Soldier: A Visual History of The Fighting Man

FOREWORD BY

COLONEL TIM COLLINS

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1 don 't yet fully und erstand th e co mpulsio n th at drew me to the life of a sold ier. Certainly th ere

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was a traditi o n of m ilitary service in my fam ily; but there was an invisible, mo re powerful force

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that was abo ve family tradition . Kipling o nce wrote th at " Irishmen m ove to th e sound of guns like salmo n to the sea". Perhaps it is j ust so.T he regime nts in w hich I served, the R oyal Irish, with over three hund red years of history and th e much yo unger Spec ial Air Service, have both left an ind elible mark o n me. It was the regiments that made me th e man I am . Increasingly in modern societies, th e affl ue nt first wo rld, w here mi litary serv ice is reser ved for the daring and the inspired, th e pri vilege of bel on gin g to a profession al army unit is still an expe rience that changes the ind ivid ual, their o utlook, and how the world perceives them. It is also extremely expensive for the nation s to maintain such forces - with the largest portio n go ing o n salaries. Has it not always been th e case that elite fighting men co mmand a premium? Societies have raised and maint ained the se standing fightin g elites since before wr itten record s. Many were th e preser ve of k in gs and em pero rs, while othe rs, like the Zulu ill/pis or th e Spartan regim ents, embo died a warrior code th at was woven int o th e very fabric of th eir society. So me were pri vileged elites, set apart from so ciety like N apoleon 's Imperial G uard, and some even becam e so influ enti al that the y challenge d the very power of th e state they were created to prot ect, like the Otto man janissaries did in th e ISth cent ury. But o ne thing remai ns co nsistent; the m ilitary o rganizatio ns from across the m illen nia reflect the society fr om w hich they arc drawn and arc underpinned and m otivated by the standards of th at soc iety. T hey reflect not j ust the values of the soc iety bu t the way in w hich those soc ieties wish to see th em selves. Essent ially it is the way that soc ieties organize their fightin g forces that gives those forces their uniqu e qualities. In Asian soc ietie s th e mart ial tradit io n is preserved wit hi n tribes and castes. In Japan it was formalized under the code of bushido, the " warrio r's way".

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In Europe, th e broad principl es o f military traditi on evo lved o ut o f th e m edi eval co ncept

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o f chivalry. Across Europe, however, a number of different traditi on s developed . In th e United

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Kin gd om and its em pi re, th e traditi on was m aintain ed by th e regiments, w ith eac h o ne tracing its own history back to the date of its formation . In Pru ssia and subseq ue ntly in th e Germ an Em pire, states relied m ore o n their own history as a state, altho ugh ce rtain regiments withi;l elite form ations did maintain unit histor ies. The Fren ch, meanwhile, created th e co nce pt of esprit de corps, or pride in o ne's unit, within most elite o r uniqu e Frenc h units. But a sing le th read , a bond forged by histo ry, gro up ri tual, an d an invisible force of wi lling obligatio n runs th rou gh all these traditi on s. It is beca use of th is thread , thi s co m mon need, that th e mann er in w h ich states and soc ieties have raised and o rgan ized th ei r fightin g forces across the conti ne nts of th e wo rld has rema ine d essentially the same for over two tho usand year s.

Soldier takes yo u th rou gh th e story of th is m arti al tradi tion . It features 30 key in dividual soldiers and warr iors, inclu di ng sailors and air me n, w ith over 70 o thers covered in lesser detail. T hese inc lude not o nly th e fighting elites of great em pi res, but also inexpe r ienc ed conscr ipt s an d voluntee rs. For eac h of th e key soldiers th ere is a full acco unt of the ir orga nizat io n and eq uipment w ith insights into th eir m otivation and an assessme nt of th eir achievemen ts. T his will allow yo u to sense th e spiri t of th e G reek hoplite co nv ince d that the re was nothing finer in life th an to stand in a ph alan x bristlin g wi th 2.7 m (8ft) spea rs, see th e remot e o utposts of th e R oman Em pire throug h th e eyes of a legi on ary, and under stand th e co nfide nce o f th e British red coats standing !;ISt, loadi ng and firin g more qu ickl y and acc ura tely than th eir foes. M ore m odern ar m ies arc featured too, allowi ng yo u to trace the unbro ken thread o f darin g, o bedie nce, and skill that lin ks the sold iers of every per iod o f h um an history. CO LONEL T I ,\ \ C O L LI N S

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H E C IT Y-ST ATES OF AN C I ENT GIl EEC E

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inv ented a di stinctive

kind of armo ured infantry force : th e hop lit es. These spea r-a rme d citizen-sold iers pro ved th eir worth in th e 5th ce ntu ry

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first in th e repulse of Per sian in vader s and

th en in th e Peloponn esian Wars that pitted At hen s aga inst Sparta . Wi dely recogni zed as th e finest foot sold iers of th ei r time, G ree k hoplites later serve d in th e all-conquering army of Alexand er th e Great and as mercen aries

in the service of o the r power s, including th e Egy ptians and Persian s.

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The A nci e nt Gre ek world embraced no t on ly co nsisting o f a c u irass, g reaves to pro te ct hi s m a inl and Greece. bu t ex te nd ed alo ng the co ast legs, and a hel m et : he ca rried a la rge sh ield, of mod ern Turke y and acro ss the M ed iter ra nean a spC;lr, and a sho rt iron sw o rd . He tC)llght in to Sicily. so uthe r n Ital y. a nd eve n the so u th a tig ht (orm ario » kno wn as a phalan x , of Fra nce. T hou gh th e llIan y cit y- states typi cally eig h t ranks d eep . using th e and their co lo nies showed grea t cu ltural lon g spl';lr as h is primar y weapon . un ity, po litically they were mor e oft en tha n not di vid ed . T hey co uld unite ATH EN I AN H OPLI TE S to cou nte r th e th reat of a co m m o n Ath en s and Sparta diff ered sha rply, enem y. as they had do ne again st however, in their organi znrion the Trojans in the legendar y and train ing. In Athen s hoplites era of pr ehi stor y described in were barely trained partHOllier 's e pic poelll, th e JIi..d. rimers, ex pec ted to abando n T hi s th e y did again , although their c ivilian occupation and not without dis ag reements and present th em selves for serv ice nc ar-disasters. when they thwarted wh en e ver th e state requ ired . the in vasion atte mpts o f the Pe rsian The Trojan War They had to bu y th eir o w n This relief shows Achilles kin gs Da riu s and Xerxes in the ea rly eq uipm en t. A full pan opl y of dragging the body of Hector years of th e 5th ce nt ury nCE. But in armour was very expe nsive and around the wallsof Troy. the second half of the ce nt ury rivalr y almo st ce rta in ly beyo nd t he between Athe ns and Sparta prov oked th e so mean s o f m any Ath enians, wh o will have calle d Pelo po nn csian War (431- 404 nCE). The presented them selve s with o n ly part o f th e alliance s formed b y th e two main powers during standard kit. The w ealth iest cit izens, o n the o ther t hi s period invo lved almost all th e Greek cityhand , we re deck ed o ut ill the fine st armour to stare s and as J result their citizens had to be ill a proclai m thei r status. T ho se too po or to own any state of perm anent readiness for war . The warrior s armo u r at all ofte ll ended up beco mi ng oarsmen w ho did t he bul k of the fi ght in g in th e lon g in the At he n ian fleer. O ne man w ho ser ved bloody struggle that d evelop ed were th e ho pl itcs. Ath ens in th is wa y was the ph ilo sopher Socrate s. A lth o ug h t he tr adition al pr act ice of foo tWEA PO NS A N D TACT I C S raci ng , w restl ing , and ot he r co m pet it ive spo rts Se rv ice as a ho pl ire wa s bo th a dut y and a provided t he Ath en ia ns w ith a k ind of ph ysic II pr ivil ege of ad ul t m ales enjoy ing fu ll citize n co nd itio ning , the y se e m to have had little or no status. T he tw o mo st prom in ent ci ty- state for ma l mi litar y t rai n ing or dr ill. But they were arm ies , those of Athen s and of Sparta , we re free me n fig hti ng for their cit y and their honour, broad ly sim ilar in th eir eq uip me nt and tacti cs. and t hus ex hibited at ti mes a hi gh level o f T he ho plire wo re th ick, he av y bron ze armour mo rale and co m m in u cnt.

TH E KO PIS, A LO NG SLASHING KNIFE

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Phalanx meets phalanx Ancient Greek. warfare was highly symmetrical . When two phalanxes clashed, each presented exactly the samewall of shields topped bya bristling rowof spears. On the left. a musician

with a doubleflute plays a Spartan-style war song to keep up the spirit of the advancing hoplites.

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By co nt rast. Spa rta was a tota lly militari zed state. The Sparta n cit izens , who w er e probabl y man y fewer in number than the At henia n s. relied 0 11 a large popu lation o f no n- ci ti ze n labo u rers - the helot s. These were essent ially se r fs that belonged to the state: and, as suc h, po sed :I mu c h gr ea ter th reat to the sec u rity of the Spartan reg im e than did th e slaves o w ned by in di vidu al Athenia ns. That all Sparta's m ale citizens were raised to be sold iers was partly t hrou gh fea r of a helo t revol t.

SPA RTAN U PBR I NG ING Youn g Spartans were subj ected to a rigorou s system o f militar y tr ainin g and bondin g. Mal e c h ild re n were to ug he ned up by expos u re to the elem ents - th ey we nt barefo ot a nd lightly clad throu gh the wi nte rs - and punishments fo r f.liling tests o f initiati ve and daring. At the age o f 20. the y were assig ned to a barrack s w here th ey ate and sle pt , kept apart from w omen , for the followi ng ten Yt.'ars. It was a syste m designed to c reate a d isciplined fighting force . a nd it see ms to have succeeded. The Sparta ns m arched to battle

in ste p to m usic. a sk ill that wa s quite be yo nd the Ath e nians . T hey had a co he re nt cha in of co m m and and co uld ca rry out rela tivel y co m plex bat tlefield m an o eu vres wit ho ut lo sin g formatio n.

W hen cit y-s tate armies m et , th ey fir st m ad e sac rifices to th e gods and then drew up in pha lan xe s facing o ne anot her, choosing the most level piece of gro und available - pha lan x tacti cs did not work we ll on rou gh terrai n . T he most

G R EEK V ERSUS G REEK

ex pe rie nced fig hters were placed in the front t h ree rows of the ph alan x a nd in the back row, w hen: it wa s their job to deter w eaker spirits fro m attemptin g to run aW:ly. A c ro wd of sk irm ish ing troops, many o f th em probably the per son al slaves o f t he hoplires, o pe rated aro u nd th e ph alan xes, harassin g th e e ne my with a deluge of sto nes, j avel ins, and ar ro ws . The ad vance of a n armoured ph alan x to contact - each m an

C am paig ns foug ht by city - sta te cit ize n arm ies we re of necessity sho rt. usually re stric ted to the su m mer seaso n . T here wa s no prope r supply sys te m to ma intain an ar m y in the field . altho ugh large numbers of slaves - o r, in the case of the Spartan s. helo ts accompanied an army 0 11 its march to meet the ene my. and foragi ng a nd pr ep arin g food w ould have been an important part o f th eir duties. A militar y ca m paig n o fte n came to an end sim ply be cau se most o f the so ld iers o n both sides were farmers who had to go home to their field s to har ve st th eir crops.

Cooking on campaign The Greeks madeportableearthenware cooking stoves that were fuelled by charcoal. These may well havebeen used by Greekarmies on the march.

GREEK NAVAL WARFARE The Greeks w ere famed for their skill at naval

A trireme wa s ext remely cramped. There wa s

wa rfare, using th e light. fast w arships known

room only for t hree days' supply of food and

as triremes. Each trireme w as run by a captain,

wa ter. Crews usually we nt ashore to eat at

or " trierach". In Athens trie rarchs we re

midd ay and at nightf all to sleep. Mu ch tim e

appointed f rom among tho se who ow ned

wa s spent foraging for food and drin k, unless

" land and a house" in the city. It w as the

the w ar fleet w as supported by supply vessels.

captain's responsibility to recruit and pay a

The tri reme had a heavy bronze ram at it s

crew, th e majorit y of wh om we re oarsmen.

prow . In batt le, ships manoeuvred around one

Since a fleet of 100 ships might be assembl ed

anot her, atte mpti ng to ram an enemy in th e

for a campaign, it w as hard to f ind suff icient

f lank. Meanwhile the marines and archers

recruits . Most trir emes wen t to sea w ith a

rained missiles upon the enemy - t he marines

mix of paid citizens, fo reign mercenaries,

t hrew their javelins fro m a seated posit ion,

and slaves at the oars. A trireme also typically

to avoid unbalancing the ship. A trireme wi th

carried ten armoured marines and four archers.

a skilled helmsman and a disciplined crew could ram an enemy vessel or ride over its

Trireme It took 170 men to crew the oarsof a trireme and synchronizing the strokes wasnot easy, as volunteersaboard the reconstructed trireme Olympias discover.

oars and then reverse, leaving it crippled in the water. Alternatively, the marines w ould board t he rammed vessel, seizing it afte r hand-t o-hand f ight ing wi t h spears and axes.

a ph alan x wo u ld collapse und er t he pre ssurl' of

THE SPARTANS MARCHED SLOWLY AND TO THE MUSIC OF MANY PIPERS IN THEIR RANKS ... SO THAT TH E MEN COULD CLOSE ON THE ENEMY STEADILY AN D EVE N LY AND NOT FALL OUT OF FORMATION . THUCYDIDES. DESCRIBING SPARTANS AT THE FIRSTBATTLE OFMA NTINEA. 418 BCE . PElOPONNESIAN WAR

w ith hi s sh ield ho ok ed over hi s left fo rea r m and a spea r held in h is righ t hand - wa s an int im id ating sight. The Spa rta ns initi ated th e custo m of singing a " paean", o r wa r so ng. as they march ed forwa rd . a hab it eventua lly ado pte d by m o st Greek force s. Sing ing helped men to co pe with t he de sperate feel ing o f vu lne ra b ility as t he shoc k o f co ll isio n with th e ene my app ro ac he d . T he G re ek h isto ri a n T hucyd ides recorded how an advan cin g ph a la n x tended to drift to the righ t , sinc e "fear m akes ever y m an w ant to do hi s be st to find prote ction for hi s u na r m ed side in the shi eld o f the m an Respite from wa r During the Olympic Games. a pan- Hellenic festival held every four years, hostilities between warring cities were normally suspended. One of the best-preserved sites at Olympia is the palestra or gym whe re th e athle tes t rained .

next to him o n th e ri ght . thinking th at th e m ore clo sel y the sh ield s are lo ck ed to ge t he r. the sa fer he w ill b e: ' Ther e w as alwa ys a ri sk o f losing th e ti ght phalan x form ati on . G ree k w rite r Xe no pho n described a ll occasion w he n " part o f the phalan x surged for ward in front o f the re st a nd t he part t hat w as left be hi nd be gan to ad vanc e at the do ub le" to catc h up. At a ce rta in di stance fro III t he e ne m y, t he ho plitcs wo u ld break into a run , ch a rg ing forward whi le e m itt ing a hi gh -pitch ed w ar c r y. Then the two ph alan xes clashe d sh ield to sh ield. the hopl it cs in the front ranks th r u st ing with th eir sp ears th rou gh th e gaps in the e ne my sh ield w all. At so m e point in this st r u g g le o ne p a rt of

t h e a tt ac k. A s the form ation br ok e u p a n d me n att e m pted to flee th e field , th e de feate d side cou ld ex pect t o su ffe r h e av y c a su a lt ie s. It see ms th at lo sses 0 11 t he w in n ing side we re ty pica lly a ro u nd five p er ce nt - includin g a rel at ivel y hi gh per cen tage o f the ho plitcs in th e fro nt li nes, the m en ac t iv ely e ngaged in t h e fi gh ti n g . O n th e lo sin g side. casua lt ies w o uld probabl y mount to around 15 per ce nt of the so ld iers in till' field , m an y bein g but chered as th ey fled .

FIG HT I NG T HE PERSI A NS The fig hti n g qu a liti c» of t he Greek hoplitc we re p ut t h o rou g h ly to th e test wh en larg e Pe rsian a r mi e s in vad ed G reece, fi rst i n 4<JO Be E a n d th en ag a in a d e c ad e later. On the fir st o c ca sio n a pr ed ominantl y At henian force cl ash ed w it h a ( I r larger Pe rsia n a r ru y, includi n g

cava lry. at Marathon . Dcspin; the ir in fer io r numbe rs, t h e h oplit c s c h a rge d th e Pe rsia n li n e s.

Gre ek w arrior

This stylized figurine shows a hophte with a crested helmet and a round shield. Hoplites dressed and fought in much the same way across all the smallcity-states of the Greek world.

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I G IV E THA NKS ... T HAT WHI LE AL L AR E WORKIN G HARD TH E WHOLE DAY CUTT I NG STONES. I AS A PRIN CIPALI S GO ABOUT DO I NG N OT HIN G. ROMAN SOLDIER STATIONEDIN EGYPTIN A LETTER TO HIS FAMILY. 109 CE

agai nst th e Dacians in 10\

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Emperor Trajan's

arm y cro ssed the Ih llube o n a rapid ly co nstruc ted brid ge of boa ts. But ret urnin g fo r a sec o nd Arch of Trajan. Thamug adi. Algeria While legionaries built magnificent paved roads across the empire, emperorserected memorials to their military triumphs. This arch in a once prosperous North African city commemoratesTrajan's vic toriesover the Parthians in 114- 117 CEo

decisive c am pa ig n five years lat er th e y built a m o numental sto ne-a nd-w o o d ar c he d bridge , accessed by an approa c h roa d cur int o th e cl iffs lining th e ri ver. It h as be en suggeste d th at th e legion ari es shou ld h e re garded more as co m ba t e ng ineers than as straight fo rward in fantr y, T he need to lI SC to o ls as m uch as weapo ns was also mu ch in ev ide nce dur ing siege o pe rati on s, w h ich for m ed suc h a n imp orta nt pa rt of th e wa rfa re o f the age . T aki n g a for t ifie d po siti o n th at w as sto u tly d efe nd ed was a cha lle nge to an y attac ki ng force. hu t th e R o m an leg io ns ach ieved th e fea t time an d again th rou gh a co m bina tion o f

engineering skills and indomi table tigll£ing spirit.

SIEGE TACT ICS AND WEA PONS Sieges w er e norm all y lon g. d rawn - out affairs, bc..' cJU SCan assault 0 11 a fortress o r fortified to wn wa s a de sperate bu siness to attem pt . even o nce the w all s w e re br each ed . Fig ht in g yo ur w ay into a stro ng ho ld w as a last reso rt, and defend ers w ho m ade it ne ce ssary by re fusin g to su rrende r co uld

ex pec t no merc y. Vic to riou s leg io naries. w ho had see n co lleag ues ki lled Of w o unded by m issi les as th e y adva nce d o n th e fo rt ifica t io ns a nd in the confuse d clo se -qu arter s fighti n g th at followed. indu lged in an orgy of slaug h te r. rap e. and pillage. T h is w as th e legi on ar y's reward fi)[ th e h ard sh ips and dan gers of the siege and hi s re ve ng e o n th o se wh o had ca use d him so m uch trouble . It w as also d elib e rat e R o man poli c y. d esig ned to de te r o the rs fro m att e m p ting to defy R om an p ow e r.

The str onghold of Masada The tak.ing of the cliff-top fortress in 73 cs showed greatengineering skill and ruthless determination. When the Romans finally broke into the fortressafter two years' siege. the few remainingdefenders had committed suicide.

The scale of th e sie ge w o rks u nd ert ak en w as o fte n h ighl y im pressive. Besieging th e G allic ar my o f Vcr cingerorix at AleSI in ce nt ra l G au l in 52 Bel: . Caesar's leg ionari co nstructed a ci rc ular d it ch - and-ram part wa ll a ro u nd th e Ga u ls' h ill fort stre tc h ing lSk m (11 m ile s) and inco rpor atin g 23 fort s a nd ove r 10 0 woode n ro wer s, H av in g co m plete d th is ma ssive w o rk. th ey th en bui lt a n ev e n lon ger for ti fied w all fac ing o utw ard , to de fend th emselves agai nst a Gall ic army arriv ing to rel ieve Vcr cin gctor ix. At the siege o f the mountain fortress o f M asada in Palest ine, h eld b y a d e fiant band o f J ew ish re be ls in 73 CE o till' T enth Leg io n bu ilt a ra m p (,OO m (nea rly 2,()(IOft) lo n g reaching from the foor to th e top of th e 200- m (650- ft) h igh shee r roc k o n which the fort ress per ch ed . Constr uc te d unde r co nstant fire . this ram p allo wed them to haul a g iant batterin g ram lip to th e fortress and hamme r a bre ach in its w alls.

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The R o m an s h ad siege art ille ry w ith w hich to bo mbard the e ne m)'. These we re m o stly torms o f ballista, a tor sio n ma ch in e superficially resembling a lar ge c ross bow, In the late e m pire peri od bdJliStll!' w e n..' sup pleme nte d by the (l1l' ~l!{'r, a o ne-a rme d c atapult. N o ne o f the se siege e ngines , however, packe d su ffic ie nt pu nch to breach c ity wa lls o r o the r so lid fort ifi carion s. T hey w ere usually fired from rowers w ith the ai m of pickin g off defe nders o n the ramparts o r ca usi ng rand om damage in side the w all s. To m ak e a br each th at co u ld he sto r m ed,

lcg io uar ics had to ge t rig ht up to rill' ra m pa rts . Th is W JS th e m ain use o f the f.l t110US tcstudo.

ROMAN AUXILIARIES AND CAVALRY The auxiliaries we re troops recruited from "ba rbarian " peoples. usually livingwithin the borders of the Roman Empire but not enjoying the privilege of Roma n citizenship. They provided extra manpower and specialist skills that the Roman arm y very much needed . In particular. they constituted the majority of the army's skirmishing light infantry and of its cavalry. Li ke the legiona ries. auxiliaries we re expec ted to serve for 25 years . On completing the full te rm of service. the ir rewa rd was the grant of Roman citizenship to them and thei r de scendants. An auxiliary cohort wa s composed of recruits from a single area or eth nic group. but it was usua ll y sta tioned AU XILIARY SHiElD

away from its home a rea. Auxiliaries wer e paid less than legionaries and seem often to have been thrown into the most dangerous fighting as relatively dispensable troops. On the other ha nd. they were subjec t to less strict discipline. did less work - they were not involved in engineering or building - and ca rried less weigh t on the march. Ma ny of the auxiliaries we re trained to fight in a similar mann er to the legionary. but so me regions supplied specia list troops - the Ba learics produced stone-slinqers. for instance, and Syria was a source of bowmen. Most importan t were the expe rt horsemen from areas such as Batavia, Pannonia , and Thrace. They were the cream of the Rom an

cavalry. armed with spears, javelins. and the spatha - a longe r sword than the infantry

gladius. Although they did not have stirrups. their horned sadd les served to hold them firmly on their mounts in combat. Roman cavalry did not usuallyact as shock troop s charging infantry. but instead defended the army's flanks. carried out encirclements. and hunt ed dow n defeated enemy so ldiers in the pursuit afte r a victory. In the later pe riod of the Empire. cavalry probably becam e more numerous

an d played an increasingly important role in battle. Cavalry training Cavalry training in the useof the spear isdemonstrated by re-enactors. Note that Roman horsemen did not have stirrups.

