Social Transformation and the Family in Post-Communist Germany

Social Transformation and the Family in Post-Communist Germany Edited by Eva Kolinsky SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE FA...

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Social Transformation and the Family in Post-Communist Germany Edited by Eva Kolinsky

SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE FAMILY IN POST-COMMUNIST GERMANY

Also by Eva Kolinsky BETWEEN HOPE AND FEAR: Everyday Life in Post-Unification East Germany (editor) ENGAGIERTER EXPRESSIONISMUS OPPOSITION IN WESTERN EUROPE (editor) PARTIES, OPPOSITION AND SOCIETY IN WEST GERMANY POLITICAL CULTURE IN FRANCE AND GERMANY (editor with J. Gaffney) THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY – END OF AN ERA (editor) THE GREENS IN WEST GERMANY (editor) TURKISH CULTURE IN GERMAN SOCIETY TODAY (editor with D. Horrocks) WOMEN IN CONTEMPORARY GERMANY WOMEN IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY GERMANY WOMEN IN WEST GERMANY

Social Transformation and the Family in Post-Communist Germany Edited by

Eva Kolinsky Professor of Modern German Studies Keele University England

in association with ANGLO-GERMAN FOUNDATION FOR THE STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

First published in Great Britain 1998 by

MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 0–333–69987–4 First published in the United States of America 1998 by ST. MARTIN’S PRESS, INC., Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 ISBN 0–312–21100–7 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Social transformation and the family in post-Communist Germany / edited by Eva Kolinsky. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–312–21100–7 (cloth) 1. Family—Germany. 2. Social change—Germany. 3. Family policy– –Germany. 4. Germany—History—Unification, 1990. 5. Germany– –Economic conditions—1990– 6. Germany—Social conditions—1990– 7. Germany—Politics and government—1990– I. Kolinsky, Eva. HQ626.S55 1998 306.85'0943—dc21 97–40287 CIP Selection, editorial matter, Introduction, Chapter 6 and Conclusion © Eva Kolinsky 1998 Chapters 1–5, 7–9 © Macmillan Press Ltd 1998 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. 10 07

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

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Contents List of Tables List of Charts Notes on the Contributors Preface and Acknowledgements Introduction: Social Transformation and the Family: Issues and Developments Eva Kolinsky

vii ix x xi

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PART I: FAMILIES AND FAMILY POLICY

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Chapter 1: Women and Women’s Policies in East and West Germany, 1945–1990 Hildegard Maria Nickel

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Chapter 2: Family Policy and Family Function in the German Democratic Republic Mike Dennis

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Chapter 3: Social Protection and Family Transformation: Speculations on the German Agenda Steen Mangen

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Chapter 4: Gender, Family and the Welfare State – Germany Before and After Unification Ilona Ostner

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PART II: SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND FAMILY CHALLENGE

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Chapter 5: Economic Transformation and Income Change Christopher Flockton

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Chapter 6: Recasting Biographies: Women and the Family Eva Kolinsky

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Chapter 7: Women’s Career Choices after the Collapse of the East German Employment Society Ingrid Hölzler

141

Chapter 8: Young People and the Family Hans Oswald

164

Chapter 9: Family Support of Older People in Post-Communist Germany Thomas Scharf

184

Conclusion: The Family Transformed: Structures, Experiences, Prospects Eva Kolinsky

207

Select Bibliography Index

218 233

List of Tables Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 1.3 Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 4.1 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 5.4 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 7.4 Table 7.5 Table 7.6 Table 7.7 Table 7.8

Women of working age and in employment in the GDR Female students at GDR universities Female university students by academic discipline, 1971 and 1989 Some household tasks performed by partners, 1988 Household income and families, 1980–1988 in East German marks Breadwinner and family obligation models: male breadwinning; family obligations Gross monthly earnings per employee in west and east Germany Disposable monthly incomes per employee in west and east Germany, 1990-1995 Living costs in east Germany in 1995 Financial assets of private households in east and west Germany Labour market participation of women by age groups in the old and the new Länder Living conditions of children in the old and the new Länder Employment motivation of women by age of the child Negative views of engineering among women students Suitability of women for technical employment: the students’ view Suitability of women for technical employment: the female trainees’ view Female apprentices in technical fiels in Saxony-Anhalt, 1985–1994 Women’s interest in technology in the old and the new Länder Choices of degree programmes among A-level students, 1991–1994 Pupils by age and school type in the Magdeburg survey vii

24 25 25 46 49 89 110 110 111 116 127 134 147 149 151 152 155 156 157 158

viii Table 7.9 Table 7.10 Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 8.3 Table 9.1 Table 9.2 Table 9.3 Table 9.4

List of Tables Choosing a career: main sources of information Unemployed parents by school type of students in Saxony-Anhalt The family situation of children in west and east Germany Parent-child relationship in east and west Germany Educational styles of mothers in east and west Berlin towards their daughter and sons, 1990/91 Marital status of older population in west and east Germany, 1990 Willingness of families to care for older relatives Importance of the family by age groups in the old and the new Länder, 1990–1993 Frequency of family contacts of older people in the old and the new Länder, 1993

158 159 169 171 176 187 188 190 191

List of Charts Figure 6.1 Figure 6.2 Figure 6.3 Figure 8.1

Monthly incomes in the new Länder, 1991 and 1994 Household incomes 1992 in the new and the old Länder Personal incomes in Leipzig, 1991–1995 Importance of adolescents’ relationships to parents and peers in East and West Germany, 1992 and 1996

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129 129 131 172

Notes on the Contributors Mike Dennis is Professor of European History at the University of Wolverhampton Christopher Flockton is Professor of European Economic Studies at the University of Surrey Ingrid Hölzler is Professor of Sociology at the University of Magdeburg Eva Kolinsky is Professor of Modern German Studies and Director of the Centre for the Study of German Culture and Society at Keele University Steen Mangen is Senior Lecturer in Social Policy and Social Administration at the London School of Economics and Political Science Hildegard Maria Nickel is Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Gender Studies at the Humboldt University, Berlin Ilona Ostner is Professor of Sociology at the University of Göttingen Hans Oswald is Professor of Educational Studies (Pädagogik) at the University of Potsdam Thomas Scharf is Lecturer in German Studies at Keele University

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Preface and Acknowledgements In October 1994, the Anglo-German Foundation and the ESRC invited a group of British and German academics to a research workshop in London to discuss the economic, political and social transformation that had begun to unfold in post-communist Germany since unification in 1990. Among them were Eva Kolinsky and Hans Oswald. The ‘rest is history’ and documented in this volume. With funding from the Anglo-German Foundation and the ESRC, the research group on Social Transformation and The Family held its first formal meeting in February 1996 at the Civil Service College in Sunningdale. In October 1996, the group was invited to present interim findings at a workshop in Berlin which was jointly sponsored by the AGF, the ESRC and the British Council. In February 1997, our research group obtained a three-year award under the ESRC Seminar Competition Programme to fund a series of British-German meetings and conferences on social transformation and the family in post-communist Germany, in East and West German society and in Europe. In this country, Mike Dennis, Chris Flockton and Eva Kolinsky are co-ordinating a Social Transformation Study Group under the auspices of the Association for the Study of German Politics to bring researchers with common interest together and to encourage an exchange of ideas about one of the most exciting developments of our era: the social transformation of the former communist part of Germany. This book could not have been written without the support and encouragement of many colleagues and friends. I should like to thank in particular Dr. Connie Martin, the General Secretary of the Anglo-German Foundation in London and Dr. Chris Caswill from the ESRC for their interest in the project and financial backing of its initial stages. Thanks are due especially to ‘the team’ who felt like friends at their very first meeting and made researching and working together such an enjoyable and inspiring experience. I should like to thank Val Elks from German at Keele for assisting me with preparing the manuscript, Ariel Katz for converting files and de-mystifying e-mail communications and my husband Martin for being so supportive, encouraging and tolerant. March 1997

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Introduction: Social Transformation and the Family: Issues and Developments Eva Kolinsky

When unification ended the division of Germany in 1990, post-communist transformations were still going on throughout Eastern Europe, taking a different route in the different member states of the former Soviet bloc. In Germany the ‘experiment’ (Offe, 1992:1) of such a transformation seemed to be more clear-cut than in other countries and less uncertain in its outcome. The GDR ceased to exist as the newly constituted eastern Länder joined the Federal Republic. The constitution, the political institutions and legislative framework that had enabled democracy to emerge and gain stability in the West were extended to the East. (Lehmbuch, 1991; Wiesenthal, 1995) The replacement of one system by another happened in record time. Less than a year elapsed between the breach of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and formal unification. Economic unification occurred even faster as the social market economy and the Deutschmark replaced their GDR equivalents in July 1990, eliminating the planned economy, its ownership structure, business practices and financial procedures in its entirety. Social unification, by contrast, was less rapid and less clear-cut. Without the landmarks of a new beginning, the many changes in established practices, traditional ways of doing things and social opportunities amounted to a transformation of people’s daily lives. Nothing appeared to remain the same. New admininstrative processes, new personnel with new modes of communication, a new centrality of money – not to mention the shock realization that the GDR employment society had been an artifice, an unsustainable system of overprotection from social risk which disappeared with the political system that created it. Of course, East Germans had expected (and indeed hoped) that unification would change their circumstances and turn their region into a consumer society after the West 1

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Social Transformation and the Family

German model. They had not foreseen that many of their social customs, working habits and life strategies would suddenly be outmoded. Social divisions between West and East began to appear as soon as East Germans arrived in the West in greater numbers and West Germans crossed to the East in pursuit of property claims or out of curiosity. East Germans were collectively berated as Ossis, backward in their way of life and out of place in modern society. (Geyer, 1995: 226 ff.) From a West German point of view, the social transformation of post-communist Germany could but mean westernizing the East. East Germans, by contrast, castigated their Western compatriots as socially cold, arrogant, colonialists in style and intention. They perceived social transformation as a bewildering and unsettling array of uncertainties that affected all aspects of their daily environment. In managing transformation, East Germans did not hastily emulate the West but built on social networks and strategies that had served them well in GDR times. Of these social networks, the family has been the most important in coping with social transformation, while the repercussions of post-communist developments on the family show how profoundly East German society has been recast and how distinctly it remains visible as East German.

POST-COMMUNIST DIFFERENCES At closer inspection, post-communist Germany does not replicate the Western model. The ‘experiment’ of system transfer implemented the constitutional and legal framework and installed the institutions of the Federal Republic in 1990. Yet the outcome is not identical. At the political level, East Germans have remained more detached than West Germans had been in the founding years of their Republic or on the eve of unification. Electoral turnout, party membership, confidence in the democratic political process have all been lower than in the West. In the 1950s, reluctant democrats in the Federal Republic gradually accepted the constitutional and institutional foundations of democracy, while the young generations were no longer democrats-by-the-book but developed an affective endorsement of democracy that has been regarded as the hallmark of a democratic political culture. In the new Länder of unified Germany, turnout has declined since the first free elections in March 1990. Young people in particular appear uninterested in politics, indifferent towards democracy. While about half abstain in elections, increasing numbers are supporting the PDS, the remodelled Socialist Unity Party of the GDR era, as a sign of protest against the political and social consequences of unification.

Issues and Developments

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Political participation no longer means the same as it did in the GDR. Then, eight million East Germans, half the adult population, were members of a political party. Then, of course, party membership tied in with state conformism and, as we shall see below, with social opportunism and networking. Unification turned party membership from an endorsement of decreed policies into an expression of personal political preferences. This form of political commitment proved less compelling. Four years after unification, party membership had declined to merely 250,000 (Jesse, 1995: 236). At local level, party organizations were virtually defunct and dependent on an influx of personnel from the West. The citizens’ movements which had played such an important role in the closing years of the GDR in articulating dissent ended with the system they had targeted. They did not generate their own agenda of participation in postcommunist Germany. Economic transformation has also taken a different course than the Western model would suggest. Although based on the principles of a social market economy, the tried practice of tight housekeeping has been suspended in favour of massive transfer payments. In the Federal Republic, wages have been linked to productivity; in the new Länder, this link has been broken. The political commitment of adjusting wages to those in the West resulted in take-home pay doubling within the first two years of unification, while productivity rose by only one-fifth from its low GDR level (Schmidt and Sander, 1993: 63). Amounting to around 25 per cent of the federal budget in 1991, transfer payments were intended as an interim measure of assisting the East to close the gap with the West (Smith, 1994: 107). Since economic reconstruction in the new Länder was too slow to fund the newly established regional governments and welfare state, West Germans continue to fund unification by the so-called ‘solidarity levy’ and higher taxes. In the social market economy, an active and investing state is nothing new. However, the focus of government incentives and public funding has always been on strengthening vital and successful ventures and investing in productive industries (Shonfield 1965). In the new Länder, the bulk (at least 60 per cent) of public funding is not used for investment but to cover salary costs, including bonuses – commonly dubbed the jungle allowance – to Westerners willing to take key positions in the east. Out of kilter, the economy in the new Länder leans too heavily on the state to replicate Western structures. Although some observers predict that in the 21st century the post-communist regions will have the most modern and prosperous economy in Germany (Wiesenthal), there is no evidence of such an about-turn yet. In the near future, the new Länder are likely to remain a

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problem area, plagued by weak economic performance, dependency on government funding and protracted social problems (Flockton, 1996: 217–20).

SOCIAL REPERCUSSIONS When East Germans opted for unification in the mass demonstrations of 1989 and in the elections of 1990, most had opted for their own access to Western modernity: access to the branded goods they knew from the television, quality cars, freedom to travel and lifestyle choices which to some meant political pluralism and the right to voice their opinion in public, while others were mainly interested in gaining the right to purchase and listen to their favourite pop music, wear their preferred hairstyles and fashion and rid themselves of the cultural and ideological intrusions of the East German state into their private sphere. In the GDR, the presumed supremacy of the state and its practice of governing by public pronouncement and party decree had created a rift between policy-makers and people who called for more ‘dialogue’ in political decision making and more individuality in their everyday lives (Kolinsky, 1993: 239). Unification recast the troubled nexus between the public and the private spheres. While smashing state intrusion and ideological interference with the socialist system that perpetrated them, it also smashed all familiar processes of social, political and economic orientation. As we mentioned earlier, the system, of course, had been tried and tested in the Federal Republic and could have been familiar, in principle at least. Its repercussions, however, on everyday life constituted a completely new and unexpected set of experiences. Below the system level, postcommunist transformation challenged East Germans to adjust to different ways of doing things in all aspects of their social environment. Set in motion by politicians and steered to its conclusion by the Treaty of German Unity, east of the former German-German border unification amounted, above all, to recasting private lives. For some, it opened new opportunities of commercial independence and career mobility; for others, losses outweighed gains. All East Germans were faced with the collapse of the socialist employment society and the need of adjusting to competition, employment uncertainties or labour market exclusion through unemployment or early retirement. Within two years of unification the active workforce had been reduced by one-third, while between 20 and 40 per cent depended on publicly funded schemes and interim measures to retain their place in the labour market (Hasse, 1993: 46).


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Although East Germans had looked westwards throughout their forty years of separate political history, they had developed attitudes, values and living conditions that reflected policies and opportunities in the GDR and differed from those in the west. The challenges of post-communist social transformation have resulted from a clash of new regulations and institutional structures with behaviour patterns that had been honed in the GDR and no longer suited the altered circumstances. Although all areas of daily life – from housing, employment, shopping, communication or transport to individual rights and freedom of choice – were transformed after unification, experiences differed vastly from person to person, between men and women, young and old, single parents and two-earner households or the unskilled and the well educated (Kolinsky, 1995). East Germans, however, shared a sense that old networks had lost their effectiveness, while families and households, as will be shown in this book, were challenged to develop new strategies of managing transformation and coping with its impact.

ESTABLISHED WAYS By the late 1980s, East Germans had accumulated enough discontent with the state socialist system to force it to collapse; yet they had also developed multiple strategies of survival within it. Taking out party membership was one such strategy. Some may have joined as an extension of their political beliefs. In most cases, however, party membership was required as an outward sign of loyalty to the state and linked to employment status and career prospects. On a day-to-day level, the contacts emanating from political activity could be utilized to obtain goods, services, advancement and housing which would otherwise not have been attainable. Similar pragmatic reasons may have persuaded East Germans to let themselves be hired as unpaid informers by the Ministry of State Security. The largest employer in eastern Germany, the Stasi had 90,000 full-time employees and 300,000 part-time informers, some 5,000 officials whose task is was to stalk suspects and 3,000 who opened mail and bugged telephones. Intended to enforce compliance and impose control over an increasingly restive, disillusioned citizenry, Stasi surveillance extended to at least half the East German adult population. Six million active files were found when the agency was closed down and its offices stormed in January 1990 (Joppke, 1995: 109–10). In East German society generally, networks flourished as people performed and returned favours. Whether based on the workplace, political or

6


trade union activities, positions as functionaries or more informally on circles of friends, neighbours or families, East Germans relied on mutual support and improvization to get by in a social environment plagued with shortages. The shared goal of attaining the best possible living standards joined people together. Informal networking mattered in the daily hunt for goods and bargains or in moving ahead on the waiting lists for a car or apartment. The flip-side of networking also applied: information could be used to disadvantage others, not least since avenues of claiming equal rights did not exist in the GDR and the less well connected were unable to have their needs met. Networking was as central to running the economy and coping with management tasks as it was to society as whole. Managers of East German state enterprises had developed a finely tuned system of exchanging goods and favours since central planning failed in securing provisions, while a political agenda enforced unrealistic performance indicators (Hertle, 1992; Wenzel, 1992). At the workplace, public policy and private endeavours merged. Firms were the multifunctional core of East Germans’ lives. The firm provided childcare, allocated benefit payments, operated holiday schemes, assisted with the provision of groceries and organized leisuretime activities. Employees were obligated to seek the advice of their immediate colleagues, their ‘brigade’, if they encountered personal problems and they were expected to mix with them as friends after hours. Employment defined social networks and assisted with the supply of goods for daily living. Through the state-controlled trade union organization, the workplace constituted a key point of contact between state and individual. Special shop-floor representatives enforced political compliance and advancement through political conformity. East Germans understood how their system worked both in terms of securing promotion through political activism and securing provisions through personal contacts. Without the multiple function of the workplace, its networks and exchanges of favours, East Germans would have suffered considerable hardship in their daily lives and would have been unable to obtain many essential goods and services.

NETWORKS ERODED Networks of material privileges and mutual favours had been lifelines in the GDR. After unification, they lost their pivotal function as the market economy alleviated shortages and consumer goods could be purchased freely. In a similar way, East German political networks lost their


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effectiveness after decision making was placed on a democratic footing. Now, citizens had to master new procedures rather than secure special promises from someone they knew or hoped to enlist on their behalf. At the local administrative level of small-town East Germany, former SED functionaries remained in post longer and operated old network procedures more persistently than in big cities or at regional government level. The displacement of the informal networks by formalized and standardized bureaucratic processes constituted an unexpected obstacle in the transformation process. In the past, most East Germans had known whom they could contact and in most cases they would communicate their requirements – with or without success – at their place of work. After unification, employment and other life-tasks were newly segregated and special agencies dealt with special concerns. Thus, Labour Exchange Offices dealt with problems of unemployment and retraining. A system of local government administration, not the functionary in the local party office or the trade union representative at work, addressed pressing issues such as housing, schooling, child-care and pensions. Contrary to the GDR past, trade unions were confined to employment-related issues while new business ventures could call on the newly created Chambers of Commerce or banks for advice. Transformation required East Germans to relate to a new system of administration, learn new codes of public communication and utilize unfamiliar processes of decision making, where personal networks and the goodwill of unaccountable functionaries mattered less or had been obliterated altogether as new people rose to leadership positions (Glaessner 1996: 192–4). East German ways of doing things no longer worked as they had done in the GDR but had left enough traces to create another everyday culture.

GENERATION AND TRANSFORMATION IN GERMANY In the course of the 20th century, system transformation in Germany forced several generations to recast their lives and adjust to a different political environment. The generation born around 1900 saw their social equilibrium destroyed as the First World War took an unparalleled toll of young men, as food shortages threatened even the better off with hunger, as blue-collar workers gained and white-collar workers lost income and social standing while women emerged, for the duration of the war at least, as a modern, flexible labour force. The end of the war brought military defeat, the abolition of the monarchy and parliamentary government based on a democratic constitution – but it also brought a new rift between the

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political order of the day and anti-democratic system preferences across the political spectrum. For the Weimar generation, the rise of modernism went hand in hand with economic uncertainties. While the massive inflation of 1923 eroded savings and undermined the social position of the middle class, mass unemployment in the late 1920s and early 1930s hit the working classes particularly hard. Politically, the Weimar years had been years of polarization and the formation of ideological camps on the left and the right, each with their own para-military organization as streetfighting wings of political parties and milieus. The post-war leaders of both Germanies had received their political socialization in the troubled climate of the Weimar Republic; in East Germany, this generation remained at the helm without relinquishing power until the system collapse in 1989 (Zwahr, 1994: 448). National Socialism imposed one-party rule backed by state-controlled mass organizations for all age groups, in particular the young. More than other age cohorts, Germans born between 1925 and 1935 were honed in their political views and their personal behaviour by the Hitler Youth, the Association for German Girls and the military and paramilitary machinery of the Nazi era of which they were a part. Their system collapsed with the defeat of National Socialism in 1945. While their parents and grandparents were treated – at least in the first hour when democracy appeared to depend on denazification – as perpetrators and had to clear their name before the military governments of the day, the young were deemed innocent, protected by an amnesty and encouraged to take a lead in the remade Germany and its future. In West Germany, this generation was dubbed ‘sceptical’ (Schelsky, 1957) for its pragmatic adjustment to post-war conditions and its distaste for all-embracing ideologies. In East Germany, the generation aged between fifteen and twenty-five when the GDR was founded, bore the brunt of socialist efforts to recast society. Children from working-class backgrounds were encouraged to enter higher education and groomed to take up elite positions, while their peers from middle-class homes were excluded from educational and political advancement (Weber, 1991: 62–71). The resolve of the first hour of recasting the social order and of offering improved opportunities to those at the lower end of the social spectrum came to a halt as soon as the new elites occupied their positions. From the 1960s onwards, access to educational and employment opportunities was determined by political compliance and favoured the children of those who already enjoyed social privileges and elite positions. Compared with the new recruits to communism in the 1950s, the generations who had grown up inside East Germany lacked the ardent enthusiasm


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of the founders. Given that SED leadership expected ideological uniformity and adherence to socialist principles, the children of the GDR were a disappointment. From the 1960s onwards and continuing through to 1989, a significant and growing number of young East Germans refused to endorse the prescribed ‘socialist personality’. Before the Berlin Wall, disaffected East Germans would leave for the West. After the Berlin Wall, they were compelled to stay. While the state assumed it could inspire all East Germans with a distinctive GDR identity, many continued to harbour a dislike of the socialist mould. While most people developed a dual strategy of public compliance with and private distance from the ideological and political purposes of the GDR, some young people were more assertive in their dissent. Unable to articulate it by leaving the GDR, they now turned to Western popular culture to express their sense of distance. Young working-class men were most inclined to eschew East German styles and emulate those of the West. In the 1960s, Beatles haircuts and blue jeans were powerful outward signs of dissent with the East and preferences for the West. In the ‘70s and ‘80s, heavy metal music, shaven heads, leather gear or died, spiked haircuts and other distinct personal and group styles had become so widespread among young people in the GDR as to amount to a counter-culture (Wierling, 1994, 408–413). Resistance to the GDR identity acquired political overtones in peace and environmental action groups, a diverse citizens’ movement of dissenters and would-be emigrants that found shelter and organisational scope within the churches. By 1986 some 500,000 East Germans had filed applications to leave their state as the government scrambled to curtail dissent by expelling alleged ring-leaders to the West (Joppke, 1995: 123). Among young blue collar workers and apprentices, the counter-culture took on a neo-Nazi hue. Followers of this right-wing protest culture sported Nazi emblems and evoked fragments of Nazi ideology and discourse in a provocative stance against East Germany’s self-proclaimed identity as an anti-fascist state (Mertens, 1995: 196–205). The West had always penetrated the East. Well before Ostpolitik facilitated personal contacts between the two Germanies, East German military trainers had complained that their recruits frequently lacked the necessary ideological zeal and did not seem to have a clear image of the enemy. The destructive influences, it seemed, could be traced to young people’s habit of listening to Western radio stations, notably those devoted to popular music (Wierling, 1994: 406). When West German television spread to East German households in the mid-1970s and most East Germans adjusted their aerials to receive it, the state had finally lost the battle to determine from the pulpit of socialist power the contents and fabric of the

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private sphere. East Germans had written their own script of transformation, a transformation aimed at everyday conditions, consumer choice and individual lifestyles without an explicit agenda for the political order or system of government. Some were more resilient to Western influences than others: young people whose political conformism and FDJ activism had secured them a place among the select seven or eight per cent in advanced secondary and university education responded to their potential elite positions by endorsing the socialist system more strongly than other groups and voicing support for its policies until the very end. The Leipzig Institute for Youth Research, which had been created in 1966 to monitor attitudes among young people and document the emergence of the ‘socialist personality’ in East German society, found from the outset differences in system conformity between blue-collar workers and apprentices on the one hand and university students on the other (Friedrich, 1990: 10). In the last decade of GDR history, blue-collar workers became increasingly outspoken in their rejection of the prescribed ideology while students’ approval of state socialism remained largely unchanged until near the end. Socially, the GDR was less homogeneous than the declared policy aims of equality and classlessness would suggest. Official statistics present a false uniformity by counting the majority of East Germans as members of the working class, from the chairman of the Council of Ministers down to the humblest farmhand. Some ten per cent were denoted as ‘intelligentsia’ while the self-employed accounted for a mere two per cent by the late eighties. This claim of social uniformity belied the actual diversity. When West German researchers applied their categories to established the social structure of GDR society before unification, they found interesting East–West differences. In the West, some 19 per cent of the population could be characterized as members of the elite; in the East, elite membership amounted to 32 per cent. In the West, 22 per cent of the population could be described as working class; in the East, this sector remained much larger and numbered 40 per cent (Vester, 1995: 13–16). Compared with the West, East German society included an underdeveloped middle ground and overdeveloped extremes at both ends of the social spectrum. Data on income, housing and lifestyles in the GDR confirms that East German society was polarized into a top and (larger) bottom sector (Winkler, 1990a). Earnings from employment in the state-controlled economy were relatively low and remained within a narrow band, averaging 1,200 Mark per month. By contrast, members of the political and cultural elite commanded incomes up to five times higher, in addition to the advantages of networks and provisions mentioned earlier. A social order


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dominated by political criteria, the GDR was materially divided and socially ossified. Individuals could not advance on merit or achievement but on the grounds of political compliance and the conformity of their action with established practices. In its unequal and rigid structure, the GDR created its own winners, the functionaries, offices holders and executors of state power, and its own losers – the majority of the population (Geiβler, 1992: 205–11).

FAMILY FUNCTIONS IN THE GDR This kind of system set out to control individuals, their social groups and personal activities. Families were to fade into the background as mere ‘places to sleep, eat and watch television’ (Niermann, 1991: 12). As Mike Dennis shows in this volume, the East German state celebrated the family as the ‘smallest cell of socialism’ and credited it with the core function of raising children as ‘socialist personalities’. Yet, the family was surrounded if not eroded by complementary and competing institutions (Hille, 1985: 31–43). By the mid-1980s, the GDR offered full-time day-care facilities for children from birth to the age of ten, a near-compulsory youth organization which blended political indoctrination with leisure activities and free entertainment, a school system geared to employment and a secure transition for young people from school to work or advanced education. Compliance and career chances were linked from an early age. Interviewed after unification, an East German woman reported some of the difficulties that could arise from this link: My son refused to wear his FDJ shirt during roll call .. and wasn’t attending parts of the FDJ programme. It wasn’t actually because he wanted to miss the FDJ programme. He was attending a music school and had performances during the times of some of the FDJ political instruction. As a result some of the teachers… singled him out. People looked at me and said that I should see to it that my kids got to the FDJ events. My son’s teacher accused him of being a political opponent. He wore short hair. He refused to wear his FDJ shirt. He bordered on ‘Americanized behaviour’. That’s the way the teacher described it (Dodd and Allen, 1992: 69). For pre-school children, day-care facilities provided up to twelve hours’ supervision, while a minority of children received residential care during the week and only returned to their families on weekends (Winkler 1990b:

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142–45). Established to permit women to combine full-time employment with motherhood, they took on care functions which had traditionally resided in families. Despite delegating a considerable part of childcare to the state sector, the organization of daily life produced its own stresses in the GDR. The following is a description of a typical morning’s rush: It was important for me to get to work on time, so I had to get the kids to day-care at a certain time. That was terrible. I had to be at work at seven o’clock in the morning, and so I would drag the boy out of bed and dress him even though he was old enough to dress himself, but it was faster if I did it. They were always talking about how much they were doing for mothers with children, but when I had to race to nursery school with a child in tow and then race to catch the bus because my boss would carry on if I came five minutes late, that was bad. It would have been better if they had said that a mother with small children can get to work between seven and eight o’clock and make up the time another day. Sometimes when I came late to work it wasn’t because I was lazy but because my son had wet his pants just before we left the apartment. ( Dodd and Allen: 40) After work, shopping and queuing in the GDR shortage society could take an additional two or three hours every day. Although work finished in mid-afternoon, it was often early evening before a home-life could begin. Domestic duties occupied a considerable part of time after work. In 1988, nearly 30 per cent of East German women who worked forty or more hours per week spent at least another forty hours per week doing housework (Dannenberg, 1992: 202). Taking employment and housework together, 87 per cent of East German women worked more than fifty hours per week; so did 73 per cent of East German men, 70 per cent of West German women and 51 per cent of West German men. In both German societies, women contributed longer hours to performing domestic duties than men; although many worked shorter hours than men in employment, demands on their time in the home were heavier and their leisure time shorter. Within the home, men and women performed different tasks. A survey of attitudes to gender in East Germany showed in 1979 that young people clearly associated different tasks with male and female parents. Mothers rather than fathers played the dominant role in disciplining and rewarding a child, deciding on pocket money, attending parents’ evenings at school and taking charge of sexual education, while fathers outperformed mothers only as far as political discussions with their children were concerned (Wilhelmi, 1983: 100). Of the domestic chores, shopping,


13

cleaning, cooking were perceived by men and women as female tasks, while men were credited by both genders with carrying out repairs (Dannenberg, 1992: 205–6). In the majority of East German households, decisions about household expenditure were taken jointly by the partners or shared between them. In households with traditional role patterns, however, where women were in charge of cooking and cleaning while men contributed mainly repairs, women were also frequently in sole charge of decision making. In such households, 29 per cent of men and 44 per cent of women reported that it was the woman who managed the family budget (Dannenberg, 1992: 210–1). When the 1965 family legislation recommended that parents should share the domestic tasks fairly between them, the policy makers seemed to remonstrate over the mismatch between women’s integration into the labour market and the persistence of genderized social roles. In reality, gender stereotypes were firmly institutionalized at state policy level (see Nickel in this volume). Gender determined educational opportunities, career tracks, incomes and access to leadership positions and disadvantaged women (Kolinsky, 1996: 272–6). Interview evidence and data on women’s health, sense of stress and lack of free time indicate that combining employment and family duties required the strength of ‘superwoman’ in a society where few had cars or telephones and where one-stop shopping or convenience food were unknown (Belwe, 1889; Kolinsky, 1993). At work, outmoded technology impeded productivity and produced the mix of overmanning and low efficiency that destroyed the GDR economy from within. The same lack of modernity prevailed in the home – only here, individuals had to cope as best they could. In the private sphere of home and family, the inefficiencies of the East German system were mostly borne by women. Throughout its history, GDR society remained dominated by concerns for material well-being and survival, since neither the financial circumstances of households or individuals nor the provision of goods and services improved at any point sufficiently to be taken for granted. As mentioned earlier, networks became lifelines of survival. Among these networks, the family was the most important. Despite state-run institutions to reduce the centrality of the family in child rearing through day-care, in the socialization of children and young people through school, after-school activities, youth organizations and obligatory participation in their activities or for adults through canteen meals and a host of party, trade-union or neighbourhood meetings, the family remained firmly entrenched in its centrality.

14


Families were not easily directed by the state. For example, the GDR installed communal washing machines in its apartment buildings to move family tasks into a communal and public setting. East Germans, however, ignored these communal facilities and preferred to buy their own, fitting them into already cramped bathrooms or kitchens. Another example concerns meals. The state provided cooked meals at highly subsided rates to all working adults, school children and children in day-care. Yet East German women prepared a second cooked meal for the family in the evening despite the additional chores this entailed. The state also invested considerable sums into theatres, orchestras and other cultural events offering low ticket prices. Attendance was frequently collective, based on workplace brigades, party groups or other organisations. Staying at home and watching television, however, constituted an even more central aspect of GDR culture. Over 90 per cent of households owned a television, although purchasing such a presumed luxury item would devour five or six months’ earnings. Generally speaking, East Germans furnished and equipped their apartments as lavishly as they could afford in an attempt to make the stateproduced, externally uniform housing units personal by creating their own private, distinctive world (Lepsius, 1994: 29). The primacy of the private world was even more apparent at weekends. Then, most East Germans retreated to a weekend cottage or Datscha – often no more than an upgraded summerhouse – tended their allotment or sought refuge in a beekeepers’ association or similar state-free sphere (Bleek, 1992: 79–80). Families remained important in the daily lives of East Germans. For young people from adolescence to adulthood, parents were the main source of advice in planning their career (92 per cent) and when they sought help with personal problems (75 per cent) (Wilhelmi, 1983: 96; 99). Oswald demonstrates in this volume that friends and peers gained in importance as young people grew older but never supplanted parents. Teachers, youth workers or other public figures who were in daily contact with the young people as carers or educators remained relatively marginal when young people sought advice or needed to confide in someone. The centrality of the family also coloured life course choices, as over 90 per cent of young East Germans wished to have a family of their own. After unification, concerns about employment upstaged the emphasis on the family but it retained its place among the top priorities for East Germans (Starke, 1995: 165). There are several reasons why the family constituted such a priority value in the GDR. Firstly, the state and its official discourse of political conformity could be excluded from the home and the circle of family members. Many families became havens of private retreat from the political prescriptions that dominated their daily lives (Gaus, 1983: 156–60).


15

The private home was one of the few areas where individuals could let off steam and express their likes and dislikes freely. In the ‘niche society’ (Gaus) GDR , the family was the most important of all niches. As Mangen and Ostner demonstrate in their chapters, national and European policy frameworks determine social choices. GDR family policy offered material incentives to get married and have children. Such incentives included access to housing, to bonuses, loans, discounts and financial benefit which added significantly to household income. Young East Germans took for granted that they would marry and have children around the age of twenty and that having a family would feature prominently in their personal lives. That families were less stable in East Germany than elsewhere in Europe did not reduce the focus on the family as a preferred institutional framework of everyday living. (Huinink, 1995: 34) Until the collapse of its separate state, East Germany was a family-oriented country, despite the relative instability of the family as an institution and the provision of functions by state organizations which would have largely or solely resided in the family in West Germany.

SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE FAMILY It has been suggested that at times of dislocating social change, the family may be a key or even the only institution to offer support, assist normalization in the life of its members and thus enhance the stability of society overall. Hilde Thurnwald, for example, showed for Berlin in the late 1940s that families coped with the challenges of destruction by providing emotional support in addition to shelter, food and care in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War (Thurnwald, 1948). In a similar vein, Wurzbacher argued in the early 1950s that the family had become the backbone of social stability and reorientation at a time of homelessness, migration and socio-economic hardship. (Wurzbacher, 1952). Both studies found evidence that the challenges of adjusting to new living conditions could invalidate traditional role patterns within the family and increase the risk of family instability. Thurnwald observed that German men who returned from war service or prisoner of war camps into civil society were unable or unwilling to accept the destruction around them and contribute to the material survival of their families. Many sat at home, disillusioned and irritable, while their wives (who had already coped on their own throughout the war years) bartered for food, cleared the rubble in return for improved ration cards, prepared meals in inadequate and often shared kitchens with inadequate ingredients – but kept going.

16


Kuhn shifted the emphasis from the family to employment and argued that it was the women’s contribution as workers and (unpaid) homemakers in the zero-hour of transformation that laid the foundations of post-war reconstruction (Kuhn, 1984). In the zones of occupation that were to become West Germany, men only emerged in greater numbers from their private retreats after the currency reform had made employment financially worthwhile and halted the bartering economy. At that point, many women were dismissed while men regained their traditional position of breadwinner and head of household. In the Soviet zone of occupation soon to become the GDR, no such choices had existed, since integration through employment served as a linchpin of the new political order. Even in the West, the clock could not be wound back altogether. In German society, women outnumbered men by one-third, since the war had taken its toll of the male population. Many widows needed to support themselves and their families and looked to the labour market for their material survival; the high divorce rate in the wake of the war further boosted the number of single women and single mothers determined to be breadwinners and heads of household in their newly incomplete families. After the foundation of the two German states, the socialist system in the East advanced the pluralization of the family more rapidly than the West (Bertram, 1992: 44–5). Here tax benefits and a host of social policies favoured married couples and children born within marriage while the GDR removed the material advantages of marriage by targeting benefits at mothers and their children regardless of their marital status (Hettlage, 1992: 254–8). When the social market economy and political unification set the social transformation of post-communist Germany in motion, the family occupied a central position in the estimation of East Germans and often gained special significance as a retreat from state intrusion. Although the East German family had stubbornly resisted delegating as many functions to the state as the state had wanted to remove, it had adjusted to its reduced responsibilities and developed its own modus vivendi. In advanced industrial societies generally, the institutional basis of the family has become more pluralistic as common-law marriages, divorce and remarriage have become more frequent and socially acceptable. In GDR times, the family as an institution was among the most popular and the most unstable as marriage rates, divorce rates and remarriage rates were among the highest in Europe. East Germans married young and divorced early – in many cases after only two years. Since the full integration of women in the labour market did not come to a halt on marriage or childbirth, the West


17

German breadwinner model of a working man and his homemaker wife was unknown. Even women who were in the so called ‘baby year’ felt isolated in a society geared towards full employment. Before unification, the pluralization of family forms, the increases in the number of mothers who remained unmarried, the number of children who were born out of wedlock, and the instability of marriage as an institutional framework constituted a normal facet of everyday life in Eastern Germany (see Dennis in this volume). Increasingly, families were merely households, not initiated by a marriage ceremony but defined pragmatically by living together. As one critic put it: the people in a house or flat who have breakfast together are a family (Der Spiegel, 43/1996: 79). Despite the individualization of the family and the fading of institutional structures, there were few social risks involved for the individuals concerned. This changed after unification, when the GDR employment society gave way to an East German version of the risk society. While incomes from employment had been assured at a low level before unification, they were now uncertain (see Flockton in this volume). Where state provisions such as childcare and paid leave to look after sick children had alleviated conflicts between family roles and employment, such conflicts now loomed and threatened women’s place in the labour market (Kolinsky in this volume). Single mothers and families with three or more children faced a risk of poverty (Keiser, 1995: 188). In Western societies, full-employment and continuous employment biographies had long been challenged by uncertainty, intermittent unemployment and retraining (Ostner in this volume). Even for men, the traditional format of choosing a career in their teens and working in their trade or profession until retirement became increasingly unlikely in a working environment recast by economic restructuring (Beck, 1986). Many skills and qualifications were outdated in less than a lifetime. In the GDR, such ravages of modernization had been unknown, given the slower pace of technological innovation and the state policy of employment integration for all. Unification shattered this immobilism of East German society with positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, individuals gained scope of developing their potential and seizing opportunities as they presented themselves without having to pass a political conformity test. On the other hand, newly vulnerable social groups were confronted with risks of being excluded from avenues of social participation which had been assured in the past (Berger, 1994: 40). Among these new risks, unemployment and low income were the most pressing, although others – such as a devaluation of East German educational qualifications, increased rental cost and the threat of homelessness – also mattered (Hanesch, 1994: 173).

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Hölzler’s chapter in this volume highlights new risks with reference to technical education for girls and argues that the gender gap in education has been widening, while Scharf shows that family networks and support systems for older people have remained remarkably unchanged in the post-communist environment and improved pension rights have even reduced the risks of underprovision that had existed in the GDR. Had unification occurred in the mid-1950s, one might have expected the trajectory of economic growth and the ‘elevator effect’ (Beck) of living standards to mobilize and improve living conditions in the East within less than half a decade. Then, full employment was still attainable, while social institutions and milieus offered orientation and integration to individuals, families, citizens. When unification did occur, these anchor points had already been replaced by an individualization of life-styles and a social order where the risk of exclusion was never far away for at least one in four inhabitants (Habich, 1991: 492) and where neither state policies nor personal motivation could produce GDR-style predictability. In the social transformation of post-communist Germany, the family is challenged to adjust to altered material circumstances, adapt to recast values, assume functions which had formerly been delegated to the public domain, cope with the newly acute conflicts between work and raising children, and manage economically and emotionally despite the ‘patchwork biography’ (Berger, 1994: 25) of reskilling and intermittent employment which has – in the new Länder as in the old – become the hallmark of working lives in the present and future. References Beck, U. (1986), Risiko Gesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. Belwe, K. (1989), ‘Sozialstruktur und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in der DDR’ in W. Weidenfeld and H. Zimmermann (eds), Deutschland Handbuch. Eine doppelte Bilanz 1949–989. Munich: Hanser. Berger, P. A. (1994), ‘Individualisierung und Armut’ in M. M. Zwick (ed.), Einmal arm, immer arm? Neue Befunde zur Armut in Deutschland. Frankfurt/Main: Campus. Bertram, H. (1992), ‘Familienstand, Partnerschaft, Kinder und Haushalt’ in H. Bertram (ed.), Die Familie in den neuen Bundesländern. Stabilität und Wandel in der gesellschaftlichen Umbruchsituation. DJI Familien-Survey 2, Opladen: Leske und Budrich. Bleek, W. (1992), ‘Kleingärtner, Kleintierzüchter und Imker. Die exemplarische Nische in der DDR und deren Zukunft’ in D. Voigt and L. Mertens (eds), Minderheiten in und Übersiedler aus der DDR. Berlin: Duncker und Humblot. Dannenberg, C. (1992), ‘Zeitökonomische Aspekte der Organisation des Familienalltags’ in H. Bertram (ed.), Die Familie in den neuen Bundesländern. Stabilität und Wandel in der Umbruchssituation. DJI-Familiensurvey 2, Opladen: Leske und Budrich.


