Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII: Design, Implementation and Accountabilities

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS UNDER CHAPTER VII Design, Implementation and Accountabilities The Cases of Afghanistan, Cô...

Author: Blanca Antonini (ed.)

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SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS UNDER CHAPTER VII

Design, Implementation and Accountabilities The Cases of Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Kosovo and Sierra Leone

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS UNDER CHAPTER VII

Design, Implementation and Accountabilities The Cases of Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Kosovo and Sierra Leone

Blanca Antonini, Editor Maud Edgren-Schori, Gender Adviser Débora García-Orrico, Kosovo Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, Afghanistan Gilles Yabi, Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone

Copyright © Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) 2009.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means including information storage and retrieval systems, without prior written consent of the publisher. ISBN: 978-84-613-4974-6 Legal Deposit: The views expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinion of FRIDE. If you have any comments on this document or any other suggestions, please email us at [email protected] For further information: Goya, 5-7, Pasaje, 2… planta. 28001. Madrid Spain Tel.: +34 912 44 47 40 - Fax: +34 912 44 47 41 Email: [email protected] www.fride.org

Printed by: Priority Producción, Diseño y Comunicación S.L. Printed in Spain

Security Council Resolutions Under ChapterVII

Contents

III

CONTRIBUTORS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

VII

ACRONYMS

IX

FOREWORD

XIX

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

XXIII 1

INTRODUCTION

AFGHANISTAN

24

<Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh>

CÔTE D’IVOIRE

86

KOSOVO

128

SIERRA LEONE

168

CONCLUSION

210

I

II


CONTRIBUTORS

Blanca Antonini is a visiting professor at the Master’s degree in International Relations of the Torcuato Di Tella University in Buenos Aires, Argentina, where she lectures on peacemaking and peacekeeping within the framework of the United Nations (UN). Blanca Antonini has had an extensive career at the UN in the area of peace and security. In such a capacity, she participated in peace negotiations in El Salvador and served in peacekeeping operations in Central America and in Kosovo. She was a member of the Joint Group established with the participation of representatives of the local parties and of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to formulate the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government Institutions and was the head of the UNMIK Office in Belgrade. Antonini has written several papers and contributed to various publications on UN-related issues, including the section on El Salvador in The UN Security Council from the Cold War to the 21st Century, published by Lynne Rienner in 2004. Maud Edgren-Schori is a researcher and lecturer on Social Work at Stockholm University, Sweden, where she lectures about Social Policy, International Social Work and Human Rights in Social Work. Maud Edgren-Schori was deployed in Côte d’Ivoire as a gender adviser in 2005-2006 and is a member of the GenCap roster of gender advisers. GenCap is a project of the Sub-Working Group on Gender in Humanitarian Action of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC). As a GenCap gender adviser, she has been deployed in Liberia and is currently in Georgia. Edgren-Schori is the president of the National Committee of the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) in Sweden. Débora García-Orrico is an independent political consultant. She has spent most of her career at international organisations, mainly at the United Nations Secretariat (at headquarters and in the field) and the European Union (EU), but also at the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It is of particular relevance for this study her experience within the Interim Administration in Kosovo where she served, from 1999 until 2006, as political affairs officer in three of its four pillars. Pierre Schori is director general of FRIDE. A Swedish diplomat with vast experience in foreign affairs, development cooperation and peacekeeping operations, Schori served from 2005 until the beginning of 2007 as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and Head of Mission in Côte d’Ivoire. Pierre Schori was minister for International Development Cooperation, Migration and Asylum Policy, and deputy foreign minister between 1994 and 1999. In 2000, Schori was appointed Swedish Ambassador to the United Nations, a position he held until 2004. He has also served as member of the Swedish Parliament and the European Parliament. He is chairperson of the Olof Palme Memorial III

Fund and of Swedish ECPAT (End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes). Visiting professor at the Adelphi University, New York (2004-2005), Pierre Schori is author of several books including, most recently, The Years of the Dragon’s Teeth - September 11, the Iraq War and the World after Bush (2008). Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, PhD, is a researcher and professor on the subject of Human Security at L’Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Sciences Po) in Paris, France. Previously, she worked as a staff member of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) posted in Central Asia, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eastern Europe and New York. In addition to this project with FRIDE, her fieldwork on Afghanistan has included a participation in the ‘Ethics of Liberal Peace’ project of the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), as well as a joint Sciences Po/University of Kabul project on ‘Norms and Values of Liberal Peace’. She was the editor-in-chief of the first National Human Development Report in Afghanistan, entitled ‘Security with a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities’ (UNDP and Government of Afghanistan, 2005); is co-author of Human Security, Concepts and Implication (Routledge, 2007); and has written numerous publications on human security, peacebuilding, Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Gilles Yabi is a researcher and independent consultant in the fields of conflict analysis, peacekeeping operations and political governance in West Africa. He was previously a senior political analyst with the West Africa project of the conflict prevention organisation International Crisis Group (ICG), where he was responsible for the policy reports on Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea. He also contributed to the research on conflict and instability in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Sahel region. Before joining ICG, he worked as a journalist in a weekly magazine edited in Paris, specialising on African political and economic affairs. He holds a PhD in Development Economics and has published academic articles on the role of foreign direct investments in developing countries.

IV

V

VI


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work is the result of expert research and extensive consultations with senior diplomats, officials

of the United Nations (UN), independent experts, representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and citizens of the countries that hosted the peace operations under review. Answers to the questions posed were crucial to enrich and give special meaning to the findings of the research work. Their insights served to broaden our understanding of the underlying realities at the Security Council, in the capitals and on the ground that most influenced the peace operations in Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Kosovo and Sierra Leone. In addition, they contributed to shed more light on the scope and limits of the UN Secretariat’s support for the peace missions. The authors would like to thank in particular the senior and other involved officials of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations for their openness in sharing information and analyses. We are also grateful to the officials from the relevant regional divisions of the Department of Political Affairs, who agreed to be interviewed, for their willingness to provide valuable elements to assess the situation conditioning UN intervention.Very welcome also was the help of those who facilitated contacts with persons who had held key responsibilities in relation to the peace missions under consideration. All of them deserve credit for their support to this project. A special word of recognition goes go to Jean-Marie Guehénno, who generously dedicated his time and attention to share his views and look at parts of the draft. His analysis and suggestions were very useful in giving shape to the study. We are particularly grateful to Ramesh Thakur and Lise Morjé Howard, who agreed to review the full draft and made very helpful comments and suggestions to improve it, and to Iqbal Riza for his constant support. Acknowledgement should also go to Juan Garrigues, working for FRIDE at the initial stage of the project, for his good preparatory work and for first conceptualising and formulating the initial draft project proposal, and to Ana Martiningui for her help with the final text. Prior to its completion, this study was presented to selected groups of scholars and policy-makers in Paris, London and Stockholm in the course of pre-launch meetings. Participants made most valuable contributions to the formulation of the conclusions. Special thanks should go to the Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques of the Ministry of Defence of France for hosting and co-organising the meeting in Paris; the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), whose valuable support facilitated the holding of the meeting in London; and the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Folke Bernadotte Academy for hosting the Stockholm event. VII

VIII


ACRONYMS

ACO

Allied Command Operations

AFRC

Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

AIEC

Afghan Independent Electoral Commission

AIHRC

Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission

ANA

Afghan National Army

ANDS

Afghanistan National Development Strategy

ANP

Afghan National Police

APC

All Peoples Congress

ARTF

Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund

AU

African Union

AWN

Afghan Women’s Network

CEDAW

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women

CDF

Civil Defence Forces

CDG

Consultation and Drafting Group

CENTCOM

United States Central Command

CIC

Centre on International Cooperation

CIS

Commonwealth of Independent States IX

COM JFCN

Commander of Joint Force Command Naples

COMKFOR

Commander Kosovo Force

CSTC-A

Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan

CSTO

Collective Security Treaty Organisation

DDA

District Development Assembly

DDR

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

DIAG

Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups

DPKO

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DSRSG

Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General

ECOMICI

ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire

ECOMOG

Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

ECOWAS

Economic Community of West African States

ESDP

European Security and Defence Policy

EU

European Union

EULEX

European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

FANCI

National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire

FN

Forces Nouvelles

FRY

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

FSS

Department of Field Support Services

FYROM

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

HDZ

Croatian Democratic Union X


HRE

High Representative for the Elections

HRW

Human Rights Watch

HVO

Croatian Defence Council

IASC

Inter-Agency Standing Committee

ICC

International Criminal Court

ICG

International Crisis Group

ICO

International Civilian Office

ICR

International Civilian Representative

IDP

Internally Displaced Persons

IFS

International Friendship Service

IMATT

International Military Advisory and Training Team

IMTF

Integrated Mission Task Force

IOM

International Organisation for Migration

IPF

Ivorian Patriotic Front

ISAF

International Security Assistance Force

ISG

International Steering Group

IWG

International Working Group on Côte d’Ivoire

JCMB

Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board

JEMB

Joint Electoral Management Body

JFC

Joint Force Command

JIAS

Joint Interim Administrative Structure

KFOR

Kosovo Force XI

KLA/UÇK

Kosovo Liberation Army/ Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës

KPC

Kosovo Protection Corps

KPS

Kosovo Police Service

KSF

Kosovo Security Force

KVM

Kosovo Verification Mission

KWN

Kosova Women’s Network

LMA

Linas-Marcoussis Agreement

MARWOPNET

Mano River Union Women’s Peace Network

MDG

Millennium Development Goals

MINUCI

United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire

MJP

Movement for Justice and Peace

MNB

Multinational Brigades

MNTF

Multinational Task Force

MOU

Memorandum of Understanding

MOWA

Ministry of Women’s Affairs

MPCI

Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire

MPIGO

Ivorian Peoples’ Movement for the Great West

NAC

North Atlantic Council

NAM

Non-Aligned Movement

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NCDDR

National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation

XII


NEC

National Electoral Commission

NGO

Non-Governmental Organisation

NPFL

National Patriotic Front of Liberia

NPRC

National Provisional Ruling Council

OAU

Organisation of African Unity

OCHA

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OEF

Operation Enduring Freedom

OHCHR

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

OPA

Ouagadougou Peace Agreement

OSCE

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

OSGAP

Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan

PBC

Peacebuilding Commission

PDCI

Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire

PDPA

People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan

PDSRSG

Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General

PRIO

Peace Research Institute of Oslo

PRT

Provincial Reconstruction Teams

P5

Permanent Five

RDR

Rally of Republicans

ROE

Rules of Engagement

RTI

Ivorian National Television

XIII

RUF

Revolutionary United Front

RUFP

Revolutionary United Front Party

SCO

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

SCR

Senior Civilian Representative

SHAPE

Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe

SLA

Sierra Leonean Army

SLPP

Sierra Leone People’s Party

SNC

Serbian National Council

SRSG

Special Representative of the Secretary-General

SSR

Security Sector Reform

TRC

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UAE

United Arab Emirates

UIF

United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan

UK

United Kingdom

UN

United Nations

UNAMA

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNAMSIL

United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

UNCT

United Nations Country Team

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNGOMAP

United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF

United Nations Children’s Fund XIV


UNIFEM

United Nations Development Fund for Women

UNIOSIL

United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone

UNIPSIL

United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone

UNMIK

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNMIL

United Nations Mission in Liberia

UNOCA

United Nations Office of the Coordinator for Afghanistan

UNOCI

United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivore

UNOMSIL

United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

UNOWA

United Nations Office for West Africa

UNPREDEP

United Nations Preventive Deployment Force

UNPROFOR

United Nations Protection Force

UNSMA

United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan

UNSC

United Nations Security Council

UNV

United Nations Volunteer

US

United States

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

WIPSEN-Africa

Women Peace and Security Network Africa

XV

XVI


We manage 18 operations deployed across 12 time zones in five continents, comprising 140,000 authorised personnel, of which 110,000 are currently deployed, directly impacting the lives of hundreds of millions of people. This compares to 30,000 deployed personnel from just 10 years ago. Alain Le Roy, 1 December 2008 There is no sign that the need for peacekeeping will diminish. Threats such as environmental changes, economic shocks, transnational crime and extremism threaten many states and contribute to growing political and security instability. UN ‘New Horizon’ internal paper, quoted in The Financial Times, 3 August 2009 So we need mission mandates that are more credible and achievable. We need peacekeeping operations to be planned expertly, deployed quickly, budgeted realistically, equipped seriously, led ably, and ended responsibly. Ambassador Susan E. Rice, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, remarks at New York University’s Centre for Global Affairs and the Centre on International Cooperation, ‘A New Course in the World, a New Approach at the UN’, 12 August 2009 Concerns had been voiced […] that United Nations peacekeeping was dysfunctional, because the troops the United Nations deployed — troops mostly from developing countries — were often ill-equipped, ill-trained and ill-prepared […] if developing countries would stop responding to the frantic calls of the United Nations today, there would be no peacekeeping tomorrow, barring a few choicest areas in the world of strategic interest to major powers. Blaming the failure on the peacekeepers was the easy way out of meeting the Organisation’s collective responsibility. Ambassador Anawrul Kadim Chowdhury, Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the United Nations, statement at a Security Council session on the situation of Sierra Leone, 11 May 2000

XVII

XVIII


FOREWORD

Overstretched and under-funded, yet irreplaceable to achieve universal legitimacy, and in everincreasing demand, United Nations peacekeeping missions have undergone a dramatic shift over the last decade. So has the world. New actors and new alliances are changing the global balance of power. The UN of today is very different from the world organisation we used to know. Its ways and means of keeping and making peace are changing, and we have seen how other international organisations have stepped in, be it in the name of regional stability, the fight against global terrorism, to suppor t an elected government under attack or for ‘humanitarian intervention’. This has happened without much public debate. General knowledge of the new circumstances conditioning the tasks of conflict prevention and peacekeeping remains limited outside government offices and political and diplomatic circles. The inspiration for initiating this academic study, commissioned by the Madrid-based think-tank FRIDE and funded by the Government of Sweden, came from the privilege of having been given the confidence to head a major peacekeeping mission. As the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Côte d’Ivoire from 2005 to 2007, I experienced the peacekeeping responsibilities and conditions in the field and ‘from within’. The proximity to the realities on the ground, characterised by images of violence, greed and human suffering, but also of ordinary people’s hopes in the UN and their struggle for a better future, was a powerful reminder of the impor tance of UN peacekeeping. But there was also frustration; when the gap between noble prescriptions and possible actions became too wide. The study Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII: Design, Implementation and Accountabilities. The Cases of Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Kosovo and Sierra Leone deliberately examines widely different operations, thus reflecting the multiple challenges facing contemporary peacekeeping. In reviewing the mandates, the political and material suppor t for their implementation, the contribution of regional actors to the peace process and the local context, the research largely followed the broad lines set out in the Brahimi Repor t, to this date the broadest review and reform proposal for UN peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War. XIX

It has also tested its findings against the four templates of the UN Depar tment of Peacekeeping Operations and the Depar tment of Field Suppor t document ‘Peacekeeping Operations 2010’, which is based on lessons learned on peacekeeping over the past six decades. This work comes at a par ticularly critical juncture for peacekeeping operations and international intervention in general. In the past five years, the Security Council has been asked to intervene under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Char ter in situations of increasing diversity and complexity. The growing number of operations under the Council’s watch evidences its continuous central impor tance in maintaining peace and security. However, it also brings to the forefront inherent weaknesses, revealing contradictions within the international community over inter vention policies. During the immediate post-Cold War period, the rich countries allied with the West — and subsequently with the UN — had in the eyes of many exper ts gone beyond the level of international consensus. The original basic tenets of UN peacekeeping were altered by intervention in situations where there was no peace to keep. Impar tiality, consent and non-use of force except for situations of self-defence, which the Brahimi Repor t recognises as the ‘bedrock principles’ of UN peacekeeping, were put to the test when confronted with intra-state transnational conflicts. In this context, the Security Council authorised security enforcement missions led by regional organisations or interested states in parallel to UN-led peacekeeping and peacebuilding ones. This poses a new set of problems for UN civilian missions deployed in conjunction with such enforcement operations, as illustrated in this study. The disposition of member states, especially from developed nations, to send their troops and resources to defuse or resolve distant wars has dwindled in the face of uncer tain results. The capacity of the United Nations to respond effectively to crises is severely strained. Warning voices about the dangers of overstretching have come from the UN itself. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, former Under-Secretary-General of the Depar tment of Peacekeeping Operations, told The Financial Times in July 2008 ‘We are reaching the outer limits of peacekeeping’. Yet, the demand for UN peacekeeping continues. The approval of landmark resolutions related to the human rights of non-combatants in situations of armed conflict — resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) on women, peace and security; 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict; and 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict — is a positive trend. While not specific to any case in par ticular, these resolutions signal a resolve to eradicate the kind of abuse that came to the world’s attention in the 1990s during the armed conflicts that ravaged the Mano River region in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Great Lakes in Central Africa and the Balkans in Europe. XX


This research focuses on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), whose application in its three dimensions — protection, participation and promotion of women — constitutes a strong potential for increased security and change in post-conflict societies. The four case studies show beyond any doubt that the UN and its member states have failed in implementing this resolution. This study seeks to enhance understanding of the mandates, their design and implementation, and of the dynamics between the Council and the operations authorised in the four cases under review, and thus intends to serve as ‘food for thought’ for upcoming operations. In addition, it aims to provide information and analysis that can contribute to the mobilisation of public suppor t for UN peacekeeping as a tool of the international community to help countries emerging from war in their effor ts to consolidate peace and improve their people’s lives.

Pierre Schori Director General, FRIDE, Madrid

XXI

XXII


Executive Summary

T

he study Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII: Design, Implementation and Accountabilities. The Cases of Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Kosovo and Sierra Leone examines four widely different interventions approved by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the past decade.To varying degrees, they all confronted the risk of regression to violent conflict and had mandates that entailed the actual or potential use of force. Of the case studies, Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone involve missions under UN command in countries where individual member states launched military operations with or without Council approval. Afghanistan and Kosovo had UN civilian missions with a political and peacebuilding mandate deployed in parallel to military operations authorised by the Council and led by a multinational or regional organisation. Each case reviews the context for UN intervention, its role vis-à-vis other key international players, the design of the mandate and its eventual evolution in response to emerging needs. Taking into account the role of the Secretariat in supporting UN field missions, the study reviews implementation, with a special focus on the dynamics between the Council and the field. The approach taken is largely based on the principles laid down in the Brahimi Report and more recent literature on UN peacekeeping. Particular areas of analysis in the study include: ● The supportive or negative impact of the use of force, whether by UN blue helmets, operations by individual member states or multinational regional organisations, on the political and peacebuilding objectives; ● The Council’s effectiveness in backing and monitoring implementation, its ability to steer the way in the face of new requirements and the internal divisions that hamper its action; ● The Council’s role in legitimising interventions by multinational or regional forces over which it has little or no control and where accountability becomes a responsibility delegated in large part to other international players; ● The distance between prescription and action as evidenced by the level of implementation of UNSC resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security; ● The challenges of state-building by outsiders vis-à-vis the local context. XXIII

I. Case studies

Afghanistan Security Council engagement in Afghanistan intensified after the US-led military Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) removed the Taliban from power and the UN drew the Bonn Agreement as a blueprint for a functioning democracy and institutions. Thereafter, three streams of resolutions would be implemented simultaneously: a sanctions regime established in response to terrorist actions by AlQaeda and the Taliban; the operation of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), under Chapter VII; and that of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), not under Chapter VII. Despite the completion of the Bonn timetable, the state-building agenda was being increasingly challenged by the resurgence of the Taliban and problems of uncoordinated and wasted aid. Council resolutions went from minimal carte blanche to an ambitious list of tasks reflecting diverging interests among the Permanent Five (P5) and other members. The original ‘light footprint’ approach proved unviable: while UNAMA was under-funded, the military contingents run by ISAF/NATO and OEF were inflated with resources, personnel and equipment, especially as the operation moved from security assistance to full-fledged combat and counter-insurgency. UNAMA’s mandate became more difficult to implement as it incorporated the simultaneous tasks of coordinating aid from a large but fragmented international community, implementing its own projects and advocating for peace and reconciliation in a country where insecurity and institutional weaknesses were reversing gains made on democratisation. By late 2008, it had become clear that a military solution was not the answer, but it was far from apparent that a political solution based on negotiations with the Taliban would bring long-term stability. As the country prepared for elections in 2009 and 2010, the puzzle was whether the Taliban would participate and whether, after the elections, the government would be able to deliver public goods more effectively and transparently. For the international community, the two pressing priorities were to transform a heavily militarised operation into a civilian one, and to shift from an externally-directed enterprise into a locally-owned one. The Afghanistan case evidences the particular challenge of implementing a UN peacekeeping mission, jumpstarting state-building and political assistance, coordinating aid in a fragmented framework, and implementing resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security in situations where there is no peace to keep, and where the international community itself becomes engulfed in counter-insurgency. Côte d’Ivoire Seven years after the eruption of a brief civil war in Côte d’Ivoire, the country is at peace but almost all the preconditions for renewed political violence that could continue to expose it to an armed conflict in the medium term remain. The conflict was just one of the dimensions of a deep political crisis that has not been solved. The presidential elections expected since October 2005 have yet to be organised in mid-2009. Various external actors have been involved in peacemaking and XXIV


peacekeeping efforts in the country. The United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) is one of them. Established in February 2004 by the Security Council through a resolution under Chapter VII, UNOCI is still on the ground in 2009. Since the signing of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement, the Council’s resolutions, yet under Chapter VII, limited UNOCI’s role to providing passive support to the implementation of the agreement depending on the goodwill of the president, the prime minister and to some extent the facilitator, the president of neighbouring Burkina Faso. The Council continues regularly to renew its mandate with little impact on the internal political process, a situation that turns the timeline of the peacekeeping operation uncertain. While real progress has finally been made regarding the technical electoral preparations, there is still no guarantee that the new official date of 29 November 2009 will be respected. Kosovo In March 1999, a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) military campaign with no prior endorsement from the Security Council resulted in the expulsion of Serbian forces from Kosovo and the subsequent deployment in the territory of two international operations authorised by the Council: the civilian United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK); and the military NATOled Kosovo Force (KFOR). Resolution 1244 (1999), adopted under Chapter VII and negotiated entirely outside the Council, contains a fundamental ambiguity that reflects the division within the Permanent Five on the future of Kosovo. While reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the now extinct Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), it puts on hold the exercise of these principles for an indefinite period, and places Kosovo under an international protectorate. Progress has been achieved in the implementation of the mandate’s most pressing issues: ending the cycle of violence, ensuring the return of Kosovo-Albanian refugees, and establishing a structure for the gradual transfer of administrative responsibilities to local authorities. But the authority vested in UNMIK was contradictory in many ways to the aim of promoting local ownership. Most importantly, the international presence was unable to create a political environment where a multi-ethnic society would thrive. Kosovo-Serbs remain largely alienated from the process. Many have left the territory never to return due to insecurity, and have refused to participate in the new self-government structures. The Comprehensive Proposal for the Status Settlement submitted by UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari in 2007 was rejected by Serbia and failed to obtain the Council’s approval. On 17 February 2008, the Kosovo-Albanian leadership unilaterally declared independence. Resolution 1244 (1999) is still nominally in force in the absence of a revision. Since its adoption, the Council has pronounced itself on the Kosovo situation through presidential statements on barely a few occasions. In November 2008, it endorsed the Secretary-General’s proposal on the reconfiguration of the civil presence thus far embodied by UNMIK, thereby accepting the deployment of the European Union Rule of Law mission (EULEX). However, the crisis over the status of the territory is not over yet and the goal of a multi-ethnic Kosovo remains distant.

XXV

Sierra Leone Ten years after the horrific rebel attack of 6 January 1999 and the battle for Freetown, Sierra Leone is a country at peace. A president from the opposition party in the immediate post-war period, Ernest Baï Koroma, is in power since the September 2007 elections. The elections were organised by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) with broad citizen support and assistance from the United Nations Integrated Office in the country (UNIOSIL), which succeeded the then largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). In 2009, the country is still on the agenda of the Security Council and hosts the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). Sierra Leoneans interviewed in November 2008 recognised UNAMSIL’s contribution to their country’s recovery from collapse and generalised violence. They insisted on the conjunction of efforts by key players in helping to end the conflict: Nigeria and Guinea bilaterally and as participants in a regional peacekeeping force; the United Kingdom (UK) through direct support to the Sierra Leonean army; and UNAMSIL. The quasi collapse of the mission in May 2000 remains vivid in their memories but so does its progressive recovery since 2001. Ultimately, UNAMSIL achieved the key tasks assigned by the Security Council: it assisted in conducting the disarmament, demobilisation and to some extent reintegration of former combatants; supported the redeployment of the state throughout the country; provided key assistance and security to national and local elections; contributed to the reform of the national police; suppor ted the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC); and provided security for the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Its record in implementing UNSC resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security was much less impressive.

II. Main findings and conclusions

The general conclusions of the study are organised around five issues: the question of local consent; the viability of the mandate; Security Council support; the implementation of UNSC resolution 1325 (2000); and the political environment at the international and regional levels.They are inspired in the four criteria set out in the Capstone Doctrine for success in peacekeeping and add the question of women’s participation, one of the specific objectives of this study and an example of the gap between prescription and action. Below are some of the most salient findings and conclusions. The question of consent 1. Peace accords signed prior to deployment neither necessarily reflected true commitment nor did they always include key parties. The level of consent was only formal, fluctuating or minimal in Côte d’Ivoire and in Sierra Leone at the initial stage. In Afghanistan and Kosovo, accords were signed after XXVI


the situation on the ground had been altered by military defeat at the hands of international forces. They did not include the Taliban in Afghanistan or representatives of the population of Albanian descent in Kosovo. 2. Consent by local parties should not only be the norm for the deployment of peacekeeping forces, it also needs to be sought for the long-term state-building strategies pursued by an international intervention. The legitimacy of certain types of state-building, especially during ongoing conflict, is questioned by attempts to ‘engineer’ institutional processes in accordance with the strategic interests and values of the international presence. 3. In all cases, the use of force has had an impact on the level of consent by local parties and actors: ● In Afghanistan, the intensification of military operations by OEF and ISAF and the resulting civilian casualties and destruction have fuelled resentment and played in favour of the insurgency; ● In Côte d’Ivoire, although French Opération Licorne was able to halt hostilities, its destruction of the Ivorian air force fuelled resentment against an international presence that was perceived as associated with the former colonial power; ● In Kosovo, the absence of a forceful reaction to ethnically-motivated attacks against Serbs was one of the main reasons behind a large exodus of members of this community from the territory and made their integration more remote; ● In Sierra Leone, the timing of the UK intervention, ostensibly to rescue its nationals and related personnel, had the unintended consequence of giving UNAMSIL the possibility of recovering after its virtual collapse, thus helping to create favourable conditions for the implementation of the peacebuilding and political aspects of the mandate. A clear, credible and viable mandate 4. In Afghanistan, the challenge for mandate implementation has been the uncomfortable co-existence of UNAMA’s state-building and political tasks with the war waged by international forces in parts of the country. The short-term goal of counter-insurgency through war fighting undermined long-term state-building and peacekeeping objectives. 5. From the beginning, and especially after the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement, the mandate in Côte d’Ivoire was broad in the tasks assigned, but limited to the role of ‘assisting’ the government. Much depended on the latter’s goodwill, and ultimately on internal politics. Despite similarities to the mandate of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, mainly for political reasons, including the existence of a comparatively stronger government in Côte d’Ivoire, UNOCI was unable to obtain the required resources. 6. In Kosovo, resolution 1244 (1999) captures the general agreement of Council members, including Russia, on the most pressing issues: ending the cycle of violence and ensuring humanitarian relief to the many refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). But it glosses over the deep divisions among

XXVII

the Permanent Five over the legality of the intervention and the approach to the process that would lead to the determination of the future status of Kosovo.The resolution became a frame of reference with red lines on sovereignty, rather than a tool to guide UNMIK’s actions. Soon overtaken by events, in the eyes of many resolution 1244 (1999) became obsolete upon approval. 7. UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone was the first peacekeeping operation with a mandate to protect civilians. As the situation became more complex, and after the virtual collapse of the mission due to erroneous political assumptions, inadequate deployment and severe operational weaknesses, debates in the Security Council and pressures from regional leaders resulted in the restructuring and increase of force levels. 8. In general, for all the case studies, operational challenges included the slow deployment of qualified personnel; poor logistics and training; the absence of a common understanding of the mandate, resulting in difficulties in defining priorities and a unified strategy; and lack of communication, coordination and transparency, especially between the civilian and military peacekeepers. 9. A specific set of difficulties stems from the co-existence of a civilian mission with a military operation not under the UN, be it a multinational or a regional force or an intervention by a member state. While the UN has nominal authority over all operations authorised by the Council, it does not have the information, the resources or the leverage required substantially to influence their actions, except for those under UN command. Security Council support 10. The relationship between the multinational forces in Afghanistan and Kosovo with the Security Council that authorised them is characterised by a paradox. While the majority of troop-contributors consider the Council necessary as a legitimising agent, they do not feel under the obligation to report to it and in many cases are reluctant to do so. Despite its legitimising role, the Council has neither a say in determining their rules of engagement nor effective authority over these forces, whose resources, equipment and budget are guaranteed by the troop-contributing countries that have the means and political clout to act, and over which the UN has no leverage. 11. Overall, the role of the Security Council in these cases has reflected the inter-governmental function of the institution, with each country pursuing its national interests, rather than its transgovernmental function of creating a common good and implementing it in a coherent and effective manner. A way to enhance mutual accountability would be to establish a consultation mechanism between NATO or the organisation responsible for the implementation of the security mandate and the Security Council on key aspects of its execution, starting with the rules of engagement. 12. In Afghanistan, initial unanimity over intervention gave way to more detailed enquiries as the security situation deteriorated and ISAF engaged in hostilities with a resurgent Taliban resistance. Within the Council, a coalition of dissent formed by Russia, China and elected members from the South began to question US actions on the ground. European countries, especially the Nordics, have insisted on the subjects of human rights, the situation of women, humanitarian law and the legitimacy XXVIII


of Afghan institutions. Security Council resolutions eventually introduced language on civilian casualties and endorsed UNAMA’s role in promoting humanitarian law, even if it meant criticising ISAF operations. 13. In Côte d’Ivoire, until 2007 the Council approved several resolutions under Chapter VII to control the content and rhythm of the peace process, but without providing adequate resources or exerting sufficient pressure on the parties to comply. Unlike in Sierra Leone, sanctions were imposed reluctantly, rather late and on a very small group of three low profile persons. Due to lack of consensus, especially regarding the level of troops requested by the Secretary-General, the Council failed to provide enough support to shape a robust peacekeeping mission ready to defend itsef and its mandate. 14. Divisions within the P5 over Kosovo have virtually paralysed the Council since the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999). Initiatives to address new developments have resulted from UNMIK regulations or measures taken by other international actors, rather than emanating from Council directives, and were reported to the latter ex post facto. The Council has pronounced itself through presidential statements on very few occasions, the last being to endorse the reconfiguration of UNMIK, and concomitantly the deployment of EULEX. In the absence of action by the Council, the Secretary-General assumed an advanced interpretation of his role, seeking to respond to events without tipping the balance of power between contending positions or crossing the ‘red lines’ of resolution 1244 (1999). 15. In Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL’s near collapse after coming under attack from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) — a signatory to the Lomé Peace Agreement whose implementation the mission was required to support — caused a unanimous reaction in the Security Council on the need to prevent the mission from failing and abandoning the country to its fate. As a result, the Council adopted a series of resolutions that increased UNAMSIL’s military strength to the then highest historical levels for a UN mission, reinforced its mandate, hardened sanctions and approved the establishment of a Special Court to deal with those responsible for crimes and atrocities. The international context — marked by memories of the genocide in Rwanda and other past failures in peacekeeping — influenced the Council’s position.The British bilateral intervention in pursuit of its own national interests also had positive unintended consequences.The same level of interest should be expected at any time and for any similar situation, not just by accident of history. Implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) 16. International initiatives, the repeal of Taliban laws and the adoption of measures to improve their situation notwithstanding, women rarely occupy strategic level positions in Afghanistan and their presence in Parliament does not guarantee them a power similar to that of their male fellows.The large presence of warlords and their affiliates in Parliament continues to silence many women. The appearance of language from resolution 1325 (2000) in the mandates of UNAMA and ISAF has not bridged the gap between theory and practice due to a lack of resources and capacities, the context of a traditionally insecure society, weak political institutions and the overlapping and sometimes contradictory tasks assigned to the international forces. XXIX

17. Through its Gender Unit, UNOCI took several initiatives to strengthen local capacities in Côte d’Ivoire such as training of female candidates, national school advisers, national gendarmerie and police forces, and the development of a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project to establish a centre for women and girls affected by the conflict, including survivors of gender-based violence. Nonetheless, UNOCI was not effective in protecting women from gender-based violence. Widespread atrocities against women were reported well after the combats had ceased. The UN mission continues to document cases of sexual violence, but national authorities take no follow-up action. The Security Council also shares a degree of responsibility for its failure to activate targeted sanctions against individuals responsible for grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including sexual violence. More generally, a tough stance against perpetrators of human rights violations on all sides could have been a powerful tool for the Council to influence the behaviour of the spoilers of the peace process. 18. There is not a single mention of women in resolution 1244 (1999) on Kosovo, approved one year before resolution 1325 (2000). UNMIK had a gender adviser, but verbal support for gender mainstreaming did not translate into active commitment from UNMIK’s management: resources and policy decisions were generally missing or weak. A crucial achievement was the contested introduction of quotas for female candidates in party lists. But few women were appointed to political office or integrated into the parties’ leadership structures, and the measure yielded poor results in terms of improving women’s participation over time. 19. In Sierra Leone, women and girls were frequently victims of abduction, sexual slavery, rape and all kinds of abuse during the war. UNAMSIL, established one year before the approval of resolution 1325 (2000), as of 2001 incorporates gender-related language into its mandate. It refers to the widespread violation of human rights of women and children, and specifically mentions the recurrent problem of abuse of women and girls by peacekeepers, expressing serious concern at allegations of sexual abuse in refugee camps by some UN personnel and supporting the ‘zero tolerance’ policy for such abuse. But it took a long time for UNAMSIL to act on the resolution: the demilitarisation, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme was gender-blind and only in its drawdown phase did the mission assume responsibility for implementing its prescriptions. 20. While implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) has been less than satisfactory within UN peacekeeping, civil society and especially women’s organisations have taken the resolution seriously, as illustrated by the case of Sierra Leone. These efforts should not be ignored but strongly and sustainably supported. Political environment 21. Although the case studies cover a relatively short period, starting in 1999, they reflect the fluctuating priorities of the international community throughout the past decade. Until the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the main concerns on the international security front were associated with weak or collapsing states, and a fundamental goal was the restoration of the collective security system after its failures in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Following the attacks and the subsequent launch of the ‘war on terror’, crises where intervention could not be cast as part of the global fight XXX


against terrorism were sidelined or neglected. These circumstances may in part explain the different level of support for the operation in Sierra Leone approved in 1999 from that of the operation in Côte d’Ivoire authorised in 2004. 22. The involvement and influence of neighbouring or regional countries, in turn, varies in each case as explained below. 23. Because they share borders, histories, ethnic populations and common threats, the countries adjoining Afghanistan, including Pakistan, Iran, China, and the Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, are inter-linked in a common regional security complex: their security problems cannot be analysed or resolved individually. Although the priority for the US administration is increasingly avoiding runaway radicalisation in Pakistan, a regional strategy is imperative to address common potential vulnerabilities, as well as the opportunities that the wider neighbourhood represents. A unified political strategy, led by the UN with the support of the main international actors in Afghanistan, could address the main regional challenges and create a peace-conducive atmosphere. 24. While the initiatives taken by South Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) to move the Ivorian peace process forward set an example of ‘Africanisation’, they have yet not yielded the expected results.The lack of a common reading of the root causes of the conflict and the responsibilities of the national parties led only to halfway measures. After the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement, it is important for the region to continue to engage the parties in order to ensure the implementation of their long-delayed commitments. 25. In Kosovo, the perception and use of identity as a justification for the conflict can only be resolved in the prospect of a regional integration strategy that effectively creates new bonds among the various communities. It is in this context that the role of the European Union will remain essential. 26. The possibility of regional and international consensus was crucial to the achievements of the peacekeeping presence in Sierra Leone. The support of the governments in the region to the ban on arms and diamond sales that financed the war showed their commitment. The ECOWAS heads of state exerted continuous pressure on Charles Taylor to stop supporting the RUF. Also worth noting was Guinea’s forceful military reaction to incursions from Sierra Leone, a policy that dealt a severe blow to the already weakened rebel forces. This study examines the origin, content and implementation of Security Council mandates for operations deployed in four cases of intervention over the last decade, all of them implying some level of actual or potential use of force. It seeks to test the extent to which the prescription for success in peacekeeping operations derived from the Brahimi Report — the combination of political will expressed by Council decisions with the availability of appropriate resources to implement them — is still a valid parameter.The case studies show the obstacles that can stand in the way to consensus and to securing the true commitment of the Council membership in support of the operations it established.The Council does not always go beyond the individual, sometimes contradictory, interests of its membership, particularly its permanent members, and the adoption of resolutions is not necessarily an indication of sustained political support for the missions deployed. Accountability XXXI

understood in the broader sense of responsibility for decisions taken — is at times shared with, or delegated to other international players, such as NATO.The legitimising role of the Council does not translate into effective control, or even guidance, of non-UN missions on the ground. Yet, these military operations have the power to enable or compromise the achievement of the political and peacebuilding strategies that underlie UN peacekeeping operations. Hence, coordination at the operational level should be complemented by substantive consultations among major non-UN security players and other states in the Security Council.

XXXII

Introduction

1 Introduction

T

he study Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII: Design, Implementation and Accountabilities. The Cases of Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Kosovo and Sierra Leone examines the implementation of Security Council mandates and assesses the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) monitoring role vis-àvis the missions deployed under its authority in the four cases under review. Two of the cases considered — Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone — involve missions entirely under United Nations (UN) command, while the other two — Afghanistan and Kosovo — include UN civilian missions with a peacebuilding mandate deployed in parallel to military operations authorised by the Council under Chapter VII and led by a regional organisation. With the exception of the resolution establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the resolutions examined in this study were adopted within the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, denoting the possible use of force in defence of the mandate. Although UNAMA is not a Chapter VII mission, its role is strongly conditioned by its co-existence with two enforcement operations, one of which is under the Council’s mandate. Hence its inclusion as a specific focus of attention in this study. The impact of the use of force on the peacebuilding objectives of the operations under review, whether by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as in Afghanistan and Kosovo, or by the UN blue helmets and by a member state, as in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, is one of the main threads followed in all case studies. Each case presents a review of the context for UN intervention, the role of the world organisation vis-à-vis other key international and regional players, and the design of the mandate and its eventual evolution in response to emerging needs. The UN Secretariat has specific responsibilities to service and assist UN field missions, not so to non-UN ones, even if authorised by the Council. Taking into account this role of the Secretariat, the study reviews its implementation, looking into the existing dynamics between the Council and the field and the former’s responsiveness to new developments. Another area of analysis is Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. Particular attention is paid to the Council’s effectiveness in supporting and monitoring implementation of its mandates; its ability to find common grounds on the way forward in the face of new requirements; and the internal divisions that hamper its action. In this context, the question of accountability emerges as a multi-directional responsibility that involves the Council and other key international actors: from the Council to member states, in supporting and 1

steering mandate implementation; from the UN Secretariat, in assisting UN field missions effectively; from all operations on the ground, in complying with their mandates and providing good reporting and advice; and from member states, particularly the Permanent Five (P5); as well as from regional organisations, in recognising the Council’s authority and providing the authorised missions with political backing and the necessary resources. Of the peacekeeping missions considered in this work, those in Kosovo and Sierra Leone were deployed before the Brahimi Report, but continued to be in place following its publication; those in Afghanistan and Côte d’Ivoire were established after the report was issued; and in the case of Afghanistan, it was initially led by Brahimi himself. Eventually, all were largely influenced by its thinking and recommendations. The approach taken in this study owes a lot to the principles laid down in the Brahimi Report, as well as to recent literature inspired by the document.These include, among others, the ‘Capstone Doctrine’, a 2008 document of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) on principles and guidelines for UN peacekeeping operations, and the 2009 Annual Review of Peacekeeping Operations of the Centre on International Cooperation (CIC) of the New York University. Since the completion of the study, DPKO has presented the ‘New Horizon’ non-paper.

I. Demand on the rise

This work was developed at a time of increasing pressures on UN peacekeeping. Alain Le Roy, UnderSecretary-General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, stated on 1 December 2008: We manage 18 operations deployed across 12 time zones in five continents, comprising 140,000 authorised personnel, of which 110,000 are currently deployed, directly impacting the lives of hundreds of millions of people.This compares to 30,000 deployed personnel from just 10 years ago. In the 2009 Annual Review of Peacekeeping Operations, Richard Gowan stresses that the UN peacekeeping system faces ‘an extended and dangerous period of strategic uncertainty’. According to Gowan, in spite of setbacks the contribution of UN peacekeeping to the decline of armed conflicts since the 1990s suggests that the demand for peacekeeping will rise in the coming years. In addition to the demand for new operations, those already in place are often assigned additional responsibilities that require fur ther resources. The Security Council ‘refined’ its resolutions on Afghanistan, adding a series of ambitious tasks to the mandate of the political and peacebuilding mission (UNAMA). Initially, the Council’s resolutions on the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under NATO command were broad and generic, leaving to NATO the details of the mandate. This changed after 2007, as the Council introduced more elements in its resolutions, following a surge of insecurity and civilian casualties that raised questions within its membership on the role of the security mission. In Côte d’Ivoire, although the mandate of the United Nations Operation (UNOCI) in the country has been relegated to a largely passive role after the signature 2

Introduction

of the Ouagadougou Agreement, due to the fragility of the situation the mission still operates under Chapter VII and requires a substantial military force. If UN peacekeeping operations are stretching themselves too far, they are also stretching themselves too thin by trying simultaneously to undertake such tasks as self-defence, stabilisation and state-building, reflecting the trend of no longer distinguishing among phases of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The evolution of the Security Council mandates from peacemaking — not only through diplomatic means, but also through enforcement missions by multinational forces or by NATO — to peacekeeping and peacebuilding has created a new set of challenges for the world organisation. The fusion of these stages, particularly when international forces are still engaged in combat, raises difficult questions in terms of sequencing, delineation of responsibilities and the timing of negotiations with the parties in conflict. In UN-led missions, an effective operation depends on the concurrence of three groups of countries: the Council members that take the decision to intervene and define the mandates, the P5 in particular; troop-contributing countries from the South; and those rich countries of the North that are the largest contributors. While the latter do not generally place their own troops under UN command (save for cases of political or strategic significance to them), they often make substantive contributions in terms of logistics, matériel and specialised troops for targeted operations under their own command structures, thus filling the gaps of the UN military contingents, but also putting at risk the perception of impartiality of the peacekeeping mission, such as in Côte d’Ivoire. The need to seek consensus among the three groups has been all too often neglected in the definition of mandates and the design of field missions. This may have a negative impact on the willingness to implement mandates on the ground: military and civilian personnel may be less than enthusiastic to apply resolutions in whose content their countries had little or no input and that reflect values their own societies may not share.

II. Challenges posed by the use of force

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11), the over-securitisation of international policies through immediate military action seemed to overtake diplomacy and close the door to the possibility of third-party negotiations, thus sidelining the United Nations and ignoring the unique advantages it may have as an honest, credible and impartial broker in conflict situations. The study on Afghanistan presents the contradiction between the military operations conducted by the two international military forces on the ground and the political and peacebuilding character of the responsibilities assigned to its civilian mission, UNAMA. Chapter VII of the UN Charter refers to ‘Actions with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression’ and authorises enforcement measures — included, but not restricted to, the use of military force — to restore international peace and security. Reference to Chapter VII in a resolution denotes the willingness to resort to force when deemed necessary to defend the operation, 3

the mandate or civilians. The invocation of Chapter VII in a resolution has been a recurrent practice of late when dealing with complex international conflicts. But it represents neither a pre-requisite nor sufficient basis for the use of force. The essential elements for the use of force are the mandate, the rules of engagement (ROE) and the decision of UN commanders on the ground in consultation with the mission’s political leadership and counting with the Council’s authorisation.This is clearly illustrated in the cases of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and UNOCI in Cote d’Ivoire. As recognised by the Brahimi Report, although the basic principles of UN peacekeeping remain the same, UN peacekeeping operations need a clear, robust mandate with the necessary resources to repel attacks on its own force, stop acts of violence against civilians they may witness, and more generally, act in defence of the mandate.These parameters are rather broad, particularly when referring to the defence of the mandate. Unless UN peacekeepers can be a credible deterrent capable of stopping or restraining violent factions in their attempts to sabotage a peace process, their effectiveness and credibility will be at stake. A difference should be drawn, however, between enforcement and robust operations. As postulated by the Capstone document, there is a difference between the use of force for tactical purposes and waging war or conducting counter-insurgency operations. Even in such cases, a minimum level of strategic consent is considered necessary for a UN mission to operate. A poor assessment or misperception as to the true depth of such consent can severely damage the chances of success. Evidence of this may be found in the case study on Sierra Leone, where the initial optimistic assumption that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was truly committed to the Lomé Peace Agreement was one of the main factors that led UNAMSIL to the brink of total failure. In Afghanistan and Kosovo, the deployment of multinational or regional forces under their own line of command — ISAF and the Kosovo Force (KFOR) — reflected the aim of stabilisation in war-ravaged countries of key strategic importance to the North Atlantic Alliance countries. In both cases, the rules of engagement were decided not by the UN but by troop-contributing capitals or by NATO in Brussels.This situation raised problems of information-sharing and coordination with the civilian mission in Kosovo. In Afghanistan, as illustrated in the case study, it revealed a serious inconsistency of goals. In Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, military operations under the UN blue helmets came after intervention from a regional force and were completed by targeted military interventions from France and the United Kingdom (UK), respectively. While the latter two were quite different, they both acted forcefully at particular junctures to freeze the military situation or thwart factions that were threatening the peace process. French Operation Licorne was established before UN deployment, and was built on a four-decade long and permanent military presence in the country. Licorne then facilitated the deployment of an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) mission in Côte d’Ivoire, ECOMICI. Both operations were given a Security Council mandate. But while the regional force withdrew upon UNOCI deployment, Licorne remained in a supportive and durable role for the UN force.The UK intervention in Sierra Leone took place after UNAMSIL was deployed, just as it was on the verge of collapse, initially to evacuate its own nationals, without a Security Council mandate. The presence of UK troops — though accidental — was one of the factors contributing to the ‘reversal of fortunes’ that accompanied UNAMSIL to its eventual success, as explained in the case study. The 4

Introduction

impact of both bilateral interventions on the host countries and their interaction with the UN forces on the ground is a subject of analysis in the respective case studies. The participation of non-UN troops in operations with a Security Council mandate, and the Council’s authorisation to delegate military functions to coalitions of the willing or other forces under bilateral or regional arrangements, has had mixed results. While on the one hand these developments have ensured the deployment of experienced personnel, equipment and logistics not usually available under UN command, or maintained a secure environment that enabled implementation of the civilian mandate, they have on the other hand raised questions over accountability, coherence of goals and coordination. Authorisation does not mean that the Council has actual authority over the forces deployed or a say in its rules of engagement. Forceful military action by troops deployed under their own national or multinational structures with little or no accountability to the Security Council has on occasion been counterproductive to the political and peacebuilding goals placed under the UN purview, as well illustrated in the case study on Afghanistan. Ensuring appropriate support, guidance and monitoring for UN mission staff in widely different situations and under increasingly complex mandates has been one of the main challenges for the UN Secretariat and member states since the Brahimi Report. As illustrated by examples in the case studies, measures have been taken on the operational side to enhance action coherence and coordination within the UN and with other key stakeholders, through the Integrated Mission Concept (applied in UNAMA for the first time with mixed results); to expedite the selection and recruitment of personnel by making it more flexible and transferring functions to the field (as done, also for the first time, in UNMIK); and to incorporate more systematically the practice of independent monitoring and evaluation, as exemplified in Sierra Leone after UNAMSIL’s near collapse. Progress in some of these areas notwithstanding, the distance between new prescriptions and actual practice continues to be wide.

III. Council dynamics

Beyond the operational challenges stemming from the growing demand for UN peacekeeping forces, concern has arisen about the fundamental political problems surrounding international intervention. These problems range from the dynamics within the Security Council, to the politics of coordination with non-UN actors and the design of peacebuilding models that reflect Western liberal criteria, in disregard of the local context and often in blatant contradiction with the political interests and priorities furthered by the same interveners. There is evidence to this effect in the case studies, particularly Afghanistan, Côte d’Ivoire and Kosovo.These circumstances and disappointing evidence from the field have led to a growing perception that the principles that have underpinned international intervention in the last two decades — influenced by the international ‘liberal’ peace agenda — are seemingly inadequate to respond to the security challenges of today’s world. 5

A certain reluctance to act and the existing fragmentation within the Council’s membership, including among the P5, weaken its response to situations on the ground. The internal dynamics within the Council has been negatively influenced by cleavages among the Permanent Five, of which the case of Kosovo is the most noticeable example, as illustrated both by the early debates on the legality of the intervention and by the more recent irreconcilable division over the future status of Kosovo. Since the 1999 NATO campaign, Russia has become more assertive. Although the 9/11 attacks elicited a unanimous response from the permanent members in support of the operation in Afghanistan with the Council’s authorisation, the case study notes that Russia has recently taken a more critical approach. It has played a leading role in the wave of objections raised by a group of countries at the civilian casualties resulting from the military operations of ISAF/NATO and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). At one juncture in September 2007, Russia abstained from voting on the renewal of the ISAF mandate out of concern over a reference to maritime interception by the US Operation Enduring Freedom included in the text of the resolution. Divergent approaches also characterise the rich countries, mainly in North America and Western Europe, where there is widespread support for the notion that human rights, democracy and development are the foundations for peace. Following the attacks of 11 September 2001, the priority given to the fight against terrorism and the ensuing militarisation of security have in practice worked against many of the principles and policies that the countries of the Western Alliance have sought to promote, not least among them the protection and promotion of women’s rights.This has undermined the progress achieved in what is a rather recent development, in historical terms, in their own countries, while putting at risk the prospects for improvement in countries that are host to international operations. Examples of disagreement or different policy priorities among these countries when dealing with specific situations abound. In Kosovo, European Union (EU) members have not found a common position on the final status proposal put forward by UN Envoy Martti Ahtisaari; in Afghanistan, there is discord between emphasis on state-building or stabilisation, between the need to negotiate or not, and over stabilisation and securitisation methods, sequences and approaches. The Nordic countries, with the support of other EU states, have kept the human rights and humanitarian aspects of the situation in Afghanistan under the Security Council’s watch, including the thorny question of civilian deaths resulting from international military operations, thus overcoming the reluctance of the US. Non-permanent Council members usually reflect the divisions of the P5 by aligning their stand in accordance with their own interests and perspectives, depending on the situation. They tend to prioritise development issues over security and are very reluctant to support policies that undermine national sovereignty. Although the reform of the Council to make it more representative is still a distant prospect, the role increasingly played by elected non-permanent members has introduced a new dynamic by giving them a say and some leverage on issues of importance to UN missions. In fact, third world countries can block or delay approval of many administrative or budgetary matters that are necessary for the successful implementation of mandates. Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII where the big countries have strategic interests (for instance, in former colonies or in operations deployed within the context of the ‘war on terror’), are often 6

Introduction

negotiated in the concerned capitals rather than in the Council chamber. Unless their promoters can demonstrate that there are broader interests at stake and muster the support of key regional players, resolutions proposed by them on peacekeeping operations may in certain circumstances obtain only lukewarm support from the rest of the membership for motives that are not necessarily those sought by the intervention. In such cases, the willingness of Council members to back their own mandates with adequate and timely resources and to provide sustained political support and guidance to missions deployed under its authority cannot always be taken as a given. The example of UNOCI is a case in point, as suggested by the case study presented in this report. A positive development is the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), which keeps on the Council’s agenda the situation of countries that after emerging from war and hosting a peacekeeping operation require continued international attention to consolidate the still fragile achievements of peace. Such is the case of Sierra Leone, host to one of the first UN peacebuilding offices. Because of its composition, the Commission opens the Council to the concerns of non-members, including countries from the South that contribute troops to UN peacekeeping missions. This is in itself a step in the right direction, even though it is still to be determined whether it will be a decisive factor in keeping the international community’s commitment, preventing recurrence to war and ultimately improving the life of people on the ground.

IV. Resolution 1325 (2000)

The selection of UNSC resolution 1325 (2000), based on the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and which calls for women’s participation and the protection of women in conflict and post-conflict situations, for review in this study is founded on several reasons. No international intervention on its own is able to bring durable peace to a country emerging from war. Although the international community has an obligation to, and a role to play in supporting countries in such a situation in order to avoid recurrence to armed conflict and to consolidate peace, this latter goal is mainly the result of domestic processes that require the concurrence of all members of society. In this context, the participation of women is crucial to orient and inform these efforts, to elicit the wide societal support they need and to promote the process aiming at gender equality over time. Women were the target of atrocious crimes, sexual violence, mistreatment and discrimination in the period preceding, during and after the wars in the four cases selected for review. While the proportion of victims and survivors and the ideological basis for these attacks may have varied, the gravity of the crimes committed was the same. To seek remedy, fight impunity against sex offenders and prevent further sex-related abuses in times of peace is a matter of justice and a human rights imperative. In addition, in order to reconstitute the social fabric after civil war and lay the foundations for future reconciliation it is necessary to apply gender-sensitive policies in all spheres of action. 7

Women are not only victims and survivors of wars.They are also actors and should participate on their own right in making the decisions that are part of a peace process. One of the groundbreaking elements of UNSC resolution 1325 (2000) is that it establishes women’s roles and specific experiences in conflict and peacemaking, in addition to prescribing that parties to armed conflicts must take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence.The resolution also recognises sexual violence as a self-standing security issue, linked with reconciliation and durable peace.1 Therefore, the three dimensions that require action in addressing the situation of women in relation to conflict are protection, promotion of human rights and participation in decision-making processes, including negotiations. Yet, before the approval of the resolution, women were very seldom mentioned in the context of peacemaking, peacekeeping or peacebuilding.The Brahimi Report is gender-blind.There is not a single reference to women in UNSC resolution 1244 (1999) authorising the international security and civilian presences in Kosovo; and only a few references in the resolutions on Sierra Leone. However, women and gender are included in the resolutions on Afghanistan and Côte d’Ivoire. In Afghanistan, releasing women from the marginalisation and mistreatment they endured under the Taliban was one of the main banners raised by the US, the European Union and their allies in 2001. But women are still excluded in general from peace-related decision-making structures in all cases. Gender-based violence continues to be used as a war tactic, although in June 2008 the Security Council approved resolution 1820 to end sexual violence as a weapon in conflict and impunity.

V. Case selection and methodology

The UN had varying levels of involvement in the four cases examined in this work. The selection of cases for this study intends to reflect a diversity of situations brought before the Council, their complexity and their sui generis character. Besides apparent similarities between the West African countries that derive from their geographical location and their historical links to European colonial powers, they represent widely different historical backgrounds, socio-political dynamics and cultural environments. The wars that the international community sought to prevent or to end in the four cases are rooted in these realities and should have informed the selection of peace strategies. This was not always the case, as shown by erroneous assessments based on a lack of understanding of some trends and realities of the local context. The international approach to intervention has also been at variance from one another in the four cases. So has the role of the UN, its degree of involvement and its relationship to other international or regional actors who assumed an active role in diplomatic or military efforts to solve the conflict or who sought to influence the parties through diplomatic or other means. For the purposes of this 1

Sexual violence as a weapon of war and as a self-standing security risk was further established in United Nations Security Council resolution 1820 (2008). 8

Introduction

analysis, the common thread that brings such a varied group of cases together is the fact that they have hosted UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions deployed under a Security Council mandate and influenced by the actual or potential use of force implied in the reference to Chapter VII. Even UNAMA in Afghanistan, not itself a Chapter VII mission, was heavily conditioned by its co-existence with an UN-sanctioned enforcement mission. The two West African cases — Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone — had peacekeeping forces under an UN-headed line of command, in addition to forces deployed by individual member states. Afghanistan is host to three distinct operations: a UN civilian mission, alongside a multinational military force authorised by the Council under Chapter VII, and the US Operation Enduring Freedom, which the Council implicitly authorised under the provisions of article 51 of the Charter on self-defence. Kosovo was host to an operation under Council mandate with responsibilities assigned to the UN and other international or regional organisations — the EU and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as the civilian presence, and NATO, a politico-military regional organisation, as the security presence. The four studies also represent different moments of UN involvement in the continuum of war to peace. In Afghanistan, a situation of open conflict (at least in certain areas of the national territory) co-exists with a political and state-building mandate. In Côte d’Ivoire, a five-year peacekeeping presence was established after reiterated deferral of elections and a protracted disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme. In Kosovo, there was a transfer of peacekeeping and institution-building responsibilities to a EU mission after 10 years of presence as an international protectorate, without having reached an agreed-on formula on final status. And having gone through the whole cycle from war to peace in Sierra Leone, the UN established one of its first peacebuilding offices to follow-up on the achievements reached during the peacekeeping mission’s presence. Furthermore, the record of the cases under study exemplifies the extent to which they were influenced by the fluctuating priorities of the international community. While each study tells its own, unique story, the research was conducted by examining clusters of issues and questions common to all cases: ● The local historical and political context for UN intervention, at the regional and international levels and within the Security Council; ● The mandate’s origin, design and eventual evolution, including an analysis of the resolutions and the implications of invoking Chapter VII; ● The implementation of the security mandate, the type of military force and enforcement agent, the rules of engagement, and the level of effective authority, monitoring and follow-up by the Council; ● The impact of the security mandate on the implementation of the peacebuilding strategy, and possible links to an exit strategy; ● The Council’s response to developments on the ground and the political constraints under which it acted; 9

● The operational challenges that hindered implementation, in particular resources, coordination, training and communication; ● An overview of the gender dimension through the implementation of UNSC resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security; ● The question of ownership and the dilemmas posed by state-building. The review of these issues allows for an assessment of the mandate’s implementation organised around the following areas of specific interest to this project and inspired on the criteria used in recent UN literature: ● The question of local consent, the use of force and its impact on the political and peacebuilding mandate; ● A clear, credible and viable mandate with the required resources; ● UNSC support and its willingness and capacity to determine or influence the intervention agenda; ● The participation of women and implementation of resolution 1325 (2000); ● The political environment at the international and regional levels. The authors based their findings on their own experience and expertise, documentary evidence, and extensive interviews with key actors and witnesses in the field, at UN headquarters and in the capitals where engagement was crucial to the peace process.

10

11

12

Afghanistan

2 Afghanistan <Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh>

Synopsis By the time the US-led international coalition intervened militarily to remove the Taliban regime in October 2001, and the United Nations (UN) drew the Bonn Agreement as the blueprint for a functioning democracy and institutions, Afghanistan had already seen two decades of war: starting with jihad against the Soviet invasion, followed by a civil war between various mujahideen factions and culminating with the Taliban takeover of most of the territory. Chapter VII was long overdue. Although the UN had been engaged in Afghanistan throughout those years, mostly through General Assembly resolutions on the ‘Situation in Afghanistan’ and through the establishment of Good Offices missions in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the post-2001 period marked an intensified engagement by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). From then on, three streams of resolutions concerning Afghanistan began to be implemented simultaneously: the continuation of a sanctions regime that had been established in response to the terrorist actions of Al-Qaida and the Taliban, authorisation given for the operation of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) under Chapter VII, and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The past eight years have also seen the deployment of a large number of actors to the field at the same time: humanitarian organisations, international donors, UN sister agencies, and the private sector, as well as a large military presence — ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) troops led by the Nor th Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Despite the completion of the Bonn timetable and the rudimentary establishment of formal democratic institutions, the state-building agenda became increasingly challenged by the resurgence of the Taliban, as well as by institutional problems of uncoordinated and wasted aid. Meanwhile, in New York, Council resolutions went from minimal carte blanche to becoming increasingly ambitious, reflecting diverging interests among the Permanent Five (P5) and rotating countries. Increasingly, the original design of the ‘light footprint’ approach proved unviable: even though the UN mission had been consistently underfunded, other entities on the ground, especially the military contingency run by NATO and the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, were inflated with resources, personnel and equipment, particularly as the operation moved from security assistance to full-fledged combat and counter-insurgency. The role of the UN also became increasingly difficult to implement, 13

considering the simultaneous tasks given to UNAMA of coordinating aid from a large but fragmented international community, implementing its own projects and advocating for peace and reconciliation in a country where insecurity and institutional weaknesses were reversing gains made on democratisation. By late 2008, it had become clear that a military solution was not the answer. However, it was not apparent that a political solution, in terms of negotiations with the Taliban (which were left out of the Bonn Agreement), would bring long-term stability. As the country prepared for presidential elections in late summer 2009 and parliamentary elections the year after, the puzzle was whether the Taliban would take part in the political process or remain outside of it, and whether the government, after the elections, would be able more effectively and transparently to deliver public goods increasingly demanded by the Afghan people. In the meantime, for the international community, the two pressing priorities are to transform the international presence from a heavily militarised operation to a civilian one, and to shift its external coordination into a locally-owned enterprise.The case of Afghanistan shows the particular challenge of implementing a UN peacekeeping mission, jumpstarting state-building and political assistance, coordinating aid in a fragmented framework, and implementing resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security in situations where there is no peace to keep, and where the international community becomes engulfed in a counter-insurgency operation.The UN Security Council resolutions have made the peace enforcement operation in Afghanistan legal, but a combination of operational, political and conceptual difficulties have raised problems of effectiveness, if not legitimacy. The case of Afghanistan raises a number of questions for the future of peacekeeping missions: can external forces help bring political stability, and if so, how effective can the role of the United Nations be in this process, and how does outsourcing of stabilisation to regional security organisations support such a role?This study argues that three elements are necessary: an impartial role for the international community; clarity about the division of responsibilities and better cooperation between the political and military sectors; and a more strategic role for the United Nations.

I. Background to the conflict

1. Historical context

Afghanistan is a landlocked mountainous country bordering Pakistan to the east and south, Iran to the west, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to the north, and China to the northeast. It is home to multiple ethnic communities: Pashtuns in the south and the east, Tajiks and Uzbeks in the north, and Hazaras in the central regions. The major languages are Pashto and Dari/Farsi. By latest estimates in July 2008, the population was 32.7 million (48 per cent of which were women).1 In 2007, Afghanistan ranked 174th out of 178 countries on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human 14

Afghanistan

Development Index. Life expectancy in 2005 was 42.9 years;2 literacy rates, 28 per cent;3 and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, US$ 964. Administratively, the country is divided into 34 provinces (Welayat), each further divided into districts (Woleswali). The country’s present borders were established at the end of the nineteenth century when the great powers sought to establish a buffer state between the then British and Russian empires. After the Second World War, although Afghanistan preserved its political neutrality, it received considerable quantities of development and military assistance from both the United States (US) and the Soviet Union.4 Internally, regimes have come and gone with frequency: in 1964, King Zahir Shah (1933-1973) adopted the first liberal Constitution that established a bicameral legislature and allowed for greater political freedoms, including for the many newly-formed political parties.The monarchy, however, ended in 1973, when Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin Mohammad Daud. Daud’s republican government faced opposition from both the leftist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and religious and tribal leaders. Five years later, the PDPA seized power in another military coup, which overthrew Daud and installed a pro-Soviet communist regime under Noor Muhammad Taraki. In September 1978,Taraki was replaced by his deputy, Hafizullah Amin, who also failed to suppress armed revolts launched by Islamic and tribal leaders. In 1979, in response to increasing fears of Islamic resistance both within Afghanistan and in the newly-declared Islamic Republic of Iran, the PDPA ‘invited’ the Soviets to enter Afghanistan. The Soviets installed Babrak Karmal, the leader of a less hard-line faction of the PDPA. Thus began the two decades of war that caused a million deaths and made five million people refugees in Iran and Pakistan. From then on, the Afghan conflict mutated over time to distinct phases:5 a) 1979—1988: Jihad in the Cold War context. From late 1979 until February 1989, Afghanistan was occupied by Soviet military forces, whose presence reached over 100,000 troops.These were fiercely resisted by Western-backed guerrilla fighters, the mujahideen, who mounted a mainly rural resistance. Estimates of combat fatalities range between 700,000 and 1.3 million. The resistance movement received substantial international assistance starting with US$ 30 million from the United States in 1980, and reaching US$ 630 million in 1987, with Saudi Arabia approximately matching US aid.6 They were also joined by thousands of Muslim radicals from the Middle East and Africa, eager to fight the Soviet Union in the name of Islam. Among them was Osama bin Laden, who first arrived in Pakistan and Afghanistan in the early 1980s and built training facilities for foreign recruits. During this period, 1

CIA World Factbook, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html. UNDP, Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2007: Bridging Modernity and Tradition - the Rule of Law and the Search for Justice, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2007. 3 Ibid. 4 From 1955 to 1978, the Soviet Union provided Afghanistan with US$ 1.27 billion in economic aid and roughly US$1.25 billion in military aid, while the United States furnished US$ 533 million in economic aid. See Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2nd Edition, 2002, p.20. 5 Adapted from Mohammed Haneef Atmar and Jonathan Goodhand, ‘Afghanistan: The Challenge of Winning the Peace’, in Monique Mekenkamp, Paul van Tongeren, and Hans van de Veen (eds.), Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. 6 Rubin, 2002, op. cit., pp. 180-181. 2

15

approximately three million refugees settled in camps along the Afghan border in Pakistan, and about two million fled to Iran. Various international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) established operations in the refugee camps both to provide humanitarian aid to the displaced and channel aid into areas that were under the control of the mujahideen within Afghanistan. In 1988, two years after Babrak Karmal was replaced by Mohammad Najibullah, the UN-facilitated Geneva Accords paved the way for Soviet withdrawal. An interim government composed of different mujahideen parties was set up under the aegis of the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. b) 1989—1994: Jihad among Afghans. The accords, however, failed adequately to address the question of post-occupation government setup, and the war continued between the regime of Najibullah and an increasingly divided mujahideen, who could not agree on a power-sharing formula. In 1992, the mujahideen took Kabul, forcing Najibullah to take refuge in the UN compound, where he would remain until his violent death four years later. On 24 April 1992, the Peshawar Accord brought the agreement of leaders of the mujahideen to form a government first under Sebghatullah Mojadeddi, and several months later under Burhanuddin Rabbani. Rabbani was declared President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in July 1992, but fighting continued in Kabul among various forces, including Hazara par ties, the forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud, Rabbani’s Minister of Defence, and Hekmatyar. As financial assistance from the superpowers declined with the end of the Cold War, fighters began fuelling the war economy with alternative local sources of drugs and contraband.7 c) 1994—2001: Talibanisation. The third phase of the Afghan conflict was initiated with the arrival of the Taliban on the military scene in 1994. The Taliban consisted mainly of Pashtun youth raised in refugee camps in Pakistan, from where they brought conservative values from the madrassas (Koranic Schools),8 who believed that the mujahideen had corrupted Afghan society. Resistance to the Taliban was led by a coalition of groups calling themselves the United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIF), also known as the Northern Alliance, which included Rabbani, Massoud, and Uzbek leader Dostum. If the Taliban initially benefited from the financial and military support of the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency of Pakistan and the United States, the Northern Alliance was backed by Iran, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and India. The Taliban, however, enjoyed military superiority and advanced with relative ease, taking control of Kabul in September 1996. During the takeover, former President Najibullah was dragged from the UN compound, beaten to death and hung in one of the city’s main squares. The Rabbani government relocated to Taloqan and Mazar-e Sharif but was pursued by the Taliban, who took over the northern provinces in 1997. In October of that year, the country became the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. By mid-2001, the Taliban controlled 95 per cent of Afghanistan, but were never accorded official international recognition except by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).Their strict policies (especially those regarding women) earned them the opprobrium of most of the

7

Christopher Cramer and Jonathan Goodhand, ‘Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State, and the “Post-Conflict” Challenge in Afghanistan,’ Development and Change 33 (5), 2002, pp. 885-909. 8 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000. 16

Afghanistan

international community and world opinion. The Taliban regime was based on a very strict interpretation of sharia law combined with the Pashtun honour system, pashtunwali, which interfered in the private lives of citizens, with strict edicts.They were, however, able to stop fighting in the territory they controlled and to eradicate opium cultivation through the imposition and strict enforcement of fatwa (religious edict). d) 2001: US-led international ‘war against terrorism’. On 9 September 2001, the military leader of the Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Massoud, was killed by two suicide assassins posing as journalists.Two days later, the 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the United States were blamed on the Al-Qaida network led by Osama bin Laden, who was supposed to have taken refuge in Afghanistan. On 7 October 2001, after the Taliban refused US demands to extradite bin Laden, a US-led international coalition, Operation Enduring Freedom, launched a military attack under the auspices of a self-defence operation. With the support of the Northern Alliance forces, the coalition took Kabul on 13 November 2001. By late November, the Taliban had been removed from power and defeated militarily, albeit temporarily.