CAVALRY HELMET

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The tortoise Using the tor toise formation

to attack. the walls or gate of a city required considerable practice to coordinate the movements of all the soldiers involved (right), If they executed the

manoeuvre successfully, they we re immune to the arrows and other missiles directed against t hem by the defenders (far right) ,

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LEST TH E SO LD I ERS ... SHOULD BE SEPARATED FROM TH EI R COMRADES, EVERY

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CO H O RT HAD IT S SH IELDS PA I NTED I N A MAN NER PECULIAR TO ITSELF. THE

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NAM E OF EACH SOLD IER WAS ALSO W RITTE N O N HI S SH IELD, TOGETHER W ITH TH E NUMBER OF THE COHORT A ND CENTURY TO WH ICH HE BELONGED. VEGETIUS, A M ILI TA RY DIG EST, 4TH CENTURY CE

III t h is aptly named torm ati on - trstudo is Latin for tortoise - J body of so ld iers wou ld adva nce wit h sh ield s covering t he m fro m above as we ll as fro m all sides . When t h~y reach ed the wa lls. they would e it her attack the m w ith me tal bars and picks

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I N T O II AT TL E Pu ll-s cale' field ba tt les we re infre q ue nt, bu r th ey were the ulti mate test of a leg io n ar y's mora le an d fighting ski lls, Con fro n ted w ith a "bar bari an" army. the R o m an s h ad no c r u cia l tec h no logica l adva ntage 0 11 the bat tlefield . T hey did d epl oy field a rr illcr y ill t he for m of sma ll ba llistae k now n as " sco r pio ns" , b ut a lt ho ugh these we re acc u rate a nd l.,trt.'ct ivl.' mi ssile wea po ns th ey wer e not de cisive, T he R o m ans ra rel y m ad e u se o f Ii '14 to rt ifi rnri on s, a nd th e n o n ly to defe nd the ir Hank s. It was the d iscipline, stam in a, an d t of th e l q.~i on a r y th at so o fte n b ro ug ht vi H e was , it is t r ue. bett er ar mo u red t h an hi s o ppo ne n ts, bu t sword, spe ar, and sh ield were co m mo n to bot h sides . T he savage ry o f close-quart ers co mba t de ma nde d emotio nal co m m itm e n t to co u nte r hi s inev itab le fear. H er e hi s bo nd in g w ith co m rad es fight ing alo ngs ide a nd id ent ificat io n w it h t he hon our of the coh o rt a nd I~gio ll wo u ld have their fu ll effect.

Roman art i ll ery A team of legionaries mans a ballista . Two of them prepa re to wi nch back the bows tr ing into th e firi ng posit ion . This kind of ballista could fire stone projecti les or heavy darts.

Bu t the R o m an leg ion ari es we re no t invi nc ib le. 53 li C E th ey we re wors te d b y Parthian a rche rs at Ca rr hne . In <J C E three R o m an legi on s we re surro u nded a nd massacred in t he Te u to b u rg Fo rest by Germa n tr ib es led b y Armi ni us , Th e in rh Leg io n was parti all y des t royed by Quee n B OlH.li CCJ of th e lrc n i ill (ll) \.1:. before th e l-lth and 20 th L ~g i o ns d efeated he r a nd reasse rt ed R om an p ow~r ill Britaill. But th ei r reco rd of success against ene mies fro m o utsi de a nd wi t hi n th e Em pi re in th e first two ce ntu ries of the C h r ist ia n e ra was impressive, I II

Fro m th e 3rd ce ntu ry CE th e leg io ns often becam e to ol s in th e powe r str uggles of a m b itio us lead ers, Economic probl em s led to th e adoptio n of chea pe r armou r and polit ical di sruption m ad e armies much h ard e r to raise a nd sup ply. M ost o f th e sold iers of the b tl.' Empi re we re conscripts and the di stin cti on be tween th e ci rizc n- lcgiona r ics a nd " b arbar ian" aux iliaries w as la rgely lost. But th e event ua l f.1 11 of th e R o m an Em pire in th e wes t ill th e 5th ce ntu ry CE was not th e resu lt of defeat s su ffere d by th e leg io ns, a nd much of th e tradi tion of th e R o m a n army was pr ese r ved by th e Em pi re in th e cast.

ROMAN BATTL EFIELD TACTICS Roman battle tactics obviously changed radically over

enemy fighting largely on foot, such as the Briton s

silence at a slow and steady pace to meet th e warriors

time and depended on whether they were fighting

in the 1st century

charging towards them . It wa s at thi s point that the

CEo

Roman infantry drew up on

fellow Romans or " barbarians". The Romans wou ld

the batt lefield in close order, with the most reliable

also have to adapt their battl e formations to th e

troops in the fro nt lines. The fir st century of each

the test, for there had to be no wavering as the enemy

terrain and in orde r to cou nter forces emp loying

cohort , the one w it h t he best troo ps, was placed

came ever closer. Then th e order wa s given to charge.

large numbers of cavalry or chariots. The deployment

in front of th e ot hers wi th the veterans at the rear.

The previously silent legionaries wo uld raise a spine-

of troop s show n below is one that might have been

When t he mo ment came for batt le to be joine d -

discipline of the legionary was put most severely to

chilling shou t and hurl their javelins into the mass of the

adopte d by a legion - along with it s cavalry and

usually afte r a prolonged exchange of arrows,

enemy, then surge forwa rd to make conta ct, shoving

assorted auxiliary troops - to confront a " barbarian"

slingshots, and artille ry - the cohorts advanced in

with their shields and stabbing with their short sw ords.

A legi on in order of battle Here the cohort s of a legion are lined up side by side, but they could also have been deployed with five cohorts in front and five behind . Gaps between the cohort s and between the individual centuries were essential to battlefield manoeuvring, but they could be speedily closed in th e event of an enemy charge.

Century in marching ord er The legionaries approached the battlefield marching in disciplinedranks and fIles, probably led by their centurion and signifer - the junior officer who carried the century's standard.

Cavalryheld In reserve until required. when It would probablybe deployedon the wings

CAVALRY

RESERVE

LEGIONARIES

DO

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SliNGERS &

SLiNGERS &

SKIRM ISHERS

SKIRMISHERS

Ord e r of battle Depending on how the enemylined up, the Romans might greet them with arrowsand artillery boltsor harass them with skirmishersand slingers. The latter would withdraw asthe main infantry force of legionariesadvanced . Comicen (trumpeter)

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First cohort - five centuriesof 160 men each

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Centu ry in attack formation The century hasdeployed in four ranks to attack, first launching a volley of javelins, then assuming closer order to smash into the enemyfront linewith a wall of shields.

Fust two ranks advance WIth swo rd and shieldalter

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ROMAN FORT

NORTH GATE

The Romans were the greatest experts in fortificatio n in th e Ancient World. When on campaign. a legion wou ld co nstruct a fortified camp. surro unde d by a rampa rt and dit ch . at every stop . Whereas fighting migh t often be left to less wel l-t rai ned auxi liaries.

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CAVALRY BARRACKS

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building wo rk was always the job of legio naries. T hey wou ld have bu ilt th e fort show n here at Arbei a in northern Eng land, altho ugh it subseq uently housed aux iliary tro ops.

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Permanent forts and fortresses. like thi s one that has been recon structed at Arbeia, wer e bui lt of sto ne rath er than the wood used for temporary camps. T hey acted as barracks, supply depots. and ad m in istrative headquarters to m aintain R OIllC'S militar y presen ce in potentia lly hostile te rri tory. In addition to their mi lita ry tasks. edu cated sold iers might be assig ned to cle rica l duties. keepi ng the written records required by Roman

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bureaucracy. Outposts o f Roman civilization. they made no co ncessions to local climate or cu lture s. displaying simil ar features thro ug hout the empire . Living co nditio ns were cramped and basic. but with their heated bath ho uses and latr ines cleaned by ru nnin g wate r, the forts had a stan dard of hygiene far superior to any of the qua rters provided for th e arm ies th at fought almo st 2,000 year s later in th e C rimean War . Sett leme nts of local civilians grew up aro un d fort s an d fort resses to service th e R oman troo ps and many mode rn-day to wn s and cities trace the ir origins back to a R oman mi litary base.

WORKSHOPS

EAST GATE

'ITJIJ [QJ~ GRANARIES

OFFICER'S HOUSE

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INFANTRY BARRACKS

layout of a Roman fort Arbeia wasa small fort housing about 600 men. l egionary fortresses, housing 5,000. were much larger, but had a similar layout with barracks for cavalry and infantry, workshops. granaries. and a headquarters building.

WHAT OTHERS WOULD HAVE SPREAD OVER SEVERAL DAYS TOOK YOU ONLY ONE TO FINISH: YOU HAVE BUILT A WALL ... IN NOT MUCH MORE TIME THAN IS RECWIRED FORA TURF RAMPART. EMPEROR HADRIAN TO TROOPS AT l AMBAESIS IN MODERN ALGERIA

Garrisoning the fort Barrack life would have been familiar to any soldier in a modern regular army. There wasmorning parade, drill, guard and patrol duties, training exercises. kit to maintain, and latrines to clean.

Building a fort legionaries on the Dacian campaign (101102CE) build a stone fort. They are working in full armour in case of a surprise enemyraid.

Gatehouse battlements The plaque statesthat the fort wasbuilt by l egio VI Victrix under SextusCalpurnius Agricola, governorof Britain ( .163- 166 CE.

Doorway The solid wa lls and doors of the for t wo uld have kept out the tribal fighterswho might carry out raidsin Roman-occupied Britain.

Gat ehouse The gatehouse of the for t of Arbeia, on th e Tyne estuary in nor thern England, has been recontru cted to give an impression of its original appearance. Built in the 2nd century CE, the fo rt became a majo r supply depot for the troop s manning Hadr ian's Wall. Although the tw in tow ers are imposing, th ey are smaller than those at some othe r Roman forts, which had gateho uses up to four storeys high .

TH E BARRACKS T he barrack blocks at Arbcia were built of plastered sto nework o utside w ith wartl c- and-daub dividin g walls in side . The aux iliary t roops th at wen.' statio ned th er e would have be en di vid ed , lik e legion ari es, into eig ht- ma n ( tlU / u b n tt ;ll . O[ "tent gro ups". Each in [;lIlt r y block hous ed five ( llJlu/n'", i" and each (dUlubt'rlli" m was allo tted a cramped two-roomed su ite . which also had to accom mo da te mu ch of their equipment, The cent ur io n and thv lower rank ing officers lived in a slightly larger su ite at th e end of the barracks. Cavalryme n were bill eted in sim ilar sized barr acks. W ith 30 men and th eir horses housed in each blo ck , co nditio ns were even less en viab le rhan those of the in fantry.

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41 Edward III sco u red hi s ki ngdom to co llect 7,7t1t1 bow« and 13t1.tItiti sheaves of ar row.... which were th en store d in th e Tower of Lo ndon and other ar m o u r ic s. It w as sa id t hat in the IJ 511s not all a rro w w as to b e tou nd in till' whole of En gl and, since the k in g had rakcn them all t'{u' h is cam paign in France. T he problem (If su pply illg hows and arrows w as no thing, ho wever. co m pare d with th e d iffi c u lty of assl' mhlillg su ffic ie nt numbers of arc he rs . Shooti ng a lon g bo w wa s a spec ialist sk ill. requ irin g li t,:loll g pr art irc - boys ty pi ca lly learn ed t he USl' o f t he how trom t he ag e of seve n. The arc he r had to d evel op co n side rab le physica l st re ng th, Arch e rs' ske leto ns o f th e pe r io d h ave be e n fo u nd w ith d efo r m ed Id i: arms and shou lde r bon es, and badly tw iste d ver te brae . as a result of the rep eat ed dl(l rt of drawi ng t he I. HIll (M t) bow. Awa re of th e need to ma in ta in ;1 pool of bowmen fro m w hom till' b est co u ld be

selec ted for service, th e English m on arc hy took active StqlS to l'll cou ra gl' thl' pra cti ce o f arc hl' r y,

BARBED ARROWHEADS

l o ngbow s in action At the battl e of Aljubarrota in 138 5 (right) English longbowmen helpedthe Portuguese defeat the French and Spanish forces . Here,asin manymedieval illustrations. mostof the archers are shown firing their arrows from the wrong side of the bow. A modernre-enac tor (far right) demonstrates how the bow should be drawn.

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THE MAYA

THE INCAS

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In the sec o nd h.ilf of thc 15th celltu ry the Incas established an e x te n sive e m p ire ill w este r n So u th A mcric« stre tc h ing fro m north ern Ec u ador to c e nt ral C h ile . T h e c reat io n o f the

e m pire was largely d ue to the milit ary skills of t il l' I ncas' te n th ru ler. T o p a I nca (reigned

147 1- 93) w ho led cam pa ig ns o f co nq ue st both b ef ore and aftc r asce nd i ng the th ro ne . Hi s

m ili tary o pe ratio ns showed a rare d egree

of organizational skill. On one o cca sio n , fo r

ex am ple. the so u th o f the e mp ire wa s t h rea te ned b y th e C a lch nq u i peo ple fro m nor t hern Ar g clltina

c ro ssing the m ouu t ni n s to the P;u: itic coast. To pa ( Il ea

ma rch ed hi s Il ll"ces I.oook lll (()o o miles) dow n t he A nd es

from his capital at C uzc o ill Peru. Engineers wen t ahead o f the army bu ilding mou ntai n roads and bridges. while supplies of w eapo ns and foo d w ere carrie d so ut h by se a 011 balsa rafts. R e supp li ed 0 11 reach ing the c o ast, the Inca arm y threw itself up on the C alchaq u i and d c tca rcd the m in bat tle . At its heigh t the Inca e m p ire was a thoroughly militaristic sta te , From the age o f 12. boys we re ro ug hen ed lip w ith a rou tin e o f strenuo us g.u n cs and exe rc ise, T hen, from the age o f 15 to 20 . the y had to p er form co mpulso ry mi lita ry serv ice. A m ino rity of yo li ng co nsc ripts stay ed O il to m ak e a career

in the army and a few ach ieved high position as a re w ard fo r co nspic uo us brave ry. T he Inca bur eaucrac y e ns ured rhar the Jf lll Y w as wel l fed and clot he d. Th e mo st co m mon we apo ns w ere the slings ho t and the sto ne-ed ge d spe:u o r axe. Mem bers of the Inca clan , who co nstituted the nob il it y o f the e m pire and m ade up the hi gh e r COl lll11311d o f the arnlY. so m et imes car ried axes o f br on ze. O n ca m pa ig n they wo uld march alo ngs id e thei r ruler. w ho W :lS carried 0 11 :1 litter. T he Inc" "rm y was acco mpanied by a hagg;lg:e t ra in o f lla m as. and of wo men bowed dow n under their e n o rm o us lo ads. A lar ge par t o f th e ar m y w as made up o f co ntinge nts fro rn subj ec t peo ples. so me o f d o ub t fu l lo yalty. It was dissen sion w ithin the empire. and civ il wa r betw een m embe rs of the ru lin g In c" c lan itself th at expo sed the empire to European co nquest ill the !(lth ce ntury. No net heless. it took the Spa n ish 50 ye ars. from t he 1520 s to th e 1570 s. to ful ly subd ue the Inca pe op le .

Inca w arrior Elaborate feathered headdresses were part of the war costume of many Americanpeoples, serving as symbolsof warrior status.

T Ill' M aya c ivilizatio n o f easter n C c n rra l Am erica. w hich reached its peak in around 2S0 to ()()() C E , was o nce tho ught to have b een ave rse to w arfa re. But in rece n t years histo rians have revi sed the ir o pinion s, co nc luding that th e Maya fo ug ht wars o f co nq uest and to ok pri son er s to use as slaves and fi)r ritua l sacr ifice . T he bu lk u f their force s w er e probably p easant m ilit ia It,d by warrio rs draw n fro m royal and no ble fa m ilies. T em ple wall paintings sho w ar mi e s w ith splend id rcgal ia - war rio rs decked o ut in masks and plumes, carrying standards and shields deco rated wi th relig io us symbo ls. More pro sa ically, so ld iers w e re eq u ipped w it h q ui lte d ja ck et s as armo ur and ca rried a r:1n gt' of ed ge d and m issile weapo ns, including spears, sto neblad ed woode n axes. thro w ing sticks. sli ngsho ts and bow s. It is assumed that co nflicts we re brief. if blo od y, since the pcnsan t m ilitia wo uld have need ed to return ho me to tl-'IH.I their cro ps after a sho rt spell 01 1 cam paig n. W h cn the M aya e nco u n te re d Spanish invaders in th l' I(,th ce n tu ry , the y we re able to sustain armed resistance for far lon ger t ha n e ither the Incas o r A ztecs. The y we re not fu lly subj ug "[l' d unti l th e !(>')Os. a nd reb el M aya ns co ut inu cd to ti gh t the Mex ican sta te from till' IH40 s to th e 20 th ce n tury.

COME LET US EAT) A ND CO ME LET US DR I N K LET US EAT A ND DR I NK OF TH E BLOOD A ND T HE BO N ESOFOUR EN EMY

INCA WAR CHANT

Tomb fight er This terracotta warrior comes from a Maya tomb on Jaina island, off Yucatan.

THE AZTECS III th e: 15th ce nt u r y the A zt ecs w c-rc th e most po werful people in M esoamerica. d omin ating o ver o t her c ity- states in a Lug\.' area a ro u nd their ca pita l. Tcn o chritl an. Their ar my. o rga n ized into legi on s 8 ,000 st ro ng . was frequently O il ca m paign , e ngaged in wars to ex te nd th e: e m pi re o r su ppress rebellion a lllo ng the tributaries. When no practi cal J110 tiVl' for w arf ar e pr esented it self. the A zt ecs arran gl'd .. flowe r wa rs", A tr ibutar y state was o bliged to pre sent it s force s for battle at a specifi ed time and pla ce . to g ive th e A ztecs pr actice ill fighti n g a nd provid e" fre sh sup ply o f pri so ne rs. Taki n g

prison er s wa s esse nt ia l to Azt ec life b l' C;lU SC it pro v id ed vic tims for human sac r ifice. It a lso

allowed a ll Azt ec warrior to achie ve pr omot ion . H is sta tus dep ended 01 1 th e n umber of l' IH..' 1l 1Y ti ghtcrs he captu red. T hus Aztec warr ior s struc k at th e legs of th eir o p po ne nts, scc kin g to d isable th em. rather than killing th em wit h a bl o w to th e head . The most success fu l warrio rs joi ned th e elite order s o f ja gu ar o r l'ag k' " k n ig hts", The Azt ecs wer e not alway s victo rio us in pr l'Colu m b ia n tim es. For e xampl e , in 147H th ey lost a hatti e wi th th e nei ghbourin g Tar ascan s. But they were fierce, co urageo us fighte rs.

PONDER TH IS, EAGLE A ND JAGUA R KNIGHTS, THOUGH ... C A RVE D IN JA D E, YOU W ILL BREAK. FROM A POEM BY KI NG NE ZAHUALCOYOTl OF TEXCOCO. 15TH CENTURY

Pieces o f obsidia n I

Wood

Fea ther ed shi eld and w a r club Aztec w arr iors often carried round shields decorated with jagua r skin and feather s. Their wooden wa r clubs were edged with razor-sharp pieces of volcanic glass. A zt ec do w nfall Cortez, the leader of the Spanish conquistado rs, battles the A ztecs for the causew ay to their island capit al Tenochtitlan in 1520 .

.