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Dodd, D. and P. Allen (1992), East German Women in Transition. Manuscript. Flockton, C. (1996), ‘Economic Management and the Challenge of Reunification’ in Gordon Smith et al. (eds), Developments in German Politics 2. Basingstoke; Macmillan. Friedrich, W. (1990), ‘Mentalitätswandlungen der Jugend in der DDR’ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B, 16–17. Gaus, G. (1993), Wo Deutschland liegt. Eine Ortsbestimmung. Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe. Geiβler, R. (1992), Die Sozialstruktur Deutschlands. Ein Studienbuch zur Entwicklung im geteilten und vereinten Deutschland. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Geyer, M. (1995), ‘“Sie nehmen die Kälte nicht wahr”. “Westdeutsche” aus der Sicht eines “Ostdeutschen”’ in E. Bräher and H.-J. Wirth (eds), Entsolidarisierung. Die Westdeutschen am Vorabend der Wende und danach. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Glaessner, G.-J. (1996), ‘Regime Change and Public Administration in East Germany’ in German Politics, vol.5/2. Habich, R. et. al. (1991), ‘Armut im Reichtum – Ist die Bundesrepublik eine ZweiDrittel-Gesellschaft?’ in U. Rendtel and C. Wagner (eds.), Lebenslagen im Wandel. Zur Einkommensdynamik in Deutschland seit 1984. Frankfurt/Main: Campus. Hanesch, W. (1994), Armut in Deutschland. Der Armutsbericht des DGB und des Paritätischen Wohlfahrtsverbandes. Reinbek: Rowohlt. Hasse, R. (1993), ‘German-German Monetary Union. Main Options, Costs and Repercussions’ in A. G. Ghaussy and W. Schäfer (eds.), The Economics of German Unification. London: Routledge. Hertle, H.-H. (1992), ‘Der Staatsbankrott. Der ökonomische Untergang des SEDStaates’ in Deutschland Archiv 10. Hettlage, R. (1992), Familienreport. Eine Lebensform im Umbruch. Munich: Beck. Hille, B. (1985), Familie und Sozialisation in der DDR. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. Huinink, J. (1995), ‘Familienentwicklung und Haushaltsgründung in der DDR: Vom traditionellen Muster zur instrumentellen Lebensplanung?’ in B. Nauck et. al. (eds.), Familie und Lebensverlauf im gesellschaftlichen Umbruch. Stuttgart: Enke. Jesse, E. (1995), Die Parteien in den neuen Bundesländern’ in Winand Gellner and H.-J. Veen (eds), Umbruch und Wandel in westeuropäischen Parteiensystemen. Frankfurt: Lang 1995. Joppke, C. (1995), East German Dissidents and the Revolution of 1989. Social Movements in a Leninist Regime. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Kaelble, H., J. Kocka and H. Zwahr (eds) (1994), Sozialgeschichte der DDR. Stuttgart: Klett Cotta. Keiser, S. (1995), ‘Die Familien in den neuen Bundesländern zwischen Individualisierung und “Notgemeinschaft”’ in R. Hettlage and K. Lenz (eds), Deutschland nach der Wende. Eine Bilanz, Munich: Beck. Kolinsky, E. (1996), ‘Women in the New Germany’ in G. Smith et al. (eds), Developments in German Politics, 2. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Kolinsky, E. (1993), ‘Concepts of Party Democracy in the East’ in S. Padgett (ed.), Parties and Party Systems in the New Germany. Aldershot: Gower. Kolinsky, E. (1993), Women in Contemporary Germany. Life Work and Politics. Oxford: Berg. Kuhn, A. (ed.), (1984), Frauen in der deutschen Nachkriegszeit. Düsseldorf: Schwann.

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Lehmbruch, G. (1991), ‘Die deutsche Vereinigung. Strukturen und Strategien’ in Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 32/4. Lepsius, R. M. (1994), ‘Die Institutionenordnung als Rahmenbedingung der Sozialgeschichte der DDR’ in H. Kaelble, J. Kocka and H. Zwahr (eds), Sozialgeschichte der DDR. Stuttgart: Klett Cotta. Mertens, L. (1995), ‘Die SED und die NS Vergangenheit’ in W. Bergmann, R. Erb and A. Lichtblau (eds), Das schwierige Erbe. Der Umgang mit Nationalsozialismus und Antisemitismus in Österreich, der DDR und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Frankfurt/Main: Campus. Niermann, J. (1991), ‘Identitätsfindung von Jugendlichen in den neuen Bundesländern’. Briefing submitted to the Enquête Commission on Women and Youth of the German Bundestag, 18 September (unpublished manuscript). Schelsky, H. (1957), Die skeptische Generation. Eine Soziologie der deutschen Jugend. Cologne: Diederich. Schmidt, K.-D. and B. Sander (1993), ‘Wages, Productivity and Employment in Eastern Germany’ in A. G. Ghaussy and W. Schäfer (eds), The Economics of German Unification. London: Routledge. Shonfield, A. (1965), Modern Capitalism. The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power. Oxford University Press. Smith, E. O. (1994), The German Economy. London and New York: Routledge. Starke, U. (1995), ‘Young People: Lifestyles, Expectations and Value Orientations since the Wende’ in E. Kolinsky (ed.), Between Hope and Fear. Everyday Life in Post-Unification East Germany. Keele University Press. Thurnwald, H. (1948), Gegenwartsprobleme Berliner Familien. Eine soziologische Untersuchung. Berlin: Colloquium. Vester, M. (1995), ‘Milieuwandel und regionaler Strukturwandel in Ostdeutschland’ in M. Vester, M. Hofmann and I. Zierke (eds), Soziale Milieus in Ostdeutschland. Cologne: Bund. Weber, H. (1991), DDR. Grundriss der Geschichte 1945–1990. Hannover: Fackelträger. Wenzel, S. (1992), ‘Wirtschaftsplanung in der DDR. Struktur, Funktion, Defizite’ in Berliner Arbeitshefte und Berichte zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung 75. Wierling, D. (1994), ‘Die Jugend als innerer Feind. Konflikte in der Erziehungsdiktatur der sechziger Jahre’ in H. Kaelble, J. Kocka and H. Zwahr (eds), Sozialgeschichte der DDR. Stuttgart: Klett Cotta. Wiesenthal, H. (1995), ‘Grundlinien der Transformation. Ostdeutschland und die Rolle korporativer Akteure’ in H. Wiesenthal (ed.), Einheit als Transformationspolitik. Studien zur sektoralen Transformation Ostdeutschlands. Frankfurt/Main: Campus. Wilhelmi, J. (1983), Jugend in der DDR, Berlin: Verlag Gebr. Holzapfel. Winkler, G. (1990a), Sozialreport ‘90. Daten und Fakten zur sozialen Lage in der DDR. Berlin: Die Wirtschaft. Winkler, G. (1990b), Frauenreport’90. Berlin: Die Wirtschaft. Wurzbacher, G. (1952), Leitbilder gegenwärtigen deutschen Familienlebens. Stuttgart: Enke. Zwahr, H. (1994), ‘Die DDR auf dem Höhepunkt der Staatskrise 1989’ in H. Kaelble, J. Kocka and H. Zwahr (eds), Sozialgeschichte der DDR. Stuttgart: Klett Cotta.

Part I Families and Family Policy

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1 Women and Women’s Policies in East and West Germany, 1945–1990 Hildegard Maria Nickel

For all its ambiguities and problems, the future seemed to be more predictable in communist than in post-communist Germany (Metz-Göckel, 1992). Official policy matched more closely the dual orientation of the female population towards employment and the family than it had ever done in the Federal Republic. While social policy measures in the GDR supported the full-time employment of women, they did not really challenge gender divisions of labour or dismantle traditionalism in gender relations. Gender divisions in the GDR were even reinforced inside and outside the home. After unification these inequalities were intensified by gender differences and the unresolved conflict between employment and family roles that had persisted in the Western part of divided Germany. This chapter presents an overview of women’s policies in both Germanies before unification and discusses their effect on the situation of women in the post-communist setting.

THE EMERGENCE OF WOMEN’S POLICIES IN EAST GERMANY Ever since the establishment of a communist political system in Germany in the immediate post-war years, the integration of women into ‘social production’ was considered the foremost and most fundamental step on the road to equality. In keeping with traditional ideas of the proletarian labour movement, this policy was seen as a guarantor of women’s financial independence as well as their intellectual and political autonomy. Lenin’s claim that only the world of employment could liberate women from the ‘yoke’ and the ‘slavery’ of housework and give them the opportunity to develop their abilities to the full turned into the ideological assumption that employment equalled emancipation and assured selfrealization. In the GDR, occupational activity provided a structure for life 23

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Social Transformation and the Family Table 1.1

Women of Working Age and in Employment in the GDR

Year

Women of working age (in 1000)

Women in employment (in 1000)

Women in employment (%)*

1955 1970 1980 1989

6,182 5,011 5,257 5,074

3,244 3,312 3,848 3,962

52.5 66.1 73.2 78.1

* Counting apprentices and full-time students as employed, the employment of women of working age amounted to 91.2% in 1989. Source: Gunnar Winkler, Frauenreport ’90. Berlin: Die Wirtschaft 1990, p. 63.

in society and the Socialist Unity Party (SED) hailed it as a ‘core element of the socialist way of life’ for women and men. The first stage of GDR women’s policy, the integration of women into employment, was all but completed in the course of the 1960s (see Table 1.1.) In the mid-1950s, female employment in the GDR was high compared with Western societies (52.4 per cent) but still lower than male employment. By 1970, gender differences had disappeared for the post-war generations; by the late 80s, women were as active in the East German labour market as men, despite longer periods spent in full-time education and training. From the 1970s onwards, women’s employment constituted a norm while further developments focused on qualifications and family support. The second stage can be called an educational offensive. The introduction of comprehensive schools for both sexes until the age of sixteen halted the earlier practice where girls left school earlier than boys and gained minimal educational qualifications. In addition, the GDR provided special educational programmes aimed at extending the participation rate of women in higher education. By 1980, women had closed the gender gap in higher education (see Table 1.2). The access to university studies turned women’s equal involvement into the labour process into a more genuine equality of opportunities and qualifications between the sexes. In the two decades between broadening women’s accesss to university studies and the collapse of the GDR as a separate state, women made gains in several traditionally ‘male’ fields such as mathematics, natural sciences, engineering or agriculture and consolidated their lead in the teaching profession (see Table 1.3). Economics emerged as a predominantly female field of study, while the female dominance of medicine that had devel-

Women and Women’s Policies Table 1.2 Year

Female Students at GDR Universities*

Total student numbers

Number of female students

n/a n/a 99,860 143,163 129,970 130,150 132,423 131,127

n/a n/a 25,213 50,689 63,266 65,079 65,152 63,728

1949/50 1952/3 1960 1970 1980 1985 1988 1989

25

Female students in %

28.4 20.4 25.2 35.4 48.7 50.1 49.2 48.6

*

Excluding research students and foreign students. Source: Calculated from Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR and Winkler, Frauenreport, p. 42.

Table 1.3

Female University Students by Academic Discipline in 1971 and 1989

Academic discipline Teachers Training Economics Languages and Literature Medicine Agriculture Theology Mathematics, Sciences Cultural Studies and Sports Law and Social Sciences Technology/Engineering

Total 1971

%

Total 1989

%

20,764 9,078 1,078 6,619 2,432 194 5,007 742 3,328 8,477

62 38 63 71 35 41 33 32 36 16

21,327 11,316 782 6,941 3,198 279 3,614 936 3,121 10,729

73 67 62 55 46 46 46 40 40 25

Source: Adapted from Winkler, Frauenreport, p. 47.

oped in the 1970s was curtailed when the state reallocated numbers and imposed a numerus clausus on female students. This second stage of women’s policy also brought an extension of daycare facilities for children and a broadly-based campaign against the traditional division of roles in the organization of housework. The revised

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family law of 1965 reflected this new understanding of women’s role in society (see Chapter 2 in this volume). The third stage of women’s policy (1971–89) concentrated more specifically on measures to reduce the conflict between career and family and assist women in combining both. Since the mid-1960s, the driving force of policy change was a drop in the birth rate and an increase in the divorce rate. While the East German state advocated patterns of social stability and family orientation that no longer reflected actual developments, its main emphasis lay on supporting families and mothers. The introduction of one year’s paid leave after the birth of a child, low-interest loans on marriage and shorter working hours for mothers are examples of a women’s policy aimed at assisting traditional families and motherhood rather than enhancing women’s career opportunities and rights of equality. This policy shift underpinned a polarization in the treatment of men and women that extended to substantial income differences, different career patterns, different access to leadership positions and different time resources (Winkler, 1990). Seen as a whole, GDR women’s policy provided protection mixed with restrictions. The sheer number of women involved in paid employment and the relatively high degree of material independence derived from this came close to emancipation. Geissler even speaks of an ‘equality bonus’ in the GDR compared with the FRG (Geiβler, 1992). This was evident in the fact that most women of working age were in employment or full-time education (over 90 per cent), most had completed some form of vocational training (87 per cent) and 90 per cent of working women of childbearing age were also mothers, since they could rely on almost universal childcare facilities (Nickel, 1993). A product of state policy, equality in the GDR was ‘patriarchal equality’ (Nickel, 1990). That is to say that equality, its definition and the measures to secure it did not arise from women’s own actions or initiatives but were instituted from above, shaped by the state on women’s behalf rather than created by women themselves. Thus, cultural stereotypes conducive to paternalistic and patriarchal gender relations remained unchallenged, while traditional views of gender roles in society were reproduced despite women’s near-equal socio-economic participation. Domestic duties are a good example of these problems. Although almost all women were in full-time employment and in this respect equal to men, they spent considerably more time on housework than men. In the early 1980s, 60 per cent of women spent two or more hours per day on housework, a further 38 per cent up to two hours. As far as men were concerned, 50 per cent spent less than one hour per day on housework while just 14 per cent reported doing two or more hours (Frauen im mittleren Alter, 1993: 258).

Women and Women’s Policies

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Such contradictions contributed to the high divorce rate despite social policy programmes to assist families. Women chose divorce as a way of rebelling against the traditional views and behaviour of their husbands. GDR women’s policies, it seems, have transformed women but had little effect on men. Although ‘transformed’ in their way of life and personal expectations, women remained subject to the constraints of traditional gender roles and cultural stereotypes in society. Largely ignored in the public domain, these unresolved conflicts manifested themselves all the more powerfully at the individual and personal level. Rising divorce rates went hand in hand with a high occurrence of remarriage, although there is no evidence that second or third marriages and second or third families solved the gender conflicts that were endemic in the GDR. East Germans continue to attach great importance to the family (Gysi and Meyer, 1993) and the nuclear family of a couple and their children remains the model in German society. Before unification, both parts of Germany underwent similar developments despite their different social and political orders. These developments included • • • • • •

a trend towards smaller families; a general reluctance to marry and a growing number of births to single mothers; a growing number of separations and divorces; a growing number of second and third families, i.e. changes in the composition of the family as a result of divorce, remarriage or cohabitation; a growing number of women in employment or willing to work, in particular mothers; a pluralization of family and household forms. (Mayer, 1992)

Family changes in East and West took a similar course towards individualization, and pluralization but some important differences pertained. In East Germany, both marriage and divorce were more frequent than in West Germany. In the early 90s, 70 per cent of East Germans and 64 per cent of West Germans were married and nine per cent of East Germans compared to six per cent of West Germans were divorced. In the West, 28 per cent of the population lived in one-person households; in the East, so called ‘singles’ constituted only 19 per cent (Keiser, 1993). In the GDR, people married young; in the late 1980s women were on average 22.7 years of age, men 24.7 when they entered into their first marriage; the marital age in West Germany was 25.9 years for women and 28.1 years for men. Every second East German woman had given birth to at least one child before her twenty-second birthday; by the age of twenty-five, women had

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given birth to 75 per cent of their children. Ninety percent of all East German children were born to women under the age of thirty (Gysi and Meyer, 1993). After unification, 64 per cent of households in the new Länder and just 52 per cent of households in the old Länder included children (Keiser, 1993). In the GDR, very few women did not want children. Even women in top management positions usually had at least one child (Frauen im mittleren Alter: 256). More than one in ten households in East Germany were single-parent households (11 per cent), about twice as many as in the West. One in five East German children and one in ten West German children grew up with only one parent. In the GDR, single parents were almost always women; in West Germany, men accounted for 12 per cent of the total (Grossmann and Huth, 1993: 139). For all the contradictions, discrepancies and indisputable multiple burdens shouldered by women, the salient feature of emancipation in the GDR was that it allowed employment to be reconciled with motherhood. Both areas were deemed compatible, making women financially and legally independent of their male partners. Of course, traditionalism persisted in gender relations and social polarization resulted in a high degree of gender segregation in employment and in an uneven distribution of resources and power between women and men. Yet, in economic terms, men and women were relatively equal, an equality supported by organizational structures at the workplace and in society which were perceived as less hierarchical than their post-communist replacements.

FOUR PHASES OF WOMEN’S POLICY IN WEST GERMANY In East Germany, women’s policy had been an integral part of social policy; in West Germany the link remained more tenuous, since social policy never abrogated the ‘strong male breadwinner model’ (Ostner, 1995: 3). From the mid-1960s onwards, however, four phases of women’s policy are evident as socio-economic modernization transformed established structures, opened new choices and exposed persistent gender inequalities. The first phase began around 1966 and combined traditional elements with aspects of a modern women’s policy. Family and career were no longer perceived as blunt contradictions but as fields of activity which women might wish to pursue and combine. Part-time working and the socalled ‘three-phase model’ dominated the political discourse at the time (Erster Familienbericht, 1966). The ‘nature of woman’, however, was still


29

equated with motherhood and care for the family, while policy targeted women as housewives and mothers (Frauen im mittleren Alter: 20). During the second phase of women’s policy from the early 70s onwards, vocational training and employment gained prominence as core parts of a woman’s life alongside family duties. Women’s policy was, first and foremost, educational policy designed to secure equal opportunities through educational qualifications. The new woman of that period enjoyed the freedom to choose between career, family or career and family and proclaimed her right of self-determination. Designed to facilitate women’s emancipation, women’s policy stressed education and paid employment as the means to establish equality. Legislative reform at the time centred on marriage and the family and replaced the traditional housewife model by a concept of partnership between women and men (Frauenbericht, 1972; Zweiter Familienbericht, 1975). During the third phase of women’s policy (1976–80), freedom of choice and equal opportunities remained core issues but the family gained a new centrality. This time, concerns focused on problems of compatibility. No longer indebted to the ‘three-phase model’, women’s policy now faced the challenge of making family and career compatible without forcing women to choose or alternate between them (Frau und Gesellschaft, 1980). Commencing around 1979, the debate on ‘new motherhood’ marks the fourth stage of women’s policy. Neo-conservative policies now sought to amplify the role of the family. In fact, women’s policy became family policy. From freedom of choice between family and/or career, the policy agenda had again shifted to women’s ‘nature’. Rather than focus on working women as a group, the ‘new motherhood’ policy suggested that each woman could find her own subjective way to combining family and career. Exonerated from the task of reconciling the conflict between family and career, social policy ceased to be women’s policy (Dritter Familienbericht, 1979). The neo-conservative interest in ‘new motherhood’ could not halt the modernization of life-styles and the pluralization of relationships in modern industrial society. They are evident in a decline in the number of marriages, in rising divorce rates, the postponement of childbirth, an increase in childlessness and a break with traditional family structures. These changes in marriage and in the family appear to have been initiated largely by women and reflect the transformative changes in their socioeconomic position and personal aspirations (Meyer and Schulze, 1993). In the wake of post-war economic growth in West Germany and the structural changes in the labour market arising from it, the proportion of women in paid employment increased by ten per cent since 1960, to reach

30


58 per cent in 1991. The sharpest increase occurred among married women and mothers. In the early 1990s, more than one in three of women worked part-time (Meyer and Schulze: 167). Employment opportunities grew fastest in public services and retailing. Since the late 1960s, educational reforms have improved women’s qualifications and opened new employment opportunities, although equality has proved more attainable in education than in the labour market. Today, the majority of girls and women regard employment as a normal aspect of their lives while they are of working age, albeit with interruptions for the birth of a child. Many, however, find it impossible to plan their lives in such a way that they can successfully combine family and career (Frauen im mittleren Alter: 24). Their working lives perforated by career breaks and stunted by a lack of employment opportunities, women also face the social risks of partnership instabilities and uncertain family structures. In the light of such discontinuities, women’s economic security and their ability to earn their own livelihood must remain in doubt: ‘For West German women, having a family entails a conflict-ridden decision between motherhood and career which has never confronted East German women in this form’ (Meyer and Schulze 1993: 168). The high employment rate of women in the GDR underlines this contrast. Finally, the transformation of women’s roles in society has to be seen against the background of changed moral and sexual values since the 1960s. The decoupling of female sexuality and motherhood gave women a greater choice in planning their lives and shaping their relationships. In West Germany, demands for equality between the sexes and women’s self-realization originated ‘from below’, from the women themselves. In the GDR, no such development occurred. In the West, the new women’s movement brought issues of gender relations and sexuality into the public domain. It could even be argued that West Germans have acquired a greater sensitivity to gender issues and hidden stereotypes than East Germans. Such acceptance of equality between the sexes, however, appears to be more symbolic than actual, since large income differences and hierarchical structures exclude West German women from equality. At the very least when giving birth, West German women have been economically more dependent on their male partners than women in the former GDR.

POST-COMMUNIST TRANSFORMATIONS When the former GDR joined the Federal Republic, its policies, institutions and legal frameworks came to an end. The provisions that took their


31

place constituted transformative changes for East German women and quickly eroded the ‘equality bonus’ mentioned earlier. For many women, post-communist developments consisted of a decline in social and economic status and negative adjustments to Western inequalities. The integration of GDR society into the German market economy confronted women with an entirely new context that made entirely new and complex demands on the individual. The centrally controlled economy that had dominated East Germany for forty years had rendered employment predictable, institutionalized its own version of equality and applied a paternalist form of welfare policy. The unification of Germany applied economic criteria and measures of efficiency to all relationships and activities. These criteria proved particularly detrimental to women. Berger was quick to spell out what few wished to admit openly at the start of the unification process. Institutions may be abolished as legal entities or established to precisely defined indicators and by certain deadlines. The recruitment of new personnel to operate these institutions and the upgrading or retraining of ‘old’ employees is a timeconsuming and slow process. The rate of adjustment to these new conditions, it has been suggested, declines ‘the further one moves away from the systemic sphere of instrumental social institutions towards established practical orientations, cultural patterns and norms’ (Berger, 1992). There is little research as yet into how these two ‘time-frames’ intertwine and how their different speeds and logic influence each other. Some conclusions can, however, be drawn. Pressures to change institutions can result in rapid and far-reaching transformations, while day-to-day actions and attitudes will adjust at a slower pace and to a different agenda. It is impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy what will be salvaged of women’s emancipation as it manifested itself in their employment and their right to earn a living in the GDR. Unified Germany appears to witness a blending of lifestyles as dispositions and expectations in the eastern and western parts of the country begin to resemble one another. In fact, the process lacks equilibrium and amounts to a hegemony of the old Länder and their traditions over the new. Generally, West German standards are likely to prevail, although pressures for reform from East to West cannot be ruled out and may manifest themselves in the future! East German women are still as inclined to work as they ever were, and women who have been forced out of paid employment are keen to return to it. Moreover, East German women set great store, in theory at least, by the possibility of combining career and family, production and reproduction, even if doing so is less straightforward than in the past (see Chapter 6). It seems that East Germans, women and men alike, regard employment as an essential aspect of their cultural and personal identity. Attitudes to

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women’s employment differ greatly between in the old and new Länder (Erster Frauenreport, 1993). In the early 1990s, 93 per cent of East German and 75 per cent of West German men agreed to their partner working full-time if there were no children. These figures decreased to 54 per cent and 21 per cent respectively when children under the age of three had to be cared for. More generally, 37 per cent of East German but 76 per cent of West German men believed women should not work when the children are small (Dannebeck, 1993: 244–46). Disproving the stereotypes about women’s behaviour in the labour market, women in post-communist Germany have been particularly flexible in adjusting to the new work situation, improving their qualifications and devising schemes to remain in employment or in the job market (Nickel and Schenk, 1994). They have reacted to the new uncertainties by placing a special emphasis on holding on to their employment, even if this might mean forgoing established rights. Although parents in post-unification Germany are entitled to paid leave with a guarantee of reemployment, only 0.7 per cent of women who claimed parenting leave between 1991 and 1992 interrupted their employment to do so (Holst and Schupp, 1993: 6). Compared with the ‘baby year’ of the GDR era, the new regulations were perceived as unclear and laden with risks of unemployment at a time of general employment loss. In devising strategies of coping with the transformation process and of adjusting to the new conditions, women have tended to rely on social and cultural norms derived from their pre-unification experiences. A case study of female employees in the insurance sector found three broad strategies of responding to change and managing it (Thielecke, 1993). The first strategy was adopted by ‘high performer-type’ women who welcome the risks associated with the individualization of employment as a personal opportunity to develop their abilities. Mostly young, these women feel that conditions in the GDR had never stretched them nor allowed them to get ahead. Equipped with high educational and professional qualifications, these women hardly differ in their lifestyles from men. While regarding employment as compatible with partnership, they do not regard it as compatible with motherhood. Of the two roles, work and family, work appears to offer the higher personal rewards and scope for personal satisfaction. As one interviewee put it in Thielecke’s study: ‘Over the past 18 months, I have felt happiness and success like never before in my life. Really ….I have become a workaholic through and through. Maybe I was not exploited as much in the past, I can’t really say, but I feel better now. Now I am certainly being exploited but I do it


33

gladly. I stay until ten or eleven o’clock at night and do not ask for extra pay… I do it voluntarily, I feel good about it, get a kick out of it and the company also benefits’ (Thielecke: 129–30). While the high performers are a product of post-communist transformation, women with children and ‘normal’ East German biographies remain the largest group. These women fight for their jobs, but without career ambitions: ‘I do not want to have a career. It is too late for that. I just want a job which I enjoy’ (Thielecke: 134). These women do, however, have a certain order of priorities. Fighting for a job may involve the family in making some concessions but should not be detrimental to it. What the family can be expected to bear is discussed and agreed with its members. These employed family women appear to be able to rely on the support of their partners and on the widespread acceptance by East German men of the tried and tested ‘compatibility’ model. The third strategy of adjusting to change consists of a general lack of orientation. Not specific to any generation, women in this group do not have clear ideas about employment, prefer to wait and see, have relatively few vocational qualifications and adhere to highly traditional lifestyles. These women have been quick to agree terms to end their working lives. It seems they are under no illusion about their poor chances in the transformed labour market and have tended to opt for redundancy pay rather than attempt a change of job. Together, the strategies of adapting to transformation indicate that adjustments vary between men and women and between different groups. The structure of social inequality itself has been transformed and become more diverse. In the context of a fierce struggle for a slice of the social cake, these developments will accentuate disparities between men and women and also give rise to a growing differentiation between various groups of women. In contrast to the GDR, where they hardly mattered, social factors like motherhood or childlessness, single parenthood, partnership, number of children will take on the function of social dividing lines. Already women generally (and in particular, East German women) are more at risk from material under-provision, while households with more than three children in both parts of Germany are especially likely to face poverty (Hanesch, 1993; see also Chapter 6). The declining birth rate and the decrease in the number of marriages and divorces suggest that East Germans are recasting their personal lives in their transformed society. They are seeking to minimize individual risk in an environment based on risk and individualization. Ultimately, production and reproduction must remain compatible, not just for individual

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women but in society generally. The acrimonious talk of crisis in health care, care for the elderly, care for children and concomitant changes in generative behaviour point to a lack of social consensus and a new potential for social conflict. It remains to be seen whether the transformed structures will foster adjustment to the new roles or whether they will produce detachment and resistance among those whose values and individual plans in life cannot be reconciled with the new realities. Increasingly women derive their own social security from their own efforts and especially from paid employment. In the past, marriage may have served to provide security for life; today, marriage has become less stable and therefore less reliable in economic and in personal terms. In tackling the conflict between productive and reproductive work, women are more than ever thrown back on their own resources. The family group cannot be relied on to cushion the effects of harsh social conditions, although families may play a supportive role in individual circumstances (Bertram, 1993; Frisé, 1993). It is up to the state to devise a social policy that addresses the unresolved conflict between production and reproduction. Without a major reform of social policy regulations, the modernization of German society may become unhinged by its own shortcomings. References Berger, P. (1992), ‘Was früher starr war, ist nun in Bewegung’ in M. Thomas (ed.), Abbruch und Aufbruch. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Betram, H. (ed.) (1992), Die Familie in den neuen Bundesländern. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. Dannenbeck, C. (1992), ‘Einstellungen zur Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Beruf’ in H. Bertram, Die Familie in den neuen Bundesländern. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. Dritter Familienbericht (1979), Bundesministerium für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit (ed.), Die Lage der Familien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bonn. Erster Familienbericht (1966), Bundesministerium für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit, Bonn. Erster Frauenreport Land Brandenburg (1993), Ministerium für Arbeit, Soziales, Gesundheit und Frauen, Potsdam. Frau und Gesellschaft (1980), Bericht der Enquetekommission ‘Frau und Gesellschaft’, Bonn. Frauenbericht (1972), Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Massnahmen zur Verbesserung der Situation der Frau, Bonn.


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Frauen im mittleren Alter. Lebenslagen und Geburtskohorten von 1935 bis 1950 in den alten und neuen Bundesländern (1993), Schriftenreihe des Bundesministeriums für Frauen und Jugend, vol. 13, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Frisé, M. (1993), ‘Vertrautheit und Nähe’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 December 1993. Geiβler, R. (1992), Die Sozialstruktur Deutschlands. Ein Studienbuch zur Entwicklung im geteilten und vereinten Deutschland. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Grossmann, H. and S. Huth (1993), ‘Wandel sozialer Ungleichheit. Subjektive Erfahrungen ostdeutscher Alleinerziehender in der Sozialhilfesituation’ in W. Hanesch (ed.), Lebenslagenforschung und Sozialberichterstattung. Graue Reihe. Düsseldorf: Hans Böckler Stiftung. Gysi, J. and D. Meyer (1993) , ‘Leitbild berufstätige Mutter. DDR Frauen in Familie, Partnerschaft und Ehe’ in G. Helwig and H-M. Nickel (eds), Frauen in Deutschland 1945–1990. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Hanesch, W. (ed.), (1993), Lebenslagenforschung und Sozialberichterstattung. Graue Reihe. Düsseldorf: Hans Böckler Stiftung. Helwig G. and H-M. Nickel (eds), Frauen in Deutschland 1945–1990. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Holst E. and J. Schupp (1993), Perspektiven der Erwerbsbeteiligung von Frauen im vereinten Deutschland. DIW Diskussionspapier no. 68, Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung. Hüning, H. and H-M. Nickel (1993), ‘Dienstleistungsbeschäftigung im Umbruch. Thesen zur Analyse des Transformationsprozesses’, in Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 3. Hüning, H.-M, F. Maier and H-M. Nickel (1993), Berliner Sparkasse. Unternehmen in der Vereinigung. Zur Transformations des Dienstleistungssektors 1990–1992. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Keiser, S. (1992), ‘Zusammenfassende Darstellung zentraler Ergebnisse des Familiensurveys Ost’ in H. Bertram, Die Familie in den neuen Bundesländern. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. Mayer, Th. (1992), ‘Struktur und Wandel der Familie’ in R. Geiβler, Die Sozialstruktur Deutschlands. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Metz-Göckel, S., U. Müller and H-M. Nickel (1992), ‘Geteilte Welten. Geschlechterverhältnisse und Geschlechterpolarisierung in West und Ost’ in Jugend ‘92. Lebenslagen, Orientierungen und Entwicklungsperspektiven im vereinigten Deutschland. Ed. Jugendwerk der deutschen Shell vol. 2, Opladen: Leske & Budrich. Meyer, S. and D. Schulze (1993), ‘Frauen in der Modernisierungsfalle. Wandel von Ehe, Familie und Partnerschaft in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’ in G. Helwig and H-M. Nickel, (eds), Frauen in Deutschland 1945–1990. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Nickel, H-M. (1990), ‘Geschlechtertrennung durch Arbeitsteilung’ in Feministische Studien 8. Nickel, H-M. (1993), Geschlechterverhältnisse in der Wende’ in Deutschland Archiv 10/ 26.

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Nickel, H-M., J. Kühl and S. Schenk (eds) (1994), Erwerbsarbeit und Beschäftigung im Umbruch. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Nickel, H.-M and S. Schenk (1994),’Prozesse geschlechtsspezifischer Differenzierung im Erwerbssystem’ in H-M. Nickel, J. Kühl and S. Schenk (eds), Erwerbsarbeit und Beschäftigung im Umbruch. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Ostner, I. (1995), ‘Arm ohne Ehemann? Sozialpolitische Regulierungen von Lebenschancen für Frauen im internationalen Vergleich’ in Aus olitik und Zeitgeschichte B, 36–37. Thielecke, F. (1993), Der Habitus im Veränderungsprozess eines Versicherungsunternehmens. Dissertation Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Fachbereich Sozialwissenschaften. Winkler, G. (ed.), (1990), Frauenreport ‘90. Berlin: Die Wirtschaft. Zweiter Famlienbericht (1975) ed. Bundesministerium für Jugend, Familie und Gesundheit, Bonn.

2 Family Policy and Family Function in the German Democratic Republic Mike Dennis

Although the family was by no means terra incognita before the collapse of the GDR (see, Helwig, 1987, and Obertreis, 1986), the publication of key statistical data and research results was subject to strict political control in order to prevent any damage to the SED regime’s claim that its family policy demonstrated the superiority of ‘real socialism’ over exploitative capitalism. Research was also impeded by financial constraints and by methodological problems arising from the lack of standard indicators (these issues are reviewed by Gysi and Schubert, 1989, pp. 277–9, and Häder, 1991, p. 58). Despite these obstacles, much valuable research was conducted by East German demographers, legal scientists, criminologists, women’s studies centres and social scientists connected with bodies such as the Leipzig Central Institute for Youth Research and the GDR Academy of Sciences’ Institute for Sociology and Social Policy. Much ideologically sensitive material could not, of course, be published until after the Wende. In addition, novels and diaries, especially by women writers, and Church publications also provided insights into family issues. On the basis of these materials, as well as of investigations conducted since the collapse of SED rule, this chapter examines family policy and structures since the mid-1960s with particular reference to the increasing diversification of family forms, the penetration by state and party bodies of the family’s socialization, reproduction and economic functions, and finally, the degree of congruence between official and private perceptions of the family’s role in GDR society.

THE FAMILY AND FAMILY POLICY BEFORE 1965 In the years immediately after the end of the Second World War, official policy was characterized by a rejection of the ‘bourgeois’ ideal of the 37

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family, by an erosion of the family’s socialization function and by a programmatic commitment to equality between the sexes. With regard to the latter, the GDR’s first constitution in 1949 granted women equality before the law and the right to equal pay for equal work. In 1950, a Law on the Protection of Mother and Child replaced the previous right of the husband alone to make decisions on all marital matters by the joint decisionmaking of both partners. Furthermore, women’s employment was regarded as the key to their equality and a ‘higher’ form of family life, a premise which underpinned policy-making throughout the entire history of the GDR. Not only were these early measures designed to help repair the shattered economic and social fabric but they were also conceived of as part of a political legitimation process which sought to bring societal policies into line with basic Marxist principles. Engels’s statement on the development of women outside the home provided the ideological underpinning: ‘The emancipation of women and their equalization with men is and will remain an impossibility as long as women are excluded from socially productive life and remain confined to their own home’ (quoted in Shaffer, 1981, p. 58). These early measures did not, however, constitute a clear and integrated family policy. The first attempt to formulate such a policy, in 1954, by means of a Family Code had to be abandoned, allegedly, according to the Minister for Justice, Hilde Benjamin, because the socialization of the economy had not been completed and, in consequence, equality between the sexes could not be realized (Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, 1975, p. 270).

THE 1966 FAMILY CODE After widespread discussion a Family Code was finally promulgated in April 1966. The Code was a clear signal that the SED regime did not aspire to destroy the family but was seeking to shape the family’s structure and functions and to incorporate it fully into the SED-controlled social system. The Code was intended to set the norms for the family in socialist society and, though modified from time to time, it remained the politicoideological basis of family policy until the end of the Honecker era. The introduction of the Code was an integral part of the SED’s general strategy in the early to mid-1960s to establish a rapprochement with the East German populace after the trauma of the Berlin Wall and the upheavals connected with the nationalization of industry and the rapid collectivization of agriculture. This strategy embraced the reform of the educational

Family Policy and Function

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system, new legislative measures affecting women and young people and the implementation of what was envisaged as a more flexible and productive economic mechanism known as the New Economic System of Planning and Management. The family model (Leitbild) comprised four main elements: marriage as a union for life, the compatibility between the family and wider societal interests, the formal equality of men and women and relations of a qualitatively new kind between family members. The family was defined in the Code as the smallest cell in society and, because of the intensity of the emotional ties of love, the feelings of security and respect specific to the family, it was deemed to be irreplaceable for the upbringing and socialization of children. The latter function was not, however, regarded as the sole responsibility of parents but was to be undertaken in close co-operation with the kindergarten, school and mass organizations such as the Thälmann Pioneers and the Free German Youth (FDJ) with the goal of raising the younger generation as ‘socialist personalities’. Parents were enjoined to develop in their children ‘a socialist attitude towards study and work…[and to] bring them up to respect the working person and to observe the rules of socialist life together and [to] raise them in the spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism’ (Shaffer, 1981, translation of Paragraph 42b of the Family Code). In the preamble to the Code, it was claimed that a new and lasting quality in family relations was feasible, since socialism had eliminated exploitation at work, fostered the equality of women and enhanced educational opportunities for all. As part of this new relationship, the Code emphasized that relations between spouses were to be shaped in such a way that ‘the wife can combine her professional and social activities with those of motherhood’ and that both spouses should ‘do their share in the education and care of the children and the conduct of the household’ (Shaffer, 1981, p. 31, translation of Paragraph 7–1). Despite this exhortation for both spouses to share these tasks, no fundamental reassessment of the role of men was attempted. Their contribution was essentially to lighten the burden borne by their hard-pressed wives. Although reference was made in the Code to divorce (the legal aspects of which were dealt with in other legislation) and to the special provision made for lone mothers and fathers, the ideal family was undoubtedly the nuclear family centred around a married couple, a unit which allegedly found its ‘fulfilment’ in the birth and raising of children. As will be seen, this proved to be unrealistic and the regime had to adjust policy to cater for the diversification of family forms.

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FAMILY POLICY AFTER THE PROMULGATION OF THE FAMILY CODE The regime’s mobilization of women for work in the 1950s and early 1960s continued after 1966 and was combined with an intensification of efforts to enhance the skills and qualifications of women as members of the labour force. The need for women’s labour was crucial to economic development on account of the exodus of so many workers before 1961 and the country’s distorted demographic structure with its appreciable surplus of women over men, especially in the younger age groups. The implementation of a plethora of family policy measures to achieve these aims tended to focus on the employed mother rather than on both parents. The strain of coping with their triple roles as mother, houseworker and employee caused many women to seek part-time employment and to limit the size of their family. Soon after Honecker’s accession to power in 1971 crèche and kindergarten facilities were expanded to provide families with some relief from the burdens of childcare. Later, the introduction of the baby year in 1976 confirmed the shift towards a pro-natalist policy designed to stimulate the birth rate. Other measures included additional holidays for fully-employed mothers with children under 16 years of age, free interest loans for couples having babies and an increase in family allowance. However, despite an improvement in the birth rate, the tension between the regime’s demographic and employment policies was not eliminated and women continued to perform a disproportionate share of housework and childrearing (see below).

THE DIVERSIFICATION OF FAMILY FORMS The predominant family type in the GDR was the nuclear family. In the 1981 population census, the authorities defined the term broadly to include spouses without children (31.2 per cent of all nuclear families), lone parents with unmarried children (12.4 per cent) and spouses with one or more children (56.4 per cent). The three-generation or extended family was not common and was found more often in rural than in urban areas (Gysi, 1988, p. 510). Although the absence of any subsequent census rules out a precise delineation of family forms after 1981, it is likely, given the development in other ways of life, such as live-in couples, that the proportion of so-called ‘complete’ nuclear families decreased in the final decade of the GDR’s existence. However, despite the relative decline in the nuclear family, the conservatively-minded SED policy-makers continued


41

to place a high value on the married couple with children, as can be seen in the preference given to married couples in the allocation of apartments and family loans. Cohabitation developed rapidly from the later 1970s onwards, involving, according to the 1981 census, 153,173 people or about ten per cent of all unmarried persons. Surveys conducted in the later 1980s point to an increase in this type of relationship. In 1987, one investigation revealed that 28.7 per cent of women and 26.5 per cent of men aged 18 to 40 were cohabiting. These sources may underestimate the incidence of live-in couples as many respondents may have been reluctant to acknowledge their status in case one partner lost an unused apartment. It is estimated that perhaps as many as 50 per cent of cohabitees had children, a rate which was five times higher than in the FRG. At the time of the dissolution of the GDR, the duration of a live-in relationship tended to be, on average, one year less in the GDR than the 3.5 years in West Germany. (Details in Gysi, 1988, pp. 516–17; Meyer, 1992, p. 277; Schneider, 1994, pp. 111, 114–15, 131–2, 172–3). In principle, most cohabitees neither rejected marriage nor regarded their cohabitation as a long-term alternative to marriage. In the 1987 Kinderwunsch investigation only 7.4 per cent of the respondents fully agreed with and as many as 60 per cent disagreed with the statement that cohabitation was preferable to marriage as a lasting form of partnership (Häder, 1991, p. 60). Cohabitation was perceived primarily as a kind of trial marriage, a substitute for a formal engagement, during which partners sought to discover whether they were suited to each other. Among other reasons for delaying marriage was the desire of couples with a young child to take advantage of the benefits which a single mother could claim. Living alone, although less frequent in East than in West Germany, was relatively widespread. In 1981, about one in ten East Germans lived alone and the 1.73 million one-person households represented 26 per cent of all private households. East Berlin had the highest proportion of all such households (33 per cent) and the Bezirk of Neubrandenburg the lowest (23 per cent). The number of persons living alone remained relatively stable during the 1970s but may have declined slightly by the end of the 1980s. Widowhood and divorce were the main reasons for living alone. ‘Singles’ opting consciously for an individualistic way of life were a rare occurrence in the GDR (Schneider, 1994, pp. 120–1; Meyer, 1992, p. 280). Also rare in the GDR were alternative ways of life such as communes. Young East Germans found it difficult to appreciate how separate needs and interests could be accommodated in such an environment and they tended to associate them negatively with group sex and partner-swapping.