2. UN responses: Context of the intervention

Afghanistan joined the UN in 1946 as one of its earliest members. Throughout the years of conflict leading up to September 2001, Security Council engagement with Afghanistan was, however, inconsistent and often ineffective.9 During the Soviet invasion Afghanistan was placed on the Security Council’s agenda for the first time in January 1980, following the December 1979 invasion by the Soviet Union. The Council considered a draft resolution that condemned the intervention of foreign troops, which was consequently vetoed by the Soviets. Afghanistan therefore stayed off the Council agenda for the duration of the Soviet military involvement. The General Assembly, in the meantime, adopted a series of resolutions on the ‘Situation in Afghanistan’ throughout the 1980s. These consistently deplored the armed intervention, called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, asked states to contribute with humanitarian assistance, and called for UN assistance to find a political settlement. In 1985, the General Assembly also began a separate consideration of the human rights situation, by asking the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights appointed by the Commission on Human Rights in May 1984 to report to both the Commission and the General Assembly at regular intervals. Strongly-worded annual resolutions on ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms in Afghanistan’ were then issued by the General Assembly until 2003, deploring

9

Security Council Report, ‘Afghanistan: Profile Report’, 7 November 2006, available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.2232713/k.67DB/Profile_Afghanistanbr_7_November_2006.htm 17

human rights abuses and the severe consequences for the civilian population of indiscriminate bombardments and military operations. UN Secretary-Generals, for their part, remained engaged throughout the Soviet invasion period, and also afterwards by appointing Personal Representatives and Special Envoys to act on their behalves. Soviet withdrawal and its immediate aftermath In May 1987, under UN auspices, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and the United States signed the Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan (the Geneva Accords). By resolution 622 of 31 October 1988, the Security Council authorised Javier Pérez de Cuéllar to set up a mission to monitor the withdrawal of foreign forces — the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP, 1988-1990).The Security Council also authorised the dispatch of 50 military officers from existing UN operations to Afghanistan and Pakistan to assist in the mission. The mandate of UNGOMAP, derived from the accords, was a traditional peace monitoring mission which included, in addition to the supervision of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the monitoring of non-interference by the parties in each other’s affairs and overseeing the voluntary return of refugees. UNGOMAP’s mandate formally ended on 15 March 1990, one year after the conclusion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and focus thus returned to the humanitarian situation. Post-Soviet years In 1990, the Secretary-General established a successor to UNGOMAP, the Office of the SecretaryGeneral in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP, 1990-1996), which negotiated local agreements with local commanders, making it possible for humanitarian actors to deliver aid within Afghanistan. While OSGAP was responsible for monitoring the political situation, humanitarian efforts were coordinated through the UN Office of the Coordinator for Afghanistan (UNOCA) and subsequently through the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Afghanistan. The separation between the political and humanitarian tracks was seen as important in order to maintain the neutral and impartial nature of the humanitarian mission, although for long periods the two tracks were headed by the same individual.10 In December 1993, in response to the further deterioration of the situation, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish a new UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA, 1993-2001), into which OSGAP was incorporated in 1996. The mission was supposed to achieve a ceasefire between the mujahideen groups, a political settlement through direct negotiations between parties, and a regional political consensus in support of the peace process. It was also tasked with coordinating with the UN resident and humanitarian coordinator for Afghanistan, while discussing UN and international community concerns directly with the Taliban leadership. The mission, however, under a weak General Assembly mandate, had neither the resources nor the authority of missions under strong Security Council mandates. Its role and legitimacy was frequently 10 11

Ibid. Ibid. 18

Afghanistan

questioned by non-state actors involved in the conflict.11 As a result, UNSMA had very little success in facilitating dialogue between the warring parties, and the humanitarian situation within Afghanistan continued to deteriorate as the conflict went on. The role of the UN in Afghanistan was further complicated when former President Najibullah took refuge in its compound in Kabul in 1992, from where he was abducted in 1996 by the Taliban when the UN withdrew its senior staff. The Taliban years The Council was much freer to address the situation of Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal. Real engagement, however, did not begin until after the establishment of the Taliban government in Kabul. Between 1996 and 2001, the Security Council responded to the worsening humanitarian and human rights situations by issuing eleven presidential statements calling, fruitlessly, on the warring parties to return to the negotiating table. The Council also issued five resolutions condemning violence and calling on all Afghan parties to engage in political dialogue — resolutions 1076 (1996), 1189 (1998), 1193 (1998), 1214 (1998), and 1267 (1999). Throughout these resolutions, the Council reiterated its concern that the conflict had provided fertile grounds for terrorism and drug trafficking which had destabilised the region and beyond. Afghanistan, during the Taliban years, was the target of some of the strongest human rights language in any Council resolution ever.12 As hostilities continued, the Secretary-General appointed Lakhdar Brahimi, former Foreign Minister of Algeria, as his Special Envoy for Afghanistan in July 1997. Brahimi convened a series of informal meetings with what became known as the ‘Six plus Two’ group, comprising the six states bordering Afghanistan (China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) plus the United States and Russia. But Brahimi’s task was particularly challenged by the lack of international recognition of the Taliban regime. Since the capture of Kabul by the Taliban in September 1996, the Rabbani government in the north had continued to retain the UN seat, although the Taliban controlled the largest amount of territory in Afghanistan. UN humanitarian operations, meanwhile, faced problems of lack of access, lack of a recognised government to coordinate with, and the Taliban edicts that hampered programmes from reaching their beneficiaries. Towards the sanctions regime Beyond the issuance of resolutions, which were largely ignored by the parties within Afghanistan and frequently also by neighbouring states, and making statements deploring violence, the Security Council had not taken any decisive steps. This soon changed with the imposition of a sanctions regime. Following the August 1998 terrorist attacks on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, the Council adopted resolution 1193 (1998) in which it reiterated its concerns over the continuing presence of terrorists in the territory of Afghanistan. It condemned attacks on UN personnel as well as the capture of the Consulate-General of Iran in Mazar-e Sharif. In December, through resolution 1214 (1998), the Council demanded that the Taliban stop providing sanctuary and training for international terrorists, and that all Afghan factions cooperate in bringing indicted terrorists to justice. On 15 October, citing the failure of the Taliban to respond to this demand, the Council applied 12

Ibid. 19

broad sanctions under Chapter VII. In resolution 1267 (1999), the Council demanded that the Taliban turn over Osama bin Laden, the perpetrator behind the terrorist attacks in Africa. The sanctions, imposed on 14 November following non-compliance, included the freezing of all assets owned or controlled by the Taliban, a ban on flights of any aircraft owned, leased or operated by the Taliban, as well as an arms embargo and diplomatic sanctions. In December 2000, the Council, through resolution 1333, strengthened the sanctions, requiring all states to close Taliban offices in their countries, including those of Ariana Afghan Airlines, to restrict international travel of Taliban officials of deputy minister rank or higher, and to freeze the financial assets of bin Laden and his associates. It also imposed sanctions against Al-Qaida. The Council, in an effort to enforce compliance with resolution 1267 (1999), set up a monitoring mechanism, the ‘Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee’ as one of the three Security Council subsidiary bodies set up to deal with terrorism-related issues, the others being the CounterTerrorism Committee and the 1540 Committee. The ongoing work of the Committee is pursuant to specific guidelines13 on listing14 and de-listing15 procedures, exemptions to the assets freeze16 and from the travel ban.17 The Committee publishes annual reports of its activities18 and its chairman briefs the Security Council in joint meetings with the other two Committees.19 The names of the targeted individuals and entities are placed on the Consolidated List,20 which has come under renewed controversy as the possibility of negotiations with segments of the Taliban has been raised in recent months. The sanctions, in the meantime, were difficult to implement. The repor t by the Committee of Experts on the Effectiveness of the Sanctions, in May 2001, noted, for instance, that they were routinely violated by Afghanistan’s neighbours. The report singled out Pakistan, in particular, for its role in continuing to arm and supply the Taliban, as well as Iran for its role in arming the United Front. The Taliban had only limited assets abroad, and since much of its economic activity consisted in black market trade in heroin and opium, the financial asset freeze had limited effects. The arms embargo also did not appear to have much impact: arms in Afghanistan were already plentiful and the borders relatively porous. The sanctions regime became modified and strengthened by subsequent Chapter VII resolutions — 1333 (2000), 1390 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1735 (2006) and 1822 (2008). These either strengthened sanctions against the Taliban and Al-Qaida or expanded the scope of the 13

http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/1267_guidelines.pdf. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/fact_sheet_listing.shtml. 15 http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/fact_sheet_delisting.shtml. 16 http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/fact_sheet_assets_freeze.shtml. 17 http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/factsheet-on-travel-ban.pdf. 18 http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/annualreports.shtml. 19 For a comparative table of the distinct but complementary roles of the three Committees, see http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/Revised%20comparative%20table_ENGLISH%20_7-11-2008_.pdf 20 Narrative summaries of reasons for listing of the individuals, groups, undertakings and entities included in the Consolidated List can be found at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/narrative.shtml. 14

20

Afghanistan

regime, the Committee’s mandates or that of the Monitoring Team. They also adopted new listing requirements for financial sanctions, travel bans and arms embargo, while renewing the guidelines for listing and de-listing. Chapter VII and Security Council engagement after September 2001 If Security Council actions and words proved inefficient during the Soviet invasion and the civil war, the period after the 11 September 2001 attacks was, in contrast, marked by intense Security Council involvement.21 The day after 11 September, the Security Council, in resolution 1368 of 12 September 2001, condemned the attacks, and called on states to bring to justice the perpetrators, organisers and sponsors of those terrorist acts.This was followed almost immediately by two resolutions: resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, which created a comprehensive package of measures to curb terrorism and called on all states to cooperate and deny safe haven to those who financed, planned or supported terrorist acts; and resolution 1377 of12 November 2001, a declaration encouraging intensified global efforts to combat terrorism. The Council played no direct role in authorising the subsequent use of military force in Afghanistan by the US-led coalition Operation Enduring Freedom. However, in resolution 1368 (2001), the Council had recognised ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter’, and in resolution 1373 (2001) it had reaffirmed ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence as recognised by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in resolution 1368 (2001)’.The use of force against Afghanistan by the US-led coalition was therefore recognised, if not directly authorised, under the auspices of Article 51 in the right to self-defence. While the OEF operation began, the Secretary-General appointed Lakhdar Brahimi as his Special Envoy to Afghanistan on 3 October 2001. Brahimi began by organising a meeting of the ‘Six plus Two’ to get the neighbouring countries to agree on the need for a new government.The Security Council then adopted resolution 1378 of 14 November 2001, in which it welcomed the intentions of the Special Representative to convene a meeting of the various Afghan actors to form a transitional administration. Resolution 1378 (2001) also affirmed that the UN should play a central role in supporting efforts to establish a new administration.The meeting, organised on 5 December 2001 in Bonn, led to the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions. Known as the Bonn Agreement, the accords were signed by representatives from the Northern Alliance, the Rome group led by the former king, Zahir Shah, and the Peshawari par ties, and established an Afghan Interim Authority under the chairmanship of Hamid Karzai. The agreement was endorsed the next day by Security Council resolution 1383 (2001), in which the Council declared its willingness to suppor t the interim institutions and to implement its annexes.

21

In 2002, for example, during the first year of operation of UNAMA and ISAF, Afghanistan was prominent on the agenda and the Council discussed Afghanistan 18 times, a three-fold increase from the previous year. 21

There were two significant annexes to the Bonn Agreement. One requested the deployment of a multinational force to assist the government in providing security in Kabul. The Security Council authorised the deployment of an International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, through resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001. The other annex requested the establishment of a UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA, whose initial mandate was to provide suppor t for the implementation of the Bonn Agreement, which the Security Council also authorised through resolution 1401 (2002). In the three months between the establishment of ISAF and UNAMA, Brahimi moved with a small team to Kabul, where he was joined by a team from the Islamabadbased UNSMA and UNOCHA offices. Thereafter, three streams of UNSC resolutions concerning Afghanistan began to be implemented simultaneously: in addition to the continuation of resolutions on the sanctions regime, a second stream of resolutions acting under Chapter VII followed the authorisations given by the Security Council for the operation of ISAF troops for security purposes, while another stream of resolutions came under the direct supervision of the United Nations around the political transition and statebuilding process implemented by the UNAMA mission. While the sanctions regime and the ISAF resolutions were under Chapter VII, UNAMA ones, given the political assistance nature of the mission, were not. As the rest of this study will show, ultimately it has been the uncomfortable coexistence between the security and political mandates which has hindered the successful implementation of these resolutions.

II. The political stream: UNAMA and the state-building project

1. Preparation for the mandate

Preparations at the UN In terms of management, the UNAMA mission faced a rather favourable context compared with other UN operations.The 2002 mission came in the wake of the Brahimi Report and with the personal involvement of its author. It was also conceived as a small mission in comparison to the sizes of preceding missions in Timor-Leste and Kosovo following the ‘light footprint’ approach established by Brahimi. The mission, conceived from the beginning as a political mission, was at first managed by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) at UN headquarters, but was subsequently handed over to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in 2003. This shift was carried out at Brahimi’s request, who sought better administrative follow-up, standard practice for larger peacekeeping missions under DPKO, as well as access to more resources through the Department of Field Support Services (FSS). The initial decision to field UNAMA as a DPA mission was made because it had grown out of 22

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UNSMA, and no decisions had been made to field blue helmets, since ISAF had already been authorised. Although most of those interviewed for this project claimed that there was no fundamental difference between a DPA- or a DPKO-led mission, and that differences had only to do with the size of the mission and its operational capacities, a few people conceded on a potential conceptual difference in the approaches of the two UN units when it came to political decisions. One interlocutor claimed, for example, that DPA and DPKO had different ways of defining the problems of and solutions to state-building. DPKO traditionally tackled issues related to the legitimacy of the use of force in crisis settings, while DPA had more experience with notions of failed states and state-building. These differences, in theory, would affect the peacekeeping role and exit strategy, although in the particular case of Afghanistan, the two potentially different approaches were irrelevant, as the situation on the ground was the decisive factor, which solicited reactions rather than conceptual approaches. The DPA/DPKO difference could, theoretically, also have affected the way that state-building questions such as transition justice and elections were handled.The peacekeeping approach, for instance, would tend to accept the state as it is, while the political approach would argue that peace cannot be built without transitional justice first. But in the case of Afghanistan, Brahimi was adamant that a state had to be built first before opening the Pandora box of transitional justice, even though the Bonn Agreement had been designed during the time when UNAMA was led by DPA. As to what concerns elections, there may have been a difference between standards prescribed by the Office of Electoral Assistance at DPA and the realistic factors and pressures that DPKO had to deal with in the management of elections and recruitment of expertise during the 2004 presidential elections. Although many at the UN, including at UNAMA, warned against the lack of resources, security and technical expertise, the Security Council ultimately had the last say about the imperative of holding the elections during a particular window of time.22 Ultimately though, the decision to hand over management to DPKO was made purely on operational and administrative grounds, while any conceptual approach to strategic design was affected not by differences at headquarters but by Security Council imperatives, as well as by events on the ground. In hindsight, however, the complexity of the Afghan mission was beyond the capacities of any of the units to handle individually without the support of a variety of other actors. As one UN official explained, DPKO would not have had the necessary tools to understand counter-insurgency operations, while DPA would have lacked sufficient multilateral support to handle such a complex mission. A large evolving mission such as UNAMA was eventually backed by the operational capacities of DPKO, which included, in any case, two political officers following-up on Afghanistan. As to the contributions of DPKO and UNAMA to mandate design, interlocutors claimed that even though the resolutions took into account the changing situations on the ground, the role of UN offices in directly providing inputs for resolutions was minimal. P5 countries, most of which were directly involved in Afghanistan through funds or troops, took most of the decisions about what was discussed and what was approved.

22 The timing for the Afghan elections in October 2004 was most likely to coincide with the month of presidential elections in the United States during which the success of elections in Afghanistan could be showcased.

23

Coordination at headquarters and the Integrated Mission Task Force The preparation for the re-engagement of the UN in Afghanistan after Bonn was coordinated by the Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) for Afghanistan, which had inputs from members of the United Nations Development Group, the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs, and the Executive Committee on Peace and Security at UN headquarters. Afghanistan became the first mission to implement the proposal, emanating from the Brahimi Report, for IMTFs to be set up as a management tool and bring all relevant departments and agencies together at headquarters for planning. The planning of the UNAMA mission in Afghanistan in 2001 was the first application of the IMTF doctrine, consequently revised, refined, and adapted for each UN mission. In practice, the first attempt at implementing an IMTF for UNAMA received mixed reviews from observers,23 including an internal evaluation made at the end of the planning phase in February 2002.24 According to these evaluations, while starting early and with an inclusive number of units represented, the IMTF failed to live up to its designated role and rather became a legitimising institution which accepted plans but did not shape them.25 The various evaluations and studies note, for example, that Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Brahimi worked out the most important strategic decisions with his personal staff, leaving only the lower-level practical assignments to the IMTF. At the same time, IMTF personnel were generally too junior in rank to have access to key decision-makers at the UN as well as outside of it. Moreover, despite its deliberately inclusive composition at headquarters, frictions arose between central planning by the IMTF and the SRSG’s office, on the one hand, and field leadership of the UN country team (UNCT), on the other. The UNCT re-established itself in Kabul long before UNAMA mission planning was finalised, and agencies felt they were not sufficiently consulted. UN agencies also initially chose to return to or procure different physical locations, and this uncoordinated re-establishment of UN agencies inhibited the common location and ‘One UN idea’ intended by the integrated mission doctrine.26 Furthermore, in the absence of formal budgetary and disciplinary powers for the SRSG, the new concept of an integrated mission was obstructed by the agencies from the beginning, and continued to pose a challenge as UNAMA’s mandate expanded to coordinate not just humanitarian actors but all aid in 2008. In the field: The redeployment of the UN in Afghanistan While the SRSG started to gather staff in Kabul, a technical survey team from DPKO supported by the Office of Missions Support was sent to Afghanistan to begin developing options for enhancing United Nations activities. Since the Taliban had seized the UNSMA office building in June 2001, US$ 23

Thorsten Benner, Andrea Binder and Philipp Rotmann, ‘Learning to Build Peace? Developing a Research Framework’, Global Public Policy Institute Research Paper 7, Berlin: GPPI, 2007, pp. 53-54. 24 The IMTF self-evaluation is a non-public document quoted by Benner et al., 2007, op. cit., p. 53. 25 Nicola Dahrendorf, Astri Suhrke, Jolyon Leslie and Arne Strand, A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change. Afghanistan Report, London: Conflict, Security and Development Group, King’s College London, 2003, para. 35; Benner et al., 2007, op. cit., p. 54. 26 Benner et al., 2007, op. cit., p. 53; William J. Durch,Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle and Moira K. Shanahan, The Brahimi Report and the Future of U.N. Peace Operations,Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003, p. 49. 24

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15 million were authorised by the Security Council and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for initial costs of repairs, staffing and equipment to launch the new UN mission. Through a letter to the Security Council, the Secretary-General then asked for the Special Representative to be given the overall coordinating role of all UN activities in Afghanistan.The first task of the Office of SRSG Brahimi was therefore to unify UN presence in Afghanistan by merging the administrative components of UNSMA with that of the Office of the SRSG to minimise the duplication of overhead costs incurred in both Kabul and Islamabad. Simultaneously, the staff and assets of UNOCHA were integrated. In the meantime, all UN agencies moved their activities from Islamabad to Kabul within several weeks of the installation of the Interim Administration. Their initial deployment was at first constrained by security restrictions, and all initially maintained offices in Islamabad until procurement, banking and other needs were organised directly in Kabul. The international staff from the Office of the SRSG and UNSMA outside of Kabul was also initially limited to two political-civil affairs officers in Mazar-e Sharif, and one each in Herat, Kandahar and Jalalabad. Security restrictions and logistical constraints limited the number of staff that could be deployed outside of Kabul. By March 2002, Brahimi’s office was ready to implement the mandate that the Security Council had provided for the political stream, starting with resolution 1383 (2001).

2. First phase: The initial mandate of UNAMA. Implementation of the Bonn Agreement

UNAMA was created on 28 March 2002 by Security Council resolution 1401 for a period of one year, with subsequent renewals approved each following year. In its first stage covering the Bonn process, the UNAMA mandate was extended through resolution 1471 of 28 March 2003, which also endorsed the creation of an electoral unit, and resolutions 1536 of 26 March 2004 and 1589 of 24 March 2005. The mandate for UNAMA came after the use of force by OEF, after a January 2002 donor conference in Tokyo that had laid out the various international responsibilities through the Lead Nation modality, and after the authorisation given for the deployment of ISAF troops by the Security Council, discussed below. In essence, the roles, responsibility and the limitations of the UN had already been crafted through previous events and negotiations by the time the Security Council authorised UNAMA. For the UNAMA mandate, the Security Council did not make specific mention of the Chapter VII clause, leaving that for the separate ISAF resolution. Instead, resolution 1401 (2002) reaffirmed the Council’s strong commitment to the ‘sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan’ and ‘the inalienable right of the Afghan people themselves freely to determine their own political future’. The minimally worded resolution simply endorsed the establishment of UNAMA according to the mandate and structure laid out in the report of the Secretary-General. The actual content of UNAMA’s mandate did not therefore appear in resolution 1401 (2002) but in the report of the Secretary-General of 18 March 2002 (S/2002/278). 25

The initial mandate was broad and included essentially four areas: ● Laying the foundations for state-building, as outlined by the Bonn Agreement, which meant supporting the democratisation process and laying the foundations for state institutions; ● Monitoring, including reporting on human rights abuses; ● Coordinating all UN relief, recovery and reconstruction efforts in coordination with the Afghan Interim Administration and its successor; ● Promoting national reconciliation and rapprochement throughout the country through the good offices of the SRSG. The state-building project: Bonn process During this first stage, UNAMA’s main function was thus to put the Bonn Agreement in place by following the benchmarks that had been agreed upon: first, the convening of an Emergency Loya Jirga (Pashto for ‘grand council’, a traditional consultative assembly at which tribal and local leaders meet to settle disputes) to elect a transitional administration and its head (June 2002). UNAMA, together with the international community, provided logistics, including transport, premises and communication facilities, and fielded 50 staff and international observers to provide support for the Loya Jirga Secretariat on rules and procedures, voting mechanisms and elections.The SRSG used his good offices to address complaints of intimidation during and after the Loya Jirga by mediating with governors, local commanders and the authorities of the Interim Administration. Subsequently, Security Council resolution 1419 of 26 June 2002 welcomed the holding of the Emergency Loya Jirga from 11 to 19 June 2002. This followed the preparation of a Constitution, drafted by a nine-member drafting commission, with the support of advisers fielded by UNAMA. The Constitution, vetted during a January 2004 constitutional Loya Jirga, established a presidential system with parliamentary oversight, the framework for the rule of law consistent with the beliefs and prescriptions of Islam, and a quota for 25 per cent representation of women in the lower house of an eventual Parliament (Wolesi Jirga). The third milestone of the Bonn Agreement called for presidential elections to be held in June 2004, or two years after the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga. UNAMA set up an UN-Afghan Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) and carried out voter registration to register 10.5 million people, 41 per cent of which were women. In reason of what was at the time billed as security reasons, and because a full disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process had not been completed yet, the elections were postponed and finally held on October 2004. Hamid Karzai won with 55 per cent of the 8 million ballots finally cast. UNAMA nominated an independent panel of international electoral experts to investigate complaints alleged by opposition candidates, but did not conclude any serious irregularities. The final milestone of the Bonn process was the organisation of parliamentary elections for the lower house, the Wolesi Jirga, which were originally scheduled for April 2005 but finally held in September 2005, 26

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at the same time as elections for provincial councils to elect their representatives in the Meshrano Jirga, the upper house of the National Assembly. District Council elections, however, had to be postponed.

3. Second phase: Completion of the Bonn process, and new mandate for implementing the Afghanistan Compact

Despite some constitutional deficiencies as to the lack of District Council elections, the Bonn road map was declared accomplished in late 2005 with the holding of the elections for the National Assembly. The focus then shifted to a successor to the Bonn framework as the road map to follow for the international community. At that point, UNAMA had been involved in the organisation of the institutional road map with tight timelines for concrete milestones. It had continued to coordinate international assistance around the Bonn process while reporting on human rights. It had also, in a sense, used good offices to mediate between conflicting parties, such as local commanders, opposition candidates, and others, although a peace process in the formal sense had not been launched in Afghanistan. The evolution of the mandate in the second phase was primarily because of the completion of the original one, stipulated specifically for the implementation of the Bonn Agreement. If some at headquarters would have wanted to scale down the UNAMA operation by then, it became obvious, however, that beyond the institutional setup, further content needed to be added. At the same time, as the security situation began a downwards trend, the development and political streams could not take a backseat at this crucial junction. During this second phase, the security situation increasingly appeared on the agenda of the Security Council, which initially reacted asking for more detailed and timely reports from ISAF. In February 2006, the successor to the Bonn framework, the Afghanistan Compact, was adopted at a conference in London where donors pledged US$ 10.5 billion over the next five years. The Security Council then endorsed the Compact through resolution 1659 of 15 February 2006. In March 2006, UNAMA’s mandate was renewed through resolution 1662 of 23 March 2006 (and renewed again through resolution 1746 of 23 March 2007) to ‘ensure the overall strategic coordination of the implementation of the Compact’. UNAMA was tasked to co-chair, with the now functional Government of Afghanistan, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB), which became the coordination body through which international support was supposed to be channelled from then on. The revised mandate of March 2006 expanded on a wide range of peacebuilding tasks in areas such as DDR, security sector reform (SSR), economic reconstruction, human rights and gender rights monitoring mechanisms (including through supporting the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission), as well as reform of the justice sector and the fight against narcotics. By March 2006, UNAMA’s mandate contained six main elements: providing political and strategic advice for the state-building process, providing good offices; assisting the Afghan government in implementing the Afghanistan Compact; 27

promoting human rights; providing technical assistance; and continuing to manage all UN humanitarian relief, recovery, reconstruction and development activities in coordination with the government.

4. Third phase: Reacting to the challenges of coordination, insecurity and reconciliation through a ‘sharpened’ mandate

By the time the UNAMA mandate was ‘sharpened’ in March 2008, there had been three evolutions since 2006 which had seriously endangered the state-building process: first, there was an intensification of debates around aid effectiveness, which had come to question the role of the international community, the capacity and accountability of the government, and difficulties of ownership of the reconstruction project in addition to the omnipresent question of coordination. These debates had been raised around the preparation of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), which was subsequently adopted at the Paris Conference on 12 June 2008. Second, the worsening security situation had taken a new twist: insurgency was progressively billed as a reaction to increased civilian casualties caused by international forces. The UN, between 2006 and 2008, intensified its reporting of illegal detentions and civilian deaths as a result of aerial bombings, through reports that often conflicted with those coming out of NATO and OEF. UNAMA increasingly saw its role as custodian of humanitarian law in times of conflict.The third evolution since 2006 was the intensification of a political dialogue with different parts of the Taliban, brokered at various levels and by various actors ranging from the British military (Musa Qala Agreement, November 2006) to the Saudis (October 2008). Although the UN did not yet have a role in these direct negotiations, a consensus had been reached that military solutions alone could no longer address the growing problems of Afghanistan.All this meant that the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan solicited more attention from the Security Council. In his report of 6 March 2008, the Secretary-General recommended that while the mission’s core activities should remain the same as those outlined by the Council in 2005, the mission should place emphasis on six different, if not new, areas: coordination, political outreach, support for sub-national and local governance, humanitarian coordination, elections, and cooperation with ISAF. The Security Council endorsed these tasks through resolution 1806 of 20 March 2008 and resolution 1868 of 23 March 2009. Resolution 1806 (2008) was a ‘sharpening’ of the original mandate, a more precise spelling out of the tasks that UNAMA and its new SRSG (Kai Eide, from Norway) had to perform in Afghanistan. ‘Sharpening’ allowed the UN to do more, but it also set up a very ambitious agenda for UNAMA. As the situation on the ground became more complex, and as the new US strategy vouched to exit from Iraq and enter more forcefully in Afghanistan through a political, economic and military surge, the Security Council resolutions became increasingly intricate. The text of resolution 1820 in 2008, for example, was excessively long, at times repetitious, and extremely detailed as compared with previous resolutions. It made sure to mention the various international conferences and strategies that had taken place or were going to take place with regard to the situation in Afghanistan: the Rome 28

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Conference on the Rule of Law, held the year before, and the Afghanistan—Pakistan Peace Jirga of September 2007 were both mentioned. The anticipated Third Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan that was supposed to take place in Islamabad, for example, kept reappearing both in resolution 1806 (2008) and in resolution 1868 (2009) a year later, although there were no indications for its actual taking place. Resolution 1806 (2008) placed its hopes in the Paris Conference that was to adopt the ANDS in June 2008, while resolution 1868 (2009) counted on the Moscow Conference, under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (27 March 2009), and on the international conference in the Hague, which was to garner regional support for the new American Strategy for Afghanistan (31 March 2009). Resolution 1806 (2008) also recognised the interconnectedness of challenges and urged actors to work towards a comprehensive approach. Resolution 1868 (2009) went further and for the first time recognised that there could not be a purely military resolution to ensure the stability of Afghanistan. A host of other issues, such as the situation of prisons, public administration reforms, corruption, the need to report on resolution 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008), the use of children by the Taliban, amongst others, were also raised in resolution 1806 (2008) and reiterated in resolution 1868 (2009), reflecting a trend towards more detailed Council attention to Afghanistan. Resolution 1806 (2008) also added direct reference to the sanctions regime, in anticipation of the negotiations that were starting to take place with the Taliban. In paragraph 30 of resolution 1806 (2008), for example, the Security Council recognised the efforts of the Afghan government and UNAMA to cooperate with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) ‘by identifying individuals and entities participating in the financing or support of actors or activities of Al-Qaida and the Taliban using proceeds derived from illicit cultivation, production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors’. The updated resolution 1868 (2009) also made an explicit linkage between terrorism and illicit drugs in Afghanistan. The revised, expanded and sharpened activities of UNAMA were reiterated through a Security Council mission that visited Afghanistan between 21 and 28 November 2008. The mission concluded that the original UNAMA mandate was still ‘sound, comprehensive and appropriate’, but UNAMA needed to be provided with additional financial and human resources to meet the enhanced demands. Resolution 1806 (2008) thus laid out the enhanced responsibilities for UNAMA in detail, and the same text appeared subsequently in the extension of the UNAMA mandate through resolution 1868 (2009). ‘Sharpening’ added a host of enhanced responsibilities under the general rubric of peace consolidation: (a) Promote, as co-chair of the JCMB, more coherent support by the international community to the Afghan Government and the adherence to the principles of aid effectiveness enumerated in the Afghanistan Compact, including through mobilisation of resources, coordination of the assistance provided by international donors and organisations, and direction of the contributions of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, in particular for counter-narcotics, reconstruction and development activities. This meant that UNAMA was tasked not only with facilitating the coordinated delivery of humanitarian aid through regular forecasting, assessment of the humanitarian situation, and launching appeals, but 29

also of the US$ 20 billion pledged by donors to ANDS. UNAMA was supposed to channel this aid through government financial instruments, and muster support for reporting to the JCMB, the board of which, under UNAMA oversight, was restructured. Increasing aid effectiveness also meant better coordination of international assistance and better use of local expertise to curb ‘aid flight’ outside the country. It also meant curbing national corruption, which the UN sought to address through public sector reforms and support to the implementation of the national anti-corruption strategy. Resolution 1806 (2008) had given UNAMA the challenging task of improving the coordination of common efforts, whether through development agencies, humanitarian actors, NGOs, and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The question, however, was whether players were willing to coordinate, and whether it was possible to increase aid effectiveness, on the one hand, by increasing donor coordination and transparency, and improve government accountability, on the other. (b) Strengthen the cooperation with ISAF at all levels and throughout the country, in accordance with their existing mandates, in order to improve civil military coordination, to facilitate the timely exchange of information and to ensure coherence between the activities of national and international security forces and of civilian actors in support of an Afghan-led development and stabilisation process, including through engagement with provincial reconstruction teams and engagement with non-governmental organisations. This detailed paragraph, which in previous resolutions of UNAMA had appeared in a minimal language, showed the impact of the intensified discussions about civilian-military coordination at the Security Council referred to below. The situation on the ground had sharply deteriorated since 2005, with unprecedented levels of insurgency, especially in the volatile provinces in the south, east and central parts of the country.The answer to the insurgency required a strong international military presence, but also better cooperation and understanding between military and civilian components. Civilian deaths had also created deep divisions within Afghan communities and at the Security Council. UNAMA envisaged its own role in the escalating downturn spiral through a three-pronged approach: 1) better sharing of tasks and information with ISAF, including better coordination of facts in the assessment and reporting of civilian casualties; 2) expanding its own presence in different regions; and 3) intensifying its own efforts in the protection of civilians and upholding of humanitarian law during conflict. (c) Through a strengthened and expanded presence throughout the country, provide political outreach, promote at the local level the implementation of the Compact, of the ANDS and of the National Drugs Control Strategy, and facilitate inclusion in and understanding of the Government’s policies. In essence, UNAMA sought to do this by expanding its presence through regional offices and concentrating on sub-national governance. (d) Provide good offices to support, if requested by the Afghan Government, the implementation of Afghanled reconciliation programmes, within the framework of the Afghan Constitution and with full respect of the implementation of measures introduced by the Security Council in its resolution 1267 (1999) and other relevant resolutions. By 2007, all stakeholders had agreed that a military solution was not enough to stabilise Afghanistan and that a political dialogue was needed.The question was which actor was supposed to lead this dialogue, at 30

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what level, and for what ultimate goal. By including the paragraph above in the UNAMA resolution, the Security Council stressed on two issues: first, that the government, and not other entities such as regional powers or the military, was supposed to lead negotiations and would involve the UN if requested; second, it reminded all of the existence of a list, created through resolution 1267 (1999), on which most of the Taliban with whom various actors were trying to negotiate found themselves.Yet, the Security Council also left the doors open by recognising the legitimacy of actors who could be opposing the government but acted within the Constitution. Ultimately, though, the Council, by recognising the need for reconciliation, was in essence accepting the failure of the Bonn political process, which had failed to include the Taliban. (e) Support efforts, including through the Independent Directorate for Local Governance, to improve governance and the rule of law and to combat corruption, in particular at sub-national level, and to promote development initiatives at the local level with a view to helping bring the benefits of peace and deliver services in a timely and sustainable manner. UNAMA was tasked with launching a sub-national governance programme that sought to coordinate activities between various sub-national entities created by the government or by the international community, including, especially, the ISAF’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which were channelling donor support directly to local communities, bypassing government structures.The need to coordinate on anti-narcotics programmes rose even more by 2007 when counter-narcotics was added to the ISAF mandates. UNAMA was also tasked with the development of trust in government institutions, which were losing legitimacy through a combination of corruption and lack of delivery. Public administration reforms, police reforms and implementation of the national justice programme were supposed to bring back credibility to government institutions. (f) Play a central coordinating role to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in accordance with humanitarian principles […], including by providing effective support to national and local authorities in assisting and protecting internally displaced persons. (g) Continue, with the support of the [Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights] OHCHR, to cooperate with the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) […], to monitor the situation of civilians, to coordinate efforts to ensure their protection and to assist in the full implementation of the fundamental freedoms and human rights provisions of the Afghan Constitution and international treaties to which Afghanistan is a state party, in particular those regarding the full enjoyment by women of their human rights. From this general paragraph on monitoring of human rights, a few issues can be deduced. First, the Security Council approved of UNAMA’s important role in safeguarding humanitarian laws during conflict and monitoring of civilian casualties, even if it meant clashing with the international military forces posted in Afghanistan. Second, it also pointed out to the importance given to human rights issues in Afghanistan, including freedom of expression, rule of law and especially women’s rights, issues that were consistently raised and kept on the Security Council agenda by a core group of European countries, especially the Nordics. At the same time, however, one issue not explicitly mentioned in the mandate, but alluded to through support given to the work of the AIHRC, was the issue of transitional justice. Since 2007, an action plan on transitional justice existed, but no concrete measures on 31

transitional justice per se had been adopted either by the Government of Afghanistan or by the UN Security Council.The resolution welcomed the adoption of a national justice programme, stressing that its full implementation was vital to the elimination of impunity, among other goals. But direct reference to transitional justice was missing.This pointed out to the problem of opening the Pandora box on the question of impunity and accountability for past violations, which would have implicated many in the government and was not favoured by Brahimi from the beginning.The issue of transitional justice at the UN was delegated to the more technical follow-up by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner, including through the seconded OHCHR officers based at UNAMA, who worked in collaboration with, but separately from, the Human Rights Unit, within the integrated mission modality. (h) Support, at the request of the Afghan authorities, the electoral process, in particular through the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission (AIEC), by providing technical assistance, coordinating other international donors, agencies and organisations providing assistance and channelling existing and additional funds earmarked to support the process. Unlike during the 2004-2005 elections in Afghanistan, the UN was not to take a lead position in the preparation of the presidential (August 2009) and parliamentary (2010) elections in Afghanistan this time around. Instead, it was supposed to render technical and financial resources to the AIEC, mostly through UNDP, and provide international observers. The Security Council argued for the need for fair, free and inclusive elections before renewing UNAMA’s mandate in March 2009, but again reiterated the primary responsibility of the Government of Afghanistan, in an effort not to undermine the progress that had supposedly taken place in the consolidation of sovereignty and capacity of the government since 2004.The government was left to deal by itself, for instance, with the ‘constitutional uncertainty’ that had been created as a result of the gap that would exist in the three months that came after the presidential term expired on 22 May 2009 and the 20 August 2009 election date set by the AIEC. It was nonetheless expected that the preparations for the August poll would take place during a period of intensified fighting, paving the way for the Secretary-General to endorse ‘a judicious deployment of additional international troops to provide security for the Afghan people’ in his March 2008 report. (i) Support regional cooperation to work towards a stable and prosperous Afghanistan. Regional cooperation was substantive in the language and mandate added in resolution 1806 (2008), and came essentially around the time that Security Council powers had individually intensified their own regional strategies. The thought process that eventually went into the United States’ revised strategy for Afghanistan came, for example, with General Petreaus’ recognition of the role of neighbours in pacifying spoilers, including that of Iran.The United States fielded an Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, tasked with negotiating a regional peace strategy.The Russians and Chinese, on their part, intensified regional cooperation, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation on drugs, terrorism and crime, with the Central Asian republics and made overtures to Afghanistan through appointing a Contact Group and inviting Afghanistan to join SCO initiatives. Since 2007, the Taliban were also de facto implementing their own regional strategy by spreading into Pakistan and Central Asia, leading to the situation of Pakistan being discussed for the first time in relation to Afghanistan at the Security Council. 32

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For UNAMA, the mandate of regional cooperation essentially meant working on two fronts: soliciting a political dialogue and regional strategy for the region, which Kai Eide tried to initiate through travelling to regional capitals and seats of regional organisations; and at the same time, enhancing regional cooperation on issues such as drugs, refugees, energy, infrastructure, and trade as confidence-building measures towards regional security. In the meantime, the UN DPA had fielded its first regional field mission in Central Asia through the creation of a Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy based in Ashgabat,Turkmenistan, with the mandate of initiating regional dialogue and projects around common threats. For the Central Asian countries, the common threat was, inevitably, instability in Afghanistan. The UN, however, was careful not to cross the mandates of its two missions. Yet, the ultimate coordination had to be between the role of the UN and that of US Envoy Holbrooke in the region. Resolution 1806 (2008) was extremely ambitious, a ‘grocery shopping list’ (according to one experienced UN officer interviewed for this project), difficult to manage, even with the added budget that the Security Council authorised and the increased authority of the new SRSG. Throughout the years, different Security Council members had added their priority areas to the mandate, without taking anything off the agenda. It was imperative for the international community to find a way to restore the credibility of the political process it had laid out.

5. Operational aspects

Operational structure, staff and resources for implementation Kai Eide was confident that UNAMA could address its responsibilities within the mandate of resolution 1806 (2008), but needed more resources and political will. At an October 2008 briefing he gave to the Security Council, he argued, for instance, that as a small and vulnerable mission it would take until May or June 2009 for UNAMA to be able to garner the resources and recruit the staff needed to be able to implement the ambitious mandate given in March 2008 through resolution 1806. More resources meant more and better qualified personnel as well as financial commitments. The Security Council endorsed the recommendations for greater resources (including a doubling of UNAMA’s budget to US$ 120 million) and the expansion of the mission in Afghanistan through six new field offices. In terms of structure, the implementation of resolution 1806 (2008) meant adding a new Aid Coordination Unit, headed by the former United States Agency for International Development (USAID) director for Asia, to UNAMA’s second pillar. UNAMA was initially designed with two separate pillars: Pillar I (Political Affairs) and Pillar II (Relief, Recovery, and Development), each headed by a Deputy Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral (DSRSG).These were also supported through special advisers on human rights, gender, drugs, rule of law, police, military and demobilisation, and legal issues. By October 2008, the UNAMA mission had some 1,300 staff, around 80 per cent of whom were Afghan nationals. The international staff included 16 military observers, 3 civilian police and 39 UN volunteers. 33

Initially, the mission attracted well-qualified and experienced staff, donated by key donors, or picked up from former UN missions in the region.The early UNAMA under Brahimi was staffed by people who knew the region very well. Gradually, however, such human resources gave way to officers familiar with civil affairs used in typical political missions. What one interlocutor called the ‘professionalisation of peacekeeping’ came to replace regional expertise, which, combined with the loss of institutional memory, played to the detriment of providing context-specific solutions. UNAMA staff also included Afghan diasporas of various qualities, whose inflated salaries, by virtue of being hired with foreign passports, prevented their genuine integration into Afghan society. If, gradually, the quantity and quality of staff at UNAMA decreased, by the time Eide picked up his responsibilities, he was able to negotiate a doubling of the budget, the need for recruitment of more quality experts, and bringing down the then 30 per cent vacancy rate to 10 per cent. He also requested more expertise in new areas, such as agriculture, aid effectiveness, power, and capacity-building. One of the problems for the implementation of the resolutions in Afghanistan has been the consistent under-resourcing.The need for more resources was consistently raised at Security Council debates throughout the years, but the Council, formally at least, had little say over the budget of UNAMA, which was decided by the General Assembly. Ultimately, however, leadership counted when it came to unleashing more resources for the operation.According to Eide himself,27 the reason for which he was successful in doubling the budget of UNAMA was his constant dialogue at the political level with donors, directly with governments. He convinced donors and Security Council members of the need to expand to the regions, even in the context of insecurity, for it was at the regional level that UNAMA could better coordinate with ISAF and the government’s local governance structures.

6. Role of the SRSG

In the case of Afghanistan, leadership of the UN mission counted tremendously, not least because of the presence of larger, more powerful international entities, such as the US and NATO.The mandate of UNAMA, as stipulated by all Security Council resolutions, emphasised the role of the SRSG in leading civilian efforts, coordinating with the various actors and establishing trust by the government and for the government at the same time. The first SRSG, Lakhdar Brahimi (2002-2004) was appointed even before UNAMA was established and played an important role in designing the Bonn Agreement, which, in effect, from his point of view, was brokering a peace with the former mujahideen with which he had familiarity from his previous appointments as Special Envoy for Afghanistan. Brahimi did not need political directives before deployment: UNAMA came at the heel of the Brahimi Report, allowing the author to put into practice what he had recommended. However, in hindsight, it is possible to claim that Brahimi’s success in

27

Interview with Kai Eide, Kabul, 21 January 2009. 34

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setting Afghanistan on a proper political path was hampered structurally by the fact that the US-led military operation was sidelining the political agenda. Brahimi’s personal impact was also limited during his appointment, for it coincided with that of US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, labelled unofficially as the ‘Viceroy’, not only because of the powerful country he represented, but also for his own connections among the Afghan political elite. An uneasy relationship between subsequent UN Special Envoys and representatives of the American coalition or NATO was testimony to a larger problem of peacekeeping during an ongoing military campaign. If Brahimi, with all his power, personality, authority, experience, and backing by the Security Council was overshadowed, the more low-key SRSGs that followed him were even less able to leave a mark. Frenchman Jean Arnault (2004-2006) had the experience of having worked already in Afghanistan as Brahimi’s deputy, and Tom Koenigs (2005-2007) was a respected ‘green’ politician in his native Germany. Despite their intense efforts, including long and detailed reporting to the Security Council, as did Arnault, and personal engagement in denouncing civilian deaths caused by the military as well as pleading with the Security Council for a more integrated political and military strategy, in the case of Koenigs, these two SRSGs were not considered as authorities neither by the Security Council nor by the main actors in the field. Yet the problem remained more structural than personal: coordination between the military and civilian arms of the international community presence in Afghanistan continued to create a unique challenge for any SRSG. By the end of 2007, the solution to the problem of coordination was being sought in the appointment of a ‘Super Envoy’ which would merge the role of UN Special Representative and NATO Senior Civilian Representative with that of the Representative of the European Union in Kabul. However, the proposed candidate, Lord Ashdown, former UN High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, was ultimately rejected. His persona, and the expanded powers of an international coordinator, proved too controversial for the Government of Afghanistan, which feared the undermining of sovereignty and legitimacy, and the collapse of the entire idea of ‘Afghan ownership’. The proposed structure of a ‘Super Envoy’ was also ultimately scratched as an idea by the international community: not only were some UN members reluctant to be too closely associated with NATO, and the Americans not too happy about oversight of NATO operations, but the ability of a ‘Super Envoy’ to coordinate without independent access to resources would have been almost null. Instead of the Super Envoy, the Security Council endorsed the appointment of Kai Eide on 10 March 2008. Within a few months of his appointment, Eide was able to earn high praise from the Council. As former Permanent Representative of Norway to NATO,28 he had good knowledge and understanding of military imperatives. He also had, perhaps more than any other SRSG, the full support of the US Administration, which, fortunately for him, had just changed to a more cooperative one after the election of President Barack Obama. 28

Eide had also previously served with the United Nations as Special Envoy of the Secretary-General in Kosovo in 2005, as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1997-1998, and as the Norwegian Ambassador to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 35

In hindsight, the political authority of the SRSG in different capitals counted more than the bureaucratic preparation (including briefing, training, directives, etc.) that headquarters would provide in the case of Afghanistan. The power that the SRSG was able to project, in terms of decisive action and big picture approach and solutions, was respected more in a highly dynamic geostrategic terrain than managerial skills of running a simple civil operation. Yet, the SRSG was also the head of office of UNAMA, and as UNAMA’s operational and programmatic responsibilities expanded with each mandate, the SRSGs were expected to combine managerial skills with diplomacy. If a focus trade-off based on these two separate types of activities would undermine the effectiveness of any SRSG, this reflected more the ambiguity of the role of the UN in the field, as will be discussed below, than deficiencies in bureaucracy or leadership. Two additional structural problems continued to plague the authority of the SRSG: one was the role of UNAMA in supporting the Government of Afghanistan. UNAMA, as a political mission, was created explicitly to support and advocate for the legitimacy of the government. Through resolution 1806 (2008), for example, the SRSG had to muster up support for government policies at the sub-national level in addition to ensuring that aid at the national level went through the government budget. The SRSG was therefore mandated to play the role of honest broker on behalf of the government with the rest of the international community. As one head of agency commented, the perception among the UNCT was that government capacity was considered so low and its own budget revenues so meagre that the international community was de facto in the driver’s seat. However, Kai Eide reminded everyone that the government should be in the driver’s seat.29 Nevertheless, as the capacity and accountability of the government became increasingly scrutinised after 2007, and as the support of the international community for Karzai became scant by 2008, in the lead up to the elections, UNAMA was put in an awkward position. But as Eide himself would reiterate, the mandate was not necessarily in support of the government as a political unit per se, but of an Afghan political process. In this sense, the SRSG stood for ‘Afghanisation’. The other structural problem was the lack of clarity about reporting lines between UNAMA and ISAF. Neither did ISAF/NATO have to report to the SRSG in the field, nor did the SRSG have any power over military operations. The relationship had to depend more on personalities rather than structure. By 2008, the Pentagon had proposed to make General David McKiernan overall commander of both ISAF/NATO as well as OEF troops in Afghanistan.This would have made McKiernan the most powerful person in Kabul, given that the military presence far outnumbered the civilian one in terms of personnel, resources, terrain and, ultimately, significance.Yet, when Eide took a public position against the military in denouncing civilian deaths, aerial bombing and detentions, he gained what many considered ‘moral authority’. Ultimately though, for the resolutions to be effective, the Security Council had to field a high-level representative with a clear mandate to oversee the political process and full authority over the international community, with the task to negotiate with neighbouring countries. A super political 29

The challenge for UNAMA, as one international interlocutor interviewed mentioned, was that it was recognised by the government as the UN and, by others, as the government. 36

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envoy for the UN would have had to conduct shuttle diplomacy among regional and international powers to garner support for a regional peace deal, and not for limited deals with individual countries or for additional support for UN programmatic operations. Although Eide saw his position as also including such diplomacy, the fact that UNAMA had a full operational and coordination mandate implied lesser political possibilities for the SRSG.

III. The security stream: ISAF mandates and operations

1. Mandates and operations

Before UNAMA became operational on the ground, ISAF troops, it is important to recall, had already been deployed pursuant to the second annex of the Bonn Agreement. The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII in resolution 1386 of 20 December 2001, had authorised the establishment of a coalition of troops from various countries, initially led by the United Kingdom, to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in maintaining security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. ISAF was deployed in conjunction with, but distinctively from, the separate OEF coalition forces under US command, which continued combat operations against Taliban and Al-Qaida forces within Afghanistan. ISAF’s initial mandate was for a period of six months. It was extended for an additional six, and then on a yearly basis when ISAF came under NATO command through resolutions 1413 (23 May 2002), 1444 (27 November 2002), 1510 (13 October 2003) — which expanded ISAF’s mandate beyond Kabul — 1563 (17 September 2004), 1623 (13 September 2005), 1701 (12 September 2006), 1776 (19 September 2007) and resolution 1833 (22 September 2008). The Security Council initially authorised ISAF to provide security for Kabul and tasked it with performing two functions: protecting civilians and providing public security, including for the elections. However, as ISAF expanded beyond Kabul through resolution 1510 (2003), and became integrated into NATO, it became increasingly engulfed into the counter-insurgency operation at the same time as it was expanding into reconstruction and development projects through the PRTs. By the end of 2008, ISAF/NATO was composed of about 52,700 troops, with contributions of military personnel from 40 NATO and non-NATO countries. A number of evolutions can be noted in the ISAF mandates and operations since 2001: a) An increasingly detailed mandate For the first six years, ISAF resolutions were more or less generic. The Security Council was unwilling to go into too much detail about the functions, scope, activities, and rules of engagement of ISAF, allowing these to be discussed separately in troop-contributing countries, and in Brussels once NATO 37

took over. The major difference in the ISAF mandates came after 2007, when the Council faced the need to respond to the intensification of insecurity on the ground, and the dissent against the military operation by some countries in the Council. After 2007, more explicit guidance was given to ISAF, reflected in more detailed mandates which enhanced the scope of goals to be achieved, such as protection of civilians and overall ‘Afghanisation’, as well as with regard to methods. By 2008, ISAF mandates were as ambitious as UNAMA’s and included counter-narcotics, SSR, training and support for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), rule of law and prison reforms, and ensuring the security of elections. The only goal missing was to guard the Pakistan/Afghanistan borders to prevent the infiltration of weapons and fighters. b) NATO takeover Given that ISAF was established as a coalition of troops from voluntary countries, its command, leadership and resources were a challenge at the beginning. According to the first NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, Hikmet Çetin, it was not easy to get countries to lead the ISAF forces; after Turkey, for example, it took another six months to pass on leadership.To the problem of finding willing lead nations was added the difficulty of soliciting contributions, both in terms of troops and financial commitments, for the coalition. In August 2003, NATO took command of ISAF, taking responsibility for the coordination and planning of the force and supporting it through NATO troopcontributing nations. NATO’s role in assuming the leadership of ISAF was supposed to overcome the problem of a continual search to find new nations to lead the mission and set up new headquarters every six months. From the vantage of NATO, the command and control of ISAF allowed it to establish headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan, led by a military commander and assisted by a Senior Civilian Representative. This became the first NATO operation outside its own regional area. The merge eventually increased ISAF’s powers, personnel and geographic coverage, which from then on was guided by the regional organisation’s rules of engagement. For the Security Council, this merger had a number of implications, least relevantly, operational ones. After ISAF was merged into NATO, the Council began considering the early renewal of ISAF forces, in order to accommodate European parliaments requesting a Council resolution before considering troop commitments when they convened.With the completion of the Bonn Agreement, ISAF troops did not have to withdraw from Afghanistan, since by then they had been under the command of NATO with a new raison d’être, namely self-defence and counter-insurgency. But the merger with NATO had other kinds of political consequences for the Security Council. NATO was not directly mandated by the UN through Chapter VII. When the US was attacked on 11 September 2001, NATO de facto invoked article 51, the right of collective self-defence, since an armed attack had occurred against one of its members. By handing over the responsibility for ISAF, under a UN mandate but not its control, the Security Council, in effect, indirectly handed over Chapter VII peace enforcement to NATO. Gradually ISAF, although not a homogeneous force, became incorporated into the doctrine of NATO and, by 2008, through the joint command of General McKiernan, came to coordinate more closely with that of the OEF. ISAF therefore moved away from a peacekeeping force to becoming associated with a self-defence operation (article 51, with NATO) and counter-insurgency (with OEF), which, to date, has not been codified within the UN Charter. 38

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c) Expansion outside of Kabul ISAF’s initial deployment, limited to Kabul, showed the hesitation of contributing nations to provide combat troops, on the one hand, and the desire of one powerful P5 country to have monopoly over the use of force outside of Kabul, on the other. It took two years before ISAF’s mandate was extended beyond Kabul, through resolution 1510 of 13 October 2003. In hindsight, however, by the time it expanded, there was no more peace to keep. As ISAF troops became increasingly engulfed in counterinsurgency, they moved away from any pretences of a traditional peacekeeping mission.The expansion, primarily through the establishment of ISAF-led PRTs, was gradual, and once again showed the preference of troop-contributing countries to engage in ‘heart and mind operations’ rather than in direct fighting. While insecurity was decidedly geographically located in the south and east from the beginning, ISAF first expanded in 2003 to the more peaceful north, in 2005 to the west (Herat), and only in 2006 to the south and east. As it moved south, however, ISAF had increasingly to engage with the more thorny activity of counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency. d) Foray into development and humanitarian activities It was through PRTs that ISAF initially ventured outside of Kabul. PRT modalities were first conceived by the OEF in December 2002 as an opportunity for military presence in rural areas to deliver humanitarian goods and quick-impact projects, such as small-scale infrastructure under the auspices of ‘heart and mind operations’.The intention was for ISAF gradually to take over OEF’s reconstruction responsibilities throughout the country. ISAF saw this foray into relief and development as an opportunity to extend peacekeeping operations: it got involved in the identification of needs, in the rehabilitation of schools and medical facilities, in the restoration of water supplies, and, in sum, in channelling donor funding for civilian-military projects. By the end of 2008, 26 NATO/ISAF PRTs were operational. From the point of view of the military, the PRTs were there to extend the authority of government, thus contributing to stability and an enabling environment for development.Yet, the PRT concept was not necessarily without controversy. In the ISAF resolutions of the Security Council, reference to the PRTs happened only once, in resolution 1623 (2005), where the Security Council welcomed the ‘the commitment by NATO lead nations to establish further Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)’. In contrast, UNAMA resolutions regularly called for UNAMA to strengthen cooperation with ISAF, ‘including through engagement with provincial reconstruction teams’ (resolution 1868). This omission of reference to the PRTs in ISAF mandates was perhaps a continuation of the Security Council’s hesitation in providing concrete directives for ISAF’s operational aspects. However, another explanation could be that the PRT concept had been more successfully evaluated by military actors than by political, development, and humanitarian actors. For humanitarian actors, the PRTs endangered the neutrality of humanitarian aid workers if confusion was made between the different operations by local communities. From the point of view of government and development actors, even though PRTs were supposed to operate under the ANDS, they had in fact created parallel institutions. In the government’s view, local capacity was eroded, quick-impact projects were not durable developmental projects, and donors who funded the PRTs were contributing to the lack of transparency of aid in 39

Afghanistan. What is more, coordination between the PRTs, and among them and other actors, proved to be challenging. As each PRT was led by a different country and followed a different national concept, the transfer of experiences was difficult, and the cumulative effect was at best ad hoc and uncoordinated. Overall, the PRT experiment contributed to the militarisation and securitisation of development efforts and aid in Afghanistan. They have also benefited from the trend of power devolution from central to provincial level, given that real power has been appropriated by the PRTs at the local level. e) Better articulation of the relationship with the UN A fifth area of evolution that can be traced in ISAF mandates is the articulation of the relationship with UNAMA. UNAMA and ISAF both had UN resolutions, but their relationship was left more or less to the goodwill of actors on the ground since 2005 despite the need for synergy between UNAMA and ISAF having appeared stronger in both mandates. Language used in both resolutions called for strengthened cooperation, coordination and mutual support. Mechanisms, however, were not spelled out. Civilian-military cooperation had always been difficult, given the large ISAF presence compared with a small UNAMA one.The coordination for NATO was supposed to happen mostly through its Senior Civilian Representative (SCR).30 The first NATO civilian to occupy this post, Hikmet Çetin, from Turkey, between 2003 and 2006, for example used to organise weekly informal meetings, which he co-chaired with the SRSG at the time, Jean Arnault, who brought together ambassadors from the EU, US, NATO, OEF, and such countries as Japan for their role in the DDR. However, there was no formal structure of coordination, although a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) did exist between ISAF/NATO and the UN. This relationship became tense, however, when there were differences between the parties, such as those shown by the incidents and reactions over civilian deaths. By the time he became SRSG, Eide was keen on developing better integration, cooperation and operational cohesion between international and Afghan forces, urging restraints on detentions (by ensuring more transparency to avoid mistakes), house arrests (by showing cultural sensitivity) and air power (by refraining from their use in populated areas).Yet, there was also a need for better coordination over the allocation of overall resources that were going directly through PRTs, bypassing the government’s budget and records. A NATO high-level official interviewed for this project recognised the need for more coordination with the UN, although he agreed that, in practice, relationships depended much on personalities. When actors were largely unequal, integration was viewed with scepticism. Instead, coordination, cooperation and integrated planning were the modalities preferred by NATO. Despite the asymmetry that existed in terms of resources and personnel between the two entities, the UN also meant a number of advantages for NATO: it had information that the ISAF/NATO and OEF systems could not reach; it had knowledge of Afghanistan through a long history of involvement, as well as the total trust and 30 These included Hikmet Çetin of Turkey (2003-2006), Daan Everts from the Netherlands (2006-2008); Maurits R. Jochems (Acting SCR January 2008-May 2008), and Fernando Gentilini of Italy (since May 2008).

40

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confidence of the government; and it could mediate well amongst different interests.To this end, most actors interviewed, especially from among the Afghan government, insisted in a better military and political coordination, and more regular meetings between the SRSG and the NATO commander. At the same time, however, despite the will and need for cooperation, a number of practical problems endured: the centre of gravity of most organisations, for instance, remained internal. Assessments of causes of problems were different. Regional organisations like NATO did not have the habit of cooperating on a daily basis with other partners. Timing was also off: ISAF was supposed to be a short-term operation and NATO a reactive counter-insurgency one, while the objectives of UNAMA were long-term.Time scales were different between political actors and military cycles. When it came to providing a political solution, especially long-term negotiations over power-sharing, however, the role of ISAF and NATO was more limited. Balance needed to be reached between directives for reconciliation and those for elimination, such as the OEF directive to ‘kill or capture’. Reconciliation at the provincial level, on the other hand, could be facilitated through ISAF and NATO, which had local contacts and local interests in securing peace. But localised peace was not what the Security Council would necessarily have preferred to see in Afghanistan. f) Stronger mandate language on civilian deaths In the meantime, the stronger language on civilian casualties that appeared in the UNAMA and ISAF mandates after 2007 was both a result of events on the ground and of a discord that increasingly set member countries apart at the Security Council. In the field, the issue of civilian casualties put a decisive line between the UN and the military operation. As the number of civilians killed increased dramatically at the end of 2006 and during the first months of 2007, UNAMA started systematically to verify and document incidents involving civilian casualties caused by international forces, through criteria developed in cooperation with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The verification of civilian casualties became one of the main elements of UNAMA’s human rights work and was initiated by the then SRSG Tom Koenigs. In December 2006, UNAMA issued a public report urging ‘all parties to uphold international humanitarian and human rights law and to ensure the protection of civilian life’.31 Until then, however, UNAMA investigations had been privately shared with the ISAF leadership, and cases had been resolved through internal procedures. None of these reports were shared with the public. Tom Koenigs had preferred to negotiate with ISAF behind closed doors to bring about an amendment of the modus operandi with regard to the use of force, thus lessening future conflicts on the ground32 UNAMA sought to position itself as an impartial and credible advocate on behalf of civilians by conducting objective verifications of those incidents and sharing the information with key 31

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, A/61/799—S/2007/152, 15 March 2007, available at: http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/SC%20Report/07march15-report.pdf 32 Jeannette Boehme, Human Rights and Gender Components of UN and EU Peace Operations: Putting Human Rights and Gender Mandates into Practice, German Institute for Human Rights, October 2008, p. 27. 41

actors. Koenigs, in the meantime, regularly reported on civilian casualties more generally to the Security Council. As a result, in renewing UNAMA’s mandate in 2007, resolution 1746 urged UNAMA ‘to continue to contribute to human rights protection and promotion, including monitoring of the situation of civilians in armed conflict’. A particular incident in the summer of 2008 marked a turning point when the UN publicly rejected the US assessment of civilian causalities. Investigations by UNAMA showed that some 90 civilians, including 60 children, had been killed in an US-led coalition air raid in Herat on 21 August 2008. US investigations, however, had initially claimed only five to seven deaths before agreeing to reopen the investigation and apologise for civilian casualties. On 25 August, the Afghan government called for a review of agreements regulating the presence of international troops in Afghanistan and for regulating their presence with a Status of Forces Agreement. The Afghan cabinet was joined by the UN in demanding an end to air strikes on civilian targets, uncoordinated house searches and illegal detentions. In the October 2008 debate at the Security Council, the US Ambassador to the UN, Khalilzad, expressed regret for the accidental loss of civilian lives, and claimed that the US would do everything to ensure that ISAF and OEF prevented civilian causalities and acknowledged them when they occurred. Yet, Khalilzad reiterated that the main culprits were the Taliban, who used civilians as shields and increasingly resorted to asymmetric attacks against population centres. Meanwhile, Russia circulated a draft press statement deploring the air strikes on Herat. Russia, South Africa, and Indonesia proposed rewordings in the ISAF mandate being considered for renewal. The question was, however, whether the issue of civilian casualties would appear in the preamble or in the operational part of the ISAF mandate.The wording finally appearing in the preamble of resolution 1833 (2008) mentioned that the Security Council expressed ‘its serious concern with the high number of civilian casualties’ and called ‘for compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law and for all appropriate measures to be taken to ensure the protection of civilians’. Further, the mandate adds: Recognising the efforts taken by ISAF and other international forces to minimise the risk of civilian causalities, and calling on them to take additional robust efforts in this regard, notably by the continuous review of tactics and procedures and the conduct of after-action reviews and investigations in cooperation with the Afghan government in cases where civilian casualties have occurred and when the Afghan government finds these joint investigations appropriate. In late 2008, in response to criticism raised on cultural insensitivity, NATO issued a new tactical directive, which stated that respect for the Afghan people, their culture, and their religion should be the guiding principle of all ISAF personnel, both on and off the battlefield. As will be discussed below, Russia, on its part, would claim that actions (namely politics) in New York had an affect on the outcomes in the field.