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LANDSKNECHT WE TOOK ROME BY STORM, PUT OVER 6,000 MEN TO THE SWORD, SEIZED ALL THAT WE COULD FIND IN CHURCHES ... AND BURNED DOWN A GREAT PART OF THE CITY, TAKING APART AND DESTROYING ALL. PAUL DOLSTEIN, LANDSKNECHT, ON THE SACK OF ROME, 1527

A IUS II LY- DilESSE D LA ND SK N ECIIT

G

m er cen ari es were a

co nsta nt presen ce o n th e Eu ropean battl efield s of the late 15th and 16th ce nt uries. Fighting as den se form ations of pik ern en support ed by firearms, th ey we re at their best

exc eptiona lly tough foot sold iers in co m bat. O ut of battl e, however , th ey co u ld be a dan ger to all and sund ry, especially if th eir em ployer failed to keep th em adequ atel y paid and fed . Qu arrelsome and resistant to author ity, th e Landsknechts earned a fear some rep ut ati on for plunder and m assacre. ~

o '" o I

T he first Landskn cc hr bands we re raise d in 14H(,. at a ti m e w h e n sig n ifica nt cha nges w ere taki ng place in Eu ro pe an warfare. T he br eakup of t he m edie val so cia l o rde r w as leav ing ru lers eve r m ore dependen t upon m ercenary troops, rather

th an fo rces asse m b led o n th e b asis of feuda l lo yalt y o r o b liga t io n. In Pran ce and Bu rgu nd y, m ercen aries had be en tak en int o pe rma ne nt em ploy me nt to for m regu lar armies. A t the same tim e , tacti cal in novations were que stioning the ro le of heavy cava lry as the sho ck o ffe ns ive force o n th e battlefield . At t he battles o f M urren and Nanc y, in 147(,- 7 7, Sw iss infa ntr y armed wi th lo ng pik es wo n no tab le vic tories thro ugh attacki ng thei r e ne m y in tight. m assed ph alan xes. Lac k ing both a reg ula r ar m y and p ike- w ield in g infantry, Ge r ma n Empero r M a x im il ian I felt threat en ed by t hese m ili tar y developme nt s. H is respo nse wa s to pay for t he forma tio n of Landskn ccht (" la nd serv ant") ba nd s. T he se were to be in fantr y paid as m ercen aries, but read y to fig ht for th e e m peror w h en requ ir ed . FO R M I NG UP T he so ld ie rs w ho for med and led m l'r een ary co m pa nies h ad to b e b ot h mi litar y leade rs and ambitious e nt re pre ne u rs . A I11l'r ccn ar y captain wo u ld co ntrac t w ith the e m pero r

im mcnsc ly tc mpt iug to anyo nl' do w n O il hi s luck. Beyo nd t hi s th er e we re a ll the t rad itio nal ben e fits of co nte m pora r y m ilita r y life on o ffe r, fro m th e chance to ind ulge ill lo o tin g and p illage to thc .u n u scmc nt s of a vagabo nd lift' rich in adve n tu re and gc ncrn l hcll ra isin g. A pot ential recruit had to pr esent h im sel f eq ui pped w ith . at min imu m . a :;-(11" ( 1(,-20 ft) lo ng pik e . Since suc h a W1.'3pOn co u ld he pu rch ased fo r on e gu ilder - a c he apness that goes a lo ng way to e xplain thc popularit y of the pik e as an in fantry ar m - most m en we re ca pable o f fu lti lling this obligation , The better off might turn up wi th sw o rds , a r mo u r, o r eve n an arqueb us . A cand idate wa s traditionall y subj ec ted to a sim ple fitn ess te st, bein g requ ire d to j ump over J Il obst acle m ad e of thre e pik e s or h alb e rd s. This d on e, he wa s cons ide re d tit fo r se rvi ce an d h is name W JS entered in thl' roll. Given the se lcss-rhan- stringcn t entran ce require m ent s. thc Laud sk nc ch rs m u st have heen o f un even q ua lity, A successfu l m er cenar y captain need ed a shar p e ye for the individual q ua lities of h is men , Deployin g pikc mc n ill han k' in a tig ht m ass formation had thc co nside rable adv antage of allo win g h im to hid e incx pcricnccd so ld ier s. As lo ng as th e fro nt rank s

CEREM QNIAl 8 RQAOSWO RD

to pro vide a ce rtai n num ber of so ld ie rs and re cei ve the payme nt fo r thei r se rv ices, hop in g to crea m off a h and so m e profit. l.audsku cch ts we re m o stly recruited fro m G erman - speakin g areas of ce nt ral and northern Euro pe, suc h as th e R h in ela nd , Swabia, a nd A lsace . M en co u ld be

at t ra cted fro m far afield, however, w ith e ve n Sco tla nd pro vid in g vol u ntee rs. T he im media te lure was the pro mi se offou r g uilde rs a m onth in pay - a reasonable in come for th e d ay a nd

advanced bo ldl y into co m ba t . and th e back ro w we re sto ut c haracte rs w ho wo uld no t turn and run , the me n in the mi dd le had no cho ice but to hol d the ir po sit ion and go alon g with th e c ro wd . T he bo ldest. fierce st fighters w ere rewarded w ith double pay - hen ce th eir Il JIll C

d"ppclsiild""" w h ich translates as " double- pay m en " - a nd deployed independentl y to attac k w ith do ub le- handed broad sword or ha lberd .

\

..... -. - -~

Batt le of M aren g o Sw iss and Landsknecht mercenaries c1astfa (;........;"~---M areng o in 1515. A short katz balger swo rd ..... can be seen raised in the for egou nd; it proved hig hly eff ective at close quarte rs.

The Landsknc chts also formed elite bllI!{.IIIl/('// (b lo o d ba nn cr) un it s th at m ade nc a r- su icida I attacks on es pecia lly wel l-defended en emy po siti ons. The arq uc hu siers w ho provided the Landskn cchts' firepower did not ne ed to be espe c ia lly w ell tr ained , Ind eed , one of t he adv a ntages of fir earms wa s tha t a lmost anyo ne co u ld be ta ug h t to usc the m , w hatever th e ir perso na l q ualit ies: a pik e o r halbe rd . by co ntrast , req uired co us iderab lc st re ng th to usc ,

--- .....

" ...

,

\

-

IT WA S SO HOT THAT THE ARMOURED M EN N EARLY SU FFOC ATED ... AND WH EN O NE W ENT TO H ELP T HE OT H ER BY LOOSEN ING TH E ARMOUR H E WOULD BU RN HI S FI NGE RS O N T H E M ETA L. NIKlAU S GUl DI. l AN DSKNECHT SOl DIER, ON THE TUNIS EXPEDITION. 1535

ST Y LE AND V IO LENCE Exactl y how till' l. a nd sk ncc hts dev eloped their dis ti nct ive sw aggering st yle o f dress is no t cle ar , alt ho ugh it see ms to have b een ba sed 0 11 th e cost u me of the ir g re..'a te..'s t r ival s. th e Swi ss Con fede ra te s. o n ly g rl'a tl y e..' xagge..'r;He..'d . As w ell as fa vou r i ng br oad flat hats crow ned wi th large fe..'a the..'rs and j e rk in s spo r t ing pn ffed sleeves , till' l.andsku cchrs adopted hos e w ith till' k'gs of differ ent co lo u rs

.uid de veloped till' c us to m o f slash ing th eir d oublet s o pe n a nd pull in g " pn ffs"

la ndskne cht capt a in A mount ed capta in, holding a spear used for directin g troo ps. addresses his bodyguard before battle.

of sh irt throu gh from undcrucar h, A look that e xpressed arro gance..' and non- confor mit y, it became a maj or in flue nce 011 R cu aissanrc fashion. Whether th e Land skncchr s were ;lIlY wilder o r m ore nngodl y than the ge neral run of fightin g men in th e ir pe r io d is hard to say. T hey were ce rtain ly much g ive n to ha rd d ri n k and gam bli ng, w hi ch o cc u pie d t he dead tim e o ut of co m bat. M a ny arc known to h ave be en killed in fight s wit h t heir co m rades rath er th an with th e ene lll Y, with luck at di ce a nd card s often th e so u rce o f the di scord . Like all lIle rce na r y ba nds, the y were liable to ca u se troub le w h e n th e re wa s 110 war to p ro vide th em wit h a n o utlet for their

ene rg ies and legit imate so u rces o f plunder at th e ex pc ns e..' o f th e e nc m y. It wa s the failure o f

employers to pay th em th at provoked th e most ser io u s Landsku echt di sturban ces. The m o st infamou s cxn m ple w as the sac k of R ome in 1527. Unpaid Landsk ncchts mutinied from the arm y o f C ha rles V, the H o ly R o m an Emperor. a nd we n t 01 1 the ra m pa ge , se ek ing to make up w hat they w e re owed t h rough pill age . W it h ot he r im pe r ial troo ps (so m e 35 ,llI)O ill a ll), the y attac ke d and laid waste the c ity dur in g a rei g n of te r ro r that lasrcd nine mo nth s. The m errcn arics refu sed to leav e th e c ity until th e y were paid t heir arrea rs of wa ges.

FIG HT ING R EGIM EN T S A s fig h ting force s, th e Landskncchts were at th eir peak in till' ea rly \6th cc uru ry . From 150 H, under th e leadership o f a German kni ght, Georg \' 011 Fr undsbcrg, Emperor Ma ximi linn I's La nd sk ncclus w er e o rga ni zed into a regime nt mo re t han 10 ,0 0 0 stron g . w h ich fo ught w ith di stinction in a se r ies o f cam paig n s ill Ital y. Bu t ill t he se Ital ian wa rs t he re were ofte ll Landskn cch ts a lso fig h ting o n t he o ther side , Officia lly the Lands k nc c ht s w e n '

k i ng's lines fu ll t ilt .

Ste e l sku ll cap This light, close-fitting skull cap was worn by a l andsknecht soldier c.1510. Secured with a chinstrap, it afforded all-round vision aswell as essential protection.

force s. but th e Bla ck Band ea r ne d the g rc arc r fam e by fightin g to the last mall afte r the rest of th e Fre nch a r m y had fled th e fie ld .

Bu t th e Land sk n cch rs abso rb ed th e ru omcntum of the c h a r~ i ll ~ ph al an x a nd the two force s o f

not permitted to fight fo r the e m pe ro r's ene m ies, but findin g imperial pay in adequ ate o r in suffi ci ently reli abl e , com pa n ies so ugh t a diffe rent m aste r. The Fren ch k in g, Fr an coi s I, wa s ab le to bu y th e se rv ic es n f a "Black Balld " regiment of ren egad e Laud skncchts at least sim i lar ill numbe rs to the imper ial m er cen ari es. III 15 15 , Fran cois l ie d a n ar m y ac ro ss th e A lp s into Ital y to fig ht rh e Sw iss fo r p osse ssion of M ilan , At Marengo , 0 11 13- 1-1 Septe m be r, the co n fi de nt Sw iss pik emcu , co nside re d th e Sll p n..'I11C infaur r y force ill Eu ro pe , arrack cd th e Fr en ch

LATE D EC LIN E

pikcmcn sw aye d back and forth ill a d ead ly pushin g co ntes t. An cvcn t un l Fren ch v ic to ry. after so m e 2H hours o f int ermittent butch er y. d ep ended as m uch upo n Fr.m coi s' cavalry and ar t illcry as UpOIl th e fo o t so ld iers . But th e d efe at of th e Sw iss ine v itably se nt th e Landskn cchr s' stock so aring. In 1525 . wh en the army of th e new l'm pc ro r. C h arles V, to ok 0 11 th e Fr en ch at Pav ia, t he l.a nd sk ucchrs we re at the heart o f the co m bat 011 hoth sides. The imperial p ikc m c n m ad e a vi ta l co ntributio n to a c rush ing v ic to ry for C harles'

The Landskncchts neve r performed w ith thi s le vel of co m m itme nt ag ain . Fightin g as " lan sq u cnct s" du rin g th e Prcnch Wa rs o f R eli gi on ill the sec o nd

h al f of th e I(,t h ce nt u ry, th e y we re so mc t im cs di sparag ed even by those w ho e m ployed th em .

Spa in's gc nc rul. th e Duke o f A lva, e ntrus ted w ith suppressing the Du tch re vo lt. cl ai m e d that he bou ght the l. a nd k ucc hrs' serv ic es not be ca u se

they w e re

;lIl Y

lise ill hat tie . hut so th at they

co u ld not appe ar tightin g O il th e ot her side.

Whate ver their later decaden ce. howeve r, til l' Lan d sk ncc ht s had left an c nd u r i ng Il'gl'nd as th e qu i 11 rcs scnria l R en aissa 11 Cl' m crccn ari cs.

LANDSKNECHT TACTICAL FORMATIONS The Landsknechts' battl e tact ics we re primarily designed for symmet rical combat against the

pike-wi elding phalanxes approached one anot her, arquebusiers or crossbow men on the flanks of the

opposing army's pikemen. Unlike th e Sw iss, the

Landsknecht phalanx would fi re into the enemy ranks, hoping to weaken and disrupt th eir format ion. At the

Landsknechts do not seem to have used th eir pike phalanx for a shock charge into the enemy line. Instead th ey typically stood on th e defensive or advanced at a steady grinding pace. As two dense

same tim e th e fearsom e Landsknecht dopp elsoldn er would advance ahead of th e mass of pikes, attac king the enemy pikemen wi t h blow s from th eir halberds

and massive two-handed swords. If th e Landsknechts retained format ion, t heir pikemen we re invulnerable to all but missile weapons, their pikes form ing an unbreachable barrier. Once th e format ion was disrupted, however. t he pike was a clumsy weapo n. Most Landsknechts carried a short swo rd, th e katzba/ger, for close-quarters combat.

Gevierte ordnung

Defensive igel

Adopte d from the Swiss, this gevierte ordnung (square order) format ion w as typically made by a single fahnlein (company) of 400 men. It was ofte n preceded by an advance part y, or " forlorn hope", of criminals, prisoners, and volunteers seeking promot ion . A regiment consisted of ten fahnleins.

W hen atta cked by cavalry, the fahnlein would form a defensive igel (hedgehog). Arqu ebusiers retreated to th e th ird row, wh ile pikemen came for ward w ith pikes extended in all direct ions. (The numbers show n here are greatly reduced.)

KEY

,

ARQUEBUSIER

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PIKEMAN

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SW ORDSMA N

~r"·"·"

Arquebusiers in third row

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FOOT SOLDIERS OF THE RENAISSANCE T he R enaissan ce was a peri od w hen new technologies, in th e

attem pts to rec rea te th e orde r and di sciplin e of th e R om an ar my

form of firearm s and can no n, had a profou nd im pact o n wa r.

fou nde red up on th e fina ncia l and o rga n izat io na l weak nesses of

Yet sim ulta ne o usly Europeans soug ht to lea rn fro m the classica l

Europea n states. So ldiers remained d iversely clad , cy n ically

wo rld in w ar fare. as wel l as in art and architecture. The stu dy

m ercenar y, and da ngero usly prone to plu nder and mut iny. Fo rce s

o f An cient Gree ce and R om e convinced m ilitar y thi n kers tha t

tha t suc ce ssfu lly co mb ine d firea r ms w it h pike for mations simi lar

di sci pli ned infan tr y we re the key to success in batt le, altho ug h

to th e Gree k ph alan x had th e edge on th e battl efield .

III

a: w w

0-

SWISS PI KEMAN

w

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III

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w

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'" 0..

Th e pikcmen o f the Sw iss Confederation WOII a l l in u nc dia re na m e for th CIll Sl '! VCS i ll 1476, w he n the y tr o u nced th e m i ~h t y !lur~ull d i a ll ar m y at th e battle s of Grandso n and Murren . T he Swiss fo ot so ldiers were mi litia called up for service by th eir ca nto", (self-go vern ing d ist ri ct s), a nd thei r sty le

of fi~htill~ e xp re ssed th e so lid arity of th e ir egalitarian soc iety, Form ing de nse CO IU Ill JIS armed w ith pike s or hal be rd s, t hey att ac ke d sho ulder- to -s ho ulde r at a t ro t, ove rru n ni ng th e ir enemie s before the ir canno n o r cavalry could mount an effective ri poste. After their victories over the Bu rgu nd ian s, the Swis s were in gn .-ar de m an d as mercen aries. From the 14'Jlls t hey were either h ired o u t e ll ma sse by a canton to a fore ign employe r. or serve d ill inde pe nd e nt m er ce' ''lr y bands. Gari sh ly d re ssed

ill st riped ho se a nd pu ffed sleeves, th e y a lwa ys so ug ht to take the o ffensive . dep endin g 0 11 the mom e nt u m of their massed co lu m ns to stea m ro ller the o ppo sitio n. A few cro ssbow rnc n or ar quc hus ier s m ight accolt1 pany the pikes and h albe rd s, bu t th e ir ro le wa s periphe ral.

GE RMA N COM PETITI O N In th e co urse of th e Italian W ar s of 1494 to 1525 th e Sw iss sco red so me not able suc cesses, espe c ia lly th e defe at o f th e Fren ch at N o var a in 1513 . But o the r force s imitat ed their den se pike for ma tio n , parti cularl y th e Lands k uc chr m er cen ar ies, w ho be came the Swi ss so ld iers' bi tte rest enemi es, And th e lim irations of Swiss tac tics were re vea led 3 S ar mies learned ho w to co mbine pike s w it h a so p his ti ca te d use of firep o w er. At the battle of Bico r ca in 1521 the Sw iss rank s were decim ated by fire from arque buses and ca n no n after their ini tia l " push o f pik e" had been blocked by field fortifications . T he Sw iss, ho w e ver , put in a lac kl ust re perform an ce o n t he lo sin g side at th e batt le of P" vi a in 1525 . w h ich effect ively e nded the ir period of ascendanc y o a m o n g Euro pean infan tr y. T he y co ntinued to fig ht as me rce na ries in the ser v ice o f th e French o m on ar ch y, ho w ever, throug hou t the religi ou s wa rs 16TH ·C ENTURY in the second hal f SW ISS HALBE RD o f th e !(,th ce llt ur y. Swiss triumph at Grandson . 1476 The battle turned when the Burgundian knights we re surprised by the opportune arrival of a second force of well-disciphned Swiss pikemen and fled in disarray.

o

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SPANISH TERCIOS Aft "r th e uni ficati on of Spa in had been co m pleted wi th th e co nq ues t of Gra na da in 149 2 . th e Spanish 1110113( rh )' create d J statuti ng ar my to pr ot ect its in ter ests abroa d . T he first infmtry co m pa n ies ( "l'il'II/;"5) were sen t to fi ght in Italy iu 14W.; th ey were orga nized int o 12- compan y tcrcios in 1534 .

H ARD EN ED PRO FESSION ALS

CORSElET

LATE 16THCENTURY SWORD

(BREASTPLATE)

Corselet attached to / backplate WIth leather straps

Whc..'n.' as t he m ajorit y o f the so ldie rs se rvi ng Spain wen: fo reign , the trrcios co nsisted ent irely of Spa u ish vo lu n tee rs. They w ere an eli te force, th orough ly trained and o rga niz ed by the sta nda rds of their tim e . Ser vi ce w as in principle for lift', so a co re of veteran s built li p with ex pe rienc e of

Most prkemen and erquebusiers would not have worn armour on their arms

garr iso n du t ies in Ital y. ex ped it io ns to Muslim Nort h Africa . an d sus ta ine d wa rfa re aga in st th e Dutch in Plandcrs, O n the battl efiel d. th e trrcios' heav ily ar moured pih .' 111l.' 11 fo ug ht ill d en se s'1ua res . flank ed by so ld ie rs w ith tircar m s. T he y w er e also capab le of o pe rat i ng in sm a ll u ni ts, with g ro ups of sk ir m ish ing arq ucbusier s harassing the e ne m y. suppor te d by so ld iers wi th ha lb erds, The tcrcios suffe re d from till.' limitation s o f the ir time . In pr actice. pikcmen o fte n h ad littl e o r no a r mo ur. Althou gh so ld ie rs w ere supposed to rece ive m onthly wage..'s. pay w as o fte n in a rrea rs. Ic..' ad in g to m uti n ies and to the sacki ng o f c ities in pursuit of payment in kind . About ten pe..' r ce nt of so ld ie rs d eserted eve r y yc ar, di sgruntled over h arsh di sc ipl ine a nd irregular

Blade cut down from an earlier sw ord of the 15th century

TA SSETS

pay. Yet t he tcnios rem ained th e m o st e ffecti ve in fa nt r y in Eu ro pe unt il defeat by th e Fren ch at R o cro i in 164 3 m arked th e e nd of th eir domi nan ce .

MO RIO N

Brim typically turn ed up to a poi nt at back and front of the helmet

Spa nish a rmo ur

AS THEIR VALIANCE WAS TO BE MUCH COM ME N DE D, YET CA N I MUCH DISCOMMEND TH EIR BARBAROU S CRU ELTY. GEORGE GASCOIGNE, EYEWITNESS TO THE SACK OF ANTWERP BY SPANISH TROOPS . 1576

Only in a very wellequipped tercio wo uld all th e men have been issued wi th half armo ur and a "ma rion" helmet. The armou r was of ten made in Italy. whe re Spain had extensive possessio ns. A small numb er of the pikernen wo uld also have carried swo rds.

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OTTOMAN SOLDIER ALL THROUGH THE DAY THE TURKS MADE A GREAT SLAUGHTER OF CHRISTIANS . BLOOD FLOWED LIKE RAIN WATER IN THE GUTTERS AFTERA SUDDEN STORM, AND CORPSES FLOATED OUT TO SEA LIKE ME LO N S A LO N G A CA N A L.

NICOLO BARBARO O N THEFA LL OF CONSTANTINOPLE, 14 53

T T ilE STA IlT 0 1' Til E 16'1'11 C EN TU IlY

A

the army of th e Turkish

Ottoman Empire was probably the most effective fighting force in the wo rld, It was a unique mi x of different kinds of fighting men , wel l reward ed and organized, and wi th high

morale as a result of an unbroken string of victo ries, The most famo us eleme nt in th e Ottoman army were th e ja n issaries, slave-sold iers train ed from a you ng age wh o form ed an in fantry elite, but cavalry and arti llery played just as important a role in the sultan's wars aga inst C hristian and Mu slim powers, ~

VI

o o I

T he Ottom.m s o rig inatl'd as a band o f a few hund red T urkis h g haz is - fierce Muslim t riba l wa rrior s - w ho establishe d co ntro l over an area o f Auatol ia during th e 13th ce nt u ry. T he y were lIeig hbo llrs of th e Byznnt inc Em pi re, still a maj o r s t ~lte but by then enter ing all adva nce d stag e of d isiurcgr arion . U nder O sma n (w ho ru led 12HI to 132()) and h is suc cess o rs, th e O ttoman s ex plo ite d Byzanti ne w C;lkIlCSS to i nfi ltrate into Euro pe . taki ng over the Balkan s in th e co urse of t he l-lth ce nt u ry, T hey fina lly seized th e Byzaut in c ca pita l. C ons tant ino ple. in 1453 and made it th e ce ntre o f th eir e m pire . III th e 16th ce nt u ry th eir arm ies penetrated C h ristian Europe up to th e wa lls of Vienna, whi le they also batt led the Persian Safavid s and the Eg ypti an Mam luk s, taking co nt ro l o f N orth Afri ca and mu ch of the Midd le East. T he se extrao rdinar y wide-ranging co nques ts were achieved hy a military syste m that ex ploi ted the best of a number o f differ en t fighting trad ition s .1 1H.1 techn ologies.

GOO D LEARNERS In iti all y. the Ottoma ns fiHl g ht in t he sty le of steppe ho rsem en . They were moun ted archer s using the co mpos ite ho w as thei r main wca pon and ge nera lly avoid ing clo se-quarter s co mbat. Swi ft- movi ng , mi ssi le - arm ed cavalry wo uld rema in an impo rtant elem ent of O tto m an forces throu ghout th e peak Yl'a rs of th eir em pi re , but th ey co uld not have ach ieved th e succ e ss th ey d id w it ho ut develop ing highl y effective heavy cavalry. in fa ntry, and arti llery, as wel l as c reating th e ir o w n nav y. O ne of th e most str iki ng aspects of Ottoman r u le in th e 15th and I(,th cent uries wa s the vigour wi th w h ich the y ada pted to ne w ways o f making war.

A Eu ropean ob ser ver co m men ted that "no nation has sho w n less relu ctance to ado pt the use ful in vcntiou s of o t hers". T he Ottoman s mimick ed C hr istian Europ e ill till' ado ptio n of firearm s. prog rcssing fro III the arq uebu s, v ia the matc hlo ck mu sket , to th e Aintl ock (altho ug h th ey never

cr ea ted Euo pcan-sty lc bo d ies of pik emen) . Th ey were sim ilarly sw ift to eq u ip the i r arm y w ith can no n , init ially by purcha sing th l' skills of European ex perts. Meluncd th e C o nque ror fam ously employed a H uu gari.m, kn own as Urban. to found the g reat g u ns with w hic h he battered the walls of Consta nt ino ple in 1453. Although the Ot tomans becam e re no w ned felf thei r usc of ex tra large ca n no n in siege wa rfare, they d id not neg lect light er ticld art ille ry, w h ich always formed all etTc.'ct ivc part of th eir arm ic«.

