Securing Europe: Western Interventions Towards a New Security Community (Library of European Studies)

Fotios Moustakis is Senior Lecturer in Strategic Studies at the Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth and was awarded his PhD in International Relations by the University of Aberdeen in 2000. He is the author of Greek-Turkish Relations and NATO and co-editor of Russian Foreign Policy since the end of the Cold War. Tracey German is Lecturer in Defence Studies at King’s College, London and author of Russia’s Chechen War.

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7. Securing Europe: Western Interventions Towards a New Security Community Fotios Moustakis and Tracey German

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Securing Europe Western Interventions Towards a New Security Community Fotios Moustakis and Tracey German

TAURIS ACADEMIC STUDIES an imprint of

I.B.Tauris Publishers LONDON • NEW YORK

Published in 2009 by Tauris Academic Studies An imprint of I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com Distributed in the United States of America and Canada exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 Copyright © 2009 Fotios Moustakis and Tracey German The right of Fotios Moustakis and Tracey German to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Library of European Studies 7 ISBN 978 1 84511 768 9 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress catalog card: available Printed and bound in India by Thomson Press (India) Typeset by Bookcraft Ltd, Stroud, Gloucestershire

Contents

Abbreviations Map 1: The Balkans Map 2: The Caucasus Preface

Introduction NATO and the EU: a shift towards building a security community

1

The application of a pluralistic security community in Europe: a new model for a new Europe? The concept of security: a general perspective Addressing aspects of security The security dilemma revisited Concepts and approach to security: the European Union Nato and the security community: a radical transformation?

2

Where now for Bosnia and Kosovo? Western actions in search of stability Yugoslavia’s demise: a historical perspective The Kosovo imbroglio: a historical overview Lessons learned from NATO’s intervention in Kosovo Kosovo’s uncertain future: where does peace lie? Serbia in the post-Milosevic era: security challenges Attempting state-building in Kosovo and Bosnia: a perpetual deadlock?

vii ix x xi 1 5 8 11 12 13 16 21 27 28 36 39 43 46 49

vi 3

Securing Europe Turkish-Kurdish relations and the European Union: contemplating the future A brief examination of Turkish national identity Examining strategic choices for the Turkish Republic: a brief overview The history of the Kurdish movement: overview Turkey, Kurds and the path to Europeanisation: challenges and dilemmas

63 64 66 69 75

4

Chechnya: the gulf between Russia and Europe Background The developing partnership between Russia and the EU Peripheral actors: NATO and the OSCE Conclusions

81 84 89 96 99

5

Georgia: seeking Western engagement Background Enter Saakashvili Taking a back seat: the EU’s involvement in conflict-resolution efforts NATO engagement The US and Turkey: strengthening military security Conclusions

103 105 111

6

Nagorno-Karabakh: diplomatic deadlock Securing integration? Historical roots The OSCE: taking the lead Staying neutral: EU involvement NATO assistance International involvement: the US and Turkey Conclusions

128 131 134 138 142 146 150 151



Conclusion: Post-conflict Eurasia and the possibility of a security community system

155

Notes Index

159 197

115 119 123 126

Abbreviations

AG ASSR BTC CEECs CFE CFSP CIS CoE CSCE CSR DOS EC ECSC EIDHR ENP ESDP ESS EU EUCOM EUSR EXBS FRY FYROM GBSLE

Assistance Group Autonomous Soviet republic of Chechen-Ingushetia Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Countries of Central and Eastern Europe Conventional Forces in Europe Common Foreign and Security Policy Commonwealth of Independent States Council of Europe Conference on Security and Co- operation in Europe Common Strategy for Russia Democratic Opposition of Serbia European Community European Coal and Steel Community European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights European neighbourhood policy European Security Defence Policy European Security Strategy European Union US European Command European Union’s Special Representative Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance programme Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement Assistance Programme

viii GNP GTEP ICJ IDP IEA IFOR IJC IPAP IPAP ISAF JCC JDW JHA JPKF KDP KFOR KLA LOS MAB MAP NAC NATO NGO NRC NSC OAF OECD OSCE PARP PCA PfP PKK PS PSC PUP RAND RRM RS SAA

Securing Europe Gross National Product Train and Equip Programme International Court of Justice Internally Displaced Persons International Energy Agency Implementation Force Independent Judicial Commission Individual Partnership Action Plan Individual Partnership Action Plan International Security Assistance Force I Afghanistan Joint Control Commission Jane’s Defence Week Justice and Home Affairs Joint Peacekeeping Force Kurdish Democratic Party International Security Force in Kosovo Kosovo Liberation Army Law of the Sea Media Appeals Board Membership Action Plan North Atlantic Council North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non-Governmental Organisation NATO-Russia Council National Security Council Operation Allied Force Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Planning and Review Process Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Partnership for Peace Kurdistan Workers’ Party Socialist Party Pluralistic Security Community Patriotic Union Party Research and Development Rapid Reaction Mechanism Republika Srpska Stabilisation and Association Agreements

SRSG SSOP SSR TACIS TMC UK UN UNHCR UNMK UNOMIG UNSC US USSR WEU WTO

Abbreviations

ix

Kosovo’s Special Representative of the Secretary General Sustainment and Stability Operations Programme Soviet Socialist Republics Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States Temporary Media Commissioner United Kingdom United Nations UN High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Mission in Kosovo United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia United Nations Security Council United States Union of Soviet Socialists Republics Western European Union Warsaw Treaty Organisation

300 kilometres

200 miles

0

0

Internal and other borders * Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Internationally recognized borders

Kurdish-inhabited Turkey

FYROM*

Kosovo

Greece

Albania

Italy Montenegro

Bosnia

Serbia

Hungary

enia Slov Croatia

Austria

Slovakia

Czech Republic

d ol ov a

M

Map 1  The Balkans

Bulgaria

Romania

Ukraine

Turkey

Syria

Iraq

Russia

Maps

0

100 miles

100 kilometre

Internal and other borders

Internationally recognized borders

rm

Yerevan

Map 2  The Caucasus

iv

(A an ze r.)

ch

kh Nakhchivan

Na

ia

Tbilisi

Grozny

Chechnya

en

az

A

rgia li

va

in

kh

vk

Turkey

Adjara

Geo

So u Os th set ia Ts

North Ossetia

Nalchik

ia

Batumi

Kutaisi

Ka -Ba bar lka din ria o

Stavropol Kray

V

Poti

zia

ha

KarachaiCherkessia

Cherkessk

Stavropol

ika

Sukhumi

Ab k

ea

lad

Autonomous republics/ de facto independent states

Maykop

yg

Ad

n

Sea

Kalmykia

Russian Federation

Elista

Ingushet

0

Krasnodar

Krasnodar Kray

Rostov

zra

Black

Sea of Azov

Na

ge sta n

Makhachkala

Iran

ab Srteno ak panak h ert

go

Na ar

-K

Azerbaijan

Da

Astrakhan

Astrakhan

Baku

Sea

Caspian

Preface

In the new model of intervention that emerged from Bosnia and Kosovo, there was a division of labour amongst Western states, with US forces primarily responsible for high-end war fighting and Europeans more committed to the ‘peace-support operations’ phases and the subsequent building of ‘security communities’, i.e. integration into NATO and the EU. For Europeans this model (the establishment of a ‘security community’ in Europe) represents a ‘silver bullet’, and the emerging model could be seen as pointing the way towards a revolution in European affairs. This book will examine the emergence and practice of the new Western method of intervention (a military and political ‘soft’ approach), and assess its success and failures in the light of recent operations or interventions in the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo and the air assault on Belgrade) and in the Caucasus (Chechnya, Georgia and NagornoKarabakh), plus the Kurdish issue within Turkey.

1 Introduction

The purpose of this book is to argue that the plausible establishment of a security community in post-conflict Eurasia1 will contribute to the stabilisation of Europe’s periphery, focusing on the Balkan and the Caucasus regions. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the early 1990s presented the international community with some of its most difficult challenges in the post-Cold War era. Over the course of the 1990s, the multi-ethnic Yugoslav Federation and Soviet Union unravelled into separate, sometimes warring states, as the resurgence of nationalism accompanied the collapse of communism. This resurgence had particularly destabilising effects in the Balkans and Caucasus because of the myriad ethnic groups in the region and because the history of successive occupations by outside powers has left behind a volatile mix of ethnicity, politics and religion. Problems on Europe’s periphery can no longer be regarded as extraneous to the security of European states: instability and conflict in Bosnia, Kosovo, Turkey, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have implications both for Europe and for the wider international community. These conflicts undermine regional stability, not just because of the threat of a renewal of fighting, but because they have created security vacuums that

2

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are outside government control, providing ideal conditions for transnational security challenges such as terrorism, organised crime and illegal trafficking to flourish. They also undermine efforts to boost regional cooperation, hampering economic development and further destabilising the area. Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in August 2008 demonstrated that apparently domestic separatist disputes have serious ramifications for the international community and for relations between states. After several years of paralysis during the early 1990s, NATO and the EU used coercive diplomacy to bring peace to the Balkan region. Although the fighting has stopped, permanent stability and security have yet to take root. In Bosnia, 12 years after the Dayton Accords, the peace that exists between Muslims, Croats and Serbs is still an uneasy one. In Kosovo, even though Serb forces are gone and the Albanian population have returned to their homes, tensions are still running high: Albanians continue to exact revenge against the dwindling number of Serbs remaining in Kosovo, while at the same time we have witnessed attacks on the international peacekeeping forces (KFOR) by Albanian terrorist groups. However, the recent decision by the Kosovo-Albanians to declare the independence of Kosovo is by far the hardest blow for the Serbs in the series of secessions from the former Yugoslavia that began in 1991 with Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia. That decision resulted in the deep-seated disappointment of even the most staunchly proWestern Serbs, who suggest that there will be no easy rapprochement with the West following the declaration of independence by Kosovo’s overwhelming ethnic-Albanian majority. Policy-makers in Washington and Brussels may have seriously underestimated the Serbian bond with Kosovo, and they can only hope its severing will not lead Serbia into a new era of isolation that would be destabilising for the entire region. Another significant issue that Europeans are trying to address is negotiations with Turkey over that country’s accession to the EU.



Introduction

3

One obstacle is the Kurdish problem, which is a complex issue with multiple dimensions, including ethnic, social, economic, political and international factors. In relations between the EU and Turkey, the Kurdish issue looms so large that Turkey’s future EU membership depends on a peaceful solution to the problem. As one political leader has stated: ‘The road to the EU passes through Diyarbakır [the largest province in south-eastern Turkey, mostly populated by Kurds].’2 In contrast to the Balkans, significant Western intervention in the Caucasus region has been deterred by Russia’s influence. The Caucasus region – comprising the three South Caucasus states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, together with the Russian North Caucasus – occupies a key strategic location, squeezed between the Black and Caspian Seas, Iran, Russia and Turkey. This makes it an area of growing importance in the contemporary security environment, particularly given regional instability and the potential threat to Western economic interests posed by its energy resources and transport infrastructure. The region constitutes a vital land bridge between Asia and Europe, physically linking the Caspian Sea region and Central Asia with the Black Sea and Western Europe. Its role as a critical link between East and West is demonstrated most vividly by its increasing importance as a transport and communications corridor, and particularly as a transit route for hydrocarbons from the landlocked Caspian Sea region to international markets. The region is very volatile, divided by a series of unresolved conflicts, and this could jeopardise both the production and transit of hydrocarbons. These tensions are exacerbated by the fact that the region has also become a geopolitical battleground, with regional powers such as Russia, Turkey and Iran striving for influence in the face of growing involvement from the US, Europe and China. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the emergence of three new states in the region, this competition for leverage has been approached with renewed vigour. Russia continues to manipulate

4

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essentially local conflicts in order to achieve its own national objectives, undermining security across the Caucasus. Recognition of the growing significance of the Caucasus for European security is reflected in the EU’s gradual engagement with the region, particularly in respect of conflict resolution. Deepening EU engagement with countries of the South Caucasus was demonstrated by the appointment of a Special Representative (EUSR) for the region in 2003 and the inclusion of the states in the ‘European neighbourhood policy’ (ENP), while the 2004 NATO Istanbul summit placed special emphasis on the importance of the military alliance’s relations with the South Caucasus, appointing a Special Representative and liaison officer. This study will focus on three specific conflict-prone areas in the Caucasus: Georgia’s secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; Nagorno-Karabakh; and Chechnya, in the Russian North Caucasus. The Caucasus and the Balkans have been chosen as they are distinct geographical areas with a high level of separatist conflict, both inter- and intra-state, that was exacerbated by the collapse of the Soviet empire. Two key issues continue to confound Western policy-makers as they seek to build a stable security and political environment in Europe. First, how can the international community most effectively, and in a timely fashion, facilitate economic recovery, political reconciliation and the establishment of democratic governments in the Balkans and the Caucasus? Many regions/states continue to be governed by dysfunctional and/or corrupt regimes, whilst civilian control over the military remains weak. Furthermore, ethnic tensions continue to stand in the way of market forces and protracted separatist disputes undermine stability. Second, does the emergence of a self-sustaining order require the redrawing of borders? Should Kosovo remain viable as an independent state? What about Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia? And what is the impact of recognition of a separatist group or area by an external actor? In the light of the



Introduction

5

relatively limited progress that the Dayton Accords have made in restoring multi-ethnicity to Bosnia, should the international community drop its insistence that Bosnia remain a single-state entity? The answers to these questions will probably depend in part on how soon and whether these countries will be in a position to integrate into a ‘pluralistic security community’ (PSC). In defining the concept of a security community, Deutsch and his colleagues emphasised that one is created when social problems are resolved without resort to large-scale physical force. In their investigation they identified two types of security community. An ‘amalgamated’ security community sees a ‘formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit, with some type of common government after amalgamation’. A PSC, on the other hand, ‘retains the legal independence of separate governments’.3 Both systems require varying levels of integration between groups within the community. A society that is organised according to these values has every chance of a peaceful existence, both internally and with other democracies. In essence, a PSC is a union in which war is no longer contemplated as a possible way of resolving conflicts among its members.4 NATO and the EU: A Shift towards Building a Security Community In the new model of intervention that emerged from Bosnia and Kosovo, there is a division of labour among Western states, with US forces primarily responsible for high-end war fighting and the Europeans more committed to the peace-support operations (PSO) phases and the subsequent building of security communities, i.e. integration into NATO and the EU. Post-Cold War NATO and the EU constitute a security community, and consider the abovementioned PSC’s values and principles as a fait accompli in all its member-states. The states that are members of at least one of the

6

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two regional organisations (NATO and the EU) together form this security community.5 This book proceeds from the starting-point that in the present European security community there is a very stable nucleus, in which war and the threat of war between members has for all practical purposes disappeared. Collective security, joint military planning and integration, unfortified borders and free movement of people across them, and common definitions of both external and internal threats are all hallmarks of security communities. Once established, the security of the community is based on what Adler calls an ‘inside-out model’, where states see their interests as best served by being inside the community. No longer is security defined exclusively as the protection of sovereign national borders from military threat; rather, it is achieved through benefits accrued from participating in ‘zones of peace, prosperity and stability’ and a vision of a common future. A second starting-point is that this core of European security is surrounded by several peripheries, some of which are very unstable. The Balkans and the Caucasus regions are the most obvious cases. Given the fundamental stability at the centre of European security, how does one extend this security community from the core of Europe to its unstable peripheries? If the immediate peripheries are not stable, in principle their instability could spill over into the security core and thus threaten the gains already accomplished there. To this end, Western military and political interventions, bilaterally, regionally and through multilateral institutions, are designed to accelerate the range of democratic and market-oriented reforms. Europe’s efforts are specifically targeted to help facilitate, whether through ‘hard/military’ or ‘soft’ approaches, the integration of volatile regions into the EU and/or NATO. Participation in the European security community is believed to be critical to fulfilling the creation of a Europe that is whole, free and at peace.6 For Europeans this model (the establishment of a security



Introduction

7

community in Europe) represents a ‘silver bullet’, and the emerging model could be seen as pointing the way towards a revolution in European affairs. It was this model that was promoted by the West through its interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, its security considerations in the Caucasus, and in the post-9/11 ‘War on Terror’. The purpose of this book is thus to argue that, despite the flawed creation of a PSC in the Eastern Mediterranean (between Greece and Turkey7), the establishment of a security community in postconflict Eurasia will contribute and lead to the stabilisation of these peripheral regions of Europe. To this end, the book will examine the reasons behind the systemic instability in the Eurasian region, using Barry Posen’s securitydilemma theory. It will focus on a number of specific case studies dealing with the periphery of Europe, and will argue that integration into a European security community will contribute to the stabilisation and pacification of these regions. The first chapter outlines the theoretical framework of the book, examining the concepts of security, pluralistic security community and security dilemmas. Chapters Two and Three will initially provide a holistic historical and political overview of the former Yugoslav regions of Kosovo and Bosnia, as well as of Turkish-Kurdish relations. These two chapters will then address the prospects for establishing a security community in the Balkans. Chapters Four, Five and Six will concentrate on the Caucasus region and the case studies of Chechnya, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh, provide a historical background of the regions, and examine the current political and security situation. They will then critically address the measures adopted by NATO and the EU in their attempt to stabilise and expand security community ideals into this volatile region, and examine the problems that such action can create.

1 The application of a pluralistic security community in Europe A new model for a new Europe? Europe has only one big carrot, EU membership, with which to influence Balkan behaviour. (Paddy Ashdown, former High Representative in Bosnia) In 1993, at the Copenhagen European Council, the EU took a decisive step towards expansion, agreeing that: ‘The associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe shall become members of the European Union.’1 The Council also stated that: ‘Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required.’2 At the same time it defined the membership criteria, often referred to as the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ or the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA):3 1. Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. 2. The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.

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3. The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.4 The first of the Copenhagen criteria stipulates that states joining the EU must be stable democracies, operating under the rule of law, whilst respecting the human rights of all their citizens, particularly minority ethnic groups.5 As all aspirant states would have to achieve these goals, Deutsch’s ‘basic political ideology … [of ] constitutionalism and democracy’6 would then be achieved within the EU. Fulfilling the second and third Copenhagen criteria will only increase the interaction between states. To fulfil these criteria, aspirant states must construct ‘a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union, together with the ability to abide by the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union’.7 Although this constitutes a major challenge for many aspirant states, the rapid growth often witnessed by these economies will help to ease the pressure of integration on its citizens. Furthermore, these new members of the EU will become interlinked with other members of the PSC, which over time will lead to economic interdependence. Once this has been achieved, acts of aggression towards citizens or sites of economic importance by other states within the PSC will become self-defeating. One of the principal aims of the EU in the wake of the 2004 enlargement process has been to expand out to its neighbours the zone of ‘prosperity, stability and security’ that its citizens already enjoy. This approach has developed from an understanding that the organisation cannot keep enlarging ad infinitum, that there is a need to find new ways of spreading security beyond its borders to ensure the long-term stability of the EU, together with the security of its citizens. Unstable peripheries, such as the Balkans and the Caucasus, pose a threat because their instability could spill over into



A pluralistic security community in Europe

11

the security core and thus threaten the gains already accomplished there in terms of stable security. The EU’s failure in the Balkans during the 1990s was its largest and most public failure as an international actor, and prompted the realisation that peace and stability on the periphery are crucial to the security of the Union. The need to stabilise the periphery was recognised in the 2003 ‘European Security Strategy’, which spoke of ‘preventative engagement’ and the ability to act ‘before countries around us deteriorate’,8 and has given rise to the development of the ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ (ENP), which is seen as one way of stabilising the periphery without further enlarging the EU. It is the hope of the international community that Bosnia, Kosovo and perhaps some of the Caucasus countries can be reformed and eventually meet the standards for EU and NATO accession. Should this be achieved it is hoped that accession will not only protect these countries from the scourge of war, but will also contribute to the pacification of Europe’s most conflict-prone regions. The integration process is underway – some states will soon become members of the EU or NATO, whilst others have signed interim agreements such as ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreements’ (with the EU) or ‘Membership Action Plans’ (with NATO).9 However, some key questions remain. When will Bosnia and Kosovo be in a position to embrace the pluralistic security values mentioned above? Why is Bosnia, 13 years after the signing of the Dayton Accords, still unable to govern itself? Would Kosovo be viable as an independent state? In the face of stiff Russian opposition, should the integration of the South Caucasus into Western regional organisations such as EU and NATO even be attempted? The Concept of Security: A General Perspective Although security has always been a central concept in international relations, until recently it was one that few scholars attempted to

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define.10 Arnold Wolfers was almost alone in venturing a definition, though this has now become standard.11 There is a general acceptance that it implies freedom from threats to core values, but there is disagreement about what those values should be. There is also disagreement about whether the focus for security should be at the level of the individual, the state or the international community. From 1945 to the late 1980s the term ‘security’ was interpreted in a rather rigid and narrow sense to mean simply the military security of the state, that is, almost synonymous with military power. According to this simplistic logic the more military power a state possessed, or the more favourable to it the military balance was, the more secure it was. Similarly, the variety of potential threats tended in practice to be reduced simply to external military threats. To this end, the protection of the people within a state was the prime responsibility of that state, and not an issue of international concern. However, the dynamics of European security have become considerably more difficult to comprehend in recent years. An ‘amorphous threat-free post-Cold War security setting’12 has replaced the distinct alliance-wide threat from the Soviet Union. Second, new risks and threats (the so-called ‘soft security threats’13) have increasingly affected European security from regions immediately adjoining Western Europe, such as the Balkans and the Caucasus. As mentioned above, these conflict-prone areas are often beyond the control of central government and provide ideal conditions for transnational security challenges such as terrorism, organised crime and illegal trafficking to flourish. Addressing Aspects of Security Two processes have opened up the concept of security in international relations, creating a debate between traditional and nontraditional approaches that is important for this study. The first dynamic is the ‘widening’ of the concept of security. This widening



A pluralistic security community in Europe

13

process emerged as the Cold War drew to a close and an increased range of security risks came to the forefront of world politics. Neo-realists and liberals began to reject classic realist assumptions about anarchy and the inability of states to cooperate. At the same time the confinement of security to issues of the military, defence and coercive force was also questioned. Increasingly, academics, analysts and political actors argued for economic, political, social and environmental aspects to be included in security considerations. In contrast, traditional approaches to security argued that widening the concept of security would cause intellectual incoherence and a dilution of the field.14 However, today a general consensus exists, between various scholars and nearly all practitioners of security, that there is more at stake than solely military issues. It is evident that most international organisations and institutions, including NATO, the EU and the UN, embrace the broader agenda of security described above. The second dynamic, which is closely linked to widening, is the ‘deepening’ of the security concept. For some scholars widening was not enough of a break with the traditional conception of security, and ‘deepening’ came to define the ontological and epistemological implications of an extended security concept. This dynamic in the concept of security has led scholars to question what the referent objects of security are. Increasingly they have questioned what should be ‘secured’ and who the ‘securing’ actors are, emphasising the global-international-systemic level or the individual level, as opposed to the prevailing state-centric perspectives. Various sublevels have also been brought into the debate, such as regional security, and ideational levels, such as society or community security.15 The Security Dilemma Revisited Security can be both objective, in the sense there is a real threat, and at the same time subjective, that there is a perceived threat.

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What comes to be established as a security issue is essentially the product of political and social discourses. The post-Cold War period has witnessed a rise in ethnic awareness and consciousness, which in turn has led to the proliferation of conflicts in areas such as the Balkans and the Caucasus. This dramatic increase in the number of intra-state, as opposed to inter-state, wars has had a negative impact on international political stability. The effects of intra-state war are often felt over the border of the affected country, the so-called ‘spillover’ or ‘contagion’ effects, which can raise the risk of internationalisation. Severe political instability is likely to affect neighbouring countries (in both economic and political terms), and may even threaten to upset a global balance of power. For example, the war in Yugoslavia threatened stability in Europe and eventually led to the involvement of the USA, the EU and Russia. Consequently, NATO and the EU have increasingly emphasised that economic and political stability must be achieved before aspirant states join Western organisations. For the purpose of this book it is instructive to revisit Barry Posen’s classic realist concept of the security dilemma, which was applied to the inter-ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. On the basis of the theoretical premises in Posen’s analysis of the security dilemma in ethnic conflicts, part of his conceptual framework is helpful in understanding current events in the Balkans and the Caucasus. His analysis provides a constructive insight into one possible reason for the persistent systemic instability in the Eurasia region. The concept of the security dilemma was especially useful during the Cold War, as it facilitated analysis of how and why states sought to control or neutralise other states.16 However, Snyder and Walter now argue that the theoretical framework of the security dilemma is not only applicable in the context of conflict between states, but is also able to provide analytical insight into intra-state wars.17 A security dilemma is a situation in which each party’s efforts to increase its



A pluralistic security community in Europe

15

own security reduces the security of the others. Even non-offensive actions can invoke a security dilemma, and this is why it is important to disentangle predatory goals from those that ensure security. Jervis points out that ‘attempts to establish buffer zones can alarm others who have stakes there.’18 A security dilemma is a social situation with social and perceptual causes, not simply a fact of nature.19 What conditions must exist for a state to be overwhelmed by ethnic conflict? One prerequisite for the emergence of a security dilemma and ethnic conflict is the collapse or severe weakening of a state or empire. Posen argues that in such states ‘there will be competition for the key to security – power.’20 According to Posen, the security dilemma in an ethnic conflict is often defined by a security vacuum exacerbated not only by the mechanics of war, but also by the collapse of imperial regimes, a situation which certainly obtained in the Balkans and the South Caucasus.21 Such geopolitical instability creates not only perceptions of continuous threats, but also windows of opportunity for some ethnic groups to enhance their own security at the expense of others’. As a result, so long as the structural situation on the ground allows for perceptions of the possibility of greater power consolidation, adversaries will prefer continued conflict to settlement. Furthermore, by utilising military technology that is usually available to ethnic groups, together with high levels of mobilisation, group cohesion and the motivation to fight, offensive and defensive tactics are usually indistinguishable. Therefore any development which challenges the tense ethnic relationship between opposing groups will be likely to provoke a pre-emptive strike, since offence will be viewed as superior to defence. The negative misperception of the enemy that defines ethnic conflict is another catalyst for utilising preemptive tactics, especially when the groups in conflict share a history of mutual antipathy, as they commonly do in the Balkans and Caucasus. Posen also argues that preemptive methods offer tactical advantages that are likely to favour the outbreak of

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violence. These include protecting the group’s population, territorial conquest (including ‘ethnic cleansing’), and expropriation of valuable resources possessed by the adversary. According to the security-dilemma analysis of ethnic conflict, violence is likely to break out even when a ceasefire or other such agreement has put a temporary halt to hostilities, and also when simmering negative perceptions still exist and the history of conflict is relatively recent and protracted. Renewed hostilities will be more likely to occur when a group senses the opportunity for possible border redefinition.22 That is the case with respect to the situation in Kosovo, Bosnia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Chechyna, as well as in the Kurdish areas of Turkey after the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.23 It is widely believed that the security dilemma has considerable power to explain and predict the probability and intensity of military conflict amongst groups emerging from collapsing empires. The risks associated with these conflicts are quite high. Consequently, if outsiders are to understand and perhaps reduce the odds of conflict, they must assess the local group’s strategic view of its situation.24 It is therefore worth exploring the theoretical validity of this hypothesis in the context of the case studies that will follow. The selected case studies will test not only Posen’s theory, but also the rationale behind the Western decision to develop the idea of a security community in these volatile regions as the only effective tool for the pacification and stabilisation of the Eurasia region. Concepts and Approach to Security: The European Union In order to understand how an organisation such as the EU or NATO seeks to provide security, it is important to understand how it defines the term. Consequently it is pertinent to examine the EU, NATO and their relationship to ‘security’. The EU is neither a ‘superstate’ nor simply another organisation promoting international



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or regional cooperation. By its own definition the EU is both a political project and a form of legal organisation. The EU today is the progeny of the European integration process to date, and it is important to note that it is still an ‘ongoing project’. From its roots in the aftermath of the Second World War, and the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the process of European integration has led to a gradual expansion in competences, membership and power. However, while the EU represents an unparalleled level of integration in the areas of politics, economics and security, it is still defined and constricted by the member states that constitute it, and can be considered an intergovernmental, as opposed to a supranational, entity. In practice the EU is a set of common institutions to which member states delegate partial sovereignty so that decisions can be made at a European level. These institutions are the European Parliament, the Council of the EU, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Auditors.27 In day-to-day affairs such institutions have a great deal of autonomy, but they work within the legal framework of the various treaties ratified by the member states. As a consequence of its intergovernmental nature, the EU in fact represents a range of security philosophies, a fact demonstrated by the 2003 Iraq war and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441. Some member states are clearly Atlanticist (such as the UK), while others (notably France and Germany) seem to desire a more autonomous and more deeply integrated EU. National security and defence are at the core of a member-state’s sovereignty, and are likely to remain there for the foreseeable future. However, this has not stopped a distinctive security identity developing within the EU. The EU is intimately related to security: the very origins of the European integration project in the ECSC sought to make Europe so economically interdependent as to make war unfeasible and therefore free the region from the scourge of war that had haunted it for

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much of its history. Traditionally the EU has focused on soft security issues, promoting the development of stable economies and societies rather than military power. However, the central importance of a broad definition of security is reflected in the ‘pillar’ structure of the EU. The second pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the third, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), are explicitly expressed by the EU as reflecting aspects of security. The JHA pillar, also known as the area of justice, freedom and security, deals with internal security and promotes ‘human’ security, such as human rights, as well as freedom of movement, and judicial and police cooperation against crime, drug- and people-trafficking, and terrorism. The CFSP pillar equates to external security aspects. The European Security Defence Policy (ESDP), which has evolved as part of the CFSP, reflects the significant post-Cold War willingness and enthusiasm for developing the political and security dimensions of the EU,25 and its transformation from a purely civilian to an increasingly military organisation. Integration has been an ongoing way of promoting security, and by exporting its economic prosperity the EU has sought to counter instability on its periphery, specifically by integrating the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) after the Cold War. Similarly it helped to consolidate democracy and prosperity in Spain, Portugal and Greece during the 1980s. The EU can best be described in Karl Deutsch’s coinage as a ‘pluralistic security community’, and many have identified it as such, principally as security has developed through non-military channels of political and economic cooperation. In fact, the process of European integration to date has been described as the best attempt to construct a security community.26 The development of European integration from the 1950s in this respect can be seen as a non-security response to a specific security problem. The process of becoming a security community has led to the projection of a unique security culture or identity, distinctly



A pluralistic security community in Europe

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different to the territorial or collective defence aspect of security promulgated by NATO. As mentioned above, the EU has traditionally favoured soft, civilian security measures, such as engagement through reconciliation and the encouragement of reform through constructive dialogue and economic incentives, as well as emphasising soft governance, common security practices and the need for non-military responses. In the postCold War era, the EU faces a plethora of threats and has securitised issues such as migration, ethnic conflict and terrorism. The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) identifies a diverse number of security concerns, including poverty, open borders, interconnected infrastructure, competition for natural resources, energy dependence, organised crime and maritime piracy. According to the document: Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable … In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.27 The EU promotes a broad concept of security, in terms of referents ranging from individual ‘human’ security, the societal security of the various languages and cultures, national or otherwise, within the EU, through to the security of member states. Furthermore, the EU has a distinctly normative or moral approach, promoting peace, human rights and democratic ideals. This is not to say the EU is a ‘weak power’. As the ESS points out: As a Union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product

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(GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. As an economic ‘goliath’ it has considerable influence through trade policies and international development aid.28 The EU is part of the broader multi-organisational framework of European security that exists today, including NATO and the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe). In popular discourse it is suggested that there is a division of labour between different organisations, such that the EU represents economic and political security (low politics), and NATO represents collective defence and military security (high politics), as many do not envisage European defence, in military terms, outside of NATO. While this may have been the case during the Cold War, it cannot be said that harder elements of security cooperation have not been developing within the EU. According to the ESS: ‘Military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post-conflict phase.’29 The Yugoslav crisis and subsequent Balkan conflicts, especially in Kosovo, demonstrated that the EU, outside of NATO, had very little ‘hard power’, even when the conflict was on Europe’s doorstep, limiting its ability to act decisively. Consequently, significant steps have been taken to develop an autonomous military capability that would enable it to intervene in crisis situations. Nevertheless, in spite of these developments, NATO still remains, and will most likely continue to be, the principal provider of military security for Europe.



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NATO and the Security Community: A Radical Transformation? Since 1991 the NATO alliance has undergone fundamental changes. The end of the Cold War brought a dramatic change in focus as NATO adapted to a new security environment of instability and conflict close to its borders, by reaching out to its neighbours through a process of dialogue, cooperation and in some cases membership. It created the Partnership for Peace programme with former Warsaw Pact members, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATORussia Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, the Membership Action Plan and the Mediterranean Dialogue. In 2004 it launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with countries around the Persian Gulf. NATO admitted three new members in 1999 and seven more in 2004, extending its borders eastwards to Russia and the Black Sea.30 The requirement for regional stability also resulted in extensive NATO military involvement in the Euro-Atlantic area, including major stabilisation missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, a preventative military deployment in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), and an air campaign in and around Kosovo. The US terror attacks of 11 September 2001 demonstrated the need to stabilise failed states even further afield than the neighbouring Balkans. Although collective defence against armed attack remains the core NATO commitment, the allies recognise that their security must also take account of the global context. As a result, in 2003 NATO took over command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the first mission in its history outside the Euro-Atlantic area. However, the challenges the world faces in the 21st century cannot be overcome by military means alone. While NATO has expanded in size, scope and capabilities, the alliance and other democratic nations face a world far different from that of the 20th century. As former US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld emphasised, progress is necessary not only in the security part of the equation, but also in

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the governance, political and economic arenas.31 So it is no surprise that, despite the adaptation, even transformation, of a NATO faced by the security challenges of the 21st century, one other important element that has also emerged within the organisation is the concept of the security community as a prerequisite.32 In the Cold War the NATO alliance claimed to represent a mixture of security-community and military alliances. In the postCold War era, in a series of public declarations and statements (the 1991 Rome Security Concept, 1994 Mediterranean Dialogue and 1999 Washington Security Concept), NATO claimed to represent a security community, a claim that is widely accepted.33 Potential NATO members must adopt the following principles: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

established democracy; respect for human rights; a market-based economy; armed forces under civilian control; and good relations with neighbouring states.34

This demonstrates that NATO is not merely a military alliance, but has evolved to become a PSC whose members adhere to shared values and principles and in which war is no longer seen as a viable form of conflict resolution between members. The Washington Declaration signed in April 1999 states that alliance members ‘… will contribute to building a stronger and broader Euro-Atlantic community of democracies – a community where human rights and fundamental freedoms are upheld … where war becomes unthinkable’. The alliance is also committed to a broad approach to security, which recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. Since 1991 and the end of the Cold War, EU and NATO expansion plans have been premised on the assumption that Western



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Europe constitutes a ‘security community’ in which the possibility of war between its members has been reduced to zero. Thus, states which are admitted to the two bodies would find themselves in, and contribute to, the expanded European security community. The Membership Action Plan, which prepares countries for future NATO membership, has established norms and values for applicant countries that closely resemble Deutsch’s characteristics of an amalgamated security community, though sovereignty of states will be maintained. NATO acquired the capacity for developing a security community in the mid-1980s, after democratic governments came to power in Greece and Portugal and liberal democratic Spain joined NATO. Since 1978, with the sole exception of Turkey,35 liberal democratic regimes have prevailed in NATO countries. Security-community theory embraces the work of Deutsch et al. in the 1950s through to that of Adler and Barnett in the 1990s. Closely associated with it in the European context is the concept of democratic peace.36 First promulgated by Immanuel Kant and taken up in the early 1980s in the work of Michael Doyle, it has formed a central part of the Clinton and the Bush administrations’ strategic view.37 The ‘Global War on Terrorism’, which commenced in 2001, has in certain ways influenced the further development of a postmodern security community in Europe. It is notable that the principle of collective defence set out in NATO’s Article Five38 has for the first time been used not in its traditional meaning, against a clearly identified enemy, but as a means of cooperative security. At the same time, 11 September 2001 symbolises the unity of international liberal society, when defensive actions against international terrorism, including military operations in Afghanistan, have been widely approved. The terrorist attacks on the US stimulated cooperation between countries sharing liberal democratic values. It also stimulated the need for cooperative security, as the threat of terrorism is one of the greatest present-day problems. Moreover, the

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strengthening of liberal democratic values and security cooperation has been held in even higher esteem, a fact indicated by the NATO and EU enlargements of 2004. For PSCs, cooperative security arrangements seem to be one way of developing peace zones within their borders. ‘Cooperation should not be viewed as absence of conflict, but rather reaction to conflict or potential conflict.’39 Every security community has to be alive to the need for developing stability not only within the community but also on its periphery, and thus for an effective neighbourhood policy. For some academics, the establishment of cooperative security arrangements may even compensate for the need for valuesharing as a prequisite for joining communities.40 Both NATO and the EU have been active developers of cooperative security relationships in their neighbourhood, thus avoiding the emergence of security dilemmas. An appropriate partnership strategy is an important element in security communities, for intercommunicating with its neighbours and creating stability zones beyond its borders. The partnership strategy of the Western security communities – NATO and the EU – basically follows six criteria: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

the principle of democratic peace; the introduction of liberal democratic values; security and defence cooperation; enhanced communication; assistance programmes; and joint participation in peace operations.

Cooperative security arrangements that promote interdependence and cooperation make every effort to promote peace, to mitigate the possibility of conflicts and to avoid the emergence of adversaries. Indeed, such arrangements may facilitate a climate of collaboration and understanding among states, but under no circumstances can they replace the considerable benefits of a security community.



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Cooperative security arrangements may bring countries with different identities, norms and beliefs closer to the establishment of zones of peace and stability. Of course, the liberal democratic nucleus exercises a moral influence on the development of its cooperative security arrangements: Today, many states, especially in Western Europe, are less concerned about deterring or defending against aggression than about preserving the overall stability of their region. Such countries have much to gain by working together to decrease the likelihood of conflict. Their goal has often been called cooperative security.41 Cooperative security arrangements may be institutionalised, but may also be carried out through initiatives within the framework of other institutions. Typically, security communities try to establish peace and stability zones in their neighbourhood in order to avoid conflicts near their borders. The NATO initiatives EAPC/ Partnership for Peace (PfP),42 Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative are cooperative security arrangements, as are the EU’s Barcelona Process and its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP is viewed as one way to stabilise the periphery and ensure the long-term stability of the EU, together with the security of its citizens, without expanding further, and to promote its shared values, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law, in the hope of promoting stability. The EU’s external-relations commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner has described it as the EU’s ‘newest foreign policy instrument’, aimed at using the organisation’s soft power to leverage reforms that will facilitate the expansion of the ‘zone of prosperity, stability and security’.43 Crucially, FerreroWaldner believes it is about encouraging reform from within – not imposing it from outside. It is hoped that by encouraging stable democratic development within a country, the ENP can play a key

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role in conflict resolution. As Ferrero-Waldner affirms: ‘Through promoting democracy and regional cooperation, boosting national reform programmes and improving the socio-economic prospects of the region, it can contribute to a more positive climate for conflict settlement.’ Security communities are appropriate models for the postmodern security order. In the current post-Cold War European security environment, there are two emerging Western security communities sharing liberal democratic values – NATO and the EU. Every security community has to be aware of developing not only stability within the community but also an effective neighbourhood policy; and here, integration into the zones of stability and security is the preferable option. The establishment of cooperative security arrangements may be another option, as some states tend to cooperate in an attempt to decrease their security fears. However, participation in these security arrangements does not automatically compensate for the need to share values in order to join communities. While initiatives such as PfP and the ENP have contributed significantly to the development of better relations among states, they have failed to stabilise volatile regions on Europe’s periphery, such as the Balkans and the Caucasus.

2 Where now for Bosnia and Kosovo? Western actions in search of stability Churchill, when referring to the Balkan peninsula, once argued that: ‘The Balkan region has a penchant for producing more history than it can consume.’ That perception has once again proved to be true over the last 16 years in the former Yugoslavia. In the post-Cold War era ethnic identity and nationalism have become increasingly important factors in global conflict – causing many wars, and dominating the course of many conflicts. Events since the end of the Cold War illustrate the power behind a communal solidarity based on common language, religion, race, historical memories, values, territory, customs, symbols, myths and other cultural and physical attributes. Ethnic identity and the movements it inspires are based on a combination of interest (a desire to increase wealth and power) and affect (an emotional need for group solidarity and pride). However, the very features that unite the people of one group or nation divide them from others, creating the danger that if the feelings of nationalism or patriotism are very strongly held, outsiders who cannot share this loyalty will be looked upon with suspicion, or even hatred. Nationalism and patriotism are positive forces to the extent that they enable an identification and sympathy with fellow citizens; they are negative forces to the extent that they raise barriers which make it difficult to extend the same sympathy to other groups.

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Nationalism reflects a need for the establishment of an effective state to achieve a group’s economic and security goals. The most aggressive nationalist movements arise when states fail to meet that need, inciting people to create more effective states. Today, nationalism is flaring up where old states have collapsed and where mobilised populations are consequently demanding the creation of effective new ones. The problem is that many new states lack the institutional capability to fulfil the population’s demands. Thus managing post-communist nationalism hinges on improving the effectiveness of post-communist state structures. Nationalism is one of the reasons given for the collapse of both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, although both these occurred without the use of violence. Nationalism in Germany led to the re-creation of an older version of that country, with the reunification of East and West. Meanwhile, ethnicity and nationalism led to the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. The objectives of this chapter are thus twofold: first, it will describe and analyse the nature of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, which makes the area so problematic for European security. Second, it will seek to show that part of the American and EU solution with regard to the Balkans – such as the establishment of protectorates – is deeply flawed in terms of the West’s own values. If these issues are not addressed in the future, there might be serious implications for future operations. Yugoslavia’s Demise: A Historical Perspective Yugoslavia came into existence as a result of World War One. In 1914 only Serbia (which included what is now the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and Montenegro were independent states, while Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The movement for unification was led by Serbia, and was a major cause of World War One. On December



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1918 the ‘Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes’ was formally proclaimed and the named changed to Yugoslavia (‘Land of the Southern Slavs’) in 1929. Beset by nationalist tensions from the outset, the government was dominated by the Serbs, which, combined with an authoritarian monarchy, gave rise to anti-Serb movements amongst the Croats. World War II brought fresh turmoil to the region, and during the period 1941–45 national animosities were vented in a many-sided civil war, coinciding with the liberation struggle against Germany and Italy. When German troops invaded, Croatian fascists, the Ustase, welcomed them. Hitler rewarded the Croats with a nominally independent puppet state, which also incorporated Bosnia. Serbia also came under the control of German troops, while the Italians occupied Montenegro. A socialist Yugoslavia was declared by Tito in 1945, and the communists dealt with national aspirations by creating a federation of six nominally equal republics – Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. In Serbia, the two provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina were given autonomous status in an attempt by Tito to reduce Serbia’s dominance. However, actual power remained in the hands of Tito and the Communist Party. The country’s leadership developed a unique set of policies that within a decade transformed it into one of the most respected international actors outside of the two Cold War power blocs. Yugoslavia was distinct from other communist regimes in the Balkans in that the government and the Communist Party enjoyed a level of popular support that the other regimes did not. Communist rule restored stability, and was liberal enough to prevent the mass alienation so obvious in Czechoslovakia or Romania, the majority of the population enjoyed economic prosperity, and cordial relations with the West ensured a steady stream of loans. Yugoslavs under Tito possessed greater freedom than the inhabitants of any other Eastern European country.

