres in the 1950s there emerged a more political concept of Europeanism, advocated by the reformist opposition groups which believed that Spain would have to alter its existing political system in order to play an active role in the new Europe. The reformist or moderate opposition was responsible for the creation of Europeanist societies which provoked the first clashes with the regime. The most important was the Asociación Española de Cooperación Europea (AECE), founded in 1954 in Madrid. It was always linked to the European Movement and it often requested its support and advice.65 The aim of this institution, according to the founding manifesto was to cooperate in the process of European unification, proclaiming itself in favour of active Spanish participation, on the grounds that Spanish religion, culture and history all ascribed Spain to that Europe which the Spanish monarchs had attempted to build on a Christian basis in the glorious days of the nation.66 The AECE was originally linked to a major lay Catholic organization the Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas, (ACNP) and many of its members were deeply conservative, or sympathizers with


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Christian Democracy although it gradually began to incorporate supporters of liberal and even Socialist ideas. In relation to the concept of Europe AECE experienced a similar evolution. On 5 July 1958, on the occasion of Spain’s entry into the OEEC, the AECE made openly federalist European declarations, requesting the government to respect the principles of a constitutional state and the establishment of democratic liberties.67 Thus, a society that was initially acceptable to the Francoist establishment would soon emerge as the most important representative of anti-Francoist Europeanist thought. An important addition to the ranks of the Catholic opposition which took place in the 1950s was that of Rafael Calvo Serer. After his staunch defence of the Franco regime in his book Spain without Problems, he became increasingly critical of the dictatorship. In 1953 he published an article in the French magazine Ecrits de Paris, in which he explained that the Franco regime was entering a stage of decadence mainly due to the control of the political sphere by Falangists. As a solution he proposed the creation of a third force, capable of modernizing the regime.68 As a result of this article Calvo Serer was banned from all public posts, but his Third Force Theory was considerably more popular among the Catholic or monarchist circles. Calvo Serer has admitted that it was his travels through Western Europe in the 1950s which triggered his political evolution. Before the Second World War he had been disappointed by how the liberal democracies in crisis were incapable of creating a strong alternative to the Communist system, leading him to support authoritarian alternatives such as the Spanish. However, in the 1950s the opposite was taking place: My conservative ideological framework collapsed on observing that the new European democracies which emerged under the support of the Marshall Plan were progressing economically and culturally at an incredible rate, whereas the authoritarian dictatorships in Western Europe, Spain, Portugal and Greece remained stagnant.69 Another prominent representative of Catholic political thought who was to develop an alternative concept of Europe was Manuel Giménez Fernández. He was a genuine representative of the values which Christian Democracy defended in Europe, a non-reactionary Christian doctrine based on democracy and social justice. As early as 1950 Giménez Fernández referred to the concept of Europe in a conference under the heading of ‘the State of Europe and

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Spanish Mentalities’.70 Stressing how important it was for Spain to participate in European politics, he demanded the creation of political groups to define the Spanish attitude towards the concept of Europe. Feeling increasingly estranged from the more conservative faction of Christian Democracy led by Gil Robles, in 1959 Giménez Fernández founded the left-wing Izquierda Democrática Cristiana advocating democracy and Europeanism.71 Another important centre of political Europeanist activity was the political law seminar at the University of Salamanca, by the Socialist professor Enrique Tierno Galván. In December 1955 Tierno published an article under the heading of ‘Twelve Theses of European Functionalism’, in which he announced the foundation of an Asociación por la Unidad Funcional de Europa.72 This association was formed by university professors who shared the same principles: the defence of liberty, democracy and Europeanism. By functionalism they referred to the application of a rational method to the definition of the ideal political system, taking the unification of Europe as the aim to be pursued.73 Tierno Galván advocated democratization as a condition for Spain’s participation in Europe. As a result of his contacts with the monarchist group Unión Española, Tierno Galván also supported the monarchy as the most efficient instrument for the re-establishment of democracy. The new association started to publish a Europeanist journal in 1956 Europa a la vista, but it was closed down by the government after its third edition and shortly afterwards, in 1960, Tierno Galván was forced to abandon the country because of his opposition activities. The philosopher Ortega y Gasset continued exerting a crucial influence on Spanish Europeanist thought until his death. As author of The Revolt of the Masses he had acquired an international reputation. Disappointed with the Second Republic he went into exile when the civil war broke out, and although he initially seemed to favour a Nationalist victory he was very critical of the Franco regime and did not return to Spain until 1945. Despite the reticence that his name provoked in Francoist circles, Ortega once again made a leading contribution to Spanish cultural life. In 1948 he set up the Institute of Humanities. In the latter part of his life he wrote several essays on his idea of Europe which were published after his death. His Europeanist thought is based on the belief that Europe pre-dates the nationalities of which it is composed, that European history cannot only be written in terms of the history of Germany, France, Spain, England and so on:


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The difference between Europe and the European nations is that the former came before and is more permanent. But they all end up unified and without difference in a common ground which goes from Iceland to the Caucasus. The European people feel that they belong to the immense society and unity in fate which is Europe.74 Ortega y Gasset died in 1955. His funeral constituted a great demonstration of the Spanish intelligentsia, who were simultaneously paying homage to him as well as protesting against Francoist repression. In the wake of the 1956 university riots, a series of political groups were founded by university students and young professionals who aimed at the establishment of democracy, the best known being the Socialist Agrupación Socialista Universitaria, the Christian Democrat Unión Demócrata Cristiana, and the monarchist Unión Española. Most members of these groups had not participated in the Spanish Civil War and did not have any contacts with the democratic opposition in exile. Nevertheless they expressed themselves in convinced Europeanist terms. As Professor Tierno Galván has argued: all anti-Francoist political activity during these years had a European character. Spain was Europe in the sense that it was antiFrancoist. Europe represented for us an open window which allowed us to dream of democracy.75 Europe was also an essential ingredient in the political culture of the exiled opposition. For them Europeanism was not only the basis of their political thought, but also a mechanism for expressing opposition to the Franco regime in the international community. The fact that democracy had been established as a sine qua non condition for participation in the process of European integration enabled the exiled opposition to combine Europeanist propaganda with antiFrancoist activities. The most important contribution to Europeanist activity in exile was made by the writer and politician Salvador de Madariaga, followed by Enrique Adroher Gironella, both of whom had been the only representatives of Spain at the Geneva conference held in 1948, at which the European Movement had been created. Apart from his role as President of the Spanish Council of the European Movement, Madariaga was a member of the Permanent Executive Committee of the European Movement, President of its Cultural Commission, member of the Administrative Council of the College of Europe in Bruges, and

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President of the Liberal International. Adroher-Gironella was Secretary of the Spanish Council of the European Movement as well as Secretary of the Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe.76 Salvador de Madariaga made significant attempts at unifying the democratic opposition behind the Europeanist and anti-Francoist banner. The European Movement decided to set up councils of exiles for countries under dictatorships and Madariaga took advantage of this opportunity in order to build a united anti-Francoist opposition with a powerful European platform. Madariaga invited a wide spectrum of the democratic opposition including Basque and Catalan nationalists, in the hope that it would become: what the government of the Republic in exile had not managed to be: the only body in which can be found represented all the colours of the Spanish political rainbow except the totalitarians, Communists and Fascists.77 The Spanish Federal Council could never be called a government in exile, which Madariaga originally attempted to make of it, but the activities carried out in it did succeed in keeping anti-Francoist political activity alive. Within this council Madariaga organized regular Spanish and European conferences, holding meetings in Paris in 1950, 1952 and in Toulouse in 1955. His broadcasts had great impact and above all contributed to keep alive a European interest in the Spanish problem as well as keeping up the morale of the democratic opposition. In the 1950s the Spanish Socialists in exile, both the historic Socialist party (PSOE) and its sister trade union, the Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), combined an intense anti-Francoist campaign with Europeanism, displaying their political activity in several fora: European Socialist parties and trade unions, the Socialist international, the European institutions and the European Movement. Between 1946 and 1961 the party leaders, Indalecio Prieto and Rodolfo Llopis, and the trade union representatives, Tomás Gomez and Pascual Tomás, were active in all these institutions with the double aim of propagating socialism and winning support against the Franco regime.78 It is important to bear in mind that Europeanism was envisaged by the PSOE as a medium for anti-Francoist activity. Although it became part of its political discourse in the 1950s its Europeanist thought was not very elaborate.79 Its standard line was to present Franco as the obstacle to Spain’s integration into European institutions and


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NATO.80 European integration was seen as essential for the creation of an alternative supranational democratic community capable of counteracting the supremacy of the two great powers. In addition the Spanish Socialists were soon attracted to a supranational vision of Europe as the best formula for the establishment of a Socialist Europe, which the French and Belgian Socialists advocated, as opposed to the more nationalist concept of European integration which appealed to the British Labour Party and the Scandinavian Socialists. The Secretary General of the PSOE, Rodolfo Llopis, participated in the Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement and the European Movement for the United States of Europe. Llopis attended the meetings of the Socialist International, the Congress of Socialist parties of the European community, organized since 1952 by the Assembly of the ECSC, as well as the preparatory meetings of the Socialist Parliamentary Groups, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. The presence of the secretary general of the PSOE in all these institutions also served the purpose of drawing the attention of the international community to the Franco dictatorship, and actually achieved the setting up of special committees on Spain at the Socialist International in 1946, 1953 and 1960. The Socialist trade union organization, UGT was promptly incorporated into the international trade union organizations. It participated in the foundation of the World Trade Union Organization in 1945 and the European Confederation of Free Trade Unions, (ECFTU) in 1949. When the OEEC created a Trade Union Consultative Committee, the UGT was granted the status of observer. In these institutions the UGT combined trade unionist activity with anti-Francoism, but it was less active than the Socialists in the Europeanist field. The anti-Francoist campaign in the European organizations was focused on the absence of trade union rights which Spanish workers suffered and it proved successful. The Franco regime entered the OEEC in 1958 but its official trade union the Organización Sindical Española, never obtained the status of representative of Spanish workers at the Trade Union Committee. Nor was it successful at the United Nations International Workers’ Organization which Spain had joined in 1956.81 This rejection constituted a severe blow to the aspirations of the regime in the European trade union organizations, dashing the regime’s hopes of presenting organic democracy and the Francoist vertical syndicates as a system which could be compatible with that of the European democracies.

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There is an important difference between the Europeanism of the AECE and Madariaga’s circles, and that of the Socialist and trade union sectors in exile. For the former, Europeanism constituted the basis of their political thought, and it was the incompatibility of this concept with the Franco regime which led them to demand the change of regime. For the latter, Socialism was the most important goal, and Europeanism was essentially a tool, useful for putting pressure on the European institutions to demand a change of regime. However, all coincided in identifying the cause of Europe with democratization.

2 The Spanish Approach to the European Community, 1957–62

2. 1. The Spanish reaction to the creation of the European Community Shortly after the appointment of a new government by the Franco regime on 25 March 1957 six nations signed the treaties of Rome by which the European Economic Community was constituted. The upper echelons of the Franco regime were well informed about the process of European integration and the foundation of the EEC did not take anyone by surprise. The press gave the news without excessive detail, as was normal with European affairs, and comments ranged from indifference to hostility. The Falangist daily Arriba made the following comment in relation to the treaty of Rome: Without Adenauer personally, the old Europeanist obsession would continue in a state of darkness. Western Germany will be paying the bill for the Common Market. Europe is not only six countries, and this Europe, Spaak’s fantastic task, lacks a real content, as do all other organizations born under the masonic symbol of Strasbourg.1 On the other hand the Spanish government adopted a more openminded attitude in view of the influence that these events could have. One minister, Laureano López Rodó has described the impact of the Treaty of Rome in the following terms: On 25 March 1957, a far-reaching event took place which was to have deep repercussions on the world economy and politics, and 37

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consequently also on Spain: the signing of the Treaty of Rome by which the European Common Market was created.2 The government developed two opposing views in relation to this event: that of the Europeanists and that of the sceptics. Among the latter group were General Franco and Admiral Carrero Blanco, who as military men, were attracted by the idea that the Spanish economy should become as self-sufficient as possible. The minister without portfolio Pedro Gual Villalbí was also in this group, arguing that all attempts at unification of different states had failed and that the same would happen with the Treaty of Rome. In the Europeanist faction there was Alberto Ullastres, who defended the need to liberalize foreign trade to modernize the economy. Other convinced Europeanists of the 1957 government were Castiella, Navarro Rubio and López Rodó.3 Although Franco is included in the sceptical group in relation to the process of European integration, a statement of his made shortly before the creation of the EEC reveals a certain evolution towards a more cooperative attitude. The fact that Spain rebels against old European politics and party struggles is no obstacle for her feeling an integral part of Europe. This is not new. We have demonstrated it, when before the end of the last war, we tried to clarify our relations with Britain, predicting the impending threats against Europe which we were all to suffer after the affray.4 Franco concluded that despite the European rebuff his regime had continued working for cooperation with Europe. In this speech Franco was thus saying no to political integration, but insisting that Spain was ready to participate in any project aimed at defending common continental interests. As regards the first Spanish official reactions to the European Economic Community, these were predominantly cautious. The Minister of Commerce, Alberto Ullastres, referred to the Common Market in Valencia in May 1957, but he did not seem unduly impressed. He pointed out that the European Community needed to be consolidated before it could demonstrate to potential members that it was worth joining. A month later, however, he warned that Spain was heading towards the liberalization of her economy and that the days of isolation were over.5

Spain and European Community, 1957–62

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These declarations reveal several factors about the attitude of the Franco regime to the European Community. First, that it was above all an economic issue in which Ullastres and the economic ministers played the most important role. Castiella as Foreign Minister played the role of intermediary. Secondly, although the technocrats were enthusiastic Europeanists their main concern in 1957 was the economic crisis. There was a need to liberalize the Spanish economy, reduce the deficit and solve the balance of payments. The prospective entry into the World Bank, the IMF and the OEEC was of great help in this respect. The next step would be the Stabilization plan, and only after that would the government be in a position to consider joining the process of European integration, but in 1957 this aim was inconceivable.6 However, the government did take an important measure in relation to the EEC. The first official reaction was the establishment of the Comisión Interministerial para el Estudio de las Comunidades Europeas, CICE, on 27 July 1957.7 This was an interministerial committee in charge of studying the impact of the Treaty of Rome and advising on the policy to be followed. The fact that the minister without portfolio, Gual Villalbi, was appointed head of this commission implied that it was the sceptical faction that would guide the studies of the EEC. Gual Villalbí, as President of the Council of National Economy was protectionist by nature and consequently opposed to any tariff reduction proposal.8 Soon professionals and academics pronounced themselves on the effects of this new organization on the Spanish economy. Some sectors reacted with apprehension, considering that protection against the Common Market was essential. An editorial of the journal specializing in European affairs, Punta Europa, emphasized the dangers of the new Common Market, declaring itself against it on the grounds that ‘it was not clear whether inclusion would increase Spanish exports, whereas it would definitely imperil the development of national industries’.9 Others insisted on the need to work out a formula for Spanish integration into the European Community. The economist Manuel Fuentes Irurozqui argued that Spain could not afford to be left out of the Common Market, since over 60 per cent of Spanish exports went to Europe and 26 per cent of agricultural products were consumed in the area of the Six.10 The former minister and Europeanist, José Larraz, delivered a lecture in Pamplona in which he adopted an unusual position for a member of the Francoist establishment, declaring himself in favour of a supranational economy. He pointed out that modern techniques can only give results in vast economic areas, and for this reason nation states

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individually were not suited for the modern economic challenges. In the political sphere continental nation states were too insignificant and only by European unification would they be able to face the Soviet threat.11 As regards the reaction of the industrial and agricultural sectors to the creation of the EEC most of them remained indifferent. Only the orange-producing sector seemed genuinely concerned. Valencia had been the main supplier of oranges in Europe for several centuries, but since the last war her supremacy in this market had been challenged by the African Mediterranean countries. Professor of Economics Simón Cano spoke on behalf of orange producers at the Valencian Institute of Economy in May 1957, warning that the Common Market would be very beneficial for Dutch, French and Italian agriculture as well as for their former colonies, and consequently Spain’s agricultural exports to this area would be drastically reduced.12 Considering that the EEC had just been created, this range of opinions is surprisingly sophisticated. Although indifference predominated, two ideas were being voiced which were going to convince Spain of the need to be integrated into Europe: Spain’s trading interests were based in this area and secondly, Spanish agricultural exports could not afford to be left out.

2. 2. The reasons for Spain’s application to the European Community and its impact on Spanish politics The Franco regime was well aware that the process of European integration would inexorably affect Spain, but over the next years the government was to limit itself to the observation of the European trading blocs without taking any decision. There were three reasons for this procrastination: firstly, the period from 1957 to 1961 was one of great uncertainty in the process of European integration. It was still to be seen whether the EEC would be a successful project particularly with the creation of the British-sponsored alternative, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960; secondly, the EEC had political objectives which made full Spanish membership impossible; and thirdly because the Spanish economy was undergoing a process of change which made it impossible to consider full participation in either of those trading blocs in the short run. During the first sessions of the CICE the possibility of Spain’s integration into the Treaty of Rome was never considered. The CICE hoped that Britain would establish an alternative free-trade area in


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Europe, and if she succeeded the EEC would either collapse or become part of a bigger trading bloc led by Britain.13 There were many reasons why the Spanish administration was more attracted by the British proposals for a free-trade area. In the first place, the EEC had already been set up and the obstacles for Spain’s entry appeared insurmountable. On the other hand the formation of a free-trade area was being discussed at that moment and Spain as a founding member might be in a strong position to demand special conditions. In the political sphere there was another advantage since this organization would not aim at political union under supranational institutions like the EEC, but would seek rather to reach agreements by consensus between member states. Spanish entry into the OEEC in 1958 was an important step in the process of integration into the European economy but it did not automatically allow Spain to participate in the conversations leading to the free-trade area as expected. The Spanish government made four requests for participation in the Maudling Committee in which a freetrade area was being discussed.14 When she finally joined it was too late as France had just abandoned negotiations in November 1958. After this failure, Britain and seven non-EEC countries initiated talks leading to the formation of a European Free Trade Association (EFTA). This uncertain scenario largely explains the hesitation of Spanish observers. In December 1958, the CICE concluded that the impact of the EEC would require the negotiation of special conditions for the Spanish economy.15 The only progress made was that membership should be ruled out as an option and that only association status could be considered: Article 237 talks about the incorporation into the Common Market on an equal footing to the signatory states, and it requires their unanimity as well as the subsequent ratification by their parliaments, whereas article 238 sets the association method. The latter seems an easier formula for Spain’s entry. It constitutes a second class presence, but it is easier to carry out negotiations with the Council of Ministers than with the delegations of the six member states and their respective parliaments, where enormous problems will arise.16 In 1959 the year of the Stabilization Plan, the government was again to be absorbed by domestic policy with little time to consider a solution to the EFTA versus EEC dilemma. Nevertheless in January it

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decided to carry out a survey amongst the most important institutions of the country. A questionnaire was sent with four questions about economic and international events. The third question was whether it was convenient for Spain to participate in the European Common Market or other movements of international economic integration. The answers varied depending on the nature and aims of the institution concerned ranging from those who were openly in favour to those who were indifferent or totally against.17 Surprisingly prominent among the institutions in favour of joining the EEC was the Syndical Organization, which argued that links with Europe were essential for external trade. It also pointed out that Spanish participation in the European Community would have very important political effects, since instead of basing Spanish foreign policy exclusively on relations with the United States, Spain would be able to develop a European dimension. The Institute of Agricultural Studies believed that bearing in mind that most agricultural exports went to the EEC member states Spain should join the Common Market. Other groups of institutions declared themselves in favour but with many reservations. The Supreme Council of Official Chambers of Industry pointed out that it was important to avoid isolation, but that the Spanish approximation to the European integration should be a very gradual process. Similarly, the Bank of Spain thought that it was convenient to take part in the process of European integration but only so long as the economy was ready, which would not be the case until after the end of the Stabilization Plan. Paradoxically, the Institute of Political Studies did not make any reference to the notorious political obstacles for Spain’s participation in the EEC. It merely concluded that, for economic reasons, Spain could not afford to be left out. Delaying entry into Europe would lead not only to a deterioration of the economy but also to that of the country’s social stability. Among the group of replies against European integration, there were those institutions of conservative instincts and national interests. The National Confederation of Building Societies or Cajas de Ahorro, replied that it would be a disaster for the Spanish industry which was not ready to face so much foreign competition. The Bankers’ Representative Council, the Consejo Superior Bancario, thought that Spain should only consider participation in European integration if the EEC and EFTA were unified, since entry into only


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one of these institutions would not solve any problems. The National Institute of Industry and the Council of National Economy thought that Spain could not afford to open her economy to Europe at such a difficult moment. The survey revealed quite accurately what the position of the most important institutions was in relation to the EEC. However, very little is known as to how the government reacted to these opinions. It seems likely that the immediate reaction was to continue observing events. As Ullastres pointed out shortly afterwards in Madrid: ’The importance of the events in Europe is the spirit which they reveal, a willingness to carry out a greater integration of the different national economies.’18 This period of reflection as to when and how Spain should join European integration, provided the democratic opposition with an ideal chance to raise awareness of the political aspects of European integration and the need for Spanish democratization. The monarchist group Unión Española, for example which had never expressed any views on Spain’s role in Europe, began advocating the cause of Europeanism, becoming one of the most active groups in this field. On 29 January 1959 Unión Española organized a dinner at the Menfis Hotel in Madrid, attended by a diverse representation of the professional élites: lawyers, bankers, professors and so on. At the end there were speeches by the monarchists Jaime Mirallés, Joaquín Satrústegui and even the Socialist Enrique Tierno Galván, declaring themselves in favour of a liberal monarchy in Spain. It was probably the first time that democracy was defended publicly since the Civil War before such a big audience. Satrústegui appealed for urgent participation in the European movement in order to put an end to the differences between Spain and the Western world.19 On 20 April, Don Juan de Borbón, Count of Barcelona, the heir to the Spanish throne, sent a telegram to Robert Schuman, the President of the European Parliamentary Assembly, paying tribute to the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the constitution of the Council of Europe.20 On the Count of Barcelona’s behalf Unión Española issued a Europeanist communiqué in May 1959, which implicitly demanded the end of the Franco regime. We must remember that the principles proclaimed in the adjoining documents (the Treaty of Rome) are those which inform about the spirit of the new Europe, in which Unión Española advocates our political integration, an aim which will not be achieved, on an equal footing with the other member-states, as long as those principles are unknown or rejected in Spain.21

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The Europeanist society AECE was no less active during this period. In July 1959, coinciding with Spain’s entry into the OEEC, its members issued a declaration in favour of expanding contacts with Europe to the political sphere. They declared themselves against the construction of a Europe of nations, with no political homogeneity, and advocated a European union based on the European conventions of human rights.22 Although it is unlikely that this declaration had any impact beyond the circles close to the AECE, its importance lies in the fact that for the first time this organization was publicly demanding the democratization of the system. From this point, this group which had initially attracted members of the Francoist establishment was to transform itself into a platform for the domestic opposition. Another aspect that was to influence the Spanish application to the European Community was bilateral relations with Western European states. Spanish diplomacy had attempted to overcome the hostility that the Franco regime provoked in Europe but this proved to be a difficult task. Relations with one of the three major states in Western Europe was essential. An alliance with Britain would have been very useful for Spain – as it had been for Portugal historically – as this country was Spain’s most important trading partner and it would have enabled her entry into EFTA. However, two obstacles stood in the way: the conflict over Gibraltar and the fact that both Labour and conservatives were unremittingly hostile to the Franco regime. In the late 1950s Spain succeeded in establishing reasonably cordial relations with France and Germany. Franco-Spanish relations began to improve in 1957 when the two countries cooperated in the North African conflict. In 1959 on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of the Pyrenees the two Foreign Ministers Castiella and Couve de Murville met and discussed relations between their countries. After that, Franco-Spanish relations experienced a significant improvement. Between 1959 and 1963 seven French ministers visited Spain, and 21 Spanish ministers visited France over the same period.23 French interests in Europe were to benefit the Spanish cause for various reasons. De Gaulle advocated European integration based on the concept of a ‘Europe of nations’, which would allow nation states to maintain their independence from supranational institutions. This concept favoured Spain in that it envisaged a high degree of political autonomy for member states. Secondly, De Gaulle’s European policy was based on his obsession with the recovery of French grandeur, and he


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aimed at creating a European Community led by France. For this reason he viewed the prospective British entry into the EEC with mistrust.24 France never intended to support full Spanish membership of the EEC which was impossible for political reasons, but she did aim at opening the country up to the Community. Moving the area of interests to southern Mediterranean Europe would be a way of counterbalancing the predominance of northern ‘Saxon Europe’, particularly if Britain joined the EEC, and in this way ensure French supremacy. On 5 September 1959 Castiella travelled to Paris for an interview with De Gaulle, after which the French President stated the following: ‘Spanish isolation should definitely be ended and this country should be included in the economic and political community of the Atlantic states.’25 Spanish relations with the Federal Republic of Germany were to improve due to common economic interests. On 10 June 1958, Ullastres travelled to Germany to discuss German investments in Spain. In his toast at a dinner in Bonn, the Foreign Minister Dr von Brentano, announced that Germany should support Spanish initiatives to join European organizations. On 9 November 1959 Castiella travelled to Bonn on the invitation of the German government. At a press conference he was asked about Spain’s attitude towards the European Community, to which he replied that Spain aimed at full membership and he hoped that petty rivalries would not make the aim of European unity fail.26 An article in the German press reflects this new warmth in the relations between the two countries. The rehabilitation of the regime by the Western powers is now a fact. The economic possibilities of the Federal Republic in the Iberian peninsula would also be convenient for other countries which manifest great interest in Spain, and which know how to distinguish between ideology and economic diplomacy.27 This sentence reveals accurately the conservative philosophy towards the Franco regime which Germany put into practice. Isolating Franco’s Spain for ideological reasons was pointless, and both Spain and Europe would benefit from the development of economic relations. Germany’s concept of Europe was also to benefit Spain. Chancellor Adenauer had discussed the future of Europe with De Gaulle at Colombey on 14 September 1958 and was also in favour of the concept of a ‘Europe of nations’.28 The fact that the two strongest nations in Europe were developing close relations with Spain and were

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willing to support her desire to get closer to the European Community was to be a determining factor in the European policy of the Franco regime. The USA continued to be an important source of aid that Spain could not afford to lose. From 22 to 25 March 1960, Castiella was invited on an official visit to the USA. During an interview with President Eisenhower, the Spanish Foreign Minister insisted on the need for economic support. The American President took advantage of the occasion in order to raise the question of religious liberty in Spain, adding that otherwise relations between the two countries would be difficult.29 The impression obtained from this conversation was that Spain could no longer take American aid for granted, which left her economy increasingly dependent on links with Europe. During his stay in America Castiella was invited to Georgetown University in Washington, where he explained the nature of Spanish foreign policy, which was defined as anti-Communist, Atlantic and Western: In our days, the common danger, Communism, has served as a catalyst of a tendency to aim at Western unity, with which Spain feels solidarity. To the service of this policy of unity we have carried out the greatest efforts to improve relations with all countries. Conscious of our European character, we have worked ceaselessly in order to improve our relations with the European countries, and in this sense our relations with France, Britain, Germany and Belgium have improved considerably.30 There is nothing new in the Foreign Minister’s allegiance to the Western anti-Communist cause. It was a continuation of a policy established by Castiella’s predecessor, Martín Artajo. However, on this occasion Castiella was able to stress the European dimension of Spanish Western policy. Until 1957 this policy had been based primarily on relations with the United States, whereas in 1960, due to the improvement in relations with her European neighbours, the Spanish government could exploit continental interests. The changing spirit is well reflected in Castiella’s statement. As it became evident that European integration was crucial for Spain, the Foreign Minister began to exploit Europeanist rhetoric in his public statements, particularly in those made abroad. One of the reasons for the confusion created by European integration was the fact that Spain did not have diplomatic representation in


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the EEC. This problem was solved when on 9 November 1960, Commissioner Jean Rey accepted the Spanish Ambassador in Brussels, the Count of Casa Miranda, as head of the Spanish mission before the European Community.31 The establishment of diplomatic representation in the EEC was to improve the quality of the information reaching Spain about the process of European integration. 1961 was to be a year of great importance in the process of Spain’s rapprochement with the EEC. During this year a series of events were to take place in Western Europe that convinced the Spanish government of the need to apply for association to the EEC without further delay. On 9 July 1961, Greece was granted association status by the EEC. This was the first association agreement signed by the Community, and it was carried out under article 238 which seemed appropriate for Spain. The Greek economy bore certain similarities with the Spanish one, with predominantly agricultural and Mediterranean products. Turkey, with worse economic conditions, had already applied for association. Another worrying piece of news was the association of Finland with EFTA, which rendered Spain one of the very few countries in Western Europe without any formal link with either of the European trading blocs. The most decisive news of the year was the British application to the European Community on 9 August 1961. This decision left two things clear: that the model of European unification would be political integration which the EEC advocated, and not simply a union of markets, and secondly that EFTA was no longer an interesting option since it became evident that the EEC would dominate the process of European integration. In fact Ireland and Denmark applied to join the European Community in the same month, and the rest were soon to follow suit. Negotiations for British entry were expected to be problematic, as her economy was heavily dependent on links with the Commonwealth and EFTA.32 France would create problems since De Gaulle regarded Great Britain as the American Trojan Horse, believing that the British presence would jeopardize the project of a united Europe. Nevertheless the French government stated its willingness to accept Britain as long as she complied with the obligations of the Community.33 By this stage the majority of the Spanish foreign service was convinced of the need to apply to the EEC. On 9 August 1961, the day of the British application, a diplomat at the Spanish mission to the EEC, Eduardo de Laiglesia, warned Castiella about the consequences that a delay in opening negotiations could have, pointing out that it was likely that the EEC would receive more applications and that the longer

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it took to apply the more complex negotiations would become.34 The reasons for applying to the EEC were to multiply over the last months of 1961. On 25 July 1961, the EC Council of Ministers adopted measures concerning the circulation of labour in the Community. Preference would be given to the workers of EEC member states, and they would also enjoy training programmes for specific jobs. Spain had almost one million workers residing in several European countries, and unless she was linked to the EEC they would not enjoy any of these privileges. Spain’s inclusion in the EEC’s labour projects could also contribute to reducing the opposition that the Franco regime met in all trade union organizations. For example, the European Regional Organization of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, adopted a resolution in Holland on 29 April 1961, in support of Spanish workers in their struggle for freedom.35 When the official representatives of Spain attended the assembly of the International Labour Organization, which took place in Geneva in May, they met with strong Socialist opposition.36 The minister Solís, who represented Spanish workers, made a great effort to convince European interlocutors that the Spanish vertical syndicates were as fair a system of representing working-class interests as those of the democratic trade unions, and he also welcomed visitors to Spain to examine the conditions of the working class. However the absence of trade union rights remained one of the issues which provoked severest criticism from Europe.37 The adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy was the other reason for Spain’s sudden haste. The CAP aimed at establishing free movement of agricultural products, Community preference, and financial solidarity in the sense that all member states should share the CAP costs. The Community preference was particularly worrying, as member states were expected to give preference to agricultural goods from within the EEC area. This policy was a direct threat to the Spanish economy since the Six were the main destination of her agricultural products and agriculture still accounted for 30 per cent of Spain’s gross national product. As stated by the Count of Casa Miranda, Spain would not be allowed to sell her agricultural products until those of the Six had been sold.38 By this stage the democratic opposition was growing alarmed at the increasing European recognition that the Franco regime was obtaining with its economic policy. This concern led several opposition groups to coordinate their activities, in the hope that a single group would succeed in persuading Europe of the need to isolate the Spanish dicta-


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torship. On 24 June the democratic coalition Unión de Fuerzas Democráticas was founded by the opposition groups: the Socialist PSOE, the trade union UGT, the Christian Democrat Izquierda Demócrata Cristiana, and the Basque nationalist party PNV. Its programme, which aimed above all at the replacement of the Franco regime by a democracy, also underlined the importance of establishing links with the EEC.39 An international congress about Spain and Europe would be an ideal opportunity for demanding the democratization of the system. The Association for Cooperation with Europe, AECE, in cooperation with the International Secretariat of the European Movement attempted to organize a congress of these characteristics in Majorca, in September 1961. The Francoist authorities, always eager to suppress any public criticism of the system, suspended the event when the organizers explained their aims to the press. Amongst the foreign representatives invited were figures such as the Vice-President of the Bundestag, the President of the Social-Christian Party in Belgium, and three ex-Presidents of the Council of Ministers in France. The negative international repercussions of this event for the regime were considerable.40 The Unión Española was particularly active in 1961, propagating its monarchical Europeanism. In September 1961 when the wedding of Prince Juan Carlos and Princess Sofia of Greece was announced, it compared the two countries, pointing out that Greece had succeeded in linking up with the Common Market due to its democratic institutions, whereas Spain would never be able to join. In November the members of Unión Española organized a series of Europeanist gatherings. Joaquín Satrústegui intervened in the closing session, with a speech in which he underlined that political factors played a crucial role in the process of European integration, which constituted an insurmountable obstacle for Spain. We want a state which shall lead us into Europe, which may enable Spaniards to familiarize themselves with those political liberties which constitute the heritage of Western Civilization . . . If our system cannot be integrated into Europe it is for political reasons. If Spain is condemned to isolation, it is logical that we advocate that the monarchy must be resolutely Europeanist in the political order, as well as in the economic sphere, a basic requirement for the well being of a Western country.41 The government reacted vehemently to this speech, which consti-

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tuted one of the most explicit manifestations of Spanish Europeanism at that time, and imposed on Satrústegui a stiff fine. Ironically Satrústegui was notified of this on 10 February 1962, the day after Spain submitted its application to the European Community. In the academic and professional sphere this was also a period of resolutions in relation to the European Community. Several experts had been carrying out a project on Spain and the process of European integration under the direction of José Larraz. The final volume appeared at the end of 1961, and conclusions ranged from the enthusiastic Europeanists to those who were resolutely opposed. The General Secretary of the National Economic Council, Paris Eguilaz was a good example of a sceptic. Paris argued that autarchy had been positive because it had encouraged the development of national resources, and that Spain should not participate in European integration because this would inexorably provoke a loss of sovereignty. He also believed that the European powers had been constantly challenging Spain for centuries, and for this reason Europe could never be a solution to Spain. On the other hand, the Spanish experience in Latin America had been very positive and it was advisable to strengthen these links and encourage a process of unification with Latin America. Professor Sampedro put forward the Europeanist version, pointing out that the Spanish economy should head towards a free-market economy. The utopia of economic union with Latin America should be forgotten. The only possible alternatives were either the Seven or the Six, and observing the structure of each organization, the most advisable strategy would be to enter the EFTA and then the EEC. As regards the nature of the Spanish nation he could not understand Spain without Europe in the same way that he could not conceive of Europe without Spain. Larraz made general conclusions. Spain should aim at full integration in the long run. In the meantime, the formation of a joint Spain–EEC commission was advisable to study the impact of the Common Market. Then the possibility of negotiating an association agreement under article 238 should be considered. Thus, the conclusion coincided with that of most Spanish diplomats: Spain should gradually move towards the EEC. The number of those who acknowledged the importance of European integration proves the interest with which Spanish élites and not just the government followed this issue. On the other hand, at this early stage, these élites, like the government, did not pay sufficient attention to the political obstacles, believing that this issue


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should be debated at a later stage in the integration process. The Europeanist stance of the Minister Secretary General of the National Movement played an important role in fostering an interest in Europe within Falangist circles. Despite the fact that the economic plans initially affected the working class, Solís supported these measures, believing that the liberalization of the economy and the strengthening of ties with Europe would be very beneficial for Spain. Encouraged by Solís, the National Delegation of the Movement organized several seminars about Europe. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Schuman Plan it published a book to commemorate it, in which it claimed that the Falangists were the most convinced Europeanists in Spain, as they had traditionally expressed not only an economic devotion for Europe but also to the ideals of a united Europe, where the universal Spanish values played a crucial role as José Antonio Primo de Rivera – the founder of the Falange – had pointed out.42 This group never considered the political obstacles to integration into Europe, nor would it have approved of the need to alter organic democracy. However, it already denoted important progress that the group which had made the most hostile comments about postwar Europe was now willing to play a part in it. Solís also made a considerable effort to improve the image of Franco’s Spain in Europe. Unlike his predecessors Solís was not intimidated by the hostility with which Falangists were received in Europe. He travelled to the continent and kept in contact with European politicians, trade union leaders and businessmen, and even held an interview with the Social-Democrat mayor of Berlin Willy Brandt in 1961.43 The Caudillo’s public support of Spain’s approach to European integration was essential. Some ministers attempted to persuade Franco of the need to announce that the Cortes would soon discuss the Organic Law of the State since this would be interpreted abroad as a sign of political reform.44 However, this was not achieved. Franco delivered a speech at Burgos on 1 October to celebrate his 25th anniversary as head of state in which he put forward his idea of what Spain’s relations with the European Community ought to be: The importance of the movements of European economic integration are borne in mind. Spain must advance at the same rhythm as Europe, but she must also preserve her political stability and national independence. For this reason any possibility of integration must be analysed, taking into account that the Spanish

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economy must not suffer any damage, and always preserving the political institutions to which Spain owes her living standards and her firm international position.45 In this way the head of state made it clear that, although he agreed with the need to be integrated into the Common Market, he also rejected any conditions that might imperil the independence or prosperity that Spain was beginning to enjoy. For Franco, as he commented privately shortly after the application, Spain’s relations with the European Community were exclusively an economic affair where political factors should be set aside.46 Franco’s comment heralded the emergence of a new sphere of confrontations within the Francoist establishment: the political conditions demanded by Europe. Until then the sceptics and hardliners had advocated economic independence. Now that application to the EEC was increasingly likely they were to focus on the political front, arguing that the Franco regime should never yield to political conditions from Europe. Europeanists were initially willing to comply with the demands of the sceptics, but found it increasingly difficult to do so as it became evident that Francoist immobilism was incompatible with integration into the EEC. On 12 December 1961 a new report was presented at the Foreign Ministry with concluding remarks about the EEC.47 This report focused attention on the political aspects which Spanish policy makers had underestimated until then, pointing out that the movement of European integration was essentially a political phenomenon. It concluded that the association status suited Spain as it would avoid the EEC’s political dimension. Association, according to the definition given by Professor Hallstein on 19 September 1961, ‘constitutes an instrument of great value in order to achieve European unification’. Professor Hallstein added that: a state may not be able to fulfil the requirements of full membership for many legitimate reasons. In such case it can aim at the association status which is much more than a simple commercial agreement.48 The report also pointed out that in the near future the scenario in Western Europe could consist of a nucleus of full members of the European Community, and an external circle of countries which could only aim at association status. Spain should join the second sphere. The arguments in favour of association had not yet convinced the government. In fact the Minister of Commerce, Ullastres, was still


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expressing misgivings. At a conference in Barcelona on 12 December 1961, Ullastres emphasized the importance of Spain’s exports to the Common Market, but did not give further details.49 Shortly after, Ambassador Casa Miranda reported conversations he had held in Community circles where an association agreement was not recommended, but rather, the strengthening of economic links.50 These comments indicate that there was still no consensus on the path that should be followed. Another aspect to consider was how the European Community would react to a Spanish application. The Community would respond to the recent applications by strengthening the political conditions for entry, particularly of those European nations which aimed at association status. The Political Commission of the European Assembly had elaborated a report about issues that ought to be considered in such negotiations. The Birkelbach report named after the German Social Democrat Willy Birkelbach, who was spokesman of the Commission, was passed on 21 December and published on 15 January 1962. Although no substantial change was introduced in the differences between membership and association status, it was established that European nations which aimed at association status should have a democratic system of government.51 The Birkelbach report was certainly one more obstacle for the Spanish application but it did not alter the strategy of Spanish policy makers. A report after this event insisted on the need to apply for association.52 They were not at all concerned by the Birkelbach report, and even argued that the circumstances in Europe were very favourable for an application. There were potentially favourable conservative governments in office in France, Germany and Britain, and there was also the support of the United States. This is one of the very few references made to the support of the United States in the official documents of the period. It is surprising that Spain did not attempt to exploit relations with the US government for this purpose, one explanation for this being that with the arrival of the Democrat John F. Kennedy to the presidency, relations between the two countries deteriorated somewhat. In the wake of this report the Foreign Ministry began to analyse the political obstacles in depth reaching the conclusion that these were not as serious as they seemed. According to a new report, strictly speaking there were no political or judicial obstacles in the Spanish legal framework to the possibility of electing representatives for the European Parliament. The ideological limits established by the fundamental principles of the Movement were designed for Spanish political

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life and should be no impediment to an eventual election of Spanish representatives to the European Parliament by universal suffrage.53 This report reveals a new approach towards Spain’s relations with the European Community. Until now the strategy had been to recognize the political incompatibility of the Franco regime with the European Community and to seek an agreement with no political conditions. Now diplomats started to consider the possibility of making the Franco regime compatible or at least more acceptable to the European democracies by electing Spanish candidates by universal suffrage. It was obvious that the nature of the Franco regime would be an eternal problem for Spain’s relations with the Common Market and that a solution would be needed. The suggestion of open democratization or the introduction of symbols of democracy like political parties or press freedom would have been inconceivable at that time. This report was more subtle, proposing the need to play by the rules of democratic Europe but retaining the characteristics of the Franco regime. These ideas were never discussed beyond this point and it would have been pointless since democratic Europe would not have been deceived by anything that fell short of real democracy in Spain. The importance of this document is that the political conditions of the Community were making the Spanish administration reflect for the first time on the problems that the Franco dictatorship were creating for relations with Western Europe. The Spanish Delegate Commission for Economic Affairs met on 19 January, and took the decision to apply for association with the European Community. The Ambassador to the OECD, Nuñez Iglesias, communicated this decision to General Franco and obtained his approval.54 The government still waited for almost a month before sending the application. The most likely explanation for this delay is that the government felt the need to synchronize this with the Commissariat for the Development Plan which was launched on 26 January 1962.55 It was expected that this plan would be regarded by Europeans as definite proof of the Franco regime’s determination to be fully integrated into the West European economy.