CO M ('LEX FORC ES The forces o f th e m atur e Ottom an Emp ire:

cent red aro und a stalld ing army of hou seh old sold iers in th e direct pay of th e sulta n. Th ese pcrm .mcnt forces included th e su ltan's elite iufantry bod yguard . the j an issa r ies. wh o at least unti l rh c late 17th cc n ru r y we re slaveso ld ie rs, ;lIId non - slave cavalry, Whcll till.' su ltan e m barked 011 a military c.uupai gu . th is relativel y sma ll regular arm y wa s aug me n te d by pro vin ci al fo rces ra ised th rou gh the timor sys te m, which w as ill so n ic wa ys ak in to Europ ean fl'lHb lism . H o rsemen known as sipahis we re gi ven the rig ht to raise rent from all area of land ill ret u r n t(lr military duti es. Th ey were requ ired to pr esent them sel ve s tor serv ice along w ith a ce rtai n number of th eir foll o wers, equipped tor w ar, at the bidding of th e su ltan . RAWHIDE CHICHA K (HELMET ) WITH (OPPER GILT

Ottoman campa ign s The Siegeof Belgrade in 14S6led by Sultan Mehmet II " The Conqueror" (right ) and the typical arms and armour of an Ottoman soldier (far right) . The siege eventually escalated into a major battle, dunng which John Hunyadi led a sudden counterattack that overran the Turkish camp, ultimately compelling the wou nded

Sultan to retreat.

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... T H EN EACH [WARRIOR] WAS ORDERED TO KI LL H IS OWN PRISO NE RS, AND FOR THOSE WHO DID NOT WISH TO DO SO TH E KING [BAYEZID] APPOINTED OTHERS IN THEIR PLACE.

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Orh er cavalry we re recru ited as 'Jkil~i;. They were .u n h itio u-, yo u n g warriors wit h a horse and a t.ivtc tor advc n run..' w ho viewed wa rfa re as ;1 ch.mr...' to make t hei r \\';1)' ill th e world . The ,,/.:ily'; vcr vcd ;1\ ligh t cavalry - . . r o ut ing a nd ra id ing ahc.id of the m a in ;lfllly. The.')' profit ed f ro m plunde r a nd mi ght ho pe, i f the ir va lo u r at tracted offic ia l at te ntio n . to o ne d ay be ~ r~lIl tl'd ;) timor. At t he bo tt o m of t he ~l rJ H Y hi e rarch y were t he I'Zt,f,s. They served a" manual labou rer s a nd as toot so ld ie r». and were rl'~a nkd as di spl'lIsahk' C, II III 01 1 tt,ddl'r. Fin all y, a ll importan t co nt r ib ur io n to Ottom .in f()f(.'l' S w as m ad e by ro un tr ic s ow ing a lk'~ia l1 cl' to the su ltan th at pr o v ided n at ion al co llt i n ~l' n b u nder t heir ow n com m.m dcrs - tor e xa m p le, th e Serb s fro m till' late l-It h cent ury,

SLAVE -SO L D I

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l. ikc m ost Mu slim statl's , till' Ot rom.ms e mp loy ed slave s both ill hi ~h admin istratio n a nd to f( )rJll e lite troops i ll the ar med forces - t he M amlu ks Otto man w eapons A miquelet rifle and a gurz (mace) - both 18th century. Al thou gh Ottoman forces readily deployed firearms in batt le, th ey rejected the use of t he bayonet. seemq it as an " infidel weapon" ,

III Eg ypt were a prune exa m ple. The j a nissa ry co r ps w as ra ised th roug h th e dcrshinnc. :1 selec ti ve co nscript io n of bo ys fr om

till' C h ri stia n co m m uni ries of th e Halka ns th at c.uue under O tt oman rul e in th e l-lth ccu tury. Ottoman l'>rl.'SS ~a n~s tou red t he Halka ns l'Vl'ry year, tak in g th e chi ldren th at lo oked th e m o st pr o m isin g m il ita r y m at e ri al. R em o ved from th e ir C hr isti a n fam ilies. the bo ys were taken back to C o ns ta n riuo plc a nd raised as M u slim s, W hen th e y ca me: o f ag e: th e y e nte red the su lt an's se r v ice , e ither as j ani ssar ics o r as c iv ilia n ad ru iu isrr.uo rs. Forb idd en to m ;lrry o r o w n pr opert y and defi n it ivel y sepa ra te d from th e ir fa mi lies, t he slave-so ld iers we re re garded as t he idea l f;li t hfu l se rv an ts o f th e su lta n becau se th e y had no ot he r arta clu uv nrs o r pe rson a l am bition s, W ha t till' sys te m (:ti ll'd to allow fo r w as th e inevi tab le

Warrior 's cuirass This example of Ott om an body armo ur wo uld have provided superb prot ection, featur ing several large plates and shoulder guards,

de velopme nt over t im e o f th e ja n issa ries' lo yalt y to th eir o w n co rps, wh ich in th e en d would n u ke th em d e vot ed less to till' su ltan th an to the ir o w n intere sts as a militar y elite. H o w eve r, in the ir golde n a ~e b efore sel fin te res t took ho ld , t hey were tine in fmrr ymcn . di scipli ned, asce ti c , fea rless , and sk illed in the use of fire arm s. T he y we re the tro ops ex pecte d to sto r m t he w a lls of a be sie ged fort re:ss o r h old t he lin e o n the battlefi eld in t he f:,ce of c harg m g e ne m y cava lr y.

EFFECT I V E FIG HTE RS Altho u g h la rge a nd va r icgarcd. the O tto ma n ar m y wa s no ted fo r t he good o rder of its mil it a r y operatio n s, w it h ca m ps dea n and well o rg a ni zed and th e o ff- d u ty be hav io ur o f so ld iers less

.. '

.......... .... .... Ott om an ex pa nsio n In th e course of 150 years, the Ottoman Turks grew from a small band of holy wa rrio rs. sett led on land in north w est Anatotia. int o rul ers of an empire straddling Europe and A sia. The scale of their expansion. as Illustrated. is extraordmary. They wo n almost 20 key battles in t he 16th century alone, but by the end of the 17th century their empire was in decline.

d run ken and d isr u pt ive than was common a mo ngs t th eir co nte mpo ra r ies in the C hrist ia n w o rld . T he ir hi ghl y d eco rated \wap on r y and noi sy milit ar y ba nd gave th e Ottom an forces an a ir of grea t splendo ur, but th e y we re th o rou ghly pr acti cal light iu g m en ski lle d in t he d epl o ym ent o f th eir diffe rent arms an d capa b le of di sc ipl ined battl efi eld m an o eu vres. In co m pariso n to this effic iency, th ei r e ne m ies o fte n see m ed fatall y n.nvc. At Ni cop oli s, for exa m ple, in I.W(" a bod y o f C h rist ian c r usa de r knights laun ch ed a h ast y cavalry c ha rge ag ainst an arm y led by su lta n B;lye zid with out tir st estab lish ing the siz e or di spo sition of the Ot toma n force s. After scarrer ing the '\, ZIl!JS", w ho ha d been placed ill forward po sit io ns as sacr ifici al pawns. the knight s fo u nd th e m selves ex pose d to a co u n te ratt ac k hy Bayezid 's far more numerous cava lry and w ere dul y mas sac red . At M oha cs )31l years later, C h r ist ia n knights su ffe red a sim ila r fa«- on a ba ttl efi eld wh er e g u n po wd e..·r w l';lpons we re pr ese n t. Facing th e usu al en rh usiasric ch arge b y armoured Ch ris tia n knights. th e

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Ottoman sip"his fei gn l'd tiigllt . d rawin g the knights st raigh t into th e de vastatin g tir e o f a rtil lery and o f di sciplined ra n ks o fj;ln is,aril's a r m ed with arq ue buses , Al so ha rassed b y th e flan k in g attacks o f th e Ottoman light cav alry, th e k nig hts we re finall y swe pt away by a co u nte r-c ha rge lau nched by th e su ltan's heav y cava lry armed w it h swo rds a nd spea r, . The Ot to ma n s wer e l'q ua lly successfu l again st Muslim oppo nc uts. T heir dd \:;1t of th e Egyp tian M amluks at M arj D ahik , in Syri a. in 15 16 o wed mu ch to th e po ssessio n o f g u npowdl'r we..·apOJ 1S. which th e Eg y pt ian s did not have . W hen th e M am lu ks depl oyed th eir own hastil y asse m bled ca n non at R ayd a u iya in Eg ypt the foll owin g year. the y we re no netheless d l'feate..'d aga in, t he sk ilfu l Ottoman cava lry exec ut in g n im ble Hank ing attack s th at nu llifi ed the fi re power o f the Eg ypti an for ces .

FA I R- WE AT H ER FIG HTE RS If t he Ottom an army h ad a maj or weakness. it w as t he shee r numbers of its sold iers and hors es. W ith o n ly limited logi sti c su ppo rt, this ho st h ad m o stl y to live 011' rhc co u nt ry and could not su rv ive a winter o n Ottoman d ru m s Janisserles are shown here With the drums that were used to urge soldiers into battle. Janissaries lived in their barra cks and served as policemen and firefighters in peacet ime.

c.uupai gn in ce n tra l Europe. Thu s whe n Su ley ma n rhe M agni t, c"1\t (ru led I521l -(,(,) put Vienna, t he cap ita l of the llabshu rg Em pire , u nd er siege in 152 1) . he had to wit hdraw afte..·r o n ly a m onth in orde r to h ave ri me to complet e th e lon g m ar ch ha r k to Constantinople before th e we at he r wo rsened . 111 t he Euro pean theatre. th e O tt oman forces were on ly a su m me r arm y.

D EC LIN E A N D FALL Th rou gh th e 17th a nd lSt h cc nrur ies th e Otroman a rmy g rad ua lly ti:1l in to a decadence th at refle ct ed p ro b lems ex pe rienced by t he w ho le 0 [ O tto m3 11 soc iety. Th er e was a f ailurc to keep up with technological adva nces th at were preval e nt throu gh out We stern Eu ro pea n an d ;1 decl in in g e.·. C0I1OJ 11Y that underm in ed th e resou rces ava ilable fo r military c.u n pa ig ns . The 1;1111" syste m b egan to de cay a nd w as eve n tu a lly abandoned . Espe cia lly sad wa s t he (;lte..' o f the j aui ssar ics. Du r in g the 17th ce ntury t he y ceased to he slaves re c r uited b y the ilrvshinnr, iu stc ud hl'in g dra wn fro m fr ee- bor n Mu slim s eagl'r to join a pri vileged military set. The j anissa r y corps sw clh-d in number s, from around 2 0 .()()O at th e rime o f Sulcyman to well in excess of IOIl, IlIl Il hy th e e nd o f th e lSt h ce n tury. Thi s hlo ared body ceased to have a ny ctfecr ivc mil itar y fun ct io n , d q~el1 l' ra ti n g int o a pamper ed socia l elite an d blocking effo rt s to re for m a nd mode r n ize t he armed forces. It wa s fin all y sup presse d , w ith considerable bloodshed, in 182() - k nown as "The Aus picious Incid en t". By then O tto man Turkey had declined , now little more th an a rams hac k le mil itar y power cl inging p reca rio us ly to th e remains of its empi re ,

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MUGHAL WARRIOR DURING THE SEVEN OR EIGHT DAYS WE LAY IN PAN IPAT, OUR MEN WENT CLOSE TO IBRAHIM'S CAMP A FEW AT A TIME, RAINED ARROWS DOWN ON THE RANKS OF HIS TROOPS, CUT OFF AND BROUGHT BACK THEIR HEADS. BABUR, ON THE BUILD-UP TO THE FIRST BATTLE OF PANIPAT. 1526

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th e 16th and 17th cent uries,

th e M ughal em pero rs of Ind ia com ma nded far larger armed fo rces tha n an y co ntem porary Eu ro pea n power co uld have mu stered . Like th eir fellow Mu slim s, th e Otto ma n Turks,

th ey co mbined the Cent ral Asian cavalry traditio n of th e M ongols and Tartars w ith th e use of can non and firea rms. T hei r wea k nesses we re a failure to apprec iate th e effectiveness of disciplined in fant ry and th e lack of a cohe rent co m m and struc ture to direct their un w ieldy and mul ti- ethn ic army. ~

VI

o o I

Ilahur. th e fou nde r of t he M u gh al Em pi re , was a Turco -M on gol d escendant of t il l' mu ch - feared co nque ro r Timurlan c. As the ch ie f of a hand o f Mu slin : wa rr ior s, or ,l.? IIIlZ ;S. he con q uered K abu l in Afgha ni ,ta n in IS0 4 :1I1d [rom ISI(, be gan raidin g south into India. His de feat of Su lta n Lod i o f Delhi at Pan ipar in 152(, allowed him to establish his full' in northern India. Th e empire w as not set tled O il a so lid basis. IU )\\,C \' l' r. un t il th e reig n o f Akbar (r u led 1556-! (,05 ). A n ac tive military ca m paig ne r. Akbar ex te nd ed th e area of Ind ia ti nde r M u gh a] co ntrol :1I1 d integ rated warrio rs fro m varied ba ck g rounds, Muslim and Hindu. into a large- scale imp erial army.

m an -r o -m an a nd despi sed m issile w arfare . T he )' a lso st resse d self-sacri fice and the c ho ice of deat h rather th an di shon our. T he mo re pragm ;ltic M u gh" " a rc' rep orted to have felt the Rajput ' " k ne w how to di e hut 110t ho w to fi gh t", hut the)' we lcomed th e cava lry and arme d peasantry that H indu w arrio rs hrou gh t to till' army,

AM I RS AN D HOU SEHO LD FOR C ES

T he wa rlords and nob les w ho bro ug ht th e ir follo wers to serve the l'm pl'ror were design ated " am irs". As we ll as stat u s ill the co urt h ie rarchy, they received 1110lll'y fro III till' Mu gh al treasur y to pay the ir m en alld t he right to raise re venu e from pro vin ces placed unde r their co ntro l. T he n' we re several hund red .u n irs at any g ivl'n ri me, IM PERI A L ARMY wi th aro u n d 100 .0 0 0 to 200.000 rc raiuers. A, The ar lllY A kb ar created kept co nt ac t wi t h th e w el l as these troo ps, the em pl'ror had hou seh old Mu gh al s' Ccn trnl Asian ro ot s. The e mperor forces und er h is d irect co ntrol. T hese co nsiste d rec ru ited nom adic warbands into hi s army, Of :1 few tho usand cava lry and mu sket eers, added attracti ng them wit h the pro spect o f a share ill t he em pire's wea lt h. T he y in clud ed lar ge to large qua nt ities of arti ller y .m d a subs ta nt ia l numbe r of wa r- e leph ant s. Surprising ly, thou gh , co nt inge nts of Tura ni s. o rig inating fr om he did 110t h ave any sold ier-slaves , a m ajor Central Asia. Th ese we re horsem en espec ially skilled in th e lise of til l' co mpo site bow, w ho fea rurc o f co nte m po ra ry Mu slim armies ill \\TTe boun d to th ei r wa rband lead er by till' Tu rk ey. Egy pt . and Iran . T he fu nct io n of the Mu gh al army wa s to sim ple principl e of fid elit y to till' m an w hose maintain and extend the: emperor's rule in food th e y ate . lran is and Afgh all i' - th e the Indian subcouti nen t . Th e: emperor latt er noted bot h for their fier cen ess was ne ver clo se to csrabli shin g a nd t he ir unrel iabilit y - also a Il1OTH)pol y o f armed for ce c ame so uth to ser ve the within h is ow n domain s, e mpire. But Akbar and As o ne o bse rve r co m men ted , subsequent empe rors also wi th refere nce to the int egrated int o their wi desprea d d istribut io n of fo rces the wa rrio rs o f m atchlo ck mu ske ts, "even each area of lnd ia th at the: cu ltivator at the ti me of the y co nque red . Thus plou ghin g has hi , loaded for e xam ple the R ajputs, g Ull faste ne d to the ren o wn ed Hi ndu m ilitar y TURBAN HELMETWITH plou gh . a nd hi , m arch aristo crats, bro u ght t heir NASALAND NECK GUARD bu rnin g ", It has bee n foll o wers int o till' serv ice calc u lated that ill the Iatl' o f th e Mughal s, The lfith cent ur y the M ughal R ajl'u! , espoused a ch ivalric co de of hon our Empi re contained over that value d close co mbat fou r m ill ion arme d men .

By maint aining such a larg e army. t he l.'m pc..' ror both reduced th e number of potentia l so ld ie rs availab le to those tempted to o ppos-

Ceremon ial dagger This extremely ornate 17th -century dagger wi th scabbard is typical of th ose from the Mu ghal period . Its ram-shaped hilt is studded with semi-precious sto nes. It wo uld have been used for ceremo nial purposes.

MUGHAl lNDIA 1525 - 170 1

by oxen o n ca rts o r transpo rt ed in pi eces st rappe d to th e back s o f ca mels . T he ligh t a rt illery was pulled by hor ses. The ve ry largest ca n no n. required for th e siege o f stu bbo rn st ro ng ho lds, wo u ld be m a nu factu red o n t he SP01. Althou gh siege warfa re wa s t he pri ma ry usc of arri llcr y, its effec tiveness was lim ited . T he M ugha l« co m in ucd to resort to traditiounl tacti cs suc h as di ggin g mines unde r fort re ss w311s and sim ply sta rvi n g th e d efe nd er s into sub m issio n . The m ai n impact o f ca n no n see ms to have bee n psycho lo gi ca l. add ing to the mo un ting pressu re o n besieged for ces to ag ree su rre nde r terms.

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Mu g hals in Indi a Babur's defeat of Sultan l od i of Delhi at Panipat in 1526 allowe d him to establish Mughal rule in northern India . From th is base, t he M ugh als expanded and consolidated territor y to the south for almost a further 200 years, under successive rulers including Akba r and Aur enq zeb.

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Ind ian kard (dagg er) and scabb ard Brought to India through Mughal expansion, this st raight-bladed, singleedged kard was in use across much of the Islamic world by the 18t h century .

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ON T HE BATTLEF IELD

MUGH A L W EAKN ESSES

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lU,UfI RegiOrt .xquired by Mugh.Jls

1596- 1600

Mugh al forces ty pica lly too k form for battle w ith m assed light cava lry o n th e flanks and heav y cava lry in the ce nt re. The a rt ille ry and the mu sket- armed infan t ry we re de plo yed as a de fe nsive blo ck, w ith a lin e of wa r- elepha nt s behind them . T he pr esen ce of g u npo wde r we apOllS re nd e red elepha nts useless as a n o ffens ive for ce, since the noi se and smo ke m ad e th em panic u nco nt ro llabl y. The y fu nction ed in stead as co m ma nd a nd o bse rva t io n po sts, and as a last lin e of d efe nce. The psycho lo gical impact of their to we ring presen ce wa s also sig n ifica nt. T he Mugh als wo u ld usu all y start a battl e b y send ing thei r m o unted arc hers for ward 0 11 th e flanks to delu ge th e e ne m y w it h a rrows. After this h ighly effecti ve so fte nin g- up ph ase, th e heav y cavalry wo uld cha rge and eng age the o ppos it io n in a ge ne ra l m elee. An alte rna tive batt le plan, execute d success fu lly aga inst nume ricall y supe rio r for ces at Pan ipat a nd in seve ra l o the r co n flic ts, was for th e Mu gh al cavalry to fei g n a retreat, drawi n g th e cne my into th e fire of nl:lssed ca nnon and infantry firear ms . The cava lry wo u ld th en co u ntera ttac k to d evastat in g effec t.

BatM.lr·s domains 152S Babur 'UOflquMts 1S26-39 priof to Mug ha l ~.plIlsiort 1539

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and lise of new m ilitar y technolo g y. Their cavalry d id not carr y pistol s a nd t heir infa ntry had neither pikes nor bayonets . They failed to m o ve O il fro m till' m atchlo ck to the superior flintl o ck m usket , st ill e m ploy ing t he o ld fashio ned fire ar m in to t he IHth ce nt ury. Despi sin g in fan tr y. the y d id no t subject th e m to d rill , so th at fo ot so ld iers were slo w to lo ad t heir musket s and co u ld no t fi re ill vo lle ys. The frag ility of Mu gh al po w er wa s, ho we ve r, lar gely a co nseque nce of t he army's tu ud a m c nta l struct u re, de pendi ng o n wa rlo rds bri nging their ret ainer s to serve the l'm pl'ror. T his p re vented the creat io n of allY pe rma nent h ier a rch y of co m m and , since ea ch warlord owed allegiance d ir ectl y to the rul cr and accepted or ders on ly fro m h im . Amirs were in e vit abl y te m pte d to asse rt thei r in dcp eu dcn ce ill t he ir pr o vincial po wer base, rath e r tha n j oinin g the impc rial arm y. Pro fessio nal so ld ie rs wo u ld sel l t heir se rv ices to ano the r e m ploye r OIlCl' imperial w ea lt h a nd po wer wa ned . The Mu gha l Em pi re t he oretica lly co nt in ue d to ex ist unti l IH57. b ut b y th en it was a m er e g hos t of its forme r g lor y. H O\Vl' VCr, till' e m pire's legacy W;lS lon g-la sting: m all Y m onuments of th e Mu gh al pe rio d (m o st famo usly th e T aj M ah al) a rc sti ll in usc to da y.

H E AHMIES THAT I:O U GH T

in th e civil w ars in Brit ain

between 1642 and 1651 were co m ma nded by office rs w ith ex perience of war in co ntine ntal Europe. T hei r tac tics and o rga nization thus foll owed cur re ntly fash iona ble Euro pean models, in wh ich well- d rilled in fantry armed wi th a m ix of pik es and mu sket s were co nside red essential to battl efield success. But Britain had few men train ed in th e use of arms and it took yea rs to crea te trul y via ble fightin g forces, a pro cess th at reach ed its peak in th c N ew Model Army. ~

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At th e hea rt of t ill' co m plex se ries of co n flic ts tha t w rea ke d havo c in En~la n d . Scotla nd . and Ire land from 16 42 o nwa rd wa s a po lit ical a nd religious co n fro nta t io n bet w ee n K ing C ha rles I a nd t he Eng lish parlia me nt . M an y of thos e w ho fough t in th e civ il war s were princ ipled I1H..' 11 wi th a se nse of co m m itm e nt to t he ro yali st or parliamen tarian cause. Yet from the o utset th ere w ere also many so ld ie rs w ho sim p ly fou ght fo r whichever side happened to co nt ro l th e area th ey lived in; some fou ght for both sides at di ffer e nt times. R AI SI N G TROOP S The bulk o f th e initi al co mbatants in the c iv il w ars were e ithe r volunteer s o r members o fl oc al m ili tias (k no w n as the "Trained Band s" ). As the co n flic t dra gge d o n. however , both sides had to raise lev ies to fill the ranks o f their in fa ntr y, lISin ~ a cha otic process of co nsc riptio n th at pro duce d most ly poor q ua lity troo ps from the lo w est le vel s of so c ie ty. Equ ipping and payin g tro op s w as J challenging task und er the co nd itio ns of the time . With g reat effort . all so ldiers in t he civ il wa rs were fitte d o ut w ith basic Wl'apo ns, shoes, and so me kind of un iform . T he u n ifo rms were ge ne rally so d ive rse , however. tha t o n t he day of a ba ttl e so ld ie rs wou ld be issue d wi th a spec ial item to wear, suc h as a sash . to d istingui sh frie nd fro m foe. T he sold ie rs' pa y wa s no rm ally h eavil y in arrears - a frequ ent cause of mu tiny. M e n

o ften had to he paid so m e o f the m Olle y they w ere owed befo re a batt le or sie ge ill o rder to get t he m to tight. U npai d so ld iers dep ended o n p illa ge a nd t he s a c k i n ~ of to w n s for the c hance o f gain .