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Unconventional ways of life were to be found among some environmental groups and gay partnerships were established in larger cities like East Berlin and Leipzig. According to one investigation concluded in late 1990 among 546 homosexuals (average age 31.1 years and 65 per cent resident in a large city), almost half maintained a joint household in which the division of housework was much more equitable than among heterosexual partnerships (Starke, 1994, pp. 131–2, 137, 313). Lone parenthood was a common family type: the 1981 census revealed that 358,000 lone parents were raising at least one child under 17 years of age. In view of the rising divorce rate, the high level of births out of wedlock and the relatively young age of mothers, it is probable that the number of lone parents increased during the 1980s. Lone fathers represented only one per cent of all lone parents, partly because of the preference given to mothers in the grant of custody of a child and partly because of the higher esteem accorded to men’s labour power (Gysi and Meyer, 1993, p. 146). The vast majority of lone mothers were employed and there is good reason to believe that a relatively high proportion, perhaps 50 per cent, were in fact living with an unmarried partner (Meyer, 1992, p. 277). As far as can be judged, most lone mothers regarded their situation as a second-best and temporary alternative to having a partner. This attitude was rooted in the powerful attraction still exerted by the institution of marriage as well as in the many problems associated with lone parenthood. Among the latter were the difficulties inherent in combining a job with bringing up children, limited opportunities for social communication and a material situation which, on average, was worse than that of two-parent households.

POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY Survey after survey confirmed that marriage was the preferred relationship between couples. Men and women in all age groups regarded the main attraction of marriage as providing greater security in life, especially in the relationship between parents and children. In surveys conducted during the 1980s, 70 to 75 per cent of young men and women workers expressed a wish to marry at some stage, even though there seems to have been a slight fall in those believing they would ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ marry (Winkler, 1990a, p. 105; Winkler, 1990b, pp. 275–6. These surveys, it should be noted, were not GDR representative). With regard to the relative importance of work and the family, one retrospective study conducted under the auspices of the Max-Planck-Institute for Educational Research


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unearthed an extremely positive appreciation of the family. Nine out of ten women and three-quarters of the men in a sample born between 1959 and 1961 attached greater importance to a family than to work and a career (Huisink and Wagner, 1995, p. 145). The marriage rate also testified to the appeal of marriage. The rate was relatively stable until the late 1980s. The number of marriages per 1,000 inhabitants aged 18 to 40 stood at 26.2 in 1970 and 24.0 in 1988. The rate of remarriage of divorcees was also relatively high: 71 per cent as against 63 per cent in the FRG in 1989. East Germans tended to marry young, although the average crept up during the 1980s. Between 1970 and 1989, the average age at first marriage rose by 1.1/4 years; in the latter year it was 25.3 years for men and 23.2 years for women. The later age of marriage in West Germany can probably be attributed to East Germans achieving economic independence before their West German counterparts (Winkler, 1990a, p. 108; Schneider, 1994, pp. 178–9; Gysi and Meyer, 1993, p. 144). Expectations of a partner were extremely high and, according to research conducted by the Central Institute for Youth Research (for the details below, see Pinther, 1991, pp. 156–7), grew even more demanding during the 1970s and 1980s with regard to the joint upbringing of children, an equitable division of labour in the family, understanding, mutual respect, reliability and sexual satisfaction. Several ‘traditional’ features were on the decline: the significance of a husband’s occupation, virginity and a woman’s housekeeping skills. In two surveys of young married couples in 1973 (1,000 employed men and women) and 1988 (730 employed men and women) with an average age of 27 for the men and 25 for the women, the ingredients of a happy married life were identified as (1973 figures first): being in love (85 per cent and 84 per cent), faithfulness (78 per cent and 85 per cent), having understanding for each other (74 per cent and 70 per cent), enjoying a full sexual life (52 per cent and 71 per cent) and sharing the same basic interests (20 per cent and 26 per cent). Despite East Germans’ strong commitment to the notion of marriage, as reflected in the frequency of first and second marriages, it should be recalled that not only was cohabitation on the increase but also that Honecker’s GDR had one of the highest divorce rates in the world. In the immediate post-war period, divorce was relatively common but fell rapidly during the 1950s, reaching 24,540 in 1960. It started to rise sharply in the 1970s – to 52,439 in 1986 – before experiencing a slight drop thereafter (Statistisches Amt der DDR, 1990, p. 417). The divorce rate was much higher than in West Germany: in the mid-1980s, it was 30 per 10,000 inhabitants as against 20 per 10,000 in the FRG. The early years of marriage were the most sensitive period: in 1989, 30 per cent of all GDR

44


divorces in 1989 occurred within the first three years of marriage. The average length of a marriage which ended in divorce was nine years as opposed to twelve years in the FRG. Half of East German marriages ending in divorce did not last for more than seven years and a third for no longer than four years (Schneider, 1994, pp. 172, 192; Winkler, 1990a, p. 110). Among the factors contributing to separation and divorce were the GDR’s liberal divorce legislation, the low costs of the actual divorce process, the relative economic independence of women, the difficulties experienced by young couples in coping with the reality of married life and the weakness of religious ties. The Max-Planck-Institute investigation of 2,422 GDR marriages established that those who did not belong to any confession had an 85 per cent higher risk of divorce than did Protestants (Huisink and Wagner, 1995, p. 185). In general, women’s expectations of marriage were higher than those of men. They tended to adopt a critical view of their relationship and were more likely than their husbands to seek a dissolution of their marriage. This is reflected in the higher proportion of women petitioning for divorce: 55.1 per cent in 1960 and 69.0 per cent in 1989 (Winkler, 1990a, 110–11). Although divorce was attended by certain material disadvantages, the risks for women were partly alleviated by the high rate of female employment and by the state’s provision for lone mothers with children. The frequency of divorce is, of course, a clear indicator that marriage was far from the harmonious relationship idealized in the Family Code. Studies of marital conflict in the early years of marriage indicate that the major problems revolved around the burden of housework, inadequate accommodation, arguments with parents, sexual disharmony and marital infidelity. According to divorce statistics, sexual disharmony was given as a reason for divorce by six per cent of couples in 1959 and by 24 per cent in 1972 and research showed that at least one fifth of couples considered sexual disagreements as a reason for their marital problems. Conflict occurred because partners often did not wish to have sexual intercourse at the same time (Starke, 1980, p. 126; Pinther, 1991, p. 164; Pinther and Rentzsch, 1976, p. 150; Reißig, 1982, p. 58). Couples who disagreed over sexual matters were more likely to seek other sexual partners. Actual and suspected infidelity and the neglect of a partner were the most frequent causes of conflict in marriages of up to two years’ duration. Although more young people were opposed to extramarital sex than to pre-marital promiscuity, a not insignificant number considered it to be acceptable – 21 per cent of young men and four per cent of young women according to one Central Youth Institute investigation. One justification for marital infidelity was that marriage and love did


45

not necessarily coincide (Starke, 1980, p. 82; Pinther and Rentzsch, 1976, pp. 150–1). Marriage had clearly vacated its public position as the only legitimate place for sexual relations. Indeed, during the 1980s, GDR educationalists bowed to reality and asserted that sexual fulfilment outside marriage and the family was a fundamental characteristic of the ‘all-round socialist personality’. Leipzig youth researchers sought to underpin this by claiming that an active and satisfying sexual relationship between students based on love correlated with high levels of productivity and creativity in their studies and a greater political engagement (Voß, 1984, p. 270). Since the 1970s many traditional scruples against certain types of sexual behaviour crumbled. Not only were the normative barriers against premarital sex dismantled but sexual relations commenced at an earlier age. The Partner Studies of the Central Institute for Youth Research confirm this: where in 1973 28 per cent of students had experienced sexual intercourse by the age of 17, the percentage had risen to 52 per cent seven years later. The results of the so-called Second Partner Study indicated that by the beginning of the 1980s, the average age at which sexual intercourse commenced was 16.9 years and, an important shift, no significant difference existed between young men and women (Starke and Friedrich, 1984, pp. 96–7, 100–1, 136–7, 147, 187, 195).1

EQUALITY IN THE FAMILY? In a formal sense, as in the Family Code and the 1968 Constitution, women enjoyed equal rights in all areas of GDR life. Whether or not this was really translated into gender equality can be tested by an examination of the decision-making process in the family and of the gender-based division of labour. Given the fact that GDR women did not experience a sharp break in their career and made a significant contribution to household income, a partnership of relative equality might have been expected. One study in the early 1980s indicated that most ‘important decisions’ were reached jointly and that only in six per cent of families was decisionmaking dominated by one partner (Schneider, 1994, p. 146). However, the evidence on patterns of authority and power in the family is as yet too sparse for firm conclusions to be drawn. Although the notion of an equitable division of housework and childrearing enjoyed widespread support among both men and women, practice was somewhat different. There was, for example, still a clear division of labour within the family according to the type of task performed by men

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and women (see table below). Women were still the more likely to perform tasks such as cleaning and preparing meals, whereas men concentrated on repair jobs around the home and on outside jobs such as car maintenance and gardening. In the 1973 and 1988 Central Institute for Youth Research studies of ‘Young Marriage’ it is clear that despite the greater involvement of men in raising children and helping out in the kitchen, young women had a much greater housework burden than men and enjoyed less free time. The young couples estimated (1973 data first, 1988 data in parenthesis) that one per cent (zero per cent) of all family jobs were performed by men and 13 per cent (15 per cent) by women, 50 per cent (46 per cent) of three-quarters were undertaken by men and 40 (41 per cent) by women (Pinther, 1991, p. 160) Other investigations showed a high level of tolerance among women of their multiple roles as mother, houseworker and wage earner but indicated that many felt obliged to sacrifice promotion in order to cope with the demands of motherhood and housework. For example, in a 1982 survey over 60 per cent of women aged between 20 and 40 stated that the family/children and a career enjoyed equal weighting, while about 38 per cent of the women, mainly workers, gave priority to the family. Not only did this pattern persist throughout the 1980s (Gysi and Meyer, 1993, p. 141) but surveys conducted during the Wende also confirmed that many East German women accepted traditional gender roles (Diemer, 1994, pp. 149–51). That the Honecker regime did not seriously contemplate any significant change in the family division of labour is reflected in the statement by one family expert, Professor Anita Grandke of the Humboldt University, that while equal rights and duties for both parents constituted a higher form of family development, this could not be realized until the establishment of communist society (Helwig, 1995, p. 201). Table 2.1

Some Household Tasks Performed by Partners, 1988 (%)

Preparation of meals Washing up and drying pots Cleaning Washing clothes Household repairs Daily shopping Source: Gysi and Meyer, 1993, p. 159.

Women only

Men only

Men and Women jointly/in turn

57 40 66 87 – 36

5 – 2 – 84 13

36 53 31 12 12 47


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Research on free-time budgets also demonstrated that the traditional division of household labour was reproduced among children: girls were more heavily committed to housework and enjoyed less free time than boys. This general pattern of a division of labour along gender lines seems to have been less pronounced in families where both partners had a university degree than in worker families where, for example, the partners had a skilled worker qualification. In 1982, a survey showed that a higher qualification was correlated with less time being spent on housework and with a more equitable division of household chores (Gysi and Meyer, 1993, p. 160). The traditional female self-concept and the official line on the complementarity of women’s roles as mother, houseworker and employee were questioned from the mid-1970s onwards by women novelists such as Brigitte Martin, Helga Schubert and Christa Müller (Gerber, 1986–87, pp. 59–74). Frustrated at the lack of progress with regard to the status of women, they depicted in their novels how women, whether single or divorced, responded to loneliness and isolation and how they struggled to find their own identity. Irene Dölling, a lecturer at the Humboldt University, argued that the fundamental contradiction between women’s integration into the productive workforce and their special responsibility for the private sphere of family and home had to be overcome by the individual. Despite these stimulating contributions, the state-controlled media failed to promote a critical debate on such questions. Many parents were worried that they devoted too little time to their children. In a 1984 study, ‘Vereinbarkeit von Berufstätigkeit und Mutterschaft’, conducted by the Institute for Sociology and Social Policy, 52 per cent of the mothers and about 66 per cent of the fathers of children under the age of twelve years stated that they spent less than two hours with their children on workdays (Schneider, 1994, pp. 152–3). The problems associated with childrearing were compounded by the expansion of shiftwork during the 1970s and 1980, especially if both parents worked shifts. Older children were often left alone at the weekends while their parents were at work and shiftworkers tended to spend less time discussing school problems with their children than did dayworkers (Dennis, 1988, p. 66). Deficiencies in the upbringing of children were identified by GDR criminologists and psychiatrists as a key precondition of youth criminality in the GDR. Problems within the family which were regarded as ‘criminologically significant’ were the overburdening of parents with societal activities and career commitments, insufficient time for family life and childrearing, difficulties in supervising or controlling children’s free-time pursuits and the loosening of social bonds (Kräupl, 1980, p. 303).

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REPRODUCTION FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY The GDR birth rate gave officialdom cause for concern when from the later 1960s it commenced on a downward spiral, plummeting to 10.5 in 1975, one of the lowest birth rates in the world. The explanation for this development lies in changing attitudes to the value of a large family, the increase in the use of contraceptives, the legalization of abortion in 1972 and the shortage of spacious apartments (Henning, 1984, pp. 84–92). One crucial reason arose from the SED’s drive to mobilize women for work: women reacted to the heavy burden of their multiple roles by reducing the number of children conceived. The fall in the birth rate was not, however, primarily the consequence of couples not having children – only about one in nine women did not give birth to a child – but rather of the reluctance of couples to have a third child. Numerous surveys in the 1980s showed that whereas two children were the popular preference among East Germans aged 18 to 40, only a small minority desired to have more. Since 1971 the GDR had been failing to reproduce itself, a problem which the regime sought to tackle through the implementation of a wideranging package of social welfare measures, including the baby year. This policy contributed to a temporary baby boom in the late 1970s and early 1980s: the birth rate reached 14.6 live births per 1,000 inhabitants in 1980 and, after stabilizing at a slightly lower level in the mid-1980s, started to fall once more, declining to 12.0 in 1989 (Statistisches Amt der DDR, 1990, p. 404). Trends in the fertility rate (the number of live births per 1,000 women of childbearing age, 15–45 years) also affected demographic developments; this fell from 88.7 in 1963 to a low of 51.9 in 1974, increased rapidly to 67.4 in 1980, only to fall yet again to 57.4 in 1989 (Dennis, 1988, p. 45; Winkler, 1990a, p. 25). East German women tended to give birth at a young age, the majority of births being to mothers between 20 and 25 years of age. However, from the 1970s onwards the average age of mothers increased. For example, in 1989 the average age of mothers giving birth to their first child was 22.9, the second child 26.3 and the third child 29.3. Since 1970 this represented an increase in the first two categories by one year and by four months respectively (Winkler, 1990a, p. 27). A striking feature of the Honecker era was the high proportion of children born out of wedlock. Whereas in 1965 it was only 9.8 per cent, by 1970 it had risen to 13.3 per cent and then escalated to almost one-third of all live births in 1989, three times higher than in the FRG (Schneider, 1994, p. 216; Winkler, 1990a, p. 28). This development can be attributed, in part, to the social welfare measures of 1976 which contained provision


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for an improvement in the position of lone mothers. It can also be explained by attitudinal changes: in the Kinderwunsch study of 1987, only 14.5 per cent of interviewees agreed with the statement that ‘It is better for the children if the parents are married’, while about the same percentage thought it unnecessary to marry after the birth of a child2 (Hälder, 1991, p. 66, 161).

THE FAMILY HOUSEHOLD AS A UNIT OF CONSUMPTION Whereas the family hardly functioned as a unit of economic production, it did so as a unit of consumption and as a provider of domestic services. The level and disposal of household income is pertinent in this context. By far the highest proportion of household income (Gysi and Meyer, 1993, p. 153) was derived from wages and salaries (92.8 per cent in 1960 and 87.1 per cent in 1988) and considerably less from state transfers such as pensions, child support and subsidies (6.7 per cent in 1960 and 8.9 per cent in 1988) and ‘other sources’ (0.5 per cent in 1960 and 4.0 per cent in 1988). The level of household income according to household size and age is given in the table below. Although women’s contribution to total household income – about 44 per cent – was of considerable significance for the family’s living standard Table 2.2

Household Income and Families 1980–1988 (in GDR Marks)

Net household income Net household income of couples in toto with 2 children with 3 children Lone parents with 1 child with 2 children Married couples (both under 26 years) with no children with 1 child with 2 children Source: Winkler, 1990b, p. 266.

1980

1985

1988

1980:1988 (in %)

1,490

1,746

1,946

130.6

1,549 1,619 1,659

1,815 1,875 1,902

2,067 2,185 2,293

133.4 135.0 138.2

797 930 1,318 1,328 1,297 1,372

896 1,011 1,519 1,513 1,518 1,538

1,029 1,245 1,798 1,739 1,775 1,967

129.1 133.9 136.4 130.9 136.9 143.4

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(Dennis, 1993, p. 98), a gender wage gap was a permanent feature throughout the history of the GDR. According to recent research into different age cohorts, in 1989 the gender gap in earnings for women born between 1959 and 1961 was 23 per cent and an additional two per cent for those born 1951 to 1953 (Sørensen and Trappe, 1995, p. 403). Despite the many official pronouncements in favour of gender equality, the SED failed to grasp the nettle of the earnings gap. At the end of the 1980s, women constituted three-quarters of full time employees on 600 to 700 Marks per month but only 17 per cent and 15.7 per cent respectively of higher wage earners in the categories earning 1500 to 1700 Marks and over 1700 Marks (Helwig, 1995, p. 204). The position of lone parents, essentially mothers, was less favourable than in double-earner households as various bills and costs had to be paid out of one income (see table 2.2). However, state transfers provided some relief for lone parents as well as for couples with children. For example, whereas in 1981 family allowance amounted to 20 Marks per month for one child, 20 Marks for a second child and 50 Marks for the third and any additional children, in 1987 the sums had risen to 50, 100 and 150 Marks respectively and two sharp increases followed in 1990 (Winkler, 1990a, p. 140). In the late 1980s, it was estimated that state transfers for the education and rearing of children amounted to 534 Marks per month or about 85% of the total costs of bringing up a child (see Chapter 6 in this volume). Although most GDR households were equipped with basic consumer items, substantial differences existed between lone-parent and two-parent households, particularly as regards consumer durables. Such goods were expensive: in 1989, a washing machine cost over 2,000 Marks, a colour TV between 4,200 and 6,400 Marks, a new Trabant car 13,500 to 17,000 Marks and a new Wartburg about 33,000 Marks. Given such prices, it is not surprising that lone-parent households spent a higher proportion of income on foodstuffs, shoes, clothing, electricity, gas and heating as well as on rent than was the case in other households. Housing was another determinant of the quality of family life. Despite heavy state investment in the modernization of the housing stock and in the construction of new buildings, the SED was unable to keep its promise ‘to solve the housing question as a social problem’. In one survey carried out at the beginning of 1990, 29.4 per cent of those aged 18 to 25 and 33.1 per cent of those aged 25 to 35 expressed themselves as ‘dissatisfied’ or ‘very dissatisfied’ with their accommodation. Complaints focused on the small size of new apartments and the inadequate provision of toilets, baths and telephones. A comparison between 1985 and 1989 shows that 26 per cent and 18 per cent respectively had no indoor toilet. Furthermore,


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families with three or more children tended to be at a disadvantage as newly-constructed apartments rarely had more than three rooms (Winkler, 1990a, pp. 125–6).

THE SOCIALIZATION FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY The active involvement of pre-school institutions, schools, mass organizations and the state-controlled media in the various stages of a child’s upbringing raises the question as to whether the family’s socialization function was a mere adjunct to the activities of the state or whether parents continued to exercise a major influence on their children’s belief and value system. Certainly, young children spent much of their time in the network of childcare institutions which the regime promoted not only to exploit women’s labour but also to extend its influence over the process of primary socialization. Between 1970 and 1989 the level of care in crèches rose from 291 per 1,000 children to 802 and in kindergartens from 645 to 951 (Statistisches Amt der DDR, 1990, pp. 57, 62). Parents had to meet only a low proportion of the costs and the opening hours of the pre-school institutions were long and reasonably flexible. On average, children spent 24 hours per week in the crèche and 35 hours in the kindergarten. Despite this amount of time and despite the large role played by the Thälmann Pioneers and the FDJ in the socialization of young people, investigations during the Honecker years indicate that the family was by no means redundant. Children and young people rated their parents highly as advisers and confidants on matters such as the choice of a career, clothes and childrearing (Kabat vel Job, 1979, p. 116). One survey documented that two-thirds of pupils in the sixth to eighth classes and over half of those in the tenth class preferred their parents as advisers on all personal matters (Lemke, 1989, p. 67) and youth researchers found that parents were young people’s most important advisers in political and ideological matters. Indeed, 83 per cent of students in another investigation indicated that they were in basic agreement with their parents’ political views (Hille, 1985, pp. 128, 130). One must be careful, however, not to overstate the harmonious relationship between parents and their children as typical generational conflicts erupted over issues such as children’s poor school results, their lack of application, untidiness, alcohol consumption, sexual relations and the influence of peers. Much has already been said about gender stereotyping and the importance of role models. The culture of the family perpetuated gender cleavages, as can be seen in the division of household jobs along gender lines,

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not only between parents but also between boys and girls and in the distinctive personality traits attributed by adults to their male and female offspring. Moreover, although the state frequently expressed a wish to reshape gender roles, it proved unwilling to undertake a fundamental restructuring of gender hierarchies. Another area in which parents exercised a crucial influence was that of the educational achievement of their children. Among the key variables here are the level of the parents’ own qualifications, the size of the family, a room at home suitable for studying, and parental commitment to and interest in their children’s upbringing. The nature of this influence can be demonstrated by the tendency of the intelligentsia to reproduce itself by using certain intrinsic social advantages in the acquisition of the requisite skills and knowledge. Since the early 1970s insiders had been aware of the fact that about half of the intelligentsia was recruited from within its own ranks and that self-reproduction was on the increase. According to a 1977 investigation by the Institute for Marxist-Leninist Sociology of the Central Committee’s Academy of Social Sciences, about 73 per cent of fathers of the members of the intelligentsia aged 35 to 54 were either farmers or workers as against 54 per cent of those under 35 (Dennis, 1988, p. 53). It should not be overlooked, however, that climbing up the political ladder was heavily dependent on political variables such as SED membership, participation in the FDJ and other indicators of societal commitment and correctness and that the expansion of the intelligentsia was in itself a consequence of the SED’s own economic and political policies.

THE SEMI-PRIVATIZATION OF FAMILY LIFE In a highly politicized system such as that of the GDR, it was clearly impossible for the family to avoid penetration and steering by the state. Nevertheless, there are many indications of a widespread retreat by family members into a semi-privatized family life. Survey data suggest that this may have increased from the later 1970s onwards as opportunities contracted in the public sphere and at work for useful and rewarding activity. The family’s utilization of free time sheds light on the semi-privatization thesis. One study conducted in 1988 by the Institute for Sociology and Social Policy among 500 employees in industry established that a high proportion of free time was linked closely/very closely to the family and partner (85.1 per cent of the women and 81.1 per cent of the men), doing jobs for the family and bringing up children (Winkler, 1990a, p. 136). In the GDR more disposable free time was spent in the family than was the


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case in the FRG, partly because of the more limited range of opportunities and partly because the family served as a retreat from the political pressures in the public domain. It also served as a mechanism which helped the younger generation cope with the discrepancies between what they were taught at school and the social and political realities of everyday life (Nickel, 1991–92, p. 32). From the standpoint of the SED leadership under Honecker, the retreat into the niches of the family did not accord with the aspiration to produce all-round socialist families, especially as the high level of consumption of Western media in the home exposed East Germans to a system of countervalues. However, as in many other areas, the regime trimmed its ideology and tolerated the semi-privatization of family life as long as it posed no serious threat to the general pacification of society. This pacification was based on the SED’s monopoly of the instruments of power and coercion as well as on the informal social contract fashioned by Honecker after his accession to power in 1971. A broad popular acknowledgment of the SED’s claim to rule was sustained by the regime’s sensitivity to many of the needs of the population, including a tolerable living standard, subsidies for basic foodstuffs, job security and the extensive system of childcare. However, the emergence of a more sceptical generation and mounting economic problems from the later 1970s onwards led to the gradual erosion of this social contract. Not only did adults distance themselves increasingly from the SED and state socialism but the disaffection of parents was also linked to that of the younger generation. Two Central Institute for Youth Research investigations in 1988 found that only 46 per cent of families continued to identify themselves with the goals of socialism. The percentage of intelligentsia and workers’ families (with a skilled worker qualification) who still conformed to these goals read 53 and 28. The research also showed that the greater the parents’ distance from the political system, the stronger was their children’s antipathy towards the official agents of political socialization such as the FDJ and teachers (Keiser, 1991, pp. 39–50).

CONCLUSION Despite the semi-privatization of family life, the SED’s control over the commanding heights of the economy and politics, at least until the later 1980s, ensured that its social and economic policies – for example, the mobilization of women for work and the nationalization of the economy – had a direct impact on the structure of the family. In addition, the regime,

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suspicious of the family’s socialization function, sought to control and influence it through the state education system, the FDJ, and other state and party bodies. However, the SED was unable to remodel the family according to an ideological and political blueprint such as that of the Family Code, partly because of the incapacity of families to resist external pressures and partly because of tensions and contradictions between SED policies. With regard to the latter economic mobilization and the overburdening of working mothers contributed to a decline in the birth rate. Although the social welfare measures of the 1970s enabled the SED to arrest this trend, success proved to be temporary and the birth rate fell in the mid-1980s. Another unwelcome development for the regime was the discrepancy between the ideal family of the Family Code and the growing diversification of family forms. The SED, however, proved relatively flexible and realistic in its reaction to this process and adjusted its social policy and legislation to accommodate lone parenthood and cohabitation. Although this was also true of its efforts to remove the stigma from divorce, the high divorce rate – which was also directly influenced by the SED’s economic policies – conflicted with the Family Code’s goal of a new quality in relations between family members in socialist society. Yet in spite of the many crises and tensions in relationships and the appreciable changes in family structure, the family – and marriage – continued to enjoy a high value among East German and since the Wende it has been a source of emotional and physical support for its members during the radical and painful transformation of East German society.

Notes 1. 2.

The Second Partner Study was carried out between 1979 and 1982 among 5,496 persons aged 16 to 30. The survey included 4,136 respondents; 65.5 per cent were women.

References Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen (ed.) (1975), DDR Handbuch. Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik. Dennis, M. (1988), German Democratic Republic. Politics, Economics and Society, London/New York: Pinter. Dennis, M. (1993), Social and Economic Modernization in Eastern Germany from Honecker to Kohl. London: Pinter; New York: St. Martin’s Press.


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Diemer, S. (1994), Patriarchalismus in der DDR. Strukturelle, kulturelle und subjektive Dimensionen der Geschlechterpolarisierung. Opladen: Leske & Budrich. Geiβler, R. (1992), Die Sozialstruktur Deutschlands. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Gerber, M. (1986/87), ‘“Wie hoch eigentlich ist der Preis der Emanzipation?” Social Issues in Recent GDR Women’s Writing’ in GDR Monitor no. 16, Winter, pp. 55–83. Gysi, J. (1988), ‘Familienformer in der DDR’ in Jahrbuch für Soziologie und Sozialpolitik 1988, Berlin (East): Akademie Verlag, pp. 508–24. Gysi, J. and D. Meyer (1993), ‘Leitbild berufstätige Mutter – DDR-Frauen in Familie, Partnerschaft und Ehe’ in G. Helwig and H. M. Nickel (eds), Frauen in Deutschland 1945–1992. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, pp. 139–65. Gysi, J. and R. Schubert (1989), ‘Zu einigen methodischen Problemen empirisch-soziologischer Familienforschung. Rückschau und Ausblick’ in Jahrbuch für Soziologie und Sozialpolitik 1989, Berlin (East): Akademie Verlag, pp. 277–92. Häder, M. (ed.) (1991), Denken und Handeln in der Krise. Die DDR nach der Wende. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Helwig, G. (1987), Frau und Familie – Bundesrepublik Deutschland/DDR. 2nd. ed. Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik. Helwig, G. (1995), ‘Gleiche Rechte – doppelte Pflichten. Frauen in der DDR’ in G. Helwig (ed.), Rückblicke auf die DDR. Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, pp. 145–88. Helwig, G. and H. M. Nickel (eds) (1993), Frauen in Deutschland 1945–1992. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Hennig, W. and W. Friedrich (eds) (1991), Jugend in der DDR. Daten und Ergebnisse der Jugendforschung vor der Wende. Weinheim: Juventa. Henning, G. (1984), Kinderwunsch = Wunschkind? Weltanschauliche-ethische Aspekte der Geburtregelung in der DDR. Berlin (East): Dietz. Hille, B. (1985), Familie und Sozialisation in der DDR. Opladen: Leske & Budrich. Huisink, J. and M. Wagner (1995), ‘Partnerschaft, Ehe und Familie in der DDR’ in J. Huisink, K. U. Mayer et al. (eds), Kollektiv und Eigensinn. Lebensläufe in der DDR und danach. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Kabat vel Job, O. (1979), Geschlechtstypische Einstellungen und Verhältnisse bei Jugendlichen, Berlin (East): Volk und Wissen. Keiser, S. (1991), ‘Die Familie als Faktor der politischen Sozialisation Jugendlicher in der DDR Ende der 80er Jahre’ in W. Hennig and W. Friedrich (eds), Jugend in der DDR. Daten und Ergebnisse der Jugendforschung vor der Wende. Weinheim: Juventa. Kräupl, G. (1980), Familiäre Erziehung und Jugendkriminalität’ in Neue Justiz, vol. 34 no. 7, pp. 303–6. Lemke, C. (1989), ‘Political Socialization and the “Micromilieu”. Toward a Political Sociology of GDR Society’ in M. Rueschemeyer and C. Lemke (eds), The Quality of Life in the German Democratic Republic. Changes and Developments in a State Socialist Society. New York/London: Sharpe, pp. 59–73. Meyer, T. (1992), ‘Struktur und Wandel der Familie’ in R. Geiβler, Die Sozialstruktur Deutschlands. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 264–83.

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Nickel, H. M. (1991–92), ‘Women in the German Democratic Republic and the New Federal States: Looking Backwards and Forwards’ in German Politics and Society, nos. 24–25, Winter, pp. 34–52. Obertreis, G. (1986), Familienpolitik in der DDR 1945–1980. Opladen Leske und Budrich. Pinther, A. (1991), ‘Junge Ehen in den 70er und 80er Jahren’ in W. Hennig und W. Friedrich (eds), Jugend in der DDR. Daten und Ergebnisse der Jugendforschung vor der Wende. Weinheim: Juventa, pp. 155–66. Pinter, A. and S. Rentzsch (1976), Junge Ehen heute. Leipzig: Verlag für die Frau. Reissig, M. (1982), ‘Das sexuelle Verhalten junger Ehepaare im 1. Ehejahr und einige seiner wesentlichen Einflussfaktoren’ in H. Szewczyk (ed.), Sexualität und Partnerschaft. Berlin (East): Volk und Wissen, pp. 54–60. Schneider, N. F. (1994), Familie und private Lebensführung in West- und Ostdeutschland. Eine vergleichende Analyse des Familienlebens 1970–1992. Stuttgart: Enke. Shaffer, H. G. (1981), Women in the Two Germanies: A Comparative Study of a Socialist and a Non-Socialist Society. New York/London: Pergamon. Sørensen, A. and H. Trappe (1995), ‘The Persistence of Gender Inequality in Earnings in the German Democratic Republic’ in American Sociological Review, vol. 60 no. 3, pp. 398–406. Starke, K. (1980), Junge Partner. Leipzig: Urania. Starke, K. (1994), Schwuler Osten. Homosexuelle Männer in der DDR. Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag. Starke, K. and W. Friedrich (eds), (1984), Liebe und Sexualität bis 30. Berlin (East): Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften. Statistisches Amt der DDR (ed.) (1990). Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik ‘90. Berlin (East): Rudolf Haufe Verlag. Voss, P. (1984), ‘Sexualverhalten und Lebensaktivität’ in K. Starke and W. Friedrich (eds), Liebe und Sexualität bis 30. Berlin (East): Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, pp. 267–73. Winkler, G. (ed.) (1990a), Frauenreport ‘90. Berlin (East): Die Wirtschaft. Winkler, G. (ed.) (1990b), Sozialreport ‘90. Berlin (East): Die Wirtschaft.

3 Social Protection and Family Transformation: Speculations on the German Agenda Steen Mangen

This chapter reviews partial reforms of Fordist social security systems, focusing on the interaction of assumptions about the structures of families implicit in policy-making and the potential impact of ‘modernizing’ reforms of social protection in post-unification Germany. The German case is examined within the context of broader European evolutions. An attempt will be made to assess the opportunities offered by family change occurring within an environment of economic transformation, for positive innovations in social protection arrangements and the entitlements that they confer. Assessments of the impact of social protection have to be made in the wider context of other vital supportive interventions such as childcare, education and youth services which are discussed elsewhere in this book. West European societies vary considerably with regard to the complexities of the protean attributes of family structures which, moreover, are of disputed causation (Coleman, 1996). Thus, cross-national lessonlearning about the differential impact of social security remains a contentious enterprise. Furthermore, judged on several key indicators, West Germany has been subject to fewer elements of critical change in the family, the economy and the labour market. Rather it is East Germany that has been the object of the most intense manifestations of transformation, and it is here that the impact of social security innovations will be most acutely felt. In general, it will be argued that the European family has undergone a greater degree of transformation than most social protection systems which remain essentially cognate with the post-war settlement.

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SOCIAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION In general the European social security horizon is clear: social expenditure will stabilize at roughly the current levels in countries of the north1 and continue to offer comparatively high levels of protection.2 More effort is now being expended on design, delivery and impact, especially in investigating ways in which systems create poverty traps and welfare dependency. The object of these innovations, of course, is to harness social security to the realities of globalization and the transformations of the European economies which have long failed to guarantee full employment or high rates of sustained growth. Social security is being reinvested with the modernizing role it possessed in the immediate post-war years as a key element to facilitate high levels of productivity within an increasingly flexible labour market. Although Germany retains a stronger industrial base than most of its neighbours,3 its economic prospects, too, are currently both weaker and more volatile than during the miracle years of the 1950s and 1960s. Economic pressures, in part deriving from imperatives to conform to the Maastricht convergence criteria, contribute to the German debate about the future of social security and its suspect role as a Standortkiller. There are, then, accentuating tensions about the contemporary relevance of postwar understandings of social solidarity. Progressively these have focused on doubts about the robustness of current institutional arrangements and the value of maintaining high-quality entitlements which incur high nonwage costs. It is these costs, so the argument goes, that constrain opportunities for job creation and impinge on German competitiveness within the world economy.4 In Germany, as elsewhere, no overall master plan for social protection reform is in place, beyond the retention of the statutory basis, although ad hoc crisis interventions typifying the 1980s are giving way to a more structured, long-term approach (as witnessed by health and pensions reform in the early 1990s). Despite developments here and there which give rise to propitious assessments, speculations about future trajectories must also consider the very real short and medium-term transition costs that arise from changing social security statuses. For example, the exit costs from full-time employment in terms of welfare rights remain unattractively high. The contemporary profusion in the EU of short-term, part-time and zero-hour contracts and work share schemes raises serious questions of how the individuals concerned can establish a worthwhile social security record. Policy effort in this area has so far advanced on too limited a front to confront the full implications of these developments, which penetrate deep into gender and

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family policy and the viability of the German male breadwinner model. Although part-time work in Germany remains a very small sector for men,5 as elsewhere in the EU, it is a central source of employment for married women. Equally, in relation to employment trends, the evidence reviewed in this chapter records how modest the effort has been to reconcile labour market and familial roles, with the result that social protection measures contain perverse incentives reinforcing the traditional wifely role, especially in precipitating exit from full-time work. As we shall see, this is also true of such German innovations of the 1980s as the childrearing allowance and ‘baby year’ pension credits. The diverse and often conflicting goals of family social protection are mediated within a general scenario that is dominated by economic priorities, where demographic and family-centred priorities are secondary. Apart from exceptional countries, a strongly integrated policy line is improbable and, in any case, the direct outcomes of protection measures are difficult to judge. Two examples must suffice: impacts on birth rates are unlikely to be any more discernible than in the past (Gauthier, 1996); and the common demand in Europe for individualization of welfare entitlements for wives will require a multi-faceted strategy to overcome current internal conflicts in goals. It is, perhaps, particularly countries with ‘Bismarckian’ systems – anchored in labour-market based, contributory social insurance in which benefit levels are related to the levy extracted and, hence, to individual earnings – where the formulation of a coherent policy response will be not easily arrived at. Several of these states – (West) Germany and the Netherlands, for example – have low female participation rates. Added to this are the realities of low pay for most women which rules out founding their benefits on the earnings-related principle, if meeting the ‘adequacy principle’ – independent viability of entitlements – is the objective. Should such viability be attained, doubts might arise about the continued equity of measures that have sought to protect the financial interests of women by recognizing – and reinforcing – the contribution of women as homemakers. This has always been an arena for dispute and remains so, for example, in the German practice of splitting pension entitlements between the spouses, which in the large majority of cases are derived from the husband’s record. Modernization aimed at reconciling social security and taxation systems seems perpetually doomed to be an outstanding task. One of the urgent priorities concerns the regulation of inter- and intra-generational distribution of family wealth distribution which will engender a high degree of family cohesion while respecting greater plurality of its form. As but one

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example: part of this enterprise will entail strengthening incentives for voluntary savings and, in many countries, capital accummulation via owner occupation of housing. Contemporary changes in family structure go to the heart – the raison d’être – of social protection and challenge long-held and gendered assumptions, particularly with regard to contentious divisions routinely and statutorily made in attributing an inferior value to unpaid work as opposed to paid employment. Integral to the concerns of investigators who have taken up these issues has been the changing nature of inter-spousal dependency and axiomatic notions of justice and equality (see, for example, Leibfried and Ostner, 1991) and the distribution of command over resources within families (Hilliard, 1994). In the German context Nullmeier and Rüb (1993) examine how the formal reassessment of familial roles, in combination with demographic pre-occupations, have shaped the operationalization of a new family policy component in pension insurance since 1986, discussed later in this chapter. Policy developments of this kind demonstrate the potential for a high level of consensual renegotiation in Germany of liabilities between the principal actors within present welfare parameters. They are reassuring evidence of the positive benefits of ‘path dependency’ in German policymaking (Olk and Riedmüller, 1994). This should not detract from the fact that such favourable actions are being advanced on limited fronts. Too often, controversial questions about the evolving objectives of social security are being addressed piecemeal, raising the potential for extenuating the contradictions within and, hence, the legitimation of prevailing welfare models. Thus, one consequence is that such insurance tenets as the contributory principle – and, with it, transparency and corporate solidarity (the link between contributions and benefits for delimited occupational groupings) – are being relaxed in favour of a more universal approach. This departure aims at attaching value to the individual, not as a worker in a particular sector but as a citizen, an attempt which in some measure addresses equity issues inherent in the implicit social security ‘contracts’ between the genders – and especially between husbands and wives – and the generations. With sensitive restructuring, Döring (1995) maintains that a moderate relaxation of traditional principles could preserve the core of the German system in the interests of legitimacy if, as he claims, increases in insurance levies are more popularly tolerated than tax rises. Such policy departures, then, make deep but perhaps tolerable inroads into the post-war welfare accommodation. For one, they contribute to a reevaluation of ‘efficiency’ by extending criteria beyond mere budgetary allocations, since they point towards consideration of social and political


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dimensions that are equally fundamental. For example, does targeting reduce or reinforce poverty in its wider sense and act as a depressant on economic efficiency? Does it depress propensities for voluntary saving and, rather than act in a socially cohesive way, provoke resentments by those, especially straddling the welfare eligibility threshold, who may judge they are being unfairly penalized for their past economic prudence? Does greater emphasis on universalism and on services in kind,6 which seek to consolidate the position of individuals as ‘citizens’, dent contemporary political exhortations for their identification primarily as ‘consumers’ who have choices to make between service suppliers rather imposed delivery by statutory monopolies? Does growing reliance on ‘partial fiscalization’ (a contribution from state coffers derived from general taxation) with the stated aim of stabilizing funding sources, in fact, expose the social protection system to the vagaries of short-term general budgetary necessities and, hence, to crisis retrenchment measures?7 In sum, is there a threat to the popular legitimacy of the Bismarckian model which, for over one hundred years, has been grounded in the contributory social insurance ? Since many related issues are taken up elsewhere in this collection, here I will address three: the impact on family structures; the status of unpaid work and especially compensation for care; and emerging priorities such as greater effectiveness of targeting social security and its closer integration with recent labour market realities that have accentuated social exclusion. These policy revisions will be implemented in a situation of incremental change in the distribution of state and family responsibilities. Fundamental will be directions of funding liabilities and forms of funding – possibly incorporating some input from VAT or eco-taxes, as debated in Germany and elsewhere since the 1980s, the interaction with other compensation mechanisms, the appropriate equilibrium between cash and in-kind benefits, and the role of the statutory and non-statutory sectors.

FAMILY STRUCTURES AND SOCIAL PROTECTION Social protection issues in European family policy envelope demographic considerations, the balance between actions validating traditional family units and those sanctioning new formations, such as lone parenthood and non-conventional partnerships, assumptions about the symmetry of marital reciprocities and the lengthening interpretations of dependent childhood.