2. 3. The application to the European Community and the Spanish reaction On 9 February 1962 the Spanish Ambassador to the European Community, the Count of Casa Miranda submitted a letter from the


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Spanish Foreign Minister to the Secretary of the EC Council of Ministers, Christian Calmes, requesting Spanish association with the EEC. On the same day the Ambassador in Paris, Areilza, handed in a copy in turn to the French Minister and Chairman of the EEC, Maurice Couve de Murville, who commented: ‘it’s a long way but it’s the best way for Spain’.56 No sentence could have summarized more accurately what Spain’s long and tortuous relations with the Community would be. The letter said the following: Mr President: I have the honour of requesting on behalf of my government the opening of negotiations with the aim of examining the possible affiliation of my country to the European Economic Community in the most convenient way for our reciprocal interests. Spain’s European vocation, repeatedly confirmed throughout her history, once again has the opportunity of being manifested at this moment in which the march towards integration is making the ideology of European solidarity come true. The territorial continuity of my country with the Community and the contribution that its geographic position can represent to European cohesion, induces my government to request an association susceptible of becoming full integration after going through the indispensable stages so that the Spanish economy may match the conditions of the Common Market. My government, concerned with the task of speeding up the economic development of my country, is confident that its own demands will be duly appreciated by the Community, so that its link with Spain, far from constituting an obstacle, may be a stimulus for the achievement of that aim. The success of the Spanish Stabilizaton Plan achieved with the cooperation of the OECD and other international identities constitute an encouraging experience. Together with this, and given that the agricultural exports to the countries of the Community are a fundamental aspect of Spanish external commerce, their maintenance and increase is of maximum importance in order to count on the means of payment without which such development would be difficult, my government does not doubt that this aspect will be duly considered, hoping that reciprocal satisfactory solutions will be found. I believe it is of interest to state that my government is convinced that Spain’s links with the American countries will not suffer any reduction due to its integration into the European Community, on

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the contrary they can provide a positive contribution in order to solve the problems of compatibility faced between the former and the latter. Consequently, I hope Mr President that the authorities of the Community, will give a warm welcome to the request of negotiations that I formulate, begging you in the meantime to accept the assurance of my highest consideration. Fernando María Castiella57 Foreign Minister Castiella explained the structure of the letter to Ambassador Areilza in the following way: The flexibility of the text of our application allows sufficient margin, given the evolution that the world and our own country is suffering, to overcome any obstacle of a political kind without this implying any mental reserve about the future political development of the European Community.58 Castiella seemed to imply that the formula would allow the establishment of a link between Spain and the European Community regardless of the changes in Spain and Europe. The formula served to placate all sectors of the Francoist establishment including those who feared that drawing closer to the EEC would lead to reforms in the regime. Any future changes in the political system would not necessarily invalidate this formula. On the same day, 9 February 1962, the office of Diplomatic Information reported the event to the press. However it does not seem to have had many repercussions in the political sphere. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers that took place that same day, some remarks were made by General Franco about the international situation, but surprisingly the European Community did not receive any special attention.59 The Spanish press was controlled with strict censorship by the Ministry of Information. The press in Spain was more a spokesman for the government than an independent critic. However, a certain margin of independence was allowed for the different political families of the regime to express their views. The Spanish press spread the news of the application with information about the European Community and the consequences of the Spanish application, generally regarding it as a positive event. On 10 February the Falangist daily Arriba commented that the application to


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the EEC had been the culmination of a process of study in which the opinion of different sectors of national life had been consulted. ABC pointed out that it was a logical decision since the Spanish economy could not afford to be isolated. La Vanguardia Española pointed out vindictively that Europe would now understand that they were right when they demanded patience in relation to their decisions, and that Spain would culminate this stage initiated by the Foreign Minister.60 Economic publications like the periodical Balance, adopted a slightly more critical tone about the Spanish decision in an article on 15 February: Had there not been an agreement in Brussels recently in order to launch the Common Agricultural Policy of the Common Market, perhaps the Spanish application for opening negotiations to join this Community would not have been so urgent.61 As regards the reaction of the business sector the daily Ya published a survey revealing the opinion of the most important businessmen in the country.62 The entrepreneur Ramón Areces pointed out that the Spanish application to the EEC was very convenient. The banker Emilio Botín was also in favour adding that there was no need to worry about the theoretical reduction of national sovereignty that participation in the Common Market implied, since no member states had experienced this problem. A representative of the orange industry Victor Andea, pointed out that 73.5 per cent of Spanish oranges were exported to the Common Market, thus the country could not afford to be absent from this area. There were also sceptical opinions like that of the businessman Juan Abelló who explained that the Spanish economy could afford to be out of the Common Market and that it was only worth joining it under similar conditions to those obtained by Greece. The views of intellectuals, executives or politicians who did not agree with the official attitude to the European Community were not mentioned in the press. Nor were there references to the political obstacles that the Spanish application would face or explanations of how the Franco dictatorship would make its system compatible with the democratic member states of the Community. The members of the domestic and exiled democratic opposition were to take advantage of this occasion in order to advocate the democratization of the system. The Europeanist organization AECE adopted a resolution in relation to the Spanish petition, which its

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president José María Gil Robles sent to the President of the European Movement Maurice Faure, as well as to the Spanish Foreign Minister. It said the following. The Asociación Española de Cooperación Europea makes its most fervent prayers so that the decision adopted by the Spanish government shall be the first of a series of measures, which placing Spain in the ideological line of the Western world shall establish the necessary changes, following the principles on which Europe is based.63 The opposition group Unión de Fuerzas Democráticas issued a communiqué in which it manifested itself against the Spanish petition to the EEC on the grounds that it would only contribute to the consolidation of the dictatorship, and that if it were successful it would contradict the democratic principles on which Europe was based.64 The exiled opposition, as it had been doing systematically since 1939, expressed its open hostility to the Franco regime. El Socialista, the most important representative of the left-wing press launched a campaign against Francoist diplomacy appealing to the Socialists in the European institutions to reject the regime’s petition: the Franco regime should never be accepted into the EEC or any other organization in the democratic world, we expect that the European Socialists will veto this application.65 The Communist daily Mundo Obrero criticized the capitalist system in Western Europe which had enabled the survival of the Franco regime and was now sustaining it, and España Libre, the daily of the trade union CNT, focused its attack on European connivance with Francoist repression.66 Also all these groups put pressure on left-wing representatives of the working class at the European institutions and international organizations, who were in a stronger position to boycott the Francoist aims. The main concern of Spanish diplomacy was to avoid a negative reaction in the EEC institutions. At the EC Council of Ministers decisions were taken unanimously but in those early days of the European Community member states tried to avoid obstructions as much as possible. This implied that some member states would abstain over a certain issue in exchange for the abstention of the other member states on another issue. In accordance with this method, the Spanish diplomats should not only ensure that they would get the majority of


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votes but also convince each representative so that he/she would be more interested in defending the Spanish petition than another interest at stake during the same debate.67 France and Germany were still the only two member states which had guaranteed Spain their support. They were certainly the most influential members of the EEC but they would still need to convince the other four members. In Italy the Socialists in the coalition government would not only reject Spain’s application for ideological reasons, but also because of the potential clash with Italian agricultural interests. The three Benelux countries were not only under Socialist majorities but also the public opinion of these countries was unremittingly hostile to the Franco regime. If the Spanish application would face difficulties in the Council of Ministers, in the European Parliament obstacles were practically insurmountable. Here the debate of the Spanish petition would be mixed with the political philosophy of the Community, focusing the debate on whether the EEC should maintain relations with non-democratic nations. In this aspect those groups which defended the supranational concept of Europe would automatically reject the Spanish petition, whereas those which defended the concept of a ‘Europe of nations’, that is to say the conservative and liberal groups, would be more sympathetic to Spain. However, even within the latter groups many would reject the Spanish petition due to lack of sympathy for the Franco regime. In these circumstances the aim was to prevent the discussion over the acceptance of starting negotiations with Spain becoming entangled with the philosophy which should orientate the admission of new members. It was necessary to focus the deliberation of the Council of Ministers on the acceptance of starting negotiations and not on the convenience of accepting or rejecting Spain’s association straightaway. In this situation the Spanish foreign service concentrated on winning supporters for the Spanish cause on the following fronts: the foreign ministers of the member states represented at the EC Council and the members of the European Parliament who were likely to sympathize with the Spanish application. It was expected that the Socialists would launch a campaign against the Franco regime. The Diplomatic Information Office in Madrid prepared a report with the ideas that should be put forward to defend the Spanish case. Copies of the report were provided to European journalists who maintained good relations with Francoist Spain. It stated that the Madrid government requested association and full integra-

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tion in the long term in full knowledge of all conditions, even in the political aspect, and would be willing to loyally accomplish the Treaty of Rome. The problem of how to apply this principle to the international policy was its own private business. The report also emphasized the fact that it should be the interests of the member states and not those of political parties which should guide the decisions of the European Community.68

2. 4. The reaction in Europe The Western press received news of the Spanish application to the European Community with surprise, but it commented on the news with interest. The application was considered consistent with the liberalization of the economy that Spain had recently adopted. Reactions ranged from opposition to indifference or support depending on the ideology of the newspaper and the national interests in each country. Unlike the Spanish press, the international one presented objective views of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting Spain, and how this would affect the country’s progress. The reaction of the press in Belgium is perhaps the best example of how political views influenced the attitude towards Spain. Le Metropole, welcomed the Spanish application adding that those who wanted to turn it down for political reasons were supported by Moscow. The liberal Flemish daily Het Aatste Nieuws, presented a balance of the pros and cons of the European acceptance of Spain. On the other hand the Socialist daily Le Peuple, received the Spanish application with hostility, pointing out that membership could not be considered, since the Treaty of Rome demanded trade union freedom which Spain did not have, and from a political point of view Spanish association was unacceptable.69 The Dutch press was unanimously hostile to the Spanish petition. For example the liberal Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant demanded a total rejection of Spain as long as freedom and democracy were not established.70 The Italian press indicated two obstacles: the reaction of the Belgian government controlled by Socialists and the Italian fears of Spain’s agricultural competition. Corriere della sera emphasized the fact that the Spanish economy was predominantly agricultural and that her entry could affect Italian products. It also mentioned Belgian opposition and the fact that the Belgian Nazi leader Leon Degrelle lived in Spain under political asylum. Il Globo pointed out that in the Greek case association was possible due to Italian benevolence, but in the


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Spanish case this was going to be more difficult since the agricultural production in this country was greater than in Greece.71 The German press was generally favourable towards the Spanish application. On 10 February Die Welt stated that association would benefit Spain’s economy and also encourage reforms in the domestic policy. On 12 February Suddeutsche Zeitung commented that the application was the most important event of Spain’s foreign policy since the pact with the USA, that it proved that European powers were right when they decided to lift the boycott on the Spanish regime.72 In France Le Monde, on 12 February, commented that this application constituted a victory of the European clan led by Ullastres, but this had been possible for economic reasons not political ones. Le Figaro, on 13 February, pointed out that Spain could contribute as the European link with Latin America but that economic negotiations would be difficult. In Britain all dailies made observations about the Spanish commercial exchange with the EEC. The Daily Mirror and Daily Herald mentioned the opposition of the European trade unions. Under the heading of ‘Renovation’ The Economist, on 13 February, pointed out that this was the result of the new generation of politicians who had initiated the Stabilization Plan. Only this publication mentioned the result of an opinion poll held in Barcelona in which 80 per cent were in favour of integration. The Spanish application for association created a dilemma for both the European governments and the Community authorities. On the one hand they could not reject the opportunity of supporting the evolution which they had been demanding from the Franco regime. But on the other, they could not neglect the fact that accepting the Spanish proposal would imply that the political dimension was of secondary importance in European Community affairs. This explains the lack of firm reaction either in favour, or against the Spanish application in the European institutions. In Belgium, the official reaction was satisfactory, taking into account the fact that the government was Socialist. Spaak said that ‘the formulation of a petition which does not make reservations like the neutrals coincides with my point of view’.73 In Germany, the news was received with satisfaction. The Economics Minister and future Chancellor Dr Erhard promised the Spanish ambassador to support the application personally.74 In France Couve de Murville simply expressed himself in agreement with the Spanish decision.75 In Holland the government reluctantly declared itself in favour of the

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application while warning that it would create difficulties.76 In Luxembourg, there was no difficulty in accepting the application. The Italian reaction was very restrained. The Foreign Minister pointed out that it was necessary to accept a future political union as a condition for participating in the EEC.77 In London the Spanish application was well received although the government was busy with its own negotiations.78 Finally in Washington, the Spanish decision was regarded as a new move towards Western solidarity that would benefit the whole of Europe.79 Unlike the governments, it was expected that the EEC institutions would pose problems for the Spanish petition. Nevertheless the Commission’s President, Professor Hallstein, congratulated the Spanish government on their decision.80 On the other hand a conversation with the Secretary of the EC Council of Ministers, Christian Calmes, presaged complications. He asked the Spanish Ambassador to the EEC whether Spain was willing to accept all Community conditions including the political ones, to which Casa Miranda replied that they aimed at full integration without any reserve.81 This reply is very characteristic of Spanish diplomacy at that time, alleging that Spain was willing to comply with all the conditions of the Treaty of Rome but avoiding an explanation of how the political condition of democracy would be satisfied. Left-wing organizations promptly launched a campaign against the Franco regime. On 12 February 1962, the General Secretary of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions sent a letter to the President of the Council of Ministers, informing him that his organization did not approve of the Spanish application and it announced the beginning of a ceaseless struggle against ‘Fascist Spain’ in conjunction with the Socialist representatives at the European Parliament.82 On 19 February, at the European Parliamentary Assembly, the Socialist group presented a motion against the Spanish application. It argued that economic association did not make sense if it was not reinforced by a political will to adopt the principles of democracy, and that the application came from a dictatorship, concluding that neither the political philosophy nor the economic practices of Spain were compatible with the EEC. Therefore the Socialists requested the Council of Ministers not to take the Spanish application into consideration by not even replying to the letter.83 The Socialists did not have a sufficient majority at the European Assembly; they only had 33 out of a total of 142 seats. Also it should be borne in mind that in that first stage in the existence of the


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European Assembly, in the debates over major issues, national interests were put above party interests. Nevertheless the rest of the political forces also had their misgivings about the consequences that the inclusion of a country like Spain could have. For this reason, the Socialist request that the issue should be discussed at the next session in March 1962 was approved; this also meant that their proposal would be considered by the EC Council of Ministers and by the Commission. The campaign against Spain was soon to dampen the initial support which some member states, particularly Germany and France had expressed. The Spanish Finance Minister, Navarro Rubio, travelled to Bonn for an interview with the Economics Minister Erhard. During the conversations Erhard was ambivalent about the support that his country had previously guaranteed, insisting on the need that Spain, ‘moving from her immobilism, should evolve politically and recognize trade union freedom’.84 These series of setbacks disappointed the government. On 22 February Admiral Carrero Blanco commented to Minister López Rodó, that the Common Market was ‘a fief of Freemasons, liberals and Christian Democrats’, that Franco feared that the Spanish petition would be rejected and in this situation they would have to increase commercial links with Eastern Europe and develop their economy independently from the Common Market.85 Although this was only a confidential comment it indicates the degree to which even the sceptics recognized the need for links with the EEC, since otherwise the trade alternatives would be as unattractive as those with Eastern Europe, which would be difficult to justify for a stoutly antiCommunist dictatorship. On 6 March 1962 the EC Council of Ministers met in Brussels. The following day Couve de Murville sent a letter to Castiella replying to the petition for association. It was a simple acknowledgement of receipt saying the following. By your letter of 9 February 1962 Your Excellency informed me about the decision of the Spanish government to request the opening of negotiations with the aim of examining the possibility of establishing relations between Spain and the European Community. I have the honour of receiving this communication, which I will immediately transmit to the members of the Council of Ministers, who will examine it with the greatest attention in agreement with the Commission.86

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Spanish expectations for the application had been higher. Yet this reply was far from a defeat, especially if we bear in mind that the Socialists had suggested that the Spanish government did not even deserve a reply. On the same day two telegrams from the ambassadors in Paris and Bonn, both expressed satisfaction. They pointed out that the reply had not been influenced by political pressures but rather by the difficulties caused by Britain, which had made the Community decide that no other application should be accepted for the moment.87 This comment reveals the optimism which still prevailed among Spanish diplomats at this early stage, underestimating the political obstacles to Spain’s entry and putting all the blame on bureaucratic problems. Ambassador Casa Miranda was satisfied with this first approach and expressed himself as follows: This is the end of what we could call the prologue to our rapprochement with the Common Market. With considerable or marginal degree of success we have overcome the first obstacle. Now we need to prepare our pre-negotiation stage to reach it in the best possible conditions.88 Two other events in the European institutions were to justify Spanish optimism. On 18 March a motion was passed by the Assembly of the Council of Europe recommending the European Community to reach an economic agreement with Spain.89 On 29 March the spokesman of the Socialist group in the European Assembly presented a motion against the Spanish application to be answered by the Commission and the Council of Ministers. It asked whether they thought it appropriate to consider the application of a regime whose political ideology was incompatible with the EEC. The Council of Ministers refused to reply and Jean Rey replied on behalf of the Commission pointing out that the Socialist argument would be considered but the Spanish petition had not been dealt with yet.90 In this way the two European parliamentary institutions had sidestepped the Socialist attempts to reject the Spanish petition opting for a more subtle approach towards the Franco regime.

3 From the Congress of Munich to the Preferential Agreement, 1962–70

3. 1. The Congress of Munich and its consequences The European Movement’s Congress held at Munich in June 1962 was one of the most important events in the history of Spanish Europeanism, and the commotion that it caused was to have far-reaching consequences in the Francoist era. The idea of organizing a meeting of the domestic and exiled opposition to the Franco regime under the auspices of an international Europeanist act had appealed to various members of the opposition for a long time. On the occasion of the IV political congress of the European Movement, its president Maurice Faure invited the AECE and the Spanish Council of the European Movement to participate in it in June 1962. On this occasion the members of the opposition would be able to discuss their views, and present a joint proposal indicating the political conditions that Spain should fulfil for her participation in Europe. The members of the AECE discussed their position straightaway. They issued a document advocating the democratization of the Spanish system, concluding that Spain should either evolve politically or be excluded from the process of European integration.1 As regards the government’s reaction to the congress, no one was prevented from attending it, yet the Foreign Ministry asked the consul in Munich to inform them about its organization and attendants.2 Moreover on 7 June 1962, the government sent a prominent Francoist, the Marquis of Valdeiglesias, to persuade the organizers not to accept the presentation of the Spanish motion which obviously failed.3 There were 118 Spanish participants in the Munich congress: 80 from the domestic opposition and 38 from the exiled opposition. The 65

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initial intention was that all Spaniards of diverse political sectors should be represented, ‘with the exception of the totalitarians of both sides’, as Salvador de Madariaga called them, referring to the Francoists and Communists. The participants from Spain were mainly from the Europeanist organizations like the AECE and the Liga Europea de Cooperación Económica, though there were also members of the Catholic and monarchist groups like the Unión Monárquica or Gil Robles’s Democracia Cristiana, and the ex-Falangist Dionisio Ridruejo’s Partido Social de Acción Democrática. From the exiled opposition there were mainly Socialists, Basque and Catalan nationalists and republicans. Only the Communists were excluded. The reason for this, according to the General Secretary, Robert Van Schendel, was that the Communists did not share the Europeanist ideology, since in accordance with the Soviet doctrine they were not in favour of European integration. However the Communist party could not miss this historic meeting of the antiFrancoist opposition and sent two observers.4 After a discussion on Spain’s future the domestic and exiled representatives agreed on the following text: The Congress of the European Movement, assembled in Munich on 7 and 8 June 1962, considers that the integration of every country in Europe requires democratic institutions, which in the case of Spain and in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social Charter implies: 1. The establishment of genuinely representative and democratic institutions that may guarantee that the government is based on the consent of its citizens. 2. The effective guarantee of all the rights of the human person, particularly those of individual freedom and the suppression of government censorship. 3. The recognition of the personality of several national communities. 4. The free exercise of trade union liberties on a democratic basis and the right of the workers to defend their rights by means of strikes. 5. The possibility of organising different opinions and political parties, as well as respect for the right of opposition. The Congress expresses its profound hope that the steady evolution towards the points mentioned above may allow the Spanish incorporation into Europe, of which she is an essential element.5

From Congress of Munich to Preferential Agreement

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This gathering also contributed to an improvement in relations between the domestic and exiled opposition, which had held irreconcilable views until then, since they had fought on opposite sides of the trenches during the Spanish Civil War. Monarchists and republicans discussed the future of the country. Joaquín Satrústegui, on behalf of the monarchists, defended the idea of a constitutional monarchy as the best formula for overcoming the divisions of the civil war. Rodolfo Llopis on behalf of the Socialists told him that they were convinced republicans, but if the monarchy managed to re-establish democracy they would support it. The Socialists’ tacit acceptance of the monarchy was later to contribute to the re-establishment of a constitutional monarchy. In the closing session of the congress Salvador de Madariaga and Jose María Gil Robles spoke on behalf of the groups they represented. Madariaga emphasized the historical importance of the event and then focused his speech on the anti-totalitarian content that the construction of Europe ought to have, insisting that a regime which did not offer democratic guarantees should never be allowed into the EEC. The civil war which started in Spain on 18 July 1936, and that the Franco regime has maintained artificially, finished in Munich yesterday 6 June 1962. . . . Nothing that concerns the constitutional life of one of its provinces can be a matter of indifference to Europe.6 Gil Robles concluded with an explanation of the reasons why he had attended the congress: not to ask the European Movement to solve the problems that only Spain could solve but to inform them of the opinion that the ‘real Spain’ had about integration into Europe, as opposed to that of official Spain: As Europeans, we the Spaniards advocate full political integration into Europe, based upon the constitution of a supranational authority over authentically democratic foundations. We are ready to work for this aim that must not be imposed by external pressures and that responds to the Spanish and European interest.7 This statement accurately reveals the Europeanist thought of this dissident leader. He supported ‘full political’ integration into Europe, implying the fulfilment of the Community’s political requirements: democracy. His concept of Europe was substantially different from that of official Spain. It was not the ‘Europe of nations’ which the

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Franco regime defended in order to avoid political clashes, but a supranational model with democratic foundations. On the other hand, his warning that this aim should not be imposed by external pressures revealed his attitude as a conservative representative of the domestic opposition. He believed that the political change should be worked out by those in the interior who were aware of Spanish realities and not by those in exile. The Franco regime regarded the Congress of Munich as an act of rebellion and adopted severe measures to punish the participants of what became known as the Munich conspiracy (contubernio). The Council of Ministers which met on 8 June, decreed the suspension of article 14 of the ‘Fuero de los Españoles’, which guaranteed the rights of the citizen against arrest. The government could then control the residence of people whose activity was considered dangerous. When the representatives of the domestic opposition at Munich arrived in Spain they were arrested and given the choice of exile or confinement in the Canary islands. Jose María Gil Robles opted to go to Paris, Joaquín Satrústegui, Jaime Miralles, and Fernando Alvarez de Miranda preferred to stay on Spanish territory. Propaganda against the Munich plot was intense. Franco himself referred to the Munich event several times in a speech in Valencia on 16 June warning that the system would defend itself from attacks organized by communism and its allies.8 The international press condemned the measures of the Spanish government. Ambassador Areilza reported from Paris on the reaction of the French press which had been very hostile. Maurice Faure, informed Areilza that he did not know that Gil Robles and Madariaga were going to criticize the regime, however, he did not understand why they were being punished for expressing themselves in democratic terms. Areilza concluded suggesting that some reforms should be introduced, since the European policy of the Franco regime was being undermined.9 Yet, at this stage the ambassador’s suggestions of reforms did not go beyond the adoption of a more liberal image. In Brussels Ambassador Casa Miranda’s report focused on the response of some members of the European Movement like Pierre de Wigny and Baron Northomb who could not understand the reason for repression. The ambassador did not think it wise to take action against people like Gil Robles, who was generally favourable to the regime, and unless there was a change in the government’s attitude, future negotiations with the Common Market would be severely impaired.10 Many European countries criticized Spain. In Italy all parties unanimously condemned the Franco regime, and the Christian Democrats


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argued in the daily Il Popolo that Christian Democracy was the only way out of the Spanish crisis.11 In Germany, the Social Democrats requested the government to adopt a more distant attitude towards the Franco regime and demanded that the European Community should not consider relations with it. The Christian Democrat coalition CDU had similar feelings.12 The Dutch parliament passed a resolution against Spanish entry into the Community. The reaction of the European institutions was equally hostile. A spokesman of the EC Commission expressed his discomfort with the measures of the Spanish government against the Munich participants, adding that this attitude would not be compatible with the association status that Spain was aiming at.13 On 26 June 1962 at the European Parliament, the Socialist Delhousse intervened with an attack on Spain stating that he considered the candidature of Spain under the Franco regime as totally unacceptable.14 The members of the European Movement went beyond mere declarations against the Franco regime and Maurice Faure requested an interview with Franco. Franco granted an interview for 5 July 1962. A delegation was sent, formed by Pierre de Wigny, Vice-President of the European Movement, two other members, Etienne Hirsh and John Hynd and the Secretary-General Robert Van Schendel. The latter was not allowed to attend the interview because of his cooperation in a meeting with the exiled opposition. At this interview Franco reminded them that the government had applied for entry into the EEC, aware of what association implied.15 He added that no obstacle was being established to Europeanist activities and what was being published was a manoeuvre against the government. This was an internal problem that only the Spaniards could solve. The delegation of the European Movement was not particularly convinced by Franco’s words. Nevertheless, the fact that he had agreed to give an explanation was interpreted by some newspapers like Frankfurter Zeitung and the New York Times as a sign of repentance and concern with the international repercussions of the Spanish measures.16 Despite this apparent recovery of prestige abroad, the Munich event had dramatically increased the unpopularity of the Franco regime in Europe. The foreign minister, Castiella, aware of the adverse consequences that the Congress of Munich was having on Spanish European policy, tried to minimize its importance and attributed the campaign against Spain to the struggle between the two concepts of Europe. As he commented in a letter to Ambassador Casa Miranda:

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We have broken into the battle between federalists and supporters of a Europe of nations, at a moment when it was reaching the highest point. Many of the disputes between the two sides have been suddenly directed against us. In these circumstances we estimate that for the first time in Europe our friends are also our allies.17 For the democratic opposition, the conclusions drawn in the wake of Munich were very different, and were accurately summarized in a letter that Gil Robles sent to Dionisio Ridruejo in September 1962: The fact is that the Spanish government, for whatever motives, does not want to evolve at all. It knows that it cannot participate in mainstream Europe, as before it could not obtain Marshall Aid for the same motives. But it is easier to put the blame for what is happening on the participants in the Congress of Munich.18 In this early stage of relations between Spain and the European Community the Franco regime refused to accept that the nature of its political system was an obstacle for negotiations. Over the next years Spanish diplomacy was going to work out an appropriate strategy for the country’s interests, and any lack of progress in negotiations was attributed to either internal struggles in the Community or political problems created by the Socialists. It would take some time for the most sensitive sectors of the Francoist establishment to realize that only political evolution would definitely improve relations with Europe. Despite repression, the Congress of Munich came to symbolize the incompatibility of the Franco regime with the cause of Europe.

3. 2. The initiation of negotiations with the European Community All reports indicated that Francoist repression was invalidating the considerable improvement of relations with Europe which had been recently achieved. The best way out of this deterioration of Spain’s image seemed to be a cabinet reshuffle that would give the impression of political evolution. On 10 July 1962 a new government was formed. As on previous occasions it maintained a balance between the different political families of the Franco regime though it revealed a willingness to introduce changes. The most important innovation was the appointment of a Deputy Head of Government. Unfortunately this post fell on General


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Muñoz Grandes who was a notorious right-winger. Yet there were promising new ministers: Gregorio López Bravo, a young naval engineer and member of the Opus Dei, was appointed Minister for Industry. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, a professor of law became Minister of Information and Tourism. The incorporation of these two young men into the cabinet constituted a major improvement in the external image of the Franco regime. Fraga, who defined himself as a liberal on the same day that he was sworn in as a minister,19 was to play a major role in the evolution or ‘Europeanization’ of the Spanish political system. He made an essential, two-fold contribution to the liberalization of the regime. It was during his mandate as minister that tourism became a major industry attracting millions of European visitors, and he was also responsible for the Press Law of 1966, which responded to pressures for freedom of speech, by introducing considerable relaxation of censorship, enabling the publication of anti-Francoist literature which until then had been strictly forbidden.20 One of the most urgent tasks of the new government was to relaunch its European policy. The European Community had not yet replied to the Spanish application letter, therefore the aim was to pester the European institutions until they agreed to initiate negotiations. It was not a propitious moment, since the popularity of the Franco regime was at its lowest ebb after the Munich event. However, Spain’s lack of foreign prestige was not going to be the main obstacle, but rather domestic Community problems, since at that time the EEC was dealing with two major difficulties: the accession of Britain and the confrontation between federalist and nationalist concepts of Europe. A meeting of the EC Council of Ministers took place on 27 July in which the situation of the Community’s relations with peripheric countries was discussed, but it postponed a decision on the requirements for association. This meeting left it clear that no application would be dealt with until the negotiations with Britain had been completed. This news from Brussels caused Spanish diplomats to reconsider the strategy to follow. Until then the main concern had been how to overcome objections to Spain’s integration into Europe. Now it was necessary to follow internal developments in the Community and analyse how Spain could be affected by them. The Ambassador in Paris, Areilza, reflected on this issue in a report sent on 7 August 1962.21 In his view there were two different concepts of European integration: that of economic union and that of political union. The members who supported the former concept were the

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organizers of the OECD, and those of the latter predominated at the Council of Europe. For the moment those in favour of the economic concept of Europe had been more successful, since the ECSC, Euratom and the EEC had all been conceived in OECD circles. On the whole Areilza thought that the idea of encouraging economic cooperation but retaining national independence, the Europe of nations, was supported by the majority of governments. In this scenario Areilza recommended the following strategy: first to carry out political reform to enable the system to reach European standards; secondly, to increase dialogue with the European governments; and thirdly, they should not declare themselves in favour of a concrete model of European union, although he thought it important to defend diversity within unity as a condition for maintaining the European cultural heritage. Finally, declarations about Spain’s European vocation ought to be combined with a demonstration of respect for human rights. Without daring to use the word democracy, Areilza was suggesting political reforms that would firstly, improve the external image of the Franco regime and secondly, develop a more open political system which would help initiate a process of political evolution into democracy. Areilza’s ideas may have appealed to some members of the government but not enough for them to seriously consider how the obstacles before them might be overcome. The Foreign Minister Castiella listened to various suggestions made by his ambassador and friend,22 but to put them forward to the Council of Ministers would have required a lot of courage. Castiella had felt disappointed by the regime’s brutal reaction to the Congress of Munich and even considered resignation.23 However, he decided to remain in government and lead the reformist faction, advocating the reform of the system which in his view would enable a more successful foreign policy, particularly in the European field.24 Spanish prospects of success were not as slim as the Ambassador in Paris suggested. After summer Franco-German cooperation was strengthened with De Gaulle’s visit to Bonn. The strengthening influence of these two nations on Europe was to benefit the Spanish cause. The Ambassador in Bonn, the Marquis of Bolarque, related the conversation he had held with the German President, Heinrich Lübke, which indicated the extent to which the European attitude towards Spain was improving: After listening to me he said: ‘I understand that the stages should not be speeded up, and that the head of state should not be


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influenced by absurd petitions for freedom that will neither benefit your country nor the rest.’25 This comment of the German President reflects the attitude of the European conservatives towards the Franco regime. Cordial relations with Spain should be maintained at all costs whilst gradually trying to encourage political evolution. Abrupt breaks in relations or relegations to ostracism could be counter-productive, leading to the strengthening of the dictatorship. The Franco regime was very pleased with this patient and understanding approach from some of its continental neighbours which helped open up the prospect of a successful European policy. Towards the end of the year, Ambassador Casa Miranda summarized Spain’s diplomatic actions in accordance with the reports of other embassies. In this situation Spanish policy makers designed the following strategy: to synchronize Spain’s movements with British negotiations; insist that Spain would not be satisfied with a simple economic agreement, and that she wanted a formula with a certain level of integration; move the centre of operations from Paris to Bonn, since Quai d’Orsay feared that support for Spain could be interpreted as a manoeuvre against Britain. Finally, insist on demanding the same dialogue as that granted to the neutral countries, in which Spain would have the opportunity of discussing her aims with the EEC.26 Besides these plans, the government was still waiting for the European Community to decide what policy should be adopted towards Spain. On 4 December 1962, at a meeting of the EC Council of Ministers, it was decided to include Spain in the agenda of the next session, on 20 and 21 January 1963.27 The expectations of Spain and all countries intending to negotiate with the EEC were dashed when, in January 1963, de Gaulle announced that France would veto Britain’s entry, alleging that she would not comply with the regulations of the Treaty of Rome and that her special relationship with the United States would imperil the Community’s independence. The interruption of negotiations with Britain paralysed enlargement. Despite internal problems faced by the European Community the Spanish government was determined to continue lobbying until the European institutions agreed to initiate negotiations. Members of the government took advantage of any public events to express Spain’s European vocation. On 23 September 1963 Castiella delivered a speech at the XVIII assembly of the United Nations, in which he was to make it clear that Spain was genuinely interested in participating in the process of European integration:

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The European attitude of Spain nowadays. . . her desire to enter the European Common Market, are not opportunist positions adopted by a certain political regime, but the natural result of the unanimous expression of the Spanish people. . . The simple perspective of European integration, the announcement of being linked to it, has already had the result of creating within Spanish society a desire to improve its structures.28 In this speech the Spanish Foreign Minister urged the international community to lay prejudices against the Franco regime aside and pay attention to the interests of the Spanish people, who as Europeans, wished to participate in the process of European integration. His statement that the prospective link to the Common Market had provoked a desire to improve the structures of Spanish society seemed to suggest that the country’s modernization depended on her relations with Europe. It was particularly irritating for Spain that two years after the application the European Commission had still not paid attention to it, and this motivated a new letter. On 14 February 1964, Ambassador Casa Miranda wrote to the President of the Council of Ministers reminding him of the Spanish case: My country has successfully carried out the aims of the Stabilization Plan and has a substantially liberalized economic system. In reality this has served as the basis for a Plan for Economic and Social Development with the aim of accelerating the economic growth of the country following certain criteria which it has attempted to make compatible with the basic principles of the Treaty of Rome. He concluded by stressing that the Spanish government continued to have the same interest in the Community as had been indicated on 9 February 1962, and requesting an opportunity to analyse the nature of the relationship that could be established between Spain and the Community.29 This letter clearly indicates that there had been a change of strategy. It no longer mentioned the association status, and it placed more emphasis on the need to initiate conversations. This change was due to two factors: firstly that the Council of Ministers had shown no hurry to initiate conversations and secondly, the fact that diplomatic contacts recommended this change of strategy as it was pointless to insist on association. The Spanish government did not allow the press


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to report on this letter, since it could be interpreted by public opinion as evidence for the fact that the European Community was not interested in developing any sort of link with Franco’s Spain. There was no Community reaction to this letter until the Council of Ministers’ meeting on 25 March. On this occasion Italy opposed discussing the Spanish petition until the principles of association status had been established. However, an important change was that although the Belgian Foreign Minister, Spaak, refused to consider Spanish negotiations for political reasons he was not against initiating conversations for economic relations. Holland and Luxembourg held this same view. Spain’s allies defended her as on other occasions. Germany pointed out that economic liberalization could lead Spain to fulfil all the requirements for association. France defended the notion that association was very ambiguous since it did not imply that full membership would be obtained. The French Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville, proposed a solution: the response to Spain should be ‘neither negative nor positive but somewhat reserved’, showing the fact that there existed differences of opinion with regard to this matter. The French proposal was therefore to reply to the letter without making any reference to the application for association. This idea was supported by Walter Hallstein.30 The Council of Ministers replied pointing out that it was ready to authorize the Commission to initiate conversations with the Spanish government in order to examine the economic problems that the EEC caused in Spain, and to work out an appropriate solution.31 The decision to start exploratory talks was prompted by several reasons: firstly, that relations with Spain could not be postponed indefinitely; secondly, the reactions to the British application had calmed down enough to allow consideration of the Spanish application. Finally, an important economic factor: Spain was a client with 35 million people buying imports to a value of over $800 million from the Six.32 Business and industrial circles demanded a decision that would permit the development of this new market. Another influential factor in the opening of negotiations with Spain may have been the strengthening of ties with France and Germany. On 28 May 1964, the French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville visited Madrid, declaring that Spain was in Western Europe and that her progress was crucial for the whole area.33 A month later the daily Le Monde commented that Spanish support for the concept of a Europe of nations suited French interests, and for this reason General De Gaulle was willing to support the European aims of Franco’s

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diplomacy.34 On 5 June, ministers Carrero Blanco and López Bravo visited Bonn on the invitation of the German government. On this occasion they were received by the Social Democrat mayor of Berlin Willy Brandt, who explained his party’s attitude towards Spain. Membership or association were not possible for political reasons but a commercial agreement was quite acceptable.35 Despite outbursts of indignation which Francoist repression continued to provoke, Spain’s diplomatic relations with Western Europe, particularly with France and Germany made steady progress throughout the 1960s. Francoist diplomacy was even reaching certain sectors of the European Left, as this meeting of the two Spanish ministers with the leading Social Democrat Willy Brandt indicates. Brandt’s comment that his party would accept a commercial agreement with Spain proves the extent to which the Socialist claim to isolate Franco from Europe was losing ground. On 4 July the commissioner Jean Rey held a meeting with the Spanish mission at the Community led by Ambassador Nuñez Iglesias. It was agreed that conversations would start in October. On 9 December 1964 the Spanish mission initiated exploratory conversations with the European Commission. Now that conversations had been initiated, it was necessary to appoint an Ambassador to the European Community. On 21 July 1965 the former Minister of Commerce Alberto Ullastres, was selected for this post. The decision reveals that relations with the European Community would be regarded almost exclusively as an economic issue more suitable for an economic minister than for a diplomat. As Minister of Commerce Ullastres was assigned the role of protagonist in the approach to the EEC and from then on, as Ambassador, he would continue playing the leading role. The Euro-Spanish conversations were drastically interrupted in 1965 by another European crisis: ‘the empty chair’. It started with a dispute over the Community budget – it was proposed that the Common Market should have its own budgetary resources, instead of depending on contributions from governments, and that money raised from taxes should go directly to the EEC and its approval be subject to the European Parliament. This project was supported by the advocates of a federal Europe but it annoyed the supporters of a Europe of nations, particularly President De Gaulle. On 1 July De Gaulle announced the empty chair policy by withdrawing his ministers from the EC Council.36 In those days the commercial deficit with the European Community was getting out of control and Spain’s industrial imports from the EEC


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were increasing, but due to the obstacles of the Common Agricultural Policy her exports were not reaching the Six. Spain desperately needed an agreement in order to establish a trade equilibrium. Otherwise it would be necessary to freeze the policy of trade liberalization initiated with the Stabilization Plan. The increase of EEC sales combined with the protectionist efforts of the CAP, had created a commercial deficit which in 1962 was $200,000 and by 1965 had reached $800,000.37 This break in Community activities was very inconvenient for the Spanish government, but to compensate for it the defence of the Spanish case was thoroughly prepared. The diplomat Jose Luis Cerón studied the formula that would best suit Spain’s interests. The formula of association status in accordance with article 238, was not possible for non-democratic nations as the Birkelbach report clarified. The other alternative was a preferential agreement. In this situation the delegation of experts decided to study the possibilities offered by article 113 of the Treaty of Rome. In accordance with this article nonpreferential commercial agreements had been signed with Iran in 1963 and Israel in 1964. But there was nothing indicated in article 113 against including a preferential agreement.38 The idea of aiming at a preferential agreement was quite understandable from a commercial point of view. The Spanish economy was not prepared for the challenges of the EEC and would only be able to open her market to the Six if they granted a reciprocal agreement that would protect the less competitive sectors and allow a reduction of her commercial deficit. However, this strategy created problems. In the political sphere it would become evident that Spain was aiming at a preferential agreement because she was not eligible for association. Even though the preferential agreement included no political requirements, Community member states could decide to veto negotiations with Spain for technical reasons with the aim of preventing the infiltration of the Franco regime into the EEC. At a commercial level it also raised various difficulties: from the GATT point of view, a preferential agreement would only be acceptable if it led towards a customs union or a free-trade area, but this was not possible. The best solution seemed to be an agreement in various stages, that would respond to Article XXIV of the GATT, but without making it clear whether it would lead to a tariff union or a free-trade area.39 By the time the Spanish delegation came with this solution, the Luxembourg compromise was reached on 29 January 1966 which put an end to the empty chair crisis. The exploratory conversations with Spain were reinitiated and it was now necessary to convince the

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Community of the Spanish aims. In this aspect the Cerón–Ullastres tandem was an ideal combination. Cerón was the technocrat who dealt with the problems posed by the EEC, Ullastres then carried out the diplomatic task of convincing the governments and institutions of the need to support the formula of a preferential agreement. When Castiella was informed by Ullastres about the strategy of the preferential agreement he was not convinced by it. Although the political obstacles of the association status were evident, it would not be easy to explain to fellow cabinet ministers and public opinion at large the reasons for a sudden change. However, at the end the Foreign Minister gave in and wrote to all members of the cabinet explaining the reasons for the adoption of a new formula. He added that the success of the negotiations required the support of all member states which implied the need for an intensive lobby of the Six.40 On 11 July 1967 the EC Council of Ministers granted a mandate for negotiations with Spain. Spain had not been the only victim of the Community’s parsimony. In fact, Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Portugal were still being kept on the waiting list for reinitiating negotiations. The Spanish delegation was led by Ambassador Ullastres whereas the European delegation was led by the General Director of EC Foreign Affairs Axel Herbst. The first three sessions of negotiations were disappointing for Spain. The Community mandate was very limited and offered few concessions for Spanish industrial exports, and virtually ignored agricultural exports. In industry it offered a 60 per cent tariff reduction to be applied over a 4year period, leaving out a series of products for which the reduction would only be 40 per cent. In return the EEC requested a 40 per cent reduction on the tariffs for imports of Community products over a 6-year period and still worse, that import quotas against their products would be abolished. In agriculture, the Community made no significant offer, and Spain was required to make great concessions in this sector.41 The terms of the mandate were certainly unfair for a country with a well-developed agricultural sector and less competitive industry. The Spanish reaction was quite negative, and there were even demands to abandon negotiations. The National Syndical Organization called an emergency meeting concluding that the mandate was unacceptable and urged the government to take a decision in relation to the Common Market.42 However, Spain could not afford to abandon negotiations. Spanish diplomacy had put a lot of effort into this agreement and above all the Franco regime needed a link with Europe. Therefore it was decided to continue negotiating.


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In the meantime the coup of the Colonels in Greece and the Six Day War in Israel provoked a debate on the pros and cons of preferential agreements. The Community came to believe that this was the best formula for countries with unstable political situations since it fostered economic relations without any political implications. On 29 September 1967 the Commission issued a decree by which it recommended the preferential agreement based on article 113 of the Treaty of Rome as the most adequate judicial framework for the development of commercial relations with the Mediterranean. Spanish public opinion was increasingly disappointed with the European Community and the government was eager to transmit optimism for the future negotiations. Franco himself referred to the issue of Spain and Europe in an unusually Europhile speech on 18 November 1967: Geographically and economically we are part of Europe. Like the rest, we are willing to contribute to all serious concepts of European cooperation. Few believe any longer in a uniformist Europe, the nation-state maintains all its importance and only through its contribution will European unity be possible. As members of the OECD and other European organizations we shall continue heading in this direction as it has already been initiated in relation to the European Economic Community.43 Franco’s speech constitutes an accurate revelation of the Francoist concept of Europe two years after the empty chair crisis. Franco argued that Spain was part of Europe geographically and economically, omitting any reference to political or cultural links, and he stressed that Spain was willing to participate in a process of European integration based on the concept of a Europe of nations. As regards Spanish relations with the EEC, he simply underlined that Spain was willing to contribute to European unity through her participation in such organizations, but making it conditional on whether the direction towards unity favoured Spanish interests. The Spanish delegation worked out a new approach to the negotiations which the diplomat José Luis Cerón called a maximalist strategy. It was based on offering a generous reduction in Spanish industrial tariffs in exchange for an equivalent reduction in the Community’s agricultural tariffs, hoping, in this way, to reach a fair agreement for both parties. It also insisted on a further clause, by which Spain could

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demand a revision of the terms of the agreement on passing from the first to the second stage.44 On 15 October the Commission submitted a report about the first mandate of negotiations to the Council. It recognized that because Spain had a weaker economy the Community should grant her concessions. A global preferential agreement should be negotiated with more concessions to Spain’s industrial exports and some to her agricultural ones, as well as a revision clause.45 As negotiations with the EEC progressed, internal events in Spain were to return her to the headlines of European newspapers, and as usual the decisions of the Franco regime provoked hostility in Europe. After a wave of unrest in spring 1968 in imitation of similar disorders in French universities, a state of emergency was declared. The Six protested promptly against the repressive measures and some expressed second thoughts about continuing negotiations with the Franco regime. The Dutch deputy van der Stoel presented a motion against Spain in the Dutch Parliament on 27 February 1969 urging his government to veto negotiations for the preferential agreement. This motion was defeated a month later, but at the cost of the government’s promise to ensure that the preferential agreements granted to Spain would be very restricted.46 Despite the problems in the political sphere Spain maintained her allies among the EEC member states. By spring of 1969 all of them agreed to accept a second mandate for negotiating a 70 per cent tariff reduction vis-à-vis Spain. On 17 October 1969 the EC Council of Ministers adopted a second mandate to negotiate with Spain. The news of the second mandate made a great impact on Spain, allowing the country to recover the enthusiasm for Europe which had vanished as a result of the recent complications over negotiations. The press trumpeted the news as usual.47 Unfortunately there were no comments in relation to the fact that the preferential agreement was the only agreement Spain could aim at with the present regime. This news was to coincide with a cabinet change in the Francoist government on 29 October 1969. On this occasion the changes revealed the increasing power of Admiral Carrero Blanco who had become Deputy Head of Government in 1967. Castiella left his post after 11 years as Foreign Minister and was substituted by Gregorio López Bravo. On the whole the technocrats retained the key ministries, which was to benefit the cause of Europe. This second mandate revealed the EEC’s willingness to make an effort to establish an economic link with Spain. It offered an agreement that


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in two stages should lead ‘to the total suppression of all obstacles for commercial exchange’. It was neither a tariff union as this implied full membership, nor a free-trade area which Spain could not afford, but a provisional agreement according to the GATT regulations. Partial preferential reductions were agreed for the first stage, and further reductions would be negotiated for the second stage.48 In the industrial sector the Community improved its offer by reducing the list of products for which no tariff concessions would be made, whereas the rest of the products would be given a 70 per cent reduction. Spain was still requested to make a 40 per cent reduction in industrial customs duties but in the agricultural sector considerable advantages were obtained for the export of wine and olive oil.49 These conditions were satisfactory, particularly bearing in mind the original ones. The Spanish delegation decided to accept the terms; it was expected that renewed negotiations for British accession would start shortly and these could easily get in the way and delay the conclusion of those with Spain.50 The last meetings of the two delegations were speeded up, concluding in March 1970. The Franco regime magnified the agreement’s diplomatic and political impact. This was not surprising since it was very similar to those concluded by Tunisia and Morocco and one that was about to be signed with Israel, all of them non-European countries. It could be implicitly interpreted as if the EEC did not want to recognize the fact that Spain was part of Europe. The Franco regime reacted by deploying all its propaganda resources in order to elevate the political tone of the agreement. Even before negotiations had been concluded, the press praised Spanish diplomacy for its magnificent achievement. On 13 January 1970 the daily Arriba under the heading of ‘In favour of Europe’ made the following comment: We are installed in our condition as an integral and active part of Europe, following the directives that are prolonged to all fields, from the economic agreement with the Common Market to Spain’s contribution, which her genius and her peculiar individuality can offer in cooperation with other countries.

