Social Justice and the Experience of Emotion

Social Justice and the Experience of Emotion

Social Justice and the Experience of Emotion

Russell Cropanzano University of Arizona

Jordan H. Stein University of Arizona

Thierry Nadisic Emlyon Business School

Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 270 Madison Avenue New York, NY 10016

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© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2011. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. International Standard Book Number: 978-1-84872-844-8 (Hardback) For permission to photocopy or use material electronically from this work, please access www. copyright.com (http://www.copyright.com/) or contact the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (CCC), 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, 978-750-8400. CCC is a not-for-profit organization that provides licenses and registration for a variety of users. For organizations that have been granted a photocopy license by the CCC, a separate system of payment has been arranged. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cropanzano, Russell. Social justice and the experience of emotion / Russell Cropanzano, Jordan H. Stein, Thierry Nadisic. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-84872-844-8 1. Emotions. 2. Social justice. I. Stein, Jordan H., 1980- II. Nadisic, Thierry, 1968- III. Title. BF511.C76 2011 303.3’7201--dc22 ISBN 0-203-84047-X Master e-book ISBN

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2010023684

To Joshua and Timothy —R. C. To Mrs. Mendelson and A. G. —J. H. S. To Héloïse, Marie, and Raphaël —T. N.

Contents Preface Author Biographies

xiii xvii

1 Introduction

About This Book Major Themes of This Book Plan of This Book What Do We Mean by Affect? Presence vs. Absence of a Target Relative Intensity Duration Meta-Organization of Moods and Emotions Number of Component Processes What Do We Mean by Justice? Defining Distributive Justice Aristotle and the Ancient View of Distributive Justice John Rawls and the Original Position Distributive Justice and Affect Defining Procedural Justice Foundations in Political Philosophy Early Social Science Research on Procedural Justice Procedural Justice as a Cause of Affect Defining Interactional Justice Dimensions of Interactional Fairness: Informational and€Interpersonal Justice Interactional Justice as a Cause of Affect Summary Quo Vadis

vii

1

3 3 5 7 8 10 10 11 14 17 19 20 23 25 27 27 28 29 30 31 32 32 33

Contents

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2 Justice-Relevant Cognitions as a Cause of Affect

Adams’ (1963; 1965) Equity Theory Overview From Undifferentiated Arousal to Basic Emotions Inequity and Affect in Close Relationships Inequity and Envy: Gino and Pearce’s (2009) Abundance Effect Moderators of the Relationship Between Inequity and€Affect Summary and Critique Folger’s (1986a; 1986b; 1987; 1993) Referent Cognitions€Theory (RCT) Overview Referent Cognitions Theory and Affect: Referents and€Justifications Referent Cognitions Theory and Affect: Referents and€Choice Summary and Critique Interactions Among the Three Types of Justice (Historical) Overview From Two Two-Way Interactions to One Three-Way Interaction Adding Affect to the Three-Way Interaction Summary and Critique Cognitive Appraisal Theory Overview Justice, Cognitive Appraisals, and Emotion A Cognitive Appraisal Theory of Procedural Justice Barclay, Skarlicki, and Pugh (2005) on Procedural€Justice Tepper’s (2001) Cognitive Appraisal Model of Justice Affect Intensity as a Moderator of the Procedural Justice Effect Summary and Critique Conclusion and Future Research Directions The Fairness Tradition: Equity Theory, RCT, and the€Three-Way Interaction Cognitive Appraisal Theory

3 Justice and the Moral Emotions

Basic Research and Background Information Primatology and Evolutionary Psychology The Neuroscience of Justice Interactive Decision Making The Ultimatum Bargaining Game Altruistic Punishment

35 37 37 39 43 43 44 47 49 49 49 50 51 52 52 52 53 54 55 55 55 56 58 59 59 60 61 61 63

65 67 67 69 70 71 75

Contents

Evidence From the Negotiation Literature Concluding Thoughts Batson (1991; 1995; 1998; 2006) and the€Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis Alternative Number 1: Aversive-Arousal Reduction Alternative Number 2: Empathy-Specific Punishment Alternative Number 3: Empathy-Specific Reward Empathy and Justice as Sources of Altruism Empathy and the Motive to Punish Empathy and Altruism: Some Closing Thoughts A Brief Interlude on Universal Egoism and the Response from Justice Researchers Lerner (1975; 1982; 2003) and the Justice Motive Restoring Justice and the Benefits of Retribution Economic Motives Revisited Bies, Tripp and the Psychology of Revenge (Bies€&€Tripp,€1995; 1996; 1998; 2001; 2002; 2004; Tripp€& Bies, 1997; 2009) Revenge and Retributive Justice Some Closing Observations Stage Number 1: The Sparking Event Stage Number 2: Attribution of Blame Stage Number 3: Emotion Stage Number 4: The Nature of Retaliation Consequences of Revenge Summary and Critique: In What Sense Is Retribution€Moral? Folger (1994; 1998; 2001) and Deontic Justice Third-Party Effects Five Characteristics of the Deontic State Summary and Critique Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen’s (2008) Integrated Theory of€Moral Convictions (ITMC) Overview The ITMC and the Emotion Hypothesis Summary and Critique Future Research Directions

4 Justice, the Self, and Affect

Maintaining Control of Valuable Outcomes and Important€Events Early Research: Thibaut and Walker’s (1975; 1978) Control Model Brockner, Heuer, Siegel, Wiesenfeld, Martin, Grover,€Reed, and Bjorgvinsson’s (1998) Control€Theory Approach

ix

79 81 82 83 83 84 85 86 86 87 87 88 88 89 89 91 92 94 96 100 102 104 104 106 107 111 111 111 112 112 113

115 116 116 118

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Van den Bos and Lind’s (2002) Uncertainty Management Theory Higgins’ (1997; 1998) Regulatory Focus Theory Maintaining a Positive Self-Image: Self-Evaluation and Self-Consistency Self-Enhancement: How Injustice Can Raise Self-Esteem Evidence for the Self-Enhancement Effect An Important Caveat: Self-Enhancement Sometimes Enhances the Impact of Fair Processes Wiesenfeld, Brockner, and Martin’s (1999) Self-Affirmation/Self-Verification Theory Overview Wiesenfeld, Brockner, and Martin (1999) Wiesenfeld, Swann, Brockner, and Bartel (2007) Summary and Critique The Social Self: Tyler (1994) and the Relational Models€of€Justice Overview How Injustice Can Lower Self-Esteem Self-Evaluations as Moderators The Relational Models and Emotion Relational Models and Observer Effects Summary and Critique The Moral Self Skitka and Colleagues’ (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Skitka & Houston, 2001; Skitka & Mullen,€2002)€Moral Mandate Effect Summary and Critique Future Research Directions How Much Unity? How Much Diversity? Everything in Its Place—Including Justice

5 Mood and Emotion as Causes of Justice

Mood vs. Emotion: A Short Review of Essential Definitions Affect-as-Information Van den Bos and Lind’s (2002) Uncertainty Management Theory Hollensbe, Khazanchi, and Masterson (2008) on Event€and Entity Justice Affective Priming Affective Priming and Negotiation Affective Priming and Justice Affect and Depth of Processing Sinclair and Mark’s (199l; 1992) Information Processing€Model

119 122 125 126 126 128 129 129 130 131 132 132 132 133 135 137 139 140 141 142 143 143 144 144

147 148 150 151 153 156 156 157 157 158

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Other Affective Influences on Justice Perceptions Summary and Critique Integrating the Three Traditions: Forgas’ (1995; 2000; 2001) Affect Infusion Model Four Modes of Information Processing Affect-as-Information vs. Affective Priming Closing Thoughts Emotion as a Cause of Justice Perceptions Scher and Heise’s (1993) Affect Control Theory Mullen’s (2007) Affective Model of Justice Reasoning Future Research Directions Model 1: The Focusing Effect—From Mood to€Emotion Model 2: The Broadening Effect—From Emotion to Mood Concluding Thoughts

6 Emotional Regulation: Display Rules and Terror€Management

╇

Emotional Labor Overview of Display Rules Benefits of Display Rules Hazards of Display Rules: Emotional Labor Injustice and Emotional Labor Summary and Critique Some Final Parting Thoughts Terror Management Theory Overview of Terror Management Theory (TMT) Terror Management and Ingroup Behavior Terror Management, Punishment, and Forgiveness Where Is the Affective Driver in TMT? Justice and Terror Management Theory Terror Management Theory vs. Uncertainty Management Theory Summary and Critique Future Research Directions

7 Conclusion

Further Integration of Justice and Affect: Ashkanasy’s (2003) Five-Level Model Level 1: Within-Person Affect Level 2: Between-Person Affect Level 3: Interpersonal Interactions Level 4: Groups and Teams Level 5: Organizational Climate

xi

159 160 161 162 163 164 164 165 166 168 169 170 171

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175 175 176 178 181 185 186 186 186 187 188 190 191 193 196 197

199 202 203 206 209 215 216

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What Is Missing From the Justice Literature? Can One Identify New Antecedents to Justice Judgments? Can One Integrate Affect in the Conceptualization of the Structure of Justice Judgments? Can One Identify Understudied Consequences of Justice Judgments? Are There Understudied Moderators to the Justice Judgmental Process? Final Thoughts

217 218 220 224 227 228

References

229

Author Index

289

Subject Index

305

Preface There is a peculiar sort of blindsight that sometimes afflicts intellectuals. We may know something is there, we may be smug enough to acknowledge its existence with a fatuous sneer, we might even feel it, but we do not actually see it. Everyone who has raised a child, held a job, been in love, talked with a friend, watched the news, or read a novel—in other words, anyone who has lived the life of a human being and even when this has been done vicariously—knows that emotion is fundamental to injustice. It is difficult to experience the latter without encountering the former. We scholars are no different. We must know that fairness and feelings are closely related. Yet in our professional research work, the role of feelings has sometimes been relegated to a secondary role. Affect has not been given the attention that common sense, if not academic theory, says that it deserves. Like most mistakes, this intellectual blindsight is innocent enough. Scientists, even social scientists, need to focus on details. We take things apart to learn their particulars. When we put these pieces back together again, we only use those facts that have been rigorously tested. It is hard to imagine another way of doing things, but it does pose a concern. We sometimes forgot the obvious—what we do not know is what we do not know. It is neither more nor less than this. Like a proverbial fish that does not know it is in the water, we swim in so much uncertainty that we sometimes fail to recognize it. Instead, we begin to theorize with a global view, as if what we do not know is something more than Â�ignorance—it is what does not exist, at least with respect to our conceptual models. That is, we build our theories without sufficient regard to the missing information. Because we cannot incorporate those facts that we have not systematically tested and thus about which we do not have models even if in some way we intuitively know they exist, we build intellectual edifices with only those parts (facts) that are available to us. When our global theoretical models are done, at least to our satisfaction, we may have proposed a view of human nature that a moment’s reflection will tell us must be wrong. xiii

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Preface

Something is probably missing. The hypothesized person, the prototypical being that is implied by our theory, is an individual without an important foundational piece of human nature. Were we to encounter this person on the street, we would quickly see that he is quite mad. But since we only encounter him in academic journals, he strikes us as a friendly enough sort, at least he is accommodating to our theoretical predictions. This is the subtle problem that confronts social scientists, and it is rendered all the more dangerous by its subtlety. It is not that we lack knowledge. What honest scholar could say otherwise? It is that we build our theories without knowledge and therefore find ourselves saying, or at least implying, things that cannot be entirely true. Lacking the proper foundation, we leave off part of the structure and then expect it to function as if it were complete. More than that, we believe that it is functioning as if it were complete. John Maynard Keynes (1931, p. 373) entreated economists “to get themselves thought of as humble, competent people on a level with dentists.” In a way this is what we social scientists have succeeded in doing. We often build global theories on the basis of local models that we can trust because they have been tested. The problem is that a global theory made of a myriad of small tested models is likely to remain untested as a whole. This makes very difficult the identification of a missing part in any global theoretical system, even if this part is fundamental. Such a thing seems to have happened to the justice literature, as regards the experience of human affect. It is one thing to say, as when we apologize in the discussion sections of research articles, that future research needs more of this or more of that. It is quite another to build comprehensive theories that lack a place for our feelings. This slow and incomplete arrival of emotion into the justice literature has left us with the oddest view of things. Here are but four hypothetical people that emerge with fairness researchers who fail to give human emotions their due: • The psychopath: The psychopath is someone who feels no emotion. He or she decides fairness based upon a rational analysis of objective facts. Reason is important, but does not give a complete account (cf., Bloom, 2010). For example, in Chapter 5 we will see that our feelings can influence and even bias how we evaluate fairness. • The narcissist: The narcissist is someone whose only concern is his own benefits. Some scholars have argued that fairness reduces to individual self-interest. Justice is not really “just”; it is an arrangement cobbled together for personal benefit. We review the evidence in Chapter 3. We will see that a sincere commitment to justice is possible, even when the beneficiary is a person other than ourselves. • The hermit: The hermit is someone who gives no thought to the opinions that others might hold of him or her. In a like manner, such justice researchers have neglected the role of group membership. Addressing this concern, Chapter 4 will discuss a considerable body of research that underscores the importance of social standing

Preface

xv

in fairness perceptions. We will learn that human beings are not loners, and fairness is often understood within social settings. • The rationalist: The rationalist is someone who makes his or her decisions knowingly and intentionally. Such decisions are untouched by unconscious mental and emotional processes. In Chapter 6 we will see that there are some limits to this perspective, reviewing evidence pertinent to unconscious emotional regulation. Human beings have an unconscious, as Freud (1930; 1933) asserted decades ago. The psychopath, the narcissist, the hermit, and the rationalist that we have described here do not really exist. They are unfinished theoretical people. They result from incomplete conceptual models, which in turn result from fragmentary empirical evidence. Or is all of this no more than a failure of imagination? According to Baudelaire (1868, p.€265), “l’imagination décompose toute la création, et, avec les matériaux amassés et disposés suivant des règles dont on ne peut trouver l’origine que dans le plus profond de l’âme, elle crée un monde nouveau, elle produit la sensation du neuf. Comme elle a créé le monde (on peut bien dire cela, je crois, même dans un sens religieux), il est juste qu’elle le gouverne.” [imagination breaks down the whole universe, and, with the materials amassed and arranged following rules whose origin can only be found in the deepest of our soul, it creates a new world, produces the feeling of the new. As it has created the world (I think that one can indeed say that, even in a religious sense), it is fair that it governs it.] Thus, let us give a bigger role to imagination in order to help us rebuild a more accurate picture of the world of justice on the robust basis of a puzzle of empirically well-tested models. What we can at least say is this: Human emotion has always been an important part of our experience of (in)justice. This was so even if we scholars have not consistently recognized it. Now that we see this, it is time for us to understand what we are looking at. We will be helped in reaching this objective by research that has recently emerged, allowing us to bridge the literatures on emotions, moods, and justice. Such integrative work does exist, although one will sometimes need to search across a number of different disciplines in order to locate it. It is worth the effort. A thorough consideration of the role of affect in our experience of social justice is the best treatment for each of the unfinished theoretical people whom we have encountered in the literature.

Author Biographies Dr. Russell Cropanzano is the Brien Lesk Professor of Organizational Behavior at the University of Arizona’s Eller College of Management. Dr. Cropanzano’s primary research areas include perceptions of organizational justice as well as the experience and impact of workplace emotion. He has edited four books and published over 100 scholarly papers. In addition, he is a co-author (with Robert Folger) of the book Organizational Justice and Human Resources Management, which won the 1998 Book Award from the International Association of Conflict Management. Dr. Cropanzano was also a winner of the 2000 Outstanding Paper Award from the Consulting Psychology Journal, as well as the 2007 Best Paper Award from Academy of Management Perspectives. He is a past editor of the Journal of Management, and a fellow in the Society for Industrial/Organizational Psychology and the Association for Psychological Science. Jordan H. Stein is a senior doctoral student at the University of Arizona in the Eller College of Management. Her research examines justice, emotions, discrimination, and related issues. Her work has been published in many top academic outlets, including the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Journal of Management, and Business Ethics Quarterly, to name a few. Dr. Thierry Nadisic is an assistant professor of organizational behavior at EMLYON business school, France. He completed his PhD in management at HEC School of Management in Paris, France. He won the 2009 prize of the dissertation of the year from the HEC Foundation. Dr.€Nadisic conducts research on topics relating to organizational justice. His research has appeared in international conferences, and in French and American book chapters and academic journals.

xvii

ch a p t er

1

Introduction On June 30, 1892 the contract between the Carnegie Steel Company and the Homestead branch of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers was set to expire. The Amalgamated had reason for confidence. Having won an earlier strike, the steel workers union was at the pinnacle of its power. Since the late 1880s, membership had increased by 100%, while their general fund was at nearly $146,000 (Brody, 1998), a princely amount in the 19th century. Moreover, overall business was generally good, as Carnegie Steel had access to a number of lucrative government armor contracts (Krass, 2002). The workers deserved better, as well. Working and living conditions in Homestead, as was typical of the American steel industry at the time, were abhorrent (Standiford, 2005). Under the leadership of Hugh O’Donnell, the steel workers began negotiating for higher wages and better working conditions. But from Carnegie Steel’s perspective the timing was inauspicious. The union contract of 1889 created tight work rules, making it hard to respond flexibly to competitive challenges. The old contract was costly, as the Homestead plant was forced to keep more unionized workers than were needed to do the work. These problems came at a bad time for the company. Since the contract of 1889 had been signed, the price of steel produced at the Homestead facility had dropped from $36 per ton to only $23 per ton, and this while the firm was planning a reorganization and anticipating business downturn in the face of tough competition from Illinois Steel (Krass, 2002). Before Andrew Carnegie departed for Scotland, he and his partner, Henry Clay Frick, decided to hold firm. They would not yield Â�additional ground. This having been decided, Carnegie left on this trip leaving Frick to contend with the Amalgamated. It was a poor decision. Frick resolved to break the Amalgamated once and for all. He 1

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Social Justice and the Experience of Emotion

demanded that the workers take a pay cut. When the union balked and no Â�contract was reached, Frick turned the Homestead mill into a veritable fortress, enclosing it in a high wall ringed with barbed wire. On June 29 he locked out the workers, determined to hire nonunion replacements (Standiford, 2005). To enforce his decrees, Frick hired a squad of 300 armed members of the Pinkerton National Detective Agency (cf. Mackay, 1996). They were transported up the Monongahela River by barge. When the workers saw the Pinkertons approaching, they had had enough. The union members opened fire on the barge, the Pinkertons responded, and a number of people were killed on both sides. The Pinkertons, outnumbered and outgunned, eventually surrendered. They were allowed to live, but were savagely beaten by a gauntlet of workers and their families. Appalled by the violence, the state militia arrived on July 12, 1892 and seized control of the plant and, as well, the entire town of Homestead. The union was broken, and its leaders were blacklisted from the industry (Standiford, 2005). Frick was seriously injured in an attempt on his life (by an anarchist, not a union member). Carnegie, who had heretofore seen himself as a progressive businessman and friend of working people, blamed Frick for the trouble despite the fact that he had originally supported the contentious stance against the Amalgamated (Krass, 2002). Their friendship in tatters, Frick left the company and began a lifelong rivalry with Carnegie. The tragedy of Homestead Steel is an object lesson. The company and the workers could have been less arrogant at the outset, less indignant during the strike, or even, in the case of Carnegie and Frick, less vindictive when the battle came to a close. Or could they? The sequence of moves and countermoves that made the particular pattern of this story is due to response tendencies that seemed natural, legitimate, and probably unavoidable to each protagonist (cf. Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005). What we can say is that when the dust had cleared, even Carnegie expressed little joy in his pyrrhic victory (cf. Krass, 2002), but what we wish after our emotions have cooled may be little related to how we behave when overcome by rage. A good deal of human history, for better but sometimes for worse, has been shaped by justice, injustice, and the feelings that result from the two. And this brings us, in a roundabout way, to the topic before us. When people experience an injustice, they often respond in emotionally laden terms (Bies & Tripp, 1996; 2001; 2002), viewing it as a “hot and burning experience” (Bies, 2001, p. 90). Despite the intensity of these feelings, scholars have been slow to subject the affect–justice relationships to empirical scrutiny (Barsky & Kaplan, 2007; Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Harlos & Pinder, 2000). When Englishspeaking researchers wish to name those internal processes that begin with the experience of injustice and end with a behavioral intent, they usually use the term justice judgment, which emphasizes the

Introduction

3

cognitive nature of this process. This is not the case everywhere. In contrast, some languages emphasize the affective nature of the process; the French use the term sentiments de justice (Kellerhals, Modak, & Perrenoud, 1997), which can be translated as “feelings of justice.” In any case, when reading the fairness literature, at least in English, one will likely notice the prevalence of cognitively based theories describing how justice perceptions are formed: referent standards (Cropanzano & Folger, 1989), counterfactuals (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998), expectations (Shapiro & Kirkman, 2001), attributions (Schroth & Shah, 2000), heuristics (Jones & Martens, 2009; Lind, 2001; van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 2001), and so on. To be sure, these are important theories with considerable explanatory power (Bagger, Cropanzano, & Ko, 2006; Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001; Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & Schminke, 2001; Sheppard, Lewicki, & Minton, 1992). Nevertheless, any model of justice that excludes human emotions is incomplete (van Winden, 2007). That said, fairness research, though influenced by the cognitive revolution, was never completely “mentalized.” There has long been a subtext to justice scholarship that has maintained a strongly affective conceptual voice. In recent years this chorus has grown considerably louder (De Cremer, 2007a; De Cremer & van den Bos, 2007; Jasso, 2006; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2008).

About This Book Given the natural affinity between (in)justice and affect, integrating the two literatures has been slower than one might expect. This is because affect is understood within several theoretical traditions, including cognitive appraisal models, moods, moral emotions, and so on. Incorporating these diverse frameworks has proven a challenge for affect researchers, and may occasionally bewilder counterparts that study social justice. When scholars have attempted to integrate the justice and emotion literatures, they have sometimes derived models that bear only a passing resemblance to one other. As we shall see, some emphasize the causal primacy of cognition, others affect. Some have even examined the justice implications of emotional regulation (see Chapter 6). Other researchers have investigated fairness and mood, while their counterparts study fairness and emotion, but only rarely do we make clear links between these three concepts (see Chapter 5). And so on.

Major Themes of This Book Further progress requires a systematic catalog and critique of the available conceptual options. Toward the end, we will here provide a detailed review of the conceptual models seeking to integrate justice and affect. For each theory we shall also provide brief critiques, with a focus on the

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Social Justice and the Experience of Emotion

commonalities and distinctions among the sundry models. In short, we provide a summary of the literature linking justice and affect. There are a number of themes in our review to which the reader may wish to attend. First, this book is focused on empirical social scientific theories pertaining to fairness, mood, and emotion. Most of the available frameworks linking affect and justice were built more or less from scratch by fairness researchers (e.g., equity theory, the relational models) or reflect attempts by justice scholars to adapt existing theories of emotion to suit their conceptual purposes (e.g., cognitive appraisal models, the affective model of justice reasoning). As our review seeks to reflect the available literature as closely as possible, extensive portions are written from the perspective of fairness scholars exploring the implications of affective research. It has been rarer for work to proceed in the other direction, for affect researchers to expand their models to include justice perceptions. Still, “rare” does not mean “absent.” When affect researchers have taken a look at justice, some promising conceptual opportunities have resulted. Three such models that seem especially useful are Haidt’s (2001; 2006; see also Haidt & Joseph, 2004) social intuitionist model, which examines discrete emotions, Sinclair and Mark’s (1991; 1992) information processing model, which examines mood, and the affect infusion model (Forgas, 1995; Forgas & George, 2001), which also mainly deals with mood. We will pay special attention to these conceptual frameworks at length, given their promise. Notice that we will not be interested in specifically describing attitudinal and behavioral consequences of justice and affective perceptions. The fact that (in)justice and affect produce strong reactions in day-today life and in organizations has been well documented by researchers (see, for example, De Cremer, 2007a). This link between affect, justice, and behaviors is precisely what makes our work valuable. However, we choose in this book to go a step backward and mainly study either affect or justice as dependent variables. Second, our approach is strongly historical. Our goal is to place relevant research into its proper historical milieu, illustrating the different models by tracing how they developed. We take this approach for completeness. We do not want scholars to lose touch with their past because important ideas may be housed in musty papers. To take a diverse set of examples, it has long been argued that all human motivation cannot be logically reduced to self-interest (Butler, 1726/1983; Hume, 1748/1975), that daily mood measures allow for strong conceptual inferences (Hersey, 1932a; 1932b), that human beings (sometimes) seek to behave consistently with their self-images (Korman, 1966; 1967), that blocked goals create frustration, that fear and anger show different physiological manifestations (Ax, 1953; Wolff & Wolff, 1943), that individuals use referent others to ascertain distributive fairness (Homans, 1958; 1961), that moods can be organized into a circumplex (Wundt, 1897), that physical arousal can be mislabeled (Mandler & Kremen, 1958; Schachter, 1964; Schachter & Singer, 1962), and that emotional

Introduction

5

facial displays are a useful means of communication among members of the same species (Darwin, 1872/1965). We are not asking anyone to endorse all of these findings. We shall even qualify some of them ourselves. Rather, our point is that scholars should come to terms with this earlier work, building on it where possible and explicitly rejecting it when this is appropriate. This brings us to our other reason for taking a historical approach. As McIntyre (2006) has sadly observed, it is sometimes said that the social sciences have not made cumulative progress. Consider this book an argument against that position. As we shall see, early theories connecting justice to emotion were far more simplistic and less complete than were later models. For example, equity theory (Adams, 1963; 1965) lacked a notion of process fairness, while referent cognitions theory (Folger, 1986a; 1986b) did not clearly distinguish between interactional and procedural justice. We do not deny that there is a good deal left to do, and that progress may have been slower than we would prefer, but we have learned a lot in those intervening decades since French (1964) invented the term organizational justice. We cannot be complacent, but we can be encouraged. Third, our book places a heavy emphasis on integration. Most of the literature reviewed here is drawn from social and organizational psychology. These research disciplines have paid special attention to both affect and justice. However, a good deal of the work that appears in these pages comes from management, personality, and even evolutionary psychology. Also we present discussions of relevant philosophical positions, such as those of Aristotle (350 b.c./1962) and Rawls (1971). Though the philosophical tradition is distinct from social scientific paradigms, it has nevertheless had a pervasive influence on empirical justice research.

Plan of This Book Our goal is to familiarize the reader with the rich tradition of conceptual models explaining the association between justice and emotion. A number of such frameworks are available to scholars. Though these models are distinct, they can be organized into a few basic conceptual families. We have organized this book into five chapters (Chapters 2 to 6), each of which is based on a family of related theoretical models. We also include an introductory (Chapter 1) and a concluding section (Chapter 7). Chapter 1, the chapter you are reading now, provides the introduction. In this chapter we define the basic themes of this book. Specifically, our review focuses on the myriad theories linking justice to affect. Additionally, this first chapter also provides general overviews of the justice and affect literatures. This allows us to define key terms and make some important distinctions that are used throughout this book. Chapter 2 discusses various cognitive appraisal models linking justice to affect. This second chapter is closely linked to the first, as it provides

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Social Justice and the Experience of Emotion

a historical overview showing how justice scholars gradually came to appreciate the role of moods and emotions. There is an emphasis on earlier fairness research, including such frameworks as equity theory and referent cognitions theory (RCT). Conceptual models such as these provided the foundation for much contemporary justice research. Finally, we discuss these older justice theories in the context of what was known about affect when the original fairness research was conducted. For example, the original equity theory (cf. Adams, 1965) employed a cognitive appraisal model of emotion that was later supplemented by research on basic emotions. Chapter 3 takes up the important issue of moral emotions. We argue that human beings have an evolutionary-based aversion to unfair treatment (Buunk & Schaufeli, 1999). This aversion, which also exists in other primates (Brosnan, 2006; de Waal, 1996), does not rely heavily on effortful cognitive processing. Rather, it is based on moral intuitions (Haidt, 2006) and emotion (van Winden, 2007). Research on moral emotions moves affect to center stage, making it fundamental to understanding social justice. Chapter 4 provides a review of self-theories of justice and how they pertain to affect. For years these theories have been vital to justice research, though they have typically not been discussed as a group. We address that need here. Based on the multiple needs model of justice (Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001) we organize Chapter 4 around four goals—maintaining control over outcomes, maintaining a positive self-image, maintaining one’s social identity as a member of a valued group, and behaving in accordance with one’s self-image as a moral agent. Chapter 5 turns around the traditional causal order pertaining to social justice. In most research, perceptions of justice (or injustice) trigger an affective response. However, we shall review a class of theories suggesting that both moods and emotions can influence perceptions of fairness. In other words, Chapter 5 treats justice as a dependent variable rather than as a causal agent. Affect is the antecedent that can cause fairness perceptions. Chapter 6 is devoted to emotional regulation. This chapter takes up two innovative conceptual models, emotional labor and terror management theory (TMT). Emotional labor research shows that maintaining facial expressions that are inconsistent with one’s actual feelings requires effort. This effort, in turn, can have unpleasant consequences for individuals. Display rules can, therefore, be seen as unfair. Also, hiding moral outrage that results from injustice can be difficult. Terror management theory, on the other hand, takes us in a different direction. It describes justice as a means of managing affective responses. TMT argues that contemplating our own deaths (mortality salience) can produce fright. By clinging to culturally accepted norms of conduct, including enforcing standards of justice, we cope with this terror. In Chapter 6 we review different theories

Introduction

7

for explaining why terror management may cause one to become more concerned with fairness. Chapter 7, our final chapter, offers our conclusions. In this chapter we reflect on the research linking justice and affect, with an emphasis on future research directions. Our concluding chapter pays special attention to different levels of analysis. This issue has been separately addressed by both justice scholars (Li & Cropanzano, 2009) and affect researchers (Ashkanasy, 2003), but these two streams of inquiry are in need of further integration. Building on previous work, we present a taxonomic model and illustrate it with specific empirical examples. For all that, we will assiduously avoid proposing our own theory of affect and justice. There is a sound reason for this. There are innumerable theories already available to scholars. Many of these are both strong and underinvestigated (e.g., those of Haidt, 2001; Mullen, 2007; Sinclair & Mark, 1992; and Skitka et al., 2008, among others). Given the diversity of the theories contained herein, our greatest contribution is made by describing each of the available models and offering some analysis and integrative suggestions. We begin by providing an overview of some important ideas that we use throughout this book. With this brief blueprint behind us, we now turn our attention to the two bodies of literature that are critical to this book. We begin by reviewing empirical research on affect, paying special attention to the distinction between moods and emotions. We then turn to research on organizational justice, taking care to define the key ideas and to discuss their origins. Along the way we provide preliminary evidence that justice and affect are associated.

What Do We Mean by Affect? Affect refers to feelings (Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999). Some authors limit their definition of affect to those feelings that are, in Fredrickson (2001, p. 218), words “consciously accessible.” In this present chapter we do the same, emphasizing the influence of conscious affect on justice perceptions. However, the reader should note that scholars allow for unconscious feelings (for historic examples, see as Becker, 1973; 1975, and Freud, 1933/1965). Emotion researchers generally refer to this as implicit affect (for reviews, see Barsade, Ramaragan, & Westen, 2009; Westen, 2007). Justice researchers have been slow to integrate this possibility into their own thinking. For that reason, implicit affect will not be a major topic in the present volume. As recompense, Chapter 6 will review terror management theory—a framework that posits the existence of inaccessible affective states. Justice, as we shall further learn, can play a role in managing unconscious affect, but that discussion is for the future. Psychologists use a number of different constructs that contain affect to some degree or other. Moods and emotions are certainly affective

8

Social Justice and the Experience of Emotion

in nature, and perceived physical symptoms may have an affective Â�component as well (Fredrickson, 2001; Pennebaker, 1982). Attitudes may contain affect as well (Brief & Weiss, 2002), though there is some debate on this point (Judge & Larsen, 2001; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). With such a menagerie of constructs before us, it is not surprising that the term affect is often tricky to understand. The most important affective concepts for this book are mood and emotion. Both of these constructs have an affective component, but affect is related to mood in a more straightforward fashion. Some scholars view mood as a sort of free-floating, consciously accessible, affective state (Russell & Feldman Barratt, 1999). Indeed, the terms mood and affect are sometimes treated as near synonyms (e.g., by Fredrickson, 2001; Sinclair & Mark, 1992). Emotion is a more complex idea, whose nature can best be understood by contrasting it with the simpler concept of mood. As we will discuss, moods and emotions differ in five important respects—the presence vs. absence of a target, intensity, duration, meta-organization, and the number of processes involved (for reviews, see Barsade, Brief, & Spataro, 2003; Elfenbein, 2007; Fulmer & Barry, 2009; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Weiss, 2002). We discuss these characteristics below. We will take a second look at the mood/emotion distinction when we reach Chapter 5.

Presence vs. Absence of a Target Emotions are tied to a specific target stimulus, such as an event or object (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996; Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999; Weiss, 2002). They are about something that is meaningful to a person. Consider an individual who was excluded from an important workplace decision. This event, if perceived as inappropriate, is associated with the Â�emotion that Skitka and her colleagues (2008) have labeled “moral outrage.” Therefore, the individual’s moral outrage is about the injustice of being left out of the decision-making process. If this same experience of being excluded were perceived differently, then it would be about something else and a different emotion would result. This is because an emotion does not only feel a certain way; it also carries with it the interpretive meaning we ascribe to an event, object, or person. These interpretations can vary across individuals and situations. Instead of seeing exclusion as an injustice, one might understand it as a threat to future earnings or workplace promotions. This might lead to fear or worry. There are other possibilities. One could perceive the injustice as a violation of a hierarchy. Contempt for the harm doer is generally felt in this example (Shweder et al., 1997). Three people can experience the same event, and they can all agree that it is unfair, but base their perceptions on three wildly different appraisals of the transgression. We need to go very carefully here, because this is an issue that is commonly misunderstood. The observation that emotion is identified with a

Introduction

9

target stimulus is sometimes conflated with the notion that emotion Â� is caused by a target stimulus. The cause, of course, is the triggering event that produced the emotion. Identification is a more complex matter. Identification, loosely speaking, is what an individual believes the emotion is about. Specific and discrete emotions are Â�identified as concerning certain events or stimuli. For example, when individuals believe that they have been victimized by a moral impropriety, they are likely to feel the emotions of anger, indignation, or disgust. On the other hand, when individuals believe that they have committed a moral impropriety, they are likely to feel the emotions of guilt or shame. Emotions are affective states about something of significance to us, such as justice. We experience different feeling states depending upon how we understand the target event. Cause and identification are easy to confuse because they frequently occur together. That is, we often identify the emotion with the event or object that caused it. At these times the cause and the target of identification are one in the same. However, this is not necessarily the case, as the stimulus that caused the emotion may not be the stimulus by which the emotion is understood. The easiest way to demonstrate this point is to recognize that the relevant target event may come after the relevant feelings. For instance, affect may impact cognitions, leading us to interpret a target event in a way that retrospectively fits our emotion. Likewise, behaving in a certain way can evoke emotionally consistent feelings and cognitions (for details, see Mascolo & Griffin, 1998; Mascolo & Harkins, 1998; Mascolo, Harkinds, & Harakal, 2000). In other words, we may come to identify a stimulus as emotionally relevant because we already are experiencing affect or because we are already behaving in a certain fashion. Presumably, something caused us to feel or behave in this way, but this cause could not have been the event with which the emotion is identified since this target stimulus happened after the feelings and/ or behaviors were already in place. For example, being angry makes us more likely to judge a later event as unfair, whereas the same situation could have appeared as fair if we had felt happy in the first place (see the model of Scher and Heise in Chapter 5). From this analysis we can see that emotions contain an identifiable target, but this target is not necessarily the cause of the emotion. An obvious implication of these ideas is the realization that an individual’s interpretation of an event need not be isomorphic with the cause of the emotion. Following from our earlier comments, it should be clear that moods have causes. They vary for any number of reasons, such as personality traits (Cropanzano et al., 2003; Judge & Larsen, 2001), environmental pollutants (Cunningham, 1979; Rotton, 1983), or even by day of the week and hour of the day (Larsen & Kasimatis, 1990, for an even older example of mood fluctuation, see Hersey, 1932a; 1932b). Indeed, individuals may be able to identify the reason for their feelings state, as when an individual observes that “a lack of sleep” puts him in a bad mood. However, these causes, even when properly understood by the

10

Social Justice and the Experience of Emotion

person in question, are not identified with the feeling state in the way that occurs when an emotion is experienced. Once the feeling is identified with a target event, then the mood can be transformed into an emotion.

Relative Intensity Mood is generally understood to be a “low grade” phenomenon, while emotions are thought to have greater intensity (Oatley & Jenkins, 1996). Emotions overwhelm our thinking in a manner that moods do not (Brief & Weiss, 2002). This is not to say that mood does not affect our decision making. There is good evidence that it does (Forgas & George, 2001; Isen, 2000; 2004; Isen & Baron, 1991). The difference is of degree. People can describe themselves as “being carried away” or “overwhelmed” by their emotions, as if their feelings have taken control of their thought processes. The economists Thomas Schelling and Robert Frank have reviewed considerable evidence that, when under the sway of our passions, we often behave in a manner that is somewhat less than economically optimal (Frank, 1988; 1990; 2004). In Chapter 3 we will examine this work in more detail.

Duration A more controversial point of distinction involves the relative durations of moods and emotions. Generally speaking, most scholars view affect as presenting a trade-off between emotions and mood. Many scholars have argued that emotions tend to be of shorter duration, burning out faster than moods. As Ekman (1999) explains, emotions occur in a manner that is unbidden or automatic. Once present, they sweep over us, but like a flash flood, emotions soon pass. Though less intense, it is often believed that moods persist longer (Fredrickson, 2001; Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999). They can last for hours or even days, �impacting our thinking and behavior until they have run their course (Bower, 1981; 1991; Bower & Forgas, 2001; Forgas & George, 2001; Isen, 2000; 2004; Isen & Baron, 1991). While it may well be generally true that mood states endure longer than emotions, this may not always be the case (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Evidence presented by Frijda, Mesquita, Sonnemans, and van Goozen (1991) suggests that emotions might sometimes persist for years. In one experiment, Ketelaar and Au (2003, Study 2) found that individuals who felt guilty about the way they treated a bargaining partner were more generous when they renegotiated one week later (for similar weeklong effects, see Thompson, Valley, & Kramer, 1995, Study 2). Given these findings, we should not assume that emotions quickly burn themselves out. For justice researchers, the length of emotional states is more than an academic question, as it has important practical �implications. For

Introduction

11

example, arguing that emotions are often of short duration, Thompson, Medvec, Seiden, and Kopelman (2002) warn that some negotiators could overestimate the influence of affective states that occur while bargaining. Thompson and her colleagues suggest that, perhaps, Â�ending a bargaining session on a high note will sufficiently overshadow negative feelings. There is evidence consistent with this contention (e.g., Baron, 1976; 1984). Observe that Thompson et al.’s (2002) advice follows logically for those emotional states that Â�terminate quickly and easily. On the other hand, under some conditions, emotions, at least certain emotions and under certain circumstances, may persevere for some time. The importance of this will become evident when we discuss revenge and retribution in Chapter 3. According to Bies and Tripp (2002), Â�people may obsess about workplace injustice, failing to allay their initial hurt and ill will. Baron (1990a, p. 202) makes a similar point when he discusses the “impact of lasting grudges” (italics in original). In this way long-lasting emotions, which may result from perceived unfairness, could lay the groundwork for future conflicts.

Meta-Organization of Moods and Emotions There are multiple moods and multiple emotions. By meta-organization we refer to the manner in which scientists have arranged moods and emotions into families. The approaches are quite different, and these reflect important distinctions between the two concepts. Our goal is to contend with taxonomic differences between moods and emotions. To highlight these distinctions, we examine studies that organize moods and emotions based upon the meaning of words. Despite some �similarity of these methodological approaches, moods and emotions are arranged quite differently. Moods During the 1980s and 1990s the structure of mood was the subject of continuous research and debate. The battle over meta-organization was joined in the pages of Psychological Science (Green & Salovey, 1999; Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999a; 199b) and spilled over to Psychological Bulletin (Russell & Carroll, 1999b; Watson & Tellegen, 1999). This large and complicated literature is beyond the scope of the present chapter, involving a number of technical issues, which have not been resolved to the satisfaction of everyone (e.g., Green, Goldman, & Salovey, 1993; Green, Salovey, & Truax, 1999). Fortunately, a number of thorough reviews exist (e.g., Carroll, Yik, Russell, & Feldman Barrett, 1999; Cropanzano et al., 2003; Cropanzano & Wright, 2001; Judge & Larsen, 2001; Larsen & Diener, 1992; Larsen, Diener, & Lucas, 2002; Russell & Carroll, 1999a; Watson, 2000). We refer the reader to these sources. As this is a book on affect in its relation with justice, our present comments on the structure of mood will be brief.

12

Social Justice and the Experience of Emotion

Perhaps the easiest way to understand the meta-organizations is to treat them as differing solutions to a measurement problem. Of course, we are not saying that all differences reduce to psychometrics. To be sure, there are theoretical issues as well (e.g., Tellegen et al., 1999a; 1999b; Watson, 2000; Watson, Wies, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999). We pose this approach only as an explanatory framework for readers who are not familiar with the mood literature. Suppose that one collects a large list of words pertaining to affect. One then provides them to a sizable group of respondents. These participants are instructed to indicate the extent to which they experience each feeling state on the list. The researcher then subjects these data to an exploratory factor analysis. At this point, the investigator has a choice to make. He or she can interpret the unrotated solution or, alternatively, rotate the solution 45 degrees. Either should yield a reasonably good fit, but the resulting factor solutions will be distinct (Cropanzano et al., 2003; Cropanzano & Wright, 2001; Judge & Larsen, 2001). Let us now consider each. The unrotated solution is very old. These underlying factors were identified by Wilhelm Wundt (1897), the father of modern scientific psychology. The first and stronger factor pertains to hedonic tone. The high end of this dimension is identified by such words as happy, joy, and pleased. The low end corresponds to such items as sad, depressed, and unhappy. The strong first dimension has been given a variety of names, including pleasantness-unpleasantness (this was Wundt’s original term, see also Larsen & Diener, 1992; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) and mood valence (Russell & Carroll, 1999a). With the rise of the positive psychology (Seligman, 2002; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) and positive organizational behavior (Luthans & Youssef, 2007) movements, this important first dimension has been identified with subjective well-being (Diener, 1984; 1994; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999), also called emotional well-being (Diener & Larsen, 1993), psychological well-being (Cropanzano & Wright, 2001; Wright & Cropanzano, 2007) or simply happiness (Wright, 2005). Orthogonal to hedonic tone, the unrotated solution often yields a weaker second factor (Feldman, 1995a). This dimension corresponds to the intensity with which mood is experienced, regardless of whether the affect is positive or negative (Judge & Larsen, 2001). According to Cropanzano and Wright (2001, p. 187), those at the high pole describe themselves as active, energetic, and intense. Those at the low pole are calm, relaxed, and quiescent. Wundt’s (1897) original moniker was “excitement-calm,” but later scholars termed it affect intensity (Larsen & Diener, 1985; 1987; Murphy, 2009; Simonsson-Sarnecki, Lundh, & Törestad, 2000), arousal (Feldman, 1995a; 1995b), activation (Larsen & Diener, 1992; Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999), and even engagement (Watson et al., 1999; Watson & Tellegen, 1985). In summary, if one analyzes a large number of mood terms and does not rotate the solution, then one is likely to have a Â�two-dimensional

Introduction

13

structure with a strong first dimension corresponding to hedonic tone (negative-to-positive) and a weaker second dimension Â�corresponding to activation (mild-to-intense). But our hypothetical investigator may not stop here. Based upon his or her underlying theory (cf. Watson, 2000; Watson et al., 1999), he or she may elect to rotate by 45 degrees. If this action is taken, the new solution will be likely to fit the data well. Still, the results will be conceptually distinct from the unrotated solution. This second possibility is well known to social and organizational psychologists. It involves the separation of positive affect into one factor and negative affect into another (Watson & Tellegen, 1985; George, 1992; 1996a; Judge, 1992). Positive affectivity (PA) refers to the tendency to experience positive mood states. It ranges from low (no PA) to high. Low positive affectivity does not imply high negative affectivity. In a parallel fashion, negative affectivity (NA) refers to the tendency to experience negative mood states (Watson & Clark, 1984). As is true for PA, NA ranges from low (no NA) to high. Notice that low negative affectivity does not imply high positive affectivity. According to this rotated model, the tendency to experience one is independent of the other. An individual can be high on both (emotionally ambivalent), low on both (quiescent and bored), high on only positive affect (excited or enthusiastic), or high on only negative affect (distressed or alarmed). While this may seem counterintuitive, there is a good deal of supportive evidence (e.g., Watson, 1988a; 1988b; Watson & Clark, 1992; 1997; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; Watson & Tellegen, 1999). The PA/NA structure has been replicated outside of the United States (Almagor & Ben-Porath, 1989; Gotlib & Meyer, 1986; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1984) and even linked to various neuropsychological processes (Watson, 2000; Watson et al., 1999). In order to measure PA and NA, Watson and his colleagues (Watson, 1988a; 1988b; Watson et al., 1984) developed and validated the widely used Positive Affectivity and Negative Affectivity Schedule (PANAS). Watson et al. (1988, p. 1070) operationalized PA with such terms as interested, alert, and inspired. NA is assessed with such terms as irritable, ashamed, and hostile. Organization scholars have been quick to make use of the PANAS (e.g., Cropanzano, James, & Knovosky, 1993; Wright€& Cropanzano, 1998; Wright & Staw, 1999), as have justice researchers (e.g., van den Bos, 2003; Miedema et al., 2006). Currently, mood research proffers two two-factor models—an unrotated hedonic tone/activation solution and a rotated PA/NA solution. We have no intention of stepping into the ongoing debates (cf. Green & Salovey, 1999; Russell & Carroll, 1999a; 1999b; Tellegen et al, 1999a; 1999b; Watson & Tellegen, 1999) by proposing a final answer while the jury continues to deliberate. However, there is a compromise which, while not resolving all of the conceptual issues, does allow a typological “map” of the most important mood terms. As a result, it will suffice for our purposes here.

14

Social Justice and the Experience of Emotion

This “circumplex model” (e.g., Larsen & Diener, 1992; Russell, 1980) considers all four factors simultaneously—hedonic tone and activation are the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. PA and NA are 45 degrees from these two. Thus, PA runs from positive and intense affect to positive and mild affect. NA, on the other hand, runs from negative and intense affect to negative and mild affect. Overall, the circumplex model seems to fit the data well and provides a comprehensive meta-organization for mood (e.g., Carroll et al., 1999; Cropanzano et al., 2003; Cropanzano & Wright, 2001; Judge & Larsen, 2001; Larsen et al., 2002). Nevertheless, it is not endorsed by all scholars (Tellegen et al., 1999a; 1999b). Emotions As is the case for mood, the meta-organization of emotions is subject to ongoing research. A number of approaches and frameworks exist, though there is some consensus as to which emotions are Â�fundamental or “basic” (cf. Ekman, 1990; 1992; 1999; Izard, 1977). To illustrate, let us consider a multidimensional scaling study by Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, and O’Conner (1987). These authors had undergraduate research subjects sort affective terms into semantically similar categories. They found six families of discrete emotions—anger, fear, joy, love, sadness, and perhaps surprise—with a number of more specific feelings under each of these broad headings (we will see in Chapter 5 that other authors have proposed different taxonomies). For example, the anger family includes such terms as disgust and envy, while the love family includes affection and longing (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). In the main, Shaver et al.’s (1987) findings have now been replicated across several cultures and in a number of languages other than English (Church, Katigbak, Reyes, & Jensen, 1998; Hupka, Lenton, & Hutchison, 1999; Romney, Moore, & Rusch, 1997). As one can see, the meta-organization of emotion, with its several categories, bears little in common with the general dimensions obtained from the study of mood.

Number of Component Processes In this section we consider the internal organizations of emotions. The structure of moods is indeed more straightforward than that of emotions. As moods can be understood as free-floating or Â�unidentified affect (Fredrickson, 2001), they are roughly equivalent to feelings or “pure” affect. Emotion is a stickier subject. Any given emotion will include affect, of course, but as we have emphasized throughout this book, Â�cognition is important as well (e.g., Lazarus, 1991a; 1991b; 1991c; Ortony et al., 1988). Emotions also appear to be attached to behavioral tendencies, if not necessarily actual behaviors, and this fact introduces an additional complexity as well. Much of this thinking is summed up

Introduction

15

nicely by the work of Mascolo and his colleagues (Mascolo & Griffin, 1998; Mascolo & Harkins, 1998; Mascolo et al., 2000). According to this view, all Â�emotions have three component processes—affective, appraisal, and behavioral. As these three processes are tightly integrated in emotions, the presence of any one can cause the others to exist. Thus, it is possible for affect to cause cognitions and behavioral tendencies, cognitive appraisals to cause affect and behaviors, and so forth. Let us consider each in more detail. Affective Processes The affective processes refer to how an emotion feels. Emotions come with characteristic phenomenological experiences. Human beings have a shared understanding of what it means to feel angry, joyous, despondent, terrified, and disgusted. These feelings are hard to describe in words. When forced to explain their feelings, people often find themselves resorting to physical symptoms as analogies. For instance, we might be “burning” with rage or “tearing ourselves up” with guilt. Appraisal Processes As we have already seen, unidentified affect is insufficient to produce an emotion. Emotions also possess a cognitive component, whereby events or objects are understood in particular ways (Lazarus, 1991a; 1991b; 1991c). The particular pattern of cognitive interpretation creates different emotions. For example, if one receives a positive outcome through the assistance of another person, but can imagine a negative outcome, then one is likely to feel a sense of gratitude (Abelson, 1983). Overt Action Processes Emotions predispose us to act. We want to do something. The obvious example of this regards facial expressions. Over a century ago, Charles Darwin (1872) famously observed that the human face was an effective conduit for relaying emotions. Darwin believed, probably correctly, that this served as an intraspecies communication strategy (for modern reviews of the evolutionary approach to emotion, see Redican, 1982; Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). Ekman (1993; 1999; Keltner & Ekman, 2000) provided contemporary evidence for emotion-specific facial expressions, and these tend to be similar across different cultures. For example, when enraged, people tighten the muscles in their forehead, and disgust activates the levator labii muscle region of their face (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, and Anderson, 2009). Interestingly, scientific instruments can detect activation in the relevant muscle groups even when their movement is not visible to the naked eye (Cacioppo, Bush, & Tassinary, 1992; Cacioppo, Martzke, Petty, & Tassinary, 1988). This suggests that emotion-laden facial expressions are hard-wired. Ekman’s (2001; 2007)

16

Social Justice and the Experience of Emotion

more recent work suggests that such subtle facial expressions can be used to detect lying. Work on facial expressions is so important that it will appear in a number of guises throughout this book. We broach this topic in Chapter 3, when we present the evolutionary origins of our emotions and again in Chapter 5, when we discuss the reciprocal relationship between expressions and feeling states. We will also pay special attention to expressions in Chapter 6, when we review the literature on emotional labor, which can result from ill-advised attempts to regulate natural displays of feelings. Finally, we examine the issue one final time in Chapter 7, in our comments on emotional contagion. For all that, justice researchers tend to be interested in more overt behaviors, such as retribution (e.g., Bies & Tripp, 2004) and job performance (e.g., Adams, 1965), than they are in facial expressions. Unfortunately, emotion-driven behaviors have not yet received a great deal of attention in this regard (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), but they hold considerable promise (Elfenbein, 2007; Morris & Keltner, 2000). To illustrate this point, let us compare two emotions that are generally seen as positively valanced. Happiness can be viewed as an experience of pleasure or cheerfulness. Elevation, on the other hand, is not as well known (Haidt, 2003a). Elevation is a positive emotional state that comes from witnessing or learning about a virtuous act. It is characterized by feelings of personal warmth and uplift (Haidt, 2003b). Schnall, Roper, and Fessler (2010, Experiment 2) found that feelings of elevation boosted altruistic behavior in a laboratory setting, while feelings of happiness did not impact helping. In a similar fashion, negatively valanced emotions may also have distinct consequences for behavior. In one study Schnall, Haidt, Clore, and Jordan (2008, Experiment 4) compared disgust with sadness. Though both of these states can be said to feel “bad,” they have different effects on moral judgment. Schnall and her colleagues determined that the incidental experience of disgust led laboratory subjects to make harsher moral judgments. However, feelings of sadness had no such effects. In this context it is also worth considering Lerner and Keltner’s (2000; 2001; see also, Lerner, Small, & Lowenstein, 2004) Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF), which discusses the distinction between fear and anger. Research on the ATF demonstrates that angry individuals when making decisions under uncertain conditions, tend to be relatively risk seeking. That is, they are somewhat optimistic about their opportunities for success. Fearful individuals, on the other hand, tend to be relatively risk averse. That is, they are somewhat pessimistic about their opportunities for success (see also, Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). Subsequent work by Kugler, Ordóñez, and Connolly (2009) extends the ATF, discovering that the respective effects of anger and fear reverse, depending upon whether or not the risk is due to the behavior of another person. Kugler et al. (Study 2) found that when another individual’s actions create uncertainty, then fearful people become less risk averse, while

Introduction

17

angry people become more risk averse. In short, fear and anger push certain decisions in opposite directions, and even these directions can be transposed depending on the cause of the uncertainty! Issues like these are important for justice scholars who wish to predict real-world behavior. In this particular instance, research has shown that injustice can lead to either fear or anger, depending upon the particulars of the situation (Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998; van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a). Notice that these action tendencies refer to predispositions or motivational forces. We do not always behave in accordance with them, but they tend to direct our behavior in particular directions, even when our rational interests might be better served by a more measured response (Frank, 1988; 1990; 2004). Among other things, the presence of a behavioral predisposition may make it easier to predict behavior if we know which emotion an individual is experiencing (Morris & Keltner, 2000; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). These issues will become important when we discuss revenge seeking in Chapter 3. While the close relationship between emotions and action tendencies has been widely endorsed, there remains an important caveat regarding the distinction between negative emotions (e.g., anger, fear, disgust) and positive emotions (e.g., joy, contentment, and interest). Fredrickson (1998) makes a compelling case that specific actions are closely linked to negative emotions but that this is not so for positive emotions. Specifically, Fredrickson argues that positive emotions tend to expand our thinking, and in a similar fashion, encourage more general behavioral responses. For example, the emotion of joy tends to encourage play, while the emotion of interest tends to encourage exploration (see also, Fredrickson, 2001). Notice that Fredrickson’s work does not rule out the existence of action tendencies. Still, it does caution us that the connection between emotions and actions may be specific and strong in some cases but general and loose in others.

What Do We Mean by Justice? Fiat justitia, ruat coelum [Let justice be done, though the heavens fall.] —Roman proverb attributed to Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus

Social and organizational psychologists treat justice as a subjective judgment as to the moral propriety of some event or action (Bagger et€al., 2006; Blader & Bobocel, 2005; Cropanzano, Byrne, et al., 2001). Something is fair, in other words, when a respondent believes it to be fair. Justice is a type of cognitive evaluation, though as we shall see, it is one that provokes a good deal of feeling (see Chapters 2–4) and can be evoked by feelings as well (Chapter 5). This social scientific tradition of fairness research is descriptive. That is, it seeks to understand

18

Social Justice and the Experience of Emotion

what people believe is fair, not necessarily what actually is fair according to preexisting moral norms. In keeping with this empirically oriented paradigm, we interchangeably use the terms justice and fairness to refer to these perceptions (e.g., Blader & Bobocel, 2005; van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997), and they can vary among people even when they have been exposed to the same event (Caldwell, Liu, Fedor, & Herold, 2009). However, it is not only scholars but also practitioners (e.g., Ewing, 1989) who have been interested in justice. This is because, beyond these subjective characteristics, research has also identified some objective antecedents (such as decision procedures that include voice or a possibility to appeal) and consequences (such as employee turnover or work performance) to justice judgments. This makes social action possible in order to build social systems in general and organizations in particular that can become at the same time fairer and more socially efficient. Generally speaking, empirically oriented scholars have divided justice perceptions into three classes. Each of these classes is organized around a family of objects or events that may be perceived as more or less fair. That is, they are defined by the types of stimuli that are evaluated—outcomes received by an individual (distributive justice), processes by which outcomes are assigned (procedural justice), and social interactions that take place among individuals (interactional justice). This three-facet model of fairness has received wide attention in empirical research pertaining to justice and affect. As a result, it will be a mainstay of this book. That said, we caution the reader that other models exist. In the following we briefly discuss a framework that separates interactional justice into two parts, interpersonal fairness and informational fairness, thereby producing a four-factor model (Colquitt, 2001; Nowakowski & Conlon, 2005). In Chapter 5 we will review evidence exploring global perceptions of overall fairness (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005; Jones & Martens, 2009). Overall justice is typically viewed as having a unifactorial structure (e.g., Ambrose & Schminke, 2009; Choi, 2008). But this is for the future. For the moment we emphasize that, despite its achievements and vast size, the empirical social scientific perspective is not the only (or even the largest) scholarly tradition for studying justice. The normative tradition is favored by philosophers and legal scholars. It seeks to discover what actually is fair in accordance with certain moral rules (Bagger et al., 2006; Cropanzano, Byrne et al., 2001; Cropanzano, Rupp, et al., 2001). Ethical philosophers study how individuals should behave if they wish to be morally just (Cropanzano, Bowen, & Gilliland, 2007). While it is worthwhile to distinguish between the normative theories of justice, studied by philosophers, and the descriptive theories of justice, studied by social scientists, we need to appreciate what the latter tradition has learned from the former. In practice, social scientists have selectively borrowed a number of ideas from their more normatively oriented colleagues, examining whether the tenets of philosophical justice are truly

Introduction

19

preferred by individuals in their daily lives. As we shall see, this transfer of ideas has been especially strong for theories of distributive justice and procedural justice, though somewhat weaker for interactional justice. Notice that the normative and the empirical traditions are not as far from one another as one might expect. The research participants that are surveyed by social scientists also believe in normative rules that help them discover what is fair, just as philosophers do. The main difference is that philosophers and legal scholars choose to defend normative moral rules that they embrace, and then use them to inspire and judge people’s choices. By contrast, social scientists study all normative rules that people endorse and actually use in their daily lives. They then study how these rules explain their attitudes and behaviors. In this way, social scientists do not choose any rule as being the best one in a moral sense. This is why we refer to empirical social scientific research as descriptive.

Defining Distributive Justice When individuals assess the fairness of outcomes, they are evaluating distributive justice (Markovsky & Younts, 2001). It refers to whether or not an allocation is morally appropriate or ethically proper. An outcome judged to be “fair” (morally appropriate) is also likely to be “favorable” (personally beneficial), but this need not be the case. Though correlated, outcome fairness and outcome favorability are distinguishable constructs (for evidence, see Skitka, Winquist, & Hutchinson, 2003; van den Bos, Peters, Bobocel, & Ybema, 2006; van den Bos, Wilke, Lind, & Vermunt, 1998). A meta-analysis by Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) places the association at −.49 in field studies and −.42 in laboratory settings. As it happens, distributive justice antedated social science, philosophy, civilization, and even the emergence of fully modern humans (see Chapter 3). It is a known principle of evolutionary biology that if two animals are descended from a single ancestor, and both share a trait, then it is likely that this trait was also present in the ancestral animal. Homo sapiens certainly care about the fairness of their outcomes, but it has only recently been recognized that our close cousin the chimpanzee shows similar concerns (Brosnan, 2006). As humans and chimps diverged from a common ancestor between 4.6 and 6.2 million years ago (Wade, 2006), and as both humans and chimps show an interest in fair allocations of outcomes (De Waal, 1996; 2005), it seems likely that we inherited our interest in justice from this shared progenitor. In an insightful study, Brosnan and de Waal (2003) trained some chimpanzees to perform a task. As a reward for the task, the animal received cucumber slices. Chimpanzees like cucumbers well enough, so this task proceeded appropriately until these animals saw another chimpanzee being rewarded for the same task with more desirable grapes.

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At this point, the original chimpanzees, who had received only cucumbers for their labors, showed signs of emotional agitation and stopped Â�performing the task. Homo sapiens go beyond chimpanzees in at least one respect, though. According to Brosnan (2006), chimpanzees’ interest in fairness is only limited to their own outcomes and only if they are unfavorable (they are not sensitive to unfair overreward when they benefit from it). They seem quite tolerant of ill treatment when it is other chimps that are being victimized. As we shall discuss in Chapter 3, human beings are a bit different. While Homo sapiens show self-interested biases, they seem to dislike injustice even when it is directed at other people (Ellard€ & Skarlicki, 2002; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005). Regardless, when philosophers began writing about justice centuries ago, they were following a path well worn by our primate ancestry. So far as our current knowledge indicates, chimpanzees do not seem to give importance to other aspects of justice, procedural justice in particular (see the section on procedural justice to follow). It could be that only distributive justice is held in common by humans and other animals. Human beings also have a sense of morality (see Chapters 3 and 4), and we might even be members of the only species that is cognizant of its own mortality (see Chapter 6).

Aristotle and the Ancient View of Distributive Justice Modern theories of distributive justice can usefully be traced back to Book V of Aristotle’s (350 BC/1962) Nicomachean Ethics (cf. Frohlich, 2007; Mellers, 1982). Aristotle treats justice as a holistic concept that can be divided into two parts (or three parts, depending upon how one counts)—distributive justice and rectificatory justice. Distributive justice, as Aristotle uses the term, is concerned with the allocation of goods, be these economic (e.g., obols, drachmas) or socioemotional (e.g., status, honor) goods. Rectificatory justice has to do with the fairness of personal exchanges between two parties. These could be voluntary, as when one purchases a gallon of olive oil for 5 drachmas. They might also be involuntary. Suppose one agreed to a sum of 8 drachmas for a lamb. If one reneged, paying only 6, a judge could insist that you add the 2 additional drachmas as originally promised. Confusingly to the modern social science reader, Aristotle’s (350 BC/1962) distributive and rectificatory justice pertain to outcome distributions. In a sense, they could both be viewed as distributive justice, when used in the modern social scientific sense of that term. This would be of no great concern to Aristotle, as he emphasized justice as a unitary concept of which distributive and rectificatory were but component parts. Besides, the ancient view of justice was admittedly more ambiguous than modern notions. By whatever name or names, Aristotle’s (350 BC/1962) two-part division of justice was more influential than many contemporary

Introduction

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justice researchers realize. In 1964 Wendell French published The Personnel Management Process. In Chapter 21 of that book, specifically on page 402, he coined the term “organizational justice.” French structured this entire chapter, which was a review of the empirical literature available at that time, around Aristotle’s two-part model. Indeed, French used the term distributive justice exactly as Aristotle did. Regarding rectificatory justice, though, French’s treatment was a bit narrower. He preferred the more specific moniker “corrective justice” (p. 403). As we saw above, rectificatory justice is a more general designation than is corrective justice. To be sure, rectificatory justice includes corrective or retributive elements, especially with respect to involuntary exchanges. However, rectificatory justice also involves voluntary transactions, such as those described by the modern social exchange theory (cf. Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Cropanzano & Rupp, 2008). Regardless of these conceptual niceties, it comes as something of a surprise to see Aristotle visit a personnel administration textbook after a hiatus of roughly 2,000 years.

Aristotle’s Distributive Justice Distributive justice is concerned with who gets what. For Aristotle (350 BC/1962) this was understood as how a set of benefits is assigned among a group of individuals. This was the so-called “distribution of common goods” or of “common funds” (p. 120). As a solution to this problem, Aristotle (p. 119) proposed a complicated but mathematically straightforward theory. He argued that “the just is something proportionate,” elaborating that “Proportion is equality of ratios.” On the same page, he goes on to explain these ratios: “the combination of term [person] A with term [share] c and of term [person] B with term [share] d in the distribution is just, and this kind of just is median while the corresponding unjust violates the proportion.” In short, each person should get what they have earned—“a man who acts unjustly has more than his share of good, and a man who is treated unjustly has less” (p. 120). It is difficult to overestimate the influence of this “law of Â�proportions.” In one of the first contemporary mathematical statements of distributive justice, Homans (1961; 1974) represented this passage from Aristotle (350 b.c./1962) as an equation. For any two individuals, the ratio of their rewards should equal the ratio of their proportionate contributions. In order to build his well-known equity theory, Adams (1963; 1965) simply rearranged the terms in Homans’ equation. We shall discuss the work of Homans and Adams in our next chapter. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that their descriptive theories of justice perceptions were derived directly from Aristotle’s normative theory of distributive justice (for a more detailed analysis of Aristotle’s influence, see Mellers, 1982).

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Aristotle’s Rectificatory Justice We have spent some time on Aristotle’s (350 b.c./1962) proportional model of distributive justice partially to accurately reflect its treatment in the Nicomachean Ethics, but also because doing so allows us to describe Aristotle’s holistic view. As we have stressed throughout, Aristotle saw justice as a unitary idea, though one that was operationalized differently depending on the particular transaction. Hence, a proportional allocation is fair, while a nonproportional allocation is unfair. This is always so, in Aristotle’s view, and holds for rectificatory justice as well as distributive justice. The easiest way to demonstrate this idea is in terms of involuntary rectification. If someone has defrauded, cheated, or otherwise harmed another person, then this transgressor has committed an injustice. The act itself is wrong, even if the victim is “a bad man” or—worse still— “a bad man who committed adultery” (Aristotle, 350 b.c./1962, p. 121). On this same page, he further observes that a violation of equal proportions creates an injustice. A good judge or mediator “restores equality” (of ratios). Aristotle is quite clear about what he means. It is “As though there were a line divided into two unequal parts, he [the judge] takes away the amount by which the larger part is greater than half the line and adds it to the smaller” (p. 121). For instance, if a transgression does x amount of harm to another person, then he or she should make x amount of recompense. It is in this sense that French (1964) used the term corrective justice, since involuntary rectification repairs a (hopefully) temporary unfairness that was done by one person toward another. In this sense, corrective justice or involuntary rectification is closely related to the concept of retributive justice that we shall discuss in Chapter 3 (for a good review, see Hogan & Emler, 1981). A close reading of Aristotle (350 b.c./1962), though, suggests a problem with equating involuntary rectification with punishment. Here we see a gulf between Aristotle’s normative view of corrective justice and the average person’s subjective opinion. For Aristotle, no one is actually “punished,” as such. The just judge or mediator simply restores the distribution to its original fair state. As we shall see in Chapter 3, human moral emotions drive us to seek revenge or retribution against those we see as wrongdoers. For philosophers, the matter is somewhat different. Correction and revenge seem close, but are in fact far from being identical (Scheler, 1970a; 1970b). Philosophers see justice as precisely what helps to overcome revenge tendencies (Ricoeur, 2001). Thus, philosophers acknowledge human tendencies toward vindictiveness, but they offer justice as a means of restraining these predilections. There is a valuable lesson here. What some philosophers see as actually fair does not necessarily make ordinary people feel fairly treated. Revenge may make an individual believe that he or she has been vindicated, but the moral philosopher need not approve of harsh retaliation. This is not

Introduction

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to say that the philosopher or even the wronged party has made an error. Rather, from a social scientific point of view, we gain additional insight from studying and describing real-world human responses. Aristotle (350 b.c./1962) also presents a discussion of voluntary rectification. Here he is applying his model of fairness to the sort of person-to-person exchanges that are common within market transactions. As with involuntary rectification, a just transaction results in a sort of proportionality whereby both parties conclude the exchange with amounts of equal value. This is much like the principle of reciprocity described in social exchange theory (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005; Fiske, 1991), though Aristotle is cautious about using that term. Aristotle’s work on voluntary rectification has had less influence among justice theorists that have his other ideas about fairness.

John Rawls and the Original Position In addition to Aristotle, social scientific thinking on distributive justice has also been heavily influenced by the normative theory of John Rawls. In his famous 1971 book, A Theory of Justice, Rawls tried to reconcile two values of the good society that are often at odds with one another. These are personal freedom (liberty) and justice. While few, if any, would deny the worth of these two goals, it is widely recognized that there are practical trade-offs between the two. For example, a free market economic system may provide a good deal of individual choice, but it often creates a large gap between the very rich and the very poor. We can celebrate the freedom associated with economic liberalism, while lamenting the painful poverty of those at the bottom of the wealth hierarchy. For that reason, individuals often seek to compromise on either market efficiency or fairness or both in order to balance these objectives (Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers, & Ordóñez, 1993; Ordóñez & Mellers, 1993). Rawls sought normative guidelines that could help us make fair decisions. Consistent with the perspective taken in this book, Rawls recognized that people are neither altruistically pure nor self-servingly corrupt. Given our imperfections, but recognizing that we also seek (at least sometimes) to behave morally, how does one strike an ethical balance between justice and freedom?* The solution he hit on was a variant of the social contract. Rawls (1971) challenged his readers to consider the sort of society they would set up if they were absolutely impartial. To imagine this impartiality, he contrived an “original position.” Picture yourself as part of a small group of people with an important task—designing the future society * Notice that distributive justice, especially with regard to the criterion of equity or contribution, can be seen as fully compatible with freedom and economic liberalism. Indeed, it is sometimes argued that if there are differences between the poor and the rich, this is the result of their own personal achievements, which can be seen as unequal but fair. Of course, this is a restrictive view of justice that is not endorsed by the authors but it is worth noticing that economic liberalism can also be legitimized on the basis of a view of distributive justice (for a readable discussion, see Sandel, 2009).

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that you and everyone else will have to live in. To be sure, your team has a basic understanding of human behavior, but you know nothing else. Your group is operating behind a “veil of ignorance.” You have no information about the challenges your society will face, its technical acumen, and—most critical—the social position you will personally occupy. As you work on the task of designing your new society, you are unable to hurt others in a way that would benefit you. For instance, you cannot consign the rest of the group to serfdom, since you may well find yourself a serf. Under these conditions, Rawls argues that individuals will plan for the worst-case scenario. This thinking led him to derive two principles: • Principle of equal basic liberties: If we did not know our future position, we would elect to have as much freedom for as many people as possible. We would also want this freedom to be equally distributed. That way, we would be certain of being as free as anyone else, regardless of our social standing. • Principle of equal opportunity and difference: This principle has two parts, with the first often forgotten. Part 1 suggests that everyone should have equal opportunity (no privilege) and that those with similar skill and motivation should have the same chance in life. Part 2 states that the benefits of society should be divided according to this hierarchy of skills in such a way as to benefit the least well-off. That is, one would seek to minimize the gap between the rich and the poor when this gap is not socially useful. Though Rawls (1971) was a philosopher, his analysis was fundamental to the social scientific view of justice. Regarding distributive fairness, it is clear that Rawls defended the idea of fair inequalities in the allocation of outcomes. For example, he understood that certain jobs would likely bring greater rewards than others. However, Rawls wished to allow these differences only to the extent that they could make the society able to produce more wealth, which would in turn benefit the poor. Therefore, his preferred distribution seems to have been somewhat more egalitarian than that recommended by Aristotle (350 b.c./1962). While Rawls’ work paid considerable attention to just outcome allocations, it is worth mentioning that his principles include an obvious interest in procedural justice, or the fairness of the means by which allocations are made. We shall return to this point in our next section. Interestingly, the work of Rawls (1971) is also closely related to contemporary social justice research. For instance, there is a theory of justice called uncertainty management theory or UMT (Lind & van den Bos, 2002) that we will review in Chapter 4. UMT contends that justice helps people to cope with and to reduce the uncertainty they face. The two fundamental justice principles proposed by Rawls have precisely this function of trying to manage a situation in which

Introduction

25

people are completely uncertain about what outcomes they are going to receive and the way they are going to be treated because they are under the veil of ignorance. Like other ideas of normative justice, a few scholars have attempted to put Rawls’ (1971) theory to an empirical test (this literature is nicely reviewed by Frohlich & Oppenheimer, 1992). Lissowski, Tyszka, and Okrasa (1991) told Polish undergraduate students that they would need to work together on an experimental task. These authors further indicated that the students would be paid in accordance with whatever rule they agreed to in advance. Most groups were able to reach agreement, but they preferred an allocation principle that maximized the average income (not the minimum income, as Rawls, 1971, suggested), while also creating a “floor constraint” under which payment was not allowed to drop. Similar findings were reported in two studies by Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Eavy (1987a; 1987b), though here the research participants were from Canada and the United States. These results only partially support Rawls, and it seems that distributive justice may be more complex than the philosopher realized (Frohlich, 2007). Regardless of the particulars, Rawls’ (1971) philosophic thinking expanded our notions of distributive justice. Influenced by Aristotle (350 b.c./1962), earlier work by Homans (1961) and Adams (1963; 1965) emphasized merit-based or equitable distributions. Rawls’ just society calls attention to alternative rules of fair allocations, such as equality, which provides each individual with the same outcomes. Another possibility is need, whereby goods are distributed to those for whom they will do the most good. These three rules—equity, equality, and need—have become staples of modern social scientific theories of distributive justice (Cropanzano, Rupp, et al., 2001) although some researchers have found that people might use 17 different normative rules to process their justice judgments (Reis, 1984).

Distributive Justice and Affect As distributive justice is an old idea, a good deal of research has examined the relationship between outcome fairness and affect. We will see much of this throughout the book, but it is worth mentioning a few representative studies now. Bakker, Schaufeli, Sixma, Bosveld, and van Dierendonck (2000) took a broad view of the phenomenon, arguing that reciprocity can be violated in at least two ways (see also Buunk & Schaufeli, 1999). First, one’s outcomes might be lesser than one’s investments (Siegrist, 1996). Second, and similar to Aristotle (350 b.c./1962), one’s outcometo-investment ratio might not be proportional to the outcome-to-investment ratio of a referent person (Adams, 1963; 1965; Prichard, 1969). In either case, the distribution is likely to be viewed as unfair and, among other things, negative feelings should result.