A N EW A R MY In 1(,45 the Eng lish parliament established the New M odel Arm y ill o rde r to ce ntrali ze the o rganiza tio n o f its m ilit ary forces. w hich had previou sly be en rai sed and trai ne d lo call y. I t co ntai ne d a st ron g co re o f ideolog ica lly com m irrcd offi ce rs and vete ra ns wh o saw the m se lves as t he "army of th e Livin g Cod". It w as u n iqu e in titt ill ~ o ut all its infa utr y in identical uniform s and it w as also better th an o ther c iv il w ar forma tion s at pa yin g its tro op s regularl y. But it co u ld not escape from the ge ne ra l co nd itio ns of arm ies o f its d ay. As we ll as the d edicat ed core. the arm y co n ta in ed man y so ld ie rs wh o had joi ned for th e pay and ad venture, o r be cau se as co nscripts they had be en g ivl'n no cho ice . All o ffice r, C o lo nel J oh n Venn , co m pla ined tha t the lev ies he was se nt w e re " m en ta ken o ut of prison , tin ke rs, pe dlar s. and vag rants that have 110 dw ell in g ". Suc h men had to be brou g ht to the arm y und e r arm ed guard and man y of t hem d ese rted at the ve ry first o ppo rt u n ity . Nor did th e new arm y alw ays succe ed in paying its tro o ps o n ti me , and its soldi ers so ug ht th ei r own fortune s in traditional military f.lsh io n.

MATCHLOCK MUSKET

Matchlock d rill In the first of these pictures from a Dutchillustrated drill manual, the match in the musketeer 's left hand is already lit. In the second, he poursgunpowder froma flask from his bandolier. He then rams down a musket ball. before preparing to pourpriming powder into the pan, keeping the smouldering match at a safe distance between the fIngers of hisleft hand.

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A fter their victory over t he R o yalists at th e

bau lc of Na seb y in )(,-15, N ew M od el A r m y foo t so ldie rs plu ndered the ba ttl efield and d eser ted in Iar~~ num ber s to carr y o ff t he ir bo o t y.

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prom oti on to li euten ant a fte r six years a rloa t:

If he had th e rig ht pat ronage. o r sutficicnrly impressed hi s supe rio rs. he mi ght he a po stca pta in w ith h is o w n sh ip b y th e rime he was 21, assured that i f he surv ived lon g e no ug h he w o uld o ne d ay be come an admiral by sim p le right of sen io rity. Th ere w as the dun ce not

agc o f III or II. T h ey did the lowliest j ob s O il bo ard, from ac riug as serva nts for the o fficers to lo o king afte r the an imals that w e re ca rried O il voyage s as ;1 so urce o f frcsh f()()d. Gr.rd ua lly the y wou ld de velop th e mu scle s a nd t he sk ills to b e sailo rs. They w ould learn to mo ve nimbly barefo ot 0 11 the pitch ing d eck and ill the rigg ing , and acquire th e br oad - sho ulde red . barrel- ch ested physiqu e o f 3 sailo r, till' produc t of yea rs o f heav y lifting and pu llin g 0 11 rop es. Suc h lon gterm vo lu n tee rs formed th e co re of the navy.

TH E N AV Y AT WA R In wa r ti me. ho we ver, the n umbe r of sai lo rs ex pa nded ra pid ly - from -I5,1I1111 me n at the sta n o f th e French R evolut ion ar y War in 17')3 , for exa m ple. to 120. 01l1l in 17')'). Suc h num bers cou ld 110t be su p plie d wi tho ut the use o f th e in fa m o us pre ss gangs. The Impre ss Se rv ice sco ured por ts for ex perie nced sea me n - to r exa mple, m en serv ing o n m c rch .mt ships o r river bo ats - and " pressed" th em int o th e kin g's ser vice , M en were a lso pre sse d ;11 sea, a wars hi p sto pping a

VOllE Y G UN

o n ly o f promot ion bu t a lso , ill ti me o f wa r, of m akin g o ne 's 1r!U IIC, for the ad m ira lty pa id p ri ze mon e y to the o fficers and crew of sh ips that capt u re d cncmy vessels, A capta i n wh o had th e luck to take a number o f hea vil y laden c nc my merch anrmen co u ld be come a rich 111:111 . In pea cetime. m ost o f the lo we r ranks o f t he lIavy also joined th e service at a n early age . C h ild re n fro III t he po orest st rata of so ci er y so me save d from the st re ets by th e cha rita ble M a rit im e So ci et y - became sh ip's bo ys at the «

rnc rc ha nn n.m and forcibly tak in g the pick of her crew, Pre ss gang s w er e h ig hl y unpopul ar 3 tH.! at times th eir meth od s we re littl e better t ha n k idnapping . but th ev pro vid ed a practi cal m et h od o f rapid selec tive co nscr iption . T he Quota System , introduced in tHOS, was worse . Eve ry lo cal aut hori ty was ordered to sup ply a ce rta in number o f men to the navy; to fill their qu ot a, th ey u su all y e nded up by c mprying th e prison s, thus mannin g ships wi th perry crim inals wh o w ere landsm en and often carriers of t yph us.

Boarding part y Britishsailors, armed with cutlasses. and marines, firing muskets, makea hazardous attempt to boarda French warship.

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TE A M A FLOAT O nce aboard a wars hi p. vo luntari ly o r not, a ma n took hi s place as part o f a complex . enclos ed so c iety o ver w hic h the captain ru led wi th almost ab solute po we r. The cha racter o f the ca pta in wa s th e ke y to a hap py or unh ap py sh ip. H e co u ld m ak e life unbea rable fo r eve ry bo dy on board. b ut a captai n who ca re d for h is o ffi cers and m en , w hi lst m aintainin g good di scip lin e and order, cou ld fo rm a crew into a hi ghly m otivated team in w hi c h eac h m an w illing ly played hi s part . T he sailors were orga nize d into tw o watche s, alte rn at in g at th eir statio ns to ke ep th e shi p ma n ne d 24 hours a d ay. As well as a watc h, each sailo r be longed to a "mess" of eig ht to ten men , w ho ate to get he r an d usua lly for me d a bonded g ro up wit hi n the crew. Sailors were assig ne d specific tasks de pen d ing on t heir sk ills - for exam ple, to pmen we re th o se sufficie nt ly nimble and assured to wo rk hi gh o n th e m asts.

LI V I N G CO N D IT I O N S A sh ip was a hard piarc to live and work . O perati ng a sai ling shi p in all weathers ex pos ed men to the co nstant risk of acc idents, which cost man y th eir lives. C ra m pe d liv in g co nd itio ns enco u rage d th e spread o f di sease even o n a ship ke pt spo tlessly cle a n . Di sease alway s k illed far more m en tha n co m ba t. espec ially in u nh ealth y reg io ns suc h as the West Ind ies. Sa ilor s. ho wev er, we re not bad ly fed by th e stand a rd s of th eir d ay, wi t h basic ratio ns of salted m eat . pea s. and dr y biscuits (" ha rd tack " ). plus an am ple supply of beer a nd wa te re d rum (" g ro g") . T he tack was un fortun atel y liable to infestati on with weevils a nd lar ger g rubs kn own as " barge m e n". O n a we ll- ru n sh ip sailo rs would also have som e fresh fruit and vegeta bles a nd lem o n j u ice to avo id sc ur v y. Officers ate better th an th e m en because they paid for th ei r ow n ex t ras su pplies. At sea as asho re . co rpo ra l pu ni shment was t he means by w hic h o rde r w as m aintain ed . In th e navy t his ra nged fro m "s ta rt ing" - casua l blows wi th a ro pe or ca ne ad mi nis te red to men th o ug h t

not to be w orkin g hard en o ugh - to flo ggin g w ith the cat o' n ine tail s and even han ging. Starti ng wa s mu ch resent ed by sailo rs and was for ma lly abo lished in 180 9. Flo ggin g was th e punishment for a ran ge o f o ffences from dru nkenness to slee ping o n dut y. It wa s a ritua li zed p ro ced u re carried o ut by the bo su n's mates in fro nt o f the w ho le cre w and widely. t ho ugh not unive rsally, acce pt ed as necessar y. Its usc co u ld be abus ed by a sad istic o ffice r. b ut thi s was the- e-xce-ptio n rathe r than the ru le. l-I ang ings were rare . T he y w er e th e punishme nt fo r m ut in y, tre ason , and so do my - th e latte r rare 0 11 boa rd sh ips that affo rde d no privacy. M en 's g rieva nce s. as ex p ressed in t he m ut in ies of Spit head and the N a rc in 1797. te nded to fo cus o n issues suc h as pay being ill arre-ars. th e un equal di stribu tion of p rize money, th e po o r quality o f to ad , a nd lack o f sho re leave . Bu t a m ut in y wa s ab o ve all lik ely to be provoked b y the irrati ona l and unj ust behav io ur o f a specific capta in .

COMBAT STAT IO NS In the agc o f Nelson. th e qua lit y o f R o yal Nav y sailo rs w as demon str ated time and ag ain . M any o peratio ns, suc h as th e blo cka d e o f t he Fre nch ports, were un showy feats of seam ansh ip, call ing for th e ma in te na nce o f vessels at sea for lo ng peri ods in all weat hers . Act ua l battles we re rar e eve n ts, b ut the y were o ne s for w h ich all cre ws were well pre pa red . As t wo o ppo sin g warships vied fo r po sition in rel at io n to th e wind

The horro r of naval warfa re At the bat t le of th e Nile in 1798, th e French flagship, L'Orienr (let t), blew up, killing almost the entire crew. Both sideswere so shocked by this catastrophe that th ey stopped firingfor a few minutes.

and o ne ano the r, the g u ns w ere mann ed by thei r c rews and ot he r sailo rs issued w ith wea po ns in

or d er to form o r repel a bo ard in g part y. T he m arin es, mean whi le. assembled wi th th ei r mu sket s. so me cli mbing aloft to act as sn ipe rs. Once the captain co nside red th e position right. gu n crews w ou ld follow a sequence of o rders rem o ve tampi on s; lo ad and ram ; tir e ; run back the g uns - to tire a bro adside abo ut o nce a minute. A sh ip wou ld co nti nue to engage an e ne my even w h ile bro adsid es tired at close- range scatt ere d d ead ly spli nt ers o f wood th rough th e sh ip like shra p nel, a nd th e su rgeo n , o pe rating unde r d readfu l co nd it io ns bel ow deck s, am p utate d lim bs at ter rifyin g speed . . Par from avo idin g co ntact with the ene my. R o yal N av y sh ips ac t ive ly soug ht it, driven b y the thirst tor g lory and fo r prize m o ne y. A lm o st absu rd risks were take n to c ut o ut e llem y sh ips ill defe nde d harbou rs o r u nd er t ak e o ne - o n- o ne ac tio ns aga inst he av ily g un ned o ppo ne nts. Pr0111 th e bo ys w ho carried t he cartridges to the g u ns hi din g t he m unde r th eir j acket s so a spa rk wo uld no t igni te th e po wd er and b u rn th eir face o ff up co the captain w ho stood o n d eck am id shot. she ll. and fall ing spa r, t hese were fighting men w ho se pu lses q ui cken ed at the sce nt of bat tle. By the lat e peri od of the N apole on ic Wa rs they had e na bled the R o yal N av y to esta blish a n un pre ced ent ed domin ance of t he world 's o ceans.

NAVAL TACTICS IN THE AGE OF NELSON Royal Navy w arships oft en depart ed from th e form al

and captains w ho foll ow ed his ideas preferred to cut

tradit ion of fig hting in line of battl e - w hen tw o

t hrough the enemy line to fight in w hat Nelson called

infl ict damage on the enemy's hull, chain shot (two

hostile fleet s sailing in th e same direction form ed up

a "pell-mell" fashion . They could do this because of

smaller projectil es linked by a chain) for attac king a

abreast of each ot her to exchange broadsides (volleys

th e high stan dard of their seamanship. In a sea battle,

ship's rigging and spars, and canister (a container of

fired by all t he guns on one side of th e ship). Nelson

th e ship's gun s cou ld be loaded wi t h various kinds of

small shot used as an anti -personnel wea pon) .

sho t: large round shot (t he t raditiona l cannonball) to

Broadsides The classical form of naval engagement throughout th e 18t h century wa s based on th e line of battle. The att acking fleet bore down on the enemy to fire broadsides. Well -t rained gun crew s cou ld tim e the moment of firin g a broadside, using t he roll ing motion of t he ship on th e w aves to direct th eir fire at the enemy hull or upwa rds at it s sails and riggin g .

5. bu t at a pri ce. So me 360.0 00 Union sold ie rs di cd in the co nflic t. abo u t o ne in eig ht of tho se w ho served. Th o se w ho survived co uld return ho me w ith th e sarisfac t io n of havin g achieved . at th eir best. an impressive co mbat pe rfo rma nce. When ba tt le-harden ed a nd properl y di scipl ined , Bill y Yank ex h ibi te d. in th e words of onc officer. "implicit obedience to o rde rs, un daunted co urage, a nd gre at e nd u ranc e". T he Confede rates m ay o fte n have fo ug h t w ith m or e fier y passion . but the U n ion infant rym an u ltim atel y proved to be a st ubbo rn and co o l- headed fight er. Union art illery Federal ordinance stands at a depot readyfor deployment during the siege of Petersburg, 1864- 65. Artillery played a major role in the entrenched warfarearound the city.

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CONFEDERATE INFANTRYMAN The American C ivil War was an un equ al contest, the Confedera cy

serve d in the Confe de rate ra nk s. So me 260 ,000 of the m di ed in

fightin g at a great d isadvant age in ter ms of manp ower and reso urces.

co m bat or of d isease - almo st o ne in four of those w ho took part .

But at least for the first two years of the conflict, despite undergoin g

T he Confedera tes' outstanding ge nera l, R obert E. Lee, was

privat ions and hardsh ip, the Sout he rne rs often o utfo ug ht the

u nsti nti ng in hi s praise of his men 's fight ing qu alities, stat ing:

U nio n forces, show ing aggressio n, co m m itment , and supe rior

"The ir co urage in battle enti tles the m to ran k w ith th e so ld iers

leadership. By the end of the war, over a m illion soldier s had

of any ar my and of any time."

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T he Co n fed er ate ar m y wa s c re ated virt ua lly o ut of no t h ing. ill mu ch th e sa me m an ner as t he U n io n for ce s. Vol u nte ers sta m pe d ed to e n list. in spir ed by d n.: ;lI 11S of g lo ry a nd co nv inced of th e right ne ss of their cause. So m e lO() .()OO so ld ie rs we n .' e n ro ll,.-d ill the fi rst fo u r mo nt hs of th e war. As i ll t he Nort h , co m pa n ies a nd re gime nt s we re m o stl y fo rm ed 0 11 a lo cal ba sis 1I 1H.tcr the leadership of ind ividu als of w ea lth a nd sta nd ing. a nd co m pany officers a nd N C() s were initia lly elec ted hy th e m en . T he Confederac y b enefited , ho w ev e r, from a substan t ial leaven of reg u lar a rillY o fficer s w ho res ig ne d fro m th e U S forc es to tig ht fo r secessio n.

CO M M IT TE D R EBELS G iven its sho rtage of m anpower , the Confe derac y. in IH()2 , wa s fo rced to re sort to co nscr ipt ion , but the y suc ceede d in maki ng till' d raft wo rk better th an th e Union ever did. A ll w h ite m ales age d

CON FED ERAT ES HAD GON E DOWN AS TH E GRA SS FAL LS BEFORE TH E SCYTH E. JOURNALIST CHARLES COFFIN DESCRIBESTHEAFTERMATH OF THE BATTLEOF ANTIETAM. 17 SEPTEM BER. 1862

bet wee n IHa nd 35 were liable fin military serv ice and 110 o ne co uld pay for a subst it ute to ta ke hi s pla ce . Confedera te so ld iers we re p rcd omi u.m rly f;ume rs or f;um hand s, an d unlik e th e U n io n t roops, ver y few we re fore ig n- born . It wa s w idely ag,ree d that the So uther n so ld iers foug ht wit h grea ter d ash and cnth usinsm tha n th e stu bbo rn , pragllla tic Nort he rne rs. T heir sh rill " rebel yel l" st ruc k d rea d in to heart s o f th eir e nem ies durin g an attac k. T he Confede ra te so ld ier gl'lle ra lly felt a greater co m m it me n t

to th e war th an th e aVl' rage U nio n soldier. C o nfede rates fe lt they we re fig hti ng in de fence of horn e and fami ly, and o f their e nt ire wa y o f life. Lee ex pr essed th e fl.' din gs of m o st of hi s m en w he n , in IH64, he decla re d : " Ifvi croriou s, we ha ve eve ry t h ing to hope for; if defea ted, nothin g w ill be left for lIS to live fo r." In th e last two yea rs of the wa r, wit h defeat lo omi n g, th e Confe dera te a rm y was swe pt by reli gi ou s re vi vali sm, w it h m an y so ld iers e ngagin g e nt h usiast ica lly in prayer m eetin gs and hymn - sin gin g, Hold ing t he li ne at All Ha za rds Confederate soldiers, despite being outnumbered fo r much of th e time, held t heir posit ions heroically.

fvtan y we re st ruc k by rhc co nt rast between th e reb els' ragged a p pt.'a r~l nce an d their co u rage . A woman w ho saw the Con fe dera te Army of o rt hc rn Virgin ia O il th e m arch in late SUIlIJIler IH()2. described th e "gauur sta rva t io n th at look ed from th eir (;1\'t.'rI 10US eyes " and co m mented: "Th at th ey co u ld march or fi ght at all see m s in cr edible." Yet th ese were th e soldie rs wh o ... hcck cd th e Union fo rces at Ant iet am.

A HOP ELESS C AUSE Th e Confederate so ld ier's ex pe rience o f war was o f a sho rt age of ev er yth in g : boot s, clo t he s. blankets. tent s. fo od, ca rt r idges . pay. M an y were reduced to mar chin g barcfoor u nless th ey co uld .. liberate.. so me U nio n footwea r. Face d wit h the Nort h 's overwhe lmi ng supe rio rity , the So uth had little cho ice bu t to rely upon the attack ing spirit of its so ld iers. It cost th e m dearl y a nd co uld not w ill the war. But the Con fede rate so ld ier eme rge d w ith ho no u r, if littl e else.

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BRITISH EN FiElD RIFlE -MUSKET,1853

Con f ed er at e w eap onry The standard infantr y weapon w as th e nt le-musket . The Enfield was imported in large numbers from manufacturer s in Britai n.

A MOTLEY-LOOKING CREW, BUT TH EY FIGHT LI K E DEV I LS. UNION SOLDIER ON HIS CONf EDERATE ENEMIES

Confed er at e un iform Infantr ymen fought in a huge variety of different colours, including grey, blue, and " butt ernut ", show n here in this replica of a uniform of 1862.

1800 -

1870

MAORI WARRIOR THEN, OH MY CHILDREN BE BRAVE! THEN OH MY FRIENDS BE STRONG! BE BRAVE THAT YOU MAY NOT BE ENSLAVED AND THAT YOUR COUNTRY MAY NOT BECOME THE POSSESSION OF STRANGERS. DYING SPEEC H OF MAORI CHIEF HONGI HIKA. 1828

p

O LYNES I AN I:A nMER S A ND sx u.ous,

the M aori settled in

N ew Z eala nd some time between 800 and 1300

C Eo

War fare was a cent ral part of th eir tradition al cu lture . T hey bui lt fortified villages for defen ce and orga n ized wa r

parties eve ry year to fight th eir neighbours. In the 19th cent ury, co ntac t with Eu ropeans added mu sket s to th e M aori 's traditi on al wood-a nd-sto ne weaponry. Equipped w ith firearm s, th e M aori fought a series of costly wars - th e M usket Wars - aga inst one ano the r, and the Briti sh army.

Much abo ut th e p re - co lo nia l hi story of t he

Maori is J m at ter of dispute. including the causes and natur e of the ir warfare . It wou ld app ear that. as in m any soc ieties befo re mod ern tim e s. wa r wa s regar ded as a no rma l ac tivi ty to be e ng aged ill at the ap pr o pria te tim e o f year. Ma le M ao ri w en..' train ed lip to he warriors, or toa, fro m boyho od . Since different Maori tribes lived in close proximit y o n w e ll popul ated

coas ta l farm land . m otives for fightin g w ith nei ghbours w ere never ill sho rt supply. Som e ant h ro po logists h ave arg ued th at the M ao ri battled m ainl y o ver po ssession o f sca rce land . but less o bv io usly rational ruorives see m ac tually to h ave pred ominat ed . The M aori we re high ly sensitive to an y in sult or injur y. IlH:mor y o f which might be tr an smitrcd through genera tio ns. Militar y act io n wa s j ustified in pursuit o f " en gean ce (11111) for w ha teve r offe nce th e tribal c h ief felt th at he h ad su ffe re d . Com ba t was also an end in itself providing the '(l"with J cha nce to pro" e th eir valour a nd their ch ief with an opportunit y to e n hance hi s status.

