Shield of the Great Leader

The Armed Forces of Asia Series editors: Professor Desmond Ball, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian Natio...

Author: Joseph S. Bermudez

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The Armed Forces of Asia Series editors: Professor Desmond Ball, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University This groundbreaking series is the first to examine the military capabilities of nations in Asia. Spanning the arc from Pakistan in the west to the Russian Far East in the north, each book provides a succinct survey of each service of the armed forces, including territorial and paramilitary formations. Written by military and defence strategy experts from around the world, the books assess the role of the armed forces in relation to national defence and security policy, and their social, political and economic functions. Up-to-the-minute research is drawn upon to present, in many cases, the first unclassified accounts of nations’ defensive and offensive capabilities, as well as the ambitions of sectors within the armed forces establishments.

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92 CHANDOS STREET ST LEONARDS NSW 2065

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The Armed Forces of Asia series You Ji James Rolfe Greg Austin & Alexey D. Muraviev Stanley Weeks & Charles Meconis

China New Zealand Russia in Asia The USA in the Asia-Pacific Region

Forthcoming titles Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema Tim Huxley

Pakistan Singapore

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SHIELD OF THE GREAT LEADER THE ARMED FORCES OF NORTH KOREA JOSEPH S. BERMUDEZ JR

ALLEN & UNWIN




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To my daughter Rebecca—the Butterfly Sparkle Princess

First published in 2001 Copyright © Joseph S. Bermudez Jr 2001 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system without prior permission in writing from the publisher. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 (the Act) allows a maximum of one chapter or 10% of this book, whichever is the greater, to be photocopied by any educational institution for its educational purposes provided that the educational insitution (or body that administers it) has given a remuneration notice to Copyright Agency Limited (CAL) under the Act. Allen & Unwin 9 Atchison Street St Leonards NSW 2065 Australia Phone: (61 2) 8425 0100 Fax: (61 2) 9906 2218 Email: [email protected] Web: http://www.allenandunwin.com National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry: Bermudez Jr, Joseph S. Shield of the great leader: the armed forces of North Korea. Bibliography. Includes index. ISBN 1 86448 582 5. 1. Korea (North)—Armed Forces. 2. Korea (North)—Defenses. 3. Korea (North)—Military policy. I. Title. (Series: Armed forces of Asia). 355.0095193 Set in 10/12 pt TrumpMediaeval by DOCUPRO, Sydney Printed by SRM Production Services Sdn Bhd, Malaysia 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1




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Contents HE RMED ORCES OF ORTH OREA

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Tables, figures and maps Glossary of abbreviations and acronyms Preface 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Overview Command and control Korean People’s Army ground forces Korean People’s Navy Command Korean People’s Air and Air Defence Command Paramilitary and reserve forces Intelligence and internal security services Weapons of mass destruction Ballistic missiles

Appendix: Order of battle Notes Bibliography Index

vi ix xiii 1 20 56 92 123 161 177 212 236 292 295 338 364

v




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Tables, figures and maps ABLES FIGURES AND MAPS

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TABLES 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6

Nuclear–chemical defence battalions Tanks and armoured fighting vehicles Self-propelled artillery and multiple rocket launchers Missiles Special operations brigades and reconnaissance battalions Known KPN bases KPN anti-ship cruise missiles KPN coastal defence missiles KPAF regiments KPAF airfields KPAF highway strips KPAF heliports/helipads KPAF airfields—abandoned, unusable or status unknown KPAF accidents, 1996 KPAF aircraft strength Radars in KPAF inventory 5.7 m class SSm, Imjin River, 1965 41 m class SSAG, mid-1970s Sea Horse II civilian research submarine P4 (YUGO) class SSm, Sokch’o 1998 SANG-O class SSc (reconnaissance version), Kangnung 1996 SP–10H semi-submersible infiltration landing craft (SILE)

39 50 51 52 79 99 107 115 129 133 135 135 138 146 148 155 185 185 186 187 188 188

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T ABLES , FIGURES AND MAPS

7.7 7.8 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5

Improved SP–10H semi-submersible infiltration landing craft (I-SILE) SBS–2 swimmer delivery vehicle DPRK nuclear-related facilities DPRK chemical warfare facilities Chemical weapons research organisations Chemical weapons storage facilities Biological warfare related facilities FROG artillery rocket characteristics Ballistic missile target/range requirements Missile characteristics Missile production facilities Ballistic missile bases

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189 190 218 225 227 228 234 244 256 276 284 289

FIGURES 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.2 5.1 5.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 8.1 8.2

KPA command and control (simplified) Korean Workers’ Party Ministry of People’s Armed Forces Second Economic Committee Infantry corps (forward) Infantry corps (rear) Infantry/motorised infantry division Mechanised corps 820th Tank Corps Yu Kyong-su 105th Seoul Guards Tank Division Artillery corps P’yongyang Defence Command P’yongyang Anti-aircraft Artillery Command KPN organisation KPN naval staff KPAF organisation KPAF air staff Reconnaissance Bureau State Security Department Ministry of Public Security Director of Security, MPS Director for Safety, MPS DPRK nuclear infrastructure DPRK chemical weapons production infrastructure




21 24 28 48 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 78 94 96 124 126 193 201 205 206 208 214 224

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8.3 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6

DPRK biological weapons production infrastructure Luna–2 (FROG–5)/Luna–M (FROG–7) battalion Hwasong 5/6 regiment (postulated) No-dong battalion (postulated) Ballistic missile division (postulated) Taep’o-dong 1/2 battalion (postulated) DPRK ballistic missile infrastructure

232 243 259 268 269 283 287

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea KPA corps order of battle KPN shore establishment KPAF order of battle KPAF airfields and highway strips KPAF heliports/helipads KPAF redeployments, 1995–97 Onch’on-up Airfield Border security order of battle Coastal security order of battle DPRK nuclear facilities Chemical weapons related facilities Ballistic missile related locations

2 58 100 132 136 137 139 141 174 175 217 230 290

MAPS 1.1 3.1 4.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 6.1 6.2 8.1 8.2 9.1




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Glossary of abbreviations and acronyms LOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

G

AAA AAM AC AFV AGI AGS aka ASM ASW ATGM

anti-aircraft artillery air-to-air missile hydrogen cyanide (chemical agent) armoured fighting vehicle auxiliary, general, intelligence (intelligence collection ship) auxiliary, general, survey (research or survey ship) also known as air-to-surface missile anti-submarine warfare anti-tank guided missile

BW

biological warfare

CBW CCSKA

chemical, biological warfare Central Committee Secretary in Charge of South Korean Affairs CEP circular error of probability CG phosgene (chemical agent) command, control, communication and intelligence C3I CN chloroacetophenone (chemical agent) COMSEC communications secretary CS chlorobenzyliidene malononitrile (chemical agent) CW chemical warfare CX phosgene oxime dichloroformoxine (chemical agent) DF DF DM DMZ

Dong Feng (East Wind) methylphosphonic difluoride (chemical agent) Adamsite (chemical agent) Demilitarised Zone ix




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DPRK

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

ECM ESM EW EW

electronic countermeasures electronic support measures early warning (radar) electronic warfare

FBIS FF FFL FOIA FROG FRP

Foreign Broadcast Information Service fast frigate fast frigate, light Freedom of Information Act free rocket over ground fibre resin plastic

GA GB GCI GF GPS

tabun (chemical agent) sarin (chemical agent) ground control intercept (radar) cyclohexyl methyl phosphonofluoridate (chemical agent) global positioning system

H HD HE HJ HN HQ HY

sulfur-mustard (chemical agent) distilled mustard (chemical agent) high explosive Hong Jian (Red Arrow) Hong Nu (Red Cherry) Hong Qian (Red Leader) Hai Ying (Sea Eagle)

IAEA ICBM IOC IW

International Atomic Energy Agency intercontinental ballistic missile initial operational capability information warfare

KEDO KPA KPAF KPN KSYL KWP

Korean Energy Development Organisation Korean People’s Army Korean People’s Air Force Korean People’s Navy Kim Il-song Socialist Youth League Korean Workers’ Party

LCPA LCPF LEO LSM

landing craft, personal, air-cushion landing craft, personal, fast low earth orbit landing ship, medium

MAD

Military Affairs Department




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G LOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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MEL MIW MPAF MRL MST MWe MWt

mobile–erector–launcher mine warfare Ministry of People’s Armed Forces multiple rocket launcher Ministry of Sea Transportation megawatts electric megawatts thermal

NBC NCO NKPA nm

nuclear, biological and chemical warfare non-commissioned officer North Korean People’s Army (also KPA) nautical mile

OPSEC

operations secretary

PAAC PB PC PG POL PRC PT PTG PTH

P’yongyang Anti-aircraft Artillery patrol boat patrol craft patrol gunboat petrol, oil and lubricants People’s Republic of China patrol boat, torpedo patrol boat, guided missile patrol boat, hydrofoil

ROK ROKAF RYG

Republic of Korea Republic of Korea Air Force Red Youth Guard

SAM SDV SIGINT SLBM SLV SP SSAG SSc SSm SSM STOL SUPARCO SY

surface-to-air missile swimmer delivery vehicle signals intelligence submarine-launched ballistic missile space launch vehicle self-propelled submarine, auxiliary (research) submarine, coastal submarine, midget surface-to-surface missile short take-off and landing Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (Pakistan) Shui Ying (Water Eagle)

TA TEL

target acquisition (radar) transporter–erector–launcher




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UAE UAV UNC UNSCOM US USAF

United Arab Emirates unmanned aerial vehicle United Nations Command United Nations Special Commission on Iraq United States United States Air Force

VM VSTOL VX

ethyl methylphosphonothodate (chemical agent) very short take-off and landing ethyl methylphosphonothioate (chemical agent)

WMD WPRG WPB* WPBH* WPC*

weapons of mass destruction Workers’–Peasants’ Red Guard coast guard, patrol boat coast guard, patrol boat, hydrofoil coast guard, patrol craft

*

The ‘w’ prefix in western nomenclature indicates coast guard or similar civil organisation. In many countries this would equate to either a naval militia or other coastal maritime enforcement agency.




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Preface REFACE

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The book is a first attempt to compile, analyse and process the open source information available concerning one of the world’s largest armed forces—the Korean People’s Army (KPA)—as it stands today. To this I have been extremely fortunate in being able to add a significant body of information not generally available to the public. This information consists of: declassified intelligence reports; interviews with defectors, diplomats, intelligence personnel, soldiers and officers from around the world; and personal experience. It is my hope that this has resulted in a unique and informative book which will serve the reader well and provide the basis for future research on the subject. Accuracy in any work dealing with the Korean People’s Army is a matter of relatives. Inevitably a certain amount of the information in this volume will be incorrect. Other material may be misinformation, disseminated by interested parties to serve their own purposes. The catch words probably, estimated, are believed to and apparently must appear frequently in any work of this type. Additionally, limitations of space have necessitated that much information regarding the overseas operations of the KPA, the activities of the intelligence and internal security services, historical developments, and equipment details has been excluded. For any and all errors I alone am responsible and I ask the readers’ indulgence and understanding. A number of conventions have been used to increase the accuracy, improve the readability of the book, and to address specific requests of readers. I have endeavored to use the abbreviation DPRK to represent the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea instead of the more popular North Korea. The term Korean People’s Army is used to represent the Choson Inmingun, and the xiii




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T HE A RMED F ORCES OF NORTH K OREA

more common North Korean People’s Army (NKPA). The term Fatherland Liberation War is used by the KPA, and in this book, instead of the more popular Korean Conflict or Korean War. The term enemy normally refers to an enemy of the KPA, typically the Republic of Korea (ROK), the United States, and their respective armies. This should not be interpreted as saying that these are the KPA’s only potential opponents; they are not. This is especially true considering the KPA’s commitments to operations in the developing world. I am most frequently asked about the organisation of the KPA and the DPRK’s intelligence services and how they relate to each other. Because of this I have emphasised these aspects in the book and have produced charts and tables which should address readers’ requests for information. A confusing component concerning these organisational questions is both the DPRK’s use of different names for the same organisations and the way in which those names are translated. Therefore, whenever possible, I have attempted to resolve this confusion by using the ‘also known as’ (aka) convention to relate these alternate names. Finally, geographic names are rendered using Korean names in the commonly accepted format of city/town, province/special district, or city/town, county, province/special district. I have not used the English words ‘province’, ‘county’, or ‘special district’ since the suffixes of ‘-do’ (or ‘-to’), ‘-gun’ and ‘-si’ respectively correspond to these terms. Very few books are the product of one person and this present volume is most certainly no exception. Had it not been for the contributions and support of many people and organisations, many of whom must remain anonymous, this volume would have been a mere shadow of its present self. First, I would like to thank Professor Desmond Ball and Air Marshal Ray Funnell for inviting me to be part of their seminal Armed Forces of Asia project and being patient with me as I prepared this book. The people at Allen & Unwin, especially Ann Crabb, John Iremonger and Karen Penning have also been extremely patient and gracious as the writing and re-writing of this book have taken far too long. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to: Jeff Baker; Anna Bermudez (my mother); E. Ben Benavides; Seth and Noreen Carus for their friendship, encouragement, assistance and generosity in allowing me to stay at the Carus Bed & Breakfast; Jonathan Clemente; James R. Dennis; Ed Evanhoe; Adam Geibel; Michael Eisenstadt; Barbara Farabaugh; the Freedom of Information Act




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staffs at various US Government organisations (especially their North Korea analysts who had to review my FOIA requests); Barry Hudson who, once again, did an excellent job of translating difficult Korean terms; David Isby; Keith Jacobs; the folks at Jane’s Information Group especially Mark Daly, Peter Felstead, Robert Karniol, Ian Kemp and Duncan Lennox for their friendship, support, and assistance through the years; Patrick Kirol; Timothy McCarthy; John F. Quinn; Mark Sauter; Stephen ‘Cookie’ Sewell; David Tanks; Frank Tansey; Charles Tustison, for reading the countless drafts; Ryoko Urakawa; David Wiencek; Colonel Larry M. Wortzel (Ret.) for writing the foreword; and Steven J. Zaloga, who although he might not remember it, many years ago convinced me to start publishing the numerous works that I had written. A note of thanks also goes to the ‘Lumber Road Gang’ including: William ‘Mongo’ Baynes; Bob ‘Bobc’ Carrager; Thomas ‘High Boy’ DiMisa; Michael ‘Mikie’ Germaine; Thomas ‘Big Toe’ Gill; Marty Higgins; Yona Leopold; Tom ‘Sweet Pea’ Lillis; Chuck ‘Chas’ Leo; John ‘Big Mac’ McDonald; Donald ‘Mumbles’ Malone; Kenny Morris; Netanya ‘Bad Gas’ Newman; Richard ‘Lotto Man’ Oravitz; Joann ‘Red’ Reale; Jason Sowa; Frank ‘FU’ Usbeck and Paul ‘Yo-Yo’ Yovino. A unique note of thanks goes to all the ‘Fortyniners,’ especially Lillian, Lydia, and James ‘Roufus’ Kouletsis. My children Shammah, Rebecca and Micah are deserving of note for their patience with a father who is enthralled with such a ‘weird’ subject. Finally, there is my wife Diane without whose love and support I would not have been able to write this book. I’m still ‘. . . madly, passionately, hopelessly’ in love with her. Thank you one and all. If any readers have any information, source material, corrections, photographs, comments, or anything else, I can be contacted either by email at [email protected], or through the publisher. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr YPY Fort Collins, Colorado




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1

Overview HE RMED ORCES OF ORTH OREA VERVIEW

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Over the past 50 years, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has developed into what is undoubtedly the most militarised country in the world today.1 The two cornerstones upon which the nation has been built are the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) and the Korean People’s Army (KPA). Technically, the KPA was officially established (8 February 1948) prior to both the government (9 September 1948) and the KWP (June 1949).2 Throughout the life of Kim Il-song, although the KWP and KPA have alternated slightly in importance within the DPRK, they have remained its cornerstones. Since the death of Kim Il-song in July 1994 his son and successor Kim Chong-il has placed considerable emphasis upon strengthening the KPA, stating that ‘only when our military force is strong, can we take the initiative in a contact or dialogue with the United States or South Korea’.3 The KPA is a unified armed force that is the fifth-largest in the world (behind those of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the United States, Russia and India), numbering approximately 1.17 million active duty personnel. This active duty component is augmented by a reserve force numbering approximately 7.45 million. A significant percentage of all KPA units are forwarddeployed in heavily fortified positions along the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) with the Republic of Korea. It is an efficient, welltrained, highly disciplined force which is undergoing continual modernisation. Although initially based organisationally and doctrinally on the armed forces of the former Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the KPA has developed into its own unique form, as related later in this chapter in the section on ‘National security policy and strategy’. 1

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Map 1.1 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

People’s Republic of China

Hamgyongbukto Ch’ongjin

Yanggang-do

Chagang-do Hamgyong-namdo

Sinuiju P’yonganbukto

Hamhung P’yongannamdo Korea Bay Namp’o

Wonsan

P’yongyang

East Sea (Sea of Japan)

P’yongyang-si Kangwon-do

Hwanghaenamdo

Hwanghaebukto Kaesong-si N Seoul

Republic of Korea

COMMAND AND CONTROL4 All power within the DPRK begins with Kim Chong-il, as simultaneous Chairman of the National Defence Commission, General Secretary of the KWP and Supreme Commander of the KPA. The paths for command and control of the KPA are outlined in chapter 2, including the dramatic changes which occurred during the 1990s and resulted in the current organisation.

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GROUND FORCES5 The ground forces component of the KPA is composed of approximately 1 003 000 personnel organised into 20 corps consisting of 176 divisions and brigades, as detailed in chapter 3. During the past 15 years, the KPA has undertaken a comprehensive program to improve its mechanisation, mobility and firepower involving the reorganisation, re-equipping, and forward redeployment of ground forces units as well as the complete restructuring and upgrading of reserve forces and the rear area command structure. Notable aspects of this program include: establishment of the tank, mechanised and artillery corps; forward deployment of river crossing assets, production and fielding of new light and medium tanks; and production and fielding of new self-propelled artillery and multiple rocket launcher (MRL) systems. One of the more unusual aspects of the program was the reorganisation and expansion of the effort to construct infiltration tunnels under the DMZ. It is estimated that there are approximately 20 such tunnels, four of which have been identified and neutralised by ROK/US forces. The threat poised by the remaining tunnels and their potential to insert combat forces behind the forward defences is substantial. The MPAF has deployed approximately 70 per cent of its active duty ground forces south of the P’yongyang–Wonsan line facing the ROK. This forward deployment provides for a strong defence, allows for the rapid commitment of second and third echelon forces, and facilitates an attack on the ROK with no redeployment and little warning utilising all elements of the forward corps. It is estimated that if the DPRK decided to initiate hostilities, the ROK and the US would only have approximately 24 hours warning, less if the KPA was already at a high-alert status. The mechanised infantry and tank corps are deployed both along the primary avenues of approach to the ROK to provide effective support, for exploiting breakthroughs, and to cover strategic rear areas from invasion. The two artillery corps are forward deployed and well protected in fortified underground emplacements. Without displacing they are capable of delivering deep fire support to attacking KPA ground troops. The P’yongyang Defence Command is deployed in and around the capital of P’yongyang to provide protection in the case of invasion and to serve as a counter-coup force if required. The KPA ground forces are equipped with approximately 4000 tanks and assault guns, and 2500 armoured personnel carriers. Tanks are primarily T–54/55 and T–59s, although there are



3

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increasing numbers of T–62s (in both imported and domestically produced versions) and indigenously designed light tanks. The DPRK has attempted to produce a version of the T–72, although the status of this program is unknown. Armoured personnel carriers primarily consist of BTR–60s, BMP–1 (imported and domestically produced versions), VTT–323 variants, and a number of other domestically produced systems. KPA artillery units are equipped with approximately 12 000 artillery systems (i.e. mortars greater than 120 mm and guns greater than 76 mm), and 2300 multiple rocket launchers (greater than 107 mm). This formidable array of firepower is bolstered by a sizeable force of five FROG–5/7 battalions and two ballistic missile brigades. The operationally deployed families of ballistic missiles enable the KPA to strike at targets throughout the ROK and parts of Japan and East Asia (e.g. Hwasong 5—300 km, Hwasong 6— 500 km and No-dong—1300 km). The Taep’o-dong series of ballistic missiles currently under development will extend this threat throughout Japan and East Asia (Taep’o-dong 1—1500–2200 km) and possibly the US mainland (Taep’o-dong 2—4000–6000 km). The Taep’o-dong family has also provided the DPRK with its first space launch vehicle (Taep’o-dong 1 SLV). Augmenting the KPA’s active ground force component is an immense paramilitary and reserve force of approximately 7.45 million personnel—approximately 30 per cent of the population between the ages of 15 and 60. This sizeable force is organised into four primary components: 4.14 million Workers’–Peasants’ Red Guard; 1.18 million Red Youth Guard; 1.73 million Paramilitary Training Unit; and approximately 0.4 million People’s Guard troops. Of these, the Paramilitary Training Unit troops, composed of discharged veterans organised into units up to division size, can be mobilised immediately as units for combat operations. Beginning during the 1980s the KPA initiated a program whereby these units received additional artillery and were restructured and exercised to facilitate out-of-area operations in support of regular ground force units. A large percentage of the Red Youth Guard, composed of high school and college students, can also be mobilised quickly, but would take longer to attain combat readiness. The Workers’–Peasants’ Red Guard and People’s Guard receive only limited training and would take the longest to achieve combat readiness. They are armed with various small arms and infantry-type weapons and during wartime would defend rear areas and provide general support to the KPA. During peacetime their mission is the protection of local government and industry. With


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the exception of the Paramilitary Training Units, the majority of the reserves would probably be employed as reinforcements or replacements for regular KPA units, or as rear area security units. One of the more notable aspects of the KPA is its formidable special operations force totalling approximately 90 000 personnel (this number increases to 100 000+ if the division and brigade-level light infantry battalions are included). This force is organised into 25 special operations force brigades (14 light infantry, three airborne, three air force sniper, two navy sniper and three sniper) and five–seven reconnaissance battalions. The KPA has the capability to transport approximately 19 000 troops (4000 by air and 15 000 by sea) at once. The primary missions of these special operations forces are: reconnaissance, establishing a ‘Second Front’ within the ROK strategic rear, decapitation and disruption of the ROK/US command, control, communication and intelligence (C3I) structure, neutralisation of ROK and US airbases, and neutralisation of ROK and US missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau is the primary organisation within the KPA tasked with the training and conducting of unconventional and special warfare operations. During peacetime it is believed to exercise administrative control over all special operations units, including those of the Korean People’s Navy (KPN) and the Reconnaissance Bureau. During wartime it will function as the primary headquarters coordinating all special operations. KOREAN PEOPLE’S NAVY COMMAND6 The Korean People’s Navy Command—more commonly known as the Korean People’s Navy (KPN)—is primarily a coastal defence force. It is composed of 60 000 personnel organised into a command headquarters in P’yongyang, the East and West Sea Fleets, two navy sniper brigades, two coastal defence missile regiments, as well as a number of school and support units. The two fleet headquarters control 990 vessels in 16 squadrons (six with the West Sea Fleet and 10 with the East Sea Fleet), including approximately 150 assigned to the Coastal Security Bureau of the MPAF. The KPN operates from 12 main bases, five on the west coast and seven on the east coast, and numerous small forward operating bases. The majority of the forward operating bases are hardened, having anchorage and repair facilities blasted out of mountains or



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connected to inland lakes by tunnels. Approximately 50–60 per cent of KPN combat forces are forward deployed. In addition to its 990 vessels the KPN and intelligence services operate approximately 45 midget submarines and a large number of small semi-submersible infiltration craft. Since the Fatherland Liberation War, the KPN has placed significant emphasis on naval mine warfare. Its current capability is larger than might be expected from the number of specialised vessels within its inventory. This is both a result of doctrine and the fact that most vessels over 100 tonnes including civilian fishing craft, are equipped with minelaying equipment, some of which is quite crude but functional. The DPRK has a small indigenous shipbuilding capability that has produced submarines, frigates, missile patrol boats and a wide variety of small combatant and miscellaneous craft. During the 1990s, it has concentrated upon the construction of SANG-O class coastal submarines, an unidentified 1000-tonne coastal submarine, YUGO class midget submarines, small semi-submersible infiltration craft, hovercraft, and a ‘stealth’ patrol boat. KOREAN PEOPLE’S AIR AND AIR DEFENCE COMMAND7 The Korean People’s Air and Air Defence Command—more commonly known as the Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF)—is primarily an air defence force, with limited offensive capability. It is composed of 110 000 personnel organised into a command headquarters, six air divisions (three air combat, one training, and two transport) with approximately 1700 aircraft, a number of school and support units, several aircraft production and repair facilities, and the Civil Aviation Bureau which controls the national airline, Air Koryo. While the KPAF is numerically superior to the ROK Air Force (ROKAF), and US air components deployed within the ROK, it is qualitatively inferior in almost all aspects. The three air combat divisions and the training division are deployed for territorial air defence and incorporate a large number of anti-aircraft artillery brigades and a total of 19 SAM brigades (equipped with the SA–2, SA–3 and SA–5). Although the KPAF has 89 heliports and airfields (18 of which are highway airstrips), units are typically deployed at only 20–25 of them. All of the operational airfields are hardened to varying degrees—from simple concrete reinforced aircraft revetments to


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complete taxiways and hangars inside mountains. Approximately 40 per cent of the KPAF’s aircraft are forward deployed. The KPAF’s approximately 1700 aircraft comprise 770 fighters (including 60 MiG–23 and MiG–29s), 80 bombers, 520 support aircraft and 320 helicopters (including 87 MD–500s). The majority of its aircraft are, however, variants of the older MiG–15/–17/–19 and MiG–21. Numerically, the 300 An–2/Y–5 biplane transports are the most important aircraft in the KPAF. They are used to transport small teams of special operations forces. The KPAF maintains a small indigenous aircraft production capability which is currently centred in Panghyon. Since the 1980s, it has produced Yak–18 trainers and Mi–2 helicopters; parts for the An–2/Y–5, MiG–15/–17/–19 and MiG–21; assembled MiG–21s and MiG–29s; and conducted modifications on almost all of its aircraft.

INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES8 Augmenting the DPRK’s regular and paramilitary reserve forces is a large intelligence and internal security apparatus including military and quasi-military units. These forces are tasked with intelligence collection, internal security, and undermining the ROK through subversion, espionage and overt aggression. The lines of responsibility for the organisations comprising the intelligence and internal security services are deliberately blurred and overlapping to ensure that none gathers enough power to threaten Kim Chong-il. Control of the intelligence and internal security community begins with Kim Chong-il, who is both General Secretary of the KWP and Chairman of the National Defence Commission, and proceeds down through the—National Defence Commission, KWP, and Cabinet. Subordinate to the National Defence Commission are the MPAF and the State Security Department. Subordinate to the MPAF are the Reconnaissance Bureau, Security Command, and Guard Command. Subordinate to the KWP is the office of the Central Committee Secretary in Charge of South Korean Affairs (CCSKA) which controls four intelligence-related departments (Social-Cultural Department, South-North Dialogue Department, Investigative Department and the Operations Department). Subordinate to the Cabinet is the Ministry of Public Security.



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WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION9 Since the late 1950s the DPRK has pursued a series of comprehensive programs for the development and production of weapons of mass destruction. It presently produces significant quantities and varieties of chemical agents (e.g. mustard, sarin, V-agents) and maintains a large inventory of chemical weapons. It also possesses the ability to produce significant quantities and varieties of biological agents (e.g. anthrax, smallpox, yellow fever), however, the nature and extent of its biological weapons inventory is presently unknown. The KPA possesses the capability to effectively employ either chemical or biological weapons throughout the Korean Peninsula. To a lesser degree, it has the ability to employ these weapons worldwide using unconventional methods of delivery. More ominously, the DPRK is currently at the point where it possesses all the requisite technologies, personnel and infrastructure to produce nuclear weapons that are at least comparable to first-generation United States nuclear weapons. It possesses the capability to employ such weapons throughout the Korean Peninsula and to a lesser degree against Japan. Estimates of the DPRK nuclear weapons inventory are based upon the level of weapons design technology and quantity of weapons-grade plutonium it possesses. Currently, with the 11–13 kg of weapons-grade plutonium that it is estimated to have extracted prior to signing the 1994 ‘Agreed Framework’, the DPRK could have one–three nuclear weapons each using 4–8 kg of plutonium. If, however, the DPRK’s level of technology is higher than currently estimated it could produce nuclear weapons with quantities of plutonium as little as 1.5–3 kg. In this case its inventory of nuclear weapons could be as high as four–eight. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND STRATEGY10 The DPRK’s national security policy and the strategy and doctrine employed by the KPA were originally based upon those of the World War II armed forces of the PRC and Soviet Union. Over the years the KPA has taken these and gradually developed them into its own unique forms based upon Kim Il-song’s ‘anti-Japanese partisan struggle’, combat experiences during the Fatherland Liberation War, the philosophy of Chu’che (self-reliance), the physical and demographic environment of the Korean Peninsula, the ‘Four Military Lines’ and the ‘Three Revolutionary Forces’.


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The DPRK’s national security policy has two underlying principles: (1) the survival of the nation and its leadership; and (2) reunification of the Fatherland under the DPRK’s control (known as ‘One Choson’). These principles are given form in two national military policies which date to the 1960s known as the ‘Four Military Lines’ and the ‘Three Revolutionary Forces’. At the Fifth Session of the Central Committee, in December 1962, Kim Il-song presented a new national military policy known as the ‘Four Military Lines’ which called for ‘the arming of the whole people, the fortification of the entire country, the training of all soldiers as a cadre force, and the modernisation of arms’.11 Two years later, during February 1964, Kim Il-song explained the importance of the ‘Three Revolutionary Forces’ in order to bring about reunification of the Fatherland. These forces are: revolutionary force in the North, revolutionary force in the South, and the international revolutionary force. The ‘Four Military Lines’ were subsequently added to Article 60, Chapter 4 of the DPRK Constitution when it was amended on 9 April 1992. The 1998 constitutional revisions maintain the importance of the ‘Four Military Lines’. These two national military policies have become the foundation upon which all subsequent military policies have been based and continue to exert strong influence upon the DPRK and KPA. Reflecting the DPRK’s national military policies the KPA’s strategy has two underlying principles: (1) defence of the DPRK through the total resistance of the KPA and the people to any enemy; and (2) the complete reunification of the Fatherland within 30 days of the onset of hostilities. Defensive strategy is concerned with preventing, or destroying, any invasion across the DMZ or amphibious landing within the DPRK rear. If such an invasion does occur it is to be met with total resistance by the KPA and its people. The KPA will devotedly defend the headquarters of revolution headed by Kim Chong-il in the spirit of human bombs and suicide bombing . . . If the enemies encroach upon an inch of our land, waters and sky, the People’s Army will mercilessly annihilate them and give a thousand-fold death to the invaders and thus defend the party and socialism and reunify the country.12

DPRK officials have stated that they are ‘resolute and determined [and] . . . we will to fight to the end . . . The US might win such a war, killing half our people, but it would not win the minds of



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T HE A RMED FORCES OF N ORTH K OREA

the people’.13 ‘We openly declare that we will mercilessly fight against the US Imperialists and all the class enemies to the last drop of our blood.’14 The foundations for the KPA’s offensive strategies which are currently known as ‘two front war’ and ‘combined operations’ were laid by Kim Il-song at the Fourteenth Session of the Fourth Central People’s Committee of the KWP during 5–12 October 1966. Here, under the name of ‘Revolution in South Korea’, Kim stated, We must develop the revolutionary movement [in the ROK] at this time using a combination of methods involving all kinds of struggle, in correspondence to the objective and the subjective situation, political struggle and economic struggle, violent struggle and nonviolent struggle, and legal and illegal struggle.15 . . . We must strongly fortify the KPA with modern weapons and combat material. We must employ all means to modernize the weapons and make them more powerful based on the successes of ultra-moder n science and technology . . . In modernizing the KPA and developing military science and technology, we must fully consider the reality of our country with its numerous mountains and lengthy coastline . . . We must develop and introduce military science and technology in accordance with the reality of our country and correctly incorporate old style weapons along with modern weapons.16

This speech is noteworthy for it expands unconventional warfare within the KPA to include not only the time-honoured guerrilla warfare but also special operations. Also significant is the importance attached to adapting modern military technology, weapons and the modernisation of the KPA to the realities of the Korean Peninsula. These latter points laid the foundation for the development of the KPA’s special warfare capabilities and the prolonged reorganisation of the KPA into a more mechanised and well-balanced fighting force. At the Fifth KWP Congress, in November 1970, Kim Il-song explained the reasoning behind the KPA strategies, Our country has many mountains and rivers, and has long seacoasts. In the terrain of a country such as ours, if one takes good advantage of this kind of terrain, carrying out mountain and night combat with skill, and correctly applying combinations of large scale warfare and small scale warfare, regular and irregular combat, even in the case of an enemy who is armed to the fingertips with the latest military technology, we can do a good job of annihilating him. The special experiences of the Struggle


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for National Liberation in our country bear this out, and, in the same manner, the Vietnam War of today also bears this out.17

During 1972, these strategies were further elaborated upon: Our great leader has invented an exceptionally excellent policy enabling North Korean forces to strategically and tactically smash the enemy by either integrating or combining the following: large unit and small unit operations; the experiences of the guerrilla units and modern military technology; guerrilla and modern war tactics; strong guerrilla activities and national popular resistance. The close integration of both the large and small operations is fully compatible with the tactical principles of the guerrilla units, which hit and destroy the enemy by employing concentration, dispersion, and swift mobility. This combination is a wise strategic and tactical policy which enables guerrilla units to constantly hold the initiative in their hands until the enemy is crushed. This combination of guerrilla tactics and modern warfare tactics, and the integration of guerrilla activities and people’s resistance is intended to mobilize the whole nation, organize all the people into combat forces, reinforcing the main standing regular forces, and have them strike and annihilate the enemy everywhere. This is an excellent strategic and tactical policy which will make it possible to completely liberate the whole fatherland.18

Today, these strategies have been refined to reflect changing capabilities and new equipment, however, at their core they remain essentially unchanged. While ROK and US authorities describe the KPA’s offensive strategy for a war of reunification as ‘blitzkrieg’, the KPA represents its ‘two front war’ and ‘combined operations’ strategies somewhat differently. In practice these will consist of a massive attack across the DMZ utilising overwhelming firepower and violence known as a ‘One Blow Non-stop Attack’. Concurrent with this will be: limited use of chemical weapons against targets within the forward area; ballistic missile strikes (some armed with chemical warheads) against ROK and US airbases, ports, and C3I assets throughout the ROK; operations by hundreds of special operations force units and intelligence agents throughout the ROK rear creating a ‘second front’; and special operations force and intelligence agent attacks against US bases in Japan and Okinawa.



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The goals of this strategy are to move southward as quickly as possible, surrounding Seoul, gaining control of the ROK strategic rear (especially airbases and ports), preventing reinforcement of the peninsula by US and any allied forces, and inflicting as much damage as possible upon US forces. In its latest iteration, this strategy is known as ‘Occupying South Korea, All the Way to Pusan, in Three Days’. It was reportedly drawn up at the direction of Kim Chong-il in 1992 following an intensive evaluation of Operation DESERT STORM. The KPA leadership understands that while it is unrealistic to believe they can occupy the ROK in three days they do believe that, if the political and military conditions are favourable, the KPA can achieve this goal within three–four weeks. A number of basic interrelated political and military conditions underlie the KPA’s offensive war strategy and belief that victory in a war of reunification is possible: •

A quick war prevents the US, and any possible allies, from coming to the assistance of the ROK. The rapid capture or neutralisation of airbases and ports within the ROK facilitates KPA operations by limiting reinforcements and making the political decision to continue to fight more difficult for the US.

•

The US people and government cannot tolerate high losses to its military personnel as is evidenced by their sensitivity to casualties during Operation DESERT STORM and in Operation ALLIED FORCE. Therefore the rapid and violent destruction of all US forces stationed within the ROK is a priority. DPRK officials, in private conversations, have stated: ‘I can tell you this, we have all 30 000 of your troops targeted and will attack them first . . . we will annihilate them.’19 KPA defectors have stated: ‘Kim Chong-il believes that if the [DPRK] creates more than 20 000 American casualties in the region, the US would roll back and [the DPRK] will win the war.’20 The ‘bloodier’ and more violent the destruction of US forces, the more likely the US will accept a DPRK fait accompli.

•

Japan’s contribution to a war effort against the DPRK can be limited by the threatened, or limited, use of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The DPRK believes that such actions are likely to raise anti-US sentiment and curtail Japanese support to US operations. Any diminishment of Japanese cooperation with the US significantly reduces its ability to prosecute a war. This ability to strike at US bases


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within Japan and Okinawa is a primary reason for the DPRK’s development of ballistic missiles and WMD. •

The ROK is committed to a forward fixed defence of Seoul, even at the risk of losing the rest of the country. In August 1998 ROK President Kim Dae-jung stated the importance of defending Seoul in any future war: If a war should break out, there is no place for us to flee or escape. And unless Seoul is defended, we will not be able to protect the entire nation. Seoul controls 47 per cent of the gross domestic product and is home to 81 per cent of all public facilities, although it occupies only 4 per cent of the fatherland.21

These conditions, when combined with others within the ROK and the US, all but ensure that any war for reunification on the Korean Peninsula will be extremely costly in both human and material terms for all parties involved. That the US is fully aware of the potential costs of its commitment to defend the ROK was made clear in March 1999 by General John H. Tillelli Jr, Commander In Chief of the United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command and Commander of US Forces Korea, I will not tell you defeating North Korean aggression will be easy. The casualties on both sides will be large, and the longer it takes us to build up the necessary combat power to destroy the invading forces, the higher the casualties and devastation will be.22

KPA operational and tactical doctrines have always emphasised reconnaissance, infiltration, surprise attack, annihilation, mobility and overwhelming firepower to achieve objectives. Today, they are combined with strong armour and special operations components, as well as the use of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons.23 The basic tenet underlying all KPA national military policies, strategies and doctrines is the belief that the average KPA soldier is politically, mentally, physically and militarily better trained and prepared for war than their ROK or US counterpart. Today this phenomenon is referred to within the DPRK by the slogan ‘One a Match for 100’.24 KPA troops are taught that the outcome of a future war will not be decided by modern weapons and military technology, but by the ‘noble mission and revolutionary spirit with which it fights for the liberation of the people’.25 They are



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encouraged and exhorted to become ‘. . . human bombs, warriors of guns and bombs, and heroes of self-destruction to defend the respected and beloved Comrade Kim Chong-il with a do-or-die spirit’.26 This martial belief in individual and corporate military superiority and the importance and glory of self-sacrifice have resulted in a military force capable of enduring considerable hardships and privations while still supporting a wide range of combat options with minimal consideration of the danger involved. WARTIME OPERATIONS27 The DPRK leadership currently envisions a war to rapidly reunify the Korean Peninsula will, under ideal conditions and if strategic surprise is achieved, proceed in three broad phases: 1 Breaching the DMZ and annihilation of forward deployed ROK and US forces. 2 Isolation of Seoul and consolidation of gains within the forward areas. 3 Pursuit and destruction of any remaining ROK and US forces and occupation of the ROK. Phase 1 will commence with a massive preparatory artillery barrage conducted by organic artillery units and the 620th and Kangdong Artillery Corps against defensive lines along major routes of advance into the ROK. This would be accompanied by long-range artillery fire by the artillery corps on Seoul, and military headquarters and installations within 50 km of the DMZ, and ballistic missile attacks against airbases, ports and C3I facilities throughout the ROK. These artillery and ballistic missile attacks will be likely to include a significant portion of chemical munitions and be accompanied by special operations forces. The first echelon forces will then attack across the DMZ. The IV Corps will conduct operations against the UN-controlled islands of Paengnyong-do, Taech’ong-do, Soch’ong-do and support the II Corps advance by attacking Kanghwa-do. The II Corps will advance along both the Kaesong–Munsan–Seoul and Ch’orwon– Uijongbu–Seoul corridors. The V Corps will advance along the Hwach’on–Ch’unch’on corridor. The I Corps will advance south through the mountains of T’aebaek-san and along the coast through Kansong–Sokch’o. Amphibious landings will occur along both coasts to assist the encirclement of Seoul and the advance


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of the I Corps along the east coast. Under ideal conditions, and if strategic surprise is achieved, the KPA envisions it can reach the northern outskirts of Seoul in D+2 to D+4 days and complete phase 1 by D+7 to D+10. Phase 2 will commence as soon as a significant breach has occurred in the ROK/US lines. The II Corps will continue its assault on Seoul, being supported by both the IV and V Corps. The IV Corps will continue operations on the II Corps’ western flank and provide reinforcement as required. At Ch’unch’on the V Corps will split and advance southwest towards Suwon (thereby enveloping Seoul) and south to Wonju. It is unclear whether the KPA will immediately attempt to occupy Seoul, or wait until the remainder of the ROK is under its control before doing so. The I Corps will advance south through the mountains of T’aebaek-san and along the coast through Kangnung. The 820th Tank Corps and 815th Mechanised Corps, exploiting their mobility and firepower, will pass through the first echelon moving around Seoul along the Kaesong–Seoul–Suwon line towards Taejon. The 806th Mechanised Corps will travel in the path of the V Corps towards Taejon. The advance of the tank and mechanised corps will be supported by the operations of the V and I Corps. The V Corps will continue its thrust south from both Suwon and Wonju towards Taejon, while the I Corps will advance through the T’aebaek-san towards Andong and along the coast. Additional amphibious landings will occur along the east coast to support the advance of the I Corps. The KPA estimates that, under optimal conditions, Phase 2 can be accomplished by D+14 to D+20. Phase 3 will have the tank and mechanised corps, possibly reinforced by third-echelon forces, split into two pincers at Taejon for a drive on Pusan. The western pincer will advance along Chonju–Kwangju–Sunch’on–Pusan. At Kwangju a force will split off and move southwest to capture Mokp’o. The eastern pincer will advance along Kimch’on–Taegu–Pusan. At Kimch’on or Taegu it will be supported by I Corps elements advancing through the T’aebaek-san from Andong and along the coast moving from Ulchin through P’ohang. Together these forces will capture the remainder of the ROK. The attack on Cheju-do Island will probably be accomplished by a combination of navy sniper, airborne and regular ground force units. If Phases 1 and 2 have proceeded smoothly, the KPA hopes to have Phase 3 completed by D+21 to D+30. Throughout all phases of the war special operations forces will support the attack by conducting strategic, operational, and tactical level operations within the ROK/US rear and establishing a



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‘second front’. These operations will be targeted against air bases, C3I facilities, logistics installations, ports and critical lines of communications. The KPN’s primary wartime missions include the insertion of special operations forces (especially the navy sniper brigades) and KPA ground forces on islands and along the ROK coasts to facilitate the encirclement of ROK/US ground forces, restricting US reinforcements by conducting anti-ship attacks, covert mining of ROK ports and sea approaches, and defending advancing KPA forces and the DPRK’s coasts from ROK and US naval activity. The KPN’s ability to accomplish its missions is enhanced by its sizeable fleet of amphibious warfare craft (especially its expanding inventory of KONG BANG and NAMPO A/B class hovercraft) and SANG-O and YUGO class submarines. The primary wartime missions of the KPAF include the insertion of special operations forces (especially the air force sniper brigades) throughout the ROK coasts, ground attack and ground support for KPA ground troops, restricting US reinforcements and ROKAF/USAF close air support missions by conducting strikes against airbases, and defending advancing KPA forces and the DPRK from ROK and US air activity. The majority of sorties flown by the KPAF in any air campaign will probably be restricted to targets in the forward areas of the ROK. During the opening phase of the war, however, selected missions against air and C3I installations and in support of special operations forces will also be conducted throughout the ROK. The KPAF’s ability to accomplish its special operations missions is enhanced by its sizeable inventory of An–2 COLT/Y–5 biplane transports. Despite this optimistic view of a rapid military victory the KPA is prepared to fight a protracted war. For the past 20 years the MPAF has emphasised the establishment and maintenance of large stockpiles of all classes of military supplies. It is currently believed that these stockpiles are adequate for three months to a year of high-intensity combat. CURRENT STATUS28 Since the mid-1980s the DPRK has been battered by increasing political, economic and social pressures associated with an expanding economic crisis and a sudden change in leadership, all of which have impacted significantly upon the KPA.


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The unexpected death of Kim Il-song in 1994 brought with it a number of its own political and social pressures as his son Kim Chong-il has assumed power. Although this transition has been relatively smooth it has witnessed the purge of a large number of middle and senior level leaders, the reorganisation of the governmental structure, and the amendment of the DPRK’s Constitution.29 To achieve this smooth transition Kim Chong-il has relied upon the support of the KPA and its leadership, in much the same way as his father did during the 1960s. An indication of this is that since 1994 Kim has appointed promotions to general officers at an unprecedented rate—14 in October 1995, 123 in April 1997, 22 in April 1998 and 79 in April 1999.30 The economic crisis is the outgrowth of the DPRK’s international economic and political isolation, poorly managed central economy, decades of huge expenditures on military and propaganda projects, and the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. The result of this has been that every year since 1990 the DPRK has experienced minus economic growth. This has limited access to foreign equipment and precipitated fuel shortages, restricting training and operations. Additionally, the realities of the post–Cold War era are such that the nature of the DPRK’s treaties of ‘Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance’ (now entitled the Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation) with Russia and the PRC have changed considerably. No longer will either country automatically support or intervene in the event war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula. The political and economic environment has been complicated during the 1990s by a series of floods and famines that have affected every aspect of life within the DPRK and at times reduced much of the nation to near starvation levels.31 Throughout these upheavals the KPA has received preferential treatment, which has seen it receive a disproportionate amount of food and fuel, at the cost of other sectors of the economy and nation. Today it is ranked as the fifth-largest military force in the world. To many outsiders this emphasis on the military at the cost of social and economic stability is both puzzling and foolhardy. It is neither. It is important to understand the critical role of the military within DPRK society. The entire nation is built around the KPA. It is more than a military organisation, it is the nation’s largest employer, purchaser and consumer. The vast majority of the DPRK’s industrial infrastructure and its distribution system is centred upon military production and support. The KPA:



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. . . is the central unifying structure in the country and the source of power for the regime. In other words, the North Korean military is the embodiment of North Korea’s national identity. Without the military, the regime is simply not viable. It is truly the last remaining element of national power through which the regime achieves its objectives.32

Despite this preferential treatment the effects of the political, economic and social upheavals upon the KPA have been significant. The most dramatic effects upon the KPA were witnessed during the late 1980s through the mid-1990s as military readiness rapidly diminished, most noticeably within the KPAF, KPN and ground force units deployed within the rear areas. By the mid-1990s, the status of decline within the KPA had stabilised at a lower level of military readiness and it maintains this level today. Despite this the KPA continues to train hard and has recently completed a reorganisation of artillery assets and the fielding of long-range systems which has resulted in the deployment of over 10 000 artillery systems and more than 2300 multiple rocket launcher systems in the area south of the P’yongyang–Wonsan line. Paradoxically, as the military readiness of most conventional forces diminished, programs for the development of long-range artillery, ballistic missile and other asymmetric capabilities (e.g. special operations forces and weapons of mass destruction) have increased. This has been accompanied by the expanded sales of ballistic missiles, their related technologies, and WMD technologies to Third World nations. In fact, the DPRK through the trading companies of the MPAF, is the third-largest proliferator in the world. Today the KPA, although at a diminished level of military readiness, remains . . . a forward-deployed, offensively oriented force of over one million troops. It possesses theater ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, tremendous special operations capabilities, a massive ground force, and an artillery force that is perhaps the strongest portion of the whole. This force is poised to strike into the South with limited warning and is capable of inflicting devastation through the depth of the Korean peninsula.33

Because of the protracted economic and food crises, morale and discipline problems within the KPA are reportedly on the increase. The extent to which these affect the KPA’s military readiness are presently unknown. Reports concerning corruption and ‘black market’ operations within the KPA have also increased.


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These, however, should be viewed cautiously since there has always been a significant level of ‘official’ corruption and black marketeering within the KPA, just as there had been within most of the Cold-War-era Communist militaries (e.g. Soviet Union, East Germany). The MPAF acknowledges the various domestic crises and that they have affected the KPA, yet firmly believes that it can accomplish its assigned missions. It can achieve this by drawing upon the support and superior indoctrination of its people. Over many recent years, our people waded through many adversities and had no choice but to proceed with the arduous march. However, the sure victory of conviction of our people has become firmer, and the power of our republic has been reinforced incomparably. It is a fantasy of the US imperialist aggressors to use our difficult situation to obliterate us militarily. Today, crushing the US imperialist aggressors’ challenges with our people’s spirit of annihilating the enemies and bringing about a great upsurge in socialist construction will display the invincibility of our socialism that follows after the leadership of our great party and the leader.34

Due to continuing domestic economic and food crises the DPRK is judged to be at a heightened danger of economic and possibly social collapse than it has ever been. The continued policy of dedicating critical resources to the KPA, ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, at the expense of all other sectors of society, only exacerbates the problem. Over the years, however, many analysts have predicted the collapse of the DPRK yet it continues to sputter along defying all logic. While it is a distinct possibility, it would be imprudent to predict the DPRK’s imminent collapse. It would also be imprudent to predict that a political, economic or social collapse would trigger a war against the ROK. The nature of the situation is that it is highly volatile and unpredictable. Clearly, for the US, the DPRK remains the nation most likely to involve it in a large-scale regional war during the next ten years. The KPA is currently judged to be capable of defending the territory of the DPRK, conducting special operations against the ROK and Japan during peacetime, and maintaining internal security. It maintains the capability to initiate a war of reunification against the ROK on extremely short notice. However, it has a declining capability to prosecute such a war for more than six months.



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Command and control OMMAND AND CONTROL

C

All political, governmental and military control within the DPRK begins with Kim Chong-il, who is simultaneously Chairman of the National Defence Commission, General Secretary of the KWP, and Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army (a unified armed force consisting of the ground, navy and air forces). It then proceeds down through three distinct paths—National Defence Commission, KWP, and Cabinet.1 The primary path for command and control of the KPA extends through the National Defence Commission to the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces and its General Staff Department. From here command and control flows to the various bureaus and operational units. A secondary path, to ensure political control, extends through the KWP Central Committee to the Central Military Committee and on to the General Political Bureau of the MPAF. From the General Political Bureau it extends down via a separate chain of command to the lowest levels of the KPA. Command and control of the DPRK’s various intelligence and internal security forces proceeds down through the National Defence Commission, KWP, and the Cabinet (see chapter 7 for details). Since 1990 numerous and dramatic transformations within the DPRK have led to the current command and control structure. The details of the majority of these changes are simply unknown to the outside world. What little is known indicates that many changes were the natural result of the deaths of the ageing leadership including Kim Il-song (July 1994), Minister of People’s Armed Forces O Chin-u (February 1995) and Minister of People’s Armed Forces Choe Kwang (February 1997). The vast 20


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Figure 2.1 KPA command and control (simplified) Kim Chong-il

National Defence Commission

Central Committee

Central Mililtary Committee

General Political Bureau

Ministry of People’s Armed Forces

State Security Department

General Staff Department

Security Command

Bureaus, commands and operational units

Cabinet

Ministry of Public Security

Command Political control Coordination

majority of changes, however, were undertaken to secure the power and position of Kim Chong-il.2 At the Eighteenth Session of the Sixth Central People’s Committee, held on 23 May 1990, the National Defence Commission became established as its own independent commission, rising to the same status as the Central People’s Committee (previously, it had been one of six commissions subordinate to the committee). Subsequently, the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces was transferred to the National Defence Commission. Concurrent with this, Kim Chong-il was appointed First Vice-Chairman of the National Defence Commission.3 The following year, on 24 December 1991, Kim Chong-il was appointed Supreme Commander of the KPA.4 Four months later, on 20 April 1992, Kim Chong-il and O Chin-u were both awarded the title of Marshal.5 One year later Kim Chong-il was appointed Chairman of the National Defence Commission.6 In October 1997 he became General Secretary of the KWP. Within the KPA, between December 1991 and December 1995, nearly 800 general grade officers (out of approximately 1200) received promotions and preferential assignments. Three days after Kim Chong-il became a marshal, eight generals were promoted to



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the rank of vice-marshal. In April 1997, on the 85th anniversary of Kim Il-song’s birthday, Kim Chong-il promoted 127 general grade officers.7 The following April he ordered the promotions of another 22 generals.8 Along with these changes many KPA officers were appointed to influential positions within the KWP and Cabinet.9 This emphasis upon the military has resulted in a situation whereby the military controls the DPRK, much in the manner that the ‘Partisan Generals’ controlled the country during the 1960s.10 The most dramatic organisational changes since the death of Kim Il-song occurred during September 1998 when the First Session of the Tenth Supreme People’s Assembly met and amended the DPRK Constitution. These amendments resulted in the National Defence Commission becoming the single most powerful organisation within the DPRK, while the position of Chairman of the National Defence Commission was officially declared as the highest position within the DPRK. Additionally, • • •

•

Kim Chong-il was re-elected as Chairman of the National Defence Commission. The Central People’s Committee and State Administration Council were abolished and replaced by a Cabinet which ‘represents the government of the DPRK’. The establishment of a Presidium, the chairman of which ‘represents the state and receives credentials and letters of recall from diplomatic representatives accredited by a foreign state’. The dead Kim Il-song was declared ‘the eternal president of the DPRK’.

Concurrent with this, Kim Chong-il appointed Vice Marshal Kim Il-ch’ol, a loyal supporter and former commander of the Korean People’s Navy, to the position of Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, while the State Security Department was subordinated to the National Defence Commission.11 In the months that followed, numerous mid- and high-level KWP officials and KPA officers were purged and ministries, bureaus and departments reorganised. As part of this reorganisation an anti-corruption campaign was led by General Won Ung-hui of the MPAF’s Security Command. This campaign led to the purge of a number of high-level officials such as Kim Chong-u, the chairman of the Committee for the Promotion of External Economic Cooperation, and Kim Yong-yong, first deputy director of the State Security Department.12 The Second Session of the


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Tenth Supreme People’s Assembly, held in April 1999, confirmed these changes.13 Within the DPRK individual power is attained and measured through personal relations with Kim Chong-il, his close associates, or membership in small informal groups or factions with access to the leadership. Kim and his close associates occupy all high positions within the National Defence Commission, MPAF, KWP and the Cabinet. The result of this is that, at the highest levels, the command and control paths of the National Defence Commission, KWP and Cabinet are frequently occupied by the same individuals. Kim Chong-il is simultaneously General Secretary of the KWP, Supreme Commander of the KPA (a position within the KWP’s Central Military Committee) and Chairman of the National Defence Commission. Chon Pyong-ho (aka Chon Byong-ho) is simultaneously KWP Central Committee Secretary in charge of the Defence Industry Policy and Inspection Department and a member of the National Defence Commission; and Kim Yongch’un is simultaneously KWP Chief-of-Staff and a member of the National Defence Commission. NATIONAL DEFENCE COMMISSION14 As of September 1998, ‘the National Defence Commission Chairman controls all of the political, military, and economic capabilities of the Republic’. It is composed of ten individuals: Marshal Kim Chong-il (Chairman), Vice-Marshal Cho Myong-rok (First Deputy Chairman), Vice-Marshal Kim Il-ch’ol (Vice-Chairman), ViceMarshal Li Yong-mu (Vice-Chairman), Vice-Marshal Kim Yong-ch’un, Yon Hyong-muk, Marshal Li Ul-sol, Vice-Marshal Paek Hak-rim, Chon Pyong-ho and General Kim Ch’ol-man. The exact organisation of the National Defence Commission and the individual responsibilities of its members are presently unclear. Directly subordinate to the National Defence Commission are the MPAF and State Security Department (the later organisation is described in chapter 7). KOREAN WORKERS’ PARTY15 The KWP pervades every aspect of life within the DPRK, including the KPA. The two primary components of the KWP are the Central Committee and the Central Military Committee. The Central Committee is composed of the Political Bureau (aka Politburo),



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Figure 2.2 Korean Workers’ Party Korean Workers’ Party

Central Auditing Committee

Central Mililtary Committee

Central Committee

Political Bureau

Secretarial Bureau

22 departments

Control Committee

Local and other committees

the Secretariat (aka Secretarial Bureau), Central Control Committee (aka Control Bureau) and Central Auditing Committee. The Secretariat is the executive body of the KWP. It includes General Secretary Kim Chong-il, eight secretaries and 22 departments. These secretaries and departments are responsible for organising and implementing the policies and decisions of the KWP. Known secretaries include: Kye Ung-tae (Ideology), Chon Pyong-ho (Defence Industry Policy and Inspection Department), Han Song-ryong (Economic Policy), Choe Tae-bok (Science and Education), Kim Ki-nam (Propaganda and Agitation), Kim Guk-tae (Party Cadre), Kim Chung-nin (Socio-economic Associations) and Kim Yong-sun (South Korean Affairs). Known departments include: Organisation and Guidance; Propaganda and Agitation (Kim Ki-nam); Party Cadre (Kim Guk-tae); Military (Vice-Marshal Li Ha-il); People’s Defence (Vice-Marshal Kim Ik-hyon); the Unification Front (Kim Yong-sun); International Liaison (Kang Ju-il); Room No. 35 (Kwon Hi-gyong); Operations (General Oh Guk-ryol); Defence Industry Policy and Inspection (Chon Pyong-ho); Economic Policy Inspection (Han Song-ryong); Agricultural Policy Inspection; Financial Planning (Chae Hi-jong); Science and Education (Choe Tae-bok); Labour Organisation (Won Dong-gu); and Fiscal Management (Ro Myong-gun). According to the KWP’s Charter, ‘the People’s Army of Korea is the revolutionary armed forces of the Workers’ Party of Korea’.


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The KWP exercises political control over the KPA through both the Central Military Committee and the Organisation and Guidance Department. Central Military Committee The KWP’s Central Military Committee (aka Party Central Military Committee, Party Committee of the People’s Army, People’s Army Committee, or KPA Party Committee) was established in December 1962 and is the highest level KWP organisation directly involved with military policy. The KWP Charter states that the ‘Central Military Committee of the Party debates and decides on methods of implementing the Party’s military policies, organises and guides all the projects related to the strengthening of all armed forces, including the People’s Army, as well as the programs of developing the war industry, and commands the army’. The Central Military Committee is headed by Marshal Kim Chong-il in his position as Supreme Commander of the KPA. Other members include: Marshal Li Ul-sol (Director of the Guard Command); Vice-Marshal Cho Myong-rok (Chief of the General Political Bureau); Vice-Marshal Kim Yong-ch’un (Chief of the General Staff); Paek Hak-rim (Minister of Public Security); Vice-Marshal Kim Ik-hyon (Chief of People’s Defence); Vice-Marshal Kim Il-ch’ol (Minister of People’s Armed Forces); Vice-Marshal Li Ha-il; ViceMarshal Pak Ki-so (Commander P’yongyang Defence Command); Vice-Marshal Li Du-ik; General Oh Ryong-bang (Vice-Minister of People’s Armed Forces); Colonel General Yo Ch’unk-sok (ViceMinister of People’s Armed Forces); General Kim Myong-guk; General Kim Du-nam; and Li Yong-chol. Organisation and Guidance Department The Organisation and Guidance Department is one of 22 departments comprising the KWP’s Secretariat. In reality it is the most powerful organisation within the KWP and provides guidance to all KWP, Cabinet and National Defence Commission organisations through personnel management, supervising the activities of subordinate political departments, and conducting political surveillance and investigations. In pursuing its mission, the Organisation and Guidance Department generally concerns itself with individuals at the provincial secretary level or higher within the KWP, vice-director and above within the Cabinet, and general grade officers and above within the National Defence Commission and MPAF. Kim Chong-il began his public career as a member of



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this department. While the director and secretary of the Organisation and Guidance Department are unknown, identified senior secretaries responsible for specialised offices include Kye Ung-t’ae (party organisation), Kim Kuk-t’ae (cadre), Kim Chung-nin (mass organisations) and acting secretary Kim Si-hak (administration). This department is organised into 13 sections. The 9th, 10th and 13th sections have the responsibilities for the State Security Department, Ministry of Public Security, and MPAF respectively. The 13th Section exercises its responsibilities both indirectly through the Central Military Committee and directly through the MPAF’s General Political Bureau (see below), which it controls. Propaganda and Agitation Department While the Organisation and Guidance Department provides direction and guidance to the KWP and people, the Propaganda and Agitation Department addresses ideology. Its mission is to determine the morale and thoughts of the KWP and its people, train and motivate them to be obedient to the goals of the KWP, and prevent them from being influenced by outside ideologies. CABINET Under the constitutional changes initiated by the Tenth Supreme People’s Assembly in September 1998, the Central People’s Committee and State Administration Council were abolished and replaced by a Cabinet and a Presidium. The Cabinet ‘represents the government of the DPRK’ and assumed the responsibilities of the Administrative Council. While the Presidium ‘represents the state and receives credentials and letters of recall from diplomatic representatives accredited by a foreign state’. The Cabinet is charged with responsibility for all economic programs and the administration of the nation. The Cabinet exercises these responsibilities through at least 27 ministries: Agriculture (Li Ha-sop), Building Materials Industry (Cho Yun-hi), Chemical Industry (Pak Bong-ju), City Management and National Territory and Environment Protection (Choe Jong-gon), Commerce (Li Yongson), Culture (Choe Jae-hyon), Education (Choe Gi-ryong), Electronics Industry Finance (Lim Gyong-suk), Fishery (Li Song-ung), Foreign Affairs (Paek Nam-sun), Forestry (Li Sang-mu), Labor Administration (Li Won-il), Land and Marine Transportation (Kim Yong-il), Light Industry (Li Yon-su), Metal and Machine Industry (Chon Sung-hun), Mining Industry (Kil Song-nam), Physical


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Culture and Sports (Pak Myong-chol), Post and Telecommunications (Li Gum-bom), Power and Coal Industry (Shin Tae-rok), Procurement and Grain Management (Paek Chang-ryong), Public Health (Kim Su-hak), Public Security (Paek Hak-rim), Railways (Kim Yong-sam), State Construction Supervision (Paek Dal-jun), State Inspection (Kim Ui-sun), and Trade (Kang Jong-mo). Additionally, the Cabinet is responsible for at least five institutions: the Academy of Sciences (Li Gwang-ho), Central Bank (Chong Song-taek), General Statistics Bureau (Kim Chang-su), Sate Planning Commission (Pak Nam-gi) and Secretariat of the Cabinet (Chong Man-san). The Ministry of Public Security (see chapter 7) functions as a combination national police force, civil defence and national construction force. MINISTRY OF PEOPLE’S ARMED FORCES16 As the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces, Vice Marshal Kim Il-ch’ol is the National Defence Commission’s officer directly responsible for the KPA. MPAF Vice-Ministers reportedly include Vice-Marshal Yi Yong-mu, Vice-Marshal Yi Chong-san, Vice-Marshal Chon Chae-son, General Yi Pyong-uk, General Oh Ryong-bang, General Kim Chong-kal, General Chong Ch’ang-nyol and Colonel General Yo Ch’unk-sok.17 Operational and administrative control of the KPA is exercised through the Chief of the General Staff, Vice-Marshal Kim Yong-ch’un. The Ministry of People’s Armed Forces and its immediately subordinate units are headquartered in P’yongyang. Directly subordinate to the MPAF are the Cadre Bureau, General Political Bureau, General Rear Services Bureau, General Staff Department, Guard Command, Representative Mission at Panmunjom, Military Justice Bureau, Military Prosecution Bureau and Security Command. Cadre Bureau The Cadre Bureau (aka Cadre Personnel Bureau or Personnel Bureau) is responsible for all personnel matters relating to officers, including promotions, awards and record-keeping. It handles all promotion investigations and officers cannot be promoted without the approval of the Cadre Bureau. Prior to 1993, these functions were the responsibility of the Cadre Section of the General Political Bureau. Under the General Political Bureau all actions



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Figure 2.3 Ministry of People’s Armed Forces Ministry of People’s Armed Forces

Cadre Bureau

General Rear Services Bureau

Military Prosecution Bureau

General Political Bureau

Military Justice Bureau


Security Command

Representative Mission at Panmunjom

Guard Command

Operational units, commands and bureaus Command Political control

concerning KPA officers had to be approved by both the local political officers and the Cadre Section. This endowed the local political officers with tremendous power and led to influence buying and corruption. It also seriously inhibited military discipline and efficiency. During 1993, in response to growing complaints by KPA officers concerning ‘party cells wielding too much power’, Kim Chong-il ordered that the Cadre Section be reorganised as a separate bureau and subordinated to the MPAF. KPA commanders can now make personnel changes with significantly less interference from their political officers. This change clearly illustrates the growing power of the military within the DPRK.18 General Political Bureau From the time of its establishment in the late 1940s, until the early 1960s, political activities within the KPA were under the jurisdiction of the Culture Department (later Political Department). At the Fourth Party Congress in 1961, the General Political Bureau was established within the KPA and it assumed responsibility for the activities of the Political Department. Although nominally under the control of the MPAF, the General Political Bureau (aka General Political Affairs Bureau, General


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Political Department, 528th Army Unit, or 528 Military Unit) is actually controlled by the KWP’s powerful Organisation and Guidance Department—more specifically, through the 13th Section (Party Life Guidance) and the 4th Section (Cadre) of the Organisation and Guidance Department. The General Political Bureau is responsible for ensuring the political reliability and exercising political control of the KPA. It does so through the organisation of party committees and front organisations throughout the KPA hierarchy, placement of KWP members in key positions, planning political indoctrination, and supervision by assistant political commanders and political departments. Additional responsibilities include anti-ROK and anti-US propaganda, preparation of political training aids (including movies, magazines and newspapers), and control of KPA entertainment groups. Despite some reorganisations during the mid-1990s, it continues to wield immense power. The General Political Bureau maintains a chain of command separate from that of the MPAF extending to the lowest echelons of the KPA. General Political Bureau personnel at each echelon report not to their respective echelon commanders, but rather report to and receive directives from the General Political Bureau organisation at the next-highest echelon. This has often been a source of contention and resentment within the KPA. The General Political Bureau has a director and four vicedirectors. The current director is Vice-Marshal Cho Myong-rok, who is also First Vice-Chairman of the National Defence Commission. Vice-directors include General Hyon Ch’ol-hae and Colonel General Pak Chae-kyong (aka Pak Chac-gyong). The General Political Bureau is organised into an Enemy Propaganda and Agitation Department, Factory Party Affairs Department, General Affairs Department, Inspection Committee, Organisation Department, Propaganda Department, Statistics Department and Kim Il-song Socialist Youth League Guidance Department. The Organisation and Propaganda Departments are the largest and consist of numerous subordinate sections.19 The Enemy Propaganda and Agitation Department (aka Enemy Force Breakup Operation Department, Enemy Affairs, Special Operations Department, Special Operations Division, Special Political Department, Unit 563, or 563rd Army Unit) is responsible for psychological warfare operations against the ROK. It is controlled by the South–North Dialogue Department (aka Unification Front Department) subordinate to the KWP’s Central Committee Secretary in Charge of South Korean Affairs (CCSKA).



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During peacetime this department is responsible for establishing overt and covert contacts with ROKA troops, kidnappings, planning border crossings into the ROK, loudspeaker broadcasts in the DMZ, creating visual propaganda displays on the DPRK side of the DMZ, and distributing propaganda leaflets and publications in the ROK and Japan. During wartime its responsibilities are expanded to include conducting civilian and military-related psychological warfare operations within occupied territory, internal security (identifying ‘impure’ or ‘reactionary’ elements), and assessing the political leanings and morale of the ROK and US military forces in the ROK and Japan. The Enemy Propaganda and Agitation Department directly controls departments within each corps-level Political Bureau, two Balloon Propaganda battalions and the Enemy Propaganda and Agitation Corporation. The two Balloon Propaganda battalions consist of eight Balloon Propaganda companies each. Most of these companies are assigned to the various KPA corps and are under the operational control of the corps’ Enemy Propaganda and Agitation Department. Eleven companies are believed to be tasked with the distribution of propaganda leaflets over the ROK and five companies for operations against Japan. For years, the DPRK has been launching balloons bearing propaganda pamphlets against the ROK and Japan. Between April 1995 and November 1997, there were at least six separate incidents in which two new types of balloons were employed. During 18–19 May 1999 approximately 28.6 m × 2 m propaganda balloons were found caught in trees and telephone wires across a wide range of Japanese coastal and central inland towns. Analysts believe that these balloons could easily be modified to carry chemical or biological agents.20 The Enemy Propaganda and Agitation Corporation controls the approximately 106 loudspeaker posts along the DMZ. These posts broadcast anti–ROK/US propaganda programs two–seven times a day, 9–14 hours a day. During the past several years the number of loudspeaker broadcasting hours has dropped, apparently due to shortages of electricity. The Enemy Propaganda and Agitation Corporation may also be responsible for the approximately 500 electric signs, signboards and visual displays along the DMZ. During wartime the loudspeaker posts are apparently subordinate to the Enemy Propaganda and Agitation Departments within the division-level Political Bureaus.21 The Organisation Department (aka Organisation and Planning Department or Organisational and Planning Division) is tasked with the overall organisation and planning of General Political


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Bureau activities. It organises MPAF-level meetings and conferences and conducts political surveillance of MPAF personnel. In coordination with the 13th Section (Party Life Guidance) of the KWP’s Organisation and Guidance Department it organises yearly seminars for generals serving at division level and above. Generals participating in these seminars spend 15 days each year studying and living at the KWP’s Central Party building in P’yongyang. During these seminars the generals are isolated and conduct self-criticism. Officers below division level attend similar seminars at a KWP school subordinate to the Organisation Department. Among the approximately 15 sections that comprise the Organisation Department are: •

•

• •

• •

Personnel Section which is responsible for all personnel matters relating to non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel including promotions, awards and record-keeping. It also issues call-ups to the Military Mobilisation Bureau based upon the manpower requirements of the MPAF, oversees the classification of personnel into various military occupation specialties, and the assignment of personnel to the units. Labor Organisations Section (aka Party Organisation Department, or Party Organisation Division) is responsible for KWP organisational affairs, including the expansion of the KWP, within the MPAF. Party Life Guidance Section evaluates the political reliability and correctness of KWP members within the KPA. Information Section is responsible for the surveillance of general grade officers and the preparation of reports on their activities. These reports are forwarded to the KWP’s Organisation and Guidance Department and on to Kim Chong-il on a semi-annual basis. These reports have a significant impact on personnel changes.22 Political Events Section (in charge of events carried out with Kim Chong-il in attendance). Revolutionary Projects Section (aka Special Political Division) is tasked with planning and implementation of KWP-related activities within the MPAF.

The Propaganda Department (aka Propaganda and Education Department, or Propaganda and Education Division) is responsible for political education and propaganda activities within the MPAF.23 It accomplishes its objectives through a variety of political studies, lectures, cultural and artistic activities, newspapers and



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magazines. It operates museums, ‘historic rooms’, memorial halls and reading rooms. It also conducts political surveillance. Among organisations subordinate to the Propaganda Department are: •

•

•

• • • • • • • •

•

•

•

The April 25th Culture and Art Composition Office (aka April 25th Cultural Centre, April 25th Hall, April 25th House of Culture, 8 February Hall, 8 February House of Culture, or 8 February Group) serves as both the location and organiser for major KPA cultural events, including conferences and state funerals.24 The April 25th Athletic Team (aka 25 April National Defence Sports Team, or February 8th Athletic Corps) is responsible for the training and management of the various KPA athletic teams. The April 25th Film Studio (aka April 25th KPA Art Cinema Company, 25 April Art Film Studio and April 25 Artists Filmmaking Company, 8 February Movie Studio, 8 February Art Film Studio, or Film and Literature Production Department) produces and distributes propaganda and military-related films for the various branches of the MPAF. Ceremonies Section. Culture of the Masses Section. History Section. Lecture Section. Ministry of People’s Armed Forces Revolutionary Museum. Organisation and Guidance Section. People’s Army Acrobatic Troupe (i.e. circus). People’s Army Music and Dance Ensemble (aka People’s Army Ensemble, People’s Army Orchestra, or People’s Army Concert Corps) is the entertainment organisation of the MPAF. It conducts performances for both the MPAF and the public. The People’s Army Press (aka Inmingun Publishing Company, People’s Army Newspaper Company, or Information Division) is responsible for editing and publishing newspapers for the MPAF.25 The People’s Army Publishing House (aka People’s Army Publishing Company, or Publishing Section) publishes and distributes all military-related periodicals, books and printed materials required by the MPAF, including the books required for courses at the Kim Il-song Military University, Kang Kon General Military Academy Non-Commissioned Officers School. Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum.


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• •

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Museum of Revolutionary Artefacts.26 Munsu-ri Reception Centre.

On 16 January 1946 the Communist Party of North Korea established the Democratic Youth League as a means for strengthening the party and attracting new members. With the establishment of the KPA several years later, a section for Democratic Youth League activities was created within the Cultural Department (later Political Department). With the establishment of the General Political Bureau in 1961, Democratic Youth League responsibilities were transferred to it. At the Fifth KWP Congress in May 1964 the Democratic Youth League was renamed the Socialist Working Youth League and in 1992 the Kim Il-song Socialist Youth League (KSYL).27 The KSYL Guidance Department (aka Socialist Working Youth League Guidance Division or Youth Affairs Department) organises and supervises the activities of the KSYL within the MPAF. The DPRK considers the KSYL a ‘mass organisation’ and within the KPA it is engaged in fostering support for the KWP and patriotism among the younger troops. The Inspection Committee (aka Inspection Department or Inspection Bureau) is responsible for evaluating the status of morale and political indoctrination of, and KWP activities within, the KPA, KPN, KPAF and Paramilitary Reserve Forces. Guard Command The Guard Command is headed by Marshal Yi Ul-sol and is responsible for the personal security of Kim Chong-il and highranking officials. It is roughly comparable to the US Secret Service or the ROK Office of Presidential Security (see chapter 7). General Staff Department The General Staff Department exercises administrative and operational control over the KPA ground forces, KPAF, KPN, Workers’– Peasants’ Red Guard and Paramilitary Training Units. It is roughly equivalent to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. The General Staff Department is staffed by officers and enlisted personnel from all the branches and is responsible for organising, training, and equipping, as well as planning and executing all operations within the KPA. It also controls the supply of ammunition, weapons, maps and other military-related equipment, and directs classified information, construction, cryptographic, inspection, intelligence, personnel, training and other services.



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Subordinate to the General Staff Department are 24 known bureaus and a number of military academies, universities and research institutes. A number of these bureaus have operational units subordinate to them. The 26 bureaus are: Border Security Bureau, Classified Information Bureau, Coastal Security Bureau, Communications Bureau, Education Bureau, Electronic Warfare Bureau, Engineering Bureau, Equipment Bureau, External Affairs Bureau, Finance Bureau, Foreign Currency Earning Bureau, General Bureau of Technology (aka Technology Bureau), General Construction Bureau, Labor Administration Board, Military Construction Bureau, Military Electricity Generation Bureau, Military Mobilisation Bureau, Military Police Bureau, Military Training Bureau, Nuclear–Chemical Defence Bureau, Operations Bureau, Ordnance Bureau, Reconnaissance Bureau, Personnel Affairs Bureau (aka Replacement Bureau), Topographic Bureau and Transportation Management Bureau The Border Security Bureau is responsible for controlling unauthorised movements and preventing illegal entries and exits along the borders with the PRC and Russia. It controls a total of four Border Security Brigades. The Coastal Security Bureau is responsible for controlling unauthorised movements and preventing illegal entries and exits along the coastlines facing the East and Yellow Seas. It controls a total of six Coastal Security Brigades (see chapter 6 for details of both bureaus). The Classified Information Bureau (aka Classified Documents Bureau or Cryptographic Bureau) is responsible for overseeing all aspects of the production, transmission and storage of classified information within the KPA, including planning and inspection, encryption, and decryption. It is also believed to have a operations security (OPSEC) responsibility and works in cooperation with the Communications Bureau. It is unclear what roles this department may play in the creation of code systems for the KPA, or in the decryption of enemy communications. The Communications Bureau (aka Communications Command Bureau, Telecommunications Command Bureau or Signals Bureau) is responsible for the administration and operation of all communications within the KPA. It conducts monitoring of both domestic and foreign telecommunications traffic and is believed to work closely with the Reconnaissance Bureau and State Security Department in conducting signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations. This bureau also plays an important role within the area of communications security (COMSEC) for the KPA and works in cooperation with the Classified Information Bureau.


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Subordinate to the Communications Bureau is the 9th Signals Brigade (aka 9th Communications Brigade) and a communications school (possibly the Kim Hyong-Kwon Military Academy). Aside from overseeing all communications within the KPA, this unit apparently operates a nationwide communications monitoring system and plays an important role in maintaining communications with special operations forces operating within the ROK and overseas. During wartime it is believed that it will also be the primary channel of communications for airborne and guerrilla forces operating behind enemy lines. The Electronic Warfare Bureau is responsible for the administration and training of all electronic warfare (EW) and ‘electronic intelligence warfare’ assets within the KPA. In coordination with the Communications Bureau and Reconnaissance Bureau’s Technical/ Radio Department it probably oversees both offensive and defensive EW and ‘electronic intelligence warfare’ operations. The MPAF identifies ‘electronic intelligence warfare’ as a new type of warfare, the essence of which is the disruption or destruction of the opponent’s computer networks. Although this appears to be analogous to the developing ideas of information warfare (IW), the MPAF’s understanding is that ‘electronic intelligence warfare’ also includes reconnaissance, cryptanalysis , intelligence collection and disinformation operations. The MPAF believes that EW and ‘electronic intelligence warfare’ are important and that they must be integrated with conventional forces and operations as is indicated by Kim Chong-il’s statement: ‘Do not prepare for electronic warfare just because that is what others are doing. In modern warfare, modern and conventional weapons must be massed and combined.’ The Electronic Warfare Bureau is believed to consist of a staff, the Electronic Warfare Institute, and possibly a small number of EW/SIGINT and ‘electronic intelligence warfare’ units. It was not until the mid-1980s that the MPAF initiated a broad effort to improve the EW capabilities of the armed forces. A fundamental component of this effort was the reorganisation of the Kim Il Military College into the Mirim College for Electronic Warfare Research (aka Mirim University) in 1986 under the MPAF’s Education Bureau. The first class at the college was selected from postgraduate students of the physics, automation and mathematics departments of Kim Il-song University, Kim Ch’aek University, University of Computer Science and University of Science. To help staff the faculty the DPRK hired EW specialists from the former Soviety Union, including instructors from the Frunze Military Academy. Among the courses taught were jamming, radar detec-



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tion, missile control and guidance, computers, and infra-red detection and tracking. While most courses at the Mirim College for Electronic Warfare Research are believed to last four years there is reportedly a five-year program in computer sciences which graduates approximately 100 students a year. The MPAF also dispatched a small number of students to the former Soviet Union for specialised instruction. With the collapse of the former Soviet Union, however, and the DPRK’s economic crisis in the 1990s, this overseas schooling has ended. Upon the graduation of the college’s first class in 1990 the KPA established the Electronic Warfare Bureau within the General Staff Department. Concurrent with this, EW warfare departments were estabished within corps, division, brigade and regiment headquarters. Operation DESERT STORM appears to have been a seminal event in the MPAF’s understanding of EW and ‘electronic intelligence warfare’ operations. It probably also exerted a strong influence on the MPAF’s development of related doctrines since it has been extensively studied by the MPAF’s Research Institute for Military Sciences and the Strategy Research Institute, the Electronic Warfare Bureau and the Mirim College for Electronic Warfare Research. Shortly after operation DESERT STORM, Kim Chong-il ordered a continued expansion of research into EW by all branches of the KPA and directed the expansion of the DPRK’s indigenous computer industries and computer-related departments and courses of instruction in universities and colleges. During 1996 several research institutes for the development of computer software were established in P’yongyang. These institutes have focused on technical cooperation with other third-world countries and importing hardware and software from Japan and the West. In 1999 the DPRK established the Electronics Industry Ministry. The ministry is subordinate to the Cabinet and responsible for the electronics industry and computer sciences, both of which are essential to successful EW and IW operations. In any future war the KPA can be expected to conduct EW and limited IW operations against Japan, ROK and the US. These operations will likely be conducted by the Electronic Warfare Bureau under the direction of the Reconnaissance Bureau and possibly by the Investigative Department of the CCSKA. That the threat of KPA ‘electronic intelligence warfare’ operations is taken seriously is indicated by the public statements and actions taken during early 2000 by the ROK Government and ROK Ministry of Defence to improve computer security and skills. For example, in February, ROK Defence Minister Cho Seong-tae ordered the Army, Navy and Air Force to enhance the security of


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military computer networks (i.e. the Defence Information and Communication Network). The same month ROK President Kim Dae-jung ordered the Ministry for Defence to increase computer literacy among its members and established a cyber-terrorism report centre within the Korea Information Protection Centre.28 The Engineer Bureau (aka Engineering Bureau) is responsible for providing combat engineering support, especially river crossing capabilities, to the KPA. It overseas the development and procurement of engineering equipment for the KPA. Subordinate to the bureau is a combat engineering school and 5–12 specialised river crossing and bridging units. Included within these units are tracked amphibian (K–61), engineer river crossing, heavy bridging and pontoon bridging brigades. The engineer river crossing brigade consists of a headquarters, three–seven assault crossing battalions (both light and heavy), one–three K–61 amphibious battalions and a technical battalion. The majority of these units are deployed within the II and V Corps, and will be used to support any attack into the ROK. Other units are deployed further to the rear in the III Corps and in what was formerly the VII Corps. These units would be employed to maintain line of communications and supply (especially repairing railroad bridges, tunnels etc.) during a future war. While the KPA possesses some TPP heavy and LPP light pontoon bridging its primary bridging assets are an estimated 760 K–61 tracked amphibious vehicles and 2900 domestically produced S-Type pontoon bridging sections. The External Affairs Bureau (aka Foreign Affairs Bureau, External Operations Bureau, or External Business Bureau) is responsible for handling the external affairs of the MPAF. It is organised into at least five departments. The Second Department is responsible for arranging visits by foreign military personnel and delegations, as well as overseas trips by MPAF personnel and delegations. It provides detailed background information on foreign military visitors to those they will meet. Any foreign travel by members of the MPAF or visits by foreign military personnel requires the personal approval of Kim Chong-il. The Fourth Department handles foreign policy affairs of the MPAF. The Fifth Department is responsible for trading companies. The last known director of the bureau was Major General Yi Sang-u. The Foreign Currency Earning Bureau (aka the 44th Department) exercises overall control over the MPAF’s efforts to earn foreign capital. It plans and coordinates, in cooperation with the Fifth Department of the External Affairs Bureau, the types of activities the trading companies subordinate to the MPAF will



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engage in. It is estimated that there are approximately 24 such trading companies operated by the MPAF. The exact relationships between this bureau and the External Affairs Bureau of the General Logistic Bureau and the External Economic Affairs Bureau of the Second Economic Committee are unclear.29 The Military Construction Bureau (aka Military Engineer Bureau, Unit 583, or 583rd Army Unit) is responsible for constructing projects of national and strategic military importance. Militaryrelated projects which its units have participated in include the underground tank factory at Chasan-ri, Kaech’on-gun; underground ordnance plants in Chagang-do; underground missile facilities throughout the country; and underground shipyards at Namp’o and Ch’ongjin which produce submarines and infiltration craft. National construction projects which Military Construction Bureau units have participated in, along with the engineer brigades of the Ministry of Public Security, include the P’yongyang–Wonsan Expressway; West Sea Barrage; office buildings of the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces in P’yongyang; and the April 25th Culture Hall (formerly the February 8th Culture Hall). Although details are lacking, it is known that there are a number of specialised construction units subordinate to the Military Construction Bureau. One defector states that these units include ‘the Mechanised Engineer Division and Heavy Equipment Engineer Brigade’. The Military Construction Bureau is believed to be responsible for the construction and mainten ance of the KPA’s approximately 20 DMZ infiltration tunnels.30 The Military Mobilisation Bureau is responsible for the recruiting, drafting and discharge of military personnel and for calling up reserve forces when required. This bureau also provides support, equipment, active duty personnel and exercises some control over the Workers’–Peasants’ Red Guard and, to a lesser degree, the Red Youth Guard (see chapter 6). The Military Police Bureau is tasked with typical military police responsibilities (e.g. traffic control and criminal investigations of petty crimes). It works closely with the Military Justice Bureau and the Military Prosecution Bureau, as well as the Ministry of Public Security. The Military Police Bureau was formerly believed to have been directly subordinate to the MPAF; however, the latest available information places it under the General Staff Department. The Military Training Bureau (aka Combat Training Bureau) is responsible for education and training within the KPA, including military schools and academies (see chapter 3). In coordination with Operations Bureau it establishes yearly training requirements and schedules for the KPA, Paramilitary Training Units, Workers’–


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Peasants’ Red Guard and Red Youth Guard. In fulfilling its mission, the Military Training Bureau conducts research and evaluates combat operations through a small number of research institutes and ‘think tanks’. The most significant are the Research Institute for Military Sciences and the Strategy Research Institute. These institutes are known to have conducted extensive historical research not only on World War II and the Fatherland Liberation War, but more significantly on the Arab–Israeli conflict, Iran–Iraq War, Operation DESERT STORM and Operation ALLIED FORCE. Additionally, they have conducted an intensive study of the process by which the Nationale Volksarmee (armed forces of the former German Democratic Republic) was dissolved and merged into the Bundeswehr (armed forces of the German Federal Republic). These institutes also conduct research into the development of new weapons (especially ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and precision guided munitions) by other nations.31 The Military Training Bureau is also believed to compile unit and military histories based upon the records of the Operations Bureau. The Nuclear–Chemical Defence Bureau (aka Chemical Bureau) is responsible for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBC) defence within the KPA and the production, distribution and storage of chemical weapons and defensive equipment (see chapter 8).32 This bureau is organised into seven departments: Operations, Training, Equipment, Technology, Reconnaissance, 32nd and Underground (Tunnel) Administration; and three sections: Security, Personnel Administration and Document Management. Subordinate to the Operations Department are seven Nuclear–Chemical Defence Battalions which are responsible for chemical reconnaissance and decontamination.33 Each Nuclear–Chemical Defence Battalion consists of 500 troops and is organised with a headquarters, reconnaissance company, four decontamination companies, a smoke company and a communication platoon. Table 2.1 Nuclear–chemical defence battalions Unit

City

Province

13th 14th 15th 16th 18th 37th 38th

Hamhung Sunch’on Wonsan Hyesan P’yongwon-up Anju Sariwon

Hamgyong-namdo P’yongan-namdo Kangwon-do Yanggang-do P’yongan-namdo P’yongan-namdo Hwanghae-bukto



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The Nuclear–Chemical Defence Bureau’s Training Department operates the ‘General Training Centre’ at Onjong-ni, P’yongannamdo to train its personnel. There is also a ‘Nuclear–Chemical Training Centre’ located at Yangdok, P’yongan-namdo. This centre is under the control of the Military Training Bureau and is used by Nuclear–Chemical Defencee Bureau personnel to train KPA personnel. The Equipment Department (aka Machine Supplies Department) controls the Kanggye and Sakchu Chemical Weapons Factories and the 279th Factory (defence and decontamination equipment). The Technology Department consists of the 398th and 710th Laboratories. The Reconnaissance Department is responsible for identifying and administering areas contaminated by nuclear and chemical weapons. Subordinate to it are ‘113 AntiNuclear/Anti-Atomic Observation Posts’ located throughout the country. It includes Computation and Machine and Equipment Manufacturing Sections. The 32nd Department, with assistance from the Technology and Equipment Departments, is responsible for chemical weapons production. The Underground (Tunnel) Administration Department is responsible for the administration and inspection of underground military shelter facilities to ensure their fitness for NBC defence. The General Staff Department’s Operations Bureau is responsible for all operational aspects of the KPA, including general operational planning for the KPAF, KPN, Workers’–Peasants’ Red Guard and Paramilitary Training Units. It drafts and issues operational orders, prepares operational statistics, is responsible for the establishment and disestablishment of units and for military record-keeping. It is in direct contact with KPA Supreme Commander Kim Chong-il and in the event of an emergency he can bypass the chain of command and issue orders directly to the Operations Bureau. The chief of the Operations Bureau is Colonel General Li Myong-su. The Operations Bureau is composed of at least 10 departments. The First Department is responsible for administrative affairs, the Second Department for operational planning, and drafting instructions and orders from Kim Chong-il for the KPA. The Third Department is responsible for the operations of the I, II, IV and V Corps (i.e. those corps deployed along the DMZ). The Fourth Department is responsible for the operations of the remaining infantry corps, Mechanised, P’yongyang Defence, P’yongyang Anti-aircraft Artillery, Artillery and Antiaircraft Artillery Commands. The Fifth Department is responsible for the operations of the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau (i.e. special operations), the Sixth Department is responsible for


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KPAF operations. The Seventh Department for KPN operations. The Eighth Department handles planning and operations for all units subordinated to the bureaus of the General Staff Department. The Ninth Department is responsible for conducting corps-level military exercises and unit inspections. The final department is the Information Department, which is responsible for military-related business for the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom. Political business is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Cabinet. The Ordnance Bureau (aka Weapons Bureau) is headed by General O Yong-pang and is responsible for supplying ammunition, weapons and equipment to the KPA. It works in close cooperation with the Second Economic Committee. The Reconnaissance Bureau is responsible for the collection of tactical and strategic intelligence within the military sphere, and strategic special operations throughout the ROK and overseas (see chapter 7). The director of the bureau is Colonel General Kim Dae-shik (aka Kim Tae-sik). The Geological Bureau (aka Geological Bureau or Land Survey Bureau) is responsible for topographic, geologic and meteorological research, the production of maps for the KPA, and weather forecasts. Within the KPA topographic maps are considered classified materials. The Transportation Management Bureau (aka Transportation Bureau, Transport Bureau or Military Transportation Bureau) oversees the acquisition, supply and storage of motor vehicles and fuel, and controls approximately 10–15 transportation battalions of various types. It is believed to consist of a headquarters, road transport department, railroad transport department and water transport department.34 General Rear Services Bureau The General Rear Services Bureau (aka Rear General Bureau, General Bureau of Rear Services or General Logistics Bureau) is responsible for the combat service support of the KPA. Until 1995, the General Rear Service Bureau was headed by Colonel General Hyon Ch’ol-hae; however, a relative defected to the ROK and Hyon was apparently removed from his position. It is presently unclear who is the bureau director. The exact composition of the General Rear Services Bureau is uncertain. At present it is believed that there are at least 15 subordinate bureaus including Buildings Management Bureau (aka Building Control Bureau), Clothing Bureau, Energy Bureau, External



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Affairs Bureau (aka Extra Business Bureau, Military Commerce Bureau, or Military Trade Bureau), Farm Management Bureau, Finance Bureau, Medical Service Bureau, Military Decorations Management Bureau, Munitions Production Bureau, Organisation and Planning Bureau, Provisions Bureau, Rear Service Political Bureau, Road Management Bureau, Vehicle Management Bureau and Veterinary Bureau. Organisational details and exact responsibilities for many of these bureaus are presently unclear. The Clothing Bureau (aka Clothing Management Bureau, or Clothing Control Bureau) is responsible for the procurement or manufacture, storage, supply and repair of clothing for the KPA. The Energy Bureau (aka Fuel Control Bureau, Fuel Management Bureau, or Fuel Bureau) is responsible for the procurement, storage and supply of fuel. It manages a nationwide network of fuel storage and distribution facilities. It is believed that the Energy Bureau is responsible for overseeing the supply of electricity to KPA installations. The bureau may have a small number of transportation battalions subordinate to it. Like the Foreign Currency Earning Bureau of the General Staff Department, the External Affairs Bureau (aka Extra Business Bureau, Military Commerce Bureau) is involved in trade to earn foreign currency for the MPAF. Subordinate to the External Affairs Bureau are a number of trading companies including the Yungsong Trading General Bureau (aka Yungsong Trading Company or Yongsong Trading Company) and Maebong Trading Company. The exact relationships between this bureau and the Foreign Currency Earning Bureau of the General Staff Department and the External Economic Affairs Bureau of the Second Economic Committee are unclear.35 The Finance Bureau provides overall accounting, auditing, budget planning, payroll, and financial inspection services for the KPA. It also exercises financial oversight over the various trading companies of the MPAF. The Medical Service Bureau (aka Medical Bureau, or Military Physicians Bureau) provides medical training and support to the KPA. It consists of a staff, 11th Central Hospital, Ministry of People’s Armed Forces General Hospital), three specialised hospitals, Military Medical College and Kim Hyong-chik Military Medical College (aka Kim Hyong-chik Medical University). The bureau is also responsible for several additional rear area hospitals and the forward area field hospitals located within the corps deployed along the DMZ. The Medical Service Bureau also provides for the training of physicians, nurses and other medical


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personnel. The majority of the KPA’s physicians and medical personnel are trained at the Military Medical College in P’yongyang (affiliated with the 11th Central Hospital). This college offers both a six-year course (cadets are commissioned as lieutenants with full medical doctorates), and a three-year course (cadets are commissioned as junior lieutenants without doctorates). In addition, it provides a six-month basic military orientation course for civilian physicians (who enter the KPA as captains). Most cadets intern at the People’s Armed Forces General Hospital. Graduates from the six- and three-year programs are assigned to regiments and divisions before promotion to higher ranks. Civilian physicians, after completion of the six-month orientation course, usually serve at corps-level medical units. Field medics are trained on the job by the battalion surgeon.36 The Organisation and Planning Bureau is responsible for planning and coordinating General Rear Service Bureau operations, procurement, supply and security. The Provisions Bureau (aka Provisions Management Bureau, Food Control Bureau, or Food Administration Bureau) is responsible for the procurement, storage, and supply of food for the KPA. This bureau is responsible for maintaining the MPAF’s emergency war stockpiles of food and fuel. Defectors have variously reported that these emergency war stockpiles are large enough to sustain the KPA for from six months to three years. There is a General Munitions Mobilisation Bureau under the KWP Central Committee that is reportedly responsible for the storage of civilian food and fuel. The Road Management Bureau (aka Road Maintenance Management Bureau, or Military Roads Control Bureau) is responsible for the construction, administration and maintenance of roads used for military operations. It is believed to consist of a construction department, storage department, traffic administration department, and a number of independent military road administration units and maintenance battalions. The Vehicle Management Bureau (aka Vehicle Control Bureau, or Transportation Bureau) is for the procurement or manufacture, storage, repair and supply of military transportation. It apparently is also responsible for training KPA troops to operate and maintain trains. Representative Mission at Panmunjom On 24 May 1994 the DPRK announced that it was withdrawing from the Military Armistice Commission, which has overseen compliance to the Armistice Agreement since its signing in 1953.