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There is a good deal of evidence supporting these ideas. For example, in one early study Scafer and Keith (1980) investigated depression among married couples. They found that depression was more prevalent among those couples involved in inequitable relationships and less prevalent when equity was maintained. In a later study, Glass and Fujimoto (1994) obtained consistent results. Glass and Fujimoto observed that the inequitable allocation of household chores tended to predict symptoms of depression in marital partners. Bakker, Schaufeli, Demerouti, Janssen, van der Hulst, and Brouwer (2000) went a step further. These authors examined reciprocity within Dutch teachers’ personal lives (that is, with spouses and close partners) and also their professional lives (that is, at work). Consistent with the earlier work of Scafer and Keith, as well as that of Glass and Fujimoto, Bakker, Schaufeli, Demerouti, and their colleagues found that low levels of reciprocity in one’s private life were positively associated with depression. Low levels of reciprocity at work engendered burnout. This burnout, in turn, further increased depressive symptoms. From findings such as these, we can see that distributive (in)justice has powerful effects on peoples’ emotional well-being and can even have ramifications for one’s physical health. Bakker, Schaufeli, Sixma, et al. (2000) found that reciprocally balanced relationships with patients lowered the amount of burnout experienced by physicians, while Siegrist (1996) observed that individuals who exerted high effort for low rewards were especially prone to cardiovascular problems. We can take this process further. One of the reasons that affect is of interest to social scientists is that it seems to cause people to behave in certain ways (so-called affect-driven behavior, see Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996, p. 52). A distributive injustice, as we have seen, engenders negative feelings. Individuals should act on these feelings and, if Adams (1963; 1965) is correct, they should do it in a fashion that alleviates the negative feelings by restoring equity. This process is aptly demonstrated by research on voluntary absenteeism, where scholars have found that the relationship between inequity and absenteeism is mediated by affect. For example, several studies have shown that the lack of reciprocity leads to negative feeling states. This unpleasant affect, in turn, seems to promote absenteeism (Geurts, Buunk, & Schaufeli, 1994a; Geurts, Schaufeli, & Rutte, 1999; Geurts, Schaufeli, & Buunk, 1993). By taking such an unofficial “vacation,” employees may use their absenteeism to restore a sense of fairness either by trying to even the score through compensation or by seeking mere punishment through revenge (see Chapter 3). Of course, negative affect is not the only cause of heightened absenteeism. Indeed, some work has found a direct and unmediated relationship between inequity and absenteeism (Geurts, Buunk, & Schaufeli, 1994b; Geurts et al., 1999). Our point here is that there is evidence consistent with Adams’ view that distributive injustice causes affect, not to suggest that this is the only process worthy of consideration.

Introduction

27

Defining Procedural Justice Foundations in Political Philosophy As important as Rawls’ (1971) work was for the social scientific understanding of distributive justice, its major impact was in the area of due process. Each of Rawls’ two principles are implicitly concerned with how goods are allocated, or procedural justice, as well as with the actual goods themselves, or distributive justice. Specifically, Rawls saw that justice required equality of opportunity, individual empowerment, and the chance to participate in personally relevant decisions (a criterion called voice by Folger, Rosenfield, Grove, & Corkran, 1979). When compared to Aristotle (350 b.c./1962), Rawls not only enlarged the scope of fair outcomes, but he also directed scholarly attention to the allocation process. Shortly after publication of A Theory of Justice, one of Rawls’ Harvard colleagues, Robert Nozick, went even further. In this 1974 book, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick argued that a fair society could tolerate large differences in wealth between rich and poor. In effect, Nozick deemphasized Rawls’ (1971) difference principle. According to Nozick, people were entitled to retain their property if it was originally earned through fair processes. Nozick and Rawls concurred in asserting that allocation procedures matter. However, he goes on to assert that a fair allocation process can minimize the ill effects of an otherwise questionable outcome. Stated in the statistical terms that are familiar to social scientists, Nozick believed that a given distribution should be judged with respect to how it came about. The distribution is fair to the extent that the process that produced it is also fair. This is a profound statement, as it moves the process to center state. There is a great deal of support for Nozick’s (1974) contention, and the notion that fair procedures mitigate the ill effects of unfortunate outcomes has been of considerable interest to empirically oriented social scientists (for reviews, see Brockner, 2002; Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). While this process-by-outcome interaction affects a number of employee responses, such as organizational commitment (e.g., Siegel, Post, Brockner, Fishman, & Garden, 2005), of most relevance here is work pertaining to affect. Three papers seem especially informative in this regard. In a large public-sector organization located in the United States, Tepper (2001, Study 1) found that the interaction of procedural and distributive justice predicted general depression. As anticipated by Nozick (1974), depression was low when either procedural justice was high, distributive justice was high, or both. However, when employees felt that they were lacking in fair outcomes at the same time the process was unjust, then they tended to be depressed. Tepper (Study 2) replicated these findings with a second sample. In addition to depression, his Study 2 also examined anxiety and emotional exhaustion. The same

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process by outcome effect was exhibited for each of these dependent measures. Janssen (2004) explored the possibility that procedures and outcomes work together to generate negative emotions. In an interesting integrative model, he argued that engaging in innovative behavior has the potential to be a stressful process for working individuals, as organizational change can disrupt current hierarchies and impact the future in unknown ways. However, Janssen further maintains that this stress need not result if either the outcome (distributive justice) or the process (procedural justice) is fair. Janssen tested these ideas with a sample of 118 managers from six Dutch organizations. Consistent with his predictions, innovation did indeed lead to higher levels of job-related anxiety and burnout, but only when employees experienced both unfair distribution and also unfair procedures. If either the outcome or the process was just, then innovation was less unpleasant. Reviews by Brockner (2002) and Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) have found that fair procedures mitigate the otherwise negative reactions that people have toward unfavorable and unfair outcomes. As always, there are exceptions to the rule, and a number of moderators exist (Brockner, Ackerman, & Fairchild, 2001; Nowakowski & Conlon, 2005). To take a particular noteworthy instance, when outcome beliefs are based on strongly held moral convictions, then procedural justice is less important than the actual distribution (Skitka, 2002; Skitka & Houston, 2001). We review more evidence for the process-by-outcome interaction in Chapter 2. In that chapter, we consider a parallel interaction between interactional justice and distributive justice; we also discuss a related three-way interaction. In Chapter 3 we take up the issue of moral convictions and of their affective dimension. Nozick (1974) offers a normative foundation for the process-by-outcome interaction. More generally, he is sometimes referenced by empirically oriented researchers (e.g., by Schminke, Ambrose, & Noel, 1997). Nevertheless, the contribution of this insight philosopher has probably not been fully appreciated by social scientists. It has been the work of Rawls (1971) that has exerted the most enduring impact on social scientific scholarship. Indeed, Rawls was cited in a number of seminal procedural justice papers, such as those of Thibaut, Walker, LaTour, and Houlden (1974) and Folger and Konovsky (1989). What remained was for social scientists to place procedural justice on an appropriate empirical footing.

Early Social Science Research on Procedural Justice Psychological research on procedural justice is generally dated to the work of Thibaut, Walker, and their colleagues (e.g., Thibaut & Walker, 1975; 1978; Thibaut et al., 1974). Laurens Walker was a law professor, while John Thibaut was a social psychologist. Working together, they used their “theory of procedure” to explain how disputants judged

Introduction

29

fairness in the context of conflict resolution. Thibaut and Walker found that individuals could accept unfavorable outcomes, so long as they were able to exercise control in the process stage. That is, their disputants were desirous for “voice,” or a chance to present their opinion unheeded. Notice how similar these findings are to the Nozick’s (1974) normative theory. The outcome is legitimized by the process that produced it. As surprising as these findings may seem, subsequent evidence was generally supportive (Houlden, LaTour, Walker & Thibaut, 1978; Walker, LaTour, Lind & Thibaut, 1974; Folger, Cropanzano, Timmerman, Howes & Mitchell, 1996; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker, & Thibaut, 1980). Voice seems to be important for emotion as well. Margolis, Kroes, and Quinn (1974) found that workers that lacked voice were more prone to depression. We shall revisit Thibaut and Walker’s work in Chapter 2. Distributive justice was increasingly criticized during the seventies and seemed less and less able to explain additional variance in people’s attitudes and behaviors at work (Kellerhals, Modak, & Perrenoud, 1997). Leventhal (1980, p. 27) is famous for having asked “What should be done with equity theory?” This situation made scholars ready to include the concept of voice and more generally of procedural fairness in their research. Leventhal (1976; 1980) and Leventhal, Karuza, and Fry (1980) recognized that there was more to fair processes than participation in the decision. These authors argued for six criteria. Fair procedures tend to be consistently applied, bias free, accurate, representative of all (somewhat like voice), correctable, and ethical. Leventhal’s expanded criteria for justice set off a flood of research, testing these ideas and applying them in a number of important areas (e.g., Colquitt, 2001; Gilliland, 1993; 1994; Schminke, Ambrose & Noel, 1997). This tide of scholarship has yet to ebb and will be the subject of much of this book.

Procedural Justice as a Cause of Affect In addition to the papers that we have quoted regarding the affective consequences of the procedural and distributive justice interaction, a good deal of research has found that procedural justice engenders emotional responses (e.g., Barsky & Kaplan, 2007). We will be discussing this work throughout this book, but for now, two studies by Zapata-Phelan, Colquitt, Scott, and Livingston (2009) provide a good illustration. These scholars were interested in explaining the relationship between procedural justice and task performance, arguing that fair processes boost intrinsic motivation. Heightened intrinsic motivation (IM), in turn, was posited to increase performance. The authors argued that “positive affect is a core element of intrinsic motivation” (p. 94). Their self-report measure reflected this. For example, individuals who were high in intrinsic motivation indicated that they “felt pleasant doing this task” and performed it for “the intense pleasure I

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Social Justice and the Experience of Emotion

feel” (p. 98). To test their theoretical ideas, Zapata-Phelan and her colleagues conducted a laboratory experiment (Study 1) and a field replication (Study 2). In general, their framework was supported. Fair procedures augmented intrinsic motivation. These positive feelings about the task subsequently improved job performance.

Defining Interactional Justice When a social transaction is appraised, one forms an evaluation of interactional justice. More specifically, interactional justice has at least two parts. The first of these refers to the respect and courtesy that one receives from another person (Bies, 2001; Bies & Moag, 1986; for a related literature on destructive criticism, see Baron, 1990a; 1990b). The second refers to whether or not one is provided with complete information as to why decisions are made (Bies, 1987; Bobocel, McLine, & Folger, 1997; Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002; Masterson, Byrne, & Mao, 2005; Shaw, Wild, & Colquitt, 2003). To be sure, one can find echoes of interactional justice in a number of philosophical writings, such as those of Martin Buber (1937/1990) and Emmanuel Lévinas (1972/2003). Even granting these similarities, interactional fairness differs from its distributive and procedural counterparts in that the roots of interactional justice do not seem to lie in ethical philosophy. Its origin seems to be in the empirical social scientific work of Bies and his colleagues (e.g., Bies, 2001; 2005; Bies & Shapiro, 1987). Perhaps due to this lack of strong philosophical roots, there was a long debate over its conceptual status (for excellent discussions of this issue, see for reviews, Bobocel & Holmvall, 1999; 2001). During the 1990s, a number of researchers conceptualized interactional justice as a subdimension of procedural fairness. According to this view, procedural justice had two parts. Formal procedural justice referred to the original conceptualization of Thibaut and Walker (1975; 1978; Thibaut et al., 1974) and Leventhal (1976; 1980; Leventhal et al., 1980). Social procedural justice referred to the interactional dimension identified by Bies (for examples of scholars using this model, see Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997; Folger & Bies, 1989; Greenberg, 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Bies, 1990). In response to these concerns, Bies (2001) proposed a number of theoretical refinements that distinguished interactional from procedural fairness. Specifically, he suggested that interactional justice can be viewed as possessing at least four (not two) subfacets: overly harsh evaluative judgments, lack of honesty, violations of privacy, and disrespect. While these four subdimensions are conceptually distinct, they can be operationalized as a single, unitary dimension (Roch & Shanock, 2006). With only a few exceptions (such as Clayton & Opotow, 2003), most current research prefers to treat interactional and procedural

Introduction

31

justice as independent constructs (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005). Within research on justice and affect, it is common to treat justice as having three parts—distributive, procedural, and interactional.

Dimensions of Interactional Fairness: Informational and Interpersonal Justice Bies’ (2001) thinking has been influential insofar as it legitimizes the use of a unitary dimension of interactional fairness, which is separate from process fairness. However, less attention has been paid to his four subdimensions. A better-known approach to understanding the specific subfacets of interactional justice has been to return to the original two parts mentioned above—respect/dignity (Bies, 2001; Bies & Moag, 1987) and the provision of information (Bies, 1987; Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002; Masterson et al., 2005; Shaw et al., 2003). Colquitt (2001) and Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, and Ng (2001) refer to the former as “interpersonal justice” and the latter as “informational justice.” Notice that Colquitt’s model yields four dimensions of justice in all—distributive, procedural, informational, and interpersonal. Building on this work, a number of researchers have measured informational and interpersonal justice separately and with some success (e.g., Ambrose et al., 2007; Camerman, Cropanzano, & Vandenberghe, 2007; Colquitt, Zapata-Phelan, & Roberson, 2005; Scott, Colquitt, & ZapataPhelan, 2007; Walumbwa, Cropanzano, & Hartnell, 2009). Nevertheless, for purposes of this book we will emphasize the three-factor model and tend not to subdivide interactional fairness into its informational and interpersonal components. There are two reasons for this emphasis, one practical and one empirical. We alluded to the practical reason in the previous section. Most research on interactional fairness and affect has not assessed the two subparts. In a recent paper, Ambrose and Schminke (2009) reviewed five major journals within the organizational sciences. Of the 87 relevant articles that they identified, only seven (about 8%) separately measured informational and interpersonal fairness. Thus, there is not a large knowledge base relating moods or emotions to informational and interpersonal fairness. Of course, where exceptions exist we shall include them in our review (e.g., Zapata-Phelan et al., 2009). The second concern is empirical. Among the aforementioned seven articles, Ambrose and Schminke identified 13 reported correlations between informational and interpersonal justice. Two of these associations were above .80, and five others were above .70. Consequently, it appears that the association between informational and interpersonal justice can be quite large under some circumstances, and this makes it difficult to separately operationalize these two constructs. Given these considerations, this book will generally refer to interactional justice as a broad construct that includes both the information and interpersonal

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components. We shall review and expand on these ideas in our next chapter. For now, we will turn our attention to the relationship between interactional justice and affect.

Interactional Justice as a Cause of Affect As is the case for distributive and procedural fairness, there is evidence that interactional justice predicts emotion. We shall review this evidence throughout the book. For now, two studies are worth mentioning. For example, Bies and Shapiro (1987, Study 3) conducted a naturally occurring field study, in which subjects described their negative affective reactions (anger, resentment and outrage) after one of their proposals or recommendations had been rejected by their boss. It is only when the boss failed to employ a causal account claiming mitigating circumstances (which refers to employees’ informational justice judgments) that they felt negative emotions. When the boss provided an explanation, less negative affect was expressed. In a later study, Cropanzano and Randall (1995, Study 2) either provided advance notice of change in policy or did not provide advance notice. Individuals reported the most negative mood (measured by items like angriness and hostility) when they received no advance notice (a criterion pertaining to informational justice) and when the change cost them a desired bonus. If they either received the bonus, or if they were warned of the change in advance, then participants had less negative reactions. The results were not perfectly supportive, however, as the impact of the variable “resentful” did not achieve conventional levels of significance (F(1,61) = 3.41, p < .07).

Summary In this section we have seen that justice, as understood by social scientists, is an important descriptive construct. Social and organizational psychologists tend to study people’s cognitive appraisals of events in their environments. These events can be organized into three broad families—outcomes (distributive fairness), processes (procedural fairness), and social interpersonal and informational transactions (interactional fairness). All of these relate to affect, as we shall see in the subsequent chapters. Philosophers, such as Aristotle (350 b.c./1962), Nozick (1974), and of course Rawls (1971), are attempting to determine what actually is fair. This is the normative approach, which seeks a rational foundation for distinguishing the just from the unjust. Though this is not the explicit goal of the social scientific research reviewed in this book, this normative perspective has supplied some critical ideas to procedural justice and distributive justice (to illustrate this point, see the early writings of French, 1964). Interactional justice, on the other hand, seems to have been derived separately by social scientists.

Introduction

33

Quo Vadis We have now learned something of the literature on justice and something of the literature on affect. Before moving to the next chapter, it is worth establishing that these two phenomena—fairness and Â�feelings—tend to co-occur. Stated generally, our task is straightforward. As one might imagine, ample evidence indicates that all three types of justice are related to affective states (e.g., Mikula, 1986; 1987; Mikula & Schlamberger, 1985; Tepper, 2000). For example, in a recent meta-analytic study, Barsky and Kaplan (2007) summarized the empirical literature. The corrected association between distributive justice and state positive affect was .31. For procedural justice the association was .35. Both of these associations were within the 95% confidence interval. Unfortunately, insufficient studies were available to meta-analyze the correlation between interactional justice and positive mood states. Barsky and Kaplan also examined negative affect. Some of these correlations were a bit lower but still within the 95% confidence interval. Negative affect was associated with distributive justice at −.25, procedural at −.24, and interactional at −.43. In short, justice perceptions are related to one’s affective state. We feel better when we are treated fairly and worse when we are not. This is good news for our present venture. If affect and justice were uncorrelated, then there would be little else to say, except perhaps for the possibility that one might moderate the effect of the other (and this is possible, as close readings of Chapters 4 and 6 will attest). Still, even granting a correlation between each type of justice and affect, there remains a good deal to do. • We have not yet examined why justice should be related to feeling states. This book reviews a number of possibilities, including the effects of cognitive appraisals (Chapter 2), moral judgments (Chapter 3), threats to the self (Chapter 4), and even the terror of contemplating one’s own death and the emotional labor employees have to display (Chapter 6). • The causal direction is ambiguous. (In)justice may cause affect, as we discuss in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. It also seems to be the case that affect can cause justice perceptions, as we review in Chapter 5. • We need to return to the distinction between moods and emotions. We begin this task in Chapter 2, but pay special attention to this conceptual issue in Chapter 5. Our story on social justice and emotions is just beginning. We hope you will enjoy pleasant feelings while going though it!

ch a p t er

2

Justice-Relevant Cognitions as a Cause of Affect In this chapter we take up our first topic—how thinking about justice (or injustice) creates affect. This is probably the most straightforward and simple approach to understanding the relationship between justice and affect, and among fairness researchers it is by far the most commonly employed paradigm. In this chapter we shall review four conceptual frameworks. The first three—equity theory, referent cognitions theory, and the three-way interaction—are drawn from a common scholarly tradition. The fourth and final model, cognitive appraisal theory, is distinct from the others. This chapter will take a historical perspective, emphasizing not only current research but also the seminal work that undergirds contemporary empirical trends. As we shall see, equity theory and RCT are older models that no longer inspire as many investigations as they once did. Nevertheless, they provide an important foundation for understanding contemporary research, especially explorations of the three-way interaction. We shall also see that cognitive appraisal theory emerged some years ago, but research applying this model to justice perceptions is ongoing. For this reason, our review of cognitive appraisal theory will begin with older material and then take us up to the present day. Virtually all historical discussions of organizational justice emphasize equity theory (Byrne & Cropanzano, 2001). Some also present the intellectual context in which it was born (Cropanzano & Randall, 1993; Cropanzano & Rupp, 2008; Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & Schminke, 2001). It was relative deprivation theory that provided the early basis for 35

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equity theory. In particular, deprivation theory updated Aristotle’s idea that justice is defined in reference to some standard (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949). Interestingly, relative deprivation theory already took emotions into account and the term relative deprivation even directly referred to “the emotion one feels when making negatively discrepant comparisons” (Crosby, 1984, p. 88). In any event, equity theory was originally formulated by J. Stacy Adams during the 1960s (e.g., Adams, 1963; 1965; Adams & Freedman, 1976), and subsequently developed with contributions from other scholars (such as Berscheid & Walster, 1978; Prichard, 1969; Hatfield, Walster, & Piliavvin, 1978; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). Equity theory is a model of distributive justice. That is, it is concerned with how outcomes are allocated (Markovsky & Younts, 2001). As has long been discussed, equity theory does not contain an explicit statement of procedural justice (Folger, 1986a) or interactional justice (Bies & Moag, 1986). As we shall see, affect was always central to equity theory. However, the framework was limited and was therefore ambivalent as to whether or not discrete emotions were involved. The second model we review, referent cognitions theory (RCT), was posed by Folger (1986a; 1986b; 1987; 1993) as an extension of equity theory. RCT retained equity theory’s essence of distributive justice, but added a consideration of procedure that proved useful in generating precise predictions. In a series of studies, Folger and his colleagues found strong support for the model (Folger, Rosenfield, & Hays, 1978; Folger, Rosenfield, Hays, & Grove, 1978; Folger, Rosenfield, & Robinson, 1983), including the idea that injustice will produce discontent (Folger & Martin, 1986) and resentment (Cropanzano & Folger, 1989). This two-way interaction may hold for physiological arousal as well. An experiment run by Vermunt and Steensma (2003; see also Vermunt & Steensma, 2001) found that subjects who worked on a demanding task experienced increases in their blood pressure and heart rate. However, these effects were reduced when individuals received procedurally fair treatment. Thus, it appears that human beings respond physiologically to procedural injustice, and that process fairness blunts the ill effects of demanding outcomes. Proponents of a three-way interaction go a step beyond RCT. Research in this area maintains that all three types of justice—distributive, procedural, and interactional—work together to create affect (Goldman, 2003; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). The three-way approach further maintains that the presence of one type of justice can compensate for the absence of fairness somewhere else. For example, if the process is fair, individuals are more accepting of an unfair outcome and/or an unfair interpersonal and informational transaction. For this reason, the most negative affect is felt when one experiences three types of unfairness during a transaction. While equity theory, RCT, and three-way interaction models were formulated to help scholars understand justice, the cognitive appraisal

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models were built to understand emotion (cf. Abelson, 1983; Frijda, 1986; 1987; 1993; Lazarus, 1991a; 1991b; 1991c; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1984). Only later was it drafted into service in order to facilitate our understanding of fairness perceptions (by Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998; Montada, 1994; 1996; 1998; Montada & Schneider, 1989, among others). As we shall see, this conceptualization was a bit rocky, beginning first with overall justice and only later moving to procedural justice.

Adams’ (1963; 1965) Equity Theory Overview Equity theory is a framework for analyzing how individuals respond to distributive injustices. In Chapter 1 we observed that the basic tenets of equity theory are ultimately traceable back to Book Five of Aristotle’s (350 b.c./1962) Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle (p. 119) believed that “the just … is equality of ratios.” As we have already explained, Aristotle’s theory of distributive fairness asserted that justice was achieved when goods were allocated in proportion to each individual’s contribution. Explicitly drawing on these Aristotelian ideas, Homans (1961) mathematically expressed his rule of distributive justice as follows:



P 1 R1 = P 2 R2

where P1 and P 2 are two different persons, and R1 and R 2 are their respective rewards. If these equations match, then each individual is rewarded in proportion to his or her contributions. Interestingly, Homans (1961) was very explicit as to what would happen when an inequity existed. If one received less than deserved, then this would produce “the emotional behavior we call anger” (p. 75); if one received more than deserved, then this would produce guilt. Writing a few years later, Adams (1963; 1965; Adams & Freedman, 1976) retained most of Homans’ (1961) theoretical ideas, though Adams rearranged Homans’ equation somewhat:



O1 O 2 = I1 I 2

This is, of course, Adams’ now famous equity theory, where O1 and O 2 are the outcomes received by two different persons and I1 and I2 are their respective inputs. In good Aristotelian fashion, each person

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gets what they are entitled to when two ratios agree. A noteworthy feature of equity theory is that outcomes are not evaluated in isolation. They are understood via a social comparison process (Austin, 1977). Objective identical results could be more or less fair depending upon the standard of comparison (Ambrose, Harland, & Kulik, 1991; Kulik & Ambrose, 1992). Equity theory is a quintessentially “hot” model of human behavior; affective states serve an important mediating mechanism. An imbalance in the ratios triggers an unpleasant physical state. Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1973, p. 153) explained as follows: “When individuals find themselves participating inequitable relationships, they become distressed. The more inequitable the relationship, the more distress individuals feel.” There is even evidence that inequity produces measurable physical activation. Markovsky (1988) took physiological assessments of laboratory subjects who either had or had not been rewarded fairly. When these groups were compared, Markovsky found that inequity produced an elevated galvanic skin response (GSR), indicative of somatic arousal. However, contrary to Markovsky’s predictions, the two groups showed no differences in heart rate. In any case, the affect that occurs when an inequity is experienced is presumed to be unpleasant. Since the feeling is distasteful, individuals are motivated to reduce it. As Mowday and Colwell put it (2003, p.€68): “Inequitable treatment causes tension or distress, and people are motivated to do something about it.” The unpleasant tension is reduced by restoring equality to the ratios. This can be accomplished by acting on any of the terms in the equation, and the responses can be behavioral or cognitive. This leads to a number of predictions. The most obvious finding has to do with underreward. If individuals earn less than they think they should, then they are likely to experience unpleasant affect. To reduce the aversive feeling states, workers may curtail their effort and performance should drop. The decrease in performance (employees’ inputs) thereby restores equity and the unpleasant feelings go away. In the sixties, this was not a terribly controversial prediction and was well known (Adams, 1965). The more interesting prediction has to do with overreward. When individuals receive more favorable treatment than a referent other, they should experience guilt (Homans, 1974), though this emotion was typically unmeasured in early research. To resolve this aversive state, research has found that they tend to improve their performance (Walster et al., 1978). How individuals go about improving will vary with the way they are paid. Adams (1962) famously found that when workers are paid a high, flat rate, they improve the quantity of output. This strategy improves their outcome and thereby brings their receipts into line with their contributions. If workers are paid on a piece-rate basis, however, higher quantity poses a problem. The more they produce, the more they earn, thereby exacerbating the injustice even if it is favorable to them. Adams found that overpaid piece-rate

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employees solve this dilemma by lowering the quantity of their output while simultaneously increasing the quality of their work. Pritchard, Dunnette, and Jorgenson (1972) confirmed in a famous experiment that workers did not want to “cheat” their employer when they felt overrewarded. They either chose to increase their quantitative performance when they were hourly paid or to decrease it when they were paid piece-rate. Moreover, results showed that workers’ satisfaction was at its highest level when they were equitably paid and at its lowest level when they felt underrewarded. Satisfaction for overrewarded workers was in between. Notice that this affective reaction held regardless of the way workers were paid. However, there are limitations to the importance people give to overreward. In particular, the impact that positive inequity has on employees’ reactions seems to rapidly decrease with time (Greenberg, 1988). While the behavioral consequences of inequity are important in order to reduce distress, the theory does not require that people change their behavior. Equity theory also allows individuals to alter their cognitions. As we have seen, equity presumes some referent or point of comparison. This allows individuals the opportunity to resolve an inequity and restore a pleasant affective state by changing their referent point (Kulik & Ambrose, 1992). In so doing, they are, relatively speaking, no longer disadvantaged. Evidence suggests that workers often use this strategy (Stepina & Perrewé, 1991). For example, if a comparison other earns more money, one can simply shift to a referent that is in less fortunate economic straits. One contends that this is the reason why women often do not feel unjustly treated at work even if they earn less than men in similar positions. Specifically, working women sometimes compare themselves to other women, even those in lower-level jobs, rather than to men who are in the same job class as them (Martin, 1981).

From Undifferentiated Arousal to Basic Emotions Generally speaking, Homans (1965) and Adams (1963) proposed similar models and seemed to approve of one another’s work (e.g., Homans, 1974). Adams (1965) accepted Homans’ contention that overreward could produce guilt in the beneficiary. However, he showed some ambivalence regarding anger, initially stating that Homans was “overly influenced by Skinnerian Rhetoric.” Adams went on to add that “He means plainly that dissatisfaction will be felt or expressed” (p. 274). Later, however, Adams acknowledged that inequity could produce “an unpleasant emotional state, be it anger or guilt” (p. 283). Why the ambivalence? To understand Adams’ (1965) hesitation it is worth considering how affect was understood by social psychologists during the 1960s. At that early date scholars had not carefully delineated the distinction between mood and emotion. Emotions, many social psychologists believed, were determined by the context. As explained by Schachter (1964), sundry environmental events can

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cause individuals to experience a sort of undifferentiated psychological arousal. This arousal was neither positive nor negative; it simply was. Upon experiencing arousal, individuals were expected to search their environments for a cause. If a cause was found, it was used to label the arousal as a type of emotion. For example, in a classic experimental study Schachter and Singer (1962) administered either a placebo or epinephrine to undergraduate research subjects. Half of these individuals were informed of the nature of the drug and half were not. Shortly thereafter, individuals were exposed to a research accomplice who was either angry or euphoric. To understand the predictions, keep in mind the underlying theory. • Research participants who received the placebo had no arousal. Therefore, their moods were not expected to change. • Research participants who received epinephrine but were told of the drug’s effect had arousal, but it was explained arousal. Their moods were not expected to change either. • Research participants who received the epinephrine but were not told of the drug’s effect had arousal but no explanation of it. Therefore, they needed an explanation to account for why they felt as they did. To achieve this objective, they looked to the behavior of the accomplice. Emotions were inferred based upon the behavior of the experimental accomplice. When he (the confederate was always male) was angry, the subject should become angry. When he was euphoric, the subject should become euphoric as well. Schachter and Singer’s (1962) findings were interpreted as highly supportive (e.g., by Schachter, 1964, and later by such authors as Aronson, 1999), and they set off a wave of research on unexplained arousal and emotion. Among research in this genre, one of the more promising lines of inquiry explored excitation transfer theory (Zillman, 1978; 1979; Zillman & Bryant, 1974). Excitation transfer theory was generally consistent with Schachter and Singer’s original findings. For example, Cantor, Zillman, and Bryant (1975) found that college undergraduates mislabeled arousal as romantic attraction to a member of the opposite sex. Likewise, Zillman, Katcher, and Milavaksy (1972) found that arousal left over after exercising could heighten aggression against another person. A related line of inquiry treated arousal of the autonomic nervous system as an individual difference variable. Some of this work is quite old, even predating the Schachter and Singer (1962) study. For example, Mandler and Kremen (1958) found that people who report more arousal also report stronger emotions, while those who report less arousal report weaker emotions (see also the work of Klein & Verbeke, 1999). In other words, the more aroused, the more intensely emotions are felt. But there were also problems. The modest claim that physiological arousal enhances emotional experience is a far cry from the stronger

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claim that arousal determines all emotion. A close reading of the Â�original Schachter and Singer (1962) study suggests that the findings were less than totally supportive. Later research failed to replicate many of the authors’ contentions (see Branscombe, 1985, for an empirical example; see Zimbardo, Ebbesen, & Maslach, 1976, for an early critique). Doubtlessly, there are situations when arousal can be mislabeled, but this is insufficient to explain all affective experience. The most serious problem with Schachter and Singer’s (1962) theory is that emotions do not necessarily result from undifferentiated arousal of the autonomic nervous system. To be sure, discrete emotions and patterns of physiological activation do not necessarily line up in an unambiguous one-to-one fashion (Cacioppo, Berntson, Larsen, Poehlmann, & Ito, 2000). Nevertheless, as a meta-analysis by Cacioppo, Berntson, Klein, and Poehlmann (1997) has shown, there are different physiological markers associated with certain emotional states. Interestingly, some evidence was available even when the Schacter and Singer study, was being conducted (e.g., Ax, 1953, and for an even older study, see Wolff & Wolff, 1943). In the decades following the initial work on misattributed arousal, further evidence supported the distinctive physiology of various emotions (e.g., Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983; Graham, 1962; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen; 1990; Levenson, Carstensen, Friesen, & Ekman, 1991; Roberts & Weerts, 1982; Schwartz, Weinberger, & Singer, 1981), and these findings have been replicated in non-Western cultures (Levenson, Ekman, Heider, & Friesen, 1992). While arousal can certainly be mislabeled (e.g., Cantor et al., 1975; Zillman, 1979), it was a rather serious conceptual error not to recognize that at least some emotions involve characteristic activation states that differ from others (Ekman, 1992; 1999). The reality is even more profound than this modest conclusion would imply. The origin of our emotional experience is not in the external situation but in the brain (Davidson, 1984; Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, & Friesen, 1990; Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990). Emotional activity, in other words, seems to emerge from activity in our central nervous system (LeDoux & Phelps, 2000) and this is true for animals other than human beings (Panksepp, 2000). Later research went further. Izard (1977) built on the earlier work of Charles Darwin (1872/1965) to argue that there were a limited number of basic emotions, such as anger, fear, and happiness. These emotions were discrete and separate from one another. Among other things, each possesses a distinct phenomenological experience, characteristic physiological markers, an automatic appraisal, and its own response predisposition (Frijda, 1986; 1987; 1993). Fear, for example, makes us wish to flee, while love predisposes us to approach another person. By the early 1990s, scholars such as Ekman (1992; 1993), Izard (1992), Plutchik (1994), and Roseman, Spindel, and Jose (1990) had provided comprehensive models of basic emotions. Though the resulting lists of emotions varied somewhat, there was substantial overlap.

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Based on a review of the literature, Weiss and Cropanzano (1996) suggest that a good starting list of basic emotions should at least include sadness, love, joy, fear, anger, and perhaps surprise. In a later review, Ekman (1999) proposes a long list—amusement, anger, contempt, contentment, disgust, embarrassment, pleasure, and shame. Ekman also recommends that future work considers guilt and interest as possible additions to the list. For our present purposes, the precise set is less important than is the recognition that there is some limited set of discrete emotions that should be considered by justice researchers. As evidence of this kind waxed, it was not long before equity researchers began incorporating basic emotions into their thinking. To illustrate, it is useful to consider a study by Hegtvedt (1990). In a vignette experiment, Hegtvedt showed that underrewarded subjects felt angrier, more resentful, and more helpless, whereas overrewarded participants experienced more guilt and gratefulness. Interestingly, equitably rewarded individuals also displayed a sort of emotion: deservingness. A relationship between inequity and anger was also observed in work by Gray-Little and Teddlie (1978), Clayton (1992), and Hegtvedt and Killian (1999). By now, the relationship between anger and underreward has been well established. However, understanding the relationship between inequity and this particular discrete emotion was delayed while psychologists worked to distinguish basic emotions from undifferentiated arousal. Also relevant to our present purposes, other studies have looked directly at the emotion that can result from overreward. As one might expect, this research has found that people sometimes become guilty when they earn more than their performance should merit (e.g., Hegtvedt, 1990; Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999; Sprecher, 1992), though at least one study has been unsupportive (Gray-Little & Teddlie, 1978). In the remainder of this book we have scant occasion to return to undifferentiated arousal (see in particular Chapter 5). As we shall see, the concept of basic or discrete emotions is now well established in the scholarly literature. However, we need to refer back to the distinction between moods and emotions. While equity theory has gradually become more emotion oriented, we shall find other frameworks that prefer to emphasize mood states. Those theories that emphasize mood sometimes did so because they were formulated at a time when basic emotions were not completely understood or accepted (e.g., Isen & Baron, 1991; Sinclair & Mark, 1992). It appears that this motivated the authors to focus on what was then a better-validated construct. More recent framework tends to speak of emotion (such as the work of Skitka et al., 2008) or both mood and emotion together (Mullen, 2007). All of these approaches are reasonable, but we need to be careful about our definitions. Furthermore, since people experience both moods and emotions, theories that take them both into account are more complete.

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Inequity and Affect in Close Relationships As we have seen, early theories of equity emphasized two main emotions—anger and guilt (Homans, 1961, p. 75; Adams, 1965, p. 283). Other work, which examined inequity in the context of close relationships, has described a much broader range of emotions that follow a justice judgment. Two studies in particular have shown that anger and guilt are neither the only nor the primary emotions that may be perceived after an inequity is felt, thereby underscoring the important relationship between distributive justice and emotion. Sprecher (1986) studied the emotions experienced by more than 500 men and women in ongoing close relationships. When experiencing either underreward or overreward, respect, joy, and contentment tended to decrease. Under the same circumstances, anger, hurt, resentment, sadness, frustration, and hate (but not guilt) tended to increase. Love and commitment had no link with inequity. In a later study, Sprecher (1992) had subjects compare how they expected to feel when benefiting too much, as opposed to benefiting too little, in a close relationship. She found that underrewarded respondents anticipated feeling more anger and depression, as well as less happiness, contentment, satisfaction, and love. Noticeably, it is their depression (and not their anger) that seemed to increase the most. This runs counter to the predictions of Homans (1965) and Adams (1963; 1965), and may reflect the fact that Sprecher was examining close relationships whereas Homans and Adams were considering economic transactions. There is something sad about exploitation from one who should love you. Sprecher also found that when respondents overbenefited, they expected to feel more guilty; guilt was not anticipated when one received less than deserved. As reflected in our comments so far, equity theory has tended to treat justice as an antecedent and affect as its consequence. However, research on inequity in close relationships tells a more nuanced story. In an interesting longitudinal study, Grote and Clark (2001) examined fairness perceptions and affect (operationalized as marital distress) among married partners. When domestic chores were divided inequitably, the wronged party perceived injustice. This sense of unfairness, in turn, created marital distress. Thus far, this is the justice-to-affect model we have been discussing. Grote and Clark took this a step further. They also found that marital discord was associated with subsequent perceptions of injustice. In this study we see evidence of a reciprocal relationship whereas injustice causes affect, and affect, for its part, creates further injustice. We will shortly revisit this possibility in more detail in Chapter 5.

Inequity and Envy: Gino and Pearce’s (2009) Abundance Effect While anger and guilt seem to result from inequitable treatment (Homans, 1961, p. 75; Adams, 1965, p. 283), as well as other emotions

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identified by research in close relationships such as depression, three recent experiments by Gino and Pierce (2009) add an additional discrete emotion—envy. In these original studies, Gino and Pierce are interested in the determinants of unethical behavior. They argue for an abundance effect, whereby the mere presence of wealth in the environment causes individuals to feel jealous of others. As a result of this covetousness, people are more likely to defraud others in order to “earn” a share of this affluence. In their first experiment, Gino and Pierce found that spreading a pile of roughly 7000 dollar bills over a table increased the likelihood that undergraduate research participants would lie in order to boost their earnings on a paid experimental task. Replicating this effect, Gino and Pierce’s second and third experiments found that envy partially mediates the abundant wealth effect on cheating behavior. Experiment 3 was especially interesting, since Gino and Pierce further learned that a pile of dollar bills increased cheating, even if the person being swindled was not the owner of the money! In other words, the abundant wealth effect drives envy, and this envy is strong enough to cause some people to deceive an innocent person. Consistent with the social justice perspective, Gino and Pearce (2009) suggest that feelings of inequity produce the emotion of envy. However, in these studies the authors did not directly assess whether people felt unfairly treated. In another study, Mikula (1986) confirmed that envy can be felt as a consequence of injustice. However, this occurred in less than 1% of the cases that Mikula studied. Far more common were anger, rage, and indignation, which were reported in 68% of the unfair situations. Also common were sadness-related emotions, such as helplessness, despair, and depression. These were reported in 33% of the cases. Delving into the link between unfairness and envy would be important for future research, though other emotions seem to accompany unfairness more frequently. Nevertheless, these three experimental investigations of the abundance effect are extremely innovative and provide a novel perspective on injustice and discrete emotion.

Moderators of the Relationship Between Inequity and Affect Of course, equity theory does not claim that everyone responds to a distributive injustice in precisely the same emotional fashion. Various things can impact the sort of affect that is experienced when one encounters an inequity. In this section we will discuss four programs of study: leadership, social value orientations, gender and power, and affect intensity. Each of these moderates reactions to injustice. Autocratic Leadership De Cremer (2007b) conducted two studies that investigated the interaction between distributive justice and autocratic leadership style. Study 1 was an experimental study that presented undergraduates with written

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vignettes. A key outcome variable in this first study was negative emotion. To create his index of negative emotion, De Cremer had research participants report the extent to which they felt “disappointed” and “angry.” Scores on these two items were averaged together. De Cremer found that autocratic leadership moderated the effect of distributive justice. Distributive justice did a poor job predicting negative emotion when the leader was autocratic, mostly because negative emotion was always high. However, when the leader was not autocratic individuals had less negative emotion when rewards were allocated fairly and more negative emotion when they were allocated unfairly. Study 2 investigated these effects in a field setting. This second study only examined disappointment as an indicator of negative emotion. Regardless, De Cremer (2007b) observed a similar interaction. When leaders were autocratic, distributive justice was not a good predictor of negative emotion. Employees tended to be high in disappointment when they had an autocratic supervisor. As in Study 1, when the leader was nonautocratic, individuals experienced less negative emotion when they experienced fair treatment but more negative emotion when they experienced unfair treatment. Social Value Orientation Stouten, De Cremer, and van Dijk (2005) studied individuals’ emotional reaction to violations of the equity rule as a consequence of their social value orientation. The authors described the idea of social value orientation by first stating that individual and group interests can vary. One’s social value orientation depends on the weights that a person gives to personal outcomes vs. group outcomes in allocation tasks (Messick & McClintock, 1968; van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). Hence, there are three different social value orientations (van Lange, 1999) that one can espouse to deal with these situations in which personal and public interest diverge. The first kind of orientation is that of the proself. Proselfs assign a higher level of importance to their own well-being than the group’s well-being. They have also been shown not to value cooperation (van Lange & Liebrand, 1991). Therefore, proselfs tend to value efficiency above equality. On the other hand, prosocials value fair and equitable outcomes for everyone in the whole group. Finally, competitors are like proselfs in that they want what is best for them. However, competitors, unlike proselfs, want to get more than the other members of the group. A proself will be content as long as he or she maximizes his or her gains. However, competitors will not be happy unless they have more than the others. Stouten et al. (2005) only compared proselfs to prosocials. These scholars found that prosocials favor the equity rule due to concern for fairness, whereas proselfs prefer the equity rule to the extent that it is efficient. Specifically, these scholars assessed subjects’ emotional reactions to violations of the equity rule when everyone in the group

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succeeded versus failed. They found that prosocials’ reactions did not vary as a result of the outcome. However, proselfs experienced more negative emotional reactions when they did not receive the favorable outcome than when they did receive it. In sum, this research suggests that social value orientation may play a part in the emotional reactions that are displayed due to perceived injustice. As always, future research should examine these ideas in more detail. Gender and Power Standing Sprecher’s (1986) program of study has also identified additional moderators of the relationship between emotion and inequity. Perhaps the most notable is in regards to gender. When receiving less than deserved, women tended to turn their emotions inward, reporting sadness, frustration, and depression. Men tended to turn outward at their former partner, experiencing anger, hate, resentment, and hurt. These emotions can also be classified as being part of what Haidt (2000) refers to as the “other-condemning” emotions. When receiving more than deserved, women in Sprecher’s study did not report a great deal of guilt, though they experienced some anger. Men tended to feel guilt when overrewarded. Interestingly, this later finding is not what other respondents anticipated. In Sprecher’s (1992) study, female participants anticipated feeling more guilt when overrewarded than did their male counterparts. A second moderator is relative power. Hegtvedt (1990) found that those with a power advantage experienced less guilt, felt more deserving, and were less grateful when overrewarded. Besides, those with more power felt less helpless when underrewarded. This confirms that distributive justice is an especially strong determinant of one’s feelings (Sprecher, 1986). However, the type of emotions experienced, as well as their intensity, depends somewhat on one’s gender and standing. Affect Intensity A fourth moderator is personality (van den Bos, Maas, Waldring, & Semin, 2003). Regarding individual differences, people appear to vary consistently in respect to the intensity of their affective reactions (Larsen, Diener, & Lucas, 2002). Individuals who are high in affect intensity should respond strongly to an unfair outcome, while those who are low in affect intensity should respond less strongly. To test this possibility, van den Bos et al. (Study 1) measured laboratory subjects’ levels of affect intensity. These researchers then had individuals work on a task for which they would be rewarded. Some participants received an unjust reward, whereas others received a fair reward. In addition to their judgments of fairness, individuals also rated their feelings (if they felt happy, content, proud, well, angry, furious, hostile, infuriated, irritated, sad, disappointed, guilty, bad, and so forth). In the presence of a distributive injustice, those high in affect intensity were in a poorer mood than those

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low in affect intensity. Study 2 replicated and extended these findings, though this second experiment involved procedural justice. It will be discussed when we get to this topic later in the chapter. In a later paper, Maas and van den Bos (2009, Studies 1 and 2) took a somewhat different approach to affect intensity and justice, showing that the active self-esteem can moderate the impact of affect intensity on reactions to a distributive injustice. We shall have more to say about self-Â�esteem in Chapter 4. For now, let us consider these two experiments. Based on cognitive-experiential self-theory, the authors distinguished between the two main conceptual systems that people use to process information. On the one hand, people may process information intuitively, by encoding the material into metaphors and making associative connections. This refers to an experiential-intuitive system. Due to its metaphorical and associative nature, in situations in which people use the experiential-intuitive system, they may be seized by their emotions. On the other hand, people could instead employ a rational-cognitive system that leads them to process information analytically, encoding information in abstract ways and making logical connections. As one might expect, use of the rationalÂ�cognitive system allows people to more easily control their emotions. In two experiments, Maas and van den Bos (2009, Studies 1 and 2) induced experiential or rational mindsets among participants after having measured their interdividual differences in affect intensity. Then, the participants were subjected to a fair or unfair allocation. The results showed that when they were brought in an experiential mindset, participants high in affect intensity had stronger emotional reactions than people low in affect intensity. This was especially the case for negative affective reactions, and it was even stronger for anger than for sadness. Regarding the impact of fairness on positive reactions, responses were only marginally significant. By contrast, when in a rationalistic mindset, people’s affect intensity had no effect on their responses to fair and unfair events. In other words, it is the combination of experiential mindsets and high affect intensity that yields the strongest negative emotional reactions to unfair events. These results show how important circumstances and individual differences work together to shape the justice judgment process and its consequences. This is consistent with the interactionist model, which asserts that attitudes and behaviors are affected by the interplay between person and situation (Cervone & Shoda, 1999a; 1999b; Mischel, 1968). The interactionist model certainly seems to hold when morality and justice are at stake (Greenberg, 2002; Murphy, 1993; Treviño, 1986). We shall revisit the Maas and van den Bos paper when we discuss procedural justice later in this chapter.

Summary and Critique Equity theory is a pioneering framework of workplace fairness (Byrne€& Cropanzano, 2001), and this is also true for our understanding of the relationship between justice and emotion. We have not seen the last

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of€it. In the next chapter we shall discuss evidence suggesting that chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys display an aversion to inequity that bears much in common with that displayed by human beings (Brosnan, 2006). For now we shall keep our comments specific to the relationship between equity theory and human emotion. Plainly stated, inequity produces negative affect. Prior research has even discovered evidence of physical activation after subjects are treated in a distributively unfair manner (Markovsky, 1988). Other laboratory studies have focused on participant’s emotional reactions following an inequity. It has been repeatedly found that inequity produces negative affect that can take the form of discrete emotions, such as resentment (e.g., Sprecher, 1986; 1992). Furthermore, the effect of inequity on emotional reactions can be nuanced when one considers all of the moderators that affect that relationship (e.g., gender, Sprecher, 1986; power, Hegtvedt, 1990; personality, van den Bos et al., 2003; mindset, Maas & van den Bos, 2009). Another limitation of equity theory is that it focuses on only one type of reward allocation—to each in accordance with contributions. As we said in the introduction, there are additional ways to assign outcomes, and these may be viewed as fair in some circumstances. In addition to equity, Deustch (1975, 1985) argues that people often consider need (give to those in the worse predicament) and equality (give everyone the same), as well as sundry combinations. It is not clear how these different allocation rules impact emotion, though it is important that scholars find out. These rules are too important and too widely used to ignore. In this regard, work by Stouten, De Cremer, and van Dijk (2007) is especially promising. These authors place a good deal of emphasis on the role of equality in understanding affect. Regarding need, Horberg and Keltner (2007) proposed that the salience of this distributive rule is likely to prompt third parties’ specific emotion of compassion through the mechanism of heightened perceptions of self–other similarity. Finally, it seems clear that the critique that Folger (1986a) made a generation ago still holds today—equity theory desperately needs to include the allocation process. Without it, equity theory is more than incomplete. It is misleading. Individuals do not respond to their outcomes, even unfair ones, in isolation. Understanding the allocation process, among other things, allows people to make sense of what has transpired, and therefore changes one’s responses (Brockner, 2002). There is ample evidence for this (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996), but one illustration will suffice. In one field study, Brockner, Fishman, Reb, Goldman, Spiegel, and Garden (2007, Study 1) found that layoff victims who believed the process was unfair reported being angrier than those who felt they had been discharged through a just procedure. Notice that losing one’s job, though not desirable and often viewed as distributively unfair, had far worse effects when it was done procedurally unfairly (for similar evidence regarding layoff fairness and affect, see Bies, Martin, & Brockner, 1993). The theory we consider next was explicitly formulated to address this concern.

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Folger’s (1986a; 1986b; 1987; 1993) Referent Cognitions Theory (RCT) Overview In a series of papers, Folger (1986a; 1986b; 1987; 1993) proposed a new model, referent cognitions theory, which sought to address equity theory’s limitations. For our present purposes there are three elements that we must consider—referents, choice, and procedural justifications. Retaining equity theory’s emphasis on comparative standards, Folger distinguished between high and low referents. A high referent occurred in a situation where one could easily imagine a more favorable outcome, such as when a coworker received higher pay or when prior expectations suggested a favorable occurrence. Imagine you miss a train that goes away just when you arrive at the station. A low referent occurred in a situation where one could not easily imagine a more favorable outcome, such as when everyone receives similarly disadvantageous outcomes. Imagine that you miss a train because you’re thirty minutes late. While poor outcomes are always unfortunate, discontent is apt to be experienced when a high-referent standard is available. Folger (1986a; 1986b; 1987; 1993) went further. Building on the ideas of Rawls (1971) and Nozick (1974), and on his earlier work (Folger, 1977), he maintained that procedures were important as well. When an individual had voice or choice, which usually means that the procedure is seen as fair, then he or she could more easily accept a disadvantageous high-referent outcome (Cropanzano & Folger, 1989; Folger, Rosenfield, & Hays, 1978). Likewise, if an allocation procedure yielded an unfavorable result, people might not express ill will if the procedure in question was carefully explained and found to be sound (Folger & Martin, 1986; Folger, Rosenfield, & Robinson, 1983), which would nowadays be called informational justice (Colquitt, 2001). Notice that the role of process in referent cognitions theory is similar to that in the normative model of justice that Nozick (1974) presented in his book Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Generally speaking, empirical evidence has been supportive of RCT (e.g., Aquino, Griffeth, Allen, & Hom, 1997; Goldman, 2003). With this in mind, let us now turn our attention to the research linking referent cognitions to affect. This work offers some of the earliest hard evidence that the process-byoutcome interaction causes emotions.

Referent Cognitions Theory and Affect: Referents and Justifications Folger, Rosenfield, and Robinson (1983) examined the interaction of procedural justifications and referent cognitions. Undergraduate research participants worked on an incentive memory task for which they could earn a bonus unit of valued experimental credit by performing more

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effectively than a rival subject. All learned that they had lost the competition and would not earn the credit. But there was more. After completing the task, each participant was told that there was a change in the scoring procedure. The high-referent individuals learned that if the original scoring procedure had been maintained, they would have defeated their rivals and earned the bonus credit. The low-referent individuals learned that if the original scoring procedure had been maintained, they would have lost the competition anyway. Based on RCT (and equity theory and even common sense!) one would anticipate that the highreferent participants would express more discontent. However, there was a final manipulation. Folger et al. (1983) argued that an adequate explanation, what they termed a procedural justification, would allay any ill will. To assess this possibility, they measured three emotions—angry, upset, and resentful. They also included the item “dissatisfied,” which some scholars view as affective and others do not (to understand this debate, see Brief & Weiss, 2002; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). An overall multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) showed the predicted interaction, though univariate tests were only supportive for angry and resentful. This is an important finding, for it demonstrates that processes and outcomes work together to influence emotions. Nor is this the only study to find such an effect. A later experiment by Folger and Martin (1986) was consistent with the Folger et al. (1983) results.

Referent Cognitions Theory and Affect: Referents and Choice In a later experiment Cropanzano and Folger (1989) also examined the interaction of process and outcome. Building on the aforementioned methodology, Cropanzano and Folger had participants work on two tasks—an incentive task for which they could earn a bonus unit of valued experimental credit and a nonincentive task for which no bonus was available. All individuals were told that they failed to earn the bonus. However, half were told that they would have won if the nonincentive task counted for credit (high referent); half were told that they would not have won on either task (low referent). As above, one would intuitively anticipate that the high-referent participants would be more upset. Before jumping to this conclusion, let us consider the second manipulation. Half of the participants were allowed to select their incentive task (high choice) while half could not (low choice). The authors predicted a process-by-outcome interaction, whereas subjects would report being the most “resentful” and the least “understanding” when they would have won with the alternative task (high referent) and were not allowed choice (low process fairness). In all other conditions, even when a high referent was available, ill will

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was expected to be low. The hypotheses were confirmed for “understanding,” but the findings for “resentful” showed only a marginal effect (p = .092).

Summary and Critique Folger’s (1986a; 1986b; 1987) referent cognitions theory represented a major advance over equity theory. It added an explicit consideration of process. As such, it was among the first programs of study to document and explain how the process-by-outcome interaction engenders affect. As we shall see in the next section, Folger’s work on procedural justifications also anticipated thinking on interactional justice, and more precisely on informational justice (e.g., Folger et al., 1983), though Folger did not use this term in his early work (cf. Folger, 1993). Unlike equity theory, RCT was never ambivalent about affect. Folger integrated emotions into his model providing the foundation upon which others would build (e.g., Cropanzano & Baron, 1991; Weiss et al., 1999). For all of these achievements, RCT is nearly forgotten among contemporary justice theorists. This is unfortunate but understandable. RCT was a transitional model. It offered scholars a conceptual bridge between equity theory and procedural justice, as well as between justice cognitions and affect. Still, the model had two notable shortcomings. RCT did not explicitly distinguish between moral wrongs and economic harm. This is a common failing among the cognitive models considered in this chapter. An experiment by Folger and Cropanzano (1988) is telling here. In this study, experimental subjects failed to achieve a desirable unit of bonus credit. Later they had it restored. Despite the fact that no harm was done (low referent), individuals reported being less understanding and somewhat more resentful if the bonus was not provided to them by the original harm doer. Even when economic damage was alleviated, the affective discontent remained. Folger and Cropanzano interpreted these findings as suggesting that individuals care about moral principles. When an experimenter makes a mistake, they would like this individual to make amends. Findings such as these are better interpreted by frameworks that take into account moral feelings. It was on the basis of such shortcomings that these authors built their fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998, 2001), which updated RCT by taking moral feelings into account. While research on fairness theory is far more limited than work investigating RCT, available evidence seems to support this newer model (e.g., Brockner, Fishman, Reb, Goldman, Spiegel, & Garden, 2007; Zapata-Phelan et al., 2009). In any case, we shall examine moral emotions more closely in our next chapter. There is a second problem with RCT. Formulated as it was before Bies’ seminal work (Bies, 1987; Bies & Moag, 1986), RCT did not contain an explicit and detailed formulation of interactional justice. This is a rather serious omission and one that we shall turn to next.

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Interactions Among the Three Types of Justice (Historical) Overview We have observed that there are at least three types of justice—Â�distributive, procedural, and interactional. Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of the outcomes. Equity theory, as we discussed at length (e.g., Adams, 1965), explored affect within the context of distributive justice. RCT added procedural justice, suggesting that process and outcome interact to produce maximum discontent (Folger & Martin, 1986). We have yet to examine interactional justice, which is the fairness of the informal social treatment a person receives from another (see Chapter 1, but also Bies, 2001; 2005; Bies & Shapiro, 1987). Interactional justice can be divided into two more specific varieties. The first (interpersonal justice) refers to polite and dignified treatment (Bies & Moag, 1986); the second (informational justice) refers to the provision of adequate explanations or social accounts when things go badly (Bies, 1987). For simplicity, we shall consider interactional justice holistically (for another view, see Colquitt, 2001). Evidence suggests that interactional justice is important. For example, an early field study by Bies, Shapiro, and Cummings (1988) found that when a boss denied a worker’s request, the employee was likely to become angry unless the supervisor provided an adequate and sincere explanation. If this occurred, then anger was mitigated. Building on these ideas, scholars have found that interactional justice exhibits a twoway interaction with distributive justice (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). The pattern of this moderator effect looks much the same as the effect for process-by-outcome interaction predicted by RCT (e.g., Cropanzano & Folger, 1989). Specifically, ill will is strongest when both forms of fairness are low; otherwise negative responses are greatly reduced. The similarity that RCT’s process-by-outcome findings have to the interaction-by-outcome effect raises an interesting historical question. Why did not Folger and his colleagues incorporate interactional justice into their referent cognitions theory? A close reading of the previous section suggests a surprising answer. As Bies (1987) observed, the procedural justifications tested by Folger, Rosenfield, and Robinson (1983) and Folger and Martin (1986) were very close to the social account component of interactional justice. RCT did indeed include an element of interactional fairness, but the idea was not fully developed and the term was not yet coined (Folger, 1993).

From Two Two-Way Interactions to One Three-Way Interaction We have already learned of two two-way effects: process-by-outcome and social interaction-by-outcome, both of which have amassed considerable evidence (Brockner, 2002). In an influential field study, Skarlicki and

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Folger (1997) took the next logical step. These scholars were Â�interested in predicting organizational retaliatory behavior. This included such matters as damaging work equipment, spreading malicious gossip, taking protracted breaks, and dilatory work habits. Drawing heavily on RCT, but also considering other theoretical frameworks, Skarlicki and Folger found that retaliatory behavior toward the organization and its representatives was predicted by a three-way interaction that qualified any two-way effects. The form of this three-way interaction can be described in various ways. One might say that the two-way interaction between distributive and procedural justice was only significant when interactional justice was low, or one might say that the two-way interaction between distributive and interactional justice was only significant when procedural justice was low. Still, the fundamental point is that retaliatory behaviors were most likely to occur when all three types of fairness were found wanting. If any one type of justice existed, employees were much less likely to retaliate (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), which does not mean that they did not react at all (behavioral reactions such as the lowering of performance or organizational citizenship behaviors were not tested in this study). Cropanzano, Slaughter, and Bachiochi (2005) conducted a conceptual replication of the Skarlicki and Folger study. Among a sample of job applicants, these authors found that the three-way interaction predicted both organizational attractiveness and intention to apply for a job. While this line of research is conceptually important, we need to consider how this three-way effect is relevant to one’s feelings.

Adding Affect to the Three-Way Interaction The issue of emotion was taken up by Skarlicki, Folger, and Tesluk (1999). About a year after their aforementioned justice data were collected, Skarlicki and his colleagues assessed respondents’ level of negative affectivity. Negative affectivity is a trait measure of emotion, which indicates one’s predilection to have bouts of negative affect (cf. Cropanzano et al., 2003; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Unfortunately, the four-way interaction (negative affectivity plus the three types of justice) was not significant. Nevertheless, the findings were important. Skarlicki et al. found that negative affectivity moderated the distributive justice by interactional justice two-way effect. Skarlicki and his colleagues (1999) discovered that trait-negative affect tends to work with injustice to create retaliatory behaviors. For our purposes, these findings are only suggestive for two reasons. First, we are here concerned with whether or not injustice causes affective states. Skarlicki et al.’s study, of course, was not designed to investigate this possibility. Second, the findings regarding trait-negative affect were less compelling than a skeptic might prefer. Negative affect was tested in four different interactions and only found to be significant in one. Clearly, this issue requires a closer look.

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To address these concerns, Goldman (2003) conducted a Â�large-scale study of legal claiming. When compared to earlier work, Goldman included a series of important refinements. First, he obtained a large sample (n = 845), thereby providing more statistical power. Second, Goldman operationalized trait-affect more narrowly. Whereas other work has employed broad traits, such as negative affectivity or affect intensity, Goldman reasoned that the discrete emotion of anger was most likely to spur a law suit. Other negative emotions, such as sadness or anxiety, would be less likely to prompt direct retaliatory action. For this reason, Goldman measured trait-anger. Third, Goldman also assessed an affective state. Based on earlier research, such as that reviewed in this chapter, Goldman argued that state-anger mediates the relationship between perceived injustice and litigation. Goldman’s (2003) conceptual model argued that there would be a three-way interaction among distributive, procedural, and interactional justice. However, this three-way effect would be further moderated by trait-anger. This new four-way interaction, in turn, would have a direct effect on legal claiming. The three-way interaction would also produce state-anger. State-anger, finally, would have a direct effect on legal claiming. As we can see, Goldman proposed a comprehensive model. The three-way interaction is the ultimate driver of legal action, but it is qualified in two respects. For one, the three-way effect is moderated by trait-anger. For another, the three-way effect is mediated by state-anger. Results strongly supported his predictions. Research on the three-way interaction among types of justice is an emerging area of study. Existing findings remain limited, but they are very promising. At this point, we must call for more research, but three general conclusions can be drawn. First, the three-way interaction seems to predict employee behavior (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; Skarlicki et al., 1999). Second, the three-way interaction predicts state-anger (Goldman, 2003). Third, the relationship between the three-way interaction and employee behavior is moderated by at least one affective trait (Goldman’s trait-anger) and perhaps two (Skarlicki et al.’s negative affectivity).

Summary and Critique There is little to add concerning the three-way interaction beyond what we have already observed. Skarlicki and Folger’s (1997) original study drew heavily on referent cognitions theory, though later work has gone beyond this earlier model (e.g., Cropanzano, Slaughter, & Bachiochi, 2005; Goldman, 2003). This framework suggests that all three types of justice are important and worthy of consideration, underscoring a limitation of equity theory (which only took account of distributive justice) and RCT (which lacked detail on interactional justice). As we shall see, subsequently research has not always heeded this recommendation, limiting its focus to only one or two types of fairness.

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Cognitive Appraisal Theory Overview All of the research we have considered so far begins in the justice literature and was expanded to affect. Cognitive appraisal theory moved from the other direction. Its origins lay in research on emotions. As such, cognitive appraisal theory provides an old, influential, and wellresearched paradigm for understanding how events elicit discrete emotional states (for specifics, see Abelson, 1983; Ortony, Clore, &€Colllins, 1988; Roseman, 1984; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; 1987; Stein, Trabasso, & Liwag, 1993). According to this paradigm, emotions result from a (roughly) two-stage process (Frija, 1986; 1987; 1993; Lazarus, 1991a; 1991b; 1991c). The process is set into motion by an attention-getting, often unanticipated, event. When such things transpire, individuals engage in a sense-making process in which they try to understand the short- and long-term consequences. The most fundamental cognition is evaluation. In the first stage, individuals conduct a primary appraisal of their outcomes. During the primary appraisal, people ascertain the overall favorability or unfavorability of the event with respect to their goals. We can think of this as a perception that the event is either good or bad. If the event is favorable, this results in a general sense of happiness. If the result is unfavorable, then a sadness-related emotion, such as disappointment, is likely to occur. The primary appraisal also contains a judgment of severity, whereas more consequential events impel stronger responses. The primary appraisal is foundational, but it is insufficient to create the myriad discrete emotions that human beings experience. Our emotional experiences are further refined by a secondary appraisal. This secondary appraisal provides a more in-depth meaning analysis. During the secondary appraisal, people assess a number of other things. These include such things as the likelihood of change, the certainty with which the event will occur, the extent to which things are controllable, and so forth (for a summary, see Smith & Pope, 1992). Most emotions emerge from the combination of primary and secondary appraisals. For example, if the current situation is positive, but one suspects the future will be less advantageous, this creates worry. Conversely, if the current situation is negative, but the future looks brighter, this creates hopefulness. As should be clear from our review of equity theory and RCT, the cognitive appraisal model of emotion contains at least a superficial familial resemblance to certain theories of fairness. This similarity has inspired a number of attempts at integration.

Justice, Cognitive Appraisals, and Emotion Montada (1994) was among the first to apply the cognitive appraisal model of emotion to organizational justice. Montada placed a good deal

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of emphasis on distributive justice, or the fairness of the outcome. He argued that aspects of cognitive appraisal could alter an individual’s emotional response (for supportive evidence, see Montada & Schneider, 1989, and Reichle & Montada, 1994). Montada’s work marked a point of departure, because he reconsidered justice in light of what scholars know about emotions. This is far more sophisticated than simply measuring affect at the end of a fairness study. As an example of this line of research, let us consider a comprehensive field study by Mikula, Scherer, and Athenstaedt (1998). These scholars surveyed 2,921 students in 37 countries. Participants were asked to recall situations in which they had experienced the specific emotions of joy, anger, fear, sadness, disgust, shame, and guilt. Experiencing unfairness was among five events that were associated with these emotions (the other four were with novelty/suddenness, intrinsic pleasantness, goal conduciveness, and coping ability.) Occasions that produced anger were most frequently associated with unfairness, but Mikula and his colleagues found that a sense of injustice was associated with other emotion-provoking events. These included, in order, disgust-producing, sadness-producing, and fear-producing events, and (to a lesser extent) guilt- and shame-producing events. Consistent with earlier work (Montada & Schneider, 1989, and Reichle & Montada, 1994), these findings are quite consistent with the notion of cognitive appraisal processes because emotional states result from the construal of one’s situation. Mikula, Scherer, and Athenstaedt (1998) recognized that negative emotions happen, not only if one thinks that one did not get what one deserved, but also if one attributes responsibility to a harm doer. It was concluded that the exact nature of the emotional reaction could be determined by the combination of justice perceptions plus several other dimensions. For instance, if a situation is perceived as unfair and at the same time seems difficult to control, the more likely emotional response would be fear rather than anger.

A Cognitive Appraisal Theory of Procedural Justice Montada placed a good deal of emphasis on distributive justice. Evidence was generally supportive (Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Reichle & Montada, 1994), and his model could easily be extended to the allocation process. Building on this earlier work, Weiss, Suckow, and Cropanzano (1999) devised a cognitive appraisal model of procedural justice and emotion (for a theoretical summary, see Cropanzano, Weiss, Suckow, & Grandey, 2000). Weiss and his coworkers (1999) argued that procedural justice produces emotion by working within the familiar two-stage appraisal process found in RCT research. Similar to what we have already seen, individuals determine the overall favorability of an event during the primary appraisal. This assessment leads one to be happy or joyous if the event is beneficial, or sad and disappointed if the event is unfortunate.

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For this reason we can see that happiness and disappointment are likely to show only main effects for outcome favorability. The assessment of procedure is part of the secondary appraisal. It is at this point where the individual attempts to make sense out of the positive or negative outcome. He or she does so by assessing whether the process was fair or unfair. From the pairing of different outcomes (favorable vs. unfavorable) with different procedures (fair vs. unfair), sundry emotions were predicted to result. The secondary appraisal raises an important conceptual point that needs to be appreciated. Historically, theories of organizational justice, such as RCT, have considered whether an unfair process was harmful to an individual or whether it was not. They predicted and found that unfair and harmful processes produced stronger affective states, while unfair but harmless processes produced less affect (e.g., Cropanzano & Folger, 1989; Folger & Martin, 1986). Weiss and his colleagues (1999) emphasized that this approach is limited, because it failed to consider the additional possibility that has been highlighted by equity theory—injustice can work to a person’s benefit. Based on this reasoning, Weiss et al. considered two situations. First, a procedure might be unfairly biased against the target person, such as when one is denied an opportunity for voice that is available to others. Second, a process may be unfavorably biased in favor of the target person, such as when one receives extra consideration because of a close relationship with a decision maker. As we shall see, different emotions result when a procedure works to your advantage than when it works against you. This cognitive appraisal model of procedural justice and emotion was tested in an experimental study by Weiss and his colleagues (1999). One hundred and twenty-two undergraduates participated in a competitive game that offered the potential of earning a prize. In order to control the content of the primary appraisal, half of the students won the prize (a favorable outcome) and half did not (an unfavorable outcome). In order to control the content of the secondary appraisal, the process was either fair, unfavorably biased (the subject’s competitors had the correct answers), or favorably biased (the subject was unfairly supplied with the correct answers). Results were generally supportive. As anticipated, Weiss et al. (1999) found that participants reported higher levels of happiness when they earned the prize, regardless of the procedure, than when they lost the prize. Despite their happiness, the highest levels of guilt were reported when individuals won the prize through a favorably biased procedure (such as, when one cheats). Conversely, the most anger was reported when individuals lost the prize through an unfavorably biased procedure. The only surprising finding was for pride. Weiss and his colleagues (1999) predicted that pride would be high when individuals earned the prize fairly and when they overcame an unfavorably biased procedure. Results were different. Pride showed only a main effect, remaining high even when the bonus was earned due to a favorable injustice!

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Apparently, simply winning was enough to give people a sense of pride, though their own guilt acknowledged that they knew they had done something wrong. For the most part, these findings were replicated in a later experiment by Krehbiel and Cropanzano (2000), and this included the surprising findings for pride. Krehbiel and Cropanzano also predicted and found main effects for disappointment, happiness, and joy—participants were disappointed whenever they lost the prize, while being happy and joyful whenever they achieved it. Anger and frustration were high when they lost the prize through an unjust process, while guilt and anxiety were high when they won the prize unfairly.

Barclay, Skarlicki, and Pugh (2005) on Procedural Justice A more recent attempt at applying cognitive appraisal theory to procedural justice can be found in the work of Barclay and her colleagues (2005). The researchers explored the interaction of procedural justice and outcome favorability in a field setting with 173 layoff victims. Respondents indicated the favorability of their outcome as well as the procedural justice with which it was handled. In a taxonomy harkening back to Sprecher (1986), emotions were divided into two types. Inward-focused emotions included guilt and shame. Outward-focused emotions included anger and hostility. Barclay et al. (2005) obtained a two-way interaction between outcome favorability and procedural justice. For the inward-focused emotions, the most shame and guilt was reported when individuals received an unfavorable outcome through a fair procedure. When individuals achieve a positive outcome, then they have no reason to feel badly about themselves. Hence, shame and guilt were not widespread. Likewise, when individuals achieved negative outcomes, but could attribute them to an unfair procedure, then they had no cause for guilt or shame. The pattern of results for outward-focused emotions was somewhat different. Barclay and her colleagues (2005) reasoned that an unfair procedure would cause anger, regardless of the outcome. Thus, those who experienced a procedural injustice should be generally high in outward-focused emotion. Similarly, if the outcome was poor, then anger and hostility should also be experienced. However, if the outcome was favorable and the procedure was also just, then the least anger should occur. Results supported this contention. The interesting thing, as Barclay et al. observe, is that these findings differ from those reported in other research in which favorable outcomes mitigate the ill effects of unfair procedures (e.g., Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000; Weiss et al., 1999). Barclay and her coauthors discuss various differences in design and theory that could explain these results. Barclay et al. (2005) also found that emotions produced retaliatory work behaviors. However, the interaction of procedural justice and outcome favorability did not predict retaliation.

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Tepper’s (2001) Cognitive Appraisal Model of Justice An interesting variant on this idea can also be found in the work of Tepper (2001). We visited his two studies in Chapter 1, but they bear mention here as well. While Tepper’s model draws explicitly from research on cognitive appraisal theory, there is a difference in emphasis between his theory and that of Weiss et al. (1999) and Barclay et al. (2005). These two earlier papers examined how procedural justice moderated the emotional impact of an unfavorable outcome. Hence, outcome unfavorability was the primary appraisal, while procedural justice was the secondary appraisal. Tepper was concerned with how procedural justice moderated the effect of an unfair outcome. He viewed both an unjust distribution and an unfair process as having elements of primary appraisal but also secondary appraisal as well. Hence, Tepper’s model is a bit more general than the other two. We caution that these are matters of degree and not fundamental disagreements. Tepper (2001, p. 201) observes that “distributive justice (more so than procedural justice) conveys information about the extent to which events have implications for employees’ well-being, and procedural justice (more so than distributive justice) conveys information about the extent to which employees’ coping resources are sufficient to mitigate the threat.” In other words, the outcome is generally associated with the primary appraisal, while the process is generally associated with the secondary appraisal. Nevertheless, this need not be the case, and we should be careful not to automatically equate one type of justice with one appraisal and the other type of justice with the other. The two paradigms simply do not map onto one another with that much clarity. Outcome favorability indeed could be clearly associated with a primary appraisal, but the assessment of distributive raises moral concerns in a similar way as procedural justice and as such could be associated with a secondary appraisal (see also the conclusion of the current chapter). In any case, Tepper (2001) conducted two field studies testing his ideas. Based upon his cognitive appraisal theory of justice, he maintained that procedural and distributive fairness will interact to predict emotions. Specifically, the most negative feelings will result when distributive justice and procedural justice are simultaneously low. When either the process or the outcome is fair, then there will be less negative emotion. These findings were supportive for depression in Study 1. In his Study 2, Tepper again found this effect for depression, but also for anxiety and emotional exhaustion.

Affect Intensity as a Moderator of the Procedural Justice Effect As we have seen, the effects of procedural justice depend somewhat upon whether an outcome is unfavorable and whether the process is biased to one’s advantage (Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000; Weiss et al., 1999). In addition to these considerations, van den Bos and his colleagues (2003)

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have shown that the personality trait of affect intensity also Â�moderates one’s affective responses to procedural justice. Specifically, van den Bos et al. (Study 2) submitted participants to a decision procedure that either provided (fair condition) or denied (unfair condition) them voice. People treated with procedural justice showed more positive affect and less negative affect than did those treated with injustice. However, this effect was strongest among those individuals who were highest in affect intensity. Those low in affect intensity were less affected by this process manipulation. Extending these findings, Murphy (2009) was interested in understanding the “hot” anger that can result when a citizen is accused of law breaking by a government agency. In Study 1, she surveyed 653 research participants who were accused of violating tax law by the Australian Taxation Office (ATO). Consistent with the earlier findings of van den Bos and his colleagues (2003), citizens who were higher in affect intensity reported more anger than did those low in affect intensity. Moreover, fair procedural treatment reduced levels of anger. This is generally consistent with findings on the process by outcome interaction discussed in Chapter 1 (e.g., Brockner, 2002; Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Siegel et al., 2005). Interesting, though, was the fact that individuals high in affect intensity were more difficult to calm down. Procedural justice reduced anger more for those low in affect intensity and less for those high in affect intensity. In general, procedural justice was a more effective palliative when affect intensity was low and less so when it was high. Unfortunately, these important findings for anger were not fully replicated in a second study. As was the case for distributive justice, Maas and van den Bos (2009) found that the impact of affect intensity was further qualified by the self-system. When people were in an experiential mindset, they reacted more strongly when denied voice. When in a rational mindset, they reacted less strongly. Once again, we see that an experiential mindset and high affect intensity interact with an injustice to stir one’s emotional responses.