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However, ethnic tensions posed a latent threat to domestic stability. National and regional conflict did erupt during Tito’s rule, but he regarded any form of national self-assertion as an inherent threat to the state and therefore vigorously suppressed it, applying the principle of ‘brotherhood and unity’.1 The federal structure provided the framework for some nationalities to create embryonic nation-states, which created structural tension between republican and federal authorities that was impossible to resolve. There was an on-going policy debate about the devolution of power to the republics, while demands for decentralisation were centred on economic issues. Croatia and Slovenia were the most developed republics, and had the most productive industries, although they constituted only 18 and 7 per cent respectively of the total population. By the mid-1960s Croatia’s exports, its lucrative tourist industry and its migrant workers accounted for 40 per cent of Yugoslavia’s foreigncurrency earnings. But the centralised economy meant that this foreign currency was collected and distributed by Belgrade. It is true that liberal reformers wanted individual republics to exercise far greater control over their earnings. In effect they wanted to impose local control over the transfer of wealth from the north-west of the Federation – Croatia, Slovenia, Vojvodina and northern Serbia – to poorer regions, such as Bosnia, Montenegro, southern Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia. Following Tito’s death in 1980 there was a gradual slide into crisis, as economic problems and ethnic divisions continued to deepen, and the country found itself burdened by a huge national debt which contributed to a period of recession, economic stagnation and a gradual fall in production, exports and living standards. Slovenia and Croatia continued to criticise a system which saw a disproportionate amount of their foreign earnings directed into the development of poorer, southern regions. Regional leaders, primarily interested in protecting local political interests, created virtual fiefdoms, in which nationalism supplanted communism as



Where now for Bosnia and Kosovo?

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the main source of political legitimacy. By the late 1980s the six republics and two provinces operated to a considerable extent independently of each other, while the republics made constitutional amendments which asserted republican sovereignty, disconcerting those at federal level. Without Tito’s tight rein on Yugoslavia and his policy of ‘brotherhood and unity’, ethnic and nationalist differences began to flare. However, nationalism was not ‘bottom-up’, but used instrumentally by leaders in need of a unifying ideology in order to preserve their power. In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic, a Serbian nationalist, became the Serbian Communist Party leader, and revived the idea of a ‘Greater Serbia’, to consist of Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo, the Serbianpopulated parts of Croatia, large sections of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and possibly Macedonia. The legally elected local assemblies in Kosovo, Montenegro and Vojvodina were overthrown and replaced by Serbian representatives. In early 1989, Serbia rescinded Kosovo’s autonomy and sent in troops to suppress the protests of the province’s population, which was 85 per cent ethnic Albanian. Milosevic exploited the growing discontent among those Serbs who regarded nationalist sentiment in other ethnic groups, unleashed by the more liberal political climate, as a threat to their dominant position in the federation. He used Serbian nationalism instrumentally to bring himself to the forefront of power and consolidate support for his rule amongst Serbs. Following the collapse of the Soviet empire across Eastern Europe in 1989, calls for democratic change within Yugoslavia intensified. The holding of multi-party elections in 1990 in all republics led to victories for communists with nationalist programmes in Serbia and Montenegro, and for centre-right parties with nationalist programmes in the other four republics. The election of nationalists in Croatia and Slovenia intensified the trend towards secession from the federation. Furthermore, the lack of political change in Serbia, which elected Milosevic president, convinced these republics that

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there was no possibility of reaching accord with Serbia, and they therefore began to take serious steps towards full independence. There were two differing concepts of the future state structure of Yugoslavia: Serbia proposed a new federation, a continuation of the single state run from Belgrade. Slovenia and Croatia proposed a confederation, and wanted Yugoslavia to become a loose association of independent, sovereign states similar to the European Community.2 Milosevic aggravated the situation with his declaration that the Serb nation was sovereign, and that all Serbs should live in one state – he implied that if there was not to be a Yugoslav federation, then all Serbs should live in one state. This was perceived as a potential threat by Croatia and Bosnia, which had large Serbian minorities. The Yugoslav deadlock was strongly reinforced by Western policy, which inflexibly insisted on a single Yugoslav state, thereby inadvertently backing Serbia. By 25 June 1991 both Croatia and Slovenia had announced their intention of seeking independence. With 90 per cent of its population ethnic Slovenians, Slovenia was able to break away with only a brief period of fighting. However, because 12 per cent of Croatia’s population was Serbian, Yugoslavia fought hard against its secession. Milosevic and the Yugoslav army leadership used the substantial Serb minority in Croatia to seize as large a part as possible of the republic. By the end of December 1991 Serbs controlled about 30 per cent of Croatia’s territory. The cease-fire signed in Sarajevo on 3 January 1992 formally ended the hostilities. FYROM (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) declared independence in January 1992; immediate recognition was accorded by Bulgaria, but not by Serbia or Greece. On the 27 April 1992 Serbia and Montenegro formally announced the establishment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and asserted that the new state was the legal successor of the former socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. However, the EC declared in June 1992 that this new government could not claim the international rights



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and obligations of the former Yugoslavia, because they had devolved onto the different republics. As Yugoslavia collapsed, the Muslims in Bosnia felt threatened by Serbian domination. Bosnia was the most ethnically diverse of the Yugoslav republics; according to the 1991 Yugoslav census, its population consisted of 43.7 per cent Muslims, 31.4 per cent Serbs and 17.3 per cent Croats.3 Prior to the collapse, the republic’s capital, Sarajevo, had more mixed marriages than anywhere else in the federation. To encourage ethnic harmony the communists had introduced a ‘three-key’ system in Bosnia: if a Croat was promoted in the administration, a Serb and a Muslim also had to be advanced. Muslims were more prominent in most professions, and generally more educated; the Bosnian Serb leadership, meanwhile, ascribed the professional failure of Bosnian Serbs to a supposed Muslim stranglehold on Sarajevo society, overlooking their own shortcomings. Most Bosnian Serbs wanted to remain part of Yugoslavia; however, a 1992 referendum on independence resulted in victory for the majority Muslims and Croats, who wanted secession from the federation. In April, following the recognition of BosniaHercegovina’s sovereignty by the EU and US, Serbian troops began to seize Serb-populated areas in the republic, and Croats began to seize Croat-inhabited regions. The war aim of the Bosnian Serbs was to establish control over a great arc of continuous territory, linking up majority-Serb rural areas. The Bosnian government’s war aim was the establishment of a unitary state in a multi-ethnic Bosnia, with a degree of centralised government. The Croat war aim was at best a Zagreb-dominated union between Croatia and Bosnia, at worst to divide Bosnia from the Serbs. But neither the Bosnian government nor the Croats could achieve their aims without first establishing Bosnia’s independence, and to this end they co-operated during the conflict. Nevertheless, even as allies, the Croats regularly obstructed military and food supplies to Sarajevo.

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In the first weeks of fighting the Bosnian Serbs, with the active participation of the Yugoslav army, seized about 65 per cent of the republic, and proclaimed the ‘Serbian Republic of Bosnia’. The Croats seized about 30 per cent of the land, and proclaimed the ‘Croatian Community of Herceg Bosna’. The poorly armed Muslims, however, only held 5 per cent of the republic’s territory. In a campaign of ethnic cleansing, carried out mainly by the Serbs, thousands of Muslims were killed and many more fled the country or were placed in Serbian detention camps; this permanently altered the republic’s ethnic composition. By 1993 the Bosnian Muslim government was besieged in Sarajevo, surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces. In Central Bosnia, the mainly Muslim army was fighting a separate war against those Bosnian Croats who wished to be part of a greater Croatia. The presence of UN peacekeepers to contain the situation proved ineffective.4 Western intervention and pressure to end the war eventually led to the Dayton Peace Accords of November 1995, which created two self-governing entities within Bosnia: the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Muslim (Bosnjak)-Croat Federation. The settlement’s aims were to bring about the reintegration of Bosnia and to protect human rights, but the agreement has been criticised for not reversing the results of ethnic cleansing. The Muslim-Croat and Serb entities have their own governments, parliaments and armies. A NATO-led peacekeeping force was charged with implementing the military aspects of the peace agreement, primarily the separation of forces. Croatia, meanwhile, took back most of the territory which had earlier been captured by the Serbs during lightning military campaigns in 1995; this resulted in the mass exodus of around 200,000 Serbs from Croatia. Rejection of socialist ideas and the subsequent collapse of communist leadership led to an institutional vacuum in the former Yugoslavia. The state was unable to meet the demands of



Where now for Bosnia and Kosovo?

35

its population. Generally the danger of extreme nationalism in post-communist states stemmed from an incapacity to meet social needs in areas of security, the economy and the setting-up of democratic institutions. The former Yugoslavia was ill-prepared for the problems associated with the dual transition to a liberal democracy and a market economy. Furthermore, a public mentality rooted in socialism and the one-party state could not become receptive to political pluralism overnight, and the shock of market reforms effectively strengthened diverse ethnic identities and paved the way for the intensification of conflict. Ethnocentric mobilisation displaced democratic plurality, and nationalistic party programmes in one republic demanded directly opposing responses from parties in another. Leaders such as Milosevic and Tudjman swept to power on the basis of their nationalistic sentiments, rather than through addressing the roots of problems – all problematic issues were simply blamed on other national groups. The Dayton Peace Accords, signed on 21 November 1995, brought the three-and-a-half year ethnically motivated war in Bosnia to an end.5 It also marked the implementation of a new post-Cold War international agenda for long-term peace-building.6 This agenda extended the sphere of international involvement in post-conflict environments, from merely keeping warring factions apart to developing long-term domestic, political and institutional solutions to conflict.7 The international institutions have increasingly described this new role as ‘state-building’.8 The international community’s current interventionist approach, undertaken by international institutions, is contained in the UN’s Agendas on Peace, Development and Democratisation, which since 1992 have stressed the importance of post-conflict state-building, along with the necessity for long-term involvement of international organisations in the postconflict building of political institutions and governance.9

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The Kosovo Imbroglio: A Historical Overview Subsequent to the Dayton agreement, the international community, and especially the West, witnessed the tragic events in Kosovo with shock. Serbian-Albanian relations and, in particular, the problem of the Serbian autonomous province of Kosovo are among the most complex contemporary ethnic, territorial and security problems in the Balkans and in Europe. For the Serbs, Kosovo (the Serbian word for ‘black bird’) is part of their national territory, a region of great strategic and economic importance, besides being the cradle of the medieval state of Serbia – an area with a concentration of Serbian historical, religious and cultural monuments and one where the legendary battle against the Ottoman conquerors had been fought in 1389. In other words, it is an area that symbolises the collective identity of the Serbian people, just as Jerusalem does for the Jewish people. For Albanians, Kosovo is a territory where they comprise an ethnic majority, where the Albanian national movement (Prizren, a league for the defence of the Albanian nation) was born in 1878, and an area that is still the focus of national irredentism. The problem of Kosovo is therefore a dispute over the historical rights of the Serbs and the ethnic rights of the Albanians, two conflicting principles of international law that make any attempt at international mediation in this dispute extremely complicated. It is instructive to take into account the following factors in order to understand the causes of this conflict. Kosovo is a region with the highest population growth in Europe. In the period 1948–81, its population doubled, completely upsetting the ethnic balance that had existed among the Albanians and Serbs. In a matter of 20 years (1961–81) the Albanian population increased its percentage of the overall population from 67 to 77.4 per cent, while the Serbian proportion fell from 27 to 14.9 per cent, with the Montenegrins declining from 3.9 to 1.7 per cent.10 Secondly, despite large investments on the part of the federal government, Kosovo remained the most underdeveloped region



Where now for Bosnia and Kosovo?

37

of the former Yugoslavia, because of its high demographic growth, traditional social structure, misguided investments and various other factors.11 On a broader scale, the problem of Kosovo over the past 15 years or so has been transformed under the influence of the challenges occurring in Europe. In the old bipolar Europe Yugoslavia was a respected country, one of the leaders of the non-aligned movement. Its stability was supported by both America and the Soviet Union. Albania under Enver Hoxha, on the other hand, was a rigid communist dictatorship, and all its attempts at internationalising the issue of Kosovo fell on deaf ears. Under the influence of the regime in Tirana, many political groups of Albanians in Kosovo shared the same ideology, which isolated them even more. The crisis that exploded in the Soviet bloc and the policy of the West upset this balance, and the Eastern European nationalist movements became allies in the struggle against the communist regimes, indirectly affecting the international position of Yugoslavia, which in the meantime had lost its privileged status as a strategic buffer between East and West. Consequently, the nationalist movement of the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo gradually attracted the attention of influential Western circles, especially after the collapse of Hoxha’s dictatorship in Albania. Their activities were also enhanced by wellorganised Albanian emigration to the USA and Western Europe (especially to Germany, the Benelux countries and Scandinavia). The cause of the conflict can also be attributed to the influence of democratisation and liberalisation in Eastern Europe. In a multiracial country such as the former Yugoslavia, democratisation could turn into racialism. It is argued that the wave of East European democratisation completely destroyed the balance in Yugoslavia, which started to become destabilised in the political absence of Tito and with economic problems in the wake of the oil shock. Democratisation facilitated more open criticism of the ruling regime; but at the same time, people were able to make racialist

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speeches. During the 1990 elections in the former Yugoslavia many politicians tried to gain popularity by appealing to the people’s racialism as a way of averting their complaints about the economy.12 The liberation of the mass media also strengthened racialist trends. Thus, in many cases racialist politicians and the mass media together stirred distrust among different races. Another important factor was the abolition by Milosevic of the 1974 federal constitution, which (according to Serbs) had practically reduced Serbia to a position of equality with its province (Kosovo had been given the right of veto over any changes in the Republic of Serbia’s or the federal constitutions). The jurisdiction of Kosovo was extended even further, as far as to include the right to ratify international agreements.13 Serbia considered these reforms the basis of an ‘asymmetrical federalism’ and abolished Kosovo’s autonomy, stripping the province of its separate representation in Yugoslavia’s government. This decision was confronted by a boycott on the part of two million Albanians, who subsequently established a parallel state with a parliament, a president, taxation and an education system. Remittances from half a million Kosovars living abroad kept money flowing into Albanian schools and other important institutions. The Albanian boycott of the multi-party elections in Serbia in 1990, 1992 and 1993 paradoxically strengthened the power of the leading Serbian parties, and widened the political differences between the Serbs and the Albanians. Political analysts consider that if they had participated in the ballot they would have considerably changed the political balance in the country.14 Lessons Learned from NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo The war waged by NATO against the former Yugoslavia in 1999 marked a significant turning point, not only for America and NATO but also for the West as a whole: the principle of state sovereignty



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had been subverted in the name of humanitarian intervention. In the winter of 1999, former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, in an article entitled ‘NATO’s Success in Kosovo’, stated that the ‘air campaign achieved every one of its goals’. ‘After 77 days, with no casualties of its own, NATO had prevailed.’15 General Shelton, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, claimed that NATO’s second campaign in the Balkans had been an ‘overwhelming success’.16 President Clinton declared that Operation Allied Force (OAF) had ‘proved that a sustained [air] campaign, under the right conditions, can stop an army on the ground’.17 Javier Solana, General Shelton and President Clinton had adequate reason for praising the air campaign and celebrating the capitulation of Serbia’s president, Slobodan Milosevic. By mid-June 1999, after 11 weeks of allied air strikes, Serb forces were expelled from Kosovo and replaced by a ‘robust’ peace-keeping force under NATO command. Russia, a state that had vehemently condemned air strikes against Serbia, decided nonetheless to join Kosovo’s Implementation Force (KFOR). While the UN was unable to legitimise the NATO campaign, on 10 June 1999 it passed UN Security Council Resolution 1244 authorising the ‘immediate deployment of international security and civilian presences into Kosovo for an indefinite period’.18 One question that comes to mind while contemplating the intricacies of any conflict is whether it was preventable. While a post-mortem is not always practicable, or even desirable, to draw adequate lessons from NATO’s intervention in Kosovo one must first attempt to understand why the allies had to resort to coercive war techniques, in a region where perhaps early intervention could have prevented the crisis from taking place. One of the prime predicaments throughout the West’s interaction with Milosevic seems to have been the adoption of a half-hearted and non-committal approach to finding a viable and workable diplomatic solution to the emerging crisis in Kosovo. Lawrence

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Freedman claims that during the Dayton settlement the plight of the Kosovar Albanians had been completely neglected19 – and this despite the fact that Milosevic had abolished the 1974 constitution in Kosovo, and thus had stripped Kosovar Albanians of the power they once had in a state now run by a Serb-dominated regime.20 In 1996 the International Commission on the Balkans stated that the power of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was growing in strength compared to Ibrahim Rugova’s non-violent, Gandhian resistance movement, and that this fact could breed terrible violence.21 The EU officially recognised the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without even officially enquiring about the fate of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population or of its minority Serb population. Freedman emphasised that the West’s obsession with the ‘CNN effect’ allowed NATO’s member states to act only when pictures of thousands of refugees filled Western television screens. He claimed that although the West was eventually right to act on behalf of the victims, it was wrong not to act before the victims had been created.22 In the late 1990s, while the KLA gained serious attention23 and began to pose a comprehensive threat to Serbian authority in Kosovo, the West’s reserved attitude failed to appreciate the implication a KLA offensive might have on the ethnic Albanian population within Kosovo. As a result, on 22 March 1999 Serb forces launched an offensive against the KLA and subsequently against non-KLA ethnic Albanians. The number of Serb troops in Kosovo had increased to 36,000, with another 8,000 in transit, while 800,000 Kosovar Albanians made their way to the Albanian and Macedonian borders.24 On 24 March, NATO began its 78-day air campaign to compel Milosevic to withdraw his troops from Kosovo, in order to ‘protect thousands of innocent people in Kosovo from a mounting military offensive’.25 NATO’s air campaign was successful: on 3 June Milosevic decided to withdraw his troops from Kosovo. The primary political



Where now for Bosnia and Kosovo?

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objective behind the use of coercive war techniques had been achieved. However, this did not mean that the campaign was free from error: on the contrary, success was only attained at an undeniably high cost. The prospect of complete success seems to have been partially eclipsed for two primary reasons: first, the practice of gradually escalating the use of air power rather than using decisive force from the beginning; and second, the alliance’s decision not to deploy ground troops. Although advocates of air power claimed that Kosovo exhibited ‘one of history’s most impressive air campaigns’,26 and that air power was like a ‘silver bullet – an infallible, invulnerable instrument with universal application’,27 its utility seems to depend upon the degree to which it is used. In Kosovo, while air power largely contributed to forcing Milosevic to surrender,28 the gradual escalation in bombing, rather than the decisive use of force, seemed to have worsened the humanitarian conditions within Kosovo rather than improved them. The alliance’s expectation that Milosevic would surrender early seems to have emanated from the assumption that the ‘Bosnian model’ would work in Kosovo.29 According to Daalder and O’Hanlon, the allies failed to realise that Kosovo was not Bosnia. Kosovo was the patriarchate of the Serb orthodox Christian Church, and Milosevic would not surrender his authority over the province unless he was forced to do so. Also, unlike Bosnia, where the Serb leadership had been under tremendous pressure from Croats and Bosniaks, in Kosovo the KLA did not pose a substantial threat. Hence Milosevic had less reason to surrender.30 The only way to force the Serbian leadership to capitulate earlier would have been to use air power decisively from the beginning of the campaign, together with the threat of ground forces. Tarak Barkawi claimed that NATO’s decision-making ‘presented insoluble strategic dilemmas’.31 While NATO intervened on the cheap,32 the absence of ground troops increased the cost of

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success. Unwillingness on the part of the allies to commit ground forces affected the campaign in two predominant ways: first, as Benjamin Lambeth has claimed, by not deploying ground troops NATO allowed Milosevic to believe that the alliance was not fully committed to achieving its stated objectives.33 Second, while air power provided gratification without commitment,34 it was initially unable to arrest the Serbs’ ability Serbs to mount brutal attacks on the Kosovar Albanians.35 From the beginning of the campaign, the military logic of Operation Allied Force was a matter of intense, even bitter debate. In short, at least at its inception, the Kosovo air campaign was an exercise in coercive diplomacy rather than a concerted effort to prevail through military action by destroying the enemy’s capacity to wage war. However, NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo had a positive impact on the alliance’s long-term viability, because it confirmed that NATO was able to redefine itself not only as the core of an enlarged and reshaped security community, but also as a suitable tool for crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic region. Furthermore, the experience of the intervention demonstrated that the alliance remained the central element of the European ‘security architecture’ and the ‘Western model’ of intervention. Above all, the Kosovo experience gave new impetus to debates on a more appropriate future distribution of responsibilities, and called for a more pragmatic division of labour between NATO and the EU. NATO’s decision to intervene in Kosovo without an accompanying UN mandate, however, seemed also to have posed a conflict between legality and legitimacy.36 ‘Non-interventionists’ claim that force can be applied and legitimated under only two circumstances: a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) enforcement action under either Chapter VII or Article 51 of the UN charter.37 ‘Interventionists’ on the other hand, claim that military intervention without UN sanction can be legitimated under specific circumstances. They refer to the ideas of Hugo Grotius, who claimed: ‘The



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rights of the sovereign could be limited by principles of humanity.’38 In Kosovo, NATO defended its case for intervention according to the logic expounded by Grotius, and on the grounds that Belgrade’s disregard for UN resolutions 1199 and 1203 justified immediate engagement.39 Kosovo’s Uncertain Future: Where Does Peace Lie? Observing the outcome of Operation Allied Force, one can highlight the following parameters of the Kosovo imbroglio: first, the future of Kosovo and the prospect of lasting peace and security in the Balkans remain uncertain, despite the international community’s clear endorsement of Kosovo’s independence (although currently rejected by Serbia and Russia). It seemed clear to one school of thought that as long as Milosevic remained in power and the Serbs in Serbia were not made to account for their atrocities in Kosovo, the Kosovar Albanians were unlikely to give up their radicalism. An International Crisis Group Report noted in its conclusion: As long as Serbia remains a dictatorship and the majority of Serbs do not come to grips with the crimes committed in their names in Kosovo, Kosovo Albanians will feel threatened by Belgrade and remain prone to nationalism and ethnic intolerance. Continuing instability in Albania and its attendant crime, nationalism and poverty will also hinder stability in Kosovo.40 The gradual normalisation and democratisation of Serbia had, inter alia, clearly unnerved Kosovo’s Albanian political elite, since their ambition for an independent state was becoming a distant and unrealistic goal. Analogies of possibilities were drafted around a UN protectorate. But for the Albanians there are no longer any illusions of an independent state. It was not a surprise when in a 2001 article Isa Blumi argued that:

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Many [Albanians] see the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and its widely corrupt cadre as barriers to the future. Kosovars see Milosevic’s allies operating with impunity in Mitrovica and Gjiian and more repressive gestures from its judiciary have recently convicted 143 Kosovar hostages to long terms in Serbia jails.41 Representatives of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have also agreed that the position of ethnic minorities in Kosovo is still far from acceptable. Undoubtedly, tough and unrelenting questions are being asked about the performance of the nineyear-old international protectorate in Kosovo. The signs so far reveal that NATO and UNMIK are proving incapable of stamping out crime or re-establishing any kind of inter-communal harmony.42 On the contrary, the extreme elements of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) have signalled that the international community can expect a possible re-composition of the whole region through violent means in the near future. It is apparent that the KLA’s aspirations for unification of all the ‘conquered Albanian population’ are high on its agenda.43 Nevertheless, NATO’s dynamic presence in the region represents a safety valve for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Balkan region. By installing KFOR in Kosovo, the US and the EU have secured their joint military presence in a part of the former Yugoslavia for some time to come. However, it is evident that the creation of a multi-ethnic society in Kosovo, which was supposed to be one of the objectives of NATO’s intervention, now appears an impossible dream. The events of 1999, the war and the ensuing psychological and moral damage have created a situation in which one can only speak of re-establishing relations between the Albanians and the Serb, if this is possible at all, in entirely changed conditions. Official Belgrade would have to adapt to a new approach, and finally accept the (to it) harsh reality in Kosovo. Since the Albanians will never



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accept a Serb-dominated federation, it is imperative for the leaders of Kosovo to declare forcibly that Serbs and Gypsies will be welcomed and protected not only in enclaves, but within Kosovo’s society as a whole. This approach can only be effective if the whole Albanian population will endorse it.44 The truth of the matter is that the international community was only prepared to discuss the final status of Kosovo if multi-ethnic harmony in Kosovo were ensured. With that said, the Europeans have now expressed their willingness to accept an independent Kosovo, despite fierce opposition from Serbia and Russia, and from other countries such as Cyprus and Spain. Serbian and Russian diplomats argued that, according to UN resolution 1244, Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia, and historically has always been within the latter’s borders. Furthermore, they argued that if Kosovo is granted independence, it will serve as a precedent to many regions across Europe (Catalonia, the Basque provinces, Flemish and Walloon regions of Belgium, Northern Cyprus, Transdinestria, Chechnya, Abhkazia, South Ossetia) which have similar separatist ambitions.45 Former Russian President Vladimir Putin, a fierce opponent of Kosovo’s independence, argues that: ‘If people believe that Kosovo can be granted full independence, why then should we deny it to Abhkazia and South Ossetia?’46 On the other hand one must not forget the rationale behind the Europeans’ decision to support Kosovo’s independence. They might be divided again, as they have been in the past, regarding similar issues in the Balkans. But in the end, they had to come up with some kind of agreement and finally a solution, since Europe’s security is more important than insecurities in the Balkans. Whether independence for Kosovo will trigger off a series of separatist demands in neighbouring Bosnia (among Bosnian Serbs) and Macedonia (among the Albanian minority), or anywhere else from Chechnya to Catalonia, remains to be seen. It is widely believed that even though the status of Kosovo may be resolved the security challenges in the Balkan region still remain.

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Serbia in the Post-Milosevic Era: Security Challenges It is true that many people have taken credit for the fall of the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic: for example, Vojislav Kostunica, in uniting the Serbian opposition; the Serbian people, in rising up against Milosevic; George Bush Sr, in initiating the policy of containment and of sanctions against Milosevic in the early 1990s; Bill Clinton, in expanding that policy and standing up to him in Bosnia and Kosovo; and the leaders of NATO, in holding firm against the Serbian leader despite his many attempts to divide the alliance.47 However, the catalyst for the removal of Milosevic was the Serbian opposition’s realisation that normality could not return to their lives so long as Milosevic was at the helm. His 13-year rule had brought nine-tenths of the Serbian population to the brink of poverty.48 Serbia’s economic, political and social infrastructure had been suffocated by a devastating combination of socialism and sanctions, and a bizarre coalition of mafiosi and nomenklatura. High expectations have been raised among the international community since Kostunica and the leaders of the Democratic Opposition (DOS) took power in Serbia. Undoubtedly, positive and significant changes have taken place: the Serbs have regained their self-respect and the respect of the international community by peacefully ousting Milosevic, and the country and new leaders have initiated a fresh start. Independent media are back on air and are no longer forced to pay draconian penalties, while the country is collectively making attempts to come to terms with its past; state television has been showing the woeful living conditions that some 70,000 ethnic Albanians must endure in the southern Serbian municipalities. Serbs are no longer the pariahs of the world. Yugoslavia has been admitted to the United Nations and to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and is co-operating with the International Monetary Fund and the Stability Pact for Southeastern



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Europe. Diplomatic relations have been restored with NATO countries, as well as with neighbouring Bosnia, Albania and Slovenia. For the first time in over a decade, Belgrade has hosted concerts performed by Slovenian and Croatian bands. Despite the justifiable wave of initial enthusiasm, Serbia is today a different place, with some accumulating and unresolved issues. Its recovery from the economic decline of the war years continued during 2006. With growth of 5.8 per cent in 2005, output is now more than 40 per cent up over 2000. Privatisation and organic growth have fuelled a decisive shift away from socialism, with some 60 per cent of non-governmental, non-agricultural employment now in the private sector, almost double its share of five years ago. Inflation dropped sharply, from 17.7 per cent in 2005 to 6.6 per cent in 2006. However, structural and institutional reforms stalled during 2006, with the government demonstrating reluctance to use bankruptcy for the remaining socially-owned companies, while state-owned utility companies continued to grapple with poor governance. The incomplete state of reform is reflected in unemployment of more than 20 per cent, and a current-account deficit that exceeds ten per cent of GDP. Meanwhile, the implementation of a National Investment Plan at the end of 2006 identified key sectors for the development and support of economic growth.49 Corruption, however, remains one of the most important problems facing Serbia. While there are some indications that it may have become less rampant in recent years, available evidence suggests that corruption levels are still high, while trust in key institutions is low. The impact on citizens is significant. Day-to-day corruption can put a substantial strain on the poorest and most marginalised groups, while frequent scandals involving corruption among the highest public officials undermines people’s confidence in the future, particularly among the young. Concurrently, Kostunica’s government attempted desperately to hold together the remains of the federal Yugoslavia. Montenegro,

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the only republic yoked to Serbia in what remained of the old Yugoslav federation, represented one of the main security challenges for the current regime. Milo Dujkanovic’s election in December 1997 resulted in Montenegro following an increasingly divergent path from Serbia in economic, social-security and foreign policies, and demanding a redefinition of the constitutional relationship between the two members of the federation. Milosevic’s removal from power, and the subsequent Montenegrin referendum in May 2006, constituted a litmus test for the status quo of the republic. Montenegro’s pro-independence faction, led by Prime Minister Djukanovic, managed to win 55.5 per cent of the vote, just 0.5 per cent above the baseline set by the EU for the referendum to be considered successful. Thus 21 May 2006 marked the end of the loose union of Serbia and Montenegro, a federation that had just five joint departments. It was the end of a state which many also called ‘Solania’,50 due to the major role the EU Foreign Security Policy High Representative Javier Solana had played in its creation only three years earlier. All the developments mentioned above, and especially the declaration of Kosovo’s independence, have seriously damaged EU-Serbian relations. While it is true that those relations have entered a very difficult period, it is also the case that Serbian integration into a European security community is considered by most European policy-makers as vital for the stability and security of southern Europe, and central to the success of the EU’s regional strategy for the western Balkans. Unfortunately, the main ‘carrots’ the EU has to dangle in front of Serbia – the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and the possibility of accelerated progression to candidate status – are for the time being ineffective. For this reason the EU needs to adopt a more effective communication strategy for Serbia. The objective should focus on re-engaging Serbian society in an attempt to promote European ideals. It is important that the EU should reinforce its political engagement



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with the country and stand ready to assist with reforms in EU integration. The prospect of lifting the visa regime remains the single most effective way for the EU to convince Serbian citizens that the EU really does care about their fate. Attempting State-building in Kosovo and Bosnia: A Perpetual Deadlock? The passing of UN Security Council’s resolution (UNSCR) 124451 brought an end to NATO’s bombing campaign in Kosovo. This campaign was started in an effort to stop the Serbs’ ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanians from the province of Kosovo. UNSCR 1244 called for: the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organisations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo … which will provide transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.52 Kosovo thus joined Bosnia, as the second international protectorate in Europe.53 As well as the task of creating ‘democratic self-governing institutions’ the UN interim administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) is mandated under UNSCR 1244 to perform several other functions: 1. to perform civilian administrative functions within the province;54 2. to promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and selfgovernment for Kosovo;55

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3. to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status;56 4. to maintain civil law and order and promote human rights;57 5. to assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.58 To achieve these objectives UNMIK’s Head of Mission, who is also the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), is invested with significant powers over and above those of the elected Kosovan politicians. The reserved powers of the SRSG include: • • •

•

‘full authority to ensure that the rights and interests of communities are fully protected’;59 the power to ‘dissolve the assembly and call for new elections’;60 ‘final authority to set the financial and policy parameters for, and to approve, the Kosovo Consolidated Budget’61 and ‘monetary policy’;62 and ‘exercising final authority regarding the appointment, removal from office and disciplining of judges and prosecutors’.63

Effectively UNMIK endorses all legislation and approves all senior public appointments, while the SRSG is not answerable to any elected institution. UNMIK can disband Kosovo’s government and dismiss or suspend judges and civil servants without having to submit its decisions for review by any independent appeals body.64 It can also impose legislation and create new institutions without providing any justification to the Kosovo people. Lastly, its mandate is open-ended.65 It is instructive to mention here that on 10 December 2003 UNMIK published its ‘Standards for Kosovo’.66 The institutional and social reforms set out in this document describe a Kosovo where public institutions are representative and democratic and where the



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rule of law is effective, respected and accessible to all. In short, the standards that UNMIK has set for Kosovo envisage a stable and democratic province conforming to ‘European standards’.67 In this context, the EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process Tracking Mechanism oversees Kosovo’s institutions.68 Currently, with the support of the EU, the Government of the Republic of Kosovo has approved a ‘Plan for European Integration 2008–2010’, which includes the creation of mechanisms and of more comprehensive and advanced institutional structures, drafting different strategies and building a stronger partnership with civil society and the citizens of Kosovo in the process of European integration.69 This demonstrates that Kosovo is a key priority for the EU, and that the future of the western Balkans lies firmly in the Union’s European perspective. Even though significant progress has been made in the Balkans – particularly since Slobodan Milosevic’s fall from power in the autumn of 2000 – there is still much work to be done to ensure that successor states such as Bosnia and the autonomous province of Kosovo70 become stable, democratic, economically self-sufficient, lawful and secure partners in a regional and European framework. The current mode of 21st-century military intervention not only presupposes the destruction of the enemy but also includes the reconstruction of the affected/attacked areas/states. A successful military attack, as witnessed in Bosnia and Kosovo, will thus be followed by the deployment of UN peace-keeping forces, followed by nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), while NATO and EU provide crucial assistance in the reconstruction of the war-torn countries. However, the establishment of a stable and peaceful environment in the western Balkans, an area characterised by deep heterogeneity, can only be achieved by full integration into the most successful Western regional organisations, such as NATO and the EU.71 To this end, one must examine the difficulties of imposing the ideals of a liberal democracy on Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and

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Kosovo, and enforcing their observance. This section demonstrates, with the help of case studies, that the international community’s representatives in both areas often undermine the ‘democratisation’ programmes that they are mandated to undertake. Conflict has arisen between the ideals of the rule of law and human rights, and action is often taken which is ultimately incompatible with forming a viable liberal democracy that demonstrates the ‘common values’ of the rule of law and human rights necessary to join the EU. Here it is constructive to mention the work of Ronald Dworkin, who has argued that ‘the majority should not always be the final judge of when its own power should be limited to protect individual rights.’72 His argument was based on the belief ‘that the integrity of certain rights is a necessary condition for the legitimacy of majority decision-making’. He also advocated that these issues should be entrusted instead to a body such as ‘an oligarchy of unelected experts’.73 In the case of BiH and Kosovo, which are ultimately governed by the international community, the power to enforce human rights and the rule of law resides in BiH with the High Representative (HR) or in Kosovo with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). Conflict between the ideals of human rights and the rule of law became evident in Kosovo when the SRSG, through UNMIK’s Temporary Media Commissioner (TMC), shut down the Dita newspaper, which had published an article by the journalist Musa Sadedini, entitled ‘Crime and Criminals Have Names; They Live Undisturbed’ on 4 July 2000.74 The article contained personal information relating to particular Kosovans, and implied that they were responsible for, or associated with, certain war crimes committed during the Kosovo conflict. The TMC’s office issued a letter of warning to the owner of Dita, advising him that sanctions might be imposed. On 20 July, the TMC sent the newspaper its decision, to the effect that, because of the violation, the owners and publishers would be



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liable to a fine of 25,000 Deutschmarks which, if not paid, would result in the suspension of the newspaper. However, on 24 July, Dita exercised its right of appeal against the proposed TMC sanction, filing an appeal with the Media Appeals Board (MAB). By 27 July, the TMC had issued a directive to the newspaper instructing it to suspend operations immediately; this resulted in Dita’s eventual closure. Dita requested that the MAB annul the sanctions imposed on 27 July, and review earlier sanctions imposed on it. It also invited the Board to initiate a procedure to abrogate UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/37. The newspaper argued that the regulation was against freedom of speech and democratic and civilised values, conflicted with other regulations promulgated by the SRSG and with Articles 148–51 of the Law of Criminal Procedure of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The TMC’s representative opposed the appeal, arguing that the SRSG had the authority to maintain civil law and order in Kosovo and to promulgate UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/37 to this end. International instruments, the TMC suggested, permitted restrictions on publication in certain circumstances, including those of the present case, and the obligation to report crime declared in Articles 148–51 of the Yugoslav Law on Criminal Procedure did not authorise publication in the media of the personal details of suspected criminals. In his view, the fine imposed on Dita was proportionate.75 When considering the appeal the MAB, taking into account the terms of the applicable UNMIK regulations and internationally recognised human-rights standards adopted by UNMIK as basic principles of good governance,76 referred to the procedural guarantees established by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It noted that the principle of ‘equality of aims’ required not only that decisions of this type be taken by an impartial and independent tribunal, but also that parties to proceedings be given an opportunity to present their case, and to know and comment on the

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evidence and observations that might be brought before a decision maker. The MAB observed that UNMIK regulation No. 2000/37 made very little provision for the procedure to be followed by the TMC in determining the existence of a violation and imposing a sanction, providing merely for ‘a reasonable opportunity for reply prior to the imposition of any sanction’.77 The terms of the regulation therefore presented the Commissioner with a predicament, effectively making him ‘judge in his own court’.78 With this in mind, the MAB took the view that ‘the responsibility to promote democratic institutions of government and the rule of law, including a society in which civil and criminal disputes are settled by regular process through the courts’,79 lay with UNMIK and ‘[because] human rights are declared to be the standard of [UNMIK’s] administration’,80 the MAB held the view that the TMC’s decision to fine, and subsequently to suspend Dita’s publication, was unsound on procedural grounds. In the view of the majority of the Board the procedural defects were such that the decision as a whole should be declared null and void. Furthermore, it referred to UN Security Council resolution 1244, the basis for the authority of the SRSG, and to UNMIK Regulations 1999/1 and 1999/24 on the relevant law. It called attention to the fact that internationally recognised human-rights standards are expressly cited and required to be taken into account by every official in exercising his/her functions.81 This example demonstrates that UNMIK Regulations 1999/1 and 1999/24 did not provide the necessary due-process requirements which would have made them compatible with a liberal conception of democracy. It was the finding of the MAB that the TMC’s decision to impose sanctions on the newspaper ‘had not satisfied the procedural guarantees required by internationally recognised human rights’.82 This case demonstrates the difficulty inherent in organising legislative processes that allow for effective governance of a protectorate while still allowing for the human rights of the governed.83



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However, the significant amount of power invested in the international bodies that govern BiH and Kosovo have also been used to achieve rapid reforms of institutions. In July 2000, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia decreed that an investigative process would take place to find and dismiss, or indeed prosecute, corrupt or biased judges and prosecutors. This process, it was hoped, would restore public confidence in Bosnia’s criminaljustice system. Judicial appointments were to be subjected to an internationally supervised monitoring process, and legislation was passed to facilitate the rapid dismissal of judges and prosecutors found to be corrupt or biased. An internationally staffed organisation, the Independent Judicial Commission (IJC), was formed in order to oversee the reform process. By 2002, however, it had become clear that this process, which relied on complaints made by citizens based on their experiences with the Bosnian court system, was not creating the reforms within what the HR considered to be an acceptable time-frame. The OHR, acting on the recommendation of the IJC, then decided to replace the method of complaint and investigation which, as an IJC report noted, ‘requires that a certain amount of proof be produced to support a finding that a judge/prosecutor is not fit to hold office’.84 Instead, the OHR decreed that all judges and prosecutors would have to resign and reapply for their positions. The Council of Europe (CoE) argued strongly against this proposed change to the reform process. It felt that it was inappropriate ‘to remove from office judges already enjoying life tenure where no professional misconduct of the individual judge can be established’.85 Furthermore, it highlighted the fact that if evidence existed, corrupt or biased judges could already be removed through disciplinary proceedings set out in legislation originally promulgated by the OHR. It argued against using a reappointment process as ‘disguised disciplinary proceedings without any of the guarantees associated with such proceedings’.86

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It concluded that: ‘Problems have to be resolved in a constitutional and legal manner, respecting the very principles justifying the presence of the international community in BiH.87 If the international community is not willing to abide by its own principles when faced by major difficulties, what can we expect from local politicians?’88 The OHR ignored the CoE’s concerns, and on 23 March 2002, without delay, suspended ten judges and one prosecutor.89 Whether the OHR’s actions were designed to intimidate or not is unclear. However, when its new reappointment scheme was implemented, not one judge or prosecutor raised an official complaint. There is no doubt that an impartial criminal-justice system is an integral part of the successful completion of a ‘democratisation’ mandate, and that the decision to reform the system was taken with the best possible motives: namely, to purge the courts of injustice caused by racial and religious prejudice. It is easy to see how the OHR became impatient at the apparent lack of progress with its original reform process, and used its powers to the extent that it did. However, the reality of the reappointment reform-process is that the human rights of the judges and prosecutors were cruelly ignored. Rights such as the presumption of innocence, which form the backbone of any ideal rule of law, and those that refer to due process, were discarded. And this was justified by the OHR in the name of strengthening the rule of law. In 2004, however, the OHR used its powers in the most draconian fashion to date. On 1 July it dismissed from political office 59 politicians from the SDS, the largest political party in the Republika Srpska (RS), including most of its senior leadership, blocked the bank accounts of various individuals and companies, and transferred the SDS’s annual allocation of public funds to other institutions. The stated reason for these actions was the continuing role played by the party in protecting its founder, the indicted war criminal, Radovan Karadzic.90



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Radovan Karadzic, a man suspected of deep involvement in the ethnic cleansing that took place during the wars in Bosnia during the 1990s, who is now facing trial at the International Criminal Tribunal in Hague, and employing tough measures to bring him to account might at least have highlighted the OHR’s strong determination to enforce the rule of law. However, close examination of the OHR’s press releases reveal that it did not in fact allege that the people dismissed were individually involved in protecting Karadzic. The accusation was rather that they presided over a political party whose financial affairs, according to an investigation commissioned by the High Representative, were ‘a catalogue of abuse, corruption and tax evasion’.91 The OHR concluded that, because of an absence of proper financial controls, ‘we cannot be confident that the party is no longer providing financial assistance to its indicted founder, Radovan Karadzic.’ The HR felt these dismissals to be justified because: The Republika Srpska … has been in the grip of a small band of corrupt politicians and criminals for too long. We have to get rid of the cancer of obstructionism and corruption in the RS structures and nothing less than major surgery will do.92 The decision to dismiss these elected representatives was partly justified by the protection they were providing for a potential war criminal, and this aspect went down well with the press – making the OHR look moral and resolute; but what ramifications did it have for the OHR’s ‘democratisation’ mandate? First, the human rights of the politicians dismissed from office were ignored. No crime had been proved against them, and rights such as the presumption of innocence and due process were ignored. Second, a maximalist conception of the rule of law was ignored, as the allegations of corruption were not entrusted to the judicial system, despite the reform process which was supposed to guarantee that system’s political independence.