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It replaced the Commission with the ‘Korean People’s Army Representative Mission at Panmunjom’. The primary responsibilities of the mission include management of contacts between the United Nations Command and KPA, handling the remains of missing UNC personnel, and guarding the Joint Security Area. Military Prosecution Bureau The Military Prosecution Bureau is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of military criminal suspects. It exercises administrative control over Military Prosecution elements at lower echelons and presents cases against defendants appearing before the Military Justice Bureau. During the 1990s, this bureau has been heavily involved in investigating cases of corruption within the various trading companies of the MPAF. Military Justice Bureau The Military Justice Bureau (aka Military Tribunal Bureau or Military Justice Court) supervises the legal activities of lower Military Justice Courts, reviews their decisions, and establishes judicial policy. It also conducts trials involving high-ranking officers. The jurisdiction of military courts includes both military personnel and civilians accused of violating articles of the Military Criminal Code. Violations of many minor service regulations are handled administratively by commanders or by Officers’ Courts of Honour. According to defectors, the MPAF maintains at least one ‘forced labour regiment’ for troops that have been convicted of politcal or military offences. Whether this unit is subordinate to the Military Justice Bureau or the Military Police Bureau is presently unclear. Security Command The Security Command (see chapter 7) is responsible for internal security within the KPA. It actively seeks out and exposes elements which are corrupt, disloyal or which present a threat for a coup d’état. Although organisationally subordinate to the MPAF, it is controlled by the State Security Department. General Won Ung-hui is currently the director of the Security Command. Wartime Army Commands It is currently believed that during a war of reunification the MPAF will establish two or three army commands to control corps


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combat operations. The first command, sometimes called the ‘West Coast Command’ will be responsible for conducting the assault across the DMZ in the western portion of the ROK, destruction of ROK and US forces north of Seoul and the envelopment of Seoul. Once Seoul is enveloped, it is likely that a subordinate headquarters will be established to continue operations against Seoul while the ‘West Coast Command’, concentrates on the capture of the western half of the ROK. The second command, sometimes called the ‘East Coast Command’, will be responsible for conducting the assault across the DMZ in the eastern portion of the ROK, destruction of ROK forces in the northern T’aebaek-san mountains, and the drive towards Pusan through the T’aebaek-san mountains and along the east coast. If the MPAF deems that the operations within the western and central sectors of the front will be too demanding for the ‘West Coast Command’ to handle effectively, a third army command may also be formed. It will be responsible for conducting the assault across the DMZ in the central portion of the ROK and conducting the deep encirclement of Seoul. During an offensive the MPAF will be directly responsible for rear area operations. MILITARY PRODUCTION37 The DPRK currently possesses an economic structure in which the entire process of resource allocation, procurement, manufacture and distribution is centrally controlled by the state in minute fashion. A key aspect of the DPRK’s economy, and the only segment which has shown significant growth during the past twenty years, is the defence industry. While civilian industry is managed and administered through the Cabinet (formerly the State Administration Council), the defence industry is controlled through a single organisation—the Second Economic Committee (aka Second Economy Commission). Today, the Second Economic Committee is the single most powerful and influential economic organisation within the DPRK. It exercises overall responsibility for the planning, financing, production and distribution of defencerelated equipment and technologies. Additionally, it is responsible for the majority of foreign military-related sales (e.g. ballistic missiles).38 The origins of the Second Economic Committee date to the Second KWP Congress in October 1966.39 Here, Kim Il-song



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stressed the need to develop the defence industry and to proceed with economic and national defence development simultaneously: We must strongly fortify the Korean People’s Army with modern weapons and combat material. We must employ all means to modernise the weapons and make them more powerful based on the successes of ultra-modern science and technology . . . In modernising the Korean People’s Army and developing military science and technology . . . We must develop and introduce military science and technology in accordance with the reality of our country and correctly incorporate old-style weapons along with modern weapons.40

To oversee the expansion of the defence industry, the Second Machine Industry Ministry (sometimes called Ministry of the Second Machine Industry) was established within the State Administration Council and a party secretary was appointed to oversee its operations. Since that time the defence industry has become known as the ‘second economy’.41 In 1971, as militaryrelated production continued to increase, the Second Machine Industry Ministry was reorganised into the Second Economic Committee. This committee was allocated a budget separate from that of the MPAF and was tasked with all responsibility for planning, financing, production and supplying of military materials for domestic use and foreign sales. It was also assigned a priority status for the allocation of raw materials and foreign capital. In 1971, KWP Secretary Chon Pyong-ho was appointed director of the KWP’s Defence Industry Policy and Inspection Department which controlled the Second Economic Committee. During the early 1980s, the importance and influence of the Second Economic Committee rapidly increased as military production and foreign military sales became an increasingly significant component of the DPRK’s economy. During 1993, the year after the amendment of the DPRK’s Constitution separated the National Defence Commission from the Central People’s Committee and elevated it to an equivalent position, the Second Economic Committee was subordinated to the National Defence Commission.42 The subsequent amendments to the Constitution in September 1998 appear to have had no effect upon the Second Economic Committee. Command and control The Second Economic Committee is subordinate to the National Defence Commission independent of the MPAF and KPA. The


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KWP’s Defence Industry Policy and Inspection Department (aka Defence Industry Department or Munitions Industry Department), however, provides oversight and coordination. The present director of the committee is General Kim Ch’ol-man. Chon Pyong-ho is the KWP Central Committee Secretary in charge of the Defence Industry Policy and Inspection Department.43 Sales and procurement44 The allocation of resources, production and procurement of weapons within the DPRK involves the cooperation of the KWP, Cabinet and National Defence Commission. Each year, based upon current doctrine and plans, the MPAF through its General Staff Department (especially the Artillery Command, Operations Bureau and Ordnance Bureau) and Rear Services Bureau establishes weapons requirements. These requirements are then forwarded through the National Defence Commission to the Cabinet, Central Military Committee and Second Economic Committee. Within the Cabinet, the State Planning Commission assumes responsibility and forwards these requirements to its various ministries for coordination and action. The Central Military Committee forwards its requirements through the Defence Industry Department to the Second Economic Committee. Here the requirements are reviewed and compared with the production capabilities, resources and finances available through the current multi-year economic plan. This review, when completed, is coordinated with the State Planning Commission and incorporated into an industry-wide production plan. This plan is then published in April and used to issue production orders to the various factories subordinate to the Cabinet and Second Economic Committee. In general, foreign military sales are handled by the Second Economic Committee’s External Economic Affairs Bureau, while procurement of foreign military-related equipment and technologies is believed to be handled by the Maebong Trading Company, subordinate to the General Staff Department, and other organisations of the MPAF such as the General Bureau of Technology (aka 15th Bureau). There does, however, appear to be some overlap in the responsibilities of these two organisations. Financing is arranged through various financial institutions such as the Changgwang Credit Corporation. These activities are frequently coordinated with the trading companies and various bureaus of the Foreign Ministry and the MPAF.



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Figure 2.4 Second Economic Committee

KWP Central Committee

National Defence Committee

Central Military Committee Defence Industry Policy and Inspection Department

(Coordination and oversight)

Second Economic Committee

External Economic General Bureau Yongaksan Corporation

General Bureau

Academy of Defence Sciences

Trade with foreign nations within the munitions sector

Planning, budget compilation, and procurement and distribution of materials

Third Machine Industry Bureau

Fourth Machine Industry Bureau

Artillery and MRLs

Fifth Machine Industry Bureau

Missiles (ballistic, anti-ship, antiaircraft, cruise etc.)

First Machine Industry Bureau

Second Machine Industry Bureau

Small arms and other general military equipment

Sixth Machine Industry Bureau

Nuclear, chemical Naval ships and, possibly, and equipment biological weapons

Tanks and AFVs

Seventh Machine Industry Bureau Aircraft and communications equipment

Despite severe economic difficulties during the 1990s, the DPRK purchased at least US$110 million worth of military equipment from abroad in 1995–99. Military sales have fluctuated dramatically during the 1990s. They reached US$410 million in 1991 and US$120 million in 1992—primarily as a result of the sale of ballistic missiles and related equipment and technology. In 1997 sales had declined to US$30 million, rebounding to US$60 million in 1998.45 Organisation The Second Economic Committee is headquartered in a large office building complex in Kangdong-kun, within the capital of


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P’yongyang. It is organised into nine bureaus (first through Seventh Machine Industry Bureaus, General Bureau and External Economic Affairs Bureau) and the Academy of Defence Sciences.46 Some sources indicate that there is also a ‘Material Company’ subordinate to the Second Economic Committee which is responsible for procuring supplies and materials. Whether this is correct is presently uncertain. This may actually be a reference to the General Bureau, External Economic Affairs Bureau, or even the MPAF’s Maebong Trading Company. The various machine industry bureaus coordinate their activities with their counterpart bureaus within the MPAF (e.g. the Third Machine Industry Bureau works with the Artillery Command) and the Academy of Defence Sciences. Each bureau exercises day-to-day control over its subordinate facilities and organisations through a network of branch offices located throughout the country. A total of approximately 134 factories are believed to be controlled by the Second Economic Committee—41 specialty factories, 59 maintenance and parts factories and 34 related factories.47 These factories are typically designated using numbers, or cover names, so as to conceal their function and the types of weapons production they are involved in (e.g. the 26 Factory). The majority of these factories are hardened to some extent— being built completely or partially underground, having redundant critical components located underground, or having underground facilities prepared to accept the transfer of equipment in times of war. A number of factories subordinate to the Cabinet’s Light Industry, and Metal and Machine Industry Ministries perform a secondary role within the defence infrastructure. These factories are known as ‘Il-yong branch plants’ or ‘Il-yong plants’. Twenty-one such facilities are believed to have completed advance preparations for conversion to defence production during wartime. In addition to its own dedicated production facilities, the Second Economic Committee exercises some degree of control over certain production lines within factories subordinate to the Cabinet. Even within those factories where there is no direct Second Economic Committee involvement, production orders from the committee are assigned a high priority. During wartime, it is believed that the Second Economic Committee would assume control over all factories capable of defence-related production.48



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General Bureau Exercises overall responsibility for planning, budget compilation, and procurement and distribution of materials for the Second Economic Committee and its subordinate entities. First Machine Industry Bureau Responsible for the development and production of conventional small arms (probably up to 82 mm), ammunition and general military equipment. Most factories and enterprises subordinate to the First Machine Industry Bureau are located in the major industrial areas of the country, such as P’yongyang, Ch’ongjin, Kanggye and Sinuiju. Several factories specialising in small arms are located in Chinch’on, Chagang-do; engineering equipment is manufactured in four factories located in Hamhung, Hamgyong-namdo and Tokch’on, P’yongan-namdo. Second Machine Industry Bureau Responsible for the acquisition, development and production of tanks, armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) and probably military trucks. The vehicles in active or reserve status within the KPA are shown in Table 2.2. Table 2.2 Tanks and armoured fighting vehicles Tanks

Armoured Fighting Vehicles

PT–76 amphibious light tank PT–85 (Type–82?) amphibious light tank SU–100 assault gun T–34/85 medium tank T–54/55 medium tank T–62 medium tank T–72 medium tank Type–59 medium tank Type–62 light tank Type–63 amphibious light tank Ch’onma-ho medium tank IS–2 heavy tank

BMP–1 (Korshun) BDRM–2 BTR–40 BTR–50 BTR–60PA/PB BTR–152 M–1992/1 Model 531A MTLB Type–85 ATGM VTT–323 (M–1973) VTT–323 ATGM (M–1992)

Many of these vehicles have been produced in several variants. For example, there are at least four versions of the Ch’onma-ho tank distinguished by different fittings of external boxes, fuel tanks and, in the case of the latest version, reactive armour.49 During the 1990s the Second Machine Industry Bureau has overseen the acquisition of small quantities of specialised foreign


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components for KPA tanks and AFVs. An example of this has been the purchase of tank engines from Slovakia.50 It is believed that this bureau worked in coordination with the Fourth Machine Industry Bureau to procure and develop the transporter–erector–launchers (TELs), mobile–erector–launchers (MELs), and specialised vehicles for the various coastal defence and ballistic missile programs. Third Machine Industry Bureau Responsible for the development and production of artillery (probably greater than 82 mm), anti-aircraft artillery, self-propelled artillery and multiple rocket launcher systems. It coordinates its activities with both the MPAF’s Artillery Command and the Second Machine Industry Bureau. During the past 20 years this bureau has overseen the production of numerous self-propelled (SP) artillery and multiple rocket launchers (MRL) including those shown in Table 2.3. Table 2.3 Self-propelled artillery and multiple rocket launchers Artillery

MRL

120 mm SP combination gun M–1992 122 mm SP gun M–1981 122 mm SP gun-howitzer M–1977 122 mm SP howitzer M–1991 130 mm SP gun M–1975 130 mm SP gun M–1981 130 mm SP gun M–1991 130 mm SP gun M–1992 152 mm SP gun-howitzer M–1974 152 mm gun-howitzer M–1985 170 mm SP gun (Koksan) M–1978 170 mm SP gun (Koksan) M–1989

107 mm SP M–1992/2 107 mm SP VTT323 122 mm SP 122 mm SP 240 mm SP 240 mm SP

Anti-aircraft MRL MRL M–1992 MRL MRL MRL MRL

M–1985 BM–11 M–1985 M–1991

14.5 mm SP AA gun M–1983 23 mm SP AA gun M–1992 30 mm SP AA gun M–1992 37 mm SP AA gun M–1992

A number of these systems have been exported to countries in the Middle East (e.g. Iran, Syria). Notable among these systems are the 170 mm SP gun M–1989, which has a range of 50 km with a rocket assisted projectile and the 240 mm SP MRL M–1985/ M–1991, which have ranges of 45 km.



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During the 1990s the Third Machine Industry Bureau has overseen the acquisition of small quantities of foreign anti-aircraft systems. An example of this was the purchase of 24 surplus AAA systems from Kazakhstan in October 1995.51 Fourth Machine Industry Bureau Responsible for the procurement, development and production of all missile systems within the DPRK. It is believed to be subdivided into components based upon system type (e.g. anti-tank, anti-ship/coastal defence, air-to-air and surface-to-surface). The bureau has imported or produced the anti-tank guided missile (ATGM), anti-ship missile (ASM), surface-to-air missile (SAM) and air-to-air missile (AAM) systems shown in Table 2.4. Table 2.4 Missiles ATGM

ASM/ALCM

SAM

AAM

AT–1 SNAPPER AT–3 SAGGER AT–4 SPIGOT AT–5 SPANDREL

SS-N–2a STYX SSC–2b SAMLET HY–1/CSS-C–2

SA–2B/C/D/E/F GUIDELINE HQ–2B/F/J/P SA–3b GOA SA–5 GAMMON HN–5/5A SA–7B52 GRAIL

K–13 AA–2

SILKWORM

HY–1/CSS-N–2 SAFFLOWER

SY–1/CSS-N–1 SCRUBBRUSH

HY–2/CSS-C–3 SEERSUCKER

AG–1 Exocet (?) Unnamed ALCM

ATOLL

CSA–3A

PL–2 PL–5 PL–7 R–24 AA–7 APEX R–27 AA–10 ALAMO R–60 AA–8

PGLM Stinger (?)

R–73 AA–11

SA–14 GREMLIN

SA–16 GIMLET

APHID ARCHER

The bureau has also been responsible for developing selfpropelled tracked launchers for the STYX and SA–3, electronic countermeasure (ECM)-resistant versions of its SAMs, air- and ground launched anti-ship cruise missiles (e.g. AG–1), and AAMs. Recent defectors indicate that the DPRK has obtained examples of the French Exocet and US Stinger and is attempting to reverseengineer them.53 The Fourth Machine Industry Bureau is responsible for the DPRK’s production of the Hwasong 5/6 (Scud B/C), No-dong and Taep’o-dong series of ballistic missiles and controls a number of missile-related test and production facilities (see chapter 8). It is not known what role, if any, the bureau has undertaken in the construction of ballistic missile installations by the construction bureaus of the MPAF and the Ministry of Public Security.


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Fifth Machine Industry Bureau Responsible for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons development in coordination with a variety of other organisations such as the Atomic Energy Committee, Academy of Sciences and Academy of Defence Sciences (see chapter 8).54 Sixth Machine Industry Bureau Responsible for the development and production of naval ships, submarines and naval-related equipment (see chapter 4). Since the early 1970s the DPRK has been engaged in the production of a wide variety of warships. Most of these have been small patrol (SINHUNG-class PT, SOHUNG-class PTG etc.) or amphibious warfare craft (NAMP’O-class LCPF, HANTAE-class LSM etc.), although three frigates were also built (1 SOHO-class FF and 2 NAJIN-class FFL). During 1987, construction of the high-speed KONG BANG-class LCPA (landing craft, personal, air-cushion) began. This class is based on commercial technology imported from the United Kingdom and Western Europe. This was followed in the 1990s by production of the NAMP’O A/B-class LCPA. More than 135 vessels of these two classes are currently in service. During the past several years the DPRK has armed some of these hovercraft with the STYX anti-ship missile. Additional projects during the 1990s include the construction of SANG-O-class coastal submarines, an unidentified 1000-tonne coastal submarine, YUGO-class midget submarines, small semi-submersible infiltration craft, hovercraft, and a ‘stealth’ patrol boat (see chapter 4). Seventh Machine Industry Bureau Responsible for the procurement, development and production of communication equipment and aircraft. The aircraft industry has only achieved a very basic level of development. The vast majority of all aircraft and helicopters have been imported from Eastern Europe, Russia and the PRC. The DPRK’s aircraft industry is centred primarily around the Seventh Machine Industry Bureau’s aircraft factory at Panghyon which was completed in 1986. This facility has been primarily engaged in depot-level maintenance and the assembly of aircraft from knock-down components. During the 1980s it was producing parts for MiG–15 and MiG–17 fighters, and began producing YAK–18 trainers and An–2/Y–5 biplane transports. It also assembled a number of the MiG–29s provided to the DPRK in ‘knock-down’ condition, the first of which was



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completed during early 1992. The Seventh Machine Industry Bureau has, at various times, been reported as being interested in producing the MiG–21 and MiG–29, but no such production has taken place. During the 1990s the bureau has overseen a number of aircraft-related projects, including the production of an improved An–2, production of the Hyokshin–2 helicopter (a variant of the Mi–2); modification of the IL–28 to carry anti-ship cruise missiles; and modification of at least one An–24 to mount a MiG–29 radar (see chapter 5). External Economic Affairs Bureau The External Economic Affairs Bureau is more commonly known as the Yongaksan Corporation. It is responsible for foreign military sales and, to a lesser degree, the procurement of foreign militaryrelated equipment.55 Among the activities of the Yongaksan Corporation, the most well known have been the sale of Hwasong 5/6 ballistic missiles and related technologies to Iran and Syria, and No-dong missiles to Iran and Pakistan (see chapter 9).56 Financing for these sales was funnelled through the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation, which may be subordinate to the External Economic Affairs Bureau.57 During the 1990s, the Yongaksan Corporation has reportedly been involved in continuing attempts to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological, missile and military-related technology in the PRC, Japan, Taiwan and the former Soviet Union. 58 The relationships between this bureau and the General Staff Department’s Foreign Currency Earning Bureau and the General Logistic Bureau’s External Economic Affairs Bureau are unclear. Academy of Defence Sciences The Academy of Defence Sciences (aka Academy of National Defence Sciences, Second Academy of Natural Sciences, Second Natural Sciences Institute, National Defence Institute) was founded in the early 1960s and is responsible for all defence-related research and development. It is headed by Chu Kyu-ch’ang and headquartered immediately north of P’yongyang in the Yongsongyok area, P’yongyang-si.59 The academy is organised into divisions by fields of specialty (e.g. Guided Missile Division, Electrical and Electronics Division, and Metal and Chemical Materials Division) and consists of approximately 40 institutes specialising in specific fields (e.g. Chemical Research Institute in Hamhung, Bacteriological Institute in Sohae, Medical Research Institute, Pakch’on


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Atomic Energy Research Centre, Electronics and Guidance Systems Institute in Kanggye). The Academy of Defence Sciences works directly with the Academy of Sciences—which is under the Cabinet—Kanggye Military Academy, Yongbyon nuclear research complex and other scientific and research organisations.60 Trading companies It is estimated that there are in excess of 150 trading companies subordinate to the MPAF, KWP and Ministry of Public Security involved in foreign currency earning operations. Of these, the following have been, or currently are, involved in arms sales or purchases: Changgwang Sinyong Corporation (aka Changgwang Credit Corporation, Chang-gwang Credit Corporation, Changgwang Enterprise General Bureau, or North Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation/Bureau)61; Korea Pugang Trading Corporation62; Kumkangsan Trading Company; Maebong Trading Company/Corporation (aka Maebong General Bureau); Mangyong Trading Company/Corporation (aka Mang-yong Trading Company/ Corporation); Yongaksan Corporation (aka Korea Ryongaksan General Trading Company, Yongaksan Company, Yongaksan Trading Company, Yongaksan Trading Corporation, Yongaksan Machinery and Plant Trading Firm, Yonghansan Trading Company, Lyongaksan Machineries & Equipment Export Corporation, General External Economic Affairs Bureau and External Economic General Bureau); Yonhop Trading Company/Corporation; Zokwang Trading Company (aka Zowkwang Trading Company, Zok Wang Trading Company, Chogwang Trading Company and Chokwang Trading Company).



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Korean People’s Army ground forces OREAN EOPLE’S RMY GROUND FORCES

K

P

A

With approximately 1 million active-duty troops, the KPA ground forces are the largest and most formidable of the KPA’s components. The size, organisation and combat capabilities of the ground forces provide the DPRK with substantial defensive and offensive capabilities. The primary mission of the KPA’s ground forces component is the defence of the DPRK and the protection of the Kim Chong-il regime. Secondary missions include reunification of the Korean Peninsula, conducting special operations missions and internal security.1 During the past 20 years the KPA has expended significant time, energy and resources in improving the organisation and equipment of its ground forces. Notable improvements include the reorganisation of a number of motorised infantry divisions and mechanised brigades into mechanised corps; and the production and fielding of new tanks and long-range self-propelled artillery systems (e.g. 240 mm multiple rocket launchers and 170 mm self-propelled guns). This has been accomplished during a period of expanding economic crisis which has limited access to foreign equipment and precipitated fuel shortages, restricting training and operations. Complicating this has been a series of floods and famines that have affected every aspect of life within the DPRK. Despite preferential treatment, the effects of these domestic crises on the KPA ground component have been significant, especially upon units deployed within the rear areas. Morale and discipline problems are increasing, training has decreased and some units have difficulty in maintaining operational readiness. Despite these difficulties the KPA ground force component is currently judged to be capable of defending the territory of the DPRK, conducting special operations against the ROK and Japan, 56


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K OREAN P EOPLE’S A RMY GROUND FORCES

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and maintaining internal security. It currently maintains the capability to initiate a war of reunification against the ROK with little warning; however, it has a declining capability to prosecute such a war for an extended period of time. ORGANISATION AND DISPOSITION The ground force component of the KPA is composed of approximately 1 003 000 personnel organised into 20 corps (12 infantry, four mechanised infantry, one tank, two artillery, and the P’yongyang Defence Command) and the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau (formerly the VIII Special Purpose Corps). These corps consist of 176 combat divisions and brigades, comprising: 33 infantry/ motorised infantry divisions/brigades, 37 paramilitary training unit divisions (reserve units), one tank division, one ballistic missile division, 13 tank brigades, 25 mechanised brigades, 31 artillery/ MRL/heavy mortar brigades, 14 light infantry brigades, three airborne brigades, three airborne sniper brigades, two Navy sniper brigades, three sniper brigades, six coastal security brigades and four border security brigades. The force is augmented by a number of specialised units subordinate to General Staff Department bureaus (see chapter 2) and a large number of special operations qualified personnel within the intelligence and internal security agencies (see chapter 7). KPA ground forces are deployed in four broad echelons. The first echelon, consisting of the I, II, IV and V Infantry Corps, is deployed along the DMZ where it can defend the DMZ or be rapidly committed to a cross-DMZ assault. It consists of some of the best-equipped and trained infantry units. The 620th Artillery Corps is also forward deployed and well protected in underground emplacements. Without displacing it is capable of delivering deep fire support for the first echelon. Immediately behind these forces is the second echelon, which consists of the 820th Tank Corps, 806th Mechanised Corps and 815th Mechanised Corps. These forces are deployed along the primary avenues of approach, to provide effective support, for exploiting breakthroughs, and to serve as a mobile reserve to defend P’yongyang or the coastlines. The third echelon is deployed in the central DPRK and P’yongyang areas and consists of the III, VII, XII Infantry Corps, an unidentified infantry corps, Kangdong Artillery Corps and the P’yongyang Defence Command. These forces are responsible for the defence of P’yongyang and the vulnerable coasts, or reinforcement of any



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Map 3.1 KPA corps order of battle (boundaries are approximations)

People’s Republic of China

IX

X

425th Mechanised Corps

XI East Sea (Sea of Japan)

VII VIII

108th Mechanised Corps III P’yongyang Defence Command 815th Mechanised Corps

XII Corps Unidentified Corps 806th Mechanised Corps

P’yongyang

Kangdong Artillery Corps I V

Korea Bay

IV

II

620th Artillery Corps Seoul

820th Tank Corps

Republic of Korea

N

exploitation by the first and second echelons. The fourth echelon is deployed within the DPRK’s strategic rear and consists of the VIII, IX, X, XI Infantry Corps, 425th Mechanised Corps and 108th Mechanised Corps. These forces are responsible for the defence of strategic rear areas and for reinforcing the third echelon. The overall deployment of the KPA is such that approximately 70 per cent of all active duty units are located south of the P’yongyang–Wonsan line. The deployment of the KPA ground forces, while dictated by terrain, also provides for a strong defence and facilitates an attack


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on the ROK with no redeployment and little warning. It is estimated that if the DPRK decided to initiate hostilities, the ROK and US would have at most 24–36 hours warning under ideal conditions, or as little as 12 hours if the KPA was already at an alerted status. Whichever it is, it is a very short timeframe within which to react, order an evacuation of civilians and dependants and brace for attack/counterattack. The designations of the KPA’s infantry corps have caused some confusion during the late 1990s, with some sources still identifying a VI Infantry Corps. This is incorrect. During April 1995 a significant portion of the command staff from the VI Corps headquartered in Ch’ongjin, along with officers from the corps General Political Department and local government officials, were arrested and convicted of bribery and corruption. As a result of this incident, the VI Corps was dissolved in June 1995. The units comprising the corps were reorganised under the headquarters and support staff of the IX Corps, which had previously located in the Wonsan area. Some of the combat units of the two corps are believed to have been swapped. Those units that ended up in the Wonsan area then were placed under the command of a new and, as of yet, unidentified corps headquarters. This reorganisation/ redeployment took the better part of a month to accomplish. This incident has been widely, and incorrectly, reported as a foiled coup attempt against Kim Chong-il.2 ARTILLERY COMMAND The Artillery Command exercises administrative control over all artillery units including the supply of all weapons, ammunition, prime movers, support and fire control equipment. It is responsible for the combat readiness of all artillery units and controls tactical and technical training, mobilisation, weapons and ammunition issue and weapons repair. The Artillery Command works closely with the Third Machine Industry Bureau of the Second Economic Committee (see chapter 2) on ammunition production and weapons design. Under orders from the Operations Department it develops deployment planning and allocates fire support to the corps. Under the command of General Kim Ha-kyu, the Artillery Command is believed to be organised with a headquarters, artillery bureau, missile bureau, ordnance bureau and Combined Artillery Officers School (aka General Artillery Officers School).3 Subordinate to the ordnance bureau there is believed to be a



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number of ordnance, maintenance and ammunition depots. During peacetime the artillery bureau probably exercises operational control over the 620th and Kangdong Artillery Corps and a number of independent heavy artillery/mortar/MRL brigades (e.g. 130 mm SP and 170 mm SP), while the responsibilities of the missile bureau are presently unknown. Wartime would probably see individual brigades placed under the operational control of manoeuvre commanders with the Artillery Command maintaining administrative and logistic control. During the mid-1980s the Artillery Command was credited with two subordinate MRL divisions.4 These units were subsequently reorganised to form the 620th and Kangdong Artillery Corps. The Combined Artillery Officers School offers a three-year tactical course and a two-year technical course. Additionally, there is a one-year NCO course. The KPA has an inventory of 12 000 artillery and 2300 MRL systems greater than 107 mm, the majority of which are modern 122 mm, 130 mm, 152 mm and 170 mm self-propelled artillery systems and 240 mm self-propelled MRLs (see chapter 2 for a listing of these systems). There are additional older systems in service with the reserves.5 MECHANISED COMMAND The Mechanised Command (aka Tank Instruction Guidance Bureau, Tank Command or Armoured Command) exercises administrative control over all tank and mechanised units in much the same manner as the Artillery Command does for artillery units. It is responsible for the combat readiness of all tank and mechanised units and controls tactical and technical training, mobilisation, weapons and ammunition issue and weapons repair. It works closely with the Second Machine Industry Bureau of the Second Economic Committee (see chapter 2) with regard to ammunition production and weapons design. The command is believed to be organised with a headquarters, mechanised bureau ordnance bureau and school bureau. Subordinate to the ordnance bureau there is believed to be national-level ordnance, maintenance and ammunition depots. The mechanised bureau probably exercises operational control over a number of independent battalions (e.g. three–five light tank) and what is believed to be a training brigade. The training brigade is believed to have separate training battalions for tanks, mechanised infantry, self-propelled artillery and artillery. The ordnance bureau is


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responsible for at least two ordnance depots (aka tank repair depots). The school bureau controls the Armour Officers School and is believed to be divided into three components—driver, officer candidate/NCO and a training brigade. The Armour Officers School offers a three-year tactical course and a technical course. Additionally, there are one-year officer advanced and NCO courses. The KPA has an inventory of approximately 4000 tanks and assault guns, and 2500 armoured personnel carriers. Although the DPRK has been producing tanks such as the T–62 (Ch’onma-ho), Type–62 light tank, Type–63 amphibious light tank and PT–85 (Type–82) light tank, the most numerous type in service is the older Type–59/T–55/T–54 medium tanks. The KPA also retains a number of even older T–34 medium tanks and SU–100 assault guns, which are believed to be in use within rear area corps and paramilitary training unit divisions. Armoured fighting vehicles include the, BMP–1 (Korshun), M–1973 VTT–323, M–1992 VTT– 323 ATGM, Type–85 and M–1992/1. There are also significant numbers of BTR–152s, BTR–50s and BTR–60s in KPA service.6 It is important to understand that the KPA’s concept of ‘mechanisation’ is different from that currently used by the ROK or the US. With regard to infantry forces, ‘mechanisation’ is designed to provide rapid ‘protected’ movement to combat. The vast majority of the KPA’s mechanised infantry forces will travel in armoured personnel carriers or trucks, not infantry fighting vehicles. Once they arrive at their destination these forces will dismount and fight as conventional infantry. While the KPA does possess a number of BMP–1 infantry fighting vehicles, they appear to be used primarily as armoured personnel carriers not for fighting a mounted battle. With regard to artillery and air defence forces, ‘mechanisation’ is designed to provide enhanced mobility and protection. The KPA’s efforts at ‘mechanisation’ during the past 20 years have been primarily directed towards fielding tanks, selfpropelled artillery and self-propelled anti-aircraft systems, not the acquisition of large quantities of armoured personnel carriers or infantry fighting vehicles. Thus, anywhere from 40 to 60 per cent of any KPA mechanised infantry unit is actually truck mobile. ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY COMMAND The Anti-aircraft Artillery Command (aka Air Defence Command) is believed to exercise administrative control over all anti-aircraft



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artillery and air defence related (e.g. searchlight, radar) units of the KPA. It is responsible for combat readiness, controls tactical and technical training, mobilisation, weapons and ammunition issue and weapons repair. It works closely with the Third Machine Industry Bureau of the Second Economic Committee (see chapter 2) with regard to ammunition production and weapons design. The command may also exercise operational control over a small number of anti-aircraft artillery and air defence related units. The nature of the relationship between the Anti-aircraft Artillery Command and the KPAF is currently unknown. The KPAF (see chapter 5) rather than the Anti-aircraft Artillery Command appears to control all SAM brigades. Likewise unknown is the nature of the relationship between the Anti-aircraft Artillery Command and the anti-aircraft artillery units of the KPAF and the P’yongyang Anti-aircraft Artillery Command (see chapter 5). INFANTRY CORPS At present there are 12 infantry corps, designated as I, II, III, IV, V, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII and an unidentified corps.7 The organisation of the infantry corps is flexible, with the number of organic and attached units dependent upon the corps’ mission and area of responsibility. There are two distinct groupings of infantry corps— forward and rear. Forward corps are larger and better equipped than rear corps, having their full complement of personnel, more modern weapons, and a larger and more diverse number of organic and attached units. This disparity between forward and rear units follows down through subordinate units. The I, II, and V Infantry Corps are considered forward corps and are organised in a similar fashion. Although not adjacent to the DMZ, the IV Corps is organised in a similar manner as the three forward corps. Each is composed of: headquarters, five–six infantry or motorised infantry divisions, tank brigade, two–three light infantry brigades (attached from the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau), sniper brigade (attached from the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau), MRL brigade (122 mm/240 mm), artillery or self-propelled artillery brigade (122 mm/130 mm/152 mm), artillery instrument reconnaissance battalion, anti-aircraft artillery regiment (14.5 mm/37 mm/57 mm), ATGM battalion regiment (AT–3/4/5), anti-tank gun battalion (85 mm/100 mm), reconnaissance battalion, engineer river crossing brigade (attached from the engineer bureau), engineer river crossing brigade, technical engineer battalion, road


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122/130/152 mm

HQ

MRL

EW/SIGINT

122/240 mm

(x5–6)

Figure 3.1 Infantry corps (forward)

Technical

Recon.

(x2–3)

Road

14.5/37/57 mm

Light

(Attached)

AT–3/4/5

Sniper

(x2)

Wire

85/100 mm

64


construction engineer battalion, electronic warfare/SIGINT battalion, communications regiment, wire maintenance battalion, nuclear– chemical defence battalion, transportation battalion, maintenance battalion, two hospitals. The I Corps is also believed to have two heavy mortar regiments (160 mm) attached from the Artillery Command. Additional engineer brigades, such as tracked amphibian (K–61), and pontoon bridging, are attached to the II and V Corps from the Engineer Bureau. The technical engineer and road construction battalions may actually be brigades. Total personnel strength for a forward deployed corps is approximately 66 000–76 000. The III, V, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII Infantry Corps and the unidentified infantry corps are considered rear corps and are smaller in size and less well equipped than the forward corps. Each is composed of: headquarters, two–five infantry divisions, tankbrigade, MRL brigade (122 mm/240 mm), artillery brigade (122 mm/ 130 mm/152 mm), artillery instrument reconnaissance battalion, anti-aircraft artillery regiment (14.5 mm/37 mm/57 mm), antitank gun battalion (85 mm/100 mm), ATGM battalion regiment (AT–1/3), reconnaissance battalion, technical engineer battalion, road construction engineer battalion, communications regiment, wire maintenance battalion, nuclear–chemical defence battalion, transportation battalion, maintenance battalion, one–two hospitals. At least half of the corps’ infantry units will come from mobilised Paramilitary Training Unit divisions. Some of these corps may also include an assault gun battalion (i.e. SU–100). It is unlikely that the X and XI Corps have tank brigades.8 Additional engineer brigades, such as tracked amphibian (K–61), or pontoon bridging, are attached to the III and VII Corps from the Engineer Bureau. The VII Corps has a light infantry brigade attached from the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau. Total personnel strength for a rear corps is approximately 29 000–49 000. The primary components of a corps headquarters (both forward or rear) follow the general pattern of the MPAF, consisting of a command element, General Staff Department, General Political Department (aka Political Department), Security Department (aka Political Safety Department), Artillery Department, Rear Service Department, Military Prosecution Office and Military Justice Office (aka Military Court). The General Political Department reports to the MPAF’s General Political Bureau and not the corps commander. The transportation battalion, maintenance battalion and field hospitals are subordinate to the Rear Service Department. Also within the headquarters are a security guard company,


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HQ

Technical

Recon.

(x2–4)

Figure 3.2 Infantry corps (rear)

Road

14.5/37/57 mm

(Not X and XI Corps)

AT–1/3

(x1–2)

122/130/152 mm

Wire

85/100 mm

(VII Corps)

Light

(Attached)

SU–100

(III and VII Corps)

66


military band and an NCO school. Corps, especially forward corps, have a number of additional battalions or regiments attached from the various General Staff Department bureaus. The attached light infantry brigade is tasked with conducting enveloping and flanking attacks, infiltration operations and unconventional and special warfare operations throughout the corps area of operations. Operations in the area beyond this (i.e. the ROK/US strategic rear) are the responsibility of the special operations units subordinate to the Light Infantry Guidance Bureau. It is currently believed that there are ten light infantry brigades within the forward corps—I Corps, two; II Corps, three; IV Corps, three and V Corps, two (75th? and 80th?).9 Total personnel strength is 3200–3700 (see below). The infantry/motorised infantry division is composed of: headquarters, three infantry or motorised infantry regiments, light infantry battalion, tank battalion, artillery regiment (122 mm/152 mm), mortar regiment (120 mm), MRL battalion (122 mm), anti-tank gun battalion (76 mm/85 mm/100 mm), anti-aircraft artillery battalion (14.5 mm/37 mm/57 mm/SA-7/SA-14), engineer battalion, communications battalion, electronic warfare/SIGINT battalion, reconnaissance company, nuclear–chemical defence company, DMZ police battalion (only in divisions deployed along the DMZ), military police company, transportation company, maintenance company, hospital, training battalion. Infantry and motorised infantry divisions are believed to be organised in the same manner except that the motorised infantry divisions have a larger number of organic motor vehicles and the artillery regiment and anti-aircraft battalion are generally selfpropelled. In forward corps the anti-aircraft artillery battalion may be a regiment and a small number of divisions which cover difficult terrain have four infantry regiments. The artillery regiment within rear area divisions may be equipped with 85 mm, 100 mm, or 122 mm systems. The electronic warfare/SIGINT battalion is only found in some divisions—probably those deployed along the DMZ. Additionally, some rear area divisions may be lacking tank and light infantry battalions. The DMZ police battalion is only found in divisions deployed along the DMZ and consists of 8–12 DMZ police companies. Other divisions are believed to have a single military police company. DMZ police companies are formed into two groups. The first patrols the DMZ, while the second patrols the division’s rear areas. The two groups rotate responsibilities every several months.


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122 mm

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HQ (x3)

[2]

76/85/100 mm

[1]

DMZ police

14.5/37/57 mm

Figure 3.3 Infantry/motorised infantry division

MP

Light

Training

EW/SIGINT

120 mm

[1] In motorised divisions the infantry regiments are motorised. [2] Only in divisions found in divisions deployed along the DMZ.

122/152 mm

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The organisation of the division headquarters mimics that of the corps headquarters. The transportation company, maintenance company and field hospital are subordinate to the Rear Service Department. Also within the headquarters are a security guard platoon, military band and a training unit. Total personnel strength for an infantry/motorised infantry division is approximately 9000–12 000. The infantry/motorised infantry regiment is composed of: headquarters, three infantry or motorised infantry battalions, mortar battalion (120 mm), MRL battery (107 mm), anti-tank gun battery (76 mm/85 mm), ATGM battery (AT–1/3), anti-aircraft artillery battalion (14.5 mm), engineer company, communications company, transportation company, reconnaissance platoon, nuclear– chemical defence platoon. Some motorised units may have a self-propelled MRL battery. In forward area corps the MRL battery may be a battalion. Total personnel strength is approximately 2000–2300. The infantry/motorised infantry battalion is composed of: headquarters, three infantry or motorised infantry companies, mortar battery (82 mm), anti-tank platoon (82 mm B–10), antiaircraft artillery battery (14.5 mm), transportation company. The 14.5 mm anti-aircraft battery is only found in some battalions. The transportation company is only found in motorised infantry battalions. There are two types of motorised infantry battalions, one organised around 30 small cargo trucks and the other around 16–18 long bed cargo trucks. Total personnel strength is approximately 435–485. MECHANISED CORPS The mechanised corps resulted from a reorganisation of the KPA’s motorised divisions and mechanised brigades during the early 1980s. At present there are four mechanised corps which are designated the 108th, 425th, 806th and 815th.10 The organisation of these corps appears to be flexible, with the number of organic and attached units dependent upon the corps’ mission and area of responsibility. Like the infantry corps there appear to be two distinct groupings—forward (425th and 806th) and rear (108th and 425th). The forward corps are probably somewhat larger and better equipped than the rear corps. The mechanised corps are composed of: headquarters, four–six mechanised infantry brigades, tank brigade, light infantry brigade (attached from the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau),


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HQ

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AT–3/4/5

(x4–6)

Technical

122/152 mm

EW/SIGINT

(x1–2)

14.5/37 mm

(Attached)

Figure 3.4 Mechanised corps

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self-propelled artillery brigade (122 mm/152 mm), self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery regiment (14.5 mm/37 mm), ATGM battalion, reconnaissance battalion, technical engineer battalion, electronic warfare/SIGINT battalion, communications regiment, nuclear– chemical defence battalion, transportation battalion, maintenance battalion, one–two hospitals. It is unclear whether each corps has a tank brigade or if the light infantry brigade is actually attached to the corps from the Light Infantry and Guidance Bureau, or is simply deployed in the same general areas as the corps. In some corps the self-propelled antiaircraft regiment may be a battalion. Total personnel strength of a mechanised corps is approximately 25 000–35 000. The mechanised infantry brigade is composed of: headquarters, two–three mechanised infantry battalions, two–four motorised infantry battalions, light infantry battalion, tank battalion, one–two artillery battalions (122 mm), artillery battalion (152 mm), mortar battalion (120 mm), self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery battalion (14.5 mm/SA-14), anti-tank gun battery (76 mm/85 mm), MRL battery (107 mm), engineer battalion, communications battalion, reconnaissance company, nuclear–chemical defence company, transportation company. The anti-aircraft artillery battalion is towed in some units. Not all units have a light infantry battalion. The anti-tank battery may be a mixed battalion of 76 mm guns and AT–3 ATGMs. Total personnel strength is approximately 6000. The mechanised infantry battalion is composed of: headquarters, three mechanised infantry companies, mortar battery (120 mm), self-propelled anti-tank platoon (82 mm B–10). The battalion contains approximately five M–1967 and 45 M–1973 APCs. It has a total personnel strength of approximately 550. 820TH TANK CORPS The 820th Tank Corps is the KPA’s only tank corps. It resulted from a reorganisation of the KPA’s Yu Kyong-su 105th Seoul Guards Tank Division, ‘Koksan’ Tank Division, tank brigades and mechanised brigades during the early 1980s.11 While the tank brigades and battalions of the infantry corps and their subordinate units are generally equipped with older model tanks such as the Type–59 and T–54/55, the 820th Tank Corps is believed to be equipped with a high proportion of the more modern T–62 (Ch’onma-ho) tanks.


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14.5/23/37 mm 122/130/152 mm 122/240 mm

Technical

(x5)

(x1–2)

MRL

HQ

Figure 3.5 820th Tank Corps



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The postulated organisation for the 820th Tank Corps is: headquarters, five tank brigades, one–two mechanised infantry brigades, MRL brigade (122 mm/240 mm), self-propelled artillery brigade (122 mm/130 mm/152 mm), self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery regiment (37 mm/57 mm), reconnaissance battalion, engineer river crossing regiment, technical engineer battalion, communications battalion, nuclear–chemical defence battalion, transportation battalion, maintenance battalion, hospital. The communications battalion may be a regiment. Total personnel strength is approximately 22 000–32 000. The tank brigade is composed of: headquarters, three–five tank battalions, light tank battalion, one–two mechanised infantry battalions, two self-propelled artillery battalions (M–1981 122 mm SP gun), self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery battalion (14.5 mm/ 37 mm), MRL battery (107 mm), reconnaissance company, engineer company, communications company, nuclear–chemical defence company, transportation company. The nuclear–chemical defence company may be a platoon. Only some units have a transportation company. The tank brigade (with three tank battalions) has a total of 93–95 medium tanks, 41 light tanks and 44–77 armoured personnel carriers. Total personnel strength for this brigade is approximately 3800. The tank battalion is composed of a headquarters and three tank companies. It has a total of 31 medium tanks and 180–190 personnel. The light tank battalion is composed of a headquarters and four tank companies. It has a total of 41 light tanks and 180–190 personnel. The best known tank unit within the KPA is the Yu Kyong-su 105th Seoul Guards Tank Division which was established in May 1947 as the 15th Tank Brigade and was subsequently redesignated the 105th Tank Brigade. The unit fought with distinction during the first phase of the Fatherland Liberation War and for its efforts was elevated to division status and received the honorific title of ‘Seoul’. Shortly afterwards it was also awarded the honorific ‘Guard’. Following three months of fighting the unit was decimated by constant UN air strikes and forced to return north, where it spent the following year reorganising. While retaining the division designator, the unit was only the size of a brigade. For the remainder of the war the unit played only a minor supporting role in the fighting. During the war the division produced 19 Heroes of the Republic and members received some 1100 orders and decorations.12


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23/37 mm 122 mm

HQ

(x2)

Figure 3.6 Yu Kyong-su 105th Seoul Guards Tank Division



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During the 1960s it was reorganised and enlarged once again to division size and was subordinated to the newly formed Mechanised Command. During the early 1980s the Mechanised Command was reorganised and the division was disbanded and its two tank brigades (one of which apparently retained the 105th Seoul Guards designator) subordinated to the P’yongyang Defence Command. During the 1990s the two brigades were separated from the P’yongyang Defence Command, formed into the 105th Seoul Guards Tank Division, and subordinated to the 820th Tank Corps. During 1996 the unit was awarded the additional honorific of ‘Yu Kyong-su’ (Yu had been the wartime commander of the unit when it captured Seoul).13 The Yu Kyong-su 105th Seoul Guards Tank Division is composed of: headquarters, two tank brigades, mechanised infantry brigade, self-propelled artillery regiment (122 mm), self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery regiment (37 mm/57 mm), reconnaissance battalion, communications battalion, nuclear–chemical defence company, transportation battalion, maintenance battalion. The division has a total of personnel strength of 17 000–18 000 and approximately 217 medium tanks, 82 light tanks and 210 armoured personnel carriers. 620TH AND KANGDONG ARTILLERY CORPS The 620th and Kangdong Artillery Corps (aka Gangdong Artillery Corps) resulted from a reorganisation of the KPA’s two MRL divisions and a number of Artillery Command heavy MRL and self-propelled artillery brigades during the early 1980s.14 Although the organisation of these corps is believed to be flexible, details are lacking. The postulated organisation for the artillery corps is: headquarters, five–nine MRL brigades (122 mm/200 mm/240 mm), five–nine self-propelled artillery brigades (122 mm/130 mm/ 152 mm), self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery regiment (14.5 mm/ 23 mm/37 mm), artillery instrument reconnaissance battalion, communications regiment, engineer battalion, nuclear–chemical defence battalion, transportation battalion, maintenance battalion. The self-propelled artillery brigade is composed of: headquarters, seven–nine self-propelled artillery battalions (122 mm/130 mm/ 152 mm), self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery battalion (37 mm/ 57 mm), target acquisition battery, engineer company, communications company, nuclear–chemical defence company, transportation company, maintenance company.


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122/200/240 mm

(x5–9)

122/130/152 mm

(x5–9)

14.5/23/37 mm MRL

Recon.

HQ

Figure 3.7 Artillery corps



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The self-propelled MRL brigade is composed of: headquarters, five–nine self-propelled MRL battalions (122 mm/200 mm/240 mm), self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery battalion (37 mm/57 mm), target acquisition battery, engineer company, communications company, nuclear–chemical defence company, transportation company, maintenance company. The most common organisation is with six self-propelled MRL battalions. The support companies may be platoons. Approximate personnel strength (with six self-propelled MRL battalions) is 1400. P’YONGYANG DEFENCE COMMAND The P’yongyang Defence Command (aka Capital Defence Corps, Capital Defence Command) is a corps-level unit that is tasked with the protection of P’yongyang and the surrounding areas. In this role it is very similar to the ROKA Capital Defence Command. Prior to the 1980s the P’yongyang Defence Command, along with the Security Bureau (now Security Command, see chapter 7), were controlled by the Guard Bureau (now Guard Command, see chapter 7). Vice-Marshal Pak Ki-so (aka Pak Gi-so) commands P’yongyang Defence Command.15 The command is composed of: headquarters, four infantry/ motorised infantry divisions, four paramilitary training unit divisions, tank regiment, artillery regiment, MRL regiment, light infantry regiment, technical engineer battalion, communications battalion, nuclear–chemical defence battalion, transportation battalion, maintenance battalion. The command has a total personnel strength of approximately 70 000, 600 medium tanks and armoured personnel carriers, 500 artillery systems and 300 MRLs. P’YONGYANG ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY COMMAND The P’yongyang Anti-aircraft Artillery Command (PAAC) has the mission of defending the capital city and its environs from lowlevel air attack. The exact chain of command for the unit is unclear; however, available evidence suggests that it is subordinated to the Operations Bureau, works closely with the P’yongyang Defence Command, and is integrated into the KPAF air defence system. The PAAC consists of a headquarters, seven brigades equipped with small and medium calibre (i.e. 14.5–57 mm)


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Light

HQ

Technical

(x4)

Figure 3.8 P’yongyang Defence Command

PMTU

(x4)

P’yongyang Defence Command

122 mm

122 mm

MRL


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Figure 3.9 P’yongyang Anti-aircraft Artillery Command P’yongyang AAA Command

Female

HQ

Searchlight

(x6)

anti-aircraft artillery systems, radar and searchlight units. One of these brigades is believed to be staffed by female troops. Because of its proximity, units of the PAAC are frequently visited by highlevel officials including Kim Chong-il. For example, on 1 January 1995 Kim Chong-il visited the PAAC’s 214th Unit (possibly the 214th Brigade) in P’yongyang.16

LIGHT INFANTRY TRAINING GUIDANCE BUREAU17 One of the unique characteristics of the KPA is its formidable special operations force of 25 special operations brigades and five reconnaissance battalions totalling approximately 90 000 personnel (this number increases to 100 000+ if the division and brigade-level light infantry battalions are included) (see Table 3.1). The Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau (aka 570th Army Unit or Unit 570) is the primary organisation within the KPA tasked with the training and conducting of unconventional and special warfare operations. During peacetime it is believed to exercise administrative control over all special operations units, including those of the KPN and Reconnaissance Bureau, while operational control is exercised by the Light Infantry Guidance Bureau, Reconnaissance Bureau, KPAF and KPN. During wartime operational control of the 11 light infantry brigades currently subordinate to the forward corps may revert to the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau, which will function as the primary headquarters coordinating all special operations. The two navy sniper brigades (see chapter 4) will probably remain under the operational control of the KPN. The bureau works closely with the KPAF, KPN, Reconnaissance Bureau and CCSKA.


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Table 3.1 Special operations brigades and reconnaissance battalions Type Light infantry brigades Airborne brigades Air force sniper brigades Light infantry brigades Sniper brigades

Navy sniper brigades Reconnaissance battalions

Organisation Army corps Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau Korean People’s Air Force Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau Korean People’s Navy Reconnaissance Bureau

Brigades Battalions Personnel 11

3 500

38 500

3

3 500

10 500

3

3 500

10 500

3

3 500

10 500

3

3 500

10 500

2

3 500

7 000

500

2 500

5 25

Total

Total

5

90 000

The Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau is organised with a command element, General Staff Department, General Political Department, Security Department, Rear Service Department, a number of special operations force training facilities and nine special operations force brigades. These brigades are divided into three types totalling approximately 34 800 troops. The 38th, 48th and 58th Airborne Brigades (aka airborne assault, airborne infiltration or airborne light infantry brigades) will operate within the ROK/US strategic rear areas and are tasked with seizing and holding critical geographic features (e.g. mountain passes) or portions of the ROK infrastructure (e.g. tunnels, dams); supporting amphibious landings; establishing a ‘second front’ within the ROK strategic rear; and raids and assaults on high value targets. The airborne brigades also serve as a vital part of the KPA’s strategic reserves. The airborne brigade has a personnel strength of approximately 3500 and is organised into a headquarters, communications company, six airborne battalions, guard platoon, medical unit, and a maintenance and repair unit. Each battalion has a personnel strength of approximately 500 and is organised into a headquarters, four airborne companies, mortar company (nine 60 mm mortars), anti-tank platoon (four recoilless rifles), air defence platoon (SA–7/–16) and a communications platoon.



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The 11th, 16th and 21st Air Force Sniper Brigades (aka Airborne Sniper Brigades) will operate throughout the entire ROK, and possibly Japan and Okinawa. They are tasked with seizure or destruction of ROKAF/USAF related facilities (especially air bases, C3I, missile and radar sites); seizure or destruction of strategic/ theatre C3I, missile and NBC warfare assets; assassination or abduction of ROK political leaders and senior ROK/US military commanders; support of airborne, navy sniper and sniper brigade operations; and deception and special operations throughout the ROK. The organisation of the air force sniper brigade is similar to that of the airborne brigade. The brigade has a personnel strength of approximately 3500 men and is organised into a headquarters, communications company, six air force sniper battalions, guard platoon, medical unit, and a maintenance and repair unit. Each air force sniper battalion has a personnel strength of approximately 500 and is organised into a headquarters, six sniper companies and a communications platoon. The KPAF presently possesses sufficient transport aircraft and helicopters to theoretically airlift a total of approximately 8000 troops (see chapter 5). This figure, however, is extremely optimistic, as it assumes that the KPAF would commit all possible aircraft (including VIP transports) and helicopters to this mission; achieve a 100 per cent ‘in service’ rate; and that ROK/US forces do not have air superiority. A more realistic estimate would be that the KPAF can airlift 4000–5000 troops, or 8–10 airborne or air force sniper battalions, which could be employed anywhere on the Korean Peninsula, although, even at this lower level, it is doubtful that the KPAF could support them solely with air assets. Available evidence suggests that the missions assigned to the 81st, 82nd and 87th Light Infantry Brigades are a combination of the strategic rear area defence and establishing a ‘second front’ in the ROK/US strategic rear. These brigades may, or may not, be attached to the mechanised corps. The light infantry brigades follow the same organisation as do the corps-level light infantry brigades consisting of a headquarters, 7–10 light infantry battalions, a communications company and a small rear services element. Total personnel strength is 3200–3700. The 17th, 60th and 61st Sniper Brigades represent the KPA’s most elite special operations forces. They are well trained and equipped to perform a wide range of strategic special operations within the ROK and throughout the world, including strategic reconnaissance and the provision of timely and accurate intelligence to the General Staff Department and corps commanders; seizure


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or destruction of strategic/theatre and global C3I, missile, radar, and NBC warfare assets; assassination or abduction of ROK political leaders and senior ROK/US military commanders; special operations, including assassination, kidnapping and diversionary operations; targeting reconnaissance for DPRK weapons of mass destruction (e.g. ballistic missiles, chemical weapons); covert delivery of biological weapons; establishment of military and political intelligence nets within the ROK and fostering the growth of guerrilla forces; support of other special operations units; provision of military training to foreign governments, revolutionary organisations and terrorist groups; and foreign internal security and defence operations. The organisation of the sniper brigade is unclear.18 At present, it appears to have a personnel strength of 3300–4600 depending upon the number of subordinate sniper battalions. It is organised into: a headquarters and rear services element, a communications company and 7–10 sniper battalions. Each battalion has a personnel strength of approximately 450 and is organised into a headquarters and rear services element, a communications platoon and five companies of three platoons each. It is believed that each brigade has an organic all-female platoon-sized unit (popularly called the ‘Mata Hari’ platoon). These women are trained to the same exacting standards as regular sniper troops and are expected to conduct combat missions. In addition to this unit each brigade is believed to have specific elements specially trained and organised for ‘Direct Action’ and diversionary operations. ‘Direct Action’ operations are primarily concerned with the assassination or abduction of enemy personnel and occur both during peace and wartime. Such operations will almost always be conducted with support from agents of the Social–Cultural Department or the State Security Department. Diversionary operations seek to seize strategic objectives before they can be destroyed, to destroy strategic objectives that cannot be destroyed by conventional means, and to create confusion and panic in rear areas. These operations will be carried out while sniper brigade personnel are disguised partially or completely in ROKA uniforms and civilian clothing. Diversionary units are trained in the use of, and are supplied with, ROK/US uniforms and equipment. The Reconnaissance Bureau’s five reconnaissance battalions complement these special operations brigades. These battalions are sometimes identified as being airborne qualified. Their deployment along the DMZ within the forward corps, however, suggests



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that their mission is primarily DMZ infiltration and reconnaissance of the ROK forward areas. FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE Since the late 1950s the MPAF has dispatched small teams of military specialists throughout the world. These specialists have provided military training and assistance and internal security assistance to a dizzying array of foreign governments, revolutionary organisations and terrorist organisations. During the 1990s the size and number of these activities have fluctuated considerably (but generally in a downward trend), while their emphasis has swung towards military training and assistance to recognised governments and the earning of foreign currency.19 In 1998 the MPAF dispatched a total of 350 personnel, while in the first six months of 1999, 442 officers were dispatched to 12 countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East.20 The majority of these personnel were involved with the development of military technology (e.g. ballistic missiles) or infrastructure. The deployments included the Congo (147), Iran (70), Ethiopia (69), Syria (40), Yemen (30), Angola (25), Egypt (15) and Pakistan (7). For the foreseeable future these activities will continue at their current level. There is a distinct possibility, however, that the continued instability of sub-Saharan Africa will cause an increase in DPRK military assistance activities. CONSCRIPTION AND PERSONNEL21 Even though military service is compulsory within the DPRK, the average citizen views it as an honour and a means of social acceptance and advancement. As a result, the number of instances of draft avoidance is extremely low. Guidelines for yearly conscription are established by the Central Military Committee, with recommendations from KWP’s Organisation and Guidance Department and the National Defence Commission, as well as the KPA’s Military Mobilisation and Personnel Affairs Bureau. The actual conscription process is carried out twice a year—in March and September—through the Military Mobilisation Department of each province, municipality and county. As selection and branch assignment are conducted by local officials, there are numerous instances of favouritism and nepotism. Children of politically influential parents are frequently


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given choice assignments within the rear area, politically elite units, units in which their relatives have served or units close to their home towns. They are also frequently afforded access to military academies or civilian colleges after a much-shortened period of service. Draft notices are typically delivered to conscripts or their families through high schools. The average conscript is 17–25 years of age and has completed high school. A conscript may be exempted or disqualified from service for a variety of reasons. Exempted from service are students attending elite colleges, such as P’yongyang University of Foreign Studies, University of Music and Dance, University of Drama and Cinematography, University of Internal Affairs, University of National Economy, Man’gyongdae Revolutionary Institute, Kim Il-song Political University. Students at other junior or regular universities are eligible for conscription upon graduation, however consideration is given to their area of study. For example, graduates of medical colleges are commissioned as medical officers following an officer’s training short course. Also exempted are personnel deemed to possess special technical industrial expertise or who are currently serving within the Ministry of Public Security or State Security Department. Prospective conscripts my be disqualified for physical reasons. Typically, these include a history of emotional or chronic diseases (e.g. heart trouble, kidney disease, tuberculosis, hepatitis, arthritis etc.) flat feet or colour blindness, and weight or height limitations (conscripts must weigh at least 39 kg and be at least 147 cm tall; prior to 1994 these criteria were 40 kg and 150 cm). Also disqualified are ex-convicts and the offspring of persons implicated in political offences. If a conscript is not exempted or disqualified for one of the above reasons they are passed on to recruit escort officers from various military services for recruit training. The new recruit is typically educated, indoctrinated and motivated by the strict and regimented society of his country. His view of the world has been regulated since birth by the state-controlled information and educational systems. With an average height of only 162 cm and weight of 48 kg, the KPA soldier is generally wiry and well muscled and kept in top physical condition by constant, strenuous physical training.22 Because of his mental and physical conditioning, the KPA soldier is noted for his stamina and capabilities in all types of terrain and weather. His capabilities of strength, daring and endurance are proverbial among those who have faced him in combat. The KPA soldier is taught to be a revolutionary combatant, strong in DPRK



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ideology and spiritual combat strength, as well as determination not to betray the KWP and not to surrender to enemy forces under any conditions. The special operations force soldier excels in all the above attributes as he is considered among the elite of the KPA and only the best are accepted for membership. Special operations personnel are carefully selected, the majority drawn from politically reliable soldiers who are members in good standing of the KWP who have served four–seven years within the combat branches. Under rare and unusual circumstances (such as special language capabilities, unique skills), they can be recruited directly from civilian status (see mission training below). Approximately 10 per cent of the total personnel of the KPA are women. Prior to the mid-1980s women could join the KPA only by volunteering. Since then, however, a selective mandatory system has been in place. Women serve in all branches of the KPA including the special operation forces. The highest-ranking woman officer in the KPA is believed ot be a major-general who, in 1998, was serving as the director of the 11th Central Hospital. Legally mandated service periods for enlisted draftees are 42 months for the KPA ground forces and 48 months for KPAF or KPN. These legal periods of service frequently mean little. Typically, conscripts serve in the military from the date of their taking the oath until they are 30 years old if they are male (this was increased from 27 years old in 1997) and 27 years old if the are female. Those who serve in special operations force units frequently serve past the age of 30.22 All soldiers may be kept on active duty regardless of age if they are deemed necessary to unit performance or security. Soldiers may receive an honourable discharge halfway through their compulsory term or service if they are recommended for officer candidate school or civilian college. They may receive a dishonourable discharge if they or their families are implicated in a political offence. TRAINING23 The KPA’s training system is designed to produce soldiers who, by dint of their superior ideological training, physical conditioning, and superior skills in guerrilla warfare, can defeat a numerically and technologically superior enemy. Political and ideological training are stressed, as is the general education of the soldier. Soldiers study the Fatherland Liberation War and the Anti-Japanese


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Partisan Struggle to learn from those experiences. Soldiers are trained in both conventional and unconventional warfare. The training and the education teach the soldier to overcome all adverse conditions and emphasise proficiency in conducting combined (aka consolidated) operations. Special operations force training builds upon this basic instruction. It is designed to produce an extremely well-disciplined, politically well-indoctrinated, fanatical fighter capable of accomplishing the most demanding conventional or unconventional missions. The skills and training that the members of the special operations force receive, such as infiltration, mountaineering, night combat, swimming, martial arts, airborne skills, intelligence methods, demolition and rigorous physical fitness, are typical of elite units throughout the world. Discipline is considerably harsher, however, and a much stronger emphasis is placed upon intensive physical training and on political and ideological indoctrination. The net results of the KPA’s training system are tough, intensively trained fighters who can travel farther and faster with more equipment, and less food, than most of their counterparts in other armies. They are mentally and physically hardened and disciplined, ready to obey orders and to suffer privations that would cause mutinies in other armies. Recruit training Before and during the Fatherland Liberation War most basic training was conducted at recruit training centres, with advanced training being conducted at the recruit’s assigned unit. By the end of the war this had changed. Most recruits received only the most basic military instruction at the training centres, with the majority of training being conducted, if at all, within a training company in their assigned unit. Following the war, the training centres were abolished, and recruit training was conducted completely within the unit. Today, prior to entering the army, the typical recruit receives basic military instruction in their school or place of employment as part of the Red Youth Guard or Workers’–Peasants’ Red Guard. Once a conscript passes their induction screening and their physical they are assigned a branch of service and unit and transferred to a KPA recruit escort officer. Conscripts are then issued uniforms and are officially assigned the status of military recruits—although not yet considered to be soldiers. Before they are dispatched to their assigned units, the uniformed recruits are



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given several days to bask in the light of being in the KPA and to learn about their future assignments. They are then taken by train to their branch of service recruit training centre or the recruit training unit of their respective units (typically division level).24 The period of recruit training differs depending on branch of service, assigned unit and time of year. Typically, it lasts two months for ground force recruits and two–three months for navy and air-force recruits. It may, however, run for six months. Recruit training is cruel and harsh. Recruits suffer hunger and physical and emotional abuse which simply would not be tolerated within most other armies. The mission of the training unit is to provide instruction in basic military subjects. The training unit normally receives recruits one to three times a year, between March and October. The normal size of the class is the platoon, with most subjects being taught by company, platoon and squad leaders. Subjects taught include political doctrine, physical training, map reading, military order and discipline, military drill and ceremonies, first aid and hygiene, CBR warfare, engineering, weapons training and tactics. When recruits complete their training, they take the Soldier’s Oath, receive their soldier’s identification card, and are assigned to an operational unit which has a predetermined need for replacements/ reinforcements—they are now considered soldiers. Once at their assigned unit, they begin on-the-job training in their basic military specialty. Enlisted personnel are assigned to specific branches of service based upon their talents and educational background. Graduates from technical high schools are typically assigned to the Artillery, Nuclear–Chemical Defence or Communications Bureaus. Those with relevant civilian experience are assigned to be drivers or weapons and vehicle repair technicians. Individuals without any specific qualifications are assigned to the infantry or engineers. Recruits who have demonstrated exceptional political ability, and who possess a good family background, are assigned military police duties, such as being part of the DMZ police force.25 Private is the first rank a recruit receives after taking his Soldier’s Oath. As of February 1998 the number of enlisted ranks was increased from two (private and corporal) to four (private, junior serviceman, middle serviceman and senior serviceman). A senior serviceman can become a sergeant upon completion of a six-month training course. Promotion is generally according to ability, although political reliability plays an important role.


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Officer and NCO training26 The vast majority of KPA officers and NCOs, except those in specialised technical areas, are selected from among common soldiers. These officer and NCO candidates are trained at a variety of Military Training Bureau and branch schools. NCO candidates are actively recruited from among the best corporals. Regular ground forces candidates are sent to a six-month training course at a corps or Military Training Bureau NCO school. Courses within the technical branches (e.g. engineer, artillery) are slightly longer. Upon completion soldiers are awarded the rank of sergeant. From here they can advance from staff sergeant to sergeant first class, to master sergeant before ending their service at the rank of sergeant major. Being an officer is a prestigious occupation in the DPRK. Officers’ social position is relatively high and provides them with increased rations, better housing and other benefits. Women often seek to marry KPA officers and military life is considered as a springboard for advancement in life for youths who come from rural and peasant backgrounds. Officer candidates are selected from senior NCOs with superior service records, excellent physical condition and trusted political reliability. They must also be KWP members with a flawless family background, be popular among fellow soldiers, and receive the approval of their commanding and political officers. Within the regular ground forces, officer candidates are typically sent to the Kang Kon General Military Academy (aka Kang Kon Military Officers Academy, Kang Kon Combined Officers School, Kanggon Officers School, Kanggong Consolidated Officers University, Kanggong Combined Officers University). At the school, located in P’yongyang, cadets initially undergo a six-month introductory training course where they receive basic training in ideology, markmanship, tactics and military science. Upon successful completion of this course, they proceed to the full course of instruction. Cadets serving in the infantry undergo a two-year course, while those destined to serve in ingineering, communications, chemical and transportation units undergo a three-year course. Approximately 500 soldiers graduate from the Kang Kon General Military Academy annually. Upon graduation students are commissioned as second lieutenants and are normally returned to their original units as platoon leaders. In exceptional cases some students are directly commissioned as first lieutenants.



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The Kang Kon General Military Academy is considered the oldest of the military and political schools of the KPA. In one form or another, it has been training KPA officers since the late 1940s. Its ancestry extends back to the P’yongyang Academy (aka P’yongyang Military Academy) which was established under Soviet guidance in November 1945 for the purpose of training Korean military and political officers. In June 1946 the academy was renamed the ‘Central Security Officers Training School’. The following year, in May 1947, the school was separated into two distinct institutions. The military component became the First Military Academy and the political officer component became the Second Military Academy. In October 1950, the First Military Academy was renamed the Kang Kon Military Academy and then later the Kang Kon General Military Academy.27 It has kept this name to the present. In February 1972, the Second Military Academy was renamed the Kim Il-song Political Univeristy. At least 283 Republic Heroes and 62 Labour Heroes have graduated from its halls. The academy itself has been awarded the Kim Il-song Order, the First Class Order of the National Flag, the First Class Freedom and Independence Order and the honorific title of Kumsong Guard.28 Officer candidates from the Mechanised, Artillery, Navy and Air Force Commands attend the service schools/academies for their respective branches. They may later also attend courses at the Kang Kon General Military Academy. Officer candidates for the General Political Bureau are selected using the same process. However, they are drawn from the ranks of troops serving within the general political departments. These officer candidates undergo a two-year course at the Political Officers School or Reconnaissance Officers School. They may subsequently attend Kim Il-song Political University (aka Kim Il-song Political College). Officer candidates for the Security Command attend a command officers school and may subsequently attend Kim Il-song Political University. In some unusual circumstances, when a corps urgently needs an officer with particular skills, NCOs with requisite skills and superior yearly evaluations may be selected and receive accelerated training for a period of 15 days to six months. If they successfully complete this training they are appointed as officers. Advanced training for officers from all branches is provided at the Kim Il-song Military University (aka Kim Il-song Army College, Kim Il-song Consolidated University or Kim Il-song Combined Military University) located in P’yongyang. The Kim Il-song Military


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University is the highest ranked military training institute within the DPRK and dates back to October 1952. Courses vary in length from one–four years depending upon the subject matter. Officers from the rank of sub-captain (between first lieutenant and captain) through lieutenant colonel many be admitted to the university for a three–four-year course based upon their branches of service. Upon successful completion of the course graduates receive a promotion of one rank and preferential treatment in their choice of assignment. Senior officers above the rank of sub-colonel (between lieutenant colonel and colonel) may be admitted to the university for a one-year course. Among the schools, academies and universities subordinate to the MPAF are the Combined Artillery Officers School, Kanggye Military Academy, Kang Kon General Military Academy, Kim Chin Military Academy, Kim Ch’ol-chu Military Academy (aka Kim Ch’ol-chu Artillery Military Academy), Kim Hyong-kwon Military Academy (aka Kim Hyong-kwon Military Communications School), Kim Il-song Political University, Kim Il-song Military University, Mangyongbong Military Academy, Man’gyongdae Revolutionary School, National Defence College (at Hyesan), KPA Non-Commissioned Officers School and People’s Army Art Institute. There are additional schools, academies and universities subordinate to the KPAF, KPN, KWP, State Security Department and Ministry of Public Security.29 Almost all the KPA’s officer schools, academies and universities offer six-month, one-, two- and three-year courses depending upon the subject matter and rank of the participant. Unit training30 Since 1959 the KPA has based its combat training program on a yearly cycle. Exceptions include units attached to the technical branches and Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau that may require a more complex training cycle lasting up to two–three years. The General Staff Department and the commanders of the various arms and services formulate the annual training program. The National Defence Commission provides overall guidance. Training programs are published in book form each December. This document not only includes the annual training plan but also includes a summation and critique of the previous year’s program. Corps and division commanders are free to add such training phases as they consider necessary, but always within the limitations



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of the original plan. Units at each echelon conduct training ranging from the basic training of troops to field exercises in order to satisfy the requirements set forth in the plan. It is important to note that political indoctrination, to ensure against deviation, takes precedence over all other training. It is conducted at all echelons down to company level and includes self-study for general officers. The annual training program begins in December and lasts until October of the following year. It is divided into two cycles, with each training cycle in turn being divided into two or three phases. The first cycle is during the winter from 1 December until 30 April (five months). The second cycle is during the summer from 1 June until 31 October (five months). The training cycle from December to April is divided into two phases: the first phase lasts three months and the second phase two months. The training cycle from June to October is divided into three phases: the first phase is one month and ten days, the second phase two months and ten days, and the third phase one month and ten days. The training phases for DMZ police and Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau are somewhat different. DMZ police units spend two months on sentry duty and two months conducting training (two platoons per company are rotated). This is repeated three times a year. Each cycle consists of approximately 760 hours of training and progresses from individual unit exercises to joint service manoeuvres. The schedule of activities during a typical annual training are as follows: December: January: February: March: April: May: June: July: August: September: October: November:

Construction of fortifications and preparation for winter training. Individual and squad. Squad and platoon. Platoon and company. Company field training exercise and recruit training. Pause in training for agricultural activities and preparation for summer training. Battalion. Battalion field training exercise and recruit training. Regiment. Regimental field training exercise and harvesting crops. Brigade/division/corps combined or joint manoeuvres; recruit training and preparation for winter. Construction of fortifications and repair of barracks.


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Infantry unit training Infantry unit training emphasises political education and unit cohesiveness, and attempts to motivate the soldier to operate under the most severe conditions. Training subjects and hours are not fixed but are based on the General Staff Department’s annual training program and the mission of the unit. The training expands upon those subjects taught during recruit training to include military topography, defence against motorised and mechanised units, communications, enemy doctrine and bivouacking. Great importance is placed on tactics and live firing training. Political training is conducted in accordance with the annual political training program established by the General Political Bureau.