Summary and Critique Proponents of the cognitive appraisal model of justice and emotion deserve credit for taking a fresh look at the literature of emotion and integrating new ideas into the justice literature (see especially, Mikula, Scherer & Athenstaedt, 1998; Montada, 1994; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Reichle€& Montada, 1994). Another strength of this literature is that cognitive appraisal scholars, unlike equity theorists, have considered both outcomes and processes (e.g., Barclay et al., 2005; Weiss et al., 1999). Nevertheless, more attention to the three-way interaction would be helpful here. More generally, we can see that the cognitive appraisal model is similar to equity theory and RCT in that all of these frameworks place a good deal of emphasis on cognition (e.g., Lazarus, 1984). Thinking

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comes first and then feelings follow as a consequence. In the �cognitive appraisal paradigm, emotions are usually treated as criterion variables. This stands in contrast to other research (such as the work on revenge that is considered in our next chapter), where feelings tend to engender attributional responses. We shall revisit this issue in an even stronger form when we discuss the possibility that affect causes justice perceptions in Chapter 5. For now it is worth suggesting that the subordinate role that cognitive appraisal theory allows for emotions is probably too limited. As the work reviewed in this section illustrates, cognitions are able to cause emotions. However, other work suggests that this arrow of causality may sometimes point in the opposite direction.

Conclusion and Future Research Directions In the course of this chapter we have considered the pros and cons of four cognitive paradigms linking justice to emotions—venerable equity theory, referent cognitions theory, the three-way interaction, and the cognitive appraisal models. The first three of these frameworks appear in a direct historical sequence; the latter is unique and drawn from a different literature. For this reason, we will first discuss the three frameworks drawn from the fairness tradition, and then turn our attention to the cognitive appraisal models.

The Fairness Tradition: Equity Theory, RCT, and the Three-Way Interaction Let us begin with the three fairness paradigms. Equity theory was one of the seminal frameworks for understanding organizational justice (Byrne€& Cropanzano, 2001). Folger (1986a; 1986b) developed RCT to address the limitations in equity theory. While Folger retained the notion of comparative standards for determining fairness, he added an explicit consideration of procedural justice and procedural justifications. As such, RCT was among the first frameworks to document a process-by-outcome interaction (Folger, 1993). Research on the three-way interaction drew generously from referent cognitions theory, though other conceptual models were influential as well (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). There are a number of things that this stream of research teaches us about justice and affect. • Thoughts about fairness can proceed and cause affect. On this point, equity theory, RCT, and the three-way interaction all agree. However, the fact that justice-relevant cognitions can cause affect does not mean that they always do. Here we must beg the reader’s patience. Evidence that mood and emotion can cause justice perceptions will be reviewed in Chapter 5, and in a slightly different fashion in Chapter 6.

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• Distributive justice produces affect. Procedural justice and interactional justice also produce affect. However, when experienced together, these different forms of justice either interact two at a time or all three together, to predict the specific emotions that will be felt and their intensity. Thus, complete models that purport to describe the relationship of fairness to affect should consider all three types of justice—distributive, procedural, and interactional (Brockner, 2002; Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). In this regard, equity theory is deficient and research on the three-way interaction is the most thorough (Cropanzano, Slaughter & Bachioni, 2005; Goldman, 2003; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). However, most research linking justice and affect has not yet included the three types of justice in the design of the studies that have been conducted. We strongly call for such research works. • Despite a shaky beginning with the early equity theory research, justice scholars have learned from their colleagues who study emotion. As a consequence, affect is currently central to all of these models. Though not always explicitly noted, much of this work includes discrete emotions (e.g., Sprecher, 1986; 1992). These achievements suggest that we are beginning to eke out a crude understanding of the relationship between justice and affect, but this understanding remains incomplete. In our discussion of RCT, we also alluded to a critical issue that needs to be considered in more detail. Specifically, much of the work reviewed thus far tends to emphasize economic and quasi-economic outcomes. These range from a bonus unit of research credit (e.g., Folger & Martin, 1986), to monetary wages (Adams, 1963), to office assignments (Greenberg, 1988), to a layoff (Bies et al., 1993). The focus on potential earnings was no accident. There were at least a few scholars, such as Hatfield et al. (1978) and Homans (1958), who believed that justice reduced to maximizing one’s self-interest over a long-term relationship (see Lind & Tyler, 1988, and Tyler & Lind, 1992, who raised this concern earlier than others). In other words, when Adams’ (1963) overpaid subjects elected to improve their work quality, they were not trying to be fair as such. Rather, they were trying not to jeopardize a profitable relationship. In the end, it was about individual profit, not about doing the right thing. RCT called the focus on self-interest into question. In the Folger and Cropanzano (1988) experiment discussed earlier, the researchers remedied an objective loss by providing a bonus credit that had previously been denied. Though all participants completed the experiment with the same earnings, ill will remained unless the original harm doer corrected the injustice. In a one-time only interaction, it is hard to explain why homo economicus would care who provided the benefit. But these findings make good sense if participants are interested in “fair play”—people who harm others should make amends or

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be punished; otherwise the injustice remains (Reb, Goldman, Kray, & Cropanzano, 2006). This observation brings us to a central concern in the recent justice literature. Fairness is more than an elaborate strategy for maximizing personal wealth. It also concerns adhering to standards of appropriate conduct (Folger, 2001; Lerner, 2003) and affirming the value and dignity of other people (Blader & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Blader, 2002a; 2002b). We shall discuss these matters in the next two chapters, and they shall also be revisited at periodic intervals throughout this book. For now, it is worth emphasizing that moral emotions have an etiology of their own. They are often triggered when someone has done something that is ethically inappropriate, as opposed to something that is simply unfortunate. We might say that all outcomes are not alike, with moral violations triggering particularly strong responses (Aquino et al., 2006; Skitka et al., in press). There is even more to the matter than this. As we shall review later, different types of moral violations seem to be associated with different types of emotions.

Cognitive Appraisal Theory The cognitive appraisal theory of emotion stands apart from the three justice frameworks we have just considered. To be sure, all four of these frameworks endorse the notion that thoughts come first and emotions follow as a consequence (Lazarus, 1984). The worry is that this similarity could lead us into a seductive conceptual error. A close reading suggests that the cognitions in cognitive appraisal theory are somewhat different than the cognitions in the justice theories reviewed above. This is a subtle point, but an important one. Recall that there are two types of appraisals—primary and secondary. Also remember that research on the two-way interaction suggests at least two types of justice (Brockner, 2002). In some studies, distributive was paired with procedural (e.g., Cropanzano & Folger, 1989), while in other studies distributive was paired with interactional (e.g., Bies & Shapiro, 1987). In each case, two cognitions are working together to create affect. Taken together, we can see that there are two types of appraisals for cognitive appraisal theory and two types of justice in research on the two-way interaction. Given this, it would be conceptually convenient if we could equate the primary appraisal with one type of justice (say, distributive) and the secondary appraisal with another type (such as procedural or interactional) just as Tepper (2001) proposed. In effect, certain theories of justice would then reduce to special cases of the cognitive appraisal model of emotion. However, matters seldom lend themselves to so elegant a solution. Only RCT could be integrated into the more global theoretical framework of cognitive appraisal theories. RCT was mainly concerned with showing the importance of the process in assessments of fairness, whether it regarded its formal characteristics, such as voice, or its more informal social features, such as

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justifications. RCT did not focus only on distributive justice and instead was built on the idea that people compared their outcomes to a referent standard in order to assess their favorability. The different studies that we have quoted and that support RCT involve an interaction between outcome favorability and procedural (or sometimes interactional) justice. As such they can be explained by the cognitive appraisal theories in which outcome favorability is assessed at the first step of primary appraisal and procedural or interactional justice is evaluated during the secondary appraisal. Indeed, research on the cognitive appraisal model does not say that emotion begins when an outcome is unfair. Rather, it begins when an outcome or event does not conform to one’s expectations or goals (Lazarus, 1991a; 1991b; 1991c). An occurrence may be unusually good or unusually bad (cognitive appraisal theory allows for both), but there needs to be additional consideration before we ascertain the level of justice (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). To decide that an injustice has occurred, one must adduce additional evidence, such as the violation of a moral standard (Folger et al., 2005). This would most likely occur in the secondary appraisal, when an additional meaningfulness analysis is completed (cf. Smith & Pope, 1992). Let us now return to our three types of justice—distributive, procedural, and interactional. At the very least, each of these types requires both a primary and also a secondary appraisal. That is, we must first determine that something is more or less than we might like or expect. Then we must decide that this violates some normative standard of appropriate conduct. The reason that one type of appraisal cannot line up with one type of justice is that two types of appraisals are required for one type of justice to be experienced. It is a two-for-one appraisal, not a one-for-one appraisal. We raise this issue as a caution to the reader, though we hasten to add that cognitive appraisal theorists have generally been careful in applying their conceptual model to justice. Both Montada and Schneider (1989) and Reichle and Montada (1994) examined how multiple appraisals shape our perceptions of distributive justice. They did not assume that one sort of justice results were one sort of cognition. Similarly, the frameworks tested by Weiss et al. (1999) and Krehbiel and Cropanzano (2000) both began with a salient outcome that was positive or Â�negative—experimental subjects either won or lost at a competition. The primary appraisal was win/lose or, more generally, good/bad. Fairness, as well as the resulting emotion, was determined by procedural information, which came as part of the secondary appraisal. The evidence reviewed in this chapter strongly suggests that cognitive appraisal theory can be used to enrich our understanding of justice perceptions. These benefits are most likely to accrue if the theory is taken seriously and we use it to carefully understand how an event that is simply bad (or even too good) can be transformed into one that is wrong. It is to the issue of moral standards that we now turn.

ch a p t er

3

Justice and the Moral Emotions How selfish so ever man may be supposed, there are evidently some Â�principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him. Of this kind is pity and compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. —Adam Smith (1759, p. Ii.l.1) The majority of scientists … interpret apparent altruism in cost-benefit terms, assuming that individuals ... perform those acts that are rewarded ... and ... avoid those acts that are not. Either self-congratulation or external reward, then, must support apparently altruistic behavior. —Hatfield, Walster, and Piliavin (1978, pp. 128–129)

These dueling passages, written more than a century apart, illustrate a tension at the heart of the social sciences. The first quotation is from Adam Smith, one of the founders of economics (Skousen, 2007). Smith asserts that people sometimes act out of interest in benefiting others. Moral sentiments, such as pity and compassion, drive these otherfocused behaviors (Ketelaar, 2006). People, Smith is arguing, are not motivated exclusively by self-gain. In the second passage, three distributive justice theorists take a different view. They argue that desire for justice reduces to self-interest. People behave fairly to gain desirable outcomes (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; 1978) or to enhance their social standing (Tyler & Blader, 2002a; 2002b; Chapter 4). In other words, justice is not intrinsically valuable. Rather, it serves as a means by which people realize their personal goals. This theory, which has appeared in

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other disciplines (Holmes, 1990), has been termed “universal egoism” (Batson, 1995). According to this view, all human motives reduce to promoting one’s own interests. In recent decades, scholars have challenged universal egoism. Philosophers, of course, questioned if human motivation can be reduced to self-interest (for classic arguments, see Butler, 1726/1983; Smith, 1853/1759; for contemporary discussions, see Blackburn, 2001; Holley, 1999; Rachel, 1986). As evidence continues to mount, philosophers are joined by researchers in anthropology (Fiske, 1991), evolutionary psychology (Buunk & Schaufeli, 1999; Wright, 1994), political science (Mansbridge, 1990a; Wilson, 1993), primatology (DeWaal, 1996; 2005), management (De Dreu, 2006; Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005), and social psychology (Holmes, Miller, & Lerner, 2002; Miller, 1977; 1999; Miller & Ratner, 1998). Within economics, three Nobel Â�laureates—Herbert Simon (1990; 1993), Daniel Kahneman (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986), and Amartya Sen (1990)—argued against universal egoism, and many Â�justice scholars have incorporated these ideas into their thinking about fairness. Thinking about fairness in this way has led justice scholars to criticize universal egoism (e.g., Cropanzano & Rupp, 2002; 2008; Cropanzano, Goldman & Folger, 2003; 2005; Cropanzano & Stein, 2009; Folger, 1998; 2001; Folger & Salvador, 2008; Lerner, 1975; 1982; 2003; Mikula, 2005; Montada, 1994; 1996; 1998; Skitka, 2008; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2008; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005), though it is still defended by Greenberg and his colleagues (Colquitt & Greenberg, 2001; Greenberg, 2001; Gillespie & Greenberg, 2005). In this chapter we explore research relevant to universal egoism and altruism in their links with justice. As we shall see, human beings possess empathic tendencies that promote altruism (cf. Batson, 1987a; 1991; 1994; 1995; 1998; 2006). We also possess a “justice motive” that causes us to desire fairness as an end in itself (Lerner, 1975; 1982; 2003). In keeping with the theme of this book, our emphasis is social scientific research; therefore, we will not review philosophical thinking. For more comprehensive treatments of universal egoism, we recommend Mansbridge (1990b), Cropanzano, Stein, and Goldman (2007), and Folger and Salvador (2008). Good philosophical discussions can be found in Blackburn (2001) and Holley (1999). Our objective is to show how the experience of moral emotions can be used to understand why people sometimes value justice for its own sake. In particular, we show that strong emotions associated with injustice can lead people to punish a perpetrator even if this reaction is not economically sound for either the victim or a third-party observer. We use the terms punishment, retribution, penalization, retaliation, vengeance, and revenge interchangeably. These words simply belong to different research traditions and will be defined later. Notice that punishment, retribution, and penalization have stronger definitional links with morality, whereas retaliation, vengeance, and revenge are more informal, emergent, and often illegitimate.

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Our focus is on justice. That said, we also refer to ethics and morality because some theories use these terms as synonyms for justice (for example, we will review a theory of moral convictions). Although these three concepts have much in common, they differ on several important points (Folger et al., 2005; Cropanzano & Stein, 2009). Justice refers to people’s judgments, and it belongs to a descriptive research tradition. In contrast, ethics are concerned with normative moral rules. Finally, morality refers to moral standards that are seen as obligatory in social interactions.

Basic Research and Background Information We begin by looking at biologically based evidence for justice, and we examine two complementary research paradigms: primatology and neuroscience. Primatology research suggests that the human repugnance for unfairness has an evolutionary origin (Folger & Skarlicki, 2008). Neuroscience, on the other hand, focuses on justice-relevant brain functioning, and it suggests that humans make decisions about justice in different regions of the brain than those used for decisions pertinent to economic efficiency.

Primatology and Evolutionary Psychology One of the most exciting areas of fairness research has not examined Homo sapiens at all, but has instead explored injustice among higher primates (for thorough reviews, see Brosnan, 2006; De Waal, 1996; 2005). Consider a well-known experiment by Brosnan and de Waal (2003). These researchers rewarded capuchin moneys with a cucumber. This vegetable is considered desirable enough, though grapes are preferred. When these same monkeys observed another capuchin earning a grape, the cucumber—a previously adequate level of pay—was suddenly unacceptable. Though it is difficult to interpret affective displays in nonhuman species, the inequitably treated animal appeared to be throwing what Brosnan (p. 159) termed a “temper tantrum.” More to the point, the wronged party displayed decreased responsiveness to the cucumber, thereby lowering the number of cucumbers that they earned. Similar responses have been found among chimpanzees (Brosnan, Schiff, & de Waal, 2005). Thus, if two animals perform the same task but earn different rewards, the one that is adversely impacted is likely to stop participating. Of course, such responses to inequity are not economically rational (cf. Ariely, 2008; Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002), since the angry animal reduces its earnings. And besides, how could the value of a cucumber change just because an entirely different party earns a grape? So far, we have considered the situation where one primate sees another primate earn a more attractive reward for the same work. When this transpires, the observing animal often stops participating in the study. However, capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees are even more

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likely to desist if another animal receives a superior reward without working for it (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Brosnan et al., 2005). Hence, consistent with equity theory among Homo sapiens, primates keep track of both outcomes and inputs. A Possible Distinction Between Homo sapiens and Other Primates The evidence previously discussed highlights similarities between human beings, capuchins, and chimpanzees; even so, differences remain. Notably, Brosnan (2006) observed that neither capuchins nor chimpanzees appear distressed when an inequity works to their advantage. In other words, these animals do not display an overreward effect. Overreward refers to the tendency for Homo sapiens to appear uneasy when they receive more than they have earned (see Adams, 1963; 1965; Prichard, 1969). As we saw when we discussed equity theory in the previous chapter, Homo sapiens sometimes experience discomfort when they are overrewarded (Adams, 1963; 1965; Homans, 1974), with guilt being a common emotional response (Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999; Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000; Weiss et al., 1999). Generally, though, even human beings are more tolerant of an inequity when it benefits us and less tolerant of one when it harms us (for reviews, see Mowday & Colwell, 2003; Prichard, 1969). Homo sapiens are capable of recognizing inequity toward others, though it seems to be easier for some of us than for others (Vecchio, 1981). This leads to an interesting possibility. If two animals are descended from the same ancestor and exhibit a common trait, evolutionary biologists assume that the trait was present in the ancestor rather than assuming that it evolved separately in each of the progeny (Carroll, 2006). Homo sapiens and chimpanzees diverged about five million years ago (Wade, 2006). Hence, an aversive response to underreward appears to have been present in our species for some time. Indeed, it may have been present before we were fully anatomically modern humans. Furthermore, other species also react in a negative emotional way to injustice even if it is in a less complex way. In a recent paper, Range, Horn, and Huber (2009) discovered that domestic dogs responded negatively to inequity. In their study, two groups of dogs were trained to paw shake. Later, only some of the dogs were rewarded for exhibiting this behavior. Once unrewarded dogs saw conspecifics earn a reward, they desisted from shaking behavior. Interesting, and similar to Brosnan’s (2006) observations of primates, dogs that benefited from an inequitable rewarded did not show any distress. This response, which Homans (1961) argued was driven by guilt, could be particular to our kind. It may have evolved later, allowing us to develop egalitarian communities, and by extension, more effective and flexible social organizations (for an analysis of how this might have happened, see Boehm, 1999; 2000; Folger & Cropanzano, 2010). In any case, a primitive form of distributive injustice aversion is a trait that animal species have shared for a long

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time. Aversive responses to overreward, on the other hand, have not been found to exist in other animals or in our primate relatives. Summary and Critique Capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees, close evolutionary relatives of our species, have an aversion to inequitable treatment (de Waal, 1996; 2005). This suggests that distaste for injustice is part of our heritage (e.g., Buunk & Schaufeli, 1999; Folger & Cropanzano, 2010; Folger & Skarlicki, 2008). Furthermore, research by Chapman, Kim, Susskind, and Anderson (2009) discovered that people make the same facial expressions in response to unfairness as they do when they taste or see something disgusting: they show an activation of the levator labii muscle region of the face. Chapman and his colleagues suggest that it is a natural mammalian tendency to reject repugnant food. Like us, many animals feel disgusted when they eat something rotten. This tendency, which already exists to regulate what we eat, was later adapted for another purpose. Just as we reject repugnant food, we also learned to reject repugnant behavior (Folger & Skarlicki, 2008; Wilson, 1993; Wright, 1994). Thus, disgust may have naturally evolved without changing its basic facial form.

The Neuroscience of Justice If Homo sapiens evolution has led us to respond unfavorably to injustice, then this should manifest itself in the body as well. Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, and Cohen (2003) had individuals decide whether to accept a monetary gain. Notably, when individuals made a decision that was economically efficient, without any reference to its fairness, the putamen (a round structure that is part of the dorsal striatum) was activated. On the other hand, when participants were forced to think about an inequitable offer, they showed activation in the insula cortex; this region of the brain is associated with negative emotional responses. Those who showed the most activation in this brain region were also more likely to decline the offer. Individuals that were not treated inequitably responded with less insula activation. Like Brosnan’s (2006) primates, humans become distressed when they are treated unfairly. The more distressed we become, the less likely we are to comply with a request. The aforementioned findings were extended by Hsu, Anen, and Quartz (2008). Replicating Sanfey et al.’s work, Hsu and his colleagues observed that inequity was associated with activation in the insula cortex, and efficiency was processed in the putamen. Also consistent with Sanfey’s experiment, Hsu et al. discovered that the more activation that was present in the insula, which signals negative emotion, the less likely individuals were to accept an unfair offer, even when the offer was economically advantageous.

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Tabibnia, Sapute, and Lieberman’s (2008) findings support the idea that unfair events are associated with increased activation in brain centers related to negative emotion. However, in their study, fair offers did something else. When a participant was tendered an equitable opportunity, there was more activation in regions associated with positive emotions, including the amygdala, ventral striatum, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Stated loosely, fairness can be emotionally rewarding. While injustice causes us to feel bad, justice causes us to feel good. For similar findings, see Rilling, Gutman, Zeh, Pagnoni, Berns, and Kilts (2002). In the previous section on primates, we observed a distinction between chimpanzees and human beings. Pan troglodytes dislike underreward inequity; Homo sapiens dislike both underreward inequity and also overreward inequity (the latter corresponding to underreward inequity toward others). This implies that our sympathy to the mistreatment of others evolved recently. In short, we process underreward inequities toward ourselves in different areas of the brain than we do for underreward inequities toward others (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Hsu, Anen, & Quartz, 2008; Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008). Furthermore, this suggests that the disparate response, based on the target of injustice (i.e., self versus other) evolved separately. Perhaps this is why it is easier to become distressed when injustice is directed toward us, than when it is directed toward another innocent person. In sum, both evolutionary psychology and neuroscience show that human reactions to justice and injustice are not exclusively based on rational computation of self-interest. Rather, they are intrinsically affective as a byproduct of our evolution and as such, they have their source in specific regions of the brain distinct from areas used for rational decision making.

Interactive Decision Making There are three interactive decision-making topics relevant to understanding the connection between justice and emotion, and they help us understand how moral emotions make people move beyond their selfinterest. These include (a) research on the ultimatum bargaining game, (b) investigations of altruistic punishing, and (c) the study of anger in negotiations; this work converges on three core ideas: • People respond emotionally when they are subject to inequity (though less strongly when an injustice is to their advantage). • When people are harmed by others, they behave spitefully. That is, they seek to retaliate against them. This vindictive drive needs not align with their economic interests. Motivated by anger, individuals police the conduct of others by castigating those who behave in a counter-normative fashion.

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• Because retaliation is economically suboptimal (i.e., people are willing to pay a price to get even), it can be an effective deterrent to inappropriate conduct, even if this is not the motive of the victims who seek retaliation (Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002).

The Ultimatum Bargaining Game The ultimatum bargaining game (UBG; Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) is an experimental task used to investigate the core ideas mentioned above. In the standard UBG, the researcher provides a pool of money to two subjects. One of the players is asked to assume the role of allocator, and he or she decides how the funds will be divided between the two individuals. The other subject, however, can either accept or reject the proposal. The recipient cannot put forward an alternative, but he or she can veto the proposal. If this happens, the original proposal is scuttled and each participant walks away with nothing. If the proposal is accepted, both parties reap the benefits. Notice that the subjects are not asked to handle any task for which they should be rewarded (the inputs are equal), which makes them likely to judge that an equal allocation of the funds is fair. How then do people play this game? The Behavior of Allocators Strict economic rationality dictates that the allocator should keep nearly all of the money and the recipient should accept any offer greater than zero. In this way, both individuals behave rationally (Thaler, 1988). But this view is limited. In reality, allocators make offers that average over 40% of the total funds (Ochs & Roth, 1989)—usually for strategic reasons. Logically, if an allocator can retain more money without accruing negative consequences, he or she is likely to do so (e.g., Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Kagel, Kim, & Moser, 1996; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; Prasnikar & Roth, 1992; Straub & Murnighan, 1995). An allocator’s motivation to maximize outcomes received further support in UBG experiments in which information about the worth of the coupons was manipulated (Weg & Zwick, 1994). When allocators knew the coupons were worth $10 for them and $5 for the receivers, and when both had the same information, a majority of the allocators gave approximately two thirds of the coupons to receivers. However, most of the allocators gave roughly half of the coupons when the receivers did not know the coupons had a double value for the allocators. In other words, the allocators wanted to appear as being fair because they did not want their offer to be rejected, but in no way were they interested in maintaining equity. Still, in addition to economic concerns, emotions seem to influence allocation decisions. After making unfavorable offers to a recipient, individuals tended to report feeling guilty, and this sense of guilt caused them to be more generous in later rounds (Ketelaar & Au, 2003). Likewise, those who

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regretted their original offers tended to behave more equitably when given an opportunity to interact with a new recipient (Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997). The basic findings in the UBG are straightforward; that said, caveats arise when the UBG is replaced with a variant called the delta game (van Dijk & Tenbrunsel, 2002). According to Suleiman (1996), the delta game is much like the UBG, except that the allocator cannot disallow the entire amount. Instead, when an offer is declined, the amount recommended is multiplied by a numerical constant “delta.” Each individual receives the offer multiplied by delta. For example, suppose that delta is set at .5, and the allocator has to divide $10. The allocator recommends that she keep $8 and the recipient receive $2. The recipient demurs. Since 8 × .5 = 4, the allocator gets $4. Likewise, as 2 × .5 = 1, the recipient receives only $1. By varying the delta, experimenters can vary the power of the recipient. When delta = 0, one plays the UBG. When delta = 1, one plays a “dictator game,” in which the recipient has no power. In a relevant paper, van Dijk and Vermunt (2000) had subjects divide chips when delta = 0 (UBG) or when delta = 1 (dictator game). Interestingly, individuals displayed reduced economically strategic behavior when the recipient had less power. When one became a dictator this evoked what van Dijk and Tenbrunsel (2002, p. 36) termed “a sense of social responsibility.” Building on these ideas, Handgraaf, van Dijk, Wilke, Vermunt, and De Dreu (2008) examined four different delta coefficients—0, .1, .9, and€ 1. Allocators became less generous as their recipients gained power. However, when the delta reached 1, and the responder was powerless, the allocators were more egalitarian. It is one thing to profit at the expense of someone who can fight back, however weakly. It is quite another thing to profit at the expense of someone with no recourse at all (for related findings, see Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986, Experiment 2). This phenomenon raises an interesting question: Could it be the case that not engaging in any act of retaliation is a more practical way to produce fair behaviors from the authorities than appealing to their fear of retribution? At least some historical examples show that this could represent a fruitful avenue for justice research: a nonviolent strategy was successfully used by Gandhi against the British colonial authorities and also by Dr. Martin Luther King against segregation in the American Southeast. Along similar lines, van Dijk and his colleagues (van Dijk, De Cremer, & Handgraff, 2004) found that allocators with a prosocial value orientation did not lower their offers as recipients became weaker, but those with a proself value orientation did so. Not all allocators are strictly self-interested; those with a prosocial value orientation are concerned with how their actions affect others, and they behave in a consistent way regardless of the recipient’s level of power. But many, probably most, behave in accordance with their own interests unless the recipient is powerless.

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Behavior of the Recipients: The Wounded Pride/Spite Model In the dictator game, what happens when people receive poor offers? As we have already seen, the logical position—at least the economically rational position—is to take whatever one can get; yet, this does not occur. When the division of funds drops below 70/30, offers are generally rejected (Camerer, 2003; Kahneman et al., 1986, Experiment 1). Studies conducted in several parts of the world have replicated this finding (Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, Gintis, & McElreath, 2001). In fact, Indonesian recipients were willing to veto an unfair offer even though this amount of money was roughly equivalent to three days of pay (Surowiecki, 2004). Some studies, however, have shown that rejection decreases when the stakes increase. For example, in a large-scale Internet experiment, almost 43% of the recipients refused an unfair offer that involved 8 euros for the allocator and 2 euros for them. In contrast, rejection decreased to 28% when they received 2 tickets for a lottery with a prize of 500 euros, even if they knew the allocator kept 8 tickets for him- or herself (Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2008). UBG responders show economic ir-rationality in other ways as well. For example, Kravtiz and Gunto (1992) had allocators allocate a small denomination of money for responders. Sometimes, these tiny recommendations were accompanied by an impolite statement, what we designate as an interactional injustice, while at other times, no such interpersonal nastiness was exhibited. The same allocation was more palatable to participants if the injudicious language was absent. Notice that an unkind remark does not make one more or less wealthy—simply angrier. Furthermore, interpersonal mistreatment led to more rejected offers (for related findings, see Leventhal & Bergman, 1969). Kopelman, Rosette, and Thompson (2006; Experiment 2) took this even further. In their version of the UBG, individuals were more likely to accept an inequitable offer if the allocator displayed positive emotions while the offer was being tendered. If the allocator displayed negative or neutral emotions, rejections were more likely. In sum, these studies make it apparent that economic self-interest is not the sole driver of allocator and recipient behavior. Clearly, something other than economic efficiency is going on here. To explain rejection behavior in the context of the UBG, Straub and Murnighan (1995) and Pillutla and Murnighan (1995) proposed the wounded pride/spite model. This model incorporates fairness, emotions, and the behaviors that result from them. According to the model, an allocation recommendation that is unfavorable leads a recipient to perceive unfairness (i.e., wounded pride). This injustice, in turn, causes individuals to become angry (Solomon, 1990). When one feels enraged over an injustice, inflicting harm on the transgressor becomes a valuable end in itself (Davidson & Greenhalgh, 1999). Hence, the shortchanged recipient rejects a poor offer out of spite and incurs a loss so he or she can inflict a loss on the allocator (see also, Srivastava, Espinoza,

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Fedorikhin, 2009). The importance of emotions in explaining victims’ reactions in UBG games has received further support from Oechssler et al. (2008). These researchers used a test that differentiated between impulsive and reflective decision makers (the Cognitive Reflection Test, Frederick, 2005). They showed that impulsive decision makers were more prone than reflective decision makers to reject unfair offers involving low stakes and less likely than reflective decision makers to reject unfair offers involving high stakes. In fact, high reflective decision makers had the same rejection rate regardless of the funds at stake. The aforementioned model uses cognitions (justice perceptions), emotion (anger), and behavior (spite) to describe individuals’ actions in the UBG. Moreover, the model suggests that injustice does not beget spiteful behavior unless anger occurs. If anger is thwarted, perceptions of injustice are insufficient to cause the rejection of an unfavorable offer (cf. Baron, 1971a; 1971b). Hence, it logically follows that emotion mediates the relationship between injustice and behavior. Summary and Critique Research on the ultimatum bargaining game grows out of the tradition of interactive decision making (cf. Camerer, 2003; Hamburger, 1979; Miller, 2003). As a consequence, much of this work has not been widely incorporated into social and organizational literature’s explorations of justice perceptions. The studies reviewed above provide insights for scholars of social psychology and organizational behavior alike. Most notably, work on the strategic behavior of allocators establishes that individuals are influenced by their economic interests (e.g., Prasnikar & Roth, 1992; Straub & Murnighan, 1995), unless the recipient has no power (van Dijk & Tenbrunsel, 2002), or the allocator has prosocial values (van Dijk et al., 2004). In other words, fairness matters more when we are personally harmed by an injustice and less when we personally benefit (unless the situation makes one feel guilty or socially responsible) (Skitka et al., 2003). This is a well-known finding that is consistent with the early work on equity theory (Pritchard, 1969; Pritchard et al., 1972). These conclusions beg some interesting questions. If material advantage is important, why do recipients angrily reject a respectable payoff when the allocator earns more? Conversely, if material advantage is unimportant, why do allocators commonly behave in accordance with their strategic self-interest? The answer to this inquiry is twofold. First, humans are willing to forgo economic logic for moral considerations. Second, our decision making is inconsistent. In other words, we are biased by the possibility that we could receive monetary profits, and we are biased by the possibility that we could be harmed by injustice. Therefore, economic logic cannot fully account for the rejection of a profitable, though inequitable, offer (e.g., Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; 1996).

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We can gather some insight on this question from other research � discussed in this chapter. As mentioned previously, human beings process inequity using different parts of the brain, depending upon whether the injustice affects the self or someone else (Hsu et al., 2008; Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008). Additionally, there is evidence that other primates become upset when they are harmed by an inequity, but not when they are advantaged (Brosnan, 2006). The two inequity responses draw on different brain modules and so they operate differently. Research also shows that we react differently to injustice done to others when we are allocators in comparison to mere third parties. This phenomenon is illustrated in one of the Kahneman et al. (1986) experiments. In a dictator game, the researchers allowed participants to behave fairly or unfairly in their allocations to other research subjects. Twentyfour percent of them chose to behave unfairly by keeping $18 for themselves and allocating $2 to recipients. In another experiment involving a similar game, the same participants could choose to sacrifice some of their outcomes in order to punish an unfair allocator. Interestingly, 31% of the participants who behaved unfairly when they were allocators punished unfair allocators when they were put in the shoes of a third party, even if this was costly for them. This shows that the same people felt differently depending upon the role they took. As allocators, advantaged by an injustice, they may have responded with their putamen, and looked for economic efficiency. However, when acting as neutral observers, the same people may have responded with a different region of the brain. In short, our reactions to unfairness are not always consistent because different perspectives evoke special neural systems. The fact that allocators do not react in the same way as observers and victims to an unfairness, and value fairness only in certain conditions (when they have a prosocial value orientation or when the victims are powerless), suggests that this response, posited to be associated with guilt, evolved recently in human beings. Thus far we have considered UBG and delta game research, emphasizing the rejection of an unfavorable offer. Now we shall go further. There is other research showing that individuals seek to punish those who treat them badly.

Altruistic Punishment With some exceptions, allocators in ultimatum bargaining research are as self-serving as recipients allow (Prasnikar & Roth, 1992; Straub & Murnighan, 1995; van Dijk & Tenbrunsel, 2002). The allocator is aware of this possibility; as such, he or she will behave strategically, keeping the division at a level that will provide the maximal payoff while maintaining a deal (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995). The recipient is often offered about 40% of the original pool of money (Ochs & Roth, 1989). This is less than 50%, but is still better than nothing at all.

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This provides an excellent example of altruistic punishment. It is “punishment” because someone is sanctioned for bad behavior, and it is “altruistic” because the punisher incurs a financial cost. It is also “altruistic” because it benefits others—for example, when punishment deters unfair behaviors in the future. As such, altruistic punishment can be an effective technique for maintaining cooperation (Camerer & Fehr, 2006; Fehr & Fishbacher, 2004a; Fehr, Fishbacher, & Gächter, 2002) and thwarting free riders (Fehr & Fishbacher, 2004b; Fehr & Gäcther, 2002). Evidence Documenting Altruistic Punishment To test these ideas, Fehr and Gächter (2000) had groups of subjects play a mixed motive game in a laboratory setting. If desired, individuals could free ride, benefiting at the expense of their game partners. Sometimes the partners could discipline the free riders, and other times they could not. The game was played over 20 rounds, so the maximal payoffs required long-term cooperation. Consistent with prior work, individuals attempted to penalize free riders. In fact, these reprimands were tailored according to the offending action, with stiffer penalties administered to more serious offenders. The threat of punishment was an effective cudgel; cooperation was higher—and remained higher—when free riders could be disciplined. Cooperation was lower when the victim lacked the ability to punish. In this condition, cooperation decreased even further over time. As is common in interdependent decision making (cf. Hamburger, 1979), the maximal payoff occurs when both parties work together. However, if either defects, the defector does well and the nondefector suffers. How then does altruistic punishment impact earnings? Fehr and Gächter (2000) found that the initial chastisement diminished earnings, but only in the short term. Over time, penalties tend to boost payouts by forcing free riders to cooperate. Despite the long-term benefits of enhanced cooperation, Fehr and Gäcther did not use a rational economic explanation to explain their findings. Like Pillutla and Murningan (1995; 1996), these scholars observed that free riding causes negative emotion in the victim. This affect, in turn, is the proximal cause of retaliation (see also Fehr & Fishbacher, 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). In a related vein, Van Winden (2007) has reviewed a number of economic studies that underscore the importance of emotion. In the world of real organizations, a perfect illustration of altruistic punishment is the phenomenon of whistle-blowing. In order to prevent harm to others done by their organization, whistle-blowers report inappropriate activities to legal authorities. These individuals often sacrifice their careers, lose their jobs, or are blacklisted for their behavior (Glazer & Glazer, 1989). Evidence suggests that organizational authorities actively retaliate against whistle-blowers (Klaas & DeNisi, 1989). A qualitative study by Alford (2001) has shown that the interviewed whistle-blowers experienced the situation as not having the choice: When

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they were reminded of the emotional reactions that made them blow the whistle, those reactions were so strong that they appeared as real as though they had happened the day of the interview. Summary and Critique: The Rationality of Emotion Can emotions be economically rational? This question was taken up by a Nobel laureate, Thomas Schelling (1960). In his book The Strategy of Conflict, Schelling discusses a game of “chicken.”* In this game, two individuals drive their automobiles toward each other. The one who swerves first is the “chicken” and loses the competition. One wins at this game by appearing to be irrational enough to let his or her automobile collide with the other car. The challenge facing the champion of automotive chicken is to effectively signal his or her willingness to crash the vehicle. In a manner of speaking, extreme irrationality becomes rational! The irrationality cue, however, needs to be expensive or hard to falsify (Miller, 2003). Schelling (1960) suggests ripping one’s steering wheel from its column and tossing it out of the window, but only if the other driver is around to witness this action. The interesting paradox of the chicken game is that showing the strength of one’s willingness to behave irrationally becomes rational if the other party behaves rationally from the beginning. If the two parties use the same strategy, the result is a lose–lose situation. According to Robert Frank (1988), in his classic book Passions Within Reason, strong emotions act as a signal, much like the discarded steering wheel. For example, when people express love, you can be more confident that they are committed to you. And when people fly into a rage, then you know they are likely to strike out. In this way, altruistic punishment, driven by emotion (Fehr & Gächter, 2000), can enforce profitable cooperation (Fehr & Fishbacher, 2003; 2004a; 2004b; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Most of us would prefer to avoid creating an enemy who is stalking us in blind fury, so we curtail our selfishness in order not to anger someone in the first place (Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; Prasnikar & Roth, 1992; Straub & Murnighan, 1995). Frank (1988; 1990; 2004) goes further, adding that emotion is likely to result in material benefits if the other person believes it is genuine. He argues that “passions” signal commitment to a course of action. Because we behave “irrationally” when our feelings are active, behaving unfairly can be costly to the transgressor. Said differently, the other party must believe you are willing to behave irrationally—without close attention to economic benefits—or he or she has no incentive to concede (for similar * Though it need not concern us here, there is an interesting literature investigating such “chicken dilemma” games (e.g., Hertel, Neuhof, Theuer, & Kerr, 2000; Liebrand, 1983). These games have an intriguing payoff structure since the worse payout comes when both parties behave consistently. Doing what the other person does is a good way to lose in “chicken dilemma!”

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arguments, see Folger & Skarlicki, 2008; Ketelaar, 2006; Thompson, Nadler, & Kim, 1999). We illustrate Frank’s (1988; 1990; 2004) ideas about emotion and retaliation by examining the Cold War strategy of mutually assured destruction (MAD). According to Pinker (2002), if either the United States or the Soviet Union had launched a nuclear first strike, they would have been assured of destroying their rival. For this reason, it was to the benefit of both the United States and the Soviet Union to commence hostile action before their rival could initiate nuclear war. However, the nation that launched its missiles would face mutually assured destruction. Even while the enemy missiles were en route, the targeted government would launch a counterstrike, obliterating the country that started the war. Since each side knew an attack would invite retaliation, there was no benefit to launching a first strike. This, of course, is what actually transpired, and the MAD doctrine maintained the balance of power until the end of the Cold War. But mutually assured destruction can only work if both governments were willing to act out of spite. Once one is guaranteed destruction by a first strike, nothing can be gained by a nuclear counterstrike. It would be wasted effort, as there is no economic advantage in lashing back. Following this logic, each nation might have struck first, confident that the economically rational targets waiting at ground zero would never countenance a futile and vindictive act of retaliation (see also, Schelling, 1966, pp. 173–174 and pp.€248–249). We know, of course, that people do not behave that way. When human beings are unjustly harmed by others, they become angry, and this anger leads to spiteful behavior (Pillutla & Murnigan, 1995; 1996; Srivastava et al., 2009). Understanding how emotions impact thought processes and behavioral choices of real people is critical. We make strategic choices based upon the behavior we expect from others (Connolly & Hardman, 2009), not upon the ideally rational choices of Homo economicus (Frank, 1990; 2004; Ketelaar, 2006; Thompson et al., 1999). The deterrent value of the criminal justice system is predicated on similar logic. For the most part, capturing, convicting, and punishing a criminal is not a profit-making enterprise. Enforcing the law is often more costly than the original crime. Money could be saved, at least in the short run, by simply compensating the victim and letting the transgressor roam free. However, the knowledge that society will spend money to punish a lawbreaker aims at discouraging people from breaking the law in the first place. If one believed that society was unwilling to incur the costs of punishment, criminals would have much less to fear (Folger & Skarlicki, 2008; Pinker, 2002). Again, this logic should hold for criminals who are rational enough to weigh the pros and cons of their behaviors. The deterrent role of such a system is more questionable for harm doers who are irrational or choose not to engage in rational thought in the first place. For Axelrod (1984), a “tit-for-tat” system such as this promotes cooperation in the long run,

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even among adversaries. For example, aggressive American football players will mutually refrain from deliberately inflicting career-ending injuries on members of the opposing team (Bernstein, 2009).

Evidence From the Negotiation Literature Additional evidence pertaining to altruistic punishment is found in a series of three experimental studies reported by van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead (2004a). Van Kleef and his colleagues examined bargaining when one’s counterpart showed negative emotion, compared to when the counterpart showed positive emotion. When the other party expressed anger, the participant assumed no further concessions would be forthcoming. Hence, negotiators made less favorable agreements in the face of an enraged counterpart. When the other party expressed happiness, the participant assumed that he or she was willing to make additional concessions. Consequently, negotiators made further demands on their counterparts. Anger paid off; happiness did not. In their third study, van Kleef et al. (2004a) found that the expression of anger induced fear in participants. This fear, in turn, caused negotiators to claim less value. These findings were replicated in a second series of three studies. Additionally, van Kleef, de Dreu, and Manstead (2004b) discovered that participants used the other party’s anger as information; it allowed them to estimate how flexible their counterpart would be to future offers. Once again, the angry negotiators benefitted, and participants claimed less value after witnessing the wrath of their counterpart (for more evidence, see Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). The work of van Kleef and his colleagues (2004a; 2003b), as well as that of Sinceur and Tidens (2006), suggests that hostility can be useful when bargaining with others. That said, there are limits to this effect. In a meta-analysis comparing virtual and face-to-face negotiations, Stuhlmacher and Citera (2005) found that more antagonism was expressed in virtual interactions, but that this additional hostility lowered profit. This finding suggests that there are circumstances when one is better off expressing positive, rather than negative, feelings. Differential Power and the Limits of Anger The findings reviewed thus far provide evidence that people use anger to signal others to adjust their demands. Part of this is the reasoned used of information (van Kleef et al., 2004b) and part of it is fear (van Kleef et al., 2004a, Experiment 3). However, intimidation works best when one has commanding power. Five studies by van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, and Manstead (2006) consistently found that the expression of anger was only effective when the victim had less power than the perpetrator. Similar findings were reported in two studies by Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006) and by van Kleef et al. (2004b, Experiment 3).

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Anger, however, is not effective if the recipient is more powerful. Friedman, Anderson, Brett, Olekalns, and Goates (2004) explored dispute resolution and found that an angry response lowered the rate of settlements, partially because the victim became angry in response. These lower settlement rates did not occur when the target of this ill will was in a vulnerable position. A fearful person may concede to an angry one (e.g., van Kleef et al., 2004a, Experiment 3), but two angry people will likely reach an impasse (Davidson & Greenhalgh, 1999). For this reason, negotiators are advised to manage both their anger and their fear (Adler, Rosen, & Silverstein, 1998; Fisher & Shapiro, 2005) so that they can be more effective negotiators (Daly, 1991; Thompson et al., 1999). Findings from the negotiation research reviewed thus far can be explained in light of altruistic punishment. When a person is not “cooperating” (i.e., making strong demands), a negotiator may feel and/or express, anger. This anger signals that no further concessions are likely and may induce fear in the other party. In the aforementioned example, the fearful person may claim less value and the angry person may gain a satisfactory agreement (van Kleef et al., 2004a; 2004b). Appropriate Anger A key message of this chapter is that moral emotions will, at least at times, blunt the potentially bad behavior of even powerful people (Folger & Cropanzano, 2010; Ketelaar, 2006; Pham, 2007). If this is so, then someone who has a power advantage may not always respond to another party’s anger with competitiveness. It should depend on whether the anger is justified by the situation. That is, anger that is unfairly expressed should produce a more obstinate negotiation style than will anger that is fairly expressed. Van Kleef and Côté (2007) conducted two experiments that shed light on this possibility. When anger was appropriately justified by the circumstances, participants who were in a strong bargaining position claimed less value than they could have. This was not the case, however, when the anger was inappropriate. A powerful subject, who was exposed to inappropriate antagonism, claimed more value. The findings for inappropriate anger, of course, are in line with the earlier results of Friedman et al. (2004), van Kleef et al. (2006), and Sinaceur and Tiedens (2006). Anger, therefore, must be inappropriate to spur retaliation. We now turn our attention to the implications of these findings. Targeting Emotions As described in Chapter 1, emotions can be distinguished from moods in that only the former possesses a specific target (e.g., Weiss & Brief, 2001). What is the target of emotion during a bargaining session? One could direct his or her ire directly at the other party (person-directed

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anger). Alternatively, he or she could direct their wrath at the other party’s actions (behavior-directed anger). The same could be said about happiness. It may be specific to the person. Alternatively, it could be targeted at the person’s conduct. Steinel, van Kleef, and Harinck (2008) argued that the target of anger communicates strategic information to the other party. According to Steinel and his colleagues (2008), negotiators tend to reciprocate the feelings of the other person (cf. Barsade, 2002). For this reason, when an individual directs annoyance at her counterpart, the target’s predilection is to respond in a similar manner, thereby raising her demands. However, when an individual directs happiness at her counterpart, the target’s predilection is to reciprocate this good feeling. Therefore, demands are less likely to be raised. Consequently, person-directed anger produces fewer concessions, while person-directed happiness produces more concessions. This is generally consistent with Stuhlmacher and Citera’s (2005) meta-analytic findings. Steinel et al.’s (2008) key insight was the manner in which emotion communicates strategic information. When a person responds to bargaining behavior with irritation or annoyance, this communicates that she has reached her bargaining limit. No further concessions will be made. Hence, the party receiving the emotion communication will be likely to desist in making further demands. When a person responds to bargaining behavior with happiness, this communicates that she has not reached her bargaining limit. Further concessions might be made. Hence, the party receiving the emotion communication will continue making demands. As a result of these considerations, the effect for anger and happiness is reversed when these emotions are behavior-directed rather than person-directed emotions. This prediction is consistent with the work of van Kleef et al. (2004a; 2004b) and Sinaceur and Tidens (2006). Thus, negotiators who want the other party to make more concessions, and at the same time not to ask any more concession from them, should display person-directed happiness and behavior-directed anger simultaneously. Steinel and his colleagues (2008) tested these possibilities in an experimental study conducted using 87 undergraduates attending a university in the Netherlands. The results were supportive. Specifically, for person-directed emotion, happiness produced more favorable outcomes than did anger. However, the opposite pattern was found for behaviordirected emotions. Behavior-directed anger led to more favorable outcomes than did behavior-directed happiness.

Concluding Thoughts The interactive decision-making tradition, whether manifested in the UBG, altruistic punishment, or negotiation, explores human behavior in mixed motive settings. In negotiation studies, as well as in research on the ultimatum bargaining game, expressed anger enforces a norm of

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suitable conduct (Allred, 1999). That is, anger conveys that a standard has been violated (Fehr & Fishbacher, 2004a; 2004b; Fehr & Gächter, 2000). Consequently, altruistic punishment demands that coworkers cooperate in work groups (Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr & Fishbacher, 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2002), and anger can lead to better bargaining outcomes, when one’s counterpart has little power (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; van Kleef et al., 2004a; 2004b; 2006). However, if the anger is targeted toward the other person’s behavior (Steinel et al., 2008) or appropriate to the context, even a powerful target may alter his or her behavior toward more cooperation (van Kleef & Côté, 2007). The idea of normative standards can be used to explain why people become angry in mixed motive situations, and by extension, why they hit back with altruistic punishment. Anger inclines people to obey the rules (Daly, 1991), so to speak, and to cooperate with others (Camerer & Fehr, 2006). Even people in strong positions may be willing to accept righteous anger (Folger & Cropanzano, 2010; van Kleef & Côté, 2007). Thus far we have found that people seek to be treated fairly and become angry when they are not. We now examine a different Â�phenomenon—altruism. As we shall see, there are conditions under which individuals render aid to others.

Batson (1991; 1995; 1998; 2006) and the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis Empathy is the capacity to share another person’s perspective and imagine his or her feelings (Batson, 1987b; 1991; 1995; 1998; Batson, Batson, Todd, & Brummett, 1995; Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997). It is, therefore, closely aligned with feelings of compassion and sympathy for others (Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995; Stotland, 1969; Davis, 1983). When we experience empathy toward another person, we are likely to behave altruistically (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Hoffman, 1976). Batson (2006) termed this the empathy-altruism hypothesis, and evidence has been supportive (e.g., Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Dovidio, Allen, & Schroeder, 1990; Fultz, Batson, Fortenbach, McCarthy, & Varney, 1986; Krebs, 1975; Toi & Batson, 1982). Even so, it is worth ruling out alternative explanations that are more self-interested. Batson (1995; 2006) proffered three self-serving reasons why individuals would engage in prosocial behavior: • Reduction of aversive arousal. It is unpleasant and irritating to see someone else suffer. We may offer them assistance so as to reduce our own negative mood. • Empathy-specific punishment. We may feel guilt or shame if we ignore another person’s pain. We might also be judged harshly by others.

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• Empathy-specific rewards. Helping others may make us feel good about ourselves and thereby improve our own mood states. The three mechanisms posed by Batson are difficult to test because the self-benefit is hidden. In most situations, each will display behavior that appears to be altruistic. For example, in Chapters 5 and 6 we will see that affect regulation is an important determinant of behavior. For this reason, Batson and others conducted a series of experiments to rule out each of the aforementioned alternatives as a complete explanation of human altruism.

Alternative Number 1: Aversive-Arousal Reduction As Hoffman (1981) observed, seeing another person suffer can adversely impact one’s feelings. Hence, we provide assistance to eliminate this negative affect. There is good evidence for the aversive-arousal explanation of prosocial behavior (Schaller & Cialdini, 1988). In a well-known study, Manucia, Baumann, and Cialdini (1984) induced a doleful mood in experimental subjects. Half of the participants were told that their feelings were fixed by a drug (actually a placebo), while half did not believe that their mood was fixed. All subjects were then given an opportunity to provide assistance to another individual. Those who believed that their dejected mood was held tight by the placebo were less helpful than were those who believed that their mood could be improved. Clearly, prosocial behavior can be used to boost one’s mood; however, that does not mean it is the only mechanism by which emotions impact seemingly altruistic behavior. Batson (1995; 2006) discussed a series of studies that distinguish between personal distress and empathy. The former is a general feeling of negative affect, while the latter involves sympathy and compassion for a different person. Empathy can be induced in various ways, such as encouraging the subject to take the perspective of another individual. When participants experience generalized distress, and see a person suffer, they attempt to escape the situation if possible. If an escape is unavailable, they will—presumably with some reluctance—provide aid to the other individual. This is consistent with the findings of Manucia et al. (1984), but Batson (1995; 2006) reports different findings for empathy. When participants feel empathy for another person, they provide succor even to the point of incurring personal costs and forgoing their opportunity to escape. These findings support the idea that aversive-arousal reduction, though a very real phenomenon, is only a partial explanation for altruistic behavior.

Alternative Number 2: Empathy-Specific Punishment Batson (1995; 2006) presented a second alternative to the empathy�altruism hypothesis. He suggested that people engage in helpful behavior to avoid censure by themselves or others. If this is so, seemingly

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“altruistic” behavior is a strategic effort at impression management. There must be some truth in this alternative. Research shows that our species is capable of moral hypocrisy (Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999), and we cultivate the appearance of morality as a self-serving impression-management tactic (Jones & Pittman, 1982). Nonetheless, this does not provide a complete account of altruistic behavior. The possibility was directly tested by Batson, Dyck, Brandt, Batson, Powell, McMaster, and Griffitt (1988). Empathy was induced in some research participants, though not in others. When subjects had a justification for not providing aid to another person, they eschewed altruism without fear of censure. When such a justification was lacking, they ignored another person’s suffering at their own peril. Said differently, participants who lacked empathy were helpful when they didn’t have an excuse for not providing assistance. On the other hand, those who experienced empathy intervened on behalf of another person. They did so even when they had a justification for not doing so. Once again, evidence supports the empathy-altruism hypothesis, suggesting that empathy engenders a sincere desire to help other individuals.

Alternative Number 3: Empathy-Specific Reward Batson’s (1995; 2006) third alternative is that people engage in putatively altruistic behavior because it somehow benefits them, often by putting the altruistic person in a better mood. As was the case with aversive-arousal reduction, and with empathy-specific punishment, this third alternative has merit and some evidence supports it (e.g., Smith, Keating, & Stotland, 1989). Nevertheless, other data are inconsistent with the notion of empathy-specific reward. For example, in one experiment Batson et al. (1988) induced empathy in some experimental participants but not in others. All of these subjects were then told that a peer would receive painful shocks. Later, some participants learned they would have an opportunity to prevent harm to the victim, but other participants were informed that the shocks would be prevented by chance. Finally, Batson and his colleagues assessed the participants’ moods. The results were supportive of the empathy-altruism hypothesis. When empathic participants believed the shocks would be prevented, they were in a better mood. It did not matter whether the victim would receive succor from the subject or from the circumstances; they were simply pleased that the other individual would not suffer. Notice that this is inconsistent with the idea of empathy-specific reward, which suggests that people are altruistic to promote their own positive moods. In this study, the feelings of empathic participants were unharmed as a result of learning that they would be unable to rescue the other party (for additional evidence, see Batson et al., 1988; Study 5).

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Empathy and Justice as Sources of Altruism Batson’s (1991; 1995; 1998; 2006) work demonstrates that empathy is one source of altruistic behavior. However, justice can also prompt one to render assistance to another person. Empathy, as we have seen, is other oriented. It involves taking another person’s perspective and feeling compassion in regard to their plight (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Justice is closely aligned to moral principles; it is normatively oriented toward behaving in an ethically appropriate fashion (Cropanzano & Stein, 2009; Folger & Salvador, 2008). Sometimes empathy and justice work together, but other times they are in conflict. Below, we consider examples of each. When Empathy Reinforces Justice: The Case of Interactional Fairness Interactional justice, the reader will recall, refers to fairness judgments regarding interpersonal and informational treatment one receives from others. Patient and Skarlicki (2005) proposed that empathy makes us more likely to treat others with interactional justice, but when empathy is lacking, we are less likely to make the effort to be just. To test these ideas, Patient and Skarlicki (2010) divided interactional justice into its informational and interpersonal components (see Chapter 1). Informational justice refers to the completeness and thoroughness of explanations, while interpersonal justice pertains to the dignity and respect with which one is treated. In their first study, Patient and Skarlicki (2010) measured empathy as a personality trait. In response to a hypothetical workplace scenario, managers who were high in trait empathy reported more willingness to treat a layoff victim with informational and interpersonal fairness. Patient and Skarlicki (Study 2) replicated these findings in an experiment involving college undergraduates. In this second study, empathy was induced. They found that empathic subjects treated a confederate with greater informational and interpersonal justice than did those who were low in empathy. Additionally, this effect was strongest among participants who were high in moral development. These results indicate that empathic feelings, regardless of whether they are traits or states, prompt individuals to behave with greater interactional justice. When Empathy and Justice Collide The two Patient and Skarlicki (2010) studies are important, but emphasize one-on-one communication. Under these circumstances, empathy reinforces justice. In other settings, though, individuals are called upon to make decisions regarding multiple parties. In these situations, a decision maker may be biased toward those for whom he or she has the greatest empathy (Blader & Tyler, 2001). This possibility was explored in two experiments by Batson and his colleagues (1995). These scholars

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considered allocation decisions (distributive justice) within small groups. Batson et al. suspected that empathy toward one individual could cause favoritism toward that person, and this was precisely what they found. Subjects who were low in empathy were relatively impartial regarding their allocations; those high in empathy were more likely to show preferential treatment. Interestingly, this effect was not entirely unconscious. In Experiment 1, Batson and his colleagues found that high-empathy participants admitted that they were showing reduced fairness. These findings were replicated and extended by Blader, Rothman, and Gonzalez (2008). In two studies, research participants who were told to be empathic showed partiality toward individuals with whom they were told to identify. Once again, empathy worked against neutrality by giving certain people an advantage. Going further, Blader and his colleagues discovered that accountability can reduce empathic bias. When decision makers were told that their opinion would be made public (i.e., high accountability) their choices became more just.

Empathy and the Motive to Punish There is a parallel between empathy and the motive to punish unfair harm doers. The need that people feel to punish unfair behaviors, triggered by the moral emotion of anger, shows that they care about fairness as an end in itself. In much the same way, people can feel the need to help victims of unfairness triggered by feelings of empathy. At times, these motives go hand in hand when, for example, punishing a harm doer also helps a victim (which is the case for altruistic punishment, see also the section that follows on Bies, Tripp, and the psychology of revenge). Sometimes they do not. For example, it has been shown that whistle-blowers punish their organization by denouncing its unfair behaviors to legal authorities without expressing concern for the victims (Alford, 2001). Instead, they react out of a sense of moralized narcissism (see the section that follows on deontic justice). Some cases could even be described in which the whistle-blower’s reaction against his or her organization makes the victims’ situation worse (Nadisic et al., 2009), which can be seen as unfair. In sum, in the same way as empathy can be viewed as making people behaving unfairly, the motive to punish may also be a predictor of unfair behaviors.

Empathy and Altruism: Some Closing Thoughts In this section, we stressed that empathy-based altruism is not justice, per se. However, knowledge of the empathy-altruism literature is important to fairness scholars for two reasons. First, the work of Batson (1991; 1995; 1998; 2006) provides a compelling rebuttal to the theory of universal egoism. People are often self-interested, but this is not necessarily so. Second, empathy may cause us to be fair, under certain circumstances. In dyadic face-to-face situations, more empathy appears to

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lead to greater fairness (Patient & Skarlicki, in press; 2010). However, in multiparty settings, empathy can lead to favoritism, which is generally viewed as unfair (Batson et al., 1995; Blader et al., 2008; Blader & Tyler, 2001).

A Brief Interlude on Universal Egoism and the Response from Justice Researchers As already discussed, some justice researchers have used self-interested explanations to account for why individuals are concerned with fairness. There is much truth to this. It is worth emphasizing that self-interest is an important part of our reactions to justice (e.g., Pierce & Gardner, 2004; van Prooijen, 2008). For example, Rivera and Tedeschi (1976) found that individuals wish to appear fair publically, but are often happier when they maximize their outcomes. Likewise, two experiments by Bazerman, Schroth, Shah, Diekmann, and Tenbrunsel (1994) showed that individuals who are prompted to think carefully about a decision often choose higher pay over fairness (for additional insight see Bazerman, White, & Lowenstein, 1995). Clearly, we Homo sapiens act to fulfill our own interests, and this is especially so when financial stakes are high (e.g., Rapoport, Stein, Parco, & Nicolas, 2003). For all that, universal egoism does not provide a complete account of human motivation (Cropanzano, Stein, & Goldman, 2007; Folger€& Salvador, 2008). In this chapter, we reviewed evidence from a number of disciplines, all suggesting that universal egoism provides a limited understanding of human nature. This includes such diverse endeavors as evolutionary psychology (Brosnan, 2006; Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Brosnan et al., 2005; de Waal, 1996; 2005; Simon, 1990), neuroscience (Hsu et al., 2008; Sanfey et al., 2003; Tabibnia et al., 2008), interactive decision making (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; 1996; Stouten et al., 2005; 2007; van Dijk et al., 2004; van Dijk€ & Tenbrunsel, 2002; van Dijk & Vermunt, 2000), economics (Fehr & Fishbacher, 2003; 2004a; 2004b; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; 2002; Frank, 1988; 1990; 2004; Kahneman et al., 1986; Sen, 1990; Simon 1993), and social psychology (Batson, 1991; 1995; 1998; 2006). Justice scholars have not been unmindful of these developments. As we shall now see, a number of researchers have developed and tested theoretical accounts that emphasize the value of fairness for its own sake. Each of the next four sections will review a theory of social justice that explicitly incorporates this idea.

Lerner (1975; 1982; 2003) and the Justice Motive Among justice researchers, one of the first voices raised against universal egoism was that of Melvin Lerner’s (1975; 1982; 2003; Bobocel & Hafer,

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2007) through his work on justice motive. Lerner explicitly argued that individuals have a motive or desire to maintain fairness in interpersonal transactions. In one study, Leventhal and Bergman (1969) found that revenge-seeking individuals impaired their own outcomes to address an inequity. In a later experiment, Meindl and Lerner (1983) had a research accomplice insult a subject’s lab partner. When this occurred, participants wished to retaliate, even though doing so meant sacrificing a desirable personal opportunity. Moreover, retaliation persisted even when the putative victims would never learn of the participants’ efforts on their behalf.

Restoring Justice and the Benefits of Retribution When individuals see a sense of fairness violated, they are likely to become angry (Baron, 1990a; Bies, 2001; Solomon, 1990). This anger, as we have seen, clouds our thinking and pushes us to behave in economically irrational (Frank, 1988; 1990; 2004; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993) and hurtful (Baron, 1971a; 1971b) ways. If people are motivated to maintain fairness, these ill effects should be remedied by addressing the original harm. A study by Lerner, Goldberg, and Tetlock (1998) tested this possibility. Lerner and his colleagues found that anger-related processing bias can be alleviated by restoring fairness. If the injustice is eliminated, the anger, and resulting processing effects, dissipate.

Economic Motives Revisited None of the data we have reviewed imply that economic motives are unimportant. Rather, it seems that individuals weigh the two against each other. Consider, for instance, a study by Miller (1977). Miller provided subjects with an opportunity to earn money. Over as many as 20 sessions, individuals could earn either $US2/hour or $US3/hour. (A dollar was worth much more in the 1970s than it is now!) In addition to the differential rate of payment, Miller manipulated a second variable. He told some participants that he would deduct $US1/hour to donate to a disadvantaged family. For others, no money would be deducted. The question was this: How will losing one dollar affect motivation, when that dollar is given to someone in need? The answer is “it depends.” Miller (1977) found that if one dollar was deducted from two, subjects were less motivated to work. But, if one dollar was deducted from three, individuals were more motivated to earn the money. Miller argued that confiscating half of one’s earnings was unfair, so taking one of two dollars led to diminished effort. On the other hand, taking only one-third of the wages left subjects with a fair rate of payment, plus it had the added advantage of providing assistance to others. Hence, it produced increased effort. Consistent with the justice motive, Miller’s findings suggest that people care about their own interests, but also hope to see others treated justly.

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It is also worth noting that an extreme desire to maintain fairness, what Lerner (1980) called a strong belief in a just world, may also lead individuals to act in a counterintuitive way. It can prevent people from punishing the perpetrator or helping the victim. Indeed, witnessing an injustice may bring about anxiety because it violates some people’s assumptions that the world is a fair place. Thus, denying an injustice, and even derogating a victim, may be a self-protective reaction. For example, Pancer (1988) showed that people with a strong belief in a fair world, when they were facing an exhibition showing unfair treatment suffered by children (the aim of the exhibition being to raise funds), kept a larger physical distance when the exhibition included pictures. Moreover, they remembered less unpleasant details of the exhibit compared to people with lower levels of the just world belief.

Bies, Tripp and the Psychology of Revenge (Bies & Tripp, 1995; 1996; 1998; 2001; 2002; 2004; Tripp & Bies, 1997; 2009) Earlier in this chapter we reviewed extensive evidence on altruistic punishment (Camerer & Fehr, 2006; Fehr & Fishbacher, 2004a; Fehr & Fishbacher, 2004b; Fehr, Fishbacher, & Gächter, 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; 2002). This research, generally associated with economics, has found that human beings will rebuke an uncooperative laboratory coworker. Generally speaking, this punishment is (a) impelled by negative emotion, (b) occurs even if it is personally costly, and (c) is an effective deterrent against exploitative behavior. However, when taken by itself, research on altruistic punishment has limitations. It tends to be based on laboratory findings in artificial settings. Research on revenge and retribution, though lacking much of the precision and control of the altruistic punishment literature, is often conducted in workplace settings. Consequently, these research traditions complement one another, and because they yield similar conclusions regarding human behavior, they are all the more compelling (for a conceptual and methodological discussion of revenge, see Bies & Tripp, 2004).

Revenge and Retributive Justice Overview Similar to altruistic punishment, revenge has been defined as “action in response to some perceived harm or wrongdoing by another party that is intended to inflict damage, injury, discomfort, or punishment on the party judged responsible” (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001, p. 53). Unlike much of the work reviewed in this chapter, such as the wounded pride/ spite model (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; 1996) or the justice motive (Lerner, 1975; 1982; 2003), studies of revenge are not guided by any

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Sparking Event

Attribution of Blame

“Hot” Emotional States

Retaliation

Figure 3.1â•… A heuristic model of revenge. single theoretical position. Rather, this is a broad research area, often descriptive, but informed by a number of conceptual traditions. Despite the richness of this literature, we can draw some general conclusions. Figure€3.1 contains a heuristic model that provides a loose summary of the available research. Our model is derived from the work of a number of organizational scientists who have shown interest in the topic (e.g., Allred, 1999; Bies, 2001; Bies & Tripp, 1996; 1998; 2001; 2002; Hogan & Emler, 1981). As one can see, the process begins with some precipitating episode or what Bies and Tripp (2001, p. 201) refer to as a “sparking event” (see also, Bies, Tripp, & Kramer, 1997). This event, which is typically negative, prompts the individual to try to understand its causal dynamics. If blame for the event is attributed to the controllable behavior of another party, then the individual experiences flashes of anger and negative emotions (Bies, 2001; Solomon, 1990). If there is doubt or mitigating circumstances, however, these aversive emotional states are less likely to occur (Bies, 1987; Bies & Tripp, 1996; 1998). According to revenge theorists, emotion (most often anger is mentioned) impels one to retaliate (Allred, 1999; Baron, 1971a; 1971b; Bies & Tripp, 2002). Retributive Justice Interestingly, an individual who engages in retaliation often sees himor herself as restoring fairness by rectifying a wrong (Bies & Tripp, 2001). Under these circumstances, people behave as moral actors who do the “right thing” by balancing fairness (Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2007). Hogan and Emler (1981) refer to this as “retributive justice” (Darley, 2002). In developing this idea, Darley and Pittman (2003) distinguish between retributive justice and compensatory justice. As the term implies, compensatory justice involves compensation. Following a harm to another person, compensatory justice is maintained if the victim is restored to her original (i.e., pre-impaired) state. Generally speaking, when harm is accidental or without ill intent, compensatory justice is more likely to be viewed as satisfactory. Retributive justice, as we have seen, is punitive. It is imposed on a transgressor over and above any compensatory compensation (Carlsmith et al., 2002). Retributive Â�justice

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validates a moral norm, deters future wrongdoing, and provides a reprimand (Darley, 2002; Mahony & Klass, 2008). Evidence supports the distinction between retributive and compensatory justice (e.g., Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley et al., 2000). In a policy-capturing experiment, Mahony and Klass (2008) constructed a set of 32 realistic cases relevant to employment law (there were six additional practice cases, but only 32 were used in theory testing). In each case, a worker appealed a wrongful termination. These cases were evaluated by 61 professional employment arbitrators and 112 additional individuals who had served as jurors in similar cases. Mahony and Klass’s findings supported Darley’s (2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003) distinction between retributive and compensatory justice. Employers who had procedural violations were likely to experience retribution from the arbitrators and the jurors. For example, third-party respondents were harsher toward companies that engaged in discrimination and did not provide sufficient warning before termination. Furthermore, these researchers found that attributes of the victim determined predilections toward retribution. As they put it: Although the desire for retribution has traditionally been thought to be determined by the egregiousness of the offender’s behavior, our results showed that the interpretation of the offender’s behavior was influenced by attributes of the victim. Indeed where the victim was seen as more deserving of fair treatment, the behavior of the employer was seen as more egregious. (p. 237)

This is an important point. Mahony and Klass are suggesting that the same transgression might be more or less serious, depending upon who is harmed by it. For example, when the evidence of employee malfeasance was weak, jurors and arbitrators were more likely to be punitive. When the evidence was strong, these third parties were less harsh. Likewise, retribution was more common when the worker had a solid work history than when the worker was a poor performer. Fairness, it seems, depends only partially on what one does. Justice perceptions may also be influenced by the people who are impacted.

Some Closing Observations It is noteworthy how closely the revenge literature parallels other research discussed in this chapter, such as altruistic punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; 2002) and the wounded pride/spite model (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; 1996). In all of these frameworks, the process begins with a harmful event that is attributed to another. Emotion results and these feelings motivate action that has the potential to be costly. Additionally, there is another issue upon which these scholars agree. Just as altruistic punishment encourages coworkers to be more cooperative (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; 2002), rejecting an ultimatum can cause allocators to be more

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generous (Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Prasnikar & Roth, 1992; Straub & Murnighan, 1995), revenge in the workplace brings benefits as well (Tripp & Bies, 1997; 2009). We now examine each stage in the heuristic model.

Stage Number 1: The Sparking Event Overview and a Heuristic Model According to Bies and Tripp (2001) and Bies, Tripp, and Kramer (1997), the “sparking event” is the match that ignites the kindling. Research by Bies and Tripp (2004) sheds light on incidents that trigger retaliation. Bies and Tripp (2004) found that there are at least three broad suites of provocative offenses. • Goal blockage or obstruction: An offender thwarts a victim’s efforts to achieve a desired outcome. • Rule violations: An offender receives an unfair advantage due to the misapplication or misuse of formal or informal procedures. • Derogation of status and/or power: An offender treats a victim disrespectfully or critically. Aquino, Tripp, and Bies (2006, Study 2) further added that, while all three of these offenses subject the victim to an unpleasant state of affairs, only the latter two (rule violation and derogation) are objectively unfair. Goal blockage may or may not be just, depending upon how the decision was made and other features of the context. This distinction between justice-relevant (rule violation and derogation) and nonjustice-relevant (goal obstruction) events is an important one. Aquino and his coauthors found that high procedural justice climate interacted with the type of offense to predict revenge-seeking and avoidance behavior. When a transgression was justice related (i.e., when it involved rule violation or derogation), revenge became more likely when the procedural justice climate was low. However, when the transgression was not justice related (i.e., when it involved a goal obstruction), revenge became less likely when the procedural justice climate was low. This same pattern of results was documented for avoidance, though not for reconciliation. While contextual features can raise or lower the likelihood of revenge seeking (e.g., Aquino et al., 2001), Aquino and his colleagues (2006) found that retribution was especially likely when a person received unjust treatment and the overall climate was unfair. An additional source of collaborating evidence can be found in Goldman’s (2001; 2003) investigations into legal claiming. In his initial study, Goldman (2001) found that downsized workers were more likely to file a legal challenge if they were treated with procedural and distributive injustice. Once again, the sparking event was, at least partially, based on an event perceived as unfair. In a subsequent study, Goldman

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(2003) found that the relationship between injustice and legal claiming was partially mediated by state anger. In other words, injustice caused anger, and anger caused terminated workers to take legal action (for similar findings, see Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; 1996). Additionally, injustice had the strongest effect on claiming among anger-prone individuals. Hence, the relationship between injustice and claiming was moderated by trait anger. The research of Aquino et al. (2006), Fitness (2000), and Goldman (2001; 2003) represents a modest sample of evidence showing that Â�injustice often provokes retaliation. A number of other scholars have reached similar conclusions (e.g., Baron, 1990a; Bies & Tripp, 1996; 1998; Bies et al., 1997; Folger & Baron, 1996; McLean Parks, 1997; Reb, Goldman, Kray, & Cropanzano, 2006; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997).€ As the reader has noticed, these results support research we have already discussed. For example, the idea that unfairness triggers retaliation is Â�consistent with Lerner’s (1975; 1982; 2003) theory of the justice motive. We should also recall the two van Kleef and Côté (2007) studies that were reviewed above. These scholars determined that anger is more likely to provoke retaliation when it is inappropriate anger, and it is only a small step from inappropriate anger to interactional injustice. Comparative and Noncomparative Standards As we have seen, normative standards are important for emotion, but there appear to be two different kinds of justice standards. Building on the work of Feinberg (1974), Bies and Tripp (2002) distinguish between comparative and noncomparative standards. Certain things are unfair because a person has not been given what she is entitled to, relative to what others have received. For example, as we saw in Chapter 1, according to equity theory (Adams, 1963; 1965; Adams & Freedman, 1976), a given rate of payment—one’s outcomes—may be more or less fair depending upon what a referent other has received (Kulik & Ambrose, 1992). Similar comparative justice effects have been observed for procedural justice. Grienberger, Rutte, and van Knippenberg (1997) found that subjects denied voice in an experimental task were especially upset when they believed that a peer was given an opportunity to participate. In this example, justice is comparative because it depends on how others are treated. Bies and Tripp (2004) emphasize, though, that some actions are universally deemed as wrong. These are noncomparative standards, since we judge the fairness of these events without reference to another individual’s treatment. Bies and Tripp (p. 208) provide a number of succinct examples: “lies and defamatory statements,” which violate the principle of trust, and “public harassment,” which violates human dignity. The consideration of comparative and noncomparative standards has implications for emotions. Though more research is needed, Bies and Tripp (1996; 1998) suggest that the

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strongest negative emotions are associated with violations of the noncomparative class of standards. This is an important idea and further investigations are warranted.