3. 3. An alternative Europeanism Ever since the Franco regime applied to the European Community, the issue of Spain’s relationship with Europe was constantly discussed. Europeanism became a new fashion, shared by most Spaniards,

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though interpreted in different ways depending on the ideology and interest behind the term. Besides the official interpretation of Spain’s role in Europe, a series of alternative concepts of Europeanism were to develop. In fact Europeanism was increasingly to drive a wedge between the Franco regime and the society over which it ruled, as well as to increase the number of opposition activities. Relations with Europe emerged as the recurrent excuse for criticizing the political system: for the sake of Europe, the business and economic sectors demanded the liberalization of the regime, while the domestic opposition increased its activities, demanding democratization, and the exiled opposition campaigned for the isolation of the Franco regime. Even certain sectors of the Francoist establishment were to turn critical of the regime for Europe’s sake. After the implementation of the Stabilization Plan, Spain experienced an unprecedented rate of economic growth, usually referred to as the Spanish miracle. By the mid-1960s Spain had achieved the second highest growth rate of the OECD countries, coming after Japan. Spain’s gross domestic product expanded at an average annual rate of 7.5 per cent between 1961 and 1973.51 The social impact of this economic growth was very considerable. Spain became the ninth industrial nation in the world with an extensive urban middle class and a culture of enterprise that previously only existed in limited areas.52 Furthermore, as the barriers between Spain and the continent were reduced, the Spaniards were not only exposed to European ways but they gradually accepted them as their own. Throughout the 1960s, the Spaniards began identifying themselves with Western Europe and to admire its institutions, political culture and way of life.53 An opinion poll carried out by the Spanish Institute of Public Opinion in relation to foreign policy reveals the following results. A national sample of 3000 people was asked whether they wanted Spain to be economically autonomous, develop links with Latin America or integrate into the Common Market. Sixty per cent were indifferent, 33 per cent in favour of integration into the EEC and only 3 per cent in favour of links with Latin America.54 Although the percentage of indifferent opinions might seem very high, other European studies in relation to foreign policy issues reveal similar results. For example in 1962, four years after the Treaty of Rome, only 20 per cent of the German and French populations were well informed about foreign and European policy issues.55 The fact that in Spain 40 per cent expressed an opinion, and were overwhelmingly in favour of the European Community despite the country’s special links with Latin


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America demonstrates public opinion’s particular sensitivity in relation to Europe. In 1959 a national study of Spanish youth indicated that 58 per cent of those polled favoured integration into the Common Market and 9 per cent were in favour of economic autarchy, while 33 had no opinion. The degree of nationalist feeling was tested in the following question: ‘Should Spain be integrated into the United States of Europe even though this constitutes the loss of some prerogatives of national independence? Forty-one per cent answered yes, 22 per cent answered no and 37 per cent had no opinion.56 This majority in favour of a supranational Europe is quite surprising bearing in mind that Spanish nationalism had been a cardinal point in the education of this generation. The members of the Spanish government avoided commenting on the fact that the socio-economic changes in the 1960s and the approach to Europe were rendering the Franco regime increasingly obsolete. Ambassador Ullastres was one of the few exceptions who, despite being well aware of the incompatibilities between the Franco regime and democratic Europe, ventured to talk openly about the Spanish European policy and its influence on the future of the regime. In an interview published in 1969, Ullastres explained that Spain had always been interested in European cooperation movements, and that the economic policy was heading towards the EEC almost since its foundation, through the following four-stage plan: first convertibility, secondly stabilization, thirdly liberalization and finally integration into the European Community. To the question of whether integration into the EEC was a political issue in which the Franco regime was an obstacle, Ullastres replied that integration in the EEC was exclusively an economic issue in the short run, and political in the long run. He added that time would sort things out. The aim was to make Spain economically ready for integration. Only after this aim had been fulfilled could the future of the regime be discussed.57 Ullastres was applying the classical theory of the technocrats that economic development was the most important issue and that political change should only be considered after Spanish economic development had reached European standards. However, on this occasion he was going one step further by admitting that the political incompatibility between Spain and democratic Europe would eventually have to be dealt with. For the economic sectors and businessmen Europe appeared as a symbol of prosperity. The growth of the Spanish economy depended on four main factors: tourism, foreign investment, emigrant remittances

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and agricultural exports, and Europe was the main supplier of them all. This fact provoked the emergence of a generation of convinced Europhiles, though Europe was also to become a motive for opposing Franco. Many of those who had previously tolerated or even supported the Franco regime on the grounds that it was creating the political and social stability required for economic growth were beginning to see it by the end of the 1960s as an obstacle to future progress. Moreover, as regards relations with the European Community, most of them were aware that it was the political incompatibility of the Spanish regime with European democracies that prevented full membership of the Community’s sphere. Ex-minister José Larraz continued with his Europhile academic activities throughout the 1960s. He attributed an importance to the European Community in the future of the continent which very few Europeans let alone Spaniards, would have dared to suggest at that time. In his book The European Integration and Spain published in 1961, he advocated the need to prepare the Spanish economy for integration into the EEC, pointing out that the country should evolve politically in order to become a full member. Larraz also believed in the need to develop Europe along supranational lines to prevent rivalries among the nation states as much as possible.58 However, not all were enthusiastic supporters of a quick integration into the Common Market. Ramón Tamames was a major critic of the Francoist European policy. A professor of economics, and member of the illegal Communist party, his book Spanish Economic Structure became an essential text in left-wing economic thought. In his subsequent books he dealt with the issue of the European Community. He believed that, though economic integration of Spain was inevitable and also desirable in the long run, Spain had to be prepared for it otherwise it would have disastrous effects on the country. He regarded the negotiations of the Franco regime with the EEC as a political strategy in order to give the impression that Franco’s Spain had a voice in Europe, while genuine economic interests were being ignored. In his view, the first target was to speed up the development of the Spanish economy carrying out an agricultural, fiscal and banking reform, and then a social reform that would give the workers the same rights as their European colleagues. Then they could negotiate the real issues that concerned Spain: investment and economic aid, coordination of Spanish and European agriculture, the rights of the Spanish workers in Europe. Finally and above all, removal of the main obstacle between Spain and the Community: the Franco regime.59


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For the domestic opposition groups the European Community was a symbol of political change, and as Spain’s relations with it intensified they increased the demands for democracy. After the Congress of Munich, the AECE, was consolidated as the most important Europeanist group as well as the main reference point for all domestic opposition groups. Despite the official reprimand in 1962 it persisted with a vigorous Europeanist activity in which the allegiance to democratization was always heard. In 1964, the tenth anniversary of the AECE’s foundation was celebrated with some of the best known members of the democratic opposition present: Gil Robles, Dionisio Ridruejo, Tierno Galván, Satrústegui and so on. Its general secretary Fernando Alvarez de Miranda repeated the basic principles: faith in the construction of a democratic Europe along supranational lines and the hope that one day a democratic Spain would be integrated into a united Europe. In 1965 the AECE organized an event in the memory of Winston Churchill, with the government’s warning that it should take place exclusively on the premises of the association.60 The most important aspect of the AECE was that through its Europeanist activities it was attracting members and unifying different sectors of the domestic opposition. At a meeting on 24 February 1967, the former minister Joaquín Ruíz Gimenez was elected Vice-President. The list of participants in its various activities was quite diverse: Socialists like Miguel Boyer, Enrique Barón, Carlos Bru, Enrique Tierno Galván, liberals like, Jaime Miralles, Satrústegui, and even Communists like Ramón Tamames.61 An interesting case for the argument that contact with Europe created dissent with the Franco regime is that important Franco supporters transferred to the opposition as a result of their disagreement over this issue. The ex-ministers José Larraz and Joaquín Ruíz Gimenez are two good examples, but the most outstanding case was to be José María de Areilza, Count of Motrico. An important member of the Francoist élite since the Civil War, he had made a successful diplomatic career as Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Washington and Paris. His ideology evolved from staunch allegiance to the National Movement, to a monarchic liberalism in the 1960s. As Ambassador in Paris, he advocated political reform in order to guarantee the success of the European policy. Disappointed by the regime’s reaction to the Munich events and later embarrassed by the 1963 execution of the Communist Julián Grimau, he resigned from his post in 1964. Believing that the re-establishment of a constitutional

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monarchy would be the best solution for Spain, Areilza became a secretary of the Count of Barcelona’s privy council.62 From then on he used his expertise in foreign policy to remind public opinion of the fact that without democracy Spain would never play an active role in Europe. Here we talk of European integration as if it were a simple problem of tariffs and fruits, it is not understood that it is being negotiated with politicians who belong to the Socialist and Christian Democratic parties and for this reason their mistrust against us will not cease. Liberal and democratic homogeneity constitutes the basis of integration, and in Europe we are the exception.63 An important factor that was to contribute to the propagation of an alternative Europeanism by the democratic opposition was the introduction of a new press law in 1966 by which censorship was officially ended, enabling the propagation of anti-Francoist views. The domestic opposition used this opportunity to publish its ideas about Spanish democracy and the cause of Europe in journals like Arbor, El ciervo and above all Cuadernos para el diálogo. This journal was directed by the ex-minister Joaquín Ruíz Gimenez, who had become an outspoken critic of the system since he left government, and the most important representatives of the domestic opposition wrote for it. Almost every edition of this journal dedicated an article to the process of European integration, declaring itself in favour of a supranational concept of Europe. As far as Spain’s role was concerned, it celebrated the opening of negotiations with the EEC as a historic occasion which the Europeans offered the Franco regime in order to adapt itself to European standards and evolve politically. As negotiations progressed, Cuadernos para el diálogo criticized the Franco government for not acknowledging the political obstacles to joining the EEC. Moreover, it argued that it was difficult to achieve satisfactory formulae for economic integration without conditions favourable for political integration.64 The equation of democratization for integration was exhaustively repeated: There are no irreconcilable economic antagonisms. It is the political conditions established by the Birkelbach resolution that prevent our country from entering into the European Community. We have said it before: this journal thinks that Spain must be governed by the rules that are proper in a modern democracy.65


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For the exiled opposition, just as for the domestic, Europeanism symbolized the participation of a democratic Spain in the European Community, but, being more radical than their colleagues in Spain, they believed that Franco’s Spain should be barred from all Community activities until the cherished democratization was realized. The exiled democratic opposition was very often based in countries at the heart of Europe, like France. Contacts with EEC institutions and European parties served the important purpose of internationalizing the campaign against the Franco regime as well as obtaining political and even financial support for their activities. The Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement, was very active throughout the 1960s. As soon as it learnt of the possibility that the EEC might initiate conversations with the Franco regime, it launched a campaign to prevent this. Its president, Salvador de Madariaga, wrote letters to the European institutions, governments and the opposition political parties with the same message: the Spanish political system was incompatible with the rest of Europe and the initiation of negotiations would imply political problems which would damage the credentials of the European democracies.66 The Spanish Socialist party in exile was based in Toulouse, where the party’s newspaper El Socialista was published. Although certain discrepancies existed between them and the weak Socialist groups in the interior, for all Spanish Socialists the European Community was a symbol of democracy and the liberties that the Franco regime did not recognize. Its Europeanism was based on the need to unify Europe along democratic lines that would subsequently lead to the establishment of a Socialist continental-wide society. This was also the argument used for believing that the Community should not negotiate with Spain unless a democracy were established.67 El Socialista reported periodically on events in Spain, very often focusing on the relations of the Franco regime with Europe. For this journal the argument that the EEC should strengthen economic links with Franco’s Spain as a way of encouraging democratization was not valid, and for this reason it became critical of the Community as negotiations made progress towards the preferential agreement.68 The exiled Socialists did not even recognize the economic change, believing that it was taking place at the expense of the working class, whose living conditions were low compared to European standards.69 The Spanish Communist Party, PCE, was based in Paris where it published its newspaper Mundo Obrero. However, its concept of Europe was totally opposed to that of the rest of the opposition. As orthodox

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Communists following the Soviet doctrine, the PCE regarded the Common Market as a capitalist organization that was anathema to Marxist principles. Nevertheless over the 1960s this attitude was going to change, primarily because Europeanism was unifying the Spanish democratic opposition and becoming an important mechanism of opposition to the Franco regime. Shortly after the 1962 Congress in Munich the General Secretary of the PCE Santiago Carrillo, called upon all democratic opposition to unite against the dictatorship and that only a democratic regime would be qualified to pronounce itself for or against the Common Market.70 Carrillo became increasingly critical of the Soviet leadership. In 1967 he wrote Nuevos Enfoques de Hoy, challenging Moscow’s leadership, and attempting to adapt communism to a bourgeois democratic society, which is what Spain would become after Franco.71 However, total conversion of the PCE to support Spain’s entry into the EEC had not yet taken place.

3. 4. The preferential agreement On 29 June 1970 the preferential agreement between Spain and the European Community was signed in Luxembourg in the presence of the Spanish Foreign Minister Gregorio López Bravo, the President of the Council of Ministers Pierre Harmel and the Commission’s President, Jean Rey. The possibility of signing it in Madrid had been suggested, but it did not materialize as it would have had political implications which the Community wanted to avoid. After signing the agreement each party delivered a speech which revealed the different interpretations that could be inferred from this agreement. López Bravo made an enthusiastic and openly Europeanist speech in which he magnified the importance of the agreement. My country belongs to Europe and has faith in her. This agreement is certainly no more than the first step. But in the minds of all there is the practical irreversibility of the process and the hope in the final aim.72 The Community representatives were much more cautious. Jean Rey limited himself to pointing out that the agreement had exclusively economic implications: ‘This agreement constitutes the beginning of the economic rapprochement between Spain and the Community and it will certainly be susceptible to prolongation in the future.’73


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Thus López Bravo interpreted the agreement as a political victory for Francoist European policy that would lead to the final aim of integration into the EEC, whereas for the representatives of the Community there was no political content whatsoever, nor was there any hope for Spain’s further integration as long as the Franco regime survived. Besides diverse interpretations it was the result of eight years of negotiations between Spain and the European Community and it was going to determine their relations over the next 16 years (1970–86). The difference in interpretation was quite understandable, after all for Spain the EEC took priority in her foreign policy whereas for the European institutions a preferential agreement had marginal importance. On the whole it was generally acknowledged that the agreement had been well negotiated by Spanish diplomacy and it was to serve the country’s economic interests. In fact, this agreement was to enable Spain to initiate a reduction in the commercial deficit from which she had been suffering due to the problems in exporting to the Community, and it also enabled a gradual equalization of the Spanish economy with that of its European counterparts. It is interesting to note that a few years later the Commission regretted the terms of the 1970 agreement given the rapid development of Spanish industry.74 Above all it constituted the beginning of the irreversible process of Spain’s integration into the Common Market. The signing of the preferential agreement was analysed in depth by several sectors of Spanish society. Although, as had been clarified, it had no political content, it did have political implications: the European Community had signed an agreement with the Franco regime, thus enabling an increase in Spain’s activities in European affairs. For the Franco regime it constituted a diplomatic and political victory, since the aim of establishing links with the European Community had been fulfilled. It was celebrated as the initiation of a process that would lead to Spanish membership of the European Community, and also as a proof of the superiority of the conservative forces that had encouraged Spain’s integration into Europe over the Socialist forces which had tried to block it. On 30 June the press exploited these arguments with triumphant headlines. According to ABC, with the preferential agreement, Franco’s Spain, the regime condemned by Potsdam, was finally entering Europe. La Vanguardia Española, emphasized the fact that the Spanish Foreign Minister had signed the treaty ‘on General Franco’s behalf’.75 At a moment when Spain seemed to be initiating the process of integration into the EEC, the debate on what would happen to the

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Francoist institutions seemed inevitable. Predictably, the government and the press claimed that they would not suffer any change. López Bravo, discussing the terms of the Treaty of Rome, tried to convince public opinion that the Franco regime could play an active role in Europe without undergoing political reforms, foolishly comparing the nature of the EEC with that of the United Nations. After the initiation of the second stage of the preferential agreement we still intend to maintain the political particularities of the Spanish regime. For the moment there are many international associations which do not require the homogeneity of political constitutions, like the United Nations.76 Many justified the Francoist European policy on the grounds that independent national states would always prevail over attempts at creating supranational concepts of Europe. At a conference on Spain and Europe, Professor of Political Law Sanchez Agesta discussed the viability of the concept of European unity. He concluded that Europe did not have the required community of interests and cultural homogeneity to be defined as a nation.77 The Marquis of Valdeiglesias, a veteran Francoist, pointed out that the supreme aim of contemporary nations was not the implantation of constitutional utopias but their successful development, and in this aspect the Franco regime had undoubtedly succeeded.78 For all apologists of the Franco regime the theory that Spain could not participate in the process of European integration because of political incompatibilities seemed irrelevant. In fact they argued that the Franco regime had been the best guarantee for the defence of Spanish interests within the international community. If Spain had signed a defence agreement with the US, had joined the UN, Unesco, OECD and had signed a preferential agreement with the EEC without the need to renounce the authoritarian system, why should she not be able to participate with equal success in the creation of a political Europe if it was in her interest to do so? Since the Francoist Cortes was a mere advisory chamber, ratification of the treaties signed was not compulsory, but on this occasion the government decided to carry it out in order to ensure the institutional support. During the ratification session, in June 1970, a lively debate took place in this institution which had been predominantly dormant since 1942. For example, Dionisio Martín Sanz, President of the National Council of Entrepreneurs, declared that by this agreement


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Spain would be handed over to foreign colonization, and the economic structures were going to be devastated. The Procurador de Cortes Manuel Díaz Llanos argued that the general preferential agreement recently announced by UNCTAD would have suited Spain’s interests better. According to this project, the developed countries would grant unilateral commercial preferences to the less developed ones, allowing the import of manufactured or semimanufactured products with substantial reductions. Countries which had already signed a preferential agreement with another state would not be eligible for this plan. Minister López Bravo defended the agreement arguing that it would eliminate all restrictions which obstructed Spanish industrial exports and the Community tariff barrier would be reduced by 50 per cent to reach 70 per cent later in a year. In this way for the first time Spanish industry would have access to a market of two hundred million consumers. As regards the advantages granted by Spain to the EEC, these were very moderate, spaced out in time and duly protected by subsidiary clauses.79 After the end of the debating sessions the Cortes ratified the agreement with the EEC by an overwhelming majority, with only six votes against and one abstention.80 The government attempted to convince the country that the agreement would bring nothing but advantages since it would allow an increase in exports to Europe and at the same time prevent the collapse of some national industries by the introduction of European competitors. The business world harboured some doubts about this assertion. Dionisio Martín, President of the National Council of Entrepreneurs, said that the terms of the agreement might allow sufficient protection to Spain’s industry, though some sectors would inevitably suffer. José Ramón Esnaola, representative of the metal workers, said that the agreement would make a big impact on the mentality of Spain’s business world. The representative of Spain’s agriculture, Luis Mombiedro, said that it would not bring gains to Spanish agriculture but that at least it would diminish the threat posed by the Common Agricultural Policy.81 One of the severest criticisms of the preferential agreement came from the economist Ramón Tamames. From his point of view the agreement would bring no advantages as the country’s infrastructure was not prepared for it, and there were better options for Spain, since at that moment preferential agreements offered by UNCTAD would have suited the Spanish case better. For him it was one more proof of the fact that the Franco regime was only trying to transmit an image

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of good relations with Europe rather than pay attention to the country’s real problems.82 Within the academic sphere there were similar critical comments. For example, the economist Luis Gamir pointed out that the Spanish negotiators had obtained in economic terms much less than they had originally hoped for, and it proved that the preferential agreement was a political operation.83 The reaction of the domestic opposition was predictably to manipulate the event to demand political change. On 9 March 1970, the leadership of the AECE issued a public statement in which it pointed out that the agreement presented positive aspects with regard to Spain’s Europeanist vocation and other issues related to her economy, but it still left aside the final aspect of Spanish incorporation as a full member which would require Spain’s transformation into a democracy.84 The exiled opposition received the news of the preferential agreement with indignation. The Communist newspaper Mundo Obrero commented that Franco’s foreign policy had been first at the service of Hitlerism, then of American imperialism and at this moment it aimed at infiltrating itself into Europe. Even though they were pretending to make public opinion believe that Europe was opening her doors and that the agreement would be beneficial, some personalities of the regime had demonstrated that the agreement would actually damage the Spanish economy, and the original association status which the government aimed at would never be reached.85 The Socialist newspaper El Socialista was equally critical, pointing out that this agreement would not achieve the desired propping up of the Spanish economy, adding that due to its dictatorial nature, the Franco regime had not even achieved an association agreement, but rather a series of modest tariff concessions.86 The Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement released a communiqué pointing out that the preferential agreement could not solve the problem of Spain’s future relations with Europe, stressing the fact that the commercial treaty was not a first step towards integration into the EEC.87 In Europe the signing of the preferential agreement did not receive much attention since, after all, it was a matter of minor importance. Nevertheless, the Vice-President of the European Commission, Sicco Mansholt, referred to the Spanish case when he was asked about the possibilities of enlarging the Community and he pointed out that Spain had no chance of joining the Six since she had a dictatorial system which was not acceptable in democratic Europe.88


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As on other occasions the most hostile reactions came from the Socialist press. The Socialist newspaper Avanti pointed out that the Italian Socialist Party, like the rest of the European Socialists, rejected the agreement with Spain. From their point of view the Spanish case ought not to concern economic experts because since 1939 it had been an exclusively political case. It ended up with the vehement statement of ‘no to Greece of the Colonels and no to Franco’s Spain’.89 As far as the Community’s ethics were concerned, the agreement with Spain was perfectly justified. In March the Commissioner for Foreign Relations, Jean-François Deniau, was to clarify this point, explaining that the preferential agreement was justified on the grounds that the European Community also needed to maintain economic links with peripheral countries, in particular those in the Mediterranean area, regardless of the political systems by which they were ruled.

4 The Crisis of the Franco Regime in European Perspective, 1970–75

4. 1. The enlargement of the European Community and its consequences The Franco regime made a promising entry into the 1970s decade. There was no major challenge to its continuity and the signing of the preferential agreement had proved that it was possible to be partially integrated into the European Community without altering its political system. However, this optimism was soon to degenerate into disappointment and misgivings about the future of Spain in Europe. On the same day that the agreement between Spain and the European Community was signed on 29 June 1970, negotiations for the enlargement of the EEC were initiated with the prospective entry of four new members: Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway. On 22 January 1972, four countries signed in Brussels the treaty of accession to the European Community, but only three ratified it as the Norwegians voted against it in a referendum.1 The enlargement of the European Community to nine members was to substantially alter the European economic scenario. Those affected by the shift in economic balance of power can be classified into two groups: the EFTA member states and the Mediterranean countries. The new member states of the Common Market also belonged to EFTA, but now they would have to apply EEC tariff barriers to the EFTA countries. Both groups were eager to negotiate a readjustment as their economic links were very strong. On 22 July 1972, EFTA and the European Community signed an agreement for the gradual elimination of trade barriers between the two groups. In the agricultural sector the EEC granted trade concessions in favour of Iceland and Portugal which constituted a new threat to Spain. 94

Crisis of Franco Regime, 1970–75

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The Mediterranean countries were more seriously affected by enlargement. They constituted a diverse group with different levels of economic development, most of them being poor compared to West European standards, and with unstable political systems. As regards their relations with the EEC they could be classified into two groups: countries with general agreements – commercial and preferential agreements – Spain, Israel, Lebanon, Egypt and Yugoslavia: and countries with association agreements, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Malta and Cyprus. For the EEC it was important to seek an understanding with the Mediterranean area. Some countries like Greece or Spain were possible future candidates for membership; other countries were oil exporters, and there was a thriving trade between the two groups. The Council of Ministers soon discussed the issue, but it opted for the easy way out, and instead of renegotiating the same agreements with each country a global Mediterranean policy was designed. The Commission published a document on 27 September 1972 based on this idea. However, the report did stress the difference between European Mediterranean countries that were prospective members of the Community and the rest, with whom more specific relations ought to be established.2 The adoption of the global Mediterranean policy was confirmed at the summit of the heads of state of the Nine in Paris on 21 October 1972.3 Enlargement affected the Spanish economy in three ways; the advantages enjoyed by exports to the EEC were lost, and the tariff concessions were considerably neutralized. As regards the commercial relationship with the three new members, this was totally altered since they would have to adopt the EEC common external tariff. This was particularly damaging since Britain was Spain’s most important customer, absorbing half of Spain’s agricultural exports to the Six. The Common Market competitors, France and Italy, would now have these markets for themselves, and even countries like Greece and Turkey would enjoy more agricultural concessions for exporting to the Nine than Spain. Spanish industrial products would also suffer disadvantages as they would be excluded from the trade agreements enjoyed by EEC and EFTA countries.4 Spain had been preparing herself for an eventual enlargement. In the annex of the Preferential Agreement a text was included under the heading of ‘Letters concerning the repercussions on the Spanish economy of the eventual modifications in the composition of the EEC’.5 On 21 October 1971, the Foreign Minister, López Bravo, sent a

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letter to all EEC Foreign Ministers indicating that the new scenario invalidated the treaty with Spain, and requested a renegotiation to adapt it to the new situation.6 As on other occasions the Spanish government particularly sought the support of Germany and France. López Bravo sent a letter to the German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel in October 1971, underlining the ways in which Spain would be affected as a result of the enlargement.7 France was also to offer her support to Spain. Minister López Rodó had an interview with the Finance Minister Giscard d’Estaing on 8 June, who pointed out that, with the incorporation of Anglo-Saxon countries into the EEC, membership of Spain and Portugal ought to be considered as a cultural counterweight.8 The French Foreign Minister Maurice Schuman visited Madrid on 24 November 1971, where he stated that since he was aware that enlargement would affect Spain, France was willing to be her lawyer.9 The European Community publicly recognized that Spain would be severely affected by the enlargement and shortly afterwards the Commission prepared a report indicating that in order to compensate Spain, the Community should make unilateral agricultural concessions. However, this proposal was rejected by the EEC Council of Ministers on 29 June 1972. Italy and France – despite the promise of being Spain’s lawyer – were against it, alleging that compensation to Spain would affect their own agriculture. France proposed an alternative plan that was based on the global Mediterranean policy. On 26 October the Spanish delegation rejected negotiations based on the French proposals, insisting that the Community owed Spain unilateral compensation for enlargement. The French attitude caused indignation in Spain. President Pompidou himself stated in a press conference in September that he was in favour of Spain’s entry into the Common Market. A year later, on 30 August 1973, the Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert, discussed the Spanish case with President Pompidou, pointing out that Spain was the ninth industrial nation and the third most important customer for France and that entry into the EEC would contribute to improving the balance of power between the northern and Mediterranean countries.10 Nevertheless, despite these considerations, French agriculture still carried more weight in the Quai d’Orsay. Spain’s inclusion in the global Mediterranean policy was a major setback for the country’s European ambitions. Not only did it imply that she would not recover the advantageous terms obtained by the 1970 agreement, but also that she was included in a list of nations that


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were not even European. The event not only caused a decrease in the popularity of the Community but it also affected the image of the Franco regime, as some sectors in the press identified the failure in the European policy with the nature of the political system. For example, an article in the journal Dossier Mundo subtly quoted the Spanish nineteenth-century thinker Angel Ganivet, stating that domestic policy was the basis of foreign policy. Consequently, if Spain wanted to join the EEC she should orientate her domestic policy and fulfil the requirements in this respect. Otherwise, she would always be disappointed in her progression towards integration in the Community.11 On 29 January 1973 the complementary protocol to the 1970 agreement was signed. López Bravo explained its contents, indicating that it filled the judicial and economic gap provoked by the enlargement. It was meant to last for a year, during which the two negotiating parties would readapt the 1970 agreement so that it entered into effect by 1 January 1974. In the meantime the status quo of commercial relations between Spain and the three new EEC member states would be maintained.12 The next stage of negotiations was to be constantly interrupted by internal political affairs in Spain. On 6 June 1973 a cabinet reshuffle took place. This new government was to include for the first time a President of the Council of Ministers, equivalent to a Prime Minister in the shape of Admiral Carrero Blanco. The Foreign Ministry was to go to the veteran technocrat Laureano López Rodó. These changes were welcomed in Europe, particularly the news of López Rodó’s arrival at the Foreign Ministry, since he was reputedly one of the most liberal members of the Francoist establishment. On 26 June 1973, the EC Council of Ministers agreed to allow the Commission to negotiate a new agreement with the Mediterranean countries. The new government faced negotiations with optimism and by the October session it seemed to hold a winning hand. Spain proposed a free industrial area by 1 January 1985; since the EEC would not accept a free-trade area for agricultural products from the start, a gradual process of reductions in this field was offered. The most important aspect was that the first stage of EEC agricultural concessions would finish in 1977, and would then have to be complemented in conversations between 1977 and 1980. Also a security clause would be applied implying that if the new agricultural concessions were not satisfactory from 1977, Spain would interrupt the tariff industrial reduction.13 The Community delegation was initially willing to continue negotiations under these conditions in order to sign a new agreement before 1 January 1974.

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The Spanish position in the negotiations was strengthened by diplomatic manoeuvres in Europe. On 22 October, Prince Juan Carlos arrived in Paris on an official visit to France. This was a successful public relations operation that was to improve Spain’s image abroad. It would also put pressure on the French to alter their attitude. As Ambassador Ullastres pointed out, ‘it is a unique occasion since Pompidou cannot be insensible to the suggestions that the prince and future king of Spain can make him’.14 López Rodó took advantage of the visit to have another conversation with his colleague Michael Jobert, in which he manifested the wish that the favourable opinions of Spain at the Quai d’Orsay should prevail over the ones at the Ministry of Agriculture, and hoped that French statesmen might assess the historical importance of Spain’s membership of the European Community. He also pointed out that the Spaniards might end up manifesting themselves against integration into Europe. Jobert replied to this encouragingly pointing out that Spain would soon join the EEC.15 In October the Commission made a report recommending that the next EC Council of Ministers should agree to negotiations and sign a new agreement with Spain by 1 January 1974.16 However, by the Council’s session of November 1973, at which the report should have been examined, the Yom Kippur War had started, provoking the oil crisis. This unexpected development was to frustrate the Community’s intention of a prompt negotiation with Spain. In an attempt to overcome all difficulties, Ambassador Ullastres sent a letter to the nine Community representatives in Brussels proposing a gradual reduction in trade barriers between Spain and the Community until their total suppression in 1984. However, his proposal was not even considered.17 This may be due to the fact that the Community was to face major problems in 1974, but also the tense political situation that Spain experienced since the end of 1973 may have contributed to the impasse in negotiations.

4. 2. The increasing tension with Europe Spanish diplomacy made a great effort to adapt Spain’s role to the new situation in the European Community. However, this task proved difficult due to the increasing unease in Europe over Spain’s internal affairs. During this period the Franco regime became increasingly repressive, and the government was particularly harsh against a new Basque pro-independence terrorist group known as ETA, which was to become a constant cause of disruption in Spain over the next decades.


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In this period the European Community initiated a policy of regular intervention in Spanish affairs. Two reasons may have prompted this decision. In the first place, although the preferential agreement was exclusively economic, its renegotiation with a dictatorship which was not always respectful of human rights put the EEC in a difficult position. Secondly, the Spanish democratic opposition and particularly European left-wing groups increased their pressure on European institutions after 1970, insisting that now that the Franco regime was linked to the EEC, the latter should do all it could to encourage a change of political system, and under no circumstances allow the violation of human rights. In August 1970 16 members of the ETA organization were put on trial for the murder of a policeman. On 26 November 1970 the foreign affairs commissioner, Ralf Dahrendorf, summoned the Spanish Ambassador in Brussels, Ullastres, and handed him a letter from the President of the Commission Franco María Malfattí.18 It described the Commission’s concern about the consequences that this event could have on future relations with Spain. Dahrendorf explained that the Commission did not have the intention of interfering with Spanish internal affairs, but that he had the duty of pointing out that relations between Spain and the Community, which were progressing very well could be severely impaired by these events. The trial took place in December at Burgos with the death sentence being passed on the three ETA militants. Europe reacted with indignation, and anti-Francoist demonstrations took place in several capitals. Some members of the Francoist establishment were increasingly concerned with Spain’s unpopularity, and believed that the death sentences should be commuted for the sake of relations in Europe. The Foreign Minister López Bravo tried to convince Franco of the need to commute the death sentences, and López Rodó did the same at a meeting on 29 December with his mentor, Admiral Carrero Blanco.19 Eventually General Franco agreed to commute the death sentences. In his televised end-of-year message he stressed the improvement in Spain’s situation in international affairs, especially due to the agreement with the European Community, and concluded that he used the prerogative of grace to acquit those who had been condemned to death.20 Shortly after, on 7 January Franco sent a telegram to the President of the Commission, Franco María Malfattí, indicating that he was glad to inform him that the death sentences had been commuted. The news was very well received in Europe, and several European newspapers commented on it in favourable terms.

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In the subsequent years the Franco regime was to find it increasingly difficult to crush political unrest without simultaneously provoking indignation in Europe. On 9 November 1972 a group of members of the underground trade union, Comisiones Obreras were arrested. The police sent a report to the Foreign Ministry in order to explain this action to the European embassies.21 The arrest was justified on the grounds that the union was organized by the Communist party and that it had been carrying out activities with the intention of obstructing Spain’s accession to the European Community. This new arrest not only led to protests in Europe but also to demands that the European Community should abandon negotiations with Spain. The Spanish Ambassador in Brussels was summoned by the President of the Commission, Sicco Mansholt. On this occasion Mansholt stated that his intervention was prompted by his concern for relations with Spain. He pointed out that the most serious obstacle to Spanish integration lay in situations like the present one, since the Commission maintained close relationships with the European trade unions. He concluded that the trade unions were not expecting the workers to be acquitted but they demanded that they be tried in accordance with laws and procedures deemed acceptable by the European Community.22 Despite European warnings, the trial of the union leaders, known as the Proceso 1001 was to follow the normal Francoist procedure, in accordance with the charges of illegal association and anti-government activities. The long duration of the trial provoked an intensification of anti-Francoist propaganda in Europe. At the annual meeting of the International Workers’ Federation that took place in Geneva in March 1973, the cause of the Spanish trade union leader, Marcelino Camacho, was vehemently defended. In Belgium, the league for the defence of human rights, presided over by Georges Aronstein, sent a petition to the Spanish Minister of Justice requesting detailed information about the judicial process. Joaquín Ruiz Gimenez and Enrique Tierno Galván, who were the defence lawyers in this trial received telegrams of support from all over Europe.23 On 13 December 1973, the trial began and it was expected that harsh sentences would provoke a new wave of antiFrancoist protests. However, that same day European and Spanish attention was diverted by an unexpected event, which would constitute a turning point in Spanish contemporary history. On 20 December 1973, the same day that the sentences of the trial Proceso 1001 were made public, the regime received the severest shock to its existence: Admiral Carrero Blanco was murdered by ETA


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terrorists. With the death of Franco’s alter ego the regime was inexorably condemned to decline, as there was no other political figure of equivalent profile to take his place. Ambassador Ullastres received a telegram of condolence from the European Commission,24 and several governments transmitted their condolences to the Spanish government, yet as usual most of them opted to maintain a cautious distance from the dictatorship during the funeral. On 2 January 1974 a new government was appointed with Carlos Arias Navarro as Prime Minister and Pedro Cortina as Foreign Minister. Under this government relations with Europe progressively deteriorated. On 14 January, Agence Europe published the first impressions of the new Spanish government which were not flattering: The new Spanish government does not seem particularly willing to maintain the programme of leading Spain towards Europe. The commercial and technical contacts will remain but the enthusiastic pro-Europeanist comments of previous cabinets will be abandoned. In recent speeches only the title of adjoining culture could be obtained for Europe . . . Spain and Europe follow irreversible paths and are increasingly less parallel.25 Prime Minister Arias Navarro made a promising start in his first speech to the Cortes on 12 February. He promised a programme of liberalization that should culminate in a law for political associations, by which the formation of different political groups would be allowed as long as they all accepted the principles of the National Movement. Even though this speech provoked considerable enthusiasm, the democratic opposition cast doubts on this programme from the beginning. It did succeed in increasing hopes in Europe that these political associations would eventually lead to the establishment of a proper democracy. For The Times, it was ‘the most liberal speech delivered to the Spanish parliament during the Franco regime’. For Le Monde, it was ‘the most liberal government programme presented until now by the Cortes’.26 Repression was soon to disappoint those who expected liberal reforms from the new government. On 8 January the terrorist Salvador Puig Antich was condemned to death for the murder of a policeman. As on other occasions, the European Community sent a complaint to the Spanish government in relation to this decision. On 21 February 1974 the European foreign relations commissioner, Christopher Soames, visited Ambassador Ullastres and just as his predecessor Dahrendorf and Mansholt had done, he pointed out that, even

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though there was no intention to interfere with the Spanish authorities, it was his duty to warn him that such measures were not approved of by the European Community and could seriously damage relations with them.27 The European Parliament, which had never debated the Spanish situation in depth, began to show increasing uneasiness about this country. On 14 March it passed a motion indicating the Parliament’s concern over the growing repression in Spain, and protesting against the violation of human rights, which were an anachronism in a democratic Europe, warning that such behaviour and the regime that inspired them would delay Spain’s full membership of the European Community.28 The Assembly of the Council of Europe, also showed increasing interest in Spain, although, unlike the European Parliament, it had discussed the Spanish case on previous occasions. On 26 August 1974 the Council of Europe pronounced itself in relation to the situation in Spain. The Italian Christian Democratic representative Giuseppe Real, presented a report, indicating that Spain was going through the final stage of the Franco regime and that there were two important pressures for change in Spain; the example of Portugal and the economic situation. Both could promote either democratization or a harder line. If democracy failed in Portugal, the authoritarian regime in Spain would be strengthened. The member countries of the Council of Europe should therefore do everything in their power to stimulate the growth of democratic forces in Spain’s neighbour. As regards the economy it was important to continue investing in Spain since it was obvious that a strong, united and democratic Europe would inevitably prove attractive to Spain. Following this report, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on Spain, in which it pointed out its disappointment that Spain was a long way from meeting the conditions necessary for membership of the Council of Europe, as she had no democratic institutions. It ended by announcing that Europe would provide Spain with all the necessary assistance for moving towards democracy, and hoped she would soon be able to take her place among the democratic nations in the Council of Europe.29 After several months of political instability the new government turned its attention to the renegotiation of the preferential agreement. Even though the Spanish political crisis may have affected negotiations, the main cause for their paralysis had been problems faced by the Community. In France, after the death of President Pompidou the new President Giscard d’Estaing was altering the French policy


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towards Europe; in Britain the triumph of the Labour party in 1974 led to a request for renegotiating British conditions for entry into the Community. Besides these problems, the whole of Europe was still suffering the effects of the oil crisis. Towards the end of July 1974 the EC Council of Ministers granted new mandates for negotiating with Spain and the rest of the Mediterranean countries. Negotiations with Spain started in November but were doomed to failure from the start, since the views of each side were so opposed that an agreement could never be reached. The Community wanted to modify the 1970 agreement which was favourable to Spain, and to speed up Spain’s industrial tariff removal. It also intended to limit agricultural concessions. Spain on the other hand was worried by the consequences of losing the British market, which was essential for her exports. For this reason she intended that the new agreement should compensate the losses to the old markets with bigger concessions in agriculture.30 The EEC offer to Spain included an industrial tariff reduction in three stages to be completed by 1977. In return it demanded from Spain the removal of tariffs on industrial products to be completed by 1 January 1980. Spain was obviously not satisfied with this offer, which included virtually no compensation in agriculture. The Spanish delegation replied on 5 November demanding more agricultural concessions, and the removal of all tariff barriers by 1 July 1977. In return they offered two lists for industrial reductions, one of them affecting 20 per cent of imports from the Community which would be eliminated by 1977, and the other 80 per cent which should be eliminated by 1984. The most important aspect of the Spanish offer was the introduction of a re-examination clause which would allow a periodical control and discussion of the process. This would allow protection for the Spanish economy. If the process of tariff reduction was not considered satisfactory the re-examination clause allowed Spain to interrupt it.31 The two delegations met on 20 November 1974 in Brussels. After the Spanish delegation communicated its offer, the Community delegation led by its President, Roland de Kergolay, demanded a suspension of the next session in order to consult with the EEC member states. The re-examination clause was regarded as unacceptable, and the Community delegation requested Spain to reconsider it or negotiations would be abandoned straightaway. Agence Europe pointed out the next day that an agreement between Spain and the EEC was impossible under the present circumstances.32

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As a result of this impasse in negotiations, Spain was being left behind the rest of the Mediterranean countries. The Community had presented similar conditions to all Mediterranean countries. Yet, Spanish circumstances were very different, being industrially more developed and at the same time exporting a greater amount of agricultural products to Europe. While negotiations with Spain were blocked, those with the Mediterranean countries advanced. The first stage of the global Mediterranean Policy had been concluded by agreements with Israel, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and Malta, and a second stage of the policy was about to be launched with Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon. Spain was almost the only Mediterranean country – in the rather unstimulating company of Libya and Albania – that remained without an agreement with the European Community. Above all, the EEC wanted to avoid delays in negotiations that the Spanish case would cause. An agreement with Israel, Morocco and Tunisia was about to be concluded on the lines of the mandate passed by the Council in September. As the Spanish economic journal Actualidad Económica indicated, if they agreed to a new mandate for Spain, the rest of the Mediterranean countries would demand something as good for themselves, and the negotiations would become endless.33 The Spanish government decided to adopt a new strategy. It was based on secret diplomacy, consisting of private meetings between the two leaders of the delegations, Ambassador Ullastres and the Community representative, Roland de Kergolay, without informing the press. Once common ground had been sought, an official and public meeting would take place in which the two parties would ratify what they had already negotiated in private.34 The strategy was quite convenient for Spanish interests, as it would allow Ullastres to negotiate without constantly having to consult his government, which was embroiled in domestic problems, and also no news about the negotiations would be published unless they were successful, thus avoiding public exposure of the mediocre role of the Franco regime in Europe. During the spring of 1975 a series of private conversations between Kergolay and Ullastres took place, which culminated in the so-called Ullastres–Kergolay agreement. The agreement included a progressive reduction in Community tariffs for Spanish industrial products until their total suppression in 1983. In the agricultural aspect it included concessions for certain products and a clause preventing discrimination against Spanish products in relation to other Mediterranean countries. A global balance of exchanges was established and would be revised towards the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s.


