Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation

SCOTBOM: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation

SCOTBOM: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation

Richard A. Marquise

Algora Publishing New York

© 2006 by Richard A. Marquise. All Rights Reserved by Algora Publishing www.algora.com No portion of this book (beyond what is permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the United States Copyright Act of 1976) may be reproduced by any process, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, without the express written permission of the publisher. ISBN-13: 978-0-87586-449-5 (trade paper) ISBN-13: 978-0-87586-450-1 (hard cover) ISBN-13: 978-0-87586-451-8 (ebook) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data — Marquise, Richard. Scotbom: intelligence and the Lockerbie investigation / Richard Marquise. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-87586-449-5 (soft : alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-0-87586-450-1 (hard : alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-0-87586-451-8 (ebook) 1. Pan Am Flight 103 Bombing Incident, 1988. 2. Bombing investigation— Scotland—Lockerbie. 3. Terrorism—United States—Case studies. 4. Terrorism— Europe—Case studies. 5. Victims of terrorism—Scotland—Lockerbie—Case studies. 6. Libya—Foreign relations—United States. 7. United States—Foreign relations—Libya. I. Title. HV6431.M3649 2006 363.12'465094147—dc22 2006025956

Printed in the United States

ABBREVIATIONS AAIB ABC ABH Alat ANO ASAC BFO BfV BKA BND BSS CAD CIA CIAHQ CID CISPES CSS CTC CTS DEA DIA DOJ DOS DPM DST ESO FAA FBI FBIHQ FGJ GAO HEROES HOLMES

Air Accidents Investigation Branch American Broadcasting Company Company formed by Bollier and Megrahi in Switzerland Assistant Legal Attache Abu Nidal Organization Assistant Special Agent in Charge British Foreign Office Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz (German internal security service) Bundeskriminalamt (German FBI) Bundesnachrichtendienst (German CIA) British Security Service Central Ammunition Depot Central Intelligence Agency CIA Headquarters Criminal Investigative Division Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador Center for Strategic Studies (Libya) Counterterrorism Center (CIA) Counterterrorism Section (FBI) Drug Enforcement Administration Defense Intelligence Agency Department of Justice Department of State Deputy Prime Minister Directorate of Territorial Security (French) External Security Organization (Libya) Federal Aviation Administration Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Headquarters Federal Grand Jury Government Accounting (now Accountability) Office US reward program in the Department of State Home Office Large Major Enquiry System

IED IRS JEH JSO JTTF K-1 KM LAA Legat LICC LN LPB MEBO MI-5 MI-6 MST-13 NBC NSA NSC NSY OVC Pan Am Flight 103 Pan Am Flight 103A PFLP-GC PLF PLO PPSF PT-35 RARDE RCMP SA SAC SSA SIO SIOC TRAC TWA UK US UTA WFO Witsec

Improvised Explosive Device Intelligence Research Specialist J. Edgar Hoover (FBI headquarters building) Jamahiriya Security Organization (same as Libyan ESO) Joint Terrorism Task Force Togo Timer Air Malta (airline code) Libyan Arab Airlines Legal Attache Lockerbie Incident Control Centre Libyan Arab Airlines (airline code) Libyan People's Bureau Meister et Bollier British Security Service or BSS British equivalent to CIA Designation for timer which destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 National Broadcasting Company National Security Agency National Security Council New Scotland Yard Office for the Victims of Crime London to New York leg of flight Frankfurt to London leg of flight Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine- General Command Palestine Liberation Front Palestine Liberation Organization Palestinian Popular Struggle Front Scottish evidence designation for fragment of the MST-13 timer Royal Armament Research and Defense Establishment Royal Canadian Mounted Police Special Agent Special Agent in Charge Supervisory Special Agent Senior Investigating Officer Strategic Information and Operations Center Terrorist Research and Analytical Center Trans World Airlines United Kingdom United States Union de Transports Aeriens (French airline) Washington Field Office Witness Security Program

Patricia, Ian, Christian and Jonathan: Thank You.

RAM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PROLOGUE: THE VERDICT

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CHAPTER 1: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: FROM THE MIDDLE EAST TO EUROPE

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CHAPTER 2: DECEMBER 1988: LOCKERBIE

15

CHAPTER 3: DECEMBER 1988: WASHINGTON

22

CHAPTER 4: FBI AND SCOTS RESPOND

28

CHAPTER 5: THE WORLD IS A SUSPECT

33

CHAPTER 6: FORENSICS AND DISTRACTIONS

38

CHAPTER 7: INVESTIGATION HEADS TO MALTA

46

CHAPTER 8: AVIV AND KHREESAT TOO

52

CHAPTER 9: JANUARY-JUNE 1990: FRUSTRATION TO FRUITION

57

CHAPTER 10: MANAGEMENT CHANGES; MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES

63

CHAPTER 11: INVESTIGATORS GO NORTH

68

CHAPTER 12: BOLLIER AND GAUCI

78

CHAPTER 13: INVESTIGATION PLODS ALONG

84

CHAPTER 14: AHMED KHALIFA ABDUSAMAD

87

CHAPTER 15: SPIES AND COPS COME TOGETHER

93

CHAPTER 16: VASSALLO

99

CHAPTER 17: THE SWISS

103

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation CHAPTER 18: TRAVEL GETS OLD

108

CHAPTER 19: MEETINGS, MEETINGS AND MORE MEETINGS

113

CHAPTER 20: LOCKERBIE AND GIAKA

122

CHAPTER 21: TNT AND A BROWN SUITCASE

135

CHAPTER 22: MRS. GIAKA

141

CHAPTER 23: POLITICS AND DEATH IN WASHINGTON

150

CHAPTER 24: MALTA

155

CHAPTER 25: INDICTMENTS

160

CHAPTER 26: SUSPECTS TALK

168

CHAPTER 27: LOOSE ENDS

171

CHAPTER 28: TIME MAGAZINE

175

CHAPTER 29: LIFE GOES ON

178

CHAPTER 30: ZEIST BY WAY OF OKLAHOMA

183

CHAPTER 31: ABDUSAMAD IS MEGRAHI

189

CHAPTER 32: THE TRIAL

194

CHAPTER 33: MEBO AND GAUCI, AGAIN

201

CHAPTER 34: THE CIA CABLES

206

CHAPTER 35: “STAR” WITNESS

212

CHAPTER 36: THE PROSECUTION WRAPS UP

220

CHAPTER 37: CLOSING ARGUMENTS

226

CHAPTER 38: JUDGMENT DAY

231

CHAPTER 39: LIBYA RESPONDS

237

CHAPTER 40: POSTSCRIPT

240

INDEX

245

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Photos (L) Toshiba Bombeat singlespeaker radio recovered from PFLP-GC terrorists in Germany. (R) Black Toshiba RTSF-16 two-speaker radio cassette that housed the bomb.

(Above) Reconstruction of the baggage container that contained the bomb that destroyed Pan Am Flight 103.

Comparison of a circuit board with the fragment known as PT-35 (identical to the circuit board of a Swiss-made timer).

FBI artist rendition of the Libyan man said to have purchased clothing and an umbrella in December 1988.

(Above) 1988 diary of Lamin Khalifa Fhimah with reminder to get "tags."

(Above) Libyan passport of Ahmed Khalifa Abdusamad, with a photograph of Megrahi, brought to the trial by Megrahi himself. Megrahi denied that he knew who Abdusamad was.

Passport photo of Abdul Baset Ali al Megrahi.

MST-13 timer made by the Swiss firm MEBO, which detonated the bomb.

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(Above) 1988 airside access badge belonging to Lamin Fhimah.

Fragment of a shirt with bits of black plastic and the PT-35 chip (circled) blasted into it.

Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation

Fragment of a chip blasted into the cargo container that contained the bomb. This chip was later traced to a circuit board of a Toshiba two-speaker radio cassette recorder, model RTSF16, most of which were shipped to Libya.

Piece of the framing for the baggage container that contained the bomb, with signs of the high-powered Semtex plastic explosive.

Tom Thurman took apart a MEBO timer which had been recovered from another incident, in Africa, in 1986, and noticed the scratched-out letters "MEBO" on the circuit board.

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PROLOGUE: THE VERDICT The telephone woke me out of a deep sleep. It was after 3:00 a.m. on January 30, 2001. Dana Biehl, the Department of Justice (DOJ) attorney, who had been in the Netherlands since May 2000, was on the phone. Abdel Baset Ali al Megrahi and Lamin Khalifa Fhimah, two Libyans, had been on trial there for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. As the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the FBI office in Oklahoma, I was used to late night calls. At least this one was anticipated. Biehl said, “Dick, if you want to be at the verdict, you better get on a plane quick!” The three Scottish judges who had been hearing the evidence for nine months at Kamp Van Zeist were to reveal their verdict at 11:00 a.m. the next day. I called Phil Reid, my counterpart in Alaska. Reid had played a key role in the investigation and was the lead FBI agent assigned in Malta for several years. We had 24 hours to get to Holland. I was at my desk before 7:00 a.m. and left early for my flights to Atlanta and then Amsterdam. My thoughts returned to December 21, 1988, when it was determined a high explosive had caused the Pan Am clipper to crash over southern Scotland killing all 259 passengers and crew on board as well as eleven residents of the small market town of Lockerbie. Now we would hear the verdict in the 12-yearold case. While I was convinced that Megrahi and Fhimah were involved in the destruction of the Boeing 747, I knew others were involved, who had not been indicted because there was no evidence which could be used against them. The evidence had been collected by the FBI, police officers from Scotland and Germany, as well as police agencies in England, Malta, Sweden and Switzerland. We worked closely, although not always in unison, between 1988 and late 1991. This international investigation culminated in indictments returned in Scotland and the United States on November 14, 1991. As my plane touched down at Schiphol Airport just after 7:00 a.m., it was another dark and dreary day, frequent this time of year in the Netherlands.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Special Agent (SA) Chris Murray, the FBI agent who had been involved with the investigation longer than anyone, met me. He had become the case agent a few months after the indictments and had handled all aspects of the investigation at the Washington Field Office (WFO) since. Murray located Reid and took us to Zeist, a 45 minute drive. Getting into the camp would not be a problem. We had access badges because we had spent time there the previous summer. The first person I saw was Stuart Henderson, who had just arrived that morning as well. Henderson had been the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) for the two years before the indictments and was my counterpart in Scotland. Henderson had retired in March 1992, within months of the indictments. Once the two defendants had been surrendered in 1999, I postponed my own retirement until the trial was over. Each time it appeared a trial could become a reality, something always stopped it. No one ever thought Moammar Gaddafi, the Libyan leader, would turn his citizens over to another country for trial. I headed to the DOJ/FBI office and literally ran into Kathryn Turman, the Director for the Office for the Victims of Crime (OVC) at the DOJ in Washington. We had been friends for years. Turman had done more for the victims in this case than anyone else in the US Government. She was well known and respected among law enforcement officers, victims, prosecutors and defense lawyers alike. Turman had arranged for Reid, Henderson and me to sit in the courtroom. Dana Biehl, an experienced criminal prosecutor, along with Brian Murtagh, had presented evidence in this case to a Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) in Washington in 1991. He had been tapped by the Attorney General to be part of the prosecution team and worked side by side with the Scottish attorneys since the start of the trial in May. He and his wife, Rusty, had become “ex-officio” Scots and part of the local community. Biehl was often seen riding his bicycle around the streets of Zeist and for much of the year, Rusty drove and Dana biked to court. Murtagh had been involved with the investigation since almost the start of the case. He had been an Assistant United States Attorney at the Washington, D.C. United States Attorneys Office and later moved over to the Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section at DOJ. He had been to a number of the investigative conferences and knew the case well. He had been a prosecutor at the trial of Jeffrey McDonald, the former Green Beret, who had killed his wife and family in North Carolina in 1969. It seemed one or the other case took up most of his time. The court was filled with victim families. Many were quietly sharing fears, trepidations and concerns because much of the media coverage in Europe was negative. The visitor gallery was divided into three parts. For the duration of the trial, as the defendants had been seated to the left as one viewed the court, the Libyan families had taken refuge in the seats in front of them.

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Prologue: The Verdict John Orr, the original SIO in charge of the investigation at Lockerbie, had commanded the case from its inception until he was promoted to Deputy Chief Constable at the Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary in Scotland in mid-1989. Henderson, his deputy, replaced him. The Scots had numerous opportunities to meet and talk with the families who had traveled to Lockerbie looking for answers after the tragedy. Reid had also met with some of the family groups before volunteering to travel to Malta midway through the investigation to lead that effort and provide continuity there. He was recognizable to many of them. I was less known to many of the victims but had led the United States task force created to solve this case. Just before eleven o’clock, the defense lawyers, the prosecution team led by the Lord Advocate Colin David Boyd, and several Scottish prosecutors entered and took their places. As quickly, the defendants entered the court. Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, 44, a short, stocky man, took his place in the dock. He was joined by Abdel Baset Ali al Megrahi, 49, who had aged considerably since December 1999 when they made their initial court appearance. Both were dressed in traditional Arabic clothing. By Western standards this was unusual, but no more so than lawyers and judges wearing powdered wigs. The four judges entered the court through a side door to the left. Lord Abernathy, the reserve judge, led the way followed by Lords Sutherland (presiding judge), Coulsfield and MacLean. The defense had called only three witnesses, including two FBI agents. The lawyers for Fhimah and Megrahi believed there was not enough evidence to convict either. The macer (bailiff) announced the case and asked the judges if they had reached a “verdict in respect of each accused on the second alternative charge as now amended.” The charge was the murder of 270 persons. The visitor gallery was silent. There were three verdicts they could reach. These included an acquittal, a conviction, and a purely Scottish finding of “not proven,” which would have freed the defendants. Husbands held their wives, brothers held sisters, mothers held children, both sides preparing for the worst. The two defendants were ordered to stand. Lord Sutherland responded to the question of the macer asking if they had reached a verdict in a strong voice. “We have!” When asked for the verdict with respect to the charges against the defendant, Megrahi, Judge Sutherland said in a loud and clear voice, “Guilty!” He then said the verdict was unanimous, although under Scots law a 2-1 verdict would have also resulted in a conviction. The reaction in the most of the court was immediate. Most observers in the courtroom (predominantly the families of those killed aboard Pan Am Flight 103 twelve years before) let out a cry of thanks. Shock and defeat registered on Megrahi’s face. His relatives and supporters quickly shared that sentiment as their own grief set in. They reacted to the response of the victim families as well

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation as what they had heard through their headsets. The Libyans slumped in their seats as the verdict was translated into Arabic. As quickly as the Megrahi verdict was rendered, the macer asked if they had reached a verdict in the case against Lamen Fhimah. Lord Sutherland again stated that they had, and when asked the verdict, proclaimed in a booming voice, “Not Guilty!” When asked if the verdict was unanimous, he asserted it was. The reaction of the victim families was one of disbelief. They found it hard to imagine how one of the accused could be found guilty but not the other one. The Libyan contingent did not react immediately to the Fhimah verdict, as both defendants had believed they would be home with their families before nightfall. The Megrahi verdict was still sinking in. The court adjourned at 11:18; only fourteen minutes had passed since they had announced the verdict. During lunch on the grounds of the court, we discussed the outcome. While stunned, we were gratified they had convicted Megrahi because the message to the Libyan Government was, “your intelligence officer did it.” That Fhimah was acquitted was not startling to us. We had speculated during the trial that his best defense would have been to claim he had given baggage tags from Air Malta to Megrahi, but never knew how they would be used. We were all upset with the split verdict. We speculated the decision may well have been political, although we had tried to ensure politics never played a role in the investigation. Perhaps the judges were convinced Megrahi was responsible due to his lies during a media interview in 1991, and felt that by acquitting Fhimah they could “throw Gaddafi a bone.” It was speculation and we would have to wait to read the verdict to see their logic. At 2:00 p.m., Lord Sutherland passed sentence on Megrahi. He initially sentenced him to a term of life in prison, the maximum allowed under Scots law. However, he backdated the sentence to April 1999 when he surrendered. He said Megrahi was guilty of a “horrendous” crime but that due to the age he would reach during incarceration and that he would be serving a sentence in a “foreign country,” he should not be considered for release until he had served a minimum of twenty years. Lord Sutherland also said he would be recommended for deportation at the end of twenty years. The Libyan spectators had little reaction but on the victim family side of the gallery, emotions were high; most did not consider the sentence appropriate. One family member calculated that Megrahi was going to be in prison for a period of 27 days for each of the 270 murders. Many Americans thought a trial in the United States would be more appropriate because the defendants faced the death penalty. The Scottish prosecutors always believed the United States would only charge defendants for the 189 Americans who died and there would be no justice for the 11 Scottish victims of Lockerbie or the 70 other victims from 18 countries. They were right, because the statutes, as written, would only allow for trial concerning the American victims and that may be one reason there was no reluctance to having a trial in

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Prologue: The Verdict Scotland or under Scots law. However, the American prosecutors had charged the pair with 270 murders in their original indictment. There was one other motive. The Libyan defendants faced a possible death sentence upon conviction, something they were not exposed to in the United Kingdom. Gaddafi would never have sent his countrymen for trial at a venue where they could be put to death. A trial in the Netherlands in a Scottish court was a compromise. Perhaps the verdict was too. The Lockerbie case always had been about the two hundred and seventy victims. The motto of the passengers’ families, “The truth must be known,” is as relevant today as it was when that phrase was coined shortly after the bombing. This book is dedicated to the memory of the victims, to the rescuers, the searchers in the fields of Scotland, without whom there would have been no solution, to the law enforcement and intelligence professionals from many countries who came together in unparalleled international cooperation. This book is for the family members who would not rest until they saw justice.

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CHAPTER 1: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: FROM THE MIDDLE EAST TO EUROPE In January 1979, the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, abdicated his throne and left Iran. Islamic fundamentalists seized control of the oil rich nation which had enjoyed excellent relations with the West and in particular the United States. The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had been in exile for fifteen years, waiting to return when the Shah was overthrown. In November 1979, over 500 militants seized control of the US Embassy in Tehran and of the approximately 90 people in the compound at the time, 52 were held hostage for 444 days. The hostages were paraded through the streets of the city, blindfolded and humiliated. Despite tough economic sanctions, frozen assets and a failed attempt to rescue the hostages by the United States, the impasse was not resolved until after the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan in January 1981. During this time, the Middle East was dangerous for educators, diplomats and journalists as terrorists from the Iran-backed Hezbollah (the Party of God) had begun a series of kidnappings directed at Western citizens, many from the United States. Kidnappings by Islamic Fundamentalists and supported by the new regime in Iran continued throughout the 1980s. On April 18, 1983, a suicide bomber, an uncommon phenomenon at the time, drove a truck filled with 400 pounds of explosives to the American Embassy in Beirut. After the bomb detonated, 63 people from the embassy were dead including 17 Americans and the entire contingent of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the Middle East. On October 23, at the Beirut airport, another Hezbollah truck bomber drove an explosives-laden vehicle into the compound housing US Marines who had been sent there to keep the peace. This massive explosion killed 241 Marines. Two minutes after that attack, another truck bomb went off targeting French troops, two miles away, killing 58 soldiers.

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Chapter 1: International Terrorism: From the Middle East to Europe In response to the kidnappings of the Americans at the American Embassy in Tehran and in Lebanon, the United States Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. If an American was kidnapped abroad and the Attorney General determined the crime was perpetrated by someone committing a terrorist act, the US Government could assert jurisdiction. The FBI was given the authority to collect evidence in a foreign country, with their concurrence, and present the evidence in a court in the United States. If the terrorist was identified and brought to the United States, he would have to stand trial in an American court. This new law was not intended to enable American investigators to go to a foreign country and unilaterally conduct investigations. The focus was to empower the US to collect evidence and conduct investigations in countries where no law existed for fighting terrorism or where the crime would not be investigated. The country where the crime occurred would have to ask the FBI to participate in or take over the investigation. The “host” country would always have the right to investigate and prosecute. But if they chose not to, for any reason, the United States reserved the right to do it. Lebanon, embroiled in a civil war during the 1980s and where Americans had been at significant risk, was one country where this law was applied. It could also be applied in instances where the government was believed to be behind the kidnapping, such as Iran. The law could not be applied retroactively and those who kidnapped the Americans in 1979 could not be prosecuted under the statute. The year 1985 began as it ended in the Middle East. Groups such as the Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah, among others, were still holding Western hostages. On June 11, a Royal Jordanian Airliner was hijacked by terrorists associated with the Lebanese Amal militia, including Fawaz Yunis. Because there were fewer Americans involved, it did not go on as long, no one was killed and the plane was not a US flag carrier, this hijacking was not as extensively reported in the United States as one which would occur three days later. At the conclusion of the hijacking, Yunis and his fellow terrorists held a press conference near the steps of the plane, released the passengers and blew up the aircraft. The hijackers fled into the sanctuary of Beirut; however, they left behind footage of their press interviews. This later was valuable evidence to be used in court. On June 14, 1985, Hezbollah terrorists hijacked Trans World Airways (TWA) Flight 847 from Athens to Rome. Their demands included the release of Shi’a prisoners held in jail in Israel and other countries, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon and a public condemnation of Israel and the United States. After 17 days, Israel released over 400 prisoners. Although one American, Robert Dean Stethem, was killed, the passengers were released and the hijackers fled into Beirut. While they were eventually identified, only one was ever arrested. Throughout 1985, additional attacks against Americans occurred. As security tightened because of the hijackings, terrorists began to change their

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation methods of operation. On December 27, 1985, terrorists of the Palestinian Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), the most violent terrorist group of its time, conducted simultaneous attacks on the airports at Rome, Italy and Vienna, Austria. These took place at or near the check in areas for El Al, the flag carrier of Israel. Eighteen people were killed and scores injured by terrorists using automatic weapons. The ANO, led by Sabri al-Banna, a Palestinian, had broken away from Yasser Arafat’s Fatah. Al-Banna called himself Abu Nidal, or “Father of the Struggle.” The ANO was responsible for one hundred terrorist attacks around the world during the 1980s, which resulted in death or injuries to about 900 people. In the summer of 2002, the Iraqi Government claimed he had committed suicide in Baghdad although some press reports indicated he had bullet wounds to the back of his head. There was speculation that Saddam Hussein was looking to take over ANO to force it to become an instrument of his state-supported terrorism. On April 2, 1986, a bomb exploded aboard TWA 840, a flight from Rome to Athens, and four Americans were killed. The 1984 legislation only covered hostage-taking during a terrorist incident; attacks where American citizens were killed or injured were not covered. The US Congress passed additional legislation, the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, making it illegal for someone to kill or injure any American during a terrorist attack. In the fall of 1987, the FBI, in coordination with a number of other agencies including the CIA and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), located and apprehended Fawaz Yunis, the mastermind behind the hijacking of the Royal Jordanian airliner in Beirut in 1985. Yunis thought he was going to participate in a drug deal in international waters, off the coast of Cyprus. Once Yunis was aboard the luxury yacht, FBI agents arrested him. Yunis was flown to the United States aboard a Navy plane which was refueled in flight so no country would have to consider his extradition. This was the first “irregular rendition” by the United States in the early days of applying a law enforcement standard to combating terrorism. Fugitives may be extradited to the United States by foreign countries through the use of legal and diplomatic channels and, now, rendition and “irregular rendition.” A rendition is when two governments agreed to expel a fugitive from one country to another. “Irregular rendition” was novel in the arena of international terrorism, but was used when subjects could be located in international waters and brought directly to the United States without stopping in another country. This approach rarely had to involve other nations. Yunis’ court-appointed attorneys said their client had been kidnapped. The court, citing an old doctrine of US law known as Ker-Frisbie, which says defendants can be forcibly taken from a foreign country and brought to the United States to stand trial, upheld his arrest. Faced with the mountain of evidence against him, which included his videotaped press conference on the

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Chapter 1: International Terrorism: From the Middle East to Europe tarmac at Beirut airport, he confessed to the crime. He was found guilty in a Federal Court in March 1989 and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. The US Government showed it had the will to attack terrorism using the rule of law and not just using economic, diplomatic, intelligence or military options. Yunis was released from prison in February 2005 and returned to Lebanon a month later. Tensions continued to rise in the Middle East. Iraq was concerned Islamic fundamentalism could find its way there and destabilize its government. Iran and Iraq were locked in a bitter dispute over land boundaries. Saddam Hussein perceived Iran as militarily weak and in 1980, invaded Iran. This war, which continued until 1988, resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,000,000 people. The United States and other Western nations warily watched the progress of this war. Despite the fact most oil came from other countries in the Middle East, the conflict could easily have escalated and disrupted the supply of oil to the West. Previous disruptions and oil embargoes had led to an increase in oil prices, fueling inflation and creating lengthy lines at gas stations in the United States in 1973-74 and again in 1978-79. No one wanted this to recur. As the war progressed and each side became emboldened, Iraqi attacks targeted Iranian ports and oil complexes. In 1981, Iraqi ships and planes began attacking Iranian ships and those of other countries bringing oil to the West. By the end of 1984, approximately 120 ships had been attacked in the Persian Gulf. Iran retaliated in May 1984, attacking a Kuwaiti and then a Saudi vessel causing oil exports to decline by 25 per cent. While the United Nations had obtained a moratorium on the attacks in 1984, both Iran and Iraq ignored it and the attacks resumed. Because Kuwaiti vessels made up the majority of these attacked ships, on November 1, 1986, Kuwait announced it would seek international protection. Although much of the world’s oil traveled by pipeline rather than ship, Kuwait approached the Soviet Union and the United States, requesting protection for its oil vessels. The Soviet Union offered to reflag their tankers (place the flag of the Soviet Union in place of that of Kuwait). The United States followed suit in March 1987, and reflagged 11 Kuwaiti tankers. Once reflagged, any attack on these tankers would be an attack on the United States (or the Soviet Union). The United States sent an armada of naval vessels in a buildup not seen since Vietnam to protect these tankers and the flow of oil. Until July 1988, the most significant confrontation in the Persian Gulf involved an attack on the U.S.S. Stark by Iraq, which killed 37 sailors on May 17, 1987. Washington sent additional naval vessels into the Gulf to escort the Kuwaiti tankers. Confrontations with the Iranians continued but rather than confronting the American fleet directly, used mines and hit and run attacks by small patrol boats. On July 3, 1988, the U.S.S. Vincennes, a sophisticated navy ship, shot down Iran Air Flight 655. The crew on the Vincennes was on edge because they had already been involved in two skirmishes with Iranian gunboats that morning. The aircraft was spotted on radar and mistaken for a fighter plane about to

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation attack them. As their mistake became clear, the crew determined they had shot down an unarmed commercial airliner killing 290 people, including 66 children. Eight years later, the United States paid compensation of approximately $60 million to the families of those killed. Iranian outrage was swift and there were public proclamations Iran would exact its revenge against the United States. American politicians, including President Reagan, apologized. Although the war between Iran and Iraq was winding down and would stop in the next month, the threats coming from Iran indicated retribution would be certain. Demonstrations in the streets of Tehran were shown on worldwide television. The US intelligence community received on a daily basis dozens if not hundreds of threats and the numbers increased after the shoot down of the Iran Air plane. Most contained no specific information and little could be done with them. Even specific threat information often did not contain enough data to take action. As summer became fall, German law enforcement and intelligence agencies received information that there were Palestinian terrorists living, working and plotting in Germany. The German system of law enforcement and intelligence made it difficult for them to share information. As the Lockerbie investigators would later be told on more than one occasion, “America and the United Kingdom are responsible for this, as you set up our system of government.” The Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), the federal police agency responsible for investigating criminal activity, including terrorism, within Germany was similar to the American FBI. The Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz (BfV), the internal security service, was responsible for collecting intelligence within the borders of Germany. They had no criminal investigative authority. In the United States this is handled by the FBI. The United Kingdom had a similar service, the MI-5 or the British Security Service (BSS). The German equivalent to the CIA or Britain’s MI-6 was the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), which was responsible for collecting intelligence information outside Germany. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC) was, in 1988, one of a number of Palestinian organizations who used terror to try to secure a homeland for the Palestinians. Ahmed Jibril, its leader, was born in Palestine before the creation of Israel. He served in the Syrian Army and, along with other Palestinian officers, established an underground group known as the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine. This group had one goal, the destruction of Israel. In the late 1960s, Jibril joined the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), headed by George Habash. Jibril did not believe even Habash was violent enough to establish a Palestinian state and destroy Israel, so in the late 1960s Jibril broke away and formed his own group, the PFLP-GC. He set up his headquarters in Damascus, Syria, but enjoyed the hospitality and sponsorship of not only Hafez al Assad, the President of Syria, but Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi.

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Chapter 1: International Terrorism: From the Middle East to Europe The PFLP-GC focused on the destruction of Israel. Jibril and his group were suspected of several airline bombings. On February 21, 1970, Swissair Flight 330 (Zurich–Tel Aviv) and an Austrian Airlines flight both blew up. These two attacks, using barometric bombs concealed in radios, forever linked Jibril to attacks against aviation. This would make him, nearly twenty years later, the number one suspect in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. On August 16, 1972, another bomb exploded aboard an El Al flight. The plane was able to land in Rome. Two British women had carried the bomb, which had been placed in a record player, aboard the plane. Two young Arab men who had lived with them for a time in Rome had given them the record player. Italian police later arrested the men. This same technique would be used in the 1980s. Allegedly, a Jordanian by the name of Marwan Khreesat made each of the three bombs. Khreesat would surface years later during the investigation of the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Jibril continued his terrorist activities against Israel throughout the 1970s and the 1980s. He killed a number of Israeli citizens during that period. In 1986, Jibril made a well publicized speech saying there would be no safety for anyone traveling on an American or Israeli airliner because of the worsening situation for Palestinians in Israel. In 1987, Jibril’s men used motorized hang gliders to fly from Lebanon into Israel; they killed six Israeli soldiers and wounded six more. Despite this, Jibril had not achieved the notoriety of other Palestinian terrorists including Sabri al-Banna. Jibril had been involved in several prisoner swaps with the Israelis. One which occurred in 1979 allowed him to free Hafez Dalkamouni, who would become a valued aide to Jibril for the next ten years. Dalkamouni grew up in Israel and Jordan. In 1969, a bomb he was working with exploded prematurely, blowing off part of his leg. He was sentenced to prison and languished for ten years. After the prisoner swap he served Jibril well, was highly regarded and given an assignment in Germany. In August 1987, and again in April 1988, troop trains carrying American soldiers through Germany were bombed. The German BKA suspected Dalkamouni and his associates. As the BKA investigated the train bombings, foreign intelligence agencies began telling their German counterparts about a terrorist cell operating within its borders. Their focus was directed at Dalkamouni and his associates. The BKA, the BND and the BfV began a coordinated investigation to determine what Dalkamouni was doing. As a result of the troop train attacks and the attempted murder of a German finance official, Hans Tietmeyer, German intelligence and law enforcement began operation “Herbslaub” or Autumn Leaves. Dalkamouni and the others were placed under electronic and physical surveillance throughout Germany. By October 13 Marwan Khreesat, the bomb builder responsible for the bombs which had destroyed planes in Europe in the 1970s, had flown in from

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Jordan to join the cell. However, Khreesat was also working for Jordanian intelligence and was under orders not to build any functional devices for them. Because of threats received throughout the world since the July 3 shoot down of the Iranian Airbus, activities by any terrorist cell attracted the attention of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. The BKA surveillance determined Dalkamouni had contacts with a number of people including Ahmed Abassi, a resident of Sweden who was fluent in English and German. Dalkamouni was using an assumed name, Hafez Hussein. German law enforcement and intelligence agencies watched their targets travel throughout Germany. They collected various items that appeared strange but were not illegal. Dalkamouni placed a call to Damascus and advised his contact he had made changes “to the medicine,” and that it was “better and stronger than before.” On October 23, Dalkamouni received another call from Damascus and the caller told him that things were “almost ready.” On October 24, 1988, Dalkamouni and Khreesat went shopping, purchasing alarm clocks, batteries, switches and screws. The Germans knew they were onto something but were not sure exactly what. On October 26, 1988, BKA agents arrested sixteen people in apartments and businesses across Germany, including Dalkamouni and Khreesat. A search of Dalkamouni’s vehicle located blasting caps, a mechanical alarm clock which had been modified to make a time delay firing device, one kilogram of “explosive” material and a Toshiba Bombeat radio recorder containing Semtex, a plastic explosive of Czech origin, along with a detonator and battery. It was a barometric bomb, designed to be used against aviation. The searchers also found a Syrian and Spanish passport each containing the photograph of Dalkamouni. They also located a Syrian international driving license which had Dalkamouni’s picture but was issued in the name of Hafez Hussein. In addition to German currency, American dollars and Yugoslavian dinars were found. A search of Hashem Abassi’s flat in Neuss turned up numerous tools, timers, travel alarm clocks, batteries and other electrical components as well as a hard-sided suitcase. Another search took place in Frankfurt, at the residence of Abdel Ghadanfar. More evidence was found including an American made bazooka, mortar shells, grenade launchers, hand grenades, over five kilos of plastic explosive and other explosives. They also found numerous hand and shoulder weapons including Kalashnikov assault rifles. Among the documents located were false passports and driver’s licenses. Considering the weapons appeared to have been made in the United States, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Italy, this was truly an international terrorist cell. According to the German prosecutor, this was the largest weapons and explosives cache belonging to a terrorist cell ever found in the Federal Republic of Germany. Arrests were made in Frankfurt, Hamburg, Berlin, Neuss, and Mannheim.

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Chapter 1: International Terrorism: From the Middle East to Europe Ghadanfar, a Palestinian, was arrested at the Frankfurt apartment. Police in numerous countries knew him by many names. He told the authorities he was working for Dalkamouni and the PFLP-GC. While Ghadanfar was willing to talk, Dalkamouni sat silent. Before the day was over, two of the sixteen who had been arrested were released. By the afternoon of October 27, a judge in Düsseldorf had released all but three of those arrested, citing a lack of evidence. Only Dalkamouni, Ghadanfar and Khreesat remained in jail. Another man, Martin Kadourah, surrendered in Yugoslavia. He was eventually returned to Germany, interviewed by the BKA and released. Khreesat was interviewed a number of times and although he told the BKA he knew about the explosives he never admitted to knowing about any potential attacks in the Federal Republic of Germany. On November 5, 1988, Khreesat contacted someone in Jordan and within four days, citing a lack of evidence, a judge released him. The BKA and German prosecutors analyzed what they had found and believed it represented the planning for more than one operation. They were unable to pinpoint their target but did not believe it was in Germany. Based on historical data, they believed Israel or the United States was the target, possibly an unknown “American club.” They believed the attack was imminent. The Toshiba radio found in Dalkamouni’s car was not intended as a car bomb because the explosive power would have been insignificant. The attack would only take place after the radio had been delivered to the target location. Because of the history of the PFLP-GC conducting attacks against aviation and the fact the radio bomb contained a barometric device, it was assumed the targets included an aircraft either taking off or landing, a specially protected vehicle, or a specific part of a building. The German report discussed the previous PFLP-GC attacks against aviation. The prosecutor concluded there was no evidence to specify exactly what the terrorist’s targets were. Another reason they believed there would not be an attack in Germany was the history of the group itself. The PFLP-GC had not had a history of perpetrating attacks against foreign countries but had engaged exclusively in the struggle against the “Israeli enemy” in Palestine. While generally true, the Germans took into account neither the attacks against the American troop trains in 1987 and 1988 nor Jibril’s threats against passengers on American airliners in 1986. Another factor not considered was why they would build bombs in Germany for targets in Israel. Getting the devices there presented many logistical problems. Now, all but Dalkamouni and Ghadanfar had been released. Most went to their homes in Germany, but Khreesat was gone; to Jordan. As November passed, intelligence agencies around the world learned about the German terrorist cell. By November 10, a telex had been delivered to each of the US carriers at Frankfurt Airport. Information concerning the Toshiba bomb seized in October was laid out in detail stipulating the device will be “dif-

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation ficult to detect on an x-ray screen.” The telex concluded, “It has to be assumed that there will be further efforts to bring similar prepared explosive devices aboard aircraft.” On November 18, the American Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued a security bulletin containing the same information. Airlines were told that passenger/checked baggage match should be rigorously applied by all US carriers with international operations. According to the President’s Commission on Aviation Security, created after the Lockerbie bombing, a major flaw in the system was the manner in which the information was disseminated to airline employees. Even if information was properly disseminated by the FAA, they had no way to determine what the airlines did to provide it to the employees who needed it. On December 5, 1988, an unknown male caller phoned in a “warning” to the American Embassy in Helsinki, Finland. The caller said that within two weeks time a young Finnish woman with connections to two ANO terrorists would carry a bomb onto a Pan Am plane from Frankfurt to the United States. Two days later the FAA notified its offices around the world and similar information made its way into the message traffic at the Department of State (DOS). Finnish authorities concluded by December 10 the threat was not credible; however, this assessment was not passed to the FAA for fear the airlines would not be as watchful as necessary. At least one memo made its way to the bulletin board at the American Embassy in Moscow alerting employees of the United States Government of the threat. However, the threat was not made known publicly. After the bombing, when information about the threat publicly surfaced, many family members were outraged. Indeed, the call, although prophetic, was judged to be a hoax; It had nothing to do with the bombing itself. It would, however, be an issue during the investigation.