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Fuelled by offical predictions, in the popular and political imagination the ageing of the western European population is attaining alarming proportions. Some commentators have gone as far as suggesting that the conjuncture of demographic, economic and marital trends amounts to the most far-reaching change since the Industrial Revolution. In particular, the German ‘demographic timebomb’ has been judged as incurring especially grave budgetary consequences: historically low birth rates are accompanied by rising life expectancy;8 and, indeed, Eurostat projections of the German pensioner dependency ratio in 2020, at 51.3, are exceeded only by Italy (CEC, 1991). Demographic speculations of this order have been exploited tendentiously, but demographers and politicians are divided about the actual policy sequelae for future generations. Thus, although developments since the early 1970s have been advanced as a ‘second demographic transformation’ (Kuijsten et al., 1994), the degree to which in reality there are observable discontinuities is contested (Coleman, 1996). As for the implications for German policy, the current Federal Labour Minister Blüm views the pensions situation, for example, in a reasonably sanguine light, maintaining that historically the revenues of the schemes are more closely linked to economic growth rates than to crude cohort sizes or dependency ratios (Mangen, 1996a). There are other phlegmatic speculations: Grundy (1996) notes that among present and immediate pensioner populations there is a high rate of the currently married, presumably with an automatic source of personal care, although domestic situations in old age will substantially change for baby-boomers born after 1950. Family policies in all but a handful of modern states can scarcely be judged as neutral in terms of natalism and parenting, yet none has been as sensitive as West Germany with regard to pro-natalist ambitions. Most countries espouse the two-parent model, whilst implicitly allocating the essential caring role to mothers. Far-reaching ambiguities in goals find their policy nexus in enduring contradictions between those interventions purporting to reinforce gender relations and those attempting reconstruction (Chamberlayne, 1993): between social protection measures that aim to privilege women as ‘own right’ citizens and those advancing their status as dependent spouses. Governments in most states have been reticent about straying too far in the legislative basis from traditional assumptions about family structures and responsibilities to take account of a greater plurality of family relations. This diversity is demonstrated, among other factors, by changes in the nature of multi-generational families, the increase in monoparental and single-offspring households, as well as by the growing numbers of parents in reconstituted families with bi-familial responsibilities.9 So far too many social protection and taxation systems


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have been laggard in their responses, typically relying on ad hoc measures that have produced many status anomalies. In the German case, Kaufman (cited by Kuijsten et al., 1994) indicts these failings as a ‘structured lack of consideration’ of the internal consistencies of policy output. Despite recent innovations, central to the partial renegotiation of conservative social protection regimes such as Germany’s has been the confirmation of the husband as principal breadwinner and the linchpin of financial solidarity – provider as opposed to carer – within the family setting, in turn defining the dependency of other adult members. That this has become a prime source of instability in spousal relations is incontrovertible, but what remains contested is the utilization of social security measures to advance gender equality within internal family dynamics. In large measure resource-sharing between spouses has been unproblematically assumed, although admittedly some benefits have been specifically allocated to mothers in order to guarantee some independent source of income. It is not at all clear how a ‘modernization’ of social protection would be popularly received if it implies a real incorporation of male heads of households into the ‘equation of care’, since as Ostner (1995) argues, such an endeavour would entail forming new solidarities which are substantially alien to current mainstream interpretations of marital partnership. In Germany such a project, if deemed desirable, will necessarily be long-term: for one, the male full-time blue-collar sector has held up better here than elsewhere;3 furthermore, sixty per cent of women over 25 years old are currently living with their husbands and the contribution of women to earned family income, at 15 per cent, is about half that of Sweden, a ratio even lower for those with small children (Zimmermann, 1993). Nevertheless, the male full-time blue-collar labour market on which the breadwinner model is predicated is increasingly under threat. Together with the profusion of family formations, the rise of dual-income, female-waged and ‘no waged’ families, long-held presumptions about internal familial solidarities are progressively redundant for many households. One outcome is that prevailing assumptions in discretionary benefits of the family’s fund of solidarity in terms of its ability to subsidize its neediest members may require serious overhauling (Offe, 1991). German policies assume lifelong marriage and what has been interpreted as symmetrical partnership, and the social catholic tenet of subsidiarity in interpreting family responsibilities. Family policies in the last thirty years have pursued volatile directions: German child benefits and tax allowances have been revised, varyingly abolished and subsequently reintroduced. An indirect result of these shifting priorities has been that the provision of in-kind services for the care of infants (and the elderly) is relatively underdeveloped (Borchorst, 1994).

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A cornerstone of German social security is the assumption of the naturalness of marriage. Pensions are largely a function of the husband’s labour market activity. Moreover, tax allowances for couples are progressive. Thus, it is marriage per se, rather than childbearing, that confers advantage and means, for example, that a divorced childless woman is better off than her equivalent who never married (Scheiwe, 1994). Marriage is a prerequisite for receipt of widow’s benefit and remarriage shifts dependency from the former to the new husband. Entitlement accumulation via marriage can have seriously deleterious impacts in terms of an abrupt cessation of welfare rights on dissolution (Hauser, 1995): pension-splitting between spouses ends with divorce and continued eligibility for the ex-wife’s sickness cover is also affected. Located in this statutory preference in Europe for conventional marriage is the problematic position of single parents and cohabitees (Schluter, 1995). Eurostat data for 1996 indicate that almost one EU child in ten is reared by a lone parent. In Germany, although the old (in comparison to the new) Länder have comparatively low rates of divorce, lone parenthood and extra-marital births (CEC, 1995b), the number of sole mothers is set to rise substantially, since current Eastern divorce rates are double those of the West and already one-fifth of its households are headed by mothers alone. Even if full-time occupational rates of lone mothers are considerably above those of married women, the precariousness of their employment status is also more typical (Ostner, 1995). A general entitlement deficit has been reported in respect of lone parents in many European protection systems (George and Taylor-Gooby, 1996). German lone mothers are particularly handicapped by the dearth of infant care opportunities, which reduces their availability for full-time work, the routine criterion for receipt of unemployment compensation. However, at least in the interpretation of German social assistance regulations, there is a measure of flexibility which may offer possible avenues for future expansion: lone parent claimants may be offered additional discounts on earned income if they have high work-related expenses or, alternatively, free child care; and they also have access to certain tax and housing allowances (Evans, 1996). It is the never-married mothers who comprise the most vulnerable group. They are the victims of residualization in welfare models robustly grounded in marital and labour market status (Hobson, 1994; Orloff, 1996). Whilst data for the 1980s deriving from the EU Poverty Two Programme indicate that the Union’s children are exposed to twice the average risk of poverty, it is those living with lone parents or in large families that are most at risk. Evaluations are highly sensitive to the indicator


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employed. According to Bradshaw (1993), the net ‘horizontal distributional effort’ in respect of German lone parents with several children is less than for couples, although lone parents with only one child are treated more generously. Drawing on data from his cross-national investigation, Lawson (1996) assesses that, in general, German lone parents are exposed to a greater-than-EU-average disparity of net income when compared to marital partners. Crucially, the benefits of existing social entitlements for single parents may be more apparent than real. The German childrearing allowance, for example, is of little effective value to most lone mothers, since at best it is set at too low a level to provide other than minimum subsistence support, even when combined with the typical remuneration from part-time work. The inevitable result is that many of these mothers opt either to stay in the full-time labour force or to make their exit in order to claim social assistance (Kahn and Kammerman, 1994). Ultimately, the economic status of lone parents is highly dependent on whether they are in full-time employment (Lister, 1995), a status varying considerably among EU member states: forty per cent of lone mothers in Germany, the UK and Netherlands are working full-time compared to over seventy per cent in Sweden and France where regimes actively assist lone mothers into the workforce (Bradshaw, 1996). Finally, brief comments should be made on two rapidly emerging issues. One relates to high youth employment and lengthening tertiary education. The consequence is that in some states recent policy regulating the status of children has prolonged dependency well into early adult life. Although in the Netherlands there is a statutory expectation of financial independence for those over 18 (Lister, 1994), German child benefit, for example, has been extended to 21 years for the unemployed and for students to 27 years. Dependency rules arising from the German subsidiarity principle and governing relations between parent and child have also been held in abeyance in certain situations: the statutory right to incorporate the means of parents or working children in assessing unemployment assistance for either party is, in general, not being applied (Schluter, 1995) and the two-generational criteria for assessing entitlement to social assistance is now less strictly enforced (Evans, 1996). The other issue refers to the under-legislated area of extending rights beyond conventional heterosexual contractual partnerships. Whereas proponents of the status quo argue that marriage is a legally binding commitment and is the only form of partnership that should confer entitlements, critics suggest that extending these rights to other couples would greatly assist the individualization and equalization of rights (Gilbert, 1994). More problematic still are homosexual partnerships. While in some countries there have been recent

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amendments improving their status, in most there are serious dysjunctions between rights and liabilities, particularly with regard to tax allowances for dependent relationships and access to discretionary benefits, including social assistance and lump sum pension awards.

REPRIORITIZING FAMILY OBJECTIVES IN SOCIAL PROTECTION In all but a handful of countries, prevailing family measures amount to inadequate compensation for total childcare costs, still less a viable minimum income guarantee. It is mothers who have been most exposed to vagaries of these policy failures. Whatever the model of social protection, there are contemporary manifestations in all EU states of a gendered twotiered social citizenship in which men gain favoured access to benefits as entitlements. Though the rate varies internationally, many more women are relegated to means-tested and discretionary non-contributory benefit (Sainsbury, 1993; Orloff, 1996). Restrictive eligibility such as minimum continuous contributory periods or hours worked, particularly in regard to pensions, have been cited as a contributory cause of the ‘feminization of poverty’ with the result that in some member states, including Germany, social assistance and ‘relict’-derived rather than employment-related pensions comprise the majority of entitlements for elderly women (Scheiwe, 1994). But, whilst universal benefits would tend to reduce gender bias (Sainsbury, 1993) and reduce the number of female-headed ‘assistantial’ families, they do carry the risk of exacerbating incentives for self-exclusion from labour markets (Lister, 1995). The total impact of family change and the interaction of allied policy is, of course, specific to each country. Germany has one of the lowest current birth rates in Europe and even optimistic projections suggest that, although the rate could increase to the end of the decade, the relative position of the country will be unchanged (Joshi, 1996); one marriage in five may well be child-free (Nave-Herz, 1989). Yet a budgetary policy has remained inherently conservative: thus, maternity and family expenditures in 1992 consumed under nine per cent of social protection expenditure, which is an outlay less than that of France or the UK (CEC, 1995a). Despite important advances – to be discussed later – a full socialization of risk paid through general taxation in the form of a universal ‘citizenship’ minimum benefit has been consistently rejected by the governing coalition. Nevertheless, recent German action on family protection has been more expansionary and, to some degree, is compromising the traditional social insurance model. Significantly, the restitution principle


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(monetary reparation for loss or effort expended) has been extended into compensation for limited forms of non-remunerated domestic care. If the logic of these innovations were to be fully followed through it would entail a move in the un-Bismarckian direction of privileging welfare need and redistribution, a greater degree of targeting and, over the long term, realigning the balance between the traditional German trinity of Versicherung (insurance), Versorgung (solidarity or citizenship payments) and Fürsorge (discretionary assistance) in favour of solidarity solutions. As a longer-term aim, within this formula the existing social protection system could be more effectively utilized to support ‘life-course regimes’, intervening to alleviate periods of need or risk during the various phases of life. (Leibfried and Leisering, 1995).

MONETARIZING INFORMAL CARE Monetarization is but one strand of a restructuring of the notion of the (male) breadwinner and, with it, dependency in social protection arrangements which at every level have routinely distinguished between the value of paid and unpaid work, a direct outcome of state subsidiarity in regulating remuneration of what are regarded as private domestic duties. Though there is a serious outstanding task here, a certain political fiat has already been injected since the mid-1980s by incorporating into entitlement calculations a limited number of non-remunerated but socially valued tasks – which extends political regulation, as well as performing the important macro-economic function of siphoning off surplus labour (Nullmeier and Rüb, 1993). The three elements of unpaid work that have been introduced into the ‘own right’ calculation of German social security entitlements, along with the establishment of the French minimum social income (Revenu Minimum d’Insertion or RMI), are some of the few recent innovations in European social protection. For the most part they relate to child and elder care, having been adapted from elsewhere, principally from Scandinavia. To what degree these recent entitlements bear a significant effect on ‘decommodification’ – perhaps better defined by McLaughlin and Glendinning (1994) as ‘de-familialization’ (which confers on individual adult family members a viable source of independent income) – is contested; but they are a clear policy pathway for the future and merit some detailed discussion here. The innovations are: a childrearing allowance for infants; pension credits for motherhood; and, latterly, care benefits and attendant allowances for the disabled and frail elderly. Interestingly – and

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providing pointers to the future – they combine extensions of universal entitlement with an infusion of means-testing. Equally significant, they further formalize familial duty to supply care, a liability which has been extended by the statutory requirement of individuals to make provisions via insurance for the possibility of a later future need for long-term care. The result of these recent policies is that a significant expansion of formal payment for care has entered the family arena long after the state conceded compensation for child care. Rewarding current childrearing Writing from a largely British perspective, Harker (1996) formulates a three-tier model of child care compensation of an ideal type, embracing individualized entitlements, a flat-rate child benefit and supplementary childrearing allowance. These, together with active labour market policies and progressive taxation (she speculates) would enhance the redistributive impact of family social protection while offering real choice to mothers as regards seeking employment. She concedes that this costly alternative is approximated currently only in Sweden and Denmark. She also admits that her model espouses a particular kind of ‘modern’ family. The issue of whether social protection should fully compensate for the decision to have children has proved enduringly controversial and it has been fashionable in some countries for proponents of ‘new right’ views to speculate that enhancing entitlement could merely encourage irresponsible ‘welfare breeding’ among the poor whilst providing little to stimulate the better-off to have children. At present there is considerable variation among Western European countries in the degree to which the sum of childcare provisions offers mothers, particularly of infants, an effective choice between staying at home and freely entering – as opposed to being dragooned into – the labour market, especially as full-time workers. These issues are taken up by Ostner in this volume. As for Germany, West and East had different perceptions of female labour market roles, but since unification it is the Western model of encouraging mothers of young children to stay at home that has prevailed. As argued earlier, German family protection has been sluggish in response, volatile and dubiously selective. Like the UK, the country has at different times operated a combined tax and benefit system and a benefitonly system with the abolition of tax allowances. Until 1995 there were means-tested progressive benefits up to the fourth child (LohkampHimmighofen, 1994). In attempt at streamlining tax and benefit provisions, reform introduced in 1996 offers parents the ability to choose either


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the child benefit or a tax allowance on the basis of their incomes (Bundesregierung, 1996). Although low-income households receive additional payments in lieu of their failure to benefit from tax allowances (until the 1996 reform), civil servants, too, receive additional non-contributory allowances. In terms of targeting child poverty, allocative efficiency, equity and redistribution, the impact of the principal family measures – child allowances, tax allowances and the childrearing allowance – is, as Schütte (1995) maintains, particularly opaque with regard to their connexion to stated political intentions. The present lack of transparency suggests a possible ‘value for money’ policy line in the future, especially as current outcomes dent the increasingly sensitive issue of the generation contract by imposing high opportunity costs on the fecund working woman. Indeed, the childrearing allowance which replaced maternity leave in 1986 and subsidizes child care for up to the first two years of life was intended to ameliorate the situation.10 But reservations have been expressed about the actual gains accruing, since the benefit, although also available to working men, inevitably acts to reinforce gender divisions of care, particularly as the restrictions on the number of weekly working hours for its receipt fly in the face of the realities of many sectors of the German labour market. Added to this, some CDU-governed states have supplemented the benefits on the proviso of complete labour market withdrawal (Zimmermann, 1993). All in all, as stated earlier, the availability of the benefit is an incentive for the low-wage earning mother to exit the fulltime labour market, given high childcare costs, although – combined with part-time work or receipt of social or unemployment assistance – it at least provides some women with the barest subsistence income (Schütte, 1995). Notwithstanding these restrictions, which arise essentially from amendable political decisions, the benefit is an indicator of future orientations of family social protection in Germany and elsewhere. Conditions for receipt could be relaxed pragmatically to take account of any significant changes in female and, for that matter, male employment activity – perhaps ultimately extending the allowance, with varying tax clawbacks, to full-time working mothers, when conjunctural indicators signify a need to reduce the incentive for labour market withdrawal. Rewarding past childrearing Given the popularity of the decision by Chancellor Kohl to instigate ‘baby year’ pension credits added to the calculation entitlement, it is worth noting that initially the CDU/CSU were sceptical about such an innovation. There were misgivings that extraneous objectives were being added

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to income maintenance policy in old age, that the valuing of the credits would be problematic and, perhaps above all, that they committed pension funds to additional liabilities at a time when budgetary containment and flexibility were prime considerations. Neverthless, they were enacted in 1986, at roughly the same time as in France, as a tactical gesture by a Chancellor under serious electoral threat in the states. Available to either parent born after 1921 (1927 in the new Länder) – though overwhelmingly benefiting mothers – the credit was initially set at one year’s contribution for periods out of the workforce in order to raise children up to the age of ten, but was tripled within the space of a few years for children born after 1992. Official reticence about the credit is evidenced in the value of recognition afforded to parenthood or, better said, motherhood. Entitlement was set at 75 rather than 100 per cent of average earnings. Pointedly, there is a disincentive for continued labour market participation, since earned credits of those on at least average incomes cannot be simultaneously combined with those derived from the ‘baby years’. The credits do signify an imperfect recognition of the long-term contribution of motherhood and, at least, will in small measure add to income maintenance in old age and could reduce resort to social assistance. Admittedly, at present, for most of the older generation of mothers the credit is of marginal importance.11 The minority who continued to work full-time during the early years of their child’s life or who paid voluntary insurance levies derive no credits, since they have already established their rights via insurance. Those who did not work at all, or worked in part-time positions which were not liable to insurance indemnity, also do not qualify unless they have had five children to meet the statutory contribution threshold of five years for pensions receipt. To what extent the ‘baby years’ will ultimately substantially enhance future mothers’ pensions status is open to conjecture, since much depends on their propensity to remain in employment attracting insurance liability after the birth of their children and, in any case, any major expenditure outlays are thirty years hence. In part, the credits were conceded as an alternative to a more radical choice of a minimum social pension guarantee (which many in the feminist lobby would have preferred) and represent what Offe (1992) castigates as but another element of ‘conservative state feminism’. Nonetheless, the credits do go a little way towards individualizing ‘own right’ social security entitlements. Their introduction was also employed as a partial justification for the abolition of a differential pension age. This cost containment measure complements an earlier decision to means-test survivors’ benefits, after being extended to widowers on the grounds of gender equality (van Oorschot and Schell, 1991).


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Rewarding adult care The growing salience of the issue of the disabled (and especially care of the elderly) on the social security agenda has prompted several EU states to take action for its long-term regulation. Others are currently considering options. The dominant policy line has been to seek effective replacements for non-contributory benefits and services paid by social assistance through statutory social insurance, private indemnity or a combination. Apart from guaranteeing the viability of funding, a secondary objective has been to simplify liabilities and reduce illogicalities and inequities. These are inherent in many existing systems that routinely have sought to operationalize distinctions between ‘health’ and ‘social’ services and medical ‘treatment’ as opposed to social ‘care’. A further consideration has been to devise policies relatively free of strong disincentives to save for or in old age. This has long been a contested area, given the widespread use of means-testing of domiciliary and residential care services, a practice which has been regarded as particularly penalizing in countries with high rates of owner occupation among the current and future elderly. Consequently, preference is being given to replacing the supply of services on arbitrary tests of need and means by guarantees of pre-determined entitlements. Private insurance schemes which have sometimes involved capitalizing on housing values share a common disincentive of being voluntary, requiring heavy premiums and offering in return a relatively unattractive package of services. At the time of writing, the UK government has been investigating ways of combining initial personal liability for intensive care with subsequent state-funded guarantees for those with longer-term need. Collectivizing costs through compulsory care insurance seems the only viable alternative to existing models, especially in countries with comparatively few owner-occupiers with housing assets to realize in old age. After intense debate – and considerable delay in comparison to the Netherlands, for example – a variant of this form of funding has been introduced in Germany. Significantly, the German scheme demonstrates a continuing political commitment to statutory social insurance within the existing plural system, in part reflecting the anxiety to repatriate responsibilities more firmly within federal fiscal control. This solution provides important signposts for the future of social security in general in that several key traditional principles have been relaxed and liabilities combined in new ways. Reliance on the employer contribution was neutralized in most of the federal states by the docking of a statutory public holiday. Furthermore, the new scheme permits alternative insurance by allowing

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cover – which unlike health care is compulsory for all income groups – to be contracted through private underwriters, thereby stimulating an element of competition. There is also an explicit commitment to regulating the quality of services supply through official accreditation. Federal subsidies, primarily for capital investment, have been available from its inception and not simply as ad hoc measures to remedy deficits. It is significant, too, that benefits are uniform and not income-related. Care insurance departs from the principle of adequacy in that what is offered is a limited rather than open-ended care package: in particular, full reimbursement of 24-hour domiciliary care is excluded, in part to stimulate voluntary supplementary private cover to fund the residual, with the possibility of future tax concessions (Scheil-Adlung, 1995). Officially, the prime objective is to empower the individual with real effective choice between limited packages of care, including the options of institutional and domiciliary care, and the ability to select between formal and family care. How effective the latter option will be within the current benefit levels is debatable. However, certain guarantees to respite services are offered to carers who, in addition, have access to new benefits and, hence, a supplementary source of family income. Clearly the scheme is oriented to resolving what have been problematic responsibilities for funding the care of average and low-income elderly populations. The medium-term goal is to promote the CDU preference for self-reliance and relieve burdens on state and local authority social assistance budgets, although the impact will take time to filter through since, unlike private insurance schemes, social care insurance will not provide full statutory cover in the short term.12

FAMILY PROTECTION AND WIDER SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM In this final section, I want to examine some general issues which are central in emerging approaches to resolving the problems of efficiency and equity. Here, I restrict myself to the implications of dual labour markets; measures concerned with social exclusion, particularly among the longterm unemployed; and the interaction of benefits and taxation in determining total welfare efforts. As I discussed earlier, labour market transformations are belatedly impacting on Germany and are slowly opening up wider, albeit often precarious employment opportunities – to German mothers, amongst others. They are rendering increasingly redundant the post-war assumptions of the male breadwinner and the ‘family wage’ as the linchpin of centralized


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negotiations in the German skilled manual sector. In fact, the consequences go far beyond narrow social security considerations and challenge the neo-corporatist social partnership model of decision-making organized largely in the interests of working men. Although several authors have argued that part-time work is often elected rather than enforced (Land, 1994; Hakim, 1996), many of the developments in this ‘atypical’ sector evade social insurance coverage in one way or another and constitute an important element in expanding dual labour markets. Despite attempts to regulate part-time work within insurance, partly as a result of ECJ rulings, protection systems continue to privilege the status of the full-time employee. Minimum thresholds of hours worked for access to social insurance now appear increasingly irrelevant. One means of preserving entitlements could be a form of ‘modularization’, which would allow credits to be accumulated and maintained over much longer contributory periods than is current. A policy of this kind would reduce the existing gender biases in income maintenance. To be sure, it could form but one element of a wider stragegy to regulate atypical work. Not all EU governments have been willing to extend entitlements in this area, arguing that job creation rather than social protection must take priority. Beyond statutory schemes it must be admitted that there are also problems of accommodating atypical work arising, for example, from the growth of supplementary occupational pensions (Bieback, 1993). Proponents of a minimum wage and a guaranteed minimum social benefit, perhaps on the lines of the French RMI, anchor their case in social citizenship and the debilitating manifestations of social exclusion. The debate on a social minimum has been waged in Germany for about twenty years with little concrete effect save for the ‘social supplement’, a de facto minimum benefit paid temporarily to some East German pensioners. There are predictable objections on the right that the benefit is superfluous, given the availability of social assistance. Critics of the benefit point to empirical evidence of the creation of moral hazards by its potential for raising work disincentives and welfare dependency. Such a move would impose extra and unwelcome burdens on the social budget and delegitimize social insurance by abandoning the contributory principle. Conversely, proponents on the left, including some among the social policy wing of the CDU, judge the guarantee of a social minimum as essential in order to break dependency, especially on the primary labour market, to encourage effective social participation and to temper the excesses of social exclusion. It is clear that if the stipulations of the 1992 EU Recommendation on the convergence of social protection were fully implemented everywhere,

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a social minimum benefit would be accompanied by a greater resort to targeting, perhaps with the establishment of explicit criteria promoting greater social cohesion. The universality principle will still find a place since, as Atkinson (1993a) has demonstrated, it also frequently incurs an element of conditionality. The greater emphasis on targeting is likely to incorporate wider preventive measures, by attempts at effective integration with economic and labour market investment priorities, active antiexclusion rather than passive compensatory interventions, actions to curb fraud, and possibly more scope for ‘no claims’ bonuses in operation, for example, in some private health insurance schemes. On the other hand, low take-up of targeted and means-tested benefits implies the need for a more active policy effort. Studies since the 1980s have consistently estimated the uptake of German social assistance as being in the range of fifty per cent (see, for example, Schneider, 1993). Moreover, Bieback (1993) cautions against a potential profusion of targeting and meanstesting which could complicate welfare statuses, particularly of mothers, who may rely on disparate sources of income encumbering the ability to combine effective entitlements to benefits with part-time work. The current policy horizons are clear. Targeting and the search for greater efficiency will be pursued in Germany through the modernization of existing measures such as social assistance and unemployment assistance (a federal second-line, means-tested benefit) by affording access to certain groups currently excluded and reforming the rules of access for others. The federal division of responsibilities for social assistance funding has been a thorny issue in Germany since the early 1980s, which was an era of severe fiscal pressures on local authorities, the principal funders. There has been a more than threefold increase in the number of claimants, a rate of growth much faster than that of France or the UK, although the total proportion of recipients among the population in 1992, at four per cent, is far smaller. Several causes are indicted: the rising costs of elderly care, claims by lone parent families, refugees and so forth; but what has caused particular alarm is the number of claimants among the unemployed whose entitlement to insurance benefits has expired. In 1991, fifteen per cent of the unemployed were receiving social assistance: one-third of Western and two-thirds of Eastern claimants cited this contingency as the principal grounds for the claim (Schütte, 1995). Added to this, about onefifth of those registered unemployed have no right to claim (for example, the young job-seeker and many housewives of working husbands). The close link between unemployment and assistential benefit is relatively new and alien to the German model of social protection. In this policy environment social assistance and unemployment compensation are


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now being subject to major review to take account of the realities of labour market and wider social change. Social assistance legislation dates from 1961, a time when the benefit was intended to be a residual aid primarily for the physically and mentally disabled and the indigent elderly. Recent evidence indicates that although there is a considerable annual turnover among recipients, claimant chronicity is predictably high among the elderly, lone mothers and other poor families (Leibfried and Leisering, 1995). The percentage of children under fifteen in claimant families has risen more than threefold since 1980, the highest rate of growth of any cohort (Neuhäuser, 1995). Among many criticisms of the provisions is the complaint that, if it ever did, the benefit no longer fulfils its original objective of ‘help for self help’ but, rather, institutionalizes subsistence welfare dependency. In reforming social and unemployment assistance, the Germans have several opportunities for learning lessons from fellow EU states. These include more effective integration with other elements of social protection, flexibilizing connections with labour market participation and other benefit receipt, or adopting a more contractual active policy format along the lines of the French RMI. Current proposals indicate a continuation of a conservative trajectory with modest advances towards greater flexibility but with tighter labour market stipulations. For example, among measures announced in 1996, which gave rise to mass public demonstrations, was the attempt to encourage part-time employment, which would also become liable to insurance cover, and stricter measures concerning redundancy payments in part to stimulate its use for investment in self-employment. Lesson-learning in Germany has fallen short of attributing in future social security a much greater role for private insurance. This sector, in terms of total volume of expenditure, is comparatively small in Germany and is largely confined to private health insurance for high earners and relatively small supplementary pensions. In deliberating the various means of funding long-term care, Chancellor Kohl ignored the privatizing predelictions of his junior FDP partners and opted, instead, for a solution principally within statutory insurance. His government also vetoed a proposed EU directive on private pensions because of its potentially negative consequences for the German statutory system. If the alleviation of poverty and social exclusion is to move higher on the agenda, social protection and taxation systems will require new mechanisms ensuring closer alliance. Data produced by the Luxembourg Income Study indicate that the total German welfare impact (benefits and taxation) in reducing gross income poverty is above the European average of the countries in the sample (Mitchell, 1991). Critically, however, unlike

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the situation within the narrower confines of family benefits, the burden of general welfare effort falls on the insurance contributor rather than the taxpayer. Income ceilings for contribution levies and non-contributory benefits enjoyed by civil servants render this route to providing welfare to the most needy deeply inequitable and increasingly resented, given that it has also been a favoured medium for financing German unification. The stable of studies undertaken by the European Observatory on National Family Policies suggests that, owing to the major impact of taxation, the German family package is more generous for the higher-earning couple, although reforms to be introduced in 1996 will limit these privileges. But in the EU of the Twelve, Germany and France – each with different motives – were among the very few member states where combined allowances were not completely negated by the costs of child care (Ditch et al., 1996). It is easy to speculate that, whatever the government, more activity will be invested in Germany in streamlining total welfare impacts. However, a form of negative income tax which could be as economical as social assistance (Wagner, 1994) – although not without problems when spousal resource sharing is assumed – seems irrevocably rejected. Nonetheless, as a result of Constitutional Court rulings, action in this area is already on the agenda, in the form of removing exposure to taxation for those on incomes at or below subsistence level (OECD, 1995). A Commission chaired by Finance Minister Waigel is currently examining these issues. Modernization of taxation is unavoidable, if the exigencies of family change, among other contingencies, are to be more appropriately accommodated. In general, what will be required is a broader trawl of liabilities whilst protecting the lower end of the income distribution, whatever the source. This endeavour will require some hard thinking about the costs and benefits of current arrangements and, among other factors, about how married women are treated, what politically sanctioned roles will be allocated to them, and especially their position in future labour markets. This will find resonance in other EU states. In his analysis of fiscal and social welfare, Atkinson (1993b) concludes that mothers’ employment is acutely sensitive to the combined effects of tax and benefits. In the German situation, in particular, the retention of tax-splitting for married couples has quite specific effects, encouraging wives with earning potentials much lower than their husbands to exit labour markets or face what EspingAnderson (1995) judges as punitive total tax takes. The ultimate effect is to reinforce the male breadwinner model. A last consideration: it might seem curious that a chapter speculating on the future of social protection has paid limited regard to the role of the EU. The high-water mark of EU policy endeavour in terms of concrete


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obligatory policies was the ill-fated draft Directive of the mid-80s specifying that parental leave should be shared between partners. A Directive on individualization of social entitlements almost met with a negative response. Since then, the Commission’s priority has been developing protection measures that are more job creation-‘friendly’ (CEC, 1996). Growing emphasis on subsidiarity within the EU has reinforced the position that most aspects of family life lie in a strictly private sphere outside its competence (Ostner and Lewis, 1995). Thus, the prospects for further convergence in this arena, where the policy outcome has been an accumulation of derogations, downgrading and implementational delay and revisionism, are scarcely propitious (Mangen, 1996b). In any case, the intervention of Brussels is essentially double-edged: the 1992 Recommendation on social protection implies budgetary expansion, especially for southern countries, whilst the Maastricht convergence criteria give the incentive for governments to impose cuts where it is easiest – and that, all too frequently, is in the social budget.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

Social Protection Budgets as a percentage of GDP in 1993 amounted to approximately 28 per cent in West Germany and the UK and 31 per cent for France and all Germany (CEC, 1995a). Current per capita expenditures on social protection in 1993 in ECU were 5,380 in Germany (the second highest in the EU), 5,046 in France and 4,182 in the UK. Data are in purchasing power standards (CEC, 1995a). The percentage of the civilian population employed in the industrial sector in 1993 at 38.0 per cent is the highest of the then EU states, although since 1980 this represents an almost seven percentage points fall (CEC, 1981; 1995a). In fact, German social security, at about 21 per cent of labour costs in 1992, was about average in the EU (compared with 26 per cent in Italy and 13 per cent in the UK). Similarly, the employer contribution amounted to 40 per cent of the total revenue, compared to about 50 per cent in both France and Italy and 26 per cent in the UK (CEC, 1995a). The proportion of men working part-time in Germany is particularly low and in 1993 accounted for only 2.9 per cent of the total. In France and UK the figures were 4.1 and 6.6 per cent respectively . On the other hand, a higher percentage of German than French women work part-time – 32 as opposed to 26 per cent, both far lower than in the UK at 44 per cent (OECD, 1996). Contrary to the conventional view that Germany has marginalized the provision of benefits in kind, the latest Eurostat data indicate an aboveEU-average proportional expenditure on this sector, partly as a result of trends since the late 1980s (CEC, 1995a)

78 7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12.

Social Transformation and the Family German government contributions to social protection in 1992 accounted for 26 per cent of total revenues, compared with under 20 per cent in France, 30 per cent in Italy and 43 per cent in the UK (CEC, 1995a). In Germany, the gender gap of life expectancy at birth favouring women is over six years, approximately the same as the EU average. In the larger EU states about fifteen per cent of the population is over 65 years old (CEC, 1994). In Germany, although multi-generational households are in decline, the number of three- and four-generation families has increased. The number of offspring per divorced couple has also fallen (Nave-Herz, 1989). Recipients have the guarantee of a right to return to the same status of work with the same employer after an absence not exceeding three years. The benefit is means-tested after six months, during which it offers about onequarter of average net replacement earnings; thereafter it is strongly incomerelated. The burden of funding has been moved from general taxation to the pension schemes. In 1996 the monthly amount in the pension derived from the baby year was 34 DM (approximately 65 ECU) per child (Bundesregierung, 1996). Initially the benefits are being paid without a qualifying insurance period, but this will be gradually introduced, with the aim that by the year 2000 claimants must have at least five years’ contribution record within the last ten years.

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Leibfried, S. and I. Ostner (1991), ‘The Particularism of West German Welfare Capitalism: The Case of Women’s Social Security’ in M. Adler et. al (eds), The Sociology of Social Security. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Lister, R. (1994), ‘She has other duties: Women, Citizenship and Social Security’ in S. Baldwin and J. Falkingham (eds), Social Security and Social Change. London: Rivers Oram. Lohkamp-Himmighofen, M. (1994), ‘The Institutional Dimension of FamilyEmployment Relations in Germany’ in M-T. Letablier and L. Hantrais (eds), Cross National Research Papers. Fourth Series, No. 2: ‘Family-Employment Relations’. Mangen, S. (1996a), ‘German Welfare and Social Citizenship’ in G. Smith, W-E Paterson and S. Padgett (eds), Developments In German Politics 2. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Mangen, S. (1996b), ‘Social Security in the Post-Maastricht Union’ in S. Stavridis, H. Machin and E. Mossialos (eds), Maastricht and Beyond. The EU Politics and Policy. London: Dartmouth. McLaughlin, E. and C. Glendinning (1994), ‘Paying for Care in Europe: Is there a Feminist Approach?’ in Cross National Research Papers. Third Series 3 No. 3, ‘Family Policy and the Welfare of Women’. Mitchell, D. (1991), Income Transfers in Ten Welfare States. London: Avebury. Nave-Herz, R. (1989), ‘The Significance of the Family and Marriage in the Federal Republic of Germany’ in P. Close (ed.), Family Divisions and Inequalities in Modern Society. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Neuhäuser, J. (1995), ‘Sozialhilfeempfänger’ in Wirtschaft und Statistik, No. 9, 704–718. Nullmeier, F. and F. Rüb (1993), Die Transformation der Sozialpolitik. Frankfurt: Campus. Offe, C. (1991), ‘Smooth Consolidation in the West German Welfare State: Structural Change, Fiscal Policies and Populist Politics’ in F. Fox Piven (ed.), Labour Parties in Postindustrial Society. Oxford: Polity Press. Olk, T. and B. Riedmüller (1994), ‘Grenzen des Sozialversicherungsstaates oder grenzenloser Sozialversicherungsstaat? Eine Einführung’ in B. Riedmüller and T. Olk (eds), Grenzen des Sozialversicherungsstaates. Leviathan Sonderheft, No. 14, pp. 9–33. OECD (1995), Economic Survey: Germany 1995. Paris: OECD. OECD (1996), Economies at a Glance: Structural Indicators. Paris: OECD. Ostner, I. and J. Lewis (1995), ‘Gender and the Evolution of European Social Policies’ in S. Leibfried and P. Pierson (eds), European Social Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. Ostner, I. (1995), ‘Wandel der Familienformen und soziale Sicherung der Frau oder: Von der Status zur Passagensicherung’ in D. Döring and R. Hauser (eds), Soziale Sicherung in Gefahr. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Sainsbury, D. (1993), ‘Dual Welfare and Sex Segregation of Access to Social Benefits’ in Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 22, pp. 69–98. Scheil-Adlung, X. (1995), ‘Social Security for Dependent Persons in Germany and Other Countries: Between Tradition and Innovation’ in International Social Security Review, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 19–34. Scheiwe, K. (1994), ‘German Pension Insurance, Gendered Times and Stratification’ in D. Sainsbury (ed.), Gendering Welfare States. London: Sage. Schneider, U. (1993), Solidarpakt gegen die Schwachen. Munich: Knaur Verlag.


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Schütte, W. (1995), ‘Unemployment, the Threat of Poverty and Social Security in Germany’ in K. Funken and P. Cooper (eds), Old and New Poverty: The Challenge for Reform. London: Rivers Oram. van Oorschot W., and J. Schell (1991), ‘Means Testing in Europe: A Growing Concern’ in M. Adler et al. (eds), Sociology of Social Security. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Wagner, G. (1994), ‘Möglichkeiten des Sozialversicherungsstaates. Prinzipielle und Reformvorschläge an den Beispielen Gesundheits- und Umweltvorsorge’ in Grenzen des Sozialversicherungsstaates. Leviathan Sonderheft No. 14, pp. 37–56. Zimmermann K. (1993), ‘Labour Responses to Taxes and Benefits in Germany’ in A. Atkinson and A. Mogensen (eds), Welfare and Work Incentives: A North European Perspective. Oxford: Clarendon.

4 Gender, Family and the Welfare State – Germany Before and After Unification Ilona Ostner

INTRODUCTION During the last decade feminists have significantly contributed to comparative welfare research by developing gender-sensitive frameworks for assessing the gendered character of state policy regimes and policy logics (Lewis, 1992; O’Connor, 1993; Orloff, 1993; Ostner, 1995; Ostner; Lewis, 1995). These frameworks entail gender-centred dimensions, indicators and measures, like gendered entitlements and obligations both in the field of work and care, which reveal normative assumptions about the gender and generational relations as well as the extent to which women, men and families live up to these norms. Welfare regimes are based on gendered norms and differ with respect to these norms. By elaborating gendered assumptions feminists have advanced a fuller understanding of the welfare state under consideration. The comparative approach facilitates answers to the question as to which direction the ongoing transformation of the welfare state(s) will take. So far, a gender-sensitive focus has proved highly heuristic for those interested in the quality and the impacts of recent welfare state restructuring which most East and West European governments have promoted and/or forced upon their citizenry. This chapter presents a preliminary framework for comparing two welfare regimes, the socialist East German and the ‘social capitalist’ (Kersbergen, 1995) West German one. In doing so, it applies a woman’s perspective which inextricably includes a focus on her family, be it her family of origin or her own. It starts by briefly delineating the once German, then West German, and again all-German social policy logic.

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Family Policy as Social Policy

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German unification has become notorious for the unfettered transfer of various institutions (Wiesenthal, 1996; Backhaus-Maul; Olk, 1994), among them those of the German ‘Sozialstaat’. Denigrated by some – at a closer look unfairly – as ‘colonization’ of East Germans, the immediate transfer of sociopolitical institutions has successfully cushioned the radical challenge of economic privatization within an open and highly competitive world market. It has granted entitlements to income maintenance provided by social insurance and social assistance as well as collective bargaining agreements. The latter have led to wages which have not so far matched productivity (Wegner, 1996), thus to high rates of unemployment and to continuing financial dependence on West Germany – itself under growing pressure – for the near future. Both the clash of two institutional cultures and the immense and lasting costs of unification have set off policy feedbacks which are catalysts in the Government’s effort to adapt the German Sozialstaat and its (as it is said) much too generous safety-net to the austerity criteria imposed by Maastricht and a global economy. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to elaborate these trends and how they feed back on social rights and welfare policies in general. Instead, my essay comments on the rise and fall of assumptions revolving around the ‘strong male breadwinner’ and his standard employment as well as on some possible substitutes for that eroding norm.