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2. The Security Council and NATO: A polite relationship

Yet, even though compromise had been reached over the inclusion of a par ticular issue in the preamble of the mandate, the Security Council was still not very explicitly authoritative when it came to ISAF.The Council, for example, routinely expressed authority only in ‘deciding to extend the authorisations’ and in authorising ‘member states par ticipating in ISAF to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate’, or in encouraging ‘ISAF and other par tners to sustain their effor ts, as resources [permitted], to train, mentor and empower the Afghan national security forces, in par ticular the Afghan National Police’ (resolution 1776). ISAF did not report directly to the Council; it did so through a letter sent by the NATO SecretaryGeneral or, as was the case with the repor t released in November 2008, by the Deputy Secretary-General, to the UN Secretary-General, who then forwarded it to the president of the Security Council. Although resolution 1386 (2001) had required ISAF to repor t to the Council regularly on its activities, its repor ting practices remained erratic, often minimal in terms of information, without reference to the actual mandate, and regularly late and outdated in six months by the time they were declassified and released. For instance, the report circulated in May 2008 covered the period from 1 November 2007 to 31 January 2008; the one released in September 2008 covered operations from 1 February to 30 April 2008; another released in November 2008 covered the period from May to August 2008. Hence, in later resolutions, the Security Council changed the paragraphs on repor ting. According to one diplomat interviewed, who was familiar with the repor ts, there was definitely ‘room for improvement both on the substance and the timing’ of ISAF repor ts. One solution proposed was to have periodic oral repor ts to the Security Council. NATO, as a regional organisation, did not repor t directly to the Security Council but to Brussels. In the meantime, the attendance of the UN Secretary-General at NATO summits, including, for example, the April 2008 Bucharest one, was criticised by some at UN headquar ters. ISAF was not a UN force under UN command, but a coalition of the willing deployed under the authority of the Security Council. The Council therefore neither discussed the rules of engagement nor the national caveats and troop contribution, even though caveats posed by national contingents weakened ISAF’s enforcement mandate. The UN had very little control over ISAF and had no leverage over troop-contributing countries. The leading nations and NATO decided the rules of engagement for ISAF.To one observer interviewed, the relationship between the UN and ISAF/NATO was similar to that of a divorced father who wrote checks. In fact, the UN had no authority and could only provide cooperation, authorisation, and legitimisation. According to a NATO official interviewed, when Chapter VII operations are subcontracted, the UN is effectively handing over its authority, although it can still play an impor tant par t as a legitimising power. The dilemma is fur ther exacerbated when the UN is given a secondary role as coordinator without control over the budget that others are using. In the case of Afghanistan this applied, for instance, to the role of the UN in police training and SSR sectors. While the 43

United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Combined Security Transition Command— Afghanistan (CSTC-A) was spending 80 to 90 per cent of the budget called for training under ANDS, the UN could not drive the process. According to the same NATO official, the UN could play a role in the legitimisation of the international presence in Afghanistan, by organising processes for others to par ticipate in, by providing intelligence and information for the more effective operation of ISAF/NATO and OEF forces, amongst other things. However, most of the weight of the Afghanistan mission was placed on the military, and especially on the US military — not on the political process. Under such circumstances, power derived from those who spent money and had forces. The UN was legitimate but not necessarily effective, and the Security Council authorised broad mandates but did not have effective authority to determine concrete action and rules of engagement. Yet, the timid authorisations and lack of discussion on details of the military operation at the Security Council manifested the desire of one of the P5 countries who was taking the lead on military operations to keep a free hand without much interference from others. It suited the US and NATO well for the Security Council not to discuss details while reaching general consensus over the role of ISAF. On several occasions, however, Russia steered Security Council debates towards the issue of the military operation, in order to question the details of the so-called consensus. Russia abstained, for instance, from the vote of September 2007 to renew the ISAF mandate, in reason of its concern over the inclusion of a clause pertaining to maritime interception by the OEF. The maritime interception component appeared in the text of resolution 1776 (2007), under request from the Japanese government. Japan, which had been providing fuel and water to the US Navy and other coalition ships engaged in OEF, needed reference for this component to allow its Parliament to enact new legislation under Japan’s Anti-Terrorism Special Measure Law.33 Russia, however, argued that OEF operations were outside the context of the UN and abstained from the vote to renew the ISAF mandate in 2007. The same language appeared again in resolution 1833 (2008), but this time additional clarification was added to make linkages with Afghanistan more explicit in response to Russia’s concerns. The 2008 resolution mentioned the Security Council’s appreciation for OEF leadership, including on the maritime interdiction component of OEF, ‘which [operated] within the framework of the counter terrorism operations in Afghanistan and in accordance with the applicable rules of international law.’ Resolution 1833 (2008) was approved unanimously, without Russian objection, although the wording remained. Ultimately though, in order to obtain the Russian vote (or at least to avoid another abstinence) for the extension of ISAF, resolution 1833 (2008) included stronger language on civilian protection and on counter-narcotics, both issues strongly pushed by Russia at the Council. In general, however, the unanimous support for the ISAF/NATO operation at the Security Council reflected not only the collective interest in security in Afghanistan, but also the fact that each

33

Security Council Report, ‘Monthly Forecast For September 2008’, 27 August 2008, available at www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.4441245/k.5181/September_2008brAfghanistan.htmn. 44

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country had its own strategic interests with regard to ISAF/NATO, including the Russians, who were concerned with the possibility of alternative supply routes transiting through its territory once the route through Pakistan proved unsafe. At the same time, troop-contributing countries did not want the Security Council to give procedural directives. The Council therefore resorted to cooperative language, giving guidance, suggestions and encouragement, while the real work of coordination between the UN mission and ISAF remained the challenge to be dealt with by the personal figures on the ground.

IV. Challenges for the implementation of the resolutions

As noted above, the ever more detailed mandate of UNAMA reflected the more ambitious wishes of Security Council members. In a way, the less they individually endeavoured directly, the more they transferred responsibilities to the UN. As the situation deteriorated, the UN was expected to do more itself, on the one hand, as well as do more on behalf of Council members on the other.Yet, the implementation of such an agenda was considerably hampered by the lack of clarity as to what type of operation, at the end of the day, UNAMA was supposed to carry out: a peacekeeping one, when there was increasingly no peace to keep, or a state-building one, when the construction of a liberal, democratic state was being gradually abandoned as an ideal and replaced with the more immediate, short-term objective of stabilisation. The most important operational factor that inhibited the full implementation of UNAMA and ISAF mandates in Afghanistan was the constantly deteriorating security situation from 2005 onwards. Violence affected ordinary Afghans, but also increasingly targeted local and international aid workers, forcing them to restrict the scale and scope of their operations. In 2007, 40 humanitarian workers were killed and 89 abducted. From January to July 2008, over 84 security incidents involving aid organisations were reported, causing the deaths of 19 NGO staff. By the end of 2008, Afghanistan remained roughly divided between the generally more stable west and north, where insecurity was linked to factionalism and crime, and the south and east, where an increasingly coordinated insurgency reigned. The security situation was exacerbated by a number of factors: the burgeoning drug economy trapped many indebted farmers into supporting local commanders and drug lords in the regions. Demobilised combatants had little opportunities to rejoin the civilian economy and easily tipped over. The National Police and National Army were still inadequately trained and ill-equipped. The political vacuum and instability in Pakistan opened the gates to a flood of weapons and fighters from border areas. At the same time, the force with which international troops went about eliminating insurgencies also increasingly created sympathy for the latter. The military operation was increasing popular dissatisfaction through air strikes on civilian targets, uncoordinated house searches, and illegal detentions of Afghan citizens. 45

The UN consistently argued that the problem of security required a multipronged approach: in addition to the deployment of additional international forces, progress needed to continue on the security sector reform, including enhancing the size and capabilities of the Afghan National Army and National Police. Since October 2003, the DDR process, supported by the UNDP Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme, under the leadership of Japan, had disarmed former soldiers of the Afghan National Forces.The major challenge that remained, however, was the disarmament of unofficial militia associated with warlords, criminal gangs, and politicians. In June 2005, the Disband Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG) programme was initiated, but it proved to be a difficult process that brought direct resistance from spoilers profiting from the drug economy. As part of DIAG development activities, District Development Assemblies (DDAs) were established in 82 districts, which added to the complexity of sub-national institutions set up by the government or by different donor initiatives. In the meantime, the UN argued that the security problem needed more than security sector reforms, and should also concentrate efforts in the areas of reform of the justice sector, anti-narcotics activities, reconstruction, expansion of government authority, and imposition of the rule of law, including anticorruption projects. As Eide mentioned during the October 2008 debate to the Security Council, real security would be established by an improvement in the daily lives of Afghans. Beyond the issue of the larger problem of insecurity, it is possible to cluster the challenges for the implementation of Security Council resolutions in Afghanistan, especially those related to UNAMA, around two distinct yet related sets of factors: 1) challenges that derived from the operational context, and 2) underlying political problems of design and implementation of the resolutions.

1. Operational challenges

UNAMA was conceived as a political mission with a broad mandate. The shortcomings in the implementation, from an operational point of view, were related to the lack of resources, which limited leverage and the ambition of coordinating the multiplicity of actors that operated in Afghanistan. Starting in 2006, the Security Council had begun gradually to give more responsibilities to the UN, as a show of confidence in its legitimacy as well as its efficiency in getting the work done in a better way. Implementing such an ambitious mandate, however, faced a number of structural difficulties. Internally, within the UN a) Integration challenges Within the UN system, the Integrated Missions modality was supposed to bring the UN Country Team, which included 17 UN agencies and Bretton Woods institutions, under one framework led by UNAMA. The coordination of the UNCT was carried out by the UN Resident Coordinator (traditionally a post held by a UNDP staff), but acting as the DSRSG in UNAMA and head of the Development and Humanitarian Pillar. Weekly coordination meetings were held to discuss security and 46

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programmatic concerns. Under this integrated framework, it was the SRSG who had the final say as he spoke on behalf of the UN and was the direct representative of the Secretary-General. However, divergent priorities and reporting requirements among the agencies often obstructed progress on coordination in the field. Furthermore, some agencies had problems of principle with the question of integration, on grounds of neutrality. UNOCHA, for example, protested that the neutrality of humanitarian assistance would be compromised if it were integrated under the political mission of UNAMA. In the final analysis, it was decided that UNOCHA would stay within the integrated framework, albeit in different offices, and report both to the SRSG and UNOCHA. The integrated framework modality not only suffered from the usual problem that exists when UN agencies are multiple but also, in the case of Afghanistan, it was exacerbated by the nature of the mission as well as the context. b) Coordinating and implementing at the same time UNAMA was not only responsible for coordinating UN relief and reconstruction activities, but also for implementing projects in the areas of DDR, SSR, relief, reconciliation, human rights, gender, antinarcotics, and livelihoods. The mission was therefore tasked with the sometimes conflicting mandates of coordinating among the large number of international actors and implementing projects directly. According to the head of an agency, interviewed for this study, UNAMA designed the political strategy and represented the Secretary-General and the Security Council, while UN agencies acted as executive agencies. In the eyes of the UNCT, then, UNAMA brought added-value by focusing on political and policy issues, leaving implementation and execution of projects to others. Yet, Security Council resolutions directly mandated UNAMA also to implement projects. The problem was therefore structural, and, if conflicts were avoided, it was mostly because of the personal figures of the SRSGs, on the one hand, and because needs were numerous on the other. Within the larger international community c) Lack of leverage A major challenge to the successful implementation of the resolutions had to do with the lack of leverage that the UNAMA operation had, given its meagre resources. Despite consensus, commitments did not always translate into the proper financial and human resources necessary for UNAMA to gain political authority and to function in the complex theatre that was Afghanistan. In terms of security, the ISAF/NATO operation, let alone the OEF one, was much more equipped. Without its own police and military forces or a substantial amount of resources dedicated to training national forces, the UNAMA mission could not begin to have leverage and authority on security operations. In terms of resources, the money available for UNAMA’s projects and administration did not match what was available for the UN Country Team, let alone the World Bank and the EU.The leverage of UNAMA was associated with the personal figure of the SRSG, but to be able properly to coordinate the civilian side of the international community, financial resources mattered. In the operation in Afghanistan, power mattered in terms of resources and military might: politics and soft power, in the end, did not count for much, even though Kai Eide tried precisely to make soft power work. It was expected that as the financial possibility of UNAMA increased with resolution 1806 (2008), the leverage would also increase. 47

d) Light footedness in a heavy environment Coordination problems were exacerbated by the sheer number and variety of actors present in Afghanistan, including actors over which the UN did not have power, such as international troops, humanitarian international NGOs, and private military and security personnel. In such an environment, the initial light footprint approach proposed by Brahimi may have been a doomed project, despite its initial consensus at the Council. Under the leadership of Brahimi, the focus of the Bonn Agreement was to bolster Afghan capacity and to rely only on limited international presence.This approach was supposed to limit the UN role in governance — at least on paper — and was a sharp divergence from the previous approach used in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, which relied on a massive international presence and personnel at all levels. Brahimi used two important factors to his advantage for advocating a new design principle of light bureaucracy:34 in terms of leadership, he took advantage of his personal standing within the Secretariat; and in terms of structural conditions, he profited from the unwillingness of the Security Council at the time to engage in heavy transitional administration, especially in a country such as Afghanistan, which historically showed resistance to foreign rule. At the field level, the light footprint approach also benefited from ISAF’s limited deployment in Kabul and US pressure not to limit the freedom of its own anti-terrorism operations throughout the country. 35 Eight years on, experience with this approach, however, has pointed out two serious fallacies: first, formal ‘lightness’ hardly ever translated into practice. Even if the UN was initially small, the large number of international NGOs, private sector security and international troops definitely exaggerated the heaviness of the international presence. Even if the UN was supposed to refrain from intrusive administration, the fact that it was entrusted to form the government, build democratic institutions step-by-step and build institutional capacity made the ‘light footprint’ a mere formality. Second, this approach was, perhaps, to begin with ill-suited for the post-Taliban environment. A number of people interviewed for this project claimed that the initial ‘light footprint’ had prevented Security Council resolutions from being effective, through limiting, for instance, the timely expansion of UNAMA into regions. Initial hesitation, in hindsight, especially with regard to moving ISAF forces beyond Kabul, resulted in a loss of time and patience, allowing for the Taliban to regroup and present a new, formidable challenge. e) Coordinating a fragmented Afghanistan Another structural problem that the UN faced, and which was negotiated from the beginning, was the fragmentation that donors de facto produced along the geographical area and sectors. The Tokyo Conference of January 2002 introduced what came to be known as the ‘lead country’ approach for five building blocks: National Army (US lead), National Police (German lead), Judicial Training (Italian/European Commission lead), Counter-narcotics (UK lead) and Demobilisation (UN lead). The 34

Benner et al., 2007, op. cit.; Dahrendorf et al., 2003, op. cit. Simon Chesterman, Tiptoeing Through Afghanistan: The Future of UN State-Building, New York: International Peace Academy, 2002, p. 4.

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lead nation modality was, however, problematic. It led to one-dimensional interventions without proper linkages between sectors. When each sector became individually associated with a separate donor, problems of coordination and integration were inevitable. By the end of 2008, UNAMA had on its plate an ambitious plan to play a larger role in the police, rule of law, anti-narcotics, and others, perhaps partly because, by then, the lead nation mechanism had in fact failed. Hitherto, donors had wanted more direct handling of these sectors, leaving the UN. As this proved inefficient, responsibilities mounted for the United Nations. The lead nation approach was also adopted in the military, with different countries basing their ISAF troops and PRTs in different regions: the UK in Helmand; Canada in Kandahar; Germany in Kunduz; Sweden in Mazar-e Sharif; amongst others. When donors began funnelling their resources through PRTs, this led to the donor-generated geographical area fragmentation of Afghanistan, and the bypassing of national institutions set up and supported by the UN, such as the JCMB, a criticism reiterated by Eide in the context of aid effectiveness throughout 2008. The geographic division of Afghanistan was exacerbated when military resources were allocated mostly to provinces that were experiencing the worst fighting, in effect ‘punishing’ the more stable provinces of the north. Instead, Eide argued that a more balanced and equitable distribution of resources was needed, based on the actual needs of provinces. f) The need for transparent information After UNAMA received a mandate to coordinate international resources going into ANDS, it needed proper information from donors to be able to brief the Council. In his briefing to the Security Council prior to the renewal of the mandate in 2009, Eide stressed that international donors were ploughing as much as US$1 billion into Afghanistan without going through the government, ultimately hurting the broader development effort. On their part, donors lacked confidence in the government because of persuasive corruption and inability to coordinate or account for aid. They tended therefore to bypass the central government in Kabul, focusing directly on the provinces. As a result, the Afghan government and the UN lacked an overall picture of how much aid was available or spent for specific purposes. A January 2008 Oxfam report claimed that since 2001 Afghanistan had received more than US$15 billion in assistance, but much aid was provided in ways that were ineffective and inefficient. As in Iraq, too much aid was being absorbed by the profits of companies and subcontractors, or spent on nonAfghan resources and on high expatriate salaries and living costs. The cumulative impact was that some 40 per cent of aid to Afghanistan flowed out of the country.36 Oxfam, said that international assistance was too ‘top-heavy, prescriptive and supply driven’ and not enough Afghan-owned, which would make it sustainable.37

36 Oxfam, ‘Afghanistan: Development and Humanitarian Priorities’, Briefing Article, January 2008, available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/conflict_disasters/downloads/afghanistan_priorities.pdf 37 Ibid.

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In his efforts to ‘tame donor behaviour’, Eide wanted to propose the creation of coordination cells in the government with focal points from each donor to communicate what was being done.The SRSG also set out to restructure the JCMB that had been established in 2006 for the implementation of the Compact, by replacing the consultative groups with three standing committees dealing with security, governance, rule of law and human rights, and economic and social development. Yet, efforts of gathering information and databases were hampered by donor mistrust of government capacity and accountability, or simply due to donor interest in keeping control over their own resources directly. g) Lack of a comprehensive approach If discussions at the Security Council revolved around the problems of alignment of resources around unified structures, the underlying problem was the lack of a clear sense of direction, a comprehensive military, development, and political strategy, one which was consistently demanded by the various SRSGs briefing the Council. What many interlocutors pointed out in interviews for this case study was that the UN, neither at the field level nor at headquarters, had a coherent conception of a strategy for dealing with Afghanistan in the long term. The underlying problem was that for a peacekeeping mission there was no peace to keep. Under such circumstances, strategising was forfeited for reactionary practices, and reaction was based not on what was needed but on what was available.

2. Underlying political challenges

a) Political problems with the legitimacy of engineered democratisation Politics also mattered greatly: a further constraint in the implementation of the Security Council resolutions was the problematic design and implementation of the Bonn Agreement. In hindsight, the rapid establishment of the formal tenets of Western-style democracy in Afghanistan (elections; separation of powers, etc.) were more attuned to the international community’s need to show success in the country rather than engrained in the deep understanding of the psyche of a traumatised and ultimately traditional Afghan demos.38 Democracy and state-building ‘outside in’ proved not only an expensive exercise for the international community, but it also did not become rooted in Afghan traditions of political participation. The Bonn process, at the end of the day, did not commit to genuine democracy.The use of traditional consultative fora such as the Loya Jirga, seemed to bring consensus about new political frameworks, but the choice had already been made as to the imposition of a Western-backed president to whom this method, coupled with highly mediatised national elections, seemed to provide ex post legitimacy. The Constitution secured the president a very high degree of influence. During the presidential

38 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Michael Schoistwhohd, ‘Playing with Fire? The International Community’s Democratization Experiment in Afghanistan’, Journal of International Peacekeeping 15 (2), April 2008, pp. 252-267.

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elections, a number of political manoeuvres came to influence the outcomes: US and UN officials apparently persuaded the main opposition candidate, Yunus Qanuni, to step down; refugees in Pakistan were registered in mass allowing for a Pashtun vote, and those in Iran, who would have voted for Tajik candidates, encountered so-called logistical difficulties; there was massive international pressure for the West’s preferred candidate. During the parliamentary elections, political parties were banned from standing for election, to ensure unlimited presidential influence; at the same time, election laws were not followed, as candidates with links to militant groups were allowed to be nominated.The end result was that Afghans were most confused as to the difference between ‘old’ and ‘new democracy’ and as to why democracy should be promoted when all efforts were used to install a preferred candidate. They elected candidates for Parliament without any understanding of what their responsibility would be. The Bonn Agreement had also not adequately taken into account the need for a reconciliation process. Brahimi saw Bonn as a peace process amongst the royalists, the mujahideen, and communist parties. The Taliban, however, were excluded under US request, owing to the misconception at the time that the Taliban were a matter of the past. As a result, the Bonn Agreement was not an indigenous peace accord in the first place; it was an externally-mediated agreement among victors in a war, won primarily by the US. In the long run, the marginalisation of the Taliban impeded the possibility of reconciliation, on the one hand, and led to a false premise that the war had been won or settled, on the other. Brahimi himself conceded in hindsight to the mistakes committed in the Bonn process. In a briefing to the Security Council in September 2008, Brahimi recalled that at the 2001 Afghanistan peace talks there had been immense pressure to conclude an agreement within a few days, although several months were required. Nor had it been possible to pursue a genuinely inclusive political process because political realities demanded the contrary. In the words of Brahimi, ‘But we also failed, later, to reach out to many constituencies who might have joined the political process. It should have been clear to us, all along, that those who were absent would have no stake in the success of the agreement and would obstruct its implementation.’39 Legitimacy for democratisation may be lost when the West and the UN are seen as ‘engineering’ institutional processes. Democratic processes not fully explained and not rooted in local traditions are doomed to limited legitimacy. b) Failed state-building? Most importantly, by 2008 there were indications that the agenda of liberal state-building had also failed. The West had wanted to impose democratisation with emphasis on human rights, gender equality and political participation.Traditional Afghan forces, however, were not ready to accept such changes, especially if they failed to provide the everyday bread on the table. Lack of genuine commitment to justice and accountability had led to impunity for human rights violations, undermining confidence in the rule of law. In the meantime, corruption in government institutions had seriously 39

Lakhdar Brahimi briefing the Security Council at the 23 September 2008 debate. 51

eroded institutional trust, and donors required improvements in the quality of the Administration and curbing of corruption before delivering more aid to the budget. Most importantly, corruption had undermined people’s confidence in the government’s capacities and will to deliver. In December 2008, Kai Eide reported that in only three years Afghanistan had dropped from 119th out of 159 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index to the fifth last in the world. Overall, the democratic state-building agenda had been largely problematic in design and practice. Given that the reconstruction project in Afghanistan did not begin on the basis of established real needs-assessments or a carefully planned process based on agreements among all parties to the conflict, but rather as part of a rushed ‘knee-jerk reaction’ by external actors to the sequence of events that followed 9/11, the country’s absorption capacities were overlooked, leading to short- and longterm deficiencies in the delivery and impact of the aid and state-building. In the rushed attempt to (re)create a state, the credibility of institutions, the long-term capacity and needs, and nation-building through reconciliation were omitted. c) Underlying problem: A political mandate during the primacy of a military operation Ultimately, however, no matter what the authority and resources of the UN mission were, the successful implementation of the resolutions in Afghanistan was hampered by an overarching structural problem: there was not, and in the final analysis there had never been, a peace to keep in Afghanistan. Lack of peace made objectives difficult to reach on the ground structurally, no matter what mechanisms were used and how broad and consensual UN mandates were. When it came to redesigning the international presence in Afghanistan post-11 September 2001, the separation of the political stream from the military one reflected, in a sense, ambiguities about the ‘peace’ that had been negotiated at Bonn by the Security Council. The fact that security enforcement was given to coalition countries and not the UN was an indication that, at the Security Council, the two tasks of nation- and state-building and stabilisation and securitisation were seen as different exercises, each led by different interests. This separation also hinted at differences that existed between a political process, which needed to be followed through an impartial UN, and a stabilisation process which risked being, and subsequently became, engulfed in the conflict as a party to war. In effect, the mandates of two Security Council-authorised entities seemed incompatible at best and contradictory at worst: the strategic goals of UNAMA of legitimising a political process and state-building clashed with the stabilisation objectives of ISAF. The further contradiction came when ISAF began to undertake PRT operations, considered by many to be in conflict with the reconstruction and development mandate given to the UN by the Security Council. In the meantime, the UNAMA office maintained its own military advisers, who reported on the generic military situation to the SRSG. According to one old Afghanistan hand who had worked in the UN for many years, it was important for UNAMA to have access to its own military information, and the Security Council needed to be informed by ‘neutral’ elements, and not ISAF, which was seen as representing the interests of lead nations first and of NATO subsequently. If the situation was to be rectified, argued this specific interlocutor, a proper UN peacekeeping mission would have been necessary, complete with its own military and police component.This however, would not have served 52

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the interests of Security Council members, who were themselves individually involved, outside of the UN alliance, as lead nations for the police, or for contributing and leading troops as part of NATO or OEF. Ultimately, the main impediment to the success of the UN in Afghanistan lays in the fact that the international intervention is not a classic peacekeeping one but a military campaign, and the UN is not at an advantage during military interventions led or initiated by other countries.The views presented in the 2009 Annual Review of Global Peace Operations are therefore applicable to the case of Afghanistan: when peace operations engage in war-fighting, the diffuse nature of peace operations command structures are accentuated and present a series of operational and doctrinal dilemmas. Thus, ‘[p]eace operations work best when they are not only authorised internationally but also invited to deploy under the terms of a peace agreement, offering both local and international legitimacy. When peacekeepers are asked to identify enemies, the legitimacy of the operation can be called into question’. The use of force by peacekeepers also becomes a problem: ‘[b]lurring the line between peacekeeping and war-fighting runs the risk of compromising the entire peacekeeping enterprise. For this reason peace operations should be kept doctrinally and organisationally distinct from combat operations’.40

V. Chapter VII in Afghanistan

1. Security Council dynamics: Retrospectively

For its involvement with Afghanistan, the Security Council acted in constant reaction: it was presented with a fait accompli after the 9/11 attacks solicited action in self-defence by one of the P5 members. The various mandate evolutions came as a result of consensus that had been reached in Kabul among various actors, on the one hand, and among political powers behind the scene on the other.The Security Council became, in the case of Afghanistan, a platform for authorising the results of prior negotiations. Yet, although it is often said that the Security Council reunited countries that already had consensus on the case of Afghanistan, it was in the details that dissent could be observed. For a number of years, it was Russia and China that kept Afghanistan on the Security Council agenda.The United States would have wanted to have broad consensus but drive discussions away from details. Under the Obama Administration, however, it is expected that Council discussions on Afghanistan will increase. Looking back at the first eight years of debates post-11 September, it is possible to make six sets of conclusions in terms of the political dynamics within the Security Council: 40 William J. Durch and Madeline L. England, The Purposes of Peace Operations. Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2009 Briefing Paper, New York: Center on International Cooperation, with the support of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2009, p. 4.

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a) First, there was general consensus among the P5 on the need for action in Afghanistan and general support for the three streams of resolutions (related to the sanctions, to UNAMA, and to ISAF). Consensus was reached on a number of issues throughout the years: on the need for engaging in Afghanistan because of the danger that the power vacuum, created between the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the 11 September 2001 attacks, had represented for the international community at large. There was also consensus for fielding a separate UN political mission to support the state-building efforts, and an international military one for securitisation purposes. Throughout the years, there was consensus on the deterioration of the security situation in general, and the need for more comprehensive approaches. Elections, institution- and capacity-building were also always consensual.The need to allocate resources both for the UN mission, for the different sectoral interventions, and for the Government of Afghanistan was also a matter of verbal consensus in Council debates. Furthermore, Security Council members and observers were unanimous in their support for frameworks such as the Bonn Agreement, the Compact and the ANDS for coordinating aid, and for aid in itself to be more transparent, accountable and effective, especially after reports by international NGOs denouncing corruption and waste both on the part of the government and the international community. A ‘surge’ in the support to UNAMA for implementing the more ambitious resolution of 1806 in 2008 also found unanimous support. Council members were also in parole united in their desire to see more ownership by the Afghan government, including more capacity for its police and national army. Finally, there was consensus that a military solution was not sufficient to stabilise Afghanistan. b) Despite general consensus and underlying unanimous assumptions, the devil was in the details: discussions at the Security Council concentrated primarily on the political and institutional situation, with the US ensuring that the details of the security operation would not be discussed at the Council per se. Details of the military operation were relegated to Brussels for the NATO/ISAF operation and to Washington for the OEF one. In this sense, the US wanted to have a free hand in Afghanistan.The Security Council had authorised the military operation by NATO but did not have any power or authority over the action of a regional organisation.The rules of engagement for ISAF, for instance, were not discussed or decided by the Security Council but by NATO. Discussions at the Security Council were also toned down because a part of the P5 members was already present in Afghanistan as part of military coalitions and decided matters outside the Council. Another absent item on the Security Council agenda was a discussion on the influence of Pakistan on the destabilisation of Afghanistan until mid-2008.41 c) Despite the fact that one Security Council member, namely the US, initially dominated by virtue of having started the operation in Afghanistan and being the largest contributor both in terms of financing for development activities and military personnel, as the security situation deteriorated, the power of the United States was increasingly challenged by a China-Russia-Southern countries coalition of dissent during more elaborated debates often led by non-P5 members (Qatar in 2007; Libya in 2008). 41 Much to the discontentment of the Foreign Minister and the Afghan Ambassador to the UN. According to one DPA official, Tom Koenigs had become PNGed in Pakistan for raising the alarm over their role.

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Russia was one country that consistently created dissent at Security Council debates on Afghanistan. In 2007, it abstained from the vote extending ISAF’s mandate, protesting over the inclusion of maritime interdiction for OEF.Together with China and some Southern observers, it specifically chided ISAF troops for causing civilian deaths. And given its dissent over the potential negotiations with the Taliban, it dampened enthusiasm to tackle the question of negotiations directly at the Council. By 2008, European P5 countries and the US wanted to have negotiations with the rank-and-file of the Taliban. Russia, however, did not want reconciliation with whom it considered as criminals, Taliban leaders who were on the 1267 sanctions list. Russia’s powerful blockage explains why negotiations with the Taliban were not directly discussed during Security Council debates, although by 2008 it was clear that they had already started in various fronts. d) The debates at the Council, open to Iran, Pakistan,Afghanistan, and India as interested countries, reflected the reality of a North-South, East-West divide in the UN. European countries, notably the Nordic ones, kept insisting on the human rights component to stay on the agenda. They were also the ones who raised concerns over transparency, competence and representativeness of Afghan institutions, naming specifically the problem of corruption. If European countries became the defenders of first generation political rights, developing countries in addition to China and Russia consistently argued for second-generation rights. In 2008, for example, there was consensus to aid the government in its economic and political challenges, but the US and European countries specifically mentioned the need for reforms and curbing of corruption, hinting at their discontentment with the legitimacy of the government, while China, Russia, and Southern countries refrained from blaming the government and instead concentrated on the economic challenges and poverty in the country as more structural problems. All Security Council countries wanted to see more from ISAF and UNAMA and agreed in principle that more resources were needed for these operations. Iran and Russia, however, wanted to see more direct support to the Afghan national armed forces and law enforcement with modern weapons in addition to training. Russia also wanted to see a breakdown and rationale for the proposed expansion of UNAMA, and China in general preferred to see a shorter mandate for UNAMA with a clear exit strategy. e) The debates at the Security Council were also an opportunity for countries to claim ownership over certain sectors, mirroring and legitimising the ‘lead nation’ modality agreed upon as early as 2002, or for showing the intention or desire to be associated with part of the solution. In this sense, Security Council debates came to reflect a forum for the ‘marking of territory’. In the statements made by different Council members, for example, each highlighted the concrete support they had provided for Afghanistan, either bilaterally or through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). EU countries stressed their role in tackling the issue of human rights abuses and the need for policing, to which they had contributed through the 170-strong European Police Mission. Japan, as the lead donor for DDR activities, reported on achievements in that sector. Iran, as an observer during the July 2008 debate, highlighted the support it provided for the three million refugees it hosted, as well as its experiences with curbing of drug trafficking for which it sought international legitimacy. Russia heralded the ongoing initiatives, outside of the UN framework, by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) inviting NATO/ISAF to join the CSTO on anti-terrorism and anti-drugs initiatives. f) Overall, the role of the Security Council in Afghanistan was one of giving authority to decisions made outside of its corridors and, therefore, it reflected the inter-governmental function of the 55

institution, with each country acting through national interest, rather than its trans-governmental function of creating a common good and implementing it in a coherent and effective manner.There may have been consensus amongst the P5, but the Security Council did not have the authority or the leverage to be effective. It adopted resolutions but could not give enough resources and the necessary mechanisms to implement them. After the 1990s, the Security Council had become what one UN official called an ‘ongoing seminar’, a forum of debates and discussions on general cooperation but without proper authority to move from the generic to the specific. According to another high-level official interviewed for this study, the handing over of authority to regional organisations, such as NATO in this case, and being overshadowed by one particular member’s interests, was a reflection of the weakness of the Security Council as an institution, which, given its lack of reforms, had lost its authority. More fundamentally, however, there was the question of diffused ownership over the operation and whether, ultimately, the Afghan engagement was a peacekeeping or war-fighting mission; whether it was primarily set up for state-building or for stabilisation. Furthermore, even though the Afghan operation was conceived as part of an international war against terror which solicited a Chapter VII imperative to protect international security, the question remains as to what happens to the relevance of such mandates when a national government gains full sovereignty.

2. What does Chapter VII really mean?

Of the three streams of resolutions for Afghanistan, ISAF and the sanctions regime were designed under the Chapter VII umbrella, while UNAMA, in virtue of being a political mission in support of the government, was not technically a Chapter VII intervention. The UN did not have police, military components or security installations, even though it did have military advisers. ISAF, however, was not accountable to the UN, despite its being authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII. According to an internal memo at the DPKO viewed by this project team, there is a lack of clarity about the legal basis for peacekeeping operations and the operational implication of the Security Council invocation of Chapter VII. Historically, Chapter VI was the reference for traditional peacekeeping operations and Chapter VII for enforcement-oriented operations. In recent years, the Council has adopted the practice of explicitly invoking Chapter VII (Chapter VI has never been invoked) or mandating peacekeeping forces to perform specific tasks without specifying the chapter, but drawing on the language in Chapter VII. Invocation of Chapter VII denotes the legal basis for action and signals firm political resolves as well as reminding the parties and the wider UN membership of their obligation to give effects to its decisions.Yet, as the memo noted, in reality the Council does not need to refer to a specific chapter of the Charter when adopting or extending resolutions for UN peacekeeping operations.The missions should be guided not by references to the chapters involved but by the tasks specified in their mandate, by the accompanying rules of engagement and by other directions pertaining to the use of force and international humanitarian law. 56

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In cases like Afghanistan’s, where the UN delegated its responsibilities to a regional organisation, however, the defeating factor was that even when Chapter VII was invoked the UN had no authority. In cases when UN authorisations happen after the use of force, as was the case in Afghanistan, where OEF operations had already started before ISAF was created, the invocation of Chapter VII may in fact mean little.The real alliance-building and decision to act happened outside of the Council’s negotiations. In this sense, invocation of Chapter VII becomes associated with forceful action. The result is the overstretching of peacekeeping in situations where there is no peace to keep — Afghanistan squarely applies in this category. The use of Chapter VII in a resolution is supposed to invoke legitimacy and consensus from national actors.Yet, as national actors are hardly consulted in the preparation of mandates, and, as is often the case, national actors, especially in situations of regime change, may not be sufficiently accountable, the question is raised about the issues of sovereignty and national consensus. From the point of view of the national government, reference to Chapter VII does matter. Haiti, for example, had asked for the removal of references to Chapter VII in the Security Council resolutions in order to maintain investor confidence. In the case of Afghanistan, as the government, created through the UN-led Bonn process, gained capacity, legitimacy and sovereignty, it increasingly became critical of the use of force in its territory, especially in discord and in the absence of coordination with its own national forces.

3. Perceptions from the viewpoint of the national government

Interviews conducted for this project with high-level members of the Afghan government confirmed that it was not properly consulted in the preparation of Security Council resolutions for Afghanistan. According to one high-level official interviewed, the draft resolutions were showed to the government a day before they were to be presented at the Council. Another claimed that while Afghans wanted proper consultation, all they would get was a request to give permission. It is granted, however, that what was going to be in the resolutions themselves did not hold any secrets: they had been designed through action on the ground and, in the case of mandate renewals, already tested and implemented. Likewise, it was also granted that the resolutions, in principle, would not include text that would be against the wishes of the Government of Afghanistan, especially with regard to UNAMA.Yet, according to the government officials interviewed, sovereignty required consultation with national actors. At the same time, however, these officials conceded that Afghans did not have the proper capacity to be able to have input into the resolutions, or negotiate over the texts, if such opening were normatively provided to countries where interventions took place.The Afghan Ambassador at the UN, however, did raise a few times objections to reports presented at the United Nations, which in the government’s view did not reflect a true picture of the country. In December 2008, for example, Ambassador Tanin presented a strong objection to a report issued by International Council on Security and Development of the Department of Children and Armed Conflict presented at the Security Council meeting on Children and Armed Conflict in Afghanistan, which examined the monitoring of the implementation 57

of resolution 1612 (2005) on the protection of children during conflict. He rejected the report due to its questionable methodology, its questionable understanding of the political and socioeconomic realities in Afghanistan, and for misidentifying both the causes and the solutions to the grave abuse of children’s rights. The UNAMA operation, seen from the point of the view of the Afghan government as an operation to support a sovereign nation, consistently earned positive evaluation, at least formally, and the efforts of the SRSG were appreciated.The UN had rendered legitimacy to the government through the Bonn process, and it now needed to build on the gains. For the government officials interviewed for this study, however, it was not the UN resolutions or UNAMA actions but NATO decisions and US strategies that required more forceful scrutiny by national counterparts. The objection that the government did raise, by 2008, when civilian casualties as a result of military action, including by international forces, had reached their peak, was a request for a revision of the Status of Force Agreement with OEF forces.The government had already signed a detailed MilitaryTechnical Agreement and a Strategic Agreement with ISAF, and, in any case, as ISAF troops operated explicitly with a Chapter VII mandate, the host country could not limit their operation. But it was the US forces in Afghanistan that raised more concerns for government. As civilian casualties, insecurity and insurgency mounted, the Afghan government wanted more control over the international forces and requested a better definition of their role. According to one official, forces should not be seen as occupiers, ignoring local cultural sentiments. If the US operation had initially started under the right of self-defence, and that of ISAF under a mandate to provide security for Kabul, the role of international forces had mutated to stabilisation and counter-insurgency. Such mutation needed to be renegotiated with the sovereign government. Yet, as one diplomat familiar with the debates conceded, no one had hinted at a role for the Security Council in the relationship between the Afghan government and international troops. It was not, at any rate, at the Security Council but at NATO headquarters that such decisions would have been discussed.The Afghan government, in the meantime, did not have a specific representative in Brussels other than the embassy staff that would attend the summits as observers. Overall, the Afghan government lacked the resources and capacity for fielding expert negotiators. But the problem was not one of capacity only, but also one of legitimacy as a sovereign nation to decide on what goes on in its territory, even though the territory was ultimately used in the context of a global war against terror. Karzai, showing his frustration at the end of 2008 with the lack of success and the intensification of blowback reactions, asked the visiting Security Council mission to provide a concrete timetable for ending the war, otherwise he would have to have free hand to find his own peace, presumably by negotiating with the Taliban. He had also on numerous occasions criticised the PRTs for having created a parallel government and undermining the work of provincial governments. As the security situation deteriorated, however, criticism and accusations became mutual.The Government of Afghanistan was accused by the international community of being increasingly corrupt, unaccountable, weak, and incapacitated. In January 2009, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer claimed in an op-ed in the Washington Post that the current Afghan authorities were almost as much to blame for the country’s ‘dire straits’ as the resurgent Taliban and that the Afghan government was plagued by corruption and lacked efficiency in problem-solving. 58

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Yet, according to high-level Afghan officials, criticism of the government was misplaced because ISAF/NATO and OEF operations worked without coordination with the National Army and National Police, without coordination among themselves, and without coordination with government policies, an accusation increasingly made not only about military operations but also about the actions of the international community in general.The Afghan government also wanted NATO to be involved in the monitoring of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and wanted the question of Pakistan to be debated at the Security Council. During the 9 July 2008 debate at the Security Council, for instance, the Afghan foreign minister claimed that one of the main factors contributing to the deterioration of the security was the de facto truce in the tribal areas beyond Afghan borders. Yet, it was apparent that the international community needed the Afghan national government for breaking the cycle of violence, as much as the latter relied on the former for not withdrawing prematurely.The stabilisation of Afghanistan was as much a matter of interest to the Afghans as it was to the international community. When the new US strategy for Afghanistan was being redesigned under the Obama Administration in late 2008, there was a first step properly to involve the Afghans themselves in the process, and a delegation headed by the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan went to Washington in a bid to be included in consultations around the new design.

VI. Is an exit strategy viable? In the Security Council resolutions no exit strategies were clearly spelled out both for operational and, especially, political purposes, neither for ISAF nor for UNAMA. The ISAF resolutions were narrow to begin with, but as they became increasingly engulfed in the NATO operation, the exit strategy for ISAF/NATO became the unwritten goal of defeating insurgency in Afghanistan. The Obama Administration has revised the US strategy of reaching democracy in Afghanistan, and seeks a more limited objective aimed at getting the troops out in the long term. In the short term, this implies infusing more international troops into the country while devising a strategy of handing over control to Afghan security forces, both the army and the police, whose numbers the US Administration estimates will substantially increase by 2011. However, the short-term strategy would make the longer-term one a de facto moving target. The more US and NATO troops arrive in Afghanistan, the more resentment, resistance and violence ensue from a population increasingly associating the international intervention with national occupation. There ultimately could not be a stabilisation strategy for a mission engulfed in war fighting. For the UNAMA mission, the benchmarks within the resolutions were the achievements of specific short-term, 3-5 years blueprints: implementation of the Bonn Agreement, followed by the Compact, the ANDS, and so forth. In reality, however, the state-building mission kept increasing its scope, even with the completion of the different processes. On the one hand, the Security Council, by defining specific timelines, hesitated in committing to long-term state-building, especially in view of the 59

deterioration of the security situation. On the other hand, an untimely retreat from Afghanistan became increasingly impossible as not only state-building but increasingly the temporary peace in Afghanistan became an illusion.This was reflected in the extra responsibilities that the Council kept adding to the mandate of UNAMA. Speaking about an exit strategy would have been a wrong political move as it would have meant a lack of commitment by the international community to the enduring problem of Afghanistan. It was also an increasingly impossible strategy operationally. Both streams of resolutions at the Security Council were ultimately linked in a quagmire, one undoing achievements in the other, one unable to operate without the other, and both trying to achieve a moving target, that of long lasting peace in Afghanistan.

1. Negotiation as an exit strategy?

By the end of 2008, it had become apparent that a political solution was necessary, even though a military surge was expected with the additional 17,000 US troops that the Obama Administration was planning to send to the country, as well as additional NATO troops that were solicited at the Strasbourg meeting in the beginning of April 2009. The political solution, however, was a minimal one: negotiating power-sharing with elements of the Taliban, even though the possible inclusion of any active functionaries of the Taliban movement who had been placed on the Consolidated List could violate UN resolution 1267 (1999). Unlike other peacemaking operations, when the UN was usually tasked with brokering talks between conflicting parties, in Afghanistan negotiations were being carried out by different parties, sometimes along contradictory dictates. Furthermore, as parts of the international community, the US and NATO were themselves parties to a war against insurgencies; therefore, third-party negotiations by the UN were imperative. Yet, the UN mandate, as stipulated by the Security Council, requested it to be officially asked by the government to launch reconciliation, while national reconciliation was not a project that could be properly owned by the Karzai government in the first place. In the final analysis, however, negotiation with the Taliban, and their eventual inclusion in the political process, was not going to prove a viable exit strategy for the international community. Although negotiations could have tackled the problem of insecurity through power-sharing mechanisms that would disarm the insurgency, they would not have addressed the long-term needs of nation-building in Afghanistan. For the Tajik and Uzbek political parties, for example, the inclusion of more Pashtun elements in the government through negotiation with the Taliban raised fears of ethnic dominance, and federalism was being proposed as a solution, even though the Afghan economic and political system would have major challenges in implementing a peaceful decentralisation. Furthermore, negotiations with the Taliban could also have put the international community in a situation of compromising over values, such as for example women’s rights, which would have been detrimental to gains made in the past eight years. Without reconciling the demands of national unity, sovereignty for Afghanistan, and 60

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welfare for the citizens, returning the Taliban to the political map was not going to be an easy exit strategy for the international community. ‘Afghanisation’, the general goal repeated in the different resolutions, and which was, perhaps, a pseudonym for sovereignty, would have been a proper exit strategy for Afghanistan.There was perhaps from the beginning an inherent hesitation as to how the subject of sovereignty was tackled in Afghanistan. As one Western diplomat said, Afghanistan was not supposed to be a trusteeship of the UN, but a sovereign nation.Yet, when the budget of the international community far surpassed the one available to the Government of Afghanistan, the modality in practice, if not on paper, was that of a trusteeship; likewise, as the number of national police and army, and their limited capabilities, could not compare with the increasing number of international troops coming into the country, the Afghan state could not even begin to be in control of the legitimate use of force. With limited government institutional capacity, massive enduring poverty and unemployment, heavy sustained dependency on external donors for the recurrent budget, and lack of monopoly over the use of force in its own territory, the full sovereignty of Afghanistan required more than what the international community could provide in terms of ‘Afghanisation’. As the country prepared for presidential elections in late summer of 2009 and parliamentary elections the year after, the puzzle was whether theTaliban would take part in the political process or remain outside of it, and whether the government, after the elections, would be able to deliver more effectively and transparently the public goods increasingly demanded by the Afghan people. In the meantime, for the international community, the two pressing priorities were to transform the international presence from a heavily militarised operation to a civilian one, and to shift it from the externally-directed focus into a locally-owned enterprise.

2. The long-term danger: Regional bleeding out

Although the ‘war on terror’ that started in September 2001 was meant to address the dangers that the capture of weak or non-existent states by globalised extremist networks presented for international security, it became increasingly clear that instability in Afghanistan had an immediate and primary negative bleeding out effect on the security situation of the immediate neighbourhood.The alarming rate at which Taliban activities became radicalised in Pakistan demonstrated how porous borders, trafficking of narcotics, weapons and criminal activities, including terrorism and extremism, were concerns to the entire set of countries that share immediate borders with Afghanistan. Since they share frontiers, histories, ethnic populations and common threats, the countries of the neighbourhood, including Pakistan, Iran, China, and the Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan,Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are interlinked in a common regional security complex: their security problems cannot be analysed or resolved separately. As each set of countries is also locked in a security complex with its own neighbours, a larger circle of countries is potentially affected, ranging from India to Russia. Although the priority for the US Administration is increasingly focused on avoiding runaway radicalisation in Pakistan, a regional strategy is imperative to address common potential vulnerabilities 61

as well as opportunities that the wider neighbourhood represents. Although the UN may be the most legitimate actor to be able to ‘broker’ regional cooperation, its effectiveness, resources and leadership are less formidable than those of the United States. Yet, the design and implementation of a regional strategy is not without its pitfalls. Focus has to remain on stabilising Afghanistan and preventing the descent into chaos of Pakistan. Any efforts to create larger groupings could result in endless conversations with no results, as it would be difficult to reach wide consensus. However, leaving out key players that have more long-term stakes cannot be envisaged either. Central Asian countries, for example, may not want directly to take part in solving the security problems of Afghanistan, but they are potentially impacted by transiting of drugs, terrorism and proliferation of arms.There are also a number of limitations to regional cooperation, including lack of capacity, trust, leadership and motivation. The mistrust between the international community and a number of countries in the region also has an impact on the legitimacy of cooperation: the war of words on the nuclear affair between Iran and the international community, competition over resources that sees a more assertive engagement of China, question marks about the scope of Russian influence in Central Asia, and the presence of NATO and US troops in the region are all unresolved matters that have their direct impacts on trust enhancement. More mechanisms are needed to fill the absence of a cooperation framework amongst regional actors and external stakeholders. For the UN, a regional strategy cannot be limited to the implementation of isolated and small-scale projects or initiatives, be they in the field of development or military security, without taking into consideration the wider implications and linkages. Ultimately, however, regional stability and development have to be driven by the region and not from the outside, while extra-regional institutions could play a role in facilitating these processes. Countries in the region need to be more positively engaged and refrain from using Afghanistan to settle their other scores. At the end of the day, one of the most important factors is the rooting of a strong government in Afghanistan which can manoeuvre amongst the different interests in the region. The success of international efforts to foster security and economic growth in Afghanistan is linked to the wider stabilisation and development in the states in its proximity, a fact expected to be noted at the Security Council in the coming years.

VII. Implementation of resolution 1325 (2000)

After the highly-mediatised portrayal of the gender apartheid that women were experiencing during the Taliban regime, banned from access to education, employment and health services, and the public sphere, one of the much-publicised reasons for toppling the Taliban was to ensure that the rights of women were respected.The implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security in such a context was a moral imperative.Yet, Afghanistan continued to present a particularly challenging environment for the implementation of this resolution. International action was seriously limited where the gun ruled over the rule of law; where the Taliban decrees that denied 62

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women’s rights were still being enforced in many parts of the country; and where fear of violence and sexual harassment drove women away from public spaces.42

1.The Security Council and resolution 1325 (2000)

In the various debates at the Security Council, it was the European countries which were most vocal about concerns over violations of human rights, including those of women and their access to education and public office. Explicit language with regard to resolution 1325 (2000), however, made an appearance relatively late in the various Council resolutions. UNAMA-related resolutions only began making references in their preambles to resolution 1325 (2000) in 2007, and it was only in the 2008 resolutions that terms were added to condemn the continuing discrimination and violence against women and girls and the need to implement resolution 1325 (2000) and report on it. Until then, the texts of UNAMA’s mandates only referred to the recommendations contained in the reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan, which, however, systematically detailed all that was happening concerning women’s human rights and participation during the initial Bonn process, as well as progress made on institutional set-ups. By 2004 the Council also explicitly asked UNAMA to ‘assist in the full implementation of the human rights provisions of the Afghan Constitution and international treaties to which Afghanistan is a state party, in particular those regarding the full enjoyment by women of their human rights’.This standard phrase was included in extensions provided to UNAMA from 2005 to 2009. If the UNAMA mandates stressed the importance of promotion of human rights and participation of women in the political process, protection-related questions were supposed to have appeared instead in the ISAF resolutions.Yet, there too references to resolution 1325 (2000) only appeared in the 2007 and 2008 resolutions, but without any details in terms of specific responsibilities towards the protection of women. Resolution 1386, which had authorised the establishment of ISAF in December 2001, stressed that ‘all Afghan forces must adhere strictly to their obligations under human rights law, including respect for the rights of women, and under international humanitarian law’, but did not make explicit mention to the protection of women. No language on women or gender issues appeared in the resolutions extending the ISAF presence between 2002 and 2006. Progress on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) in Afghanistan was monitored and reported not by the Security Council, but by the Secretariat bodies and thematic groups.The Secretary-General, in his detailed reports on the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security, consistently provided updates for the Council on progress and challenges concerning the human rights situation of women and their participation in the new institutional set-ups. Afghanistan 42

Medica mondiale, ‘Women, Peace and Security in Afghanistan: Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, Six Years On: Post-Bonn Gains And Gaps’, October 2007. 63

was analysed at the General Assembly as well as in two functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council (the Commissions on the Status of Women and on Human Rights) and expert bodies, such as the Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, where the Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan at the UN Human Rights Commission gave frequent updates and raised concerns over the continued abuses and violations of the human rights of women and girls until 2006. In addition, the situation of girls in Afghanistan was highlighted by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict. There was, however, no working mechanism for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) specifically responding to the Security Council, apart from the UN system-wide Action Plan on said resolution. Women’s organisations were lobbying the Security Council for it to appoint a working group on women, peace and security with a task force on Afghanistan but they had not been successful so far.

2. Institutional mechanisms at UNAMA and at the UNCT

In the initial years of the UNAMA operation, the institutional set-up began answering the requirements from headquarters on mainstreaming gender into peacekeeping activities. By 2002, a Gender Unit was created and gender focal points appointed in the field offices, tasked with mainstreaming gender into the activities of UNAMA at the national and provincial levels. From 2002 to 2005, the UNAMA institutional set-up carried out a number of gender-related activities, including awareness-raising, training and capacity-building, both in-house and for Afghan counterparts. An Action Plan was presented to the UN Operations Managers Team that recommended the collection of sex-disaggregated data on the composition of the national and international staff of the UN. In August 2005, UNAMA also launched a mission-wide information campaign and a mandatory staff training programme on prevention of and response to sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual harassment. After 2006, however, UNAMA’s gender activities suffered from the vacancy of the post of the gender adviser for almost two years. During those years, a staff member from the Division for the Advancement of Women of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs at headquarters was seconded to serve as adviser in UNAMA on an interim basis. By the time another gender adviser was appointed in early 2008, the post had been vacant since September 2006. Because of frequent staff changes, institutional memory could not be sustained at UNAMA, a fact that was detrimental to the implementation of the resolutions. In terms of accountability, the UNAMA gender adviser reported to the DSRSG in charge of the Humanitarian and Development Pillar and had little direct access to the SRSG. If DPKO directives encouraged senior officials’ accountability for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), in Afghanistan this was very much left up to the personal commitment of the leadership. Yet, given the high turnover of UN staff, this was not the most desirable practice. By the end of 2008, the new 64

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gender adviser had carried out an exercise about awareness of resolution 1325 (2000) and found that, overall, UN staff were not sufficiently aware of this resolution nor of the DPKO gender policy in general, and only a selected group had received training.There seemed to be little interest in training from management. Opportunities were also being lost in terms of collecting disaggregated data through UN projects implemented at the sub-national levels, since information was not being shared with the gender adviser. Better communication, information-sharing and reporting architecture needed to be implemented at the UNAMA level between the gender focal points of all the regional offices and units and the gender adviser. In early 2009, when research was being carried out for this project, UNAMA was involved in the preparation of reporting on resolution 1820 (2008) as an input into the Secretary-General’s report due in June. UNAMA’s chief of staff had been appointed as the head of the task force in charge of preparing the report together with stakeholders. Senior managers were taking the focus on reporting on resolution 1820 (2008) seriously because it was required. If reporting had also been required with a precise deadline for resolution 1325 (2000), it would have provided an impetus to take stock on what had been achieved and what remained to be done. Since 2002, under the auspices of UNAMA’s Gender Unit, a Kabul-based UN inter-agency gender network was tasked with providing technical assistance to agencies in the areas of training, gender analysis of staffing and activity reporting. Although most UN agencies had appointed gender focal points, the UN country team did not have a joint action plan for resolution 1325 (2000). The work of the UNCT could also have improved by creating a working group on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) and building on the findings of previous conferences, workshops and information campaigns held on the resolution in Afghanistan. The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and UNDP, in the meantime, were the agencies most active in gender programming. UNIFEM, for instance, had programmes on economic empowerment, gender and justice, political participation, violence against women, gender and media, and had launched a comprehensive women, peace and security programme. The Fund also regularly undertook advocacy and educational activities, producing Dari and Pashto newsletters on gender issues, organising events with civil society, and working with female MPs. UNIFEM, however, had not explicitly framed its activities further to strengthen the implementation of the resolution, although it provided training and workshops for civil society organisations and government ministries based on resolution 1325 (2000). UNDP had various programmes on women, including gender-awareness training for government institutions, capacity-building for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA), programmes on awareness-raising for women and education through local media, particularly the radio, as well as the construction of hamams for women.

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3. Implementation of resolution 1325 (2000)

The provisions of resolution 1325 (2000) can be organised under the rubric of what has come to be known as the ‘3 Ps’: participation of women in peace processes; promotion of women’s human rights, including international standards of human rights that are reflected in national laws, creating accountability mechanisms; and protection of women in war and peace, including protection from gender-based violence, in particular from rape and other forms of sexual violence. Participation of women in the peace process Given the unique feature of post-conflict state-building in Afghanistan in the absence of a standard peace process, the issue of women’s participation can be divided into two lines of query: to what extent women participated 1) in the political process set out at Bonn and 2) in the eventual peace process which unfolded through negotiations with the Taliban after 2006. In a nutshell, although the UN mission was successful in institutionalising the de jure and de facto participation of women in the Bonn process between 2002 and 2005, it is also possible to claim that women were completely ignored, both in terms of physical representation and issue-related representation, in the various negotiations that have sprung in recent years. a) Bonn process The Bonn Agreement committed the country to a ‘broad based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government’. With the help of the UN, notably UNAMA, UNIFEM, and UNDP, women took relatively important steps in the first institutions that were set up to implement the Bonn Agreement. In June 2002, women accounted for 12.5 per cent of the delegates who participated in the Emergency Loya Jirga, and, in December 2003, they made up 20 per cent of the delegates at the Constitutional Loya Jirga.The Constitution Drafting Commission consisted of nine members of which two were women.The Constitution adopted on 4 January 2004 states that ‘[t]he citizens of Afghanistan — whether woman or man — have equal rights and duties before the law’. The Constitution also stipulated a number of provisions relating to the political participation of women: article 83 ensured women 25 per cent representation in the lower house of the National Assembly and guarantees were provided for women’s access to public services. In the electoral process that began in December 2003, 41.3 per cent of the 10.5 million Afghans registered to vote were women. One woman, Masooda Jalal, presented herself as candidate for presidency. In March 2004, the Gender Advisory Group established the Election Task Force, chaired by the UNAMA gender adviser, which monitored the participation of women in the electoral process. During the 2004 registrations for the elections, UNAMA and the Joint Electoral Management Body set up separate registration centres reserved for women, hired women registration staff and conducted outreach efforts targeted at female voters and at raising men’s understanding of women’s right to vote. Political participation was also supported through the creation of MOWA, established in 2002 according to the Bonn Agreement, and supported by UNAMA, UNIFEM, and UNDP. MOWA 66

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followed up on the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the National Plan of Action according to the Beijing Platform, but did not have a specific plan for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000). It identified four priority areas, health, education, legal protection and economic empowerment, but not protection. Its activities included gender mainstreaming within the ministries, preparing a sectoral plan and a budget, and working with candidates and voters for the 2004 presidential elections. MOWA opened up departments in 34 provinces and appointed gender focal points within ministries, although their integration and support varied from ministry to ministry. It also assumed secretariat functions as of 2004 of a Gender Advisory Group, which included representatives of national and international organisations. Needs, however, were many: the Ministry lacked sustained support in terms of funding and technical assistance, including training, data collection and analysis. Ministries needed capacity to integrate the gender perspective, and the government had yet to adopt an overall strategy on gender mainstreaming. Frequent changes of ministers and high-level officials within MOWA undermined long-term strategic planning and leadership. When training was conducted, lack of institutionalised follow-up often impeded progress. Despite efforts, however, the results achieved were less than expected. Women rarely occupied strategic or senior-level positions with real power to influence and change government policies. The participation or presence of women did not necessarily lead to meaningful engagement or leadership. At the most, there were three female ministers at one point in the Afghan Cabinet, including that of MOWA, but no politically-sensitive cabinet posts were ever held by women. They were rarely represented in any senior positions at the district level. Similarly, while women’s presence in the Parliament was facilitated by quotas — 23 per cent for the lower house and 33 per cent for the upper house — their presence never meant that they held the same degree of power as male MPs.The large presence of warlords and their affiliates in Parliament silenced many women, intimidating them from arguing against legislation adverse to their interests. b) Women in peace talks? Although resolution 1325 (2000) recalls the importance of the involvement of women in reconciliation processes and encourages talks in post-conflict settings to involve women, in the case of Afghanistan, given the nature of covert negotiations and local peace deals, no women were involved in negotiations. More troubling was the perspective that women’s rights would be subject to compromise if negotiations started with the Taliban. In contrast, track two meetings, such as the August 2007 Peace Jirga between Pakistani and Afghan tribal leaders, supported women’s participation in the informal peace talks. But such Jirgas had come to represent large ‘talk shops’ with little decision-making power. By the end of 2008, UNIFEM was trying to organise women to take an active part in negotiations. It did so, for example, through working with parliamentarians, training them on resolution 1325 (2000) and teaching MPs about the need for a unified message to be carried through the political process: that no negotiations should compromise on women’s rights and no negotiations should happen without women at the table. But women could not participate in peace negotiations, not only because of their lack of preparation, education or leadership, but especially because of the nature of male-dominated 67

negotiations being carried out, in secret, with some members of the Taliban. Ultimately, the main reason they could not participate in the peace process was that Afghanistan was still a conflict situation. Promotion of human rights UNAMA, both through its Human Rights Unit and through its support to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, paid special attention to the promotion of human rights, including women’s rights, which was a recurring mandate in the various Security Council resolutions.The UNAMA Human Rights Unit, supported by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, monitored and investigated, for instance, gender-based violence throughout the country, including domestic violence, forced marriages, kidnapping of young girls by local commanders and attacks against girls’ schools. UNAMA was tasked by the Council to work specifically with the AIHRC, also established in 2002.The Commission included units on women’s rights, human rights education, transitional justice, monitoring and investigation, children’s rights, and people with disabilities. The AIHRC was one of the few Afghan institutions consistently mentioned by the Security Council in all UNAMA-related resolutions for collaboration on human rights. Its chairperson, Sima Samar, addressed the Security Council directly in April 2002, in her former post as the Minister of Women’s Affairs, to stress that the rights of women were put to risk by the absence of security. Yet, AIHRC’s efforts were also hampered by a lack of capacity, particularly in the judicial monitoring programme. Moreover, the environment was not ripe for proper human rights promotion. The official court system was ineffective, biased, and corrupt, and in numerous instances justice was dispensed through the tribal system of community assemblies, through which girls could be awarded as compensation to wronged parties. There were also no effective complaints mechanisms through which to report violence against women. The correlation of national laws with international covenants on human rights took on a particularly high relevance in Afghanistan, given the draconian Taliban edicts, in the name of Islamic law or customary practices, which had effectively kept women out of public life. Despite efforts made in designing and decreeing new laws and cancelling the Taliban decrees post-2001, Afghanistan continued to face a gap between the official legal frameworks and discriminatory customary laws and practices. UNIFEM sought to prepare MPs better to understand the customary laws and cultural practices harmful to women and contradictory to national laws and international covenants. Protection of women and girls, and respect for their rights In October 2001, Human Rights Watch made the following recommendation: The Security Council, together with the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, should press for prompt and thorough investigations both of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including cases of extrajudicial execution of civilians, disappearances, sexual violence and of the system of gender-based persecution established in areas of Taliban rule; and should ensure that violations against women are a separate and specific part of any investigation.43 The exact same recommendation was still applicable in 2008, eight years after the intervention.The same applied to the findings of a 2004 Amnesty International report that claimed that ‘women and 68

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girls risked rape, sexual violence and intimidation in many parts of Afghanistan, and that these abuses had been perpetrated by armed groups with impunity since the fall of the Taliban in 2001’.44 Despite Security Council commitments to the protection of civilians, explicitly mentioned in the ISAF resolutions, not much has been achieved in terms of security and protection for women. The pervasive insecurity in Afghanistan was not conducive to the materialisation of the commitments set out in resolution 1325 (2000). The deteriorating security situation and ongoing terrorist activities continue to affect women’s security and their access to health, education and social protection.Women activists, civil servants, women educators and girls’ teachers, and women in high-profile government positions are especially vulnerable as they are targeted by conservative elements in society that consider collaboration with international organisations a betrayal to national identity. The Afghan Ministry of Defence was made aware of resolution 1325 (2000) through trainings, but the follow-up, in terms of providing gender-sensitivity training for the Afghan National Army as part of its responsibility for the protection of women and children and for DDR was not carried out.The Ministry of Interior had organised a workshop in the summer of 2008 on how resolution 1325 (2000) should be implemented but also needed to take steps towards recruiting female police officers, and convincing commanders in the field of the requirements stipulated in the resolution. Gender training also needed to be provided for the entire police force. UNDP was setting up a gender unit within the Ministry of Interior to build capacity for gender mainstreaming and to integrate gender into SSR. These two ministries need specific resolution 1325 (2000) action plans and strategies. Within the NATO system, a policy on gender-related issues in deployment was developed in consultation with member states, stipulating that all personnel taking part in NATO-led operations should receive appropriate training to make them aware of gender issues, including of resolution 1325 (2000). Although ISAF had a protection mandate in general, prevailing gender norms in Afghanistan restricted ISAF’s interaction with Afghan women and limited the ways in which the force could offer protection from violence. PRTs had more interaction with Afghan civilians, but the low number of women represented in such units meant little interaction with local women. In 2007, the Afghan Women’s Network (AWN), which comprised 57 Afghan women’s organisations, urged NATO to develop a gender policy for its PRTs better to address the specific needs of women. The issue of protection by international troops was especially thorny in Afghanistan, since ISAF/NATO and OEF troops were increasingly accused of showing cultural insensitivity in their military operations, through, for example, entering people’s homes in tribal and traditional Pashtun areas where women were heavily secluded. While protection of civilians, including women, was highlighted as an inherent part of the ISAF mission, the mission had no clearly defined strategy and approach to protect women and girls in particular. Some ISAF troops, notably those from United Kingdom and Germany, were 43 Human Rights Watch, ‘Afghanistan, Humanity Denied: Systematic Violations of Women’s Rights in Afghanistan’, Human Rights Watch Report 13 (5), 1 October 2001. 44 Amnesty International, ‘Women, Peace and Security — Fourth anniversary of Security Council resolution 1325’, October 2004.