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CHAPTER 2: DECEMBER 1988: LOCKERBIE In 1988, Pan Am was the primary US carrier between Europe and the United States. On December 21, 1988, a Pan Am Boeing 727 carrying 124 passengers left Germany’s Frankfurt Airport for London. The flight was uneventful and landed at Heathrow at approximately 5:40 p.m.. The craft parked at gate K16. The passengers and crew on that flight were unaware that contained within its cargo hold was a bomb. The crew and ground staff had only twenty minutes to transfer the passengers, cargo and luggage from the 727 to the Boeing 747 which would transport them to New York’s JFK airport and then its final destination, Detroit, Michigan. The jumbo jet, with “Maid of the Seas” stenciled on the fuselage, had arrived from San Francisco earlier that day. Scheduled departure time was 6:00 p.m. and the plane pushed back from the gate at 6:02 p.m.. The plane lifted off at 6:25 p.m. into the cold damp December air. Although some later speculated its late departure may have caused it to break up over land rather than the ocean, the flight was not delayed in London. Another early concern to the public was the low passenger load on the plane. Some speculated the United States Government might have had foreknowledge of the attack; dozens of its employees changed their plans at the last minute. The President’s Commission on Aviation Security examined this at length and discovered no abnormalities in passenger bookings before or after the Helsinki Warning and on or near the date of December 21. There were also 30 US Government employees on the flight. Pan Am Flight 103 was under the command of James MacQuarrie, a senior captain with over 10,000 hours of flight experience, including 4100 hours at the helm of Boeing 747s. His co-pilot, Raymond Wagner, had over 11,000 hours of flight time including over 5,000 on a 747. The flight engineer, Jerry Don Avritt,

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation had only 487 hours aboard a 747, yet had over 8,000 hours of total flight time. It was an experienced crew taking these passengers home. Flights traveling east to west take longer than those going east due to the jet stream. Air Traffic Control routed the flight north, the length of England, and not west, over the north Atlantic, until it was well into Scottish airspace. The headwind that night, at a cruising altitude of 31,000 feet, was in excess of 100 miles per hour. At about 7:00 p.m., air traffic control at Prestwick, Scotland assumed control of the flight as it began its turn out over the Atlantic. Presumably drinks were being served to the passengers when, just before 7:03 p.m., an explosion occurred. About two and one half minutes after the bomb tore a 13-by-23 inch hole in the side of the plane, aircraft parts, luggage, aviation fuel and people began to rain on the town of Lockerbie. A small market town of about 3,500 people, Lockerbie is situated on the A-74, the main road between Glasgow and London which lies approximately 300 miles to the south. Forensic experts later concluded the blast had occurred in less than one second, splitting the aircraft just behind the trademark hump which distinguishes a 747 from other twin-aisle jets. The nosecone came off first, tearing off an engine, part of a wing and a segment of the tail rudder. The nosecone, which became the symbol of the disaster, fell to the earth like a rock. In this section of the plane were the flight crew and about 15 people who landed in an area called Tundergarth. The rest of the airplane coasted in a northwesterly direction toward the center of Lockerbie. As the wing box and fuselage lost altitude, cargo, metal scraps, packages and bodies fell from the plane. It was barely above the ground when it went over the center of the town. Contents of the plane and 61 people fell in one square block known as Rosebank. No lives were lost among the residents there. Several hundred yards away, the residents of Sherwood Crescent, would not be so lucky. The wing box, filled with over 200,000 pounds of aviation fuel and remnants of the fuselage, crashed into the ground. A crater measuring 140 feet long and up to 40 feet deep was created. As emergency crews sped to the area around Lockerbie, major traffic jams occurred on the A-74, as well as the small two-lane roads which are common in Scotland. The Lockerbie police station reported to its headquarters in Dumfries that massive police assistance was needed. The Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary was responsible for this region of Scotland. In December 1988, the force numbered about 333 officers. While covering some of the largest territory in the United Kingdom, this constabulary was among the smallest in terms of the number of officers. According to the annual police report, the previous year the most significant crime they dealt with had been bicycle theft. The Chief Constable was a veteran police officer, John Boyd. Boyd quickly determined he needed assistance and contacted his counterparts in Glasgow to

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Chapter 2: December 1988: Lockerbie the northwest and Edinburgh to the northeast. The much larger departments of Strathclyde (Glasgow) and Lothian and Borders (Edinburgh) assembled officers to make the trips south to help Dumfries and Galloway. None of the responding officers could imagine what they would find. The international media had dispatched personnel to Lockerbie to begin covering what would become a major news story. Boeing 747 aircraft just did not fall from the sky. The event, whatever it was, had happened quickly, without warning. The senior and experienced pilots had not had the time to radio a distress call. In addition to law enforcement, fire and medical assistance which quickly arrived in the area around Lockerbie, the British military sent significant numbers of personnel and equipment to look for survivors. Later, when it was determined no one had survived the fall from 31,000 feet, they were utilized to recover the bodies of victims and to assist in the collection of evidence and other materials from the aircraft. Boyd, in one of his first press conferences to the world media which had gathered in this small town, said he was treating the crash as a criminal inquiry. He established a number of procedures which later proved essential to the solution of the case. Boyd recognized the incident needed to be treated as a criminal investigation whether or not later events proved this to be the case. He laid down five principles upon which the investigation would be based. These five were accuracy; coordination; gathering of evidence and productions; proper timing of release of information to the media and other interested parties and the proper diplomatic channels to be used when investigation needed to be carried out overseas. Accuracy was essential yet the magnitude of the task proved that inaccuracy was inevitable. In the early days the bodies of two of the American victims were mixed up and their families received the wrong bodies to bury. Coordination proved to be a challenge which would be an issue all the way through the trial, nearly 12 years later. Although each agency had the best interests of the investigation at heart, coordination was not always done efficiently. The gathering of evidence took much longer than anticipated; who had ever had to deal with a crime scene of 845 square miles? The meticulous collection of evidence would be the primary reason the investigation did reach a successful resolution. The release of information to the media was well controlled in Scotland, but the leaks of information in Europe and the United States proved problematic for investigators on both sides of the ocean. Working through diplomatic channels was also a significant challenge. As both the FBI and the Scottish police would find out, each system had benefits as well as drawbacks. Boyd deserved significant credit for the structure he created at the outset of the investigation.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Without his organizational ability, the successes achieved by the investigators and later, the prosecutors, would not have been possible. Boyd established three phases of the investigation. His first goal was that all bodies would be recovered by midnight on December 24, 1988. He did this so families could be assured their loved ones had been recovered by Christmas day. This goal would not be achieved. It was apparent Boyd could not comprehend the enormity of his task when he set as a second goal the recovery of all aircraft wreckage in two to three weeks. Although about 80 per cent of the aircraft and its contents were eventually recovered, the search went on for over a year. He stated as a third phase that this would be a protracted inquiry and the investigators would have to keep an open mind as it was possible this incident may have been caused by an explosive device. He was right on both counts. He divided southern Scotland into sectors for the purpose of collecting not only bodies but aircraft wreckage and ultimately the evidence which he hoped would lead to the reason behind the breakup of the plane. While he was overly optimistic about the time it would take to recover bodies and aircraft wreckage, Boyd had tremendous foresight. Fire and rescue crews worked through the long night of December 21, but it was only as the first light broke in the morning that the immense proportions of the disaster became apparent. Bodies and aircraft wreckage had been scattered over a large part of southern Scotland. Boyd initially established six search sectors in and around Lockerbie. The first, Sherwood Park or Sherwood Crescent, was where the fuselage, wings and three of the four engines had come to rest. Eleven local residents were killed in their homes. The wings, containing most of the aviation fuel, had burst into flames upon impact, totally destroying 15 houses and severely damaging 13 others. The fireball went almost 300 feet into the air, by some accounts. Although not all the bodies were identifiable in this sector, it was believed that 33 people on board the aircraft lost their lives here. This sector was less than one square mile. The second sector, the smallest, was in the middle of the village. Rosebank, just to the east of Sherwood, was an area which had a number of apartment buildings around a courtyard, it did not suffer the devastation which befell the Sherwood residents but 61 bodies were found here. One end level house was destroyed and incredibly, no one on the ground was injured. Sector C was Beechgrove and the Golf Course. This area was on the eastern edge of Lockerbie and encompassed 11 square miles. Forty-three bodies had come to rest in the soft Scottish earth here, many on the grounds of the golf course. The fourth engine, which had been torn from the wing box in flight by the nose cone, came to rest in a street between a football field and a row of town homes. The engine fell with such force it imbedded itself 15 feet into the ground. This is the sector where the two black boxes, the Cockpit Voice Recorder and the Flight Data Recorder were recovered.

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Chapter 2: December 1988: Lockerbie In the fourth sector, Sector D, the cockpit fell to earth in a field just in front of the church at Tundergarth. The nose cone of the 747 became the media symbol of the disaster. This area encompassed 27 square miles and was about three and one half miles to the east of Lockerbie. Members of the flight crew were found in the nose cone and a total of 106 bodies were recovered in this sector. Halldykes, an area of seven square miles northeast of Lockerbie, contained aircraft wreckage and contents but it was the last sector in which bodies, 27 of them, were recovered. Ballstack Farm, the last of the original six sectors, contained 26 square miles and aircraft contents and parts were found, but no bodies. Because the winds had been so strong at the time of the explosion, and the fact the plane was at 31,000 feet, Boyd later added five sectors to the search area. These included Cadgill (55 square miles), Haggy Hill (37 square miles), Newcastleton (195 square miles), Cumbria (126 square miles) and Northumbria (328 square miles). While no bodies were recovered in these sectors, aircraft debris was located in each. The terrain was rugged, filled with lochs (ponds), forests and desolate countryside. Altogether, the search area was 845 square miles. This would be the largest crime scene in the history of law enforcement. Boyd set a rigid structure in place. He, as Chief Constable, was in overall command of the investigation. He was assisted by both a Deputy Chief Constable and an Assistant Chief Constable. The operational command of the inquiry, as the Scots called it, fell to a Detective Chief Superintendent who would function as the SIO. Boyd placed a Chief Superintendent in charge of both Liaison and Operations. They were assisted by three Superintendents in charge of Property, Mortuary and Traffic. Within 15 hours of the crash, Boyd had at his disposal over 2000 police, fire and military personnel. The Lockerbie Academy became the first headquarters for the investigation. They set up quickly and it did not take long to determine this would be a protracted investigation. Communications were inadequate and a local private company assisted until the police communications network was established. People and equipment from a variety of services were used, particularly in the early stages. Military and private vehicles were used to move debris and personnel from site to site. Feeding stations had to be established. Days are short at this time of the year and there was no time to waste. This was especially difficult as the search for bodies went beyond December 25. The searchers had to be away from their families at Christmas, but no one complained because of the somber task at hand. For major investigations the police in Scotland used a computer system known affectionately as HOLMES, an acronym for Home Office Large Major Enquiry System. It relied on numerous data entry personnel who put every statement, piece of evidence and other information into it. This allowed investigators to track all leads emanating from the investigation. The system was

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation superior to anything the FBI had at the time and was invaluable. It would also become a source of distraction as it could not distinguish significant leads from others. As bodies were being recovered, a system was created so they could be examined, autopsied and identified. The town hall in Lockerbie was initially established as a mortuary but as the count passed 80 bodies, the local ice rink was pressed into service. The recovery and identification process was excruciatingly slow. However, the first of the bodies was turned over to the next of kin by December 27. The recovery of aircraft wreckage was also slow. The Central Ammunition Depot (CAD) in Longtown, about twenty miles from Lockerbie, was found to be a suitable location for the storage of aircraft parts which could be laid out like a jigsaw puzzle. The building was so large, police and investigators from the British Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) used bicycles to get around. Eventually, the aircraft was reassembled at the AAIB facilities in Farnborough, England, near London. In addition to bodies and wreckage, investigators wanted to account for the luggage and personal effects of each of the passengers. It was hoped this would lead them to a suspect bag, if the crash was caused by a bomb. The police created a “Property Store” at a company called Dextar which would account for the luggage and other personal effects of each of the passengers and crew. A separate HOLMES team was dispatched to the Property Store to begin the tedious job of cataloging the items retrieved from the search area. The undertaking, like many after it, would prove invaluable. Just before Christmas a strut, which once served as the framing for an aluminum cargo container was recovered from the fields near Lockerbie. A closer examination of the strut showed black marks as well as pitting and cratering which indicated to experts it had come into contact with a high velocity explosive. The strut had been ripped away from its original container. The AAIB reported that Pan Am Flight 103 had on board twelve cargo containers and two cargo pallets in the forward hold of the aircraft. Three containers were fiberglass and the other nine were constructed of aluminum. Forensic examination determined the blast had taken place in the forward hold designated as 14L. The aluminum container, AVE 4041-PA, of which 85 per cent was eventually recovered, exhibited evidence of blast damage which had come from contact with a high performance explosive. The only two containers which exhibited any damage were those located at 14L and 21L of the aircraft. The container at 14L was aluminum and 21L, directly behind it on the same side of the aircraft, was made of fiberglass. It was forensically determined the initial blast had come from within the container at 14L. This container had only contained passenger luggage. On December 28, 1988, Michael “Mick” Charles, Inspector of Accidents for the AAIB, announced that two significant pieces of metal had been recovered in

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Chapter 2: December 1988: Lockerbie the wreckage of Pan Am Flight 103 which provided convincing evidence of a detonating high performance plastic explosive. He concluded the blast had occurred just after the aircraft crossed into Scottish airspace. December 28 is the day one of the most significant criminal investigations in the history of modern law enforcement was launched. The FBI would later become involved in other major investigations to include the World Trade Center attack in 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, TWA Flight 800 in 1996, the attacks against the American Embassies in August 1998, in Kenya and Tanzania and the attack against the U.S.S. Cole, a navy vessel in Yemen in 2000 and then the attacks against the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001. Before the FBI ever heard of any of those investigations, we would learn a great deal from a police force whose officers had little experience in violent crimes or working in an international environment.

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CHAPTER 3: DECEMBER 1988: WASHINGTON When Pan Am Flight 103 began to fall onto the village of Lockerbie, it was early afternoon in Washington. Reports of a plane down over Scotland, a jumbo jet filled with Americans, quickly made their way onto the national news and into the FBI Operations Center. In December 1988, this “center” was several small rooms in the massive J. Edgar Hoover (JEH) Building in Washington, D.C. It was staffed by agents and analysts twenty-four hours a day. A new operations center, the Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC), would open in early 1989. SIOC would be where the FBI could manage a crisis anywhere in the world. I had been the chief of the Terrorist Research and Analytical Center (TRAC) since November 1986, and an FBI agent since February 1971. After the massacre at the Olympic Games in Munich on September 5, 1972, the Detroit office was mobilized, like many other FBI offices, to determine if international terrorism from the Middle East would come to America. Most in the FBI knew little about terrorism in those days; few in America had much knowledge of terrorism then. In 1972, the United States and its crime problems were different. The FBI was not prepared to battle an enemy that most of those who had been trained to investigate organized, white collar or violent crimes, did not understand. The Soviet Union was America’s biggest international threat. That battle was one with which the FBI was familiar. The threat from international terrorism was new and in 1972 we had nothing in place to address it. Detroit was home to one of the largest Arab populations outside of the Middle East. Palestinians along with immigrants from Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries lived in suburban Dearborn, in the shadow of the Ford Motor Company. Many of them worked for Ford, Chrysler, or General Motors. Some existed and many thrived in their adopted land. However, with the new threat

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Chapter 3: December 1988: Washington from Palestinian terrorists, the FBI had to develop a plan overnight to determine whether an attack similar to that which claimed eleven Israeli athletes would come to America. No one was sure where to begin. Most FBI agents did not understand the complex political situation in the Middle East. The FBI did know a little about domestic terrorism and was or would become familiar with the activities of groups such as the Weather Underground Organization, the Aryan Nations and the May 19 Communist Organization. The FBI began conducting surveillance of an unknown foe in Dearborn. The only information we had was that, if a plot would be hatched in the United States, it would come from a few known and other unknown “Arabs” living and working around Dearborn. The intelligence base was nonexistent. Information received from overseas was vague and contained little on which action could be taken. The suspected terrorist was described as a dark-skinned male with black hair and dark eyes. That was tantamount to no information at all, but armed with that, our squad began conducting surveillances in Dearborn. We removed our ties and sat in neighborhoods in four-door police-looking sedans. The surveillances accomplished little. There were too many people who matched the description of the “terrorist.” There was a lack of information sharing with local police officials in 1972. The Dearborn police knew nothing of the surveillances and our intelligence collection efforts. We never considered sharing the information with them. “Internal security of the United States is the responsibility of the FBI!” On September 11, 2001, that attitude was changed forever. Similar investigations were getting started all over the United States. The FBI in Detroit and elsewhere began interviewing individuals to determine if there was a threat within the United States from Middle East terrorists. It took years and numerous interviews to even comprehend the issue. The problem was bigger than anticipated. Most persons of Middle Eastern descent had come to the United States to take advantage of its freedoms and did not condone the actions of the terrorists back home. It was less certain if any of those interviewed would ever report an imminent attack in the United States. In the summer of 1974, I interviewed a former member of the Black September Organization (BSO), the group responsible for the attacks in Munich two years before. He joined because it was an escape from the poverty of the Middle East. However, once at the training camps, he was mistreated, people stole from him and he decided the life of a terrorist was not for him. He moved to the United States, where he had family, to get away from terrorism. He had come to live the American dream. In those days we believed all a terrorist had to do was taste our freedoms and he would renounce terrorism forever. During the 1970s, the FBI became more involved in investigating terrorism. The Bureau looked at the problem, particularly as it related to international terrorism, as an intelligence issue. The program was placed in that part of the FBI which investigated other threats from abroad, primarily from the Soviet Union

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation and China. Through the 1970s, terrorists committed attacks in the United States at the rate of about 100 per year. Most were by terrorists within the United States having no foreign funding or direction. In 1982, the FBI made counter terrorism a priority and placed the responsibility for investigating the threat in the Criminal Investigative Division (CID). That entity was responsible for the oversight of all FBI criminal investigations. The FBI had reduced the number of domestic terrorism investigations it had been conducting due to restrictions resulting from Congressional hearings of the mid-1970s. These took place in response to allegations the FBI had illegally collected information and spied on Americans during the 1960s and 1970s. The Canadians had already separated the responsibilities of counter terrorism and counter intelligence from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). President George W. Bush in 2004 considered taking these responsibilities away from the FBI and creating a new entity like the British MI-5, although this recommendation was not made by the September 11th Commission. However, the number of “stovepipes” where information has to travel must be reduced, not increased. A new agency would fuel more interagency rivalry and create yet another stovepipe where information is lost and not shared. Throughout the 1970s, the FBI continued to treat most international terrorism investigations as too sensitive for any but the Bureau to handle. After a group of domestic terrorists banded together near New York City in 1981 to rob an armored car and kill police officers, the FBI and the New York Police Department came together to form the first Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). The concept, which included other federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, pooled the resources of those agencies to address the issue of counter terrorism. The best of numerous agencies were brought into solve a common problem. Competition would be reduced and cooperation enhanced. The concept was copied in a number of larger cities around the United States. These task forces, when properly utilized, were a tremendous force multiplier in preventing terrorist plots and disrupting terrorist organizations. The JTTFs proved their worth during the 1980s. Terrorism from within was on the decrease, not just due to excellent police work but sociological factors such as the end of the war in Vietnam and a period of relative domestic tranquility. Overseas, it was another story. By 1986, the FBI had become a player in the anti-terrorism war on the international stage because of legislation passed in 1984 and 1986. Some were not happy with that. The DOS had always been the principal player in the international arena. In each embassy, the ambassadors were king (or queen) and approved everything that went on in their country, including official travel. Even the CIA Station Chief in each embassy reported through the Ambassador and as such, the Ambassador had a semblance of control over CIA personnel in country. Some at the DOS believed whatever hard work they had done could be ruined in just a few minutes by an FBI agent who did not work directly for the Ambas-

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Chapter 3: December 1988: Washington sador. FBI agents detailed to conduct investigation in some countries soon came into conflict with CIA Station Chiefs due to perceived overlapping responsibilities. Major international terrorism investigations conducted by the FBI had been managed out of a few rooms within the Counterterrorism Section (CTS). Most investigations conducted after the passage of the 1984 and 1986 extraterritorial statutes did not involve a lot of coordination with other governments. Places like Lebanon, the scene of many of the early investigations, did not require the FBI to get more than concurrence from the DOS to deploy agents there. The FBI was also investigating a number of terrorist attacks and kidnappings which had occurred in South America. These investigations were coordinated with the foreign governments, but the criminals and the crime scene were normally confined to one country at a time. There was little need for exchange of personnel or the dispatch of agents around the world with investigators from these services. Lockerbie would be very different. In December 1998, Neil J. Gallagher was the new Chief of the CTS. Gallagher had a background in national security and was a natural leader. His tenure in the CTS included not only the Lockerbie investigation, but the FBI response to the first Gulf War and the World Trade Center attack in 1993. Although the FBI counter terrorism program had been successful as the number of incidents had declined throughout the 1980s and prevention of terrorist incidents had risen, in 1988 the FBI was criticized in the press and in the Congress for its investigation of the Committee in Support of the People of El Salvador (CISPES). This investigation, which the FBI contended was properly predicated, wandered into areas which were not as focused as they should have been. The FBI was stung by allegations it was “spying” on American citizens without cause, a claim raised by Congressional committees of the 1970s. During its investigation, the General Accounting Office (GAO) received access to the counter terrorism files of the FBI. They found some procedural errors in a small number of the investigations but no wrong doing, either in violation of the law or of the Attorney General Guidelines. The GAO report went the way of many things in Washington. Procedures were changed in the way international terrorism cases were managed and greater FBIHQ oversight was required. Gallagher inherited the CTS in the wake of these criticisms, but there had been few major terrorist incidents, either in the United States or abroad. The FBI, an intensely hierarchal organization, is headquartered in Washington with 56 Field Offices located around the United States. In 1988, all but one was headed by a Special Agent in Charge or SAC. The New York Office was so large it was led by an Assistant Director, supported by three SACs. The SAC of each office was responsible for all investigative activity and set the priorities for that office. Most SACs were aware the crime problems in Oklahoma would be different from those of their counterpart in New York or Washington.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation In 1988, there were about 20 Legal Attaché offices located in major capitals around the world. These FBI representatives worked out of the US Embassy and were accountable to the Ambassador. Their role was to liaise with law enforcement and intelligence officials there and work with them in matters of mutual interest. At one time, much of their work was the coordination of domestic criminal cases which involved an American. Much of the work in the 1980s dealt with the threat from the Soviet Union. Intelligence officers from the Soviet Union and bloc countries would often travel to other countries to meet and these activities would be tracked by the local intelligence service. The FBI would have an interest because of its responsibility to protect the internal security of the United States. The role of the “Legat” changed in the 1980s along with the crime problems. Complex white collar crimes, international drug trafficking cartels, as well as the increase in attacks against US interests overseas by international terrorists, changed the way the Government and the FBI looked at these emerging crime problems. The Legats were becoming more involved in terrorism investigations. While each FBI field office in the United States was to investigate crimes, the Legats were to coordinate investigations. They would normally ask the host law enforcement service to investigate or bring an FBI agent from the United States to conduct the investigation. FBIHQ was composed of thousands of people including some 700 Supervisory Special Agents (SSAs). FBIHQ coordinated FBI investigations worldwide, managed investigative programs and provided support to Agents and support personnel involved in the actual investigations. In the 1980s, FBIHQ was not involved in investigations other than in an advisory or support capacity as this was the domain of the field offices and each SAC. When the extraterritorial legislation was enacted, responsibility was given to the WFO to be the operational entity charged with conducting each of these investigations, no matter where in the world they occurred. One of the reasons for this selection was the WFO was in Washington where the other components who dealt with international investigations were located, including the DOS and the CIA. Since FBIHQ was right around the corner, they could provide the oversight and coordination necessary in these sensitive investigations. FBIHQ considered itself better suited to fight the turf battles which were waged daily in Washington. The world was a pretty quiet place for much of 1988. While terrorist threats appeared daily, the number of incidents and suspected terrorist incidents in the United States and its territories was down to 17 for the year. No one had been killed or injured in any of them. The FBI had assisted law enforcement and security agencies in Korea to host a successful and event free Olympics during 1988, despite an attack by North Korean agents on Korean Air Flight 858 in 1987, which killed 115 people.

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Chapter 3: December 1988: Washington As word trickled through the CTS that a Pan Am jumbo jet had crashed over Lockerbie, Gallagher started talking to the DOS, the CIA and his bosses on the seventh floor. All eventualities would have to be planned for in the event the disaster was determined to have been a terrorist attack. The WFO, then headed by an experienced SAC Douglas Gow, prepared to respond. Gow and Gallagher discussed their options. They put plans in place to send agents abroad to begin collecting information about the passengers. They would also ask Darrell Mills, the Legat in London, to determine if the FBI could participate in the investigation if it turned out to be a crime. Mills had dispatched every available agent from his staff of Assistant Legats (Alats) to Lockerbie when news of the disaster reached the embassy. He had never met John Boyd. Mills reached out for the police in Dumfries and offered the services of the FBI Identification Division and its Disaster Team to assist in the identification of victims. It was accepted. Permission to allow the FBI to send agents to participate in a criminal investigation was premature because the cause of the crash was not known. Even if a bomb was suspected, in order for the FBI to become involved the Attorney General would have to certify a terrorist act had caused the crash. Mills and his Alats spent much of the first month after the crash in Lockerbie. The British anti-terror unit from New Scotland Yard (NSY), SO-13, in London, which had had much success against the Irish Republican Army, also sent representatives to Scotland. All would quickly learn that the Scots had their pride and would not be denied an opportunity to determine what happened in the skies over Lockerbie. Gallagher decided while it would be beneficial to collect as much information as possible at an early stage, no interviews of family members would be conducted until after Christmas. The families would not be celebrating anything this year and the investigators had too much on their plates already. The logistics alone would have created enormous problems for all the families. As it turned out, the time lost was not significant especially when the enormity of the crime scene was realized. With the British announcement on December 28 that a bomb had caused the crash, the wheels were already in motion for the FBI to assist in this investigation.

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CHAPTER 4: FBI AND SCOTS RESPOND In the first twenty-four hours after the bombing, four groups claimed “credit” for the attack including the Islamic Jihad, the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution and the Irish group, the Ulster Defense League; another caller said the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, had committed the attack. The CIA believed that of all the early claims, the one by the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution was the most credible. This group was pro-Iranian and had, in the past four years, claimed responsibility for an airline hijacking, several assassinations and a bombing. As the FBI began to respond to what was undoubtedly an act of terrorism, the international media began speculating who had committed the attack. The PFLP-GC cell in Germany was number one on their list. The flight had originated in Germany and most members of that cell had been released from prison within days of being arrested. The leader of the PFLP-GC, Ahmed Jibril, had said in a February 1986, news conference from Libya there would be no safety for any traveler on an Israeli or American airliner. The German BKA had said these terrorists possessed a Toshiba “bombeat” radio cassette recorder with a barometric switch designed to be used against aviation. Jibril was safely living in Syria, protected by its ruler, Hafez al Assad. Speculation also centered on the role of Iran, both in the media and the intelligence community. It had only been five and one half months since the downing of Iran Air 655 over the Straits of Hormuz in July. Iran had threatened to attack America; was this it? There had been intelligence “chatter” indicating Iran was behind this attack and the PFLP-GC cell in Germany was contracted to conduct the operation. Most intelligence intercepts were subject to interpretation. Lockerbie was no exception. It was analysis, based on intelligence intercepts, not human sources or live witnesses, which indicated Iran was behind the attack.

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Chapter 4: FBI and Scots Respond There were numerous other suspects including Sabri al Banna, also known as Abu Nidal. He had been the most prolific Palestinian terrorist of the 1980s. There were other possibilities including an unwitting courier who might have carried a package on board an aircraft for another person. As the names of the passengers were made public, one appeared in the press as a possible link to the explosion. Khaled Nazir Jaafar, a young Lebanese man from Detroit, became a focus of attention. Early reports indicated he was the only person on board of Middle East extraction and should therefore be a person of interest. William S. Sessions had become the FBI Director in November 1987, following another former judge, William H. Webster, but Sessions had no experience in managing an organization or directing major cases, particularly overseas. The experience of most FBI leaders and agents was limited to domestic and traditional law enforcement cases. There had just been very few major international cases. Sessions told SAC Gow to use whatever resources were necessary to help the Scottish police solve this case. Gow sent Hal Hendershot, a bright young agent, to Lockerbie to establish liaison with the Scottish police. The choice was exceptional. Hendershot, an affable Kentuckian, did not have extensive experience but had excellent interpersonal skills. An agent with more rank or experience, particularly at the outset, might have ruffled feathers. Hendershot left the United States at the end of 1988, and did not return for over a year. Gow selected SA Phillip B.J. Reid, a former Baltimore Police officer and a member of C-3, the squad designated at WFO to investigate terrorism against Americans abroad, to liaise with SO 13 in London as they conducted investigation at Heathrow airport. Agents with German language ability were identified around the United States and sent to Germany to work with the BKA to find information about passengers who originated in Frankfurt. There was no way yet to know where the bomb had entered the aviation system, and steps had to be taken to eliminate each passenger as the carrier of the bomb. Chief Boyd, in Scotland drew from a number of excellent police officers from his own force as well as the much larger forces in Edinburgh (Lothian and Borders) and Glasgow (Strathclyde). The SIO he appointed was John Orr. Orr had been in charge of the Criminal Investigation Division in Glasgow. His deputy was a senior officer from Lothian and Borders, Stuart Henderson. Henderson and Orr had worked their share of major violent crimes. There were political considerations as well. Strathclyde and Lothian and Borders had provided significant manpower to the investigation and Boyd needed to utilize the expertise at his disposal. No police agency in Scotland had ever been involved in an investigation of this magnitude. Boyd’s team began the arduous task of retrieving bodies, picking up debris and collecting evidence. Officers collecting items in the fields were told to pick

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation up and document everything they found unless it was naturally growing there. There would be no exceptions. Even before evidence of a crime had come to light, the United States FAA had dispatched personnel to Scotland to provide expertise. Among these was Walter Korsgaard, a retired military officer and an expert in aviation explosions. Korsgaard walked through the fields of Lockerbie with his counterparts from the United Kingdom and examined aircraft debris to help determine the cause of the crash. He used a hearing aid; and while walking the fields immediately after the crash, he lost it. He reported this loss to the police and was told to check back in a few days. While Korsgaard held out no hope it would be found, he checked back with the teams responsible for the collection of debris. He told them where he had been and an officer took him to items which had been collected in that sector. Korsgaard located his hearing aid among the aircraft wreckage. This story helped convince us the Scots would be thorough in collecting evidence. As the Scots geared up for the long haul, in Washington, the FBI began to put together a structure to address this case. The FBI investigation was codenamed “SCOTBOM” and it was designated a major case. Gow and his criminal Assistant SAC (ASAC) John Kelso would both be involved in managing the investigation. In most FBI field offices, SACs and ASACs do not have the time to personally oversee each investigation. There were thousands of pending cases in WFO. Kelso, the criminal ASAC, should have had managerial control over the investigation and the activities of the task force should have been under the command of SSA Larry Knisley of C-3. From the beginning this case was different. Gow retained operational control of the investigation and Kelso added to his workload of Organized Crime, Drugs and Violent Crime investigations, all priorities in the WFO. Counter Terrorism was just one of his responsibilities. Despite WFO having had extraterritorial responsibility since 1984, the FBI had never designated a senior manager to oversee the program, believing these cases could be managed by a SSA, like all other investigations. Lockerbie proved to be far different and it took nearly two years before the appropriate structure was place to deal with this case. On January 3, 1989, Gallagher told me to leave TRAC and take over the FBIHQ task force which he was creating. While HQ was not an operational entity, the WFO as well as the agents around the country would need support to conduct this massive investigation. This would be our role. Our task force was composed of four agents and three analysts; each was given a specific assignment and before the end of the day we were up and running. Everyone knew this investigation would be different. The FBI was not in charge. The crime scene as well as the physical evidence was in Scotland and the

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Chapter 4: FBI and Scots Respond Scottish police would lead the investigation. All the FBIHQ task force could do was ensure the investigation at WFO was fully staffed and supported, intelligence leads and communications were sent to US intelligence agencies such as the National Security Agency (NSA), military intelligence and the CIA and coordination with the DOJ and the other agencies was done promptly and effectively. FBIHQ also was responsible for doing the liaison with the police and intelligence services of other countries. Information needed to be shared with the WFO and other FBI field offices. In those days, there was little discussion about passing intelligence information onto the police at the Lockerbie Incident Control Centre (LICC). The Scottish police would collect the evidence. The intelligence apparatus of the United States would point the way and at end of the day the evidence and the intelligence would come together and fingers could be pointed at the guilty party. At least that was our plan. The WFO was designated the office of origin for this investigation. The office of origin or OO was the entity within the FBI responsible for conducting the investigation. FBIHQ would support them. Most of the information I saw in the early days was that published in the newspaper because there was a little information coming from Scotland or the intelligence community. Once Hendershot was in Lockerbie, we had eyes and ears on the ground. Hendershot knew he worked at WFO and each morning he placed two telephone calls, one to Gow or Kelso and the second to me. Every Headquarters entity in Washington was responsible for ensuring the chain of command, all the way to the President, was informed as to the status of major initiatives or events. After September 11, 2001, the FBI Director briefed the President every morning. President George W. Bush was interested not only in the status of the investigation but wanted to know if Al Qaeda was planning additional attacks in the United States. The FBI Director had no such access in 1989. President Reagan was one month from leaving office when the bombing occurred and there were no daily FBI briefings. Other cabinet secretaries including State, Transportation, Defense as well as the Attorney General were kept apprised of developments so the President could be briefed. The FBIHQ task force provided information to other agencies. Our initial reports lacked specifics because there were none. The information we would eventually provide to the DOJ, and later to the public, would be based on fact and not speculation. It had to be able to stand the scrutiny of a court, not a politician or the media looking for instant answers. For weeks there was little evidence. Few briefings were given outside the Hoover building. In addition to spending long days in the office, I took home documents to read to stay abreast of information which had been coming from other agencies of the US Government. We decided this case would be conducted as a criminal investigation and a minimal number of documents would be classified so the DOJ would not have to spend time at trial declassifying documents which should not have been classified in the first place. A side benefit was that Agents

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation assigned at the WFO and FBIHQ could share the information with other entities including the police in Scotland. It also allowed us to remove materials from the office without fear of violating regulations or laws. One cable from a US embassy in Africa related information that the Regional Security Officer (RSO) had collected from a man who had walked into the embassy, and passed on without comment or analysis. The facts of the entire Lockerbie operation were laid out in detail. German baggage handlers were involved and the main perpetrators were Middle Eastern males who lived in Germany. Names, addresses and full descriptions were provided by the African. The investigators needed to be at a certain location in Germany on the upcoming Saturday night and all the alleged participants in the bombing would be located. The detail and specificity seemed impeccable and it seemed the case would be wrapped up before every victim had been returned to the families. However, after spending nearly an hour reading the lengthy document, I read that the source had obtained all this “information” through the use of “brain waves.” Frustrating!! There would be more where that came from. It seemed a lot of the early intelligence information had come from the same place. No matter what the “source” of the information, it was still examined but nothing was ever substantiated.

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CHAPTER 5: THE WORLD IS A SUSPECT Early in the week of January 9, 1989, Scottish authorities said the explosive device had been placed in a cargo container in the left forward part of the aircraft or 14 L. This was where the cargo container having been torn apart by the blast had been located. Nearly a month into the investigation, aircraft reconstruction was progressing at the CAD at Longtown, and the AAIB was reconstructing the fuselage. At the time of the explosion the AAIB estimated the aircraft was experiencing a 130 knot per hour cross wind. Forensic investigation focused on the area where the bomb was believed to have been located as well as all suitcases recovered which exhibited explosive damage. Suitcases exhibiting explosive damage were transported to the Royal Armaments and Research Defense Establishment (RARDE) in Fort Halstead, England. RARDE’s examinations had revealed unconsumed particles of RDX and PETN which was consistent with the presence of Semtex, a plastic explosive manufactured in Czechoslovakia. FBI explosives experts provided their expertise to Scottish police authorities. Another traveled to West Germany and examined the Toshiba radio bomb and the other evidence seized from the PFLP-GC cell in October. Although no parts of the actual explosive device in Lockerbie had been recovered, we hoped an examination of this device could develop further evidence. The investigation being conducted in London developed several troubling facts which raised questions through the trial. The check-in area for Pan Am was next to that for Iran Air. Although there were limited flights from London to Tehran, that proximity was troubling. Add to that the public threat coming from Iran after the shoot down of the Iran Air flight a few months before and it was easy to reach a few general conclusions when looking at suspects. Over 38,000 airside access badges were in circulation for all sorts of people, some of foreign extraction and many of whom no longer worked at

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Heathrow. We also learned that 29 individuals had been booked on Pan Am 103 but failed to show up for the flight. After Hendershot arrived in Scotland at the first of the year, a secure communications link was established between Washington and Lockerbie. In addition to this secure voice and data link, we used something which today seems archaic, the photo Telesis machine. The FBI Disaster Team, sent to identify victims, determined many of them could be identified by fingerprints. The FBI Identification Division was the largest repository of fingerprints in the world. But the fax machine proved ineffective in providing clear, identifiable fingerprints. The photo Telesis machine was able to transmit photo quality images instantly via a telephone line. Machines were placed in London, Lockerbie and at WFO and FBIHQ. Early on, coordination between Lockerbie and Washington was not good. The FBI could muster large numbers of agents and have them posted anywhere in the world on short notice. The Scottish police worked through judicial channels as well but because they did not have previously established liaison contacts in other countries, they were obligated to go through their intelligence services which did. This slowed the process down. Although the police at the LICC had sent German-speaking officers to Germany, the FBI Legat, Dave Barham, had been there for several years and had a network of contacts within law enforcement and intelligence services. The FBI sent six German-speaking agents to Germany to begin working with the BKA at Frankfurt airport. In addition to the forensic experts who wanted to examine the materials seized during the raids in October, an agent expert in the PFLP-GC traveled from Washington to exchange information with the BKA concerning that group. Investigation in the United States focused on interviews with the next of kin. It was important to know if anyone had just taken out a large insurance policy or had been involved in activity which could have caused one of the passengers to have been targeted by a criminal element. It was also important to know what type of luggage they had. The flight crew from the originating trip was interviewed. Although our investigation would be wide ranging, certain areas had already piqued our interest; many quickly turned out to be false leads. By January 19, almost a full month after the bombing, it was apparent the FBI would be able to only do so much. The Scots had rejected our request to assist in the collection of evidence around Lockerbie, preferring to do it themselves. Evidentiary collection of aircraft wreckage in Lockerbie would set the tone for the investigation. Despite interviews of family, friends and individuals who had escorted the passengers to their airports, without a major intelligence break or an informant we would have to get lucky at Lockerbie. On January 19, a CIA briefing was given to the WFO and FBIHQ task forces. Scottish authorities already believed the CIA was withholding infor-

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Chapter 5: The World is a Suspect mation because one or more of their operatives had been on the plane. The Scottish and English liaison officers were invited to attend, as much to clear the air as to share information. Following the briefing all that was clear was the intelligence agencies were long on historical information and short on evidence. They assessed the Iranians had commissioned the PFLP-GC cell in Germany to conduct the attack. However, they had no evidence to back up that statement. That afternoon, SSA Tom Thurman, an explosives examiner assigned to the FBI Laboratory, provided a briefing. He had just returned from Lockerbie where he had worked closely with his counterparts in the United Kingdom. His forensics briefing left no doubt the bomb had been placed in an aluminum cargo container located at 14L area of the aircraft. It was something we expected but seeing it, with pictures, from one of our own, made it real. Following Thurman’s briefing, the WFO and FBIHQ task forces met to discuss the status of the investigation. This meeting showed cracks in even what we were trying to do. Most of the WFO FBI agents assigned to the investigation were overseas either conducting investigation or working with their counterparts in Germany, London and elsewhere trying to unravel the puzzle. Numerous FBI agents around the United States had fanned out to interview the next of kin to determine if there may have been a motive for any of them to have been killed. It was still possible a terrorist attack was not the cause of the bombing. Left at WFO were a handful of agents, some of whom were trying to develop a computer system which could support the case. If Americans discovered the FBI was woefully deficient with regard to technology in 2001, in 1989 it was in the stone age. The FBIHQ analysts and agents provided briefings on what they had accomplished during the preceding four weeks. It was apparent most of the WFO resources were overseas. In any major investigation, it is critical to analyze large amounts of information in a short period of time and disseminate it. It became obvious that most of the analysis and lead generation was being done by the FBIHQ task force. This did not sit well with Gow, a senior FBI executive. Gow, along with Kelso, asked to meet with Gallagher and me following the day’s briefings. Gow was unhappy his WFO task force did not seem to be “in sync” with what was being done at FBIHQ. FBI field offices were supposed to be the investigative and operational entity and we were doing their job. He ordered us to desist from sending any more leads without their being funneled to and through WFO. WFO staffing of the investigation was inadequate, however. They had no analytical support and the investigation competed for resources with every other thing going on at WFO. As I looked back at this through the years, I saw that it was as much my fault as anyone else. The FBI would learn to manage these major overseas cases “on the run.” The next day was inauguration day for President George H.W. Bush. WFO was responsible to ensure terrorists and criminal elements did not cause a dis-

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation ruption of the day’s activities. It went smoothly. Gallagher and I spent the day in the bowels of the Hoover Building. We believed the FBIHQ task force was doing what it was designed to do but egos were playing a part in the game of “who is in charge?” This issue historically has plagued law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Six days after the inauguration, more bodies had been identified. The lead concerning Karen Noonan and her friend, Patricia Coyle, the college students who had befriended a young Jordanian man, seemed less promising, but the rumor about their possible involvement in unwittingly carrying the bomb on board was ever present all the way to the indictments in 1991. It was proven they had nothing to do with the attack. Within a month of the bombing, more was known about Khaled Jaafar, too, a Lebanese-born American who also was the subject of suspicions that were later shown to be unfounded. Luggage container AVE 4041-PA, or at least what was left of it, received significant scrutiny over the next few months. Investigation at Heathrow determined that sixteen passengers had arrived on flights other than Pan Am 103A (Frankfurt to London). These sixteen passengers checked a total of sixteen bags and they traveled on five different flights. The luggage in AVE 4041-PA consisted of bags which had been sent to London on those flights and the bin was then filled with bags of passengers from Frankfurt. The rest of the Frankfurt bags were placed in a cargo container at the rear. Interviews with the baggage handler who loaded AVE 4041-PA on December 21 indicated there were between five and nine bags which had been sent to London from other flights before he began loading bags from the Frankfurt flight. The remaining bags from these flights had been placed into other cargo containers on the flight. Investigators in London noted the baggage build up area was open and could be easily accessed by any of the 38,000 people having airside access badges. The container could have sat unattended for as much as 40 minutes. Several of the initial “promising leads” evaporated as quickly as they surfaced. Most of the 58 individuals, 29 on each segment of flight, who had made reservations on the two legs of flight (Pan Am 103A and Pan Am 103) and had not shown up to fly had been identified. Their reasons for missing the flight or changing reservations were legitimate. They had been identified and “cleared.” While it was clear that the bomb had made its way into the luggage container and had not been left aboard by in the overhead bins, there would be another interesting lead about packages being left behind on the plane. Found within the search area at Lockerbie were personal effects of a Sally Vincent* with telephone numbers in Dallas, Texas. A flight attendant for Pan Am, she was currently in Moscow visiting her boyfriend, the son of a diplomat from Syria to the Soviet Union. Her boyfriend had allegedly sent her gifts and she had visited him on several occasions. This would not have been of interest except that Vincent* had commented to a friend that on an earlier occasion the boyfriend had packed her suitcases at the end of her visit.