Stage Number 2: Attribution of Blame Overview Attributions have long been a part of the literature on interpersonal conflict. The famous social psychologist Fritz Heider (1958) raised this possibility over half a century ago. Individuals are less likely to experience righteous anger when they are victims of accidental harm, but more likely when harm is deliberate (e.g., Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; 2001; Utne & Kidd, 1980). Other evidence indicates that workers are more likely to seek revenge, and less likely to reconcile, when they blame another person for an offense (for empirical evidence, see Baron, 1985; Stouten et al., 2007). Our brains seem to make these judgments efficiently, as neuroscience research shows that attributions of blame occur quickly and automatically (Liberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, & Trope, 2002). Of course, individuals also take into account mitigating circumstances. If there are alternative explanations for bad behavior, retaliation is less likely (Bies & Tripp, 1996; 2002). Other variables moderate the retributive response as well. Aquino, Tripp, and Bies (2001) surveyed 141 public sector employees. When individuals blamed a coworker for mistreating them, they were more likely to seek revenge and less likely to seek rapprochement. This, of course, is consistent with the work discussed above (e.g., Tripp & Bies, 2009). Going further, Aquino and his colleagues discovered that perpetrator status moderated the relationship between blame and revenge seeking—when an offender had more power, individuals were less likely to retaliate. (Note the similarity of this work to the van Kleef et al. [2004a; 2004b; 2006] work in the context of negotiation.) The victim’s status mattered as well, but in a way that might surprise some. Overall, victims who possessed high status were less likely to seek revenge than those with low status. Though powerful individuals had the ability to retaliate, they often chose not to do so. (For consistent findings, refer back to van Dijk & Tenbrunsel’s 2002 examination of allocator behavior in dictator games.) In a follow-up study, Aquino et al. (2006, Study 1) again found that the relationship between blame attributions and revenge seeking was influenced by victim status. Status was operationalized as one’s hierarchical level. That is, there was more status for those higher in the organizational hierarchy than for those at lower levels. Aquino et al. (Study 1) considered three criterion behaviors—forgiveness, reconciliation, and revenge seeking. In general, the relationship between blame and behavioral outcomes was moderated by status and procedural justice climate. When a high-status person was victimized, he or she was likely to forgive and reconcile if the overall

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climate was fair. However, he or she was likely to seek revenge if the overall procedural justice climate was unfair. In other words, a fair climate for procedural justice encouraged reconciliation and constrained retaliation. In a related project, Fitness (2000) examined emotions stemming from inappropriate treatment by collecting descriptions of workplace events that caused anger. Fitness considered the rule of hierarchical status, gathering his vignettes from supervisors in upper-power roles and subordinates in lower-power roles. In general, supervisors became less angry than did their subordinates, which is expected given the work of Aquino et al. (2001; 2006, Study 1). Moreover, supervisory anger was driven by what the manager viewed as poor job performance on the part of employees. The issues, that is, were oriented around the task. Subordinates, on the other hand, were prone to become angrier than the supervisors. Additionally, the source of their outrage tended to be the unjust behavior of their bosses (i.e., interpersonally oriented). Fitness (2000, p. 159) observed that workers experienced “moderate to high levels of hate” (italics added). According to Fitness, this was likely to occur if employees are humiliated by their supervisor, or if they are victimized by unfair interpersonal treatment. Managing the Attributions of Others: Revising Interactional Justice Attributions that people make about the behavior of others impact their feelings, and by extension, their subsequent behavior toward us. As one might imagine, this makes those causal judgments especially important for us. For that reason, individuals try to manage the attributions of others. When something bad happens, we do not want individuals to blame our poor conduct; we would rather they credit the circumstances or decide that we took a questionable action for the greater good. In this way, our positive image remains intact, and with luck, we are not the victims of someone else’s retaliation (Bies, 1987; 1989). Of course, the potential victim of blame may actually not be guilty of bad conduct. However, one’s social standing, and future well-being, may still depend on convincing others of this innocence. After all, people retaliate based on what they believe to be true, even if this perception is not correct (cf. Tripp & Bies, 2009). Interactional justice research has identified a number of tactics that are used to influence other people’s attributional judgments (for qualitative reviews of this large literature, see Bies, 1987; 1989; Bobocel et al., 1997; Bobocel & Zdaniuk, 2010; Folger & Bies, 1989; Scott & Lyman, 1968; Sitkin & Bies, 1993; Tyler & Bies, 1990; for a quantitative review, see Shaw et al., 2003). As we saw in Chapter 1, interactional fairness can be divided into two parts (Colquitt, 2001; Masterson et al., 2005). Interpersonal justice refers to the dignity and respect that one receives. Interpersonal justice is an important topic, but less pertinent at the moment. More relevant is informational justice, which refers to the explanatory social accounts that we provide

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in order to explain some unfavorable event or outcome. These social accounts are critical for affecting other peoples’ attributions, and when they are successful, they prevent others from thinking negatively of us (for evidence, see Baron, 1990b; Bies & Moag, 1986; Bies & Shapiro, 1987; 1988; Bobocel, Agar, Meyer, & Irving, 1998; Bobocel & Farrell, 1996; Elkins, Bozeman, & Phillips, 2003; Folkes & Whang, 2003; Sitkin, Sutcliffe, & Reed, 1993). All social accounts are not created equal, and scholars have identified important moderators. Research by Bies et al. (1988) and Shapiro (1991) indicates that an effective account needs to meet at least two criteria—it must be adequate and honest. Among other things, perceived adequacy is influenced by thoroughness and interpersonal sensitivity. For example, three studies by Shapiro, Buttner, and Barry (1994, Studies 1–3) found that thorough accounts were viewed as more adequate than their more cursory counterparts. Likewise, Shapiro et al. (Study 4) found that more sensitively delivered accounts (which relates to interpersonal justice) were seen as more adequate than were those that were less sensitive, other things being equal. As one might expect, a dishonest explanation is less effective than an honest one. Two studies by Baron (1988) examined individuals’ attempts to manage the attributions of others. Sincere attempts to attribute poor behavior to an external cause tended to reduce future conflict. However, insincere attempts increased the likelihood of future disagreements. Rather than lying, one might be better off doing nothing at all. Given the advantages and the seemingly low costs of providing social accounts and showing sensitivity when announcing decisions, these practices should be common. This makes especially surprising a phenomenon called by Folger and Skarlicki (1998) the Churchill effect. Managers, especially when they have to implement and announce unfavorable decisions and news, are likely to distance themselves from their subordinates, give very few explanations or justifications, and may even derogate them. This reaction can be explained by their natural tendency to protect their social image of fairness by trying not to be associated with unfavorable decisions. The paradox is that by not wanting to appear as unfair, they are more likely to be perceived as interactionally unfair. Nadisic and Patient (2008) showed that this Churchill effect mainly involves informational justice, is fostered when managers have to announce unfair versus only unfavorable news, and is stronger when managers identify with their firm. The emotional dynamics of this self-protective mechanism still require future research.

Stage Number 3: Emotion Bies and Tripp’s (2002) Model In this chapter, we reviewed evidence that injustice causes Â�individuals to experience negative emotions like anger (Allred, 1999; Baron, 1990a)

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and disgust (Chapman et al., 2009). These emotions, in turn, may cause us to retaliate against the person who harmed us (Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; 1996; Tripp et al., 2007). This research aligns with qualitative studies by Bies and Tripp (1996; Bies et al., 1997). In these studies, individuals’ descriptive accounts of injustice tended to include “hot,” emotionally laden terms (Tripp & Bies, 2009). Integrating their work with research by other scholars, Bies and Tripp (2002, pp. 210–211) provided five attributes of affect that are likely to result from unjust treatment. • Intensity: The feelings that victims report are powerful and visceral. • Sense of Violation: People report being “shattered” (p. 211), with a disruption to their sense of self. We shall deal with the self in more detail in the next chapter; as can be seen here, this is central to how we experience injustice (De Cremer, 2002; 2003; 2007a; 2007b; Tyler & Blader, 2002a; 2002b; 2003). • Feelings of Helplessness: Injustice causes people to feel that they have lost control of their environment (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; 1978). In Chapter 4 we discuss this issue at length. • Feelings of Terror: Injustice induces fear. This is an important insight. As we have seen, fear seems to be more likely among those employees with little social power (van Kleef et al., 2004a; 2004b). • Obsession: It is difficult to “let go” when one has experienced unfairness. As a consequence, individuals may hold a grudge (Baron, 1990a). Problems could persist unless the injustice is rectified (Hogan & Emler, 1981; Lerner, 2003; Lerner et al., 1998). Bies and Tripp (2002) identified an affective syndrome characterized by a number of powerful emotions. These include fear and anger; based on other work we also add disgust (Chapman et al., 2009; Folger & Cropanzano, 2010). Besides being intensely felt, these feelings lead to rumination, which can last for some time. With such an unpleasant experience pushing us forward, it is easy to see how retribution can result. However, as we will now see, this is not always the case. Let us discuss three caveats. Caveat Number #1: Cognitive-driven vs. emotion-driven behavior. While affect often motivates a retaliatory response, this is not always the case. Evidence obtained by Schoefer and Diamantopoulos (2008) indicates that one must take into account the particulars of a behavioral criterion. According to Weiss and Cropanzano’s (1996) affective events theory, certain behaviors are impelled by emotions; they are responses to feeling states. Other behaviors are impelled by cognition; these result from weighing costs and benefits, as well as other relevant considerations. Building on this notion, Schoefer and Diamantopoulos asserted that some retaliation is driven by emotion, while other acts are driven by cognition. They explored this possibility among customers who had

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negative experiences with service workers. This study explored three possible retaliatory responses: • Negative word of mouth, whereby the wronged customer criticizes the service provider to others. Schoefer and Diamantopoulos posited that such complaints would be emotion driven. • Third-party action, whereby the wronged customer intends to complain to an agency charged with remedying the situation. Schoefer and Diamantopoulos posited that involvement of a third party would be cognition driven. • Repurchase intentions, whereby the wronged customer resolves not to do business with the service provider. Schoefer and Diamantopoulos posited that repurchase intentions would be driven by both emotion and cognition. To test their ideas, Schoefer and Diamantopoulos (2008) collected data from 186 former customers. The three predictors were interactional justice, procedural justice, and distributive justice. The three criteria were the three retaliatory responses listed above—negative word of mouth, third-party action, and repurchase intentions. The two mediators were positive emotions and negative emotions. If a criterion behavior is emotion driven, mediators should fully account for the influence of fairness; if it is cognition driven, mediators should not account for the influence of fairness; and if it is driven by emotion and cognition, mediators should partially account for the influence of fairness. Evidence was consistent with Schoefer and Diamantopoulos’s model. • The significant impact of injustice on negative word of mouth was entirely accounted for by negative emotion, though positive emotion did not act as a mediator for this behavior. • While justice successfully predicted intention to seek thirdparty assistance, neither negative nor positive emotion mediated this effect. • Finally, the significant relationship between justice and repurchase intentions was partially accounted for by both negative and positive emotions. The findings of Schoefer and Diamantopoulos (2008) are of great importance for scholars seeking to understand the relationship between unfairness and revenge seeking. On one hand, these authors have confirmed the notion that (negative) emotion leads to retaliation (sometimes), but they have placed an asterisk next to this well-known finding. For certain types of behaviors, cognitions are more important. While it is important to understand how people feel, it is also important to understand what they are thinking. Caveat Number 2: Personality. There is also evidence that people differ in their response to unfair treatment; some of us are more

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forgiving than are others. In an initial investigation of this Â�possibility, Skarlicki, Folger, and Tesluk (1999) surveyed 240 American manufacturing workers. Consistent with research investigating the interaction between different types of justice (see Chapter 2), Skarlicki and his colleagues found that employees were most likely to engage in retaliatory actions when they encountered both a distributive injustice and an interactional injustice. This is consistent with research we have already discussed (such as that of Brockner, 2002; Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996), but Skarlicki and his coauthors went further. They also assessed trait differences in negative affectivity (NA, see Watson, 1988a; 1988b; 2000; Watson & Clark, 1984; 1992), as well as trait differences in agreeableness. The two-way interaction between distributive justice and interactional justice only predicted retaliation when negative affectivity was high. When negative affectivity was low, the interaction of distributive justice and interactional justice was unrelated to retributive behavior. As predicted, the effect of agreeableness was reversed. When agreeableness was low, the distributive justice/interactional justice predicted retaliation. This effect was not significant for those employees who were high in agreeableness. As another example of personality effects, recall the Goldman (2003) study reviewed above. Goldman (2003) surveyed employees who had involuntarily lost their jobs. Those who experienced state anger were more likely to seek legal redress. However, this effect was strongest among those who had personalities prone to trait anger. Goldman argued that injustice prompts anger leading to retribution. However, this sequence is more or less likely to occur depending upon the personality of the victim. Other evidence is consistent with these ideas. Judge, Scott, and Ilies (2006) administered daily surveys to workers over a three-week period. Those who experienced interpersonal injustice experienced state hostility. This hostility was defined by negative affect directed toward others, such as anger, irritation, or frustration (for details, Judge et al., p. 130). This hostility, in turn, lowered their job satisfaction. Diminished job satisfaction, for its part, was associated with workplace deviance. None of this should surprise the reader. Once again, injustice boosts negative emotion, which leads to pernicious action. However, Judge and his colleagues went further. They also assessed trait hostility, treating these negative feelings as stable individual differences. The relationship between state hostility and deviance was stronger for those high in trait hostility and weaker for those low in trait hostility. Judge and his colleagues found that injustice predicts deviance, and it does so by way of one’s affect. However, this effect is stronger for some people and weaker for others. Caveat Number 3: Negative affect matters, but so does positive affect. Consistent with the literature on moral emotions, we have so far emphasized negative feeling states, such as anger. There is good reason for this. As we have seen, negative emotion predicts behavior. However, there is more to the story. While injustice makes us angry or disgusted, justice

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makes us happy, and while anger makes us uncooperative, happiness blunts these effects. To illustrate the importance of both types of affect, we consider two field studies by Murphy and Tyler (2008). These authors examined the relationship of process fairness to affective states. In their first study, which focused on negative feelings, these scholars conducted a national survey of Australian taxpayers. Respondents who believed that the Australian Tax Office made procedurally unfair decisions reported high levels of anger. This anger caused the taxpayers to reduce their compliance with national tax law. In other words, as could be expected, the emotion of anger mediated the relationship between procedural injustice and lawbreaking. In their second very original study, Murphy and Tyler (2008) explored the relationship between procedural justice and happiness. Using an American sample, they found that employees, who perceived that their employer was procedurally fair, experienced greater happiness at work. This happiness led them to a willingness to be open to their supervisor’s directives. These studies by Murphy and Tyler (2008) are important because they illustrate that procedural justice can cause both negative and positive emotional states. Furthermore, these feeling states direct future behavior. For additional evidence, it is also worthwhile to review a study by Chebat and Slusarczyk (2005) that looked at customers of a retail bank. Each research participant in their sample sought redress for a problem regarding banking service. Likewise, each of these problems received a response from the firm. But how did the bank’s response impact customers’ justice perceptions and emotions? When complaining customers felt that their concern was addressed in a timely fashion (high procedural justice), they reported less negative emotion. Likewise, when they were offered appropriate compensation (distributive justice) they felt less negative emotion and more positive emotion. Finally, when customers were treated with courtesy (interactional justice), they experienced less negative and more positive affective states. Thus, both positive and negative feelings were predicted by fairness. Chebat and Slusarczyk also examined if individuals were likely to stop doing business with the firm (exit) or continue as a client (loyalty). When individuals felt more negative emotions and less positive, exit was likely. On the other hand, when they experienced more positive and less negative, loyalty was likely. This line of inquiry helps us understand how people respond when they believe they are treated fairly or unfairly. These findings caution us to consider both positive and negative affect in our theories of justice (for additional support, see Murphy & Tyler, 2008).

Stage Number 4: The Nature of Retaliation If revenge is enacted in order to restore fairness, we may be reluctant to be unjust when seeking retribution. For example, an experiment by

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Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, and Gee (2002, Study 1) found that individuals were more willing to reward fair behavior than to commit an injustice by punishing unfair behavior. Likewise, an experiment by Cropanzano and Baron (1991) found that individuals retaliated against a research accomplice who treated them unfairly only if they failed to make up their lost earnings; beyond this, there was no further retribution. Finally, we have already discussed the work of Fehr and Gächter (2000), who found that people tailor their altruistic punishment to the size of the offense; there is greater punishment for greater transgressions. These findings support an interpretation of revenge seeking as, at least in part, an attempt to right a wrong. However, according to Tripp, Bies, and Aquino (2002), this is only part of the story. Tripp and his colleagues argued that retribution has an “aesthetic” quality about it. Some forms of retaliation are simply more artistic than others. In their first study, Tripp et al.’s research participants, who held jobs, were asked to describe two incidents of retribution. These reports were limited to workplace events. Tripp and his colleagues uncovered three aesthetics-based principles that were used to evaluate acts of revenge. These were altruism, poetic qualities, and symmetry; with symmetry further distinguished as symmetry of consequences and symmetry of methods. Altruism Altruism pertained to whether the retaliation was done to uphold a principle or to promote the revenge seeker’s personal self-interest. Acts of retribution were evaluated more favorably in the former case and more harshly in the latter. Once again, these findings echo the work on altruistic punishment (Fehr & Fishbacher, 2004a; 2004b; Fehr et€al., 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; 2002). Revenge, though sometimes appearing harsh, may be considered moral by the person seeking retribution (Tripp et al. 2007). Poetic Qualities So-called poetic justice depicts retribution that fits the situation; it is akin to karma. Poetic justice often has a quality of ironic appropriateness. To illustrate, Tripp et al. (2002) described a supervisor who was stealing ideas from his subordinates. On the day of a major meeting with the company CEO, the subordinate took a brief vacation. This left the boss, with limited knowledge, alone and defenseless. The CEO then proceeded to ask the thieving supervisor a series of questions. When the unscrupulous supervisor failed to answer these queries, the CEO launched an investigation and the deceitful supervisor was fired. Poetic justice was served, as the supervisor’s own dishonesty and ignorance was the cause of his downfall. The wronged subordinate merely stood aside and watched it happen.

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Symmetry of Consequences We have already encountered the idea of symmetry, though not by this name. The punishment should roughly equal the damage inflicted by the original infraction. Tripp et al. (2002) found that if retribution was too severe or too lenient, it was not evaluated favorably. Individuals who are wronged by an injustice match a penalty to the size of the mischief (see also, Cropanzano & Baron, 1991; Fehr & Gächter, 2000). Symmetry of Methods Symmetry of methods pertains to the means of revenge. High symmetry means that one retaliated in kind. That is, a highly symmetrical response involves doing the same sort of harm as was originally done to victim. Low symmetry occurs when one retaliates in a different fashion. As there are two types of symmetry, Tripp and his coauthors (2002) launched a second study to explore them in more detail. The findings were not entirely as expected. Consistent with expectations, revenge was viewed more favorably when there was symmetry of consequences. On the other hand, contrary to expectations, revenge was viewed more favorably when there was asymmetry of methods. That is, retribution was more favorable when harm was delivered one way but the response was paid back differently. Given that the findings were not consistent with a priori predictions, more research will be useful. Nevertheless, Tripp et al.’s findings are fascinating. To be sure, victims of injustice feel that they are morally obligated to engage in revenge (Bies & Tripp, 2001; Tripp & Bies, 1997; 2009; Tripp, Bies & Aquino, 2002); however, they do consider the aesthetic qualities of their actions.

Consequences of Revenge Our guess is that when most people hear the word revenge, they think of something negative. To be sure, this is often the case. In an interesting qualitative research study, Tripp and Bies (1997) asked respondents to provide examples of dysfunctional and functional retribution. There were five types of bad revenge. First, sometimes individuals behaved unprofessionally in order to get even with another person. Unprofessional revenge seeking includes incidents in which “getting even is an emotional act or decision, and therefore inappropriate” (Tripp & Bies, p. 155). Second, as we learned from Tripp et al.’s (2002) study, punishment needs to be symmetrical to the size of the transgression. Revenge is less favorable when consequences are unpredictable or disproportionate (Cropanzano & Baron, 1991; Fehr & Gächter, 2000). Third, innocent people should not be harmed by retaliation (see Rupp & Bell, 2010; Turillo et al., 2002). Fourth, revenge can provoke

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a counterstrike by the original transgressor. These quarrels can escalate leaving all parties worse off than they would otherwise have been (Pruitt, 2008). Fifth, revenge is less favorable when the original conflict is unresolved. These negative effects are important and, we suspect, generally well known. However, in this chapter we have also seen that retaliation has prosocial benefits. For example, research on the ultimatum bargaining game demonstrates that the threat of a veto, which costs both parties their earnings, deters unfair allocation decisions (e.g., Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; Prasnikar & Roth, 1992; Straub & Murnighan, 1995). Additionally, altruistic punishment, though sometimes costly and unpleasant, promotes greater cooperation in work groups (e.g., Fehr & Fishbacher, 2003; 2004a; 2004b: Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; 2002). In this way, retaliatory behavior has rational benefits even if driven by “irrational” emotions (Schelling, 1960; Frank, 1988; 1990; 2004; Pinker, 2002). In a like manner, outcomes of revenge need not be negative. For example, revenge can rebuild the self-esteem of victims subject to inappropriate practices by management (Bies & Tripp, 1998), and it can act as a disincentive for managers inclined to abuse their power and authority (Bies & Tripp, 1995). More specifically, Tripp and Bies’s (1997, pp. 152–154) respondents listed several examples of “good” revenge: • Revenge is viewed positively when other people were helped. This is consistent with other work (e.g., Tripp et al., 2002). • It is acceptable to seek revenge to restore one’s own status. This is consistent with the relational model of justice that is discussed in our next chapter (e.g., Tyler, 1994; 1997; 2006). • It is justifiable to use revenge as a means of helping one’s self. At first glance this would seem to contradict the findings of Tripp et al. (2002). The respondents in that study preferred that the revenge be altruistic. However, a look at Tripp and Bies’ (1997, p. 153) analysis resolves this seeming discrepancy. In this paper, helping one’s self refers to doing one’s job better. The revenge, in other words, is assisting a legitimate workplace need. • It is useful to correct the original bad behavior so that the perpetrator learned a lesson. • It is appropriate to stand up for oneself. Here retribution is viewed as a type of personal empowerment. • There are times when the relationship between the revenge seeker and the transgressor was improved. • Revenge is seen as advantageous if it restores justice. This is consistent with other work (e.g., Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; 2005; Folger & Salvador, 2008). • When the doors of legitimate redress are closed off, the doors to illegitimate redress may be opened. This may be one reason why long-term conflict can be reduced when firms build better

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dispute resolution procedures (cf. Goldman, Cropanzano, Stein, & Benson, 2008; Olson-Buchanan & Boswell, 2008; Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1989) that improve the procedural justice climate of the firm. A key insight of revenge research is that we should avoid simplistic dichotomies, such as revenge is always good or always bad. The answer is that it depends upon how it is conducted, as well as upon its consequences (for an excellent review, see Tripp & Bies, 2009). We will consider this issue in more detail in our next section.

Summary and Critique: In What Sense Is Retribution Moral? As we have discussed, revenge scholars have called into question the way researchers have generally thought of revenge. Traditionally, organizational revenge has been labeled as deviant and unjust (e.g., O’LearyKelly, Griffin, & Glew, 1996; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Yet, the rationale for vengeful actions need not correspond to those labels. Tripp and Bies (1997) discovered that an act of revenge was deemed morally good when the avenger’s status was reclaimed or when the harm doer’s behavior was corrected. Revenge is undertaken to “right” what has been “wronged,” at least in the eyes of the individual seeking vindication (Tripp et al., 2007). Therefore, engaging in revenge is not necessarily seen as a deviant or immoral act (Bies & Tripp, 2001; 2004). This is not, of course, to say that retribution is always a good thing. It is only a call for researchers to understand seemingly vindictive behavior from the point of view of the person who has been wronged.

Folger (1994; 1998; 2001) and Deontic Justice In a series of papers, Folger (1994; 1998; 2001; Folger & Salvador, 2008) presented a deontic model of justice. The term deontic refers to one’s ethical duty (deon = obligation). According to Folger, witnessing an injustice, even if it happens to another person, catalyzes a deontic state. The deontic state consists of emotions like resentment and disgust (Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005; Folger & Skarlicki, 2008). These affective states drive us to restore fairness (Folger & Cropanzano, 2010). As observed by Cropanzano et al. (2008) and Cropanzano and Stein (2009), Folger’s (1994, 1998; 2001) theory of deontic justice has commonalities with Lerner’s (1975; 1982; 2003) theory of the justice motive. Both frameworks are based on the idea that individuals find justice desirable for its own sake. Furthermore, injustice is distasteful because it Â�provokes negative emotion. Given this, both Folger and Lerner argue that individuals seek to restore fairness when possible, and people are willing to pay a price to do so. One difference is that research on the justice motive

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has typically been discussed by social psychologists (e.g., Bobocel & Hafer, 2007), while work on deontic justice has been conducted within the domain of organizational behavior (e.g., Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; 2005). Evidence favoring deontic justice was obtained in a series of four experimental studies by Turillo et al. (2002). Turillo and his colleagues used a variant of the dictator game. Recall that a dictator game is similar to the ultimatum bargain game. The key difference is that with a dictator game the recipient lacks veto power (van Dijk & Tenbrunsel, 2005)—what the allocator says goes, no matter how unfair it may appear to the recipient. In each of the Turillo et al. experiments, the research participants learned that a previous allocator had made either fair or unfair decisions. The subject was now in a position to make an allocation decision of his or her own. In this way, participants were granted an opportunity to sacrifice their own earnings to castigate a transgressor. The dependent variable was whether the subject would engage in this costly reproach. The results of these four studies were generally consistent. Subjects tended to reward those allocators who were fair (Study€1) and punish those who were unfair, so long as the punishment did not constitute a moral violation in its own right (see also, Rupp & Bell, 2010). Finally, these findings held even though the participant never met the victim. In fact, both the victim and the perpetrator were bogus; no one was actually treated unfairly! Indeed, the deontic response even emerged when the alleged victim was not an ingroup member (Studies 2 and 4). These findings are consistent with other research we have reviewed, such as the literature on altruistic punishment (Fehr & Fishbacher, 2004a; 2004b) and the work of Kahneman et al. (1986). One interesting result of these studies is that they also ruled out the motive of punishing the perpetrator to deter future behavior. Indeed, even though the punisher thought the harm doer was unaware of their punishment, this did not impact the punisher’s behavior. Hence, if retaliation has a deterrent effect, this is not the first conscious motive of people who engage in these behaviors. Turillo et al.’s (2002) results were replicated and extended in a later study by Rupp (2003). Rupp argued that everyone is equally motivated by deontic considerations. She maintained that those high in moral maturity are more likely to avenge an unfair allocation than those who are lower in moral maturity. Using the same experimental paradigm as Turillo and his colleagues, Rupp found evidence for the deontic response, but less among individuals at a lower state of moral development. Individuals care about treatment that others receive, but this depends upon their ethical maturity (for additional support, see Vecchio, 1981). Nadisic, Skarlicki, Fortin, and Cropanzano (2010) integrated the moral motivation for justice with research on moral identity. According to Hart, Atkins, and Ford (1998, p. 515), moral identity is “a commitment to one’s sense of self to lines of action that promote or

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protect the welfare of others.” Aquino and Reed (2002, p. 1424) add that it is “a self-conception organized around a set of moral traits.” Research shows that individuals who possess a strong moral identity exhibit a number of ethical behaviors. For example, they are more likely to volunteer their time and to donate to charity (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reed & Aquino, 2003). Previous research has found that moral identity has implications for justice perceptions (Aquino, Reed, Steward, & Shapiro, 2005). Building on this literature, Nadisic and his colleagues (2010) argued that managers who have a strong moral identity respond more robustly when their subordinates are treated unfairly. Conversely, those with a weaker identity exhibit less concern with the treatment of others. In several studies, Nadisic et€al. (2010) found support for this contention. Specifically, managers who were high moral identifiers allocated extra outcomes to harmed employees in order to correct injustice, a behavior that the authors term Robin Hoodism. (For a thorough review of the moral identity literature, see Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008).

Third-Party Effects As is evident from the Rupp (2003) study, deontic justice researchers have shown a special interest in third-party judgments of fairness. There is a good deal of evidence suggesting that these third-party effects are common (for an excellent review, see Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005). According to Ellard and Skarlicki (2002), a critical variable is the assessment of deservingness. Ellard and Skarlicki (p. 138) suggest that deservingness refers to “who is entitled to what” (cf. Lerner, 1987; Miller, 1977). When an individual receives less than he or she deserves, the observer is apt to react negatively (Leung, Chiu, & Au, 1993). Of course, there are other factors that strengthen or weaken the reactions of third parties. For example, in responding to an injustice, third-party affect is more negative when an observer has a relationship to the other party than when no relationship exists (De Cremer & Van Hiel, 2006). One of the more interesting empirical examinations of third-party justice was presented by Skarlicki, Ellard, and Kelln (1998). Skarlicki and his colleagues prepared different versions of a realistic news article about the downsizing of a bank. One hundred and twenty-three undergraduates read the commentary. In some versions the employees were given voice (procedural fairness), while in others they were not. Likewise, in some versions employees were provided with an explanation (interactional or informational fairness), while in others they were not. Skarlicki et al. found that when the employees were treated unfairly, respondents expressed an interest in seeing the firm punished. However, when employees were treated fairly, respondents were likely to derogate the victim (for related findings, see Brockner, Heuer, Magner, Folger, Umphress, van den Bos et al., 2003; Gilliland,

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1994; Koper, van Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1993, discussed in Chapter 4). The findings of Skarlicki and his coauthors suggest that third parties actively use justice-related information to make sense out of their environments. When things are fair, the victim could be blamed; when things are unfair, the accountability falls on the perpetrator.

Five Characteristics of the Deontic State Folger et al. (2005) and Folger and Skarlicki (2008) provide a more detailed description of the deontic state. According to these authors, it has five characteristics: The deontic response tends to be automatic, it pushes us to behave irrationally, there is a strong motivation to penalize the perpetrator, emotion is central to the process, and rapprochement remains possible. Let us consider each of these in more detail. Attributions and Automatic Appraisals The deontic state is triggered by an intuitive and automatic appraisal, and it does not require cognitive elaboration. This is consistent with neuroscientific work of Liberman et al. (2002) that was reviewed previously. According to fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; 2001; Cropanzano, Chrobot-Mason, Rupp, & Prehar, 2004), there are three types of appraisals: • Would: The individual assesses what would have occurred if the target party had behaved differently. In general, if the behavior of the transgressor results in harm, it is viewed more negatively; if no harm resulted, people are more forgiving (for evidence, see Brockner, 2002; Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). • Could: The could assessment ascertains whether the perpetrator was reasonably able to follow a different course of action. This is similar to the work of mitigating circumstances that was mentioned previously (e.g., Bies, 1987; Bies & Tripp, 1996; 1998). • Should: The should assessment is central. It refers to a violation of some normative standard of conduct. If there is a moral violation, then retaliatory behavior becomes more likely (for evidence, see Carlsmith, 2006; Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; DaGloria & DeRidder, 1977; 1979; Darley, 2002; Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000; Darley & Pittman, 2003). Folger and Cropanzano (1998; 2001) and Cropanzano, Chrobot-Mason et al. (2004) argue that all three attributions are important for producing the deontic state. In other words, deonance is not only about harm. Instead, deonance is about harm that cannot be justified (Brockner, Fishman, Reb, Goldman, Spiegel, & Garden, 2007; Goldman, 2003; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Notice that fairness theory can also account

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for reactions to injustice that are less automatic. That is, it allows that people may process the three counterfactuals (would, could, and should) in a more controlled way. In this sense, fairness theory is larger in scope than the deontic model of justice, and it is a better integrative power of social justice phenomena. Deonance and Economic Irrationality Deonance pushes us to behave in ways that are economically irrational (Rupp, 2003; Turillo et al., 2002). Other things being equal, anger and resentment are likely to occur when an outcome is unfair, as opposed to simply unfortunate. That is to say, people attend to the moral implications of an event—not only to economic concerns (DaGloria & DeRidder 1977; 1979; Darley, 2002; Darley & Pittman, 2003; Mahony & Klass, 2008). More generally, each framework previously discussed in this chapter questions assumptions of economic rationality (Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002). This is not to say that retributive behaviors bring no benefits (Frank, 1988; 1990; 2004; Schelling, 1960). Deonance may involve irrational behavior, but this irrationality has advantages (Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Fehr & Fishbacher, 2004a; 2004b; Fehr et al., 2002; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; Prasnikar & Roth, 1992; Straub & Murnighan, 1995). The Retributive Motive The deontic state includes a strong motivation to penalize transgressors. Retribution is sought to uphold or restore justice (e.g., Folger et al., 2005; Tripp et al., 2007). To be sure, part of the reason that people seek to punish transgressors is practical; they seek to deter future misconduct. However, as found in research by Carlsmith (2006) and Carlsmith, Darley, and Robinson (2002), people also punish for retributive reasons. That is, they seek to give perpetrators their “just deserts.” This tendency to seek payback is expected, given that deonance is associated with anger. When we experience resentment or anger, our inclination is to lash out at the person who we believe treated us poorly (Morris & Keltner, 2000). According to deontic justice theory, this tendency is inherited from our evolutionary ancestors (Folger & Skarlicki, 2008; Folger & Cropanzano, 2010). Emotion is Central Emotion is a partial mediator between injustice and retribution. This theme has been central to most of the work discussed therein (e.g., Allred, 1989; Solomon, 1999). Of course, cognition matters as well. In a recent study, Rupp and Bell (2010) had undergraduate subjects make an allocation decision that would impact a (bogus) person who had previously been unfair. Rupp and Bell had their participants voice their

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thoughts while they made a decision. They found considerable evidence that individuals deliberate before taking action. The deontic model of justice treats moral emotion in a novel manner. The theories presented thus far view moral emotions as a mediator between the attribution of blame and retaliatory action. Deontic justice does not dispute this, but instead argues that emotions are complementary (Folger et al., 2005). The simplest way to illustrate this idea is in a dyad. The emotion of one party can be accounted for by the opposite emotion from another (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). We have already seen one example of this. Van Kleef et al. (2004a, Study 3) found that anger in a power individual induced fear, its complement, in a person with less power. Fear and anger complement one another. Ketelaar (2006) applied this idea to moral emotions. According to Ketelaar, there are two sets of moral emotions: norm-obeying and norm-enforcing emotions. The norm-obeying emotions are those that we direct toward ourselves when we misbehave, such as guilt, shame, and embarrassment. The norm-enforcing emotions are those that are directed toward other people who misbehave, such as indignation, contempt, and disgust. Together, these two sets of emotions act as a hammer and an anvil to enforce social behavior.* Building on these ideas, Folger and Cropanzano (2010) distinguish between two types of moral norms—perfect duties and imperfect duties. These are based on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1797/1991). Perfect duties are those that are demanded of everyone. To not abide by these rules would make one an unethical person. For example, we should not lie, steal, or commit murder. An imperfect moral obligation is more flexible. If these were performed then one would be a good person, but we would not necessarily view someone as unethical because they neglected to follow these prescriptions. For example, it is kind to donate to the poor, to tend to a sick person, and so on. According to Folger and Cropanzano, these two types of duties create different kinds of emotions, and they can be understood in the context of Ketelaar’s (2006) norm-obeying versus norm-enforcing distinction. Specifically, if one fails to live up to an imperfect moral obligation, he or she is likely to experience guilt. However, if one observes another individual failing to live up to an imperfect duty, the third party is likely to experience resentment. Guilt and resentment, therefore, are complements. They accompany one other, and they work together to ensure that imperfect obligations are upheld. Different emotions result from the violation of perfect duties. If one does not live up to these, the individual is likely to experience shame. An observer, on the other hand, could become indignant or disgusted. * The alert reader will recall the work of Barclay, Skarlicki, and Pugh (2005) and Sprecher (1986) that we discussed in Chapter 1. These authors made a similar distinction between inward-focused emotions, such as shame and guilt, and outward-focused emotions, such as hostility and anger. Ketelaar and Au’s (2003) contention would seem to be resting on a strong conceptual foundation.

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Consequently, shame and indignation are complementary emotions; they work together to ensure that perfect obligations are upheld. To date, there have been no published tests of Folger and Cropanzano’s (2010) theory of complementary deontic emotions. This would be a useful venue for future inquiry. For Alford (2001), fear of shame is the main motive pushing whistleblowers to punish their organization at their own (huge) costs. If they do not react, they will feel corrupted by the behaviors of the organization with which they are associated. The researcher analyzes shame as wounded narcissism and views it as a deep and powerful source of Â�morality—whiste-blowers seem to want to stay “whole, pure, and perfect” (p 63). They are not so much interested in the victims’ fate than in the purity of their ideal ego. It is this moralized narcissism that makes them experience strong moral emotions, feel the situation as choiceless, and engage in altruistic punishment, whatever the future cost they would have to pay for their ethical reactions. Don’t Give Up on Rapprochement Even when faced with an injustice, rapprochement remains a possibility. Deontic justice theory argues that the parties involved should reaffirm whatever moral standard was originally violated. One method is the use of an apology (e.g., Kim, Ferrin, & Cooper, 2004; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989). Revenge researchers share a similar view; they have found that apologies are a valuable means of conflict resolution (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2006; Bies, 1987; Tripp et al., 2007). Social psychologists will also be familiar with the extensive literature on forgiveness, which is consistent with these conclusions (McCullough, Bellah, Kilpatrick, & Johnson, 2001; McCullough, Rachal, Sandage, Worthington, Brown, & Hight, 1998; McCullough & Worthington, 1995; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). Deontic states involve things that are unfair and not simply unfortunate. In other words, there has been a transgression against some normative standard (Folger & Salvador, 2008). Sincere apologies are effective, at least in part, because they assert the principle in question, not because the wronged party is especially generous. In fact, when a moral standard has been violated, and no apology is forthcoming, one would expect harsher retribution. This was explored in two studies by Reb, Goldman, Kray, and Cropanzano (2006). Reb and his colleagues reasoned that procedural injustices are often based on loss of instrumental control (e.g., Thibaut & Walker, 1975; 1978; also our next chapter). Hence, it may not be clear to the wronged party that a principle was violated. Interactional injustices, on the other hand, violate noncomparative standards (Feinberg, 1974; Bies & Tripp, 2002). Therefore, it is easier to determine when one has been treated immorally, as there is less need for a referent or for some other point of comparison (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). Consequently, Reb et al. maintained that victims

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of procedural unfairness prefer remedies that reassert control (e.g., monetary compensation), while victims of interactional justice prefer punitive remedies that vindicate the injured party (e.g., harsh disciplinary action). In two studies, Reb and his coauthors found support for these predictions.

Summary and Critique The theory of deontic justice shares much in common with other research, such as that involving the justice motive (Lerner, 1975; 1982; 2003) and revenge (Bies & Tripp, 1995; 1996; 1998; 2001; 2002; 2004). For instance, they view justice as an autonomous motive, important for its own sake. They also agree that negative emotions impel retaliatory responses. These commonalities are important, though deontic justice has unique features. For one thing, deontic justice places greater emphasis on evolution (Folger & Skarlicki, 2008; Folger & Cropanzano, 2010). Also, deontic justice’s focus on complementary emotions is a distinct idea, worthy of additional research attention.

Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen’s (2008) Integrated Theory of Moral Convictions (ITMC) Overview Skitka et al.’s (2008) integrated theory of moral convictions (ITMC) is a comprehensive theory of justice that acknowledges the importance of emotions. The touchstone of this theory is its distinction between preferences and moral convictions. Preferences are a matter of taste; one may prefer one alternative to another, but there is no reason to expect others to agree. A preferred option can be better or worse (to you), but it is not unethical to prefer a different option. Moral convictions exhibit a property of “oughtness.” A conviction is a belief that some conduct is right and upstanding, whereas other conduct is not. Convictions are moral standards that exhibit three key properties: • Universality. The things we believe in should be applied everywhere. This is not to say that individuals always agree as to what constitutes fair and unfair behavior. Rather, the point is that once a behavior is viewed as an injustice, it is seen as inappropriate for virtually everyone. Slavery, for example, is seen by most contemporary human beings as always wrong. • Objectivity. Counter-normative behavior is viewed as self-evidently wrong. For example, Haidt (2001; 2006) reports that people disapprove of cannibalism and incest even when they have no logical reason for opposing it. The act itself is inappropriate on its face—not

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because it has disadvantageous consequences. This automatic and intuitive disapproval is similar to Folger’s (2001) theory of deontic justice. • Autonomy vs. heteronomy. Convictions are autonomous. Individuals are concerned with them apart from more concrete matters, such as social standing and economic gain. Earlier, we observed that individuals dislike injustice even when it happens to other people (Ellard & Skarlicki, 2002; Skarlicki et al., 1998; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005). Similar to Lerner (2003) and Folger (2001), Skitka et al. (2008) emphasize that justice perceptions can act like moral convictions. This suggests that evaluations of fairness exhibit universality, objectivity, and autonomy. For example, according to the authority independent hypothesis, when a person in power behaves unfairly, he or she is viewed as less legitimate than a counterpart who is fair. Hence, people are less apt to obey a “leader” who is unjust. For our present review, the most important implication of the ITMC is the emotion hypothesis.

The ITMC and the Emotion Hypothesis Skitka and her colleagues (2008) argue that the more fervently held the moral conviction, the stronger the resulting emotion will be when that standard is violated. Emotions color subsequent perceptions of fairness (see our review of Mullen’s 2007 affective model of justice reasoning, discussed in Chapter 5) and drive retaliatory behavior. For example, in their studies of hypothetical legal decisions, Mullen and Skitka (2006), and Mullen and Nadler (2008) all found that outcomes that were seen as morally inappropriate caused anger. This anger, in turn, caused individuals to derogate the decisions and express greater acceptance of deviant actions.

Summary and Critique The ITMC is among the strongest theoretical frameworks that we have found. Perhaps its most distinctive feature is that the model explicitly distinguishes moral convictions from simple preferences. As Skitka and her colleagues (2008) aptly demonstrate, the elegant distinction is incredibly powerful, as it allows for better understanding of justice perceptions and the discrete emotions that result from them. Incorporation of Skitka et al.’s preference/moral conviction typology would greatly improve other approaches, such as equity theory and the cognitive appraisal models. Another powerful feature of the ITMC is that discrete emotion is fully integrated as a mediating mechanism. Emotion has clear antecedents. It results when a moral conviction is compromised, and the strength of the affective response is proportional to the size of the violation. Emotion

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also has consequences; once the affect is experienced, it impacts later justice judgments (Mullen, 2007), and it can create retaliatory behavior (Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Mullen & Nadler, 2008). The number of discrete emotions examined by Skitka et al. (2008) remains somewhat limited. Specifically, these scholars emphasized anger and moral outrage. Outrage is voiced as a mixture of anger and disgust.

Future Research Directions In this chapter, we discussed a diverse set of literatures. Despite differences in perspectives, a consistent picture of human beings emerges. Emotions lead individuals, who perceive they have been treated unfairly, to seek revenge (Bies & Tripp, 1996; McLean Parks, 1997; Skitka et al., 2008). This can prompt deviant behavior (Mullen & Nadler, 2008). Revenge is also spurred by deeply felt moral obligations to rectify injustice (Bies & Tripp, 2001; Tripp & Bies, 1997; Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2002). Finally, if the reader questions the sanity/rationality of the vengeance, they can look to the work of Frank (1988; 1990; 2004) to see that the threat of vengeance staves off many injustices from occurring in the first place. When they are in a position in which they control the social allocation of valued resources, people may behave unfairly. Research based on UBG games shows that guilt and regret impels them to behave more fairly. Allocators may also become fairer when they interact with people who have no power at all (like in the dictator game), apparently because this triggers their sense of social responsibility. That said, it seems that these motives have not been extremely important in the shaping of human social behaviors. The paradox is that recipients, when they are victims of an unfairness, do not react by appealing to the harmdoer’s sense of guilt, regret, or sense of social responsibility, even if this could represent a successful strategy on the basis of the research we reviewed. Rather, the models we described (the wounded pride/spite model, the altruistic punishment hypothesis, the justice motive, the heuristic model of retributive justice, the deontic model, and the integrated theory of moral convictions) show that victims react with strong moral emotions, mainly anger, which motivates them to penalize the perpetrator. Ironically, this can lead to social benefits in the long run. Notice that retribution does not lead the perpetrator to become fairer. Rather, it makes him behave more fairly by distorting the costs–benefits balance associated with his or her behavior. In sum, by increasing the cost of unfairness for the perpetrator, the victims’ retaliatory behaviors directly speak to his or her self-interest. This implies that the retaliation to which he or she is subject is not viewed by the perpetrator as unfair. Indeed, if the perpetrator feels unfairly treated, he or she will react as victims usually do, that is, with the insula cortex instead of using his or

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her putamen, which is the surest way for the conflict to escalate without any control. When people react out of rage, they may not react in a proportional way. For all that, an irrational emotional reaction to unfairness still has advantages. If the victim shows that he or she is willing to pursue the perpetrator in blind fury to get revenge, this can also deter unfairness. But this does not mean that their reaction helps them to build �justice over the long run. We still know very little about the way in which the desire for revenge following moral emotions can translate into a restorative action that can be socially useful. In this respect, restorative justice viewed as action aimed at restoring a sense of justice through renewed value consensus among the victim, the perpetrator, and the whole community (Umbreit & Coates, 2006; Wenzel, Okimoto, & Feather, 2006) might be an interesting avenue for research and social action. Because it does not involve the study of justice in its links with emotions, we will not review this domain further.

ch a p t er

4

Justice, the Self, and Affect Few topics have spilled more social psychological ink than has the self (Baumeister, 1995). Researchers interested in justice and affect have only scratched the surface of this vast literature, though even in so doing they have already produced a sizable body of research. The present chapter will review this work, beginning with some basic definitions. Following from Baumeister (1998) we use the term selfconcept to refer to a person’s cognitive understanding and description of whom and what he or she is. A similar term is self-identity, though we emphasize that people have multiple identities and these are not always well integrated (cf. Sedikides & Gregg, 2003; Skitka, 2003). Finally, self-esteem refers to one evaluation of the self as good or bad (Brockner, 1988; Pierce & Gardner, 2004). Self-esteem is often affectively laden so it is important for understanding the relationship between justice and affect. Pulling these ideas together, we can say that people have a self-concept, or cognitive image, of themselves that is divided into a number of separate identities. These identities can then be evaluated positively or negatively, resulting in higher or lower self-esteem. We also use the term self-image, which we view as a global concept that accounts for the system that is represented by the constructs of self-concept, self-identity, and self-esteem and the links between them. In order to impose some order on this literature, Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, and Rupp (2001) described the different aspects of a person that would lead him or her to care about justice in the first place. Their multiple needs model proposes that four motives drive justice. Each of these is relevant in our discussion of the self (for evidence supporting the model, see Colquitt, Scott, Judge, & Shaw, 2006; Reb et al., 2006).

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• People may care about justice because it gives them a feeling of psychological control. As control is intrinsically desirable (cf. Skinner, 1996), fairness is preferred to unfairness. • People may care about justice because it allows them to boost their self-esteem (self-enhancement) and maintain their self-image (self-verification). As we shall see, these are different psychological mechanisms, but fairness plays a role in each (see also, Bobocel & Zdaniuk, 2010). • People may care about fairness because it signals that they are respected and valued by important social groups (Tyler & Smith, 1998; 1999). This occurs because human beings are social animals who care about their relationships with others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). As we shall see, the social self is important for understanding this motive (e.g., De Cremer, 2003). • People may care about fairness because it gives them a sense of transcendent meaning and appropriate moral conduct. We discussed this at length in the previous chapter (e.g., Folger et al., 2005; Lerner, 2003), but now we shall consider virtue as part of the self-concept. Our objective in this chapter is to show that concern for justice is linked to emotions via the different fundamental needs that we have described: the need for control, the need for a high and consistent self-esteem, the need for belonging, and the need for moral meaning. As the self is a system built on these needs, four distinct issues can be identified. Respectively, these include self-interest, self-esteem, the social self, and the moral self. Thus, we are going to show that when one of these concerns is activated, this salience colors in a specific way the link between justice and emotions. Each of these four motives is important in certain settings (Skitka, 2003) and/or for certain individuals (Colquitt, Scott, Judge, & Shaw, 2006). We shall organize our review around each of them, but we begin with a warning. Such an organization, though allowing a suitable framework for reviewing the literature, tends to separate the four motives and gives the appearance that the self cannot work as an organized system. While considering one perspective at a time is consistent with the available research, it tends to de-emphasize the manner in which each identity can work with the others. For that reason we will return to the issue of integration at the end of this chapter.

Maintaining Control of Valuable Outcomes and Important Events Early Research: Thibaut and Walker’s (1975; 1978) Control Model To understand what is meant by control, we need to look into the past and consider the origin of the term procedural justice. Notice

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that unlike the other motives and associated self-identities that are presented in the Â�following sections, the control motive of justice has mainly been studied in relation to only one type of fairness—procedural justice. The results we are presenting should hold for distributive and interactional justice, but more research would be welcome to confirm this contention. Recall from Chapter 1 that our psychological understanding of process fairness was originally formulated by two researchers—the social psychologist John Thibaut and the legal scholar Laurens Walker. Reflecting their twin specialties, during the 1970s these authors produced a number of influential and integrative writings. These were targeted toward both empirically oriented psychologists (e.g., Houlden, LaTour, Walker, & Thibaut, 1976; LaTour, Houlden, Walker, & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Walker, LaTour, Link, & Thibaut, 1974) and law professors (e.g., Thibaut & Walker, 1978; Walker, LaTour, & Houlden, 1974). Collectively, these writings made two arguments, supporting each with research evidence. Based on the work of Rawls (1971) and others, Thibaut and Walker’s (1975; 1978) first insight was that people care about fair processes. That is, they care about how things are assigned. While results matter, individuals are often willing to accept less than perfect outcomes so long as the procedures are deemed to be fair. This is the origin of the “fair process effect,” suggesting that fair procedures have positive attitudinal and behavioral consequences (Folger et al., 1979). Thibaut and Walker’s work also provides the foundation for the process-by-outcome interaction discussed in Chapter 2—individuals accept poor outcomes when they have just processes. Thibaut and Walker’s (1975; 1978) second insight attempted to answer the “why” question. They maintained that fair processes were those that could be controlled by the participants. Procedures that afford individuals voice or input into the process introduce an important element of control (Folger, Rosenfeld, Grove, & Corkran, 1979; Shapiro, 1993). Since people find psychological control desirable (Skinner, 1996), fair procedures (that is, high-control) are preferred to unfair (that is, low-control) processes (e.g., Cropanzano, Rupp, et al., 2001). In making this second point, Thibaut and Walker introduced the notion of psychological control as a motive for procedural justice. This control model inspired a flurry of empirical tests, and the results tended to be supportive (e.g., Casper, Tyler & Fisher, 1988€ ; Folger, Cropanzano, Timmerman, Howes, & Mitchell, 1996; Houlden, 1981; Lind, Kurtz, Musante, Walker, & Thibaut, 1980; Tyler & Folger, 1980; Rasinski, 1992; Roberson, Moye, & Locke, 1999, for an exception, see Sheppard, 1985), though we hasten to add that other motives also drive the preference for procedural justice as well (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2006; Lind, Kanfer, Earley, 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Shapiro & Brett, 1993; Tyler & Smith, 1998).

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Brockner, Heuer, Siegel, Wiesenfeld, Martin, Grover, Reed, and Bjorgvinsson’s (1998) Control Theory Approach Overview Brockner and his colleagues (1998) drew directly from the long-standing tradition of control theory in order to understand the manner in which self-esteem influences responses to voice. Even apart from Thibaut and Walker’s (1975; 1978) work, voice has long been viewed as an important determinant of procedural fairness perceptions (e.g., Folger, 1977; Folger et al., 1979; Shapiro, 1993; Shapiro & Brett, 1993). However, if voice’s beneficial effects are partially based on psychological control, as Thibaut and Walker maintained, then procedural justice should have greater benefits for those high in self-esteem and weaker benefits for those low in self-esteem. In making this argument, Brockner et al. reasoned as follows: High self-esteem people are more likely to view themselves as competent and able to control a situation in which voice is provided (cf. Pierce & Gardner, 2004). Low self-esteem people, on the other hand, are more likely to see themselves at the mercy of the situation (for similar arguments but framed in a more general way, see Brockner, 1988). For this reason, control should be less beneficial to low self-esteem individuals. To test these ideas while also increasing external validity, Brockner et al. (1998) conducted a diverse series of five studies. The findings were uniformly supportive of their control theory arguments. Theoretically speaking, the most important study might have been their Study 5. In this experiment the authors manipulated voice as well as the participants’ ability to provide useful input into the decision. They found that voice mattered more when input had a practical effect, which shows the reason why high self-esteem people are more likely to value voice than low self-esteem individuals. This is, of course, consistent with the control model as well as with previous research (e.g., Lind et al., 1990). Summary and Critique Brockner et al. (1998) showed that self-esteem can act as a moderator, and not simply as a consequence, of justice. Their work further indicates that high self-esteem individuals responded more strongly and favorably to voice (a type of fair procedure) than did their low self-esteem counterparts. Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas, and Weinblatt (1999, Study 3) similarly found that high self-esteem respondents benefited more from respectfully interpersonal treatment (a type of interactional justice), than did those with low self-esteem. Finally, as we shall discuss below, Wiesenfeld, Swann, Brockner, and Bartel (2007) also found consistent findings for procedural justice. For all of this support, there is one limitation that bears mention. Brockner et al.’s (1998) five studies were primarily interested in testing

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their control model of self-esteem and procedural justice. In this regard, they were very successful. However, they were less interested in testing the role of affect, which is important for this book. As their dependent measures were likely correlated with feelings states (e.g., satisfaction), we can presume that the results would hold for moods and emotions. That is, it seems plausible that individuals higher in self-esteem would experience more positive affect and less negative affect than people low in selfesteem after having been treated procedurally or interactionally fairly. Nevertheless, direct empirical confirmation would be useful here.

Van den Bos and Lind’s (2002) Uncertainty Management Theory Overview While the work of Brockner and his colleagues (1998) draws upon Thibaut and Walker’s (1975; 1978) control theory, there is a more recent control-oriented formulation of justice. This is provided by uncertainty management theory (van den Bos, 2001a). In this framework, though, the emphasis shifts away from control and toward prediction. According to van den Bos and Lind (2002; van den Bos, 2001b), uncertainty is an uncomfortable and potentially threatening state (Sedikides, De Cremer, Hart, & Brebels, 2010). People prefer to feel certain about their social environments. Justice is important because it provides a sense of predictability. Loosely, we might say that fairness tells us how things work and where we stand in relation to others. For this reason, when individuals are made to feel uncertain, they react more strongly to procedural and distributive justice (van den Bos, Poortvliet, Maas, Miedema, and Ham, 2005). While a complete review of uncertainty management theory is beyond the scope of this book, it should be noted that a good deal of evidence supports this framework (e.g., van den Bos, 2001b; 2002; 2003; van den Bos, Bruins, Wilke, & Dronkert, 1999; van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 2001; van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997). We shall need to revisit this theory in our next chapter. In interpreting these findings, we need to pay close attention to the meaning of uncertainty in this context. According to De Cremer, Brebels, and Sedikides (2008; see also Sedikides et al., 2010) there is more than one kind of uncertainty. In two experiments, De Cremer, Brebels, and Sedikides found that when research participants reported general uncertainty, then voice had a strong effect on perceived procedural justice. This is the effect predicted by van den Bos and Lind’s (2002; van den Bos, 2001a) uncertainty management theory. On the other hand, when participants were uncertain about their standing in a group, so-called belongingness uncertainty, then fair processes tended to create greater group identification. In their Study 2, De Cremer, Brebels, and Sedikides went further by decomposing belongingness uncertainty into two parts—family uncertainty (affiliation with one’s family) and

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stranger uncertainty (affiliation with people one does not know well). When individuals were high in family uncertainty, then voice had a large effect on identification; this was not the case when individuals were high in stranger uncertainty. From this we can see that uncertainty is an important construct for understanding procedural justice, but its impact can vary depending upon the type of uncertainty being considered (Sedikides et al., 2010). Justice, Uncertainty Management, and the Self As we have seen, Brockner et al.’s (1998) control theory formulation predicted and found that those with high self-esteem would respond more strongly to voice, while those with low self-esteem would have weaker reactions. Heuer et al. (1999, Study 3) report consistent findings. Curiously, Miedema, van den Bos, and Vermunt’s (2006) uncertainty management approach anticipates a somewhat different effect. Miedema et al. argue that a sense of uncertainty threatens the self-concept. As a consequence of this threat, individuals seek to enhance their self-esteem. Fortunately, fairness can promote a positive self-image (cf. Tyler & Smith, 1998). For this reason, those who have had their self-concept jeopardized will react most strongly to fairness, while those who have not received a threat will respond more weakly. Notice how this turns around Brockner et al.’s expectations. According to Miedema and his colleagues, the more your self-esteem is threatened, the more you seek to maintain it. And hence, the more fairness matters to you. Miedema and his collaborators (2006, Study 1) tested this possibility with 62 undergraduate research subjects. Those in the high threat condition wrote about (a) how they would feel if others thought they lacked intelligence, and (b) how they did feel in a situation where they behaved foolishly. Those in the low threat condition, of course, got to write about behaving intelligently. All subjects were then given either “voice” on an experimental task, or “no voice.” Consistent with their predictions, Miedema et al. found that those who had received a threat to their intelligence rated the voice procedure as fairer than did their counterparts who did not receive a threat. Likewise, those in the self-threat group rated the no voice procedure as even less fair than did their counterparts who did not receive a threat. In other words, receiving a threat pushed fairness ratings toward both extremes—more positive when voice was received and more negative when voice was denied. Interestingly, Miedema and colleagues measured affect, but only as a filler task. In fact, the mood measure was taken before the manipulation of procedure, and as the authors expected, did not show any significant effects. Future research should confirm if individuals whose self-esteem has been threatened are likely to show especially strong positive affective reactions to procedural justice, consistent with the results found by Miedema et al. (2006).

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Summary and Critique As we shall see throughout this chapter, the interactive effects of selfesteem and justice are not always consistent. Some studies find that high self-esteem people benefit most (e.g., Brockner et al., 1998; Heuer et al., 1999, Study 3; Wiesenfeld, Swann, Brockner, & Bartel, 2007). But we shall see other findings suggesting that high self-esteem people benefit less than their low self-esteem counterparts (e.g., De Cremer, 2003; De Cremer, van Knippenberg, van Dijke, and Bos, 2004). Miedema et al. (2006, Study 1) is more in line with the latter group. Those who received a threat seemed to benefit most when they had voice, whereas Brockner et al. (1998) found that voice was most important for those with high self-esteem. It is difficult to ascertain why this would be the case. One possibility is that Miedema and his collaborators manipulated threat, whereas Brockner and his colleagues tended to measure self-esteem. Unfortunately, this explanation may be incomplete. In their Study 5, Brockner et al. manipulated the extent to which input was meaningful. They found the same interaction as in their other four studies. It is also noteworthy that the theoretical mechanisms are different in each case. Brockner et al. (1998) found that those with high self-esteem expect their voice to matter. Hence, the lack of voice violates their expectations of control. Miedema et al. (2006) maintain that those who have been threatened desire to recoup their “lost” self-esteem through fair procedures. Curiously, these mechanisms are so completely different, they are not in contradiction. It could be that there are situations where control is salient, and hence high self-esteem increases the power of justice. In other situations, such as the one designed by Miedema et al., self-threat is the most salient. Hence, justice is most important to those who experience a threat to their self-esteem. Another possibility is suggested from social psychological investigations of the self-concept (Baumeister, 1995; 1998). It may be that the effects of self-esteem level are conditioned by a moderating variable that has not yet been measured by justice researchers. Self-esteem level might produce different—even opposite—responses to unfairness, depending upon some other characteristic of the individual. This is a distinct possibility. Kernis and his colleagues (Kernis, 1993; Kernis, Granneman, & Barclay, 1989) have found that the level of self-esteem (high vs. low) can be separated from its variability (stable vs. unstable). Considering level and variability together allows us a better understanding of certain behaviors. To illustrate, consider interpersonal aggression. People prefer to think highly of themselves, as we noted earlier in this chapter. Hence, an individual whose self-esteem is high but also unstable has a valuable resource (positive self-regard) that would appear to be at risk (that is, it tends to sometimes fluctuate downward). Consequently, such a person would respond assertively when they fear that their tenuously held selfesteem is in peril. Kernis, Granneman, and Mathis (1991) found that

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hostility toward others is highest among those with high but also variable self-esteem. Among those with other combinations it was lower. More relevant to the present book, those with high and unstable selfesteem were also more likely to be angry when confronted with a threat to their (shaky) self-regard. Given that self-esteem variability is useful for predicting both anger and aggression, justice researchers will wish to incorporate this construct into their thinking. Building on the work of Kernis et al. (1991), it is plausible that those with high but unstable self-regard are more motivated to maintain their self-esteem and, consequently, feel especially endangered by self-threats. This could explain why justice has more impact when self-esteem is high and when self-esteem is threatened. In any case, future research is necessary to sort through these possibilities.

Higgins’ (1997; 1998) Regulatory Focus Theory Overview A somewhat different self-oriented view of justice and control was offered by Higgins’ (1997; 1998) regulatory focus theory. Briefly, this theory suggests that emotions assist in behavioral regulation. Higgins argues that people envision at least two sorts of “selves.” The ideal self is a vision of what we would like to become. The so-called self-standards contained in the ideal self involve our wishes for the future, long-term life goals, and so on. The ought self is what we believe we should be. The self-standards contained in the ought self include our deservingness, duties, and obligations. Violating either set of these self-standards will create emotion, though the form of the affect will depend on the regulatory goals that are currently in operation. There are two types: • When people have a promotion focus they are interested in improving their situation. The ideal self is active. Relevant emotions are arrayed on a dimension that runs from cheerful to dejected (Brockner & Higgins, 2001). For example, if one is successful, then one might become joyful or happy. Failure makes one become disappointed or despondent. • When people have a prevention focus they are interested in forestalling loses. This activates the ought self. Relevant emotions are arrayed on a dimension that runs from quiescent to agitated (Brockner & Higgins, 2001). For example, if one is successful then one might become calm or content. Failure makes one become nervous or upset. As is readily apparent, regulatory focus theory is a more-or-less comprehensive framework for understanding self-goals and emotion. Evidence reviewed by Higgins (1997; 1998) suggests that it has at least a reasonable degree of support.

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Justice and Regulatory Focus Theory Concerns over justice, of course, can be relevant when one fails to receive something desirable (e.g., if failing to be selected for a job) and also if one has something valuable taken away (e.g., if one is forced to endure a pay cut). According to regulatory focus theory, the opportunity to receive something desirable should engage a promotion focus, whereas the threat of losing something of value should engage a prevention focus. Cropanzano, Paddock, Rupp, Bagger, and Baldwin (2008) tested this possibility in an experimental study. Individuals were provided with the opportunity to earn a bonus unit of research credit by successfully completing a business simulation. Subjects were either successful, thereby earning the bonus credit, or unsuccessful, thereby not earning the credit. Performance was rated through either a careful scoring procedure (fair process condition) or through an inaccurate and careless process (unfair process condition). As described thus far, the study is like any other examination of the process-by-outcome interaction. One would expect that the least favorable responses would occur when the outcome was negative (no bonus credit) and the process was inaccurate. Under other circumstances, such as when the bonus credit was earned or when the scoring process was just, then ill will should be mitigated. However, Cropanzano et al. maintained that this only holds when there is a promotion focus. When the emphasis is on preventing a loss, different psychological processes are engaged because in this situation people are afraid of failing to protect what belongs to them. The novel part of this experiment came in the manipulation of regulatory focus. Cropanzano and his collaborators employed a manipulation based on the work of Higgins, Shah, and Friedman (1997). Accordingly, half of the research participants were given one ticket and told they could earn an additional one. This constituted the manipulation of promotion focus. The other half were given two tickets and told that they might lose one of them. This constituted the manipulation of prevention focus. Success or failure among the different foci conditions should produce distinct emotions. • As found in prior work (e.g., Weiss et al., 1999; Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000), anger-related emotion was supposed to be highest whenever someone lost a desired reward through an unfair process; this was supposed to be so regardless of whether the focus was promotion or prevention because procedural unfairness is a sign of moral impropriety, whatever the situation. However, this prediction was not supported, although the means were in the anticipated direction. • The authors measured the self-conscious emotion of embarrassment. Since losing a bonus that a participant already possessed was deemed to be especially threatening (for similar logic, see Barclay

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et al., 2005), individuals were supposed to be quite embarrassed when the outcome was unfavorable but the process was fair. In other words, it is one thing to have something taken away, but it is quite another to have it taken away through one’s own poor performance! This prediction was supported: individuals reported the highest levels of embarrassment in the prevention focus/no process violation/unfavorable outcome condition. • Pulling these ideas together, happiness was expected to be low in two conditions: (a) when there was a prevention focus but an unfavorable outcome achieved through a fair process, and (b) when there was promotion focus but with an unfavorable outcome achieved through an unfair procedure. This prediction was also supported. This study was the first one to show that the interaction between procedural fairness and outcome favorability may have different shapes regarding the emotions felt depending on the kind of regulatory focus with which participants approach a goal. A somewhat different approach to regulatory focus theory and justice was taken by Brebels, De Cremer, and Sedikides (2008). Brebels et al. were interested in predicting when a procedural injustice would cause someone to retaliate against a harm doer. In their first experiment, they situationally induced either a prevention focus or a promotion focus. Those with a promotion focus were more likely to steal from someone who had treated them unfairly; this was less true for those with a prevention focus. In their second experiment, Brebels et al. again examined the relationship between procedural fairness and retaliation. However, in Study 2 the authors measured regulatory focus as an individual-difference variable. They found that those with a promotion disposition tended to strike back when treated unfairly, but this tendency was less pronounced for individuals with a disposition more oriented toward a prevention focus. Brebels and colleagues (2008) followed up these two successful experiments with three additional studies. These were designed to ascertain the psychological process through which a promotion focus engenders revenge seeking. The researchers obtained support for an intriguing model. Promotion focus tended to make the individual self highly accessible (Study 3). This individual self, which is often competitive and opportunistic, was the proximal cause of retaliation. Even when subjects had a prevention focus, if the individual self was activated, they sought revenge as vigorously as their more promotionally oriented colleagues (Studies 4 and 5). Summary and Critique As we have seen, there is a reasonably sized literature testing regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997; 1998). However, the application to justice and emotion is somewhat tentative and in need of additional investigation. As applied to justice and affect, regulatory focus theory

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addresses an often neglected situation; it considers how individuals feel when something of value is taken away from them, as opposed to not having been granted in the first place. As Brockner and Higgins (2001) observe, this is a common situation in everyday life that can engender deep feelings of moral outrage. Regulatory focus theory provides a conceptual means of understanding these feelings. The data reported by Cropanzano et al. (2008) and Brebels et al. (2008) were mostly supportive of the fact that injustice produces different emotions and therefore attitudes and behaviors depending on the regulatory focus that people have, but future research is encouraged.

Maintaining a Positive Self-Image: SelfEvaluation and Self-Consistency When Cropanzano, Byrne, et al. (2001) proposed the original version of the multiple needs model, they only considered one important psychological mechanism pertaining to self-esteem—self-enhancement. They argued that individuals want to feel good about themselves. While research has extended this earlier conceptualization, self-enhancement has long been an important topic of study (e.g., Jones, 1973) and so it remains (Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Tesser, 2000; Tesser & Martin, 1996). In an insightful and entertaining review, Brown (1993) discusses a number of ways in which human beings systematically select and bias incoming information in order to maintain a positive self-image. No one denies the existence of self-enhancement, and justice scholars have been incorporating it into their theoretical thinking at least as far back as Adams and Freedman (1976), but there is more to the story. Self-enhancement makes sense, insofar as it goes; the problem is that it does not go far enough. As Jones (1973) and Swann and Ely (1984) observed some time ago, there are other processes involved. In particular, individuals are also motivated to confirm their self-views by seeking consistency between themselves and others. This consistency-seeking predilection has been referred to as “self-affirmation” (Wiesenfeld, Brockner, & Martin, 1999) or “self-verification” (Wiesenfeld, Swann, Brockner, & Bartel, 2007). More broadly, Steele (1988) suggested that people are motivated to maintain a sense of “integrity.” This sense of integrity, to be sure, includes a positive self-evaluation and a sense of self-efficacy (that is, the belief that one is competent). Beyond this, integrity also includes a stable self-identity that one carries across different times and situations. This core and consistent sense of identity leads us to seek affirmation of our beliefs about ourselves. Steele’s (1988) analysis is generally consistent with the available justice research on the self and affect. There are two processes that have been investigated—self-enhancement and self-consistency. With respect to feeling states, which is the topic of this book, the most interesting case of self-enhancement is when injustice can

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improve one’s self-esteem. We shall take up this issue in the next section. However, we will not neglect self-affirmation or verification. As we shall see, there is an interesting body of research on this topic as well.

Self-Enhancement: How Injustice Can Raise Self-Esteem Overview Intuitively, indeed almost automatically, it strikes us that injustice is a bad thing. Certainly, being subjected to unfair treatment would be hurtful and, one imagines, would damage our self-esteem. There is good evidence for this. Work by such scholars as Koper, van Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, Vermunt, and Wilke (1993), Smith and Tyler (1997), Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, and Lind (1998), and Tyler, Degoey, and Smith (1996) support the contention that unfairness lowers the self-esteem of the victim by making him or her feel excluded by the others in a valued group. This mechanism is especially at work when the social self is at stake, as should become clear in the next section about the relational models of justice. Some years ago, Mark and Folger (1984) made a different prediction regarding injustice and self-esteem. According to these authors, if individuals wish to uphold their positive self-image, then there will be settings when less justice bolsters self-esteem. The underlying explanation is attributional. If one fails at a task because of injustice, then blame rests externally with the decision maker. One can always believe that “but for that unfairness” success and whatever underlying talent success implies would have been forthcoming. The victim might well be angry (e.g., Weiss et al., 1999), but self-esteem could be preserved by the externalization of responsibility. On the other hand, if one fails due to a fair procedure, then blame rests internally with the self. One could well lack the talent that might otherwise have been demonstrated through successful performance. This could lead one to conclude that one lacks ability at the task in question, thereby lowering self-esteem. Consequently, in achievement settings, experiencing failure through a just process may damage a person’s self-image. Mark and Folger’s (1984) analysis languished for a good ten years until Gilliland (1994) published a study examining procedural fairness in the context of organizational staffing. Gilliland found that self-efficacy dropped when individuals were turned down for a job due to fair procedures.

Evidence for the Self-Enhancement Effect Van den Bos, Bruins, Wilke, and Dronkert (1999) tested this effect in three laboratory experiments. In their Study 1, individuals received a (bogus) favorable or unfavorable evaluation regarding their performance on two experimental tasks. These evaluations were based on

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either an accurate or an inaccurate process. Following this, participants provided what these researchers referred to as “outcome judgments” (p. 327), but what readers of this book will recognize as ratings of affect—happy, agreeable, and hostile. These three items were summed for an overall score. As predicted, when the outcome was unfavorable, individuals felt better when the procedure was inaccurate (that is, unfair) and worse when the procedure was accurate (that is, fair). Studies 2 and 3 found consistent results, though the outcome judgments were not ratings of affect. Study 3 was also important because it gave participants an opportunity to make attributional judgments. Consistent with the theory, van den Bos et al. found that individuals made more external attributions when they failed through an unfair process, while they made more internal attributions when they failed through a fair process. Unlike Gilliland (1994), van den Bos et al. (1999) did not directly measure self-cognitions. Two later experiments by Schroth and Shah (2000) addressed this issue. They found that poor performance (or expectancies of poor performance, see their Study 3) lowered selfesteem if the procedure was just. Schroth and Shah did not assess affect, though based on van den Bos et al.’s findings, one can presume that feelings will covary with self-esteem to some degree. Most recently, the attributional model of self-esteem and justice was tested in four studies by Brockner et al. (2003). Once again, the model received strong support. We hasten to add that these findings should not be taken to imply that injustice bolsters people’s self-image. Unfairness typically has pernicious effects, and that is entirely our point. The desire for selfenhancement can short-circuit some of our usual negative responses to injustice. By providing an external explanation for poor performance, injustice will sometimes allow us to preserve our self-respect. Notice that this self-enhancement process, which is sometimes able to reverse the fair process effect, may be a plausible explanation for the results found by Cropanzano et al.’s (2008) study, which applied regulatory focus theory to justice and emotions. If a prevention focus is more likely than a promotion focus to make people react negatively to a fair process when negative outcomes are allocated, this might be due to the fact that a prevention focus makes people more sensitive to protecting what belongs to them and what is characteristic to them, including their level of self-esteem. Thus, these individuals could be more prone than people with a promotion focus to show the reverse fair process effect accounted for by the attributional model of self-esteem and justice. It is also noteworthy that this effect may be stronger for some people and weaker for others. Holmvall and Bobocel (2008) argued that those with an independent and achievement-oriented identity would respond relatively poorly when they received an unfavorable outcome through a process that was otherwise fair. They indeed base their selfidentity on outperforming others, which makes them more sensitive

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to attribute-relevant information from procedures. Thus, when they receive an unfavorable outcome through a fair process, the negative impact on their self-esteem is stronger, which makes them react more negatively. However, those with an interdependent identity who view themselves as closely tied to others would be more accepting of an adverse outcome, so long as they were otherwise treated justly. Their strong interdependent self-construal makes them indeed more sensitive to the positive social information that they extract from fair procedures. Thus, they react more positively because a negative outcome allocated through a fair procedure has a less deleterious impact on their self-esteem. Findings from three experimental studies supported these hypotheses (for additional evidence, see Bobocel & Zdaniuk, 2010).

An Important Caveat: Self-Enhancement Sometimes Enhances the Impact of Fair Processes We have reviewed a number of experimental tests indicating that fair procedures can harm self-esteem to the extent that they take away an individual’s ability to attribute failure to an external agent (e.g., Gilliland, 1994; van den Bos et al., 1999; Schroth & Shah, 2000; Brockner et al., 2003). It is important to recognize, though, that the aforementioned research tends to emphasize specific outcome exchanges, such as when one is not chosen for a particular job (such as in the study by Gilliland, 1994). One might expect different results when the exchange is ongoing, such as in the relationship between a leader and a subordinate. In this context, De Cremer, van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, Mullenders, and Stinglhamber (2005) suggested an interaction of a different form. Having a rewarding leader is most beneficial to self-esteem when he or she is procedurally just. This is because a fair allocation process suggests that the reward is deserved. Hence, the recipient is worthy and valued as a person. To test these ideas, De Cremer, van Knippenberg and their colleagues (2005) conducted three studies—a role-playing vignette (Study 1), a laboratory experiment (Study 2), and a survey in a work organization (Study€ 3). Despite these differences in methodology, the researchers found the same two-way interaction in each case. Specifically, procedural justice and rewarding leadership interacted, such as rewarding leadership was most effective at boosting selfesteem when procedural justice was high. Even if it seems so, this result is in fact not contradictory with the attributional model of self-esteem and justice. In the studies supporting this model (for example, Schroth & Shah, 2000), self-esteem dropped when the process was fair only if the allocated outcomes were unfavorable. In contrast, when the outcome was favorable, such as in the De Cremer, van Knippenberg et al. (2005) study, which dealt with rewards for a job well done, a fair process was more likely than an unfair one to be able to boost self-esteem.