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Korean People’s Navy Command OREAN EOPLE’S AVY OMMAND

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The primary mission of the Korean People’s Navy Command— more commonly known as the Korean People’s Navy (KPN)—is the defence of DPRK territorial waters and coasts. Secondary missions include insertion of special operations forces, coastal surveillance, and protection and control of coastal shipping and fishing operations. During wartime the KPN would be tasked with amphibious lift and fire support operations, support to KPA ground force units, naval mine warfare, interdiction of enemy shipping in waters adjacent to the Korean Peninsula and rear area security.1 Despite the economic crises engulfing the country during the past ten years, limited access to equipment from abroad, and fuel shortages which have restricted training and operations, the KPN still maintains the capability to conduct sustained offensive and defensive wartime operations. The KPN’s experiences with operating an inventory of both midget and coastal submarines and hovercraft provides it with the wartime ability to interdict commercial shipping to and from the ROK, particularly in the East Sea (Sea of Japan), and to conduct substantial amphibious lift operations.2 These wartime capabilities are likely limited to the initial stages (e.g. 30–90 days) of a renewed war against the ROK. The KPN’s limited abilities to operate at night and in foul weather, as well as weaknesses in EW, SIGINT and air defence, portend that the advanced weaponry and combined operations capabilities of the USN and ROKN, combined with air supremacy, would quickly render the vast majority of KPN’s surface combatants ineffective. KPN midget and coastal submarine operations would undoubtedly prove more problematic for the USN and ROKN and would likely survive for a considerable time. The KPN is primarily 92


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a coastal defence force and is ill-equipped and ill-trained for ‘blue water’ operations. These weaknesses were exhibited during the June 1999 naval skirmishes around Yonp’yong-do island. On 7 June 1999 approximately 20 DPRK fishing vessels and six KPN patrol vessels crossed the Northern Limit Line (NLL, the seaborne extension of the Military Demarcation Line) in the area of Yonp’yong-do island— 95 km northwest of Seoul. The publicly stated reason for these actions was to protect and enforce the DPRK’s rights to fish in the region. The DPRK vessels were met by ROKN patrol vessels which attempted to block their intrusion. What followed, during the next several days, was an ongoing series of tense bumping and ramming incidents between the patrol craft of the two navies. During these confrontations several KPN vessels were disabled and had to be towed back to base. On the morning of 15 June the situation escalated. Between 0715–0725 hours, 13 DPRK fishing vessels cross the NLL. These were soon followed at 0755 by seven KPN vessels in two groups. During the next two hours a number of KPN vessels were rammed. Then, at 0925, a KPN torpedo boat opened fire with its 25 mm guns. ROKN vessels returned fire with both 40 mm guns and 76 mm cannons and a number of KPN vessels were heavily damaged. At approximately 0935 both the fishing and KPN vessels began withdrawing north of the NLL. Shortly afterwards two of the more seriously damaged KPN vessels sank. Throughout the nine-day confrontation the ROKN suffered only minimal damage and casualties. This very public defeat came as a surprise to the MPAF and it reacted decisively—Vice Admiral Kim Yun-shim was reportedly removed from his post as commander of the West Sea Fleet, an expanding series of naval training and coastal defence exercises was instituted, and several coastal defence artillery and missile units were shifted to the southwest coast of Hwanghae-namdo. The KPN is judged to have a limited capability to guard DPRK territorial waters (12 nautical miles) and to insert special operations forces into the ROK during peacetime. It is unable to enforce the DPRK’s claimed 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone. ORGANISATION AND DEPLOYMENT The KPN is a coequal service under the MPAF, with both the KPAF and the KPA ground forces. Control of the KPN is vested in its commander who is responsible to the Chief of the General



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Naval staff

Naval Squadron

Sniper

West Sea Fleet Headquarters

8th 11th (x6) 12th

29th

Figure 4.1 KPN organisation

Naval Squadron

Sniper

East Sea Fleet Headquarters Naval Medical Centre

Coastal Security Units

Naval Technical Training Centre

(x10)

Coastal Defence Artillery

Maritime Department

Naval Petty Officers School

Support Units

Merchant Marine

Ship Building and Repair Facilities

(Coordination and support)

Naval Officers School

Kim Chong-suk Naval University

Naval Command Headquarters


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Staff, MPAF. It is headquartered in P’yongyang and has a total personnel strength of 60 000. The total combat ship strength of the DPRK is approximately 990, with 840 vessels assigned to the KPN, Maritime Department and Operations Department, and 150 vessels assigned to the MPAF’s Coastal Security Bureau (see chapter 6), and ranks the KPN as one of the world’s largest navies.3 The KPN is organised into a Naval Command headquarters, Naval Staff, two fleet headquarters (the East and West Sea Fleets), sixteen squadrons, two navy sniper brigades, two coastal defence missile regiments, an unknown number of surveillance radar companies, independent naval support/ASW air battalion, Naval Medical Centre (Navy Central Hospital),4 Kim Chong-suk Naval University, Naval Officers School, Naval Petty Officers School, Naval Technical Training Centre, a number of support units, and several shipbuilding and repair facilities. The KPN also controls a number of ocean-going cargo ships and coordinates with the Ministry of Sea Transportation (MST) the operations of the DPRK’s merchant marine fleet;5 provides support to the Reconnaissance Bureau’s Maritime Department which operates a number of SANG-O class coastal submarine (SSc) and YUGO class midget submarines (SSm) in the infiltration role (see chapter 7); coordinates coastal defence with the KPA’s coastal defence artillery batteries; and coordinates coastal surveillance and security with the MPAF’s Coastal Security Bureau and paramilitary organisations (see chapter 6). The commander of the KPN performs three primary functions: participates in the formulation of broad military policy at the MPAF level; commands the KPAF through the Naval Command Headquarters; and coordinates naval operations with the other branches of the armed forces. Immediately subordinate to the KPN commander are the Chief of Naval Staff, Deputy Political Commander, Deputy Technical Commander, Deputy Rear Services Commander, Deputy Navigation Commander, military prosecution office and military justice office. Up until September 1998 Vice Marshal (Admiral) Kim Il-ch’ol was commander of the KPN, when he was promoted to the position of Minister of the People’s Armed Forces6 and his place was taken by Colonel General (Vice-Admiral) Kim Yun-shim, the commander of the West Sea Fleet. Kim occupied both the position of commander of the KPN and commander of the West Sea Fleet until mid-1999. He was reportedly ousted from his post because of the defeat suffered by the West Sea Fleet during the June 1999 West Sea incident, when several KPN vessels were lost or damaged in skirmishes with the ROKN.7 Kim’s replacement is



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Deputy Political Commander Deputy Technical Commander

Naval staff

Deputy Rear Services Commander

Departments Political Department Rear Services Department Technical Department Chemical Electronics Political Buildings Coastal artillery/missile Material supply Political safety Clothing Communications Munitions Organisation Food Cryptographic (classified materials) Propaganda and agitation Naval construction Harbour and port Enlisted personnel Socialist Labor Youth League Ordnance facilities Finance Organisation and planning Organisation and Guard company planning Medical POL Meteorology Ship fittings Officer (cadre) personnel Transportation Operations Radar Reconnaissance (intelligence) Safety Submarine Technical liaison Training

Chief of Naval Staff

Figure 4.2 KPN naval staff

Navigation Department Waterways Meteorology Sea chart compilation

Deputy Navigation Commander


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unknown. The commander of the East Sea Fleet is Kwon Sang-ho. The Naval Command headquarters (aka Supreme Naval Headquarters) is located in P’yongyang. The Chief of Naval Staff exercises control over naval operations through his staff, which consists of the following departments: Chemical, Coastal Artillery/Missile, Communications, Cryptographic (Classified Materials), Enlisted Personnel, Finance, a guard company, Medical, Meteorology, Officer (Cadre) Personnel, Operations, Radar, Reconnaissance (Intelligence), Safety, Submarine, Technical Liaison and Training. The Deputy Political Commander commands the Political Department, which is responsible for ensuring the loyalty of KPN personnel and assisting in morale and welfare activities. The Political Department consists of the following sections: Political, Political Safety, Organisation, Propaganda and Agitation, and Socialist Labour Youth League. The Deputy Technical Commander commands the Technical Department, which is responsible for the design, construction, repair, and maintenance of naval vessels. It consists of the following sections: Electronics, Material Supply, Munitions, Naval Construction, Ordnance, and Organisation and Planning. It also administers the Navy Technical Training Centre at Najin. The Deputy Technical Commander and Technical Department coordinate closely with the Second Economic Committee’s Sixth Machine Industry Bureau and the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry. The Deputy Rear Services Commander commands the Rear Services Department, which is responsible for providing logistic and administrative support for the KPN (i.e. finance, provisions, equipment, construction and transportation). It is also responsible for providing support to the Naval Medical Centre. The Rear Services Department consists of the following sections: Buildings, Clothing, Food, Harbour and Port Facilities, Organisation and Planning, Petrol, Oil and Lubricants (POL), Ship Fittings and Transportation. The Deputy Navigation Commander commands the Navigation Department, which is responsible for the maintenance and installation of hydrographic aids, surveys, charting, notices to mariners, and materiel maintenance of naval communications and observation posts. It consists of at least three sections: Waterways, Meteorology and Sea Chart Compilation. The Navigation Department operates four DONGHAE and SOHAI class survey ships and numerous small boats. The designation system for KPN units and vessels is unclear. Units apparently have several designations—a cover designation



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(e.g. 155th Navy Unit, 1017th Navy Unit or 853rd Unit), official designation (e.g. 12th Naval Squadron or 8th Naval Squadron), and an honorific name (e.g. Kumsong Guards). All sailors throughout the world have unofficial names for the ships they sail on and KPN sailors are no exception to that rule. Whether KPN vessels have official names is unclear. KPN and Reconnaissance Bureau Maritime Department personnel have been known to refer to their vessels simply using a number and type designation (e.g. ‘Number 2 Reconnaissance Submarine’). The West Sea Fleet (aka Yellow Sea Fleet) is headquartered at Namp’o and consists of approximately 360 vessels organised into six squadrons. Known squadron designations include 8th Naval Squadron (headquartered in Sagon-ni, Hwanghac-namdo), 11th Naval Squadron and 12th Naval Squadron (headquartered in Yomju-gun, P’yongan-bukto). The Coastal Security Bureau operates approximately 63 additional vessels in the Yellow Sea. The total number of KPN and Coastal Security Bureau vessels in the Yellow Sea is approximately 420. Major KPN bases and facilities are located at Namp’o (Chinnamp’o), Pip’a-got and Sagon-ni (Sa-got). Smaller bases and facilities are located at Cho-do, Haeju, Kwangyang-ni, Sunwi-do, Tasa-ri and Yongwi-do. Namp’o appears to be the primary submarine base for the West Sea Fleet, with Pip’a-got serving as a forward operating base. 11th Naval Squadron (headquartered at Namp’o) is equipped with submarines. The East Sea Fleet is headquartered at T’oejo-dong (Nagwonup) and consists of approximately 480 vessels organised into ten squadrons. The Coastal Security Bureau operates approximately 87 additional vessels in the East Sea. The total number of KPN and Coastal Security Bureau vessels in the East Sea is approximately 570. Major KPN bases and facilities are located at Ch’aho, Munch’on, Mayang-do and Najin. Smaller bases and facilities are located at Chakto-dong (Chakto-ri), Hodo-ri, Kosong-up (Changjonni), Puam-dong, Sinch’ang, Sinch’ang-nodongjagu, Sinp’o, Songjin (Kimch’aek), Songjon-pando, T’oejo-dong, Wonsan, Yoho-ri and Yongam-ni. Ch’aho and Mayang-do appear to be the primary submarine bases for the East Sea Fleet. Operating bases for SANG-O class SSc and YUGO class SSm under the control of the Reconnaissance Bureau’s Maritime Department have been reported at Hwangt’o-do, Kosong-up and T’oejo-dong. There is some confusion as to the exact locations of KPN bases. In part, this has arisen from the tendency to group smaller bases in the same location and identify them with the nearest port of significant size. For example, Wonsan is frequently


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identified as a major KPN base. Actually, there are at least three KPN bases in the immediate area (Munch’on, Hodo-ri and Songjon-pando). The actual port city of Wonsan appears to have only minor KPN activity. Likewise, T’oejo-dong consists of both T’oejo-dong and Yoho-ri (located within the same small bay). On the west coast Sagon-ni, Sunwi-do and Yongwi-do are all within a few nautical miles of each other. In addition to the bases and facilities named above, the KPN frequently deploys ships at numerous smaller forward operating bases, or at small civilian ports, located along both coasts. Known KPN bases are shown in Table 4.1 and Map 4.1. Table 4.1 Known KPN bases Naval base/facility Ch’aho Ch’o′do Ch’ongjin Chakto′dong (Chakto′ri) Haeju Hodo′ri Hwangt’o′do Kosong′up (Changjon′ni) Kwangyang′ni Mayang′do Munch’on Najin Namp’o (Chinnamp’o) Pip’a′got Puamdong Sagon′ni (Sa′got) Sinch’ang′nodongjagu Songjin (Kimch’aek) Songjon′pando Sunwi′do T’oejo′dong (Nagwon′up) Tasa′ri Wonsan Yoho′ri Yongam′ni (Yongamnichung′ch’on) Yongamp’o Yongwi′do

Latitude

Longitude

40°12′26″N 38°32′09″N 41°46′34″N 39°48′58″N 37°59′47″N 39°21′00″N 39°10′00″N 38°44′25″N 38°44′25″N 39°59′54″N 39°18′00″N 42°09′24″N 38°42′59″N 38°35′29″N 41°19′34″N 37°49′23″N 40°08′11″N 40°39′32″N 39°21′56″N 37°46′10″N 39°54′13″N 39°48′53″N 39°09′10″N 39°52′20″N 40°24′35″N 39°56′05″N 37°48′10″N

128°38′58″E 124°52′39″E 129°49′54″E 127°39′33″E 125°41′59″E 127°32′00″E 127°32′01″E 128°11′25″E 125°13′30″E 128°12′50″E 127°23′54″E 130°12′04″E 125°23′12″E 124°59′29″E 129°45′49″E 125°20′57″E 128°28′10″E 129°12′27″E 127°27′08″E 125°20′18″E 127°46′29″E 124°24′56″E 127°26′37″E 127°47′05″E 128°54′28″E 124°22′23″E 125°21′20″E

Subordinate to the Naval Command Headquarters is a naval support/anti-submarine warfare (ASW) air unit believed to be battalion sized. This unit contains ASW, helicopter and transport elements.8 The ASW element consists of 10–20 Mi–14PL HAZE-A ASW helicopters acquired during the late 1980s and early 1990s



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Map 4.1 KPN shore establishment Operating base/facility

Najin People’s Republic of China Ch’ngjin Ch’ongjin Puam-dong Korea Bay Songjin East Sea Fleet

Sinuiju Tasa-ri

West Sea Fleet Namp’o

Yongam-ni Ch’aho Sinp’o Hamhung Mayang-do Toejo-dong Yoho-ri Songion-pando Chakto-dong Hodo-ri HQ Munch’on East Sea Wonsan (Sea of Japan) P’yongyang Wonsan Kosong-up

Kwangyang-ni

Pip’a-got Cho-do Haeju

Sagon-ni Sunwi-do

Seoul

Republic of Korea

N

Yongwi-do

to counter the growing ROKN submarine fleet. It is unclear how the Mi–14PLs are organised and deployed, however the majority are believed to be subordinated to the East Sea Fleet. The helicopter and transport elements are utilised for VIP travel and the transport of high priority cargo. In keeping with the ‘Four Military Lines’ policy the KPN began construction of underground and underwater shelters for its vessels in the late 1960s. By mid-1980 construction of approximately seven major such facilities on the East Sea coast and five


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on the Yellow Sea coast had been completed. Some of these shelters can house as many as 10–13 vessels. This fortification program has continued till the present and a majority of the KPN’s operating bases are fortified to some degree. This can consist of a variety of measures including having berthing and repair facilities blasted out of mountains, or on inland lakes connected to the sea by tunnels blasted through rock, their entrances protected from direct fire and torpedo attack by high concrete and rock seawalls. This is especially true for submarines and fast attack craft bases. The fortified submarine facilities at Ch’aho and Mayang-do are particularly notable.9 Approximately 60 per cent of the KPN is currently forward deployed at bases south of the P’yongyang–Wonsan line. The East Sea Fleet has historically been larger than the West Sea Fleet due to a variety of hydrographic features of the Yellow Sea and Korea Bay. Due to the geographic isolation imposed by the DPRK’s location on the Korean Peninsula and the narrow Korea Strait, the West and East Sea Fleets are not known to have conducted any joint operations of significance or to have shared vessels. NAVY SNIPER BRIGADES The KPN currently contains two navy sniper brigades (aka amphibious sniper, maritime sniper, naval sniper or marine) which are trained to conduct offensive amphibious assault, unconventional warfare and special operations along the ROK coast. The 29th Navy Sniper Brigade is subordinate to the West Sea Fleet and is headquartered in Tongnim-gun, P’yongan-bukto. The designation of the East Sea Fleet’s navy sniper brigade is presently unknown.10 What separates them from the other special operations brigades (see chapter 3) is their specialised amphibious warfare training, equipment and manner of employment. The two Navy sniper brigades have a combined personnel strength of approximately 7000. The organisation of the navy sniper brigade is apparently derived from that of the light infantry brigade, although it is considerably smaller. It consists of a headquarters element and rear services element, a communications company, an engineer platoon or company and six battalions. Although there is no hard evidence, each brigade organisation is also believed to contain a ‘combat swimmer’ unit (similar in capabilities to Russian Naval Commandos or US SEAL units), and a ‘special boat’ unit (similar to the US SEAL special boat units



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and SEAL delivery vehicle teams). Each navy sniper battalion has a personnel strength of approximately 500 and is organised into a headquarters and rear services element, a communications platoon, five companies and a mortar company. Each company is organised into a headquarters element and four platoons.11 The ability of the MPAF to employ the navy sniper brigades is dependent upon the amphibious lift capabilities of the KPN. During the past ten years the KPN has made significant advances in the construction and deployment of amphibious warfare craft. The KPN has approximately 250–270 amphibious warfare craft, with a theoretical amphibious lift capacity of approximately 15 000–18 000 troops. 12 This includes 135–150 of the KONG BANG I/II/III and NAMP’O A/B LCPAs, whose high speed and ability to traverse large mud flats and ride up onto the beach significantly increase the survivability and viability of navy sniper forces. A more realistic estimate would be that the KPN can lift 15 000 troops, which easily exceeds the combined personnel strength for both navy sniper brigades (7000 troops). This excess capability provides the capacity to quickly reinforce any amphibious assault with regular ground troops and heavy equipment (e.g. tanks, artillery, multiple rocket launchers). PERSONNEL The overall quality of KPN personnel is believed to be good. The current personnel strength of the KPN is estimated to be 60 000 (8000 officers and 52 000 ratings). The minimum service period in the KPN is 5–10 years, with skilled technical personnel and officers often being retained longer. Recruitment of ratings is handled in the same manner as that for the KPA ground forces. It is believed, however, that preference for assignment to the KPN is given to those who live on the coast and those who have a family background in the Coastal Security Bureau or fishing industry. Most KPN officers receive their commissions upon graduation from Kim Chong-suk Naval University, Naval Officers School, or Naval Petty Officers School. Some are commissioned from NCO ranks and then attend an officer training course. Political officers, rear service officers and staff officers are obtained from various service schools, KPA ground units and the enlisted ranks. KPN personnel receive pay that is generally equivalent to ground force personnel; however, captains and certain skilled ratings are believed to receive higher pay. KPN officers reportedly


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receive an additional allowance for sea duty. Service and training within the KPN is harsh by Western standards, with officer beatings of ratings for minor offences a common occurrence. There are a significant number of women in the KPN, some of whom serve in combat units. MOBILISATION It is estimated that there are 40 000 trained navy personnel available for mobilisation in the form of Workers’–Peasants’ Red Guard (WPRG) or Paramilitary Training Unit formations that are dedicated to the naval mission. Personnel in such units would likely come from those with special skills who have been discharged from the KPN. Additionally, Coastal Security Bureau personnel, merchant mariners and fishermen could also be used to augment KPN operating forces. Augmentation of the shore establishment could be met by the transfer of personnel from KPA ground force units. The KPN is not known to have any vessels in reserve. During wartime, however, additional auxiliary and support ships would most likely be obtained by mobilising the Coastal Security Bureau vessels, oceangoing cargo ships and the fishing fleet. During the early 1990s, Kim Chong-il issued an order that all fishing vessels larger than 50 tonnes be equipped with naval minelaying equipment. TRAINING KPN officer training is conducted at the Kim Chong-suk Naval University (aka Kim Chong-suk Naval Academy or Naval University), Naval Officers School (aka Officer Training Centre) and Naval Petty Officers School.13 The Kim Chong-suk Naval University offers three- to five-year line-officer courses which emphasise instruction in the naval sciences, communist history, language instruction, communications and infantry tactics. It also offers a five-year course in engineering and six-month refresher courses. In the past, promising graduates of the Kim Chong-suk Naval University were sent to the Soviet Union or PRC for postgraduate study. This appears to have ended in the 1990s. The Naval Officers School conducts refresher courses in certain subjects for officers on active duty. Senior naval officers are selected for attendance at the Kim Il-song Military University or Kang Kon General Military Academy in P’yongyang.14



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Enlisted naval training is believed to be generally patterned after that of the Russian and PRC navies. Conscripts are inducted and tested at provincial centres. The majority of those assigned to the KPN are then sent to KPN recruit centres located at Wonsan and Namp’o to receive basic naval training. Others are sent directly to a training unit at their assigned afloat unit. Training emphasises political indoctrination and physical fitness as well as basic military skills. When basic naval training is complete new conscripts take their place within their assigned units. If, however, they demonstrate aptitude or technical skills they may be sent, along with similarly skilled service personnel, for further schooling at the Navy Technical Training Centre in Najin. Here KPN personnel receive advanced technical training in areas such as navigation, gunnery, missiles, radio, communication and engine maintenance. Depending upon the course this additional training can last 6–12 months. The Navy Technical Training Centre apparently also provides refresher courses to technical personnel within the KPN. The KPN, as does the KPAF and KPA ground forces, conducts continuous operational training. This training typically follows a yearly cycle and is characterised by extensive planning and preparations prior to exercises, attention to detail and realism, emphasis on speedy and precise execution of simple and basic tasks, combination of basic tasks to accomplish more advanced goals and repetition. The underlying philosophy appears to be one of building effective forces through the use of unsophisticated but relatively foolproof individual components. Afloat units routinely practise increasing and decreasing speeds, forming attack formations and making attack runs, all while under air and surface attack. These manoeuvres are apparently kept simple and repeated to perfection. The KPN also conducts mine and countermine, anti-submarine, and amphibious warfare training on a regular basis. The KPN is known to conduct training above the unit level (probably based upon the yearly training cycle), but details are lacking. The KPN does engage in joint training with paramilitary units, the KPAF, KPA ground force units and special operations forces. These exercises typically portray an assault by elements of the navy sniper brigades (possibly with follow-on support by KPA ground forces), or combined coastal defence operations. During the early 1990s, as a result of economic crisis and famine, the KPN shifted the emphasis of training from afloat exercises to ashore training, focusing upon political and ideological indoc-


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trination, and wargaming. The result was a decline in KPN combat capabilities, especially within units deployed within the rear areas. Afloat training reached the lowest level during 1998–99. Following losses by the West Sea Fleet during the June 1999 skirmishes around Yonp’yong island, the KPN instituted a number of changes and has increased afloat exercises. By early 2000 KPN training, especially within the West Sea Fleet, had increased dramatically. 15 During the mid-1970s through the early 1980s, the KPN conducted a number of small exchange visits and joint exercises with the (Chinese) People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). These activities ended during the earlier 1980s as the DPRK once again drew closer to the Soviet Union.16 As part of the agreements signed by Kim Il-song during his May 1984 visit to Moscow, the DPRK opened its ports of Najin, Wonsan and Namp’o to visits by surface ships and submarines of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, while the navies of the two countries initiated a series of exchange visits and joint exercises. Access to DPRK ports proved to be of significant intelligence value to the Soviets. Namp’o, for example, was deep in the Korea Bay and provided Soviet AGIs (Auxiliary, General, Intelligence) access to PRC naval bases from Dandong to Qingdao.17 On the east coast, the port of Najin was used extensively by the Soviet Pacific Fleet during the winter months and at least one pier was set aside for its exclusive use. The largest Soviet Pacific Fleet ‘goodwill’ visit to the DPRK occurred during 4–6 July 1986 to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Soviet–DPRK Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. For this visit the KIEV class VSTOL (very short takeoff and landing) carrier Minsk, with the commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet Admiral V. V. Sidorov aboard, led a flotilla of three warships into Wonsan harbour.18 Two weeks later, Vice Admiral Kim Il-ch’ol led a small KPN flotilla on a visit to Vladivostok.19 The joint exercises between the two navies were of great value to the KPN, which had the opportunity to learn from an ally with extensive skills and ‘blue water’ experience, particularly for submarine, amphibious warfare, naval mine and ASW operations. The exercises were conducted yearly in the East Sea off the port of Ch’ongjin, (typically during August–October), lasted about a week and would include five–seven Soviet and 15–20 KPN vessels. The last major goodwill visit or exercise between the two navies took place in August 1990 when a flotilla of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, led by the UDALOY class guided missile destroyer Marshal Shaposhnikov, called at Wonsan. By the beginning of 1991,



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however, these exchange visits and joint exercises came to an end due to political tensions between the two countries and the growing disintegration of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.20 Since the early 1990s, the KPN has not engaged in any ‘goodwill’ visits with either the PRC or Russia. This was due both to political developments and, possibly more significantly, the economic crisis within the DPRK. The economic crisis has resulted in a scarcity of POL products, which in turn has resulted in a dramatic decline in KPN afloat and training exercises. While training does take place, it is at irregular intervals and for short periods of time. Efforts are made to incorporate as much training as possible within operational deployments. SHIPS AND WEAPONS The 990 (840 KPN and 150 Coastal Security Bureau) combat ships of the DPRK represent a mixture of former-Soviet, PRC and DPRK construction. Reflecting both the DPRK’s poor economic conditions and KPN doctrine, approximately 15 per cent of these vessels are more than 20 years old, and 83 per cent are smaller than 200 tonnes. The KPN has no vessels of destroyer size or larger. The nine largest combatants are its one SOHO FF (fast frigate), two NAJIN FFL, three SARIWON PG and three TRAL PGs. With the exception of the TRAL class PGs, which were provided by the former Soviet Union, all these vessels were constructed within the DPRK. The single SOHO class FF is armed with both guns and four HY–1 (CSS-N–2 SAFFLOWER) missile launchers.21 It is unique in that it is one of the largest catamaran-hull design ships in the world and is the only helicopter capable vessel in the KPN. It may not, however, have been a successful design since no additional ships in this class have been built. The two NAJIN class FFLs are armed with both guns and two SY–1 (CSS-N–1 SCRUBBRUSH) missile launchers.22 One of the NAJIN class FFLs is subordinate to the West sea Fleet’s 8th Naval Squadron which guards the DPRK’s southwest coastline (e.g. Hwanghae-namdo). The remaining six SARIWON and TRAL class PGs are armed with guns only. One of the SARIWON class PGs reportedly serves as the flagship of the Coastal Security Bureau. Approximately 423 of the KPN’s combatants are small patrol craft, including torpedo boats, patrol boats, patrol craft, and fast attack craft. The majority of these vessels are limited to calm seas


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Table 4.2 KPN anti-ship cruise missiles Range (nm/km)

Speed (mach)

P–20 (SS-N–2a STYX)

25/46

0.9

500

Autopilot with active radar

SY–1 (CSS-N–1

25/46

0.9

500


46/85

0.8

400


Name

Warhead (kg) Guidance

SCRUBBRUSH)

HY–1 (CSS-N–2 SAFFLOWER)

and operations within 50 nm of the coast. Approximately 303 of these vessels are equipped with 25–85 mm guns, torpedoes, or both. Torpedoes known to be in the KPN inventory include the 45–36AN, 53–38, 53–56, SAET–60 and the ET–80. Production of torpedoes is known to take place at the 26 Factory.23 During the past 10 years the KPN has undoubtedly acquired additional, more modern, torpedoes from both the PRC and Russia. The 56 CHAHO class PBs (patrol boats) are unique in that their main armament consists of a single 122 mm 40-tube multiple rocket launcher mounted above the bridge structure at about 45 degrees with a detachable reloading track connecting to a fantail magazine. Rockets can be fired in salvo, ripple or individually. These vessels are utilised to provide fire support for amphibious landings or to attack surface ships. The KPN’s most capable combatants are their approximately 43 PTGs equipped with the P–20 (SS-N–2a STYX), SCRUBBRUSH or SAFFLOWER anti-ship cruise missiles. The eight OSA, four HUANGFEN and 15 SOJU class PTGs are equipped with four missile launchers, while the nine KOMAR and six SOHUNG class PTGs have two missile launchers. Additionally, one CHONGJU class PC is believed to have been re-equipped with two–four missile launchers. In the future these missiles may be replaced by the more modern C–801 (CSS-N–4 SARDINE) or a modified version of the indigenously designed AG–1 (see below). During the mid-1990s defectors indicated that the DPRK had obtained examples of the French Exocet anti-ship missile and is attempting to reverse-engineer the system.24 Successful reverse-engineering of this system may see a DPRK-produced version of it being deployed on KPN PTGs. Although primarily tasked with the anti-ship mission, the KPN’s missile-armed PTGs may also be tasked with limited land attack missions. Similar to the Indian Navy’s employment of STYX



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missiles to attack oil refineries in Karachi during the 1971 India– Pakistan War. With the start of construction of the KONG BANG classes of LCPA during the late 1980s, growing numbers of older NAMPO A LCPFs (landing carft, personal, fast) were converted to the PC (patrol craft) role (NAMPO B/C class) by having their forward hull doors welded shut and welldeck covered. At present it is estimated that there are 77 such PCs. During the 1990s, the KPN developed what has been described as a ‘stealth’ patrol boat. This is reportedly constructed with faceted surfaces covered with radar-absorbing paint. It has a crew of 30, is 38 metres long, and has a maximum speed of 50 knots and a maximum range of 1600 nm. It is armed with a 57 mm gun on the forecastle deck and a 30 mm gun on the stern. How many of these new vessels are in service and the extent of their stealthiness is unknown.25 The KPN’s amphibious warfare component is both capable and sizeable, consisting of approximately 268–283 craft. All these vessels were built within the DPRK. Until the late 1980s the primary assault landing craft was the NAMPO class LCPF. This craft is based upon the P–6 class PT hull modified with clamshell bow doors, 1.2 m wide personnel ramp which could be extended 9.7 m, and a deck well capable of carrying up to 30-combat equipped troops. It has a maximum speed of 40 knots and a radius of 335 nm at 28 knots. Although not an amphibious warfare vessel the CHAHO class PBs, with their 122 mm multiple rocket launcher, were specifically designed to support amphibious assault operations conducted by the NAMPO class. The two classes would frequently practise such operations together. Beginning in the late 1980s the KPN began construction of the KONG BANG class hovercraft, which have been gradually replacing the NAMPO class. This class was based upon commercial technology imported from the UK/Western Europe. Currently there are approximately 135–150 KONG BANG I/II/III and NAMPO A/B LCPAs in KPN service. The KONG BANG II can carry 50 troops at 52 knots, while the KONG BANG III can carry 40 troops at 50 knots. The NAMPO A/B LCPA have a top speed of 52 knots. All these hovercraft have added tremendously to the KPN’s amphibious assault capabilities since they can quickly and easily navigate the large mud flats and tidal pools of the Yellow Sea and deliver troops up onto almost any beach within the ROK. The primary users of the hovercraft during the opening stages of a new conflict would be elements of the KPN’s two navy sniper brigades.


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During the 1990s the KPN armed a number of these craft with STYX or SCRUBBRUSH anti-ship cruise missiles. Additional amphibious warfare vessels include 35 HANCHON, HUNGNAM and HANTAE class landing craft. The KPN operates an estimated 52–67 submarines (99–114 if the 47 YUGO class SSm of the intelligence services are added), which ranks it as one of the world’s largest submarine fleets. It acquired its first submarines during the 1960s when the former Soviet Union provided four WHISKEY class (Project 613) SS patrol submarines. Today, it is unclear whether any of these are still operational. Two, assigned to the West Sea fleet at Pip’a-got, may still be used for training. The KPN received its first four ROMEO class (Type 033) SS from the PRC during the early 1970s.26 Subsequently, with PRC assistance, the DPRK began construction of its version of the ROMEO. Construction appears to have continued until the late 1980s, when it was phased out in favour of the new SANG-O class SSc. The DPRK began production of its SANG-O class SSc during 1989–1990 and continued at two–three units per year through 1995. During the latter half of the 1990s this was initially thought to have increased to four–five units per year, the DPRK’s economic crisis has probably worked against this. It is currently estimated that at the end of 1999 there were 26–30 SANG-O class SSc in service (some with the Reconnaissance Bureau’s Maritime Department). It is built in two versions—a standard attack version for the KPN armed with torpedoes, and a reconnaissance version for the Reconnaissance Bureau’s Maritime Department, which has the torpedo tubes replaced by a diver lock-out chamber (see chapter 7). This version is used to clandestinely insert special operation force units and intelligence agents into the ROK and Japan. A SANG-O class SSc gained notoriety in 1996 when one was captured by the ROK after running aground near the city of Kangnung during an infiltration mission. During the mid-1990s the DPRK also began construction of a new 1000-tonne reconnaissance submarine at the recommendation of the Reconnaissance Bureau’s Maritime Department for a vessel with greater capabilities than the SANG-O class. From the early 1960s the DPRK has demonstrated a deep interest in midget submarines (SSm), swimmer delivery vehicles (SDV), and infiltration craft for use in intelligence and special operations missions (see chapter 7 for details of these craft). Since that time it has imported and built numerous models of these vessels. The most numerous model is the YUGO class SSm,



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which has been built in multiple sub-classes. It is currently estimated that there are approximately 47 of these submarines operated by the Reconnaissance Bureau’s Maritime Department and the Operations Department of the CCSKA, which are not counted within the total KPN ship strength.27 It is presently unclear whether the KPN operates the YUGO class SSm. Since the Fatherland Liberation War, the KPN has placed considerable emphasis on naval mine warfare, as evidenced by the construction and operation of 24 YUKTO I/II class inshore minesweepers. These are relatively modern vessels of wooden construction which are employed for traditional minesweeping, minefield maintenance and minelaying. Due to limited electronic and sweep equipment, these vessels would have limited effectiveness against modern mines, especially those equipped with counter-sweep technology. They are, however, effective against older mines, including those found in the KPN’s inventory. In addition to the combatants listed above, the KPN operates a small number of auxiliaries. The four DONGHAE and SOHAI class AGS survey ships are controlled by the KPN Deputy Navigation Commander through the Navigation Department. They are responsible for conducting oceanographic surveys and maintaining navigational aides. The single KOWAN ASR is believed to be a catamaran hull and constitutes the KPN’s sole submarine rescue capability. The KPN controls an unknown number of dedicated intelligence gathering ships (AGI) including a number of which have been modified from fishing trawlers. Some of these vessels may, in fact, be controlled by the Reconnaissance Bureau’s Maritime Department. Ocean-going cargo vessels play an important role for various elements within the DPRK, including the intelligence community. The KPN operates a small number of ocean-going cargo vessels in the traditional supply and arms transfer roles (e.g. the Jang Soo Bong-Ho and Hae Yeon-Ho). The Korean Workers’ Party operates at least eight vessels in the intelligence mission through its ‘Seventh’ and ‘Sixteenth’ Bureaus. Included among these is the Tong Gon Ae Guk-ho (aka Dong Geon Ae Gook-Ho), which has been used to transport the agents who killed the ROK president in Burma in 1983 and weapons to terrorist and guerrilla groups throughout the world. Finally, the Ministry of Sea Transportation controls the DPRK’s 99 merchant marine vessels (greater than 1000 gross tonnes), totalling 641 090 gross tonnes (899 243 deadweight tonnes) through its subordinate East Sea Company and West Sea Company. These include eight bulk, 83 cargo, one


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combination bulk, two oil tanker, two passenger, one passengercargo and two short-sea passenger. There are an additional five ships (greater than 1000 gross tonnes) totalling 58 435 deadweight tonnes, operating under the registries of Cambodia, Honduras and Poland.28 NAVAL CONSTRUCTION AND LOGISTICS The DPRK has a large shipbuilding industry, which has been constructing various classes of civilian and military vessels since the end of World War II. It is capable of meeting almost all of the KPN’s current requirements. Construction of vessels for the KPN is believed to be overseen by its Technical and Rear Services Departments in coordination with the Sixth Machine Industry Bureau of the Second Economic Committee (see chapter 2) and the Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry. This coordination also extends to the development and construction of new anti-ship and coastal defence missiles and other naval weapons. In the years following the Fatherland Liberation War the shipbuilding industry concentrated on producing small commercial vessels and converting Soviet-supplied vessels into gunboats. During the 1960s emphasis gradually shifted to indigenous design and construction of combatants including the SARIWON class PG. Since that time the shipbuilding industry has designed and constructed vessels for the KPN ranging from the small 5-tonne SP–10H semi-submersible infiltration landing craft (see chapter 7) to the 1600-tonne SOHO class FF. During the 1990s the KPN has been engaged in an ambitious naval construction program which has seen the construction of numerous vessels of various classes as well as the continued modification of older classes. New construction has concentrated upon a ‘stealth’ patrol boat, KONG BANG and NAMPO class LCPAs, an unidentified 1000-tonne coastal submarine, SANG-O class SSc, YUGO class SSm, SP–10H semi-submersible infiltration craft, SBS–2 two-man swimmer delivery vehicles (SDV), other infiltration craft and SDVs and small floating docks. Modification of existing vessels has included projects such as the mounting of anti-ship cruise missiles on the KONG BANG and NAMPO class LCPAs and continued conversion of older NAMPO A LCPFs to the PC role (NAMPO B/C class). Beginning in the 1990s production of the SANG-O class SSc commenced in two versions: an unarmed reconnaissance version



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for use in infiltrating small units of special operations forces and a fleet version equipped with torpedoes. This class, which currently numbers about 20–25 units, will eventually replace the ageing ROMEO class. In May 1996, the DPRK began construction of the first unit of a 1000-tonne class reconnaissance submarine at the Bong Dae Bo factory (also called the Pongdae Boiler Plant) in Sinp’o, Hamgyong-namdo. This factory has also been involved in the production of the SANG-O class SSc. Where the DPRK acquired the stealth technology for the ‘stealth’ patrol boat, its effectiveness, and the number of such vessels constructed so far are presently unknown.29 In addition to military construction the DPRK’s shipbuilding industry has produced commercial cargo ships up to 20 000 tonnes. Known KPN shipyards and maintenance bases are located at Ch’ongjin, Mayang-do, Munch’on, Najin, Namp’o, Pip’a-got, Sinp’o, Songjin, Tasa-ri, Yongamp’o and Yukdaeso-ri. The primary weaknesses of the shipbuilding industry are use of older technologies, lack of automation and continued dependence upon foreign sources for high-speed marine engines (except for 2500 horsepower diesels), electronic equipment, advanced weapons and POL.30 During September 1993, the KPN signed a contract with the Toen Trading Company of Tokyo for the purchase of 12 decommissioned Russian GOLF II class (Project 629) SSB and FOXTROT class (Project 641) SS for scrap metal. At the time there was considerable concern that the KPN might attempt to refurbish and recommission them, especially since both classes were built later than the ROMEO and WHISKEY class SS currently in KPN service. While this has not happened, these vessels have provided the KPN with new insight into Russian submarine design. Elements of these vessels could also be utilised as patterns for future KPN submarine developments. This is especially true for the GOLF II class SSB, which was originally equipped with three R–21 (SS-N–5 SARK [SERB]) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). It is believed that due to the impracticality (i.e. expense) of their removal, the vessels delivered to the DPRK contained the basic elements of the missile launch system, including the stabilisation mechanisms. This equipment could facilitate the DPRK design of a submarine or ship-mounted ballistic missile launch system.31 Little is known concerning the KPN’s logistic system. The Rear Service Department is responsible for procurement and distribution of almost all supplies to and within the KPN. It performs this mission in coordination with the various departments of the MPAF and bureaus of the Second Economic Committee. It is


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estimated that the KPN’s wartime reserve POL and munitions stocks could sustain combat operations for 60 to 90 days without replenishment. The KPN has demonstrated only a very modest capability to resupply at sea. During the 1980s the DPRK sold, or provided as gifts, a small number of indigenously produced patrol and infiltration craft to developing countries. In April 1983 the DPRK concluded an agreement with the Caribbean island nation of Grenada to provide, at no cost, $12 million worth of arms. Included within this were two small patrol boats (possibly KIMJIN WPB). These were never delivered due to the October military intervention by the US and other Caribbean nations.32 That same year the DPRK provided the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua with two KIMJIN and two SINHUNG WPBs. This was followed, in 1987–88, by an additional six SINHUNG WPBs.33 During 1987, it was reported that a midget submarine that Iran had placed on display was either provided by the DPRK, or based upon one of its designs. There were also reports of the DPRK providing infiltration craft and SDVs to Iran. These reports remain to be confirmed.34 Small numbers of KIMJIN WPBs were also provided to Tanzania and Uganda.35 During 1997 Vietnam is reported to have acquired two SANG-O class SSc. These vessels were apparently second-hand vessels and were refurbished at the Cam Ranh Bay navy base.36 COASTAL DEFENCE Dating to before its official creation, the DPRK leadership had strong concerns regarding coastal defence and used Soviet and Japanese World War II doctrine to establish a coastal defence system before the Fatherland Liberation War. Experiences gained during the war, especially the inability to prevent United Nations Command (UNC) amphibious operations, reinforced the need for a nationwide coastal defence system.37 Today the DPRK maintains a formidable integrated coastal defence system which is based upon experiences during the Fatherland Liberation War, PRC, Soviet and Japanese World War II doctrines, and lessons learned from various wars in the Middle East and South Asia. It is designed to deter or repel an amphibious assault and lessen the effectiveness of conventional shore bombardment. To accomplish these goals the KPN maintains two coastal defence missile regiments, a large number of coastal surveillance radar companies, and coordinates coastal defence



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operations with the KPA’s numerous coastal defence artillery batteries and the Coastal Security Bureau. Coastal surveillance radar installations are reportedly located at 40+ locations on both coasts and on a number of islands with heavy concentrations on the south-west coast from Haeju to Changsan-got, on the south-east coast from Kosong-up to Hodo-ri, and at major KPN bases. These provide complete and overlapping coverage of the sea approaches to the DPRK. The KPN is believed to operate, or have operated, the following coastal defence and surveillance radars, BALL GUN, BR–271, Burun, CROSS SLOT, FLAT FACE, FRONT DOOR, Klen–205, Model 405, Mys, NEPTUNE, NEPTUNE M, PLANK SHAVE, PLINTH NET, S–1M, SHEET BEND, SPOON REST, SQUARE HEAD, SQUARE TIE and SO–7. The coastal surveillance radar network is supplemented by Coastal Security Bureau and paramilitary patrols and observation posts. KPN coastal defence missile units are equipped with the AG–1, S–2 Sopka (SSC–2b SAMLET), HY–1 (CSS-C–2 SILKWORM), or HY–2 (CSS-C–3 SEERSUCKER), which are mounted on a variety of towed launchers and DPRK-produced self-propelled transportererector-launchers (TEL). In the future these missiles may be replaced by the more modern HY–4/C–201 (CSS-C–7 SADSACK), C–802 (CSS-C–8 SACCADE), indigenously designed AG–1, or a reverse-engineered Exocet. The size and organisation of these assets is currently unclear. As can best be determined these assets are organised into two coastal defence missile regiments—with one regiment being subordinate to each fleet headquarters. These regiments are most probably administrative rather than operational headquarters, while individual batteries/battalions are subordinate to local base commanders. These are deployed in both soft and hardened sites to cover the sea approaches to major ports and KPN bases and to cover the northern extremities of the ROK coast.38 Coastal defence missile batteries deployed in the Haeju–Sagon-ni area can interdict shipping entering the ROK port of Inch’on, while missiles deployed near Kosong-up can interdict shipping entering the ROK port of Sokch’o. Known coastal defence missile sites are located at An-gol (AG–1), Chakto-dong (SSC–2b), Mayang-do, Sinsang-ni (CSS-C–2/–3 and AG–1) and Unam-ni (CSS-C–2/–3) on the East Sea coast; and Chungsan, Hwajin-ni, and Pip’a-got (CSS-C–2/–3) on the Yellow Sea coast.39 Target acquisition is provided by target acquisition radars organic to the coastal defence missile regiment, Coastal Security Bureau and KPN afloat units. Coastal defence


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Table 4.3 KPN coastal defence missiles Range (nm/km)

Speed (mach)

S–2 Sopka (SSC–2b SAMLET)

43/80

0.8

500

Autopilot with semi-active radar

HY–1 (CSS-C–2

46/85

0.8

400


51/95

0.9

513

HY–2: Autopilot with active radar

Name

Warhead (kg) Guidance

SILKWORM)

HY–2 (CSS-C–3 SEERSUCKER)

HY–2A: Autopilot with IR seeker HY–2G: Autopilot with active radar and radio-altimeter AG–1

108/200

?

?

Autopilot with active radar and radio-altimeter?

missile units may also have a basic electronic support measures (ESM) capability. As part of a May 1965 arms agreement with the DPRK, the Soviet Union agreed to provide small quantities of the SAMLETs. The first consignment, believed to have consisted of two launch batteries, target acquisition radars and support equipment, arrived quickly and was first observed in September 1965.40 The Soviets are believed to have also provided training to allow the DPRK to bench test the SAMLET and assemble it from ‘knock-down’. At that time the system employed the standard Soviet towed launcher and support systems. By the early 1980s the DPRK had developed a self-propelled TEL based upon the VTT–323 armoured personnel carrier chassis for the SAMLET. The first identified operational use of this new self-propelled TEL occurred in 1984 at a site near Namp’o. Although obsolete by Western standards the system remains in service with the KPN. Given the advances in missile engineering during the 1990s, it is possible that the SAMLET force has been upgraded or retired. Due to a cooling of Soviet–DPRK relations during the late 1960s, the DPRK turned to the PRC for weapons and military assistance. One of the first tangible results of this cooperation was the PRC’s assistance in reorganising the maintenance and assembly programs for the Soviet provided SA–75M Desna (SA–2 GUIDELINE), SS-N–2 STYX and SSC–2b SAMLET. This was followed



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by the DPRK’s acquisition of PRC missile systems—the CSA–1, CSS-N–2 SAFFLOWER and CSS-C–2 SILKWORM. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the PRC assisted the DPRK to further reorganise and expand its missile programs to include the assembly, upgrade and eventually the production of these systems. By the mid-1980s production of the CSS-C–2 SILKWORM was being phased out and replaced by CSS-C–3 SEERSUCKER (HY–2). Production of coastal defence and anti-ship missiles is believed to occur at the Yakch’on Machine Factory (see chapter 9). The DPRK was a major supplier of the CSS-C–2 SILKWORM to Iran during its eight-year-long war with Iraq. A number of these were actually first purchased from the PRC, delivered by rail to the DPRK and then resold to Iran—earning a considerable profit.41 The KPN currently deploys both the CSS-C–2 SILKWORM and CSS-C–3 SEERSUCKER, on towed launchers and self-propelled TELs. The self-propelled TEL utilises the same chassis as do a number of the KPA’s self-propelled artillery systems (e.g. 130 mm M–1991). It is unclear whether the KPN has received any of the more advanced versions of the CSS-C–3 SEERSUCKER.42 The KPN currently deploys the CSS-C–2 SILKWORM and CSS-C–3 SEERSUCKER on towed and self-propelled TELs. There appear to be at least two versions of the latter—tracked and wheeled. The tracked TEL utilises the same chassis as do a number of the KPA’s self-propelled artillery systems (e.g. 130 mm M–1991), and consists of a rotating, one-man, turreted launch rail. The wheeled TEL apparently consists of a rotating launching mechanism and rail mounted on a flatbed truck.43 Operation DESERT STORM, particularly the use of the BGM–109 Tomahawk cruise missiles, had a profound effect upon the thinking of military planners and missile designers in Iran, Syria and the DPRK. Among the results of this were the establishment of cruise missile acquisition and development programs in these countries. During 1992 the DPRK is believed to have begun development of both an extended range anti-ship cruise missile and an air-launched cruise missile based upon the CSS-C–3 SEERSUCKER. The following year Syria and Iran apparently initiated the joint development of both cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).44 There appears to be some level of cooperation with the DPRK, however this remains to be verified. During 1994, as a result of the expanding Syria–DPRK missile relationship (see chapter 9), the DPRK was allowed extensive access to Syria’s missile systems, missile technology and UAVs. Included within this were access to the 9K79 Tochka (SS–21 SCARAB), P–35 Redut (SSC–1b SEPAL), P–20 Rubezh-A (SS-C–3 STYX)


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missiles; solid fuel rocket engine technology; and the DR–3 Reys UAV. More significantly, it is believed that Syria also provided an example of each system to the DPRK. Some of the technology from the SEPAL, STYX, and DR–3 is believed to have been fed into the AG–1 ASCM, unnamed ALCM and UAV programs (see chapter 5). That same year, in June 1994, when the DPRK tested its new anti-ship cruise missile, three missiles were fired from Sinsang-ni at a target barge 160 km away. Although only one missile hit the target, the test provided a clear indication that the KPN was well along in the development of an extended range missile. These tests were notable for another reason. In the past, anti-ship and coastal defence missiles were typically launched from a test site near Hwajin-ni, on the west coast, north-west in the direction of Sinmi-do island. The Sinsang-ni test was the first known test launch of a coastal defence missile on the east coast. On 23 May 1997, the DPRK again test-launched the missile, now identified as the AG–1 since this test was conducted near the An-gol Army Barracks south of Ch’ongjin on the east coast. This test was conducted from a self-propelled TEL and is believed to be an indication that the missile was now operational. Intelligence sources estimate that this system’s propulsion and guidance systems were based upon the CSS-C–3 SEERSUCKER and that it possesses an operational range of approximately 200 km. Iranians and ‘other potential buyers’ were reportedly present for both the 1994 and 1997 tests.45 The KPA ground forces currently maintain in excess of 250 soft and hardened coastal defence artillery sites with more than 1000 firing positions, deployed along both coasts of the DPRK. On the East Sea coast there are in excess of 100 hardened and 20 soft sites, with the heaviest concentration located in the Wonsan– Hamhung area. The Yellow Sea coast has in excess of 100 hardened and 30 soft sites, with the heaviest concentration located in the sea approaches to Namp’o and P’yongyang. Coastal defence artillery systems generally consist of 122–152 mm guns. Sites in less important or rear areas may still employ 76–100 mm guns.46 How many coastal defence artillery sites are currently occupied is presently unclear. The artillery units that man these sites coordinate their operations with the KPN, Coastal Security Bureau and regular KPA artillery units. The soft sites typically consist of simple pre-surveyed revetted or dug-in firing positions, linked by an unimproved road or track, communications trenches for troops and a dug-in ammunition storage area. Hardened artillery sites are similar to those



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constructed along the DMZ and around the DPRK, and consist of elaborate fortified underground or partially underground facilities. Typically, . . . artillery tunnels are constructed in rock on the seaward side of a hill or cliff face, in many cases near the waterline. The tunnel openings, through which the guns are moved for firing, are 3 to 5 meters wide and approximately 3 meters high. These openings are secured by double-leaf steel doors equipped with rubber seals to make the installation airtight for protection against CBR warfare. The tunnel walls and arched ceilings are lined with steel-reinforced concrete 20 to 40 centimeters thick. The firing positions, only a few meters in front of the tunnel entrances, are constructed of concrete or packed earth and are protected by mounded earth or earth-backed parapets. A reverse slope tunnel entrance often provides access for personnel and supplies. Quarters are included, in some instances, as part of the underground complex. Part of a gun’s basic load of ammunition is stored in rooms adjacent to the artillery storage tunnel. Pillboxes, trench-works, and automatic weapons positions are located nearby or are an integral part of the tunnel complex. A ventilation system is provided to bring in fresh air and remove stale air, including fumes generated during firing. Humidity control devices are employed to combat the problems of dampness. Most hardened sites have exposed support facilities consisting of one or two barracks and several support buildings located on the landward side of a hill. Nearly all support facilities are linked to the artillery positions by a loose surface, all-weather road, although access may be possible by a tunnel entrance in the rear slope of the hill as well.47

Women apparently play some role within the coastal defence artillery units. During 1995 Kim Chong-il made a much publicised visit to ‘the Women’s Coastal Artillery Company of Unit 291’.48 The extent of female involvement is, however, unknown. NAVAL MINE WARFARE The KPN has a history of mine warfare experience dating back to the Fatherland Liberation War. The North Koreans have had wartime experience in mine warfare (MIW), acquired under Soviet tutelage during the Korean War—a war in which MIW was the only area of naval warfare in which the North Korean navy had any appreciable success.


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That success was the direct result of extensive Soviet assistance which included furnishing the North with a large stock of mines, training in MIW, and assistance in mine laying. The North Koreans and Soviets laid defensive minefields at such ports as Pohang, Wonsan, Chongjin, Inchon and Kunsan to deny entry by U.S. naval forces attempting to support ground forces ashore; mine clearing by the U.S. Navy was necessary virtually from the beginning of hostilities.49

These wartime experiences, combined with Soviet and Chines doctrines, and lessons learned from recent wars in the Middle East and South Asia, have strongly influenced KPN naval mine warfare doctrine. This doctrine was reinforced by events in the Middle East during the 1980s and 1990s. The DPRK was a major supplier of naval mines and naval mine technology to Iran during the eightyear-long Iran–Iraq War. During the later part of that war, Iran covertly laid numerous small offensive minefields and floating mines in Kuwaiti waters and international shipping lanes in the Gulf of Arabia. The intention of these operations was to disrupt the flow of oil from the Gulf States which were supporting Iraq and a number of vessels were extensively damaged or sunk. In June 1987, 10 moored M–08 mines manufactured in the DPRK were swept from the approaches to the Kuwaiti port of Ahmadi. Later, in September of that year, US special operations forces captured the 1662 tonne Iranian amphibious landing ship the Iran Ajr, while clandestinely engaged in minelaying operations 50 miles north-east of Bahrain. The mines on board the Iran Ajr were Iranian copies of the DPRK M–08. These mines had been modified with a larger explosive charge than the original and the removal of safety devices.50 During the 1990s the DPRK was a victim of naval mine warfare. On 2 August 1994, the 14 000 tonne ocean-going cargo ship Dae Hung Dan-ho (aka Dai Hong Dan) was damaged by one of approximately 190 naval mines clandestinely laid in the Gulf of Suez and Red Sea by Libya.51 The KPN’s mine warfare doctrine calls for the establishment of extensive defensive minefields around its operating bases and ports during wartime. On the surface this might appear impractical since there are no dedicated minelaying vessels within the KPN’s inventory. The 21 YUKTO I/II class inshore minesweepers do have a modest minelaying capability, but this is insufficient to quickly lay extensive minefields. Instead the KPN plans to utilise



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a wide variety of larger combatant and patrol craft equipped with mine rails to quickly establish these fields. Additionally, a majority of the DPRK’s fishing craft over 50 tonnes are equipped, or can be in a relatively short time, with various types of minelaying equipment. While this may appear to be extremely crude by Western standards, it should be remembered that the KPN laid its extensive minefields during the Fatherland Liberation War using only junks, barges and miscellaneous small craft, while Iran laid a number of small minefields and floating mines during its war with Iraq using modified landing craft and small patrol vessels. Defensive minefields will be monitored by coastal defence surveillance radars and observation posts and will be supported by coastal defence missile and artillery batteries. This will make close approach and mine clearing operations by ROKN and USN forces extremely hazardous. The KPN’s offensive mine warfare capability is limited by the lack of dedicated minelayers. It will, however, attempt to employ its ROMEO class SS and SANG-O SSc submarines to lay offensive minefields outside ROK and Japanese ports, the Korea Straits and the shipping lanes between the ROK and Japan.52 During wartime, it is likely that some ocean-going cargo ships will also be equipped with equipment for clandestine mining operations. The KPN could also engage in the laying of free-floating mines. Given the currents in the Yellow and East Seas such mines would quickly be carried south at speeds of 14–24 miles per day. If laid correctly in the East Sea, mines would first be carried south along the ROK coast, then east, and finally north along the coast of Japan.53 It is unclear how successful the KPN would be in sweeping modern mines laid by the ROKN or USN. Its 21 YUKTO I/II class inshore minesweepers are of relatively recent construction, but lack modern electronic and sweep equipment. The KPN’s naval mine inventory is believed to be in excess of 2000 primarily early-generation Soviet contact and magnetic mines. Mines known to be in the KPN inventory include: ALCM– 82, KMD-I/II, M–08, M–12, M–26, MKB, MKD, MYaM, PDM–1M and PDM–2. The DPRK-manufactured versions of these mines are believed to have significant differences when compared to the original Soviet models (e.g. larger warheads or modified arming devices). It is unclear if this was a DPRK or Iranian modification.54 During the past ten years the KPN may have developed more advanced mines or acquired them from eastern Europe, PRC or Russia. Production of naval mines is believed to take place at the ‘26 Factory’.55 There is no current information available concern-


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ing KPN use of anti-sonar coatings on its mines. The use of fibre-impregnated resin on some of its YUGO class SSm suggests that they are aware of such technology and that they might employ it to make some of its naval mines more stealthy. The KPN may also possess command-controlled mines which are already placed at the entrances to sensitive bases and facilities. Although there is no current information available concerning the use of moored obstructers and anti-sweep devices it is probable that the KPN has a variety of such devices in its inventory. ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE The KPN possesses a small anti-submarine (ASW) component consisting of 32 large patrol craft (13 SO–I, eight TAECHONG I, five TAECHONG II and 6 HAINAN class PCs).56 Approximately 75 per cent of these vessels are based along the east coast under the command of the East Sea Fleet. The remaining 25 per cent are under the command of the West Sea Fleet. This force is inadequate both in number and capability to counter a modern submarine threat. All these vessels are equipped with the old hull-mounted, highfrequency STAG EAR sonar, which is practically useless against current ROKN and USN submarines. A secondary ASW capability exists with the KPN’s one SOHO FF, two NAJIN FFLs, three SARIWON PGs and two TRAL PGs. All these vessels are equipped with the hull-mounted, high-frequency STAG HORN sonar which, like the STAG EAR, is relatively ineffective against modern submarines. This ASW weakness was particularly noticeable given the growing fleet of ROKN Type–209 submarines which were first laid down in 1989.57 To address this, the DPRK acquired 10–20 Mi–14PL HAZE-A ASW helicopters during the late 1980s and early 1990s. These are believed to be formed into an ASW unit under the KPN command headquarters. These helicopters represent the KPN’s only modern ASW capabilities. Although the KPN’s fleet of 22 ROMEO (Type 031) class submarines could be used for ASW operations in deeper waters, there is no evidence of training for such operations.58 Additionally, up until the mid-1980s the KPN was not known to possess ASW torpedoes. With the Soviet–DPRK rapprochement during the mid1980s the KPN may have obtained a small inventory of older Soviet ASW torpedoes. From mid- to late-1980s the KPN and Soviet Navy conducted a number of small joint ASW exercises. There is



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no evidence that the KPN’s inventory of SANG-O class SSc are equipped or trained for ASW.59 The KPN’s ASW component plays a major role in training its submarine forces to operate under ASW conditions. This is believed to be especially true for those submarines engaged in infiltrating special operations forces into the ROK, including those SANG-O class SSc and YUGO class SSm of the Reconnaissance Bureau’s Maritime Department.


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5

Korean People’s Air and Air Defence Command OREAN EOPLE’S IR AND IR EFENCE OMMAND

K

P

A

A

D

C

The primary mission of the Korean People’s Air and Air Defence Command—more commonly known as the Korean People’s Air Force (KPAF)—is the air defence of the DPRK mainland and territorial waters. Secondary missions include reconnaissance, transportation and logistic support, insertion of special operations forces, strategic bombing, and provision of tactical air support to KPA ground force and KPN units. The KPAF controls and operates all aircraft, airfields and airports within the DPRK.1 Due to an inflexible and unsophisticated command and control system, large numbers of obsolete aircraft, limited access to spare parts for its few modern aircraft, and fuel shortages which have limited flying time and training, the KPAF is judged to possess only limited offensive and defensive wartime capabilities. It is judged to be capable of conducting a surge of offensive operations during the initial phase of any new war on the Korean Peninsula. It is judged to be capable of guarding DPRK airspace during peacetime.

ORGANISATION Under the MPAF, the KPAF is a coequal service with both the KPN and the KPA. Control of the KPAF is vested in its commander, who is responsible to the Chief of the General Staff, MPAF. It is headquartered in P’yongyang,2 has a total strength of 110 000, approximately 1700 aircraft, and is organised into a command element, air staff, six air divisions, several independent air battalions, three Air Force Sniper Brigades, UAV unit, hot 123



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Air Force Hospital

1st, 2nd, 3rd Combat

Air Staff

(Coordination)

Production and Repair Facilities

Air Force Command Headquarters

8th Training

P’yongyang AAA Command

5th, 6th Transport

Air Koryo

Civil Aviation Bureau

Figure 5.1 KPAF organisation

SAM Maintenance Depot

Deputy Commander Air Defence

Air Traffic Control

UAV

(x1–4)

Hot Air Balloon

Cha Kwang-su Airman Training School

17th Air Officers School

(x1–4)

Searchlight

Sailplane

Kyongsong Flight Officers School

Kim Ch’aek Air Force Academy

K OREAN P EOPLE’S A IR AND A IR D EFENCE C OMMAND

125

air balloon unit, sailplane unit, 19 surface-to-air missile (SAM) brigades, a SAM maintenance depot, an unknown number of antiaircraft artillery (AAA) regiments, one–four radar battalion(s), one–four searchlight battalion(s), communications regiment, air traffic control regiment, several aircraft production and repair facilities, Air Force Hospital, Kim Ch’aek Air Force Academy (aka Kim Ch’aek Air Force University, or Kim Ch’aek Military Academy), Kyongsong Flight Officers School, 17th Air Officers School, Cha Kwang-su Airmen’s Training School and the Civil Aviation Bureau which controls the national airline—Air Koryo. The KPAF also coordinates air defence operations with the P’yongyang Anti- aircraft Artillery Command and the KPA’s antiaircraft artillery assets.3 Like the commander of the KPN, the commander of the KPAF performs three primary functions: participates in the formulation of broad military policy at the MPAF level; commands the KPAF via the Air Force Command Headquarters; and coordinates air operations with the other branches of the armed forces. Immediately subordinate to the KPAF commander are the Chief of Staff, Deputy Political Commander, Deputy Flight Commander, Deputy Technical Commander, Deputy Rear Services Commander, Deputy Air Defence Commander, military prosecution office and military justice office.4 The air staff consists of the following departments: Chemical, Communications, Construction, Cryptographic (Classified Materials), Engineer, Enlisted Personnel, Finance, a guard company, Medical, Meteorology, Officer (Cadre) Personnel, Operations, Ordnance, Reconnaissance (Intelligence) and Training. For 17 years, from 1978 to 1995, General Cho Myong-rok was the commander of the KPAF. In October 1995 he was promoted to vice-marshal and appointed Chief of the KPA General Political Bureau and a member of the KWP Central Military Committee. His place as commander of the KPAF was taken by Colonel General Oh Gum-ch’ol. As commander of the KPAF he is assisted by deputy commanders Chang Dong-jin, Hong Song-ryul, Chong Gyu-ham, Pak Hyong-uk, Li Chol-hwan, Ahn Yong-guk (Flight) and Kim Su-hyon (Political).5 Subordinate to the Deputy Political Commander are the Political and Political Safety Departments. The Political Department is organised into the following sections: clubs, organisation, propaganda and lecture. The Political Safety Department is organised into four sections: investigation, safety, information and cryptographic.6 The Deputy Flight Commander controls the following departments: Gunnery, Pilot Training, and Navigator and Bombardier Training.7



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Deputy Rear Services Commander

Departments Aircraft Parts Chemical Armament Communications Clothing Construction Food Cryptographic (Classified Materials) Installations Engineer POL Enlisted Personnel Finance Guard Company Medical Meteorology Officer (Cadre) Personnel Operations Ordnance Reconnaissance Military (Intelligence) Prosecution Training Office

Chief of Air Staff

Figure 5.2 KPAF air staff

Military Justice Office

Air staff

Deputy Flight Commander Gunnery Pilot Training Navigator Bombardier Training

Aircraft Repair Armament Instruments Maintenance Motor Vehicle Repair Radar Radio Engineering

Deputy Technical Commander

Deputy Air Defence Commander

Political Department Clubs Organisation Propaganda Lecture Political Safety Department Investigation Safety Information Cryptographic

Deputy Political Commander


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The Deputy Technical Commander controls the following departments: Aircraft Repair, Armament, Instruments, Maintenance, Motor Vehicle Repair, Radar and Radio Engineering. The Deputy Air Defence Commander is believed responsible for overseeing air defence matters. While air defence assets are located primarily within the air divisions the Deputy Air Defence Commander is believed to have operation control over a small number of AAA units, radar battalions (early warning, target acquisition and ground control intercept), searchlight battalions and the SAM maintenance depot. He also coordinates air defence operations with the P’yongyang Anti-aircraft Artillery Command. The Deputy Rear Services Commander controls the following departments: Aircraft Parts, Armament, Clothing, Food, Installations and POL. The Civil Aviation Bureau controls the national airline, the Korean Civil Aviation Company, more commonly known as Air Koryo. The Civil Aviation Bureau was under the control of the Ministry of Transportation until 1960 when it was incorporated into the KPAF. All civilian aircraft are flown and maintained by KPAF personnel. Air Koryo maintains irregular services to Beijing, Moscow and a small number of other cities in Eastern Europe and South Asia. During times of national emergency or war they will be integrated into KPAF operations.8 During the past ten years numerous changes have taken place within the KPAF’s operational units. At present the primary operational unit is the air division, (aka combat aviation group) of which there are six—three combat (1st, 2nd and 3rd), two transport (5th and 6th) and one training (8th). Combat air divisions consist of three–five air regiments, service and support units, and have a total of approximately 160–200 aircraft. The 5th and 6th Transport Divisions consists of two–three An–2 and two Mi–2/–4/–8 regiments, service and support units, with a total strength of 120–135 aircraft and 80–90 helicopters. The 8th Training Division consists of three MiG–15, one Yak–18, one An–2, and one Mi–2 regiments, service and support units, with a total aircraft strength of approximately 120–135 MiG–15s, 35–45 Yak–18s, 35–45 An–2s and 35–45 Mi–2 helicopters.9 The subordination of the MD–500 and Mi–24 (HIND-D) regiments is presently unclear. All helicopters and An–2s are subordinate to the KPAF. They may, however, during combined and special operations be temporarily subordinated to the KPN Command headquarters or a KPA corps headquarters.10 The combat air divisions are organised into a headquarters and division command post, three–five fighter regiments, one bomber



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regiment, five–seven anti-aircraft rocket brigades (i.e. SAM brigades), communications centre, radar regiment, nuclear–chemical defence battalion, engineer battalion, transportation battalion, guard battalion, and a maintenance and repair unit. The communications centre has a personnel strength of approximately 600 and is organised into six signal squadrons. Three squadrons are for wireless communications and two are for cable and telephone communications. Each squadron consists of four–five platoons.11 The 1st Air Division is slightly larger than the 2nd and 3rd due to its responsibility for the defence of P’yongyang. It consists of five air regiments, five air defence units and service and support units. The five air regiments are: 24th Air Regiment, based at U’iju and equipped with the H–5 (Il–28); 35th Air Regiment, based at Kaech’on and equipped with MiG–19, MiG–15U and MiG–17U; 55th Air Regiment, based at Sunch’on and equipped with MiG–29 and Su–25; 57th Air Regiment, based at Onch’on-up and equipped with MiG–19, MiG–15U, and MiG–17U12; 60th Air Regiment, based at Pukch’ang and equipped with the MiG–23. The five air defence units are: 3rd Anti-aircraft Rocket Brigade, headquartered at Sohung; 5th Anti-aircraft Rocket Brigade, headquartered at Unch’on-up; 8th Anti-aircraft Rocket Brigade, headquartered at Chaeryong-up; 66th Anti-aircraft Rocket Brigade, headquartered at P’yongyang; 116th Anti-aircraft Rocket Brigade, headquartered at Namp’o.13 The air regiment is organised into a headquarters and staff platoon, three flight battalions, AAA battalion, air communications company, communications company, two airfield management companies, two guard companies, transportation company, nuclear– chemical defence platoon, weather section, work section, gas service section, fuel supply section, material supply section, bomb section, weapons repair section, radioactive preparation section, medical section and several other miscellaneous sections.14 The air regiment is well organised for the command and control of its subordinate elements in wartime. Air regiments have a total of approximately 40–50 aircraft, 90 pilots and 300–350 support personnel.15 According to defectors, the 66th and 116th Anti-aircraft Rocket Brigades are composed of five battalions each and are equipped with a variety of ‘SA–2, SA–3, SA–5, SA–6, 37 mm AAA, and 14.5 mm AAA’.16 Units subordinate to the 3rd Air Division reportedly include the 11th Air Regiment and the 203rd Air Regiment. Primary


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Table 5.1 KPAF regiments Category

Aircraft type

Air regiments

Fighter/interceptor

MiG–15/–17, F–5 MiG–19, F–6, A–5 MiG–21PF/PFMA, MiG–21U, F–7 MiG–23ML MiG–29 H–5, HJ–5, H–5R† Su–25K/UBK MD–500D/E Mi–2 Mi–4/Z–5 Mi–8/–17/–26 Mi–24D/DU An–2/Y–5, Li–2 Il–14/–18/–62–76MD, An–24, Tu–134B/–154B†† MiG–15 (MiG–15/–15U and FT–5, FT–6) Yak–18/CJ–6 An–2 Mi–2 H–5R, An–2/–24, MiG–17/–21/–23 An–2, Mi–14PL, Mi–2, Mi–4 MiG–15/–23/–29, H–5, Mi–2, An–2/–24

3 4 3 1 1 battalion 2 1 battalion 2 2 1 1 1 6

Bomber/ground attack Helicopter

Transport

Training

Reconnaissance/EW Naval support/ASW††† Test and evaluation†††† †

1 3 1 1 1 1 battalion 1 battalion 1 battalion

The H–5 is a PR-built version of the Il–28. The HJ–5 is a crew trainer and the H–5R is the reconnaissance version.

†† The Il–76 MDs and Tu–134s/–154Bs are assigned to the national air line—Air Koryo. ††† This unit is believed to be subordinate to the Naval Command Headquarters. †††† This unit may contain several US and foreign-built aircraft (e.g. F–5, A–37, F–4, MD–500).

operating airfields for the 3rd Air Division include Hwangju, Koksan, Kwail and T’aet’an. It is estimated that the KPAF has about 33 air regiments. This could be increased to 34 if the aircraft assigned to the national airline—Air Koryo—are counted. There are at least three additional specialised independent air battalions—reconnaissance/electronic warfare (EW), test and evaluation and naval support/anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The MiG–29 and Su–25 battalions are formed into the 55th Air Regiment. Each KPAF airfield has a commander, chief of staff, political deputy base commander, rear services deputy base commander and safety department commander. A typical airbase consists of a guard company, transport company, communications platoon, engineer platoon, fuel depot, supply depot, weather station, medical clinic, nursery and military store. The Hwangju Airfield serves as the KPAF’s showcase facility.



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It is here that Soviet Air Force exchange visits would be based and fly demonstrations conducted during the 1980s, and where foreign dignitaries are brought on official state visists.17 It also has served as a private hunting preserve for Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il—being stocked with pheasants, deer and roe deer—and the location for one of their many villas.18 During the period from September through November 1995 the KPAF conducted a major redeployment of its combat units from rear area airfields to airfields closer to the DMZ (see below). Aside from testing the operational readiness of KPAF units, this redeployment was apparently utilised to redistribute assets as part of a general reorganisation of the KPAF into the new combat air divisions. Beginning in September 1998 published reports appeared indicating that the KPAF had established a number of ‘suicide squadrons’ under the direct command of Kim Chong-il. Approximately 140 ageing aircraft (e.g. MiG–15s, MiG–17s) were to be dedicated to this purpose. According to these reports, during a war these pilots would crash their aircraft into high-value targets (e.g. Blue House, the Defence Ministry) within the ROK. While these reports may be correct, they could also be a misinterpretation of a domestic propaganda campaign begun within the DPRK in the mid-1990s which called on the people to become human bullets, bombs and shields for the regime.19 KPAF units apparently have several designations—a cover designation (e.g. 150th Air Force Unit, 436th Air Force Unit, 927th Air Force Unit), official designation (e.g. 1st Battalion, 35th Air Regiment, 1st Air Division) and an honorific name (e.g. Kumsong Guards). Air companies and battalions are frequently identified in sequential single digit order (e.g. 1st, 2nd, 3rd) within their parent unit.20 For example, Captain Yi Ch’ol-su, who defected to the ROK in May 1996, gave his complete unit identification as the ‘3rd Company, 2nd Battalion, 57th Pursuit Air Regiment, 1st Air Division’.21 There is no evidence that pilots or ground crews have adorned their aircraft with individual markings or unit insignia. Individual aircraft within a unit are identified by a unique number, while battalions or regiments may differentiate their aircraft by use of different-coloured aircraft numbers, fin flashes or rudders. The majority of the fighter aircraft appear to be natural metal or silver-grey, while ground attack aircraft, An–2s and helicopters are camouflaged or painted overall dark green with grey or light blue undersurfaces. Some An–2s are reportedly painted black overall to


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assist in infiltration. During the late 1960s a number of H–5s (PRC-built versions of the Il–28) wore a very distinctive camouflage of dark green overall with large brown ‘tiger stripes’ on the vertical stabiliser and a red rudder. They now appear to be natural metal or silver-grey. On the Il–76MD FALSIE this consists of a grey underside and white topside—which meet mid-fuselage with a red strip separating them. Markings include ‘Air Koryo’ written in Korean on the upper fuselage just aft of the cockpit, the national flag on the tail and an individual aircraft code (P–912, P–913 and P–914) at the base of the tail.22 DEPLOYMENT The 1st Air Division (Combat) is headquartered at Kaech’on (Saamcham) and is responsible for the defence of the northwestern section of the country, including the Yongbyon nuclear research complex. The 3rd Air Division (Combat) is headquartered at Hwangju and is responsible for the defence of the southern section of the country, including the area along the DMZ. The 2nd Air Division (Combat) is headquartered at Toksan (Hamhung) and is responsible for the defence of the eastern section of the country. The 8th Air Division (Training) is headquartered at Orang (Hoemun-ri, Hoemun-dong) and is responsible for training and the defence of the north-eastern section of the country, including the Musudan-ni Launch Facility (see chapter 9). The 6th Air Division (Transport) is headquartered at Sondok (Sondong-ni) and the 5th Air Division (Transport) is headquartered at T’aech’on. There are currently 99 known airfields and heliports of various types and levels of usability within the DPRK. Of these 10 are abandoned, not usable, or their status is unknown but believed unusable. The remaining 89 can be broken down as follows: 51 airfields, 18 highway strips and 20 heliports/helipads. These 89 airfields and heliports provide the KPAF with a significant surplus of runways for its 1700 aircraft. Of the 51 airfields, 25 have hard surface runways and represent the KPAF’s primary operating bases. The remaining 26 have soft surface runways composed of crushed stone, dirt or sand. This very high percentage (51 per cent) of soft-surfaced airfields does not necessarily represent a disadvantage for the KPAF since the vast majority of its aircraft are capable of conducting operations from them. The numerous unoccupied airfields within the forward corps along the DMZ will be used to support flight operations during wartime.



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Map 5.1 KPAF order of battle

People’s Republic of China Ch’ongjin 8th Orang

5th Sinuiju

2nd Toksan 1st Hamhung

T’aech’on

Kaech’on

Sondok

6th East Sea (Sea of Japan)

HQ Wonsan P’yongyang 3rd Hwangju

Seoul

Republic of Korea

N

The 18 highway strips represents a KPAF acknowledgement that its primary operating bases will be principal targets for ROKAF/ USAF attacks during any renewed conflict and that it has a limited capability to defend and repair them under wartime conditions. The 21 heliports/helipads are located near important facilities and installations (e.g. P’yongyang, corps headquarters). There are undoubtedly additional, yet unidentified, highway strips and heliports/helipads throughout the country. For example, two new


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Table 5.2 KPAF airfields Designation (alternate)

Latitude

Ch’o-do Changjin-up Haeju Hoeyang Southeast Hwangju Hwangsuwon-ni Hyesan Hyon-ni Ich’on Ich’on Northeast Ihyon-ni (Haeju Northeast) Iwon Kaech’on (Saamcham) Kangdong Koksan Kuktong (Irhyang-dong) Kumgang Kuum-ni (T’ongch’on) Kwail (P’ungch’on) Kwaksan-ni (Yongsong-ni) Kyongsong-Chuul (Kyongsong Southeast) Maengsan Manp’o (Manp’o-up) Mirim (P’yongyang East) Nuch’on-ni Onch’on-up Ongjin Orang (Hoemun-ri, Hoemun-dong) P’yongsul-li Paegam (Kuso) Panghyon (Namsi) Pukch’ang (Pukch’ang-up) Samjiyon (Sinmusong) Sangyang-ni (Koksan Southeast) Sinuiju Sohung South (Sinmak, Sinmak South) Sonch’on Sonch’on Southwest Sondok (Sondong-ni) Sunan (Sunan-up, Sunan International Airport) Sunch’on (P’yong-ni) Sungam-ni T’aech’on T’aet’an (T’aet’an-pihaengjang) Toha-ri North Toksan (Hamhung) U’iju Unch’on-up

38°33′02″ 40°22′08″ 38°00′09″ 38°39′42″ 38°39′01″ 40°40′54″ 41°22′40″ 38°37′00″ 38°28′54″ 38°40′19″ 38°07′42″ 40°22′00″ 39°45′14″ 39°09′16″ 38°41′35″ 41°14′48″ 38°38′00″ 38°51′35″ 38°25′19″ 39°43′51″ 41°33′39″ 39°39′04″ 41°08′20″ 39°01′00″ 39°14′00″ 38°53′25″ 37°55′39″ 41°25′42″ 38°42′46″ 41°56′41″ 39°55′43″ 39°29′40″ 41°54′20″ 38°38′00″ 40°05′01″ 38°21′36″ 39°55′06″ 39°45′00″ 39°44′45″ 39°12′05″ 39°24′48″ 41°40′19″ 39°54′14″ 38°08′04″ 38°42′10″ 39°59′37″ 40°08′59″ 38°32′59″



Longitude N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N

124°50′04″ 127°15′47″ 125°46′50″ 127°38′56″ 125°47′34″ 128°09′05″ 128°12′19″ 127°27′05″ 126°51′34″ 126°55′34″ 125°51′00″ 128°44′00″ 125°54′03″ 126°02′38″ 126°36′07″ 129°33′53″ 127°59′00″ 127°54′32″ 125°01′20″ 125°06′47″ 129°37′44″ 126°40′23″ 126°21′19″ 125°50′41″ 126°07′00″ 125°14′17″ 125°25′11″ 129°38′51″ 126°43′29″ 128°51′35″ 125°12′29″ 125°58′44″ 128°24′31″ 126°39′00″ 124°24′28″ 126°13′14″ 124°50′20″ 124°49′00″ 127°28′37″ 125°40′21″ 125°53′45″ 129°40′23″ 125°29′32″ 125°14′43″ 126°17′18″ 127°37′02″ 124°29′53″ 125°20′22″

E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E

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Table 5.2 (cont.) Designation (alternate)

Latitude

Longitude

Wonsan Yonggang-ni Yonp’o (Soho-dong)

39°09′41″ N 39°29′00″ N 39°47′00″ N

127°29′06″ E 126°00′00″ E 127°32′00″ E

highway strips were reported in mid-1999 to be under construction in the Songnim and Kaesong areas.23 In December 1995 the DPRK agreed to make the military airfield at Sondok, south-west of Hamhung, available to KEDO (Korean Economic Development Organisation, see chapter 8) as a point of entry to assist it with constructing a light water reactor under the provisions of the Agreed Framework.24 Historically, the majority of the KPAF’s aircraft have been deployed in the central and northern provinces of the country. With the reorganisation of the KPAF into six air divisions during the 1990s, however, there has been some forward deployment. Currently, it is estimated that 40–50 per cent of the KPAF’s combat aircraft are deployed south of the P’yongyang–Wonsan line. These developments, coupled with a renewed emphasis upon training and preparation for a surprise air attack upon the ROK, are based upon orders given to the MPAF by Kim Chong-il on 30 April 1994. These orders state, in part, that the KPA must be prepared to ‘commence attack while our people are sleeping, occupy South Korea in an instant, so our people will be sure of the occupation when they wake in the morning’.25 As noted above, during the period from September through November 1995 the KPAF conducted a series of large-scale exercises and unit redeployments as part of its annual winter training cycle (November through April). Such winter exercises which have witnessed the forward deployment of aircraft during September–November and their subsequent withdrawal during December–February.26 On 21–22 October 1995 an exercise took place in which several hundred aircraft participated. This was followed, during the next two months, by the redeployment of 420 aircraft and helicopters. Approximately 120 of these aircraft were deployed from rear area airfields to frontline airfields within 40 km of the DMZ. Major aspects of this redeployment included: approximately 35–40 H–5s (Il–28) bombers of the 24th Air Regiment deployed from U’iju to T’aet’an; 40–50 MiG–17s from Panghyon were deployed to Nuch’on-ni; 50–60 MiG–15s (or possibly MiG–19s) from Wonsan were deployed to Kuum-ni; other MiG–15s (or


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Table 5.3 KPAF highway strips Designation (alternate)

Latitude

Longitude

Ayang-ni Changyon Kaech’on Southwest (Saamcham Southwest) Kangda-ri (Wonsan South) Kilchu Kojo Koksan South Nuch’on-ni Okpyong-ni Py’ong-ni South Panghyon South (Namsi South) Sangwon Sangwon-ni Sinhung Sunan-up North (Sunan Auxiliary) Tanch’on South Wongyo-ri (Koksan Southwest) Yonghung

38°14′54″ N 38°13′30″ N 39°43′00″ N 39°05′43″ N 40°55′00″ N 38°50′21″ N 38°44′07″ N 38°13′46″ N 39°16′01″ N 39°19é24″ N 39°52′58″ N 38°50′47″ N 40°07′00″ N 40°10′53″ N 39°14′16″ N 40°24é00″ N 38°35′47″ N 39°32′09″ N

125°57′53″ 125°08′29″ 125°51′00″ 127°24′18″ 129°18′49″ 127°52′21″ 126°39′40″ 126°16′05″ 127°19′28″ 125°53′57″ 125°09′43″ 126°03′51″ 125°52′00″ 127°32′36″ 125°40′27″ 128°54′00″ 126°31′38″ 127°17′29″

Designation

Latitude

Longitude

Hwagwan-dong Inhung Kaesong Kan-ch’on Kan-ch’on South Kan-ch’on West Kosong-dong Kowon Kusong Munhoe-dong P’yongyang South P’yongyang VIP Pakch’on Pakch’on North Pakch’on South Saekolch’on Samjang-kol Sep’o South (?) Supreme Naval Headquarters T’aech’on Yujong-dong

39°16′00″ 39°30′00″ 37°58′13″ 40°56′00″ 40°54′00″ 40°56′00″ 39°54′00″ 38°32′00″ 39°38′00″ 40°57′00″ 38°57′00″ 39°02′00″ 39°41′00″ 39°43′00″ 39°42′00″ 40°58′00″ 39°40′00″ 38°35′00″ 39°07′00″ 39°57′00″ 40°59′00″

Table 5.4

E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E

KPAF heliports/helipads



N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N

125°36′00″ 127°12′00″ 126°30′59″ 129°22′00″ 129°22′00″ 129°21′00″ 125°52′00″ 127°23′00″ 125°12′00″ 129°14′00″ 125°43′00″ 125°49′00″ 125°39′00″ 125°39′00″ 125°39′00″ 129°13′00″ 127°13′00″ 127°23′00″ 125°44′00″ 125°26′00″ 129°16′00″

E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E

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Map 5.2 KPAF airfields and highway strips Airfield Highway air strip

Samjiyon

Paegam

People’s Republic of China Ch’ongjin Sungam-ni Kyongsong-Chuul Orang Hyesan Kuktong Manp’o

U’iju

Hwangsuwon-ni

Kilchu

Sonch’on Iwon Tanch’on South Changjin-up Panghyon Sangwon-ni Sinhung Sinuiju Panghyon S Sinuiju Hamhung T’aech’on Toksan Kwaksan-ni Kaech’on Kaech’on SW Yonp’o Maengsan Sondok Pukch’ang Yonghung East Sea Yonggang-ni Sunch’on Sonch’on SW Okpyong-ni (Sea of Japan) P'yong-ni S Sunan-up N Wonsan Kangdong Wonsan Sunan Kangda-ri P’yongyang Onch'on-up Kuum-ni Toha-ri N Mirim Sangwon Koksan S Kojo P’yongsul-li Hoeyang SE Unch’on-up Kumgang Koksan Ch’o-do Ich’on NE Wongyo-ri Sangyang-ni Kwail Hyon-ni Ich’on Hwangju Changyon Sohung S Ayang-ni Ihyon-ni T’aet’an

Ongjin

Haeju Nuch’on-ni Nuch’on-ni

Seoul

Republic of Korea

N

possibly MiG–19s) that had been at Hwangsuwon-ni and Samjiyon were then deployed to airfields around Wonsan. KPAF aircraft deployed at T’aet’an, Nuch’on-ni, and Kuum-ni can reach Seoul in approximately six minutes.27 In addition to the aircraft and their units, families of the pilots were also moved. This redeployment necessitated the construction of additional barracks and maintenance facilities at the T’aet’an, Nuch’on-ni and Kuum-ni airfields, which were essentially only


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Map 5.3 KPAF heliports/helipads

People’s Republic of China Ch’ongjin

Saekolch’on Munhoe-dong

Yujong-dong Kan-ch’on W Kan-ch’on Kan-ch’on S

Sinuiju Kusong

Supreme Naval HQ

T’aech’on Hamhung Kosong-dong Pakch’on N Pakch’on S Pakch’on Hwangwan-dong P’yongyang VIP Wonsan P’yongyang

Samjang-kol Inhung Kowon


P’yongyang S

Kaesong

N

Seoul

Republic of Korea

forward operation bases meant for short-term wartime or emergency use.28 The majority of these aircraft were subsequently withdrawn during December–February, but some remained moved as part of the restructuring of the air divisions. The 1996–97 winter training cycle witnessed a similar, but smaller, redeployment of aircraft and personnel. According to defectors, within the context of this exercise the 55th Air Regiment’s MiG–29 battalion was permanently transferred from Sunch’on Airfield to



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Table 5.5 KPAF airfields—abandoned, unusable or status unknown Designation (alternate)

Latitude

Ch’ongjin Chik-tong Kaep’ung P’yong-ni West Highway Strip P’yongyang Southwest Highway Strip Panmunjom Puryong T’aebukp’o-ri T’aech’on Northwest Uthachi (Chunghwa)

41°47′11″ 38°43′24″ 37°56′00″ 39°26′00″ 38°56′14″ 37°58′00″ 42°01′00″ 38°19′46″ 39°59′32″ 38°54′46″

Longitude N N N N N N N N N N

129°44′51″ 126°40′52″ 126°27′00″ 125°49′00″ 125°37′47″ 126°36′00″ 129°45′38″ 126°52′17″ 125°21′36″ 125°48′00″

E E E E E E E E E E

Onch’on-up Airfield.29 Further details concerning this exercise, however, are lacking. The annual winter training exercises during 1997–98 were similar in size and scope. The most recent 1998–99 winter exercises were the smallest in years, being reduced in size to about 30 per cent of the 1997–98 exercises. The primary reason for this was the shortage of fuel.30 During 1998, MiG–19s of 2nd Air Division deployed back to the Wonsan area from forward bases near the DMZ. This appears to have been part of a reorganisation and redeployment of the KPAF within the forward areas. During 1999 there were several additional redeployments including a MiG–19 air regiment, probably from the 2nd Air Division, to Hwangsuwon-ni.31 The institution of the ‘Four Military Lines’ policy in the 1960s, which called for turning the country into ‘an impregnable fortress’, led to the hardening of the KPAF’s operational airfields and the construction of numerous highway strips. All of the operational airfields are hardened to varying degrees, providing increased protection for aircraft and critical activities. This hardening extends to the air defence system also (see below). Airfield hardening typically consist of aircraft revetments and taxiways leading to hangars, maintenance and service facilities which have been blasted out of the sides of mountains. These facilities have multiple entrances and exits which can be sealed by large steel blast doors. At a number of airfields these fortified mountain hangars and service facilities are not located within the airfield’s perimeter. Instead they are located some distance away and connected by taxiways consisting of public roads. Some of these underground facilities are large enough to house 50–60 fighter aircraft and contain what have been described as ‘underground


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Map 5.4 KPAF redeployments, 1995–97 September–October 1995 1996–97 Airfield

People’s Republic of China Samjiyon (MiG-15s)

Hwangsuwon-ni (MiG-15s) Uiju (Il-28s) Panghyon (MiG-17s)

Sunch’on (MiG-29s) Korea Bay


Wonsan (MiG-15s) P’yongyang

Onch’on

Kuum-ni

T’aet’an

Nunch’on

Seoul

Republic of Korea

N

runways’. It is possible that these ‘underground runways’ can partially support the direct launching and recovering of aircraft. Defectors have indicated that they are large enough to conduct ‘take-off and landing’ training. Many of the secondary airfields are also hardened, albeit to a lesser degree, with concrete reinforced aircraft revetments or dispersed maintenance and service facilities. It is estimated that all the KPAF’s jet aircraft, except the largest transports, can be housed in these shelters. During wartime



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operations aircraft will use highways and roads to move to and from the runways.32 Onch’on-up Airfield is a good example of the extent to which the KPAF has gone to harden its airfields. The base consists of three separate sets of runways, none of which intersect but which are interconnected with a series of roads and a highway that runs through them. The primary 2500 m runway runs north– south. A secondary 2000 m runway is located 1300 m to the east and runs roughly east–west. In the hill mass at the eastern end of the secondary runway the DPRK has constructed what has been termed an ‘underground runway’ which runs through the hill. This underground runway was constructed for the purpose of using it as a spare runway in case the primary and secondary runways were destroyed, and as a secure base for the KPAF’s MiG–29s. Construction was undertaken by the MPAF’s Military Construction Bureau and reportedly commenced in October 1990. The underground runway apparently became partially operational in late 1993, but with its supporting underground facilities was not actually finished until May 1995. The dimensions of the underground runway are 2850 m long, 25–30 m wide and 10 m high. A small portion of the runway is believed to extend out from underneath the hill mass. The underground hangar area is 1000 m long, 15–20 m wide and 8–10 m high. In addition to the runway and hangar, additional underground facilities include a command post, machinery room, pilot quarters and a number of typical support entities. In total, the underground facilities at Onch’on-up Airfield can accommodate an air regiment.33 Several take-off exercises, utilising MiG–29s from the 55th Air Regiment, have verified that these aircraft can be launched directly from the underground runway, but a five minutes interval is required between aircraft due to exhaust gases. It is believed that this time might be reduced to three minutes if additional ventilation equipment is installed. Direct landings into the underground runway are deemed impractical due to limitations in both the length and the width of the runway. In addition to airfield hardening, the KPAF intends to use camouflage and deception to protect its airfields and aircraft. In a news conference a KPAF defector, Captain Yi Ch’ol-su, stated that the KPAF ‘is operating fraudulent runways to protect existing airstrips in case the South Korean Air Force makes a night attack, and that the phony landing strips were very difficult to tell from


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Map 5.5 Onch’on-up Airfield

Primary runway

Secondary runway

Approximate location of underground runway

Porim-nodongjagu

0

1

2 km

the real thing during drills’.34 Decoys will also play a major role in KPAF deception operations. Since the late 1950s, high-ranking KPAF officers have engaged in a small number of exchange visits with their counterparts in communist and non-aligned countries. For example, during September 1981, an Algerian military mission led by the commander of the Algerian air defence forces travelled to P’yongyang for an eight-day visit. 35 On 4 June 1990, a delegation of the Soviet Air Force led by Colonel General Valentin Pankin arrived in P’yongyang.36 In January 1994, KPAF Commander Cho Myong-rok led a military delegation to Iran where he discussed, among other things, Iranian– DPRK missile cooperation.37 In December of the same year he travelled to Havana.38 In May 1998, Cho Myong-rok led a military delegation to Syria.39 Beginning in the early 1970s KPAF pilots have been deployed to a number of countries on exchange visits as advisers or for training. These countries include Egypt, Iran, Kampuchea (Cambodia), Libya, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Sudan, Vietnam and Zimbabwe. KPAF pilots have also been involved in flying combat operations in Egypt, Libya and Vietnam.40



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PERSONNEL The KPAF is currently estimated to possess a total strength of 110 000. Personnel for the KPAF are obtained through voluntary enlistment, conscription and assignments from other branches of the KPA. The selection criteria for the KPAF are generally higher than those for the ground forces or the KPN. This has resulted in a force which is qualitatively above the national average in the level of education, technical proficiency, political reliability and ideological conviction. In general, NCOs and privates of the KPAF are required to serve three years; those with technical specialisations serve four years. Officers serve for 20–30 years and are usually discharged only for physical disability, illegal activities or political reasons. All pilots are believed to be members of the KWP. Base pay is determined by duty assignment and rank rather than by rank alone. All officers receive longevity pay and pilots are given several additional allowances. Pilots receive a higher rate of flight pay for hours flown during adverse weather or at night. Enlisted ground crews receive only base pay; air crews probably receive base pay plus small allowances.41 KPAF pilots receive somewhat better treatment than officers of the same rank in the KPAF and other branches of service. In spite of the severe shortage of food within the DPRK during the 1990s, pilots—although they do not receive a full ration—had priority for food in their units. Pilots’ food rations currently consist of 850 per day. This is increased to 950 during periods of flight training. On national holidays pilots also receive special rations, including buckwheat and beef. Pilots receive an extra clothing allowance, although alcohol and cigarettes are strictly rationed. Pilots and support personnel assigned to overseas deployments live in sharp contrast to their companions at home, enjoying the use of cars, television, refrigerators and easy access to food and personal goods. Despite the hardships of the DPRK’s current economic situation, morale among KPAF pilots is relatively high. According to Captain Yi Ch’ol-su, all pilots have the ‘firm will’ to immediately attack the ROK and fulfil the orders of Kim Chong-il. They are . . . ideologically resolved to confidently fly their fighters, and are mentally prepared for fight. Besides, we conducted many research works in addition to military education. Thus, we believed that if we fight with the spirit of making ourselves


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human bombs, we would win. Thus, all of our pilots are resolved to fight with such spirit.42

Younger pilots, in particular, have a desire for combat. Older pilots, however, have a more realistic appreciation of war because they understand the deficiencies of their aircraft and have concerns about their families. MOBILISATION The size and organisation of the KPAF’s reserve component is unknown, although discharged pilots and key technical personnel are probably earmarked to return to the KPAF in wartime. In 1983 a KPAF defector Major Lee Ung-pyong stated that Kim Il-song had ordered the KPAF to double or triple the number of reserve pilots in anticipation of possible wartime losses.43 Augmentation of non-technical and support units could be met by the transfer of personnel from the KPA ground forces. The KPAF is not known to have any aircraft in reserve, however many outdated and unserviceable aircraft are kept on hand. These could possibly serve as a ready supply for spare parts for operational aircraft. During wartime the aircraft, pilots and ground crew of Air Koryo would be mobilised into the KPAF. TRAINING The KPAF places great emphasis upon pilot training. In general, pilot education is conducted under a plan by which fighter pilots are trained by the type of aircraft they will fly, then assigned to units having that type of aircraft. Transport and helicopter pilot training follows a similar pattern. The KPAF’s two primary schools are the Kim Ch’aek Air Force Academy located at Ch’ongjin and the Kyongsong Flight Officers School. The process and criteria by which personnel are selected to attend either the Kim Ch’aek Air Force Academy or the Kyongsong Flight Officers School is presently unknown. There is also a 17th Air Officers School (17th Aviation School), but its relationship to either the Kyongsong Flight Officers School or 797th Unit (see below) is presently unclear. In addition to these organisations there are a number of smaller specialised KPAFrelated schools and courses. For example, during the mid-1990s the Kim ch’aek Air Force Academy could not meet the demand



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for officers and so a short-term course was established at the KPAF headquarters located at Chunghwa-kun, P’yongyang-si. It was a one-year course for senior enlisted personnel which concentrated upon command and administration.44 The Kim Ch’aek Air Force Academy enrols approximately 200 cadets a year for training as pilots, navigators/bombardiers, radiomen/gunners and engineer/maintenance technicians. Courses typically last four years, after which a successful cadet graduates as a second lieutenant. Additionally, the academy offers specialised three- and five-year courses. The majority of the cadets enrolled in the pilot training program are graduates of high schools or colleges and come from families with reliable political backgrounds. Promising enlisted men from any branch of the KPA may also be selected. The academy also provides continuing education through short specialised courses for KPAF officers. As with the KPN and KPA ground forces, senior KPAF officers are selected for attendance at the Kim Il-song Military University or Kang Kon Military Academy in P’yongyang. The Kyongsong Flight Officers School (aka Aviation Officers School or Chuul Aviation Officers School) located at KyongsongChuul Airfield is believed to be solely for pilot training. Like the academy, courses here typically last four years, after which a successful cadet graduates as a second lieutenant. During their four years of instruction at either the Kim Ch’aek Air Force Academy or Kyongsong Flight Officers School pilot students are believed to also receive about 70 hours of primary flight training in propeller-driven trainers (Yak–18/CJ–6). All flight training (primary and advanced) is conducted under the control of the 8th Air Division (Training). Following successful graduation from either the Kim Ch’aek Air Force Academy or Kyongsong Flight Officers School new pilot trainees proceed to advanced flight training, consisting of a 22-month course that includes about 100 hours of flight instruction. Fighter pilots receive instruction on MiG–15/–15UTI/–17 or FT–5/–6 trainers at Orang (Hoemun-ri) or Samjiyon (Sinmusong) Airfields; transport pilots receive instruction on An–2s; and helicopter pilots receive instruction on Mi–2s (probably operating from the six heliports/ helipads in the Kilchu area). The fighter pilot training at Orang is believed to the responsibility of the 797th Unit (aka 797th Air Force Unit or 797th Army Unit). After successful completion of flight school pilots receive their wings and are assigned to an active unit, where they receive operational training for up to two years before being fully assimilated into the unit as a combat pilot. It is also here that


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they receive conversion training to the specific type of aircraft flown by their unit. This training is accomplished through the use of a small number of dedicated conversion aircraft available within each regiment. In air regiments equipped with the MiG–15/ –17/–19/–21 the trainers are either the MiG–15U or MiG–17U, although there may also be a small number of MiG–21Us available in air regiments equipped with the MiG–21. H–5 equipped air regiments use the HJ–5 trainer and a few MiG–15s. The 55th Air Regiment, equipped with the MiG–29 and Su–25, is believed to use a mix of MiG–21Us, Su–25UBKs and MiG–29UBs. The 60th Air Regiment, equipped with MiG–23s, uses a mix of MiG–15U and MiG–23UB trainers. Further conversion, or dissimilar flight training occurs very rarely within the KPAF and many pilots only fly one type of operational aircraft during their service careers. Non-pilot aircrew trainees receive the same instruction as pilot trainees during their ground-course phase, then proceed to training in their specialised fields. Ground personnel training includes a three-year course for officer engineer/maintenance technicians and a six-month course for enlisted personnel. Engineer cadets specialise in weapons, engines, communications or avionics.45 With the DPRK’s economic crisis during the past 10 years, flight training of both new and experienced pilots has suffered and pilot proficiency has declined significantly. The fuel situation for the KPAF began to grow severe at the end of 1989 and flight hours decreased. In 1990 the KPAF stopped conducting regular intercepts of ROKAF aircraft flying near the DMZ and flight training hours dropped precipitously.46 Captain Yi Cho’l-su, a KPAF pilot who defected in a MiG–19M in 1996, had logged only 380 flight hours from the time of his graduation from the Air Force Academy until the time of his defection in 1996—an average of only 32 hours per year or 2.6 hours per month.47 By the beginning of 2000 flight training for the average KPAF pilot dropped to no more than 20–25 training flights totalling 10–13 hours per year or 0.84–1.1 hours per month. To compensate for the decreased number of actual flight time, KPAF pilots and pilot trainees are now spending more hours in flight simulators and possibly sailplanes and in extensive discussions of air tactics on the ground. Except for major annual exercises, flight training hours are currently portioned out in intervals of only 30 minutes and consist almost exclusively of take-off and landing exercises. There is extremely limited air combat manoeuvre or ground attack training. When actual flight training is conducted aircraft are only provided with the minimum amount of fuel required to complete the training flights. This is



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both a function of the current economic crisis and the desire to prevent further pilot defections. Despite these hardships, the KPAF has maintained a yearly training cycle in which major flying exercises are typically held in spring and winter. For example, on 30 April 1994, Kim Chong-il ordered a surprise exercise in which a majority of the KPAF’s combat aircraft were ordered into the air simultaneously. The purpose of this exercise was to establish the readiness of the various units and determine the number of aircraft available for a surprise attack on the ROK.48 This was followed the next year by a major forward redeployment of combat aircraft during September– December 1995. This redeployment was worked directly into regular winter exercises which take place from November to April. During December 1995 the KPAF’s daily sortie rate had risen to 350–400, which represented a slight increase over previous winter exercises. Included within the 1995–96 winter training cycle were large-scale exercises by elements of the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau using An–2s.49 The intensity of training declined unexpectedly in January 1996, with the daily sortie rate dropping to approximately 100 as winter training was suspended. This suspension affected the entire KPA, which entered a period of political education due to serious corruption problems identified within VI Corps in 1995.50 Yearly training has continued on a regular basis since then, but has seriously declined during 1998–99 due to fuel shortages. The KPAF has sustained an average loss of four–ten aircraft per year (approximately 0.5 per cent of total KPAF strength) due to accidents during the 1990s. Typical of these were five known losses in 1996 (see Table 5.6).51 Table 5.6

KPAF accidents, 1996

Date

Aircraft

Airfield

2 March 26 September

Mi–2 MiG–19

22 October 11 December 17 December

MiG–21 MiG–21 MiG–21

Panghyon Kaech’on Crashed due to engine trouble during a ground attack exercise Hwangju Toksan Hwangju

Comment

During the 1998–99 annual winter training exercises a MiG–19 crashed following take-off from an airfield located in the western part of the country. Immediately after the crash, the KPAF suspended flight training and went on a minimal flight schedule for routine reconnaissance and patrol flights. This suspension is


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believed to have lasted for approximately one month as investigators conducted an inquiry into the cause of the crash. It is presumed that either poor maintenance, due to a lack of spare parts, or pilot error, due to a lack of training hours because of fuel shortages, was the cause of the crash.52 During these annual training exercises the ground components go on a wartime footing, leaving their barracks, and live in the field operating for two–three months from inside mountain tunnels or fortifications. SAM units conduct test launches and practise redeployment, camouflage and deception. AIRCRAFT AND WEAPONS The KPAF currently possesses approximately 1690 aircraft. Approximately 90 per cent of the combat aircraft are older generation former-Soviet or PRC designs dating to the 1950s and 1960s (see Table 5.7).53 Although the majority of these aircraft have been modified and updated, they are generally limited to daylight clear-weather operations and carry small weapon loads. During the 1980s a distinct warming of relations with the Soviet Union occurred and Kim Il-song visited Moscow in May 1984 and October 1988. A result of these visits was a number of agreements concerning intelligence sharing, basing, arms deliveries and general military cooperation. One of the more significant developments for the Soviets was the opening up of DPRK airspace to Tu–16 BEAR reconnaissance missions along Japan and the PRC, and shadowing US Navy operations in East Asia. For the KPAF these agreements witnessed the delivery of MiG–23ML FLOGGER G, and later Su–25K FROGFOOT and MiG–29 FULCRUM A aircraft. In May 1985 the KPAF began receiving its first of what would eventually total 46 MiG–23ML/UB FLOGGER G fighters when six MiG–23s arrived at Pukch’ang Airfield, north-east of P’yongyang. Additional deliveries were ten in July 1985, ten in September 1985, ten in June 1986 and ten in July or August 1986. These aircraft formed the 60th Air Regiment and represented a significant step towards modernisation for the KPAF. It is a third-generation fighter with limited all-weather and ground-attack capabilities and a range and payload greater then any previous KPAF fighters. It was also armed with the more capable R–24 AA–7 APEX or R–60 AA–8 APHID air-to-air (AAM) missiles, which were a notable improvement over the standard AAM in KPAF inventory, the short-range infrared K–13 AA–2 ATOLL. The MiG–23, if armed with the AA–7,



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Table 5.7 KPAF aircraft strength Aircraft

Estimated number

Bombers H–5/H–5R/HJ–5 (Il–28 BEAGLE) Fighters/interceptors/ground attack MiG–15/F–5 FAGOT MiG–17 FRESCO MiG–19/F–6 FARMER/A–5 MiG–21PF/PFMA/F–7 FISHBED MiG–23ML/UB FLOGGER G MiG–29/UB FULCRUM A/B Su–25K/UBK FROGFOOT A Su–7BKL FITTER Helicopters MD–500D/E DEFENDER Mi–2 HOPLITE/Hyokshin–2 Mi–4 HOUND/Z–5 Mi–8/–17 HIP Mi–24 D/DU HIND-D Mi–26 HALO Mi–14PL HAZE-A

82 190 120 180 175 46 16 36 20 87 140 48 25–35 50 n.a. 10

Transports An–2 COLT/Y–5 An–24 COKE Il–14 CRATE Il–18 COOT Il–62 CLASSIC Il-76 FALSIE Li–2 CAB Tu–134B CRUSTY Tu–154B CARELESS

300 10 5 4 6 3 14 2 4

Trainers Yak–12, Yak–18/CJ–6, FT–5, FT–6, PZL–104 etc.