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The conditional re-examination clause that had caused so much trouble in November 1974 disappeared. Instead a clause for periodical revisions would be used in order to establish the bases of future conversations.35 Towards the end of April the Spanish government accepted the agreement. Shortly after, the Community delegation proposed a final negotiating session in September so that the agreement would enter into effect on 1 January 1976.36 Thus, it seemed that, after three years of frustrating negotiations, Spain was going to recover the advantageous situation she enjoyed in 1970. However an unexpected political crisis was going to frustrate the Ullastres–Kergolay agreement. It seemed as if the Franco regime was doomed to be isolated from the continent and that only a new Spanish regime would be able to negotiate definite incorporation into Europe.

4. 3. The democratic opposition and Europe The political activity of both the domestic and the exiled opposition increased dramatically over the early 1970s as it became evident that the Franco regime was drawing close to its end. During this period Europe, European institutions and political parties were to play an essential role in the following ways: firstly, providing a meeting place for the members of the opposition, secondly defending them against government repression, and thirdly contributing to the unification of all political groups with the common aim of overthrowing the Franco regime. Since the 1950s the Spanish Socialists had consistently defended the principle that a democratic Spain should be integrated into Europe, but internal divisions and lack of means prevented them from forming a united opposition group. However, during the 1970s they were to emerge as the most important opposition group in Spain. This transformation would not have been possible without the assistance of the Socialist International, which provided not only financial means for reorganization but it also carried out an intensive antiFrancoist campaign and intervened with the Spanish authorities in order to liberate Socialists facing imprisonment. The Socialist International (SI) was undoubtedly the international organization that carried out the most consistent anti-Francoist propaganda. This was partly due to the fact that, since the Spanish Civil War Spain was to occupy a special place in European left-wing thought. Prestigious Socialist leaders like Willy Brandt and Pietro Nenni had participated in the war on the republican side. Not surprisingly in its founding manifesto in 1951, the Socialist International

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stated that ‘every dictatorship, wherever it may be constituted, is a danger to the liberty of all countries’.37 The Socialist International parties had contributed to the economic survival and organization of the PSOE since the 1950s, both the exiled group led by Rodolfo Llopis as well as the other branch of socialism in the interior led by Enrique Tierno Galván. The struggle for the control of the party provoked a split after its eleventh congress in 1972. The opposing groups were the PSOE histórico, those in exile, and the PSOE renovado, in the interior. The SI intervened in order to determine which of the two factions was considered its Spanish counterpart. The interior representatives tended to be more radical. For example, despite advocating Spain’s integration into the EEC, they had a more critical attitude towards the Common Market, believing that it was a capitalist organization which was making little progress towards a federal social Europe.38 However, its leaders were young professionals, like those of the SI, and were in a better position to promote socialism in Spain. In January 1974 the SI decided to support the renovated, that is, domestic PSOE, and this decision was ratified at the 13th congress of the PSOE at Suresnes in 1974, sometimes referred to as the congress of the renovators. On this occasion the SI also welcomed the election of a young Sevillian lawyer, Felipe Gonzalez, as the new secretary general of the PSOE. Since then co-ordination between the Spanish Socialists and their European link in the Socialist International was to play an essential role in anti-Francoist activity. The PSOE demanded that the SI should play a more active role in Spanish affairs. At Suresnes the PSOE ‘aware of the importance that the international dimension can have in the downfall of the Franco regime and the conquest of liberties’ demanded that the parties and governments of the SI ‘show more solidarity with the Spanish people against the Franco regime’.39 Also assuming a leading role in anti-Francoist activities, the renovated PSOE stated that: ‘it falls to us, the European Socialists, to whom the honour is bestowed of washing away the cowardly complicity of the victors in 1945 with the Franco regime’.40 At Suresnes in 1974, the PSOE also discussed the strategy to follow in the imminent transition to democracy. It opted for the so-called ruptura democrática or democratic break, implying the absolute dismantling of the Francoist system and rejection of any moves that would merely reform it. It also reiterated its opposition to Spanish entry into the European Community ‘as long as the present regime continues’ due to the fact that ‘such integration would actually


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constitute a strengthening of the regime’. They also believed that ‘as democrats, we offer the only bond of union that is valid with the signatory countries of the Treaty of Rome’.41 The PSOE’s link with the Socialist International also proved very useful in defending itself against the threat of Francoist police activity. In October 1974 the trial against the Socialist leaders Felipe Gonzalez, Enrique Múgica and Nicolás Redondo took place. They had been detained in 1971 under the charge of illegal association, but at the end it was suspended due to the massive presence in Madrid of European parties and trade unions which had been mobilized by the SI. Shortly afterwards, Felipe Gonzalez had his passport confiscated because of his political activities and was not allowed to attend a congress of the German Social Democratic Party, the SPD. Yet thanks to the intervention of Willy Brandt, he recovered his passport and was able to travel to Germany.42 The illegal trade union movement was active in most European trade union events. In 1973 the Socialist union UGT participated in the European Conference of Trade Unions, ECTU, which took place in Brussels in February 1973. In September of that same year the Spanish Socialist trade union was accepted as a member of the ECTU. During this period the UGT co-ordinated its activities with the other main Spanish trade union, Comisiones Obreras, CCOO and both organizations represented the Spanish workers at the Second European regional conference of the International Workers Organization, in January 1974. The Spanish trade union movement also lobbied European institutions on behalf of Spanish workers. On the occasion of the trial of the anarchist, Puig Antich, in February 1974, a committee of Spanish workers in exile wrote to the President of the European Commission, requesting its intervention with the Franco regime in order to prevent a death sentence.43 In response to this request, the foreign affairs commissioner Sir Christopher Soames presented a request for reprieve to Ambassador Ullastres. Also in December 1975 an international trade union conference about Spain took place in Geneva, sponsored by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, ICFTU in which a special committee for Spain was constituted.44 The Communists in Western Europe regarded the European Community as a typical capitalist product. It was also considered as an instrument created at the beginning of the Cold War in order to protect Western Europe. The Spanish Communists were also against the EEC and for this reason did not participate in any Europeanist event like the Congress of Munich which allowed members of the Spanish democratic

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opposition the chance to discuss Spain’s future. By the end of the 1960s this attitude began to change. The Italian Communist party challenged obedience to the Soviet Union developing the concept of Euro-communism, which was an adaptation of the Communist doctrine to West European circumstances. The leader of the Spanish Communist Party, Santiago Carrillo, became a supporter of this new concept, which was to lead to a reconciliation with the Community.45 During the VIII congress of the PCE in exile, which took place in Paris in July 1972, one of the most important decisions taken was to support the Spanish integration into the European Community once democracy had been established.46 This decision provoked much debate at the VIII Congress, as it constituted a break with one of the basic principles of the Communists. The arguments used for this change were a mixture of economic needs and political strategy. The EEC was still seen as a capitalist organization that ought to be confronted. However, in the same way that they could not abandon Spain for being a dictatorship, they could not turn their backs on Europe just because it was dominated by the Common Market. From the economic point of view, European integration could not be ignored; Europe was Spain’s natural trading area, therefore, to remain out of the Common Market would damage the Spanish economy and the working class. The European Community would also provide the Spanish Communists with a new forum to present an alternative programme, that of a Socialist Europe. Membership of the European Community would not prevent the growth of the Communist party – the cases of France and Italy where the Communists had experienced important electoral victories proved this case. Finally the consequences of not supporting adherence to the EEC would be politically costly. With the exception of the Francoist extreme right, no other Spanish political group was against integration into Europe. It would also facilitate the formation of a coalition of political groups from conservatives to Christian-Democrats, Social-Democrats and liberals to be united under the banner of Europeanism. As was stated in the congress: the Common Market today is not a problem that can divide or confront the democratic forces in our country, or obstruct the search for an agreement to overthrow the dictatorship.47 In the decaying stage of the Franco regime the Spanish Communist Party gave evident signs of political evolution. In April 1975 the PCE


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condemned the attempt of the Portuguese Communists to create a one-party state in Portugal following the Soviet model. In July it signed a joint declaration with the Italian Communists in Leghorn, announcing the abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat as an aim, rejecting the leadership of Moscow and declaring itself in favour of political pluralism. The PCE was also the first party to seek alliances with other political groups in preparation for the transition to democracy. In August the party’s secretary general, Santiago Carrillo, announced at a Paris press conference given jointly with the Catholic monarchist, Calvo Serer, the creation of a Junta Democrática, by several groups of centre and left-wing ideology. The Junta prepared a transition programme in which it ruled out the succession of Prince Juan Carlos for his participation in the dictatorship, but did not exclude that of his father, the pretender, Don Juan, if the Spanish people should opt for a monarchy in the constitutional referendum.48 The case of Rafael Calvo Serer was particularly important in this period as he contributed substantially to the propagation of information in Europe about the lack of liberties in Franco’s Spain. In 1971 the daily which he directed, Madrid, was closed down by the government, due to its criticism of the regime. Calvo Serer exiled himself to Paris where he published the article ‘The Spanish Government against Liberty: I Accuse’ in the daily Le Monde. In this article he described how freedom of the press was suppressed in Spain, and that the only solution was that the reactionary forces led by Admiral Carrero Blanco should give way to reformist politicians capable of bringing about the change.49 Two years later he published in Paris ‘The Francoist Dictatorship’, a series of articles in which he criticized the dictatorship. To the argument that the Franco regime had brought order, justice and development to Spain, Calvo Serer pointed out that there was no more order than in a democracy, let alone freedom, justice was made at the cost of repression, and finally as far as economic development was concerned political obstacles made impossible its most important aspect which was integration into the European Community.50 Convinced that nothing in Spain would change until Franco’s death, Calvo Serer carried out a consistent anti-Francoist campaign through his articles in the Parisian daily Excelsior. The domestic democratic opposition experienced a dramatic increase in activities during the last five years of the Franco regime. Even though repression increased as the regime drew to its end, Europeanism was always a topic about which the government allowed

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more discussion. Thus, Europe was often used as an excuse for the organization of anti-Francoist activities. During this period the opposition groups were also increasingly aware of the fact that they needed to offer political solutions for the future, and contacts with the European institutions and politicians became frequent in order to ensure their co-operation for the transformation of the Spanish political system. The AECE was once more the most active group in the Europeanist field. The 13th congress of the European Movement at Nancy coincided with the 10th anniversary of the Congress of Munich. The AECE took advantage of this occasion to ratify the conclusions of the Congress and insist on the need to make Spanish political institutions evolve in order to join the EEC.51 The AECE had got away with openly anti-Franco propaganda in the late 1960s, but in the 1970s it proved increasingly difficult. When on 15 May 1974, the AECE celebrated the 24th anniversary of the Council of Europe, the government forbade all discussion of the issue. The press dared to publish this prohibition as well as the protest telegram that the AECE sent to the Spanish President.52 During this period a new reformist group was founded that was to have great importance not only in Europeanist thought but particularly in the transition to democracy, the Tácito group. Tácito came into existence in May 1973, and the age, occupation and social profile of its members is perhaps the best definition for it. Most of them were in their thirties, and were either in the service of the Francoist élite corps or had strong links with it. Many had been members of the Asociación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas, ACNP, or the AECE, and usually sympathized with Christian Democracy. Their political aim was the establishment of a Western democratic system of government in Spain and a peaceful transition to democracy. As members of the Francoist élite they believed themselves to be in the best position to carry out this aim, since democratization ought to come through peaceful reform and not a violent break which many members of the opposition advocated.53 Besides the influential social profile of Tácito’s members, its success was largely determined by access to the Catholic press, in particular the daily Ya. After Carrero Blanco’s assassination, Tácito began to show concern about Spain’s position in Europe: for us the chief task in the external projection of our country is integration into the EEC. We are worried about the consequences that would provoke Spain’s isolation as the integration of the Nine


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achieves more cohesion. It is well known that the authorities of the Community are against entry for political reasons. What measures are going to be taken in order to overcome these difficulties? Is there an intention to bring our institutions into line with those of the Community?54 The domestic opposition, like that in exile was soon to organize a political coalition with a specific programme for the forthcoming transition. The Plataforma de convergencia democrática (Democratic Convergence Platform) came into being in mid-June 1975. The parties concerned could be grouped under the general headings of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Socialists. Before the formation of a wider grouping, the four Christian Democrat groups recognized by the European Union of Christian Democrats had joined in an alliance under the name of Christian Democratic Group of the Spanish State (the Democratic Left, Social Christian Democracy, Democratic Union of Catalonia and Basque Nationalist Party). Among the points in their programme were: a complete break with the present system, followed by the election of a constituent body, amnesty for political prisoners, greater social justice, the separation of the church and state, greater regional autonomy and the immediate launching of a process which would lead Spain to full membership of the European Community.55 Relations between the members of these groups and their political allies in Europe intensified during this period. European politicians visited their colleagues in Spain and became interested in the programmes for democratization, and the Spanish colleagues travelled just as often to European capitals. For example, on the occasion of the second congress of the Convergencia Democrática, observers from the Christian Democratic parties of France, Germany, Italy and of the European Parliament’s Christian Democratic Group took part in a clandestine meeting. A delegation of the AECE was invited by the Konrad Adenauer foundation on a fact-finding visit to Germany. European institutions responded to this enthusiastic Europeanism by organizing events in which the Spanish opposition groups were given the chance to discuss Spain’s future. On 10 and 11 January 1975, the Club Realités Européennes du Présent organized a congress at the European Commission’s premises in Brussels, in which the topic to be discussed was ‘the new Spain and Europe’. Thirty-four representatives of non-official Spain attended this event. They were drawn from diverse professions and ideological backgrounds, and many were later

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to play important roles in post-Francoist Spain: liberals like Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Joaquín Garrigues Walker, Socialists like Miguel Boyer and Enrique Múgica and Catalan nationalists like Miquel Roca are examples.56 The members of the Junta Democrática were no less active in the European arena. In March 1975 23 members of the Junta held a meeting in Strasbourg coinciding with a session of the European Parliament. They took advantage of the occasion to hold a press conference as well as meetings with Georges Spéndale, President of the European Parliament, political groups and members of the European Commission. As these visits to Europe by members of the opposition became more frequent the Spanish government increased repression. On 14 March the Socialists Tierno Galván and Raul Morodo had their passports confiscated on returning from the meeting of the Junta Democrática in Strasbourg, and Antonio García Trevijano, one of the founders of the Junta went through the same experience on entering Spanish territory. Their European hosts did not hesitate to protest to the Spanish government about what they considered the violation of an essential civil right, the right to travel. Five of the members of the Commission who had been visited, Cheysson, Haferkamp, Simonet, Spinelli and Thomson sent a telegram to the Ambassador Ullastres which said the following: We have participated in these events, aware of the political importance of the Spanish Junta Democrática and we have discussed political issues which refer to the relations between Spain and the Community, with the same interest and courtesy that we give to the representatives of the Spanish government in the sphere of commercial relations and negotiations.57 The Spanish government regarded this letter as an intolerable interference with its internal affairs and sent a letter of complaint to the President of the Commission, Ortoli. It protested at the fact that the five European commissioners had employed the term ‘we’, causing the confusion of whether ‘we’ referred to them exclusively, or whether it was the whole European Commission. If it were the latter case, it could be inferred that the Community was treating political matters with people who had no Spanish official representation, in the same spirit as it discussed commercial issues with accredited members of the Spanish government.58 This could not take place without seriously


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contravening the fundamental principles of international law; the Spanish government expected a clarification of this event. Shortly after, Ambassador Ullastres had an interview with the VicePresident of the European Commission, Sir Christopher Soames, in which the latter apologized and said that the commissioners had acted independently, and although he regarded the telegram as impertinent, nothing could be done, since unlike in a normal government the President of the Commission did not have power to make a commissioner resign. Nevertheless the President of the Commission sent a letter to the Spanish government on 10 April 1975, confirming that the telegram of the commissioners was private not official.59 The democratic opposition intervened in this confrontation in order to support the original telegram. Professor Tierno Galván made some declarations to the Spanish daily Informaciones, pointing out that it was irrelevant whether the telegram sent by the commissioners was official or not, the fact was that they had protested to the Franco regime about the violation of a fundamental right, freedom of circulation. He concluded that he did not believe that Ortoli did not agree with this telegram, as this would contradict the principles defended by the EEC.60 This event provoked a confrontation between the Foreign Minister from Luxembourg, Gaston Thorn and the French commissioner, Claude Cheysson, in which the former criticized the latter for the mistake committed by the telegram and the lack of political sense that it implied. This confrontation is very indicative of the different attitudes that the European Left and Right adopted with regard to the Spanish problem. For European liberal-conservatives like Gaston Thorn it was a mistake to intervene in Spain’s internal affairs and the best attitude was to wait for the Franco regime to end with Franco’s death. For Socialists like Claude Cheysson Europe´s duty was to combat the Franco regime and try to provoke its downfall. These two attitudes were to become increasingly irreconcilable as the crisis of the end of Franco’s system became more acute.

4. 4. The final crisis of the Franco regime The European reaction to the death sentences of September 1975 deserves special attention since for the first time both the governments of Western Europe and the European institutions agreed unanimously to express their rejection of Franco’s policy and they used all mechanisms in order to make it effective. The impact was to

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be very considerable and it demonstrated that to challenge the principles defended by democratic Europe was a dangerous move. It could relegate Francoist Spain to pariah status, and undo the work that Spanish diplomacy had been carrying out in order to improve her relations with the rest of the continent. On 26 August 1975 the Spanish government passed an anti-terrorist law which re-established summary court martials, and the death sentence for those who carried out terrorist acts against the state. The following month this decree was applied to 11 members of the ETA and FRAP terrorist organizations, accused of participating in the assassination of three policemen. The news provoked an outbreak of protests against Spain and petitions of clemency at all levels. The magnitude of the European reaction was undoubtedly influenced by the belief that the Francoist regime was reaching its end. The disappointing reforms of Prime Minister Arias Navarro as well as the events in Portugal and the declining health of General Franco, all contributed to make Europe turn against the Franco regime more than ever in defence of the principles of democracy. An editorial in The Economist, under the heading ‘The Last Corrida’ describes the atmosphere very effectively: ‘The Franco regime can continue agonising for months, but its behaviour now is more that of a condemned bull’.61 European institutions followed the Spanish events with attention and there was an overwhelming majority in favour of protesting officially against the Spanish political system. On 22 September 1975 the issue was discussed at the Assembly of the Council of Europe. Giuseppe Reale read a report on the situation in Spain. Despite the current crisis, the report was more optimistic than it had been the previous year. It was suggested that the Council of Europe should continue denouncing the lack of democracy in Spain but offer its support for change. Following these recommendations it adopted a resolution by which it regretted the fact that the regime was not evolving towards democracy and trusted that the members of the Community should defend democratic principles and human rights in negotiating with Spain. It ended by expressing the desire that ‘Spain shall soon occupy her place among the democratic families at the Council of Europe’.62 The European Parliament also debated a motion of protest presented by the Socialist group. It denounced the anti-terrorist law and appealed to the Spanish authorities to commute the death sentences. Finally it urged the Council and the Commission to freeze relations with Spain until the re-establishment of a democracy.63


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During the debate that took place on 25 September the old dispute between its members arose again in relation to the right of the European institutions to intervene in Spain’s internal affairs and about its effect on the country’s political evolution. Fellermaier’s Socialist group as well as the Communists represented by Amendola were in agreement as to the right to interfere in Spanish affairs since this country was not only part of Europe, but had also signed a preferential agreement with the EEC and it intended to become a full member. The precedent had been established two years before when the European Community decided to break off relations with Greece after the coup of the colonels. On the other hand, the Conservative and Liberal Euro-MPs, thought that excessive pressure could provoke the Spanish government, isolating Spain from Europe and arousing old fears about Western democracies. The experience of the postwar years when the Allies ostracized Spain which, in fact, contributed to strengthening the regime, was a fact to take into consideration. As on other occasions in which the issue of dictatorships had been debated, political groups on one side attacked the other for being led by ideological prejudices in their analyses. Both the Conservatives Kirk and Lord St Oswald and the Christian Democrat Bertrand accused the Left of using the death sentences as a pretext for attacking the Franco regime and not condemning equally the violation of human rights in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. General Franco received petitions for clemency from all over the world, including one from Pope Paul VI, but ignored them all. On 26 September 1975 the Burgos jury sentenced five of the alleged ETA terrorists to death and absolved six of them. The death penalties were carried out the next day. This provoked a wave of protests and antiSpanish measures of a magnitude reminiscent of those that the Franco regime experienced in 1947 as a result of the international embargo against Spain. Nineteen governments as well as the Vatican protested officially, 15 withdrew their Ambassadors and the Mexican President requested Spain’s expulsion from the United Nations. The reaction at the popular level was extremely violent and most Spanish embassies in Europe experienced demonstrations and often violent attacks. In Utrecht, Holland, an anti-Spanish demonstration was led by the Dutch Prime Minister and in Sweden the Prime Minister Olaf Palme organized a petition to raise money to finance the activities of the democratic opposition.64 On 27 September the European governments took measures against Spain. The European Community member states withdrew their

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ambassadors from Madrid, with the exception of the Irish government which claimed that it had similar problems of terrorism at home. The Spanish government retaliated by withdrawing ambassadors from Norway, Holland and the German Federal Republic. In Portugal, the diplomatic mission was not only withdrawn but also closed the frontier with Spain. Even Spain’s relations with the Holy See were to be affected as a result of the death sentences as Pope Paul VI made a public condemnation of the executions. The European CFTU could not be an exception in the condemnation of Franco’s Spain, and at a meeting in Geneva it agreed that all European non-Communist trade union organizations should organize a simultaneous anti-Francoist demonstration in their respective countries, on 2 October. These demonstrations were also to be accompanied by a general boycott of all European means of transport going to Spain. This wave of anti-Spanish protests was inevitably to affect Spain’s relations with the EEC. The European Parliament recommended that the Commission and the Council should immediately suspend relations with Spain. On 27 September the President of the European Commission Francois Xavier Ortoli sent a note saying the following: The European Commission has learnt with sorrow of the executions carried out in Spain. It deplores the fact that the Spanish government has not been sensitive to the numerous demands of the nine member-states on behalf of principles of justice and humanity that are expected from the European democracies.65 The reaction of the Community was not limited to declarations of protest. On 2 October the European Commission notified its decision to suspend negotiations with Spain.66 European hostility contrasted with the indifference of the United States, which continued relations with Spain without making value judgements about her internal policy. Traditionally the United States had shown more concern about the strategic interest of the Iberian peninsula than with its political evolution. In the 1970s, when conflicts in several Mediterranean areas provoked confrontations between the two blocs, the US government was particularly eager to maintain the status quo in the area. In the case of Spain it was unwilling to take part in any activity that could undermine the stability of the Franco regime. On 2 October the Spanish Foreign Minister Alberto Cortina had an interview with the American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The latter stated that ‘the Spanish political situation has not


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influenced the negotiations at all’.67 On 5 October the 1970 agreement with the United States was renewed. A conversation which took place in May of that year between the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, President Ford and Kissinger illustrates how opposed the European and American views were in relation to Spain. Schmidt pointed out that the USA should take into consideration the possibility of a future change of regime when negotiating with Spain, and make contacts with the democratic opposition. Kissinger replied that the Americans had the same attitude to Spain as Europe had to Portugal. They were unwilling to support any movement that could not be controlled. Schmidt concluded: I was expressing the opinion of my European colleagues. We thought the chances were particularly good for a shift to democracy in Spain, and we supported all democratic parties and labour unions to the best of our ability.68 The vehemence of the European reaction made the regime draw into itself and revert to old anti-European attitudes, creating a very similar atmosphere to that of the postwar years, when Spain successfully challenged international isolation. On 1 October Prime Minister Arias Navarro communicated his disapproval of the international reaction and assured that nothing would influence the government’s policy. That same day a demonstration took place in Madrid in support of General Franco on the day of the 39th anniversary of his rise to power. The Caudillo took the opportunity of this last public appearance to explain his old theory about the enemies of Spain, pointing out that Spain’s problem was ‘a left-wing masonic conspiracy of the political class in indecent concubinage with the Communist and terrorist subversion within society’.69 The September death sentences of the Franco regime presented the European Community with a new opportunity to implement the European Political Cooperation. The European Political Cooperation is the mechanism designed to allow member states to discuss and coordinate their positions on foreign affairs and, where appropriate, act in concert. It started in 1970 as a pragmatic way of achieving a common foreign policy, avoiding institutional problems or clashes of national interests.70 It was used for the first time during the coup d’état in Cyprus in 1974, and it proved successful due to the fact that France, holding the presidency of the EEC had the support of all Community Ambassadors, and produced a statement in which this action was

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condemned. The second time was during the outbreak of the Portuguese revolution, in April 1974, although on this occasion it was the Community not the EPC, which took the leading part. After the fall of Caetano, on 25 April, there was no immediate response from the Nine. It was not until the EPC ministerial meeting on 10 June that the question was raised, but the scene of action passed to the Community. In the Spanish case the European Political Cooperation did not work effectively since it was not possible to coordinate a common action of all nine EEC member states. During the ministerial meetings of 11 and 12 September in Venice, Holland requested the adoption of a common stance with regard to the Spanish problem but it was not possible to make the Nine agree. Two weeks later the Political Committee and the Community ministers moved to New York for the opening session of the United Nations General Assembly, and the Nine agreed to send a complaint to the Spanish government. After the executions, the EPC had similar problems of coordination. Italy, then controlling the presidency of the Community, tried to coordinate a joint withdrawal of the nine ambassadors in Madrid but the Dutch government was not willing to wait and withdrew its ambassador straightaway. This caused the withdrawal of the other ambassadors but on behalf of their governments and not of the European Community.71 The failure of the European Political Cooperation to achieve a common reaction to the executions is not surprising bearing in mind the diversity of national interests. Countries like France and Ireland were not willing to take excessively harsh measures against the Franco regime. On the other hand the Northern human-rights belt, led by the Netherlands and Denmark were under too much domestic pressure to be able to wait for the preparation of a common policy against Spain. The return of ambassadors to Madrid took place in a similar uncoordinated way to that of their withdrawal, although the majority of the governments agreed that to leave Spain longer without diplomatic representation could be counter-productive. On 9 October the French Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues stated that the protests had gone too far and criticized the European Community for its statements the week before. He also stated that it had not been wise to leave Europe without representation in Madrid while the United States was negotiating a new defence treaty. He finished by saying that the French Ambassador would return to Madrid without delay.72 Only the Dutch and Danish governments were still resistant to the normalization of diplomatic relations. The Danish Prime Minister suggested that all ambassadors of the


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European governments should wait and return together to Madrid. This would convert the affair into a European Community decision but the governments were not willing to allow this. During this period the possibility of applying economic sanctions to Spain was discussed. The effect on Spain would have been devastating, since the EEC member states received 50 per cent of Spain’s exports.73 The European Parliament as well as the European trade unions supported the option of imposing economic sanctions, but this proposal was rejected by all governments. Spanish economic links with the rest of Europe were too strong to pretend to break them in one blow. Besides this fact, Spain was a rapidly expanding market which attracted investment from diverse European business sectors. Therefore the arguments against economic sanctions were powerful. The political philosophy of the EEC was also against sanctions since it had always made the distinction between economic aid where the policy of the country was influential and commerce where politics should be laid aside. Despite the wave of anti-Spanish protests expressed at all levels there were also dissenting voices who criticized the European policy towards Spain. On 5 October an article in The Economist proved sceptical with regard to the measures adopted against Spain, pointing out that it was difficult to find cases in which diplomatic or economic sanctions had contributed to bringing about political change or protecting civil liberties. More often the effect had been the opposite.74 In France the newspaper L’Aurore commented on 5 October: ‘The great loser in this affair is Europe once again, since Spain’s entry into the European Community has been delayed once more.’ Especially influential and polemical was an article which the sociologist Raymond Aron, published in Le Monde on 8 October under the heading ‘Iberian Contrasts’. In this article he commented on the fact that a credit had been granted to Portugal while negotiations with Spain had been suspended. For him these decisions responded to political rather than moral criteria and the attitude would have been different if Spain had not been converted into a French internal affair and if the press condemned terrorism to which governments usually responded with exceptional juries. Comparing the American with the European attitude he asked which of the two most favoured the democratic evolution of Spain. It ended with the comment that small states teach lessons of moral values more easily than big ones. This article reveals the dilemma that confronted European governments towards Spain. Not surprisingly, shortly after, this same newspaper published

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declarations of the French President, Giscard d’Estaing, in which, influenced by the criticism of the boycott, he commented that they did not have the right to intervene in Spain’s internal policy and that France would always support a transition to democracy.75 The outbreak of the conflict in Spanish Sahara allowed an interval in Spain’s internal crisis. Nevertheless, Franco’s illness and the increasing probability that Prince Juan Carlos would replace him as head of state focused Europe’s attention once more on Spain, this time with a more cooperative attitude. On 20 October the news of the appointment of Prince Juan Carlos as provisional head of state was very well received in Europe. In Belgium the journal La dernière heure of 2 November published a flattering article about Juan Carlos, commenting that ‘demonstrating a strong personality, the prince in the first stage is in search of ensuring a transition without conflict’. The Daily Telegraph commented in an editorial that the change in Madrid must be a signal for dismantling the barriers against Spain. All efforts were necessary in order to achieve a quick incorporation of this country into the European Community. In Brussels the Commission’s general directors held a debate on 6 November in which it was agreed that the prince of Spain would be fully supported as soon as he assumed definitively the role of head of state.76 This support could include a prompt reinitiation of negotiations, but this would be decided by the heads of government of the Nine during the next meeting of the Council of Ministers on 1 December. It was also announced that the Spanish Ambassador in Brussels would resume his post. On 20 November General Franco died. The majority of the Community member states transmitted their condolences to the Spanish government. The European Community sent its condolences to the Spanish mission in Brussels. However it was made evident that the intention of the EEC members was to go unnoticed at Franco’s funeral and that all the emphasis be put on welcoming the new king. During General Franco’s funeral no important government minister of a European or Western democratic nation was present with the exception of the American Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller. The European Community was represented by the general director of foreign relations, Edmund Wallster. Despite the apparent reconciliation with Europe and the recovery of normality, relations with Franco’s Spain were still tense. The European attitude of estrangement from Spain was to continue until the first signs of political reform were made evident in the country.

5 The Spanish Transition to Democracy and the European Community, 1975–77

The death of General Franco opened a period in Spanish history in which the attention of Europe was to be focused on the country with an unprecedented intensity if one excludes the period of the Spanish Civil War. Governments, European institutions and other political fora debated and made predictions for the future of Spain, and although scepticism with regard to democratization predominated, the new Spanish monarchy was to be gradually accepted. Europe had several ways of intervening in Spanish politics since negotiations between Spain and the European Community were still pending, and European parties had acquired great influence. Not surprisingly, European ties were frequently utilized by the main Spanish actors in the transition to democracy in order to achieve their aims. On 22 November 1975 King Juan Carlos delivered his first speech at the Cortes as sovereign of Spain in which he expressed a considerable Europeanist thought. The idea of Europe would not be complete without a reference to the presence of Spain and without consideration for the activities of my predecessors. Europe must identify itself with Spain, and we the Spaniards are European. It is an urgent necessity that the two sides understand this and draw the appropriate consequences.1 It seems incredible that the King of Spain had to point out in his coronation speech that the Spaniards are part of Europe. Nevertheless this statement gives an idea of the extent to which European sanctions against Spain had had an impact on the governing élite and how important it was deemed to initiate this new era by integrating Spain into Europe. 121

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One day before the coronation of King Juan Carlos his father the Count of Barcelona, who was still the head of the royal house, issued a communiqué in relation to the role of the monarchy in Spain. It should be an independent power which would strive to overcome the effects of the civil war, consolidate democracy based on social justice, and integrate fully into the European Community.2 No other European monarch would have included integration into the EEC among the basic aims of the monarchy. Don Juan de Borbón, who had spent most of his life in exile understood that the only way of legitimizing the role of the monarchy in post-Francoist Spain was by overcoming traumas of the past and serving a modern democratic society, and for this purpose integration into Europe was deemed essential. The king’s message was treated very favourably in the international sphere and many European newspapers made positive comments on the references to Spain’s Europeanism.3 The reprieve that the king granted to the recently condemned terrorists two days later was regarded as a sign of political evolution. The best indication of the improvement in relations between Spain and Europe was given on 26 November, during the coronation ceremony of Juan Carlos I as King of Spain. On this occasion several European nations sent their highest representatives: the President of the German Federal Republic, Walter Scheel; the President of the French Republic, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the Duke of Edinburgh on behalf of Great Britain; the heir to the ducal throne of Luxembourg; the Prince of Liège representing Belgium. The European Community was represented by Olav Gundelach, who was temporarily replacing Sir Christopher Soames as Foreign Relations Commissioner, and Director General Roland de Kergolay,4 constituting a presence of superior rank to those present at the funeral of the French President Pompidou. Such a plethora of major personalities from the Western world in Madrid had not been experienced from time immemorial, and it was to symbolize the interest and support of Europe for the new Spanish monarchy. The first statements of European political personalities about Spain were soon heard, and these were generally encouraging. Gaston Thorn, Prime Minister of Luxembourg and President of the EC Council of Ministers, expressed his hope that Spain should soon satisfy the necessary conditions to apply for membership of the EEC.5 President Giscard d’Estaing on leaving Madrid on 28 November, said the following: Spain is part of Europe, by her history and civilization she is one of the founding nations of Europe, and we therefore desire that Spain

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may participate in the great task of our times which is precisely the European political union.6

5. 1. The first government of the monarchy The first sign of post-Francoist change occurred on 13 December 1975, with the formation of a new government. Despite the fact that the head of government Carlos Arias Navarro was particularly loyal to the memory of Franco, other members of the cabinet were well known for their reformist tendencies; Antonio Garrigues, former Ambassador in Washington, was appointed Minister of Justice. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, former minister and Ambassador in London was appointed Minister of the Interior; Jose María de Areilza was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. This latter appointment was particularly indicative of a changing mentality in the new cabinet, since Areilza had become a well-known representative of the democratic opposition in Spain since 1965. The press welcomed the programme of the new Arias Navarro government, emphasizing its reformist will. The next day The Times commented that ‘the Spanish cabinet promised democracy and freedom’. The Italian daily Il Tempo commented ‘for the first time the Spanish government talks about a democracy linked with the West and full integration into Europe’.7 These enthusiastic comments made in Europe raised expectations in Spain about the reinitiation of negotiations with the European Community. Yet, these were not yet to be. Neither the EC Council of Ministers of 1 December nor the EC Foreign Ministers’ meeting on 9 December dealt with the Spanish situation. It was evident that, despite the new circumstances, no change in Spain had taken place which was important enough to require a change in the EC’s attitude. The green light for the initiation of negotiations was given at the beginning of 1976.8 The initiative was taken by France and Germany, and received the support of Belgium and Luxembourg. The rest of the member states maintained a distant attitude, although anti-Spanish feelings were beginning to dwindle. A brief debate on the British attitude towards Spain in the House of Commons is quite indicative of this atmosphere. The Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, was asked whether he agreed that before establishing closer relations with Spain it was necessary to ensure that she became a full democracy. Callaghan replied:

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We have the choice between uttering outright condemnations at every opportunity and trying to ensure the success of the forces in Spain which are working for the return to democracy. I choose the latter. That is in the best interest of Europe and of the Spanish people themselves.9 Taking advantage of the improvement in Spain’s prestige abroad it was decided that the Foreign Minister should carry out a tour round the nine EEC capitals in order to inform the European governments and institutions about the process of political change in Spain and the imminent application for full membership of the European Community. This task was tailor-made for Jose María de Areilza, for he was undoubtedly the Spanish politician with the most experience in the international sphere and had a great reputation abroad. Besides, his allegiance to the cause of democracy in Spain was beyond doubt. As he had told Arias Navarro on accepting the post of Foreign Minister, he did not want to become a salesman abroad of a commodity that he himself did not believe in.10 In his view the most important task of Spanish foreign policy was to convince the Europeans of the genuine intention to achieve democratization, and that evidence for this should be provided promptly by domestic reforms. Areilza’s message in Europe was that Spain would apply for membership of the EEC as soon as democracy had been established, and for this reason there was no longer interest in negotiating a free-trade area with the EEC as this would be made redundant by negotiations for entry. In the meantime, the preferential agreement would continue to regulate commercial relations between the two parties. Also it was hoped that the commercial problems caused by the enlargement would be solved straightaway.11 Bonn was the first capital visited by Areilza in January 1976, where Germany’s support for negotiations with the EEC was guaranteed, although the Social Democratic government warned that it would be conditional on the evolution of democracy in Spain. In Luxembourg Areilza was received by the Foreign Minister Gaston Thorn, who offered all his support. In Paris as well, the Foreign Minister, Sauvagnargues gave his full support for democratization in Spain and negotiations with the EEC. The sincerity of these declarations needed to be proved, as the French government had also left it clear that it would not allow negotiations with Spain to affect its agricultural interests. The visit to Brussels was the most problematic of all. The European commissioners, with a vivid memory of the Franco regime were


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sceptical about democratization. Areilza had an interview with the President of the Commission, Francois Xavier Ortoli, who believed in the Spanish intentions. However, when the interview was expanded to other members of the Commission, the situation changed. The Vice-President of the Commission, Sir Christopher Soames, asked whether it would not have been better for the minister to wait to do this journey when democracy had been established. Areilza replied that Spain was a sovereign nation and her Foreign Minister could travel wherever he wished without asking permission of the Community. Soames insisted that it would not be realistic to apply for membership of the EEC since the process of democratization could be a long one. Areilza replied with resolution that the intention of the journey was to explain the process of reforms and that the institutions would then have to decide when Spain could apply for membership.12 At the end Areilza’s arguments convinced the commissioners, and he then sent a note to the Spanish Prime Minister, explaining that despite some political objections the aims in relation to the negotiations with the EEC had been well received, agreeing to establish a programme of discussions for both delegations straightaway, with the aim of renegotiating the 1970 agreement.13 In Dublin the Irish Prime Minister offered Areilza his full support. The visit to Holland was expected to be difficult, since the Dutch had consistently been outspoken anti-Francoists. Areilza had an interview with the Dutch Foreign Minister van der Stoel and as on previous occasions he used all his charm to persuade his interlocutor about the sincerity of the democratic reforms in Spain. The following day, the Dutch Foreign Minister confirmed his belief in the democratic reforms, looking forward to a new era of cordial relations between the two countries. The visit to the United Kingdom was very cordial; the British Prime Minister offered his support and hoped that relations with democratic Spain would improve, particularly in relation to the conflict over Gibraltar. Copenhagen was the eighth country visited. The Danish attitude towards Spain had been almost as hostile as that of the Dutch. The last Prime Minister, Jens Otto Krag, had said that Denmark would veto Spanish membership. The next Prime Minister, however rectified this attitude after the death of Franco. In the economic field, Denmark as a consumer of agricultural products would not put any obstacles in the way of concessions to Spain in this sector. The last capital to be visited by Areilza was Rome. Here the interviews with the Prime Minister Aldo Moro and his colleagues posed no problem, despite the

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fact that Spain’s prospective membership of the Community would affect Italian agriculture. On the whole Areilza’s European tour was quite successful. He had convinced European governments and institutions of the genuine intentions of the Spanish government to reach democratization, and that once this had been achieved they expected to initiate negotiations for full integration into the EEC. The European Community was satisfied and agreed that, in the short run, Spain’s relations with the EEC should be based on a readapted 1970 agreement. However, as far as the long term was concerned, no one ventured to predict when Spain would be ready to apply for full membership and how long negotiations would take.14 The initial European enthusiasm for political change in Spain was soon to decay into disappointment. Despite Areilza’s promises on his continental tour of an imminent democratization, events in Spain proved the opposite. Several months after the death of Franco no definite step towards democracy had been taken and in fact repression increased. Francoism was far from being dismantled. An article published in The Times gives a very accurate description of the situation in Spain: It seems that there is a distribution of roles in Spain: Mr Arias Navarro has to placate the extreme right, who are still in power, while Mr Areilza has to calm down the liberal opinions abroad. Someone sooner or later will be disappointed.15 Events were soon to clarify that Areilza would be the disappointed one, as Arias Navarro proved determined to perpetuate the Francoist system. He had made it clear at a Council of Ministers on 11 February, stating that his intention was to continue with Francoism without any substantial alteration.16 He was particularly hostile to European intervention in Spanish politics, and on one occasion refused to receive a delegation of the British Conservative party visiting the country, compelling the Minister of State Alfonso Osorio, to represent him.17 The Spanish democratic opposition was prepared for a change of political system that would sooner or later take place. At this stage substantial progress was made in the coordination of different opposition groups. The Democratic Junta, that was dominated by Communists and the rival Socialist-led Platform of Democratic Convergence, initiated conversations, and on 26 March formed the so-called Democratic Coordination, or Platajunta. This unification of


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Communists and Socialists in a single group alarmed the government, and Areilza did not hesitate to call the German ambassador in order to tell him that the PSOE was not complying with what was agreed in Bonn in relation to the Spanish Communists, hoping that the SPD would intervene. However, his intervention was not successful since according to the German ambassador Guido Brunner, the SPD government exerted influence over the PSOE, ‘but not enough’.18 After Areilza’s attempt to make the SPD dismantle the new Platajunta, the government resorted to repression in order to hold it at bay, and Fraga ordered the arrest of five members of the new organization. At this stage European institutions grew increasingly disappointed with the process of democratization. The heads of government of the European Community reported their disappointment to the Spanish Foreign Minister, who then transmitted this to the King at a Council of Ministers on 2 April 1976. Repression provoked disputes within the cabinet. On 3 April the Foreign Minister warned Fraga that detentions would affect the image of Spain in Europe, but Fraga was determined not to release those detained until after 1 May, replying to Areilza that the European reaction was not so important: ‘Get this clear, neither Europe nor the European Community are going to give you anything if we release Marcelino Camacho’.19 Official protests from European institutions had not always been taken into consideration by the government, but on this occasion they constituted an important psychological pressure. The fact that several months after Franco’s death the government was still receiving official protests from the European Community, provided the clearest evidence for the lack of progress made on the road to democracy. From this point the relations of the most liberal members of the cabinet, like Areilza and Osorio with Arias Navarro became increasingly tense, and the King himself began to think that the Prime Minister would have to be dismissed before it was too late.20

5. 2. The European Community and the cause of democracy in Spain During the transition to democracy, Europe displayed an unprecedented activity in favour of democracy in Spain. The role of the European Parliament and the Assembly of the Council of Europe was particularly important. Despite the fact that both assemblies were mere advisory chambers with no real executive power, they revealed the attitudes of different parties towards Spain and secondly, their

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decisions were followed by the Spanish government and opposition, as they were an accurate description of how Spanish political events were seen from abroad. Members of the two parliamentary assemblies kept in touch with Spanish political organizations and some of them travelled to Spain. On 16 December 1975, Giuseppe Reale, in charge of issuing reports to the Council of Europe invited ten Spanish opposition leaders and three members of the Cortes to Paris, in order to debate the situation in Spain. The opposition leaders represented the widest spectrum of political opinion to sit round a table outside Spain since the congress of Munich in 1962. From the Junta Democrática, there were Santiago Carrillo (Communist), Rafael Calvo Serer (Monarchist), Raul Morodo (Popular Socialist) and Jose Vidal Beneito (Socialist Alliance). The Plataforma de Convergencia Democrática was represented by Joaquín Ruiz Gimenez and Fernando Alvarez de Miranda (Christian Democratic left), Felipe Gonzalez (PSOE), Manuel Díez Alegría (Socialist Democratic Party). The three members of the Cortes were, Ignacio Satrústegui, Manuel Escudero and Juan Pablo Martinez de Salas, though they attended on their own behalf not officially.21 Giuseppe Reale made a report on the situation in Spain after Franco, and a resolution was adopted on 14 January 1976. The Council of Europe declared that it welcomed the government programme to reform the country’s representation in order to broaden their base so that the legal and political system became more like that in the community of Western countries. However, it added that the reconciliation of the Spanish people implied the restoration of human rights and fundamental liberties, starting with genuine amnesty for political prisoners and emigrés. The report concluded with the promise to follow future developments with close attention, intensifying its contacts with Spanish political circles, to encourage the conditions which would enable Spain to take her place within the community of democratic nations at the Council of Europe.22 The European Parliament followed a similar strategy, keeping in touch with Spanish political groups and then debating and adopting resolutions. As on other occasions the pragmatism of the EC Council of Ministers and the Commission in relation to Spain caused tensions with the European Parliament which insisted on treating Spain as a political problem. On 14 January the EC Council of Ministers announced that the situation in the Spanish regime had changed sufficiently to allow the resumption of negotiations. This decision irritated several groups in


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the European Parliament. On 11 February the President of the Council of Ministers Gaston Thorn and the Commission’s Vice-President, Sir Christopher Soames were to defend their attitude towards Spain before the European Parliament.23 President Thorn was asked if he did not think that the Council’s attitude would lead the government to believe that Europe was content with the events in Spain and consequently block the process of democratization. Thorn replied that Spain was undergoing an evolutionary process and that the level of the EEC’s rapprochement depended on its speed. Soames defended the Council’s statement that there was nothing against resumption of talks. However, he stressed that over the following weeks the Commission and the EEC member states would have conversations with the Spanish Foreign Minister, and that the official opening of negotiations with Spain would depend on the outcome of events in the country. In April 1976 the European Parliament focused its attention once more on Spain, and this time an intense debate took place in which the projects of the Arias Navarro government were discussed. As on previous occasions, there were two opposing views in relation to Spain. Socialists and Communists considered that the official initiatives taken were insufficient, while Conservatives and Liberals were moderately optimistic. The Conservatives were particularly eager to justify the government’s reforms and prevent the adoption of a resolution against it. Lord St Oswald defended the Spanish executive energetically and the Vice-President of the Commission, Sir Christopher Soames, informed the Assembly that the Socialist leader, Felipe Gonzalez, whom he had just met, was travelling freely abroad and was also participating in Spanish political rallies. In this situation it was decided that the best option was to wait and see how events turned out.24 Despite the Conservatives’ pressure against it, a month later on 12 May 1976, the Christian Democrat leader, Maurice Faure, who was in charge of informing the European Parliament about the situation in Spain, read a report in which he stressed his disappointment with the rhythm of political reforms.25 The Spanish Prime Minister Arias Navarro had delivered a speech on 28 April, which left it clear that he did not have any intention of establishing a Western-style democracy. Arias had proposed an electoral system with two chambers, one of which would be elected by universal suffrage but would be subordinated to a higher chamber, the Senate whose members would be directly appointed by the sovereign, and would have a veto on the popular assembly. Thus, the system would

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continue being a fief of the Francoist establishment. As regards the legalization of democratic parties, all of them would be legalized with the exception of the Communist party. This political system, according to Faure, would not be compatible with Western Europe. After Faure’s intervention a debate took place on the situation in Spain which was to reflect how ideology modified their vision. The spokesman of the Socialist group, Ludwig Fellermaier, was particularly concerned by the fact that trade union rights had not yet been established. The chairman of the Christian Democratic group, Pierre Bertrand, pointed out that with regard to the legalization of the Communists so long as the Berlin wall was being strengthened, the Christian Democrats did not need any lessons in democracy from the Communists. The liberal leader Jean Durieux added that with regard to the legalization of the Communists it was better to have them legalized than operating secretly. Christian De la Malene, on behalf of the European Progressive Democrats criticized the European Parliament’s attitude towards Spain, adding that although it was right to take interest in a country that wished to join the European Community, excessive pressure on Spain could be harmful. The representatives of the Conservative group, Sir Peter Kirk and Lord St Oswald adopted an apologetic attitude towards Spain. Kirk said that the government was in the hands of people who aimed at the establishment of democracy but who needed time, and for this reason he did not agree with the excessive pressure that Parliament was exerting. As regards the legalization of all political parties, he warned that this would also mean legalization of the Falangist party, which could constitute a threat to democracy. Legalization of all political parties could not be a condition for entry into the EEC. Britain could not legalize the Irish Republican Army and for similar reasons the German Federal Republic banned at one point the Communist Party and ultra right-wing parties. Finally a resolution was adopted by which Parliament demanded the re-establishment of trade union rights, the legalization of all political parties without exception, and a general amnesty that should enable the return of all political emigrés. The success of this programme would determine the credibility of the general elections announced for spring 1977. In this way the European Parliament proved to have a clear majority in favour of the ruptura pactada, or negotiated break strategy.26 This strategy had been recently adopted by the Democratic Coordination group, implying dissatisfaction with the government, but a willingness to wait for its reforms to come.