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Wiesenfeld, Brockner, and Martin’s (1999) Self-Affirmation/Self-Verification Theory Overview As Wiesenfeld, Swann, and their colleagues (2007) observe, self-enhancement and self-verification make identical predictions when an individual receives positive information that is consistent with one’s self-view. Specifically, such information is desirable. However, what about the situation where positive information is inconsistent with one’s self-image? In this situation, self-verification theory would predict that individuals will prefer negative but consistent information. This is a bold hypothesis, but it has empirical support. In one study Giesler, Josephs, and Swann (1996) compared people with high self-esteem to people with low self-esteem. If one’s self-esteem is high, then one should prefer people who provide positive evaluations. The more interesting case is when self-esteem is low. In this circumstance, self-verification theory suggests that a negative evaluation is preferred. Giesler et al. found support for this contention (for additional evidence, see Cast & Burke, 2002; Steele & Liu, 1983; Swann & Pelham, 2002). Self-affirmation theory is drawn from the social psychological literature on self-image and self-esteem. However, it does have a longforgotten history within organizational psychology. In the 1960s and early 1970s, Korman (1966; 1967; 1970) tested his “self-consistency” theory of motivation and occupational choice. In these papers Korman argued for a proto-self-verification theory in which individuals preferred feedback and selected jobs consistent with their self-esteem. Korman’s work was later criticized by Dipboye (1977) on conceptual and methodological grounds (though see Korman, 1977, for a response), and the theory more or less dropped from sight. Among the circles of management scholars, the idea of consistency between the self-esteem and interpersonal treatment was later revived by Wiesenfeld and her colleagues (1999). These authors do not appear to have drawn from Korman’s earlier work. Rather, modern self-verification (or self-affirmation) theory was heavily influenced by social psychological (e.g., Steele, 1988; Steele & Liu, 1983) and clinical (e.g., Cast & Burke, 2002; Giesler et al., 1996) research. Unlike, Korman’s (1966; 1967; 1970) prior work, Wiesenfeld et al. emphasized the role of affect. Self-affirmation theory maintains that people seek to build self-images that are consistent. Conversely, we experience negative emotion when our self-image is threatened (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996). Justice researchers have found that self-affirmation tends to lessen the negative affect that results from injustice (van den Bos, 2001b, Study 2), and this effect is especially strong among those with lower (as opposed to higher) self-esteem (De Cremer & Sedikides, 2005, Study 6). Let us now consider two additional papers in more detail.

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Wiesenfeld, Brockner, and Martin (1999) Since injustice harms the self, it should create negative emotion, to say nothing of other ill effects. Such aversive consequences of injustice should be most likely to exist when (a) victims have no opportunity for reaffirmation and (b) victims are high in private self-consciousness, which accounts for their chronic dispositions to be self-attentive. These moderators follow from the theory. If one can reaffirm the self, even if this is done in a manner that is unrelated to the original threat, then negative emotion should be greatly reduced. Likewise, people who are high in private self-consciousness tend to more closely monitor and are more aware of their emotions. To test these ideas, Wiesenfeld and her coauthors (1999) divided negative emotions into two categories. Emotions that were high in self-consciousness were similar to what Sprecher (1986) and Barclay et al. (2005) termed “inward-focused”; these included shame and guilt. Emotions that were low in self-consciousness are similar to what Sprecher and Barclay et al. termed “outward-focused”; these included scared and irritable. They then conducted an experiment in which justice was manipulated in a fashion that included both distributive and interactional effects (p. 450). Results of their experiment were complex but supportive. Generally speaking, self-conscious negative emotions were highest when participants were treated unfairly, but the more important finding was a significant three-way interaction. The highest level of negative selfconscious emotions occurred when (a) there was an injustice, (b) there was no opportunity for reaffirmation, and (c) victims were high in private self-consciousness. Another interesting finding was the difference between self-conscious and non-self-conscious emotions. When participants were high in private self-consciousness and also treated unfairly, this difference was large—more negative self-conscious emotions were reported. When participants were low in private self-consciousness and also treated unfairly, this difference was small—fewer negative self-relevant emotions were reported. While keeping in mind that Wiesenfeld et al.’s (1999) justice manipulation combined an unfortunate outcome with an unfortunate interpersonal transaction, it is interesting to compare their findings to other studies. Though the measures are somewhat different, Wiesenfeld et al.’s findings for non-self-conscious emotions are generally consistent with results obtained by Barclay et al. (2005). Barclay et al. found that outward-focused emotions (anger plus hostility) were uniformly high in the presence of an interactional injustice. The more controversial case is to be found when emotions were high in self-consciousness. In the Wiesenfeld et al. (1999) experiment, these included shame and guilt. Barclay and her colleagues (2005) also examined whether interactional justice could predict guilt and shame (what they termed inward-focused emotions). Consistent with the

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attributional model of self-esteem and justice, Barclay et al. found that guilt and shame were high when interactional justice was high and the outcome was unfavorable. This is, of course, distinct from Wiesenfeld et al., who found on the basis of self-affirmation theory that low (interactional + distributive) justice produced more guilt and shame. Future research is needed to reconcile these seemingly contradictory findings.

Wiesenfeld, Swann, Brockner, and Bartel (2007) Further evidence pertaining to the self-verification theory of justice and emotion was provided in a series of five studies reported by Wiesenfeld et al. (2007). The purpose of these studies was to test the relationship between procedural justice and commitment. Procedural justice and commitment tend to be positively related (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2001). Wiesenfeld and her colleagues added an interesting caveat. Based on self-verification theory, these authors maintained that high self-esteem individuals will expect and feel deserving of fair processes, but this will be less true for those with low self-esteem (for a similar argument and supportive findings, see Heuer et al., 1999, Study 3). Consequently, the relationship between procedural justice and commitment should be stronger for those with high self-esteem and weaker for those with low self-esteem. Each of the five studies was consistent with the notion, including an experiment that directly tested the meditational role of self-verification (Study 5). The primary criterion variable for Wiesenfeld et al. (2007) was commitment, not affect, and at first glance this would seem to make the paper beyond the scope of the present book. However, one needs to carefully read their Footnote 9 on page 1248. This footnote refers to some supplemental analyses that were conducted for their Study 5. The authors had two measures of emotion—anger and a confusion scale. The confusion scale was based on the sum of two items—“uncertain” and “confused.” Interestingly, procedural justice and self-esteem significantly interacted to predict confusion. There was a nonsignificant trend for the anger variable. Based on these findings, Wiesenfeld et al. (2007) suggest an interesting possibility. They argue that emotion may indeed be important for theory. However, unlike other frameworks, they suggest that confusion, not anger, is the central driver. While these affect data are tentative, they are suggestive. At the very least, these findings should caution future researchers not to limit their analyses to the most obvious emotions, such as anger and resentment, and to include other affective states. Simple confusion might be a good place to begin. In an earlier study, Skoe, Eisenberg, and Cumberland (2002, p. 967) examined undergraduates’ affective reactions to various emotional dilemmas. As part of their study they formed a scale measuring what they termed “Upset.” It contained three items—“uncertain,” “turmoil,” and “confusion.” These feelings of turmoil and confusion were

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especially likely to result when the moral dilemma was important to the �respondent. Clearly, confusion deserves additional scrutiny.

Summary and Critique As the juxtaposition between the work of Wiesenfeld et al. (1999) and Barclay et al. (2005) suggests, self-affirmation theory makes predictions that are at least somewhat distinct from those of the more widely studied cognitive appraisal model. Specifically, cognitive appraisal theory suggests that high interactional justice plus an unfavorable outcome will produce guilt and shame. Self-affirmation theory suggests that low (not high) justice is the actual culprit. A resolution to this issue must await future research. In addition to this empirical question, there is more theoretical work to be done. When negative but consistent feedback is offered, two different predictions are possible—one for self-enhancement (the feedback will be rejected in order to protect the self) and the other for self-verification (the feedback will be embraced in order to produce consistency between people’s and others’ views about themselves). In effect, almost any findings can be taken to support one theory or the other. The only way out of this paradox of nonfalsifiability is to consider when individuals will engage in self-enhancement and when they will engage in self-verification. Closer attention to situational moderators would be especially useful. In this regard, the work of Wiesenfeld et al. (2007) is an excellent start.

The Social Self: Tyler (1994) and the Relational Models of Justice Thus far this chapter has emphasized theories that pertain to selfÂ�esteem (e.g., Brockner et al.’s [1998] control theory) and selfÂ�consistency (e.g., Wiesenfeld et al.’s [2007] self-verification theory). In this section we turn our attention to a different kind of model. As we shall see, the work of Tyler and his colleagues (e.g., Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Smith, 1998) emphasizes the social self, or how we review ourselves as members of valued groups (for a thorough review of this concept, see Forgas & Williams, 2002). Later in the chapter we will turn our attention to the moral self, or how people construe their identities as ethical agents (Skitka, 2003).

Overview For many years, Tyler and his colleagues have been studying a series of related theoretical frameworks. These have been termed the group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996), the relational model of authority (Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Lind, 1992),

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and the group engagement model (Blader & Tyler, 2005; 2009; Tyler & Blader, 2002a; 2002b). Collectively, De Cremer and Tyler (2005) refer to this family of related theories as the “relational models of justice” (p. 121), and we shall employ their nomenclature (for similar terminology, see also De Cremer & Blader, 2006). The relational models represent an evolving and rich tradition of scholarship, and each of these frameworks has unique features of its own. Unfortunately, a complete review of this work is beyond the scope of the present chapter (the reader is referred to Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Smith, 1999; Blader & Tyler, 2005). Our goal will be to point out the commonalities among these frameworks, with an emphasis on how they contribute to emotion. The touchstone for the relational models is the important observation that people are social animals. Normal human beings wish to participate in social groups and to have meaningful relationships with other people (see Baumeister & Leary, 1995, for an excellent review). The relational models maintain that group standing impacts one’s sense of self-worth (e.g., Aquino & Douglas, 2003; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003; Tyler & Blader, 2002a, 2002b; 2003). Our concern for justice, especially procedural and plausibly interactional justice, follows from our desire for inclusion. Lack of respect, such as when one is treated unfairly by teammates, may indicate that one is not valued or important to the group. This undermines one’s status and, therefore, is a major reason that people are concerned with justice. On the other hand, when individuals receive justice, this affirms their social identities. This, in turn, leads fairly treated workers to perform helpful citizenship behaviors that benefit their employers (Blader & Tyler, 2009). While each of the relational models have unique features, their overall support is quite strong, suggesting that individuals care about justice, at least in part, because it provides a signal that they are respected within a valued group (Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Smith, 1998; 1999).

How Injustice Can Lower Self-Esteem Earlier in this chapter we discussed self-enhancement. In the course of doing so, we reviewed a number of studies suggesting that failure in an achievement situation can have less pernicious effects on self-esteem when the process is unfair, rather than fair. This is because an unfair process allows us to attribute our failures to the malfeasance of others (e.g., Gilliland, 1994; van den Bos et al., 1999; Schroth & Shah, 2000; Brockner et al., 2003). At the time we reviewed this literature, we also qualified these findings by considering three studies by De Cremer, van Knippenberg and their colleagues (2005). De Cremer, van Knippenberg et al. found that rewarding leadership can increase the impact of fair procedures when the outcomes are favorable. Now we shall qualify these findings a second time. As the studies conducted by Holmvall and Bobocel (2008) about the role of interdependent self-construal suggest, while it is certainly true that individuals seek psychological control

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(Cropanzano, Byrne, et al., 2001; Skinner, 1996), the relational models of justice point out that we have a social motive as well. When this social motive is activated, the relational models suggest that injustice will damage self-esteem (Tyler & Smith, 1998; 1999). This is because unfair treatment signals exclusion from valued groups and a lack of standing and worth. For example, a scenario experiment by De Cremer (2002) found that a violation of the equity rule, which is a type of distributive injustice, lowered self-esteem, though the size of this effect was influenced by other factors. A number of other studies have obtained similar results and shown that procedural injustice can harm self-esteem as well (for evidence, see De Cremer, van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, Mullenders, & Stinglhamber, 2005; Koper, van Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1993; Smith & Tyler, 1997; Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996). Regarding procedural justice and self-esteem, four particularly compelling experiments were reported by De Cremer and Sedikides (2008). In their first study, undergraduate research participants either received or did not receive voice in an experimental task. They were further told that they would be identifiable or nonidentifiable to other research subjects. When participants were denied voice, they believed that the experimenter showed less concern for their reputation than when they received voice. This effect was stronger for those subjects whose lack of voice was identifiable to others. Study 2 examined the effects of denied voice on self-esteem. Participants read a hypothetical scenario about workers that had been denied voice when being considered for a promotion. Individuals reported that this lack of voice would impair their self-esteem, but this effect was only significant for participants with a good deal of concern for their reputation. Those who worried less over their reputation did not exhibit the diminished self-esteem. These findings were replicated in Study 3, in which voice was actually denied to research participants. Finally, Study 4 found that the negative impact of procedural justice on self-esteem was larger for those with good reputations and weaker for those with poor reputations. Taken together, these findings provide strong support for the relational models of justice, and especially highlight the importance of procedural fairness. Notice, of course, that the relational models maintain that the need to belong, a specific psychological mechanism, drives the adverse effect that injustice has on self-esteem (Goldman, Slaughter, Schmit, Wiley, & Brooks, 2008). If this is so, then individuals who are high in the need for belonging should respond more favorably to procedural justice than will individuals who are low in the need for belonging. In a series of three studies, De Cremer and Blader (2006) explored this possibility. In their first experiment, they had 83 Dutch undergraduates complete a short survey instrument that measured their need to belong. They then provided these subjects with a role-playing vignette. In this scenario a workplace decision was made through either voice or no-voice

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procedures. Affect was measured by asking participants the extent to which they would be angry and disappointed. Self-evaluation was assessed by asking the individuals to rate how competent and dissatisfied with themselves they would be. For both of these measures, De Cremer and Blader found the expected two-way interaction between voice and need to belong. Specifically, negative affect was highest and self-Â�evaluations were lowest when individuals were high in need to belong but were denied voice. This is consistent with the notion that unfairness creates bad feelings while also impairing self-esteem. Supporting the notion that social standing is essential to understanding justice, these ill effects were strongest for those high in the need to belong. In passing it is worth noting that Studies 2 and 3 also supported De Cremer and Blader’s (2006) predictions. However, neither affect nor self-evaluations was the focus of these projects.

Self-Evaluations as Moderators Social Self-Esteem as a Moderator There is another way to integrate self-esteem into our thinking. It may moderate the impact of justice. We have already considered a number of studies that tested this effect. Whether for reasons of control (Brockner et al., 1998) or self-affirmation (Wiesenfeld et al., 2007), this work suggests that justice brings greater benefits to those with high, rather than low, self-esteem. Despite this evidence, it is possible that social selfesteem, which is concerned with how one is esteemed by others, could show different effects. Whereas Brockner and his colleagues examined general perceptions of self-esteem, De Cremer, van Knippenberg, van Dijke, and Bos (2004) explored social self-esteem. De Cremer and his collaborators maintained that justice builds feelings of inclusion, and these feelings are most valued by those who are predisposed to lack them. Thus, fair treatment should maximally benefit those with low, as opposed to high, social self-esteem. De Cremer and his colleagues found strong support for this effect in one field study (De Cremer et al., 2004) and two experiments (De Cremer, 2003, Studies 2 and 3). Consistent findings were also obtained by Vermunt, van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, and Blaauw (2001). A Remaining Problem? The analysis presented by De Cremer (2003) and by De Cremer et al. (2004) would seem to settle the issue. Low social self-esteem exaggerates justice effects, while high general self-esteem does the same. This explanation appears sound, and it may have much truth, though careful readers of this chapter might recognize two findings left to explain. Let us begin with a study that replicated the Brockner et al. (1998) finding that those with high self-esteem responded most profoundly to

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justice. However, this study measured social (not general) self-esteem. Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas, and Weinblatt (1999) published three studies. Each study explored a different moderator that impacted the size of the relationship between respectful treatment and procedural justice perceptions. In their Study 3, Heuer and his collaborators investigated whether self-esteem would interact with respectfulness. They found that those with high self-esteem benefited more from respect, while those with low self-esteem benefited less. As mentioned above, this is generally consistent with the Brockner et al. (1998) results for general self-esteem, and this is worrisome since Heuer et al. measured social self-esteem (see page 1288 in their study). In other words, Heuer et al. report a situation where social self-esteem is acting the way that general self-esteem is supposed to behave. Now let us return to Miedema et al.’s (2006) first experiment. These authors reported that a threat to the self led people to respond more strongly to justice. In other words, in their findings, threat (which presumably lowered self-esteem) is acting the way social self-esteem is supposed to behave. The manipulation of self-threat used here has elements that are social (other people believing the subject is unintelligent) and nonsocial (behaving unintelligently). Thus, it is not clear where these findings support the contention of De Cremer (2003) and De Cremer et al. (2004). They may, if we take the threat as social, and they may not, if we take the threat as general. Given the mixed and ambiguous findings regarding general and social self-esteem in their links to injustice, we can only call for additional inquiry. As alluded to above, the solution to this disagreement may best be resolved by close attention to the psychological processes involved. Whenever low self-esteem is predicted to render the stronger effects, the mechanism involves a deficit reduction. Specifically, a positive sense of self was denied and the victim wishes to use fairness to restore his or her self-concept. This is a type of self-enhancement (e.g., Tesser, 2000). When high self-esteem is predicted to render the stronger effects, something else is involved. Either the victim enters the situation expecting control (Brockner et al., 1998) or else the victim is engaging in selfverification (Wiesenfeld et al., 2007). Self-esteem might be a single construct (or two constructs if one separates it into social and nonsocial components), but it seems to involve three distinct processes: • Self-esteem maintenance or enhancement (the mechanism tested by Miedema et al., 2006) • Expectations of control (the mechanism tested by Brockner et al., 1998) • Self-verification (the mechanism tested by Wiesenfeld et al., 2007) Findings are conflicting because a single construct (self-esteem) is being used to investigate at least three different theories—self-enhancement, self and control, and self-verification. Since virtually everyone

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seeks to enhance their self-esteem (sometimes), has greater or lesser expectations of control (sometimes), and seeks to verify their self-image (sometimes), then either set of findings are to be expected in some situations but not in others. Clear predictions cannot be made until scholars begin to pay closer attention to those aspects of the research setting, and perhaps individual differences as well, that engage one process rather than the other two. Self-Uncertainty as a Moderator The relational models support similar predictions with respect to selfuncertainty (for a thorough review, see Sedikides, De Cremer, Hart, & Brebels, 2010). According to De Cremer and Sedikides (2005), individuals who are high in self-uncertainty are more vulnerable to injustice as they have fewer internal resources to call upon. In essence, unfairness more easily persuades them of their lack of worth. Those who are low in self-uncertainty have greater confidence in themselves. A bout with unfairness should have a weaker effect on them. The results of six experiments reported by De Cremer and Sedikides (2005) support these conclusions, even when the absolute level of selfesteem is controlled (see their Studies 1 and 5). Most relevant to the present chapter were the studies that examined affect as dependent variables. In De Cremer and Sedikides’ Study 2, for example, unfairly treated individuals reported diminished positive affect, but only when their self-esteem was unstable. In their Study 3 and Study 5, injustice led to increased negative affect, but only for participants who were high in self-doubt.

The Relational Models and Emotion As we have seen, self-esteem is important to the relational models, but it is not the only self-relevant concern. To summarize the key idea once again—people care about their standing and dignity within valued social groups. For this reason, considerations such as reputation and respect are important signals of our worth to others. As one might expect, they also have implications for emotions. Building on these ideas, De Cremer and Tyler (2005) argued that not all individuals care about respect to the same degree. Additionally, they posited differing emotional responses depending on how much an individual values respect. In short, these scholars tested the idea that concern for respect would moderate the effect that justice would typically have on emotional responses. Three of their six studies measured emotions as a dependent variable (Studies 1, 5, and 6). We elaborate on the findings of those studies below. De Cremer and Tyler’s (2005) first study examined the salience of the desire to belong to a group. Their Studies 5 and 6 looked at concern for individual reputation. The authors hypothesized that individuals would display more positive emotions when they were treated with respect

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as opposed to disrespect. Moreover, they posited that the anticipated effect in their first hypothesis (i.e., the effect of respect) would be more pronounced when subjects were primed to think about belongingness and reputation. In their first study, De Cremer and Tyler (2005) operationalized respect by asking participants to recall a time when they were either respected or disrespected and write a short story about it. Belongingness was then primed by either having participants write about themselves using the words “I” or “we” (Stapel & Koomen, 2001). The idea behind this prime is that participants who write about themselves as an individual (“I” prime) will not feel like they are a part of the group. However, those participants that are primed with “we” should feel like they belong to the group. In the “I” condition, subjects wrote a short story about themselves using “neutral descriptive terms.” Furthermore, subjects were told that each sentence had to include one of the following words: I, me, myself, or mine. On the other hand, in the “we” condition, subjects were instructed to write a story about “who we are” using one of the following words in each sentence: we, our, ourselves, or ours. The “we” referred to the group of four subjects participating in the experiment at the same time. Following this task, the dependent variables were measured. To measure positive emotions, subjects used a 7-point scale with endpoints labeled not at all and very much. Participants answered questions such as: “to what extent do you feel positive toward others in your department,” “… feel happy in your department,” and “… feel comfortable in your department.” The results supported their hypotheses as there was a significant interaction between respect and belongingness. More explicitly, the effect of respect versus disrespect was significant when participants were primed with an “I” but not when they were primed with the “we.” Hence, their findings suggest that perceiving respect (a form of interactional justice) can impact emotions. However, this may only be the case when individuals do not feel that they are part of a group and therefore desire to belong to it (i.e., the “I” prime). Thus, it appears that concern for justice is linked to emotions via a need to belong. To further strengthen their findings, De Cremer and Tyler (2005) conducted another study (Study 5) in which they explicitly manipulated respect. To begin the experiment, participants completed a reputation scale that was created for their study. Following the reputation scale, subjects were expressly informed whether or not they were respected by the other fictitious group members via a scenario. Next, dependent variables were measured. Participants’ positive emotions were measured by asking them, “To what extent do you feel satisfied and cheerful.” Participants’ negative emotions were gauged by asking them, “To what extent do you feel disappointed and sad.” As anticipated, in terms of positive emotions, the respect effect was stronger when subjects had a greater concern for their reputation. On the other hand, participants reported higher levels of negative emotions when they felt disrespected

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as opposed to respected by others. Unlike positive emotions, a Â�significant effect of reputation was found with negative emotions. Participants high in concern for reputation reported more negative emotions than individuals low in concern for their reputation. Finally, the anticipated interaction was found—the effect of respect on negative emotions was greater when subjects had a high concern for their reputation. By studying concern for reputation (Study 5), in addition to belongingness (Study 1), the authors increased confidence surrounding their findings relating justice and emotions. In Study 6, De Cremer and Tyler (2005) looked to further bolster their findings by examining the idea of identifiability and reputation. They hypothesized that making an individual more identifiable in the group should increase his or her reputation concerns. Therefore, easily identifiable individuals should react more strongly than less easily identifiable individuals when there are variations in respect. Similar to Study 5, Study 6 used a scenario. However, there was an additional identifiability manipulation that informed the participant that he or she had personally received respect and would have to report back to the group and provide an explanation about this. In the no identifiability condition, participants were told that they did not personally receive respect and would not have to provide feedback to their group. Following the identifiability manipulation, positive emotions were measured. As anticipated, individuals in the high identifiability condition expressed more positive emotions than those participants in the no identifiability condition. Additionally, the effect of respect on emotions was more pronounced for participants in the high identifiability conditions than in the no identifiability conditions. In sum, Studies 1, 5, and 6 demonstrated that people are concerned about their reputation within groups and this can impact their emotional reactions. Also, not all individuals care about respect at all times. It appears that when reputational concerns are high, respect is more important than when reputation isn’t as important. Regardless, what is clear is that receiving respect and being treated fairly is important to feeling that one belongs to a large entity. When one is not confident that they have been treated with respect, negative emotional reactions will most likely follow.

Relational Models and Observer Effects The examples thus far tend to emphasize how one will react when he or she directly experiences unfairness. However, research by Skarlicki and his colleagues (Ellard & Skarlicki, 2002; Skarlicki et al., 1998; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005) clearly indicates that people react strongly when they see others treated unfairly. How do the relational models fit into this picture? Actually quite well. The relational models have consistently maintained that people are not exclusively selfish (Lind & Tyler 1988; Tyler & Dawes, 1993), that they are concerned with group identification

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(e.g.,Tyler & Blader, 2002a; 2002b; 2003) and even self–other merging (De Cremer, Tyler, & den Ouden, 2005). As a result, the models anticipate that individuals are moved by the victimization of others. However, the relational models further predict that third-party fairness will evoke stronger reactions when the victim in question has a relationship with the observer. That is, shared ingroup membership tends to evoke stronger feelings of identification and, as a consequence, greater concerns with fair play. This seems to be what occurs. In two experiments, De Cremer and Van Hiel (2006, Study 1 and Study 3) found that people experienced more positive emotion and less negative emotion when a coworker was treated with procedural justice. However, this effect was strongest when the coworker in question had been helpful to the subject. As another example, consider a study of layoff survivors conducted by Brockner (1990). After downsizing has occurred, workers who retain their jobs will sometimes view the layoffs as unfair. Among such survivors, Brockner found that decreases in performance and commitment were most strongly related to injustice when the victims (those who had lost their jobs) were similar to those with continued employment. When the victims were viewed as different from the survivors, then survivors showed a weaker relationship between commitment and justice and also between performance and justice. In other words, unfairness toward a similar other evokes a stronger response than unfairness toward an outgroup member. Consistent with the De Cremer and Van Hiel (2006) results, this effect may have been mediated by emotions.

Summary and Critique It is difficult to overstate the impact that the relational models have had on justice scholarship. During the 1980s and into the 1990s, earlier versions of these frameworks were the only available alternative to the more instrumental control models (for earlier reviews, see Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler, 1994). Likewise, relational theorists were among the first to critically challenge the belief that fairness could be reduced to veiled self-interest (e.g., Tyler & Dawes, 1993; Tyler & Smith, 1998). It is a testament to the strength of these models that these notions are part of the conventional wisdom among current scholars. This was not the case 15 years ago. Nor is the contribution of the relational models purely historical. As we have seen in our review, scholarship continues to evolve with the recently formulated group engagement model (Blader & Tyler, 2005; Tyler & Blader, 2002a) and even greater emphasis on the social self (De Cremer, 2002; 2003). Related work even suggests that fair processes may cause subordinates to fuse their identities with those of their supervisor (De Cremer, Tyler, & den Ouden, 2005). There is, however, one caveat we would like to make before we move on. As important as social factors are in the perception of fairness, we saw in the prior chapter that people also have moral or deontic concerns

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(Cropanzano, Stein, & Goldman, 2007; Folger et al., 2005; Lerner, 2003). To illustrate, let us consider three families of offences identified by Bies and Tripp (2004)—rule violation, status derogation, and goal blockage. Goal blockage seems close to concerns about control and one’s ability to influence important outcomes (e.g., Thibaut & Walker, 1975; 1978). Status derogation seems very close to concern about social standing, which is central to the relational models (Tyler & Blader, 2002a; 2002b; 2003). Rule violation, apart from its effects on instrumental control and status, is quite consistent with concerns over moral duty and the ethical treatment of others (e.g., Folger, 2001; Lerner, 2003; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2008). Recall further, that individuals will forgo money to punish an unjust person even when they remain anonymous and unable to benefit from their actions (Kahneman et al., 1986; Turillo et al., 2002). This sort of evidence suggests that individuals have deontic concerns. These are important even beyond their impact on social standing. We close this section by emphasizing the value of the relational models and the importance of interpersonal concerns. However, we further recognize that there is another piece in the puzzle. In the next section we will discuss how these moral concerns can be incorporated into the self.

The Moral Self The reader of a philosophical bent may have reason to be disappointed with our chapter thus far. The “self,” as we have described it, is indeed an impoverished one. We see a person struggling to maintain control, and failing in those dealings that occur in the real world, at least looking to build his or her own self-esteem. True, we also remain social animals, but this is a society of individuals seeking standing. Deeper and more varied, at least, than Homo economicus, but still attending carefully to received esteem from others. Where, as Wright and Goodstein (2007) lament of our discipline as a whole, is the character in this self? It was not always so. Morris (1997) reminds us that Aristotle saw justice as a virtue, and Kirk (1987) says the same of Plato. Peterson and Seligman (2004) go further. After an in-depth review of the literature, including a consideration of evidence gathered from different cultures, Peterson and Seligman constructed a list of 24 character strengths, which were then organized into six basic virtues. These include justice, but also wisdom, courage, humanity, temperance, and transcendence. In this very book, we have reviewed evidence presented by Folger (2001; Folger et al., 2005), Lerner (2003), and Skitka et al. (2008) attesting to the human concern with moral (or deontic) matters. Given all of this, we must see our discussion of the self as so far incomplete. To be sure, control, self-esteem, and social standing matter, but beyond this there seems to be a concern with one’s ethical duty, or if we state the matter more simply, doing what is “right” as opposed to what is personally beneficial. At the very least, what is needed is an approach

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to moral reasoning that treats justice as a sort of individual difference or aspect of character.

Skitka and Colleagues’ (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Skitka & Houston, 2001; Skitka€& Mullen, 2002) Moral Mandate Effect Back in Chapter 1 we introduced the reader to the “fair process effect.” This is an old idea among justice scholars (going back to Folger et al., 1979). It states that fair procedures will partially allay the ill will that would otherwise result from a negative outcome. As we have seen throughout this book, the fair process effect has long had a good deal of support (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Or does it? Skitka and Houston (2001) suggested that “moral mandates” can create an important boundary condition. There are limits to how much a fair process can alleviate the ill will that comes from certain types of events. Moral mandates are “self-expressive moral positions or stands” (p. 305). An individual with a moral mandate takes a certain position (e.g., pro-choice or pro-life) because it reflects his or her core ethical values. A moral mandate is akin to an attitude, but one held with deep moral conviction (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Among other things, moral mandates reverse the fair process effect. When a moral mandate is violated, the process is likely to be derogated simply by virtue of the fact that the procedure upsets an important value. Skitka and Houston (2001) tested this possibility in two studies (three studies, if one counts their Study 1a and Study 1b as separate studies). In Study 1b, undergraduate research participants read one of three vignettes. An individual was on trial for burglary and murder. This defendant was either clearly guilty, clearly innocent, or else the evidence was ambiguous. Skitka and Houston found the usual fair process effect when the evidence was uncertain. Otherwise, both the outcome and procedure were seen as more fair when the guilty defendant was convicted and the innocent defendant was acquitted. These findings were replicated in their Study 2, though with a different legal case. In a longitudinal study, Skitka and Mullen (2002) investigated reactions to the forced deportation of Elián González. The best predictors of the final fairness judgments were the subjects’ initial moral mandates (for related evidence, Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). As important as the moral mandate effect seems to be, heretofore it does not seem especially affective. What is the role of feelings? Skitka (2002) explored emotion in a general way. She found that moral mandates regarding certain issues (e.g., immigration, abortion, civil rights) predicted “moral outrage” toward Supreme Court decisions or state referendums when these were inconsistent with respondents’ convictions. The three-item measure of “moral outrage” includes one item that assessed anger—“How angry would you be about this outcome?” (p. 592). It appears that feeling states are

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important to the theory, and this is consistent with other evidence (Skoe et al., 2002). In two more recent experiments, Mullen and Skitka (2006; Studies 1 and 2) go further. They found that feelings are central to understanding the moral mandate effect. Based on a thorough review of the literature, Mullen and Skitka identified three possible mechanisms though which moral mandates might impact judgments of fairness. These were: • A cognitive mechanism whereby individuals carefully attended to processing errors when their personal convictions were not validated. • An interpersonal mechanism whereby individuals see those who do not share their mandates as out-group members (see also Skitka et al., 2005). • An affective mechanism whereby anger over the outcome colors subsequent judgments of fairness. Mullen and Skitka found consistent support for the anger hypothesis. Moreover, it was anger at the outcome—the violation of a moral Â�mandate—and not the process that caused the effect. Feelings seem to be driving judgments regarding moral issues, a finding that should not surprise readers of this book (and if it does, see Haidt, 2001; 2003a; 2003b; 2006; Skoe et al, 2002, for additional evidence).

Summary and Critique The moral mandate hypothesis is one of those rare social scientific conceptual events that force us to reinterpret earlier theoretical statements. It seems that the venerable fair process effect should heretofore carry an asterisk reminding the reader that it applies when respondents do not have strong moral convictions about the outcomes. When a moral mandate is present, on the other hand, a violation will induce anger and this anger, in turn, may lead individuals to derogate the process and the outcome.

Future Research Directions As we have seen throughout the four sections of this chapter, at least four different sets of concerns can be activated depending on the types of deep motives or needs that are at stake for certain individuals in certain situations. These distinct self-identities shape, in turn, the relationship between justice and affect in specific and sometimes contradictory ways. This diversity of the self creates a difficult task for justice researchers. Different identities and various psychological processes can push us in sundry directions. Unless one specifies which identity is active, multiple sets of findings can be seen as “confirming” one prediction or another. From a meta-theoretical perspective, one can address this problem by viewing the self as a system not (only) considering one identity at a time. Brockner and

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his colleagues (1998) take a control theory approach; De Cremer (2003) considers the relational identity; Skitka and Houston (2001) explore what we have here termed the moral self. Since most people have multiple selfidentities, each model is likely to be valid depending upon which identity is activated at the time. Scholars need to appreciate the complexity of the self (Baumeister, 1995; 1998; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). The human working memory cannot hold every possible self-view in consciousness at the same time. Individuals will experience different emotions, and respond and behave differently to justice and injustice, depending upon which selfidentity happens to be accessible (Skitka, 2003). Future justice inquiry should consider how the different self-views work together as a system in order to determine emotion. As we shall see in our next section, even conceptually distinct identities can operate in combination.

How Much Unity? How Much Diversity? This chapter was organized around the multiple needs model, with its four motives for fairness—control, self-regard, belonging, and deonance (cf. Colquitt et al., 2006; Cropanzano, Byrne, et al., 2001). Skitka (2003) presents a somewhat different taxonomy of three separate identities, each of which might be accessible at different times. Whatever the merits of these frameworks, we do not wish to imply that the different aspects of the self can be discretely divided. Matters are not so clean, and our identities overlap a great deal. Future work should investigate the manner in which different identities work together. As an example, let us return to the De Cremer and Van Hiel (2006) studies that were discussed earlier. These authors suggested that Â�people tend to care more about third-party justice when it involves people with whom they have some sort of positive relationship. It strikes us that the social motives described by the relational model, and the normative motives described by deontic justice, are intimately related. We more easily extend our “circle of moral regard” to ingroup members who are similar to us (cf. Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005). Is there hope for justice beyond this all-too-small group? It is too early to be certain, but work by Reed and Aquino (2003) provides cause for optimism. These authors found that individuals with strong moral identities were more concerned with injustice toward outgroups than were individuals with weak moral identities. Research of this kind has not been directly applied to justice and affect, but it clearly could be. In this respect, the construct of moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002) that was used in this study and that we reviewed in the former chapter would be useful to investigate the role of the moral self in driving the relationships between justice and emotions.

Everything in Its Place—Including Justice Different self-identities may activate different types of relationships between justice and emotions and make people respond in different

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ways to fairness and unfairness, which makes the integration of the different motives important to study for justice researchers. However, things become even more complex when we delve into what constitutes moral identity and ethical behavior. As we have seen, scholars such as Peterson and Seligman (2004), Morris (1997), and Wright and Goodstein (2007) (to say nothing of Aristotle and Plato!) all affirm the importance of justice to ethical character. However, all agree that justice is not the only virtue that people should cultivate. The list of six presented by Peterson and Seligman is instructive—justice, to be sure, but also wisdom, courage, humanity, temperance, and transcendence. A key insight here is that, when making moral decisions, every person does not use exactly the same subset of virtues (Haidt, 2006). Different cultures, as well as different political ideologies, may emphasize distinct virtues (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). This can lead to misunderstandings. To illustrate, let us consider two examples. When deciding what constitutes proper conduct, Western societies tend to place a great deal of emphasis on justice and compassion (cf. Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). An action is proper if it is fair and if it is generous toward the needs of other persons. As reasonable as it may appear, it is a somewhat limited approach in that it draws on two of the six virtues, justice and humanity. Other cultures draw on a larger set of moral intuitions. For example, a meta-analytic investigation by Li, Bagger, and Cropanzano (2005) found that East Asian respondents were less likely to be influenced by fairness than were their counterparts in the United States. Li and Cropanzano do not argue that Asians are less moral than North Americans, nor even that Americans are especially fair. The problem is practical. If one only engages a few virtues, then it is easier to consistently conform to any one of these. On the other hand, if one is trying to craft appropriate conduct from a larger subset of considerations, then practical trade-offs will sometimes necessitate that any one will be de-emphasized in order to balance others. A similar misunderstanding concerns liberals and conservatives in the United States. Haidt and Graham (2007) argued and found that political liberals tend to emphasize justice and humanity, whereas political conservatives rest their moral choices on a different set of foundations. In other words, when compared to political liberals, conservatives appear to use a larger set of moral intuitions as opposed to focusing on justice and humanity. This is not to say that conservatives are more moral than liberals (or liberals more fair than conservatives), but they are not less so either. The point of this analysis is to suggest that moral thinking has a number of potential foundations, and scholars should learn to study—and perhaps even respect—all of them. This means that moral identities, depending on the particular of virtues upon which they are built, can produce even more complex relationships between justice and emotions. For example, when morality is based on compassion, it could make people become more interactionally fair and at the same time more accepting of

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procedural injustices (Blader, Rothman, and Gonzalez, 2008). As certain people in certain cultures or with certain ideologies seem not to use the same sets of virtues as the basis for their moral conduct, future research should try to investigate the different impact these distinct sets of virtues can have on justice and emotions. There seems to be more than one way to be moral and, as such, more than one way to be fair.

ch a p t er

5

Mood and Emotion as Causes of Justice So far we have only considered one causal relationship between justice and affect—the former engenders the latter. The experimental evidence we have already discussed, especially in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, supports this contention. That said, while a justice-to-affect paradigm seems to be the dominant perspective among fairness scholars, it is not the only possibility. Scher and Heise (1993), for example, suggest that the causal arrow may go in the other direction. According to their affect control theory, which we review later in this chapter, justice and emotions are correlated because the experience of negative emotion prompts one to cognitively evaluate fairness. Without this emotional “shove,” individuals are less likely to do the cognitive work necessary to ascertain justice. Similarly, in his social intuitionist model of moral judgment Haidt (2000; 2001; 2006) argues that our feelings precede and then influence our subsequent ethical decisions. In addition to this view of affect impacting the process of fairness evaluation, other more content-oriented approaches, such as uncertainty management theory (van den Bos and Lind, 2002), which we also review later in the chapter, show how affect might also become an input in the whole judgment process. Of course, it need not be one or the other. In an insightful conceptual paper, Mullen (2007) maintains that the relationship between justice and feeling states is reciprocal. To be sure, people’s emotions are influenced by (un)fairness. However, as this chapter will show, the reverse appears to be true as well. One’s feelings predispose people to appraise events as fair or unfair. In this chapter, we discuss theories that treat mood states as antecedents of justice perceptions. We also turn our attention to discrete emotions as causes of fairness perceptions.

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Mood vs. Emotion: A Short Review of Essential Definitions At this point, it is useful to expand upon three terms—affect, mood,€and emotions—that we introduced in Chapter 1 (Weiss & Brief, 2001). Affect is the most general term, while mood and emotions are expressions of affect. Specifically, affect is a term that refers to one’s feelings. Moods and emotions are different types of affect. Based on prior work, we maintain that there are at least five essential differences between mood and emotion (e.g., Fredrickson, 2001; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Weiss, 2002; Weiss & Brief, 2001; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). • First, emotions are tied to a target. For example, I may be angry (an emotion) at my supervisor (the target), for denying me a promotion (a failure situation; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). However, much of the time, our feelings are not associated with a particular stimulus. When an affective state lacks a target, it is referred to as a mood (Cropanzano, Weiss, Hale, & Reb, 2003). Mood is a broad term, as when one says “I feel good” (positive affectivity) or “I feel bad” (negative affectivity) (Brief & Weiss, 2002). • Second, emotions are of greater intensity, sometimes so overwhelming that it is difficult to think rationally (Frank, 1988; 1990; 2004). Moods tend to be less intense; they bias and partially direct our cognitions, but do not disrupt them entirely (Isen, 2000; 2004). • Third, emotions are experienced as a flash flood that sweeps over us but is quickly gone (Ekman, 1999). Moods are less intense, but linger for a longer period of time. That said, there are times when emotions can be of longer duration (cf. Frijda et al., 1991). • Fourth, emotions and moods have different meta-organizational structures. Emotions are classified into a limited set of discrete emotions (Ekman, 1992; 1999), like anger, fear, love, and sadness. These emotional states are relatively independent of one another (Shaver et al., 1987). Moods, on the other hand, are organized in a two-dimensional circumplex—hedonic tone (good/bad) and activation (intense/mild) (Larsen & Diener, 1992; Russell, 1980). • Fifth, emotions have more component processes, while moods have fewer. Emotions, though experienced holistically, are complex. They consist of tightly organized feelings, cognitions, and states of action readiness (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 2001; Morris & Keltner, 2000). Moods are simpler, as they consist of pure affect or feeling (Fredrickson, 2001). Mascolo’s (Mascolo & Griffin, 1998; Mascolo & Harkins, 1998; Mascolo et al., 2000) model of component processes has another interesting feature. Specifically, the three processes—affective, appraisal,

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and action—are bidirectionally related. That is, each can be caused by the action of the other two, and the casual sequence can flow in multiple directions. A demonstration of these relationships can be found in work on facial expressions. We were introduced to this research in Chapter 1 (e.g., Ekman, 1993; 1999). When people feel happy they smile, and when they are sad, they frown. That said, the reverse is also true. As an example of this, Ekman (2007) had undergraduate subjects hold a pencil in their mouths. Some were forced to hold it with their teeth, which tend to push the lips and cheeks into a smile. Others held it only with their lips, which tend to push the lips and cheeks into a frown. Interestingly, those who held their pencils with their teeth (the forced smile) reported better moods than those who held their pencils with their lips (the forced frown). Ekman’s (2007) findings demonstrate that action can also influence feelings. To illustrate why this reciprocal effect is important, we return to the working definition of justice presented in Chapter 1. Social and organizational psychologists define justice as a subjective judgment regarding the moral propriety of some event or action. In other words, justice is treated as an evaluation or appraisal. In Mascolo’s terms, this is analogous to an appraisal producing affect. However, according to Mascolo’s model, causality can occur in the other direction. Affect—both in the form of emotion and mood—should also be capable of changing one’s cognitions. In the following we elaborate on this relationship by exploring more complex emotions. Historically, social and organizational psychologists have paid more attention to moods than to emotions (e.g., Isen & Baron, 1991), and justice researchers appear to have followed this trend (Sinclair & Mark, 1992). Only in recent years have emotions been more widely explored (e.g., Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). Consequently, our review considers theories of justice that emphasize either moods or emotions. With the exception of Mullen (2007), none of the models we review incorporate both. In keeping with the available literature, we will begin with a discussion of mood and fairness. In this regard, Mullen (2007) argues that there are three research traditions that describe how mood can impact justice perceptions: affectas-information, affective priming, and depth of processing. The first two are concerned with how affect impacts the content of the evaluation process, while the last one emphasizes the way affect influences the form of the process itself. The affect-as-information tradition maintains that one’s mood can be used as a sort of crude form of evidence (Clore, 2001; Ketelaar€& Au, 2003; Sullins, 1991). As Mullen (2007, p. 22) puts it, people “consult their current mood state to determine how they feel about an object.” Other things being equal, people who feel bad are more apt to believe that something bad happened than are people who feel good. As we shall see, uncertainty management theory is grounded in this affect-as-information tradition, as is the work on entity justice done by

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Hollensbe, Khazanchi, and Masterson (2008). We shall turn our attention to these frameworks in a moment. Mullen’s (2007) second tradition, affective priming, is built on the notion that memory is organized into an associative network (e.g., Blaney, 1986; Bower, 1981; 1991). When a given node in the network is primed, activation spreads to other nodes that are linked. Evidence suggests that concepts are stored in memory with an affective “tag.” As befits a mood, this tag may be positive or negative. When the concept is evaluated, so is the tag. For example, when you think of a cheater, you probably experience negative feelings. One insight of the affective priming tradition is that the link spreads activation in both directions—from concept to affective tag, but also from affective tag to the concept. For that reason, direct activation of the tag, such as through priming causes people to consider related ideas (Bower, 1981; Bower & Forgas, 2001). Mood can also influence justice judgments in another way. Under some conditions, those in positive moods utilize more heuristic decision making than do those in negative moods—heuristic decision making being a quick, rule-of-thumb decision-making strategy (Hertel, Neuhof, Theuer, & Kerr, 2000; Petty, 1995; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). As a consequence, information pertinent to justice is treated differently depending on the perceiver’s feeling at the time. In this last research tradition, in contrast to the two others, affect is not an input when justice is assessed. Instead, it impacts the kind of process used (cf. Sinclair & Mark, 1992). Even from the most cursory of reviews, it is clear that literature on mood and social judgment is diverse and rich (for reviews see Forgas, 2000; Forgas & George, 2002; Isen, 2000; 2004; Isen & Baron, 1991; Pham, 2007). Justice researchers have made some promising advances (Mullen, 2007), though we have only begun to tap this rich vein of ideas.

Affect-as-Information The notion that individuals consult their feelings in order to evaluate some stimulus object or event has been widely researched (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994). While Mullen (2007) prefers the term affect-as-information (for similar terminology, see Clore, 2001; Ketelaar & Au, 2003), this phenomena has been studied under a number of guises by scholars in different disciplines (Stephen & Pham, 2008). Within social psychology, Schwarz and Clore (1988) have termed it the how-do-I-feel-about-it? heuristic. Within judgment and decision making, Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor (2002) term it the affect heuristic, and within neuroscience, Damasio (1994) has called it the somatic-marker hypothesis. The notion that individuals use their feelings to determine fairness judgments is also acknowledged in van den Bos and Lind’s (2002) uncertainty management theory, and in Hollensbe, Khazanchi, and Masterson’s (2008) work on entity justice.

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Van den Bos and Lind’s (2002) Uncertainty Management Theory Uncertainty management theory, however, contends that people care about justice because it allows them to predict and control what will happen to them (van den Bos, 1999; 2003; van den Bos & Lind, 2002). For this reason, individuals monitor their environment to ascertain whether they receive appropriate outcomes and processes. If individuals possess the requisite data, they will use it to form their judgments. That said, facts regarding fairness-relevant events are not always clear. For example, we may not know if our payment is fair until we know how much other people have earned. Going further, it seems that even if we learn about the outcomes of others, we may still be uncertain how to measure their inputs. Hence, it prevents us from computing Adam’s (1963) equity equation to ascertain the distributive fairness of the situation. Consequently, we use heuristics to make a “best guess” when confronted with a lack of information (Kray & Lind, 2002; van den Bos, 2001b; 2002; 2003; van den Bos, et al., 1999; van den Bos, et al., 2001; van den Bos, et al., 1997). In other words, fairness is important, but we may not have the facts we need to ascertain how we were treated. When this is the case, we ground our judgment using the limited data that is available, and affect can be a source of this information. Uncertainty Management and Justice According to van den Bos (2003), when a situation is ambiguous, we refer to our feelings in order to form justice judgments. Van den Bos (2003) explored this idea in three experiments. In the first experiment, participants’ moods were manipulated. Participants were then told to count geometrical figures on a computer screen; following that exercise, they received a reward associated with their performance. As in former studies, subjects in a bad mood judged the outcome to be significantly less just than subjects in a good mood. This effect, however, was present only when participants did not have all the information necessary to compute their distributive justice judgment. When they knew for certain that they had been underrewarded, overrewarded, or equitably rewarded, their mood had no significant impact on their judgment. Their second experiment replicated this finding with the subjects, but instead focused on procedural justice judgments. When subjects were not given voice and were not told that others could voice their opinions, mood affected their procedural justice judgment. On the other hand, when subjects were explicitly given voice or no voice in the decision, which made the procedure clearly just or unjust, mood had no effect on their procedural justice judgment. A final experiment confirmed this result, and by introducing a control condition, showed that both positive and negative affective states can influence justice judgment under conditions of uncertainty.

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Uncertainty Management and the Experience of Others As we have seen, uncertainty management theory is a framework for understanding how individuals make their fairness decisions. It argues that fairness-relevant information is not always available. For that reason, people rely on heuristics, short cuts, and as shown by van den Bos (2003), their moods. Another source of data can be found in the experience of others. For example, Kray and Lind (2002) found that experimental subjects were sometimes influenced by a coworker’s reports of unfair treatment. Extending these ideas, De Cremer, Wubben, and Brebels (2008) asserted that one’s anger at observing an injustice is influenced by the emotional state of the victim. To illustrate this idea, consider the following vignette used in De Cremer, Wubben, and Brebel’s (2008) first experiment. A coworker completes a project, but the leader denies him a merit bonus. After this event, the coworker is either angry or ashamed. If he is angry, one can infer that the coworker believes the bonus denial was unfair. If he is ashamed, the inference can be made that the denial of the bonus was deserved and the coworker knows this. Then, at a later date, the subject interacts with the leader and is denied voice. Will this engender anger? The answer is twofold. If the denial of voice is an unambiguous injustice, one will likely become angered. However, if denial of voice is ambiguous, one is likely to become angered only when the original colleague felt anger. In summary, if the colleague had earlier expressed shame over the lost bonus, less anger should result. The aforementioned finding is complex, but one that uncertainty€ management theory predicts a priori. When a person experiences€an unambiguous injustice, he or she has information to render€an evaluation—there is no need to search for additional data. However,€ when a person experiences an ambiguous event that might be an injustice, he or she lacks the facts to form a judgment. In this uncertain state, the individual may look to the emotions of coworkers in order to decide whether one’s own treatment was unfair. This suggests that the affective states of others provide us with information that we use to form justice perceptions (Mullen, 2007). Parenthetically, we remind the reader that research by van Kleef and his colleagues (e.g., van Kleef, 2009; van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a;€ 2004b), which was reviewed in Chapter 3, makes a similar point. Summary and Critique Uncertainty management theory maintains that justice judgments are heavily influenced by affective information, but adds a critical caveat— the role of affect depends on the quality of other information that is available. If information about outcomes (van den Bos, 2003, Study€1) or processes (van den Bos, 2003, Studies 2-3) is uncertain, affective effects are more profound. On the other hand, if outcome and process

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information is more certain, the impact of affect on justice judgments should be weaker. This explains why fairness will sometimes appear to cause moods and sometimes appears to be caused by moods. Notice, however, that the mechanism by which moods impact fairness judgments under conditions of uncertainty can be accounted for by affective priming. Said differently, when a situation is ambiguous, mood can automatically activate fairness feelings consistent with it, even if people do not deliberately seek information to process their justice judgments. It is also interesting to examine uncertainty management theory’s assumptions about human nature. This model views human beings as actively trying to understand their social environments. Hence, the principle motivational goal is neither moral duty (as in the deontic view) nor social standing (as in the relational view); rather, people seek prediction and control. In other words, uncertainty management theory is similar to the cognitive appraisal model as both assume that people care about (or wish to predict) something. Likewise, both models are flexible with respect to content. In principle, people might wish to predict and control a number of things, depending on the situation or on their personal values. In this regard, uncertainty management theory may still be viewed as being in its infant stages. Indeed, it considers fairness as a tool for people to understand their environment. However, it may be that only certain characteristics of fairness, such as “consistency,” lead people to believe the environment around them is more predictable. Paradoxically, unfair decisions that remain consistent—for example, decisions resulting in bonuses consistently 20% lower than what is judged as a fair reward—should also lead individuals to perceive that their environment is predictable. Research in this area, however, has not considered such counterintuitive propositions.

Hollensbe, Khazanchi, and Masterson (2008) on Event and Entity Justice In an earlier review of the justice literature, Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, and Rupp (2001) observed that fairness researchers operationalized justice in accordance with one of two paradigms. Within the event paradigm, participants evaluated the fairness of some specific occurrence, such as a performance appraisal rating or a particular pay raise. Hollensbe et al. (2008, p. 1099) defined an event more precisely “as a segment of time at a given location that is known by an observer to have a beginning and an end.” Within the entity paradigm, participants made traitlike judgments of an individual or institution, such as the immediate supervisor or employing organization. As Hollensbe and her colleagues (p. 1099) put it, an entity “is an object or unit that persists over time and across situations.” In other words, events and entities are different things, and the perceptions of one could behave differently than the perceptions of the other. In fact, events and entities do not seem to have the same structure. As discussed in Chapter 1, fairness appraisals of events seem to be

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made in terms of three (distributive, procedural, and interactional) or four (distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational) justice dimensions. Entity justice, on the other hand, so far appears to manifest itself in terms of a single, global dimension that scholars have termed overall justice (cf. Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005; Ambrose & Schminke, 2009; Choi, 2008; Jones & Martens, 2009). Evidence for Event and Entity Justice The first scholars to explore the relationship between these two types of fairness were Ambrose, Hess, and Ganesan (2007). Ambrose and her colleagues surveyed customers who complained about the quality of their service. These customers were asked to indicate how effectively the service provider responded to their complaint. These scholars assessed the four types of justice suggested by Colquitt (2001)—distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational. In this initial study, Ambrose et al. did not assess entity justice per se, but the researchers did measure “system-related attitudes” (p. 27) or “overall attitude toward the organization” (p. 25). As expected, the different types of fairness impacted attitudes toward specific events. These event attitudes, in turn, impacted system-related attitudes. Hence, Ambrose and her co-researchers found that event perceptions caused entity perceptions, though they did not examine entity justice. In two subsequent field studies, Ambrose and Schminke (2009) assessed overall justice. They also assessed three dimensions of event justice—distributive, procedural, and interactional. Consistent with the earlier work of Ambrose et al. (2007), event justice caused overall fairness perceptions. In Study, 1 this global evaluation, in turn, predicted job satisfaction, commitment, and turnover intentions. In Study 2, overall justice predicted performance, citizenship behavior, and workplace deviance. Ambrose and Schminke further determined that overall fairness fully mediated the impact of event fairness on the six outcome measures. These effects were conceptually replicated in two studies by Jones & Martens (2009). Affect as a Cause of Entity Justice The work of Ambrose and her colleagues (2007; 2009) and Jones and Martens (2009) suggests two things. First, entity justice is distinct from event justice. Second, the two types of justice are causally connected. Appraisals of events cause responses to a social entity as a whole. But what does affect have to do with all of this? Interestingly, Ambrose and Schminke (2009) suggested that overall fairness might be influenced by respondents’ affective states. In their second study, these authors measured negative affectivity. Controlling for this variable changed their results slightly (making their model a bit less

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supportive of predictions) but did not alter their conclusions. Such findings suggest that affect and overall fairness are related, as originally suspected. In this regard, an investigation by Hollensbe and her colleagues (2008) found that feelings become especially important. Hollensbe€et€al. conducted two sets of qualitative interviews with individuals who had been recently hired. Consistent with Ambrose and Schminke (2009), it was determined that “traditional justice rules” (e.g., p. 1106) caused perceptions of entity fairness for both immediate supervisors and for the employing organization as a whole. However, Hollensbe and her collaborators found evidence for what they termed “emergent justice rules” (for example, on p. 1107). That is, individuals formed appraisals of entity fairness using nontraditional (at least to justice researchers) sources of information, such as talking to coworkers or ascertaining the longevity of job incumbents. In fact, these emergent justice rules proved to be even more important determinants of entity justice than were the traditional standards. When judging the entity fairness of the overall organization, participants often consulted their affective states. That is, they used their positive and negative feelings as a source of information about the organization. As one informant put it, “It is kind of like passing emotions. I have good days and I have bad days. If you ask me how I feel about [the company] on a good day or a bad day, it is going to change my answer” (p. 1107).* One’s affective state causes one to formulate a particular rating of the employing firm. Hollensbe et al. have identified an important phenomenon. At least for entity justice, affective states seem to impact fairness ratings. Summary and Critique The available research on event and entity justice is terribly limited, and we have found only a single study that directly examines affect as a causal antecedent (that is, Hollensbe et al., 2008). Clearly, this is a topic crying for additional inquiry. Evidence thus far suggests that event perceptions of fairness have an effect on overall justice. However, as Hollensbe and her colleagues point out, there are other influences that seem to be important—quite possibly more important than traditional standards of justice. Future investigations may wish to consult a thoughtful paper by Choi (2008). Choi does not dispute the possibility that over time, event justice could create a sense of entity fairness. A model such as that proposed by Ambrose and Schminke (2009) seems likely, especially when one is forming a new relationship with an organization or with * The astute reader will recognize the similarity between this quotation and the various theories we have been discussing in this chapter, such as Forgas’ affect infusion model (Forgas, 1992; 1995; 2000).

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a supervisor. Choi (2008), however, goes further by considering how these two types of justice work together once individuals have a wellworked judgment of the entity in question. He proposes that entity and event justice interact. Specifically, if workers believe that they have a fair supervisor or organization, then they will be more tolerant of an unfair event. Conversely, if events are fair, individuals may be more accepting of an unfair supervisor or employer. Things are problematic when both the entity and the event are viewed as unjust. Choi presents evidence that this combination of low event with low entity justice produces poor work attitudes and fewer citizenship behaviors. When either type of fairness is high, reactions are somewhat more positive. Choi’s findings that event and entity justice interact provide fertile grounds for future investigations.

Affective Priming The theory of affective priming is predicated on a certain understanding of human memory. Memory is believed to be organized into a series of nodes. These nodes are linked together into a network. When a given node is activated, this activation spreads to nearby nodes, stimulating these as well (Bower, 1981; 1991). This is potentially important for fairness, because some nodes are closely linked to an affective tag. If one experiences a certain mood, this should activate nodes that are connected to that mood (Blaney, 1986; Bower & Forgas, 2001; Isen, 2000; 2004). For example, in most people the node for injustice is probably tagged negatively. Thus, when in a bad mood, one is probably more likely to view someone as unfair if the situation is ambiguous. When one is in a good mood, conversely, the injustice node is less likely to be activated, and so we may be more forgiving of others. Based on the spreading activation from mood to concepts, Isen and Baron (1991) suggest that people in a bad mood perceive more injustice than their better feeling counterparts, not because they will use their mood as a piece of information as in the affect-as-information tradition. Rather, their bad mood will automatically activate feelings of unfairness that have strong links with negative affect stored in their memory.

Affective Priming and Negotiation The affective priming tradition represents a powerful paradigm with implications for real-life situations (e.g., Forgas & George, 2001; Isen, 2000; 2004). Much of the available work on interpersonal situations has considered dyadic negotiation. For example, in one influential experiment, Carnevale and Isen (1986) had undergraduates bargain together. The negotiation task allowed for either distributive (competitive) or integrative (cooperative) negotiations. About half of the

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participants observed 30 funny cartoons, thereby inducing pleasant feelings. When negotiators were placed in a good mood, they were more likely to use cooperative tactics; when they were not in good moods, they were more likely to use contentious tactics. Similar findings were obtained in studies by Baron (1990c) and Baron, Fortin, Frei, Hauver, and Shack (1990). In three later experiments, Forgas (1998) examined both good and bad moods. Consistent with other research, negotiators placed in a good mood were more likely to anticipate using and executing cooperative tactics. When placed in a bad mood, however, participants plotted contentious tactics and often employed them against their counterpart.

Affective Priming and Justice Despite its promise, the affective priming tradition has not received a good deal of attention from justice scholars. We did locate one study by Le Roy and Finkelstein (2009). Using a vignette study, these scholars found that a manager’s decision was viewed as more unfair by participants who were told to describe a real-life interaction they experienced in the past with a hostile manager (versus a benevolent manager). Obviously, the past experience envisioned had no logical link to the scenario described in the vignette study. Even so, participants who were told to think about a hostile manager (versus a benevolent one) judged the manager’s decision in the scenario to be more unfair when the decision was unfair and also when the decision was neutral. The researchers proposed that affect is a plausible mediator of the relationship between prior managerial decisions and the formation of later, unrelated, managerial decisions. Although we will not consider affect priming further, we parenthetically emphasize that this is a promising possibility for future research.

Affect and Depth of Processing As observed above, van den Bos and Lind’s (2002) uncertainty management theory, as well as Hollensbe et al.’s (2008) entity model, treat affect as a source of information. Le Roy and Finkelstein (2009) employ a different perspective. Considering how one’s feelings can prime memory and impact fairness ratings (cf. Isen & Baron, 1991), we turn to Mullen’s (2007) third tradition, and explore the work of Sinclair and Mark (Mark & Sinclair, 1990; Sinclair & Mark, 1991; 1992), which uses a depth of processing approach to understand mood and justice perceptions. Their information processing model is a comprehensive theory of mood and judgment. It is not strictly limited to fairness perceptions, though we shall emphasize this aspect of their theory here.

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Sinclair and Mark’s (199l; 1992) Information Processing Model Drawing on dual process theories of persuasion, Sinclair and Mark (1992) suggest that people in negative moods process information more systematically, while those in positive moods process information more heuristically (Hertel, Neuhof, Theuer, & Kerr, 2000). Three primary reasons for this are cognitive capacity, mood maintenance and repair, and mood as information. • Cognitive capacity: Sinclair and Mark argue that people in good moods tend to bring a larger variety of material to mind than do their counterparts in bad moods. If time is limited, this extra material can strain cognitive capacity and leave fewer resources available for careful analysis. • Mood maintenance and repair: Individuals prefer to feel good and dislike feeling bad. As deliberate and effortful processing can disrupt a good mood, people who are feeling fine prefer to avoid it. • Mood as information: It is important to emphasize that Sinclair and Mark (1992) are not using the term mood as information in the same way as Mullen’s (2007) affect-as-information. By mood as information, Sinclair and Mark refer to a mood state’s signaling value—not to a mood state’s role as an input in a justice evaluating process. When one feels good, optimism ensues and the individual is apt to show confidence in one’s judgment. When one feels badly, one is less optimistic and confidence declines. In other words, a bad mood signals that something is wrong, and this results in effortful thinking. A good mood signals that all is well and that we need not devote excessive effort to understanding and weighing information (Bless, 2000). Collectively, these three processes lead those in negative moods to be more careful and thoughtful than do those in hedonically positive mood states. Needless to say, there are exceptions to the rule (Sinclair & Mark, 1992). For example, if carefully thinking through a task makes one happy, mood maintenance and repair should lead that person to engage in more deliberate information processing. Information Processing and Justice Perceptions For Sinclair and Mark’s (1992) information processing model, the route from mood to justice perceptions is mediated by the type of processing strategy. Subjects in a negative mood appear to process information in a more systematic and less heuristic, less superficial, and more careful way than subjects in a positive mood. In other words, when we feel poorly, we think harder about matters at hand.

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To illustrate how these sorts of processes impact justice perceptions, Mark and Sinclair (1990) had subjects rate the fairness of six alternative pay allocations spanning equality, equity, and inequity. Mark and Sinclair maintained that equity (to each in accordance with contribution) would be viewed as the most fair. Equality (to each the same) and inequity (unequal payment that does not reflect the size of the contribution) should be less fair. They further maintained that equity is the most cognitively demanding allocation to ascertain, as it involves comparing outcome and performance ratios for at least two individuals (cf. Roch, Lane, Samuelson, Allison, & Dent, 2000). Based on these assumptions, Mark and Sinclair predicted, and found, that subjects artificially placed in a positive mood discriminated less among allocations, and those in poorer moods were more discriminating. That is, those who were experiencing negative affect reported a greater difference in fairness when the equity allocation was compared to the alternatives. Another study asked participants to divide money between two workers and tell what range of payment they considered as fair. Subjects who were in bad moods showed narrower fair payment categories, while those in good moods were more flexible (Mark & Sinclair, 1990). Specifically, those in bad moods adhered more closely to the equity rule than did their better feeling counterparts. People in bad moods perceived equity as the most fair and deviations from equity as the most unfair.

Other Affective Influences on Justice Perceptions While Sinclair and Mark’s (1991; 1992) framework emphasizes depth of processing, these scholars are cognizant that affect can have other influences as well. Consistent with the later work of Mullen (2007), Sinclair are Mark (1991; 1992) are careful to note that there are additional ways in which mood can impact fairness judgments. In addition to the three information processing mechanisms reviewed above, they acknowledge the other two traditions identified by Mullen: • Mood as an informational cue. This is consistent with what Mullen (2007, p. 22) termed “affect-as-information” (see also Clore, 2001). Individuals use their current feelings to make a judgment about a stimulus. For example, if one is in an incidental good mood, he or she might be more likely to view an allocation decision as fair. • Accessibility of Thoughts. This is very similar to what Mullen (2007, p. 22) referred to as “affective priming.” Specifically, activation of affective nodes in memory may prime related concepts, such as when a negative feeling state engenders thoughts of unfairness. Notice, of course, that accessibility of thoughts (or affective priming), and mood as an informational cue (affect-as-information), are

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not depth of processing explanations as such. They show how mood can act as input in the evaluation process while simultaneously shaping the process itself. Despite the promising additions of accessibility and informational cues, Sinclair and Mark’s (1992) work emphasizes the depth of processing tradition in which mood directly impacts the process by itself.

Summary and Critique The information processing model is unique among the theories reviewed in this chapter. While it argues that affect influences justice perceptions, it does so by emphasizing that the process of forming fairness judgments changes with one’s mood. Sinclair and Mark (1991; 1992) argue that people think about justice differently depending on their prevailing state level. Given support for the information processing model, as well as its close connection to influential social psychological theory, we are surprised that justice researchers have paid Sinclair and Mark’s (1991; 1992) work so little heed. It is possible that the theory’s breadth has worked against it. The information processing model is a general framework for understanding decision making. Fairness judgments, though emphasized in this present review, are only one criterion that the authors have considered. As a consequence of this generality, the information processing model may not have been noticed by justice scholars. This is unfortunate, as the theory has much to say about the relationship between affect and fairness. Another possibility is that justice researchers may be hesitant due to ongoing controversy regarding mood and information processing. In their thorough review of literature on positive affect, Lyubomirsky, King, and Diener (2005) stress that the performance advantage of negative moods is contingent on various moderating factors. For example, those in favorable moods perform as well as those in poor moods when they are held accountable for the results (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994). The performance differences are also minimized when the task is self-relevant (Aspinwall, 1998). Likewise, though positive affect sometimes pushes individuals to use effort-saving heuristics and stereotypes (Bodenhausen, 1993), this is not done to the exclusion of other individuals. For instance, those in good moods are more, not less, likely to define other people as part of their ingroups (Urada & Miller, 2000). Moreover, the tendency to use broad categories boosts the creativity of those in positive moods (Isen, 2000). Of course, Lyubomirsky et al. acknowledge that negative affect can, at times, lead to more careful information Â�processing in the manner suggested by Sinclair and Mark (1991; 1992). However, Lyubomirsky and her colleagues caution against overgeneralizing this effect without attention to contextual moderators. This would seem to be sound advice. Another potential limitation is that Sinclair and Mark’s (1991; 1992) model emphasizes general moods at the expense of specific emotion. Once discrete emotions are taken into account, implications for

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information processing are more complex—not all negative emotions engender the same sort of processing (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). According to Lerner and Keltner’s (2000; 2001; see also Morris & Keltner, 2000) appraisal-tendency theory, specific emotions share similar valance—negative or positive—but push information processing in different directions (for evidence, see Fessler, Pillsworth, & Flamsom, 2004; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fishhoff, 2003; Lerner, Small, & Lowenstein, 2004). To illustrate this point, consider a manuscript by Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer (1994). Bodenhausen and his colleagues considered two negative emotions—anger and sadness. Sadness increased the systematic processing of information, as Sinclair and Mark’s (1990; 1991) model implies that it should. However, anger had the opposite effect. Specifically, enraged individuals showed an increase in heuristic processing. A third negative emotion, regret, was explored by Kugler, Connolly, and Kausel (in press). These scholars found evidence consistent with that of Sinclair and Mark. In two experiments, Kugler and her colleagues determined that individuals who anticipated feeling regret were more likely to engage in effortful consequentialist thinking (for more information about anticipated regret and decision making, see Connolly, Ordóñez, & Coughlan, 1997; Connolly & Reb, 2005; Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Ordóñez & Connolly, 2000; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998). Notice that these findings do not rule out Sinclair and Mark’s (1991; 1992) predictions. Some negative emotions, such as sadness and regret, seem to promote more careful thinking. However, at least one other negative emotion, anger, seems to bring about more heuristic processing. Consequently, the findings change somewhat depending upon which discrete emotion is under consideration. Of course, emphasis on mood is not a fatal flaw, but it does suggest the need for scholars to investigate the role of emotion as well. We turn to this later in the chapter.

Integrating the Three Traditions: Forgas’ (1995; 1998; 2000) Affect Infusion Model In this chapter we organized our review around the three research traditions suggested by Mullen (2007)—affect-as-information, affective priming, and depth of processing. To a greater or lesser extent, each of these three traditions has been represented in the social scientific literature on justice. We have further found that each of these Â�traditions has empirical support, though much of the empirical evidence has not come from fairness research. Unfortunately, our review has left the justice literature appearing to be something of a mosaic. There are at least three ways that mood can impact justice judgments, but how are scholars to select among these distinct explanations? Moreover, how are we to know when each is operative? To address these sorts of questions, we

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now turn our attention to an integrative framework, the affect infusion model (AIM; Forgas, 1995; 1998; 2000; Forgas & George, 2001), which combines these disparate processing elements into a comprehensive model of affect and information processing. According to Forgas (2000, p. 255), “Affect infusion refers to the process whereby affectively loaded information exerts an influence on, and becomes incorporated into cognitive and judgment processes, entering into a person’s deliberations and eventually coloring the outcome” (italics in original). In this chapter, we discussed different ways by which our moods influence the content of our judgments, decisions, and other thoughts. The affect-as-information phenomenon is one example of feelings impacting the content of subsequent decisions. Affective priming, of course, is a second example. In short, moods can infuse thinking by either being used as information or by priming our memory. According to the AIM, each of these developments may be more or less likely depending upon how we process the information. Hence, how we think about things influences the manner in which our moods impact our judgments. To understand this point, we now consider the four processing strategies suggested by the AIM.

Four Modes of Information Processing As we have seen, the dual process models of decision making (e.g., Petty, 1995; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000) are a common theoretical taxonomy that has been useful in the mood and justice literature (cf. Mark & Sinclair, 1990; Sinclair & Mark, 1991; 1992). The AIM recognizes these two processing strategies, and it adds two additional ones. • Direct access processing. This occurs when individuals retrieve something directly from memory, such as when an employee follows a well-known rule. Affect tends to have a weaker influence on judgments that are made by pulling an evaluation out of longterm memory. • Motivated processing. This is focused thinking that is directed by a specific goal, such as when a job candidate struggles to make a good impression. As motivated processing is quite narrow, affective infusion is expected to be weak. • Heuristic processing. This occurs when individuals process information automatically, using heuristic rules of thumb. Affect should impact our judgments. • Substantive processing. This is similar to the systematic decision making reviewed above. Substantive processing is controlled and deliberate. Somewhat surprisingly, the AIM anticipates strong affect infusion when individuals engage in controlled processing. The AIM makes specific predictions about when each of these processing styles will be adopted by individuals. In general, there are three

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sets of antecedents—characteristics of the person (e.g., there is more heuristic processing when one lacks cognitive capacity), characteristics of the processing task (e.g., there is more substantive processing when the task is complex and novel), and characteristics of the situation (e.g., there is substantive processing when one is held accountable). For our present purposes, which are specific to justice and affect, we need not review each of the antecedents, though they are important for a complete understanding of the AIM. There is, however, one individual antecedent that bears mention— affective states. Forgas and George (2001) allow that one’s current mood could influence the processing strategy that is subsequently adopted. This implies that mood has a main effect on one’s cognitions (Forgas, 2000). Notice, of course, that such a direct relationship is not dissimilar to Sinclair and Mark’s (1991; 1992; Mark & Sinclair, 1990) information processing model that we examined previously. This effect was explored in three experiments reported by Forgas and Fiedler (1996). These researchers were interested in how happy and sad individuals allocated rewards to ingroup members versus outgroup members. When group membership was low in personal relevance, the pleasant mood triggered heuristic processing. In other words, happy individuals relied on membership identity as a heuristic rule of thumb, and they were more generous to their ingroup. Under the same conditions, sad allocators were deliberate in their thinking and became fairer to outgroup members. These are important findings, but the AIM posits an additional role for processing depth. Specifically, the type of processing influences the mechanism by which affect influences cognition. We turn to this in our next section.

Affect-as-Information vs. Affective Priming While the AIM posits four strategies of information processing, the primary effect of mood occurs in only the latter two—heuristic and substantive. The reader should notice that there are at least two routes though which mood can impact thinking—affect-as-information and affective priming. According to Forgas (1995; 1998; 2000), each of these affective infusion mechanisms is likely to occur with one particular type of information processing. Let us begin with the less deliberate heuristic processing. When people engage in heuristic processing they are likely to use their moods as informational cues. Affect-as-information is a relatively automatic heuristic, which lends itself to less effortful thinking. Substantive processing, on the other hand, works differently. Forgas (1995; 2000) observes that substantive processing is open and constructive. When people employ this cognitive strategy, they elaborate and build on their ideas (Petty, 1995). Recall that affective priming activates memory nodes tagged to the mood in question, but not other nodes. This leads to recall of a subset of information that is stored in memory. In this

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way, affective priming causes infusion when individuals engage in substantive processing. These predictions are supported by a considerable amount of research (for reviews, see Forgas, 1992; 1995; 2000; Forgas & George, 2001).

Closing Thoughts The affective infusion model pulls together processing strategies discussed in this chapter, and posits a main effect for affect with respect to how people formulate their judgments (similar to Sinclair & Mark, 1991; 1992). Moreover, the AIM articulates how modes of processing engender affect-as-information effects, as well as affective priming. In the future, justice researchers should consider fairness judgments in light of this model.