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Chapter 5: The World is a Suspect In 1989, the FBI had no liaison with any Soviet police or intelligence agency. An FBI liaison agent contacted the DOS and described the problem. If Vincent* had somehow been involved and her boyfriend was the terrorist, he might do away with her as well and what better way than to give her a “going away” present when she left Moscow? The DOS relayed its concerns, which were taken seriously in Moscow. For about ten days, we received reports from the Soviet KGB, through the DOS. Surveillances showed a young American woman enjoying life in the company of her boyfriend. When Vincent* arrived at the airport in Moscow to leave, authorities would not allow her luggage to accompany her. She was searched and her luggage was left behind for further evaluation. After the flight to Frankfurt, she was subjected to a thorough search of her person by Pan Am security before she was allowed to continue to New York. Upon her arrival, an FBI Agent met the flight. Vincent* commented she had been ripped off in Moscow, violated in Frankfurt and wondered what the FBI could do to her. Vincent* was later eliminated from any involvement in the bombing, but one thing was certain. The FBI had received cooperation from the police in a country which had always been described as the “enemy.” If the “enemy” was going to provide help in this case, what could be expected from “friends. Everyone was at risk. One of the early struggles was the lack of precise information concerning luggage. Pan Am’s records were consistently inaccurate as to how many bags each passenger had and whether they were checked into cargo containers or were carry-on items. By the end of January the only thing certain was that we would not get an accurate accounting of what was loaded onto the plane. It would take excellent evidence collection in Scotland as well as accurate interviews of family members to reconstruct what had gone into the aircraft.

*Names with an asterisk have been changed to protect the individuals.

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CHAPTER 6: FORENSICS AND DISTRACTIONS On Friday, January 27, Chief Boyd and his SIO, John Orr, traveled to Washington to brief the FBI. The room at FBIHQ was full. Their presentation made it clear that this investigation would be thorough, complete and would be conducted worldwide, no matter the cost or how long it took. Orr and Boyd later had lunch with Director Sessions, when Sessions allegedly said, “you lead and we will follow.” Sessions did not know the trouble that innocent comment would create. By early February, RARDE had examined 200 pieces of luggage and noted significant explosive damage on some items. About ten items of checked luggage were being held for further examination by RARDE. On February 2, 1989, NSY reported that scientists at RARDE had located a tiny part of a circuit board imbedded in the frame of the luggage container, AVE 4041-PA, the container which had housed the improvised explosive device (IED). The tiny chip had numbers on it which could help in its identification. This chip, smaller than a fingernail, was compared with the circuit boards of other electronic components. It was identified and linked to a circuit board used in several models of Toshiba radio cassette recorders, the RT-8026, RTSF16, RT-SF26 and RT-8016S. The radio were all twin speaker models. Some people were excited at the news but it did not sit well in Germany. Everyone was reminded of the Toshiba radio cassette recorder recovered in the PFLP-GC arrests in October. The major difference was the German Toshiba had only one speaker. German authorities did not believe the PFLP-GC cell had anything to do with the bombing. They believed they had neutralized them in October; German law enforcement and intelligence authorities, as well as their politicians, insisted the bomb went on the plane in London. Their logic was that if it was a PFLP-GC barometric device, it should have gone off during the flight from Frankfurt to London. It became know as the “Up/Down theory.” The plane

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Chapter 6: Forensics and Distractions should have gone up only one time before it exploded. If the bag went on the plane in Frankfurt, the plane should have exploded on the first leg of flight. Their argument would have merit for a time and would be the subject of significant debate for two years. These radios had been distributed and sold in the United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, Africa, South America as well as the Middle East. The radios are about 17 inches long, six inches high and four inches deep and came in red, white and black. The clues were just trickling in and even though information was being sent to other US Government agencies, some believed we were withholding information. None of the leads being generated by the criminal investigation or the information being produced by the intelligence community could provide the basis for a prosecution or for the policy makers to take action against a particular country or group. In mid-February 1989, Nezar Jaafar, Khaled’s father, traveled to Washington. He had been interviewed several times and his son’s name had appeared in various newspapers. A number of documents belonging to Khaled had been located among the wreckage. These included airline travel coupons and a Lebanese passport. Khaled’s mother and sister resided in Syria, making this a logical place for him to visit. His grandfather resided in Lebanon. One of the individuals arrested in the October “Autumn Leaves” roundup in Germany bore a resemblance to Jaafar and was no longer in custody. When I learned that Jaafar had been originally identified only by a mark on his feet, I wanted more certainty. Fingerprints were located for Jaafar and compared with the body recovered in Lockerbie. They matched, ending any speculation that Jaafar might be alive and part of a sinister yet unexplained terrorist plot. But Jaafar’s name would surface several more times during the investigation. Old sources of every law enforcement and intelligence agency were coming forward and providing information, some of it imaginary. A former Libyan intelligence agent said the bombing was planned and financed by the Libyan Government and subsequently carried out by the PFLP-GC. Part of the operation had been carried out by an American affiliated with the ANO. The American had allegedly picked up the suitcase, outfitted with explosives and provided to a baggage handler who had placed it on the Frankfurt leg of the flight. His information was speculative based on his past knowledge of the Libyan Government and the PFLP-GC. The agent acknowledged his experience with the PFLP-GC was three to four years old. While interesting, his information was not helpful. Unknown to any of us, something had already happened which would later be determined to be significant to the outcome of the investigation. In early January, a European man had walked into the American Embassy in Vienna, Austria and asked to speak with the Ambassador, who was unavailable. He left behind a message. The note, cryptically written, said that while the media focused its attention on the PFLP-GC cell in Germany, he assumed the investi-

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation gators were doing the same thing. He described a meeting he had attended in Tripoli days before the Lockerbie bombing and described the “thugs” who had been present. He believed the Libyans had been involved in the attack but did not state why he felt that way. He did not add new evidence but just another theory which had to be researched. The names he provided were well known Libyans who were affiliated with the Libyan Government. A copy of his letter was sent to the FBI in Washington, but because he did not sign his name, he became another anonymous “source” of unverifiable information. The CIA attempted to contact him but failed and after six months they gave up. This individual, however, would resurface and become one of the key witnesses in the case as well as the most troubling. In February, news leaks became a downright distraction. There were already problems with trust on both sides. The Scottish police believed if they gave information to the FBI, it would end up in the media and the feeling was mutual. Information sharing between agencies within the United States as well as with what should have been international partners was seriously affected. The seeds of distrust had been sown and only time and the right personalities would fix it. In reality there was little information which could be shared. It did not exist and anyone who was speaking to the media could only be speculating as to who was behind the attack. On February 20, 1989, RARDE concluded the bomb had been contained within a dark brown or brownish colored rigid suitcase. A number of fragments of this suitcase had been recovered and the conclusion was reached after examination of an eight inch section of the case. Progress was being made, albeit slowly. As with the piece of circuit board, agents and officers fanned out to visit the major suitcase manufacturers. They hit pay dirt in Denver, Colorado, the home of Samsonite. Officials there identified the eight inch piece of suitcase as belonging to a Samsonite suitcase, System Four model (later shown to be a Silhouette 4000), and antique copper in color. It was manufactured in a 24” and 26” model, large enough to accommodate the Toshiba radio cassette recorder. By March 1, of the 259 passengers and crew, 236 had been positively identified. An additional 13 persons had been identified by body parts and 10 people remained unidentified. Of the Lockerbie victims, only three had been positively identified, one had been identified through a body part and seven remained missing. There were 28 bags of unidentified body parts which were eventually buried in a mass grave at the Dryfesdale Cemetery in Lockerbie. Luggage recovery was moving along but not at the pace the impatient officials in Washington believed it should be. Six hundred and seven pieces of luggage had been recovered and 415 had been identified and matched with owners. Of the bags which were probably in 14L, the site of the IED suitcase, 23 bags had been identified.

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Chapter 6: Forensics and Distractions During the first week of March, Deputy Chief Constable Paul Newell and two other officers traveled to the United States. They met with the American next of kin to give them a status report on the return of personal items belonging to the victims which were not deemed evidentiary. These meetings were arranged at the request of the DOS. If there was any agency of the US Government which bore the brunt of family criticism, it was the DOS. Many American families found the DOS offered little comfort in the days after the bombing. The Scottish police, on the other hand, had always been supportive and informative when any family member was looking for answers. As a result, the American families often trusted the word of a Scottish officer over that of anyone in the US Government. The interviews of the no-show passengers, those who had not traveled on the flight, had yielded nothing of significance. Interviews of the American relatives as well as those who had last seen the passengers who boarded the aircraft revealed little additional information. None of them owned or had a brown hardsided Samsonite suitcase. Meanwhile, more was learned about Khaled Jaafar. Born in Lebanon, he came to the United States in 1983 to join his father. He obtained his citizenship and returned to Lebanon in 1987. He intended to be married but his father did not agree with his choice of a wife. He returned to the United States in September 1988 to discuss this with his father. In late September or early October 1988, he returned to Lebanon to tell his bride-to-be of his father’s decision. Before returning to America to complete his education, he stopped in Dortmund, Germany on November 8, 1988, to visit his childhood friends, the Salheli brothers. The investigation in Germany had turned up nothing unusual during Jaafar’s time there. No link to the PFLP-GC cell was ever established. However, the investigation determined the Jaafar family in Lebanon had connections to drug smuggling. Although there had been a meeting in London shortly after the bombing, the leaders of the various investigative agencies had never gotten together to discuss strategy. Clearly, the Scottish police were in charge. No one was responsible for coordinating the efforts of the FBI, the Scottish police and the BKA. The efforts of the intelligence agencies also lacked coordination and often led to friction between them and law enforcement, in the United States and Scotland. Gow and Gallagher had gone on a fact finding trip in February 1989 to see for themselves what had transpired over the fields of Lockerbie. As the SAC of WFO, Gow had weekly telephone contact with the SIO, John Orr. Hal Hendershot was in Lockerbie in a liaison capacity. However Gow’s trip with Gallagher marked the only time between December 1988 and November 1990 when a FBI agent who directly managed the investigation traveled to Scotland to deal one on one and face to face with the police officials who were leading the international investigation.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation The Scots wanted to host an international coordination meeting on March 28. John Kelso, the WFO ASAC and I were asked to attend. On Tuesday night, March 27, we boarded a Pan Am clipper which took us to Lockerbie. All we could think about was the barometric bomb which had been recovered in Germany. Thirty to forty minutes after the plane reached altitude, it would explode. The first hour of the flight was nerve wracking for both of us. We arrived in Lockerbie and after lunch, the meeting opened. Also present from the United States were Deputy Legat Tim Dorch from London, Dave Barham, the Legat in Bonn, and Hendershot. The DOJ had dispatched John Depue, the Senior Legal Advisor for Terrorism Matters. Representing Scotland in addition to Boyd, Newell and Orr, were Ian Armstrong, Detective Superintendent of the Joint Intelligence Group, Pat Connor, Superintendent in charge of liaison in Germany, Superintendent Angus Kennedy, the Information Officer, and three attorneys. These were Andrew Normand, the Deputy Crown Agent, James MacDougall, the Procurator Fiscal and Norman McFadyen, the senior depute in the Crown Office in Edinburgh who represented the Crown Prosecution Service. Hartwig Maas and Ulrich Morsbach represented the BKA and Herr Hemberger was a German federal prosecutor. Peter Phelan, the Deputy Assistant Commissioner and Detective Superintendent Chris Bird of the Metropolitan Police in London also attended. We heard firsthand denials by the Germans that the bomb originated in Germany. They believed that if it had, the barometric devices should have exploded on the leg of the trip from Frankfurt to London. No one could explain why the IED failed to detonate on the first leg of the flight. We would all later be more perplexed when the evidence pointed to yet another flight taken by the IED suitcase. Kelso told the group the next international conference would be in Washington at the end of May and would be hosted by the FBI. Little significant information was learned, but by dinner, friendships were starting to form which would set the course for future interaction. The next morning, we took time to see where bodies fell to earth and houses destroyed. We visited the Property Store at Dextar where 259 boxes, one for each passenger and crew member, sat on rows of shelving, all awaiting what would be found in the fields. There was nothing in the box marked “Jaafar.” They showed me two bags which the Scots believed belonged to him; in one were several items of clothing including a Gold’s Gym shirt and a blue satin jacket. I immediately recognized the jacket and asked the custodian to find the driver’s license for Jaafar. The picture on that license showed Jaafar wearing the distinctive jacket. His second bag would later be positively identified as well. Neither bag exhibited any signs of blast damage. The investigation was ready to take another bizarre turn. Since the German BKA had disrupted the PFLP-GC cell in Germany in October, only Dalkamouni and Ghadanfar were still in custody. Seized at the time of the

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Chapter 6: Forensics and Distractions arrests in October were significant amounts of weapons and explosives, including TNT and Semtex. In the Ford Taurus driven by Dalkamouni was a Toshiba bombeat radio with a barometric timer. The FBI wanted the German intelligence reports about the “Autumn Leaves” investigation. Initial examination of the radio showed it to be well disguised and the BKA had successfully taken it through airport security a number of times. The forensic report concerning this device concluded that at a certain atmospheric pressure, the pressure element would be switched and the timer activated. Within 30 to 40 minutes the bomb would explode. While the fact this device had been seized was chilling enough, but intelligence information indicated that three other devices were still at the apartment in Neuss, at one time shared by Dalkamouni, Hashem Abassi and Marwan Khreesat. While Dalkamouni was still in jail, Abassi, a grocer, was free and Khreesat was back in Jordan. On April 13, 1989, the German BKA returned to the home of Hashem Abassi in Neuss and searched the apartment. They located two radio tuners and one television monitor. Abassi was not arrested but the items were taken to the BKA headquarters in Meckenheim. The BKA took these over bumpy and windy roads and there was no initial suspicion these items were, in fact, explosive devices. The devices were transported to the BKA lab in Wiesbaden. During the examination one of the radio tuners exploded, killing a BKA technician and seriously injuring a second. The other two devices were destroyed before they could be examined. This event so angered German authorities that they had an overnight conversion. Many in Germany were not convinced the PFLP-GC cell was involved in the Lockerbie bombing, but now some members of that group were responsible for the death of one of their own. The BKA did something unprecedented. They invited Scottish police officers and FBI agents to participate in a series of searches and interviews of at least fifteen individuals having a connection to the suspected PFLP-GC cell or Jaafar. Despite these efforts, nothing of substance was developed and no evidence connected to Lockerbie was found. As winter turned to spring, the evidence collection process slowed considerably. During early May, the lock of the IED suitcase was recovered and was linked to a number of pieces of suitcase which had been located in the fields around Lockerbie. A shirt with blast damage was recovered. By the end of May, 618 bags had been recovered and 503 of them had been identified. The German BKA turned over to the FBI 42 volumes of reports concerning their investigations of both the PFLP-GC and their investigation into the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. While the BKA had willingly provided the information, there was a caveat specifying the information could be shared neither with the Scottish police nor the CIA. We later learned the same information had been shared with the Scottish police.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Through the spring of 1989, the media continued to speculate on who may have been responsible for the attack. Suspects ran the entire spectrum, from Israel to Libya and Iran. But still there was little which could be brought into court as the basis for prosecution. In mid-May 1989, 15 individuals suspected of links to terrorism were taken into custody by the Swedish Security Service during raids around Stockholm. These individuals were believed to be involved in the 1985 bomb attacks against a Northwest Airlines office as well as a synagogue in Sweden. Swedish authorities had earlier arrested Ahmed Abassi, Hashem’s brother, for burglaries but not for terrorism. Ahmed Abassi had been arrested during the Autumn Leaves roundup in October 1988, while he was visiting his brother in Germany. There were no known links between the individuals arrested in Sweden and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103; however, the Swedes were now partners in this international investigation as there were connections to the PFLP-GC cell in Germany, still the number one suspect in the bombing. Investigation was also being conducted in Yugoslavia because of information obtained during the Autumn Leaves arrests. Yugoslavia cooperated fully with the FBI and Scottish police. Another PFLP-GC member, Mobdi Gobden, also known as Abu Fuad, had fled Yugoslavia when his apartment was searched. Numerous detonators, detonation cord, Soviet TNT and several pounds of Semtex, the Czechoslovakian plastic explosive which had caused the Lockerbie crash, were found. Although this avenue was fully explored to include a forensic examination of the plastic explosive, no tie to Lockerbie was ever established. Gobden’s name would resurface, after his death, at the Lockerbie trial in 2000. The Scots and the FBI believed one of the keys to solving this crime would be to interview Marwan Khreesat, the bomb builder who had been arrested in Germany in 1988. This would prove to be a difficult task. Intelligence reporting indicated that Khreesat was back in Jordan, under the protection of Jordanian officials. We went through the CIA, who had an excellent relationship with officials in Jordanian intelligence. Scottish officers, on their own, traveled to Amman and confronted the Jordanians. They demanded access to Khreesat and for their troubles were sent packing. We had no better luck working through the CIA. At the end of May 1989, a high-ranking Jordanian officer traveled to the United States and met with the CIA and FBI. When a Scottish officer attempted to attend the meeting, the Jordanians barred him from the room. They had been put off by the earlier visit from the Scots. We did our best during the week of May 21 to get access to Khreesat, thinking it did not really matter who got access so long as the information was made available to the investigative team. To some it did matter and would continue to matter. By the time the Jordanians returned home, the FBI at least had an idea what it was facing and the Scottish police were truly upset — with the FBI, the CIA and the Jordanians.

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Chapter 6: Forensics and Distractions The cast of characters at the next international conference in Washington, D.C. at the end of May 1989 would grow. In addition to Scottish, English, American and German officials, the Swedish police were invited to participate. The conference only lasted a day and by the time it ended, it was clear the solution was not within sight.

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CHAPTER 7: INVESTIGATION HEADS TO MALTA The next international conference was held in Tyson’s Corner, Virginia, outside Washington. WFO agents discussed what had been accomplished in the United States since December. Little information had been developed through the interviews of American family members. No one recalled any victim having a suitcase similar to that which contained the bomb. Few passengers had sinister backgrounds and there was no indication of a murder for insurance. One big discrepancy had been found. Pan Am’s records indicated Khaled Jaafar had checked two bags. Two bags had been recovered intact and appeared to have been carry-on luggage. However, no evidence had been developed connecting Jaafar to the bombing. Another WFO agent provided an overview of the PFLP-GC and discussed their history of attacks against aircraft. Deputy Chief Newell announced that Chief Boyd had retired from the police service; George Esson, from Aberdeen, Scotland, would replace him. Newell then stressed the point that the investigation would go nowhere unless there was a free exchange of information between all parties. His comments were not necessarily directed at those in the room. He added, “We are only as good as our worst investigator.” Indeed, it was very small fragments of evidence which had thus far driven our investigation—and overlooking the smallest item of debris could cause valuable evidence and lines of inquiry to be lost forever. Stuart Henderson gave a presentation on the luggage and other forensic avenues being explored. He confirmed the bomb had been within a hard-sided antique copper Samsonite Silhouette 4000 suitcase. This identification was positive as the lock had also been recovered. The suitcase had been manufactured within the past two years and many had been distributed in the Middle East. The radio, a Toshiba RT-SF16 twin speaker, was probably black in color. It was known as the “bombeat.” We were reminded of the PFLP-GC device recovered

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Chapter 7: Investigation Heads to Malta in Germany in October. A portion of the owner’s manual for this radio had also been recovered in K sector of the search area. The explosive device contained 390-420 grams of plastic explosive, or less than one pound. He discussed placement of the IED suitcase and said it was the opinion of Scottish police the bag had gone on the plane at Frankfurt or transited Frankfurt. It was a consolation to Chris Bird, the NSY representative from London, but not to the German contingent. The bag containing the explosive device was on the second row of bags. While the balance of probability was the bag came from Frankfurt, he did not rule out a rogue bag entering the system at London. When Bird spoke, he outlined in exhaustive detail the extent of the investigation at Heathrow. There were 100,000 employees at Heathrow and over 50,000 people had airside access badges. Their prior estimate had been 38,000. While he acknowledged the introduction of the bag at Heathrow was a possibility, NSY had interviewed all the former employees there. He asked the Germans if they had done the same thing at Frankfurt. There was tension in the air in anticipation of the German presentation. Hartwig Maas, of the BKA, discussed the numerous countries and organizations around the world having the desire and ability to commit such an atrocity and suggested it was possibly a surrogate of these nations, the PFLP-GC or Hezbollah, that carried out the attack. Maas acknowledged the device could have gone on board in Frankfurt through an airport worker but pointed out that the German PFLP-GC bombs would detonate after reaching a certain altitude. If it went into the system at Frankfurt, the PFLP-GC bomb should have detonated between Frankfurt and London. We agreed with this assessment, but believed the device may have malfunctioned on that leg of the flight. The BKA was having difficulty accessing the records of their intelligence agencies. These were considered key to developing more information regarding others who may have been involved in the German cell. The newest participants at the conference were the Swedes. They had been asked to attend because of the connection between Sweden and the Autumn Leaves subjects in Germany. They had no information to indicate that anyone in Sweden had been involved in the downing of the Pan Am jumbo jet, but raids earlier that month in Sweden resulted in the arrests of 15 individuals of Middle Eastern descent. Six were still in custody. They were suspected of involvement in bombings which had taken place in Amsterdam and Copenhagen in 1986. Some of those arrested had connections to the individuals arrested in Germany in October. During the afternoon prosecutors discussed the evidence which had been developed. It was apparent no country was close to an indictment. Little information had been received from the intelligence community. While no one gave it much consideration at the time, no intelligence agency played an active role in this conference or the earlier one in Scotland. We would

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation have to wait until the clues emerged from the rubble in Lockerbie. What no one knew was that it had already been found but its significance had yet to be appreciated. The conference ended with unanimity. We agreed to cooperate, share information, stop the leaks and cover the “actions” generated by the Scottish HOLMES case management system. The next conference would be held in Germany around the first of September. It looked like time rather than events would dictate these meetings. Early that summer Gallagher dissolved the FBIHQ task force and placed me in charge of a Middle East terrorism unit focused on Palestinian terrorism. We still suspected the PFLP-GC had bombed Pan Am Flight 103. I took oversight of the case with me and while it was still my first priority, I had additional responsibilities. The PFLP-GC continued to be our prime focus, not so much due to specific evidence or intelligence, but was the most logical place to look. But by midsummer 1989, our investigation was about to take another turn. RARDE determined the Samsonite suitcase which contained the bomb had also contained a medium blue “romper suit.” This garment was sized for a 12- to 18-month-old. While the manufacturer was not identified, the garment was made in Malta, an island in the Mediterranean between Libya and Sicily. Items which exhibited significant explosive damage were being identified at RARDE. This included an “Outback Red” shirt as well as a pair of brown plaid pants and a white T shirt. It was still too early to tell if these items had been contained within the explosive suitcase. Throughout the rest of the summer, I met with the CIA on a regular basis as well as German and Israeli intelligence liaison officers. As a representative of FBIHQ, I had access to these intelligence agencies in Washington, access that agents at the WFO did not have. It would be up to me to share the information developed with the WFO. It was about this time the first of the CIA intelligence charts surfaced. Gallagher and I often joked their charts could tie anybody to anything. One of the earliest charts assessed the PFLP-GC was responsible for the bombing. Following its orderly flow, it was easy to make an intelligence case that Jibril, Dalkamouni and the PFLP-GC in Germany was responsible for the attack using one of Khreesat’s devices. While logical, there was not one shred of evidence which could be used in court. Similar charts would later be used to tie Libya to the bombing but they were only useful as a guide or a policy tool. By late August 1989, RARDE had identified a number of “category one” items which they opined had been in or near the primary cause of the explosion. These items included the baby’s romper suit, some Yorkie brand trousers, a cardigan sweater, a herringbone patterned sport jacket and a pajama top. As summer ended, Scottish officers headed to Malta. The island is 17 miles long and has a storied history. St. Paul and Napoleon were two visitors of note

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Chapter 7: Investigation Heads to Malta who spent time there. Malta obtained its independence from Britain in 1964 and declared a republic ten years later. Strategically located in the Mediterranean, Malta had its share of notoriety and was getting ready for more. Air Malta, Swissair and Libyan Arab Airlines were a few of the carriers which served Malta in 1988, but no one offered direct service to the United States. The airline guide for December 1988 recommended that if someone wanted to go to New York from there, the routing would be Air Malta (KM) Flight 180 from Valletta to Frankfurt, transfer to Pan Am Flight 103A to London and then Pan Am Flight 103 to New York. The Scottish police traveled to Malta in late August 1989 to find the manufacturers of the category one items. They located the Yorkie Clothing Company and determined that they only distributed their products in Malta. The investigators in Scotland had also determined that the piece of material having the Yorkie label had the number 1705, in ink, on the garment. When interviewed, the manager of the company said 1705 was an order number. He determined that order number 1705 was for 98 pair of trousers placed by a Tony Gauci in October 1988. It had been delivered to Mary’s House, a shop owned by Gauci, on November 18, 1988. Five pair of these trousers were plaid like those in the bomb suitcase. In addition to this identification, a sweater having a “Puccini” label was also contained in the suitcase. The manager of Eagle knitwear in Malta confirmed that the sweater had been manufactured by his company. On November 7, 1988, ten sweaters bearing this label were delivered to Mary’s House. Senior police detective Harry Bell from Strathclyde interviewed Tony Gauci on September 1, 1989. Gauci recalled one day during the winter of 1988 when he was working alone in his shop and a man came in just before closing at about 6:30 p.m. Gauci recalled the man because he had acted strangely, buying whatever Gauci suggested, regardless of size. He recalled details of the purchases, including a wool herringbone jacket that Gauci had had in his shop for several years since the weather is warm in Malta year round. The man also purchased a pair of Yorkie trousers, a light brown pair of trousers, a blue colored baby outfit with a lamb’s head on it and a black umbrella (he recalled the black umbrella specifically, because it had been raining that day.) Other items which he purchased included three pair of large size pajamas which were brown and cream colored, and a large brown Puccini cardigan. Gauci gave a detailed description of the purchaser, a Libyan, judging by his accent, at least six feet tall with a large chest and head, very black hair, dark-colored skin and clean shaven, between 45 and 50 years of age. Tony also helped pin the date of the sale to December 7, 1988. He said he had been alone in his shop and his brother, Paul, was at home watching a football match on television. He said it was also about the time the Christmas lights were put up near his shop. An FBI sketch artist traveled to Malta and prepared a drawing of what the man looked like. The field of suspects had now widened to include the mystery man with the Libyan accent. Libya had always been on the list of suspects and we soon

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation determined that Malta, only 200 miles from Libya, was a favorite vacation spot. Now the questions mounted. Who was involved? The Palestinians? The Libyans? The Iranians? Was it a collection of each of these groups and nations? The next international conference was scheduled for Germany in mid-September 1989. The cast of participants had grown to include the Maltese Police. John Orr, the Scottish SIO, shared information about the ongoing inquiries in Malta. The BKA had, in the past month, given him a computer printout from the internal baggage record system at Frankfurt Airport on December 21, 1988. Knowing the baggage system would purge its records a few days after the bombing, Bogomira Erac, an airport employee, had printed a copy of the baggage records for December 21 and kept it in her desk. While this information had been made available to the BKA in February 1989, it was not shared with the LICC until eight months after the bombing. Orr was livid and was suspicious the BKA had intentionally withheld this information. While Scottish police officials were irate over the belated production of the baggage records, the Scots too would be guilty of slowing down the investigation in the coming months. Through the trial, many people associated with the investigation disagreed with the numbers of pieces of luggage which had been carried on each flight. Baggage records were notoriously inconsistent. The biggest problem was that human beings were required to input information and they did not do it in a consistent manner. But we knew this baggage record could be used in conjunction with other evidence collected. The baggage records for Pan Am and other airlines had been frozen in December 1988 so they could be further analyzed. However, Frankfurt Airport had its own internal baggage record system which tracked luggage as it made its way around the airport from one plane to another, something which had not been known at the outset. The newly found baggage record showed bag number B8849, the 8,849th bag to go through Frankfurt Airport for the day, had been entered into the system at 13:07 (1:07 p.m.) on December 21. This bag was loaded at V-3 hall, a baggage buildup area near Gate 44 from which Pan Am Flight 103 would depart about three hours later. Other worksheets maintained at the airport indicated a total of seven bags had been processed through station 206 between 12:15 and 13:10. The bags loaded after 12:15 were from five Lufthansa flights and one from an Air Portugal flight. According to a handwritten note on the records, the sixth bag was from KM180, an Air Malta flight which had arrived in Frankfurt shortly before 1:00 p.m.. After passing through the system, it was coded as being destined for Pan Am Flight 103. The remainder of the conference was uneventful. There were discussions about the PFLP-GC cell and additional pledges of cooperation. It was similar to the last conference. Some progress had been made but it was slow. The Germans were hospitable but the accusation they had purposefully withheld information cast a pall over the day.

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Chapter 7: Investigation Heads to Malta The next day Gallagher and I returned to the United States. We were in for a surprise. The Pan Am station in Frankfurt was undergoing a security inspection. At check in, our bags were thoroughly searched even after they learned we were with the FBI. Although we returned home resolved to more closely coordinate our investigative efforts, some believed it was business as usual. The Scottish police believed they were “in charge.” There were a number of unresolved issues and the Scots were independently running in several directions at one time. Rather than effective coordination, there was competition. Pressure was kept on the CIA to get access to Marwan Khreesat. Despite the efforts of the CIA and FBI, it seemed no one was going to see him. Although the Scots had been rebuffed both in Jordan and Washington, their security services continued to make efforts to gain access to him as well. Even with all the progress which had been made forensically, the investigation had bogged down. What we needed was a break. However, before that happened, there would be a detour.

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CHAPTER 8: AVIV AND KHREESAT TOO On October 4, 1989, William H. Webster, the former FBI Director and then head of the CIA, had just been briefed on a sensitive issue. Pan Am was fighting for survival; travel to Europe was down and there were threats of civil suits which could bankrupt the airline. They had hired Interfor Incorporated, owned by an Israeli named Juval Aviv, to look into the circumstances surrounding the bombing. I met with Thomas Plaskett, the chairman of Pan Am, the next day in Washington, D.C., then with his lawyers in New York, who made Aviv’s report available. Watergate had shaken the United States in 1972, but if Aviv’s report was true, the allegations would be significantly more damaging because it alleged US Government complicity in the bombing. Aviv’s report included the generally accepted and public version of what brought down the aircraft, with the detonation of a barometric timing device, designed to evade airport security, similar to those found in Germany in October 1988 in the possession of members of the PFLP-GC. The report further suggested that five employees of the CIA were on board the aircraft and there were four US Air Force scientists having secret documents in their possession. CIA agents allegedly converged at the scene in Lockerbie after the bombing and acted strangely while securing the luggage of the CIA employees. (This would have been virtually impossible due to the Scottish police control of the search area. The FBI, who had agents in Lockerbie, did not participate in the search. The search area encompassed an area of 845 square miles. It would have been impossible for anyone to know where to go to find the luggage of specific passengers.) The report made a variety of allegations. It said the perpetrators could be either Iranians, the PFLP-GC, or Hezbollah, or Libya, as Gaddafi wanted to commit an attack which would not lead back to his doorstep. Aviv said that Khaled Jaafar met with Jibril and a bomb maker in Germany in December 1988

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Chapter 8: Aviv and Khreesat Too and Jibril tried to convince Jaafar to make a courier run for the “cause.” Aviv alleged that there were both drug and weapons smuggling operations going through Frankfurt on a regular basis. There were references to “Turkish” baggage handlers there as well as a possible BKA/DEA/CIA operation gone wrong. This rogue CIA operation was referred to by Aviv as “CIA 1.” He also said part of the CIA 1 operation dealt with arms for hostages exchanges. Aviv said the BKA had filmed all the activities at the airport and although the BKA copy had been “lost,” one was maintained at the CIA. None was ever found and each agency involved denied there was any truth to these allegations. Aviv’s sources said that Jaafar’s luggage was switched at Frankfurt for the one which contained the bomb. He also said the bomb had been manipulated so it would survive two takeoffs such as the Lockerbie bomb did if one believed the bomb went on the plane at Frankfurt. Aviv described his sources as individuals who worked in different units of the intelligence community in four western governments. They were individuals who did not collect evidence or apprehend terrorists, but they “monitored” their activities. Another source was in a position to receive “inside consensus” of security officers at Frankfurt Airport and the last was someone who was in a position to “observe” the activities of various terrorist networks in Europe. The rest of Aviv’s report contained recommendations for the pending litigation against Pan Am. Aviv’s report made interesting reading, but he never identified his sources. His theories could never be verified through travel records, telephone calls or any other documentation. He told Pan Am what it wanted to hear. Pan Am was not responsible for the bombing; components of the United States Government were! The investigation conducted by the FBI and the Scottish police never confirmed any of Aviv’s findings. The CIA, DEA, BKA and the Israeli Mossad all denied the roles Aviv said they played. In November 1989, the CIA succeeded in getting the FBI access to Marwan Khreesat in Jordan. Although the Scots had failed in their prior attempts, our persistence with the CIA and ultimately the Jordanians paid off. We were told not to tell the Scots or share the information obtained with them. He was interviewed over two days, five hours each day. Khreesat acknowledged he had been a member of the PFLP-GC, but said he had been recruited by the Jordanian Intelligence Service as a source. He went to Europe in 1988 to infiltrate that group, a number of whose members he knew. The Jordanians sent him with the caveat he not only kept them apprized of his activities, but was to build no functional bombs. He went to work with Hafez Dalkamouni, a high ranking official of the PFLP-GC. He had met Dalkamouni in Syria in 1986.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation In 1985, Khreesat had purchased, in Syria, five Toshiba radios, including the one seized in Germany in 1988. They were single speaker radios. He constructed each of them to be used as bombs on the instruction of Ahmed Jibril. He eventually took them apart. One of the radios was converted back into a regular radio. He believed three of them were still in Syria and one was taken to Germany by Khreesat’s wife to be given to her brother who was in prison. In September 1988, Dalkamouni summoned Khreesat to Yugoslavia. While there he met Mobdi Gobden, also known as Abu Fuad. Dalkamouni and Khreesat stayed at Gobden’s home. Khreesat was not aware of any telephone calls made by Dalkamouni while they were in Yugoslavia but recalled they were supposed to meet with Abu Elias, but they never met. Khreesat and his wife traveled to Germany on October 13, 1988 to visit her brother who was in prison there. Dalkamouni had asked Khreesat to come. They went to Hashem Abassi’s apartment, where the Khreesats stayed. On their second day there they attempted to give her brother the Toshiba bombeat 453 radio that had been configured into an IED in 1985 and then converted back into a regular radio. The prison officials would not allow them to leave it, so they took it back to the Abassi apartment. Dalkamouni told Khreesat he was needed to build IEDs to be used against aviation targets. He said Abu Elias would be coming to Germany. Elias was supposed to have been in Yugoslavia the previous month, but failed to appear. Khreesat wondered why he was needed, but Dalkamouni told him that Elias was a specialist in aviation security and he (Khreesat) was the specialist in building IEDs. Dalkamouni discussed with Khreesat plans to bomb Israeli and other unspecified aircraft. Dalkamouni also mentioned other targets including a nightclub frequented by Americans as well as Jewish-owned stores near Frankfurt. Dalkamouni gave Khreesat all the money he needed while in Germany. On his third day in Germany, Khreesat began to look at electronic devices he could convert into IEDs. By Sunday, October 16, Khreesat, who was working for the Jordanians, noticed police or intelligence vehicles doing surveillance. Early the next week he began to purchase what he needed to build IEDs. Dalkamouni brought him explosives. Dalkamouni purchased two alarm clocks which Khreesat understood were to be used against a nightclub. Khreesat recalled that Jibril and Dalkamouni spoke one or two times while he was there but the conversations were always in a code that he did not know. About a week before the BKA arrested them, Dalkamouni put about 300 grams of a plastic explosive, wrapped in heavy brown tape, into his car where it stayed until they were arrested. Dalkamouni also discussed plans for the nightclub attack. This IED was to contain two live mortar shells. The explosives and timer were to be put in with the mortar shells and the device placed into a shoulder bag or backpack, which would be taken into the nightclub and left there. The mortar shells would serve as a fragmentation device. Khreesat’s wife returned to Jordan on October 22, 1988 and after she left, Dalkamouni told him Abu Elias

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Chapter 8: Aviv and Khreesat Too was in Germany. Khreesat was concerned about the presence of Elias because he was under orders from his Jordanian handlers to render any devices he made inoperable. In the evening of October 22, he began constructing the IEDs. The first device he built was in the Toshiba bombeat 453 which he had brought to give to his wife’s brother. The interviewers knew a bombeat 453 had been recovered in the initial arrests in October 1988 and the tuners and monitor located in April 1989, just prior to the BKA technician being killed. He made devices out of two Ultrasound tuners. The fourth device was constructed from a Sanyo television monitor. The fifth device was similar to the Toshiba radio cassette recorder only a little larger, a Toshiba RT-F423 model one-speaker radio. There was an altimeter switch in the device. On Monday, October 24, he worked on all five devices. He went to take a shower, but when he returned he discovered the second Toshiba radio (F423), the “fifth device,” had disappeared. He believed Dalkamouni had taken it. This “fifth device” haunted us for years. Until it was proven forensically that Khreesat’s bombs had not brought down the Lockerbie plane, we assumed it was the “fifth device” which had brought down the jumbo jet. Dalkamouni wanted to have someone take a device like the Toshiba bombeat 453 on board an aircraft, arm it, and then get off at the next stop before the device detonated. He said he wanted to conduct an operation within the next week, but offered no details. On the night of October 25, Dalkamouni called Jibril and told him the devices were ready. That night Khreesat contacted the Jordanians to tell them he had armed devices for Dalkamouni. That information was passed onto the Germans, who decided to end operation “Autumn Leaves.” The next morning Dalkamouni put the Toshiba bombeat 453 in the trunk of his car along with the remainder of the plastic explosive. Khreesat called Jordan to bring them up to date; after the call, he and Dalkamouni were arrested. Khreesat never saw Abu Elias in Germany and could only speculate Dalkamouni may have taken the “fifth device,” the larger Toshiba radio cassette recorder, and given it to Elias. The investigators showed Khreesat a Toshiba radio cassette recorder similar to that which was considered to have blown up Pan Am Flight 103. He said he could not use this type of radio because it would only hold about 100 grams of explosive after he inserted all the components he needed for an altimeter bomb. He only built four devices in Germany and connected wires on the “fifth device” at Dalkamouni’s request. He did not know what had become of the fifth device. During his interview Khreesat was shown a number of photographs, including one of Khaled Jaafar; he did not recognize him. The interview with Khreesat did not help us. Khreesat had told his Jordanian handlers the same story early in the investigation. Khreesat could have been lying or withholding information. However, we had gotten access to him and half a loaf was better than nothing.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation We wrestled with how to inform the Scottish police about the interview. The Jordanians and the CIA were adamant they not be provided any details about the interview or even told it had taken place. Even though no information had been obtained which would move us forward, it was impossible to work a joint investigation and not share everything. This was a no-win situation. Whatever we did would anger someone and possibly damage relationships and cooperation. We decided to tell the Scots about the interview at the next international coordination conference scheduled for Lockerbie in January 1990. This problem of cooperation and information sharing was a problem which would hamper us for another full year.