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provided with gender sensitivity as part of their pre-deployment training in their home countries, and NATO headquarters occasionally held pre-deployment gender workshops in Brussels.Yet, such gender training was neither mandatory nor institutionalised.

4. Conclusions on resolution 1325 (2000)

While some awareness of resolution 1325 (2000) existed among the international community in Afghanistan, and many different activities had been carried out in the past few years, there was no strategy to coordinate among them under the umbrella of resolution 1325 (2000). There was no unified action plan for its implementation neither by the government, nor by UNAMA or the UN country team. Capacity-building was needed, but so were mechanisms for accountability. Most women’s civil society organisations, or organisations working on gender issues, worked in service delivery, while fewer on advocacy issues. Several women’s organisations were aware of resolution 1325 (2000), which had been translated into Dari, Uzbek and Pashto, yet civil society organisations were not sufficiently rallied behind this specific resolution. Despite the rich resource they represented, women’s organisations were also seldom consulted with regard to peace and security issues, neither in Afghanistan nor in international arenas. In the case of Afghanistan, there was a huge gap between theory and practice, between what was stipulated in the various resolutions and their implementation. At the UN level, the gap was marked less by commitments from the Council than by the lack of resources and capacities, as well as the context of a particularly traditional and insecure society.There is not much evidence that the Security Council paid less de facto attention to gender issues and women’s rights because Afghanistan was a traditional society. Yet, difficulties and obstructions to promote gender equality existed and a highly dynamic political and security situation put various other priorities continuously on the Council agenda. In the meantime, commitment and capacity at senior level in the UN in the field seemed to be ad hoc and inconsistent. Ultimately, protection, one of the pillars of resolution 1325 (2000), could not be adequately implemented, while its absence hampered progress on the other provisions. Resolution 1820 (2008) was easier to report on, given that violence against women was pervasive on the ground. Resolution 1325 (2000), on the other hand, was not easily implemented in a situation where there was no peace, where the legitimacy of political institutions was being questioned, and where international forces were trying to protect the population, provide development assistance, and fight insurgencies all at the same time.

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VIII. Concluding observations

In the final analysis, there was consensus among those interviewed for this project that there had been a general underestimation and under-evaluation of the problem of Afghanistan.The Security Council did not have the proper mechanisms for assessing the situation on the ground proactively, and its increasingly ambitious mandates reflected desperate action as the situation deteriorated.The longer-term creation of stability in Afghanistan and in the region needed a more proactive strategy, one that needed to be worked out before engagement, and not left to ad hoc reactions to unfolding events.The international community, aware of previous disastrous interventions by the British and the Russians, was weary not to allow history to repeat itself. Despite this knowledge, however, it too became engulfed in the Afghan theatre, precisely because it believed that it would be able to design a better liberal peace. It underestimated the role that local tribal politics played, on the one hand, and the value of freedom from occupation that exists in the Afghan ethos, on the other. As a result, an inadequate and incomplete statebuilding project by the international community became incompatible with the war-fighting mission. The case of Afghanistan raises a number of questions for the future of peacekeeping missions: can external forces help bring political stability? If so, how effective can the role of the United Nations be in this process and how can outsourcing of stabilisation to regional security organisations support such a role? To ponder an answer to these questions requires reflection on a number of issues: First, a priori, is an impartial role for the international community. In the case of Afghanistan, lack of impartiality is precisely what hampers the effectiveness and legitimacy of the international presence. By virtue of being created as missions to assist the new government back in 2002, neither UNAMA, as a political mission, nor ISAF, as an originally conceived security force to assist the government in Kabul, can be considered neutral by design.Yet, the question of partiality is further complicated by the mere fact that the troops of some Security Council members are directly engulfed in fighting in Afghanistan. If the military operation is being conducted on behalf of the government against insurgencies, it is a fact that the insurgency has increased directly as a reaction to the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan. In the mind of local Afghan populations, the international community is perceived as being a party to war. Technically, this may not be a wrong perception, given the continuation of the international war against terrorism and Al-Qaida on the territory of Afghanistan, in addition to the other war against insurgents and the Taliban. The double war adds to confusion and increases the militarisation of the campaign at the expense of a political settlement. External actors thus perceived as partial cannot exercise a third-party peacekeeping and peacemaking role. The second, and related, element is clarity about the stage of post-conflict that characterises a peacekeeping operation. In a classical setting, political stabilisation and development are not carried out in tandem with massive stabilisation through military means, especially by the same set of actors, that is, an external ‘international community’, as they are in Afghanistan. The fact that in current complex emergencies the various stages of peace operations are merged may be a growing trend. However, 71

co-existence and the merging of stages can be self-defeating when, as is in the case of Afghanistan, the method adopted by the military in stabilisation undermines the political process by creating more ‘blowback’ reactions. Third, the more pertinent question that stems from the Afghan case is the potential co-existence of the United Nations with regional security actors such as NATO. In an optimistic scenario, the two can cooperate through a division of labour: while security organisations clear the terrain, the United Nations can focus on organising elections, state-building and delivery of humanitarian and development assistance. Such division of responsibilities is, however, far from being clear and effective in Afghanistan. The foray of the military into development and humanitarian aid delivery through PRTs, as well as the reaction of insurgents to the massive and indiscriminate military presence and operations, makes the political and development role of the UN ineffective, at best. Outsourcing may be a cost-effective way for the UN to undertake peacekeeping operations in general, but they can become problematic if the security and the political sides of the operations are not properly coordinated. In the final analysis, the role of the United Nations is crucial to bringing stability to a very volatile region. Only the UN as an inter- and trans-governmental body — and not UNAMA, currently conceived as a limited mission with an ambitious mandate — can be perceived as an impartial actor that can act as a legitimate third party that can broker negotiations within Afghanistan and negotiate a political strategy for the region. For this, the Security Council should encourage the UN to play a more strategic role, by for instance appointing contact groups and powerful envoys responsible for shuttle diplomacy and strategic interventions.The military operation is expected to increase in terms of a surge in funds and manpower provided by the United States and NATO countries. Yet, a different type of leverage needs to be found for the UN to be able to play the kind of role that may set Afghanistan on a path of recovery. The case of Afghanistan shows that the gap between design and implementation of Security Council mandates is not only due to operational or political limitations, but can also be in reason of conceptual differences about what peace is and how to get there. The UN Security Council resolutions have made the peace enforcement operation in Afghanistan legal, but the combination of the problems outlined above have made it problematic and, therefore, ineffective at best, if not lacking legitimacy.

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Côte d’Ivoire

3 Côte d’Ivoire

Synopsis Seven years after the eruption of a brief civil war in Côte d’Ivoire, the country is at peace but almost all the conditions for renewed political violence that could continue to expose it to an armed conflict in the medium term are still present.The conflict was just one of the dimensions of a profound political crisis that has not been solved. The presidential elections expected since October 2005 have yet to be organised in mid-2009. Various external actors have been involved in the peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in Côte d’Ivoire. The United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) has been one of these. It was established by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) through a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in February 2004. UNOCI is still on the ground in 2009 and the Council continues to renew regularly its mandate with little impact on the internal political process; and thus an embarrassing uncertainty on the timeline of the peacekeeping operation.

I. Conflict history

In the 1960s and 1970s, Côte d’Ivoire, through its production of coffee and cocoa, presented a rare example of growth and stability in West Africa. But from the 1980s, the country began to experience a period of economic, social and political turmoil. The end of the 33-year presidency of Félix HouphouëtBoigny, who died in December 1993, forced the Ivorian nation to face the democratic process in a tense context. Besides, the large number of foreigners in Côte d’Ivoire, and of Ivorians of somewhat recent foreign descent, created an important issue of voting rights and control of land in specific regions. Around 26 per cent of the population was of foreign origin according to a 1998 census. Many of these had been Ivorian citizens for two generations or more. The underlying tensions had been suppressed under the leadership of Houphouët-Boigny, but surfaced in the context of a shrinking economy and political succession battle at the end of his rule.1 Early signs of a divided social fabric along ethnic and regional lines (broadly defined, Northerners versus Southerners, despite the limitations of such categorisation) were widely perceptible when 75

Henri Konan Bédié, who was the President of the Parliament, succeeded Houphouët-Boigny. Bédié won the presidential elections in 1995 amidst contestations and ‘active boycott’ by a coalition that was mainly formed by the long-time opposition party of Laurent Gbagbo, the Ivorian Patriotic Front (FPI), and a breakaway of Houphouët-Boigny’s powerful Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), the Rally of Republicans (RDR), led by Alassane Ouattara. The latter was the Prime Minister at the time of Houphouët-Boigny’s death and engaged in an undeclared rivalry with Bédié. President Bédié did not finish his constitutional mandate. He was overthrown on 24 December 1999 by General Robert Guéï, a former army chief of staff. This was the first coup d’état in the history of Côte d’Ivoire. The junta promised to return rapidly the country to democratic and civilian rule. Guéï allowed elections to be held in 2000 but decided to be candidate. When the election was won by Laurent Gbagbo — the only impor tant political leader whose candidacy had not been rejected by a controversial Supreme Court decision on the eligibility of RDR and PDCI candidates — Guéï at first refused to accept his defeat. Massive street protests and a shift in the loyalty of part of the security forces forced him to step down. Gbagbo became president on 26 October 26 2000. On 19 September 2002, the civil war erupted when the coup plotted by soldiers facing demobilisation under the army reform programme was driven back in Abidjan, and became a rebellion led by the Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) of Guillaume Soro. MPCI was later joined in the conflict by two other rebel groups, the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) and the Ivorian Peoples’ Movement for the Great West (MPIGO). The three factions later formed the Forces Nouvelles (FN). From September 2002 to January 2003, the civil war was marked by confrontations between governmental forces and rebels, the capturing of towns followed by massacres of civilians suspected of supporting one camp or the other, the execution of gendarmes and their families, aerial attacks by helicopters in the West, targeted kidnappings and assassinations, and large-scale sexual violence. There also emerged ‘patriotic’ groups and militias aligned to defend the president and counter both the rebellion and the political opposition. The recruitment of Liberian and Sierra Leonean mercenaries by both the Ivorian rebel groups and the governmental forces and associated militias added a worrying regional dimension to the conflict. The rebels also hired combatants from Mali and Burkina Faso, which had been the training base for the September 2002 insurgency.2 1

On the origins of the Ivorian crisis and the rising political, ethnic and regionalist tension and violence, see Christian Bouquet, Géopolitique de la Côte d’Ivoire, Paris, 2005; Marc Le Pape and Claudine Vidal, Côte d’Ivoire, l’année terrible 1999-2000, Paris, 2002; Jean-Pierre Dozon, ‘La Côte d’Ivoire entre Démocratie, Nationalisme et Ethnonationalisme’, Politique Africaine: Côte d’Ivoire, la tentation ethnonationaliste 78, June 2000; Human Rights Watch, ‘The New Racism:The Political Manipulation of Ethnicity in Côte d’Ivoire’, Human Rights Watch Report 13, 6 (A), August 2001; and United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events Related to the March in Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire)’. 2 For an account of the security situation from September 2002 and the key phases of the peace process, see the reports of the International Crisis Group: ‘Côte d’Ivoire: the War Is Not Yet Over’, Africa Report 72, 28 November 2003; ‘Côte d’Ivoire: No Peace in Sight’, Africa Report 82, 12 July 2004; ‘Côte d’Ivoire: the Worst May Be Yet To Come’, Africa Report 90, 24 March 2005; ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Halfway Measures Will not Suffice’, Africa Briefing 33, 12 October 2005; ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Peace as an Option’, Africa Report 109, 17 May 2006; and ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Stepping up the Pressure’, Africa Briefing 40, 7 September 2006. 76

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The first peace negotiations took place at the end of October 2002 in Lomé (Togo). A ceasefire was agreed between the MPCI and the loyalist army, but violence continued. The French military force monitoring the initial ceasefire line, known as Operation Licorne, received additional troops until it numbered almost 2,500 by the end of December 2002. January 2003 brought further fighting and increasing reports of abuses against civilians in the western region. French diplomacy led to the new peace talks in the Parisian suburb of Linas-Marcoussis and resulted in the signing of a comprehensive peace agreement on 24 January 2003. A neutral Prime Minister, Seydou Elimane Diarra, was appointed to form a Government of National Reconciliation that would implement the military, political and legal components of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (LMA). The Security Council (by resolution 1474 of 4 February 2003) authorised the deployment of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) troops supported by the French Licorne force along with the monitoring presence of a small UN peace mission.3 The implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement quickly appeared as an impossible task in the short term. A series of meetings and other agreements negotiated by the heads of state of the region did not prevent the protagonists from creating and sustaining a situation of ‘no peace, no war’.The president and his partisans strived to keep power in the southern part of the territory while the Forces Nouvelles set the bases of a durable military, political, economic and financial organisation of the northern half of the country divided by a ‘zone of confidence’ monitored by the international forces.The ‘armed peace’ took the shape of bloody events in March 2004 when the government used war weapons and ‘parallel’ forces to prevent a demonstration of the opposition parties in Abidjan, which resulted in 150 deaths according to the UN.4 In November 2004, the president ordered the Operation ‘Dignity’ against the FN, thus violating the ceasefire. An unexplained aerial attack on a French military base in Bouaké was followed by the destruction by the Licorne force of almost all of the Ivorian military air fleet. Extreme tension between Ivorian demonstrators and French nationals and military in Abidjan ensued, marked by the death of Ivorian civilians on 9 November. Diplomatic efforts resumed with the mediation led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki. A new peace agreement was signed in Pretoria on 6 April 2005, but it enabled neither to avoid hindrances nor to organise the presidential election slated for October 2005, at the end of the constitutional tenure of the president. A Security Council resolution extended the transition period by one year (resolution 1633 of 21 October 2005) and reinforced on paper the powers of the prime minister to the detriment of the head of state. One year later, the process for the way out of the crisis had practically not moved forward. Another resolution of the Security Council (resolution 1721 of 1 November 2006) was issued to open a ‘final transition period not exceeding twelve months’.The president opposed the essence of resolution 1721 (2006) and officially proposed on 19 December 2006 to dialogue directly with the FN. The discussions took place in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) and resulted, on 29 March 2007, in the signing of an agreement by the president and the ex-rebel leader who would later become prime minister.5 However, 3

Albert Tevoédjrè (Benin) was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General. ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events Related to the March in Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire)’, op. cit. 5 For an account of the Ouagadougou talks and an analysis of the Agreement, see International Crisis Group, ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Can the Ouagadougou Agreement Bring Peace?’, Africa Report 127, 27 June 2007. 4

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the schedule of the implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement has been modified and delayed on several occasions.The presidential election expected since October 2005 is still awaited in 2009.

II. Mandate and evolution

In 2003, a few months after the 19 September 2002 failed coup attempt which inaugurated the Ivorian conflict, the Security Council voted first the resolution 1464 (2003) on 4 February. Acting under Chapter VII, the Council gave its authorisation to the already deployed ECOWAS and French forces tasked with monitoring the ceasefire between the governmental forces and the rebellion; and it endorsed the newly signed Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (24 January 2003). On 13 May 2003 the Council voted resolution 1479, which established a United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI), with a military component. On 4 August of the same year, resolution 1498 renewed ECOWAS and French forces authorisation for another six months. Resolution 1514 of 13 November 2003 extended MINUCI’s mandate until 4 February 2004. Having determined that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continued to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1528 of 27 February 2004, decided to establish UNOCI for an initial period of 12 months as of 4 April 2004. On that date UNOCI took over from MINUCI, but French forces remained as an independent operation authorised by the Council and expected to act in support of the UN peacekeeping force.

1. The initial mandate of UNOCI and its subsequent revisions

By resolution 1528 of 27 February 2004, the Security Council: ● Decided to establish the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire for an initial period of 12 months as of 4 April 2004, and requested the Secretary-General to transfer authority from MINUCI and ECOWAS forces to UNOCI on that date; ● Decided that UNOCI would comprise, in addition to the appropriate civilian, judiciary and corrections component, a military strength of a maximum of 6,240 United Nations personnel, including 200 military observers and 120 staff officers, and up to 350 civilian police officers; ● Requested UNOCI to carry out its mandate in close liaison with the United Nations missions in Sierra Leone and in Liberia, including especially in the prevention of movements of arms and combatants across shared borders and the implementation of disarmament and demobilisation programmes. 78

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The Council decided that the mandate of UNOCI, in coordination with the French forces authorised by the same resolution, should be the following: ● Monitoring of the ceasefire and movements of armed groups: (a) to observe and monitor the implementation of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement of 3 May 2003, and investigate violations of the ceasefire; (b) to liaise with the National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) and the military elements of the Forces Nouvelles in order to promote, in coordination with the French forces, the re-establishment of trust between all the Ivorian forces involved; (c) to assist the Government of National Reconciliation in monitoring the borders, with particular attention to the situation of Liberian refugees and to the movement of combatants; ● Disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement: (d) to assist the Government of National Reconciliation in undertaking the regrouping of all the Ivorian forces involved and to ensure the security of their cantonment sites; (e) to help the government implement the national programme for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of combatants, with special attention to the specific needs of women and children; (f) to coordinate closely with the United Nations missions in Sierra Leone and in Liberia in the implementation of a voluntary repatriation and resettlement programme for foreign excombatants, with special attention to the specific needs of women and children, in support of the efforts of the government; (g) to ensure that the programmes mentioned in paragraphs (e) and (f) take into account the need for a regional approach; (h) to guard weapons, ammunition and other military materiel handed over by the former combatants and to secure, neutralise or destroy such materiel; ● Protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians: (i) to protect UN personnel, installations and equipment, provide the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the government, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment; (j) to support, in coordination with the Ivorian authorities, the provision of security for the ministers of the Government of National Reconciliation; ● Support for humanitarian assistance: (k) to facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance, inter alia, by helping to establish the necessary security conditions; ● Support for the implementation of the peace process: (l) to facilitate, in cooperation with ECOWAS and other international partners, the re-establishment by the Government of National Reconciliation of the authority of the state throughout Côte d’Ivoire; (m) to provide oversight, guidance and technical assistance to the government, with the assistance of ECOWAS and other international partners, to prepare for and assist in the conduct of free, fair and transparent electoral processes linked to the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, in particular the presidential election; 79

● Assistance in the field of human rights: (n) to contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights in Côte d’Ivoire with special attention to violence committed against women and girls, and to help investigate human rights violations with a view to help ending impunity; ● Public information: (o) to promote understanding of the peace process and the role of UNOCI among local communities and the parties, through an effective public information capacity, including the establishment as necessary of a UN radio broadcasting capability; ● Law and order: (p) to assist the government in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international organisations in restoring a civilian policing presence throughout Côte d’Ivoire, and to advise the government on the restructuring of the internal security services; (q) to assist the government in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law. The resolution, inter alia, also: ● Authorised UNOCI to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment; ● Stressed the importance of the complete and unconditional implementation of the measures provided for under the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, and demanded that the parties fulfil their obligations under the LMA so that, in particular, the forthcoming presidential election could be held in 2005 in accordance with the constitutional deadlines; ● Called upon all parties to cooperate fully in the deployment and operations of UNOCI, in particular by guaranteeing the safety, security and freedom of movement of UN personnel as well as associated personnel throughout the territory of Côte d’Ivoire; ● Reaffirmed, in particular, the need for the government to undertake the complete and immediate implementation of the DDR programme, including the disbanding of all armed groups, in particular the militias, the curbing of all kinds of disruptive street protests, especially of the various youth groups, and the restructuring of the armed forces and the internal security services. The Council finally also authorised for a period of 12 months from 4 April 2004 the French forces to use all necessary means in order to support UNOCI in accordance with the agreement to be reached between UNOCI and the French authorities, and in particular to: ● Contribute to the general security of the area of activity of the international forces; ● Intervene at the request of UNOCI in support of its elements whose security might be threatened; ● Intervene against belligerent actions, if the security conditions so required, outside the areas directly controlled by UNOCI; ● Help to protect civilians, in the deployment areas of their units. 80

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On 24 June 2005, Security Council resolution 1609 slightly modified their mandate, authorising the temporary redeployments among UN missions in Liberia (UNMIL) and Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), if needed. The Council, by this resolution, inter alia, decided that UNOCI should have the following mandate from the date of its adoption: ● Monitoring of the cessation of hostilities and movements of armed groups: no significant change as compared with resolution 1528 (2004); ● Disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement: no significant change; ● Disarmament and dismantling of militias: to assist the Prime Minister of the Government of National Reconciliation in formulating and monitoring the implementation of the Joint Operation Plan for the disarmament and dismantling of militias envisaged in the Pretoria Agreement, to secure, neutralise or destroy all weapons, ammunition and other military materiel surrendered by militias; ● Protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians: no change; ● Monitoring of the arms embargo: to monitor the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 7 of resolution 1572 (2004), in cooperation with the Group of Experts established under resolution 1584 (2005) and, as appropriate, with the United Nations Mission in Liberia, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone and governments concerned, including by inspecting, as they deemed it necessary and without notice, the cargo of aircraft and of any transport vehicle using the ports, airports, airfields, military bases and border crossings of Côte d’Ivoire; to collect, as appropriate, arms and any related materiel brought into Côte d’Ivoire in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 7 of resolution 1572 (2004), and to dispose of such arms and related materiel as appropriate; ● Support for humanitarian assistance: same as in resolution 1528 (2004); ● Support for the redeployment of state administration: to facilitate the re-establishment by the Government of National Reconciliation of the authority of the state throughout Côte d’Ivoire which is essential for the social and economic recovery of the country; ● Support for the organisation of open, free, fair and transparent elections: to provide all necessary technical assistance to the government, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and other relevant agencies or institutes, with the support of the African Union (AU), ECOWAS and other international partners, for the organisation of open, free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections within the time frames envisaged in the Constitution of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire; to provide technical information, advice and assistance as appropriate to the High Representative referred to in paragraph 7 of resolution 1603 of 3 June 2005; to contribute, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment, to the security of the areas where voting is to take place; ● Assistance in the field of human rights: to contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights in Côte d’Ivoire, with special attention to violence committed against children and 81

women, to monitor and help investigate human rights violations with a view to ending impunity, and to keep the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) regularly informed of developments in this regard; ● Public information: to promote understanding of the peace process and the role of UNOCI among local communities and the parties, through the mission’s public information capacity, including its radio broadcasting capability; to monitor the Ivorian mass media, in particular with regard to any incidents of incitement by the media to hatred, intolerance and violence, and to keep the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) regularly informed of the situation in this regard; ● Law and order: to assist the Government in restoring a civilian policing presence throughout Côte d’Ivoire, to advise the government on the restructuring of the internal security services, and to assist the Ivorian parties with the implementation of temporary and interim security measures in the northern part of the country, as provided for the Pretoria Agreement; to assist the government in re-establishing the authority of the judiciary and the rule of law throughout Côte d’Ivoire; The Council’s resolution 1609 (2005) also authorised an increase in the military component of UNOCI of up to 850 additional personnel, as well as an increase in the civilian police component of up to a ceiling of 725 civilian police personnel, including three formed police units, and the necessary additional civilian personnel. On 2 June 2006, resolution 1682 authorised a further increase of up to 1,500 additional personnel including a maximum of 1,025 military and 475 police personnel. On 10 January 2007, Security Council resolution 1739 made a few modifications to the mandates of UNOCI and French forces supporting it.The Council, inter alia, decided that UNOCI should have the following mandate from the date of adoption of this resolution: ● Monitoring of the cessation of hostilities and movements of armed groups: no change; ● Disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement: no change; ● Disarmament and dismantling of militias: no significant change; ● Operations of identification of the population and registration of voters: to contribute to the security of the operations of identification of the population and registration of voters, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment; ● Reform of the security sector: to assist, in close liaison with the working group mentioned in paragraph 15 of resolution 1721 (2006), in formulating a plan on the restructuring of the Defence and Security Forces and in preparing possible seminars on security sector reform to be organised by the African Union and ECOWAS; ● Protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians: no change; 82

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● Monitoring of the arms embargo: no change; ● Support for humanitarian assistance: no change; ● Support for the redeployment of state administration: no change; ● Support for the organisation of open, free, fair and transparent elections: to provide all necessary technical assistance to the prime minister, his government, the Independent Electoral Commission and other relevant agencies or institutes, with the support of the African Union, ECOWAS and other international partners, for the organisation of open, free, fair and transparent elections, presidential and legislative, by 31 October 2007 at the latest, as referred to in resolution 1721 (2006); to provide technical information, advice and assistance as appropriate to the High Representative for the Elections (HRE); to contribute, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment, to the security of the areas where voting is to take place; to provide as necessary, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment, in close cooperation with the United Nations Programme for Development, logistical support for the IEC, in particular for the transportation of electoral material; ● Assistance in the field of human rights: no change; ● Public information: no significant change; ● Law and order: no significant change; The Security Council also authorised by that resolution the French forces to use all necessary means in order to support UNOCI and in particular to: ● Contribute to the general security of the area of activity of the impartial forces; ● Intervene at the request of UNOCI in support of its elements whose security might be threatened; ● In consultation with UNOCI, intervene against belligerent actions, if the security conditions so require, outside UNOCI’s areas of deployment; ● Help to protect civilians, in the deployment areas of their units; ● Contribute to monitoring the arms embargo established by resolution 1572 (2004); ● Contribute to the drawing up of a plan on the restructuring of the Defence and Security Forces and to the preparation of possible seminars on security sector reform to be organised by the African Union and ECOWAS.

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2. Resolutions on individual sanctions, arms embargo and ban of diamond imports from Côte d’Ivoire

On 15 November 2004, Security Council resolution 1572 condemned the violation of the ceasefire by governmental forces, decided to impose an embargo on arms sale to Côte d’Ivoire and targeted sanctions on individuals to be identified by a Council committee. The resolution, inter alia: ● Condemned the FANCI air strikes, which constituted flagrant violations of the ceasefire agreement of 3 May 2003, and demanded that all Ivorian parties to the conflict, the Government of Côte d’Ivoire as well as Forces Nouvelles, fully comply with the ceasefire; ● Reiterated its full support for the action undertaken by UNOCI and French forces in accordance with their mandate; ● Demanded that the Ivorian authorities stop all radio and television broadcasting inciting hatred, intolerance and violence; requested UNOCI to strengthen its monitoring role in this regard, and urged the Government of Côte d’Ivoire and the Forces Nouvelles to take all necessary measures to ensure the security and the safety of civilian persons, including foreign nationals and their property; ● Decided that all states should, for a period of thirteen months from the date of adoption of the resolution, take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Côte d’Ivoire, from their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms or any related materiel, in particular military aircraft and equipment, whether or not originating in their territories, as well as the provision of any assistance, advice or training related to military activities; ● Decided that all states should take the necessary measures, for a period of 12 months, to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of all persons designated by the Committee established by the resolution, who constituted a threat to the peace and national reconciliation process, in particular those who were blocking the implementation of the LinasMarcoussis and Accra III Agreements, any other person determined as responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Côte d’Ivoire on the basis of relevant information, any other person who incited publicly hatred and violence, and any other person determined by the Committee to be in violation of measures imposed above; ● Decided that all states should, for the same period of 12 months, freeze immediately the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which were on their territories at the date of adoption of that resolution or at any time thereafter, owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the persons designated by the Committee, and decided further that all states should ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources were prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons within their territories, to or for the benefit of such persons or entities; 84

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● Decided to establish a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council (the Committee), to undertake the following tasks: (a) to designate the individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraphs above, and to update this list regularly; (b) to seek information regarding the actions taken by the member states to implement the measures imposed by the resolution; (c) to consider and decide upon requests for the exemptions set out in the resolution; (d) to make relevant information publicly available through appropriate media; (e) to promulgate guidelines as might be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by the resolution; (f) to present regular reports to the Council on its work, with its observations and recommendations, in particular on ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the measures imposed by the resolution; ● Decided that the measures imposed should enter into force on 15 December 2004, unless the Security Council should determine before then that the signatories of the Linas-Marcoussis and Accra III Agreements had implemented all their commitments under the Accra III Agreement and were embarked towards full implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Security Council resolution 1584 of 1 February 2005 included monitoring of the arms embargo in the mandate of UNOCI and Licorne force and requested the creation of a panel of experts to gather and analyse information on implementation of resolution 1572 (2004) on arms embargo and individual sanctions. On 15 December 2005, another resolution (1643) banned the imports of rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire with a view to tackling one of the sources of finance of the Forces Nouvelles. Resolution 1643 (2005), inter alia: ● Decided that all states should take the necessary measures to prevent the import of all rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire to their territory, welcomed the measures agreed by participants in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to this effect, and called upon the states in the region which were not participants in the Kimberley Process to intensify their efforts to join the Kimberley Process in order to increase the effectiveness of monitoring the import of diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire; ● Requested all states concerned, in particular those in the region, to report to the Committee (the Sanction Committee), within 90 days from the date of adoption of the resolution, on the actions they had taken to implement the measures imposed by resolution 1572 (2004) and by resolution 1643 (2005) and authorised the Committee to request whatever further information it might consider necessary; ● Requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, to re-establish a group of experts consisting of no more than five members (the Group of Experts), with the appropriate range of expertise, in particular on arms, diamonds, finance, customs, civil aviation and any other relevant expertise, inter alia: to gather and analyse all relevant information on flows of arms and related materiel, on provision of assistance; advice or training related to military activities, on networks operating in violation of the measures imposed by resolution 1572 (2004), and on the sources of financing, including from the exploitation of natural resources in Côte d’Ivoire, for purchases of arms and related materiel and activities; to provide 85

the Council Committee in its reports with evidence of any violations of the measures imposed by resolution 1572 (2004) and resolution 1643 (2005).

3. Resolutions on the wider peace process and transitional political arrangements

On 3 June 2005, after the signing of the Pretoria Agreement, the Council adopted resolution 1603, which demanded implementation of the peace agreement, requested the designation by the UN Secretary-General of a High Representative for the Elections and defined the HRE mandate. The Council, inter alia: ● Took note with satisfaction of the provisions of the Pretoria Agreement reaffirming the determination of the signatories of the agreement regarding the need to organise presidential elections in October 2005 and legislative elections following immediately thereafter, as well as their agreement to invite the UN to participate in the work of the Independent Electoral Commission and the Constitutional Council and in the organisation of the general election, and of the decision by the Council of Ministers on 28 April 2005 to hold the first round of the presidential elections on 30 October 2005; ● Welcomed the decision taken by President Thabo Mbeki with regard to the eligibility for the Presidency of the Republic and took note with satisfaction of the announcement made by President Laurent Gbagbo on 26 April 2005 that all candidates nominated by the political parties signatory to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement would be eligible for the presidential elections. The Council requested the Secretary-General, on the basis of the Pretoria Agreement, to designate, as an exceptional arrangement, after consultations with the AU and President Thabo Mbeki, a HRE in Côte d’Ivoire autonomous from UNOCI to assist in particular in the work of the Independent Electoral Commission and of the Constitutional Council, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and with the following mandate: ● To verify, on behalf of the international community, that all stages of the electoral process, including the establishment of a register of voters and the issuance of voters’ cards, provide all the necessary guarantees for the holding of open, free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections within the time limits laid down in the Constitution of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire; ● To provide, in close cooperation with UNOCI and the mediation, all necessary advice and guidance to the Constitutional Council, the Independent Electoral Commission and other relevant agencies or institutes to help them prevent and resolve any difficulty which might jeopardise the holding of open, free, fair and transparent elections within the time limits laid down in the Constitution with the authority in that regard to make necessary determinations; 86

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● To report immediately to the Security Council through the Secretary-General, and to inform the mediator of the African Union, President Mbeki, any difficulty which might jeopardise the holding of open, free, fair and transparent elections, and to submit to them, as appropriate, such recommendations as he may see fit to make; ● To keep the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, and President Thabo Mbeki regularly informed of all aspects of his mandate; ● To request and receive information and technical advice from UNOCI as well as other sources. With the end of the constitutional term of the president on 30 October 2005 without elections being held or even in early stages of preparations, the Security Council, after propositions of ECOWAS and a decision of the AU Peace and Security Council, adopted, on 21 October 2005, resolution 1633.The Council, inter alia: ● Supported the establishment of the International Working Group on Côte d’Ivoire (IWG) at a ministerial level and the Mediation Group (decided by the AU Peace and Security Council), which should both be co-chaired by the SRSG; ● Urged the chairperson of the African Union, the chairperson of ECOWAS and the African Union mediator to consult immediately with all the Ivorian parties in order to ensure that a new prime minister acceptable to all the Ivorian parties signatories to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement would be appointed by 31 October 2005, in accordance with the decision of the Peace and Security Council; ● Stressed that the prime minister had to have all the necessary powers according to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and all the governmental financial, material and human resources, particularly with regard to security, defence and electoral matters, to ensure the effective functioning of the government, to guarantee security and the redeployment of the administration and public services throughout the territory of Côte d’Ivoire, to lead the programme of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and the operations of disarmament and dismantling of militias, and to ensure the fairness of the identification process and of voter registration, leading to the organisation of free, open, fair and transparent elections, with the support of the United Nations; ● Requested the IWG to verify that the prime minister had all the necessary powers and resources, and immediately to report to the Security Council any hindrance or difficulty which the prime minister might face in implementing his tasks and to identify those responsible; ● Requested the IWG to draw up as soon as possible a road map in consultation with all Ivorian parties, with a view to hold free, fair, open and transparent elections as soon as possible and no later than 31 October 2006; 87

● Demanded that the Forces Nouvelles proceed without delay with the DDR programme in order to facilitate the restoration of the authority of the state throughout the national territory, the reunification of the country and the organisation of the elections as soon as possible; ● Affirmed that the identification process had to also start without delay; ● Demanded also the immediate disarmament and dismantling of militias throughout the national territory. One year after the adoption of resolution 1633 (2005), the Council took note of the impossibility of organising elections on the scheduled date. Resolution 1721 (2006) endorsed the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council that President Gbagbo should remain head of state as from 1 November 2006 ‘for a new and final transition period not exceeding 12 months’; renewed the mandate of prime minister for a ‘new and final transition period not exceeding 12 months’, renewed and strengthened the mandate of the HRE and underlined that the Council was fully prepared to impose targeted measures against persons to be designated by the Sanctions Committee established by resolution 1572 (2004). Almost immediately after the adoption of resolution 1721 (2006), the Ivorian president affirmed his intention to look for an alternative way of finding a solution to the impasse of the peace process. The dialogue that he proposed to the Forces Nouvelles with President Compaoré of Burkina Faso acting as facilitator led to the signing of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement on 4 March 2007 and a clear power-sharing between the president and the rebel leader.The Security Council’s posture would change substantially from mid-2007 and the peacekeeping mission would find itself in a passive supporting role.

III. Implementation of Security Council resolutions

1. UNOCI and the provision of a stable and secure environment

Initial challenges for UNOCI as consequences of the post-Linas-Marcoussis Agreement political context Created by resolution 1528 in February 2004, UNOCI began its deployment in April by ‘rehatting’ the West African troops that were part of the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ECOMICI) and were deployed along the ceasefire line with the much more equipped French Licorne troops. The general objective of UNOCI as tasked by the Council was to assist the Ivorian Government of National Reconciliation under the joint authority of the president and the consensual prime minister to implement all aspects of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, including maintaining the ceasefire; conducting the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants; restoring state authority and public administration throughout the country; and organising free and fair presidential elections in October 2005. 88

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It meant that the implementation of the UNOCI mandate would be closely linked to the implementation of the LMA and this, in turn, would be dependent on the political will of the Ivorian actors regrouped in the Government of National Reconciliation. It would depend on the good faith of those who had signed the LMA (the representatives of all significant political parties and the initial three rebel movements) or endorsed it (President Gbagbo at the 25-26 January 2003 Kléber Summit of Heads of State in Paris). The political context from February 2003 to April 2004 when UNOCI entered the scene provided unambiguous indications on the reluctance of the key actors fully to respect their commitments in good faith. Beyond ending the armed conflict and reunifying the country, the LMA attempted to address the political problems at the root of the crisis. The annex of the peace accord outlined a programme to guarantee free and fair elections and end impunity and hate media, as well as do away with the policy of exclusion that began under Henri Konan Bédié. That policy has been associated to the notion of ivoirité (‘Ivorianness’), which distinguishes between Ivorians of ‘authentic’ native origin, and those whose heritage is ‘mixed’, and at the same time accuses immigrants from northern bordering countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea) of trying to take over the economy.To address these and related problems, the LMA outlined procedures for naturalising immigrants present in the country before 1972, revision of rural land tenure laws, the conditions for presidential eligibility, elimination of the requirement for ECOWAS nationals to hold a resident’s card, and modification of the national identification process. The legal reforms called for by the LMA meant that the National Assembly had to be fully involved as well, and that the political will had to be shared by all significant political actors. Government portfolios were negotiated at the Kléber summit in a tense atmosphere. In closed-door sessions with the leader of the MPCI rebel group presided over by the French president and UN Secretary-General, the Ivorian president, under pressure, reportedly agreed to cede the Defence and Interior Ministries to the MPCI in exchange for the nomination as prime minister of Seydou Diarra, who held the post under Guéï’s military junta.6 But on the same day, pro-FPI youth leaders in Abidjan carried out violent anti-French demonstrations in protest, following which some 8,000 French nationals left the country. In subsequent weeks, the Ivorian president publicly expressed his reservations about the LMA, without rejecting it. After long negotiations, the MPCI finally renounced its claims on the Defence and Interior portfolios, and a National Security Council was set up to identify ministers for the sensitive posts. The president eventually named the ministers in September 2003. The improvement of the security situation throughout 2003 (a ceasefire was signed on 3 May between the rebellion and the armed forces, and the war was declared over on 4 July) was not accompanied by an attenuation of the political tensions and real progress in the implementation of the LMA. FPI key figures, notably the president’s wife Simone Gbagbo, and the President of the National Assembly Mamadou Koulibaly, echoed by ‘patriotic’ youth organisations, appeared determined to delay full implementation of the accords. The presidential camp continued to buy large quantities of weapons, including fighter aircraft, while members of the armed forces and the FPI were supporting the recruitment, training and arming of private urban militias.7 6

International Crisis Group, 28 November 2003, op. cit. 89

In short, the president and his close associates were not enthusiastic about a political settlement that was to some extent imposed on them in 2003 when the loyalist forces were militarily weak and needed French military support, at least in the short term, to prevent the rebel groups from attempting again to remove the president from power. For the presidential side, the main political consequence of the real implementation of the LMA and the appointment of a prime minister in Paris would be the neutralisation of the powers of the elected president and the transfer of government authority to the prime minister until the election expected in October 2005.The president found himself in the position of the legal president who had been unsuccessfully attacked by rebel groups but was to implement a peace agreement that would weaken him politically from 2003 and thus threaten his reelection in 2005. On the other side, the rebel coalition of the Forces Nouvelles wanted to keep their armed combatants as long as possible, retain control of the northern territory they had taken over, obtain the implementation of the reforms called for by the LMA on nationality, identification policy, eligibility to the presidency, electoral commission, and ultimately push the president out of power. In the middle, the political actors of the opposition, composed mainly of the RDR and PDCI parties, felt that they had an unexpected opportunity to take their revenge against the FPI and conquer presidential power in 2005. The leaders and militants of the opposition, especially the RDR, had also not forgotten the bloody repression of their demonstrations immediately after the contested presidential election in October 2000.8 The apparition of an armed opposition to FPI and youth militias close to Gbagbo in the form of the FN rebellion gave a fresh impetus to the unarmed opposition. When one adds to that already complex internal political context the external factors at the regional and international levels that were at play, the Ivorian ground looked like a perfect trap for a UN peacekeeping mission. In the region, one of Côte d’Ivoire neighbours, Burkina Faso, was quite directly involved in the conflict both as supporter/sympathiser of the rebellion and as victim, given the targeted violence and harassment on Burkinabe residents under FPI’s rule. Despite President Blaise Compaoré’s insistence on the purely internal nature of the Ivorian conflict, it was indisputable that he had provided support to the MPCI and continued to allow Guillaume Soro and the military commanders of the rebellion to use Ouagadougou as a safe rear base. The animosity between the Ivorian president and his Burkinabe neighbour was at its peak after September 2002 when the latter even ‘promised’ an unfortunate judicial future before the International Criminal Court (ICC) to his Ivorian counterpart.9 Another northern neighbour of Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, was also considered to be sympathetic to the rebellion and not really supportive of the Ivorian president’s legalist argument. Ghana appeared neutral and President John Kufuor was very active in the peace efforts throughout 2003 and 2004, without ever attracting accusations of partiality from either side. As the unique superpower in the region, Nigeria’s position was an important factor. At the outburst of the conflict, President Olusegun Obasanjo offered military support to the Ivorian president. His position

7

Ibid., and International Crisis Group, 12 July 2004, op. cit. Human Rights Watch, August 2001, op. cit.; and Marc Le Pape and Claudine Vidal, 2002, op. cit. 9 Declaration of President Blaise Compaoré in an interview with the French newspaper Le Parisien, 21 January 2003. 8

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progressively moved towards hostility when he felt that the Ivorian president was playing with the commitments taken before himself and the other heads of state of the region.10 One element was essential to explain the rather limited support the Ivorian president had in the region: the nationalist and almost xenophobic ideology of the FPI in a country that had been hosting for decades an exceptionally high population of immigrants from all West African countries. Be it just a tool in the fight for internal power or a real ideology, the nationalist inclination of the FPI could be considered as a political and economic threat for most West African countries. At the international level and especially within the Security Council in 2004, France was the major player, given its history of colonial power and post-colonial close relationship with HouphouëtBoigny’s Côte d’Ivoire. When the conflict began in September 2002, the French president was Jacques Chirac, a long-time right-wing politician who had personal relations with Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI and little sympathy for Laurent Gbagbo, who had been the single most vocal opponent to the ‘father of the Ivorian nation’. Moreover, the FPI was officially a left-wing party aligned with the French Socialist Party (PS). France had maintained a permanent military base in Abidjan providing a guarantee of external and de facto internal security for Houphouët-Boigny’s three-decade presidency. But the French government did not save Konan Bédié from the December 1999 coup. After the coup attempt of September 2002, the Ivorian president asked for French military support in virtue of the defence agreement between both countries. France did provide logistical assistance to the Ivorian army but opted for a ‘neutral’ stance consisting of freezing the military situation by deploying troops on a ceasefire line while calling for a political solution.The political conditions of the Linas-Marcoussis talks and the Kléber conference in January 2003 ended up convincing the presidential side that the French government was not ready to adopt a firm and unequivocal line against the rebellion. When UNOCI entered the scene in April 2004, the Ivorian ‘peace process’ had already displayed its characteristic features. It would be dominated by the struggle of an embattled president to keep the real power in a national, regional and international environment that was not favourable to him in the short and in the medium terms, when his constitutional mandate would end. The civil war had been brief and the western region was the most violent and volatile area due to a combination of pre-war land disputes between ‘autochthons’ and ‘foreigners’, the proximity of the Liberian border and related movements of ex-combatants, weapons and illegal economic activities and the entrenchment of militia groups which initially defended the region against the rebel attacks between November 2002 and February 2003. All the actors of the violence were identifiable: the rebel forces in the north and northwest, the militarised and ethnic militias supporting the FPI in the west, the youth ‘patriotic’ organisations and associated urban militias in Abidjan and other southern cities, and the official security and defence forces in the government-controlled south. UNOCI would have to operate in the middle, assisting a divided ‘government of national reconciliation’ with a disarmament programme and the restoration of state authority, protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, and helping with the organisation of elections. The security situation would be tightly determined by the political battle 10

FRIDE interview with a former African Union diplomat, February 2009. 91

between the president, the FN, opposition parties and, depending on their positions on specific issues of the peace process, France and the UN peacekeeping mission. The November 2004 ceasefire violation On 4 November 2004, early in the morning, two Ivorian army Sukhoi-25 fighter planes took off from Yamoussoukro airport, which was also used for operations by the ‘impartial’ forces, as UNOCI and Licorne were usually called. Fifteen minutes later, the planes were hitting a check-point held by the FN in Bouaké. In Abidjan, two former officials of the Ivorian national television (RTI) close to the president, under military escort, took control of the public institution. RTI operated the media coverage of the country’s ‘war of liberation’.11 The ‘Young Patriots’ played their role by trying to attack the hotel where most ministers of the FN, under protection of UNOCI’s special security group, were residing. They ransacked the offices of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation (NCDDR), as well as those of RDR and PDCI opposition parties, and plundered the offices of three opposition newspapers.12 In the morning of 5 November, FANCI planes took off again and fired weapons which hit Vavoua and Séguéla. On the ground, government troops attempted forays into the ‘zone of confidence’ heading towards Bouaké, before meeting refusal from the UNOCI blue helmets to let them pass through their positions in Tiébissou. The military offensive continued the following day, 6 November, with aerial bombing on Bongora, Brobo and Bouaké.13 The last raid of the Sukhoi planes on Bouaké reached a base of the French forces: nine French soldiers and an American citizen were killed; 38 other French soldiers were wounded. The Licorne force retaliated by destroying on the ground almost all of the Ivorian military air fleet in Yamoussoukro and Abidjan, fighter planes as well as helicopters, including inside the presidential compound in Yamoussoukro. The chain of events from 6 to 9 November14 was widely covered by the international media because of the transformation during these days of the Ivorian internal conflict into a quasi-war between France and its former colony: ● On 6 November, a few hours after the attack on the French forces in Bouaké and the immediate retaliation ordered by Paris, hundreds of Ivorian demonstrators poured onto the streets with the objective of besieging the French military base in Abidjan and paralysing the movement of French troops towards the airport; the Licorne soldiers took over the airport after short clashes with the Ivorian forces; French attack helicopters opened fire to prevent the advancing tide of demonstrators from crossing the two bridges of Abidjan; organised small groups of youths went on looting houses, shops, business offices and Franco-Ivorian schools; and the Licorne troops began sheltering thousands of French and other Western foreigners before launching a massive evacuation operation by plane out of the country. 11

International Crisis Group, 24 March 2005, op. cit. Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2004/962, 9 December 2004. 13 Ibid. 14 International Crisis Group, 24 March 2005, op. cit. 12

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● On 7 November, French military reinforcements arrived at the Abidjan airport; Licorne troops based in Bouaké (centre) and Duékoué (west) undertook an emergency move towards Abidjan, which was punctuated by bloody clashes with FANCI forces, especially in Duékoué, Dibobly and Guessabo; FPI leaders publicly called for the departure of French troops from Côte d’Ivoire; and the president finally made a statement urging for calm and the end of demonstrations. ● On 8 November, Licorne tanks arrived in front of the presidential palace in Abidjan, while they were supposed to have gone to a hotel (Hôtel Ivoire) where French nationals were expected to regroup for evacuation; groups of ‘Young Patriots’ gathered to form a ‘human shield’ around the presidential palace to prevent a feared ‘coup d’état by the French army’; and hundreds of ‘patriots’ were transported by buses of the public transport company to the hotel where heavily armed French troops had taken position. ● On 9 November, Ivorian gendarmes also arrived at the hotel to set up a block between French soldiers and the crowd of anti-French demonstrators; the tension mounted and the situation got out of control; some French soldiers shot at the crowd, killing a number of people; Licorne soldiers finally withdrew after talks with Ivorian high-ranking officers. All of these events took place while South African President Thabo Mbeki, designated on 7 November as mediator in the Ivorian crisis by the AU, was in Abidjan for an emergency visit. The violent riots and the inflammatory statements in the following days resulted in the evacuation of some 9,000 foreigners including 8,300 French nationals and led to the controversy between Abidjan and Paris on the number of victims and the determination of the responsibility for the violence. Between the propaganda of the ‘patriots’ and the state media, and the numerous contradictory and embarrassing statements of the French authorities, establishing the facts turned out to be difficult. While the official toll released on November 26 by the Ivorian Ministry of Health stated 57 civilians deaths and 2,226 injured, French officials finally admitted that the shots fired ‘in self-defence’ by soldiers of Licorne had caused ‘about twenty Ivorian victims’.15 Many observers considered that the Ivorian president had received a ‘yellow light’ to embark on the military operation against the FN. Frustrated by the political stalemate, Paris and New York allegedly de facto abided by the military option to which the president never renounced, by expecting a short, ‘clean’ and successful offensive of the FANCI forces, which were equipped and assisted by mercenaries.16 Between 4 and 6 November, there were few actions from French and UN authorities to dissuade the president and his army from pursuing the military operation and blatantly violating the ceasefire and the peace agreement.17 The exact circumstances and motivations of the bombing of the French quarters in Bouaké remain a mystery. Neither the Ivorian authorities nor their French counterparts have shown the political will to establish the truth of that episode.The November 2004 15

Ibid. Ibid. 17 A French military official quoted in an International Crisis Group Report recognised that possibility: ‘We looked elsewhere when the attacks started on 4 November; we thought that after capturing Bouaké, for example, the Forces Nouvelles would have understood that it was time to disarm’. See International Crisis Group, 24 March 2005, op. cit. 16

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extreme tension between France and the Ivorian government was symbolic of the passion and the hesitations that characterised France’s political and military management of the Ivorian crisis and ended up diluting its strategy and objectives. UNOCI and Security Council reactions to the November 2004 events The crisis illustrated the limits of UNOCI in influencing the course of events. Commenting the November 2004 episode, the third report of the Secretary-General on UNOCI in December 2004 read: Throughout the crisis, UNOCI troops actively sought to reduce tensions by maintaining close contacts with both FANCI and Forces Nouvelles, as well as working robustly to preserve the integrity of the zone of confidence and to prevent any military movements through it. Additional United Nations troops were deployed to Abidjan to provide security for UNOCI personnel and property in the city. UNOCI continues to be proactively engaged in all these areas.18 When asked whether the UN forces could have done more to prevent or halt the violation of the ceasefire before the French military retaliation of 6 November, former senior UNOCI officers insisted that the blue helmets did not allow the FANCI ground troops to advance to Bouaké by passing through their positions inside the zone of confidence, but added that they had neither the mandate nor the capacity to enter in direct confrontation with the Ivorian army or stop fighter planes.19 There had been, in fact, diverging views within the UN mission senior staff about the reaction to adopt in face of the 4-6 November resumption of hostilities. The position of the then force commander was seen by some senior civilian staff as too passive. Also significant was the absence of a clear directive from New York to guide the reaction of the peacekeeping mission to major security developments that could have plunged the country back into direct military hostilities. In his December 2004 report on UNOCI, the Secretary-General included a section on the ‘Emergency requirements for the reinforcement of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire’ in which he acknowledged that ‘[t]he crisis in the first half of November [had] strained to the limit UNOCI’s capacity to implement its mandate’. The report noted that on the military side, ‘the new dynamics of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire [had] changed some of the key assumptions on which the original concept of operations was based’. It also acknowledged the clear difficulties of coordination between UNOCI and the French independent Licorne Operation in times of crisis, as it stated: UNOCI’s structure was predicated on the ability of the Licorne force to provide quick reaction capacity when needed. However, the recent events have illustrated the complexities of the balance between the two forces and how difficult it can be to reconcile the emergency requirements of each when both are severely stretched. Consequently, UNOCI needs to be provided with its own modest reserve capability as a first level of response, in particular, in Abidjan. In addition, in order for the Mission to be able to present a credible deterrent, particularly in the zone of confidence, it is 18 19

Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General, op. cit. FRIDE interview, January 2009. 94

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assessed that the peacekeepers on the ground will need to be backed up by both attack and light helicopters.20 The Secretary-General recommended the deployment of an additional infantry battalion of 850 military personnel to act as a reserve force; an additional aviation unit composed of eight attack and light helicopters and 270 support personnel; a small-boat unit of 30 personnel to assist with the deployment of troops and extraction of personnel in emergency situations; the deployment of an additional 76 gendarmes to bring the level of gendarme units in charge of the close protection of key Ivorian political actors to 282. The adjustments requested by the Secretary-General would add 1,226 military personnel to the December 2004 authorised strength of UNOCI force of 6,240, increasing it to up to 7,466 military personnel. To enhance the protection of UN personnel and facilities, in particular UNOCI headquarters in Abidjan, the Secretary-General also recommended the deployment of a formed police unit of 125 personnel, temporarily drawn from the already authorised strength of 350 civilian police personnel. Other emergency requests included a military medical facility in Abidjan; a modest increase in security and public information personnel to strengthen the mission’s information capacity and to enhance monitoring of the ‘hate media’, as called for in Security Council resolution 1572 (2004); and a small number of additional civilian staff to carry out other tasks required to implement the post-November 2004 crisis Council resolution, including the collection of information on the arms embargo and the situation along the borders of the country.21 In its final observations, the Secretary-General’s report noted that the ‘recent crisis [had] brought into focus UNOCI’s responsibilities regarding the protection of civilians, both in Abidjan and more widely in the country’; ‘highlighted the limitations of the mission when faced by massive unrest and attacks against certain groups of civilians that [were] clearly orchestrated, organised and undertaken in a climate of impunity’. The Secretary-General then invited ‘the Security Council and regional leaders to consider long-term strategies that could be employed in [that] pivotal West African country, including by the United Nations’.22 After the beginning of air strikes on 4 November 2004, the first official reaction of the Security Council would happen two days later, on 6 November, following the deadly attack against the French cantonment in Bouaké on that same day. In a presidential statement read out by the US Representative John Danforth, the Council ‘[condemned] the attack against French forces in Bouaké on 6 November 2004 that resulted in fatalities and other casualties, as well as the fatal air strikes in the north by the national armed forces of Côte d’Ivoire, as violations of the ceasefire agreement of 3 May 2003’.23 In the same statement, the Council ‘[confirmed] that French forces and UNOCI [were] authorised to use all necessary means to carry out fully their mandate in accordance with its resolution 1528 (2004) of 27 February 2004’, and ‘[confirmed] also that UNOCI, within its capabilities 20

Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General, op. cit. Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 ‘Presidential Statement Demands End to Military Action, Full Cooperation with United Nations Group in Country’, Security Council Press Release, SC/8239, 6 November 2004. 21

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and areas of deployment, [was] authorised to prevent any hostile action, in particular within the Zone of Confidence’.24 Without the attack that cost the lives of French soldiers, and which provoked in retaliation the destruction of major Ivorian military assets, as well as the anti-French demonstrations and violence in Abidjan on 6 November, it was not clear that the Security Council would have reacted in the same way to the violation of the ceasefire by one of the parties. A more substantial reaction of the Security Council to the deterioration of the security situation in November came with the adoption of resolution 1572 of 15 November 2004, which imposed as of 15 December 2004 an embargo on arms sales to Côte d’Ivoire and allowed targeted sanctions on individuals considered as spoilers of the peace process to be identified by the Council Committee created by the same resolution.25 Though the adoption of the resolution was a strong signal to the Ivorian parties, the resources necessary for its implementation would take some time to follow and nobody would be placed on the list of the individuals subjected to targeted sanctions until the anti-UN violent demonstrations of January 2006. On the military side, the reinforcements requested by the Secretary-General in December 2004 would not be allowed by the Council until its resolution 1609 of 24 June 2005, and, even then, only partially. UNOCI, the protection of civilians and the promotion of human rights 2005 was supposed to be the year of elections which would mark the end of the process initiated by the LMA. After the near collapse of the peace process resulting from the November 2004 events, most of the diplomatic efforts to return to the implementation of the LMA were in the hands of South African President Thabo Mbeki, acting as the mediator appointed by the African Union. Mbeki’s involvement led to the signing of the Pretoria Agreement on 6 April 2005.26 Once again, the conflict was solved on paper, and only technical, logistical and financial constraints seemed to be the main obstacles to the conduct of the presidential election in October 2005. But as had been the case with the LMA and the various Accra peace agreements, the Pretoria Agreement would face enormous difficulties in the implementation phase. The security situation remained precarious and volatile in the country, especially in the west and inside the ‘zone of confidence’ monitored by UNOCI and Licorne forces without adequate capacities and without police and judicial responsibilities. In the western part of the country, ordinary civilians, usually farmers in their villages or on the way to and from their plantations, continued to be the main victims of deadly attacks by unidentified armed groups with an ethnic dimension. As reported in the Secretary-General’s June 2005 report on UNOCI, ‘[b]etween 30 April and 2 May, 25 people were killed and 41 injured in Duékoué, Yrozon, Blody and 24

Ibid. See the details of the resolution in section II above. 26 The PA included a joint declaration by the Ivorian parties on an immediate and final cessation of hostilities, an end to the war throughout the country, the agreement to proceed immediately with the disarmament and dismantling of militias and armed groups, the resolution of the question of eligibility to the presidency and the revision of the various laws which were still not in conformity with the LMA. 25

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Tao Zeo and more than 9,000 people, mostly from the Guéré community, were displaced’.27 In the night of 31 May 2005, unidentified individuals armed with machetes and hunting guns brutally attacked the inhabitants of Guitrozon and Petit Duékoué villages, near the town of Duékoué, 480 kilometres from Abidjan, in their sleep. The toll was 41 dead and 61 injured. Another attack in the neighbouring settlement of Diapahi, and the retaliations in the town of Duékoué itself, brought the toll to more than 100 civilians assassinated in early June 2005. Following the 31 May 2005 massacre, UNOCI reinforced its presence in the volatile area around Duékoué, and 350 troops helped the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces to stabilise the situation. Licorne and UNOCI also launched a joint surveillance operation in the area and the ‘zone of confidence’. The Secretary-General noted that the strengthened presence in the west placed ‘an additional strain on the mission’s already overstretched military capacity’.28 The emergency reinforcements of UNOCI requested by the Secretary-General in his third report in December 2004 and reiterated in the fourth report in March 2005 had not been authorised by the Security Council. In his fifth report of 17 June 2005, the Secretary-General highlighted the need urgently to allow an increase of the mission’s strength by the deployment of an additional 2,076 troops and three formed police units comprising 375 officers. On 24 June 2005, the Security Council finally included in its resolution 1609 (2005) an authorisation for an increase in the military component of UNOCI of up to 850 personnel and an increase in the civilian police component of up to 725 personnel, including three formed police units. Though the resolution also opened the possibility for temporary redeployment of troops from the two other peacekeeping missions in West Africa, UNAMSIL and UNMIL in the context of inter-mission cooperation, the Council’s support to the Secretary-General’s requests was limited. Only 850 additional military personnel were authorised instead of the 2,076 troops recommended in the fifth report on UNOCI. One of the consequences of such limited reinforcement of the UN mission was to maintain the perception and to some extent the reality that the only external force on the ground with a real deterring capacity was the French Licorne Operation, which was much more equipped and mobile than the UNOCI. While Licorne’s mandate to support UNOCI especially as a rapid reaction force was confirmed by resolution 1609 (2005), the events of November 2004 had shown that in difficult times the French forces act independently and had also severely affected the perception of Licorne by the Ivorian public opinion and thus its operational margin of manoeuvre. The protection of civilians from physical violence and, more generally, the protection of human rights remained a permanent concern for the UN mission, which informed of detailed human rights violations in regular public reports and informed the Council on worrying developments in the SecretaryGeneral reports.The Secretary-General’s report of 26 September 2005 denounced, for example, the persistence of ‘politically motivated and arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, rape, confiscation of private property, the intimidation of opposition leaders and their followers, committed with impunity by elements of the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces and by the Forces Nouvelles, and militias 27 28

Fifth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2005/398, 17 June 2005. Ibid. 97

associated with both forces’; as well as ‘incidents of ethnically motivated human rights abuses such as killings, rape and destruction of dwellings which were also committed by ethnic and community-based militias’.29 But the mission could not do much more than reporting violations to protect the human rights in a context of limited military presence throughout the territory, limited cooperation or even hostility from the official Defence and Security Forces, absence of political will to dismantle the numerous militias, and little action from the Security Council on human rights issues. Despite resolution’s 1572 (2004) authorisation of sanctions on, among others, individuals responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, the list of the Sanctions Committee of the Council remained empty until February 2006. The fate of the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Côte d’Ivoire, covering the period from 19 September 2002 to 16 October 2004, provided a telling example of the Security Council’s fleeing of its responsibilities and sending confusing signals to the parties to the conflict and the general public opinion. In the final observations of his sixth progress report on UNOCI, the Secretary-General called on the Security Council ‘to consider, as a matter of urgency’ the report that had been transmitted to the Council on 23 December 2004.30 The Council never put the discussion of that report on its agenda and, consequently, never took any follow-up action. Some UNOCI officials still express their frustration at the wide gap between the numerous statements against impunity emanating from Council resolutions and presidential declarations and its reluctance to take concrete action against the perpetrators of human rights violations and the political actors who encouraged them.31 The opportunity to influence the calculations and thus the behaviour of the Ivorian players from all sides and perhaps get them to respect their commitments to the peace agreements by prioritising human rights issues was missed. UNOCI under harassment and attacks in January 2006 The question of the future of the National Assembly of Côte d’Ivoire, whose constitutional mandate expired on 16 December 2005, triggered off violent demonstrations from 16 to 19 January 2006, which for the first time directly targeted the United Nations mission. The International Working Group on Côte d’Ivoire, which had been created by a decision of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 6 October 2005 and confirmed by UN Security Council resolution 1633 on 21 October 2005, recommended on 15 January 2006 that the Parliament’s mandate should not be extended. Resolution 1633 (2005) had fixed the rules of the transitional period that followed the end of the constitutional mandate of the president in October 2005. It had confirmed the AU’s decision of extending for one year the mandate of the president to allow for the organisation of free and fair elections, but it had also transferred the essential powers in all aspects of the peace process to the new Prime Minister, Charles Konan Banny (appointed on 4 December 2005 to 29 Sixth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2005/604, 26 September 2005. 30 Ibid. 31 FRIDE interview, UNOCI headquarters, Abidjan, November 2008.

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replace Seydou Elimane Diarra after a selection process under influence of France and ECOWAS heads of state). The resolution also gave a strong supervisory role to the International Working Group32, which had to ‘verify that the Prime Minister has all the necessary powers and resources’, had to ‘report to the Security Council any hindrance or difficulty which the Prime Minister [might] face in implementing his tasks and to identify those responsible’ and was tasked with drawing ‘a roadmap in consultation with all Ivorian parties in view to hold free, fair, open and transparent elections as soon as possible and no later than 31 October 2006’.33 Côte d’Ivoire’s peace process and politics were meant to be tightly controlled by the international community, represented by the IWG. For the partisans of the president, the framework imposed by the Security Council under strong influence of ECOWAS members, the AU Peace and Security Council and France was aimed at neutralising presidential powers in the key period leading to the organisation of elections. It was thus unacceptable for them. The first actions unfolded on 15 January 2006, before the release of the IWG statement on the fate of the National Assembly.34 The entourage of the prime minister on the way to attend the IWG meeting was stoned by demonstrators while a UNOCI vehicle was burnt.The following day, barricades were set up in various parts of Abidjan. Hundreds of demonstrators gathered in front of UNOCI headquarters blocking access and exit from the building, elements of the powerful and well-organised student union aligned with ‘patriotic movements’ supporting the president took control of the Ivorian public radio and television office, without reaction from the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces. For four days, the security forces in charge of keeping public order and protecting UNOCI personnel did not apply the presidential decree banning street demonstrations. Similar demonstrations against UNOCI and the international presence were organised in other towns in the south such as San Pedro, Yamoussoukro, Daloa, and Guiglo, in the west. In the western volatile town of Guiglo, after two days of one-off invasions of the UNOCI camp without clashes, the situation degenerated on 18 January when the blue helmets of the Bangladeshi contingent fired shots at demonstrators. Five youths were killed and 42 were wounded. Like in Abidjan, the upheaval was planned. On 12 January, five days before the release of the IWG statement on the National Assembly, the presidential party’s local federation had held a meeting at the Guiglo council, whose third deputy, Dénis Glofiéi Maho, was the godfather of the militias of the western region.35 It was the local leaders of the ruling party, the student union and the movement of ‘Young Patriots’ who held the demonstrations to demand the departure of the Guiglo-based Bangladeshi contingent of UNOCI.36 32 The IWG was composed of the representatives of the following countries and institutions: Benin, Ghana, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria, South Africa, France, United Kingdom, United States, UN, AU, ECOWAS, European Union, International Organisation of the Francophonie, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. It was expected to meet at ministerial level every month in Abidjan and was co-presided by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and head of UNOCI, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the country that holds the turning chairmanship of the African Union. 33 United Nations Security Council resolution 1633 of 21 October 2005. 34 International Crisis Group, 17 May 2006, op. cit. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid.

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The January 2006 events, the forced departure of the peacekeepers from all their bases in the region and the destruction of the offices of several humanitarian agencies in Guiglo revealed again the weaknesses of the peacekeeping operation. Devised to monitor a ceasefire line and then a buffer zone between the loyalist army and the FN rebellion, the UN force did not adapt sufficiently to the evolution of the means used by the protagonists. UNOCI continued to face the refusal by the Security Council to allow the full military, police and helicopter reinforcements requested in successive reports by the Secretary-General. In the 3 January 2006 report, the Secretary-General had recommended an increase of the military component by 3,400 troops, as well as the immediate deployment of three additional formed police units (375 personnel) and 100 civilian police officers.37 On 7 February 2006, the Security Council Sanctions Committee released the list of the first three Ivorians that would face international travel bans and the freezing of their assets, in accordance with resolutions 1572 (2004) and 1643 (2005) of the Security Council: leaders of the ‘patriotic’ organisations involved in the January 2006 attacks on UNOCI, Charles Blé Goudé and Eugène Djué, as well as Martin Kouakou Fofié, a military commander of the FN based in Korhogo (northern city). Although these sanctions, brought up on several occasions but never applied since November 2004, targeted agitators rather than their masterminds and political supports, they gave, at last, a signal of the firmness of the Council. However, the fact that they were applied only in reaction to targeted attacks on UN presence and the wider international community sent the message that the Council acted decisively when UN staff and equipments were threatened but not to defend and protect the human rights of the ordinary civilian population. On the UNOCI reinforcement issue, the Security Council remained reluctant to follow the SecretaryGeneral’s recommendations. In a letter dated 1 February 2006, addressed to the President of the Security Council,38 the Secretary-General recommended the emergency redeployment of one infantry battalion and one formed police unit from UNMIL to UNOCI on a temporary basis. The Council approved the temporary deployment of just one mechanised infantry company by its resolution 1657 of 6 February 2006. But in his 11 April 2006 report, the Secretary-General noted that such reinforcement was limited and temporary and reiterated his request for a substantial strengthening of UNOCI by four battalions, three additional formed police units and 100 civilian police officers.39 A new letter of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council on 22 March40 eventually pushed the Council to authorise a limited reinforcement of the peacekeeping mission. On 2 June 2006, resolution 1682 authorised until 15 December 2006 an increase in the strength of UNOCI of up to 1,500 additional personnel, including a maximum of 1,025 military personnel (well short of the 3,400 troops recommended by the Secretary-General) and 475 civilian police personnel, as requested.