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Finally, dismissing elected representatives from office, especially in this large and indiscriminate way, can only be described as undemocratic, as ultimately they represent the people. This case showed the OHR flouting every one of the ideals that it is mandated to encourage in Bosnia, and in so doing it is undermining much of the democratisation process already achieved.93 In the examples mentioned above the underlying problem is one of absolute international power in the governance of both these protectorates. The international reserve powers are designed to act as an emergency brake on the political system. If, for example political representatives endanger the peace process by persecuting minority groups, or are seen to pursue secessionist agendas, the powers of the international community are there to put an end to such threats. However, these powers are not subject to either substantive or procedural limitations; they are inevitably used to advance a whole range of international policy objectives.94 The most basic problem with absolute international power is that it demonstrates precisely the wrong standards of behaviour. In a society emerging from civil conflict, the overwhelming priority is to restore the legitimacy of the constitutional order, so as to prevent political actors from opting out or resorting to violence. The goal is liberal constitutionality, a political culture in which power is subject to law and rights. When an international official overrules parliament, bypasses checks and balances in the exercise of public power, or punishes citizens without recourse to the judicial system, the message conveyed to the local elites is that constitutional rules can be flouted. It is vital that when governing these protectorates the international community practises the ideals which it wishes to instil.95 Otherwise any future Western intervention in volatile regions might suffer from lack of local cooperation and from accusations of double standards. To this end, in June 2004 the CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly assessed Bosnia’s current political system, and concluded:



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The scope of the OHR is such that, to all intents and purposes, it constitutes the supreme institution vested with power in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this connection, the Assembly considers it irreconcilable with democratic principles that the OHR should be able to take enforceable decisions without being accountable for them or obliged to justify their validity and without there being a legal remedy.96 Furthermore, the Assembly noted that 139 officials had been removed from office by the HR, including elected officials and judges, without any form of due process. It commented: ‘The question indeed arises as to the extent to which the current role of the [HR] is compatible with membership of [Bosnia] in the Council of Europe.’97 Unlimited international power has other distorting effects on a protectorate’s domestic politics. It is a feature of weak states that governments have little incentive to try to engage with broad developmental problems which they lack the capacity to resolve. The existence of a supreme international authority tends to reinforce this tendency: it becomes convenient for local politicians to leave difficult or unpopular decisions to the international community. This relieves the local political elites of their obligations: they calculate that if they refuse to act, the international community will do so. Moreover, they are protected from the practical consequences of refusing to take difficult decisions, and so have little incentive to become more active in the reform process. The resulting political distortions have become clear in Bosnia and Kosovo: the burden of decision-making is regularly shouldered by the international community, which takes many of the politically unpopular decisions, leaving the government free of political responsibility. As a result of this, international officials argue that the withdrawal of international powers should take place when the local institutions begin to behave more responsibly. However, this is unlikely to

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happen if the presence of the international community does not provide the mechanism for change. It can also be argued that international reserve powers must be retained in areas such as minority protection, where a recent history of violence makes it unlikely that the local authorities will act in a responsible manner. Although the international community clearly has a part to play in this matter, the best way to encourage responsible political behaviour is to make local institutions clearly responsible. In Kosovo, security is the responsibility of UNMIK, since there is no Kosovar ministry designed to deal with this issue, while the Kosovo Police Service (which was established by the OSCE) is also under the authority of the UN. On 14 March 2004, when large-scale ethnically motivated riots erupted, the effectiveness of the domestic security structures proved inadequate. In the aftermath of the riots, much of the criticism for the breakdown of security was directed towards prominent Kosovo-Albanian politicians, who were accused of irresponsible levels of inaction – on the one hand refusing to disassociate themselves politically from extremist elements, and on the other blaming UNMIK for the security failures. Retrospectively analysing domestic politicians’ actions is no substitute for an accountability mechanism. It is imperative that local institutions are held responsible for the protection of minorities, while the international community sets down clear standards, robust monitoring mechanisms and effective emergency measures. Taking responsibility away from domestic institutions merely encourages apathy among the local political elites, who are able to avoid unwanted responsibilities by passing them on to the international community. The final distortion caused by unlimited international authority is its effects on a civil society and their attitudes towards the ideals of liberal democracy. Low levels of participation and concern for political affairs are symptoms of many post-conflict environments. This problem is only heightened when international officials are seen



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to intervene in domestic politics unnecessarily, or to take important decisions without consulting domestic political structures, or to punish or dismiss local politicians. Such actions simply underscore the perception that the elected government is not the real focus of power in the protectorate. As a result civil society loses faith in its elected politicians and directs its political efforts towards the international missions, putting pressure on them to use their extraordinary powers to deal with any ensuing problems. Those who defend the exercise of undemocratic powers in post-conflict interventions often point to the fact that ordinary citizens welcome the international community’s role. This sentiment would, in part, seem to be based on fact. Many citizens of Bosnia and Kosovo, given the choice, would dispense with the electoral process altogether and submit to governance by the international community indefinitely.98 A population that no longer wishes to rule itself is surely a benchmark of the failure of any democratisation effort. When this happens the international community is unquestionably undermining its own efforts by distorting the political process through the dictatorial role it has chosen for itself. The international administrations in Bosnia and Kosovo justify their positions in terms of crisis management, suggesting that the reality of these protectorates is one of permanent emergency. Both administrations continually interpret events from this perspective, and thus foresee a succession of crises, or potential crises, which in their own minds lends justification to their extraordinary powers. The reality of both protectorates’ security is far removed from the situation obtaining when the international community first intervened. When the HR or the SRSG speak of ‘emergencies’ today they do not refer to political leaders inciting ethnic cleansing or broadcasts promoting attacks on peacekeeping troops or the police, but rather to inefficient tax collection, excessive regulation of private business, corruption in public utilities, or a lack of appropriate legislation to make the court system more efficient. Despite these

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changing circumstances it should not come as a surprise that the international missions are reluctant to hand over power. In the light of this, post-conflict missions must be subject to clear principles, rules and accountability mechanisms, rather than being trusted to define their own mandates.99 It is widely acknowledged that the overall objective of the state-building missions in Bosnia and Kosovo is their eventual integration into the EU. If this is to be achieved, both protectorates must first adopt principles of liberal democracy and political structures that are compatible with the rest of the EU. With the unlimited, unchallengeable power invested in the international missions, the citizens of Bosnia and Kosovo have yet to live in a liberal democracy that respects human rights and the rule of law. As a result, those citizens are learning to live in an environment which is not conducive to accepting the principles that a liberal democracy espouses.100 Consequently, they do not as yet hold values in common with other EU states. In Western democracies mechanisms have been installed to control the exercise of state power by decentralising it, creating checks and balances within society, and subjecting that power to the law, as well as assigning procedures and external scrutiny that minimise the opportunity to wield it arbitrarily. So far, these lessons have not been applied to international missions. Without a change in the international community’s policy towards the management of both these protectorates, a significant opportunity to increase the security of Europe and to validate the Western model of intervention may be wasted. Furthermore, the prospect of integrating these states into a European security community will also be jeopardised.

3 Turkish-Kurdish relations and the European Union Contemplating the future If seeking to examine a case-study of European ‘soft intervention’, one has to examine the situation in the eastern Mediterranean, and more specifically Turkish-Kurdish relations. The issue of cultural rights is usually associated with the Kurdish problem in the European-Turkish context. This is quite a sensitive and important issue, and not only in Turkish politics – it is also a major factor in Turkey’s attempt to meet the democratic criteria (see Chapter One, on security community norms) for entry into the EU. In the past few years, Turkey has adopted several constitutional and legislative reforms which have brought about significant institutional changes with respect to this important issue. These changes aim to bring Turkey much closer to EU standards in terms of the level of human-rights practices. Since the Copenhagen Criteria required for EU membership mandate the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minority rights, the Kurdish issue represents a litmus test for Turkey’s efforts to adopt the security-community criteria. To avoid social and economic extinction, the struggle for recognition within a wider political arena has become an essential ingredient for a state, or a group of people within a state, if they are to survive. It is widely accepted that the possibility of Turkey’s accession to the EU and her final integration into a European security

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community could not only bridge the cultural gap between East and West but would also bolster the Turkish economy1 and create an opening for the EU into Asia. In order to meet these aspirations, the Turkish state will have to fulfil the conditions stated in the Copenhagen Criteria2 (see Chapter One). This would mean that the Kemalist state will have finally to address the 80-year-old ‘question’ relating to the recognition of a unique Kurdish ethnic identity within Turkey. Before one examines the issues surrounding the plight of the Kurds in south-eastern Turkey, with respect both to Turkey itself and to the EU, it is imperative to understand the peculiar yet unique polemics that exist between the Turkish state, on the one hand, and the Kurdish battle for recognition and representation on the other. This chapter attempts to trace the relationship between the state and Turkish Kurds from 1923 to the present day, highlighting the practical as well as theoretical changes this relationship will have to confront, in the light of Turkey’s possible accession to the EU and of her attempts to meet the requirements of a security-community system. A Brief Examination of Turkish National Identity Turkish national identity has been an amalgam of territorial/civic and ethnic models.3 The French territorial/civic model of national identity was chosen in the early republican years as the most suitable for the new-born Turkish nation-state. As part of his campaign to homogenise the diverse Muslim populations of ANatolia and form a modern Turkish nation, Atatürk used the tools of citizenship and of the bond to ANatolian territory in his efforts to foster the idea of a common Turkish identity. ANatolia was presented as the historic heartland of Turkism, while Turkish citizenship united the inhabitants of this land under the same set of duties and of rights. In the course of time the French model was considered insufficient for



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the development of a strong Turkish national identity, and Turkey subsequently incorporated elements from the German ethnic model. According to this latter view, the modern Turkish nation did not merely consist of citizens who were residents of ANatolia: it was claimed that these people were also ethnic Turks, tracing their origins to the numerous tribes that had invaded ANatolia from the 11th century onwards.4 The term ‘Turk’ lost its previous derogatory meaning5 and became a source of national pride. This ‘revised’ version of Turkish national identity did not allow much room for diversity and cultural rights. Minorities could be tolerated only if they expressed willingness to be assimilated into the dominant national identity. Minority rights, multiple identities, religious and cultural diversity, while well accepted in Europe, in Turkey were suspected of threatening the success of the Kemalist ethnic homogenisation project and of inciting ethnic division and national partition.6 With the rise of Kurdish separatism in the late 1970s, Turkish suspicions grew, and approaches to identity issues became even more rigid. The gap between Turkish and European notions of national identity became wider after the 12 September 1980 coup. Severe repression, the absence of minority rights, and attempts to impose the dominant model of national identity put additional obstacles in the way of Turkish attempts to draw closer to Europe.7 The most dramatic aspect of Turkey’s Kurdish problem in the 1990s was the fierce struggle against insurgents of the PKK (‘Kurdistan Workers Party’) in south-eastern Turkey. In the course of military action, especially since 1992, more than 30,000 people have been killed in the fight between the PKK and Turkish troops, and villages with Kurdish populations have been evacuated. Migration from Kurdish areas to the urban centres of western ANatolia has been high, economic activity in the south-east has come to a halt and private investment has stopped due to the prevailing insecurity and the weak purchasing power of the Turkish currency.8 The arrest in 1999 of Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, and the military defeat

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of the PKK forces some years later, which resulted in the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire, certainly improved the situation in Turkey’s south-east. Nevertheless, the cultural and minority-rights issues ultimately bound up with the debate on national identity remained extremely critical in the process of Turkey’s convergence with the Copenhagen Criteria. The persistence of the European Commission and European Parliament reports and resolutions addressing the pr66oblems of Turkey’s minorities and demanding their solution had a clear influence on the constitutional and legal reforms and the change in the official state discourse on the issue of national identity.9 Examining Strategic Choices for the Turkish Republic: A Brief Overview Since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Turkey’s strategic policy has shown many fluctuations; these have resulted from domestic, regional and global factors. Changes that followed World War II affected its strategic profile in various ways. The AngloTurkish Treaty of 1939 was an important turning-point, and a visible hallmark of Turkish foreign policy after the war. During it, Turkey followed a policy of active neutrality, and by declaring war against Germany at the end of hostilities it became, with this symbolic act, one of the founding members of the United Nations. Turkey’s formal acceptance into the Western camp was accomplished by its entry to the Council of Europe in 1949 and to NATO in 1952.10 The main rationale behind these moves is related to Turkish concerns about Soviet behaviour towards Turkey. Upon the expiration of the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression, Stalin put forward a set of demands, including joint control over the Turkish straits and the readjustment of the TurkishSoviet borders established by the treaty of 1921.11 Throughout the 1940s and 1950s Turkish foreign policy was shaped by efforts to



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counter the Soviet threat through Western support. At the same time as strengthening Turkish ties with the US, and the West generally, within the framework of NATO and the Truman Doctrine, Turkey sought to pull the Muslim countries of the Middle East into the Western-sponsored military-defence network, for the common protection of all against the Soviet threat. In 1955 this effort came to fruition with the establishment of the Baghdad Pact. The Middle Eastern members of the Pact were Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan, with the US and Britain providing support for the fragile alliance.12 However, this ill-fated policy failed to recognise that the Soviet threat was not regarded by the Arab nations as serious enough to convince even the most Westernleaning regimes, like Jordan and Lebanon, to cooperate with the West in an anti-Soviet pact. Other, nationalistic Arab regimes like Syria and Egypt not only showed indifference, but also declared Turkey unfit as an ally because of its continued relations with Israel and the US. After the 1960 coup in Turkey the new leaders began to question the unconditional support for Western-dominated foreign policy. The decision of the US administration to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey in order to solve the Cuban missile crisis, and Washington’s unwillingness to support Turkey over Cyprus,13 caused disappointment on the Turkish side, and revealed the limitations on its friendship with the US.14 As a consequence, Turkey’s Middle East policy ceased to be a function of its pro-Western alignment, and instead turned to the adoption of a balanced approach towards its neighbours in the area. In the 1970s rapprochement with the Arabs resulted from a combination of the need to maintain good relations with the Middle Eastern members of OPEC15 and the commercial opportunities opening up in the oil-producing Arab states. The search for political support from the Arab countries after the military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the US arms-embargo and the rise to power of the religious and conservative National Salvation

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Party16 contributed to the shift in the orientation of Turkish foreign policy toward the Middle East. For the remaining years of the Cold War, Turkey, while remaining a NATO member, managed successfully to exploit the possibilities of better relations with the Soviet Union by expanding economic opportunities and by converting Moscow from a hostile to a neutral force on the Cyprus question. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union during 1989–91 dramatically altered Turkey’s security environment: the threat from the Soviet Union, which had been the main reason for Turkey’s attachment to the Western alliance, had effectively ended. A series of small and relatively weak countries had replaced the single, powerful Soviet state. In this security context the NATO alliance acquired new missions, in which Turkey could play an important role. Although Turks occasionally voiced doubts as to whether NATO would honour its security commitments now that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist, Turkey’s membership continued to be a vital part of its links with the West. The main shadow over Turkey’s position in the Western alliance arose from plans by the EU to build its own security structures, independent of both NATO and the United States. Turkey’s main discomfort was with the scenario under which forces assigned to NATO could be used for operations led entirely by the Western European Union, in which Turkey, as an associate member, had only marginal powers. The most serious challenge to Turkey’s national security in the 1990s was the fierce struggle against insurgents of the PKK in the country’s south-east. The onset of the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88) and of the Gulf War in 1991 provided the PKK with strategic depth in its confrontation with Ankara. In both cases the regime in Baghdad was forced to reduce its concentrations of troops in the north, creating a power vacuum. PKK fighters benefited from the absence of a military presence and found shelter in the areas near the Iraqi-Turkish border. More important was the creation of a de



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facto Kurdish autonomous zone north of the 36th parallel, under pressure from the international anti-Saddam alliance. This anomalous situation in northern Iraq provided the PKK with a temporary opening to Western news media and interest groups. The Kurdish question came to cast a long shadow over all Ankara’s foreign-relations concerns, ranging from the Middle East to Europe and the US. Ankara tried to maintain good relations with the leaders of Kurdish organisations in northern Iraq, namely Massoud Barzani of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union Party (PUK) in order to make sure that the PKK could not use the area as a safe heaven for mounting raids into Turkey. However, Turkey did not manage to eliminate all the threats that the situation in northern Iraq presented to its own stance on the Kurdish question. The American intervention in Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent collapse of the Saddam regime have advanced the idea of a federal solution for the Iraqi Kurds.17 Despite American assurances about the territorial integrity of Iraq and the prevention of PKK’s border operations from northern Iraq into Turkey, the inability of the American army to impose order and prevent sectarian conflict has intensified Turkey’s concerns about a possible partition of Iraq, and the then-inevitable creation of an independent Kurdish state. The History of the Kurdish Movement: Overview The world’s 25 million Kurds are often described as the biggest ethnic group without a state,18 and are certainly one of the longeststanding. Since the Allies dropped their pledge of a Kurdish state, made after the First World War, the Kurds have been divided mainly between four – inhospitable – countries: Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq.19 Kurdish nationalism constitutes the biggest single political problem Turkey faces today. The republic of Turkey was founded as

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the Turkish national state and was assumed to be nationally homogeneous. However, the truth is more complicated. The republic was and still remains religiously homogeneous. More than 99 per cent of its inhabitants profess the Muslim faith; indeed, the founding fathers of the republic equated Muslim with Turk. Atatürk, as the founder of modern Turkey, sought to unite all the Muslims who had come as refugees when the Ottoman Empire began to contract at the end of the 17th century, or when Russia began to expand southwards, or more consistently after the Bolshevik Revolution. Atatürk’s motto – ‘Happy is he/she who calls himself/herself a Turk’ – stressed choice and personal commitment over origin, though the accompanying injunction, ‘Citizen, speak Turkish!’, had a somewhat coercive ring. Nevertheless, none of the ethnic components constituting the Turkish citizenry has presented a political or societal problem, with the exception of the Kurds.20 The Turkish republic has failed to satisfy any legitimate demands of those of its citizens who are of Kurdish ethnic heritage, although they constitute between 20 and 25 per cent of the overall population.21 The Kemalist state aimed to transform Turkey into a country that was 100 per cent Turkish, and considered any war waged towards this end as almost a holy war. It was also a state which saw itself as the vehicle for the civilising mission of the Turkish nation, and it used this to justify its provision of education and civilisation to other, non-Turkish ethnic groups – by force, if necessary. The Kurds therefore presented an obstacle both to the objective of homogenising the national territory and to the Turkish nation’s civilising mission.22 A fear of losing ‘national unity’ was and still is a common characteristic of most politicians and army officers.23 During 1960 and 1961, while the soldiers were the absolute masters of Turkey, the only bank created by the internal dynamism of the Kurdish regions, the Dogu Bank, was liquidated by military decree. During succeeding years, while tribunals applied the laws banning the Kurdish language and culture,24 the extreme right and the army



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came into conflict over plans for negotiation and general strategic questions. One of the leaders of the coup d’état of 27 May 1960, Colonel Turkes, did not hesitate to threaten Kurds openly with a ‘final solution’ of the kind that had been adopted by the Unionist government against the Armenians in 1915: If the Kurds run after an illusion of creating a state, their destiny will be wiped off the face of the earth. The Turkish race has shown the way in which it can treat those who covet the homeland which it has obtained at the price of its own blood and untold labours. It has eliminated the Armenians from this land in 1915 and the Greeks in 1922.25 The state created ab initio by Atatürk in 1920–23 was built on nationalism and secular modernisation. It relied on military power to achieve both objectives, and has remained dedicated to this dual purpose ever since. Its two main challenges are the Kurdish insurgency, led by the PKK, and the anti-modern and anti-secular reaction of large numbers of Muslims, led politically by the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi).26 The current crisis – a civil war with the PKK that has left 24,000 dead, and a confrontation between Islamic ‘fundamentalism’ and the military – are in fact recurrent themes of modern Turkey’s history. ‘Both the PKK and Refah,’ says Turkish intellectual Dogu Ergil, ‘are the illegitimate children of the system’. And they were conceived in the early, tumultuous years of the republic’s proto-fascist governance.27 The roots of this intra-state conflict can be attributed to Turkish nationalism. The Turkish state, for the reasons mentioned above, from 1923 onwards simply refused to acknowledge that Kurds even existed as a separate ethnic group – until the 1990s they were known as ‘Mountain Turks’. The Turks were portrayed as founders of the great Asian civilisations, to the extent that the Kurds and their history were largely disregarded. A ‘Turkification’ programme was

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instituted in the south-east, raising the visibility of Turkish culture, moving Turks into the area, and above all promoting the dogma of Atatürk. At the same time the Kurdish regions were gradually impoverished by persecution, the deportations of Kurdish elites and the disappearance of the Christian entrepreneurial class. Furthermore, economic neglect has left the area traditional and tribal, impeding the growth of any national feeling. By the early 1990s less than ten per cent of adults in the Kurdish south-east had industrial jobs, and most of those tended to be in low-skilled industries. The demise of viable agrarian life and the growth of urban poor and unskilled youth radicalised large segments of the Kurdish people. As a result, radical movements such as the PKK were created in 1974 on the campus of Ankara University. The bloodless and temporary coup by the military of 1980 inaugurated and engineered a new round of systematic and methodical persecution of Kurdish nationalists. Since then the PKK has turned into a genuine guerilla movement, significantly supported by ordinary Kurdish peasants. What had been merely a nuisance to the Turkish state grew over the 1980s into a large-scale civil war. The Turkish government has steadily increased its military presence in the Kurdish provinces under the state of emergency. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the normal level of Turkish troop deployments in the area was around 90,000, but by June 1994 this had risen to 160,000. By the end of that year, taking into account also the number of police, special forces and village guards, there were 300,000 security personnel deployed in eastern and south-eastern Turkey. Approximately a quarter of the total manpower of NATO’s second-largest army was deployed in the area against the PKK.28 It was during President Turgut Özal’s time in office that the current Kurdish problem began, slowly escalated and then exploded. Although at first Özal rejected any political or democratic solution to the Kurdish problem, by the end of his life he had evolved to become the only important Turkish statesman politically and



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intellectually capable of conceiving imaginative, democratic solutions. In the spring of 1991 Özal legalised the use of Kurdish in everyday conversation and in folkloric music recordings by rescinding Law No. 2932, which had been enacted by the military in October 1983. The use of Kurdish in the media and education, however, remained prohibited. Even according to the PKK leader Ocalan (‘Apo’), Özal ‘was the one who could find a way to solve the problem’.29 One of the most dramatic developments in Turkey’s changing Kurdish problem occurred in 1993. The PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire from March 20 and presented President Özal and Prime Minister Demirel with a proposal for a mutual ceasefire. However, this failed for two basic reasons: first, the Turkish authorities interpreted Ocalan’s move as a sign of weakness, and therefore as their chance to finish his movement off, rather than a way of achieving a permanent solution to the Kurdish problem. The second reason was the sudden death of Özal, the Turkish leader who had been the most receptive to some form of compromise that might have ended the struggle. This argument was corroborated by a well-known Turkish academic, Ismet G. Imset, who claimed that if Özal had lived ‘everything would have been different. A major reform package would have been underway and even the hawks [hard-liners] would have fallen in line.’30 On 16 February 1999 a new chapter was opened in the war between the Turkish forces and the PKK: the PKK leader Ocalan was abducted by Turkish special forces while being escorted across Nairobi by Greek diplomats. His arrest – and the recently revealed American involvement in his abduction – highlight the strong probability that Kurdish calls for some kind of autonomy, or even for some degree of minority rights, will continue to fall on deaf ears.31 Despite Ocalan’s capture, the political aspirations of Turkey’s 15 million Kurds lived on. Meanwhile, Turkish attitudes and behaviour towards the Kurdish minority remained under international

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scrutiny. It is no coincidence that in 1999 the EU placed Turkey at the bottom of the league of applicants, in part because of its dismal record on human rights. The United States fears that the break-up of Iraq or a weakening of Turkey would favour Iran, which in the eyes of many Pentagon planners remains the greatest threat to stability in the Middle East. In the face of such grand strategic imperatives, Kurdish self-determination is far from high on the American or international agenda. Even in northern Iraq, where the Kurds have run their own affairs with American support since their 1991 uprising, the US has made sure that the local authorities cease all support for the PKK, and solemnly reaffirm their respect for the territorial integrity of Iraq.32 Turkey, Kurds and the Path to Europeanisation: Challenges and Dilemmas Ocalan’s arrest in 1999, and the virtual dismantling of the PKK,33 has provided the Kurds with an opportunity to ‘seize the day’. The EU can no longer accept the PKK’s presence as a raison d’être for understanding Turkish sensitivities. The Turkish state has lost its quasi-legitimate excuse for resorting to brutal repression, while the Kurds have been provided with fertile ground for accelerating their long-awaited right to legal recognition. The Turkish state’s fear of an independent Kurdistan, one of the primary reasons for not recognising Kurdish ethnicity, has lost its validity, despite the fact that Turkey’s concern over the Kurdistan issue has been growing, due to the emerging autonomy of the Kurdish population in northern Iraq. Kurdish communities within Turkey are aware that any discussion of secession would lead to the denial of the Kurds’ cultural rights, which the Copenhagen Criteria are bound to protect. Secession from Turkey, especially after the deconstruction of the PKK, could easily resurrect the bloodshed that was prevalent between the Kurds



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and the Turkish state during the early 1990s.34 This is something that the politically charged Kurdish community would rather not risk. Furthermore, secession is also an unlikely prospect in the light of the limited consensus that exists between the Kurdish factions in Iran, Syria, Iraq and Turkey itself. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Kurdish population of Turkey has been striving for the right to be recognised, to use their mother tongue, to dance freely in their traditional clothes and to be represented in Parliament. Driven by fear and insecurity, rather than by confidence and solidarity, the Turkish state’s unwillingness to allow these basic and fundamental freedoms has been under review by the EU for the past five years. The outcome of the December 2004 EU summit not only presents Turkey with a historic offer that could put the country on course for EU membership, but also represents a litmus test for the willingness of Turkey’s political and military establishment to seek ways of resolving the Kurdish problem. In this context, it is possible that the Kurdish people’s search for the right to legitimacy may be coming to an end. Under the auspices of the EU, the path to Westernisation and modernisation would include the south-east, which is bound to benefit from increased investment.35 Better economic conditions and employment opportunities, the lack of which played a prominent role in the growing popularity of the PKK in the 1970s, will greatly aid an assimilation process which could integrate the Kurdish population of the south-east with the rest of Turkey. How then can the EU provide the Turkish Kurds with legal recognition and a safer living environment? The answer to this is contained in the Copenhagen Criteria, which state: ‘Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.’36 In response to the Criteria, and in an attempt to exhibit the state’s capacity to amend its poor human-rights records, Turkey has already adopted

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143 new laws. It has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Protocol 6 of the ‘Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’. The Copenhagen Criteria have also forced Turkey to reform its legal system and to incorporate laws consistent with democratic rights. This development is expected, in time, to reduce the influence of the Kemalists and encourage a safer environment for the Kurdish population of Turkey. The institutionalisation of the new ‘harmonising law’ (November 2003), which includes the protection of minorities and broadens the scope of fundamental freedoms, has already exposed the Turkish policy of secrecy37 with respect to the Kurds. This policy has been supported by censorship laws such as ‘Karaname 413’ (April 1990) and the ‘anti-terror law’. The adoption by the Turkish Parliament of four new reform packages38 in November 2003 was also aimed at impressing the EU. Since these promise to unshackle the press by guaranteeing freedom of speech and expression, the Kurds will no longer have to rely on the only Kurdish television channel, Med-TV (televised by satellite from the United Kingdom).39 If implemented, these changes will certainly benefit the Kurdish minority, while at the same time the media will also be free to expose any state transgression. In the past, the Turkish press40 has been deliberately muzzled or controlled by the state when providing positive coverage of the Kurds. Pro-Kurdish writers, such as Yasar Kemal, Aliza Marcus and Ahmet Altan41 amongst many others, have been arrested and ‘silenced’, while pro-Kurdish newspapers like Gundem, Ozgur Gundem, Rojname and Yeni (which caught the attention of the Western media, and of human-rights groups such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the US Helsinki Commission) have been constantly harassed and temporarily closed down. Under the new reforms, the press has been provided with stronger legal leverage to resist any arbitrary state repression. A liberated media is bound to further the



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cause of the Kurdish people by providing a system of checks and balances like those prevalent in most Western democracies. Even though the Turkish Parliament has ratified the new reforms, the visible gap between theory and practice has nonetheless disheartened the Kurdish population. For instance, although the harmonisation law permits Kurdish television to be aired freely, in reality only state-owned and regulated channels – e.g. Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) – are permitted to broadcast Kurdish programmes.42 In July 2002, the government lifted the state of emergency in Hakkari, Tuniceli and Diyarbakir, after a period of 18 years; this in theory meant that the continued harassment meted out by the security forces would come to an end. However an Amnesty International report published in 200243 states that in practice instances of harassment still occur. The report also demystifies the state’s claim that it has adopted a ‘zero-tolerance policy’ towards torture. In instances of state-sponsored violation of human rights the much-publicised reform-monitoring groups (the government’s supposed ‘oversight mechanism’44) continue to turn a blind eye. Furthermore, the new reform packages also permitted the opening of Kurdish schools in any part of Turkey. In practice, however, these schools cannot be operated without the prior permission of the National Security Council (NSC) – though according to the new reforms this body was obliged drastically to reduce its influence on state policy, thereby allowing civil authority to supersede the powers of the military. According to the Copenhagen Criteria, it is also important that institutions must guarantee democracy. In theory, article 125 of the Turkish constitution permits judicial review and retrial. However, in practice, the Supreme Military Council and the Supreme Council of Judges, which primarily deal with the Kurdish question, are exempt from this article. Human-rights groups such as Amnesty International emphasise that the state has not fulfilled its obligations with regard to

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the accession criteria. The ‘village guard’ system has not yet been dismantled, while laws for minorities and education have not yet been changed. The civil-registry law has been reformed, thus permitting children to be given Kurdish names – a practice prohibited in the past. Nevertheless, it strangely disallows the letters q, w and y (common in Kurdish names) to be used in such names. At the same time the ‘repentance law’ continues to demean Kurdish communities and to strip them of their cultural identity. In the light of the these facts, it would seem that the Copenhagen Criteria are incapable of implementing the fundamental changes which would create a truly democratic environment and allow the Turkish Kurds the right to live without Kemalist restrictions. However, it must also be remembered that, uniquely in Turkey, the denial of Kurdish cultural identity is equated to upholding and protecting Kemalism. A shift from this outdated paradigm will require the military and the Turkish old guard to be permanently removed from the seat of power. It is imperative that the state’s mechanism not be controlled by an outdated ideology but by democratic principles, which recognise and assimilate the erstwhile ‘Mountain Turks’. In defence of the Turkish state, these democratic values have not remained mere ideological principles. It is true that new reforms have drastically reduced the overwhelming influence of the military over state politics. In August 2003, the Turkish Parliament stripped45 the NSC of its powers and placed it under civilian control. This subsequently led to the education budget being higher than the figure allocated for defence – a unique development for a nation previously dominated by the ‘men in uniform’. However, it must be pointed out that these changes were endorsed by the army only because such reforms were implicitly supported by Hilmi Ozkok, Chief of the General Staff from August 2002 to August 2006. Rather than opposing these reforms or even staging a coup, the army (or at least a significant proportion of General



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Ozkok’s supporters) agreed that the armed forces should indeed accept and take orders from a civilian government.46 This decision by the army represents an unprecedented shift away from the Kemalist paradigm, and the willingness to reform has been viewed as a positive indication by the Kurds, who suffered enormously under the previous non-transparent system, which allowed atrocities by the security forces to go unchecked. The army realises that a coup or any other form of intervention would end Turkey’s chances of joining the EU. Furthermore, it also acknowledges that 70 per cent47 of the Turkish population (including a majority of Kurds) are in favour of Turkey’s accession to the EU, and that the Turkish public will find it unacceptable for any form of military interference to delay this process. The reduced influence of the NSC, together with the openminded, non-Kemalist attitude of Turkey’s key military figure, General Ozkok, provides an element of hope for the Kurdish population, since they will be the immediate beneficiaries of the new reforms. However, the changing nature of the Turkish army has not yet thawed the influence of the traditionalists. Unlike in other democracies, the Chief of the General Staff in Turkey continues to report directly to the Prime Minister and not to the Minister of Defence. Although the army’s influence in Turkish politics may have been curtailed under the guidance of Hilmi Ozkok (as mentioned above, he retired in August 2006), a key question remains: will the current Chief of Staff, General Büyükanıt, be as open to reform? Will the Turkish old guard respect the new reforms, and thereby support Turkey’s accession to the EU, or will nostalgia gradually oppose further changes in the Turkish body politic? An answer to these questions will not only determine Turkey’s future in the EU but also seal the fate of the Kurdish people within Turkey. It is true that Turkey’s Kurdish problem is the outcome of Turkey’s Kemalist project of constructing a homogenous nation-state out of diverse groups, and of enforcing the secularisation of that state and

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of society generally; furthermore, the culture of state security has become an obstacle to Turkey’s aspiration for entry into the EU. On the other hand, the same democratisation that improves the position of the Kurds might also allow an Islamic fundamentalist party to operate, and the West might then find it hard to be consistent in its pro-democracy principles. The weakening of the state-security culture might be perceived by the Kurds as an ideal opportunity for them to raise their demands for Kurdish autonomy by undermining the existence of the Turkish state (see Chapter One on the security-dilemma theory). However, if Turkey adopts the securitycommunity criteria and is integrated into the European security and political structure any Kurdish ambitions for independence will be eliminated.

4 Chechnya The gulf between Russia and Europe

The protracted crisis in the Russian North Caucasus republic of Chechnya, ongoing since before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, has proved to be a significant juncture and key benchmark in the development of Russian democracy and in the country’s transition from communist rule. A persistent refusal by Moscow to seek a political resolution to the Chechen crisis has undermined both Russia’s internal security and the security of the wider Caucasus region. From the beginning of its second military campaign in the republic, which began in October 1999 as a ‘counter-terrorist’ operation, Russia has claimed that it is fighting international terrorism in the North Caucasus. During this second campaign, the scope of the conflict, which initially began in December 1994 as an operation to quash the Chechen separatist movement and ‘restore constitutional legality’, has been widened to become part of Russia’s war against global terrorism, and has frequently threatened to spill over into neighbouring Georgia. While Moscow wants international recognition for the proposition that it is fighting global terrorism in the North Caucasus, it does not want international involvement, thereby weakening the parallels that it seeks to draw with the West’s ‘war on terror’. In contrast to the conflicts in the Caucasus that will be examined in the next two chapters, external actors are not involved in efforts

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to resolve the crisis in Chechnya, and neither is such involvement sought. Thus, cooperation between Moscow and European security structures such as the EU, NATO and the OSCE over the Chechen issue is extremely limited. This chapter will explore the impact that the ongoing conflict in the North Caucasus has had on the evolution of a strategic partnership between Russia and European security organisations. One observer believes that the state of the discussion over Chechnya serves as a ‘political barometer’ of relations between the EU and Russia.1 European actors and Moscow take very different approaches to the Chechen issue, demonstrating the considerable gulf that remains between them, in spite of progress in other areas. Organisations such as the EU continue to insist on a political resolution to the conflict, while Moscow believes that military action is the only way to solve the problem. The gulf between the two approaches raises the issue of common European values, and undermines the possibility of developing a security community in the Caucasus region. It also raises the question of whether a common European approach to democracy and human rights can be said to exist. In their work on security communities, Adler and Barnett identified the existence of compatible core values as key to the development of close security cooperation and to the furtherance of security communities.2 The EU is keen for core values such as human rights, democratic freedoms and the rule of law to be more closely incorporated into its relations with Russia. Furthermore, peaceful conflict-resolution also represents a core value of the NATO alliance. However, Chechnya is a very sensitive issue for Moscow, and any criticism of Russian action there only serves to upset the political leadership. Russian resentment of the West’s criticism and its ‘misunderstanding’ of the Chechen operation was underscored in a statement by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to the Council of Europe in 2000: claiming that Russia was waging a counter-terrorist operation which was ‘defending the borders of



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Europe against a barbaric offensive from international terrorism’, he questioned the aims of those who ‘wish to exploit our current problems in order to criticise Russia’.3 Unlike the conflicts in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh (which will be examined in forthcoming chapters), the Chechen crisis is not between two sovereign states, nor is Russia seeking the involvement of external actors in conflict-resolution efforts. However, in spite of Russian protestations that the matter is a purely internal affair, the ongoing crisis has serious ramifications for the wider international community, and European security organisations thus need to engage with Moscow on the question. The protracted conflict continues to destabilise the entire Caucasus region, and to provide a focus for radicalised Muslims around the world who perceive it to be a further example of the repression of the Muslim people. The war has proved to be a catalyst for violence across the North and South Caucasus, and is used in external propaganda by jihadist groups to foster support for their cause and attract new recruits. The situation in Chechnya serves as an important recruiting tool for international terrorist groups, who depict the conflict as a clash between Islam and the West, attracting the attention of the Muslim world. It has also been a proving ground for terrorist activities: many of the tactics used to great effect by groups in Iraq, such as propaganda videos, ‘commercial’ hostage-taking and beheadings, were seen in Chechnya many years before US President George W. Bush ever uttered the phrase ‘global war on terror’. Thus more pressure needs to be put on Russia to resolve the conflict peacefully and quickly. The EU’s 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) recognised the need to stabilise the periphery, identifying the South Caucasus as an area that it would be taking a greater interest in, speaking of ‘preventative engagement’ and of the ability to act ‘before countries around us deteriorate’.4 However, no mention was made of the North Caucasus, the source of some of the major threats to European security identified by the ESS,

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including terrorism and regional conflicts, which ‘can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure’ and also provide ‘opportunities for organised crime’.5 Furthermore, the stabilisation of the South Caucasus will not happen until security issues in the North Caucasus are addressed. Despite being formally divided by international boundaries, the two regions are inextricably linked, and so efforts by the EU and NATO to contribute to stability and security in the South Caucasus will be futile until the problems of the North are also tackled. Background There is a long and acrimonious history of struggle between the two sides in the contemporary conflict, as the Russians have continually fought to dominate the volatile Caucasus region, which is vital to them both geopolitically and economically.6 It is a key supply route for oil from the Caspian Sea, which provides a source of income for republics across the North Caucasus, although this role has diminished somewhat with the commissioning of two new pipelines that bypass the region entirely. (The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which came on stream in 2005, transports oil from Azerbaijan via Georgia to the Turkish deep-water port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean, while the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) runs parallel to the BTC and transports gas from the giant offshore Shah Deniz field in the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea through Georgia to Erzurum in Turkey.) The compact territory of Chechnya, which is approximately 15,000 square kilometres in area, lies on the northern side of the Caucasus mountain range. According to the last population census conducted by the Soviet authorities, in 1989, there were over 700,000 Chechens living in the autonomous Soviet socialist republic (ASSR) of Checheno-Ingushetia, a constituent part of the Russian Republic (RSFSR). The most recent census, conducted in October



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2002, recorded a significant rise in the number of Chechens in the (now-divided) republic: despite years of conflict and high levels of emigration, official statistics stated that there were over one million Chechens.7 The Nokhchi people, as the Chechens call themselves, are thought to have inhabited their present territory for thousands of years, although accounts vary as to the exact date of their arrival. They are closely related to the neighbouring Ingush (the Nokhchi and Ingush are together called Vainakh (meaning ‘Our People’), but both are distinct ethnic groups with separate languages.8 The majority of the Chechen people are nominally Muslim, adhering to a form of Islamic mysticism known as Sufism.9 Islam in Chechnya is represented by two Sufi brotherhoods (tariqats): the Naqshbandiya and Qadiriya. The Naqshbandiya tariqat is relatively orthodox and intellectual, whilst the Qadiriya is more informal, preaching non-violence and practising the zikr with music and dancing, an activity prohibited by the purist Naqshbandiya order.10 These two orders remain crucial to Chechen society, uniting disparate clans that lack any hierarchical social structure. Notwithstanding initial expansion into the North Caucasus during the 16th century, when Cossack settlers arrived in the Terek delta and foothills of Chechnya, the Russian incursion did not commence in earnest until the 18th century. Mindful of the strategic importance of this region, Peter the Great renewed Russian activity southwards as part of his ambitious scheme to establish a trading route to India.11 Following his death in 1725, Russia’s imperial expansion was suspended for almost 50 years, until Catherine the Great renewed the drive to the south, as rivalry with the Persian and Ottoman empires for influence in the region intensified. The imperial forces met fierce resistance in Chechnya, which became the centre of one of the longest guerrilla campaigns of the 19th century, the Caucasian War (1817–64).12 The republic was eventually assimilated into Tsarist Russia, in 1859, and many residents were exiled to the Ottoman Empire.13 Russians began to settle in