120

Total

1693

provides the KPAF with its first beyond-visual-range air-to-air engagement capability. Several of the MiG–23s are believed to be configured for reconnaissance.54 The MiG–23s were soon followed by delivery of the first batch of six Su–25K Grach (FROGFOOT A) ground attack aircraft in late 1987.55 The following year these aircraft were followed by an additional 30 aircraft and two–four Su–25UBK trainers. The Su–25s were formed into the 55th Air Regiment at Sunch’on.56 The heavily armoured, all-weather Su–25 can carry a greater payload and deliver it more accurately than the KPAF’s aging H–5 bombers.


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At the beginning of 1988, the KPAF received its most modern and capable aircraft—the MiG–29 FULCRUM A air superiority fighter. Between 1988 and 1992 the DPRK imported 14 MiG–29s (including several two-seat MiG–29UB FULCRUM B trainers). During the same period it also assembled/produced an additional three aircraft delivered in ‘knock-down’ form. Of these three aircraft, one subsequently crashed—leaving an inventory of 16 aircraft.57 It appears that the original agreement was for a regiment of 30–45 aircraft, with the majority to be delivered in ‘knockdown’ form, and provisions for the DPRK to establish an assembly line for the aircraft. Due to subsequent political and economic events all deliveries of MiG–29s were stopped. Since then the DPRK has continued to obtain additional MiG–29s and, in 1999, had even shown interest in obtaining the Su–30MK.58 All the MiG–29s were formed into the 55th Air Regiment along with the Su–25s. The MiG–29 can carry the R–60 AA–8 APHID, R–27 AA–10 ALAMO and R–73 AA–11 ARCHER AAMs. These aircraft provide the KPAF with a limited but much improved air defence capability and have the potential to pose a significant threat to ROK/US airborne reconnaissance capabilities during a war. The H–5 (Il–28) is the only bomber in the KPAF inventory and equips two regiments. Over the years a number of these aircraft have been modified to perform different roles, including stand-off photo reconnaissance, SIGINT collection, jamming, missile testing, and radar and weapons testing. During the early 1990s, the DPRK is believed to have begun development of an air-launched cruise missile for the H–5, apparently based upon the CSS-C–3 SEERSUCKER and complemented by a program to develop an extended range anti-ship cruise missile based on the same system (see chapter 4). Flight tests using the H–5 were conducted during the mid-1990s and the system may now be in limited service with the KPAF. It is unclear whether this system is designed for the anti-ship or air-to-surface role. There is also a possibility that the KPAF has acquired, or will in the future, the PRC C–601 (CAS–1 KRAKEN). The An–2 biplane is the most numerous aircraft in the KPAF inventory and it holds a special position within the minds of the DPRK’s leadership. This has its roots in the Fatherland Liberation War when the KPAF had been initially swept from the skies by the UNC air forces. The only offensive success the KPAF enjoyed during the remainder of the war was the small-scale night bombing campaign conducted by the Po–2 (a two-seat biplane dating back to the 1920s). This campaign achieved considerable propaganda



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success by repeatedly conducting night-time raids against Seoul and Inch’on.59 In January 1969, Kim Il-song combined the remembrance of the Po–2 with his desire to ‘incorporate old style weapons along with modern weapons’, and established the acquisition of the An–2 for the KPA’s ‘light infantry forces’ as a national priority. Large-scale procurement of the An–2 from Poland, the PRC and the Soviet Union began the following year.60 The continued use of the An–2 for the delivery of KPA special operations forces today is not as implausible as it might at first appear.61 The An–2 is capable of extremely low-altitude, low-speed flight which, given the mountainous terrain of the Korean Peninsula, affords it a relatively good chance of infiltrating the ROK undetected at night and under conditions of low visibility. It has excellent range and short take-off and landing (STOL) capabilities which allows it to operate from unprepared fields almost anywhere on the Korean Peninsula, is a stable paratroop drop platform and has a relatively large cargo capacity. Under conditions of daylight, good visibility and ROK/US air superiority, however, it is extremely vulnerable. KPAF An–2s can be equipped with a variety of small bombs, napalm canisters, rocket pods and ATGMs. During the 1990s the KPAF was reported to be employing its An–2 COLTs in a variety of new and unexpected roles including, SIGINT collection, jamming and as carriers of laser-guided bombs to be used with special operations force units using laser designators.62 Additionally, the An–2 could serve as an excellent delivery system for chemical and biological weapons due to its slow speed, ability to fly very low, low detectability and its load-carrying capabilities (see chapter 8). The An–2 is used throughout the world for agriculture spraying and chemical or biological agents could easily be delivered by adapting commercial spraying equipment. During 1984–85, the DPRK conducted a remarkable covert operation in which it was able to acquire 87 Hughes MD–500 (20 Model 500Ds, 66 Model 500Es and 1 Model 300C) helicopters. These were civilian versions of the MD–500 DEFENDER anti-tank helicopters used in large numbers by the ROKAF. The KPAF subsequently armed these MD–500s with a variety of guns, rocket pods and ATGMs and painted them with ROKAF markings.63 Thus configured these helicopters would prove extremely useful to the KPA in any renewed conflict. This is especially true in the areas of special operations and airfield assault. In 1986, these helicopters were formed into a special task force at Pakch’on airfield, 70 km north of P’yongyang.64 Air force sniper units have actively trained with these helicopters and have sometimes conducted this train-


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ing near the DMZ, reportedly with occasional penetrations of ROK airspace.65 Due to the age of these helicopters, limited access to spare parts, KPAF maintenance practices and normal attrition, it is probable that a number of these MD–500s are no longer serviceable. The KPAF’s inventory of air-to-air missiles is based primarily upon Russian and Chinese systems. Air-to-air missiles believed to be in the KPAF inventory include various versions of Russian and PRC-produced systems, including K–13 AA–2 ATOLL, PL–2, PL–5, PL–7, R–24 AA–7 APEX, R–27 AA–10 ALAMO, R–60 AA–8 APHID and R–73 AA–11 ARCHER. The KPAF is believed to have engaged in some domestic AAM development, though details are lacking.66 The KPAF is supplied with a wide variety of indigenously manufactured conventional air-dropped ordnance, including 250 kg– 1000 kg ‘dumb’ bombs, cluster bombs, smoke bombs, chemical bombs, air-to-ground rockets, napalm tanks, drop tanks and ATGMs. A small number of laser-guided bombs (possibly acquired from Russia) are also believed to be in inventory, although it is unclear whether the DPRK has attempted to domestically manufacture such weapons. As noted above, the KPAF has undertaken tests of air-launched cruise missiles using the H–5. Details of the type and manufacture of these missiles are unknown. It is believed that the DPRK has also attempted to acquire modern air-to-surface missiles from Russia and the PRC. Whether such systems are currently in KPAF inventory is unknown. The KPAF possesses a small inventory of aerial spraying equipment which could be utilised for the delivery of chemical and biological weapons.67 Little is known concerning the KPAF’s electronic warfare capabilities. The KPAF does operate a reconnaissance/electronic warfare unit which is equipped with a small number of specially configured H–5R, An–2/–24, MiG–17/–21/–23 aircraft. In any future war the KPAF can be expected, at a minimum, to conduct barrage jamming of ROK/US air defence radars and communications nets and to make some use of chaff.68 Since the late 1980s, the DPRK has operated an unknown number of UAVs which it has obtained from the PRC, Russia and possibly Iran. It is presently believed that the UAVs are operated solely by an element of the KPAF. These UAVs are equipped with cameras for reconnaissance or target acquisition and may be employed to dispense radar countermeasures or function as decoys to fool ROK/US radars. During the early 1990s, probably as a result of the use of UAVs during Operation DESERT STORM, the DPRK initiated a domestic UAV program. One aspect of this has been the manufacture at least one version of UAV based upon the PRC



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jet-powered D–5 target drone.69 In 1994, Syria provided the DPRK with access to its UAVs, including the DR–3 Reys and information concerning its operational use.70 More significantly, it may also have provided a few examples of each of its systems to the DPRK. During the late 1990s the DPRK acquired a small number of Pchela–1T UAVs from Russia. These have reportedly been used for reconnaissance along the DMZ. Technology and information from Russia, Syria and Iran undoubtedly found its way into the DPRK’s ongoing UAV programs. It is probable that UAVs of both foreign and domestic design are presently under production, however it is unlikely that the DPRK produces a UAV in the same class as the DR–3.71 The KPAF also operates an unknown number of hot air balloons and about 20 two-person sailplanes (sometimes identified as gliders), while the Operations Department of the CCSKA operates an unknown number of hang gliders. These are employed for the infiltration of special operations force and reconnaissance personnel. Given favourable weather conditions and if released close to the DMZ it is estimated that the sailplanes could reach the central section of the ROK. The DPRK is known to have imported sailplanes from the Soviet Union during 1981–86 and during the 1990s it imported hot air balloons.72 AIR DEFENCE Since the Fatherland Liberation War, the DPRK has consistently expanded and improved its air defence system with assistance from the Soviet Union (Russia) and, to a lesser extent, from the PRC and Eastern European countries. Presently the DPRK possesses an integrated air defence system that covers the nation’s airspace. The five elements of this system are: the Deputy Air Defence Commander and the units directly subordinate to him (including the Air Defence Command Centre); 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 8th Air Divisions; P’yongyang Anti-aircraft Artillery Command (PAAC); Anti-aircraft Artillery Command; and KPA AAA assets. Air defence operations are coordinated by the Deputy Air Defence Commander through the Air Defence Command Centre near P’yongyang. The four air division headquarters and PAAC monitor the situation in their respective areas, reporting to and receiving guidance from the Air Defence Command Centre. Reports from radar sites and visual surveillance posts are sent to


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air division or PAAC headquarters, and then transmitted to the Air Defence Command Centre.73 The Deputy Air Defence Commander is also believed to exercise operational control over a small number of AAA brigades, early warning (EW) and ground control intercept (GCI) radar battalions, searchlight battalions and the SAM maintenance depot. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 8th Air Divisions are deployed in such a manner to create a national air defence system based upon four air defence sectors (Northeastern, Western, Eastern and Southern). The respective air divisions are responsible for the air defence of their individual sectors, supporting the air defence of adjacent sectors and providing the Air Defence Command Centre with timely and accurate information. The P’yongyang Anti-aircraft Artillery Command consists of seven brigades equipped with small and medium calibre (i.e. 14.5–57 mm) anti-aircraft artillery systems and has the mission of defending the capital city and its environs from low-level air attack.74 KPA air defence assets, some of which may come under the operational control of the KPAF, include an estimated 20 corpslevel AAA regiments, 105 AAA battalions organic to active duty divisions and brigades and an unknown number of independent AAA brigades. The 36 paramilitary training unit divisions probably have organic AAA battalions, however this remains to be confirmed. In addition, a number paramilitary units are equipped with light AAA weapons. The combined AAA assets of KPAF, PAAC and KPA ground forces are in excess of 13 800 anti-aircraft guns. The KPAF’s SAM force consists of approximately 19 SAM brigades with about 338 launchers and a SAM maintenance depot. These 19 brigades have historically been thought of as each being equipped with a single types of system (i.e. 15 SA–two brigades, two SA–3 brigades and two SA–5 brigades).75 This may be incorrect as defectors’ comments suggest that some brigades may operate more than a single type of missile. This remains to be confirmed. The total number of missiles in inventory is approximately 3400, with 1700 in operational units and another 1700 in strategic storage.76 The vast majority of these missiles are later models of the SA–2/HQ–2. Older models of missile have either been expended in testing or upgraded to newer versions. In addition to these systems the KPA ground forces operate 15 000 shoulder-fired SAMs such as the SA–7B, 9K34 Strela 3 (SA–14 GREMLIN) and



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9K310 Igla–1 (SA–16 GIMLET) (see chapter 2 for a listing of SAM types that have been operated by the KPA). In the past, SAM units were known to be manned by KPA rather than KPAF personnel. Whether this is still true is unknown. There are approximately 125 SAM sites in the DPRK. Of these, 60 are prepared sites which are operational and occupied by firing battalions. The remaining 65 are alternate sites capable of being occupied on short notice. Additionally there are an estimated 55 dummy sites which, if the need arises, could be upgraded to either alternate or operational status. Although SAM, as well as AAA, sites are deployed throughout the country, there are concentrations located along the DMZ and around major cities, ports, military installations, factories and airfields. As with its airfields, the KPAF has also hardened a considerable portion of its air defence network. Many SAM sites are located near fortified tunnel complexes which allow missile reloads, support vehicles and even launchers to remain securely hidden and protected when not operational. A number of EW and GCI radars are located within fortified mountain positions which allow the entire radar to be raised or lowered by elevators as the situation requires. Like their airfield counterparts these fortified positions typically have multiple entrances and exits and steel blast doors.77 The KPAF operates in excess of 50 GCI and EW bases which provide overlapping coverage of the entire country, particularly along the DMZ and on the west coast. Coverage along the PRC– DPRK border is lighter than elsewhere. In the mountainous central area of the country, there are gaps in low altitude coverage of both GCI and EW systems, particularly below 1000 feet, because of terrain masking. Radars known, or believed, to be in the KPAF inventory are shown in Table 5.8.78 With the exception of the TIN SHIELD and BIG BACK, all these systems are quite dated and vulnerable to rudimentary countermeasures. The TIN SHIELD and BIG BACK were acquired in small numbers during the 1980s. Both systems are relatively modern three-dimensional early warning/ground control intercept/target acquisition (EW/GCI/TA) radars. The delivery of the TIN SHIELD was significant, since it was the first known deployment of this system outside the Soviet Union. The BIG BACK is associated with SA–5 brigades.79 This DPRK’s air defence system is hampered by a relatively unsophisticated and inflexible national command and control system. This is evidenced by the historical inability of the system


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Table 5.8 Radars in KPAF inventory Name

Type

BACK NET BACK TRAP BIG BACK DOG EAR FANSONG A/B/C/E/F GIN SLING LOW BLOW ODD PAIR P–8 KNIFE REST A P–10 KNIFE REST B/C P–12 SPOON REST A/C/D P–14 TALL KING P–15 FLAT FACE P–15M SQUAT EYE P–35/37 BARLOCK A/B PRV–11 SIDE NET

Early warning/ground control intercept Early warning/acquisition Early warning/ground control intercept Acquisition Fire control/tracking Fire control/tracking Fire control/tracking/guidance Height finding Early warning Early warning Early warning/acquisition Early warning Early warning/acquisition Early warning Early warning Height finding Fire control/acquisition Fire control Early warning/ground control intercept

SJ–202 SQUARE PAIR TIN SHIELD

to respond quickly to accidental incursions into DPRK air space or the defection of its own pilots. For example, at 1232 hours on 5 May 1983 a Chinese civilian airliner was hijacked over Dalian (Dairen). The hijackers directed the pilots to fly to the ROK. The plane flew directly east into DPRK air space and circled around P’yongyang several times before heading south. It crossed the armistice line into ROK airspace at 1357. For the hour it was within DPRK airspace it was not intercepted or shot at. KPAF aircraft were only scrambled to intercept the aircraft after it left the P’yongyang area and headed for the ROK. A KPAF pilot who subsequently defected suggested that the 1983 failure to intercept the PRC airliner was not a result of a failure of radar to detect the airliner, but rather a command and control failure. The decision to intercept, or force down, the aircraft was probably pushed up to the highest levels in the chain of command, resulting in a delayed response.80 In 1983 KPAF Captain Lee Ung-pyong defected to the ROK in a MiG–19,81 and more recently, in May 1996, Captain Yi Ch’ol-su defected to the ROK in his MiG–19M. In both cases the KPAF air defence system failed to identify their defection attempts quickly and when it did the response was completely inadequate.82



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CONSTRUCTION AND LOGISTICS The Rear Service Department of the KPAF is responsible for the procurement of all technical supplies and materiel other than complete aircraft and for the distribution and storage of these supplies. In fulfilling these responsibilities the Rear Service Department works closely with the Seventh Machine Industry Bureau of the Second Economic Committee which is charged with the procurement, development and production of aircraft and aviation-related equipment. Procurement of complete aircraft for the KPAF is believed to be accomplished through the Second Economic Committee’s Seventh Machine Industry Bureau and KPA General Staff. Each airfield is serviced by two technical branches of the Rear Service Department. One is responsible for aircraft maintenance and servicing, while the second performs the various routine rear service functions including the provision of fuel, parts, food and clothing. The KPAF is entirely dependent on foreign imports (most notably Iran and the PRC) for POL products. The economic crisis within the DPRK began to severely affect the KPAF during the late 1980s. Since that time aviation fuel for training has been strictly rationed. The KPAF does, however, possess POL reserves which are roughly estimated to consist of a 90-day wartime supply. There appears to be very little pilfering of such supplies since the unit commander and his family would be severely punished if these were used in peacetime. Maintenance control is exercised by using a system of logbooks and maintenance records and by frequent inspections. Repair of minor damage to airframes, engine changes, inspections and partial overhaul of components are accomplished within operational units at the air division level. Depot level maintenance, major repair and the assembly of aircraft from knock-down components is conducted at the national level. It is believed that parts availability and maintenance standards for older aircraft are relatively good, but there appear to be some significant difficulties with the more modern aircraft (Su–25, MiG–23 and MiG–29) in KPAF service. The vast majority of all KPAF aircraft and helicopters have been imported from Eastern Europe, Russia and the PRC. The DPRK does have a small indigenous aircraft assembly/production capability which is currently centred near the cities of Kusong, Panghyon and Tokhyon in the north-west province of P’yonganbukto. A small aircraft factory is also reported to be located in


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Ch’ongjin. These facilities, along with numerous sub-contractors, are under the control of the Seventh Machine Industry Bureau. During the late 1960s, a modest program for the production of aircraft sub-components was established at the Air Research Institute located outside Kusong. This built upon existing depot level maintenance capabilities and was supplemented by aircraft assembly capabilities provided with assistance from both the former Soviet Union and the PRC. During 1985, the DPRK and East Germany signed an ‘Agreement for Technology Transfer Needed for the MiG–21 Jet Fighter and Engine Maintenance Project’. The details of this agreement are presently unknown. The following year, however, a new aircraft manufacturing facility was completed at Panghyon. This facility was initially constructed for the overhaul and maintenance of the MiG–21 and its engine. Apparently the DPRK had plans to follow this with manufacture of the MiG–21 and MiG–29, but this has not occurred. By the late 1980s, the DPRK’s aircraft assembly and production capability had developed to include the production of small numbers of Yak–18 trainers, An–2 (Y–5) biplane transports and Mi–2 helicopters; parts for An–2, MiG–15, MiG–17 and MiG–21s; and assembly of these aircraft. It also assembled a number of the MiG–29s provided to the DPRK in ‘knock-down’ condition, the first completed at Panghyon during early 1992. During the 1990s the Seventh Machine Industry Bureau has overseen a number of projects including the production of an improved An–2, production of the Hyokshin–2 helicopter (a variant of the Mi–2), modification of the H–5 to carry anti-ship cruise missiles and modification of at least one An–24 to mount the MiG–29’s NO–19 TOPAZ pulse-Doppler radar.83 During the late 1980s Russia agreed to provide the DPRK with a number of modern arms, including a small number of MiG–29s. The first were in flying condition, the remainder were in ‘knockdown’ condition to be assembled at the Panghyon facility. The first two (possibly four) aircraft were completed by April 1992 in celebration of then-President Kim Il-song’s birthday. Since that time MiG–29 assembly has proceeded extremely slowly despite Kim Chong-Il’s stated plans to equip the KPAF with the aircraft. The primary reason for this appears to be that, by early 1992, Russia stopped providing components because of the DPRK’s failure to pay for them in hard currency. The continued viability of the DPRK’s MiG–29 effort became considerably more doubtful during November 1992 when, during his visit to the ROK, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated that Moscow had withdrawn support



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for the DPRK’s MiG–29 facility, as well as halted sales of offensive arms to P’yongyang.84 This, however, has not precluded Russian supply of spare parts for equipment previously provided.85 This assistance continues at a low level and is primarily dependent upon the DPRK’s ability to pay. Additional assistance, albeit also at a low level, has also been received from several Eastern European countries and the PRC. Although the DPRK is no longer in a financial or political position to purchase significant quantities of new combat aircraft from foreign sources, it continues its efforts to acquire small numbers of surplus aircraft from Russia and Eastern Europe. For example, during the late 1990s it acquired small numbers of Mi–26 HALO and Mi–8 helicopters from Russia. The circumstances surrounding the acquisition of Mi–8s illustrates the process by which the KPAF currently acquires many of its weapons systems. On 6 October 1998 Russian customs service inspectors in the small town of Khasan on the DPRK border detained five Mi–8T HIP-C helicopters being shipped to the DPRK.86 The helicopters had been purchased as military surplus by the Russian company Arden in February at an auction organised by the State Unitary Enterprise for the Sale of Military Property under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence. The Mi–8Ts had been put up for auction by the Ground Troops Aviation Directorate, which had acquired them from three flight units of the Far East Military District. The helicopters were flown to Khasan from Khabarovsk and customs inspectors would not clear them for take-off for a variety of infractions. All military surplus aircraft are required to have all military equipment removed before their sale. These helicopters, however, still contained Russian identification-friend-foe (IFF) equipment and the wiring, sockets and attachment points for external weapons, which would have allowed these helicopters to be made combat-ready with little effort. The sale and transfer documents presented to the customs inspectors were not signed by the chairman of the Military Technological Policy Committee reporting to the Russian General Staff, or the Moscow Chamber of Commerce which is supposed to clear such transactions, both of which are required for all such military surplus sales. The documents listed the recipient only as the DPRK rather than a specific company or corporation and the sale price for the helicopters was given as approximately $20 000 each, when the average price is $300 000. Arden is a small Khabarovsk company which has been involved in the sale of lumber to the DPRK. According to Russian


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sources, however, it is operated by organised crime and has previously been involved in smuggling activities involving the PRC.87 During early 1999 another attempt by the DPRK to covertly acquire military aircraft was uncovered. This effort began the previous year during October 1998 when the Kazakhstan Government concluded a contract to sell 40 surplus MiG–21 fighters to the Czech arms firm Agroplast. According to the contract the aircraft were to be disassembled and shipped from the airbase at Taldy Kurgan in southern Kazakhstan and transported, at Agroplast’s expense, to the Czech Republic. To transport the disassembled aircraft Agroplast contracted with the Russian company Polyot for the use of one of its An–124 RUSLAN transports. Between October 1998 and April 1999 three shipments were made. Each shipment consisted of six MiG–21s and flew from the airbase at Taldy Kurgan to the Azerbaijani capital of Baku to refuel. From here the flight plan called for the RUSLAN to continue on to Bratislava in Slovakia, though the real destination was P’yongyang.88 On Wednesday 17 March 1999, the fourth shipment of six disassembled MiG–21s was loaded aboard a Polyot An–124 at Taldy Kurgan. On 18 March, due to a discrepancy with flight documentation, Baku customs officials inspected the cargo of the aircraft. The subsequent investigation revealed the MiG–21s, 16 illegal passengers (14 of whom were MiG–21 specialists), and that the aircraft were bound not for Bratislava but for the DPRK.89 Limited production of some AAMs is believed to occur within the DPRK. Two factories reported to be involved in this production are the ‘26 Factory’ located in Kanggye in Chagang-do and the ‘18 January Machine Plant’ in Kagam-ni, P’yongan-namdo. Limited indigenous development of AAMs, believed to be reverse-engineering of Russian or PRC systems, is also believed to have occurred. Little, however, is known concerning any developments.90 The KPAF’s inventory of SAMs is a mixture of Russian and PRC systems, as well as DPRK-produced, often unlicensed, copies of these systems. There is a small SAM development effort that appears to concentrate upon making minor improvements to existing systems rather then designing new systems. For example, on 14 and 16 May 1996, the DPRK conducted tests of a modified Russian SAM from the So’kta-ri test range on the west coast. MiG–19s from 57th Air Regiment based at Onch’on-up participated in these tests by dropping flares, suggesting that the modifications were to reduce the system’s vulnerability to infrared



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jamming.91 The DPRK is known to produce modified versions of the SA–2, SA–7 and SA–8. In the fields of AAM and SAM development the DPRK is believed capable of indigenously developing and producing the following components: warheads, airframes, power supply systems, ignition systems, liquid and solid propellant engines, and some fuel regulating valves. Among those components that it is believed to import, or receives assistance in producing, from Russia or the PRC are: guidance systems (radar and infra-red), tracking and guidance radars, gyros, accelerometers, and computer systems and software. Airfield construction (including underground facilities) is believed to be conducted by the MPAF’s Military Construction Bureau and the KPAF’s Construction Department. Once constructed, maintenance and repair of these facilities is the responsibility of the respective air divisions.


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6

Paramilitary and reserve forces HE RMED ORCES OF ORTH OREA ARAMILITARY AND RESERVE FORCES

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The establishment of paramilitary and reserve type units within the DPRK dates to the 1950s, although it was not until the early 1960s and the formulation of the ‘Four Military Lines’ that the DPRK undertook concerted efforts to increase the size, number and capabilities of such units. Today the paramilitary reserve forces total approximately 7.45 million personnel—approximately 30 per cent of the population between the ages of 15 and 60. This force is organised into four primary components 4.14 million Workers’–Peasants’ Red Guard (WPRG) personnel, 1.18 million Red Youth Guard (RYG) personnel, 1.73 million Paramilitary Training Unit personnel and approximately 0.4 million People’s Guard troops.1 Paramilitary Training Unit troops can be mobilised immediately, on a unit basis, for combat operations. The WPRG and People’s Guard troops would take longer to achieve combat readiness. A large percentage of the RYG (composed of high school and college students) can be mobilised quickly but would require additional training to attain combat readiness. With the exception of the Paramilitary Training Units, the majority of the reserves would probably be employed as rear area security units or as reinforcements or replacements for regular KPA units rather than as new combat units. Beginning during the 1980s, the KPA initiated a series of force improvements to reorganise and revitalise its paramilitary and reserve forces in line with newly developing concepts of wartime operations. The Paramilitary Training Units received additional artillery and were restructured and exercised to facilitate outof-area operations in support of regular KPA ground forces. At the MPAF level a new command structure was created for the 161

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wartime mission of rear area defence. Paramilitary and reserve units assigned to this structure were reorganised and their training intensified. The entire life of the average DPRK citizen is centred around some sort of military service. This begins as a young adult (15–17 years old), when they usually serve in the RYG. They serve here until their conscription into the KPA (18–25 years old). Those unable to serve in the KPA are typically assigned directly to the WPRG. Upon discharge, they will be employed at a factory, enterprise or collective farm. Here they will serve in the Paramilitary Training Units headquartered at their job location until the age of about 40. At that time, most personnel are reassigned to the WPRG until the age of 60. Service in all components of the paramilitary reserves entails varying amounts of training each year, a portion of which is spent on active duty (i.e. monthly or yearly ‘call-ups’). The type and quantity of this training is established each year by the MPAF and is different for each reserve component. The net result of this lifelong process is that the DPRK is one of the most militarised nations in the world today and possesses a trained reserve manpower pool that allows it to rapidly expand the size of its active armed forces in times of national emergency or war. Because of the ‘Four Military Lines’, and by extension the paramilitary forces, there is little ‘civilian’ society within the DPRK. Workers’–Peasants’ Red Guard The Workers’–Peasants’ Red Guard (aka Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Militia, Worker–Peasant Red Guard, Worker and Farmer Red Guards, Red Guard Militia) was officially established on 14 January 1959, following the withdrawal of the Chinese People’s Volunteers from the DPRK.2 Since that time it has expanded to be the largest paramilitary force within the DPRK, consisting of an estimated 4.14 million personnel. Missions The WPRG has the capability, training and equipment to execute the following peacetime missions: provision of basic military training to the population at large and to indoctrinate it politically; provision of local security for government buildings, facilities and property; render assistance to various elements of the Ministry of

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Public Security in maintaining internal security and public order as needed; render assistance to various elements of the KPA as needed; render assistance in disaster relief and recovery. In fulfilling its mission of maintaining internal security WPRG personnel are known to conduct coastal surveillance, ambush and patrol operations, and have participated in alerts and search operations for escaped prisoners, defectors and possible enemy agents. WPRG personnel assist Ministry of Public Security officers in administering the citizen registration program. The extent of their involvement in this role is unclear. Since its establishment, the WPRG has been utilised on occasion to provide limited assistance in disaster relief and recovery. The calamitous series of floods during the 1990s, however, have witnessed WPRG units being frequently mobilised to provide disaster relief and recovery. The WPRG has the capability, training and equipment to execute the following wartime missions: rear area defence and security operations (e.g. defending towns, farms and factories). This includes counter-airborne and counter-amphibious landing operations; guerrilla warfare operations (e.g. sabotage, raids, ambushes and intelligence collection) in areas occupied by enemy forces; some WPRG units have specialised combat service or support functions and would provide support to KPA units. Command and control The WPRG is subordinate to the KWP and command and control parallels that of the KWP at each administrative echelon. It begins at the KWP’s Central Military Committee, which establishes policies and exercises control over the WPRG at the national level. From here control extends down to the Military Affairs Department (MAD) of each of the nine provinces and three special cities (P’yongyang, Kaesong and Namp’o).3 The MADs are typically commanded by the chairman of the provincial or city KWP central committee. Control proceeds down to the county MAD, commanded by the chairman of the county KWP central committee. Here control passes to a local MAD or directly to a WPRG unit. During wartime, control over the WPRG may possibly pass to the National Defence Commission. The provincial MADs supervise all WPRG units within their geographic areas. Organisation Due primarily to the demographics of the DPRK the organisation of the WPRG varies considerably. The highest operational level is




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the provincial MAD, which supervise all WPRG units within their geographic areas. The provincial MAD is staffed by 50–100 personnel, including several active duty KPA officers, and a communications element (typically a platoon or company). Operational WPRG units are formed at county, village and ward level and at industrial and agricultural installations. At each level these units are controlled by local MADs. Apparently, company-size and larger units are not given a numerical designation, instead being named after the territorial (e.g. Pukch’ong-gun WPRG Regiment, Sinhung-gun WPRG Regiment) or occupational organisation (e.g. Huich’on Machine Tool Complex WPRG Company, Ch’ondok-ri Cooperative Farm WPRG Company) from which they draw their personnel. Regardless of unit titles, the vast majority of WPRG units are not believed to be capable of conducting operations at greater than company or battalion level due to a lack of heavy weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, training and experienced commanders and staffs. Although the provincial MADs may have a few specialised WPRG battalions and companies directly subordinate to them, the vast majority of units are organised into regiments, the basic unit of the WPRG.4 Regiments are considered administrative organisations rather than combat formations, are designed primarily to serve in a local defence role and should not be considered as fillers to be directly incorporated into the KPA. They are organised in each provincial county, in each ward of the three special cities, the Kaesong special region, and in certain large factories and government agencies. The regiment is subordinate to the corresponding territorial, enterprise, or institutional KWP committee. Regiments formed within large enterprises and institutions may be directly subordinate to the provincial committee. WPRG regiments have no uniform organisational structure; rather there is a considerable range of variations dependent upon the demographics of the area in which they are based. The regimental commanders have the rank of colonel and are chairman of the county or major enterprise KWP committee and chief of the local MAD. They are assisted by a small command staff, all of whom are leading members of the local KWP committee. On average the regiment has a personnel strength of approximately 3000–4000 (although it can vary from 1000 to 8000) and is organised into a command element, operational element and support element. The operational element in general consists of: 20 companies (although it can vary from 12 to 60); five battalions (although it can vary from 2 to 7); or a combination of companies and battalions.




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The support element consists of a number of units (normally of platoon or company size) including transportation, engineer, communications, medical, grain administration and direct support (administrative). These units are organised from personnel employed at mission-related local industries and facilities. Battalions are generally found in urban areas, where numerous factory WPRG companies exist, and in more populated rural areas where three–four village WPRG companies are organised into a battalion. Battalion commanders have the rank of major and are WPRG committee chief secretaries who have served in the KPA. As with the regiment, the battalion generally functions as an administrative headquarters (i.e. handling training, storing weapons). The WPRG battalion has a personnel strength of approximately 700–750 and is organised into a headquarters element, two–ten companies and a support element. The support element mimics that of the regiment. The company is usually considered the highest operational echelon of the WPRG. Companies are established in villages, factories, farms, mines and various institutions. Some small villages combine their workers to form a single company, while large villages may have up to three companies. Companies are commanded by a captain or senior lieutenant who is the secretary of the local KWP committee. The WPRG company has a personnel strength of approximately 100–150 and is organised into a headquarters element and three–five platoons. Each platoon has a personnel strength of approximately 30 and is composed of three squads. WPRG companies in areas bordering the DMZ and along the coasts are considerably larger, with a personnel strength of up to 400. The vast majority of WPRG companies are infantry units, but there are also ‘anti-airborne’ and AAA units armed with antiaircraft heavy machine-guns, 76–85 mm artillery batteries, 82 mm and 120 mm mortar companies, heavy machine-gun platoons and numerous service support units. WPRG medical companies are formed from community hospitals; communications companies from local power stations and communications offices; transportation battalions from truck and tractor units of the region’s cooperative farms; and rear service companies and ordnance repair shops from factories. This system allows the mobilisation of facilities and capital resources in conjunction with the call-up of WPRG units. The size of WPRG units belonging to universities and colleges varies considerably and is dependent on student and faculty populations. These units appear to be assigned military specialisations




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based upon their academic area of studies (P’yongyang University of Light Industry—military engineering; Kimch’aek Industrial University’s electrical engineering department—communications; P’yongyang Medical College—medical; University of Chemical Industry— chemical warfare; Tonghae University—naval personnel). Mobilisation The mobilisation of the WPRG is controlled by the Civil Defence Bureau of the KWP and can be achieved rapidly. Mobilisation of the entire WPRG force would not be possible without causing serious economic disruption. Approximately 75 per cent (3.1 million) of WPRG personnel could be mobilised (e.g. alerted, assembled and deployed in local defence) within three days of an emergency order. After 30 days, the WPRG could reach a maximum total mobilisation strength of approximately 85 per cent (3.5 million). The remaining 14 per cent would be exempted from military service to prevent the erosion of that economic base necessary to support the war effort. Vacated critical positions would be filled by those previously exempted from military service due to physical unfitness, age or sex. Politically unreliable personnel would be available for use as a basic labour force. Personnel and training The WPRG has an estimated personnel strength of 4.14 million physically fit and politically reliable males and females. Males between the ages of 17 and 60, and single female workers between the ages of 17 and 35, are obligated to join the WPRG. Although the age range for membership in the WPRG begins at 17 there are very few members who are that young since most are obligated to serve in the KPA and Paramilitary Training Units first. More than half the members of the WPRG are KPA veterans. A large number of the members, and all leaders, are members of the KWP. Women are estimated to comprise 10–15 per cent of the total membership of the WPRG. When a person leaves the military they are typically placed within either the Paramilitary Training Units or WPRG depending upon their skills and local requirements. Although regulations have eased considerably during the past decade, those that remain are enforced with varying levels of zeal. Those who would be excluded from service in the KPA are also excluded from the WPRG. Training programs and frequency of training vary greatly with the type of unit, its location and the occupations of members. Training




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directives are passed down annually in November–December from the KWP’s Central Military Committee, through the province MADs to the county and ward MADs. Here detailed training plans are prepared and passed on to individual units for implementation. WPRG personnel are required to undergo 240 hours of training per year. In general, this is conducted at a rate of eight hours per week either in one eight-hour day or in several sessions. Additionally, practice alerts are held monthly to test unit readiness. Units consisting of farm labourers meet less frequently due to their seasonal workload and they accomplish most of their training at squad and platoon level during extended field exercises of 10–30 days duration. Company-level combat training is carried out quarterly and company-level alerts are called periodically. WPRG units generally participate in an annual 15-day field training exercise, which may involve several regiments from adjoining counties. Occasionally, WPRG units have participated in joint field exercises with the KPA. Weapons training consists of extensive close order drill and weapon familiarisation. The majority of this training consists of aiming practice (usually with dummy rifles) and simulated firing. Live firing is typically conducted only during the annual arms qualification, at which time each individual fires 3–10 rounds at targets at a range of 100–200 m for qualification. The yearly training cycle for WPRG personnel consists of basic, tactical and guerrilla warfare training with the primary emphasis being placed upon guerrilla warfare. Weapons and equipment The WPRG is essentially a lightly armed militia force. DPRK small arms production is sufficient to allow for fully arming the Paramilitary Training Units and WPRG. WPRG units are generally issued surplus and obsolete KPA weapons. The AK–47 assault rifle is the primary weapon of the WPRG. A small but growing number of automatic weapons, anti-aircraft heavy machine-guns, RPG–2/7, and light mortars are deployed with WPRG units at battalion and regiment level. Artillery and medium anti-aircraft weapons are limited primarily to units guarding large cities, the DMZ and coastal areas, and key enterprises. Communications equipment is rare below regiment level and service units are typically limited to the equipment available at the facility with which they are associated. WPRG units do not maintain their own installations, nor do they control their own firearms. Weapons are controlled




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by the local Ministry of Public Security office, which distributes them as required for alerts and training. RED YOUTH GUARD The Red Youth Guard (aka Young Red Guards, Youth Red Guard) was established on 12 September 1970 as part of the general military reorganisation and the ‘Four Military Lines’.5 The purpose in establishing the RYG was to foster the ‘arming of the whole people’, increase political control and heighten esprit de corps in the military training given to students. The RYG consists of approximately 1.18 million male and female students aged 14–17. The missions of the RYG include: enhancing student military training at all levels from middle school through college; searching out undesirable elements to report them to the KWP; and helping defend the country in wartime. Like the WPRG, the RYG is subordinate to the KWP and follows the same chain of command through provincial and local MADs. RYG units are organised similarly to WPRG units, with each school, college or university supporting an element in direct relation to its size. RYG units are believed to be commanded by officials dispatched from local MADs. Platoon leaders are selected from among school teachers and ranking members of the local Socialist Labour Youth League. Squad leaders are chosen from among promising students. No units higher than company level are known to exist, though some large colleges or universities may have battalions. Membership in the RYG is open to all male and female students above the age of 14. Once students graduate they leave the RYG and join either the KPA or the WPRG. Politically unreliable, physically unfit and troublesome students are not accepted. The yearly RYG training cycle consists of 150–160 hours instruction in a combination of basic military and specified Red Youth Guard instruction. Basic military training consists of physical fitness, close-order drill, first aid, swimming, air raid alert procedures and some practice training with wooden mock-up rifles. Red Youth Guard training covers map reading, weapons familiarisation, tactics, engineering and political indoctrination. Additionally, college students undergo a three-month field training exercise during their senior year. College graduates are qualified to serve as junior lieutenants in the KPA if needed. RYG units share the equipment available to local WPRG units and it is




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believed that the light weapons inventory is sufficient to arm a majority of them. While mobilisation of the RYG can be achieved relatively rapidly, training them as soldiers and moving them into the KPA as replacements for KPA combat or combat support units would require time. With further basic training after mobilisation, RYG personnel could free WPRG troops for service in the KPA, be utilised as service troops in the rear areas or act as an organised labour force. Approximately 340 000 RYG personnel could be mobilised, trained and be available in 30 days, 600 000 in 90 days and 890 000 in 180 days.

PARAMILITARY TRAINING UNITS The Paramilitary Training Units (aka Reserve Military Training Units, Pacification Units, Guidance Units, Instructional Units, Instruction Guidance Units or Reserve Units) were first organised at major industrial enterprises during the early 1950s and subordinated to the local Military Mobilisation Department. During the late 1960s these units were subordinated directly to the MPAF. Since that time these units have expanded to be the primary ready reserve force of the MPAF and are capable of being immediately incorporated into the KPA in times of war or national emergency. The total strength of the Paramilitary Training Units is estimated to be 1.73 million personnel. Approximately 35–40 per cent of these are organised into 36 Paramilitary Training Unit divisions. Missions The Paramilitary Training Units have the capability, training and equipment for the following peacetime missions: maintaining a trained military force of KPA veterans who can be immediately mobilised and incorporated into the KPA; provision of security for large government buildings, facilities and property. They have the capability, training and equipment to execute the following wartime missions: rear area defence and security operations (e.g defending cities and industrial facilities); incorporation as units into their parent KPA units; augmentation as conventional light infantry units for any KPA unit; provision of individual fillers or replacements for KPA units; and serving as independent units directly subordinate to the MPAF.




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Command and control Unlike the WPRG and RYG, which are controlled by the KWP’s Civil Defence Bureau, the Paramilitary Training Units are controlled directly by the MPAF. Control extends down from the General Staff Department to a corps or command headquarters and on to a specific Paramilitary Training Unit organisation. In the case of Paramilitary Training Units which are directly associated with a KPA unit smaller than a corps, control is through the respective KPA unit headquarters. All Paramilitary Training Units are believed to be commanded and staffed by active duty KPA personnel. On average 20–30 personnel are assigned per Paramilitary Training Unit battalion. They occupy all slots except those for squad leaders. Each Paramilitary Training Unit commander is concurrently a member of the respective enterprise’s KWP committee. Organisation Paramilitary Training Units are organised in echelons from squad through division at large industrial complexes and some universities, though the majority of units are either battalions or regiments. Each echelon maintains an organisation roughly equivalent to that of a comparable regular KPA unit. A special-class business, depending on its special nature and numbers of employees, may support a brigade or division; a first-class business, with 3000+ employees, supports a regiment; a second-class business, with 2000–3000 employees, supports a battalion; a third-class business, with 500– 2000 employees, supports one or more companies. At larger universities, a school supports a regiment, an academic department supports a battalion, the faculty a company and the class a platoon. At universities and colleges with smaller student and faculty populations the size of units is proportionally smaller. Since the driving factor behind Paramilitary Training Unit organisation is the number of eligible workers at a particular facility or group of facilities, division headquarters are established only in those areas where sufficient personnel exist. Because of changing demographics these headquarters may have their area of responsibility shifted to more suitable locations as requirements change. Division headquarters provide administrative control for Paramilitary Training Unit regiments and battalions within their area of responsibility. It is probable that these headquarters could also provide operational command and control during wartime. They are, however, limited by their small size and limited communications equipment. Although it is believed that Paramilitary




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Training Unit divisions attempt to maintain an organisation equivalent to that of a regular KPA infantry division, they undoubtedly exhibit differences in heavy equipment such as fewer motor vehicles and smaller combat support units. Additionally, although the standard KPA infantry division has three–four infantry regiments, the Paramilitary Training Unit division may vary anywhere from two–seven regiments and a number of attached battalions. Paramilitary Training Unit divisions are probably commanded by a major general or senior colonel. The Paramilitary Training Unit regiment has a personnel strength of 2500–3500 and is organised into a headquarters, three– five infantry battalions, mortar battery or battalion, AAA company or battalion, artillery or rocket launcher battery, anti-tank company engineer company, communications company, security platoon and rear services. Regiments are commanded by a senior colonel or colonel. A Paramilitary Training Unit battalion has a personnel strength of 375–475 and is organised into a headquarters element, three–four infantry companies, heavy weapons company and security platoon. Although the vast majority of Paramilitary Training Units are infantry-based, it is believed that some specialised units exist, including battalion-level organisations organised as rear service, anti-aircraft, artillery and possibly even armoured units. Mobilisation Mobilisation of the Paramilitary Training Units is controlled directly by the MPAF and can be achieved relatively rapidly. Approximately 50 per cent of the Paramilitary Training Unit personnel could be mobilised and fielded immediately in wartime, with the remaining 50 per cent becoming available within 30 days. Unlike WPRG units, Paramilitary Training Units would perform as part of the national armed forces and would most probably be assigned away from their home area. Units may also be placed on active or semi-active status as required by the MPAF. For example, four Paramilitary Training Unit divisions are part of the P’yongyang Defence Command (see chapter 3). Personnel and training The total personnel strength of the Paramilitary Training Units is estimated to be 1.73 million males aged 17–45 and unmarried females aged 17–30, all of whom are KPA veterans or have generally




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completed some form of military training. Approximately 10 per cent of this total strength are active duty KPA personnel serving as officers and cadre, who would probably be mobilised with the units. Officers for the specialised branches of the Paramilitary Training Units are obtained from those personnel with prior military experience, job specialisation (e.g. personnel from the February 8th Vinalon Complex in Hamhung may be utilised as chemical warfare [CW] troops), or who are receiving schooling at trade-specific universities or colleges. Training requirements and directives are established annually by the MPAF which passes them down to the various KPA corps headquarters. Here the corps staff prepares detailed training plans and passes these on to individual Paramilitary Training Unit division or regiment commanders for implementation. The detailed implementation of these training programs varies somewhat according to work schedules, season, type of unit and location. Paramilitary Training Units generally undergo 320–400 hours of training per year (approximately eight hours per week), plus annual field exercises of four–five days duration. The training itself is essentially the same as that of regular KPA personnel. It includes individual skills through small unit tactics to regimentsize manoeuvres. In addition, Paramilitary Training Units receive extensive training in march order, ambush and counter-ambush tactics, and defensive chemical–biological warfare (CBW) measures. Live fire training, however, is extremely limited consisting of three–ten rounds per year during weapons qualifications. Field exercises can be either individual unit exercises or joint operations with other Paramilitary Training Units, KPA units, and/or WPRG units. Exercises include both defensive and offensive manoeuvres, with emphasis on forced marching, construction of defensive positions and night actions. Emergency alerts, usually at night, are called to assess unit readiness and proficiency. These alerts occasionally expand into one–two day exercises involving advanced activities such as ambush, counter-airborne and CBW exercises. Weapons and equipment The Paramilitary Training Units are subordinate to the MPAF and are its ready reserve infantry component. As such they are armed and equipped, with minor differences, to the same level (up to 160 mm mortars) as regular KPA infantry units of equivalent size. Differences are believed to include older models of weapons and equipment, fewer motor vehicles, limited availability of anti-tank




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and anti-aircraft missiles, and reduced levels of communications equipment. Motor vehicles are obtained as needed from among the best vehicles available from industrial facilities at which members work. With the economic crisis of the 1990s, however, most non-military motor vehicles are now idle. This undoubtedly will affect the readiness and capabilities of a number of units. Unlike the WPRG, the Paramilitary Training Units maintain and control their own weapons. They do so in dedicated installations located adjacent to their supporting industry. These installations include barracks (for active duty KPA personnel), mess halls, arms rooms, lecture halls and firing ranges. Paramilitary Training Unit personnel wear second-hand KPA uniforms when training or if mobilised. These uniforms differ from KPA uniforms in that they have no rank insignia.

PEOPLE’S GUARD The People’s Guards (aka People’s Security Guards) consist of the Border Security and Coastal Security Bureaus of the MPAF and the Railway Security Bureau and Engineer Bureaus of the Ministry of Public Security (see chapter 7). It is estimated that this force has a combined personnel strength of 400 000. In times of war or national emergency elements of the Ministry of Public Security’s Railway Security and Engineer Bureaus would probably be subordinated to the MPAF. Border Security Bureau6 The Border Security Bureau is responsible for controlling unauthorised movements and preventing illegal entries and exits along the borders with the PRC and Russia. Border Security Bureau units maintain checkpoints, conduct patrols and are believed to be responsible for airport security. During 1994, as a result of the increasing numbers of people escaping the DPRK into the PRC, the State Security Department reinforced the bureau and the MPAF deployed units closer to the border. These measures proved inadequate and in October 1995 the Border Security Bureau and Coastal Security Bureau, which had previously been part of the State Security Department, were transferred to the MPAF.7 According to defectors, Border Guard troops have been authorised to shoot ‘anybody who crosses four metres over’ the border.8




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Map 6.1 Border security order of battle

People’s Republic of China Ch’ongjin 27th 25th 29th

Sinuiju 31st Hamhung

Korea Bay

Wonsan

P’yongyang

Seoul

Republic of Korea


N

The organisation of this bureau is unclear, however it is believed to consist of at least four departments—Counter Espionage, Political, Exit/Entry and Rear Services—and four border security brigades. The four border security brigades are deployed on a provincial basis: 31st Brigade (P’yongan-bukto), 29th Brigade (Chagang-do), 25th Brigade (Yanggang-do) and 27th Brigade (Hamgyong-bukto).9 These units are equipped with light infantry weapons. Personnel strength is estimated to be 30 000–40 000 troops.




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Map 6.2 Coastal security order of battle

People’s Republic of China Ch’ongjin

21st

19th

Sinuiju 11th

Hamhung 13th Wonsan

P’yongyang

Korea Bay


17th

15th

Seoul

Republic of Korea

N

Coastal Security Bureau10 The Coastal Security Bureau (aka Coastal Guards, Coast Guard, Maritime Coastal Security Force, Maritime Police) is responsible for preventing unauthorised movements and illegal entries and exits along the DPRK’s 2495 km of coastline. Coastal Security Bureau elements conduct maritime patrols, maintain harbour and port security, and possibly assist the KPA man coastal defence sites. Coastal and port operations are conducted both ashore and




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afloat using a fleet of approximately 130–150 small patrol vessels. Coastal Security Bureau units also have a police responsibility along the DPRK’s navigable inland waterways and in cooperation with the KPN are responsible for the security of the DPRK fishing fleet in coastal waters. During October 1995, in an effort to improve the effectiveness of the border and coastal security forces, the Coastal Security Bureau and Border Security Bureau were transferred from the State Security Department to the MPAF. The organisation of this bureau is unclear, however it is believed to consist of at least five departments—Counter Espionage, Criminal, Political, Public Security and Rear Services—and six coastal security brigades. The coastal security brigades are deployed —three on each coast—on a provincial basis: 11th Brigade (P’yongan-bukto), 13th Brigade (P’yongan-namdo), 15th Brigade (Hwanghae-namdo), 17th Brigade (Kangwon-do), 19th Brigade (Hamgyong-namdo) and 21st Brigade (Hamgyong-bukto). The brigades are equipped with a variety of light infantry weapons and small DPRK-produced patrol craft. The most numerous patrol craft within the Coastal Security Bureau are the KIMJIN (60–70) and YONGDO (45–55) class WPBs. Since the early 1990s, the DPRK has supplemented older vessels with two new classes of high-speed coastal patrol craft. The TB 40A (12 vessels) is the larger of the two classes, being a 40 m design. The TB 11PA (15 vessels) is an 11 m high-speed police launch which displaces 8 tonnes, carries 800 kg of fuel for a 200 nm range, is powered by two 260 hp OHC diesel engines and has a crew of two to five. A single SARIWON class PG is reported to serve as the flagship for the Coastal Security Bureau.11




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Intelligence and internal security services NTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES

I

The primary missions of the DPRK’s intelligence organisations are to actively collect and disseminate timely and accurate information concerning any possible political, military or economic threat to the security of the nation, or to the political and military leadership; and the subversion of the ROK. Secondary missions include overt and covert acquisition of foreign military and civilian technologies and equipment, support of the DPRK’s foreign policy goals, training and support for foreign revolutionary and terrorist organisations, and the acquisition of foreign capital for state and intelligence operations.1 The primary missions of the DPRK’s internal security organisations are to protect the government and the KWP from domestic threats and to prevent or neutralise any foreign intelligence collection or subversion activities against the DPRK. Secondary missions include maintenance of domestic tranquillity, normal police and civil defence activities, protection of natural resources, industrial security, protection of transport and communication networks, coast and border security, and acquisition of foreign capital. While these missions suggest a distinct separation of external and internal security responsibilities, the reality of the situation is somewhat more ambiguous, with various agencies often having overlapping areas of responsibility and in competition with each other. For example, all agencies have an internal security responsibility to some degree, and internal security agencies have conducted positive intelligence operations within the ROK and overseas. This has often resulted in the duplication of effort and a waste of precious resources, with operations frequently displaying overlapping and sometimes conflicting areas of responsibilities. 177




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Additionally, there appears to be a political competition among these agencies to accomplish ‘feats’ in their anti-ROK operations in order to celebrate important domestic events (e.g. the anniversary of the KWP) or to ingratiate themselves with Kim Il-song or Kim Chong-il.2 This situation has arisen because of the way in which the intelligence and internal security organisations have evolved over the past 50 years and the fact that Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il employ the various organisations as a means of preventing any person or faction from becoming too powerful and threatening their control. The DPRK’s worsening economic situation during the past 10–15 years has witnessed the acquisition of foreign capital become established as a mission for all intelligence and internal security organisations. This is often accomplished through illicit trade in narcotics. Trading companies established by the various organisations not only provide convenient ‘fronts’ for intelligence activities but also a means to raise foreign capital. This has seen the connections to, and cooperation with, foreign crime organisations increasing significantly. The DPRK’s intelligence organisations have proved that they are capable of fulfilling their missions, especially within Asia. Intelligence collection outside Asia is problematic as a result of the DPRK’s expanding economic crisis and political isolation in the international community. The DPRK’s internal security organisations have proved to be extremely effective. There are no significant domestic threats to the Kim Chong-il government or the KWP and none is likely to emerge in the foreseeable future due the draconian methods employed by the internal security organisations. It should be understood, however, that due to the unique convergence of current internal and external political, economic and social circumstances the DPRK could swiftly and unexpectedly ‘implode or explode’. Either eventuality could readily be precipitated by a seemingly minor event that spins out of control. In either eventuality it is unlikely that the intelligence and internal security services could do anything to prevent, or delay for any length of time, the ensuing disaster. ORGANISATION3 During the 1990s the organisation of the DPRK’s intelligence and internal security community has undergone numerous changes. The details of the majority of these changes are simply unknown




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to the outside world. What little is known suggests that some of these changes were normal evolutionary developments that all such organisations go through. The vast majority of changes, however, appear to have been undertaken to secure the power and position of Kim Chong-il and to deal with increasing levels of unrest and unofficial corruption within the civilian population and the military. With these changes the power and influence of the individual organisations and leaders has risen and fallen (and sometimes risen again) with remarkable speed. The most recent series of major changes began during September 1998, when the Tenth Supreme People’s Assembly met and amended the DPRK Constitution. The amendments established the position of Chairman of the National Defence Commission as the highest position within the DPRK and replaced the Central People’s Committee and State Administration Council with the Cabinet. The following four months witnessed numerous mid- and high-level officials being purged and a reorganisation of numerous ministries, bureaus and departments. As part of this an anti-corruption campaign was led by General Won Ung-hui of the MPAF’s Security Command. The organisation of the intelligence and internal security community begins with Kim Chong-il, who is both General Secretary of the KWP and Chairman of the National Defence Commission, and proceeds down through three distinct paths— National Defence Commission, KWP and Cabinet. All paths are supported by the National Intelligence Committee which is a national-level policy and decision making body for intelligence and security matters. Subordinate to the National Defence Commission are the MPAF and State Security Department. Subordinate to the MPAF are the Reconnaissance Bureau, Security Command and Guard Command. The paths through the KWP and Cabinet are relatively short. Subordinate to the KWP is the office of the Central Committee Secretary in Charge of South Korean Affairs (CCSKA) which controls four intelligence-related departments (political control of the military is discussed in chapter 2). Subordinate to the Cabinet is the Ministry of Public Security. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE The National Intelligence Committee is a decision-making body led by Kim Chong-il and composed of four other members, including Kim Yong-sun (aka Kim Yong-son), CCSKA; Chung Kyong-hi, Director of the Social–Cultural Department; Im Ho-gun, Director




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of the Investigative Department; and Kim Young-chun, Chief-ofthe-General Staff of the MPAF. This committee is the primary national-level policy and decision making body for intelligence and security matters and as such it establishes overall policy direction for all intelligence and security activities, sets intelligence objectives and delegates responsibilities to the intelligence and security communities.4 KWP, CCSKA Beginning at the Seventeenth Session of the KWP Party Central Committee in January 1990, several organisational changes within the intelligence and special operations assets began. The majority of these appear to be logical organisational developments, but a number were in direct response to policy changes and evolving doctrines. At the January 1990 meeting, Kim Chung-nin was replaced by Yun Ki-pok as CCSKA.5 Kim was not purged, but was shifted to a new position in an administrative reorganisation and at present is the party secretary responsible for ‘workers’ organisations’ (e.g. General Federation of Trade Unions, Kim Il-song Socialist Youth League etc.).6 In December 1992, Yun Ki-pok was transferred from his position as CCSKA to Secretary for Education. This transfer was apparently in response to the much-publicised ‘South Korean Workers’ Party of Korea espionage case’. Yun was replaced by Kim Yong-sun, who has continued in this position into 1999.7 The office of CCSKA is responsible for implementing antiROK operations, based upon guidelines established by the National Intelligence Committee. It also exercises control over subordinate agencies and coordinates with the Reconnaissance Bureau, Ministry of Public Security and State Security Department. It apparently collects information from its subordinate intelligence agencies and other organisations, and disseminates finished intelligence products to all DPRK government agencies. The office of the CCSKA is located in ‘No. 3 Government Building’ in P’yongyang, as are the headquarters of its four subordinate departments: Social–Cultural Department, South–North Dialogue Department, Investigative Department and the Operations Department. It is estimated that in 1996 there were approximately 15 000 personnel (although not all were operational) subordinate to the CCSKA.8




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Liaison Department/Social–Cultural Department9 By the early 1990s the Liaison Department was renamed the Social–Cultural Department (aka Socio–Cultural Department, Social and Cultural Department or Department of Socio-cultural Affairs), although many routinely still refer to it by its former name. Its primary missions are the establishment and expansion of the KWP within the ROK (i.e. underground KWP cells), and the collection of political intelligence within the ROK and Japan. By the mid-1990s, operational control over the Chosen Soren was transferred from the Unification Front Department to the Social–Cultural Department in an effort to improve its sagging performance, although other agencies (particularly the Operations Department) still routinely operate with and through the organisation. The Social–Cultural Department has an estimated personnel strength of approximately 1500 and is organised into administration and training sections; world regional sections; four regional sections dealing with the ROK, a political/cultural section for the ROK (e.g. ROKA, industry) and trading companies (e.g. Dae Song Trading Company). Within the context of its trading companies the department operates a number of ocean-going cargo vessels. During early 1997, Kang Chu-il, the First Vice-Director of the Unification Front Department was appointed director of the KWP Social–Cultural Department, replacing Chung Kyong-hi.10 Unification Front Department/South–North Dialogue Department11 Although the South–North Dialogue Department is routinely identified as the Unification Front Department (aka Reunification Front Department), it is believed to have been renamed during the late 1980s or early 1990s. This came about as a result of an increasing level of contacts between the ROK and DPRK. It appears that the CCSKA, at least under Kim Yong-sun, personally heads this department. The South–North Dialogue Department is responsible for all open and covert issues relating to ‘South– North Dialogue’ and the reunification of the Fatherland— including all anti-ROK psychological warfare and propaganda operations. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the South–North Dialogue Department dramatically expanded its open and covert contacts with Koreans living overseas (especially within the US and Canada). Koreans living abroad recruited by the department are apparently referred to the Social–Cultural Department.




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Much of the Unification Front Department’s work had been conducted through its Chosen Soren affairs section, however operational control of the Chosen Soren has now passed to the Social–Cultural Department. The Unification Front Department, however, remains actively involved within the ROK and Japan. It is organised into 13 divisions (or sections). Some of these are organised along geographic lines, as is the Investigative Department. Others are functional. For example, the ‘6th Division’ supervises the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland, the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland, the Chondoist Chongu Party, the Korean Christians Federation and the Korean Buddhists Federation. Research Department for External Intelligence/Investigative Department12 As part of the general reorganisation of intelligence assets during the 1990s, the Research Department for External Intelligence (aka External Intelligence Research Department) may have been redesigned as the Investigative Department (aka Investigaton Department). The Investigative Department retained the responsibilities for the collection of external intelligence and conduct of foreign operations. It is organised into a headquarters and six primary sections: Chosen Soren; Japan; Americas; Europe; Africa and Asia; and ROK.13 Up until the 1990s it is known to have had field offices in Moscow, Beijing, Berlin, Tokyo, Guangzhou, Macao, Singapore and Hong Kong. The status of the offices in Macao and Hong Kong following their return to the PRC is uncertain. Since 1990, Kwon Hui-kyong has been the Director of the Investigative Department.14 During 1993, what is believed to have been the element of the Investigative Department that was responsible for training foreign terrorists was separated and subordinated to the MPAF (most likely the Reconnaissance Bureau).15 Operations Department16 The Operations Department is the primary organisation responsible for the basic and advanced training of intelligence agents, escort training, and escort operations (i.e. covert infiltration of agents throughout the world). It is organised into a headquarters, basic training, advanced training, two Seaborne Escort Training Centres, four Seaborne Escort Units (aka Maritime Liaison Offices)




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and two DMZ Escort Units. Since at least 1994 the director of the Operations Department has been General O Kuk-yol (aka Oh Guk-ryol, O Guk-ryol). Defector statements suggest that the Operations Department has a personnel strength of approximately 6500, with 1000 being located in P’yongyang for command, communications and support (including training), 4400 in seaborne units (including training) and 1100 in the DMZ escort units. The DMZ escort units are headquarted in Kaesong and P’yongyang (or possibly Sariwon). A component of the Operations Department (possibly one of the DMZ escort units) operates an unknown number of hang-gliders which can be used to infilitrate agents into the ROK. During 1998–99, the DPRK imported a number of ‘hang-gliders’ and ‘motorised paragliders’ (or possibly ultralights) for use by the Operations Department.17 The Seaborne escort units are headquartered in Haeju, Namp’o, Wonsan and Ch’ongjin. Personnel strengths for the various Seaborne escort units are reported as Ch’ongjin 1100 (700 in training and support, 400 combatants), Wonsan 1000 (800 in training and support, 200 combatants), Namp’o 1200 (800 in training and support, 400 combatants) and Haeju 1100 (700 in training and support, 400 combatants). Each unit has a specific area of responsibility: Ch’ongjin, operations against Japan; Wonsan, operations along the ROK east cost down to Pusan; Namp’o, operations along the ROK southern coast including Cheju-do and Pusan; and Haeju, operations along the ROK west coast. The unit based in Wonsan is believed to be the 313th Army Unit (aka 313th Liaison Unit, 313th Liaison Station, 313th Liaison Office or 313th Liaison Department) and operates a number of specialised high-speed infiltration craft and YUGO class SSm. The 313th maintains a training base on the island of Hwangt’o-do in Yonghung-man (the bay outside the east coast port city of Wonsan).18 Here infiltration teams receive advanced and mission-specific training.19 According to defectors, the Ch’ongjin unit has approximately 12 ‘mother ships’ assigned to it. Basic and advanced training generally occur at a system of safehouses located throughout the DPRK, although most are in the P’yongyang area. The specific organisation responsible for this training was previously known as the Central Committee Political School, or 695th Army Unit, and may now go under the name of the Kim Chong-il Political and Military Academy (or Central Committee Political and Military Academy). Safehouses are isolated so that students know only of the training, operations and




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members of their own team to prevent compromise if captured. Instructors and others working within the Operations Department generally have little or no contact with members of other departments. Courses can last from six months to two years and cover a wide range of subjects. Agents, or agent teams, live alone except for a housekeeper and are generally permitted to leave the house only once a week or month, and they may be allowed to visit their families once a year. The Kim Chong-il Political and Military Academy graduates 60–80 agents a year. The Operations Department has been involved in kidnapping operations throughout the world. The primary objectives of these operations have been to secure persons who can serve as language and cultural instructors for operatives and to allow a previously trained operative to assume the victim’s identity. These latter operations have generally occurred within Asia, particularly Japan. To conduct these missions, the Operations Department employs a wide variety of specialised swimmer delivery vehicles (SDV), high-speed infiltration craft and submarines. Much of what is known concerning the operations of the CCSKA comes from a number of failed or aborted missions against the ROK. These missions clearly indicate that CCSKA operatives have regularly entered the ROK undetected and that there are numerous ongoing operations in both the ROK and Japan—some of which date to the end of the Fatherland Liberation War.20 Recent examples of CCSKA operations against the ROK and Japan include: Puyo (October 1995),21 Sokch’o (June 1998) where a YUGO class midget submarine was captured,22 Tonghae (July 1998),23 Kanghwado (November 1998),24 Impo-ri (December 1998) where a improved high-speed SP–10H submersible infiltration craft was sunk and captured,25 and most recently the infiltration attempt by two disguised ‘mother’ ships off Noto-hanto, Japan (March 1999).26 Submarines, ‘mother’ ships and infiltration craft During the past 45 years, the DPRK has employed a wide variety of highly specialised indigenously designed and constructed infiltration vessels, submarines and SDVs to conduct infiltration operations of the ROK and Japan.27 During the late 1950s and early 1960s the DPRK undertook the indigenous design and production of at least one class of midget submarine (SSm). This class doesn’t appear to have been based on any pre-existing World War II or post-war design. It was small, very crude and probably produced only in extremely small numbers. One example was captured by




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Table 7.1 5.7 m class SSm, Imjin River, 196528 Displacement Dimensions Main machinery Speed Range Test depth Complement Armament Operational endurance

3 tonnes 5.7 x 1.1 x 2.05 m 1 diesel; 1 shaft 7 knots surfaced, 3–5 knots dived n.a. n.a. 2+ Light infantry weapons n.a.

Table 7.2 41 m class SSAG, mid-1970s Displacement Dimensions Main machinery Speed Range Test depth Complement Armament Operational endurance

200 tonnes 41 x 3 m 1 diesel; 1 shaft n.a. n.a. n.a. 15 533 mm torpedo tubes, 2 anti-ship torpedoes (estimate) n.a.

the ROK on 5 July 1965 following its grounding on a mudflat during a receding tide at the confluence of the Imjin and Han Rivers, north-north-west of Seoul. These indigenous efforts were apparently a failure and beginning in the late 1960s, the DPRK acquired (openly and clandestinely), reverse-engineered, and indigenously designed and produced, new classes of SSm for use in intelligence and special operations missions. The largest class of SSm is based upon Yugoslavian designs acquired during the 1960s and 1970s and is therefore generally identified as the YUGO class. There appear to have been several distinctly different sub-classes within the YUGO class SSm constructed over the years. These differ in overall dimensions, displacement, engines and weapons fit. It is currently estimated that there are approximately 47 of these submarines operated primarily by the intelligence services, which are not counted within the total KPN ship strength.29 During the late 1970s, utilising experience gained in the production of the various subclasses of the YUGO class, the DPRK designed a larger 41 m submarine. This design was possibly going to be used to complement the YUGO class, however only one of these experimental




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41 m class (SSAG) designs was ever launched. Construction of additional sub-classes of the YUGO SSm has continued to the present.30 During the early 1980s the DPRK acquired at least one example of a West German civilian research submarine known as the Sea Horse II (sometimes referred to as the Type–100). This submarine was covertly acquired through one of the DPRK’s trading companies which maintained an office in West Germany. In December 1983, the submarine was shipped to Singapore using false end-user documentation. Here, in January 1984, it was reloaded onto a DPRK flagged cargo ship for the final leg of the voyage to the DPRK. Design features of this vessel were apparently incorporated into the indigenous SSm programs.31 The YUGO class SSm that was captured off Sokch’o during its ill-fated 1998 infiltration mission was the latest model of the class known as the P4 and exhibited a number of interesting features. Probably the most interesting is the use of an advanced singleshaft dual-propeller design, with the main prop consisting of five specially designed skewed blades measuring approximately 130 cm in diameter, and a second prop with five blades measuring 30 cm in diameter. Skewed blades are utilised to lower the radiated noise signatures (i.e. cavitation) from propellers at high speeds. ROK officials indicate that the smaller prop is believed to further reduce the noise created by the main prop. In an effort to decrease its acoustic and visual signature, the upper portions of the submarine including the conning tower are painted with green and dark green mottled camouflage and covered with fibre resin plastic materials. The small conning tower not only contains the submarine’s periscope and radio antennas, but also serves as a diver lock-out chamber. Between the upper and lower hatches of the conning tower there is enough space to allow three people to don or remove scuba gear. The outer hatch is hand operated, while the inner hatch is controlled by a hydraulic arm which can only be operated Table 7.3 Sea Horse II civilian research submarine32 Displacement Dimensions Main Machinery Speed Range Test depth Complement Armament Operational endurance

40 tonnes 13 x 2.2 m 1 Mercedes Benz diesel; 1 shaft 8–9 knots surfaced, 4–5 knots dived 100 nm (estimate) 150–200 m 4 n.a. n.a.




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from within the sub itself. The interior of the submarine is separated into 10 watertight compartments. Mounted on the stern deck is a snorkel device which can be pivoted aft to lie flush in the deck when not in use. Reports indicating that the sub had two small torpedo tubes appear to be incorrect. Detailed inspection and analysis by ROK and US intelligence experts revealed that commercial parts from Japan, Russia and Germany were used in the submarine’s construction. The radar, sonar and electronic systems are all of Japanese origin.33 Table 7.4 P4 (YUGO) class SSm, Sokch’o 199834 Displacement Dimensions Main machinery Speed Range Test depth Complement Sonar Radar/GPS Armament Operational endurance

70 tonnes† 22.3 x 2.4 x 4.3 m 1 diesel generator; 1 motor; 1 shaft 14 knots surfaced, 8 knots dived At least 225 nm at 4 knots n.a. 9 (6 cadre and crew, 3 passengers) Furuno CH–24 Furuno 1831/Furuno GP–500 Light infantry weapons n.a.

† Some sources give the displacement as 50 tonnes.

Following a six-month refit that cost approximately 1 billion Won (US$873 000) the captured P4 (YUGO) entered service with the ROKN. It will be employed as an ‘enemy’ submarine during naval and counter- infiltration exercises to train sonar operators and ASW personnel to detect its distinctive propeller signature and operational profile.35 It is believed that the DPRK first began production of the 34 m SANG-O SSc during 1991. This class is based upon a combination of Yugoslavian designs, the 41 m class SSAG, experience in constructing the ROMEO class SS and operational experiences. It is built in two versions—a standard attack version for the KPN armed with torpedoes and a reconnaissance version for the Reconnaissance Bureau’s Maritime Department which has the torpedo tubes replaced by a diver lock-out chamber. This latter version is used to clandestinely insert special operations force units and intelligence agents into the ROK and Japan. A SANG-O class SSc was captured by the ROK after running aground at Kangnung in 1996. Examination of the captured submarine revealed that it was equipped with a large amount of off-the-shelf commercial radio equipment.36 By 2005 the SANG-O class SSm will probably replace the elderly WHISKEY class SS entirely and supersede the ROMEO class SS as the KPN’s primary submarine.37




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Table 7.5 SANG-O class SSc (reconnaissance version), Kangnung 199638 Displacement Dimensions Main machinery Speed Range Test depth Complement Armament Operational endurance

275 tonnes surfaced; 360 tonnes dived 34 x 3.8 m (the sail stands approximately 2.5 m above the deck) 1 diesel generator; 1 motor; 1 shaft 7.2 knots surfaced, 8.8 knots dived At least 1500 nm surfaced 150 m 26 (6 cadre, 15 crew, 5 passengers) Not equipped with torpedoes. The KPN attack version has four torpedo tubes and can carry 16 naval mines. 20 days

Yi Kwang-su (aka Li Kwang-su), a captured crewmember from the SANG-O class SSc that ran aground near Kangnung, stated that the DPRK

had recently begun construction of a new 1000 tonne class reconnaissance submarine at the Pongdae Boiler Plant in Sinp’o on the east coast. This project was initiated at the recommendation of the Reconnaissance Bureau’s Maritime Department for a vessel capable of greater range, endurance and capacity than the SANG-O class. Little is known concerning this new class other than that it will have a capacity to carry 80 personnel (including the crew). The Maritime Department began recruiting and training crew for this new submarine in 1996.39 Beginning during the late 1950s and continuing until today, the DPRK has produced a variety of specialised high-speed infiltration craft. It was during the early 1980s that several new classes of high-speed semi-submersible infiltration craft were developed. One of these, the SP–10H (known as the semi-submersible infiltration landing craft, SILC), is powered by three V-8 OHC diesel engines developing 260 hp, equipped with a Japanese Furuno 701 marine radar and indigenously produced SS–25 radio and radar detection equipment.40 These vessels are employed by both the Maritime Department and the Sea Escort Units of the CCSKA’s Operations Department. Table 7.6 SP–10H semi-submersible infiltration landing craft (SILC)41 Displacement Dimensions Main machinery Speed Range Complement Armament Operational endurance

5 tonnes surfaced 9.3 x 2.54 x 1.0 m Three 260 hp V-8 OHC diesel engines; 3 shafts 30–40 knots surfaced, 12 knots semi-submerged At least 300 nm surfaced 6 (2 crew, 4 passengers) Small arms (can include 82 mm recoilless rifles and shoulder-fired SAMs) n.a.




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The infiltration vessels involved in both the Kanghwa-do and Impo-ri operations are an improved model of the SP–10H (known as the improved semi-submersible infiltration landing craft, I-SILC). This latest model has been operational since 1995 and the DPRK has apparently made it available for export. It displaces 10.5 tonnes and has a maximum surfaced speed of 40–50 knots and a submerged speed of 4–6 knots. The craft rides very low in the water and unlike its predecessors, which could only partially submerge leaving their pilot and passenger cabins above the waterline, this new class can submerge to a depth of 3 m using a snorkelling system and has a maximum submerged depth of 20 m. The vessel is constructed of fibreglass, covered with a ‘special’ (i.e. radar absorbing) paint, and is the first infiltration craft captured by the ROK that is equipped with a global positioning system (GPS) receiver. The fibreglass construction and radar absorbing paint endow the craft with an extremely small radar cross-section and it is reportedly only detectable when moving at speeds of greater than 12 knots. The craft can carry up to eight people—four crew, two escorts and two infiltrators. It is estimated that 20 per cent of the equipment aboard the craft, including the radar, sonar, radio and power converters, was manufactured in Japan.42 Table 7.7 Improved SP–10H semi-submersible infiltration landing craft (I-SILC)43 Displacement Dimensions Main machinery Maximum speed Range Dived depth Complement Radar Armament Operational endurance

10.5 tonnes 12.8 x 2.95 x 1.05 m (0.62 m draft) Three V-8 OHC diesel engines; 3 shafts 40–50 knots surfaced, 4–6 knots dived 200 nm (maximum) 3 m (snorkel); 20 m (maximum) 8 (4 crew, 1–2 escorts, 1–3 infiltrators) Furuno 1830 Small arms (can include 82 mm recoilless rifles and shoulder-fired SAMs) n.a.

This vessel is part of an ambitious building program conducted by the DPRK during the 1990s which also includes the 1000-tonne class infiltration submarine (see above); the SBS–2 two-man SDV; and a ‘stealth’ patrol boat (see chapter 4).44 Over the years the DPRK has imported, reverse-engineered and indigenously designed and produced a wide variety of SDVs. These range in size from small single-person to larger six-person models. The SDV found during the 1998 Tonghae infiltration was a batterypowered, propeller-driven, craft which measures 1.57 m long and




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0.33 m in diameter. It has a speed of 2–3 knots and a range of approximately 3 km. This SDV was designed to be launched by either a submarine or ‘mother’ ship and transport three–five swimmers and their equipment. An almost identical SDV was found aboard the YUGO class SSm captured just 20 days earlier.45 Table 7.8 SBS–2 swimmer delivery vehicle46 Displacement Dimensions Main machinery Maximum speed Range Dived depth Complement Armament Operational endurance

0.58 tonnes 4.8 x 0.76 x 0.93 m 1 electric motor; 1 shaft 4 knots 85 nm (maximum) 5–8 m 2 n.a. n.a.