Emotion as a Cause of Justice Perceptions We now turn our attention away from generalized affective states and focus on discrete emotions. Mullen (2007) reviews two research traditions exploring the relationship between discrete emotions and cognitive appraisals (cf. Lerner & Keltner, 2000). These paradigms are similar to those observed in the investigation of mood and justice perceptions. The first posits direct effects on the content of judgments, and the second posits mediated effects based on information processing differences. We briefly review each. Appraisal tendency theory maintains that emotions impact judgments in a fairly straightforward fashion. To illustrate, consider how two emotions, anger and fear, impact perceptions of risk. Anger tends to lead people to minimize the amount of risk they perceive, whereas fear tends to lead people to exaggerate risk (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). Under certain conditions, anger may also prompt individuals to make hostile attributions about others (Tiedens, 2001). Scher and Heise’s (1993) affect control theory belongs to this tradition. A second tradition examines the impact of emotion on information processing. Drawing on the dual process models reviewed previously, these scholars focus on the amount of certainty associated with particular emotions. Angry people tend to be certain about their circumstances and engage in heuristic processing (Bodenhausen, 1993). Frightened people tend to be less certain about their circumstances, and hence engage in more systematic processing (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Mullen’s (2007) affective model of justice reasoning belongs to this tradition. In reviewing the available theories involving the relationship of emotion to justice, we are struck by the richness of the emotion literature (e.g., Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 2001). In this regard, justice scholars are in a situation akin to that for mood and

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fairness. Specifically, the theoretical opportunities offered by the emotion literature have only just begun to be exploited (see Mullen, 2007, for a notable exception).

Scher and Heise’s (1993) Affect Control Theory Overview Scher and Heise (1993) share the uncertainty management view that justice judgments can be affective in origin, but they were more concerned with the role of discrete emotions rather than diffuse moods. Consistent with the appraisal tendency framework, affect control theory argues that specific emotions, such as anger and guilt, play a prominent role in the early stages of the justice judgment process. These authors favorably cited two studies that showed how angry subjects were more prone to attribute intentionality and blame to a transgressor than subjects experiencing fear or happiness, or subjects who had to recall a nonemotional incident (Gallagher & Clore, 1985; Melton & Scher, 1992). Building on these ideas, Scher and Heise (1993) observed that anger and guilt periodically arise within regular human transactions. Typically, these unpleasant states are resolved naturally. However, in certain settings, individuals experiencing anger or guilt have limited opportunity to work through their feelings. Options to allay these emotions are limited. If anger and guilt are not ameliorated, people may then use one of these emotions to draw conclusions about the transaction. For example, in dyadic interactions, feeling anger implies that one’s partner acted unfairly, while feeling guilt implies one dealt with one’s partner unjustly. A cognitive assessment of the justice of the event follows the emotional state. If this rationalistic assessment confirms that the event is unfair, the victim asks for reparation. If the assessment concludes that the event is just, the victim will likely employ stress-management techniques. Summary and Critique Scher and Heise’s (1993) affect control theory turns cognitive labeling theory on its head! As we have seen, the cognitive labeling approach assumes that individuals make primary and secondary appraisals, and emotions result from these twin assessments (e.g., Mikula, Scherer, & Athenstaedt, 1998; Montada, 1994; Wess et al., 1999). Scher and Heise, on the other hand, suggest that the emotions come first. These feeling states, in turn, activate and impact the cognitive appraisal system. At first glance, this may appear counterintuitive. However, it is consistent with frameworks that place a stronger emphasis on emotions, such as deontic justice (Folger, 2001; Folger et al., 2005). At the present time, this possibility has received only limited attention in the justice literature. We hope that future scholars will investigate it further. Affect control theory shares a causal direction with uncertainty management theory—justice is a criterion and not an independent variable.

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The difference is in the antecedents. Uncertainty management theory emphasizes mood states, whereas affect control theory is more open to the idea of emotions. Since both moods and emotions are naturally occurring phenomena, this can be seen as complementary, as both moods and also emotions may impel justice evaluations. Where the two models diverge somewhat is in the process by which affect leads to fairness perceptions. Uncertainty management theory makes assumptions about human nature, notably a strong need for prediction. For this reason, van den Bos (2003) found that judgments were based on affect when facts about the process or outcome were lacking. Very loosely, we might say that feelings substituted for cognitive analysis when the necessary information was unavailable. When the necessary information was available, individuals attended less to their feelings. Affect control theory de-emphasizes this either/or logic. Scher and Heise (1993) suggest that emotions garner attention and prompt us to do an attribution analysis (which may be biased). In other words, affect causes cognition and motivates us to think through the fairness of an event. In uncertainty management theory, however, people struggle to understand their social environments in the absence of complete information. Under affect control theory, individuals are swept up by feelings. Both perspectives are intuitively appealing, and they may be useful in different settings.

Mullen’s (2007) Affective Model of Justice Reasoning Overview An especially innovative theory is the affective model of justice reasoning (AMJR) proposed by Mullen (2007). As is the case for the cognitive appraisal models, the AMJR begins with an assessment of an event. This initial appraisal is oriented toward either an outcome or the interpersonal treatment that an individual receives, and it is labeled as either positive or negative. At this point, the AMJR diverges from the cognitive appraisal approach and inserts a causal role for affect. It does so by integrating the research on emotion and processing that was mentioned above (e.g., Bodenhausen et al., 2001; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). • If the initial appraisal is favorable, one has either received an advantageous outcome or one has been treated well. In either case, the resulting emotion is positive. One feels happiness and joy, and therefore ceases to think effortfully about fairness. A happy person is less likely to claim an injustice than is someone experiencing a negative emotion. • If the initial appraisal is negative, one has either received a disadvantageous outcome or one has not been treated well, and if he or she is confident in his or her assessment of the relevant attributes of the situation (i.e., is certain), anger or disgust should result.

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Since the individual is confident, he or she is apt to engage in motivated processing. The wronged party is, in effect, biased. He or she is likely to overvalue evidence consistent with the emotion of anger. Hence, an angry individual is more likely to perceive an injustice than is someone who has not been angered. • If the initial appraisal is negative, one has either received a disadvantageous outcome or one has not been treated well, and this person lacks confidence in his or her assessment of the situation (i.e., is uncertain), then fear results. These uncertain and fearful individuals are more apt to use careful and systematic processing. This could lead to a claim of injustice or it may not, depending on the facts of the case. Before moving on, there is a final point that deserves mention. In her theoretical statement, Mullen (2007) emphasizes the situation where affect causes justice perceptions. This makes sense, given that most research to date has focused on the opposite causal path. However, the AMJR model is clearly reciprocal. Citing the work of Grote and Clark (2001) and others, Mullen makes a strong case that the assessment of injustice, partially impelled by emotion, creates additional impact. Summary and Critique The AMJR model has a number of notable features. It takes seriously the available research on emotion and cognition, successfully integrating this literature into the study of fairness perceptions. In so doing, Mullen (2007) posits a strong role for affect. Another strength of the AMJR is that it takes discrete emotions into account and is not limited to mood. Finally, the explicit statement of reciprocal effects between affect and justice is a necessary antidote to our occasional casualness about causal paths (see also Skitka et al., 2008). Generally speaking, Mullen’s (2007) AMJR model is consistent with the cognitive appraisal approach, though AMJR allows affect to play a more important causal role. One commonality between Mullen’s work and that of cognitive appraisal theory can be found in their similar treatment of the initial appraisal. In both cases, the event is viewed as good or bad. As we have seen at various points in this book, this approach is limited. Occurrences, in other words, are not simply positive or negative. They may violate moral norms, and engage different emotions and motivations distinct from the situation in which one fails to achieve a goal (e.g., Aquino et al., 2006). Consequently, to distinguish anger and disgust from sadness, it may be insufficient to consider only certainty. It may also be helpful to examine whether a moral issue is at stake. Building on this analysis, we suggest that the AMJR model more sharply distinguishes between anger and disgust. While both of these negative affect states can be activated by moral concerns (Haidt, 2006),

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the issues involved are distinct. As Shweder and Haidt (1993, p. 364) put it: “Anger is about injustice and the perception of a demeaning personal insult. … Disgust is about degradation and human dignity.” Both emotions are important, but they involve divergent moral concerns. The AMJR model is also reminiscent of Sinclair and Mark’s (1991; 1992) information processing model, though these authors emphasize mood whereas Mullen places greater emphasis on discrete emotions. Another difference between these models is typified by the way they treat positive affect. While Mullen’s (2007) views on happiness overlap with Sinclair and Mark’s (1991; 1992), there are differences. In the AMJR model, a happy person has received what he or she desires, and the individual does not have a problem to consider. This is similar to Sinclair and Mark’s view of mood as information. But Sinclair and Mark go further. In addition to signaling that “all is well,” these authors argue that positive affect taxes cognitive capacity. Sinclair and Mark further maintain that individuals engage in mood maintenance. To preserve their good feelings, they avoid deliberate thinking. None of these ideas are inconsistent with the AMJR, but instead suggest an avenue for future theoretical and empirical extensions. Mullen’s (2007) AMJR is somewhat different from the family of relational models discussed earlier (e.g., De Cremer & Tyler, 2005; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989; Tyler et al., 1996). Mullen argues that outcomes and interpersonal interactions are more important than procedures for understanding affect. Tyler and Blader (2002) argue in favor of procedures. This is an important debate for justice theorists, though its resolution will have to await future inquiry.

Future Research Directions Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet, Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God’s great Judgment Seat. —From The Ballad of East and West by Rudyard Kipling

Preparing a chapter on the separate mood and emotion literatures reminded us of Kipling’s famous couplet. Scholars acknowledge that both are important, yet few efforts have been undertaken to integrate mood and emotion, while also considering social justice (see Mullen, 2007, for an exception). There are three families of ideas—moods, emotions, and fairness judgments—but the literature only seems to consider two of them in any single study. Some scholars are interested in how mood impacts justice perceptions (e.g., Sinclair & Mark, 1991; 1992), while others are interested in how discrete emotions impact justice perceptions (e.g., Scher & Heise, 1993). However, we could not locate any empirical studies that tie all three of these concepts together. This is a problem given the conceptual similarity between mood and emotion, and we suspect that a model that includes one as

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an antecedent of justice, while simultaneously failing to consider the other, is underspecified. Thinking in these terms, one can see that only two of three possible pairings have been explored. There is research on mood and justice, and research exists on emotion and justice, but not on mood and emotion as these two pertain to fairness perceptions. This final pairing being the deficit, a closer look at it could provide a resolution. Two possibilities strike us as particularly interesting, particularly with reference to negative mood states.

Model 1: The Focusing Effect—From Mood to Emotion Our first model presumes that injustice can transform a negative mood into an emotion. To understand this mechanism, recall that a mood can be viewed as a sort of floating affect that is unidentified with a particular target (Brief & Weiss, 2002; Fredrickson, 2001). By this logic, if a mood is directed toward a target, it should be experienced as an emotional state. Consider the case of an employee who is in a “bad” mood (e.g., high negative affectivity [NA], low positive affectivity [PA]) and receives unfortunate news, such as the denial of a promotion. Given the individual’s hedonically negative mood state, the jilted worker is at a higher risk for claiming unfair treatment. Based on the cognitive labeling model reviewed in Chapter 2, this (allegedly) unfair event should alter the negative mood so that it becomes a negative emotion, such as moral outrage or anger. On the other hand, an unfavorable promotion decision would have a different impact on a worker who was initially in a positive mood. Earlier in this chapter we discussed characteristics of discrete emotions. Once a negative mood has an object (that is, the “unfair” event), and thereby becomes an emotion, a number of predictable things should occur. According to Ekman (1999) the angry individual should feel a rush of feelings and negative thoughts, even if these are not wanted. Recall, of course, that emotions come with a predisposition to respond (e.g., Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). There should also be characteristic parasympathetic nervous system activity, such as an accelerated heart rate and higher blood pressure, as the body prepares to attack. Furthermore, following a moral harm, the tendency is to seek retribution (e.g., Bies & Tripp, 1996; 2001; 2002; 2004; Tripp & Bies, 1997; Tripp et al., 2002; 2007; Folger et al., 2005). After restoring justice, possibly through revenge, the emotion will pass quickly. This model leads to a number of clear predictions, all of which are based on the literature reviewed in this book. • Those in a bad mood will respond more strongly to a presumed injustice than those in a good mood. Therefore, injustice perceptions (if not actual injustice) can be created by anything that puts people into a bad mood. Such things may have nothing whatsoever

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to do with deliberate victimization and may simply be part of the environment, such as crowding, pollution, and loud noise (cf. Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). • This effect of mood and behavior may not be direct. It could be that mood impacts justice strongly when it is turned into some discrete emotion. Emotions, as we have stressed in this chapter, come with a disposition to act. This tendency may trigger an actual behavior. • In other words, emotions may mediate the behavioral effect of moods, at least in some situations. • Over time, physical arousal caused by emotions may wear and tear on the body. Certain environments, those that place workers in bad moods, may create long-term health problems. These problems could well be mediated, at least in part, by the re-occurrence of discrete emotions. As one can see, the net result is for a diffuse bad mood to be channeled and focused as it becomes a particular emotion. Once this occurs, a number of predictions automatically follow. Now let us consider an alternative model that turns this sequence around.

Model 2: The Broadening Effect—From Emotion to Mood Relative to moods, emotions tend to have briefer durations (Fredrickson, 2001). If this is so, it is worthwhile to consider what they leave in their wake. It is possible that a passing emotion, especially an intense one, might leave traces of residual affect that are phenomenologically experienced as negative mood. Returning to the cognitive appraisal model discussed in Chapter 2, we find that injustice can engender discrete emotions (e.g., Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999). After the event is past, an individual may lose the initial association or identification with the unfair target event. Compared to a burst of emotion, the resulting mood should be of reduced intensity, but persist longer. The mood should also have predictable effects. • An aversive mood state will lead to more deliberate and systematic processing of information (Sinclair & Mark, 1991; 1992). This may be good news, but there is also reason for concern (Isen, 2000; 2004). • Individuals in bad moods may suffer decrements in creativity and also become less collaborative in negotiations (Isen & Baron, 1991). Obviously, these effects are potentially problematic. The key implication of this model is that the resulting mood may last longer than its emotional parent. As a consequence, the mood has a number of effects on the thinking and interpersonal behaviors of the employee. These may be difficult to detect because the initial event, such as an injustice, can influence cognitions and actions in situations

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that are unrelated to the original harm, and this can continue even after the problem is otherwise resolved. If this second model is supported by future research, it suggests an interesting issue for conflict resolution specialists. To be sure, research has shown that fair processes offer an effective way to resolve workplace conflicts (see Goldman, Cropanzano, Stein, & Benson, 2008, for a review). What is not clear is whether the effects of conflict resolution are cognitive, affective, or both. If a third-party intervention restores fair perceptions (cognitions), to what extent will it allay the negative affect? If these feelings persist, they may become detached from their original source. In the form of a bad mood, the affect may rear its head at a later time, with requisite and well-documented effects on decision making and interpersonal behavior (Forgas, 1992; 1995; 2000; Forgas & George, 2001; Isen, 2000; 2004; Isen & Baron, 1991; Pham, 2007).

Concluding Thoughts Let us pause for a moment and review where we have been. In Chapters 2, 3, and 4 we discussed the most common cases of justice research, those where fairness (or unfairness) are viewed as causes of mood and emotions. In this chapter we reviewed a smaller but compelling literature illustrating a reciprocal relationship. Affect also causes justice perceptions. In Chapter 6 we examine another possibility. It is almost tautological to observe that individuals prefer pleasant feelings to unpleasant ones; otherwise we would be hard pressed to distinguish between “good” and “bad” moods. As a consequence, people actively attempt to manage their feelings so as to alleviate negative states and enhance or extend positive ones (Forgas & George, 2001; Isen, 2000; 2004). As we shall see in the next chapter, justice can play an active role in mood management.

ch a p t er

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Emotional Regulation Display Rules and Terror Management Throughout this book we have seen evidence pertaining to a close and intimate relationship between justice perceptions and emotions. In Chapters 2, 3, and 4 we explored the literature demonstrating that (in)justice perceptions give rise to a range of emotional states. In Chapter 5 we turned this causal ordering around, finding that both moods and emotions induce, or at least influence, fairness judgments. There is a bit more to the story, however. Emotions often convey messages to other people (Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2003; Morris & Keltner, 2000). There are some messages that we may not wish to send, such as when salespeople try to conceal their irritation from demanding customers or when counselors try to veil their sadness at their clients’ suffering (Grandey, 2003; Pugh, 2002). There are also some messages that we do not want to send to ourselves, such as when some events make more salient some fundamental threats that we prefer not to focus on—terror of death for instance (Becker, 1971; 1973; 1975). Emotional regulation is indeed necessary for our own well-being. The inability to effectively manage and regulate our feelings is linked to poor mental health (e.g., Gross & Muñoz, 1995; Kokkonen & Kinnunen, 2006; Vingerhoets, Nyklicek, & Denollet, 2008). Consequently, there are at least two reasons for people to engage in emotional regulation—it makes it easier to work with other people, and it improves psychological well-being. Given these considerations, it should come as no surprise that emotional regulation has become a major topic among social psychologists and clinical psychologists (Gross, 1998a; 1998b). (Though as we shall 173

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see, the topic has received less attention among management scholars.) Since emotional expressions are often “unbidden” and occur relatively automatically, controlling them—as well as regulating our underlying feelings—can be a trying task. This has led various scholars to argue that emotional regulation has implications for fairness perceptions (Jasso, 1993; 2006), especially in work settings (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Grandey & Fisk, 2005; Rupp, McCance, & Grandey, 2007). Research integrating justice and emotional regulation remains limited (cf. Cropanzano, Weiss, Suckow, & Grandey, 2000), but two literatures exist that can be used to tie them together. Our objective in this chapter is to show that these two seemingly distinct literatures show in fact a same picture, namely that justice helps people to regulate their emotions while injustice makes this task much more difficult. We first discuss the display of affective expressions (cf. Grandey, 2000; Pugh, 2002). As we shall see, emotional displays are often regulated by organizations interested in pleasing customers and maintaining internal harmony (Goldberg & Grandey, 2007). Justice is important, in this context, since it can be difficult to maintain a positive “face” after one has been treated unfairly. We also examine evidence that display rules themselves may be viewed by employees as unfair (Grandey & Fisk, 2005). Display rules, while having the intended effect of improving job performance (Diefendorff & Gosserand, 2002; Grandey, Fisk, Mattila, Jansen, & Sideman, 2005; Tsai, 2001; Tsai & Huang, 2002), also lead workers to engage in emotional labor (Grandey, 2003; Grandey & Brauburger, 2002; Grandey, Dickter, & Sin, 2004; Grandey, Fisk, & Steiner, 2005). When the display rules are forced or inauthentic, well-being as well as performance can be adversely effected (Grandey, 2003) and turnover can increase (Chau, Dahling, Levy, & Diefendorff, 2009). And it is precisely when these rules are viewed as unfair that they are more likely to lead people to behave in an inauthentic way. The second literature concerns an innovative line of research on mortality salience (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Grant & Wade-Benzoni, 2009). When individuals are confronted with the idea of their future death, this creates the potential for unpleasant feelings to be evoked. According to terror management theory (TMT), we reduce these feelings of terror by utilizing a number of psychological defense mechanisms that mitigate negative feelings associated with contemplating life’s finitude. For some, this defense mechanism (what TMT theorists call a cultural anxiety buffer) includes seeking meaning by conforming to rules of fairness that are deemed important and central to personal identity (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Rosenblatt, 1990; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). In fact, research on terror management has found that engaging in acts of “justice” (which will be described in more detail later) can impact whether or not an affective state (terror) will be displayed at all (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). Hence, we treat

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terror management as a theory that can be used to understand a type of emotional regulation that, though often preconscious, allows people to regain emotional equilibrium after thinking about human mortality. Together, emotional labor and terror management theory demark the frontier of research on justice and affect. These are novel frameworks that depart substantially from other theories presented in this book in that they are concerned with how fairness helps to regulate feelings. Support for these theories suggests that the relationship between fairness and affect may be more complex and even more interesting than scholars have heretofore recognized.

Emotional Labor Overview of Display Rules “Service with a Smile” is the trite mantra espoused by many service organizations (Pugh, 2002; Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988). For jobs that involve interacting with other people, business is facilitated when employees display certain emotions, especially in service industries in which the employees are viewed as being the “face” of their firms (Rupp, McCance, & Grandey, 2007). These emotions are typically positive, such as liking and interest, but can be neutral or negative as well. For example, 911 dispatchers were found to show “detached concern” for callers so as not to become overwhelmed by their own emotions (Shuler & Sypher, 2000; Tracy & Tracy, 1998). Likewise, bill collectors are often firm with customers whose accounts are delinquent and undertakers are not expected to show friendly smiles. In order to enforce an environment that encourages the appropriate display of emotions, workplaces often create a set of display rules. Employees are expected to abide by these rules, showing more control when they interact with customers, but having more flexibility when they interact with coworkers (Diefendorff & Greguras, 2009). These rules typically involve engaging in friendly, courteous, and cheerful behavior (Schneider & Bowen, 1985; Schneider, Parkington, & Buxton, 1980). The term feeling rules was originally coined by Hochschild (1983) in her influential book, The Managed Heart (see Fulmer & Barry, 2009, for a historical review of emotional labor). Later, Rafaeli and Sutton (1987) modified the name to display rules, which is the term we use here in this book. Display rules can be either formally enforced or informal in nature (for an overview, see Pugh, 2002). According to research by Diefendorff and Greguras (2009), rules vary among the different types of emotions. Generally speaking, one is typically not expected to show fear, disgust, or contempt while at work. Employees may also be expected to mask sadness and anger, though they can sometimes be expressed at lower intensities than they are felt. It is more acceptable to show happiness, though sometimes it is expected to not appear too intense.

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Benefits of Display Rules Display rules, however, are associated with a number of risks. Hochschild (1983), and later scholars, have demonstrated that coercing employees to express emotions that they do not feel can create negative individual consequences. So why do firms do it? As it happens, they have a good reason—display rules can be good for business. In an interesting study of 156 Taiwanese shoe stores, Tsai (2001) had two observers rate the affective displays of 290 clerks. Customers rated their own reactions and made purchase decisions. While displaying positive emotions did not increase shoe sales, they did cause customers to respond positively to the stores. In a larger follow-up study, Tsai and Huang (2002) studied 352 customer– employee pairs in 169 Taiwanese shoe stores. As in the Tsai (2001) study, trained observers rated the clerks’ affective displays. Customers reported better moods, spending more time in the store, being treated with greater friendliness, and having more positive intentions toward the organization (e.g., being more likely to return and speaking positively of the store). Building on these findings with a North American sample, Diefendorff and Gosserand (2002) found evidence supporting the beneficial effects of formal and specific display rules. Specifically, these scholars found that specific display rules promoted a higher level of job performance than did more general rules. The authors argued that more specific display rules are similar to organizational goals that employees work to achieve. These display goals act to direct employees’ behaviors and display of emotions. In short, positive displays can be good for business. The studies by Tsai (2001), Tsai and Huang (2002), and Diefendorff and Gosserand (2002) provide evidence that display rules, when judiciously utilized, can bring practical benefits to organizations. In principle, it need be no more unreasonable to ask a salesperson to smile than it is to ask him or her to show up for work on time or to assist customers. All of these tasks are helpful to others and bring benefits to the employer. More specifically, Cropanzano, Weiss, and Elias (2004) maintain that there are three main reasons why organizations enforce display rules: customer satisfaction and altruism, to maintain internal harmony, and to promote employee well-being. Display Rules Can Increase Customer Satisfaction For many organizations, the interaction between customer and employee is part of what is being sold. For example, at Renaissance festivals, patrons buy admission to see the actors wear attire and act and speak as if they were alive during the Renaissance. Part of what is sold in the ticket price is the understanding that certain behaviors and emotions will be displayed for the entertainment of the customer. Hence, theses actors’ emotions become a commodity that can be bought or sold (Cropanzano, Weiss, & Elias, 2004; Fulmer & Barry, 2009; Grandey & Brauburger, 2002; Hochschild, 1979; 1983; Kruml & Geddes, 2000a;

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2000b). Ideally, this leads to customers returning the smiles of their service providers (Barger & Grandey, 2006). Consequently, these positive emotional expressions should lead to increased customer satisfaction (Pugh, 2001), especially when the affect is perceived to be authentic (Grandey, Fisk, Mattila, et al., 2005). Many organizations build display rules into their vision. For example, Starbucks Coffee Company’s mission statement includes six guiding principles for “establishing Starbucks as the premier purveyor of the finest coffee in the world” (Starbucks Mission Statement, 2008). Principles€1 and 4 clearly indicate the company’s desire to display positive behavior and emotions for the good of the organization as well as customer satisfaction: • “Provide a great work environment and treat others with respect and dignity.” • “Develop enthusiastic and satisfied customers all of the time.” It is clear from the aforementioned examples that service organizations can and do attempt to regulate emotions at work. Doing so is part of the “product” that they purvey. Notice however that this phenomenon may be dependent on the national culture in which the firm operates. “For example, people from a collectivist society tend to be somewhat more likely to surpress their negative emotions in order to maintain group solidarity. But those from individualistic societies are relatively more likely to express their feelings” (Stephan, Stephan, & de Vargas, 1996). Display Rules Can Increase Internal Harmony As Charles Darwin observed in 1872, emotional displays are used as communication devices among members of the same species. Research on emotional contagion takes this observation even further. Specifically, the positive or negative emotions of a few individuals can spread throughout the rest of the group via emotional contagion (Pugh, 2001; see also Chapter 7), with all the consequences that are sure to follow from shared affective experiences. Put more simply, group members’ emotions are interconnected (Totterdell, Kellet, Teuchmann, & Briner, 1998), and this can pose a challenge to group harmony. Positive feelings, or insidiously negative feelings, can sweep through a group based on how others display their emotions. Shared negative emotions can be harmful to the performance of the group (Barsade & Gibson, 1998; George & Bettenhausen, 1990), while the lack of positive affect may boost absenteeism (George, 1990). Fortunately, firms can check this contagion through the use of display rules that discourage the exhibition of negative emotions. If only positive feelings are expressed, then it is less likely that the group will be negatively influenced by an unhappy group member (Kelly & Barsade, 2001).

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Display Rules Can Increase Employee Well-Being Although display rules can have negative repercussions, it is Â�important to recognize that they can be beneficial for employees, as well as to employers and customers. For example, Shuler and Sypher (2000) found that 911 dispatchers tried to maintain a level of emotional neutrality when talking to callers, attempting to curb their emotions in order to better help callers on the other end of the line. This emotional neutrality can be stressful, but it can also be the social dimension that brings together employees and makes their work enjoyable. More specifically, Shuler and Sypher (2000) argued that emotional labor can lead to comic relief between coworkers to downplay the severity of the event. This comic relief is posited to lead to social cohesion at work. As is clear from the aforementioned example, this sort of behavior can be healthy for service workers in some contexts (e.g., Miller, Birkholt, Scott, & Stage, 1995; Miller, Stiff, & Ellis, 1988). While providing free rein to one’s emotions can be detrimental in the short term (Cropanzano, Weiss, & Elias, 2004), we want to guard against overstatement. Too much disengagement from the work environment can have negative consequences (Kleinman, 1989). It is to these perils that we now turn.

Hazards of Display Rules: Emotional Labor Employees can be viewed as performers who portray characters. The cruel bill collector, the emotionless doctor, and the feminine secretary are culturally understood roles (Goffman, 1959). As is true for professional actors, the display of emotion is part of the role. However, away from the theater, the forced display of artificial emotions can produce job stress, burnout, and diminished overall health (e.g., Adelmann, 1995; Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Fulmer & Barry, 2009; Glomb, Miner, & Tews, 2002; Jones & Rohrer, 2002; Pugliesi, 1999; Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000; Wharton, 1993). This may reduce work performance (Grandey, 2003) and cause workers to exit the organization (Chau et al., 2009). The effort required to manage feeling states is the crux of emotional labor, and it can sometimes be hurtful. Three Definitions of Emotional Labor Historically, there are three ways in which emotional labor has been operationalized (Grandey, 2000). First, emotional labor has been defined as the effort that is required to maintain a certain emotional appearance (e.g., Hochschild, 1983; Kruml & Geddes, 2000a; Wharton & Erickson, 1993). In short, this involves creating observable facial and bodily displays that may not be consistent with one’s internal feeling state (Hochschild, 1983). This perspective makes a distinction between surface acting and deep acting (Brotheridge & Lee, 1998; Grandey, 2000;

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2003; Grandey & Brauburger, 2002). The essential difference between these two types of acting is that surface acting occurs when an individual outwardly displays disingenuous emotions. Deep acting, on the other hand, involves exerting effort to take the perspective of the other(s) with whom one is interacting in hopes of changing one’s internal emotional state so that it mirrors the emotions that are outwardly expressed. For the purpose of this book, we use the aforementioned definition of emotional labor because it considers the role of affect more than the other two definitions, which we discuss below. Later in this chapter we describe surface and deep acting in more detail. Still other scholars have viewed emotional labor strictly in terms of the emotions that are displayed (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993). This definition focuses purely on behaviors and does not attempt to infer a psychological state. In order to meet these definitional requirements, an individual needs only to display the organizationally sanctioned emotions. In other words, these scholars do not differentiate between varying internal emotional states. Defining the construct in this way makes it difficult to distinguish between emotional labor and emotional expression (Cropanzano, Weiss, & Elias, 2004). Therefore, we do not use this definition to describe the workplace emotional phenomena in this book. The third and final definition of emotional labor describes it in terms of the organizational environment that prompts the psychological activity of repressing and/or showing emotions (e.g., Morris & Feldman, 1996). This perspective takes the focus off the individual and places it on the organization’s requirements. This has been previously referred to as jobfocused emotional labor (Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002). In support for this definition, Schaubroeck and Jones (2000) found that the amount of interpersonal behavior required for a job was positively correlated with individuals’ proclivity to perceive the job as having emotional display rules for positive emotions. Similarly, Brotheridge and Grandey (2002) found that service workers used more surface acting than administrative workers and physical laborers. This definition of emotional labor, however, is lacking due to its overly narrow focus on emotion regulation at work. More specifically, because this definition is context specific, there is the underlying assumption that emotional labor cannot occur outside of work (Cropanzano, Weiss, & Elias, 2004). It is clear, however, that emotional labor can occur in a variety of other settings such as the home (Wharton & Erickson, 1993) or in the lab (Gross, 1998a; 1998b). Due to this perspective’s narrow view of emotional labor and its lack of attention to affective implications, we only describe it here but choose not to use it any further to explain workplace events. Emotional Labor Tactics Just as there are several ways that scholars have conceptualized emotional labor, there are also many tactics used by employees that have

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been posited to assist in emotional regulation. These tactics fall under one of two broad categories: antecedent focused and response focused (Grandey, 2000; 2003; Grandey & Brauburger, 2002). Antecedentfocused regulation emphasizes the causes of the emotions, while response-focused regulation emphasizes the outcomes. An individual engaging in antecedent-focused coping actively adapts environmental conditions to produce a situation that will not require emotions to be regulated. On the other hand, response-focused regulation requires one to deal with emotions after an event has already occurred. As mentioned above, there are sundry types of antecedent-focused regulation. Attentional deployment, one type of precoping, involves mentally preparing oneself for emotionally straining activities that are anticipated (Grandey, 2000; 2003; Grandey & Brauburger, 2002). For example, if a waitress “psyches” herself up before a long shift in anticipation of difficult customers, this may mitigate negative emotions from emerging while she is working. Another type of precoping involves cognitive reappraisal of the anticipated situation. Bill collectors, for example, have been found to justify their harsh demeanor toward those in debt by calling attention to the fact that their actions might help these individuals’ credit ratings (Sutton, 1991). There are also several types of response-focused emotional regulation ranging from the consumption of mood-altering drugs (Kramer, 1994; Parks, 1983; Restak, 1994) to engaging in friendly conversation with customers (Rafaeli, 1989; Rafaeli & Sutton, 1990). Our focus in this chapter, however, is on surface and deep acting as a responsefocused coping mechanism since these tactics have received much of the research attention (Abraham, 1998; Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Chau et al., 2009; Erickson & Wharton, 1997). Surface acting is a form of behavioral modification that involves displaying inauthentic emotions or suppressing felt emotions that would normally be readily observed by others (Sideman Goldberg & Grandey, 2007). Surface acting has been referred to as faking in “bad faith” (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987, p. 32) and occurs when an employee’s internal feeling state is not the same as the emotions he or she is required to convey. Faking in “good faith” (i.e., deep acting) is an attempt to modify one’s emotional state by reappraising the situation or choosing to focus on more positive cognitions (Grandey, 2000; Hochschild, 1983). Researchers have found that surface acting can be detected and can lead to customer dissatisfaction (Hennig-Thurau, Groth, Paul, & Gremler, 2006). Surface acting has been found to increase exhaustion and depression among employees (Abraham, 1998; Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Erickson & Wharton, 1997; Grandey, 2000; Grandey & Brauburger, 2002; Grandey, Fisk, & Steiner, 2005; Gross, 1998a; 1998b). Two field studies, one by Grandey (2003) and the other by Chau and her coworkers (2009), shed interesting light on the distinction between surface and deep acting.

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Grandey (2003) explored surface and deep acting among a sample of 131 administrative assistants in a large American university. Deep acting was found to improve the employees’ interactions with customers. In addition, deep acting was unrelated to emotional exhaustion when Grandey controlled for the effects of surface acting. Surface acting impaired performance, while also being associated with emotional exhaustion. Generally speaking, surface acting created ill effects for both the organization and for the worker, whereas deep acting did not. In a later study of 263 American bank tellers, Chau and her colleagues investigated the relationships among emotional labor, emotional exhaustion, turnover intentions, and actual turnover behavior. Deep acting had a direct and negative relationship to turnover intentions. Thus, when the tellers engaged in deep acting they were less likely to desire leaving the organization. Consistent with Grandey’s (2003) results, deep acting was not significantly correlated with emotional exhaustion (r = −.08). Surface acting was not directly related to turnover intentions. However, surface acting was related to emotional exhaustion (r = .56). This exhaustion, in turn, was positively related to turnover intentions. Taken together, these results suggest that surface acting had an indirect and positive relationship to turnover intentions. Thus, when the tellers engaged in surface acting they were ultimately more likely to desire leaving the organization. Some Concluding Thoughts As we have seen, the satisfaction of customers, business necessity, and employee well-being push firms to regulate the expression of emotion. This regulation can cause employees to change their actual feeling states through deep acting, or else they can change their superficial behavior through surface acting. In general, it seems that surface acting is more hazardous than is deep acting. Regardless, the use of workplace policies to regulate workers’ affect raises issues of organizational justice. We will turn our attention to this next.

Injustice and Emotional Labor As we have documented throughout this book, injustice has an impact on emotions. In many cases, the emotions generated include anger and hostility, feeling states that may be expressively discouraged by the display rules of many organizations (Cropanzano, Weiss, & Elias, 2004; Grandey & Brauburger, 2002). To remain in conformance with these rules, employees may resort to emotional labor. Emotional labor, and especially surface acting, can have adverse effects on people’s well-being (Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Grandey, 2000; 2003; Grandey & Brauburger, 2002; Grandey, Fisk, & Steiner, 2005; Gross, 1998a; 1998b). Taken together, evidence suggests three mechanisms

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by which injustice generates ill effects (for theoretical reviews that pertain to justice, see Cropanzano et al., 2000; Rupp, McCance, & Grandey, 2007; see also Grandey & Fisk, 2005). • The injustice itself can be directly hurtful. • The display rules can be viewed as unfair and, therefore, also hurtful. • Injustice may make it harder to conform to display rules. It is interesting to consider the theoretical status of each of these ill effects in light of what we have already discussed. The first, of course, is identical to the justice-leads-to-emotion mechanism that formed the basis of Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Indeed, one can make this point with scarcely any consideration of emotional labor. Given this, the first ill effect will not be considered further. The second ill effect is similar as well, though it seems closer to a procedural (in)justice. While an unfair (display) rule is a novel predictor of affect, we caution that the conceptual position is generally the same as other theories positing that injustice creates affect. We review evidence for this position below. The third ill effect, arguing that laboring to control affect expression may be especially difficult when injustice is involved, is conceptually unique to emotional labor scholars. As a result, we devote the most attention to this third possibility. How Display Rules Create Injustice Perceptions As mentioned above, display rules deemed unfair can provoke affective reactions. That said, it appears that individuals differ in the extent to which they are aware of these display rules (Best, Downey, & Jones, 1997; Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000) as well as how fair or unfair they perceive the rules to be (Grandey & Fisk, 2005). Readers should observe how closely this parallels the idea of procedural justice, introduced in Chapter€1. The display rules are business directives that workers are expected to obey and as such may be subjected to employees’ justice€assessments. How individuals respond to process guidelines can depend on both situational factors and individual differences. Previous theorists have proposed that (a) situational factors (e.g., negative events and low job autonomy; Grandey & Brauburger, 2002) and (b) a negative or inexpressive personality style can make some more likely than others to perceive a discrepancy between felt emotions and the display standard (Dieffendorff & Gosserand, 2003). Specifically, some theorists suggest that individuals’ personality traits may influence their perception of the fairness of display rules. Recently, Grandey and Fisk (2005) added a new individual difference that is relevant to our understanding of emotional labor. Termed the SERF (service emotion rule fairness), this new individual difference is more cognitive in nature than previous work on affective personality (e.g., that of Abraham, 1998; Bulan,

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Erickson,€ &€ Wharton, 1997; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003; Morris & Feldman, 1997). SERF describes employee’s cognitively based perceptions about the fairness of their organization as opposed to trait-level variation in affect. Grandey and Fisk (2005) argued that employees who believe that the organization unfairly controls their emotional displays should have a poor fit with their job and this could increase strain. To test this newly proposed individual difference, these emotional labor scholars recruited 104 participants from various locations in the United States and Canada. All participants worked at least 16 hours per week and were nonstudents. Surveys were administered that included measures of (a) SERF, (b) perceptions of workplace policies and outcomes, (c) affective personality, (d) job strain, and (e) group membership. These scholars found that SERF explained variance in turnover intentions and emotional exhaustion above and beyond individual and group characteristics providing initial support for this new individual difference variable. However, there were some interesting caveats in their findings that are important to note. First, individuals scored higher on SERF when they perceived that emotional displays to customers were a way for them to gain monetary rewards, or if this would lead to the formation of valuable relationships. An additional twist in their findings was that individuals with more social and organizational power tended to perceive that display rules were fairer than those with less power. Finally, participants from minority groups were more likely than majority group members to report that engaging in emotional labor made them feel used. In the future, emotional labor scholars should continue to examine these caveats in more depth. In particular, display rules may be judged as more fair if their creation and implementation respects organizational justice rules. As reviewed above, employees consider these rules as more just when they are compensated for applying them, which relates to distributive justice perceptions. So far, however, justice researchers have not studied to what extent having voice regarding the creation of these rules (procedural justice) or being asked with respect and full justification to implement them (interactional justice) results in fairer perceptions for service employees. In summary, the important point to take away from the Grandey and Fisk (2005) study is that the mere existence of display rules can spur justice judgments. This is consistent with treating display rules as procedural guidelines that may be imposed on employees. That having been said, we emphasize that there is more to this matter. As discussed at the outset of this chapter, unjust treatment from customers may make it harder to maintain one’s affective composure. We consider evidence pertaining to this possibility below. How Injustice Increases the Burden of Emotional Labor The impact of emotional labor becomes relevant when one realizes that service workers can experience severe abuse from customers (Grandey,

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Dickter, & Sin, 2004). This mistreatment can be described as an Â�interactional injustice stemming from an interpersonal encounter. Rupp and Spencer (2006) recently examined the effects of customer interactional injustice on the perceived emotional labor of the customer service employee. Specifically, undergraduates played the role of a call center employee and answered the telephone when customers (confederates) called. The confederates were trained to act as either interactionally fair or unfair customers. The authors predicted that when employees were subject to interactionally unfair customers, they would engage in higher levels of emotional labor than those customers subject to fair customers. Additionally, the authors posited that anger and happiness, respectively, would partially mediate the aforementioned relationships. The results of the study supported their claims. Explicitly, employees who were treated unfairly by customers engaged in higher levels of emotional labor and found it harder to comply with emotional display rules than employees who were treated in a fair manner. Given that Rupp and Spencer’s (2006) study utilized an undergraduate population and overthe-phone encounters, one could question the generalizability of their findings to real organizations with face-to-face employee–customer interactions. For that reason, Spencer and Rupp (2009) conducted another laboratory study in which participants interacted in face-to-face encounters with their coworkers in addition to fair or unfair customers. Results were similar to their first study, in that subjects experienced negative counterfactual thinking, anger, and increased emotional labor. Spencer and Rupp’s (2009) results seem bad enough for organizations, but there is another finding that makes them even worse. What is unique and interesting is that these emotions were felt by the coworker—a bystander—as well as by the actual participant subject to the injustice (consistent with Ellard & Skarlicki, 2002; Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005). In fact, the negative emotions were felt by the bystander even when they themselves had received fair interpersonal treatment (in which case they not only felt angry but also guilty)! These results strengthen the support for the argument that justice/injustice can cause negative emotions such as anger and guilt, and thereby make emotional labor more difficult than when customers are interactionally fair. In fact, the effect of injustice on emotions is so strong that it can cause anguish in bystanders who do not experience the injustice themselves but are merely witnesses and make them less able to respect display rules. To add generalizability to their results, Rupp, McCance, Spencer, and Sonntag (2008) examined customer-based injustice from a sample taken from a bank in Germany. This study focused on the idea of surface acting and perspective taking (perspective taking is also often known as deep acting; see Grandey, Dickter, & Sin, 2004 and van Hoorebeke, 2005). From their examination, Rupp et al. (2008) found that anger mediated the relationship between customer interactional injustice (both interpersonal and information justice) and surface acting. Furthermore, Rupp and Colleagues (2008) discovered that individual differences

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in perspective taking had a moderating influence on the link between unfairness and perceived emotions. More specifically, those who were low in perspective taking experienced stronger negative emotions when exposed to unfair customers and engaged in more surface acting. On the other hand, those who were high in perspective taking experienced weaker negative emotions, thus making complying with display rules easier for them. We are able to garner several important pieces of information from the three previously mentioned studies. First, injustice can spur strong negative emotions, and these emotions are experienced in face-to-face interactions and by other means of communication, such as the telephone. Second, the individual subjected to the injustice is not the only person who is adversely affected. Specifically, coworkers or witnesses to the unfair treatment may also feel badly after seeing someone else treated poorly. These results show a clear picture about how the divide between felt emotions and those sanctioned by the display rules is dramatically broadened by customer interactional injustice, thus making emotional labor much more difficult. These laboratory results were further bolstered by the field data findings that German bank tellers experience injustice and engage in emotional labor on the job, but that high perspective taking can allay some of the negative emotions and thus make employees more able to respect display rules without engaging in surface acting. Due to the similarity of perspective taking with the concept of deep acting, it is entirely plausible that in fact employees high in perspective taking engaged in more deep acting. Further examination of these ideas should ensue. Even so, the results are robust and quite promising for elucidating the link between injustice and emotional labor.

Summary and Critique As we have observed, employees, and service workers in particular, are many times subject to abuse from customers (Grandey, Dickter, & Sin, 2004; Rupp & Spencer, 2006). These interactions can lead the employee to experience a variety of negative emotional states such as anger and hostility (and even guilt if it’s the coworker who has been treated unfairly). But organizations, as we know, do not want these feeling states to be displayed for fear of annoying customers or disrupting coworkers (Cropanzano, Weiss, & Elias, 2004; Grandey & Brauburger, 2002). Therefore, workers that experience injustice may be forced to engage in more emotional labor than when they are fairly treated, albeit with some difficulty (Rupp et al., 2008; Rupp & Spencer, 2006). If ineffectively managed, the discomfort of engaging in emotional labor can have potentially deleterious effects on one’s overall health and wellbeing (Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Grandey, 2000; 2003; Grandey & Brauburger, 2002; Grandey, Fisk, & Steiner, 2005; Gross, 1998a, 1998b; Pugh, 2002). Additionally, these problems can spread to coworkers that are forced to observe an injustice, and this can transpire even among

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those who themselves were treated fairly (Spencer & Rupp, 2009). That said, there are some optimistic findings. For example, Rupp et al. (2008) observed that perspective taking can reduce negative emotions and the need to surface act. While this is worthwhile, reducing injustice in the first place will likely have the greatest long-term benefits for workers and employers alike.

Some Final Parting Thoughts We opened this chapter by considering important research on �emotional regulation (Gross, 1998a; 1998b; Kokkonen & Kinnunen, 2006; Vingerhoets et al., 2008). Investigations of emotional labor have explicitly and meaningfully incorporated these conceptual ideas into their thinking, finding that the effort taken to control our emotions can have consequences for both workers and the customers with whom they interact (Adelmann, 1995; Grandey, 2000; Grandey & Brauburger, 2002; Fulmer & Barry, 2009; Pugh, 2002). As such, workplace fairness is bound to be an important issue (Grandey & Fisk, 2005; Jasso, 1993; 2006; Rupp, Bashshur, & Liao, 2007a; 2007b). These are important aspects of emotional regulation, but there is a limitation worth considering. The two types of emotional labor we have observed, deep acting and surface acting (Brotheridge & Lee, 1998; Grandey, 2003), are both performed in responses to work demands (Morris & Feldman, 1996; 1997), such as those found in service occupations (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Hochschild, 1983). Next we explore a different type of emotional regulation. And, we will observe that justice is an important outcome of this process as well.

Terror Management Theory Le soleil ni la mort ne se peuvent regarder fixement [Neither the sun nor death can be looked at steadily] —François de La Rochefoucauld

Overview of Terror Management Theory (TMT) Whether people consciously realize it or not, we are reminded of our mortality regularly. Following the news, watching a horror movie, and thinking about life insurance all make salient the fact that our lives will one day end. Historically, human reactions to death have been the purview of clerics and not psychologists, but some scholars have changed this trend. Over the years, some notable contributions appeared. Among these, terror management theory (TMT) is the most relevant to empirical social justice research (for summaries, see Greenberg et al., 1986; Solomon et al., 1991).

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Unique among the theories in this book, which have been drawn from the social psychology and organizational psychology literatures, TMT emerged from cultural anthropology. Specifically, the framework was pioneered through the influential work of anthropologist Ernest Becker (1971; 1973; 1975). In Becker’s (1975) words, “Reality for us is simply refusing to accept that evil and death are constantly with us” (p. 17). Becker’s statement accentuates a truism about human nature. “Reality” involves an act of denial. Stated simply, seriously confronting our own nonexistence fills us with horror. Humans are therefore placed in a mentally bothersome position. By means of evolved intelligence, we are able to keep ourselves alive for long periods of time. Yet, with that intelligence comes an understanding that no amount of exercise, medicine, or technology exists to keep our bodies functioning forever. Becker asserted that humans have a great deal of trouble reconciling this inconsistency between having a drive to live and the knowledge that life cannot go on forever. This dissonance is the hypothesized mechanism that causes many of the effects discussed in the TMT literature. Greenberg and his colleagues (Greenberg et al., 1986; Solomon et al., 1991) sought to place Becker’s (1971; 1973; 1975) work on a solid and testable conceptual footing. The result of these efforts is terror management theory. According to TMT, people cannot emotionally handle thinking about their own death. Rather than live lives of constant worry, we keep these thoughts outside of focal consciousness most of the time. However, when we are confronted with death, TMT asserts that we have psychological defense mechanisms that we can use to mitigate feelings of terror. TMT theorists have called this psychological defense mechanism the “cultural anxiety buffer.” This anxiety buffer consists of individuals’ self-esteem and their cultural worldviews. By means of their cultural worldviews, for example, individuals are able to imbue their lives with a sense of value and existential meaning in an attempt to gain either symbolic immortality (e.g., feeling as though you will live on after death through your accomplishments) or actual immortality (e.g., belief in an afterlife). Thus, when confronted with a death reminder, people cling to the elements of their worldview, which give them a sense of meaning and make them able to mentally deal with the dissonance between having a drive to live and the knowledge that they cannot do it forever. Cultural worldviews vary from person to person; different people (and societies) value diverse things (Arndt, Goldenberg, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2000). Despite this, all cultures provide meaning, order, stability, and personal significance (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). It logically follows that an increased adherence to one’s cultural worldview is the coping mechanism used to buffer thoughts of mortality.

Terror Management and Ingroup Behavior In the past two decades, many studies have been conducted �investigating the impact of fear of death on cultural worldviews

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(e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). This research has shown that reminding individuals of their mortality can lead to an increase in questionable behavior. More specifically, after being reminded of death, subjects have been found to bolster their worldviews (e.g., Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002). This bolstering process can take the form of physically aggressing against people who threaten their preferred outlook (McGregor et al., 1998). It can even lead to discriminatory behavior against outgroup members (e.g., See & Petty, 2006). This hypothesis was first tested by Greenberg and his colleagues (1990). These scholars had participants ponder their own mortality and subsequently make judgments about fictitious others who either upheld or violated elements of their cultural worldviews. They further posited that following a mortality salience induction, participants would harbor distaste for those who questioned the validity of their worldviews and would embrace those they believed to share similar worldviews. Greenberg and his colleagues (1990) conducted three studies. In their final study, American participants read essays by fictitious authors that either strongly liked or strongly disliked the U.S. political system following a mortality salience manipulation or a control condition. They found that all participants preferred the pro-American author over the anti-American author. However, this effect was accentuated when participants were told to contemplate their death. Greenberg et al. (1990) argued that national identity is a key component of most people’s worldviews. Therefore, participants should like pro-American targets and dislike anti-American targets after thinking about their death. Pertinent to this book, a subset of the TMT research has focused on how mortality salience can affect perceptions of justice in a legal setting and consequent punishment. We concentrate on these studies below as they plausibly point to the ability of an emotional experience (i.e., unconscious or anticipated terror even if the possibility that colder cognitive mechanisms are at work should not be ruled out; see below) to drive justice perceptions and consequent actions (i.e., punishment).*

Terror Management, Punishment, and Forgiveness The seminal TMT and legal decision-making study was conducted by Rosenblatt and his colleagues in 1989. These scholars used municipal court judges from Tucson, Arizona, as their participants. The judges were informed that the research they were participating in was examining * For our purposes here we will be emphasizing mortality salience effects that are directly pertinent to justice and emotion. We emphasize that this is only one part of the literature. In fact, research suggests that there are a number of ways to reduce the threats from mortality salience. For example, raising one’s self-esteem is posited to make the participant feel important and has a similar effect to bolstering cultural worldviews after a mortality salience reminder (Arndt & Greenberg, 1999; HarmonJones, Simon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1997).

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the relationships among personality, attitudes, and bond decisions. The judges began the study by completing a set of personality assessments. Additionally, half of the judges completed a section entitled, “Mortality Attitudes Personality Survey.” The participants were informed that this section was a new type of personality measure. In the mortality salience condition, the judges were asked to write brief responses to the following open-ended questions: “Please briefly describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you.” And, “Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you as you physically die and once you are physically dead.” This is the standard mortality salience manipulation that is used in the TMT literature (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990; van den Bos & Miedema, 2000). After completing the mortality salience manipulation, all participants completed the Positive Affectivity and Negative Affectivity Schedule (PANAS) scale assessing their positive and negative state-level affect (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Judges assigned to the control group received the same information with the exception of the mortality salience induction. To make the study as true-to-life as possible, the judges were presented with a hypothetical legal case brief that was similar to those that they typically use during a trial. The following information was included in the brief (1) the charge of prostitution, (2) the defendant’s address, (3) the defendant’s employment record, and (4) the defendant’s length of residency. A copy of the citation was included in the judges’ materials in addition to the case brief. The citation included information such as the date and location of the hypothetical crime, the officer who made the arrest, and the arresting charge. Following the case brief was a form that the judge was to complete asking him or her to set a monetary value for the alleged prostitute’s bond. Rosenblatt and his colleagues (1989) hypothesized that judges reminded of their mortality would set higher bonds for the fictitious prostitute than judges who had not been reminded of their death. And, indeed, the results supported their hypotheses. Specifically, judges reminded of their mortality set a bail bond an average of $50 greater than judges who had not been reminded of their mortality ($455 versus $405, respectively). These scholars argued that judges’ worldviews probably involve the “laws of the land” since their chosen profession resides within the legal system. In short, this study provided support for the contention that mortality salience heightens the need to bolster cultural worldviews and that this act can take the form of punishing transgressors. There are many other studies of TMT and legal decision making that followed from the work of Rosenblatt et al. (1989; see Arndt, Lieberman, Cook, & Solomon, 2005, for a review). While the results tend to support the predicted TMT effects, none of the previous work has examined the effects of mortality salience outside of the laboratory. In order to close this gap in the research, Stein, Steinley, and Cropanzano (2010) used archival data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics to investigate the effect of 9/11 on federal criminal sentencing. The killing of American

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civilians in the World Trade Center attacks, which were widely Â�broadcast and viewed by millions of people, were viewed as real-world manipulation of terror management. As such, the authors predicted and found evidence suggesting that this death reminder led to an increase in prison sentences for transgressions deemed morally egregious, though not for transgressions that were less morally loaded. Explicitly, the authors employed a quasi-experimental time-series design to examine the punishment of criminals in the federal court system pre and post September 11th, 2001. Their datasets were obtained from the Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center. The study covered the period from 1994 to 2005. These authors then employed a piecewise linear regression with correlated error terms and an intervention analysis in the context of an autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) model to test for the hypothesized effects. Using these techniques, they found that there was an increase in prison sentences for the morally egregious crimes of first degree murder, sexual abuse, and kidnapping. Additionally, they found no significant increase in prison sentences for less morally charged crimes (i.e., income tax evasion, food stamp fraud, and manslaughter). The authors argued that these more innocuous crimes did not violate deeply held moral norms, and therefore there were no observed effects of mortality salience (i.e., 9/11) on prison sentencing. These findings provide support for terror management theory’s contention that individuals are inclined to punish those who commit crimes that threaten their worldviews (i.e., morally charged crimes) after they are reminded of their death. Moreover, the previously mentioned studies also make it clear that TMT effects can have an impact on legal decision making. We would, however, shortchange the reader if we failed to mention that mortality salience has been found to promote reactions of forgiveness as well as those of punishment. Specifically, Schimel, Wohl, and Williams (2006, Study 2) hypothesized and found that mortality salience increased forgiveness of a hypothetical violent hockey player for participants high in trait empathy. Interestingly, this was so regardless of whether or not they considered the hockey player to be a member of their ingroup. Therefore, it appears that for some individuals with specific traits, mortality salience can also induce seemingly positive attitudes. In the next section, we describe the mechanism that is posited to produce the TMT effects.

Where Is the Affective Driver in TMT? At the present time there are hundreds of TMT studies that have supported the idea that morality salience causes people to reaffirm their cultural worldview (see Pyszczynski et al., 2003 for a review). However, terror management theory says a bit more than this. Specifically, the model asserts that terror, or fear of our death, is the driver that causes these behavioral and attitudinal responses. Debate over the theory has

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centered on the mediating role of this affective process. Some scholars have taken issue with the theory because there is limited evidence that the posited affective experience of terror occurs after death reminders (e.g., Muraven & Baumeister, 1997). Indeed, a thorough reading of the available empirical research shows that death thoughts do not appear to produce any clear signs of emotional distress. Additionally, consciously experienced emotion does not appear to act as a mediator in producing increases in worldview defensive attitudes and behaviors (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyzczynski, 1997). This would seem to be problematic for the theory, but there are two plausible alternative theories of how affect drives TMT that address these concerns. The first theory is that affect is experienced at an unconscious level. Indeed, Vallacher (1997) has asserted that the lack of conscious affect is just what should be expected if the fear of mortality is so intensely frightening that it must be driven out of conscious awareness. As Solomon and his colleagues (1997) have maintained, there is no question that thoughts of mortality can at times produce a conscious experience of anxiety: One need only think back to the last time the doctor suggested to you that a lump, wart, or cough “seems suspicious.” … What is surprising to some is that the conscious experience of emotion does not appear to produce these effects. There is, however, a long history of theorizing that defensive responses can occur so rapidly and automatically as to completely subvert the conscious experience of emotion. (Solomon et al. 1997, p. 65)

These scholars went on to argue that studies within the cognitivedissonance tradition have repeatedly found evidence of dissonance reduction without consciously acknowledging awareness of internal conflict. Adding additional support to their argument, they maintained that in studies of avoidance conditioning, animals generally do not show signs of emotion when engaging in routine behaviors that avoid coming into contact with unpleasant stimuli (e.g., Sidman, 1966). Alternatively, it may be that the unconscious experience of emotion is not driving TMT effects. Instead, the motivational catalyst for the sundry effects found in the TMT literature could be the potential for extremely negative affect and not the conscious or unconscious experience of affect per se. Regardless of whether the “terror” of thinking about death is conscious, unconscious, or anticipated but not experienced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the findings in the TMT research are driven by an affective management system geared at quelling fear.

Justice and Terror Management Theory General Findings Based on the above argument, it seems likely that TMT is driven by mechanisms that involve negative affect, or at least the potential for

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negative affect. Now we turn to research demonstrating that mortality salience can impact individuals’ justice perceptions. Van den Bos and Miedema (2000) were the first researchers to suggest a link between mortality salience and justice. They hypothesized that individuals would need justice more when reminded of their mortality. These scholars posited that individuals asked to think about their death would react more negatively toward things that violate their cultural worldviews (in a way similar to the reactions of the judges studied by Rosenblatt et al. [1989] and Stein et al. [2010]) and more positively toward things that bolster their worldviews. Their reasoning is consistent with prior TMT research (e.g., Solomon et al., 1997), but also stems from Lind and Tyler’s (1988) contention that individuals evaluate (un)fair processes to be in accordance with (violation of) generally accepted norms and values. In their Study 1, van den Bos and Miedema (2000) manipulated both mortality salience (salient condition vs. control condition) and procedure (voice vs. no voice). To begin the experiment, research participants completed a computer-based task in which they were able to compare their performance to the performance of a fictitious subject. Each participant was further informed that the experimenter would later divide lottery tickets between him or her and the hypothetical subject. These tickets would provide a chance to win money. Participants were then told to take a minute to think about how many lottery tickets they thought they deserved. Following this exercise, mortality salience was manipulated using the well-established two-question induction that has been used in previous research (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Schimel, 1999; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Rosenblatt, 1990; HarmonJones et al., 1997; McGregor et al., 1998). The procedural manipulation followed. In the voice condition, subjects had the opportunity to tell the experimenter how many lottery tickets they should receive in comparison to “other.” Participants in the no voice condition were told that they would not have the opportunity to voice their opinion on the issue. Results indicated that there was an interaction between voice and mortality salience on the level of reported affect. Specifically, subjects who had the ability to voice their opinion (a high procedural justice condition) had higher positive affect ratings than those who did not have this option. Moreover, the effect of voice was stronger for those in the mortality salient condition than in the control condition. Similar results were found in Studies 2 and 3. In each case, the lack of voice (a procedural injustice) created the most negative affect when participants were directed to think about their deaths. Van den Bos and Miedema (2000) interpreted this to mean that mortality salience heightened both the favorable effects of justice and the ill effects of injustice. Mortality Salience and Self-Threat In later research, Miedema, van den Bos, and Vermunt (2006, Study€2) conducted a study that examined both self-threat and mortality€salience.

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In this regard, the study harkened back to the literature that we discussed in Chapter 4. Undergraduate research participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions in a 2 (salience: self-threat vs. mortality) x 2 (outcome: equal vs. unequal) factorial design. Upon entering the lab, subjects were ushered into cubicles with a computer and all instructions were presented in electronic format. Participants in the self-threat condition were asked to contemplate being negatively judged by others and to respond to two questions about that topic. Individuals in the mortality salience condition were asked to ponder their own death and then answer two questions similar to those in the aforementioned research by van den Bos and Miedema (2000). Participants were told to imagine themselves in a situation where they have completed work in conjunction with one other individual and their boss has to decide how to split bonus money between the two of€ them. In the equal condition, they are told that they received the same amount of money as the other. In the unequal condition, the other person received twice as much as did the participant. After reading the scenario, participants were asked how fairly they were treated in the scenario. They were also asked to what extent they were in a negative mood and to what extent they felt hostile. As predicted, there was an interaction between salience and condition such that both self-threat and mortality salience had effects on participants’ ratings of negative affect when there was an unequal outcome. These findings provide additional support for the contention that mortality salience has an impact on justice perceptions and that these perceptions can be affectively laden. Miedema et al.’s (2006) Study 2 is also noteworthy in that it includes both threats to the self and threats to one’s mortality. The experiment suggests that each sort of threat has independent effects on feeling states, though the results of these effects appear to be similar.

Terror Management Theory vs. Uncertainty Management Theory Findings such as those reported by Miedema and his colleagues (2006) suggest another possibility. Can the effects of terror management theory be explained by the van den Bos (1999; 2003; van den Bos & Lind, 2002) uncertainty management theory (UMT)? In other words, are the findings that have previously been attributed to mortality salience actually due to the avoidance of uncertainty? As Colquitt, Greenberg, and Zapata-Phelan (2005) have observed, van den Bos et al. (2005) have raised this as a possibility worthy of investigation. To explain why this idea has merit, it is necessary for us to take a closer look at UMT. Drawing on an extensive body of literature (cf. Skinner, 1996), uncertainty management theory suggests that individuals desire to feel a sense of control in their lives. By this reckoning, uncertainty is likely

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to be threatening and unpleasant (Lind & van den Bos, 2002; van den Bos & Lind, 2002). UMT explains that justice is important because fairness allows individuals to predict and understand why events occur in their social environments. As a consequence, the experience of justice makes even unfavorable outcomes somewhat more tolerable (van den Bos et al., 2005). With this in mind, one can see the relevance of UMT to mortality salience. Being aware of one’s death could make one uncertain and confused. Thus, one might cling to an interest in social justice simply to reduce the threat of uncertainty and not due to the fear of death per se (for evidence, see van den Bos et al., 2005). The terror management mechanism is somewhat different. TMT predicts that mortality salience will cause individuals to bolster important aspects of their worldview in order to gain meaning and existential significance (e.g., Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). Individuals are not simply responding to uncertainty, but are trying to affirm personal meaning in the face of their own deaths. While it seems reasonable to suppose that UMT could explain some of the observed effects, other research suggests that we should be cautious before adopting uncertainty management as the only viable theory for explaining mortality salience. The punishment literature, reviewed earlier in this chapter, is important in this regard. Recall the work by Rosenblatt and his colleagues (1989; Study 2). These authors examined the punishment of fictitious prostitutes following a mortality salience manipulation. They found that participants in the mortality salience condition set higher bonds for the prostitutes. In fact, there was a moderating factor to this effect: The judges did so only if they espoused negative views about prostitution from the outset of the experiment. Specifically, the effect in the second study was achieved if participants found prostitution legally inappropriate and morally abhorrent. On the other hand, certainty could have best been maximized if all individuals had set equally high bonds for all lawbreakers, regardless of their personal values. In so doing, the participants would have taken the maximal amount of control of the situation. The fact that they did not, raises the possibility that findings were not (exclusively) due to the need for certainty, but instead reflected an increased desire to affirm an ethical principle (prostitution is wrong) that some people espouse. The Stein et al. (2010) study of sentencing is similarly suggestive. Specifically, Stein and her colleagues found that after 9/11 (a mortality salience induction), criminals convicted of morally egregious crimes (i.e., first-degree murder, sexual abuse, and kidnapping) saw their sentences increase. Those that were convicted of less morally charged crimes (i.e., manslaughter, food stamp fraud, and tax evasion) showed no such effect. Once again, the largest reduction in uncertainty would have come for locking up all lawbreakers for as much time as possible. However, this was not the case. Instead, America witnessed an increase only among those crimes that were morally egregious in

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nature. Findings from the punishment literature Â� suggest that mortality salience produces an effect that cannot be fully explained by the need for certainty. To state the matter more generally, terror management theory and uncertainty management theory may be describing different psychological mechanisms that sometimes produce similar effects. However, a way to reconcile punishment literature with UMT could consist in viewing people as feeling less uncertain only when their ethical principles are reassessed. It is possible that in both the Rosenblatt et al. (1989) and Stein et al. (2010) studies, judges reduced their feelings of uncertainty due to their fear of death only when they could punish the perpetrators of injustices that violated their moral principles. Thus, uncertainty reduction could indeed be the main explanation for the stronger reactions that people have to justice and injustice when reminded of their death (and not the explanation favored by TMT) but only when their ethical view of the world is at stake. Unfortunately, very little research has directly compared the mortality salience mechanism to uncertainty management. An important exception is the recent work of Yavuz and van den Bos (2009). These scholars exposed undergraduate students from Turkey to three critical manipulations. For about one third of the participants, mortality was made salient by having the individuals write about the emotional and physical experience of death. For roughly another third, uncertainty was made salient by having individuals write about the emotional and physical experiences that it engendered in them. Finally, the final set of participants comprised a control group. They wrote about the emotional and physical experience of watching television. Afterward, the research subjects read essays that either supported or challenged their personal worldviews. As expected, Yavuz and van den Bos (2009) found evidence for both UMT and TMT. When compared to individuals who wrote about television, those who wrote about death and also those who wrote about uncertainty had more negative reactions to the challenging essay. Significantly, Yavuz and van den Bos also discovered that the uncertainty manipulation had a stronger effect than did the mortality salience manipulation. Likewise, those who wrote about their deaths reported thinking about uncertainty, while those who wrote about uncertainty did not report thinking about their deaths. Based on considerations such as these, Yavuz and van den Bos suggested that uncertainty may have stronger effects than does fear of one’s death. Notice however that this study doesn’t compare the explanatory power of UMT and TMT regarding the impact that mortality salience has on strengthening people’s reactions to threats to their worldviews. Instead it compares the impact of uncertainty to the one of fear of death (which might be due to uncertainty or to threat to beliefs in the meaning of life). Thus, more research is still needed in this respect.

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Summary and Critique From our review of the literature, it is clear that TMT describes a highly adaptive human mood management system. This system regulates our emotional states following mortality salience reminders, and it does so by engaging worldview defense mechanisms. Furthermore, at least some research provides support for Solomon et al.’s (1997) contention that the human desire for justice can be explained, in part, as deriving from the need to address the problem of mortality in a symbolic fashion (i.e., obtain existential meaning by means of fairness and social significance). Despite the general support for TMT, there are two theoretical questions that are useful to address. The first concerns the role of conscious and unconscious affect. The second concerns the use of uncertainty management as an alternative explanatory mechanism. Wherefore Consciousness? So far, thinking about death has not been found to create conscious affective responses (Solomon et al., 1997). This does not, of course, explain away the considerable body of evidence obtained in support of TMT. However, it might suggest that there is a different mechanism by which mortality salience impacts peoples’ responses. This alternative mechanism, one presumes, would be “colder.” That is, more cognitive and less affective. While this possibility cannot be ruled out, terror management theorists have a different explanation. The lack of conscious affect may be due to the extremely frightening nature of death. It is likely that these fears are quickly driven out of conscious awareness, so that individuals can function and are not paralyzed with terror (Solomon et€al. 1997; Vallacher, 1997). Indeed, this is precisely what our defense mechanisms are designed to do—they keep us for becoming afraid. There is an additional possibility. It may even be that the emotions never actually exist, either consciously or unconsciously. Rather, their potential painfulness is sufficient to prompt a decisive response before they actually occur. If this model proves to be correct, then mortality salience automatically cues the defensive terror management system, perhaps without the individual even knowing it has been triggered. As a result, the negative emotion is never experienced. Future research is necessary to choose among these possibilities. Uncertainty Management vs. the Search for Meaning Earlier we discussed an ongoing debate as to the causal mechanism driving mortality salience effects. TMT researchers suggest that awareness of one’s death leads one to seek meaning in social groups, philosophical or religious principles, and so forth. However, some justice scholars have proposed an alternative. They suggest that mortality salience may lead

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one to experience a lack of control. According to uncertainty management theory, this can cause a number of affective states and related behaviors (van den Bos & Miedema, 2000; van den Bos et al., 2005). The best available evidence suggests that both mechanisms are important. In any case, it seems that general uncertainty can have even stronger effects than mortality salience on people’s reactions to threats to their worldviews (Yavuz & van den Bos, 2009). Clearly, this is a possibility ripe for exploration.

Future Research Directions The two theories we discussed in this chapter (i.e., emotional labor and terror management theory) may appear to be extremely different from one another. Emotional labor describes the process and psychological strain involved in abiding by display rules. These display rules generally involve the outward expression of positive emotions (e.g., a happy sales clerk), but they can also dictate neutral or even negative emotional displays (e.g., an emotionless 911 dispatcher or an intimidating bill collector). Terror management theory, on the other hand, describes a subconscious process (with some conscious elements) by which individuals deal with the intense emotions associated with the idea of their own mortality. TMT suggests that contemplating human mortality is wrought with intense feelings of terror that have the potential to paralyze individuals with fear. In order to live one’s life on a day-to-day basis, one must exit (or subvert entering) this paralyzing state. In essence, after thinking about death, individuals must perform acts of emotional labor that consist of both conscious and subconscious elements. The conscious portion is analogous to deep acting. More specifically, in many TMT laboratory studies individuals will respond to mortality salience induction by making statements that are indicative of attempting to enter a conscious emotional state in which death is not bothersome or frightening. Below we have cited two responses that exemplify typical responses to mortality salience manipulations: • “Death is a thing that will certainly happen at a point in life time, and it’s just sooner or later. As I can do nothing about death, I really don’t have any feeling or emotion for it. If it comes, I would pleasantly accept it.” • “I use to feel anxiety about my death and what happens after death. Since around the age of 15, however, this anxiety has for the most part gone away” (Stein & Rupp, 2005). Scholars and philosophers alike agree that death is a universally frightening concept (Becker, 1971; 1973; 1975; Frankl, 1963). Therefore, taken at face value, these responses seem strange and curious. However, when TMT is conceptualized as a varietal of emotional labor, it is possible to make more sense of seemingly calm responses

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to an obviously fear-inducing concept such as death. Consciously, it appears that individuals are capable of espousing the belief that death is not frightening.* Similar to deep acting, humans can place themselves in a state that is not initially natural after thinking about death. In the case of workplace emotional labor, for example, trying to internalize the perspective of an irate customer is one type of deep acting. TMT, however, diverges from emotional labor in that deep acting in this domain is not necessarily done with the goal of taking someone else’s perspective, but instead is driven by the need to drive out fearinducing thoughts and induce an almost unrealistic perspective—that death is not frightening at all. The likeness of emotional labor and terror management theory ends at the TMT’s incorporation of unconscious processes. These unconscious processes are at the heart of TMT. But it is still unclear exactly what occurs at the unconscious level after individuals ponder their future death. Specifically, mortality salience may create subconscious terror which then drives the TMT effects. Alternatively, the potential for extremely negative affect may be the driver and not the experience of actual affect. At any rate, TMT scholars are in agreement that the act of buffering death thoughts necessitates some type of unconscious mechanism (Arndt, Cook, & Routledge, 2004; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). Although it is clear that emotional labor and terror management theory are distinct in many ways, both of these mood management theories have been studied in conjunction with justice-related concepts. In the case of emotional labor, research has shown that display rules can be perceived as unfair (Cropanzano et al., 2000; Rupp, McCance, & Grandey, 2007) and that individuals vary in their proclivity to view display rules as being fair or unfair, which can affect their ability to regulate their emotions, turnover intentions, and emotional exhaustion (Grandey & Fisk, 2005). In a slightly different vein, research on TMT has shown that subjects who have the ability to voice their opinion have higher levels of positive affect following a mortality salience reminder than individuals who are not given that option (van den Bos & Miedema, 2000), showing the extent to which justice helps to regulate even strong emotions such as terror. In this chapter, we tied together these two seemingly different theories by describing how emotional labor and TMT can both act as mood management systems through the role of justice. And, these systems can in turn impact how and what we perceive as fair. Now that we have discussed through six chapters the different links that research in social and organizational justice have found to exist between justice and emotions, in the next and final chapter we provide the reader with our conclusions and put forth ideas for further research. * It is important to note that some participants respond to mortality salience inductions by stating that thinking about their own death scares them (Stein & Rupp, 2005). Therefore, similar to emotional labor, it seems as if some people are more inclined (or capable) to deep act than others.