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During the last months of the Arias Navarro government, contacts between the European Community and Spanish political groups became particularly intensive, despite the disappointment with the rhythm of democratic reforms. On 3 May a group of 25 members of five Christian Democratic groups in Spain visited the European Community, invited by the members of the Belgian Christian Democratic party with the aim of discussing electoral systems. In this same month the secretary general of the Conservatives at the European Parliament Dunstan Curtis, travelled to Spain and held interviews with the Tácito group, the Unión Democrática Española, Unión Democrática Cristiana, Partido Demócrata, Club Cataluña and Reforma Social Española, all of which were centre-right-wing parties, and also discussed the process of reforms with the ministers Fraga, Areilza and Osorio. The international political organizations also played an influential role in the Spanish transition to democracy. Out of all of these, the most active was undoubtedly the Socialist International, and in particular the German SPD. Its task was not just limited to helping Socialist colleagues, for it skilfully used its international powers to ensure the establishment of a democracy in the Iberian peninsula. For example, in 1975 Willy Brandt, increasingly alarmed by the situation in Portugal and its repercussions in Spain, ensured that the Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev received a letter from the Portuguese Socialist leader, Mario Soares in which he warned that a Communist take-over in Portugal would seriously damage East–West relations.27 On 16 November 1975, the recently created Socialist International Committee for Spain, met in Amsterdam to study the situation. Towards the end of the month the Bureau of the SI, after deploring the fact that countries with Socialist governments had been represented at Franco’s funeral and the coronation of Juan Carlos, it declared that until a democratic government had been re-established in Spain political isolation of the Spanish regime should be maintained.28 Over the last two years the SI had achieved the recognition of the renovated PSOE and its leader Felipe Gonzalez, and was now to ensure its success in democratic Spain. In January 1976 a delegation of the SI went on an official visit to Spain and stated that the PSOE constituted ‘the link which consolidated the unity of Spanish Socialists’. The other Socialist groups protested considering it an inappropriate intervention in favour of their rivals. In April 1976 the parties of the SI, after overcoming certain resistance had supported the Congress of the Socialist trade union, UGT in Madrid, and in subsequent months the

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SI ensured that the next congress of the PSOE would take place in Spain, with the most important European Socialist leaders present. Bearing in mind that six of the nine Community governments were Socialist during the first stage of the transition to democracy, it is not surprising that in Areilza’s tour, his interlocutors often enquired about the future of socialism in Spain. During his visit to Germany the count of Motrico visited the premises of the German SPD, whose representatives he tried to convince of his government’s intention to enable the PSOE to return to legality shortly. In Luxembourg, Areilza was warned by the government about the importance of improving Spanish relations with Israel, due to the pressure that the Israeli Socialists could exert on the SI, and particularly over the Dutch and Danish Socialists, with the aim of preventing Spain’s entry into the EEC. The Socialist leaders were also well aware of the divisions existing within Spanish socialism. Both the Danish Foreign Minister, Andersen, and the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, asked Areilza about the electoral possibilities of the groups led by Rodolfo Llopis, Tierno Galván and Felipe Gonzalez, replying that in his view Gonzalez was the most popular candidate.29 Some members of the Socialist International, in particular the French and Portuguese Socialists developed friendly relations with the Spanish Communists, provoking clashes with other members of the SI, especially the German representatives, as well as with the Spanish Socialists. Unlike Willy Brandt, the French Socialist leader Mitterrand never established close relations with any Spanish Socialist, and despite his presence at the congress of Suresnes, initially he showed more interest in the PCE than in the PSOE. When the Spanish government arrested the Communist leader Carrillo, in December 1976, the French Socialists put greater insistence on demanding his release than did the French Communists.30 The Portuguese Prime Minister Mario Soares developed a close relationship with Carrillo, primarily as a way of highlighting the differences between the Spanish ‘Eurocommunist’ party and the Stalinist Portuguese Communist party. Both Carrillo and the rival Socialist leader of the PSP, Tierno Galván, were invited to the Portuguese Socialist party’s congress in November 1974, which provoked the withdrawal of the PSOE representatives.31 The international Christian Democratic organizations did not play such an important role as their Socialist equivalents, but were still quite active in Spain during this period. Representatives of the European Christian Democratic Union, ECDU were sent to the second and third congresses of the Equipo Democristiano del Estado Español,


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ECDEE, that took place in May 1975 and in January 1976 respectively. The Liberal International was not very active in Spain and its role was particularly difficult because of the fact that Spanish liberals were divided.32 In February 1976, the spokesman for the liberal group in the European Parliament declared that their parties had finally managed to go to Spain and initiate a dialogue that had been impossible until then, at the same time it announced the creation of a European Liberal Party and that Spanish representatives would be present in the first congress. In June 1976 the Liberal International recognized the Partido Demócrata Popular, led by Ignacio Camuñas as a member.33 Besides the essential political and diplomatic role played by the international political organizations the political foundations were also to be very active in Spain during this period, as they provided the political parties with the financial means which the international organizations lacked. The German political foundations, linked to the main parties in the country, are non-governmental institutions financed by the ministry for foreign development, and to a certain extent by the Foreign Ministry and private donations. Theoretically their role abroad is to intervene in socio-political education and in the support of social structures in the countries where they are active. They rose to prominence in the postwar period when, due to the Nazi past, the German governments could not intervene abroad without causing hostile reactions. Thus political foundations intervened on their behalf.34 The most important foundation in the Spanish transition was the Friederich Ebert foundation, linked to the SPD, which had started to work abroad in 1957 in Latin America. Apart from contributing to the establishment of democracy in Spain the Ebert foundation also had the aim of establishing a political party which would represent the cause of democratic socialism and be capable of forming a government. After contributing to strengthen the renovated branch of the Socialist party, the Ebert Foundation opened an office in Madrid in 1976, when the PSOE had still not been legalized, and cooperated in the organization of the XXVII Socialist Congress. In a certain way the Ebert Foundation was the permanent representative of the SI in Spain. Spanish Socialists travelled to the Ebert centres in Germany, participating in diverse courses. As regards the amount invested in Spain by this foundation this has not been established but it was undoubtedly a substantial sum. Sources estimate that the Ebert spent DM4 million in the Iberian peninsula in 1977 alone.35

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The Adenauer Foundation, linked to the German Christian Democratic Party, the CDU, was also to play an important role. Nevertheless its activity in Spain was very much restricted due to the weak infrastructure of the Spanish Christian Democrats. Initially its main links were the parties represented by Gil Robles and Ruiz Gimenez, although after the 1977 elections it gave its full support to the victorious UCD coalition. The Friedrich Naumann Foundation associated itself with the Spanish liberal groups, all of which were later to join Suarez’s UCD coalition. Finally, the Hanns Seidel Foundation, linked to the CSU led by Franz Joseph Strauss, cultivated several Francoist ministers during the early 1970s, and from June 1976 it established relations with Manuel Fraga’s Alianza Popular.36 The democratic opposition exploited the Europeanist cause to the maximum throughout the process of transition, aware that the European governments, institutions and political parties were all eager to listen to them. During this period the European dimension was essential for all Spanish opposition groups for several reasons. First, because at a time when repression in Spain still prevailed, Europe constituted an ideal forum for the propagation of the opposition’s programmes. Secondly, because European governments and institutions had power to put pressure on the Spanish government and consequently it was an effective way of imposing the opposition’s views. Thirdly, because these opposition groups aimed at reaching power after the transition and it was necessary not only to gain allies in Europe but also to become acquainted with the European Community. The Spanish Socialists and in particular the members of the PSOE travelled to Europe with the assistance of the Socialist International. On 21 January 1976, the Socialist leader, Felipe Gonzalez declared in Paris that the EEC should wait and see how events developed in Spain before deciding whether negotiations ought to be reopened for a new commercial agreement. Shortly afterwards he travelled to Brussels and had interviews with the European commissioners Soames and Spinelli. On 12 February he declared to the Belgian Socialist daily Le Peuple that he had insisted to the European Commission on behalf of the PSOE, that certain minimum conditions should be fulfilled, like freedom of expression, of assembly, of constituting political parties without any exclusion, liberation of political prisoners, return of emigrés, before any negotiations between Spain and the European Community could be reinitiated. These declarations were very welcome as they coincided with the views held by all European Socialists.


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The Communists still had their base in Europe since their activities in Spain were prohibited. The Spanish PCE was eager to prove its allegiance to democracy and its independence from Soviet control. Consequently, it cultivated relations with the Socialist International and the Eurocommunist groups, particularly in France and Italy. During the early stage of the transition, the Spanish Communists were eager to convince European interlocutors of the importance of legalizing the Communist party. On 2 April, the Secretary General, Santiago Carrillo, gave a press conference in Paris in which he stated that Spain was on the road to democratization, but that she would not achieve it with the present government. In his opinion, the reformists in government instead of becoming locked up in institutions of the past, should initiate negotiations with the democratic opposition.37 Most opposition groups sent petitions and organized visits to the European institutions, which is indicative of how highly esteemed they were. On 31 March 1976, the Democratic Coordination or Platajunta, the recently founded Spanish opposition group, sent a letter to the President of the European Council, Gaston Thorn, asking him to adopt a clear position in favour of the political alternative proposed by this group to enable the real Spain, which it represented, contribute to the unification of democratic Europe, by establishing permanent relations with the Community institutions.38 On 4 April 1976 a group of Spanish Christian Democrats visited the Commission and the European Parliament. The group comprised five different Christian Democratic groupings, which had recently formed an alliance: the Christian Democratic Left led by Ruiz Gimenez, the veteran Jose María Gil Robles’s Popular Democratic Federation and regionalist groups like the Basque PNV, led by Ajuriaguerra, the Catalan CUC led by Cañellas, and the Valencian Unión Valenciana led by Ruiz. Canellas explained to the press that the aim of the visit was to learn about political developments in Europe and to inform about events in Spain. Canellas also drew attention to the fact that on 17 November 1975, the group had laid down five conditions for an alternative democracy in Spain, as follows: abolition of laws prohibiting political activity, recognition of parties without exclusion, and recognition of autonomous governments in Spain. Ajuriaguerra insisted on the need to solve the problem of nationalities and finally Ruiz Gimenez added that the five Christian Democratic groups did not believe in mini-reforms but rather in free elections.39 Another Christian Democratic group that was active in Europe was Federico Silva Muñoz’s Unión Democrática Española. Silva travelled to

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Aachen, Germany, to attend the Pan-European Congress on 7 and 9 May 1976. At this Congress Silva underlined the importance of Europe’s support for the actual situation of Spain: In order to ensure that the ideas of the Western world shall not be buried in the peninsula it is essential to count on the support of all well-meaning politicians, from all organizations and European parties that want democracy established in Spain as well as future Spanish integration into the European Community.40 Professionals in Spain also organized themselves in favour of democracy. This was one of the most enthusiastic Europhile groups, regarding the European Community as synonymous with an advanced civil society in which educated professionals had great career prospects. On 13 June 1976 a group representing liberal professions in Madrid travelled to Strasbourg for an interview with the President of the European Parliament, Georges Sperale, and also to hand in a petition signed by members of different professions. The petition was addressed to the European Parliament and expressed satisfaction with the news of the parliamentary resolution of 12 May, on the future of Spain. In it, the Madrid professionals stated that they would continue to demand the establishment of democracy, advocating the ruptura strategy, to be followed by a referendum about the form of the state. The document was signed by well-known professionals of various sectors. Among them were the lawyers Federico Carvajal, Manuel Diaz Alegria, Raul Morodo, Francisco Saltillo, the economists Luis Angel Rojo, Jose Luis Sampedro and Ramón Tamames, engineers like José María Kindelán, and doctors like Pedro Laín Entralgo.41 Despite the alleged independence of this group of professionals, several of them were linked to the Left Christian Democrats, Socialists and Communists, which accounts for their support for the ruptura formula. Other groups of professionals, like those of the Tácito group equally active in the Europeanist field, would never have supported this programme in spite of their dissatisfaction at that time, as they believed that the transition to democracy ought to be carried out through legal reforms of the present political system, rather than by overthrowing it.

5. 3. The first Suarez government Towards the end of spring, disappointment with the process of democratization was so acute that a change of government seemed


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inevitable. Many commentators in Spain and abroad thought that the ideal prime minister would be a Francoist minister with a reformist character, like Fraga or Areilza, nevertheless the King unexpectedly appointed Adolfo Suarez, on 3 July 1976. Suarez was a relatively unknown bureaucrat with no democratic credentials. Not surprisingly his appointment received many negative comments in the international press: ‘Entente between the Opus and Falange’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; ‘the Council of the Realm has committed an historic mistake’, Le Monde; ‘Juan Carlos has opted for moderation’, La Libre Belgique.42 On 7 July Suarez appointed a new government, and on 16 July its programme was issued, aiming at the establishment of a democratic political system, promising a referendum on constitutional reform, and general elections before 30 June 1977. As far as Europe was concerned the new government issued the following statement through the Council of Ministers: The government confirms the continuity in the fundamental lines of Spanish foreign policy . . . and it also manifests its willingness to be integrated into the European Communities to pursue active and increasing international cooperation.43 The new premier was not an enthusiastic Europeanist and had very little political experience abroad. However, the appointment of Marcelino Oreja as Foreign Minister was to guarantee a positive European policy. Oreja was well known for his commitment to democracy as a member of the Tácito group, and had been a close collaborator of Areilza at the Foreign Ministry.44 Contacts with Europe were to play an essential role in the new government. Suarez and most members of his cabinet were aware that the international discredit of the previous government had been one of the main causes of its downfall, and for this reason it was essential to recover credibility abroad. Another reason for the need to win the support of Europe was that failure to do so would leave Europeans with no alternative but to support the ruptura formula, in which case the transition would not only be drastically altered but could also provoke a serious breakdown of law and order. The King of Spain was to play an important role in making the new government acceptable in Europe. Aware of the lack of enthusiasm with which the new Spanish Prime Minister had been received in Europe it was decided that Suarez should make a visit to a European

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capital. The King got in touch with the French President Giscard d’Estaing who acceded to his request, and on 13 July Suarez arrived in Paris for a meeting with Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. From that moment the popularity of the new premier steadily increased. The European dimension was particularly useful for the King as he could not intervene directly in the referendum campaign but could bring his influence to bear from abroad. On 30 October 1976, two months before the referendum for the reform of the state, King Juan Carlos and the Queen went on an official visit to France that was to be the first European country to receive them after Franco’s death. At home the visit was portrayed as evidence of the recognition of the new monarch by Europe. King Juan Carlos also used his contacts with the royal families in Europe to support the process of democratization in Spain. In November of 1976 his cousin Lord Mountbatten invited him on a visit to the United Kingdom with the aim of talking to the members of the Labour Party. As Mountbatten wrote to him: hoping that this would contribute so that our Labour government shall see you just as you are since until now they don’t seem to have understood the excellent job that you have been carrying out liberalising the constitution.45 Unfortunately Juan Carlos was unable to take up his offer. European institutions followed events in Spain with particular interest. Initially, scepticism prevailed, as there was no guarantee that the new Prime Minister would succeed where the last one had failed. Members of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament travelled to Spain and held interviews with Spanish politicians of all ideologies, before deciding the position to adopt. Eventually, they were convinced that the new cabinet deserved an opportunity. In August 1976, Areilza invited a delegation of the Council of Europe led by Giuseppe Reale to visit Spain in order to establish contacts with both members of the government and the opposition. Marcelino Oreja intervened so that the delegation was received by Adolfo Suarez, with whom it had a long discussion.46 The delegation was also received by several government ministers as well as representatives of diverse institutions. On that occasion they talked to the ex-minister Manuel Fraga who was then setting up a party known as Reforma Democrática. As far as the opposition was concerned, the delegation was able to renew its contacts with


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personalities who had already attended recent meetings organized by the Political Committee in Paris and Strasbourg: Ruiz Gimenez and Alvarez de Miranda (Christian-Democrats), Camuñas and Satrústegui (Liberals), Felipe Gonzalez and Raul Morodo (Socialists) and representatives of diverse political options with the exception of the Spanish Communists, allegedly due to lack of time. A report made by Reale came to the conclusion that the situation in Spain was very delicate, and that it was necessary to believe in the government’s good faith. He added that any suspicion that it might seek to manipulate the forthcoming elections could be dismissed. He emphasized that there was a further safeguard: the spotlights of Europe were focused on the operation. On 15 September 1976 the Assembly of the Council of Europe debated a new resolution on Spain, in which it recognized the determination of the Suarez government to introduce a genuinely democratic system. It also recognized the increasing tolerance in terms of human rights and trade union liberties. However, it regretted the fact that political and labour relations remained distorted. It ended by reiterating its solidarity with all the forces in Spain working for democracy and placed at their disposal its experience in order to contribute to the democratization of the country desired by the Spanish people and the whole of Europe.47 The European Parliament also experienced a drastic change of attitude in relation to Spanish democratization. This was primarily due to the Christian Democrat, Maurice Faure who, after his disappointment with the previous government, was to develop a very close relationship with the new one. On 1 September he made a statement on Spain revealing a new position. Faure pointed out that the Spanish cabinet, that was practically made up of unknown people had been badly received. Nevertheless, the first declarations of the new prime minister had undoubtedly constituted a positive liberal statement. The fact that the opposition had not launched an attack on it yet, was very significant. He added that it was no secret that the sovereign had given the new government instructions to initiate an almost official contact with members of the opposition parties. Finally he concluded that: it will be understood that this new cabinet, more restricted, younger, more flexible has been appointed by the king in order to achieve a concrete political aim. If this is so, we shall not need to regret what has happened but the opposite.48

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Shortly afterwards, Faure travelled to Madrid in order to obtain a first-hand impression of the situation. During his 3-day stay he had interviews with Prime Minister Suarez, as well as several ministers and members of the opposition. On 4 July, Faure discussed the democratic reforms with the deputy head of the government, Alfonso Osorio. Discussing the electoral system that Spain should adopt, Osorio suggested the 2-round constituency system since it tended to create big parties which could be very convenient for political stability. Faure did not agree and recommended him to meditate seriously about it in order to avoid committing a historical mistake. He indicated that the majority system was more appropriate for well-established democracies like Britain.49 Faure’s advice was transmitted by Osorio to Suarez who still preferred the majority system. Eventually it was decided that it ought to be proportional representation. The attitude of the left-wing Europeans in relation to the Spanish government was also substantially altered. On 4 October the speaker of the House of Commons and Labour MP Sir George Thomas, was invited by Osorio on an official visit to Spain. It was the first time a Labour MP had visited Spain since the 1930s. He was received by the King, the President of the Cortes, and several members of the government. On leaving, he admitted to having been impressed by the people he talked to, and stressed his belief in the democratizing intentions of the government, and that they ought to receive all the necessary support from Europe.50 A date of crucial importance for confirmation of European support of the government’s reforms was on 23 November 1976. Five days after passing the law for political reform in the Cortes, the Political Commission of the European Parliament was to consider supporting a petition made by the Socialist leader Felipe Gonzalez, and adopt a resolution that would support the Spanish opposition against the reformist process carried out by the Spanish government and thereby cast doubts on its legitimacy. This issue was discussed at a meeting which took place on 2 December. Maurice Faure’s intervention was crucial, since he was very much opposed to such a resolution, and at the end it was agreed to reject the proposal made by the Spanish Socialists, recommend the continuation of contacts with Spanish political groups and programme a new visit by Faure to Spain, after the referendum on the law for political reform had taken place.51 The resolution of this meeting implied that the possibility of breaking relations with the Spanish government and supporting the alternative of the democratic opposition, was definitely ruled out.


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This event was enthusiastically noted by the Spanish government since it implied, as Osorio stated in his political memoirs that ‘the government had already won the political battle in Europe’.52 By the beginning of 1977 not only were all alternative plans for Spanish democratization laid aside, but the Suarez government received support from the majority of European political leaders. This is proved by the intervention of the Communist MEP Renato Sandri, who referred to the Spanish situation in inconceivably sympathetic terms for a Communist. He described the prospective enlargement of the EEC as ‘another nail in the coffin of fascism and a triumphant blow for democracy on the continent, as the candidates for membership are Greece, Portugal and Spain’ and praised the fact that all parties working towards democracy in Spain were unanimous in their desire to join the European Community. As regards the EEC’s attitude he said the following: The Commission and the Council of Ministers can use membership as a stimulus to encourage the political parties of Spain to achieve democracy. There is no need to interfere. . . . without interfering we can properly encourage and stimulate the development of democracy in Spain, of great importance for the future of our continent.53 The 27th congress of the Socialist party in Madrid would provide evidence of the progress made in dismantling the Franco regime. It was the first congress to take place in Spain after 40 years in exile and the last one as an illegal party. It was also to be a triumph for the Socialist International and Willy Brandt. With his unconditional support for the Sevillian-led party a broader range of Socialist International support was forthcoming. In most cases, it was expressed in public endorsement of the PSOE and the big names of European socialism who were present at the Congress: Brandt himself and Olof Palme, both speaking in Spanish, Mitterrand, Pietro Nenni and Michael Foot. The programme passed at the congress was rather radical. On international and defence issues, the aspiration was to build socialism in Europe, independently from imperialism and in cooperation with the Third World. The PSOE manifested its intention to work within the European Community for democratic socialism, and a European defence policy that would help Spain to assert its neutrality vis-à-vis NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Despite the radicalism of this programme, the PSOE gave signs of moderation in its confrontation with the

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government. The strategy of ruptura or open confrontation with the government was modified to what Felipe Gonzalez called ‘the democratic alternative, a dialectical process of conquering parcels of liberty’.54 Willy Brandt took advantage of his stay in Madrid to visit the King and Areilza. Suarez requested an interview with Brandt, in which the latter insisted on the need to legalize the Socialist Party. On the other hand he did not show excessive interest in the legalization of the Communists. In his conversation with Areilza he said that the PSOE ‘would go to the elections if there are guarantees, even if the PCE has not been legalized’.55 For the German Socialists the legalization of all parties including the Communist one was not essential as the case of the German Federal Republic indicated, where the Communists had been banned in the postwar period. Nevertheless, behind this argument there was a clear electoral interest, since if the PCE remained illegal the PSOE would have no major left-wing rival in the elections. Negotiations between Spain and the European Community had been interrupted shortly after Franco’s death and would not be resumed until the transition to democracy had been completed. However, despite the fact that the Spanish government was immersed in political problems it did not wait for the transition to finish before reorganizing the strategy for negotiations with the EEC. On 26 July Prime Minister Suarez called a meeting of several ministers and diplomats in order to discuss Spain’s situation vis-à-vis the European Community. Shortly afterwards, it was decided that Ullastres should be replaced by Raimundo Bassols as ambassador to the EEC. This decision was not surprising bearing in mind that Ullastres had occupied the post for the last 11 years and was the most veteran ambassador to the EEC. Yet there was an implicit political symbolism in this change, for Ullastres represented the Franco regime and the new era in Spain required a new ambassador. On 9 December 1976 Ullastres officially retired. The day before, he wrote a letter to the Foreign Minister reporting the conversation he had had with the President of the Commission Francois Xavier Ortolí, during his farewell dinner. The letter accurately summarized the situation of the negotiations. Ortolí emphasized that he had always been optimistic and believed that the political evolution would culminate happily. As far as negotiations for Spain’s membership were concerned, he did not foresee any political problems, just some economic ones especially in agriculture where Spain’s interests clashed with those of France and Italy.56 Although it was unpredictable how long it would take to overcome the economic obstacles for Spain’s integration into the EEC, Ullastres


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had reason to retire with satisfaction. During his 11 years as head of the mission in Brussels, the Spanish situation in relation to the European Community had undergone a remarkable transformation. When he arrived in Brussels in 1965, Spain was a total outcast, and the political obstacles made her integration into the Community an impossible dream. Now in 1976, he could leave repeating the words of President Ortolí, ‘the President of the Commission did not see any political obstacles for Spain’s march to Europe’.57 The new ambassador in Brussels was the career diplomat, Raimundo Bassols. On 13 December 1976 he presented credentials to the President of the Commission François Xavier Ortolí, and the President of the Council of Ministers Max van der Stoel. Both presidents showed great concern over the Spanish situation and Bassols took advantage of the occasion in order to give an outline of the new Spanish European policy. The political reforms which the last two Foreign Ministers announced were being promptly implemented: first, the law for political reform was passed by the Cortes; second, a referendum for the approval of the reform would take place; third, political parties would be progressively organized; fourth, free elections would take place before summer. The conclusion was obvious: after the political reform had been completed, Spain would apply for membership of the European Community. Once Spain had applied it was hoped that the Spanish entry would be duly dealt with by the Community under acceptable terms. Finally, in the short run, it was necessary to update the 1970 agreement, if possible before March 1977, since otherwise it would coincide with the Spanish elections.58 Shortly thereafter, Bassols held interviews with each ambassador of the EEC member states in Brussels, in order to discuss Spain’s situation. On 19 January 1977 he wrote to the Foreign Minister Oreja reporting his impressions. All nine governments were satisfied with the remarkable tranquillity with which the transition to democracy was taking place. They all expected Spain to apply for integration into the European Community, once the first democratic government had been elected, and expected the EEC to give this application the consideration it deserved, particularly from the political point of view. Certain difficulties were foreseen in the economic sphere but above all there should be no obstacle to the progress of negotiations.59 This eagerness to prepare the application for membership of the European Community without even completing the transition is quite understandable. The initiation of negotiations with the EEC implied

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European recognition of the Spanish political system, which would play an essential role in the consolidation of democracy. It was also important to initiate contacts as soon as possible since negotiations for full membership would take a long time.60 Finally, Spain seemed to be going through a good moment of popularity among the Community member states. According to the opinion poll carried out in November 1976 on behalf of the European Commission in all EEC member states, Switzerland, Spain and Austria were, in that order, the countries which people in the EEC would most like to have seen join the Community.61 This result was particularly encouraging for Spain, not only because it came second in the list of preferences, but also because as Switzerland was not considering joining, it left Spain at the top of the list. On 15 December 1976 the government’s law for political reform was overwhelmingly approved in the referendum: 94.2 per cent voted in favour and only 2.6 per cent against. This result boosted the popularity of the Suarez government both domestically and abroad, making it evident, even to the democratic opposition, that the government was effectively carrying out the plan for transition to democracy. In view of the recent events in Spain, Europe was to adopt a double strategy for the new year: one at political and another at institutional level. European political parties intensified their relations with their colleagues in Spain and planned a strategy to ensure a good result for their political option in the spring elections. At the European Parliament, debates on the situation in Spain became more regular and although intransigence was considerably reduced, the need to achieve proper democracy in Spain was constantly repeated. Meanwhile the EC Commission prepared itself for an imminent Spanish application, though warning that it would still take some time for negotiations to begin. Maurice Faure continued travelling to Spain and giving advice on democratization. On 21 February 1977, he discussed with Osorio the European perception of the Spanish transition to democracy. Faure insisted that it would be desirable to establish two moderate political forces which would avoid the Communist and reactionary extremes, adding that in Europe the danger did not come from the Communist parties, generally in a minority, but from the Soviet army and its satellites. Above all the formation of a popular front should be avoided, and for this purpose it was important not to force the Socialist party to become more radical but to allow it to stay within its natural area of influence in a democracy.62


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In January 1977 the Spanish Christian Democrats, Equipo Demócrata Cristiano del Estado Español, EDCEE, organized a meeting in Madrid with the European Christian Democratic Union, under the clearly electoral slogan ‘To Europe with us’. It counted on the presence of distinguished European Christian Democrats, among them Aldo Moro, Mariano Rumor, Leo Tindemans, Bertrand and the President of the ECDU, von Hassel. However, the leaders of German Christian Democracy did not attend since they had a better relationship with those Spaniards who had distanced themselves from Ruiz Gimenez and Gil Robles, led by Alvarez de Miranda, Cavero, Ortega y Díaz Ambrona, and who were in favour of seeking an understanding with Suarez. This struggle between the two sectors of Spanish Christian Democracy was going to be intensified when Leo Tindemans took the opportunity during his stay in Madrid to visit Suarez. After this he declared that Suarez was making a great effort to transform the country into a true democracy. Tindemans concluded that ‘all Western democratic forces have the duty of assisting him in such a difficult task’.63 The Suarez government was also aware of the advantage in associating itself with the European Christian Democrats. Suarez admitted to having included in his first government a good contingent of politicians with a similar ideology in an attempt to gain international recognition. From 1976, the government attempted to improve its external image with the help of the European Christian Democrats. During the event of the ECDU, Suarez took advantage of their presence in Madrid to have interviews with some of them. From 1976, the government attempted to improve its external image with the help of European Christian Democrats like Faure. According to Osorio, after some conversations with these visitors, Suarez confessed to him ‘I am getting on very well with these men and I consider myself as one more Christian Democrat.’64 Vice-President Osorio also attempted to ensure that the ECDU would support a future centre party identified with Christian Democracy and promoted by the government. Nevertheless his efforts did not manage to divert the loyalty of the ECDU to their allies in the EDCEE. At the same time the process of legalization of left-wing parties made steady progress. In February 1977, the PSOE had been legalized. In March a Euro-Communist summit took place in Madrid, attended by the most important Communist personalities such as Berlinguer and Marchais, which put the government in a difficult position, since banning it would provoke a scandal in Europe whereas permitting it

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would imply a recognition of the Spanish Communists. The government opted to turn a blind eye on the event and shortly after, on 9 April the Spanish Communist Party was legalized. The fact that it had adopted this decision defying the hostile reactions it would provoke from the ultra-right and the army, received Europe’s praise. The European institutions promptly reacted to these evident signs of democratization in Spain. On 8 March 1977 the Iberian peninsula was debated at the EC Council of Ministers. On 5 April 1977 Spain, Greece and Portugal were included in the agenda of the next Council of Ministers. The Council acknowledged receipt of the Portuguese petition for membership of the EEC, and passed a mandate for the negotiation of an agreement with Greece.65 After the legalization of the PCE and the general elections on 22 April 1977, the European Parliament unanimously passed a resolution in which it recognized the fulfilment of democratic promises that the Suarez government had made in July 1976.66 Spanish diplomacy was prepared for negotiations with the European Community. On 8 June 1977, a week before the elections, ambassador Bassols wrote to the Foreign Minister Oreja with comments about what the new European policy ought to be. Bassols pointed out that 15 June constituted the end of an era which had begun in February 1962, in which Spain had been marginalized from Europe for political reasons. After the elections the door leading to Spain’s full integration into the EEC would be opened. Both for political and economic reasons the European Community was not only the most desirable but also the most realistic solution to Spain’s problems, and for this reason Spain should apply for entry after the elections. In fact, it was important that the will to be integrated into Europe should be manifested in the first public declaration of the new government, as the Community was expecting it. It would not be desirable to delay the application since Greece had applied for membership on 12 June 1975 and Portugal had done so on 28 March 1977. There was a risk that Spain could be left behind.67

5. 4. The first democratic elections The Spanish general elections took place on 15 June. The UCD coalition led by Adolfo Suarez emerged as winners with 47 per cent of the seats, followed by the Socialist PSOE with 33 per cent. The Communist party came third with 9 per cent and the neo-Francoist party Alianza Popular polled a mere 8 per cent of the votes. The result was noted


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throughout Western Europe with satisfaction, as the Spaniards had voted for moderation and change, and rejected both Francoism as well as utopian left-wing solutions. In fact, the link with Europe proved to be the key to success in the elections, since the two most successful parties had been the ones which had developed the most contacts with Europe. Shortly after the elections the new democratic government did not hesitate to initiate a campaign of rapprochement towards Europe. At a press conference given by Prime Minister Suarez on 28 June he was asked about Spain’s entry into NATO and the EEC, to which he replied: Spain is in Europe and forms part of it. Democratic countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece constitute a contribution to Europe of men, geographic and political structures of major importance.68 On 11 July 1977 it was officially notified that the new government would present in due course an application for the opening of negotiations for entry into the European Community. On 22 July, the Council of Ministers announced that the government had authorized the Foreign Minister to present the application for joining the EEC. On that same day Suarez had a meeting with the Socialist leader Felipe Gonzalez, who declared to the press afterwards that ‘the PSOE supports the application for entry into the EEC’.69 Finally, on 26 July, Foreign Minister Oreja arrived in Brussels. Before leaving the airport he stated: ‘the option adopted by the government of applying for entry into the European Community is truly national’.70 This statement was quite accurate; it had been true for Francoist Spain and was going to be the case in democratic Spain. Unlike its concern with the European Community, the government showed no interest in applying for entry into NATO, the other major Western organization which had vetoed Spain’s entry for political reasons. The motives for this paradox are several. In contrast to the European Community, NATO was not associated in Spain with democracy but rather with American strategic interests. In fact, despite NATO’s allegiance to the defence of democratic principles of the West, Portugal under the Salazar dictatorship had become a member and Greece remained in the organization after the coup of the colonels. Another major reason for avoiding an application to NATO was that it was not approved of by a considerable part of the political sphere, in particular the left-wing parties, and at a time when consensus was particularly weak it would not have been wise. Nevertheless, some

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contacts were established with the organization. Areilza was in favour of joining it, and in February 1976 he visited the General Secretary Joseph Luns, becoming the first Spanish Foreign Minister to visit NATO headquarters officially.71 After the first democratic elections, NATO was willing to remove the political veto on Spain and in fact, Oreja had an interview with the NATO General Secretary on the same day that he applied for entry into the EEC. However, despite these initial contacts, Suarez avoided the decision of joining the organization.72 Spain officially applied for entry into the EEC on 28 July. The Spanish Foreign Minister handed the official application for membership of the European Community to the President of the EC Council of Ministers, Henri Simonet. Simonet stated that it was a historical event as much for Spain as for the EEC.73 In Europe the events in Spain were observed with satisfaction, particularly the remarkable peace with which elections had taken place after almost forty years of dictatorship. It was also unanimously recognized that the Spanish political system was now equivalent to the rest of Western Europe. The European parliamentary institutions officially praised Spain’s new democracy. On 6 July the European Parliament passed a resolution by which it congratulated Spain on the development of the first democratic elections and expressed ‘its political will to see Spain occupy a place in the European Community as soon as possible’.74 On 8 July 1977 the Assembly of the Council of Europe, passed a resolution congratulating the Spanish people on the maturity demonstrated in voting freely and inviting a series of political representatives to head a delegation of observers to attend a session in October.75 The reaction in Europe to Spain’s application made a big contrast with any previous Spanish contact with the institution. The spokesman for the European Commission declared: The Commission congratulates itself for the desire expressed by Spain and will participate fully and actively in the consecutive tasks to the petition according to the appropriate proceedings.76 The President of the Council of Ministers Henri Simonet made the following comment: Spain’s dimension, the vigour of her economy, the potential it represents and the role that she plays in the Mediterranean, prevents the European Community from being able to underestimate Spain’s


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candidature. On taking it into consideration, the Community shows the degree of confidence it has in her. We shall do all there is in our power so that the negotiations shall culminate within reasonable time and conditions.77 As regards the reaction of the Community member states these were generally encouraging. The spokesmen for Great Britain, Germany and Holland welcomed Spain to the European Community without misgivings. However, despite the widespread recognition that Spain had fulfilled the political conditions for entering the European Community, economic issues were soon to break this unanimous political will to see Spain join the European Community.

6 The Negotiations of Democratic Spain with the European Community, 1977–85

6. 1. Beginning negotiations With the elections of June 1977 Spain became a parliamentary democracy. As soon as this process of transition finished a new one started: the international transition which involved abandoning the abnormal situation Spain had maintained over the last forty years and becoming a full member of the Western community of nations. The most important aspect of this international transition was integration into the European Community. The Community veto on Spain’s entry had been withdrawn the day that Spain became a democracy. However, despite the fact that the EEC welcomed the Spanish application for membership it was clear that Spain’s entry would not come about until after a long process of negotiations. Aware of this fact, Spanish diplomacy carefully prepared the strategy for negotiations. Ambassador Bassols wrote down in a paper which he constantly referred to the reasons why Spain aimed at membership of the European Community. Firstly, there were political reasons: the European Community constituted a definite anchorage to democracy. It symbolized the end of an intolerable period of isolation. It guaranteed the practice of liberties. It presented a new horizon which was going to lead Europe into a process of political and economic integration. Secondly, there were economic reasons: 48 per cent of Spain’s exports (80 per cent of her agricultural exports) went to the European Common Market and 30 per cent of her imports came from that area. Also, 41 per cent of foreign investments into Spain came from the Community. As long as Spain remained out of the EEC, exports to Europe would suffer restrictions and the industries in crisis would be 150

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deprived of financial aid. The most backward regions would also be deprived of European benefits. Thirdly, there were social reasons. Nine hundred thousand Spaniards lived in the European Community, but were not eligible for the rights which the EEC workers enjoyed. Finally, there were legal reasons: the EEC had a modern and efficient legislation. The Spanish judicial system was obsolete and its modernization would be difficult to implement in a young democracy. Membership of the Community would enable the introduction of a system by the EEC institutions and be tacitly accepted by Spaniards as the price to be paid for membership.1 To summarize, entry into the European Community was not only identified with the consolidation of democracy but also with a global modernization of the country in politics, the economy and society. Spain was impatient to initiate negotiations but the obstacle was a very tight agenda at the Council of Ministers. At the October Council of Ministers they would deal with Greece, and the next one in November already had a full agenda. Therefore if the Spanish case was not dealt with in September it would be delayed until the following year.2 Another reason why Spain needed a quick response from the EEC was the fear of being left behind the other two Mediterranean candidates. In both the Greek and Portuguese cases, the first EEC Council of Ministers following their application had requested the view of the Commission. There was no sense of solidarity between the Mediterranean candidates, in fact Greece was worried that the globalization of the three applications would delay her entry, and was eager to have her case treated separately.3 Ambassador Bassols was convinced that Prime Minister Suarez should carry out a tour round all Community capitals. It would serve a double purpose: first to put pressure on the member states to discuss the Spanish case in September and, secondly, to enhance the image of the new democratic government in Europe. The precedent had been established by the Portuguese Prime Minister Soares, who visited the nine EEC capitals shortly before handing in Portugal’s application for membership on 28 June 1977. It was therefore decided that Suarez would visit all EEC capitals between 29 August and 10 November. After the first visits to Holland, Denmark, France and Italy the aim had been achieved. The EC Council of Ministers which met on 20 September 1977 informed the Spanish premier that the procedure for admission had been initiated.4 The initiation of conversations between Spain and the EEC was

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delayed due to the fact that the Spanish government had still not appointed a delegation. Negotiations required a delegation under the leadership of a political figure. It was a task that could not be dealt with by a foreign minister who was absorbed by many other international issues. It was therefore decided to create a new ministry for relations with the European Community.5 On 10 February Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo was appointed to the post, a well-known politician who had already become acquainted with the EEC as Minister of Commerce in the previous cabinet. The Commission was soon to reveal increasing concern over the consequences of enlargement. On 19 April 1978, it presented a document under the heading of ‘General Considerations on Enlargement’, most commonly known as the Fresco.6 In the economic and institutional sphere the Fresco proved discouraging. It underlined the need to strengthen cohesion and progress on the road towards economic, monetary and political unification – essential conditions in the process of European integration – but these aims were obstructed by three new candidates with far less developed economies than the EEC member states. The Fresco concluded that the solution would be the establishment of financial aid for the candidates in exchange for a strict economic programme. As far as the political will for enlargement went, the Fresco reflected the spirit of the Treaty of Rome stating that ‘the three countries have entrusted the Community with a political responsibility which it could not possibly avoid without renouncing the principles on which it was built’. On the whole the Commission left it clear that the EEC needed to resolve several internal problems before adopting this decision. As regards the argument so often advocated by politicians that enlargement should be speeded up at all costs in order to consolidate democracy in southern Europe, it was ignored. Both the Fresco and the ‘Opinion on Spain’s Application for Membership’ published shortly after, dedicated just a few sentences to the issue of the democratic consolidation of southern Europe.7 Contacts between Spain and the European Community intensified. On 27 April the President of the Commission Roy Jenkins, made his first official visit to Spain. On arriving in Madrid he stressed the need for the EEC to give a warm response to Spain as well as to other applicant countries and added that the Commission and Spain’s interest had the same goal: strengthening the Community.8 Not satisfied with these wishful declarations, Calvo Sotelo embarked on a tour round European capitals on 9 May with the aim of speeding up negotiations.