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the lowlands, particularly after oil was discovered near Grozny in 1893 and thousands of oil workers were sent to the city from European parts of the Russian empire. The Chechen autonomous oblast was established on 30 November 1922, on the dissolution of the Mountain People’s Republic, which had included all the North-east Caucasus apart from Dagestan. It was merged with the Ingush autonomous oblast in 1934, in an attempt to dilute the indigenous majorities, and two years later was raised in status to an autonomous republic, becoming the Checheno-Ingush ASSR (see Chapter Six for further details of the USSR’s administrative structure). This merely enhanced the tensions between the manifold peoples of the region, as artificial borders divided natural alliances and strengthened individual ethnic identities. Furthermore, the policy of korenizatsiya (indigenisation), first advocated by Lenin, encouraged the development of local languages and culture in an effort to attract the nationalities to the idea of revolution. This brand of officially sanctioned nationalism directly contributed to the simmering discontent of the region by instilling a separate ethnic awareness previously absent amongst the numerous tribal groups in the Caucasus. In 1944 the Chechens became the largest group from a compact territory to be deported en masse by Stalin for alleged collaboration with the Nazis. On 23 February 1944 over 500,000 Chechens and Ingush were transported to northern Kazakhstan, into an exile that lasted for 13 years – they were not permitted to return until 1957, following rehabilitation under Khrushchev’s leadership.14 During this 13-year period nothing was published in Chechen, which became a prohibited language, and the very term ‘Chechen’, along with the names of other deported nations, disappeared from Soviet textbooks and encyclopaedias. Similar to the separatist disputes in Georgia and NagornoKarabakh, the current Chechen crisis developed during the Gorbachev era of glasnost and perestroika, when ethnic minorities



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were granted greater freedoms to express grievances. The programme of liberalisation introduced by Gorbachev across the Soviet Union initially had very little impact on the situation within the Checheno-Ingush ASSR. However, elections for the newly-established Congress of Peoples’ Deputies, held in the spring of 1989, stimulated public activism within the Checheno-Ingush ASSR’s political arena, and across the Soviet Union as a whole. As a result of the first ‘competitive’ elections in the history of the USSR, not only did party functionaries, such as the First Secretary of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR, V.K. Foteev, gain seats in the Congress, but so too did several independent candidates from the republic.15 This politicisation of the Chechen nation fostered nascent ambitions of statehood, as ethnic Chechens were finally permitted to take a relatively active role in Soviet political life. The mood of optimism was enhanced by the appointment of Doku Zavgayev in July 1989 to the post of First Secretary of the republic’s Communist Party, the first Chechen to hold the position since the creation of the Soviet Union. The appointment of Zavgayev and subsequent liberal ‘thaw’ triggered further nationalistic sentiments in Chechen society, and facilitated the rise to power of General Dzohkhar Dudayev.16 In the wake of the abortive coup by hard-line conservative elements of the Soviet government in Moscow in August 1991, Zavgayev was ousted by Dudayev, who became the first popularly elected president of the Chechen Republic, and subsequently declared its unilateral independence from Russia in November 1991. In spite of the threat to the unity of the Russian Federation from Chechnya’s self-declared independence, federal troops did not enter the breakaway republic until December 1994, following three years of quasi-independence under Dudayev’s regime. The Kremlin justified the military invasion of the North Caucasian republic on the basis of protecting ‘the unity of Russia’, stating that the longer the situation there was allowed to continue, ‘the more destructive an

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influence it has on stability in Russia’, having become ‘one of the principal internal threats to the security of our state’.17 The Russian invasion was an embarrassing failure, and in 1996 a cease-fire was agreed, together with the Khasavyurt Accords, which deferred a decision on the republic’s status until 2001. However, while the conclusion of this agreement was an impressive feat, it failed to settle crucial underlying issues, once more leaving the republic in a vacuum. The question of Chechnya’s status remained unresolved, and the republic continued to pursue its secessionist stance, calling for international recognition as a sovereign state. Chechen optimism over Russia’s humiliating withdrawal quickly faded. The republic was riven by internal conflicts between various clans and warlords opposed to the new President Aslan Maskhadov (Dudayev was killed in April 1996), and the republic descended into anarchy.18 The second military operation in Chechnya, which began in October 1999 as a ‘counter-terrorist’ operation, was triggered by the incursion of Chechen rebels into Dagestan and by the September bombings of apartment blocks across the Russian Federation – in Moscow, Buinaksk (Dagestan) and Volgodonsk (in the Rostov region) – which killed a total of over 300 people. Moscow believes that the conflict has provided an arena for Chechen separatists to join forces with radical Islamists from abroad, and the involvement of foreign groups in the conflict has been a recurrent theme in Vladimir Putin’s rhetoric. Growing radicalisation, together with the presence of a small number of foreign (predominantly Arab) fighters, has enabled the Kremlin to justify its campaign in Chechnya on the grounds that the country is defending itself against a threat from extremist Islamist terrorists, comparing it to the campaign against the Taliban.19 Certainly, the situation has changed since the early 1990s, with the appearance of political Islam and international jihadist networks overshadowing the original nationalist-separatist cause – which latter has to some extent been hijacked by Islamist extremists.20 Increasingly extremist methods,



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such as suicide bombings and the mass hostage-taking at Beslan in September 2004, suggested that Islamists were gaining the upper hand. Although criticism of the Russian operation in Chechnya became more muted in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on the US, the international community has continued to urge Moscow to find a political solution to the conflict. The North Caucasus region is stuck in a vicious circle of violence: the Russians argue that because Chechnya is a hotbed of extremism that threatens the security of the entire region, they need to eliminate ‘terrorists’ and restore order. But this approach bolsters support for extremist groups and increases the pool of recruits which militants can draw on throughout the North Caucasus. The longer the war in Chechnya continues, the harder it will become to control the spread of extremism. The Developing Partnership between Russia and the EU As mentioned above, Russia dislikes any evaluation of its actions in what it perceives to be an internal counter-terrorist operation. It has never sought international involvement in the Chechen conflict, and neither has it accepted the validity of statements on the subject by organisations such as the EU and NATO, considering the issue to be a purely internal affair. Thus, the Chechen conflict is not an area of specific dialogue between the EU and Russia, nor is it a key driver of the relationship; it represents only a very small component of the relationship between Moscow and Brussels. Nevertheless, it colours all aspects of interaction and remains a fundamental impediment to the development of a strategic partnership between the two. A stable, democratic Russia is vital to European security, even more so as the EU embraces new member-states adjacent to the former superpower. The ongoing Chechen conflict is a major source of instability, not just within Russia but across the region

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as a whole, enabling terrorism, organised crime and weapons-trafficking to flourish, as well as prompting high levels of migration both internally and externally. The threat was brought home by a series of terrorist attacks across Russia, which culminated in the Beslan school siege of September 2004.21 Thus Russia is a key partner for the EU, one which the ESS describes as ‘a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership.’22 Although the prospects of Russia ever joining the EU are minimal, the country is too large to be simply ignored, and the EU has recognised the necessity of building a strategic relationship with it to enhance regional security and stability.23 Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, has described the development of a partnership with Russia as ‘the most important, the most urgent and most challenging task that the EU faces at the beginning of the 21st century’.24 For its part, Russia views a relationship with the EU as key to developing its own role on the world stage and shaping the international environment to assist its domestic development. The relationship is mutually beneficial, with the EU serving as a major source of investment and trade for Russia, which has considerable potential for economic growth. The EU is Russia’s principal trading partner, accounting for over 50 per cent of its total trade, and the EU’s enlargement has only increased its importance in this respect.25 In 2006 total trade between Russia and the EU amounted to over €210 billion, the bulk of which was imports of Russian energy. Russia is an important source of oil and gas for EU member-states: the EU as a whole obtains 44 per cent of its oil and 25 per cent of its natural gas from Russia, and the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that this will rise to 94 and 81 per cent respectively within 25 years, as indigenous reserves dwindle.26 Unlike the South Caucasus states, Russia is not a part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – its relations with the EU



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are developed through a ‘Strategic Partnership’ that encompasses four ‘common spaces’: the economy; freedom, security and justice; external security; and research, education and culture. The framework of the relationship between the EU and Russia is provided by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Signed on 24 June 1994 in Corfu, the PCA did not actually come into effect until 1 December 1997, after the signing of the 1996 Khasavyurt peace accords which ended the first post-Soviet conflict between Moscow and Grozny;27 EU ratification of the PCA had been delayed by the first Russian military operation in Chechnya in December 1994, triggering the first public crisis in relations between Moscow and Brussels and illustrating the argument that, while Chechnya may not be on the agenda as a specific item for discussion, it nevertheless impacts upon and colours all aspects of the partnership. At the beginning of the first Chechen conflict in December 1994, the EU supported the principle of Russia’s territorial integrity, concerned as it was about the prospect of the Russian Federation’s disintegration and the impact this could have on European stability and security. It was also very keen to provide support for Yeltsin’s regime as it struggled to dismantle the last vestiges of the Communist Party apparatus and continue with the process of democratic transition. There was an appreciation of the fact that Russia was undergoing a difficult period of transition, and the EU wished to ensure that democracy took root in the country. However, while the EU supported Russia’s territorial integrity, it sought to remind Russia of its commitments under the PCA and to persuade it to return to the negotiating table, consistently calling for a political resolution to the Chechnya conflict and condemning human-rights violations committed by both sides.28 Such condemnations had little effect on the Russian military operation, and merely served to underline the EU’s lack of influence in Moscow. In addition, the suspension of the PCA’s implementation was conducted in a very lackadaisical manner, further highlighting the

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EU’s lack of resolve: bilateral programmes remained in force and funds from Technical Aid for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) were not frozen. Thus Moscow surmised that Chechnya was not a major obstacle to the development of closer relations with the EU, an assumption that was reinforced by the adoption of an interim agreement in 1996, which enabled trade clauses to come into effect, and the continuation of bilateral relations with EU member-states. The beginning of Russia’s counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya in the autumn of 1999 raised doubts within the EU about the development of Russia as a liberal democracy, and also tested the EU’s commitment to the newly unveiled Common Strategy for Russia (CSR) with its proclamations of ‘closer cooperation’, ‘shared democratic values’ and ‘strategic interest’, making the divergence between the objectives of the two actors even more conspicuous.29 The EU was much more vocal in its criticism of the Kremlin’s decision to launch the second military operation, describing Russian actions as disproportionate and indiscriminate.30 In contrast to its reaction to the 1994 intervention, this time the EU made its position very clear, declaring that the methods employed by Russia in its counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya were incompatible with the principles of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council, adopted on 10 December 1999, included a separate Declaration on Chechnya that condemned the military action, although it did not question Russia’s right to preserve its territorial integrity nor its right to combat terrorism. It stressed that Russia is considered to be a ‘major partner for the European Union’, but that it ‘must live up to its obligations if the strategic partnership is to be developed. The European Union does not want Russia to isolate herself from Europe.’31 The declaration called upon the Russian authorities to end the bombing and the use of force against the civilian population in



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the republic, to begin political negotiations with the Chechens and to allow humanitarian aid to be delivered, emphasising that the Russian military action contradicted basic principles of humanitarian law, as well as Russia’s commitments within the OSCE and its obligations as a member of the Council of Europe, an organisation to which it had been admitted in 1996 after its request for membership was delayed by the 1994 invasion of Chechnya.32 In a further statement by the Presidency, issued in December 1999, the EU urged the Russian government to meet ‘its obligations under international humanitarian law and as a member of the United Nations, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, and in the spirit of the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia’, reiterating that, in its view, there could be no military solution to an essentially political problem.33 Russian commentators were highly critical of what were perceived to be the West’s double standards over Chechnya, saying that the EU had no ‘moral or legal right’ to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs, particularly after its support for the NATO bombing of Serbia. It was also pointed out that while the EU had not supported Milosevic’s determination to uphold the territorial integrity of Serbia-Montenegro and prevent the secession of Kosovo, it was taking the opposite position over Chechnya.34 EU criticism was seen as an attempt to interfere in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state, rather than an attempt to uphold certain norms and values, and the Russian reaction accentuated the Kremlin’s sensitivity to any such interference. This divergence in perception, between what the EU hopes to achieve and what Moscow believes it to be seeking, highlights the huge gulf that remains between the two actors and does not bode well for the future establishment of any kind of security community that includes Russia. The EU seeks to influence Russia in areas where it considers there to be common values at stake, such as human rights in Chechnya, but Russia does not consider such

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issues to be anything other than a matter for internal policy and action, certainly not for external ‘interference’. In a speech in Moscow April 2004, Romano Prodi described the EU as a ‘union of nations based on the shared ideals of democratic institutions, human rights, the protection of minorities and the rule of law’,35 ideals that the EU consistently highlights in both its internal and external relations. Thus it could be expected that the well-documented violations of human rights committed by both sides in Chechnya since 1994 would be a focus of its discourse with Russia, particularly as the continuing crisis impacts on the development of democracy and respect for fundamental freedoms within the country, as well as on its relations with other countries, notably Georgia.36 However, when the EU makes reference to human-rights violations in Chechnya, it is perceived to be a cynical, anti-Russian move rather than intercession on the grounds of humanitarian and democratic values. This highlights a fundamental distinction in the development of the relationship: while Russia views human rights as a domestic issue, the EU views respect for such rights as one of the common values on which their partnership is based. The EU wants to believe that Russia is keen to install so-called ‘European standards and values’, something which Russia views as interference in its internal affairs and consequently is unlikely to embrace. The issue of Chechnya in relation to ‘European values’ was particularly prominent in the European Parliament’s 2004 Belder Report, which called for a reassessment of the EU’s Russia policy in the light of the fact that the country had not developed in the way foreseen in 1994. Noting Russia’s increasing importance for the EU, as a result of the latter’s enlargement, the report stated that the situation in Chechnya contradicted the ‘values and principles’ of modern Europe and acknowledged that the policies of the EU and its member-states had been unable to prevent the weakening of democracy and the rule of law in Russia.37



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In spite of its criticism of the ongoing crisis in Chechnya, the EU is nevertheless the largest donor of aid to victims of the Chechen conflict, allocating over €220 million in aid to the North Caucasus region since the beginning of the second military operation in 1999.38 In 2007, the organisation allocated €17.5 million in humanitarian aid to help victims of the Chechen conflict. EU assistance to the North Caucasus is provided by the European Commission (EC) via three channels: humanitarian aid; recovery programmes; and support to NGOs. The Russian authorities want humanitarian assistance to continue, but for such assistance to be low-profile; thus developmental assistance is preferred. As Chechnya is a Russian domestic matter, the EU cannot become involved without a specific request. At the November 2004 EU-Russia summit meeting, EC President José Manuel Baroso offered assistance in the rehabilitation of Chechnya, an offer welcomed by Putin, who affirmed that Russia was ready to accept such assistance, a willingness he reiterated in a meeting with German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in December 2004. In April 2005 an EU team visited Chechnya, Ingushetia and North Ossetia to examine ways that the organisation could give economic and reconstruction aid, as opposed to humanitarian aid. According to the EC, as the situation in the region slowly stabilises the focus is gradually shifting away from humanitarian aid programmes, such as emergency support, to recovery programmes that focus on health, education and income generation. Its programme for the North Caucasus has a budget of €20 million, and is being implemented in collaboration with the Russian authorities. Specific projects include the development of the Chechen health-care system, the provision of equipment and teacher training for schools in Chechnya and Ingushetia, and the establishment of a micro-finance institution in the region to help create basic job opportunities. The fact that the EU’s programme covers the entire North Caucasus underlines the need to stabilise the whole region,

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which has been suffering the effects of the ongoing conflict in Chechnya. Not only has a high level of migration been seen across the North Caucasus, but since 2005 there has been a conspicuous escalation in militancy and Islamist radicalism across the region, with terrorist attacks occurring from Karachai-Cherkessia in the west to Dagestan in the east. The EU has also been attempting to spread stability in its periphery through projects conducted under the aegis of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), which has been working in Russia since 1997. Many of its projects, which seek to protect human rights and democracy, to prevent conflicts and to assist in their resolution, are located in the North Caucasus region. Specific examples include a €99,000 human-rights training programme for prison officers in southern Russia, and a €157,000 project intended to combat human-rights violations in the North Caucasus, particularly to eliminate torture in places of detention.39 Peripheral Actors: NATO and the OSCE Unlike the EU, NATO does not have a presence in the North Caucasus and has no involvement in Chechnya. This is unsurprising, as Moscow’s former Cold War adversary is first and foremost a defensive military alliance. However, in the ten years since the signing of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, the two actors have established a pragmatic relationship that aims to tackle common challenges. The Act reaffirmed their determination to give substance to their ‘shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe’, based on the principle that ‘the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible’. Interestingly, it maintains that the two will work together to establish in Europe a ‘common



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and comprehensive security based on the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behaviour in the interests of all states’, outlining the need to tackle challenges such as ‘terrorism, persistent abuse of human rights and of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities and unresolved territorial disputes, which pose a threat to common peace, prosperity and stability’.40 There is little doubt that these laudable ideals have been severely tested by the protracted Chechen crisis. In a statement issued after a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in December 1999, the alliance warned that future cooperation was dependent upon ‘Russia’s respect for international norms and obligations’, condemning what it described as the disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force against civilians.41 Reminding Moscow of its obligations under the Founding Act, it acknowledged Russia’s right to preserve its territorial integrity, but called for a political solution to the conflict, urging the Kremlin ‘to exercise the fullest restraint, to refrain from the use of force against civilians and protect their human rights, to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to those in need, and to co-operate fully with international relief agencies and to ensure security for their operations’.42 The 1999 NATO air campaign against Serbia over Kosovo raised fears in Russia that the alliance might target it over Chechnya in a similar manner. This strained relations between the two and hampered cooperation at a time when the relationship had already reached a nadir over the thorny issue of future NATO enlargement, which would expand the spread of the military alliance’s membership right up to Russia’s borders. A common theme in the Russian media at the time was the argument that one of the most vocal critics of the Chechen operation, Javier Solana, was NATO Secretary-General during the bombing of Serbia. As discussed above, Moscow was angered by the West’s perceived double standards over Chechnya and Kosovo: while it had not supported Milosevic’s determination to uphold the territorial integrity of

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Serbia-Montenegro and prevent the secession of Kosovo, it was taking the opposite position over Chechnya. The situation changed somewhat after the 2001 terror attacks against the US, and relations between Russia and NATO were cemented with the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which has become the principal forum for further developing cooperation between the two. Within the NRC, counterterrorism is a key issue; Russia views the Chechen conflict as a major source of terrorism, both domestic and international. Furthermore, its 2000 National Security Concept identified terrorism as a ‘serious threat to national security’ and placed a priority on cooperation with the international community to tackle it.43 Thus it would be reasonable to assume that NATO is deeply involved in efforts to resolve the Chechen crisis. However, because Moscow sees the conflict as an internal matter, this is far from the case. Speaking in November 2002 at a joint press conference with President Putin, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson emphasised NATO’s support for Russia’s right ‘to deal with breaches of law and order on its own sovereign territory’, but once again called for a political, as well as a military, solution to the conflict.44 It is surprising that the OSCE has not played a greater role in the North Caucasus, as Russia has always been a keen supporter of the pan-European security organisation, which has a broad EuroAtlantic and Eurasian membership and takes a cooperative and collaborative approach to security. The NATO-Russia Founding Act included a pledge to help strengthen the OSCE, particularly its role as ‘a primary instrument in preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and regional security cooperation’, in order to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines or confrontation within Europe.45 The OSCE did have a presence in Chechnya from 1995 until 2003, but its mandate was not extended and the organisation’s Assistance Group (AG) was closed. During the eight years of its



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operation, the OSCE’s AG to Chechnya had worked with the Russian authorities to promote respect for human rights and other fundamental freedoms, to assist the delivery of humanitarian aid for victims of the Chechen crisis and to facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). It also sought to promote a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Unfortunately, its presence in the North Caucasus region was not straightforward, and the poor security situation meant that often the organisation could not actually operate from within Chechnya, but was forced to evacuate to Moscow and Ingushetia. Conclusions The Chechen conflict is much harder for European security structures to become involved in, primarily because Russia views it as an internal security matter and not one that warrants international intervention, even in terms of conflict-resolution efforts. Any perceived criticism of its actions in the republic or attempts to influence the situation are consequently unwelcome. The awkward issue of Chechnya has amply tested and revealed the limits of the relationship between Europe and Russia, accentuating the fact that they are very different actors pursuing different objectives in the development of their bilateral and multilateral relations. Organisations such as the EU and NATO are international organisations comprising various member states which have ceded a certain amount of sovereignty in the belief that a system of cooperation and interdependence will boost their security. Such a system is based on the conviction that those involved share certain values and norms, and naturally relies on a certain level of external ‘interference’ in the internal affairs of each member state. Both organisations espouse ideals such as democracy, human rights, the protection of minorities and the rule of law and will consequently seek to promote these ideals, in both their internal and their external

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relations. By contrast, Russia is a sovereign state that will seek to protect and further its own national interest – hence the divergence in the approaches of the two actors. Pavel Baev believes that the core problem demonstrated by the ongoing Chechen conflict is that Russia is trying to join Europe without making any serious effort to ‘Europeanise’ itself by accepting standards of democratic governance or human rights.46 If the EU is serious about the establishment of a ‘security community’ in its neighbourhood in order to extend stability out to its periphery, and the associated spreading of its values that this will entail, then it needs to be taking a more visible stance with regard to Chechnya. The ESS noted that the organisation is particularly well-equipped to respond to regional conflicts such as those in the Caucasus region: ‘Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post-conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government.’47 However, the prospect of an EU-led military or police mission being deployed in the Chechen conflict zone is extremely remote, unless it was responding to a request from Moscow. While the member states of the various European security structures clearly do not want to alienate Russia again, there is uncertainty about the form that closer integration should take. Russia is an important source of hydrocarbons, and countries within Europe cannot afford to upset one of their key suppliers, particularly as gas consumption in the region is set to grow dramatically over the coming decades as indigenous oil reserves decline.48 Furthermore, Europe and Moscow need to cooperate to tackle the numerous ‘soft’ security challenges facing the wider European continent. Both the EU and NATO need cooperation and dialogue with Russia; and while it is good to have high ideals and values to protect, sometimes these have to give way to a more pragmatic, realistic stance. However, while European actors continue to advocate a



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political resolution to the Chechen conflict and Moscow continues to stand by its military action, the Chechen issue will remain a major challenge in the development of an effective strategic partnership, a challenge that is likely to prevent the development of further integration, as well as of a Eurasian security community. While the relationship is important to both actors, particularly in economic and security terms, and is unlikely to be permanently derailed by the Chechen issue, it does raise questions as to whether they are capable of taking their partnership further, to diminish the wide disparity that currently exists between rhetoric and reality.

5 Georgia Seeking Western engagement

Georgia is the most pro-Western of the three South Caucasus states, and it has consistently sought to maintain an autonomous and pragmatic foreign policy that removes it from the Russian sphere of influence. However, this has upset Moscow, which is unhappy with its southern neighbour’s European leanings and rewarding relationship with Washington, and particularly with the growing US military influence in the South Caucasus. The international significance of this former Soviet state has increased greatly in the wake of 11 September 2001 and the initiation of the global war on terrorism. Already on the map thanks to its position on a key transit route for oil and gas from the Caspian region, the country’s alleged links with international terrorism have propelled it further into the spotlight and it has become a battleground for regional influence, a contest led by the US and Russia. Since the 2003 ‘Rose Revolution’ the new leadership in Georgia has been even more inclined to seek the active engagement of external actors such as the EU, NATO, the OSCE and the US, and is keen to demonstrate its desire to integrate with the West. Integration into both NATO and the EU represent key priorities for Georgia’s foreign and security policy-makers, warranting dedicated sections in the country’s National Security Concept (approved by parliament in 2005) and its Foreign Policy Strategy for the period 2006–09.

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In addition to the need to preserve a delicate balance in the country’s relations with outside actors, President Mikhel Saakashvili faces an array of daunting challenges to Georgian security, notably crime, widespread corruption, economic stagnation, volatile relations with Russia, and separatism. The government is particularly eager to attract greater regional and international involvement in the search for a resolution to unresolved disputes with the secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia’s separatist conflicts are far more than domestic territorial disputes: they have both regional and international implications, and are one of the principal difficulties in Georgian-Russian relations. Georgia’s two secessionist regions represent one of the most serious threats to the security and stability of the multi-ethnic country. Following wars of independence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the early 1990s, both have existed as de facto independent states for over a decade. From the beginning of his presidency in 2004, Saakashvili has made the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity a priority, expressing his wish to consolidate the country by resolving the enduring conflicts with the two secessionist regions. Despite the passing since he came to power of several years in which to resolve the disputes, they remain locked in stalemate. Efforts to restore central Georgian control over South Ossetia in August 2008 triggered a Russian military invasion, jeopardising security across the unstable Caucasus region. Tension is very high in the conflict zones and the threat of renewed hostilities remains very real. The impact of these separatist areas within Georgia has been considerable. In addition to the fact that thousands of ethnic Georgians who used to live in these regions have become refugees, Tbilisi has been unable to govern or levy taxes in substantial portions of the country, and important trade routes have been disrupted. The unresolved conflicts mean that nearly 20 per cent of Georgian territory is outside the control of the central authorities, and have led to the displacement of almost 300,000 people, as well as providing



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fertile ground for the smuggling of weapons, narcotics and people. Furthermore, the presence of thousands of Russian peace-keepers, who are considered neither impartial nor neutral, exacerbates relations between Tbilisi, Moscow and the regional leaders.1 Georgia’s separatist conflicts undermine regional stability, not just because of the threat of a renewal of fighting but because they have created security vacuums that are outside government control, providing ideal conditions for transnational security challenges such as terrorism, organised crime and illegal trafficking to flourish. They also undermine efforts to boost regional cooperation, hampering economic development and further destabilising the area. There is a need for greater international involvement, a key objective of the Georgian government, particularly with organisations such as the EU and NATO, which are keen to encourage the development of stable democracies on their periphery. However, the involvement of these actors in Georgia and in the country’s potential integration into European security structures has inflamed tensions with Russia, leading to further instability in the separatist areas and thus pushing Georgia even further away from a European security community, rather than closer. Background Although there is little doubt that Russian involvement has exacerbated and prolonged the disputes, Georgia’s separatist problems are not solely the consequence of Russian involvement. David Darchiashvili argues that Ossetian and Abkhaz separatism is not the result of a ‘Russian plot’, but of a process of ‘awakening’ in these ethnic groups, which was distinct from the Georgian ‘rebirth’.2 As the Soviet Union unravelled, several of Georgia’s myriad ethnic groups intensified their calls for self-determination, threatening both the country’s territorial integrity and its sovereignty. The USSR was a multinational federation, comprising myriad national groups,

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many of which lacked political recognition as nations. The Union was composed of 15 Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs), national administrative groupings on which was conferred the highest status by the Soviet state (see Table 1 below). Within these SSRs there were 20 Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs), eight Autonomous Regions (oblasti) and ten Autonomous Areas (okruga), together with hundreds of smaller administrative units, namely provinces (krai) and regions (rayony). During the early years of perestroika national movements in the ASSRs and regions demanded sovereignty, challenging the Russian domination of republican governments. The nation who held administrative power in a particular region, the titular nation, was in a privileged position, reaping numerous economic and social benefits, such as better housing and employment prospects. Russians were often the titular nation in the ASSRs and regions, as opposed to the SSRs, where the titular nations were usually also the indigenous nation. Thus, those ethnic groups governed by a minority nation (predominantly Russians) within the administrative unit exploited nationalism in an attempt to achieve self-determination. This was particularly prominent in the Caucasus, with its numerous ethnic groups, many of whom did not hold power in their republics. Secessionist campaigns in Abkhazia and South Ossetia were revived during the national revitalisation movement at the end of the 1980s, when the renewed upsurge of Georgian nationalism during Mikhail Gorbachev’s era of perestroika increased inter-ethnic tensions within the Soviet republic, as manifold national groups were permitted free expression throughout the USSR, and the manipulation of ethnic affiliation became a key dynamic in political life. Both regions have traditionally been suspicious of the Georgian state, fearing what is perceived to be Georgian ‘chauvinism’ that threatens a loss of ethnic identity. Ossetians are a people of Iranian origin, who arrived in Georgia during the 13th century and are spread between the Georgian



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Table 1. Administrative structure of the USSR3 Administrative unit

Degree of autonomy

Union Republic (SSR)

• • • • •

Autonomous Republic (ASSR)

• • • •

‘Sovereign socialist state’ of most populous national groups Right of secession Border with foreign country Own constitution, citizenship, legislature, executive and judiciary Permitted to establish universities and pursue cultural and education policies in national language4 Sub-division of SSR ‘National state’ – territory of national minority not large enough to be ascribed SSR Executive, legislative and budgetary powers Permitted to establish universities

Autonomous Region (oblast)

•

Province (krai)

•

Large territory of geographical or military significance, in strategically important borderland

Region (oblast)

•

Non-national administrative units

Autonomous Area (okrug)

•

Designated territory of national minority within oblast

•

Designated territory of national minority within SSR or krai Control over local affairs and administration

region of South Ossetia and the republic of North Ossetia-Alania, in Russia’s North Caucasus. Kamaludin Gadzhiev argues that, in comparison with the ‘indigenous’ Abkhazians, Ossetians are considered to be relative newcomers to Georgian territory, despite their arrival in the Caucasus more than 700 years ago.5 When Georgia

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was annexed by Russia in 1801, the Ossetian people were united in the same state. However, Georgia’s separation from Russia in 1918 meant that the South Ossetians were divided from their fellow-citizens in the north, causing tension and antagonism.6 Under Soviet rule, South Ossetia was an autonomous region within the Georgian SSR, while North Ossetia was an autonomous republic (ASSR) within the Russian SSR, on a higher administrative level than its southern counterpart (see Table 1 above). On 20 September 1990 the communist authorities of South Ossetia declared the formation of the South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic, a constituent part of the USSR, and the secession of this new entity from Georgia. However, ethnic Georgians living in South Ossetia and Abkhazia began to voice discontent with what they perceived to be anti-Georgian policies in these regions, and in October 1990 Zviad Gamsakhurdia became leader of the Georgian Supreme Soviet, predominantly on the basis of his support for the rights of Georgians, promulgated under the slogan ‘Georgia for Georgians’, reinforcing suspicions about perceived Georgian ‘chauvinism’. Gamsakhurdia openly promoted the ‘cleansing’ of Ossetians from the country with the aim of driving them back to North Ossetia, and his election triggered a sharp deterioration of relations between the Georgian government and ethnic minorities, who began to view independence as the only way to retain their cultural rights and autonomy. Following attempts by Tbilisi in August 1989 to make Georgian the country’s sole official language, the authorities in South Ossetia (where reportedly only 14 per cent of Ossetians spoke Georgian) ruled that Ossetian was to be the region’s sole language. On 19 January 1991 South Ossetia held a referendum in which supposedly over 90 per cent of the population voted to become part of Russia, although the results were never recognised by Georgia. Gamsakhurdia subsequently stripped South Ossetia of its autonomy and imposed a state of emergency, escalating Ossetian



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demands for reunification with North Ossetia into full-scale violence.7 Armed skirmishes broke out, leading to full-scale war in the spring of 1991. The prospect of a localised conflict spreading, together with the election of Eduard Shevardnadze as Georgian president in March 1992, encouraged the two sides to seek a more conciliatory stance, and on 24 June 1992 the Dagomys peace agreement was signed, prompting the deployment within the conflict zone of a Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) that comprised ‘national’ battalions from Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia-Alania and Russia (500 troops from each). A quadripartite negotiating body, the Joint Control Commission (JCC), was also established to foster political reconciliation between the various sides. It includes representatives from Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia, North OssetiaAlania and the OSCE.8 Despite a lasting cease-fire, a political settlement of the dispute remained elusive, and the separatist authorities remained in control of the majority of the region’s territory. The situation had looked relatively promising towards the end of the 1990s, with signs that the two communities were seeking to normalise relations and refugees were beginning to return home.9 However, Georgian efforts to regain control of the region by military means in August 2008 ended in failure and triggered fighting between Russian and Georgian forces. The lack of a political resolution has meant that the South Ossetian republic existed beyond Tbilisi’s control and, without international recognition, became heavily reliant on criminal sources of income. Its status as a de facto independent republic enabled it to exploit the lack of official borders between Russia and Georgia (ie between North and South Ossetia), facilitating a prolific smuggling operation, predominantly of alcohol and fuel. It should be noted that there has never been great support among North Ossetians for reunification with South Ossetia; the former are concerned about further instability in their own republic,

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particularly in the wake of the 2004 Beslan siege (in North Ossetia), and the economic implications of such a move.10 In September 2005 the South Ossetian leader, Eduard Kokoity, held talks with the leader of North Ossetia-Alania, Taimuraz Mamsurov, to discuss plans to boost cooperation between their respective republics. The significance of these talks lay not in the fact that they took place, but rather that they took place 15 years after South Ossetia had declared its ‘independence’, suggesting a disinclination on the part of one party towards an intensification of bilateral relations. The situation in Abkhazia was somewhat different. Unlike the Ossetians, the Abkhaz are believed to have occupied their current territory for several thousand years, being related to the large number of tribes that once populated the eastern shores of the Black Sea, and are thought to have once been part of the Greek and Roman empires. The Abkhaz kingdom was unified with the Georgian state during the 10th century, but was consistently caught between the Ottoman and Persian empires, splitting from Georgia again in the 16th century. Although Georgia was annexed by Russia in 1801, Abkhazia remained autonomous until 1864. The republic was de facto independent during the 1920s, before Stalin incorporated it into Georgia and encouraged ethnic Georgians to migrate to the region: by 1989 Abkhazians only constituted 18 per cent of the population, while ethnic Georgians accounted for 46 per cent, unlike other regions where the ethnic group seeking independence was in the majority.11 At the beginning of the 1990s, Gamsakhurdia took a more conciliatory approach in relations with Abkhazia than with South Ossetia, and avoided all-out war. However, his successor, Shevardnadze, was far more confrontational and, with both sides refusing to compromise, war broke out in 1992. The Georgian forces were defeated by the end of 1993, and the 1994 Moscow agreement formalised a cease-fire, providing a legal basis for the introduction of a CIS peacekeeping force made up of around 1,700 Russian peacekeepers, together with the



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establishment of a United Nations observer mission (UNOMIG) to monitor the agreement. The UN leads on mediation in the Abkhaz conflict with UNOMIG, established to oversee the cease-fire, whilst the UN Secretary-General’s ‘Group of Friends’ (France, Germany, Russia, the UK and the US) is leading efforts to find a resolution within the framework of the so-called Geneva process. Little has been achieved in the years since the 1994 cease-fire agreement and, speaking during a UN General Assembly summit meeting in September 2005, Saakashvili called on the international organisation to do more than merely talk about solutions, declaring that it ‘must act to end the lawless and immoral annexation’ of Abkhazia.12 It can be seen that little progress has been made in resolving the political stalemate with either region in the years since the end of the respective conflicts, and in September 2005 South Ossetia celebrated the 15th anniversary of its ‘independence’ with a Sovietstyle military parade watched by representatives from Abkhazia and Russia. There has been growing unrest recently: in addition to ongoing military skirmishes, two sets of presidential elections and referenda on independence in South Ossetia held in November 2006 were followed by a rally in December 2006, reportedly attended by thousands, calling for independence in Abkhazia. These events have brought renewed international attention to an often-overlooked but increasingly tense region, where the threat of violent conflict is high, as the territories in question seek to sever ties with the central authorities and achieve de jure independence. Enter Saakashvili Speaking prior to his inauguration in January 2004, Saakashvili stated that the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity was his first priority, and he expressed his desire to ‘consolidate’ the country by seeking resolutions to the frozen conflicts of the Shevardnadze

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era, emphasising that ‘Georgia as a single organism does exist’, ambitious declarations that have been backed up by substantive action.13 Saakashvili reportedly has a particular interest in resolving the Abkhazian and South Ossetian crises, having written his thesis at Kiev University on national minority rights, focusing on the problems of the two separatist regions. The Georgian leader has described Abkhazia as the ‘promised land’ and his ‘most cherished goal’, ominously pledging that: ‘Just as President Putin wants to establish control over Chechnya and all other regions, I want Abkhazia’s reintegration into Georgia.’14 At the end of May 2004, buoyed by his success in Ajaria, Saakashvili offered Abkhazia and South Ossetia ‘special status’ within Georgia, proposing the creation of a federal state containing republics with considerable autonomy, a proposal that was rejected by both regions. Tbilisi has focused on seeking a resolution to the dispute with South Ossetia, largely because, of the two, it was perceived to be the region that would be the most willing to compromise with Tbilisi and to make concessions. Moreover, the UN is involved in conflict resolution in Abkhazia, thereby alleviating some of the pressure on Tbilisi. While the South Ossetian conflict shares many similarities with that in Abkhazia, the territory involved is much smaller and ethnic Georgians are still living in the disputed region, unlike the situation in Abkhazia, where the majority of Georgians have fled. As mentioned above, South Ossetia is not seeking to become an independent state. Rather, it is calling for reunification with fellow Ossetians in the Russian republic of North OssetiaAlania, across the international border in the North Caucasus, and hence is effectively seeking to become a constituent part of the Russian Federation. Russian is the region’s official language, the Russian rouble is the official currency and in February 2004 the South Ossetian leader, Eduard Kokoity, proclaimed that 95 per cent of the republic’s population of approximately 100,000 had adopted Russian citizenship.15



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Abkhazia is seeking full independence, an ambition its leaders insist is non-negotiable. This autonomy would be based on close political and economic integration with Russia. Following his election to power at the beginning of 2005, the Abkhazian leader Sergei Bagapsh stated that integration with Russia was a priority for his government. He described Abkhazia as being tied to Russia ‘by an umbilical cord’ and said his administration would do ‘everything we can to make the laws and the acts of legislation of the republic of Abkhazia dovetail with those of the Russian Federation’.16 As in South Ossetia, a majority of the republic’s population have adopted Russian citizenship. In August 2005 the Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed that over 80 per cent of Abkhazians held Russian passports, a figure that Bagapsh confidently expects to rise, particularly following a declaration from Moscow that, as of 1 December 2005, it would no longer pay pensions to those Abkhazians who did not hold Russian passports.17 As mentioned above, the majority of ethnic Georgians were either expelled from the republic or fled during the war. The conflict in Abkhazia resulted in demographic changes in the region which have been described as ‘unacceptable’ by the UN and which triggered claims of ethnic cleansing from Tbilisi: a major stumbling-block in negotiations is Georgia’s demand for official recognition that ethnic cleansing has taken place. Around 300,000 ethnic Georgians fled the fighting in 1992–93 and little is being done to facilitate their return. Those who do attempt to return to their homes in Abkhazia are often subjected to persecution and Bagapsh has advised those residents who refuse to adopt Russian citizenship to leave the republic and move to Georgia.18 There is a special regime in place for ethnic Abkhazians and Ossetians to claim Russian citizenship, thereby bypassing the usual lengthy application process. These peoples are keen to acquire Russian passports, as their refusal to acknowledge Georgian statehood means they do not hold Georgian passports and hence are

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unable to travel beyond the country’s borders. Abkhazians and South Ossetians are also excluded from the visa regime Russia imposed on Georgian citizens in December 2000, a move described by the European Parliament as the ‘de facto annexation of Georgian territory’.19 With the majority of the South Ossetian population claiming Russian citizenship, Moscow was able to cite concerns for the security of its citizens as a motive for launching a military operation on Georgian territory in August 2008.20 Saakashvili’s desire to consolidate Georgia’s territorial integrity has pushed the country towards renewed conflict with Russia, which not only has peace-keeping contingents in the two regions, but maintains two military bases elsewhere on Georgian territory, and is accused of providing tacit support for the separatists. The hand of its powerful northern neighbour has been visible in all Georgia’s separatist conflicts, as Moscow seeks to retain political leverage over the South Caucasian state, and Tbilisi has frequently accused Russia of seeking to undermine Georgian sovereignty by supporting separatist provinces. The Georgian leader, presciently, cautioned that in the event of large-scale armed conflict erupting in South Ossetia it would be an issue of bilateral Georgian-Russian relations, not merely an internal conflict. Speaking in September 2005, Saakashvili declared that there is ‘no Ossetian problem in Georgia’, but ‘a problem in Georgian-Russian relations with respect to certain territories’.21 Russia holds the key to the resolution of Georgia’s territorial disputes in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moscow plays a crucial role, both in keeping the conflicts alive and in moderating tensions. Unable to stop itself meddling in what it still considers to be its own backyard, Russian officials have held periodic meetings with the leaders of Georgia’s separatist regions, and in September 2005 hosted a conference of self-proclaimed republics, the so-called ‘Commonwealth of Unrecognised States’, which included representatives from South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdniestr. Moscow



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took its political support one step further in August 2008, formally recognising the independence of Georgia’s two separatist regions and further inflaming tensions with its neighbour.22 This recognition by a major world power encourages the separatists to persist with their demands and to baulk at negotiations. Vladimir Socor has identified what he describes as the Russian policy paradigm of ‘controlled instability’ in the region, the ultimate goal of which, in his opinion, is to thwart the integration of the South Caucasus into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.23 This consequently undermines the development of a Eurasian security community. Taking a Back Seat: The EU’s Involvement in Conflict-Resolution Efforts The Georgian leadership has consistently called for greater regional and international participation in the search for a resolution to the conflicts. In an attempt to weaken Russian influence in the Caucasus, Tbilisi has sought to use international forums such as the UN and OSCE to express its views and gain support. Saakashvili reiterated his commitment to a peaceful resolution of Georgia’s unresolved separatist disputes in a speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2004, stating that ‘no democracy can go to war against its own people.’ Proposing a new three-stage programme designed to facilitate their settlement, he underlined his determination to resolve these conflicts, observing that such ‘black holes’ are ‘incompatible with progress, development and lasting stability’ as they ‘breed crime, drug trafficking, arms trading and … terrorism’.24 The Georgian leadership has been pushing for the internationalisation of the existing negotiating frameworks for the South Ossetian and Abkhazian disputes, believing the current structures – the JCC and the Geneva process, which were established at the beginning of the 1990s – to be outdated, and biased against Georgia. Tbilisi wants greater participation from international actors in the