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CHAPTER 9: JANUARY-JUNE 1990: FRUSTRATION TO FRUITION

On January 10, 1990, Chief Esson welcomed 25 investigators and prosecutors from the United States, Germany, Malta, Sweden and England. The new SIO, Stuart Henderson, talked about the forensic evidence. The suitcase fragments which had been recovered were being analyzed for fingerprints. None were ever found. Only 487 these 26-inch suitcases were made. Investigators had recovered the owners’ manual for the radio, printed in Arabic, near Lockerbie. Neither the radio nor the suitcase had been distributed in Malta. Deputy SIO Jim Gilchrist made a presentation concerning the luggage carried on board the aircraft. Seven passengers had “interlined” into London. They had come from another flight other than Pan Am Flight 103A into London. These included Matt Gannon and Major Charles McKee, who had arrived in London from Cyprus at 1:30 p.m.. Both were alleged to be associated with US intelligence agencies. Gannon’s one checked bag had been recovered but had some blast damage. McKee had two bags, one of which had blast damage and the other did not. The forensic examiners opined the bags were probably in the luggage container at 14L, the location of the IED suitcase. Henderson discussed the evidence which had been collected. He talked about the “fifth device.” He detailed the ongoing investigation throughout Europe to locate Mobdi Gobden, Abu Elias and others associated with the PFLP-GC in Germany and Sweden. He discussed ongoing efforts in Malta and Cyprus. We were still focused on the Frankfurt Airport luggage record which showed a bag from KM Flight 180 that made its way to Pan Am Flight 103. Nothing had as yet linked the bag to an individual. The BKA, represented by Manfred Klink, the Leading Criminal Director for Counter terrorism, pointed out that the attack could have been carried out by the PFLP-GC, but not the cell in Germany. All baggage handlers at Frankfurt

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Airport had been interviewed with negative results, an answer to Bird, who had asked that question six months before. He said a number of the hand written notes at the airport had proven to be inaccurate. Two other significant events occurred, but outside the confines of the conference. Both the Americans and the Scots had something to share in private. During a break on January 10, Gallagher and Gow decided it was time to share the Khreesat information with Chief Esson. They went for a walk in a garden on the grounds of the conference center. They asked him to keep this conversation private and provided him a copy of the FD-302 FBI interview conducted in Jordan in November. Esson thanked them for the report. However when the conference was over he lambasted his security services for not getting Scottish police officers the same access the CIA had gotten for the FBI. This was not soon forgotten. This made the CIA upset with the FBI for having shared the details with the Scottish police. No doubt the Jordanians were also unhappy. However, this was an international investigation and we decided not to keep this secret while searching for a mass murderer. At the same time, in a corner of the conference room, Henderson spoke to Kelso and me about a new, possibly significant, forensic discovery. A chip, so small it would fit on the end of a man’s finger, had been located among the debris in Lockerbie. It had been blasted into a piece of clothing which was definitely in the bomb suitcase. This chip, which became known as PT-35, was about the size of the fragment of the radio circuit board which had been recovered after the bombing and had been traced to the Toshiba radio cassette player. This fragment was in fact smaller than the radio chip and was different to anything they had seen before and was not part of the radio which had concealed the bomb. Henderson was not going to bring this up to the entire group but he wanted to ensure we were aware of this development, the significance of which was not yet known. Henderson said the Scottish police would run out the leads concerning it but, as yet, no positive information had been discovered. Although we insisted the FBI be involved to identify the chip, Henderson was emphatic the Scottish police would discover its source. This decision cost us six months. The next day prosecutors from each country met to discuss the evidence which had been gathered. This was the first time they had gotten together, as a group, without the police. Much of the day’s discussion related to definitions and the mechanics of statutes which could apply to the case. There were big differences in each legal system. It was clear if there was a prosecution, it would happen in either Scotland or the United States. The first discussion of a “rendition” of a subject, if one could be identified, came up at this meeting. Scottish prosecutors acknowledged Scottish officers had no jurisdiction outside their country. However, the Scots were aware the US Government had exercised its extraterritorial juris-

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Chapter 9: January-June 1990: Frustration to Fruition diction to arrest terrorists overseas and they cautioned that a Scottish court might not look favorably on an “irregular rendition” of a suspect. Another discussion related to the Scottish rules of evidence. No person could be convicted based solely on the testimony of one person. This rule required all evidence to be corroborated by another witness or source. However, they agreed the case had not progressed far enough to provide evidence to sustain a conviction. My trip back to the United States seemed longer than usual. The investigation was more than a year old but it seemed there was still distrust. Shortly after our return to Washington, I vented to Gallagher about what the FBI was doing. I was critical of the number of agents the FBI dedicated to the investigation since the outset. While the Scottish police still had over 80 officers on the case, the FBI never had that many people assigned and the core of the investigation was far less. We had no one expert in any area and a handful of agents were carrying most of the load. While there had been continuity of the FBI agent in Scotland, the same could not be said for Malta. Agents were being rotated in and out far too often. During the spring of 1990, the investigation moved slowly forward. The Scots went all over the world to find what PT-35 was. No one knew if the fragment, with few distinguishing marks on it, would ever be identified. It did not have numbers which could be matched such as those on the fragment which identified the radio. We knew it was a long shot, but the FBI wanted a crack at figuring out from where it had come. However, the tenacity and dedication of the Scottish police could not be questioned. The investigative focus was now in Malta. The FBI, the Scottish police and the BKA were all there. Although Tony Gauci had been interviewed several times and had been shown numerous photographs of suspected terrorists, he had not identified any of them as the person who had purchased the clothing contained in the bomb bag. The FBI made a decision to send analysts to Malta, to enter all of the Maltese immigration records from before and after the bombing into an automated database. These records consisted of cards filled out by persons arriving and departing Malta, and had to be hand searched. It was another long shot but the future benefits could not be ignored. This turned out to be a significant bit of investigative strategy and although it took months to complete and would not pay the ultimate dividend for nearly a year, it was, along with the superb evidence collection at Lockerbie, key to the success of the investigation. During the spring of 1990, the Scots traveled the world to identify PT-35 to no avail. I continued to meet with German intelligence agencies in Washington for any new information about the PFLP-GC cell. The CIA continued to assert that the Iranians had contracted with the PFLP-GC to take revenge on the United States after the Vincennes shot down the airbus. When the cell in Germany was disrupted in October 1988, someone, they said, took the task on

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation and completed the attack on December 21. Such intelligence assessments would never reach the standard which prosecutors needed in a court. Cold hard facts were missing. Although all of the world’s intelligence agencies had suspicions, not one had anything we could use. By the time investigators from Scotland, Malta, Germany and Sweden arrived at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia for the next International Conference, on June 11, 1990, we wondered what we would talk about because so little progress had been made. Everything seemed to be a dead end. We were frustrated. One of the Scottish officers said they had enough evidence to write a report naming the PFLP-GC as the perpetrators. Little more had been found in the fields around Lockerbie, the intelligence information had remained constant and no witness had come forward to tell us how the bombing took place. Without a significant break, it seemed there would be no solution to the crime. The Scots finally told everyone else about PT-35, the fragment that appeared to have come from a circuit board, which had been blasted into the Yorkie clothing. They had visited 55 companies around the world and had been unable to identify its source. It did not match any of the electronic components found at Lockerbie. Tom Thurman, the agent from the explosives unit, who had been present in Lockerbie early in the investigation and had been part of the team which had interviewed Khreesat the prior November, approached Henderson and asked if he could take photographs of PT-35 and attempt to identify it. Henderson, who believed the Scots had done all they could do, agreed. What Thurman did yielded fruit within two days. This quickly put us on a new track leading to the eventual solution. Thurman took the photographs to John Scott Orkin* at the CIA. (Orkin* later testified at the Lockerbie trial using this name.) He was a technical expert and collected and analyzed explosive devices which had been recovered all over the world. Henderson and his colleagues were on an airplane headed back to Scotland; what Thurman discovered would turn Henderson around quicker than he ever imagined. When Thurman produced the photographs of PT-35, Orkin* took out some of his reports to compare circuit boards. Orkin* had photographs of a certain timer and it appeared similar to a second which had been seized several years before in Africa. Thurman asked if he could remove the back of the timer. He exposed the circuit board and examined it with a magnifier. When he saw it, he exclaimed, “I have you now!” It seemed the timer he held in his hand and the photograph of the fragment found at Lockerbie were identical. Thurman quickly notified officials at WFO and FBIHQ of his discovery. We quickly decided we had something to share and did it immediately. In twenty-four hours the Scots along with their chief forensic scientist, Allen Feraday, were back in America.

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Chapter 9: January-June 1990: Frustration to Fruition Because of what Tom Thurman had done — he knew where to look — the FBI was able to conclusively determine the chip had come from a circuit board which was found in a timer that was identical to timers which had been seized in two African countries, Togo and Senegal. Our next task was to find out the circumstances surrounding the seizure, as well as the origins of the timer itself. The Togo investigation yielded little information. There had been an attempted coup to overthrow the Government of Togo in September, 1986. Numerous items had been seized from the rebels to include an electronic timing device. The device had been turned over to the Americans in 1986, shortly after it was recovered. This device, later called K-1 by the FBI, was given by the CIA to the FBI when Thurman visited them in mid-June. There was no proof what country was behind the coup. Some in the Togolese Government believed Ghana was behind it. Others believed the Libyan Government may have had a hand in the attempt. The investigation in Senegal was more productive. Not only was the timer recovered the same year as the Lockerbie bombing, names were connected with the recovery. On February 20, 1988, two Libyan men had been arrested at the Dakar airport in Senegal after arriving on an Air Afrique flight from Benin, another African country. These men possessed 19 pounds of Semtex plastic explosive, fuses, detonators, a weapon and ammunition along with an electronic timer. The timer seized in Senegal was an updated version of that which had been seized in Togo 18 months before. One of the two Libyans who had been arrested was Muhammad Al-Marzuq also known as Muhammad Ali Al-Nayil (true name). Court records later showed his name might be Mohamed Abdou Salam El Marzouk. Al-Nayil was alleged to be a terrorist who had been active in attacks in Africa on behalf of the Libyan Government for many years. He allegedly spent time in a jail in Tunisia for activities in that nation in the 1970s and was in charge of military intelligence at the Tripoli airport. His companion was Mansur Umram Sabir (also known as Mansour Omran Ammar Saber). He was a suspected terrorist, in charge of the Libyan External Security Office at Tripoli airport. Although these two men were arrested with bomb-making materials, they were released four months later and deported to Libya. When the FBI and the Scots were in Senegal in July 1990, they located a gun and silencer but all the other materials which had been seized, including the timer, had disappeared. Fortunately, the CIA had taken photographs of that timer. The photograph of Al-Nayil, taken when he was arrested, buoyed our spirits. He looked a lot like the drawing of the individual who had bought the clothes at Gauci’s shop. We had no idea where the circuit board or the timer had come from, but we could now place a timer identical to the one which blew up Pan Am Flight 103 in the hands of a known Libyan intelligence officer ten months before the bombing.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation A review of the Maltese database showed an individual using the same name as an alias of Al-Nayil had departed Malta on October 19, 1988. Still, Gauci was shown a photograph of Al-Nayil on August 31, 1990, and he could not pick him out as the person who had bought the clothing. That was disheartening, but we had more work to do. The investigation was starting to focus. The evidence was pointing us to Libya despite all the intelligence analysis which had directed us toward the PFLP-GC. The discovery of the timer did one other thing. It was not a barometric timer but one which was dependant only on time, not altitude. This device was not similar to the PFLP-GC timers. No wonder it had not mattered how many times the plane took off or landed. These timers could be set on a time delay. In the meantime, while investigators were trying to learn about the attempted coup in Togo in 1986, as well as the arrests at Dakar airport in February 1988, other agents and officers were trying to find the origins of the timer, known simply as an MST-13. There were few markings on it. Thurman and Feraday had already confirmed the chip known as PT-35 had come from an identical circuit board. Although we had a piece of a timer similar to that which destroyed the “Maid of the Seas” in our possession, we were no closer to determining the manufacturer. Thurman decided to examine the Togo timer more closely. He took K-1, the Togo timer, apart and when he did, noticed the letters “MEBO.” They were difficult to read as if someone had intentionally tried to obliterate them and appeared to read “M580.” Before we got to MEBO, the investigation would take another turn, this one more cosmetic.

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CHAPTER 10: MANAGEMENT CHANGES; MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES In August 1990, Ghadanfar and Dalkamouni, the PFLP-GC members in jail in Germany, were interviewed. No one believed they would tell the truth anyway, and they denied involvement in the bombing. No new evidence was developed. They were tried and convicted for the bombings of US troop trains in 1987 and 1988 but, as summer moved to fall 1990, our investigation was moving away from them. On September 28, 1990, Gallagher called me into his office and said the FBI was going to designate one person to be responsible for both the administrative and operational aspects of the investigation. I had been involved with the investigation from the outset and had led the FBIHQ task force. After it was dissolved, six months after the bombing, I had become chief of a Middle East terrorism unit and took oversight of the case with me. I had been to all the international conferences, knew the other country participants and knew the case as well as anyone in the FBI. I was asked to go to the WFO and lead the investigation. While I did not have to make a decision until the next day, I knew it had already been made. I would now be responsible for the operational and administrative aspects of the case. I had often disagreed with WFO and its use of resources dedicated to the case. Now it would be up to me. The transfer would be effective on November 1. However, there were issues to be addressed before this happened. There was competition between the police agencies involved. There was probably competition between the intelligence agencies as well. Gallagher wanted to host a meeting in Washington to air differences and set an agenda for working together. Indeed, his foresight set the tone for future cooperation. The October 9 meeting was the first time the FBI, the Scottish police, the CIA and the BSS had been in one room together. And even now, before the week

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation was out, there were problems in Switzerland where the FBI and the Scots were trying to identify MEBO. By mid-October, I had provided Robert S. Mueller, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division at the DOJ and his prosecutors, Brian Murtagh from the US Attorney’s office in Washington and Dana Biehl, the assistant chief of the Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section at the DOJ, with briefings on the case. Murtagh had been involved in the investigation for a year and Biehl was newly appointed. They would also be detailed to the task force. I received my marching orders. “Make the relationships work and proceed toward an indictment.” Gallagher thought my assignment would last six months. While I hoped the case could be solved by then, we still had no idea who had bought the clothes, put the bomb together, and put the bag on the plane. Most significantly, we had no idea who had ordered the bombing. Before arriving at WFO, new revelations would be reported in the media and this once again would redirect our attention. I did not return to FBIHQ for nearly two years. Since January 1989, I had never contacted any Scottish official directly, always deferring to the WFO. Now, prior to reporting to WFO, I closed my office door and called Stuart Henderson. The Scots had a fantastic network of sources in the FBI (who were more than compensated for in the person of Tom Jourdan, the FBI agent now detailed to the LICC), but they had only been able to report rumors of my transfer to the WFO. I confirmed it to Henderson. We spent over an hour on the telephone and this conversation became the model for the future; we would spend hundreds of hours on the phone and in person over the next year. Our conversation that day related to cooperation and full sharing of information. I told Henderson I would pay him a visit before the next international conference. Meanwhile, we found MEBO with help from the CIA and the BSS. The intelligence agencies had been asking questions in Switzerland and, after some initial problems and as a result of the recent meeting in Washington, became helpful. MEBO, a small electronics firm located in Zurich, was the abbreviation for Meister et Bollier (or Meister and Bollier). It was run by two Swiss businessmen, Erwin Meister and Edwin Bollier. A fifth country was about to be added to the investigative team. The Swiss proved to be helpful and capable colleagues. But before the legal and logistical issues concerning a judicial hearing could be worked out in Switzerland, new and troubling allegations surfaced which sidetracked us again. The Aviv report, which had surfaced the previous year, had alleged the CIA was involved in the destruction of the Pan Am jet. The President’s Commission on Aviation Security had rejected the claim, and we had seen no evidence of it during our investigation. Still, in mid-October 1990 the media reported new allegations. Lester Knox Coleman, also known as Thomas Leavy, who later authored a book entitled Trail of the Octopus, alleged he had been an informant of the

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Chapter 10: Management Changes; Management Challenges Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the DEA while working as a reporter in the Middle East in the mid-1980s. He said that Khaled Jaafar, the young Lebanese American who had died aboard the flight, was a drug courier and that a joint CIA/DEA drug courier operation had been set up in Germany to funnel drugs through Frankfurt Airport to the United States. The drug operation was known as “Corea” or “Courier” and was set up to spot drug traffickers coming to the United States. According to Coleman, the operation was being run with the complicity of the German BKA. Jaafar was a regular courier on this route and his drug bag had been replaced by baggage handlers at Frankfurt Airport with one containing the bomb. This scenario was similar to the one in Aviv’s report, which had deflected blame from Pan Am, then fighting for its corporate survival, and onto the Government itself. Coleman’s claims created a furor in Washington, resulting in Congressional hearings into the activities of the CIA and the DEA. Mueller wanted the inquiry conducted by FBI Agents not assigned to the Lockerbie task force but I convinced him to use people familiar with the investigation. He agreed and on November 1, 1990, I spent what was supposed to be my first day at WFO at DEAHQ. Steve Greene, a DEA Assistant Administrator, said the DEA had already done a cursory review of its files and could find no record of Operation Corea or Courier. Jaafar had never been a DEA informant or courier and he doubted anyone had ever had contact with Jaafar, but was not as certain about that because of the vast numbers of people with whom DEA did have contact. He dismissed the allegations out of hand. I briefed Mueller, who had to report the preliminary findings to the White House by the end of the day. DEA Administrator Robert Bonner wanted the findings publicized, as it was his agency which had been criticized. Mueller noted that the Presidential Commission on Aviation Security had debunked the allegations contained in Aviv’s report about the CIA earlier that year. On November 2, I reported to WFO, located at Buzzards Point on the Anacostia River. The trip there took me through some of the roughest neighborhoods in Washington. The task force was allocated workspace in three windowless rooms, filled with diagrams of a Boeing 747 and photographs from the crime scene. There were also two pictures on the wall near the door which kept the agents motivated. One was of a baby shoe which had been recovered at Lockerbie. There were sixteen children under the age of ten on the plane and most of us were parents. The second photograph was of an American flag on the “tail” of Pan Am Flight 103. There was no doubt the Lockerbie attack had been directed at the United States. Not only was Pan Am an American flag carrier but 189 of the people who died on the plane were American citizens. This was an attack on our children and our country. The “office” which I inherited was around the corner from SAC Tom DuHadway. The walls were covered with cheap wood paneling. I shared a room with Larry Knisley, the supervisor of squad C-3. The task force agents occupied

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation the other two rooms. Because of all the travel, most of them were gone so it was generally quiet. When told I was going to WFO, I made only one request. I asked if I could bring Meg Buckis with me. She was the Intelligence Research Specialist (IRS) who knew the intelligence side of the investigation better than anyone; and she agreed to come. A third desk, in the room with Knisley, had two chairs for the prosecutors, Biehl and Murtagh. I met with the WFO task force; the agents would have specific responsibilities, so accountability could be ensured. Then I drove to DEA Headquarters to meet again with Assistant Administrators Greene and Dave Westrate. Special Agents Ed Marshman and Keith Bolcar, with others, began an exhaustive investigation to determine the validity of the allegations against DEA. In a statement made before Congress on December 18, 1990, Greene said that the DEA, which had cooperated fully with the FBI and Congress, had reviewed all operational case files opened between 1984 and 1989 and found nothing resembling an Operation Corea or Courier. No one in the DEA had ever operated any person on Pan Am Flight 103 as an informant, cooperating witness or courier, including Khaled Jaafar, nor had they ever talked to or interviewed any such person. DEA never had nor would they ever place a bag into an aircraft bypassing airport security. We conducted a parallel investigation at the CIA and DIA. Nothing was found which resembled the operations outlined by Coleman or Aviv. I was not naïve and knew there was no way FBI agents could access CIA, DEA and DIA files and find, independently, what the media had alleged. However, the Government is made up of people who generally do the right thing. I doubted any of them would jeopardize their own careers or futures by lying about or covering up something so serious. Secrets are not secrets long in Washington. Meanwhile, despite these distractions, our investigation was moving ahead. The Scots did not share the concern expressed in the United States about the DEA and CIA. They had been concerned about CIA attempts to slow down the investigation and their incursion into avenues better explored by law enforcement. The Scots did not insist their officers accompany FBI agents doing the interviews at the DEA, DIA or the CIA in what they considered to be a wild goose chase. They were onto better and more promising leads. PT-35 was starting to show some progress. On November 5, the investigation in Malta was suspended due to media leaks. The Maltese press had been critical of our investigation and that put investigators in Malta in a more difficult position. Because of such potential news leaks, information about MEBO had not been widely shared. Henderson had not planned to let the Maltese know about the Swiss Magistrate hearing which would be held in ten days, but they had their own sources who told them about the ongoing inquiries in Switzerland. That week, Henderson and I began to discuss how best to advise our law enforcement partners in Germany, Malta and Sweden about Switzerland. We

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Chapter 10: Management Changes; Management Challenges agreed to tell them at the next conference, which was scheduled in about a month in Sweden. I was at WFO a week when I walked into the office of Tom DuHadway, a gentleman who would not live to see the indictments returned. I said, “Tom, I need to go to Lockerbie.” He was skeptical of the need for travel, but I persuaded him it would be most effective for me to meet the Scots at their place, and on their terms, to clear the air and come to some agreements about working together. The only time FBI “officials” had visited Lockerbie was when Gow and Gallagher went there in February 1989 for a few days. The FBI had sent two excellent young agents, first Hal Hendershot and later Tom Jourdan, to Lockerbie, to serve in a liaison capacity. While they did an exceptional job, they were junior in rank and experience, something which rarely went unnoticed in Scotland. I wanted to build a strong relationship with Henderson, the SIO, discuss the Swiss magistrate hearing as well as the upcoming international conference, and establish the rapport which would be needed in the future. DuHadway agreed reluctantly. Before I arranged to leave town, new allegations surfaced in Malta which impacted us. Abu Nada, a principal of the Miska Bakery in Malta which had been a focus of the investigation as a possible Palestinian connection to the bombing, discovered a problem with his telephone line on October 25, 1990. Thinking he was the target of eavesdropping, he had notified the media and the Maltese police. The Maltese police confronted Harry Bell, the lead Scottish investigator in Malta, but never said a word to Phil Reid, the FBI agent there. Bell denied knowing about the device. I spoke with Henderson, who had sent a letter to Malta denying knowledge of the device. We discussed going to Malta together to mollify the Maltese and decided to discuss it further when we got together. We were upset because we had no knowledge of the wiretap, but we did have suspicions about who had done it.

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CHAPTER 11: INVESTIGATORS GO NORTH On November 14 I headed for London, my first stop before heading north to Lockerbie and my one-on-one meeting with Henderson. While the magistrate hearing was ongoing in Switzerland on November 15 and 16, I met with the CIA and representatives of the BSS to develop relationships with the agencies with whom we had had so many problems during the previous two years. In Switzerland Edwin Bollier, his partner Erwin Meister, along with MEBO’s only employee Ueli Lumpert, were interviewed by a Swiss magistrate. FBI agents and Scottish police officers were present to take notes and provide questions to the court. Lumpert was the first witness and after examining a photograph of PT-35, testified the chip had come from a circuit board for a timer he designed and built in 1985 at the request of Bollier. He had no firsthand knowledge of the customer but the specifications required the timer be small, reliable and capable of different time settings. He had learned one week prior to the hearing that this timer might have been used in a bomb. He believed the chip had come from one of the first timers made. He detailed how he had designed this circuit board, noting the slight imperfections on PT-35. Once the master board was made, the imperfections showed up on the other circuit boards built from that master. Meister testified that MEBO had been dealing with Libyan Government officials for years, particularly the police and military. He confirmed that PT-35 had come from a timer built by MEBO but said Bollier had personally handled those accounts. Bollier and Meister were co-owners of MEBO. It was clear that Bollier had the most information to provide. In the mid-1970s, Bollier began doing business with members of the Libyan Government and sold them a ship he and Meister owned. In the following years, he sold electronic equipment to the Libyan military and security services. In August 1985, Said Fazani*, who was later deter-

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Chapter 11: Investigators Go North mined to be a high ranking official of the Libyan Jamahiriya Security Organization (JSO), asked Bollier to design and build a small electronic timer for use by the military in their war with Chad. Fazani* said that if the prototypes were suitable, they would order five or ten thousand of them. A total of twenty prototypes were designed and built by Lumpert, ten for use in a waterproof container (boxed) and ten of which were free standing (unboxed) and did not require a container. They were produced in lots of five, five and finally, ten. The first five were delivered by Bollier to Fazani* in Libya in the late fall of 1985. The second five were delivered to an individual at the Libyan People’s Bureau (LPB) in East Berlin by Bollier around November 1985. The last ten were delivered to Izz Al Din Hijazi*, a high ranking intelligence official in Libya, in Tripoli, by either Bollier or Meister. These timers had the designation MST-13. Bollier later participated with the Libyans in tests in the Libyan Desert and a number of them were destroyed. Bollier heard nothing further from Libyan officials concerning a larger order. During December 1988, Badri Al Kafi*, a Libyan with whom MEBO had done business and who had rented space within the premises of MEBO in Zurich, contacted Bollier. He said the Libyans immediately needed 40 more MST-13 timers, in waterproof containers. Al Kafi* was in Zurich around December 12, 1988, and Bollier told him he could not produce these timers on short notice because he did not have any components to make them. He offered to obtain commercially available timers and bring them to Libya. Bollier arrived in Tripoli on December 18, 1988, with 40 Olympus timers purchased commercially in Zurich. He was a shrewd businessman and raised the price several times and tried to pass them off as his own. The Libyans rejected them because they were too expensive. Although originally scheduled to return to Zurich on December 21, he concluded his business and departed Tripoli on December 20. During the magistrate hearing, Bollier stated that after the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 he attempted to contact the individuals he knew as Abdul Basset and Izz Al Din Hijazi* in Tripoli but the person with whom he spoke did not recognize either name. He found this odd because he had several different business ventures going with the Libyans at that time. Although the Swiss police had shown him photos of known or suspected Libyan intelligence officers including Nayil and Sabir, the two Libyans arrested in Senegal in February 1988 with an MST- 13 timer, he could not identify them. Bollier mentioned one other thing at the hearing which took time to put into context. He said he had left a letter for the American ambassador in Vienna, Austria in January 1989. This letter contained details of his trip to Libya in December 1988 and laid the blame for the Lockerbie bombing on Libya. Following the hearing, there was renewed enthusiasm on both sides of the Atlantic. Despite numerous false starts, it seemed we had finally come up with something concrete. Tony Gauci had said the purchaser of the clothing in the

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation IED suitcase had a Libyan accent. This plus the fact the clothing was manufactured in Malta, and the unexplained extra bag which had somehow made its way onto KM Flight 180 and then Pan Am Flight 103, and now the testimony of the principals of MEBO, changed the direction of the investigation away from the PFLP-GC cell based in Germany. Everything was pointing to Libya. I traveled to Edinburgh on Saturday November 17 and had dinner at Stuart Henderson’s home. The next day Hendershot returned from the magistrates hearing in Switzerland and he provided more information from the hearing. That night, I sat in my room at Tom Jourdan’s rented cottage in Torthorwald and pondered my upcoming formal meeting with Henderson. The investigation was bigger than either one of us. I wanted Henderson to know I would do anything to ensure total cooperation and sharing between us. I would find Henderson had an identical agenda. However, neither of us knew how we would be tested. Early the next morning the three of us traveled to the LICC. As Jourdan drove, I reviewed my notes. My main point was, “we certainly could go off on our own — but we want to be partners.” Now it was time to see how I would be received. By late morning, Henderson called me in. As I climbed the steps leading to his office, I was a little intimidated. Despite our mutual respect for each other, dealing with the Scottish police had not been easy. No doubt they felt the same way about working with us. Henderson’s office, which he shared with his deputy, Jim Gilchrist, was about five times larger than the one I shared with Knisley and the prosecutors in Washington. On the wall between their desks was a chart listing the names of those who had died in the attack. A large table was in the middle of the floor and this is where the three of us met the rest of the day. Henderson, a big man, came to the inquiry after 30 years of police service in Edinburgh. He had many years as a detective, Detective Superintendent and now as a Chief Superintendent. He easily took command of most situations. His deputy Jim Gilchrist was serving as the head of the Criminal Investigation Division at Dumfries and Galloway at the time of the bombing. He should have been the head of all criminal investigations in the area which included Lockerbie. However, there had been an influx of officers from Edinburgh and Glasgow who outranked him and he was relegated to number three in the hierarchy of the LICC. He was named the Deputy SIO after John Orr was promoted. He was a smart investigator. He was slender with a neatly trimmed silver beard which gave him a distinguished appearance. And he, like Henderson, had a keen sense of humor. I was the shortest of the three, and was junior in the sense that I was just 43 years old and had only 21 years of service with the FBI. However, I had more experience in counter terrorism investigations than any of the Scots, including Henderson. I took notes and listened. When we finished discussing the status of the investigation to include the new revelations uncovered in Switzerland, we

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Chapter 11: Investigators Go North turned to coordination and cooperation. This was why I had made the trip. We discussed the friction which had, on occasion, impeded progress. Henderson had been at the October meeting in Washington where the Scots, the FBI and the CIA and BSS had discussed the problems and where we agreed to make this a thing of the past. We had credibility gaps to fill with each other before this could be a reality. Henderson acknowledged, “This attack was done because Pan Am was an American carrier and the majority of the passengers and crew had been Americans.” I told him there was enough work for everyone to do. We bonded that day and, although it would be tested, this led to a lifelong friendship. Although we discussed a number of issues that day, the new revelations brought forward by the principals of MEBO were utmost in our minds. I spent some time that day with Norman McFadyen, who later played a key role in the prosecution in Holland, and Jim MacDougall, the local Procurator Fiscal (district attorney). We talked about media leaks and the harm they did. There were some things we could not control; although information had occasionally gotten to the media, more often than not it was wrong. While disconcerting, it usually had little impact on the investigation. On Tuesday, November 20, I returned to Washington, hopeful for the future. Because I had arrived home late in the day, I decided to get a good night sleep before going into the office the next morning. DuHadway and I normally arrived in the office early, around 6:00 a.m., and took the opportunity to discuss the case before the office was humming. Tomorrow would be different. I was tired from my trip and decided to come in later, perhaps 9:00 a.m.. The next morning there was a story in the newspaper which infuriated me. A retired CIA agent had told the media the focus of the Lockerbie investigation was no longer on Palestinians, Syrians or Iranians but was now on Libya because of evidence which had been recovered at Lockerbie. Vincent Cannistraro, the former Deputy Director at the CIA Counterterrorism Center (CTC), who had come to few FBI-CIA meetings on the Lockerbie investigation, had retired the previous summer. I had even gotten Cannistraro a letter from the FBI Director congratulating upon his retirement. Why this? Since this was probably already news in Scotland, I quickly dressed and rushed to the office. Henderson and the Scots were as aggravated I was. None of us had wanted the Libyans to know we were now focused on them. The information provided by Cannistraro had also reached Germany and they assumed if the CIA knew, so did the FBI. The Germans were upset because the FBI had not shared the information with them. They believed we did not trust them. Henderson and I had agreed more should be done to share information with the Germans, the Swedes and the Maltese. Each had proven they could be trusted, at least at the police level. The real problem was the politicians who insisted on knowing everything about the investigation. While we thought we

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation could trust our intelligence services, the Cannistraro revelations cast a pall over that. It was a fine line, one which the FBI and the Scots tried to walk with varying success. There would be more bumps in the road ahead. On November 23, Henderson and I discussed whether the MST-13 timer should be shown to the FAA and shared with the airlines. However, recognizing the timer in itself would not be significant in preventing another act of terrorism. The airlines had to be sensitive to all electronic devices; thus, pictures of the timers were not released. During November, Henderson and I spoke at least daily. Our primary concerns were getting the investigation in Malta restarted and how best to share information with our international partners at the upcoming conference in Sweden. The BKA was frustrated they were not getting updated. We trusted them, but we had decided not to do unilateral briefings in order to keep from angering the Scots. There was probably a better way to handle this, but neither Henderson nor I knew what it was. In-person briefings were few and far between primarily due to the distances involved. The Scottish Lord Advocate wrote a letter to the Maltese authorities and requested the investigation be started again at the earliest possible date. At about the same time, Granada television in the United Kingdom aired a story about the Lockerbie crash which did not mention Libya but said Iran had given Dalkamouni $10 million to carry out the attack. They mentioned Malta and the Miska Bakery. This broadcast did not convince the Maltese the investigation was going to be conducted without publicity. Malta had its tourism industry to consider and putting them at the forefront of a major international disaster, without strong evidence, was not helpful. Phil Reid, who had volunteered to bring continuity to the investigation in Malta by taking charge of that aspect of the case, was still there. The investigation had been virtually shut down but he still provided daily updates. He offered to stay on, to avoid having the Maltese shut down the investigation altogether. He would be ready to work as soon as the Maltese agreed to resume the investigation. This was expensive, but I thought it was worth it. Henderson and I looked forward to the upcoming meeting in early December and the opportunity to brief our counterparts. While the criminal investigation had led us to the timer’s country of origin, no evidence had been developed to bring indictments and the assistance of the intelligence community was needed now more than ever. Henderson had invited the Swiss to the international conference. DuHadway, Biehl, Murtagh, and I left from Washington National Airport on a flight through JFK in New York, arriving in Stockholm the next morning. The conference was held at a resort on an archipelago not far from Stockholm. The wind was blowing and the air extremely cold on the remote island. It was deserted except for the police officials who had come to discuss the investigation or those who patrolled the grounds of the compound as security.