During April 1999 a naturalised American from the PRC, and living in New York, was convicted of selling speedboats to the DPRK. According to the indictment in his case, Shei-Kei Mak in collaboration with his brother Shea-Yee Mak arranged for the purchase of seven speedboats from Powerboat Industries Inc. in North Carolina. The total cost for the craft was an estimated US$1.7 million. The craft were first shipped from North Carolina to Hong Kong. From here they were trans-shipped to the DPRK. While these were civilian pleasure craft, they do have military applications.47 Because infiltration craft (aka landing craft) have limited ranges, for operations against Japan or the southern section of the ROK they are usually transported to their area of operations by a ‘mother’ ship (aka agent boat) which operates from international waters. The ‘mother’ ship is either a specially built high-speed 50–100 tonne vessel posing as a legitimate fishing vessel, or a larger cargo ship modified for special operations. The currently operational 100-tonne high-speed ‘mother’ ships (VEGA 1 class) have a number of distinctive characteristics: • • •

Long length to beam ratio which distinguishes them from typically shorter and squatter fishing boats. Low freeboard (approximately 1–1.5 m) and a generally low profile, but a high bow. A hull design which incorporates a distinctive splash rail below the bulwark to deflect water at high speeds. This specially




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designed planing hull creates a distinctive, wide rooster-tail wake at high speeds. While most legitimate fishing vessels can reach only 10–15 knots, ‘mother’ ships are capable of speeds in excess of 30–35 knots (some reports even suggest maximum speeds of 40 knots). They typically are equipped with three–four high-quality marine engines. The deckhouse is typically located aft, beginning approximately amidships, and features a stepped-down after cabin. Although fishing gear is sometimes carried for deception purposes, these vessels present a much neater appearance in contrast to the cluttered and crowded topsides of legitimate fishing trawlers. Because these vessels are not engaged in fishing operations seagulls are generally not attracted to them as they are to legitimate fishing trawlers. The predominant colour is white, rather than the blue usually associated with DPRK fishing vessels. Hull colours do vary but the deckhouses are almost always white. While most legitimate fishing vessels have a minimal number of radio or radar antennas, ‘mother’ ships almost always have a large number of vertical and specialised horizontal wire antennas. The horizontal wire antennas are rigged between either the single high forward mast and the aft mast, or between a forward mast and the deckhouse. These vessels are undoubtedly also equipped with a GPS receiver. Crew-served weapons (e.g. 82 mm recoilless rifles, 12.7 mm heavy machine-guns) are usually positioned in the centre of the bow section, just aft the deckhouse and sometimes beside the deckhouse. These are generally covered by tarps but are easily readied for use. Numerous small arms, including shoulderfired SAMs, are carried below decks but within easy reach of the crew. A high-speed infiltration craft or SDV, depending upon the size of the ‘mother’ ship, can be carried on the deck and covered by tarps or below deck in cargo holds. Extra fuel or equipment is sometimes carried on the deck and covered by tarps.48

Typically, a ‘mother’ ship departs its base with an infiltration craft, SDV and infiltration team and travels a circuitous route to a launching point 25–50 nm (i.e. in international waters) off the ROK or Japanese coast. Here it launches the infiltration craft with




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SDV at night—typically moonless and with coastal fog. The infiltration craft transports the SDV and infiltration team into territorial waters to a point approximately 1–5 nm from shore. It then launches the SDV, which carries an infiltration team of three–six persons (two escorts and one–four infiltrators). The SDV submerges and approaches to within 100–200 m of the shore, where the escorts will sometimes leave the SDV and swim to shore. They will secure the beach and then signal the infiltrators to come ashore. Alternatively, both the escorts and infiltrators use an SDV to reach the shore together. The escorts then ensure the agents’ safe departure inland, clear the beach of any traces of infiltration and return to the infiltration craft. There have also been instances where the infiltration craft does not carry an SDV and the infiltrators and escorts swim to shore. When recovering infiltrators, escorts will typically approach to within 100–200 m of shore with the SDV and wait before landing for a prearranged signal from the infiltrators waiting to be recovered. They land, confirm the identities of the infiltrators and escort them back to the infiltration craft and ‘mother’ ship. A typical infiltration mission takes six–eight hours to complete. This includes launching of the infiltration craft from the ‘mother’ ship, insertion, landing and finally, recovery and stowage of the infiltration craft on the ‘mother’ ship.49 MPAF, RECONNAISSANCE BUREAU The primary missions of the Reconnaissance Bureau (aka 586th Army Unit or Unit 586) are the collection of tactical and strategic intelligence within the military sphere, and strategic special operations throughout the ROK and overseas. The effects the reorganisation of intelligence assets during the early 1990s had upon the Reconnaissance Bureau are presently unclear. It is known that by early 1993, the director of the Reconnaissance Bureau, Lieutenant General Kim Dae-shik, was promoted to the rank of Colonel General.50 Kim remains the head of the Reconnaissance Bureau today. The Reconnaissance Bureau is headquartered in P’yongyang and organised into a headquarters, Political Department, Intelligence Department, Special Department, Technical/Radio Department, Training/Plans Department, Maritime Department (aka Special Seaborne Operations Unit) and five reconnaissance battalions. Additionally, the Reconnaissance Bureau is believed to operate




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Figure 7.1 Reconnaissance Bureau

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a small number of trading companies as ‘covers’ and to generate financing for operations. The Technical/Radio Department, in cooperation with the Electronic Warfare Bureau, is believed to be the organisation exercising overall responsibility for SIGINT, COMSEC, EW and ‘electronic intelligence warfare’ operations within the MPAF. The number and organisation of the SIGINT assets within the MPAF is unclear. Ground based assets are believed to consist of a small number of independent SIGINT collection sites located throughout the DPRK in areas of high interest (e.g. along the DMZ, the Russian and Chinese borders); the EW/SIGINT battalions within KPA corps; and the EW/SIGINT battalions that exist within some KPA divisions. In addition to these assets the Technical/Radio Department exercises some degree of control over KPAF SIGINT collection aircraft and KPN intelligence gathering vessels (AGIs). The Technical/Radio Department also coordinates with the MPAF Communications Bureau and its subordinate units (i.e. 9th Signals Brigade). The relationship and level of coordination and cooperation between the Reconnaissance Bureau’s Technical/Radio Department and the State Security Department’s Communications Interception Bureau (aka Signals Interception Bureau) is unknown. The Communications Interception Bureau may be the senior service. The Maritime Department is believed to be headquartered in Wonsan and is responsible for infiltrating agents and special operations force personnel by sea using a variety of specialised midget submarines, high-speed infiltration craft and swimmer delivery vehicles. It is believed to be organised into three operational bases. Each base consists of a small number of units or combat squadrons (aka battle groups). It is presently unclear whether each base consists of a number of combat squadrons or if the term ‘base’ is used interchangeably with squadron. It is known that the Maritime Bureau operates YUGO class SSm, SANG-O class SSc, and a variety of high-speed infiltration craft and support ships (see above). These are apparently organised into separate squadrons by type.51 It is presently unclear how the changing inventory of YUGO class SSm and SANG-O SSc has affected the organisation of the Maritime Department’s subordinate units. Yi Kwang-su has reported that during 1994 the Maritime Department reorganised its subordinate operational units separating submarines from infiltration craft and support ships. Following this reorganisation the Maritime Department had two ‘special’ submarine bases—the First




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Base and the Second Base—responsible for operations in the East Sea and the Yellow Sea. In July 1995 the Third Base was established at T’oejo-dong (Nagwon-up, 23 km east of Hamhung) using personnel from the First and Second Bases. The Third Base (aka 22nd Squadron or 22nd Combat Squadron) consisted of approximately 300 personnel and four SANG-O SSc.52 These submarines were identified as the ‘No. 1’, ‘No. 2’, ‘No. 3’, and ‘No. 4 Submarine’ or ‘Reconnaissance Submarine’. Reportedly, as of September 1996, one SANG-O SSc was operational, one undergoing repairs and one being ‘disassembled’. The 22nd Squadron is known to have conducted a successful reconnaissance mission near Kangnung on 15 September 1995 (one year prior to the failed 18 September 1996 infiltration at Kangnung in which a SANG-O class SSc ran aground and was captured by the ROK).53 The five reconnaissance battalions have a personnel strength of approximately 500 and are organised into a headquarters and five companies (one of which is a training company). Each company has a personnel strength of approximately 90 and is organised into a headquarters and four platoons. Each platoon consists of four five-member teams. The team members are highly trained combat troops, each with an assigned specialty (e.g. team leader, assistant team leader, communications, cryptographic and linguistics). Four are employed primarily for DMZ infiltration and are deployed one apiece within the four forward corps (i.e. I, II, IV and V). The fifth battalion is responsible for overseas operations.54 As with the CCSKA, much of what is known concerning the operations of the Maritime Department comes from failed or aborted missions against the ROK. There have undoubtedly been numerous successful—and thus undetected—operations in both the ROK and Japan. The most recent example of a Maritime Department operation was the failed infiltration attempt at Kangnung in September 1996.55 During this attempt a SANG-O class SSc specifically modified for reconnaissance operations ran aground and was captured and its 26 crew members either captured or killed. MPAF, GUARD COMMAND56 Subordinate to the MPAF is the Guard Command (aka Protection Command, Protective Service General Bureau Command Bodyguard Command, Guard Bureau, General Guard Bureau, General Bureau of Security or Secret Service), which is responsible for the




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personal security of Kim Chong-il and high-ranking officials. It is roughly comparable to the US Secret Service or the ROK Office of Presidential Security. In the performance of its mission it works closely with the State Security Department and, to a lesser degree, the P’yongyang Defence Command. This command is headed by Marshal Yi Ul-sol (aka Li Ul-sol), though, due to Yi’s age, General Chang Song-u, director of the Guard Command’s Political Bureau, exercises real command authority.57 It has an estimated strength of 50 000 and is organised into an unknown number of departments, three independent ‘combat’ brigades and a construction battalion.58 Known departments include 1st Department, 2nd Department, 3rd Department, Communications, Political and Rear Services. The 1st Department was charged with the protection of Kim Il-song up until his death in July 1994. Although reduced in size since that time it is still active and is believed to be responsible for the security of his preserved body and monuments to him. The 2nd Department is responsible for the personal security of Kim Chong-il and is the largest department. The 3rd Department is responsible for the personal security of General Political Bureau personnel and other high-ranking officials. The activities and attitude of 2nd Department personnel have often caused friction between the department and the troops of the KPA. A KPAF defector describes a 1990 ‘on-the-spot-guidance’ tour of Hwangju Airfield by Kim Chong-il as: At 0400, all airmen were taken to the airfield and its adjacent areas to clean the areas spotless. Due to the creative ‘idea’ of the political commissar and supervisor of our unit, we literally mopped the airstrip with brand new towels. Around 0900, 300 [Guard Command] members in full battle gear drove into the airfield aboard 10 new Russian-made Zil trucks. They were very arrogant. Looking up and down us who were lined along both edges of the airstrip, the security troops had us stand on grassland about 10 meters away from the airstrip. They then searched our bodies, seizing and throwing into a garbage can even fingernail clippers and pocket knives. Around 1030, a motorcade of 10 Benz sedans drove into the airfield. Kim Chong-il got off from the third Benz . . . He waved toward us with a smile in response to our cheers. When we, shouting ‘Long Live’, tried to move forward to have a closer look at him, the security troops who fenced us off at 1 meter’s interval hit us mercilessly in the abdomen with rifle butts. After Kim Chong-il entered the airfield command building, complaints were heard from here and there. ‘Do the




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bastards of the Security Service believe they alone are powerful?’ or ‘Bastards, what do they think of us?’ One soldier said selfcontemptuously, ‘They say all are the same servicemen. But, we are the third-rate ones.’59

The construction battalion was responsible for construction and demolition of facilities associated with the protection of Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il. Up until the death of Kim Il-song in 1994 the unit was reportedly subordinate to the 1st Department. Subsequently, it is probable that the unit was reassigned to the 2nd Department. The battalion has a personnel strength of approximately 250 troops and is equipped with modern foreignmanufactured engineering and construction equipment. During the early 1990s, Kim Chong-il reportedly established a personal bodyguard unit known as the ‘2.16 Unit’ (Kim’s birthday is 16 February). This unit numbers approximately 2000 personnel, of whom 200 are responsible for the actual protection of Kim Chong-il. The majority of the personnel for this unit were drawn from graduates of the Man’gyongdae Revolutionary and Kang Pan-sok Revolutionary Institutes. At present, it is unclear whether the ‘2.16 Unit’ is an independent unit, part of the 2nd Department, or part of the Guard Command. Recent defectors report that the Guard Command contains three independent ‘combat’ brigades (aka ‘special mobile assault units’) which provide the command with greater firepower to counter a coup by military units and to suppress ‘anti-regime activities’.60 Other defectors report that there is at least one tank brigade subordinate to the Guard Command.61 MPAF, SECURITY COMMAND62 Although institutionally subordinate to the MPAF, the Security Command (aka Defence Bureau, Security Guard Bureau, Security Bureau, Military Security Command, Military Security Department, Military Security Headquarters or Political Safety Bureau) is controlled by the State Security Department. This organisation is responsible for internal security within the KPA. Up until the 1980s the Security Bureau (now Security Command), along with the P’yongyang Defence Command, were controlled by the Guard Bureau (now Guard Command). During 1994–95, Kim Chong-il ordered the reorganisation and expansion of the Security Bureau (aka Defence Bureau or Political Security Bureau) into the Security




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Command. General Won Ung-hui is currently the director of the Security Command. Although the organisation details of this command are presently unclear, it is reported to have representatives at every echelon down to battalion level. Additionally, as with all the intelligence and internal security organisations, the Security Command operates a trading company—the Haegumgang Trading Company—to earn foreign currency. The Security Command actively seeks out and exposes elements which are corrupt, disloyal or which present a threat for a coup d’état. It is known to conduct investigations, surveillance and wire-tapping of high-ranking general officers both in their offices and homes. It has authority to make arrests on evidence of criminal activity or political unreliability. The bureau regularly produces a report which includes the ideological trends, friendships and daily activities of general grade officers. This report is submitted to the General Political Bureau and is forwarded (presumably through the Organisation and Guidance Department) to Kim Chong-il along with similar reports produced by the General Political Bureau and the Operations Bureau. These reports tend to have a great impact on the personal fortunes of all officers. As such, they are notorious and the activities of the Security Command are universally dreaded by KPA officers. Following the constitutional amendments in September 1998, Kim Chong-il order a sweeping purge of mid- and high-ranking KWP and military leaders due to increasing levels of corruption and organisational irregularities. This purge was led by General Won Ung-hui and the Security Command. That the State Security Department and Ministry of Public Security are playing a minor role in this effort suggests that Kim Chong-il and the KWP leadership believe they are not capable of performing the job due to their numerous internal problems during the 1990s. The purge initially focused on activities in the port cities of Najin, Namp’o and Sonbong, where there are frequent contacts with the outside world (especially the ROK). In these cities a number of local officials have amassed personal wealth and have engaged in influence peddling. STATE SECURITY DEPARTMENT63 The State Security Department (aka State Security and Defence Department, State Security Agency, Political Security Department, State Political Security Department or State Security Bureau)




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functions as both an intelligence agency engaged in active operations overseas and a domestic political security force (i.e. secret police). It is most comparable in function to the former Soviet KGB or, to a lesser degree, the ROK National Intelligence Service (formerly National Security Planning Agency). It is responsible for security (physical and political) within the DPRK’s embassies, missions and legations located throughout the world. The State Security Department and the Guard Command are the agencies most directly responsible for the security of Kim Chong-il and only he is reportedly exempt from their scrutiny. Following the constitutional amendments in September 1998, the State Security Department was subordinated to the National Defence Commission. During the 1990s, at the direction of Kim Chong-il, the State Security Department was subordinated to the National Defence Commission and reorganised. This department is headed by the Director of State Security and at least six deputy directors— organisation, propaganda, personnel, inspection, rear services and security.64 In 1994, the Director of the State Security Department was Cho Sun-paek.65 More recent reports suggest that Kim Ch’ol-su, who is believed to hold the rank of general, may have been appointed director after Cho. The State Security Department is headquartered in P’yongyang and organised into 17 subordinate bureaus, ‘Special Mission Group’, State Security Department Hospital, State Security Department University, Training Centre and Ministry of Public Security Liaison Office. The 17 subordinate bureaus are: data management, entry/exit management, equipment, external intelligence, finance and supply (Kim Chong-il), interrogation, investigation (dissidents), investigation, military industrial security, north/south dialogue, operations and secretary (Kim Chong-il), prison camps, protection and security (Kim Chong-il), rear services, research, communications interception and surveillance. Although the details are at present unclear it is believed that there are State Security Department representatives at every KPA echelon down to division level. During the 1990s Kim Chong-il reportedly ordered the establishment of a ‘Special Mission Group’ within the State Security Department which reports directly to him. This group is charged with conducting surveillance and ideological investigations of high-ranking officials in the KWP, State Security Department, Cabinet and general-grade officers of the MPAF. It is composed of approximately 15 members personally selected by Kim Chong-il,




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who are experienced in investigating anti-party and counterrevolutionary activities.66 An operative of the State Security Department, along with three members of the special operations force, were captured in Bangkok, Thailand, during March 1999 when they bungled a kidnapping operation. The State Security Department operative, Kim Sun Li, was there to assist the special operations force team in covertly arresting and returning to the DPRK the counsellor for Science and Technology Hong Sun Gyong, his wife and son. Hong was variously reported as embezzling government funds, being involved in narcotics trafficking or attempting to defect. Kim and the three special operations force members arrived in Bangkok over a two-week period in February. On 9 March this four-member team, with the assistance of six diplomats from the DPRK Embassy and two Thai nationals, raided Hong’s apartment and captured him and his family. They first transported the captives to the DPRK Embassy. The plan was to drive them in two vehicles across the border into Cambodia (Kampuchea). From here they would be flown back to P’yongyang. On the road to the border crossing, however, one of the vehicles drove off the road and was disabled. When local police arrived at the scene they discovered the captives. National police were called in, an investigation revealed what was happening, the Hongs were placed in protective custody and Kim and the three members of the special operations force were arrested.67 The Prison Camps Bureau maintains a political prison system for persons deemed a political threat (which is subject to a very wide range of interpretation) and is known for its brutality. It is currently estimated that this system houses 200 000 people in 12 separate entities known as ‘Special Districts Subject to Dictatorial Rule’ (aka Restricted Areas or Dictator Subject Areas). These are all located in isolated mountainous regions of Chagang-do, Hamgyong-bukto, Hamgyong-namdo, P’yongan-bukto and in Yanggang-do. Each district covers an area of 50–250 square kilometres, can house 5000–50 000 prisoners and is composed of two classes of installations—‘closed detention camps’ (aka ‘Perfect Control’ camps) and ‘detention camps’ (aka ‘Revolutionisation’ camps). The ‘closed detention camp’ is for long-term detention of persons whom there is little chance of rehabilitating (e.g. convicted of crimes against the KWP, attempting to defect). There is little chance of release once an individual is sentenced to such a camp. The ‘detention camp’ is for individuals who have been convicted of minor political offences (e.g. ‘impure’ immigrants




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from Japan, critics of the KWP, capitalistic-minded people). These persons, once rehabilitated through hard labour and self-criticism, may be released. The ‘restricted areas’ are controlled by both the State Security Department and the Ministry of Public Security.68 The Communications Interception Bureau (aka Signals Interception Bureau) is believed to be the DPRK’s primary SIGINT agency. It is responsible for the creation of encryption systems and equipment, as well as the decryption of foreign code systems. It maintains a system of listening posts throughout the country which monitor for both illegal internal and foreign civilian and military transmissions. This system appears to be separate from that of the Reconnaissance Bureau’s Technical/Radio Department. The relationships among the Communication Interception Bureau, Technical/Radio Department and Electronic Warfare Bureau are unclear; however, the Communications Interception Bureau appears to be the senior service. The power and influence of State Security Department have risen and fallen during the 1990s as a result of a number of factors including the death of Kim Il-song, corruption within the department itself, growing levels of corruption and dissatisfaction within the KPA and among the general population, and reportedly several assassination attempts against Kim Chong-il. Examples of these problems include a reported coup d’état attempt in 1993 and the 1995 corruption within the VI Corps. During March 1992 a reported coup d’état attempt by the commander of the 7th Infantry Division and approximately 30 other officers was detected and neutralised by the State Security Department before it could be implemented. In April 1995, State Security Department personnel uncovered corruption on the part of the most senior officers within the VI Corps, headquartered in Ch’ongjin. The corruption was so egregious that the corps was dissolved and reorganised using the staff and designation of the IX Corps.69 The most recent development occurred during 1998 when the First Deputy Director of the State Security Department Kim Yong-yong (aka Kim Young Ryong) was purged on charges of corruption.70 These incidents, and others, have resulted in numerous changes to the organisational structure of the State Security Department during the 1990s. With the growing economic crisis during the 1990s a number of the DPRK’s intelligence and internal security organisations increased their involvement in smuggling narcotics and counterfeiting (especially US $100 bills) operations. It is clear, however, that narcotics trafficking is the primary means of earning foreign




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currency for these organisations. The vast majority of such activities are within the jurisdiction of the State Security Department. During the same period this organisation’s involvement with terrorist and revolutionary organisations has declined although it still continues at a low level.71 In the foreign intelligence mission the State Security Department conducts operations including the recruitment of operatives and the security of DPRK embassies, consulates and missions. It also collects data on Koreans who repatriated to the DPRK from Japan. From the information it obtains concerning their relatives and friends still in Japan or in the ROK, it selects likely candidates for recruitment. These recruits receive extensive training and are then frequently sent back overseas posing as Japanese and ROK business persons. MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY72 The Ministry of Public Security (aka Public Security Ministry, Public Security Department or Social Security Bureau) functions primarily as the national police and civil defence force for the DPRK. Like the State Security Department it is also responsible for conducting political surveillance, though political suspects are remanded to the State Security Department. The Ministry of Public Security maintains a large organisation of provincial, county, town and city forces which conduct routine checks of travellers to ensure they possess appropriate travel documents; maintains checkpoints and security posts to inspect buses, trucks and trains; and perform normal police and civil defence duties. It maintains organisations responsible for protecting the DPRK’s railroads, key government facilities and officials. The ministry is also responsible for the construction and security of sensitive and national infrastructure projects. During the 1990s, the Ministry of Public Security suffered a number of political setbacks and underwent a number of reorganisations. These changes were precipitated by the ministry’s growing inability to both stem the increasing number of civilians illegally crossing the border into the PRC, despite a redeployment of its forces and increased levels of border security operations; its reduced effectiveness in containing the disorder resulting from repeated natural disasters (e.g. flooding and famine); and the growing level of corruption. Reports in early 1994 stating that the Ministry of Public Security had been subordinated to the National




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Defence Commission are incorrect. At that time it remained subordinate to the State Administrative Council.73 By the end of November 1995, however, the Border Security and Coastal Security Bureaus, as well as responsibility over entry and exit to P’yongyang, were transferred to the MPAF.74 During early 1997, the ministry’s authority for controlling travel in and out of P’yongyang was diminished as personnel from the P’yongyang Defence Command and the Guard Command were mobilised for inspections of travel permits.75 With the abolition of the Central People’s Committee and State Administration Council in 1998, the Ministry of Public Security was subordinated to the new Cabinet. The Ministry of Public Security is headquartered in P’yongyang and headed by Vice-Marshal Paek Hak-nim (aka Paek Hak-rim) as Minister of Public Security. Immediately subordinate to Paek are at least eleven directors or commanders who oversee the operations of a single bureau or office.76 The ministry is organised into 12 subordinate bureaus, Communications Office, Public Security Political University (aka Public Security Political College or Public Security Officers Academy), Public Security Training Centre, Public Security Hospital (possibly the Mun Sin-chaek Hospital), State Security Department Liaison Office and the Tonghung Trading Company.72 The 12 bureaus are: Air Raid (Civil Defence), Interrogation, Penal Affairs, Political (Director Choe Mun-tok), Public Security (Safety), Railway Security, Security and the 6th, 26th, 27th, 28th and 29th Engineer Bureaus.78 As with the MPAF, KWP and State Security Department, the Ministry of Public Security operates a number of trading companies. These companies earn foreign currency and procure supplies for the ministry. Their organisation and subordination within the Ministry of Public Security is unclear. The total personnel strength of the Ministry of Public Security is unclear. Several sources suggest that it is approximately 130 000, including 30 000 in administration, civil defence, law enforcement and security, and 90 000–100 000 in the construction bureaus. This remains to be confirmed. The Security Bureau (aka 5th Bureau, Security and Guard Bureau, Guard Bureau or General Guard Bureau) is believed to be organised into at least four departments and directly controls the P’yongyang Guard Brigade and Kaesong (aka Surrender District) and Namp’o Guard Regiments. The known departments include Counter-espionage, Political, Rear Services and Security. The Security Department controls the national police system, which is




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organised into provincial, county, town and city elements. In each of the DPRK’s nine provinces there is a Public Security Bureau which can vary in size from 300 to 400 personnel. At the county level, and possibly at large industrial complexes, there are Public Security Departments. These can vary in size, according to the size of the population they protect, from 60 to 150 personnel. City-level Public Security Departments, or sections, can vary in size from 200 to 300 personnel, depending upon the size of the population they protect. Most towns and medium-sized factories have a Public Security Office of 2–10 personnel. Public Security officers perform as civilian and political police, civil defence coordinators, sanitation inspectors and firemen. The Penal Affairs Bureau maintains both a traditional system of prisons and a system of detention camps. The traditional prisons (sometimes known as ‘Indoctrination Houses’) are for persons convicted of having committed common crimes and separate from those of the State Security Department, for those convicted of political crimes. The Penal Affairs Bureau, in cooperation with the State Security Department, controls a series of detention camps, known as ‘Special Districts Subject to Dictatorial Rule’ for political prisoners (see State Security Department section). The Air Raid Bureau (aka Central Civil Air Defence Department) was established in 1961 and assigned the civil defence mission. It consists of a number of Civil Defence Committees (aka Anti-aircraft Artillery Committees or Civil Air Defence Teams) at the provincial, county, city and town levels. Additionally, each large industrial facility or complex has a Civil Defence Team. Included within the responsibilities of these committees and teams are the identification and location of enemy air raids and NBC attacks. In the case of a nuclear attack local teams would report its azimuth and elevation from their position, elevation of the resulting cloud, width of the fireball and cloud, and weather conditions. It is presently unclear what, if any, connection the Civil Defence Committees have for the Anti-Nuclear/Anti-Atomic Observation Posts administered by the Reconnaissance Department of the Nuclear–Chemical Defence Bureau. The DPRK, through the Air Raid Bureau, regularly conducts air raid drills for its civilian population. The Public Security Bureau is the counter-espionage/counterrevolutionary element within the Ministry of Public Security. It is organised into eight departments: 1st Counter-espionage, 2nd Counter-espionage, Political, Public Security, Industrial Security,




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2nd Counterespionage

Public Security

Investigation

Surveillance

1st Counterespionage

Political

Industrial Security

Rear Services

Public Security Bureau

Figure 7.5 Director for Safety, MPS

Interrogation Bureau

Director for Safety

Rear Services

Political

Counterespionage

Criminal

Anju Ch’ongjin Hamhung Kanggye P’yongyang

Railroad Security Command

Public Security

Railway Security Bureau


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Investigation, Rear Services and Surveillance. Security at the Yongbyon nuclear research complex, and possibly the DPRK’s other nuclear-related facilities, is believed to be the responsibility of the Public Security Bureau.79 The Railway Security Bureau is responsible for the security of the DPRK’s railroad tunnels, bridges, rail lines, rail facilities, military supplies at rail depots, and freight and passenger trains. The DPRK rail system consists of approximately 5000 km of rail line—4095 km standard gauge, 665 km narrow gauge and 240 km double gauge—and serves as the country’s primary means of transportation and communication. The Railway Security Bureau is organised into five departments and five Railroad Security Commands. The departments include Counter-espionage, Criminal, Political, Public Security and Rear Services. The operational forces of the bureau consist of approximately 4000 personnel and are organised into five Railroad Security Commands—Anju, Ch’ongjin, Hamhung, Kanggye and P’yongyang. Each command consists of approximately 700 personnel and is organised into companies, platoons and squads. Each command is responsible for a section of the country’s rail system and deploys sub-units at strategic locations within its area. The Engineer Bureaus (aka General Bureaus, Engineering Bureaus, General Construction Bureaus or Sapper Bureaus) are essentially construction/engineer organisations which are assigned the construction of sensitive (e.g. residences for Kim Il-song and Kim Chong-il, intelligence organisations’ buildings, Yongbyon nuclear research complex) and national infrastructure (e.g. T’aech’on Hydroelectric Plant, P’yongyang–Namp’o Railway) projects. There are a total of 23 engineer brigades subordinate to the engineer bureaus. Each bureau is composed of a headquarters, three–eight brigades, supply office/company (responsible for supplying materials to the construction brigades) and support units. The organisation of these brigades is somewhat unusual in that they have the personnel strength of divisions and have regiments subordinate to them. The average personnel strength of individual engineer brigades ranges between 8000 and 12 000 and consists of three–five regiments. A regiment has a personnel strength of 2000–2500 and consists of three–five battalions. A battalion has a personnel strength of 600–1000 and consists of five–six companies, while companies have a personnel strength of 120–200. The supply company has offices located at each major construction project. For sensitive projects the supply company




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can draw supplies from ‘Presidential Reserve Materials’. These reserves were used in the construction at Yongbyon.80 The 6th Engineer Bureau (aka 1st Engineer Bureau) consists of the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 9th Brigades. It is responsible for the construction of the P’yongyang subway system and underground facilities in the P’yongyang area. The 26th Engineer Bureau (aka 2nd Engineer Bureau) consists of the 21st, 23rd, 25th, 27th, 29th, 37th, 39th, 47th and 49th Brigades. It is the largest of the bureaus and is charged with large-scale projects. The bureau has worked on the P’yongyang subway system, facilities in the P’yongyang area, dams and hydroelectric plants, Sunch’on Vinalon Complex, Sariwon Fertiliser Complex and the P’yongyang–Ch’ongjin railroad. At one point, the 27th and 28th Engineer Bureaus were merged into the 26th, however this proved to be too unwieldy to control and the bureaus were separated again. The 27th Engineer Bureau (aka 3rd Engineer Bureau) consists of the 41st, 42nd and 45th Brigades. It is an elite unit tasked solely with the construction at the Yongbyon nuclear research complex and of other nuclearrelated facilities. Although subordinate to the Ministry of Public Security, the bureau apparently takes orders from the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau of the Second Economic Committee and the KWP Atomic Energy Committee.81 The 27th Engineer Bureau operates its own trading company—the Puhung Trading Corporation. This company is responsible for procuring materials from overseas. It has dealt in gold and silver bullion and other materials, and conducts business in Japan, the PRC, Russia and other countries.82 Troops of the 27th Engineer Bureau receive special treatment with regard to food and accommodations. The 28th Engineer Bureau (aka 4th Engineer Bureau) consists of the 31st, 33rd and 35th Brigades. It is responsible for digging the vertical mine shafts for the development of bituminous coal in the Anju area. The 29th Engineer Bureau (aka 5th Engineer Bureau) consists of the 51st, 53rd and 55th Brigades. It was established during the early 1980s and tasked with the construction of the P’yongyang– Ch’ongjin railroad, Kaesong–P’yongyang Expressway and several bridges over the Tae-dong River in P’yongyang. Personnel for the Ministry of Public Security are drawn from the national pool of raw recruits available to the MPAF. Service in the Ministry of Public Security fulfils an individual’s military obligation. Once selected for membership in the Ministry of Public Security, conscripts undergo basic training at a ministry




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training centre for three–four months. Upon graduation they are assigned to an operational unit of the ministry for further training and service. In November 1999, it was reported that Kim Chongnam, the eldest son of Kim Chong-il, has started work at the Ministrey of Public Security.83 Non-commissioned officers are drawn from either existing enlisted personnel or from outstanding recruits. They then attend an additional six months of training. Officer candidates are drawn from existing non-commissioned officers or outstanding enlisted personnel. They attend either a six-month or one-year officer candidate course. If they successfully complete the course they are commissioned as junior lieutenants. Advanced officer and special technical courses are also offered. Refresher courses are given to both officer and enlisted personnel during their careers. Grade structure and pay for Ministry of Public Security personnel appears to be the same as those for MPAF personnel.




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Weapons of mass destruction EAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

W

Almost immediately following the end of the Fatherland Liberation War the DPRK initiated the first of an ambitious series of ongoing defence programs to both enlarge and enhance the fighting capabilities of the KPA. One component of this was the establishment of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBC) defence elements throughout the KPA. Over the years this defensive component has evolved into comprehensive programs for the development of NBC weapons—weapons of mass destruction (WMD). While the missions assigned to the KPA have remained constant since its creation—preservation of the regime, providing the leadership with political leverage at the international level and reunification of the Korean Peninsula—the value of WMD to the completion of these missions has increased. Today the DPRK leadership views WMDs as an integral component of the KPA and an essential means by which it ensures the survival of the nation. Conspicuous is the fact that the DPRK has pursued its WMD and ballistic missile programs (see chapter 9) fully in line with its national philosophy of chu’che (self-reliance). It has done so with impressive single-mindedness and determination. This has been accomplished at an extremely high cost to both its economy and society as scarce human and natural resources were funnelled into these programs. These costs have been exacerbated by the precipitous decline of the economy during the 1990s, which has seriously limited the DPRK’s ability to support both the military and civilian sectors of the economy. Shortages, especially food, electricity and raw materials, have been common in recent years. Nevertheless, the DPRK continues to invest scarce resources in its WMD and ballistic missile programs. In fact, these programs 212




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along with its special operations forces are practically the only areas of growth within the DPRK during the 1990s. Since the late 1980s, the sale of WMD equipment and technologies, particularly ballistic missiles, has become a fundamental component of the DPRK’s efforts to generate foreign currency for its failed economy and as a means of supporting continued WMD research and development. These sales have been to countries in North Africa and South Asia and are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. NUCLEAR1 During the past 40+ years the DPRK has pursued an expanding nuclear program which today has positioned it at the point where it possesses all the requisite technologies, personnel and infrastructure to produce nuclear weapons that are, at a minimum, comparable to first-generation United States nuclear weapons. It possesses the capability to employ such weapons throughout the Korean Peninsula and to a lesser degree against Japan. In 1998 Hwang Chang-yop, the most senior DPRK official ever to defect, described the potential employment of nuclear weapons by the DPRK. For one thing, they will use them [nuclear weapons] if South Korea starts a war. For another, they intend to devastate Japan to prevent the United States from participating. Would it still participate, even after Japan is devastated? That is how they think.2

Organisation The organisation of the DPRK’s nuclear program originates with Kim Chong-il, who is both General Secretary of the KWP and Chairman of the National Defence Commission, and proceeds down through the National Defence Commission, KWP and Cabinet. Subordinate to the National Defence Commission are three organisations heavily involved in the nuclear program—the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, the Ministry of Public Security and the Second Economic Committee. Subordinate to the MPAF, through its General Staff Department, is the Nuclear–Chemical Defence Bureau. This bureau is involved with the development of both nuclear weapons and doctrine. The Ministry of Public Security is responsible for both the construction and security of




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Figure 8.1 DPRK nuclear infrastructure


Taesong General Bureau

Atomic Energy Committee

Cabinet

Ministry of Mining Industry

General Bureau of the LWR Project

General Bureau of Atomic Energy

Academy of Sciences



Academy of Defence Science

5th Machine Industry Bureau



27th Engineer Bureau

Nuclear Chemical Defence Bureau




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nuclear facilities. Construction is handled exclusively by the elite 27th Engineer Bureau (aka 3rd Engineer Bureau) which consists of three engineer brigades (see chapter 7). The Second Economic Committee (see chapter 2), through its 5th Machine Industry Bureau, appears to be responsible for the day-to-day operations of the nuclear program. As such it is probably the single most important organisation within the nuclear infrastructure and coordinates with all the other organisations involved in the program. Defectors report that Chon Pyong-ho, the Director of the Defence Industry Policy and Inspection Department and member of the National Defence Commission, is in ultimate control of the nuclear program. Also subordinate to the Second Economic Committee is the Academy of Defence Sciences which is responsible for all defence-related research and development. It works closely with both the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau and the Academy of Sciences. Other bureaus subordinate to the Second Economic Committee are responsible for the development of delivery systems for nuclear weapons. The KWP provides overall political guidance to the nuclear program through the Atomic Energy Committee which is believed to be subordinate to the powerful Organisation and Guidance Department. Subordinate to the Cabinet (up until 1998 the State Administration Council) are believed to be four organisations involved in the nuclear program—the Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Mining Industry, the General Department of Atomic Energy (aka General Bureau of Atomic Energy) and the General Bureau for the Light Water Reactor Project. Up until the mid-1990s there was a Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry, headed by Ch’oe Hak-kun. This ministry was reportedly established on 29 December 1986 to facilitate the introduction of nuclear power and represent the DPRK to the international community concerning nuclear affairs. In the years following the signing of the 1994 Agreed Framework almost nothing has been heard of this organisation. It is assumed to have been disbanded and replaced by the General Department of Atomic Energy which now represents the DPRK’s nuclear interests to the international community. The Academy of Sciences is responsible for the scientific aspects of the nuclear program including education, theoretical and practical research, and overall program integration. It administers most of the nuclear-related research institutes and laboratories, oversees the scientific departments and institutes of all DPRK




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colleges and universities and coordinates closely with the Second Economic Committee’s Academy of Defence Sciences. The Ministry of Mining Industry oversees the mining of uranium and rare earth elements. In this role it coordinates with the Academy of Sciences and uranium concentrate facilities of the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau. On 21 October 1994, the DPRK and the United States signed the Agreed Framework under which the DPRK undertook to suspend operations of the 5 MWe and Radiochemistry Laboratory; stop construction of the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors; dismantle all these facilities by the time the light-water reactor (LWR) project is completed; and come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In return the Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO) was created to construct two 1000 MWe light-water nuclear reactors by 2003; and in compensation for the loss of possible electrical production from the 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors the US would provide the DPRK with heavy oil (at a rate of 500 000 tonnes annually) until the first LWR was completed. Additionally, the US would upgrade its relations with the DPRK.3 To interface with KEDO the DPRK established a new bureau— the General Bureau for the Light–Water Reactor Project. The bureau is believed to be subordinate to the Cabinet, however this remains to be verified. Facilities Much understandable confusion surrounds the DPRK’s nuclear infrastructure. What follows is a composite listing of reported facilities. It must be pointed out, however, that a certain amount of the information presented here may inevitably be proved incorrect. Other material may be misinformation or disinformation, disseminated by interested parties to serve their own purposes. A prime example of this is how the different parties rate the output of the DPRK’s various reactors. Because the DPRK states that its indigenously designed nuclear reactors are for electricity generation it identifies them by their electrical output—megawatts electric (MWe). ROK and US sources, however, seeing no significant evidence of an electricity generation capability, have identified the same reactors by their thermal output—megawatts thermal (MWt). Facilities within the DPRK’s nuclear program apparently have several designations—a cover designation, official designation and




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Map 8.1 DPRK nuclear facilities Nuclear-related location Miscellaneous location

Unggni People’s Republic of China Nanam

Ch’ongjin

Hyesan Kilchu

Kanggye

Ch’olsan

Kumch’ang-ni Kusong

Kimdan-ri

T’aech’on Ha’gap Kujang-ni Pakch’on Yongbyon P’yongsong Yomso-gol Korea Bay

Sinp’o

Hamhung-Hungnam

Sunch’on Songch’on-up Wonsan


P’yongyang Maebong-san P’yongsan Kumch’on

Seoul

Republic of Korea

N

sometimes an honorific name. At present there is simply too much confusion to isolate and resolve these names. Reported nuclear-related locations are listed in Table 8.1.4 Production capacities and inventory5 The US estimates the DPRK possesses 11–13 kg of weapons-grade plutonium obtained from the discharge and reprocessing campaign during 1989–90. ROK, Japanese and Russian estimates differ—being




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Table 8.1 DPRK nuclear-related facilities Location

Comment

Ch’ongjin, Hamgyong-bukto

‘Radioactive Isotope Utilisation Research Institute’

Hamhung, Hamgyong-namdo

University of Chemical Industry Uranium deposits, possible mine International Chemical Joint Venture Corporation

Hungnam, Hamgyong-namdo Hyesan, Yanggang-do

Uranium deposits, possible mine ‘National Defence College’ Uranium deposits, possible mine

Kanggye, Chagang-do

Kanggye Defence College, physics department 1950s era KPA ‘Atomic Weapons Training Centre’

Kilchu, Hamgyong-bukto Kimdan-ri, Chagang-do Kujang-ni, P’yongan-bukto Kumch’on, Hwanghae-bukto Kumch’ang-ni, P’yongan-bukto

Possible nuclear-related facility Kujang Mine Wolam (aka Wolbingson) Mine Possible nuclear-related facility under construction

Kusong, P’yongan-bukto

Possible uranium concentrate facility Possible uranium mine Possible explosives test site Uranium mine under development Nuclear research centre January Industrial Mine Namch’on Joint Chemical Industrial Company (uranium concentrate)

Maebong-san, Kangwon-do Nanam, Hamgyong-bukto P’yongsan, Hwanghae-bukto

P’yongsong, P’yongan-namdo

P’yongsong Institute of Science Nuclear Physics Institute, P’yongsong Institute of Science ‘Metal Science Section’, P’yongsong Institute of Science

P’yongyang, P’yongyang-si

Nuclear Physics Research Institute, Kim Il-song University Sub-critical Assembly, Kim Il-song University Nuclear Physics Research Institute, Kim Ch’eak University Nuclear Physics Research Institute, Academy of Sciences Institute of Radiation Protection

Pakch’on, P’yongan-bukto

Nuclear research centre April Industrial Company Uranium mine




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Table 8.1 (cont.) Location

Comment

Sinp’o (Kumho Administrative Region, Kumho-ri), Hamgyong-namdo

Two 1000 MW(e) light-water reactors being built by KEDO Possible uranium mine under development

Songch’on-up, P’yongan-namdo

Possible uranium mine, May 18th Mine Complex

Sunch’on, P’yongan-namdo

Sunch’on No. 2 Mine Possible nuclear research centre

T’aech’on, P’yongan-bukto

200 MW(e) reactor, construction stopped Possible explosives test site

Unggi, Hamgyong-bukto Yomso-gol, P’yongan-namdo Yongbyon, P’yongan-bukto

Uranium deposits, possible mine Possible explosives test site 0.1 MW(t) critical assembly 8 MW(t) IRT-DPRK reactor 5 MW(e) reactor, operations frozen 50 MW(e) reactor, construction stopped Radiochemistry Laboratory (reprocessing facility), operations frozen Radiochemistry Institute Nuclear Physics Research Institute Isotope Processing Laboratory Nuclear Electronics Institute Fuel Fabrication Facility Fuel storage facility (wet) Fuel storage facility (dry) Waste storage sites (x3) Explosives test site Uranium Ore Analysis Laboratory Radiation Detection Research Laboratory 25 Mev Betatron

Unknown

Pilot reprocessing facility?

Unknown

Pilot enrichment facility?

Unknown

Enrichment facility?

7–12 kg, 16–24 kg and 22 kg respectively. The differences reflect different assessments of the multiple reprocessing campaigns during 1989–91.6 Estimates of the DPRK nuclear weapons inventory are based upon the level of weapons design technology and quantity of weapons-grade plutonium it possesses. The United States Department of Energy in January 1994 reported that, depending upon technology used, as little as 4 kg of plutonium would be sufficient




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to produce a nuclear weapon.7 With the 11–13 kg of weapons-grade plutonium that the DPRK is estimated to have extracted prior to signing the 1994 Agreed Framework, it could have one–three nuclear weapons. If the fuel from the May–June 1994 refuelling of the 5 MWe reactor is reprocessed it would provide enough plutonium to manufacture four–five additional nuclear weapons. If the Japanese and Russian estimates of plutonium inventory are more accurate the DPRK could possess an additional one–three nuclear weapons. If the DPRK’s level of technology is higher than currently estimated it could produce nuclear weapons with quantities of plutonium as little as 1.5–3 kg. If it achieves this level of technology, its nuclear weapons could be double current estimates. The acquisition of fissile material from Russia, Pakistan or elsewhere would significantly increase the DPRK’s nuclear weapons inventory.8 Weapon design and fabrication Based upon known ROK and US deployments and operational plans, KPA doctrine and operations, availability of delivery systems and the availability of fissile material it would be reasonable to assume that the MPAF originally established an initial requirement for 10–20 nuclear weapons in the 30–60 kiloton range by the year 2000. This figure not only includes weapons for operational use but also a small reserve for contingencies.9 It is interesting to note that such figures, which were arrived at independently, appear to be similar to those found in statements by the DPRK defector Kang Myong Do.10 Given what is known of the nuclear program and DPRK military-industrial production capabilities and methods, it is probable that design research for a nuclear weapon began during the late 1970s. It is likely that this research explored three basic areas—the design of a rudimentary nuclear explosive device, a free-fall aircraft deliverable weapon and a ballistic missile warhead.11 The design for the DPRK’s first nuclear device was probably of indigenous origin since its scientists have not received nuclear weapons training in either the former Soviet Union or the PRC. Preliminary evidence suggests that during the late 1970s and early 1980s the DPRK attempted to design and fabricate non-nuclear components for nuclear weapons. From the early 1980s until the early 1990s, it is reported to have conducted a number of high explosive core implosion tests along the Kuryong-gang River, at




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the Yongbyon nuclear research complex.12 Subsequent to this the DPRK is reported to have conducted additional implosion tests at other locations. This suggests that weapons design is continuing and that the DPRK may be compiling data for computer modelling in the future.13 Available evidence suggests that the earliest the DPRK could fabricate plutonium metal into a fissile core would have been 1989, when it reprocessed spent fuel from its 5 MWe reactor. It would be more reasonable to assume, however, that the first complete core was not manufactured until 1990. Given the timing of these events, under optimal conditions, the DPRK could have assembled its first nuclear weapon during 1990–91. A 1990 KGB document would seem to support such a conclusion: According to available data, the development of the first nuclear device has been completed at the DPRK nuclear research center in Yongbyon, in P’yongan-bukto Province. There are no plans for testing it at the moment in order to conceal from the world public and international monitoring organizations the fact that nuclear weapons are being produced in the DPRK14

To date the DPRK is not known to have conducted a test of a nuclear device with fissile material. US intelligence officials discussing the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program indicate that the technology involved in producing a first generation nuclear weapon is so rudimentary that the lack of testing ‘would not greatly lower their confidence’ that a weapon would work.15 During 1991, the Pentagon estimated that the DPRK was able to construct a crude plutonium-based nuclear explosive device capable of fitting on a railroad boxcar or in a military transport aircraft.16 In a 1993 analysis of weapons of mass destruction the US Office of Technology Assessment stated that, ‘First time proliferants [e.g. the DPRK] in the 1990s could and probably would build nuclear weapons considerably smaller and lighter than the first U.S. weapons.’17 Currently, it is estimated that the DPRK could produce a nuclear weapon expected to weigh 500–1000 kg. While such a weapon could be mounted on either the Hwasong 5 or Hwasong 6 ballistic missiles (see chapter 9), it appears that the later No-dong was intended to be the first nuclear-armed ballistic missile. The development of a workable and reliable nuclear warhead for the No-dong or the later Taep’o-dong family will require a significant level of design sophistication. Until this is achieved the DPRK will be dependent upon aircraft or unconventional means (e.g. cargo ship) for nuclear weapons delivery.




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During the 1990s, and possibly earlier, the DPRK has engaged in the exchange of nuclear scientists, technicians and technology with Pakistan and Iran.18 It is assumed that a significant portion of this exchange has been related to weapons design. The cooperation with Pakistan became most disconcerting in 1998, when Pakistan conducted an extended nuclear weapons test campaign. CHEMICAL19 The DPRK presently produces indigenously, and possesses the capability to effectively employ throughout the Korean Peninsula, significant quantities and varieties of chemical weapons. It also possesses, to a lesser degree, the ability to employ these weapons worldwide using unconventional methods of delivery. Organisation The development and production of chemical agents and weapons within the DPRK involves the cooperation of the KWP, the Cabinet and the National Defence Commission. The Second Economic Committee of the National Defence Commission plays the central role through its Fifth Machine Industry Bureau and Academy of Defence Sciences (see chapter 2). The two organisations receive the cooperation and assistance of the Academy of Sciences. Each year, based upon current doctrine and plans, the MPAF through its General Staff Department (especially the Artillery Command, Operations Bureau, Ordnance Bureau and Nuclear– Chemical Defence Bureau) establishes chemical weapons requirements. These requirements are then forwarded through the National Defence Committee to the Second Economic Committee, Cabinet and the Central Military Committee of the KWP’s Central Committee. Within the Second Economic Committee the requirements are reviewed and compared with the chemical industry production capabilities, and resources and finances available through the current multi-year economic plan. This review, when completed, is coordinated with the Central Military Committee’s Munitions Industry Policy and Inspection Department and the Ministry of Chemical Industry. The completed review is incorporated into an industry-wide production plan, which is then used to issue production orders to the various chemical factories subordinate to the Ministry of Chemical Industry and the Second Economic Committee. If the production plan requires the acquis-




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ition of components, equipment or chemicals from outside the DPRK the orders are passed to the Second Economic Committee’s External Economic General Bureau (aka Yongaksan Company) which is responsible for international trade within the munitions sector.20 The bureaus of the Second Economic Committee maintain regional offices throughout the country which not only manage its own production facilities but also control certain production lines in various factories throughout the country that are operated by the ministries and departments subordinate to the Cabinet. In general, Cabinet plants give higher priority to implementing the Second Economic Committee’s production orders than other production orders. Production During the year, Cabinet and Second Economic Committee factories produce and store various chemical feed stocks and precursors. When required these are then shipped to ‘chemical laboratories’ which produce the actual chemical agents. At present it is believed that these ‘chemical laboratories’ are directly subordinate to the 5th Machine Industry Bureau. Once the chemical agents are produced they are stored until needed at, or near, the production facilities. It is difficult to differentiate among locations associated with just the production of feed stocks or precursors and those which actually produce chemical agents. This difficulty arises from several factors, most significantly because facilities which produce dual-use chemicals are sometimes described as being chemical agent factories. A possible example of this is the Hyesan Chemical Factory in Yanggang-do which is sometimes identified as producing chemical agents. Yet it is known to produce only intermediate products such as benzene, phenol, hydrochloric acid and sulphuric acid. It is also important to note that the DPRK’s larger chemical complexes are sizeable facilities consisting of several smaller factories with different process units. Some of these complexes (e.g. February 8th Vinalon Complex) apparently produce feed stocks, precursors and agents, but in different units within the complex. In reality, however, only a small portion of any one complex is involved in chemical agent production and these are probably purpose-built units. At present, the cities and facilities listed in Table 8.2 have been associated with actual chemical agent production.21




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Academy of Sciences

Requirements flow Production flow Coordination

Chemical Complexes

Ministry of Chemical Industries

Cabinet

Anju Aoji-ri Ch’ongjin Hamhung Hwasung Manpo

(Coordination)

Sakju Sariwon Sinhung Sinuiju Sunch’on (x12)

Chemical Agent Factories

5th General Machine Industry Bureau

General Bureau

Munitions Factories

3rd General Machine Industry Bureau

Sakchu Kanggye Maram Chiha-ri

Storage Facilities

Chemical Weapons Factories

Factory 279

Equipment Department

Nuclear–Chemical Defence Bureau

Army Corps

Air Force Command

Ordnance Bureau Artillery Command

Navy Command

Operations Bureau


(x19)

Special Munitions Depot





External Economic General Bureau ‘Yongaksan Company’



Munitions Industry (Coordination Policy and Inspection and oversight) Department

Central Military Committee


Figure 8.2 DPRK chemical weapons production infrastructure


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Table 8.2 DPRK chemical warfare facilities City

Facility

Chemical agents

Anju

Namhung Youth Chemical Complex Aoji-ri Chemical Complex Ch’ongjin Chemical Fibre Complex February 8th Vinalon Complex

Blood

Aoji-ri Ch’ongjin Hamhung Hamhung Hwasong-up Manp’o Sakju Sariwon Sinhung Sinuiju Sunch’on

Blood, emetic Blood, tear Blister, asphyxiant, lachrymatory, nerve Tear, asphyxiant Asphyxiant, nerve Blister, blood, tear Tear, asphyxiant unknown

Hungnam Fertiliser Complex Hwasong Chemical Complex Manp’o Chemical Complex Ch’ongsu-up Chemical Factory Sariwon Potassic Fertiliser Complex Sinhung Chemical Complex unknown Sinuiju Chemical Fibre Complex Tear, asphyxiant Sunch’on Nitrolime Fertiliser Blister, blood, asphyxiant, tear Factory or Sunch’on Vinalon Complex

When required, stored chemical agents are shipped in bulk form to either the Kanggye Chemical Weapons Factory in Kanggye, Chagang-do or the Sakchu Chemical Weapons Factory in Sakchu, P’yongan-bukto.22 As a security measure these shipments are by normal military train and not easily distinguishable by casual observation. The Kanggye and Sakchu Chemical Weapons Factories are under the control of the Equipment Department of the Nuclear– Chemical Defence Bureau and it is at this point that control of the chemical agents apparently passes from nominal civilian to military control. The Kanggye or Sakchu Chemical Weapons Factories receive both chemical agents from the 5th Machine Industry Bureau and empty mortar, artillery and artillery rocket rounds from the factories subordinate to the 3rd Machine Industry Bureau. It appears that these two chemical weapons factories are responsible for a wide range of activities including the filling, packaging and shipping of ‘training and war’ chemical munitions which range from as small as 80 mm up to 240 mm MRL rounds; preparation, packaging and shipment of chemical agents in bulk form; and production of aircraft and helicopter delivered weapons (e.g. spray tanks, chemical bombs) which would be filled at airfields from bulk supplies immediately prior to use.23 It is presently unknown whether these factories produce chemical warheads for ballistic missiles or FROG artillery rockets. It would seem reasonable,




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however, to assume that at a minimum they provide the bulk agent to be used to fill any such warheads. In addition to the obvious chemical weapons produced by these factories, it appears that they may also be responsible for the production, packaging and shipment of smoke and incendiary munitions, however this remains to be confirmed.24 What division of labor, if any, exists between the Kanggye and Sakchu Chemical Weapons Factories is presently unknown. Both facilities have a limited storage capacity for ‘several tonnes’ of chemical weapons. Agents Chemical agents currently reported to be in the KPA inventory include, but are not necessarily limited to, adamsite (DM), chloroacetophenone (CN), chlorobenzyliidene malononitrile (CS), hydrogen cyanide (AC), mustard-family (H or HD), phosgene (CG and CX), sarin (GB), soman (GD), tabun (GA) and V-agents (VM and VX).25 It is important to note that according to KPA defectors the DPRK produces a total of 20 different chemical agents for use in weapons. For a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the DPRK’s capability to produce or acquire certain precursors, it is believed that the KPA has concentrated upon mustard, phosgene, sarin and the V-agents. As an example, the production of soman requires the use of pinacolyl alcohol which is currently produced by only a few companies in the world and in extremely small amounts, has no commercial uses, and is on the Australia Group’s list of restricted products. To date there are no public indications that the DPRK produces binary chemical agents. Given the significant benefits (e.g. safety and longer shelf life) of such weapons, however, it is likely that some binary chemical agents are in production. Additionally, the KPA has conducted extensive studies of the Iran–Iraq War and Operation DESERT STORM. Those studies have probably led them to follow the Iraqi model with regard to ‘binary’ chemical weapons. For example, the Iraqis made the decision to produce binary sarin, however, because the DF precursor produced by Iraq was very impure—which would result in an extremely short shelf life of sarin—they filled their munitions with isopropyl and cyclohexyl alcohols and stored the DF separately. Immediately prior to using the munitions the DF was added by hand.26 Chemical protection equipment production The production of ‘chemical defence and decontamination equipment’ is known to occur at only one facility within the DPRK—




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Table 8.3 Chemical weapons research organisations Organisation

Location

Central Analysis Centre and Chemical Department at the P’yongsong Institute of Science

P’yongsong, P’yongan-namdo

Chemical Research Institute under the Academy of Defence Sciences Hamhung branch of the Academy of Defence Sciences (probably at the University of Chemical Industry)

Hamhung, Hamgyong-namdo

Kim Il-song University

P’yongyang, P’yongyang-si

Factory 279 (aka Research Centre 279) located at P’yongwon-up, P’yongan-namdo. This facility is located in Sokam-ri and, like the Kanggye and Sakchu Chemical Weapons Factories, is subordinate to the Equipment Department of the Nuclear–Chemical Defence Bureau.27 This factory produces a wide range of chemical defensive equipment including detection kits and equipment, masks, protective clothing, decontamination kits and materials (chemical solutions). It is not currently known whether these facilities produce nerve agent antidotes, or if these are provided by the pharmaceutical industry. Products from Factory 279 are shipped to the ‘Maram Materials Corporation’ and ‘Chiha-ri Chemical Corporation’. Research and testing facilities There are conflicting reports as to where chemical weapons research and testing occur within the DPRK. Official ROK Ministry of Defence sources indicate that practical chemical weapons research facilities are located in the Kanggye, Sinuiju and Hamhung areas (see Table 8.3).28 The exact nature of these facilities and the type of research is currently unknown. There is a possibility that these three locations are being confused with either chemical agent production facilities or educational institutes. It would seem reasonable that the DPRK has a chemical weapons test facility which would be similar to the United Kingdom’s Porton Down or the United States’ Dugway Proving Grounds. To date there is no information available concerning any such facility. KPA defectors indicate that the Kanggye and Sakchu Chemical Weapons Factories conduct chemical weapons testing underground. This, in all probability, is only connected with quality control and not weapons development. There are two known




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‘Nuclear–Chemical Training Centres’, one under the direct control of the Nuclear–Chemical Defence Bureau and a second controlled by the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces. These, however, appear to be dedicated to operational training and not weapons testing and development. Field testing may also be conducted, like biological weapons, on islands in the Yellow Sea. Defectors report that the KPA has conducted chemical weapons testing on humans, but supporting details and information are lacking.29 Strategic storage The chemical weapons produced by Kanggye and Sakchu Chemical Weapons Factories are apparently not stored locally for any great length of time, but rather are shipped by military train, with a minimal security team, to the ‘Maram Materials Corporation’ and ‘Chiha-ri Chemical Corporation’. These two facilities are known as ‘store offices’. According to defectors the ‘Maram Materials Corporation’ is located at Maram-dong, P’yongyang-si and the ‘Chiha-ri Chemical Corporation’ is located at Anbyon, Kangwondo.30 These facilities are also subordinate to the Equipment Department of the Nuclear–Chemical Defence Bureau. Both consist of a number of special underground storage tunnels dug into mountains. These tunnels contain filled chemical weapons, bulk agents stored in 4 m high tanks, v chemical warfare (CW) protection and detection equipment, and decontamination agents produced by Factory 279. It is presently unclear, but possible, that these two ‘store offices’ are also used for biological weapons also. At least five additional chemical weapons storage facilities have been reported (see Table 8.4).31 Table 8.4 Chemical weapons storage facilities Facility

Location

Chiha-ri Chemical Corporation

Anbyon, Kangwon-do

Maram Materials Corporation

Maram-dong, P’yongyang-si Hwang-ch’on, P’yongyang-si† Masan-dong, P’yongyang-si† Samsan-dong, P’yongyang-si Sanum-ni, P’yongan-namdo Wanjaebong (possibly Wangyun-dong), Hwanghae-bukto††

† ††

Hwang-ch’on and Masan-dong are within 1–2 km of the Maram Materials Corporation and may be alternate references to that facility. Because of its forward location the Wanjaebong facility is probably an operational storage facility.




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Operational storage Chemical weapons are shipped directly to corps special munitions depots from the ‘store offices’. Once again, this is done via regular military train with a minimal security escort. Shipments are made directly to a railroad siding serving the corps depot. If this depot is not served directly by a railroad siding the weapons are offloaded onto trucks and then delivered to the depot. At these depots chemical weapons are stored separately from regular munitions and are under the control of the corps Nuclear–Chemical Defence Departments and battalions. A corps special munitions depot is located within each corps deployed along the DMZ and they may also be located within the artillery, mechanised and tank corps. From corps depots the chemical munitions are delivered to tactical units by truck. A primary reason for this forward deployment of chemical weapons is that it allows the KPA to minimise the time to transport these weapons to operational units in time of emergency. Chemical mortar and artillery munitions are shipped in wooden crates that are painted dark green. On the end of each crate, at the left-hand side is a large orange triangle signifying chemical weapons. To the right of the triangle is an information panel with the following information: type of filling, production date, expiry date and possibly production facility. Practice chemical mortar and artillery munitions are shipped in wooden crates that are not painted but with similar identification markings on the end of each crate. One KPA defector has indicated that the individual chemical mortar and artillery munitions are not marked in any special manner, so that if they are removed from their shipping container there is no way to readily identify them. This has not been verified and should be viewed critically until further information becomes available. Chemical weapons and equipment in the air force and navy commands Chemical protection and decontamination equipment is also supplied to both the KPAF and KPN. Whether this is done directly from the Kanggye and Sakju Chemical Weapons Factories or from the ‘store companies’ is currently unknown. Chemical weapons are also supplied for training and operational use. These weapons are most probably stored in special munitions depots subordinate to these commands, however details concerning this are completely lacking.




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Map 8.2 Chemical weapons related facilities Precursors & agents Agents and filling Defensive equipment

Research Storage Training

Aoji-ri People’s Republic of China Ch’ongjin

Hwasong-up Manp’o Kanggye

Sakju

Sinhung

Sinuiju Hamhung

P’yongwon-up Hwang-ch’on Masan-dong Korea Bay

Anju Sunch’on Onjong-ni Sanum-ni Yangdok Samsan-dong Anbyon P’yongyang


Sariwon Wanjaebong

Seoul

Republic of Korea

N

Production capacities and inventory Present estimates credit the DPRK with an annual production potential of 4500 tonnes of chemical agents in peacetime and 12 000 tonnes in wartime.32 Estimates of the chemical weapons inventory have varied considerably over the past ten years. In 1989, the inventory was estimated to be ‘180–250 tons of chemical weapons of several kinds’.33 Current estimates suggest an inventory of 2500–5000 tonnes, the majority of which are believed to be




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filled with mustard, phosgene, sarin and V-agents.34 It is further believed that this inventory includes as many as 150 warheads for ballistic missiles. The KPA may also possess limited numbers of binary (e.g. GB, GF or VX) chemical munitions. BIOLOGICAL35 The DPRK presently possesses the indigenous capability to produce significant quantities and varieties of biological weapons. It also possesses the ability to employ such weapons on the Korean Peninsula and to a lesser degree worldwide, using unconventional methods of delivery. In general, the offensive employment of biological weapons by the KPA has not received the attention that CW has. This is probably due to the DPRK’s limitations in bio-technology and the realisation that once employed there is almost no control over such weapons. Additionally, the KPA must calculate that biological warfare (BW) is potentially a greater threat to the KPA than to the ROK or US due to its own limited medical and bio-medical capabilities.36 For exactly the same reason, however, defensive BW has received significant attention. While the former Soviet Union and the PRC have provided the DPRK with chemical agents, they are not believed to have provided any direct assistance in the development of biological weapons. Such capabilities are believed to have been developed indigenously.37 BW research is thought to have begun sometime during the early 1960s and to have focused primarily upon 10–13 different strains of bacteria.38 At present, it is believed that the DPRK has not employed genetic engineering or advanced biotechnology to develop these bacteria.39 Organisation At its highest level the production of biological agents and weapons within the DPRK appears to follow the same organisational structure as that for chemical weapons (i.e. KWP, Cabinet and National Defence Commission), with the Second Economic Committee playing the central role through its 5th Machine Industry Bureau which is charged with the development and production of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Any role which the Cabinet may play is presently unknown. The responsibilities of the MPAF and its subordinate components are probably similar to that for chemical weapons, however it is believed that the Germ Research




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Academy of Sciences

Central Military Committee


Academy of Defence Sciences

(Coordination and oversight)

Bacteriological Institute Medical Research Institute

Munition Industry Policy and Inspection Department

(Coordination)

Ministry of Public Health

Central Germ Research Laboratory Institute of Microbiological Diseases Kim Il-sung University Medical College P’yongyang Medical College

Ministry of Agriculture

Cabinet

Figure 8.3 DPRK biological weapons production infrastructure

3rd Machine Industry Bureau




MPAF Medical College Medical Officers School

February 25th Factory




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Institute (aka Central Germ Research Laboratory) of the General Rear Services Bureau is responsible for developing biological weapons.40 Under the Cabinet, the Academy of Sciences undoubtedly plays a major role, while the Ministries of Public Health and Agriculture have a lesser role. The DPRK possesses a number of additional agricultural and scientific entities which could immeasurably enhance its BW program if put to that use. A good example is the Aeguk Compound Microbe Centre subordinate to the Cabinet’s Academy of Sciences.41 The centre was inaugurated on 2 June 1997 and since then has been expanded a number of times. It produces ‘several tens of tons’ of concentrated ‘original germs’ annually. These feed stocks are then supplied to some 111–120 factories throughout the DPRK which produce ‘compound microbial fertilizer’.42 Agents Although the reliability of this information is uncertain, biological agents currently reported to be in the KPA inventory include, but are not necessarily limited to: anthrax (Bacillus anthracis), botulism (Clostridium botulinum), cholera (Vibrio cholera 01), haemorrhagic fever (probably the Korean strain), plague (Yersinia pestis), smallpox (Variola), typhoid (Salmonella typhi) and yellow fever.43 It is possible that the BW is even more varied then this listing may suggest since the DPRK was politically and militarily active throughout Africa, South Asia and South America during the 1960s–70s and had access to many of the diseases that spread through these regions during this period. The inclusion of smallpox might seem unusual since the only known inventories of the disease available today are stored within the US and Russia. The DPRK, however, has apparently maintained its own store of smallpox cultures from the time of the Fatherland Liberation War when the disease affected thousands of Chinese and KPA troops. A May 1994 report by the Defence Intelligence Agency states that there are indications that some of the Russian smallpox stocks had been provided to both Iraq and the DPRK during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Recent blood samples from KPA defectors appear to confirm this since they showed evidence of fresh smallpox immunisations which would be unnecessary if the DPRK was not producing smallpox weapons.44 It has been suggested that during the 1990s DPRK BW research has been studying the use of E. coli 0–157 as a result of the recent




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Table 8.5 Biological warfare related facilities 1988

1994

‘Institute of Microbiological Diseases at the Academy of Medical Science’ ‘Medical Research Institute at the Academy of National Defence Sciences’ ‘No. 25 Factory’ (probably stands for the February 25th Factory)

‘Institute for Medical Science, Microbiological Laboratory’ ‘Central Germ Research Laboratory’ ‘College for Army Doctor and Military Officers in P’yongyang’ ‘Kim Il-song University Medical College’ ‘P’yongyang Medical College’

outbreaks in Japan, or may attempt to re-engineer a strain of influenza (possibly A/Japan/305/57) for use as an agent due to ease of transmission (i.e. airborne), short incubation period (e.g. typically one–three days), level of communicability (e.g. three–seven days) and susceptibility (when a new influenza subtype appears all children and adults are equally susceptible). Research, and testing facilities Little is known concerning the facilities engaged in BW research and testing. At present two sets of seemingly disparate information, with different dates, are available concerning this subject, as shown in Table 8.5. Even less is known concerning BW testing. Although most testing is probably conducted within research institutes, it would seem reasonable that the DPRK has a field test facility similar to those in Russia and the West. One report suggests, quite logically, that BW testing has been conducted on islands.45 If this is correct, it would appear that islands on the west coast in the Yellow Sea would be the most likely candidates. Defectors have stated that BW ‘tests are conducted on political prisoners by the College for Army Doctor and Military Officers and Kim Il-song University Medical College’.46 These statements, however, remain to be confirmed. Strategic storage Due to requirements unique to biological agents, storage facilities for biological weapons may be separate from those for chemical weapons. There may be special sub-sections of the Maram Materials Corporation and Chiha-ri Chemical Corporation (see above) specifically designed for this purpose.




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Production capacities and inventory It is not known when the DPRK actually initiated the production of biological agents for weaponisation. Such a capability presently exists and is believed to have existed since at least the mid-1970s and possibly earlier.47 Limited production of biological agents may be conducted at research facilities, however it is likely that there exist separate production or filling facilities. The ‘February 25th Factory’ noted in Table 8.5 may be such a facility. It is unlikely that there are more than one or two such facilities. A biological agent production facility would most likely also be responsible for munitions filling. If this is correct the facility would receive empty artillery and artillery rocket rounds, bomb casings etc. from the factories subordinate to the 3rd Machine Industry Bureau. There are no reasonable estimates of KPA biological weapons inventories. Such estimates, even if they had been available, would be somewhat misleading since equipment, materials, and expertise needed to produce biological warfare agents all have legitimate uses in the pharmaceutical and medical industries. With currently available technology, biological warfare agents can be produced at such a rate that inventories are no longer necessary. Actually, any nation with a modestly developed pharmaceutical industry can produce biological warfare agents, if it chooses.48

Production capabilities could easily be expanded using facilities such as the Aeguk Compound Microbe Centre noted above.




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Ballistic missiles ALLISTIC MISSILES

B

During the past 30 years the DPRK has pursued an aggressive ballistic missile development program. Since the late 1970s this program has been assigned a national priority at least equal to that of the nuclear program. Because of this emphasis the ballistic missile program has steadily progressed in spite of some 10 years of economic collapse and famine. The development of ballistic missiles within the DPRK can be divided into three distinct chronological stages moving from artillery rockets, to short-range ballistic missiles, to medium-range ballistic missiles. Today, it possesses one of the largest ballistic missile forces in the Third World and is on the verge of deploying space launch vehicles and intercontinental ballistic missiles which could threaten continental USA. This is an ominous development since there is little doubt that the DPRK perceives the ballistic missile to be the delivery system of choice for nuclear weapons.1 For the past 20 years the DPRK has made strenuous efforts to market both its ballistic missiles, and the technology to produce them, to a wide range of nations including Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria and the United Arab Emirates. The success of these efforts has established the DPRK as the world’s leading proliferator of ballistic missiles and technology, and has contributed significantly to the increasing levels of tension within South Asia. Coupled with the growing level of WMD capabilities within the region, this has created the potential for the rapid escalation, in both scope and lethality, of almost any local conflict. Without the DPRK sales the ballistic missile capabilities and developments in these countries would be 5–10 years behind their current levels and South Asia would be more stable. 236




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When studying the development of ballistic missiles within the DPRK the attribute which is most impressive is the speed at which it has occurred. Given the known levels of science and technology and industrial development within the DPRK it is almost impossible to believe that it has achieved its current level of missile development (especially within the areas of guidance and engines) without significant external assistance. The questions then become ‘Who provided this assistance?’ and ‘When and what did it entail?’. The detailed answers to these questions are presently unknown. What is known is that the DPRK has engaged in missile technology exchanges with Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria and possibly Iraq; it has openly and covertly obtained— and is continuously seeking to obtain—ballistic missile technologies, components, and materials from Europe, Japan, Russia and the PRC; and it has, over the years, acquired the services of small numbers of foreign missile designers, engineers and specialists. This last factor is probably the most significant and the most difficult to prove. With this stated it should also be understood that it would be foolish, as the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections of Iraq have demonstrated, to underestimate the dedication and abilities of the DPRK’s own missile designers, engineers and specialists, especially when considering that the ballistic missile program has long been assigned a national priority second only to the nuclear weapons program. Regardless of how it achieved its current level of development, the DPRK currently stands on the threshold of possessing viable space launch vehicle and intercontinental ballistic missile systems. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS, 1960–79 The first significant steps towards developing an indigenous missile capability occurred during the later part of 1960 within the area of surface-to-air missiles. A long-term agreement was concluded with the Soviet Union to undertake the modernisation of the DPRK’s arsenal. This included provisions for the delivery of the DPRK’s first missile system, the V–75 Dvina (SA–2a GUIDELINE) SAM.2 This acquisition qualified the DPRK as the third nonWARSAW Pact country (after the PRC and Cuba) to operationally deploy the SA–2.3 During late 1962 to early 1963, the first battalion of SA–2s arrived and was deployed near the capital city of P’yongyang.4 Also included within the SA–2 agreement were provisions for the Soviet




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Union to assist in establishing a rudimentary capability to assemble, maintain and test these systems. The delivery of the SA–2s also marked another milestone in DPRK–Soviet relations—the Soviet Union’s suspension of all negotiations for future military aid in 1962. This action was in response to the DPRK’s support of the PRC in its dispute with the Soviet Union. Despite this suspension, the Soviet Union did honour commitments made in late 1960 for aid through 1964. On at least one occasion during the arms moratorium the DPRK approached the Soviet Union seeking missile related assistance. On 3 August 1963, Brigadier General Kang Hyong-su, the KPA military attaché in Moscow, contacted the First Deputy Minister of Defence, Andrey A. Grechko, to discuss possible cooperation in manpower training and acquisition of missile development technology.5 The results of this contact are unknown, however the Soviet arms moratorium continued until 1965 and seriously damaged DPRK–Soviet relations. During 1965, to support development of modern weapons (including missiles) within the DPRK, Kim Il-song established the Hamhung Military Academy (aka Hamhung Defence Academy or Military Academy of Hamhung) directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defence (now Ministry of People’s Armed Forces).6 In establishing the academy Kim stated: If war breaks out, the U.S. and Japan will also be involved. In order to prevent their involvement, we have to be able to produce rockets which fly as far as Japan. Therefore it is the mandate of the Military Academy to nurture those personnel which are able to develop mid and long-range missiles.7

Within the academy the First Department was the Department of Missile Engines. Other departments are believed to be missile design (including anti-ship and surface-to-air), physics (i.e nuclear) and chemical (i.e. chemical and biological). Among the topics studied within the Department of Missile Engines were the German V–1 Fieseler (Fi 103) and V–2 (A4) and Soviet FROG. Following the 1968 Pueblo incident the academy was moved to Kanggye, where it became known as the Kanggye Military Academy (aka National Defence College, Kanggye Defence College, Kanggye Defence Academy or Military Academy of Kanggye).8 Following the ouster of Khrushchev, relations with the Soviet Union improved and negotiations for further aid reopened. Military aid resumed under agreements arrived at in May 1965 and March 1967. These agreements were to have a great impact upon




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missile development within the DPRK, as the Soviets agreed to provide the S–2 Sopka (SSC–2b SAMLET) coastal defence cruise missile, P–20 (SS-N–2 STYX) anti-ship missile, and the 3R10 Luna–2 (FROG–5) artillery rocket.9 The first consignment of SSC–2b SAMLETs is believed to have consisted of two launch batteries, target acquisition radars and support equipment. These arrived quickly and were first observed in September 1965.10 It is believed that additional deliveries would bring the total to eight launchers and 32 missiles. These were organised into a single regiment with four batteries. The first SS-N–2 STYX are believed to have arrived during 1967–68 with the delivery of four KOMAR class fast attack craft.11 The first FROG–5 transporter-erector-launchers (TEL) are believed to have arrived during 1968.12 As with the SA–2s, the Soviets are believed to have provided training to allow the DPRK to assemble, test and maintain SS-N–2 STYX and SSC–2b SAMLETs. This capability, combined with experience gained in producing MRLs and operating the FROG–5 and SA–2a, was to provide the foundation upon which the DPRK would subsequently develop an indigenous missile production capability. PRC assistance During the late 1960s, DPRK–Soviet relations began to sour once again. The Soviet Union declined to provide additional missile systems or upgrades for those already delivered. This action forced the expansion of the DPRK’s rudimentary assembly and maintenance capabilities. To facilitate this expansion and in hopes of filling the gap resulting from the Soviet action, the DPRK approached the PRC for assistance. During September 1971, the DPRK signed a wide-ranging military agreement with the PRC which established extensive cooperation in the areas of modern weapons acquisition, production and development. Included within this was the acquisition of PRC missile systems, the transfer of PRC missile research and development technology, and the training of DPRK personnel within the PRC. The first tangible result of this cooperation is believed to have been the PRC’s assistance in reorganising the Soviet-established assembly and maintenance programs for the SA–2, SS-N–2 STYX and SSC–2b SAMLET.13 Interestingly, during the early 1970s, the Soviet Union continued to provide SS-N–2 STYX and SSC–2b SAMLET missiles at irregular rates in fulfilment of previous contracts.




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This was soon followed by the DPRK’s acquisition of the PRC-produced HQ–1, HQ–2 (CSA–1) SAMs and SY–1 (CSS-N–1 SCRUBBRUSH) anti-ship cruise missiles.14 The HQ–1 is a PRC reverseengineered version of the SA–2, the HQ–2 (CSA–1) is an enhanced version of the HQ–1 with improved range and guidance systems, and the SY–1 is a licence-produced version of the P–20. Initial examples of these systems are believed to have been delivered directly from People’s Liberation Army and Navy stocks to the DPRK.15 During the mid-1970s the DPRK also began to acquire the HY–1 in both its coastal defence version (CSSC–2 SILKWORM) and later in its ship-launched version (CSS-N–2 SAFFLOWER).16 This was accompanied by a PRC-supported effort to expand the DPRK’s existing missile programs to include the assembly, upgrade and eventually the production of both the HQ–2 and HY–1.17 This effort proceeded from technical assistance to the provision of complete missile systems, to ‘knocked-down’ kits and then to sub-assemblies, as the programs developed. The DPRK is believed to have achieved an indigenous HQ–2 and HY–1 production capability sometime during the late 1970s, although it was most likely still heavily dependent upon the PRC for critical sub-components. Establishment of a ballistic missile program It is believed that during 1975 the DPRK initiated a multifaceted ballistic missile program. One of the primary factors precipitating this move was the establishment of an ROK program to develop a short-range ballistic missile—the Paekkom (White Bear).18 The unfortunate aspect of this is that the primary incentive for the ROK program was itself a response to the threat poised by the FROG–5 which possessed the range to strike Seoul, while the ROK possessed no missile system capable of reaching P’yongyang. Within the ROK, discussions concerning the feasibility of a surface-to-surface missile (SSM) project began in 1972, and the development of the Paekkom officially commenced in February 1974 and progressed rapidly. The objective of the project was to design a missile which could target P’yongyang and KPAF airfields. In 1976 the Paekkom program was absorbed into the newly established ‘Yulgok Project’. This project was established by President Park Chong-hui (Park Chung-hee) in 1976, with the goal of achieving an independent defence capability.19 The Paekkom prototype was developed from the Nike-Hercules SAM, then in service with the ROK. Subsequent models, however, were significantly




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different, having newly designed solid composite-type propellant first and second stage engines, an enlarged and strengthened body and a simplified guidance system. The preliminary research and development was completed within four years and a flight test program began in 1978. The first two test launches were failures, with the missiles being lost immediately after launch. The third, and first successful, test launch took place on 26 September 1978. In total, six–seven test launches were conducted. The estimated range of the Paekkom was 180 km with a circular error of probability (CEP) better than 500 m. The Paekkom, however, never entered production due to political pressure from the US, who feared it would lead to an escalation of tension and an arms race in the region.20 Aside from the Paekkom program, factors which contributed to the DPRK decision to establish a ballistic missile program included the continued instability in DPRK–Soviet relations and the Soviet refusal to provide additional missiles and FROG–5 rockets, the solidification of the internal situation within the DPRK as embodied in Chu’che and the national military policies of ‘Fortress Korea’ and ‘Four Military Lines’, the growing military and economic strength of the ROK, and the Egyptian and Syrian use of tactical ballistic and coastal defence and anti-ship cruise missiles during the October 1973 War.21 As best as can be presently determined the ballistic missile program established by the DPRK during 1975 consisted of three discrete and concurrent efforts—FROG–5/6/7, HQ–2 and the DF–61.22 The intent appears to have been for the FROG and HQ–2 to provide a modest improvement in ballistic missile capabilities in the near term, while the DF–61 would provide a world class short-range ballistic missile in the long term. It is clear that the DF–61 program was the primary effort with the FROG and HQ–2 programs providing the ‘fall-back’ position.23 FROG–5 (Luna-2), FROG–6 and FROG–7B (Luna-M)24 As part of the military assistance agreements concluded with the Soviet Union in 1965 and 1967 the DPRK received approximately 27–63 3R10 Luna–2 (FROG–5) artillery rockets, nine TELs and associated equipment during 1968. These were accompanied by approximately 12 FROG–6 trainer vehicles. Although numerous references indicate that the DPRK also received a number of 3R9 (FROG–3) rockets, this has yet to be confirmed. The Soviet Union may have provided a small number of these rockets for training,




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or confusion may have arisen because the 3R9 and 3R10 are similar in appearance. The FROG–5 consists of a TEL (based upon the PT–76 chassis) and the 3R10 artillery rocket. The 3R10 is a solid fuel, unguided, spin-stabilised rocket with a maximum range of 55 km and a 408 kg high explosive (HE) warhead (the Soviet Union is known to have only provided HE warheads). It has a CEP of approximately 880 m at a range of 40 km. Reaction time from arrival at a pre-surveyed site is 15–30 minutes. Associated equipment included a ZIL–157V rocket transloader, K–51 crane and an RVS–1 Malakhit (BREAD BIN) meteorological data receiver. The FROG–6 is a training system with a non-operational dummy rocket and launch rail which is mounted on a modified ZIL–157 wheeled vehicle.25 The FROG–5s were initially organised into three battalions and deployed near P’yongyang, within the III Corps. Each battalion had three TELs, approximately 167 personnel and was organised into a headquarters and three firing batteries. The headquarters consisted of a small staff, technical platoon (with three–six ZIL–157V rocket transloaders), communications platoon, rear services platoon, meteorological section (with a RVS–1 Malakhit (BREAD BIN) meteorological data receiver) and a survey section. Each firing battery consisted of a launcher section with one TEL. The standard Soviet organisation for a FROG battalion during this period called for meteorological and survey sections to be organic to each launch battery. It appears, however, that since radars were in short supply, the KPA may have established either meteorological and survey sections within the battalion headquarters, or independent target acquisition batteries which served both the FROG battalions and multiple rocket launcher units. This organisation is believed to have remained essentially unchanged until the 1980s, by which time an air defence section was probably added to each firing battery and the BREAD BIN meteorological data receiver may have been replaced by the RMS-1 (END TRAY). With the establishment of a ballistic missile program it appears that a decision was made to enhance and expand the FROG force. This effort is believed to have consisted of three sub-components: acquisition of the 9M21E Luna-M (FROG–7B) or, failing that, additional FROG–5s; reverse-engineering the FROG–5 and possibly the FROG–7B; and development of chemical warheads for the systems (see Table 9.1 for characteristics). Due to the poor state of DPRK–Soviet relations the effort to acquire the FROG–7B was limited to those countries which could




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Figure 9.1 Luna–2 (FROG–5)/Luna–M (FROG–7) battalion

[1]

HQ (x3) Technical

Staff SA–7/–14

1 TEL

[3]

Rear Services

Survey [2]

[2]

1 An alternative organisation, especially for Luna-M (FROG–7) battalions, may be two launch batteries of two TELs each. 2 Since radars are rare within the KPA, these assets may be in independent target acquisition batteries, and use the RMS–1 (END TRAY) radar instead of the RVS–1 (BREAD BIN). 3 Launch batteries may have a SA–7/–14 air defence section.

fulfil three requirements: previously acquired the system from the Soviet Union; were on good terms with the DPRK; and were willing to incur the displeasure of the Soviet Union by selling or transferring the systems to the DPRK. At that time only a few countries met all of these conditions including Egypt, Romania and Syria. During the late 1970s, as a result of a precipitous decline in Egyptian–Soviet relations and in return for the DPRK’s assistance during the October 1973 War, Egypt’s President Anwar el-Sadat transferred a small number of their Soviet-supplied FROG–7B TELs and rockets to the DPRK and agreed to cooperate in the field of missile development.27 Approximately 24–56 9M21E Luna-M (FROG–7B) rockets, six–eight TELs, and six–eight rocket transporter vehicles are believed to have been delivered sometime




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Table 9.1 FROG artillery rocket characteristics

Weight Warhead weight Length Diameter Maximum range Minimum range CEP Warhead types

3R10 Luna-2 (FROG–5)

9M21E Luna-M (FROG–7B)

1.9 tonnes 400–450 kg 9.1 m 0.4 m 55 km 15 km 800 m HE, chemical

2.5 tonnes 420–457 kg 9.4 m 0.544 m 65 km 15 km 400 m HE, chemical

during 1975–76. Syria may also have been involved in this transfer or may have provided a small number of FROG–7B rockets. This, however, remains unconfirmed.28 The FROG–7B consisted of a new TEL (based upon the eightwheeled ZIL–135LM vehicle) and the 9M21E artillery rocket. Like the 3R10, the 9M21E is a solid fuel, unguided, spin-stabilised rocket, however it has a maximum range of 65 km and a 450 kg HE warhead. Reaction time from arrival at a pre-surveyed site is 15–30 minutes. Upon arrival in the DPRK these systems were organised into two battalions subordinate to the Artillery Command. The organisation of these two battalions was modelled upon that of the FROG–5 battalions. Possible differences include two instead of three firing batteries, each with two TELs, and the END TRAY radar may have been substituted for the BREAD BIN meteorological data receiver in the meteorological section.29 The effort to produce indigenously a reverse engineered FROG–5 built logically upon the experiences gained with the production of large-calibre artillery rockets (i.e. 122, 200 and 240 mm) and the operation, maintenance and upgrade of existing missile systems (most significantly the FROG–5). With the receipt of the FROG–7Bs, the program to reverse-engineer or acquire additional FROG–5s is believed to have been refocused upon the FROG–7B. It is unclear when, but defectors have reported that by the end of the 1970s the DPRK was producing a reverse-engineered FROG (presumably the FROG–7B) at the January 18th Machine Factory in P’yongyang, P’yongyang-si.30 How many were produced and how long production lasted are unknown. It is probable that the production rate was low and that it continued at least into the mid-1980s. This program had the additional benefit of providing practical experience which was utilised in ongoing MRL programs.




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When the Soviet Union provided the FROG–5 to the DPRK they provided only HE warheads. Likewise, the FROG–7Bs provided to Egypt (and subsequently to the DPRK) had only HE warheads. The warhead component of the FROG program was apparently successful in developing chemical warheads for both the FROG–5 and FROG–7B.31 HQ–2/SA–2 SSM3232

The ROK program to develop the Paekkom ballistic missile from the Nike-Hercules SAM, it is believed, led the DPRK to ‘mirror’ this program by either assigning the surface-to-surface mission to a small number of its HQ–2/SA–2 units, or establishing a project to develop a dedicated SSM version of the HQ–2/SA–2. It is conceivable that both paths were pursued for a short time. Almost all early Soviet (e.g. SA–2, SA–3 and SA–5) and US (e.g. Nike-Hercules) SAMs were designed with the capability to conduct surface-to-surface fires as a secondary mission.33 When employed in this role they have their fusing systems changed, self-destruct sub-systems deactivated and the timer for thrust termination reset. Once launched they are actively guided to a specific point in the sky and then allowed to fly a ballistic path to their ground targets. In this role they are very accurate and have relatively good ranges—an unmodified HQ–2/SA–2 has a range of approximately 60 km; if modified this could reach 150– 200 km. Because of their small HE charge and fragmentation rather than blast warheads (190 kg in the SA–2, compared to the FROG–7B’s 420–457 kg) they are, however, of limited effectiveness. Although the KPA’s minimal target acquisition capabilities would appear to limit the HQ–2/SA–2 to attacking high-value fixed targets (e.g. Seoul, airfields, radar installations), this was not significant since these were exactly the intended targets. There is presently no additional information concerning KPA development or utilisation of the HQ–2/SA–2 in the SSM surfaceto-surface role. The establishment of a surface-to-surface mission for these systems may have been a factor in the subsequent development of a self-propelled HQ–2/SA–2 launcher during the 1980s (alternatively, this system could have been the PRC HQ–2B, or a copy of it). DF–6134

The DF–61 program was the primary, and most sophisticated, component of the DPRK’s early ballistic missile program. During




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April 1975, at the invitation of Mao Tse-tung, Kim Il-song travelled to Beijing. The PRC viewed the visit as an opportunity to continue its policy of wooing the DPRK away from the Soviet Union. The DPRK viewed the trip as an opportunity to elicit greater PRC political and military support for its struggle against the ROK.35 It was during this nine-day state visit that DPRK Defence Minister O Ch’in-u inquired whether the PRC could equip the KPA with short-range tactical ballistic missiles. The PRC did not possess such missiles, but the request coincided with internal interests and later that year feasibility studies were initiated. The following year, General Chen Xilian, of the Central Military Commission, authorised a full-scale development project for a liquid-fuelled tactical ballistic missile to be designated the DF–61. To expedite the design and development cycle every effort was made to exploit the PRC’s existing technology base (e.g. the propulsion system was derived from the second stage of the DF–5). The DF–61 was to be produced in two versions—domestic and export (i.e. for the DPRK). The export version was designed for a range of 600 km with a 1000 kg conventional warhead, while the domestic version was to have a 1000 km range with a 500 kg nuclear warhead. The 600 km range was an important requirement for the DPRK, since it would provide the capability to strike targets anywhere within the ROK including Cheju-do. The type of conventional warheads apparently studied for the export DF–61 included high-explosive, fuel-air-explosive and cluster. The submunitions of the latter were given varying aerodynamic properties, so that when the ballistic windshield was released the submunitions would all travel with slightly different trajectories. Guidance was to be provided by a new PRC-developed computerised inertial strap-down system (the estimated CEP that this guidance system was to provide is currently unknown). The liquid rocket motor consisted of four vernier combustion chambers, their associated servomechanisms (for attitude control) and a high pressure turbo pump, and was fuelled with AK–40 and UDMH. The production missile was to be approximately 9 m in length, 1 m in diameter and constructed with a relatively thick gauge steel skin. This would allow the DF–61 to be transported without fear of damage—a requirement for both the PRC and DPRK. Development of the DF–61 progressed for approximately one year when for internal PRC political reasons it was first suspended and then in 1978 cancelled, when General Chen Xilian was ousted from power.




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The extent to which the DPRK was involved in the design of the DF–61 is unknown. It is believed that a small number of DPRK personnel were allowed access at the PRC design bureau and kept abreast of most DF–61 developments. The possible exceptions to this access were in the areas of guidance systems and warhead (especially nuclear) development. Other missile systems The DPRK was involved in a number of smaller missile projects during this period. During 1975 the DPRK initiated the manufacture of a reverse-engineered version of the Soviet PUR–61 Shmel (AT–1 SNAPPER) anti-tank guided missile (ATGM). This is regarded by some as the first missile system to be totally manufactured with indigenous components.36 During 1974, both the DPRK and PRC are believed to have acquired examples of the Soviet PUR–64 Malyutka (AT–3 SAGGER) ATGM and 9K32 Strela 2 (SA–7 GRAIL) SAM from Egypt. These systems were subsequently reverseengineered by the DPRK and placed in service with the KPA during the late 1970s.37 FIRST BALLISTIC MISSILES, 1979–89 While the collapse of the DF–61 program was a considerable setback, the DPRK did not abandon its goal to obtain ballistic missiles. The direct paths to this goal, however, were now extremely limited since there were only two countries that possessed such capabilities and which could conceivably provide assistance to the DPRK—the PRC and the Soviet Union. The PRC was obviously not in a position to provide such missiles and the Soviet Union, for a variety of political reasons, would not provide them. This left the DPRK with only one real choice—to indigenously design and produce its own ballistic missiles. During 1979 the existing ballistic missile program was reorganised into an ambitious effort to achieve this goal.38 With this reorganisation both the FROG and HQ–2/SA–2 programs appear to have been refocused—the FROG program to maintenance of existing systems and the HQ–2/SA–2 program to the production and improvement of the SAM versions of these systems. Some HQ–2/SA–2 units undoubtedly retained a secondary surface-to-surface mission. There were significant hurdles to overcome to indigenously design and produce ballistic missiles. Primary among these was that the DPRK simply did not possess the skilled manpower or




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technology to design a ballistic missile from the ground up. Almost all its relevant expertise was confined to its SAM, antiship cruise missile and artillery rocket programs. To overcome these serious limitations, the DPRK once again turned to Egypt and the two countries concluded a series of new agreements to cooperate in the field of missile development. The central focus of this cooperation was a program to reverse-engineer the Soviet R–17E (Scud B) as an interim step to the future production of indigenously designed ballistic missiles with greater ranges and improved accuracy. A part of this agreement called for the exchange of scientists and technicians between the two countries. Egypt had long held the desire to produce long-range ballistic missiles and shortly after the October 1973 War had initiated several feasibility studies for an improved Scud B.39 The cooperation with the DPRK was viewed as a means of advancing its own ballistic missile ambitions while conserving its resources. In addition to this expanded cooperation with Egypt, the DPRK apparently also requested and received PRC assistance in the areas of rocket engine design/production, metallurgy and airframe technology. Although ballistic missile developments within the ROK during this period would strongly influence the overall direction of the DPRK’s ballistic missile program, the effects upon the contemporaneous R–17E and Hwasong 5 programs appear to have been minimal. The primary ROK activity during this period was the development of the Hyonmu (black weapon) SSM—a follow-on to the Paekkom.40 Development of the Hyonmu began during 1984, its test launch phase was successfully completed during 1987 and the system was deployed shortly afterwards. When the US became aware of the Hyonmu development program it applied considerable pressure upon the ROK to limit both the range of the system and the number of missiles produced. The US feared that a long-range system, built in large numbers, would be perceived as a threat to the PRC. The ROK bowed to US pressure and limited the range of the Hyonmu to 180 km (instead of 250 km) and deployed only a single unit (with 12 TELs). In return for these concessions, the US provided greater military aid and the US Army announced, during November 1986, its decision to return tactical ballistic missiles to the ROK with the redeployment of B/6–32nd Field Artillery Regiment equipped with the MGM–2 Lance SSM.41 Although the range of the Lance was only 120 km (i.e. unable to reach P’yongyang), it possessed a CEP of 120 m and was capable of delivering the W70 nuclear warhead.42




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Against this background the DPRK acquired its first ballistic missile—the R–17E, and subsequently initiated the production of its first indigenous ballistic missile, the Hwasong 5.43 R–17E (aka Scud B)44 The most significant aspect of the new agreements with Egypt was their decision to transfer a small number of Soviet R–17E (Scud B) missiles, MAZ–543 TELs, and support vehicles and equipment to the DPRK during 1979–80.45 The agreements also provided for a limited exchange of engineers, technicians and military personnel. The DPRK now set about reverse-engineering the missile. All available evidence suggests that none of the Egyptian-supplied missiles were ever test launched. They were used primarily as patterns for reverse-engineering and as tools to train a cadre of hand-picked engineers, technicians and KPA personnel. The KPA personnel were subsequently used to establish in 1981 or 1982 a special missile test and evaluation unit to conduct flight tests and prepare for the introduction of ballistic missiles into KPA service. It is unclear whether this unit was established or equipped as a combat unit. Regardless, it provided the DPRK with its first true, albeit contingency, ballistic missile capability. Concurrent with these efforts the DPRK set about establishing the infrastructure required to support an indigenous ballistic missile program. Included within this were the 118 Factory, 125 Factory, Sanum-dong Research and Development Facility, Musudan-ni Launch Facility (aka Hwadae Agriculture Experimental Yard or Agriculture Experimental Station) located on the northeast coast, and a range of other related installations. Hwasong 5 prototype (aka Scud Mod. A) The reverse-engineered version of the R–17E was assigned the name Hwasong 5.46 The primary organisations involved in this project, as well as all missile development within the DPRK, were the Guided Missile Division (aka Guided Weapons Institute) and Engineering Research Institute of the Academy of Defence Sciences and the 4th Machine Industry Bureau.47 All of which were subordinate to the Second Economic Committee. Work proceeded steadily through 1982–83 and by early 1984 the first Hwasong 5 prototypes were completed. The missile is believed to have been a straight copy of the R–17E with no modifications and was built in extremely small numbers. They




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represented ‘proof-of-concept’ and prototype articles intended to provide training and experience to those involved in its design and manufacture, identify problem areas in both the design and production processes, and identify areas in which the production could be tailored to best suit DPRK manufacturing capabilities. As such, it is probable that none of these missiles were intended to be operational and none were deployed. During this early development period, as a result of the ongoing Iran–Iraq War, the Iraqi employment of FROG–7B and Scud B missiles, and Iran’s inability to acquire comparable systems elsewhere (except in very small numbers from Libya), the Iranian Government approached the PRC and DPRK for tactical ballistic missiles and missile technology.48 In October 1983, Iranian Prime Minister Husayn Musavi and Defence Minister Colonel Mohammad Salimi travelled to P’yongyang. It is believed that the DPRK’s Hwasong 5 program was a major topic of discussion during this trip.49 The following year, during April and September, the DPRK conducted a minimal flight test program for the Hwasong 5 with a least three launches and two failures.50 Preliminary evidence suggests that there were three successful and two failed launches. All test launches are believed to have been Hwasong 5 prototypes and were conducted from the Musudan-ni Launch Facility, with flight trajectories being southeast over the East Sea.51 There is a good possibility that these first prototypes consisted of DPRKproduced airframes and fuel tanks, but utilised the engines and guidance systems taken from the original R–17Es. An Iranian presence during the flight test program is also probable. No additional flight tests of the Hwasong 5 are known to have been conducted within the DPRK.52 The timing of this test launch program may have been in response to the ROK Hyonmu test program. Hwasong 5 (aka Scud Mod. B, Scud B) The Hwasong 5 was the first ballistic missile to reach true production status within the DPRK. In comparison to the prototypes, it was modified slightly to conform to DPRK production practices and capabilities, and probably included a small number of more modern components. While the external dimensions of the Hwasong 5 are almost identical to the R–17E, these modifications enabled the system to achieve a 10–15 per cent increase in operational range compared to the original—approximately 320 km




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versus 280 km with a 1000 kg warhead.53 The CEP of the Hwasong 5 is unknown, however it is believed to be similar to that of the original R–17E (500–800 m). Over the course of its production numerous changes were apparently incorporated into its design. For example, the earlier models were equipped with a copy of the original R–17E strap-down guidance system, or examples of R–17 guidance systems covertly obtained from the Soviet Union or other countries, while later models used an improved indigenous guidance system. It is likely that the DPRK also incorporated minor changes to its copy of the Isayev 9D21 rocket engine produced at the 118 Factory. Concurrent with the production of the Hwasong 5, DPRK engineers worked to develop new warheads for the system including HE, cluster, chemical and possibly biological.54 These changes undoubtedly resulted in various submodels, but the designations and details of these are presently unclear. Low-rate series production of the Hwasong 5 is believed to have commenced during 1985, followed by full-scale production during 1986. The production rate for the Hwasong 5 is believed to have averaged four–five per month during the early years. Given the number of missiles exported and those required for KPA use, the production rate probably reached 8–10 per month during 1987–88. The Hwasong 5 provided the KPA with the capability of striking targets throughout the northernmost two-thirds of the ROK. The Hwasong 5 was probably phased out of production in favour of the Hwasong 6 during 1989.55 The details of the establishment of operational Hwasong missile units within the KPA are unclear. It is believed that sometime during 1984–85 the MPAF established a Hwasong missile regiment subordinate to the Artillery Command. Personnel for this new unit are believed to have been drawn from the special missile test and evaluation unit. It is probable that this regiment was initially deployed near P’yongyang and was later moved south to the area of Chiha-ri (south-south-east of P’yongyang and approximately 50 km north of the DMZ). Additional reports, during this period, of an operational Hwasong missile unit stationed in the Kilchu–Ch’ongjin area (i.e. Hamgyong-bukto) suggests one of several possibilities:56 • •

The Hwasong missile regiment deployed independent battalions or firing batteries to operating locations in different parts of the country. The initial deployment of Hwasong missile units was by battalion, not regiment.