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Conclusion In this book we have reviewed research integrating two literatures— organizational justice and affect. After a historical introduction and definition of key terms (Chapter 1), we turned our attention to the cognitive models of affect and how these pertain to social justice (Chapter 2). As we saw, work linking justice and affect is well known to fairness scholars, for affect has long been an important part of two venerable theories of justice—Adam’s (1963; 1965) equity theory, and Folger’s (1986a; 1986b; 1987; 1993) referent cognitions theory. Beyond this, we found that a number of researchers followed the pioneering work of Montada (1994; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Reichle & Montada, 1994) and Mikula, Scherer, and Athenstaedt (1998), using the cognitive appraisal perspective on emotions in order to understand justice evaluations (e.g., Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Krehbiel & Cropanzano, 2000; Tepper, 2001; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999). The cognitive appraisal models reviewed in our second chapter treat fairness rather generically. That is, these frameworks focus less on distinct motives that drive justice concerns. Such motives might include one’s moral duty, desire to maintain control, and a concern with one’s standing in social groups. For that reason, Chapter 3 investigated whether fairness is ever valued for its own sake. In doing so, we reviewed evidence for deontic justice (Folger, 2001; Folger & Salvador, 2008) and the justice motive (Lerner, 1975; 1982; 2003), as well as recent work on the integrated theory of moral convictions (Skitka et al., 2008). We saw that people often view fairness as worthwhile in its own right, apart from any concrete benefits it may bring them (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; 2005; Cropanzano, Stein, & Goldman, 2007). We also saw that this concern for justice can be impelled by our feelings (Mullen, 2007; Mullen & Nadler, 2008; Mullen & Skitka, 2006). We become angry and 199

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even spiteful when we witness others behaving unfairly, while feeling guilty or ashamed when we ourselves violate social norms of just conduct (Ketelaar, 2006; Ketelaar & Au, 2003). Chapter 4 explored an even larger literature, pertaining to burgeoning research on justice and the self. Early in this chapter, we presented the multiple needs model, which argues that fairness is desirable for a host of reasons (Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001). Besides the moral considerations reviewed in Chapter 3, justice provides individuals with a sense of personal control, as well as with an indication of their value to important social groups (Colquitt, Scott, Judge, & Shaw, 2006). Our fourth chapter explored evidence for each of these motives, beginning with the control model. It has long been known that people prefer to be treated justly because it gives them a sense that they can impact important events in their environment (e.g., Houlden, LaTour, Walker, & Thibaut, 1978; LaTour, Houlden, Walker, & Thibaut, 1976; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; 1978; Walker, LaTour, Lind, & Thibaut, 1974; Walker, LaTour, & Houlden, 1974). As we saw, contemporary research has updated this paradigm (Brockner et al., 1998; Pierce & Gardner, 2004), paying specific attention to the need to manage uncertainty (van den Bos, 2001b; 2002; 2003; van den Bos and Lind, 2002). In addition to the control perspective, our fourth chapter placed special emphasis on the relational models of justice. This family of theories argues that people care about justice because it has implications for the self, helping to establish an identity, and signaling acceptance by important social groups (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Smith, 1998; 1999). Among other things, fairness impacts one’s self-evaluation, though as Mark and Folger (1984) note, the direction of the effect varies. When one is treated unfairly, this sends a message that one is not respected or esteemed by other people (Blader & Tyler, 2005; 2009; Tyler & Blader, 2002a; 2002b). As one would expect, this message of disregard often results in diminished self-esteem (for evidence, see Koper et al., 1993; Smith & Tyler, 1997; Smith et al., 1998; Tyler et al., 1996). But there is another possibility. An unfair procedure could suggest that outcomes were assigned in an arbitrary fashion. As a consequence, when a person experiences failure due to injustice, the luckless protagonist need not internalize blame for the event. Accordingly, injustice can prevent selfesteem from dropping following an unfavorable outcome (Brockner, Heuer, Magner, Folger, Umphress, van den Bos et al., 2003; Gilliland, 1994; Schroth & Shah, 2000; van den Bos Bruins, Wilke, & Dronkert, 1999). Fairness impacts how we view ourselves, though the specific effects vary somewhat depending upon the situation. In the subsequent two chapters, we turned the conceptual wheel once again. Chapter 5 reversed conventional logic. Whereas most scholars have argued that justice (or perhaps more appropriately injustice, cf. Gilliland, 2008) causes affect, we reviewed sundry theoretical positions that posit the opposite—affect sometimes causes justice. We

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opened this chapter by presenting the research traditions reviewed by Mullen (2007). The first, affect-as-information, suggests that individuals look to their feelings to interpret events (Clore, 2001; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Mullen, 2007). If we feel good, then a cotemporaneous event must also be a positive one. If we feel badly, then a cotemporaneous event must also be negative. This causes us to make harsher fairness judgments when our moods are poor. According to research by van den Bos (2003), the affect-as-information effect has the strongest influence on justice evaluations when the original event is ambiguous. A second research paradigm concerns affective priming. Researchers have argued that memory is organized into a network of associated links (Blaney, 1986; Bower, 1981; 1991). The point where two links come together is called a node (Bower & Forgas, 2001). Some nodes are also connected to an affective tag. When this tag is primed, the resulting activation spreads along the association network triggering the nodes to which it is connected. In this way, our feelings bias our search and retrieval of information (Forgas & George, 2001; Isen, 2000; 2004). For example, when one experiences an emotion that triggers similar past emotions, which are stored in memory in association with past injustices, one can feel much more unfairly treated than someone for whom these emotions are not associated with similar past injustice perceptions. Though the mechanisms differ somewhat, cognitive models, such as affect-asinformation and associative networks, agree that individuals’ emotions can precede and influence perceptions of fairness. A third paradigm concerns affect and depth of processing. Since negative feeling states provide a signal that something is wrong, they often prompt us to think more carefully and deeply about events in our environment (Mark & Sinclair, 1990; Sinclair & Mark, 1992). This third approach argues that our moods change the way we think, not simply what we think about. People in positive moods process information more heuristically and superficially, while those in negative moods consider information more deliberately and effortfully. Chapter 6 showed how two seemingly different topics—emotional labor (Grandey, 2000; 2002; 2003) and terror management theory (TMT, Greenberg et al., 1990; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989)—have a similar relationship to justice. While these frameworks differ in a number of respects, they share a similar orientation toward affect. Both emotional labor and TMT specify that human beings respond to emotion, especially negative emotion, by regulating or managing it. This act of regulation has consequences for the individual. In the case of emotional labor, firms often impose “display rules” on their employees (Cropanzano et al., 2000). Complying with these rules may cause people to experience stress and poor work attitudes (Grandey, 2000; 2002; Grandey & Brauburger, 2002; Grandey & Fisk, 2005). TMT, on the other hand, maintains that the fear of death creates a sense of “terror” (Becker, 1971; 1973; 1975; Frankl, 1963). To manage this angst, individuals engage in a number of activities that

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reaffirm their worldviews (van den Bos & Miedema, 2000). TMT is conceptually important because it does not demand that this terror be conscious. Rather, our negative feelings are a sort of unconscious or implicit affect (Barsade, Ramarajan, & Westen, 2009; Arndt, Cook, & Routledge, 2004; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). We will return to implicit affect below. As we shall discuss at that time, implicit affect has relevance for fairness research. For all their diversity, these chapters were inspired by a simple question that all of us have asked our friends at one time or another when they experienced an unfair event—“How did that make you feel?” In this case, this simple question requires a complex answer. And organizational justice research has uncovered three possible replies. Specifically, justice may cause affect (see especially Chapters 2, 3, and 4). Affect may cause justice (see especially Chapter 5). And justice may impact affective regulation (see especially Chapter 6). In this concluding chapter we go further, considering the implications of our combined inquiry. It seems likely that the empirical exploration of justice perceptions will gradually change as affect is taken more seriously by fairness scholars. In this vein, we take a final look at moods and emotions, highlighting different levels of analysis. As we will see, fairness researchers have only scratched the surface of the available literature. There is much that affect scholars know that justice researchers have not yet incorporated into their own thinking. Given this, we pay special attention to unaddressed issues, focusing on how fairness scholars can further incorporate affect into their work. Afterward, we discuss fairness more specifically, arguing that future progress may depend on some conceptual retooling. We present a number of conceptual issues in the fairness literature that will require additional research. As these topics are addressed by future scholars, moods and emotions are likely to play an important role.

Further Integration of Justice and Affect: Ashkanasy’s (2003) Five-Level Model Reflecting on the literature available to us, most of this book—virtually all of this book—has taken the individual level of analysis. An individual perspective is useful, insofar as it goes, but it does not go far enough. Even the terms that scholars have been used so far to name their field of inquiry, whether it is social justice or organizational justice, suggest that research should be more concerned with global perspectives better able to take social group dynamics into account. One emerging trend over the past decade has been the use of multilevel analysis in organizational behavior and other social sciences (Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999). For example, scholars have posited cross-level models for such topics as interpersonal conflict (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008; Korsgaard, Jeong, Mahony, & Pitariu, 2008), organizational politics (James, 2006),

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and safety (Hofmann, Morgeson, & Gerras, 2003; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996). For the present book we are mainly concerned with affect and justice. As it happens, there is multilevel work on each of these topics as well. To help scholars with this task, Ashkanasy (2003) presented a multilevel theory of emotions in organizations. Ashkanasy’s model is important, in that it acknowledges five different levels of analysis. These include within-person variation in emotional state over time (level 1), between-person differences in emotional traits (level 2), emotional variation and change via interpersonal interactions (level 3), group-level emotions (level 4), and organizationwide emotional climate (level 5). Given the many ways in which justice perceptions influence emotions (and vice versa), we view Ashkanasy’s (2003) five-level model of emotions as a good jumping off point for researchers wishing to explore the multilevel nature of justice. Building on Ashkanasy’s five levels, we present several promising areas for future research.

Level 1: Within-Person Affect The within-person approach focuses on temporal changes in individuals’ affective experience. The reader should recall from Chapters 1 and 5 that emotions tend to be shorter term than moods, though even mood states fluctuate over time. Many decades ago, Rexford Hersey (1929; 1930; 1932a; 1932b) reported a series of almost-forgotten findings. Hersey was a faculty member at what was then called the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, who studied emotion and stress in a small sample of railroad workers. He interviewed each employee about four times a day over an extended period of time. He also collected a number of other measures, including blood pressure, blood content, hours of sleep, presence of illness, and so forth. This was a very intense investigation. It was so intense, in fact, that Hersey (1929, p.€459) remarked that he was “in almost constant contact with the workers studied” because he sought “to obtain a complete picture of their whole life.” Among other things, these data allowed Hersey to chart daily moods. He found that affective states predicted worker productivity, and that the harm done by negative feelings was stronger than the benefits gained by positive feelings. Use of Experience Sampling in the Study of Affect Rexford Hersey’s vital research lay dormant for years until rediscovered by later researchers (e.g., Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996; Wright & Cropanzano, 2007). To explore the cycles of affect identified by Hersey’s pioneering work, justice scholars could learn from their counterparts who study emotion and mood. A number of affect researchers have adopted a similar dynamic approach using experience sampling methodology (ESM; for empirical examples, see Beal,

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Trougakos, Weiss, & Green, 2006; Beal, Weiss, Barros, & MacDermid, 2005; Trougakos, Beal, Green, & Weiss, 2008). Generally, Â�individuals are signaled at various intervals during a day, typically using personal digital assistants (PDAs). Upon receiving the signal, respondents indicate their current affective states and other information relevant to the study. In this way, events are studied in “real time” (for a review, see Hektner, Schmidt, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2007). The ESM methodology has provided a number of interesting findings, such as the discovery that moods tend to entrain to regular cycles (e.g., McFarlane, Martin, & Williams, 1994; Stone, Hedges, Neale, & Satin, 1985). ESM is a valuable methodological tool, but its use also signals something of a paradigm shift as scholars seek to understand the dynamic flow of our feelings. A convenient analogy to understand affect cycles is that of the rising and falling oceanic tides. Just as the tides vary predictably based on the gravitation force of the Sun and Moon, we can similarly conceptualize changing our fluctuating feelings as impacted by qualities of the individual (e.g., state and trait-level affect), life events (e.g., layoffs), and usual social organization of time (for example day or week commonly used work schedules). Analogous to the cyclical tidal range, it has been found that state-level affect cycles over the course of a normal day or week (McFarlane, Martin, & Williams, 1994; Stone et€al., 1985). To illustrate, Larsen (1987) found that people tend to be in better moods during the morning, but that their moods tend to fade as evening approaches. Likewise, Larsen and Kasimatis (1990) documented that people tend to be in the poorest mood on Monday but that feeling states improve as Friday approaches. On Sunday, affect tends to become less positive. Notice that these are predictable cycles, regular oscillations that can be documented over time. Hence, we have gained a sense of how human affect flows, not simply where it happens to be when a researcher shows up with a questionnaire. In a related vein, sociologists have found that suicides also follow sociotemporal cycles (Bourgoin, 2000). In particular, suicides are more likely on Monday for most employees but they are more numerous on Tuesday for people who begin their work week on that day (for example, storekeepers in France who usually have their day off on Monday). It appears as plausible that mood changes are able to mediate the impact of sociotemporal cycles on important social phenomena such as suicides. Dynamic Justice: Fairness, Affect, and Time Among fairness researchers, a similar perspective could be termed dynamic justice. Said succinctly, dynamic justice is the acknowledgment that individuals’ justice perceptions change over time and in conjunction with their affective states. The dynamic justice model is overdue. Similar to emotion researchers, justice theorists often assume that fairness perceptions change over time, usually in response to new events or new information. Despite this assumption, change over time has not

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been explicitly incorporated into many research designs. This misfit between theory, which assumes dynamism, and cross-sectional designs, which are static “snap-shots,” can potentially lead to inaccurate conclusions (Glomb & Miner, 2002; Hulin, Miner, & Seitz, 2002; Ilgen & Hulin, 2000; Miner, Chernyshenko, & Stark, 2000). For example, many field studies are cross-sectional and ask respondents to report on fairness-relevant events that took place sometime in the past. This sort of retrospective recall is likely to introduce heavy bias and error into research findings. This lack of attention to time is likely to be especially problematic when one studies affect and justice. To illustrate, let us revisit some of the data we reviewed in Chapter 3. Oechssler, Roider, and Schmitz (2008) showed in a large-scale Internet experiment that immediately after an unfair allocation of lottery tickets in an ultimatum bargaining game, victims were likely to strongly feel anger and envy, as well as a desire for revenge. This led approximately 27% of them to reject the unfair offer. However, after a night of sleep, these emotions had faded away. When the stakes were high (six large prizes of 500 euros each could be won), there was a significant drop in the rejection rate of unfair offers by 25%. Some of the participants’ comments illustrate their motives. For example, one subject indicated that “two lottery Â�tickets are better than none.” Another also showed insight about internal states, noting that “the initial rejection resulted from my desire to pay player A back. In the end, reason … [changed my] mind.” With a cooler head, the individual thereby has the opportunity to consider events in an economically rational way instead of seeking revenge. Longitudinal studies of fairness would be very helpful here, but these are also rare (see Ambrose & Cropanzano, 2003, for an exception). In Chapter 5, we reversed the causal arrow between justice and affect. At that time, we saw that emotional reactions to events influence our judgments of fairness. While this is so, it also seems to be the case that this influence will sometimes fade over time, with a resulting loss of impact on justice judgments. In the future, a more fluid representation of justice perceptions will allow fairness scholars to create a more accurate picture of how injustice events impact emotions and vice versa. Furthermore, by employing a dynamic paradigm, scholars may discover things about justice that have not previously been identified. This will allow justice scholars to move from theorizing about the drivers of justice perceptions to a form of research that can decompose the justice construct and gauge the relative dependence of fairness perceptions on processes, strategies, and knowledge, to name a few. In addition to the benefit of a paradigm shift for identifying processes, fairness scholars will be able to show how affect and justice interact over time. For example, it may also be that our fairness judgments map onto our emotions, with regular cycles of waxing and waning (Larsen, 1987; Larsen & Kasimatis, 1990). While this has not yet been tested,

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some justice scholars have suggested the existence of predictable cycles in which justice perceptions and affective states reciprocally influence each other over time (e.g., Barsky & Kaplan, 2007, and Chapter 5). If these justice–affect cycles do exist, it may be possible to predict cycle properties (e.g., phase, amplitude, and frequency) by examining other factors related to justice and affect (e.g., trait-level difference in Belief in a Just World; Lerner, 1980). These are exciting prospects.

Level 2: Between-Person Affect In addition to within-person variation and change, by taking a multilevel perspective, researchers can observe how injustice perceptions and affect differ between persons. Some individuals, for example, may be more likely to view a given event as “unfair” than another person. Said differently, some people view the world as a more unfair place (i.e., where more unfair events occur) than others. In addition, certain persons probably view unfair events as more unfair or extreme violations than others. That is, if two people label the same event as unfair (e.g., a companywide pay cut), there may still be individual differences in the perceived magnitude or egregiousness of an unfair event even after controlling for confounding variables (e.g., varying perceptions regarding how unfavorable the event is judged to be). There are a number of ways that scholars might approach this problem, such as conducting additional research on individual differences in fairness judgments (Cropanzano & Stein, 2009) or personality traits moderating fairness judgments, such as trust propensity, risk aversion, and morality (Colquitt, Scott, Judge, & Shaw, 2006), as well as individual differences in affective experience (Cropanzano, Weiss, Hale, & Reb, 2003). In particular, dispositional affect or differences in individual traits regarding affective experience, such as affect intensity (see, for example, Maas & van den Bos, 2009) or SERF (SERF, or service emotion rule fairness), Grandey & Fisk, 2005), can represent a very fruitful way to investigate the relationship between affect and justice. However, as these literatures are well known, we would like to instead direct the reader to some issues that are in special need of additional inquiry. Toward that end, we first elaborate on implicit affect. Our point is to show that people have distinct affective responses, but only some of these are conscious. Unconscious differences in affect are important as well. Afterward, we turn our attention to differences in perspective. Based on a review of the justice literature, we show that actors and recipients sometimes have very different responses to the same event. Implicit Affect Evidence suggests that affect can manifest itself both consciously and unconsciously (Westen, 2007). Specifically, between-person differences are not limited to conscious affective experiences; people vary

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on their unconscious feelings as well. With the exception of the role of mood in Chapter 5 (the influence of affect on justice judgments often works without the subject being conscious of it) and the role of TMT in Chapter 6 (the impact of the fear of death on justice perceptions goes unnoticed by people experiencing it), we have not considered whether an affective state is conscious (explicit) or unconscious (implicit). This is a limitation in our review, which reflects a larger limitation in the literature on justice and affect. Implicit affect, though widely investigated by social psychologists (cf. Westen, 1998; Winkielman & Berridge, 2004; Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger, 2005), has received much less attention in the field of organizational behavior (for an important exception, see Barsade, Ramarajan, & Westen, in press) and almost none from justice scholars. To illustrate how unconscious feelings produce between-person differences, consider a well-known study of political persuasion reviewed by Westen (2007, pp. 58–59). During the 2000 election for the American presidency, George W. Bush was pitted against Al Gore. Gore proffered a plan to help retired Americans pay for their prescription drugs, and the Bush campaign ran a television advertisement opposing Gore’s recommendation. The Bush advertisement concluded with the words “Bureaucrats decide,” a reference to the belief that the Gore plan might limit patient choice. So far this would seem to be healthy public debate, except that the word “RATS” appeared in bold letters at the end of “bureaucrats.” Subsequent research by Weinberger and Westen (2008) found that the presentation of the word “RATS,” which is linked in memory with unpleasant affect, influenced the political opinions of viewers. Seeing “RATS” made one less likely to support the Gore prescription plan, and this is not based on careful deliberation regarding the proposal’s strengths and weaknesses. Clearly, this sort of finding should be of interest to fairness scholars. According to Barsade and her colleagues (in press) implicit affect manifests itself in three ways. Notice that the first two are able to embrace the results we presented in Chapter 5 about the impact of moods on justice, and that the last one is consistent with the results we presented in Chapter 6 about TMT. First, there are implicit sources of affect. We are aware of our feelings, but we are unaware of their actual cause. For example, in one study Winkielman et al. (2005) subliminally primed research participants with either happy faces or with angry faces. As these primes were subliminal, they did not register in consciousness. Nevertheless, when asked to drink, those who were primed with happy faces drank more and were more eager to pay. Those primed with unhappy faces drank less and were less eager to pay. Among other things, this study suggests that distributive justice (willingness to provide fair compensation) may be impacted by implicit feelings. Second, there are implicit experiences of affect. We are not consciously aware of our feelings, but they continue to influence our behavior. Research on implicit racism provides a good example of this. Research

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shows that many people are genuinely unaware of holding invidious prejudices; they honestly believe themselves to be unbiased. Nevertheless, racism may unconsciously express itself in a way that disadvantages others (Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007). For example, Black defendants in the United States are more likely to receive long sentences if they have a stereotypically “African” appearance, such as darker skin. Notice that our unconscious feelings may cause us to treat others inconsistently, which violates a principle of procedural justice. Third, there is the implicit regulation of affect. We unconsciously seek to allay negative emotion and promote positive emotion. Terror management, of course, is an example of unconscious affect regulation, a point we made above, and this has implications for justice (see Chapter 6). As another relevant example, consider a study by Zhong and Liljenquist (2006). These authors asked participants to recall a time in the past when they had behaved immorally. Individuals who did so were more likely to view antiseptic wipes as a desirable gift. Participants who had not recalled an example of unethical conduct were more likely to select pencils as a gift. Likewise, cleanliness can have an influence on moral judgments. Schnall, Benton, and Harvey (2008) showed that when the notion of physical purity was made more salient, moral judgments were less severe. Participants were asked in a first experiment to form sentences either using words related to cleanliness and purity (such as pure, clean, or immaculate) or using neutral words. In a second experiment, subjects were asked to watch a disgusting movie scene and either to wash their hands with soap and water or not to wash their hands at all before rating six moral dilemmas (such as putting false information on a résumé). In both experiments, the results were similar: subjects who had their intuitions about cleanliness activated through the use of words related to purity or by washing their hands made less severe moral judgments. Outside of their conscious awareness, the cleanliness priming made them find immoral actions to be less wrong, possibly by having reduced their emotion of disgust. All of the examples reviewed previously in this chapter have implications for justice research—payment, racism, and moral cleansings are relevant to the topics of this book. Of course, researchers have barely scraped the surface of interesting possibilities that result when justice perceptions are considered in light of implicit affect. We suspect and hope that this will be an important topic of investigation for scholars in the coming years. Affect and Justice Both Depend on Perspective What is felt may strongly depend on the perspective that is taken by the person in question. Objectively, identical events may have different implications depending upon how they are understood by the party in question. As we saw in Chapter 3, in two experiments conducted by

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Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986), 31% of the participants who behaved unfairly in their allocations to other research subjects did not hesitate to punish unfair allocators when they were put in the shoes of a third party. The same people felt differently depending upon the role they took (for consistent findings, see also Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999). Neuroscience research paints a similar picture. As we saw in Chapter 3, when individuals personally experience an injustice, they respond with their insula, a portion of the brain that is closely linked to negative emotion. As allocators, if they are advantaged by an injustice, they may look for economic efficiency and thus respond with their putamen. When people witness an injustice that is done to another as neutral third parties, then they respond with a different brain region (Hsu et al., 2008; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003; Tabibnia, Sapute, & Lieberman, 2008). Our reactions to unfairness are not always logically consistent because different perspectives evoke different neural systems. While these sorts of perspective differences are well known to scholars (and to the rest of us as well!), their implications have yet to receive adequate research attention. Fortunately, there are exceptions. In four studies, Mikula, Athenstaedt, Heschgl, and Heimgartner (1998) found that actors and recipients sometimes disagreed in their fairness judgments. These researchers compared the opinions of those who performed the questionable behavior (actors), with that of people who were on the receiving end of their actions (recipients). Mikula, Athenstaedt and their colleagues determined that differences in evaluations between actors and recipients were moderated by other considerations. For example, in their Studies 1 and 2, Mikula, Athenstaedt et al. found that when recipients were€i n a high-quality relationship, they were more generous in their interpretations of the actor’s behavior (for consistent evidence, see MansourCole & Scott, 1998). This sort of research could become a model for future investigations of perspective differences, especially the perspective of the harm doer because the perspective of the victim has now been widely studied and the perspective of the third party has also recently received substantial attention (see, for example, Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002).

Level 3: Interpersonal Interactions While it is critical for scholars to understand within-person and betweenperson affect, it is equally as important to examine how interpersonal interactions can alter individuals’ affective states and fairness perceptions. According to Ashkanasy (2003), this “interactional level constitutes the central level of emotions in organizations … therefore, interactions serve as the links between Levels 1 and 2. … The importance of this level most likely arises because communication of emotions is so critically important in social animals such as primates” (pgs. 25–26). In this section we consider interpersonal interactions in detail. We first review the social

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functional perspective that has been posed by emotion scholars. We then turn our attention to two interactional phenomena that have inspired a good deal of research. Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Emotion: The Social Functional Perspective Consistent with Ashkanasy’s (2003) view, a number of researchers have distinguished between intrapersonal and interpersonal emotions (e.g., Morris & Keltner, 2000; van Kleef et al., 2004b; van Kleef, 2009). This distinction is almost entirely missing in the justice literature. Much of the available fairness literature is intrapersonal, or focusing on processes that are internal to the individual. The biasing effects that emotions may have on social judgment (Mullen, 2007), the spite that results from mistreatment (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1995; 1996), and the possibility of subconscious experience of terror following mortality salience (Greenberg et al., 1986; 1990; 1997) are all intrapersonal phenomena. They are important, but there remains more to the story. In 1872, a year in which Susan B. Anthony was fined for attempting to vote, Charles Darwin published The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals. In this famous book, Darwin argued that certain emotions evolved because they serve a social purpose, such as communicating intentions to conspecifics (Plutchik, 1991). These interpersonal effects of emotion have to do with how our feelings cause other individuals to react to us, as well as how we react to them. The focus on how emotions impact other people has been called the social functional perspective (Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Morris & Keltner, 2000). The social functional perspective has had only a modest impact among justice researchers, mostly among those with an evolutionary outlook (e.g., Folger et al., 2005; Folger & Cropanzano, 2010; Folger & Skarlicki, 2008). Let us present two noticeable exceptions. One study conducted by Wubben, De Cremer, and van Dijk (2008) showed that newcomers to a small group, when confronted with a public good dilemma, used the Â�emotions displayed by a member of the group to make their justice judgments, which influenced their decisions regarding the group. Namely, when the other member displayed anger (versus guilt), the newcomers concluded that the group had behaved unfairly against this member. Along the same lines, De Cremer, Wubben, and Brebels (2008) showed that when the unfair treatment of an authority was ambiguous, participants based their justice judgments on others’ emotions and were more convinced that the authority had behaved unfairly when the others felt angry (versus Â� guilty). This third level adds a new layer of complexity and richness to the affect and justice relationship. We discuss two areas of study in the following text. The first, on emotional contagion, finds that people tend to mimic one another’s emotions. Thus, they come to share similar feelings. The second, on complementary emotions, argues that some emotional

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states have accompanying opposites. Under certain Â�conditions, a given emotion can induce a quite different counterpart. We review each of these in turn. Emotional Contagion People can “catch” others’ emotions, a phenomenon that is called emotional contagion. Emotional contagion is defined as the “process in which a person or group influences the emotions or behavior of another person or group through the conscious or unconscious induction of emotion states and behavioral attitudes” (Schoenewolf, 1990, p. 50). This common type of social influence may result from an innate human tendency to mimic one another’s feelings, and notice that it results in group members becoming more alike in their feelings. There are times when emotional contagion can result from a highlevel, conscious cognitive process. When people listen to someone talking about his or her emotions, they can remember when they felt the same way in the past and as a consequence produce equivalent feelings (Lang, 1985). Likewise, and as we saw in Chapter 5, people can also use the affect displayed by others as information to understand what emotions they should feel in order to adapt their reaction to the social situation (Clore, 2001; Ketelaar & Au, 2003; Sullins, 1991). More commonly, the emotional contagion process is unconscious and naturally associative (Aronfreed, 1970), quite possibly on a prewired neural basis. Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson (1992) define this primitive form of emotional contagion as: “the tendency to automatically mimic and synchronize facial expressions, vocalizations, postures and movements with those of another person and consequently to converge emotionally” (p. 153). It can occur quite quickly. Wild, Erb, and Bartels (2001) showed that participants in an experiment were “infected” by others’ emotions after visual exposure to them lasting only 500 ms. A two-stage model of emotional contagion. Barsade, Ramarajan, and Westen (in press) suggest that contagion often results from a two-stage process that involves behavioral mimicry, which is then followed by efferent feedback. Behavioral mimicry, the first stage of the process, consists of the unintentional imitation of another person’s behavior activated by this person’s emotion. That is, an individual who has observed another’s behavior unconsciously engages in the same actions. Various experiments have given consistent support to the existence of this “chameleon effect” (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). It has been found that participants passively imitated the others’ facial expressions, body postures, speech patterns, and vocal tones without being aware that they were doing so (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Lundqvist & Dimberg, 1995; Neumann & Strack, 2000). It seems that this tendency might be due to a more general mechanism that involves the activity of mirror neurons (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 2008). Mirror neurons are premotor

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neurons that fire in a similar way when the subject either observes an action or performs the action. Even the sound of an action may activate these neurons (Kohler, Keysers, Umilta, Fogassi, Gallese et al., 2002). Among other functions, mirror neurons provide an action recognition mechanism by which any perception of another person’s behavior can elicit the same behavior in the observer. Efferent feedback represents the second step of the process. The physical act of expressing an emotion induces that feeling in the actor. This phenomenon has been shown in many studies involving body postures or vocal tones, though it seems especially robust for facial expressions (see Adelman & Zajonc, 1989, for a review). For example, a subject who is instructed to show a smiling face is likely to induce a positive mood (Ekman, 2007, see also Chapter 5). According to Zajonc (1985), this facial feedback hypothesis could be explained by changes in neurochemistry of the brain caused by vascular processes. As a result, at the end of the two-step process described above, the observer has caught the stimulus emotion that was first displayed by the observed person. Practical implications of emotional contagion. What makes emotional contagion worth study, in addition to understanding this fascinating process, is the fact that it has been shown to have an important impact on various outcomes, such as members of communities falling into a sort of collective depression or the spread of hysterical fear from one group member to another (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). In this respect, four main areas have been investigated by organizational researchers: service encounters, negotiation, team dynamics, and leadership. For example, several studies have shown that contagion effects occur between salespersons and customers in both directions, and can result in a higher level of perceived service quality and customer satisfaction (Pugh, 2001; Tan, Foo, & Kwek, 2004). Verbeke (1997) showed that salespersons who were more sensitive to emotions from others or more able to transmit their emotions to others, had a higher level of performance (see also below). Regarding team dynamics, Barsade (2002) showed in a laboratory study that positive emotional contagion in a group produced more cooperation at the individual and group level, less group conflict, and increased perceived task performance. Van Kleef et al. (2004a, 2004b) showed that emotional contagion also happened among negotiators and that the emotions felt by the counterpart in reaction to his or her partner’s emotional display predicted liking of the other individual, as well as satisfaction and willingness to meet him or her again. Along the same lines, emotional contagion can be a powerful explanation of the unfavorable results anger can have on negotiation outcomes in some circumstances (see Chapter 3). Finally, in the leadership area, leaders’ displayed emotions can be transferred to and then felt by their followers. This directly impacts followers’ impressions of their leaders, as well as subordinates’ level of coordination and effort (Sy, Coté, & Saavedra, 2005; Van Kleef, Homan, Beersma, van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, & Damen (2009).

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Moderator effects. Several moderators of emotional contagion on work outcomes have been identified. The first type of moderator is related to the attention and sensitivity to others’ emotions. In two experiments, Laird, Alibozak, Davainis, Deignan, Fontanella, Hong, Levy, and Pacheco (1994) showed that some people were consistently more likely than the average participant to mimic the behavior of actors in a movie, to feel the emotions that were consistent with the facial expressions they were instructed to display, and to report less emotions when instructed to inhibit the movements of their faces. Doherty (1997) built the emotional contagion scale in order to measure this dispositional individual difference. Using this self-report scale (corroborated with judges’ ratings), Doherty, Orimoto, Singelis, Hatfield, and Hebb (1995) consistently found in two studies that women were more susceptible than men to emotional contagion for both positive and negative emotions. In addition, these authors showed that sensitivity to emotional contagion can be predicted by professional occupation (students showed more evidence of contagion than other professional groups). A second type of moderator relates to people’s tendency to send powerful emotional signals that are more likely to be noticed and imitated. Using the facial expressiveness scale (Klein & Cacioppo, 1993), in addition to the emotional contagion scale, Verbecke (1997) built a typology identifying four different groups of salespeople on the basis of their tendency to catch others’ emotions (high and low on the emotional contagion scale) and their ability to influence the emotions of others (high and low on the facial expressiveness scale). • Charismatics were able to influence others with their emotions and also to be influenced by the emotions of others. • Empathetics caught others’ emotions, but were not able to influence others with their own. • Expansives were able to influence others’ emotions, but without any form of empathy. • Blands were neither able to influence nor to pick up others’ emotions. The Charismatics and the Empathetics were the best performers, but were also prone to burnout. However, the most vulnerable group was the Expansives, who were at the same time the poorest performers and had the highest level of burnout. In sum, emotional contagion is a powerful phenomenon of direct interpersonal influence. Although it usually goes unnoticed by participants in social interactions (because of its automatic and unconscious processes), important social outcomes have now been clearly identified. Positive emotional contagion has the important adaptive function of smoothing social interactions. However, we are just beginning to understand the two-stage emotional contagion process involving mirror neurons and vascular mechanisms, as well as the role of important

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moderators. Thus, it is a very promising avenue for research in the field of emotions and justice and especially in understanding the way that (in)justice perceptions can diffuse in groups and organizations. Only a few papers have begun to address these questions. For example, Robertson (2006) has suggested that justice may be contagious and van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, and De Cremer (2007) have proposed a model of how individual justice perceptions may give rise to emotions and then, through the mechanism of emotional contagion, participate in building affect at a group level. Complementary Emotions The emotional contagion literature argues that people sharing the same group will come to feel more alike by means of an imitative process. This often occurs, but as we saw in Chapter 3, this is not necessarily so. There are other occasions when interacting individuals come to experience complementary (not common) emotions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). For example, Tiedens and Fragale (2003, Study 1) had two individuals interact in a laboratory. One of these was an actual research subject; the other was an accomplice. Generally, when the accomplice displayed a physical posture signaling dominance, the subject reciprocated with posture signaling submission. Conversely, when the accomplice signaled submission, the subject reciprocated by displaying dominance. In their second study, Tiedens and Fragale further determined that research participants who engaged in complementary behaviors liked the accomplice more. Those subjects who engaged in consistent behaviors liked the subject less. Other research has examined complementary emotions within the context of interpersonal bargaining. Van Kleef, De Dreu, and Manstead (2004a) discovered that the expression of anger during negotiation can trigger fear in a counterpart, which in turn produces concessions. However, this fear is less likely to occur when the threat is illegitimate (van Kleef & Côté, 2007) or when the potential victim lacks the power to defy the enraged party (Sinaceur & Tidens, 2006; Friedman, Anderson, Brett, Olekalns, Goates, & Lisco, 2004; van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004b). For fairness researchers, the most relevant work on complementary feelings involves moral emotions (Folger & Cropanzano, 2010). In Chapter 3 we reviewed Ketelaar’s (2006; Ketelaar & Au, 2003) distinction between norm-obeying and norm-enforcing emotions, which is especially relevant here. Norm-obeying emotions are directed against ourselves when we commit a transgression. These include guilt, shame, and embarrassment. Norm-enforcing emotions are directed against others for their transgressions. These include indignation, anger, contempt, and disgust. Ketelaar’s model implies that emotions often work together as a coordinated system (Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005). An individual who has committed a transgression might experience guilt or shame, while simultaneously being buffeted by the anger and contempt

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from others. Like a vise that grips from both sides, these two sets of moral emotions serve to regulate behavior and maintain social systems. These are fascinating possibilities, which we hope future generations of researchers will explore.

Level 4: Groups and Teams Scholars exploring feelings in the workplace were quick to recognize that work teams often share affective experiences (e.g., Ashkanasy & Nicholson, 2003; Barsade & Gibson, 1998; George, 1996b; 2002) and that a shared positive mood can improve performance (Barsade, 2002). For example, Kelly and Barsade (2001) believe that groups and teams develop their own “affective composition.” This affect composition is constructed from each individual and from the interaction of the people in the group. In a like fashion, justice researchers have also begun to operationalize fairness at the level of work teams, and doing so has proven quite useful for predicting work attitudes and behaviors (for reviews, see Colquitt, Zapata-Phelan, & Roberston, 2005; Li & Cropanzano, 2009; Rupp, Bashshur, & Liao, 2007a; 2007b). Generally speaking, fairness scholars have distinguished between two unit-level phenomena. The first is justice climate, which refers to a group’s collective judgment of how it is treated by an authority figure. The second has been variously called intraunit justice (Cropanzano, Li, & James, 2007), or more recently, peer justice (Cropanzano & Li, 2010). Peer justice refers to a group’s collective perceptions of how individuals treat one another. Despite this promising work, we are facing a persistent research need. While both affect and justice have been separately treated at collective levels of analysis, these two literatures have not yet been integrated in detail. We will consider the available evidence next. Justice Climate As we have seen, a just climate is said to exist when team members collectively believe that they are being treated fairly by those in authority (Colquitt, Zapata-Phelan, & Roberson, 2005; Rupp et al., 2007a; 2007b). While empirical research relating justice climate to affect is limited, two relevant studies exist. The first was conducted by Spell and Arnold (2007). Spell and Arnold measured group-level perceptions of procedural justice and distributive justice. As criterion variables, these researchers assessed anxiety and depression. Consistent with research conducted at the individual level of analysis, Spell and Arnold’s participants reported the most anxiety and the most depression when both types of justice climate were low. These are important findings, since they are consistent with the notion that team-level fairness predicts individual-level emotion. In a later investigation of customer service behaviors, Moliner, Martínez-Tur, Peiró, Ramos, and Cropanzano (2008) also assessed justice

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climate. They found that procedural justice climate and Â�interactional justice climate directly impacted two other unit-level variables—group perceptions of burnout and group perceptions of engagement. These collective judgments of burnout and engagement, in turn, predicted extra-role customer service behaviors. Moliner et al.’s findings suggest an empirical connection between fairness and team-level affect, but this is very preliminary. Even so, we can see that the concepts and studies discussed heretofore may range across many levels of analysis. Due to lack of multilevel research merging justice and affect, there is still much to be learned about how these complex constructs interact with each other at different levels of analysis. Peer Justice To our knowledge, only two studies of peer justice are available. Neither of these directly measured affect. In their Study 1, Cropanzano and Li (2010) examined peer justice perceptions among student project teams. They found that teams reporting higher levels of peer justice earned a better grade. In their follow-up Study 2, these authors found that peer justice created more effective teamwork processes. These processes, in turn, improved intrateam citizenship behaviors. While these initial findings suggest that peer justice is an important predictor of workÂ�relevant outcomes, future research is necessary to ascertain the relationship between peer justice and emotion.

Level 5: Organizational Climate The fifth level in Ashkanasy’s (2003) multilevel emotions framework is a departure from the first four levels in that it focuses on a macrolevel phenomenon—deeply rooted emotions tied to a small population or organization. This concept of emotional climate has been defined by De Rivera (1992) as “an objective group phenomenon that can be palpably sensed—as when one enters a party or a city and feels an attitude of gaiety or depression, openness or fear” (p. 197). As Ashkanasy (2003) aptly notes, “this begs the question as to how to ascertain real emotional climate (or culture) in organizations” (p. 38). He pertinently observes that describing culture is much easier to do by means of intense involvement in the moment-to-moment workings of organizations. With intensive (both as a function of time spent in an organization and the magnitude of individuals studied within that population) longitudinal organizational data, it is more likely that the researcher will unearth the objective qualities of emotional climate that are less fleeting and more structurally sound aspects of the unit. As an example, Ozcelik, Langton, and Aldrich (2008) studied leader behavior in a sample of Canadian small business owners and entrepreneurs. Ozcelik and his colleagues found that leaders’ behaviors associated with a positive emotion climate facilitated the growth of their firms. Likewise, Ashkanasy

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and Nicholson (2003) examined emotional climate and culture in two restaurant chains. In particular, they developed and used a measure for assessing a “Climate of Fear.” Notably, via ethnographic interviews, they found that this fearful climate was “palpably sensed” by employees. Fortunately, there is an organizationwide or even societywide approach to fairness, though it has not been closely linked to affect. Systemic justice pertains to fairness judgments relevant to an organization or institution as a whole; for example, the capacity of the system to be stable and at the same time responsive to change in answering to its stakeholders or the fundamental rules that it uses to insure protection from arbitrary use of power (Sheppard, Lewicki, & Minton, 1992). The concept has been empirically explored by Beugré and Baron (2001). In future years, systemic justice is likely to become more important for those who wish to govern organizations efficiently. According to Laufer (1996) there have been drastic and recent changes in the functioning of our contemporary societies. Before the 1960s, the legitimacy of authorities was not under question. The rational-legal system described by Weber (1921/1971) as characteristic of modern industrial societies was still working well. A whole set of consistent and well-known social norms was accepted and applied by the vast majority of people. After a general crisis of sense and legitimacy in Western countries around the 1960s, this general acceptance evaporated. Given all this, on what can contemporary organizations and authorities base their legitimacy? When there are fewer norms that are consensually validated, people may base their perceptions of legitimacy on their systemic justice judgments. If the organization is viewed as systemically fair, then it gains legitimacy; if it is viewed as systemically unfair, then it doesn’t. The presence of certain fairness cues (Tyler, 2006) might help people to make their systemic fairness judgments. For example, if the outcomes, the procedures, and/or the interactions are fair, this suggests to employees that an organization is systemically fair, legitimate, and that they can be confident in it and thus cooperate with it (Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Blader, 2002a). People may also use their affect toward an organization to assess their systemic justice judgment. Thus, research on justice and its emotional processes is nowadays not only interesting, but also crucial to understanding how contemporary organizations and authorities concretely build their legitimacy (Tyler & Smith, 1998; 1999). For this reason, systemic justice, or the fairness of organizations, would seem to be an important topic for future inquiry about fairness and emotions. More research in this area would be very welcome.

What Is Missing From the Justice Literature? One way to understand this book is to treat affect as a lens though which we have examined social justice perceptions. As a lens will do, we have found that our view of justice is different than it was before

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we began this volume. In particular, research on affect highlights some remaining questions in the justice literature that should be answered by future research. The fairness literature, like all scientific endeavors, is somewhat bounded by the scope of its conceptual categories (cf. Kuhn, 1970). In the space below, we discuss a few theoretical issues that, with minor modifications, could open justice research to further integration with the affect literature.

Can One Identify New Antecedents to Justice Judgments? In this section we consider why people come to experience fairness and unfairness. First, we are going to move one step backward and propose that emotions could explain why authorities behave in ways that are likely to be judged fair or unfair by followers. Second, we are even going to take two steps backward and show that the recipient’s behavior could by itself be an antecedent to the justice behavior of the authority. Proactive Justice This book was primarily concerned with the perspective of the victim. This has been termed reactive justice or the way that people respond when they experience fairness or unfairness (Greenberg & Wiethoff, 2001). An alternative view, which has been less widely studied in organizational behavior, is proactive justice, or how people decide to treat others. The research reviewed in this volume suggests that a good deal is known about emotion when people experience unfairness. However, less is known about how our emotions cause us to treat other people. In a conceptual paper, Folger and Skarlicki (2001) speculated that fear of an unpleasant confrontation might cause managers to forgo interactional justice, though research on this point is limited. In a related vein, Gonzalez and Tyler (2007) have suggested that harm doers might feel embarrassment when violating social conventions, shame when violating role expectations, and guilt, regret, or remorse when not respecting their own values. There are also some relevant empirical findings. As we saw in Chapter 3, Batson (1987a; 1991; 1994; 1995; 1998; 2006) found that empathy promoted altruism. Likewise, Patient and Skarlicki (in press; 2010) reported that empathy may boost interactional fairness as well (thought not procedural justice; see Blader, Rothman, & Gonzalez, 2008). Finally, a recent replication of Milgram’s well-known obedience to authority experiments (1963) opens some interesting avenues for research linking harm doers’ affect and their (un)fair behaviors (Bègue, 2010). In this study, subjects were told that they participated in the pilot of a new TV show and were asked to play a game in which they had to tell a list of words to another participant whose task was to remember them. They also had to punish the other participant by sending him electric shocks when he made a mistake by not recalling the right words. The victim was in fact an actor who simulated pain, crying, and screaming as

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the shocks increased. A woman played the role of the authority Â�figure, requesting that the hesitating participants continue inflicting pain on the victim. The vast majority of participants (81%) behaved unfairly toward the victim and sent (bogus) shocks that would have been life threatening. Bègue (2010) investigated some interpersonal variables as moderators of the tendency of the participants to this experiment to obey to such unfair orders. In particular, he found that the higher participants scored on conscientiousness and agreeableness (two of the big five personality characteristics, see Costa & McCrae, 1992) the more likely they were to obey orders to harm the victim. Closer to our topic, he also found that happier people were more prone to go along with the demands to punish. Thus positive emotions may also have counterintuitive effects on fair behavior. At least when a seemingly legitimate authority makes a request, happy people may comply with an injustice. Given this, it could be that our feelings prime our responses toward others, causing us to be more or less proactively fair. These phenomena have not yet been investigated by justice researchers. Victim’s Affect as a Cause of Unjust Treatment From Others One unexpected antecedent of proactive justice, or if you will, proactive injustice, may be the emotions felt by the victims themselves. In other words, the feelings that other people display in our presence may cause us to treat them with more or less fairness. Let us consider an especially interesting finding from the workplace victimization literature. There is evidence that attributes of the individual, including his or her typically affective dispositions, contribute to their being harmed by unfairness. Operationally, workplace victimization is quite similar to what we have been calling interactional (in)justice. For example, Aquino and Bradfield (2000, p. 530) assessed perceptions of victimization with such items as “Swore at you,” “Refused to talk to you,” “Made an ethnic, racial, or religious slur against you,” “Lied to get you in trouble,” “Made an obscene comment or gesture at you,” and so on. A few other items are less clearly focused on the interpersonal transaction, such as “Endangered you with reckless behavior” and “Stole your possessions.” Nevertheless, the construct space between victimization and interactional unfairness overlaps substantially. At the very least, the two would seem to be highly correlated. The reason these similarities bear mention is because Aquino and his colleagues (1999) have turned our usual paradigm for victimization on its head. Normally, researchers consider the characteristics of a harm doer that causes him or her to hurt another person as we did in the preceding section. While granting that this is important, Aquino (2000) has also maintained that characteristics of the victim can precipitate cruel treatment from others. In a theoretical paper, Aquino and Lamertz (2004) asserted that two types of employees are apt to provoke victimization. Most commonly, there are submissive victims, whose

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anxiety and insecurity makes them “safe” targets for bullying. There are also provocative victims, whose ill will and ham-handed treatment of others causes coworkers to retaliate in kind (see also, Bolger &€Schilling, 1991; Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995). Aquino, Grover, Bradfield, and Allen (1999) maintain that individuals who are high in trait-negative affectivity, which includes emotions such as “hostile” and “nervous” (Watson et al., 1984, p. 1070), tend to be more provocative and submissive. Hence, so-called high-NAs are more prone to victimization than are low-NAs. A series of field studies provide solid support for this possibility (Aquino & Bradfield, 2000; Aquino et al., 1999; Tepper, Duffy, Henle, & Lambert, 2006). Justice researchers would do well to consider the implications of Aquino’s (Aquino & Bradfield, 2000; Aquino et al., 1999) studies of interactional fairness, and perhaps of distributive and procedural justice as well. It could be that innocent workers are inadvertently provoking ill will from others. Trait differences in feelings, as well as other causes (cf. Aquino, 2000), may be one of the culprits. This is a worthwhile subject for additional inquiry. For now it seems that only the level of employees’ assertiveness has been shown to impact the interactional fairness behaviors of their managers: supervisors behaved in a more interactionally fair manner toward subordinates who were more assertive (Korsgaard, Roberson, & Rymph, 1998).

Can One Integrate Affect in the Conceptualization of the Structure of Justice Judgments? There are at least three areas in which new ways of conceptualizing fairness judgments could help to better integrate justice and affect. First, our perspectives are limited because of the usual emphasis on injustice rather than on justice. Second, the usual view that affect follows justice judgments does not allow us to get an accurate complete view of all the mechanisms at work. Lastly, the motives of justice have not yet been studied in relation to affect, though there might be some isomorphism between these two concepts. Let us address these three questions in turn. Justice and Injustice We have arguably spent more time discussing injustice than we have spent discussing justice. Taking this approach makes sense, as it could be that people react more strongly to the former than to the latter (Gilliland, 2008). Justice may be seen as the normal state that people do not notice until something goes wrong, just as a fish notices that it needs water only when it is taken out of the sea (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998). van den Bos, Ham, Lind, Simonis, van Essen, and Rijpkema (2008) have shown that injustice is able to arouse the human alarm system, which might be the reason why people react to it with such strong emotions. In

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contrast, justice may just send the signal that everything is okay and that one now has the freedom to pursue other things of value. Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate this position. The difference between justice and injustice should be investigated by future research. Perhaps unfairness is associated with active and negative emotions (e.g., rage), whereas fairness is associated with pallid and positive emotions (e.g., contentment). It might be helpful to closely consider research on positive emotions (Fredrickson, 1998; 2001; 2009). Research on the circumplex model of affect, discussed in Chapter 1, may also be helpful in understanding this possibility (e.g., Cropanzano, Weiss, Hale, & Reb, 2003; Judge & Larsen, 2001; Larsen & Diener, 1992; Larsen, Diener, & Lucas, 2002). Let us make a proposition regarding the links among positive affect, negative affect, justice, and injustice. We presented in Chapter 1 a model commonly used to represent affective states: the circumplex model of affect (Larsen & Diener, 1992). Two dimensions of this model have been named positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) (Watson & Tellegen, 1985). These two dimensions are autonomous (not completely, in fact, as the emotions have to be positioned on a circle, which means that the sum of the values taken on each of the two dimensions has to€remain constant for all the rated moods). Still, multiple combinations are possible between these two dimensions. For Thayer (1989) these dimensions are representative of two kinds of activations: PA represents energy and NA represents tension. When energy is high, people feel exalted (high PA) and when it is low, they feel lethargic (low PA). When tension is high, people feel nervous (high NA) and when it is low, they feel calm (low NA). This model has received support from neurobiological research (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Bernston, 1999). The two dimensions of energy and tension could be linked to the two fundamental physiological motivational systems: energy would be related to the appetitive system, which is the basis for the search of rewards and approach behaviors, whereas tension would be linked to the aversive system, which pilots the avoidance of threats. In a similar way, Carver (2001) proposes that PA would relate to the fundamental behavioral activation system whose function is to detect available resources in the environment, and NA would be linked to the behavioral inhibition system, which is used to identify threats and protect the body. We propose that injustice judgments could be functional in the sense that they allow one to detect and handle threats and that justice judgments could in turn serve the valuable function of confirming that rewards will be received and that an approach strategy should be followed. If this is so, then it is plausible that affective states characteristic of PA are aroused by judgments of justice, whereas judgments of injustice would be better able to trigger affective states on the NA dimension. Studying the way people high on PA or NA react to justice and injustice could be a way to confirm these propositions.

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Affect Follows Injustice, but This Is Not Always So We normally think of affect as following from a justice-relevant episode. As we saw in Chapter 2, research suggests that individuals feel negative emotion after they are treated unfairly and positive emotion when things go their way (e.g., Cropanzano et al., 2000; Weiss et al., 1999). This is important, but it is also plausible to reverse this causal order. Chapter 5 reviewed evidence that both moods and emotions can impact justice perceptions. As already mentioned, this fifth chapter summarized various theories, each of which asserts that mood is an antecedent to fairness judgment. While this research is important, there is a paucity of evidence exploring whether discrete emotions can also cause justice. This is so, even though emotion scholars in other domains have considered how emotional states impact judgments and decisions (e.g., Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994; Fessler, Pillsworth, & Flamson, 2004; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 2001; Pham, 2007; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). For example, a person who is angry may be more likely to make hostile attributions than a person who is not angry (Tiedens, 2001). The possibility that emotions cause (un)fairness perceptions should receive more attention. A model of the impact of emotions on justice was proposed by Scher and Heise in 1993 (see Chapter 5) but empirical confirmation is lacking. As an exception, we can quote one study that showed how a discrete emotion can impact justice judgments. Considering that fear is more likely to evoke uncertainty than disgust, De Cremer and Hiel (2006) predicted and found that fear strengthened the positive effect that procedural justice had on self-esteem (see Chapter 4 for more information about the links between justice and self-esteem). This thinking turns around the traditional causal order and opens up new opportunities for increasing our understanding of affect and justice. Let us describe one of these new possibilities. We have shown that at least two different causal links may relate justice judgments and affect: justice can cause emotions (Chapters 2, 3, and 4) and affect (mainly moods but emotions as well) can cause justice (Chapter 5). Whatever the case, we suppose that behaviors such as revenge and poor job performance follow as natural byproducts of emotions and injustice. However, it could be the case that this logical order can be reversed: behavior could sometimes occur first, triggering as an automatic reaction to an event, such as when we fight or fly to counter or avoid a threat. This behavior, associated with physiological responses including muscular tension or heart rate increases, could then trigger emotional reactions that could make one more likely to frame the event as fair or unfair. This idea that behaviors could impact emotions is in fact an old hypothesis proposed by James and Lange in the nineteenth century (Lang, 1994). It is related to the work of Schacter and Singer (1962), which we reviewed in Chapter 2. As we saw at that time, it seems unlikely that all emotion can be determined by undifferentiated psychological arousal

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(Cannon, 1927). But this is not the claim we are making here. There is evidence that mislabeled arousal can heighten affective experiences (Cantor et al., 1975; Zillman, 1979). Which Motive? Which Emotion? Drawing from the multiple needs model of justice (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2006; Cropanzano, Byrne et al., 2001; Goldman, Slaughter, Schmit, Wiley, & Brooks, 2008; Reb, Goldman, Kray, & Cropanzano, 2006), we have asserted that people care about fairness for a variety of reasons. These include, though are probably not limited to the following: justice to maintain control (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; 1978), justice as an indicator of one’s self-esteem and standing in an important social collective (Tyler & Blader, 2002a; 2002b; 2003), and justice for its own sake (e.g., Folger & Salvador, 2008; Folger & Skarlicki, 2008; Lerner, 1975; 1982; 1987; 2003). Since different concerns produce different emotional states (Ekman, 1992; Fredrickson, 1998; 2001; 2009; Plutchik, 1991; 1994), we would not expect each of these motives to be associated with the same discrete feelings. As such, one would not expect injustice to always result in the same type of emotion. Feelings would differ depending upon which motive is most prominent at the time of a transgression. Given this, let us outline a preliminary model: • Proposition 1: To the extent that the motive for control is most salient, and injustice thwarts our ability to manage a situation, then the victim has experienced goal blockage. This should result in dissatisfaction, disappointment, and frustration or irritation (Geen, 1990). • Proposition 2: To the extent that the motive for a social identity is more salient, and injustice signals that we are not valued by others, then the victim has been separated from the collective. This should result in despondency (sadness) and loneliness (Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008). • Proposition 3: To the extent that justice is about deonance or morality, and injustice indicates that an ethical transgression has taken place, the victim is confronted with a normative violation. This should produce a feeling of anger, disgust, or contempt (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009; Ekman & Heider, 1988; Mullen, 2007; Mullen & Skitka, 2006). According to this model, the emotional responses to unfairness depend on the salient goals of the victim. Whether he or she is concerned about control, group identity, or morality, each will produce a different set of affective responses. The motive in question changes the resulting Â�emotional state. This isomorphic relationship between emotional experiences and justice motives has also been suggested by other researchers.€For example,

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Rozin, Lowery, Imada, and Haidt (1999) have linked three emotions (contempt, anger, and disgust) to, respectively, three moral violations (community, autonomy, and divinity) in their CAD triad hypothesis. An important aspect of our model is that it also makes behavioral predictions. Recall that discrete emotions come with associated behavioral predispositions. Therefore, if the salient motive engenders different feeling states, it will subsequently predispose victims to different behavioral options. For example, Reb and his colleagues (2006) found that victims of injustice preferred financial restitution if they were concerned with the instrumental value of the event. On the other hand, they preferred to see the harm doer punished if they were concerned with morality. We can take this further. An injustice, especially one that concerns an important issue, can activate more than one motive (Goldman, Slaughter et€al., 2008). Thus, we posit that real-life emotions are experienced in bundles. To be sure, people often report multiple emotions at the same time (Frijda, 1993). Building on this finding, our model should be able to predict which emotions are likely to co-occur. For instance, frustration (relevant to control) could be associated with loneliness (relevant to social isolation).

Can One Identify Understudied Consequences of Justice Judgments? When seeking to understand the consequences of injustice, there are at least three areas that seem to have been understudied. First, people often seem to let injustice pass; they fail to react to it. Second, justice appears to have internal consequences for the victims themselves, but this has received less research attention. Third, and last, the victims’ behaviors, revenge for instance, do not represent the end of the story. One can go one step forward and investigate the consequences that victims’ behaviors may have in and of themselves. When (In)justice Leads to Nonaction As we noted way back in Chapter 1, justice researchers have often studied the behaviors that individuals have in response to the treatment they receive from others. This is a useful area of study, of course, but there is a problem. People often do not react behaviorally. In one study Mikula (1986, Study 1) reported that 17.54% of the participants engaged in some action to get even after having felt unfairly treated. However, 15.79% simply let the relationship decline, 12.28% resisted passively, and a fully 21.05%—more than one fifth of the respondents— responded with resignation. Similarly, in a study about retaliation it was found that 71% of the respondents did not engage in any form of revenge (Crombag, Rassin, & Horselenberg, 2003). In these studies the most common “action” following an injustice was “nonaction.”

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Bembenek, Beike, and Schroeder (2007) suggest that different Â� psychological processes explain action and nonaction. These can be cognitive, such as when victims minimize the harm that has been done to them or engage in a cost-benefit analysis that restrains them from taking action. These can also be affectively driven, such as when victims forgive the perpetrators either because they feel empathetic after the harm doer apologizes or because their rumination decreases, thereby reducing their negative emotions and making forgiveness possible (McCullough, Bellah, Kilpatrick, & Johnson, 2001). This suggests that emotions may have an important role in explaining nonaction after injustice, although this role still has to be better understood by researchers. The Internal Consequences of Injustice When we mentioned the behaviors that people engage in when they feel unjustly treated and experience negative emotions, we mainly focused on behaviors that have consequences for other people and organizations. For example, in Chapter 3 we saw that unfairness could prompt revenge seeking (Tripp & Bies, 2009). Retaliation of this kind has implications for the well-being of others. While this is an important topic, we believe that fairness also has direct consequences for its victims. To illustrate, Greenberg (2006) showed that unfairness can create insomnia in people. Similarly, Chapter 4 reviewed the Â�extensive evidence suggesting that, at times, injustice can lower one’s self-Â�esteem (for evidence, see Koper et al., 1993; Smith & Tyler, 1997; Smith et al., 1998; Tyler et al., 1996). More generally, there is considerable evidence to suggest that injustice produces adverse stress in its victims (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Benson, 2005; Cropanzano & Wright, in press), as can affect-provoking interpersonal conflict (Spector & Â�Bruk-Lee, 2008). At the present time, we seem to know little about the link between justice, emotions, and the internal consequences for the victim of unfairness. There are some emotions such as anger that have been shown to lead to negative consequences for others (e.g., sabotage). In a like fashion, it could be that anger also has negative physiological consequences for individuals. A few studies in the field of cardiology have explored the impact of positive and negative emotions on cardiovascular function. These studies show that anger activates the sympathetic nervous system (Rein & McCraty, 1995). The general action of this system consists in quickly mobilizing the body’s resources under stress, but its frequent activation has also been shown to predict cardiovascular diseases. It has also been found that hostility decreases parasympathetic activity, whose role consists in controlling the rest and digest functions of the body (Sloan, Shapiro, Bigger, Bagiella, Steinman, & Gorman, 1994). In contrast, positive emotions such as appreciation have been shown to have a favorable impact on the global autonomic nervous system (which is composed of the sympathetic, parasympathetic,

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and enteric nervous systems). In particular, the Â�alterations in heart rate variability of the Â�feeling of appreciation have been shown to be beneficial for cardiovascular health (McCraty, Atkinson, Tiller, Rein, & Watkins, 1995). Since this book has shown that justice produces positive emotions similar to appreciation and that injustice leads to negative emotions such as anger, it is very likely that they have a significant impact on human health, cardiovascular diseases in particular (for evidence, see reviews by Cropanzano, Goldman, & Benson, 2005; Cropanzano & Wright, in press). It would also be useful to learn how individuals can better manage the unfairness events that they are likely to experience. In one original study, Barclay and Skarlicki (2009) showed that people appeal to simple techniques (such as writing about the cognitions and emotions that they experience) to manage their own feelings of injustice and feel better. We would encourage future scholars to explore such possibilities more directly. Escalating Revenge Consistent with the available literature, most of our comments have been limited to feelings that follow from justice and also to perceptions of justice that follow from feelings. In places we have also considered behaviors that result from affect and fairness. While this is all to the good, it discontinues our narrative before the story really ends. The reader is in the position of a moviegoer who watches the curtain fall while still asking “And then what?” Emotion episodes are often linked together in a series (Frijda, 1993), and work has yet to examine this in the context of fairness. Research is also limited regarding the feelings that are evoked in other people. To illustrate, consider the phenomenon of revenge. As we saw in Chapter 3, injustice may make people feel disgusted and angry as a result of the moral outrage they have experienced. If they can blame a perpetrator, they may seek revenge in order to rectify an injustice in a way that seems fair to them. However, more research is needed to understand what people really feel after revenge. While individuals may sometimes feel satisfied, there may also be circumstances where they experience remorse or guilt at having harmed another person (cf. Tripp & Bies, 2009). Moreover, this raises the question of the intersocial processes that can happen afterward. Even if one celebrates an act of revenge, third parties may feel angry and disgusted by this behavior. They may not agree that revenge seeking was necessary, or they may be worried over the secondary consequences of retribution (e.g., a lack of harmony within a social group). Perhaps even worse, the victim of revenge may now feel unjustly treated, prompting him or her to retaliate in turn. This can create future problems, as conflict escalation literature suggests that reciprocal acts of revenge can accelerate out of control (Pruitt, 2008). These social dynamics of unfairness and emotions are worth studying

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as they may explain enduring conflicts between two parties that seem impossible to solve. These long-term effects would seem to be worthy of additional study.

Are There Understudied Moderators to the Justice Judgmental Process? We have shown throughout this book that it appears that justice perceptions are “hot cognitive” processes (van den Bos, 2007). These are processes in which cognitive and affective factors work together, which is quite different from viewing affect only as a factor distorting a cognitive appraisal. We have also shown that important moderators cause justice judgments to be more or less affectively driven. For example, affect intensity is an individual difference that has been shown to make people more likely to process their justice judgments in an affective way (Maas & van den Bos, 2009). Situational moderators also have an impact. For example, in Chapter 5 we saw that uncertainty made people more likely to use their moods as sources of information for their justice deliberations, whereas certainty made them more prone to use cognitively driven processes (van den Bos, 2003). It is important for future research to explore variables that moderate the relative importance of cognitive versus affective determinants of justice. Doing so could teach us much about how individuals decide that they are being treated fairly or unfairly. One such moderator, to which we have not given much importance so far in this book, is culture. On a construct level, emotions seem to exhibit a degree of a cross-cultural equivalence (Breugelmans & De Cremer, 2007). However, the way that cultures feel and express certain emotions can differ in many respects (Mesquita, 2001). This can be relevant to fairness. For example, Wallbott and Scherer (1986) have shown that an Israeli who felt angry attributed it to an injustice about 31% of the time, while French participants who felt angry only attributed it to unfairness in 14% of the cases. Another study has found that Americans gave more importance to interpersonally disengaged emotions such as pride and anger, whereas Japanese tended to focus on interpersonally engaged emotions such as friendliness and shame (Kitayama, Markus, & Kurokawa, 2000). These results could be explained by cultural differences in the emphasis given to different types of self-construals. An independent self-construal seems to be more common in Western countries, whereas Asian countries are more likely to emphasize an interdependent self-construal (Brockner, De Cremer, van den Bos, & Chen, 2005). Notice however that some cultural differences might be due, not to differences in the links between justice and emotions, but in the specific cultural rules used to display emotions (see Chapter 6 on emotional labor). If a great deal of work has now been done regarding the impact of culture on justice on the one hand (Leung, 2005) and concerning the relationship between culture

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and affect on the other hand (Gudykunst & Ting-Toomey, 1988), these three concepts have still to be better linked together.

Final Thoughts Many pages ago we opened this book by recalling the tragedy of Homestead Steel. You might have felt strong emotions while reading this case; we certainly experienced them while recounting the story. On one hand, it is odd to feel emotion about an event when all of the key participants have long been buried. Perhaps we should not have been surprised. Fairness and our feelings about fairness are closely intertwined. More than that, they are an important part of being human. In Greek mythology, justice is represented by Themis, a blindfolded goddess holding two scales of impartiality in one hand. But in her other hand she often holds the sword of punishment. Dice, her daughter, is also known as the goddess of fairness who pierces the hearts of the unjust with her sword. She is even sometimes represented holding Zeus’s thunderbolts. As people, we intuitively recognize this emotional nature of fairness. It is time for scholars to do the same.