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In Brussels he managed to get Natali to announce that the publication of a decree on Spain that was due for the first term of 1979, would be moved to November 1978.9 The decree on Spain was announced by the Commission on 29 November and was immediately communicated to the Council of Ministers.10 The decree supported Spanish entry into the European Community and recommended the initiation of negotiations. It considered that the Spanish market had a great potential and would also open up new horizons in Latin America as a result of the traditional links that Spain had with this continent. However, it also emphasized the fact that the Spanish economy would need time to be brought into line with the EEC. Certain sectors of the Spanish economy were very competitive and could damage their Community rivals, however other sectors could be seriously affected by the introduction of competitors. It was therefore necessary to work out the appropriate balance. The industrial sector required a readaptation for the elimination of tariffs that had been pending since the 1970 agreement. It was necessary to restructure certain industries so as to adapt them to the needs of the Community. The agricultural sector posed serious problems. Spain’s entry implied a 30 per cent increase of the Common Market’s agricultural land, 31 per cent of its active population and 31 per cent of its exploitations. Fifty-eight per cent of Spanish agricultural exports were sent to the Nine whereas only 10 per cent of Spain’s agricultural imports came from the EEC. Spain’s entry would be particularly problematic to the Community Mediterranean areas. Therefore it would be necessary to introduce progressively the Common Agricultural Policy and prevent the collapse of certain agricultural areas that the introduction of Spanish agricultural products would cause. In regional and social policy Spain’s entry would increase the number of underdeveloped regions. Also there would be tensions as a result of the introduction of industrial policies in some areas, which would cause some traditional industries to disappear. Some areas could be severely affected by unemployment and emigration. In foreign relations, the Spanish entry would on the one hand increase its commercial potential but on the other affect relations with the Mediterranean countries, whose exports would be challenged by Spain. The decree concluded that once Spain entered the European Community she would have to undergo a transition period that should last for ten years. It would allow Spain to be ready for tariff

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unification, free circulation of labour, the Common Agricultural Policy and agreements with third countries. On 19 December the EC Council of Ministers declared itself in favour of Spain’s application also agreeing that the exploratory talks should be completed soon in order to allow negotiations for entry to start in February 1979.11 The European Parliament, proved to be the less problematic institution in relation to Spain. On 18 January 1979 it manifested its satisfaction with the fact that Greece, Portugal and Spain had established democratic regimes and confirmed its desire that these countries should join the European Community.12 The Spanish lobby had worked for this result. Between 14 and 16 January a delegation of the Cortes had visited the Parliament bringing two messages: first, the desirability of completing the negotiations for entry as soon as possible, and secondly that the Cortes should be regularly informed about their progress. The Parliament discussed this visit on 18 January and promised to deal with the request. Nevertheless, the European Parliament also reflected the economic misgivings in Europe about enlargement. At a debate on 10 May 1979 it expressed its concern about the economic difficulties of enlargement, demanding that adequate measures be taken.13 The attitude of the European Parliament in the negotiations was always encouraging for Spain as it had always defended the view that the economy should serve a political aim, not the other way round as so often happened in the decision-taking process of the European Community.

6. 2. The Spanish political consensus in relation to the European Community The process of Spain’s negotiations with the European Community was followed with great interest by Spanish society just like any other country involved in the same process. However, the case of Spain is unique because it experienced a political consensus in favour of entry into the EEC that had not been experienced before by any other country in Europe. All political parties represented in the Spanish Parliament were in favour of Spain’s integration into the European Community. Moreover, all agreed that this was a truly national aim and was the most important target of Spanish foreign policy.14 The explanation for this unanimity is deep in Spanish contemporary history as Europe had symbolized the country’s modernization


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for a long time, particularly after the postwar years when integration into Europe was defended by most Spaniards for either political or economic reasons. But more specifically in the new Spanish democracy, membership of the European Community was deemed essential by all political groups although they did not necessarily agree about the motives. The Alianza Popular and Unión de Centro Democrático supported Spain’s entry into the European Community for different reasons although they agreed on the basic ones. The Community symbolized the consolidation of democracy and the recovery of Spain’s historical role in Europe. It also stood for traditional values upheld by Western society, and against the pseudo-revolutionary changes of the Left. For a society that was coming out of an authoritarian regime this was very important. Secondly, the EEC would guarantee the persistence of the free-market economy. In all member states capitalism had persisted no matter how strong the left-wing forces were. In Spain this would guarantee respect for private property and business enterprise. Thus the Spanish bourgeoisie, and in particular those who had prospered in the 1960s ‘economic miracle’ felt that their status would not be threatened by the EEC. At party level the AP and UCD had different reasons for supporting entry into the EEC. The Alianza Popular, led by Manuel Fraga, represented the rightwing option. Among its members there were several ex-ministers of Franco and members of the Francoist élite. Although it claimed full allegiance to democracy, it also demanded respect for the legacy of the Franco regime. Its electoral programme was typical of a European Conservative party and should have attracted the same electorate. Yet its unashamedly Francoist past made many conservatives choose other options. The AP was in favour of joining the EEC, but this support also served an electoral purpose, since Europeanism had been synonymous with democracy and it could contribute to lessen the Francoist image that was so damaging to the party’s popularity. The first political programme of the AP, intended to ‘fully participate in the political and economic field of Communitary Europe’.15 But the AP also used the allegiance to Europe as a way of enhancing traditional national values. We shall foster the strength and prestige of the Spanish state as well as maximum international cooperation. We shall work so that

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Spain shall occupy a place in Europe and shall cooperate for its common destiny retaining her own personality, rejecting all intervention in our internal affairs.16 The Unión de Centro Democrático, led by Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez, was the party in government. It claimed to be at the centre of the political spectrum and its members were of diverse political origins, some of them former members of the Francoist political élite like Suarez himself, while others had been members of the reformist opposition. Owing to the role that this party played in the transition to democracy, it symbolized the entry into a democratic and modern era and a definite break with Francoism. Compared to the AP which was regarded as the reactionary right the UCD was the ‘civilized’ right and the liberal option. The European ideology of the UCD was very much influenced by the Christian Democratic groups in Europe with which many members of the UCD had been in touch, ever since the Congress of Munich. The first electoral programme of the UCD supported ‘the principle of incorporation into the European Communities’, since the ideologies that constituted UCD were ‘those which made possible the construction of Europe and the re-birth of democracy in the old continent after the last world war’. It also added that the ‘final aim must lead into the construction of a unified Europe’.17 The document produced at the 1978 congress ‘Ideological Principles and the UCD’s Model of Society’ included Europeanism in the definition of the party. In fact it was linked to the political centre to which the party claimed allegiance. UCD is the Spanish political party with the clearest European vocation; it is the one that is most profoundly identified with the political and socio-economic organization of Western Europe, which is not Marxist revolutionary nor does it defend the interests of a political right of authoritarian tendencies.18 The Socialist PSOE and the Communist PCE represented the leftwing options. Traditionally, southern European Socialists and Communists in particular, were lukewarm supporters of European integration and in some cases they were overtly opposed to it. This was not the case in Spain, where Socialists and Communists fully supported entry into the European Community. This enthusiastic allegiance to the Europeanist cause of the Spanish Left had its origins in


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the Franco regime, since throughout the period when left-wing activity was clandestine, Europe was essential for its survival in many ways. For Spanish left-wing thought the European Community was a symbol of democracy and civil rights, which the Francoist regime had denied. Membership of the European Community would enable the consolidation of democracy in Spain and eliminate any threat of regression to a dictatorial system. Despite the fact that the European Community was essentially capitalist, once Spain had become part of it the Spanish Left would be able to work closely with its comrades in Europe for the transformation of the monetary Europe into a Socialist Europe. Aware that no other Spanish party had developed a closer link with its European equivalent, the PSOE regarded itself as the party that could best lead Spain into Europe. In the electoral programme of 1977 the PSOE claimed to assume ‘the responsibility of opening Europe to Spain’ due to its splendid relations with the Socialist and Social Democratic parties in Europe’, and it proposed that the first democratic government should apply for entry into the Council of Europe, sign the European Social Chapter and apply for membership of the EEC. It added the following arguments for this Europeanism: Democratic Spain cannot be absent from the construction of a unified Europe that shall overcome obsolete nationalisms and may endow the framework for the development of socialism, independent from imperialism and in cooperation with the Third World. The aim of this process must be a democratic and Socialist Europe.19 What was more amazing was that the PSOE’s advocacy of Europeanism was made compatible with anti-imperialist slogans of the radical Left. The 1979 programme made Western values compatible with anti-American imperialism. ‘We the Socialists want to avoid Spain becoming a satellite of any bloc. We aim at gaining autonomy for our country within the Western world to which we belong’.20 The Spanish Communists like all Marxist-Leninist parties, were no enthusiastic Europeanists. Europeanism was particularly anathema to the Greek and Portuguese Communists who followed more Sovietinspired policies. However, the European Community was soon to appear as a useful tool for fostering the Communist cause in Western Europe. For the Communist parties which challenged Soviet obedience, the concept of Euro-Communism and integration into Europe were deemed interdependent.

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As Communist influence in the European institutions was very limited, the PCE never enjoyed support like that of the Socialists. Yet it soon came to realize that the allegiance to Europeanism would be a useful asset (See Chapter 4, section 4. 3). The 1975 Communist Manifesto proposed Spain’s entry into the European Community and the democratization of the latter. In the 1977 electoral programme it repeated these aims. In that same year Carrillo published Eurocomunismo y Estado in which he pointed out that his EuroCommunist proposal implied a common strategy of all European Socialist forces ‘which can contribute decisively to the creation of a unified Europe’.21 A year after, in 1978, the PCE entered the Federal Council of the European Movement. That same year Carrillo stated in the Cortes that ‘the Communists supported the petition presented by the government in Brussels for starting negotiations that should lead to Spanish entry into the European Community’. This was repeated in 1979 where it demanded the impulse of the contacts for entering the European Community ensuring the widest social and political participation in governmental decisions.22 Nationalist and regionalist parties which challenged the centralized structure of the Spanish state during the Franco regime had all been illegal. After Franco’s death their claims for autonomy became widespread. By the 1978 constitution Spain was divided into 17 autonomous regions, and the historical nationalities of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia were granted a special status which included an autonomous parliament and the recognition of their local language as official languages of the state. For the nationalist parties, particularly the Catalan and Basque nationalists, the European Community was the ideal forum for the propagation of their aims. For them European nation-states were obsolete and would be substituted by a great European state in which the historic regions would be allowed to play an independent role from the nation to which they had been historically attached. Membership of the European Community would also contribute to ease tensions between nationalist parties and the central government. As regards the economic advantages, many Spanish regions would be eligible for the Community funds for the underdeveloped regions. 23 On 27 June 1979, four months after the initiation of negotiations, the issue of Spain’s entry into the European Community was discussed at the Congress of Deputies.


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Calvo Sotelo pointed out that Spain’s decision to join the European Community should have everyone’s support ‘because it is our privilege to be part of Europe, and we should not be absent from the forum where the new united profile is being debated’.24 He concluded by saying that Europe was not a magical solution for Spain’s problems, although adding that only European solutions could be reasonable. Oreja concluded by requesting the Cortes to vote in favour of Spain’s adhesion to the EEC. The motion was passed by 285 votes in favour and only two against. A joint motion was then passed with the support of all parties – the UCD, AP, PSOE, PCE as well as the nationalist parties CIU, PNV and so on. It said the following: 1. This chamber has taken note of the communication made by the government about the European Communities, the process of negotiations and the consequences of integration. 2. Has listened to the positions of all parliamentary groups in relation to these issues. 3. Expressed support for the decision to integrate Spain into the European Community. 4. Requested the government to continue informing this Chamber punctually, at the level of a Commission, about the progress of negotiations and encourages it to lead them with the utmost resolution in defence of Spanish interests. 5. Requests the government to inform the trade union and business organizations and the rest of the political forces periodically about the state of negotiations.25

6. 3. The stagnation of negotiations with the European Community Negotiations for Spain’s entry into the European Community officially began on 5 February 1979. Bearing in mind the international context of this date it is not surprising that negotiations were soon to decay into confusion. A month before, a new oil crisis was to plunge the industrialized countries into recession. There was also the impression that the USSR was gaining strength in the Cold War. Western Europe’s security was being undermined, for which enlargement was relegated to a secondary place in the Community’s agenda.26 The analysis of Spain’s negotiations from the Community’s side reveals a constant dichotomy between high and low politics. The EEC was experiencing the growth of ‘Euro-sclerosis’ in which the self-

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interest of the member states was to make it increasingly difficult to foster the Community’s development. In the words of Lukas Tsoukalis, ‘the rhetoric of Western democratic ideas gradually gave way to heated discussion about the price of peaches and olive oil’.27 At the opening ceremony, the President of the Council of Ministers, Jean-François Poncet announced the schedule for negotiations. From February to September the Commission would establish the basis for negotiations, the second stage would conclude with an overview and then a new stage would be initiated for the negotiation of all sectors.28 This schedule was rather discouraging for Spain. After the Commission’s Fresco it was still necessary to go through a preliminary stage before initiating negotiations. This confirmed Ambassador Bassols’ suspicion that real negotiations would not start until the end of summer when the French presidency of the Community had finished.29 Despite the unpredictable future of the Euro-Spanish negotiations Spain soon started to make progress in the European political sphere. François Poncet had pointed out that Spain should be ready to accept all the political aims of the EEC and he handed over a letter in which the aims of the European Political Cooperation were explained. Oreja made a declaration to the Belgian paper Le Soir in which he put this event in historical context. We are definitely heading towards Europe, breaking a long historical period of isolation which, since 1815, has kept Spain marginalized from the great Western political currents.30 From the day negotiations were opened, both the Spanish government and the political parties intensified their contacts with the European Community, discussing not only aspects of the negotiation with Spain but also the structure and aims of the EEC. On 9 September Oreja organized a meeting at the Spanish embassy in Brussels with all Ambassadors of the Community member states as well as the Greek and the Portuguese, in order to discuss the future of the European Political Cooperation and the role that the three new members would play in it.31 Taking advantage of his stay in Brussels, Oreja gave a conference at the Institut Royal des Relations Internationales in Brussels under the heading of ‘Spain’s foreign policy. A clear policy: the West’. He pointed out that the aims of Spanish foreign policy were to strengthen national security, safeguard territorial integrity, protect emigrant interests, stimulate trade, encourage détente and disarmament, and promote a


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new economic international order as well as the protection of human rights. He stressed that the neutralist temptations no longer existed. Furthermore, Spain formed part of the Western security system and was fully aware that the defence of Western Europe hinged on the Atlantic Alliance with which she would conduct negotiations in the near future. Finally aware of Europe’s vulnerability she urged on the need for a Euro-strategy.32 Prime Minister Suarez also intervened in the negotiations. Aware that France was the most serious obstacle, the premier visited Paris on 29 November accompanied by seven ministers who in their turn met their French colleagues. Suarez held conversations with Giscard and Prime Minister Raymond Barre which he termed as extremely satisfactory. Quoting Barre, he informed the press that there were no obstacles to Spain’s entry into the Community but only problems which required reasonable solutions.33 A month later, on 15 December Suarez met the President of the Commission Roy Jenkins in order to review the negotiations, and the two parties confirmed that they would try to get through the bulk of negotiations by the end of 1980.34 The relative progress made in negotiations with Spain was suddenly interrupted by the outbreak of a crisis with France. On 5 June 1980 the French President stated at the French Assembly of the Chamber of Agriculture, that the integration of some new members was not possible yet, since they requested dispensation from Common Market obligations. He added that the EEC already had enough problems without considering the ones that the new candidates would pose, concluding that it would be advisable for the Community to complete the first enlargement before becoming involved in initiating a new one.35 It was well known that France was a lukewarm supporter of Spain’s entry into the EEC due to clashes over agriculture. What was certainly not expected was that Giscard d’Estaing himself would provoke a confrontation, since he had been an enthusiastic advocate of democracy in Spain and had always been willing to support the new monarchy in Europe.36 The declarations of the French President provoked indignation not only among the countries affected by them but also within the EEC. The following day, the European Commission declared that it had no comments to make on the statement of the French President and that it had the intention of completing negotiations in accordance with the predicted timetable.37 Even though the French President referred to enlargement in general, it seemed that only Spain would be affected. The French

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government confirmed that these declarations would not affect the Greek case whose entrance into the Community would come into effect on 1 January 1981. The Portuguese Prime Minister declared that French declarations were not aimed at Portugal, and shortly after there were rumours that Portugal wanted her case to be treated separately from Spain.38 The prospect of Spain being left alone to face the French veto while the other two Mediterranean candidates succeeded in the march towards the EEC could not be more discouraging. In view of these dim prospects Ambassador Bassols sent a letter to the new Minister for Relations with the EEC, Eduardo Punset, informing him about the Portuguese intentions and adding that if they succeeded it would have a very negative impact on the country. Even worse, once Portugal was in, France could then decide to lock the door on Spain indefinitely, alleging that the EEC was not prepared for another enlargement. It was therefore essential to exert pressure in order to avoid this.39 Shortly afterwards the situation was clarified: France was not against enlargement and would not veto Spain or Portugal’s entry but she simply refused to negotiate the chapters relating to agriculture and the budget until the EEC had modified its rules in these aspects. It was not clear how long this ‘pause’ as it became known, would last, but it was certainly going to delay Spanish entry considerably. Spain received the news of what was soon known as the Giscardazo with indignation, and exploited old grievances about France. The press was particularly morbid; Cambio 16 for example quoted Charles I of Spain telling his son, the future Philip II that ‘the French never do what they promise’.40 The disenchantment provoked by this crisis could lead to a rise in scepticism in relation to the EEC, and break the consensus which Spain had enjoyed until then in the European policy. The Spanish government called an urgent Council of Ministers, on 6 June and it issued a communiqué warning that if the Commission yielded to the French attitude it would be transferring to the new candidates difficulties originally caused by other member countries. It also put forward the conviction that neither internal Community measures nor economic circumstances should interrupt negotiations or affect the political compromise which the Nine had expressed to see Spain join the EEC.41 The outbreak of this crisis did not take the Minister for Relations with the EEC by surprise. Three days before, on 2 June, Calvo Sotelo attended a joint commission between the European Parliament and the Spanish Cortes, in which the Franco-Spanish clash was discussed.


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The Commission’s Vice-President, Natali, made an apologetic speech alleging that Spain’s entry into the Community created serious problems and concluded that the only way of accepting Spain would be by making her apply VAT to her products from the beginning. Calvo Sotelo counterattacked pointing out that the EEC deceived itself by delaying Spain’s entry. The Community was already so complex that there would always be a problem. Public opinion in Spain was increasingly disappointed by the fact that the EEC’s economic interests were more important than the political will to allow Spain’s entry, and hypocritical manifestations of support were no longer believed. Moreover, the European attitude was damaging the cause of democracy in Spain, since in times of political instability the country could not afford to wait indefinitely for negotiations to finish. On 6 June Calvo Sotelo stated that the French declarations constituted the biggest obstruction in the history of EEC negotiations. From now on he understood that the negotiations would focus on relations between Spain and France. Consequently he adopted a double strategy, on the one hand focusing on French domestic policy and on the other lobbying the rest of the EEC member states for support against France.42 He wrote to the Italian Minister Colombo who was then President of the Commission expressing Spanish preoccupations. The Spanish Prime Minister himself sent a letter to the German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. These letters were not sent in vain as the majority of the Community continued supporting enlargement. The fact that no other Community member supported the pause did not alter the French attitude. On 3 July the French Prime Minister Raymond Barre travelled to Spain on an official visit in return for the one made by Prime Minister Suarez. Adopting a conciliatory attitude, he explained that France was not against Spain’s entry but there were problems which ought to be dealt with beforehand.43 These declarations did not placate the Spaniards and the Franco-Spanish reconciliation was stillborn. This unfortunate event in Spanish European policy was to coincide with moments of tension in the domestic policy which led to a cabinet reshuffle on 8 September 1980. The policy towards the EEC was affected by it, since Calvo Sotelo was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and was substituted at the head of the Spanish delegation in Europe by Eduardo Punset, who had neither the prestige nor the experience in Community affairs that his predecessor enjoyed. In June Marcelino Oreja had been replaced by José María Pérez Llorca as Foreign Minister.

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In the meantime the march towards Europe continued on various fronts. On 13 October a conference took place in Madrid under the title of ‘Spain and the Common Market’. It was organized by the Financial Times and was attended by many leading figures, Spanish authorities, members of European institutions and representatives of the business world. On this occasion the European Commissioner Natali defended Spain’s candidature. He emphasized the advantages of Spain’s membership. To the question of whether it was better to wait for the consolidation of the Nine before enlargement he pointed out that the problems which the current Community was experiencing would exist with or without enlargement. He added that the principle of fair return should not have its place without the enlarged Community, where solidarity among all regions should see a geographical and cultural Europe translated into a political and economic Europe. He concluded that if the process failed the price Europeans would have to pay for it would be nothing less than their extinction.44 On the Spanish side Calvo Sotelo felt that the country’s policy in preparation for accession coincided almost completely with the policy required to solve the domestic crisis. The Socialist leader Felipe Gonzalez made a strong appeal for working out a successful entry into the EEC. The Commission’s Vice-President Natali visited Spain on 12 November. He tried to justify the pause, arguing that it was provisional and that there would be a Community declaration about agriculture at the end of the year, and the rhythm of conversations would be speeded up.45 Not fully convinced by Natali’s arguments, towards the end of November Punset set out on a tour of the European capitals including the EEC institutions. Punset insisted that the political will should help negotiations to progress. In relation to this issue he proposed that informal bilateral negotiations should be carried out with the aim of clarifying mutual misunderstandings. In order to gain the support of one of the big Community members Punset held an interview with the German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on 28 November. Despite the success of this interview the Spanish Ambassador in Bonn, Emilio Garrigues, was to warn against the strategy of attempting to rely on Germany to overcome the problems in the Community: Genscher will continue to be our godfather, but even if he were our actual father he would still be conditioned by the nemo dat quod non


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habet, by which I mean that he would not like to oppose the Community majority or even less to be confronted with France. Any whim of playing Bonn against Paris, would be condemned to failure.46 Spain had two main allies in the EEC: France and Germany. Having been abandoned by the former the logical way out seemed to get the latter to defend her. Yet this formula was not going to work. Despite German support for the Spanish cause, this was not so important as to risk provoking a confrontation with France. The only way out of this impasse was by bilateral negotiations between France and Spain on the one hand and with the Community delegation on the other. In this respect Punset’s visit to Paris in December 1980 was to be very important, since it constituted a considerable change of atmosphere compared to the recent visit of the French Prime Minister to Madrid. The French government reiterated its political will to support Spain’s entry, and stated that the problems which the Community was facing should be resolved by the beginning of 1982. France also agreed to continue negotiations for the chapters not affected by the Community crisis, to discuss the outline of the agricultural and financial issues, and above all maintain the rhythm of work that would enable negotiations to end by 1982 and the treaty to be signed by January 1983.47

6. 4. The Spanish political crisis and the attempted coup d’état While negotiations between Spain and the European Community remained stagnant, internal events in Spain were soon to attract European attention with a similar intensity to that experienced in the wake of Franco’s death. The Spanish transition to democracy had been carried out with remarkable smoothness, however, its process of consolidation was to be full of obstacles. After the 1977 elections the next aim had been the drawing up of a constitution, which was overwhelmingly accepted at the December 1978 referendum. Yet, over the next two years political unrest increased dramatically. The Suarez government had been successful at integrating the left-wing opposition into the new democracy, but it proved incapable of dismantling the ultra-right. For the reactionary sectors, Suarez became their bête noire the day he legalized the Communist party. Later they grew increasingly indignant at the issue of decentralization, which they regarded as a challenge to the

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country’s unity, and on top of this, ETA terrorist acts against members of the army increased tension. As the crisis became more acute, rumours of a coup d’état became frequent. The calling of early elections would not solve the situation since the Socialists were leading the opinion polls. Suarez therefore announced his resignation in February 1981 and proposed Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo to replace him. On 23 February the candidature of Calvo Sotelo was submitted to debate at the Cortes. As the MPs cast their votes, the parliament was taken over by members of the Civil Guard announcing a coup d’état. A few hours later King Juan Carlos appeared on TV informing that he had taken the necessary measures to restore constitutional normality and that the attempted coup d’état was over. The incredible news attracted the attention of the international community, particularly Europe. That night the Europeans realized that, despite the success of Spain’s democratization, the threat of regression to authoritarianism was still pending. Political cooperation with Spain became more important than ever and the most efficient way of carrying it out was to speed up negotiations for entry into the EEC and to definitely eradicate the challenge to democracy in Western Europe. On 24 February the spokesman for the European Commission read the following statement: The Commission has always been convinced that a democratic Spain has its place in the European Community. . . It has followed with admiration the speed with which Spain has recovered the European democratic traditions. . . Today, with the experience of two years of relations with Spain, in the negotiation for membership, the Commission hopes that the initiators of the violence who have wanted to provoke subversion, have provoked in fact a firm and immediate re-affirmation of the constitutional order.48 Shortly afterwards, on 13 March, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on Spain with the support of all groups. It started condemning: the attempted coup d’état aimed at an interruption of the Spanish democratic process which would have had dismal consequences, not only for that country, but also for the whole process of the democratic unification of Europe. It followed by congratulating the King, the Spanish authorities, the


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political forces and the Spanish people for their action in favour of democracy. The three last points of the resolution aimed at including Spain in the EEC. It underlined the responsibility of the Community with regard to the maintenance of democracy in Spain, as well as the political importance of enlargement, and therefore requested the competent institutions to speed up negotiations for membership.49 The new Spanish Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo was determined to complete the external transition now that the internal was considered to be over. By this he meant to include Spain in the two most important Western organizations EEC and NATO. With the new government the Spanish negotiating delegation underwent some changes. The Ministry for relations with the EEC was downgraded and became a department of the Foreign Ministry. On 28 February Ambassador Bassols substituted Punset as leader of the Spanish delegation, though without ministerial rank. José Pedro Pérez Llorca, in one of his first public interventions as Foreign Minister, pointed out that if there had been something positive in the event of 23 February it was that the Spaniards had reaffirmed their conviction of the need to consolidate democracy, as well as emphasizing an aim which was an inseparable part of this: full integration into the European Community. He added some warnings, stressing that the government’s political will should be mirrored by an equally determined will on the side of the EEC member states.50 France was still the main obstacle. The French presidential elections, won by the Socialist candidate François Mitterrand, was the expected turning point. Mitterrand had criticized Giscard for the delay in the negotiations with Spain. However, his government was soon to add new ones. At the EEC Council of Ministers on 13 July 1981, France declared that she would be willing to lift the blockade on negotiations as long as Spain agreed to apply the Value Added Tax from the day they became members of the EEC.51 At this point negotiations between Spain and the EEC reached their nadir. The Spanish delegation considered several strategies. One possibility was to abandon negotiations, but the consequences of this decision could undermine the Spanish cause severely. This would have been interpreted by Europe as a unilateral decision to withdraw and would have led to a definite break-up of negotiations. It would also have been in contradiction with the European vocation which Spain had demonstrated. The other alternatives were to passively accept the rhythm of negotiations or opt for global action. This would imply that Spain should

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present the Community with a global programme of negotiations in which Spain would agree to accept the application of VAT from the first day of membership in exchange for a solution to the agricultural sector. The Spanish delegation concluded that this third option would be the wisest. The EC Council of Ministers on 14 September 1981 broke the stalemate in negotiations. It was decided that the agricultural question would be negotiated with Spain as well as the tariff union as long as she agreed to apply VAT. It also announced that the chapter on fisheries would soon be freed as well. On 19 November 1981 the European Parliament adopted a resolution by which the European Parliament congratulated itself that the Foreign Ministers were willing ‘to consult the candidate countries in the framework of the European Political Cooperation’. It also passed a resolution inviting the Council of Ministers that was going to adjourn six days later to confirm the date for membership of Spain and Portugal as 1 January 1984.52 Under these favourable circumstances Spain presented a document on 26 February accepting the imposition of VAT, and a 10-year period of transition. The Council of Ministers that took place on 21 June 1982 was once more to prove disappointing. All the ministers initially decided to close the chapters on which Spain had presented documents but once again France presented excuses for delaying negotiations. At the next Council of Ministers on 28 and 29 June President Mitterrand requested the application of the principle that it was not possible to negotiate chapters on agriculture, fisheries and their own resources as long as the Community problems in these sectors had not been resolved.53 The reasons for France’s persistence in obstructing Spain’s road to the EEC were mainly economic. The first government of the Mitterrand era faced financial difficulties, but there also seemed to be an increasingly apparent political reason. The Spanish government would have to call elections by the end of 1982 and opinion polls predicted that the Socialists would win. With the prospect of having a Socialist party governing Spain there was no point in accelerating negotiations; it would be better to wait and do this with Mitterrand’s political allies in power. The President of the Commission sent letters to all EEC member states inviting the heads of government to state their priority concerns in relation to enlargement. Italy carried out a last attempt to overcome the impasse in negotiations with Spain during the summer


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of 1982. It was based on article 8 of the Treaty of Rome and defended the thesis that Spain should join the European Community on a determined date, 1 January 1984, and then once she was a member, negotiate full integration by stages. Nevertheless the COREPER rejected it straightaway. A few months later another ally of the Spanish cause, Germany intervened in her favour. The German Chancellor Schmidt replied on 4 October to Thorn’s letter demanding priority for the political significance of the Iberian accession. He reminded them of the fact that the stability of the Iberian peninsula represented a vital interest for the Community. It should also be borne in mind that in the long run enlargement would bring economic advantages.54 It soon became clear for the Spanish government that there was no chance of finishing negotiations within the period of that legislation. However, this failure in European policy was to be compensated for by a major success in Spanish foreign policy – entry into NATO. On becoming Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo had announced his intention of making Spain a member of NATO and, unlike the case with the EEC, negotiations progressed with no major obstacle, allowing Spain to sign the treaty of Washington on 16 February 1982 and become the 16th member of the Atlantic Alliance. Calvo Sotelo was to make it clear that NATO was a different issue from the European Community and that it would be a big mistake to assume that Spain’s membership of NATO increased her chances of joining the EEC.55 However, it was inevitable that analysts would speculate on the links between the two organizations. NATO was certainly no requirement for membership of the EEC. Nevertheless, with the exception of Ireland, all EEC member states were also in NATO, and moreover the other two Mediterranean candidates Portugal and Greece were already members of NATO. NATO was a forum where the most powerful nations in the West met, and by joining it Spain was once more opting for active participation in Western politics. After this decision it seemed inevitable that sooner or later Spain would have to join the European Community.

6. 5. Civil society and the European Community It is not easy to ascertain with accuracy what Spanish civil society thought about the European Community. The only serious debate on the pros and cons of Spanish entry into the EEC took place in Parliament, and negotiations were exclusively dealt with by the

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government and the delegation in charge. Political parties were regarded as the only true representatives in this issue. Business organizations generally believed that either UCD or AP would ensure that negotiations were carried out under terms favourable to business interests. In the same way trade unions trusted that the Socialist or Communist parties would defend the interests of the working class. Trade unions, business associations and other pressure groups were overwhelmingly in favour of joining the European Community but they did not debate it in depth. The reason for this paradox is twofold: first, a political reason – in the first years of democracy there was a tacit agreement to cooperate in order to avoid confrontations that could imperil the consolidation of democracy. Secondly, a sociological reason, after over three decades of dictatorship it took some time for the unions and business organizations to assume the role that is normally attributed to them in democracy.56 The state decided the country’s policy and civil society tacitly assumed it. Opinion polls constituted the most accurate way of finding out the attitude of the Spanish population in relation to the European Community. The Community publication Eurobaromètre carried out opinion polls among the candidates for membership and in the case of Spain it obtained the following results. In October 1982, 48 per cent of Spaniards considered entry into the EEC as positive, 24 per cent were not sure and 7 per cent considered it negative. In earlier opinion polls the number of positive replies had been over 60 per cent. As far as the benefits were concerned, 46 per cent considered that it would be beneficial for democracy and only 9 per cent disagreed. Forty-three per cent considered that it would increase the role of Spain in world affairs, and only 8 per cent disagreed. Forty-three per cent considered that it would help to overcome the economic crisis and only 6 per cent disagreed. As far as European integration was concerned 59 per cent were in favour and Euro-scepticism was as low as 8 per cent, the lowest in Western Europe after Portugal.57 A business survey conducted by the Ministry of Industry revealed that the attitude of business organizations, like the Confederación de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa, CEPYME, the trade unions UGT and CCOO, and agricultural organizations, was essentially the same: they all thought that membership of the European Community would be positive for the Spanish economy, yet they revealed anxiety about the level of competitiveness and the effects of trade liberalization, and for this reason they demanded a long transition period to allow for adaptation of the most sensitive sectors of the economy. Of the three


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groups, businessmen were the most enthusiastic and farmers the most sceptical.58 Despite the predominant apathy with which civil society followed negotiations with the EEC in the 1980s, several sectors of society showed increasing interest in the impact of European integration and began to debate it. During the first three months of 1982, the Association for European Integration organized a course in Madrid on the development of the European Community, with the participation of various ministers involved in the negotiations, as well as professors, lawyers and economists.59 In March 1982 the Faculty of Economics in Madrid in cooperation with the Enterprise Confederation and the Association for European Integration organized a series of conferences on the Spanish regions and European integration. They invited the most important representatives of each region to discuss the impact of Spain’s future membership. Catalonia was the most active region in the Europeanist field. In 1982 the Patronat Català Pro Europa was created, in charge of analysing the impact of membership of the European Community from a Catalan perspective. Several seminars took place in Catalonia on European integration, for example in July 1982 the Catalan Council of the European Movement organized one on Catalonia, the Mediterranean and the EEC.60 During this period the press and some journals began to discuss the issue of Spain’s membership of the EEC in depth. Revista del Movimiento Europeo was to be the first journal to specialize in European Community affairs and it also constituted the best forum for debating such issues. For example, representatives of the two trade unions, UGT and CCOO explained in this journal their reasons for supporting membership of the EEC, arguing that it would enable Spanish workers to coordinate their activities with their comrades at the European Confederation of Trade Unions, and work for a unified Europe of workers. Businessmen, through their main representative the Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales, CEOE also put forward their views in this journal. They feared that agricultural sectors as well as the least competitive industries would suffer as a result of Spain’s entry into the EEC, but on the whole that it would be beneficial for the Spanish economy, helping to bring about the country’s modernization and with it new business opportunities.61

6. 6. The Spanish Socialist Party in power On 28 October 1982 the Socialist Party, PSOE obtained a landslide

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victory at the elections, with 202 seats in Parliament against 105 gained by Alianza Popular. It was the first time since the Second Spanish Republic that a Socialist party had formed a government in Spain and their programme was to have a radical effect. The day after the elections the new Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez declared his country’s support for all oppressed peoples, as well as for peace and respect for human rights. He also reaffirmed the commitment to strengthen relations with Latin America and restore Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar. Finally he announced that a referendum on NATO membership would be called.62 The reaction of the European Community to the Spanish elections was generally positive. The formation of a strong Socialist government could be beneficial for the consolidation of democracy. In relation to the negotiations with the EEC they were not expected to change since, despite certain neutralist tendencies in relation to NATO, the PSOE had always declared itself in favour of entry into the EEC. In relation to the French problem, it was expected that Paris would be more willing to negotiate with a Socialist government and it was hoped that Gonzalez would avoid bilateral negotiations.63 The new negotiating team was led by the new Foreign Minister, Fernando Morán, a career diplomat and veteran Socialist, and the Under-Secretary for Relations with the EEC Manuel Marín. The question of whether the Socialists had to deal with the bulk of negotiations or just the final stage is the subject of much controversy. The Foreign Minister, Morán, points out that when they took office the essence of the negotiations had not been dealt with.64 Ambassador Bassols rejects this opinion, stressing that by the end of 1982 six chapters of the negotiations had been completed and seven were practically finished out of a total of 16.65 The truth is that despite the progress made by the previous negotiating teams, the remaining chapters were the most problematic, as they dealt with agriculture, industry and fisheries, and also the French veto was still to be removed. In this aspect the contribution of the Socialists was decisive. They believed that during the previous negotiations Spain had made the mistake of emphasizing negotiations with the EEC institutions in Brussels and neglecting those with member states. The new strategy was based on solving differences with France as well as cultivating a good relationship with the other heavyweight in the European Community, Helmut Kohl’s Germany.66 Prime Minister Gonzalez referred to the negotiations with the EEC in his initial speech at the Cortes on 30 November 1982. He promised to work with the aim of overcoming the obstacles that were still


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hindering Spanish integration into the European Community, which ought to be achieved in the present legislature. Gonzalez expressed in this way his determination that membership should be attained before 1986.67 Three days after Gonzalez’s speech at the Cortes, on 3 December 1982, a European Council was held at Copenhagen. Despite the fact that Europe was experiencing unemployment and economic stagnation, both Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl stated that Spain should not be affected by these circumstances. The German Chancellor stated that the compromise with Madrid should be maintained and that they should send a signal to Madrid and Lisbon stimulating the Iberian countries to persevere with negotiations. Mitterrand however did not change his opinion and declared that the French attitude in relation to this affair had already been left very clear.68 The recently appointed Foreign Minister Fernando Moran, presided over the Spanish delegation at a session of negotiations that was held on 13 December 1982. On this occasion his statements sounded even more categorical than those of his predecessors since 1975. Spanish membership of the EEC was a national cause. Secondly, it was one of the fundamental pillars of Spanish foreign policy. Thirdly, it was necessary to convert the Community’s political statements into concrete decisions in relation to Spain. Fourthly, Spanish integration would take place within the present legislature. Finally, the Socialist Foreign Minister ruled out any approach that would not involve full adhesion.69 Gonzalez endorsed the declarations of the Foreign Minister two days later, saying that the European Community had enormous public support and should not be obstructed by a quarrel over tomato quotas or one percentage margins. He repeated that a 4-year period seemed a reasonable amount of time in which to achieve a definitive integration.70 The European Commission made important moves to speed up negotiations. On 16 December 1982 Vice-President Natali visited Madrid and held conversations with the Under-Secretary for the EEC Manuel Marín. Marín stated that the Spanish government desired to make substantial progress during the term of the German presidency that was about to start, and finish all pending chapters with the exception of agriculture and fisheries. Above all, full integration should be achieved before the end of the present legislature.71

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6. 7. The culmination of negotiations: Stuttgart, Athens and Fontainebleau It was evident that Spanish integration would never come about unless French cooperation was ensured. The Spanish government hoped that solidarity between the Socialist parties governing the two countries would overcome this problem, and also that France would put the political vocation of enlargement before her agricultural interests. A conversation between the Spanish Foreign Minister and his Soviet counterpart Andrei Gromyko about Spain and Europe is very interesting in this aspect. The veteran Communist diplomat recommended Morán to convince President Mitterrand of the political importance of including Spain in the European Community, adding that France was the Western European nation with the most powerful state, and once this decision was adopted by the government, no other obstacle would be considered.72 On 10 and 11 January 1983 the foreign and economics ministers of the two countries held a meeting in Paris. France agreed to accept a parallel negotiation about internal Community reforms and negotiations for enlargement. It was also agreed that triangular cooperation between Madrid, Paris and Bonn should be developed in addition to discussions among other member states. After this meeting the French government declared its willingness to help with Spain’s integration into the EEC.73 The new atmosphere of relations between Spain and France was to culminate in a meeting on 2 July at La Granja in Madrid, but this time on a larger scale with the presence of eight ministers from each country. On this occasion the ministers discussed not only a joint plan for Spain’s membership but also cooperation in the fight against terrorism that had also been another point of friction between the two countries. Thus, party solidarity between the French and Spanish Socialists managed to overcome the main obstacle to enlargement. Two meetings between the two governments were to achieve what endless Councils of Ministers were incapable of achieving. This event demonstrated that where there was a political will to cooperate, French economic interests should be no obstacle. In the EEC Council of Ministers which took place in Stuttgart on 5 and 6 July, the German government which held the presidency of the EEC at that time, made a decisive contribution to the Spanish cause. It proposed that the two candidates should join the EEC by mid-1984, adding that the issues of financial and agricultural policy and enlargement should all be dealt with by the next Council. In this way the


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solution to the most urgent problems were linked to enlargement, and above all the entry of Spain and Portugal was accepted as irreversible.74 On 18 October a Council of Ministers of agriculture took place in Luxembourg, where the decision was adopted to reform the agricultural policy in favour of the southern products. It was agreed to reform the rules and adopt a mechanism that would benefit Mediterranean products, particularly fruits, vegetables and olive oil. This implied a tacit acceptance by the northern states that they could assume new expenses as subsidies for southern agriculture. In this way the French strategy of setting a price for enlargement was successful.75 Encouraged by this news, Felipe Gonzalez wrote to the ten Community Prime Ministers on 18 November 1983, explaining that Spain would never give up the intention of participating in the construction of Europe, urging them to ensure that at the next Council of Ministers in Athens it ought to be decided that Spanish integration would enter into effect by 1 January 1984.76 The reaction of his European colleagues was generally positive. President Mitterrand was still reluctant to indicate a date for Spain’s entry and sent a letter back in which he indicated that ‘France will pronounce herself so that this stage shall be fixed in Athens’.77 The Council of Ministers in Athens took place on 6 December 1983 and it proved an absolute disaster. It was essential to come to an agreement on the financial requirements for enlargement and draw conclusions in relation to agriculture, but as usual the self-interest of individual states prevented a unanimous decision in relation to the breakdown of the budget. At the following EEC Council in Brussels in March 1984, the blockade continued, this time particularly due to the British dissatisfaction over its contribution to the budget. Britain complained that, despite being among the less well off in terms of per capita gross national product (GNP), she was the second largest contributor to the budget. The meetings at Fontainebleau on 25 and 26 June 1984 were the epilogue of a series of useless meetings. The British problem was solved by an abatement, by which Britain was to be refunded part of her contribution to the budget. After this, the Spanish candidacy was unanimously approved. At the end of the summit Mitterrand informed the press that once the problem of the British contribution had been solved, they had established the bases for the enlargement of the EEC, agreeing that negotiations should finish in September 1984. In 1985 the national parliaments would ratify the agreement and the treaty would enter into effect on 1 January 1986.78