37

Seventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2006/2, 3 January 2006. 38 Letter of the Secretary-General dated 1 February 2006 addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2006/71. 39 Eighth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, 11 April 2006. 40 Letter dated 22 March 2006 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2006/184. 100

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2. UNOCI’s role in the DDR programme and the organisation of elections

UNOCI and the impossible disarmament One of the essential elements of UNOCI’s mandate as defined by the initial resolution 1528 of 27 February 2004 was to assist the Government of National Reconciliation in undertaking the regrouping of all the Ivorian forces involved and to ensure the security of their cantonment sites; to help the government implement the national DDR programme with specific attention to the needs of women and children; and to guard weapons, ammunition and other military materiel handed over by former combatants and to secure, neutralise or destroy such materiel.41 The DDR division of UNOCI was tasked with fulfilling this key component of the peacekeeping mission’s mandate, but four years of renunciations to the parties’ commitments to peace agreements, hesitations, political game, entrenchment of a ‘no peace, no war’ situation comfortable for the protagonists, continuous delays in the implementation of the DDR programme, and a lack of substantial pressure on the parties responsible for the stalled process led to an insignificant result. A simple and clear way of illustrating the story of the DDR and UNOCI’s impuissance is to provide selected excerpts of the SecretaryGeneral’s reports to the Council in their sections on the DDR: In the second report on UNOCI, dated 27 August 2004: Under the Accra III Agreement, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process is to start on 15 October (2004). In preparation, the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration has updated its road map, which is based on the previously-developed joint plan of operations […] In view of the expanded presence of UNOCI forces, it is now planned to conduct the disarmament and demobilisation process in two phases, starting in the north and then proceeding to the south, to be completed by 31 December (2004). The National Commission has also intensified its work to rehabilitate the disarmament sites […] It is worth noting that the Ivorian parties at the meetings did not set any preconditions for the commencement of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process. Significant challenges remain, however, including the formulation of plans to dismantle militias and paramilitary groups, and obtaining funding for the reintegration phase of the programme.42 In the fifth progress report on UNOCI, dated 17 June 2005: On 14 May (2005), in Yamoussoukro, the chiefs of staff of FANCI and the Forces Nouvelles agreed on modalities for the national disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme, with the disarmament and demobilisation phases envisaged to take place from 27 June to 10 August (2005) [...] A total of 48,064 persons are expected to benefit from the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme, including 5,500 FANCI and 42,564 Forces Nouvelles 41 42

See the details of United Nations Security Council resolution 1528 (2004) in section II. Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, 27 August 2004. 101

personnel […] On 18 May (2005), the Forces Nouvelles indicated that they would not disarm, until a number of conditions had been met. These include the disarmament and dismantling of militias and the adoption by the National Assembly of the amended law on the composition of the Independent Electoral Commission, the nationality code and the law on identification.43 In the tenth progress report on UNOCI, dated 17 October 2006: With regard to disarmament, the Yamoussoukro meeting [convened on 5 July 2006 by the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan] had decided that a monitoring group, comprised of the National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI), the Forces Nouvelles, UNOCI and the French Licorne force, would be established by 15 July, and that the pre-cantonment of combatants would be completed by 31 July. Although the monitoring group was established on 13 July, the Forces Nouvelles suspended its participation in the group and in the dialogue on military issues in reaction to the proclamation of the new guidelines on the operations of the mobile courts. They argued that the guidelines violated the agreed principle of conducting the initial phases of the disarmament and identification processes concomitantly […] In addition, despite UNOCI efforts, the two sides have not yet submitted the lists of their combatants and weapons. Furthermore, the Forces Nouvelles are now insisting that the restructuring of the national army must be implemented immediately, as part of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process.To that end, they have called for the establishment of an integrated command under the authority of the Prime Minister.44 The story of the DDR in the Ivorian peace process is an endless series of meetings, roadmaps, updated plans, revised timetables, ruptures of dialogue between ex-belligerents and new demands from the parties accusing each other of not respecting its part of the peace deal. While the FN military and political leaders demanded the conduct of a large programme of identification of the population to issue national identity cards and then voter cards without exclusion of any Ivorian, the FPI party demanded the immediate disarmament of the FN to allow for the reunification of the territory and restoration of state authority before any significant progress on the identification programme and the organisation of elections. As it can be seen clearly from the above quotations from some reports of the Secretary-General, the Ivorian protagonists fully decided on the rhythm of the DDR, which never happened in fact. Except for the limited number of weapons collected and destroyed during mediatised ceremonies to launch the disarmament process, there has been no proper disarmament exercise. The signing of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement on 4 March 2007 inaugurated another way of envisaging the future of ex-combatants by prioritising the unification of the ‘two armies’, in view of the creation of new Ivorian Security and Defence Forces, regrouping the loyalists and the former rebels. As the new Prime Minister and Head of the FN, Guillaume Soro was to decide, with his co-signatory, President Gbagbo, and the facilitator, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, the terms of the dissolution of the rebel movement and the future of ex-combatants. 43

Fifth Progress Report of the Secretary-General, op. cit. Tenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2006/821, 17 October 2006.

44

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The experience of UNOCI with the DDR part of its mandate provided a good illustration of the overall impuissance of the peacekeeping mission and also of the Security Council, which created it, when faced with a considerable level of lack of political will of the Ivorian protagonists to settle the crisis. UNOCI was there to ‘assist’ a government that was composed of representatives of parties which were engaged in a permanent battle to save their particular interests and was headed by prime ministers whose authority, entrenched in peace agreements and Security Council resolutions, was only theoretical. The Ivorian president used perfectly the legal argument of the prevalence of the Constitution of a sovereign country on all other considerations, in order to obstruct the steps of the peace process that might threaten his grip on power immediately or eventually. For their part, the FN political and military chiefs took full advantage of the relative sympathy that they initially enjoyed — for a rebel movement that attacked an elected government — in the region and during the LinasMarcoussis and Kléber peace talks. The FN got used to the power and financial resources derived from their control of more than half of the Ivorian territory since September 2002 and had no reason to respect their commitment to disarm without strong internal or external pressure. The Security Council repeated in its numerous resolutions and presidential statements its calls on the FN to engage in the DDR programme, but it never backed up those words with real measures. Only one FN commander was put on the list of individuals subjected to targeted sanctions for human rights violations, on February 2006.The Council acted on the financial side of the rebellion only through resolution 1643 of 15 December 2005, which banned imports of rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire. But even this limited part of the substantial illegal resources that were going into FN coffers was never severely affected by that resolution, given the incapacity of making the sanctions effective, as confirmed by UN panel of experts’ reports.45 The permanently delayed electoral process The story of electoral preparations in Côte d’Ivoire since the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement in January 2003 is quite similar to that of the DDR programme. It was tightly connected to the endless disagreements between the Ivorian parties on the chronology of all the components of the LMA: the legislative reforms, the eligibility criteria for the presidential candidates, the identification programme and the revision of electoral lists, the composition and functioning of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), the disarmament programme, and the restoration of state authority on the entire territory. It was also largely determined by the political calculations of actors and their anticipations of the decisions of the international community. From 2003 to 2005, all parties were less interested in advancing the technical preparations to have a chance to organise the presidential elections in October 2005, in conformity with the Constitution and the LMA, than in anticipating the post-October 2005 transitional arrangements and the related future status of the president. In that context, UNOCI had little to do on electoral issues, given its limited mandate, which was initially to 45 Report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 1643 (2005), S/2006/735, 5 October 2006; Report of the Group of Experts submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1708 (2006) concerning Côte d’Ivoire, S/2006/964, 12 December 2006; Report of the Group of Experts submitted in accordance with paragraph 7 (e) of Security Council resolution 1727 (2006), S/2007/349, 14 June 2007.

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‘provide oversight, guidance and technical assistance’ to the government, and ‘to prepare for and assist in the conduct of free, fair and transparent electoral processes […] in particular the presidential election’.46 The Pretoria Agreement, signed on 6 April 2005, called upon the UN to play ‘an enhanced role’ in the organisation of the general elections. On 23 May, the Ivorian government officially requested that the UN provide expertise and other assistance for the organisation of presidential and legislative elections. The South African mediation under Thabo Mbeki also asked the Security Council to authorise a larger UN role in the organisation of elections. To ensure that the elections would be credible and meet international standards, the Ivorian parties had agreed in Pretoria to a halfway solution, one between elections fully organised by the UN and elections fully managed by Ivorian institutions.The FN and the opposition parties pleaded for a heavy involvement of the UN in the electoral process, while the president opposed such external intrusion. The UN Secretary-General also considered that Côte d’Ivoire was not a failed state and had the capacity to organise its elections. It needed UN assistance and an election certification mechanism as a remedy to the total lack of confidence between the Ivorian parties. By its resolution 1603 (2005), the Security Council requested that the Secretary-General designate, as an exceptional arrangement, after consultations with the African Union and President Mbeki, a High Representative for the Elections in Côte d’Ivoire, autonomous from UNOCI, to assist, in particular, in the work of the Independent Electoral Commission and that of the Constitutional Council, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the SRSG for Côte d’Ivoire.The High Representative was mandated ‘to verify, on behalf of the international community, that all stages of the electoral process, including the establishment of a register of voters and the issuance of voters’ cards, [provided] all the necessary guarantees for the holding of open, free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections, within the limits laid down in the Constitution of Côte d’Ivoire’. The High Representative was also mandated ‘to provide, in close cooperation with UNOCI and the mediation, all necessary advice and guidance to the Constitutional Council, the Independent Electoral Commission and other relevant agencies or institutes to help them prevent and resolve any difficulty which [might] jeopardise the holding of the elections, with the authority to make necessary determinations in [that] regard’. On 19 July 2005, the Secretary-General appointed his High Representative for the Elections in Côte d’Ivoire.47 The HRE spent most of his time mediating between the Ivorian parties to agree on the sensitive issue of the composition of the Electoral Commission. It was already obvious at the time that the elections would be organised neither in October 2005 nor in the immediate months to follow. The IEC was formally inaugurated on 9 March 2006, and UNOCI began deploying electoral advisers in the context of its electoral assistance’s mandate. The HRE strived to put pressure on all actors involved in the electoral process, including with regard to the preliminary step of identification of the population and voters, to move from declarations of intent to concrete preparations. However, the 46

United Nations Security Council resolution 1528 of 27 February 2004. Antonio Monteiro (Portugal) was the first to hold the position. He was replaced on 13 April 2006 by Gerard Stoudmann (Switzerland). 47

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31 October 2006 deadline for holding the presidential election, which had been requested by resolution 1633 (2005), was missed. The last quarter of 2006 was marked by mounting tension between the president and his political allies, on one side, and the prime minister and international actors incarnated by the International Working Group, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and the High Representative for Elections on the other.The Secretary-General’s frustration at the political stalemate was perceptible in his tenth progress report on UNOCI, dated 17 October 2006, in which he said:

At every critical turn of the peace process, some of the main political leaders have resorted to calculated obstruction of the peace process, exploiting loopholes in the peace agreements, using legal technicalities and often inciting violent acts by their followers. Consequently, the second transition period, like the first, is coming to a close without elections. […] In this context, it would be necessary for the Council to review the mandate of UNOCI and to augment its resources. It is also important for the Security Council to closely monitor the implementation of the road map during the new transition period, in particular, with a view to imposing targeted sanctions against those obstructing the peace process, or seizing the International Criminal Court.48

On 1 November 2006, following ECOWAS and AU Peace and Security Council meetings, the Security Council adopted the ambitious resolution 1721 (2006), which renewed and strengthened the mandate of the prime minister and extended the president’s term for a ‘new and final transition period not exceeding 12 months’.49 The resolution also renewed and reinforced the mandate of the HRE who ‘[should] be the sole authority authorised to arbitrate with a view to preventing or resolving any problems or disputes related to the electoral process’ and ‘[should] certify that all stages of the electoral process, including the process of identification of the population, the establishment of a register of voters and the issuance of voters’ cards, [provided] all necessary guarantees for the holding of open, free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections in accordance with international standards’. The president almost immediately rejected the essence of the resolution and unveiled his own solution: engaging in a direct dialogue with the Forces Nouvelles, with the exclusive facilitation of his former regional adversary, the president of neighbouring Burkina Faso. From December 2006 to the signing of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement on 4 March 2007, the UN was largely marginalised, and key elements of resolution 1721 (2006) were ignored. On 16 July 2007, Security Council resolution 1765, which defined the new role of UNOCI after the signing of the OPA, terminated the mandate of the HRE, transferred the responsibility for the certification of the elections to the SRSG, and retained the technical and logistical assistance of the UN to Ivorian

48 49

Tenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General, op. cit. United Nations Security Council resolution 1721 of 1 November 2006. 105

electoral institutions. A ‘post-mortem’ analysis of the HRE mandate in Côte d’Ivoire and Security Council responsibility, provided by a former high-level UN diplomat, offers a good summary of that story: The mandate of the HRE was a confidence-building measure decided by the UN SecretaryGeneral and Thabo Mbeki to respond to the concern of Ivorian parties about the transparency of the electoral process. But it was an impossible job. It could not work without putting aside the Constitution of the country. The president did not want a strong international supervision of the elections. The HRE mandate participated to the same conceptual mistake as the appointment of presumably neutral Prime Ministers by the international community. The president never accepted a diminution of his powers […] Except the French, the members of the Security Council were not interested in the issue and most were cynical. The significant fact is that the Council does not provide support to the people it sends to the field, especially when they face difficulties. The HRE played a positive role at some point and provided useful advice on technical compromises for the identification programme and the electoral registration. […] However, the UN would have saved some credibility had it not created that position.50

IV. Peace agreement, elections and exit strategy

1. The Ouagadougou Political Agreement and the ‘accompanying’ role of UNOCI

Signed on 4 March 2007, the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (OPA) was the latest in a series of peace agreements but the first to have resulted from a ‘direct’ dialogue between the armed protagonists of the Ivorian crisis, on the initiative of the Ivorian president. One month of discreet discussions in Ouagadougou between the two delegations resulted in an ambitious agreement. The OPA did not represent a complete break with preceding agreements or Security Council resolutions. The transitional government had to implement the operations already required: the identification of the population and the distribution of new Ivorian identity cards to all those who have a right to them; the disarmament of armed militias, restructuring of the army and the reintegration of demobilised soldiers; the reunification of the national territory and redeployment of the administration in the area under control of the former rebels; and the organisation of open and transparent elections (within ten months of 4 March 2007). What changed with the OPA is that responsibility for the conduct of the transition was transferred to the protagonists themselves, the president and the new prime minister. Previous agreements had allocated this task to a prime minister equidistant from the parties to the conflict. The signatories to the OPA have agreed to a restructuring of the two armed forces in view of setting up new Ivorian Defence and Security Forces, including through the creation of an Integrated Command

50

FRIDE telephone interview, October 2008. 106

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Centre to unify the governmental and ex-rebel forces under joint command. The OPA transferred all responsibility for military issues to the Integrated Command Centre and therefore considerably limited the role of the UNOCI international forces and the French Licorne force.The missions of the Integrated Command Centre included the implementation of the National Programme of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration under the supervision of impartial forces; the implementation of military and security tasks related to the peace process; the security of the identification operations and the electoral process. The OPA was particularly vague on how to achieve DDR and restructure Ivorian Defence and Security Forces. A series of ‘supplementary accords’ will be signed in the course of the difficult and slow implementation of the OPA.51 The OPA made no request for a withdrawal of UN and French Licorne forces. It only explicitly requested the gradual reduction of forces in the ‘zone of confidence’, which was to be removed.The signatories to the OPA reaffirmed to the technical evaluation commission sent by the UN SecretaryGeneral on 10-22 April 2007 that they needed continued support from the UN to implement the agreement. The UN technical evaluation mission made recommendations on the necessary adjustments of UNOCI’s mandate, which were submitted in the Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council dated 14 May 2007. On 16 July 2007, Security Council resolution 1765 endorsed the recommendations of the Secretary-General and requested UNOCI to ‘support the full implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, including by supporting the integrated command centre, the restoration of State administration throughout the country, the identification and voter registration processes, the electoral process, persons affected by the conflict, efforts to create a positive political environment, protection and promotion of human rights, and the economic recovery process of Côte d’Ivoire’.52 Before the OPA, the Council had been producing ambitious resolutions under Chapter VII intending to control the content and the rhythm of the peace process, but without providing the adequate resources or support to the peacekeeping mission, and not exerting sufficient pressure on the parties. Since its signing, the Council’s resolutions, yet under Chapter VII, have limited UNOCI’s role to providing passive support to the implementation of the agreement, depending on the goodwill of the president, the prime minister and, to some extent, the facilitator. The regional and global context of the Ivorian conflict had changed after five years. Key international actors of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement’s era had left the scene, including President Chirac of France, the only permanent member of the Council that was very active on the dossier, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, two chiefs of UNOCI, and two High Representatives for Elections. The security situation undoubtedly improved, the risk of resumption of military hostilities opposing the Ivorian army to the Forces Nouvelles was substantially reduced and signs of return to normalcy multiplied. But the implementation of the OPA by those who elaborated and signed it became an open-ended process, leaving UNOCI and the Security Council in an uncomfortable position. 51 The OPA also provided for the removal of the ‘zone of confidence’, the strip of land extending 600 km from east to west that has separated the southern part of the country under the control of government forces and the northern part occupied by the FN since September 2002. 52 United Nations Security Council resolution 1765 of 16 July 2007.

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2. The state of the peace process in 2009 and the future of UNOCI

Two years after the signing of the OPA, significant progress has been made, especially in the realisation of the identification of nationals and future voters, and the country continues to enjoy relative peace and stability. However, the elections scheduled at one point for 30 November 2008 — with a threeyear delay — have been postponed again. In the first quarter of 2009, the Independent Electoral Commission was still unable to announce a new and realistic electoral timeline. At the request of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, a technical assessment mission led by the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations visited the country from 10 to 14 December 2008 to review UNOCI’s role in the peace process.The mission observed that UNOCI’s capabilities should be retained, in order to enable UNOCI to contribute to maintaining a secure environment for the full implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement, in particular the electoral process. The following potential threats to the peace process were identified: the continued existence of armed militias and violent youth; the absence of effective disarmament of former combatants; the uncompleted redeployment of state administration; the risk of localised clashes in the north and the west; the limited freedom of movement due to continuing checkpoints and roadblocks; and the fact that elections could be a catalyst for violence in Côte d’Ivoire, in particular if they were perceived as lacking transparency and credibility.53 However, ‘the assessment mission proposed that the UNOCI force could be reduced by one battalion during the next rotation, from 8,115 to 7,450 troop personnel, on the understanding that the force’s mobility will be enhanced with adequate air capabilities, including additional utility helicopters, and taking into account the continued support of the French forces to UNOCI in terms of quick reaction capabilities’.54 The assessment mission also determined that a more substantial drawdown of UNOCI forces should not be considered ‘until progress was made in carefully benchmarked areas and in security conditions on the ground’. The following key benchmarks and preconditions for a more substantial drawdown of UNOCI were identified: (a) completion of credible disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants and dismantling of militias; (b) successful completion of the elections; (c) commencement of security sector reform, in particular confidencebuilding measures within a broader framework for democratic governance and oversight of the security sector, reunification of the army and establishment of functional and republican Ivorian armed forces and security services; and (d) restoration of state authority throughout the country.55 The Secretary-General’s recommendations were endorsed by the Security Council on 27 January 2009 with the adoption of resolution 1865.The Council renewed the mandates of UNOCI and of the French forces that support it; endorsed the recommendations of the report of the Secretary-General dated 8 January 2009; decided to reduce the level of authorised military personnel from 8,115 to 53

Nineteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, 8 January 2009. Ibid. 55 Ibid. 54

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7,450; requested UNOCI, within its existing resources, to support actively the full implementation of the OPA and its Supplementary Agreements; endorsed the benchmarks proposed by the SecretaryGeneral for a possible further drawdown; requested the Secretary-General to monitor progress on their achievement; and encouraged him to continue to refine and update these benchmarks and to report to the Security Council. In the same resolution, the Council recalled that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Côte d’Ivoire ‘[should] certify that all stages of the electoral process [provided] all the necessary guarantees for the holding of open, free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections in accordance with international standards’.56 Five years after its creation, the UN peacekeeping mission in Côte d’Ivoire actually initiated discreetly its exit strategy by decreasing for the first time its military strength and defining general benchmarks that will guide its further drawdown. After initial optimism and fatigue about the Ivorian dossier, the Council seemed to realise that the recurrent delays in the implementation of the OPA could not be only explained by technical, logistical and financial difficulties. It appeared that the only external actor who has an impor tant role in the post-OPA context, President Compaoré, could not accelerate the implementation of the agreement and push President Gbagbo, Prime Minister Soro and the Ivorian institutions involved in the electoral process to make extraordinary effort to respect a date for the elections. In its resolution 1865 (2009), the Council recalled that it was fully prepared to impose targeted measures against persons who were determined to be a threat to the peace and national reconciliation process in Côte d’Ivoire, including by threatening the electoral process. It remains to be seen if such threatening language from the Council still carries some weight after years of hesitations and fluctuating decisions on the missions and objectives of UN peacekeeping in Côte d’Ivoire.

V. Implementation of resolution 1325 (2000)

1. The language on resolution 1325 (2000) in Security Council resolutions and reports by the Secretary-General on UNOCI

UNOCI was created by resolution 1528, adopted in February 2004, quite a while after the vote on resolution 1325 (2000). From the beginning, the resolutions on UNOCI contained references to gender issues in the context of peacekeeping.The initial resolution 1528 (2004) ‘reaffirmed’ resolution 1325 (2000) and included explicit gender references. UNOCI was mandated, amongst other things, to help the government implement the national DDR programme, ‘with special attention to the specific needs of women and children’; to coordinate with the United Nations missions in Sierra Leone and in Liberia the implementation of a voluntary repatriation and resettlement programme for foreign 56

United Nations Security Council resolution 1865 of 27 January 2009. 109

ex-combatants, ‘with special attention to the specific needs of women and children’; to contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights ‘with special attention to violence committed against women and girls and to help investigate human rights violations with a view to help ending impunity’; and requested the Secretary-General ‘to give special attention to the gender and child-protection components within the staff of UNOCI’. In its resolution 1603 of 3 June 2005, the Council ‘[underlined] the importance of mainstreaming the gender perspective in peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peacebuilding and of appropriate expertise in this regard, and [encouraged] UNOCI to actively address this issue’. It also mentioned the recurrent issue of involvement of peacekeepers in sexual exploitation and abuse. It welcomed the zero tolerance policy, requested the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action and urged troop-contributing countries ‘to take appropriate preventive action including the conduct of predeployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel’. Resolution 1609 of 24 June 2005 also requested ‘special attention to the specific needs of women’ in the conduct of the DDR programme, in the facilitation of humanitarian assistance by UNOCI and in the promotion and protection of human rights. Resolution 1739 of 10 January 2007, almost three years after the establishment of UNOCI, went further than simply calling for ‘special attention’ to women and children, and urged ‘UNOCI to take into account the rights of women and of gender considerations as set out in Security Council resolution 1325 as a cross cutting issue, including through consultation with local and international women’s groups, and [requested] the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout UNOCI and all other aspects relating to the situation of women and girls, especially in relation to the need to protect them from gender-based violence’. There was at last a certain level of precision and definition of priorities in the role that was expected from UNOCI in implementing resolution 1325 (2000).The idea of monitoring and of progress in gender mainstreaming in general, and in the protection of women from genderbased violence in particular, are essential. But this effort in the wording of the resolutions came late, given the well-known serious impact of the conflict and the ongoing political crisis on the security of women and girls. After the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement, the Council in its resolution 1765 of 16 July 2007 ‘[called] upon all concerned parties to ensure that the protection of women and children [was] addressed in the implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement as well as the post-conflict reconstruction and recovery phases, including continued monitoring and reporting of the situation of women and children’. It is worth mentioning that the OPA itself, as negotiated by the two former belligerents, was gender-blind. Given that UNOCI was established more than three years after the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000), the Council could have included explicit language on the protection of women from gender-based violence and participation of women in the peace process to provide unambiguous guidance and obligations in that area to the peacekeeping mission.

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2. The record of UNOCI in the areas of protection of women and promotion of the participation of women in the peace process

The Secretary-General’s report dated 18 March 2005 mentioned the establishment of a Gender Unit within UNOCI to implement the principles of resolution 1325 (2000) on gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping operations and described its first activities as follows: As of March 2005, the Unit had established a gender component in the civilian staff induction training. It has also carried out liaison with the civilian police and the military training units for the inclusion of a gender component in their respective training activities and in preparation of a trainthe-trainers course. The Unit has also established contacts and partnerships with United Nations agencies, non-governmental organisations and local organisations as well as with the Ivorian Ministry of Children, Women and Families.57 From 2005, the Secretary-General’s reports almost systematically included a section on ‘Gender’ which gave a short summary of the work of UNOCI in that area. In the course of 2005, the Gender Unit continued to conduct gender-awareness training for military personnel, UN police and civilian personnel. Another main activity was to work with the National Commission for DDR to integrate the special needs of women into DDR planning and execution. But as reported in the SecretaryGeneral’s sixth progress report, it was difficult to obtain from the National Commission the total number of women involved in the DDR process. As an UNOCI gender officer noted, ‘men are the ones who make the lists’. He gave the example of the FN military chiefs who initially included only 14 women in the list of ex-combatants to be involved in the cantonment phase of the DDR. It turned out that they had ignored 596 female ex-combatants.58 The Gender Unit also extended its focus on strengthening local capacity through training sessions and workshops on gender-based violence, including sexual exploitation and abuse, and gender mainstreaming in DDR. In the course of 2006, the Secretary-General’s reports mentioned the initiatives of UNOCI to sensitise and prepare women to take an active role in the decision-making process, in line with the objectives affirmed in resolution 1325 (2000). The Gender Unit participated in the training of female candidates for the forthcoming elections through a long-term cooperation with one of the major women’s organisation in the country, the Coalition of Women Leaders.59 The mission also developed training activities on gender equality for national school advisers, specific gender training for national gendarmerie and police forces (1,000 police cadets and 26 officers from the gendarmerie, reported as of July 2006).60 In cooperation with UNDP and the International Friendship Service (IFS), the mission 57 Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2005/186, 18 March 2005. 58 FRIDE interview, Abidjan, November 2008. 59 Eighth Report of the Secretary-General, op. cit. 60 Ninth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2006/532, 17 July 2006.

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also developed a project for the creation of a Women’s Resource Centre to support women and girls who had been affected by the conflict. UNOCI also assisted the Ministry of Family and Social Affairs in drafting a national gender policy and trained the personnel on gender issues.61 The interviews conducted with the main Ivorian non-governmental organisations working on gender issues confirmed the efforts made by UNOCI in advancing the objectives of resolution 1325 (2000). Women leaders and activists recognised the work that has been done from mid-2005 by the peacekeeping mission’s Gender Unit and the interest showed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for gender mainstreaming in the mission’s activities.62 They all identified the sensitisation on the contents of resolution 1325 (2000) and the training on gender issues as the most significant contributions of the Gender Unit. The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) also played an important role in the promotion of resolution 1325 (2000) and support of local women’s organisations for their activities in that regard.63 UNOCI radio has been used as an instrument to popularise the key issues on the protection of women and participation in decisionmaking processes, and offered a precious outlet for women’s organisations in a sociological context that tends to marginalise their voices in public debate. The lack of sufficient human resources devoted to gender issues in the mission was highlighted. A gender adviser (and head of the Gender Unit) with two gender officers and an assistant could certainly not successfully face the challenges. The Gender Unit has no representation outside the mission’s headquarters in Abidjan.The establishment of gender focal points in addition to the Gender Unit was not enough to mainstream gender in all areas of the peacekeeping mission as called for by resolution 1325 (2000). Women’s organisations also regretted the absence of a dedicated fund for women’s initiatives within the framework of the Quick Impact Projects of the mission, but they welcomed the direct support of the Gender Unit to help women’s organisations improve their project proposals. In the priority area of protection of women from gender-based violence, notably the violence related to the conflict, the record of UNOCI is not impressive. Information campaigns, distribution of brochures, sensitisation about resolution 1325 (2000) and women’s rights, training of peacekeepers, national police and gendarmes, as well as elements of Forces Nouvelles, are all useful activities that should eventually (and hopefully) reduce the extent of gender-based violence in the Ivorian society. But when a peacekeeping mission is on the ground, people, in general, and women, in particular, expect to be better protected, even if those who bear the primary responsibility for the protection of the population remain the country’s security forces and the de facto authorities like the FN on the territory under their control. As in many conflicts, in the Ivorian case those who are expected to protect civilians from physical violence are often involved in the violation of the basic rights of their fellow citizens. Many non-governmental organisations, both national and international, reported the widespread atrocities 61

Tenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General, op. cit. Within the mission, according to a senior staff member, resolution 1325 (2000) was one of the favourite subjects of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, but he was a lone voice in the mission, and most staff considered gender issues as the exclusive work of the Gender Unit. FRIDE interview, Abidjan, November 2008. 63 FRIDE interviews, Abidjan, November 2008. 62

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committed against women in the course of the Ivorian conflict and their persistence a long time after the period of actual fighting. As observed, for instance, by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in a comprehensive report: Human Rights Watch documented over 180 cases of sexual violence in Côte d’Ivoire, including individual and gang rape, sexual slavery, forced incest, and egregious sexual assault. […] Sexual victimisation of girls and women was often accompanied by other gross human rights violations against them, their families and their communities, as armed men on both sides of the political divide massacred, killed, tortured, assaulted, and kidnapped innocent civilians. […] Abuses took place throughout the country, especially in the hotly contested western regions which experienced the most fighting. Mixed groups of Liberian and Sierra Leonean mercenaries supporting both the Ivorian government and rebel forces in the west were guilty of especially egregious and widespread sexual abuses. However, even after the end of active hostilities, from 2004 onwards, sexual violence remained a significant problem both rebel- and government-held areas.64 Women leaders interviewed by FRIDE considered that no significant progress has been made in fighting sexual violence. They observed that there is little to expect until the rule of law is restored throughout the country and impunity ends. With a political situation still marked by uncertainty and bad faith of the main actors — resulting in the continuing delays in the organisation of elections, disarmament and dismantling of irregular forces, and reform of the security sector — a real return to normalcy and the end of impunity will also be delayed. Local organisations engaged in the defence of women’s rights unambiguously blamed Ivorian political authorities, security forces, associated militias and ex-rebels for the failure to contain the violence inflicted on women and girls. The work of the Human Rights Division of UNOCI in documenting the basic violations including sexual violence both in rebel-held and governmental areas is appreciated.65 But the lack of follow-up action by national authorities is the major problem.Yet, there is also a degree of responsibility at the UN Security Council level. Its failures to activate targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including sexual violence; merely to discuss the report of the UN Commission of Inquiry into human rights violations committed since 2002; and to give adequate resources to the mission, in order to allow it to deploy massively in the areas most exposed to violence against civilians in a deterrent posture, have done nothing to combat the culture of impunity. The mission’s efforts to promote an increased participation of women in the peace process are also acknowledged. UNOCI supported the initiatives of women’s organisations aiming at identifying and training women from various backgrounds so as to make them fit for candidacy to elections at local, regional and national levels. Bilateral donors participated in the funding of such projects and UNOCI’s Gender Unit contributed in providing training expertise. As often, the main obstacles to a significant participation of women in politics and public affairs — be it in a context of a peace process or not — are entrenched in the functioning of the political parties and all other organisations that are expected 64 Human Rights Watch, ‘ “My Heart is Cut”. Sexual Violence by Rebels and Pro-Government Forces in Côte d’Ivoire’, Human Rights Watch Report 19, 11 (A), August 2007.

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to be representative of the diversity of the population, beginning with its gender diversity.The relative economic dependency on men who for long have been holding most decision-making positions, and taking advantage of it with no intention of sharing power with women, remains a serious obstacle. Ivorian women also quoted the unambiguously male-dominated traditional structures, such as local chiefs, as significant hurdles in their efforts to promote gender equality in decision-making. The repeated postponements of the presidential and general elections in Côte d’Ivoire did not discourage the most active civil society organisations in their efforts to bring women’s voices, gender issues and a gender perspective to the appraisal of the numerous challenges of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding in the country. ‘Coordination for the participation of women to the electoral process and the post-crisis reconstruction’ has been created in the postOuagadougou Agreement context. UNOCI reiterated its support, including at the Special Representative of the Secretary-General level. But the resources for concrete results-oriented action remain limited. A positive note comes from the development of a national action plan for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) by the Direction of Equality and Promotion of Gender at the Ministry of Women, Family and Social Affairs, and from the existence of dedicated staff despite the limited resources at their disposal.66 UNOCI’s exit strategy should explicitly include a gender component and identify key areas of continuing international assistance to address the serious problems that have not been given the necessary priority in the first years of the peacekeeping mission.

VI. Concluding observations

The armed conflict opposing President Gbagbo’s loyalist army and the rebellion of Forces Nouvelles is over. The deep political and social crisis is not. Seven years after the outburst of the rebellion, the conditions for durable peace and stability are far from present. The immediate consequences of the brief civil war and the long situation of ‘no peace, no war’ constitute a serious threat to the security of the state and its populations, including the internally displaced population, of which women represent a majority. No real disarmament of irregular armed groups has taken place.The ex-rebel commanders are yet fully to relinquish their control of the northern part of the territory to the official state administration. The power-sharing agreement between the president and the former leader of the rebellion has been on hold since March 2007. The political agreement signed in Ouagadougou was supposed to organise a short transitional period when all conditions for credible elections would be put in place. More than two years after the OPA, it is impossible to know when the presidential election will be organised and in what political and security conditions they may take place. It is also impossible to know whether the elections will be an essential step in the return of durable peace or they will open a new period of political violence and instability that could degenerate in the medium term into a fresh rebellion. 65 66

FRIDE interviews, Abidjan November 2008. Ibid. 114

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The UN peacekeeping mission has been on the ground since mid-2004. Main military hostilities were over when UNOCI deployed its troops. It was there to assist a Government of National Reconciliation in the implementation of the comprehensive Linas-Marcoussis Peace Agreement, including by monitoring the ceasefire, helping to build confidence between the belligerents, protecting civilians in imminent danger of physical violence if and when it could, assisting in the DDR programme, the reunification of the country and the organisation of free and fair elections. The mandate defined by the Security Council for UNOCI was broad in terms of the areas to be covered. But it was also limited in the sense that the mission was to ‘assist’ the Ivorian government in almost all areas. Almost everything depended on the space given by the government and, ultimately, on internal politics. The peacekeeping mission was constrained internally by the contradiction between the political interests of the president and the programme of the Government of National Reconciliation defined by the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The conditions of the negotiations that led to the LMA and the formation of the Government of National Reconciliation in 2003 have had a profound and durable impact on the evolution of the peace process. UNOCI found itself in a situation where both armed parties had no interest in respecting the peace accords, including the president who maintained his authority over the regular armed forces and his constitutional legitimacy, at least until October 2005. For a UN peacekeeping mission to have had some chance of accomplishing its mandate in such internal political context, it would have needed considerable resources in terms of troops, civilian police and deterrent capacity in general, as well as an unequivocal and sustained political support of an anonymous Security Council. UNOCI was also constrained externally by the early involvement of France, which played the roles of former colonial power, controversial peace-broker of the LMA, first foreign military actor on the ground, and permanent member of the Security Council. French quick military intervention was certainly decisive in halting the civil war and thus saving lives, but the French diplomatic way of handling the dossier failed to provide sufficient motives for a large international support, including from other members of the Security Council, for a robust peacekeeping mission ready to defend itself and its mandate. Ivorian actors took full advantage of the reluctance of the Council to exert real pressures on those who were obstructing the peace process and even committing or encouraging serious human rights violations. UNOCI’s presence was positive and continues to be so in contributing to a peaceful environment, but it has never been in a position to have a strong impact on the evolution and pace of the peace process. The signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement was expected to offer an exit way for the UN peacekeeping operation and the Security Council. However, as long as elections are not organised, it will be difficult for the Council to decide on the departure of UNOCI.The mission may be long and costly. It still has the responsibility of making sure that it does not simply delay the civil war before leaving the country.

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4 Kosovo

Synopsis In March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) launched a military campaign in Kosovo without the prior endorsement of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The goal of the operation was to bring to an end increasing fighting between Serbian government forces and armed Kosovo-Albanian separatist groups that had a serious humanitarian impact. The Security Council had earlier been seized of the situation in Kosovo and adopted three resolutions which, among others, imposed a comprehensive arms embargo, condemned the excessive use of force by Serbian forces and acts of terrorism by Kosovo-Albanian groups, ordered the withdrawal of Serbian forces, and called for dialogue to reach a political solution to the crisis.1 NATO’s air campaign, starting on 24 March and concluding on 9 June, resulted in the withdrawal of Serbian forces from the territory, their replacement by international peace forces, and the massive return of the displaced Kosovo-Albanian population. In May, the G-8 foreign ministers agreed on a set of guiding principles designed to achieve a political solution to the crisis. After 78 days of bombardment and under pressure from Russia, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević accepted the ceasefire conditions and signed the Military-Technical Agreement on 9 June 1999.2 On 10 June 1999, the Security Council adopted resolution 1244 (1999),3 based on the G-8 agreed principles4 under Chapter VII authorising the deployment in Kosovo, under UN auspices, of an international civil presence — the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), established by the Secretary-General with the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU) and the UN Secretariat;5 and a security presence — the Kosovo Force (KFOR), 1 United Nations Security Council resolution 1239 of 14 May 1999; United Nations Security Council resolution 1203 of 24 October 1998; United Nations Security Council resolution 1199 of 23 September 1998; and United Nations Security Council resolution 1160 of 31 March 1998; amongst others. Available at www.un.org/Docs/sc. 2 Military-Technical Agreement between the International Security Force and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, signed in Kumanovo on 9 June 1999, available at www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm. 3 United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999, available at www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm. 4 Included as Annex 1 to United Nations Security Council resolution 1244, op.cit. 5 United Nations Security Council resolution 1244, op. cit., paras. 5, 6 and 10.

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established by member states6 with substantial NATO participation and including forces from the Russian Federation. UNMIK and KFOR were required to coordinate their efforts to redress the grave humanitarian situation, create the conditions for the normal functioning of society for all inhabitants of Kosovo, and lay the ground for a political solution to the dispute about the future status of the province.Their responsibilities were to be discharged in compliance with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Resolution 1244 (1999) reflects a fundamental ambiguity that cannot gloss over the cleavages between the parties, within the Council and in the international community in relation to the final status of Kosovo. The resolution lays down the commitments undertaken by the Permanent Five (P5) on the need to put an end to the violence and address the humanitarian crisis, while laying the ground for dialogue. However, it falls short of admitting the eventuality of independence, the only mention of the problem of status being counter-balanced by the prescription on sovereignty. While advances in the implementation of the transitional measures established by UNMIK and KFOR have been considerable, the basic disagreement over the crisis has impeded progress on the political process towards status dictated by the resolution.The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement put forward by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari7 in 2007, almost eight years after the intervention, was rejected by Serbia and failed to obtain the Council’s approval. On 17 February 2008, representatives of the Kosovo Provisional Institutions of Self-Government unilaterally declared independence, adding to the already complex political situation. Unique in its character and not subject to renewal, resolution 1244 (1999) remains in force in the absence of a revision, due to the lack of consensus among the P5. Since its adoption in 1999, the Council has pronounced itself on matters of substance on the situation in Kosovo on barely a few occasions without altering the resolution. These include the condemnation of the ethnic violence of March 2004, the need to proceed with political status talks in October 2005 and, more recently, in November 2008, the endorsement of the Secretary-General’s proposal on the reconfiguration of the civil presence thus far embodied by UNMIK. From the perspective of the Serbian government, this endorsement represents a turning point in the existing stalemate and opens the possibility of a more constructive dialogue with the international community. In Belgrade’s view, despite earlier claims that UNMIK had helped to set up a ‘para-state’ in Kosovo,8 its presence remained crucial. Another consequence of the Serbian endorsement was its agreement to the unavoidable deployment of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) — under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) — which allowed the Serbian government to ‘save face’, to a limited extent, vis-à-vis its population.9

6

Ibid., paras. 5 and 7. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, S/2007/168/Add.1: Letter Dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General, available at www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf. 8 Interview with a Serb official. 9 A reflection implicit in one of the interviews held in the summer of 2008 with a Serb official. 7

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I. Background to the conflict

In order to understand the Security Council’s decision to intervene and its choice of intervention, several factors need to be considered. These include the political situation of Kosovo, at national and regional levels; the eventuality of an expansion of the conflict to neighbouring countries having substantial Albanian minorities; and the absence of an ‘administrative fabric’ found by the international civil presence upon arrival on the ground, a circumstance that left it with no option but to undertake the difficult task of administrative and institutional reconstruction. In this context, resolution 1244 (1999) and the establishment of UNMIK signal a landmark in the history of the organisation: the Security Council charged the UN mission with the direct and comprehensive administration of the territory,10 temporarily suspending the sovereignty rights and attributes of the state concerned, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and in fact creating an international protectorate. Kosovo’s political, legal and historical situation within Serbia lies at the core of the problem.The approval of the 1974 Federal Constitution entailed a big step towards decentralisation, giving the constituent republics powers similar to those granted to territorial units within a confederation. The province of Kosovo, while remaining part of the Republic of Serbia, enjoyed a very broad autonomous regime.11 Tito’s government policy was to restrain the nationalist movements that had plagued the region since the collapse of the former empires with the aim of maintaining the balance of power among the republics. A specific objective was to keep within bounds the ascendancy of Serbia, the most populous republic and the one having more weight in the officer corps of the Federal Army. The 1974 Federal Constitution was designed to mitigate discontent and to even out the competences of the republics’ national groups. The Constitution also sought to satisfy the claims of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, both part of Serbia, by giving them a seat at the Council of the Presidency, an assembly, a police force and a banking system of their own, always under the control of the regional Communist Party. The provinces acquired a status similar to that of the republics, save in name and in the right to secede. In the wake of Tito’s death,Yugoslavia’s unity began to collapse. In the summer of 1991, Slovenia issued a unilateral declaration of independence. Tension sprinkled resulting in violent incidents, only to relax after the Federal Armed Forces withdrew from Slovenia and the republic acquiesced to put its 10

Amongst the existing models of international administration of territories as a conflict or crisis management, and given that all of them imply intervention into the host country’s sovereign affairs, this is the farthest reaching one, as it involves the complete and indefinite suspension of a state’s (Yugoslavia) sovereignty over a portion of its territory. It is another step in the evolution of different models of international administration of territories ranging from the international trusteeship system, resulting from decolonisation, passing through a transitional supervisory role such as in Cambodia, up to ‘indirect’ administration — though with a high level of interference in the decision-making process — in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Eastern Slavonia. 11 After the 1974 Federal Constitution, the territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was organised into six republics (Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia) and two Serbian autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina); the political status of these provinces being the same as the republics — including participation at federal institutions — save in the right to secede, exclusive to the republics. 119

declaration of independence on hold for three months. In October, Slovenia ratified its independent status, formally recognised by the EU and other countries in January 1992, without major confrontation. A member of the EU and NATO since 2004, Slovenia chaired the Security Council in 199912 at the time of the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999), and chaired the European Council during the first semester of 2008. The independence of Croatia came next. The country had a strong and aggressive nationalist movement that, similarly to Serb nationalism, had ambitions over parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina where many Croats lived. Slovenia’s unilateral declaration of independence and the ensuing proclamation of an independent Serbian Republic (Republika Srpska) in the Croatian territory of Krajina precipitated Croatia’s secession from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The war that followed since August 1991 displayed unusual cruelty and raised fears of regionalisation among international actors. The Croatian and Slovenian declarations of independence precipitated that of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) in 1991 with the support of 71 per cent of its population. While avoiding armed conflict, the birth of the new independent state raised conflicting views amongst its neighbours: Serbia did not oppose it; Bulgaria was supportive without caveats; Greece was adamantly opposed to it; and Albania was ambivalent, given its strong ties to the increasingly vocal Albanian minority opposing the FYROM government. The Security Council established a multinational force of a preventive nature — the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)13 — to oversee and monitor Macedonian borders, thus reinforcing its precarious stability. In 1999, China vetoed a further extension of the mission following FYROM’s formal recognition of Taiwan. Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaimed sovereignty over its territory in October 1991, declaring independence on 1 March 1992, after a referendum that — though boycotted by many Bosnian-Serbs — counted on almost 100 per cent of a 64 per cent turnout. On 9 January 1992, the Bosnian-Serbs had proclaimed the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which became Republika Srpska later in August, while the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) had proclaimed in November 1991 the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosna as a separate entity with a supporting militia, the Croatian Defence Council (HVO). Armed conflict broke out in March and extended for more than three years during which Serb irregular forces, with the support of the Yugoslav army, fought against Croat and Muslim militias. Europe witnessed the worst atrocities committed in its territory since the Second World War.Various peace plans, some negotiated and others imposed, were drafted and discussed but none succeeded. It would only be with the Dayton Agreements in December 1995 (not until Croatian forces, with US support, had recovered control over the areas occupied by the Serbs) that the future and complex political map of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be established, setting — both by action and omission — the basis of the problems and deficiencies that would since ail the rest of the territories of the extinct Federation. 12 Danilo Turk, who represented Slovenia at the Security Council during the first semester of 1999, was recruited as United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations later that year. 13 United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP), established on 31 March 1995 to replace the United Nations Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR, February 1992-March 1995) in the territory of FYROM.

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It was at Dayton where a new Balkan map was drawn, with a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constituted only by the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro and succeeding the former in its international rights and obligations. Ulterior conflicts in Albanian populated areas of the extinct FRY — and their consequences — were directly or indirectly related to the Kosovo-Albanian plight, be it the 2000-2001 conflict in the southeast of Serbia or the 2001 crisis in FYROM. After Tito’s death in 1980, Albanian claims to become the seventh republic resulted unacceptable to the Republics of Serbia and Macedonia.The Albanian-Serbian contention worsened. In 1987, Milošević was elected President of Serbia and in 1990 he declared the state of emergency, depriving Kosovo of its autonomy.This gave Serbia three — out of eight — seats at the Council of the Federal Presidency, along with Montenegro’s permanent support. The decision was ratified through a poll where only Serbia’s inhabitants (including Kosovo) cast their vote. Kosovo-Albanian nationalist leader Ibrahim Rugova organised a peaceful resistance movement and called for civil disobedience (boycotting taxes, population census and elections), setting up parallel structures to provide health, education and other basic needs to the Albanian population of Kosovo, along with parallel elections and a referendum followed by the proclamation in Kaçanik of the Republic of Kosovo, with himself as president. For almost ten years (1989-1999), the only state administration present in Kosovo for the majority of Albanian descent was the police and the military forces redeployed in the territory from other areas in Serbia by the Belgrade government. Having for the most part been excluded by Milošević from the civil service, Kosovo-Albanians relied on the parallel structures established under Rugova’s leadership to manage public goods and services. These structures, however, lacked the necessary basic infrastructure and had no solid technical and administrative support systems. Slobodan Milošević ’s nationalist ambitions took Kosovo to a lengthy conflict that led to the NATO military intervention, the subsequent withdrawal of Serbian forces and the Security Council’s adoption of resolution 1244 (1999), which placed the territory of Kosovo under the interim administration of the UN-led international civil presence under the protection of the NATO-led Kosovo Force. Rugova’s peaceful resistance approach could not prevent a growing sense of frustration among Kosovo-Albanians. The issue of Kosovo had not been addressed at Dayton in 1995 and reiterated requests to establish a UN force in the territory had gone unheeded. Armed cells claiming membership of a separatist insurgency, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA/UÇK),14 started operations on 22 April 1996, marking the beginning of hostilities with the Government of Serbia, by launching simultaneous attacks against civilian targets in four separate locations of Kosovo.The KLA adopted an ‘action-reaction strategy’ designed to attract international attention to what became an ever-increasing and disproportionate response of Serbian police and military, in the hope of eliciting growing sympathy for the Kosovo-Albanian plight and obtaining international support.The international attitude vis-à-vis the KLA was at the very least ambiguous. While some qualified it as a national liberation movement, many had strong reservations at what they perceived as a terrorist organisation. In resolution 1160 (1998), the Security Council had, inter alia, condemned ‘all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army’.15 14

In Albanian: Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës, UÇK. 121

Despite this, no financial or arms embargo was specifically aimed at restricting the KLA. On the contrary, the KLA was reportedly well funded and supported from outside, mainly by the United States (US).16 The institutional crisis in Albania allowed large amounts of war material from the Albanian army to be handed out to the KLA in 1997. Albanians from Kosovo moved to Montenegro, Albania and FYROM, posing a challenge to the fragile unity of the latter where a large Albanian minority was increasingly vocal and a civil war could give rise to territorial claims in neighbouring countries with the ensuing destabilisation of the entire region. Meanwhile, Milošević had become president of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1997.

II. Context for UN intervention

The threat of international intervention led to the first Security Council resolutions,17 the brokering of a ceasefire agreement and the deployment of an international operation, the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), between October 1998 and March 1999.The KVM’s working conditions and chances of success were precarious from the beginning, mainly owing to the negative attitude of the Serbian authorities and the expressed intention of the KLA to prevent agreement. KLA leaders had not been included in the ceasefire negotiation: their participation would have turned them into formal and legitimate interlocutors, a legitimacy unwanted by many (including not only the Serbian government, but other European states as well). No success, however, was possible without their concurrence.The situation in Kosovo worsened, as foreseen by KLA’s ‘action-reaction’ strategy. Confrontation between Serbian forces and the KLA reached a point of no return for the international community with the events at the Central Kosovo village of Račak, on 15 January 1999, where 45 males of the same family were killed. Serbian forces were initially accused of the massacre. Notwithstanding the fact that its actual authorship was contested (and has still not been clarified to date) by a Russian and Finnish investigating team (it was not investigated by the KVM), it provided the trigger that the international community needed to decide on intervention, given the cruelty and indiscrimination of the Serbian forces’ actions against the KosovoAlbanian population. Memories of the massacre in Srebrenica were still fresh, sparking international outrage and influencing ongoing initiatives to solve the conflict (amongst which the talks that were being held at Rambouillet, in France). These talks, held at the beginning of 1999, constituted a key precedent for resolution 1244 (1999). An Interim Agreement was proposed to the Government of Serbia and a delegation of representatives of the Kosovo-Albanian population. Yugoslavia refused to accept it, a fact that NATO used as justification to launch its 1999 air campaign.The proposed agreement contained provisions for Kosovo’s autonomy that went further than what the Serbian government was willing to concede, including — as mentioned above — the implicit reference to a referendum finally to settle the issue of Kosovo. 15

United Nations Security Council resolution 1160 of 31 March 1998. ‘Moral Combat: NATO at War’, BBC 2, 12 March 2000. 17 United Nations Security Council resolutions 1239, 1203, 1199, and 1160, op.cit., amongst others. 16

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A particularly controversial point was the then secret Appendix B (in the drafting of which Russia had not participated), which stated, inter alia, that: NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, manoeuvre, billet, and utilisation of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations. 18 The terms presented to the Government of Serbia at Rambouillet were considered intolerable and could not possibly be accepted. To many qualified observers, it seemed as a deliberate attempt to provoke a Serbian rejection that would legitimise a NATO intervention that had already been decided upon. In a comment to the press, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared that: The Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet is not a document that an angelic Serb could have accepted. It was a terrible diplomatic document that should never have been presented in that form.19 In the end, on 18 March, the Albanian, US and British delegations signed the text while the Serbian and Russian delegations refused to do so. Talks were called off the following day. Events proceeded rapidly after the failure at Rambouillet. KVM international monitors withdrew on 20 March, for safety reasons ahead of the anticipated NATO bombing campaign. On 23 March, the Serbian assembly accepted the principle of autonomy for Kosovo20 and the non-military part of the agreement. Nonetheless, the Serbian side had objections to the military part, Appendix B in particular, which it characterised as ‘NATO occupation’. The full document was described as ‘fraudulent’ by the Serbs because the military part had only been offered at the very end of the talks without room for negotiation, and because the other side bluntly refused to hold direct negotiations with and even to meet the FRY delegation. The following day, on 24 March, NATO’s bombardment began. The Council’s reaction to this turn of events was reflected in its meetings of 24 and 26 March, convened at the request of Russia.21 To a large extent, the debate laid down the main issues of the still unresolved debate over humanitarian intervention versus national sovereignty. On the first day, Russian Ambassador Lavrov stated that his country was ‘profoundly outraged’ and expressed ‘categorical rejection’ towards the NATO action, which he said had long-term harmful consequences not only for Kosovo and the Balkans, but also for the entire ‘modern multi-polar system 18 Paragraph 8 to ‘Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force’ to the Rambouillet Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, not signed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, available at www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo_rambouillet_text.html.The accords contained in this agreement (also referenced as UN DOC S/1999/648) were to be fully taken into account when ‘promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo’, and when ‘facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status’ as required by article 11 (a) and (b) of resolution 1244 (1999). 19 Henry Kissinger, Daily Telegraph, 28 June 1999. 20 www.serbia-info.com/news/1999-03/24/10030.html 21 See verbatim reports of those meetings in S/PV/3988 and S/PV/3989, for following quotes.

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of international relations’. Quoting the then President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, he warned that his country ‘reserved the right to take adequate measures, including military measures, to ensure its own and common European security’. He blamed ‘[their] partners in the Contact Group’ for discussing military aspects with regard to Kosovo ‘behind [their] backs, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and not in the Contact Group’. The Contact Group had been set up in response to the crisis in Bosnia in the early 1990s by four of the five permanent members of the Security Council (the exception being China) in addition to the two largest contributors in terms of troops and assistance to the peacebuilding efforts in the Balkans, Germany and Italy. US representative Burleigh replied that it was ‘only with the greatest reluctance’ that NATO had taken action and justified the decision by the need to prevent ‘a humanitarian catastrophe of immense proportions’. Ambassador Fowler, from Canada, a firm promoter of humanitarian intervention, said that ‘We c[ould] not simply stand by’ while innocents were murdered and an entire population was displaced. Ambassador van Walsum, of the Netherlands, an active participant in the NATO operation, was equally forceful. Ambassador Dejammet of France drew attention to earlier Security Council resolutions on Kosovo under Chapter VII. Sir Jeremy Greenstock, on behalf of the United Kingdom (UK), accused President Milošević and said that NATO ‘had been forced to take military action because all other means of preventing a humanitarian catastrophe had been frustrated by Serb behaviour’. An opposing view was presented by India’s representative Sharma, who took the floor to say that the military campaign was ‘in clear violation of article 53 of the Charter’. In the name of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), he added that the UN ‘c[ould not] be forced to abdicate its role in peacekeeping’ to a regional organisation. Speaking on behalf of the European Union, German representative Kastrup said that the EU countries were under a moral obligation to ensure that indiscriminate behaviour and violence of the kind seen in Kosovo were not repeated. He also added that President Milošević had to stop Serb aggression in Kosovo ‘and sign the Rambouillet Accords, which included the establishment of a NATO-led implementation force to provide stability’. On 26 March, the Council met again to consider a draft resolution submitted by Russia that demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities and the urgent resumption of negotiations. After giving an account of past failed negotiations with President Milošević , the Canadian Ambassador referred to the expanding humanitarian crisis and said that those who supported the draft resolution before them would ‘place themselves against the international consensus’.The statement prompted an angry reaction from Lavrov, who considered it ‘bordering on blackmail’. Ambassador Turk from Slovenia spoke in favour of the NATO campaign, countering claims about its illegality with the argument that ‘the Security Council had the primary, but not exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’. The draft resolution was eventually put to the vote and rejected by 12 Council members. Those voting in favour were China, Namibia and Russia. International initiatives to end the conflict did not stop during NATO’s air campaign. Negotiations were held outside the framework of the Security Council, within the group later known as ‘the Quint’. The Quint was constituted by the foreign ministers of the US, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy and had 124

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started functioning on 29 March as an informal vehicle for debate among the key countries. In essence, it was the Contact Group on the Former Yugoslavia, but without Russia. At teatime each day in London (after lunch for Madeleine Albright in the US), they would review the progress of the war and discuss the prospects for a negotiated peace.The original Quint of foreign ministers was soon replicated at the level of the Ministries of Defence and chiefs of the defence staff and political directors from the five chancelleries, where teleconferences took place every evening during the war. It was the Quint — whose existence was kept under wraps during the war to avoid offending other Alliance nations — that first raised, at Germany’s insistence, NATO’s five conditions for an end to the war after Milošević ’s first offer of unilateral truce on 3 April, providing for a partial withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo; an offer immediately rejected by the White House. The Quint was the key to keeping the Western alliance together.22 This was important because, as the air campaign dragged on, some NATO countries seemed to have second thoughts. While the Alliance would ultimately stay together, any sign of internal disagreement or lack of resolve was grist to Milošević ’s mill, hoping as he did to ride out the bombing campaign as NATO’s unity fractured around it. Milošević had put his hopes first on the Russians, and then on other members of the Alliance, such as Italy, Germany and Greece whom he believed lacked the necessary resistance for a prolonged war. Greece, in particular, was a source of concern to Quint leaders, since public opposition to a war against a Christian Orthodox sister nation was running at 95 per cent.The US became frustrated due to mounting public criticism against a campaign with no visible results. The KLA was not succeeding in their fight against Serbian forces. Milošević decided to push Kosovo-Albanians out as an air defence tactic: by doing so, he sought to undermine the KLA’s backbone and destabilise neighbouring countries by provoking a humanitarian crisis. NATO realised the need to deploy ground troops, something that most Alliance members were not willing to do. The Quint was aware that without some level of concurrence from the Russian Federation negotiations would drag on endlessly, putting in jeopardy the possibility of a timely solution. Russia had to be on board despite the fact that its position in the international arena had weakened considerably; in 1999, it was waging war in Chechnya and seeking to recover from the collapse it suffered in 1997. Following an informal meeting of the heads of state and government of the European Union, with the presence of the UN Secretary-General, on 16 April, a G-8 proposal for a peace agreement in Kosovo was submitted at Germany’s initiative. On 6 May, the G-8 agreed on a set of general guiding principles to achieve a political solution to the Kosovo crisis.23 After a round of talks, the conclusions of the EU foreign ministers meeting on Kosovo were presented on 17 May. Two days later, G-8 political directors met in Bonn and on 27 May, the Preparation conference for a stability pact for Southeastern Europe took place. On 1 June, German Foreign Minister Fischer received a letter from President Milošević stating his readiness to withdraw forces from Kosovo and to accept a UN presence in the Serbian province. The Yugoslav government agreed to the G-8 proposal of principles to settle the Kosovo crisis.24 The Serbian Parliament approved a Peace Interim Agreement on this basis on 3 June. During 22 23

According to Foreign Office and French officials in declarations to The Observer. United Nations Security Council resolution 1244, op.cit.; S/1999/516, annex 1. 125

a meeting held on 3-4 June in Belgrade, a peace deal with President Milošević was brokered by EU Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and Russian Federation Special Envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin, accompanied by Special Adviser Valentin Sergejev. On 5 June, representatives of NATO and of the Yugoslav government finalised the details in preparation of a Military-Technical Agreement. Finally, on 8 June, G-8 foreign ministers, at a meeting held in Cologne, reached an agreement on a draft resolution on Kosovo for the UN Security Council, and EU Special Envoy Ahtisaari met the Chinese president and the Chinese foreign minister in Beijing. After 78 days of air campaign and under Russia’s pressure, Milošević accepted the ceasefire conditions and signed the Military-Technical Agreement, on 9 June 1999.25

III. Mandate design and origin On 10 June 1999, the Security Council adopted resolution 1244. Approved with 14 affirmative votes and one abstention (China), the resolution authorised the deployment of international security and civil presences in Kosovo under UN auspices and laid down the mandate for both operations.The table below sets out the main responsibilities assigned to KFOR and UNMIK. Main responsibilities of international presences Security (KFOR)26 To maintain and enforce the cease-fire;

Civil (UNMIK)27 To perform basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;

To ensure the withdrawal and to prevent the return of Serbian forces, except of those allowed to return to To maintain civil law and order, including the liaise with the international presences, to mark/clear establishment of local police forces; minefields and to maintain a presence at patrimonial To protect and promote human rights and assure the sites and key border crossings; safe return of all displaced people to their homes; To demilitarise the Kosovo Liberation Army and other To support humanitarian and disaster relief aid and the armed Kosovo-Albanian groups;28 reconstruction of key and other economic To establish a secure environment for those displaced infrastructure; to return in safety, for humanitarian aid to be delivered To establish and oversee the development, and for the international civil presence to operate; consolidation and ulterior transfer of provisional selfgoverning institutions; To conduct border monitoring duties; To ensure the protection and freedom of movement of To facilitate the political process towards status, in full account of the principles contained in Annex 2 of international organisations; resolution 1244 (1999) and the Rambouillet Accords;29 To ensure public safety and order and supervise demining until the international civil presence takes At a final stage, to oversee the transfer of authority over those responsibilities. from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement.

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As evidenced by the chain of events, resolution 1244 (1999) was conceived, negotiated and drafted in its entirety outside the multilateral framework of the United Nations. A German initiative at its outset, its content was discussed and agreed upon by the Quint in the form of general principles for a solution to the Kosovo crisis at the G-8 meeting of 6 May 1999. The final wording of the draft resolution was agreed upon at the G-8 meeting of 8 June and the text was sent to New York for the Council to vote. By the time that President Milošević started to withdraw forces from Kosovo,30 the draft resolution counted on the tacit support of Russia. Contrary to most Security Council resolutions, it can be argued that far from representing an understanding on the lowest common denominator, resolution 1244 (1999) created a reality that was subject to open-ended interpretation with a state-making element to it. Fully drafted outside the organisation — a case unprecedented in the history of the Security Council — it contains two principles that encapsulate the opposing positions at stake. On the one hand, an open-ended temporal framework that deprives the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of all authority over Kosovo and leaves it under an international presence for an indefinite period of time and, on the other hand, the obligation to uphold the principles of sovereignty and protection of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. The Rambouillet Agreement31 is an important factor in explaining the position of the Government of Serbia and its attitude towards the operations approved by resolution 1244 (1999). The body of the resolution includes four mentions to the Rambouillet Accords.32 However, only one directly relates to the future political status of Kosovo and omits the prescription of respect for FRY sovereignty and territorial integrity: ‘the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include […] [f]acilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet Accords’,33 which implicitly include the holding of a referendum to determine the final political status, at the very end of the text: Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party’s efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement,

24

Ibid.; and S/1999/649, annex 2. Military-Technical Agreement, op. cit. 26 United Nations Security Council resolution 1244, op. cit., para. 9. 27 Ibid., para. 11. 28 Demilitarisation, demobilisation and further reintegration of the KLA took place mainly through the relocation of its membership in the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and — most of them — in the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC).The KPC would gather around 5,000 of these demobilised KLA members to perform civil protection functions within the provisional institutions established, the organisation and competences of which were to be under KFOR’s and UNMIK’s oversight. 29 S/1999/648 of 7 June. 30 The full text of the draft resolution was leaked and published by CNN on 8 June, available at www.cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9906/08/resolution.text/. 31 The full text of the agreement (later to be referenced as UN document S/1999/648) was not revealed to the public until after the beginning of NATO’s campaign, when it was leaked to the press. 32 United Nations Security Council resolution 1244, op. cit., para. 11, items (a) and (e); Annex 1, item 6; and Annex 2, item 8. 33 Ibid., para. 11, item (e). 25

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and the Helsinki Final Act, and to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this Agreement and to consider proposals by any Party for additional measures.34 What is not clearly determined in the accords is the census that would be applied in the consultation, a key factor to determine its outcome. Worth mentioning is the binding character of the Helsinki Final Act regarding the determination of a final settlement for Kosovo in the text of the accords. During the debate of 10 June, Ambassador Lavrov justified his country’s suppor t for the draft resolution by saying that it restored the Kosovo settlement to the political track, along with the central role of the United Nations. The resolution — he said — authorised the deployment of international civil and security presences with a clearly formulated, specific mandate. Later discrepancies on the mandate’s true meaning and scope would put to the test the veracity of this statement. Abstaining China — a country whose embassy in Belgrade had been hit by NATO missiles during the air campaign — said that the ‘human rights over sovereignty theory served to infringe upon the sovereignty of other states and to promote hegemonic power under the pretext of human rights’. Elected members of the Council that had been sidelined from the negotiations were sceptical of a proposal that shed no light on the end point of the political process dictated by the resolution. Several disliked the fact that negotiations had been led by the Quint outside the Council’s framework, but many — because of their strong views against separatist movements — showed no desire of taking part in the discussions once NATO’s campaign had dramatically altered the situation on the ground. Such was the case of Indonesia, which preferred not to become involved in the matter. The resolution was the result of a compromise between a number of Western countries and Russia to stop the cycle of violence in the Western Balkans. It was inspired by the values of Western democracies, at a time when the power of Russia had eroded considerably. Yugoslavia was thereby deprived of all its sovereignty attributes over the territory of Kosovo, while retaining a void nominal right, a situation to be later inherited by Serbia as the successor state upon the demise of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The resolution became obsolete upon implementation and there was neither never sufficient leverage nor political will on any side to review it. While it is not unusual for draft resolutions to be negotiated prior to their presentation at informal consultations of the Security Council, this practice had become the rule in the case of the Balkans. The Contact Group for the former Yugoslavia, the informal grouping of influential countries with significant interests in the Balkans,35 worked through the so-called Consultative and Coordination Process in New York relating to the Work of the Contact Group (CCP)36 and acted outside the framework of the Council, while seeking retroactive UN blessing for their actions. 34

S/1999/648, op. cit.; Rambouillet Agreement, Chapter 8, Amendment, Comprehensive Assessment and Final Clauses. Article I, para. 3. [Author’s underlining]. 128

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Kosovo-Albanian actors maintained regular, though bilateral, talks with some states of the Contact Group during the NATO campaign. The extent to which their views and needs were reflected on the mandate remains uncertain. There is no evidence of consultation with Kosovo-Serbian actors prior to the arrival in Kosovo of the international presence. The views of the Government of Serbia, despite permanent consultations via UN Special Envoy and former President Ahtisaari and Russian Special Envoy and former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, do not seem to have been taken into account. The precedent of the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina heavily influenced the process; some of the lessons learnt weighed considerably on the principles adopted to guide the drafting of the mandate for Kosovo. Formal consent from Serbia was achieved, cooperation was demanded. Serbia’s real consent was never achieved neither was its government’s full and permanent cooperation with the international presence. In the process leading to the approval of resolution 1244 (1999), the position of Kosovo’s neighbouring countries within the framework of multilateral organisations was guided by their own perceived interests. Slovenia voiced its strong support for the intervention at the Council; others that may have been more reluctant, avoided confrontation not to jeopardise the prospects of future EU integration. The situation of Montenegro and the possibility of its separation from Serbia weighted on the G-8 when drafting resolution 1244 (1999). FYROM’s policy was influenced by its border dispute with Serbia and by European policies. Albania was cautiously active in support of Kosovo-Albanians. The Stability Pact, established at Germany’s initiative, served as a forum to defuse potential regional tensions. Close to the end of NATO’s air campaign, on 20-22 May the UN Secretariat sent a needsassessment mission to Kosovo. This assessment was undertaken prior to mandate formulation, but did not alter the text. Immediately after the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999), a small advanced team was sent to Kosovo to determine the entity and quality of the operation to be deployed. The team proposed the structure of the civil presence based on its own assessment; the structure foreseen did not substantially change over the period of implementation of the mandate. The assessment was carried out in the field in consultation with local actors present in the area of deployment. At this stage, these included Kosovo-Albanian representatives of the different political sectors, Kosovo-Serbs and even Serbian government representatives still present on the ground, as Žoran Andjelković , President of the Interim Executive Council of Kosovo-Metohija.37

35

United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia. The members of the Contact Group for the Former Yugoslavia established the CCP, later renamed Consultation and Drafting Group on Kosovo (CDG), to move their policy on Balkan issues upward to receive the formal blessing of the Security Council, through settling differences outside the Council before a draft was introduced. See J. Prantl, ‘The UN Security Council and Informal Groups of States: Complementing or Competing for Governance?’, OUP, 2006. 37 Interview with a member of the Advanced Team. 36

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1. Why Chapter VII?