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Chapter 11: Investigators Go North The night before the formal conference, Henderson and I convened the other police officials in a private room above the main dining area. The Swiss were introduced and the new direction of the investigation discussed. Because the formal agenda had been drawn up in advance, much of it was devoted to the PFLP-GC cell in Germany. However, we had always said evidence would drive the investigation, not speculation. Now the evidence had pointed away from Dalkamouni and his PFLP-GC cell. Everything we saw pointed directly at Libya. The new information was shared with the police officials. This was the first time meaningful discussion had taken place at one of our international conferences. The Germans were relieved because it appeared the arrests they had made in October 1988 had nothing to do with the downing of Pan Am Flight 103. The Maltese were not as ready to accept the new scenario. Evidence showed the bomb bag was routed through Heathrow and Frankfurt, but it had originated in Malta. This evidence, which first surfaced during the summer and fall of 1989, had not yet been proven to the satisfaction of Maltese officials. Not one word of what was discussed at the meeting was ever leaked to the media, proving that this group of law enforcement officials was trustworthy. The Swedes were excellent hosts and the following day’s conference went smoothly. Everyone could see how and why the investigation had moved away from the PFLP-GC. However, the Maltese adopted the philosophy which the Germans had employed for a time. The next morning the prosecutors met. Although they were also provided with the new information, the Maltese prosecutor stated, “There is no evidence of crime in Malta.” While he was techinically correct at that point in time, this would soon change. That night we flew to London for a meeting with the CIA and BSS the next morning. The prosecutors would return home from Heathrow the next morning. When Henderson and I met with the CIA and BSS, the names of a number of suspects were surfaced. One name provided by the CIA that day was Abdel Baset Ali al Megrahi. According to the Maltese immigration records, he had been in Malta on December 7, 1988, the day the clothing was purchased at Mary’s House. He had also been there on other dates, but had not been there on December 20 and 21, 1988. We had not yet located a photograph of Megrahi to show Tony Gauci. Megrahi had connections to Bollier, but that area had not yet been fully explored. Megrahi was alleged to be a member of the Libyan Intelligence Service. I returned to the United States on Saturday, December 8. Two days later, Henderson reported the Maltese were ready to let us back in to work, possibly as soon as December 17. In the meantime, Bob Fanning, the FBI Legat in Bern, developed some interesting news. It was actually information which had come out at the Magistrate hearing in Zurich the previous month, but no one had taken significant note of it. We would have seen it after the translated transcript reached the

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation United States. Fanning had just finished talking with Bollier. Bollier said that in early January 1989 he had been on a business trip to East Berlin. He went to the United States Embassy in Vienna, Austria and asked to see the ambassador. When he was unable to see him, he left a letter at the embassy. This was the unsigned letter that had been turned over to the FBI in January 1989. In his note, Bollier said that based on what he had seen in the media, he knew the investigators believed the PFLP-GC was responsible for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. He wanted to let us know he believed Libyans may have been behind the attack. The letter mentioned a meeting of Libyans which had taken place in Tripoli right before the bombing. Although Bollier’s letter documented names of people in Libyan intelligence and security, their names were known to Western intelligence agencies and provided no specific evidence for us. He had not left his name but did leave a way he could be contacted. I remembered receiving a copy of the note and found it buried in a folder at FBIHQ. Nothing had been done with it as it contained nothing which could be investigated. After getting hold of the letter at the embassy in 1989, the CIA had given him a telephone and fax number, as well as the name of a person to contact. Bollier thought he was having contact with an official of the NSA and his last contact, by radio, was in November, 1989. Bollier had tried to find us in January 1989, but it took nearly two years of painstaking evidence collection and investigation before we found him. Bollier said he was not interested in a reward concerning Lockerbie. He was a businessman whose primary interest seemed to be in establishing a business relationship with an American intelligence agency. Bollier insinuated he had a contact in Tripoli, a Palestinian, who knew how Lockerbie had happened but would not tell him. He implied he had additional information on Iran and Iraq which he wanted to provide, but did not go into detail. I called Dave Bresett, a US Secret Service agent, on detail to the CIA who was now handling the Lockerbie investigation there. Bresett, an experienced criminal investigator, was what had been missing—someone in the intelligence chain who understood evidence. Bresett determined that Bollier had sent two packages, one in February 1989 and the second two months later. There were no other communications from him. Bollier’s messages were coded and were never broken. What he had sent did not relate to Lockerbie and made little sense. Fanning thought we ought to interview Bollier at length, outside of Switzerland. I shared this interesting news with Henderson, who expressed reservations about another interview of Bollier. He was concerned about the reaction of the Swiss authorities. We agreed to raise this issue with the Swiss at a face to face session with them in the near future. In Switzerland, Fanning went to see Peter Humert* of the Swiss Federal Police. Humert* opined that Bollier may well have been involved in the assembly of the device which had downed Pan Am Flight 103. Bollier’s role may have been

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Chapter 11: Investigators Go North to take the timer from Switzerland to Libya. While no one believed Bollier would have intentionally blown up the jumbo jet, he could have been an unwitting courier of the device and as a result had a guilty conscience. When he was first contacted by Swiss authorities in September 1990, Bollier thought it was because the FBI had discovered he was the mystery person who had left the letter at the embassy in Vienna. Bollier gave us more credit than we deserved. Humert* saw no problem with Bollier going to the United States. The Scottish police could object but Bollier had not indicated a desire to speak with any law enforcement entity. The FBI was both a law enforcement and an intelligence agency. Bollier’s main focus was to speak with intelligence agencies. Fanning was adamant Bollier had something he wished to tell US intelligence agencies and that it would best be done away from Switzerland. The Swiss believed Bollier may have not told the truth in some of his statements to them and at the Magistrate Hearing. Bollier had mentioned a Karl Heinz in the letter he left in Vienna. German authorities had been unable to identify anyone by that name and the flight number given by Bollier did not exist in the Lufthansa system. All the verifiable information contained in Bollier’s note had proven to be wrong. Because of the information coming from Switzerland, to include Bollier’s statements, we decided it was time for a trip there. A meeting with the Swiss was scheduled for December 19. The flight over was uneventful. The plane was not full; that may have had a lot to do with the buildup which was taking place in the Middle East. In August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded and then occupied Kuwait. Some said he did it with the benign concurrence of the United States. After all, the United States had supported Hussein in his long war with Iran and this expansion was just making up for what he thought was an improper alignment of his country years before. US President George H.W. Bush was creating a coalition of forces to expel Iraq from their southern neighbor. Kuwait was not only friendly to the United States but was a major exporter of oil to the West. This coalition was unique because it included many predominantly Arab countries, including Syria, whose president, Hafez al Assad, had been a host to Ahmed Jibril, the leader of the PFLP-GC, the group many suspected as being behind the Lockerbie bombing. December 19 was cold, snowy and foggy in Bern, the Swiss capital. Our meeting was held in the impressive Parliament Building. As they gave information in German, we waited as it was translated into English. Bollier had provided more information on his trip to Libya in December 1988, to include detail on an unknown person giving him a suitcase and some clothing to take with him to Tripoli. He said his offices in Zurich had been broken into before his travel to Libya. I was getting goose bumps. Was he trying to confess? It was a question which bothered us throughout the investigation. There was never any evidence

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Bollier had participated in the plot to blow up the plane or knew it was going to happen. However, we agreed he was a strange man. The next day, Hendershot went to Vienna to pick up the original note left by Bollier at the embassy in 1989. The next morning, Hendershot and I flew from Geneva to Paris to Washington. It was December 21, 1990, the second anniversary of the Pan Am bombing. Security was especially tight, not due to any new intelligence but because of the date. The flight gave me time for reflection. We were getting close. Now, if we could only put it together and determine how the bomb had gotten on the plane and who specifically was responsible for it, we would be successful. This was my third international trip in a month, and it had taken its toll. I was suffering the initial stages of the flu. Hendershot was in bigger trouble. His fiancée Denise was waiting for him to travel to Kentucky for the Christmas holiday. Because of security and weather, the flight was about 5 hours late getting to Washington. On December 27, Fanning had more information about Bollier. They had spent nearly five hours together at the American Consulate in Zurich. Fanning was convinced Bollier was not telling the truth. He was now saying the letter left at the embassy had been created by Bollier and his “source.” Bollier declined to identify the source but said they had first met in January 1989. According to Bollier, his source was connected to the Libyan Intelligence Service and was part of a group opposed to Gaddafi. Bollier later said he saw this source in Tripoli in December 1988, during his travel there, and the source told him Gaddafi was about to be overthrown or killed. He met the source in Vienna in January 1989, and they wanted to put the investigators on the right track. Bollier also said the ANO was very active in Libya and Gaddafi put pressure on them to conduct the Lockerbie bombing to “earn their keep.” Bollier said the contacts with the CIA during 1989 had been made by the source and he had no idea what communications he had with the Americans. Although his letter described a secret meeting in Tripoli on December 18, 1988, he was not personally aware of the meeting as that part was provided to him by the source. He admitted Karl Heinz was a fabrication. He said he had taken the 40 Olympus timers to Tripoli on his trip in December 1988. On December 20, he was in the office of Izz al din Hijazi*. When he was given back the 40 timers, he put them all back in their original boxes. When he returned to Zurich he noticed all but one was still “set at zero.” One timer had been set for a date which he said was Wednesday, December 21, 1988, at 1930 (or 7:30 p.m.), 27 minutes after the Pan Am jumbo jet disintegrated over Lockerbie. When he arrived in Tripoli he had left all 40 timers at Izz al din’s office and Libyan officials had access to them for two nights. Bollier provided additional information regarding his contact with the Vienna embassy. He had typed the letter on a small portable typewriter and left it at the embassy but denied being involved in any radio traffic with the United

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Chapter 11: Investigators Go North States. He said the radio communication was done by his source. He insisted he had not had contact with the source since the fall of 1989. Bollier denied to the Swiss police he had any first hand information about the Lockerbie bombing. He said he wanted to recontact his source who he described as a social contact and not one with whom he had business dealings. Bollier insisted his “source” not only knew all the Libyans who were involved in the Lockerbie bombing, but he also knew individuals who belonged to the ANO. Fanning believed Bollier would never tell the entire truth with Swiss authorities present; but bringing him to the United States would raise a whole range of problems. Henderson and Scottish prosecutors did not want Bollier to be interviewed in the United States. I had to present this in such a way to make it acceptable to Henderson and his prosecutors. I called Henderson at home. We spoke at length and agreed investigative interests should be our first priority. Henderson agreed to do “whatever it would take to get him [Bollier] to tell the truth.” On the last day of 1990, Fanning made a compelling case to the Swiss police to bring Bollier to the United States and now it was a question of their concurrence. The American prosecutors knew their Scottish counterparts had also been concerned about Bollier testifying under oath before a Swiss magistrate once again. At the same time, Henderson and I were concerned with restarting the investigation in Malta. As 1990 ended, there were many different things going on and we looked forward to the New Year.

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CHAPTER 12: BOLLIER AND GAUCI In early January 1991, the Scots learned the investigation in Malta could restart immediately. Chief Esson would travel there within a week to brief Maltese officials. We anticipated work there could be completed in about three weeks. From January 4 to 7, Henderson and I talked constantly about Bollier’s travel to the United States. He had asked Swiss authorities for compensation for his time and business lost because of his “contributions” to the investigation. The Swiss said they were no longer officially involved and the decision to travel was up to Bollier. Bollier agreed to travel to the United States around the first of February, but wanted a letter granting him safe passage back to Switzerland. Before the letter was written, we ran Bollier’s name through every database in the US criminal justice system to ensure he was not wanted in the United States. Word traveled fast. Henderson called me to complain he had heard the United States was giving Bollier a letter granting him immunity from prosecution. It took some talking to convince him this was not the case. Things were moving swiftly. The first Gulf War was days away, the investigation in Malta was about to be resumed, Bollier was to come to the United States for an extensive interview and the Fatal Accident Inquiry (FAI) was beginning in Lockerbie. The FAI was a non-criminal examination of the facts of the bombing, such as cause and how individuals died. The Scottish prosecutors were certain they would be able to insulate the criminal investigation from this inquiry. In early January, the plans for Bollier’s travel to the United States were beginning to take shape. Bollier would leave Switzerland on Saturday, February 9, spend the night in Boston and travel to Washington on February 10 with the interview beginning the next day. The Scots were ready to accept this as a reasonable attempt to get at the truth, however there would still be additional

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Chapter 12: Bollier and Gauci hurdles to overcome. I received information from Switzerland the Scots wanted to derail Bollier’s trip. Allegedly the Scots were trying to resurrect the magistrate hearing which had been discussed for January. By forcing Bollier to appear at another formal hearing, he might decide not to come to the United States. On January 10, I updated Mueller on the investigation. Although Mueller was an aggressive prosecutor, he shared the Scottish Lord Advocate’s concern about Bollier’s travel to the United States. Mueller wondered whether the trip should be postponed. The Lord Advocate communicated in writing to Swiss authorities he wanted a second judicial hearing. The Swiss could not arrange it on such short notice and believed they were under no obligation to arrange a hearing which seemed designed to thwart us from bringing Bollier to the United States. After meeting with Mueller, I called Henderson to discuss Bollier’s travel. Henderson said while Jim Gilchrist may have said it was a good idea for Bollier to come to the United States, he was not authorized to make those kinds of decisions. Henderson said he could not make those decisions as they rested with the Lord Advocate. It seemed the Lord Advocate was unhappy Bollier had been interviewed in the consulate in December and thought he had been granted immunity. The Scots believed the Swiss wanted Bollier out of Switzerland and out of their hair. They thought Fanning had made promises to Bollier that the investigation (headquartered in Lockerbie) could not keep. They feared Bollier would stay in the United States, we would cut them out and take credit for solving the case. Some in Scotland believed Bollier faced an indictment there for his role in this case. Henderson was also concerned the United States would again bomb Tripoli, a non-judicial solution to the investigation. The US invasion of Panama to arrest Manuel Noriega had just taken place. Henderson and the Scots believed this could be our solution to the Lockerbie case, as well. In the meantime, Henderson and I had agreed it was better to find out what Bollier knew rather than worry who got the information. By late January, things were going well in Malta. All the hotels in Malta except one, a hotel where many Libyan officials stayed, had been contacted and had turned over records of individuals who had stayed there during 1988. The Scottish HOLMES system was good at creating leads, known as actions. Once the computer created an action, it would have to be covered before that lead would go away. Between the FBI and the Scots, new actions were being created daily so we certainly would not be finished within three weeks. In addition to determining who had stayed at which hotels and traveled in and out of Malta, it was also essential to find out who had access to secure areas of the airport in December 1988. Henderson and I also discussed the travels of Jean-Louis Bruguiere, the French anti-terrorism judge who was conducting his own investigation into Libyan involvement in the Pan Am crash and the bombing of a French airliner, UTA Flight 772, over Niger in September 1989 which killed 171 people. Bruguiere

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation had come to Scotland seeking information which he could use in his own case; the Scots had given him little. The French wanted to send investigators to Senegal to find out about the seizure of the timer at the Dakar airport in February 1988. That timer had never been accounted for and we too wanted to add that piece of evidence to what had been collected. On January 28, Fanning gave the Swiss authorities a copy of the letter which would be provided to Bollier after his interview scheduled in about two weeks. By the next day it seemed everyone on both sides of the Atlantic accepted this trip would occur. Despite all the progress which had been made, the DEA issue came to the fore in late January when the BKA provided more details about the alleged DEA involvement in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. It was positively determined that when the DEA did a controlled delivery from Germany; they did it in conjunction with German Customs rather than the BKA. However, there were no controlled deliveries which had taken place around the time of the Lockerbie bombing. This confirmed what the DEA had already told us. Although the FBI and the DOJ believed this avenue needed to be explored to put the allegations to rest, the Scots did not think they needed to defend the FBI, DEA or any other US law enforcement or intelligence agency. The evidence did not lead us in that direction anyway. I was concerned that failure to examine all aspects of the investigation would create conspiracy theories; I was certain I wanted as few of those as possible when the investigation was complete. Plans were moving forward to interview Bollier in the United States. He would be housed and interviewed at the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia. Ed Marshman, the Lockerbie “case agent” would do the interview. He had been involved in the case since the beginning and I gave him this difficult, but important assignment. The interview was crucial for several reasons. Bollier was a significant witness as we had determined a timer built by his firm had been in the bag which contained the bomb which blew up Pan Am Flight 103. He had numerous connections within the Libyan intelligence apparatus and might know what had happened on December 21, 1988. No one knew what he would say. The Scots would be watching the interview on a closed circuit television feed. By agreement with the prosecutors, the interview would not be audio or video taped. I would spend the week with Jim Gilchrist, Henderson’s deputy, among others, observing the interview to see what new bombshells Bollier would drop. On Monday, February 11, 1991, Fanning brought Bollier to FBIHQ in Washington to meet with me. They arrived at 10:00 a.m. and came to Neil Gallagher’s fifth floor office in the J. Edgar Hoover Building which I had borrowed for the hour. My space at the dilapidated, windowless office at WFO would hardly give the appropriate impression. I explained the gravity of what we were doing and told him the sole purpose of his trip was to provide everything he knew about MST-13 timers and his dealings with Libyan officials.

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Chapter 12: Bollier and Gauci Bollier said he would tell what he knew, but also asked about work the FBI did of a technical nature. When our meeting concluded, Bollier headed to Quantico to begin his debriefing. I returned Gallagher’s office to “normal” and headed back to Buzzards Point. Gilchrist had arrived from Scotland late the previous week and was eager to learn first hand what Bollier had to say. While he would not participate directly in the interview, he could formulate questions and see, in real time, what was being said by this man who had become a crucial part of the investigation. We did not know his mindset when he stopped at the American Embassy in Vienna in January 1989 or how much he had learned since, but intended to find out. Bollier’s interview began on Tuesday, February 12. Ed Marshman, who had interviewed Khreesat, did the questioning. There were a number of us listening to Bollier’s every answer and thinking up questions which could be posed to him. Marshman had him recount his dealings with Libyan intelligence and military personnel since the 1970s. Bollier did not stray far from what he had said at the hearing in Zurich. There were no new revelations about the events of December 1988, when the Libyans were searching for more of the timers he had produced as prototypes. After Marshman completed the interview, we still wondered if he knew about the plot to destroy an aircraft. We wanted him to take a polygraph examination, even though the results were not useable in American courts and, as I found out, they were never used in Scotland. We had placed on standby one of our best and most senior polygraph examiners, SA Barry Colvert, from WFO. He was an excellent interrogator. Bollier agreed to be polygraphed. The exam was done so Gilchrist and others could watch not only the questions but Bollier’s reaction to them. He was calm and answered all questions without hesitation. When the examination was concluded, it was Colvert’s opinion that Bollier had not been deceptive in any response. He had been asked if he had knowledge of the plans to attack the Pan Am plane or any other aircraft. He was also asked whether he played any role in the bombing or knew who did. His negative answers did not indicate deception. It seemed Bollier had told us everything he knew. By early Friday, February 15, Bollier had completed his interview and we had gotten no closer to solving the puzzle of who put the bag on board the airliner or who had ordered the attack. Despite the tidbits of information he had provided since first being contacted, he had not given us anything new to justify bringing him to the United States. We were convinced Bollier’s firm had built the timer which brought down the jumbo jet, but it did not seem Bollier could be directly connected to the Pan Am bomb plot. However, not everyone was convinced. That morning, he was shown the drawing of the individual who had purchased the clothing at Mary’s House in Malta over two years before. He said the

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation drawing resembled a man he knew as Abdel Baset Ali al Megrahi. They had done business together and Megrahi rented office space at MEBO in Zurich. Bollier had been shown the drawing before but now he said it had been a bad photocopy and he did not notice the resemblance then. Was it possible the man who had shared space with Bollier in Switzerland could have been the purchaser of the clothing? He had been on the island of Malta the day we believed the clothing was purchased. The Libyan security apparatus was looking for timers weeks before the Pan Am bombing. Was this just a coincidence? We would not have long to wait to find out. What was going on thousands of miles away in Malta would begin the steamroller leading to indictments in this case. Tony Gauci had been interviewed numerous times about the purchase of clothing from his shop in 1988 and had been shown dozens of photographs of potential suspects. Phil Reid and Harry Bell had been through this drill so many times, they were concerned they would never get an identification. Our expectations had been raised after we learned about Nayil, the Libyan arrested in possession of an MST-13 timer in Senegal in February, 1988. The photograph taken at the time of his arrest resembled the drawing of the individual who had purchased the clothing. But when a photo spread containing his picture was shown to Gauci, he failed to pick Nayil as the purchaser. We were crushed. However, this was prior to the details about the MST-13 being developed through the magistrate hearing and the interviews with Bollier. Our expectations were raised again when we got a photograph of Megrahi. Megrahi’s name had initially surfaced through intelligence channels as an intelligence officer in the Libyan Intelligence Service. We had been looking at him since December 1990, but his name was only one of many provided to us by the intelligence agencies. He had been in Malta on December 7, 1988, the day we believed the clothing was purchased. Maltese immigration records showed he had arrived around 8:20 a.m. that day and departed two days later. We finally had obtained, through liaison with a foreign intelligence service, an undated passport photograph of him. Gauci was scheduled to be shown the newly obtained passport picture of Megrahi, along with eleven others, the same Friday Bollier was completing his week at Quantico. Upon concluding the interview of Bollier, I called Henderson to update him on Bollier’s “identification” of the drawing of the clothes purchaser as resembling Megrahi. Since it was noon in Washington, the business day had ended in Scotland. Henderson said, “We are having a celebratory drink in my office. Gauci picked Megrahi out of the lineup and identified him as the person who purchased the clothing which had been contained in the bomb bag.” What Gauci had actually said was that it had been “over two years since the clothing was purchased and I have been shown many photographs. Of all the pictures I have been shown, the one of (Megrahi) most resembled the person who had bought the clothing in my shop. However, the man would have to have been a few years

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Chapter 12: Bollier and Gauci older.” Since the date of the photograph was unknown, perhaps the picture was a few years old. We did not know, as we had never seen Megrahi. This identification was a turning point in the investigation. The evidence to this point seemed simple. A timer manufactured by a company doing business with the Libyan intelligence and military agencies had been located in the wreckage of the Pan Am jet in Lockerbie. One of the principals of that firm said only twenty of those MST-13 type timers had been manufactured, all as prototypes. All been delivered to Libyan officials in Berlin and Tripoli during 1985 and 1986. Some of these same officials had requested an additional forty of these timers in December 1988, but MEBO was unable to deliver them. Two of them had shown up in Africa, one in 1986 and another, in February 1988, in the possession of a suspected Libyan intelligence officer. The MEBO timer explained how the bomb could have survived three takeoffs, Malta, Frankfurt and London, prior to detonation. We had always used the PFLP-GC model, a barometric timer as our suspected device. This MEBO timer was not barometric but a straight timer which could have been programmed to survive as many takeoffs or landings as needed and set on a time delay instead. Another Libyan intelligence officer, Abdel Baset Ali al Megrahi, who had been in Malta on December 7, 1988, had just been identified via his undated photograph as the individual who most resembled the person who had purchased the clothing on that same date. We had not found any evidence that Megrahi had been in Malta on December 21, the date a baggage record at Frankfurt Airport showed a bag from Air Malta Flight 180 was transferred to Pan Am Flight 103. We had no idea how the bag was gotten onboard the Air Malta flight. Although some questions had been answered, many more remained before we could ask prosecutors to bring charges. However, for the first time in two years, we believed someone, a real person, would be held accountable for this crime. And the path of the evidence might well lead to the Libyan leader, Moammar Gaddafi. Henderson told me he was hopeful this time, after two years of false leads. While his day was concluding, I had at least a half a day to work. Although it had been a draining week, Gilchrist and I were ecstatic. We told the others about the Gauci identification. I needed to bring the information about Gauci’s identification up the chain of command. I called Tom DuHadway and told him what I knew. I asked him to arrange a meeting at FBIHQ that afternoon. A meeting was set up in the conference room of FBI Director Sessions at 3:15 p.m. Also present were DuHadway, Bill Baker, the Assistant Director of the CID, Bob Mueller and Jay Stephens, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. It appeared progress toward developing solid evidence had been made. However, the FBI Agents, prosecutors and even Director Sessions, himself a former prosecutor and Federal District Court Judge, were aware there was more to do before indictments could be returned. There would be time for euphoria later. No one in that room could know how long it would be until justice was done.

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CHAPTER 13: INVESTIGATION PLODS ALONG Henderson and I spoke the next day, a Saturday. He believed once Bollier returned to Switzerland and had a chance to sit down and speak with Meister, we might get additional information. Henderson opined that Bollier did not believe we could have found an item of evidence as small as PT-35. I spent the entire morning on the telephone. Most of the calls related to my travel to Switzerland and then Scotland the following week. Because the first Gulf War was underway, senior FBI officials had to approve all overseas travel. During the next week, passenger records at Luqa Airport were reviewed and the investigators hoped to have records from Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA) by the end of the week. The investigation in Malta was progressing, however not as quickly as we and the Maltese wanted. Every stone they turned over caused a few more to have to be examined. Upon returning to Switzerland, Bollier met with the Swiss police and said he had had a “wonderful experience” while at Quantico. The Scots were back in Switzerland and wanted additional information about Bollier and MEBO. The Swiss were more than willing to cooperate, but believed the investigation should be done in a more seamless manner. The Swiss asked whether we wanted to use Bollier against the Libyans in an effort to obtain evidence which could be used in court. They were not convinced Bollier could be trusted. The Swiss believed Meister and Bollier were interested in money, yet expressed concerns about their safety if either of them were to be used as agents against the Libyans. The Swiss did not believe the Scots were interested in using either of the MEBO principals in any operational scenario against the Libyans. They believed the Scots were laying a foundation to bring Bollier and others from MEBO to Scotland. The CIA was beginning to provide some useable information, in particular, a suggestion that both Badri Al Kafi* and Megrahi had worked for the Center for

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Chapter 13: Investigation Plods Along Strategic Studies (CSS) in Libya. It was not evidence, but helped tie these people together. Al Kafi* was the man who had told Bollier the Libyans needed more timers in December 1988. We were finally working as we should, and we were making progress. In the meantime, Fanning believed the FBI and Scots each were going in a different direction and even though our goals and objectives were the same, he did not believe the Swiss felt there was truly a joint direction as to where the investigation needed to go. Fanning knew the Swiss wanted to help, but occasionally thought the FBI and Scottish police were asking them to do different things, putting them in a difficult position. And I was not certain the Scots had, as yet, accepted us as full partners in the investigation. Things were going well in Malta despite the rough start. I planned a trip to Switzerland and Scotland to see if I could smooth out the problems in Switzerland. Henderson told me about his trip to Switzerland that week. He wanted me to buy into what he was about to propose. As the leader of the investigation, he believed Meister and Bollier needed to be interviewed and their statements recorded outside the judicial arena. Henderson wanted them to come to Scotland where their statements could be taken and documented by Scottish officers. Although Henderson did not say so, it was apparent the recent statement Bollier gave us at Quantico would not suffice for a Scottish prosecution because it had not been taken by Scottish officers. Henderson wanted Lumpert, the MEBO technician, interviewed in Scotland as well. If this could be accomplished, Henderson said, “Any statement taken in Scotland would be evidence.” Henderson would provide the details to the Swiss after the statements were taken and would ensure the MEBO principals safe passage home after they were interviewed. This was the same offer we had made to Bollier prior to his trip to the United States. It was frustrating. I wanted a solution to the case and wanted the investigation to be carried out together. To prevent another magistrate hearing, which would not fully develop the truth, the best way to get the information was to have them interviewed in Scotland. Henderson wanted to wrap this area of the inquiry up as soon as possible. I felt the same way. Henderson had not blocked Bollier’s trip to the United States. It would be unfair for me to block the Scots if they wanted to do this. I doubted we would learn more, but if it enhanced cooperation and moved the case forward, I was all for it. I met with Mueller again. He had just returned from a meeting with the Scottish Lord Advocate, Peter Fraser, in London. The Lord Advocate hoped the investigation could be resolved in a matter of a few months. They agreed neither country would go public with any official statements about the case without prior consultation. They discussed how best to arrest subjects once warrants were issued. The Lord Advocate expected the results of the investigation would become public in the near future. If that occurred, there would be pressure in Scotland to indict the case. They agreed to announce any indictments simulta-

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation neously. The Lord Advocate and Mueller were aware there had been disagreements in the conduct of the investigation. Fraser was not sure if Bollier was a subject or a witness. They agreed additional investigation needed to be conducted in Malta and Switzerland. Fraser thought the indictments could be returned by late summer, 1991, although agreed the evidence was not yet to the stage where warrants could be obtained. Bollier had turned over samples of circuit boards to the Swiss authorities. These would be given to me during my upcoming trip to Switzerland. Bollier had also told the Swiss authorities that an unknown person had called him at home at 9:00 p.m. and said only two words. They were “MEBO” and the word “bomb.” Bollier thought the person calling had an “Arabic” accent. He believed it was some type of bomb threat. Swiss authorities had been busy tracking the activities of Libyans whose names had surfaced during the investigation. They also discovered they had interviewed Bollier in another investigation and were not certain he had told them everything he knew then. The Swiss were reluctant to have Bollier become involved in any scenario wherein he would be tasked to do things to elicit information from his Libyan contacts. They were not convinced he was reliable. The Swiss police also were concerned about Bollier’s upcoming trip to Scotland because of their 72-hour detention law. Although this information had been passed onto Bollier, he showed the Swiss a copy of a letter he had received which had granted him safe return to Switzerland following his interview. Bollier had more “get out of jail free cards” than a Monopoly game! Late that day I met with Murtagh and Biehl. We discussed an item the FBI called K-1. K-1 was the timing device which had been recovered in Togo in 1986, and was one of the first devices built by MEBO for the Libyans based on their order from 1985. K-1 was similar to the device located in Senegal in February 1988, in the possession of two Libyan intelligence officers. Tom Thurman had stored it in the FBI lab since June 1990, when the CIA turned it over to him. Thurman had already confirmed the circuit board on K-1 and the piece of green circuit board recovered at Lockerbie known as PT-35 were identical. PT-35 had been blasted into a piece of clothing manufactured in Malta, which had apparently been purchased by Megrahi in December 1988. Allen Feraday, the forensic expert from RARDE, had also confirmed this identification. The Scots wanted us to turn K-1 over to them to consolidate the evidence. I had no concerns about giving it to them but wanted to be sure the prosecutors agreed. Murtagh and Biehl were aware of the political issues, which had transpired over the course of the investigation, and I could not cite any specific reason to keep it. We agreed I would hand carry the timer and give it to Henderson when we met the next week. I spent the weekend packing and preparing for my meetings with the Swiss and the Scots. I hoped we could resolve the major issues between us. While Henderson and I had aired our concerns in November 1990, and we spoke every day by telephone, there were still problems which had to be discussed.

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CHAPTER 14: AHMED KHALIFA ABDUSAMAD Although I was to leave for Switzerland late in the day on Monday, February 25, I was at work early, as was my practice. In the mid-morning my secure phone rang and it was Dick King*, an analyst from an American intelligence agency near Washington. This agency did not deal in live sources and investigations. Their information was disseminated to the FBI, CIA and others to protect the United States from terrorist and other threats. The FBI had shared much of what it had obtained with all of the intelligence agencies to find out who was behind the bombing. We hoped that, where the evidence and intelligence converged, we would find our solution. King* said his analysis concerning Megrahi showed connections to a man named Ahmed Khalifa Abdusamad. He did not have much more information. This was a new name and since I had no idea how to access the computer system, I asked the name be run in the Maltese immigration database. The name Abdusamad hit immediately. Abdusamad traveled from Tripoli to Malta on December 20, 1988, and returned the next morning. Here was a name worth exploration. Although we knew Megrahi had been in Malta on December 7, 1988, and had been identified as the purchaser of the clothing contained in the IED suitcase, we had no evidence he was there on December 20-21, 1988. I called Henderson, and had the name passed to the team in Malta. As I left for the airport, I had no way to know how much impact this information would have on the investigation. Before I caught my flight to Switzerland, Jourdan called from Lockerbie. He wanted to ensure I was bringing the Togo timer we had agreed to turn over to Scottish authorities. Jourdan passed along some discouraging news. Allen Feraday, the British forensic expert who had been personally examining the evidence, had told the Scottish police that his examinations would take at least six more months. While that caused me some concern, I knew the written report

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation would not change what we knew. Hoping the investigation into the activities of Abdusamad could shed light on what had occurred on Malta in December 1988, I set off. The trip was uneventful yet I had difficulty sleeping. The meeting in Switzerland would not be contentious, but the one in Scotland could be. Upon arriving in Zurich I boarded a train for the trip to Bern. The next morning, Bob Fanning, the FBI Legat, and I met with Peter Humert* and Hans Cretton* of the Swiss police. They provided us with a little more information Bollier had given them. He had been at Megrahi’s house in Libya in 1987 to put an antenna on it. Megrahi had rented space at the MEBO office in Zurich and his colleague, Badri Al Kafi*, spent time there. Cretton*, the leader of the Swiss contingent investigating this case, articulated what was bothering him. He believed the Scots were interested in indicting the case to say it was solved, but not really interested in an operation to flush out the perpetrators or to arrest them. Bollier was in financial difficulty and might be willing to take risks to solve his money problems. Bollier was not controllable and Cretton* was reluctant to make him a double agent to work against the Libyan government. Cretton* said, “He is a risk to all of us.” Cretton* wondered if Bollier could be convinced to have Megrahi meet him in Tunisia but noted that if we were not there to control him, it would be difficult to know what Megrahi said. Cretton* was of the opinion Bollier would offer to do an undercover operational role to further the interests of the investigation. He reiterated his concern that Bollier would be killed and the blame would come back to law enforcement. Cretton* wanted to make it clear to Meister and Bollier if they did anything unilaterally with Libyan officials, no one was encouraging them to do it. The Swiss wanted guidance in the event any of the people we were looking at came to Switzerland, including Megrahi. “Unfortunately,” I told them, “nothing could be done at this time because no one, neither the United States nor Scotland, is prepared to issue arrest warrants.” No one could predict when or if that would be done. Cretton* provided me with the circuit boards which Bollier had turned over to them so these could be given to Henderson along with the Togo timer. Early the next morning, I rode to Zurich with Bob Fanning and his wife, Pat, who were on their way back to the United States. We split up at the airport and I flew onto Scotland. When I arrived at the LICC later that morning, the place was vibrant. I learned from Henderson that the name Abdusamad, the one I had gotten from Dick King* days before, had opened a new lock. A review of the embarkation cards in Malta determined he had stayed at the Holiday Inn on the night of December 20, 1988. The next morning Abdusamad had made one telephone call, to the Mosta area of Malta. Henderson said they did not have much else to go on at that time. Henderson was happy to receive K-1, the Togo timer.

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Chapter 14: Ahmed Khalifa Abdusamad I began the week with a series of meetings with Henderson. We discussed the current deployment in Malta. Investigation there did not require long drawn out legal processes as inquiries were handled informally, which was rare in the European systems I had encountered before. Henderson reported there were fingerprints on the embarkation cards which had now become crucial to the case. That was excellent news, but we did not have any fingerprints with which to compare them. Henderson told me 56 pieces of the bomb suitcase had been recovered and identified. While this was good news, it put us no closer to who had purchased, packed and then sent the bag on its way. We still did not know who had ordered the bombing and why. The next morning, we met with the US and Scottish prosecutors. The meeting lasted much of the day. If a prosecution would occur, I had no doubt the Scots wanted a chance to make their case. Biehl and Murtagh had other ideas and dreamed of bringing this case to trial in Washington, D.C. Henderson said that although much work remained to be done with respect to events in Malta around December 21, 1988, he was comfortable with the idea the bag had been ingested into the airline luggage system for the first time in Malta. He listed the potential suspects in the case. They included Megrahi, Abdusamad, Izz al din Hijazi*, Said Fazani*, Mustapha Last Name Unknown, Abu Agila Al Mahmudi*, and Badri Al Kafi*. Megrahi and Abdusamad were the easiest to figure out. Megrahi had been identified as the purchaser of the clothing contained in the IED suitcase. Abdusamad’s culpability was not yet known as his name had just come to our attention. He was an alleged associate of Megrahi and had been in Malta the day the IED suitcase began its journey. Hijazi* had ordered the timers made by Bollier. Fazani* and Mustapha had received them when they were made. Abu Agila Al Mahmudi* was a name which had come up before and he remained a shadowy figure throughout the investigation. He had flown out of Malta with Abdusamad on December 21, 1988. Intelligence assessments indicated he may have been the technical expert who had armed the IED. However, this was a theory, not evidence. Badri Al Kafi* was a business associate of Bollier and Megrahi who spent time in Switzerland. He told Bollier the Libyans needed more MST-13 timers in December 1988. We would have much work to do to tie these men into the conspiracy to bomb Pan Am Flight 103 and even more for an indictment. Henderson discussed the telephone call that Abdusamad made from the Holiday Inn early on the morning of December 21, 1988. He said the MEBO device was a straight timer, not one which required barometric pressure, and was accurate within six seconds. Henderson said it would be critical for international forensic experts to state they had never seen a timer like this in order to eliminate the possibility there were hundreds or thousands of them around the world. Henderson discussed the Senegal timer and efforts which had been made

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation to recover it. The French official who took possession of it had not divulged where it went. Although much had been done in Malta, it appeared some of the airport logbooks were missing, specifically for the days from December 20-27. If they could not be located, this would be a blow to reconstructing what occurred on the airport grounds on December 20 and 21. Henderson and I had already discussed the issues he was presenting to the attorneys. Much more needed to be done to develop background information on the seven suspects. He believed it was far too early to make plans to arrest them as evidence had not yet been developed against them. He turned his attention to Meister and Bollier. Henderson believed they were possible suspects who could be charged in Scotland. He raised concerns about Bollier’s travel to Libya from December 18-20, 1988. Henderson talked at length about Meister and Bollier and conceded that, while they could be subjects, they were probably only witnesses. Biehl made a brief presentation on the laws which allow the United States to prosecute individuals for this crime. It was obvious the United States was interested in prosecuting this case in the event the evidence came together. However, this was one issue which no one dared to broach publicly. During Biehl’s presentation, MacDougall asked the hard question, “If a prosecution were to occur in the United States, how will justice be extracted for the more than 80 people who were killed in the attack but who were not citizens of the United States, since the existing laws did not account for other than citizens of the United States?” MacDougall went onto say what no one had been willing to say to this point. He was ready to draft a memorandum which would stipulate where a prosecution would take place. Then he asked the question, “Let’s not beat around the bush; who wants to prosecute?” There was no answer, as no one in the room had the political clout to make that determination. We talked about witness security and Scottish law, treaties regarding extradition, double jeopardy and even simultaneous proceedings. Norman McFadyen of the Crown Office said he needed to know what the evidence was before any decision could be made as to a venue for prosecution. MacDougall closed this aspect of the discussion by stressing the need for coordination. He said there should be no unilateral indictment. Before the day concluded, we agreed there was not enough evidence to indict anyone anyway, so this discussion was premature. Feraday at RARDE was a road block. He had insisted on reviewing all evidence personally and was not interested in having any help. He wanted to ensure he was accurate and no one could fault him for that. The meeting wrapped up cordially and it seemed that not only had progress been made, both sides were seemingly working together, a goal which had been unattainable since the beginning. Our problems were not over, however.

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Chapter 14: Ahmed Khalifa Abdusamad On Thursday, March 7, I walked to Henderson’s office and noticed new life around the LICC. It had been vibrant when I arrived the week before, but something else was happening. The lead concerning Abdusamad which had emanated from an American intelligence analyst had furthered the investigation. The call Abdusamad placed on the morning of December 21 from the Holiday Inn was to the residence of Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, 3 St. John Spring Street in Mosta. Fhimah had been not only an employee of LAA in 1988; he was the station manager at Luqa Airport in Malta. Fhimah had been the station manager in 1988, but left Malta on December 29, 1988. Immigration records indicated Fhimah arrived in Malta on the night of December 20, 1988, on LAA (LN) Flight 231, the same flight as Abdusamad. This could be the link to prove how the IED bag was introduced into the aviation system. What better way than to use an airline employee, who would know everyone and have access to luggage tags and the aircraft themselves? Henderson had arranged a meeting with Manfred Klink the following Monday to update the BKA. That meant another weekend in Lockerbie, but I wanted to show the Germans this was a joint investigation and we were a partner in the decision making process. The next morning, Bill Chornyak, who had been my deputy on the FBIHQ Scotbom Task Force, called me from Washington with information that Fox News was getting ready to report that Swiss police and other agencies had interviewed a Swiss national who had made a timing device which might have destroyed Pan Am Flight 103. Bollier was no longer a secret. On Monday, I met Henderson in Glasgow for our early flight to Cologne, Germany, for the briefing of Manfred Klink. After we changed planes in Birmingham, England, the pilot announced an emergency and a short time later our plane returned to Birmingham. Because of the delay, we did not arrive in Germany until 3:00 p.m.. Our meeting with Klink was much shorter than we wanted it to be. Henderson had to get back to the LICC and I was headed home the next day. We left Cologne at 6:35 p.m. for London, where we parted. I had arranged to stay at a hotel near Heathrow but had plans for the evening. Joanne Harris, an employee of Pan Am in London, picked me up. She had spent time in Lockerbie after the bombing and was always able to find us good seats on any Pan Am flight to the United States. She had arranged for me to meet a number of the Pan Am staff from Heathrow including Nicky Milne, the young woman who had closed the doors of the doomed airliner on December 21, 1988. During dinner, the eight employees talked about the demise of a great airline for which many of them had worked for years. Pan Am was bankrupt and its London route was being purchased by United Airlines. Milne was still troubled by the crash. Although she worked for the airline and was around planes each day, she had not flown since. She was haunted by the fact she had closed the door to the aircraft and could not bring herself to get into another airplane.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation The next morning, I left Heathrow for the trip home. I had been gone 17 days, visited four countries and had survived an aircraft malfunction. I believed the time I spent with Henderson, Gilchrist and the other Scots helped establish the rapport we would need in the upcoming months. I was feeling the stress of the investigation. The next day, I made an appointment to see my family doctor. Before leaving, Jourdan called from Scotland. The good news was the reporter who was prepared to publish the story about the timer had agreed to withhold publication, at least for a time. Bollier was on his way to Scotland for an interview. I was not sure what would be accomplished, but if the Scots wanted an additional interview, it was acceptable to me. Jourdan also told me the Scots were of the opinion that Abdusamad and Megrahi were the same person. With that news, I left for the doctor. He told me I needed a vacation. It was not something for which I had time. By mid-March we had learned a great deal about Fhimah. The investigators discovered Vincent Vassallo, a Maltese who dispensed coffee at the Luqa Airport, had received some money in 1989 to open a travel agency with Fhimah. Vassallo had bragged how he was able to get around the airport. Other information showed Fhimah and Vassallo were still close and Vassallo may have visited Fhimah in Libya as recently as the past month. A review of the records of the Civil Aviation Administration, in Malta, showed Fhimah was the Station Manager for LAA in December 1988, and had airside access to aircraft. The investigators had not yet verified whether Fhimah was still working at the airport in December. Other avenues of investigation had opened as a result of the Abdusamad information. It was clear this investigation would not be complete in three weeks as Harry Bell predicted a few weeks before. The Scots brought Bollier to Scotland for his interview. They also wanted documentation as to why the United States bombed Tripoli in 1986. The media had reported that US intelligence had intercepted radio messages from Libya to its diplomats in Germany ordering the April 5, 1986 attack on the La Belle Discotheque. I doubted anyone in the US Government would put that in writing. However, Scottish prosecutors believed they had their motive for the attack: revenge for the bombing of Tripoli in 1986. That week moved slowly. On Thursday, March 21, Reid reported they had obtained a large number of documents from the Luqa Airport which would take time to analyze. Efforts were being made to find out about the travels of Vassallo and his family, but this too would take time. Reid said they were trying to find a connection between Megrahi and Fhimah, but that had not yet happened. Bell and Reid seemed to be working well together. The joint FBI-Scottish team was finally jelling and information was truly being shared. I had told Henderson during our meeting in November there was a role for the FBI and believed it would benefit the investigation. However, in order for it to work, the FBI and the police from the LICC had to be full and complete partners. Perhaps we finally were.