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mediation process, as well as the internationalisation of existing peace-keeping forces in the two regions.25 There is clearly a need for more impartial mediators to help resolve Georgia’s secessionist disputes, as currently Russia dominates crisis management in the region. Tbilisi is particularly keen for organisations such as the EU and NATO to boost their presence in the country, and has been encouraging their participation in conflict resolution, although the contribution of these organisations is hardly viewed as neutral and impartial by either the separatist leaders or Moscow. In an interview in October 2006, the Georgian Deputy Defence Minister Mamuka Kudava urged the EU to mediate between Georgia and Russia over the separatist territories, stating that Tbilisi would only achieve results ‘with the help of logical and objective arbiters. Otherwise, we will never come close to a constructive approach.’26 So, what have individual organisations been doing with regard to conflict resolution and increasing security in Georgia? Recognition of the South Caucasus’ growing significance for European security is reflected in the EU’s gradual engagement with the region, particularly with respect to conflict resolution. Deepening EU engagement with the three countries of the South Caucasus was demonstrated by the appointment of an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the region in 2003, and by the inclusion of the three states in the European neighbourhood policy (ENP); in December 2005 Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, affirmed that the organisation was ready to play a greater role in efforts to resolve the longrunning conflicts of the South Caucasus.27 The EU has included the South Caucasus in the ENP with the aim of advocating political and economic reform, supporting conflict prevention and resolution, and enhancing intra-regional cooperation.28 The relationship between Tbilisi and the EU acquired considerable momentum after Saakashvili’s accession to power: EU financial aid to the country increased significantly post-2003, and in 2004



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the European Commission utilised its Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) to support Georgia’s democratisation, providing €4.65 million. The country has ambitious aspirations with respect to its relationship with the EU and what the organisation could and should be doing to support it. In particular, it was hopeful that the EU would provide it with greater political support in its strained relations with Russia and in the resolution of its separatist disputes. There has been some progress: the Georgian ENP Action Plan notes the EU’s continuing ‘strong … commitment to support the settlement of Georgia’s internal conflicts, drawing on the instruments at the EU’s disposal, and in close consultation with the UN and OSCE’. It also stresses that the EU is ‘ready to consider ways to strengthen further its engagement’. The Action Plan’s sixth ‘priority area’ is identified as the promotion of a ‘peaceful resolution of internal conflicts’, and stresses the need for ‘constructive cooperation between interested actors in the region’. It also recognises Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within internationally recognised borders, and the EU has pledged assistance in confidence-building, together with economic assistance in the light of progress in the settlement process.29 Nevertheless, the EU is very aware of the need to maintain friendly links with Russia, and is keen not to jeopardise its relationship with Moscow; it has thus tended to take a very pragmatic approach in its relations with Georgia. Tbilisi was hopeful that the EU would establish its own border-monitoring mission to replace the OSCE’s, now defunct, on the border with Russia.30 However, internal wrangling between EU member states over the issue of Russia meant that no agreement was reached. Instead of an EU border-monitoring mission, the mandate of the EUSR was enlarged to include reporting on the border situation, together with the establishment of a support team to work with Georgian border guards in non-conflict areas, with the aim of strengthening Georgia’s border security. By contrast, the EU presented a united front in September

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2008, strongly condemning Russia’s ‘disproportionate reaction’ in Georgia and postponing negotiations on a new partnership agreement until all Russian troops were withdrawn.31 Of all the conflicts in the South Caucasus, the EU is most involved in the search for a settlement between South Ossetia and Tbilisi. The European Commission participates in economy-related issues that are discussed at the JCC, and the EU has provided grants to the OSCE Mission in Georgia to finance the JCC, but Georgia is keen for the organisation to have a greater involvement in that body, which it feels is very biased against it, given its composition. The Georgian Action Plan went some way to reflecting this, with its recognition of the need for the JCC to intensify its efforts, but there is still much work to be done.32 A further step towards greater EU participation would be the inclusion of the EUSR at JCC meetings in an observer capacity. His presence would perhaps satisfy Georgia’s wishes and, as he would only have observer status, might also be acceptable to South Ossetia and Russia. The EU is far less involved in the search for a negotiated solution to the Abkhaz conflict, lending its support to the ongoing UN-led negotiations and providing financial assistance for rehabilitation, but otherwise playing a very minimal political role. At present, the largest contribution that the EU makes to conflictresolution efforts in Georgia is financial – it is the largest donor to the South Caucasus region. It has been financing the rehabilitation of the conflict zones in South Ossetia and Abkhazia since 1997, providing assistance worth a total of 33 million Euros to the two areas over the period 1997–2005. At an OSCE donor conference held in June 2006, the European Commission pledged a further 2 million Euros to assist in the economic rehabilitation of South Ossetia and indicated that it was ready to make a similar contribution in 2007 if projects were implemented satisfactorily and if the situation on the ground was ‘favourable’. The organisation has also announced an aid package of2 million Euros for victims of the conflict in Abkhazia, to assist in reconstruction, the provision of food, and health-care and



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job-creation programmes. The EU’s most recent project in Abkhazia is a programme worth 4 million Euros to support rehabilitation and reconstruction in the conflict zone, with the aim of creating conditions for the return of IDPs and refugees.33 However, these unresolved conflicts require more than financial aid from the EU: they also necessitate political action. So far, the organisation has preferred to provide assistance through economic rehabilitation, humanitarian aid and confidence-building projects, tackling problems at the grass-roots level rather than engaging in ongoing negotiations. While its financial efforts to date are commendable, it also needs to engage politically in order for its conflict-resolution efforts to become more effective. With no presence or voice in the key negotiating mechanisms for either the Abkhaz or South Ossetian disputes, the EU’s political influence remains extremely limited. The EU made the move from rhetoric to substantive action after the 2008 conflict, offering an autonomous civilian monitoring mission to monitor the ceasefire agreements. The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) is mandated to cover the whole of Georgia and is tasked to contribute to the stabilisation and normalisation of the situation in the areas affected by the war, to monitor the deployment of Georgian police forces and to observe the compliance with human rights and rule of law. It provides tangible demonstrations both of the organisation’s commitment to stability on its periphery and of its ability to conduct crisis management missions.34 The EU-led deployment in Georgia was far more acceptable to Moscow than any similar NATO-led force, which would represent too much of a threat in what it has traditionally perceived as its own strategic backyard. NATO Engagement Georgia’s relations with NATO have been rewarding, and the country has benefited from cooperation with the alliance, as well as individual member states, particularly within the area of security-

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sector reform. The 2004 Istanbul summit placed special emphasis on the importance of the military alliance’s relations with the South Caucasus, appointing a Special Representative and liaison officer. However, it is important to note that the objective of NATO assistance to the South Caucasus states is to support international efforts to promote confidence-building measures in the region. The alliance is not directly involved in conflict resolution, but intends to contribute to the enhancement of security and stability in the region through the pursuit of a policy of partnership, cooperation and dialogue, in the belief that this will help to overcome the divisions that lead to conflict.35 Its assistance to the region is focused on boosting stability in order to foster a better environment for conflict resolution, primarily by helping the states of the South Caucasus to establish institutions that are better able to deal with the varied security challenges each country faces. Thus the alliance’s role in conflict resolution is indirect, limited to the leverage it gains from its support. It can only hope that the threat of the benefits it provides being removed if hostilities resume is sufficient deterrence, and adequate motivation for all parties to seek a political resolution. Like the EU, NATO’s role is also complicated by its relations with Russia and the need for such relations to remain transparent. Although the possibility of NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Georgia’s two conflict zones has been mooted, perhaps along the lines of recent operations in the Balkans, this is not considered to be a viable option because of fears of antagonising Moscow. Georgia was the first country in the South Caucasus to articulate its desire to join the alliance, expressing its membership aspirations in 2000, and it became an official aspirant at the Prague summit held in November 2002. As its relations with Russia deteriorated over the Pankisi Gorge issue,36 so President Eduard Shevardnadze sought to accelerate Georgia’s membership of NATO: a special government commission was instructed to prepare a programme



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on integration into the organisation in the political, economic and military spheres. This desire to join the Western military alliance was underlined by a parade in Tbilisi in December 2002 of the first battalion of Georgian troops to be trained in anti-terrorist techniques by the US. Speaking at the parade, Shevardnadze stated that: ‘Georgia has pledged to modernise its army to meet the criteria needed to join NATO, and that is the path we have chosen. The Commando battalion of the Georgian armed forces … will form the basis of our future professional army.’37 Georgia views NATO membership as key to its national security. The country’s National Military Strategy makes it clear that a shift from the principle of territorial defence to one of collective defence is a cornerstone of Georgian defence policy. According to the National Security Strategy, NATO membership would ‘not only endow Georgia with an unprecedented degree of military and political security, but would allow it to contribute to strengthening the security of Europe, particularly the Black Sea region’.38 However, its potential accession to NATO is complicated by the long-running secessionist conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Russia’s reaction to possible Georgian membership. Peaceful conflict resolution is a core NATO value, hence the political settlement of its separatist disputes is key to Georgia’s membership hopes. Since 1994 Georgia has also been a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme (PfP), the alliance’s principal vehicle for deepening its engagement in the South Caucasus, and participates in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which affords it the opportunity to hold political discussions and receive assistance on political and security issues. In addition, it participates in the Planning and Review Process (PARP), which aims to ensure interoperability between NATO members and partner countries. Georgia deepened its relationship with NATO in October 2004 with the conclusion of an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). The purpose of an IPAP is to outline a specific programme

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of reforms considered vital for the development of a country into a stable democracy, encompassing both civilian and military issues. Speaking at the 2002 NATO summit in Prague, then-President Shevardnadze underlined the significance attached to Georgia’s engagement with NATO, stating his belief that an IPAP would encourage the country to ‘accelerate and more boldly pursue political, economic and military reforms’. He also expressed the country’s understanding of the need to promote ‘Euro-Atlantic values’ in the region.39 Georgia’s IPAP states the government’s commitment to resolving separatist disputes by peaceful means, in cooperation with international organisations, and mandates two actions to be taken with regard to conflict resolution: informing allies of any progress or change; and determining the status of the autonomous entities, facilitating the return of refugees and IDPs, and rehabilitating the conflict zone. It has made considerable progress in implementing its IPAP, agreed in 2004, and as a result NATO made the decision in September 2006 to commence ‘intensified dialogue’ with Tbilisi. In Georgia’s eyes this represented a ‘significant step from partnership to membership candidate format’.40 In the wake of the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, a NATO-Georgia Commission was established to deepen dialogue and cooperation and oversee the future development of relations between the alliance and Tbilisi.41 Georgia also benefits from NATO’s Virtual Silk Highway Project, which became operational in spring 2003. The project involves the installation of a satellite-based network that provides internet access to scientists and researchers across the South Caucasus and Central Asia. It is part of the NATO Science Programme, founded in 1958 on the basis that scientific and technological developments can be decisive factors in determining the security of countries and their position within the international arena.42



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The US and Turkey: Strengthening Military Security In terms of tangible improvements to its physical security, Georgia has most benefited not from its relationships with organisations such as the EU and NATO, but from bilateral relations with individual member-states, particularly the US and Turkey. As Georgia continues to push for a Russian military withdrawal from its territory, the influence of the US military within the country has risen. Sitting on Russia’s southern flank, astride a vital transit route for Caspian hydro123carbons heading for international markets, Georgia has witnessed a veritable flood of assistance from the US: financial support for the country to date totals over US$1billion. Nevertheless, despite this financial assistance, prior to 11 September 2001 the possibility of a formal American military commitment to the erstwhile Soviet states in the Caspian region was assumed to be remote, and the region was not considered to be of vital strategic importance to the US. However, this changed dramatically with the terror attacks against New York and Washington. A US$64million ‘Train and Equip’ (GTEP) programme began in May 2002 to train Georgian troops in anti-terrorist techniques and to assist in bringing the lawless Pankiski Gorge region under control. GTEP ended in April 2004, but was followed by a 16-month, US$64million ‘Sustainment and Stability Operations Programme’ (SSOP) launched in 2005 to train four battalions of troops, partly to support US-led coalition operations. Reflecting a similar American-run training programme in the Philippines, GTEP was initiated to help the country address security threats and to ‘enhance the capability of selected Georgian military units to provide security and stability to the citizens of Georgia and the region’.43 In particular, the programme was intended to train four combat infantry battalions (three from the army and one from the Georgian National Guard) and one mechanised company to defend Georgia against potential terrorist threats in the Pankiski Gorge.44

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The initial phase of GTEP consisted of command-centre staff training for members of Georgia’s Ministry of Defence, as well as staff training for units of the Land Forces Command. The objective of this 70-day programme, which reflected training offered at institutions such as the US Army War College, was ‘to build strong and effective staff organisations capable of creating and sustaining standardised operating procedures, training plans, operational plans, and a property accounting system’.45 GTEP allocated US$350,000 to renovate and upgrade the national-level command-and-control capability of Georgia’s Ministry of Defence (MoD), and Georgian officials were also introduced to the concept of a National Military Command Centre (NMCC) that would enable the various government ministries and agencies within the MoD to communicate and co-ordinate with each other in times of crisis.46 The core of GTEP was the tactical training provided by American military instructors for the four battalions and one company. The first battalion to be trained, the Commando Battalion, received its instruction at the symbolically named Krtsanisi 9/11 Training Area. Each unit received approximately 100 days’ training, which included platoon-level offensive and defensive operations, tailored to the specific type of unit. GTEP also provided for the permanent transfer of military equipment to Georgia, including communications equipment, small arms, uniforms, fuel and construction material. However, it was emphasised that any such equipment was provided for the four battalions and one company only for the duration of their training, and was not intended to be a rearmament programme for the entire Georgian army. Furthermore, GTEP was conditional on a pledge that the trained units would not be used in domestic conflicts. The largest single US-funded programme in Georgia has been the ‘Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement’ (GBSLE) assistance programme, which has helped the country to secure its borders since the departure of Russian border guards in 1998. This has been



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boosted by the introduction of the ‘Export Control and Related Border Security’ (EXBS) assistance programme – combined, the two programmes are intended to facilitate the border-guard, coastguard, customs and other security forces become more effective in the protection of Georgia’s land and sea borders.47 In return for assistance with the reform of its armed forces in line with NATO standards, Georgia has become a staunch supporter of US foreign policy; it was vocal, for instance, in its support for the war in Iraq, and has provided small numbers of troops for NATO- and US-led operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Furthermore, on 21 March 2003 the Georgian parliament ratified the December 2002 military cooperation agreement with the US, granting US military personnel visa-free entry, exemption from criminal prosecution, and permission to carry weapons when offduty. The US was also granted overflying rights and the unimpeded deployment of military hardware in the country. This agreement boosted tension with Russia, as it put US military personnel on a par with the diplomatic corps and is far more than is granted to Russian troops based in Georgia.48 Turkey has been providing financial assistance and equipment to the Georgian armed forces since 1997, and during a meeting between representatives of Turkey’s General Staff and the Georgian Defence Ministry, held at the beginning of March 2007, further cooperation was discussed. According to a document signed in November 2006, Turkey agreed to provide US$1.8 million-worth of financial support to Georgia. Part of this would be provided in the form of material assistance, while the remainder would be used to cover the daily expenses of the Georgian platoon serving in Kosovo (as part of the Turkish battalion), as well as financial expenses incurred by the Georgian military representative at NATO Headquarters.49

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Conclusions The growing strategic significance of the Caucasus region within the contemporary security environment means that efforts to resolve the long-running conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia need to be stepped up by international and regional actors. The long-running disputes have been perpetuated by the interests of individuals at the local level, for whom conflict is more profitable than peace, as well as by Russian involvement and a lack of international attention. Peaceful settlement of these conflicts would boost stability in Georgia and strengthen regional security and cooperation. As discussed above, current EU involvement in conflict resolution in Georgia is limited to political support for existing negotiating mechanisms and to financial assistance for rehabilitation within the conflict zones, whilst NATO is not directly involved in conflictresolution efforts at all, attempting instead to enhance stability through cooperation and dialogue. The prospect of NATO-led, Balkans-style stabilisation operations remains a remote possibility. Although the declared intention of NATO and the EU is to boost Georgian security, in some respects their involvement, as well as that of individual member states, has merely served to inflame geopolitical tensions in the region. This has further undermined stability on Europe’s periphery rather than strengthened it, and has undermined the development of a Eurasian security community. As Tbilisi seeks to move away from the Russian sphere of influence, Moscow has manifested its dissatisfaction by demonstrating its continuing ability to exert control over its neighbour, lending its tacit support to the secessionist regions, imposing economic sanctions and implementing restrictive registration procedures for Georgians living in Russia. In September 2005 the Russian Foreign Ministry warned that the supply of armaments to Georgia by NATO member-states could destabilise the whole of the Caucasus region, strengthening Tbilisi’s desire to resolve its territorial disputes by force.50 Unsuccessful Georgian efforts to regain control of South



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Ossetia by military means in August 2008 merely served to undermine the country’s security and to highlight Russia’s continuing dominance in the Caucasus. The resolution of both the South Ossetian and Abkhazian disputes depends on the attitude that Russia takes. In spite of Moscow’s decision to launch a military operation in Georgia in August 2008, it is important to take into account the crucial moderating role that Russia plays in the Caucasus region as a whole: its stabilising influence and substantial presence cannot be ignored. Russia played a decisive part in averting bloodshed during Georgia’s ‘Rose Revolution’ of November 2003, becoming involved in the impasse surrounding Shevardnadze’s position as president, and also remains the key economic power in the country. Moscow will gain far more from encouraging the development of a stable country on its volatile southern border and from co-operating with Tbilisi to tackle transnational problems such as drug- and weapons-trafficking. On the other hand, an unstable Georgia is much less attractive to the West in terms of investment and political partnership, and would enable Moscow to retain its dominant influence in the region. Russian pressure on Georgia, particularly the leverage it exerts by means of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts, undermines the efforts of the South Caucasian state to establish durable partnerships with the West. This ultimately has a negative impact on the West’s endeavours to secure its peripheries and to ensure the security of its own citizens. Conflict ‘management’ in the country is still dominated by Russia – security organisations such as the EU and NATO need seriously to rethink the objectives and methods of their involvement, although the level of this involvement is driven to some extent by concern about balancing relations with Moscow. Georgia is very keen for the EU and NATO to boost their involvement, but these organisations appear to be somewhat reticent, aware of the need for transparent, balanced relations with Russia. However, it could be argued that if they were genuinely concerned

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about promoting stability and security in Georgia, then they might well need to take a more definite position. The separatist conflicts have implications not only for stability in the Caucasus region, but also for Europe and the wider international community. As the EU and NATO seek to expand their borders, it is becoming more important to focus on conflict resolution at the periphery, where the presence of weak or unstable states poses a threat to the stability of member states. Thus resolution of these disputes has become more critical, and international actors such as the EU and NATO need to use their not inconsiderable influence to play a more active role in the search for a negotiated settlement. However, international involvement in conflict resolution can actually hinder the development of long-term stability, and the lessons of Bosnia and Kosovo, as outlined in previous chapters, must be heeded. Even if the EU, NATO and Russia have different ideas and approaches to conflict resolution and about the best way to bring stability and security to Georgia, it is nevertheless obvious to all that the unresolved conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia hinder stability by deterring investment, undermining regional cooperation and preventing integration. All the external actors involved in Georgia’s separatist disputes, to whatever extent, need to work together to restore dialogue and confidence at the grassroots level. There is little doubt that Saakashvili is determined to restore Georgia’s territorial integrity and regain control of separatist regions, moving the country further from the Russian sphere of influence and demonstrating Georgian sovereignty.

6 Nagorno-Karabakh Diplomatic deadlock

The unresolved dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the majority Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the most worrying unresolved conflicts in the Caucasus region, both because it is between two sovereign states and because the three principal regional powers – Russia, Turkey and Iran – all have a differing stance towards the issue, raising fears that if there was a renewal of fighting, it could rapidly become internationalised. The dispute has polarised countries and their allies in the region, and has also created a security vacuum that encourages the proliferation of transnational security challenges such as organised crime and illegal trafficking. Armenia is isolated within the South Caucasus region as a result of the conflict, having no diplomatic or trade links with two of its powerful neighbours, Azerbaijan and Turkey.1 Furthermore, in a similar fashion to the ongoing separatist disputes in Georgia, the protracted conflict undermines regional cooperation, as well as economic development and stability, deterring vital investment and the development of a wider security community. Although it is well over a decade since a cease-fire agreement was signed (in 1994), Armenia and Azerbaijan are still officially at war over the mountainous region. The ensuing stalemate has brought no real peace or stability and there are fears that the conflict could be easily reignited. In spite of intermittent talks, negotiations over the

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disputed territory have failed to produce any tangible results. With all parties refusing to compromise, there has been an intensification of international efforts to resolve the long-running stand-off and avert the threat of further conflict. The stagnant peace process was kick-started in 2004, and attempts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict were stepped up by several international and regional actors, including the OSCE, its Minsk Group, the UN and the Council of Europe, while Russia and the US both issued statements on the conflict.2 The OSCE has also boosted its cooperation with other European organisations, reaching agreement in 2005 with the Council of Europe that both organisations would continue to interact closely on initiatives for a settlement of the conflict.3 However, in spite of numerous well-intentioned statements, few tangible results have been achieved. The involvement of international actors in conflict-resolution efforts has been very limited, despite the potential threat to European and global stability from this lack of progress towards a political settlement, and despite the fact that Azerbaijan is keen to encourage greater international participation in the ongoing negotiating process. Only the OSCE is fully engaged in that process: the EU has occupied a back seat in negotiation efforts, preferring to offer political support to the OSCE, whilst NATO has made it clear that it has no direct role to play in conflict resolution. With recent EU expansion eastwards to the Black Sea, there have been calls for the organisation to play a more active role in attempts to settle the dispute. A resolution issued by the European Parliament in January 2006 stressed the importance of peaceful development on the European continent and in neighbouring areas, stating that the EU must help settle conflicts in the Caucasus region. It described the ongoing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh as an impediment to ‘the development of Armenia and Azerbaijan and regional cooperation as well as the effective implementation of the European neighbourhood policy’.4 It also called for the OSCE’s Minsk Group



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to coordinate their action more effectively with the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus, Peter Semneby, in order to move the negotiation process forward. Securing Integration? Both Azerbaijan and Armenia have been far less vocal about their desire to integrate with Western security structures such as the EU and NATO than has neighbouring Georgia. Nevertheless, continuing integration with NATO is a key strategic goal of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, and the government has welcomed the Euro-Atlantic alliance’s growing interest in the South Caucasus, making it clear it would accept the alliance playing a greater role in dealing with ‘conflicts and crises’ in the region.5 However, despite valuing cooperation with NATO, Baku has never expressed its intention of joining either the military alliance or the EU. Speaking in December 2006, President Ilham Aliyev described entry into any organisation as a ‘two-way process’, and said he did not intend to ‘bang on the door, to seek entry, to ask and to plead’ with either NATO or the EU.6 Armenia’s attitude towards greater integration with Europe is best characterised as enthusiastic pragmatism. It has stressed that the development and consolidation of its relations with both the EU and NATO are priority directions for the country’s foreign policy. However, this foreign policy is based on ‘complementarity’, a partnership approach that seeks to develop relations simultaneously with all states having an interest in the region.7 Yerevan’s relations with European organisations must be balanced against its strategic partnership with Russia, and membership of either the EU or NATO is not a priority. Isolated within the South Caucasus as a result of the NagornoKarabakh dispute, Armenia particularly needs the external trade links that a deeper relationship with the EU could bring, but it is also mindful of its reliance on Russia for traditional military security.

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Armenia is Russia’s closest ally in the South Caucasus, and Yerevan has sought a close relationship with Moscow to counterbalance what it perceives to be its vulnerable position between two countries that are antagonistic towards it: a militarily powerful Turkey and an increasingly strong Azerbaijan. Russian support for Armenia means that it could easily be dragged into renewed fighting over NagornoKarabakh, particularly as Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), which guarantees mutual military assistance if a member is attacked. There are two Russian military bases on Armenian territory, at Yerevan and Gyumri, and as long as it has the security of Russian backing, Armenia has little incentive to participate in negotiations. The relative ambivalence towards European integration of both Armenia and Azerbaijan has been reflected in the past by the attitude of European organisations towards the South Caucasus region as a whole, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in particular. However, there has been growing interest in recent years, particularly in Azerbaijan. Energy represents one of the most important aspects of Azerbaijan’s increasing significance to the international community and resulting international involvement. The broader area of the Caspian contains significant reserves of oil and gas, and the South Caucasus region has been identified as both a source of and key transit route for hydrocarbons from the Caspian Sea. The Tannock report on the European Neighbourhood Policy, published in December 2005, described energy policy as ‘an important aspect, since the EU is surrounded by the world’s largest oil and natural gas reserves (Russia and the Caspian basin, the Middle East and North Africa) and many countries in the neighbourhood … are suppliers or … transit countries’. 8 Consequently Azerbaijan has become increasingly important to the economic security of the West, as international oil companies have spent vast sums of money on exploration and development in the South Caucasus and the wider Caspian region, which are



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expected to be producing three million barrels of crude oil per day (150 million tonnes per year) by 2010. It is hoping to become a key player in global energy markets, an ambition that was boosted with the commissioning of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) export pipeline in 2005, an essential element in expanding oil production in the Caspian basin. Lacking any notable hydrocarbon resources, and excluded from transit routes (and consequently from any transit-tariff revenue), Armenia is more isolated and has attracted far less international interest than Azerbaijan. However, the ongoing dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh means that it should not be overlooked, as a renewal of hostilities in the region would threaten not only the stability and security of the South Caucasus, but also the security of energy infrastructure and supplies to the West. Armenia is totally cut off from the oil windfall that neighbouring Azerbaijan (and to some extent also Georgia) will receive, and perceives Baku’s growing economic strength as a threat. There is a fear in Armenia that, in the short term, oil-rich Azerbaijan will be in an economic and financial position to settle the conflict by force. This could fuel hawkishness on the Armenian side, in order to pre-empt the apparent risk of future Azeri aggression. The huge financial rewards that Azerbaijan is set to reap over the coming decade from its hydrocarbon reserves may well mean that it is less inclined to seek a negotiated resolution. However, these oil and gas revenues also provide a very good reason why Baku may decide against military action. The Azeri economy is highly dependent on the revenues from its hydrocarbon reserves, the development of which requires considerable foreign investment, and a renewal of the war with Armenia would damage Azerbaijan’s prospects of attracting further investment. There are fears that tensions between the two countries are actually increasing, rather than being reduced over time. The EU’s external relations commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, has criticised

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leaders in the region for their ‘inflammatory rhetoric’ and noted that ‘defence expenditure in the region is going through the roof.’9 As long as mediation efforts remain fruitless, the possibility of renewed hostilities cannot be discounted. The ‘wall of money’ that Azerbaijan expects to receive could significantly alter the current status quo, shifting the balance of power towards Baku and making it less inclined to seek a peaceful resolution. Azerbaijan’s armed forces are already almost double the size of Armenia’s, although they are not as well equipped. Fears of a resumption of full-scale fighting have been heightened by a dramatic rise in Azerbaijan’s annual defence spending, from US$175 million in 2004 to an estimated US$660 million in 2006.10 This has prompted Armenia, which is unable substantially to increase defence spending, to seek greater support from Russia. According to the Armenian defence minister, Serge Sargsian, during 2006 Yerevan received a ‘considerable amount’ of weaponry from Russia that give it ‘superiority over any adversary in some specific areas’.11 Of particular concern is the prospect of heavy equipment from the two Russian bases in Georgia, which Moscow has promised to close by 2008, being sent to its bases in Armenia.12 Azerbaijan has expressed its opposition to this, but ultimately has little influence over events. Historical Roots The dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan over NagornoKarabakh has deep historical roots, although both parties are guilty of seeking to manipulate history to support their opposing claims. Michael Croissant believes that the conflict over the enclave has ‘far more to do with interpretations of history than with demographics’: Armenian scholars argue that for centuries the region has been a heartland of Armenian civilisation, whilst their Azerbaijani counterparts contend that the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh are not Armenians per se, but ‘Armenianised … Azerbaijanis’, the



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result of the forcible cultural, linguistic and religious assimilation of the indigenous population conducted, from the eighth century, by immigrant Armenians.13 There is little doubt that Nagorno-Karabakh is of vital significance to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, in strategic, geographical, economic and cultural terms. Croisssant argues that the region occupies a ‘central place in the national consciousness’ of both peoples: For the Armenians, Karabakh is … the final stronghold where a tradition of national autonomy was preserved nearly uninterrupted; for the Azerbaijanis, Nagorno-Karabakh is both a key part of the ancient state to which they trace their ancestry and a focal point of their nationalism.14 This view is reinforced by Thomas de Waal, who stresses the cultural and symbolic meaning of the region for both peoples. In his opinion: Karabakh is the last outpost of [Armenian] Christian civilisation and a historical haven of Armenian princes and bishops before the eastern Turkic world begins. Azerbaijanis talk of it as a cradle … the birthplace of their musicians and poets.’15 Nagorno-Karabakh is an enclave within Azeri territory, populated predominantly by ethnic Armenians. The disputed territory is a graphic illustration of the impact of the complex level of ethnic diversity in the Caucasus region, resulting from its status as a borderland, squeezed between empires, that has seen high levels of migration over the centuries. The Caucasus is an area where several great powers – Russia, Turkey, Iran – have competed for influence throughout history, and the region has been ruled by different powers at different times, all of whom have left their mark.

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The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the First World War and its withdrawal from the Caucasus triggered considerable conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, as the three Caucasus republics struggled to gain control over territory. The arrival of the British in the region saw the pendulum swing in Azerbaijan’s favour, driven largely by economic and strategic concerns, and Nagorno-Karabakh was promised to Azerbaijan.16 The enclave was incorporated into the Azeri Socialist Soviet Republic (SSR) in 1921, in spite of previous indications that it would be assigned to Armenia. It has been argued that Stalin’s decision was partly influenced by a desire to show deference to Kemal Atatürk’s new Turkey, in the belief that it would become a fellow Bolshevik state. Turkey was opposed to any decision favouring Armenia, fearing that a strong Armenia could pose a threat to it.17 Stalin’s decision also reflected his policy of ‘divide and rule’, which further enhanced tensions between the different peoples of the region, as artificial borders divided natural alliances and reinforced individual ethnic identities. Armenians in the enclave were unhappy with the decision to assign it to Azerbaijan, and over subsequent years frequently petitioned the Kremlin to change the borders.18 Violence erupted at the end of the Soviet era over demands for greater autonomy, following a resolution issued in 1988 by the local Soviet in Nagorno-Karabakh, encouraged by the climate of glasnost, that called on Moscow to allow the region to join the Armenian SSR. This violence soon developed into full-blown civil war between Azerbaijan and the enclave, supported by Armenia, a war that lasted from 1992 to 1994 and resulted in a definitive defeat for Azeri government forces. It is estimated that at least 20,000 people were killed during the fighting, and Azerbaijan lost over 14 per cent of its territory (the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh itself and the broad Lachin security corridor that connects NagornoKarabakh with Armenia). The conflict area includes not only Nagorno-Karabakh, but also the total or partial territory of eight



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surrounding districts of Azerbaijan, occupied by the Armenians during the 1992–94 war. A key, and very elementary, obstacle still standing in the way of a peaceful settlement to the dispute is the continuing debate over the number of parties to the conflict. The enclave of NagornoKarabakh is demanding full sovereignty for its majority ethnicArmenian inhabitants, and is thought to be ultimately seeking unification with neighbouring Armenia. Azerbaijan, however, is only prepared to offer it autonomy within the Azeri state, and Baku does not negotiate directly with the region, claiming that the only parties to the conflict are Armenia and Azerbaijan, as reflected in the OSCE (then CSCE) document of 1992.19 It views the region as a separatist area within its own territory and refuses to recognise the regional leadership as legitimate. It will only accept the participation of Karabakh representatives in the peace process if they renounce their desire for secession from Azerbaijan. Consequently, Nagorno-Karabakh has no direct relations with Azerbaijan, and negotiations are conducted through Armenia. The enclave’s leader, Arkady Gukasyan, has consistently rejected the OSCE’s idea of a phased approach to settling the conflict, entailing Armenian withdrawal from occupied territories prior to the start of proper peace negotiations, and has stated that the region will not give up its goal of independence and international recognition for Karabakh, which has been identified as the primary objective of the region’s administration, particularly of its ‘foreign ministry’.20 The administration of the separatist region is fairly sceptical of the ongoing peace process, which in their opinion lacks legitimacy because the talks are bilateral rather than multilateral: ‘It must not be forgotten that the NagornoKarabakh problem was raised by the Nagorno-Karabakh people and is about the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.’21 Armenia supports this, arguing that representatives of the ‘republic’ must be allowed to participate in any talks.

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The OSCE: Taking the Lead As mentioned above, Azerbaijan is keen for greater international involvement in the resolution of the conflict and has called for the EU, Council of Europe and UN to play a more active role. Speaking in London in 2004, Ilham Aliyev declared that the NagornoKarabakh issue should be put on the ‘permanent agenda’ of international organisations in order to help establish peace in the region.22 Armenia prefers mediation by the OSCE’s Minsk Group, and its ‘National Security Strategy’, adopted in 2007, states that it ‘does not deem it necessary to consider or accept declarations made by other international organisations or their possible involvement’.23 This preference for the Minsk Group is most probably explained by the fact that Russia, one of Armenia’s key allies, is a co-chair, together with France and the US, both countries also perceived to be pro-Armenian. Since the early 1990s the OSCE has been the principal European actor engaged with the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. Other organisations concerned with European security, notably the EU and NATO, have limited their involvement to political support for the so-called OSCE Minsk Group process. The Minsk Group, co-chaired by France, Russia and the US, is a coalition of OSCE member states dedicated to seeking a negotiated settlement to the NagornoKarabakh conflict. Since 1999 the Armenian and Azeri presidents have been meeting regularly within the Group framework to discuss the conflict, but have not come any closer to resolution; their peace talks are beginning to seem increasingly perfunctory. It is very difficult for international organisations to boost their involvement in the negotiating process in the face of persistent disagreement over fundamental issues such as the number of parties to the dispute. The OSCE-led peace process was reinvigorated in 2000 with the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s presidency in Russia and his efforts to improve relations with Azerbaijan. In April 2001 high-profile, intensive negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan were held



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in Key West, Florida, and hopes were high that a resolution was close. However, domestic pressures in both countries undermined the process, and by 2003 it had come to a virtual standstill, as a result of parliamentary and presidential elections held in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.24 There was renewed optimism with the initiation of the ‘Prague process’, a stage-by-stage solution introduced in 2004, which represented a new phase in negotiations and got the two sides talking again. According to a report by the Minsk Group co-chairs, a new method of mediation was agreed, one that involved ‘no agenda, no commitment, no negotiation, but a free discussion, on any issue proposed by Armenia, Azerbaijan, or by the co-chairs’.25 This method has had positive, if barely perceptible, results, encouraging the co-chairs to propose starting substantive negotiations on the same basis. In a joint statement released at the end of November 2006, the Minsk Group co-chairs described the three rounds of consultations that had taken place between foreign ministers in Moscow, Paris and Brussels in October-November as ‘useful in moving the negotiations forward’.26 However, the window of opportunity for constructive progress appeared to be slammed shut the following month, with the holding of a referendum on a new constitution in Nagorno-Karabakh and concern that Baku’s position was hardening.27 Presidential elections in Armenia and Azerbaijan, scheduled for 2008, meant that a peace deal was highly unlikely to be reached before then, as neither president was willing to make compromises during an election campaign. This coincided with a new US co-chairman, Ambassador Matthew J. Bryza, who appeared to be taking a firmer line in negotiations and was certainly being less open with the media.28 In addition to the position of the main protagonists, the OSCE’s mediation efforts have been hampered by its broad membership and by the composition of the Minsk Group, the co-chairs of which all have an interest in the conflict and who have often worked at cross-

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purposes. Leadership of the Group has been controversial from the outset. Russia has been involved with it since its establishment in 1992, becoming a permanent co-chair in 1994. However, its role in mediation efforts complicates matters, as not only is it a staunch ally of Armenia but also the dominant power in the Caucasus, and it has been unwilling to encourage an international organisation such as the OSCE to take a lead role in the region. The US took the position of permanent co-chair in 1997, a move strongly opposed by Moscow, which has been unhappy with growing American influence in former Soviet states. France was appointed as a rotating co-chair, also in 1997, but has stayed in position, rejecting suggestions that its co-chairmanship be transferred to the EU. The appointment of both France and the US angered Azerbaijan, which perceives them both as pro-Armenian. The US has a large Armenian diaspora, which is a powerful political force.29 France too is home to a significant Armenian minority of approximately 400,000, the largest in Europe, which has an impact on both the country’s internal and external politics. French politicians have been pushing for Turkish recognition of the mass killing of Armenians in 1915 as a ‘tragedy’, and in October 2006 the French lower house of parliament passed a bill making it a crime to deny that the mass killing of Armenians in 1915 was ‘genocide’.30 The OSCE’s mediation role is further complicated by the fact that it is not just involved in the negotiation process, but also maintains a presence on the ground to try to acquire a true picture of the situation. In February 2005 it sent a fact-finding mission to NagornoKarabakh to investigate claims that Armenians were being illegally resettled in areas outside the enclave’s administrative borders. The Azeri authorities were alleging that, under a programme officially sanctioned by the Armenian government, people who are being settled in the enclave receive privileges such as tax and land benefits and exemption from military service.31 The mission did find evidence of settlers on the territories it inspected, although it did



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not ascertain whether this was the result of a calculated Armenian government policy. The findings elicited a strong response from Armenia, which accused the OSCE of breaking its own principles by demonstrating a selective approach towards the dispute and thus showing that it ‘de facto recognises the sovereign right of Azerbaijan to carry out ethnic cleansing’.32 More recently, Baku has been very critical of the OSCE’s special representative on Karabakh-related issues, Andrzej Kasprzyk, for failing, in their eyes, to investigate satisfactorily a series of fires that began breaking out in areas of Azerbaijan under Armenian control in June 2006.33 Thus, in these instances the mission has merely served to undermine the organisation’s wider conflict-resolution attempts. There is a deep mistrust of external actors involved in mediation efforts, a suspicion that undermines attempts to resolve the dispute peacefully; this is demonstrated by the impact of a resolution issued by the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) in January 2005, adopted to coincide with the fourth anniversary of both states’ accession to the Council. Tensions between Baku and Yerevan were inflamed by the resolution, which followed a report on the situation presented to the Political Affairs Committee in November 2004 by rapporteur David Atkinson. The Assembly drew attention to the fact that the occupation of foreign territory by a member state ‘constitutes a grave violation of that state’s obligations as a member of the Council of Europe’, and urged both governments to comply with the commitments associated with their accession in 2001, ‘to use only peaceful means for settling the conflict, by refraining from any threat of using force against their neighbours’.34 Each side manipulated the wording of the resolution to gain political capital and serve their own interests. Aliyev regarded the resolution as a triumph for Azerbaijan, as it made use of the term ‘separatist forces’ and described the Armenian forces as ‘occupiers’.35 Although the description of occupation was used in reference to

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Azeri territory outside Nagorno-Karabakh, it was interpreted by Baku to include the enclave. In a worrying sign of growing impatience and militancy, the Azeri deputy foreign minister, Araz Azimov, warned that the PACE resolution was a ‘last warning’ to Armenia and that Yerevan had to change its position: ‘Azerbaijan states once again that the country’s territorial integrity is inviolable and indubitable, and the best security guarantee is to liberate the territories invaded.’36 This statement raised fears that a renewed Azeri offensive was being planned. Armenia took a more non-committal tone, highlighting the nonbinding, consultative nature of the resolution. Seeking to accentuate the resolution’s positive findings for Armenia, several officials pointed out that the document called on Azerbaijan to begin talks with both communities in Nagorno-Karabakh to determine the region’s status, a petition that was initially proposed by the Armenian delegation to the Council of Europe. In Yerevan’s eyes, this represented a modest success, as it meant the enclave’s representatives might be given a chance to be a party to the negotiations. The limitations of third-party actors such as the OSCE has been recognised by Bernard Fassier, the French co-chairman of the Minsk Group, who has made it clear that, while the group can help to facilitate negotiations, it cannot resolve the Karabakh conflict: ‘The Minsk Group is a political forum. It can put forward political ideas. However, it does not have financial resources to implement those ideas.’ He has suggested that the EU should perhaps play a greater role, as ‘it has enough economic capacity’.37 Staying Neutral: EU Involvement Current EU involvement in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute is very limited, in spite of the danger posed by a renewal of the conflict. It is not directly involved in conflict-resolution and prevention mechanisms, choosing instead to give active support



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to the ongoing political dialogue between the three parties, as well as to the activities of the Minsk Group. This support is provided largely by the EUSR, whose mandate covers precisely this area.38 The failure of the Minsk Group to make any significant progress in achieving a peaceful resolution to the conflict has led to calls for the EU to boost its involvement. In particular, it has been argued that the European organisation should take over the French co-chair, a suggestion consistently rejected by France. As discussed in the chapter above on Georgia, EU engagement with the South Caucasus region has historically been tentative, although recent moves to include the region in the European Neighbourhood Policy represent deepening interest, with the aim of advocating political and economic reform, supporting conflict prevention and resolution, and enhancing intra-regional cooperation.39 The individual Action Plans (APs), signed by all three South Caucasus states in November 2006, highlight the interests of each specific country involved and the emphasis it gives to certain issues. The Azerbaijan AP identifies specific ‘common values’ that the two parties are committed to, including ‘the respect of and support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability and internationally recognised borders of each other’, clearly a reference to the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Precedence is given to this conflict throughout the Action Plan, particularly when compared with the Armenian AP: contributing to a ‘peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’ represents the first priority area in Azerbaijan’s AP, but only the seventh in Armenia’s, reflecting Baku’s determination to seek a resolution and Yerevan’s tolerance of the status quo. Although the OSCE has to date remained the key external actor involved in attempts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, its efforts are hampered by its broad membership and lack of enforcement mechanisms, as discussed above. The EU has more leverage: it is developing into a major international player, and is a key trading