Resolution 1244 (1999) is the last of a series of UNSC resolutions addressing the situation in Kosovo. At least three of them included measures adopted under Chapter VII38 — resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998). Resolution 1160 (1998) carried a stronger enforcement provision than those that followed, through the imposition of an arms embargo, the termination of which was subject to the fulfilment of a number of conditions by the parties to settle the conflict. Resolution 1199 (1998) prolonged the embargo and contained a decision to consider further enforcement measures; and resolution 1203 (1998) endorsed KVM, demanded the parties to implement a ceasefire agreement and full cooperation with KVM, and reiterated the embargo, save for KVM needs. Resolution 1244 (1999) carries the strongest enforcement provision, through actions that require the Council’s authorisation under Chapter VII, while the earlier resolutions rely on cooperation from the parties. Resolution 1244 (1999), however, does not constitute a traditional Chapter VII resolution stricto sensu. Intervention came after the use of force and not for the use of force. It was designed to act upon the reality engendered by the use of force, implicitly legitimising it. As evidenced from the debate surrounding the crisis, the rationale to circumvent the Council resulted from the conviction of major Western powers that obtaining authorisation for the use of force considered necessary in the circumstances would have never been possible within the UN framework. The mandate contained in resolution 1244 (1999) is a Chapter VII mandate, not only due to its explicit mention, but also because of its ‘terms of reference’. It prescribes — both explicitly and implicitly — responsibilities that require cooperation from the parties, while giving ultimate authority to the international presence. It establishes an interim administration with the power to legislate and execute government functions, thereby enforcing the suspension of the attributes of sovereignty of Yugoslavia (and of Serbia as its successor state), by placing administrative, policing and military custody of national borders, amongst other state functions, in the hands of an international authority. It dictates the establishment of a political process for the solution of a conflict in the territory of Serbia and for its nationals, and leaves the direction of such process outside the reach of the Government of Serbia, from which it only requires formal consent. Resolution 1244 (1999) is still in force: no review has been possible since its inception. The Council has only managed to agree on a few occasions to make an official pronouncement through a presidential statement. Furthermore, there were only three truly relevant presidential statements — containing such a pronouncement — between 1999 and 2005:39 in 2003, in support of the ‘Standards before Status’ policy; in 2004, condemning the violent events of March; and in 2005, as the Council welcomed the report prepared by the UN Secretary-General’s Standards Review Envoy, Ambassador 38 Chapter VII refers to ‘Action with respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression’ and authorises enforcement measures — including the use of military force — to restore international peace and security in cases of threat or acts of aggression. The qualifying element of a Chapter VII operation lies, therefore, on the enforcement nature of its mandate and not so much on the use of force or threat of use of force, though the latter comes usually linked with the enforcement. 39 S/PRST/2003/26 of 12 December; S/PRST/2004/5 of 18 March; and S/PRST/2005/51 of 24 October.

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Kai Eide, on the Comprehensive Review of the Implementation of Standards.40 In December 2008, after three years of silence, the Council was again able to agree on a presidential statement to endorse the Secretary-General’s proposal for the reconfiguration of UNMIK. Resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, adopted a year after resolution 1244 (1999), bore the urgent need of mainstreaming the gender perspective into all matters related to conflict and conflict resolution, with particular emphasis on peacekeeping operations. Though in itself it does not carry any measure for enforcement, it places the issue under the brief of the Council.

IV. Mandate implementation

1. Structure and functions of the international civil and security presences

UNMIK Following the approval of resolution 1244 (1999), two reports of the Secretary-General to the UNSC41 provided the framework and organisation of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. Both reports were drafted by the advanced team headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) ad interim, the late Sergio Vieira de Mello. They outlined the structure, functions and competences of the mission and its various components, with special attention to security, law and order, and the rule of law. Soon thereafter, the first SRSG regulations were approved as regulatory tools for the provisional administration of Kosovo. Although UNMIK administration resembled that of a state, its departments and personnel were never accountable to the judiciary for their administrative acts, or subject to extra-judicial control. The SRSG was to discharge his responsibilities with the assistance of five42 Deputy Special Representatives (DSRSG), one of whom, the Principal Deputy Special Representative (PDSRSG), without a specifically assigned portfolio, would act as primus inter pares and replace the SRSG when absent.The mission was structured into four components, known as pillars: Pillar I, Humanitarian Affairs, led by UNHCR and in charge of humanitarian assistance and demining activities; Pillar II, Civil Administration, led by the UN Secretariat and in charge of the administration of the territory; Pillar 40 This report (S/2005/635) was forwarded by the Secretary-General to the Council, on 7 October 2005, as a continuation of the work started earlier in the year and represented by the Secretary-General’s report of 23 May 2005 (S/2005/335) in which he initiated the Comprehensive Review conducted by Ambassador Eide. 41 S/1999/672 of 12 June 1999 and S/1999/779 of 12 July 1999. 42 Initially, only four DSRSG were foreseen, wielding the DSRSG Civil Administration representation powers in the absence of the SRSG, functions presently carried out by the PDSRSG, a figure already present on the aforementioned report of 12 July (S/1999/779).

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III, Institution-Building, led by the OSCE and in charge of democratisation, elections and human rights; and Pillar IV, Reconstruction, led by the EU and in charge of economic and financial reconstruction. At the end of the emergency phase, UNHCR left UNMIK but remained in Kosovo in pursuit of its statutory mandate, and Pillar I eventually assumed police and justice functions until then exercised by the Civil Administration Pillar. UNMIK lost its EU Pillar at the end of June 2008. The Police and Justice Pillar would be replaced by EULEX, which has finalised deployment in March 2009. KFOR The Kosovo Force is a NATO-led operation initially composed of some 50,000 personnel from member countries, partner countries and non-NATO countries under unified command and control, within the framework known as the NATO+ format.43 KFOR was initially structured into five regionally-based multinational brigades (MNB), with its main headquarters in Pristina and a rear headquarters and most national supporting elements in FYROM. The Force Commander (COMKFOR) reports to the Commander of Joint Force Command Naples (COM JFCN) in Naples, Italy. Its direct relationship with the Security Council is limited to reporting obligations that KFOR discharges through the Secretary-General. In the summer of 2002, the five original MNB were reduced to four, with the merging of MNB West and MNB South. The setback represented by the violence that erupted in March 2004 was followed by the rapid deployment of additional troops to reinforce the existing KFOR strength. NATO defence ministers agreed at their meeting in Brussels in December 2004 to maintain a robust KFOR profile during 2005. In August 2005, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided to restructure KFOR, replacing the four MNB with five multinational task forces (MNTF).This change allowed for greater flexibility with the removal of restrictions on the cross-boundary movement of units based in different sectors of Kosovo.The move from brigades to task forces also placed more emphasis on intelligenceled operations. The task forces work closely with both the local police and the local population to gather information.The Alliance has promised to support the security provisions of any final settlement.

43

Ad hoc cooperative mechanism for partnership developed between NATO and non-NATO countries. 132

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Resolution 1244 (1999) main accountabilities in a snapshot It demands from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression, and the withdrawal of Serbian military, police and paramilitary forces. It allows for the return of a small number (hundreds) of Yugoslav and Serbian military and police personnel to perform the following four functions: liaising with international presence; marking/clearing mines; maintaining presence at patrimonial sites; and maintaining presence at key border crossings. Withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian forces was completed on 20 June, but the return to Kosovo of a small number of its police and military, as foreseen in the resolution, has not been implemented in practice. It places Kosovo under an interim administration with directions to establish Provisional Institutions of SelfGovernment and to facilitate a political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government, and therefore authorises the deployment of a civil presence, led by the UN with the assistance of UNHCR, the EU and OSCE and the deployment of a security presence, a NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo, both endorsed by the United Nations. UNMIK remains the nominal administrator in Kosovo, though with no real authority at present, an authority which started to subside — amongst other factors — as a consequence of its reaction (or lack thereof) vis-à-vis the civil unrest of March 2004, which sparked status process by the end of 2004. KFOR has in the past, and more now, adopted institutional and capacity-building functions, particularly in the case of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and now, though only performed by NATO countries with national approval, with the newly created Kosovo Security Force (KSF). Provisional Institutions of Self-Government were successfully established, following the approval of a Constitutional Framework and the holding of Kosovo-wide polls. Kosovo-Serb participation was never fully achieved and Kosovo-Serb parallel institutions — unofficially led/supported by Belgrade — still administer the territory, north of the Ibar river. It requires the UN to ensure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo and to secure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of the province. After 10 June 1999, in barely over three weeks, hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) returned to Kosovo (though not necessarily to their homes), a figure that according to UNHCR rose to more than 800,000 by the end of October 1999.44 As Kosovo-Albanians returned, the minority communities in the province, particularly Kosovo-Serbs and Roma, began their exodus fleeing acts of revenge and retaliation from the Kosovo-Albanian majority. An important part of the Kosovo-Serbian and other non-Albanian population of Kosovo were subsequently displaced in revenge. Shortly after the war, the number of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo was less than 25 per cent of the pre-conflict population figures.45 According to UNHCR, there are still more than 220,000 displaced Kosovo-Serbs and Roma — over 207,000 of them in Serbia and the rest in Montenegro.46 The non-Albanian exodus from Kosovo continues.

44

Conference Documents and Reports, Kosovo International Human Rights Conference, 10-11 December 1999, p. 134, available at www.osce.org/documents/mik/2000/01/989_en.pdf. 45 On 15 October 1999, the Yugoslav Red Cross and local authorities indicated that the total number of registered internally displaced persons from Kosovo in Serbia and Montenegro stood at 230,884. 46 www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/4513b490b.html. 133

It requires that the KLA and other armed Kosovo-Albanian groups be demilitarised. Undertaken by the KLA on 20 June, who thereby committed to conclude on 19 September, it nominally took place on 21 September, following an agreement for its subsequent ‘transformation’ into the KPC; violence continued to be exerted by Kosovo-Albanian armed groups onto the population, both of Albanian and non-Albanian origin. The political process to determine Kosovo’s future status, its level and forms of autonomy shall be carried out taking full account of the Rambouillet Accords and in full respect of the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of FRY (to which Serbia is now the recognised successor state). Launched following Kai Eide’s reports, it began in late 2005 under the auspices of the United Nations that tasked Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, former Prime Minister of Finland, to find a negotiated final status solution for Kosovo. His proposal for status — of supervised independence — was not approved by the UNSC, due to reticence by the permanent members following the complete disagreement of the Republic of Serbia with the negotiation process and with the negotiator. The Council thereafter charged the EU, Russia and the US — commonly known as the ‘troika’ — to continue the negotiations. This latter process ended in December 2007.

a) Security The mandate authorised the use of force beyond self-defence, whenever necessary to implement the mandate, that is, enforcing the ceasefire,47 authorising the security presence to ‘operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission’.48 The lead in maintaining a stable and secure environment and other military duties was assumed by KFOR, a multinational operation willing to deploy forces under NATO, with robust rules of engagement (ROE), its own line of command and having obtained authorisation from the Security Council. The Council defined no timeline for engagement on the ground; the Council only requested early deployment and demanded full cooperation from the parties.49 The security presence synchronised its deployment with the phased withdrawal of Serbian forces.50 The authorised use of force was relevant, timely and sufficiently forceful for the stated purpose of ensuring the withdrawal of Serbian forces and protecting the population of Kosovo. Completion of withdrawal of Serbian forces and their replacement by international troops was followed by the prompt and massive return of KosovoAlbanian refugees to Kosovo. The framework for the ROE51 established for the Kosovo operation went further than those that restrict the legitimate use of force to self-defence. The ROE extended the use of force to other situations, detailing the circumstances of such situations and determining who had the capacity to

47

United Nations Security Council resolution 1244, op. cit., para. 9 (a). Point 2, Military-Technical Agreement, op. cit.; the particulars of the use of force are regulated by the applicable rules of engagement. 49 United Nations Security Council resolution 1244, op. cit., para. 8. 50 Ibid., para. 3. 48

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decide when to use it. KFOR was authorised to use force — subject to limitations and conditions — in, inter alia, riot control; the prevention of serious crimes52 occurring or about to occur, attacks demonstrating hostile intent or committing or contributing to a hostile act towards forces, friendly forces or persons designated with special status; or even in preventing the detention or seizure of property belonging to NATO-led forces, persons designated with special status or property designated with special status, including (but not limited to) when necessary and when explicitly stated in the rule, property of the local population.53 In the first months following initial deployment, retaliatory and ethnic-based attacks against the physical integrity and property of minority groups, particularly the Kosovo-Serbs and Roma, were frequent. This led to an exodus of Serbs and other minorities that many critics labelled as ‘reversed ethnic cleansing’.The fact that it happened in a territory under international administration and under the protection of some 50,000 well-armed and equipped troops was particularly harmful to the credibility of the international presence. The protection mandate was hampered by the initial failure to apply a robust enough intervention policy. International attention seemed exclusively focused on reaching an understanding among the Kosovo-Albanians and failed to prevent the murder of Serb villagers and other minority representatives. The gradual adoption of appropriate security measures and mechanisms for the protection of Gračanica and other minority enclaves and for the transportation of members of the local communities improved their situation substantially, but by the time these measures were implemented most of the Serbs and many Roma had fled, having left behind their homes and property. During the subsequent period, minorities were regularly under the protection of international troops, and the security situation steadily improved. KFOR’s strength and willingness to operate forcefully subsided as the situation improved. By the beginning of 2002, NATO had reduced KFOR troop levels considerably. A serious reversal took place in March 2004, when a renewed wave of violence resulted in the killing of more than 30 people, mostly Serbs, and the massive destruction of their personal and patrimonial property in several municipalities. The lack of an appropriate response from UNMIK and KFOR drew attention to insufficient planning, anticipation and appropriate mechanisms to respond to such situations. The Council’s reaction to these events was of strong condemnation. In a meeting that counted with the participation of German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, the representative of the democratically51

The ROE established provide political direction for the conduct of military operations, including authorisations for, and limitations on, the threat or use of force or actions which might be construed as provocative; ROE do not limit the inherent right of self-defence. National law may further limit the use of force by member states in certain types of military operations or in certain situations. ROE are directives to military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied. ROE are not used to assign tasks or give tactical instructions.The ROE established provided the sole authority to NATO-led forces to use force.The use of force, and in particular, the authority to use deadly force to accomplish a mission receives detailed scrutiny and attention. 52 Any act of arson or damage to ethnic, religious or cultural property constitutes a serious threat to the maintenance of a safe and secure environment in Kosovo. These acts are to be considered serious crimes. 53 The specific rule on each case should specify who is authorised to decide on the determination of persons designated with special status or property designated with special status. 135

elected government that had succeeded Milošević in Belgrade, Foreign Minister Goran Svilanović , strongly denounced the attacks, which had happened ‘almost five years after the establishment of an international presence’. He said the events seemed to show that ‘there was no life for (the Serbs) in the province, and that they should leave’. Resolution 1244 (1999) and its commitment to the return of all refugees and the creation of a secure and safe environment for all communities would not be implemented. Condemning the riots, Joschka Fischer said the people of Kosovo faced a stark choice: either ‘create a society based on tolerance, multi-ethnicity or democratic values’, or ‘live in chaos and misery’. More concretely, the representative of the UK, Sir Emyr Jones Parry, announced that his country was deploying a spearhead battalion to be on the ground that same night, the Operational Reserve Force.54 Enforcement problems did not in fact derive from how robust the mandate was regarding the level of authorised use of force or from the difficulties in increasing the level of troops at a given moment (a good example of this was the UK 1,000-troop contingent that KFOR deployed on 18 March 2004 within 24 hours).They were the result of the caveats imposed by the troop-contributing countries that placed limitations on the rules of engagement. KFOR’s response to situations faced in the areas of responsibility of the national contingents present in the territory of Kosovo varied in attitude, strength and involvement. Even though resolution 1244 (1999) makes no mention of the role of the Commander Kosovo Force, it does establish the requirement of a unified command and control.55 Most local interviewees expressed no doubts in their conversations with FRIDE about the unified character of the command; international civil servants and observers in Kosovo, in turn, considered the role of COMKFOR to be that of a coordinator rather than of a military commander. In addition to the fulfilment of its mandated responsibilities, resolution 1244 (1999) implicitly required KFOR to report to the Council regularly,56 through the Secretary-General. Its reporting was limited to that required by NATO’s chain of command (JFC Naples, Italy; Allied Command Operations/Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe, ACO/SHAPE Mons, Belgium; and NAC, Brussels, Belgium), and to belated monthly activity reports to the Security Council through the UN Secretary-General. These reports on KFOR progress and activities were sent to the Secretary-General for their transmittal to the Council, prior approval through the NATO chain of command, usually with several months of delay. There seems to be no other record of direct relations between the Council and KFOR. KFOR has not regularly fulfilled its reporting obligations to the UNSC under resolution 1160 (1998). Inadequate communication between UNMIK and KFOR did not help effectiveness in implementing the mandate. KFOR initiated and completed the transfer of policing and demining responsibilities to UNMIK through Memoranda of Understanding signed at KFOR Multinational Brigades/UNMIK Regional Administration, while retaining control of the overall security situation on the ground, not 54

See S/PV.4928 of 18 March 2004. United Nations Security Council resolution 1244, op. cit., para. 7 and Annex 2, point 4. 56 Ibid., para. 20. 55

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always in coordination with UNMIK. While the relation was officially reported as cooperative and efficient, some UNMIK officials complained of KFOR’s alleged lack of transparency and the existence of a one-way flow of information, going exclusively from UNMIK to KFOR. KFOR officials, in turn, explained their reluctance to share information considered confidential or restricted on the grounds of the presumed porosity of UNMIK pillars and police, and seemed to lack guidance on the matter. The responsibility over training received by KFOR military personnel prior to deployment was under the exclusive jurisdiction of their national authorities, as was the case of the military personnel deployed as liaison officers within UNMIK, the latter being tested upon arrival on a number of abilities necessary to perform their functions. The soundness of the tests was nevertheless strongly contested by many interviewees. The selection and training of police personnel was also under the responsibility of the respective contributing nation. Officers to be deployed would undergo a test prepared by the UN (known as SAT) and, upon arrival in the field, would be briefed, inter alia, on the peace operation, the situation on the ground, cultural traits of the local population, the UN code of conduct, appropriate behaviour, and basic norms of human rights, humanitarian and rule of law issues. Though brief and very general, the training programme aimed at covering the most fundamental human rights issues and served to underscore the basic rules of behaviour. Great emphasis was placed on mainstreaming the gender perspective in police work, though the focus centred on addressing internal rules, rather than the external behaviour of the police. The operation’s security plan was generally criticised for its failure to take into account the executive character of the mandate and the functions of direct administration it entailed for international officials. This deficiency became evident when, on the occasion of the ethnic-motivated riots of March 2004, UNMIK realised that it should not evacuate police or any other law enforcement or adjudicating officials, even in the event of an emergency, as foreseen in the plan. b) Peacebuilding The mandate carries an important peacebuilding commitment by both presences in areas as important as demobilisation, reintegration of former fighters (covering both male and female, as no distinction was designed or sought); the setting up of a democratic security sector; the establishment and reinforcement of the rule of law; and the development of the whole array of political institutions needed to proceed with the devolution of administrative competences, once the international mandate had come to an end, to the institutions established under a political settlement.57 Deprived of its autonomy since 1989 by the Government of Serbia, since the approval of resolution 1244 (1999) Kosovo came to be administered by UNMIK, endowed with transitional legislative and executive powers on behalf of the international community. The resolution prescribes as a model a plural society (by implication, if not explicitly, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic),58 under the guidance and supervision of an international civil presence. This approach met systematic resistance from the Kosovo-Serbs, who were reluctant to be part of the transitional public administration out of fear of 57

Ibid., para. 11, item (f). 137

attacks by Albanian extremists and of reprisals from the government in Belgrade,59 mainly of — but not restricted to — an economic nature, for being spotted as collaborating with the international occupation forces. In general, cooperation with the international presence worked better in the areas of security and police than in other areas of the civil administration. Early staffing deficiencies delayed effective engagement and facilitated the emergence of selfappointed administrative structures.60 This situation was largely redressed in subsequent stages through the gradual incorporation of representatives of local groups and parties into the interim administrative structures, particularly after the municipal and Kosovo-wide elections held in October of 2000 and November 2001, respectively, and the establishment of Transitional Self-Government Institutions at both levels of administration. Cases of incompetence, a perceived lack of direction in the absence of a temporal limit and instances of corruption by international officials in connivance with local partners did nothing to cement the trust that the people of Kosovo had placed on the international civil presence. The mechanisms to ensure accountability for misconduct were handled through standard Department of Administration administrative procedures and lacked transparency and publicity, proving ineffective to avoid abuse. There were nevertheless cases of serious crimes where immunity was almost automatically lifted and which were judicially investigated and criminally prosecuted before panels with a majority of international judges. The more troubling fact, however, is that despite its many successes in developing an administrative structure where nothing existed, UNMIK failed to create an atmosphere where a multi-ethnic society would thrive, establishing credible political structures that would facilitate negotiations towards a final and agreed solution to the situation in Kosovo. Some forms of horizontal cooperation between the Serbian authorities and the international presences developed throughout the mandate at operational levels, depending on the personality of the individuals involved at each stage, yielding better results with KFOR and UNMIK police. UNMIK was nevertheless unable to extend its transitional administrative functions and those of the Kosovo Self-Government Institutions it helped to create 58

The Security Council requests the security presence to ‘establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees’, Ibid., Annex 2, principle 4. It also authorises the SecretaryGeneral to establish an international civil presence […] which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo’, Ibid., para. 10; Annex 1, principle 4; and Annex 2, principle 5. 59 A fact relevant to the attitude of Kosovo-Serbs and the Serbian government vis-à-vis UNMIK institution-building efforts in Kosovo, it is worth mentioning the agreement establishing the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) signed by the international administration, on 15 December 1999, with three Kosovo-Albanian leaders, implicitly excluding Kosovo-Serbs, as well as other non-Albanian with an even more marginal presence in the territory of Kosovo. They were later invited to participate in the resulting administrative structures.The Serbian National Council (SNC) of Gračanica — led by Bishop Artemije — publicly and officially denounced the agreement, stating that the Serbian minority had been called to legitimise a decision taken without its concurrence. All different branches of the SNC, at a meeting without precedent as it counted on the presence of the Mitrovica Branch, led by Oliver Ivanović, discussed the text of the agreement and concluded stating that they would not participate. They did participate at a latter stage. 60 For a detailed account of how the substitution of the international administration’s role (due to the initial power vacuum resulting from the quantitative and qualitative difficulties in recruiting) by the Kosovo-Albanian parallel structures operated, see International Crisis Group, ‘Waiting For UNMIK: Local Administration in Kosovo’, Europe Report 79, 18 October 1999, available at www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1583&l=1. 138

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to the north of the Ibar river in the Mitrovica region, the only one in Kosovo where Kosovo-Serbs are the majority and the governmental, administrative and judicial structures from Belgrade still hold sway. Disarmament and demobilisation of former KLA fighters was a task performed by the security presence, though administratively shared with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) that assumed the task of registering demobilised KLA fighters. Reintegration was mainly channelled through the integration of those demobilised into the Kosovo Protection Corps (a civil protection body agreed upon in September 1999, the responsibilities of which would include tasks in disaster relief and certain tasks in demining) and the Kosovo Police Service; demobilised female fighters’ participation in both structures was very small, when not marginal. Reintegration tasks were shared by KFOR and UNMIK to develop a coherent process of demobilisation and security sector reform. The enforcement provisions had an impact on the implementation of the peacebuilding aspects of the mandate, which varied depending on the personality and profile of the SRSG and the political support he received from local actors. In the north of Kosovo, such support would have helped the UN to extend its influence and hence reduce the leverage of Serbian parallel structures vis-à-vis the local Kosovo-Serbian population. Until the Serbian elections of October 2000, the government in Belgrade openly opposed and obstructed the international presence, an attitude that would only change little and gradually. KosovoSerbs also faced problems with Belgrade, which tended to see them as a pawn in a larger game to regain influence, rather than as its own citizens. During the initial period, their main shortcomings stemmed from the difficulties they experienced with regard to freedom of movement, weak security protection and insufficient protection and promotion of their rights by the international presence. The situation changed in 2001 as conditions improved.The Civil Administration established structures for the protection and promotion of minority rights through Local Community Offices at the municipal level. This development and better relations with the new Serbian government resulted in the participation of a considerable percentage of Kosovo-Serbs, both residing in Kosovo or displaced to other parts of Serbia, in the first Kosovo-wide elections. This fact, which reversed an earlier policy of boycott and abstention from elections called by the international authority, gave grounds for hopes that Kosovo-Serbs would join the post-elections Provisional Institutions of Self-Government. Relations between Belgrade and UNMIK, however, suffered a steady decline in the ensuing period. Returns of Kosovo-Serbs did not proceed as rapidly as expected. Important as it was, the improvement of the security situation did not occur to the extent necessary for returns to proceed in full safety. The necessary economic backing for the returns programme was not a negligible aspect of its partial failure. Responsibility for this did not fall exclusively on UNMIK’s back: the actual disposition of the government in Belgrade to facilitate returns was not as categorical as could have been desired. The inability of KFOR and UNMIK to foresee, prevent and efficiently counteract the widespread violence that erupted in March 2004 against Kosovo-Serbs, their property and patrimonial sites in Kosovo, raised sharp criticism and dealt a serious blow to any prospect of enhanced relations. The latter suffered a regression to pre-1999 levels, a time when the international community was seen and denounced by 139

Belgrade as an accomplice in the anti-Serb policies of the Kosovo-Albanian majority. Only in 2007, with the repositioning of Russia as a world power and the ensuing failure of the process to define the final status of Kosovo, due to deadlock at the Security Council, did the situation start again to revert. Belated engagement of the civil presence on the ground, difficulties in identifying and recruiting personnel with knowledge of public administration and experience in post-conflict situations, the cases of corruption, and lack of accountability contributed —amongst other factors — to the increasing discredit of the international presence. The selection and recruitment of UNMIK personnel was slow and inadequate. UNMIK administrative structures began operating after June 1999 but only became fully operational in 2001 with the establishment of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government, following the adoption of the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo. Similar problems affected the police contingents. Being seconded, police personnel’s working conditions and remuneration were neither unified nor under UN authority. This had a negative impact on the coherence and cohesiveness of the police force. In the opinion of several Kosovo-Albanian analysts and elected members of the Assembly, the international administration did not take into account and did not use to good effect the ten year-long experience of the Kosovo-Albanian parallel structures in administering health and education. According to these sources, incorporating such experience would have lessened the international administration workload and enhanced its institution-building role. The resolution did not provide a clear definition of the role and profile of the SRSG, merely stating that his responsibility was ‘to control the implementation of the international civil presence’. This has led to confusion and is, to a large extent, the origin of the misperception amongst Kosovars from all ethnic groups regarding the role of UNMIK. Furthermore, the mandate only mentions a generic political directive: the Secretary-General should ‘instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner’.61 Given the undefined character of the figure, the perception of his role has varied depending on the personality and conception of the tasks of each particular SRSG, shifting from administrator to ‘dictator’, or negotiator. In general, SRSGs had strong political profiles and only one, Jessen-Petersen, was considered an experienced administrator. He was seen by many as the most respected SRSG, though criticism was voiced about his reportedly too clear allegiance to the Kosovo-Albanian side of the conflict.62 There is a common belief that the role assigned to the SRSG should have been clearly defined as a reflection of the main tasks he was required to take over: in the case of Kosovo, those of an administrator. Personnel and other resources A fact of relevance for the peacebuilding mandate and the most acute problem affecting the day-today operations of the international civil administration was staffing, a function initially under the 61

United Nations Security Council resolution 1244, op. cit., para. 6. Interviews held with local Kosovo-Albanian media and international officials. 63 International staff, of Balkan and non-Balkan extraction, of organisations present in Kosovo. 62

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exclusive responsibility of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York.This and the lengthy procedures meant that the time between recruitment and deployment would average six months or more. Late in 2000 selection and recruitment were delegated to UNMIK, speeding up procedures. In the eyes of many,63 this was done to the detriment of scrupulous respect for sound selection and recruitment criteria. Despite criticisms, the decision to delegate had a positive effect on mandate implementation inasmuch as it facilitated the incorporation of professionals that would hold crucial positions throughout the territory. UNMIK was the first operation where selection and recruitment were delegated to the field; a successful pattern to be followed while applying adequate mechanisms to respect UN rules of recruitment and correct possible abuse. The marginal representation of women at UNMIK is worth noting. At UNMIK police, this presence was merely symbolic, although it is important to mention that police officers’ pre-selection was decided by policecontributing countries. On the purely civilian side, the number of female staff members remained very small in global terms,64 falling to marginal or no representation at all senior levels. Aside from the difficulties posed by slow procedures, it is commonly believed that recruitment failed to take into account the reality on the ground due to inadequate needs-assessments. Many of those recruited at the beginning of the mission, civilians and police, came from the downsizing of the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a fact that may explain to some extent the mismatch between the qualifications offered and those required. Some of the international officials interviewed noted that many of these initial recruits coming from Bosnia-Herzegovina might have also had strong anti-Serb feelings that contributed to the adoption of non-neutral political positions in the exercise of their functions. Many officers lacked appropriate experience.The worst deficiencies occurred in the areas of police and justice, with negative consequences for the maintenance of civil law and order in full respect of the rule of law. Given the general instability affecting Kosovo, and in particular its judicial system, the integration of international judges and prosecutors was deemed necessary to reinforce the fragile rule of law.The frequent ethnically-motivated incidents in the area north of the Ibar river were the triggered the decision to integrate international personnel to take up such delicate responsibilities. Cases of violation of the right to a fair trial and to an impartial judge were first detected in the District Court of Mitrovica, in particular in instances where the accused was of Serbian ethnicity or had been directly or indirectly related to the recent conflict. UNMIK concluded that only the involvement of international judges and prosecutors would redress the lack of impartiality. Lack of impartiality of the law adjudicating staff was due, in most of the cases, to the coercion exerted on them by certain sectors of society. A substitution of the primacy of the ‘elders’ in the social, judicial and administrative fabric of the past, by that of certain socio-criminal groups born of the recent conflicts was operating in Kosovo and, along with it, a pretended return to feudal norms and customs65 that covertly aimed at the replacement of the elders of the community by young ‘commanders’ resulting from the recent conflict.66 64

An interviewee mentioned data from 2000 — non-confirmed — whereby females represented 20 per cent of the mission staff, a figure that fell to almost zero when referring to middle senior staff, stopping there. 65 Amongst these, the most relevant is the Kanun (or code) of Lekë Dukagjini, name of the feudal lord who promulgated it. Dukagjini being the region in Albania known nowadays as Mirditë (and not the one presently known under that name) and where this lord ruled. Lekë is the Catholic Albanian version of Alexander. 141

It is within this framework that the integration of international judges and prosecutors in the judicial District of Mitrovica was established by regulation, to be later expanded to all judicial districts of Kosovo.67 This regulation permitted the appointment of international judges and prosecutors under the same conditions as their local counterparts save for the internationals’ entitlement to choose the cases for adjudication, the phase of the process where they would intervene and the nature of their participation. The rationale behind this type of integration was based on the goals of oversight and capacity-building. It involved cases where the nature of the crime adjudicated, the notoriety of the subjects involved, or both, demanded the establishment of a special jurisdiction where the free exercise of the judicial function would not be impaired. The emergency solution adopted thereafter was to allow a majority of internationals in criminal panels: the controversial Regulation 2000/6468 gave the SRSG the power to appoint prosecutors and/or international judges to any criminal case, at any phase of the proceedings and at any level of jurisdiction, all over Kosovo, and allowed him to change the venue with or without a formal change of jurisdiction. Participation of local judges was impaired by the need to obtain permission from the two District Court presidents involved and to get the endorsement of the President of the Supreme Court, as much as by the risk of being signalled out as ‘sepoys’ or servants of the occupation. Fundamentally, the SRSG could decide who, when and in what cases the judicial function would be exercised. This regulation implicitly amended the Kosovo Law on Regular Courts69 and undermined the purpose of capacity-building. A measure initially advanced in response to the need to ensure judicial impartiality wherever in jeopardy, was perceived as blunt interventionism by UNMIK’s executive power into judicial affairs, and thus rejected by the local judiciary. Many of FRIDE interviewees raised concerns about the independence of international judges and questioned their capacity to promote the establishment of an impartial, professional judiciary. Most criticised the dangerous politicisation of the administration of justice that resulted from their dependency on the executive branch of the mission, because international judges and prosecutors were selected, appointed and had the term of their appointments determined by UNMIK. It was widely argued that this policy contributed to the marginalisation of the local judiciary, thus undermining the goal of rebuilding a credible judicial system in Kosovo. In this respect, the situation of the international administration in Kosovo, where both judicial and executive powers were intimately concentrated in the person of the SRSG, was deemed to be in clear breach of the democratic principle of the division of powers, a basic foundation for the reestablishment of the judicial system and the rule of law — two fundamental pillars of UNMIK’s institution-building efforts. Particularly in — but not limited to — the area of justice, the selection and recruitment of required personnel was slow and insufficient.Training was practically non-existent and there was no guarantee 66

D. García-Orrico, ‘La internacionalización de la Administración de Justicia: Misión de Naciones Unidas de Administración Provisional de Kósovo’, available at www.iugm.org. 67 UNMIK regulations 2000/6 of 15 February and 2000/34 of 27 May. 68 UNMIK regulation 2000/64 of 15 December. 69 This regulation constituted a non-explicit amendment of the Law on Regular Courts in force in what it created, de facto, a jurisdiction ad interim that did not previously exist, with new and different rules of procedure, distribution of competences and personnel. 142

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to ensure the continuity of judicial actions taken by international judges and prosecutors once their contracts expired. Regarding the police, criticism was voiced concerning the slow and meagre contributions, particularly in the first crucial months of the operation. Consequently, KFOR’s policing activities were prolonged. KFOR contingents took over such duties to the best of their abilities, but soldiers were not trained or meant to police, investigate or execute judicial orders. KFOR succeeded in maintaining public safety, but it was not able to enforce civil law and order, nor did it in general conduct investigations to retrieve evidence that could thereafter be presented before a court of law. Another frequently voiced criticism was the randomness of police selection and recruitment. This had a heavy impact on daily tasks, including their institution-building responsibilities: while many of those selected were experienced police officers, others were drawn from private security companies, the army and the labour market without having prior policing experience. Rather than being deployed in accordance with their education, training or experience, many police officers were assigned to positions that responded to the national interests of their country of origin. Some of them were posted to discharge specialised functions for which they were clearly unfit. Many interviewees from more privileged police contingents were of the view that police personnel should enjoy working conditions defined and implemented by the UN operation in accordance with common criteria. International police officers interviewed expressed their belief that police-contributing countries should be engaged at early stages and commit to minimum standards of staff quality and preparation and not merely use participation in UN operations as a tool to improve the experience and training of their officers or even their working and operational gear. A very important point raised by many, including police personnel of the most favoured countries, refers to the fact that police officers were paid directly by their countries and were thus subject to comparative disadvantages that influenced their personal commitment and the quality of their work, depending on their nationality.To redress this situation, some interviewees argued that salaries should be established in the Memoranda of Understanding signed by contributing countries and the UN and be the same for all secondments, thus evening out the level of dedication and the quality of the service provided. New tasks assumed by UNMIK were more than adequately backed. Budgetary issues were rarely a problem. The open-ended character of the mandate and the existing ‘consensus’ (at times based on different rationales) on the need for the operation’s continuity facilitated the allotment of resources to an extent not comparable to other UN missions. Even for the approval of the 2009 budget, when global priorities had shifted and an important downsizing of the operation was in sight, the generally reluctant Western countries presented no opposition to the proposal. Most of the local actors interviewed by FRIDE believe that UNMIK’s public information campaigns did not have a significant impact on the local population and did not succeed in explaining the international administration’s role, functions and goals. In contrast, to many international officials public information was frequently one of the best performing areas, with effective public information campaigns on issues of general interest, such as trafficking in women and domestic violence. 143

Unfortunately, a peacebuilding initiative from the Department of Public Information to assist in the establishment of a Kosovo-wide public radio broadcast service to meet local information needs on issues such as security did not bear fruit due to conflict of interests and inadequate intra-pillar coordination. Mission integration was not always perceived as efficient. Coordination between UNMIK and KFOR and within UNMIK pillars was required in the resolution but not further detailed in subsequent agreements or memoranda. Success depended on the individuals in charge at each stage. Inefficiency and duplication of efforts were relatively frequent. Many observers and participants in the operation complained of the lack of real inter-pillar cooperation. In the absence of a consistent coordination policy, personal contacts were often the preferred means of communication. Coordination between the military and civilian components was also largely dependent on personality, and particularly on the leadership of UNMIK and KFOR. Who is in the driving seat? There is agreement, in general, on the main turning points and setbacks in the implementation of the mandate, but disagreement seems to appear when assessing their impact on the political developments in Kosovo, both with regard to the international presences and to intra- and inter-ethnic relations. The most important events include: the first regulations issued by the SRSG on the authority of the international civil presence and on the applicable law; the Prizren Judges’ refusal to apply legislation in force and the subsequent UNMIK regulation changing applicable law; the December 1999 agreement on co-administration; the Constitutional Framework;70 the 17-19 March ethnically-motivated riots; Kai Eide’s Report containing a Comprehensive Review of the Standards before Status Policy;71 Ahtisaari’s proposal on the Kosovo Status Settlement; and the declaration of independence. With the placet of the Security Council Presidential Statement of November 2008, the reconfiguration of UNMIK and the deployment of EULEX have already taken place. EULEX has replaced the UN-led Police and Justice Pillar, as well as its formerly EU-led customs functions. Nonetheless, some UNMIK rule of law personnel were initially retained in order to carry out residual functions relating to monitoring and reporting, facilitation of Kosovo’s participation in international arrangements and facilitation of practical arrangements between Pristina and Belgrade. Some UNMIK police personnel are still operational finalising the transfer and fulfilling residual tasks. Resolution 1244 (1999) was the last of the Security Council’s resolutions on the intervention in Kosovo. Kosovo has been the subject of many briefings to the Council, most of them behind closed doors. The Council visited Kosovo four times. Three of these missions occurred in the period immediately following the decision to intervene. The fourth and last one took place in 2007, after submission by the Secretary-General of his special envoy’s proposal on status. Mission reports included references to all meetings in the field, with international and local public authorities and different representatives of civil society. 70

UNMIK regulation 2001/9 of 15 May on a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo. S/2005/235 of 7 October. Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council transmitting the Report on a Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo presented by Kai Eide, Special Envoy of the SecretaryGeneral (S/2005/335).

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UNMIK reported to headquarters periodically and whenever the situation so required. Many interviewees claimed that such reporting did not fully reflect the realities on the ground and instead responded to ‘what headquarters wanted to hear’. Many also stated that UNSC monitoring and follow-up was too much of a one-way channel of communication: ‘there was much information going to New York, but little returning’. The resolution contains a very generic clause72 that requests the Secretary-General to report regularly on implementation, without explicitly stating how often such reports are to be submitted. The Security Council was never the driving force behind developments, being largely reactive and silent due to its internal divisions over the future of Kosovo. In the opinion of some observers, the mandate was immediately superseded by events and rapidly evolved through actions outside the sphere of the Council, either through regulations or decisions taken by UNMIK, to fill the gaps or through policies promoted by major international actors to address new circumstances. Several noreturn situations emerged on issues such as privatisation of socially-owned or state property or new legislation approved without regard to the legal and judicial tradition of the region. The adoption of new criminal and procedure laws is a case in point. Among the actions that bore consequences to the evolution of the mandate were the introduction of Kosovar vehicle registration plates to replace those issued by Belgrade, or the issue of UNMIK travel documents. Although justified as merely administrative decisions taken to fill in existing lacunae, they required recognition by other countries, thus entailing international agreements. The intervention in matters that were under the sole responsibility of the Government of Serbia touched on its sovereignty over the territory of Kosovo. Responsibility for these actions was shared by the SRSG and his collaborators, the Secretary-General and other UNMIK (OSCE, UNHCR, EU, and UN) officials. These policies would be later legitimised by DPKO and reported to the Council where they did not elicit reactions. The Security Council’s long silence starting in 2005 ended in November 2008 with the presidential statement welcoming the Secretary-General’s reconfiguration proposal. Seemingly, direct action from the Security Council presidency regarding the situation in Kosovo has been scarce as a reflection of the Council’s deadlock over the Kosovo crisis. Even the wording of the presidential statements reflects this paralysis. All presidential statements regarding the Kosovo question issued prior to resolution 1244 (1999) referred to the matter as the Kosovo crisis, conflict, or situation, among others. From 2000 onwards, all discussions at the Security Council on the issue of Kosovo, all references in official documents, briefings and presentations are referred to as ‘relative to Security Council resolutions S/RES/1239 (1999), of 14 May; S/RES/1203 (1998), of 24 October; S/RES/1199 (1998), of 23 September; and S/RES/1160 (1998), of 31 March’, in the subject title. There are diametrically opposed opinions regarding the evolution of the mandate.The absence of new resolutions that would modify, or merely add to, resolution 1244 (1999), as well as the paucity of the Council’s statements, has led to the generalised perception that the Council has not been directly involved in ensuring implementation or setting the direction of the international presence. Other than the aforementioned exceptions, all official UN documents on Kosovo are those that come from the 72

United Nations Security Council resolution 1244, op. cit., para. 20. 145

Secretary-General and the SRSG. On key occasions, the SRSG would formulate policy to respond to new requirements and brief the Council on the new approach in informal sessions. For these reasons, it is often held that while the mandate did not evolve in the narrow sense, it did in practice, through its implementation on the ground. Others73 contend that the mandate did not evolve despite changing circumstances: Yugoslavia — and Serbia as its successor state — has been deprived of the attributes of sovereignty over Kosovo and will never regain them. KFOR’s mandate remains the same, its role having only evolved as a consequence of a reassessment of needs, as foreseen by resolution 1244 (1999). UNMIK’s present authority is considered merely nominal, the resolution being still in force. Nonetheless, not even other international organisations present in Kosovo recognise such authority, and least of all the Kosovo leadership.Transfer of authority from UNMIK’s Pillar I to EULEX, concluded on 31 March 2009, took place with a degree of secrecy atypical of a respected international institution, no documents or Memoranda of Understanding being adequately publicised.74

V. Resolution 1325 (2000)

There is not a single mention of women or women issues in UNSC resolution 1244 (1999). The first — and only — reference to women in relation to this operation, prior to the adoption of resolution 1325 (2000), appears in the Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo of 12 July 1999, when establishing the democratisation and institution-building component, with regard to the strengthening of associations.75 The existing societal deficit between males and females in Kosovo is significant, though with small variations depending on factors such as age, access to education or social and economic status. Women’s access to jobs, education, and legal protection of their rights is directly tied to their ability — or lack thereof — to participate in formal decision-making structures. Crucial achievements notwithstanding (including the introduction of quotas for female candidates in central and local elections, which have rendered Kosovo a forerunner for women’s representation throughout Europe), the low number of women nominated to political office or integrated in political party’s senior levels indicates the need for profound changes to improve qualitatively and quantitatively women’s participation in decision-making and to make their involvement sustainable. Despite the binding character of education laws, just over half of Kosovar girls were reported to attend school three years after UNMIK’s arrival, and girls’ drop-out age was lower than that of boys’, particularly in the transition from primary to secondary education. Illiteracy rates upon arrival of the 73

Western officials of international organisations and Kosovo-Albanian political analysts interviewed in the summer of 2008. International officials currently present in the field. 75 S/1999/779, op. cit., Part VI, section 1, para. 80. 74

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operation were much higher for women (10 per cent) than for men (2 per cent). In rural areas, 26 per cent of women aged 16-19 were relatively illiterate and 9.5 per cent entirely illiterate.76 Women’s education and health continues to be an issue of concern, as is the question of equal opportunities in employment in qualified jobs, a situation that is even worse concerning middle or senior management positions. Women remain largely absent from crucial activity sectors, with a more pronounced occupational segregation turnout in rural areas. In addition, women’s access to financing is hampered by their inability to provide the necessary collateral to secure loans, mainly because they usually forego property for the benefit of their male relatives due to, inter alia, customary practices. It is not surprising that the number of companies headed by women remains modest, with remarkable exceptions found in first line media holdings, as is the case of Koha Vision, led by Flaka Surroi. Women’s leadership is also present in civil society, where women’s organisations with a gender perspective have increased considerably. These organisations have developed powerful networks, such as the Kosova Women Network (KWN), including women of different ethnic groups, and which helps them build capacities to work effectively on behalf of their communities.77 The adoption of resolution 1325 (2000) turned the gender perspective into a requirement for all UN peace operations. Shortly after its establishment, UNMIK introduced a post of gender adviser. In the early stages of the mission and at middle-management level, the gender adviser was directly under the SRSG, as part of his staff. As the operation developed, the gender adviser’s position was transferred to the Civil Administration Pillar, and then transferred back under the direct authority of the SRSG at a later stage of the mission. The availability of material resources for developing a gender programme increased, but human resources were never adequately provided, with regard to both the assignment of senior-level positions and the recruitment of specialised staff. Plans for gender mainstreaming varied in focus depending on the person in charge, his/her experience and the ongoing events in Kosovo. Some plans included specific responsibilities and attached the resources required to implement them, but the resources never materialised due to conflicting priorities within the mission. The main problem was the absence of sufficient personnel allocated to the area and the junior level of those posted in the Gender Office, which diminished their chances of making a convincing case before the very senior mission staff78 when requesting that gender issues be considered a priority and given sufficient resources. While there always was verbal support for gender mainstreaming, it did not translate into the delivery of resources and the adoption of policy measures. 76

http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/aug04/focusksocaffair1.htm The Kosova Women’s Network (KWN), presently led by Igballe Rogova, was established in 2000 as an informal network of women’s groups and organisations from all over Kosovo. Since its inception, it has grown into a key advocacy network on behalf of Kosovar women at the regional and international levels. It is now a leading network of more then 60 women’s NGOs and groups, some of which are well established in the region and have over ten years of experience in community development while others were more recently formed after the arrival of the UN in Kosovo. 78 During the interviews held in Kosovo in the summer of 2008, the author met a very helpful and well-qualified young UN volunteer (UNV) who had been in charge of the office for quite some time, since the departure of the last incumbent (reportedly a P3/P4). 77

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Support from the top levels was rather weak or lacking. At a time when resources for the mission were not a contested issue, the scarcity of resources allocated to promote gender policies evidenced the meagre weight given to this goal by the mission’s leadership. In the opinion of international and local officials in the field, many efforts were undertaken, most of them successfully, particularly in the rule of law area of gender-based violence. However, there is no record showing that the resulting developments were the consequence of the adoption of the resolution in October 2000.There were positive trends in the areas of legislation and implementation, including the prosecution of violators and the establishment in 2002, within the Judicial Development Division of the Department of Justice, of a Victims’ Advocacy and Advisory Unit, whose work was performed in coordination with local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Strategies to increase political representation of women in Kosovo through the application of quotas for female candidates and appointments to public office yielded poor or no results. Women did not have a significant presence at decision-making levels. In the view of most interviewees, resolution 1325 (2000) has not been implemented in practice despite its formal incorporation in official documents and working plans. The mapping of gender-training needs was undertaken but randomly implemented. Mechanisms for the systematic gathering of sex-disaggregated data did not exist in the early stages of UNMIK, but were eventually put in place, including in the assessment of certain areas and at some intervals. The UN is criticised for failing to set an example to local actors. Resolution 1325 (2000) was barely implemented internally: there were no women in most UNMIK senior positions; amongst the appointees for the positions of SRSG, PDSRSG and DSRSG, only one woman was nominated in nine years, while the number of women directors and other higher decision-making level positions was merely symbolic. Women associations and other civil society representatives disagree with the 30 per cent quota in politics (‘why not 50 per cent or actual percentage in society?’) if it is not accompanied by effective monitoring and control of the use of this measure by political parties and backed by an adequate training programme. Many claim that civil society in Kosovo provides better examples of promoting women to higher positions than the UN mission ever did: the three most important media in the territory are run by women. Examples can even be found within the local administration: the Kosovo Police Service is the only police force in Southeast Europe where a woman holds a commanding position. UNMIK police also had one woman of US nationality as deputy commissioner. Regardless of Kosovo’s final status, one overriding challenge remains: convincing local and international policymakers that the status of women is integral to economic growth, reconstruction and sustainable peace. Gender remains an essential element for a future peaceful multi-ethnic Kosovo.

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VI. Is an exit strategy viable?

The mandate’s fundamental ambiguity, its open-ended framework79 and the fact that the solution to the crisis is subject to interpretation, made it particularly difficult to conceive and design a wellarticulated exit strategy. The resolution seeks to solve this inherent tension by implicitly linking exit to the accomplishment of the institution- and peace-building processes.80 In fact, the interim administration was to be exercised by the international presence for as long as required,81 having been given the authority to devolve responsibilities to Provisional Institutions of SelfGovernment, pending the final political settlement, which should nevertheless not delay or disrupt the establishment of those very institutions.82 The Council reaffirmed its commitment to the goal of a multiethnic and democratic Kosovo and called on all communities to work towards this end by actively participating in public institutions and in the decision-making process, and by integrating into society.83 The final stage of the process required the international civil presence to oversee the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to the institutions established under a political settlement.84 UNMIK linked its exit to the ‘Standards before Status Policy’. In this case, as in others, the Council was merely reactive, but managed, at least, to reach a weak consensus to endorse it.85 The policy postulated targets in eight key areas: functioning of the democratic institutions, the rule of law, freedom of movement, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, the economy, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and the Kosovo Protection Corps.The fulfilment of these targets would open the door to negotiations on Kosovo’s future political status. The Council later stressed that further progress would depend on a positive outcome in the comprehensive review of those standards,86 a responsibility to be discharged by Special Envoy Kai Eide. Eide’s report on the Comprehensive Review of the Implementation of Standards of October 2005 was a step further in the building of UNMIK’s exit strategy. Based on its findings, the Secretary-General stated to the Council that, despite the fact that more sustained progress was required and that the implementation of standards in Kosovo had to continue with undiminished energy and a stronger sense of commitment, the time had come to move to the next phase and set in motion the political

79

United Nations Security Council resolution 1244, op. cit., para. 19. The responsibilities of the civil presence at the beginning of the process of transfer of the established institutions included its oversight and support to their consolidation, along the facilitation of the political process that would determine the future status of Kosovo, taking into account the Rambouillet Accords (which included a referendum on the issue of status); see United Nations Security Council resolution 1244, op. cit. 81 Ibid., paras. 10 and 19. 82 Ibid., paras. 10 and 11; Annex 1, principle 6; Annex 2, principles 5, in fine, and 8. 83 S/PRST/2003/26, op. cit. 84 United Nations Security Council resolution 1244, op. cit., para. 11. 85 S/PRST/2003/01 of 6 February 2003; this support was first (merely) expressed on the Report of the Security Council Mission to Kosovo and Belgrade, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 14-17 December 2002 (S/2002/1376). 86 S/PRST/2003/26, op. cit. 80

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process to determine Kosovo’s future status, as foreseen in resolution 1244 (1999). The Council welcomed Kai Eide’s report and the Secretary-General’s readiness to appoint a special envoy to lead the future status process.87 The Comprehensive Proposal88 submitted by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, after more than one year of consultations with both sides, entailed the status of supervised independence for the territory. The proposal was unacceptable to Kosovo-Serbs and to the government in Belgrade, which considered it to be in violation of resolution 1244 (1999) and its prescription reaffirming ‘the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’. Kosovo-Serbs and the Government of Serbia criticised what they saw as lack of impartiality on the part of the special envoy, and requested his replacement as mediator. Ahtisaari’s proposal limited the independence of Kosovo by placing it under international supervision and leaving the ultimate decisionmaking authority in the hands of the ‘international community’. The proposal, submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council along with the report of the special envoy,89 did not receive the necessary sanction due to irreconcilable positions amongst the Permanent Five. The Kosovo authorities’ unilateral declaration of independence further complicated the already difficult situation. The new government in Pristina claims to abide by the rules and limitations contained in Ahtisaari’s non-approved proposal.90 Its real authority is therefore subject to the self-imposed limitation and sine qua non condition for international recognition contained in the document: the supervisory powers of the International Civilian Representative (ICR), as well as the alienation — to a large extent — of Kosovo’s judicial and police functions. Following the stalemate that emerged over the proposal, the Contact Group established a troika with representatives of the US, the Russian Federation and the European Union, to conduct a limited period of further negotiations. As expected, these negotiations also failed to reach an agreed solution. In December 2007, the Secretary-General transmitted the report submitted on the negotiations, stressing that a solution to the situation of Kosovo was critical to the stability and security of the Western Balkans region and of Europe as a whole. The Security Council presidential statement of 26 November 2008,91 the first to be issued on Kosovo since 2005, gave green light to the reconfiguration of UNMIK. This pronouncement constituted an important step towards UNMIK’s exit strategy, since EULEX was to replace UNMIK by taking over the police and justice functions that had not yet been transferred to the Kosovo authorities. EULEX completed its deployment by the end of March 2009, while UNMIK’s presence is limited to representative and monitoring functions, apart from a small number of UNMIK police officers that are still finalising different aspects of the transfer. At the moment of this report’s conclusion,92 the UN retains some 87

S/PRST/2005/51, op. cit. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, op.cit. 89 http://www.unosek.org/docref/report-english.pdf 90 Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, op. cit. 91 SPRST/2008/44 of 26 November 2008. 88

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personnel at its headquarters in Pristina, 16 political affairs/civil affairs officers in four field offices throughout Kosovo, and a representative in North Mitrovica along his staff. Following the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo and upon the request of its leadership, a group of states formed the International Steering Group (ISG) on 28 February 2008.93 They also decided on the establishment of the International Civilian Office (ICO) and appointed the already present EU Special Representative as International Civilian Representative. The ICO is to support of the ICR in Kosovo, head of the international presence in the territory as per Ahtisaari’s proposal. The EU is subject to strong movements within its membership that pull in opposite directions on the question of status, and it will be difficult for it to maintain the necessary attitude of neutrality within the reconfiguration endorsed by the Council. Kosovo-Albanians did not object to UNMIK’s withdrawal but wanted EULEX to operate within their constitutional framework. Continued support from the parties to the conflict will depend on how the new mission continues to portray itself. If EULEX advocates for the implementation of Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal, as his head of mission reportedly did on a statement to the media in July 2008,94 it will face Serbian resistance; if it maintains a policy (even implicit) of status neutrality, it will stand a better chance in the exercise of its functions. Kosovo-Albanians perceive the mission as working in their favour, despite complaints of their authorities against the Council’s approval of UNMIK’s reconfiguration. Kosovo-Serbs see EULEX (and KFOR) as clearly favourable to KosovoAlbanians and their drive for independence. Regardless of the option taken, it will face opposition once the population realises that the international presence will continue, a fact already voiced by the leaders of self-determination movements, including women’s organisations.95 While stating the monitoring status of the mission, EULEX’s recent decision to start issuing identity documents to Kosovo-Serbs involves the assumption of direct administrative functions. The fact that the EU Special Representative is also the ICR, whose policy is explicitly designed to support the implementation of Ahtisaari’s proposal, adds to the confusion of international actors currently present in Kosovo. This double function places the EU in a difficult position and may create serious operational concerns, and thus needs to be resolved as soon as possible. The crisis is far from being over. The situation in the Kosovo Serb-populated Mitrovica region is extremely volatile; incidents occur frequently; the security situation could soon worsen. EULEX has been officially deployed also in the North, but mainly works from the South. UNMIK’s Police and Justice Pillar has finalised the transfer of its functions to EULEX, though a number of police officers are still in the field to conclude the transfer. In addition, Kosovo-Serbs are the victims of constant incidents everywhere else in Kosovo (stabbing, arson, 92

This case study was concluded on 11 May 2009. The International Steering Group comprises a number of states that support full implementation of Ahtisaari’s proposal for status and have recognised Kosovo’s independence. 94 It was reported during several interviews held in Kosovo with international and Kosovo-Serbian officials in the summer of 2008, though without specific mention of the media concerned. 95 Albin Kurti, Vetëvendosje (www.vetevendosje.org), and Igballe Rogova, in the non-delivered speech that she had prepared for the ‘International Conference on Women and Governance in Eastern Europe and CIS’, held in Istanbul on 1-3 December 2008 and posted on her organisation’s webpage (www.womensnetwork.org). 93

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damage of property, and threats, amongst others).‘UNMIK will quietly die away while EULEX, theoretically status-neutral, will be forced to operate under the Kosovo Constitution. EULEX executive powers will gradually become marginal, allowing Kosovo-Albanian institutions to take over and to create comparative disadvantages vis-à-vis the Kosovo-Serbian population’.96 Some of the actions of public companies, such as the Energetic Corporation of Kosovo KEK, vis-à-vis the Kosovo-Serbian population, are perceived as discriminatory and aimed at their expulsion. On 12 June 2008, NATO agreed to assist in the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)97 and the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), as well as the civilian structure to oversee the KSF.98 Reaching out to Kosovo’s minority communities and encouraging them to apply for the KSF remains a priority. NATO assists the Kosovo authorities in establishing a ministry for the Kosovo Security Force.99 Primary responsibility for this task rests with NATO headquarters in Brussels; KFOR is to support the NATO Advisory Team that has been established in Pristina. In December 2007, NATO foreign ministers agreed that KFOR shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of resolution 1244 (1999), unless the Security Council decides otherwise. In addition, they renewed their commitment to maintain KFOR’s national force contributions, including reserves, at current levels and with no new caveats. At the Bucharest summit in April 2008, it was agreed that NATO and KFOR would continue to work with the authorities in Kosovo. It was also agreed that, bearing in mind its operational mandate, KFOR would cooperate with and assist the UN, the EU and other international actors, as appropriate, to support the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo. They also stressed that NATO stood ready to play its part in the implementation of future security arrangements. At their meeting on 2-3 December 2008, NATO foreign ministers reaffirmed that the robust, UNmandated NATO-led KFOR presence would remain in Kosovo on the basis of resolution 1244 (1999). They reaffirmed that NATO would continue to work towards the standing down of the Kosovo Protection Corps and the establishment of the Kosovo Security Force on the basis of NATO’s voluntary trust funds. 96

Extracted from telephone interviews held with international officials present in the filed, at the time of finalising this report. The KPC was conceived as a transitional post-conflict arrangement, under UNMIK’s responsibility. Its mandate was to provide disaster response services, perform search and rescue, provide capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas, assist demining, and contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities. Dissolution of the KPC is taking place in parallel with the creation of the Kosovo Security Force. The KPC ceased its operational activities on 20 January 2009 and will be formally dissolved on 14 June 2009. Those KPC members not recruited into the KSF will be resettled, reintegrated or retired. A resettlement programme funded by a NATO Trust Fund is being implemented by a local partner NGO (APPK) under UNDP supervision. 98 The KSF shall be a lightly armed force and possess no heavy weapons, such as tanks, heavy artillery or offensive air capability. The KSF shall have primary responsibility for security tasks that are not appropriate for the police such as emergency response, explosive ordnance disposal and civil protection. It may also participate in crisis response operations, including peace support operations. 99 The ministry for the KSF will be a civilian-led organisation that will exercise civilian control over force. The minister for the KSF, through his ministry, will exercise day-to-day responsibility for the force. 97

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The UK announced, earlier in 2009, its withdrawal from Kosovo by the end of the year. Spain also announced its withdrawal, due to fundamental disagreements with the current political developments in the territory. KFOR is currently in the process of downsizing its strength.

VII. Concluding observations

The case of Kosovo placed the Security Council at the centre of the ongoing debate surrounding intervention on humanitarian grounds versus the prescription of national sovereignty. While the Council could not surmount its existing cleavages on the matter, the discussion that followed the NATO air campaign in Kosovo brought to the world organisation an issue of essential relevance to international peace and security in today’s world. Later efforts to achieve consensus within the framework of the policy of responsibility to protect owe a lot to this initial debate. If no agreement was reached on the legality of the intervention, through the adoption and implementation of resolution 1244 (1999), the Council was able to chart a way for a transitional period, in the hope of preparing the ground for a political process that would define the final status of Kosovo. Expectations regarding the mandate’s adequacy were relevant to the goals of stopping the violence and repression by Serbian authorities and paramilitaries, ensuring the withdrawal of their forces from Kosovo, providing humanitarian relief, and establishing a transitional administration under international authority. But the Kosovo-Serbs remained largely alienated from the process set in motion by the mandate. In this context, the resolution did not respond to all inhabitants of Kosovo. It reflected a partial interpretation of the crisis — that of the Western powers — without clashing with Russia’s outright opposition. The resolution was the basis for the construction of the Institutions of Self-Government which, following the approach of the major powers, sought to replicate the Western European model, often without an appropriate transition. Despite its many successes in developing an administrative structure where nothing existed, the international interim administration failed to create the necessary atmosphere for a multi-ethnic society to emerge and develop into a credible and more permanent political structure that would lead to a final and agreed solution for Kosovo. The inability of the international civil and security presences to prevent the ethnically-motivated attacks of March 2004 — five years after the intervention — dealt a severe blow to their credibility and cast serious doubts on the prospects of a future peaceful and multi-ethnic Kosovo. KFOR’s reaction only partially redressed the situation and showed that international presence and commitment would continue to be required in the near future. However, it did draw attention to the need better to coordinate, at both the design and implementation levels, the approved use of force and the rules of engagement adopted. The absence of a common understanding within the Council on the scope and implications of resolution 1244 (1999) made it impossible to adapt it in response to new developments and thus turn 153

it into an effective tool for guiding the process of change. In the eyes of many, the resolution became obsolete upon approval.The Council was the largely passive recipient of information on initiatives and proposals originating in UNMIK or assumed by the Secretary-General to move the process forward without touching on the question of sovereignty. The Secretary-General’s role evolved considerably since the initial deployment of the mission in Kosovo. His interpretation of the powers vested in him has been advanced and extensive. At the crucial time of defining the future course of action after the rejection of Ahtisaari’s proposal, he was confronted with a stalemate at the Council and irreconcilable divisions on the ground.The SecretaryGeneral sought to respond, relating to events as they occurred, in a manner that would neither block nor facilitate the course of events, so as not to influence the balance of power in the face of a breakdown in the Council. Under great political exposure and pressure, he took an unprecedented step in proposing the reconfiguration of UNMIK. He was criticised —though not too forcefully — on the premise that the middle ground where he was moving would lead to a kind of equilibrium. Within this very line of policy of status neutrality, the Secretary-General engaged in a dialogue with Serbia that gradually involved the EU, the US, and Russia. This initiative was necessary to engage the Council and to accelerate talks with Belgrade, creating a situation where a new solution package counting on the support or acquiescence of all or most stakeholders could be submitted to the Council for approval. Kosovo is an example of the dilemmas of state-building. Faced with the need to take over the direct public administration of a territory, a responsibility for which it was ill-prepared and lacked appropriate staff, the organisation had to adopt new and more flexible modalities for the selection and recruitment of personnel. The decision to decentralise this function to the field was one such modality. Aside from the difficult operational challenges stemming from the establishment of an international protectorate, lie the tensions arising from the need to promote local and national ownership. UNMIK’s experience in the appointment of international judges and prosecutors is a reminder of the risks posed by placing excessive or exclusive emphasis on international personnel. As evident from the case of Kosovo, doing so may jeopardise the very purpose of local institution-building, which is at the core of the mandate. It also raises serious questions of accountability and loss of credibility for the international authority.