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The last round of negotiations took place in March 1985 under the Italian presidency of the EEC, where the fishing and social policy rights were discussed. In these aspects the individual interests of the member states also prevailed. The Spanish fishing fleet, the third largest fleet in the world, was allowed a maximum of 150 boats in Community territorial seas. As far as the free circulation of labour was concerned, the Spaniards would enjoy this privilege only after a 7-year transition period. Conditions for entry were not ideal, but above all, Spain’s adhesion to the EEC was going to come true. At this stage the Europhile feelings which had recently declined were to experience a new upsurge. According to a Eurobaromètre opinion poll carried out in January 1985, 60 per cent of Spaniards were in favour of joining the EEC.79 At the Cortes Spain’s entry into the EEC was debated on 28 March 1985. As on previous occasions Spanish entry received the unanimous support of all parliamentary groups.80 Both the business association CEOE and the two trade unions UGT and CCOO expressed some reservations. The chairman of the CEOE stated that the government had been weak on agricultural issues, and that entry would increase unemployment. CCOO criticized the excessive haste in wanting to join the EEC at any cost. Yet, despite some misgivings, Spain’s potential entry into the EEC was generally judged with an optimistic spirit. During the last three years of negotiations with the European Community, the Socialists were also to reorientate many aspects of Spanish foreign policy. Entry into the EEC required the support of all member states and for this reason Spain had to accede to some of their demands which led to alterations in her foreign policy. Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s Germany was Spain’s best ally in Europe. Kohl was the most enthusiastic Europeanist head of government, and he supported Spain’s entry, first because he considered it essential for European integration and secondly, because Germany had economic interests there. Germany did not explicitly establish the condition of her support on Spain remaining in NATO but she did insist on this point, thus contributing to the conversion of the PSOE from its neutralist position to being in favour of remaining in NATO. France was to moderate her anti-Spanish position when the PSOE formed government. Prime Minister Gonzalez took advantage of this French change of attitude to improve cooperation between the two countries against terrorism. Members of the ETA terrorist group were taking refuge in the neighbouring country but the French authorities were not always willing to cooperate with Spain, and Gonzalez and


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Mitterrand discussed this issue in December 1983. A month later Gonzalez called upon all democracies at the Council of Europe to unite against terrorism. From then on Paris hardened its attitude against Basque terrorist activities launched from the French frontier.81 Britain was in favour of Spain’s entry as it suited her economic interests as well as her concept of European integration. However, due to the conflict over the sovereignty of Gibraltar, she decided to make her support conditional on the lifting of the blockade on Gibraltar which Spain established in 1969. Under the UCD government the two delegations had begun to negotiate, but the outbreak of the Falklands War in which Spain sympathized with Argentina led to a deterioration in relations. Finally, in November 1984, the Foreign Ministers Howe and Morán reached an agreement by which Spain removed the blockade on Gibraltar and Britain agreed to discuss sovereignty and support Spain’s entry into the EEC. Britain also requested that Spain should remain in NATO. The Benelux countries had been the most outspoken critics of the Franco regime, and their reconciliation with democratic Spain was to take time as they still kept historic memories about Spanish Catholic religious bigotry. The Franco regime never recognized the state of Israel, partly due to anti-Jewish prejudices but also due to its pro-Arab foreign policy. Even though the new constitution recognized religious liberty in Spain, diplomatic relations with Israel had not yet been established. The low countries insisted that relations between the two countries be established as a condition for their support for Spain’s entry into the EEC. The establishment of proper diplomatic relations between Spain and Israel in January 1986, suitably took place at The Hague and under Dutch presidency of the EEC. Latin America had always been an essential pillar of Spanish foreign policy. In fact, Spanish official terminology usually refers to this continent as Ibero-America, implying a group of American countries colonized by Spain and Portugal, rather than Latin America which is a much vaguer term introduced by France in the nineteenth century. Ever since the Spanish empire collapsed, Spain was to exploit the concept of hispanidad, Spanish culture, in order to foster cooperation among this community of nations. During the Franco regime the concept of hispanidad was an important asset of Spanish foreign policy but it did not bring significant benefits. When Spain sent the first application to the EEC, in 1962 it mentioned the possibility of acting as intermediary between the two continents. However, this was not possible as the Franco regime lacked the international prestige to play this role. The Gonzalez government was determined to make Spain the

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spokesman for Latin America in Europe and this intention helped the Spanish cause in the approach towards the EEC. The revolution in Nicaragua in 1979 and later the Falklands war renewed the political interest in Europe for Latin America. Gonzalez discussed the Central American conflict with President Ronald Reagan during his first visit to the United States in 1983, and was promised that the USA would work towards peace in this area. Latin America served Spain as a means of integrating into the European Political Cooperation. In October 1984 a meeting took place between all the Community and Latin American Foreign Ministers, to which the Spanish and Portuguese Foreign Ministers were also invited.82 Finally, negotiations with the Community contributed to solving the conflict over NATO. Spain joined the Atlantic Alliance in 1982, but the Socialists promised at the elections that they would call a referendum on this issue and campaign in favour of withdrawing from this organization. This decision was partly motivated by the traditional anti-American feelings of the Spanish Left, but also due to the conviction that Spain should be neutral in any East–West confrontation. However, when the Socialists came to power, this attitude was drastically altered. Gonzalez’s government aimed at making Spain play an active role in the West, thus not to be a member of NATO, where the most powerful nations debated defence policy, did not seem advisable. In view of these considerations, Gonzalez called a referendum in 1986 but this time campaigned in favour of NATO, after which Spain’s membership of NATO was reconfirmed.83 Whether remaining in NATO was a requirement for entry into the European Community is subject to much controversy. No EEC member state made its support for Spain’s entry into the EEC conditional on staying in NATO. In fact from June 1985, during the ratification period of Spain’s membership, it was clear that there would be a referendum on NATO, yet no member state withdrew its support from Spain.84 On the other hand, both Germany and Britain expressed their desire that Spain should remain in NATO, which may have motivated Gonzalez to be in favour of the Atlantic Alliance. On 12 June 1985 Spain signed the treaty by which she became a member of the European Community at the Royal Palace in Madrid. The King of Spain presiding over the ceremony addressed those attending in the following terms: If your countries are Europe, so is Spain by her culture and secular will. At the dawn of the modern age, on constituting the international community, Spain was present as one of the first nation-states


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constituted in our continent . . . Before, Spain, this country which lived for centuries with the Islamic and Hebrew cultures; this country which established her condition as nation in a transEuropean enterprise called America, never desired to cease being European. Throughout history Spain has been present in the main efforts of Europe and she has the intention to continue in that role.85 On the Community’s behalf, the President of the EC Council of Ministers, Giulio Andreotti, announced the relaunching of the European Community with its new members. The President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, announced that at the next EC Council of Ministers that same month, the Spanish Prime Minister would participate with all his EC colleagues in a debate on the European Union. Prime Minister Gonzalez delivered the last speech, first paying tribute to his predecessor Adolfo Suarez who had applied to the EEC, adding that Spain was well aware of the universal concept of Europe since her European identity had a Latin American and a Mediterranean dimension. Finally he offered Spain’s full support to the process of European integration, since for the Spaniards, participation in Europe was identified with the consolidation of the ideas of liberty, progress and democracy. This was certainly a very accurate description of Spanish feelings towards Europe.

Epilogue and Conclusion The signing of the treaty of Spanish accession to the European Community on 6 June 1985 constitutes one of the most significant events in Spain’s contemporary history, ranking in importance with the coronation of King Juan Carlos and the celebration of the first general elections after 40 years of dictatorship. If the two latter events mark the return of the monarchy and democracy to Spain, the treaty of accession signifies the end of Spain’s isolation and her return to mainstream Europe. Few events in Spain’s recent history have received as much attention by Spanish public opinion as the entry into the European Community. The government made use of all its propaganda machine in order to inform the population about the news and it was exhaustively discussed within the media and among the political élite for several months. Among the comments made the euphemism of ‘Spain enters Europe’ or ‘we are now Europeans’ predominated. It seems paradoxical that one of the first nation-states in Europe and a country whose contribution to European history is beyond discussion made such statements as if before joining the EEC it had not been part of the continent or had been beyond the pale of Western civilization. However, besides exaggerations, this was the effect produced on the country: from being a relatively insignificant power on the continent Spain was suddenly transformed into an active member of the concert of Europe. From the historical point of view, the accession to the European Community marks the culmination of Spain’s transition from isolation to participation in the international community. Under the Franco regime Spain made some progress in this respect. In the early postwar years Spain was condemned to ostracism and banned from all international organizations, but Spanish diplomacy skilfully negotiated a return to world affairs. Spain was accepted into the United Nations, became an ally of the United States and consequently a member of the Western bloc, and as far as European integration is concerned achieved a partial economic anchorage in the European Community that culminated in the signing of the preferential agreement in 1970. This was a substantial achievement bearing in mind the hostility that the Franco regime provoked in any international forum, 180

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but this did not quell Spanish aspirations in foreign affairs. Spain was not part of the EEC and other important forums of the West such as the Council of Europe or NATO, and there was no possibility of achieving full integration into any of them as long as the Franco dictatorship persisted. The transition to democracy considerably improved Spain’s situation in the international sphere. The new constitutional monarchy was promptly recognized and the Spanish political spectrum was unanimously praised for the ability with which democracy had been established. This new respectability enabled Spain to renew cordial diplomatic and political relations with Western democracies and be accepted as a worthy member of the West. However, she was still an outsider, as she was not part of the main international organizations where Western democracies took decisions. Entry into the Assembly of the Council of Europe constituted a first step on the new road towards active participation in European affairs, but the limited power of this institution did not take her far. In relation to Western security, the second UCD government arranged for Spain to join the NATO organization, in spite of the opposition it caused within the left-wing parties. This decision constituted a considerable increase in Spain’s international role. But without membership of the European Community the feelings of isolation would continue and, furthermore, the negative effects of remaining out of the European integration movement were to become increasingly acute for Spain as the 1980s approached, when very important decisions would be taken in relation to economic and political unification in Europe. When Spain signed the accession treaty, isolation from Europe was automatically relegated to history. Not only would she now have a say in the economic and political decisions taken but she would be able to project the country’s future into this European enterprise. In other words, Spain’s historical vocation to participate in European affairs would be fulfilled. Membership of the European Community would also enable Spain to carry out traditional roles of her foreign policy like active participation in Mediterranean affairs and to use her special relationship with Latin America in order to become the intermediary between the two continents. As regards the economic and social benefits obtained by Spain from membership of the European Community, these are more complex and debatable. Lack of preparation of the Spanish economic structure to meet European requirements was to make the country less well off in the short run. The trade deficit increased fourfold between 1985

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and 1987 as a result of the opening of the Spanish market to the EC. Important industrial areas closed down as they were not able to face competition. Spain had an excessively large agricultural output which needed to be drastically reduced and there was a similar problem with the fishing industry. Such drastic decay in the most important sectors of the Spanish economy caused great social distress, as it was to alter traditional ways of living in many areas and cause a dramatic increase in unemployment which has consistently been one of the highest in Western Europe until the present day. Political parties in opposition and certain sectors of the civil society expressed disappointment as a result of Spain’s entry into the EC, and criticized the government for what they considered a hasty negotiation which had not guaranteed entry under the best conditions for the Spanish economy. Spain’s role in the Community also aroused much criticism, as it seemed rather marginal, a kind of European playground dependent on foreign investment and where the most competitive industry was tourism. Nevertheless, the benefits of Spain’s entry into the EC have outweighed the costs by far, achieving a substantial modernization of the Spanish economy. The country´s economic infrastructure has obtained great benefits from the Community’s structural funds. In 1988 structural funds increased from 7 billion ECU to 14 billion ECU. At the Maastrict treaty in 1991, it was agreed that a new cohesion fund would be created and structural funds would be doubled again over a period of five years to 1997. As a member of the Community Spain achieved the image of a stable country, inspiring confidence in potential investors, and also received the key backing of other EC countries for the organization of important projects such as the Barcelona Olympics and Expo-92. Above all, membership of the European Community has enabled Spain to be at the forefront of the most ambitious economic projects, and at present she is among the European Union member states participating in the first round of the European Monetary Union.

The European Community as the external factor of change This book has proved that the European Community was the single most important international factor affecting Spain’s political change. The European Community was the only international organization which Spain aspired to join but whose entry was refused for political reasons. Despite the apparent immobility of the Franco regime, the impact of this prohibition on Spain’s political development was to be considerable,

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since as contacts with Europe increased so did the pressure for political change. However, as far as the methods of the European Community to influence Spain are concerned it is important to bear in mind the different approaches which each European institution adopted. Even though the idea that only democratic Spain could become a full member of the Community was a principle shared by all institutions, the influence of member states and European political parties on the institutions affected this theoretically unbreakable principle. The EC Council of Ministers, the principal decision-making body and the European Commission, the administrative and executive body in charge of imposing the policies are usually well coordinated. For this reason decisions taken in the Council of Ministers in relation to Spain were automatically implemented at the Commission, though delays could often take place. Yet changes in governments and interests of member states could always affect the verdict of the Council of Ministers. For example, the French veto paralysed negotiations with Spain in 1978, and later the French presidency of the Council led to a delay in negotiations with Spain. On the other hand when Germany held the presidency of the Council, in 1983, she decided to link the drawing up of a new budget to the enlargement, thus propping up the Spanish cause. The European Parliament and the Assembly of the Council of Europe as well were often to adopt different and even opposed views to those taken by the other institutions in relation to Spain. For example the European Parliament passed the Birkelbach report in 1962 in order to prevent dictatorships like the Spanish one achieving association status of the EEC. In spite of reluctance with regard to negotiations with Spain in Parliament, the Commission initiated conversations with the Franco regime in 1964. After the transition to democracy the European Parliament passed a resolution inviting Spain to join the European Community, and shortly after the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe accepted Spain as a full member. The other two institutions did not share this impatience to get Spain to join the EEC, and stressed the economic obstacles which needed to be solved. After the attempted coup d’état in 1981 the European Parliament warned against the dangers of keeping Spain out of the EEC. Besides these warnings bureaucratic problems and the economic self-interest of some member states delayed Spain’s accession until 1985. European Community member states and their governments were to be equally influential in the political development of Spain, although their role was substantially different. Among member states

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there was never consensus in relation to Spain and in fact their views were often contradictory. National interests in Europe were the leitmotiv influencing policy towards Spain. When Spain first applied to the EEC her allies were France and Germany since these two nations advocated the concept of the Europe of nations and Franco’s Spain could strengthen this. In the case of France, Spain’s participation in the EEC would strengthen the Mediterranean dimension. Mediterranean fraternity did not work in the case of Italy who at that time was too concerned with her agricultural interests. As regards the other member states, they were all opposed to Spanish participation since entry of a non-democratic state would challenge the supranational concept of Europe. After the transition to democracy, when Spain applied for membership of the EEC, the French attitude changed automatically since Spain would pose a challenge to her agricultural interests. Thus France switched from being Spain’s most important ally in Europe to her most obstinate adversary. Germany was a consistent supporter of Spain. As regards Britain, she always supported Spain’s entry, first because it would benefit the strong trading links with the United Kingdom, and secondly, as an advocate of a heterogeneous and intergovernmental Europe, enlargement would always benefit this concept. The role of European political parties was influential in two ways: first, because of their influence in the European institutions and secondly, because of the direct influence exerted on the Spanish political élites. A clear rule is that left-wing parties were resolutely against any sort of political or institutional relation with Franco’s Spain, whereas liberal and conservative parties believed that the establishment of close relations with Spain would foster her political evolution. A Socialist majority in the European Parliament enabled the passing of the Birkelbach report which challenged the liberal–conservative idea of establishing links with Spain. In a similar way whenever there was a Socialist majority at the EC Council of Ministers negotiations became more complicated. The activity of the European political parties in Spain intensified from the early 1970s, when the Franco regime entered its final stage, until after the first democratic elections in 1977. They intervened in three main ways: first, warning the government about the effects of repression and advocating the need to democratize, secondly inviting members of political groups to the European intitutions and other fora to discuss the Spanish situation, and thirdly, by travelling to Spain in order to obtain a first-hand impression of the situation and also advise their political colleagues on the strategies to follow.

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European political parties were particularly important in establishing links and contributing to the formation of Spanish political parties under democracy. For the left-wing parties banned in Spain their European colleagues provided the main source of survival. For the Spanish Socialists, the German SPD and the Socialist International were not only a constant support which intervened in their defence but also a source of financial aid, essential in converting a weak and divided PSOE into a strong Socialist party capable of forming a government in 1982. For the Spanish Communists the European dimension was crucial in order to prove their independence from Soviet obedience. The PCE developed some links with the French Socialists, but its main allies in Europe were the major Euro-Communist parties in France and Italy. The support of Berlinguer and Marchais was an important asset for the legalization of this party in Spain. The European Christian Democratic Union was less active than the SI in Spain but its contribution was also important. It played a major role in the European Parliament and Council of Europe initiatives relating to Spain. It also offered its support to the major Christian Democratic forces which emerged in Spain in the early 1970s, although they failed to establish a major Spanish Christian Democratic party, partly due to the rivalry with Suarez’s UCD coalition. However, the Suarez government identified itself with the ECDU in order to count on this group’s support.

Europeanism as a mechanism of domestic change Europeanism, the belief that Spain should play an active role in the construction of Europe, was an essential mechanism of domestic political change during this period. Europe was a myth, symbolizing the solution to all problems that Spain was facing, and this European myth was to captivate all Spaniards at different socio-economic and political levels. We can trace three different stages of Europeanism. Initially Europeanism was adopted by opposed political factions to foster their aims, secondly it became a factor of consensus unifying previously opposed ideologies during the transition, and thirdly, during the consolidation of democracy it became a tool for the country’s modernization. Long before the creation of the European Community, the process of European integration attracted diverse Spanish political groups for different reasons. In the early postwar years the Spanish administration became aware of the difficulties of surviving in isolation from the

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European economic cooperation movements. This fact led the Franco regime to exploit the idea of the need to fulfil Spain’s historical vocation to participate in European affairs. Within the regime there were already several dissenting voices who linked the idea of Europe with political reform, like the well-known AECE and personalities like the ex-minister José Larraz. For the exiled opposition, Europeanism was to become immediately associated with anti-Francoist activity. At the Geneva conference in 1948 only exiled Spaniards were present. Thereafter the exiled opposition groups, with the single exception of the Communists, became ardent Europeanists. The Franco regime was aware of the difficulties created by declaring itself Europeanist but not democratic. The struggle between the two concepts of Europe that kept the EEC member states confrontational was to help the Francoist cause. The Spanish government was in favour of the concept of a Europe of nations, just as Germany and France and against the supranational concept of Europe supported by the Benelux countries and in general by most European Socialists. In this way they justified the nature of the regime alleging that the system of government was exclusively an internal affair of any European nation which should be no impediment to active participation in the construction of Europe. The insistence of the Franco regime that its Europeanism was not opportunist may have been of service in negotiating the 1970 preferential agreement, but it proved ineffective when confronting the Community’s principle that only a democratic Spain would be fully integrated into the European Community. Paradoxically Francoist Europeanism did not contribute to the regime’s stability: in fact it was owing to this issue of Europe that the opposition within the regime increased dramatically in the mid-1960s. Integration into the Western European economy implied an exposure to European ways, and this provoked the unexpected side-effect of increasing anti-Francoist activities. Many of those who had previously tolerated or even supported the Franco regime, on the grounds that it provided the necessary political stability for economic development, began to regard it as an obstacle to its future growth. If democracy was the requirement for full integration into the European Community the sooner democratization was fulfilled the better for the Spanish economy. Besides Spain’s economic interests, the more frequent contacts with Europe made a number of members of the Francoist establishment increasingly aware that the Spanish political system was an embarrassment and that a change was urgently needed in order to recover

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Spanish self-respect and prestige abroad. The best example of political dissent through contacts with Europe is Jose María de Areilza, whose disagreement with the Francoist European policy led him to resign from his post as ambassador in Paris and transfer to the opposition. He was later to contribute with the prestige he gained in Europe to Spain’s transition to democracy as Foreign Minister, leaving it clear to the European institutions that Spain was heading towards democracy and that full integration into the European Community was an immediate aim. The Tácito group is the best example of political dissent within the ranks of the Francoist establishment. This group is particularly important not only as it provides evidence for the case that contacts with Europe provoked dissent with the official line of the Franco regime, but also because many members of this group were to play very important roles in the transition to democracy. Marcelino Oreja for example, a prominent member of this group, was Foreign Minister in the first Suarez government and handed in the application for membership of the EEC, just after the first general elections in June 1977. The Europeanist activities of both the exiled and domestic opposition intensified as the relations of Franco’s Spain with the EEC progressed. The Congress of Munich allowed the democratic opposition to discover that attendance at Europeanist acts was a useful tool for expressing political dissent and propagating anti-Francoism. It is curious that amongst the democratic opposition not only was there a unanimous Europeanist enthusiasm but in most cases it was identified with the supranational concept, believing that this would be the best formula to ensure that only a fully democratic Spain would be allowed to participate in the European Community. The extent to which Europeanism was a useful mechanism of opposition to the Franco regime is seen in the conversion of the Spanish Communist Party. The PCE, initially under Soviet influence, was against the European integration movement because of its capitalist spirit. This anti-Europeanist ideology left the Spanish Communists in a situation of inferiority to the rest of the democratic opposition, for example, they were the only group that was not invited to the Congress of Munich. Towards the mid-1960s the Communist party began to show signs of change in this respect, and at the VIII Congress in 1972 it declared itself in favour of membership of the EEC on the grounds that Spain should participate in the construction of Europe, but pointing out that this construction should be along socialist, not capitalist, lines. The fact that the entire political spectrum, from Francoists to Communists, was Europeanist, was an essential factor during the

188


transition to democracy. During this period Europeanism attained a metapolitical value, as it was one of the facts on which the necessary unanimity was built in order to permit change. The other big issues of the transition, the monarchy and republic, centralism versus regionalism created confrontations between the Spanish Right and Left. In relation to Spanish foreign policy the debate between membership of NATO or neutralism also created deep and irreconcilable divisions. The reason for the consensus in relation to the European Community is that it served all political purposes in times of change. For the Francoists it symbolized the maintenance of a traditional model of society, private property and market economy, whereas for the democratic opposition the EEC represented the definite implantation of democracy and civil rights which Spain had lacked for the last decades. The excessively long period that spanned from the end of the transition to democracy and the signing of the treaty of accession to the European Community in 1985 did not affect this unconditional allegiance to the cause of European integration. In the Spanish Parliament many parties expressed indignation over the fact that negotiations for accession were taking so long but this did not have any effect on the Europeanist consensus, since no party declared itself against integration into Europe due to the complexities of negotiations. In relation to the concept of Europe Spanish political parties did develop certain discrepancies on similar lines to those which confronted the rest of the EEC political parties. The Socialists were advocates of the supranational concept of Europe, whereas the liberal conservatives AP and UCD declared themselves in favour of the concept of a Europe of nations as most of the European parties with a similar ideology. Besides these minor discrepancies on the concept of European integration between different political groups, a very significant characteristic in Spain was the absence of Euro-scepticism or proposals of alternatives to European integration. No significant opposition to European integration made progress in Spain. Europe was to remain identified with liberty, modernization, prosperity and the active pursuit of Spanish interests.

Chronology Main political events, 1931–85 1931 April 1936 18 July 1937 29 November 1939 1946 1947 1949

1 April 12 December 12 July 4 April

1951 18 April 1953 18 November 27 August 26 September 1955 14 December 1957 25 February 25 March 1958 1959 22 July 1960 4 January 1961 9 July 9 August 21 December 1962 9 February 5–8 June 10 July 1964 14 February 21 July 1967 1 July 21 September 1969 22 July 17 October 1970 29 June

End of the Spanish Monarchy. King Alfonso XVIII leaves Spain. Proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic. Spanish Civil War breaks out. General Franco becomes Head of State and Head of Government. End of Civil War. Victory of Franco´s Nationalist forces. United Nations votes for diplomatic boycott of Spain. Paris conference for the Marshall Plan. Spain is excluded. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO is founded. Spain is excluded. Assembly of the Council of Europe is founded. Spain is excluded. Spain is admitted to UNESCO. Concordat with the Vatican. Pact of Madrid. Base agreement between Spain and the United States. Spain is admitted to the United Nations. Sixth government of the Franco regime is formed, including the technocrats of the Opus Dei. European Economic Community, EEC is founded. Spain joins the OEEC, World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Stabilization Plan is announced. European Free Trade Association, EFTA is formed. Greece is granted association status to the EEC. British application to the EEC. Birkelbach report, restricting entry into the EEC to European democracies. Spain requests negotiations with the EEC. Congress of the European Movement in Munich. Seventh government is formed. General Muñoz Grandes is appointed Deputy Head of Government. Spanish government sends a new letter to the EEC. Alberto Ullastres becomes Ambassador to the EEC. First EEC mandate for negotiations with Spain. Admiral Carrero Blanco is appointed Deputy Head of Government. Franco presents Prince Juan Carlos as successor to the throne of Spain. Second EEC mandate for negotiations with Spain. Preferential agreement between Spain and the EEC is signed. 189

190

Chronology

1973 1 January 29 January 8 June 20 December 29 December 1975 12 June 26 August 27 September 20 November 26 November 13 December 1976 3 July 26 July 15 December 1977 28 March 9 April 15 June 11 July 28 July 27 November 1978 6 December 1979 1 March 17 June 1980 5 February 5 June 1981 January 23 February 1982 30 May 28 October 3 December 1983 5 June 1984 25 June 1985 12 June

EEC enlargement to include Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Complementary protocol to the 1970 agreement is signed. Admiral Carrero Blanco is appointed Prime Minister. Admiral Carrero Blanco is assassinated by ETA. Carlos Arias Navarro is appointed Prime Minister. Portugal applies to the EEC. Anti-terrorist law re-establishes summary court martials. Five terrorists are executed. Several European states withdraw their Ambassadors from Madrid. General Franco dies. Juan Carlos I crowned King of Spain. First government of the Monarchy is formed. Adolfo Suarez is appointed Prime Minister. Raimundo Bassols is appointed Ambassador to the EEC. Referendum on the Law for Political Reform. Greece applies to the EEC. Spanish Communist Party is legalized. First democratic elections. UCD coalition led by Adolfo Suarez wins. Application to the EEC is officially announced. Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja hands in application to the EEC. Spain joins the Assembly of the Council of Europe. Referendum on the constitution. New constitution is approved. General elections. UCD coalition led by Adolfo Suarez wins. Congress of Deputies unanimously approves negotiations with the EEC. Negotiations for entry into the EEC officially begin. French Prime Minister Giscard d’Estaing announces the pause in negotiations. Greece becomes a member of the EEC. Attempted coup d’etat. Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo is appointed Prime Minister. Spain becomes a member of NATO. PSOE wins the elections. Felipe Gonzalez is appointed Prime Minister. Stuttgart summit. Prospective entry of Spain and Portugal is accepted. Fontainebleau summit. Spanish candidature is unanimously approved. Spanish government signs the treaty of accession to the European Community.

Notes Introduction 1 Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘An Introduction to Southern European Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey’, in G.O. O’Donnell, P.C. Schmitter, and L. Whitehead (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Leicester, 1991. 2 Laurence Whitehead, ‘Democracy by Convergence: Southern Europe’, in L. Whitehead (ed.). The International Dimensions of Democratization, Europe and the Americas, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 261. 3 Raymon Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations, Calmann-Lévy, 1962, p. 65. 4 William Wallace (ed.), The Dynamics of European Integration, Pinter, 1990. 5 Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-state, Routledge, 1995. 6 Anne Deighton (ed.), Building Postwar Europe. National Decision-Makers and European Institutions, 1954–1963, St Antony’s Macmillan, 1995. 7 William T. Salisbury, Spain and the Common Market, 1957–1967, DPhil thesis, Wisconsin University, 1970. 8 María Teresa La Porte, La política europea del régimen de Franco, 1957–1962, Eunsa,1992. Antonio Moreno Juste, Franquismo y construcción europea (1951–1952), Tecnos, 1998. Fernando Guirao, Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–57, St Antony’s/Macmillan series 1998. 9 Antonio Alonso, España en el Mercado Común. Del acuerdo del 70 a la Comunidad de los Doce, Espasa Calpé, 1985. Raimundo Bassols, España en Europa, historia de la adhesión a la CE, 1957–85, Política Exterior, 1992. 10 Fernando Morán, Una política exterior para España, una alternativa socialista, Barcelona 1980. Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Del ‘contubernio’ al consenso, Barcelona, 1985. 11 José Luis Abellán, ‘El significado de la idea de Europa en la política y en la historia de España’, and Juan Marichal, ‘La europeización de España, 1989–1936’, in Sistema, 86–7, November 1988, are two of the very few academic examples dealing with the term Europeanism. 12 Geoffrey Pridham, The New Mediterranean Democracies: Regime Transitions in Spain, Greece and Portugal, Cass, 1984; Richard Gunther, Sani Giacomo and Shabad Goldie, Spain after Franco, the Working of a Competitive Party System, Berkeley, 1986. Richard Gillespie, The Spanish Socialist Party, a History of Factionalism, Clarendon Press, 1989. 13 Berta Alvarez-Miranda, El sur de Europa y la adhesión a la Comunidad. Los debates políticos, CIS, 1996. Lukas Tsoukalis, The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement, George Allen & Unwin, 1981.

191

192

1

Notes

Spain and the Early Process of European Integration, 1945–47

1 Raymond Carr, Spain, 1808–1975, Clarendon Press, 1982, p. 38. 2 Quoted by Paul Preston and Denis Smyth in Spain, the EEC and NATO, Chatham House, 1987, p. 24. 3 Viscount Templewood, Ambassador on Special Mission, Collins, 1946, p. 102. 4 Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, George Allen & Unwin, 1926, pp. 107–8. 5 Richard Herr, An Historical Essay on Modern Spain, Berkeley, 1974; Jordi Nadal, El fracaso de la revolución industrial en España, 1814–1913, Ariel, 1987, are two examples of this approach. 6 Carr, Spain, p. 1. 7 Juan Pablo Fusi y Jordi Palafox, España: 1808–1996, El desafío de la modernidad, Espasa, 1997. 8 Miguel Artola, Los afrancesados, Madrid, 1976, pp. 59–73; Carr, Spain, pp. 111–14. 9 Américo Castro, The Spaniards: an Introduction to their History, Berkeley, 1971, p. 563. 10 Miguel de Unamuno, En torno al casticismo, Madrid, 1996. 11 Ramiro de Maeztu, Defensa de la Hispanidad, Madrid, 1996; Angel Ganivet, Idearium español, el porvenir de España, Madrid, 1996. 12 Joaquín Costa, Reconstrucción y europeización de España, y otros escritos, Madrid, 1981, p. 27. 13 Joaquín Sanchez de Toca, Del poder naval en España y su política económica para la nacionalidad ibero-americana, Madrid, 1986. 14 José Ortega y Gasset, Obras Completas, Alianza Editorial, 1994, vol. 1, p. 128. 15 For further information about the Second Republic see Stanley Payne, Spain’s First Democracy. The Second Republic, 1931–1936, University of Wisconsin Press, 1993. 16 El Socialista, 5.4.1931; Payne, The Second Republic, p. 31. 17 Manuel Azaña, Speech of 19.4.1933, in Obras Completas, Mexico, 1966, vol. II, p. 689. 18 Salvador de Madariaga, Memorias (1921–1936), Amanecer sin mediodía, Espasa Calpé, 1974, p. 272. 19 For a biography of Salvador de Madariaga see Carlos Fernandez Santander, Madariaga ciudadano del mundo, Biografías Espasa, 1991. 20 For a classic account of the Spanish Civil War including foreign intervention see Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, Pelican, 1965. 21 Speech of Francisco Franco, 18.4.1937, quoted by Ian Gibson, En busca de José Antonio, Barcelona, 1980, p. 314. 22 The Times, 5.3.1946. 23 United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 39. AG (1–2) 59, plenary session, p. 1222. 24 Carr, Spain, p. 704. 25 Pensamiento político de Franco II, Chap. IX. Bases de la democracia española, Madrid, 1975.

Notes 26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35 36 37 38

39 40

41 42

43 44 45

46

47 48

193

Carr, Spain, p. 704. Foreign Relations of the United States, FRUS 1947, vol. III, p. 1097. Preston, Franco, p. 587. Florentino Portero, Franco asilado: la cuestión española, 1945–1950, Aguilar, 1989, p. 399. Angel Viñas, Los pactos secretos de Franco con Estados Unidos: bases, ayuda económica, recortes de soberanía, Barcelona, 1981, pp. 165–9. For further information about the United States and its influence on Spanish European policy see Fernando Guirao, ‘The United States, Franco and the Integration of Europe’, in Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (eds), The United States and the Integration of Europe. Legacies of the Postwar Era, St Martin’s Press, 1996. José María Gil Robles, La monarquía por la que yo luché, páginas de un diario 1941–1954, Madrid, 1976, p. 260. Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 15, Document 107, 28.8.1950. Ibid. Resolution 14, Document 107, 28.8.1950. Angel Viñas et al., Política comercial exterior en España (1931–1975), Madrid, 1979, vol. 1, p. 489. See Fernando Guirao, Spain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–57, St Antony´s Macmillan Series, 1998. Ibid. For further details see Fernando Guirao, ‘Spain and the Green Pool. Challenge and Response, 1950 to 1955’, in Richard T. Griffiths and Brian Girvin (eds), The Green Pool and the Origins of the Common Agricultural Policy, Lothian Press, 1995. Ibid., p. 279. Archive of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AGMAE), file 5332 folder 2. Nota informativa. Resumen del desarrollo de las relaciones de España con la OECE, Madrid, 21.9.1956. Ibid. For a detailed account of this process by its protagonists see Maríano Navarro Rubio, Mis memorias, testimonio de una vida política truncada por el caso Matesa, Barcelona, 1991; Laureano López Rodó, Memorias I, Barcelona, 1990. Joseph Harrison, The Spanish Economy in the Twentieth Century, Croom Helm, 1985, pp. 137–49. José María de Areilza and Fernando María Castiella, Reivindicaciones de España, Madrid, 1941. Florentino Portero and Rosa Pardo, ‘La política exterior’, in Raymond Carr (Coord), La época de Franco (1939–1975), Vol 1: Política, ejército, iglesia, economía y administración. Historia de España Menéndez Pidal, Vol XLI, Espasa Calpé, 1996, pp. 227–43; Jose Mario Armero, La política exterior de Franco, Barcelona, 1978, pp. 171–99. Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, El nuevo estado español, 25 años de Movimiento Nacional, 1936–1961, Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1961. Arriba, 18.5.1950. ABC, 10.5.1950.

194

Notes

49 Jose María Doussinague, Conferencia inaugural del curso 1948–49 de la Escuela Diplomática, Madrid, 1949. 50 Javier Tusell, Franco y los católicos: la política interior española entre 1945 y 1957, Madrid, 1984, p. 238. 51 Ibid., p. 239. 52 Petra Maria Weber, ‘El CEDI, promotor del occidente cristiano y de las relaciones hispano-alemanas en los años cincuenta’, Hispania, 1994, n. 188. 53 Ibid., p. 1084. 54 Ibid., p. 1091. 55 Interview with Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora, Madrid, 9.4.1997. 56 Francisco Franco, Textos de doctrina política, 1945–1950, Madrid, 1951, pp. 147–73. 57 See Francisco Franco, Discursos y mensajes de Su Excelencia el Jefe de Estado ante las Cortes Españolas, 1943–1961, Madrid, 1961. 58 Alberto Martín Artajo, ‘Cristianismo y Comunidad Internacional’, Revista de Estudios Políticos, 93, Madrid, May–June 1957. 59 José Larraz, Dos discursos sobre la unidad económica europea, Madrid, 1949. 60 José Larraz, Estudios sobre la unificación económica europea, Espasa Calpé, 1961. 61 Pedro Laín Entralgo, España como problema, Rialp, 1949. 62 Rafael Calvo Serer, España sin problema, Rialp, 1949. 63 Salvador de Madariaga, Europe, a Unit of Human Culture, European Movement, 1952. 64 Luis Díez del Corral, El rapto de Europa, una interpretación histórica de nuestro tiempo, Alianza, 1974. 65 Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Del ‘contubernio’ al consenso, Barcelona, 1985, p. 92. 66 Javier Tusell, La oposición democrática al franquismo, 1939–1962, Barcelona, 1977, p. 387. 67 Alvarez de Miranda, Del ‘contubernio’, p. 127. 68 Rafael Calvo Serer, Mis enfrentamientos con el poder, Plaza y Janés, 1978, p. 36. 69 Ibid., p. 40. 70 Javier Tusell, Gimenez Fernández: precursor de la democracia española, Madrid, 1990, p. 265. 71 Ibid., p. 275. 72 Enrique Tierno Galván, Cabos Sueltos, Barcelona, 1981, p. 204. 73 Ibid., pp. 221–34. 74 José Ortega y Gasset, Meditación de Europa, Revista de Occidente, 1960, p. 123. 75 Tierno Galván, Cabos Sueltos, p. 131. 76 Paul Preston, Salvador de Madariaga and the Quest for Liberty in Spain, Clarendon Press, 1987, p. 25. 77 Salvador de Madariaga, De la angustia a la libertad: Memorias de un federalista, Madrid, 1982, p. 311. 78 Abdón Mateos, ‘Europa en la política de presencia internacional del socialismo español en el exilio’, Espacio, Tiempo y Forma, 2, 1989, p. 348. 79 Fernando Guirao, ‘The Spanish Socialist Party’, in Richard T. Griffiths (ed.), The Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950s, E.J. Brill, 1993. 80 Adelante, Discurso de Indalecio Prieto en Nueva York, 22.5.1950; Richard

Notes

195

Gillespie, The Spanish Socialist Party, a History of Factionalism, Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 112. 81 For an account of the relations between the Francoist syndical organization of the international trade union movement see Abdón Mateos, La Denuncia del Sindicato Vertical. Las relaciones entre España y la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (1939–1969), Colección Estudios, 1996.

2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24

The Spanish Approach to the European Community, 1957–62 Arriba, José Luis Gomez Tello, Entre la utopía y el idealismo, 27.3.1957. Laureano López Rodó, Memorias, Barcelona, 1990, pp. 103–4. Ibid., pp. 103–4; interview with Laureano López Rodó, Madrid, 25.4.1997. Francisco Franco, Discursos y Mensajes del Jefe de Estado (1957–1960), Madrid, 1961, p. 103. Alberto Ullastres, speech at Valencia, 1.5.1957, and speech at Barcelona, 1.6.1957. Discursos y declaraciones, Madrid, 1958. Interview with Alberto Ullastres, Madrid, 2.4.1997. Comisión interministerial para el estudio de los problemas que pueden plantear en la Península el Mercado Común Europeo como una posible Zona de Libre Comercio (CICE), Boletín Oficial del Estado, BOE, 21.8.1957, p. 770. López Rodó, Memorias, pp. 103–4. Punta Europa, 16.4.1957. Manuel Fuentes Irurozqui, ‘El Mercado Común Europeo, Revista de Política Internacional, 31.5.1957, p. 27. Ya, Continentalismo como solución, 14.6.1957. Simón Cano, Anales de Economía, 64.8.1957, p. 17. PRO FO 371/136664. Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella’s intervention at the OEEC Council of Ministers, April 1958. PRO FO 371/136664. Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella’s intervention at the OEEC Council of Ministers, April 1958. PRO FO 371/153240. Record of the meeting between the Foreign Secretary and Castiella at the Foreign Office, 13.7.1960. AGMAE 5746/16. CICE. Acta de la comisión jurídica e institucional, Madrid, 11.11.1958. Answers to the economic questionnaire of the government. Oficina de Coordinación y Propagación Económica, Madrid, 1959. Alberto Ullastres, Radio Declarations, 25.1.1959. Política Comercial Española, Ministerio de Comercio, 1963, p. 525. Tusell, La oposición democrática, p. 345. Ibid., p. 345. Unión Española ante Europa. Documentos de Unión Española, 7.5.1959. Tusell, La oposición democrática, p. 388. Paloma Gonzalez Gómez del Miño, La heterogeneidad de las relaciones bilaterales hispano-francesas durante el cambio político español, 1969–1986, DPhil thesis, Complutense University, Madrid, 1991, p. 394. Pierre Maillard, De Gaulle et l’Europe, entre la nation et Maastricht, Tallandier, 1995.

196

Notes

25 AGMAE 5539/18. Viaje a Francia del ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Sr. Castiella. Entrevistas con el general De Gaulle y con Couve de Murville, Paris, 8.9.1959: Le Monde, 7.9.1959. 26 AGMAE 5539/15. Declaraciones del ministro de Asuntos Exteriores de España al señor Heinz Bath de la televisión alemana, 9.11.1959. 27 Die Welt, 10.11.1959. 28 Maillard, De Gaulle et l’Europe, pp. 151–2. 29 Jose María de Areilza, Memorias Exteriores, 1947–1964, Barcelona, 1984, pp. 122–8. 30 Fernando María Castiella, Política exterior de España: Discurso de Castiella en la Universidad de Georgetown, Madrid, 1960, p. 10. 31 AGMAE 6416/20. Informe del conde de Casa Miranda, embajador en Bélgica, Brussels, 9.11.1960. 32 For a detailed analysis of the British application to the EEC see, Anne Deighton and Piers Ludlow, ‘A Conditional Application: British Management of the First Attempt to Seek Membership of the EEC, 1961–1963’, in Anne Deighton (ed.), Building Postwar Europe. National Decision Makers and European Institutions, 1954–1963. St Antony’s Macmillan, 1995. 33 Maillard, De Gaulle et l’Europe, p. 169. 34 AGMAE 6415/8. Informe de Eduardo de Laiglesia desde la misión española ante la CE, Brussels, 9.8.1961. 35 El Socialista, 11.5.1961. 36 Ibid., 27.5.1961 37 See Abdón Mateos, La Denuncia del Sindicato Vertical. Las relaciones entre España y la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (1939–69), Colección Estudios, 1997. 38 AGMAE 6417/12. Informe de Casa Miranda, Brussels, 8.9.1961. 39 El Socialista, 25.6.1961. 40 Alvarez de Miranda, Del ‘contubernio’, pp. 28–9. 41 Tusell, La oposición, p. 346. 42 Delegación Nacional de Organizaciones del Movimiento. Europa a los diez años del plan Schuman, Madrid, 1960 43 Antonio Sanchez Gijón, El camino hacia Europa, Madrid, 1973, p. 161. 44 López Rodó, Memorias, p. 285. 45 Francisco Franco, speech at Las Huelgas, Burgos, 1.10.1961. Discursos y Mensajes del Jefe de Estado (1960–1963), Madrid, 1964, p. 337. 46 Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco, Barcelona, 1976, entry for 3.3.1962, p. 334. 47 AGMAE 6415/26. Aspectos políticos e institucionales del Mercado Común: su implicación ante una solicitud eventual de España ante la CEE, Madrid, 12.12.1961. 48 Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne, Débats, 36–46, 1961–62, Conclusion des accords d’adhésion, séance du mardi 19 septembre 1961, pp. 62–3. 49 Alberto Ullastres, Conference at the Chamber of Commerce, Barcelona, 12.12.1962. Política Comercial Española, 1963, p. 670. 50 AGMAE 6415/18, Despacho del Conde de Casa Miranda, Brussels, 16.12.1961. 51 Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne, Documents de séance 1961–1962.