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partner for the South Caucasus countries, giving it considerable influence. Furthermore, it has more resources to hand than the OSCE and could thus potentially be a more effective actor. Azerbaijan is the EU’s largest trading partner in the South Caucasus region, whilst trade with Armenia is limited; thus trade leverage varies considerably. In 2005, Azerbaijan had a positive trade balance with the EU, with exports amounting to nearly €2.4 billion, predominantly oil, gas and cotton, whilst imports from the EU totalled €1.5 billion. Nevertheless, despite being the EU’s largest trading partner in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan’s share of total EU imports was only 0.2 per cent, and 0.14 per cent of total exports.40 By contrast, Armenia accounted for only 0.04 per cent of total EU imports in 2005, with exports to the region amounting to €528 million, predominantly transport materials and machinery, and imports €416 million. One way in which the EU could play a greater role in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would be to link future trade with progress being made towards a negotiated settlement. However, these trade figures raise the question of influence within the various relationships and of where the balance lies. Azerbaijan’s strategic importance, in terms of energy security and geographical location, means that the EU is willing to turn a blind eye to the country’s painfully slow pace of liberal democratic reform. Without the lure of potential membership, the EU lacks any form of significant leverage by which it can seek to influence Azerbaijan’s behaviour, while conversely Azerbaijan appears to have considerable leverage in the form of its hydrocarbons and energy-transport infrastructure. This contrasts strongly with the position of Armenia, which has no trade with its neighbours Azerbaijan and Turkey and is thus keen to expand its limited trade links with the EU. However, it appears to have little to offer in return, other than potential political support, giving the EU substantial potential for leverage within the relationship. This divergence in the EU’s approach to the two countries again raises the issue of common European values, and undermines



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the possibility of developing a security community in the region. If the organisation is willing to overlook Azerbaijan’s faltering democratic development in order to maintain access to hydrocarbons, it would appear that the existence of Adler and Barnett’s ‘compatible core values’, necessary for the furtherance of security communities, can be brought into question. Financial assistance from the European Commission is the most direct form of support for conflict resolution that has come from the EU. At the request of Baku, the EC has provided considerable financial aid for the rebuilding of territories within Azerbaijan damaged during the conflict, including the rehabilitation of a railway line, electricity supplies, drinking water and irrigation, and the reconstruction of schools.41 In particular, it has concentrated on the rehabilitation of infrastructure in the Fizuli, Agdam and Agjabedi regions that would facilitate the return of displaced peoples. However, it is important to note that assistance has only been provided to war-damaged areas under Azeri control. There has been no assistance from the EU, financial or otherwise, provided for Nagorno-Karabakh and the ‘occupied territories’. This financial support from the EU is a start, but more needs to be done to break the negotiating deadlock. For the future, it is planned that such financial assistance will be used increasingly to reduce tensions from the conflict by supporting regional cooperation and post-conflict rehabilitation and by linking assistance levels to progress in conflict resolution. The EU’s official position is that it would consider contributing to peace-keeping forces in the region if there was agreement between the parties on the deployment of such forces, a highly unlikely prospect.42 The organisation’s determination to maintain a neutral position with regard to the conflict means that its policy is often incoherent and contradictory. This can be seen most clearly in the recently signed Action Plans prepared for Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan AP supports the country’s territorial integrity, whilst the Armenian AP supports the

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contradictory ‘principle of self-determination of peoples’.43 One key reason for the EU’s often incoherent stance towards this conflict is the position of its member states, in particular France, which is seen as a supporter of the Armenian position rather than, as mentioned above, a neutral observer. In a similar fashion to its handling of the situation in Georgia, the EU has so far preferred to assist efforts to achieve a political settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, through economic rehabilitation, humanitarian aid and confidence-building projects, tackling problems at the grassroots level rather than engaging in ongoing negotiations. While its financial efforts to date are commendable, it also needs to engage politically in order for its conflict-resolution efforts to become more effective. With no presence or voice in the key negotiating mechanisms in the protracted dispute, the EU’s political influence remains extremely limited. NATO Assistance As discussed in the previous chapter, NATO has been deepening its involvement in the region, although it is important to note that the objective of NATO assistance to the South Caucasus states is to support international efforts to promote confidence-building measures in the region. The alliance is not directly involved in conflict resolution, but intends to contribute to the enhancement of security and stability in the region through the pursuit of a policy of partnership, cooperation and dialogue, in the belief that this will help to overcome the divisions that lead to conflict. Its assistance is focused on boosting stability in order to foster a better environment for conflict resolution, primarily by helping the states of the South Caucasus to establish institutions that are better able to deal with the varied security challenges each country faces. Thus, the alliance’s role in conflict resolution is indirect, limited to the leverage it gains from its support. It can only hope that the threat of removing the



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benefits it provides if hostilities resume is sufficient deterrence and adequate motivation for all parties to seek a political resolution. Like the EU, NATO’s role is also complicated by its relations with Russia and the need for these relations to remain transparent. Since 1994 both Armenia and Azerbaijan have been members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme (PfP), the alliance’s principal vehicle for deepening its engagement in the South Caucasus. They also participate in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which affords them an opportunity to hold political discussions and receive assistance on political and security issues. Initiatives such as PfP represent attempts by NATO and its member states to move beyond the institution’s Cold War territorial-defence remit in order to engage with states elsewhere in Europe and on its southern borders, in an attempt to promote stability on its periphery. However, the Euro-Atlantic security structure has effectively done little to resolve existing conflicts in its neighbourhood and thus to encourage greater stability. Azerbaijan is considered a key partner country for NATO, not only because of its importance as a supplier of much-needed hydrocarbons to the West, but also because of the fact that it is a predominantly Muslim country.44 A NATO Parliamentary Assembly report highlighted this fact, noting that: [As the alliance] increasingly engages with countries with largely Muslim populations, it may become important to have partner militaries with that cultural and ethnic background who will have an intuitive understanding of issues that must otherwise be taught to European and North American militaries.45 In order to intensify its cooperation with NATO, and to improve inter-governmental cooperation with the alliance, a Governmental Commission on Cooperation with NATO was established by

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presidential decree in 1997. In 2000 Azerbaijan formally expressed its hopes of becoming a NATO member, and became an official membership aspirant in April 2003. Speaking at the NATO summit held in Prague in November 2002, former president Heydar Aliyev stated that Azerbaijan aspired to ‘integrational partnership and intensified bilateral dialogue with the alliance’.46 He noted the increased attention being paid to the South Caucasus by NATO, but cautioned that the first priority of any regional initiative should be the ‘liquidation of consequences of wars’, as well as the ‘restoration of internationally recognised borders between states’, a clear reference to the unresolved dispute over NagornoKarabakh. Referring to this conflict, he called on the international community to ‘undertake all possible efforts to achieve peaceful settlement of the conflict on the basis of full restoration of sovereignty and territorial integrity … in accordance with the norms and principles of international law’.47 However, as mentioned above, NATO is not directly involved in conflict-resolution efforts in the South Caucasus. Although Azerbaijan was the second South Caucasus state to agree an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with NATO, signing one in 2005, a year after Georgia, President Ilham Aliyev’s proclamation in December 2006 that he did not intend to ‘bang on the door, to seek entry, to ask and to plead’ with either NATO or the EU48 drew attention to the fact that Azerbaijan may actually only want increased cooperation with these structures, rather than membership, perhaps seeing little benefit in formally tying itself to a European or Euro-Atlantic institution. Baku has certainly benefited from greater integration with the military alliance. NATO has been providing assistance to bolster the security of Azerbaijan’s borders and in 2003 NATO SecretaryGeneral George Robertson requested that member states help the country reinforce its borders.49 The alliance has also helped Azerbaijan clear its territory of unexploded ordnance around



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a former Soviet military warehouse in the Agstafa district, and responded to a request from Baku for assistance in destroying its stock of liquid rocket-propellant oxidiser, also inherited from the Soviet era.50 Armenia was the last state in the South Caucasus to agree an IPAP with NATO, which it did only at the end of 2005, highlighting its lukewarm response to greater integration with the alliance. However, Yerevan views active cooperation with NATO as vital both for deepening its relations with European security structures and for developing bilateral relations with allies such as the US. In addition to intensifying its cooperation with NATO on the political level, it is also establishing military units that are capable of participating in the alliance’s peace-keeping operations. However, Armenia is in a difficult position. Whilst apparently keen to develop closer economic ties with the West, particularly Europe, it is aware of its reliance on Russia, in both economic and military terms. Thus Yerevan must constantly seek to balance relations with the two. Russia is its key trading partner, providing vital supplies of energy, as well as its principal source of security, providing much-needed military equipment, as discussed above. This policy of complementarity is outlined in the country’s National Security Strategy, adopted in 2007, which states that: Armenia’s strategic partnership with Russia, its adoption of a European model of development, mutually beneficial cooperation with Iran and the US, membership of the CSTO, and its intensification of the cooperation with the NATO alliance, all contribute to the consolidation of the potential of Armenia’s policy of complementarity.51

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International Involvement: The US and Turkey In addition to organisations such as NATO and the EU, the US has increased its involvement in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The region’s strategic importance as an access corridor to Central Asia has propelled it further into the international spotlight. While Armenia has been America’s traditional ally in the Caucasus, as discussed above, since the 2001 US terror attacks increasing sums of American dollars has been spent on other countries in the region.52 In January 2002 President Bush waived Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act that prohibited technical aid to Azerbaijan and military assistance to Armenia, meaning the US is now able to help Azerbaijan’s border security in preventing terrorist infiltration/exfiltration, and to enhance intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation.53 In July 2004 the US Congress approved a parity policy that allocated US$5 million of military aid per year for each country.54 This policy of parity has been maintained, and in June 2007 US$68 million in economic aid for both Armenia and Azerbaijan was approved. The 2008 Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill also reportedly allocated US$6 million in humanitarian assistance to Nagorno-Karabakh.55 Increased US support for Azerbaijan has raised concerns in Armenia, in spite of the fact that the US operates a policy of parity with regard to its military aid to the two countries. An article in the Armenian newspaper Ayots Ashkhar in June 2003 portrayed the possible deployment of US troops in Azerbaijan as an attempt to isolate Armenia and undermine its relations with Iran. It also suggested that US troops would initially be deployed to implement a peace agreement on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and that Turkey would play a key role in establishing a cordon sanitaire around Iran.56 In some respects this article merely reflected Armenia’s attitudes towards its neighbours, particularly its animosity towards, and fear of, Turkey. Furthermore, in April 2005 it was announced that the US would not deploy military bases in Azerbaijan, perhaps



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mindful of the impact such a move could have on regional stability. While the US may be providing military aid to the country as part of its fight against terrorism and smuggling, the bulk of such assistance has been maritime. US Army Colonel Mike Anderson, chief of the Europe Plans and Policies Division at US European Command (EUCOM), stressed that the US has ‘no intention of beefing up the Azeri army to go back and attempt to retake Nagorno-Karabakh’.57 Azerbaijan also receives a considerable amount of military support from Turkey, which has been assisting the development of the Azeri armed forces since the country became independent in 1991. Ankara provides professional military training and resources to help bring the Azeri military up to NATO standards.58 It has been argued that this support merely serves to prolong the dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, as it allows Yerevan to perceive a military threat from Turkey and thus increases its reliance on Russia. Here, once again, it can been seen that the presence of external actors in the region often serves merely to inflame existing tensions rather than boosting the security of either the states in the South Caucasus or organisations such as NATO and the EU, which border the region. Conclusions Peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would boost stability in the Caucasus and strengthen regional security and cooperation. After years of stalemate, greater international involvement is needed, but there is a lack of resolve in the international community to address the problem. One reason for this is the fear of setting a precedent, and another the need to balance the seemingly contradictory principles of territorial integrity and self-determination. However, Western states must make a commitment to the stability and democracy of countries in the region, and efforts to sort out unresolved conflicts there need to be stepped up by international

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and regional actors. As organisations such as the EU seek to expand their borders, and as Western interest in the South Caucasus grows with its importance as a transit route for Caspian hydrocarbons, it is becoming more important to focus on conflict resolution. As discussed at the beginning of this book, greater attention needs to be paid to security on the periphery, where the presence of weak or unstable states poses a threat to the stability of member states. Thus actors such as the EU, as well as individual states, need to redouble their involvement in the search for acceptable solutions to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. They should promote the negotiation process and advocate the necessity of compromise and consensus. Confidence must be restored, and all sides need to express a willingness to compromise on key issues such as political autonomy and the rights of refugees. Russia’s role as a mediator must be fostered, within the OSCE Minsk Group framework and as one of the principal regional actors. In January 2006 Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov affirmed Russia’s willingness to do everything possible to find a settlement to the dispute. In addition to being a co-chair of the Minsk Group, Russia is the principal economic and military power in the region, exerting huge leverage.59 Then-President Putin has insisted that Moscow will continue trying to influence affairs in former Soviet states, dismayed at perceived Western attempts to ‘manufacture democracy’ in what it considers to be its own ‘strategic backyard’.60 Nevertheless, Moscow has a very positive role to play as the major economic and military power, but it needs to move away from its traditional geopolitical view of the region towards a more cooperative and consensual approach. Moscow holds the key to the resolution of territorial disputes in the South Caucasus, in terms both of its relationship with the various parties and of the mediating role it purports to play. As discussed above, the role of external actors in conflict-resolution efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh can be very problematic and



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often serves to inflame existing tensions, rather than encouraging reconciliation. The international community, including the EU, needs to take preventative action and put more pressure on the parties involved to resolve the dispute peacefully, in order to avert the threat of a complex emergency that would destabilise the entire region. Although the EU is represented within the Minsk Group by individual member states, the EUSR needs a presence within the Group in order to represent the organisation’s position and give it a voice. A renewed conflict could spell disaster for the volatile South Caucasus: the resumption of large-scale conflict would herald a war of attrition, with the civilian population bearing the brunt of the fighting. Of great concern is the prospect of a renewal of fighting over the enclave rapidly becoming internationalised, particularly with Russian military bases in Armenia and Turkish support for Azerbaijan. Baku needs to be persuaded that it stands to lose far more than it would gain from any attempt to impose a military solution on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. There is no such solution to this latent conflict – it can only be solved by political means.

Conclusion Post-conflict Eurasia and the possibility of a security community system Unresolved conflicts in the Balkans and Caucasus have implications not only for stability in these regions, but also for Europe and the wider international community. As the EU and NATO seek to expand their borders, it is becoming more important to focus on conflict resolution on the periphery, where the presence of weak or unstable states poses a threat to the stability of member states. Thus, resolution of these disputes has become more critical and both organisations need to use their not inconsiderable influence to play a more active role in the search for a negotiated settlement, rather than waiting for other actors to negotiate a solution. It is widely believed that in view of Eurasia’s historical legacy of persistent conflict and the old antagonisms that surfaced with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Iraq, peace and stability in these regions can be achieved only through a comprehensive regional system of security or through integration into a security-community system. All the countries and regions in the above case studies are at different levels of integration into the EU and/or NATO, from Turkey, an existing member of NATO which has opened accession negotiations with the EU, to Russia, which is extremely wary of greater cooperation with European security organisations. Involvement on the part of these security structures also varies, from NATO’s

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1999 military intervention in Kosovo, which renewed the debate about the limits of state sovereignty versus humanitarian intervention, to the EU’s tentative involvement in conflict-resolution efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh. A comprehensive regional system in Eurasia should be viewed as a pact or alliance of all the Eurasian countries, which might be linked with NATO or the EU, or included in regional agreements as envisaged in Chapter Eight of the UN Charter. There are two routes to such a regional security system: one would imply a prior resolution of the territorial and ethnic problems which are the ‘apple of discord’ among these countries. The alternative is to develop a political atmosphere in relations amongst Eurasian countries which is conducive to the establishment of a security system, and which in turn could sweep away or peacefully resolve their disputes over territorial and ethnic questions, and thereby secure peace and stability in the region. The former route appears more promising because the removal of sources of conflict would establish a firmer foundation for a regional security system. It should be kept in mind that throughout the last century, regrettably, neither the wars that have swept these regions nor the periods of ‘peace’ – such as that of bi-polarism – have seen the elimination of major conflicts. This leaves the second route, that of fostering an economic, social and political climate favourable to the establishment of a comprehensive security-community system in Eurasia, regardless of unresolved territorial and ethnic disputes. The formation of such a community would mean that violence and war would no longer be seen as viable or acceptable forms of conflict resolution. Consequently, the conditions would be created for settling disputes over territory and ethnic minorities and, more importantly, for a common realisation that in the final analysis such disputes cannot be solved on the basis of any Balkan or Caucasian country’s maximalist programmes, but only if the disputes are recognised and accepted as historical and geopolitical realities.1



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The involvement of all countries2 in the process of NATO enlargement or EU integration would be a major contribution towards achieving this goal. The establishment of a stable and peaceful environment in these regions, which are notably heterogeneous, can only be achieved by full integration in or close association with regional security organisations such as NATO and the EU. However, it is important again to note that in some instances integration or cooperation with European security structures can actually lead to greater instability. As can be seen in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh and, to some extent, Bosnia and Kosovo, the involvement of external actors in conflict resolution can actually inflame existing tensions rather than encourage reconciliation, undermining stability and security. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that the EU and NATO will remain the primary agents of international influence in the Balkans and Caucasus over the coming decade, along with strong US support and interest. The EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process, in conjunction with continued NATO peace-keeping operations and NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme and Membership Action Plan, are the blueprints around which the international community can most usefully organise and prioritise its actions, incentives and penalties. Taken as a whole, these programmes provide the necessary standards for association with, and integration into, NATO and the EU, which is absolutely crucial to a successful future for the Eurasian states and the creation of a pluralistic security community. The case studies outlined above demonstrate that both NATO and the EU have been actively seeking to develop cooperative security relationships in their neighbourhoods, and attempting thereby to develop ‘zones of peace’ on their borders, to prevent security dilemmas arising. This is vital to prevent a renewal of hostilities in areas such as the Balkans and Caucasus, where the simmering tensions of unresolved conflict still threaten to undermine stability on Europe’s periphery. As Posen’s analysis of the security dilemma in ethnic conflict has shown, violence is likely to break out even when

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a cease-fire or agreement has put a temporary halt to hostilities, and also when simmering negative perceptions still exist and when the conflict is relatively recent and protracted. In conclusion, one could argue that more than a decade after the start of ethnic conflicts in Eurasia, political leaders throughout these regions are genuinely trying to walk the difficult, painful path away from communism and war into Euro-Atlantic institutions.3 Western interest lies in making sure the path is clear, and in supporting their journey in every way possible. European security organisations have a chance to prevent a repeat of the Balkans imbroglio in the Caucasus, but only if the lessons of Bosnia and Kosovo are heeded. The development of a Eurasian security-community system will benefit not only conflict-prone areas in the Balkans and Caucasus, but the European continent as a whole.

Notes

Introduction 1 2 3

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For the purposes of this book, ‘post-conflict Eurasia’ will refer to Europe and its periphery, including the Balkans and the Caucasus. See http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=90438 Deutsch, K.W., Burrell, S.A. and Kann, R.A., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 6. Deutsch et al. concluded that while 12 conditions appeared to be essential for the success of an amalgamated security community, the pluralistic version required only three. Any additional conditions might enhance the chances of successful integration and consolidation; however, they were not considered indispensable. These essential conditions were: 1) the compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making; 2) the capacity of the participating political units or governments to respond to each other’s needs, messages and actions quickly, adequately and without resort to violence; and 3) mutual predictability of behaviour. This assumption is also based on Waever’s analysis, which contends that Europe has become a security community. For further analysis see Waever, O., ‘Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-war Community’. In Adler, E. and Barnett, M. (eds.), Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 69–118. NATO has always demonstrated its adherence to the idea of a security community: see the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO, 1990). The view that NATO is a security community has been expressed by Javier Solana, in ‘NATO: A Reliable Alliance for Dynamism and Leadership’. NATO’s Sixteen Nations, Vol.

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Securing Europe 42, No. 1, (1997), pp. 7–10. Evidence of a PSC can be found also in the 23 April 1999 Washington Declaration on NATO’s 50th anniversary. See also http://www.usembassy.org.uk/NATO85.html; The Economist, ‘NATO is a club of democracies whose stated aims include the promotion of lofty ideals like the rule of law and civilian control over the armed forces.’ 7 August 1999, p. 46. For more details see Moustakis, F. and Sheehan, M., ‘The Democratic Peace and European Security Community: The Paradox of Greece and Turkey’. Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2004), pp. 69–85. For more information on this issue see Moustakis, F., The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO. London: Cass, 2003.

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Source: the European Commission website, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ enlargement/intro/criteria.htm#Accession. Ibid. For a detailed analysis of SAA, see Cremona, M., ‘State Aid Control: Substance and Procedure in the Europe Agreements and the Stabilisation and Association Agreements’. European Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3 (July 2003), pp. 265–87. Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm#Accession. Terriff. T., Croft, S., Krahmann, E., Webber, M. and Howorth, J., ‘One in, All in? NATO’s Next Enlargement’. International Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4 (October 2002), pp. 713–29. Deutsch et al., Political Community, p. 6. Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm#Accession. European Union, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World. Brussels: EU, December 2003, pp. 8, 11. Outlining key threats to the security of the EU and its member-states, the European Security Strategy highlights the dangers of unresolved conflict: ‘[It] not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty’ (p. 2). One of the casualties of the French and Dutch votes against the proposed EU constitution appeared to be the enlargement process, although few leaders were willing to say so in public at the EU summits. Former French President Jacques Chirac also suggested that the EU might not be able to cope with additional members for a while. However, the draft communiqué also emphasised that the future of the western Balkan states lies with the EU, but



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did not give any of them a timetable for further integration, adding that each country would be judged on its own merits. The text encouraged the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to improve on their existing efforts toward European integration. Brock, P. and Berkowitz, M., ‘The Emerging Field of National Security’. World Politics, Vol. 19 (1966), p. 124. Wolfers, A., ‘National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol’. In Brock, P. and Berkowitz, M. (eds.), Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 147–65 . See also Krell, G., ‘The Development of the Concept of Security’. In Jahn, E. and Sakamoto, Y. (eds.) Elements of World Instability: Armaments, Communication, Food, International Division of Labour. Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association’s Eighth General Conference. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1981, pp. 238–54; Jahn, E., ‘From International Peace Research to National Security Research’. in Jaap, N., (ed.), The Coming of Age of Peace Research: Studies in the Development of a Discipline. Groningen: Styx, 1991, pp. 57–75; Frei, D., ‘Was ist unter Frieden und Sicherheit zu verstehen?’. In Heisenberg, W. and Lutz, D.S. (eds.), Sicherheitspolitik Kontrovers: Frieden und Sicherheit: Status quo in Westeuropa und Wandel in Osteuropa. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1990, Vol. 1, pp. 41–9; Stephenson, C., ‘New Conceptions of Security and Their Implications for Means and Methods’. In Tehranian, Katharine and Tehranian, Majid (eds.), Restructuring for World Peace: On the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century. Creskil, NJ: Hampton, 1992, pp. 47–61; Fischer, D., Nonmilitary Aspects of Security: A Systems Approach. Aldershot: Dartmouth and UNIDIR, 1993). See also Møller, B. ‘Security Concepts: New Challenges and Risks’. Working Papers, No. 18. Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1993. Tanner, F., ‘Conflict Management and European Security: The Problem of CollectiveSolidarity’. Seminar held in Leukerbad, Switzerland, 21–2 August 1998, at www.isn.ethz.ch/securityforum/Online_Publications/WS4/Tanner.htm ‘Hard security’ has traditionally ‘referred to the military defence of the state, seeing security issues in terms of the military balance as well as military strategy and tactics’. ‘Soft security’ refers to the non-military combat aspects of security. In other words it focuses on political, social and economic concerns, such as poverty and unemployment, population explosion and environmental degradation, resurgent nationalism and social tensions, uncontrolled migration and coerced displacement, and the proliferation of narcotics, crime and small arms.

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14 Walt argued that the widening of security to non-military issues is dangerous since it undermines the ‘intellectual coherence’ of the study of security. See Bilgin, P., Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective. London: Routledge, 2004, p. 27. 15 http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/full_text_search/AllCRCDocs/90-4.htm. 16 Jervis, R., ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’. World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1978), pp. 167–213. 17 Snyder, J. and Walter, B., Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 15. 18 Jervis, ‘Cooperation’, p. 169. 19 Snyder and Walter, Civil Wars, p. 24. 20 Posen, B., ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’. Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), p. 28. 21 For more details see ibid, pp. 27–47; see also Stefanova, R. ‘New Security Challenges in the Balkans’. Security Dialogue, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2003), pp. 169–82. 22 For more information on intra-state conflicts see Roe, P., ‘The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a “Tragedy”?’. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 2 (March 1999), pp. 183–202. 23 Whenever centrally imposed order in any communally divided state collapses, as in the case of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, or when the US destroyed Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, communities must rely on their own resources for self-defence. In effect, the communally divided state comes to resemble a pocket international system, and behaves like one. The problem is that the material measures, and even the rhetorical measures, that communities use to mobilise for defence also pose offensive threats to other communities. The result is a security dilemma: a situation in which no community can provide for its own security without threatening the security of others. If and when this reaches the point that all sides are mobilised for war, or if largescale violence has already commenced, it ceases to matter whether the original reasons for conflict were based on real material interests or were whipped up by political elites using populist rhetoric for their personal gain. Nor does it matter which side started the spiral into internal conflict: each group’s mobilisation now poses a real security threat to other groups. For more details on this analysis see Kaufmann, C., ‘A Security Dilemma: Ethnic Partitioning in Iraq’. Harvard International Review, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Winter 2007), pp. 44–50. 24 See www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~goodrich/IRnotes/Week07/Posen_summary. pdf. 25 Marsh, S. and Mackenstein, H., The International Relations of the EU. London: Pearson, 2005, p. 68.



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26 See Weaver, O. and Buzan, B., Security: A New Framework for Analysis. London: Lunne, 1998. 27 For more details see http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, pp. 3–7. 28 Ibid, p. 1. 29 Ibid, p. 7. 30 On 1 April 2004 NATO saw the largest intake of members since the formation of the US-led military alliance in 1949, when seven Central and Eastern European countries were admitted. The new members, all either former members of the Warsaw Pact or former republics of the Soviet Union, were Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. It is the second time in recent years that NATO has expanded its membership in the Central-Eastern European region. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined in 1999. Croatia and Albania were offered full membership at the alliance’s summit in Bucharest on 3 April 2008. 31 See http://police-officer.blog.co.uk/2006/09/29/rumsfeld_21st_century_ challenges_can_t_b~1172463. 32 Alexandra Gheciu, in her NATO in the ‘New Europe (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), examined practices of international socialisation conducted by NATO, with particular emphasis on the alliance’s involvement in Central and Eastern Europe in the first decade of the post-Cold War period. As the book explains, following the end of the Cold War the prevailing security discourse in NATO – and more broadly in the Western security community – came to revolve around the Kantian-inspired democratic peace thesis. According to the logic of that discourse, the establishment of stable liberaldemocratic polities in the former communist bloc represented the key to preventing (or ending) violent conflict in that region, and to promoting international stability. In that context, NATO placed the promotion of liberaldemocratic norms in transitional ex-communist polities at the heart of its security strategy. In the name of promoting international stability, the alliance carried out systematic practices of socialising actors from the former communist bloc into liberal-democratic norms. It also provided new insights into the nature of security practices conducted in the name of preventing war and enhancing international stability in post-Cold War Europe, and explained the productive forms of power involved in those practices. 33 ‘The Atlantic Alliance continues to provide residual defence insurance, the means for proactive security policy on behalf of its members, and the foundation of a pluralistic security community in which war among its members has all but been abolished’; see Gordon, P.H., ‘Recasting the Altantic Alli-

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Securing Europe ance’. in Gordon, P.H. (ed.) NATO’s Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Altantic Alliance. London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997, p. 24. Evans, G. and Newham, J., Penguin Dictionary of International Relations. London: Penguin, 1998, p. 353. Moustakis, The Greek-Turkish Relationship. For more information see Russett, B., ‘The Fact of Democratic Peace’. In Lynn-Jones, S., Brown, M. and Mille, S. (eds.), Debating the Democratic Peace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996, pp. 58–81. However, Coker argues that NATO has ceased to be a ‘security community’ (in Deutsch’s terms) and transformed itself into a ‘risk community’, given the multiplicity of risks that have come to replace the threats of the past. Should this new approach to defining the post-Cold War international environment as one of ‘security challenges and risks’ fail, due to disagreements between the United States and its European allies (over the issue of defining risks or the methods through which they are managed), NATO could become a ‘virtual’ community. See Coker, C., ‘Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the Management of Risk’. Adelphi Papers, No. 345. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 2002. Article 5 is a fundamental principle of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. It provides that if a NATO ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the ally attacked; this is the principle of collective defence. See http:// www.Nato.int/terrorism/five.htm. Keohane, R.O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984. See www.bdcol.ee/fileadmin/docs/bsdr/1-NATO,per cent20Europeanper cent20Securityper cent20andper cent20theper cent20Balticper cent20Seaper cent20Region-Holgerper cent20Molder.pdf. Cohen, R. and Mihalka, M., ‘Co-operative Security: New Horizons for International Order’. Marshall Centre Papers, No. 3 (April 2001), p. 33. NATO has identified Central Asia and the South Caucasus as priority cooperation areas within the Partnership for Peace initiative. While Georgia, the Ukraine and, to some extent, Moldova have made progress in establishing democratic regimes, the former Soviet republics generally experience a lack of democratic norms. The development of defence reforms in partner countries is one of NATO’s cooperation priorities. ‘By presenting itself as a Western institution embodying a set of values opposite to those represented by the Soviet block, NATO was able to use the communicative frameworks to change



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the partners’ conception of civil-military relations’; Lucarelli, S. ‘Peace and Democracy: Rediscovered Link between the EU, NATO and the European System of Liberal-Democratic Security Communities’, at http://www.NATO. int/acad/fellow/00-02/Lucarelli’s.pdf, p. 35. Accessed 12 September 2005. 43 Ferrero-Waldner, B., ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU’s Newest Foreign Policy Instrument’. European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 11 (2006), p. 139.

Chapter 2   1 See www.marxist.com/making-unmaking-yugoslavia.htm.   2 See ‘Yugoslav Army Uses Force in Breakaway Republic; Slovenia Reports 100 Wounded or Killed’: New York Times, 28 June 1991.   3 See www.fzs.ba/popis.htm.   4 See www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-034.html.   5 See ‘The Dayton Peace Accords’, 21 November 1995, at www.state.gov. For an excellent account of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Little, A. and Silber, L., The Death of Yugoslavia. London: Penguin, 1996.   6 UN document A/47/277-S/24111, ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy Peacemaking and Peace-keeping’, 17 June 1992; UN document A/48/935, ‘An Agenda for Development’, 6 May 1994.   7 See also UN document A/50/60-S/1995/1, ‘ Supplement to an Agenda for Peace’, 3 January 1995a; UN document A/51/761 ‘Agenda for Democratisation: Supplement to reports on Democratisation’, 20 December 1996 .   8 Ibid; see also UN document ‘Agenda for Peace’; UN document, ‘Agenda for Development’.   9 Ibid. 10 Bieber, F. and Daskalovski, Ž., Understanding the War in Kosovo. London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 35–6. 11 For more information on this issue, see Mason, F. and Ogden, K., ‘The Tragedy in Kosovo’, ch. 12 in The Geopolitics of Hunger, 2000–2001: Hunger and Power. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000). 12 For more information see www.hrw.org/reports/1990/WR90/HELSINKI. BOU-05.htm. 13 After the promulgation of the 1974 constitution, positive discrimination in favour of the Albanians in Kosovo took place: 80 per cent of the available posts were reserved for Albanians, on a parity basis; the University of Pristina became the largest Albanian tertiary institution; and in the mid-1980s an Albanian (Sinan Hasani) became president of the SFRY. The academy of

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Securing Europe arts and science was effectively an Albanian academy. Total albanianisation of public life and the local establishment resulted in discrimination against the non-Albanian population. For more details see www.kosovo.net/simic.html. See Solana, J., ‘NATO’s Success in Kosovo’. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6 (November/December 1999), p. 118 Lambeth, B., NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), p. 222 Cited in ibid, p. 222. See Daalder, I. and O’Hanlon, M.E., Winning Ugly. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000, p. 234. See Freedman, L., ‘Victims and Victories: Reflections on the Kosovo War’. Review of International Studies. Vol. 26 (2000), p. 346. Once the constitution was abolished in 1989, ethnic Albanians could not buy or sell property without special permission, and thousands of Albanians were dismissed from state-funded jobs; for further details see Caplan, R., ‘International Diplomacy and the Crisis Over Kosovo’. International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4 (October 1998), pp. 750–1. See Freedman, ‘Victims and Victories’, p. 347. Ibid, p. 358. According to Freedman, ibid, p. 347. See McGuire, M., ‘Why did We Bomb Belgrade?’. International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 1 (January 2000), pp. 10–11. According to President Clinton, this was one of the objectives of launching OAF. See Redd, S., ‘The Influence of Advisors and Decision Strategies on Foreign Choices: President Clinton’s Decision to Use Force in Kosovo’. International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 6 (2005), p. 130. According to Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo, p. 219. Scott Cooper quotes Senior US officials who support the increasing use of air power. See Cooper, S.A., ‘Air Power and the Coercive Use of Force’. Washington Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn 2001), p. 81. Although certain academics and writers claim that Russian intervention and the threat of deploying ground troops may have led to Milosevic’s eventual capitulation, there is little doubt that air power was the fundamental reason for his surrender. For a convincing argument see Stigler, A., ‘A Clear Victory for Air Power: NATO’s Empty Threat to Invade Kosovo’. International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 124–57. During Operation Deliberate Force NATO air strikes had managed to convince the Serb leadership to give up and to stop the atrocities. General



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Wesley Clark claimed that while designing OAF, the Bosnian model was used: it was assumed that Milosevic would give up after a few days of bombing. See Clark, W. ‘Waging Modern War’. Public Affairs, New York: 2001, p. 123. See Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, pp. 92–3. Barkawi, T., ‘Air Power and the Liberal Politics of War’. International Journal of Human Rights. Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn/Winter 2000), p. 307. According to Eliot Cohen and Andrew Bacevich, without having to deploy ground troops, the allies could ‘intervene on the cheap’. See Biddle, S., ‘The New Way of War’. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May/June 2002), pp. 138–44)]. See Lambeth, NATO’s Air War, p. 231. According to Cohen and Mihalka, in Cooperative Security: New Horizons for International Order. Marshall Center Paper No. 3. Garmisch-Partenkirchen, p. 250. This had been one of the prime objectives of the entire campaign, according to the US State Department: ‘The primary goal of air strikes … would be to arrest the ability of the Serbs to brutally attack the Kosovo Albanians.’ See Nardulli, B., Perry, W., Pirnie, B., Gordon, J. and McGuinn, J., Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999. Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 2002, p. 22. According to Nicholas, W., ‘Reflections on the Legality and Legitimacy of NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo’. International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn/Winter 2000), p. 146. For individual and collective self-defence. Quoted in Nicholas, ‘Reflections’, which see for a complete analysis of the arguments posed by restrictionists and counter-restrictionists. According to both resolutions Belgrade was to remove Serb forces from Kosovo and put an end to ethnic cleansing. The allied stance was defended by the French government, who claimed that: ‘Actions decided upon respond to Belgrade’s violation of its international obligations under the resolutions which the SC has adapted under Chapter 7 of the UN charter.’ See ibid, p. 156. For more information see www.crisisgroup.org/home/index. cfm?id=3225&l=1#C2. Blumi, I., ‘One Year of Failure in Kosova: Chances Missed and the Unknown Future’. Southeast European Politics, Vol. 1, No. 1 (October 2000), p. 21. See http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/07/27/serbia9136.htm and http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6422183.stm. See Bardos, G.N., ‘Containing Kosovo’. Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 17–43.

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44 The proposal put forward by Marti Ahtisaari emphasises that reintegration into Serbia is not a viable option, but also states that the powers of institutions within Kosovo, as a supervised independent state, should be strong and focused on critical areas such as community rights, decentralisation, the protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the rule of law. See letter dated 26 March 2007 from the UN Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, and the report on Kosovo’s future status by the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy. For more information on Albanian expansion in the Balkans see http://www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrc/document-listings/balkan/07(01)MV.pdf. 45 In an interesting article entitled ‘Kosovo: The View from Belgrade’, Nikolic and Comrie argue that the international community is simplifying an extremely complicated case by demonising the Serbs, in an effort to resolve another Yugoslav gordian knot. They also pose the question: ‘Would the US accept New Mexico becoming Mexican because of demographics?’ See www.globalpolitics.co.uk/issueper cent203/Aper cent20Serbianper cent20view.htm. 46 See ‘If Kosovo Goes Free’. The Economist, 1 December 2007, p. 52. 47 See Holmes, K.R. The Lessons of Milosevic’s Fall. Report No. 1400. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 27 October 2000, p. 1. At http://www. heritage.org/Research/Europe/BG1400es.cfm. 48 See Sell, L., Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003, pp. 193–4. 49 For more information see www.buyusa.gov/serbia/en/doing_business.html. 50 See www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&id=281&story_ID=10&slide_ID=8. 51 See UNSCR 1244 (UN Document S/RES/1244), at www.un.org. 52 Ibid, para. 10. 53 For more information on Kosovo’s status and its destabilising potential, see Yannis, A., ‘Kosovo under International Administration’. Survival, Vol. 43, No. 2 (2001), pp. 31–48; see also Redman, M., ‘Should Kosovo Be Entitled to Statehood?’ Political Quarterly, Vol. 73, No. 3 (July 2002), pp. 338–43. 54 Ibid, para. 10, b. 55 Ibid, para. 10. 56 Ibid, para. 11, e. 57 Ibid, para. 11, j. For more details on civilian policing in Kosovo, see Patterson, W.R.,‘To Protect and Serve: Civilian Policing and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo’. Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring, 2002), pp. 77–93. This article outlines the aims of using civilian police officers in nation-building missions and discusses a variety of problems (pragmatic, legal and cultural) that policing may introduce to such missions.



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58 Redman, ‘Should Kosovo be Entitled to Statehood?’, para. 11, k. 59 See the ‘Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government’. UNMIK/REG/2001, ch. 8, a. 60 Ibid, ch. 8, b. 61 Ibid, ch. 8, c. 62 Ibid. ch. 8, d. 63 Ibid, ch. 8. 64 For more details on the specific legislative and institutional aspects of UNMIK’s administration of Kosovo, see Brand, M.G., ‘Institution-Building and Human Rights Protection in Kosovo in the Light of UNMIK Legislation’. Nordic Journal of International Law. Vol. 70, No. 4 (April 2001), pp. 461–88. The article attempts to highlight the discrepancy between the nature of an international security presence and a civilian administration under a Security Council peace-keeping mandate, on the one hand, and effective human rights remedies on the other, as well as principles of democratic governance such as accountability, lawfulness and constitutionality. 65 UNSCR 1244 does not mention a time-frame relevant to UNMIK’s mandate. 66 See ‘Standards for Kosovo’. UNMIK document UNMIK/PR/1079. 67 See ‘SRSG’S remarks at the launch of the Kosovo standards implementation plan’. UNMIK press release, UNMIK/PR/1158, 31 March 2004. 68 Interview with P. Sorenson, Director of the European Office, UNMIK pillar IV. 69 See http://www.ks-gov.net/pm/Fillimi/tabid/36/EntryID/594/Default.aspx. 70 For an examination of the possibility of shared sovereignty, see Krasner, S.D., ‘The Case for Shared Sovereignty’. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January 2005), pp. 69–83. The article argues that since borders are fixed, violent state death is rare, foreign assistance is available and raw materials can be exported, political leaders in many poorly governed states do not have an incentive to craft self-enforcing pareto-improving agreements (i.e. invoking the principle of factor sparsity) with their own populations. Shared sovereignty arrangements, institutions in which authority would be shared by external and internal actors, would offer possibilities for such agreements that would not otherwise be available. 71 See Kavalski, E.R., ‘The International Socialization of the Balkans’. Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 4 (June 2003), pp. 71–88. The article claims that Balkan states’ interaction with Euro-Atlantic organisations (principally the EU and NATO) leads the latter to propagate norms of accepted practices to Southeast European states.

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72 Dworkin, R., Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996, p. 16. 73 Ibid, p. 32. Dworkin asserts that an individual cannot be a member of a true political community entitled to govern by majority decision unless that community treats the individual in a way that allows him or her to reconcile membership with self-respect; and that is only possible if the community does not purport to dictate fundamental ethical convictions on matters such as religion or reproductive freedom. He believes a society becomes a democracy in a distinctive and attractive way when the fundamental law which structures its political decision-making also makes these guarantees explicit, presenting them as legal and legitimate on the basis of the power entrusted to the relevant representative institutions. 74 ‘OSCE mission in Kosovo under Temporary Media Commissioner: Dita decision’, at www.osce.org/kosovo. 75 Ibid. 76 See UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1, section 2, and UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/24, section 1. 77 Media Appeal Board, ‘Beqaj & Dita v. Temporary Media Commissioner’, September 2000, at www.osce.org/kosovo, p. 17. 78 Ibid, p. 14. 79 Ibid, p. 18. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 See also Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. This is the work of an independent commission of experts coming together of their own accord through the initiative of Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson. Kosovo Report attempts to address two related subjects: most directly, it comprehensively examines the international community’s response to the Kosovo crisis, taking a critical look at successes, failures and remaining dilemmas; perhaps more importantly, the authors also look to Kosovo for precedents and lessons learned that can be applied to similar conflicts in future. 84 Independent Judicial Commission, ‘Alternative Strategy to Verify the Competency of the Judiciary: A Re-appointment Process’, 18 December 2001. 85 Council of Europe, ‘Comments on the Discussion Paper on the Selection Process for the Interim High Judicial Council’. At www.coe.int. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid.