R ITUAL AND MA SSACR E M ao ri warriors would form a war part y on their ch ie f's orders ;

ty pica lly bet w ee n 70 an d 140 men co nstituted a warba nd 70 was the num ber that w o u ld tit ill a w ar cano e , the usual mode of t ra ns po rt fo r warriors. Variou s ritu als had to be observed before settin g off incl uding the rehe arsal of g rieva nce s again st the encmy and th e avoidance o f ce rtain foods. Ambushe s and sur p rise attack s pla yed a m ajor part in M aori warfare, but in evitab ly oppo sin g force s would sometimes co nfront o ne

another in 0 IH.'n co mbat. In preparation fo r batt le , w arrior s wou ld perfo r m ;1 dan ce (the !laka); th is wa s ;1 co m binatio n of w ar chants and agg ressive gestu rc« w ith g ro tesque g rim aces desig ncd to inr im id are the c llc my . T he w arr io rs wo u ld probably b e nak ed but for a b elt ar ound th ei r wa ist. T he y fou g ht w ith wooden spc ars and club s. g ive n a sharp edge by in corp or ating pie ces of sto ne, co ral, bon e, o r shel l. D espite ritua li zed c leme n ts th at so met imes limited cas ua lties . M aori wa rfare co uld be bru tal and thorough ly de adl y. If an ene my force tr ied to flee, for exa m ple. th c fle et est wa rrio rs m ight pur suc th em . striki ng as m an y as pos sible to rhe g round w ith their spea rs w itho ut sto pping . T he inju red men would th en he ove r take n by slo wermov ing wa rrio rs follo wi ng o n b ehind wh o ruthlessly slaughte red th em wi t h club, a nd axes .

Similarly. a w arband th at i"'l in to a n a m b ush co u ld often ex pec t to b e k ill ed to th e last m an. Aft er a v ic to ry, so me o f th e dea d ene my wou ld be eate n, for religi ou s rather th an nutrition al reason s. and th eir e m ba lme d heads e xhibited a ro u nd th e vill age as t rophi es o f battle. T he pri ncipl e o f vc ugca ncc co u ld ha ve led to w ars of c xrcrmin atio n . since if o n ly so m e of the e ne my were k illed . th e su rvivo rs wou ld in evi tabl y ret u r n to seek reven ge. W hat usually prev ente d t he tota l m assacr e or e nslave me n t of tribe s w e re the ir stro ng defe nsive preparatio ns. T he M aor i b u ilt 1''' (fo rt ified st ro ng ho lds) on h ill- to ps. su rro u nd ed by palisades. ditch e s. and bank s, and in corp oratin g fo od sto res that w ould enable th em to su rv ive a len gth y siege. Once withdrawn w ith in th ese defen ces, the M aori we re unlikely to be ove rrun , even by a clea rly stronge r enemy. JADE HEI-TIKI ( NECK PENDA NT)

MUSK ET WARFAR E

VI

co:

w

..... Z

oco:

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r th e Z u lu w arrior w as f.1f from idy llic , r:igh rs we re co ns t;llJtly br eakin g o u t bet wee n in di vidu als or ri val rl'giml'nts, who att ack ed one an othe r with k nohkcrr ics (h eav y sticks) . Th ese pu ni shing duds we re CO il II ivcd at by the offi n :rs (i : iudlll/l'), w ho saw li g ht in g .rs a usefu l to ug he ning exerc ise tlU' the wa rriors , a ltho ug h co m bat wit h spea rs wa s strictl y

fo rb id de n . TIll" 'i lOd su pplied to th e rcgi m c n rs b y th e chief wa s oft en m e:1 grl' , at times :1 ser io us cause of di scontent . Warriors were gl' nc fa lly fo rb id de n to marr y, a rcgularion that be e.nne more irk some as men g re w o lder. In pra cti ce, m arr iage wa s pcrm irrcd afte r aroun d 15 yea rs of serv ice , War rio r« were re lea sed from th eir

military duties at aro u nd th e

age

of ··H).

FI GH TIN G M ETH OD Co w hi de shield Shields needed to be both stro ng and fiqht w erqht . The distinct ive colouring of t he shield showed the- re-giment to w hich t he w arrior be-longed, and his status WIthin it.

A Zulu warrior tun ct ion cd as part o f a mobile ag g ress ive a r my dedicat ed to lo cat in g and then d estroy in g a n l't1emy for n ' at clo se quarters. One o f Shak a's reforms wa s to aba ndo n th e w earin g o f sa nd a ls, b ecause Ill' beli eved hi s warriors co u ld JI10ve f:lster unshod. Thus the Zulu rravcl lcd

barefoot - J Eu rop ean ob ser ver de scribed t he so les of thei r feet as h ar d e ned " like the ho o f of a co w " , Wa rr io rs adva nced in co lu m ns at aro u nd 311k m (2 11 mi ll's) a d ay, o ften accompa n ie d by bo ys un der 12 years o ld c:Hry in g their cook ing po ts, slec pin g ma ts, and ex tra weapo ns . On o ccasion, cattle were brought alo n g as a mo bile food supply, but when m aximum spee d wa s required th e w arriors travelled light and su rv ive d hy {()rag ing . Scouts rep orted back O il th e e ne my's lo cation a nd st re ng th , and ac te d as skir m ishe rs. sc rc c n iug the movement of th e arm y. A lth ough t he Z u lu alwa ys ex ploited spee d of m o ve m e nt an d k no wl cd gc of the co untry, the y wert.' ill no se nse g ue r r illa fig hters. T heir a im was to c ngage the c ne m y ill p itch ed batt le , d epl o yin g tho u sa nd s of m e n at a tim e in a dec isive attac k . Be fore l'lltl' r in g co m ba t. a warrior w o u ld ca rry o ut va r io us rit ua ls, incl uding anoi ntin g hi m self with a ma g ic potion to g u a ra ntee h is safl.· ty . With hi s regimcilt he wou ld then rak e up hi s

appointed po sit ion in till' traditional " bu ffa lo horn" batt lefi eld formation . Younger rcgimcnt« form ed th e "horns" Oil eac h flank . which were to en circle th e ene my . Th e ce ntre. or "c hest". wou ld be co m posed of exp eri en ced fighters. since it wa s ex pe cted to hear t he bru nt o f the ba tt le o n , fro nta l ch arge . T h e " lo ins", a bod y of o lde r vet e ran s. was h eld in re serve. Movement o n till' batt lefield wa s directed b y the izindun a using hand m o veme nt s o r me sse ngers, althou gh Z u lu armies ra re ly departed from sta nd ard ta ctics with which all were familiar. The warriors would adv ance towards their e ne my at a ste ad y jog, so m et im es heating their shi elds rh ythmical ly with their sp e.ns. Once within su itable di stan ce. th ey ru shed forward in a last fu ll-ti lt das h , la u n chi ng th eir throwi ng spears w he n "bout 3011I ( 100 ft) from the enelllY. At close qu art e rs th e sta b bi ng sp ear a nd sh ield were put to dead ly lise, T ilt' Z u lu never too k pri so ners. m assacrin g the ir e lle lll Y to the last mall and rippi ng opell the bodies of t ilt.' dea d to rele ase the ir spir its.

EFFECT OF FIR EARM S T lu- Z u lu fir st ex pe rienc ed the powe r of European fir earms when fightin g D utch spl'a ki ng Afrik aner settlers. kn own as th e Boe rs, At Blo o d R ive r in IX3X, th e fir epower of , few hundred Bo e rs dcfcar cd " Z u lu ,rlllY possib ly nUIIII",ri ng 10 ,1I0 0 1II1'n . Z u lu leade rs su b seq ue n tly o btained firea r m s fin th e ir warriors, but failed to m a ke " ny radi ca l ch a ug c in tacti cs. T hey co n tinue d to practise m assed in fmtr y assau lt , w hic h agai nsr r itlc-n r m cd troops in J prepared po sit io n wa s bound to Cos t t hem heav y cas ua lt ies . The Z u lu did learn to make good lise of cover ill ap proac h ing th e e ne my positi on and att ac ke d in

W E WILL GO AND EAT UP TH E WHIT E MAN AND FINI SH TH EM OFF. TH EY AR E NOT GOING TO TAKE YOU WHIL E WE ARE HERE, THEY MUST TAKE US FIRST. ZULU W A RRIO R SHiEl D

ZULU ARM Y, ADDRESSING KING CETSH W AYO AT THE BATTLE OF ULUNDI. 18 79

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PAPAKHA SHEEPSKIN HAT

Badge In Ro manov colours

t ro o p' had di ed in t he w ar.

Z

Vl' IlC S. Bo sn ians, Rur hc nes. a nd Po les. T he majo rit y of o fficers were Ger ma n spea ke rs. w hi le nea rly half the co nscripts wer e Slavs, man y of w ho m spoke 110 Germa n . The ar my. ho we ver. ini tia lly foug ht we ll an d the infa ntry wa s supplie d wit h good q ua lit y Wt'apons for t re nch warfare , even i f 4 U:lI1 t it i cs were ins uffic ien t. But c rac ks in

lo yalt y to th e empire soon began to appt'ar. T he shoc k o f till' Ru ssian Brusilo v offe ns ive in SlI Jl1I1lc..'r 1
arc flyin g like th is over o u r co untry in their blo od y bombers covered wi th Iro n C rosses and Swast ika s?" For o the rs, es pec ially the Po les, there w as a more savage, int imat e hatred o f the Ge r ma n e ne my. Su stai ned b y w hatever b el ief o r com m itme nt, th e R A F sq ua d ro ns n eve r faltered. Fighter Com ma nd's aim was to den y th e Luft waffe ai r su prem acy, a nd in thi s t hey succeede d . T he Luft w affe was no t b ea ten , but fro m Octo be r it was di vert ed to n ight bombing, an adm issio n that it cou ld no t ac h ieve d aylig ht com ma nd of the air. T he re we re aro u nd 1,9 0 0 Luft waffe airc ra ft sho t d o wn in th e Bartl e of Br it ai n for aro u nd 1.0 0 0 RAF ai rc ra ft lo st. It was b y no mea ns a clea r-c ut v icto ry, bu t it was eno ug h .

Yellow 2"