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CHAPTER 15: SPIES AND COPS COME TOGETHER The next morning Henderson told me Bollier was coming to Scotland the following week. Bollier was becoming difficult. The interview would be conducted by Scottish officers, but Ed Marshman, the FBI agent who interviewed Bollier at Quantico, could observe. Henderson said the FAI, which had concluded its investigation into why the plane crashed, had issued a 99-page report. Their inquiry did not focus on the criminal investigation. Their report made no mention of Malta, but concluded the bag which carried the bomb had come to London from the Frankfurt leg of Pan Am Flight 103. He believed their report was not harmful to the investigation. Henderson planned to take a few days off before traveling to the United States in early April. Henderson, like me, was feeling the pressure. The CIA’s Tom Wilson* had been busy analyzing information. He worked closely with Bresett. The results of the criminal investigation had allowed the CIA to reach certain non evidentiary conclusions. Other Libyans too had flown from Malta to Libya on LN 147, the flight on which Abdusamad was booked on December 21, 1988, and we had to examine them further. He believed that Badri Al Kafi*, a business associate of Megrahi and Bollier, might not have been involved in the bombing but could possess useful information. Wilson* and I discussed Vassallo and his association with Megrahi. Vassallo had started a travel agency in Malta, Medtours, to encourage Libyans to travel to Malta for vacation. On Wednesday March 27, Gilchrist, in Henderson’s absence, told me Bollier had been interviewed and had signed a statement which did not develop additional evidence but substantiated what he had previously provided. The Scots hoped Meister would come to Scotland in the near future. While no new information was uncovered, the Scots had consolidated information held in the United States, Scotland and Switzerland.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Early the next week Meister agreed to go to Scotland for a follow-up interview. Scottish investigators were not returning to Malta until the next week. Henderson believed they would be better served after his visit to the CIA, scheduled for Friday, April 5. I disagreed. I wanted the Malta aspects of the case wrapped up quickly before the Maltese had another change of heart; but it was not worth the risk of ruining our relationship. Henderson arrived at Dulles Airport on Wednesday, April 3, for his first meeting at the CIA. The BSS would be there. On the afternoon of April 4, Henderson and I jogged through Georgetown for a half hour. It was warm but we ran slowly and discussed how far we had come. We were optimistic for a solution and hoped the answers we needed for an indictment would come soon. The next morning I drove Henderson to our meeting at the CIA. He was accompanied by Donald Fraser, a Scottish policeman assigned to the Special Branch, which allowed him to access classified information. The BSS was there and I was joined by Gallagher and four other FBI agents. We discussed the recent Gauci identification of Megrahi and how important it was for the intelligence services of the United States and United Kingdom to remain alert to any travel by Megrahi, Fhimah or any of those developed as “persons of interest.” (This was a term not used in 1991, but it came into prominence in the investigation of the 2001 anthrax attacks in New York, Florida and Washington.) The CIA opined the Libyan CSS might have played some role in the bombing as some of the main suspects in the investigation had or may have had connections to it. However, it was too early to tell what role, if any, they had. The intelligence representatives present also believed the Libyan Government was less worried about a criminal prosecution than they were about another military strike, such as occurred in 1986. The intelligence officials also believed that Badri Al Kafi*, a business associate of Megrahi, traveled a great deal and could be a valuable witness. They would monitor his travel to see if he could be located somewhere in the world for an interview. They had no way of knowing what information he possessed, if any. Finally, cooperation was getting better. Everyone in the room had a common mission, to identify whoever was responsible for this vicious crime and put them on trial. The CIA and BSS promised to track leads and provide them to us. It seemed like a model which would bode well for the future in combating terrorism. On Monday morning, April 8, the Scots, including John Orr, as well as the prosecutors, came to FBIHQ for a law enforcement/prosecutor meeting to discuss the investigation. I chaired the meeting and we focused on where the investigation was with respect to each area of significance. The investigation in Malta was of paramount importance but any further leak of information could cause the Maltese to shut down the investigation yet again. The Maltese had been extremely concerned about damage the investigation could do to the tourist industry. Henderson said the investigation in Malta would not be a

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Chapter 15: Spies and Cops Come Together “frontal assault” on LAA or on those employed at the airport, where we believed the bomb bag was introduced into the airline luggage system. Henderson believed the French could play a key role to determine what happened to the MST-13 timer seized at Dakar Airport in Senegal in February 1988, in the possession of the two Libyan intelligence officers. The seized timer had been one of the “boxed” timers and was identical to that which blew up Pan Am Flight 103. The prosecutors were interested in knowing when the Scottish Police and the RARDE reports would be completed. Although both had been works in progress for some time, neither would be ready soon. It was the forensic report being prepared at RARDE which most concerned the American prosecutors, especially Murtagh. He wanted to send a letter from the Attorney General to officials of the British Defense Department which oversaw the work of Feraday. Orr stated the LICC would be closed in the fall of 1991, and all functions folded into the Dumfries and Galloway Police headquarters building. I knew Henderson was not looking forward to this as it probably meant the end of his assignment and ultimately, the end of his career. It seemed officials in Scotland had created a timeline for the end of the investigation. I had not been privy to the discussions between the White House and the Justice Department and wondered if they too had discussed an end line! We discussed each of the suspects who had been identified and the information which made them of interest. Although Vincent Vassallo, the partner of Fhimah in Medtours in Malta, and Bollier were not considered suspects they were still of interest because of what they might know. The last major topic of the day related to the protection of witnesses. Although the CIA had opined Libya was more concerned about a military strike than a criminal investigation, prudence dictated the safety of witnesses had to be considered. For the time being, we agreed all that needed to be done was being done. Gauci was being looked after by the police in Malta. Bollier and Meister were doing nothing more than providing evidence in a criminal case. None of them had expressed concern for their personal welfare. Henderson and I agreed to discuss this further with both the Swiss and the Maltese authorities. Orr and Henderson returned to Scotland the next day. The intelligence agencies began looking for a mechanism to transmit intelligence information to the FBI and the Scottish police. In 1991, there were no protocols for using intelligence information in court. Much discussion was generated after the events of September 11 about the “wall” between intelligence and evidence as well as the sharing of information. Lockerbie was a case which involved foreign terrorists who committed an attack on Americans overseas. Although there were numerous difficulties in the sharing of information within US agencies and abroad, most were driven by personality rather than by legal issues. Once we agreed to work together, information, evidentiary and intelligence was openly

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation and freely shared. However, there would still be issues about how to “translate” intelligence into evidence which would be useable in a court of law. Henderson and I spoke several times on April 12. Meister had been interviewed in Scotland and provided some information but nothing which furthered the investigation. The Maltese immigration cards had been sent for a handwriting comparison analysis. Henderson hoped the Scottish examiner could match the Abdusamad card with known handwriting of Megrahi. This match could prove Abdusamad and Megrahi was the same person. While there were no known fingerprints for Abdusamad or Megrahi, we discussed the possibility of eventually raising prints on documents which now included immigration cards and hotel registration forms. Although I offered to have the FBI lab conduct the analysis, Henderson told me the Scots wanted to do it. Henderson and I had discussed showing the Swiss authorities PT-35. We wanted them to tell Meister and Bollier, who had only seen photographs, that they had seen the chip and the evidence was real. Henderson extended an invitation to Swiss police officials to travel to Scotland for briefings which would be conducted jointly by Henderson and me. Henderson had also been contacted by French counter terrorism authorities seeking information. The CIA and BSS had apparently briefed their French counterparts and Judge Bruguiere was asking questions about Megrahi. I said I would speak with the FBI Legat in Paris to find out what the French knew. Neither of us wanted information about our suspects in the press before the investigation was complete and we had a plan in place to arrest them. The conversation ended with a bit more news. George Esson, who had been making public statements about the case since his appointment as Chief in mid-1989, had written in his annual report that the investigation would be concluded by the end of the year. It was not something either Henderson or I could say with certainty. In the meantime, the Swiss police had received a letter from Bollier. He accused the FBI, the CIA and the Swiss of burglarizing his MEBO offices in December 1988. He accused the Scots of manufacturing evidence in this case, particularly PT-35. He said this was done so investigators could say they solved the case. The Swiss were mystified because they had spoken to Bollier on a Friday and he had composed the letter to them over the weekend. Bollier made no mention of his visit to Vienna in January 1989 when he placed the blame for Lockerbie on the Libyans. The Swiss believed there would be an article soon in the press about the MEBO connection to Lockerbie and they wanted us to know they were not the source of the leak. The Swiss were still not convinced of the MEBO connection to Lockerbie. Henderson’s letter of invitation had not yet been received. Our Legat, Bob Fanning, believed the letter was with the British MI-6 representative in Bern. Fanning and I were frustrated by the cumbersome system the Scots insisted upon using. They used formal diplomatic channels when informal law

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Chapter 15: Spies and Cops Come Together enforcement to law enforcement channels, such as those we used, was much more efficient. The Swiss planned to travel to Scotland to look at the evidence. They did not believe the evidence had been fabricated but wanted to be able to convince Meister and Bollier of the authenticity of PT-35. Early Monday morning, April 15, Henderson told me an article had appeared over the weekend which said the Lockerbie investigators had been at MEBO. A spokesman for MEBO confirmed that but provided little other information. Since the Swiss authorities had been asked to respond, Henderson believed they would want to travel to Lockerbie soon. Henderson had other news to pass along. The investigation in Malta had begun to sputter as one of the hotels had refused to turn over additional records. This hotel was one which was a favorite of Libyans on their trips to Malta. Late that afternoon Gallagher told me he had received a call from a friend in the French Directorate of Territorial Security (DST). The DST is responsible for countering terrorism within France, as the FBI is in the United States. The French were getting close to an indictment in the UTA Flight 772 investigation. Judge Bruguiere, who had come to the United States shortly after the Lockerbie bombing seeking information because two French citizens had been killed in that attack, was conducting the inquiry. Bruguiere was willing to provide information about his investigation into the UTA bombing, which had occurred in September 1989 over Niger and killed 171 people (including Bonnie Barnes Pugh, the wife of the US Ambassador to Chad). The DST was aware of MEBO and its connection to Lockerbie. Gallagher proposed that he, Henderson and I travel to France to meet with Bruguiere. There was still the outstanding issue of the Senegal timer and what became of it. I agreed to see if Henderson would be willing to go to France. The next two days were just as busy. Henderson confirmed the Swiss were coming to Scotland on April 29. While the meeting was just 12 days off, I rearranged my schedule to ensure I could participate. Although Henderson would carry much of the briefing load, I wanted to be sure there was no doubt this was a joint investigation. The head was Scotland, but the United States was the body. We needed each other to collectively solve this case and the world needed to see not only the cooperation, but the commitment as well. As we discussed my upcoming trip to Lockerbie and London to look at PT35 with the Swiss, I asked Henderson what he thought about a trip to Paris to meet with the French. Henderson was initially optimistic but said he would make a decision later. I knew the FBI needed to nurture each of its overseas relationships as the Bureau would be back to help or be helped by these other law enforcement and intelligence services. The FBI had been doing this for years and would be doing it in the future. But few of the officers assigned to the LICC were likely ever to need to develop international police relationships beyond Lockerbie.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Later that week Vincent Vassallo, the partner in Medtours with Fhimah, was scheduled to be interviewed. There was speculation Fhimah might be on Malta. On Thursday, April 18, Vassallo was interviewed for the first time. He spoke good English and the interview lasted several hours. Vassallo had established Medtours to generate travel of Libyans to Malta and Maltese citizens to Libya. The expected tourism never materialized. He later got into the importexport business, sending coffee and tuna from Malta to Libya and importing fish and watermelons from Libya. This effort also failed. Vassallo seemed willing to cooperate, but he had to go before they could get to any significant questions. Reid and Bell did not want to appear too aggressive on the first contact. He had been asked to provide information about his business associate, Lamen Fhimah. Vassallo had given conflicting dates about when he last saw Fhimah. One interesting note came from the interview. Vassallo had kept a diary in 1988 and he believed he still had it. The investigators put off interviewing Vassallo until Monday, at his request. Reid and Bell went to the Luqa Airport in Malta to interview staff at the LAA. They began with the station manager, the man who had taken Fhimah’s place, Mustafa al Safi*. The only one present in the office was a secretary who said no one was available until the next Monday. When they asked for passenger lists and records of the airline for 1988, the records for the period of October 1988 until April 1989 were missing. On Monday, April 22, Vassallo was interviewed briefly. Fhimah had given him several contact telephone numbers in Libya and said he was working at the airport in Tripoli as a “controller.” The FBI and Scots had interviewed the people who had moved into Fhimah’s flat after he moved. They had removed a large number of items including clothes, whiskey bottles, beer bottles, shaving gear and other garbage. However, it was long gone. The teams reviewing immigration records were coming up with possible times when Fhimah and Megrahi may have been together. While none of this was of great value in determining the guilt or innocence of either party, it did show a connection between the two, something which was still missing at that time. The CIA was still busy collecting and analyzing information on our seven main suspects plus Fhimah. The prosecutors wanted to know who these men were, what their connection to the Libyan hierarchy was and whether we could get any of them to travel so they might be interviewed — or arrested. Did they have a connection to Gaddafi? I was starting to be worn out; the stress was taking its toll. The trips to the doctor were coming more often. He said I was under extreme stress. I felt bad paying a doctor good money to tell me what I already knew. Besides, there was nothing I could do about it.

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CHAPTER 16: VASSALLO Malta was heating up. The investigators went back to see Vassallo. He seemed to have a great deal of information about Megrahi. Vassallo had found his diary from 1988, but Reid and Bell doubted he had any information about the attack itself. It was Reid’s opinion that Medtours was a front company for something or someone, as they conducted little business. However, Vassallo’s 1988 diary turned out to contain some interesting information. In it was a notation that Fhimah and Megrahi came to Vassallo’s house on December 20. Vassallo recalled the meeting and said he did not see Megrahi the next day. Another diary entry noted that this was Megrahi’s first visit to his home. This was significant because this was a record putting Megrahi on Malta the night before the bomb laden bag left on its journey. We knew Abdusamad and Fhimah had traveled to Malta from Libya that evening. Although there were no immigration records to support Megrahi’s travel to Malta on December 20, the diary entry indicated Fhimah and Megrahi were together on the night of December 20, 1988, at Vassallo’s house in Malta. Was Megrahi Abdusamad? What reason did Megrahi have to visit Malta under an assumed name for a few hours on the night and morning of December 20–21? A judge decided that question nearly ten years later. The diary did not indicate the time of the visit but Vassallo recalled it was in the evening. Vassallo’s diary contained a notation Fhimah left Malta on December 18 to travel to Libya to meet with Megrahi, and that he left Malta to return to Libya on December 29, 1988. Vassallo recalled that between October and December 1988, he had discussions with Fhimah about starting a travel agency. Fhimah told Vassallo that Megrahi might be in a position to provide the money for the business. Vassallo would be reinterviewed the next day. While the number of interviews seemed excessive, I was not aware of the dynamics at play

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation and was reluctant to intervene, especially because so much positive information was forthcoming. Reid and Bell did not believe Vassallo was a party to the bombing, and Vassallo himself was starting to question his relationship with Megrahi and Fhimah. He seemed petrified to think he might have been dealing with people who had a role in this attack. Vassallo also provided an intelligence gem, Megrahi’s home telephone number in Libya. One of the Scottish officers asked if Fhimah had kept a diary. Vassallo said he did and led them to Fhimah’s abandoned office at Medtours. Fhimah’s diary was there, and had been there since 1988. Vassallo authorized the police to take the diary and it was quickly copied. It was translated and a review developed several significant comments. One of the notations said to bring the “TAGGS” from the airport for AB (interpreted to mean Abdel Baset — Megrahi). Reid had also developed some information that Megrahi was related to Abd al Salam Jallud, the number two man in the Libyan Government. Media reports later indicated the two were from the same tribe in Libya. A second item, located with the diary, was Fhimah’s airside access badge for Luqa Airport. It had his name, photograph and an expiration date of December 31, 1988. Since it was found in his desk, we assumed it had been in his control on December 21, 1988. This badge allowed him access to all areas of the airport. Reid and Bell were working out the logistics of keeping the diary, because it was powerful evidence. The Malta team continued to interview Vassallo but wanted to begin interviewing LAA employees at Luqa Airport. However, they declined to be interviewed, requesting all questions for them be put in writing and forwarded to Libya. The LAA station manager said he would get a response within two days of receiving the questions. An analysis of the diary revealed a few more things. On December 15 was a notation about “AB” coming to Malta to pick up “Taggs” for an Air Malta airline. In the late 1980s, many airlines did not use computerized luggage tags and some were made of cardboard. Popular routes were printed and others were handwritten on tear-off strips. This type of tag could be used to send a suitcase anywhere in the world. Vassallo was asked not to contact Fhimah. The investigators considered asking Vassallo to place a recorded telephone call to him. They wanted to gauge his reaction to being told of the interest by the Lockerbie investigators in him. Bell planned to speak with the Maltese police about seizing the diary as evidence. Due to a French holiday, my trip to France had been pushed back a week. The extra week would give me an opportunity to get over the jet lag from my trip to Scotland to meet with the Swiss. I wanted to let Henderson know I believed his participation in the meetings with the French was crucial to demonstrate international cooperation.

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Chapter 16: Vassallo April 24 started as each day the past few months had. My phone was ringing off the hook as soon as I walked into the office. It was just after 6:00 a.m. The Legats, Jourdan and Henderson, all of whom were well into their work days by then, knew my work schedule and the phone would normally start ringing quite early. We did not have voice mail so it was impossible to judge how many calls I had missed. In addition, they all had my pager number and I received many calls when I was not at my desk. Henderson wanted to discuss a variety of issues. He was having a letter prepared to be sent to LAA in response to their request. Henderson did not want to provide them much detail but wanted information about who was on duty at Luqa Airport on the days around December 21, 1988. Henderson was reluctant to disclose much information to either the Libyan Government or to the High Commission in Malta, the British equivalent of the American DOS. We feared media leaks would again derail the investigation and take away our momentum. We discussed the legal issues around seizing the diary. Henderson knew the Maltese were aware of its existence and believed the diary, as abandoned property, could be seized on the authority of the Police Commissioner. We discussed the upcoming trip to France and Henderson was planning to bring Donald Fraser with him. By 8:00 a.m., it felt as if I had already put in a full day when the phone rang again. It was Reid calling from Malta with an update on the day’s interview with Vassallo. Vassallo had a change of heart and asked to get the Fhimah diary back. Fortunately, the police believed the diary was significant and would not return it. George Grech, now the Maltese police commissioner, would, however, maintain the original at Police Headquarters. While the interviews of Vassallo were not developing many leads, information coming from them could develop additional evidence. Vassallo recalled numerous meetings which placed Megrahi at the same Holiday Inn where Abdusamad stayed on December 20, 1988. Vassallo recalled Megrahi had called him from Zurich in 1990, asking to be picked up at Luqa when he flew to Malta. While Vassallo recalled the dates as June or July, the immigration records actually documented Megrahi was in Malta in August and September that year. Vassallo provided information which tied Fhimah to the Nova Park Hotel in Zurich. While this was not evidence of guilt, it provided insight into the travel of Fhimah and Megrahi. Reid mentioned the diary again. The notation regarding the “taggs” from the Air Malta airline was followed by the letters, “OK.” Reid said other items had the same note and the investigators would be checking them to see if the other items on the list had also been accomplished so there could be some assurance this is what those letters meant. This was starting to look like a “to do” list and getting the “taggs” was seemingly marked as completed by the notation of “OK.” Grech told Bell he would be “issuing” a warrant to seize the Fhimah diary. Vassallo said he had not contacted Fhimah but Reid doubted that. Vassallo probably

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation made some assumptions about their interest in Fhimah and Megrahi, but had not been told details of the evidence collected so far. I spent the next few days dealing with a whole range of issues from the upcoming trip to Scotland to meet with the Swiss, the trip to France to meet with Bruguiere, issues from Malta and Scotland, as well as the continuing saga of the lawsuit by Pan Am. Pan Am had just filed a 900-page brief with the Government seeking information for their defense in the suit by the victim families. Attorneys at the FBI and the DOJ believed Pan Am was doing everything it could do to delay the lawsuit from being heard. Vassallo allegedly had a recent telephone conversation with Fhimah. Vassallo told Fhimah the Lockerbie investigators had been to Medtours and had seized his and Fhimah’s diaries. According to Vassallo, Fhimah seemed nonplussed and told him not to worry about it. He apparently told Fhimah about all the people the police had asked about, including Megrahi. It seemed the cat was out of the bag. Fhimah did say he would not be coming to Malta anytime soon. As soon as I finished speaking with Reid, I called Dave Bresett at the CIA. I briefed him on the events in Malta and Bresett provided a little news of his own. It seemed the agency had not only been busy sharing intelligence with other foreign services but was attempting to locate a low level Libyan intelligence officer. Bresett said he had previously furnished his photograph to the FBI, but the man, Abd Al-Magid Giaka, also known as Majid Giaka, had formerly worked for Fhimah at LAA in Malta. The CIA was trying to locate him. They provided the information to the BSS but did not want them to try to find him. Giaka had been a CIA source and had provided them information, none of it related to the bombing, in Malta in 1988 and 1989. Bresett authorized me to pass this information to Henderson when I saw him the next week. He was not certain the CIA could locate Giaka and, if they did, had no idea what information he could provide. I did not think much of it at the time, but copied the document Bresett passed to me to give Henderson on my upcoming trip.

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CHAPTER 17: THE SWISS On Saturday night, April 27, 1991, I flew from Dulles to London and connected with a British Airways shuttle to Edinburgh. Jourdan met me early Sunday morning and we drove to his cottage in Torthorwald, about 10 miles to the west of Lockerbie. That day, we were dinner guests of Stuart and Yvette Henderson in their beautiful home in Edinburgh. Prior to dinner, while Jourdan spoke with Yvette, Henderson and I went out on the front porch of the house. On a clear day, the view was incredible. You could see the Edinburgh castle to the east and the distant Pennicuik Mountains. As we drank a beer, we shared our thoughts. The world would be watching when we finally closed in on a suspect. This case attracted international attention and with that, scrutiny. We had discussed many times how we had gone from looking at the whole world to Iran, to the Palestinian terrorist group, the PFLP-GC, to Palestinian terrorists in Sweden and now to Libya in the form of Libyan operatives acting either on their own or with the support of the Libyan Government. It was well known that the PFLP-GC was supported by the Government of Syria. Its leader, Ahmed Jibril, was living in Syria. After the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, the United States was looking for allies and partners in the Middle East, especially among some of Saddam Hussein’s Arab neighbors. Many in the Middle East feared Hussein, but few wanted to be seen as supporting the United States or Israel. President Bush courted heads of state in the region and it was considered a coup to have recruited Hafez al Assad, then the president of Syria. Assad’s support was seen as critical to the coalition formed to drive Iraq from Kuwait. The downside of being cozy with Syria was Assad had supported many Palestinian terrorist groups through the years, including Jibril’s PFLP-GC. Jibril had always denied involvement in the Lockerbie bombing and Assad con-

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation tinued to support him. However, Syrian support was essential in the war with Iraq in 1991. Kuwait had been invaded in August 1990, and Cannistraro’s remarks, publicly identifying Libya as the focus of our investigation, were made in November, before the start of either the air or ground wars in Iraq, but at the time the United States and the United Kingdom were trying to gain Assad’s support. Once they received it, there was speculation a deal had been made. If Assad supported the coalition, the focus of the Lockerbie investigation would shift from the PFLP-GC, Jibril and in essence from Syria, to another target. What better suspect than a country run by Moammar Gaddafi, the man many in the world had already loved to hate? We discussed the strength of the evidence and what needed to be done, and the fact the evidence had taken us to Gaddafi’s doorstep. It was not politics or intelligence which had driven the investigation. It was the painstaking evidence collection on the ground by dedicated Scottish officers along with superb forensic work on both sides of the Atlantic. That, combined with detailed police investigation by the joint task force, led us to where we were. We knew many people in the world would doubt the evidence and would conclude we had reached a “politically correct” solution. The media later reported that President Bush and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher met and shifted blame for Lockerbie from the Syrian backed PFLP-GC in exchange for Assad’s cooperation. If any such meeting occurred, no one told us or the officers and agents who worked with us. As we discussed the case, its strengths and weaknesses, I pulled from my notebook a copy of the information Bresett had sent me the week before. I said the CIA had identified someone who had worked for Fhimah at LAA in Malta during 1988. The paper only contained his name, Majid Giaka. There was no certainty the CIA would be successful in locating him. Even if he was located, there was no way to know if we could interview him. We also had no way of knowing if anything he knew could shed light on the investigation. It was another long shot. Using the guidance given me by Bresett, Henderson was told that while the BSS was also aware of Giaka, the CIA was trying to locate him and had requested no one else make an attempt to do so. The next morning, April 29, I rode with Jourdan to Lockerbie for the meeting at the LICC with Hans Cretton* and Peter Humert* of the Swiss police. Willie Williamson, a Scottish officer who had been involved in the Swiss aspects of the investigation, Jim Gilchrist, Henderson and I met them. The British MI-6 also sent a representative. The CIA was not there. Henderson provided an overview and updated them on the current developments in Malta as well as details of the letter he had written to LAA officials in Malta. I heard for the first time of reaction to the investigation focusing in Malta which had been published that morning in the Maltese newspaper. Henderson’s briefing included detail from the time the explosion occurred to the con-

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Chapter 17: The Swiss tainer, the radio, clothing and suitcase. He discussed the timer which had brought the Swiss into the investigation. Williamson provided the history of PT35 which had been traced to MEBO, the Swiss electronics firm. Williamson said that Allen Feraday, the forensic examiner, had sent a fax to Henderson in January 1990 about items he found blasted into a Slalom shirt. In addition to pieces of black plastic, some wire and a piece of the instruction manual for the RT-SF16 radio were discovered. The most significant item was a fingernail-size chip, green in color, with solder for a circuit on one side only. This chip became known as PT-35, the evidence designation placed on it by the Scots. He spoke of the efforts which led us to MEBO, one familiar to the Swiss. Cretton* expressed his concerns and those of Bollier. The first was that the CIA had planted the chip in the wreckage found at Lockerbie. Henderson and I told him this thought had also crossed our minds. Neither of us believed the CIA or any government official would do such a thing, but we had discussed the possibility. Henderson was convinced of the veracity of PT-35, the way it had been found, logged in and the fact it had not been identified even by the forensic examiners until January 1990. Although it had been located early on in the search, the piece of cloth into which it had been blasted was not examined until a year after the attack. If the CIA or another intelligence agency had planted the chip to divert attention from Iran, Syria or the PFLP-GC, it was inconceivable they would have allowed so much time to pass before the chip was identified. Henderson and I knew it was a bit of luck that not only had PT-35 been found, but Tom Thurman, the FBI forensic examiner, was also able to track it to Libyan intelligence officers and MEBO with the help of his contacts at the CIA. Their next concern related to Bollier’s correspondence with the CIA in the months following the bombing. The Swiss believed this would be a serious issue raised by any defense lawyer. Bollier’s third concern related to photographs which had been shown to him by the Scots and which appeared to be of undamaged clothing. Bollier believed the Swiss had broken into his office and photographed it. Bollier had taken clothing with him to Libya shortly before the bombing and he feared prosecutors would accuse him of being involved in the bombing. Henderson said the photos Bollier had been shown were “control samples” of new clothing, similar to the blast damaged clothing found at Lockerbie and believed to have been in the IED suitcase. Bollier told the Swiss police that before he ever testified in court he would have to be convinced that the photograph he was shown of PT-35 was of an item actually found in the wreckage. He wanted an independent scientific examination of the crash and PT-35. Henderson detailed what the evidence was at this point in the investigation. He said the main perpetrators of the crime met in Tripoli from December 18-20, 1988. Megrahi, using a false name, came to Malta sometime in the evening of December 20, 1988, and the bomb bag was placed onto KM 180, an Air Malta

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation flight from Valetta to Frankfurt on the morning of December 21, 1988. Megrahi, using the name of Abdusamad, returned to Libya 30 minutes after the bomb bag was on its way to Frankfurt. The baggage record from Frankfurt Airport showed one bag from Air Malta Flight 180 had been sent to Pan Am Flight 103 in Frankfurt. Henderson believed Maltese officials had come to terms with the idea the bomb suitcase had originated in Malta. Information about the diaries of Vassallo and Fhimah was furnished to the Swiss. Henderson optimistically hoped to name four or five Libyans as defendants in his final report. Each of those he would name had connections to Switzerland, Malta, timers and clothing. I, too, was optimistic more defendants other than Megrahi and Fhimah would be identified and eventually indicted, arrested and convicted. During the lunch break, Reid called me regarding the Malta investigation. They learned Vassallo had gone to Libya to see Fhimah on February 10, 1991, and may have told him the Lockerbie investigators were asking questions about him. Five days later, Mary DeBello*, who had been a friend of Fhimah while he was at LAA, left Malta for Canada. No one knew if her trip was related but we hoped to find out. After lunch, Henderson disclosed the results of the Vassallo interviews. Although Henderson never mentioned him by name, referring to him as a Maltese national, he provided detail about his and Fhimah’s diaries. He discussed the immigration records which showed numerous trips by Megrahi to Switzerland. Henderson was doing what he could to convince Cretton* and Humert* that Switzerland was playing an important role in the investigation. He discussed the telephone call to Fhimah at 7:11 a.m. on December 21, 1988, which came from the room occupied at the Holiday Inn in Malta by Abdusamad (who we believed was Megrahi). He talked about Fhimah having airside access at Luqa Airport until the end of December 1988, because of his Luqa Airport pass which was found at the offices of Medtours in the past month. Henderson detailed the preferential treatment Megrahi received when he came to Luqa Airport on his travels there. He was emphatic Megrahi had entered Malta on December 20, 1988, using an assumed name. I knew that it would be difficult to back up that claim from the evidence which we had at the time, but I believed it was true. To further demonstrate to the Swiss how they fit into this investigation, Henderson talked about some of the entries found in the diary which had been left in Malta by Fhimah. An entry on December 15 showed Megrahi was due back from Zurich that day. The Swiss discussed the media leaks in Switzerland. Bollier had apparently spoken to a reporter there about the involvement of MEBO in manufacturing the timer which was contained in the bomb suitcase. The journalist had contacted a number of people, in Lockerbie and Switzerland, trying to confirm his story; but Scottish and Swiss officials declined to confirm his information.

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Chapter 17: The Swiss Cretton* said there had been a story in the Swiss media in January 1991 about Libyan involvement in the downing of Pan Am Flight 103. That was possibly because of Cannistraro’s interview in November. We discussed in general terms Bollier’s many statements to the Swiss, the FBI and the Scots. Cretton* also said if Bollier ever thought he was a suspect and subject to prosecution, he would never have helped in the first place. Bollier was probably upset he had become a party to such a heinous act and it was Bollier who had tried to direct us toward Libya in January 1989, in Vienna. Bollier stayed in contact with the Libyans despite their apparently having used his timer because they were a revenue source for him. We believed Bollier would gravitate to the money. The afternoon ended as did many days in Scotland, with some single malt whiskey. Like the victim families, the four of us, from America, Scotland and Switzerland had been drawn together by a common tragedy. We should never have met except for the unspeakable horror of Lockerbie. Each of us wanted the same result, justice for the victims. We made a short night of it as we had an early flight to London the next morning. I, along with the Swiss, would get our first look at PT-35, the small piece of evidence which had become crucial to the solution of the case. Early the next morning Henderson, the Swiss officers and I flew to London and took a train to RARDE. We met Allen Feraday and an associate, Maurice Marshall. Feraday was the man who had taken it upon himself to personally examine all the evidence in the case. Feraday described in detail what he had done, which was impressive. Then he brought out the item which we had all come to see; PT-35. This was the circuit board fragment which had led to the identification of Switzerland and MEBO as the source of the timer and subsequently traced to Libyan officials. The Swiss were convinced. This was important; after all it was the purpose of the trip. As we headed for downtown London and a meeting with the BSS, the day seemed bright even though it was a typical British spring day, cool and rainy. Feraday and Dr. Thomas Hayes, who had been involved in the forensic examinations earlier in the investigation, said they were 100 per cent certain of the accuracy of what they had examined. This was helpful even though the written report was months from completion. Since the police and intelligence agencies had begun fully sharing information, it allowed the intelligence agencies to make assessments from the evidence. It seemed that in most cases, places where Bollier said he had met with suspected Libyan intelligence officers had indeed been locations where intelligence officers worked in Tripoli. We discussed whether or not this was a government-sponsored operation or one done by a group of rogues. That question followed us for the duration of the investigation, including through the trial.

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CHAPTER 18: TRAVEL GETS OLD It appeared Gallagher and I would be going alone to the meeting in France, with no one from Scotland attending. Henderson had been told by people in his government not to attend. The investigators in Malta located Mary DeBello* in Montreal and arranged for her to be interviewed. Nothing new was learned. It was another wild goose chase. The upcoming meeting in France was becoming more complicated and would include organizations other than the DST. Although the number of attendees was limited, I was concerned about a leak of information. On Monday, May 6, Al Ringgold, the FBI Legat in Paris, told me the French were not happy the Scots would not be coming. In addition to Judge Bruguiere, the French DST forensic experts, other police officials and a representative from a coordinating committee among police and judicial agencies would be there. Jean Francois Claire, the head of the Counter Terrorism branch of the DST, said he welcomed a bilateral meeting with the FBI in the event no one from the UK attended. I planned to raise the issue with Henderson again, but doubted I would have success getting him to France. The next day I met with Tom Wilson* and Dave Bresett from the CIA CTC. The intelligence agencies had been busy in Eastern Europe. Megrahi had been in Czechoslovakia from December 9-16, 1988. He had traveled under passport number 755973. They hoped to be able to get additional information before law enforcement would go in and collect evidence. Henderson and I spoke briefly on the secure line from Jourdan’s office at the LICC. We discussed the DeBello* interview which had just taken place. Not much had come from the interview; however, Henderson believed there was a suggestion that Fhimah could have had access to luggage tags. Henderson said Libyan officials from LAA had contacted the police in Malta and it was unknown

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Chapter 18: Travel Gets Old whether or not they would cooperate. I again raised the issue of having the immigration records and the Holiday Inn cards examined by the FBI laboratory for fingerprints; however, Henderson wanted it done in Scotland as their lab was state of the art. Although skeptical, I took Henderson at his word. On May 8, Henderson and I discussed the trip to France. I never wanted it to appear we were again going our own way. There had been too much of that, on both sides. Henderson recognized what I had told him was valid, but said he could not attend. Each of us had bosses and there would be things that could not be changed. Then Reid was on the other line waiting to say that investigators were getting information from the Maltese police. Reid doubted that LAA would ever cooperate with the investigation and their message was, if you want information, you have to go through Tripoli to get it. Reid and Bell intended to go back to LAA and have them decline to cooperate. It would put them on the record as the only airline at Luqa Airport which had not cooperated. Reid wanted to sit down with Vassallo and have his undivided attention for a full day. They still did not know whose side he was on. Although Bell was returning to Scotland, Reid said that he and Craig Bates, another FBI agent, would stay in Malta to conclude the actions which had been developed during their most recent deployment. Vassallo seemed to be having regular, ongoing contact with the two main subjects of the investigation, Megrahi and Fhimah. Reid was optimistic this would be the last major deployment of resources as the number of leads in Malta was dwindling. Jourdan, our liaison agent in Scotland, was a tremendous resource for the FBI and the Scottish police. He had a PhD in nuclear chemistry and. although he did not have much use for it in Scotland, kept me apprised of issues which arose there—even providing a “heads up” if Henderson was ever having a bad day. I often wondered if the Scottish liaison officer detailed to WFO also provided Henderson intelligence on my moods and temperaments. Jourdan picked up tidbits of information from a range of officers and kept me aware of what was going on. Early on the morning of May 9, Jourdan learned the reason Henderson was not going to France the next week. The Scots believed neither Judge Bruguiere nor the head of the French DST would be at the meeting; Henderson would invite Bruguiere and the French DST to Lockerbie for a meeting. All I could think was, “here we go again.” I never got back to Henderson that day as events which seemed insignificant later overcame the existing time left in the day. While we often spoke from our respective homes, after hours and on weekends, I thought it best to wait another day. Before the day ended, Jourdan called again. He wanted to know if I was still going to France absent the Scots. Jourdan was looking for an answer in case he should be asked. Although it would be me who would have to deal with

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Henderson and the rest of the police hierarchy at the LICC, I wanted to at least give him something he could use in his day-to-day dealings with the police. I confirmed that Judge Bruguiere and Jean Francois Claire would be at the meeting, and that I was definitely going to attend. Reid found some people in Malta who believed they could locate and talk to Fhimah. The contact would be made through the intelligence service of another country. This seemed like a way to develop information but we knew this could also explode in our faces. The Scots might not be receptive to such an approach and the information might not be admissible in court, in the United States or in Scotland. I wanted to discuss this with a few others. I wanted the investigation to succeed and would do nothing to jeopardize its integrity. I also was concerned about our relationship with the Scots. I called Gallagher to discuss the proposed contact with Fhimah. Although Gallagher was the chief of the CTS and oversaw all counter terrorism investigations, when I went over to WFO, I no longer worked for him. I told him about my phone conversation with Reid. Gallagher wondered if Fhimah had a more significant role in the attack than just obtaining luggage tags. He was concerned any contact by an intelligence agency could result in the collection of evidence which might be needed in court. The issue of intelligence officers testifying in court had not yet been resolved. Any statement made by Fhimah to an intelligence officer could be problematic. We discussed the downside of the Scots not being in the loop and might adversely affect the relationship we had developed. There was the positive benefit of being able to find out who else was involved in the bombing. Gallagher did not believe this could be a secret for long because the intelligence agencies spoke between themselves and it would be a matter of time before the BSS was aware and the Scottish police notified. Gallagher was going to discuss this at FBIHQ and I planned to speak with the DOJ attorneys to get their opinion. The next morning, Gallagher and I spoke again. We discussed in more detail the possibility that Fhimah would make a statement about his involvement in the bombing. What would happen if we got that? Could that information be used in court, but especially a court in Scotland? After all, it was for this eventuality that this case was being investigated. We recognized this approach might get additional information against others higher in the Libyan Government. We agreed to let the CIA broach the subject with the BSS to gauge their reaction. If the BSS convinced the Scots to go for it, it was a viable option. In the meantime, the CIA was trying to develop a plan to contact Fhimah. I called Henderson just as he was getting out of a three hour meeting. News travels fast and it was obvious the BSS had already contacted him about the proposed intelligence service contact with Fhimah. Henderson expressed his concerns, but was not opposed to the contact if it furthered the investigation. He would leave the attempt in the hands of the security services and said we would discuss it further if it appeared the contact with Fhimah became viable.