THE ORIGINS OF THE GERMAN WELFARE STATE – MALE WORKERS AT RISK During the 1950s the German social reformer Hans Achinger (1979) recounted the origins of German social security policies and their incremental transformation towards comprehensive social policies. Wage work had become the sole source of income for the vast majority of household, irrespective of their social class. Accidents during work, sickness or invalidity in old age immediately put households at risk, as it had been argued when social (insurance) legislation was first launched under Bismarck’s auspices. From then on, the Sozialstaat has granted social provisions in cases of average workers’ (head of households’) risks. From Weimar on, – with the exception of the Nazi period, – it helped to democratize industrial relations and thereby to empower wage-earners through individual and collective participation and codetermination rights. The postwar Wirtschaftswunder enlarged and extended entitlements. Sooner or later the

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Sozialstaat was to significantly shape the life-courses and living conditions of its members. The Sozialstaat established a standard worker’s or employee’s lifecourse by defining a similarly standardized sequence of various status and status passages: from apprenticeship to wage work and, eventually, retirement. It granted wage replacements to those who continuously matched the standard of an employment-centred life-course. Achinger criticized the extent to which German social policy had concentrated on the ‘Arbeiterfrage’: it had steadily improved the working and living conditions of ‘better-off’ workers and their families, mainly of highly qualified selfconscious male ones [Facharbeiter]. Up to the very recent present, social policy has revolved around male skilled workers’ (Facharbeiter) needs, slowly extending the notion of what can be defined as male workers’ risks: for example, a wife’s widowhood – and most recently frailty in old age – passed as an average male worker’s and breadwinner’s risk, and not as a typically female or elderly person’s hazard. At the outset, the purpose of privileging the Facharbeiter had been to promote industrial production and German competitiveness by giving incentives to high achievers. Today, the many privileges and protective regulations which safeguard skilled labour are talked of as jeopardizing German competiveness. As is well known, other countries chose different starting points. Britain first developed poverty policies for the deserving needy, be it male breadwinners, children or the sick. It slowly transformed these benefits for the poor in a ‘national minimum of civilized life’ through flat-rate insurance ‘for all and everything’ based on the minimalist notion of ‘equality in misery’ (Bremme, 1961; Fraser, 1994; Hill, 1990). Thereby, Britain matched the idea of a universalist, though minimalist, welfare state which grants social security ‘as of right’ to all citizens, while the Nordic countries have been vanguards of the maximalist version of the universalist welfare state, eg. by offering public social services and benefits of all sorts to individual citizens ‘as of right’ to enable them to be citizen-workers (Erikson et al., 1987; Lawson, 1987; Esping-Andersen, 1990). France, on the other hand, mainly took care of its families. The French welfare state originated in social policies for the working family and in employers’ benevolence (‘patronage’) towards their workers (Pedersen, 1993; Schultheis, 1988). The diversity of social classes in France, among them many small property owners, farmers, self-employed and all sorts of ‘cadres’, hindered the development of a universalist welfare state and equal provisions for all citizens; it also deferred the introduction of insurance-based social security on the German model (Bremme, 1961). Comparative welfare research rarely mentions that Bismarck originally planned to introduce ‘universal-welfarist’ social security: flat-rate state


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benefits to all wage dependents at risk under the auspices of a benevolent Kaiser. He failed for many reasons. Since his defeat the German state, lately the West German one, has always refrained from providing for its citizens on a ‘state-run’ universalist basis. Instead, and foremost, the German Sozialstaat hinges entitlements upon individual work status (paid, and to some extent also on unpaid, caring work) and careers; on the duration and quality of employment before retirement, unemployment or sickness; consequently, pensions or sick pay are vitally earnings-related and reflect individual employment efforts during the life-course. Obviously, Germany lacks the crucial constituents of what is commonly defined in Europe as a fully developed welfare state: universalism; entitlements as of right; comprehensiveness, that is inclusion of all and everything through national minima. Instead, the particularist German Sozialstaat has been strongly biased towards self-reliance, be it reliance on one’s employment record or reliance on family ressources – a bias which has so far advantaged the standard (male) worker and his household. The most important provisions have been based above all on the principle of equivalence, which links entitlements to income-related contributions. Equivalence-based social insurance not only reproduces existing inequalities; it also eschews questions of social justice. According to Achinger, the specific bias of German social policies, their male breadwinner or standard male employment focus, led to a ‘negative’ attitude towards wage work and labour market participation in general. Exit from, not entry into employment (one could say ‘decommodification’ instead of ‘commodification’) has become the dominant yardstick for welfare state efforts and outcomes, also in comparative welfare state research, and not only in Germany. In fact, wage/salary replacements in cases of unemployment, sickness, or old age have been geared to safeguarding a good deal of the standard employee’s social status. Sickness pay replaces the wage/salary by 100 to 80 per cent (80 after six weeks); the male standard pensioner receives 65 to 70 per cent of his former wage/salary; the two-tiered unemployment insurance offers benefits which average 60 to 40 per cent of the previous market income. German women have rarely lived up to the standard. In order to be entitled, women must have worked like men and accorded with the complex ‘time policies’ which have underlain the rules for entitlement (Scheiwe, 1994). Working hours and number of years of full-time employment determine access to and the generosity of social provisions. Thresholds to be passed successively exclude employees from unemployment, health and old age insurance, or, to put it in a more euphemistic way, they ‘free’ nonstandard working (workers and employers) gradually from the burden to contribute to social insurance. In any case, women have relied on entitlements

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derived from their husbands’ employment and contribution record and have so far profited more from derived than individually acquired benefits. Needless to say, the German Democratic Republic deviated in most aspects from the West German Sozialstaat. Socialist East Germany provided for all and everything by universalizing the status of the worker. Everyone was equally included in the socialist work society. Needs untackled by the working status were met by various public services and provisions like income subsidies for children in families. In contrast, Germany (lately, West Germany) has traditionally followed the principle of subsidiarity, which rules the priority of the smaller unit before the larger one, eg. self-help of the family prior to support of the wider community or the state which has contributed to the often fragmentary and implicit character of its social policies. East German social policies, to the contrary, appeared to be rather coherent and explicit, which can be attributed to the centralist and unifying raison d’état of the socialist state (Schultheis, 1995). Centralism and principles like comprehensiveness, coherence and unification of measures went together with tax-based provisions which are to a significantly larger extent prone to succumb to ideological or political interests. The next sections compare such differences in the logics of social policy from a gendered perspective.

CONCEPTUALIZING THE WELFARE STATE FROM A WOMAN’S POINT OF VIEW All Western societies are – regardless of focus – welfare states. Even the meanest welfare state grants some social provision in cases of average workers’ risk. However, comparative research on welfare reveals the variability of meaning and measures by which welfare states deal with risks. Welfare states differ as to the rules of entitlement as well as to the generosity of provisions. Each has its specific welfare mix: some stress the priority of the market as main provider of welfare, others the role of the state; a majority sees the family as providing an indispensable ‘fallback position’. Socialist welfare states, on the other hand, replaced the market by the plan and family resources partly by those of the firm, substitutes which again strengthened the role of the all-providing state. Such differences are by no means gender-neutral. The family’s position in the welfare mix shapes a society’s service profile – that is, the availability of social services provided by the welfare state. Services determine women’s labour force participation, the degree of women’s ‘commodification’. Feminists insist that commodification is prior to


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decommodification: in order to be granted exit options from the labour market and respective wage replacements or subsidies, one has first to be fully “commodified”. To put it another way: welfare states differ – from a woman’s point of view – with respect to the extent to which they free women from family obligations or – to use a German concept – to which they ‘individualize’ women. Mothers’ employment options and women’s freedom to choose family obligations are important indicators for any gender-sensitive social policy assessment. Social policies incorporate social norms which define how citizens should make a living and provide for their families. These norms are culture-bound, closely linked to a society’s history and traditions. Social, religious or legal norms delimit the interplay of market, state and the family; they demarcate gender as well as generational divisions of labour. Norms tell who – woman or man – is to take care of which task, how and for how long. They explain differing cultural attitudes towards childminding and elderly care – whether a child or a grandparent is cared for by a family member or by a third person via state or market. The concept of individualization is useful for comparing welfare regimes. Individualization incorporates two dimensions: (1) economic independence – that is, options for a mother to earn her living, measured by what Jane Lewis and I have called the‘strength’ or ‘weakness’ of the male breadwinner norm underlying the welfare state; and (2) independence from family obligations – that is, options to choose how to care for a family member, measured by the existence of laws which enforce family obligations as well by the availability of full-time public services for children and the elderly. In order to assess the ‘individualization potential’ of welfare states, we developed a typology for analytical, not normative, purposes. The typology does not tell us which welfare state to prefer or which to judge as more or less ‘women-friendly’. However, it hints at trade-offs embodied in each welfare state and at respective gendered gains and losses. Individualization can be regarded as a function of the two mentioned dimensions, economic independence and family obligations, and the latter as two axes in a system of coordinates. The first dimension ‘measures’ the extent to which women are capable of living an economicly independent life without having to rely on another – mostly a male – income. It pertains to gender relations in a society. The second dimension concerns the ways and forms by which a society regulates family obligations and thereby the extent to which family members can choose to care or not to care. It pertains to the relations between the generations in a society. The next task is to find indicators which – taken together – more closely define women’s economic independence as promoted by the

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welfare state. Three indicators seem appropriate: (1) mothers’ employment, whether full-time, part-time, continuous or discontinuous; (2) women’s social citizenship, that is the scope and scale of women’s entitlements vis-à-vis the welfare states, whether independent or derived from the husband’s employment record; (3) women’s contribution to household income, whether high, medium or low (Hobson, 1994) 1. Employment, entitlements and money are indicators for economic independence, the first dimension. Legal enforcement of family obligation and the availability of public services, whether full-time or part-time, high, medium or low, for children and the elderly are indicators for family obligations (for a detailed approach to family obligations see Millar; Warman, 1996). STRONG BREADWINNERS, STRONG FAMILY OBLIGATIONS – GENDER AND GENERATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE One can classify EU welfare states with the help of these briefly sketched indicators (Lewis; 1992; Ostner; Lewis, 1995; Ostner, 1995). Taken together, they lead to a classification of welfare states. Welfare states can be strong, moderate or weak ‘individualizers’; they incorporate strong, moderate or weak breadwinner norms, and, correspondingly, strong, moderate or weak family obligations (diagram p. 89). Let us take first the ‘strong’ breadwinner and family obligation regime. Ideally, a mother was married in this regime; she took care of her child and of other family members in need of care at home; she stayed at home, especially if the child was a toddler. Only reluctantly and part-time, she would go back to paid work, mostly when the child entered school. Because her employment was discontinuous and often part-time, she relied on a partner’s income and on social security entitlements derived from his employment record. Unsurprisingly, she contributed little to the household income, but a lot as regards domestic chores and activities. With the woman at home, the welfare state could refrain from providing social services. Childcare facilities existed, but merely for pedagogical reasons; they did not exist to help women to work. (West) Germany has been a strong breadwinner/family obligation welfare state or a weak individualizer for women. Ideally again, the ‘weak’ breadwinner/family obligation welfare states deviated from the strong ones in each outlined aspect. Women – whether they have children or not – were expected to work and thereby contributed nolens volens to their living; and they presumably expected themselves to do so. In order to help women to be equally included in the labour market,

Family Policy as Social Policy Table 4.1

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Breadwinner and Family Obligation Models Male breadwinning

Criteria Mothers’ Employment continuous discontinuous full-time part-time Social Security individual mixed derived

strong

Degree moderate

FB D NL UK IRE FB D UK NL IRE

weak

DK SF S GDR N SF GDR DK S N DK S SF N GDR

F B NL UK D NL IRE

Women’s Contribution to Household Income low D NL IRE UK medium equal

DK S SF N GDR

Family obligations

Criteria Obligation to pay maintenance (parents children)

strong no age limits

Public services for children aged 0–3

D low D UK NL

children aged 3–7 full-time part-time elderly people

D NL UK D IRE UK

Degree moderate

weak

for children below majority SF DK N S UK GDR low to medium medium to high FBN SF DK S GDR FBN

SF DK S GDR

F B NL

DK SF S N GDR

the state provided a whole range of social services and/or it compensated for family care/time out of employment. Women contributed equally to

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the household income. There is, however, no reason to be euphoric about women’s equal contribution. As an indicator of weak male breadwinning it rather points to moderate male, and also female, wage levels and the necessity of two earners in one household than to female (or male) economic independence. But benefits and services often moderated the costs of children. Therefore, children did not put much pressure on household ressources; disputes on who was to pay for the child and to what extent rarely occurred. Because of their individual earning power and state support, even mothers can give up an unsatisfactory marriage more easily than those with little or no income. Money of one’s own did not, however, necessarily improve women’s position in the partnership/marriage market, since in a weak breadwinner regime all women could wave their paychecks. But this regime strengthened women’s position vis-à-vis men, because the latter, like women, relied on a second income in order to meet ends. Thus, the weak breadwinner regime individualizes women. Moderate breadwinner/family obligation regimes fall in between the strong and weak ones: the welfare state treated women (less so men) both as mothers and workers, not so much as individuals, but as parts of specific relations and institutions, eg. the working family. Finland and most formerly socialist European countries, among them the GDR, best fit the model of the weak regime; France most clearly typifies the moderate regime.

SOCIALIST EAST GERMANY: WEAK MALE BREADWINNERS, WEAK FAMILY OBLIGATIONS Building the postwar Eastern Germany meant breaking with German history and traditions – also with respect to the position and function of the family. Postwar West Germany strengthened a woman’s personal dependence on a husband. In contrast, the East German socialist regime identified emancipation with economic activity and expected women both to work and to be mothers. Such ideas contributed to women’s economic independence and shifted the remaining forms of personal dependence to the state. The socialist ‘providential state’ [Versorgungs- und Vorsorgestaat] took command of essential family functions, assuming the parental role (mainly the father’s role) and, to some extent, that of the breadwinner-husband. The new socialist East German economy required full-time employment of all women. In 1950 East Germany passed the ‘Law on the Protection of Children and Mothers and on Women’s Rights’, which formally abolished women’s economic dependence and, thus, the idea of the male-breadwinner-


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headed household. In addition, the notion of a full-time homemaker and wife faded away (Ostner 1993: 108). During the 1950s and early 1960s, the demand outstripped the availability of childcare facilities. Policies oriented toward mothers and children (e.g. entitlements to day care with meals furnished, and maternal leave) emerged gradually in the 1960s. Every woman had the right to one day off per month for household responsibilities (Hausarbeitstag). They could also claim paid maternity leave for the first year after the birth of a child. Pronatalist policies privileged mothers with more than two children by granting an extended maternity leave and a reduction of working years required before retirement. ‘Material equality’ or ‘equality of results’ has always been viewed as socialism by the West and was, in fact, laid out in the policy model of the East. The 1949 GDR Constitution outlawed the discrimination of illegitimate children. The 1950 Mother and Children Protection Bill stated that being born out of wedlock did not constitute a stigma. These legal reforms were a prelude to comprehensive child-focused policies. When the wall came down, the socialist state paid directly or indirectly for eighty per cent of the costs of children, typically through all sort of subsidies, public child care and holiday facilities. The socialist party or the firm regularly organized pastimes and (very cheap) school holiday activities for children. The state – not the parent – decided on children’s future: for instance, on schooling and vocational training, job placement and job location. Children had few choices and were kept on strict schedules. Thus, the other side of socialist security and egalitarianism was a highly standardized life-course characterized profoundly by lack of choice in consumption, occupation and travel. These policies supported women’s employment efforts and placed children – and the elderly – under public care. A far greater number of women worked throughout their lives in East Germany than in West Germany and spent most of their daily life apart from their families (most East German women worked 43 hours per week – commuting not included – and an average of 35 compared to West German women’s 20 years of – often part-time – employment). There was little space for ‘strong’ family obligations, nor were they stipulated by law. Unsurprisingly, when the wall came down, 83 per cent of East German ‘partnered’ women were still employed, sixty per cent of these full-time, compared to fifty per cent of women in West German couple-households [only 21 per cent of these worked fulltime]. The East German rates have slowly decreased from 83 per cent in 1990 to 59 per cent in 1995 [full-time: from 60 to 43], mainly due to the economic crisis, while West German rates remained stable (DIW, 1996, 466). However, despite the same training, GDR women seldom enjoyed

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same-work opportunities and earnings; therefore, they contributed less than their partners to the household’s income. Most households received in kind benefits directed at families, such as free daycare, subsidized clothes and food for children. Additional income was needed in order to make ends meet and to afford expensive extras like a car, household appliances or a ‘datscha’. Women in East Germany had higher rates of marriage, divorce and outof-wedlock births; they married and had children earlier in their lives (mostly between the age of 20 and 25). Due to weak male breadwinning and state support for children, divorce and lone motherhood hardly jeopardized East German children’s and women’s social status and well-being or reduced their options. This explains partly demographic differences between the East and the West: while West German out-of-wedlock births amounted to only five per cent between 1960 and 1975, the rate never fell below ten per cent in postwar East Germany (Schwarz, 1995 p. 278). East German lone mothers used to be younger and remained to a larger extent unmarried than West German. In the 1980s, one-half of first children were born out of wedlock in East Germany compared to twenty per cent of West German first children [1976: 10 per cent in FRG; 19% in GDR]. Contrary to the pattern in the East, young West German women in training or otherwise enrolled in education have not been ready to have a child (Ostner, 1997). Since the late 1960s, West German adolescents, especially young women, have continuously increased their number of years in the educational system. Educational aspirations, enrolment, occupational training and promising job prospects have apparently ‘diverted’ young women from having children, let alone from having them on their own. The differences suggest that opportunity costs of having a child have been significantly higher for West German young women – the majority of them skilled – than for East German. East Germany also lacked the good reasons embedded in the German welfare regime for marrying or for avoiding a divorce: relatively high male wages which have so far made a one-earner family affordable; widows’ pensions; pension rights derived from the husband’s employment record; exemption of non-employed family members from health insurance contributions; higher unemployment insurance benefits for the breadwinner; marriage friendly taxation [Ehegattensplitting] (ibid.). The GDR and the old FRG clearly belonged to two different welfare and family policy regimes. Unification revealed the extent to which West German social and family laws ignored basic rights like the equal treatment, less of the two sexes than of all children, whether born to a married couple or out of wedlock. So unification has become a catalyst of longstanding reforms in custody rights, mainly fathers’ rights.


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AFTER STRONG MALE BREADWINNING: FATHERS IN NEED OF RESOURCES Women in formerly strong male breadwinning Germany are now expected to contribute to the household income and compensate, if only part-time, for eroding male wages and employment prospects (Ostner, 1997). And they do so, especially East German women. As already mentioned, fulltime working women (a stable 21 per cent of West German couple households, declining from 60 to 43 per cent in the East) have steadily increased their contribution to net household income from 44 to 48 per cent between 1990 and 1995. Part-time working women (who make up roughly thirty per cent in the West and one-fifth in the East of married couple households) contribute a stable twenty per cent in the West, compared to thirty per cent in the East, to collective net income (DIW, 1996). Overall, married East German women’s total contribution to household net income was 45 per cent in 1995. The East/West differences are mainly due to lower male incomes and job propects in the East, and correspondingly higher male wages and prospects in the West. Germany has finally said goodbye to Gary S. Becker’s ‘specialization model’ of a small nuclear family system based on a strong male breadwinner and a homebound wife and mother. Relying on one specialist and solely on his/her resources is a risky strategy. It makes ‘the family’s welfare vulnerable to the temporary or permanent loss of one of the two major specialists’ and their resources insecure in times of growing socioeconomic uncertainty (Oppenheimer, 1995 p. 238). One might have expected the erosion of strong breadwinning to eventually lead to society’s taking women’s economic and social rights seriously. After all, women have received all the blame for what are assumed to be their ‘rational choices’ (Hinrichs, 1996, 105): increased labour-market participation; increased deferral of marriage and birth of children; cohabitation and divorce – strategies which, as many maintain, have added to the fragility of the German social insurance system. Experts and politicians have promptly proposed to restrict ‘derived’ social entitlements to the deserving childbearing and caretaking mothers and daughters. The debate is still going on. However, instead of a policy supportive of women’s breadwinning and family obligations, a new focus on parents and their shared responsibility, regardless of marital status, has emerged. Roughly put, welfare policy discourses in various countries have converged by recalculating the costs of having a family and by identifying fathers as resources and those in want of resources. Men lack rights as fathers and they increasingly lack income. Social policies are to provide both: additional income through women’s

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increased labour market participation and better targeted family allowances; rights through new custody legislation. Changes are accelerated by policies on children’s best interest [Kindeswohl]. The traditional notion of parental responsibility which has been weakened in West Germany since the 1970s is reestablished. Stress has been put on parents, whether married or not, and on the father’s right and obligation to provide for his children and their mother while they depend on her. However, the shift of focus towards children’s rights does not lead to equal treatment of all family forms, including lone-mother families. The latter issues have been increasingly debated in terms of depriving children of economic and social resources which society can hardly compensate for. Legal reforms and related family policies promote the transformation of the ‘husband-breadwinner’ norm into that of a ‘fatherprovider’ who maintains his children, and their mother, if and as long as necessary. Whether men are willing and capable of living up to the norm, is an open question.

Note 1.

Barbara Hobson uses the dependency measure developed by Sara McLanahan and Annemette Sorensen: Dep=100 × (ME–FE):(ME+FE); [FE = female earnings; ME = male earnings]. A West German example: ME = DM 4000 [net]; FE = DM 800 ==>> male contribution to household income = 83%; female contribution = 17%; ==>> female dependency = 66%. According to recent calculations on the basis of the German Socioeconomic Panel, West German women contributed in 1995 an average of 33 per cent to household income compared to 45 per cent of East German women (DIW, 1996: 467).

References Achinger, Hans (1979), Sozialpolitik als Gesellschaftspolitik. Frankfurt: Deutscher Verein für öffentliche und private Fürsorge (first edition: 1958). Backhaus-Maul, Holger and Olk, Thomas (1994), ‘Von Subsidiarität zu “outcontracting”: Zum Wandel der Beziehungen von Staat und Wohlfahrtsverbänden in der Sozialpolitik’, in Wolfgang Streeck (ed.): Staat und Verbände. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 100–130. Bremme, Gabriele (1961), Freiheit und soziale Sicherheit. Motive und Prinzipien sozialer Sicherung dargestellt an England und Frankreich. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag.


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DIW, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (1996), ‘Erwerbstätigkeit von Frauen in Ost- und Westdeutschland weiterhin von steigender Bedeutung’, in DIW Wochenbericht 63 (28), 461–469. Erikson, Robert, Hansen, Erik, Ringen, Stein and Uusitalo, Hannu (eds) (1987), The Scandinavian Model. New York, London: Armock. Esping-Andersen, Gosta (1990), The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. Fraser, Derek (1994), The Evolution of the British Welfare State. Houndsmill: Macmillan (first edition: 1979). Hill, Michael (1990), Social Security Policy in Britain. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. Hinrichs, Karl (1996), ‘Das Normalarbeitsverhältnis und der männliche Familienernährer’, in Soziale Sicherung, 45 (4), 102–107. Hobson, Barbara (1994), ‘Solo Mothers, Social Policy Regimes, and the Logics of Gender’, in Diane Sainsbury (ed.): Gendering Welfare States. London: Sage, 170–187. Kersbergen, Kees van (1995), Social Capitalism. A study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State. London and New York: Routledge. Lawson, Roger (1987), ‘Gegensätzliche Tendenzen in der Sozialen Sicherheit: Ein Vergleich zwischen Großbritannien und Schweden’, in Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Arbeits- und Sozialrecht, 1 (1), 6–22. Lewis, Jane (1992), ‘Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes’, in Journal of European Social Policy, 2 (3), 159–173. Millar, Jane and Warman, Andrea (1996), Family Obligations in Europe. London: Family Policy Studies Centre. O’Connor, Julia S. (1993), ‘Gender, class and citizenship in comparative analysis of welfare state regimes: theoretical and methodological issues’, in British Journal of Sociology , 44 (3), 501–518. Orloff, Ann Shola (1993), ‘Gender and the social rights of citizenship: state policies and gender relations in comparative research’, in American Sociological Review, 58 (3), 303–328. Ostner, Ilona (1993), ‘Slow motion: women, work and the family in Germany’, in Jane Lewis (ed.): Women and Social Policies in Europe. Work, Family, and the State. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 92–115. Ostner, Ilona (1995), ‘Arm ohne Ehemann? Sozialpolitische Regulierung von Lebenschancen für Frauen im internationalen Vergleich’, in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 45 (B36/37), 3–12. Ostner, Ilona (1997), ‘Lone Mothers in Germany before and after Unification’, in Jane Lewis (ed.): Lone Mothers in European Welfare Regimes. London: Jessica Kingsley [forthcoming]. Ostner, Ilona and Lewis, Jane (1995), ‘Gender and the Evolution of European social policies’, in Stephan Leibfried and Paul Pierson (eds): European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 159–193 Pedersen, Susan (1993), Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State. Britain and France 1914–1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ritter, Gerhard (1983), Sozialversicherung in Deutschland und England. Entstehung und Grundzüge im Vergleich. München: Beck. Scheiwe, Kirsten (1994), ‘German Pension Insurance, Gendered Times and Stratification’, in Diane Sainsbury (ed.): Gendering Welfare States. London: Sage, 132–149.

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Schultheis, Franz (1988), Sozialgeschichte der französischen Familienpolitik. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag. Schultheis, Franz (1995), ‘Die Familie: Eine Kategorie des Sozialrechts? Ein deutschfranzösischer Vergleich’, in Zeitschrift für Sozialreform, 41 (11/12), 764–779. Schwarz, Karl (1995), ‘In welchen Familien wachsen die Kinder und Jugendlichen in Deutschland auf?’, in Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft 20(3), 271–292. Wegner, Manfred (1996), ‘Die deutsche Einigung und das Ausbleiben des Wunders’, in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 46 (B40/96), 13–23. Wiesenthal, Helmut (1996), ‘Die neuen Bundesländer als Sonderfall der Transformation in den Ländern Osteuropas’, in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 46 (B40/96), 46–54.

Part II Social Transformation and Family Challenge

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5 Economic Transformation and Income Change Christopher Flockton

FROM AN ‘EMPLOYMENT’ SOCIETY TO A ‘TWO-THIRDS’ SOCIETY? The transition to a market economy under the conditions of unification inevitably created great stresses in the East German economic and social fabric, which large-scale transfers from the West could only ameliorate. The restructuring of the command economy according to the West German social market economy model would introduce much greater income differentiation and redistribution among sub-groups in society, even though an overall higher real level of incomes was to be expected as productivity grew. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) has often been termed an ‘employment society’, where extremely high levels of labour market participation for men and women were required for ideological, social mobilization and broad income equality reasons (Kaelbe et al., 1994, p. 31). A principal risk in market transition was then of much greater social differentiation: a substantial minority could become significantly poorer relative to the much broader band of the middle class, who are often thought of as making up two-thirds of West German society. Of course, in practice, the profound slump, factory closures and large-scale labour-shedding which followed the exposure of the obsolescent, centrally-planned economy to world markets has masked other changes: only one in five of East German employees continues to hold his/her job, such that unemployment and job insecurity are the key threats to household incomes. Ultimately, even though economic recovery and catching-up with the West may require at least fifteen years, the underlying questions of income and income distribution in the East will be determined by productivity levels, the structure of the economy and by the West German ‘social state’ which has been set in place. In this chapter, our concern however is with the first six years of transition, to trace the labour market changes and income differentiation which have taken place. 99

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The contrast between the two social and economic systems was fundamental, even if East German society exhibited deep cultural attributes of the pre-war Prussian and Saxon provinces. The ‘employment society’ in the GDR constituted on ideological grounds an employment guarantee (even if disguised unemployment was widespread); it had the highest labour market activity rates in the world, and exhibited low levels of wage differentiation. A very high degree of female labour participation could only be supported by generous child allowances, maternity leave and child care support: such tolerable female incomes from employment supported household incomes or permitted viable single-parent families to subsist. The proportion of the self-employed in the workforce was very low, though clearly this group enjoyed higher gross incomes. Finally, pension provision was meagre, but very low rent costs (often held at 1936 levels in old property), together with the all-pervading subsidization of prices of basic foods and services, ensured that a minimum standard of living among the old could be achieved. In such circumstances, of subsidization, large social transfers and low income variation, the taxation system did not need to be progressive. A flat rate income tax of eight per cent was levied, although the self-employed faced high marginal rates, partly because they had also to pay the employer’s social insurance contribution. The economic transformation in the East, following the entry into force of the State Treaty on Economic, Monetary and Social Union on 1 July 1990, can be summarized in three broad processes: the macroeconomic effects of absorption into the free-trading Deutschmark zone, the microeconomic effects of the social market economy and the adoption of the West German ‘social state’. All have had a profound effect on employment, income levels and income distribution. The macroeconomic effects of union were to incorporate East Germany into the federal German exchange rate, monetary, budgetary and trading system, such that, overnight, the East German monopolistic combines had to trade in Deutschmarks at world prices. Overmanned, often technologically obsolescent and heavily polluting, this industrial apparatus suffered two mortal blows. The perhaps fourfold overvaluation of the Ostmark when translated into Deutschmarks rendered exporting uncompetitive, and this fatal handicap was much compounded by the subsequent rapid wage alignment of Eastern wage levels on those of the West. Such a low labour productivity region could not support the Western levels of labour cost (Ghanie Ghaussy and Schäfer, 1993, p. 26; Sinn and Sinn, 1992, p. 51; Smith, 1994, p. 22). In response, industrial output slumped in the second half of 1990 to 60 per cent of its pre-unification levels, and overall employment fell from

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10 million to 6.4 million in Spring 1992. 2.5 million jobs, representing 25 per cent of the entire labour force were lost, and registered unemployment rose from 140,000 in early 1990 to 1.1 million. At its height in Spring 1991, short-time working affected 2 million people and, as noted, only one in five employees retained his/her job. Clearly, to support incomes and purchasing power in the East, large-scale public financial transfers were required (equal to five per cent of GDP). These errors of economic unification – currency overvaluation and wage harmonization – effectively bankrupted rapidly the Eastern economy, and so obsolete productive assets were transferred at minimal valuations to the West (Nick, 1995, p. 94), while the old Länder for their part incurred huge deficits and debts in supporting Deutschmark incomes in the East. Expressed simply, the East German population, in demanding the Deutschmark and a Western standard of living in as short a time as possible, had sacrificed economic assets for income (Ghanie Ghaussy and Schäfer, 1993, p. 123; Flockton, 1992, p. 60). At the microeconomic level, the break up of the monopolistic combines, the privatization strategy of the Treuhandanstalt, and the numerous creations of small firms and craft workshops, had profound effects on the structure of employment. Within the broader evolution of a large fall in full-time employment (particularly of women), labour market participation rates have been sustained at a very high level, reflecting the work orientation of East German society. Wage differentiation has proceeded, though at a slower rate than expected. Redistribution of income between sub-groups in society has been marked, in favour of pensioner households and to the detriment of women and older workers. To the extent that the consumption patterns of these different social groups vary, the changes in relative prices occurring with the shift from highly-subsidized, administered prices to Western price relativities also differentially affects the purchasing power of these groups. As a third process of change, the adoption of the Western social security and pension systems has, naturally, had a direct impact on the incomes and relative position of pensioners, the unemployed, working mothers and the early retired, and to this we return in detail later.

WAGE STRUCTURES AND NON-WAGE BENEFITS IN THE GDR Before examining more deeply the impacts of economic transformation on incomes in the East, a brief discussion of the wage structures, the nonwage social benefits and housing support under the GDR is in order. Wage

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levels and wage differentiation for dependent employees were under the direct control of the GDR Central Planning Commission and industrial ministries, even though the Free German Trade Union Confederation (affiliated to the ruling Socialist Unity Party) was a subordinate party to wage agreements. Similarly, the ten per cent of the labour force who were members of manufacturing and agricultural co-operatives received not wages, but a share in the net surplus of the co-operative, though this was very heavily influenced by centralized product prices and subsidies. Even the small proportion of self-employed, who gained the highest gross incomes, were subject to direct influence by the planners. The Central Planning Commission sought to control the total wage bill and subsequently balance it with the value of the supply of consumer goods at administered prices. Total wage incomes over recent decades grew progressively more slowly than the value of net material product (total net output in nominal terms). In particular, after a spurt in consumption in the first years of the Honecker regime, external debt crises at the end of the 1970s and the end of the 1980s led to the imposition of marked income restraint and frustrated consumer desires (Dennis, 1988, p. 26). In the stage of socialism, it was accepted that a crude, enforced income equality was inappropriate: rather, material incentives for output had to be offered, though subject always to the primacy of need (DIW, 1985, p. 257; Ruban, 1981, p. 331). However, wage structures provided insufficient incentives for qualified and responsible staff, and rates were low in retailing and services, especially in non-productive services. The cause of this lay in part in the fact that the basic tariff wage was held constant for many years, and wage increases were linked to rises in planned output targets. This clearly favoured production workers. Even within manufacturing, differences in wage rates by branch favoured heavy industry and energy compared with light manufacturing, textiles and food processing. Reforms in wage structures in the later 1970s did nothing to alleviate these disincentive effects (Gutmann, 1983, p. 419). As a floor to the wage structure, a minimum wage was in force, which varied from 400 Marks to 500 Marks gross per month in 1976, covering 1 million workers (or ten per cent workforce). Even in 1982, 28 per cent of wage and salary earners earned less than 600 Marks per month and there were imperceptible improvements in the material standard of living, both in the early and late 1980s. The importance of allowances compared to basic wage rates continued to grow. Thus child allowances in 1987 stood at 50 Marks per month for the first child, rising to 150 Marks for the third: in relation to incomes, therefore, they represented a significant addition. Modest as these direct wage levels appear, it should also be borne in mind


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that the average working year was 300 hours longer per employee than in the Federal Republic, and shift work became ever more extensively used (Schneider, 1987, p. 403). Turning finally to household disposable incomes in the GDR, some dispersion around the average was clearly perceptible. Average household disposable incomes stood at 1,800 Marks per month in 1988, with self-employed households enjoying 2,700 Marks and worker households receiving 2,200 Marks. Pensioner households had net incomes of 800 Marks per month, which only covered mere necessities (DIW, 1993, p. 166). Of course, in the above discussion we have so far failed to set the levels of Ostmark incomes within a true comparison with the West and to consider the purchasing power values of the Eastern Mark. An East-West comparison of real household incomes (i.e. measuring purchasing power), does however, present serious conceptual and measurement difficulties. One accepted approach is to compare the costs of typical baskets of goods for household types in the GDR and the Federal Republic measured in local currency. This enables the purchasing power of local currency to be measured and exchange rates to be constructed which reflect the relative purchasing powers of the two currencies. Unsurprisingly, given the highly subsidized prices, the Eastern Mark purchased far more (though supply was rationed or of poorer quality): nominal incomes in the West, however, were far higher. The outcome of comparisons of real incomes, though methodologically difficult, gave the result that, for four-person worker households, the Eastern real incomes stood at 30 per cent of the Western in 1960, but reached 55 per cent in 1982 (DIW, 1985, p. 276). Of course, such comparisons do not capture important but less material benefits such as job security and release from work for sickness, care or maternity. Housing cost, its availability and quality in the East also contributed to material standards of living. In the field of public housing, in spite of the much trumpeted key task set by SED Party Chairman Honecker in 1971 of a radical increase in the supply of new apartments, the housing situation in the West improved much more rapidly. In spite of a more favourable post-war inheritance in the housing stock, and despite the construction of a net 510,000 new apartments in 1971–1981, the GDR ended with a somewhat lower rate of number of dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants than the Federal Republic (Bartholmai and Melzer, 1987, p. 181). The floorspace of dwellings per inhabitant was 30 per cent higher in the West, and many GDR dwellings required modernization. For example, in 1981–82, only 60 per cent of dwellings had a shower/bath and toilet, and only 36 per cent had central heating. In spite of large suburban apartment

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complexes (‘Plattenbauviertel’), old cities such as Leipzig, Dresden and Karl-Marx Stadt (Chemnitz) had significant residential decay (Schneider, 1986, p. 741). From the foregoing, it will be clear that, in spite of East Germany’s position as the star performer among Comecon economies and its claim to being the tenth industrial economy in the world, real household incomes were far lower than in the West, and material conditions such as housing remained in need of substantial improvement. Income differences by household showed limited variation, though pensioners, as economically inactive, had only basic necessities and the self-employed accumulated higher incomes, often in Deutschmarks. Party membership and loyalty were required for careers, but employment was stable and well adapted to the needs of working mothers. In the succeeding discussion, we consider the strains imposed on the labour market by the transition to capitalism and the ameliorating effects of social policy. The evolution of incomes since 1990 is subsequently investigated and gainers and losers among social groups are identified.

ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION, THE LABOUR MARKET AND SOCIAL POLICY Changes in branch structure and firm size The deep slump in activity consequent upon unification persisted until mid-1992, when output began to show a recovery with GDP rates of eight per cent per annum until 1995. Industrial output, in this period, including construction, grew far more rapidly, at between 15 and 20 per cent annually, leading to claims that East Germany was Europe’s fastest-growing region. However, much poorer performance in late 1995 and 1996 (when output declined absolutely) has led to a more nuanced view of the evolution in the East, and its absence of any self-sustaining sources of growth, independent of transfers from the West. Even in mid-1996, output in the region only covered two-thirds of consumption there, with the remainder maintained by transfers from the West, which have continued at DM 200 billions per annum, rather than the DM 25 billion to DM 35 billion foreseen in the Unification Treaty. This scale of transfer indicates the fundamental uncompetitiveness of the region. The once dominant industrial sectors in the East – capital goods, energy, chemicals and textiles – suffered an all but mortal blow upon exposure to world competition, and they account for much of the contraction in


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industrial employment down to 622,000 employees (from 3.4 million in early 1990). Initially, construction and building-related trades and building materials provided the stimulus to an upturn, with construction still representing 16.7 per cent of GDP in mid-1996. Branches supplying regional demand and sheltered from extra-regional competition, such as food processing and printing, also expanded. In spite of the more broadly-based upturn which was evident from late 1993, it remains the case that Eastern production is very skewed to branches little exposed to extra-regional competition. The region’s foreign exports make up only 1.8 per cent of total German manufacturing exports. With the fall-off in Eastern growth in mid-decade below that of the old Länder, attention has focused on the financial and competitive weaknesses of Eastern enterprises. Now after often two years or more without Treuhandanstalt liquidity credits (the Treuhand closed its doors on 31 December 1994), firms have to face the dangers of insufficient own capital: the insolvency rate is double that of the West, and reports tell of often acute balance sheet problems among a predominance of Eastern enterprises. For more than one-third of companies, own funds represent less than ten per cent of their capital stock. East German firms have had only limited success in penetrating Western markets, of which one prime cause is the very high cost base in the East. The constant outstripping of productivity gains by wage increases arising from wage harmonization has meant that unit labour costs are still 35 per cent higher than in the old Länder (having stood at 70 per cent higher in the early 1980s). In the six years since unification, the structure of firms has altered profoundly as the old monopolistic combines were broken up and the Treuhand privatized by auction, direct sale or management buy-out. Formerly dominant enterprises such as the chemical industry in the BunaLeuna-Bitterfeld triangle, which once employed 28,000 employees, now support only ten per cent of that number. 25,000 enterprises were restructured by the privatization strategy and 500,000 generally small private firms have been created since mid-1990. Much new employment has been created in the artisan craft sector, with 167,000 employees in early 1995. The stresses in the labour market Clearly, the labour market has experienced traumatic changes in response to this recasting of East German productive activity. The shrinkage in the size of the employed labour force by 35 per cent to 6.5 million, and the fact that 300,000 commute to work in the West, have been referred to. The impact of these factors upon activity and unemployment rates by

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gender and age group deserves detailed comment. The overall level of employment has fluctuated above 6.3 millions in the period 1992 to mid 1996, and unemployment has varied from 1.1 million to 1.3 million (or 14–17.5 per cent) over this period. Importantly, this level is influenced by the ‘second labour market’ measures of the federal government and the Federal Labour Office, designed to ameliorate the traumatic stresses of adjustment as well as to adapt the skills of the labour force. Until December 1991, for example, unemployment was artificially restrained to 10.4 per cent by the short-time working provisions of the State Treaty on Economic, Monetary and Social Union, such that employees, even those with ‘zero work’, were guaranteed full pay for an eighteen-month period, intended as transitional support. Equally, measures such as job creation schemes and retraining assistance have continuously supported more than 500,000 workers who would otherwise be unemployed, and early retirement provisions, which expired in 1995, supported 750,000 workers aged over 55 years. This marked shrinkage can be detected in the proportion of the population which remains in full-time employment. In 1990, those fully employed made up 47 per cent of the population, but the proportion has fallen to 35 per cent in 1995, though still above the West German rate (DIW Wochenbericht 51–52, 1995, p. 863). However, labour market participation rates have remained uniformly very high, at over 95 per cent for males and females between the ages of 20 and 55 years, with only slight changes since 1991. This contrasts with participation rates in West Germany of 85 per cent for this group, (with substantially lower rates for women) (Wirtschaft und Statistik, 5/1996, p. 306). Finally, within the East German labour force, the proportion among males who are in full-time employment has fallen by 20 per cent over the period 1990–94, a markedly sharper fall than for women. However, the proportion of women who are in part-time work has halved (DIW Wochenbericht 51–52, 1995, p. 863). It is clear that those most crucially affected by unemployment have been females, who enjoyed, for ideological and demographic reasons, very high levels of employment opportunity under the GDR system. Among East German women there remains a deep-rooted desire for employment and a career, (94 per cent of those of working age wish to work), with a bitterness at the change in occupational position which many suffered with unification (Behringer, 1995, p. 590). Women now represent two-thirds of the unemployed and three-quarters of the long-term unemployed. (See also Chapter 6) A particularly strong influence here has been that women are under-represented (at 38 per cent) among new recruits. This loss of oppor-


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tunity and the concurrent withdrawal of generous childcare support for working mothers is held to be one of the influential factors in the collapse in marriage and birth rates since 1989, with the latter rate having fallen by 60 per cent. At 0.7 children per family, East Germany has the lowest fertility rate in the world. If one draws provisional conclusions from the effects of these profound upheavals for incomes and income distribution, it is transparently clear that mass unemployment, the shrinkage in full-time employment, the worsening of occupational opportunities for women as second earners, or as single parents, all will have a profound effect on household incomes. Household income may have risen but has become more uncertain, and the high labour market participation of women can have a marked moderating effect when the male breadwinner suffers periods of unemployment or short-time working. Other significant influences on household incomes are growing differentiation in wage rates and transfer incomes such as pensions and social security benefits. It is to these transfers which we now turn. Transition to the West German welfare system The paternalistic, uniform and largely centralized system of welfare in the GDR was subjected to the most radical reform when it was assimilated to the Western system. In the GDR, universal and modest flat rate benefits applied and basic necessities were heavily subsidized. A key welfare role was played by state enterprises in supplying, for example, kindergartens and primary health facilities, whose progressive disappearance with unification has been viewed with concern. However, all welfare sectors were in need of substantial upgrading (Mangen, 1994, p. 44). The insurance-based Western system, offering earnings-related benefits and based on a plurality of insurance funds and voluntary welfare services, was fairly rapidly instituted. Local government took over immediate responsibility for much social housing, the hospitals and the welfare facilities previously operated by state enterprises, and they assumed responsibility for social assistance. Needless to say, these heavy commitments threatened to impose insolvency on such financially weak authorities. Emergency funding for pump-priming health and pension funds was provided by the DM 115 billion German Unity Fund; the Federal Labour Office supported short-time working provisions, and the federal government instituted a wide-ranging early retirement programme, mentioned earlier. The key elements of the Federal Republic’s welfare system were rapidly instituted, with the Federal Labour Office taking responsibility for unemployment insurance from 1 July 1990. The multiple insurance sickness

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schemes of the West were applied from 1991, although their funding was organized separately, such that there was no cross-subsidization with the old Länder. Childrearing allowances and federal child benefit (proportionately much less attractive in purchasing power terms than under the GDR) were instituted in 1991, as was student support. Finally, the pensions system was integrated in 1992, though with special ‘social supplements’ offered to top up what would otherwise be lower pension entitlements (Mangen, 1994, p. 49; Smith, 1994, p. 245). In the period 1991–94, DM 240 billion was transferred to the East in pursuance of these social policy objectives. In comparison with earlier GDR social support, East Germans gained markedly in pensions, invalidity, war injury and war widow allowances. However, two-thirds of this DM 240 billion expenditure supported job creation schemes and almost one-third flowed as pension payments. By the end of 1991, 750,000 Easterners had taken early retirement before entering the pension system proper five years later. At the same time, 20 per cent of employees had received full pay over an eighteen-month period for short-time (even ‘zero’) working. By the end of 1994, two million workers had received Federal Labour Office support on job creation and training schemes. The acute pressures of the threatened mass unemployment were deflected by such labour market management, but from 1993 to mid-1996 the Eastern pension funds have suffered deficits of DM 2 billions per quarter and the Federal Labour Office has deficits of DM 8 billions – DM 12 billions per quarter (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1996, p. 34).