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Blue 2

/

Blue J

~ ~YeIlOWJ ~ ~

~

YEl lOW SECTION

BLUE SECTION

Green2 ~T

Squadron in " vic" The standard search-and-cruise fo rmatio n was th e "vic "; a sq uadron of 12 planes co mpo sed of fou r three -plane "sectio ns". Each sectio n had a leade r and two wingme n. Towards the end of th e war, four or five squad rons were flow n to geth e r in "vic", fo rming "big wing s".

~~~ ! ! ! " LINE ABREAST

GREEN SECTION

Flying hne asternreduced the numberof planes exposedto enemyfire ~

'J.~-

~~

~ !

Fly,ng"ne,b,east

maximized a section's firepower

ECHElON

Battle of Britain The Battle of Britain saw an end to th e prewar tactics practised by the RAF. When German bom bers appea red esco rted by Messe rchmitt fighte r planes , the RAF Spitfires an d Hurricanes were forced to break formation and engage the ene my one-on-o ne . This often resulted in "dogfights ", with enemy fighters trying to ou t-turn ea ch other.

Gr~nJ~

I

Section formations Othe r th an the "vic", figh ters learned "line abreast". "line astern ", an d "echelon" flying. Abreast and aste rn we re offensive and defe nsive formatio ns, w hile echelon cou ld deploy either way.

Green 1

LINEASTERN

MESSERSCHMITI FIGHTER ESCORTS Attacking head-o n was the mosteffective meansof attacking bombers, but needed alot of

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ne",e ~

l.oe-"'

Germanescorts flew some 1.000m (3,OOOft) above the bomberstream, and dived onto the RAF fighterplanes

'1) GERMAN BOMBERSTREAM RAF SPITFIRES

\ Attackingfrom beneath / wasoften the onlyoption available fighters from ~;Y southern airfields who were still gaining altitude ~ as the bombers a rrived ~;.Y RAFSPITFIRES

t~

~

The Germanbombers flew in a tight formation that required an escort from the faster, more manouevreable fighter planes

GE RMAN U-BOAT CREW

...

Whcn th ey were at th e pe ak o f their effectiv en ess, between 194 1

th e co urse o f the war. Yet th e U s-boats were them selves th e prcy

and 1943, Ge rma ny's U i-boars came close to cutt ing Britain's

o f Allied hunters, in th e shape o f esco rt warship s and patrol

supply lifelin e across th e Atlantic. Co m mandcd by capta ins o f an

aircraft. U-boat crews suffered probably the highcst percentage

ind epend ent, bu ccan ccrin g spirit, th cy hunted across vast expanscs

casualties of any gro up o f co mbatants in World War 11. SOl11e

of ocea n, assembling in " wo lf packs" to savage merchant co nvoys .

1,000 U'-boat s were su n k and rou gh ly two out of evc ry three

In to tal, U-boats san k some 14 million to ns of Alli ed shipping in

U-boat crew me n who serve d in the war lost th ei r lives.

."

:I: \:l u.. \:l

U vbo at CfC WS en tered th e war as a highly trained elite . Admira l Karl Donit z, who m asterminded

Cl Cl

five ye ars tr a ini ng be fo re they we n t ope rationa l, thus instilling a high degree of pr o fe ssio n alisIII and ream spirit. Th e Type VII, the most co m mo n U -boat , w as crow e d by fo u r o fficers and 40 pett y off ic ers a nd Sl' ;tI1lC Il. So me crew m embers had the ir 0\\' 11 spe c ialities - fin exa m ple. the per sonnel w ho ma intai ne d and tired the ro rp ... dol'S or th e rad io stuff wit h t heir E lligll1 ~l encoding mac hine, Others perf o r med ge ne ral duties , suc h as stand ing watc h or operating the g U llS.

o z

«

."

w :I: U

Z w

...a:

the U-boat progra m me . insisted that his men had

ON PATRO L The ro uti nes of a patrol in th e Atl antic were to ug h and dcmanding. The U -boat travelled 0 11 th e su r fac e - sub m e rg ing wa s an c tlle..' rgc llc y

tacti c on ly. C o ns tant a lert ness wa s req u ired to

co nd itio ns were cra mped a nd c laustro pho bic .

avo id being su rprised by cllcmy aircraft or

SOllie men shared bu n ks o n " shift syste m . On ly the captain had a c u rtain to gi ve SOIHC privac y to h is Jiv in g ' pace. O il a pat rol th at wo u ld last weeks o r eve n month s, th e c rew we re un ab le to

wa rsh ips. Watc h wa s ke pt 24 ho urs a d ay by fo u r seam en. eac h surveyi ng these m uj ahi dccn (o r "thos e who stru ggle ") were ba cked b y the A m eri ca n C I A as well as by Pak ista n i sec re t se rv ic es. In I)c rl'l11bcf 1')79 the Sov ie t Union sent troops

into Afghanistan to co unter the burge onin g in surgen c y, Th e gu errilla s wh o took 0 11 the Sov iet for ces co nsisted mostly of local tribesmen o pe rati ng in g ro ups a tew hundred stro ng . In the course o f th e war , links between guerri lla gro ups de veloped until they were able to mount operations in vo lvin g as m any as 10 .0 0 0 men . T he m uj ahidce n ma in tain ed a cam paig n of

h it-a nd -r u n raid s in the (ICe of inten sive Sovi et

including Saudi bu sin essman O s.nna bill Lade n ,

co u nte r ins u rge ncy operat io ns , ex ploiti ng their kno w led ge of til l' moun taino us terrain , but were un su ccessfu l w hen th ey at tem pted to overrun

also became invol ved ill the co nfl ic t. Fro m IlJH5

urba n areas. They o btain ed w capons chiefly

from th e US. Saudi Arabia . Iran , a nd C h ina. fu n ne lle d into Afghan ist an vi a Isla m ic parties in Pak ista n . which cla im ed leadership of the in surrection . Arab Islam ic fund amentalists.

till' mujah id ccn we re su pplied wi th Am er ican Stinger a nd Br it ish Blo wpipe anti -ai rcra ft mi ssiles. which redu ced the effe ctiveness of Soviet hel ico pters. The Soviet s never co nt ro lled mu ch of Afgh ani stan o utside th e towns and pulled o u t their t ro ops in \')l!l! -l!'). h aving su ffe red 64,()()() cas ua ltie s.

RPG·7 This Russian-made rocket launcher was regularly used against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

Asymm etric warfar e

Afghan mujahideen stand on the remains of a Russian helicopter brought down by an American-su pplied Stinger surtece-to-ai r missile.

SANDINI STA REBELS

-

Th e Frente Sa ndi n isra d e Lib cracion Naciona l (FSLN Sand in isra N ati ona l Lib e rat io n Front ) w as nam ed aft e r Au gu sto Cesa r Sandi no, w ho lau nche d

Brit ish l1A1 M any o f the se Briti sh army service rifl es came to th e Sandinistas from Belize, a on e-t ime Briti sh co lo ny.

3 11 an ti- A me r ica n g ue rr illa cam pa ig n in N ica ragua in th e )f)20s. S~1I 1di l1o W3S assassin ate d in 1 C o ld War 3 10. 3 11..'3H . .14H collabor ator s, Na zi J 14 C olombia. I:AR C JJt) coloniali..m J il l CO IUIlIII foruuu ion 17 5 Coma nc he warrior.. 2 1t) Com bat Ap phcat io us Force .1--17 co mba t box fo rmation 279 t"Ollllllis'iio llS. h uyi ng 17 1- 2 n ll1IIlIUni, t.. Cold W;u 3 .>X Ind ot.'h in.l 3 I 4 Spa n ish C ivil W:lr 253 View.lIn W.lf 321I. .12I. 32 2. 33 1..>.\3 C(m lp uter.., IUVig.ltiOlul 25 X C o n Thi t'li . Sil'gl' of .121 co nCl'alllll'n t Wl';lpOIl" 2 1) ( ) CS EI Al.uncin . Hu rlv of 20 7 elephant.. 42 . 125 . 12(1. t 27 em pires. brea kup o f J i l l Enfield revolve rs 25 5 . 2(13 Enfield ritlc- tuuckct 11) -1 . 211 1 cng juc cr v,Amcric.m C ivil \V:u (I)'"

England Ci vil W" r IllS . 130-5 lougbowm.m 80 -5 Nor m.in co nq ll\..vt 47 . 5.>. (,II . (12 Engli..h m usket eer 130-5 .m uv !iti: 1.12 rl'n ~l i t lll l' l lt I .l I rr.unin u I .l2 -.l un it( lr;lI .urd \ W ,l pOm 1.l-l - 5 Eni guu enc o d ing m .u-lu nc 2(,4 Ent vbbc airp ort .l4(1 cntrcm-luucn t sa tren ch wa rfa re l'ntr)' t;ICtit'" SAS .>42-.1 Ep.uuiuoud.ts 2 1

vquiptn cnr Auu-rir.tn ritlcm.m 1511- 1 llr iti, h infm tr vm.m ( I t) 14- 1H) ~ .\4 -5

Br iti..h Redcoat 172. 17 .>. 1 7 H-~

dl.l""l·ur I lI-I- 5 C Olltl·d l·r,ttl· illl;lIItr\,lII.lIl ~ ll I En gli'i.h Il1USkl·t l·l·r 1'.l-l - 5 G l·r lll.lll ..torm trn o p er ( 1'J 14- IH) 242-3 R AF tight l'r pilot 2(12-.\ R OIl1;1II lq.d Olu ry .>(1 SAS , o ld il' r .144-5 S( ) E agl·!It ~1>4 -5 U ll io n int;lIltr ylll ,1I 1 Ji) .\. 1'>4. 1t)5 , JI)X_I) US hOIllIll' r rfl'\\'IlW I 2XO- l US c lVa!r" 222 US M ,lril;t'" J2()-7 US p,lr.m o opl'r .\() 1. 30 4-5 Vil·t C on g glll' rr ill.1 .l.l 4- 5 Erlll l·IH.lrill'i 5 1 esnnt ti ~ ht t' r pilo ts. U S 2XH

n p,jt 111- Ctl,ps 7 Ethdrl·d . Kin g o f Northumbri ,l 4') Ethiopi,lI1 It l'g illl l'lH 155 Eyl.llI. n ,ltt k' o f HIli

F r:airb ur n , W E 2 1) I Ell.lllV;i..t 1II0\'l"ml'lH 252 Falkirk. H,ltt k' o f XI Falkb nd.. W:lr J -1J FAl\\ AS ,1".llIh ril ll" 3 13,

3 1~ .

.' 41) FA R e (FlIl·T7.1.. Arm.ub.. R l'vol lKi(HUr i:ls d l' C o lo m bi'l) .B 9 fa'i.ci..m 227 . 2 52 . 25.> t;tt i!-.'l.ll's Frend' hlfl'i ~n Ll'g io n 3 11>- 17 US l\1.lrin c j un gk' .124-5 I:l,.·rgm oll. C o!o l1 d P.ltr ick 14 1) Fl,tt l'rnu ll. C o lo n d Will bm J 2 1S ft.'u d al sy, rl"1Il 6 2. (IH Figh tt'r CO lllIll;lIHI. Il A F 255 . 257 . 259

z

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tin:ti ght \ .12 J. 322 first-aid kir. juugle (U S Marine} J27 tl.ik helmet (U S bomber) 27K. 2X5 n.lk vest (U S bomber ) ~X 1 t1.11111'- thmWl.'Ts

G eruuu 24 1 M OIl ~oI 91

tlarcs

.. x

w C Z

tlarc pistols 2·m ma gnesi um 2-tO pa rachut e 32() tlachb.m g g rena de s .142 fl em ish foo r soldi er Nfl tliutlo ck m uskct v 10K. lOt), 125 .1 4 1, 17 2. 2116 flint lock pi sto l.. Ih-l . 172 FL tcrrori stv ,, 15 Floren ce 79 fl ying tonn.ruons (R Ail 25 1) Flying Fortress Jf f B- 17 hom her flying j ac ket R A F (Irvin) 2110-1 US 27X. 2 X ( ~ I Fockc- Wulf fighter.. 27M food and d r ink

Amcrican rit1c.· II1.11l 14K British infantryman 19 14-1 H

230.235 Briti..h sailo r (17 1).l,- IH15) 1X2 Ger man ..hoTtagl''', Wo rld \VaT I 241 Greek hoplitc IH. 2.\ HM S Vi((M") ' HIM Mongol hO r \I,'111.111 Xl) R o m .11I 4 1 Ullio!l int:lnt rYllull I t)H US f\.hrint.· 3 20 . 322 US p.ua (roopt.·r 30 4- 5 Vit.·( Con~ ~u t.'rr ill.1 33 2-3 . .'.1 4. 33 5 Fort.· i~ll Lq!;ioll llain', Frt.·IKh 3 12- 17 AI ~t.·ri ;lII W;lr 3 I S. 3 I (I Indo c h ina War 3 14 - 15 n ·cru i(Illt.·1I( and trai n in g 3U- 14 u ni for l11 and \wapo n.. 3 16..... 17 tl>r~e.·r y of do c ulll e.' m.. 292 Forlorn I lope.' 17 4 Fort Kt.·;1fI1Y 2 1H r:on SUnHl"f 191 fi)f«•. R Ollun 30. 3X-4 1 ff re.·ign Iq!;io llllai re.· 3 12- 17 Fre.' !lch cavalrYlll.lll 156-63 Fre.'IH:h Illus kc.·te.·t.'r 1( 1). 138 (m p e.· r ial Cllard (), 1(17 libe ratio n o f ( 11)44) 3 1... N apo le.'o llic ani lle.· ry 1(17 Napolc.·olli c in (;lI1try 1(1(.-7 Poil us 24(1 re.·..iq ;lIKt.' 11l0\·e.'111e.'1lt 293 use.' o f 1lle.· rn·lIarit.'s III , 11() SCC disil hattie.. a nd wa rs by n.1111 e.· halKo. ( ;e.·IIe.·ral Fran (i ..e.·o 252 FU lll;oi.. I. King: of Frall ce 113 h ;lI1ks 43. "'6- 7. 49 . 50. 51. 52 \\ 'arriors 6 t frami..e k . j ose.·f 25 7 fraser. G t.'IIe.·ral Simoll I...H Frt.·daic.-k II . Kinl-!; of Pru ....ia 109 . 140 . 14 1 Frt.'d l'ri ( k Wi llialll I. King of Prus ..i;l 1...1 Frl'd l'r ic ksburg. ll.1tt lc.. of 11) 5. 20 2

Free French 11l00't.·IUe.·m J 14 French cavalryman 156-/13 rccruinuen t 157 (.Kti n 159 traini ng ISH uni form 157.1 59 . 162-3 \\'c.'apom 15X. 164- 5 French Fo reign Legion 252. 3 12-17 French R evolu tion 1 I. 157 Fren ch R evolu tionary Wa rs 15.... 157. IXI. I HI, Fren ch War s of R elig ion I 13 Prc u tc Sa u di ni..ta d e Lib c r.u-ion Naciona l (r:SLN) 3,V) Pre..lu uau, O peration 291 Priedland. Battle of 157 Pmiscm. jean XO. K\ fronri cr smeu 147-9. 1511 Pru nd..berg , Georg von 113

fyrd (,0

G

G. lbc.' ik . jose.·f 2 1)3 (; ;llil a....;H1 h ritlc 3 4(, Gallan d. Ad o lf 2H9 (;a llipo li c.nupaigu 247 .249 ga.. m asks. Ge r man 2...1 gall warfare 229.233. 23').247 Goue.· Pa. Ta u ran g a 2117 (;atling gum 213 (;;1lI1.. 27 . 31 . ...3 GClllpcoi Wa~ 95. WI ( ~t.·lIgh i ll Kh an HH.Ht).911. 91, 93 G l·tH);! nmdottie.'ri 79 cro~ ..howman H7 Cc.'mgc.' IV. Kinl-.!; of G rc.·at Br iui n 211(, ( ;e.· rnuII Y Cond or Lc.·l-.!;ion 252 . 25 3 , 25f1 ( ;C.' fIlla ll tig ht e.' r pilo ts 2HI) (; l'rlll;lll ..to TllltrnOp t·r ( I'J I 4- IX) I I. 23X-lS G Cfllun ic.' tr illl''' 15 , 3 2, 42 , 43 (; S( ; -~ 346 H essians 152 . 15 5 Lal1thk nnht 110- 15 lu n ze.· r cre.·ws 275 U -ho.lt Cfl' W 2(,4-5 sn' .dsl) baull,.·.. ;m d wan hy name.' (;l"fonimo 223 Gc.·..tJ po 291. 293 Gcuphl1fl-.!;. B;m !c.· of I I. 19 2 , 19 3 ,1!l'l'iatl' ,)rd"m~\? 113 .\?/", zis (M uslim wa rr io r..) I It) . 125 ( ;h O\t I h lll't.· re.' vival 1ll0Vt:' I11Cllt 2 19 ( ;iap , Ge.'Ile.· r;l1Vo N gu yc.' n .' 15 G ibralt;lr 3 ·B ,\?I.'IJillS (..wo rd) 15 , 27 . 3(.-7 j.!;lide.·r ope.'ratiom 2 1)1), .lOO. 30 1 GO;l 12(1 "l-.!;Ot·dc.· mbl-.!;·· (spe.u) H6 goWc.·s R A F ti l!;h te.' r pilot 2e.2 SOE .1j.!;l' nt 294 So\,it.·t t.m k c.."rt.'wmall 270 US homhe.·r O \ ·\\ ·1l1.l11 2XB ( ;m Yllno\, madlint:-gum .'\.'\ 2 Goth .. 15.43 G(l yOith ley. C hit: f 22.\ G rand Arl1ll·e.·. Na pole.·oni c.· 157-(,7 G raillh o n , Batt le o f I 1(1 C ran t , G e.· m'ral U ly....e.. 194 C rant ta nks 27 4

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g r.rves. Viking 53 Crear Patriotic Wolr 270 g reaves (Ie.·g .m uo ur) Greek hoplitc 23 medi eval kni gh t 73 Samurai 9H Greece naval warfa re I H resistance movem e nt 293 C reek hopli rc 7. 10, 14- 15. 16--23 a r m o ur 22 -.l tac tics 17, 2 1 traini ng 17-1 H wca pom 14-1 5. 22 - 3 Green Berets .l 47 grenade 1,IUIK hc.·rs • Ge rman . Wo rld War I 244 M 79 "Blooper" 3211 M 20'\ 327. 34 7. 35(H SAS 3 45 Vit.'t C ong .\.\ (.-7 grenades an tita n k 33t. b.r..d u ll .l2 7 CS ga.. 3...2 d iscu s 23') 11.Ishhan ~ .H 2 fragm en tat ion 2"'9 .33(.-7 han d I'N . 2.1(1 , .\.\ 5 , 33 () Mi ll.. bombs 2.\(1 M KI I ,\0 5 ri fle 2.'t.

H I Iab..burg dyn.w y 121 . I ., H 1Iadri.m, Emperor J X 1bdriJIl 's \V;lll 29 ,.\') I,.d...., (wa r d.mce) 20 5 . 207 . 20X halb erd s I Jurch foo t ..o ldicr 1JX l.and sk uc rh t I 1J. 11"'- 15 Sw iss 11(, l lalido n H ill. B,m lc of HI hand g re na de .. 11)1). 23(1 , 3J5- (1 I i.nuu bal 1.... 42 " 4 Ha r ri s, R itle.· II1J l1 172 . 17.\ I [nr trn an n , Erich

2~W

"'7. 53.

Ha ..ting.... Hnrlc of "'('. 60 . 6.\. 6"'-5 Hatrin , Battle of 79 H .IvoUl.l .U 9 Ha wk wo od. Sir john 7 1) hcaddrcs..e.' s Apache 22.\ Nez PlT( l' 223 Sio ux 22 0 Z ulu 2 14 heavy water 2() I. 2 1)J H ec kle r &. Ko ch MI'5

..ubma chinc-gun .H I.

R u wian R GI> - 5 .\.\6 stick 23e.. 2...1. 243 stu n 3 44 Grt.'llJdi e.'r .., Na pole.'tmic It.7 Grc.·n ur ..h ,1fp~hoot e.'r'i 14 I " G r ilm hy C h Ulm" 229 Grouc hy. M .lTlllli'i dc.· 157 Gf{) ll~e.·, Opc.·r.Hion 29 1 G ru nwald, Ihttl e.· of 7H G SG -9 (G re.·n zsd n u zg ru ppc.' - 9) 346 (;uantllUI1l0 Ih y .' I t) G ubbim , Colo nd Co lin

21) I. 21)2-3 (;ud e.'r ian , G t.'Ile.·ral I k inz 275 G ue.'fIl iCI 253 h'lIc.·r r ilLi w.1ff;lre.· 3 10- 11 AIl-.!;c.·r b .l I S Ap .ld ll,·. 22 .l C uhan n ·bd army 339

FARe .\.W In do d lilu War 3 14-15 , .\.\ 1 Israd 3...e. M ;w r i 2117 M Uj ;lh idc.· e.· Jl .\.\K S.lndinista rc.·hcl.. 339 Sioux 217-19 Vict Conl-.!; ~ue.' rr i lla 330-7 Wo rld W.lr II 293 G uc.·..elin . lk rtralld d u (.H C lIc.· var a. Emc.·sto " C he " J39 gllidc.'d llIi....i1 e.·.. 3 10 Gu i..c m i , It ob e.· rt ()2 G u lf War .H.l, .H X. 349 G lInnc.·rside.·, O pe.·ratioll 29 t h'llnpowdc.·r \w apo m "'7 . 71 , ~ 1. lOX. 12 1. 126-7 h"llllS ami -.lirnati: 27K ant itank 274 B- 17 homhe.·r 2H2-5 c he l"k 2H3 c.' hi ll 27 1), 2H2 T-34 tank 27 2-3 wai ..t 2X5. 2X(.-7 .\ 1'1' .,lsl)..pc. ·c ilic ty pc .. o f l-.!;1I1l Cmt;lv Adolf, Kin g o fSwe.·de.·1I 1119 , 1.13. I3 X G lith ru m 52

=

344. .145 I lcin kd hOl1lhe."fs 25 7 hdinlptc.·r.. Bd l H ul,.·Y tmop (a r r il'rs 3...6 in Kor c.· Jl1 W.lf 3 III in Vil,.·ul.lm 3 10. 320. 32 1 hdlllCt.. Br itish in l;lIltrylll.l1l ( I'J I 4- I X) 2.14 B r i ti ~h in l;lI HrVIll.lIl (m m lc.' m) 349 C d tic 4.\ C hak id ian 20 C orint h ian 22 C rm ;ld e.'r 7 M cllira....i e.· r 15 1) I )ut(h pi kc.·man I .' X (;e.·rl1l.l11 ..tnr illtroope.·r ( 1 ~ 1 4- 1 X ) 242 Gn·e.·k hopli tc.· 20 . 22 It.lli;lll ·· ho u ll..k ul l" h.ISille.·t 6 7. 6X It.lliall ..alle.·t 79 jOU'itinl!; hdm 69 Lall d ..kncdlt 113 . 114 ll1l'dil'va l knight 68 . 72 M OI1 l-.!;o l K9. 1)2 M u gl1.11 125 . 12K Ncow M od d Army c lYalry 132 Nor ma n 62 O u om,lIl I )I) , 12.\ it A F pilo t 2(lO, 2(12 Roman c;lv.llry 3 I R o m an ce.·n turio ll 2M R o m an 1c.· l-.!;i Olu ry 34 S;lI111lrai 95 . 9H SOE al-!;e.·lH 294 Sovict tank n c.· wnW1 270 Sp .1Ilish (CrnlIS 117 US hOl11blT crc.·wnWl 2KO US 1M 27X. 2X5 US infantry. World War J 24 7 US M ar ine 32 4 US p aT;1(roope.'r 30 2 Vikill g 54 h d ot .. I H ~knry III . H ol y R Ollun Elllpt.'ror 62 11c.· Ilf), V. Kin l-.!; o f Eng lan d 6M H c.· Ilf Y r itk 222 hc raldr y 67, (IH, 7(,

I Icrodo tu v 14.20 H l·..... iaus 152 . 155 f Icyd rich , R ei n hard 29 3 H i-Sta nda rd .22 silenc ed pi..tol

2 1U H idcyoshi . Toyo tomi 1)7 hijacking , ai rlin e 311 . 3"'2 , .H (, H ind cnb urg. G eneral 239 H iroshima 22 7 H itle r. Ad olf 26 7 .275.29 1 H o C hi M inh (ra il 33 (1 l Io h c n fr icd bvrg. Hartle of 1...0 H o ly l .and "'7. (12 , ()7. (IX. h9 . 70. 7 X. X7 . ~ 0. 120. 12 1 H Olli e.' Rul e. Ir ish 173 . 229 110 111t.'r 17 Hongi Hi b , C hief 20 "'. 21)6 hoplites. Greek 7. 10. 1"'-15. 16-23 horses An glo-S ;lxon (,II int ro d uct io n of I.... I S m edie val hor..r- .ir ru o ur (.H M o ngol h or..em an 46 . 88-93 M u glu l I2() Sio ux 2 17 su pcriori ty of m ou nt ed war r-ior.. 9 -10 Vik ing 5 1, 52 sec ,,1St' cavalry H ospi tallc r.., Kn ig ht s "'7, (,X hO\tJl-!;e.·-t ak in g 3 11. .\"'2- 3 . J 44, 341>.347 H o rch ki.... ma chine-gun s 253 homccarls (,0 H u l" 3 22. 323 H lI l c h"l1 9( ~ 1

Hundre.·dYc.lf'i·War 67. 76 . KI. X2. X3 H u ngary 90 . 109. 119. 12 1 Au~tro - f l u nga r iJIl a rm y 2...H. 24 9 Hu ns 15 Ilunyadi .joh n 120 I-Iur rr icam' aircra fi: 22 7 .255, 25t.. 257 ,259

hl/ss."i•• 13') hu ..sar... Napolc olli c 157 . 159 I-Im ..ein , S.llld.lI11 3 11 HlI s..itc.· so ld ic.· rs K6 H utic r. Ge.·I1e.·r;11 vo n 24 1 hyd rat ion sack 3 49

I Ih e.·r iallS 43 In ni 32.43 ikillu (..pcar) 2 14-15 Im pc r i.l l G ua rd . N .lpo leo n ic 6 . 167 imp rl's"I1lt.'1lt 1H1 h K ;l ~ 10. to4 in d e.·p e.· nd e.·lll' t· Illo vcnl e.·nt .. 3 1() Ind ia Br iti..h troop" in 145 . 234 Mu ghal w arrio r 109 . 12 4-9 Indi all Mut iny 179 In do c h ina War 3 14- 15 . •\3 1, 33H inf~1I1 t ry

17th-n ·lltury Ellropcan ..oldicrs 13 H Amt: ric .lII r itlcn u n 146-51 Allza r s 24 7

cu/,,:\? ,m 9(.-7 Am tro -I-Iun gar ian . World War I 249 Br itish inf.lntrymall (19 14- 1M) 22X-37 Brit ish in f:lI1t r ylllJ.n (m o dc:rn) 3 49 Br itish R cd co at 16 8- 9 . 170-9 Calladia n , Wo rld War I 2...7

,

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C o nfede rate infantryman 2tHf-1 Engli..h mu sket eer 130-5 foo t sold ier'; of the: R enaissan ce 1 t (t-1 7