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88 Ibid. 89 ‘High Representative Suspends Ten Judges’. OHR press release, 24 May 2002. 90 ‘Financial review reveals abuse, corruption, tax evasion in SDS’. OHR press release, 1 July 2004. 91 Ibid. 92 ‘High Representative announces measures against ICTY obstructionists’. OHR press conference, 30 June 2004. 93 It is instructive to mention that Ashdown’s action on 29 March 2005 in dismissing Dragan Covic, the Croatian member of the Bosnian Presidency, has raised questions about the future of the former’s office and of the political order in Bosnia. Many observers had expected the post of High Representative to be phased out after Ashdown left in 2005, but the Financial Times quoted an unnamed ‘senior US diplomat’ as saying that ‘Bosnia’s leaders cannot go suddenly from having such an assertive high representative to swimming on their own, even if the European Union steps [in] with a strong role, as everyone expects’; see ‘RFE/RL Balkan Report’, 5 March and 16 July 2004. Furthermore, many observers note that Ashdown’s repeated dismissals of elected and other officials underscore a central dilemma faced by the international community in administering what is in effect a protectorate in Bosnia. The issue is whether it is possible to promote Western democratic values by intervening by fiat to overrule the wishes of the electorate, clearly expressed at the ballot box and including times when the voters have elected nationalist officials, as is the case in Bosnia (see ‘RFE/RL Balkan Report’, 2 May and 5 September 2003, 22 October 2004 and 25 March 2005). 94 For an insightful examination of the conceptual problems of applying Western liberal ideas of democracy to multi-ethnic societies, on the need to define and limit the ambiguous concept of self-determination and on the problem of finding ways for minority groups to achieve meaningful representation without disintegrating states, see Sokolovic, D. and Bieber, F. (eds.), Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies:  The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001. 95 For more information on the political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Bojkov, V.D., ‘Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-1995 Political System and its Functioning’. Southeast European Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1 (May 2003), pp. 41–67. The article makes the case that the current political system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a controlled democracy, and assesses the outcomes of its functioning to date by referring to the powers, stated intentions and actions of domestic and international political actors.

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  96 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1384, 26 June 2004.   97 Ibid.   98 This sentiment was expressed during an interview with Nicholas Wood, the New York Times Eastern European Correspondent.   99 For further analysis of the connection between peace-building and development, see Smoljan, J., ‘The Relationship between Peace Building and Development’. Conflict, Security and Development. Vol. 3, No. 2 (August 2003), pp. 233–50. See also Paris, R., ‘International Peacebuilding and the “Mission Civilisatrice”’. Review of International Studies. Vol. 28 (2002), pp. 637–56; Coyne, C.J., ‘State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century’. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 63, No. 4 (October 2004), pp. 951–4. 100 For more information on the possibility of establishing a liberal democracy in the western Balkans, see Panebianco, S. and Rossi, R., ‘EU Attempts to Export Norms of Good Governance to the Mediterranean and Western Balkan States’. Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, No. 53, October 2004. This comparative analysis suggests that when the enlargement is a long-term prospect EU initiatives can favour the local political-reform process (as in the case of the western Balkans); but when the EU adopts a comprehensive framework of regional cooperation (such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership) it is difficult to promote democracy and human-rights protection effectively.

Chapter 3    1 The 2003 inflation rate in Turkey was 65 per cent, compared to 1.3 per cent in the EU. Turkey’s accession to the EU will provide greater scope for the employment of currently unemployed Turkish young people. Paranzino, J, ‘Are the Kurds an Obstacle to Turkey’s Accession to the European Union?’. EU seminar I and II, Fall 2003, at http://www.meditagenda.com/Journal/ Arepercent20thepercent20Kurdspercent20anper cent20Obstaclepercent20topercent.    2 In June  1993, the Copenhagen European Council recognised the right of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to join the European Union when they have met three criteria: political – stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for minorities; economic – a functioning market economy; incorporation of the EU’s acquis communautaire; and adherence to the various political, economic and monetary aims



  3   4   5   6

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of the EU. These accession criteria were confirmed in December 1995 by the Madrid European Council, which also stressed the importance of adapting the applicant countries’ administrative structures to create the conditions for gradual, harmonious integration. For a comprehensive analysis of the issue of nationalism and identity, see Smith, A.D., National Identity. London: Penguin, 1991. Akman, A., ‘Modernist Nationalism: Statism and National Identity in Turkey’. Nationality Papers, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2004), p. 5. The term ‘Turk’ had been derogatory, meaning ‘unskilled peasant’. See http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4094873.stm. Canefe, N., ‘Turkism, Nationalism and the Ethno-Symbolic Analysis: The Rules of Exemption’. Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2002), p. 7; Neyri, L., ‘Remembering to Forget: National Identity and Subjectivity in Turkey’. Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2002). Kadioglu A., ‘The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Constitution of Official Identity’. Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1996), pp. 10–20. Barkey, H.J. and Fuller, G.E., Turkey’s Kurdish Question. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, p. 26. Quite indicative of the discourse change on this issue is a report released in 2004 by the ‘Working Group on Minority and Cultural Rights’, a committee working under the Office of the Prime Minister. In the report it was accepted that Turkey had misinterpreted the spirit of the Lausanne treaty in respect of the status and equality of minorities, and it stressed Turkey’s commitment to ensuring fundamental rights for every minority residing in Turkey, such as the right to individual freedoms, the right to participate freely in economic, social and state activities and the right to cultural pluralism. For the context of the report see Azinlik Haklari ve Kulturel Haklar Calisma Grubu. Rapor No. 188 (2004). Athanassopoulou, E., Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests, 1945-1952. London: Cass, 1999, p. 195. Nachmani, A., Israel, Turkey and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean. London: Cass, 1987, p. 63. Robins, P. (ed.), Turkey and the Middle East. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs and New York: Council on Foreign Relations, p. 76. In 1964 US President Johnson expressed his reluctance to support Turkey in the crisis over Cyprus, and reminded Turkey not to use American weapons. Aras, B., ‘Turkish Foreign Policy and Jerusalem: Toward a Societal Construction of Foreign Policy’. Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 22 (2000), p. 37. Although Turkey was excluded from the oil embargo of the mid-1970s, it

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Securing Europe was still faced with the indirect effects of the oil crisis, which increased the country’s economic burden. Its leader, Erbakan, advocated the development of relations with Islamic countries and the abolishing of alliances with the West. See http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2007/issue4/jv11no4a7.asp. See http://lilt.ilstu.edu/critique/Springper cent202008/Eriten_and_Romine _2008.pdf. See ‘The Kurds: An Ancient Tragedy’, The Economist, 20 February 1999, p. 58. For Syria’s political regime, see Sorenson, D.S., ‘National Security and Political Succession in Syria’. Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 69–91. For more information on Syria, see Kienle, E., Contemporary Syria: Liberalisation between Cold War and Cold Peace. London: Academic, 1994. For more details on Kurds in the countries mentioned, see Pelletiere, S.C., The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf. Boulder, CO, and London: Westview, 1984). See also McDowall, D., A Modern History of the Kurds. London: Tauris, 1997. During World War I, most Armenians were deported from the eastern part of present-day Turkey. The Greek movement out of Turkey, which began around 1912, reached its high point in the 1920s, during and after the War of Independence. As part of the peace settlement following the defeat of the Greeks, a formal exchange of populations was agreed upon. As a result, Turkey received about 500,000 Turkish immigrants in exchange for nearly two million Greeks. It is instructive to mention that the threat of foreign Christian rule, initially in the east and then following the Greek invasion, galvanised the Muslim population into a war of resistance against the perceived invaders. As a result, the spread of nationalist ideas led to the Armenian massacres in 1915 and the expulsion in 1922 of most of the Christian minorities. It is worth mentioning that Turkey has never admitted an act of genocide against the Armenians, with the rare exemption of Akcam, T., Turkish National Identity and the Armenian Question. Istanbul: Iletisim, 1992 (in Turkish). For more information about minorities in Turkey, see Poulton, H., ‘The Struggle for Hegemony in Turkey: Turkish Nationalism as a Contemporary Force’. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1999), pp. 15–19; see also Turkey: A Country Study. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1992. The Greek population in Turkey, whose numbers have dwindled due to pogroms and expulsions, has declined from about 110,000 at the time of the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 to about 2,500 in 1992; see Denying Human Rights and Ethnic Identity: The Greeks of Turkey. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992, pp. 1–25.



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21 Gunter, M.M., The Kurds and the Future of Turkey. London: Macmillan, 1997, p. 2. 22 See Kreyenbroek, P.G. and Sperl, S. (eds.), The Kurds: A Contemporary Review. London: Routledge, 1992, p. 103. 23 See Demirel, S. ‘Demirel Warns Greece’ and ‘There is Absolutely no Resemblance Between What is Going on in Kosovo and Southeast Turkey’. Anadolu Agency, 29 April 1999; See also ‘Down but Far from Out’, The Economist, 1 August 1998, pp. 44–5. 24 Gunter, M., The Kurds and the Future of Turkey. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997, pp. 11–21. 25 Kreyenbroek and Sperl (eds.), The Kurds, p. 104. 26 The Welfare Party was banned by Turkey’s highest court on 16 January 1998, and replaced by the Virtue Party, which became the third party in Turkey after the elections of April 1999, winning 111 seats in Parliament. Welfare’s leader, Necmettin Erbakan, and five of his colleagues were ejected from politics for five years. It is instructive to mention that the generals, once more, were responsible for overthrowing Erbakan’s coalition government in the summer of 1997. A faction of moderate conservative members within the banned Welfare Party formed the Justice and Development Party (AKP) on 14 August 2001 in an attempt to ground moderate conservative politics in a secular democratic framework. The AKP achieved a landslide victory in the 22 July 2007 elections, with 46.6 per cent of the vote, translating into 341 of the 550 available parliamentary seats. 27 See Tirman, J.,‘Understanding Turkish Nationalism and Its Contribution to the War against the Kurds’. January 1998, at http://www.wf.org/turknational. htm, p. 1. 28 Kirisci, K. and Winrow, G.M., The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict. London: Class, 1997, p. 130. 29 ‘Milliyet Interviews PKK Leader Ocalan’, Part II, Foreign Broadcast Information Service – West Europe (27 March 1992), p. 43. For more recent views from Ocalan see his interview with Professor Michael Gunter in Damascus, 13–14 March 1998. Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1998), pp. 79–85. 30 See Imset, I.G. ‘Wiping out the PKK Again … Again’. Turkish Probe, 6 July 1993, pp. 4–7. 31 The geopolitical reality constitutes Kurdistan as a frontier between the countries America considers its staunchest regional allies and its foes, i.e. between the weak but rich states of the Gulf and their expansionist neighbours. 32 For further study of the Kurdish problem, see Olson, J.R., ‘The Kurdish Question Four Years On: The Policies of Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq’. Middle

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East Policy, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1994), pp. 36–44; ‘The Kurdish Question and Geopolitic and Geostrategic Changes in the Middle East after the Gulf War’. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Summer 1994), pp. 49–67; Barkey, H., ‘Turkey’s Kurdish Dilemma’. Survival, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter 1993), pp. 51–70; Robins, P., ‘The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue’. International Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4 (October 1993), pp. 657–71; Soguk, N., ‘A Study of the Historico-Cultural Reasons for Turkey’s Inconclusive Democracy’. New Political Science, No. 26 (Fall 1993), pp. 89–116. For information about the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK) and PKK see www.library.cornell.edu/collde/mideast/ kurd.htm. For the Turkish view on the Kurdish problem, see Beriker-Atiyas, N. ‘The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Issues, Parties and Prospects’. Security Dialogue, Vol. 28, Pt. 4 (1997), pp. 439–52. For an analysis of missed opportunities and critical turning points in the Kurdish problem, see Barkey, H.J. and Fuller, G.E., ‘Turkey’s Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities’. Middle East Journal, Vol. l51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), pp. 59–79. 33 It was renamed ‘Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Party’ (KADEK) in 2002. Many of its members have fled to Northern Iraq or Syria. 34 The PKK/KADEK Kurdish rebel group has recommenced hostilities against Turkish security forces. However, PKK/KADEK recently ‘said it would declare a cease-fire in its war for autonomy in Turkey’s southeast, if Turkey ended its military operations against the rebels and opened the way for a dialogue’. Manila Times, 3 June 2005. On the other hand the Kurds argue that since February 2005 ‘more that 1500 special commandos and undercover agents were deployed in the North of Iraq for secret designated operations by Turkey. The key objectives of these units were to distribute loads of imported arms and hardware from the Iraqi-Syrian boarder to Turkoman; provide logistic and financial support to the remnants of Baath and foreign Islamists to destabilizse the region; promote pro-Turkey media elements as well as terror; and a crackdown on Kurdish political activists. Turkey has stationed numerous clandestine military bases throughout Kurdistan with the intention of protecting Kirkuk from falling under the direct rule of Kurds and naturalize Kurdish modernism in case of an abrupt partition’. Kurdish Observer, 13 March 2005 (and see http://home.cogeco. ca/~kurdistanobserver/news.html.) 35 GAP (South Eastern Anatolian Project) is a multi-sectoral and integrated regional development project based on the concept of sustainable development. See ‘Are the Kurds an Obstacle to Turkey’s Accession to the European



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Union?’. EU seminars II & II (Fall 2003), at http://www.meditagenda.com/ Journal/Arepercent20thepercent20Kurdspercent20anper cent20Obstacleper cent20topercent. 36 See www.meditagenda.com/Journal/

Chapter 4   1 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 December 1999, p. 6. Yury Borko believes it is no coincidence that the first public political crisis in relations between the EU and Russia was triggered by the beginning of the first Russian military operation in Chechnya in December 1994, as the dialogue between the two touched upon fundamental values and principles that impact on a country’s domestic and foreign policies. Borko, Y., ‘Ternistyy put’ k partnerstvu’. Svobodnaya Mysl’, No. 3 (2001), p. 58.   2 For further details see Adler and Barnett (eds.), Security Communities.   3 Speech by Russia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs I.S. Ivanov to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 27 January 2000. At www.ln.mid.ru (in Russian).   4 European Union, European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World. Brussels: EU, 12 December 2003, pp. 8, 11. Outlining key threats to the security of the EU and its member-states, the ESS highlighted the dangers of unresolved conflict: ‘[It] not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty’ (p. 2).   5 Ibid, p. 4.   6 Even the Russian term ‘Chechen’ is inextricably linked with incessant hostilities in a history where peace has been the exception – it is derived from the name of the village (Chechen-aul, on the Argun river in the North Caucasus) where the first battle was fought between the Russians and Chechens in 1732. For Chechen accounts of the nation’s history see Aidaev, Y.A. (ed.), Chechentsy: istoriya i sovremennost’. Moscow: Mir domu tvoemu, 1996; Shakhbiev, Z., Sud’ba checheno-ingushskogo naroda. Moscow: Rossiya molodaya, 1996; Usmanov, L., Nepokorennaya Chechnya. Moscow: Izdatelskiy dom ‘Parus’, 1997. Good overviews of Chechen history are provided in Broxup, M.B. (ed.), The North Caucasus Barrier London: Hurst, 1996; Gall, C. and de Waal, T., Chechnya: A Small Victorious War. London: Pan, 1997; Taylor, H.J., ‘The Origins and Development of Chechen Separatism: Historical Background’. War Studies Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Spring 1997), pp.

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Securing Europe 45–55; Dunlop, J.B., Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. The number of ethnic Russians in the republic had dramatically fallen, from 269,000 in 1989 (23 per cent of the total population) to 40,645 in 2002 (3.7 per cent). The figures for Chechnya in the 2002 census were highly controversial, not least because it was conducted prior to the 2003 constitutional referendum. For official census figures, see www.perepis2002.ru. For further details see Nichols, J., ‘Who Are the Chechen?’. Central Asian Survey, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1995), pp. 573–7. Sufism first arrived in the North Caucasus region during the 18th century. It spread rapidly amongst the Chechens during the 19th century, as it preached resistance to the Russian Empire. Sheikh Mansur, the son of a shepherd from the Chechen aul of Aldi, was the first Chechen to utilise the religious orders as a mobilising force against the Russians. In 1784 he proclaimed himself imam (chief of a Sufi Muslim order) and declared a ghazawat (holy war) against the invading Russian Empire. According to Bennigsen and Wimbush, ‘Sufism in the North Caucasus has always been … a revivalist, radical and even revolutionary force.’ Bennigsen, A. and Wimbush, S.E., Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide. London: Hurst, 1985, p. 159. See also Zelkina, A., In Quest of God and Freedom. London: Hurst, 2000. For further details see Bennigsen and Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire, pp. 158–9. The Naqshbandiya order spread to Chechnya from neighbouring Dagestan during the 1830s. The Qadiriya order arrived in Chechnya following the end of the Caucasian War in 1864, its central tenet of nonviolence proving popular after years of fighting. Gammer, M., Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan. London: Cass, 1994. The Chechens under Imam Shamil fought against Russian domination during the War, after the resistance leaders proclaimed a ghazawat against the Russians to the north, following the example set by Sheikh Mansur in the 18th century. For a detailed examination of this period see Gammer, ibid. This means that today there is an extensive Chechen diaspora, particularly in Turkey and Jordan, the descendants of those who fled. Grozny’s Islamic University contained teachers from Chechnya’s diaspora communities across the Middle East, particularly Syria and Jordan, and the republic’s first ‘foreign minister’, Shamil Beno, was a Jordanian-born Chechen. For a detailed account of the Chechen diaspora see Bennett, V., Crying Wolf: The Return of War to Chechnya. London: Picador, 1998.



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14 See Flemming, W., ‘The Deportation of the Chechen and Ingush Peoples: A Critical Examination’. In Fowkes, B. (ed.), Russia and Chechenia: The Permanent Crisis. New York, Basingstoke and London: St Martin’s, 1998, pp. 65–86; Karcha, R., ‘Soviet Propaganda Concerning the Rehabilitated Peoples of the Northern Caucasus’, Caucasian Review, No. 8, 1959, pp. 3–16; Bugai, N.F., ‘Pravda o deportatsii chechenskogo i ingushkogo narodov’. Voprosy istorii, No. 7 (July 1990), pp. 32–44; V.V. Cherepanov, ‘Udary v spinu Krasnoi Armii’. Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, No. 1 (1997), pp. 60–2. 15 These included Professor Salambek Khadzhiev, the writer Abuzar Aidamirov and the ex-Speaker of the regional CPSU committee, Lecha Magomadov. 16 A report by the Moscow Carnegie Centre asserts that ‘it would be hard to find a person more appropriate as a symbol of the Chechen national revival.’ See Chechenskaya Respublika Ichkeria, unpublished report by the Moscow Carnegie Centre, 1998, p. 293. Born in 1944, the year of the deportations, Dudayev grew up in exile in Kazakhstan. He eschewed university for a career in the military, serving in Afghanistan and rapidly rising through the ranks to become the first Chechen general. At the time of his initial contact with the Chechen nationalist movement he was commander of a division of strategic bombers based in Tartu, Estonia. 17 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 28 December 1994, p. 1; this address by President Boris Yeltsin was televised on 27 December. 18 The economy had been destroyed and there were very few legitimate jobs, schools and hospitals were all closed, and pensions and wages went unpaid. The lack of any legitimate means of making a living pushed many towards crime in order to survive in a republic awash with weapons. The prime example of this was the rise in ‘commercial’ hostage-taking: hundreds of people of all nationalities were seized and then held for ransom. Foreign workers who arrived in the republic to assist in the reconstruction effort were highly visible targets, and their capture ensured that Chechnya remained in the spotlight. In December 1996 six Red Cross workers were murdered as they slept in Groznyy, leading to the withdrawal of all foreign aid workers from the unstable republic. Two British volunteers, Camilla Carr and Jon James, were kidnapped in July 1997 and held for over a year, and in December 1999 four British-based telephone engineers were beheaded whilst being held hostage. 19 In January 2002 a Kremlin spokesman rejected US charges that Russia was using excessive force against civilians in Chechnya, stating: ‘Our experience in Chechnya and the US experience in Afghanistan shows that it is very difficult to reach terrorists without making civilians suffer, but both Russia and the US strive for it’. Agence France Presse, 11 January 2002, Moscow.

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20 Islam began to play a far more important role during the 1994–96 war, when it was used to emphasise the difference between Russians and Chechens. The spread of radical, political Islam has allegedly been accompanied by money from the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, and the second round of fighting has an even more pronounced religious character. By legitimising the war in Islamist terms, the separatists have found it far easier to gain financial support from the outside world, particularly the Middle East. The guerrillas now call their war a ‘jihad’, and the republic has declared itself an Islamic state, introducing Sharia law in February 1999. The influence of Wahhabism had been growing for several years after the Russian invasion in 1994 and the arrival of foreign mercenaries in the region, although it was probably present in Chechnya prior to 1994, having seeped over the border from Dagestan. For further information regarding the role of Islam see Henze, P.B., Islam in the North Caucasus: The Example of Chechnya. Rand Paper P-7935. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1995; Shah-Kazemi, R., Crisis in Chechnia: Russian Imperialism, Chechen Nationalism, Militant Sufism. London: Islamic World Report, 1995. 21 It is important to appreciate the impact of both Beslan and the 2002 Moscow theatre siege (as well as a series of terrorist attacks against Russian cities) on the Russian people, an impact perhaps misunderstood or underestimated in Brussels. See Lo, B., ‘Beslan: A People’s Trauma’. The World Today, Vol. 6, No. 10 (October 2004), p. 5. While EU leaders were quick to sympathise with Moscow and condemn terrorism, a row broke out when Bernard Bot, the Dutch Foreign Minister (the Netherlands were holding the EU presidency at the time), apparently asked the Kremlin ‘how this tragedy could have happened’. The remarks by Bot were published on the Dutch presidency’s website, but changed to quote the Foreign Minister as saying: ‘In order to better understand what happened in the school, we would like to learn more details from the Russian authorities so we can help each other to combat terrorism in any form anywhere in the world.’ Statement by Bot on North Ossetia, 4 September 2004, Press Releases (CFSP), General Affairs and External Relations, EU, at www.eu2004.nl. There were reports that Bot had come under pressure from some EU colleagues to go beyond merely expressing sympathy with Russia. See Lobjakas, A., ‘Beslan Hostage Tragedy Leads to Spat with EU’. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 6 September 2004, at www.rferl.org. Despite claims from the Netherlands that Bot’s intentions had been misinterpreted, Russian officials reacted furiously, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov calling it ‘inappropriate and blasphemous’. See Izvestiya, 9 September 2004, p. 1. The incident triggered a warning from



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President Putin that foreign perceptions of Russia were often wrong and that there were ‘frequent planned campaigns to discredit the country’. Putin, V., ‘Key Tasks of Russian Diplomacy’. International Affairs (Moscow) (October 2004), pp. 1–6. EU, European Security Strategy, p. 14. Russia is the EU’s largest neighbour and in the wake of the 2004 enlargement they now share a common border of some 1,500 km. In 2004 the European Commission noted that ‘it is in the interests of the EU for Russia to take forward its reforms and to modernise its economy.’ Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Relations with Russia, COM (2004) 106, 9 February 2004, p. 1. While it is currently very unlikely that Russia will seek EU accession in the future, it would be unwise to rule out the prospect completely. Solana, J., ‘The EU-Russia Strategic Partnership’. Speech delivered on 13 October 1999, Stockholm. At www.ue.eu.int. The EU is the largest single market in the world, and after the 2004 enlargement Russia has access to a larger, harmonised EU market of over 450 million people. Noviye Izvestiya, 6 December 2004. At www.newizv.ru. However, European foreign direct investment (FDI) in Russia is still low (€9 billion in 2005) and far below its potential, although it has been increasing steadily since 2001. There is some debate as to the reasons behind this, with some analysts arguing that the delay in ratification was more to do with the EU’s external policies and Russian concerns about the agreement rather than with the conflict in Chechnya. See Smith, H. ‘Chechnya in Russian Foreign Policy’. In Smith, H. (ed.), Russia and Its Foreign Policy. Saarijärvi: Kikimora, 2005, p. 102. The EU issued numerous declarations on the situation in Chechnya throughout 1995, speaking out against ‘the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law’ and calling for the immediate cessation of fighting and for the opening of negotiations, whilst also underlining the importance it attached to relations with Russia. See ‘Declaration on Chechnya made by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union’, 17 January 1995, Brussels. At www.ue.eu.int; ‘Declaration by the European Union on Chechnya’. General Affairs Council – no. 1825, 23 January 1995. At www.ue.eu.int; ‘Declaration on Chechnya made by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union’, 1 April 1995, Brussels. At www.ue.eu.int. The EU revealed the CSR at the Cologne Summit in June 1999. The document was intended to strengthen the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia on the basis of the PCA and through binding orientations, together

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with an increased coherence of EU and member states’ actions. Crucially, the CSR was the EU’s earliest attempt to articulate a common vision as part of its embryonic CFSP, and Russia was the first country to which such a strategy was applied, highlighting its importance to the organisation. See ‘Common Strategy of the EU of 4 June 1999 on Russia’. 1999/414/CFSP, Official Journal of the European Communities, 24 June 1999. For in-depth analysis of the CSR and its objectives, see Haukkala, H. and Medvedev, S. (eds.), The EU Common Strategy on Russia: Learning the Grammar of the CFSP’. Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, No. 1. Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs and Berlin: Institut für Europäische Politik, 2001; Likhachev, V., ‘Rossiya i Evropeiskii soyuz v strategicheskoi perspektive’. Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’, No. 1 (2000), pp. 40–9. 30 Helsinki European Council, 10–11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions, Annex II, at http://europe.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_eng.htm, p. 13. 31 This declaration was triggered by Moscow’s ultimatum to the residents of Grozny to leave the city or face annihilation, and warned that ‘the fight against terrorism cannot, under any circumstances, warrant the destruction of cities, nor that they be emptied of their inhabitants, nor that a whole population be considered as terrorist.’ However, although the declaration was very critical of Russian action, it also called on the Chechen authorities to ‘respect the rules and principles of humanitarian law, to condemn terrorism and to aim at the renewal of a political dialogue’. See Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions. Annex II, 10–11 December 1999. At http://europe. eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_eng.htm, pp. 13–14. 32 The EU also invited these organisations to review their relationship and cooperation with Russia. OSCE membership involves a strong politically (although not legally) binding commitment to a set of shared values and norms, including the non-use of force in international relations, and respect for existing borders and state sovereignty, for democracy and free elections, and for human and minority rights. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted a resolution on 27 January 2000 that condemned the military operation in Chechnya and censured Russia for violating ‘some of her most important obligations under both the European Convention on Human Rights and international humanitarian law, as well as the commitments she entered into upon accession to the Council of Europe’. PACE, The Conflict in Chechnya. Recommendation 1444 (2000), text adopted by the Assembly on 27 January 2000 (7th sitting). See http://assembly/coe/int/ Documents/AdoptedText/TA00/EREC1444.htm. In April 2000 the Council



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of Europe suspended Russian’s full voting rights over its human-rights record in Chechnya, and did not restore them until January 2001. Statement by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Chechnya. Press release 14309/99 (Presse 423), Brussels, 30 December 1999. At www.ue.eu. int. See Rogov, S., ‘Against Everyone’. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 17 December 1999, p. 3. There was anger after the US demanded an explanation for Russia’s aims and objectives in Chechnya, prompting one journalist to observe that: ‘The president of a great nuclear power is treated like a schoolboy, who must explain his bad behaviour to Uncle Sam’. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 December 1999, p. 1. Prodi, R., ‘Russia and the Europan Union: Enduring Ties, Widening Horizons’. Speech delivered on 23 April 2004, Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow, at http:// www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/prodi/sp04_198.htm. Since the start of Russia’s second military campaign in Chechnya, animosity between the two neighbours has focused on the Pankiski Gorge in northern Georgia, which Russia claims is a haven for both Chechen rebels and international terrorists. European Parliament, Report with a Proposal for a European Parliament Recommendation to the Council on EU-Russia Relations (2003/2230(INI)). Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, rapporteur Bastiaan Belder, 2 February 2004, A5-0053/2004, PE329.339, pp. 8–11. It should be noted that this aid has not been allocated only to Chechnya, but also to internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in neighbouring Ingushetia and Dagestan. ‘North Caucasus’, June 2007. At www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/ en/p_565.htm. For further details see Delegation of the European Commission to Russia, ‘European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights: New Projects 2007’. March 2007. At www.delrus.ec.europa.eu. Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997. At www.Nato.int/docu/ basictxt/fndact-a.htm. According to this Act, the relationship between the two is based on specific principles such as ‘acknowledgement of the vital role that democracy, political pluralism, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and civil liberties and the development of free market economies play in the development of common prosperity and comprehensive security’ and the ‘prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means in accordance with UN and OSCE principles’.

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41 Final Communiqué - Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 15 December 1999, M-NAC2 (99)166. At www. Nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-166e.htm. 42 Ibid. 43 For further details see Cross, S., ‘Russia’s Relationship with the United States/ NATO in the US-led Global War on Terrorism’. Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 19 (2006), pp. 175–92. Most recently, a Russian frigate, RFS Ladniy, has been preparing to deploy in support of NATO’s maritime counterterrorist operation in the Mediterranean (‘Operation Active Endeavour’), the second Russian ship to do so. Other Russian ships are expected to be rotated into the operation in future. 44 Press Point by NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson and Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation. Brussels, 11 November 2002. At www. Nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021111a.htm. 45 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, op cit. 46 Baev, P., ‘Putin’s Western Choice’. European Security, Vol. 12 (Spring 2003), p. 8. 47 EU, European Security Strategy, p. 7. 48 By 2020 it is estimated that two-thirds of the EU’s energy requirements will be imported. The consumption of natural gas in particular is forecast to rise dramatically as a result of environmental concerns and also of the increased availability of supplies from countries such as Russia and Algeria. In 2003 32 per cent of natural gas imports into the EU came from Russia, representing 19 per cent of total EU gas consumption, but this figure is set to rise dramatically as indigenous reserves dwindle. See European Commission, European Union Energy Outlook to 2020. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1999.

Chapter 5   1 In February 2006 the Georgian parliament voted unanimously (179–0) in support of a non-binding resolution demanding the withdrawal of Russian peace-keepers from South Ossetia and calling upon the government to review the 1992 Dagomys peace agreement; this forms the legal basis for the Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF), which comprises ‘national’ battalions from Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia and Russia.   2 Darchiashvili, D., ‘Georgian Security Problems and Policies’. in Lynch, D. (ed.), The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU. Chaillot Papers, No. 65. Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2003, p. 115.



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  3 Information in this table taken and adapted from Hill, F., Russia’s Tinderbox: Conflict in the North Caucasus and its Implications for the Future of the Russian Federation. Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1995, pp. 11–13.   4 Control over higher education was a crucial aspect of Soviet policy on nationalities, and a strict quota system regulated university places among applicants of various nationalities. This quota system favoured the local nationality, thus providing an incentive for indigenous elites and middle classes to remain loyal to the centre. For further information see Zaslavsky, V., ‘Success and Collapse: Traditional Soviet Nationality Policy’. In Bremmer, I. and Taras, R. (eds.), Nations and Policies in the Soviet Successor States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 29–42.   5 Gadzhiev, K.S., Geopolitika kavkaza. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyie Otnosheniya, 2003, p. 161.   6 Cornell, S.E., Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus. London: Curzon, 2001, p. 143.   7 Ibid, pp. 162–9. For an in-depth analysis of the conflict itself, see Birch, J., ‘Ossetia: A Caucasian Bosnia in Microcosm’. Central Asian Survey, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1995), pp. 43–74.   8 The OSCE (then CSCE) established a mission in Georgia on 6 November 1992, with the primary task of bringing conflicting parties in the country’s separatist conflicts closer together. In 1994 its mandate in South Ossetia was expanded to facilitate cooperation with and between the parties concerned and, with their consent, to monitor the Joint Peacekeeping Forces. More recently it has been involved in projects to reduce the quantity of small arms in the region. For further information see Sabahi, F. and Warner, D. (eds.), The OSCE and the Multiple Challenges of Transition. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.   9 Writing in 2003, Dov Lynch surmised that ‘the separatist regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh have survived isolation and blockades for a decade, and look set to survive another ten more years.’ Lynch, ‘The South Caucasus’, p. 20. 10 See Gadzhiev, p. 162. 11 Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, p. 156. 12 ‘Steps to reform UN should unite, not divide, international community, General Assembly told’. Sixtieth General Assembly, Plenary, 5th and 6th Meetings, GA/10384, Department of Public Information. At http://www. un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/ga10384.doc.htm.

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13 The rebellious region of Ajaria has been brought back into the fold with the removal of its former leader Aslan Abashidze and the success of the proSaakashvili political bloc in local elections there in June 2004. There have been concrete moves to crack down on crime, particularly smuggling, and consequently the leadership has turned its attention to resolving the political disputes with separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 14 BBC Monitoring Select, Central Asia and Transcaucasus, 16 July 2004, pp. 35–6, Imedi TV, Tbilisi. 15 Novyie Izvestiya, 4 February 2004, pp. 1–4. 16 BBC Monitoring (online version), 11 January 2005, NTV Mir, Moscow. 17 Ibid, 19 August 2005, ITAR-TASS news agency, Moscow. 18 Ibid, 12 November 2005, Rustavi-2 TV, Tbilisi. 19 ‘Visa Requirements between Russia and Georgia’, text adopted by European Parliament 18 January 2001. At http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade 2?PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2001-0037+0+DOC+XML+V0// EN&LEVEL=3&NAV=X. 20 This was to be expected. In July 2004 the Russian authorities had warned that Moscow ‘will not remain indifferent towards the fate of its citizens, which comprise the absolute majority of South Ossetia’. Statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘V svyazi s obostreniem situatsii vokrug Yuzhnoi Osetii’, 9 July 2004. At http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sp s/3C8799FB6DC16167C3256ECC0045352E). This stance was affirmed in 2005 by Andrei Kokoshin, head of the Duma committee on CIS affairs, who said that Russia ‘will not stay aloof ’ if Georgia resorts to force, stating that: ‘Many residents of South Ossetia are citizens of Russia and Russia has the right to defend the life, freedom, property and health of its citizens using all means available to a state in modern circumstances.’ BBC Monitoring (online version), 4 August 2005, RTR Russia TV, Moscow, 4 August 2005. 21 BBC Monitoring (online version), 9 September 2005, Imedi TV, Tbilisi. 22 The Russian position is at odds with its stance over Chechnya, a self-proclaimed republic that is seeking independence from the Russian Federation, and Moscow’s anger at other states which engage with Chechen separatists. 23 Socor, V., The Frozen Conflicts: A Challenge to Euro-Atlantic Interests. Report prepared by the George C. Marshall Fund of the United States, on the occasion of the 2004 NATO Summit on ‘A New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region’. 24 Saakashvili, M. (President of Georgia), Remarks on the occasion of the 59th Session of the UN General Assembly, 21 September 2004. At www.un.org/ webcast/ga/59/statements/geoeng040921.pdf, pp. 6–10.



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25 ‘Georgia’s NATO Membership is in Russia’s Interest’; interview with Mamuka Kaduva, Georgian Deputy Minister of Defence, 26 October 2006. At www. mod.gov.ge/?l=E&m=13&sm=2&st=0&id=401. 26 Ibid. The EU, under its French presidency, was instrumental in brokering a cease-fire between Russia and Georgia in August 2008. 27 ‘Summary of remarks by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, at press briefing with foreign ministers of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, following political dialogue meetings’. Brussels, 13 December 2005, S411/05. At http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/discours/87535.pdf. 28 The ENP is viewed as a way to address the EU’s relations with its new neighbours and promote its shared values, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law, in the hope of promoting stability. It is hoped that by encouraging stable democratic development within a country, the ENP can play a key role in conflict resolution. Although the ENP does not offer potential membership of the EU, it does offer a ‘privileged relationship’, with the aim of sharing the Union’s stability and prosperity. The relationship is supposed to be mutually beneficial, with the EU serving as a major source of investment and trade for the region, which has considerable potential for economic growth. 29 EU/Georgia Action Plan (Final), November 2006. At http://ec.europa.eu/ world/enp/pdf/action_plans/georgia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, pp. 10, 17. 30 Tensions flared between Russia and Georgia at the end of 2004 when Moscow refused to extend the OSCE’s border-monitoring mandate, which covered Georgia’s border with the Chechen, Ingush and Dagestani republics, arguing that the missions had completed their tasks and were no longer required. The mandate expired at midnight on 31 December 2004. 31 Extraordinary European Council, Presidency Conclusions. Brussels, 1 September 2008, 12594/08, pp. 2, 5. 32 EU/Georgia Action Plan (Final), op cit, p. 17. 33 European Commission Delegation to Georgia, ‘Abkhazia: Planned Projects’. At www.delgeo.cec.eu.int/en/programmes/Abkhazia.htm#A1. 34 Under a ceasefire agreement between Russia and Georgia, brokered by French President Nicholas Sarkozy in September 2008, the EU will provide over 200 monitors to patrol the areas bordering South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 35 NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept widened its geographical remit, highlighting the alliance’s determination to pursue a policy of partnership, cooperation and dialogue, with the aim of enhancing security for all, excluding no-one, and thus helping to overcome the divisions that might lead to conflict. Initiatives such as PfP represent attempts by NATO and its member states to move

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Securing Europe beyond the institution’s Cold War territorial-defence remit in order to engage with states elsewhere in Europe and on its southern borders, in an attempt to promote stability at its periphery. The 40-mile-long gorge in northern Georgia has suffered spillover from the Chechen conflict in neighbouring Russia and witnessed the arrival of a large number of refugees fleeing the second bout of fighting in Chechnya. The gorge quickly became a notorious centre of crime that was no longer under the control of the Georgian authorities, and Russia claims that the lawlessness of the gorge made it an ideal base for rebel fighters to regroup and rearm. Georgia is the only foreign country bordering Chechnya, and since the outbreak of hostilities in 1999 over 7,000 Chechens are reported to have crossed the border into Georgia, most heading for the northern Akhmeta district, which was already home to a large ethnic Chechen-Kist population (who have lived on Georgian territory for centuries), particularly in the Pankiski Gorge adjacent to Russia. According to a census of non-Georgians conducted in June 2003, there were approximately 3,200 Chechens living in the Pankiski Gorge. See BBC Monitoring Select, Central Asia and Transcaucasus, 27 June 2003, ITARTASS, Moscow, p. 14. For an in-depth historical and ethnographic survey of the gorge, see Kurtsikidze, S. and Chikovani, V., ‘Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge: An Ethnographic Survey’. Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series. Berkeley, CA: University of California, 2002. Agence France Presse, 15 December 2002, Tbilisi. Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Security Concept of Georgia. Approved by parliament in 2005. At www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?sec_ id=24&lang_id=ENG. ‘Statement by President of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze at the EAPC Summit’. Prague, 22 November 2002. At www.Nato.int. See NATO-Georgia: Chronology of Major Events. At www.mfa.gov.ge. See ‘Framework document on the establishment of the NATO-Georgia Commission’. Press Release (2008) 114, 15 September 2008. At www.Nato.int. For further details see The Virtual Silk Highway Project. At www.Nato.int. US European Command Public Affairs, Georgia Train and Equip Program. Fact Sheet. At www.eucom.mil/directorates/ecpa/operations/gtep/englishproducts/FactSheet.htm. Training was initially conducted by US Army Special Forces assigned to Special Operations Command Europe, although in December 2002 this responsibility was assumed by US Marines, under the operational control of US Marine Forces Europe. The total number of US personnel present in Georgia, including support staff and technicians, has been minimal, never exceeding 150.



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44 Soldiers in the GTEP programme received 400 lari (approximately US$200) per month, over four times what regular-army soldiers received (80–100 lari). Miller, E.A., ‘Morale of US-trained troops in Georgia is high, but US advisors concerned about sustainability’. 5 May 2003. At www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav050503_pr.shtml. 45 US Department of Defense, ‘Georgia “Train and Equip” Program Begins’. Press Release No. 217-02, 29 April 2002. At www.defenselink.mil/news/ Apr2002/b04292002_bt217-02.html. 46 The NMCC, located within MoD headquarters in Tbilisi ‘is designed to accommodate representatives from military, internal security forces and specialists from non-governmental organisations, as needed’. Equipped with ‘the latest desktop computers, electronic briefing systems and high frequency communications equipment’ it is intended to ‘serve as the primary command and control point and receive and relay critical information in times of national emergency’. US European Command Public Affairs, Georgia Train and Equip Program – National Military Command Centre. Fact Sheet. At www.eucom. mil/directorates/ecpa/operations/gtep/englishproducts/fact_sheet5.htm. 47 US Department of State, US Assistance to Georgia – Fiscal Year 2006. Fact Sheet, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington, DC, 12 May 2006. At www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/66198.htm. 48 Russia was also upset by at least three flights by American spy planes over Georgia in March 2003. Although the planes remained within Georgian airspace, they travelled the length of the border separating Russia and Georgia. It should be noted that US support is not limited to Georgia – it also provides military aid to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia has been America’s traditional ally in the Caucasus region, and in the wake of 11 September 2001 offered the use of its airspace, intelligence-sharing and other confidential support. See The Caucasus and Caspian Region: Understanding US Interests and Policy. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 107th Congress, First Session, 10 October 2001. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2001, p. 5. 49 For further details see the Georgian Ministry of Defence website, at www. mod.gov.ge/?l=E&m=13&sm=0&id=95. 50 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, ‘Kommentarii departamenta informatsii i pechati MID RF v svyazi s voprosom SMI otnositelno resheniya pravitelstva Chekhii o peredache Gruzii boyepripasov’, 13 September 2005. At www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/sps/FEC8CB5B3B3C7D9CC325707B003BFC99.