THE OVERALL EVOLUTION IN INCOMES AND CHANGES IN LIVING COSTS It has often been observed that the desire on the part of East Germans to achieve West German material living conditions, together with the ability to travel, constituted as much of a force leading to pressure for unification as was the desire for free democratic expression. It is therefore understandable that East Germans have pressed for a rapid equalization of living standards and view this in strong moral terms of social justice. The rapid alignment of collective wage rates upon those of the West is its clearest expression. In looking at the evolution of incomes in the East after unification, and their relativity with the old Länder, a variety of measures must be retained. Gross nominal incomes per employee or per household neither encapsulate the taxation and transfers activity of the state and social security funds, nor do they reflect purchasing power directly. Net


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wages and salaries take account of the tax and social security contributions, and when measured against the consumer price index they give an indication of the average evolution of net purchasing power per employee or per household type. Alternatively, using national accounts data, net disposable income per inhabitant can be calculated, which incorporates the tax and transfer impacts of the fiscal and parafiscal (pension and social security, including employer contributions) systems. A calculation in real (i.e. purchasing power) terms conveys most appropriately the evolution in the command over resources, and detailed reference will be made here to the evolution of rents and rent assistance, since housing and housing costs constitute the second or even largest element of expenditure by household. As a result of the wage harmonization agreements struck in Autumn 1990 by IG Metall, IG Druck and by the banking and insurance union, the phased alignment of Eastern upon Western collective wage levels had run its course by 1 July 1996 for several negotiating groups of workers. This full alignment was initially intended to be achieved by 1994, but after demands for a relaxation and following a bitter strike in 1993, the terminal date of mid-1996 was agreed. Of course, given that productivity per head in the East in aggregate remains at only 40 per cent of the Western level, this implies that East German unit wage costs are far higher than in the West, and must be among the highest in the world. On average, negotiated tariff wages in the East stood at 85 per cent of the Western level in the Autumn of 1995 and at 100 per cent for printing, banking and engineering workers by July 1996. There is, however, some considerable variation by wage bargaining groups, with for example, seven of the twenty-three main negotiating groups paying less than 80 per cent at the end of 1995 (Handelsblatt, 26.6.1996). In addition, this data overstates the equalization of wages for two broad reasons: the working week at 39 hours in the East is four hours longer and there are three fewer days of paid holiday. More significantly, at least one-third of industrial firms pay at less than the tariff wage, and this proportion can be expected to be significantly higher in craft and services enterprises (DIW, 13ter Bericht, 1995). The evolution of average gross monthly income per employee (which includes employer social security contributions) in the period since unification is shown in Table 5.1. In net income terms (after tax), the Eastern relative wage was 41 per cent rising to 82 per cent over this same period. The catch-up process in nominal terms is clear. As an alternative, were we to take the national accounts measure of disposable income per inhabitant, which incorporates income taxes and transfers, the relative positions are as follows (Table 5.2):

110 Table 5.1

Social Transformation and the Family Gross Monthly Earnings per Employee in West and East Germany 1990–95

third quarter 1990 second quarter 1995

East Germany

West Germany

East as % of West

DM 1,466 DM 3,641

DM 4,231 DM 5,057

35% 72%

Source: DIW Wochenbericht 8,1996, p. 136 Table 5.2

Disposable Monthly Incomes per Employee in West and East Germany 1990–95

third quarter 1990 second quarter 1995

East Germany

West Germany

East as % of West

DM 768 DM 1,587

DM 1,944 DM 2,334

40% 68%

Source: DIW Wochenbericht 8,1996, p. 137.

Let us move to a discussion of relative income evolution in real terms, since this gives a far clearer view of the purchasing power of incomes. The change from heavily subsidized Ostmark prices to market prices in Deutschmarks and the adoption of the VAT system brought not only a fundamental rise in the price level, but it introduced important shifts in price relativities, which have a varied impact on different social groups. Heavily-subsidized basic commodities and services (rents, heating, transport) rose significantly, while the relative price of once-rationed consumer goods (electronics, cars) fell. The consumer price index (‘Lebenshaltung’) rose by 39 per cent in the East and by 17 per cent in the West, between the third quarter 1990 and the second quarter 1995. A more detailed breakdown, which displays the varied incidence of living cost rises on different social groups is given in Table 5.3. Overall, therefore, in the five years since unification, real disposable incomes per head (on the national accounts basis) rose to 62 per cent of the West German, from 43 per cent. Calculated in standard household terms, however, the proportion in mid-1995 stood at 85 per cent. Though these varying bases of calculation lead to different relative income levels, it is clear that purchasing power in the East, and particularly by household, is now relatively close to the average Western level.

Economic Transformation and Income Change Table 5.3

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Living Costs in East Germany in 1995* Price Index for Living Costs : June 1995 Total Food Housing/Heating

4 Person in middle income employee household 4 Person in higher income employee household 2 Person in pensioner household

136.9

111.8

444.2

136.2

112.6

482.3

139.5

109.6

414.4

*

Increases are measured from 2nd half of 1990/1st half of 1991 = 100 Source: Wirtschaft und Statistik, 9,1995, pp. 620–621.

One very significant element of living costs is clearly that of housing and heating costs, which have risen at least sevenfold since 1989 as the West German controlled rents system has replaced the East German pattern, whereas rental costs in older property had been held down to the 1936 levels. In spite of this steep rise, however, it is clear that the burden of rent and heating as a proportion of income remains lower in the East, and more favourable rent assistance allowances are granted. However, of equal or greater impact upon households is the question of restitution of residential property to previous owners, which has involved many tenants in uncertainty or in vacating the property. The Unification Treaty, apart from its specification of restitution of property to previous owners in priority over financial compensation, provided that rents could only be raised in parallel with the general rise in incomes. Rented residential property, for which no private claim to title existed, was to be transferred to local authorities and their housing associations, with a view to later partial privatization. In 1992, the federal government agreed that a transition towards the West German comparable rents system would be introduced from mid-1995, to be completed by the end of 1997. However, rent rises for properties requiring modernization would be subject to a ceiling. In practice, this means that, from 1 August 1995, rents could rise by up to 20 per cent annually over two years, but that where modernization had taken place the costs could only be recouped in monthly rent rises of a maximum of DM 3 per square metre of floorspace. Where dwellings still lacked a bath or central heating, strict limits on rent increases pertained. On 1 August 1995, to compensate for the sharp rent rise, rent assistance payments rose in direct proportion, and

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special rent assistance payments were extended to the end of 1996 (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2.6.1995). The burden of rent on household incomes remains lower in the East, and this is especially so for those on low incomes. The absolute level of rents in the East is 30 per cent lower than in the West. This can be explained by the typical smaller area and poorer physical condition. Tenants have an average living area of 27 sq. m. per head, compared with 37 sq. m. in the old Länder. Two-thirds of public housing in the East is in need of modernization or substantial repair (Handelsblatt, 1.7.1996). This is reflected in the rent burden on households. In a comparison of the share of net household incomes devoted to rents, the East German share at 18 per cent is six percentage points, or one quarter, lower than in the West. Of course, these averages take no account of the distribution of income and the rent burden is higher for single people and households with at least one member unemployed, in both parts of Germany. In households with incomes lower than DM 1,000 monthly, one-half is paid in rent in the West, and one-third of income in the East. Among this group, however, two-thirds of households in the East receive rent support, compared with one-third in the West. This more favourable treatment of Eastern households extends also to monthly incomes of up to DM 2,000, and this can be explained by the fact that heating charges are included in the housing allowance in the East. Overall then, of the households who rent in the East, 14 per cent receive housing allowances (seven per cent: West), and this higher proportion reflects the greater proportion of households at the lower end of the income scale there (DIW Wochenbericht 22–23, 1996, p. 385). The conclusion here is that, given that household incomes are lower and the housing stock less comfortable in the East, the rent burden is lower and the proportionate gain deriving from housing benefit is greater. Privatization of apartments and houses, including sales to tenants, has proceeded very slowly indeed, with an ownership rate of only 26.3 per cent of households compared with 42.5 per cent in the West. Only 60,000 of 400,000 dwellings have been sold and new models of privatization by the social housing associations are being tested, including housing cooperatives and ‘option to buy’ for tenants. The fact that 60 per cent of the 600,000 restitution claims on the housing stock remain to be resolved has, among other effects, resulted in 65,000 dwellings remaining vacant in the East due to disputed title. A further obstacle to the privatization of housing lies in the fact that 60 per cent of the stock held by local authorities and co-operative housing associations is unregistered and has no deed of title. This clearly has consequences for the distribution of wealth and property, a question to which we return briefly later.


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GAINERS AND LOSERS IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION AFTER UNIFICATION Economic transformation has, of course, brought large redistributional changes in incomes in East Germany, which the above discussion of average disguises. One might have expected a much greater range in income distribution, accompanied by changes in relative income position between the retired, others who have withdrawn from the labour market and the self-employed, as well as between those in growing and declining industries and in the public and private sectors. Looking back over the period since July 1990, it is clear that the principal gainers in relative income position have been pensioners and the self-employed, while the principal losers have been older workers (including those forced to take early retirement) and the poor, those with no regular income or who have not completed an apprenticeship. Among the mass of wage earners, one can crudely sketch a threefold division in the labour market. Employers in privatized or newlyestablished firms with a higher technical level and therefore higher capitalintensity pay at above the collective wage rate: in particular, there is a greater wage differentiation within the workforce, reflecting productivity differences. Among the later-privatized Treuhandanstalt firms, or the few remaining in the ‘industrial core’ for which no buyer has been found, collective wage levels adjusting to the West German rate are paid, but there is less wage differentiation, reflecting the pattern inherited from GDR days. Lastly, small- and medium-sized enterprises tend to pay at rates below the collective wage rate, for reasons of simple financial survival. In cases where the firm is a member of the branch employers’ federation, this is illegal, but in many cases firms have left their association to opt out of wage harmonization and the blanket coverage of wage agreements (Handelsblatt, various issues). For this reason, it is common for workers engaged on job creation or training measures under Section 249h of the Arbeitsförderungsgesetz (Work Promotion Law), who are therefore paid at a fixed proportion of the collective wage level, to stay the maximum time of three years on such schemes and so avoid the fall in wage rate which employment in a small firm often entails. Among the winners in this income redistribution are the self-employed and owners of craft enterprises. In the GDR in 1989 there were 83,000 craft enterprises, a figure which has now risen to 120,000. Their employment has expanded from 430,000 to 1.4 million (Handelsblatt, 3.6.1996). A small, propertied middle class has therefore emerged and their income has widened since 1989. Many inherited some property from the GDR

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days, had acquired some Deutschmark holdings at the time and have now gained also from favourable investment credits. Pensioners are the second main group of beneficiaries. They have moved from their situation in the GDR of having only a minimum level of support to one of being very well placed, even in relation to the West. The first revision to Eastern pensions took place in January 1991 with a 45 per cent rise , and so 20 per cent of all East German households automatically benefited. Measured in terms of the reference pension (‘Eckrente’) payable after 45 years of contributions for those on average incomes, East German average pensions have risen from 30 per cent of the Western figure in 1990 to over 90 per cent in 1995. Thus, in this interval, Eastern male pensions reached 91 per cent of the Western, while female pensions exceed their Western levels by 6.5 per cent. In the case of widows’ pensions, the treatment was at its most favourable, rising from 360 Ostmark in 1989 to DM 1,850 in 1995. Admittedly, an improvement was desperately needed, but in aggregate, the fact that female pensions in the East can exceed those in the West arises from the longer period of economic activity and the crediting, under the GDR, of extra years in compensation for raising children: these top-up contributions (‘Auffüllbeträge’), have been recognized by the newlyestablished pension funds, but are expensive, affecting 2.2 million of 4.3 million pensioners in East Germany, and their consolidation into future annual pension increases is sought. Among the losers are older workers, those obliged to take early retirement and the poor, who also existed under the GDR. It is clear that favourable treatment of the retired has been at the expense of those of one generation earlier. For workers over 45 years of age, the majority of whom have lost their original job since 1990, the prospects of continuous, wellremunerated work are poor. Long working experience is not rewarded in new employment and older workers who have experienced short-time working but remain with their firm seem only to experience slow wage increases thereafter. Older workers often suffer significant income losses and poverty rates are higher among this group than among pensioners. If such workers are unemployed for periods they thereby lose pensionable years of contributions. Among the very many older workers who have been forced into early retirement though large-scale job shedding, retirement incomes are lower. Finally, the poor who have interrupted work experience and irregular work histories are poor in the new Germany, as they were under the GDR (K. Mueller et al., 1994, p. 58). We come then to the question of whether income inequality has widened in East Germany since 1990, as one would imagine with the transition to a market economy. From a position of narrow income differentials in the


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GDR, income variation has grown slowly, but appeared stable in 1995 (DIW Wochenbericht 51–52, 1995, p. 867). By convention, income poverty is defined by household (using standard ‘equivalents’ to model household size), as having a net household income of less than fifty per cent of the average. Such incomes of less than forty per cent of the average are defined as ‘strict poverty’. Broadly speaking, one may hypothesize that unemployment and forced inactivity are the prime reasons for the rise in ‘income poverty’, though individual households may not stay in poverty. There is considerable mobility in the labour force and the comparatively high level of female participation moderates the impact of unemployment on household incomes. There can be little doubt, however, that unemployment is the prime contributor to low incomes among the two lowest household income classes. This interpretation rests also on the view that pensioner households ought not to be ‘poor’, given the generous adjustment of pensions. As will be seen, the relatively limited widening of household income differentials in total may result from these countervailing forces, but the average result should not be allowed to disguise the significant shifts in relative income position among different classes of household. Adopting the measure of less than fifty per cent of the average net household ‘equivalent’ income as the threshold of income poverty, therefore, three approaches to the assessment of the scale of poverty in East Germany can be attempted (DIW Wochenbericht 8, 1996, p. 134; DIW Wochenbericht 51–52, 1995, p. 865). These adopt different criteria as the target average net household income: the average of East Germany itself, that of the old Länder, or a subjective measure of what households in West Germany regard as a satisfactory net income. Clearly, the purpose is to assess income differentiation intra-regionally, extra-regionally and against a subjective Western income target. Adopting a comparison within East Germany itself, the proportion of households below the threshold net income rose from 3.5 per cent in 1990 to 7.9 per cent at the end of 1994, a slow rise with little further change in 1995 (DIW Wochenbericht, 51–52, 1995, p. 868). If the comparator is the subjective measure of a satisfactory income in West Germany, then 10.4 per cent of Eastern households are to be regarded as income poor at the end of 1994. Finally, in a comparison with West German household incomes, the income poverty rate in the East stands at 12 per cent of households, a figure comparable with conditions within West Germany. Finally, differentials in wealth can be explored, using the partial data which is available. Table 5.4 sets out Bundesbank statistics for the holding of financial assets by private households.

116 Table 5.4

West East

Social Transformation and the Family Financial Assets of Private Households in East and West Germany 1990

1994

DM 100,000 DM 20,000

DM 137,000 DM 40,000

Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, July 1995, p. 43.

Data on wealthholding in physical assets (land, building, art works) is not available, but remarks can be made which convey a partial picture. The scale of home ownership in the East is only one-half that of the old Länder and the productive capital assets in the craft and manufacturing sectors held in Eastern hands must, net of borrowings, be small. Farm land ownership, if the large question of restitution to previous owners is left out of account, still remains either in public hands or in the form of co-operative farms (successors to the collectives). The numbers of farmers who have, with state support, taken their land out of co-operative ownership to set up independently are few. Hence, property-owning among Easterners is poorly developed in such a comparison. In conclusion, such an assessment points to the fact that the growth of poverty in the new Länder has been contained, in spite of the wholesale loss of jobs and the prevalence of periods of unemployment and shorttime working. Labour market measures to curtail unemployment, relatively high female wage rates and favourable pension payments have all moderated the impact of the transition. Certainly, the relative income position of families of unemployed persons in the East is substantially better than in West Germany, probably for the reason of the long transitional income support provisions and the more favourable housing allowances. Overall household income poverty will also tend to be lower within the region as a result. The relatively slow move towards West German levels of income poverty and income differentiation may accelerate now that the transitional arrangements of unification are finally expiring. In particular, among the long-term unemployed, the shift from unemployment benefit to social assistance may lead to greater levels of income poverty relative to household average incomes.


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References Bartholomai, B. and M. Melzer (1989), ‘Zur Entwicklung des Wohnungsbaus in der DDR und der BRD’ in Deutschland Archiv, no. 2. Behringer, G. (1995), ‘Zur Arbeitsmarktsituation von Frauen in den neuen Bundesländern’ in Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DWI) Vierteljahresheft zur Wirtschaftsforschung, no. 4. Dennis, M. (1988), The German Democratic Republic: Politics, Economy and Society. London: Pinter. Deutsche Bundesbank (1996), Monthly Report, June. DIW (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) (1985), Handbuch DDR Wirtschaft. Hamburg: Rowohlt. DIW (1993), ‘Die Einkommensverteilung nach Haushaltsgruppen in Deutschland seit Mitte der achziger Jahre’ in Vierteljahresheft zur Wirtschaftsforschung, nos. 3–4. DIW (1995), Strukturelle und unternehmerische Anpassungsprozesse in Ostdeutschland, 13. Bericht, Berlin: DIW. DIW Wochenbericht (1995), ‘Ostdeutschland: 5 Jahre nach der Einheit’, nos. 52–52. DIW Wochenbericht (1996), ‘Löhne und Gehälter in Ost- und Westdeutschland gleichen sich an, Lohnstückkosten jedoch nicht’, no. 8. DIW Wochenbericht (1996), ‘Wohnungsmieten in Deutschland im Jahr 1995’, nos. 22–23. Flockton, C. (1992), ‘Federal Republic of Germany’ in D. Dyker (ed.), The National Economies of Europe. London: Longman. Ghanie Ghaussy S. and W. Schäfer (eds) (1993), The Economics of German Unification. London: Routledge. Gutman, G. (ed.) (1983), Das Wirtschaftssystem der DDR. Frankfurt/Main: Fischer. Kaelble, W., J. Kocka and H. Zwahr (eds) (1994), Sozialgeschichte der DDR. Stuttgart: Klett Cotta. Mangen, S. (1994), ‘The Impact of Unification’ in J. Clasen and R. Freeman, Social Policy in Germany. London: Harvester. Müller, K. et al. (1994), ‘How Unemployment and Income Inequality Changed in East and West Germany Following Unification’ in DIW Vierteljahresheft zur Wirtschaftsforschung, nos. 1–2. Nick, H. (1995), ‘An Unparalleled Destruction and Squandering of Economic Assets’ in H. Behrend (ed.), German Unification: the Destruction of an Economy. London: Pluto. Ruban, M. E. (1981), ‘Einkommen in Ostdeutschland’ in J. Bethkenhagen (ed.), DDR und Osteuropa. Opladen; Leske und Budrich. Smith, O. E. (1994), The German Economy. London: Routledge. Schneider, G. (1987), ‘Die Lösung der Wohungsfrage als soziales Problem der DDR’ in Deutschland Archiv, no. 4. Sinn, G. and H-W. Sinn (1992), Jumpstart: the Economic Unification of Germany. Boston: MIT. Wirtschaft und Statistik (1996), monthly journal edited by the Statistisches Bundesamt, no. 5.

6 Recasting Biographies: Women and the Family Eva Kolinsky

The socialist order that prevailed in the GDR seemed to address the age-old conflict between emancipation and domesticity by requiring all citizens to work. The employment of women was seen as institutionalizing equality and ending all discrimination based on gender. In fact, the East German ‘employment society’ drew on female labour to alleviate persistent manpower shortages arising from low productivity, population loss and the determination to rival the West German economic miracle (Smith, 1994: 37 ff). At the workplace, special measures to assist women in their careers – Frauenförderung – did not exist. On the contrary, the GDR moved increasingly towards separate employment tracks and occupational routes for women with lower educational and vocational qualifications. Forty years of integration into the socialist labour market had not secured women’s emancipation as equals in the workforce but had established a separate, usually lower tier. After unification, women found themselves disadvantaged by these hidden inequalities. Women also found themselves disadvantaged by their family roles. On the one hand, traditional gender divisions in the home remained largely unchanged. On the other hand, GDR social policy favoured working mothers by a range of financial benefits and other concessions. These not only blunted the conflict between employment and motherhood that had persisted in the West; they also enabled women with children to add child-related benefit to their income and virtually obliterate the pay gap between men and women that persisted in the GDR. After unification, the Muttipolitik of the GDR turned into the disadvantage of relatively large families and low incomes while the economic transformations to a market economy produced their own agenda of disadvantage for women generally – and in particular for women who wished to combine employment and motherhood.

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Recasting Biographies

119

WOMEN, WORK AND FAMILY IN THE GDR In the first twenty years of GDR history, the labour market participation of women was hampered by their lower skills and a lack of childcare facilities outside the family. From the mid-1960s onwards, both shortcomings were dispelled. Women of working age had their skills updated while compulsory education up to the age of sixteen and vocational training for every young East German ensured that women of the post-war generations enjoyed better access to qualifications than their mothers or grandmothers had done (Bertram, 1994). In principle at least, East German women were as well educated and trained as men. When the GDR collapsed, women constituted half the labour force, virtually all held vocational qualifications and the dead-end of remaining unskilled had become a thing of the past (Winkler, 1990: 37ff). Although access to higher education was restricted compared with West Germany and more determined by political conformism than academic ability, women and men were represented in equal numbers in all but the most advanced level of doctoral studies that led to top leadership positions in the party state and the university sector. The East German state undertook to remove the conflict between employment and family roles by a system of institutional and financial support for mothers and children. Women (not men) were entitled to paid leave during the first year of the child’s life and could take up to three years’ leave before returning to work. The state was responsible for ensuring that children were cared for during working hours and that women could be workers as well as mothers. Employers (including universities and colleges) ran crèches and nurseries for pre-school children while schools and the state youth organization provided supervision and entertainment after school hours and also during holiday periods. On the eve of unification, eighty per cent of children under the age of three and some 97 per cent of older children attended full-time day-care institutions (Winkler, 1990: 141). The majority of East German women accepted full-time childcare outside the home without reservations and even formed the view that institutions were better able than the nuclear family to encourage a sense of solidarity and teach their children desirable behaviour such as ‘motivation to work’, ‘a positive attitude towards the state’ ‘comradeship’, ‘ reliability’ and a sense of responsibility and duty (Helwig, 1984: 66). It has been suggested that the extensive provision of childcare facilities was also designed to reduce the influence of families on the socialization of their children and allow the state to mould the young generations into

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‘socialist personalities’ who would be conformist in their views and compliant in their actions. West German critics held that families in East Germany had delegated too many tasks to public bodies (Niermann 1991: 12). The fact that several thousand East German children were left behind during the exodus of 1989 and 1990 suggests that some families at least had relinquished traditional care functions to the state and its institutions.

TRADITIONAL MODERN WOMEN: EAST GERMAN CONTRADICTIONS In the course of social modernization, the range and duration of education and training have been extended for an increasing number of people, while employment opportunities, incomes and lifestyles produced a more complex social structure than that of class society (Hradil, 1983). The emergence of advanced industrial democracies entailed a pluralization of lifestyles and an individualization of biographies. Women have benefited from the weakening of traditional role prescriptions and the diversification of opportunities, although many expectations of equal treatment have not been met. In the GDR, the organization of society and individual biographies in it took a different course. At the macro-level of social structure, official statistics designated eight out of ten East Germans to be ‘working class’ (Geissler, 1992a: 79ff). While West German society seemed dominated by a large middle sector, East German society was polarized between a sizeable upper stratum of administrators and bureaucrats and an even bigger working-class sector, while the middle sector hardly mattered (Vester, 1995a). The majority of the population lived at a relatively uniform level with regard to earnings, education, training qualifications and housing conditions, although the upper strata enjoyed the Western-style living conditions to which everyone aspired (Vester 1995b: 48–50). Geissler argues that the prescribed homogeneity generated immobilism and impeded social modernization (Geiβler, 1992b). In his view, East German women escaped this modernization deficit and even enjoyed a modernization bonus compared to women in the West: all had access to employment, education and training and the gender gap had ceased to matter. On closer examination, however, it appears that women’s biographies in the GDR lacked key landmarks of modernity and resembled those of West German women in the 1950s, despite their forty-year history of employment. The Shell youth study of 1992 compared the biographies of young East German and West German women who were born in 1969 and were thus


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in their early twenties when the research was conducted (Jugend ‘92, 1992: 207ff; Kolinsky, 1995a: 277–81). In the East, biographies were more predictable and young women reached landmarks of adult life earlier than in the West. For example, by the age of sixteen, nine out of ten East German women had left school. By the age of seventeen, 85 per cent had decided on their career and had found an employer. In West Germany, most seventeen-year-olds continued in full-time education and few had clear career plans. Most remained dependent on their parents. In East Germany, most earned their own money. By the age of nineteen most East German women were in full-time employment, and seven out of ten had achieved financial independence from their parents; in the West, just forty per cent earned enough to live on. Of the cohort born in 1969, most women were married by the time they were 21 and had at least one child by the time they were 22 (Gysi and Meyer, 1992: 144). Their West German peers were only just completing their education and were some five years older before getting married and older still before starting a family. In the East, the ideal family was held to consist of a couple and their two children (although the state tried to advocate the three-children family). Having children remained an accepted social norm throughout the GDR era. Most families were complete when the woman was in her mid-twenties. Seventy per cent of East German women had children, normally (68 per cent) two or more (Winkler, 1990: 29). From the mid1980s onwards, one in three children were born to unmarried mothers (Datenreport, 1994: 29). Many of these unmarried mothers lived in a trial relationship and married their partner after the birth of their first child or subsequent children. One in three single mothers in the GDR, however, had never been married and appeared to have chosen single parenthood as an alternative to married life (Gysi and Meyer: 146). Since forty per cent of marriages ended in divorce, an increasing number of households consisted of a single parent and children. In 1989, one in five East German households was headed by a single parent, almost always a woman (Hölzler and Mächler, 1992: 34–5). Despite their traditional path into early marriage and motherhood, East German women had begun to break away from traditional family structures by opting for single motherhood or raising their children as head of household after a divorce. State policies in support of working mothers protected East German women from the risk of poverty – although partner households with two incomes were significantly better off in material terms than single parent households, since women in the GDR contributed some forty per cent of household income (Gysi and Meyer: 154).

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GENDER ROLES AND EMPLOYMENT TRACKS Women’s participation in employment did not in itself signify a break with traditional gender roles. The ‘baby-year’ enabled East German women to interrupt their employment, although they remained officially listed as employed. In a modified form, the East German system instituted family phases of the type envisaged by Myrdal and Klein (1957). In order to fulfil their family duties, women interrupted their employment and returned to it when their children no longer needed constant care. Combining work and family had become an accepted dual role for women. Surveys of attitudes to employment before unification revealed that women voiced more modest career motivations than men. One in three women worked part-time but up to eighty per cent would have preferred to reduce their hours to part-time if such work was available (Bertram, 1993: 35).1 Given that a full working week amounted to nearly 44 hours (compared to around 35 in the West) and women like men were required to do shift work in the state’s bid to increase economic output, employment itself was more time-consuming than in the West, although anecdotal evidence suggests that most East Germans had nothing to do for the better part of a working day, since raw materials and supplies tended to run out by mid-morning. Women were faced with a society that utilized them as a labour force yet had failed to undergo a process of modernization that might have eased everyday duties such as shopping or transport. Obtaining everyday provisions was a daily battle against shortages or a hunt for surprise bargains. After work, most women shopped, collected their children from their day care, prepared the meal and performed domestic duties such as cooking, mending or doing the laundry: ‘In the morning tired out of bed, get the little one ready, grab something quick to eat, hurry to the bus, to the nursery, to the bus again, to work where I can sit down and have a coffee at leisure. Work, end of work, to the bus, into the Kaufhalle, to the nursery, back home with the little one. When she is finally tucked up in bed, I have to do mending or some laundry, and flop in front of the television to let myself be entertained’ (B. Schröder, Barfuss durch die Wiese quoted in Helwig,1984: 68). Everyday life in the GDR was steeped in traditional assumptions about men’s and women’s roles. In the family, male and female roles differed sharply. Women were in charge of most domestic duties while men carried out domestic repairs or played with the children. After work, women had


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considerably less free time than men. In households where both partners were university graduates, chores were shared more evenly than in working-class households. Even children appear to have been groomed for gender-specific roles in the family: most girls were expected to help at home while most boys were not (Helwig, 1984: 47). Women’s larger contributions to the household made it more difficult for them to undertake the additional political and public duties required to secure advancement at work. Women, it seems, were more dissatisfied with the persistence of traditional role patterns in their private sphere and vented their dissatisfaction by petitioning for divorce or refraining from marriage. In retrospect, it can be argued that the persistence of traditional gender roles in the home turned into a structural disadvantage for women in their employment opportunities and their competitive chances after unification. East Germans did not challenge the gender stereotypes that persisted in their society. Accepting that women should be employed and that homemaking constituted only a facet of a woman’s life, they deemed employment and motherhood, work and family, to be without conflict. In assuming that a woman’s place is at work and in the family, East Germans continue to differ from West Germans and from most other West Europeans. A comparative study of attitudes towards the family and employment showed in December 1994 that 45 per cent of East Germans and only 12 per cent of West Germans disagreed with the statement: ‘a pre-school age child will be harmed if his mother goes out to work’ (Eurobarometer, 42/1995: 71). Twice as many East Germans (73 per cent) as West Germans (36 per cent) objected to the claim that ‘being a housewife is as satisfying as working in paid employment’ and similar prescriptions of traditional women’s roles (ibid: 72). In the GDR, women had not been forced to choose between traditional and non-traditional roles, between family duties and employment, but had been expected to perform both. The biographies of East German women were ‘modern’ in making education and employment standard trajectories, yet their ‘modernity’ was limited by comparatively low levels of formal education, by early and sizeable family duties and a society saturated with concealed traditionalism and gender stereotypes. THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF INEQUALITY In employment, the gender stereotypes amounted to a hidden agenda of inequality (Kolinsky, 1993: 259–94). In their choice of qualification, women were directed by the state into an increasingly narrow and genderized range of occupational and professional fields such as telecommunications, retailing, health care, teaching and administrative tasks in industry

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and public administration (Rink, 1995: 74). Within each area, women performed mainly unskilled or semi-skilled work while only a handful reached skilled or leadership positions. Overall, about two per cent of East German women held top management positions, although one in four had risen to intermediate management posts (Winkler, 1990: 90–4). Even service sector and administrative employment caught women in a modernization trap, since their functions consisted predominantly of support services to compensate for the lack of technology and could be classified as unskilled or semi-skilled labour.2 While the women’s prevalence at the lower end of the GDR labour market and their deficit in leadership positions may be explained by a lack of career motivation or insufficient political activism, the inequalities of pay in the GDR can only be explained as the result of discrimination. At all levels of seniority and in all areas of the economy, women were concentrated in the lower bracket of the relevant wage band, men in the top bracket (Kolinsky, 1995d, 188–9). The overall effect of this institutionalized wage discrimination was that women earned on average one-third less than men, although the GDR claimed to have made equal pay a statutory right of all citizens. The wage discrimination went unnoticed, partly because information about gender-specific pay levels was kept out of the public domain and because the so-called ‘second wage package’ served to obfuscate the pay differentials between men and women. The ‘second wage package’ consisted of child benefit and other allowances to encourage childbearing and assist with childcare. Compared to women’s income, child allowances were generous. Thus a woman with two children could increase her monthly earnings by fifty per cent (Kolinsky, 1992: 272–3). Although badly paid for her employment, her actual income was often no lower than that of men. Until the end of their state, East German women had not perceived the hidden agenda that curtailed their equality. They took it for granted that they were equal with men and had not suffered discrimination. They also took employment for granted, assuming that they would be free to balance their family and employment duties in their own way. There is no evidence that East German women anticipated the collapse of their employment society or were prepared for its effect on their personal lives.

SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND OPEN DISADVANTAGE The transformation that turned the former GDR into the Germany of the new Länder met some of the expectation that had inspired East Germans


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to opt for unification: it put an end to the socialist shortage society and brought the onset of consumerism as Western goods became freely available; it put an end to restrictions and opened choices to travel, to voice political and personal views in public without fear of reprisals. The social transformation since 1990, however, also put an end to the East German employment society and rocked the very foundations of everyday life by making employment itself uncertain. For women, the collapse of the employment society was doubly momentous, since it turned hidden inequalities into open disadvantages and ended the institutional and financial support that had favoured women with children in the GDR. THE RISK OF UNEMPLOYMENT The unification treaty confirmed the introduction of a market economy and the currency union of July 1990 but merely hinted at the risk of unemployment when it stipulated that East Germans over the age of 55 (originally 57) should take early retirement. When this programme came on stream in 1992, it was phased in more effectively for women than for men. By 1994, seventy per cent of women in the early retirement bracket and only fifty per cent of men had been excluded from the labour market (Kolinsky, 1995c: 26–7). During the first years of transformation, unemployment was cushioned by a range of labour market measures. For the individual, participation in these measures ensured that their employment status was protected and their entitlement to benefit retained. Women were outnumbered by men in all such programmes except retraining courses. Initially, short-time working constituted the main device of stabilizing the labour market. At times, it affected half the labour force. With some regional variations, the programme had seventy per cent male and thirty per cent female recipients. The same applied to the work creation schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen) that took effect in 1992. Initially, men obtained seven out of ten of the new (albeit temporary) placements. It took the protests of Equal Opportunities Commissioners at local level and representations to labour exchanges and potential employers to increase women’s participation to over forty per cent before the programme itself was scaled down in 1994. From the outset, women constituted a majority – between 65 and 80 per cent – on retraining courses. This high participation rate reflects women’s motivation to upgrade their skills and meet the competitive demands of the new labour market. Even more important appears to be that participation in such courses was the only means open to women to retain their place on the unemployment register and their entitlement to benefit.

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In 1995, unemployment in the new Länder stood at fifteen per cent and had, for the first time, overtaken unemployment levels in the old Länder. However, since unification, the workforce in the new Länder had already been reduced by one third as people were phased into non-employment or migrated west. The figure of fifteen per cent, therefore, only points to the sharp end of employment society collapse. Like employment opportunities, unemployment has shown clear gender differences. In 1995, ten per cent of the male workforce and twenty per cent of the female workforce were unemployed. Of the unemployed themselves, two-thirds were women. Given the genderized employment policy of the GDR, the closure of a Frauenbetrieb such as textile production could drive female unemployment levels in affected regions much higher. There is evidence that women lost their employment in greater numbers during the first years of the social transformation, when short-time working tended to favour men. Since then, gender differences at the point of entering unemployment have receded (Nickel and Schenk, 1994b: 262). Yet, since women have found it more difficult than men to return to the labour market, their share among the unemployed has remained higher. Women constitute a clear majority among the long-term unemployed. In 1993, 55 per cent of the short-term unemployed who had been out of work for less than one month but seventy per cent of the long-term unemployed who had been out of work for six months or more were women. Despite these adverse conditions, the employment motivation of East German women has not wavered. Most perceive themselves as active in the labour market and do not accept being sidelined into homemaking. In the old Länder, the Alternativrolle Hausfrau has long been regarded as a viable second choice for women who cannot find employment and in particular for women who have lost their entitlement to benefit. In 1993, sixty per cent of West German women who were not in employment referred to their own status as that of ‘housewife’ and just 23 per cent were looking for work or planned to do so. In the new Länder, no such Alternativrolle had been accepted. Just eight per cent of women without employment gave their status as ‘housewife’. Nine out of ten were either looking for work (76 per cent) or intended to look for work in the near future.(Datenreport: 481) Women’s employment motivation in the new Länder is also evident in the continued high labour market participation. Despite the battering inflicted by unemployment and persistent uncertainties, women’s share of the labour force in the age groups between 25 and 55 has remained higher in the new Länder than in the old (Table 6.1). In the middle age groups, over ninety per cent were in work or looking for work, fewer than had

Recasting Biographies Table 6.1

Age group

15–20 20–25 25–30 30–35 35–40 40–45 45–50 50–55 55–60 60–65 65–70

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Labour Market Participation of Women by Age Groups in the Old and the New Länder (in %) Old Länder 1992

Old Länder 1993

New Länder 1992

New Länder 1993

34 73 73 68 70 73 69 61 46 12 4

33 71 72 68 70 73 70 62 47 12 4

43 85 95 97 97 97 96 90 27 3

37 83 94 96 97 96 95 91 27 3

*

*

Note: Percentage figures are rounded and may not add up to 100. Source: Datenreport 1994, p. 80.

been employed in the GDR but considerably more than in the West and all but matching labour market participation of men. Despite their employment motivation and intense labour market participation, only about one in four women have been employed without interruption since 1990, while the remaining three out of four have moved in and out of work and retraining measures in a determined bid to avoid labour market exclusion (Berger and Schulz, 1994: 6).3 Even for those in work, employment has lost its erstwhile certainty, while fears of unemployment are all-pervasive. While older women dread that they may never work again if they become unemployed, many younger women doubt that their educational and vocational qualifications are good enough to withstand the new competitive pressures of the labour market. From a normal part of life, employment has turned into a prime area of concern. In order to optimize their chances of advancement and in particular escape exclusion from the labour market through unemployment, East German women (and men) have tended to enhance their skills or work longer hours. Five years after the collapse of the GDR employment society, employment has gained a greater centrality in people’s lives and a greater urgency than it ever had in the past. More than ever in the past, employment has become a dividing line between integration and exclusion, between material lifechances and poverty.

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INCOMES AND THE RISK OF POVERTY In recasting East German society, unification also dismantled the web of state subsidies that had kept rents and energy prices at their 1940s level and made goods of the so-called Grundbedarf very cheap to buy. While socalled luxury goods absorbed a huge proportion of earnings and included most attributes of modern living, from television sets or refrigerators to washing machines and cars, people could get by with very little money if their needs did not stray beyond the basics deemed essential by the state. Since nobody could fall through the social net into homelessness or starvation and money mattered less than in the West, poverty did not exist. It arrived with unification in the wake of income developments and earning differentials that blew the relative uniformity of the GDR wide open. Initially, incomes in the new Länder kept their GDR uniformity and were pitched at 65 per cent of those in the old. Provided their employment situation remained unchanged or shielded from unemployment by short-time arrangements, most people perceived the scope afforded by the new currency as an improvement – although comparisons with the West also gave rise to fears that East Germans had entered the new Germany as underpaid second-class citizens. Women with children suffered an immediate reduction of income since their new earnings were calculated only on the basis of their GDR pay without taking heed of the second wage package of allowances. Widows, however, enjoyed a windfall as they became eligible to a part of their husband’s pension in addition to their own. From about 1993 onwards, incomes lost their GDR uniformity. While all incomes rose, white collar incomes rose faster (Figure 6.1). Between 1991 and 1994, blue-collar pay more than doubled from DM 1,300 to DM 2,900 while collar pay grew to nearly three times its 1991 level and reached an average of DM 4,600. In 1991, the pay difference between the two occupational groups had been DM 380; in 1994, it had quadrupled to DM 1,600. (Leipziger Statistik IV, 1994: 15) As the social transformation gathered pace, incomes rose and so did their diversity. In 1992, average earnings in Saxony (for example) stood at DM 2,000 per month, eighteen months later at DM 3,205 (Leipziger Statistik IV, 1994: 3). Compared to the old Länder, income levels remained bunched in the lower half of the range. In 1992, 48 per cent of households in the old Länder but only 24 per cent in the new had a monthly income of over DM 3,000. (Figure 6.2) Since then, the balance has shifted further towards higher incomes. In 1995, 61 per cent of households in Leipzig recorded monthly incomes above DM 3,000 compared to just 18 per cent in 1991. Individual earnings showed a similar surge.

Recasting Biographies Figure 6.1

5

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Monthly Incomes (in DM) New Länder, 1991 and 1994

Thousands

4 3

1991 1994

2 1 0 Blue Bl ue Col lar

White Coll lar la r White

Source: Datenreport 1994: 105.

Figure 6.2

Household Incomes, 1992 New and Old Länder

30 25

under 1000 under 1000 1000-1800 1800-2500 2500-4000 4000-6000 4000-6000 over ov er 6000

20 15 10 5 0

ä New Lander

ä Ol d Lander

under un der 11000 00 0 11000-1 800 000 -18 00

14 28

66 16

11800-2 500 800 -25 00 22500-4 000 500 -40 00

23

19

27 77 11

29

44000-6 000 000 -60 00 over-6 o ver 6000 00 0

20 10

Source: Calculated from Datenreport, 1994: 104 and Statistisches Jahrbuch der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1995.

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In 1991, 44 per cent of Leipzig’s inhabitants had earned less than DM 1,000. By 1995, that number had decreased to 14 per cent (ibid. 20–21). After unification, as before it, women’s earnings were about one-third lower than those of men. The conversion of the currency into Deutschmarks extended the genderized wage levels of the GDR into the new Germany. Moreover, the troubled employment history of women since unification and their greater exposure to unemployment meant that most women’s earnings rose less rapidly than those of people with an uninterrupted employment history. Since few women succeeded in gaining employment in or promotion to managerial and higher civil service positions or become selfemployed, their stake in the highest income brackets has remained small. Data for Saxony show that in 1992, 56 per cent of women in employment and 28 per cent of men were in the lowest income brackets, earning less than DM 1,000 a month. At the opposite end of the pay spectrum, 11 per cent of women but 29 per cent of men earned more than DM 1,400, the highest income bracket at the time (Kolinsky, 1995d: 189). Unemployment benefit mirrors inequalities of pay and exacerbates them. The maximum entitlement amounts to 67 per cent of earning for one year, falling to 53 per cent after that (Hanesch, 1995: 16). Without entering into a detailed analysis of benefit entitlement, it is important to emphasize that all unemployment entails a significant reduction of income. Long-term unemployment, moreover, entails the risk that benefit entitlements may cease altogether. In 1992, 64 per cent of unemployed women and 37 per cent of unemployed men received less than DM 600 per month. At the time, average income stood at DM 1,500 in the new Länder generally and at DM 2,000 in Leipzig. The poverty line has been defined as fifty per cent of average income and thus lay between DM 750 and DM 1,000 at the time. By this yardstick, four out of five unemployed women (and half the unemployed men) had fallen into poverty (Kolinsky, 1995d: 188–91). The correlation between unemployment and poverty is borne out by data on income development between 1991 and 1995. (Figure 6.3) Incomes of the unemployed have been lowest throughout the period. Although they increased by about one third, increases for other groups have been steeper and the gap widened (Leipziger Statistik II, 1995: 22). As mentioned earlier, poverty did not signify in GDR society where earnings were pegged and daily living underpinned by a state policy of minimum provisions. Within two years of unification, however, poverty levels in the new Länder resembled those which had been familiar in West Germany for a decade (Krause, 1992: 9). East Germans who had been phased out of employment were unable to reap the benefits of wage and salary changes and tended to remain at the bottom end of an increasingly disparate income spectrum. In his Armut in Deutschland, Hanesch

Recasting Biographies Figure 6.3

4

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Personal Incomes in Leipzig 1991–1995

Thousands

3

Unemployed Pensioners All Incomes Employed Self-Empl. Civil Servts

2

1

0 1991

1993

1995

Source: Calculated from Leipziger Statistik, Statistische Berichte II, 1995: 22.

compares poverty in East and West by measuring under-provision in key areas such as income, employment, housing or education. He argues that East Germans were hit much harder than West Germans by underprovision of income and employment (Hanesch, 1994: 173). They were also more likely than West Germans to experience under-provision in more than one area and for a longer duration. By his measure, women were more affected by poverty than men and twelve per cent of East German women could be classified as poor. (Hanesch, 1994: 178) The risk of poverty was highest for single parents, most of whom were women. In the new Länder, nineteen per cent of single parents were affected by poverty. In the GDR, a normal household included one or two working adults. In the transformed Germany of the 1990s the number of such ‘normal’ households dropped to 42 per cent while the remainder had one or two non-working adults. In the past, eighty per cent of households with children included two working adults/parents; in 1992, just 57 per cent did. (Berger and Schulz, 8: 13) After unification, households with three or more children were more affected by unemployment and 42 per cent of these households lived in poverty. (Hanesch, 1994: 179) Recent research has suggested that most poverty in modern society is transitory, although it may be recurrent. In a stable society such as that in the old Länder, moving in and out of poverty appears to have become a regular occurrence that caused no undue alarm or despondency

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(Krause: 11–14). In the transformed society of the new Länder, exclusion from employment and relegation into poverty cannot yet have the normality ascribed to them in the West and are more keenly perceived as devastating life-plans and expectations. Women – women with children, and especially women with several children – have proved especially vulnerable to the unfamiliar risks of unemployment and social exclusion.