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Chapter 18: Travel Gets Old We moved back to the topic of the French meeting. Henderson had been told the French interior minister had some contact with Libyan officials. The British were concerned any information Henderson divulged about Fhimah, Megrahi or anyone else who had become targets of the investigation would get back to officials in Tripoli. This would make our job much more difficult. Henderson said he was not going to discuss the results of the investigation with six or eight people whose agendas were unknown to him. He never told me I was precluded from providing information to the French. Henderson reiterated his concern about the leak of information and stated for the last time he was not going to France. He would extend an invitation to the French to come to Lockerbie as he was more willing to share information on a one to one basis. He also invited Gallagher and me to stop in Lockerbie on our way home. Henderson was willing to meet with one or two of the French officials such as Judge Bruguiere and the forensic experts looking at the explosion of the UTA Flight 772 over Africa in September 1989, but this meeting would only occur in Lockerbie. Frustrated, I gave up Scottish participation in the French trip as a lost cause and we went back to discussing the intelligence service attempt to approach Fhimah. We discussed using an intelligence agent to collect information which could be investigated and turned into evidence. We decided to shelve any further discussion of this topic pending a determination as to whether it was even feasible. Henderson said he would like to have the opportunity to interview Badri Al Kafi* but said we probably had time to discuss this in more depth. Henderson said the attorneys probably wanted a perfect case and while we might put together a rock solid case; it would probably not be as perfect as a prosecutor might want. Based on what was being found, we were moving toward a circumstantial case. We agreed it was far from perfect. Whatever we accomplished would not only be scrutinized by a skeptical public once the facts were made known, but it would have to stand the rigors of cross examination in a court of law. We knew we would have to be meticulously certain the facts were correct. Before leaving the office on this day, a Friday, I wanted to be sure I had done everything possible prior to my trip to Paris. I was still concerned about the immigration and the Holiday Inn registration cards of Abdusamad. The Scots had these in their possession and the FBI had never been told the results of the fingerprint examinations. It was crucial to try and lift fingerprints from these items if the prosecutors ever hoped to prove Megrahi was Abdusamad. I had spoken to Reid earlier in the week about the status of the fingerprint examination and called Jourdan in Lockerbie. Neither was able to shed any light on the status of the examination of the cards. I called Henderson again. Henderson said that RARDE had a fingerprint specialist and state of the art equipment to extract fingerprints from pieces of paper. He thought it important to have all the forensic examinations done in one place. I knew the FBI lab would expeditiously handle the examination. RARDE

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation had done nothing quickly and I doubted these cards would be handled any faster. Henderson said in order to make a comparison for use in a Scottish court, the court demanded sixteen points of identification. He told me while he appreciated my concerns, he wanted RARDE to conduct the fingerprint examinations. I went home that night further frustrated. On Saturday, May 11, Gallagher and I left for Paris and arrived early on Sunday morning. Gallagher suggested a four-mile run through the city streets before meeting Al Ringgold and his wife Marcia. Gallagher had been to Paris before but it was my first trip to the French capital. The next morning we met with Jean Francois Claire, the head of counter terrorism for the French DST. We discussed Lockerbie in general terms. The DST was aware of what had been found in Scotland and where the investigation stood. We also talked about the 1989 UTA bombing, one I did not know much about. The French had developed a great deal of information about the involvement of Libyan intelligence officials in that bombing. The next day we met with Bruguiere and his entourage. The focus was on the bombing of the French UTA plane. Gallagher and I had to give up little regarding Lockerbie but it was clear the French already knew a lot about our investigation. They were far more interested in seeing if they could tie the two bombings together. The French were gracious hosts and treated us well. I would get another chance to meet with Bruguiere in the next year concerning the UTA bombing over Africa in 1989. We left Paris on Wednesday May 15, and headed home.

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CHAPTER 19: MEETINGS, MEETINGS AND MORE MEETINGS On Friday, May 17, I filled Henderson in on the details of the meeting in France. Nothing of a sensitive nature had been divulged. In Malta, Vassallo showed up at the police headquarters and asked to retrieve his address book, his diary, Fhimah’s diary as well as statements he had made to the police. The police agreed to give him copies of everything. Bell asked Vassallo what had triggered this request. Vassallo admitted contacting Megrahi, who allegedly told him to give the police whatever they wanted. I called Henderson again to get his reaction to the events in Malta. Henderson was upset the Maltese police had turned over copies of the evidence which had been collected. Henderson confirmed Vassallo had been in contact with Megrahi and Megrahi had encouraged him to cooperate with the police. Henderson said the prosecutors were displeased with the turn of events in Malta as well. I often questioned the evidence and had numerous discussions with Henderson on the issue. We wondered if an intelligence agency could have planted evidence to lead us where we had come in the investigation. Cretton* had asked that question in Scotland a few weeks before. However, after knowing what we had been through to have gotten this far, it did not seem possible the evidence could have been planted. Henderson was convinced of the credibility of the evidence collection process which was in place. Too many people, in Scotland and the United States, would have to be involved in the conspiracy, if there was one. Henderson and I each questioned the motives and abilities of the various intelligence services during the investigation. However, we concluded that if an intelligence agent or agency wanted to “frame” someone for the bombing, they would have made the path to the evidence easier to navigate. The next morning, in Malta, the LAA had officially received orders from their headquarters in Tripoli not to assist with the Lockerbie investigation. This

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation was not shocking news to anyone. In a turn of events, we were invited to Tripoli to conduct interviews and review records. Henderson, as the leader of the international task force, had sent a letter requesting the answers to a number of questions, but the LAA said the letter meant nothing to them legally. There was no way anyone in the United States or Scotland would authorize any investigator to travel to Libya. The Libyans did say they would allow Fhimah and Megrahi to be interviewed. The next day, in response to a letter from me, Henderson told Jourdan the immigration and hotel records of Abdusamad were being sent to NSY for analysis. Although I thought the cards had been sent to RARDE, I found this unusual because in the early stages of the investigation, the Scots had communicated to NSY their expertise was not needed. However, I had no reason to doubt what Henderson had to say and decided not to bother him with it again. At least the examinations had been ordered. Later that day, Brad Smith from the DOS called. The DOS was talking with Interpol and looking for ways to publicize the US reward program for significant terrorism cases. The reward, which offered up to four million dollars for information leading to the solution of the Lockerbie bombing, had been publicized around the world. A significant amount of money had been paid to individuals who provided information which led either to the capture or conviction of someone who was involved in a terrorist attack against Americans overseas. However, one thing was abundantly clear; money was and is not a motivating force. Although large amounts of money have been offered for the arrests of various al Qaeda leaders today, little of this money has been paid. That afternoon, there was a meeting of the United States principals at the FBI SIOC, including the DOJ, CIA and FBI. I briefed the attendees on the current status of the investigation. Megrahi was the key suspect with the others linked to him or the timers through common travel, possession of the MST-13 timers or through intelligence information which had not yet been verified through investigation. The attorneys believed there was not yet enough evidence to indict anyone under US law, but seemed unsure if the Scots had enough to bring about an indictment. We discussed the “irregular” rendition of one of the defendants or a witness, which had been successful in the American case against Fawaz Yunis in 1987. This was impermissible under Scottish law. Bob Mueller opined more evidence or at least one “inside” witness would be needed to move the case forward and said that if the United States was going to prosecute anyone, we might have to use rendition, possibly irregular. Mueller believed the Scots should be told of our intentions if it ever came to that. The CIA held to the theory that the attack was revenge for the American shoot down of the Iran airbus over the Persian Gulf. The operation was contracted to the PFLP-GC cell in Germany but they were arrested before they were able to carry out the attack. The Libyans and the PFLP-GC had worked together

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Chapter 19: Meetings, Meetings and More Meetings before and the Libyan Government had provided them funding, including approximately $4 million during 1988. Libya and the PFLP-GC did not normally carry out joint operations even though Libya had provided funding for and supported their goals. As the meeting ended, I was concerned about the CIA providing briefings all over Washington on what was a criminal investigation. While the CIA had been supportive, especially since the previous October, and was providing timely information, I believed that if the FBI was to be the lead agency in international terrorism investigations, we should be taking the lead in any briefings. However, we were not inclined to brief anyone at this stage because of the possibility of leaks. If the information was briefed and then leaked, I would have to answer to the Scots. On May 24, Henderson and I spoke again. He did not have any intelligence or evidentiary information which we did not have. Henderson did not expect to complete the Scottish police report until late fall. The case was strongly circumstantial, but we still had to develop what the intelligence agencies suspected into evidence which could some day be used in court. Henderson believed if we could “turn” some of the intelligence into evidence, we might be able to tie officials of the Libyan Government to the bombing. We wondered if any of the Libyan Government hierarchy had traveled into Malta in the days preceding the Lockerbie bombing. Thus far we had not found evidence of that. We also needed a person, a witness, who could provide some insight into the Libyan Intelligence Service. Henderson was being pressured by officials in his Government to provide briefings on the investigation such as were being done by the CIA in Washington. Henderson and I preferred to keep the investigation out of the news. We discussed who we might be able to charge under Scottish law. Henderson believed charges were possible against Izz al din Hijazi*, Said Fazani*, Fhimah, Megrahi and possibly Abu Agila Al Mahmudi*, if he could ever be fully identified. Records indicated Al Mahmudi* had carried four suitcases home to Libya when he left Malta on December 21, on the same flight with Abdusamad (Megrahi). While we had identified the first four, we had not had success in identifying Al Mahmudi*. We speculated he was the technical expert who armed the bomb. Much of what we had was circumstantial, subject to interpretation, and would be a tough sell to a jury in Scotland or the United States. Henderson laughingly said he always hoped “his lads” would come in from the fields with the luggage handle containing an Air Malta luggage tag with Fhimah’s or Megrahi’s fingerprints on it. There were just so many things we wished we could put together. Among them was proof of Megrahi’s affiliation with the Libyan Intelligence Service, a Fhimah association with MEBO (no direct tie was ever found) and what happened to the MEBO timer which had been seized in Senegal

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation in February 1988. We hoped a Libyan official would break ranks and bring us some inside information about those who had committed this atrocity and why. Handwriting experts believed some of the immigration cards from Malta had been completed by someone other than the person whose name appeared on the card. Neither of us knew the significance of this, other than that the traveler could have been important in the Libyan hierarchy. By the end of May information was starting to leak into the press in Malta. Vassallo had allegedly told people there about being interviewed relative to the Lockerbie investigation. He had also said Megrahi was a “secret man” who was close to Gaddafi. Harry Bell told Commissioner Grech in Malta he wanted to speak with Vassallo’s wife and, through Grech, she was interviewed. She admitted meeting Megrahi on several occasions and believed she had made hotel reservations for him in Malta in July 1990. She told Grech Fhimah and Megrahi were at her house for a short visit just before Christmas in 1988. Grech spoke with Vassallo and requested he be more cooperative with the FBI and the Scots. Grech relayed that Vassallo said Fhimah would be upset if he knew the FBI had been at Medtours because he did not like the United States because of the attack on Libya by the United States in 1986. Vassallo quoted Fhimah as saying “if the Germans bombed Malta and killed one of your children, you would not like Germany either.” By the end of May the Maltese teams had reduced the number of actions to be completed from thirteen to seven. Several of the leads they had developed could not be further examined. These included leads pertaining to Fhimah, Megrahi and Mohamed Hassan Badi*. Badi* was now in the mix because of his relationship with Fhimah and Megrahi. It was possible he had some connection to the Swiss front company, ABH, which had been set up in Zurich, at the premises of MEBO. Reid thought it essential to have a signed statement from Vassallo. Tony Matthews* of the BSS told me the status of the immigration and hotel record handwriting and fingerprint analysis. He had become an indispensable part of the investigative team. He said the handwriting analysis had been completed with a preliminary assessment that the cards filled out by Abdusamad and Megrahi were completed by the same person. Matthews* also said a court recognized expert in handwriting analysis from the Lothian and Borders Police in Edinburgh had completed the report, which meant it would be acceptable in court. The cards were going to NSY for fingerprint analysis. We spoke at length about the MEBO timers. It was Matthews*’ assessment from a review of the interviews of Meister, Bollier and Lumpert that a total of 24 timers were made. About ten had been destroyed in testing in the Libyan Desert. The Lockerbie timer had been a “boxed” timer, one designed to be placed in a waterproof box; and the boxed timers had been among the first built. This analysis was not perfect, because of poor record keeping, but he believed

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Chapter 19: Meetings, Meetings and More Meetings the recollections of the MEBO principals and Lumpert corroborated each other. We discussed Bollier’s mention of the meeting in Libya on December 19, 1988. We talked about the intelligence leads which could be followed. Henderson and I spoke the next day. Chief Esson had asked Henderson about arranging a FBI and Scots meeting for early July, in Scotland. Bell was on his way back to Scotland and he and Henderson planned to assess what they had left to do in Malta and with me, decide what else needed to be done. Henderson had also invited the French to visit Lockerbie. They had tentatively agreed to travel to Lockerbie on June 17. Henderson also planned to sit down with Feraday in the near future to discuss his report. In Malta, the LAA officials said they had provided all the information they would. In a move which further signified our expedition to Malta was coming to a close, Reid planned to send back much of the equipment he had accumulated during his time there. Henderson called me the same day. He had invited Manfred Klink from the BKA to Lockerbie for a visit. He suggested a date in mid-July, near the time of the bilateral conference with United States and Scottish investigators and prosecutors, and wanted me to attend. On Monday, June 3, 1991, another meeting of the United States principals was held. At 3:00 p.m., Tom DuHadway and I met with officials from the CIA and DOJ. The Libyan Government had funded the PFLP-GC in the amount of $4.7 million during 1988, and more than twice that amount the previous year. All funding to the PFLP-GC by the Libyan Government had been cut in early 1989. Although much of the discussion this warm summer afternoon was about intelligence, we knew intelligence was not evidence and what they offered could not be “turned” into evidence. The evidence which had been found in Scotland through a methodical search had been analyzed by forensic experts whose testimony would be crucial in proving how the aircraft was blown out of the sky. The trail of evidence that had been followed by determined law enforcement officers from around the world was what we needed to get a conviction in any court, in the United States or Scotland. The CIA presentation was long on history about significant Libyan intelligences operatives, but did not come close to being evidence. The Libyan External Security Organization (ESO) or JSO had allegedly placed all their operatives on high alert after the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. We learned a great deal about the history of the ESO, but in addition, some of the inner workings of the Libyan Government came to light. I recognized years later that the structure of the Libyan intelligence apparatus was very different than that of al Qaeda, which targeted the United States in the mid-1990s and led to the attacks of September 11, 2001. In 2006, al Qaeda and some of the other Islamic fundamentalist groups committing terrorist attacks around the world were the prototypes of the new terrorist organizations. They were more a movement or philosophy than an organization and did

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation not need a leader like Osama bin Laden to inspire them to commit their atrocities. The structure of the Libyan Intelligence Service was much different and we knew if the JSO had committed this attack and it could be proven, the trail could lead all the way to Gaddafi. Megrahi, who had become the focus of much of what we had done in the past six months, may have been related by blood or marriage to Major Jallud, the number two man in Libya. Libya was not a loose conglomeration of terrorists. This attack, if done by Libyan agents, would have been ordered at the top of the Libyan Government. However, this would be difficult to prove, at least beyond a reasonable doubt. Mueller, the leading DOJ official present, felt that Libya could well have been motivated by the US attack on Tripoli in 1986, and Gaddafi may have wanted to attack former President Reagan before he left office in early 1989. He asked the CIA to provide additional information about Megrahi’s connections to the Libyan Government. We discussed other attacks which could have had Libyan sponsorship. The only similar attack, probably was carried out by Libyan officials, was the September 1989 attack on a French airliner over Africa, UTA Flight 772. Mueller was ready to build his case not just against Megrahi but the Libyan JSO as well. We talked about the possibility to “snatch” either Fhimah or Megrahi, should they travel outside Libya. Stephens cautioned against moving too quickly and “apprehending” some of those accused before the case had been built. This meeting was beneficial and provided a blueprint for the investigators, the intelligence experts as well as the attorneys for the future. The next day, Dalkamouni and Ghadanfar were sentenced in a court in Germany for bombing US troop trains. Dalkamouni was given a 15-year sentence and Ghadanfar was ordered to serve 12 years in prison. Dalkamouni had been charged with bombing the trains, possession of explosives and membership in a terrorist organization. Ghadanfar was not convicted of the train bombings specifically, but convicted of possession of explosives. The prosecution decided against prosecuting either for membership in a terrorist organization because the German officials believed they were “criminals” rather than “terrorists.” They also dropped charges relating to creating the device which killed the BKA explosives technician in 1989, because the prosecution would have been required to produce, for trial, Khreesat, the bomb maker. Prosecutors would also have been required to produce the testimony of members of the PFLP-GC. The trial would have dragged on for three or four years. They were given substantial sentences because they were convicted of constructing bombs which could have been used against aircraft. It was a blow against terrorism, but not the blow we had hoped to strike. Two dangerous men were off the street. But when would we close in on the criminals who had blown Pan Am Flight 103 out of the sky? The next morning, June 5, Henderson and I held another one of our long distance telephone meetings. The Lord Advocate, Peter Fraser, had again spoken

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Chapter 19: Meetings, Meetings and More Meetings publicly about Lockerbie, stating the case would be concluded by the end of the year. Henderson said he was “raging” and described the response of the Chief Constable in the same manner. There was nothing worse than to make speculative statements when Henderson and I hoped to bring proof to the table for an indictment. Henderson said one of the British Members of Parliament (MP) had just returned from Libya with approximately 250,000 pounds and an apology from Gaddafi for the 1984 death in London of a police officer, Yvonne Fletcher. It seemed Gaddafi believed he could buy his way out of trouble. Allegedly, Gaddafi told the MP that the United States was looking to attack him again. There was new information from Malta. Vassallo had spoken with Megrahi who was beginning to comprehend the focus on him. He told Vassallo he was upset anyone was investigating him and would only answer questions if asked by the police in Malta. Henderson and I were concerned Megrahi and/or Fhimah could travel to Malta, provide an explanation for the Fhimah diary entries and then have the Maltese ostensibly “clear” them from the investigation. We agreed to have a joint letter sent to Malta to ask the Maltese to desist in asking the two Libyans to travel to Malta until the evidence was solidified. The next week dragged by slowly, but on Thursday June 13, 1991, I again met with the US task force to discuss the investigation to ensure each was focused on their assignments. I told them of Director Session’s trip to Scotland and his discussions with the Lord Advocate. This was information I had obtained from Scotland rather than through the FBI or the DOJ. The Scottish chief prosecutor had told the Director he believed he had enough evidence to convict Megrahi in a Scottish court. The Lord Advocate had asked how the US intelligence agencies could better help them. Other than that small amount of information, nothing else the two discussed ever made its way to me or the Scotbom Task Force. The next day, Gallagher and I discussed the possibility of briefing the investigation to select US Government officials. We knew this was fraught with danger because of the history of Washington politics. Few people in Washington can keep a secret. One of the reasons the details of the Lockerbie case had not been publicly divulged was because there had been few briefings on the investigation. The last major leak of information had been the previous November when Cannistraro told the media about the Libya connection. “High level” people in Washington almost always included staff members who use the information to curry favor either with the press or some member of the opposite sex. In Washington, the story goes the best means of communication after the telephone, telegraph and telegram was to tell a politician. These were the days before the internet. I was adamantly opposed to briefing anyone at this time but realized I was fighting a losing battle. I was unaware of any scheduled briefings and called Bresett to find out what he knew. Bresett said briefings were scheduled for September and October by the CIA. These briefings would be provided to Secretary of State James Baker,

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Secretary of Transportation Sam Skinner as well as Attorney General Richard Thornburgh. It also seemed the CIA would be briefing the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and for some reason, Director Sessions of the FBI and finally, Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney. I had a difficult time figuring out these briefings because the CIA, while helpful, had provided little information which led us to where we were. Our progress was driven by the evidence collected in Lockerbie by the Scottish police. However, in Washington, in 1991, significant events were often reported directly to administration officials because of the role played by the CIA. They provided information which helped dictate US policy abroad and as such they had the duty to let the administration know what was happening. This had never been the role of the FBI, which had the task of solving crimes and putting people in jail. It was not until after the events of September 11, 2001, that the FBI would play a role in briefing the president on a regular basis. That afternoon, another meeting was held at CIAHQ in Langley. Although Bresett and I spoke daily and I regularly briefed DuHadway, Bill Baker as well as Bob Mueller, we had agreed to meet on a regular basis to ensure no stone was left unturned. This meeting was shorter than the others. Jay Stephens and Mueller were at the meeting although I was the lone FBI representative. One of those present from the CIA was “Christian,”*who ran all operations against Libya for the CIA and was familiar with all of the suspects and the inner workings of the JSO. Christian* stated what they had speculated all along, due to the hierarchal structure in Libya, this operation, if linked to the JSO, would have to have been sanctioned at the highest levels of the Libyan Government. Christian* reported his sources had told him that some of the Libyans who were mentioned in the press, namely Sabir and Nayil who were arrested in Senegal in February 1988, with an MST-13 timer, had been ordered to remain in Libya. Stephens looked at the investigation as a conspiracy and hoped the investigators or the intelligence community would be able to show the structure of the JSO and how it functioned. Stephens would soon get his wish. Mueller cautioned against a “snatch” operation which had not been discussed with the Scottish authorities as it would cause problems for their prosecution. Mueller hoped if an operation to arrest either Fhimah or Megrahi could be underway by November 1991, the Scots might postpone their announcement of the indictments. We believed it more important to arrest subjects than to announce a legal process had been returned which would cause the defendants to go underground, preventing their arrest. On June 20, Mueller, Stephens and Peter Fraser, the Lord Advocate, met to discuss the investigation. Investigators were not invited but I learned they came up with a “charging” date of November 15, 1991. They discussed the possibility of an “irregular” rendition and the Lord Advocate said this would not be his choice. Fraser cautioned the prosecution could be impacted in Scotland depending on “how irregular the rendition was!” Allegedly, the Lord Advocate was taken aback

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Chapter 19: Meetings, Meetings and More Meetings when told the United States might not be able to prosecute anyone if the evidence was not there. The Lord Advocate expressed his concern about a defendant facing the death penalty in the United States. They agreed to talk again before the middle of November to ensure the case was viable. Fraser indicated Scotland would be the venue for prosecution; this had not yet been carved into stone. During the next week little additional progress was made as we worked to strengthen our case. Henderson and I knew any indictment against two Libyan intelligence officers would leave a number of questions unanswered, including “who ordered the bombing and why?” We believed Gaddafi wanted to avenge the US raid on Libya in 1986, which resulted in the death of his infant daughter. However, we would only be able to speculate until such time as a witness came forward to provide details for the reason behind the attack. In late June 1991, Pierre Salinger, the former press secretary to President John F. Kennedy, walked into the Legat office in London to provide information. Salinger had received intelligence he wanted to share; with the expectation the FBI representatives would confirm it. Salinger had learned Ahmed Jibril, the leader of the PFLP-GC, had visited Libya in November 1988, shortly after the German BKA ended Operation Autumn Leaves. Jibril allegedly met with “Major Jallud,” who was the number two man, after Gaddafi, in the Libyan hierarchy. Jibril had also met with Abdullah Senussi, a high ranking member of the Libyan Intelligence Service. Allegedly, Jibril asked the Libyans to take over the project of bombing an American airliner after his terrorist cell in Germany had been dismantled. The source of the information was supposedly an asset of the CIA. He also reported the two Libyans, who had been arrested in Senegal in February 1988, with an MST-13 timer, were involved in the Pan Am attack but other operatives had planted the bomb. While we knew a hand off was a possibility, we had never seen any evidence to substantiate that. I passed the information to Dave Bresett at the CIA and Stuart Henderson. Henderson and I continued to be troubled by the “end line,” the date set by the Lord Advocate to conclude the investigation. We believed we might not be finished by November 15 and thought an artificial deadline was one which would put undue pressure on us. That could lead to shortcuts taken and mistakes made. I had lunch with the MI-5 representative at the British Embassy in Washington, Eliza Manningham- Buller. She later became the head of MI-5 in London. She and I had become friends during her tenure in Washington and was an engaging and interesting person. We often discussed Lockerbie and I had found her to be open and forthright. I voiced my concerns about the Lord Advocate and his “deadline.” She did not believe Whitehall (the British seat of power in London) would allow the Scottish prosecutor to set an artificial deadline. She assured me the criminal investigation would be able to run its course. While this was only one opinion, it was good to hear, at least informally, that others in the United Kingdom would not let “deadlines” get in the way of completing our work.

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CHAPTER 20: LOCKERBIE AND GIAKA Prior to heading to Lockerbie, first for the meeting with the German BKA, and then the bilateral discussions between the American and Scottish investigators and prosecutors, I wrapped up a number of loose ends. The CIA had been unable to provide information which could prove or disprove the information furnished by Salinger in London. The alleged information provided by the “CIA source” had never been provided by any source of the agency, so this became a non issue. Salinger later played a key role in the investigation and the trial but no one knew it at the time. I received exceptional support from many people in and out of the FBI. Although leading all operational and administrative aspects of the case since November 1990, DuHadway and Bob “Bear” Bryant would be attending the bilateral conference with the Scots in July. DuHadway had been promoted and Bryant would be the new SAC at WFO. I would be happy to have them there. We believed the investigation was leading to what we hoped were the first indictments in the case and important decisions had to be made concerning the prosecution. Although Mueller was not going, he would be represented by Jay Stephens, the US Attorney from Washington, D.C. It would be an interesting meeting. No one had any way of knowing the events of the next week would impact the investigation. I arrived in Scotland on Wednesday, July 10 and was met by Jourdan, who had been in Lockerbie for 18 months. He was taking a well deserved vacation to return to the United States. Although tired, I had a brief meeting with Henderson to discuss the agendas for our meeting with the Germans and the bilateral the next week. Henderson asked for support in asking the prosecutors on both sides of the Atlantic not to set a deadline for the announcement of the indictments.

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Chapter 20: Lockerbie and Giaka Although exhausted from my trip and ready for a good night’s sleep, Jourdan came to Henderson’s office and told me DuHadway was on the phone. My first reaction was that he would be unable to attend the conference. DuHadway was a stand up leader who let me run the case and make decisions so long as he was kept in the loop. Since DuHadway had never called on any other international trips, I feared he had some bad news. I descended the stairs leading from Henderson’s second floor office and went into the room which had only been occupied by two FBI Agents over the past 30 months, Hal Hendershot and Jourdan. DuHadway was waiting on the secure telephone line. This line made it sound as if the two parties were carrying on a conversation underwater. What DuHadway said forced me to sit down. DuHadway, as Henderson, had been briefed months before about the former CIA source in Malta, Majid Giaka. The CIA had located Giaka in Libya, gotten him a message and he was currently near Malta. They were ready to make him available for an interview and if he knew anything, he would be brought to the United States. DuHadway told me not to say anything to the Scots until Giaka had been debriefed. He wanted me to go to Malta, but I needed to participate in the upcoming meetings. DuHadway concurred and asked who should go to the Mediterranean. I recommended Reid and Hendershot travel there to conduct the interview. As I hung up the phone, I was not sure what to think. I had been in open dialogue with the Scots since being told to lead the investigation the previous October and did not believe it was right to withhold information. However, I had orders and despite having been open with the Scots, did not believe I should mention this to Henderson right now. I hoped no harm would come from withholding details of the ongoing events and rationalized that Giaka would be another dead end lead. There was no reason to get everyone excited over nothing. After a good night sleep, I arrived at the LICC early the next morning. Before meeting with Henderson and the Germans, I called DuHadway. The CIA wanted us to interview Giaka aboard a US military vessel. Once that was complete, we would decide whether or not to bring him to the United States. I contacted Bresett to see what he knew about Giaka. He said the CIA had a 10:00 a.m. briefing with the FBI and the DOJ in Washington. They would discuss a game plan for the debriefing, and what to do with Giaka if he had any information. He too said the information was not being shared with anyone. I called Gallagher and asked about telling the Scots. He too had been told to keep the Giaka information secret. It was time for the meeting with the Germans. Although I wanted to tell Henderson about Giaka, I had orders. It was difficult to contain what I wanted to say but orders were orders. Was this another wild goose chase? A few minutes later, I was back in Henderson’s office. Henderson reiterated we should be united there be no definite timetable to conclude the inves-

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation tigation. I agreed. Henderson said the deadline was being discussed by the Lord Advocate and the Chief Constable. Henderson wanted to tell the Maltese and the Germans about the investigation and hoped to get half of that done that day with the BKA. He had already given a full briefing to the Swiss in April. Henderson began his briefing of Manfred Klink and Otmar Soukup by going through the details of PT-35. He updated them on the investigation in Malta which Henderson believed implicated Fhimah and Megrahi, directly, in the bombing. Henderson said the motive for the attack was the 1986 raid on Tripoli by the United States. He hoped to collect additional information about Vassallo, Bollier and other Libyans to determine if they too could be subjects in the case. Later that afternoon, prior to leaving for dinner with Henderson and the Germans, Gallagher called to fill me in on the latest in the Mediterranean. The FBI team, being sent to meet Giaka, had a narrow window of opportunity to make a decision whether to bring him to the United States as a witness. Gallagher believed he could be interviewed between the dates of July 13-15 on a US Navy ship located in international waters near Malta. Giaka worked at Luqa Airport between August 1988 and September 1989. In that job, he would have been in a position to observe the activities of Fhimah and Megrahi. It was not known if Giaka had any information about the Lockerbie attack. The team going to the Mediterranean included a linguist, representatives of the CIA, DOJ and FBI, although FBI agents would do the interview. The CIA was adamant the Scots not be told about Giaka until a decision was made what should be done with him. I was just as adamant I be allowed to convey the information to Henderson. Approval from Washington was not forthcoming. Chief Esson hosted dinner at the Dryfesdale Hotel that night for me and the Germans. The Dryfesdale had an excellent restaurant. The meal was outstanding and the evening filled with camaraderie and fellowship. I felt terrible about not telling the Scots about Giaka. Friday morning the Germans had a brief meeting with Chief Esson. Following that meeting, we retreated to Henderson’s office. Henderson asked Klink and Soukup for a report on the baggage records which showed a bag had come from Air Malta Flight 180 to Pan Am Flight 103. Henderson said he hoped to have his report completed by September. The meeting ended cordially. I felt good because we had come such a long way from the first meeting in March 1989, in Lockerbie. There seemed to be cooperation, good will and complete sharing of information. Well, almost complete! I still felt terrible about the secret I was keeping but had been ordered not to share. We shook hands and the Germans headed for the airport. After they left, I got back on the phones. DuHadway said Reid, who knew more about the investigation in Malta than anyone, and Hendershot who had been involved in researching the files of the various American agencies about Libyan Government intelligence activities, would do the initial debrief of Giaka.

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Chapter 20: Lockerbie and Giaka Nick Hreiz, an Arabic speaking FBI agent, Chornyak, the FBIHQ supervisor and at least one DOJ attorney were also going to Malta. The agents would interview Giaka to determine if he could further the investigation. He had been a member of the Libyan Intelligence Service and worked at Luqa Airport in Malta at the time of the bombing. I again asked about telling the Scots. DuHadway appreciated my predicament but said a decision had been made to only tell them after we determined whether he would be a witness. No one knew if this was a CIA power play or just cautious decision making designed to prevent embarrassment for the US Government. Either way, it was not good for the investigation or me. On Sunday, I picked up DuHadway and Bryant around noon at the Edinburgh Airport. I was glad for their company, as they would be staying with me at Jourdan’s cottage. Bryant was exhausted from the flight and opted to sleep. DuHadway was tired but wanted to play golf with Henderson and me at the Royal Burgess Club in Edinburgh. The club, one of the oldest in Scotland, was one Henderson had belonged to and we met him there. The day was damp and very cool, especially for July. During the afternoon, DuHadway, Henderson and I played a round of golf. It was apparent to Henderson that DuHadway was one of the “good guys,” although their friendship would be short lived. That night the Lord Advocate hosted dinner in the center of Edinburgh. It was a wonderful evening and new and old friends had an opportunity to get to know each other better. There was still that “thing” going on in near Malta with Giaka. On Monday morning, July 15, 1991, the most important conference of the investigation began at the LICC in Lockerbie. Although the Lord Advocate and Mueller did not attend, both sides were well represented. Chief Constable Esson, Henderson, Jim Gilchrist, along with Scottish officers Willie Williamson, Bob House, David Johnson and Harry Bell plus the Procurator Fiscal, Jim MacDougall, rounded out the Scottish team. Assistant Director DuHadway, SAC Bryant, Alat Frank Waikart from London and I represented the FBI. US Attorney Jay Stephens of Washington, D.C. and attorneys Dana Biehl and Brian Murtagh completed the American contingent. No one from the intelligence services on either side were there. The CIA would never send anyone to Lockerbie because there had been allegations that CIA agents were there after the crash trying to find things in the wreckage. They wanted to be able to clearly state they had never sent anyone to Lockerbie — ever. The meeting began in the conference room at the LICC. The Americans had come over early to have dinner with the Lord Advocate the night before and were relatively well rested. I had been there for a few days already after my meeting with the Germans. Chief Esson began by stating this was day number 938 of the investigation. Pressure had been exerted by the European Union to normalize relations with Libya. The United Kingdom had resisted thus far, primarily due to the Lockerbie investigation and the 1984 murder in London of policewoman Yvonne Fletcher

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation by a Libyan official. At the moment the Scots still had 35 officers dedicated to the investigation, but as we moved forward, more officers were going back to their forces. This was logical as large numbers of officers had been seconded from the Lothian and Borders Constabulary in Edinburgh and Strathclyde in Glasgow. At some point Dumfries and Galloway would take control of the investigation with its own officers and management staff. Esson turned the meeting over to Henderson. Henderson went through what needed to be done to bring the case to a logical conclusion. In Switzerland, there were unresolved issues at MEBO, but they could be sorted out quickly. France was still significant because of the missing timer which had been seized by the Senegalese in February 1988, in the possession of the two Libyan intelligence officers. This timer might be in the possession of the French but was not known at that time. He discussed what had become the focal point of the case, Malta. LAA had been the only airline which had not cooperated during the investigation. Most of the significant investigative leads which had been identified in Malta had been completed. The investigation had identified only Libyans as involved in the bombing and the evidence led to no other groups or individuals. The intelligence agencies had provided a great deal of information; however, none of it led us closer to other suspects. Henderson said the motive for the Lockerbie bombing was the April 14, 1986, attack by the United States on Libya, retaliation for the bombing of the La Belle Disco, a club in Germany which killed two US servicemen, a Turkish woman and injured about 230 others. Henderson described the chain of events which led to the bombing. Much of what he said was based on the evidence collected as well as analysis of what the intelligence agencies, in the United States and the United Kingdom, had provided. Ibrahim Bishari, the foreign secretary of Libya, had set up the Libyan External Security Organization (ESO), the Libyan intelligence service. Bishari and Abdullah Senussi had set up the CSS as the core training center for the ESO. He discussed the arrests in Senegal of Sabir and Nayil in February 1988, with weapons, explosives and an MST-13 timer. Henderson believed that Abdusalem Ibrahim*, a suspected intelligence officer, was in charge of all Libyan intelligence and terrorist operations abroad. Intelligence indicated Ibrahim* had traveled to Senegal in March 1988, to request the Senegalese release Sabir and Nayil. He allegedly traveled there again in June 1988, asking for their release. The two were released and returned to Libya in a private plane. The weapons had probably been destroyed but it was not known what had happened to the MST-13 timer. The Senegalese had allowed the Americans to photograph the timer. The investigators interviewed Jean Colin, the Frenchman who had served as the Governor General of Senegal at the time, and he was unaware what had happened to the timer. Henderson wondered if the Senegal timer may have blown up Pan Am Flight 103.