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2

3

4

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8

Turkey closed its borders with Armenia in 1993, and has said it will not reopen them until Armenia and Azerbaijan reach agreement over NagornoKarabakh. In December 2004 Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed Russia’s readiness to act as a mediator and guarantor in the conflict; the idea was rejected by Azerbaijan, as Russia is perceived to be a strong ally of Armenia and therefore liable to act in Armenian interests. At the beginning of 2005 the US State Department issued a statement on the conflict in which it confirmed its commitment to advancing a peaceful settlement and its support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. See US Department of State, The United States and the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. Fact Sheet, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington DC, 7 February 2005. At www.state.gov/p/eur/ rls/fs/41401.htm. ‘OSCE and Council of Europe hold high-level meeting, issue joint declaration’. OSCE press release, Strasbourg, 23 February 2005. At www.osce.org. Although the Council of Europe is not directly involved in negotiations, it spends a considerable amount of time reviewing the situation and has called upon the OSCE’s Minsk Group to step up its efforts to resolve the stalemated dispute, praising the ‘tireless’ efforts of the group’s co-chairs. See The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1416 (2005), text adopted by the Assembly on 25 January 2005 (2nd sitting). European Parliament resolution on the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004/2166 (INI)), text adopted by parliament on 19 January 2006, A6-0399/2005, P6_TA-PROV(2006)0028. At www2.europarl.eu.int, p. 8. See Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, at www.mfa.gov.az. BBC Monitoring (online version), 23 December 2006, Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow. Armenian Foreign Ministry, Republic of Armenia National Security Strategy, Appendix to RA Presidential Decree NH-37-N, 7 February 2007. At www. armeniaforeignministry.com. Report on the European neighbourhood policy (2004/2166(INI)), European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, rapporteur Charles Tannock, 7 December 2005, A6-0399/2005, p. 10. This reinforced the opinion of the earlier Gahrton report, which asserted that the South Caucasus region would become increasingly important for energy supply to the EU. See Report with a proposal for a European Parliament recommendation to the



  9

10 11

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Council on EU policy towards the South Caucasus (2003/2225(INI)), European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, rapporteur Per Gahrton, 2 February 2004, A5-0052/2004, p. 7. Ferrero-Waldner, B., Political Reform and Sustainable Development in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Approach. Speech delivered at ‘Caspian Outlook 2008’, Bled Strategic Forum, 28 August 2006, speech no. 06/477. At http:// ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/ferrero-waldner/index_en.htm. ‘Balancing Act’. Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 (March 2007), p. 66. Quoted in ‘Russia and Armenia Cement Military Alliance’. Jane’s Foreign Report. 8 March 2007, No. 2919, pp. 6–7. Russia has reportedly helped to upgrade Armenia’s air defences; at a military parade in Yerevan in September 2006, the Armenian military showed off new surface-to-surface rockets. Moscow finally agreed, at the end of March 2006, a detailed timetable for its planned military withdrawal, which is to be completed by the end of 2008, in line with a preliminary agreement signed in 2005. Croissant, M.P., The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict: Causes and Implications. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998, p. 10. Ibid, p. 13. de Waal, T., Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War. New York: New York University Press, 2003, p. 3. Walker, C.J., Armenia: the Survival of a Nation, Routledge: London, 1990, pp. 270–2. Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers, p. 74. For further historical details see ibid; Croissant, The Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict; de Waal, Black Garden. Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Helsinki Document 1992: The Challenges of Change. At www.osce.org. Speaking at a press conference in February 2005, Arman Melikyan, Foreign Minister of the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh republic’, criticised the ‘distorted format of the negotiations in which [Nagorno-Karabakh] is not participating’ and stated that if the international community sought a resolution of the conflict within the context of the enclave as an independent entity, and thus as a party to negotiations, then a solution would be found. BBC Monitoring Select, Central Asia and South Caucasus, 5 February 2005, p. 11, Arminfo news agency, Yerevan. Ibid, 24 January 2005, p. 7, Regnum news agency, Moscow. Ibid, 14 December 2004, p. 15, MPA news agency, Baku. Republic of Armenia National Security Strategy, op cit, p. 8.

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24 For further details of OSCE involvement in the peace process, see Cornell, Small Nations and Great Powers; de Waal, Black Garden. 25 ‘Report of the Co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group to the OSCE Ministerial Council’. Twelfth Meeting of the Ministerial Council, 6–7 December 2004, Sofia, p. 148. For a detailed chronicling of the Prague Process see Mehtiyev, E., Armenia-Azerbaijan Prague Process: Road Map to Peace or Stalemate for Uncertainty. Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 05/23, 2005. 26 Joint Statement by OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs. Press release, Vienna, 30 November 2006. At www.osce.org. 27 There was a very high turn-out for the referendum, held on 10 December 2006, the 15th anniversary of the enclave’s original referendum on independence. The referendum proposal was reportedly supported by 99 per cent of the electorate. 28 See Blandy, C.W., Azerbaijan: Permanently between Scylla and Charybdis? Watchfield: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 06/33, 2006. 29 The Armenian diaspora in the US is estimated to be as large as one million. California is home to the largest concentration of Armenians, but there is also a significant population on the US East Coast. 30 The bill is unlikely to become law, as the Senate has no plans to consider it. 31 BBC Monitoring Select, Central Asia and South Caucasus, 2 February 2005, pp. 10–11, Trend news agency, Baku. 32 Ibid, 3 February 2005, pp. 12–13, Ayots Ashkhar, Yerevan, p. 2. 33 There is suspicion in Azerbaijan that the fires were started deliberately by Armenians. Azerbaijani officials feel that Kaspryzk failed to investigate how the fires were started, and have accused him of being incompetent and proArmenian. Abbasov, S. and Ismailova, K., ‘Azerbaijan Targets OSCE Special Representative for Criticism’. Eurasia Insight, 28 August 2006. At www.eurasianet.org. 34 The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference, op cit. 35 The resolution stated that ‘considerable parts of Azerbaijan are still occupied by Armenian forces and separatist forces are still in control of the NagornoKarabakh region.’ Aliyev regarded this as a reflection of ‘all the Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan including the ethnic cleansing and other issues’. BBC Monitoring Select Central Asia and South Caucasus, 27 January 2005, p. 13, ANS TV, Baku. 36 Ibid, 28 January 2005, p. 20, Trend news agency, Baku. 37 Ibid 27 January 2005, p. 12, Turan news agency, Baku. 38 The EUSR’s mandate is based on the EU’s policy objectives in the South



39

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Caucasus, which include the prevention of conflicts in the region and the peaceful settlement of existing conflicts. For further details see Council Joint Action 2006/121/CFSP of 20 February 2006 appointing the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, in Official Journal of the European Union, L49/14, 21 February 2006. The ENP does not offer potential membership of the EU, but it does offer a ‘privileged relationship’, with the aim of sharing the Union’s stability and prosperity. In return for this ‘privileged’ relationship with the EU, ENP partners accept precise commitments, set out in individual Action Plans, to strengthen the rule of law, democracy, and respect for human rights, to promote economic reforms, and to cooperate on key foreign policy objectives such as counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The European Commission – External Trade, The European Union and Its Main Trading Partners: Economic and Trade Indicators. Armenia: at http:// trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113345.pdf; Azerbaijan: at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/ tradoc_113347.pdf; Georgia: at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/ september/tradoc_113383.pdf. Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006. Tacis National Indicative Programme 20022003: Azerbaijan. Adopted by the European Commission on 27 December 2001, pp. 13–14. In 1997 a European Union Rehabilitation Programme (EU-REHAB) was established, one of several instruments through which the EU gives or has given support to the reconstruction process. From 1998, further funds were made available through the EU’s Exceptional Assistance Programme (EU-EXAP). The EU’s rehabilitation programme, which is now completed, disbursed €18.3 million in five tranches. For further details see ‘Europa House: the European Commission’s Implementation and Management Support Office in Azerbaijan’. At www.europahouse-az.org. Popescu, N., ‘The European Union and Conflicts in the South Caucasus’. 8 January 2007. At www.caucaz.com. As mentioned above, Armenia’s National Security Strategy, adopted in 2007, affirms the country’s satisfaction with OSCE mediation and its disinclination to accept the involvement of other international organisations. Republic of Armenia National Security Strategy, approved by National Security Council on 26 January 2007, p. 8. EU/Armenia Action Plan (Final). November 2006. At http://ec.europa.eu/ world/enp/pdf/action_plans/armenia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, p. 9. More than 90 per cent of the country’s population of 8.3m is nominally Muslim, the majority adhering to Shia Islam, the remainder Sunni.

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45 NATO’s Role in South Caucasus Region, 168 DSCFC 06 E, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, rapporteur Frank Cook, p. 7. 46 Statement by H.E. Mr Heydar Aliyev, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan at Working Session of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Summit meeting, Prague Summit, 22 November 2002. At http://www.NATO.int/ docu/speech/2002/s021122l.htm. 47 Ibid. 48 BBC Monitoring (online version), 23 December 2006, Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow. 49 BBC Monitoring Select, Central Asia and Transcaucasus, 19 June 2003, p. 21, Uc Noqta, Baku. This followed Robertson’s description in May 2003 of the Caucasus as an ‘area of crucial importance to [NATO’s] common security’, describing the countries of the Caucasus as front-line states in the battle against threats such as terrorism, proliferation and regional instability. Speech by Lord Robertson delivered at the French University, Yerevan, Armenia on 15 May 2003. At www.Nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s030515a.htm. 50 For further details, see Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, at http://www.mfa.gov.az/eng/international/organizations/NATO.shtml. 51 Republic of Armenia National Security Strategy, Appendix to RA Presidential Decree NH-37-N, 7 February 2007. At www.armeniaforeignministry.com, p. 9. 52 The US has financed the upgrading of the communications system used by the Armenian armed forces, allocating US$4m in 2002 and a further US$3.5m in 2003. See BBC Monitoring Select, Central Asia and Transcaucasus, 17 June 2003, p. 15, Arminfo, Yerevan. American aid was also forthcoming to assist Azerbaijan’s State Border Service in installing engineering equipment on the country’s southern borders in order to boost security, and the Service was presented with US coastguard cutters. Furthermore, joint US-Azeri naval exercises were held in August 2003 in the Caspian Sea, highlighting the strategic importance of the region to the US. The Goplat exercises involved 18 US servicemen and 45 Azeris, together with two Mi-8 helicopters and two coastguard vessels, seeking to protect oil and gas platforms. BBC Monitoring Select, Central Asia and Transcaucasus, 19 June 2003, p. 21, Uc Noqta, Baku. 53 Jones, E. (US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs), US Engagement in Central Asia and the Caucasus: Staying Our Course along the Silk Road. Remarks at a conference on ‘Central Asia: Its Geopolitical Significance and Future Impact’, hosted by Title VI Undergraduate International Studies and Foreign Language Program Directors, University of Montana, Missoula, MT, 10 April 2003. At www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/19606pf.



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htm. Section 907 restricted US assistance to Azerbaijan until such time as it removed its blockades of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. This prohibition became law in 1992 as a result of the war. It can be no coincidence that these restrictions were lifted as the construction of the BTC pipeline got under way, a development that will facilitate the development of Azerbaijan’s oil reserves by US companies. International Crisis Group, Armenia: Internal Instability Ahead. Europe Report No 158, 18 October 2004, Yerevan/Brussels. At www.icg.org, p. 24. See www.panarmenian.net. Additionally, the legislation called for US$3m in Foreign MilitaryFinancing (FMF) and US$500,000 in International Military EducationandTraining (IMET) for both Armenia and Azerbaijan. BBC Monitoring Select, Central Asia and Transcaucasus, 27 June 2003, pp. 9–10, Ayots Ashkhar, Yerevan. Quoted in Kuchera, J., ‘US helps forces, gains foothold in Caspian region’. Jane’s Defence Weekly, 25 May 2005, online version. ‘Turkish Armed Forces will continue to assist Azerbaijani Armed Forces in conforming to NATO standards’. Today. Azerbaijan, 23 May 2007. At http:// www.today.az/print/news/politics/41245.html. Economic pragmatism drives Moscow’s relations with its ex-Soviet neighbours, relations that until recently were more about geo-politics than geoeconomics. Determined to re-assert its influence within what it considers to be its own strategic ‘backyard’, Russia has been flexing its economic muscle, reducing subsidies for those countries that have sought to orient their policies away from Moscow. The gas disputes with Ukraine at the start of 2006 and 2009, and the bans on Moldovan and Georgian wine exports to Russia are part of this strategy. Moscow has used its role as a key energy supplier as a political tool to exert influence. Both Armenia and Georgia are dependent on Russian gas imports; in addition, the Russian electricity giant UES controls power generation and distribution in these countries. Putin, V., Annual Address to the Federal Assembly. Moscow, 25 April 2005. At www.kremlin.ru. The democratic ‘revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine are viewed as part of a Western conspiracy to usurp Russian influence, an opinion expressed in the government-controlled newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta in December 2004, which argued that ‘Russia cannot afford to allow defeat in the battle for the Ukraine’ as it ‘would mean velvet revolutions … in Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgysztan and possibly Armenia’. Rossiskaya Gazeta (internet version), 2 December 2004, at www.rg.ru, quoted in Herd, G.P., The ‘Orange Revolution’: Implications for Stability in the CIS. Camberley: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 2005.

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Effectively this would create a ‘security system’ based on Deutsch’s work. For a view on the stabilisation of the Balkan region, see Blagoev, B., ‘Two Models for Stabilisation of the Balkans and South-Eastern Europe’. Balkan Forum, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 49–63. See Vukadinovic, R., ‘South-Eastern Europe: Instabilities and Linking Strategies’. Paper presented at a conference on Conflict Resolution, Corfu, 1997. See also Vorohkov, L., ‘The Challenges of NATO Enlargement’. Balkan Forum, Vol. 5, No. 2 (June 1997), pp. 5–39. See ‘Political Stalemate’, The Economist, 11 June 2005, p. 42.

Index

Abkhazia 4, 107, 111, 121, 126 see also Georgia ‘anti-Georgian’ policies 108, 113 border redefinition 16 EU involvement 118–19 history 110 integration with Russia 113–14 international involvement 104, 115 Russia 114–15 Saakashvili’s proposed ‘special status’ in Georgia 112 seeking independence 45, 106, 113 Adler, Emanuel 6, 23, 82, 145 Afghanistan 23 AG (Assistance Group) 98–9 Albania 43 Albanians boycott Serbian elections 38 Kosovo 36–7, 166n living conditions in Serbia 46 NATO membership 163n potential Albanian separatist demands 45 relations with Yugoslavia 47 revenge against Serbs in Kosovo 2

Aliyev, Heydar 148 Aliyev, Ilham 131, 138, 141, 148 Altan, Ahmet 76 America see USA Amnesty International 76, 77–8 Anatolia 64–5 Anderson, Mike (US Army Colonel) 151 armed forces under civilian control 22 see also military power Armenia 3, 133 see also NagornoKarabakh Action Plan 143, 145–6 Council of Europe resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh 142 defence budget 134 Individual Partnership Action Plan 149 mass killing of Armenians in Turkey (1915) 71, 140, 176n negotiations with Azerbaijan 137, 138–9 relationship with EU 131, 144 relationship with NATO 131, 149 relationship with Russia 131–2, 149, 153 relationship with Turkey 150–1

198

Securing Europe

relationship with USA 150–1, 193n arms trafficking 90, 105, 115, 127 Ashdown, Paddy 9, 172n Assistance Group 98–9 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal 64, 70, 71, 136 Atkinson, David 141 Austro-Hungarian Empire 28 Autonomous Areas, Regions and Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) 105–6, 107 table Ayots Ashkhar (Armenian newspaper) 150 Azerbaijan 3 see also NagornoKarabakh Action Plan 143, 145–6, 148 defence budget 133–4 Nagorno-Karabakh 130, 137, 138, 141–2 negotiations with Armenia 138–9 relationship with EU 131, 144, 148 relationship with NATO 131, 147–8 relationship with Turkey 150–1, 153 relationship with USA 150–1 strategic importance to the West 132–3 Azimov, Araz 142 Baev, Pavel 100 Bagapsh, Sergei 113 Baghdad Pact (1955) 67 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline 84, 133 Balkans 14, 15, 20, 26 see also Albania; Bosnia; Croatia; Kosovo; Macedonia; Montenegro; Serbia; Slovenia on periphery of European stability 6, 10–11, 12

Barcelona Process 25 Barkawi, Tarak 41 Barnett, Michael 23, 82, 145 Baroso, José Manuel 95 Barzani, Massoud 69 Basque provinces 45 Belder Report 2004 (European Parliament) 94 Belgium 37, 45 Beslan school siege (2004) 89, 90, 110, 182n Blumi, Isa 43–4 bombings 88, 89 see also military power borders 190n Azerbaijan 150 Georgia 117–18, 124–5 open 6, 19 potential for redefinition 4–5, 16 Turkish-Soviet 66 Borko, Yury 179n Bosnia 2, 16, 27–62, 30, 156 see also Balkans border redefinition 5 creation of Serb Republic 34 Croation state under Hitler 29 ethnicity 33 EU and NATO accession 11 NATO operations 21 referendum for independence (1992) 33 relations with Yugoslavia 47 Serb separatism 45 war aims 33 Bosnia-Herzegovina 28, 29, 31, 55, 58–9, 161n imposing liberal democracy 51–2 recognised by EU and US 33 ‘brotherhood and unity’ (Tito) 30, 31 Bryza, Matthew J. 139 Bulgaria 32, 163n Bush, George (Senior) 23, 46 Bush, George W 23, 83, 150



Index

Büyükanit, Yasar 79 Catalonia 45 Catherine the Great 85 Caucasian War (1817-64) 85 Caucasus 3, 14, 15, 26, 82, 130 see also Abkhazia; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Chechnya; Dagestan; Georgia; Ingushetia; Nagorno-Karabakh; North Ossetia; South Ossetia China involvement 3 EU and NATO accession 11 European Security Strategy (2003) 83 importance for European security 4, 10–11, 12, 116 North Caucasus 95, 107 Russia 3–4, 11, 81, 84, 152 security issues between North and South Caucasus 84 South Caucasus Action Plan 143 strategic importance 3, 84 US military influence 103 CEECs (Countries of Central and Eastern Europe) 9, 18, 163n Chechnya 4, 16, 45, 81–101 border redefinition 16 Checheno-Ingush republic 86 declaration of independence 87 ethnicity 84–5 history 84–9 impact on EU-Russia relationship 91–2 implications to wider international community 83 internal conflicts 88 precendent in Kosovo’s independence 45 relationship with EU 95, 99 relationship with Russia 87–8, 98 strategic geographical importance 85 China 3

199

Chirac, Jacques 161n Churchill, Winston 27 CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) 110 Clinton, Bill 23, 39, 46 Cold War 14, 21, 22, 68 Collective Security Treaty Organisations 132 Common Foreign and Security Policy 18 Common Strategy for Russia (CSR) 92 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 110 communism 1, 28, 29, 34, 68, 81 community security 13 conflicts see individual countries or areas cooperative security arrangements 23–4, 25–6 Copenhagen Criteria see Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) (Copenhagen Criteria) Copenhagen European Council (1993) 9 corruption 47, 55–7, 104 Council of Europe 55–6, 82–3 on Bosnian political system 58–9 Nagorno-Karabakh 130, 138, 141 Russian obligations 93 Turkey 66 Council of the EU 17 see also EU crime see organised crime Croatia 28, 29, 33 see also Balkans control by Serbs 32 Croat anti-Serbian movements 29 ‘Croatian Community of Herceg Bosna’ 34 Croats in Bosnia 2 foreign currency earnings 30 NATO membership 163n proposal for confederation (1990) 32 seeking independence 32 Serbian-populated area to join ‘Greater Serbia’ 31

200

Securing Europe

Serbs exodus following Dayton Peace Accords 34 war aims 33 Croissant, Michael 134–5 CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) see Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) CSR (Common Strategy for Russia) 92 Cuban missile crisis 67 cultural rights 63, 78, 175n Chechnya 86 Kurds 70, 71–2, 73, 74–5, 77 South Ossetia 108 Turkey 66 Cyprus 45, 67, 68 Czechoslovakia 28, 29 Daalder, Ivo 41 Dagestan 86, 88, 186n Dagomys peace agreement (1992) 109 Darchiashvili, David 105 Dayton Peace Accords (1995) 2, 5, 34, 35 de Waal, Thomas 135 Demirel, Süleyman 73 democracy 22, 99, 115, 151 Azerbaijan 144 former Yugoslavia 35, 37–8 Georgia 117 ignored by Office of High Representative 58 liberal democracy 51–2 NATO membership 22 Russia 91, 94 Russian operations in Chechnya 92 Stabilisation and Association Agreements 9, 10, 75 Turkey 77 Democratic Opposition (Serbia) 46

democratisation see democracy Deutsch, KW 5, 10, 18, 23, 159n discrimination see ethnicity; minority rights; nationalism; racialism Dita newspaper (Kosovo) 52–3, 54 Diyarbakir, Turkey 77 Dogu Bank (Turkey) 70 Doyle, Michael 23 Dudayev, Dzohkhar 87 Dujkanovic, Milo 48 Dworkin, Ronald 52 EC (European Community) 117 economic aid 95, 116–17, 118–19, 150 economic incentives 19 economic investment 65, 72, 75, 129 economic security 10, 13, 17–18, 22, 35 economic stability 156, 174n accession to EU and NATO 10, 14 Georgia 104 Nagorno-Karabakh 129 Serbia 47 Yugoslavia 30–1, 37–8 ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community) 17 education 77, 78, 95 elections 38, 87, 177n energy 19, 67, 187n, 199n see also hydrocarbon transit Azerbaijan 132–3, 144–5, 147 Chechnya 86 Georgia 103 Nagorno-Karabakh 132–3 North Caucasus 84 trade between Russia and EU 90, 100 ENP (European neighbourhood policy) see European Neighbourhood Policy environmental security 13 Erbakan, Necmettin 177n



Index

Ergil, Dogu 71 ESDP (European Security Defence Policy) 18 ESS (European Security Strategy) see European Security Strategy (2003) ‘ethnic cleansing’ Abkhazia 113 Bosnia 34, 57 Kosovo 49, 168n Nagorno-Karabakh 140–1 South Ossetia 108 Turkey 71 ethnic conflict 19, 27, 156, 156–7 see also individual countries and areas security-dilemma theory analysis 15–16 ethnic identity 1, 14, 27 see also minority rights; nationalism Abkhazia 106 Bosnia 33 Georgia 106 Kosovo 36 Ossetia and Abkhazia 105 South Ossetia 106 EU see European Union EUCOM (US European Command) 151 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 21, 121, 147 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 17 European Commission 17, 66 European Convention on Human Rights 53 European Court of Auditors 17 European Court of Justice 17 European Neighbourhood Policy 11, 25–6, 90, 117, 190n, 197n inclusion of South Caucasus countries 4, 116, 143 Nagorno-Karabakh 130, 132 European Parliament 17, 66, 94, 130 European Security Defence Policy

201

(ESDP) 18 see also military power European Security Strategy (2003) 11, 19, 19–20, 83–4, 90, 100, 160n, 179n European Union 2, 9, 10, 17, 161n see also the West Armenia 133–4 Azerbaijan 133–4, 145 Bosnia 28, 51 Caucasus 3, 4, 116 Chechens 95, 100 Chechnya 82, 92, 93 Council of the EU 17 Georgia 103, 116–17, 118–19, 126, 127–8 human rights 94 Kosovo 28, 40, 45, 51, 93 Kurds in Turkey 74, 75 military power 20 Nagorno-Karabakh 138, 142–6, 156 NATO 19, 20, 42 post-war reconstruction 51 Russia 82, 89–96, 99–101, 100, 117–18 security communities 5–6, 18–19, 23, 63–4, 156, 159n security concepts 13, 16–20, 19 security on periphery 11, 100, 105, 126, 147, 152, 156 Serbia 48, 48–9 Yugoslavia 14, 32–3 European Union High Representative 52, 55–9, 61, 90, 172n European Union Special Representative 4, 116, 117, 118, 130, 143 EXBS (Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance programme) 125 Eygpt 67 Fassier, Bernard 142 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992) see Yugoslavia

202

Securing Europe

Ferrero-Waldner, Benita 25–6, 133–4 financial aid see economic aid Flemish region, Belgium 45 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 161n potential Albanian separatist demands 45 Foteev, VK 87 France 17, 111, 161n, 168n Minsk Group 140, 143 seen as pro-Armenian 138, 140, 146 Freedman, Lawrence 40 freedom of movement 6, 18 freedom of speech 53, 76 FYROM see Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) Gadzhiev, Kamaludin 107 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad 108, 110 gas see energy; hydrocarbon transit GBSLE (Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement Assistance programme) 124–5 Georgia 3, 81, 83, 103–28, 156, 165n see also Abkhazia; South Ossetia Action Plan 121–2 alleged links with international terrorism 103 defence policy 121 EU 103, 105 Georgians in Abkhazia 113 history 105–15 Joint Peacekeeping force 109 Kosovo 125 NATO 103, 105, 120–1, 125 Russia 2, 94, 104, 114, 120, 125 strategic importance 103, 104 territorial integrity 111–12, 114 USA 103, 125 using UN and OSCE to gain

support 115 Georgia Border Security and Law Enforcement Assistance Programme (GBSLE) 124–5 Germany 17, 28, 29, 37, 111 Gorbachev, Mikhail 86–7, 106 Greece 7, 18, 23, 32, 71 Grotius, Hugo 42–3 ‘Group of Friends’ in Georgia 111 GTEP (Train and Equip Programme) 123–4, 192n Gukasyan, Arkady 137 Gulf War (1991) 68 see also Iraq Gundem (newspaper) 76 Gypsies 45 Hakkari, Turkey 77 health-care 95, 119 Helsinki European Council 92–3 Hitler, Adolf 29 hostages 90, 182n Hoxha, Enver 37 human rights 18, 19, 54, 82 Bosnia and Kosovo 52–3, 62 Chechnya 91, 92, 93–4, 99 Dayton Peace Accords (1995) 34 ignored by Office of High Representative 56–7 NATO membership 22 NATO-Russia Founding Act 97 Stabilisation and Association Agreements (Copenhagen Criteria) 9, 10, 75 Turkey 63, 74, 77 Human Rights Watch 76 humanitarian aid 95, 99, 119, 146 hydrocarbon transit 3, 123, 132–3, 152 see also energy IEA (International Energy Agency) 80 IJC (Independent Judicial Commission) 55 Imset, Ismet G 73



Index

Independent Judicial Commission 55 Individual Partnership Action Plan 143, 145–6, 148 Ingushetia 85, 86, 95, 186n see also Chechnya International Commission on the Balkans 40 International Crisis Group 43 International Energy Agency 90 International Institute for Strategic Studies 72 international protectorates 49, 54, 58 and domestic politics 59–60, 60–1, 170n International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) 21 ‘interventionists’ 42–3 IPAP (Individual Partnership Action Plan) 143, 145–6, 148 Iran 67, 74, 75 Armenia 149, 150 influence in Caucasus 3 Kurds 69 Nagorno-Karabakh 129, 135 Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) 68 Iraq 16, 67, 74, 75, 83, 155, 162n Gulf War (1991) 68 Kurds 69 war (2003) 17, 125 Islamic radicalism 80, 83, 88, 96, 182n see also Muslims Israel 67 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 21, 25 Istanbul summit (2004) 120 Italy 29 Ivanov, Igor 82–3 Jervis, Robert 15 jihads 88, 182n Joint Control Commission (JCC) 109, 115, 118 Jordan 67 justice systems 55–6, 77

203

Kant, Immanuel 23, 164n Karadzic, Radovan 56–7 ‘Karaname 413’ (censorship law, Turkey) 76 Kasprzyk, Andrzej 141 KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party) 69 Kemal, Yasar 76 Kemalism 64–5, 70, 75–6, 78 KFOR (International Security Force in Kosovo) 2, 39, 44 Khasavyurt Accords (1996) 88, 91 Khrushchev, Nikita 86 Kokoity, Eduard 110, 112 Kokoshin, Andrei 189n Kosovo 2, 4, 27–62, 38, 156 border redefinition 16 conflicts between rule of law and human rights 52–4 economy 30 ethnic minorities 36, 44–5 EU 11, 20, 51 history 29, 36–8 importance to Serbs 36 independence 2, 43, 45, 48, 93 Kosovar Albanians 40, 42, 43, 49 liberal democracy 51–2 NATO 11 NATO operations 21, 168n police service 60 prospect for lasting security 43–5 right of veto in Serbia 38 Serbian troops 31, 40 Kosovo Liberation Army 40, 41, 44 Kosovo’s Implementation Force (KFOR) 2, 39, 44 Kosovo’s Special Representative of the Secretary-General 50, 52, 53, 61 Kostunica, Vojislav 46, 47–8 krai (Soviet Union) 106 Krtsanisi 9/11 Training Area (Georgia) 124 Kudava, Mamuka 116 Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) 69

204

Securing Europe

Kurds 16, 63–80 cultural rights 77 independence 69, 74–5, 80 industry and economy 72 in Iraq 69 Kurdish movement 69–74 Kurdish names 78 Turkish security forces 77, 79 Turkish troops 72 Lambeth, Benjamin 42 language see cultural rights Lavrov, Sergei 152 Law of Criminal Procedure of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 53 Lebanon 67 Lenin, Vladimir 86 liberal democracy 51–2, 60–1, 164n Azerbaijan 144 Bosnia and Kosovo 62 Yugoslavia 35, 37–8 Luxembourg 37 MAB (Media Appeals Board) 53, 54 Macedonia see Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) Mamsurov, Taimuraz 110 Marcus, Aliza 76 market economy 9, 10, 22, 35 see also economic stability Maskhadov, Aslan 88 media 40, 52–3, 54, 76–7, 150 Media Appeals Board 53, 54 Mediterranean Dialogue (1994) 21, 22, 25 Membership Actions Plans (NATO) 11, 21, 23, 156 migration 19, 90, 96 military aid 150–1, 193n military power 13, 20 under civilian control 22 intervention without UN mandate 42–3

Russian approach to security 82 Turkey 78–9 Milosevic, Slobodan 31–2, 43–4, 93 abolition of federation constitution 38 air campaign against 41, 167n nationalism 35 relationship with West 39–40 removal from power 46, 48, 51 minority rights 78, 99, 175n in NATO-Russia Founding Act 97 Stabilisation and Association Agreements (Copenhagen Criteria) 9, 10, 75 Turkey 63, 66 Minsk Group 142, 143, 152, 153 monetary union 10 see also economic stability Montenegro 28, 29, 30, 31, 161n divergence from Serbia 47–8 establishment of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 32 referendum for independence 48 Moscow 88 see also Russia Mountain People’s Republic 86 ‘Mountain Turks’ (Turkish name for Kurds) 71, 78 Muslim (Bosnjak)-Croat Federation 34 Muslims 83, 182n Azerbaijan 147 Bosnia 2, 33, 34 Chechnya 85, 180n Nagorno-Karabakh 4, 16, 83, 129–53, 156 see also Armenia; Azerbaijan Adler and Barnett core values 145 history 134–7 importance to Azerbaijan and Armenia 135 potential unification with Armenia 137



Index

referendum on constitution 139 Naqshbandiya tariqat (Chechnya) 85 National Salvation Party (Turkey) 67 National Security Concept (Georgia, 2005) 103 National Security Concept (NATORussia Council, 2000) 98 National Security Council (Turkey) 77, 78–9 National Security Strategy Armenia 149, 197n Georgia 121 Nagorno-Karabakh 138 nationalism 1, 27–8, 35 Chechnya 86, 87 French model 64 Georgia 106 German model 65 Soviet republics 106 Turkey 70, 71 Yugoslavia 31 NATO 5–6, 20–4, 105, 159n, 164n see also the West Afghanistan 125 Balkans 2, 125 Bosnia 5–6, 34 Chechnya 82, 96 after dissolution of Soviet Union 68 EU division of labour 5–7, 19, 20, 42 Georgia 103, 116, 119–22, 126, 127–8 Kosovo 5–6, 38–43, 44, 155–6 Nagorno-Karabakh 138, 146–9 pluralistic security community 156 post-war reconstruction 51 Russia 96–8, 99–101, 120, 147 security concepts 13, 19, 21–6, 82, 146, 164n Turkey 66, 68 Virtual Silk Highway Project 122 NATO Istanbul summit (2004) 4 NATO-Georgia Commission 122

205

NATO-Russia Council 21, 98 NATO-Russia Founding Act 96–7, 98 NATO-Ukraine Commission 21 natural resources 19 see also energy Netherlands 37, 161n newspapers 52–3, 54, 76, 150 see also television NGO (Non-governmental organisations) 95 Nokhchi 85 see also Chechnya ‘non-interventionists’ 42 North Caucasus see Caucasus North Ossetia 95, 108, 109–10 North Ossetia-Alania 107 Joint Peacekeeping force 109 NSC (National Security Council) (Turkey) 77, 78–9 oblasti (Soviet Union) 106 Ocalan, Abdullah (Kurdistan Workers’ Party leader) 65–6, 73, 74 Office of the High Representative (Bosnia) see European Union High Representative O’Hanlon, Michael 41 oil see energy; hydrocarbon transit okruga (Soviet Union) 106 OPEC 67 Operation Allied Force 39, 40–2, 43, 168n Operation Deliberate Force 167n Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 20, 44, 60, 190n Assistance Group 98–9 Chechnya 82, 98–9 Georgia 103, 117, 118 Minsk Group 130, 138, 139–40 Nagorno-Karabakh 130, 137, 138–42, 140–1 North Caucasus 98 Russian commitments 93 organised crime 2, 12, 19, 84, 90, 129

206

Securing Europe

Ossetians 106–7 see also North Ossetia; South Ossetia Ottoman Empire 136 Özal, Turgut 72–3 Ozgur Gundem (newspaper) 76 Ozkok, Hilmi 78–9 Pakistan 67 Pankiski Gorge 120, 123, 191n PARP (Planning and Review Process), Georgia 121 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EU and Russia) 91–2 Partnership for Peace programme 21, 25, 121, 147, 156, 165n, 191n peacekeeping 35, 51, 156 Bosnia 34 Georgia 114, 116, 120 Kosovo 39 Nagorno-Karabakh 145 Peter the Great 85 piracy 19 PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) 65–6, 68, 69, 71–5, 178n Planning and Review Process (PARP) 121 pluralistic security communities 5, 156, 159n, 164n cooperative security arrangements 24 EU 9–26, 18–19, 156 NATO 22 Poland 163n political security 13, 18 political stability 10, 14, 156 politics, domestic with international protectorate 60 Portugal 18, 23 Posen, Barry 7, 13–16, 156 post-war reconstruction 51, 62, 95, 100, 118–19, 145–6 poverty 19 Prizren (league for defence of the

Albanian nation) 36 Prodi, Romano 94 protection of minorities see minority rights protectorates 49, 54, 170n and international power 58, 59, 60–1 PSO (peace-support operations) 5–6 PUK (Patriotic Union Party) 69 Putin, Vladimir 45, 88, 95, 98, 112, 138, 152 Qadiriya tariqat (Chechnya) 85 racialism see also ethnic conflict; ethnic identity; minority rights; nationalism used by politicians 37–8 Rapid Reaction Mechanism (EC) 117 rayony (Soviet Union) 106 recovery programmes see post-war reconstruction Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, Turkey) 71 refugees 40, 44, 99, 104, 122 regime collapse 15, 16, 69 Republika Srpska 56–7 Robertson, George 98, 148, 198n Rojname (newspaper) 76 Romania 29, 163n Rome Security Concept (1991) 22 ‘Rose Revolution’ (Georgia, 2003) 103, 127 RRM (Rapid Reaction Mechanism) 117 RS (Republika Srpska) 56–7 Rugova, Ibrahim 40 rule of law 9, 10, 63, 75, 82, 99 Bosnia and Kosovo 52, 54, 62 ignored by Office of High Representative 56–7 Russia 94 Russian operations in Chechnya 92



Index

Rumsfeld, Donald 21–2 Russia 39, 81, 111 Abkhazia 126 Armenia 134, 138, 140, 151 Azerbaijan 138 Chechnya 82, 89, 92–3 Georgia 2, 114, 114–15, 120, 122, 126–7 human rights 94 influence in Caucasus 3 Joint Peacekeeping force 109 Kosovo’s independence 43, 45 Minsk Group 138, 140 Nagorno-Karabakh 129, 130, 135, 152 relationship with EU 82, 89–96, 99–101, 187n relationship with NATO 96–8, 99–101 South Ossetia 112, 126 in Yugoslavia war 14 Saakashvili, Mikhel 104, 111–15, 116, 128 Saddam Hussein 16, 69, 162n see also Iraq Sadedini, Musa 52 sanctions 46 see also economic investment; trade Sargsian, Serge 134 Scandinavia 37 Schröder, Gerhard 95 scientific developments 122 SDS (Republika Srpska) 56–7 security, definitions 6, 11–13, 12, 13, 18, 162n security communities 5, 82 see also pluralistic security communities security-dilemma theory 7, 13–16, 156–7 separatism and independence see individual countries and areas September 11 attacks 21, 23, 89, 98,

207

103, 123, 150 see also ‘War on Terror’ Serb Orthodox Christian Church 41 Serbia 2, 28–32 accession to EU 48 Democratic Opposition 46 economic recovery 47 establishment of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 32 and FYROM 32 idea of ‘Greater Serbia’ 31 Kosovo 2, 43, 45 post-Milosevic era security challenges 46–9 proposal for new federation (1990) 32 relationship with EU 48–9, 161n Serbs in Bosnia 2 Shelton, Hugh 39 Shevardnadze, Eduard 109, 110, 111, 120–1, 122, 127 Slovenia 28, 29, 163n industry 30 proposal for confederation (1990) 32 relations with Yugoslavia 47 seeking independence 32 smuggling 109 Snyder, J 14–15 social aspects to security 13, 19, 156 Socor, Vladimir 114 ‘soft security threats’ 12 Solana, Javier 39, 48, 90, 97, 116, 160n South Caucasus see Abkhazia; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Caucasus; Georgia; Nagorno-Karabakh; South Ossetia South Ossetia 4, 45, 107, 115, 121, 126 see also Georgia border redefinition 16 EU involvement 118–19 Joint Peacekeeping force 109

208

Securing Europe

relationship with Georgia 114 Russia 104, 113–14 Russian Federation 112 Saakashvili’s proposed ‘special status’ in Georgia 112 secession from Georgia 106, 108, 111 under Soviet rule 108 Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) 105–6, 107 table Soviet Union 28, 31, 155 behaviour towards Turkey 66–8 dissolution 1, 68, 105, 162n federal structure 105–6, 107 table Spain 18, 23, 45 SRSG (Kosovo’s Special Representative of the Secretary General) 50, 52, 53, 61 SSOP (Sustainment and Stability Operations Programme) 123 SSR (Soviet Socialist Republics) 105– 6, 107 table Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SSA) (Copenhagen Criteria) 9–11, 63, 77, 157 Kosovo 51 Kurds cultural rights 74 Serbia 48 Turkey 64, 66, 75–6, 78 Stalin, Josef 66, 86, 110, 136 ‘Standards for Kosovo’ (UNMIK) 50–1 Sufism 85, 180n Supreme Council of Judges (Turkey) 77 Supreme Military Council (Turkey) 77 Syria 67, 69, 75 TACIS (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States) 92

Talabani, Jalal 69 Tannock report (European Neighbourhood Policy) 132 Technical Aid for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) 92 technology 122 television 40, 77 see also media; newspapers Temporary Media Commissioner 52–4 territorial integrity 111–12, 114, 156 terrorism 2, 12, 18, 19, 23, 90, 123, 150 Chechnya 83, 96 in conflict-prone areas 115 NATO-Russia Council 98 NATO-Russia Founding Act 97 Russian claim of international terrorism in North Caucasus 81, 82–3, 88, 89 the West appearing to back Milosevic 32 Bosnia 7 Kosovo 7, 39–40 ‘misunderstanding’ of Russian operation in Chechnya 82–3 model of intervention 62 relations with Caucacus 7 threat and perceived threat 13 ‘three-key’ system (Bosnia) (positive discrimination) 33 Tito, Josip Broz 29–30, 31 trade 46, 90, 144 see also economic stability traditions see cultural rights trafficking 2, 12, 18, 105, 115, 129 see also organised crime Train and Equip Programme (GTEP) 123–4, 192n Transdinestria 45, 114 Truman Doctrine 67 Tudjman, Franjo 35 Turkes, Alparslan 71



Index

Turkey 23, 63–80 coup (1960) 67 coup (1980) 72 EU accession 2–3, 63, 75, 79, 155 foreign policy 66–8 Greece 7 history 66, 70, 71 importance for East-West relations 63–4, 68 influence in Caucasus 3 Kurds 3, 16, 63–80, 69 Middle East policy 67 military relationship with government 78–9 Nagorno-Karabakh 129, 135, 136, 150–1 national identity 64–6 relationship with Georgia 123–5, 125 relationship with Soviet Union 68 response to Copenhagen Criteria 75–6 Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Non-aggression 66 UK 17, 67, 111, 136 UN see United Nations United Nations 35 Abkhazia 112, 118 Bosnia 34 Georgia 117 ‘Group of Friends’ in Georgia 111 Kosovo 39, 44, 49–51, 53–4, 60 Nagorno-Karabakh 130, 138 peacekeeping 34, 51 United Nations General Assembly 115 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 44 United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 44, 60 mandates 49–51 Regulations 53–4 Temporary Media Commissioner

209

52–4 United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) 111 United Nations Security Council 42 Resolution 1244 13, 39, 49, 49–50, 54 Resolution 1441 17 UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) see United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) UNOMIG (United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia) 111 UNSC (United Nations Security Council) see United Nations Security Council US Helsinki Commission 76 USA 67, 111 see also the West Afghanistan 125 Armenia 138, 140, 149 Balkans 125 Georgia 123–5 intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo 5–6, 28 involvement in Caucasus 3 involvement in Yugoslavia war 14 Iraq 17, 69, 74, 125 Minsk Group 140 Nagorno-Karabakh 130, 150–1 Turkey 67, 74 USSR (Union of Soviet Socialists Republics) 105–6, 107 table see also Soviet Union Ustase (Croatian fascists) 29 Vainakh 85 see also Chechnya Vojvodina 29, 30, 31 Volgodonsk 88 Walloon region, Belgium 45 Walter, B 14–15 ‘War on Terror’ 7, 23, 81, 83, 103 see also September 11 attacks Washington Declaration (1999) 22

210

Securing Europe

weapons trafficking 90, 105, 115, 127 Welfare Party (Turkey) 71, 177n Wolfers, Arnold 12 Yeltsin, Boris 91 Yeni (newspaper) 76 Yugoslavia 14, 28, 29, 47, 155 admitted to UN and OSCE 46 creation of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992) 32

devolution of power to republics 2, 30, 31–2 disintegration 1, 162n economy 35 elections (1990) 31 history 28–35 international importance 29 security-dilemma theory 14 Zavgayev, Doku 87