Notes

52

53 54 55 56 57

58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86

197

Document 122. Rapport sur les aspects politiques et institutionnels de l’adhésion ou de l’association à la Communauté, par M. Willi Birkelbach, 15.1.1962. AGMAE 6916/6. Informe de Francisco Armijo Director General de Relaciones Económicas y Javier Elorza, Director General de Organizaciones Internacionales, Madrid 24.1.1962. AGMAE 6916/6. Posible asociación de España a la Comunidad Económica Europea, Madrid, 25.1.1962. López Rodó, Memorias, p. 305. Ibid., p. 306. Antonio Alonso, España en el Mercado Común. Del Acuerdo del 70 a la Comunidad de los Doce, Espasa Calpé, 1985, p. 11. AGMAE 6916/7. Texto de la Carta de Castiella al Presidente del Consejo de Ministros de la Comunidad Europea, solicitando la asociación de España a la CEE, Madrid, 9.2.1962. Areilza, Memorias Exteriores, p. 169. AGMAE 7276/5. Acta del Consejo de Ministros, 10.2.1962. Arriba, ABC, La Vanguardia Española, 10.2.1962. Balance, n. 188, 15.2.1962, p. 3. Survey carried out by Europa Press in May 1961, published by the daily Ya on 10.2.1962. Carta de José María Gil Robles a Maurice Faure, Madrid 28.2.1962. Archive of the AECE, Madrid. Tusell, Gimenez Fernández, p. 278. El Socialista, 22.2.1962. Mundo Obrero, España Libre, February 1962. AGMAE 6916/7. Carta de Casa Miranda a Castiella, Brussels, 23.2.1962. AGMAE 6916/6. Nota confidencial, OID, Madrid, 1.3.1962. AGMAE 6916/7. Nota OID sobre la prensa belga, Brussels, 10.2.1962. AGMAE 6916/6. Nota confidencial OID, The Hague, 10.2.1962. AGMAE 6916/7. Nota de Jose María Doussinague, embajador en Roma, 14.2.1962. AGMAE 6916/7. Noticia de EFE, OID, Bonn, 9.2.1962. AGMAE 6916/7. Noticia de EFE, OID, Brussels, 10.2.1962. AGMAE 6916/7. Nota de UPI, OID, Madrid, 9.2.1962. AGMAE 6916/7. Noticia de EFE, OID, Paris, 9.2.1962. AGMAE 6916/7. Noticia de EFE, OID, The Hague, 10.2.1962. AGMAE 6916/7. Informe de José María Doussinague, Rome, 14.2.1962. AGMAE 6916/7. Noticia UPI, OID, London, 9.2.1962. AGMAE 6916/7. Noticia UPI, OID, Washington, 9.2.1962. AGMAE 6916/8. Carta de Casa Miranda a Castiella, Brussels, 8.2.1962. AGMAE 6816/8. Carta de Casa Miranda a Castiella, Brussels, 9.2.1962. AGMAE 6916/8. Carta del secretario de la CISL al Presidente del Consejo de Ministros, Brussels, 12.2.1962. Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne, Débats 47–55, 1961–62, Séances du 20 au 22 février 1962, pp. 80–81. López Rodó, Memorias, p. 302. Ibid., p. 316. AGMAE 6916/7. Carta de Couve de Murville a Fernando Castiella, Brussels, 7.3.1962.

198

Notes

87 88 89 90

AGMAE 6916/7. Telegramas de Bonn y París, 7.3.1962. AGMAE 6916/7. Carta de Casa Miranda a Castiella, Brussels, 14.3.1962. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 18.3.1962. Parlement Européen. Débats, 56–61, 1962/63, Séance du jeudi 29 mars 1962. Question orale sur l’ouverture de négociations avec l’Espagne, pp. 81–4.

3

From the Congress of Munich to the Preferential Agreement, 1962–70

1 Project of resolutions of the AECE, 26.5.1962, in Joaquín Satrústegui (ed.), Cuando la transición se hizo posible: el ‘contubernio’ de Munich, Tecnos, 1993, pp. 176–7. 2 AGMAE 6720/E25. Nota del Director de Política Exterior al Consul en Munich, 28.5.1962. 3 Areilza, Memorias Exteriores, pp. 170–71. 4 Gregorio Morán, Miseria y grandeza del Partido Comunista, Barcelona, 1990, pp. 353–4. 5 Text passed by the Congress of the European Movement in Munich on 6.6.1962, in Joaquín Satrústegui, Op. cit., p. 180. 6 Speech of Salvador de Madariaga, Munich 8.6.1962. Ibid., p. 189. 7 Speech of Jose María Gil Robles, Munich 8.6.1962. Ibid., p. 190. 8 Francisco Franco, Valencia 16.6.1962. Discursos y mensajes del Jefe de Estado (1960–1969), Madrid, 1964, pp. 399–404. 9 AGMAE 1763/E7. José María de Areilza a Castiella, Paris 14.6.1962. 10 AGMAE 7651/E6. Casa Miranda a Castiella, Brussels, 7.7.1962. 11 AGMAE 7213/E3. Despacho de Francisco Gomez de Llano, Rome, 13.6.1962. 12 AGMAE 7510/E3. Despacho de Victor Arantegui, Bonn, 3.7.1962. 13 Die Welt, L’Aurore, 16.6.1962. 14 Parlement Européen, Débats, 56–61, 1962–63, Séance du mardi 26 juin, 1962, pp. 80–81. 15 AGMAE 1786/E3. Telegrama de Castiella a Areilza, Madrid, 6.7.1962. 16 Frankfurter Zeitung, New York Times, 7.7.1962. 17 AGMAE 7651/E6. Castiella a Casa Miranda, Madrid, 19.7.1962. 18 Tusell, La oposición, p. 431. 19 Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Memoria breve de una vida pública, Barcelona, 1980, p. 33. 20 Ibid., pp. 144–5. 21 Nota sobre la Unión Política Europea, José María de Areilza, San Sebastian, 7.8.1962. Document of Luis Suarez, Archivo Francisco Franco. 22 José María de Areilza, Crónica de libertad, 1965–1975, Barcelona, 1985, p. 41. 23 Fraga, Memoria breve, p. 48. 24 Ibid., p. 48; Portero and Pardo, ‘La política exterior’, p. 235. 25 Carta del marqués de Bolarque a Castiella, Bonn, 17.9.1962. Document of Luis Suarez, Archivo Francisco Franco. 26 Interview with Alberto Ullastres. 27 AGMAE 7651/E6, Informe de Casa Miranda, Brussels, 6.11.1962. 28 ABC, Discurso de Fernando María Castiella ante las Naciones Unidas, 24.9.1963.

Notes

199

29 AGMAE 7360/5. Carta de Castiella a la Comisión Europea, Madrid, 12.2.1963. 30 AGMAE 7390/E 7. Consejo de Ministros, 25.2.1964. 31 AGMAE 7390/5. Carta de Spaak a Castiella, Brussels, 2.6.1964. 32 OECD, report on Spain 1964. 33 Ya, 30.5.1964. 34 Le Monde, 2.7.1964. 35 ABC, 6.6.1964. 36 Derek Urwin, The Community of Europe: a history of European integration since 1945, Longman, 1995, p. 107. 37 OECD report on Spain, 1965. 38 Alonso, España en el Mercado Común, p. 26. 39 Ibid., p. 28. 40 Ibid., p. 27; interview with Alberto Ullastres. 41 Alonso, España en el Mercado Común, p. 33. 42 AGMAE 8967/E 51. La organización sindical ante el mandato de negociaciones, 3.10.1967. 43 Francisco Franco, Speech at the Cortes, 18.11.1967. Discursos y mensajes del Jefe de Estado (1964–67), Madrid, 1968, p. 320. 44 Alonso, España en el Mercado Común, p. 35. 45 AGMAE 9223/E 14. Informe sobre la evolución de las negociaciones, José Luis Cerón and Javier Elorza, 8.11.1968. 46 AGMAE 10085/E 8. Moción contra España en el Parlamento Holandés. 26.2.1969. 47 Informaciones, España avanza hacia el acuerdo con la CEE; Arriba, Exito de la diplomacia Española en Europa, 18.10.1969. 48 AGMAE 9223/E 15. Nota sobre los términos del segundo mandato, 21.10.1969. 49 Alonso, España en el Mercado Común, p. 39. 50 Interview with Alberto Ullastres. 51 Harrison, The Spanish Economy; OECD report on Spain 1974. 52 Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy, George Allen & Unwin, 1979, pp. 55–78. 53 Victor Pérez Díaz, The Return of Civil Society: the Emergence of Democratic Spain, Harvard University Press, 1995, p. 13. 54 Revista Española de Opinión Pública, Vol. 9, 1967, p. 202. 55 Jacques-René Robier, L’opinion publique et l’Europe, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1966, p. 20. 56 Revista Española de Opinión Pública, 15.3.1969. 57 Salvador Pániker, Conversaciones en Madrid, Barcelona, 1970, pp. 25–8. 58 José Larraz, La integración europea y España, Espasa Calpé, 1961. 59 Ramón Tamames, Cuatro problemas de la economía española, Península, 1965. 60 Alvarez de Miranda, Del ‘contubernio’, p. 56. 61 Ibid., p. 60. 62 Areilza, Crónica de libertad, pp. 19–21. 63 Pániker, Conversaciones en Madrid, p. 305. 64 Cuadernos para el diálogo, February 1967, p. 4. 65 Ibid., p. 5. 66 Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement. Enquiries made on

200

67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89

4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Notes the problems caused by the Spanish application for association to the Common Market. Paris, 15.6.1963. AECE Archive. El Socialista, 10.6.62. El Socialista, 10.6.62, 22.3.62, 22.7.64, 3.5.67. El Socialista, ‘La verdad sobre el movimiento económico-político actual en España’, 27.7.1967. Mundo Obrero, 15.10.1962. Morán, Miseria y grandeza, p. 430. ABC, ‘Firma del acuerdo preferencial en Luxemburgo’, 29.6.1970. Ibid. Commission of the European Communities, ‘Opinion on Spain’s Application for Membership’, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 9/78, p. 43. ABC, ‘La Vanguardia Española’, 30.6.1970. Actualidad Económica, 627, 21.3.1970, p. 17. ABC, ‘España al encuentro de Europa’, 4.2.1970. ABC, ‘Europa sin matute’, Marquis of Valdeiglesias, 11.1.1970. Revista El Mundo, 1.7.1970, p. 52. ABC, 29.7.1970. Arriba, ‘Consecuencias del acuerdo con el Mercado Común’, 4.4.1970. Ramón Tamames, Acuerdo preferencial CEE/España y preferencias generalizadas, Barcelona, 1972. Luis Gamir, Las preferencias efectivas del Mercado Común a España, Moneda y Crédito, 1972. Alvarez de Miranda, Del ‘contubernio’, p. 61. Mundo Obrero, ‘La política exterior del Opus’, 7.3.1970. El Socialista, ‘España dentro de Europa’, 8.4.1970. Spanish Federal Council of the European Movement. Declaration. Paris 22.6.1970. AECE Archive. AGMAE 10085/E 4. Declaraciones de Mansholt a la radio alemana, 31.1.1970. Avanti, 30.3.1970.

The Crisis of the Franco Regime in European Perspective, 1970–75 Urwin, The Community of Europe, pp. 139–40. Bulletin of the European Communities, 27.9.1972. Agence Europe, 22.10.1972. Alonso, España en el Mercado Común, p. 76. AGMAE, 15484/ Informe de la Comisión al Consejo en relación con los problemas planteados por la ampliación, Brussels, 14.8.1971. Laureano López Rodó, Memorias III, Barcelona, 1992, p. 214. AGMAE. 12151/5 López Bravo a Walter Scheel, 23.10.1971. López Rodó, Memorias III, p. 188. Raimundo Bassols, España en Europa, Historia de la adhesión a la CE, Política Exterior, 1995, p. 79. Le Monde, 31.8.1973; López Rodó, Op. cit., p. 438.

Notes

201

11 Revista Dossier Mundo, 23.7.1973, p. 38. 12 ABC, 3.1.1973. 13 AGMAE 15280/73. Re-negociación del acuerdo preferencial, 18.10.1973, Bassols, España, p. 314. 14 Bassols, España, p. 84. 15 López Rodó, Memorias, p. 465. 16 Alonso, España en el Mercado Común, p. 87. 17 Interview with Alberto Ullastres. 18 AGMAE 15570/E 13. Franco María Malfattí a Alberto Ullastres, November 1970; interview with Lord Dahrendorf, 26.5.1997. 19 Interview with López Rodó. 20 Francisco Franco, Discursos y mensajes del jefe de Estado (1968–1970), Madrid, 1971, pp. 167–78. 21 AGMAE 15570/E 13. Informe policial sobre el proceso 1001, 9.11.1972, Bassols, España, p. 316. 22 Bassols, España, p. 86; interview with Alberto Ullastres. 23 Marcelino Camacho, Memorias: confieso que he luchado, Temas de Hoy, 1993, p. 334. 24 ABC, 21.12.1973; interview with Alberto Ullastres. 25 Inforeuropa, 14.1.1974. 26 The Times, Le Monde, 13.2.1974. 27 Agence Europe, 22.2.1974. 28 Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament, Doc. 4/74. Sitting of Thursday, 14.3.1974. 29 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Report on Spain. Doc 3466, 25.8.1974 30 Bassols, España, p. 101. 31 Ibid. 32 Agence Europe, 23.11.1974. 33 Actualidad Económica, n. 871, 23.11.1974, p. 37. 34 Interview with Alberto Ullastres. 35 Bassols, España, p. 117; interview with Alberto Ullastres. 36 Bassols, España, p. 117. 37 Charles T. Powell, ‘International Aspects of Democratization: the Case of Spain’, in Laurence Whitehead (ed.), International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas, Clarendon Press, 1996, p. 300. 38 El Socialista discurso de Felipe Gonzalez ante el XII congreso en el exilio, 21.9.1972. Richard Gillespie, The Spanish Socialist Party, a History of Factionalism, Clarendon Press, p. 286. 39 Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Memoria, PSOE, 13th congress in exile, October 1974. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Willy Brandt, My Life in Politics, Penguin, 1992, p. 382. 43 AGMAE 15570/E 13. Carta del Comité contra la represión al Presidente de la Comisión, 17.2.1974, Bassols, España, p. 317. 44 Fundación Pablo Iglesias, Memoria de la Conferencia Europea al XXX Congreso de UGT, 1976. 45 Eugenio Mujal-León, Communism and Political Change in Spain, Indiana

202

46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76

5

Notes University Press, 1983, pp. 83–5; Santiago Carrillo, Memorias, Barcelona, 1995, 499–500. Mundo Obrero, Resoluciones del VIII Congreso, July, 1972. Ibid. Rafael Calvo Serer, Mis enfrentamientos, pp. 251–2; Carrillo, Memorias, p. 600. Le Monde, 11.11.1971. Rafael Calvo Serer, La dictadura de los Franquistas, Paris, 1973, p. 261. Alvarez de Miranda, Del ‘contubernio’, p. 76. Ibid., p. 76. Charles T. Powell, ‘The Tácito Group and the Spanish Transition to Democracy’, in Francis Lannon and Paul Preston (eds), Elites and Power in Twentieth Century Spain: Essays in Honour of Sir Raymond Carr, Clarendon Press, 1990. Ya, ‘Tácito Coordenadas de la política exterior’, 30.6.1973. Fernando Alvarez de Miranda, Del ‘contubernio’, pp. 80–1. Ibid., pp. 89–90. Bassols, España, p. 112. AGMAE 15570/E 13. Carta de protesta envíada por el gobierno; Bassols, España, p. 319. Bassols, España, p. 113; interview with Alberto Ullastres. Informaciones, 10.4.1974. The Economist, ‘Spain. The Last Corrida’, 20.9.1975. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Doc 3664. Resolution, 22.9.1975. Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament. Motion of Resolution, Doc 269/75. Sitting of Thursday, 25.9.1975. The Times, 26.9.1975. Bulletin of the European Communities, n. 2325, 9–1975; Ibid. ABC, 2.10.1975. Helmut Schmidt, Men and Powers, a Political Retrospective, Cape, 1990, pp. 167–8. ABC, 1.10.1975. Simon Nuttall, European Political Cooperation, Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 1. Bulletin of the European Communities, n. 2326, 10–1975; Nuttall, Political Cooperation, pp. 126–7. L’Aurore, 10.10.1975. OECD report on Spain, 1975. The Economist, 5.10.1975. Le Monde, 8.10.1975 and 14.11.1975. ABC, 6.11.1975.

The Spanish Transition to Democracy and the European Community, 1975–77

1 ABC, ‘Mensaje del Rey’, 22.11.1975.

Notes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

203

Luis María Ansón, Don Juan, Plaza y Janés, 1994, p. 408. Le Monde, Le Figaro, The Times, 23.11.1975. ABC, 26.11.1975. ABC, ‘La Comisión Europea inclinada a apoyar a Juan Carlos I’, 25.11.1975. ABC, 28.11.1975. The Times, 14.12.1975. Agence Europe, 21.1.1976. House of Commons, Oral Answers, 18.2.1976, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 1975–76, Vol. 905, p. 1286. Jose María de Areilza, Diario de un ministro de la monarquía, Barcelona 1977, entry for 9.12.1975, p. 13. Ibid. Ibid., p. 90. Bassols, España, p. 149. Interview with Marcelino Oreja, 14.5.1997. The Times, 3.3.1976. Areilza, Díario, p. 84. Interview with Alfonso Osorio, 17.1.1997. Areilza, Díario, p. 122. Ibid., p. 123. Charles T. Powell, Juan Carlos of Spain, Self-made Monarch, St. Antony’s/ Macmillan, 1996, p. 99; interview with Alfonso Osorio. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Report on the Situation in Spain, Giuseppe Reale, 14.1.1976. Doc. 3714. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Resolution on the Situation in Spain. 14.1.1976. Doc. 3714. Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament, Doc 520/75, Sitting of Wednesday, 11.2.1976. Ibid., Doc. 48. Sitting of Friday, 8.4.1976. Ibid., Doc. 100/76. Sitting of Wednesday, 12.5.1976. El País, ‘El Parlamento Europeo apoya la ruptura pactada en España’, 12.5.1976. Brandt, My Life, p. 316. El Socialista, 30.11.1975 Areilza, Díario, p. 101. Carrillo, Memorias, p. 521. Ibid., p. 601. Powell, International Aspects of Democratization: the Case of Spain, p. 305. El País, 17.6.1976. Michael Pinto-Duchinski, Foreign Political Aid. The German Foundations and Their US Counterparts, International Affairs, 67/1, 1991. Ibid., p. 89. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, En busca del tiempo servido, Barcelona, 1987, p. 52. Agence Europe, ‘Declarations of Santiago Carrillo in Spain’, 3.4.1976. Agence Europe, ‘Spanish Opposition Makes an Appeal to the European Council’, 31.3.1976. Agence Europe, ‘Spanish Christian Democrats in Brussels’, 28.4.1976. El País, ‘Silva en el Congreso Paneuropeo’, 9.5.1976. Federico Silva Muñoz, Memorias Políticas, Barcelona, 1987, p. 330.

204

Notes

41 El País, ‘Escrito de profesionales madrileños al Parlamento Europeo’, 6.6.1976. 42 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Le Monde, La Libre Belgique, 4.7.1976. 43 Bassols, España, p. 160. 44 Charles T. Powell, Un hombre puente en la política exterior española: el caso de Marcelino Oreja, Historia Contemporánea, 1996, 15. 45 Powell, Juan Carlos of Spain, p. 124. 46 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Report on the Situation in Spain, Doc. 3853, 15.9.1976. 47 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Resolution on Spain, Doc. 3853, 15.9.1976. 48 Agence Europe, 2.9.1976. 49 Alfonso Osorio, Trayectoria política de un ministro de la Corona, Barcelona, 1980, pp. 216, 281; interview with Alfonso Osorio. 50 Osorio, Trayectoria, p. 215. 51 Ibid., p. 215. 52 Ibid., p. 216. 53 Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament, Doc. 509/76. Sitting of Wednesday, 12.1.1977. 54 Alfonso Guerra (ed.), XXVII Congreso PSOE, Barcelona, 1977, 275–6. 55 Jose María de Areilza, Cuadernos de la transición, Barcelona, 1983, p. 78. 56 AGMAE 15573/ E 73. Alberto Ullastres a Marcelino Oreja, 5.12.1976; Bassols, España, p. 165. 57 Interview with Alberto Ullastres. 58 Bassols, España, pp. 166–7. 59 AGMAE 15574/E 77–1. Raimundo Bassols a Marcelino Oreja, 19.1.1977, Bassols, España, p. 168. 60 Interview with Marcelino Oreja. 61 The Times, ‘Encouraging Poll to Spain’, 11.2.1977. 62 Osorio, Trayectoria, pp. 216, 281. 63 El País, 14.1.1977. 64 Osorio, Trayectoria, p. 297. 65 Agence Europe, 6.4.1977. 66 Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament, Doc. 63/77/ rev. Sitting of Friday, 22.4.1977. 67 AGMAE 12557/77, Raimundo Bassols a Marcelino Oreja, 8.6.1977, Bassols, España, p. 189. 68 El País, 29.6.1977. 69 Ibid., 23.7.1977. 70 Agence Europe, El País, 27.7.1977; interview with Marcelino Oreja. 71 Interview with Marcelino Oreja. 72 Interview with Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, 16.4.1996. 73 El País, ‘El Presidente del Consejo de Ministros no ocultó sus temores ante la ampliación’, 29.7.1977. 74 Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament. Doc. 208/77. Sitting of Wednesday, 6.7.1977. 75 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Resolution on the Situation in Spain, 8.7.1977. 76 Agence Europe, 28.6.1977.

Notes

205

77 Agence Europe, 29.7.1977.

6 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

27 28 29 30 31

The Negotiations of Democratic Spain with the European Community, 1977–85 Bassols, España, pp. 169–70. Bassols, España, p. 195. AGMAE 17893/ 77–1. Antonio Poch a Marcelino Oreja, 6.11.1977. El País, 21.9.1977. Interview with Marcelino Oreja. Commission of the European Communities, Enlargement of the Community, General Considerations, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/78. Fresco, pp. 1 and 6, ‘Opinion on Spain’s Application for Membership’, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 9/1878, pp 1–3. Jenkins, European Diary, 1977–1981, Collins, 1989, entry for 27 April 1978. Interview with Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo. ‘Opinion on Spain’s Application for Membership’, Bulletin of the EC, Supplement, 9/1978. Agence Europe, 20.12.1978. Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament, Doc.479/78. Sitting of Thursday,18.1.1979. Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament. Doc 42/79. Sitting of Wednesday,10.5.1979. Berta Alvarez-Miranda, El sur de Europa y la adhesión a la Comunidad. Los debates políticos, CIS, 1996, pp. 308–10. Alianza Popular, 1977, p. 15. Ibid. Unión de Centro Democrático, 1977, pp. 17, 19, 21. Raul Morodo, Los partidos políticos en España, Barcelona, 1979, p. 164. PSOE, 1977b, pp. 24–5. PSOE, 1979c, p. 17. PCE, 1975, p. 123; Santiago Carrillo, Eurocomunismo y Estado, Madrid, 1977, p. 132. Santiago Carrillo, El año de la Constitución, Barcelona, 1978, p. 58. Lukas Tsoukalis, The European Community and its Mediterranean Enlargement, George Allen & Unwin, 1981, p. 123. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, DSCD, 21, 27.6.1979, pp. 1044–5. Ibid. François Duchene, ‘Community Attitudes’, in Dudley Seers and Constantine Vaistos (eds), The Second Enlargement of the EEC: the Integration of Unequal Partners, Macmillan, 1982, pp. 25–7. Tsoukalis, Mediterranean Enlargement, p. 136. El País, 6.2.1979. Interview with Raimundo Bassols, 29.4.1996. Le Soir, 5.2.1979. Interview with Marcelino Oreja.

206 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72

Notes Agence Europe, 10.9.1979. Agence Europe, 29.11.1979. El País, 15.12.1979. El País, 6.6.1980; Bassols España, p. 238. Interview with Oreja and Calvo Sotelo. Agence Europe, 6.6.1980. Bassols, España, p. 239. AGMAE 17893/ 77–1. Bassols a Eduardo Punset, 30.10.1980; Bassols, España, p. 239. Cambio 16, 28.9.1980. El País, 7.6.1979, Bassols, España, p. 242. Calvo Sotelo, Memoria viva de la transición, Planeta, 1982, pp. 151–2; interview with Calvo Sotelo. El País, 4.7.1980. Agence Europe, 15.10.1980. Agence Europe, 12.11.1980. Interview with Emilio Garrigues, 21.3.1995. El País, 17.12.1980. Agence Europe, 25.2.1981. Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament, Doc. 1–8/81. Sitting of Friday, 13.3.1981. El País, 17.3.1981. Agence Europe, 14.7.1981. Official Journal of the European Communities, Debates of the European Parliament, Enlargement of the Community, Sitting of Thursday, 19.11.1981. Agence Europe, 12.6.1982. Agence Europe, 4.10.1982. Interview with Calvo Sotelo. Tsoukalis, Mediterranean Enlargement, p. 129. Eurobaromètre, Opinion Poll on Spain and the European Community, October 1982. Tsoukalis, Mediterranean Enlargement, p. 127. Revista del Movimiento Europeo, March 1982. Catalina García, ‘The Autonomous Communities and International Relations’, in Richard Gillespie, Fernándo Rodrigo and Jonathan Story (eds), Democratic Spain, Reshaping External Relations in a Changing World, Routledge, 1995, p. 134. Revista del Movimiento Europeo, January 1983. Agence Europe, 28.10.1982. Agence Europe, 2.11.1982. Fernando Morán, España en su sitio, Plaza y Janés, 1990, p. 44. Bassols, España, p. 282. Interview with Fernando Morán, 15.4.1997. El País, 1.12.1982. Agence Europe, 4.12.1982. Agence Europe, 15.12.1982. Morán, España, p. 48. El País, 17.12.1982. El País, 16.12.1982. Interview with Fernando Morán, 14.4.1997.

Notes

207

73 Morán, España, p. 69; Ramón Luís Acuña, Como los dientes de una sierra, Plaza y Janés, 1991, p. 150. 74 Agence Europe, 7.7.1983. 75 Morán, España, p. 163. 76 El País, 19.11.1983. 77 Bassols, España, p. 289. 78 Agence Europe, 26.6.1984. 79 Eurobaromètre, Opinion Poll on Spain, January 1985. 80 Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados, DSCD, 195, 27.3.1985; El País, 28.3.1985. 81 Jonathan Story, ‘Spain’s External Relations Redefined’, in Gillespie, Rodrigo and Story (eds), Democratic Spain. 82 Jean Grudgel, ‘Spain and Latin America’, in Gillespie, Rodrigo and Story (eds), Democratic Spain. 83 C. del Arenal and F. Aldecoa, España y la OTAN: Textos y Documentos, Tecnos, 1986. 84 Morán, España, p. 311; interview with Fernando Morán. 85 El País, 13.6.1985.

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Index Abelló, Juan 57 ACNP (Associación Católica Nacional de Propagandistas) 25, 110 Adenauer, Conrad 24, 37, 45 Adroher Gironella, Enrique 17, 33 AECE (Asociación Española de Cooperación Europea) 7, 30, 36, 44, 57, 58, 65, 66, 85, 92, 110, 186 Ajuriaguerra, Juan 135 Alfonso XIII 12 Algeria 104 AP (Alianza Popular) 155, 159, 188 Alvarez de Miranda, Fernando 4, 68, 85, 112, 127, 139, 145 Alvarez-Miranda, Berta 5 Amendola, Giorgio 115 Andea, Victor 57 Andersen, Knut Borge 132 Andreotti, Giulio 179 Areces, Ramón 57 Arias Navarro, Carlos 101, 114, 117, 121, 124, 126, 127, 129 Areilza, Jose María de 55, 56, 68, 71, 85, 86, 123, 124, 125, 126, 131, 132, 137, 138, 142, 187 Aron, Raymond 2, 119 Aronstein, Georges 100 Azaña, Manuel 13 Barre, Raymond 161, 163 Barón, Enrique 85 Bassols, Raimundo 142, 143, 146, 150, 151, 162, 167, 172 Belgium 46, 49, 60, 100, 120, 122, 123 Benelux 59, 177, 186 Berlinguer, Enrico 145, 185 Bertrand, Pierre 115, 130, 145 Birkelbach, Willy 53 Birkelbach Report 53, 77, 183, 184 Bolarque, Marquis of 72 Borbón y Battemberg, Juan de

(Count of Barcelona) 43, 86, 109, 122 Botín, Emilio 57 Boyer, Miguel 85, 112 Brandt, Willy 76, 105, 107, 131, 132, 141, 142 Brentano, Karl von 45 Brezhnev, Leonid 131 Bru, Carlos 85 Brunner, Guido 127 Burke, Edmund 9 Caetano, Marcelo 118 Callaghan, James 123 Calmes, Christian 62 Calvo Serer, Rafael 29, 31, 109, 127 Calvo Sotelo, Leopoldo 152, 159, 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, 169 Camacho, Marcelino 100, 127 Camuñas, Ignacio 132, 139 Cañellas, Antón 135 Cano, Simón 40 CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) 48, 77 Carvajal, Federico 136 Carr, Raymond 10 Carrero Blanco, Luis 38, 39, 63, 76, 80, 97, 99, 100, 109, 110 Carrillo, Santiago 88, 108, 109, 132, 135, 158 Casa Miranda, Count of 47, 48, 53, 54, 62, 64, 69, 73, 74, 100 Castiella, Fernando María 22, 27, 38, 39, 44, 45, 46, 56, 69, 71, 74, 80 Castro, Américo 11 Cavero, Iñigo 145 CCOO (Comisiones Obreras) 107, 170, 176 CDU (German Christian Democratic Party) 69, 134 CEDI (Centro Europeo de Documentación e Información 26, 27

218

Index CEOE (Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales) 171, 176 CEPYME (Confederación Española de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa) 170 Cerón, Jose Luis 77, 78, 79 Charles I 9, 162 Cheysson, Claude 112, 113 Chirac, Jacques 138 CICE (Comisión Interministerial para el estudio de las Comunidades Europeas) 39, 40, 41 CIU (Convergencia i Unió) 159 CNT (Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores) 58 Colombo, Emilio 163 COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives) 169 Cortina, Pedro 101, 116 Costa, Joaquín 11 Council of Europe 18, 23, 24, 101, 104 Couve de Murville, Maurice 44, 54, 61, 63, 75 Craveiro Lopes 24 CSU (German Christian Social Union) 134 Curtis, Dunstan 131 Cyprus 95, 117 Czechoslovakia 115 Dahrendorf, Lord Ralf 99, 101 De Gaspieri, Alcide 25 De Gaulle, Charles 45, 46, 47, 72, 73, 75, 76 Degrelle, Leon 26, 60 Deighton, Anne 3 De La Malène, Christian 130 Delors, Jacques 179 Deniau, Jean-François 93 Denmark 47, 78, 93, 118, 125, 151 Díaz Llanos, José María 91 Díez Alegria, Manuel 128, 136 Díez del Corral, Luis 30 Doussinague, José María 25 Durieux, Jean 130

219

EDCEE (Equipo Democristiano del Estado Español) 145 Eguilaz, París 50 Egypt 95, 104 Eisenhower, Dwight David 46 Erhard, Ludwig 61, 63 Escrivá de Balaguer, José María 21 Escudero, Manuel 128 Esnaola, Jose Ramón 91 ETA Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna 98, 99, 114, 115, 166 Europeanism 4, 5, 11, 23 alternative Europeanism 81–8 Congress of Munich 65–8 democratic opposition 105–13 Europeanist political consensus 154–9 mechanism of domestic change 185–8 monarchy 121, 122 role in Spanish politics 1945–62 23, 36, 43, 44, 49, 50, 51, 52 Suarez Government 137 transition to democracy 134–6 European Agricultural Community 20 European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 72 European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU) 132, 133, 145, 185 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 20, 24, 25, 72 European Conference of Trade Unions (ECTU) 107, 116 European Defence Community 25 European Economic Community (EEC or European Community) 19, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 126, 150–53 democratization in Spain 98–118, 120–30, 136, 138–44, 146, 147, 154, 158, 159–65 external factor of change 182–5 impact of enlargement 95, 96, 97 negotiations for entry 70–87, 150–59, 174–80, 181, 182 Preferential Agreement 88–94

220

Index

European Economic Community – continued reaction in Europe 60–64 Spanish application 54–60 Spanish attempted coup d’état 165–6, 169, 170, 172 European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 41, 50, 94, 95, 96 European Monetary Union 182 European Movement 17, 29, 34, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 European Payments Union (EPU) 19 European Political Cooperation (EPC) 117, 118 European Recovery Programme 15 Faure, Maurice 58, 65, 68, 69, 129, 130, 139, 140, 144, 145 Fellermaier, Ludwig 115, 30 Fernández de la Mora, Gonzalo 23, 26 Finland 18, 19 Foot, Michael 141 Ford, Gerald 117 Fraga Iribarne, Manuel 26, 71, 123, 127, 131, 137, 138, 155 France 13, 14, 15, 22, 24, 32, 40, 41, 44, 46, 47, 53, 59, 61, 68, 72, 73, 75, 76, 82, 96, 102, 108, 119, 122, 123, 151, 161, 162, 165, 168, 174, 183, 184, 186 Franco, Francisco 2, 13, 14, 15, 21, 34, 37, 38, 51, 52, 54, 68, 69, 79, 89, 90, 99, 109, 113, 114, 115, 117, 123, 126, 131, 165, 187 Franco Regime Axis powers 14 Civil War 13, 14 Congress of Munich 65, 68–70 early European cooperation projects 17–23 early strategy towards the EEC 37–60, 63, 64 Europeanism 23–8 final crisis 113–20 postwar Europe 14–15 Preferential Agreement 80–1, 88–92

tensions with Europe 98–105, 113–14 Fuentes Irurozqui, Manuel 39 Fusi, Juan Pablo 10 Ganivet, Angel 11, 97 García Trevijano, Antonio 112 Garrigues Díaz Cañabate, Emilio 164 Garrigues Walker, Joaquín 112, 123 GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) 77, 80, 81 Gaupp-Berghausen, George von 26 Genscher, Hans Dietrich 164 Germany 13, 14, 26, 27, 37, 45, 46, 53, 59, 61, 72, 75, 76, 80, 111, 116, 122, 123, 124, 130, 132, 133, 136, 149, 164, 165, 169, 172, 176, 183, 184, 186 Gestenmaier, Eugen 26 Gil Robles, José María 17, 32, 58, 66, 67, 70, 132, 134, 135, 145 Giménez Fernández, Manuel 31, 32 Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry 102, 120, 122, 138, 161, 167 Gomez, Tomás 34 Gonzalez, Felipe 107, 129, 131, 132, 139, 140, 141, 164, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179 Great Britain 13, 14, 32, 38, 41, 44, 46, 47, 53, 64, 71, 73, 78, 81, 93, 94, 103, 122, 125, 130, 140, 149, 175, 177, 184 Greece 18, 30, 31, 47, 49, 57, 61, 79, 95, 141, 146, 147, 151, 154, 169 Griffiths, Stanton 16 Grimau, Julián 85 Gromyko, Andrei 174 Gual Villalbí, Pedro 39 Guirao, Fernando 4 Gundelach, Olav 122 Habsburg, Otto von 26 Haferkamp, Wilhelm 112 Hallstein, Professor 52, 62, 75 Harmel, Pierre 88 Herbst, Axel 78 Hirsh, Etienne 69 Hitler, Adolf 14

Index Holland 40, 48, 60, 80, 115, 116, 118, 119, 123, 149 Howe, Geoffrey 177 Hynd, John 69 Iceland 94 ICFTU (International Conference of Free Trade Unions) 76, 107 International Monetary Fund 21 Ireland 47, 78, 94, 125, 169 Israel 79, 95, 104 Italy 13, 14, 40, 59, 60, 62, 96, 108, 151, 184 Jenkins, Roy 152, 161 Jobert, Michel 96, 97 Jordan 104 Juan Carlos I 49, 95, 109, 120, 127, 131, 137, 140, 142, 166, 170, 180 Kennedy, John F. 53 Kergolay, Roland de 103, 104, 122 Kindelán, José María 136 Kirk, Peter 115, 130 Kissinger, Henry 116, 117 Kohl, Helmut 172, 173, 176 Krag, Jens Otto 125 Laiglesia, Eduardo de 47 Laín Entralgo, Pedro 136 La Porte, María Teresa 4 Largo Caballero, Francisco 13 Larraz, José 28, 39, 50, 84, 85, 186 Lebanon 95, 104 Lequerica, José de 16 López Bravo, Gregorio 71, 76, 80, 88, 89, 95, 97, 99 López Rodó, Laureano 21, 37, 38, 63, 97, 99 Llopis, Rodolfo 34, 35, 67, 106, 132 Lübke, Heinrich 73 Luns, Joseph 127 Luxembourg 77, 113, 122, 123, 132 Madariaga, Salvador de 13, 17, 29, 33, 34, 36, 67, 68 Maeztu, Ramiro de 11 Malfatti, Franco María 99 Malta 95, 104

221

Mansholdt, Sicco 92, 100, 101 Marchais, Georges 145, 185 Marín, Manuel 172, 173 Marshall, George C. 15, 16 Martín Artajo, Alberto 23, 25, 27, 46 Martín Sanz, Dionisio 90 Martínez de Salas, Juan Pablo 127 Merckatz, Joachim von 26 Milward, Alan 3 Mirallés, Jaime 43, 68, 85 Mitterrand, François 132, 141, 167, 168, 173, 174, 175, 177 Mombiedro, Luis 91 Monnet, Jean 28 Morán, Fernando 4, 172, 173, 174, 177 Moreno, Antonio 4 Moro, Aldo 125 Morocco 81, 95, 104 Morodo, Paul 112, 128, 136, 139 Mountbatten, Lord Louis 138 Múgica, Enrique 107, 112 Muñoz Grandes, Agustín 71 Mussolini, Benito 14 Natali, Lorenzo 153, 163, 164, 173 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 16, 18, 147, 148, 169, 172, 177, 181, 186, 188 Navarro Rubio, Mariano 21, 38, 63 Nenni, Pietro 105, 141 Northomb, Baron 68 Norway 94, 116 Nuñez Iglesias, José 54, 76 OECD (Organization for European Cooperation and Development 7, 54, 55, 72, 79, 80, 81, 82, 90 OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation) 19, 20, 21, 22, 31, 41 Oreja, Marcelino 127, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 146, 147, 160, 163, 187 Ortega y Díaz-Ambrona, Juan Antonio 145 Ortega y Gasset, José 12, 32, 33 Ortoli, François Xavier 112, 113, 116, 142, 143

222

Index

Osorio, Alfonso 144, 145

126, 127, 131, 140,

Palafox, Jordi 10 Palme, Olof 115, 141 Paul VI, Pope 115, 116 PCE (Partido Comunista de España) 87, 88, 108, 109, 132, 135, 142, 145, 146, 158, 159, 185, 187 Pérez Llorca, José María 163, 167 Philip II 9, 162 PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco) 49, 135 Pompidou, Georges 96, 101, 122 Poncet, Jean François 160 Portugal 16, 18, 24, 33, 44, 77, 93, 102, 109, 114, 116, 117, 141, 146, 147, 151, 156, 162, 169, 175 Prieto, Indalecio 17, 34 Primo de Rivera, José Antonio 51 Primo de Rivera, Miguel 12 PSI (Partido Socialista del Interior) PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) 34, 35, 49, 106, 107, 127, 128, 131, 132, 133, 134, 141, 142, 145, 146, 156, 157, 159, 172, 176 Puig Antich, Salvador 101, 107 Punset, Eduardo 162, 163, 164, 165 Reale, Giuseppe 102, 114, 127, 128, 138, 139 Redondo, Nicolás 107 Rey, Jean 47, 64, 76, 88 Ridruejo, Dionisio 66, 70 Roca, Miquel 112 Rockefeller, Nelson 120 Rojo, Luis Angel 136 Ruiz Giménez, Joaquín 25, 26, 85, 86, 127, 132, 134, 135, 145 Salisbury, William 4 Sampedro, José Luis 136 Sanchez Agesta, Rafael 90 Sanchez Bella, Alfredo 26 Sanchez de Toca, Joaquín 11 Sandri, Renato 141 Satrústegui, Joaquín 43, 49, 50, 67, 68, 85, 139

Sauvagnargues, Jean 118, 124 Scheel, Walter 96 Schmidt, Helmut 163, 169 Schmitter, Philipe C. 1 Schuman, Maurice 96 Schuman, Robert 24, 43 Schuman Plan 51 SI (Socialist International) 105, 106, 131, 185 Silva Muñoz, Federico 135, 156 Simonet, Henri François 112, 148 Soames, Christopher 101, 107, 109, 122, 125, 129, 134 Soares, Mario 132, 151 Sofia of Greece 49 Solís, José 21, 48, 51 Soviet Union 13, 115, 159 SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) 127, 131, 133, 186 Spaak, Paul Henri 37, 75 Spendale, Georges 112, 136 Spengler, Oswald 10 Spinelli, Altiero 112, 134 Stabilization Plan 22, 41, 61, 74 Stoel, Max van der 80, 125, 143 St. Oswald, Lord 115, 129, 130 Suarez, Adolfo 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 145, 146, 147, 151, 156, 161, 163, 179, 185 Sweden 115 Switzerland 144 Syria 104 Tamames, Ramón 84, 85, 91, 136 Tierno Galván, Enrique 32, 33, 43, 106, 112, 113, 132 Tindemans, Leo 145 Thatcher, Margaret 173 Thomas, Sir George 140 Thomson, George 112 Thorn, Gaston 113, 122, 124, 129, 135, 169 Tomás, Pascual 34 Tsoukalis, Lukas 5 Tunisia 81, 95, 104 Turkey 95 UCD (Unión de Centro Democrático)

Index 136, 146, 155, 156, 177, 181, 185, 186, 188 UGT (Unión General de Trabajadores) 34, 35, 49, 107, 131, 170, 176 Ullastres, Alberto 21, 37, 38, 45, 52, 53, 61, 76, 78, 98, 101, 104, 105, 107, 112, 113, 142, 143 Unamuno, Miguel de 12, 83 UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) 91 UNESCO (Unied Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization) 17, 73, 90 UN (United Nations) 14, 17, 23, 24, 90, 186 United States 14, 16, 17, 27, 42, 53,

223

62, 116, 117, 118, 178, 180, 186 Valdeiglesias, Marquis of 26, 65, 90 Vatican 17, 22, 115, 116 Van Schendel, Robert 66, 68 Vidal Beneyto, Jose 128 Waldburg-Zeil, George von Wallace, William 3 Wallster, Edmund 120 Wellington, Duke of 9 Whitehead, Laurence 1 Wigny, Pierre 68 Wilson, Harold 132 World Bank 21 Yugoslavia

18, 20, 95

26

Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957-85 (St Antony's Series)

Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957-85 (St Antony's Series)

The Principle of Mutual Recognition in the European Integration Process

The economics of European integration

The State of European Integration

The Economics of European Integration

Process Integration (Process Systems Engineering)

Chemical Process: Design and Integration

European Monetary Integration (CESifo Seminar Series)

University dynamics and European integration

Batch Chemical Process Integration

Interlocking Dimensions of European Integration

European Integration: Scope and Limits

European Integration and Supranational Governance

The European Parliament, the National Parliaments, and European Integration

Theorizing European Integration

European Financial Integration

Theorizing European Integration

Theorizing European Integration

The Politics of European Integration: A Reader

European Integration Theory

European Integration as an Elite Process (Routledge Advances in Sociologu)

The United States and the Nuclear Dimension of European Integration

The Stateless Market: The European Dilemma of Integration and Civilization

Bullying Bonn: Anglo-German Diplomacy on European Integration, 1955-61 (St. Antony's Series)

European Integration and Disintegration: East and West

Pollution Prevention Through Process Integration

Pollution Prevention Through Process Integration

The Political Economy of European Employment: European Integration and the Transnationalization of the

The Economics of European Integration: Limits And Prospects 2005

Political Economy of European Integration, The: Arguments and Analysis

Spain and the Process of European Integration, 1957-85 (St Antony's Series)