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•


The special missile test and evaluation unit in the Musudan-ni area also served as an operational missile unit.

During March–June 1985 Iran and Iraq engaged in what became known as the first ‘War of the Cities’. In response to this battle the Iranian Government concluded an agreement with the DPRK calling for the bilateral exchange of missile technology, financing for the DPRK’s missile program and an Iranian option to purchase the Hwasong 5. Part of this agreement may have also included the delivery of DPRK SA–2, HQ–1 and HQ–2 SAMs.57 In June of 1987 the two countries concluded a $500 million arms agreement which included the purchase of 90–100 DPRKproduced Hwasong 5s and apparently assistance in establishing a missile assembly/production facility in Iran. Hwasong 5 deliveries are believed to have begun in July 1987 and continued through early February 1988. Within Iran the Hwasong 5 is known as the Shehab 1.58 These Hwasong 5s played a significant role in the second ‘War of the Cities’ during 1988. During this battle, which lasted for 52 days, the Iranians fired approximately 77 Hwasong 5 missiles at Iraqi cities (77–86 per cent of its total inventory). Of these 77 launches the majority were targeted at Baghdad (61), while the remainder were aimed at Mosul (9), Kirkuk (5), Takrit (1) and Kuwait (1).59 The Iranian use of the Hwasong 5 during the 1988 ‘War of the Cities’ was not without its problems, as indicated by one report that eight of the missiles exploded during launch.60 It is unclear whether this was indicative of inadequate Iranian training, operations under unique wartime conditions, quality control problems with the missile, or a combination of these factors. It was also during the ‘War of the Cities’ that reports began to emerge concerning Iran’s development of a chemical warfare capability for its missile force. Although the Iranian chemical warheads capability had been developing for several years, apparently with PRC and European assistance, it is believed that the DPRK facilitated the missile-related effort by providing Iran with chemical weapons technology and possibly a small number of Hwasong 5 chemical warheads.61 During 1989 the DPRK concluded an arms sales agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This agreement, which was worth approximately $160 million, included 25 Hwasong 5 missiles, self-propelled artillery, multiple rocket launchers and munitions. For a variety of reasons the UAE was not pleased with the quality of the Hwasong 5. The systems never became operational in UAE




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service and were quickly placed in storage at a remote warehouse facility. UAE officials view the missiles as a problem and are currently discussing how to dispose of them. As of 1998 they were still sitting in storage.62 Foreign assistance63 Throughout the Hwasong programs the DPRK exchanged technical information documentation (e.g. blueprints, specifications) and personnel with Egypt. This involvement was somewhat paradoxical in light of Egypt’s staunch support of Iraq during the ongoing Iran– Iraq War while the DPRK supported Iran. Egypt was also pursuing a longer-range ballistic missile program with Iraq—the Condor II (known in Egypt by the code name Vector). With the success in production of the Hwasong 5, Egypt possessed all the technical documentation required to begin production of the system at home—should it desire to do so. Beginning during 1984–85 a similar level of cooperation was also extended to Iran as the DPRK assisted it in establishing a Hwasong 5 assembly facility and provided it with all the required technical documentation to produce the system in the future. Key engineers and military personnel have been exchanged on a regular basis between these two countries and the DPRK. The PRC provided assistance to the DPRK from the beginning of the Hwasong 5 program, in the areas of engine design and production, metallurgy and airframe design. It appears, however, that a majority of this assistance was more academic or generic in nature, rather than specifically targeted to the Hwasong 5 program, for example providing technical training to DPRK engineers and technical specialists, or high-quality machine tools. The numerous allegations of Soviet involvement in the DPRK’s early ballistic missile program are erroneous.64 There is no evidence that the Soviet Union has worked with the DPRK on the Hwasong 5 program or in the development of new warheads. Additionally, the Soviets provided no components during the early to mid-1980s. DPRK–Soviet relations were strained during the late 1970s and only began to improve following Kim Il-song’s May 1984 visit to Moscow. Following that visit relations did experience a dramatic improvement and the Soviet Union did agree to provide the DPRK with several new SAM systems, maintenance training and equipment.65 It is possible that the DPRK requested Soviet Scud Bs during this period of rapprochement, however the Soviet Union apparently declined on the basis that this would be too




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dangerous and destabilising for the region. In 1987, Captain Yu Hak-ch’ol, who was studying at the Soviet Frunze Military Academy, was arrested and expelled after he was caught copying the missile-related documents.66 With the dramatically changing domestic situation within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the late 1980s, the DPRK appears to have achieved some success in acquiring—either through official or unofficial channels— technologies and components for its ballistic missile programs. Other missile related develoments During this period DPRK proficiency in the production of the HQ–2 continued to develop and in 1984 it signed a contract to provide Egypt with technical assistance in their effort to develop a variant of the SA–2b Mod. 1 known as the Ta’ir al–Sabah (Morning Bird). Like most of Egypt’s indigenous advanced weapons projects during the 1980s, this was soon cancelled.67 Following Kim Il-song’s May 1984 visit to Moscow there began a new era in DPRK–Soviet relations. A significant part of these new relations was a 1985 Soviet agreement to provide assistance in the modernisation of the DPRK’s armed forces. This would witness the introduction of the S–125 Pechora (SA–3b GOA) and S–200 Angara (SA–5 GAMMON) into KPAF service (see chapter 5). During the mid-1980s, the DPRK acquired the HJ–73 and HN–5A SAMs from the PRC.68 It also undertook the production of the HN–5A, and assembly or production of the AA–2, PL–2 and PL–5 AAMs. LONGER RANGE DESIGNS, 1989–PRESENT Reorganisation of the missile program The acquisition of Egyptian R–17Es during the early 1980s, and the resulting Hwasong 5, provided the DPRK with its first ballistic missile capability. The cancelled DF–61, however, was a significantly more capable system than the R–17E and would have provided the DPRK with the capability to strike at the entire ROK—a MPAF requirement. To address this limitation the DPRK initiated development of an extended range variant of the Hwasong 5 to be known as the Hwasong 6. By 1989, a number of factors had converged to result in the DPRK leadership establishing a comprehensive set of long-term




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requirements for the ballistic missile program. These factors included: • • • •

•

• •

With the end of the Iran–Iraq war, resources which had been engaged in Hwasong 5 production could now be refocused on other projects. The desire to acquire the capability to strike at targets in the southernmost sections of the ROK and at US bases within Japan. The desire to eventually be capable of striking US targets throughout East Asia and the continental US. The international prestige associated with the acquisition and production of ballistic missiles held a strong allure for the DPRK leadership. They also understood that given the current geographic situation in north-east Asia even a short-range ballistic missile, such as the Hwasong 6, provided the DPRK with a strategic weapons system, giving it the ability to threaten Beijing, Vladivostok, Khabarovsk and large sections of south-west Japan. The recent ‘War of the Cities’ and ongoing Iraqi missile developments (e.g. al-Husayn, al-Abbas) had established an Iranian requirement for missiles with greater range than the Hwasong 5. Such a system would be able to strike deep into Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The Iranian desire to eventually be able to strike Israel. The longstanding involvement with Egypt in an effort to produce a product-improved R–17E.

The long-term requirements established by the DPRK called for more ambitious missile systems based not upon the technical capabilities of the missile infrastructure, but rather upon targets which the leadership desired to be able to strike (see Table 9.2)69 In this regard, the DPRK followed the example established by the PRC which established goals for the development of its ballistic missiles based upon target ranges.70 Whether these requirements were all defined at once or over a period of several years is unclear, however they were in place by 1990. These range requirements led to the reorganisation of the missile program into four distinct, but interrelated, projects The simplest project, and the one which could be brought to completion in the shortest amount of time, was already under way in the form of the Hwasong 6. This program would only undertake minor modifications to the basic Hwasong 5 system.




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Table 9.2 Ballistic missile target/range requirements Target

Range required

The entire ROK US bases in Japan and major Japanese cities US bases in East Asia US bases in Alaska and Pacific Continental US

500 km 1000–1500 km 1500–2500 km 4000–6000 km 6000+ km

The more complicated, and thus longer term, projects involved the design of a completely new missile based upon the refinement of Scud technologies and experiences gained in the Hwasong 5/6 programs. This missile would become known as the No-dong in the West. The No-dong would itself serve as the basis for the development of two more advanced and more capable systems— the Taep’o-dong 1 and Taep’o-dong 2. A space launch vehicle (SLV) would also be developed from the Taep’o-dong 1 system. Iran would serve as the primary financial backer for all these projects. By the early 1990s, the FROG battalions were reorganised into a brigade subordinate to the Artillery Command. Whether this change was related to the reorganisation of the ballistic missile program is unclear. Hwasong 6 (aka Scud Mod. C, Scud C, Scud PIP) It is unclear whether an extended range variant of the R–17E was a goal of the DPRK ballistic missile program from the beginning. By 1987–88, however, work on such a system—to be known as the Hwasong 6—had begun. The Hwasong 6 subsequently formed the first leg of the DPRK’s reorganised ballistic missile program.71 DPRK engineers quickly achieved their goals by undertaking only simple and minor modifications to the basic Hwasong 5. Primary among these were the reduction of the warhead from 1000 kg to 770 kg, and lightening of the airframe by using a special stainless steel imported from the Soviet Union (later Russia). 72 A modified inertial guidance system was also used. The resulting missile is almost identical in size to the Hwasong 5, being 11.3 m long, having a diameter of 0.884 mm and weighing just under 6 tonnes, yet it possesses a range of 500 km—sufficient to strike any target within the ROK including the southern island of Cheju-do. The Hwasong 6 benefited from the warhead research conducted for the Hwasong 5 and could be armed with HE, chemical and cluster warheads.73 Early concerns that the Hwasong 6 would




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be armed with a nuclear warhead appear to have been premature. Although the DPRK could theoretically have designed and mounted a nuclear warhead on the Hwasong 6 for a contingency capability, it appears that given the timing and status of both the nuclear and ballistic missile programs that the No-dong was the first missile intended to carry a nuclear warhead.74 Low-rate series production of the Hwasong 6 is believed to have commenced during 1989 and the first examples became operational the same year, followed by full scale production during 1990–91. The production rate for the Hwasong 6 is believed to have averaged four–five per month and the system is believed to have superseded the Hwasong 5 on the production lines. Some Hwasong 5s may have subsequently been remanufactured to Hwasong 6 standards. Production of the Hwasong 6 has continued through the late 1990s. It may have been reduced or superseded by production of the No-dong. There appear to be several sub-models of the Hwasong 6, but details are unknown. The guidance system is believed to have given the DPRK considerable difficulties and has undergone several updates. At the end of 1999, the DPRK is estimated to have produced a total of 600–1000 Hwasong 5/6, of which 350–500 were sold to foreign countries; 25 were used for initial operations, test and evaluation/training; and 300–625 are in current inventory. Complementing the development of the Hwasong 6 were efforts to develop TELs and expand the Musudan-ni Launch Facility and the missile support infrastructure. DPRK engineers slightly modified the support arms of the existing TELs by the addition of a support arm underneath the two existing ones to accommodate the Hwasong 6 (possibly due to a different centre of gravity).75 Many of the original Soviet-produced components in the TELs were replaced by commercially available equivalents (e.g. the auxiliary power units were replaced by commercial Mitsubishi units). An effort was initiated to obtained additional MAZ–543 chassis, TELs and spare parts from the Soviet Union (later Russia), Belarrus and other countries. Apparently, due to the difficulty in obtaining additional complete MAZ 543s TELs, the DPRK was able to import a number of MAZ–543 chassis (possibly demilitarised TELs) and undertook the development of their version of the TEL. This is similar in appearance to the original MAZ–543 TEL, however the forward cab is somewhat different. In addition to the TEL, a number of support vehicles were also developed, including a missile transloader, maintenance truck and mobile test equipment truck. All TEL, launcher and support




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vehicle develoment is believed to be performed by the Sungni General Automotive Factory with the assistance of the 2nd Machine Industry Bureau. The Musudan-ni Launch Facility continued to expand with the construction of new launch towers and the development of ground support equipment.76 The similarity of these developments to PRC designs has sometimes led to erroneous speculation that the equipment and the No-dong were based on PRC design, or built with PRC assistance. Finally, during the mid-1980s, construction was initiated of hardened (i.e. underground) missile facilities around the country. The timing of the Hwasong 6 development is interesting in that it occurred almost simultaneously with the Iraqi development of its extended range variant of the Scud B—the al-Husayn. It is probable that the Iranians provided the DPRK with technical intelligence concerning the Iraqi systems, including access to wreckage recovered from al-Husayn attacks on Tehran during the 1988 ‘War of the Cities’. The Hwasong 6 program, however, did not directly benefit from the al-Husayn and reports suggesting that it was a copy of the al-Husayn are incorrect.77 To date there have been five successful Hwasong 6 test launches. The first occurred during June 1990 when a missile was launched from the Musudan-ni Launch Facility and impacted in the East Sea.78 Given the difficulties encountered in developing new guidance systems there is a strong possibility that this first test either included a modified Hwasong 5 guidance system or simply used a timer to control engine shutoff. The following year, in July, a second Hwasong 6 missile was test launched. This time, however, it was fired from an indigenously produced TEL at a forward KPA base in Kangwon-do (which encompasses the I and V Corps deployed along the DMZ). The missile flew north-east and impacted in the East Sea.79 During May 1993 the DPRK conducted a major ballistic missile test event in which it launched three Hwasong 6 and one No-dong missiles. In addition to these domestic tests, Syria and Iran have conducted an ongoing series of Hwasong launches focused primarily on operational readiness and troop training. To date, four of these tests have been publicly revealed—three Syrian (July 1992 and mid-1994) and one Iranian (May 1991).80 By 1991 the Hwasong missile regiment had been expanded to an estimated 27–30 TELs and was equipped with a mixture of Hwasong 5 and 6 missiles. Rather than being subordinate to the Artilery Command, the regiment was under the direct control of the General Staff Department.81 The regiment is believed to be




258

SA–7/–14 1 TEL or MEL

(x3)

Survey

Rear Services

Technical

HQ

Staff

(x4–5) Staff

Technical

Rear Services

HQ

Figure 9.2 Hwasong 5/6 brigade (postulated)




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headquartered in the Chiha-ri area (approximately 85 km southeast of P’yongyang and 50 km north of the DMZ). Individual missile battalions are deployed nearby in separate bases. The regiment’s technical support battalion is reported to be at Chihari.82 By the early 1990s, the infrastructure built to support the regiment had 2–3 times the number of hardened bunkers required to house all the unit’s TELs and support vehicles.83 The Hwasong 6 regiment probably consists of a headquarters (staff, rear services company, communications company), missile technical battalion, air defence company and four–five launch battalions. Each launch battalion has six TELs or MELs and approximately 175 personnel. It is organised into a headquarters and three firing batteries. The headquarters consists of a small staff, technical platoon, communications platoon, rear services platoon, meteorological section with an RVS–1 Malakhit (BREAD BIN) meteorological data receiver and a survey section. Each firing battery consisted of two launcher sections, each with one TEL, and an air defence section with SA–7/14 SAMs. Independent launch battalions are probably configured in a similar manner, but may have larger support units.84 Foreign developments During late 1990 Iran and the DPRK concluded several new agreements. These included provisions for an Iranian purchase of the Hwasong 6, TELs and DPRK assistance with the conversion of a missile maintenance facility in eastern Iran. This facility would initially assemble and later manufacture the Hwasong 6. Beginning in January 1991, shipments of Hwasong 6 missiles, TELs and related equipment were tracked as they were delivered to Iran. The exact number of missiles acquired by the Iranians is not known, but a total of 60 may have been purchased.85 Within Iran the Hwasong 6 is known as the Shehab 2. In May 1991 US satellites observed the test launch of a Shehab 2/Hwasong 6 misile from a DPRK-produced TEL near the city of Qom. 86 The missile flew 500 km before impacting south of Shahroud (Emamshar) in the Dasht-e Kavir (Salt Desert) where Iran has a major missile test facility. The test was probably monitored from a tracking station located near the town of Tabas. Both the missile test facility at Shahroud and the tracking station at Tabas were constructed, in part, with DPRK assistance.87 It is probable that the test was conducted in conjunction with DPRK advisers or observers. Deliveries of Hwasong 6 missiles and support equipment




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are known to have continued through 1995. During late 1994 or early 1995, Iran ‘received at least four’ Hwasong 6 TELs from the DPRK. These may have been delivered by air.88 During November 1999 a published report indicated that Iran had sold ‘Scud B and Scud C’ missiles to the Democratic Republic of Congo.89 The report states that the missiles arrived in the capital city of Kinshasa in October 1999 and that Iranian military personnel will assemble them and conduct training of the Congolese Army personnel who will operate the systems. If this report proves to be correct, it is probable that the sales agreement was concluded during August or September 1999, and that only a very small number were provided—probably four–six launchers and 12–18 missiles. The 1990 Iranian agreements were soon followed by an agreement with Syria. For several years Damascus had been seeking to acquire the OTR–23 Oka (SS–23 SPIDER) from the Soviet Union. These efforts failed and Syria turned to the DPRK for Hwasong 6 missiles, TELs and production technology. The agreement signed between the DPRK and Syria was financially and materially supported by Iran and the PRC. Deliveries of an estimated 60 missiles and 12 TELs began during April 1991 and continued to 1995. A number of these deliveries were by air, using private contractors flying An–124 Ruslan heavy transports. The Syrians experienced significant problems with the guidance system of the Hwasong 6. These were apparently not resolved with the DPRK and Syria approached the PRC, who provided replacements or upgrades. The DPRK, with assistance from Iran and the PRC, also assisted Syria in the construction of Hwasong 6 production facilities near Aleppo and Hamah.90 Syria has conducted a small number of Hwasong 6 test launches. The first consisted of two Hwasong 6s and took place at the end of July 1992 prior to their becoming operational.91 This test was conducted in the presence of DPRK observers with missiles that had been delivered by the DPRK ship Dae Hung Ho the previous March. Syria conducted a second Hwasong 6 test in mid-1994. This missile may have been from a delivery made in August 1993 by two Russian civilian An–124 Ruslan aircraft leased by Syria to airlift Hwasong 6 missiles and TELs from Sunan airfield north of P’yongyang to Damascus.92 During November 1994, Syria received cluster warheads for the Hwasong 6 from the DPRK. That same month they test fired the Hwasong 6, although with a conventional warhead. Three years later, during early 1997, Syria conducted a small number of missile tests. Although most are believed to have been R–17s, the possibility




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exists that several were Hwasong 6 launches.93 It is believed that all these tests were intended both as a means of verifying missile reliability and as a means of training Syrian missile troops. Missile cooperation between Syria and the DPRK has continued throughout the 1990s. For example, during 1996 a group of Syrian missile technicians reportedly travelled to the DPRK for two weeks.94 During 1999 the DPRK supplied 10 tonnes of powdered aluminium originally purchased from the PRC. This powdered aluminium was reportedly delivered to the Centre des Etudes et de Recherche Scientifique (CERS, Scientific Studies and Research Centre)—the agency which oversees Syria’s missile and chemical weapons programs.95 Although Egypt’s participation in the Hwasong 6 program dates to the program’s inception, it appears to have been as a purchaser of technology rather than as a co-developer. With the cancellation of the joint Egyptian–Iraqi Condor II/Vector project during late 1989, the Hwasong 6 assumed a higher level of importance to Egypt. The missile-related ties between the two countries continued to expand throughout the 1990s. During May 1990, shortly before the first test launch of the Hwasong 6, President Hosni Mubarak visited P’yongyang. While there, he is believed to have visited the 125 Factory where the Hwasong 6 is assembled. Although Egypt is not known to have received entire Hwasong 6 missiles from the DPRK, it has received Hwasong 6 components and related technologies. In June 1996 US intelligence disclosed that over the course of a three-month period the DPRK had shipped to Egypt Hwasong 6-related materials and components. Included within these shipments were sheet metal used for the missile airframe, rocket motors and guidance devices.96 During 1998–99, Vietnam is reported to have obtained a small number of Hwasong 6 missiles as part of an arms agreement which included two SANG-O class SSc and SA–16s. The number of Hwasong 6s obtained and whether the arms agreement also included TELs is presently unknown.97 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s Libya has both pursued its indigenous al-Fatah missile program and provided varying levels of financing to the DPRK missile program. Although this financing has been primarily in support of the Syrian and Iranian missile programs, Libya has also purchased DPRK missile components and technology. These have been used to maintain its existing R–17s and incorporated into the al-Fatah and possibly other missile programs. While there have been numerous reports indicating




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Libyan interest in purchasing the Hwasong 6, none are known to have been delivered.98 During the 1990s DPRK relations with Sudan steadily grew closer (probably as a result of growing Iranian–Sudanese relations). In 1988–99 the DPRK is reported to have offered to sell Sudan a complete production facility for the manufacture of the Hwasong 5/6. The status of this offer is presently unknown.99 It is estimated that between 1987 and 1992, the DPRK exported 250 missiles and related technology worth $580 million to Egypt, Iran, Libya and Syria. Hwasong 5 and Hwasong 6 missiles are estimated to have cost $1.5–2 million apiece.100 No-dong (aka No-dong 1, Rodong 1, Scud Mod. D, Scud D)101 Work on what would eventually become known in the West as the No-dong (the DPRK national designator is unknown) is believed to have begun during 1988, shortly after the Hwasong 6. There appear to have been three primary design objectives for the No-dong program. First was to design a ballistic missile that could deliver a 1000–1500 kg warhead to a range of 1000–1500 km— enough to strike at targets throughout Japan, including US bases on Okinawa. Second was the development of a ‘base’ system and related technologies which could be utilised in the development of longer range ballistic missiles. Third, design of a ballistic missile with the capability of delivering a first generation nuclear weapon.102 To achieve the ambitious range and payload objectives with the technology base available to the DPRK the decision was made to essentially scale-up the existing Hwasong 6 design by 150 per cent. The resulting missile is 16 m long, has a diameter of 1.32 m and weighs approximately 16 tonnes. It can carry either a 1200 kg warhead to a range of 1300 km or a 1000 kg warhead to a range of 1500 km.103 While this simple expedient would be sufficient for the airframe and warhead, the engine and guidance systems provided a greater challenge. To address these issues the DPRK was able to secure the services of foreign nationals, most notably from Russia, Ukraine and the PRC. Because No-dong represented a dramatic expansion in missile design, development and technology for the DPRK progress proceeded at a considerably slower rate than had the Hwasong 5/6 programs. The new No-dong required a more powerful engine than the DPRK-produced version of the Isayev 9D21 found in the Hwasong 5/6. Following the pattern established with the airframe, DPRK




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engineers at the 118 Factory scaled up their existing Isayev 9D21 copy. This work was accomplished with the assistance of Russian engineers formerly with the Makeyev design bureau in Miass. Although the design of the new engine appears to have proceeded relatively quickly there appear to have been problems with its manufacture. These problems are believed to have been in the areas of quality control and the acquisition of special materials. These engines undoubtedly incorporate a number of foreignproduced components. Reports stating that the No-dong engine consists of four clustered Scud B engines are incorrect.104 The guidance system for the No-dong is apparently based on a development of that employed in the Hwasong 5/6. It is believed, however, that the DPRK received foreign assistance in adapting it for use in the No-dong. This system has apparently undergone several development cycles aimed at improving both reliability and accuracy, and later models are probably significantly different and more accurate than those produced early in the program. There is a possibility that this system may be modified to use GPS to further improve accuracy. At present, there are no reliable CEP estimates for the No-dong. The new warhead section of the No-dong is based upon that of the Hwasong 5/6, however it is longer and more tapered. Information that became available in 1998 indicates that the No-dong is capable of carrying either a 1000 kg or 1200 kg HE warhead. Following the lead of the Hwasong 5/6 program it is probable that the No-dong can be armed with HE, cluster, chemical or possibly biological warheads.105 More significantly, given what is known concerning the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, it appears as if the No-dong was intended to carry a first generation nuclear warhead.106 Concurrent with the development of the No-dong were a number of programs to design and develop support vehicles, and expand the basing and deployment infrastructure. Due to the Nodong’s large size and greater weight it could not use the standard Hwasong 5/6 TELs and transport vehicles. This led to the development of a number of system-specific vehicles including an MEL and a missile transport vehicle.107 In addition, a decoy vehicle of some sort was also produced.108 This vehicle-related work is probably performed in cooperation with the Sung ni General Automotive Factory. Preliminary evidence suggests that the MEL and transport vehicle were based upon commercially available heavy duty trucks and trailers. Reports suggest that the DPRK currently uses IVECO heavy duty




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trucks manufactured by Fiat in Italy for the chassis and cranes manufactured by the Austrian company Palfinger AG.109 The No-dong MEL may be similar to the one employed by the Iranians for their version of the No-dong—the Shehab 3. The increased size of the No-dong appears to have resulted in a number of changes to the deployment and support infrastructure. Storage tunnels needed to be enlarged, access roads widened, fuel storage sites enlarged. More significantly, the ambitious construction program for specialised hardened missile tunnels and launch facilities continued.110 As noted above the design and production of the airframe proceeded relatively quickly, however the engine and guidance systems proved to be more problematic. These difficulties undoubtedly were the prime factor behind the long gestation of the No-dong. The first No-dong prototype is believed to have been available by mid-1990, when the DPRK appears to have initiated a test program. During May 1990 US intelligence detected what appears to have been the first prototype No-dong on a launch pad at the Musudan-ni Launch Facility.111 No missile launch, however, was detected. Subsequent photographs of the site revealed no missile and what appeared to be burn marks, leading to the assumption that there may have been a catastrophic failure of the missile resulting in an explosion. Other possibilities include an engine performance test or simply a training exercise with a No-dong prototype or mock-up. During November of the same year, the DPRK initiated preparations for a second missile test. This was accompanied by increased activity by the KPN along the east coast—apparently preparing to assist in the test by tracking the missile’s flight over the East Sea. US Navy radar tracking ships positioned in the East Sea, however, detected no launch.112 It was June 1992 before any further test activity associated with the No-dong program was detected, when Japanese military sources indicated that a second launch cancellation or failure occurred. In May 1993, the DPRK conducted its largest ballistic missile test event to date, when four missiles were launched—three Hwasong 5/6 and one No-dong. US intelligence first detected the possibility of a test launch during late April when activity at the Musudan-ni Launch Facility was detected. This activity was far more significant than had been previously detected and included the assembling of loading cranes and TELs (and possibly MELs), modification of launch towers to accommodate a larger missile, and more. These activities were accompanied by an increased level of KPN activities at Ch’ongjin and other ports along the east coast,




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which was correctly assumed to be associated with the assembling of ships to track a forthcoming missile test. The primary focus of this KPN activity was the deployment of two KPN vessels, a 1500-tonne NAJIN class frigate and a 500-tonne YUKTO II class minesweeper, positioned 30 km apart and 350 km off Japan’s Noto Peninsula. In addition, several other KPN vessels were observed to the north of these two ships. On 29 May the test launches began and would continue on the following day. All four missiles were apparently aimed at target buoys in the East Sea and along an azimuth facing the Noto Peninsula. Several—if not all—of the Hwasong 5/6s were launched from TELs or MELs. A number of points of the May test stand out. None of the missiles flew beyond 500 km. The No-dong travelled the furthest— 500 km—overflying the KPN tracking ships. One Hwasong 5/6 travelled 100 km, while the remaining two fell short of the 100 km mark. No telemetry was detected being transmitted from any of the missiles.113 While some analysts have speculated that the missiles’ ranges were intentionally reduced in an attempt to secrete the No-dong among the Hwasong 5/6s being tested, this does not explain why the DPRK did not launch all of the missiles out to a range of 500 km. There are a number of possible explanations for the reduced range of the missiles. Although the reduced ranges may suggest a failure, it is more probable that it was intentionally restricted in order to test engine cut-off capability, the accuracy of the missiles at shorter ranges, or other performance characteristics. It is possible that the Hwasong 5/6 launches were in some fashion also supporting the No-dong development program. The complete absence of telemetry interception is intriguing given the limited number of missile tests conducted. One final aspect of the May 1993 test is of interest—the presence of Iranian and Pakistani observers at the test.114 In March 1993, an Iranian delegation travelled to P’yongyang to discuss ballistic missile related cooperation and the No-dong. Pakistani interest in the No-dong dates to the early 1990s. In August 1992 DPRK Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam travelled to Pakistan to discuss matters concerning bilateral cooperation. High on the list of matters discussed is believed to have been mutual missile cooperation and the No-dong.115 These visits set the stage for observer teams from Iran and Pakistan to be present at the Musudan-ni Launch Facility for the May 1993 test event.116 During late April 1994, US intelligence once again detected preparations at the Musudan-ni Launch Facility for what was believed to be a production No-dong test. These, once again,




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included the assembling of loading cranes and TEL/MELs, modification of launch towers to accommodate a larger missile, and increased KPN activities (indicative of the assembling of tracking ships) at Ch’ongjin and other ports along the east coast. Without explanation, however, all activity ceased. The cancellation of this test was apparently in response to the very sensitive and intense US–DPRK nuclear negotiations then under way in Geneva. The DPRK has not conducted any further flight testing of the No-dong, though another flight test was planned for October 1996.117 This was cancelled in consideration of political developments with the US at the time and as a result of the capture of the SANG-O class submarine at Kangnung in September. Estimates as to when the No-dong became operational and production rates for the system vary considerably. Small numbers of prototypes were probably built between 1989 and 1990. Low-rate production had begun by January 19991 and a small number of missiles were probably available for contingency usage shortly afterwards (the DPRK apparently accepted a significantly lower level of reliability and readiness in order to field the systems more quickly). It probably was 1993 or 1994, however, before the system was produced and fielded in sufficient numbers to be considered truly operational. 118 Production rates for the Nodong have probably averaged two–four per month, concurrently with the Hwasong 6. It is likely that the Hwasong 6 will be phased out in favour of the No-dong when the Taep’o-dong 1 comes into production. At the end of 1999, the DPRK is estimated to have produced a total of 75–150 No-dong missiles, of which 24–50 were sold to foreign countries; one–five were used for initial operations, test and evaluation/training; and 50–100 are in current inventory. It is currently believed that, to facilitate the operational deployment of the No-dong, experienced personnel from the Hwasong 5/6 regiment were utilised to establish an independent No-dong battalion. The organisation of this battalion is believed to be similar to that of Hwasong 5/6 battalions, however some reports suggest that it is equipped with six–nine TELs. It is possible that additional independent No-dong battalions will be formed as more systems are produced. Published reports suggest that a base for an independent No-dong battalion, with six TELs, is being constructed near Yongo-dong, Yanggang-do. During late 1990s, the DPRK undertook a major reorganisation of its FROG and ballistic missile forces and established a ballistic missile division directly subordinate to the General Staff Department. The organisation of this division is unclear, however it is




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Figure 9.3 No-dong battalion (postulated)

HQ (x3–4)

Technical

Staff

SA–7/–14 1 TEL or MEL Rear services

Survey

known to consist of the FROG brigade, Hwasong 5/6 regiment and the No-dong battalion. Administration and support units probably consist of a headquarters (staff and rear services), air defence battalion, engineer battalion, communications battalion, missile technical battalion, target acquisition and survey company, nuclear–chemical defence company, transportation company and maintenance company.119 The No-dong program has undoubtedly benefited significantly from the experiences, technology exchanges and 1998 test flights of the Pakistani Ghauri and Iranian Shehab 3 programs. Ghauri (Hatf V) and Ghauri 2 The Pakistani–DPRK missile relationship dates to the late 1980s. In December 1988, Benazir Bhutto became Prime Minister of




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14.5/37/57 mm No-dong

Technical

Hwasong 5/6

HQ

FROG–3/5/7

Figure 9.4 Ballistic missile division (postulated)




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Pakistan. Although she would accomplish little and be dismissed the following August, she threw her full support behind the acquisition of PRC ballistic missiles and expanded Pakistan–DPRK missile and nuclear cooperation. An indication of this expanded cooperation was the visit by Pakistani officials to the 125 Factory in P’yongyang (and possibly the Sanum-dong research and development facility) to examine the No-dong. This visit may have been related to the June 1992 failed, or cancelled, No-dong test event.120 The following month DPRK Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam travelled to Syria (27–30 July), Iran (30 July– 3 August) and Pakistan (4–7 August), to discuss matters concerning bilateral cooperation. High on the list of matters discussed is believed to have been mutual missile cooperation and DPRK sales of Hwasong 6 and possibly No-dong missiles.121 The following year, Pakistani and Iranian specialists are believed to have been present for the DPRK’s 29–30 May 1993 test event in which one No-dong and three Hwasong 6 were launched.122 In December 1993, two months after her re-election as prime minister, Benazir Bhutto travelled to the PRC and the DPRK. Although she publicly denied it, subsequent events indicate that she was seeking, among other things, increased cooperation in the development of ballistic missiles, specifically a system capable of striking strategic targets within India. Immediately after leaving Beijing, Bhutto travelled to P’yongyang on 30 December to request similar assistance from the DPRK.123 Shortly afterwards, during late 1993 or early 1994, Pakistan established a ballistic missile project to purchase and manufacture the No-dong missile—known locally as the Ghauri (Hatf V).124 From this point on Pakistan–DPRK political, scientific and missile cooperation accelerated. During April 1994, a delegation of the DPRK Foreign Ministry headed by Pak Chung-kuk travelled to Iran and Pakistan.125 In September of the same year another delegation led by Choe Hui-chong, chairman of the State Commission of Science and Technology, travelled to Pakistan.126 During late November 1995, a DPRK military delegation led by Marshal Choe Kwang (Vice Chairman of the National Defence Commission and Minister of the People’s Armed Forces) travelled to Pakistan. Here he meet Pakistani President Sardar Leghari, Defence Minister Aftab Shaban Mirani, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chief of Naval Operations, Commander of the Air Force and various other military officials. Choe is also believed to have visited the missile-related production facilities in the Faisalabad–Lahore area and possibly even Jhelum (the area from




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which the Ghauri was subsequently launched).127 Choe is believed to have finalised the agreement to provide Pakistan with major components from the No-dong or Taep’o-dong programs, about 12–25 No-dong missiles, and at least one TEL or MEL.128 The agreed upon items were to be produced by the Fourth Machine Industry Bureau of the Second Economic Committee and a majority are believed to have been delivered to the Khan Research Laboratories at Kahuta in spring the following year by the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation (aka North Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation/Bureau).129 On 24 April 1998 the US State Department imposed sanctions against both the Khan Research Laboratories and Changgwang Sinyong Corporation.130 This was the second time that the State Department had imposed sanctions against the Khan Research Laboratories. The first time occurred during August 1993 in relation to Pakistan’s acquisition of PRC ballistic DF–11/M–11 missiles. The Changgwang Sinyong Corporation was also the organisation responsible for supplying Iran with DPRK missile technologies, components and missiles during the mid-1990s. The Iranian Ministry of Defence Armed Forces Logistics and State Purchasing Office and the corporation were subsequently placed under US State Department sanctions during June 1996.131 On 6 April 1998 Pakistan conducted its first test of the Ghauri which it claimed had a range of 1500 km. While Pakistan has publicly stated that the missile was designed and produced indigenously it was, in fact, a DPRK-produced No-dong launched from an MEL. This was the second test of a No-dong and it is believed that DPRK observers were present. The specific events that precipitated the testing of the Ghauri are uncertain. It is clear, however, that India’s testing of its Prithvi missile in 1997 was an underlying cause. In a speech before the Pakistani parliament on 17 February 1997, Benazir Bhutto stated that, ‘Pakistan will give its response to Prithvi this year’. Although the scheduled response would slip until April of the following year it is clear that Bhutto had the Ghauri in mind when she made her statement.132 Following the test flights of both the Ghauri and Ghauri 2, Pakistan has made numerous statements indicating that it is developing a series of more capable ballistic missiles including the Ghaznavi, Abdali and Shaheen. For example, several days after the 6 April test of the Ghauri, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the director of the Ghauri program and Khan Reserach Laboratories, announced that Pakistan was in the process of developing the Ghaznavi, with a range of 2000 km.133 During July 1998, press




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reports stated that SUPARCO, presumably in cooperation with the Khan Research Laboratories, has completed initial design and development of two additional ballistic missiles—the Abdali and Shaheen. Both systems are based upon the Ghauri but with greater ranges and capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The Abdali is reported to have a designed range of 3500 km. Prototypes of both these systems are reported to be currently available for flighttesting.134 The status of these programs and the extent of DPRK involvement is presently unclear, but all these new systems will incorporate both technology and components from the Taep’o-dong programs and the PRC. At a minimum the Ghauri programs will continue to incorporate both technology and components from the DPRK’s No-dong program. Shehab 3 Iran has been an active participant in the No-dong program from its inception during the late 1980s. This led to the establishment of the Shehab 3 program and has allowed both technology and components from the DPRK’s programs to continue to flow into Iran’s missile programs.135 Exactly when the Iranians established the Shehab 3 program is presently unclear. Preliminary evidence suggests that both the No-dong and Shehab 3 programs were established simultaneously during 1988, although the Shehab 3 program may have had a different name at the time. In March 1993, a 21-member Iranian delegation travelled to P’yongyang.136 This delegation was headed by Brigadier General Hossein Mantequei who was the director of the Defence Industries Organisation (which was responsible for the Iranian ballistic missile development and production program under a project known as ‘Department 140’).137 The purpose of the visit was reportedly to discuss ballistic missile related cooperation, arrange for Iranian participation in the forthcoming No-dong test and the purchase of No-dong missiles. The following year, in February 1994, KPAF commander General Cho Myong-rok visited Iran with a 29-member delegation of military and nuclear experts and toured the missile test site at Shahroud.138 This may have been a reciprocal visit to Hossein Mantequei’s March 1993 visit, and was intended to conclude final arrangements for the delivery of production No-dongs to Iran. Delivery of either No-dong components or a small number of completed missiles is believed to have occurred during midto late-1994. Sometime during late 1994 or early 1995, Iran also




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received four TELs from the DPRK. While these are believed to have been for the Hwasong 6, it is possible that there was an MEL for the No-dong within this shipment. Further deliveries apparently continued at a very slow rate for about a year, when funding and other problems apparently resulted in their halt. By 1997 low-level deliveries appeared to have resumed.139 There were apparently a number of quality, technical and production issues to be resolved with the new missiles and components. These problems had a domino effect which slowed shipments of missiles from the DPRK, introduction of the missile into Iranian service and start-up of Iranian production. It has been suggested that the Iranians were not pleased with the overall progress within the No-dong program and that the problems they were encountering with the newly delivered missiles only exacerbated this sentiment. This may have led to the decisions to replace a number of the missile’s subsystems with technology acquired from Russian sources and to focus longer range missile projects (e.g. Shehab 4) on Russian SS–4 technology rather than on the DPRK’s forthcoming Taep’o-dong.140 At present there is no reliable information available detailing the type of components and number of No-dong missiles provided to Iran by the DPRK. Some sources suggest that there was an agreement for 150 missiles, however this would appear to be excessive and remains to be verified.141 On 22 July 1998, Iran conducted its first test of the Shehab 3 (and the third test of a No-dong). This missile is believed to have been a DPR-produced No-dong which was assembled in Iran with few, if any, local internal modifications. The missile flew for approximately 100 seconds and travelled 1000 km before exploding. It is uncertain whether this was an accidental explosion, or if the Iranians deliberately terminated the flight after achieving their objectives. If this was an accidental explosion it would suggest that problems noted early by the Iranians may still not have been resolved. The Iranians may follow the DPRK lead and deploy the system regardless of any current problems. Like the earlier test of the Ghauri, DPRK observers are believed to have been present for the test of the Shehab 3.142 Further development of the No-dong/Shehab 3 system is being undertaken cooperatively by both the Iranians and the DPRK. It is believed, however, that the Iranian intention is for production versions of the missile to incorporate increasing levels of Russian, and possibly PRC, technologies or components.143 If this effort is successful it could result in a missile that is significantly different




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from the DPRK-produced No-dong. Since it is unlikely that the airframe or engine will change significantly, it will be difficult to identify many of these internal modifications. In support of the No-dong/Shehab 3 program the DPRK provided Iran with 12 No-dong engines during November 1999. These engines shipped from Sunan International Airport aboard an Iran Air Boeing 747-100 transport and arrived in Iran on 21 November. Iranian–DPRK Shehab 3 cooperation may also have extended into the space launch vehicle and satellite, and the Shehab 4 programs. In August 1998 Iranian television showed what appears to be a mock-up of a clamshell nosecone with a small satellite inside it and a model of a space launch vehicle with a bulbous payload section, apparently based upon the Shehab 3. The Shehab 4 (with and estimated range of 2000 km) may utilise two booster stages equipped with No-dong engines or, possibly, a single No-dong booster stage on top of a more powerful Russian-designed firststage booster.144 Egypt, Libya and Syria Throughout the 1990s Egypt continued to cooperate with the DPRK in a broad range of ballistic missile development activities. This cooperation accelerated during the late 1990s and witnessed the exchange of missile technology and components. During March 1999 three Egyptian companies (Arab British Dynamics, Helwan Machinery and Equipment Company, and the Kader Factory for Developed Industries) were sanctioned by the US Government because they provided the DPRK with access to duel-use Western and US technologies with missile applications. In return for this access the DPRK continued to provide Egypt with a range of missile-related materials, components, production assistance and technologies. For example, in July 1999, the DPRK shipped Egypt specialty steel—with missile applications—through a PRC company in Hong Kong. Egypt is believed to have full access to the No-dong program and may be using a combination of No-dong and Condor II/Vector technologies to develop its own medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM). To date Egypt is not known to have received complete No-dong missiles. Missilerelated personnel continue to travel between these two countries.145 Although Syria appears to be satisfied with its current Hwasong 6 capabilities it is believed that it would also like to obtain a small number of No-dong missiles. The 1996 visit to the DPRK by a delegation of Syrian missiles technicians, while




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believed to be primarily concerned with the Hwasong 6 program, may have been related to Syrian interest in the No-dong. During April 2000 the head of the KPA’s General Bureau of Technology (aka Technology Bureau), Lieutenant General Kim Yang-chom, led a delegation to Syria. There he met with Syrian Defence Minister Mustafa Talas and Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Ali Aslan. It is believed that among the topics discussed was the exchange of ballistic missiles.146 During the 1990s Libya received both No-dong components and technology for use within its indigenous al-Fatah and other missile programs. On 24 November 1999, British customs and intelligence personnel at Gatwick Airport seized an illegal consignment of ‘Scud’ missile parts bound for Libya. The parts were discovered packed in 32 crates disguised as automobile spare parts when they arrived on a British Airways flight bound for Tripoli via Malta. The shipping records seized with the consignment indicated that it both originated with a subsidiary of the textile firm Nan Liang Company based in Taiwan and that similar consignments had previously been shipped to Libya through Great Britain. The initial investigation suggested that the components originated in the DPRK and were trans-shipped through Hong Kong using false documentation. DPRK origins were subsequently confirmed when components for the No-dong engine were identified among the siezed missile parts. To date Libya is not known to have received complete No-dong missiles. In addition to the provision of missile components and technology there have been reports indicating the development of a joint DPRK–Libyan missile test facility. This, however, remains to be verified.147 Taep’o-dong 1 (aka No-dong 2, Rodong 2, Scud Mod. E and Scud X), Taep’o-dong 1 SLV, Taep’o-dong 2 (aka No-dong 3) During the early 1990s, the DPRK initiated development of two ambitious ballistic missile systems which would become known in the West as the Taep’o-dong 1 and Taep’o-dong 2 (the DPRK designators are unknown).148 The design objectives for the Taep’odong 1 appear to have been for a system which could deliver a 1000–1500 kg warhead to a range of 1500–2500 km. The Taep’odong 2 would carry the same warhead 4000–8000 km.149 Both systems are a logical evolution of the experience gained and technology employed in the development and production of the Hwasong 5/6 and No-dong. To facilitate the design and production of these new systems the design decision was apparently




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SA–2/HQ–2 SSM DF–61 Scud B (R–17E) Hwasong 5 Prototype Scud Mod. A) Hwasong 5 (Scud Mod. B, Scud B) Hwasong 6 (Scud Mod. C, Scud C, Scud PIP) No-dong (No-dong 1, Rodong 1, Scud Mod. D, Scud D) Taep’o-dong 1 (Daep’o-dong 1, No-dong 2, Scud X, Scud Mod. E, Rodong 2)

SRBM

1

770e

500

50–100 700–1000 100–500 500–1000

6700i

Taep’o-dong 1 SLV

Taep’o-dong 2 (Daep’o-dong 2, No-dong 3) (Three Stage Taep’o-dong 2, Taep’o-dong 3)

IRBM

ICBM 2 3

3

2

32 (18/14) ?

26.0 (13.7/9.1/3.2)

25.5 (13.7/11.8)

16.0

11.3

11.2

11.2

10.7 9.0 11.2

Length (mb)

2.4/1.32 ?

1.32/0.884/0.884

1.32/0.884

1.32

0.884

0.884

0.884

0.65/0.5 1.0 0.884

Diameter (m)

64.3 ?

18.7

20.7

16.25

5.93

5.86

5.86

2.287 6.0 5.86

Weight (tonnes)

2000 ?

1998

1998

1993

1989

1985

1984

1976 n.a. 1981

DPRK IOCc

Notes: Figures for all DPRK-produced systems are based upon the best ‘open source’ information currently available and should be regarded as provisional. a There is considerable confusion concerning the national designators for the DPRK’s missiles. One defector claims that the first DPRK-produced copy of the R–17E is identified as the Hwasong 1, while the No-dong 1 and Taep’o-dong 1 are Hwasong 5 and Hwasong 6 respectively. Another defector identifies the Hwasong 1, 2 and 3 as surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, and air-to-surface missiles respectively. Reliable non-DPRK sources identify the DPRK produced ‘Scud B’ as Hwasong 5 and the ‘Scud C’ as the Hwasong 6. Until more information becomes available these later designations will be used. Hwasong translates as Mars. b Figures are for 1st, 2nd and 3rd stages respectively. The 2nd stage figures include the interstage assembly.

6000+ 10–12 000

700–1000

4000h

1

1

000

320–340

1200 700

1

1000

300

1350f 1500f

2 1 1

190 1000d 1000

Warhead (kg) Stages

60–160 600 300

Range (km)

2500g

MRBM

Name (alternate names)a

Class

Table 9.3 Missile characteristics

i

g h

d e f

c

DPRK IOC: Initial operational capability. The DPRK places missiles systems into service decidedly earlier in their development phase than do most other nations. The PRC planned a domestic version with a 1000 km range and a 500 kg nuclear warhead. Several sources suggest that the Hwasong 6 warhead weighs 700 kg. The 1350 km figure is derived from Iranian information for the Shehab 3 which ‘. . . can carry at least 1200 kg of explosives’. The 1500 km figure is based upon Pakistani information which gives the Ghauri this range with a 700 kg warhead. This is the latest ROK Ministry of Defense estimate. Earlier public estimates were 1500–2000 km. The best information currently available suggests that during the 1998 Taep’o-dong 1 SLV launch, the payload, or debris from the payload, travelled approximately 4000 km. When employed as a ballistic missile, a space launch vehicle (SLV) capable of placing a 100 kg payload into low earth orbit is theoretically capable of delivering a 200 kg warhead to a range of approximately 10 000 km. This is assuming a launch trajectory due east. This is the latest ROK Ministry of Defense estimate. Earlier public estimates were 4000–6000 km.

278


made to utilise the No-dong and Hwasong 6 as the basic ‘building blocks’. The Taep’o-dong 1 is a two-stage system, which appears to utilise derivatives of the No-dong as the first stage and a Hwasong 6 as the second stage. It is approximately 25.5 m long and weighs 20.7 tonnes. It is estimated that it can carry a 700–1000 kg warhead to a distance of 2500 km. The Taep’o-dong 2 is also a two-stage system, which appears to be constructed by utilising a newly designed first stage and a No-dong variant as the second stage. It is approximately 32 m long and weighs 64.3 tonnes. The first stage of the Taep’o-dong 2 is a newly designed system which appears to be based either upon the clustering of three No-dong engines or a new single engine (possibly of Russian or PRC origins). It is approximately 18 m long and 2.4 m in diameter.150 It is estimated that it can carry a 700–1000 kg warhead to a distance of 6700 km. There have been frequent reports suggesting a linkage between both systems—especially the Taep’o-dong 2—and PRC missiles (i.e. DF–3). These, however, remain to be confirmed.151 The relatively long gestation period for these systems is a result of delays in the No-dong program and technical issues concerning multi-staging, engine design, clustering, guidance, airframe design and the economic turmoil that the DPRK has faced in the 1990s. Multi-staging requires the design of a sequencing system which will terminate operation of the first stage, smoothly separate it from the second stage (typically using explosive bolts), and ignite the second stage. These multi-staged missiles also required a more advanced guidance system than available in the Hwasong 6 or No-dong. Airframe design probably presented challenges with interstaging and adjusting for the different aerodynamic loadings at various stages of flight. As noted above with the No-dong program, many of these technical issues were and are being addressed by employing missile designers and engineers from Russia, Ukraine, and others. DPRK missile designers and engineers have continued to travel to the PRC for professional training and possibly technology exchange throughout the 1990s. Estimates concerning the size and type of warheads the Taep’odong 1/2 can carry have varied considerably. Following the lead of the No-dong program it is probable that the DPRK has designed HE, cluster, chemical and nuclear warheads for the Taep’o-dong 1/2. The mock-ups of these two new systems were identified by US intelligence, at the Sanum-dong research and development facility, during February 1994.152 Following the revelation of the new systems the DPRK began an active program to shield the




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mock-ups from US observation. Since that time the DPRK has expanded both camouflage and deception operations to mask activities of its missile development activities. These include the construction of fake facilities, manufacture and deployment of numerous decoy vehicles and missiles, and more.153 Because of these deception activities it is increasingly difficult to determine the developmental progress of the Taep’o-dong 1/2. There has been some discussion that a February 1994 static rocket engine firing at the ‘Taep’o-dong rocket test stand’ was directly related to the Taep’o-dong program.154 Another possible indication of the Taep’odong development program was the abovementioned modification of the launch towers in May 1994 at the Musudan-ni Launch Facility and the erection of a ‘giant shelter pad against propellant jets’.155 Sometime during late 1993 or early 1994, at a meeting of the KWP Central Committee, Kim Il-song expressed the desire to place a satellite into orbit.156 This decision was apparently precipitated by the international recognition received by the successful launch of the ROK’s second research satellite, Uribyol II, in September 1993. Kim’s expressed desire has apparently led to the establishment of a space program and the requirement for a space launch vehicle (SLV). The most likely candidate for use as an SLV was the Taep’o-dong 1. Since the timing of this decision and the start of the Taep’o-dong program were so close, it is possible that from its inception there were plans for an SLV version.157 The Taep’o-dong 1 SLV is a three-stage system which appears to utilise derivatives of the No-dong as the first stage, Hwasong 6 as the second stage, and a solid fuel third stage (possibly derived from the HQ–2) booster. It is approximately 26 m long and weighs 18.7 tonnes. Concurrent with the development of the delivery system work began on a small satellite which would be named the Kwangmyongsong 1 (Bright Lodestar).158 In designing the Kwangmyongsong 1, the DPRK is believed to have received considerable assistance from the PRC’s Academy of Launch Technology. This assistance, albeit at varying levels of intensity, has continued until the present and the forthcoming Kwangmyongsong 2. It may also extend to additional, unnamed satellites—possibly including a crude reconnaissance satellite.159 The expansion of the ballistic missile infrastructure has continued throughout the development of the No-dong and Taep’o-dong programs. The construction of specialised ‘underground missile bases’ or ‘missile silos’, which began during the mid-1980s, has continued through the 1990s. A small number of these facilities




279

280


are located throughout the country and are now believed capable of handling both the No-dong and Taep’o-dong 1—and possibly the Taep’o-dong 2. In addition, a small number of specialised transport and support vehicles have been manufactured for the Taep’o-dong 1/2 programs, including an MEL for the Taep’o-dong 1 and missile transport vehicles.160 The first prototypes for these systems were probably constructed during 1995–96. An initial production run for the Taep’o-dong 1 may have begun during 1997–98 and it is estimated that a rate of one per month could possibly be achieved if Hwasong 6 and No-dong production were curtailed. At the end of 1999, the DPRK is estimated to have produced a total of one–ten Taep’odong 1/SLVs and one–two Taep’o-dong 2 prototypes. On 31 August 1998, the DPRK conducted its first flight of a Taep’o-dong system—the three-stage Taep’o-dong 1 SLV. The objective of the mission was to place the DPRK’s first satellite—the Kwangmyongsong 1—into orbit. Launch preparations began at the Musudan-ni Launch Facility on 7 August. This was accompanied two weeks later by the movement of KPN vessels into the East Sea. By 27 August, final preparations for a test were detected by US intelligence and surveillance assets were moved into position. Lift-off occurred at 1207 hours on 31 August. The three-stage Taep’o-dong 1 SLV flew due east across the East Sea. The first stage separated at T+95 seconds and impacted in the East Sea approximately 253 km east of the Musudan-ni Launch Facility. At T+144 seconds the payload shroud separated and impacted in the Pacific Ocean approximately 1090 km from the launch site (east of the main Japanese island of Honshu). The second stage separated at T+266 seconds and impacted in the Pacific Ocean approximately 1646 km east of the Musudan-ni Launch Facility. The third stage apparently suffered a technical failure and failed to insert the Kwangmyongsong 1 into orbit. Instead it continued east, burning up, with a debris trail that apparently extended to approximately 4000 km. The test was tracked by US aircraft and ships of the US Navy, including the Observation Island. After the test, Japan’s Self Defence Forces sent three destroyers and patrol aircraft to search the impact area in the Pacific for wreckage of the missile and its warhead. These efforts may be in vain since the second stage impacted on the edge of the Japan Trench in waters with a depth of some 5000 m and the third stage burnt up.161 The DPRK has never acknowledged this failure. Instead, on 4 September, the Korean Central Broadcasting Network read an announcement signed by Kim Chong-il that ‘our scientists and




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technicians succeeded in launching its first satellite into orbit with multi-staged delivery rockets’.162 They further claimed that it was circling the Earth and transmitting the revolutionary anthems ‘the Song of the Sun, the Song of General Kim Il-song and General Kim Chong-il’.163 For ‘successfully launching Kwangmyongsong 1’ numerous scientists, technicians, workers and officials were awarded state commendations, titles and gifts.164 In December 1998, the DPRK announced that it would launch the Kwangmyongsong 2, but did not set a date for the launch.165 The launch of the Taep’o-dong 1 SLV was the longest flight of any DPRK missile system to date. While the timing of this launch was correctly anticipated and predicted by US intelligence it also demonstrated a number of unanticipated developments. Up to this point the DPRK was only known to have developed a two-stage Taep’o-dong 1 ballistic missile. The third-stage and satellite capabilities came as a surprise, indicating that the program is further along the timetable in developing ICBMs than had previously been estimated. The launch tested a number of important aspects of ICBM development, such as multi-stage separation, guidance and multi-fuel systems. It also validated the two-stage Taep’o-dong 1 and its ability to deliver a 700–1000 kg warhead to about 2500 km. If the three-stage Taep’o-dong 1 SLV were to be configured as a missile it could deliver a 200 kg warhead into the central section of the US, although with poor accuracy. With a 100 kg warhead, it could reach Washington, DC. The larger and more powerful Taep’o-dong 2, which has yet to be tested, is now assessed as being able to deliver a 700–1000 kg warhead to about 6700 km, although the accuracy would also be poor. If the DPRK was willing to settle for a smaller warhead this system has the potential to strike any point within the continental US.166 The Taep’o-dong development is being aggressively pursued and improvements are being incorporated into the system.167 As of April 2000, the Taep’o-dong program is assessed as being able to: • • • • •

conduct a second Taep’o-dong 1 SLV launch, possibly with the Kwangmyongsong 2 satellite; conduct the first launch of a Taep’o-dong 1 MRBM/IRBM; conduct the first launch of a Taep’o-dong 2 ICBM; conduct the first launch of a Taep’o-dong 2 SLV, possibly with the Kwangmyongsong 2 satellite; place the Taep’o-dong 2 ICBM in service with the KPA without any flight test.168




281

282


Excluding either political developments or the collapse of the DPRK, development of the Taep’o-dong family will undoubtedly continue for the foreseeable future. If the program is allowed to proceed unfettered, likely developments within the next ten years will include: •

• •

a three-stage version of the Taep’o-dong 2 ICBM (sometimes identified in press reports as the Taep’o-dong 3). Such a system could deliver a 500–1000 kg warhead to a distance of 10– 12 000 km (e.g. anywhere within the US); development of more sophisticated reentry vehicles, warheads and penetration aids; a new and more sophisticated two- or three-stage system incorporating improved guidance (possibly utilising GPS or stellar), engine with gimbaled nozzles, greater throw weight etc.

It is unclear whether the Taep’o-dong will be deployed within the new ballistic missile division or as an independent battalion. A Taep’o-dong missile battalion might consist of a headquarters (staff, technical section, rear services section and communications section), one–two firing batteries (each with one launcher) and an air defence company. Such battalions will be deployed in the specialised ‘underground missile bases’ or ‘missile silos’ built during the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 9.5). Like the No-dong program, it is probable that the Taep’o-dong program has benefited from the experiences, technology exchanges and test flights of the Pakistani Ghauri and Iranian Shehab 3 programs. It is also believed that both Iranian and Pakistani observers were present for the Taep’o-dong 1 SLV launch.169 Iran has been involved in the development of the Taep’o-dong family from its inception. This involvement has included financing and the exchange of information, technology and personnel. Although Iran was initially deeply interested in the acquisition of Taep’odong 1/2 missiles and technology, it appears that Iran has now committed itself to utilising Russian technology for its Shehab 4. Iranian–DPRK cooperation in the program may extend to the Taep’o-dong 1 SLV and Kwangmyongsong satellites. The export of Taep’o-dong 1/2 missiles or technology to Pakistan is also of great concern. The Pakistani announcement of the 2000 km Ghaznavi may, in reality, be a Taep’o-dong 1. There is concern that the ongoing missile cooperation between Egypt and the DPRK may extend to the Taep’o-dong programs, with Western and US technologies finding their way into the Taep’o-dong systems while




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Figure 9.5 Taep’o-dong 1/2 battalion (postulated)

HQ

SA–7/–14 1 Launcher each

Technical

Staff

Rear Services

Egypt gains access to Taep’o-dong technologies and components which may be applied to its MRBM program. There is concern that the ongoing missile cooperation between Egypt and the DPRK may extend to the Taep’o-dong programs, with Western and US technologies finding their way into the Taep’o-dong systems while Egypt gains access to Taep’o-dong technologies and components which may be applied to its MRBM program.170 The extent of Libyan or Syrian interest or involvement in the Taep’o-dong programs is presently unclear. The DPRK is reportedly offering the Taep’o-dong 1 to these countries at a cost of US$6 million apiece.171 Production and basing infrastructure172 The research, development and production of all missiles within the DPRK involves the cooperation of three separate but inter-related branches of the government—the KWP, the Cabinet and the National Defence Commission. The National Defence Commission’s Second Economic Committee and MPAF, however, occupy the central roles. The specific nature and extent of the KWP’s involvement in any of the missile programs is presently unknown. Likewise, very little is known concerning the involvement of the Cabinet in any of the missile programs. The Cabinet’s Academy of Sciences provides technical assistance to the Second Economic Committee’s




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284


Table 9.4 Missile production facilities Facility

Location

Comment

26 Factory (aka Factory No. 26, or Kanggye No. 26 General Plant)

Kanggye, Kanggye-si, Chagang-do

Reportedly the largest underground facility within the DPRK, employing an estimated 10–20 000 workers to produce components for ballistic missiles as well as: surface-to-air, antitank and air-tosurface missiles; rockets for multiple rocket launchers; depth charges; torpedoes; mines, and numerous other weapons and munitions.173

118 Factory (aka January 18th Machinery Factory, 118 Factory, or Factory No. 118)

Kagam-ri, Kaech’on-gun, P’yongan-namdo

Employs an estimated 10 000 workers and is partially underground. Involved in a wide range of weapons production projects, including engines for rockets, missiles, torpedoes and tanks. During the late 1970s it began the production of a reversed engineered FROG–7. It currently produces engines for the DPRK’s ballistic missiles.

125 Factory (aka Factory No. 125, 125th Machine Factory or P’yongyang Pig Factory)

Chunggye-dong, Hyongje-san, P’yongyang-si

Employs an estimated 5000 workers. It is the DPRK’s primary ballistic missile assembly facility. It is also involved in the assembly of surface-to-air and anti-ship cruise missiles. Foreign dignitaries and military delegations from Egypt, Iran, Pakistan and Syria have visited the factory.

301 Factory (aka Plant No. 301)

Taegwan-up, Taegwan-gun, P’yongan-bukto

Reportedly involved in the production of missiles.

East Sea Light Ch’ongjin, Electric Plant (aka, Hamgyong-bukto East Sea Light Electrical Factory)

Employs an estimated 4000 workers. Involved in the production of surface-to-air missiles and anti-tank guided missiles. May play a role in the production of surface-to-air missiles.

Kumsong Tractor Kangso, Namp’o-si The largest tractor factory in the DPRK. Factory (aka Produces tracked TELs for anti-ship Kumsong General cruise missiles. Tractor Works, Kumsong Tractor Complex, Kumsong Tractor Comprehensive Factory, Kumsong Tractor General Plant and Kumsong Tractor Plant)




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Table 9.4 Missile production facilities (cont.) Facility

Location

Comment

Man’gyongdae Light Man’gyongdae-ri, P’yongyang-si Electric Plant (aka Man’gyongdae Light Electric Machinery Plant, Man’gyongdae Light Electric Appliances and Machine Plant, Maritime Missile Factory, Yakch’on Machine Factory, Yakch’on Machinery Plant and Jisangdae)

Employs an estimated 6000 workers. Involved in the design and production of coastal defence and anti-ship cruise missiles. It is believed to be involved in the production of surface-to-surface missiles, explosive compounds for warheads and possibly solid fuel engines.174

Man’gyongdae Machine Tool Plant

Reportedly produces ‘guided-missile launchers’.175

Man’gyongdae-ri, P’yongyang-si

Musudan-ni Launch Musudan-ni, Facility (aka Hwadae-gun, Hwadae Agriculture Hamgyong-bukto Experimental Yard)

Primary DPRK missile and rocket test launch facility.

P’yongyang Semiconductor Plant (aka P’yongyang Integrated Circuit Factory)

P’yongyang-si

Manufactures electronic components for the various missile programs.

NamgungniSanum-dong Sanum-dong, Research and P’yongyang-si Development Facility (aka Sanum-dong Plant)

Although commonly identified by the US as the Sanum-dong Research and Development Facility, this is actually located at Namgungni-Sanum-dong (14 km north of the centre of P’yongyang). It is reported to be involved in the assembly of ballistic missiles or ballistic missile sub-assemblies.

Tokch’on, Sungni General Automotive Factory Tokch’on-si, P’yongan-namdo (aka Sungni Automobile Combined Plant, Sungni Automobile General Plant, Sungni Automobile Factory or Sungni Motor Combination Enterprise, or Tokch’on Motor Plant)

Employs an estimated 7000 workers. Reportedly responsible for the production of ballistic missile TELs, MELs and support vehicles. These are believed to be based upon the Chaju-ho (10 ton), Konsol-ho (25 tonne), and Kumuasan-ho (40 tonne) series of heavy trucks. This facility has 18 affiliated factories.




285

286


Table 9.4 Missile production facilities (cont.) Facility

Location

unidentified machine factory

Kangso, Namp’o-si Reports indicate the presence of a missile related production facility in Namp’o.

Comment

unidentified machine factory

Tokhyon, U’iju-gun, P’yongan-bukto

Reports indicate the presence of a factory which produces ‘engines mounted on missiles’ (possibly related to anti-ship cruise missile engines).

Academy of Defence Sciences, while the various research institutes and production facilities subordinate to the Cabinet’s ministries provide components and sub-assemblies to the Second Economic Committee for the production of missiles. The newly established Electronics Industry Ministry will likely play a key role within the ballistic missile programs in the future. The primary organisations within the Second Economic Committee responsible for all missile development and production are the 2nd Machine Industry Bureau, 4th Machine Industry Bureau and Academy of Defence Sciences. The 2nd Machine Industry Bureau is believed responsible for the procurement, modification and development of TELs, MELs and specialised vehicles for all the various missile programs. The 4th Machine Industry Bureau controls the facilities that manufacture and assemble missiles. The Second Economic Committee’s Academy of Defence Sciences has at least three organisations involved in missile development—the Electronics and Guidance Systems Institute, Engineering Research Institute and the Guided Missile Division. The Electronics and Guidance Systems Institute at Kanggye, Chagang-do, is believed to be responsible for the design and development of guidance and control systems for all classes of missiles,176 while the Guided Missile Division and Engineering Research Institute are responsible for the reverse-engineering of all missile systems and the design of new systems. The Engineering Research Institute is headed by Kwon Tong-ha.177 The exact subordination of the Sanum-dong Research and Development Facility at Namgungni-Sanum-dong is unclear. It may be subordinate to the Academy of Defence Science. This facility appears to be involved in both missile and general military technology research. In 1994, when US intelligence identified the mock-ups of the Taep’o-dong 1 and Taep’o-dong 2 at the facility, also on display were an HY–2 and mobile launcher, a mobile crane,




286


FINAL PAGES

p: (02) 9438 3722 f: (02) 9438 3733



287

Missile Test and Evaluation Unit

Musudan-ni Launch Facility

Kanggye Military Academy

(x12–15)

Missile Bases

Military Construction Bureau


Kumsong Tractor Factory

Sungni General Automotive Factory

2nd Machine Industry Bureau

Figure 9.6 DPRK ballistic missile infrastructure

Man’gyongdae Light Electric Plant Man’gyongdae Machine Tool Plant Unidentified Machine Factory

118 Factory

125 Factory 301 Factory

Sanum-dong Research and Development Facility

East Sea Light Electric Plant

26 Factory




Engineering Research Institute

Electronic and Guidance Systems Institute

Guided Missile Division


Electronics Industry Ministry

P’yongyang Semiconductor Plant

(Technical support and assistance)

Academy of Sciences

Cabinet

288


Hwasong 5, Hwasong 6, SA–2 and a T–62 tank.178 The Academy of Defence Sciences and its subordinate organisations receive technical assistance from the Academy of Sciences. The MPAF has a number of subordinate organisations involved in missile development, employment and basing. Since its inception in 1965, the Kanggye Military Academy has been responsible for training military technical specialists, including missile engineers, technicians and combat officers. The Military Construction Bureau (see chapter 2) is believed responsible for the construction of the numerous missile bases and operating locations around the country, missile production facilities and the Musudan-ni Launch Facility. The Musudan-ni Launch Facility (aka Hwadae-gun Missile Test Facility), located in Hwadae-gun, Hamgyong-bukto, has developed into a complex consisting of numerous smaller components including assembly/maintenance facilities, command centre, fuel storage facility, launch control centre, launching pad, maintenance tower, monitoring and tracking facilities and observation tower. The 117th Engineer Regiment is believed to be responsible for construction at this and other missile-related facilities in the Hwadae-gun area179 It is unclear whether references to the ‘Taep’o-dong missile base’ are actually referring to the Musudan-ni Launch Facility or two separate entities within the same general area. Additionally, there are a number of unconfirmed reports that there is a production facility at the Musudan-ni Launch Facility. This, however, could be confusion over the facility’s assembly/ maintenance capabilities. During the mid-1980s, the Military Construction Bureau initiated the construction of specialised hardened (i.e. underground) missile facilities around the country. These appear to be of two broad types. The first are storage tunnels based upon the standard type constructed for large artillery systems. These have presurveyed and prepared launching sites located nearby, to which a TEL or MEL would move, launch and then return. The second type are reportedly a more specialised launch facility (possibly including silos) which allow a launch from underground. This second type are apparently built to accommodate the larger Nodong and Taep’o-dong.180 Reported locations for ballistic missile bases within the DPRK are shown in Table 9.5.165 Other missile systems During the 1990s a number of events precipitated missile-related developments within the DPRK. Primary among these was Operation DESERT STORM in 1991. The use of BGM–109 Tomahawk




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Table 9.5 Ballistic missile bases Town

County/Province

?

Chunghwa-gun, P’yongyang-si

Comment

?

Sangwon-gun, P’yongyang-si

?

Toksong-gun, Hamgyong-namdo

Started in mid-1990s

Chiha-ri

Ich’on-gun, Kangwon-do

Completed in 1999–2000; within 9 km of T’o-gol

Chunggang-up (Chungganjin)

Huch’ang-gun, Chagang-do

Started in 1990 and completed in 1995

Kanggamchan-san

Chungsan-gun, P’yongan-namdo

Completed in 1985

Mayang-do

Sinp’o, Hamgyong-namdo Completed in late-1980s by the 110th and 115th Engineer Regiments

Musudan-ni

Hwadae-gun, Hamgyong-bukto

No-dong


Okpyong-nodongjagu

Munch’on-gun, Kangwon-do

Oryu-ri

P’yongyang-si

Paekun-ri

Kusong-gun, P’yongan-bukto

Completed in 1986

T’o-gol

Kangwon-do

Within 9 km of Chiha-ri

Taep’o-dong


Completed in 1988 by the 117th Engineer Regiment

Yongnim-up

Yongnim-gun, Chagang-do

Yongo-dong

Kimhyongjik-gun, Yanggang-do

Started in 1991 and completed in 1997–98; constructed by the 111th Engineer Regiment

Completed in 1999–2000

There are unconfirmed references to three additional missile bases. Two are in Hamgyong-bukto: Komdok-san, Hwadae-gun and Myongch’on, Myongch’on-gun.181 The third is in P’yongsan-gun, Hwanghae-bukto.182

cruise missiles, al-Husayn ballistic missiles and UAVs had a profound effect upon the thinking of military planners and missile designers in the DPRK. This led the DPRK to establish cruise




289

290


Map 9.1 Ballistic missile related locations Operational base Production facility Research and development

People’s Republic of China East Sea Light Electric Plant

Chunggang-up

Yongo-dong Kanggye Military Academy 26 Factory

Taep’o-dong No-dong Musudan-ni Launch Facility

Sangnam-ni Yongnim-up Toksong-gun

301 Factory Tokhyon Paekun-ri

Sungni General Automotive Factory

Mayang-do

118 Factory

Kanggamchan

Korea Bay

Okpyong-nodongjagu

Sanum-dong R&D Facility P’yongyang Oryu-ri Sangwon-gun Chunghwa-gun Chiha-ri Kumsong T’o-gol Tractor Factory Unidentified Machine Factory

Seoul


125 Factory Man’gyongdae Light Electric Plant Man’gyongdae Machine Tool Plant P’yongyang Semiconductor Plant

Republic of Korea

N

missile and UAV programs (see chapters 4 and 5) and spurred the development of the No-dong and Taep’o-dong systems. In the years following the war Iran is believed to have provided the DPRK with access to BGM–109 Tomahawk wreckage from missiles that impacted on its territory during Operations DESERT STORM and DESERT FOX, or that it acquired from Bosnia.183 It is unlikely that the DPRK gained significant design, production or operational knowledge from the wreckage, although access may have provided insights into possible counter-measures or served as a design catalyst.




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During 1994, as a result of the expanding Syria–DPRK missile relationship, the DPRK was allowed extensive access to Syria’s missile systems, missile technology and UAVs. Included within this were access to the 9K79 Tochka (SS–21 SCARAB), P–35 Redut (SSC–1b SEPAL), P–20 Rubezh-A (SS-C–3 STYX) missiles; solid fuel rocket engine technology; and the DR–3 Reys UAV. More significantly, it is believed that Syria also provided examples of some of these systems to the DPRK. Of these the possible acquisition of the 9K79 Tochka is most interesting. A number of unconfirmed reports from a variety of sources suggest that during the 1990s the DPRK was interested in both replacing its ageing inventory of Luna-2 (FROG–5) and Luna-M (FROG–7B) artillery rockets, and in developing a solid fuel tactical ballistic missile. The 9K79 Tochka could prove valuable in both areas. During mid-1996 an unknown number of Syrian technicians spent two weeks in the DPRK. This trip was concerned with both studying the production of the Hwasong 6 and reportedly sharing information concerning the 9K79 Tochka which the Syrians had previously provided.184 Despite this access, it is unlikely that the DPRK has made significant progress in developing a solid-fuel ballistic missile given financial, manpower, technology and other limitations. During the late 1980s and 1990s the DPRK has acquired the 9M111 Fagot (AT–4 SPIGOT) and 9M113 Udar (AT–5 SPANDRAL) ATGMs, and the 9K34 Strela 3 (SA–14 GREMLIN) and 9K310 Igla–1 (SA–16 GIMLET) SAMs from Russia. It is believed to have undertaken the production of at least the 9M111 Fagot and 9K34 Strella. In addition to these systems the DPRK has continued development of existing SAMs and AAMs, although details are lacking. On 19 March 1991, the DPRK reportedly signed an arms agreement with Cuba. This agreement called for the sale of SAMs (presumably SA–14/16s) and other anti-aircraft weapons to Cuba. This agreement came at the end of an official visit to Cuba by a delegation led by MPAF Chief of Staff Choe Kwang. On 10 March Choe signed a military cooperation agreement with Cuba.185 In early 1990, a KPA delegation visited Ethiopia and reportedly acquired an example of the US TOW ATGM.186 During the mid1990s defectors revealed that the DPRK had earlier obtained examples of both the French Exocet anti-ship cruise missile and US Stinger SAM.187 These were acquired with the intention of reverse-engineering the systems and deploying them with the KPA. It is unclear how successful the DPRK has been in this effort, however US intelligence believes that the Stinger may be available in limited numbers.188




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HE RMED ORCES OF ORTH OREA PPENDIX

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KOREAN PEOPLE’S ARMY (GROUND FORCES) The ground force component of the KPA is composed of approximately 1 003 000 personnel organised into 20 corps (12 infantry, four mechanised infantry, one tank, two artillery and the P’yongyang Defence Command), and the Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau (formerly the VIII Special Purpose Corps). These corps consist of 176 combat divisions and brigades: 33 37 1 1 13 25 31 14 3 3 2 3 6 4

Infantry/Motorised Infantry Divisions/Brigades Paramilitary Training Unit Divisions (reserve units) Tank Division Ballistic Missile Division Tank Brigades Mechanised Brigades Artillery/MRL/Heavy Mortar Brigades Light Infantry Brigades Airborne Brigades Air Force Sniper Brigades Navy Sniper Brigades Sniper Brigades Coastal Security Brigades Border Security Brigades

The force is augmented by a number of specialised units (e.g. bridging, construction, nuclear–chemical defence) subordinate to General Staff Department bureaus (see chapter 2) and a large number of special operations qualified personnel within the intelligence and internal security agencies (chapter 7). 292




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The 12 infantry corps are designated as I, II, III, IV, V, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII and an unidentified corps. The four mechanised corps are designated the 108th, 425th, 806th, and 815th. The 820th Tank Corps is the KPA’s only tank corps. The two artillery corps are designated the 620th and Kangdong Artillery Corps. KOREAN PEOPLE’S NAVY COMMAND The KPN has a total personnel strength of 60 000. The total combat ship strength of the DPRK is approximately 990, with 840 vessels assigned to the KPN, Maritime Department and Operations Department, and 150 vessels assigned to the MPAF’s Coastal Security Bureau (see chapter 6), and ranks the KPN as one of the world’s largest navies. The KPN consists of two fleets—the West Sea Fleet and the East Sea Fleet. The West Sea Fleet is headquartered at Namp’o and consists of approximately 360 vessels organised into six squadrons. The Coastal Security Bureau operates approximately 63 additional vessels in the Yellow Sea. The total number of KPN and Coastal Security Bureau vessels in the Yellow Sea is approximately 420. The East Sea Fleet is headquartered at T’oejo-dong and consists of approximately 480 vessels organised into 10 squadrons. The Coastal Security Bureau operates approximately 87 additional vessels in the East Sea. The total number of KPN and Coastal Security Bureau vessels in the East Sea is approximately 570. The KPN also controls a number of ocean-going cargo ships and coordinates with the Ministry of Sea Transportation the operations of the DPRK’s merchant marine fleet. It provides support to the Reconnaissance Bureau’s Maritime Department which operates a number of SANG-O class SSc and YUGO class SSm in the infiltration role (see chapter 7), coordinates coastal defence with the KPA’s coastal defence artillery batteries, and coordinates coastal surveillance and security with the MPAF’s Coastal Security Bureau and paramilitary organisations (see chapter 6). KOREAN PEOPLE’S AIR FORCE COMMAND The KPAF has a total strength of 110 000, approximately 1700 aircraft. Operational units of the KPAF consists of six air divisions with 33 air regiments and five air battalions. The six air divisions are:




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1st Combat Air Division 2nd Combat Air Division 3rd Combat Air Division 5th Transport Air Division 6th Transport Air Division 8th Training Air Division The 33 air regiments and five air battalions consist of: 11 Fighter/Interceptor Regiments (includes 1 MiG–29 battalion) 2 Bomber/Ground Attack Regiments (includes 1 Su–25 battalion) 7 Helicopter Regiments 7 Transport Regiments 6 Training Regiments (fighter/interceptor, helicopter and transport) 1 Reconnaissance/EW Battalion 1 Naval Support/ASW Battalion 1 Test and Evaluation Battalion Additionally, KPAF combat units include UAV unit, hot-air balloon unit, sailplane unit, 19 surface-to-air missile (SAM) brigades, a SAM maintenance depot, an unknown number of AAA regiments, one–four radar battalion(s), one–four searchlight battalion(s). The KPAF also controls the national airline—Air Koryo—and coordinates air defence operations with the P’yongyang Antiaircraft Artillery Command and the KPA’s anti-aircraft artillery assets.




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1 OVERVIEW 1 The following publications were used extensively throughout this book and are recommended to anyone interested in the subject. The appropriate range of pages will only be referenced at the beginning of each chapter or when specifically required within the remainder of the text: Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea Handbook, PC–2600–6421–94, Washington, DC, 1994; Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength, Washington, DC, October 1991; Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength—Update 1995, Washington, DC, March 1996; Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper, all volumes 1990–99, Seoul, 1991–99; US Army, North Korea: A Country Study, DAPam 550–81, 1994; US Army, North Korean People’s Army Handbook, FC 100–2–99, April 1992; US Army, North Korean People’s Army Operations, FC 100–2–99, 5 December 1986; Kin Motoyoshi, ‘Personnel Management’, Gunji Kenkyu, June 1986, pp. 186–93, as cited in JPRS-KAR– 85-O45; Kin Motoyoshi, ‘Military Strength’, Gunji Kenkyu, May 1986, pp. 186–93, as cited in JPRS-KAR–85-O45; Kin Motoyoshi, ‘Kim Chong-il’s Army’, Gunji Kenkyu, April 1986, pp. 200–9, as cited in JPRS-KAR–85-O45, 23 October 1986, pp. 20–3; and Kin Motoyoshi, ‘Armed Forces Structure, Make-up Discussed’, Gunji Kenkyu, March 1986, pp. 196–205, as cited in JPRS-KAR–85-O45. 2 In reality there was a Communist Party in the northern section of Korea prior to the establishment of the KPA. Prior to June 1949 it was known as the Workers’ Party of North Korea. In June of that year the Workers’ Party of North Korea merged with the Workers’ Party of South Korea to form the Korean Workers’ Party. Additionally, during the late 1970s, the KPA’s foundation day was changed from 8 February 1948 to 25 April 1932. The official explanation for this was that this date is more accurate since the KPA can now be traced to 25 April 1932 when Kim Il-song began conducting partisan activities against the Japanese in Southern Manchuria. 3 ‘Defector to ROK on Kim Chong-il’s Control of DPRK Military’, Win, June 1996, pp. 161–7, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–197. 4 Author interview data; United States Forces Korea, Analysis of the North Korean Threat, Backgrounder No. 12, Public Affairs Office, Seoul, 1999; and 295




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11 12 13 14 15

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17 18 19 20 21 22

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T HE A RMED F ORCES OF NORTH K OREA North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength—Update 1995, p. 13; and Bermudez Jr, Joseph S.; Kenneth Brower and Gerald Segal, ‘North Korea A Potential Time Bomb’, Jane’s Intelligence Review: Special Report No. 2, April 1995. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. ibid. Author interview data; ‘N. Korea Deploys 10 more Subs’, Korea Times, 12 October 1999; Defense White Paper 1998, pp. 54–6; Agency for National Security Planning, Republic of Korea, NSP Issues Press Release on Hwang’s Comments, Press Release, Seoul, 9 May 1997, as cited in FBIS-EAS–97–091; and North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength—Update 1995, pp. 23–4. Institute of Internal and External Affairs, Inside North Korea: Three Decades of Duplicity, Seoul, July 1975, pp. 43–5. ‘N. Korea Fetes Late "Great Leader" at 50th Birthday’, Reuters, 9 September 1998. Author interview data. ‘Nodong Sinmun Essay Urges ‘‘Mercilessly’’ Fighting US’, KCNA, 4 December 1998, as cited in FBIS-EAS–98–338. Manabu, Aota, Kim Il Sung’s Army, Nyumon Shinsho, Tokyo, 1979, p. 42; and North Korean Affairs Institute, Brief History of North Korean Provocations Against South Korea: 1945–1977, Seoul, October 1977, pp. 30–2. ‘South Army Official Looks at DPRK’s Weapons’, Kukbang Kwa Kisul, January 1989, pp. 102–13, as cited in FBIS-EAS–89–055; and Welles, Benjamin, ‘North Korean Militancy Linked to 1966 Meeting’, New York Times, 1 February 1968, p. 15. Kim Il Sung’s Army, p. 43. Kim Il Sung’s Army, pp. 43–4. Author interview data. ‘NK Said to Target 200 000 US Casualties: Defector’, Korea Herald, 22 October 1997. ‘Kim Says DPRK To Destroy DPRK if War Provoked’, Korea Times, 10 August 1998. US Congress, Statement of General John H. Tillelli Jr, Commander In Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command & Commander, United States Forces Korea, Before the House National Security Committee, 3 March 1999. Yu Yong-won, ‘Military Authorities on ROK Damages of DPRK Chemical Attack’, Choson Ilbo, 9 September 1997. DPRK defectors credit the ‘One a Match for 100’ concept to a February 1963 visit to an infantry battalion of 14th Division, II Corps, in the Kaesong area, by Kim Il-song. Since that time it has become one of the KPA’s basic slogans. ‘Defector to ROK on Kim Chong-il’s Control of DPRK Military’, pp. 161–7. North Korea Handbook, pp. 3–20. ‘Daily Reacts to KPA Spokesman Statement’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 4 December 1998, as cited in FBIS-EAS–98–338. Author interview data; Defense White Paper 1998, p. 56; ‘Monthly on Operation Plan 5027’, Sindong-A, 27 April 1999, as cited in FBIS; NSP Issues Press Release on Hwang’s Comments; ‘DPRK Defector’s 28 May News Conference’, KBS–1, 28 May 1996, as cited in FBIS; and North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength—Update 1995, pp. 23–4.




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28 Author interview data; ‘Defector on Corruption of DPRK Army’, Pukhan, May 1999, pp. 56–63, as cited in FBIS; Statement of General John H. Tillelli Jr, Commander In Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command & Commander, United States Forces Korea, Before the House National Security Committee, 3 March 1999; ‘US Commander Says DPRK’s Military Posture Changed Little’, Korea Times, 29 January 1999; Defense White Paper 1998, pp. 49–54 and 67–9; ‘DPRK Defector’s 28 May News Conference’; US Congress, Statement of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats, 28 January 1998; US Congress, Statement of Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, U.S. Army, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on Current and Projected National Security Threats, 28 January 1998; Gertz, Bill, ‘U.S. Commander Voices ‘‘Concern’’ Over N. Korea Fears Its Quest for Long-range Nuclear Missiles’, Washington Times, 27 January 1999; US Congress, Statement of General John H. Tillelli Jr, Commander In Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command & Commander, United States Forces Korea, Before the House National Security Committee, 4 March 1998; ‘High-Level Defector Comments on DPRK Military, Part V’, Choson Ilbo, 9 February 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–072; and ‘High-Level Defector Comments on DPRK Military, Part II’, Choson Ilbo, 6 February 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–072. 29 Many of the officers who were purged had attended military academies and training courses within the Soviet Union during the early 1990s. The purge was intended to prevent the spread of any influences or ideas that they may have acquired during the collapse of the former Soviet Union, thereby insulating the DPRK against the effects of such events. 30 These were in addition to 664 such promotions in April 1992 and 99 in July 1993. ‘Status of DPRK Military Discussed’, Yonhap, 2–8 July 1999, pp. A14–A17. 31 ‘Russia, N. Korea Initial New Treaty’, Reuters, 17 March 1999; and ‘Russian Official Interviewed on DPRK Situation’, Voice of Russia World Service, 24 March 1999, as cited in FBIS; and ‘PRC Not To Observe Treaty on Automatic Intervention in War’, KBS–1, 21 March 1997, as cited in FBISEAS–97–079. 32 Statement of General John H. Tillelli Jr, Commander In Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command & Commander, United States Forces Korea, Before the House National Security Committee, 4 March 1998. 33 Statement of General John H. Tillelli Jr, Commander In Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command & Commander, United States Forces Korea, Before the House National Security Committee, 3 March 1999. 34 ‘Daily Reacts to KPA Spokesman Statement’.