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Au t h o r In d e x A Abelson, R.P., 15, 35, 37 Abraham, R., 180, 182 Ackerman, G., 28 Ackerman, P., 82 Adams, J.S., 5, 6, 16, 21, 25, 26, 36, 37, 38, 39, 43, 52, 62, 68, 93, 151, 199 Adelmann, P.K., 178, 186, 212 Adler, R.S., 80 Agar, S.E., 96 Agarie, N., 110 Aldrich, H., 216 Alford, F., 76, 86, 110 Alibozak, T., 213 Allen, D.G., 49, 220 Allen, J.L., 82 Allison, S.T., 30, 159 Allred, K.G., 82, 90, 96, 108 Almagor, M., 13 Ambrose, M.L., 18, 28, 29, 31, 38, 39, 93, 154, 155, 205 Anderson, A.K., 15, 69, 214, 223 Anderson, C., 80 Anen, C., 69, 70 Aquino, K., 49, 63, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 101, 102, 106, 110, 113, 133, 144, 167, 219, 220 Ariely, D., 67 Aristotle, 5, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 32, 37 Arnaud, A., 18, 31, 154 Arndt, J., 187, 189, 192, 198, 202 Arnold, T.J., 215 Aronfreed, J., 211 Aronson, E., 40, 209 Aronson, J.A., 69

Ashforth, B.E., 174, 179, 186 Ashkanasy, N.M., 7, 203, 209, 210, 215,€216 Aspinwall, L.G., 160 Athenstaedt, U., 17, 37, 56, 60, 165, 199,€209 Atkins, R., 105 Atkinson, M., 226 Au, W.T., 10, 71, 106, 149, 201, 211, 214 Austin, W., 38 Ax, A.F., 4, 41 Axelrod, R., 78

B Bachiochi, P.D., 53, 54, 62 Bagger, J., 3, 17, 18, 123, 145 Bagiella, E., 225 Bakker, A.B., 25, 26 Baldwin, J., 123 Banaji, M.R., 208 Barclay, L.J., 2, 58, 59, 60, 121, 123, 130, 131, 132, 199, 226 Barger, P.B., 177 Bargh, J.A., 211 Baron, R.A., 10, 11, 30, 42, 51, 74, 88, 93, 94, 96, 97, 101, 102, 150, 156, 157, 170, 171, 217 Barros, E., 204 Barry, B., 96, 175, 176, 178, 186 Barsade, S.G., 7, 8, 177, 202, 207, 212,€215 Barsky, A., 2, 29, 33, 206 Bartel, C.A., 118, 121, 125 Bartels, M., 211 Bashshur, M.R., 186, 215

289

290 Batson, C.D., 66, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87,€218 Batson, J.G., 82, 84 Baudelaire, C., xv Bauman, C.W., 3, 66, 141, 142 Baumann, D.J., 83 Baumeister, R.F., 115, 116, 121, 129, 133, 144, 191 Bazerman, M.H., 87 Beal, D.J., 203, 204 Beattie, J., 72, 161 Becker, E., 7, 173, 187, 197, 201 Beersma, B., 212 Bègue, L., 219 Beike, D.R., 225 Bell, C.M., 102, 105, 108 Bellah, C.G., 110, 225 Bembenek, A.F., 225 Ben-Porath, Y.S., 13 Bennett, P., 104 Benson, L., III, 104, 171, 225, 226 Benton, J., 208 Bergman, J.T., 73, 88 Berns, G.S., 70 Bernstein, R., 79 Berntson, G.G., 41, 221 Berridge, K.C., 207 Berscheid, E., 36, 38 Best, R.G., 182 Bettenhausen, K., 177 Beugré, C.D., 217 Bies, R.J., 2, 11, 16, 30, 31, 32, 36, 48, 51, 52, 62, 63, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 110, 111, 113, 141, 169, 225, 226 Bigger, J.T., 225 Birch, K., 82 Birkholt, M., 1787 Bjorgvinsson, S., 118 Blaauw, E., 135 Blackburn, S., 66 Blader, S.L., 17, 18, 63, 65, 85, 86, 87, 97, 133, 134, 135, 140, 141, 146, 168, 200, 217, 218, 223 Blaney, P.H., 150, 156, 201 Bless, H., 158 Bloom, P., xiv Blumenthal, E., 118, 136

Author Index Bobocel, D.R., 3, 6, 17, 18, 19, 30, 87, 95, 96, 105, 115, 116, 127, 128, 133, 153, 200 Boden, J.M., 129 Bodenhausen, G.V., 160, 161, 164, 166,€222 Boehm, C., 68 Bolger, N., 220 Bos, A.E.R., 120, 134 Bosveld, W., 25 Boswell, W.R., 104 Bouhuijs, F., 107, 126, 134 Bourgoin, N., 204 Bowen, D.E., 18, 175 Bower, G.H., 10, 150, 156, 201 Bowles, S., 73 Boyd, R., 73 Bozeman, D.P., 96 Bradἀeld, M., 219, 220 Brandt, J.R., 84 Branscombe, N.R., 41 Brauburger, A.L., 174, 176, 179, 180, 181, 182, 185, 186, 201 Brebels, L., 119, 124, 125, 137, 152, 210 Brett, J., 80, 104, 117, 118, 214 Breugelmans, S., 227 Brief, A.P., 8, 10, 50, 80, 148, 169 Briner, B., 177 Brockner, J., 27, 28, 30, 48, 51, 52, 60, 62, 63, 99, 106, 107, 115, 118, 120, 121, 122, 125, 127, 128, 129, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 140, 143, 200, 227 Brody, D., 1 Brooks, S.M., 134, 223 Brosnan, S.F., 6, 19, 20, 48, 67, 68, 69, 75, 87 Brotheridge, C.M., 178, 179, 180, 181, 185, 186 Brouwer, J., 26 Brown, J.D., 125 Brown, S.W., 110 Bruins, J., 119, 126, 200 Bruk-Lee, V., 225 Brummett, B.H., 82 Bryant, J., 40 Buber, M., 30 Buckley, T., 82 Bulan, H.F., 182

Author Index Burke, P.D., 129 Bush, L.K., 15 Butler, J., 4, 66 Buttner, E.H., 96 Buunk, B.P., 6, 26, 66, 69 Buxton, V.M., 175 Byrne, Z.S., 3, 6, 17, 18, 30, 35, 47, 61, 115, 125, 134, 144, 153, 200, 223

C Cacioppo, J.T., 15, 41, 211, 212, 213, 221,€223 Caldwell, S., 18 Camerer, C., 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 89, 92, 103, 108 Camerman, I., 31 Cannon, W.B., 223 Cantor, J.R., 40, 41, 223 Carlsmith, K.M., 90, 107, 108 Carnevale, P.J., 156 Carroll, J.M., 11, 12, 13, 14, 68 Carstensen, L.L., 41 Carver, C.S., 221 Casper, J.D., 117 Cast, A.D., 129 Castano, E., 188 Cervone, D., 47 Chapman, H.A., 15, 69, 97, 223 Chartrand, T.L., 211 Chau, S.L., 174, 178, 180, 181 Chebat, J., 100 Chen, Y.R., 227 Chernyshenko, O.S., 205 Chertkoff, J.M., 30, 31 Chiu, W., 106 Choi, J., 18, 155, 156 Chrobot-Mason, D., 107 Church, T., 14 Cialdini, R.B., 83 Citera, M., 79, 81 Clark, L.A., 11, 13, 99, 189 Clark, M.S., 43, 167 Clayton, S., 30, 42 Clore, G.L., 14, 16, 37, 55, 149, 150, 159, 165, 201, 211 Coates, R.B., 114 Cohen, J.D., 69, 70, 209 Cohen-Charash, Y., 19

291 Coke, J.S., 82 Collins, A., 14, 37, 55 Colquitt, J.A., 18, 29, 30, 31, 49, 52, 66, 95, 115, 116, 117, 131, 144, 154, 193, 200, 206, 215, 223 Colwell, K.A., 38, 68 Conlon, D.E., 18, 28, 31 Connolly, T., 16, 78, 161 Conway, M., 150 Cook, A., 189, 198, 201 Cooper, C.D., 110 Corkran, L., 27, 117 Cosmides, L., 15 Costa, P.T., 219 Coté, S., 212, 214 Côté, S., 80, 82, 93 Coughlan, R., 161 Craighero, L., 211 Crombag, H., 224 Cropanzano, R., 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 42, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 80, 82, 85, 87, 93, 94, 97, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 115, 117, 123, 125, 127, 134, 141, 144, 145, 148, 149, 153, 169, 170, 171, 174, 176, 178, 179, 181, 182, 185, 189, 198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 205, 206, 210, 214, 215, 216, 220, 221, 222, 223, 225, 226 Crosby, F., 36 Csikszentmihalyi, M., 12, 204 Cumberland, A., 131 Cunningham, M.R., 9

D DaGloria, J., 108 Dahling, J.J., 174 Daly, J.P., 80 Damasio, A.R., 150 Damen, F., 212

Author Index

292 Darley, J.M., 70, 90, 91, 107, 108 Darwin, C., 5, 15, 41, 177, 210 Davainis, D., 213 Davidson, M.N., 73, 80 Davidson, R.J., 41 Davis, M.H., 82 Dawes, R.M., 139, 140 De Bruin, E.M.N., 45 De Cremer, D., 3, 4, 44, 45, 48, 97, 106, 116, 119, 121, 124, 128, 129, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 144, 152, 168, 210, 214, 222, 227 De Dreu, C.K.W., 17, 66, 72, 79, 152, 202,€214 De Rivera, J., 216 de Vargas, M.C., 177 De Vinney, L.C., 36 de Waal, F., 6, 19, 66, 67, 68, 69, 87 DeCoster, J., 150, 162 Degoey, P., 126, 132, 134 Deignan, K., 213 Demerouti, E., 26 den Ouden, N., 140 DeNisi, A.S., 76 Denollet, J., 173 Dent, J.L., 30, 159 DeRidder, R., 108 Deutsch, M., 48 Diamantopoulos, A., 97, 98 Dickter, D., 174, 184, 185 Diefendorff, J.M., 173, 174, 175, 176, 182,€183 Diekmann, K.A., 87 Diener, E., 11, 12, 14, 46, 148, 160, 221 Dimberg, U., 211 Dinnerstein, J.L., 84 Dipboye, R.L., 129 Doherty, R.W., 213 Douglas, A., 118, 136 Douglas, S., 133 Dovidio, J.F., 82 Downey, R.G., 182 Dronkert, E., 119, 126, 200 Duffy, M.K., 220 Duncan, B., 82 Dunnette, M.D., 39 Dyck, J.L., 84

E Earley, P.C., 29, 117 Early, S., 82 Eavy, C.L., 25 Ebbesen, E.B., 41 Edwards, K., 88 Eisenberg, N., 82, 85, 131 Ekman, P., 14, 15, 41, 42, 148, 149, 169, 212, 223 Elfenbein, H.A., 8, 16 Elias, S.M., 176, 178, 179, 181, 185 Elkins, T.J., 96 Ellard, J.H., 20, 106, 112, 139, 184 Ellis, B.H., 178 Ellsworth, P.C., 55, 88 Ely, R.J., 125 Emler, N.P., 22, 90, 97 Erb, M., 211 Erickson, R.J., 178, 179, 180, 182, 183 Espinoza, F., 73 Ewing, D.W., 18

F Fabbri-Destro, M., 211 Fairchild, G., 28 Farrell, A.C., 96 Feather, N.T., 114 Fedor, D.B., 18 Fedorikhin, A., 74 Fehr, E., 73, 76, 77, 82, 87, 89, 91, 97, 101, 102, 103, 105, 108 Feinberg, J., 93, 110 Feldman Barrett, L.F., 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 Feldman, D.C., 179, 183, 186 Feldman, L.A., 12 Ferin, D.L., 110 Ferraro, F., 66 Fessler, D.M.T., 161, 222 Fiedler, K., 163 Finkelstein, R., 157 Finucane, M., 150 Fischhoff, B., 16, 164 Fishbacher, U., 76, 77, 82, 87, 89, 101, 103, 105, 108 Fisher, B., 117

Author Index Fishman, A.Y., 27, 48, 51, 107 Fisk, G., 174, 177, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 198, 201, 206 Fiske, A.P., 23, 66 Fitness, J., 94, 95 Flamson, T.J., 161, 222 Fogassi, L., 212 Folger, R., 2, 3, 5, 27, 28, 29, 30, 36, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 78, 80, 82, 85, 87, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 116, 117, 118, 126, 141, 165, 169, 199, 200, 209, 210, 214, 218, 220, 223 Folkes, V.S., 96 Fontanella, K., 213 Foo, M.D., 212 Ford, D., 105 Forgas, J.P., 4, 10, 132, 150, 156, 157, 161, 162, 163, 164, 171, 201 Fortenback, V.A., 82 Fortin, D., 105 Fortin, S.P., 157 Fragale, A.R., 214 Frank, R.H., 10, 17, 77, 78, 87, 103, 108,€148 Frankl, V.E., 197, 201 Frederick, S., 74 Fredrickson, B.L., 7, 8, 10, 14, 17, 148, 169, 170, 221, 223 Freedman, S., 36, 37, 93 Freeman, D., 106 Frei, P.L., 157 French, W., 21, 32 Freud, S., 7 Friedman, R., 80, 123, 214 Friesen, W.V., 41 Frijda, N.H., 10, 37, 41, 55, 148, 224, 226 Frohlich, N., 20, 25 Fry, W.R., 29 Fujimoto, T., 26 Fulmer, I.S., 175, 176, 178, 186 Fultz, J., 82

293

G Gächter, S., 76, 77, 82, 87, 89, 91, 97, 101, 102, 103 Gallagher, D., 165 Gallese, V., 212 Ganesan, S., 154 Garden, C., 27, 48, 51, 107 Gardner, D.G., 87, 115, 118, 200, 221 Gaunt, R., 94 Geddes, D., 176, 178 Gee, J., 71, 101, 209 Geen, R.G., 223 Gelfand, M.J., 202 George, J.M., 4, 10, 13, 150, 156, 161, 162, 164, 171, 177, 201, 215 Gerras, S.J., 203 Geurts, S.A., 26 Gibson, D.E., 177, 215 Giesler, R.B., 129 Gilbert, D.T., 94 Gillespie, J.Z., 66 Gilliland, S.W., 18, 29, 106, 126, 127, 128, 133, 200, 220 Gino, F., 44 Gintis, H., 73 Glass, D.C., 26 Glazer, M., 76 Glazer, P., 76 Glew, D.J., 104 Glomb, T.M., 178, 205 Goates, N., 80, 214 Goffman, E., 178 Goldberg, J.H., 16, 88, 93, 161 Goldberg, L., 174 Goldberg, S.B., 104 Goldenberg, J.L., 187 Goldman, B.M., 2, 11, 36, 48, 49, 51, 54, 62, 63, 66, 87, 92, 93, 99, 104, 105, 107, 110, 134, 141, 171, 199, 214, 223, 224, 225, 226 Gonzalez, C.M., 86, 146, 161, 218 Gonzalez, R.M., 16, 164 Goodstein, J., 141, 145 Gorman, J., 225 Gosserand, R.H., 163, 174, 176, 182 Gotlib, I.H., 13 Graham, D.T., 41 Graham, J., 145

294 Grandey, A.A., 56, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 198, 201, 206 Granneman, B.D., 121 Grant, A.M., 174 Gray-Little, B., 42 Green, D.P., 11, 13 Green, S.G., 204 Greenberg, J., 30, 39, 47, 66, 174, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 198, 201, 202, 210, 218, 225 Greene, J.D., 70 Greenhalgh, L., 73, 80 Greenwald, A.G., 208 Gregg, A.P., 115, 133, 144 Greguras, G.J., 175 Gremler, D.D., 180 Grienberger, I.V., 93 Griffeth, R.W., 49 Griffin, R.W., 104, 148 Griffin, S., 9, 15 Griffitt, D., 84 Gross, J.J., 173, 179, 180, 181, 185, 186 Grote, N.K., 43, 167 Groth, M., 180 Grove, J., 27, 117 Grove, R., 36 Grover, S., 106, 118, 220 Gudykunst, W.B., 228 Gunto, S., 73 Güth, W., 71 Gutman, D.A., 70

H Hafer, C.L., 87, 105 Haidt, J., 4, 6, 7, 10, 16, 46, 109, 111, 145, 147, 153, 167, 168, 210, 214, 224 Hale, J.M., 148, 206, 221 Ham, E-J., 119, 220 Hamburger, H., 74 Handgraaf, M.J.J., 72 Harakal, T., 9, 15 Hardman, D., 78 Harinick, F., 81 Harkins, D., 9, 15, 148 Harland, L.K., 38 Harlos, K.P., 2

Author Index Harmon-Jones, E., 192 Hart, D., 105, 119, 137 Hartnell, C.A., 31 Harvey, S., 208 Hatἀeld, E., 36, 62, 211, 212, 213 Hauver, L.A., 157 Hays, R.P., 36, 49 Hebb, J., 213 Hedges, S.M., 204 Hegtvedt, K.A., 42, 46, 48 Heider, F., 94, 223 Heider, K., 41 Heimgartner, A., 209 Heinrich, J., 73 Heise, D.R., 147, 164, 165, 166, 168, 222 Hektner, J.M., 204 Henle, C.A., 220 Hennig-Thurau, T., 180 Herold, D.M., 18 Hersey, R.B., 4, 9, 203 Hertel, G., 150, 158 Heschgl, S., 209 Hess, R.L., 154 Heuer, L., 106, 118, 121, 131, 136, 200 Higgins, E.T., 122, 123, 124, 125 Highberger, L., 82 Hight, T.L., 110 Hochschild, A.R., 175, 176, 178, 180, 186 Hoffman, M.L., 82 Hofmann, D.A., 202, 203 Hogan, R., 22, 90, 97 Hollensbe, E.C., 150, 153, 155, 157 Holley, D.M., 66 Holmes, J.G., 66 Holmes, S., 66 Holmvall, C.M., 30, 127, 133 Hom, P.W., 49 Homan, A.C., 212 Homans, G.C., 4, 21, 25, 37, 38, 39, 43, 62, 68 Hong, J., 213 Horberg, E.J., 48 Horn, Z.V., 68 Horselenberg, R., 224 Houlden, P., 28, 29, 117, 200 Houston, D.A., 28, 142, 144

Author Index Howes, J.C., 29, 117 Hsu, M., 69, 70, 75, 87, 209 Huang, Y-M., 174, 176 Huber, L., 68 Hulin, C.L., 205 Hume, D., 4 Humphrey, R.H., 174, 179, 186 Huo, Y.J., 126, 134 Hupka, R.B., 14 Hutchinson, K.A., 14 Hutchinson, S., 19 Hyde, J.S., 145

I Ilgen, D.R., 205 Ilies, R., 99 Imada, S., 224 Irving, P.G., 96 Isen, A.M., 10, 42, 148, 150, 156, 157, 160, 170, 171, 201 Ito, T.A., 41 Izard, C.E., 14, 41

J Jaffee, S., 145 James, K., 13, 202, 215 Jansen, K.J., 174 Janssen, O., 28 Janssen, P.P.M., 26 Jasso, G., 3, 186 Jenkins, J.M., 8, 10 Jensen, S.M., 14 Jeong, S.S., 202 Johnson, J.L., 110, 225 Joireman, J.A., 45 Jones, D.A., 3, 18, 154 Jones, E.E., 84 Jones, J.R., 178, 179 Jones, R.G., 178, 182 Jones, S.C., 125 Jordan, A.H., 16 Jorgenson, D.O., 39 Jose, P.E., 41, 55 Joseph, C., 4, 145 Josephs, R.A., 129 Judge, T.A., 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 99, 115, 116, 200, 206, 221

295

K Kagel, J.H., 71 Kahneman, D., 66, 72, 73, 75, 87, 105, 141, 209 Kameda, M., 110 Kampf, H.C., 84 Kanfer, R., 29, 117 Kant, I., 109 Kaplan, S.A., 2, 29, 33, 206 Karuza, J., 29 Kasimatis, M., 9, 204, 205 Katcher, A., 40 Katigbak, M.S., 14 Kausel, E.E., 161 Keating, J.P., 84 Keith, P.M., 26 Kellerhals, J., 3, 29 Kellet, S., 177 Kelln, B.R.C., 106 Kelly, J.R., 177 Keltner, D., 10, 15, 16, 17, 48, 88, 109, 148, 161, 164, 210, 214, 222 Kernis, M.H., 121, 122 Kerr, N.L., 150, 158 Ketelaar, T., 10, 65, 71, 78, 80, 109, 149, 150, 200, 201, 211, 214 Keynes, J.M., xiv Keysers, C., 212 Khazanchi, S., 150 Kidd, R.F., 94 Killian, C., 42 Kilpatrick, S.D., 110, 225 Kilts, C.D., 70 Kim, C., 71, 110 Kim, D.A., 15, 69, 223 Kim, P.H., 78, 110 King, L., 160 Kinnunen, M.L., 173, 186 Kirk, R., 141 Kirkman, B.L., 3 Kirson, D., 14 Kitayama, S., 227 Klaas, B.S., 76 Klass, B.S., 91, 108 Klein, D.J., 40, 213 Klein, T.R., 82 Kleinman, S.B., 178

296 Knetsch, J.L., 66, 72, 209 Ko, J., 3 Kobrynowicz, D., 84 Kohler, E., 212 Kokkonen, M., 173, 186 Konovsky, M.A., 13, 28 Koomen, W., 138 Kopelman, S., 11, 73 Koper, G., 107, 126, 134, 200, 225 Korman, A.E., 4, 129 Korsgaard, M.A., 202, 220 Kramer, G.P., 160, 161, 164, 222 Kramer, R.D., 180 Kramer, R.M., 10, 90, 92 Krass, P., 1, 2 Kravitz, D., 73 Kray, L.J., 63, 93, 110, 151, 152, 223 Krebs, D.L., 82 Krehbiel, P.J., 58, 59, 64, 68, 123, 170, 199 Kremen, I., 4, 40 Kroes, W., 29 Kruml, S.M., 176, 178 Kugler, T., 16, 161 Kuhn, T.S., 218 Kulik, C., 20, 38, 39, 93, 106, 112, 139, 144, 184 Kurokawa, M., 227 Kurtz, S., 29 Kwek, M.H., 212

L Laird, J.D., 213 Lambert, L.S., 220 Lamerz, K., 219 Lane, J.A.S., 30, 159 Lane, K.A., 208 Lang, P.J., 222 Langton, N., 216 Larsen, J.T., 41, 46, 148 Larsen, R.J., 9, 11, 12, 14, 204, 205, 221 LaTour, S., 28, 29, 117, 200 Laufer, R., 217 Lavelle, J.J., 71, 101, 209 Lazarus, R.S., 14, 15, 37, 55, 60, 63, 64

Author Index Le Roy, J., 157 Leary, M.R., 116, 133 LeBoeuf, R.A., 67, 108 LeDoux, J.E., 41 Lee, R.T., 178, 186 Lenton, A.P., 14 Lerner, J.S., 16, 88, 89, 97, 104, 106, 111, 112, 148, 161, 164 Lerner, M.J., 63, 66, 87, 97, 116, 141, 199, 206, 222, 223 Leung, K., 106, 227 Levenson, R.W., 41 Leventhal, G.S., 29, 30, 73, 88 Levinas, E., 30 Levy, B., 213 Levy, P.E., 174 Lewicki, R.J., 3, 217 Li, A., 7, 145, 215, 216 Liao, H., 186, 215 Liberman, M.D., 94, 107 Lieberman, J.D., 189, 209 Lieberman, M.D., 70 Liebrand, W.B., 45, 77 Lieu, Y., 18 Liljenquist, K., 208 Lind, E.A., 3, 18, 19, 24, 29, 30, 62, 117, 118, 119, 126, 132, 134, 139, 140, 142, 147, 150, 151, 152, 157, 168, 192, 193, 194, 200, 220 Linton, S., 164, 166 Lisco, C.C., 80, 214 Lissowski, G., 25 Liu, T.J., 129 Livingston, B., 29 Liwag, M., 55 Locke, E.A., 117 Loewenstein, G., 161 Lowenstein, G., 16, 87 Lowery, L., 224 Lucas, R.E., 11, 12, 46, 221 Lundh, L.G., 12 Lundqvist, L.O., 211 Luthans, F., 12 Lyman, S.M., 95 Lyon, D., 174, 201 Lyubomirsky, S., 160

Author Index

M Maas, M., 46, 47, 48, 60, 119, 206, 227 MacGregor, D.G., 150 Mackay, J., 2 Magner, N., 106, 200 Mahapatra, M., 8 Mahony, D.M., 91, 108, 202 Mandler, G., 4, 40 Mansbridge, J.J., 66 Mansour-Cole, D.M., 209 Manstead, A.S.R., 17, 79, 152, 161, 214 Manucia, G.K., 83 Mao, H., 30 Margolis, B., 29 Mark, M.M., 4, 7, 8, 42, 126, 149, 150, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 168, 170, 200, 201 Markovsky, B., 19, 36, 38, 48 Markus, H., 227 Martens, M.L., 3, 18, 154 Martin, C.L., 48, 49, 50, 52, 57, 62, 106, 118, 125, 129 Martin, J., 39 Martinez-Tur, V., 215 Martzke, J.S., 15 Mascolo, M.F., 9, 15, 148 Maslach, C., 41 Masterson, S.S., 30, 31, 95, 150 Mathis, L.C., 121 Mattila, A.S., 174, 177 McCance, A.S., 174, 175, 182, 184, 198 McCarthy, P.M., 82 McCline, R.L., 39 McClintock, C.G., 45 McCrae, R.R., 219 McCraty, R.M., 225, 226 McCullough, M.E., 110, 225 McDavis, K., 82 McElreath, R., 73 McFarlane, J.M., 204 McGregor, H.A., 188, 192 McIntyre, L., 5 McLean Parks, J., 93, 113

297 McMaster, M.R., 84 Medvec, V.H., 11 Meindl, J., 88 Mellers, B.A., 20, 21, 23 Melton, R.J., 165 Mesquita, B., 10, 227 Messick, D.M., 45 Meyer, J.P., 13, 96 Miedema, J., 13, 119, 120, 136, 192, 193, 197, 198, 202 Mikula, G., 17, 33, 37, 44, 56, 60, 66, 165, 199, 209, 224 Milavasky, B., 40 Milgram, S., 218 Miller, D.T., 66, 74, 88, 106 Miller, J., 77 Miller, K.I., 178 Miller, N., 160 Miller, P., 82, 85 Miner, A.G., 178, 205 Minton, J.W., 3, 217 Mischel, W., 47 Mitchell, D., 29, 117 Mitchell, G., 23 Mitchell, M.S., 21, 23 Moag, J.S., 30, 31, 36, 51, 96 Modak, M., 3, 29 Mohler, C.J., 3, 35 Moliner, C., 215, 216 Montada, L., 37, 55, 56, 60, 64, 66, 165,€199 Moore, C.C., 14 Morgeson, F.P., 202, 203 Morris, J.A., 179, 183, 186 Morris, M.W., 16, 17, 145, 148, 161, 173,€210 Morris, T., 141 Moser, D., 71 Mowday, R.T., 38, 68 Moye, N.A., 117 Much, N.C., 8 Mullen, E., 3, 7, 42, 66, 112, 113, 141, 142, 143, 147, 149, 150, 152, 158, 159, 161, 164, 167, 168, 199, 201, 210, 223 Mullenders, D., 128, 134 Muñoz, R.F., 173 Muraven, M., 191

298 Murnighan, J.K., 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 97, 103, 108, 210 Murphy, K., 12, 47, 60, 100 Musante, L., 29

N Nadisic, T., 86, 96, 105, 106 Nadler, J., 78, 112, 113, 199 Neale, J.M., 204 Neuhof, J., 150, 158 Neumann, R., 211 Ng, K.Y., 31 Nicholson, G.J., 215, 217 Nicolas, T.E., 87 Noel, T.W., 28, 29 Nosek, B.A., 208 Nowakowski,J.M., 18, 28 Nozick, R., 27, 28, 29, 32, 49 Nyklicek, I., 173 Nystrom, L.E., 69, 70, 209

O O’Connor, C., 14 O’Leary-Kelly, A.M., 104 Oatley, K., 8, 10 Ochs, J., 71, 75 Oechssler, J., 73, 205 Ohbuchi, K., 220 Okimoto, T.G., 114 Okrasa, W., 25 Olekalns, M., 80, 214 Olg, 110 Olson-Buchanan, J.B., 104 Opotow, S., 30 Oppenheimer, J.A., 25 Ordóñez, L., 16, 23, 161 Orimoto, L., 213 Ortiz, D.J., 126, 134 Ortony, A., 14, 37, 55 Otten, W., 45 Ozcelik, H., 216

P Pacheco, C., 213 Paddock, E.L., 123

Author Index Pagnoni, G., 70 Paladino, M.P., 188 Pancer, S.M., 89 Panksepp, J., 41 Parco, J.E., 87 Park, L., 8 Parkington, J.J., 175 Parks, K.R., 180 Patient, D.L., 85, 86, 87, 96, 218 Patrick, W., 223 Paul, M., 180 Peiró, J.M., 215 Pelham, B.W., 129 Pennebaker, J.W., 8 Perrenoud, D., 3, 29 Perrewé, P.L., 39 Peters, E., 150 Peters, S.L., 19 Peterson, C., 141, 145 Petty, R.E., 15, 150, 162, 163, 188 Pfeffer, J., 66 Pham, M.T., 80, 150, 161, 171, 222 Phelps, E.A., 41 Phillips, J.S., 96 Pierce, J.L., 87, 115, 118, 200 Pierce, L., 44 Piliavin, J.A., 36 Pillsworth, E.G., 161, 222 Pillutla, M.M., 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 87, 89, 91, 93, 97, 103, 108, 210 Pinder, C.C., 2, 78 Pinker, S., 78, 103 Pitariu, A.H., 202 Pittman, T.S., 84, 90, 107, 108 Plutchik, R., 41, 210, 223 Poehlmann, K.M., 41 Poortvliet, P.M., 119 Pope, L.K., 55, 64 Porter, C.O.L.H., 31 Post, C., 27 Powell, A.L., 84 Prasnikar, V., 71, 74, 75, 77, 92, 108, 193 Prehar, C.A., 107 Pritchard, R.D., 25, 36, 39, 68, 74 Pruitt, D.G., 103, 226 Pugh, S.D., 2, 58, 173, 174, 175, 177, 185, 186, 199, 212

Author Index Pugliesi, K., 178 Pyszczynski, T., 174, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 194, 198, 201, 202

Q Quartz, S.R., 69, 70 Quinn, R., 29

R Rachal, K.C., 110 Rachels, J., 66 Rafaeli, A., 175, 180 Raghunathan, R., 161, 222 Ramarajan, L., 7, 202, 207 Ramos, J., 215 Randall, M.L., 32, 35 Range, F.L., 68 Rapoport, A., 87 Rapson, R.L., 211, 212 Rasinski, K.A., 117 Rassin, E., 224 Ratner, R.K., 66 Rawls, J., 5, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 32, 49, 117 Reb, J., 48, 51, 63, 93, 107, 110, 111, 115, 148, 161, 206, 221, 223, 224 Redican, W.K., 15 Reed, A., II, 106, 118, 144 Reed, G.L., 96 Reichle, B., 56, 60, 64, 199 Rein, G., 225, 226 Reis, H.T., 25 Restak, R.M., 180 Reyes, J.A.S., 14 Richard, E.M., 183 Ricoeur, P., 22 Rijpkema, M., 220 Rilling, J.K., 69, 70, 209 Rivera, A.N., 87 Rizzolatti, G., 211 Roberson, Q.M., 31, 117, 214, 215, 220 Roberts, R.J., 41 Robinson, P.H., 90, 107, 108 Robinson, S., 104 Robinson, T., 36, 49, 52 Roch, S.G., 30, 159 Rohrer, A., 178 Roider, A., 73, 205

299 Romney, A.K., 14 Roseman, I.J., 37, 41, 55 Rosen, B., 80 Rosenblatt, A., 174, 188, 189, 192, 194, 195, 201 Rosenfeld, D., 27, 36, 49, 52, 117 Rosette, A.S., 73 Roth, A.E., 71, 74, 75, 77, 103, 108 Rothman, N.B., 86, 146, 218 Rotton, J., 9 Routledge, C., 198, 202 Rozin, P., 224 Rupp, D.E., 3, 6, 18, 21, 25, 35, 66, 102, 105, 107, 108, 115, 117, 123, 153, 174, 175, 182, 184, 185, 186, 197, 198, 200, 215 Rusch, C.D., 14 Russell, J.A., 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 148 Rutte, C.G., 26, 93 Rymph, R.D., 220

S Saavedra, R., 212 Sacchi, S., 188 Salovey, P., 11, 13 Salvador, R., 66, 85, 87, 103, 104, 110, 199, 223 Salvarani, G., 82 Samuelson, C.D., 30, 159 Sandage, S.J., 110 Sanfey, A.G., 69, 70, 75, 87, 209 Sapute, A.B., 70, 209 Sargis, E.G., 66, 142 Saron, C., 41 Satin, M.S., 204 Scafer, R.B., 26 Schachter, S., 4, 39, 40, 41, 222 Schaller, M., 83 Schaubroeck, J., 178, 179 Schaufeli, W.B., 6, 25, 26, 66, 69 Scheler, M., 22, 60 Schelling, T., 77, 78, 103, 108 Scher, S.J., 147, 164, 165, 166, 168, 222 Scherer, K.R., 17, 37, 56, 165, 199, 227 Schiff, H.C., 67 Schilling, E.A., 220 Schimel, J., 190, 192 Schlamberger, K., 33

300 Schmidt, J.A., 204 Schminke, M., 3, 18, 28, 29, 31, 35, 154,€155 Schmit, M.J., 134, 223 Schmittberger, R., 71 Schmitz, W., 73, 205 Schnall, S., 16, 208 Schneider, A., 37, 56, 60, 64, 199 Schneider, B., 175 Schoefer, K., 97, 98 Schoenewolf, G., 211 Schroeder, D.A., 82, 128, 225 Schroth, H.A., 3, 87, 127, 128, 133, 200 Schwartz, G.E., 41 Schwartz, J., 14 Schwarz, N., 150 Schwarze, B., 71 Scott, B.A., 29, 31, 99, 115, 116, 200, 206 Scott, C., 178 Scott, M.B., 95 Scott, S.G., 209 Sedikides, C., 115, 119, 120, 124, 129, 133, 134, 137, 144 See, Y.H.M., 188 Seiden, V., 11 Seitz, S.T., 205 Seligman, M.E.P., 12, 141, 145 Semin, G.R., 46 Sen, A.K., 87 Senulis, I., 41 Seuferling, G., 84 Shack, M.L., 157 Shaἀr, E., 67, 108 Shah, P., 3, 87, 123, 127, 128, 133, 200 Shanock, L.R., 30 Shao, R., 106 Shapiro, D.L., 3, 30, 32, 52, 63, 96, 117,€118 Shapiro, P.A., 225 Shaver, P., 14, 148 Shaw, J.C., 30, 31, 95, 115, 116, 200, 206 Shaw, L.L., 82 Sheppard, B.H., 3, 161, 217 Shoda, Y., 47 Shuler, S., 175, 178 Shweder, R.A., 8, 168 Sideman Goldberg, L., 180 Sideman, L.A., 174 Sidman, M., 191

Author Index Siegel, P.A., 27, 60, 118 Siegrist, J., 25, 26 Silverstein, E.M., 80 Simon, H.A., 66, 87 Simon, L., 192 Simonis, M., 330 Simonsson-Sarnecki, M., 12 Sin, H-P., 174, 184, 185 Sinaceur, M., 79, 80, 81, 82, 214 Sinclair, R.C., 4, 7, 8, 42, 149, 150, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 168, 170, 201 Singelis, T.M., 213 Singer, J.A., 41, 222 Singer, J.E., 4, 40, 41 Sitkin, S.B., 95, 96 Sixma, H.J., 25 Skarlicki, D.P., 2, 20, 36, 52, 53, 54, 58, 61, 62, 67, 69, 78, 85, 87, 93, 96, 99, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 111, 112, 139, 144, 184, 199, 210, 218, 223, 226 Skinner, E.A., 116, 117, 134, 193 Skitka, L.J., 3, 7, 8, 19, 28, 42, 63, 66, 74, 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 132, 141, 142, 143, 144, 167, 199, 223 Skoe, E.E.A., 131, 143 Skousen, M., 65 Slaughter, J.E., 53, 54, 62, 134, 223, 224 Sloan, R.P., 225 Sloman, S.A., 150, 162 Slovic, P., 150 Slusarczyk, W., 100 Small, D.A., 16, 161, 164 Smart, L., 129 Smith, A., 66 Smith, C.A., 55, 64 Smith, E.R., 150, 162 Smith, H.J., 116, 117, 120, 126, 132, 133, 134, 140, 200, 217, 225 Smith, H.L., 12 Smith, K.D., 84 Solomon, R.S., 73, 90, 108, 186, 187, 188, 191, 192, 194, 196, 198, 201, 202 Solomon, S., 174, 189 Sommerville, B., 70 Sonnemans, J., 10 Sonntag, K., 184

Author Index Spataro, S.E., 8 Spector, P.E., 19, 225 Spell, C.S., 215 Spencer, S., 174, 184, 185, 186 Spiegel, S., 48, 51, 107 Spindel, M.S., 41, 55 Sprecher, S., 42, 43, 46, 48, 58, 62, 130 Srivastava, J., 73, 78 Stage, C., 178 Standiford, L., 1, 2 Stapel, D.A., 138 Star, S.A., 36 Starbucks Mission Statement, 177 Stark, S.E., 205 Staw, B.M., 13 Steele, C.M., 125, 129 Steensma, H., 36 Stein, J.H., 66, 85, 87, 104, 141, 171, 189, 192, 194, 195, 197, 199, 206 Stein, N.L., 55 Stein, W.E., 87 Steinel, W., 81 Steiner, D., 174, 180, 181, 185 Steinley, D., 189 Steinman, R.C., 225 Stephan, C.W., 177 Stephan, W.G., 177 Stephen, A.T., 150 Stepina, L.P., 39 Stetzer, A., 203 Stiff, J.B., 178 Stinglhamber, F., 128, 134 Stone, A.A., 204 Stotland, E., 82, 84 Stouffer, S.A., 36 Stouten, J., 45, 48, 94 Strack, F., 211 Straub, P., 71, 73, 74, 75, 77, 92, 103, 108 Strongman, J.A., 84 Stuhlmacher, A.F., 79, 81 Suchman, E.A., 36 Suckow, K., 56, 170, 174, 199 Suh, E.M., 12 Suleiman, R., 72 Sullins, E.S., 149, 211 Surowiecki, J., 73 Süsser, K., 160, 164, 222

301 Susskind, J.M., 15, 69, 223 Sutcliffe, K.M., 96 Sutton, R. I., 66, 175, 180 Swann, W.B., Jr., 118, 121, 125, 129 Sy, T., 212 Sypher, B.D., 175, 178

T Tabibnia, G., 70, 75, 87, 209 Tan, H.H., 212 Tassinary, L.G., 15 Teddlie, C.B., 42 Tedeschi, J.T., 87 Tellegen, A., 11, 12, 13, 14, 189, 221 Tenbrunsel, A., 72, 74, 87, 94, 105 Tepper, B.J., 27, 33, 59, 63, 199, 220 Tesluk, P., 53, 99 Tesser, A., 136 Tetlock, P.E., 16, 23, 88, 161 Teuchmann, K., 177 Tews, M.J., 178 Thaler, R.H., 66, 71, 72, 77, 92, 103, 108,€209 Thayer, R.E., 221 Theuer, T., 150, 158 Thibaut, J.W., 28, 29, 30, 65, 97, 116, 117, 118, 141, 200, 223 Thompson, E.R., 84 Thompson, L.L., 10, 11, 73, 78, 80 Tiedens, L.Z., 79, 80, 81, 82, 164, 166, 214, 222 Tiller, W.A., 226 Timmerman, T.A., 29, 117 Ting-Toomey, S., 228 Todd, R.M., 82 Toi, M., 82 Tooby, J., 15 Törestad, B., 12 Totterdell, P., 177 Trabasso, T., 55 Tracy, K., 175 Tracy, S.J., 175 Treviño, L.K., 47 Tripp, T.M., 2, 11, 16, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108, 110, 111, 113, 141, 169, 225, 226 Trope, Y., 94

Author Index

302 Trougakos, J.P., 204 Truax, K.M., 11 Tsai, W-C., 174, 176 Turillo, C.J., 71, 101, 102, 105, 108, 141,€209 Tyler, T.R., 30, 62, 63, 65, 85, 87, 95, 97, 103, 116, 117, 120, 126, 132, 133, 134, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 168, 192, 200, 217, 218, 223, 225 Tyszka, T., 25

U Umbreit, M.S., 114 Umilta, M.A., 212 Umphress, E., 71, 101, 106, 200, 209 Urada, D., 160 Ury, W.L., 104 Utne, M.K., 94

V Vaidya, J., 12 Vallacher, R.R., 191, 196 Valley,K.L., 10 van den Bos, K., 3, 13, 18, 19, 24, 46, 47, 48, 59, 60, 106, 119, 120, 126, 127, 128, 129, 133, 147, 150, 151, 152, 157, 166, 189, 192, 193, 194, 195, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 206, 220, 227 van der Hulst, R., 26 van Dierendonck, D., 25 van Dijk, E., 45, 48, 72, 74, 87, 94, 105,€210 van Dijk, W.W., 161 van Dijke, M., 120, 135 van Essen, W.J., 220 van Goozen, S., 10 Van Hiel, A., 106, 140, 144, 222 van Hoorebeke, D., 184 van Kleef, G.A., 17, 79, 80, 81, 82, 93, 94, 97, 109, 152, 210, 212, 214 van Knippenberg, A.F.M., 93, 121, 126, 128 van Knippenberg, B., 128, 133, 134, 135, 212, 214

van Knippenberg, D., 107, 128, 134, 135, 212, 214 van Lange, P.A.M., 45 van Prooien, J-W., 87 van Winden, F., 3, 6, 76 Vandenberghe, C., 31 Varney, L.L., 82 Vecchio, R.P., 68 Verbeke, W., 40, 212, 213 Vermunt, R., 18, 19, 36, 72, 87, 107, 120, 134, 135, 192 Vingerhoets, A., 173, 186

W Wade, N., 19, 68 Wade-Benzoni, K.A., 174 Walker, L., 28, 29, 30, 65, 97, 116, 117, 118, 141, 200, 223 Wallbott, H.G., 227 Walster, E.H., 36, 38 Walster, G.W., 36, 38 Walumbwa, F.O., 31 Watkins, A.D., 226 Watson, D., 11, 12, 13, 99, 189, 221 Weber, M., 217 Weerts, T.C., 41 Weg, E., 71 Weinberger, D.A., 41 Weinblatt, T., 118, 136 Weiss, H.M., 10, 12, 14, 16, 17, 26, 42, 50, 51, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 64, 68, 80, 97, 123, 126, 148, 149, 165, 169, 170, 174, 176, 178, 179, 181, 185, 199, 203, 204, 206, 221, 222 Wenzel, M., 114 Wesson, M.J., 31 Westen, D., 7, 202, 206, 207 Whang, Y-O., 96 Wharton, A.S., 178, 179, 180, 182 White, S.B., 87 Whitney, G., 84 Wiese, D., 12 Wiesenfeld, B.M., 27, 28, 30, 48, 52, 60, 62, 99, 106, 107, 118, 121, 125, 129, 130, 132, 135, 136 Wiethoff, C., 218 Wilbarger, J.L., 207

Author Index Wild, B., 211 Wild, E., 30 Wiley, J.W., 134, 223 Wilke, H.A.M., 3, 18, 19, 72, 107, 119, 126, 134, 200 Williams, K.D., 132 Williams, R.M., 36 Williams, T.J., 190 Williams, T.M., 204 Wilson, A.D., 84 Wilson, J.Q., 66, 69 Winkielman, P., 207 Winquist, J., 19 Wladring, I.E., 46 Wohl, M.J.A., 190 Wolff, H.G., 4, 41 Wolff, S., 4, 41 Worthington, E.L. Jr., 110 Wright, R., 66, 69, 141, 145, 203 Wright, T.A., 11, 12, 13, 14, 225 Wubben, M.J.J., 152, 210 Wundt, W.M., 4, 12

303

Y Yavuz, H., 195, 197 Ybema, J.F., 19 Yik, M.S.M., 11 Younts, C.W., 19, 36 Youssef, C.M., 12 Yzerbyt, V.Y., 188

Z Zajonc, R.B., 212 Zapata-Phelan, C.P., 29, 31, 51, 193, 214, 215 Zdaniuk, A., 95, 116, 128 Zeelenberg, M., 72, 161 Zeh, T.R., 70 Zhong, C., 208 Zillman, D., 40, 41, 223 Zimbardo, P.G., 41 Zuckerman, A., 220 Zwick, R., 71

S u bje c t I n d e x 911 dispatchers, display rules beneἀts,€178

A Absenteeism due to emotional contagion, 177 and lack of reciprocity, 26 Abundance effect, 43–44 Accountability, reduction of empathic bias by, 86 Achievement-oriented identity, 127 Activation, 12, 13, 14 Actors, display rules and, 176 Affect, 3, 7–8, 158 between-person, 206–209 as cause of entity justice, 154–155 centrality to equity theory, 36 cognitive models, 199 dependence of role on available information, 152–153 and depth of processing, 157–161 and distributive justice, 25–26 distributive justice and, 62 duration of, 10–11 and experience sampling, 203–204 implicit, 206–208 implicit experience of, 207–208 implicit regulation of, 208 and inequity in close relationships,€43 interactional justice as cause of, 32 as justice antecedent, 200 justice-relevant cognitions as cause of, 35–37 as mediator of later decisions, 157 and memory nodes, 156

meta-organization of, 11–14 number of component processes,€14–17 and presence/absence of target, 8–10 procedural justice as cause of, 29–30 RCT and, 49–50 referents and justiἀcations, 49–50 relative intensity, 10 sociotemporal cycles, 204 and thoughts about fairness, 61 and three-way justice interactions,€53–54 unconscious differences in, 206 within-person, 203–206 Affect-as-information, 149, 150, 159, 162, 201 and event/entity justice, 153–156 and uncertainty management theory,€151–153 vs. affective priming, 163–164 Affect control theory, 165–166 and discrete emotions, 166 and uncertainty management, 165 Affect cycles, 204 Affect-driven behavior, 26 Affect heuristic, 150 Affect infusion model, 4, 161–162 and modes of information processing, 162–163 Affect intensity, 12, 57, 60, 227 and experiential/rationalistic mindsets, 47 and inequity-affect relationship, 46–47 as moderator of procedural justice effect, 59–60 Affective events theory, 97 305

Subject Index

306 Affective model of justice reasoning, 4, 166–168 Affective priming, 149, 150, 156, 201 critique, 160–161 and justice, 157 and negotiation, 156–157 vs. affect-as-information, 163–164 Affective processes, 15 Aggression, and variable selfesteem,€122 Allocation decisions, 86 Allocator behavior, 71–72 Altruistic behavior and elevation/happiness, 16 empathy and justice sources, 66, 85–86 positive effects on mood, 84 and retaliation, 101 Altruistic punishment, 70, 75–76, 82, 91 cooperation induced by, 103 evidence for, 76–77 and offense size, 101 and rationality of emotion, 77–79 Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers, 1–3 Ambiguity, 153, 201 and emotions of others, 152 and uncertainty management, 151 Anger, 14, 39, 56, 165, 199, 223, 224 appropriate, 80 as basic emotion, 42 in close relationships, 43 and cooperation, 82 and depth of processing, 161 differentiating from fear, 16 discouragement by display rules, 181 expressing during negotiations, 214 and guilt, 43 heuristic processing with, 164 and hostile attributions, 164 inappropriate, 93 and injustice, 17 limits with differential power, 79–80 masking by display rules, 175 and moral mandates, 143 with negative initial appraisal, 166 in negotiations, 79 as norm-enforcing emotion, 214 person-directed, 80–81

physiological manifestations, 4 and risk seeking, 16–17, 164 and underreward conditions, 42 and variable self-esteem, 122 Anxiety, and procedural justice, 27 Apologies, 110 Appraisal processes, 15 Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF),€16, 164 Appropriate anger, 80 Appropriate conduct, 63 Aristotle, 32, 37, 141 on distributive justice, 20–21 on rectiἀcatory justice, 22–23 Arousal, 12 as determinant of emotions, 41 physiological, 36 undifferentiated, 42 unexplained, 40 Associative networks, 201 Attributions, 107–108, 133 external, 126, 127, 133 hostile in anger, 164, 222 Authority independent hypothesis, 112 Autocratic leadership, and inequityaffect relationship, 44–45 Automatic appraisals, 107–109 Autonomic nervous system, 40, 225–226 Autonomy, of moral standards, 112 Autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA), 190 Aversive-arousal reduction, 82, 83 Aversive mood, and systematic processing, 170

B Balance of power, 78 Basic emotions, 39–42, 41, 42 physiological markers, 41 Behavior, emotions and, 14 Behavioral activation system, 221 Behavioral inhibition system, 221 Behavioral mimicry, 211 Behavioral predictions, 224 Belief in a just world, 89 Belongingness needs, 116, 119 effect of respect and, 138 and reputation, 139

Subject Index and response to procedural justice,€134 and voice, 135 Between-person affect, 206 dependence on perspective,€208–209 and implicit affect, 206–208 Bill collectors display rules for, 175 emotional labor tactics, 180 Blame attribution of, 90, 94–96 managing attributions of others,€95–96 of victim vs. perpetrator, 107 Blands, 213 Broadening effect, 170–171 Burnout, 28 among Charismatics and Empathetics, 213 due to emotional labor and display€rules, 178 and lack of reciprocity, 26 Bush, George W., 207 Business beneἀts of display rules in, 176 display rules in, 175

C Capuchin monkeys, 67, 68 Cardiovascular health, 226 Carnegie, Andrew, 1, 2 Carnegie Steel Company, 1–3 Causal attributions, vs. identiἀcation, 9 Chameleon effect, 211 Charismatics, 213 Chicken game, 77 Chimpanzees aversion to inequity, 48 distributive justice among, 19–20 evolutionary psychology and, 67–68 Choice, and referent cognitions theory, 50–51 Churchill effect, 96 Circumplex model, 14, 221 Close relationships, inequity and affect in, 43

307 Cognitive appraisal theory, 4, 5, 33, 35, 36–37, 55, 60, 63–64, 132, 167, 199 and affect intensity, 59–60 Barclay, Skalicki, and Pugh contributions, 58 and justice-emotion interactions,€55–56 of procedural justice, 56–58 summary and critique, 60–61 Tepper’s model, 59 Cognitive capacity, and depth of€processing, 158 Cognitive dissonance, 191 Cognitive-driven behavior, 97–98 Cold War strategy, 78 Collectivist societies, display rules€in,€177 Commitment after downsizing, 140 and justice, 140 procedural justice and, 131–132 Comparative justice, 93–94 Compassion, 145 morality based on, 145 Compensatory justice, vs. retributive justice, 90 Competitors, 45 Complementary emotions,€210, 214–215 Conceptual models, 5 Concessions, emotions and, 81 Conflict escalation, 226 Conflict resolution and mood states, 171 process fairness and, 29 Conservatives, 145 Contempt, 223, 224 Control, 144 expectations of, 136 and goal blockage, 141 and mortality salience, 193, 197 need for, 116 Control model, 116–117, 200, 223 Control theory approach, 118–119 Cooperation anger as stimulus for, 82 maintaining through altruistic punishment, 76, 103

308 Corrective justice, 21 Criminal justice system deterrent value, 78 mortality salience and, 189, 190, 194 Cross-sectional research designs, 205 Cultural anxiety buffer, 174, 187 Cultural worldviews and mortality salience, 187–188 reaffirmation through morality salience, 190 Culture, and injustice perceptions, 227 Customer interactional injustice, 183–184 Customer satisfaction beneἀts of display rules, 176–177 impacts of surface acting, 180 Cycles justice-affect, 206 of moods, 204

D Death. See also Mortality salience; Terror management theory fear of, 187 Deep acting, 178–179, 180, 198 and perspective taking, 185 vs. surface acting, 180–181 Delta game, 72 Denial, and mortality salience, 187 Deontic justice, 104–106, 140, 144 and attributions, 107–108 and automatic appraisals, 107–108 centrality of emotion in, 108–110 and economic irrationality, 108 ἀve characteristics, 107–111 and rapprochement, 110–111 and retributive motive, 108 rule violations and, 141 and third-party effects, 106–107 Deontic state, 107–111 Depression among married couples, 26 and gender, 46 and lack of voice, 29 and procedural justice, 27 and reciprocity, 26 Deprivation theory, 36

Subject Index Depth of processing, 149, 201 affect and, 157 and information processing model,€157–159 miscellaneous affective influences,€159–160 in sadness/regret, 161 Derogation and procedural fairness, 106 of status/power, 92 Descriptive justice, 17–19, 32 Deservingness, assessment of, 106 Dice, 228 Dictator game, 73–74, 75, 105 Difference, 24 Differential power, 79–80 Dignity, 31 Direct access processing, 162 Disappointment, 45 Discontent, 36 Discrete emotions, 48, 62, 113 and affect control, 164 and depth of processing, 160–161 elicitation by events, 55 families of, 14 as justice antecedents, 222 and legal claiming, 54 Disgust, 56, 223, 224 as complement to shame, 109 and harsh judgments, 16 in higher primates, 69 with negative initial appraisal, 166 as norm-enforcing emotion, 214 Display rules, 173–175, 201 beneἀts, 176–178 as business directives, 182 customer satisfaction beneἀts, 176–177 emotion labor due to, 178–181 and employee well-being, 178 employees’ view as unfair, 174 hazards of, 178–181 and injustice perceptions, 182–183 internal harmony and, 177 job performance improvement through, 174

Subject Index perception as unfair, 198 view as unfair, 182 Dispositional affect, 206 Distancing, to avoid association with injustice, 96 Distributive fairness, 4, 154 interaction with procedural justice,€59 Distributive injustice individual responses to, 37 and retaliation, 99 Distributive justice, 18, 19–20, 31, 52, 56, 63, 64, 65, 86, 100 and affect, 25–26, 62 and affect intensity, 46 Aristotle and, 20–23 aversion in animals, 68 in chimpanzees, 19–20 and equity theory, 36 interaction with procedural justice,€53 multiple appraisals and, 64 role of implicit affect in, 207 three-way interactions, 36 Dogs, responses to inequity, 68 Downsizing, observer effects after, 140 Due process, 27 Dynamic justice, 204–206

E Economic harm, 51, 62 Economic irrationality, 108 Economic motives, 88–89 and putamen activation, 209 Economic rationalism, 69, 71, 108 and activation of putamen, 69 in dictator game, 73 in higher primates, 67–68 Efferent feedback, 211, 212 Elevation, 16 Embarassment, 123–124 in harm doers, 218 as norm-obeying emotion, 214 Emergent justice rules, 155 Emotion-driven behavior, 97–98 Emotion hypothesis, ITMC and, 112 Emotional climate, 216

309 Emotional contagion, 16, 177, 210, 211–214 moderator effects, 213 practical implications, 212 predicting by professional occupation, 213 two-stage model, 211 Emotional contagion scale, 213 Emotional exhaustion, 181 and SERF model, 183 Emotional labor, 6, 16, 33, 175, 197, 201 antecedent focused, 180 and beneἀts of display rules, 176–178 and comic relief, 178 critique, 185–186 deἀnitions, 178–179 and display rules, 175, 178–181 due to customer abuse, 185 and hazards of display rules, 174, 178–181 increased burden of, 183–185 and injustice, 183 injustice and, 181–185 job-focused, 179 response focused, 180 tactics, 179–181 vs. emotional expression, 179 Emotional neutrality, 178 Emotional regulation, 6, 173–175, 201 emotional labor and, 175–186 future research directions, 197–198 implications for fairness perceptions,€174 justice effects on, 202 justice implications, 3 and terror management theory, 186–197 in work settings, 174 Emotions, 4, 8, 148 and action tendencies, 17 affective processes, 15 as antecedents of justice perceptions,€147 appraisal processes, 15 and arousal, 40 and behavioral tendencies, 14 Bies and Tripp’s model, 96–100 broadening effect, 170–171

310 as cause of justice perceptions, 164–168 centrality in deontic justice, 108–110 as communication devices, 177 complementary, 214–215 component processes, 148 as criterion variables, 61 distinctive physiology of discrete, 41 duration of, 10–11, 148, 169, 170, 203 effects of physical arousal due to, 170 evolutionary origins, 16 focusing effect, 169–170 future research directions, 168–171 identifying with target stimulus, 8–9 and interpretive meaning, 8 as mediators of behavioral mood effects, 170 meta-organization of, 14, 148 to mood from, 170–171 number of component processes,€14–17 overt action processes, 15–17 persistence of, 10, 11 rationality of, 77–79 relational models and, 137–139 relative intensity, 10, 148 responses to injustice, 2 in revenge psychology, 96–100 structure of, 14 targeting, 80–81, 148 and variations in physiological markets, 41 vs. mood, 10, 42, 148–150 Empathetics, 213 Empathy collision with justice principles, 85–86 and favoritism, 86 in homo sapiens, 66 as reinforcement to justice, 85 Empathy-altruism hypothesis, 82–83, 86–87 and aversive-arousal reduction, 83 and empathy-speciἀc punishment, 83–84 empathy-speciἀc reward and, 84 and motive to punish, 86 and sources of altruism, 85–86 Empathy-speciἀc punishment, 82, 83–84

Subject Index Empathy-speciἀc reward, 83, 84 Employee turnover and SERF model, 183 and surface acting, 181 Employee well-being, display rules and, 178 Employees, as performers, 178 Energy, 221 Engagement, 12 Enteric nervous system, 226 Entity justice, 150, 153–156, 154 affect as cause, 154–155 critique, 155–156 evidence for, 154 interaction with event justice, 156 Envy and abundance effect, 43–44 inequity and, 43–44 Equal basic liberties, 24 Equal opportunity, 24 Equality, 25 of opportunity, 27 Equitable distributions, 25 Equity rule violations, 134 Equity theory, 4, 5, 6, 21, 25, 35, 37–39, 93, 199 and basic emotions, 39–42 as distributive justice model, 36 and fairness, 61–63 and inequity/affect in close relationships, 43 summary and critique, 47–48 and undifferentiated arousal, 39–42 Ethical duty, 104, 142, 145 Ethical philosophers, 18 Event justice, 153–156 critique, 155–156 evidence for, 154 interaction with entity justice, 156 Evolutionary psychology, 66, 68, 87 evidence for moral emotions, 67–68 and payback-seeking, 108 Excitation transfer theory, 40 Expansives, 213 Experience sampling, in study of€affect, 203–204 Experiential mindset, 47, 60

Subject Index Exploitation, in close relationships, 43 External attributions, 127, 133

F Facial expressions detecting lying from, 16 in emotional contagion conditions, 211 and emotional labor theory, 6, 15 hard-wired character of, 15 in higher primates and humans, 69 inconsistent, 6 and intraspecies communication, 5 Facial expressiveness scale, 213 Fair inequalities, 24 Fair play, 62 Fair process effect, 117, 142. See also Process fairness effects of moral mandates on, 142 Fairness, 3, 4, 63 and affect, xiii, 61 East Asian responses to, 145 and emotions, 3 and equity theory, 61–63 influence of moods and emotions on perceptions of, 6 and RCT, 61–63 three-way interactions, 61–63 valuing for own sake, 199 Fairness perceptions, 18 among married partners, 43 Fairness research, 3, 6 Fairness theory, 51 Faking in good faith, 180 Family uncertainty, 119, 120 Favoritism, empathy and, 86 Fear, 14, 56 as basic emotion, 42 differentiating from anger, 16 and injustice, 17 with negative initial appraisal, 167 physiological manifestations, 4 and risk aversion, 16–17, 164 systematic processing in, 164

311 Feeling rules, 175 Five-level model of justice-affect integration, 202–203 between-person affect, 206–209 groups and teams level, 215–216 interpersonal interactions, 209–215 organizational climate level, 216–217 within-person affect, 203–206 Focusing effect, 169–170 Forgiveness, 94, 99, 110, 188–190, 225 Free market economic system, 23 Free riders, 76 Freedom, vs. justice, 23 Frick, Hendry Clay, 1, 2 Frustration, and gender, 46

G Galvanic skin response (GSR), 38 Gender, 48 and emotional contagion, 213 and inequity-affect relationship, 46 General self-esteem, 135 General uncertainty, 119 Goal blockage, 92, 141, 223 Goal salience, 223 Gore, Al, 207 Group emotions, 215 and justice climate, 215–216 and peer justice, 216 Group engagement model, 133, 140 Group harmony, 177 Group identiἀcation, 139 Group standing, 133, 134 Group-value model, 132 Grudges impact of lasting, 11 and retaliation, 97 Guilt, 56, 132, 165, 200 as basic emotion, 42 in close relationships, 53 as complement to resentment, 109 and favorably biased procedures, 57 and imperfect moral obligations, 109 as inward-focused emotion, 130 as norm-obeying emotion, 214 and overreward conditions, 38, 68

312

H Happiness, 16 and heuristic processing, 163 and obedience to authority, 219 person-directed, 81 with positive initial appraisal, 166 and procedural justice, 100 Hate, and gender, 46 Hedonic tone, 12, 13, 14 Helpful behavior, avoiding censure by,€83 Helplessness, and retaliation, 97 Hermits, xiv–xv Heuristic processing, 162 in ambiguous/uncertain situations,€152 in anger, 161, 164 discrete emotions and, 161 in happy individuals, 163 with lack of cognitive capacity, 163 in positive moods, 150, 158 High referents, 49, 50 High self-esteem procedural justice effects and, 118 and self-veriἀcation theory, 129 and voice, 120, 121, 135 Historical approach, 4, 5 Homestead Steel case, 1–2, 228 Hostility discouragement by display rules, 181 usefulness in negotiations, 79 Hot cognitive processes, 227 Hot emotional states, 90, 97 Hurt, and gender, 46 Hypothetical persons, xiv, xv

I Ideal self, 122 Identiἀability conditions, 139 Impartiality, 23 Imperfect duties, 109 Implicit affect, 202, 206–209 political persuasion example, 207 role in distributive justice, 207 Impression management, 84 Impulsive decision makers, 74 Inappropriate anger, 93

Subject Index Independent self-construal, 227 Indignation as complement to shame, 109–110 as norm-enforcing emotion, 214 Individual empowerment, 27 Individualistic societies, emotional expression in, 177 Inequity and activation of insula cortex, 69 and affect in close relationships, 42 brain processing of, 75 dogs’ responses to, 68 and envy, 43–44 and galvanic skin response, 38 higher primates’ responses to, 69 moderators of relationship to affect, 44–47 Inequity-affect relationship affect intensity and, 46–47 autocratic leadership and, 44–45 gender and, 46 moderators, 44 power standing and, 46 social value orientation and, 45–46 Information processing model, 4, 158, 160 and justice perceptions, 158–159 modes of information processing, 162–163 Informational justice, 18, 31–32, 49, 52, 95 distancing and, 96 Ingroup behavior, terror management and, 187–188 Initial appraisal, 166 Injustice as abnormal state, 220–221 association with discrete emotions, 56 and damage to self-esteem, 134 and difficulties in emotional regulation, 174 and discontent, 36 and emotional labor, 181–185 emotional responses to, 2 and fear/anger, 17 goal salience and responses to, 223

Subject Index and increased burden of emotional labor, 183–185 internal consequences, 225–226 and lowered self-esteem, 133–135 nonaction responses to, 224–225 and nonconformance to display rules, 182 and self-affirmation, 129 self-esteem raised by, 125–126, 126–128 transformation of mood to emotion in, 169 victim’s affect as cause of, 219–220 Injustice judgments, 221 Injustice perceptions display rules and, 182–183 and negative mood, 169 Insomnia, as consequence of injustice, 225 Insula cortex, 69, 113, 209 Integrated theory of moral convictions (ITMC), 111–112 and emotion hypothesis, 112 Integrity, 125 Intellectual blindsight, xiii Intensity of mood vs. emotion, 10 and retaliation, 97 Interaction-by-outcome effect, 52 Interactional fairness, 31–32, 106, 220 promotion by empathy, 218 vs. procedural fairness, 30 Interactional injustice, 73, 184, 219 and retaliation, 99 Interactional justice, 5, 18, 30–31, 32, 51, 52, 64, 98, 100, 154 as cause of affect, 32 and empathy, 85 and inforrmational justice, 31–32 and interactional fairness, 31–32 and interpersonal justice, 31–32 lack of philosophical roots, 30 and managing attributions, 95–96 and outcome favorability, 64 three-way interactions, 36 Interactional justice climate, 216 Interactions, among three types of justice, 52–54 Interactive decision making, 70–71, 87

313 and altruistic punishment, 75–79 evidence in negotiation literature, 79–81 in ultimatum bargaining game (UBG), 71–75 Interdependent self-construal, 133, 227 Interest, as basic emotion, 42 Interpersonal conflict, 202 Interpersonal emotions, 210 Interpersonal interactions, 209–210 and complementary emotions, 214–215 and emotional contagion, 211–214 social functional perspective, 210–211 Interpersonal justice, 18, 31–32, 52, 95 Intimidation, and power, 79 Intrapersonal emotions, 210 Intraunit justice, 215 Intrinsic motivation, 29 Involuntary rectiἀcation, 20, 22 Inward-focused emotions, 58, 130

J Job performance, 16 beneἀts of display rules for, 176 reductions due to display rules, 178 Joy, 14 as basic emotion, 42 Justice, 17–19, 67 affect as antecedent to, 200 and affective priming, 157 Aristotle and distributive, 20–23 and cognitive appraisals, 55–56 as cognitive evaluation, 17 cognitive vs. affective determinants, 227 collision with empathy, 85–86 and commitment, 140 comparative and noncomparative standards, 93–94 control motive, 117 correlation with emotions, 147 dependence on perspective, 208–209 descriptive theories of, 17, 18 distributive, 19–20 and affect, 25–26 dynamic, 204–206

Subject Index

314 and emotional regulation, 174 interactional, 30–32 and moral emotions, 65–67 and mortality salience, 192 neuroscience of, 69–70 as non-intrinsic value, 65 as normal state, 220–221 normative tradition, 18 procedural, 27–30 and Rawl’s original position, 23–25 reasons for caring about, 116 reciprocal relationship with feeling states, 147 rectiἀcatory, 22–23 and regulatory focus theory, 123–124 reinforcement by empathy, 85 relational models and social self, 132–141, 200 self-theories of, 6 as source of altruistic behavior, 85 Tepper’s cognitive appraisal model,€59 and terror management, 191–193 time dimensions, 204–206 uncertainty management and, 151 as virtue, 141 vs. freedom, 23 working deἀnition, 149 Justice-affect cycles, 206 Justice-affect integration, xv, 3, 4, 7, 35, 199, 220–224 affect as injustice antecedent, 222–223 and discrete motives/emotions, 223–224 ἀve-level model, 202–217 self and, 115–116 time dimensions, 205 Justice climate, 215–216 Justice judgments, 2, 221 and escalating revenge, 226–227 new antecedents, 218–220 and proactive justice, 218–219 understudied consequences of, 224–227 understudied moderators, 227–228 and victim’s affect, 219–220 Justice literature omissions, xiv, 217–218

integrating justice and affect, 220–224 new antecedents to justice judgments, 218–220 proactive justice, 218–219 understudied consequences of justice judgments, 224–227 Justice motive, 66, 87–88, 199 and beneἀts of retribution, 88 and economic motives, 88–89 Justice perceptions, 18 affect control theory, 165–166 affective influences on, 159–160 affective model of justice reasoning, 166–168 and affective states, 33 change over time, 204–205 emotion as cause of, 164–168 and emotions, 173 as hot cognitive processes, 227 impact of moods and emotions on, 222 influence of conscious affect on, 7 information processing and, 158–159 mood and emotion antecedents, 147 and negative mood, 169 Justice-relevant cognitions and Adams’ equity theory, 37–48 affect and three-way interactions, 53–54 as cause of affect, 35–37 cognitive appraisal theory, 55–61, 63–64 fairness tradition, 61–63 future research directions, 61–64 and interactions among justice types, 52–54 referent cognitions theory (RCT), 49–51 three-way interactions, 35, 36, 52–53 two-way interactions, 52–53

K Kant, Immanuel, 109

Subject Index

L Law breaking, and affect intensity, 60 Law of proportions, 21 Legal claiming study, 54 injustice and, 93 and sparking event, 92–93 Legitimacy, and systemic justice perceptions, 217 Liberals, 145 Litigation, mediators of, 54 Loneliness, and social identity motives,€223 Love, 14 as basic emotion, 42 Low referents, 49, 50 Low self-esteem procedural justice and, 118 and self-veriἀcation theory, 129 and uncertainty, 120

M Marital discord, and justice perceptions,€43 Meaning in face of mortality salience, 194 search for, 196–197 and terror management, 187 Meaning analysis, 55 Memory nodes, 156 Mirror neurons, 211–212 Mood, 4, 8, 148 as antecedent of justice perceptions,€147 component processes, 148 and cooperative/contentious tactics,€157 cyclic entraining, 204 duration of, 10–11, 203 focusing effect, 169–170 future research directions, 168–171 and heuristic decision making, 150 impact on justice perceptions,€149 as informational cue, 163 and memory nodes, 156

315 meta-organization of, 11–14, 148 number of component processes, 14–17 and processing strategy, 163 relative intensity, 10 structure of, 14 vs. emotions, 10, 42, 148–150 Mood-as-information, 158, 159 Mood maintenance/repair, 158 Moral cleansing, 208 Moral convictions, 199 and liberal/conservative divisions,€145 vs. preferences, 112–113 Moral emotions, 6, 63, 214, 215 basic research, 67–70 and deontic justice, 104–111 discrete, 63 empathy-altruism hypothesis and, 82–87 evolutionary psychology of, 67–68 future research directions, 113–114 in homo sapiens vs. other primates, 68–69 integrated theory of moral convictions, 111–113 interactive decision making and, 70–82 justice and, 65–67 justice motive and, 87–89 as mediator between blame and retaliation, 109 and neuroscience of justice, 69–70 primatology research and, 67–68 and revenge psychology, 89–104 universal egoism and, 87 Moral hypocrisy, 84 Moral identity, 104–106, 145 Moral judgments, 33 effect of cleanliness, 208 Moral mandate effect, 142–143 critique, 143 Moral maturity, 105 Moral meaning, need for, 116 Moral outrage, 8, 113, 142 Moral self, 141–142 and moral mandate effect,€142–143

Subject Index

316 Moral standards, violation of, 64 Moral violations, 224 Moral wrongs, 51 Moralized narcissism, 86 Mortality salience, 6, 20, 186, 210 and consciousness, 196 and criminal punishment, 189 effect on cultural worldviews, 188 and justice perceptions, 192 links to uncertainty management,€195 and PANAS scale, 189 and search for meaning, 196–197 and self-threat, 192–193 and terror management, 192–193 and voice, 192 Motivated processing, 162, 167 Multilevel analysis, 202, 203 Multiple needs model, 115, 125, 144, 200 Mutually assured destruction (MAD), 78

N Narcissists, xiv National identity, and mortality salience, 188 Need, 25 Need for control, 116 Negative affect, 13, 14, 53, 221 as implicit affect, 202 inequity and, 48 and retaliatory behaviors, 53, 99 and submissive/provocative victims,€220 trait-based, 53 Negative emotions, 17, 45 and depth of processing, 161 discouragement through display rules, 177 interaction of process and outcomes in, 28 links to speciἀc actions, 17 in negotiations, 79 perception by bystanders, 184 processing in insula, 209 and self-affirmation, 130–131 shared, 177

Negative mood, 169 impacts on negotiations, 170 performance advantages, 160 and systematic information processing, 158 Negative word of mouth, 98 Negotiation, 70, 79 affective priming and, 156–157 appropriate anger, 80 complementary emotions and, 214 differential power and limits of anger,€79–80 emotional contagion in, 212 impact of bad mood on, 170 targeting emotions, 80–81 Neuroscience, justice and, 69–70 Neutrality, vs. empathy, 86 Nichomachean Ethics, 20, 37 Nonaction, as response to injustice, 224–225 Noncomparative justice, 93–94 Norm-enforcing emotions, 214 Norm-obeying emotions, 214 Normative justice, 18, 19, 32, 223

O Obedience to authority experiments, 218–219 Objectivity, of moral standards, 111–112 Observer effects, 152 relational models and, 139–140 Obsession, and retaliation, 97 Organizational climate, 216–217 Organizational justice, 5, 21, 55 Organizational politics, 202 Organizational psychology, 129 Organizational retaliatory behavior, 53 Original position, 23–25 Ought self, 122 Outcome distributions, 20 and social comparisons, 38 Outcome fairness, 19 Outcome favorability, 19 and procedural justice, 58, 64 Outcome judgments, 127 Outcome-to-investment ratio, 25

Subject Index Outward-focused emotions, 58, 130 Overall justice, 154 Overreward conditions, 38, 39 higher primate insensitivity to, 68, 69 human responses to, 68 speciἀc emotions associated with, 42

P Parasympathetic nervous system, 169, 225–226 Participation, 27 Passions, and commitment to action, 77 Payback, seeking, 108 Peer justice, 215, 216 Penalization, 66 Perfect duties, 109 Person-directed anger, 80–81 Person-directed happiness, 81 Personality and affect intensity, 46 and response to unfair treatment, 98–99 Perspective taking, 185 reduced negative emotions with, 186 Physical arousal, due to emotions, 170 Physical symptoms, affective components, 8 Physiological arousal, 36 and variations in emotional states, 41 Plato, 141 Poetic justice, 101 Political persuasion, 207 Political philosophy, procedural justice and, 27–28 Positive affect, 13, 14, 221 impact on retaliation, 99–100 and intrinsic motivation, 29 Positive Affectivity and Negative Affectivity Schedule (PANAS),€13 Positive emotions, 17, 225 and increased customer satisfaction,€177 in negotiations, 79 and obedience to authority, 219

317 Positive mood, and heuristic processing, 158 Power standing and inequity-affect relationship, 46 and limits of anger, 79–80 Predictability, 119, 151 Preferences, vs. moral convictions, 112–113 Prevention focus, 122, 123 with unfavorable outcome and fair process, 124 Pride, 57, 58 Primary appraisal, 55, 64 Primates aversion to unfair treatment in, 6 moral emotions in, 68–69 Primatology, 66 evidence for moral emotions, 67–68 Private self-consciousness, 130 Proactive justice, 218–219 Procedural injustice and job loss perceptions, 48 moderation of emotions in unfavorable outcomes, 59 and morality based on compassion, 145–146 physiological responses to, 36 three-way interactions, 36 Procedural justice, 5, 18, 19, 24, 27, 29, 31, 52, 61, 63, 64, 92, 94, 98, 106, 116, 140, 154, 183 affect intensity as moderator, 59–60 Barclay, Skarlicki, and Pugh contributions, 58 as cause of affect, 29–30 cognitive appraisal theory of, 56–58 and commitment, 131–132 and display rules, 182 early social science research, 28–29 emotions produced by, 56 foundations in political philosophy, 27–28 and happiness, 100 interaction with distributive justice, 53, 59 interaction with rewarding leadership, 128 and outcome favorability, 58 and RCT, 49

318 and retaliation, 124 and self-esteem, 118 voice and, 118 Procedural justice climate, 216 Procedural justiἀcation, 50 Process-by-outcome interaction, 27, 28, 50, 52, 123 Process fairness, 5, 27, 117 and affective states, 100 mitigation of negative reactions by,€28 and prevention focus, 124 self-enhancement and impact of, 128–129 Promotion focus, 122, 123, 124 and likelihood of stealing, 124 Proportion, Aristotle’s law of, 21 Proportional allocation, 22 Proselfs, 45 and UBG allocator behaviors, 72 Prosocials, 45, 46, 75 motivations for, 82–83 and UBG allocator behaviors, 72 Provision of information, 31 Psychometrics, 12 Psychopaths, xiv Punishment, 22, 66, 188–190 as deterrent, 89 empathy and motives for, 86 mortality salience effects, 189–190, 193, 194 Putamen, 114, 209 activation by economic efficiency, 69

R Racism, 208 Rapprochement, 110–111 Rationalistic mindset, 47, 60 Rationalists, xv Rawls, John, 23–25 Reactive justice, 218 Recipient behaviors, in UBG, 73–74 Reciprocity, 25 and absenteeism, 26 and depression, 26 Reconciliation, 94

Subject Index Rectiἀcatory justice, 20, 21, 22–23 Referent cognitions theory, 5, 6, 35, 49, 62, 199 and affect, 49–50 and choice, 50–51 and fairness, 61–63 summary and critique, 51 Referents and choice, 50–51 and justiἀcations, 49–50 in over- and underreward conditions,€39 Reflective decision makers, 74 Regret, depth of processing in, 161 Regulatory focus theory, 122–125, 123 critique, 124–125 justice and, 123–124 Relational models, 4, 134, 200 of authority, 132 critique, 140–141 emotion and, 137–139 observer effects and, 139–140 social self and, 132–133 Relative deprivation theory, 35, 36 Relative power, 46 Repurchase intentions, 98 Reputation, concern for, 139 Resentment, 48 as complement to guilt, 109 and gender, 46 injustice and, 36 Respect, 31, 137 and concern for justice, 116 and high vs. low self-esteem, 136 Responsibility attributions, 56 Restorative justice, 114 Retaliatory behavior, 53, 66, 225 and altruism, 101 as economically suboptimal, 71 as effective deterrent, 71 impact of positive affect on, 99–100 in kind, 102 poetic justice and, 101 procedural fairness and, 124 prosocial beneἀts, 103 and revenge psychology, 100–102

Subject Index and symmetry of consequences, 102 and symmetry of methods, 102 and trait-anger, 99 against whistle-blowers, 76–77 Retribution, 11, 16, 66, 113, 169 beneἀts of, 88 morality of, 104 as motive in deontic justice, 108 Retributive justice, 22 revenge and, 89–91 vs. compensatory justice, 90 Revenge, 11, 22, 66, 113, 124, 169, 225 blame and, 94 consequences of, 102–104 escalation of, 226–227 heuristic model, 90 prosocial beneἀts, 103 restoration of justice by, 103 and retributive justice, 89–91 Revenge psychology, 89 attribution of blame, 94–96 and consequences of revenge, 102–104 emotion in, 96–100 nature of retaliation in, 100–102 sparking event, 92–94 Reward allocation and equity theory, 48 reactions in higher primates, 67–68 Rewarding leadership and increased impact of fair procedures, 133 interaction with procedural justice, 128 Risk aversion, fear/anger and, 16–17 Risk seeking, fear/anger and, 16–17 Robin Hoodism, 106 Rule violations, 92, 141 Rumination, 97

S Sadness, 14, 56 as basic emotion, 42 depth of processing in, 161 gender and, 46 masking by display rules, 175 and social identity motives, 223

319 Secondary appraisal, 55, 57, 59, 64 Self control model and, 116–117 control theory and, 118–119 future research directions,€143–146 ideal vs. ought, 122 and justice-affect relationships,€115–116 moral, 141–143 positive self-image maintenance, 125–132 regulatory focus theory and, 122–125 self-enhancement effect, 126–128 social self, 132–141 and uncertainty management, 120 uncertainty management and, 119–122 Self-affirmation, 125 reduced negative affect with, 129 Self-concept, 115, 121, 144 uncertainty threats to, 120 virtue as part of, 116 Self-consistency, 125–126, 129 Self-efficacy, 125 reductions with fair procedures, 126 Self-enhancement effect, 116, 125 critique, 132 evidence for, 126–128 and impact of fair processes, 128–129 injustice and, 126 Self-esteem, 115, 200, 223, 225 attributional model, 128 effects of denied voice on, 134 enhancement by injustice, 126–128 injustice and lowered, 133–135 and justice, 121 level of, 121 maintenance or enhancement, 136 as moderator of affect intensity, 47 procedural justice and, 118 social, 135 and TMT, 187 variability of, 121, 122 Self-evaluation, 125–126 as moderators, 135–137 Self-gain, 65 Self-goals, 122

Subject Index

320 Self-identity, 115 multiple types of, 144 Self-image, 115 behaving in accordance with, 6 maintaining positive, 125–132 Self-interest, 4, 66, 87 in chimpanzees vs. homo sapiens, 20 as non-sole driver of behavior, 73 Self-standards, 122 Self-system, 60 Self-uncertainty, moderating effects, 137 Self-veriἀcation, 125, 131, 136 Sense-making, 55, 57 Service emotion rule fairness (SERF), 182–183, 206 Service industries abuse from customers, 183–184, 185 display rules in, 175, 179 regulation of emotions by, 177 Service quality, and emotional contagion, 212 Shame, 56, 132, 200 as complement to disgust/ indignation, 109–110 in harm doers, 218 as inward-focused emotion, 130 as norm-obeying emotion, 214 in whistle-blowers, 110 Smith, Adam, 65 Social contract, 23 Social exchange theory, 23 Social functional perspective, 210–211 Social identity, 223 maintaining, 6 Social justice, and abundance effect, 44 Social motive, 134 Social responsibility, 72 Social science research, on procedural justice, 28–29 Social self, 116, 132–133 and lowered self-esteem, 133–135 Social self-esteem, 135, 136 confusion over moderating effects, 135–137 effects of low, 135 Social standing, 134, 141 and goal blockage, 141 Social uncertainty, 119

Social value orientation, and inequityaffect relationship, 45–46 Sociotemporal cycles, 204 Somatic-marker hypothesis, 150 Sparking event, 90, 92 comparative and noncomparative standards, 93–94 heuristic model, 92–93 Spiteful behavior, 70, 78, 200 Starbucks Coffee Company, display rules, 177 State-anger, 54 Status derogation, 141 Stranger uncertainty, 120 Substantive processing, 162, 167 with aversive mood states, 170 in fear states, 164 mood effects on, 163 Surface acting, 178–179, 180 and customer-based injustice, 184 vs. deep acting, 180–181 Surprise, 14 as basic emotion, 42 Sympathetic nervous system, 225–226 Sympathy, as recent evolution, 70 Systemic justice, 217

T Target and affect, 8–10 emotion links to, 148 Team dynamics emotion sharing in, 215 and emotional contagion, 212 Tension, 221 Terror, 201 and retaliation, 97 Terror management theory, 6, 7, 33, 173–175, 174, 186–187, 201, 208 affective drivers in, 190–191 and emotional regulation, 175 and forgiveness, 188–190 and ingroup behavior, 187–188 and justice, 191–193 and mortality salience, 192–193, 197 and punishment, 188–190

Subject Index and self-threat, 192–193 vs. uncertainty management theory, 193–195 Themes, 3–5 Themis, 228 Theory of Justice, A, 23, 27 Theory of procedure, 28 Third-party effects, 98, 106–107 Thought accessibility, 159 Time, change of justice perceptions over,€204–205 Trait-anger, 54 and retaliation, 99 Trait hostility, 99 Trait-negative affect, 53 Transcendent meaning, 116

U Ultimatum bargaining game, 70, 71, 105, 113 allocator behavior in, 71–72 critique, 74–75 recipient behaviors, 73–74 time considerations, 205 and wounded pride/spite model, 73–74 Uncertainty, xiii, 227 general, 119 social, 119 Uncertainty management theory, 24, 119–120, 200 and affect-as-information, 151–153 critique, 121–122, 152–153 emphasis on mood states, 166 and experience of others, 152 and justice, 151 and search for meaning, 195–197 self and, 120 vs. terror management theory, 193–195 Underreward conditions, 38, 39 and anger, 42 aversive responses in higher primates, 68, 70 in close relationships, 43 speciἀc emotions associated with, 42 Undifferentiated arousal, 39–42, 40 Unfair outcomes, 108

321 Unfavorable bias, 57 Unfavorable outcomes effects on self-esteem, 128 procedural justice as moderator of€emotions with, 59 and self-enhancement effects, 127 and unfair procedures, 124 voice and acceptance of, 29 Universal egoism, 66, 86, 87 Universality, of moral standards, 111

V Veil of ignorance, 24, 25 Vengeance, 66 Victim blaming, 107 Victim characteristics, 219 Victim perspective, 218 Victims provocative, 220 submissive, 219 Victim’s affect, 219–220 Virtue, 141, 145 and self-concept, 116 Voice, 29, 106, 134 in ambiguous situations, 151 and belongingness needs, 135 denial of, 60 and depression, 29 effects of denied on selfesteem, 134 mood and, 151 and mortality salience, 192, 198 and procedural fairness, 118 and process fairness, 117 and self-esteem, 118, 120, 121 Voluntary absenteeism, 26 Voluntary rectiἀcation, 20, 23

W Well-being adverse effects of surface acting, 181 employees, 178 importance of emotional regulation for, 173 Whistle-blowers moralized narcissism in, 86

322 retaliation against, 76 shame as motivation for, 110 Within-person affect, 203–206 and dynamic justice, 204–206 experience sampling and, 203–204 Workplace fairness, 47–48

Subject Index Workplace victimization, 219 World Trade Center attacks, 190 Would/could/should assessment, 107,€108 Wounded pride/spite model, 73–74 Wrongful termination, 91