Fren ch Poilus 2-16 G er man sto nu troo pc r (19 14- IH) 23H-43 G reek hoplit c 7. 14- 15. 16-23

Italian, World W;u I 2-1H Landskncchr 110-1 5 lo ngbow man Hl )-S

medieval fo o t so ldie rs 9, 86-7 Mu ghal 126,1 27 Na po leo nic iu fantr ym au

166- 7 Ottoman 119-21 Pru ssian infantrym an 1119. 140-1 R oman legio nary 7. 10, 15. 26--37 R ussian . World War 1 24 M SAS sold ier 3411- 5

M on gol attacks o n 9 1 nava l pilots 2H9 S.ulIuu i 47, 9 4- 103, (01) World War II 22(. , 227 , 2XI),J I9 javelins, R o man 3(.-7 j cna. Battl e o f 157 j eru salem 2 1) .62, 78 . 7Y, 87

iihad 71) J oseph . C hid 22 3 j oseph us. Flavius 28, 3(. joustin g (,I) j um p jackets (U S paratrooper] J 02 j um psuit (SO E agent ] 294-5 jungle fatigu es (U S M arin e) ,' 24-5 jungle ti N -aid kit (U S M ar inl') .127 ju ng le sur vival kit (U S Ma rine} .121 junkers aircraft 25 3.257 j urchcn 4(.

Swi ss 11 1

Turkish. World W ;tT I 2-tlJ U nion in fantryma n 190- 9

US infantryman (modern) 3-1H US Marine 22 7.3 111. 3 IH-29 . 351f-! U S pa rat ro o per 227. 29H-307. 3 111

infant ry squ;m:s J l'f squ.Ift.' formation infiltration tac tics 2-1 1 influ enza ep idem ic 19 IH- I c) 24 1. 24 7 insole s, co nce alment 21)5 Internatio nal Hrigadcv 252. 25 3 inrerroganon 29I , 2lJ3 lphicrates 2 1 IR A 343 . •14'1 Iran Iranian Emb assy siege (Lo ndo n) 34 1. 3 42- 3 .344 U S hm tagt,.' s in 3 47 Iraq Fn.'n ch Fore ign Ll'gi o n in 3 15 Gulf War 343 . 3 4H.34'1 inV,lsion of Ku wait 3 11, .14H. 34') invasion and Occ ulu tion of (2003) 3 11. 3 23. 34H. 351f- 1 US sp ~da l o pl'ratio ns for ces in 347 lrd and , H O Il R' R ull' 173.229 Irvin 11ying j ach t 26 H-I Isand hlwana, Ih u le of 2 10. 2 11. 2 13 Islam 46, 79 fundalll t:ntalisl11 33 8. 3 48 J I'C d iN Muslim w,u r iors Israd co nflil·t w ith Arab statl's 3 1 I spt:cial fim.·es 3 46 Issus, U;ltd c o f 20 h alian Wars ( 1495- 1525) 79. I U . 116. 117 h aly co ndo ttil'ri 7 1) Fren ch Fo rei ~l Ll'gioll in 3 14 Norm ans in so ud1l'TI1 47, ()2 World War I troo ps 248 iz j,l/l w llJ (Z ulu o llicer) 212 . 2 I3

J

J Kkson , H oward 27 H ja de 205. 208 , 209 j agl'r (rill l'Illt,.·n) 155, 240 janisari cs 6, 109. 11'). t2 U. 121 J lpa n mili tarislll 22 7

K Kabul 125 Kniscr whlaclu (Kaiser's Battl l') 2.1H. 2.1'). 240- 1 Knl.rsluuk o v ri fles sec AK4 7 k" fk.m (shid d) 123 Kam ikaze pilo ts 2H9 k,m/ 127 k.,,,,,,,, (swor d) 47, 96. 100- 1 k.u zhalgcr (swo rd ) 112, 113 Kd lt.' TI1W I, G eneral Francoi s Etien ne 160 Kenned y, President j oh n F J47 kCl'i blanc 3 16 khaki 234 . 247. 249 kha nates, M on gol 9 I kI",,, d,, (broa dswo rd] 12 1) J..'h"'!i'lf (daggl'r) 122 Khe S;lIIh, Sil'gl' of 32 1-2 Kid 2(.4 Kit'V 5 I. t)O ki/ii (swo rd) 122- 3 Ki;lg. M art in Lllth t,.'r 323 Kin l-,rs M ount;lin. lb ttk' of 147. 141) King's R ora l R egim l·nt 155 th l' King's Shilling 171 Kipling. Rud yard 6 Kih:hl'n er, Lord 22 9.231) Klushillo, Bau k' of 139 kni g ht , lIled ieval 9. 46 . 47. 66-79. H2. 12 1 .Ul1lo ur and \W.1POns 7 I,

72- 3 chivalry and glory 47. 68 l'vo!luio n of 68 Im,dieval l':Istie 76-7 piKh t,.·d batt le tactics 70. 7 I sil'gt,.' wart;lre 70 Knig ht s I lospit'lllers 47. (.H Kni ght s Tl"m plar 47. 6H. 78 kn i\'l's C l'mu n tlg hti ng 243 C rl'l"k ho plit l' 17. 22 Sio ux 2 17,221 SO E 293 , 296 trench J03 U S in fJntrym an 247 US Mari lle 326 US Jurat roo per 304-5 Vil·t C o ng l1Iad ll'te 33 (. k nob h-rril' (fighting stick) 2 12. 2 14-15 klluck lt..· -d ustl'rs 24 7. 30 7 k'll'is ("c ho ppe r") 17. 22 Kor l·;\. M o ngo l ru ll" 9 1 Ko rl';l11 War 3 10 . 3 19

Kochkiu . M ik hail 272 Krulak. Lieu tenant G ene ral V 1-1 325

Kubiv.jan 293 Kuhl ai Khan 4(•. 91. 96 I.·fllllel f

(fl'l'd ing funnd) 207

Kurik ara. Hartle of95 Kur sk. Battle o f 2Mt, 268-9 Kut n.i HOTa. Hu tlc o f X(. Ku wait 3 48,349 Kwa rcsmi au Empire 88. 90

L LI A I nfl e J J9 Lacey, Ser geant " G inger" 25 7,25X lancer s N apo leonic 15 t) -(,o Po lish J(,O lances M o ngol 9 2 Nez Pl'rn:' 223 Po lish wi nge d cavalry 139 Landskucc ht IOH. 110-1 5. I 1(. .ITl110 Ur and weapo ns 114- 15 decline of I 13 recru itm ent and train in g 111-1 ., regim ent s I 12- 13 style o f dr ew 112 violen t behaviour o f I 12 Laos 3 15, .H3 Lebel ri tlcs 24() Lee. Gen eral R o bert E 200 Lee En field rifles 2." .-7 l.ee tanks 274 Legion d ' Honn cur 246 Levellers JJO Lew is h'\ lI1S 229 Lexin gton . Battl e o f 153 Lcyt c Gu lf, Hattle of 289 Lihya 42. 274 I.il'gn itz. Ban k, o f 46. I) () life wsts R AF tight er pilo t 262 -3 U S Army Air For l"e 277, 2H2 U S p;uatroop er J OI. 30(.-7 Lighming ti ght l'rs 288 li gny, Batd t,·. o f 174 LilKoln . Pn'sid t,.' nt Ahralulll 191 Lindi sf.u m' 49 . 50 . 58 lint.' forma tion 175 linot hor ax 22- 3 Lith u.1Ilia 7H Litt le: lli gh orn, B.ml e: of2 17 . 21 9 . 222 LOth . Sultan 125 Lod z 26H Lo ndo n. blitz 259 lo ngbo wll 1a1l K (~5 in hatti e H3 t'all to arm s H2-3 d ot hi llg and wl'apo ns H4-5 lk'di ne of 83 lo n brships. Viking 49. 50. 5 1. 58-9 Lo uis XI, Kin g o f Fr;uKl' 70 Louis X IlJ. King o f Fr;mce 138 Loyalists. Am eri can War o f Ind e:pl' lllil"nl"e 152. 155 Loyalists. Sp.1Ili"h C ivil War 252 . 253 Lufi:ham a. hij .1Ck 346 Luftw alfe Battl e o f Br it.l in 255-9. 289 on Eastl' rn r:ront 289 Gl'rl1lan fighter pilo ts 9, 28 9 Spanish C ivil War 25 3 ;lnd US hOlllbin g m issio ns 27H. 2HH Lut ZCll, Ib tt!e of 10urh alll 4N. 49 SiIllOllO\, riill'" 3J2, ,'-' (.-7 Sind 12() Sinn Fl'in 21)1 Siou x warrior 2 1(}-2 1, 222 dn'.... 220-1 ttmn o f w;l r6 r~' 2 17 hor\l'numhip 2 17. 21 M, 219 littll' Bi ~h orn 219 w,lfrinr \tKi l· t i l'~ 2 1X Wt'.lpom 2 1H,2211-1 s;/',JII;$ 119, 121 SIS 2t)2 Sittillg Bull, Chid2 1lJ SKS ritlt's .B (.-7 ~ 1. 1 \"l'\

AlIIl'ri cH1 Civil War )t)), 1')2 Al11 l'r icH1 W,1f of hld l'p ~'nd l'IK l' 155 Mu ..lim ;tr m il.''' 71). 125 OttOI1UI1 ..l.Jw soldicr" 101),

11'1. 1211. 121 Spartan I H ..uipcr.. I-tH So bieski. john UI) So crates 17 SOE agent 2911-7 kit 29-t- 5 rccruinu cur .1IId training 2()1- 2 Wl';lpom 2l)I , 2 tH , 296-7 Solferino. B.ml l· o f 31-t Som alia J -t(1 SOl11mt... Hml c of the It. 227, 229 ,2J2,240. 2-t-t, 247 SOIIlOZ;1 dicr.uorvlup 3.W So ut h Amer ici liberatio n ru o vcm cu t .. Ji ll prc-Columhim warrior.. III. 47 . 111 4-5 South Ko rea .l 10 South Vil·Ul.Il11 J i ll, J.' I, 33 2, .B J South ern Alri ca. Zulu warr-i orv 145. 2 111-15 Soviet tank crewman 26(.-73 di scipline and punivluucnr 269 T-3-t tank 22h . 272-3 uniform and \W;lpOm 271l- 1 Soviet U nion in A I~ ha n i~tall J I I. 33M Cold War 3 10, .'-tH. J-t l ) lutc r n.n io n.tl B r i ~;lllt· s 253 .m d Vil'Ul.IlII W.tr' ,D I World War )I 22(1, 2511.2(,7-9. .'"1'('

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Sp.lin n lIHIUl'\(\ in South Al1ll'ri t'a 1114- 5 . I II') rV1uslil1l" ill -t7 1\ 'llim uLl r War 1611, 171, 172 , 17.1. 174 Il'fC;cJS lOX, 117. 13(.-7, UX Sp.lllish Civil War 22(., 252-3 , 256 .2X') Sp.lIli,h Fort·ign l l·gion 252 SpJni "h-AlIIl'r iclI1 W.tr J II) Sp;lrt;t 6, 17, IX, II) \Pl';)"'" Fkl1l ish "gm'dl' ntbg" Hh Crl'l·k ho plitl' 14,2 1, 22- J L lIldklll·du 112 M;ln ·dtm ian 211 M ao ri 2115 S;llIIur.li I I U ~ I Vikin g 51,52, 5() Z ulu 211. 2 14-15 Sp~' ci .t1 Air S~· r \' ict.·\ 3·U)-5 "pl.'ci.ll forn..... ,' I I GSG -'! .14(, Isradi "pt.'c i.11 1()n-l'S 34(, SAS \oldit:r .H (~ 5 US "pl'cial op l'r;ttiom fo rn'.. .147 Spl'cia l ( )pl'ratilll1\ EXl'(utlw 2 1)(1- 7 Spi ttirl's 227. 255. 25(•. 25X. 2HM , 255 t) Spithl';ld mutiny IX2 Springtid d rith.'s 191. 19-t, 19X-9 "qlu rl' 1()fIII.llioll 113, U (.-7, 15t ) . H1O, 161. 16H-I) , 174, 175 S5 29 1. .\ 1.> St'llingrad 227. 2hl) Stalllilmi Br i d ~l', B,Htll' of 5J ..tar ~ hd l .. 2-ttI Stl'ulwll, It noll hi l'dri (h \Vilhd m von 15J ..tick grl'll.ld t· ~ 2J(). 241.. 2-t.' Stingl'r ,Hlti-a irnatl l1Iis"i1 l''' .B X stirrups, Siou x 21 X. 211) Swkl'\ mort.lr bombs 2.'(.-7 \ tor m h,ltt,llio!h 240 stor llltf(l()pl'r, C l'rnun (11)14- 1X)

11. 238-15 concept of 2-tll kit 2-t2- .' Nazi myth of 2-t I rccrui rmvnt and trainin g 2JI), 2-t1l trench warfare 2Jt) . 244- 5 M 1'7 .H 7 Wdgun 297 cub m.u-iues. U -bons 2()4-5 Subot.u. C l·Ilt.·r.ll tJO Sud .1II 145 su icide 1)6 . 125, 2M') S u l ~·)' I1 1.1 11 th e fvb gniti n ·I1t, Sultan 11').1 21 Sumeria l-t SlIll ~ dyn.tcry -th, 1)11, 91 Sweden l Zt h- ccn tury Swedish troops I.>H mu sket and pike t.u- n cs I.n Swi ,.. Co nfcd cr.uion I 12. 113, 1 16 Swi.... pikvmcn lOX , III , 113, I H, ..wont.. An glo -Sa xon (,I British ";lilor IH4- 5 I >U1 l'll f()()t soldil'r IJH Frl'nd l (;Iv;lln · 15S, Ih-l-5 Frl'IKh il1fant~v Ihe) Frl'IKh lIlU\h '(l'l'r UX ( ;rl'l'k hop litl' IS. 2J L a n d ~ k lll' c h t 1 I I . I 12, I I.' . 114- 15 IJIl'llit'val k lli~ht 4(,. 7 1. 72- 3 J\1ugh.ll 126:12M- 9 OUOIl1,IIl 122- J R OIII,lIl 15, 27. 3"'- 7 Russ i,1Il l-tl S,ll1lULli -t7, 1)S, WI. 100-1 Sp,lIIish IUC;IIS 11 7 V ikill~ -tt), 5 1, 52, 5(.-7 Sykt·s, E A 2 1) 1, 292 Syr i;1 J I, lJO, 121, ,' I-t Szabo, Vinll·u t.· 2() I

T T..J ol t.mk 226 . 267- 9, 272- 3 T;Kitm H. olJ t;Klin Ap.ldll' 22J B- 17 (o l1lha t hox Ilml u tioll 27 1) "blitzk ril'g " 275 brt',lkt hro ugh (trl' nc h) 2.n c1u rgl' ,md co untl' r- d l.lrgt' 71I nlira ~ ..il'r 159 ( ;l'fIlun inti ltratio ll, World \V;tr I 24 1 Gn..'l'k hop litt.· 17. 2 1 ht".lvy (;I\'"alry 159 I,andsklll'( ht t;Kticll fim u;ltioll\ I I.' 11)llghtIWI1 Il·11 01 1 thl' battld i l'ld

HJ M arilll' \l';lrdl ;m d dl'S1 fOV 322 IlIl·dil·\'al pitdll'd h,lttll' 7;I Mo ngn ltJl Mu ~It.l1 127 mu \h,t ;m d pih' U J 11.I\'al tacti n in th l' ;Igt.' of Nd\on tH3

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r.mks Crom well 27-t C rnvadv r 274 (; r,IIH 27 4 Lt.'t' 27 4 M .ltild a 270l 1'.lIlt hcr 2h9 , 275 p,11l7l'r 2()7, 2h H. 275 mit' in \Vorld War II 22(1 , 274 Slll'mu ll 27-t, 27 5 So viet T-J-t 22(1 , U,7-9 , 27 2- 3 T igl'r 2()9. 27-t, 275 l :lIlllt.· nbt'r g. B,lttlt.' uf 24M '1:Ir.l"c;lII.. 105 '1:lrll'to ll. Sir B.Hl,I\tr l' 1-t9 '1:Irll'w n'"s R ,lidl·r.. 155 'Ii.: R aup .lr;tlu 20(1 tl·,lr g;l\ pen 21) .' tdl'pho lll'\ , fi d d 2.'2 tdl ~o,:rl';k" G;K kt'[) 27(1-1 'li·lI1 pl.lf\ , Knigh ts -t7, ()H,7M 'Yi'lIluj in .'"I 'j' Gl·nghi .. Klu n 'Ii' nod n idan IllS tneills l OX, 117, IJ (l- 7, IJ X 'l1.: rri tor i,lh , Briti..h .' -tl ) tl·rr ori ..1lI Algt.·ri.1 ., 15 nnnHt.·r tl'rn) ri\ t 0 pl'ration\ 311. 3 411-3 Elltdlh e .' ol6 Ir,lIIi;m Emll.l\\ Y ..i l'g~' ,H I, 3 42-3 Isl.ullit· J 4X M un ich O IYllIpics .l-t() Vil·IIl.1I1l 3J2 (("SI ll /Ill J I-2 'Ii,t O lli..'ll\ i\'l' J 22, J 23, ,B 3 Tt.·utobur gl'r Wald .'2, 4J " l' utolll'S -t.' Tl'ut nll ic Kni ght ()X- t), 7M tm·II.ltl·U,IIll (cluh) 211X-9 Thdll'\ 2 1 Th l'rlllopyLll·,IJ.lttlt, o f 211 T hin \' Yl';trS' \Var I.'X Th r,lt:l' 20 T hu cvd idl's 19,20 T i K(;oti 207 Ti gl'r t.m b 2h t). 27-t, 275 Tilllml.lllt.· 125 Titokow ;Jru 207 'Ii.)k.trt.·v pi..to l 27 1 Toku ~;I \\';l "hOgUJI,ltl' 1)5. t)7 tOlll.llu wk'i 2 1X, 22 1 l i.lI1l.lr 7H

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SI-t lJ.g:h O rti (h) . 61 akgimages: AllIt·lol (br). 62 A ncie nl A rt & A rc h it(' ctu r(' Colleclion : R . ShCfid.lII (r;l). il K Ima ge s: B)' kind I'l'r llli....ioll nf tlw T fU..t~·t·s til' tht' W;IIl,l n' CO ll~'t" lio ll (br). (,3 DK Im 'lgt·s: N i~d I lil-b (tr). M-67 a kg-im,lg('s : Britid l li hrary. 6K T h (' Bo ard ofTrust('es of t h (' Armouries: (he) . C o rb is: (;i.1lllli J)J. ~1i Orti (tI). OK Im ag es: B)' kinti I'l'r llli....iull of Ihl' Tru ..t~·t'" ufdu' W.1I1Jl"t' Cullt't'linll (n) O,r). 69 T he Board ofTru ste('s of Ihe Ar m o llri(' s: (dol). Th e II r id gt' m ;1I1 A rt Li b ra ry : British lihr.lry. l Olll!OIl Bri ti..h I.ihrJ.r y Ihl.lrd (h r). 70 C o rh is: Ht·ltlll.lIlli (h) . G('tl)' Im ag es: Kt·J.lI Col1 ~'cllon I I luhon An-hiw (t). 7 1 il K Im ag es: Uo m t ofTrmt ~'l'" (If tlu' Arll1uur il'S (Ih l) (hI) (b r): By kin d p~' rllli ",~ iu n of dw Tr l!"I ~' c~ of 11ll' W.III.Kt· ( :l)llt·.-ciull (r) (hf ). 72 DK Im ag es: B)' killd pl'rllli....ioll o f t ht' Tr mt ~·t·s of lill' W.1 Il J~·t' C(l lI/ arIllOllr) (f) . 116 akg-i l1laii:es: (hi). 117 OK Im age s: Bo.m l () frnNc ~"" of thc Arlll nur il'" (d h) (cr). 118-11 9 T h(' Bri dgem an Ar t Lih rOlr )': "' i.lpb l' i P.ILln · M U..t·lllll. I.. t .lIIb llI. Turk ~·y (t).

120 Ala l11)' Im ag es: I mJ. g:~'\& St or i t'" (t r). T he Br id geman Art Lib rary: Tc pkapi 1'.II.ICt· M uwum . "'t.mbul. Turkey (tc) . OK I ma g es: Boar d o f Tr ustees of the Arlllourit·.. (br) . 12 1 T be Arl A rc h ive: Top k.rpi MU"l'UlIl h tJ.n bul l 1>.Ig:li O ni (hi). 124· 125 C o rh is: SlJ.p!a:WIl Collection (I). 126 T he Bri dgema n A rl Lib ra r y: Eh')"PUJIlNational Library, Cain) . Egypt I Grraudon (hi). il K I m a ge s: National M uwutu , New Delhi (br). 127 T he Hoard ofTr us tees of rhc A r m n u ri es : ((';1). 12H- 129 Tht• Bo ar d ofTruste es of th e Ar l1lo u ril"s: (t) (b) (~' J.)" DK Images : Bo ard of'Tru-rees of tilt' Armoune.... (t·.l/ m.u·c). 129 The Ho ard of T rusll"l"S of t hl" A r l11ollri('s: (br) (n h). D K Im aJ:es: l' ltt R iw f' MlI\~'ulll . U nin·,..ity of ( lxtl ml (t r). 130 ·13 I P;HII Se lf: Eng:li\h C ivil W;lr Snell' IY (t1). 132 C nrh is: Ik u lllJllll (t). 136- 137 a kg- im; lg('s : RJh.u li Il omi ng it'. 139 Corbis: Um!l'Twoud &: Undl'twtHld (b). 140-141 akgim a ge s: (h). 14 1 DK hnaJ!:e s: ImIx·riJ.1WJT Mu \t'um (r). 144-223 O K Il1Ia g('s: Mlh(-t' s: lln.Jrd u flhNt't" (If IIw Arlll o ur it'" (h) . 240 C o r h is: I l ulw lI- 1)c uN"h {:oll t'fli llll (h). DK Im ;IJ!;{"s: {:nUt'n illll " f jt'.m - I'it·rrt· Verlll'y ([1") , 24 t C urh is: 111,.' ((11 1.11111 (hr). 24 4 C o r h is: Ik ll lll.11ll1 (d ). OK h WIJ!;t' s: Cll llt'l"lIOIl o f jt'.IllPIt'rr e Vl'TIIey (n h). Pl't t>r Gumhl'ir : B.I)w llw.lld Trl' nd l (hi) (h r). 245 Pl't l'r Gom ht"ir : ItI Yl·TII w.ald'It l'lIl"h (Ii) (he) (hi) (h t) (f ) (If) (tl). 246 C u r h i'i: I l u1ln n - 1k ut,""h COUt·.UUIl (hi), OK h n a ~ l' s : Colk·rt io ll Ofjl'.IllPil'm ' Yt'TII1'y (d l) (n) , 24 7 C urh is: Ik ll lll.llill (n .I)"UK hl1 aJ!;l's: { :oUt'I'l iull o f,k .IIl- I'll·rrt· Vl·t!ll' Y (Ir) (hI') (d): Mmi, tr y 111' 1)l'ft·nu .· 1'.!ttl·T11 R oolll. Nllllin~h.llIl (hi). 24MC o r b is: Iknlll.lllll (hi). DK Im a):l's: C t)lIt't'll\l ll u f je.an - I'u' rn.'Yt·r1wy (Ir) (h r) (d) (n h) : fi n·po \\w.The R oy.11 Artll kry MUWlIlIl. Il op l Arti lk'r y Il i' lUrif ;\1 Tr u'[ (d.I). 24 1} C n r h io; : Il u1l0 1l- 1h'u N "h ( :lllll'n iOlI (n .l) (lh r/ b,IY(Jlll'I). OK Im aJ!:l's: Colll'l"tion ofjt· .IIl- PIt·rrt, Vt'r m·y (cl.1) (d h) (n h); h n'p owt'r,Tlw R oy.11 Art illl' ry M lh t'Ulll, R opl Artill t'r y f h , tur k al Ttl ht (h rl c.n h illl"). 25 0-25 1 Getty Itna J!;l' s: S trlll~I' r I I fultoll Ardliw , 252 C o r h is: ErE (h). 253 Tlu' Br hl J!;,,' m lUl Arl Lihrllr)': BihliotlH:'lJUl' N.llioll.llt" 1'.lri, I Ardli w .. ( :h .lTIIll'1 (d h). H.o h e rl Hunt Librar y : (tc) . 25 4- 255 GI'II )' 111I "~l' s : Auhur l :ulIwr I Str illgl'r I I l ullu n Ardllw . 25h Gell)' Il1I il ~"' o;: Fo x I' ho tm I S t r ill~l'r (t); H .ll h W Ild I S IrlIl~I' r (hi). 25 7 GI' II)' 1 11I 00 ~l' s : Fox Pho w , I S t r i l l~l' r (b)" 25 MG I'II )' hn a):t:'s : ILlnY Sh l"plll'rd I Slr ill ~I'r I I Iu1Io n Ardliw (\1). 259 C u r h i",: f IU1lo llwi ku t\dl {:tJllt·l"tioll (11). 2£..1 C tJr h is: Iktt lll,mll (h). 26 5 Alall1 )" Il11aJ!;e..: P"ppl' rtl )lU (hi). 26()-267 DK / Sll.In lll Spt..· lll1·r, 26 M(i 1'1I)' Irn il ~t' '' : Hu1Iu n Arl hiw (hi). 269 C u r b i..: Th \" I hlll tn B,lhl'rlll.llll ' CUlll'l"IlO lI (h). 272 OK / Sh.101Il S ~ll' Ill"I' r : (1111) (hr) . 27 ,\ OK / Sh.ln lll Spl' llfl' r: (bf ). 274 il K h l1ll ~""i : Impl'ri,11Wn J\l m l'Ulll (hi). (;1.'11)' 11I1i1~t>s : Il o r.Kl' Abr .ah.allh I Strill ~l"r I f l uh ull Ardliw (n) . 275 UK Il11 a ~e s: Mi (l l.Id Ih lllt'r ( :ollt'l"ti()fl (t') (d h) (r). 276-277 C o r h i..: Il ultn nI k lll'l·h Colk·l"Iio li. 27M Gl'tI )· 11I1lI):es: h .lI1kSdwr\ dld I S t r i ll~I'r I T illlt' &: Lili.' I' id llrl" (hI). Wikipl' di a , TIll" Fr et'

E nc yclo p ed ia: (rl ). 27 1} Gett y IlI1 a ~ e s : Frank Sdll'r\I' hl'1 I Smugc r I Tilllt' &: Lili.· I' Ktllrl'" (tI). 2H2 A lilll1)' Il11a):e",: N il' Hamilto n (Ih l). Gett y 111I" ~l' s : M.lr~.I rt."1 Bourk eWhItt' I Strin ger I T illlt' &. l ili,: 1'll"IUrt·\ (d), 2M3 Ala l11)r Imil~l' s : Nic 11.1I11ihull (tI). G I'CI )' Im ag es: Kt'y' to lll" I S l r i n~t' r I H ulto n Arrhivt" (c), 2M4 EAA : (hi) (bt') (e1) . Hri;1I1 Lo ck en {w ww... Ir- an d - spa ce . l'mn) : (tr). 2M5 UK Il1IiI ~(" s : Bo ,ltd o fl h Nt't'\ o f tilt' Announce (d .I). EA A: (cr ) (br). 2M 6~ 2 H 7 G etty I l1Iil ~t> S : PN A Itul .a I S lri ll~t'r I Hulton Archive. 2MM Wikipl'di a , Tbc Free Encyclo ped ia : .1Iinn.11 Ardli vt"" .alld Itt"f ord ..Adminictr.nion (cb): U SAI: (n) (hi). 2HtJ C o r h i..: 1111 110 11 -1kmsdl ( :o lll'C1ion (h r). 2911- 29 1 T hl' IttHl"hI G r'lIll Ar chiw . 29 1 OK IlI1a):l's: Un.ltd Ilflrmll't'.. u f tlll" Arlll ouri t".. (h r). 2tJ2 C o d )' IlI1 it ~t' s: (d). ilK hn a ~cs : h nrt'r iJI W.ar MU\t'Ulll (n J). Il11 p "' r ial \\'ar MII\I'UI1I: (hi). 293 DK Inlll~l's : (m l' t' ri,11W"lr MU\t'ulII (th l) (hi); Mini 'lry 111' 1kli.·nu · 1'.lttl'rll R oo m , NO ll i ll~ h .1ll1 (h): R oy.11 (;rt't'lI J.I,"h ·I' MU' ""Um. Windll",t t'r (tr ). T hl' Koh lll C o lIl'c l io n : Ct' ntr.ll ( Uli n ' (lfi llftmu.atiull (11,.'). 294 UK I l1Iil ~t' S : Impt:ri.al W,lr Mll ' '''UIIl (1,.'). 29 4- 295 OK IlI1a ~l's: Imrt"riJI W.ar )\IU, t'\l1II (h). 295 OK ImaF:l' s: Thl' I.ltt· C l l.l rll'~ Fr.I,,"'r -Smi th (t d li~ l lIs) (tr); f I. Kl·illl Mdwll C(llkcliun (n .l) (cr / lw]( pi,tul)"2% ilK h n a):l' s: I I. Kl·ith MdlOIl Colll'n ion (d / pipl' pi, tol): Illlpl'r iJI War Mlhl'UIlI (r) (br ) (lh r). IlUll cri al W"r Musl'um : (d l Pl'lll"il kni fl"). 296·297 DK 111I"~l's : RAr foo hllt'ulIl, l h "lldn n (c). 297 ilK Il11a):e'l : Illlp t·ri .11W.ar '''' ' u ~l" U1 n (r). 29M C o r b is: Bt·lIl1l.11l1l . 311l! (lell)' I lII il ~l' S : Tilllt' &. Lili.' I' i et ur~' ~ I Sirill /-:l'r (h) . 30 t G t'U )' I lH il ~t· ..: 'fi liI\' &: I.ili.· I'in un" I Str ingl'r (tl'); US Arm )' Air Furce I Slrill ~t'r I Tilll\' &. Lili.' l' iI'lu rt'" (hr)"30 4- 305 UK 111101 J!;I'S: Bu.anJ ()fi 'rm lt't'" Of lhl' Arlll o uri l"~ (b). 3 111 DK Im a ~e ..: 1~( I J rd ofltlh tl"t'" (If till" Arll ltHlrit"" (h r). G t>II)' hU il~I''' : hl'dl' ri~' J. Bm wll I An' (t'). 3 11 U,S, A r m )': PH : Br.mdo ll It . Ainl (11,.'). 3 12· 3 13 C n r h is: Al.!ill Ntl~\ll''' ' 3 13 ilK Im il):t's: Bo.lrd ofltIMt't'\ of til\' Arlll uurit'" (hr ); I k m\ I..,)" u" I'.ari, (l:). 3 14 C o r b is: It n hh it' Coupt.·r (It'); Plt"rr t' Y.nuht'y (rr). OK I lII a ~,,' s : l"kurl"IUIIt