2 COMMAND AND CONTROL 1 Sources used throughout this chapter include author interview data; Vantage Point, ‘Military Rule in Full Swing’, April 1999, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 2–8; Defense White Paper 1998, pp. 57–8 and 67–9; A Handbook on North Korea: 1st Revision, Naewoe Press, Seoul, 1996, pp. 64–88; Vantage Point, ‘An Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment and the Reorganization of Power Structure in North Korea’, November 1998, Vol. XXI, No. 11, pp. 30–9; ‘Journal Views DPRK’s Military Organization’, Sisa Journal, 6 June 1996, pp. 30–1, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–116; NSP Issues Press Release on Hwang’s




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T HE A RMED F ORCES OF NORTH K OREA Comments; and North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength—Update 1995, pp. 1–3. ‘Signs of Reform Appear in DPRK Power Structure’, Naewoe Tongsin, 27 February 1997, as cited in FBIS-EAS–97–055. This organisational change was subsequently formalised by an amendment to the DPRK’s Constitution in April 1992. ‘The North Korean Armed Forces’, Vantage Point, February 1995, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, pp. 40–2; ‘Monthly Examines Political Hierarchy in the DPRK Following the Ninth Supreme People’s Assembly Elections’, Wolgan Choson, July 1990, pp. 214–27; and Chong, Sang-yong, ‘Resurgence of the ‘‘First-Generation Revolutionaries’’ and Choe Kwang’, Pukhan, July 1990, pp. 102–12, as cited in FBIS-EAS–90–187. ‘BRF-North Korea-Kim’, Associated Press, 28 December 1993. ‘Kim Il-song’s Son Gets Title of Marshal’, Reuters, 20 April 1992; ‘North Korea Confers a Top Military Title on Kim Jong Il’, United Press International, 21 April 1992; and ‘Kim Chong-il’s Military Support Described’, Sindong-A, June 1993, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–134, 15 July 1993, p. 12. ‘DPRK’s Kim Chong-il’s Position on Retaliation’, Weekly Choson, 17 October 1996, pp. 8–11, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–231; ‘Kim Il-sung, a Soviet Agent, Turns into ‘‘Great Leader’’ ’, Vantage Point, October 1995, vol. XVIII, No. 10, p. 8; and Huh Moon-young, ‘North Korea’s Foreign Policy in Transition’, Vantage Point, July 1994, Vol. XVII, No. 7, pp. 21–9. ‘KCNA Reports Promotions of KPA Officers’, KCNA, 14 April 1997, as cited in FBIS-EAS–97–104; and ‘Decree on Promoting KPA Commanders’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 13 April 1997, as cited in FBIS-EAS–97–071. ‘North Korea Announces Promotion of 22 New Generals’, Korean Times, 14 April 1998. ‘Major Reshuffling of NK Cabinet’, Digital Chosunilbo, 6 September 1999. For a discussion of the period of the ‘Partisan Generals’ see Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., North Korean Special Forces—Second Edition, US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1998, pp. 64–93 and Suh, Dae-sook, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader, Columbia University Press, New York, 1988 pp. 224–48. Chong, Bong-uk, ‘Military Rule in Full Swing’, Vantage Point, April 1999, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 2–9; and ‘NK Reshuffles Political Structure’, Choson Ilbo, 14 January 1999. Kim was one of the four who were appointed as ViceMarshals in April 1997. ‘Appointment Signals Generational Shift in North Korea’s Military’, Korea Herald, 9 September 1998. ‘Weekly Views DPRK’s ‘‘Purge’’ of Kim Chong-u’, Chugan Choson, 29 September 1998, as cited in FBIS-EAS–98–284. ‘Articles Sees Few Changes Made in DPRK Power Lineup’, Chungang Ilbo, 9 April 1999, as cited in FBIS. Author interview data; ‘Military Rule in Full Swing’, pp. 2–8; A Handbook on North Korea: 1st Revision, pp. 64–88; ‘An Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment and the Reorganization of Power Structure in North Korea’, pp. 30–9; ‘Is People’s Army Becoming More Powerful than Workers’ Party?’, Vantage Point, June 1998, Vol. XXI, No. 6, pp. 32–9; and ‘Journal Views DPRK’s Military Organization’, pp. 30–1. ‘Defector Hwang Chang-yop Interviewed’, Sindong-A, July 1998, pp. 328–45, as cited in FBIS-EAS–98–191; ‘Role of Political Organs in Military Examined’, Naewoe Tongsin, 15 January 1998, pp. B1–B6, as cited in FBIS-EAS–98–079; ‘DPRK’s Kim Chong-il’s Position on Retaliation’, pp. 8–11; ‘Defector to ROK on Kim Chong-il’s Control of DPRK Military’, pp. 161–7; ‘Defector Says KPA Under ‘‘Complete Control’’ of Kim Chong-il’, Seoul Sinmun, 26 February 1996, p. 20, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–039; and ‘Channels and Means of Control of the Workers’ Party to Control the People’s Army’, Vantage Point, March M

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1995, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, pp. 32–41; and ‘Newspaper Profiles Kim Chong-il’s Supporters’, Sindong-A, February 1994, pp. 421–39, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94– 050. Author interview data; ‘ROK Journal on DPRK Leadership’, Pukhan, October 1998, pp. 60–77, as cited in FBIS; ‘Role of Political Organs in Military Examined’, pp. B1–B6; ‘Journal Views DPRK’s Military Organization’, pp. 30–1; ‘Defector Says KPA Under ‘‘Complete Control’’ of Kim Chong-il’, p. 20; ‘Channels and Means of Control of the Workers’ Party to Control the People’s Army’, pp. 32–41; ‘Organization, Officers of Korean People’s Army’, Pukhanui Kigwan Mit Tanchaebyol Inmyongjip, April 1988, pp. 93–9, as cited in JPRS-KAR–88–018; and Kin Motoyoshi, ‘DPRK Military Structure’, Gunji Kenkyu, March 1986, pp. 196–205, as cited in JPRS-KAR–85-O45. Yo Ch’unk-sok is considered one of the KPA’s experts in combat operations. In 1975, he was appointed chief of the general staff of the V Corps. In 1980, he was selected as the first commander of the newly established Ix Corps. In December 1984, he was promoted to lieutenant-general and appointed commander of IV Corps. In April 1992, he was promoted to colonel-general and appointed commander of VII Corps. ‘Yo Ch’un-sok Appointed DPRK Armed Forces Vice Minister’, Tong-a Ilbo, 10 September 1999; ‘DPRK Vice Defense Minister Yo Ch’’un-sok Profiled’, Chungang Ilbo, 10 September 1999. Author interview data; and ‘High-Level Defector Comments on DPRK Military, Part III’, Choson Ilbo, 7 February 1996, pp. 1–2, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–072. ‘Articles Sees Few Changes Made in DPRK Power Lineup’. ‘Flock of Mystery Balloons Puzzles Japan Police’, Reuters, 19 May 1999; and ‘S. Korea Trains for Hang-glider, Balloon Attacks by North’, Los Angeles Times, 20 March 1999. Defense White Paper 1997–1998, 1998, pp. 57–9. ‘Defector to ROK on Kim Chong-il’s Control of DPRK Military’, pp. 161–7. The last known director of the Propaganda Department was Lieutenant General Han Tong-kon. This organisation, like many other KPA organisations, derives its name from the KPA’s claimed Foundation Day. Originally, this was 8 February 1948—the date that the Security Battalion Headquarters (the true predecessor of the KPA) was established in P’yongyang. During the late 1970s, DPRK propagandists changed Foundation Day to 25 April 1932, alleging that Kim Il-song founded the KPA on this date in southern Manchuria while conducting partisan activities against the Japanese. Many organisations are still often referred to using the earlier date (e.g. February 8th Athletic Team). The People’s Army Press and the People’s Army Publishing House may be the same organisation. It is unclear if the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum and the Museum of Revolutionary Artefacts are the same entity. For a description of these ‘workers’ organisations’ see ‘DPRK Working People’s Organizations Viewed’, Pukhan, September 1999, pp. 82–95, as cited in FBIS. Author interview data; ‘Ex-KPA Major writes on DPRK Military Situation’, Pukhan, January 2000, pp. 86–93, as cited in FBIS; ‘Future Electronic Warfare Discussed’, Nodong Sinmun, 5 December 1999, p. 6, DPRK Hacking Threat Creates Concern’, Choson Ilbo, 10 February 2000; Chong Son-ku, ‘North Operating Mirim College for Electronic War’, Chungang Ilbo, 22 September 1994, p. 4, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94–186; ‘N.K. Establishes New Ministry for Electronic Industry Growth’, Korea Herald, 26 November 1999; ‘Kim Chong-il Stresses Electronic Warfare Capabilities’, Radio P’yongyang, 24 September 1999, as cited in FBIS, 29 September 1999; ‘Defector Says DPRK Receives Spy Photos From Russia’, Korea Times, 25 June 1996, p. 1, as cited in




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T HE A RMED F ORCES OF NORTH K OREA FBIS-EAS–96–123; ‘ROK Government to Establish Cyber Terrorism Report Center’, Yonhap, 25 February 2000; ‘ROK President Stresses Military Computer Literacy’, Yonhap, 18 February 2000; ‘ROK Defense Ministry Tightens Online Networks Security’, Korea Herald, 14 February 2000; ‘DPRK Hacking Threat Creates Concern’, Choson Ilbo, 10 February 2000; and ‘Weekly Views Preparation for Cyber Warfare’, Hangyore, 13 May 1999, pp. 46–7, as cited in FBIS. ‘High-Level Defector Comments on DPRK Military, Part VI’, Choson Ilbo, 12 February 1996, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–121; Kim Chong-min, ‘DPRK Defector on North’s Nuclear Development’, Segye Ilbo, 30 October 1991, p. 3; and Kim Chong-min, ‘I Was In Charge of Materials for the Construction of the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility’, Wolgan Choson, July 1991, pp. 290–303. Author interview data; Kim Chong-min, ‘Monthly Discusses Secret Works in DPRK’, Pukhan, January 1999, pp. 72–83, as cited in FBIS-EAS–99–012; ‘DPRK Defector Views Life of High-Level Cadres’, Hanguk Ilbo, 8 May 1995, p. 14, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–089; and ‘Korea-Defector,’ United Press International, 24 August 1993. One source suggests that the number of infiltration tunnels is 26. Yu Yong-won, ‘GNP Claim NK Digging 26 Tunnels on DMZ’, Chosun Ilbo, 5 October 1999. Author interview data; ‘Lessons for DPRK From NATO Bombing of Yugoslavia’, Nodong Sinmun, 20 April 1999, p. 1; ‘DPRK’s Keen Interest in New Weapons Used in Yugoslavia’, Yonhap, 13 May 1999; ‘DPRK Military Studies Merging of East, West German Armies’, Choson Ilbo, 25 April 1997, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-EAS–97–115; and ‘Journal Views DPRK’s Military Organization’, pp. 30–1. Author interview data; and Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘Inside North Korea’s CW Infrastructure’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 8, No. 8, August 1996, pp. 378–82. There are conflicting reports as to whether there are seven or eight nuclear— chemical defense battalions. Some reports suggest that there is a 17th Nuclear–Chemical Defence Battalion. This, however, appears to be incorrect. There are also references to a Transportation Bureau subordinate to the General Logistics Bureau. However, these may in fact refer to the Transportation Management Bureau of the General Staff Department. ‘High-Level Defector Comments on DPRK Military, Part VI’, p. 2; ‘DPRK Defector on North’s Nuclear Development’, p. 3; and ‘I Was In Charge of Materials for the Construction of the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility’, pp. 290–303. For a detailed discussion of DPRK medical capabilities see Defense Intelligence Agency, Medical Capabilities Study: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, PC–1810-KN–94, Washington, DC, March 1994. Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘North Korea: North Korea’s Deadly Industries Revealed,’ Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 28, No. 21, 26 November 1997, p. 29; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, North Korea’s Military Machine: How It Maintains Strength, Press Release, Washington, DC, 22 August 1997; ‘High-Level Defector Comments on DPRK Military, Part VI’, p. 2; North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength—Update 1995, p. 24; ‘DPRK Defector on North’s Nuclear Development’, p. 3; and ‘I Was In Charge of Materials for the Construction of the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility’, pp. 290–303. ‘Daily Reviews Defector’s Paper on DPRK Munitions Industry’, Hangyore Sinmun, 31 March 1997, p. 6, as cited in FBIS-EAS–97–090; ‘DPRK’s Science and Technology Development and Exchange Viewed’, Pukhan, March 1996, pp. 104–11, as cited in FBIS Report, Science & Technology, Korea, 1 March




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1996; and ‘DPRK Munitions Industry Organization Described’, Chungang Ilbo, 22 May 1995, p. 13, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–099. ‘South Army Official Looks at DPRK’s Weapons’, pp. 102–13. ibid. Author interview data; and ‘Kim Chong-il’s Hold on Power in DPRK Analyzed’, Vantage Point, April 1996, Vol. XIX, No. 4, pp. 9–11, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–089. Author interview data; ‘Influential DPRK Economic Officials Profiled’, Hanguk Ilbo, 21 November 1994, p. 8, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94–224; ‘Daily Reviews Defector’s Paper on DPRK Munitions Industry’, p. 6; and ‘DPRK Munitions Industry Organization Described’, p. 13. ‘ROK Daily Profiles Major DPRK Military Leaders’, Kyonghyang Sinmun, 15 April 1996, p. 6, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–074; and ‘DPRK Munitions Industry Organization Described’, p. 13. Author interview data; ‘DPRK Missile Industry, Technology Examined’, T’ongil Kyongje, August 1999, pp. 96–104;‘ Daily Reviews Defector’s Paper on DPRK Munitions Industry’, p. 6; ‘DPRK’s Science and Technology Development and Exchange Viewed’, pp. 104–11; and ‘DPRK Munitions Industry Organization Described’, p. 13. Author interview data and ‘Defense Ministry Report on DPRK Imports of Weapons’, Korea Times, 28 September 1999. The numbered bureaus are frequently identified as General Bureau, Machinery Industry General Bureau, General Machine Industry Bureau or General Machinery Industry Bureau. The number of military-related factories within the DPRK is unclear with estimates ranging from 130 to 200+. Author interview data; ‘Status of North Korea’s Science and Technology Development and Exchange, Part II’, Pukhan, March 1996, pp. 121–30, as cited in FBIS Report, Science & Technology, Korea, 1 April 1996; and ‘DPRK Reportedly Earns $500 Million Annually in Arms Exports’, Chollian Database, 3 November 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–222-A. Author interview data. Gertz, Bill, ‘Iran Top ‘‘Pariah State’’ in Arms Buys CIA Report Faults N. Korea as Well’, Washington Times, 12 January 1998, p. A4. ‘Military Cargo for DPRK Detained by Russia Illegally’, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 27 October 1995, p. 1, as cited in FBIS-SOV–95–209; ‘DPRK Said To Admit Weapons Purchase From Kazakhstan’, Voice of Russia World Service, 29 October 1995, as cited in FBIS-SOV–95–209; ‘Kazakh Artillery Bound for North Korea Seized in Primorye’, Segodnya, 1 November 1995, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-UMA–95–226-S; and ‘North Korean Arms Shipment Deal Examined’, Kovcheg, 2 November 1995, No. 19, p. 3, as cited in FBIS-SOV–95–224-S. The SA–7B is known as the Hwasongch’ong in KPA service. ‘NK Said to Target 200,000 U.S. Casualties: Defector’. For detailed descriptions of the DPRK nuclear, biological and chemical weapons infrastructures see: Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘Exposing the North Korean BW Arsenal’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 10, No. 8, August 1998, pp. 32–3; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘Inside North Korea’s CW Infrastructure’, pp. 378–82; and Bermudez Jr., Joseph S., ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 6, No. 2, February 1994, pp. 74–9. ‘DPRK Munitions Industry Organization Described’, p. 13. Author interview data; Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, ‘Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against North Korean and Syrian Entities’, Federal Registry, Vol. 57, No. 130, 7 July 1992, pp. 29924–5; and Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,




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T HE A RMED F ORCES OF NORTH K OREA ‘Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against North Korean and Iranian Entities’, Federal Registry, Vol. 57, No. 67, 7 April 1992, pp. 11767–8. US Congress, Statements of Colonel Joo-hwal Choi and Young-hwan Ko, Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, 21 October 1997. Author interview data, January 1998; and Department of State, ‘Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against Entities in North Korea and Pakistan’, Federal Register, Vol. 63, No. 85, 4 May 1998. ‘Defector Discusses DPRK Missile Program’, Chugan Tong-A, 1 December 1999, as cited in FBIS. Author interview data; and ‘DPRK Reportedly Earns $500 Million Annually in Arms Exports’. Department of State, ‘Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against Entities in North Korea and Pakistan’; and Department of State, ‘Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against Entities in Iran and North Korea’, Federal Register, Vol. 61, No. 114, 12 June 1996. Department of State, ‘Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against Entities in North Korea’, Federal Register, Vol. 62, No. 161, 20 August 1997.

3 KOREAN PEOPLE’S ARMY GROUND FORCES 1 This chapter is based upon the following sources: Author interview data; ‘North Korea Deploys 10 More Subs’; Defense White Paper 1998, pp. 57–69, 303; Defense White Paper 1997–1998, pp. 43–60; North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength—Update 1995, pp. 13–14, 21; North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength, pp. 40–56. 2 Some sources correctly state that it was the VII Corps that replaced the VI Corps. Author interview data; ‘DPRK Defector’s 28 May News Conference’; and ‘Attempted 1995 Military Coup d’Etat in DPRK Alleged’, Chugan Choson, 21 March 1996, pp. 34–5, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–053. 3 Kim was the first commander of the 425th Mechanised Corps when it was formed in the early 1980s. He served in this position until being appointed as the commander of the Artillery Command in 1988. ‘DPRK Artillery Commander Kim Ha-kyu Profiled’, Yonhap, 25 November 1999. 4 It is presently unclear whether the type designation of ‘MRL Division’ was correct. These units may have been ‘artillery groups’. 5 This should not be taken as an exhaustive listing of all the artillery systems in KPA service. 6 This should not be taken as an exhaustive listing of all the tanks and armoured fighting vehicles in KPA service. 7 Reported corps commanders include Vice-Marshal Chon Chae-son (I Corps), General Chang Song-u (III Corps), General Yo Chun-sok (VII Corps) and Colonel General Kim Yong-un (VIII Corps). 8 Some sources suggest that the tank units in some of the rear area corps may include some T–34/85s. 9 One source reports a different distribution of light infantry brigades within the forward corps—I Corps, three; II Corps, three; IV Corps, one and V Corps, three. 10 The designations of the four mechanised corps is a subject of some confusion. This appears to be a result of both the MPAF’s assignation of deceptive cover names such as the 15th August, 25th June and 25th April Training Centres (or recruit training centres) when the corps were first established, and the continued reorganisation of the KPA during the early 1990s. In the early 1990s




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the ROK and US identified these corps as the 9th, 10th, 425th and 815th. By the mid-1990s the ROK and US had changed these designations to 108th, 425th, 806th and 815th. Defectors report that the cover names for the 425th and 815th Mechanised Corps are the 25 April Training Centre and the 15 August Training Centre respectively. Following this logic, the cover names for the 108th and 806th Mechanized Corps may be the 8 January Training Centre and 6 August Training Centre respectively. Defectors have also reported the 106 and 801 Training Centres. Author interview data; ‘Ex-DPRK Officer on Military’, Wolgan Choson, August 1999, pp. 62–96, as cited in FBIS; and ‘DPRK Operational Plan to Invade ROK Detailed’, Sisa Journal, 6 June 1996, pp. 26–9, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–116. ‘Koksan’ is a Western designator based upon the location of the division during the 1980s. The 820th Tank Corps is sometimes referred to by the cover name 820th Training Centre. Some DPRK sources indicate that the 105th has also been awarded the ‘Kim Il-song Order’ and the honorific of ‘Kumsong Guard’. This honorific is sometimes translated as ‘Kumsong Royal Guard’. ‘Kim Chong-il Inspects KPA Tank Division’, Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 2 December 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–233. Author interview data; ‘KCNA Details Kim Chong-il’s Inspection of Tank Division’, KCNA, 3 December 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–233; and ‘KCNA Reports Kim Chong-il’s Inspection of Tank Division’, KCNA, 3 December 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–233. The 620th Artillery Corps is sometimes referred to by the cover name of 620th Training Centre. Pak was appointed commander of the P’yongyang Defence Command during 1996 or 1997. Prior to this he had been commander of the 820th Tank Corps. Author interview data; ‘High-Level Defector Comments on DPRK Military, Part VI’, p. 2; and ‘Journal Views DPRK’s Military Organization’, pp. 30–1. For a detailed study of the Light Infantry Guidance Bureau and the development of the KPA’s special operations forces see Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., North Korean Special Forces—Second Edition. For an alternate sniper brigade organisation see: Bermudez Jr, Joseph. S., North Korean Special Forces, Jane’s Publishing Company, Ltd., London, July 1988, pp. 127–8. For detailed accounts of the DPRK’s military assistance and support for terrorism see Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., Terrorism: The North Korean Connection, Taylor & Francis, New York, October 1990; and Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., North Korean Special Forces, 2nd edn, US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1998. ‘DPRK Increases Number of Military Officers Sent Overseas’, Korea Times, 28 September 1999. ‘Draft System, Soldiers’ Lives in DPRK’, Pukhan, August 1999, pp. 134–45, as cited in FBIS; Hunter, Helen-Louise, Kim Il-song’s North Korea, Praeger Publishers, Westport, Connecticut, 1999, pp. 83–94; North Korean Special Forces—Second Edition, pp. 215–16; and North Korean People’s Army Handbook, FC 100–2–99, pp. 14–1 to 14–18. During the 1990s the physical standards of recruits dropped as a result of a number of famines caused by both floods and droughts. Yu, Yong-won, ‘Wolgon Choson Views DPRK Military’, Wolgon Choson, December 1990, pp. 166–87, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–073-S, 16 April 1991, pp. 1–14. ‘Draft System, Soldiers’ Lives in DPRK’, in Kim Il-song’s North Korea, Praeger Publishers, pp. 83–94; North Korean Special Forces, 2nd edn, pp. 215–16;




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T HE A RMED F ORCES OF NORTH K OREA North Korean People’s Army Handbook, FC 100-2-99, pp. 14-1–14-18; and ‘Journal Views DPRKK’s Military Organization’, pp. 30–1. The reported sizes of these training units vary from corps-level training battalion to regimental training company. The DMZ Police are special units responsible for security along the DMZ and the borders with the PRC and Russia. There are approximately 10 DMZ Police battalions deployed within the I, II and V Forward Corps. Each battalion apparently attaches one company to each infantry division deployed on the DMZ. These companies are deployed in platoons, which rotate every two months. These units perform sentry duty and normal military police functions. They may also be employed to conduct agent escort, scouting and reconnaissance operations. Yu Yong-won, ‘The Defense Ministry’s View of North Korea’s Unusual Movement’, Choson Ilbo, 13 December 1995, p. 6, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–239; and ‘Officer Organization in DPRK Military Detailed’, Choson Ilbo, 9 September 1994, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94–177. Kang Kon was a longtime colleague of Kim Il-song from the anti-Japanese partisan days of World War II. Kang later rose to the rank of general and was KPA Chief of the General Staff Department at the onset of the Fatherland Liberation War. Kang died in October 1950. This honorific is sometimes translated as ‘Kumsong Royal Guard’. Author interview data; ‘Kang Kon Military Academy Profiled’, National Intelligence Service, http://www.nis.go.kr:700, 21 January 2000; ‘Kim Chong-il Inspects Military School’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 9 December 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–238; ‘Founding Anniversary of Military Academies Marked’, KCNA, 17 November 1995, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–222; and ‘Organization, Officers of Korean People’s Army’, pp. 93–9. ibid. It is unclear what relationship, if any, there is between the Combined Artillery Officers School and the Kim Ch’ol-chu Military Academy. Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘North Korean Army Training—Steadily Progressing’, Defense Intelligence Digest, June 1968, pp. 29–31.

4 KOREAN PEOPLE’S NAVY COMMAND 1 Author interview data; ‘N. Korea Deploys 10 More Subs’; Defense White Paper 1998, pp. 60–1; Defense White Paper 1997–1998, 1998, pp. 49–50; Sharpe, Captain Richard, Jane’s Fighting Ships 1998–1999, Jane’s Information Group Limited, London, 1998, pp. 397–403; ‘Kim Chong-il Visits Naval University, KPA Naval Unit 6 June’, KCNA, 6 June 1997, as cited in FBISEAS–97–157; US Marine Corps, North Korea Country Handbook, Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, MCIA–2630-NK–016–97 (FOUO), Washington, DC, May 1997, pp. 38–40; North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength—Update 1995, p. 16; Jacobs, G., ‘The Korean People’s Navy—Further Perspectives’, Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 5, No. 7, July 1993, pp. 315–19; Jacobs, G., ‘Korean People’s Naval Forces’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 4, No. 8, August 1992, pp. 367–71; Tracey, Gene D., ‘North Korea’s Naval Forces’, Asian Defense Journal, July 1990, pp. 30–6; Jacobs, G., ‘North Korea’s Growing Amphibious Warfare Forces’, Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 2, No, 4, April 1990, pp. 167–71; Kin Motoyoshi, ‘DPRK Military Structure’, Gunji Kenkyu, May 1986, pp. 186–93, as cited in JPRSKAR–85-O45; Hahn, Bradley, ‘The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Maritime Power’, Combat Craft, Vol. 3, No. 1, January/February 1985, pp. 10–19; and Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korean Armed Forces




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Handbook (U), DDI–2680–37–77, Washington, DC, July 1977, pp. 2–41 to 2–44, 3–1 to 3–12. Koreans—both the ROK and DPRK—call the Sea of Japan the East Sea. The exact strength of the KPN is unclear. The numbers used in this chapter are drawn primarily from ‘N. Korea Deploys 10 More Subs’; Defense White Paper 1998, p. 60; Jane’s Fighting Ships 1998–1999, pp. 397–403; and North Korea Country Handbook, pp. A–167 to A–194. The Naval Medical Centre reportedly has a training squadron and scientific research laboratory subordinate to it. The Ministry of Sea Transportation is also known as the Ministry of Marine Transportation. Kim Il-ch’ol’s promotion and the change of command may have taken place during April 1997. ‘Appointment Signals Generational Shift in North Korea’s Military’, Korea Herald, 9 September 1998; and Yi, Chong-hun, ‘Defector Testimony Describes North Korean Navy’, Sisa Journal, 17 July 1997, p. 54, as cited in FBIS-EAS–997–204. ‘DPRK Forces Out Commander in Yellow Sea Incident’, Chungang Ilbo, 3 September 1999. This regiment may, in fact, be a battalion with three squadrons. Author interview data; ‘Underground Bases Described’, Yonhap, 4 February 1991, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–023; and Schemmer, Benjamin F., ‘ ‘‘Everything is Buried!’’ ’, Armed Forces Journal International, August 1984, pp. 94–7. Author interview data; ‘Defector Testimony Describes North Korean Navy’, p. 54. Although this is the current organisation of the Navy sniper force, it is believed that this force was previously organised into one brigade of ten battalions, and then later into two brigades of five battalions each (one assigned to each coast). Additionally, the current battalion organisation may also include a mortar battery. Author interview data; Jane’s Sentinel: North Korea (DPRK), Jane’s Information Group Limited, London, 1995, pp. 18–19; and Jane’s Fighting Ships 1996–1997, pp. 396–401. The Kim Chong-suk Naval University is reportedly located at Majon-ri, Hamhung. Several reports also indicate that there is a ‘Najin Naval Academy’ or ‘Najin Maritime University’. The Kang Kon Military Academy is often referred to as the Kang Kon General Military Academy, Kang Kon Military Officers Academy, Kang Kon Military Officers School, Kang Kon Military University and Kanggon Officers School. ‘DPRK Said to Seek "Return Match" to 1999 West Sea Battle’, Munhwa Ilbo, 27 January 2000, p. 2, as cited in FBIS; and ‘DPRK West Coast Fleet Intensifies Mobile Exercises’, Yonhap, 23 January 2000. Author interview data; and ‘North Korea’s Naval Forces’, p. 31. Redmand, Ron, ‘Port Call’, United Press International, 6 November 1986; Burgess, John, ‘In North Korea Kim Cult Thrives’, Los Angeles Times, 28 September 1986, p. 2; Butler, Steven, ‘The North Engages In Classic Strategy Of Footdragging’, Financial Times, 4 September 1986, p. 12; Niksch, Larry A., ‘The Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula’, Korea & World Affairs, September 1986, pp. 253–77; ‘ ‘‘Soviet Base’’ in North Korea’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 21 September 1985, p. 612; ‘USSR-Korea Exercise’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 20 April 1988, p. 821; Niksch, Larry A., ‘The Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula’, Korea & World Affairs, September 1986, pp. 253–77; and ‘The North Engages In Classic Strategy Of Footdragging’, p. 12. ‘In North Korea Kim Cult Thrives’, p. 2. M

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19 Neilan, Edward, ‘Naval Visits Highlight N. Korean-Soviet Ties’, Washington Times, 1 August 1986, p. 9. 20 ‘USSR/Korean Exercise Off’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 15 December 1990, p. 1222; ‘Soviet Pacific Flotilla Arrives at Wonsan Port’, KCNA, 14 August 1990, as cited in FBIS-EAS–90–158; ‘Army Chief Meets Soviet Naval and Air Delegations’, KCNA, 14 August 1990, as cited in FBIS-EAS–90–158; and ‘Radio Moscow Cited on DPRK-USSR Exercise’, Korea Herald, 4 February 1989, p. 1. 21 HY (Hai Ying, Sea Eagle). 22 SY (Shui Ying, Water Eagle). 23 ‘Defector Discloses 1991 Explosion Accident in Missile Plant’, Sankei Shimbun, 19 March 1994, morning edition, p. 1, as cited in JPRS-TND–94– 003-L. 24 ‘NK Said to Target 200,000 U.S. Casualties: Defector’. 25 Author interview data; Yu Yong-won, ‘NK Develops ‘‘Stealth’’ Ship’, Digital Chosunilbo, 20 December 1998; and ‘Yonhap Reports on Infiltrator, Defector News Conference’, Yonhap, 29 October 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–210. 26 It is possible that these ex-PRC units were from a group of 21 Soviet Project 633 boats assembled in the PRC from Soviet knock down-components. If so, they would be more correctly Soviet Project 633 boats rather than PRC Type 033. The Type 033 was based upon Project 633 blueprints which had some modifications by PRC designers but were generally consistent with the original blueprints. 27 Author interview data; and ‘DPRK Said Increasing Infiltration Capabilities’, Yonhap, 10 November 1997, as cited in FBIS-EAS–97–314. 28 Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book, 1997, Washington, DC, 1997; and Jane’s Fighting Ships 1998–1999, p. 397. 29 Author interview data; ‘NK Develops ‘‘Stealth’’ Ship’; and ‘Yonhap Reports on Infiltrator, Defector News Conference’. 30 Author interview data; Jane’s Fighting Ships 1998–1999, pp. 397–403; ‘KCNA Reports Construction Activity in Shipyards’, KCNA, 24 August 1993, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–164, 26 August 1993, p. 15; ‘Kim Chong-il Sends Thanks to Shipbuilding Complex Employees’, KCNA, 20 January 1993, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–015, 26 January 1993, p. 25; ‘Shipbuilding Complex Launches Floating Dock’, KCNA, 29 May 1991, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–103; ‘Shipbuilding’, KCNA, 5 February 1991, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–024, 5 February 1991, p. 22; ‘DPRK Drive for Science, Technology Analyzed’, Sindong-A, No. 12, December 1990, pp. 212–28, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–017; ‘North Korea’s Naval Forces’, pp. 30–6; and ‘The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Maritime Power’, pp. 11–12. 31 Author interview data; ‘Russia Sells North Korea ‘‘Scrap’’ Subs’, Reuters, 9 June 1994; Polmar, Norman, ‘Letter to the Editor—Old Submarines for North Korea’, Washington Post, 6 June 1994, p. A18; West, Michael, ‘KoreaSubmarines’, Associated Press, 22 May 1994; ‘Russia Said Not Checking DPRK Sub Dismantling’, Yonhap, 28 April 1994, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94–082, p. 39; ‘Questions Asked on Submarine Sale’, Yonhap, 21 January 1994, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94–014, 21 January 1994; and Sanger, David E., ‘North Korea Buying Old Russian Subs’, New York Times, 20 January 1994, p. A6. 32 Author interview data; Philip Taubman, ‘U.S. Makes Public Arms Pacts it Says Grenadians Made’, New York Times, 5 November 1983, p. A1; Michael T. Kaufman, ‘49 Russians and 53 Cubans Leave Isle’, New York Times, 5 November 1983, p. A1; and Philip Taubman, ‘Experts Say Grenada Arms Pacts Exceeded Needs of Isle’s Defense’, New York Times, 6 November 1983, p. A1.




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33 ‘N Korea Fast Attack Craft Boost Nicaraguan Navy’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 4 February 1989, p. 167; and ‘Honduras vs. Nicaragua’, Army Times, 4 May 1987, p. 3. 34 Author interview data; Almond, Peter, ‘That Iranian Sub, If Real, May Be N. Korean’, Washington Times, 7 August 1987, p. A3; and ‘Iran-Meeting Its Arms Requirements’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 28 November 1987, p. 1276. 35 Jane’s Fighting Ships 1998–1999, p. 402. 36 Karniol, Robert, ‘Vietnam Stocking Up ‘‘SCUDs’’ ’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 April 1999, p. 63; and Karniol, Robert, ‘Vietnam Buys Submarines From North Korea’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 9 December 1998. 37 ‘North Korean Coastal Defenses’, ONI Review, October 1954, Vol. 9, No. 10, pp. 407–10; and US Marine Corps, ‘Soviet Coastal Defense’, Foreign Battlefield Concepts, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1987. 38 In some cases coastal defence missile units have displaced coastal defense artillery units in hardened sites. 39 Author interview data; and Statements of Colonel Joo-hwal Choi and Younghwan Ko, Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services. 40 Author interview data; and ‘North Korean Militancy Linked to 1966 Meeting’, p. 15. Kim Il Sung’s Army, Table 3.1, indicates a delivery date of 1972, however this is clearly too late. 41 Author interview data; and Statements of Colonel Joo-hwal Choi and Younghwan Ko, Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services. 42 ‘President of CASC’s Third Academy Details Contribution of HY–2, C601, C801 Cruise Missile Series’, Zhongguo Hangtian, September 1996, No. 9, pp. 12–17, as cited in FBIS-CST–97–002; Bussert, ‘HY–2 ‘‘Silkworm’’ Anti-ship Missile Detailed’, Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 1991, p. 120; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘North Korea’s HY–2 ‘‘Silkworm’’ Programme’, Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 1, No. 5, May 1989, pp. 203–7; and Zaloga, Steven J., ‘Soviet Coastal Defense Missiles’, Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 1, No. 4, April 1989, pp. 167–72. The advanced versions of the HY–2 include HY–2G: active radar and a high precision radio altimeter so that the level flight altitude of the missile can be lowered to 30–50 m; HY–2A: passive infrared target seeker; HY–2B: monopulse guidance radar; and HY–2C: television guidance. 43 This is different from the PRC truck-mounted HY–2 launcher seen in their 1999 military parade. 44 ‘Report on Missile Production Denied’, IRNA, 13 November 1993, as cited in FBIS-NES–93–218, 15 November 1993; and Evans, Michael, ‘Iran And Syria ‘‘Plan Missile’’ ’, The Times, 12 November 1993, p. 15; and Blanche, Ed, ‘Iran-Military’, Associated Press, 11 November 1993. 45 Author interview data; Gertz, Bill, ‘N. Korea Fires New Cruise Missile Anti-ship Weapon Spotted by U.S.’, Washington Times, 30 June 1997, p. A1; ‘Success Rate of Tested DPRK Missiles Reported’, Yonhap, 7 June 1994, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94–110; ‘South Korea-Military’, Associated Press, 7 June 1994; ‘DPRK UN Envoy Confirms Missile Test Firing’, KBS–1, 6 June 1994; Gertz, Bill, ‘N. Korea as Nuclear Exporter?’, Washington Times, 8 June 1994, p. A1; ‘Second DPRK Missile Test Confirmed’, Kyodo, 3 June 1994; and Gordon, Michael R., ‘North Korea Tests Cruise Missile Designed to Sink Ship’, The New York Times, 1 June 1994, p. A12. 46 There may also be a small number of ex-World War II German 170 mm coastal defence guns, provided by the former Soviet Union during the 1950s, M

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T HE A RMED F ORCES OF NORTH K OREA still in service. These guns apparently served as the foundation upon which the DPRK developed its M–1978/1989 170 mm SP gun (Koksan). North Korean Armed Forces Handbook (U), p. 2–41. ‘Radio Reports Kim Chong-il Visits KPA Unit on Navy Day’, KCNA, 16 June 1995, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–116. Defense Intelligence Agency, The North Korean Mine Warfare Threat Against the ROK, DDB–1200–242–83, Washington, DC, July 1983, p. 1. Tyler, Patrick E., ‘U.S. Arranges Return Of 26 Iranian Sailors’, Washington Post, 25 September 1987, p. A1; ‘Codebook’, United Press International, 25 September 1987; Tyler, Patrick E., ‘Kuwait May Offer Support Facilities’, Washington Post, 21 July 1987, p. A1; and ‘Mines’, United Press International, 30 June 1987. ‘International News: Mines’, United Press International, 15 August 1984; and Fred Hiatt, ‘Explosions Hit Three Ships in Gulf of Suez’, Washington Post, 1 August 1984, p. A1. Japan is extremely sensitive to the possibility of being mined by the DPRK. For example see, ‘Japan DA Trying To Verify Report on DPRK Laying Mines’, Mainichi Shimbun, 3 June 1994, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94–110. Author interview data; and U.S. Army, ‘Soviet Naval Mines’, Far East Command Intelligence Digest, Issue No. 17, 1–15 February 1952, pp. 9–13. Author interview data; and ‘Codebook’. ‘Defector Discloses 1991 Explosion Accident in Missile Plant’, p. 1. The KPN operates a total of 18 SO–1 class PCs, however only 12 are believed to be fitted out for ASW operations. Jane’s Fighting Ships 1998–1999, p. 401. Jane’s Fighting Ships 1998–1999, pp. 404–5. ibid., p. 397. The KPN’s obsolete fleet of four WHISKEY class submarines, based at Pip’a-got, are used for training and probably not capable of combat operations. This lack of evidence shouldn’t be understood as meaning a lack of capability.

5 KOREAN PEOPLE’S AIR AND AIR DEFENCE COMMAND 1 Author interview data; ‘N. Korea Deploys 10 More Subs’, Defense White Paper 1998, pp. 61–2; Defense White Paper 1997–1998, pp. 50–1; North Korea Country Handbook, pp. 36–8; ‘DPRK Defector’s 28 May News Conference’, KBS–1, 28 May 1996, as cited in FBIS; North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength—Update 1995, pp. 16–21; North Korea Handbook, pp. 3–9 to 3–13; Yu, Yong-won, ‘Comparison of North and South Korea’s Air Power,’ Wolgan Choson, March 1991, pp. 378–91, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91– 088; Kenchi Aoki, ‘Air Power of the ROK Navy, ROK Army, and the North Korean People’s Armed Forces Air Force’, Aerospace Japan, January 1991, No. 1, pp. 58–61, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–084; ‘Military Strength’, gunji kenkyu, April 1986, p. 186–93; and North Korean Armed Forces Handbook, pp. 4–1 to 4–10. 2 Some sources indicate that KPAF headquarters is located at Chunghwa, immediately south of P’yongyang. 3 Author interview data; ‘Kim Chong-il Visits Air Force Training School’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 3 November 1996, as cited in FBISEAS–96–214; ‘Further on Kim Chong-il Visit to Air Force Training School’, KCNA, 3 November 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–214; and ‘Kim Chong-il Inspects Air Force Training School 1 November’, KCNA, 3 November 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–214.




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4 Deputy Flight Commander is sometimes identified as the Deputy Aeronautical Commander, and the Deputy Technical Commander is sometimes identified as the Deputy Engineering Commander. 5 ‘Party, State, Parliament, and Military’, Vantage Point, December 1995, Vol. XVIII, No. 12, pp. 46–51. 6 How the Cryptographic section within the Political Safety Department differs from the one under the chief-of-staff is unclear. 7 The Gunnery Department is sometimes identified as the Tactical-Firing Department. 8 For a brief history of the Civil Aviation Bureau and an overview of its operations in the early 1990s see, ‘North’s Foreign Transportation Links Viewed’, Chungang Ilbo, 6 December 1991, p. 11, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91– 237. 9 Author interview data; and ‘Journal Views DPRK’s Military Organization’, Sisa Journal, 6 June 1996, pp. 30–1. 10 Author interview data. 11 ‘Ex-DPRK Officer on Military’, pp. 62–96. 12 Had the acquisition of additional MiG–29s proceeded, the 57th Air Regiment was to be the next unit equipped with them. 13 The 3rd, 5th and 8th Anti-aircraft Rocket Brigades may be regiments. 14 The distinctions between the nuclear–chemical defence platoon and the radioactive preparation section are unknown. The latter could be part of the nationwide NBC warning system. 15 Some sources suggest that air regiments can have as many as 60 aircraft. 16 Author interview data. The reference to the SA–6 is interesting since it is one of the few sources which credit the KPAF with the system. Whether the SA–6 is operational with the KPAF is presently unknown. 17 Nations, Richard, ‘Militant Brotherhood—Kim Tilts to Moscow’, Far East Economic Review, 20 June 1985, pp. 32–4. 18 ‘Ex-DPRK Officer on Military’, pp. 62–96. 19 ‘N. Korea Forms Suicide Air Squadron-S. Korea media’, Reuters, 19 September 1998 and Sang Hun-choe, ‘N Korea-Suicide Bombers’, Associated Press, 19 September 1998. 20 There is considerable confusion over the proper terms to use for KPAF units. This is due to both translation differences and the usage by KPAF defectors. In news conferences KPAF defectors have stated that their units were ‘regiment’, ‘air regiment’, ‘pursuit regiment’, and ‘fighter regiment.’ In this work the terms ‘air division’ and ‘air regiment’ will be used. 21 Author interview data; ‘DPRK Defector’s 28 May News Conference’. 22 Gordon, Yefrim and Komissarov, Dmitriy, ‘The Red Star Lifter’, World Air Power Journal, Vol. 35, Winter 1998, pp. 104–33. 23 For example there appears to be a heliport/helipad at Panghyon and reports suggest that a highway strip was recently constructed on the P’yongyang– Kaesong Highway. ‘More than 8,200 Underground Sites in the DPRK’, Joong-Ang Ilbo, 8 December 1998; and ‘Defense Ministry on Crashes of DPRK Military Aircraft in 1996’, Yonhap, 7 January 1997, as cited in FBIS-EAS–97– 004-A. 24 ‘North Vows ‘‘To Convert’’ Military Airport’, Chungang Ilbo, 17 December 1995, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–242. 25 Some analysts have suggested that the KPAF’s forward redeployment was initiated by O Kum-chol, the new Air Force commander, in order to firmly establish his authority over the KPAF. ‘ ‘‘Contradictory’’ Interpretations of North Movements’, Hanguk Ilbo, 15 December 1995, p. 11, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–243. M




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26 ‘Official Notes Withdrawal of Some DPRK Aircraft From DMZ’, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 17 February 1996, p. 2. 27 Author interview data; ‘ ‘‘Mounting Threat’’ From North, Response Discussed’, Yonhap, 16 December 1995, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–242; ‘DPRK ‘‘Ready To Provoke’’ South’, Yonhap, 15 December 1995, as cited in FBISEAS–95–241; ‘DPRK Holding Exercise Near DMZ’, Munhwa Ilbo, 15 December 1995, p. 1, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–241; ‘U.S. Official Cited on ‘‘Abnormal’’ Signs in North’, Tong-a Ilbo, 12 December 1995, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–239; ‘Paper on Analysis of Recent DPRK Movements’, Choson Ilbo, 13 December 1995, p. 6, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–239; and ‘The Defense Ministry’s View of North Korea’s Unusual Movement’, Choson Ilbo, 13 December 1995, p. 6. 28 ‘DPRK Said Building Facilities Near DMZ Airfields’, Choson Ilbo, 15 January 1996, p. 1, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–013. 29 ‘Further on DPRK Defector Pilot News Conference’, Yonhap, 28 May 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–103. 30 ‘DPRK Reinforcing Training Near Major Port Bases’, Choson Ilbo, 30 April 1999; Ch’oe, Won-ki, ‘Monthly on Signs of Change in DPRK’, Wolgan Chungang, 6 April 1999; Kim Min-sok, ‘DPRK Army Reduces Winter Training 30 Percent’, Chungang Ilbo, 19 March 1999; and Kim Min-sok, ‘DPRK Reportedly Suspended Air Force Training’, Chungang Ilbo, 4 March 1999. 31 ‘DPRK Strengthens Airpower in Yanggang Province’, Chungang Ilbo, 4 July 1999, as cited in FBIS. 32 Author interview data; ‘Defense Ministry Comments’, Yonhap, 8 October 1993, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–194; Fulghum, David A., ‘North Korean Forces Suffer Mobility Loss’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 24 November 1997, Vol. 147, No. 21, p. 62; ‘Defector Says DPRK Receives Spy Photos From Russia’, Korea Times, 25 June 1996, p. 1, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–123.‘Further on DPRK Defector Pilot News Conference’; ‘Ministers on North Nuclear Issue, Military’, KBS–1, 29 October 1993, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–208; ‘North Korea Constructs 7 Underground Airstrips’, North Korea News, 18 October 1993, No. 705, p. 3; ‘DPRK’s Advanced Weapons Analyzed’, Korea Times, 8 February 1991, p. 8, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–090; ‘Underground Bases Described’, Yonhap, 4 February 1991, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–623; ‘ ‘‘Everything Is Buried!’’ ’, Armed Forces Journal International, August 1984, pp. 94–7; and ‘N.K. War Plan ‘‘Complete’’: P’yang Design to Blitz through Pusan Bared’, Korea Herald, 5 March 1983, p. 1. 33 Author interview data; and ‘Concern Over Underground Runway’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 9 October 1993, p. 5. 34 Author interview data; and ‘Further on DPRK Defector Pilot News Conference’. 35 ‘Events in September, 1981’, Vantage Point, October 1981, Vol. IV, No. 10, p. 30. 36 ‘Soviet Air Force Delegation in Pyongyang’, KCNA, 4 June 1990, as cited in FBIS-EAS–90–107, 4 June 1990. 37 ‘North Korean Air Forces Chief Visits Iran’, North Korea News, 24 January 1994, No. 719, p. 5. 38 ‘KPA Armed Forces Delegation Returns From Cuba’, Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 11 December 1994, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94– 240; and ‘DPRK Military Delegation Departs’, Tele Rebelde, 8 December 1994, as cited in FBIS-LAT–94–237. 39 ‘North Korean Military Mission Visits Syria’, Vantage Point, June 1998, Vol. XXI, No. 6, pp. 20–1. M

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40 Author interview data; Kim Dong-sub, ‘800 NK Pilots In Vietnam War’, Chosun Ilbo, 13 September 1998; ‘N Korea-Vietnam-Pilot’, Associated Press, 14 September 1998; ‘Comparison of North and South Korea’s Air Power’, pp. 378–91; Jae Kyu Park, Byung Chul Koh, and Tae-Hwan Kwak, The Foreign Relations of North Korea, Westview Press, Boulder, 1987, pp. 402–3; Some Facts About North Korea, Naewoe Press, Seoul, 1984, pp. 60–5; and ‘Data on North Korea’s Terrorism Exports’, Kunkje Munge, September 1983, pp. 123–33. 41 North Korean Armed Forces Handbook (U), pp. 4–8. 42 ‘DPRK Defector’s 28 May News Conference’. 43 ‘N.K. War Plan ‘‘Complete’’: P’yang Design to Blitz through Pusan Bared’, p. 1. 44 ‘Ex-DPRK Officer on Military’, pp. 62–96. 45 North Korean Armed Forces Handbook (U), pp. 4–8. 46 ‘North Korea’s Energy Shortage ‘‘Critical’’ ’, Chugan Choson, 4 April 1991, pp. 10–13, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–200. 47 Author interview data; ‘DPRK Defector’s 28 May News Conference’; and ‘DPRK Reportedly Modified MiG–19 Piloted by Defector’, Joong-Ang Ilbo, 26 May 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–103. 48 ‘DPRK Defector’s 28 May News Conference’. 49 Author interview data; ‘ ‘‘Mounting Threat’’ From North, Response Discussed’; ‘The Defense Ministry’s View of North Korea’s Unusual Movement’, p. 6. 50 ‘DPRK Suspends Winter Military Training’, Chungang Ilbo, 14 January 1996, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–012. 51 Author interview data; and ‘Defense Ministry on Crashes of DPRK Military Aircraft in 1996’. 52 ‘DPRK Reportedly Suspended Air Force Training’. 53 Author interview data; Defense White Paper 1998, p. 62; Defense White Paper 1997–1998, Seoul, 1998, pp. 50–1; North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength—Update 1995, pp. 16–21; Jane’s Sentinel: North Korea (DPRK), pp. 16–18; ‘Aviation Exports Listed by Recipient Country’, Voyennyye Znaniya, 19 August 1995, No. 8, 1995, p. 25, as cited in FBIS-UMA–95–192-S; ‘DPRK Domestic, International Air Routes Noted’, Yonhap, 11 February 1993, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–027; Beaver, Paul, ‘Equipment: Mi–2 Armed—and Ready’, Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, February 1989, pp. 76–7; Aviation Advisory Service, International Air Force and Military Aircraft Directory, Aviation Advisory Service Ltd., 1987, pp. 181–2; and ‘North Korea to Import Hungarian Helicopters’, North Korea News, No. 351, 8 December 1986, p. 4. 54 Lake, John, ‘Mikoyan MiG–23/27 ‘‘Flogger’’ ’, World Air Power Journal, Vol. 8, Spring 1992, pp. 40–85; ‘Comparison of North and South Korea’s Air Power’, pp. 378–91; ‘DPRK’s Advanced Weapons Analyzed’’, Korea Times, 18 October 1993, No. 705, p. 8; ‘Source in Seoul cited on MIG–23s in DPRK’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 10 August 1986, p. 6; Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat 1988, 1988, p. 27; ‘SA–3 SAMs in North Korea’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 25 January 1986, p. 100; ‘Korea (North)’, Air International, October 1985, p. 163; ‘Weekly Update: Korea Flogger-Gs’, Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly, September 16–22, 1985, p. 1; ‘North Korea Receives Ten More MiG–23 Floggers’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 17 August 1985, p. 296; and ‘MIG–23s Delivered to North Korea’, AFP, 28 June 1985, as cited in JPRS-KAR–85–058. 55 US Congress, Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence, Before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in Intelligence M

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T HE A RMED F ORCES OF NORTH K OREA Issues, 22 February 1989, p. 35; and US Congress, Statement by General Louis C. Menetrey, U.S. Army, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Before the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, 26 May 1988, p. 4. The Su–25K is the Soviet counterpart to the USAF’s A–10. Lake, John, ‘Sukhoi ‘‘Frogfoot’’ Su–25, Su–28 and Su–39,’ World Air Power Journal, Vol. 30, Autumn/Fall 1997, pp. 59–97. Author interview data; Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence, Before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in Intelligence Issues, p. 47; Mama, H. P., ‘Indian Aerospace Programs: Opportunity Knocks’, International Defense Review, 10/1988, pp. 1336–9; and ‘N. Korea Has 30 ‘‘Fulcrums’’, Says Japan’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 1 October 1988, p. 749. ‘N. Korea Moves to Buy Russian SU–30 Fighters’, Korea Herald, 7 October 1999. For an interesting discussion of the UNC difficulties in countering KPAF ‘nuisance’ raids during the Fatherland Liberation War see: Jackson, Robert, Air War Korea 1950–1953, Motorbooks International, Osceola, Wisconsin, 1998, pp. 11, 66, 80–1 and 105; O’Conner, Mike, ‘Coping with Charlie’, Journal of The American Aviation Historical Society, Spring 1985, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 2–11; ‘Enemy Light Plane Raids in Korea’, ONI Review, August 1953, Vol. 8, No. 8, pp. 378–9; and ‘Korea (North Korea): Notes From a North Korean Defector’, ONI Review, November 1955, Vol. 10, No. 11, p. 606. Author interview data; Williams, William J., ‘ ‘‘Bedcheck Charlie’’ and the An–2’, Air Power History, Winter 1996, pp. 4–13; and Pak, Song-kun, ‘Weapons Systems of North Korea’, Kukbang Kwa Kisul, January 1989, pp. 102–13, as cited in FBIS-EAS–89–055. Butowski, Piotr, ‘ ‘‘Antek’s’’ Early Years’, AIR Enthusiast, No. 81, May/June 1999, pp. 2–11; Butowski, Piotr, ‘How to Replace the An–2?’, Air International, October 1996; and Mader, Georg, ‘Hrvatske Zrance Snage’, World Air Power Journal, Vol. 24, Spring 1996, pp. 140–7. Author interview data. ‘North Military Personnel, Arms Double in Decade’, Korea Herald, 27 July 1985, pp. 1–2, as cited in JPRS-KAR–85–059, 30 August 1985, pp. 7–8. Author interview data; and ‘Special Force Formed in DPRK With U.S. Helicopters’, Kyonghyang Sinmun, 24 March 1986, p. 1; as cited in JPRS-KAR–86–015, 14 April 1986, p. 5. Author interview data; and Anderson, Jack, ‘N. Korea Penetrates S. Korean Airspace With U.S. Choppers’, Newsday, 29 April 1985, p. 54. Author interview data; and ‘NK’s MiG–29s Carry Advanced Missiles’. Author interview data. Author interview data; and ‘Defector Says DPRK Receives Spy Photos From Russia’. For details of the D–5 see Munson, Kenneth, World Unmanned Aircraft, Jane’s Publishing Company Ltd., London, 1988, p. 32. For information on the DR–3 see, Butowski, Peter, ‘Russian Reconnaissance UAVs—Part 2’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Pointer, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1996, pp. 4–5; and Zaloga, Steven J., ‘Russian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1994, pp. 291–6. Author interview data; ‘North Korean Forces Suffer Mobility Loss’, Aviation week & Space Technology, 24 November 1997, Vol. 147, No. 21, p. 62; ‘ ‘‘No Knowledge’’ on New Missile’, Yonhap, 16 September 1993, as cited in FBISEAS–93–178. M

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72 Author interview data; ‘S. Korea Trains for Hang-glider, Balloon Attacks by North’ Los Angeles Times, 20 March 1999; and ‘North Korea Imports Gliders from USSR for Military Use’, North Korea News, September 1986, No. 340, p. 2. The sailplanes may have been manufactured by the Arsenyev Aviation Company. 73 During the 1970s the DPRK was organised as a single air defence district which was subdivided into zones. Although it was autonomous it functioned as part of the PRC’s air defence warning system. 74 Author interview data; ‘High-Level Defector Comments on DPRK Military, Part VI’, Choson Ilbo, 12 February 1996, p. 2; and ‘Journal Views DPRK’s Military Organization’, pp. 30–1. 75 The possibility exists that these SAM regiments have been organised into six brigades (four SA–2, one SA–3, one SA–5), although this remains to be confirmed. 76 For a detailed description of Soviet SAM development, operations, capabilities and organisation see Zaloga, Steven J., Soviet Air Defense Missiles, Jane’s Publishing Company Ltd., 1989. 77 Author interview data; and ‘ ‘‘Everything Is Buried!’’ ’, pp. 94–7. 78 There is an unconfirmed report that during 1994 the KPAF received the first of a small number of Polish-built early warning radars. These were reportedly deployed south of P’yongyang to enhance the low-altitude defence of the capital. Starr, Barbara, ‘North Korean Missile R&D Gains New Pace’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 25 June 1994, p. 10. 79 Statement of Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence, Before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in Intelligence Issues, 1 March 1988, pp. 50–1; and author interview data, US Navy, 17 May 1988. 80 ‘Comparison of North and South Korea’s Air Power’, pp. 378–91. 81 ‘N.K. War Plan ‘‘Complete’’: P’yang Design to Blitz through Pusan Bared’, p. 1. 82 Author interview data; ‘DPRK Defector’s 28 May News Conference’; ‘DPRK Reportedly Modified MiG–19 Piloted by Defector’; ‘Further on DPRK Defector Pilot News Conference’; ‘More on Defecting Pilot’s News Conference,’ Yonhap, 23 May 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–101; Browne, Andrew, ‘Pyongyang defector shows up bumbling on all sides’, Reuters, 24 May 1996; ‘N. Korean defector said he left three-plane flight’, Reuters, 24 May 1996. 83 Author interview data; North Korea Handbook, pp. 3–13; ‘German Technology Transfers to DPRK Examined’, Sindong-A, December 1991, pp. 384–93, as cited in FBIS-EAS–92–005; ‘North’s Production, Export of Weapons Described’, Hanguk Ilbo, 26 February 1991, p. 15, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91– 041; ‘North Attempting to Buy East German Weapons’, Choson Ilbo, 28 October 1990, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-EAS–90–209; and ‘Air Force Day Commemoration Announced’, Naewoe Tongsin, No. 655, 1 September 1989, pp. 1J–4J, as cited in FBIS-EAS–89–220. 84 ‘North Said To Seek Aid in MiG–29 Production’, Yonhap, 3 October 1995, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–191; ‘DPRK MiG–29 Assembly Plant Said ‘‘Stopped’’ ’, Chungang Ilbo, 10 November 1993, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–220-A; ‘ ‘‘No Knowledge’’ on New Missile’, p. 16; ‘Yeltsin Promises To Stop Arms Supply to DPRK’, Yonhap, 19 November 1992, as cited in FBIS-EAS–92–224; and Lake, John, ‘Mikoyan MiG–29 ‘‘Fulcrum’’ ’, World Air Power Journal, Vol. 4, Winter 1990/91, pp. 44–91. 85 ‘Russia To Maintain Military Relations With DPRK’, Voice of Russia World Service, 19 May 1997, as cited in FBIS-UMA–97–139. 86 The Mi–8T is a troop transport/utility helicopter which may also be armed with four rocket pods or a total of 1000 kg of bombs. M

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87 ‘Illegal Helicopter Sale to DPRK Stopped’, Kommersant, 17 October 1998, p. 3, as cited in FBIS-SOV–98–299; ‘TV Reports Inquiry Into Export of Combat Helicopters’, Russian Television Network, 9 October 1998, as cited in FBISUMA–98–283; ‘Helicopter Shipment to North Korea Seized’, Kommersant, 9 October 1998, p. 3, as cited in FBIS-EAS–98–287; ‘More on Attempt to Smuggle Russian Helicopters to DPRK’, NTV, 8 October 1998, as cited in FBIS-TAC–98–281; and ‘Army Said To Have Sold Helicopters Held in Russian Far East’, Interfax, 8 October 1998, as cited in FBIS-UMA–98–282. 88 The exact route to P’yongyang is presently unclear. 89 ‘Czech TV Probes MiG–21 Sale To North Korea’, CT 1, 12 July 1999, as cited in FBIS; ‘Baku Confirms Agroplast Tried To Smuggle MiGs To DPRK’, CT 1, 12 May 1999, as cited in FBIS; ‘Czech Combat Planes Reportedly Headed for North Korea’, CTK, 12 May 1999, as cited in FBIS; ‘Kazakhstan Says Azeris Seized Their MiGs’, Reuters, 24 March 1999; and ‘Azerbaijan-Russian Jets’, Associated Press, 24 March 1999. 90 Author interview data; ‘Defector Discloses 1991 Explosion Accident in Missile Plant’, Sankei Shimbun, 19 March 1994, morning edition, p. 1, as cited in JPRS-TND–94–003-L; ‘1991 Explosion at DPRK Missile Plant Reported’, KBS–1, 19 March 1994, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94–054; and ‘Defector on North’s Nuclear Development’, Seoul Sinmun, 9 October 1991, p. 5, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–204, 22 October 1991, pp. 19–20. 91 Author interview data; and ‘DPRK Defector’s 28 May News Conference’.

6 PARAMILITARY AND RESERVE FORCES 1 Author interview data; A Handbook on North Korea: 1st Revision, p. 41; Defense White Paper 1998, pp. 62–3; Defense White Paper 1997–1998, pp. 51–2; North Korea Country Handbook, p. 34; A Handbook on North Korea, Naewoe Press, Seoul, 1996, pp. 35–6; North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength—Update 1995, PC–1510–101–96, p. 23; North Korea Handbook, pp. 3-3 to 3-4; Kin Motoyoshi, ‘Kim Chong-il’s Army,’ pp. 200–9; and North Korean Armed Forces Handbook, pp. 5-1 to 5-14. 2 A more precise translation of Workers’–Peasants’ Red Guard is ‘Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Militia’, however, the former is the more common usage and will be used here. For a detailed description of the birth of the WPRG and its early usage see Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, Communism in Korea, 2 volumes, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972, pp. 946– 4. 3 Central Military Committee control may also extend directly down to the Military Affairs Departments of Ch’ongjin and Hamhung. 4 There are reports of WPRG brigades and divisions, however these have yet to be confirmed. If such units do exist, they are administrative units rather than combat formations. 5 Other sources suggest that the Red Youth Guards were established in either late 1969 or January 1970. 6 Author interview data; ‘Monthly Discusses Secret Works in DPRK’, Pukhan, January 1999, pp. 72–83; ‘Tighter Border Control’, Vantage Point, Vol. XX, No. 6, June 1997, p. 23; ‘Official Notes DPRK Border Guards in ‘‘State of Anarchy’’ ’, Joong-Ang Ilbo, 7 December 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–237; Han Ki-hung, ‘DPRK Refugee Influx Via PRC Considered’, Tong-a Ilbo, 5 January 1996, p. 3, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–011; and ‘DPRK ‘‘Reinforced’’ PRC, Russia Border Guards’, Yonhap, 15 April 1994, as cited in FBIS-EAS– 94–073. M




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7 Twelve years prior, in 1983, the Border and Coastal Security Bureaus were transferred from the Public Security Ministry to the State Security Department. 8 ‘NK Border Guard Shoots Attempted Crosser: Defectors’, Choson Ilbo, 2 September 1997. 9 The 25th was reportedly deactivated in 1974 and then re-activated in 1991. 10 Author interview data; ‘Monthly Discusses Secret Works in DPRK’, pp. 72–83; ‘Tighter Border Control’, p. 23; ‘Official Notes DPRK Border Guards in ‘‘State of Anarchy’’ ’; ‘DPRK Refugee Influx Via PRC Considered’, p. 3; and ‘DPRK ‘‘Reinforced’’ PRC, Russia Border Guards’, p. 39. 11 Jane’s Fighting Ships 1998–1999, pp. 397–403; ‘The Korean People’s Navy— Further Perspectives’, Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 5, No. 7, July 1993, pp. 315–19; and ‘North Korea’s Naval Forces’, p. 34. M

7 INTELLIGENCE AND INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES 1 For a detailed look at DPRK support of terrorism and revolutionary organisations see Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., Terrorism: The North Korean Connection, Taylor & Francis, New York, October 1990. 2 Author interview data; and Chon, Shi-yong, ‘Security Agency Suspects North Korea Plotting Terrorism to Strain Ties’, Korea Herald, 10 July 1998. 3 Author interview data; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., North Korean Special Forces— Second Edition; A Handbook on North Korea, p. 20; and Terrorism: The North Korean Connection. Portions of this chapter were extracted from chapter 5 of North Korean Special Forces—Second Edition. 4 Author interview data; Oh Il-hwan, ‘The Aims and Characteristics of North Korea’s United Front Strategy’, Vantage Point, Vol. XIX, No. 3, March 1996, pp. 27–9. 5 ‘Kim Chung-nin’s Background Detailed’, Pukhan, January 1992, pp. 91–100. 6 For a description of these ‘workers’ organisations’ see ‘DPRK Working People’s Organizations viewed’. 7 ‘Article Criticizes Kato’s Ties to DPRK’, Bungei Shunju, 10 December 1995, pp. 116–27, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–238; ‘North Fires Southern Affairs Chief Yun Ki-pok’, Chungang Ilbo, 27 January 1993, p. 9, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93– 041; and ‘Transfer of DPRK Official for ROK Affairs Discussed’, Chungang Ilbo, 25 February 1993, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–037. 8 Author interview data; ‘Weekly Discusses Reshuffle of Power in DPRK’, Sisa Journal, 3 April 1997, pp. 66–3, as cited in FBIS-EAS–97–063. Defense White Paper, various editions 1990–99; ‘The Aims and Characteristics of North Korea’s United Front Strategy’, pp. 27–9; and ‘Former North Korean Agent Discloses DPRK’s Spy Activities’, Mainichi Shimbun, 9 May 1996, p. 6, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–093. 9 Author interview data; ‘DPRK Said Increasing Infiltration Capabilities’ Yonhap, 10 November 1997, as cited in FBIS-EAS–97–314; ‘The Aims and Characteristics of North Korea’s United Front Strategy’, pp. 27–9; ‘Articles by Defector Kang Myong-to Reported: ROK-Watching Spy Agencies, Activities, Part 8 of 12’, Chungang Ilbo, 28 April 1995, p. 3, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–097; and ‘Former North Korean Agent Discloses DPRK’s Spy Activities’, p. 6. 10 ‘Weekly Discusses Reshuffle of Power in DPRK’, Sisa Journal, 3 April 1997, pp. 66–3, as cited in FBIS-EAS–97–063. 11 ibid.; and ‘North Fires Southern Affairs Chief Yun Ki-pok’, p. 9 12 Author interview data; ‘WPK Intelligence Chief Kown Hui-kyong Profiled’, Chungang Ilbo, 3 August 1999; ‘The Aims and Characteristics of North




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T HE A RMED F ORCES OF NORTH K OREA Korea’s United Front Strategy’, pp. 27–9; ‘Articles by Defector Kang Myong-to Reported: ROK-Watching Spy Agencies, Activities, Part 8 of 12’, p. 3; and ‘Former North Korean Agent Discloses DPRK’s Spy Activities’, p. 6. These sections are sometimes referred to as divisions. ‘WPK Intelligence Chief Kwon Hui-kyong Profiled’; and ‘DPRK’s Kim Chongil’s Position on Retaliation’, pp. 8–11. ‘Article on Composition, Mission of DPRK ‘‘Operation Agents’’ ’, Choson Ilbo, 23 September 1996, p. 4 as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–185; ‘NSP Presumes Consul’s Murder Work of DPRK Terrorists’, Yonhap, 4 October 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–194; and ‘NSP Urges Bolstering Security Measures Against Terrorism’, Chollian Database, 4 October 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–208-A. Author interview data; ‘Article on DPRK Spy Ships’, Sekai no Kansen, July 1999, pp. 106–7; and ‘DPRK Spy Organizations Targeting Japan Tokyo’, pp. 68–73. Author interview data. Alternate spellings for Hwangt’o-do are Hwangt’o-som and Hwangt’o-to. Previously captured infiltrators from the 313th Army Unit have reported undergoing up to 45 days of mission-specific training before conducting an infiltration into the ROK. As an example of CCSKA long-term espionage efforts see the case of Ko Yong-pok who was only arrested in 1997 after 36 years of espionage work in the ROK. ‘NSP Announces Arrest of DPRK Spies’, KBS–1, 20 November 1997, as cited in FBIS-EAS–97–325. Author interview data; Bruce, Katherine, ‘Shooting of Alleged N. Korean Spy Ends Drama’, Reuters, 27 October 1995; ‘Agents Sent for ‘‘Resident Spy’’ ’, KBS–1, 25 October 1995, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–206; ‘News Conference Provides Details’, Yonhap, 25 October 1995, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–206; and ‘Police Find Equipment Hidden by Infiltrator’, KBS–1, 25 October 1995, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–207. Author interview data; and Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘Midget Submarine Infiltration Upsets South Korea’s Trouble Waters’, International Defense Review, Vol. 31, August 1998, pp. 23–4. Author interview data; ‘Military Says Manhunt Meaningless, Calls Off Search for 2 North Korea Agents’, Korea Herald, 20 July 1998; Lee Sung-yul, ‘Army Troops Search for 2 North Korean Agents Spotted in East Coast Mountains’, Korea Herald, 16 July 1998; Lee Sung-yul, ‘North Korean Agent’s Possible Mission: Kill or Abduct Hwang Jang-yop’, Korea Herald, 15 July 1998; Lee Sung-yul, ‘Body of Suspected North Korean Commando Found on Beach’, Korea Herald, 13 July 1998; and ‘Body of Suspected NK Spy Discovered’, Korea Times, 12 July 1998. Author interview data; Lee Sung-yul, ‘South Korean Forces Spot Possible North Korean Ship in West Sea’, Korea Herald, 21 November 1998; ‘Suspected NK Spy Boat Sighted’, Korea Times, 20 November 1998; and ‘NK Vessel Chase In West Sea’, Digital Chosunilbo, 20 November 1998. Author interview data; ‘Analysis of Anti-Submarine Operations’, Sindong-A, 27 January 1999, as cited in FBIS; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘Details Emerge of New DPRK Infiltration Craft’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 6 January 1999, p. 14; Lee Sung-yul, ‘North Korean Spies Suspected of Committing Suicide Before Boat Sank’, Korea Herald, 21 December 1998; Yu Yong-won, ‘All NK Semi- Sub Crew Confirmed Dead’, Digital Chosunilbo, 20 December 1998; Lee Sung-yul, ‘Sunken Boat Typifies Vessel Used By N.K. Agents Infiltrating South’, Korea Herald, 19 December 1998; and Lee Sung-yul, ‘Navy Sinks North Korean Spy Vessel off South Coast’, Korea Herald, December 19, 1998. M

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26 Author interview data; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘DPRK Spy-ships Chased on High Seas’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 11, No. 5, May 1999, pp. 34–5; ‘Operations in Pursuit of DPRK Spy Ships,’ Bungei Shunju, May 1999, pp. 146–52, as cited in FBIS; ‘Japan Examines Its Defence as Ships Reach N. Korea’, Reuters, 25 March 1999; ‘Defense Agency Intercepted Messages From Suspicious Ships’, Asahi Shimbun, 25 March 1999, p. 39, as cited in FBIS; and ‘U.S. Helping Track 2 Mysterious Ships in Sea Off Japan’, Kyodo, 23 March 1999. 27 ‘Details Emerge of New DPRK Infiltration Craft’, p. 14; North Korean Special Forces—Second Edition; and Terrorism: The North Korean Connection. 28 Author interview data. 29 Author interview data; and ‘DPRK Said Increasing Infiltration Capabilities’. 30 Author interview data; and ‘North Korea’s Naval Forces’, Asian Defense Journal, July 1990, pp. 35–6. 31 Author interview data. 32 Author interview data. 33 Author interview data; Yu Yong-won, ‘NK Sub To Be Target Ship In Exercises’, Digital Chosunilbo, 4 January 1999; ‘North Korean Sub Displays Unique Features’, Korea Herald, 29 June 1998; Lee Sung-yul ‘North Korean Sub Believed to Be Returning to North When Caught in Fishing Net’, Korea Herald, 29 June 1998; ‘Questions Abound About Agents from NK Sub’, Korea Times, 24 June 1998; and ‘ROK Navy Identifies Stranded Sub as Yugo-Class Sub’, Yonhap, 22 June 1998, as cited in FBIS-EAS–98–173. 34 Author interview data; ‘Article on Transfer of Technology to DPRK’, Bungei Shunju, August 1999, pp. 94–107, as cited in FBIS; ‘North Korean Sub Displays Unique Features’; and ‘ROK Navy Identifies Stranded Sub as YugoClass Sub’. 35 ‘NK Sub To Be Target Ship In Exercises’. 36 Starr, Barbara, ‘Off-the-Shelf Infiltrator’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 23 October 1996. 37 Author interview data; US Navy, Worldwide Submarine Challenges: 1996, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, DC, 1996, pp. 30–1; Jane’s Fighting Ships 1996–1997, p. 397; and Jane’s Fighting Ships 1990–1991, p. 356. 38 Author interview data; and Jane’s Fighting Ships 1996–1997, p. 397. 39 ‘Yonhap Reports on Infiltrator, Defector News Conference’, Yonhap, 29 October 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–210. 40 This class is sometimes known by the US codename of CLUSTER OSPREY. Author interview data; and ‘North Korea’s Naval Forces’, p. 34. 41 Author interview data; ‘Article on Transfer of Technology to DPRK’, pp. 94–107; and Jane’s Fighting Ships 1996–1997, p. 397. 42 Author interview data; ‘NK Subs Using Japanese Technology’, Digital Chosunilbo, 18 May 1999; Lee, Sung-yul, ‘Four Bodies, Numerous Weapons Found Inside N.K. Spy Boat’, Korea Herald, 24 March 1999; ‘Six Corpses Found in Sunken NK Infiltration Boat’, Korea Times, 23 March 1999; ‘JCS Announces Results of Probe on DPRK Semi-Submarine’, Yonhap, 23 March 1999; ‘NK Develops ‘‘Stealth’’ Ship’; and ‘Yonhap Reports on Infiltrator, Defector News Conference’. 43 Author interview data; and ‘Article on Transfer of Technology to DPRK’, pp. 94–107. 44 Author interview data; ‘NK Develops ‘‘Stealth’’ Ship’; and ‘Yonhap Reports on Infiltrator, Defector News Conference’. 45 Author interview data; ‘Body of North Korean Infiltrator Found’, Digital Chosunilbo, 12 July 1998; and ‘Body of Suspected NK Spy Discovered’. 46 Author interview data.




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47 Author interview data; and ‘North Korea Speedboats’, Associated Press, 13 April 1999. 48 Author interview data; ‘Ex-Agent Says 2 Ships Typical to DPRK’, Kyodo, 3 April 1999, as cited in FBIS; North Korean Armed Forces Handbook, p. 6–8; and North Korean Armed Forces Handbook (U), pp. 145–6. 49 Author interview data; ‘S. Korea Finds Four More Bodies in N. Korea Vessel’ Reuters, 23 March 1999; ‘NK Develops ‘‘Stealth’’ Ship’; and ‘Sunken Boat Typifies Vessel Used By N.K. Agents Infiltrating South’. 50 ‘Daily Profiles Head of DPRK Reconnaissance Bureau’, Choson Ilbo, 26 September 1996, p. 3. 51 ‘Agency Releases Videotaped Testimony by DPRK Infiltrator’, Yonhap, 29 October 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–210. 52 It is unclear whether the terms ‘Base’ and ‘Squadron’ (e.g. Third Base and 22nd Squadron) are synonymous. It would appear from the testimony of Yi Kwang-su that they are. 53 ‘Captured Infiltrator Cited on DPRK Submarine Operations’, Korea Herald, 3 October 1996, p. 3, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–193; and ‘DPRK Has 4 Submarine Bases for ‘‘Infiltrations’’ of South’, Digital Chosun Ilbo, 30 September 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–191. 54 Author interview data; and ‘DPRK Spy Organizations Targeting Japan Tokyo’, pp. 68–73. 55 Author interview data; ‘Chronology of North Korean Submarine Drama’, Reuters, 29 December 1996; ‘Agency Releases Videotaped Testimony by DPRK Infiltrator;’ ‘DPRK Sub Infiltrator, Defector Interviewed’, KBS–1, 29 October 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–211; North Korea Submarine Incursion, Korean Veterans Association, Seoul, 1996; Jane’s Fighting Ships 1996–1997, p. 397; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘Submarine Was on Mission to Spy on South’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 26, No. 13, 25 September 1996, pp. 4–5; ‘Recon Photographs Taken by DPRK Espionage Agents Found’, Kyonghyang Sinmun, 24 September 1996, p. 1, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–186; ‘DPRK Makes Radio Contact Daily With 5 Remaining Agents’, Joong-Ang Ilbo, 23 September 1996; ‘Identities of 20 DPRK Infiltrators Revealed’, KBS–1, 18 September 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–182; and Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘North Korea’s Reconnaissance Bureau’, Jane’s Intelligence Watch Report, Vol. 3, No. 2, April 1996, pp. 3–10. 56 Author interview data; ‘Monthly Discusses Secret Works in DPRK’, Pukhan, January 1999, pp. 72–83; ‘Kim Chong-il’s Security Force Strengthened’, Naewoe Tongsin, No. 961, 13 July 1995, pp. E1–E4, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95– 182; and ‘Journal Views DPRK’s Military Organization’, Sisa Journal, 6 June 1996, pp. 30–1. 57 Author interview data; and ‘Articles Sees Few Changes Made in DPRK Power Lineup’, Chunghang Ilbo, 9 April 1999, as cited in FBIS. 58 During the 1970s and early 1980s the Guard Bureau (now Guard Command) also controlled the P’yongyang Defence Command and the Security Bureau (now Security Command). 59 ‘Ex-DPRK Officer on Military’, pp. 62–96. 60 ‘DPRK Said To Operate Assault Unit Against Possible Coup’, KBS–1, 7 February 1999. 61 ‘Ex-DPRK Officer on Military’, pp. 62–96. 62 Author interview data; ‘DPRK Reportedly Purges High-ranking Officials’, Chungang Ilbo, 25 January 1999, as cited in FBIS-EAS–99–026; ‘DPRK’s Kim Chong-il’s Position on Retaliation’, pp. 8–11; ‘Generational Shift in DPRK Leadership Gaining Momentum’, Hanguk Ilbo, 29 July 1996, p. 13, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–146; ‘Defector to ROK on Kim Chong-il’s Control of DPRK




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Military’, pp. 161–7; ‘Defector Hwang Chang-yop Interviewed’, pp. 328–45; ‘Defector Says KPA Under ‘‘Complete Control’’ of Kim Chong-il’, p. 20; and ‘Journal Views DPRK’s Military Organization’, pp. 30–1. Author interview data; ‘NK Reshuffles Political Structure’; A Handbook on North Korea, p. 20; ‘Attempted 1995 Military Coup d’Etat in DPRK Alleged’, pp. 34–5; ‘Article on Past Military Coup Attempts in North’, Iryo Sinmun, 21 May 1995, p. 9, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–097; ‘DPRK ‘‘Intensifying’’ Internal Control’, Seoul Sinmun, 6 May 1996, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96– 088; and ‘Journal Views DPRK’s Military Organization’, pp. 30–1. The deputy directors may be identified as the 1st, 2nd, 3rd . . . vice-director rather than deputy director for organisation, propaganda etc. ‘Weekly Reviews DPRK Defectors’ News Conference’, Sisa Journal, 11 August 1994, pp. 6–10, as cited in FBIS. ‘Kim Chong-il’s Security Force Strengthened’, pp. E1–E4. For a detailed description of this incident see Jinakul, Surath, ‘North Korea— Attempted Kidnap Drama’, Bangkok Post, 11 April 1999. A Handbook on North Korea: 1st Revision, pp. 104–5; ‘DPRK Defector on North’s Nuclear Development’, p. 3; and Kim Chong-min, ‘I Was In Charge of Materials for the Construction of the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility’, pp. 290–303. Both these incidents have previously been reported as being coup attempts. The details concerning the March 1993 affair are still unclear and it may have been a corruption case. The April 1995 incident, however, was clearly a case of corruption. Author interview data; ‘Attempted 1995 Military Coup d’Etat in DPRK Alleged’, pp. 34–5; ‘Article on Past Military Coup Attempts in North’; ‘DPRK ‘‘Intensifying’’ Internal Control’, p. 2; ‘Armed Forces Structure, Make-up Discussed’, pp. 196–205; and ‘Kim Chong-il’s Army’, pp. 200–9. ‘DPRK Reportedly Reshuffles Political Structure’, Chungang Ilbo, 14 January 1999, as cited in FBIS-EAS–99–014. For information on the DPRK’s involvement in terrorism see Terrorism: The North Korean Connection. Author interview data; ‘Kim Chong-il Thanks KPA, Security Officers’, KCNA, 11 January 1996, as cited in FBIS-EAS–96–008; A Handbook on North Korea, p. 20; ‘Attempted 1995 Military Coup d’Etat in DPRK Alleged’; ‘Article on Past Military Coup Attempts in North’; ‘DPRK ‘‘Intensifying’’ Internal Control’; ‘Armed Forces Structure, Make-up Discussed’, pp. 196–205; and ‘Kim Chong-il’s Army’, pp. 200–9. ‘Korea North Intelligence Unit Shifted to Defense Commission’, KBS–1, 10 January 1994, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94–006. Author interview data; A Handbook on North Korea, pp. 35–6; and ‘U.S. Official Cited on ‘‘Abnormal’’ Signs in North’, p. 2. ‘DPRK Said To Tighten Control Over Travel in P’yongyang’, Chungang Ilbo, 6 May 1997, p. 1, as cited in FBIS-EAS–97–126. It is unclear whether the official title of the eleven directors is ‘director’, ‘vice-director’, or simply ‘chief’. According to reliable sources they are not ‘vice-minister’ as would normally be expected. The heads of the engineer bureaus are military officers with the title of ‘commander’ and are typically lieutenant generals. There are likely to be additional trading companies directly subordinate to the Ministry of Public Security. ‘Articles by Defector Kang Myong-to Reported: Imports for Elite, PRC, Part 11 of 12’, p. 3. The exact subordination for some of these engineer bureaus is unclear. Some may, in fact, be subordinate to other ministries (e.g. Ministry of Mining




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T HE A RMED F ORCES OF NORTH K OREA Industry, Ministry of Railways). Author interview data; ‘Monthly Discusses Secret Works in DPRK’, pp. 72–83; ‘DPRK Defector on North’s Nuclear Development’, p. 3; and ‘I Was In Charge of Materials for the Construction of the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility’, pp. 290–303. The possibility exists that a separate bureau or department was established just for the security of the DPRK’s nuclear infrastructure. Author interview data; and ‘Monthly Discusses Secret Works in DPRK’, pp. 72–83. The Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry may have been dissolved. If so, the 27th Engineer Bureau probably takes its orders directly from the KWP Atomic Energy Department or the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau of the Second Economic Committee. ‘Defector on Nuclear Facilities in Chagang’, Chungang Ilbo, 28 August 1995, pp. 1–2, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–167 Kim Chong-il had also served in the Ministry of Public Security. ‘Son of DPRK’s Kim Chong-il Said to Join Government’, Chungang Ilbo, 4 November 1999.

8 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 1 Author interview data; Defense White Paper 1998, pp. 63–5; Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defense, November 1997, Washington, DC, pp. 4–8; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘Military-Technical Observations of the DPRK Nuclear Program’, 1994 for Los Alamos National Laboratory’s Center for National and Strategic Studies; US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC–115, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, December 1993; US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials, OTA-O–572, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, September 1993; US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC–559, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, August 1993; Hansen, Chuck, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, Orion Books, New York, 1988; and Rhodes, Richard, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1986. 2 ‘Defector Hwang Chang-yop Interviewed’, pp. 328–45, as cited in FBIS-EAS– 98–191. 3 Author interview data; US Department of State, Agreed Framework Between The United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Geneva, 21 October 1994; US, General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implementation of the U.S./North Korean Agreement on Nuclear Issues, GAO/RCED/NSIAD–97–165, June 1997; and US General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S./North Korean Agreement on Nuclear Issues, GAO/RCED/NSIAD–97–8, October 1996. 4 Author interview data; ‘Development at ‘‘Dangerous Point’’ ’, Yonhap, 9 May 1994, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94–089; ‘Energy Institute Reports Status of DPRK Nuclear Facilities’, Tong-a Ilbo, 8 July 1993, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–130; ‘‘Roundtable Talk’’ on Withdrawal’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 23 March 1993, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–057; ‘Researcher Views DPRK Nuclear Capabilities’, Sindong-A, July 1992, pp. 262–84, as cited in FBIS-EAS– 92–187; ‘Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations’, Chugan Choson, 30 June 1994, pp. 26–8, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94–126; and ‘Manpower in DPRK’s Nuclear Program Reported’, Wolgan Chungang, March 1994, pp. 252–67, M




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as cited in FBIS-EAS–94–093. Satellite photographs of the Yongbyon facilities can be viewed at www.isis-online-org. Author interview data; Albright, David, North Korean Plutonium Production, ISIS, Washington, DC, 24 June 1994; Brunnstrom, David, ‘Perry Says N. Korea Will Have Extra Fuel for Bombs’, Reuters, 20 April 1994; ‘U.S. Pentagon Comments on North Korea’, United Press International, 3 April 1994; Pagani, Steve, ‘Checks of N. Korea Sites Vital to Plutonium Quest’, Reuters, 30 March 1994; Lederer, Edith M. ‘N Korea-Nuclear Mystery’, Associated Press, 5 January 1994; Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC–115, Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, December 1993, p. 125; Gordan, Michael B. ‘Intelligence Study Says North Korea Has Nuclear Bomb’, New York Times, 26 December 1993, p. 1; Posner, Michael, ‘North Korea Might Have Nuclear Bombs—U.S. Officials’, Reuters, 26 December 1993; ‘Government Offers DPRK Nuclear Reactor Technology’, Choson Ilbo, 23 April 1993, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–077; ‘ ‘‘Roundtable Talk’’ on Withdrawal’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 23 March 1993, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–057; ‘North Believed Closer to Producing Nuclear Arms’, Korea Herald, 6 July 1989, p. 1; ‘North to Produce Bombs’, Korea Herald, 28 November 1986, p. 1; and ‘U.S. Prods IAEA About Safeguards for North Korean Nuclear Plants’, Nuclear Fuel, 3 April 1989, p. 5. Author interview data; Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S./North Korean Agreement on Nuclear Issues, pp. 3 and 28; North Korean Plutonium Production; ‘Perry Says N. Korea Will Have Extra Fuel for Bombs’; ‘U.S. Pentagon Comments on North Korea’; and Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 125. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S./North Korean Agreement on Nuclear Issues, pp. 3, 28. Author interview data; Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implementation of the U.S./North Korean Agreement on Nuclear Issues; Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S./North Korean Agreement on Nuclear Issues; Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Problems of Extension, Moscow, 1995, pp. 1–73, as cited in JPRSTAC–95–009-L; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Nuclear Capabilities, latest revision August 1998; North Korean Plutonium Production; ‘Perry Says N. Korea Will Have Extra Fuel for Bombs’; ‘U.S. Pentagon Comments on North Korea’; ‘Manpower in DPRK’s Nuclear Program Reported’; ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure’, pp. 74–9; Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction; ‘Intelligence Study Says North Korea Has Nuclear Bomb’, p. 1; ‘North Korea Might Have Nuclear Bombs—U.S. Officials’; ‘N. Korea and the Bomb: High-Tech Hide-and-Seek; U.S. Intelligence Key in Detecting Deception’, p. A1; ‘Government Offers DPRK Nuclear Reactor Technology’; ‘ROK Defector Leads DPRK Nuclear Development’, Tong-a Ilbo, 18 March 1993, p. 23, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93– 053; Larry A. Niksch, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 1999; ‘Biography of North’s Nuclear Expert Yi Sung-ki’; ‘Reporter Identifies DPRK Nuclear Scientists’; and U.S. Nuclear Weapons. Author interview data. These figures appear to be similar to those found in statements by the DPRK defector Kang Myong Do, ‘North Korean Defectors 27 July News Conference’, Choson Ilbo, 28 July 1994, pp. 3–4, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94–145; Sterngold, James, ‘Defector Says North Korea Has 5 A-Bombs and May Make More’, New York Times, 28 July 1994, p. A7; and ‘Defector: N. Korea Eyes 10 A-Bombs’, Newsday, 28 July 1994, p. A14.




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10 ‘North Korean Defectors 27 July New Conference’; ‘Defector Says North Korea Has 5 A-Bombs and May Make More’, p. A7; and ‘Defector: N. Korea Eyes 10 A-Bombs’, p. A14. 11 It is interesting to note that Iraq had apparently focused its limited resources upon the development of a 20-kiloton implosion device to be mounted on a ballistic missile. At the time of Operation DESERT STORM, this weapon had reached an advanced stage of development. Kay, David, ‘Iraqi Inspections: Lessons Learned’, Eye on Supply, Winter 1993, pp. 88, 93, 98; and United Nations Security Council, Report to the Executive Chairman, S/23165, 25 October 1991. 12 ‘Defense Minister-DPRK Tested Detonators’, KBS–1, 15 June 1994, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94–115. 13 While extremely beneficial, computer modelling is not essential for a nuclear program. A 1993 US Office of Technology Assessment report stated that ‘High-performance computers are not now, and never were, an essential technology for designing fairly sophisticated nuclear weapons.’ Likewise, David Kay, who led the UN nuclear inspection team into Iraq after Operation DESERT STORM, has stated that today’s ‘laptop computers are more powerful than the computers used to develop second generation thermo-nuclear weapons’. ‘Nuclear Proliferation Has Many Faces—Kay’, BMD Monitor, 3 June 1994; Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 150; and ‘Nuclear Researcher on DPRK Effort To Make Bomb’, Wolgan Choson, pp. 342–6, May 1993, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–105. 14 ‘KGB Document Reveals DPRK Nuclear Potential’, Izvestiya, 24 June 1994, p. 4, as cited in FBIS-SOV–94–122. 15 Lovace, Joseph, ‘North Korea Has Not Tested Nuclear Weapons: Official’, Defense Week, 25 April 1994, p. 11. 16 Gertz, Bill, ‘North Korea Fortifies Air Defenses, Fears U.S.-Led Strike on Nuclear Arms Plant’, Washington Times, 28 November 1991, p. A3. 17 Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 125. 18 Author interview data; Koch, Andrew, ‘Pakistan Persists with Nuclear Procurement’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Volume 9, Number 3, March 1997, p. 131; Gordon, Marcy, ‘Iraq-Nuclear-Probe’, Associated Press, 21 October 1992; ‘Dozens of U.S. Exports Went to Iraqi Arms Projects’, p. A1; ‘DPRK Defector on North’s Nuclear Development’, p. 3; ‘DPRK Drive for Science, Technology Analyzed’, pp. 212–28; and Milhollin, Gary, ‘Asia’s Nuclear Nightmare: The German Connection’, Washington Post, 10 June 1990. 19 Author interview data; Defense White Paper 1998, pp. 65–6; and ‘Inside North Korea’s CW Infrastructure’, pp. 378–82. 20 ‘DPRK Munitions Industry Organization Described’, p. 13. 21 Yi, Chung-kuk, a KPA defector, has also identified Wonsan as being the site of chemical agent production, however no details of this have become available. ‘Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Warfare Research Detailed’, Naewoe Tongsin, No. 903, 9 June 1994, pp. B1–B4, as cited in JPRS-TND–94–017; ‘KCNA Reports on Chemical Fertilizer Production’, KCNA, 14 May 1994, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94-O95; ‘Food Shortages Said Worsening; No Relief Seen’, Pukhan, June 1993, pp. 138–47, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–140; ‘North Korea Major Producer of Biochemical Weapons’, Vantage Point, Vol. XV, No. 11, November 1992, pp. 23–5; ‘DPRK’s Advanced Weapons Analyzed’, p. 8; ‘Daily Says North Stockpiling Biochemical Weapons’, Yonhap, 23 June 1990, as cited in FBIS-EAS–90–122; and ‘North Korea Accused’, Washington Post, 13 December 1988, p. A16. The February 8th Vinalon Complex/Factory is sometimes referred to as the 2.8 Vinalon Factory, February 8th being the anniversary date of the




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founding of the KPA. Chemical-related (although not necessarily chemical weapons related) facilities located within the Hamhung area include the February 8th Vinalon Complex, Hungnam Fertiliser Complex, Hungnam Pharmaceutics Factory and numerous minor chemical factories. For a brief overview of the chemical industry in the area see ‘Chemical Industry in South Hamgyong Viewed’, KCNA, 12 July 1991, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–135, 15 July 1991, p. 20. The Sunch’on chemical complex was built with the assistance of the KPA. ‘Brilliant Embodiment of Revolutionary Line of Self-reliance in Defense by Our Party’, Pyongyang Domestic Service, 5 May 1989, p. 1, as cited in FBIS-EAS–89–086; and ‘Houses for Sunchon Complex Workers Built’, KCNA, 1008 GMT, 3 May 1989, as cited in FBIS-EAS–89–086. The terms Kanggye or Sakchu Chemical Weapons Factories are used here for convenience until the actual designations become known. The DPRK is producing a small number of cruise missiles and RPVs which may, in the future, be able to serve as delivery systems for chemical weapons. Smoke operations within the KPA fall under the jurisdiction of nuclear– chemical Defence units. In fact, each nuclear–chemical defence Battalion has an organic smoke company. ‘Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Warfare Research Detailed’, pp. B1–B4; and North Korean People’s Army Operations, FC 100–2–99, p. 11–4. Gander, Terry J., ‘Iraq-The Chemical Arsenal’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 4, No. 9, September 1992, p. 414. ‘Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Warfare Research Detailed’, pp. B1–B4. Defense White Paper 1990, pp. 73–4. All subsequent editions of this publication recount similar information; and ‘Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations’, pp. 26–8. Author interview data; ‘Seoul Says N. Korea Tested Chemicals on Prisoners’, Reuters, 26 September 1994; and ‘Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations’, pp. 26–8. Although it appears unusual that the ‘Chiha-ri Chemical Corporation’ is located in Anbyon rather than Chiha-ri, the author has in his possession a map upon which a defector carefully explained the locations of both the ‘Maram Materials Corporation’ and ‘Chiha-ri Chemical Corporation’. ‘Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Warfare Research Detailed’, pp. B1–B4. It is often unclear whether sources are referring to weapons or agent tonnes. Author interview data; ‘Military Estimates DPRK Chemical Arms Stocks’, Seoul Sinmun, 15 April 1995, p. 1, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–073; ‘North Said To Own 1,000 Tons of Chemical Weapons’, Yonhap, 21 March 1995, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–054; and ‘DPRK’s Advanced Weapons Analyzed’, p. 8. ‘Daily Says North Stockpiling Biochemical Weapons’; and ‘N. Korea is Mass Producing Chemical Weapons: U.S. Report’, FPI International, 8 June 1986, p. 4. ‘N. Korea Deploys 10 More Subs’; ‘Military Estimates DPRK Chemical Arms Stocks’; ‘North Said To Own 1,000 Tons of Chemical Weapons’; and ‘Defense Minister Interviewed 16 Aug’, Korea Herald, 17 August 1991, pp. 1, 3, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–163. Author interview data; ‘N. Korea Deploys 10 More Subs’; Defense White Paper 1998, pp. 65–6; and ‘Exposing the North Korean BW Arsenal’, pp. 32–3. The 4 August 1988 completion of a pharmaceutical factory in Aba, Nigeria, funded as a joint DPRK–Nigeria venture, is an indication of the DPRK’s increasing medical and bio-medical capabilities. ‘Pharmaceutical Factory Built in Nigeria in North Korea-Nigeria Joint Venture’, North Korea News, 22 August 1988, No. 438, pp. 4–5.