RECASTING BIOGRAPHIES Women, who had already passed the landmarks of East German normality, had to adjust to their transformed society after 1990 as best they could. They had left school early, trained in the field into which they were directed by the state, worked in a lower skilled or intermediate position, married early or resolved to remain unmarried, had had children, possibly divorced and lived the life between employment and family that all women in the GDR took for granted. After unification, each of these landmarks turned into a potential disadvantage in the newly competitive era. Early fears that childcare facilities would collapse proved unfounded. Although some crèches and nurseries closed down when firms refused to finance them, local authorities took over. With temporary support from central government and guaranteed support from regional governments who covered forty per cent of the cost, local authorities in the new Länder succeeded in maintaining a comprehensive network of day care institutions and offering a place to each child who required one. Yet the system was no longer the same. Charges increased from 35 pfennig (East German currency) a day to at least ten times that amount. New guidelines about staffing levels and provisions resulted in closures of facilities, amalgamations and staff cuts. In the past, women could be sure to have access to childcare near their home or their workplace; now facilities might be anywhere and their location changed frequently as further closures and amalgamations took effect. Despite comprehensive provisions, women perceive child-care as under threat and less reliable than in the GDR (Kolinsky, 1996). One of the main reasons for the contraction of the sector has been a rapid decline in the birth rate in the new Länder. It is here that the social transformation recast biographies. As we saw earlier, women have retained a keen employment motivation and tried their utmost to continue in employment. While the desire to have children remained as high as it had been in the GDR, women shunned or postponed motherhood. Between 1990 and 1991, the birth rate fell by fifty per cent; by 1995, it had dropped to just forty per cent of its 1989 level, less than half that in the old Länder (Martin, 1995: 13). A slight increase in 1996 points to a degree of social


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normalization as women who postponed childbirth after unification become mothers. Now, East German women were over 27 years old on average when they had their first child, several years older than in the GDR, and only about one year younger than in West Germany. Single motherhood, however, continued at a high level. In the mid-1990s, every second new baby was born to a single mother. In the GDR, of course, single mothers had been able to rely on additional support such as reduced working hours, paid leave to care for their children in case of illness and provision for their children during illnesses or school holidays. None of these special measures applied in the new Länder. In the GDR, single motherhood signalled self-reliance and a disdain for the traditional values and behaviour patterns that appeared to beset most conventional families. In post-unification society, this emancipatory spirit bears all the hallmarks of social risk-taking as single mothers have been among the first to lose their employment and face a higher risk of poverty than other groups. In Leipzig, for instance, forty per cent of those on income support in 1994 were single mothers and they constituted the fastest-growing group of welfare recipients in the city (Kolinsky, 1995d: 191). There is nothing to suggest that conditions were better for single mothers elsewhere. For women with children generally, unification has made things worse. With the abolition of the second wage package, children turned more visibly into a financial burden. Counting all GDR benefits and special allowances together, it has been estimated that before unification, the state contributed about 85 per cent of the cost of a child (Gysi and Meyer: 155). After unification, most of these costs had to be borne by the household. In addition, unification diversified and individualized the standards of how children should be brought up, treated and provided for. In the GDR, state institutions and an endorsement of the ‘socialist personality’ made for collective standards with little scope for choice. After unification, families were thrown back on their own resources of defining values and meeting standards. In retrospect, things appeared to have been easier and better for families in the GDR. A 1994 survey showed that women remembered the East German state, its motorists, its childcare institutions, their neighbours and their place of work as kinderfreundlich, as accepting of children (Fischer, 1994: 9–10).4 With the exception of doctors, children’s playgrounds and restaurants, conditions generally seemed worse after unification and more hostile to children. In addition, GDR legacies such as cramped housing, environmental pollution and the lack of amenities added to women’s concerns about the quality of life for their children (Table 6.2). As they compared their own situation with that in the West, women with children in the new Länder found their flats too small (23 per cent), their environment too polluted (42 per cent), outdoor playing facilities too scarce

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Living Conditions of Children in the Old and the New Länder

Married women with children were asked: Does your child have too little, enough or too much of the following… Listed in the table are responses (in %) of ‘too little’: Too little provision of: Space in the apartment Healthy environment Facilities to play outdoors Contact with other children A happy childhood Contact with the father Contact with the mother

New Länder 23 42 41 7 2 22 7

Old Länder 14 29 15 5 1 11 3

Source: Jürgen Sass, ‘Leben mit Kindern’, quoted in Leipziger Statistik, Statistische Berichte IV, 1994: 9.

(41 per cent) and relations with absent parents, especially fathers, unsatisfactory (22 per cent). The same study showed that women with children in the old Länder were more at ease with their situation and more assured about their family’s quality of life.

MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES No less momentous than the decline in the birth rate after unification was the drop in marriages and in divorces. Both developments were responses to a climate of social uncertainty and, more specifically, to the introduction of federal German law. In the GDR, most people married to confirm an existing relationship or even to stake a claim on the housing list. Marriage had no bearing on property rights, tax benefits or other aspects of personal or financial security. By contrast, marriage in federal German legislation entitles both partners to material benefits from the union. East Germans had not perceived marriage in these terms and were reluctant to accept the new strictures, not least since cohabitation and child-bearing had long become accepted without the prerequisite of marriage. At a time when controlling and reducing social risks became all-important, few chose to undertake the unknown commitments that were now linked to marriage. Between 1990 and 1993, marriages dropped to half their former level and, as mentioned earlier, the average age on marriage for both


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women and men jumped by half a decade (Datenreport: 33). In 1992, 48,000 couples were married; five years earlier, there had been three times that number. Existing marriages, however, gained unprecedented stability. Divorces dropped to a record low in post-war Germany, East or West (Datenreport: 35). In 1992, 10,000 marriages in the new Länder ended in divorce; in the late 1980s, the number of divorces had been five times higher. Indeed, the divorce rate in the GDR had ranked among the highest in the world. Then, divorce entailed no obligation of maintenance and divorcees could even expect to be allocated a new flat after their marriage had broken down. Since women were in employment and could expect work-related pensions later in life, divorce in the GDR was treated as an arrangement of convenience. In the Federal Republic, the divorce law reform of 1977 ruled that each partner was entitled to a fair share of the joint assets as well as maintenance payments. Introduced to protect the financially weaker partner, normally the woman, from material disadvantage arising from periods of non-employment, family roles and child-rearing, the legislation was radically different from the ‘clean break’ concept in the East. Amidst the material upheavals after unification, East Germans shied away from taking on these additional commitments, as they shied away from the commitment of marriage. Of the divorces that did take place in the new Länder, two-thirds involved children under the age of eighteen, thus entailing maintenance arrangements and unfamiliar material liabilities.

WOMEN, WORK AND FAMILIES: FUTURE PERSPECTIVES In an historical perspective, it is not unknown for periods of economic stress and uncertainty to reduce the frequency of marriages and births. During the mass unemployment of the late 1920s and early ‘30s for example, Germans responded to the economic hardship by delaying marriage. As soon as material circumstances improved, things got back to normal. Postponed marriages took place and the birth rate which had declined faster than in earlier years actually increased until the mid-1930s (Kröllmann, 1993: 100–3). ‘Normality’ at the time implied that families were based on the marriage of a couple and that children were born within marriage. Although the Second World War and the social dislocations that followed it drove the divorce rate to record levels and established oneparent families as a regular facet of daily life, the nuclear family of a married couple and their children retained normative status well into the 1960s. Since then, attitude changes between generations and in the wake

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of socio-economic modernization modified the normative function of the nuclear family and favoured a pluralization of family forms in line with a more general pluralization and individualization of lifestyles and social expectations in society. In the GDR, state support for childcare functions reduced the material effects of child-rearing on the family budget and freed families from many supervisory and educational responsibilities. Women could take motherhood for granted, since it seemed compatible with employment and did not constitute a ‘massive investment’ of time and money (Fischer: 9). In fact, the GDR Muttipolitik of financial incentives for mothers and child allowances kept the birth-rate higher than it would have been in a less pronatalist setting. A decline of the birth-rate in the mid-1970s was reversed by introducing more generous allowances and more concessions for single mothers (see Chapter 2). The abolition of GDR social policy after unification made children unexpectedly expensive in an environment where the state had subsidized or provided free of charge regular day care, entertainment, leisure activities, holiday camps and many other items of child-related cost. East German women reacted to the post-unification uncertainties by asserting established priorities. These established priorities had been to combine employment and motherhood. Nickel and Schenk have shown that the majority of women in the new Länder prefer to balance both areas of their lives without choosing between them. Under the transformed conditions of a unified Germany, the motivation to combine employment and motherhood amounts to a rejection of a role as full-time housewife and priority of work over family. Some younger women already relish the new occupational opportunities and the prospect of building a career based on ability and qualifications (Nickel and Schenk, 1994: 278). The demographic transformations since unification reflect the individual answers of East German women to the question of how they hope to combine employment and motherhood in the future. Family developments in the new Länder resemble those in the old in their plurality of structures and the imprint of individual choice. Yet women’s choices in the new Länder have remained distinctive in several ways. Firstly, their employment motivation has remained unbroken. Adjustments in their family situations and personal lives are determined by their perception of how this employment motivation can best be realized. Postponing childbirth and opting for or against marriage reflect women’s perceptions of how to succeed in the transformed social environment. Secondly, women continue to see themselves as working mothers. In the old Länder, one in four women did not wish to have children. In the new Länder, only one in ten women did not wish to have children. Studies of young East Germans


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have found that the wish to have children has declined a little since the days of the GDR but still holds its place among the top priorities, alongside the wish to find a partner for life and to find employment (Starke, 1995: 163). Faced with the conflict of combining motherhood and employment, women in the new Länder have opted to delay motherhood not in order to remain childless but in a bid to combine employment and motherhood when they can manage to do so. Thirdly, women in the GDR had begun to perceive the choice for single parenthood as a means of evading the unresolved gender conflicts that had soured a considerable proportion of partner and family relations. The choice for single parenthood indicated that a woman felt able to organize her life and combine employment and motherhood in line with her own abilities and inclinations. All economic indicators suggest that households consisting of two adults and children are better off financially than singleparent households. Moreover, unification added the risk of poverty to social hardship linked to low incomes, even before unification. Yet a growing number of women have opted for single parenthood. Between 1990 and 1994, the number of children born to unmarried mothers in the new Länder increased by more than one-third, constituting more than half the births. Although fewer children are born than before unification, more children are born to unmarried mothers. In the new Länder, single parenthood has attained a normality it does not possess in the old. The payment of educational allowances, the benefit payable to a new parent for up to three years after the birth of a child, is a good example of these developments. In 1994, 42 per cent of recipients in the new Länder were single mothers compared with just eleven per cent in the old Länder (Datenreport: 213) In their bid to secure their dual role in work and family by defying traditional family arrangements and opting for unmarried motherhood, women in the new Länder cling to the values and social preferences that had emerged in the GDR. More than half a decade after unification, the social risks associated with single parenthood have failed to deter women from choosing a lifestyle that held a promise of self-determination and emancipation in the GDR era. In the old Länder, most women (and couples) tend to marry as soon as a child is on the way (Strohmeier, 1993: 11ff). In the new Länder, women have refused to see motherhood as an entry point to full-time homemaking. In staking their independence as single mothers, they try to infuse the GDR norm of working mothers into their new environment. In post-communist Germany, this blend of GDR rules and personal motivations has come to entail unfamiliar risks of social exclusion and poverty for East German single mothers and their families.

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Notes 1.

2.

3.

4.

The information on the demand for part-time working is based on unpublished studies conducted by the Institut für Jugendforschung, Leipzig and was provided to the author by Barbara Bertram in an interview on 22 August 1992 in Leipzig. In Leipzig, for instance, 80 per cent of the female labour force worked in the service sector and women constituted 90 per cent of unskilled white collar employees. A considerable proportion of clerical employment consisted of auxiliary tasks such as filing and often compensated for lack of technological equipment. After unification, these seemingly ‘modern’ white-collar positions had no future in the changed working environment. The authors report that overall, 31 per cent had been with the same employer; 24 per cent in manufacturing, 19 per cent in agriculture, 52 per cent in transport and postal services, 44 per cent in banking and insurance and 43 per cent in building construction. Unemployment affected women more strongly in all areas. Jürgen Sass, ‘Leben mit Kindern’ quoted in Josef Fischer, ‘Rückblick auf das Jahr der Familie 1994’, pp. 9–10. Seventy-five per cent thought that the East German state had been kinderfreundlich; only eleven per cent thought that of their post-unification state. In a similar vein, seventy per cent remembered their workplace in the GDR as kinderfreundlich but just 25 per cent felt this about their workplace in unified Germany.

References Berger, H. and A. Schulz, (1994), ‘Veränderungen in der Erwerbssituation in ostdeutschen Privathaushalten und Befindlichkeit der Menschen’ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 16. Bertram, B. (1993), ‘Die Entwicklung der Geschlechterverhältnisse in den neuen Bundesländern’ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 6. Bertram, B. (1994), ‘“Nicht zurück an den Kochtopf” – Aus-und Weiterbildung in der DDR’ in Gisela Helwig and Hildegard Maria Nickel, Frauen in Deutschland 1945–1992. Akademie Verlag, Berlin. Datenreport 1994. Zahlen und Fakten über die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1994), Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), Bonn, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Europeans and the Family. Results of an Opinion Survey (1993), Report prepared in conjunction with the Commission of the European Communities by N. Malpas and P.-Y. Lambert, Brussels, December. Eurobarometer. Die öffentliche Meinung in der Europäischen Union. Ed. Europäische Kommission (several issues per year). Fischer, J. (1994), ‘Rückblick auf das Jahr der Familie 1994’ in Leipziger Statistik, Statistische Berichte IV. Quartal. Geißler, R. (1992a), Die Sozialstruktur Deutschlands. Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag. Geißler, R. (1992b), ‘Die ostdeutsche Sozialstruktur unter Modernisierungsdruck’ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 29–30.


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Gysi, J. and D. Meyer,(1993), ‘Leitbild: berufstätige Mutter – DDR-Frauen in Familie, Partnerschaft und Ehe’ in Gisela Helwig and Hildegard Maria Nickel (eds), Frauen in Deutschland 1945–1992. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Hanesch, W. (1994), Armut in Deutschland. Rowohlt: Reinbek. Hanesch, W. (1995), ‘Sozialpolitik und arbeitsmarktsbedingte Armut’ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 31–32. Helwig, G. (1984), Jugend und Familie in der DDR. Leitbild und Alltag im Widerspruch. Edition Deutschland Archiv, Cologne, Kiepenheuer und Witsch. Helwig,G. and H. M. Nickel (eds.) (1993), Frauen in Deutschland 1945–1992. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Hölzler, I. and H. Mächler, (1992), Sozialreport 1992. Daten und Fakten zur sozialen Situation in Sachsen Anhalt. Magdeburg: Institut für Soziologie. Hradil, S. (1983), Sozialstrukturanalyse in einer fortgeschrittenen Gesellschaft. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. Jugend ‘92. Gesamtdarstellung und biographische Porträts. (1992), ed. Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. Kolinsky, E. (1992), ‘Women in the New Germany – the East-West Divide’ in Gordon Smith et al. (eds), Developments in German Politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Kolinsky, E. (1993), ‘Women in the New Germany’ in Eva Kolinsky, Women in Contemporary Germany , Oxford: Berg Publishers. Kolinsky, E. (1995a), Women in 20th century Germany. Manchester University Press. Kolinsky, E. (ed.) (1995b), Between Hope and Fear. Everyday Life in PostUnification East Germany. Keele University Press. Kolinsky, E. (1995c), ‘Everyday Life Transformed’ in Kolinsky (ed.) Between Hope and Fear. Keele: Keele University Press. Kolinsky, E. (1995d), ‘Women after Muttipolitik’ in Eva Kolinsky (ed.), Between Hope and Fear. Keele University Press. Kolinsky, E. (1996), ‘Women in the New Germany’ in Gordon Smith et al., Developments in German Politics, 3rd. edition, Basingstoke: Macmillan. Krause, P. (1992), ‘Einkommensarmut in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 49. Kröllmann, W. (1983), ‘Die Bevölkerungsentwicklung der Bundesrepublik’ in Werner Conze and M. Rainer Lepsius, Sozialgeschichte der Bundesrepublik. Klett Cotta: Stuttgart. Leipziger Statistik, Statistischer Bericht, quarterly since 1990. Martin, A. (1995), ‘Entwicklung der Geburtenkennziffern in der Stadt Leipzig 1989 bis 1994’ in Leipziger Statistik, Statistische Berichte I. Quartal. Myrdal, A. and V. Klein, (1957), Die Doppelrolle der Frau in Familie und Beruf. Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik. Nickel, H. M. and S. Schenk, (1994), ‘Prozesse geschlechtsspezifischer Differenzierung im Erwerbssystem’ in Hildegard Maria Nickel et al (eds), Erwerbsarbeit und Beschäftigung im Umbruch. Berlin, Akademie Verlag. Nickel, H. M., J. Kühl and S. Schenk (eds) (1994), Erwerbsarbeit und Beschäftigng im Umbruch. Berlin, Akademie Verlag. Niermann, J. (1991), ‘Identitätsfindung von Jugendlichen in den neuen Bundesländern’ Bonn, 18 September (unpublished report to the Bundestag commission on Youth and Women ).

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Rink, D. (1995), ‘Leipzig: Gewinnerin unter den Verlierern?’ in Micheal Vester et al. (eds), Soziale Milieus in Ostdeutschland. Cologne: Bund Verlag. Smith, E. O. (1994), The German Economy. Basingstoke, Macmillan. Starke, U. (1995), ‘Young People: Lifestyles, Expectations and Value Orientations since the Wende’ in Eva Kolinsky (ed.), Between Hope and Fear. Keele University Press. Strohmeier, K. P. (1993), ‘Pluralisierung und Polarisierung der Lebensformen in Deutschland’ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B17 Vester, M. (1995) ‘Milieuwandel und regionaler Strukturwandel in Ostdeutschland’ in Micheal Vester et al. (eds), Soziale Milieus in Ostdeutschland. Cologne: Bund Verlag. Vester, M., M. Hofmann and J. Zierke (eds), (1995), Soziale Milieus in Ostdeutschland. Gesellschaftliche Strukturen zuischen Zerfall und Neubeginn. Cologne: Bund Verlag. Winkler, Gunnar (ed.) (1990), Frauenreport ‘90’. Berlin: Verlag Die Wirtschaft.

7 Women’s Career Choices after the Collapse of the East German Employment Society Ingrid Hölzler

The social situation and living conditions that have developed in the new Länder since unification bear the hallmark of transformative changes and breaks of continuity. As the political system of the GDR collapsed, the state-controlled social and economic system came down with it. Many people experienced these events as a rupture in their life-course. The widespread rejoicing about the newly won freedom cannot hide the fact that many lost their employment and saw their life plans shattered. For some, the processes of transformation opened new professional opportunities and enriched their daily lives, while others faced unfamiliar uncertainties and a fear of the future. The transformative change of the political and social environment rendered some established behaviour patterns obsolete and made others less appropriate than they had been in the past. In particular, • •

•

individuals lost their familiar social context and encountered a destandardisation in their everyday lives; faced with a variety of choices of what to do and how to act, individuals enjoyed a disconcerting scope of making their own decisions. The flip-side of the freedom to choose was the need to make choices in areas where such choices had not been available before and where the consequences of actions were not transparent; already disorientated by the rapid social changes of their environment, East Germans now had to function in a society where actions seemed to be determined first and foremost by criteria of economic rationality (see Sozialreport, 1994: 62).

141

142


Repercussions of these transformative developments reach well into the family. In the new Länder, ‘the fundamental conditions of daily living for families have changed – the labour market, the childcare system, the material circumstances, the social security system, housing and health care, democratic participation, opportunities to travel and involvement in culture, all have altered beyond recognition’ (Sozialreport, 1995: 283). At the time of writing, it cannot be predicted whether these transformed living conditions will enable East Germans to retain their values and lifestyles or whether West German ways will ultimately prevail. There is no doubt, however, that the process of unification has resulted in massive changes in the social infrastructure and employment conditions. Since unification – since the Wende as East Germans prefer to call it – a process of differentiation and polarization in the living conditions of families has already become apparent, reflecting the chances and the risks inherent in the social order of the Federal Republic generally: The differentiation and polarization of family conditions has resulted, above all, from access for adult family members to employment, from the financial and material circumstances, the number and the age of children in a family, housing conditions as well as ‘the physical, psychological and cultural capital of a family’ (Sozialreport, 1995: 286).

WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT – SIGNIFICANCE AND CHOICES Of the many factors that may determine the social situation of families, this chapter focuses specifically on female unemployment and the extent to which it has influenced the career choices of young women. In the GDR, of course, full-time employment was near-obligatory, while most women succeeded in combining full-time employment with family duties and motherhood. Since unification, by contrast, the rise in unemployment has hit women harder than men and challenged them more directly to adjust. For those generations of women who had grown up in the GDR and had been socialized into its economic and social order, employment constituted a normal and essential part of their biography. Regardless of its level and whether it consists of managerial or craft functions, employment in Germany is normally preceded by a qualifying period of vocational or professional training. In the GDR, such training had been obligatory since the 1960s. Regardless of gender, training and employment constituted the core of a person’s life between leaving school and starting retirement. Deciding on a career track predates the actual integration into the world of work since the question ‘What do

Women’s Career Choices

143

you want to be when you grow up?’ is already asked when young people are still at school and may determine subject choices, educational qualifications and employment aspirations. In today’s society, employment enhances educational qualifications, imparts expert knowledge, competence, material security, social status and facilitates contacts with other people. As Ulrich Beck put it: ‘A person’s occupation helps to define his identity. For people in employment, we tend to use their occupation as a measure of their needs, abilities and socioeconomic standing. While it is odd that we should equate a person with his or her occupation, in a society which arranges life according to employment, occupation does indeed hold key information about income, status, linguistic competence, possible interests, social networks and such like’ (Beck, 1996: 221). In the GDR, the identity of women was not defined through the employment of their husbands but through their own employment. The status of each woman was derived only from her own history and achievements. Assuming that employment and occupational level are important indicators for the integration of individuals into society, we can state likewise that non-employment or unemployment means disintegration and may entail exclusion from society. The break in structure after unification – often euphemistically called a process of modernization – resulted above all in a break in their employment certainty for women. Reduced employment opportunities for women that have become apparent since unification affect all sectors of the economy, although not with equal severity. Regardless of whether an economic sector had been contracting, stagnating or prospering, whether it had a high or a low proportion of female employment in the past, male employment as a proportion of overall employment increased while female employment decreased. Being a woman has become a special disadvantage in the labour market. Women do not find it easy to retain their existing employment and they find it increasingly difficult to gain access to areas of employment that are dominated by advanced technology. These have become male strongholds. Women are regarded as incompetent in occupations that depend on using advanced technologies and are kept out of these fields. Competition in employment has intensified. This pertains to carrying out an occupation and it also pertains to gaining access to an occupation through qualifications and training. In view of these social and economic developments, we have to assume that women can only secure employment in the future if they focus on new fields of occupation, accept the challenges of new technologies and participate fully in the advances of science and technology. One of the most promising occupational fields is

144


eco-technology. Here, pressures to reduce cost, exploit raw materials more effectively, limit waste generation and make the manufacture of products compatible with environmental protection create special challenges. Young women in particular have tended to regard nature conservation and the environment as priorities. As employment opportunities in this area expand they might make ‘a momentous contribution to the occupational and social equality of women’ (Chahberny, 1994: 3984). Yet, half a decade after unification, women of all ages have tended to make insufficient use of such opportunities. On the contrary, women are leaving technical fields of employment. Many who qualified in these areas in GDR times have sought to retrain for employment in the commercial sector or in the caring professions (Integration 1994). Some women have even accepted employment below their level of qualifications in order to avoid unemployment. Generally, the participation rate of women in employment in the new federal states appears to be falling and seems set to match that in the old Länder. The familiar adage that employment constitutes a normal aspect of a woman’s life no longer applies without caveat, while the self-confidence of East German women in combining employment and family has begun to fade. The findings presented in this chapter are based on a survey conducted in Saxony-Anhalt with funding from the regional Ministry for Employment, Social Affairs and Health (Hölzler, 1995). The aim of the study was to determine how the employment situation in the region influenced the career choices of young women and how the women with technical qualifications or university education in technical subjects go about finding employment in their areas of expertise. Young women were also asked to outline their hopes for the future after completing their professional or vocational training in engineeringrelated fields. This chapter examines two hypotheses on the link between post-communist employment change and women’s career choices: 1.

2.

The generally high level of unemployment and the intensified competition in the labour market lead to a reduction in female employment across all sectors and in particular in technical fields of occupation. As the economic situation of women deteriorates, the distribution of roles within the family takes on a more traditional hue. The expectations of young people generally (and of girls more than boys) about the career they wish to pursue in later life are strongly influenced by the experiences of their parents. A high unemployment rate among parents affects the career choices and life-course planning of young people.


145

EMPLOYMENT CHANGE AND THE WANING OF WOMEN’S ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE Equality between adult members of a family is based on the employment of both partners and is more difficult to achieve without it. Women are more likely than men to become economically dependent on their partner. With regard to Saxony-Anhalt, the following picture emerged: in the wake of economic restructuring and labour market changes, unemployment in the region was high, reaching 19.2 per cent in April 1996, the highest regional unemployment rate in the Federal Republic at the time. Men and women were not affected to the same degree. In June 1996, 15 per cent of men and 23 per cent of women in the region of Saxony-Anhalt were unemployed. Among the unskilled and semi-skilled, 31 per cent were unemployed while those with higher education (including Fachschule) were less affected (seven per cent). Since women constituted just 39 per cent of university graduates but 61 per cent of the unskilled and semi-skilled in the region, the high female unemployment rate reflects the qualification gap between men and women. Of the unemployed, 37 per cent perceived age as the biggest obstacle to finding employment while 18 per cent thought their qualifications were inadequate. One in four unemployed women (24 per cent) stressed that having a small child barred them from finding work, while 15 per cent were convinced that they were discriminated against on the grounds of gender (Arbeitsmarkt-Monitor, 1994). In Saxony-Anhalt at least ‘women experienced significantly more difficulties than men in finding new employment opportunities in white-collar employment or to hold on to their employment in this sector. Although employment has expanded in particular in the white-collar sector and the number of white-collar employees overall has increased, the proportion of women in white-collar employment has decreased in the majority of areas.’ (Schäfgen and Rosendorfer, 1994: 23) In the region, gender-specific segregation in the labour market exists and has aggravated the employment situation of women. One of the main reasons for the disadvantages suffered by women has been the implementation of Western-style employment and production policies. Enterprises no longer provide childcare facilities or family support; instead, women are faced with making their own arrangements (Schäfgen and Rosendorfer, 1994: 31). In Western Germany women have tended to interrupt their employment after the birth of a child or even discontinue it altogether. In the former GDR, by contrast, a range of family support measures existed to promote maximum labour market integration of women. Engelbrech argues that the recast employment policies at enterprise level are less likely to result in the dismissal of women than in a

146


reluctance to employ women when recruiting labour. Access to new employment opportunities has been restricted by discrimination against women and mothers: ‘There is no doubt than men receive preferential treatment when applying for employment. The records of the job centres (Arbeitsämter) show clearly that *

* * *

*

women with small children are particularly affected. Offers of parttime employment are an exception. The net of childcare facilities has deteriorated; for employment in clerical occupations, very young childless women or women aged between 35 and 45 are given preference; women with commercial or university qualifications are normally employed below their formal level of qualifications; women with completed apprenticeships fail to find employment in manufacturing industry even though many are willing to accept lower-skilled employment; increasingly, men are recruited into formerly female dominated areas of employment such as the service sector (banks, postal services, transport). This trend has been accelerated as service sectors became computerised’ (Engelbrech, 1994: 22–23).

These developments left their mark on partner relations and families. In order to ensure that they were not permanently frustrated, women would have to change their view of employment and focus more strongly on their family roles. This change is unlikely to occur in the near future, since women continue to value individuality, independence and social participation. They reject being dependent on their partner and prize their personal autonomy also as material autonomy. Increasingly, women are aiming for skilled employment, qualifications based on training, a challenging professional career and at the workplace, co-operation and scope for decision making. The conflict between these life goals and current labour market prospects leads women to feel let down. Against their will, they are excluded from the labour market and pushed back into the domestic sphere. Surveys among them have revealed again and again that a life as mother and homemaker is not acceptable to the majority. Regardless of the age of their children, East German women have retained a strong employment motivation.(see Table 7.1) The proportion who wish to be employed full time is highest among women with children over the age of twelve (78 per cent) while 72 per cent of women without children or with children aged sixteen or over also make employment their priority. Among women with children below the age of seven, just 63 per cent favour full-time

Women’s Career Choices Table 7.1 Children by age

no children 0–7 years 8–11 years 12–15 years 16–21 years

147

Employment Motivation of Women by Age of Child Full-time employment

Part-time employment

72 63 67 78 72

24 37 31 21 26

No employment*

2 0 1 1 4

*

Of the respondents without children, 2 per cent gave no answer and should be added to the total. Source: Sozialreport 1995: 291.

employment. This group is also more interested than other women in parttime employment (32 per cent). As yet, the link between a preference for part-time employment and the quality or availability of childcare provision has not been researched. The interest in part-time employment can have many possible reasons. Thus, the overall working time (including the time it takes to travel to and from work) has risen considerably. The number of people who work away from home and only return at the weekend increased sharply in Saxony-Anhalt (Hölzler and Mächler, 1993: 97). This means that men and women may be commuting and need to find new ways of managing family duties and domestic chores. As a rule, it falls to the woman to seek part-time employment. Since overtime working and stress at the workplace have increased significantly, moving into part-time employment often appears to be the only way of combining family and employment in the transformed post-communist environment. It is important to remember that child-care provisions and some day care facilities have been preserved in the new Länder, albeit at higher cost to the clients and with often reduced opening hours. In the mid1990s, just two per cent of women declared that they did not wish to be employed. (Sozialreport 1995: 291)

EMPLOYMENT RISKS AND FAMILY DEVELOPMENTS AT REGIONAL AND LOCAL LEVEL Surveys carried out in Saxony-Anhalt to monitor labour market developments confirm these observations. In 1994, eighty per cent of women were determined to work (Arbeitsmarkt-Monitor, 1994: 5). Women cited different

148


reasons for their employment motivation; among them, financial considerations were important but not dominant. For many, their enjoyment of work was the main reason. Asked to prioritize their reasons for holding or seeking employment, the following ranking order emerged: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

working is enjoyable improving family income securing income to live on meeting other people remaining in touch with profession financial independence furnishing home; purchasing equipment financial provisions for child insufficient without own employment not enough to do as a mere housewife (Vereinbarkeit: 21).

Women’s wish to work and their restricted access to employment may result in conflicts between aspirations and reality and have negative consequences for partnership relations and the family as a whole. Studies in the new Länder have shown that ‘more than half the unemployed noted negative effects of their unemployment on the atmosphere in the family and between partners’ (Sozialbericht 1995: 2878). For women, unemployment has triggered an economic dependence they had not experienced in the past. This dependence may reinforce traditional role patterns in the family. Although it is true to say that, in GDR times, women’s emancipation was administered by the state and did not, by itself, reflect the demands or expectations of women, it is evident in retrospect that employment had beneficial consequences. Women abandoned their fixation on the domestic idyll, were more self-confident and the equals of their husbands or partners. That women should be in employment had been accepted by men (83 per cent) and women (85 per cent) alike. This acceptance prevailed after unification. A study conducted by the Market Research Institute in Leipzig on the social role of women in post-communist Germany found that 71 per cent of women and 62 per cent of men regarded employment of equal importance for men and women. Eighty-four per cent of women and eighty per cent of men believed that women alone should decide whether they wanted to work or not. Only eight per cent of women and nine per cent of men viewed employment and child-rearing as mutually exclusive alternatives for a woman (Hallisches Tageblatt 1993: 4). A 1993 survey revealed similar findings. Fifty-four per cent of men and women favoured without reservations that women should be employed since only employment could secure their economic independence, while thirty per cent voiced partial agreement (Hölzler and Mächler 1993: 111). Economic dependence creates its own divisions of labour which in turn


149

recasts the image of women’s and men’s role in society. As models for the next generation, the way in which men and women perceive their social role and the way in which they balance employment and family will influence the career choices of their own children as well as their attitudes to marriage, child bearing and the family. The example of female engineering students who completed their studies at the University of Magdeburg in the early 1990s can illustrate how employment opportunities have changed since unification and how biographies have been recast (Gräfe and Hölzler, 1996). At the time of the survey, more than half (52 per cent) of the 289 graduate respondents had been unemployed since 1990. Most had wanted to work as engineers after completing their degrees: 56 per cent had never wanted to do anything else, while 26 per cent took up engineering as their second choice. By and large, graduate unemployment in engineering resulted from a contraction of employment opportunities in the sector and compounded the nonacceptance of women for employment. If female engineering graduates had found employment, it was usually unrelated to their training. The mismatch between qualifications and employment opportunities is one of the reasons why some 41 per cent of the respondents thought engineering was the wrong field of study for women and only one in four would choose it again if they were to begin afresh (see Table 7.2). Many felt they could not recommend engineering since women were not accepted in the profession (42 per cent) and since employment chances for women in engineering were poor (42 per cent). Table 7.2

Negative Views of Engineering among Women Students

Respondents were asked, whether they would recommend other women to study engineering. The table records the negative responses only: Reasons for not recommending engineering

%*

Acceptance of women not assured Poor employment prospects Profession held in low esteem for women Employment in engineering cannot be combined with family Personal reasons

42 42 9 5 3

*

percentages rounded off and may not add up to 100; N-142. Source: Ingrid Hölzler, Berufswahl und Berufsorientierung von weiblichen Studierenden in technischen Fächern an der Universität Magdeburg, 1995 (unpublished report).

150


Interviews with female mathematics graduates from the University of Magdeburg produced ample evidence of discrimination and perceived disadvantage: ‘Today, only men reach higher positions.’ ‘Employment chances for women with a small child are very poor.’ ‘About 50 per cent of my female friends were or are unemployed; despite university education, women are first in line for dismissals and redundancies.’ ‘When jobs in data processing go, women are the first to go.’ ‘Based on personal experience and borne out by the experience of others, single women with children are today’s social losers, for example through unemployment, lack of money etc.’ ‘More uncertainties, e.g. of going back to work after a pregnancy.’ ‘I personally detect a general trend: women to the hearth.’ ‘To give an example from among my friends: a single mother with two children has no chance at all in the labour market, however hard she tries.’ ‘In the past, women were more accepted at work and it was easier to be employed and have a family.’ ‘A woman is regarded as the second earner and the places of employment belong, above all, to men.’ ‘Men have much better chances everywhere.’ ‘A widespread view: the woman belongs into the kitchen and with her children.’ ‘It is not liked, these days, that women are employed; they are meant to stay at home and look after the household.’ ‘An acquaintance of mine was told by an official: when men already cannot find employment, women should of course remain at home.’ ‘It is now up to women to play the part of the good wife and mother.’ (Gräfe and Hölzler, 1996) In the light of such experiences, women graduates in ‘men’s fields’ tended to concur with the view that men are better suited to work in engineering professions than women. Seventy-three per cent were convinced that men had encountered fewer employment problems and 57 per cent felt that clients and colleagues were more prepared to accept a man than a woman engineer. Yet women engineers were convinced that, given a chance, they could match any man in their competence at the workplace. Seventy per cent believed that women could be as successful as men in their career, possess as much technical expertise and practical skills and organize their work on a day to day basis no less effectively than men. (see Table 7.3) Women engineers also thought they could work as well with colleagues and in teams as men and

Women’s Career Choices Table 7.3

151

Suitability of Women for Technical Employment: the Students’ View

Required skill or condition Assertiveness Getting on with colleagues Getting on with superiors Meeting physical demands Technical competence Practical skills Legal restrictions e.g. night working

Men and women equally suited

Men better suited than women

Women better suited than men

69 71

5 24

26 5

75

17

8

78

6

16

72

2

26

79 57

4 3

17 40

Source as for Table 7.2. (N=289)

relate to their superiors. Thus, women perceived themselves as equal in their abilities and qualifications but hampered by unequal treatment in today’s working environment. The only tangible difference in men’s and women’s employment concerns legal restrictions for women to work nightshifts and their entitlement to maternity protection. With hindsight, most women engineers regarded their occupational track as an unfortunate choice. Seventy per cent noted a marked deterioration of working conditions in the technical field since unification. The negative experiences of women engineers are mirrored in the negative views among young people with engineering qualifications generally and the belief that girls will perform worse in these areas than boys. A survey of engineering apprentices revealed that most regarded girls as inferior in technical occupations (see Table 7.4). Only fifteen per cent thought there were no significant gender differences in technical know-how, manual dexterity and the ability to get on with colleagues and superiors at work. Men were credited with higher technical acumen than women by 52 per cent of the female and 65 per cent of the male apprentices and a majority of both sexes believed that men were better able to cope with the physical demands of technical employment than women. The interviews among apprentices also revealed that many young people found it difficult to express an opinion. Young women seemed especially uncertain when asked to comment on whether or not approaches to work might be determined by gender. One in three female respondents

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Suitability of Women for Technical Employment: the Female Trainees’ View (in %)*

Required skill or condition Assertiveness Getting on with colleagues Getting on with superiors Meeting physical demands Technical competence Practical skills Legal restrictions e.g. night working Organising work better

Men and women equally suited

Men better suited Women better suited than women than men

14 16

37 9

19 41

15

13

33

12

47

15

15

52

4

15 9

38 49

13 11

15

7

48

*

not recorded in the table are the ‘don’t knows’. N = 175 Source: Ingrid Hölzler, Berufswahl und Berufsorientierung von weiblichen Auszubildenden in technischen Berufen, Universität Magdeburg 1995 (unpublished report).

did not answer the question (see Table 7.4). Young men, however, had fewer scruples. Seventy per cent were convinced that they were more suited to technical employment than girls. Our interviews suggested that trainers and other specialist personnel believed that men should be given priority in technical fields while women should concentrate on the domestic sphere, on childrearing and other family duties. Women tended to endorse the views of their superiors and even share their reservations about women in technical fields. Stereotypes about women’s lack of technical competence which seemed to have been eliminated in the GDR era have become visible and constitute a new obstacle to the employment of women in technical occupations. At this point, we can confirm our earlier assumption and conclude that the drop in female employment in technical fields is accompanied by a change of attitudes towards women in such employment. This does not mean, however, that women have modified their employment motivation or would assent to a more traditional distribution of domestic tasks in the family.


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THE TRANSFORMATION OF FEMALE EMPLOYMENT AND ITS EFFECT ON CAREER CHOICES OF YOUNG WOMEN Young people choose their training and future careers in the context of their social environment, not as a vocation arising from within them. Defining career paths always occurs in response to social conditions and the communicative networks available to an individual. Resulting from a long-term process of decision making, occupational choice is influenced by a range of factors. Schäfers identifies the following as most important: •

• • •

the interests, inclinations and abilities of the young people. Here, the Basic Law guaranties in Article 12 the right to choose freely an occupation, a place of work and a place of training; the expectations and perceptions of people close to the young person, such as parents, relatives, teachers, friends; the availability of training in the region and the recommendations offered by career counsellors; information imparted to young people at school about employment prospects in specific occupations and economic branches. In addition, everyday circumstances may influence career choices by eliciting accurate or misleading views about a career and its uses (Schäfers, 1994: 153).