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Sierra Leone

5 Sierra Leone

Synopsis Ten years after the horrific rebel attack of 6 January 1999 and the battle for Freetown, Sierra Leone is a country at peace. A president from the opposition party in the immediate post-war period, Ernest Baï Koroma, is in power since the September 2007 elections. The elections were organised by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) with broad citizen support and assistance from the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), which succeeded the then largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). In 2009, the country is still on the agenda of the Security Council and hosts the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). Sierra Leoneans interviewed in November 2008 recognised UNAMSIL’s significant contribution to their country’s recovery from collapse and generalised violence. They insisted on the conjunction of efforts by key players in helping to bring an end to the conflict: Nigeria and Guinea, bilaterally and as participants in a regional peacekeeping force; the United Kingdom (UK) through direct support to the Sierra Leonean army; and UNAMSIL. The quasi collapse of UNAMSIL in May 2000 remained vivid in their memories, but so did its progressive recovery since 2001. Ultimately, UNAMSIL achieved the key tasks assigned to it by the Security Council: it assisted in conducting the disarmament, demobilisation and to some extent the reintegration of former combatants; supported the redeployment of the state throughout the country; provided key assistance and security to national and local elections; contributed to the reform of the Sierra Leone police; supported the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; and provided security for the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Its record in implementing resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security was much less impressive.

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I. Conflict history

Civil war in Sierra Leone began in March 1991, when an armed group known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) headed by former Corporal Foday Sankoh entered the country from Liberia to launch a rebellion against Joseph Momoh’s government of the All Peoples Congress (APC), in power since 1967 and with a poor record in terms of economic development, political freedom and resource management.The rebellion quickly developed into a campaign of violence and looting of the country’s diamond and mineral wealth. Sierra Leone was plunged into a maelstrom of instability. In 1992, a group of young military officers led by Captain Valentine Strasser staged a coup which sent Momoh into exile in Guinea and established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) as the ruling authority in Sierra Leone. Strasser was in turn overthrown in 1996 by his deputy. An exploratory mission sent to the country in 1994 by the UN Secretary-General reported that, as a result of the then three-year old conflict, about 10 per cent of the population had fled to neighbouring countries (mostly Guinea) and at least 30 per cent were internally displaced. Vital infrastructure had been destroyed and three quarters of the national budget was injected into defence. In 1995 the Secretary-General appointed a special envoy.1 He worked in collaboration with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the ancestor of the African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to seek a settlement that could return the country to civilian rule. International pressure on the military junta and the determination of a group of Sierra Leoneans from civil society led to multiparty elections in February 1996. The army handed power over to the winner, Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, of the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP). The RUF had opposed the elections and done everything to prevent citizens from casting their votes, including committing horrendous atrocities.The new government was nationally and internationally recognised, but the conflict continued. The special envoy assisted in negotiating an agreement between the government and RUF, known as the Abidjan Accord, in late 1996. But resentment at the elected government mounted within the Sierra Leonean army (SLA). A group of officers accused Kabbah of giving more resources to a network of civilian militias, the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) — the most powerful of which were the Kamajors — to fight the RUF, instead of relying on the army. In May 1997, SLA rebels known as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, overthrew the president, forcing him into exile in Guinea, and invited the RUF to join the government. The new administration was characterised by a total absence of the rule of law — violence, rape and looting were widespread.

1

Berhanu Dinka from Ethiopia. 158

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A new Secretary-General special envoy2 and other representatives of the international community tried unsuccessfully to put pressure on the ruling junta to step down. The Security Council imposed an oil and arms embargo and authorised ECOWAS to ensure its implementation using the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), deployed in Sierra Leone to protect the government. Resolution 1132 of 8 October 1997, the first of the Council on the situation in Sierra Leone, acting under Chapter VII, demanded that the junta ‘relinquish power and make way for the restoration of the democratically elected government’ and decided that ‘all States [should] prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of members of the military junta and adult members of their families’; and imposed an arms and oil embargo on Sierra Leone.3 In March 1998 ECOMOG ousted the AFRC junta and reinstated President Kabbah’s government.The Security Council lifted prohibitions on the supply of oil but maintained the arms embargo. In July 1998, it established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to monitor and advise on efforts to disarm combatants and restructure the nation’s security forces. In January 1999, AFRC and RUF fighters infiltrated and overran most of Freetown. Atrocities committed against civilians included rape, random amputations of men, women and children, and kidnapping.4 After almost three weeks of fighting, ECOMOG ousted the rebels. Three thousand people are believed to have been murdered or abducted and many hundreds mutilated. All UNOMSIL personnel were evacuated, mainly to Guinea. While the rebels failed to take Freetown, they controlled large parts of the territory and showed their capacity of devastation. With the assistance of West African heads of state and other dignitaries from the UK, the United States (US), OAU and the UN, the president, the RUF leader and his AFRC allies signed the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999, giving Sankoh the status of vice-president and other positions in the government to the RUF.The accord called for a neutral international peacekeeping force to help with implementation, beginning with the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process (DDR).The Security Council terminated UNOMSIL and established the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in October 1999, with an initial force of 6,000 personnel. ECOMOG left in April 2000, but some contingents were retained and ‘rehatted’ under UNAMSIL. The war in Sierra Leone saw the intervention of foreign governments and mercenary forces, which generally provided support in exchange for lucrative contracts and mining concessions. Charles Taylor’s rebels, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), responsible for the armed conflict that broke out in Liberia in 1989, inaugurating the cycle of devastating civil wars in the Mano River region, and Taylor’s government from July 1997 to 2003, backed the RUF with training, personnel, logistics, weapons and initial funding. After his forced departure from power in 2003 and exile in Nigeria,Taylor was arrested and has been facing trial before the Special Court for Sierra Leone for war crimes and crimes against 2

Francis Okelo from Uganda. United Nations Security Council resolution 1132 of 8 October 1997. 4 For a detailed account of the atrocities committed during the occupation of Freetown by the AFRC and RUF and the fighting with ECOMOG force, see ‘Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation, and Rape: New Testimony from Sierra Leone’, Human Rights Watch Report 11, 3 June 1999. 3

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humanity committed by the RUF.There was considerable diplomatic activity among parties interested in bringing the conflict to an end: the OAU, ECOWAS, ECOMOG troop-contributors (Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana, and Mali), the UK, the US and the UN. Access to alluvial diamonds, the war in Liberia and the ambitions of warlord-turned-president Charles Taylor in the Mano River region, as well as lack of interest from the world powers, played a role in the outbreak and duration of the civil war. But the political, economic and societal failures of governments since independence created the conditions for violence, instability and state collapse. The report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which provides a comprehensive account of the civil war, recognises its root causes and calls for profound reforms. The United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) replaced UNAMSIL in January 2006 to assist the government in consolidating the achievements of UNAMSIL and addressing post-conflict security, political and reconstruction challenges. In 2009, Sierra Leone remains a testing ground for new forms of UN engagement as one of the first countries to benefit from the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).5 Since October 2008 the country hosts the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office (UNIPSIL).

II. Mandate and evolution

UNAMSIL was established to replace the prior observer mission, UNOMSIL, by resolution 1270 of 22 October 1999 after the Lomé Peace Agreement. More resolutions would follow as reactions to the deterioration of security in early 2000 and the need to play a key role in disarmament, the deployment of national security forces throughout the country and the organisation of credible elections.

1. The initial mandate

Security Council resolution 1270 of 22 October 1999 gave UNAMSIL the following main tasks: ● To cooperate with the government and other parties to the Lomé Agreement in its implementation; ● To assist the government in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration plan, establishing a presence at key locations; 5

The Peacebuilding Commission was created by resolution 60/180 of the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolution 1645 of 20 December 2005. 160

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● To ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel; ● To monitor adherence to the ceasefire in accordance with the agreement of 18 May 1999; ● To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; ● To provide support to the elections. Resolution 1270 (1999), inter alia, also: ● Decided that the military component of UNAMSIL should have a maximum of 6,000 personnel; ● Commended ECOMOG’s readiness to provide security for the areas where it was located, in particular around Freetown and Lungi, and protection for the government, and to proceed with disarmament and demobilisation in conjunction and full coordination with UNAMSIL; ● Stressed the need for close cooperation and coordination between ECOMOG and UNAMSIL and welcomed the intended establishment of joint operations centres; ● Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, decided that UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the government and ECOMOG; ● Underlined the key role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and urged the Government of Sierra Leone to ensure its prompt establishment; ● Urged the government to expedite the formation of professional and accountable national police and armed forces. For the first time a peacekeeping operation was mandated to protect civilians. The limitations to comply were also made clear: such protection would depend on the capabilities and deployment in the areas where civilians faced an imminent threat. The mandate is linked to the functions of the regional force on the ground, ECOMOG. It prescribes close cooperation and coordination with ECOMOG, which will continue to ‘provide security for the areas where it is currently located’ and proceed with disarmament and demobilisation ‘in conjunction and full coordination with UNAMSIL’. ECOMOG’s withdrawal was not considered in the writing of the resolution and not factored into UNAMSIL’s preparation for deployment. To be noted finally is UNAMSIL’s limited mandate related to a ceasefire between belligerents supposed to be at peace following the Lomé Agreement. UNAMSIL was to ‘monitor adherence to the ceasefire’. It was not asked to prevent violations or stop them by using means such as military force.

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2. Revisions of the mandate and strength of UNAMSIL from 2000 to 2001

The year 2000 saw intensive activity from the UN Secretariat and the Council on Sierra Leone, as the newly created UNAMSIL faced enormous difficulties from its very early stages. The Council voted six resolutions on the situation in Sierra Leone in the course of that year, four of them focusing on UNAMSIL’s mandate and strength adjustments, two on non-military measures to influence the parties — ban on diamonds exports; strengthened arms embargo — and a request to create a Special Court to deal with the perpetrators of certain crimes in the course of the conflict. Reacting to the sudden withdrawal of ECOMOG: Additional tasks for UNAMSIL by resolution 1289 (2000) The Council, by resolution 1289 of 7 February 2000, inter alia: ● Noted that the peace process had thus far been marred by limited participation in the DDR programme, lack of progress on the release of abductees and child soldiers, hostage-taking and attacks on humanitarian personnel; ● Noted continuing human rights violations against the civilian population and emphasised that the amnesty extended under the peace agreement did not extend to such violations committed after the date of its signing; ● Took note of the decision of the governments of Nigeria, Guinea and Ghana to withdraw their remaining ECOMOG contingents;6 ● Decided that UNAMSIL’s military component should be expanded to a maximum of 11,100 personnel. The resolution also revised the mandate of UNAMSIL to include the following tasks: ● To provide security at key locations and government buildings, in particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports, including the Lungi airport; ● To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified thoroughfares; ● To provide security for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; 6

Letter of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, S/1999/1285, 23 December 1999. 162

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● To coordinate with and assist the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities; ● To guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction. This resolution was the Council’s response to two important developments: the violation of the peace agreement and ECOMOG’s full withdrawal. Both required UNAMSIL to have a larger mandate than previously thought, taking primary responsibility for security of the DDR programme, in a context where some of the parties to the agreement showed hostility to the peacekeeping force. In February 2000, it was obvious that UNAMSIL would not be a smooth operation, easily collecting weapons from disciplined ex-combatants and progressively transferring responsibilities to the national institutions after the holding of elections. In the wording of the resolution, the additional tasks in the area of security demanded an increase of the authorised military strength to 11,100 personnel. From May 2000 to mid-2001. UNAMSIL under stress: Rapid reinforcement and mandate adjustments The Council voted a new resolution on 19 May 2000 following a serious setback marked by attacks on UNAMSIL and hostage-taking of hundreds of UN peacekeepers by the RUF. Resolution 1299 (2000): ● Decided that UNAMSIL’s military component should be expanded to 13,000 personnel; ● Acting under Chapter VII, decided that the restrictions on the sale or supply of arms and related materiel did not apply for the sole use in Sierra Leone of those member states cooperating with UNAMSIL and the Government of Sierra Leone. On 4 August 2000, resolution 1313, admitting UNAMSIL’s ‘serious weaknesses’, inter alia: ● Considered that ‘the widespread and serious violations’ of the Lomé Agreement constituted ‘a breakdown of the prior generally permissive environment based on the Agreement and predicated on the cooperation of the parties’; and considered that there would continue to be a threat to UNAMSIL and the security of the state.To counter that threat, ‘the structure, capability, resources and mandate of UNAMSIL [required] appropriate strengthening’; ● Expressed its intention to strengthen the mandate with the following priority tasks: (a) to maintain the security of the Lungi and Freetown peninsulas and their major approach routes; (b) to deter and decisively counter the threat of RUF attacks by responding robustly to any hostile actions or threat of imminent and direct use of force; (c) to deploy progressively in a coherent operational structure and in sufficient numbers and density at key strategic locations and main population centres and to assist the government’s efforts to extend state authority, restore law and order and further stabilise the situation progressively, and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under threat of imminent physical violence; (d) to patrol actively on strategic lines of communication, to ensure freedom of movement and to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; (e) to assist in the promotion of the political process leading, inter alia, to a renewed disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme where possible; 163

● Considered that UNAMSIL should be reinforced through accelerated troop rotations, aviation and maritime assets, a strengthened force reserve, upgraded communications and specialist combat and logistic support assets; ● Recognised that the RUF offensive against UNAMSIL since May 2000 revealed serious inherent weaknesses in the mission’s structure, command and control and resources, as reflected in the assessment mission’s findings, welcomed the recommendations made on that basis and requested the Secretary-General to take urgent steps to implement them; ● Stressed that the successful achievement of the objectives of the mission would depend on the provision to UNAMSIL of fully equipped, complete units, with the required capabilities, effective command and control structure and capacity, a single chain of command, adequate resources and the commitment to implement the mandate of the mission in full. Resolution 1313 (2000) explicitly recognised the serious weaknesses of UNAMSIL and detailed the areas where quick progress had to be made. It expressed the willingness to see a more robust military response to attacks from restive parties. The order of priorities was clear: restoring security and promoting a political process to resume the DDR programme. On 22 December 2000, Security Council resolution 1334 took note of the new ceasefire agreement signed in Abuja on 10 November 2000 and recalled UNAMSIL’s objectives. The Council highlighted the need to improve the mission through the ‘appropriate strengthening of the structure, capability, resources and mandate’.7 Another resolution was approved on 13 March 2001 (1346), which increased UNAMSIL’s military strength to 17,500 personnel, welcomed a new concept of operations and called for a lasting settlement of the crisis in the Mano River Union. UNAMSIL’s authorised military strength actually grew almost threefold in 15 months. In 2001, it had become the largest peacekeeping operation worldwide.

3. Beyond military measures in 2000-2001: Resolutions on arms, diamonds and a Special Court

The arms embargo proved ineffective in stopping hostilities, which continued despite the Lomé Agreement. After the attacks on UNAMSIL and the refusal of RUF and AFRC rebels to disarm in May 2000, the Council re-examined the context that allowed the parties, especially the RUF, to pursue the military option. Anecdotal evidence showed that control of the diamond fields, mainly in the Kono district, was the source of money for the purchase of weapons and other rebels’ expenditures. The Council voted resolution 1306 on 5 July 2000 to tackle ‘conflict diamonds’ and strengthen the ban on arms exports. Adopted under Chapter VII, the long resolution contained two parts. In part A, the Council: 7

United Nations Security Council resolution 1334 of 22 December 2000. 164

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● Expressed its concern at the role played by the illicit trade in diamonds in fuelling the conflict, and at reports that such diamonds transited neighbouring countries, including Liberia; ● Welcomed ongoing efforts by interested states, the International Diamond Manufacturers Association, and other representatives of the industry and non-governmental experts to improve the transparency of the international diamond trade, and encouraged further action; ● Decided that all states should take the necessary measures to prohibit the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to their territory; ● Requested the Government of Sierra Leone to ensure, as a matter of urgency, that an effective Certificate of Origin regime for trade in diamonds was in operation in Sierra Leone; ● Decided that such measures be established for 18 months, after which it would review the situation, including the extent of the government’s authority over the diamond-producing areas, to decide whether to extend or modify them or adopt further measures; ● Requested the Sanctions Committee8 to hold an exploratory hearing in New York to assess the role of diamonds in the Sierra Leone conflict and to report on the hearing to the Council. In Part B, resolution 1306: ● Reminded states of their obligation under resolution 1171 (1998), called on them to enact legislation making it a criminal offence to act in violation of measures contained in that resolution and to report to the Committee on implementation no later than 31 July 2000;9 ● Urged all states, relevant UN bodies and others to report to the Sanctions Committee information on possible violations of the measures imposed by the Council; ● Requested the Secretary-General to establish a panel of experts, of no more than five members, to collect information on possible violations and the link between trade in diamonds and in arms; to consider the adequacy of air traffic control systems; to participate in the requested hearing; and to report with recommendations on the implementation of the measures imposed by resolutions 1171 (1998) and 1306 (2000) no later than 31 October 2000. The Council also addressed the issue of impunity by backing the establishment of an independent Special Court to deal with those responsible for atrocities committed in the course of the conflict. On 14 August 2000, resolution 1315: 8

The Sanctions Committee on Sierra Leone had been established by resolution 1132 of 8 October 1997 in reaction to the AFRC coup, which overthrew President Kabbah’ government. See section I, above. 9 Resolution 1171 of 5 June 1998 had prohibited the sale and supply of arms and related material to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone. 165

● Recalled the United Nations’ understanding that the amnesty provisions of the Lomé Agreement should not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law; ● Recognised the desire of the government for assistance from the UN in establishing a strong and credible court that would meet the objectives of bringing justice and ensuring lasting peace; ● Requested the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent Special Court; ● Recommended that the jurisdiction of the Special Court include crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, as well as crimes under relevant Sierra Leonean law committed within the territory of Sierra Leone; ● Recommended that the Special Court have personal jurisdiction over persons who bore the greatest responsibility for the commission of those crimes, ‘including those leaders who […] [had] threatened the establishment and implementation of the peace process’; ● Requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution, in particular his negotiations with the Government of Sierra Leone on the establishment of the Special Court, and his recommendations, no later than 30 days from the date of the resolution. In early 2001, the Security Council discussed the first report of the Panel of Experts established by resolution 1306 (2000). On 7 March 2001 it adopted resolution 1343, unique in addressing the situation in Sierra Leone by taking measures against Charles Taylor’s government in Liberia. Based on the panel’s finding ‘that the bulk of RUF diamonds [left] Sierra Leone through Liberia, and that such illicit trade [could not] be conducted without the […] involvement of Liberian government officials at the highest levels’, the resolution expressed ‘deep concern at the unequivocal and overwhelming evidence’ that the Liberian government was ‘actively supporting the RUF at all levels’.The Council thus determined that Liberia’s support to armed rebellion in neighbouring countries was ‘a threat to international peace and security in the region’. Resolution 1343 (2001), inter alia: ● Demanded that the Government of Liberia immediately cease its support for the RUF and for other armed rebel groups in the region, and expel all RUF members from Liberia; cease all direct or indirect import of Sierra Leone rough diamonds not controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime; freeze funds or assets for the benefit of the RUF; ground all Liberia-registered aircraft until it had updated its register and given the Council the updated information; ● Called on the President of Liberia to help ensure that the RUF would give UNAMSIL free access throughout Sierra Leone; release all abductees; enter their fighters in the DDR process; and return all weapons and other equipment seized from UNAMSIL; ● Demanded that all states in the region prevent armed individuals and groups from using their territory to commit attacks on neighbouring countries and contribute to further destabilise the situation, particularly on the borders between Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone; 166

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● Decided that all states should prevent the supply to Liberia of arms and related materiel; and the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Liberia; ● Decided also that all states should prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of senior members of the Government of Liberia and its armed forces and their spouses and any other individuals providing financial and military support to armed rebel groups in countries neighbouring Liberia, in particular the RUF, as designated by the Sanctions Committee; ● Requested the Secretary-General to submit biannual reports, drawing from all relevant sources, on Liberia’s compliance with the resolution. A Sanctions Committee and a Panel of Experts were created by resolution 1343 (2001) to monitor compliance with the Council’s demands, identify the individuals to be targeted by the travel ban and asset freeze and provide updated information. Resolutions 1306 (2000) and 1343 (2001) banned arms and diamonds sales to Sierra Leone and Liberia and put them under the scrutiny of the Sanctions Committees. President Taylor’s government was the main source of destabilisation in the region. On 19 December 2001, by resolution 1385, the Council extended the ban on uncertified rough diamonds.

4. Completing disarmament and organising elections: Security Council resolutions since 2002

The mandate later moved to the DDR programme and the assistance for the organisation of elections and for the rebuilding of a viable security sector. On 16 January 2002, Security Council resolution 1389 defined UNAMSIL’s supporting role in the organisation of elections. The Council, inter alia: ● Decided that UNAMSIL should undertake election-related tasks, including: (a) assisting with logistic support to the National Electoral Commission for the transport of electoral materials and personnel, including the use of the air assets of UNAMSIL, storage and distribution of election materials prior to the elections, movement of ballot papers after the elections, logistic assistance to international election observers, and the use of UNAMSIL’s civilian communications facilities; (b) facilitating the free movement of people, goods and humanitarian assistance; (c) providing wider security and deterrence in the period of electoral preparations, polling and immediately after the announcement of electoral results, and, exceptionally, responding to public disorder, with the Sierra Leone police taking the lead; ● Reiterated that UNAMSIL may take the necessary action to ‘afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’; ● Authorised the increase in the United Nations civilian police and endorsed the recommendation that it perform the following tasks: (a) advise and support the Sierra Leone 167

police; (b) assist them with an electoral training programme for their personnel, focused on establishing security for public events, human rights and police conduct; ● Welcomed the interim establishment of an electoral component in UNAMSIL to strengthen the coordination of electoral activities between all stakeholders; ● Underlined the government’s and the National Electoral Commission’s responsibility to hold free and fair elections, and encouraged generous international support and assistance. On 28 March 2002, Security Council resolution 1400 welcomed the formal completion of disarmament while raising concern at the financial shortfall of the programme; welcomed agreement on the Special Court; expressed concern at continuing human rights abuses and allegations of sexual abuse by UN personnel; emphasised that the development of the government’s administrative capacities was essential to the holding of free and fair elections; and urged the government, with the assistance of UNAMSIL, to accelerate the restoration of civil authority and public services throughout the country, in particular in the diamond-mining areas, including on border security tasks. Further resolutions focused on UNAMSIL’s exit strategy, defining benchmarks for drawdown and withdrawal, to be completed in December 2005.

III. Implementation of Security Council resolutions

1. UNAMSIL and the provision of a stable and secure environment

Initial challenges for UNAMSIL: Deployment and security from November 1999 to May 2000 UNAMSIL’s priority was to provide a secure environment for the implementation of the Lomé Agreement and to help build the confidence needed to launch the sensitive disarmament process after several years of conflict. The UN force was also requested to ‘afford protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence within its capabilities and areas of deployment’, including by taking ‘all measures’. To organise a smooth transition from ECOMOG, a fighting regional force controlled by one country (Nigeria) that had borne a high cost for its engagement in terms of human lives and financial resources,

10

Nigerian heavy and costly military involvement in Liberia and Sierra Leone to prevent the rebellions of Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh, respectively, from taking power was a decision made by military rulers who had no public opinion to care about. The democratic election of Olusegun Obasanjo in December 1999 would change the internal politics and prompt the Nigerian decision to withdraw from Sierra Leone in the context of ECOMOG. 168

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to a UN force expected to be neutral, was a major challenge.10 The modalities of Nigeria’s incorporation in UNAMSIL had to be dealt with astutely to avoid a confusion in the roles and objectives that distinguished one force from the other, while allowing UNAMSIL to benefit from the West Africans’ deeper knowledge of country and actors. Competition for the force commander position, between the new troop-contributors to UNAMSIL (India being the largest) and the Nigerians who were to join the UN force and continue to play a key role in it, was another delicate issue. A condition for UNAMSIL’s success in launching the DDR process was the quick deployment of military and civilian staff in a country where large areas were under the control of RUF/AFRC rebels or pro-government Civilian Defence Forces (CDF), while the official army was weak and disorganised. UNAMSIL would deploy in potentially hostile areas where armed groups had been exploiting resources, especially diamonds, and terrorising civilians. Furthermore, disarmament depended to a large extent on the encouragement of RUF leader Sankoh, who had a record of unstable decisions and failed commitments. The Secretary-General’s first report on UNAMSIL (6 December 1999) noted as positive developments the president’s announcement that a Government of National Unity had been established with eight members of the RUF/AFRC, the appointment of RUF leader Sankoh as Chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development and of AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma as Chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, and the provisional registration of the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP), which was meant to reflect the RUF’s renunciation of armed rebellion and transformation into a political party. But the report also observed that the security situation had deteriorated in October and November as a result of increasing ‘ceasefire violations and human rights abuses by rebel elements’.11 The launch of the DDR programme on 20 October 1999 had met with a ‘poor response’ from excombatants. As of 2 December, those registered at the DDR sites totalled 4,217 out of an estimated total of 45,000 fighters (male fighters from RUF, AFRC, ex-Sierra Leonean army and CDF).12 Some RUF commanders publicly opposed the disarmament of troops under their command. That was the case of Sam Bockarie, in the eastern strongholds of the RUF, who said they ‘[would] not disarm unless Nigerian ECOMOG troops [withdrew]’ and vowed to ‘resist any attempts at forced disarmament’ by UN troops.13 Despite Sankoh’s public appeals, doubts remained about his commitment. The report observed an ‘escalation of attacks on civilians by former rebel elements in the areas west of the Occra Hills, along the Lungi-Port road, as well as around Kabala and in parts of Koinadugu’, which ‘frequently [involved] rape, abduction and harassment, in addition to looting and destruction of property’. Deployment was in its early stages in December 1999. The first contingent from Kenya had arrived on 29 November, as preparations for the deployment of Indian contingents were underway. The Secretary-General had appointed his Special Representative14 and the force commander.15 The first 11

First Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/1999/1223, 6 December 1999. There was no gender disaggregated data in the DDR figures and girls and women directly or indirectly involved in the fighting groups had been excluded from the official DDR programme. See section V of the present report. 13 Ibid. 12

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report on UNAMSIL noted that ‘while the United Nations [expedited] the deployment of its troops […] ECOMOG [was] expected to continue to play a critical role in providing security’. The Nigerian decision to withdraw would require a major change in UNAMSIL’s plans. On 23 December 1999, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that Nigeria had decided to repatriate its ECOMOG troops and recommended UNAMSIL’s expansion of its military component and mandate to take over the security functions thus far assumed by the West African force.The Nigerian decision was the result of a major change in the regional power’s political situation. Democratically elected president Olusegun Obasanjo had replaced the military rulers who had committed troops to military operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone without being held accountable by their citizens. There was also some frustration in Nigerian circles over the arrival of the UN operation and the reluctance of non-African donors to take on more of the financial burden of ECOMOG.16 The second report on UNAMSIL, dated 11 January 2000, observed that the authorised strength was considered sufficient, together with ECOMOG’s presence, to assist the DDR programme and create an acceptable level of security.17 The Sierra Leonean army ‘which [had] yet to be restructured, retrained and equipped’ was unable to make a substantial contribution to national security. With ECOMOG leaving, the Secretary-General saw no alternative but to keep the process on track rather than expand UNAMSIL. He proposed a revision of resolution 1270 (1999) and a new concept of operations to allow UNAMSIL ‘through its military presence […] capabilities and posture […] to deter attempts to derail the peace process’.18 The report requested a force of 11,100 personnel, ‘including 12 infantry battalions, force and sector headquarters personnel, 2 military engineer companies, adequate medical personnel and facilities, communications and transport units, a helicopter and other military support elements’. It detailed the envisaged deployment in four sectors throughout the country including population centres, DDR activities and vital communication lines.19 Also mentioned was the need for robust rules of engagement (ROE) in light of the additional security tasks. The need for close coordination and deployment of UN battalions in synchrony with the repatriation of ECOMOG troops was also highlighted. The third report, released on 7 March 2000, noted lack of progress in disarmament in the north and east regions, continuing interference with humanitarian activities and UNAMSIL patrols, and harassment of the civilian population by rebels.20 Sankoh had made hostile public statements against UNAMSIL and violated the travel ban by travelling to Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa.21 Serious incidents against 14

Oluyemi Adeniji from Nigeria. Major-General Vijay Kumar Jetley from India. 16 See Funmi Olonisakin, ‘Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone, The Story of UNAMSIL’, Histories of UN Peace Operations, A Project of the International Peace Academy, 2008. 17 Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/13, 11 January 2000. 18 Ibid. 19 The four sectors were the Freetown peninsula, the Lungi/Port Loko area, the Makeni/Magburaka/Koidu area and the Bo/Kenema/Kailahun area. 15

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UNAMSIL had occurred. In one case, RUF rebels seized a large number of weapons, ammunition and vehicles from Guinean troops; in others, soldiers of the UNAMSIL Kenyan battalion were ambushed and had to surrender their weapons to ex-Sierra Leonean army combatants in the Occra Hills area, and to RUF elements near Makeni.22 In February, a convoy of Indian troops going from Kenema to Daru was stopped by well-armed RUF fighters and forced to return to Kenema.23 The report indicated that the Secretariat and the force commander had urged troop-contributing countries to ensure that troops be equipped in accordance with UN standards.24 As of 1 March 2000, UNAMSIL’s military personnel had reached 7,391 out of the authorised 11,100 ceiling. UNAMSIL had deployed in several important locations, but was opposed by RUF elements in the key regions of Koidu and Kailahun.The human rights situation remained dismal, despite some improvement in the UN areas of deployment. Elsewhere, looting of villages, house burnings, harassment and abduction of civilians, rape and sexual abuse continued, ‘mostly perpetrated by ex-Sierra Leone Army elements from the surrounding Occra Hills’.25 In its final observations, the report expressed concern at Sankoh’s often negative and confusing approach to key elements of the peace process and the UN role, and called on the RUF to return all weapons and equipment and to allow UNAMSIL free movement. One of the UN’s main priorities in Sierra Leone remained ‘the speedy establishment of a credible peacekeeping presence’.26 It was clearly not yet the case in March 2000. The culmination of UNAMSIL’s failed start: The May 2000 hostage crisis and early responses Political developments were generally positive in March and April 2000 before the major setback of early May. In a meeting of the National Commission on DDR held in March, all faction leaders, including Sankoh and Johnny Paul Koroma, had agreed to give UNAMSIL unhindered access to all parts of the country. The UN operation had been able to deploy to the RUF stronghold of Kailahun, but access remained blocked to Kono, where RUF fighters controlled diamond mining activities. At UN headquarters, the deployment of UNAMSIL was receiving special attention as demonstrated by the visit of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations from 19 to 21 March. The mobilisation of US$ 70 million in donor pledges at a conference held in London at the UK’s initiative was another positive development. In the last weeks of April, however, tensions re-emerged between UNAMSIL and RUF combatants around DDR reception centres, especially in the Makeni/Magburaka area.27

20

Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/186, 7 March 2000. The Sanctions Committee convened an emergency session on 18 February and urged Sankoh to return immediately to Sierra Leone. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 21

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Events took a turn for the worse on 1 May, when RUF fighters approached the DDR reception centre in Makeni demanding that UNAMSIL turn over disarmed ex-combatants and their weapons in order to punish them for having joined the DDR programme. The rebels detained three UNAMSIL military observers, destroyed part of the camp and looted the town. In Magburaka, RUF fighters tried to disarm UNAMSIL troops, provoking an exchange of fire throughout the day. A few soldiers of the Kenyan battalion were injured. RUF destroyed DDR facilities in both locations, where attacks on the Kenyan peacekeepers continued. Incidents multiplied in all places where RUF fighters were in contact with UNAMSIL.28 As immediate measures were taken by the force commander, a Zambian battalion moving from Lungi to Makeni was ambushed by the RUF in one of the most humiliating episodes for UNAMSIL: ‘[s]ome 400 UN troops were believed to have fallen into the hands of RUF, which reportedly had moved 200 of them to its stronghold in the Kono district.’29 Clashes continued in the north and west involving not only RUF and UNAMSIL but also government forces (SLA) and the CDF. Rumours abounded, including reports of fighters infiltrating Sierra Leone from neighbouring countries. UNAMSIL headquarters in Freetown had serious difficulties to gather reliable information, increasing the feeling of total disruption in the UN mission.30 On 15 May 2000, 139 detainees from the Zambian battalion were taken to the Liberian border and 15 of them moved to Monrovia in Liberia. The Secretary-General’s report commended the ‘personal involvement of President Taylor’ resulting in the peacekeepers’ release.31 On 15 May there were still 352 UNAMSIL personnel in RUF hands, including 297 from Zambia, 29 from Kenya, 23 from India, and three military observers. Twenty-five peacekeepers had been wounded and 15 had gone missing. The arrival of UK troops at the Lungi airport and of a substantial British naval presence offshore was a major turning point in this chain of events. As noted in the 19 May 2000 report, though the claimed objective of the UK intervention was the evacuation of its nationals and other foreigners, it ‘boosted the confidence of the Sierra Leoneans and enabled UNAMSIL to redeploy much-needed troops to areas east of Freetown’.32 UNAMSIL was reinforced by the arrival of 300 ‘well-trained and wellequipped troops’ from Jordan. That mention in the report seemed to indicate that good training and equipment was not the norm for some of the peacekeepers that had already been deployed. Additional Indian troops were also sent to UNAMSIL. As of 19 May 2000, there were 9,495 military personnel in total, the largest contributors being Nigeria (3,235), India (1,676), Jordan (1,136), and Kenya (882). Sankoh became the centre of diplomatic attention. Before being engaged by envoys of the heads of state of Liberia, Libya, Mali, and Nigeria, as well as the Secretary-General’s Special Representative (SRSG), he had refrained from ordering his troops to stop attacks on UNAMSIL and release detained peacekeepers. On 8 May, thousands of people demonstrated against the RUF near Sankoh’s house in 27

Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/455, 19 May 2000. Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Olonisakin, op.cit. 31 Fourth Report of the Secretary-General, op.cit. 32 Ibid. 28

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Freetown.The protest degenerated into an exchange of fire, and Sankoh fled to go into hiding, but was apprehended by pro-government elements. ECOWAS strongly condemned attacks on UNAMSIL and demanded Charles Taylor personally to ensure the release of detainees and the resumption of the peace process.33 The Secretary-General recommended the adoption of immediate measures to put more political pressure on the RUF with ‘strong military posture’. The number of troops was brought to 13,000, allowing UNAMSIL to defend its positions at Lungi airport, in the Freetown peninsula and other strategic locations in the west and south of the country. UNAMSIL needed the capacity to deploy ‘in sufficient numbers and backed up by adequate military means to deter attacks and, if necessary, respond decisively to any hostile action or intent’.34 The mandate defined by resolution 1289 (2000) and its robust rules of engagement were sufficient for UNAMSIL ‘to use force, including deadly force; in self-defence against any hostile act or intent’. The May 2000 report on UNAMSIL acknowledged the mission’s grave problems. In its final observations it said: ‘it is obvious that the United Nations will have to draw lessons from its experiences in Sierra Leone.The Force, […] designed, equipped and deployed as a peacekeeping force, was quickly forced into actual combat with one of the parties.’ It added that ‘many problems emerged within the mission, including with regard to command and control, cohesiveness, […] flow of information, equipment and preparedness […] and coordination between and within the various components’.The Secretariat was ‘taking urgent steps to assess these problems and to address recognised shortfalls, in close coordination with the troop-contributing countries’.35 The May 2000 crisis: Security Council debates and responses The Council was aware of developments in Sierra Leone and UNAMSIL’s unsatisfactory reaction to the incidents.These issues were raised on 13 March 2000, when the Council discussed the third report on UNAMSIL.The members of the Council were unanimous in condemning the RUF and Sankoh, and supportive of a strong UNAMSIL presence. The Ambassador of the United Kingdom, who had just visited Sierra Leone, stated that he had not got the commitment to peace from the main factional leaders, particularly RUF leader Foday Sankoh, and added that the Council’s authority was being thwarted. UNAMSIL, he added, had not got off to a successful start.36 People had come to believe that the UN was responsible for the withdrawal of ECOMOG, whom they trusted to protect them, to replace it with ill-equipped and poorly motivated UN contingents. He stressed that UNAMSIL had to be brought to full strength, in quality and in quantity.37

33

Ibid. Ibid. 35 Ibid., para. 105. 36 ‘Security Council stresses need for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone’, Security Council Press Release, SC/6821, 13 March 2000. 37 Ibid. 34

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The Ambassador of China at the UN observed that the performance of the RUF, and Sankoh in particular, had become the major roadblock to the peace process.38 The US Ambassador called the failure of the RUF leader to live up to his promises ‘disquieting’, said the UN operation was ‘not fully up and running’, and that its expansion would take several months.39 The Canadian Ambassador stated that a robust troop commitment in support of a strong mandate was the best contribution the Council could make to individual security. Canada was concerned that, he continued, UNAMSIL’s ability to protect civilians might erode with future confrontations.40 The Ambassador of Bangladesh, then in the Council’s presidency, said that the Council should be prepared to take specific measures for Sankoh and the RUF. He also observed that UNAMSIL had no mandate to prevent illegal activities (meaning diamond mining in rebel-held areas) and the Council should examine that limitation in the future.41 The first official reaction of the Council to the RUF’s direct attack on UNAMSIL was a presidential statement issued on 4 May 2000. The Council, it said, ‘condemns in the strongest terms the armed attacks perpetrated by the RUF against the forces of the UNAMSIL, and their continued detention of a large number of United Nations and other international personnel’ and ‘expresses its outrage at the killing of a number of United Nations peacekeepers of the Kenyan battalion’. The Council, it added, ‘considers Mr Foday Sankoh, as leader of the RUF, to be responsible for these actions’ and ‘believes that he must be held accountable, together with the perpetrators, for their actions’.42 In a late-night session convened on 11 May 2000 at the request of the African Group, the Council held a vibrant debate about the appropriate response to the crisis in Sierra Leone. The SecretaryGeneral commended the Council’s sense of urgency in dealing with the crisis. He said: ‘It is vital that the world should not now abandon the people of Sierra Leone in their hour of greatest need’, and pleaded, ‘Let us not fail Sierra Leone. Let us not fail Africa. […] [L]et us back words with deeds, and mandates with the resources needed to make them work.’43 His request was to reinforce UNAMSIL troops ‘so they [could] defend themselves and their mandate effectively’. He highlighted the UK’s ‘invaluable contribution in securing the airport’, and, in response to West African leaders who had called for a revision of the mandate to give UNAMSIL a clear enforcement role, he insisted that the first priority was to ensure the mission’s capacity to carry out the tasks implied by the existing mandate. The UK representative at the meeting commended India, Bangladesh and Jordan for expediting the deployment of their battalions. The mandate was sufficient to use force in self-defence and where possible in defence of the civilian population; and changing UNAMSIL’s mandate would not itself 38

Ibid. Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 ‘Security Council, in presidential statement, condemns actions of RUF in Sierra Leone, says Foday Sankoh must be held accountable’, Security Council Press Release, SC/6852, 4 May 2000. 43 ‘Secretary-General pleads with Council not to fail people of Sierra Leone, Africa’, Security Council Press Release, SC/6857, 11 May 2000. 39

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change it into an effective peace enforcement mission, he said.44 The Canadian Ambassador noted that UNAMSIL’s troops were ‘low in equipment’ and stressed the need to respect the principle of unity of command. He noted that the threat of sliding back into civil war in Sierra Leone demonstrated ‘the need for a rapidly improved capacity for the United Nations rapid reaction’ and encouraged member states to improve the UN in ‘military planning, headquarters oversight, access to reliable field-level intelligence, effective communications and longer-term contingency planning’.45 The US representative informed of his country’s diplomatic action in Sierra Leone, particularly the visit of President Clinton’s Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights, Reverend Jesse Jackson, to work with the West African leaders on a solution to the crisis. The US would assist the deployment of additional troops for UNAMSIL and considered providing equipment support. The representative of the Netherlands mentioned the ‘dangerous message’ conveyed by the amnesty blanket of the Lomé Agreement. He recalled that he had proposed ‘the inclusion of a reference to such concerns in the relevant resolutions but was prevailed upon not to insist because any mention of accountability would prolong the war’.The Council had to wonder to what extent that had contributed to Sankoh’s behaviour, he continued.46 France and Norway for their part asked the Council ‘to act decisively’ to prevent the illegal trade in diamonds that fuelled the war. The Ambassador of Bangladesh, an important troop-contributor for UNAMSIL, said that the battalion promised by his government would be ready for airlifting by 20 May. His words on UNAMSIL’s failures were interesting, saying that concerns had been voiced and that UN peacekeeping was dysfunctional because the troops the United Nations deployed — troops mostly from developing countries — were often ill-equipped, ill-trained and ill-prepared. He added that if developing countries would stop responding to the frantic calls of the United Nations that day, there would be no peacekeeping the next, barring a few choicest areas in the world of strategic interest to major powers. Blaming the failure on the peacekeepers was the easy way out of meeting the organisation’s collective responsibility.47 The Indian representative urged the Council ‘not to consider withdrawing as an option’. India had no intention of withdrawing its troops and was sending a second battalion urgently. Responding to those who believed that the UN could not do what needed to be done and that ‘force should be used by others with the blessings of the Security Council’, he warned strongly against this, recalling Somalia and ‘the dangers inherent in forces outside United Nations command taking military action in a theatre where peacekeepers are deployed’. ‘We must stay there for two reasons’, he added, ‘First, because to leave now would be to abandon the people of Sierra Leone to a terrible fate, and second, because the credibility of the United Nations is at stake.’48 The Ambassador of Pakistan asked the Secretariat ‘to assess what went wrong in the planning and deployment of peacekeepers in Sierra Leone, including the configuration of the force’.49 44

Ibid. Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 45

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A week after the emergency debate, the Council approved resolution 1299 (2000) expanding UNAMSIL’s military component to 13,000 personnel. The situation in Sierra Leone remained high on the Council’s agenda in the following months. On 21 June 2000, the Council held a private meeting with a delegation of the ECOWAS Mediation Committee on Sierra Leone (Mali, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria,Togo, and Guinea).The Council informed ECOWAS of ongoing discussions on the strengthening of UNAMSIL, the control of diamond exports and arms imports, and the provision of justice. The recovery of UNAMSIL from mid-2000 to 2001 The security situation remained highly volatile in the three months following May 2000. While the Freetown and Lungi peninsulas were relatively stable, incidents multiplied in other parts of the country. RUF ambushed UNAMSIL troops, who responded more robustly than in previous events. UNAMSIL launched military operations to ensure the security of its personnel and restore their freedom of movement, as was the case on 15 July, when troops from four contingents attacked a position in Kailahun where the RUF had refused to free peacekeepers. Most of those held hostage had, however, been released via Liberia as the result of the diplomatic pressure on Charles Taylor. In his fifth report on UNAMSIL, of 31 July 2000, the Secretary-General detailed measures taken to redress the serious weaknesses exposed by the attacks on peacekeepers. A high-level assessment team, led by a former Assistant Secretary-General in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), had reviewed UNAMSIL’s operations and made recommendations.50 The team found ‘serious lack of cohesion within the Mission’ and ‘no commonly shared understanding of the mandate and rules of engagement’. Some contingents were insufficiently prepared to deal with the difficult environment and logistic challenges on the ground, and serious problems related to internal communication and coordination between the civilian and military components and within each component (owing in part to a lack of communications equipment). Also noted was a lack of integrated planning and logistic support, and insufficient coordination and sharing of information with UN and other agencies and with diplomatic missions. Some military units showed a lack of training and others had serious shortfalls in equipment. Military support units were lacking despite attempts to find member states willing to make such units available.51 Detailed recommendations to improve the operational effectiveness of UNAMSIL were given to various units in UNAMSIL and at headquarters for immediate follow-up. According to the assessment team, an important cause of the problems of UNAMSIL was ‘the fast growth of the Mission from a small team of military observers to a large multi-disciplinary peacekeeping operation with complex organisational and logistical requirements’. The report was confident in the implementation of corrective measures.The mission’s military headquarters established a joint operation cell with officers from all contingents, and mixed civilian-military coordination mechanisms, including on logistic support. Progress was made in meetings between the Secretariat and troop-contributors to address issues of command and control and shortfalls in equipment. Similar meetings were held in the field between 50 51

Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/751, 31 July 2000. Ibid. 176

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the leadership of the mission and contingent commanders to discuss the mandate, explain the rules of engagement and improve internal communication. An internal ROE training programme was underway.52 At the end of July 2000, the military strength of UNAMSIL had reached 12,440 personnel, close to the maximum of 13,000 authorised by the Council on 5 July. This reinforcement and the other measures clearly made a difference in discouraging the RUF from prolonging hostilities. After the adoption of resolution 1313 of 4 August 2000, which ‘[admitted] UNAMSIL’s weaknesses’ and outlined UNAMSIL’s future priority tasks, the Secretary-General made new recommendations. In his sixth report on UNAMSIL he recommended a further increase to 20,500 military personnel, while maintaining the mandate based on resolutions 1270 (1999) and 1289 (2000) and robust rules of engagement.53 He made reference to the recently issued report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations — known as the Brahimi Report — in order to defend the Sierra Leone case: In a sense, the course taken by the Security Council, Member States and the Secretariat with regard to the situation in Sierra Leone represents an important first test of our joint responsibility to implement the practical recommendations made by the Panel, with a view to making the United Nations truly credible as a force for peace.54 The Security Council visited Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, and Nigeria from 7 to 14 October 2000. Headed by the Ambassador of the United Kingdom, the 11-member mission focused on UNAMSIL restructuring efforts, security developments, prospects for elections, arms and diamonds, and the regional dimension of the crisis, especially the attacks on Guinea.The mission met with various national interlocutors, including civil society organisations (and women’s organisations). The mission ‘noted that different contingents had different perceptions of the mandate and tasks of UNAMSIL’.55 It confirmed that considerable progress had been made in implementing the measures recommended, but mentioned significant shortcomings in the coordination of logistics and the equipment of contingents, issues which it said ‘[required] action by United Nations headquarters and the troop contributors themselves’.56 The Council’s report also dealt with the RUF after the replacement of Foday Sankoh by Issa Sesay, as well as with Charles Taylor’s role. Most interlocutors of the Council’s mission, ‘including those at most senior levels, had no doubt that President Taylor exercised strong influence, even direct control over RUF’. Presidents Conté of Guinea and Obasanjo of Nigeria identified the Liberian president as the most difficult factor in the region.57 Taylor, who had also met the Council mission, denied all accusations. The mission concluded that ‘the complexity of problems in Sierra Leone and its neighbours […] [required] extraordinary action’; and made recommendations on the peace process, military aspects, 52

Ibid. Sixth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/832, 24 August 2000. 54 Ibid. 55 Report of the Security Council mission to Sierra Leone, S/2000/992, 16 October 2000. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 53

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the regional dimension, the DDR programme, human rights and humanitarian assistance, and the role of the Government of Sierra Leone.58 It insisted on the need for an UN-based process for overall strategic coordination that would include Council members, the Secretariat, ECOWAS, troopcontributing countries to UNAMSIL, and the Government of Sierra Leone. On 3 November 2000 the Council issued a presidential statement condemning ‘the continued crossborder attacks along the border area of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone’, supporting the coordination strategy advocated by its mission in the region and the Secretary-General’s appeal to member states to participate in UNAMSIL.59 Renewed contact between the Sierra Leonean government, UNAMSIL, ECOWAS and the RUF on 10 November in Abuja, Nigeria, led to a ceasefire agreement with UNAMSIL monitoring, and promised freedom of movement for the UN throughout the country, as well as return of UNAMSIL seized weapons and the immediate resumption of the DDR programme. Despite early conflicting signals from the RUF leaders, the ceasefire held up, except along the Guinean border, where fighting resulted in heavy civilian casualties in south-western Guinea. Accusing the RUF and the Liberian government, Guinean forces shelled RUF positions in the Sierra Leone territory. UNAMSIL experienced important leadership changes with the arrival in November 2000 of a new force commander,60 a new deputy force commander,61 and a new chief of staff.62 British troops, in bilateral cooperation with the government, intensified training and provision of equipment to the Sierra Leonean army, which was taking over security responsibilities in some areas in coordination with UNAMSIL. In his eighth report on the mission, the Secretary-General recalled his recommendation of an increase of UNAMSIL’s strength to 20,500 troops.63 On 30 March 2001, through resolution 1346, the Council authorised an increase to 17,500 personnel. The Council intensified its pressure on RUF supporters in the region in early 2001 on the basis of findings of the UN Panel of Experts, established by resolution 1306 (2000). The Panel’s report confirmed that mining and trade of diamonds was ‘a major and primary source of income for the RUF […] more than enough to sustain its military activities’.The estimated value of RUF diamonds was ‘from as little as $25 million per annum to as much as $125 million’. Liberia was the main venue for the exports of rough diamonds by the RUF. In the absence of a global certification system, the Panel recommended that such systems be required of all diamond-exporting countries in West Africa with immediate reference to Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire.64 It proposed ‘a complete embargo on all diamonds from Liberia’ until it demonstrated that it was no longer involved in trafficking.65 58

Ibid. ‘Security Council condemns continued cross-border attacks along border area of Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia’, Security Council Press Release, SC/6946, 3 November 2000. 60 Lieutenant General Daniel Opande of Kenya. 61 Major General Martin Agwai of Nigeria. 62 Brigadier General Alastair Duncan from the United Kingdom. 63 Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/1199, 15 December 2000. 64 Report of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), para. 19, in relation to Sierra Leone, S/2000/1195, 20 December 2000. 65 Ibid. 59

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The Panel ‘was struck by the widespread breaking of Security Council sanctions on both weapons and diamonds’ and found ‘unequivocal and overwhelming evidence’ of Liberia’s active support for the RUF.66 Burkina Faso was identified as a transit point for arms shipments for use in Sierra Leone. The Panel mentioned the role of aircraft in the RUF’s supply chain and gave examples of arms deliveries from Eastern Europe to Liberia with the involvement of businessmen associated to Charles Taylor. During the day-long discussion of the Panel’s findings, 26 speakers took the floor.The UK representative said that there should be ‘no sanctuary for sanctions busters’ and that President Taylor had been callously prolonging conflict for personal gain, his recent overtures being ‘too little too late’.67 The US representative shared that stance and co-sponsored with the UK a draft resolution to impose fresh sanctions on Liberia. On 7 March 2001, the Council adopted the sanctions targeted at Taylor’s government under resolution 1343.68

2. UNAMSIL’s role in the DDR programme and the organisation of elections

The revival of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme It took approximately a year after the May 2000 crisis to restart the key DDR programme. After the Abuja agreement, the new military leadership of UNAMSIL and the SRSG focused on initiating communications with the RUF to convince them to allow UNAMSIL’s full deployment in the areas they still controlled and lay down their weapons.The replacement of Foday Sankoh — then in custody — by Issa Sesay, the military presence of a restructured UNAMSIL and the newly trained Sierra Leonean army soldiers backed by the British task force discouraged the RUF from pursuing an alternative to disarmament.69 A factor usually neglected in the literature on the conflict was the military pressure exerted by Guinea.70 The latter’s decisive response to attacks on its territory from Liberia and Sierra Leone closed the RUF option of using the Guinean forest as a haven. On 2 May 2001, a meeting in Abuja, led to the pro-government CDF’s decision to disarm simultaneously, starting in the Kambia district, where fighting between RUF and the Guinean army was continuous. Known as ‘the Kambia Formula’, this decision was ‘the crucial step which accelerated the peace process in post-May 2000’, in the words of the SRSG. Besides enabling fast implementation of the DDR issue, he said, it resolved regional difficulties linked to Guinea’s attitude.71 66

Ibid. ‘Security Council takes up report on diamonds, arms in Sierra Leone; Expert Panel says Council sanctions broken with impunity’, Security Council Press Release, SC/6997, 25 January 2001. 68 See more details on resolution 1343 (2001) in section II.3 above. 69 FRIDE interviews with former members of Kabbah’s government, Freetown, November 2008. 70 FRIDE interviews with former members of government and academics, Freetown, November 2008. 71 Oluyemi Adeniji, ‘End of assignment report of Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone’, quoted in Olonisakin, op. cit. 67

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The tenth report on UNAMSIL (25 June 2001) noted that disarmament of RUF and CDF in Kambia and Port Loko concluded on schedule, and the Sierra Leonean army completed its deployment in the Kambia district on 31 May. RUF had released 591 child combatants on 25 May and 178 on 4 June. Clashes between CDF and RUF in the Kono district ceased after discussions between UNAMSIL and the local commanders of both groups.72 The reintegration aspect of the DDR programme, however, caused some concern. The report reads: There are still critical gaps in the reintegration programme, including the absence of a bridge between demobilisation and reintegration, a shortage of resources for assistance beyond the short-term reintegration period, a lack of coordination with the military reintegration plan and weak linkages with parallel and bilaterally funded programmes in community reintegration.73 Disarmament progressed swiftly throughout the country.The number of demobilised combatants had reached 36,741 in December 2001, with 13,500 collected weapons and 2.8 million pieces of ammunition.74 On 17 January 2002, the Joint Committee on DDR declared the end of the process and announced the final figures: between May 2001 and January 2002, 47,076 combatants were disarmed, and 15,840 weapons and 2 million rounds of ammunition were collected. In two previous phases of disarmament, 11,824 weapons had been collected and mostly destroyed by UNAMSIL.75 As of March 2002, all disarmed combatants had received their initial reinsertion payment and 17,951 had been absorbed in various short-term reintegration projects. But the funding shortfall for the reintegration programme, estimated at US$ 13.48 million for the year 2002, was a major problem.76 The UNAMSIL-supported May 2002 parliamentary and presidential elections UNAMSIL was asked to support the organisation of elections at the end of the president’s mandate in 2001. Due to the delays in the DDR process, the restoration of state authority and the peace process more generally, Parliament gave the president two six-month extensions in order to prepare for credible and secure elections. RUF and other actors favoured the establishment of a transitional government of national unity, but these calls were rejected by the government and key international players. In late 2001, the NEC initiated voter registration. A National Consultative Conference endorsed the date of 14 May 2002 for parliamentary and presidential elections. The December 2001 report on UNAMSIL identified the operational and political challenges that should be addressed before holding the elections.77 The proposed UN role in the electoral process focused on technical and logistical assistance to the NEC, as well as on general security support. The Secretary-General requested more international staff for the electoral component of the mission and consultancy funds for specific tasks, including support to the international observers.78 UNAMSIL 72

Tenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2001/627, 25 June 2001. Ibid. 74 Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2002/267, 14 March 2002. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid. 77 Twelfth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2001/1195, 13 December 2001. 73

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would provide security during the electoral process through a realignment of its military deployment based on the electoral districts, robust patrolling and ‘exceptionally’ through interventions ‘to respond to situations of public disorder, with the Sierra Leone police taking the lead’.79 The UN civilian police would give advice and support to the 6,500-strong national police through electoral training. An additional 30 officers would bring the civilian police component to a total of 90. Additional logistical means and public information resources were also envisaged. Radio UNAMSIL would disseminate voter education in local languages and provide ‘a level playing field in the media for the candidates’.80 Interestingly, the report contained a section entitled ‘Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Mission’, in line with those that followed the 2000 crisis. Measures to improve the operational effectiveness of UNAMSIL included training and briefing on health, human rights, gender, child protection, rules of engagement and mandate; review of the self-sustainment and wet-lease arrangements with troopcontributing countries; early identification of equipment deficiencies; appointment of a second Deputy Special Representative with responsibilities for governance and stabilisation, who was also the Humanitarian Coordinator and Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).81 At the end of 2001, there were 17,354 troops on the ground, almost the number of 17,500 authorised by the Council. Security Council support to the revamped UNAMSIL The Council maintained its support for UNAMSIL throughout 2001 and before the May 2002 elections. On 28 June 2001, it expressed satisfaction at progress achieved in disarmament and in the wider political process. The UK Ambassador insisted on the ‘need to maintain momentum’ and called on donors to commit more resources to DDR, saying that his country had contributed significantly and it was time the burden was shared more widely.82 He called for the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court as ‘equally important elements of the reconciliation process’.83 Countries like China and Norway pledged financial support for the Special Court. The US representative expressed satisfaction at the reversal of the situation, saying that UNAMSIL was now achieving the results the Council wanted and that it was ‘a genuine success’.84 He was less encouraged by lack of progress on the Special Court, saying that the Council had decided that it wanted those most responsible for war crimes — the ringleaders — to be held accountable, and that the United States urged all to join in contributing to the court so it could be brought into being. The process should begin with the trial of Foday Sankoh.85

78

Ibid. Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 ‘Council, briefed by Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Sierra Leone, considers recent signs of progress in peace process’, Security Council Press Release, SC/7087, 28 June 2001. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 79

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On 16 January 2002, the Council discussed the Secretary-General’s report on the mission’s role in the electoral process and further supported UNAMSIL. Resolution 1389 (2002) gave the mission wideranging tasks in the security area, as well as in logistical assistance to the NEC and approved the additional requested resources, including an increase of 30 officers to the UN civilian police.86 On 28 March 2002, the UN mission obtained an extension of its mandate until 30 September 2002 through resolution 1400. The Council was satisfied with the recent signature of the agreement on the establishment of the Special Court envisaged by resolution 1315 (2000).87 In a presidential statement of 22 May 2002, the Council welcomed the 14 May elections as ‘an important milestone on the road to peace and security in Sierra Leone and the Mano River region’.88 Very few security incidents were reported. UNAMSIL’s support had been key: 11,000 troops had been redeployed to some 200 high-risk areas; it had assisted the national police in deploying 4,400 police personnel and mobile armed units; and with the UN country team had given critical logistical support to the NEC and to national and international electoral observers.89 President Kabbah was reelected with 70.06 per cent of the vote; Ernest Koroma of the All People’s Congress got 22.35 per cent; and the former leader of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Johnny Paul Koroma, 3 per cent, while the RUF Party candidate achieved only 1.7 per cent of the votes.90 In his post-election report, the Secretary-General identified two factors as posing the greatest threat to stability.The first was the escalating conflict in Liberia, leading to incursions from the Liberian fighting parties into Sierra Leone. It entailed a ‘real risk that Liberia and Sierra Leone could be trapped in a vicious cycle, with civil war continuously swinging back and forth between the two countries’.91 He called on the international community to act quickly. The second factor was the challenge for the Sierra Leonean army and police to assume responsibility for the country’s security after UNAMSIL’s departure.The gradual drawdown of the mission ‘should be commensurate with the prevailing security conditions and the government’s capacity to match them’.92

86

See section II.4 above for details on resolution 1389 (2002). ‘Security Council extends UN mission in Sierra Leone until 30 September; urges restoration of civil authority, public services’, Security Council Press Release, SC/7344, 28 March 2002. 88 ‘In presidential statement, Security Council welcomes Sierra Leone elections, calls on political parties to strengthen democracy, assure peace’, Security Council Press Release, SC/7408, 22 May 2002. 89 Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2002/679, 19 June 2002. 90 President Kabbah was sworn in on 19 May, and announced on 21 May a new Cabinet, which consisted only of persons affiliated with his party. The presidential party, the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) won 83 of the 124 parliamentary seats; the All People’s Congress won 27 seats, and Johnny Paul Koroma’s Peace and Liberation Party won 2 seats. The remaining 12 parliamentary seats were filled as prescribed by the Constitution: by representatives of paramount chiefs, who were elected on 10 June 2002. 91 Fourteenth Report of the Secretary-General, op.cit. 92 Ibid. 87

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IV. Exit strategy

1. The post-electoral security assessment and key benchmarks for drawdown plans

Elections are often seen as the end of a peace process and generally considered to open the way to a relatively quick departure of international forces. But UNAMSIL remained in Sierra Leone three and a half years after the elections. There was a real exit strategy in Sierra Leone, nurtured by the UN Secretariat and the Security Council in a dialogue undertaken to organise the mission’s disengagement while safeguarding what was seen as a rare success in UN peacekeeping. In his fifteenth report on UNAMSIL (5 September 2002), the Secretary-General assessed the threats to security and described the concept of UNAMSIL’s adjustment to the post-electoral situation. General security was improving as evidenced by freedom of movement, the revival of commercial activity and progress underway in resettling the displaced, except in the border areas.93 An immediate threat stemmed from the slow pace of reintegration: some 24,000 male ex-combatants were still awaiting reintegration opportunities and getting increasingly restless. Furthermore, the large number of unemployed youth (both male and female) in the urban centres was also a potential cause of instability.94 Security remained fragile in the diamond-mining areas where thuggish youth groups took advantage of the fragility of government control while state structures had began their progressive redeployment. The most serious threat to stability came from the armed strife which was raging in Liberia opposing Taylor’s loyalists to a rebel group. Liberian combatants often retreated to the border areas of Sierra Leone and Guinea.95 The Secretary-General noted that downsizing the mission while consolidating peace and addressing remaining challenges would require ‘careful assessment and balancing’.The mission’s adjustments should avoid creating a security vacuum. Progress in building the capacity of the Sierra Leonean police and army would be the key security benchmark. Other benchmarks to minimise the security challenges included the reintegration of former combatants, the consolidation of state authority and the restoration of government control over diamond-mining areas. Progress towards the resolution of Liberia’s conflict was also an important benchmark.96 The drawdown plan proposed to the Council was elaborated by UNAMSIL after consultations with the government and all significant partners on the ground. The envisaged downsizing of the military component was based on various security scenarios. The worst-case scenario could emerge if there 93

Fifteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2002/987, 5 September 2002. For a study of the link between youth unemployment and insecurity in West Africa, see ‘Youth unemployment and regional insecurity in West Africa’, United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), December 2005. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 94

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was ‘no satisfactory progress in building up the capacity of the army and police, and if the threat from Liberia [became] more critical’. It envisaged a drawdown process extending for a considerable period of time. The most likely scenario would entail a ‘drawdown over a period of approximately two years, with withdrawal largely completed by December 2004’ if sufficient investments were made in developing the Sierra Leone police and army capabilities.97 In the first phase, the Secretary-General proposed a reduction of 600 troops by the end of 2002. In the second, 4,000 would withdraw while the remaining 13,000 would be concentrated in key threat areas. Responsibility for the vacated areas would be taken over by government forces. In the third phase, UNAMSIL would pull back from the hinterland to the Freetown and Lungi peninsulas. Troop levels would fall to 5,000 by late 2004. In the final phase, 2,000 military personnel would stay on, their exit depending on the security situation. The civilian police would increase from 60 to 185 personnel to provide assistance to the national police in recruitment, training of trainers, planning and deployment plans.98

2. Security Council support to the gradual and careful drawdown of UNAMSIL

The Security Council agreed to the drawdown plan with only a few adjustments. Resolution 1436 of 24 September 2002 ‘[urged] UNAMSIL […] to complete phases 1 and 2 of the Secretary-General’s plan, including a reduction of 4,500 troops within eight months […] and [requested] the SecretaryGeneral to report to the Council at the end of each phase, […] and to make any necessary recommendations’.99 The resolution supported the deployment of up to 170 civilian police in UNAMSIL.100 The authorised increase fell short of the 185 that was requested by the SecretaryGeneral, but was nevertheless a significant boost. In his report of 17 March 2003, the Secretary-General observed that ‘developments over recent months [had] proved the prudence of pursuing gradual drawdown of the Mission’ and noted that ‘a Government capacity to maintain internal and external security without any assistance from UNAMSIL [had] yet to be attained’.101 A serious security incident occurred in early 2003: a group of former soldiers attacked a military barrack’s armoury in East Freetown. Police investigation uncovered a plan involving ex-combatants and some serving soldiers to destabilise the state and prevent the Special Court from discharging its mandate.102

97

Ibid. Ibid. 99 United Nations Security Council resolution 1436 of 24 September 2002. 100 Ibid. 101 Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2003/321, 17 March 2003. 98

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On 28 March 2003, the Security Council adopted resolution 1470, which urged UNAMSIL to complete phase 2 of the drawdown plan and embark on phase 3 as soon as practicable, and requested the Secretary-General to propose detailed plans for the remainder of the plan, including options for faster or slower withdrawal, depending on security and the capacity of the national security sector to take responsibility.103 In his eighteenth report to the Council, dated 23 June 2003, the Secretary-General gave an update on progress in the key benchmarks. The UNAMSIL military component had been reduced from 17,500 to 13,074 by 1 June 2003, as planned in phase 2 of the drawdown plan.104 The Secretary-General presented three options. The ‘accelerated drawdown option’ would see all UNAMSIL troops leaving the country by June 2004. ‘The delayed drawdown option’ would see complete withdrawal by June 2005. The third option, called ‘modified status quo drawdown option’, would modify the pace and completion of drawdown by December 2004. The Secretary-General noted that ‘the gradual and carefully calibrated approach to the drawdown of UNAMSIL […] [was] yielding the desired benefits’.105 But the pace of progress on benchmarks ‘gave no cause for optimism that any accelerated implementation of the […] plan would be advisable’. He recommended the third option. The Council agreed, adopting resolution 1492 of 18 July 2003. On 19 March 2004, the twenty-first report on UNAMSIL relayed the findings of an interdepartmental assessment mission which had visited the country in February 2004. The team saw good progress in attaining the key security benchmarks, but found that the country’s institutions would still need strong support after December 2004. The target level of 9,500 for the national police strength could not be met before mid-2005 and coping with the payment of salaries and the maintenance of equipment would remain a challenge. The situation of the army was also worrying due to a significant funding shortfall for the construction of army barracks and priority communications equipment.106 Possible options included the total withdrawal of UNAMSIL, leaving UN and other agencies to assist the government’s peace consolidation efforts and bilateral partners to support the security sector; the extension of UNAMSIL’s mandate with a large military and police component; and the retention of a reconfigured residual UN peace presence. After consultations, the assessment team and the SecretaryGeneral recommended the latter option. The post-UNAMSIL office would assist Sierra Leone to assume its full responsibilities on security; reassure the population; deter potential threats; support the Special Court; backstop the police and army in protecting the volatile eastern border; and monitor the situation to provide early warning on potentially destabilising developments.107 102

It appeared that Johnny Paul Koroma, former leader of the AFRC fighting group and an elected member of the Parliament was implicated in the attack. On 10 March 2003, the prosecutor of the Special Court announced the indictments of key actors of the civil war including Foday Sankoh, Johnny Paul Koroma, Sam Bockarie, Issa Sesay and Sam Hinga Norman, who was Minister of Internal Affairs and coordinated the pro-governmental Civil Defence Force during the war. 103 United Nations Security Council resolution 1470 of 28 March 2003. 104 Eighteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2003/663, 23 June 2003. 105 Ibid. 106 Twenty-first Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2004/228, 19 March 2004. 107 Ibid. 185

The Secretary-General proposed to keep some 1,500 blue helmets for no more than two months after the end of UNAMSIL to facilitate the transition.The follow-on mission would have 3,250 troops plus 141 military observers to be deployed in the west (including Freetown, where the Special Court is located), the east (the border and diamond-mining areas) and the centre (where the CDF militia remained a threat despite formal disarmament and demobilisation). The Sierra Leonean police force still required 80 civilian police. The civilian component of the follow-on mission would have neither DDR nor an electoral unit, since relevant remaining tasks would be transferred to UNDP and the UN country team. The Council agreed to the Secretary-General’s proposals. In resolution 1537 of 30 March 2004 it approved a residual UNAMSIL presence for an initial period of six months, reducing the military strength to a new ceiling of 3,250 troops, 141 military observers and 80 civilian police. The Council urged the government ‘to intensify its efforts to develop an effective and sustainable police force, army, penal system and independent judiciary’.108 Through resolution 1562 of 17 September 2004, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council defined the tasks of UNAMSIL’s residual presence. Military and police personnel would monitor the security situation; support the national army and police in patrolling the border and diamond-mining areas; monitor their capacity; support the police in maintaining internal security and security for the Special Court; assist with its recruitment, training and mentoring programme; and protect UN personnel, installations and equipment. The Council authorised UNAMSIL’s residual presence to ‘use all necessary means to carry out its mandate’.The civilian components would monitor the repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants from abroad; monitor, investigate and promote human rights; disseminate information on the mandate; and monitor progress towards consolidation of state authority throughout the country.109 The twenty-fifth report on UNAMSIL (26 April 2005), made a new assessment of the situation, including the regional dimension marked by the deployment of peacekeeping missions in Liberia (UNMIL) and in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI).110 The presence in Sierra Leone of the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT), led by the UK, and expected to stay at least until 2010, gave a strong signal of continuity in the commitment to security sector reform. The deployment of a large peacekeeping mission in Liberia to support the transition after the forced exit of Charles Taylor enhanced prospects for stability. The Secretary-General recommended an extension of the residual UNAMSIL presence until the end of 2005 and a strong presence thereafter to assist peacebuilding efforts. In the addendum to the report, the Secretary-General set out his recommendations on the mandate and the structure of UNAMSIL’s successor, the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone.111 Security Council resolution 1620 of 31 August 2005 endorsed these recommendations. It authorised the establishment of UNIOSIL with a mandate of assisting the government in building the capacity of 108

United Nations Security Council resolution 1537 of 30 March 2004. United Nations Security Council resolution 1562 of 17 September 2004. 110 Twenty-fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2005/273, 26 April 2005 111 Twenty-fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, Addendum, S/2005/273/Add.2, 28 July 2005. 109

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state institutions, addressing the root causes of conflict and accelerating progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); establishing a national human rights commission; enhancing good governance, transparency and accountability; building the NEC to conduct free, fair and credible elections in 2007; strengthening the security sector; and working for the protection and well-being of youth, women and children.112 UNIOSIL was to be headed by an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General, who would also serve as the UNDP Resident Representative and the UN Humanitarian Coordinator to ensure cohesiveness of all UN agencies, programmes and funds.