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37 Author interview data; and ‘North Korea Capable of Fighting War Singlehandedly for 3–4 Months’, Seoul Sinmun, 30 December 1988, p. 1, as cited in FBIS-EAS–89–027. 38 ibid. 39 Cushman Jr, John H., ‘United States Cites Increase in Biological Arms’, New York Times, 4 May 1988, p. A9. 40 Statements of Colonel Joo-hwal Choi and Young-hwan Ko, Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services. 41 Aeguk means ‘patriotism’. The name was selected to honour the contributions made by overseas Koreans (primarily in Japan) for the centre’s construction. 42 ‘Aeguk Compound Microbe Center Cited for Agriculture Role’, FBIS Report, 11 February 2000, as cited in FBIS. 43 Author interview data; and ‘North Korea Capable of Fighting War Singlehandedly for 3–4 Months’. 44 William J. Broad and Judith Miller, ‘Government Report Says 3 Nations Hide Stocks of Smallpox’. New York Times, 13 June 1999, p. 1. 45 Russian Federation, The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Moscow: Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, 1993, pp. 61–2. 46 Author interview data. 47 Statement of Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence, Before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in Intelligence Issues, p. 48; Fialka, John J., ‘Fighting Dirty: Chemical Weapons Spread in Third World, Pose Challenge to West’, Wall Street Journal, 15 September 1988, pp. 1, 26; and Wright, Robin, ‘Chemical Arms: Old and Deadly Scourge Returns’, Los Angeles Times, 9 October 1988, pp. 1, 19. 48 Central Intelligence Agency, Remarks by William H. Webster, Director of Central Intelligence, Before the Town Hall of California, Los Angeles, California, 30 March 1989, p. 10.

9 BALLISTIC MISSILES 1 This chapter is based upon the following works: ‘N. Korea Deploys 10 More Subs’; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘Taepo-dong Launch Brings DPRK Missiles Back Into the Spotlight’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 10, No. 10, October 1998, pp. 30–2; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘North Koreans Test Two-stage IRBM Over Japan’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 30, No. 10, 9 September 1998, p. 28; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘A Silent Partner’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 29, No. 20, 20 May 1998, pp. 16–17; Defense White Paper 1998, pp. 66–7; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘N. Korea Set for More Ballistic Missile Tests’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 26, No. 17, October 23, 1996, p. 5; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Programme, Special Report Number 3, Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 1994; ‘Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 19, No. 15, 10 April 1993, pp. 20–2; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘Ballistic Missiles in Egypt’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 4, No. 9, September 1992, pp. 452–8; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘Ballistic Missiles in the Third World—Iran’s Medium-Range Missiles’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol.4, No. 4, April 1992, pp. 147–52; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘Afghanistan: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, February 1992, pp. 51–8; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘Egypt: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 12, December 1991, pp. 531–7; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘N. Korea on Way to ‘‘Decisive Weapon’’ ’,




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Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 16, No. 15, 12 October 1991, p. 653; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘Syria’s Acquisition of North Korean SCUDs’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 6, June 1991, pp. 249–51; and Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘New Developments in North Korean Missile Programme’, Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 2, No. 8, July 1990, pp. 343–5. For a detailed analysis concerning Soviet SAMs and their development see Soviet Air Defence Missiles. Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘North Korea’s Air Defense Missile Forces’, Defense Asia-Pacific, 5: 1988, pp. 37–43; and Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘North Korea’s Air Defense Expansion’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 25 June 1988, pp. 1289–90. Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘USSR Continues Military Aid to North Korea’, Defense Intelligence Digest, June 1963, p. 43. ‘DPRK Attempted to Obtain Soviet Missile Technology in ‘63’, Chungang Ilbo, 29 August 1999, as cited in FBIS Author interview data; and Statements of Colonel Joo-hwal Choi and Young-hwan Ko, Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services. Statements of Colonel Joo-hwal Choi and Young-hwan Ko, Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services. Author interview data; and Statements of Colonel Joo-hwal Choi and Young-hwan Ko, Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services. It is probable that several 3R9 (FROG–3) artillery rockets were also provided. Such a practice would not be unusual for the Soviets, with the earlier variants being utilised for familiarisation and training. A January 1989 statement by Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, indicated that the KPA has nine ‘FROG 3–5’ launchers. Report of the Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci to the Congress on the FY 1990/FY 1991 Biennial Budget and FY 1990–94 Defense Programs. The Soviet index number and name for the FROG–3 are 3R9 and Luna–2, respectively. Author interview data; and ‘North Korean Militancy Linked to 1966 Meeting’, p. 15. Kim Il Song’s Army, Table 3.1, indicates a delivery date of 1972, however this is clearly too late. By 1971 the Korean People’s Navy had four OSA and ten KOMAR class combatants. See Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘North Korean Navy: Compact, Capable, Growing’, Defense Intelligence Digest, November 1971, pp. 4–7. Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘North Korean Armed Forces Modernization’, Defense Intelligence Digest, December 1968, p. 15; Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘North Korea, The USSR, Communist China: Operation Tightrope’, Defense Intelligence Digest, September 1968, pp. 37–40; Department of State, ‘Arms Suspension: A Big Stick or a Weak Reed’, INR–22, Washington, DC, 12 November 1969; and Central Intelligence Agency, The Threat of the Guided Missile Patrol Boat, Weekly Review (Special Report), 17 November 1967, p. 4. It is interesting to note that the PRC never produced the SSC–2b SAMLET and only deployed it in limited numbers, believing it to be an obsolete system with limited effectiveness. Author interview data. HQ (Hong Qian, Red Leader) and SY (Shui Ying, Water Eagle). Hahn, Bradley, ‘The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Maritime Power,’ pp. 10–19. HY (Hai Ying, Sea Eagle). For an overview of PRC naval missiles see Hahn, Bradley, ‘China’s Tactical Naval Missiles’, Navy International, June 1988, pp. 308–12.




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18 The Chinese character ‘Paek’ is white, while the Korean ‘Kom’ is bear. Paekkom can also be translated as ‘Polar Bear’. 19 Yulgok, was the pen name of Yi I, who insisted on building a 100 000 man army in the years immediately prior to Japan’s invasion of the Choson Dynasty in 1592. 20 Author interview data; Kim Chae-hong, ‘Article Describes ‘‘Yulgok’’ Military Buildup Project’, Tong-a Ilbo, 26 April 1993, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–078; Yu Yong-won, ‘The Hyonmu Versus the Scud’, Wolgan Choson, April 1991, pp. 378–93, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–191; ‘Fighting Dirty: Chemical Weapons Spread in Third World, Pose Challenge to West’, pp. 1, 26; Isby, David C., ‘Weapons and Tactics of the Republic of Korea Army’, Jane’s Defense Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1982, pp. 55–61; Weichel, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick P., ‘The Last to Leave’, Air Defense Magazine, July–September 1982, pp. 31–2; and Roming, Captain Pete, ‘Partners in Defense’, Air Defense Magazine, July– September 1977, pp. 6–9. 21 For information regarding the Arab use of tactical ballistic missiles during the 1973 War see Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘The Syrian Missile Threat’, Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 69, No. 1, January 1985, pp. 54–62; and Shazly, Lt. General Saad el-, The Crossing of the Suez, American Mideast Research, San Francisco, 1980, pp. 79–80, 198, 268, 309. 22 DF (Dong Feng, East Wind). 23 Many of the details concerning the FROG and HQ–2 programs presented in the following sections is extremely tenuous and may contain erroneous information. 24 Author interview data; Zaloga, Steven J., ‘Luna-M: A Source of Third World Thunder’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 8, No. 6, June 1996, pp. 249–53; and Jacobs, G., ‘North Korea’s Arms Industry: Development and Progress’, Asian Defense Journal, March 1989, pp. 28–35; North Korean Armed Forces Handbook (U), pp. 2–13, 2–67 and 2–69; and United Nations Command, United States Forces Korea and Eighth United States Army, 1976 Annual Historical Report, HIST-S–77–6, 1977, pp. 50–1. 25 At least one source states that the FROG–6 trainer vehicle consisted of a dummy missile permanently fixed to the launch rail. 26 ‘Luna-M: A Source of Third World Thunder’, pp. 249–53. 27 This transaction may have been repayment for DPRK assistance during the 1973 War, or for spare parts and weapons acquired from the DPRK. 28 Author interview data. 29 ibid. 30 Statement of Colonels Joo-hwal Choi and Young-hwan Ko, Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services. 31 ibid. The Soviet chemical warhead for the FROG–7 weighs 436 kg with 216 kg of VX agent. Conference on Disarmament, Information on the Presentation at the Shikhany Military Facility of the Standard Chemical Munitions and of Technology for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons at a Mobile Unit, CD/789, 16 December 1987, pp. 24–6. 32 Author interview data. 33 Zaloga, Steven J., ‘Back-Door BMs: The Proliferation Threat Posed by Converted SAMs’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 April 1999, Vol. 11, Issue 4, pp. 51–3; Soviet Air Defence Missiles, pp. 36–109; and U.S. Nuclear Weapons, pp. 187–9. The Nike-Hercules could use the W–31 nuclear warhead, with yields up to 40 kilotons, in the surface-to-surface role. 34 Author interview data; Hua Di, ‘China’s Case: Ballistic Missile Proliferation’, in Potter, William and Harlan Jencks, eds, The International Missile Bazaar,




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Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, pp. 163–4; ‘Journal Outlines Missile, Nuclear Capability’, Xuang Chiao Ching, No. 254, 16 November 1993 pp. 16–19, as cited in FBIS-CHI–93–221; and Lewis, John Wilson and Hua Di, ‘China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals’, International Security, Fall 1992, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 5–40. Kiyosaki, Wayne S., North Korea’s Foreign Relations: The Politics of Accommodation, 1945–1975, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1976, pp. 102–5; ‘Kim Il-song Bids U.S. Get Out of Korea’, New York Times, 20 April 1975, p. 26; ‘North Korea’s Kim Leaves Peking’, New York Times, 27 April 1975, p. 7; and ‘North Korea Gets Peking’s Support’, New York Times, April 29, 1975, p. 35. Author interview data. Author interview data; and Manabu, Aota, Kim Il Sung’s Army, Table 3.1. The exact date of this reorganisation is presently unknown. The 1979 date used here represents the best estimate currently available. Due to both monetary and political restraints Egypt was unable to act upon these studies until 1984 when the Condor II/Vector (i.e. Iraqi Badr-2000 program was initiated. Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘Egypt’s Missile Development’, in Potter, William and Harlan Jencks, eds, The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers Network, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1993, pp. 23–46; ‘Ballistic Missiles in Egypt’, pp. 452–8; and US Congress, Administration and Enforcement of U.S. Export Control Programs. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, First Session, 18 April and 1 May 1991, Serial 102–72, pp. 134–53. Hyonmu is a mythical Chinese animal with the body of a turtle and the head of a dragon. The Chinese character ‘hyon’ is translated as black, while the Chinese character ‘mu’ is weapon. The US removed its last tactical ballistic missiles from the ROK in 1978 when the 4th Missile Command was deactivated. Author interview data; Lennox, Duncan, Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Jane’s Information Group Ltd., London, 1999; ‘The Hyonmu Versus the Scud’, pp. 29–37; ‘Lance Back in South Korea’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22 November 1986, p. 1203; and ‘Lance Missiles to South Korea’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1987, p. 56. There is considerable confusion concerning the national designators for the DPRK’s missiles. One defector claims that the first DPRK-produced copy of the R–17E is identified as the Hwasong 1, while the No-dong 1 and Taep’odong 1 are Hwasong 5 and Hwasong 6 respectively. Another defector identifies the Hwasong 1, 2 and 3 as surface-to-air, surface-to-surface and air-to-surface missiles respectively. Uusually reliable non-DPRK sources identify the DPRKproduced ‘Scud B’ as Hwasong 5 and the ‘Scud C’ as Hwasong 6. This book will use these later designations. For a detailed description of the R–17 and its development see Zaloga, Steven J., ‘Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, Scud and Beyond’, International Defense Review, November 1988, pp. 1423–7. There is some debate as to the exact year in which the DPRK received the Scud B missiles from Egypt. This transfer may actually have been a DPRK purchase, or part of an Egyptian barter agreement for DPRK arms and spare parts. Author interview data; ‘Merchants of Death: How to Curb the Weapons Trade’, Moscow News, 29 November 1990, p. 13; and ‘DPRK’s Advanced Weapons Analyzed’, p. 8. Hwasong means Mars. The exact relationship between the Guided Missile Division and Engineering Research Institute is unclear.




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48 For details concerning the early Iranian missile program see Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘Iran’s Missile Development’, in Potter, William and Jencks, Harlen, eds, The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers Network, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1993, pp. 47–74. 49 ‘Iranian Prime Minister Arrives in North Korea’, Reuters, 24 October 1983. 50 Author interview data. 51 Satellite photographs of the Musudan-ni can be viewed at www.fas.org. Author interview data; ‘DPRK’s Advanced Weapons Analyzed’, p. 8; and Yu, Yin-taek, ‘North’s Military Reorganization, Mobilization Analyzed’, Pukan, No. 6, June 1985, pp. 132–41, as cited in JPRS-KAR–85–070. 52 Press reports during January 1987 report ROK Defence Minister Lee Ki-Baek as stating that the DPRK had recently conducted a ‘secret test’ of a long-range guided missile. While this suggests a test launch in 1986, subsequent information indicates that Minister Lee was referring to the 1984 tests. Author interview data; ‘North Korea Deploys Romeo-class Submarine in East Sea: Min. Lee’, Korea Herald, 29 January 1987, p. 1; and ‘Asia: North Korea Launches Submarine/Tests Missile’, Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly, 9–15 February 1987, p. 2. 53 Author interview data; ‘DPRK Said Developing Improved Scud Missile’, Kyodo, 20 September 1991, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–183; and Ottaway, David B., ‘Egypt Drops Out of Missile Project’, Washington Post, 20 September 1989, p. A32; ‘State Department Official Offers No Details on Iraqi Program’, Washington Post, 20 September 1989, p. A32. The latter article indicates a ‘190-mile [306 km] range and is capable of carrying an 1,100-pound [500 kg] warhead’. 54 There is some speculation that there is also a biological warhead, however this remains unconfirmed. 55 ‘DPRK’s Advanced Weapons Analyzed’, p. 8; ‘Measures Against Possible Scud Attack Detailed’, Yonhap, 12 April 1991, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–071; and ‘Merchants of Death: How to Curb the Weapons Trade’, p. 13. 56 Author interview data; and ‘Measures Against Possible Scud Attack Detailed’. 57 ‘N Korea Denies Tehran Reports’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 October 1985, p. 857; and Robinson, Jr, Clarence A., ‘Iraq, Iran Acquiring Chinese-Built Fighters’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 April 1983, pp. 16–18. 58 Shehab means ‘meteor’ in Farsi. Author interview data; Peyman, Pejman, ‘International News: Iran’, United Press International, 18 September 1987; ‘Pyongyang Missile Sale to Tehran Reported’, Washington Times, 1 June 1988, p. A2; Broder, John M., ‘Five Key Nations Sold Arms to Iran’, Los Angeles Times, 20 January 1988, p. 5; and ‘Al-Musawwar Interviews Ramadan on War’, Al-Musawwar, 20 May 1988, pp. 20–1, as cited in FBIS-NES–88–100. 59 Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘Iraqi Missile Update’, Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 2, No. 7, July 1990, p. 329; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S. and W. Seth Carus, ‘Iraq’s al-Husayn Missile Programme, Part II’, Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 2, No. 6, June 1990, pp. 242–8; Bermudez Jr, Joseph S. and W. Seth Carus, ‘Iraq’s al-Husayn Missile Programme, Part I’, Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review, Vol. 2, No. 5, May 1990, pp. 204–9; and Bermudez Jr, Joseph S. and W. Seth Carus, ‘Iran’s Growing Missile Forces’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, Volume 10, Number 3, 23 July 1988, pp. 126–31. 60 ‘Ballistic Missiles in the Third World—Iran’s Medium-Range Missiles’, pp. 147–52. 61 For information on Iranian missile chemical warfare capabilities during this period see Bazoft, Farzad and Allan George, ‘Missiles Armed With Chemical Warheads ‘‘in Sight’’ ’, Observer, 13 March 1988, p. 23. 62 Author interview data. Some sources suggest that the total number of missiles supplied was less than 25. Others have speculated that the UAE arms purchase M




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agreement was, in part, a covert intelligence operation by the US to acquire a number of the DPRK’s latest weapons systems. Author interview data. Author interview data; Chin, Chang-uk, ‘North Korea’s War Preparedness’, Chungang Ilbo, 20 August 1985, p. 3, as cited in JPRS-KAR–86–008; ‘ ‘‘Soviet Base’ in North Korea’, p. 612; and ‘Realities of Military Buildup of the North Korean Puppets and Their Jingoistic Trend’, Naewoe Tongsin, No. 416, 28 December 1984, pp. 1L–9L, as cited in JPRS-KAR–85–022. US Navy, Current Naval Intelligence Issues, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, DC, March 1987; Statement of Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence, Before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in Intelligence Issues; Statement by General Louis C. Menetrey, U.S. Army, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command/U.S. Forces Korea, Before the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations; and Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988. Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence, Before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in Intelligence Issues, p. 47, states that the DPRK does produce the Scud B. ‘Defector Discloses DPRK’s Overseas Espionage Cases’, Yonhag, 14 December 1999. ‘Egypt’, Military Powers: The League of Arab States, Vol. 2, February 1987, p. 73. HJ (Hong Jian, Red Arrow) and HN (Hong Nu, Red Cherry). Author interview data; Gertz, Bill, ‘N. Korea Building Missiles That Could hit American Forces Alaska’, Washington Times, 22 October 1997, p. A1; Lim, C. W., ‘Korea’, Associated Press, 24 August 1993; and ‘Korea-Defector’. ‘In practice, the designers were neither told nor supposed to worry about the possible strategic purposes of their missiles. They were simply given the range and payload requirements for striking, sequentially, Japan (DF–2), the Philippines (DF–3), Guam (DF–4), and the continental United States (DF–5). Although their world was essentially technology driven, a strategic retaliatory doctrine was implicit in the target selection . . .’ ‘China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals’, p. 20. Author interview data; ‘Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant’, pp. 20–2; Schweid, Barry, ‘Washington News: US-Missile Projects’, Associated Press, 19 September 1988; and ‘U.S./Allies Seek to Curb Argentine/Brazil/North Korean Missiles’, Defense Daily, 21 September 1988, p. 109. Author interview data; Gertz, Bill, ‘Pakistan Gets Help with Missile’, Washington Times, 14 September 1998, p. A1; Gertz, Bill, ‘CIA Seeks Missile Data from Defector’, Washington Times, 27 August 1997, p. A1; and Gertz, Bill, ‘Russia Sells Iran Missile Metals Contract Contrary to Official Denials’, Washington Times, 20 October 1997, p. A1. As with the Hwasong 5, there is some speculation that the Hwasong 6 could also be armed with a biological warhead, however this remains unconfirmed. Author interview data; ‘DPRK Said Developing Improved Scud Missile’; McNally, Brendon, ‘Pentagon Seriously Reviews Ability of Patriot to Defeat New N. Korean Scuds’, Inside the Army, 5 August 1991, p. 12; and Emerson, Steven, ‘The Postwar Scud Boom’, Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991, p. A12. Author interview data; ‘DPRK May Have Several Nuclear Bombs’, South China Morning News, December 19, 1993, pp. 1, 9, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–242; ‘Pyongyang Seeks Self-sufficient Auto Industry’, Naewoe Tongsin, 10 June M

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T HE A RMED F ORCES OF NORTH K OREA 1993, pp. D1–D4, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–145; and ‘North Said To Develop Scud Mobile Launcher’, Yonhap, 4 October 1991, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–193. Author interview data. ‘2d Sermon on Missile Attacks’, Tehran Domestic News Service, 11 March 1988, as cited in FBIS-NES–88–049. ‘Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant’, pp. 20–2; ‘DPRK Said Developing Improved Scud Missile’. ‘Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant’, pp. 20–2; ‘North Said To Develop Scud Mobile Launcher’. Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., and Greg Gerardi, ‘An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 7, No. 4, April 1995, pp. 184–91. Author interview data; ‘North Korean Forces Suffer Mobility Loss’, p. 62; ‘North Said To Develop Scud Mobile Launcher’; and ‘North Reportedly Expands Scud Unit’, Tong-a Ilbo, 25 August 1991, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-EAS– 91–165. ‘NK Builds Two New Missile Sites’, Digital Chosunilbo, 21 November 1998; and Priest, Dana and Lippman, Thomas W., ‘N. Korea Expanding Missile Programs’, Washington Post, 20 November 1998, p. A1. Author interview data; and ‘North Korean Forces Suffer Mobility Loss’, p. 62. Author interview data; US Marine Corps, North Korea Country Handbook, p. 134; and North Korea Handbook, pp. 5–22. Gertz, Bill, ‘Iran Fired Ballistic Missile’, Washington Times, 24 May 1991, p. A5. Other reports suggest that the contract was for 200 Scud-B and -C missiles, see: Royce, Knut, ‘The Gulf War Briefing: Iran’s Arsenal Worries Analyst’, Newsday, 30 January 1991, p. 16. Several months later, during October, reports surfaced that indicated that the DPRK had exported 20 Scud missiles to Iran and that some of them already have arrived there and were fully assembled, see ‘DPRK Scuds Said to Arrive in Iran’, KBS–1, 13 October 1991, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–199. ‘Iran Fired Ballistic Missile’, p. A5; and ‘The Postwar Scud Boom’, p. A12. Gertz, Bill, ‘Stop Arming Mideast, Bush Urges Iran Now Top Threat in Region’, Washington Times, 30 May 1991, p. A1; and ‘Iran Fired Ballistic Missile’, p. A5. Author interview data; Starr, Barbara, ‘Iran Gets ‘‘Scud’’ TELs From North Korea’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 13 May 1995, p. 5; ‘Al-Asad Said Pursuing Military Missile Buildup’, Yedi’ot Aharonot, 29 October 1991, as cited in FBIS-TND–91–018. ‘Iran-Scuds’, Associated Press, 22 November 1999, and Gertz, Bill, ‘Iran Sold Scud Missiles to Congolese’, Washington Times, 22 November 1999, p. 1. Gertz, Bill, ‘Iran-Syria Deal Revealed as Scuds Near Gulf Ports’, Washington Times, 10 March 1992, p. A3. Gertz, Bill, ‘Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles’, Washington Times, 16 July 1992, p. A3; and Hoffman, David, ‘Israelis Say Syrians Test-fired New Scud’, Washington Post, 13 August 1992, p. A25. Gordon, Michael R., ‘U.S. Says Russians Helped Damascus in a Missile Plan’, New York Times, 12 December 1993, p. A1; and ‘North Korea Buying Old Russian Subs’, p. A6. Author interview data; and Starr, Barbara, ‘U.S. Aegis Cruisers Spy on Syrian Missile Launches’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 15 January 1997, p. 3. ‘Better Firepower for Syria’s Assad’, U.S. News & World Report, 5 August 1996, p. 20. Author interview data; and Gertz, Bill, ‘North Korea Continues to Develop Missiles’, Washington Times, 28 October 1999.




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96 Author interview data; Balman Jr, Sid, ‘U.S. Probes Scud Shipments to Egypt’, United Press International, June 21, 1996; ‘US–Egypt–N Korea’, Associated Press, 21 June 1996; ‘U.S. Probing Reports of Egypt–N. Korea Deal’, Reuters, 21 June 1996; and ‘Egypt Drops Out of Missile Project’; ‘State Department Official Offers No Details on Iraqi Program’, p. A32. 97 ‘Vietnam Stocking Up ‘‘SCUDs’’ ’, p. 63. 98 ‘North Reportedly to Develop Missiles With Libya’, Hanguk Ilbo, 17 February 1992, p. 1, as cited in FBIS-EAS–92–032; ‘DPRK Said Developing Improved Scud Missile’; Gertz, Bill, ‘Libya May Buy N. Korea Missiles’, Washington Times, 4 June 1991, p. 4; and ‘Qadhafi Financing Syrian Purchase of Scud-C Missile’, Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly, 28 January–3 February 1991, p. 2. 99 ‘North Korea Continues to Develop Missiles’. 100 Author interview data; ‘North Korea’s Taepodong 1 Missile Priced at $6 Million’, Korea Times, 29 October 1999; and ‘DPRK Reportedly Asking $6 Million Per Taepo Dong Missile’, Yonhap, 29 October 1999. 101 Author interview data; North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Programme; ‘Chief of Staff on Intifadah, Golan, Iran’, Israel Television Network, 3 March 1993, as cited in FBIS-NES–93–041; Central Intelligence Agency, Address to the Annual Soref Symposium of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Gordan C. Oehler, National Intelligence Officer for Science, Technology and Proliferation and Director, Nonproliferation Center, 27 April 1992; ‘DPRK Nuclear, Missile Technology Assessed’, Chungang Ilbo, 19 March 1992, p. 6, as cited in FBIS-EAS–92–055; and ‘North Said To Develop Scud Mobile Launcher’. 102 Author interview data; and Starr, Barbara, ‘No Dongs May Soon be Nuclear, Warns USN’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 18 June 1994, p. 1. 103 Author interview data; and ‘IRGC Commander Reveals Shahab–3 Missile’s Size, Capability’, IRNA, 4 August 1998, as cited in FBIS. 104 The author would like to thank Mr Steven J. Zaloga for providing details concerning the development of the R–17 and R–21 and their engines. Author interview data; ‘Miass Missile Center Designer on Industry Development’, Segodnya, 25 January 1995, p. 9, as cited in JPRS-TAC–95–004-L; North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Programme; ‘Further on Attempt To Recruit Urals Rocket Scientists’, Moscow News, No. 14, 2 April 1993, p. 9, as cited in JPRS-TND–93-O13. 105 Author interview data; and Gertz, Bill, ‘Pentagon: N. Korea’s Missiles Operational U.S. Forces in Japan Now Within Range’, Washington Times, 10 June 1998, p. A9. 106 Ludington, Nick, ‘Iran-Korea Missiles’, Associated Press, 8 April 1993; and Blanche, Ed, ‘Iran-Missiles’, Associated Press, 16 February 1993. 107 Author interview data; ‘DPRK May Have Several Nuclear Bombs’, pp. 1, 9; ‘Pyongyang Seeks Self-sufficient Auto Industry’; and ‘North Said To Develop Scud Mobile Launcher’. 108 There may actually be several different versions of decoy vehicles or decoys. 109 It is interesting to note that during 1978–87, the DPRK imported 156 heavy-duty log-carrier trucks from Nissan Diesel Industries, a subsidiary of Nissan Motors Corp. US intelligence sources stated that a number of these vehicles were subsequently modified by the DPRK to mount MRLs and were deployed along the DMZ. Although there was nothing illegal concerning these Nissan sales, the company announced that henceforth ‘we have decided to voluntarily control our sales to the country [the DPRK] and refrain from exporting large-size trucks which can be converted for military use’. Author interview data; and Peterson, John E., ‘Nissan Truck Sales Probed’, Detroit M




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T HE A RMED F ORCES OF NORTH K OREA News, 12 June 1987, p. A3; and Sneider, Daniel, ‘Japanese Investigate Use of Trucks Sold to North Korea’, Defense News, 15 June 1988, p. 14. Author interview data; ‘Pyongyang Found Constructing 5 Underground Facilities’, Yomiuri Shimbun, 8 January 1999; ‘U.S. Military Detects Underground Bases in DPRK’, NHK, 8 December1998, as cited in FBIS-EAS–98–342; and ‘Says Long-range Missile Bases Built’, KBS–1, 24 August 1993, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–162. ‘Libya May Buy N. Korea Missiles’, p. A4; and ‘Defense Ministry: May Nodong–1 Test Successful’, Yonhap, 24 June 1993, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93– 120. ‘Libya May Buy N. Korea Missiles’, p. A4. Gertz, Bill, ‘General Spotlights N. Korean Threat’, Washington Times, 15 September 1993, p. A6. Iranians and ‘other potential buyers’ were present at the June 1994 and May 1997 tests of the DPRK AG–1 anti-ship cruise missile. The AG–1 is believed to be based upon the CSS-C–3 SEERSUCKER. Author interview data; and Gertz, Bill, ‘N. Korea as Nuclear Exporter?’, Washington Times, 8 June 1994, p. A1. Author interview data; ‘North Korea Strengthens Ties With Syria, Iran and Pakistan—Foreign Minister Makes Official Tours’, North Korea News, No. 645, 24 August 1992, pp. 5–6; ‘Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam Visits Syria, Iran and Pakistan’, North Korea News, No. 641, 10 August 1992, p. 5; ‘Kim Yong-nam Leaves For Syria, Iran, Pakistan’, Pyongyang KCNA, 27 July 1992, as cited in FBIS-EAS–92–145; and Weymouth, Lally, ‘In Israel, a New View Of Syria’, Washington Post, 6 July 1992, p. A1. Author interview data; ‘An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing’, pp. 184–91; and Gertz, Bill, ‘Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles’, p. A3. NSP Issues Press Release on Hwang’s Comments. During January 1997 General John Tilelli, Commander of US Forces Korea, ‘We know that the Nodong missile has come out of [research and development] and is being produced . . . Whether or not we would categorize it as deployed or not, at this point is difficult to say . . . We believe they are building them.’ ‘U.S. Commander Says DPRK’s Military Posture Changed Little’; and Gertz, Bill, ‘U.S. Commander Voices ‘‘Concern’’ Over N. Korea Fears its Quest for Long-Range Nuclear Missiles’, Washington Times, 27 January 1999; Address to the Annual Soref Symposium of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and ‘DPRK Said Developing Improved Scud Missile’. Author interview data; ‘N.K. Building Bases for Scud-C Missiles’, Korea Herald, 28 October 1999; ‘S. Korea Denies Report North Deploys Missile Units’, Reuters, 25 October 1999; Kwon-hyun Jung, ‘NK Deploys Rodong–1 Missiles’, Choson Ilbo, 24 October 1999; and N. Korea Deploys 10 More Subs’, Korea Times, 12 October 1999. Author interview data; ‘An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing’, pp. 184–91; and Gertz, Bill, ‘Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles’, p. A3. Author interview data; ‘North Korea Strengthens Ties With Syria, Iran and Pakistan—Foreign Minister Makes Official Tours’, pp. 5–6; ‘Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam Visits Syria, Iran and Pakistan’, p. 5; ‘Kim Yong-nam Leaves For Syria, Iran, Pakistan’; and ‘In Israel, a New View Of Syria’, p. A1. Author interview data; ‘An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing’, pp. 184–91; and Gertz, Bill, ‘Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles’, p. A3.




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123 ‘Bhutto Holds News Conference, Departs for DPRK’, Radio Pakistan Network, 29 December 1993, as cited in FBIS-CHI–93–248; ‘Bhutto Holds News Conference, Departs for DPRK’, Xinhua, 29 December 1993, as cited in FBIS-CHI–93–248; ‘Denies Possible Talks on Missiles’, Radio Pakistan Network, 26 December 1993, as cited in FBIS-NES–93–246. 124 An alternate spelling for Ghauri is Ghuri. 125 ‘Foreign Ministry Group Leaves for Iran, Pakistan’, KCNA, 31 March 1994, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94–063. 126 ‘Science Delegation Leaves for Pakistan 26 Sep.’, KCNA, 26 September 1994, as cited in FBIS-EAS–94–187. 127 Author interview data; ‘Delegation Visiting Pakistan Attends Banquet’, Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 24 November 1995, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–227; ‘Choe Kwang Delegation Meets Pakistani President’, Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 22 November 1995, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–226; ‘Choe Kwang—Led Delegation Arrives in Pakistan’, Pyongyang Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 20 November 1995, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–224; and ‘Military Delegation Leaves for Pakistan’, Pyongyang Korean Central Television Network, 19 November 1995, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–223. 128 Author interview data; Raman, B., ‘Pakistan’s Missile Deals With North Korea’, Indian Defense Review, pp. 97–100. 129 Author interview data, January 1998; and Department of State, ‘Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against Entities in North Korea and Pakistan’. 130 ibid. 131 Department of State, ‘Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against Entities in Iran and North Korea’, Federal Register, Vol. 61, No. 114, 12 June 1996. 132 ‘Bhutto Claims Nation To ‘‘Give Response to Prithvi’’ in 1997’, AFP, 17 February 1997, as cited in FBIS-TAC–97–007. 133 Dina Nath Mishra, ‘The Essence of Intolerance’, Observer, 30 March 1998. 134 The Abdali is named after Ahmed Shah Abdali, a famous conqueror of India–Pakistan. Additionally, SUPARCO is working on Pakistan’s second satellite, the al-Badr II (aka al-Badar II). ‘Pakistan Makes New 3,500-Km Range Missile’, Al-Akhbar, 19 July 1998, pp. 1, 7, as cited in FBIS-TAC–98–201. 135 Shahab means ‘meteor’ or ‘shooting star’ in Farsi. 136 ‘Pyongyang Strongly Denies Reports of ‘‘An Agreement With Iran for Missile Exports’’ ’, North Korea News, No. 680, 26 April 1993, p. 5; and Jehl, Douglas, ‘North Koreans Reported Selling Missiles to Iran’, New York Times, 8 April 1993, p. A9. 137 Hedges, Stephen J. and Cary, Peter, ‘The other Problem in the Persian Gulf’, U.S. News & World Report, 14 November 1994, pp. 87–8. 138 ‘Iran’s Top Diplomat Visits Pyongyang’, North Korea News, No. 721, 7 February 1994, p. 4; ‘North Korean Air Forces Chief Visits Iran’, p. 5; and Blanche, Ed, ‘Iran-North Korea’, Associated Press, 24 February 1994. 139 Author interview data; and ‘Iran Gets ‘‘Scud’’ TELs From North Korea’, p. 5. 140 Author interview data; Rodan, Steve, ‘Iran Has Problems With Shihab–3’, Middle East News Line, 1 March 1999; and Gertz, Bill, ‘Longer Range on Iranian Missile Shahab–4 Could Hit Central Europe’, Washington Times, 29 July 1998, p. A12. 141 Author interview data; ‘Israeli Effort To Stop DPRK Missile Sales Viewed’, Choson Ilbo, 10 July 1993, p. 6, as cited in FBIS-EAS–93–132. 142 Author interview data; Eisenstadt, Michael and Lorber, Azriel, ‘Iran’s Recent Missile Test: Assessment and Implications’, Washington Institute for Near M




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T HE A RMED F ORCES OF NORTH K OREA East Policy, Policywatch, No. 303, 5 August 1998; Gertz, Bill and Martin Sieff, ‘Iran’s Missile Test Alarms Clinton’, Washington Times, 24 July 1998, p. A1; Weiner, Tim, ‘Iran Said to Test Missile Able to Hit Israel and Saudis’, New York Times, 23 July 1998; and Gertz, Bill, ‘Iran Tests Medium-Range Missile Weapon Could Strike Israel, U.S. Troops’, Washington Times, 23 July 1998, p. A1. Author interview data; ‘Iran Has Problems With Shihab–3’; and Risen, James, ‘C.I.A. Sees a North Korean Missile Threat’, New York Times, 3 February 1999. Author interview data; ‘Iranian Defense Minister on Shahab–3 Missile’, IRIB Television, 5 August 1998, as cited in FBIS-NES–98–217; ‘Further on Khatami’s Visit to Defense Ministry’, IRIB Television, 1 August 1998, as cited in FBIS-NES–98–217; and ‘Iran’s Khatami on Military Issues, Missiles’, IRIB Television, 1 August 1998, as cited in FBIS-NES–98–217. Author interview data; Department of State, ‘Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against Entities in Middle East, Including a Ban on Certain U.S. Government Procurement’, Federal Register, Volume 64, Number 73, 16 April 1999, p. 18957; ‘North Korea Continues to Develop Missiles’; and ‘Israel, USA claim Egyptian missile links with N Korea’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 23 February 2000. ‘Better firepower for Syria’s Assad’, p. 20; and ‘DPRK–Syria Seek to Strengthen Military Cooperation’. Author interview data; MacAskill, Ewen and Norton-Taylor, Richard, ‘Protest at Libyan Missile Parts Find’, Guardian Manchester, 10 January 2000, p. 5; ‘Taiwan Company Reaffirms no Involvement in Arms Shipment’, Taiwan Central News Agency, 10 January 2000; Rufford, Nicholas, ‘Parts for the Scud Missiles were Found at Gatwick Disguised as Automotive Parts’, London Sunday Times, 9 January 2000, p. 1; Gertz, Bill, ‘China Assists Iran, Libya on Missiles’, Washington Times, 16 June 1998, p. A1; ‘N. Korea as Nuclear Exporter?’, p. A1; Gertz, Bill, ‘Libya May Buy N. Korean Missiles’, p. A4; ‘Syrian, Iranian Missile Developments Reviewed’, Izvestiya, 13 November 1993, p. 3, as cited in FBIS-SOV–93–218; and ‘Possible Missile Threat from Middle East Neighbors Detailed’, Turkish Daily News, 30 July 1993, pp. 1, 11, as cited in JPRS-TND–93–026. ‘Iran Gets ‘‘Scud’’ TELs From North Korea’, p. 5; Starr, Barbara, ‘Economics Could Undermine North Korean Capability’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 25 June 1994, p. 15; ‘No Dongs May Soon be Nuclear, Warns USN’, p. 1; ‘North Korean Missile R&D Gains New Pace’; p. 10; Starr, Barbara, Paul Beaver and Bermudez Jr, Joseph S., ‘North Korea Grasps at the Stage Beyond Nodong 1’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 March 1994, p. 18; and Starr, Barbara, ‘N Korea Casts a Longer Shadow With TD–2’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 12 March 1994, p. 1. Ranges for both could be significantly increased with smaller warheads. The diameter may be closer to 2.8 m. Author interview data; Gertz, Bill, ‘China Assists North Korea in Space Launches’, Washington Times, 23 February 1999, p. A1; ‘Taepodong Missile ‘‘Does Not Make Technical Sense’’ ’, Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, 19 May 1998; and ‘North Reportedly Deploying Nodong–1 Missiles’, Kyodo, 12 September 1995, as cited in FBIS-EAS–95–177. Although most sources attribute the first sighting of these missiles at Sanumdong, this would appear to be incorrect. Until a national identifier becomes known, US intelligence usually names a new weapon system after the nearest geographic feature in which it is first sighed. Therefore, if the missiles were first sighted at Sanum-dong, they would have been labelled the ‘Sanum-dong M

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1/2’. But since they are, in fact, labelled Taep’o-dong 1/2 it would appear that they were first identified at Taep’o-dong near the Musudan-ni launch facility. Author interview data; and ‘North Korean Missile R&D Gains New Pace’, p. 10. ‘North Korean Missile R&D Gains New Pace’, p. 10. ‘Impact of Missile Tests Examined’, Aera, 13 June 1994, p. 17, as cited in FBIS. Author interview data. DPRK sources suggest that their space interests date to much earlier. ‘DPRK’s Power in Launching Satellite Lauded’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 6 October 1998, as cited in FBIS-EAS–98–281. Given the timing of the various Taep’o-dong sub-programs it is possible that the Taep’o-dong 1 was always intended as an SLV and that the Taep’o-dong 2 is the ICBM component. Kwangmyongsong is the name Kim Il-song gave Kim Chong-il on his 50th birthday. It is also meant as a slight to the ROK Uribyol satellites. Uribyol means ‘Our Star’. Author interview data; and Gertz, Bill, ‘China Assists North Korea in Space Launches’, p. A1. Author interview data; ‘Pyongyang Found Constructing 5 Underground Facilities’; ‘U.S. Military Detects Underground Bases in DPRK’; and ‘Says Long-range Missile Bases Built’. Author interview data; Clark, Phillip, ‘Fact and Fiction: North Korea’s Satellite Launch’, Spacelaunch, January/February 1999, pp. 39–41; ‘DPRK’s Power in Launching Satellite Lauded’; and ‘Article Explains Facts About Satellite’, p. 4. ‘N. Korea Says It Launched ‘‘Satellite’’ ’, United Press International, 4 September 1998. ‘DPRK’s Power in Launching Satellite Lauded’; and ‘Article Explains Facts About Satellite’, p 4. ‘DPRK Satellite Reportedly Circles Earth 770 Times’, KCNA, 8 December 1998, as cited in FBIS-EAS–98–342; ‘KCNA Reports on Awards Given to Satellite Scientists’, KCNA, 1 December 1998, as cited in FBIS-EAS–98–335; and ‘Satellite Scientists Receive State Citation, Gifts’, Korean Central Broadcasting Network, 30 November 1998, as cited in FBIS-EAS–98–335. ‘No Advance Announcement for 2d Launch’, Asahi Shimbun, 11 December 1998, as cited in FBIS-EAS–98–345. Author interview data; ‘North Korea Continues to Develo Missiles’; Sanger, David E., ‘North Korea Warns U.S. It Can Launch Another Missile’, New York Times, 26 December 1998, p. A1; ‘Ground Zero’, Inside Missile Defense, Vol. 5, No. 5, 10 February 1999, p. 1; ‘Intell Says Taepodong 2 Could Strike Entire U.S.’, Defense Week, 25 January 1999; Central Intelligence Agency, North Korea’s Taepo Dong Launch and Some Implications on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, speech by Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 8 December 1998; ‘Pentagon: N. Korea’s Missiles Operational U.S. Forces in Japan Now Within Range’, p. A9; and Central Intelligence Agency, Speech by Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 17 September 1998. ibid. ibid. Author Interview data; ‘Iran Attends DPRK Test’, Iran Brief, No. 50, 8 September 1998; and ‘Second Shahab Test Planned’, Iran Brief, No. 55, 8 February 1999. Dina Nath Mishra, ‘The Essence of Intolerance’, Observer, 30 March 1998. M




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171 Author interview data; ‘DPRK Missile Industry, Technology Examined’, pp. 96–104; ‘U.S. Confirms Missile Deployment in North of N. Korea’, Korea Times, 28 March 1999; Lee Sung-yul, ‘North Korea Operates at Least 4 Missile Factories, 10 Launch Sites, Official Says’, Korea Herald, 26 March 1999; ‘Report on DPRK Missile Plants, Launch Sites’, Hangyore, 25 March 1999; ‘Officials Confirm Missiles Deployed Near DPRK-PRC Border’, Kyodo, 5 March 1999, as cited in FBIS; ‘Pyongyang Found Constructing 5 Underground Facilities’; ‘DPRK Said To Deploy Missiles at More Than 10 Sites’, Yonhap, 6 January 1999; ‘Further on DPRK Deploying Nodong Missile’, NHK, 2 January 1999, as cited in FBIS; ‘U.S. Military Detects Underground Bases in DPRK’; ‘DPRK Reportedly Building 3 Underground Missile Sites’, Korea Times, 8 December 1998; ‘NK Builds Two New Missile Sites’; ‘DPRK Defector Discusses Chemical Weapons’, Kyodo, 28 April 1994, as cited in FBIS-EAS– 94–082; Statements of Colonel Joo-hwal Choi and Young-hwan Ko, Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services; ‘Says Long-range Missile Bases Built’; ‘Defector on North’s Nuclear Development’, p. 5; and ‘Israel, USA claim Egyptian missile links with N. Korea’. 172 Author interview data; ‘North Korea’s Taepodong 1 Missile Priced at $6 Million’, and ‘DPRK Reportedly Asking $6 Million Per Taepo Dong Missile’. 173 On 30 November 1991, the 26 Factory suffered serious damage caused by an explosion. The accident occurred at an outdoor storage site near No. 11 Missile Assembly Site. The mishandling of explosives by workers ignited a fire which in turn set off explosions among the missiles and artillery ordnance at the site. The official death toll was placed at 127. Author interview data; ‘Defector Discloses 1991 Explosion Accident in Missile Plant’, p. 1; and ‘1991 Explosion at DPRK Missile Plant Reported.’ 174 The Man’gyongdae Light Electric Plant was originally an experimental plant of the Academy of Defence Sciences. A majority of the plant was reportedly moved underground in 1977. ‘DPRK Missile Industry, Technology Examined’, pp. 96–104. 175 ‘DPRK Missile Industry, Technology Examined’, pp. 96–104. The connections, if any, between the Man’gyongdae Machine Tool Plant and the Sungni General Automotive Factory—which reportedly is responsible for the production of ballistic missile TELs—or the Man’gyongdae Light Electric Plant are unknown. 176 The Electronics and Guidance Systems Institute may be subordinate to the Guided Missile Division. 177 ‘Defector Discusses DPRK Missile Program’, Chugan Tong-A, 1 December 1999, as cited in FBIS. 178 Author interview data; and ‘N Korea Casts a Longer Shadow With TD–2’, p. 1. 179 Given past DPRK practices this facility probably has both honorific and classified names also. In 1998 the DPRK identified it using the current name. Author interview data; ‘DPRK’s Power in Launching Satellite Lauded’; and ‘Article Explains Facts About Satellite’, Nodong Sinmun, 16 September 1998, p. 4, as cited in FBIS-EAS–98–281. 180 ‘South Defense Minister Says North Tunnel for Missile Use’, Kyodo, 8 July 1999; ‘Further on DPRK Underground Missile Facilities’, Hangyore, 8 July 1999, p. 2; ‘N. Korea Building New Missile Facility Near Border With China’, Korea Times, 7 July 1999; and ‘DPRK Allegedly Constructing Missile Pit Sites for Launch’, Choson Ilbo, 30 June 1999, as cited in FBIS. 181 Author interview data; ‘DPRK Reportedly Earns $500 Million Annually in Arms Exports’; ‘N. Korea Expanding Missile Programs’, p. A1; and ‘Says Long-range Missile Bases Built’. The Myongch’on reference may be a misidentification for the Taep’o-dong missile base.




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182 ‘N.K. Building Bases for Scud-C Missiles’, Korea Herald, 28 October 1999; and ‘ROK Authorities: DPRK Building Scud-C Bases in 6 Places’, Yonhap, 26 October 1999. 183 Iran is also reported to have acquired BGM–109 TOMAHAWK wreckage from Bosnia. Barel, Zvi, ‘A (Missile) Shot in the Dark’, Ha’aretz, 31 July 1998. 184 ‘Better firepower for Syria’s Assad’, p. 20. 185 Gertz, Bill, ‘Cuba, North Korea Getting Cozy, U.S. Fears’, Washington Times, 29 November 1991, p. A1; and ‘DPRK-Cuba Contract for Missiles Export Alleged’, Choson Ilbo, 20 March 1991, p. 2, as cited in FBIS-EAS–91–054. 186 ‘Defector Discloses DPRK’s Overseas Espionage Cases.’ 187 Statements of Colonel Joo-hwal Choi and Young-hwan Ko, Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services; ‘N. Korea Building Missiles that Could Hit American Forces Alaska’, p. A1; and ‘NK Said to Target 200,000 U.S. Casualties: Defector’. 188 North Korea Handbook, p. 6–80; and North Korea Country Handbook, p. A–70




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363

Index I

NDEX HE RMED ORCES OF ORTH OREA

T

VIII Special Purpose Corps, 57, 292 abductions, 80, 81, 184, 200 Academy of Sciences, 27, 53, 55, 215, 222, 233, 283, 288 Agreed Framework, 8, 134, 215, 216, 220 Anti–aircraft Artillery Command, 40, 61–2, 152 Arab–Israeli conflict, 39, 241, 243, 248, 326 arms acquisition, 53–4, 106–9, 115, 120, 131, 147–60, 185–7, 189–90, 210, 231, 236–40, 242–9, 253–8, 261, 268–72, 274, 278, 279, 290–1, 328 arms production, 38, 41–3, 45; see also Korean People’s Air and Air Defence Command; Korean People’s Navy Command arms sales, 45–7, 54–5, 110, 113 Cuba, 291 Egypt, 236, 254, 262–3, 274, 284 Grenada, 113 Iran, 51, 54, 113, 116, 119, 236, 250, 252–6, 260, 263, 266, 271–4, 282, 284 Libya, 236, 263, 275, 283 Nicaragua, 113 Pakistan, 236, 266, 268–72, 282, 284 Sudan, 263 Syria, 236, 261, 263, 274, 283, 284 Tanzania, 113

A

F

N

K

Uganda, 113 United Arab Emirates, 236, 252, 329 Vietnam, 113, 262 Artillery Command, 40, 47, 49, 51, 59–60, 64, 74, 86, 222, 244, 251, 256, 258, 302 assassination, 80, 81 Border Security Bureau, 34, 57, 173–4, 176, 204, 292, 315 Cabinet, 7, 20, 22–6, 36, 41, 45, 47, 49, 55, 127, 179, 199, 204, 213, 215, 222–3, 231, 233, 283 Central Committee Secretary in Charge of South Korean Affairs, 7, 29, 78, 179, 180–92, 195 Investigative Department, 7, 36, 180, 182 Liaison Department, 181 operations, 181, 184 Operations Department, 7, 95, 110, 152, 180–4, 186, 293, 316 Social-Cultural Department, 7, 81, 179–82 South-North Dialogue Department, 7, 29, 180, 181 State Security Department, 180 Unification Front Department, 29, 182 Chosen Soren, see Central Committee Secretary in Charge of South Korean Affairs 364

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364

I NDEX

Chu’che, 8, 212, 241 Coastal Security Bureau, 5, 34, 57, 95, 98, 102, 103, 106, 114, 117, 173, 174–6, 204, 292–3, 315 Combined Artillery Officers School, 59, 89, 304 command and control, 2, 20–55 COMSEC, 34 Reconnaissance Bureau, 194 concentration camps, see Ministry of Public Security; State Security Department conscription, 82–4, 142, 162 corruption, 18, 19, 22, 28, 44, 59, 146, 179, 198, 202, 203 counterfeiting, 202, 203 cryptanalysis, 35 cryptography, 34 Korean People’s Air and Air Defence Command, 125, 309 Korean People’s Navy Command, 97 State Security Department, 202 current status, 16–19 deception operations, 80, 140, 147, 154, 191, 279 defectors, 12, 38, 41, 43–4, 52, 107, 128, 130, 137, 139–40, 143–7, 173, 183, 196–7, 213, 215, 220, 226, 227, 228, 229, 233, 234, 244, 291 Defence Industry Policy and Inspection Department, 23–4, 46–7, 215 detention camps, see Ministry of Public Security; State Security Department discipline, 18, 28, 56, 86 disinformation, 35, 216 diversionary operations, 81 DMZ, 1, 3, 9, 11, 14, 30, 38, 40, 57, 62, 66, 81, 118, 130–1, 134, 138, 145, 151–2, 154, 165, 167, 195, 229, 251, 258, 260 economic situation, 16, 17, 36, 56, 92, 104, 106, 109, 145–6, 156, 173, 178, 202, 212, 236 Egypt, 82, 141, 236–7, 241–8, 253–5, 262–3, 274, 284, 327–8

electronic intelligence warfare, 35, 36, 194 electronic warfare, 34–6, 52, 64, 66, 70, 92, 115, 129, 151, 194 Fatherland Liberation War, 6, 8, 39, 72, 84, 85, 110, 111, 113, 118, 120, 149, 152, 184, 212, 233, 304 foreign currency earning operations, 34, 37, 42, 54, 55, 82, 198, 203, 204, 213 fortifications, 3, 9, 39, 40, 49, 101, 228, 258, 260, 265, 288; see also Korean People’s Air and Air Defence Command; Korean People’s Navy Command ground forces, 2–5, 56–91 command and control, 57 deployment, 3 dispositions, 57 order-of-battle, 292–3 organisation, 3, 57 Guard Command, 7, 25, 27, 33, 76, 179, 195–7, 199, 204, 318 guerrilla warfare, 10, 35, 81, 84, 163, 167 information warfare, 35, 36 Iran, 54, 82, 116–20, 140–1, 151, 156, 222, 236–7, 250–3, 256, 258, 260–6, 268, 271–4, 282, 284, 290, 337 Iran–Iraq War, 39, 116, 119, 226, 250, 252–3, 255, 258 Iraq, 119, 226, 237, 255, 322, 327 Japan, 4, 8, 11–12, 19, 30, 36, 54, 56, 80, 109, 120, 147, 187, 190, 195, 203, 210, 213, 237, 255, 263, 266, 317, 329 Kim Chong-il, 1–2, 7, 9, 12, 14, 17, 20–5, 28, 31, 33–7, 40, 56, 59, 78, 103, 118, 130, 134, 142, 146, 178, 179, 196–9, 202, 209, 211, 213, 280, 300 Kim Il-ch’ol, 22–5, 27, 95, 105, 305 Kim Il-song, 1, 8–10, 17, 20, 22, 45, 105, 130, 143, 147, 150, 157,

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365

365

366


178, 196–7, 202, 209, 238, 246, 253–4, 279, 295 Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), 134, 216, 219 Korean People’s Air and Air Defence Command, 5, 6–7, 18, 33, 40–1, 62, 76, 78, 84, 93, 95, 104, 123–60, 272, 293, 294, 313 aircraft production and repair, 7, 53, 125, 127, 156 airlift capabilities, 80 bases, 6, 128–9, 134, 131–4, 136–8, 140, 144, 147, 156, 196, 240 hardening, 7, 138, 140, 147, 160 Civil Aviation Bureau, 6, 125, 127, 309 communications regiment, 125 cryptography, 125 deception, 140, 154 decoys, 141 deployment, 6, 131–41 electronic warfare, 35, 129, 151 exchange visits, 130, 141 foreign deployments, 141 heliports/helipads, 131–2, 144 highway strips, 131–2, 138 operational readiness, 123, 130, 134, 136, 145, 146, 156 organisation, 6, 123–31, 293–4 reorganisation, 130, 134, 137, 138 SIGINT, 149, 150, 194 special operations forces, 7, 123, 127, 146, 149, 150, 152 training, 88, 89, 123, 130, 134, 137, 143–7 wartime operations, 16, 123, 127, 128, 131, 132, 137, 139, 143, 147, 156 Korean People’s Navy Command, 5–6, 18, 33, 40–1, 78, 84, 97, 105–9, 117, 121, 92–123, 127, 185, 187, 293 amphibious lift capabilities, 92, 102, 108 amphibious warfare operations, 14–16, 79, 92, 102–8 antisubmarine warfare, 99, 105, 121–2, 129 bases, 5, 98, 101, 112, 114, 119

hardening, 6, 100, 119, 121 coastal defence, 95, 97, 113–18, 120, 163, 175, 293 command and control, 93–101 cryptography, 97 deployment, 6, 98–101 electronic warfare, 92 exchange visits, 105, 106 June 1999 West Sea incident, 93, 95, 105 naval mine warfare, 6, 16, 92, 103, 105, 110, 118–21 ocean-going cargo vessels, 95, 103, 110, 120, 261, 293 operational readiness, 93, 105, 106 organisation, 5, 93–101, 293 shipbuilding and repair, 6, 38, 53, 95, 97, 106, 108–9, 111, 112 SIGINT, 92, 194 special operations forces, 92–3, 104, 109, 112, 122 submarine operations, 38, 92, 98, 105, 109–13 support of ballistic missile tests, 265, 266, 267, 280 training, 88, 89, 92, 103–6, 121–2 wartime operations, 16, 92, 113 Korean War, see Fatherland Liberation War Korean Workers’ Party, 1–2, 7, 10, 20–5, 29, 45–7, 84, 87, 142, 163, 166–8, 177–9, 198–9, 202, 204, 210, 213, 222, 231, 283, 295 Central Committee, 9, 20, 23, 47, 180, 222, 279 Central Military Committee, 20, 23, 25–6, 47, 82, 125, 163, 167, 222, 314 Central People’s Committee, 10, 21–2, 26, 46, 179, 204 command and control, 23–6 lessons learned Arab–Israeli conflict, 39 Iran–Iraq War, 39, 226 October 1973 War, 241 Operation ALLIED FORCE, 12, 39 Operation DESERT FOX, 290 Operation DESERT STORM, 12, 36, 39, 116, 151, 226, 288, 290




366

I NDEX

Libya, 119, 141, 236, 237, 250, 263, 275, 283 Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau, 5, 40, 57, 62, 64, 68, 70, 78–82, 89, 90, 146, 292, 303 Mechanised Command, 40, 60–1, 74, 88 military assistance to, 37, 81, 82, 116, 141, 177, 238, 253, 263–4, 273, 278 Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, 3–7, 16–36, 46–9, 64, 82, 93, 95, 112, 123–5, 134, 169–73, 179–82, 199, 204, 210, 213, 220, 222, 228, 231, 238, 283, 288, 291, 293 command and control, 27–45 General Political Bureau, 20, 25–31, 64, 91, 125, 196, 198 General Rear Services Bureau, 27, 41–7, 54, 300 General Staff Department, 20, 27, 33, 47, 57, 80, 89, 91, 156, 170, 213, 222, 258, 267, 292, 304 command and control, 33–41 Communications Bureau, 34, 35, 86, 194 Electronic Warfare Bureau, 34, 35, 36, 194, 202 Electronic Warfare Institute, 35 Engineer Bureau, 34, 37, 62, 64 Foreign Currency Earning Bureau, 34, 37, 42, 54 Military Construction Bureau, 34, 38, 140, 160, 288 Nuclear–Chemical Defence Bureau, 34, 39, 86, 213, 222, 225–8 Operations Bureau, 34, 38, 40, 47, 59, 76, 198, 222 Ordnance Bureau, 34, 41, 47, 222 Representative Mission at Panmunjom, 27, 41, 43 wartime operations, 14, 16, 43–5 Ministry of Public Security, 7, 26, 27, 38, 52, 83, 162, 163, 168, 179, 198, 202, 204, 207, 210, 203–11, 213, 315

Ministry of Sea Transportation, 95, 110, 293, 305 Merchant Marine, 95, 103, 110, 293 Mirim College for Electronic Warfare Research, 35, 36 morale, 18, 26, 30, 33, 56, 97, 142 narcotics, 178, 200 National Defence Commission, 2, 7, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 29, 46, 47, 82, 89, 163, 179, 199, 204, 213, 222, 231, 270, 283 National Intelligence Committee, 179, 180 missions, 180 national military and security policies, 8–14 Fortress Korea, 241 foundations, 8, 9 Four Military Lines, 8, 9, 100, 138, 161, 162, 168, 241 One Chosen, 9 Three Revolutionary Forces, 8, 9 Operation ALLIED FORCE, 12, 39 Operation DESERT FOX, 290 Operation DESERT STORM, 12, 36, 39, 116, 151, 226, 288, 290, 322 Pakistan, 54, 82, 220, 222, 236, 237, 266, 268–73, 282, 284 paramilitary and reserve forces, 161–76 Paramilitary Training Units, 4, 33, 38, 40, 61, 64, 76, 103, 161, 169–73 People’s Guard, 4, 161, 173–6 People’s Republic of China, 1, 8, 17, 34, 53–4, 103, 105–7, 109, 113, 115, 120, 131, 147, 149, 150–2, 156–60, 182, 203, 210, 220, 231, 237–40, 245–7, 250, 252–4, 261–3, 270–3, 278–9 personnel, 83, 82–4, 102, 142, 162 prison camps, see Ministry of Public Security; State Security Department propaganda, 17, 26, 29, 30, 31, 130, 149, 181 psychological warfare, 29, 30, 181




367

367

368


purges, 17, 22, 179–80, 198, 202, 297 P’yongyang, 3, 5, 27, 31, 36, 38, 43, 49, 50, 54, 57, 76, 78, 88, 95, 97, 103, 117, 123, 128, 132, 141, 144, 147, 150, 152, 155, 158, 159, 163, 180, 183, 192, 199–200, 204, 209–10, 218, 227, 234, 237, 240, 242, 244, 248, 250–1, 260–2, 266, 270, 272, 285, 308 P’yongyang Anti-aircraft Artillery Command, 40, 62, 76, 78, 125, 127, 152–3, 294 P’yongyang Defence Command, 3, 25, 40, 57, 74, 76, 171, 196–7, 204, 292, 303, 318 readiness, 4, 18, 56, 59, 60, 62 Reconnaissance Bureau, 7, 34, 36, 41, 78, 79, 81, 95, 98, 109, 110, 122, 179, 180, 182, 187–8, 192–5, 293 Red Youth Guard, 4, 38–9, 85, 161, 168–9, 314 Republic of Korea, 1, 3, 4, 13–16, 19, 30, 33, 36, 76, 93, 114, 121, 130, 183, 196, 203, 227, 240–1, 248, 250, 279, 316, 326 Research Institute for Military Sciences, 36, 39 Russia, 1, 17, 34, 53, 54, 107, 120, 151–2, 156–60, 173, 210, 220, 233, 237, 256–7, 264, 273, 278, 291; see also Soviet Union sanctions, 271 Second Economic Committee, 38, 41–7, 112–13, 222–3, 283, 286 Academy of Defence Sciences, 49, 53, 54, 55, 215–16, 222, 227, 286, 288, 336 Security Command, 7, 22, 27, 44, 76, 88, 179, 197–8, 318 SIGINT, 34–6, 64, 66, 70, 92, 149–50, 194, 202 smuggling, 158–9, 178, 190, 275 Soviet Union, 1, 8, 17, 19, 35, 103–6, 109, 115, 130, 141, 147, 150–2, 154, 157, 220, 231, 237, 238, 239–40, 242, 243, 245–7, 251, 253–7, 261; see also Russia

special operations forces, 5, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 35, 56, 78–85, 92, 104, 119, 122, 123, 149, 150, 152, 187, 194, 200, 213, 302 State Security Department, 7, 22, 23, 26, 44, 81, 83, 179, 196, 197, 198–203, 204, 207, 315 strategies, 5, 9, 10–12, 16, 79, 90 Supreme People’s Assembly, 22, 23, 26, 179 Syria, 51, 54, 82, 116, 141, 151, 236, 237, 241, 243, 258, 261–3, 270, 274, 283, 284, 291 terrorist organisations, 81, 82, 110, 177, 182, 203 trading companies, 18, 37, 42, 44, 47, 49, 54–5, 112, 178, 181, 186, 194, 198, 204, 210, 223, 271, 275, 320 training, 40, 84–91, 162, 166–9, 172 United States, 1, 13, 33, 216, 219, 227, 233, 238, 248, 327, 329 wartime operations, 14–16, 49, 59 women, 78, 81, 84, 87, 103, 118, 166, 168, 171 Wonsan, 3, 18, 38, 39, 59, 98, 99, 104, 105, 117, 134, 136, 138, 183, 194, 322 Workers’–Peasants’ Red Guard, 4, 33, 38–40, 85, 103, 161–8

Weapons systems and programs aircraft A–5, 129, 148 A–37 Dragonfly, 129 An–2/Y–5 COLT/Improved An–2, 7, 16, 53–4, 127, 129–30, 144, 146–9, 150, 151, 157 An–24 COKE, 54, 129, 148, 151, 157 An–124 Ruslan, 159, 261 Boeing 747–100, 274 CJ–6, 129, 144, 148 F–4 Phantom II, 129 F–5 FAGOT, 129, 148 F–5 Freedom Fighter, 129




368

I NDEX

F–6 FARMER, 129, 148 F–7 FISHBED, 129, 148 FT–5, 129, 144, 148 FT–6, 129, 144, 148 H–5/5R/HJ–5 (Il–28 BEAGLE), 128, 129, 131, 134, 145, 148, 149, 151, 157 Il–14 CRATE, 129, 148 Il–18 COOT, 129, 148 IL–28, 54, 134 Il–62 CLASSIC, 129, 148 Il–76MD FALSIE, 129, 148 Li–2 cab, 129, 148 MiG–15/UTI FAGOT, 7, 53, 127–9, 130, 134, 144–5, 148, 157 MiG–17/UTI FRESCO, 7, 53, 128–30, 134, 144–5, 148, 151, 157 MiG–19/M FARMER, 7, 128–29, 134, 136, 138, 145–6, 148, 155, 159 MiG–21PF/PFMA/UTI FISHBED, 7, 54, 129, 145–6, 148, 151, 157, 159 MiG–23ML/UB FLOGGER G, 7, 128, 129, 145, 147, 148, 151, 156 MiG–29/UB FULCRUM A/B, 7, 54, 128, 129, 140, 145, 147, 148, 149, 156, 157, 158, 294, 309 Po–2, 149, 150 PZL–104, 148 Su–7BKL FITTER, 148 Su–25K/UBK FROGFOOT A, 128, 129, 145, 147, 148, 149, 156, 294 Su–30MK, 149 Tu–16 BEAR, 147 Tu–154B CARELESS, 129, 148 Yak–12, 148 Yak–18 MAX, 7, 53, 127, 129, 144, 148, 157 armoured personnel carriers, 3, 50, 61, 70, 72, 74, 76 artillery systems, 4, 51, 56, 60, 116, 307–8 assault guns, 3, 61, 64 balloons, 30, 123, 152, 294

biological weapons program, 8, 53, 212, 228, 231–5 agents, 8, 226, 233 balloons, 30 delivery systems, 81, 150, 151 facilities, 231, 233–5 feed stocks, 233 genetic engineering, 231 immunisations, 233 missile warheads, 251, 256, 264 production capacities and inventory, 234–5 storage, 228 camouflage, 108, 112, 130, 140, 147, 150, 186, 189, 279 chaff, 151 chemical weapons program, 8, 11, 13, 39, 40, 53, 212, 222–31, 252, 262 agents, 225, 226, 231 chemical industry capabilities, 222 chemical warheads, 11, 226, 231, 242, 245, 251, 252, 256, 264 delivery systems, 30, 81, 150, 151, 323 facilities, 172, 223–9, 234, 322–3 operational storage, 228–9 organisation, 222–3 precursors, 223, 226 production, 223–6 protection equipment, 226–7 requirements, 222 storage, 226 wartime production, 230 GPS, 187, 189, 264, 282 hang gliders, 152, 183 helicopters Hyokshin–2, 54, 148, 157 MD–500D/E Defender, 7, 127, 129, 148, 149, 150 Mi–4 HOUND, 127, 129, 148 Mi–8/–8T HIP/HIP-C, 127, 129, 148, 158, 313 Mi–2 HOPLITE, 7, 54, 127, 129, 144, 146, 148, 157 Mi–14PL HAZE-A, 121, 129, 148 Mi–17 HIP, 129, 148




369

369

370


Mi–24D/DU HIND-D, 127, 129, 148 Mi–26 HALO, 129, 148, 158 Z–5, 129, 148 hovercraft, 6, 53, 92 KONG BANG I/II/III class LCPA, 16, 53, 102, 108, 111 NAMPO A/B class LCPA, 16, 102, 108, 111 infiltration craft, 6, 53, 109, 111, 113, 183–94 improved SP–10H (I-SILC), 184, 189 sale to Iran, 113 SP–10H (SILC), 111, 188 speedboats, 190 intelligence gathering ships (AGI), 105, 194 laser designators, 150 laser-guided bombs, 150–1 missile programs, 212, 236–91 AA–2, 52, 147, 151, 254 AA–7 APEX, 52, 147, 151 AA–10 ALAMO, 52, 149, 151 AA–11 ARCHER, 52, 149, 151 Abdali, 271, 272 AG–1, 52, 107, 114, 115, 117 al-Abbas, 255 al-Fatah, 262, 275 al-Husayn, 255, 258, 289 AT–1 SNAPPER, 52, 64, 68, 247 AT–3 SAGGER, 52, 62, 64, 68, 70, 247 AT–4 SPIGOT, 52, 62, 291 AT–5 SPANDREL, 52, 62, 291 Bases, 260, 265, 279, 282, 283, 288, 289, 337 BGM–109 Tomahawk, 116, 288, 290, 337 C–601/CAS–1 KRAKEN, 149 C–801/CSS-N–4 SARDINE, 107 C–802/CSS-C–8 SACCADE, 114 chemical warheads, 11, 231 cluster warheads, 251, 256, 261 cooperation with Egypt, 237, 243, 248, 249, 253, 254, 255, 262, 274, 282, 284, 328

Iran, 54, 116, 117, 237, 250, 252, 253, 256, 258, 260, 261, 266, 271, 272–4, 282, 284, 290 Iraq, 237 Libya, 237, 263, 275, 283 Pakistan, 237, 266, 268–72, 282, 284 PRC, 239–40, 245–7, 248, 261, 278, 279 Soviet Union, 253 Syria, 237, 244, 261, 274, 283, 284, 291 CSA–3A, 52 DF–2, 329 DF–3, 278, 329 DF–4, 329 DF–5, 246, 329 DF–11/M–11, 271 DF–61, 241, 245–7, 254 engines, 160, 237, 241, 250, 264, 274, 278, 284, 286, 331 Gimbaled nozzles, 282 Isayev 9D21, 251, 263, 264 facilities, 49, 54, 107, 120, 131, 159, 244, 249–51, 257–8, 262, 264–6, 270–2, 278–80, 283–8, 328, 335–6 FIM–92 Stinger, 52, 291 foreign assistance, 253–4 FROG–3 (Luna), 325 FROG–5 (Luna–2), 4, 226, 238–45, 247, 291 FROG–6, 241–5, 326 FROG–7, 4, 238 FROG–7B (Luna-M), 226, 241–5, 247, 250, 284, 291, 326 Ghauri 1/2, 268–72, 273, 282 Ghaznavi, 271, 282 guidance systems, 117, 160, 240, 241, 246, 247, 250, 251, 256, 257, 258, 261, 263, 264, 265, 278 HJ–73, 254 HN–5/5A, 52 HN–5A, 254 HQ–1, 240, 252 HQ–2 (CSA–1), 153, 240, 241, 245, 247, 252, 254, 279 HQ–2B/F/J/P, 52, 245




370

I NDEX

Hwasong 5, 4, 52, 54, 248, 249–56, 257, 258, 263, 264, 265, 266, 275, 288 prototype, 249–50 Hwasong 6, 4, 52, 54, 251, 254, 255, 257, 256–63, 264, 265, 266, 270, 274, 275, 278, 279, 280, 288, 291 HY–1/CSS-C–2 SILKWORM, 52, 114, 115, 116, 240 HY–1/CSS-N–2 SAFFLOWER, 52, 106, 107, 240 HY–2/CSS-C–3 SEERSUCKER, 52, 114, 115, 116, 117, 149, 286 HY–4/C–201/CSS-C–7 SADSACK, 114 Hyonmu (Black Weapon), 248, 250, 327 K–13 AA–2 atoll, 52, 147, 151 MGM–2 Lance, 248 MIM–14 Nike-Hercules, 240, 245 missile designators, 327, 335 MM 38/40 Exocet, 52, 107, 114, 291 mobile–erector–launchers (MEL), 51, 260, 264–6, 267, 271, 273, 280, 285, 286, 288, 307, 336 No-dong, 4, 52, 54, 221, 256, 257, 258, 263–75, 278, 280–2, 290, 332 organisation, 283–8 Paekkom (White Bear), 240–1, 245, 248 penetration aids, 282 PGLM, 52 PL–2, 52, 151, 254 PL–5, 52, 151, 254 PL–7, 52, 151 Prithvi, 271 R–60 AA–8 APHID, 52, 147, 149, 151 range requirements, 255 reentry vehicles, 282 reorganisation, 247–9, 254–6 reverse engineering, 52, 107, 114, 159, 240, 242, 244, 247, 248, 249, 284, 286, 291 SA–2B/C/D/E/F GUIDELINE, 6, 52, 115, 128, 153, 160, 237, 239, 240, 245, 247, 252, 288

SA–3b GOA, 6, 52, 128, 153, 245, 254 SA–5 GAMMON, 6, 52, 128, 153, 154, 245, 254 SA–6 GAINFUL, 128, 309 SA–7B GRAIL, 52, 153, 160, 247, 301 SA–14 GREMLIN, 52, 153, 291 SA–16 GIMLET, 52, 154, 160, 262, 291 sales to Cuba, 291 Egypt, 236, 254, 262, 263, 274, 284 Iran, 54, 116, 236, 250, 252, 253, 256, 260, 263, 266, 271, 272–4, 282, 284 Libya, 236, 263, 275, 283 Pakistan, 236, 266, 268–72, 282, 284 Sudan, 263 Syria, 236, 261, 263, 274, 283, 284 United Arab Emirates, 236, 252, 329 Vietnam, 262 Scud B (R–17E), 248, 249–50, 254, 255, 256, 261, 262, 327 Shaheen, 271, 272 Shehab 1, 252 Shehab 2, 260 Shehab 3, 265, 268, 272–4, 282 Shehab 4, 273, 274, 282 space launch vehicles, 236, 237 SS–4 SANDEL, 273 SS–21 SCARAB, 116, 291 SS–23 SPIDER, 261 SS-C–1b SEPAL, 116, 291 SS-C–2b SAMLET, 52, 114, 115, 239, 326 SS-C–3 STYX, 116, 291 SS-N–2a STYX, 52, 107, 109, 115, 239 SS-N–5 SARK [SERB], 112 SY–1/CSS-N–1 SCRUBBRUSH, 52, 106, 107, 109, 240 Taep’o-dong 1, 4, 52, 256, 267, 271, 273, 275–83, 286, 290, 335 Taep’o-dong 1 SLV, 4, 256, 275, 279–81, 335




371

371

372


Taep’o-dong 2, 4, 256, 275–83, 286, 290, 335 Taep’o-dong 2 SLV, 281 Taep’o-dong 3, 282 Ta’ir al–Sabah (Morning Bird), 254 testing, 52, 115, 117, 147, 149, 151, 153, 159, 238–41, 249, 250, 258, 260–7, 270–5, 279–82, 288 transporter–erector–launchers (TEL), 51, 114–17, 239, 241, 242, 243, 244, 248, 257–62, 264–7, 271, 273, 284–8, 336 unnamed ALCM, 52, 117, 149 W70 nuclear warhead, 248 mother ships, 183, 184–92 vega 1 class, 190 multiple rocket launchers, 3, 4, 51, 60, 76, 226, 244, 332 naval mines, 119, 284 ALCM–82, 120–1 nuclear weapons program, 8, 53, 212, 213, 216, 220, 221, 213–22, 237, 320 Atomic Energy Committee, 53, 210, 215 cooperation with Iran, 222 Pakistan, 222 delivery systems, 221, 236 doctrine, 213 facilities, 216–21 General Bureau for the Light Water Reactor Project, 215, 216 General Department of Atomic Energy, 215 implosion tests, 220, 221 inventory, 8, 220 No-dong nuclear warheads, 263 nuclear warheads, 264 organisation, 213–16 Pakistan, 220 plutonium, 8, 219, 220, 221 production capacities and inventory, 217–20 reprocessing, 217, 219 strategic thought, 213 testing, 1998, 222 weapons design, 219, 220–2

ocean-going cargo vessels, 95, 103, 110, 119–20, 181, 186, 293 radar, air defence, 154–5 radar, aircraft NO–19 Topaz, 157 radar, coastal defence, 114 radar, data receiver RVS–1 Malakhit (BREAD BIN), 242, 260 radar, maritime, 187, 189 river crossing K–61 tracked amphibian, 37, 64 LPP light pontoon bridging, 37 S-Type pontoon bridging, 37 TPP heavy pontoon bridging, 37 sailplanes, 123, 145, 152, 294 satellites Kwangmyongsong 1 (Bright Lodestar), 279, 280, 281, 335 Kwangmyongsong 2 (Bright Lodestar), 281 Uribyol II, 279 self-propelled artillery, 3, 51, 56, 60, 61, 252 sonar, 121, 187, 189 submarines, 184–92, 184 1000-tonne class SSc, 6, 53, 109, 111, 112, 188–9 41 m class SSAG, 185, 186, 187 5.7 m class SSm, 185 FOXTROT class (Project 641) SS, 112 GOLF II class (Project 629) SSB, 112 Midget, 6, 53, 109, 184, 186, 194 reverse engineering, 185 P4 (YUGO) class SSm, 186–7, 194 ROMEO class (Project 633) SS, 306 ROMEO class (Type 033) SS, 109, 112, 120, 121, 187, 306 sale of SANG-O class SSc to Vietnam, 113 sale of SSm to Iran, 113 SANG-O class SSc, 6, 16, 53, 95, 98, 109, 111–13, 120, 122, 187–8, 194–5, 262, 267, 293 Sea Horse II, 186 WHISKEY class (Project 613) SS, 109, 112, 187, 308




372

I NDEX

class SSm, 6, 16, 53, 95, 98, 109, 110, 111, 121, 122, 183, 184, 185, 186, 190, 194, 293 swimmer delivery vehicles, 109, 111, 184–92, 194 YUGO

tanks, 3, 50, 61, 70, 242, 288, 302 torpedoes, 107, 121, 185, 187, 188, 284 ultralights, 183 unmanned aerial vehicles, 116–17, 123, 151–2, 290–1, 294, 323

373

11PA class PBF, 176 40A class PBF, 176 TRAL class PG, 106, 121 USS Observation Island, 280 YONGDO class WPB, 176 YUKTO I/II class MSI, 110, 119, 120, 266 TB TB

weapons of mass destruction, 5, 7–8, 12, 18, 19, 81, 212–35; see also biological weapons program; chemical weapons program; nuclear weapons program research and development, 213 strategic thought, 212

warships class PB, 107, 108 PC/PT/PTG/WPC, 107 DONHAE class AGS, 97, 110 HAINAN class PC, 121 HANCHON class LCU, 109 HANTAE class LCU, 53, 109 HUANGFEN class PTG, 107 HUNGNAM class LCM, 109 intelligence gathering ships (AGI), 110 Iran Ajr, 119 KIMJIN class WPB, 113, 176 KOMAR class PTG, 107, 239, 325 KOWAN class ASR, 110 Marshal Shaposhnikov, UDALOY class guided missile destroyer, 105 Minsk, KIEV class VSTOL carrier, 105 NAJIN class FFL, 53, 106, 121, 266 NAMPO a/b/c/d class LCPF/PC, 53, 108, 111 OSA I class PTG, 107, 325 P–6/SHANTOU PB/PT, 108 SARIWON class PG, 106, 111, 121, 176 SINHUNG class PT, 53, 113 SO I class PC, 121 SOHAI class AGS, 97, 110 SOHO class FF, 53, 106, 111, 121 SOHUNG class PTG, 53, 107 SOJU class PTG, 107 stealth patrol boat, 6, 53, 108, 111, 189 TAECHONG I/I class PC, 121 CHAHO

CHONGJU

Names units Border Security Bureau 25th Brigade, 174 27th Brigade, 174 29th Brigade, 174 31st Brigade, 174 Coastal Security Bureau 11th Brigade, 176 13th Brigade, 176 15th Brigade, 176 17th Brigade, 176 19th Brigade, 176 21st Brigade, 176 Guard Command, 2.16 Unit, 197 Korean People’s Air and Air Defence Command 1st Air Division (Combat) 24th Air Regiment, 128, 134 35th Air Regiment, 128, 130 55th Air Regiment, 128, 129, 137, 140, 145, 148, 149 57th Air Regiment, 128, 130, 159, 309 60th Air Regiment, 128, 145, 147 3rd Anti-aircraft Rocket (SAM) Brigade, 128, 309 5th Anti-aircraft Rocket (SAM) Brigade, 128, 309 8th Anti-aircraft Rocket (SAM) Brigade, 128, 309 66th Anti-aircraft Rocket (SAM) Brigade, 128 organisation, 128




373

374


116th Anti-aircraft Rocket (SAM) Brigade, 128 2nd Air Division (Combat), 131 3rd Air Division (Combat) 11th Air Regiment, 128 203rd Air Regiment, 128 5th Air Division (Transport) 6th Air Division (Transport) 8th Air Division (Training), 144 11th Air Force Sniper Brigade, 80 16th Air Force Sniper Brigade, 80 17th Air Officers School, 125, 143 21st Air Force Sniper Brigade, 80 Air Koryo, 6, 125, 127, 129, 143, 294 hot air balloon unit, 123, 152, 294 sailplane unit, 123, 145, 152, 294 UAV unit, 123, 151, 294 797th Unit, 143, 144 Korean People’s Army 620th Artillery Corps, 14, 57, 60, 74–6, 293, 303 ballistic missile division, 57, 267, 282, 292 I Corps, 14, 15, 40, 57, 62, 64, 66, 195, 258, 293, 302, 304 II Corps, 14, 15, 37, 40, 57, 62, 64, 66, 195, 293, 296, 302, 304 III Corps, 37, 57, 62, 64, 242, 293, 302 IV Corps, 14, 15, 62, 66, 195, 293, 299, 302, 304 V Corps, 14, 15, 37, 40, 57, 62, 64, 66, 195, 258, 293, 299, 302, 304 VI Corps, 59, 146 corruption 1995, 202 reorganisation, 202 VII Corps, 37, 57, 62, 64, 293, 299, 302 VIII Corps, 58, 62, 64, 293, 302 IX Corps, 58, 59, 62, 64, 202, 293 X Corps, 58, 62, 64, 293 XI Corps, 58, 62, 64, 293 XII Corps, 57, 62, 64, 293 14th Division, 296 FROG battalions, 242, 244, 256 FROG brigade, 268 Hwasong missile regiment, 251, 258, 260, 267, 268

7th Infantry Division, 202 Kangdong Artillery Corps, 14, 57, 60, 74–6, 293 Koksan Tank Division, 70, 303 9th Mechanised Corps, 303 10th Mechanised Corps, 303 108th Mechanised Corps, 58, 68, 303 425th Mechanised Corps, 58, 68, 302, 303 806th Mechanized Corps, 15, 57, 68, 303 815th Mechanised Corps, 15, 57, 68, 303 special missile test and evaluation unit, 249, 251, 252 105th Tank Brigade, 72 820th Tank Corps, 3, 15, 57, 70–4, 293, 303 unidentified corps, 59, 62, 293 Yu Kyong-su 105th Seoul Guards Tank Division, 70, 72, 74, 302, 303 Korean People’s Navy Command East Sea Fleet, 5, 95, 97, 98, 100, 101, 121, 293 8th Naval Squadron, 98, 106 11th Naval Squadron, 98 12th Naval Squadron, 98 29th Navy Sniper Brigade, 101 155th Navy Unit, 98 1017th Navy Unit, 98 853rd Unit, 98 West Sea Fleet, 5, 93, 95, 98, 101, 105, 106, 109, 121, 293 Women’s Coastal Artillery Company of Unit 291, 118 Korean Workers’ Party, 695th Army Unit, 183 Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau 28th Airborne Brigade, 79 48th Airborne Brigade, 79 58th Airborne Brigade, 79 75th Light Infantry Brigade, 66 80th Light Infantry Brigade, 66 81st Light Infantry Brigade, 80 82nd Light Infantry Brigade, 80 87th Light Infantry Brigade, 80 17th Sniper Brigade, 80 60th Sniper Brigade, 80




374

I NDEX

61st Sniper Brigade, 80 Ministry of People’s Armed Forces Forced Labour Regiment, 44 General Staff Department, Communications Bureau, 9th Signals Brigade, 35, 194 Military Construction Bureau 110th Engineer Regiment, 289 111th Engineer Regiment, 289 115th Engineer Regiment, 289 117th Engineer Regiment, 288, 289 Nuclear–Chemical Defence Bureau 32nd Department, 39 279th Factory, 40 13th Nuclear–Chemical Defence Battalion, 39 14th Nuclear–Chemical Defence Battalion, 39 15th Nuclear–Chemical Defence Battalion, 39 16th Nuclear–Chemical Defence Battalion, 39 17th Nuclear–Chemical Defence Battalion, 300 18th Nuclear–Chemical Defence Battalion, 39 37th Nuclear–Chemical Defence Battalion, 39 38th Nuclear–Chemical Defence Battalion, 39 Ministry of Public Security 6th Engineer Bureau, 204, 210 1st Engineer Brigade, 210 3rd Engineer Brigade, 210 5th Engineer Brigade, 210 7th Engineer Brigade, 210 9th Engineer Brigade, 210 26th Engineer Bureau, 204, 210 21st Engineer Brigade, 210

23rd Engineer Brigade, 210 25th Engineer Brigade, 210 27th Engineer Brigade, 210 29th Engineer Brigade, 210 37th Engineer Brigade, 210 39th Engineer Brigade, 210 47th Engineer Brigade, 210 49th Engineer Brigade, 210 27th Engineer Bureau, 204, 210, 320 41st Engineer Brigade, 210 42nd Engineer Brigade, 210 45th Engineer Brigade, 210 28th Engineer Bureau, 204, 210 31st Engineer Brigade, 210 33rd Engineer Brigade, 210 35th Engineer Brigade, 210 29th Engineer Bureau, 204, 210 51st Engineer Brigade, 210 53rd Engineer Brigade, 210 55th Engineer Brigade, 210 Security Bureau, 204 Kaesong Guard Regiment, 204 Namp’o Guard Regiment, 204 organisation, 204 P’yongyang Guard Brigade, 204 P’yongyang Anti-aircraft Artillery Command, 214th Unit, 78 Reconnaissance Bureau, Maritime Department 22nd Squadron, 195 first base, 194 second base, 195 third base, 195 Workers’–Peasants’ Red Guard Ch’ondok-ri Cooperative Farm WPRG Company, 164 Huich’on Machine Tool Complex WPRG Company, 164 Pukch’ong-gun WPRG Regiment, 164 Sinhung-gun WPRG Regiment, 164




375

375

Shield of the Great Leader

Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader

Shield of the Sky

The Shield of Time

Shield

The Shield of Achilles

Shield Of The Sky

Shield

Shield

Leader of the Pack

Leader of the Pack

The Shield of Weeping Ghosts

The Golden Shield of IBF

Leader of the Pack

The rose, the shield

The Golden Shield of IBF

The Shield of Weeping Ghosts

The Shield of Weeping Ghosts

The Leader

Shield of Refuge

The Leader

The Leader

Shield of lies

Troy: Shield of Thunder

Beneath the Shield

The Riven Shield

Behind the Shield

Desert Shield

Destiny's Shield

DESTINY'S SHIELD

King's Shield

Shield of the Great Leader

Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader

Shield of the Sky

The Shield of Time

Shield

The Shield of Achilles

Shield Of The Sky

Shield

Shield

Leader of the Pack

Leader of the Pack

The Shield of Weeping Ghosts

The Golden Shield of IBF

Leader of the Pack

The rose, the shield

The Golden Shield of IBF

The Shield of Weeping Ghosts

The Shield of Weeping Ghosts

The Leader

Shield of Refuge

The Leader

The Leader

Shield of lies

Troy: Shield of Thunder

Beneath the Shield

The Riven Shield

Behind the Shield

Desert Shield

Destiny's Shield

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