In the Federal Republic the majority of girls and boys choose a career on leaving school and enter an apprenticeship. A good school-leaving certificate is a prerequisite for obtaining a good training placement, while special factors such as knowledge of a foreign language may determine specific choices. In 1996, there were 375 officially approved occupations in the Federal Republic for which apprenticeships or other recognized training programmes were on offer. Many of these occupations were little known and the majority of young people tended to concentrate on a handful of familiar areas when making their choice. Training conditions, opportunities of further education and earning potential differ widely between careers. Despite the wide range of occupational pathways, women continue to experience disadvantages in training and employment. They encounter greater difficulties than men in being kept on after training, in finding employment generally, while their earnings remained lower than those of men even if their actual tasks did not differ. In technical occupations and in positions of seniority, women remain in a minority. Girls have at times been criticized for remaining too narrowly focused on a mere handful of careers. This criticism seems justified if we

154


compare male and female choices for apprenticeships. The majority of women want to train as doctor’s receptionists (Arzthelferin), hairdressers, retail sales assistants or clerical workers. A 1993 survey of the ten most popular career choices showed that most young people opted for familiar and traditional occupations. Preferred male occupations were car mechanic, electrician, carpenter, toolmaker, bricklayer or commercial assistant. In rejecting technical occupations, girls have responded to the negative image of this kind of work. Technical employment tends to be linked with an ugly working environment, noise and air pollution at the place of work. Improvements in the working conditions in many enterprises and the virtual disappearance of heavy physical labour went unnoticed. The use of computers and computer-aided manufacturing have transformed industrial employment but enterprises have not done enough to make the public and potential apprentices aware of these transformations. In areas such as building construction, working conditions remain, of course, physically more demanding than in a bank, an office or a department store. In their reluctance to opt for technical training and employment, women may also try to avoid potential conflicts at work. Men have been known to be unwilling to work alongside women, accusing them of technical inferiority. The regional government of Saxony-Anhalt has attempted to increase the acceptance of women in technical working environments by sponsoring a special training and employment programme. Participating enterprises receive public funding for each female apprentice or employed worker. Since enterprises which refuse to take on female apprentices or hire female labour are not penalised in any way, the pilot programme has not been successful in recasting established practices. In the GDR, matters were quite different. Here, the process of choosing a career was less determined by a young person’s own wishes than by outside agencies. Training places were allocated to girls in accordance with the economic and ideological objectives of the state and its mechanism of central planning. Recruitment in every field was determined by specific planning numbers, which also stipulated the proportion of women in each occupational field and apprenticeship programme. Only when no girls would come forward to train for technical employment were women’s places filled with young men. Despite these directives, young women even then preferred nontechnical training and employment, although more chose technical career paths than in the old Federal Republic. In 1989, young women constituted 89 per cent of clerical employees, 80 per cent of skilled workers in chemical production, 70 per cent of computer operators but only 20 per cent of skilled electricians, 15 per cent of tool setters or 4 per cent of electrical engineers. Between 1980 and 1989, the proportion of young women in technical occupations had fallen slightly, although remaining higher than West Germany.


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Following the same formula of allocating places by planning numbers and gender, the proportion of female engineering students rose in the GDR. At Technical Colleges (Fachschulen) female students of engineering increased their share from 21 per cent in 1971 to 27 per cent in 1989, at universities female participation in technical and engineering subjects rose from 16 per cent to over 25 per cent in the same period (Frauenreport, 1990: 46). Barbara Bertram noted the high level of interest and work discipline among women in technical employment and linked it to their excellent performance (Bertram, 1986: 34). It is impossible to determine whether the success of these young women reflected their positive view of technology or an effective adjustment to their working environment. Could it be that since unification, young women interpret the new freedom to choose their own career paths as a freedom to conform with unspoken assumptions in society that women and technology do not mix and turn again towards predominantly female occupations? This question informed our research on women in technical occupations; some of our findings will be presented below. WOMEN AGAINST TECHNOLOGY? Since the Wende, women’s participation in technical occupations has declined sharply. In 1985, women constituted 84 per cent of the apprentices in the chemical industry of Saxony-Anhalt; in 1994, the proportion of women had fallen to 53 per cent. Even in fields where young women had already been poorly represented in GDR times, they became scarcer still. In 1994, just 6 per cent of toolmaker apprentices and a mere 0.5 per cent of trainee electricians were women (see Table 7.5). Subject choices in vocational training schools (Berufsschulen) reflect these gender gaps. In 1994, women constituted 46 per cent of trainees in business administration, Table 7.5

Female Apprentices in Technical Fields in Saxony-Anhalt, 1985–1994

Occupational field Chemical Industrial Metal Working Crafts Precision Tool Making Painting and Decorating

1985

1988

1992

1993

1994

83 28 52 7

86 24 33 8

72 18 64 4

63 16 60 4

54 16 53 5

Source: Adapted from the annual reports of the Statistical Office for Saxony-Anhalt, Halle 1994: 15; 1995: 15–16.

156 Table 7.6 Region West East

Social Transformation and the Family Women’s Interest in Technology in the Old and the New Länder* interest: high to moderate

Interest: low to non-existent

39 58

61 42

* The ‘Freundin Studie’ is a representative survey (N = 3001) of women between the ages of 16 and 59. Source: H. Faulstich-Wieland, ‘Frauen und Technik’ in Frauenwelten 1, 1993: 113.

90 per cent in retail sales, 74 per cent in technical drawing, 28 per cent in land surveying while just 7 per cent of trainnee locksmiths, 4 per cent of trainee plumbers and 3 per cent of trainee decorators were women (see Berufsbildungsstatistik, 1994). In the early 1990s, women in the new Länder were more interested in technical issues than women in the old, 58 per cent and 39 per cent respectively (Table 7.6; Faulstich-Wieland, 1993: 113). Lack of interest in things technical cannot by itself account for the decline in technical training among women. In the new Länder, young women at secondary school level were also less interested in mathematics than young men. In the mid1990s, 42 per cent and 56 per cent respectively liked mathematics as a school subject, although 65 per cent of secondary school students thought that men and women were equally suited to occupations which required a background in mathematics. (Gräfe and Hölzler, 1996: 52) In 1996, just 65 per cent of young women who were entitled to study at a university did in fact commence their studies. Of these, a majority chose non-technical subjects such as social sciences and business administration (20 per cent), humanities and languages (18 per cent) or natural sciences (15 per cent). In 1992, engineering had attracted 8.5 per cent women students, in 1994 only 7.7 per cent. In 1993, 14 per cent of technology students were women, in 1996 only 9.6 per cent (Hölzler, 1996). The intention to study engineering had, however, collapsed even more drastically among young men, while the number who remained undecided about the subject they might study rose dramatically from 2 per cent in 1991 to 40 per cent in 1994. In 1994, one in three young women and every second young man who had completed A-levels in the region of Saxony-Anhalt had not yet decided upon their degree programme and future career path (see Table 7.7). Such uncertainty had been completely unknown in the GDR, since the state allocated individuals to university places leading to employment while they were still at school.

Women’s Career Choices Table 7.7

Choices of Degree Programmes among A-Level students, 1991–1994 (in %)

Degree Programme*

Male/Female

Natural Sciences

Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female

Engineering Social Sciences Humanities Undecided

157

1991

1992

1993

1994

15 9 33 9 33 40 6 23 2 1

15 8 32 9 31 41 7 15 6 7

14 7 24 8 35 41 4 14 11 15

23 15 4 8 11 20 5 18 52 31

*

only a selection of university subjects listed in the table. Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Land Sachsen Anhalt, ed. Statistisches Landesamt, Halle 1994: 6.

In the post-communist environment, many A-level students doubt that completing university studies will secure them employment. In the GDR, educational qualifications would automatically have resulted in a career once a young person had been accepted for a pre-defined track. The new freedom of choosing a career without state interference is rendered meaningless by a lack of suitable jobs on offer. Young women appear to have more doubts than young men about their chances of matching education to employment, not least since sixty per cent were convinced that they were disadvantaged on the grounds of gender in obtaining training and in securing employment afterwards. The uncertain link between career wishes and employment opportunities is already evident among secondary school students. In Magdeburg, we interviewed over 2,000 full-time pupils between the ages of fifteen and eighteen at all levels of schooling from Hauptschule, the lowest tier in Germany’s three-tier selective system, to the German grammar school equivalent, Gymnasium. (see Table 7.8) We wanted to find out how young people saw their future careers, who influenced their choices, when they decided on a specific occupation, how much they knew about the occupation they intended to pursue, how confident they were in attaining their goals, how girls and boys perceived their prospects and which reasons they gave for their specific career choice.

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The findings confirmed the genderized career choices mentioned earlier which have not receded since unification. In obtaining information about possible careers, young people in Magdeburg turned to career advisers, the media and books but one in three depended predominantly on their parents to provide key information and help in locating a training place. Most wanted their future employment to be interesting, varied and challenging (Table 7.9 ). In their perception of the world of work, young people are also influenced by stories in the media and experiences in their daily lives indicating that society does not offer employment for everyone. As mentioned earlier, women have been encouraged to think that they should step aside and devote themselves to caring and domestic duties to ease the labour market pressures. These pressures are immediate in homes where one or Table 7.8

Pupils by Age and School Type in the Magdeburg Survey

Age

Gender

Under 16

Male Female Male Female Male Female

16-under 17 17 and over

Grammar school Intermediate Basic school N = 1067 school N = 1070 (Haupts) N = 119 11 17 12 21 13 26

24 27 18 22 4 3

28 28 20 12 10 2

Source: Ingrid Hölzler, Die Berufswahl und Berufswahlverhalten von Schülern in Sachsen-Anhalt, Universität Magdeburg 1995 (unpublished report).

Table 7.9

Choosing a Career: Main Sources of Information (in %)

Source of information

Gender

Grammar school students

Intermediate school students

Hauptschule Students

Parents

Male Female Male Female

35 37 42 51

38 29 31 34

29 36 29 28

Media, Books

Source as for Table 7.8.


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both parents have been affected by unemployment. In the Madgeburg study, 7 per cent of the fathers and 15 per cent of the mothers were unemployed at the time of the interviews (see Table 7.10). Parents of lowerlevel pupils (Hauptschule) were more likely to be affected by unemployment than parents of grammar school pupils. Predictably, parents of lower-level pupils tended to have lower levels of education than parents of grammar school pupils: of the former, 4 per cent of the fathers and 9 per cent of the mothers had completed higher or further education; among grammar school pupils, 75 per cent of the fathers and 64 per cent of the mothers had themselves obtained advanced educational qualifications. Given the small number of pupils in our sample who attended the lowest-level school, these data are not representative for the region of Saxony-Anhalt but are indicative of the link between education, schooling and unemployment across the generations. The families of young people and their parents in particular assisted their career choices by communicating their own experiences, evaluating likely job prospects and future developments and using their local knowledge and personal contacts with employers to help secure a training place for their offspring. In exercising their advisory role, some parents may also wish to warn the next generation against repeating mistakes they themselves may have made. The younger the trainee or prospective trainee, the more evident was parental influence in career choices. Of the young people who were still at school, 75 per cent reported that their parents had influenced their choice of future career. Among female engineering students, that proportion was just 44 per cent, while 15 per cent maintained that their parents did not have any influence on their career choice at all. Female engineers who had completed an apprenticeship before going to university reported a closer involvement of their parents in their career choice than those who had gone to university directly from Table 7.10

Unemployed parent

Unemployed Parents by School type of Students in Saxony-Anhalt (in %) Grammar school students

Intermediate school students

Hauptschule Students

7 9

7 18

10 28

Father Mother Source: as for Table 7.8.

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school. Young people with university-educated parents were more likely to have been influenced by them than those with less educated parents. The occupational and professional field of the parents served as a model; even for those who did not chose the same or a similar field of activity. Where fathers worked in technical jobs, the career choices of the young generation would normally also tend towards technology (Felske 1996, 29–30). In our survey, more girls (32 per cent) than boys (25 per cent) reported that their parents had been decisive in shaping their career choice. Others based their choices on the training places on offer (19 per cent) or the long-term prospects in a given area of employment (16 per cent). More than one in three (37 per cent) stressed the importance of independent career advice and nearly half reported that they had only decided on a specific career after seeking professional advice. No less important, in particular for young women, has been their individual life-course planning. In the new Länder, nearly 90 per cent of young women wish to have children at some stage in their lives (Hölzler and Mächler, 1992: 28). Well before actually contemplating motherhood, young women have to consider how they may combine employment and family duties in the future. In technical occupations, the working environment has been dominated by men to such a degree that combining such work with family roles and motherhood is perceived as virtually impossible while employment in traditional female domains such as retailing or clerical work seems more flexible not least because these areas offer more part-time employment opportunities and include more women. With regard to the second hypothesis formulated in the opening section of this chapter, we can now conclude that career choices of young people are strongly determined by the perceived long-term prospects in a given area, by labour market conditions and by individual life plans. Unemployment among parents also leaves its mark since such parents are often unsure how to advise their children and find it difficult to project their own career path as worth following. Thus, professional advisors have supplemented family-based guidance and often provided essential information to turn career intentions into definite choices. There is no clear evidence yet how the employment role of mothers and the changed labour market situation in the new Länder will shape the career choices of young people generally and in particular the future career choices of young women. CONCLUSION Since unification, women have had to reconsider their career plans and adjust their employment biographies. Employment opportunities for


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women have decreased throughout the economy, although not evenly across all branches. Today, being a woman has become a labour market impediment. Women have found it harder than men to retain their employment and also to enter new employment areas. Disadvantage based on gender has been particularly pertinent in traditional ‘male’ fields such as engineering and technology. Unemployment and changes of job have reduced the material independence of women and also left their mark on partnership relations within the family. Longer working hours and increased stress at work have affected male and female partners, while shorter opening hours of childcare facilities and increased distances between crèche or nursery and home or place of work have made greater demands on families. Inside the home, role divisions have taken on a more traditional hue as responsibility for childcare and household passes more and more to women alone. Despite these changed social conditions, women in the new Länder have sustained their employment motivation. Regardless of the number and age of their children, close to 80 per cent want to be in employment. Unemployed women miss above all the social context of working and the contact with colleagues. Earning an income takes second place in women’s employment priorities. The social transformation of post-communist Germany made career choices more diverse and less predictable than in the GDR as individuals are left to finding their future occupation and to devising their own means of qualifying for it. Since the transition from training to employment, however, is no longer guaranteed, individuals are forced to tailor their choices to perceived opportunities. With long-term uncertainty the hallmark of career choices for young people and their families, lifecourse planning itself may prove futile. The surveys we conducted in the region of Saxony-Anhalt and in Magdeburg indicate that young women have begun to opt for so-called typical women’s jobs in order to optimize their employment chances and to evade being displaced by male competitors. In planning their life-course, young women have learned that combining employment and family duties has largely become a matter of their own, individual resourcefulness and determination. Faced with potential conflicts between men and women in employment and between employment and family commitments, young women find it virtually impossible to know – as they could do in the GDR – whether to enter into a relationship and whether to start a family and have children. Gender-specific socialization had remained strong in East German families, even in the GDR era. In the transformed labour market conditions of the late 1990s, this genderized socialization compounds women’s employment difficulties.

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Schools, career advisors, job centres and the media could take a lead in breaking traditional gender stereotypes and enabling young women to be more confident about their employment choices and enjoy more equal opportunities. Much needs to be done to encourage girls in venturing into unusual careers and occupations fields. Projects to introduce women to ‘male’ occupations may help. Directing young women into technical employment without changing that working environment seems doomed to failure. Programmes to build women’s interest in this type of employment may break the mould by building women’s confidence to succeed in a traditionally male environment. The genderized view of technology as a male domain remained virtually unchanged in the forty years of the GDR. Women who had worked in technical fields had not made them their own and could be persuaded to change employment or forced out altogether when competitive pressures in manufacturing and technical employment increased. Yet, technical employment in particular could benefit from a new synergy as women infuse new ideas about using technology in a humane and environmentally friendly manner. References Arbeitsmarktmonitor des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt (1994), (ed.). Ministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Gesundheit des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt, Magdeburg. Beck, U. (1986), Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. Frankfurt/Main:Suhrkamp. Bertram, B. (1986), ‘Geschlechtstypisches zu Arbeitseinstellungen und beruflichem Engagement junger Werktätiger’ in Informationen des wissenschaftlichen Rates: Die Frau in der sozialistischen Gesellschaft, Berlin (Ost). Berufsbildungsbericht (1995) (ed.), Bundesanstalt für Arbeit und Berufsbildung, Nuremberg. Berufsbildungsstatistik (1994), Berufsbildungsstatistik des Statistischen Landesamtes Sachsen-Anhalt 1985–1994, Statistisches Landesamt, Halle. Chahberry, A. (1994), ‘Initiativen geben Frauen neue Impulse’ in Informationen für die Beratungs- und Vermittlungsdienste, Nuremberg: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit und Berufsbildung. Engelbrech, G. (1994), ‘Frauenerwerbslosigkeit in den neuen Bundesländern. Folgen und Auswege’ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 6. Faulstich-Wieland, H. (1993), ‘Frauen und Technik. Ein neues Verständnis’ in Frauenwelten no. 1, Düsseldorf: Econ. Felske, B. (1996), Berufswahlmotive Jugendlicher und junger Erwachsener im Bundesland Sachsen-Anhalt. Diplomarbeit (thesis) an der Fakultät für Geistes-, Erziehungs- und Sozialwissenschaften, University of Magdeburg, February. Gräfe H. and I. Hölzler (1996), Die Rolle der Frau in der Mathematik vor und nach der Wende. Abschlussbericht. Faculty of Mathematics, University of Magdeburg, Magdeburg (unpublished report).


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Hölzler, I. (1995), Die Berufswahl und Berufswahlverhalten von Schülern in Sachsen-Anhalt. Institute for Sociology, Magdeburg University, Magdeburg (unpublished report). Hölzler, I. (1996), Student numbers and subject choices at the University of Magdeburg. Unpublished report based on data provided by the Dean’s office, Magdeburg. Hölzler, I. and H. Mächler (1993), Sozialreport des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt. Magdeburg: University Publications. Integration (1994), Berufliche Integration und Perspektiven für Frauen in technikorientierten Berufen in den neuen Ländern. Expert Interviews. Bildungsstätte der Akademie der Führungskräfte der Deutschen Bundespost Telekom, Bad Saarow-Pieskow, 14–15. July. Martkforschungsinstitut, Leipzig (1993), ‘Untersuchung zur sozialen Rolle der Frau’ in Hallisches Tageblatt. Schäfers, B. (1994), Soziologie des Jugendalters. 5th edition. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. Schäfgen, K. and T. Rosendorfer (1994), ‘Geschlechtsspezifische Differenzierung des Arbeitsmarktes in Sachsen-Anhalt und Auswirkungen auf die Familie’ in Ministerium für Arbeit, Soziales und Gesundheit des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt (ed.), Arbeitsmarktsforschung für Sachsen-Anhalt – neue Ergebnisse. Magdeburg. Sozialreport (1994), Sozialreport 1994. Daten und Fakten zur sozialen Lage in den neuen Bundesländern. ed. G. Winkler, Berlin: Morgenbuch Verlag. Sozialreport (1995), Sozialreport 1995. Daten und Fakten zur sozialen Lage in den neuen Bundesländern. ed. G. Winkler, Berlin: Morgenbuch Verlag. Statistisches Jahrbuch (1994), Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Land Sachsen-Anhalt. ed. Statistisches Landesamt, Halle. Vereinbarkeit (n.d.), Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Arbeitswelt und geschlechtsspezifische Differenzierung des Arbeitsmarktes in Sachsen-Anhalt. Sonderauswertung des ‘Arbeitsmarktmonitor Sachsen-Anhalt’, Halle. Winkler, G. (1990), (ed.), Frauenreport ‘90. Berlin: Die Wirtschaft.

8 Young People and the Family Hans Oswald

Shortly after the Wende and German unification, many researchers from the ‘old’ Federal Republic began to conduct research on young people and the family in the German Democratic Republic and the new Länder. Although the Central Institute of Youth Research in Leipzig (ZIJ = Zentralinstitut für Jugendforschung) had conducted research programmes for several decades, little was known about the attitudes and behaviour of young East Germans because the GDR government had withheld most of the ZIJ’s findings from publication (Friedrich, 1991). West German researchers were especially interested in finding out to what extent the different political and social systems had affected the development of young people. The peculiarity of this cross-cultural research question lies in the common cultural tradition of both systems. This may offer a chance to single out the effects of different state ideologies, educational systems and leisure-time activites on the process of growing up. The earliest and most carefully designed of a clutch of comparative studies by West Germans of young people in both Germanies were the so-called Shell Study Youth ‘92 (Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell, 1992) and the huge youth and family surveys of the German Youth Institute in Munich (Bertram, 1992; Nauck and Bertram, 1995). Many other studies followed while the Shell Study was replicated in 1996 (Silbereisen et al. 1996). After unification, some findings from the GDR era were published (e. g. Hennig and Friedrich, 1991; Boltz and Griese, 1995) while other data sets were saved and stored in the Central Archive (ZA) in Cologne enabling scholars to conduct secondary analyses of data collected in the 1970s and 80s in the GDR. A handful of longitudinal studies from the GDR continued beyond unification such as the Rostock study which had commenced with the birth cohort of 1972 (Meyer-Probst et al., 1991) or the study by Förster and Friedrich (1996) with eleven waves of data collection since 1987. In addition, an ingenious life-course study of three age cohorts presents lively insights into marriage and the family in the GDR (Huinink et al., 1995). This chapter discusses some methodological issues arising from the comparative study of East and West Germany and presents key findings 164

Young People and the Family

165

on young people and their relationship with parents and peers in the western and eastern parts of German society.

PROBLEMS OF EAST-WEST COMPARISONS Hidden assumptions about East-West differences When conducting East-West comparisons, most Western researchers as well as visitors to the East tend to take Western standards as their yardstick – sometimes implicitly, but very often explicitly. In such comparisons the East shows up as deficient and is very often characterized by a lack of modernity. This interpretation may be applicable if we look at the infrastructure or production where modernity or the lack of it can be measured in terms of money and technology. However, the Western standards are largely inadequate when we compare attitudes, patterns of behaviour, sentiments or culture-specific psychological traits. Leaving aside some basic aspects such as human and civil rights or democratic procedures, we simply do not possess transferable criteria for the comparison of everyday thinking and acting for people in different cultures. We do not have the measures to tell us that a behavioural trait prevalent in the East may be worse than the corresponding trait in the West. History, ethnography and sociology have taught us to overcome ethnocentrism. But, wherever East and West Germans meet, we are confronted with evaluations representing a naive ethnocentrism on both sides, even at the universities of the new German Länder. Surely, it would be more constructive to identify differences between East and West without grading them in terms of better and worse? Adolescents and families in East Germany may have many things in common with their West German equivalents, yet they are charged wholesale with a lack of modernity. This is the case when adolescents meet (for example) in discotheques in West Berlin or at sport competitions and the Western participants demonstrate an arrogant superiority. Some observers speak of Western ‘prosperity chauvinism’ or ‘winner’s mentality’ (Bütow, 1995, p. 104). Some researchers regard the behaviour of adolescents in the West as more modern in style. However, the mere fact that a particular behaviour occurs more often or less often in the West does not make it more modern or better. It could be argued that the processes of modernization have unfolded in different ways in the GDR and the FRG (e. g. Gensicke, 1995; Kirchhöfer, 1995b). And it could be argued that the Western view is blind to the advantages of the Eastern kind of modern living.

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Instead of assuming a lack of modernization by applying questionable standards of modernity in East-West comparisons, we should use comparative analyses to enlarge our theoretical and empirical knowledge of the processes of socialisation and development in both social environments. In pursuing this aim we encounter the additional methodological challenge of conducting cross-cultural research. The overestimation of differences in comparing means Common measures in quantitative cross-cultural research are means and t-tests. If the difference between the two means is statistically significant then this is usually interpreted as a significant cultural difference between the two populations. This is not always wrong, but sometimes misleading. Firstly, in big samples small differences register as statistically significant, but tend to be interpreted as if they indicated fundamental differences. Secondly, the interpretation conceals that in most cases more people in the two cultures respond in a similar manner than in a different manner. In other words, the zone of overlapping answers in the two cultures is in most cases bigger than the zone of different answers. A good example occurred in our own research. We asked children of grades 2 to 5 in both West and East Berlin to give us all the names of the children they play with or otherwise have contact with outside school. With regard to the number of friends we got a significant (p < 05) difference, the children in the West having more friends than the children in the East. However, the difference is very small although significant: the mean number of friends has been 9.04 in the West and 8.37 in the East (Oswald and Krappmann 1995). If this result is presented in two graphs for the two cultures (Oswald, 1995, p. 171) there is a huge zone of overlapping answers and only few children differ on the right side of the graph for the East (few friends) and of the left side for the West (many friends). Despite the statistically significant difference, it would be very misleading to say that children in the East have fewer friends than children in the West. On the contrary, for the purposes of interpretation, it is rather surprising how similar the number of friends was considering the different daily routine of children due to the different day-care system (see below) in the two parts of Germany. A great many of the differences between East and West Germany featured in the media or in research-based literature are of this kind. The frequency of right-wing orientations among adolescents in the East is one such distorted difference. That leads to the related problem that sometimes differences are only true for subgroups, but are generalized for whole


167

societies. In addition, differences between subgroups in each of the two cultures are sometimes bigger than differences between the two cultures. Differences between cultures and subgroups In a complex path model Hagan et al. (1995) analysed the occurrence of right-wing extremism and school vandalism among adolescents in East and West Berlin. Although there was more right-wing extremism in the East than in the West, the differences in the whole sample were rather small. The conditions were very similar in the two parts of the city. Boys were more often violent and displayed more right-wing preferences than girls, especially if they had low educational qualifications, if they lacked confidence in societal norms (anomic aspiration in the sense of Durkheim), and if they spent most of their time hanging out with a clique (delinquent drift). If calculated separately for girls and boys, the East-West difference was only significant for girls (Boehnke et al., 1996). The East-West difference seemed to apply merely to the minor group of lowachieving girls hanging out with deviant cliques. Other studies revealed that differences in value orientations between pupils of higher and lower school types are much bigger in East and West Berlin than differences between all pupils of the two parts of the city (Ulbrich and Sydow, 1996). Similarly, the differences between school types concerning political attitudes and actions surpassed by far the EastWest differences. For example, pupils of the Gymnasium, the highest tier of the German secondary school system, were very similar in East and West with respect to right-wing extremism or political participation: They were much more liberal and politically involved than pupils of the lower tiers in the East as well as in the West (see Oswald, in press, for an overview). Influence of language and culture on survey responses The criteria applied in cross-cultural research have to measure equivalents. We always have to test if differences are real differences in the thinking or conduct of the two populations or if differences are due to a different understanding of the questions. A first aspect of this problem is correct translation. In Germany we have to ask if the meanings of certain words are the same in both parts of the country. A second aspect is that different cultures may entail different responses (Hui and Triandis, 1989). This can be tested by comparing the variances in the answers of the two populations

168


to a specific question or item. If such variances produce statistical differences, then these differences need to be explained. A third aspect of the problem is the equivalence of the psychological constructs used for comparing the two cultures. This can be tested by comparing the factor structures of a psychological construct in the two cultures by using confirmatory factor analyses (Oswald and Krappmann, 1995). Many studies about East-West differences have neglected the methodological demand for testing the equivalence of the factor structure of the constructs they set out to compare. YOUNG PEOPLE AND THE FAMILY: FINDINGS AND DEVELOPMENTS After the fall of the Berlin wall three exceptional demographic developments affected the family in the post-communist German regions: a rapid decline in new marriages, a similar decline in the birth rate, and, at the same time, a rapid decline in the number of divorces (Zapf and Mau, 1993). The first two developments do not seem to be indicators of a declining importance of the family but a sign of insecurity in times of rapid social change. Many post-adolescents postponed marriage and many young couples postponed the conception of children without devaluating the worth of the family. The future plans of adolescents still contain the wish of getting married and having children (Gille et al., 1995, pp. 43, 48). The third development does not indicate the greater importance of the family so much as the need to have subsidiary networks in insecure times (Keiser, 1995, p. 177). Demographers expect a reversal of all three developments as postponed marriages, the postponed births of children and postponed divorces will be made good over the next years. In 1995 and 1996 the birth rate in the new Länder already increased slightly from its post-unification trough.. The family was of great importance in the GDR, not least because it partly counterbalanced in the private sphere the publicly controlled sphere outside and served as a place of relaxation, security and retreat (Walper, 1995). After the Wende, the family was of even greater importance. For example, a higher proportion of adolescents regarded a harmonious family life as important in 1993 and 1994 than had done in 1980 (Kirchhöfer, 1995a, p.182). For married adults the satisfaction with the relationship with their partner increased after unification (Häder and Häder, 1995, S. 147), the instrumental support and the exchange of information became more important, and the positive evaluation of the self in the family was more significant after the Wende than before (Diewald et al., 1995, S. 337).


169

However, for a minority of married people the family did hinder the development of new experiences (Franz and Herlyn, 1995) and the dramatic changes in the labour market altered the relative importance of family and work. Although most mothers joined the labour force in the GDR, they valued family and children higher than their job and felt no discordance between the two spheres. After the Wende work became more important than the family at least for younger adults (Meyer, 1994, S. 170). Despite their decreased chances in the labour market women in the new Länder still prefer to work (Bertram, 1995, p. 154), the Western housewife model does not seem to be an acceptable alternative (Keiser, 1995, p. 183; see also Kolinsky in this volume). Most children in both parts of Germany live with their biological parents in a family. By the age of ten, 85 per cent of children in the West and 77 per cent in the East lived in this classical form of the nuclear family.(see Table 8.1). By the age of 16, these ratios had dropped to 80 per cent and 70 per cent respectively, but at the age of eighteen, 81 per cent of

Table 8.1 Age of the child

under 2 2-under 4 4-under 6 6-under 8 8-under 10 10-under 12 12-under 14 14-under 16 16-under 18 Overall

The Family Situation of Children in West and East Germany 1 Child lives with both biological (married) parents

Child lives with both (non-married) biological parents

Child lives in step family

Others i.e. single parent, foster parent, non-parent

West

East

West

East

West

East

West

East

91 90 89 86 85 82 86 80 81 86

74 87 81 80 78 78 77 70 65 77

7 3 2 2 2 1 1 0.3 0.1 2

22 5 5 3 2 3 1 3 2 5

1 0.3 2 3 4 6 3 6 5 3

1 1 4 4 7 8 8 9 5 5

1 7 7 9 9 11 10 14 14 9

3 7 11 13 13 11 14 18 28 13

1) Data for West Germany refer to 1988; for East Germany to 1990. N-15.156 children. Source: Nauck, B. (1993), ‘Sozialstrukturelle Differenzierung der Lebensbedingungen von Kindern in West- und Ostdeutschland’ p. 151.

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adolescents in the old Länder and 65 per cent of adolescents in the new still lived with both biological parents (Nauck, 1993, S. 151). These figures mean that the majority of parents in East and West stay together with their children. The probability of divorce of a couple is the smaller the younger the child is and the more siblings there are (see Klein, 1995). However, the ratio of complete nuclear families is higher in the old Länder than in the new. One important reason for this overall difference could be the greater economic power of mothers in the East who had joined the labour force to a much higher degree than mothers in the old FRG. The integration of women in the labour force was based on a comprehensive system of day care beginning with crèches for children in their first year of life. From the second year of life until school entry, 92 per cent to 95 per cent of an age cohort attended a day care institution where they could stay from early morning till late afternoon. In addition, almost all primary school children of grades one to four attended day care centres after school. Thus, children in the East had a different daily time schedule than children in the West. To this very day, the majority of pre-school and primary school children living in the new Länder and East Berlin attend day care institutions, in contrast to children living in the old Länder and West-Berlin. During the week, children in the East are removed from the control of their parents for a longer period of time than children in the West. One consequence of this is that after mothers return home from work many do not want to have friends of their children in the house. In one of our own studies, children in East Berlin visited each other less frequently at home, and stayed more rarely overnight at a friend’s home than children in the West (Oswald and Krappmann, 1995, p. 175). An additional reason for the lack of such visits by children in East Germany may be the fact that on an average homes in the East were smaller than homes in the West.

Young People, Parents and Peers In most modern societies the majority of adolescents have a warm, close and trusting relationship with their parents (Coleman and Hendry, 1990; Steinberg 1990; Bois-Reymond et al., 1994). Generational conflict appears to have been reduced by changed educational style with more elements of permissiveness, sexual liberation, the disappearance of the double moral standard for the two sexes as well as the smaller number of children per family and the psychological instead of economic value parents to today attribute to their children.

Young People and the Family Table 8.2

Parent–Child Relationship in East and West Germany1 (in %) Parents’ views about their relationship with their child/children Spending spare time with children

Age of the child 0–5 years 6–14 years 15–18 years over 18 years empty nest

171

Conversations with children

Closeness to children

East

West

East

West

East

West

95 74 42 25 20

89 58 33 25 22

14 34 44 51 42

7 22 34 40 32

77 59 75 74 83

72 72 76 76 86

1) Data for East Germany refer to 1990 (N = 1.951); for West Germany to 1988 (N = 10.043). Source: Bertram, H. and M. Hennig (1995), ‘Eltern und Kinder – Zeit, Werte und Beziehungen zu Kindern’, p. 115.

Evidence about the changed family climate and East-West differences emerged in a survey conducted by the Deutsches Jugendinstitut, where parents were asked about the amount of time they spent with their children, about conversations they had with their children, and about the closeness of the parent-child relationship (Table 8.2). Until the age of eighteen parents in the East spent more time with their children and talked more with them than in the West. Regarding feelings of closeness there was no difference between the two parts of Germany (Bertram and Henning, 1995, p. 115). In the East, adolescents believed to a higher degree than in the West that parents were competent to give advice and influence their career plans (Behnken et al., 1991). More adolescents in the East than in the West trusted their parents and sought their advice in personal matters. Parents in the new Länder, especially the mothers, were central in the life of the young (Gmür and Straus, 1994). Many Western observers (including the author) concluded from such statistically significant mean differences and some impressions from qualitative research that adolescents in the East were more family-oriented than in the West and that adolescents in the West were more peer-related than in the East (Oswald, 1992; Büchner, 1993; Kirchhöfer, 1995a, Lenz, 1995). However, the significant differences were small and the zone of overlapping behaviour was huge. It may be that some differences were due to sample biases or other distorting

172


factors. A good example that results may be misleading can be given by comparing the findings of the Shell study of 1992 (Oswald, 1992) with those of the replica study of 1996 (Reizle and Riemenschneider, 1996; see Figure 8.1) In both studies adolescents were asked about the importance of mother, father, same-sex friends, and opposite-sex friends in their life. In 1992 a higher percentage of adolescents in the East than in the West found that the father, the mother and at least one parent were very important in their life. (see Figure 8.1) As in other countries, mothers were seen as more important than fathers or peers and fathers were of similar importance as peers in both East and West Germany. Friends of the same sex were more important in the West than in the East. With regard to friends of the opposite sex, there was no difference between the two parts of the country. The greater importance of peers in West Germany as compared to East Germany was also reflected in the answers of adolescents when asked about clique membership. More adolescents in the West than in the East admitted to meeting regularly with members of a clique (42 per cent vs 34 per cent). Boys were more peer-group oriented than girls in both parts of Germany.

Figure 8.1 Importance of Adolescents Relationships 1992 and 1996 (age 13 to 24 – answer ‘very important’ in per cent) at least to one parent

to mother 80

75 72 68

70

71

70

73

to good friend (opp. sex)

to good friend (same sex)

66 to father

62

59 60

55

55

62 57

59

59 58

53 51

48

50

42 40

30

20

10

0

1992 p < .001

1996 n.s.

1992 p < .001

1996 n.s.

1992 p < .001

Source: Oswald 1992, p. 325 Reitzle/Riemenschneider 1996, p. 307

1996 n.s.

1992 p < .001

1996 n.s.

1992 p < .001

West 1992

East 1992

West 1996

East 1996

1996 n.s.


173

In the replica study of 1996, no differences were found between adolescents in the new and old Länder with regard to the importance of fathers, mothers or friends (Reizle and Riemenschneider, 1996). The importance of fathers and mothers increased in West Germany between 1992 and 1996 from 48 per cent and 62 per cent respectively to 55 per cent and 68 per cent, the percentages for East Germany were almost unchanged. Only the difference in clique membership was similar in 1996 (West: 35 per cent vs East: 27 per cent) and in 1992 (West: 42 per cent vs East: 34 per cent), and boys still were more clique-oriented than girls in 1996, just as they had been in 1992. The descriptions of the samples and the sampling procedures for the two studies give the impression that they are highly comparable. If this is indeed the case the notion that youth in the East are more family-oriented than youth in the West may have to be revised. In any case, the differences in 1992 were so small that already a minor shift (be it in the sample composition, be it in the distribution of answers) could change the interpretation regarding family orientation. The two surveys allow us to conclude, however, that adolescents are highly family oriented in the East as well as in the West. Only the stronger ties to peer-groups in the West compared to the East seem to be stable over the time period of four years. But this difference is small too, since the peer-group is important not only in the old states but also in the new Länder. More important than slight differences in the percentage points indicating family orientation in East and West is the finding that most adolescents are close to their parents. The closeness of family ties had a positive effect on adolescents in both parts of Germany. A comparative study of young people in Leipzig in the East and Mannheim in the West showed that the closer the family ties the higher the self-esteem and the weaker the family ties the more pronounced was a depressive mood among young people (Noack et al., p. 143). Scholars have debated for several decades whether the influence of parents or that of peers matters more. Again, there appears to be little difference between these two groups in either part of Germany. For about half of the adolescents in East and West parents as well as peers were very important. And only a minority – between one fifth and one fourth – thought that only their parents or only their peers were important. In this respect there was no change between 1992 (Oswald, 1992) and 1996 (Reizle and Riemenschneider, 1996) and no difference between the new and the old Länder. In both studies, boys nominated exclusively parents more often than did girls, while girls more often than boys had a dual orientation towards parents and peers. The exclusive orientation towards parents decreased with age while the exclusive orientation towards peers

174


increased. However, the percentage with a dual orientation towards parents and peers remained virtually stable between the ages of fourteen and twenty-four. The ‘normal’ case seems to be that adolescents have a good relationship with their parents and with peers. In East and West Germany negative peer pressure in deviant cliques was mainly found if the emotional relationship with parents was severely damaged (Oswald, 1992; see also Oswald and Suess, 1994, for West Berlin; Kühnel and Matuschek, 1995, for East Berlin). The influence of deviant peers is particularly negative if the bond to parents is weak. (Reizle and Riemenschneider, 1996, p. 313). The match between a negative relationship with parents and negative peer pressure applies in the east as well as in the West (see Brown and Huang 1995 for a similar result in the US).

Educational styles in East and West Germany In the East, parents have tended to spend more time with their children but have also been more inclined to exercise more explicit control over their offspring and the way they spent their spare time (Lüdtke, 1992). The issue of ‘control’ raises the question of East-West differences in educational styles and attitudes in the family. Over the last two decades educational objectives in the FRG have shifted towards permissiveness (Schneewind, 1992). Obedience and subordination no longer dominate the educational agenda. As principles of education and upbringing have become more individualistic, public educational bodies from nursery school to the institutions of higher learning have had to respect the more liberal principles adhered to by parents. In contrast, the socialist and collectivist society of the GDR favoured conformity with societal norms, responsibility towards others and solidarity. The state influenced the upbringing of children and adolescents through the public education system, the institutions of day care and the youth organization of the Communist Party. The official aim was to form the universally educated socialist personality (allseitig gebildete sozialistische Persönlichkeit). The responsibility of educating young people was partly taken away from the family and transferred to the state and to party organizations. On the other hand, due to strong family ties, parents retained much influence over their children. As mentioned earlier, parents in the new Länder continue to use the day care system which has enabled mothers to join the labour force. Nurses and teachers in these institutions seem to have been strict disciplinarians


175

compared to the educational personnel in the old Länder. In the day-care centres as well as in schools, educators and teachers of the GDR were strongly norm-oriented and punitive (Ahnert, 1991; Leuzinger-Bohleber and Garlichs, 1993). In the literature there are hints that the educational style of parents also was and remains somewhat more restrictive in the East (e.g. Schneider, 1994; Krüger, 1995, Zinnecker, 1996, 1997). In both East and West Germany, a long-term trend suggests that young people are becoming more involved in family decision-making and the number of adolescents without a voice in their families at the age of sixteen is decreasing (Reuband, 1995). Willingness to enter into arguments and discuss decisions has increased with the educational level of parents. This concentration of liberal educational attitudes in the higher strata of the society seems to be more marked in the new Länder than in the old, where permissiveness and liberal educational attitudes seem to be spread across the social classes (Krüger, 1995, p. 83). The theoretical concept of a shift ‘from the traditional command household to the modern negotiating household’ (Bois-Reymond et al. 1994; Bois-Reymond, 1995) was developed in the West. According to the qualitative study presented by Bois-Reymond and her colleagues, it is applicable also to the East. However, it seems that elements of the negotiating household like nondirectiveness, the negotiation of rules and the respect for children’s autonomy are more prevalent in the West than in the East, and that in the East parents have tended to alternate more between command and negotiation. In 1992, mothers and fathers in the East were more conformity-oriented and punitive than in the West although again these differences were only small (Zinnecker, 1996). In a recent cluster analysis with data from a representative sample, Zinnecker (1997) identified four types of parents: conflict parents (28 per cent), control parents (31 per cent), partner parents (18 per cent), and permissive (‘lockere’) parents (23 per cent). There were slightly more control parents in the East. More important than such differences are the similarities in findings and causes. In East and West alike, children from ‘conflict’ and ‘control’ parents were more depressed, had more stress and were more often delinquent than children of permissive and particularly of partner parents. The influence of social class on parenting style was a minor factor compared to the influence of the type of occupation. Parents were ‘conflict’ or ‘control’ parents if their employment was characterized by routine; they were partners if their work needed ideas and an innovative way of acting. The impact of employment characteristics as in the seminal work of Kohn (1969) – he studied only the impact of fathers’ work characteristics – proved to be true for fathers and mothers in East and West.

176


In a study of primary school children and their parents in West and East Berlin we have found that the distribution of answers of parents concerning educational goals was quite similar in both parts of the city: the range of overlapping answers was bigger than the range of differences ( see Table 8.3). However, some characteristic differences also emerged (Uhlendorff et al., 1997). The data presented in Table 8.3 shows that more mothers in East Berlin than in West Berlin were controlling in two ways. Towards daughters – but not towards sons – mothers in East Berlin tended to be more authoritarian than in West Berlin. Another aspect of control is captured by items measuring protective behaviour. Mothers in East Berlin were more protective and overprotective with regard to both daughters and sons than were mothers in West Berlin. The results for fathers point in the same direction. Results from another study confirm these observations: parents in the East were more overprotective than parents in the West (Büchner and Fuhs, 1996, p.181). However, the social class difference was bigger than the East-West difference. In our own study, mothers in the West were more often critical of their own educational style than mothers in the East. For fathers this difference was not found. Mothers in the East more often than mothers in the West brought up their daughters in the same way in which they had been brought up. Again, the same was not true for sons. Also, Table 8.3

Educational Styles of Mothers in East and West Berlin towards Daughters and Sons, 1990/91 (means)

Educational Style

Authoritarian Protective Self-Criticism Orientation: self-experienced educational style Openness

Mother–Daughter

Mother–Son

East

West

t-value

East

West

t-value

18.53 22.46 19.26 22.96

17.20 20.29 20.96 20.82

–1.90 * –2.76 *** 2.15 ** –2.02 **

18.00 20.54 16.71 21.23

17.98 17.73 20.00 20.76

–0.03 –3.84*** 5.17 *** –0.39

19.08

19.75

24.22

23.86

1.09

0.58

N = 185 mothers from East Berlin; 103 mothers from West Berlin. * p

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