3. Celebrating UNAMSIL’s success at the end of a six-year presence

In December 2005, the Secretariat and the Security Council celebrated the good job done by UNAMSIL.The Secretary-General submitted his twenty-seventh and final report on UNAMSIL. It said, ‘As UNAMSIL departs from Sierra Leone, it leaves behind a country that has great potential to achieve lasting stability, democracy and prosperity.’ Over the six years of its operations, it forged a partnership, with the UN country team, countries of the sub-region, donors, humanitarian organisations, Sierra Leone’s civil society and government, which has placed the country on a firm path to post-conflict recovery. The human rights situation was improving, and efforts to promote national cohesion, reconciliation and tolerance were making progress. Sierra Leone had achieved sustained economic recovery and started building peaceful and beneficial relations with its neighbours. UNAMSIL, it concluded, ‘has therefore successfully completed its peacekeeping mandate’.113 The Secretary-General also recalled ‘the trials and tribulations faced by the Mission during the crisis in 2000, the measures taken to reverse its fortunes’ and hailed the remarkable later achievements. UNAMSIL was a test case in a number of areas in UN peacekeeping and the first on several grounds: ‘rehatting’ of a sub-regional peacekeeping force; entering into an ‘over-the-horizon’ backstopping arrangement with a member state (the UK); introducing the concept of integrated mission with a triple-hatted Deputy Special Representative; developing an exit strategy based on a ‘carefully calibrated’ gradual drawdown of its military component; establishing strong cooperation with sister peacekeeping missions in the sub-region; and being followed by an integrated office with a comprehensive peacebuilding mandate.114 Sierra Leone would be a ‘guinea-pig’115 for UN innovations as one of the first two countries on the agenda of the new Peacebuilding Commission. When the Council met to discuss the last report on UNAMSIL, all of its members hailed the mission as one of the UN’s successes and invited the organisation to draw lessons from that experience. Council members highlighted the combination of political will and resources, the deployment of a 112

United Nations Security Council resolution 1620 of 31 August 2005. Twenty-seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, 12 December 2005. 114 Ibid. 115 The term was used by a FRIDE interlocutor who follows particularly Sierra Leone, New York, December 2008. 113

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robust mission, the fight against impunity illustrated by the Special Court in parallel with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the high leadership quality, as well as the ‘triangular partnership between the regional organisations, the troop-contributors and the United Nations’, and the definition of benchmarks to provide direction, measure progress and determine the time to withdraw.116

V. Implementation of resolution 1325 (2000)

1. Protection and participation of women in the context of the conflict in Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone had endured a devastating conflict for eight years before the Security Council considered sending a full-fledged peacekeeping mission. The conflict was an example of the ‘new’ generation of wars characterised by violence targeted at civilians and perpetrated by some or all the armed parties. As noted by the Truth and Reconciliation final report, the conflict ‘was particularly horrific because of the scope and severity of atrocities targeted at civilians’.117 Women and girls paid an especially heavy toll.Though there is no reliable data on the number of victims of gender-based violence in the course of the war, the incredible extent of the violence inflicted on women and girls is acknowledged by everybody in Sierra Leone.118 But the just appreciation of this dimension of the conflict came quite late. As a January 2002 Human Rights Watch report put it: Sexual violence has remained Sierra Leone’s silent war crime. […] The underreporting is a reflection of the low status of women and girls […] as well as the […] shame that survivors suffer and their fear of rejection by family and communities. Women and girls in Sierra Leone are subjected to structural discrimination by practice, custom and law.119 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission noted that ‘many women took on the role of perpetrators and/or collaborators, out of personal conviction or simply in order to survive’. The National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) recorded 4,751 girls in the DDR process, but the real number of female combatants was much higher. Some findings estimated that 12,056 out of 48,216 child soldiers were girls.120 The young female combatants, like a great number 116

‘Security Council commends peacekeeping mission’s contribution to Sierra Leone’s recovery as it approaches 31 December exit’, Security Council Press Release, SC/8592, 20 December 2005. 117 Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, 2004, available at http://www.trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/index.shtml 118 The TRC report mentioned the figure of 275,000 victims of sexual violence estimated by Human Rights Watch in its report on gender-based violence during the conflict in Sierra Leone: ‘We’ll Kill You if you Cry: Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict’, Human Rights Watch Report 15, 1 (a), January 2003. 119 Ibid. 120 Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, op.cit. 188

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of their male counterparts, had been victims of forced recruitment and physical and psychological violence before becoming perpetrators of violence and atrocities themselves. Women were historically excluded from politics and decision-making in Sierra Leone. Centralisation of power, violence and patriarchal attitudes marginalised women despite their contribution to economic activities and the subsistence of local communities. The failure of post-independence governments to meet the population’s basic needs led women to organise in their communities to improve their welfare. As violence grew in the early 1990s, women’s voices were increasingly heard in the wider context of an emerging civil society. In 1994, non-political women created the Women’s Forum as a discussion group. Initially focusing on the upcoming UN Conference on Women in Beijing, its attention was later drawn to the civil war raging in rural areas and with no end in sight. The Sierra Leone Women’s Movement for Peace was formed in 1995 to promote the restoration of peace. Women, it argued, were ‘natural peacemakers who could bring unique skills to resolving the conflict’.121 The movement played a strong role in preparations for the National Consultative Conferences of August 1995 and the February 1996 elections. Women leaders called elections ‘an essential and fundamental part of the peace process’, despite renewed violence, and demanded a 50 per cent participation in any delegation set up to negotiate an agreement.122 But this would never happen. As a women’s rights advocate wrote, ‘women believed that their hard work in the democratisation process would be rewarded by places at the negotiating table, but politicians recognised that the ideas and attitudes thrown up by the women’s movement had the potential of destabilising traditional politics, so they discouraged further participation.’123 From 1997, women’s groups lost most of their influence on the peace process. Only two women participated in the negotiation of the Lomé Agreement.124 The only reference to women in the Lomé Agreement was in the article ‘Post-War Rehabilitation and Reconstruction’: Given that women have been particularly victimised during the war, special attention shall be accorded to their needs and potentials in formulating and implementing national rehabilitation, reconstruction and developments programmes, to enable them to play a central role in the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Sierra Leone.125

121 Yasmin Jusu-Sheriff, ‘Sierra Leonean women and the peace process’, in Paying the Price, The Sierra Leone Peace Process, Accord, Issue 9, 2000, Conciliation Resources. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid. 124 Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, op.cit. 125 Article XXVIII of the Lomé Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front, 7 July 1999.

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2. Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security

Resolution 1270 (1999) creating UNAMSIL was adopted one year before the Council’s adoption of resolution 1325 (2000). It made very limited reference to gender, but UNAMSIL had ‘to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’, a prescription that included protection from sexual violence. The only mention of gender in resolution 1270 (1999) was to underline the importance of including personnel with appropriate training, ‘including [on] child and gender-related provisions, negotiation and communication skills, cultural awareness and civilian-military coordination’.126 Resolution 1370 (2001) carried a significant improvement in the identification as human rights abuses of ‘widespread violation of the human rights of women and children, including sexual violence’, demanding ‘that these acts cease immediately’, and requesting the Secretary-General ‘to ensure that all human rights monitoring positions within UNAMSIL [were] filled’.127 The resolution made a first reference to the involvement of women in peacemaking efforts: it ‘[welcomed] the positive impact of progress made in the Sierra Leone peace process on the situation in the Mano River basin […] and in this regard, [encouraged] the efforts of the Mano River Union Women’s Peace Network’.128 The network, known by its acronym MARWOPNET, had been actively promoting peace in the region and lobbying for peace before leaders of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, ECOWAS, Western diplomats and the UN.129 Security Council resolution 1400 of 28 March 2002 continued to ‘encourage’ the network’s contribution to regional peace, expressed concern at the violence, ‘particularly sexual violence, suffered by women and children during the conflict’ and stressed the importance of addressing these issues effectively. It requested the Secretary-General to provide a further assessment of human rights abuses, ‘particularly regarding the situation of women and children who [had] suffered during the conflict’. Resolution 1436 of 24 September 2002 encouraged the government to pay special attention to the needs of women and children affected by the war. Two years after resolution 1325 (2000), the references to the protection from gender-based violence, gender mainstreaming and higher participation of women in post-conflict activities remained minimal and vague. When the mission entered the drawdown phase, the language on gender disappeared from Council resolutions. Resolution 1562 (2004), which defined the tasks of the residual UNAMSIL presence, made no reference to gender. Resolution 1620 (2005), which defined the mandate of UNIPSIL, only asked the new presence to assist the government to develop ‘initiatives for the protection and well-being of youth, women and children’ among many other tasks. Given the exceptionally high toll paid by 126

United Nations Security Council resolution 1270 of 22 October 1999, para. 15. United Nations Security Council resolution 1370 of 18 September 2001, para. 4. 128 Ibid., para 12. 129 FRIDE interview with an active member of MARWOPNET and commissioner at the Human Rights Commission, Freetown, November 2008. 127

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women and girls during the war and their marginalisation from decision-making, a more visible focus on gender issues could have been expected. UNAMSIL’s exit strategy had been careful and well thought out in terms of the progressive transfer of security responsibilities to the national army and police and their training to assume such tasks, but it was not gender-sensitive. The first explicit reference to resolution 1325 (2000) appeared one year after UNIOSIL’s establishment. Resolution 1734 of 22 December 2006 ‘[emphasised] the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, as recognised in resolution 1325 (2000), [underlined] that a gender perspective should be taken into account in implementing all aspects of the mandate of UNIOSIL, [welcomed] the action plan developed by UNIOSIL, [encouraged] UNIOSIL to work with the Government […] in [that] area, and [requested] the Secretary-General to ensure […] adequate capacity, expertise and resources […] to carry out [that] work’. The resolution ‘[requested] the Secretary-General […] to include in his reporting to the Council progress on gender mainstreaming […] and all other aspects relating to the situation of women and girls, especially in relation to the need to protect them from gender-based violence’. When the Security Council decided the establishment of UNIPSIL in the context of the work of the Peacebuilding Commission in Sierra Leone, it emphasised in its resolution 1829 of 4 August 2008 ‘the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, as recognised in resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008)’; and ‘[underlined] that a gender perspective should be taken into account in implementing all aspects of the mandate of UNIPSIL, and [encouraged] UNIPSIL to work with the Government of Sierra Leone in [that] regard.’130 The absence of a significant reference to gender in the Council resolutions throughout most of UNAMSIL’s existence did nothing to promote gender sensitivity among peacekeepers. At the request of the DPKO gender adviser at headquarters, a consultant conducted an evaluation of UNAMSIL’s gender mainstreaming work and impact in the final months of the mission. The report noted that ‘the mission had embarked on “substantial efforts at gender mainstreaming”’ but the approach ‘fell short of a holistic strategy and, therefore, inhibited the realisation of the Mission’s full potential in gender work and impact in the country’.131 Although UNAMSIL at one point had 18,000 staff (military and civilian), it had only one full-time gender adviser, from 2003 to the end of the mission. Before that it had an ‘acting gender focal point who combined this role with another function in the mission’s human rights section’.132 This position limited the adviser’s access to the senior leadership until her relocation to the SRSG’s office in March 2005, nine months before UNAMSIL’s departure. At the peak of the mission 30 per cent of UNAMSIL’s staff were women, most of them within the mission’s civilian staff.133 The gender adviser’s tasks were: capacity-building through training within and outside the mission; information dissemination; provision of technical advice; serving in gender task forces, notably for the TRC and the Special Court; and partnerships with other UN agencies and international non130

United Nations Security Council resolution 1829 of 4 August 2008. Eugenia Date-Bah (Consultant), ‘Evaluation of Gender Mainstreaming Work and Impact of United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)’, Final Report prepared for DPKO, 19 April 2006. 132 Ibid. 131

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governmental organisations (NGOs). The evaluation report noted that the SRSG who was in the mission in its final phase was committed to gender mainstreaming. He informally advised the government to appoint women in such key positions as the head of the NEC, and made regular references to gender equity in his speeches.134 But gender sensitiveness only began making progress when the mission was focused on its drawdown process. UNIOSIL failed to put gender on its list of its priorities. As highlighted above, the resolution authorising UNIOSIL in August 2005 did not mention resolution 1325 (2000). UNIOSIL would later take gender issues more seriously, developing a plan for its implementation. The DDR programme was ‘gender blind’: it did not address the training needs of female excombatants. They were considered the ‘dependants’ of males who kept control of the lives of their ‘bush wives’. A former officer of the national DDR programme said she had never heard of resolution 1325 (2000) at the time of implementation and that such was the case for the entire DDR workforce.135 The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) launched a project called ‘The Girls Left Behind’ in 2004 to assist some 3,000 girls who had not been included in the programme.136 The first broad consultation on resolution 1325 (2000) was held in August 2005 in Freetown and was later replicated in Makeni, the main town of the Northern Province. However, the gender adviser left before other provinces were covered. Sierra Leone’s Ministry of Social Welfare was exposed to resolution 1325 (2000) for the first time in 2005, five years after its adoption. The lack of a holistic approach to gender was highlighted by various interlocutors.The mission did little work with human rights and women’s rights organisations to raise awareness on gender-based violence and promote women’s rights. Most members of women’s organisations and other civil society groups interviewed in Freetown in November 2008 emphasised the good work done by UNAMSIL in providing public information on gender, beginning with addressing the issue of sexual violence through Radio UNAMSIL.137 The essential role of this instrument in large and complex peacekeeping operations should be fully recognised.The radio gave a lot of space for debate on pervasive discrimination against women and offered women’s groups an outlet to speak out. UNAMSIL’s radio and public information campaigns also played a significant role in encouraging women’s participation as voters and candidates to the elections. On the negative side, the issues more frequently mentioned were lack of funding and long delays in the reparation of victims of war-related sexual violence; the sexual exploitation and abuses committed by 133

In November 2005, the international staff comprised 152 men and 65 women; the local staff was made up of 410 men and only 65 women. Only 13 out of the 2,085 military at post were women, most of them from Nigeria. ‘Since the onus of responsibility for the recruitment of women in uniformed peacekeeping functions lies with the troop-contributing countries, the fact of their not having a gender balance in their local troops obviously implied inability to contribute gender balanced troops to any peacekeeping mission’. Ibid. 134 This was confirmed by some of the interviews held in Freetown in November 2008 with civil society organisations. 135 FRIDE interview, e-mail communication with a former officer of the DDR programme and current government official, December 2008. 136 UNICEF,‘The Impact of Conflict on Women and Girls in West and Central Africa and the Unicef Response’, February 2005. 137 FRIDE interviews in Freetown, November 2008. 192

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peacekeepers themselves (both military and civilian, even at high levels); prostitution, and HIV/AIDS epidemics; the issue of the babies left behind by peacekeepers and the social and economic implications for their mothers; and, again, the lack of a clear strategy to address gender issues as a key component of peacebuilding and reconstruction. Beyond the repeated statements about the Secretary-General’s ‘zero tolerance policy’ for misconduct by peacekeepers, it is essential that the Council and DPKO realise that their commitment to gender mainstreaming is not credible if care and reparations for the victims of sexual exploitation and abuses by UN peacekeepers are not taken seriously.The social consequences of having a predominantly male international operation in poor countries where women and girls are severely exposed should be fully addressed, and concrete corrective actions should be envisaged in all missions’ exit strategies. While there is now wide awareness of gender issues and their importance for the well-being of the country, including its security, the dire material situation of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs is a telling indication of the challenges ahead.The lack of qualified human resources and material resources is a major problem.The country’s recent history calls for a gender-sensitive allocation of resources. UNAMSIL did little, partly because it took almost five years for resolution 1325 (2000) to make its way from New York to Freetown. UNIOSIL’s initial mandate neglected the gender dimension, but at a later stage it played a noticeable role in support of the ‘Gender Bills’ on Registration of Customary Marriage and Divorce, Domestic Violence and Devolution of Estates, enacted in June 2007.138 The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), other international organisations and regional civil society organisations, such as the Women Peace and Security Network Africa (WIPSENAfrica), developed various projects to strengthen local NGOs working on the protection of women’s rights. A national action plan for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) is, however, yet to be prepared. Since Sierra Leone remains on the agenda thanks to the Peacebuilding Commission and the establishment of UNIPSIL by Security Council resolution 1829 (2008), a much-needed holistic approach to gender should be an area of immediate work by UNIPSIL and the Government of Sierra Leone.

VI. Concluding observations

The review of the mission’s history through events on the ground, the Secretary-General’s reports and the Council’s debates and resolutions, and the interviews with relevant actors held in Sierra Leone and in New York led to some interesting observations. UNAMSIL’s initial weaknesses can be explained by the following reasons: ● The optimistic assumption that parties would abide by their commitments in the Lomé Agreement, accept the deployment of a neutral peacekeeping force in diamond-rich areas under their control and the presumed good faith of RUF leader Foday Sankoh; 138

FRIDE interview with officials of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs, November and December 2008. 193

● Lack of a decisive reaction to early provocations by RUF, and a revision of optimistic assumptions on the security environment and the conditions of UNAMSIL’s deployment; ● The difficulties for a UN peacekeeping force in a country where a regional power (Nigeria) was leading a costly military intervention; the precipitated ‘rehatting’ of ECOMOG soldiers as UN blue helmets and the fight for the mission’s leadership between those who were there before (Nigerian officers) and the newcomers (Indian officers); ● Operational issues related to slow deployment; the initial insufficient number of authorised troops; the inadequate training and equipment of some key contingents; problems of interpretation of the mandate and the rules of engagement by some peacekeepers; and problems in UNAMSIL’s command and control structures in early 2000. The reversal of fortunes from mid-2000 to UNAMSIL’s withdrawal can be attributed to: ● The UK’s immediate military intervention and show of force, which secured the airport, allowed UNAMSIL’s reinforcement and sent a clear message to the spoilers of peace; ● The determination of the Secretary-General, most heads of state in ECOWAS, the Security Council and UNAMSIL troop-contributing countries not to allow a new failure of the UN peacekeeping system which would have further undermined its credibility; ● UNAMSIL’s strengthening, restructuring and leadership changes in line with an independent assessment, a frank acknowledgement of such weaknesses by the Secretary-General and the Council, and follow-up on the implementation of the recommended redressing measures; ● Unanimity of the Council on the need to save UNAMSIL and Council activism, since mid-2000, leading to the adoption of a series of resolutions to increase UNAMSIL’s resources; pressures put on Charles Taylor’s government as the main supporter of the RUF; approval of a Special Court and of almost all the Secretary-General’s recommendations; ● Continuous diplomatic efforts of ECOWAS heads of state and their pressure on Taylor to cease financial and military support for the RUF; ● The neutralisation of Sankoh after his arrest in Freetown, and the common regional position to demand his replacement as RUF leader; ● The unequivocal evidence provided by the UN Group of Experts of the support given to RUF by Liberia’s and Burkina Faso’s governments; the subsequent sanctions on Liberia and the change of behaviour of the identified regional spoilers; ● The strong Guinean military reaction to RUF attacks, which closed the option of displacing the war to Guinean territory and severely weakened the RUF;

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● The long-term commitment to reform of the security sector by the International Military and Advisory Training Team under UK lead, which allowed UNAMSIL to focus on other areas and transfer security responsibilities to newly-trained and equipped troops; ● An exit strategy conditioned on specific benchmarks, and the Security Council’s approval of the gradual approach recommended by the Secretary-General. The recipe for success in Sierra Leone could be summarised by quoting a member of the Security Council: ‘the alignment of political will with resources’. There was a unanimous determination not to permit failure and not to abandon the country to its fate. Unanimity also existed on the need for a strong peacekeeping force to back diplomatic efforts that would bring the RUF to the negotiated settlement and disarm voluntarily. Approving up to 17,500 troops in a West African country of around 5 million people and 71,740 square kilometres was a sign of rare commitment from the Security Council. An equivalent effort in 2008 for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (a population of 62 million and an area of 2,344,858 square kilometres) would have meant sending 217,000 blue helmets on the basis of the population ratio, or some 572,000 troops on the basis of area. The authorised number of UN troops in that country at the end of 2008 was 19,815. The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) — with a military strength of 15,250, at its highest point, in a country with a population of 3.4 million and an area of 111,369 square kilometres — thanks to US support, is the only case in Africa which can be compared with Sierra Leone’s. A mission’s military strength is certainly no guarantee of effective mandate implementation, but it does make a difference. In Sierra Leone, successive reinforcements of UNAMSIL in terms of troops, equipments and management changes, along with the UK’s assistance to the Sierra Leonean army, overwhelmed the spoilers of peace. The weakness of President Kabbah and the army made security dependent on international support. UNAMSIL had only one identifiable troublemaker, the RUF rebellion, which had a bad reputation, no convincing political agenda, and only limited support from regional leaders and a powerful Council member. The president had little to fear from a massive UN involvement in state affairs. The mandate of UNAMSIL to ‘assist the government’ in a variety of tasks was tantamount to asking UNAMSIL to do the job itself with assistance from a weak government and fragile national institutions. The near collapse of UNAMSIL still carries lessons in 2009 as UN peacekeeping faces enormous challenges. The initial failure of the Chapter VII mission is a reminder of the need to anticipate the risk of blatant violations of the peace agreements that are often at the base of the Council’s decision to deploy a peacekeeping operation. Compliance with their commitments under an agreement by their signatories is just one of the possible scenarios and not necessarily the most likely one. In the Sierra Leonean case, the record of RUF and Sankoh’s personality before the Lomé Agreement should have signalled the possibility of a radical shift in the rebel movement’s future behaviour and the need for contingency planning. The usual assertion that UN peacekeepers should intervene only when there is peace to keep is certainly sound. But it may also be misleading and simplistic. 195

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6 Conclusion

Consent, impartiality and non-use of force — laid down in the Brahimi Report as the ‘bedrock principles’ of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and still considered valid in the most recent UN literature on the subject — were put under serious challenge in the four cases considered in this study, all of which involve some level of coercion. One of the key aims of this work was to assess whether the possible or actual use of force by multinational forces, the UN blue helmets, operations undertaken by individual member states or regional organisations was supportive of the political and peacebuilding objectives or counterproductive to these basic goals of UN peacekeeping. Invocation of Chapter VII is often used to express the resolve of the Council membership in the face of attacks against peacekeeping forces and their mandates. But as shown in the case studies, the actual use of force depends on the mandate, the rules of engagement, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and military commanders on the ground, as well as on the availability of appropriate military resources. Reference to Chapter VII in the absence of these requirements is misleading. Passivity in the face of challenges to peacekeeping forces deployed under a Chapter VII mandate raises questions about the effectiveness and credibility of the UN and the Council itself, as evidenced in Sierra Leone at the initial stage of the UN mission in the country (UNAMSIL). The Council had limited capacity to define or influence the intervention agendas, particularly in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Accountability — understood in the broader sense of responsibility for the decision to intervene and for supporting missions on the ground — is often shared with, or even transferred to other important international actors, multinational forces or powerful states. The Council’s ability and willingness to steer and orient mandate implementation depend on the fluctuating priorities of member states and the political issues that at different points in time make their way into the international agenda (such as the ‘war on terror’), which can explain in part the different international responses to the conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. In the absence of agreement among the Permanent Five (P5), and as evidenced in Kosovo, the lack of action or the ambiguity of mandates tend to be the norm. The Council has nonetheless shown that it can act as a sounding board in matters of concern to important non-permanent members and thus influence cases it may otherwise consider off-limits, as shown with the issue of civilian casualties in Afghanistan. 1

Written in consultation with the authors of the case studies. 197

The political strategy that should guide all peacekeeping operations needs to be based on an accurate characterisation of the conflict and good knowledge of the national parties and actors involved at the local level. There are many examples in this study that show the extent to which the process set in motion by the international intervention alienates or mobilises the support of significant sectors of society in the host country. Without their concurrence, all efforts to achieve durable peace may be futile.The participation of women, also examined in this work, is both part of this analysis and a priority on its own right. The observations listed below do not seek to provide a glimpse of the wealth of issues covered by the case studies. They limit themselves to a set of questions emerging from the facts portrayed, organised around five issues of specific interest to this project and in large measure based on the parameters set out in recent UN literature for success in peacekeeping. These include: ● The question of consent; ● A clear, credible and viable mandate; ● Security Council support; ● The participation of women and the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000); ● A favourable political environment.

I. The question of consent

Peace accords signed prior to the deployment of the operations considered in this study did not necessarily reflect a true commitment by their signatories. The level of consent varied depending on the parties, and was only formal, fluctuating or minimal in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. In Afghanistan and Kosovo, accords were signed after the situation on the ground had been altered by hostile military action by international forces. In Afghanistan, although there was consent among the P5 that something had to be done, the Bonn Agreement excluded the party believed to have been definitively vanquished (the Taliban), an assessment later to be questioned. In Kosovo, the Military-Technical Agreement was subscribed by the defeated party — the Government of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia — and the forces that carried out the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) air campaign prior to Security Council intervention. No agreement was signed between the Serbian government and Kosovo-Albanians, the two parties to the conflict. The question of consent by local parties applies not only to the deployment of peacekeeping forces, but also to the longer-term state-building strategies pursued by the international intervention. Such strategies should reflect the needs and aspirations of all significant sectors of society in the host country. The legitimacy of particular types of state-building, especially during ongoing conflict, is questioned by 198

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attempts to ‘engineer’ institutional processes in accordance with the strategic interests and system of values of the international presence. In Afghanistan, the Bonn Agreement, in force during the initial phase of the mission, was not conceived of as an indigenous peace accord, but an externally-mediated agreement among victors in a war won primarily by the United States (US). It excluded the Taliban, who had supposedly lost the war. Yet, the latter proved to represent a formidable force seven years later, as the international intervention failed to deliver on its promises of progress, development and stability. Not only did the Bonn Agreement fail to take into account the need for a reconciliation process, but it also set out to establish a number of formal institutions, such as an elected president, a Parliament and others against a tight schedule, although these institutions were not fully understood or rooted in local traditions. These factors, and heavy engineering by external actors, undermined the legitimacy of these democratic institutions. But what ultimately challenged the credibility of the intervention was the high number of civilian casualties and the failures of the political process. The growing and mutating international military operation by Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and NATO/ISAF forces seemed to contradict the political and state-building process, which the UN was mandated to carry out. Ultimately, consent between the international actors and Afghans, and among Security Council members, was fragile when it came to deciding whether a military or political solution would bring peace. In Côte d’Ivoire, the UN mission (UNOCI) was deployed to assist in the implementation of the LinasMarcoussis Agreement, signed in France at the urging of President Chirac’s government and after France had dispatched its own military force, Opération Licorne, and the latter’s action had resulted in a ceasefire. The Ivorian parties were not very keen on a somewhat imposed political settlement. President Gbagbo and his followers, as well as rebel Forces Nouvelles, had their own reasons to maintain the status quo. Gbagbo had strong reservations about an agreement that would weaken him politically and risk his chances of future re-election. The rebel coalition in turn wanted to keep the territory it had taken over and obtain the reforms on nationality proposed in the agreement. In these circumstances, no disarmament of irregular groups took place and elections were postponed repeatedly. The attack of the French forces on the Ivorian air force in November 2004 caused more resentment against the former colonial power, playing into nationalist sentiments and further undermining the possibilities of eliciting real consent. In March 2007, President Gbagbo and rebel leader Guillaume Soro signed a power-sharing agreement in Ouagadougou, placing the process under the control of the parties and taking away the leverage of the UN mission. UNOCI was thereby relegated to a largely passive role. While factional war is over, the conditions for durable peace and stability are far from achieved. Armed militias have neither disarmed nor demobilised, and elections have been repeatedly postponed. In Kosovo, the consent of the Serbian government to the terms of the Military-Technical Agreement resulted in the rapid withdrawal of its forces from the territory and the massive return of KosovoAlbanian refugees and displaced persons. But the accord did nothing to gain the confidence of Serbian and other minorities. Despite its achievements in ending large-scale violence, meeting humanitarian needs and, to a limited extent, creating an administrative structure that sought to replicate the model 199

of European countries, the international presence failed to provide an atmosphere where a multiethnic society would thrive, establish credible political structures and facilitate negotiations towards a final and agreed solution to the situation. Kosovo-Serbs remained largely alienated from the process set in motion by the mandate out of fear for their future in a Kosovo that could be placed under an independent Kosovo-Albanian government. The unquestioned authority of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) raised issues of lack of accountability and control mechanisms, its only constraint being the pressure exerted by the majority population. Judicial, legislative and executive powers were dependent on the SRSG, a concentration that contradicts with the principle of division of powers. A paramount example is the case of the judiciary, where the SRSG had the authority to appoint international judges or prosecutors to any criminal case, at any phase of the proceedings, and at any level of jurisdiction. This situation was widely perceived in Kosovo as blunt interventionism by UNMIK’s executive power into internal judicial affairs and was criticised for marginalising the local judiciary and undermining institutionbuilding goals. In Sierra Leone, initial assumptions about the alleged ‘good faith’ of the parties concerning the Lomé Agreement, including their acceptance of UNAMSIL as a neutral peacekeeping force and its deployment in the diamond-rich areas they had been exploiting for years, contributed to UNAMSIL’s failure to react quickly and forcefully to provocations and attacks from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Evidence that RUF leader Foday Sankoh’s power derived from the persistence of a war fuelled by illegal diamond trading rather than from any support from the population — as proven by his poor showing in the elections — also contributed to a radical change of approach by UNAMSIL and the other international actors involved. Thereafter, rather than considering Sankoh a party to the agreements, they would give their backing to forceful military action against rebellious forces, support for the Sierra Leonean army and police, and long-term assistance to the reform and strengthening of the Sierra Leonean security sector.

1. The use of force

The use of force by UN-led operations is restricted to thwarting rebellious factions in their attempts to derail a peace process by targeting peacekeepers and their property and by attacking civilians, although in this latter case such use — as in Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire — is limited to UN capabilities and area of operations. These restrictions do not apply to multinational forces or national operations such as those deployed by France and the United Kingdom (UK) in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone, respectively. The multinational operations authorised by the Security Council in Afghanistan and Kosovo, though sharing the same NATO-approved rules of engagement, do not have the same restrictions on the use of force or the same constraints in terms of resources, both largely dependent on the troop-contributing countries. In all cases, the use of force had an impact on the level of consent by local parties and actors. 200

Conclusion

In Afghanistan, the intensification of military operations by OEF and ISAF and the resulting civilian casualties and destruction have fuelled resentment and played in favour of the insurgency. UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire was unable to protect civilians from violent attacks. French troops in Opération Licorne had halted hostilities at the outbreak of the conflict and were given a Security Council mandate to act in support of UNOCI as a quick reaction force. But in times of crisis, French troops tended to act independently, without coordinating or consulting with UNOCI. Their operation to destroy virtually all Ivorian military aircraft in retaliation to an attack on a French military base was undertaken without prior notification. These attacks caused more resentment against the former colonial power and played into nationalist sentiments. In Kosovo, hostilities were not over when the Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered the territory to maintain a stable and secure environment and control internal and international boundaries. The withdrawal of Serbian troops and their replacement by the multinational force was followed by the massive return of Kosovo-Albanian refugees without major incidents. KFOR played a key role in support of UNMIK at the initial stage of deployment by assuming such tasks as policing and demining that were to be gradually taken over by the mission as it acquired the necessary capacities. In the first months after entering Kosovo, KFOR’s large presence, which had the priority of protecting and gaining the support of Kosovo-Albanians, did not prevent retaliatory attacks against minorities, particularly Kosovo-Serbs and Roma. This led to the exodus of the majority of the Serbs, many Roma and persons belonging to other minorities. After a period of improved security and calm, a series of ethnically-motivated attacks that caused the death of dozens of Serbs and the displacement of thousands in March 2004 — five years after the intervention — revealed lack of planning, intelligence and preparedness. This incident represented a major blow to KFOR’s credibility and cast doubts over the prospects of a future multiethnic Kosovo. NATO reacted quickly by sending reinforcements to Kosovo within 48 hours, but this did not revert the situation for the majority of those who had fled during the riots. The use of coercive force following the parameters established for UN operations proved useful in Sierra Leone, but it came after the UK had secured the airport for its own unilateral operation, ostensibly launched to rescue and evacuate its nationals and associated personnel. By preventing the renewed outbreak of major hostilities, the intervention provided time for UNAMSIL’s reinforcement, thus helping to create favourable conditions for the implementation of the peacebuilding and political aspects of the mandate, including elections in due time, and for strengthening state military and police forces. The engagement of regional powers in the initial phase of UNAMSIL under the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the decision to ‘re-hat’ some of its troops as blue helmets upon withdrawal of its monitoring force bolstered the capacity of the UN mission, through the incorporation of military personnel that had a good grasp of the country’s situation. Forceful military reaction from Guinea to RUF raids within its territory was also an important factor in weakening the rebels.

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II. A clear, credible and viable mandate

The Council approved three streams of resolutions for Afghanistan: first, establishing a sanctions regime against the Taliban and Al-Qaida, with some resolutions predating the field missions; second, authorising the deployment of a multinational force, ISAF, currently under NATO, to support the government in the maintenance of security, initially in Kabul and surrounding areas, and later throughout the country; and third, setting out the mandate of the UN political and peacebuilding mission in the country, UNAMA.The first and second streams of resolutions were approved under the provisions of Chapter VII, while the third was not. Furthermore, Afghanistan continues to host the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom, not specifically authorised by the Council but indirectly recognised under the provision of article 51 in Chapter VII on engagement for self-defence. The underlying challenge in Afghanistan was the uncomfortable co-existence of UNAMA’s statebuilding and political mandate with the ongoing war waged by the international military forces in parts of the country to defeat the insurgency, first in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and later as a counterinsurgency operation against the revived Taliban. The short-term goal of counter-insurgency through war fighting has undermined long-term state-building and peacekeeping objectives. As explained in the case study, the greater the number of US and NATO troops arriving in Afghanistan, larger the resentment, resistance and violence.The short-term strategy would make the long-term one a moving target. The co-existence of UNAMA’s political transition and state-building mandate and ISAF’s security mandate, currently engaged in counter-insurgency operations, was uneasy from the start and, in addition to OEF presence and activities, complicated the successful implementation of resolutions. UNAMA’s mandate came after OEF had initiated its still ongoing military operations and after the authorisation of ISAF’s deployment. By the time the political mission was approved, its role, responsibility and limitations had already been crafted by previous events. As the case study suggests, UNAMA’s success in setting Afghanistan on a proper political path was hampered structurally by the US-led military operation’s sidelining of the political agenda. In the meantime, UNAMA’s mandate had become increasingly ambitious. In 2008, after a sharp deterioration of the security situation, the Council incorporated an extensive list of activities: authorising its expansion to the regions within Afghanistan; seeking regional cooperation around Afghanistan; coordinating aid; and using good offices to try to jumpstart political negotiations; as well as continued monitoring of human rights and safeguarding humanitarian laws. It was only after 2008 and the expansion to the provinces that substantial increases in resources were authorised for the UN mission. In Côte d’Ivoire, the UN peacekeeping mission’s mandate was to assist the Government of National Reconciliation — to be established in accordance with the commitments undertaken by the parties at the behest of the Government of France — in the implementation of the comprehensive LinasMarcoussis Agreement. The main tasks included monitoring the ceasefire, helping to build confidence between the belligerents, protecting civilians in imminent danger of physical violence if and when 202

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possible, and assisting in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme, the reunification of the country and the organisation of free and fair elections. The mandate was broad in the tasks assigned, but limited to the role of ‘assisting’ the Ivorian government. Much depended on the goodwill of the government, and ultimately on internal politics. UNOCI was constrained internally by the contradiction between the political interests of President Gbagbo and the strategy of the Government of National Reconciliation defined by the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The role of UNOCI became less influential after the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement. Despite its similarities to UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire did not obtain the resources or the support required, mainly due to political reasons, including the existence of a comparatively stronger government in Abidjan. It was therefore unable to carry out its ambitious mandate, including the protection of civilians. In Kosovo, resolution 1244 (1999) authorised the establishment of a civilian and a security presence: the civilian presence was assumed by UNMIK; the military presence, KFOR, was under NATO command. UNMIK was in charge of the interim administration of the territory and the gradual transfer of responsibilities to local self-government institutions, to be set up without impinging on the sovereignty of Yugoslavia and pending a final political settlement on status. The resolution became a general frame of reference that contained red lines on sovereignty, rather than a tool to guide UNMIK’s actions on the ground. It was soon overtaken by events and, according to some observers, became obsolete in practice except for the security provisions under KFOR’s responsibility. Subsequent initiatives to respond to developments in Kosovo were not the result of directives emanating from the Council, but of the actions taken by UNMIK through regulations or other administrative measures, or from measures taken by other key international actors. These initiatives were reported ex post facto to the Council. Ten years after its approval and as UNMIK transferred residual functions on rule of law and justice to the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), resolution 1244 (1999) is still in force. Fully drafted outside the Security Council, it contains two principles that represent the opposing positions within the Council: an open-ended transition under international authority that deprives Yugoslavia of all authority over Kosovo for an indefinite period, and the prescription of full respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The resolution makes reference to the Rambouillet Agreement, endorsed before NATO’s bombing campaign by the US, the UK and the Kosovo-Albanians, but rejected by Russia and Serbia. The agreement would have given NATO unimpeded access throughout the territory of Former Yugoslavia. UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone was the first peacekeeping operation with an explicit mandate to protect civilians, although the limitations of such protection were also clear: implementation would depend on the capabilities of the forces and their deployment in areas where civilians faced an imminent threat of physical violence, a judgement left to local commanders and contingent on the rules of engagement. As ECOMOG withdrew from the country and the situation on the ground became more complex, the Security Council added new and more complex responsibilities to the UN mandate. After the virtual collapse of the mission due to erroneous political assumptions, inadequate 203

deployment and severe operational weaknesses, debates in the Security Council and pressures from regional leaders resulted in the restructuring and increase of force levels.

1. Operational issues

The effectiveness of the peacekeeping missions in implementing their mandates was compromised to varying degrees by operational challenges. These mainly included the slow deployment of qualified personnel in the required numbers, the provision of logistics or other resources; instances of poor training; the lack of a common understanding of the mandate within the mission, even among the various national military contingents, which made it difficult to define a set of priorities and execute a common strategy; and lack of communication, coordination and transparency, especially between the civilian and military peacekeepers. A specific set of difficulties stemmed from the co-existence of a civilian mission with a military operation not under the UN line of command, be it a multinational or a regional force or an intervention by a member state. While the UN has nominal authority over all operations authorised by the Security Council, it does not have the information, the resources or the leverage required substantially to influence their actions. The simultaneity of a peacebuilding and a military enforcement mandate creates additional operational challenges, as the case of Afghanistan clearly demonstrates. In Côte d’Ivoire, the French military operation severely affected the perception of Licorne among the Ivorian public, thus reducing its operational margin of manoeuvre. Below are specific examples that highlight the operational problems mentioned in the four case studies. In Afghanistan, given UNAMA’s co-existence with more powerful international actors (US military forces and contingents from NATO countries) and the post-Taliban environment, the initial ‘light footprint’ approach suggested by Brahimi and endorsed by the Council proved inadequate. It put the mission in a position of weakness, undermining its leverage and capacity to influence the process. The light footprint approach was explained by the need to leave governing functions to Afghanis and restrict the international civilian presence to a political advisory role in some key high-level positions. In fact, the preference for a small mission was, to a certain extent, a reaction — shared by the Council and the Secretariat alike — against the earlier experiences of Kosovo and Timor-Leste, where the UN had been required to assume heavy public administration functions and to deploy large numbers of international personnel. Another major operational challenge came from the simultaneous tasks given to UNAMA of coordinating aid from a large but fragmented international community, implementing its own projects and advocating for peace and reconciliation in less than favourable circumstances. UNAMA’s responsibilities increased but commitments and resources were not forthcoming, a situation that changed after the ‘sharpening’ of the mandate. In Côte d’Ivoire, mainly for political reasons, requests for an increase of UNOCI’s strength did not obtain the same positive reply, thus undermining the mission’s effectiveness and nurturing the Ivorian 204

Conclusion

perception of its military dependency on French forces.The Secretary-General’s recommendation to send emergency reinforcements in terms of the mission’s military and police capacities was submitted to the Council in November 2004, in the wake of the incidents that followed the violation of the ceasefire between the fighting forces. It only obtained the Council’s partial approval in June 2005. While it is unclear that quick and strong reinforcements would have had a dramatic impact on the peace process, they could have allowed for a deterrent presence in the volatile western region, where the combination of militia activity, circulation of arms, political machinations, land disputes and difficult co-habitation among various ethnic communities continued to foster violence and serious human rights violations. In Kosovo, lack of resources was never a problem for the international presence, particularly in relation to the security forces. Starting as one of the biggest operations previously deployed, KFOR’s strength and willingness to operate forcefully dwindled in the period preceding the ethnically-motivated riots of 2004, but reinforcements were dispatched by NATO within two days, and force level requirements were thereafter reconsidered. In the case of UNMIK, difficulties were mainly the consequence of the initial reluctance to take decisive action, of the slow recruitment and deployment procedures, and of the scarcity of qualified personnel with the required expertise in public administration functions, a responsibility for which the UN was ill-prepared. These factors undermined UNMIK’s authority and allowed for the early establishment of self-appointed government structures by local Kosovo-Albanian leaders, either associated with or coming from the ranks of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The UN decision to decentralise personnel selection and recruitment functions that had thus far been exclusively under the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was a way to expedite the necessary fielding of international civilian staff, but raised questions about the standards applied and the mission’s accountability. In Sierra Leone, the admission of UNAMSIL’s serious weaknesses identified by an independent group of experts after its near collapse and the positive response to its recommendations from the Council and member states were some of the main reasons for the mission’s success. Detected weaknesses included the lack of military personnel with the required level of training and equipment; the absence of internal cohesion; problems of communication and coordination; and different understandings of the rules of engagement. UNAMSIL’s troop levels went from an initial 6,000 to 17,500, turning it into the largest peacekeeping operation ever approved at the time. As noted in the case study, approving such troop levels in a West African country of around 5 million people and 71,740 square kilometres was a sign of rare commitment from the Security Council.

III. Security Council support

The relationship between the multinational forces in Afghanistan and Kosovo with the Security Council that authorised them is characterised by a paradox. While the majority of troop-contributors consider the Council necessary as a legitimising agent, they do not feel under the obligation to report to it and 205

in many cases are reluctant to do so. The Council has neither a say in determining their rules of engagement nor effective authority over these forces, whose resources, equipment and budget are guaranteed by the troop-contributing countries which have the means and political clout to act and over which the UN has no leverage. Reporting of these forces to the Council is scant, slow and in general does not carry information of substance. In the case of Afghanistan, ISAF troops under NATO report on implementation of their mandate by sending outdated communications to the Council through letters from the NATO Secretary-General to the UN Secretary-General, even though regular reporting to the Council is specifically mandated in ISAF resolutions. With regard to Kosovo, although resolution 1244 (1999) also implicitly requires KFOR to report to the Council regularly, reports were submitted with several months of delay. A way to enhance mutual accountability would be to establish consultation mechanisms between NATO or the organisation responsible for the implementation of the security mandate and the Security Council on key aspects of its execution, starting with the rules of engagement. In Afghanistan, there was unanimous support for intervention among the Permanent Five after the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks. The attitude changed gradually as the security situation worsened, hostilities intensified and the international intervention was questioned for lack of a clear, unified strategy. The Council original mandates for ISAF were generic, without going into detail about its functions, scope, activities and rules of engagement, issues that were normally discussed in the capitals of troop-contributing countries or in Brussels after the NATO takeover. The Council also tended to stay away from being too inquisitive on the military operations conducted on the ground by the forces it authorised. This changed after 2007, with the intensification of ISAF action in response to the surge of the Taliban insurgency.The Council then issued more detailed mandates and expanded its scope to the protection of civilians, counter-narcotics and support for Afghan forces. Civilian deaths as a result of ISAF counter-insurgency operations under NATO and OEF put a dividing line between the statebuilding and political mandate of UNAMA and ISAF’s securitisation one. Language on casualties appeared in Council resolutions as a result of these events and discord among the Permanent Five. ISAF merger into NATO had political consequences for the Security Council, since NATO is not directly mandated by the Council through Chapter VII. Reporting to the Council, that was erratic and minimal in its initial stage, ceased when the mission came under NATO command. By handing over Chapter VII peace enforcement indirectly to NATO, it can be said that the UN handed over its authority, retaining only the role of legitimiser. ISAF became incorporated into NATO’s doctrine and increasingly into that of OEF. It moved away from a peacekeeping force to become associated with a self-defence and counter-insurgency operation. The intensification of OEF/ISAF military operations and the resulting civilian casualties and destruction have fuelled resentment and played in favour of the insurgency. Despite consensus at the Security Council, discussions concentrated initially on the political and institutional situation, with the military operation only making it on the agenda after the surge in civilian casualties. Although the US initially dominated by virtue of having started the operation and 206

Conclusion

being the largest contributor both in terms of financing for development and military personnel, as the security situation deteriorated, its power was increasingly challenged by a coalition of dissent formed by China, Russia and Southern countries during more elaborated debates often led by nonP5 members. Overall, the role of the Security Council in Afghanistan had been to give authority to decisions made outside its corridors. Therefore, it reflected the inter-governmental function of the institution, with each country pursuing its own national interests, rather than its trans-governmental function of creating a common good and implementing it in a coherent and effective manner. There may have been consensus at the P5, but the Security Council did not have the authority or the leverage to be effective. It adopted resolutions but could not provide sufficient resources or the necessary mechanisms to implement them. In Côte d’Ivoire, until 2007 the Council approved several resolutions under Chapter VII to control the content and rhythm of the peace process, but without providing adequate resources or exerting sufficient pressure on the parties to comply. Unlike in Sierra Leone, the Council imposed sanctions reluctantly, rather late and on a very small group of three low profile persons. French diplomacy, weakened by its lack of clear guiding principles, was unable to steer sufficient international support, including from other Council members, towards a robust peacekeeping mission ready to defend itself and its mandate.The Council failed to back the troop level requested by the Secretary-General due to lack of consensus. In Kosovo, despite its internal divisions regarding the NATO military campaign, the Council was able to adopt resolution 1244 (1999) with wording previously agreed upon by the G-8. The resolution captures the general agreement among Council members, including Russia, on the most pressing issues — ending the cycle of violence and ensuring humanitarian relief to the many refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). However, it glosses over the deep divisions within the P5 over the legality of the intervention and the approach to the process that would lead to the determination of Kosovo’s future status. Due to the lack of consensus, the resolution was never revisited and continues to be nominally in force, despite the many developments on the ground. The Security Council has pronounced itself through presidential statements on very few occasions, the last being to endorse the proposal on the reconfiguration of UNMIK, which implied the deployment of EULEX. In the absence of action from the Council, the Secretary-General assumed an advanced interpretation of his role, seeking to respond to events in the field without tipping the balance of power between contending positions or crossing the ‘red lines’ of resolution 1244 (1999). In Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL’s near collapse after coming under attack from the RUF — a signatory to the Lomé Peace Agreement whose implementation the mission was required to support — caused a unanimous reaction from the Security Council, which acknowledged the need to prevent the mission from failing and abandoning the country to its fate. As a result, the Council adopted a series of resolutions that increased UNAMSIL’s military strength to the then highest historical levels for a UN mission, reinforced its mandate, hardened sanctions and approved the establishment of a Special Court to deal with those responsible for crimes and atrocities. Member states also reacted rapidly by making available the requested resources. The UK military intervention to evacuate its nationals and secure the airport had the positive unintended consequence of contributing to the mission’s 207

‘reversal of fortunes’, as did the policies of countries in the region to stop the conflict. All these actions isolated the RUF and its main source of support in neighbouring Liberia, former rebel and later President Charles Taylor. The international context — marked by memories of the genocide in Rwanda and other past failures in peacekeeping — influenced the Council’s position. The same level of interest should be expected at any time and for any similar situation, not just by accident of history.

IV. Participation of women

The issue that may best exemplify the gap between prescriptions and accomplishments in the four case studies is the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. In Afghanistan, women under the Taliban had been subject to draconian edicts, in the name of Islamic Law or customary practice that had kept them out of public life. Despite the repeal of Taliban decrees and the approval of new laws, discriminatory customary laws and practices continue. Measures taken to reverse women’s situation initially ensured their presence in the Emergency Loya Jirga of 2002 and the 2003 Constitutional Loya Jirga.The Constitution approved in 2004 contained provisions on gender equality before the law; a 25 per cent quota in the lower house of the National Assembly; and access to public services. During voting registration, separate registration centres were reserved for women. A Ministry of Women’s Affairs was established, supported by UNAMA, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Gender units and gender networks were created in UN agencies.The UNAMA Gender Unit, however, suffered from a two-year vacancy. Despite such efforts, women rarely occupy strategic level positions and their presence in Parliament does not guarantee them the same degree of power as that of their male colleagues. The large presence of warlords and their affiliates in Parliament continues to silence many women. When it came to the uncoordinated negotiations with the Taliban not only did women not participate, but also many of the gains made on women’s rights were endangered. Ultimate protection, one of the pillars of resolution 1325 (2000), could not be adequately implemented in an environment where there was pervasive insecurity and no peace to keep. In the meantime, despite the appearance of language of resolution 1325 (2000) in the UNAMA and ISAF resolutions, the gap between theory and practice was marked by the lack of resources and capacities; the context of a particularly traditional and insecure society; the weakness of political institutions; and the three overlapping and sometimes contradictory tasks of international forces: protecting the population, providing development assistance and fighting the insurgency. NATO and OEF were for example accused of showing cultural insensitivity in their military operations by entering houses in tribal areas where women were secluded. 208

Conclusion

The establishment of UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire took place almost four years after the approval of resolution 1325 (2000). Since its creation, UNOCI resolutions have contained specific language on gender issues in the context of peacekeeping. These resolutions request that special attention be paid to: ‘the special needs of women and children’ in the DDR, voluntary repatriation and resettlement programmes; violence against women and girls; and to the gender and child-protection components within UNOCI’s staff. The resolutions also mention the involvement of peacekeepers in sexual exploitation and abuse and recommend pre-deployment awareness training and disciplinary actions in cases of misconduct. Resolution 1739 (2007) goes fur ther, asking the Secretary-General to report on progress in gender mainstreaming throughout UNOCI and on the situation of women and girls, especially as it relates to the need to protect them from gender-based violence. Through its Gender Unit, UNOCI took several initiatives to strengthen local capacities. These included training of female candidates, national school advisers, national gendarmerie and police forces, and the development of a UNDP project to establish a centre for women and girls affected by the conflict, including survivors of gender-based violence. UNOCI was not, however, effective in protecting women from gender-based violence. Widespread atrocities against women were reported well after the combats had ceased. The Human Rights Division of UNOCI continues to document cases of sexual violence, but national authorities take no follow-up action. There is also a degree of responsibility at the level of the Security Council: its failure to activate targeted sanctions on individuals responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including sexual violence. More generally, a tough stance against perpetrators of human rights violations on all sides could have been a powerful tool for the Council to influence the behaviour of the spoilers of the peace process. In Kosovo, the societal deficit between men and women is significant. Upon arrival of the missions, illiteracy rates ran at 10 per cent for women and 2 per cent for men; in rural areas, 26 per cent of women aged 16-19 were relatively illiterate and 9.5 per cent completely illiterate. Today women remain largely absent from crucial activity sectors. But there are some noticeable exceptions in this grim picture: the three most important media are run by women, and women have developed powerful networks, such as the Kosova Women’s Network (KWN), open to the different ethnic groups. There is not a single mention of women in resolution 1244 (1999) establishing UNMIK and KFOR and approved before resolution 1325 (2000). A gender adviser was placed in the SRSG’s Office and later transferred to the Civil Administration Pillar. But while there was verbal support for gender mainstreaming, active commitment from the top levels was non-existent or rather weak, and did not translate into resources or policy decisions. A crucial achievement during UNMIK’s presence in Kosovo was the contested introduction of quotas for female candidates in party lists. However, few women were appointed to political office or integrated into the parties’ leadership structures, and the measure yielded poor results in terms of improving women’s participation over time. 209

In Sierra Leone, women and girls were frequently victims of abduction, sexual slavery, rape and all kinds of abuse during the war. Many were forced to collaborate with their captors and to perpetrate crimes. In some instances, those who took refuge in neighbouring countries were abused by humanitarian workers. Rape continues to be a practice after the war, although it is a ‘silent’, seldom reported crime. As to participation in decision-making, women were historically excluded from such activities. But as violence and political instability started, a Women’s Movement for Peace was organised that took an active role in promoting the call for presidential elections. Furthermore, the Mano River Union Women’s Peace Network was active in efforts to tackle the conflict and lobby for peace at the level of the political leaders of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Western diplomats and the UN. UNAMSIL was established one year before the approval of resolution 1325 (2000). As of 2001, UNAMSIL resolutions have introduced various gender-related aspects: identifying the widespread violation of human rights of women and children, including sexual violence; mentioning the recurrent serious problem of abuses of women and girls by peacekeepers; expressing serious concern at allegations of sexual abuse in refugee camps by UN personnel; and supporting the ‘zero tolerance’ policy for such abuse.The efforts of the Mano River Union Women’s Peace Network were encouraged. In addition, the important role of women and girls in conflict prevention and resolution and in peacebuilding was recognised in the resolution establishing the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). Despite these measures, it took a long time for UNAMSIL to assume the question of women and even to mention resolution 1325 (2000).The DDR programme was gender-blind and the mission only began integrating the prescriptions in its drawdown phase. UNAMSIL had a gender adviser with limited access to the senior leadership and resources. Several initiatives to mainstream gender within the mission and outside fell short of established objectives due to the absence of a holistic perspective. In summary, this study shows that in order to reduce the gap between the language of resolution 1325 (2000) and country-specific resolutions, and their implementation, several complex problems require action.These include pre-deployment training on human rights, gender equality, and on the mandate of the peacekeeping mission; increased troop contributions from developed and developing countries, including women; active and systematic policies on gender balance throughout the mission; senior level training on gender mainstreaming guided by international agreements; systematic gender analyses, based on sex disaggregated data, and their submission to the Council, with solid monitoring mechanisms; and placing women associated with fighting forces on equality with armed soldiers in DDR programmes. There is an urgent need to eradicate sexual violence during and after conflict.The tools available to the Security Council to push for the implementation of resolutions include targeted sanctions, systematic gathering of information on human rights violations, and promotion of women’s participation. Decisive measures should be taken through these tools to monitor the situation, determine responsibilities and apply sanctions to those responsible. These immediate measures should not detract from longer-term policies and actions proposed to achieve gender equality and ensure the participation of women in peace processes at all levels. 210

Conclusion

While implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) has been less than satisfactory within UN peacekeeping, civil society and especially women’s organisations have taken the resolution seriously, as the case of Sierra Leone shows. These efforts should not be ignored but strongly and sustainably supported.

V. Political environment

A favourable political environment at the international and regional levels is a key contributing factor to the success of a peacekeeping operation. At the global level, the decision to intervene and the support given to the missions deployed are conditioned by the priorities of the international agenda at any given moment. Although the case studies cover a relatively short period starting in 1999, they reflect the fluctuating priorities of the international community throughout the past decade, and particularly of the most powerful states. Until the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the main concerns on the international security front were associated with weak or collapsing states, and a fundamental goal was the restoration of the collective security system after its failures in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Following 9/11 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’, all crises where intervention could not be cast under the banner of the global fight against terrorism were sidelined or neglected. The 1999 intervention in Kosovo and the resources available for reconstruction and to the military and civilian missions deployed in the territory after NATO’s air campaign enjoyed widespread support from Western governments and public opinion. The Council gave its blessing to UNMIK and KFOR, but divisions within the P5, initially over the military intervention, would extend to the question of Kosovo’s future status. The EU, in turn, has not been able to reach unanimity on the matter. In Sierra Leone, the response to the serious setback suffered by UNAMSIL was quick and unanimous. It showed the determination of the international community not to allow a new failure of the UN peacekeeping system. Such an outcome would have further eroded its credibility as an instrument of international peace and security. As the international response to 9/11, the operations in Afghanistan initially enjoyed unanimous endorsement from the Permanent Five, with no dissenting voices within the broader membership. In Côte d’Ivoire, the early involvement of France, a former colonial power and a P5 with a permanent military presence in the country, mobilised the backing of the Council, but France was unable to maintain the decisive and unified support required to encourage compliance with the commitments undertaken by the parties and the effective implementation of the many resolutions adopted.This was part due to the resistance of the then US Administration under President Bush to authorise the troop reinforcements requested by the Secretary-General. The involvement and influence of neighbouring or regional countries, in turn, varied in each case. A comprehensive regional strategy is considered essential to the future of Afghanistan but presents serious obstacles.The Taliban rely largely on support networks from members of their own community 211

residing in Pakistan, its neighbour to the east and south, and represent a challenge to state authority and stability in the country.The Government of Pakistan has its own reasons to combine containment and appeasement in dealing with the Taliban. To the west of Afghanistan, Iran, a major country in the region and the second recipient of refugees, is limited by its strained relations with the West and neighbouring Arab countries.To the north, the Central Asian countries are preoccupied with their own security and their relationship with Russia. Yet, the ‘sharpened’ UNAMA mandate incorporates the task of supporting regional cooperation ‘towards a stable and prosperous Afghanistan’. Several efforts have been undertaken to promote dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but these have not gone beyond isolated initiatives. A unified political strategy, led by the UN with the support of the principal international actors in Afghanistan, could address the main regional challenges and create a peace-conducive atmosphere. In Côte d’Ivoire, several regional factors were at play during the conflict. Neighbouring Burkina Faso, many of whose nationals had been the target of violence under the rule of President Gbagbo and his predecessor Henri Konan Bédié, provided a rear base for rebellious forces. Another northern neighbour, Mali, was also sympathetic to the rebellion. Ghana appeared neutral and very active in the initial peace efforts. The most influential power in the sub-region, Nigeria, went from offering military support to the Ivorian president to increased hostility as the latter failed to comply with commitments undertaken before regional heads of state. The rather limited support Ivorian President Gbagbo had in the region can be explained by the almost xenophobic ideology his government allowed to thrive, a fact perceived by the country’s neighbours as a political and economic threat as Côte d’Ivoire had been hosting for decades an exceptionally high population of immigrants from all West African countries. While the initiatives taken by South Africa, ECOWAS and the African Union to move the peace process forward set a positive example of ‘Africanisation’, they have yet not yielded the expected results.The lack of a common reading of the reasons behind the conflict and the responsibilities of the Ivorian parties led only to halfway measures.After the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement, it is important for the region to continue to engage the parties to ensure implementation of long-delayed commitments. In Kosovo, the intervention agenda was heavily influenced by earlier experiences in Croatia and Bosnia. The situation in Kosovo had ramifications in countries of the region with a significant proportion of populations of Albanian ethnicity.The situation has changed substantially since 1999 — the prospect of renewed violence is remote and Kosovo’s neighbours, including Serbia, are at different stages of the EU integration process. The perception and use of identity as a justification for the conflict can only be resolved in the prospect of a regional integration strategy that effectively creates new bonds among the various communities. It is in this context that the role of the European Union will remain essential in the years to come. The war in Sierra Leone saw the intervention of foreign governments and mercenary forces that provided support in exchange for lucrative contracts and mining concessions. From Liberia, Charles Taylor backed the RUF with funding, personnel, weapons, logistics and training. At the sub-regional and international levels, there was considerable diplomatic activity among the many parties interested in the resolution of the conflict, including the then Organisation of African Unity, ECOWAS and 212

Conclusion

especially ECOMOG troop-contributing countries (Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana and Mali), the UK and the US, as well as the UN Secretary-General. The support of governments in the region for the ban on arms and diamond sales that were proved to have financed the war showed their commitment. ECOWAS heads of state exerted continuous pressure on Charles Taylor to stop supporting the RUF. In this context, the presence of UK troops was timely and welcome. It is also worth noting Guinea’s forceful military reaction to incursions from Sierra Leone that dealt a severe blow to the already weakened rebel forces. The possibility of regional and international consensus was crucial to the achievements of the peacekeeping presence in Sierra Leone. This study has examined the origin, content and implementation of Security Council mandates for operations deployed in four cases of intervention over the last decade, all implying some level of actual or potential use of force. It has sought to test the extent to which the prescription for success in peacekeeping operations derived from the Brahimi Report — the combination of political will expressed by Council decisions with the availability of appropriate resources to implement them — is still a valid parameter. The fact that the Security Council, in response to an initiative from France and the UK, stressed in a presidential statement the importance of ensuring that mandates are ‘clear, credible and achievable and matched by appropriate resources’,2 is a positive sign. The case studies also show the obstacles that can stand in the way to consensus and to securing the true commitment of the Council membership in support of the operations it established.The Council does not always go beyond the individual, sometimes contradictory, interests of its membership, particularly the P5, and the adoption of resolutions is not necessarily an indication of sustained political support for the missions deployed. Accountability — understood in the broader sense of responsibility for decisions taken — is at times shared with, or delegated to other international players, such as NATO. The legitimising role of the Council does not translate into effective control, or even guidance, of nonUN missions on the ground.Yet, these military operations have the power to enable or jeopardise the achievement of the political and peacebuilding strategies that underlie UN peacekeeping operations. Hence, coordination at the operational level should be complemented by substantive consultations among major non-UN security players and other states in the Security Council. Peace and security touch on the prospects of survival of all people and require a multinational approach: hence the need to engage all countries, especially those that can most contribute to security and stability in their own regions, in a political dialogue on these issues. Such a consensus-building effort is long overdue, and no organisation has more legitimacy than the UN to undertake it.

2

S/PRST/2009/24 of 5 August 2009. 213

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