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Chapter 20: Lockerbie and Giaka Izz Al Din Hijazi* was the secretary for communications in Libya. It was Henderson’s opinion the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, could not have happened without his authority. He had learned Said Fazani* was allegedly wanted in Italy for the murder of a dissident in 1980. He allegedly was arrested in France in 1983, but Libyan officials arranged for him to be released from jail. Medtours had been set up by Fhimah and Megrahi in Malta. The ABH Company, a company set up by Badri Al Kafi* and Megrahi in Zurich, rented space at MEBO. These businesses never generated income and were probably “front” companies used by the ESO. Hijazi* and Fazani* had placed the order for timers from MEBO in 1985. They requested the timers be sand proof, water proof, accurate and detonate with no trace of the timer left after the explosion. About December 1985, Bollier went to Lumpert, his technician at MEBO, and requested he design a circuit board for the Libyan order, one they hoped would lead to a larger order. MEBO manufactured about 20 timers, ten to be used inside waterproof boxes and ten others which could be used without the box. Actually, as many as 24 circuit boards could have been manufactured for this order. According to the evidence, six of the timers manufactured were single masked circuit boards with the corners cut out, designed to be used within a box. Ten of the timers had been damaged during production and may not have been useable. A few of the timers had been destroyed in the Libyan Desert. The exact numbers would never be accurately ascertained but the unboxed timers tested in the desert appeared to disintegrate very well. It was certain no more than 20-24 of them had ever been built. Henderson spoke of the travels of a number of Libyans of interest in the investigation and their connections to one another. He discussed the connections between Megrahi, the man identified as having purchased the clothing contained in the bomb suitcase, and other Libyan officials and suspected intelligence officers. Colonel Nassir Al Shamikh*, a suspected Libyan intelligence officer, had been in Malta at the same time as Megrahi in October 1988. Al Shamikh* was also involved in testing the timers in the desert. Another name of interest was Abu Agila Al Mahmudi*, who had not been more fully identified. Al Mahmudi* traveled to Malta on December 14, 1988, but returned to Tripoli on the morning of December 21, on the same flight as Abdusamad (Megrahi). While not evidence of a crime, Al Mahmudi* checked four suitcases on the flight back to Libya. Al Mahmudi* had been in Malta at the same time as Megrahi on December 7, the day the clothing was purchased from Gauci’s shop. It was never determined where he stayed in Malta, although almost all hotels had been cooperative in providing information. Henderson discussed the photo spread leading to the Gauci identification of Megrahi. Although no one could positively date the photograph shown to Gauci, he was reluctant to show any more photos to him without fear of tainting what he had already provided. Henderson opined the reason Megrahi had pur-

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation chased the clothing when he seemed to be a high ranking intelligence officer was because he wanted to be sure no one else knew what was happening. We did not know if this was true, but was a possibility. He next spoke of Bollier. Henderson outlined the Libyan request for 40 additional MST-13 timers around December 17, 1988. Bollier traveled to Tripoli arriving on December 18, with commercially obtained Olympus timers which were rejected by Libyan officials. Bollier’s original flight to Zurich from Libya was scheduled to be Air Malta (KM) Flight 180 on December 21, which would have placed him on the flight which carried the bomb to Frankfurt. Because the Libyans had rejected his timers, he left Tripoli earlier. Henderson asked the open ended question “was Bollier involved in the bombing?” Henderson believed by December 1988, the Libyan ESO was aware the PFLP-GC cell had been arrested in Germany in the possession of barometric bombs, designed to be used against aviation. Was it possible they built a similar device, knowing that, if discovered, the blame would shift to the Palestinian terrorists? This question would never be answered with certainty. The events in Malta around December 20-21, 1988 were the next topic of discussion. The notation in Fhimah’s diary about getting luggage tags from Air Malta during the week of the bombing was more circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy to put something into the aviation luggage system without going through normal procedures. Henderson discussed the travel to Malta of Fhimah and Abdusamad around 5:30 p.m. on December 20. He asked another question. Why did Megrahi travel to Malta using the name of Abdusamad unless there was some type of operation? Henderson discussed the routing of the bomb-laden suitcase. The bag was placed aboard the Air Malta flight to Frankfurt, KM 180, facilitated by luggage tags obtained from Air Malta by Fhimah earlier in the week as noted in his diary. No one would question Fhimah, a familiar face around the airport. He still had his airside access badge allowing him into areas off limits to most individuals at the airport. While speculative, it was the only way to explain how the bag made its way into the luggage system. The bag went onto Frankfurt where it was off loaded around 1:00 p.m., eventually arriving at the V-3 hall at the airport where it would sit until the other bags from around the world were placed into the aircraft for Heathrow. Henderson opined that because the German baggage records had shown the one bag from KM 180 had arrived in the V-3 hall the same time as the luggage of Karen Noonan and Patricia Coyle, it might explain why their luggage exhibited extensive blast damage. It may have been loaded on the London and New York bound planes the same time as the IED suitcase. Following this discussion, it was time for lunch. The Scots had always been gracious hosts and lunch at the LICC was again excellent. Most discussion was personal rather than business. The investigation had taken a toll on everyone and these non work discussions not only helped us get to know each other better, it relieved some of the pressure each felt. While Henderson and I

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Chapter 20: Lockerbie and Giaka had the weight of the investigation on our shoulders, the dedicated officers and FBI agents who traveled to the far reaches of the globe in pursuit of the truth were no less susceptible to the pressure. Hal Hendershot had spent one year at Lockerbie, away from his family and friends. Tom Jourdan had been detailed to Lockerbie since late 1989 and he had been away from home almost two years. Phil Reid and Harry Bell had been in Malta for extended deployments away from their families. Other agents and officers had spent much time traveling the world looking for clues to solve this crime. The prosecutors also were involved daily and felt pressure to resolve the case. This social interaction gave us time to think less about the pressure and concentrate on the friendships we had developed. When the conference reconvened, Henderson stated the focus was on eleven individuals, some more significant than others. Megrahi and Fhimah were the two leading persons of interest because of the evidence which had been developed. Henderson never mentioned the name of Abdusamad as we had concluded they were the same person even if we could not yet conclusively prove it. Hijazi* and Fazani* were included because they had been involved in the acquisition of MEBO timers in 1985. Other second level suspects included Mustapha Last Name Unknown (LNU), the recipient of the first MST-13 timers at the Libyan Peoples Bureau in East Berlin in 1985. Nasser Al Shamikh* who had been involved in testing the timers in the Libyan desert, Badri Al Kafi* who was involved with Megrahi in ABH which was collocated with MEBO in Zurich and Abdusalem Ibrahim*, who the intelligence agencies said may have been involved in organizing the attacks. Mohammed Badi*, a person who had not been fully identified but did have connections to Fhimah and Megrahi also made the list. Rounding out the list were Abu Agila Al Mahmudi*, the possible technical expert who had left Malta with Abdusamad (Megrahi) on the morning of December 21, en route to Tripoli and Mustafa al Safi*, the manager of LAA at the Luqa Airport in Malta who had replaced Fhimah. We had no information which tied him to either the attack or the other suspects but wanted to know more about him. Henderson was followed by Bell, who led the investigative team in Malta. Bell discussed the interviews of Tony Gauci, the Maltese shopkeeper. He mentioned the enormous pressure Gauci was under, particularly from his father and brother not to testify. He discussed the feasibility of taking him out of the country for his safety. Bell outlined the information provided by Vincent Vassallo, Fhimah’s partner in Medtours. Vassallo had spoken by telephone with Megrahi who said he would agree to be interviewed by Maltese investigators, but would not submit to an interview by the FBI or the Scottish police. He detailed what they had unearthed in Malta concerning the last nine suspects mentioned by Henderson. His discussion excluded the evidence obtained regarding Megrahi and Fhimah as this information was well known to us all. Much of what he said duplicated that said by Henderson but was more detailed. He reiterated what

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Henderson said about Al Mahmudi*, the Libyan about whom little was known but had attracted interest because of his travels which included leaving on LAA Flight 147 on the morning of December 21, 1988, with Abdusamad (Megrahi). Al Mahmudi* had four suitcases with him when he left. He had also traveled to Malta in October and December 1988, the same time frame as Megrahi. Jim Gilchrist spoke about the intelligence information which had been made available to the LICC. He assessed the motive for the Lockerbie bombing was the United States bombing of Tripoli in 1986. Everyone was concerned about the safety of Tony Gauci. Tony and his brother Paul, along with Vassallo and Ueli Lumpert and Bollier of MEBO were critical witnesses, who could be in danger if their cooperation became known. The options discussed included doing nothing or putting them in the United States Witness Security Program (Witsec) and preserve their testimony on tape. The collective decision was to do nothing more than to ensure the safety of the Gauci’s through cooperation of the Maltese police. The threat to the others was believed minimal. The forensic report being prepared at RARDE was problematic, especially for the American prosecutors. The prosecutors had been orally advised of the forensic findings but they preferred to see the results in writing, in the form of a final report. The RARDE report was not close to final. The prosecutors on both sides of the Atlantic were in the same situation and it seemed no one could speed up the process. However, they agreed accuracy was more important than speed. We discussed what would happen if Fhimah or Megrahi turned up in Malta to be interviewed by the police. Although to a man, each person in the room stated there needed to be a “game plan” to deal with this issue, no decision was reached. We agreed to deal with it if and when the problem arose. As I listened, I wondered how the Scots would deal with the issue of Majid Giaka, who at that moment was in the Mediterranean being interviewed by the FBI. Although Henderson knew Giaka existed, I did not know if he had shared that information with his countrymen. It was virtually impossible to push everything up the chain of command when there were so many pressing issues. When the topic of where a prosecution would take place arose, the prosecutors said they would discuss this the next day, when they met. They would discuss the prosecution, where the trial would be held and the state of the evidence. Esson discussed resources. He had been sending some of the seconded officers back to their home forces as the investigation began to focus. He believed they were working on a deadline of December 21, when an announcement of charges would be made. Esson said if the Lord Advocate stuck to his timetable and announced the issuance of petition warrants on December 21, 1991, it was possible no prosecution would be possible in Scotland. Stephens said it would be his preference to have a FGJ hear the evidence before it was announced to the world. Henderson and I needed investigative resources

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Chapter 20: Lockerbie and Giaka available past the date of any announcement of charges. It was Esson’s preference to close the LICC by September, but pledged while the investigation would be run out of police headquarters in Dumfries, the same level of cooperation would exist with the FBI. The conference closed with a discussion of media leaks. Henderson and I had been proud of the men and women under our charge who had access to sensitive information. There had been no leak of information from them to the media during the investigation. Some FBI, Scottish and CIA officials had been interviewed, on the record, for several of the books which had been written, but no sensitive information about what we were doing made its way into the press through them. When the conference ended, I made my way to the FBI office at the LICC. I wanted to know what Giaka was saying and when I could share the information about Giaka with the Scots. I recalled the fallout when Gow and Gallagher told Esson about our interview of Khreesat in early 1990. I wanted nothing to jeopardize the investigation and our relationships. It was eating my gut and wondered what Henderson would do if the situation was reversed. I was unable to get any updated information and would worry about it later as the Scots, as their custom, were hosting dinner. After dinner, as we were drinking a glass of port wine, a Scottish officer interrupted and told me I had an urgent call from Washington. I excused myself and went to the LICC to use the secure phone in Jourdan’s office. The Scots may have wondered what that was all about, but it was still midday in Washington. Reid had called and wanted me to know Giaka had some information and excellent recall, but did not hold a smoking gun. We had to decide if Giaka should be brought to the United States for a complete debriefing. This operation had already cost the United States Government a small fortune by the redirection of a naval fleet to support the operation. After discussing options with the agents and prosecutors in the Mediterranean as well as Gallagher in Washington and later, DuHadway and Bryant in Scotland, we decided to bring him to the United States. Gallagher needed to be part of the decision making process as he had to pay the US Navy for diverting their fleet. Upon returned to the dinner party, I resisted the temptation to pull Henderson aside and fill him in. I knew if I did and Henderson told Esson who reacted as he did in 1990, there would be hell to pay with my superiors in Washington. “The CIA could not allow this information to be held forever. Once Giaka was in the United States,” I reasoned, “he would be our witness rather than an intelligence asset, and this information could be passed to the Scots. What harm would a day make?” That night as DuHadway, Bryant and I returned to the cottage in Torthorwald, we discussed Giaka’s travel to the United States. We hoped he would be able to shed light on what happened in Malta in December 1988. We agreed we had to tell the Scots about Giaka at the earliest opportunity. As

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation DuHadway fell asleep first, Bryant and I were glad he was in another room because we could hear him snoring, something we shared with him the next morning. However, we had precious little time to laugh together. This was DuHadway’s last trip to Scotland and he would not live to see the indictments. The next morning, Tuesday, July 16, 1991, the prosecutor’s conference convened. The cast of characters was little changed from the previous day, but the prosecutors would present their issues to us. By the end of the day, we would see where they thought the investigation stood as they would be handling the prosecution. Twelve participants took part in the proceedings. Jim MacDougall, the Procurator Fiscal and Norman McFadyen of the Crown Office in Edinburgh led the discussion. Stephens, Biehl and Murtagh were the US prosecutors present. DuHadway, Bryant, Waikart and I represented the FBI and Henderson, Bell and Dave Johnson rounded out the Scottish contingent. MacDougall opened the meeting with a discussion of the witnesses he believed were in danger. These included Meister, Bollier and Lumpert from MEBO and the two Gauci brothers and Vassallo from Malta. The prosecutors believed each had credible testimony and might face harm from the Libyan Government if their cooperation became public. Tony Gauci was the most significant witness and concern was expressed for his safety. The Maltese had allegedly placed a soldier at his residence. Stephens believed each should be contacted and advised they were in danger. There had been no information about a threat to any of these witnesses. However, because of their proximity to Libya, we agreed the Maltese witnesses were at the greatest risk. We discussed putting the witnesses in the American Witsec but neither Gauci brother was interested in leaving Malta. Bollier seemed oblivious and continued to contact his associates in Libya. While we hoped to locate an additional photograph of Megrahi to show to Gauci, the prosecutors agreed to leave the identification as it was. We got around to Vassallo. The prosecutors believed he would be a better witness if he were removed from his current environment. Henderson opined Vassallo was not a witness in the same category as Gauci as he may have connections to Libyan intelligence. He also might not be willing to testify at a trial. We discussed moving Vassallo to a third country, perhaps, Italy, but this was rejected. The Scottish prosecutors were not comfortable giving money to anyone for information. Spending government money on witnesses, no matter how noble the cause, was problematic for a Scottish court. Shortly after the bombing, the United States, through the Heroes Program at the DOS, offered a reward for information leading to the solution of the case. Witnesses or informants could be paid as much as $4 million and this was a problem for the Scottish prosecutors as their laws did not allow it. We believed thousands of useless pieces of information would be sent to the task force, overwhelming us. In reality, little credible information was ever received. Giving money to witnesses smacked of paying for information and was a concern in the Scottish legal system. American

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Chapter 20: Lockerbie and Giaka judges had dealt with these issues in US courts for years and could usually distinguish between money paid to buy information and that used to sustain a witness. The issue of witnesses consumed much of the morning and by the coffee break, we moved onto other things. The Scots knew what US law allowed and the Americans had been indoctrinated on the nuances of Scottish law. The American prosecutors were interested in obtaining the Scottish police and forensic reports so they could put together a case to present to a FGJ in Washington. There would be no indictment before the FGJ had an opportunity to hear the evidence. If the Lord Advocate continued to insist on his timetable for announcing the petition warrants in the case, there would have to be a grand jury without written police or forensic reports. The Scots, who did not fully understand the American legal system, expressed concern about ordinary citizens being exposed to the evidence before a warrant had been obtained. Their fear was by presenting information to a pool of 23 citizens; it would compromise the investigation. The American prosecutors did their best to convince the Scots of the secrecy of the FGJ process. MacDougall believed the issues relative to the FGJ should be discussed between the Lord Advocate, Attorney General Thornburgh and Mueller. Stephens announced his intention to start bringing summary witnesses before the FGJ so he could have an indictment returned in November or December, if necessary. The final major topic of the day was the thorny issue of “irregular” rendition. We wanted to locate one or both of the defendants outside Libya and with a pretext, lure them to an area where they could be “irregularly rendered” to the custody of the United States. That sentiment was not shared by the Scots. While the Scottish police were all for the idea, their system of justice did not have a good way to deal with a subject being “kidnapped.” However, no other government would have to be involved. We had done this successfully before and believed it could work in this case. DuHadway broached the issue and said, “What are we going to do if we get a shot at one?” He said the United States would like the opportunity to mount an irregular rendition to bring a subject to trial. Henderson jumped into say the intelligence agencies perhaps were poised to provide this level of information. Stephens was in favor of creating situations where subjects could be apprehended; as it was not probable they would just walk in and surrender, in the United States or Scotland. McFadyen interjected, discussing aspects of an irregular rendition which concerned him. In Scotland, a court can throw out a case if the conduct in arresting or seizing a defendant was deemed outrageous and this issue could cause legal and government policy issues. McFadyen made it clear any unilateral attempt by the United States to conduct an operation without the advance approval of the Scottish authorities would cause a problem with the prosecution. He firmly stated no such action should be attempted without prior con-

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation sultation. He encouraged continued dialogue between the intelligence agencies of the two countries and believed they should be tasked with attempting to locate any of the principal suspects so they could be interviewed. He believed a decision could be made at that time as to what to do with them. We were uncomfortable doing business that way because we had been successful in the Yunis case and would like another opportunity. I looked at DuHadway and Bryant, wondering what the Scots would have thought about the ongoing operation in the Mediterranean. There was a brief discussion of material witness warrants. This was a process where a court order was issued for an individual who had not been indicted but compelled them to appear in court. It was normally used to bring a reluctant witness to court to obtain testimony. These warrants had no official standing internationally and Scottish authorities did not favor their use. McFadyen believed arrest warrants would be sought and obtained against at least some defendants and the Libyan Government would be asked to surrender them for trial. The results of the investigation would be made public, but in a manner consistent with preserving the integrity of the prosecution. One of the issues facing us was a note in the agenda indicating November 15 as the date for the announcement of the indictment. We expressed concerns with the Scots who agreed to discuss this with the Lord Advocate. As the meeting concluded, Esson came in and said he would close the LICC by October. The investigation would continue but would move the remaining officers into police headquarters in Dumfries. He expressed his concern about setting an artificial date for the conclusion of the investigation. McFadyen said the Lord Advocate viewed the dates of November 15 and December 21, as targets, not necessarily the dates when the indictments would be announced. However, it had become clear the American prosecutors would have to return to Washington and get the FGJ process started. Early the next morning the American contingent traveled to London for a meeting with the BSS. We met with Tony Matthews* and Waikart. Matthews* discussed the intelligence available to the BSS and how it fit into the case. He also discussed how they were able to access information about the travels of the suspects in this case, through other British intelligence agencies, overseas liaison and friendly intelligence services around the world. During the meeting, Matthews*, who had become a tremendous asset to us, gave no indication the CIA had shared with him the ongoing situation in the Mediterranean. The next morning, July 18, Bryant, DuHadway and I caught a taxi to the airport in London for the trip home. We were confident a solution to the case was close at hand. It would be an uphill battle dealing with Henderson and the Scots when they learned about Giaka. However, we would cross that bridge when we came to it. I arrived home late that afternoon, exhausted, as I knew what lay ahead of me.

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CHAPTER 21: TNT AND A BROWN SUITCASE By the time I returned to Washington, Giaka had arrived in the United States and Larry Knisley had given him the codename of “Puzzle Piece.” We hoped Giaka could help solve the Pan Am Flight 103 puzzle. He would rest for a couple of days and begin the interview on Sunday, July 21, 1991. Giaka’s wife was pregnant. When he left the previous week, he told her he was going out for a boat ride. He was long overdue and she was probably worried about him. We worried about his physical and psychological health. He had come to the United States on other than a commercial airliner and had no papers other than his Libyan passport. The interview would be conducted at the Tyson’s Corner office of the FBI in suburban Virginia near Washington, DC. Reid, the FBI Agent who knew the most about what was going on in Malta, would conduct the interview. Hendershot had also been on the ship, had done tremendous research into the inner workings of the Libyan JSO and was a detail man. He would take the notes and write the FD-302 interview report. We needed many things from him including the history and background of the Libyan Intelligence Service. The interview would be conducted in English as much as possible; an Arabic speaking FBI agent would handle translation, if necessary. While the interview would not be recorded, the rest of us would sit in an adjoining room and watch the interview on closed circuit television. The cast would grow as the DOJ and the CIA also sent representatives to observe. We would craft additional questions as the interview progressed. I left the office on Friday night, to take Saturday off before the interview began but was troubled by my inability to convince anyone it was essential to tell the Scots about Giaka. One reason I had been sent to WFO to lead the investigation was to improve our relationships, in the United States and abroad. I expended great effort to share information and be above board with the Scots

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation and now was playing the same games I had previously criticized. The stress of the investigation was incredible and this added to it. Early Saturday morning, July 20, I called Gallagher at home. He was a longtime friend and I respected his opinion and advice. I raised concerns about keeping information about Giaka from the Scots. Gallagher sympathized, but told me a decision had been made to conform to the wishes of the CIA and not tell the Scots at this time. I believed my own and the FBI’s credibility were at stake and by telling them, even now, it may be too late to preserve the relationship I had with Henderson and others in Scotland. Gallagher told me to be patient and he would continue to press the CIA. I asked what the repercussions would be if I told Henderson about Giaka. Gallagher said, “You will be doing so at personal risk.” He reminded me what had occurred in January 1990, when he and Gow told Esson about the Khreesat interview. This incident caused a rift in the relationship between the FBI, CIA and BSS and no one wanted a repetition. Gallagher again asked me to be patient. I spent a little time contemplating my options. Henderson, as the SIO, was responsible for reporting information to Esson. I had no way to gauge what Henderson’s or Esson’s response would be. My credibility was on the line, not only with Henderson, but also with the rest of the Scots. I had no way of knowing how long this charade would continue. Even though Giaka had not delivered a “smoking gun,” he knew Fhimah and Megrahi and could know something. I went out for a short run and contemplated my options. When I arrived home, I picked up the telephone and called Henderson. It was a risk, but I trusted him. We spoke in general terms first. “Stuart,” I said, “I am going to tell you something which may alter our relationship. If you burn me, it will cost me my career.” I asked Henderson for his word not to tell anyone what I was about to say. Our relationship was rock solid. Despite not knowing what I was about to tell him, Henderson promised he would not betray my confidence. I took a deep breath and asked if he recalled the information I gave him on his front porch in April. Henderson recalled the event, if not the name. I did not go into detail about the events of the past week, but said that individual was in the United States and we were about to interview him. I told him the CIA would not allow me to tell the Scottish police, allegedly because they had not yet told the BSS. I assured him I was doing everything possible to formally tell them. Henderson was clearly upset, but promised not to tell anyone what he had just been told. I knew I had done the right thing, but at what cost? I trusted Henderson, but wondered what I would do if the shoe were on the other foot. Would I keep a confidence entrusted to me by Henderson? Time would tell and Henderson kept his word.

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Chapter 21: TNT and a Brown Suitcase On Sunday July 21, 1991, Giaka would begin to be interviewed. He had been in the United States for several days and was living in a hotel, protected by the FBI. It was difficult to assess the threat to him, but with a witness who was potentially vital to the investigation, we were not taking chances. The formal interview began that evening. Giaka seemed relaxed but occasionally had fits of anxiety and depression when discussing his wife in Malta or family in Libya. On one occasion he showed a keen sense of humor when he made believe a senior Libyan official was standing in the darkened doorway behind Reid and Hendershot. He would need a sense of humor, as the interview was long and tedious. At no point could it be portrayed as an interrogation even though we knew Giaka could have been part of the planning process for the bombing. He had been in Malta on December 20-21, 1988, and had been a low-level intelligence officer. Even if he were not part of the conspiracy, the defense, if they ever got that far, could paint him as a participant in the bombing, even if there was no evidence to substantiate that. It became evident Giaka had tremendous recall. He did not remember specific dates but mentioned events which occurred years before with specificity. On occasion he would state something occurred on a specific day of the week and later investigation substantiated his recollections. The report of the interview which took place between July 21 and Thursday, August 1, 1991, encompassed over 100 pages and was a brief history of the Libyan JSO as well as a description of events which occurred in Malta in 1988. Giaka was interviewed each day with the exception of July 27-28, to give him and us a break. I pressed FBIHQ and the CIA to be allowed to tell the Scottish police. If they agreed I could tell them immediately, I would still be subject to the fallout when they learned Giaka had been brought to the United States without their concurrence. Giaka provided information which would be a key element of his testimony before the FGJ and later at trial. Giaka was a low level member of the Libyan Intelligence Service. He knew Fhimah, his boss at Luqa Airport. Fhimah, as the station manager for LAA, used to help his friends at the airport and Giaka recalled him tagging luggage even though airport rules stipulated only Maltese citizens were supposed to place tags on bags. Giaka told us several things during the interview which were crucial. He described an event which occurred in Malta around June 1986, when he had a discussion with Said Fazani*. He had met Fazani* in the late 1970s before he joined the JSO. Fazani* was in charge of a technical section but later headed the Directorate of Operations for the JSO in the mid-1980s and became the acting head of the JSO during that same time. Giaka was a low level member of the JSO and the assistant station manager at LAA at Luqa Airport. He spoke with Fazani* in about June 1986, during one of Fazani*’s trips to Malta. It was also two months after the American raid on Tripoli. Fazani* asked Giaka about the feasibility of sending a suitcase to Great Britain on board a British airplane. At

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation that time, British Airways flew from Malta to London. Fazani* asked Giaka to discuss this issue with a co-worker and send him a report. Giaka learned it would be possible to send a bag without a passenger on a British airliner. He was never told what the bag would carry. He sent a report to Fazani*, but never heard another thing about it. He later testified he sent the report through Megrahi. Giaka said Megrahi was a member of the JSO. Here was a live JSO member, even at a low rank, saying Megrahi was a member of the JSO, the Libyan intelligence apparatus. All the intelligence reports in the world could say the same thing but this witness would be able to testify in court. The third significant thing Giaka said was shortly after he arrived in Malta, in April 1986, as the assistant station manager for LAA, Fhimah showed him two boxes of a beige/orange or yellowish/brown material that looked like dough. Fhimah told him it was eight kilograms of “TNT.” He had never had any training in explosives and did not know what it was other than from Fhimah’s statements. The material was shaped into two squares or bricks and placed into boxes which used to contain LAA luggage tags. The boxes were kept in a drawer in Fhimah’s desk and allegedly had been there for some time prior to Giaka’s arrival in Malta. Fhimah told him he had gotten the material from Megrahi and Megrahi had worked directly for Fazani* when the material was sent to Malta. At that time, Megrahi was the head of the Airline Security Section at LAA. Giaka thought it strange the explosive material was stored at the airport but Megrahi later told him if Fhimah were ever transferred from Malta, Giaka would become responsible for the explosive. Megrahi did not want the new station manager to learn of the existence of the “TNT.” Fhimah turned the material over to him in 1987; Giaka contacted Mohamed Al-Lafi Isa, the highest ranking JSO official in Malta and turned the “TNT” over to him. He did not know what happened to it after that. Fhimah, Megrahi and others in the JSO never brought the issue up with him again. Although he described the explosive as “TNT,” he later identified a photograph of Semtex, the explosive material which had destroyed Pan Am Flight 103, as closely resembling what he had seen. The fourth and possibly most important fact Giaka related were his recollections of events around Luqa Airport in the fall of 1988. Giaka had seen Fhimah and Megrahi arrive together on a flight from Tripoli sometime in October, November or December 1988, but did not recall the exact date. The pair had driven away from the airport in Fhimah’s new metallic blue Hyundai Stellar automobile. We later determined the vehicle was purchased on December 14, 1988, so this sighting had to have been after that date. Immigration records had determined the only date during those three months that Fhimah came into Malta at the same time as Megrahi (Abdusamad) was on the night of December 20, 1988, after the car was purchased. Giaka recalled seeing Vassallo at the airport and assumed Vassallo may have met Megrahi and Fhimah there. He saw Fhimah carry a suitcase which he described as big, brown and hard sided. When

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Chapter 21: TNT and a Brown Suitcase shown a photo spread of suitcases, he picked out a Samsonite suitcase which resembled the one in which the Lockerbie bomb had been contained. Fhimah carried the bag and put it in his new car. Although Giaka said Fhimah took the bag past customs without being searched, this was not unusual unless there was something the passenger wanted to declare to customs officials. Megrahi did not seem to be happy Giaka was at the airport. Before Giaka could be completely debriefed, I had to let the Scots know where he was and what was going on. As the interview began on Sunday, I contemplated my next move. The next morning, as the workweek was starting, I went to FBIHQ and briefed Gallagher on what Giaka had said during the first hours of the interview. I insisted I be able to tell Henderson about Giaka. I called Henderson earlier that morning, hoping he had not told anyone of our conversation over the weekend. I said I hoped to be in a position to formally tell him about Giaka later that day. However, I had no way to know if my statement was accurate or not. Giaka needed medical treatment for a toothache and the interview pace had slowed down. I went back to Tyson’s Corner and waited for the call from FBIHQ. Early that afternoon, I was given permission to officially tell the Scots about Giaka, eleven days after I was first told. I called Henderson. Giaka was still at the dentist and Henderson told me would be there the next afternoon. A short time later, Henderson called back and said Tony Matthews* from the BSS was also coming. The next afternoon I picked them up at Dulles Airport and took them to their hotel. Neither seemed outwardly upset they had been excluded from the operation. The next morning they got their first glimpse of Giaka, a solidly built 31 year old former intelligence officer for the Libyan JSO. They had the same questions we had. Was Giaka involved in the bombing? Was he sent to the United States by the Libyans to find out what we knew? Henderson and Matthews* sat in the adjoining room with me and others who were watching his reaction to every question and prepared additional follow up questions which could be posed by Reid and Hendershot. The DOJ had told us Giaka would not be prosecuted so long as we found no evidence he had been involved in the attack. We had about 30 days to assess Giaka’s information and credibility. If he was still in the United States then, we would have to have a plan which included housing and subsistence. Giaka arrived in the United States with nothing but the clothing on his back. Much information was extracted from him during the ten days of the interview although he did not possess a smoking gun. Giaka did not know who had committed the Lockerbie bombing and never heard anyone discuss it or see anyone put a bomb on a plane. He put Megrahi in the Libyan JSO, alleged

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Fhimah kept explosives at the airport, a Libyan official had asked about putting a bag, probably unaccompanied, on a plane leaving Malta and had seen Fhimah and Megrahi together, in Malta, with a large brown suitcase, probably on December 20, 1988. It added to the other circumstantial evidence which had been independently collected. By August 1, Henderson had been in the United States for nearly two weeks. He had watched the interview and wanted his own crack at him. He wanted to take what Giaka said “into evidence” as he said it would take a Scottish officer to introduce the testimony. The prosecutors had no problem with Henderson sitting down with Giaka and getting a formal statement. That interview, done by Henderson and me, began on Friday, August 2, and was finished the next day. It was overseen by the DOJ attorneys to ensure Giaka did not contradict himself even before the FBI interview report was written. It was documented by Henderson in the form of a 55 page handwritten statement. By the end of Saturday, August 3, 1991, we were exhausted. Henderson left for home the next day. I took Sunday off before heading back to the office for another week.

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CHAPTER 22: MRS. GIAKA On Monday, August 5, we wondered what to do with Giaka now the interview was over. He was a witness, one the DOJ or the Scots could use in the event of a trial. The CIA wanted to speak with him for any positive intelligence information he could provide on Libya. Although the CIA had operated Giaka as a source in Malta including around the time of the bombing, they never said he had provided information in the days leading up to the attack or had even discussed the bombing with them. CIA’s documentation of their early meetings with Giaka would cause significant problems for prosecutors at the trial. Giaka received around the clock protection. No one knew if the Libyans recognized he had gone missing, but Giaka needed protection from the street elements in the Washington area as much as he did the terrorists. Giaka would relocate to the United States and his wife needed to as well. Getting Giaka out of Libya had energized us and we hoped he was the first of many we could locate and bring out as witnesses. With the CIA we began working on plans to lure Fhimah and Megrahi to a third location where they could be arrested with or without the cooperation of foreign governments. To get Fhimah or Megrahi into international waters for an arrest, similar to that of Fawaz Yunis in 1987, would be next to impossible but it was important as one or the other of them might say who had ordered the attack. The CIA believed it could get another of Megrahi’s associates out of Libya to either Egypt or Germany. However, this would be a long term project which might not lead to the apprehension of Fhimah or Megrahi. The CIA did not want to reveal this proposed “snatch” operation to any other foreign intelligence service yet. A week after the interview, Giaka’s security detail reported he was extremely upset and asking to go home. Giaka was homesick and missed his wife who was half way through her initial pregnancy. As a Muslim, Giaka said his wife would not come to the United States without him. I needed to mollify

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Giaka. I called Bill Baker and explained our predicament. We could not hold a witness, any witness, in the United States, against his will. The first problem was getting Giaka’s wife out of Malta without leading the Libyans to Giaka, should they wish to find him. On August 13, 1991, I met with Stephens and Mueller as well as officials from the CIA CTC. Although the attorneys had gotten information from their prosecutors, I provided details of the information Giaka had furnished. Giaka had looked at the Czech passport picture identified by Gauci. He said it was Megrahi when he was much younger. Giaka had also looked at Fhimah’s diary. He authenticated the handwriting as that of Fhimah. Giaka also read the Arabic writing in the diary. He translated some words written in it as “take tags from the airport (Abdul Baset-Abdul Salam)”, which could be a reference to Megrahi. Giaka said neither Fhimah nor Megrahi had any business with luggage tags as they were only supposed to be placed on bags by Maltese airport employees. We agreed Giaka was a witness whose testimony would be valuable at a trial. We decided to bring Giaka’s wife to England and she would meet him there. His wife would travel to the United States with him. Giaka said his wife would not travel alone and would probably want to bring her mother to London with her. We only hoped she would not want to come to the United States too. I had planned to take the next week off to do as the doctor ordered, “reduce your stress,” but was called back to a meeting at the DOJ. Mueller and George Terwilliger, the Deputy Attorney General were among those present. Giaka was the main topic of discussion and Mueller wondered if I was going to London with Giaka. He said if the operation to retrieve his wife fails, it could be career ending. I did my best to convince them the trip could be problematic, no matter who was there to oversee it but knew I was headed to London with Giaka. The Scots, however, had no objection to Giaka meeting his wife in London and then traveling onto the United States. There may have also been one other reason the Scots were so accommodating. They had no process in place similar to the Federal Witsec Program. Witsec had been designed to protect witnesses who testified against organized crime figures in the United States. We had talked about it in connection with Gauci and Vassallo and it seemed clear it was where Giaka was headed. I later learned the Lord Advocate knew nothing of Giaka’s travel to the United Kingdom. Chief Esson was also put out about the whole Giaka situation. I knew this would be an issue because of our experience regarding Khreesat, nearly two years before. Giaka was authorized to stay in the United Kingdom for no more than 48 hours. If, upon arrival, he asked permission to go onto a third country, nothing could be done to prevent it. This was not probable because we controlled Giaka’s airplane ticket and money. In the event he did not have the money to go onto a third country, he would be returned to his country of origin.

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Chapter 22: Mrs. Giaka Giaka had a round trip ticket to Baltimore. Officers from the local police constabulary near London’s Gatwick Airport had been enlisted to assist us. I spoke with Baker and suggested he and Mueller meet with Giaka before our trip to the United Kingdom. This would help convince Giaka of his value and he would be less inclined to stay in the United Kingdom or go to another country after meeting his wife. Baker, and later Mueller, thought it was an excellent idea, even if completely out of the norm. No one ever heard of an FBI Assistant Director and the Assistant Attorney General at the DOJ meeting with a witness to convince him of his importance in a case. However, this was far from just any case. On Monday August 26, I met with Mueller to discuss his meeting with Giaka, scheduled the next day. Mueller, an experienced prosecutor, had met numerous witnesses through the years to discuss their testimony. This would be different and Mueller wanted to be sure he knew what to say. We also discussed the investigation as Mueller was scheduled to meet with the Lord Advocate in the next few days in London. Mueller wanted to convince him of the secrecy of the FGJ process. That afternoon, Giaka made his only appearance at FBIHQ in Washington to meet Bill Baker. He was dressed in a tie and new sports jacket purchased for him by the American taxpayer. The agents who had taken him shopping knew where to get a good deal and the expense was not exorbitant. Baker greeted Giaka and told him how rare it was for an FBI senior executive to meet with a witness in a case. He discussed the impact of the Lockerbie bombing on the United States and the world. Baker expressed his appreciation for Giaka’s sacrifices and said he looked forward to having Giaka and his wife settled in the United States. Giaka was impressed when he left the office. He felt he meant something to people who were important in the United States Government. The meeting was an unqualified success. Early the next morning, travel plans were finalized for Giaka’s wife and family. Giaka’s wife and parents held confirmed round trip tickets from Malta to London. They would arrive at Gatwick Airport on Thursday, morning, September 5, 1991. Their return flight was little more than 24 hours later. While Giaka’s wife had a round trip reservation, her return was listed as “open.” Everything was set to ensure their swift and unfettered passage into and out of the United Kingdom. Arrangements had been made at a nearby bed and breakfast for lodging. Frank Waikart and Tony Matthews* would be with us. Although Giaka wanted to meet the plane upon arrival, we told him he needed to meet them outside the airport. Waikart said it would be preferable to have Giaka tell his wife someone would meet her and take her to him. My meeting with the BSS and CIA in London was scheduled the week after Giaka’s trip, meaning one less trip across the Atlantic. I had learned the Prime Minister in London wrote the Lord Advocate telling him there was no

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation deadline for concluding the investigation. The Home Office would continue to pay the costs of the investigation. He also stated the United Kingdom would prosecute the case. While it was not what the attorneys at DOJ wanted to hear, it showed the resolve of the United Kingdom and the Scots. The extraterritorial statutes were only enacted to ensure a prosecution occurred. It seemed one would happen, but not in an American courtroom. Before leaving to meet Giaka at Mueller’s office for our scheduled 1:00 p.m. meeting, I received a surprise telephone call. Chief Esson, who normally left most of the day-to-day operations of the investigation to Stuart Henderson, called me at WFO. He was displeased with what had happened regarding Giaka and thought we had forged a cooperative working relationship. He was upset not just because the FBI had not told him about Giaka earlier – he obviously did not know about my phone call with Henderson – but was also concerned we were holding up having Giaka sign the statement taken by Henderson. He said that at the “end of the day,” the FBI and Scottish police would have to work together. Esson expressed his appreciation for my personal efforts to keep the “wheels oiled.” He closed by saying he and Henderson had briefed the Lord Advocate in advance of his meeting with Mueller. Their meeting, to discuss the timing of indictments, was scheduled the next day. His call took me by surprise but it was not the last I heard about this. At 1:00pm I met Giaka in Mueller’s outer office. We were ushered in to see Mueller. Giaka was impressed with the office and the man. Mueller’s office in the Main Justice building was far more impressive than Baker’s at the Hoover FBI Building. Mueller greeted Giaka warmly but although the greeting was real, you could tell Mueller was driven. He had many other things on his plate, but I and certainly Giaka, never forgot the time he spent that day. Mueller told Giaka, “I am aware of what you told the FBI. We consider you an important witness in the criminal case which is being built in the United States and Scotland.” He said he was aware Giaka was going to England the next week to bring his wife to the United States and this would be an opportunity for them to build a new life here. The meeting was not as long as the one we had with Baker the day before, but it was just as real. Giaka knew he was important. Mueller met with Peter Fraser, the Lord Advocate of Scotland, on August 28, 1991. Twenty-four hours later I was in Mueller’s office, along with his prosecutors, hearing the results. I thanked Mueller for meeting with Giaka saying it had gone a long way to build his confidence in the United States, the FBI and the DOJ. I had previously done this with Baker. These types of meetings were unheard of and since the other agents on the Scotbom Task Force had to deal with Giaka daily, it would help them also. Mueller said Fraser was not sure what to make of the FGJ system. Fraser was concerned because the United States process might “put you ahead” of the Scots who simply had to file charges. Fraser believed he could file charges against Fhimah and Megrahi immediately. Fraser was concerned the investi-

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Chapter 22: Mrs. Giaka gative information would leak prior to the announcement of charges in Scotland. Mueller believed he had convinced the Advocate they were going along parallel paths. The Lord Advocate was ready to proceed with charges as he was concerned about going into 1992 without charges being filed. The Scots had a target date of mid-November to have charges filed. Mueller planned to go forward with the FGJ and hoped it would be completed by mid-November unless there were plans in place to bring the defendants out of Libya. They agreed unless these plans were in place, the charges would be announced publicly before the end of the year. There would be simultaneous charges in Scotland and the United States, probably in November 1991. The announcement would not be driven by the completion of the Scottish police report. Charges would be announced together at 10:30 a.m. in the United States and 3:30 p.m., in Scotland. Mueller wanted the Scottish witnesses to testify before the FGJ or have American prosecutors depose them in Scotland. He decided against Gauci or Vassallo testifying before the FGJ as it was not worth the risk of public speculation should the news of their testimony leak. He did not have concerns about Giaka’s testimony because he would not have to travel far to testify and the media would not be aware he had testified. Mueller did not need the final forensic report, but wanted written assurances from the Scots about the forensic evidence. Mueller discussed the four options available to Libya. Their first was to fail to provide the evidence necessary to prosecute the case and delay prosecution. The others included giving the evidence to the United States or Scotland for a trial in either location, prosecute the case themselves, or ask for the case to be brought before the World Court. Most of the options were not appealing. No matter what happened, Mueller wanted to be ready to bring an indictment by November 1, 1991. It was imperative the trip to the United Kingdom in the next week for Giaka to get his wife be done as quickly as possible without a problem. Mueller wanted to meet after the Giaka trip to do a number of things. These included discussing the evidence to be presented before the FGJ; to prepare a statement to be issued if the existence of the FGJ to hear the evidence became public; and broadly compose the charges which the FGJ would consider. Mueller asked his DOJ attorneys to prepare a rough draft of the indictment. He also asked them to look at the Montreal Convention to see if Libya could demand jurisdiction in the case and to look at the role of the JSO and their official involvement in the bombing. He also wanted to ensure the names of all 270 victims as well as their nationalities were included in the indictment. Everything was to be accomplished in coordination with the Scots. He asked Biehl and Murtagh to draft a trial plan to include a list of witnesses and exhibits needed to try the case in an American court. He also asked for a prosecutive memo documenting the key evidence. Although it was already August 30, Mueller asked for the FGJ to start by September 4. He wanted SA Ed Marshman, as a summary witness from the FBI, to put in the background of the

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation case followed by the technical evidence presented by SSA Tom Thurman. He said the evidence, including the computer chip known as PT-35, should be introduced and he wanted to lock in the testimony of Giaka, Vassallo and Gauci. He asked that a press release be prepared and coordinated with the Scottish authorities to answer the one question no one had yet conclusively answered, “Where will the trial be held?” Finally, Mueller wanted all possible follow-up options explored including what would be done once charges were brought. He wanted to discuss the diplomatic approach, which he did not believe feasible. He also wanted documentation about what was being done to “lure” the subjects out of Libya. The meeting ended with plenty of responsibility for everyone. I left thinking all the assignments could go into the trash can if Giaka decided to stay in the United Kingdom or demanded to return to Malta once we arrived in London the next week. Much depended on that trip. Early Tuesday morning, September 3, I met with officials from the CIA and DOJ. The CIA did not find anything unusual in Libyan activities which could be construed as efforts to locate Giaka or members of his wife’s family. We discussed what to do if Giaka’s wife failed to board her flight to London on Thursday, September 5. A backup flight would be located in the event she missed her original flight. Jay Stephens said that much depended on this trip because without Giaka, the case was weak, at best. That afternoon, Giaka, Knisley and Reid met me at Baltimore Washington International Airport for the trip to London and the flight, which took off a little late, arrived almost on time at Gatwick. Tony Matthews* and Frank Waikart met us, all weary from the overnight trek. We wanted a brief nap before preparing for the arrival the next morning of Giaka’s wife, her mother and as it turned out, her brother, as her father decided he did not want to travel. Waikart and Matthews* drove us to a bed and breakfast, Pomfret Estates*, not far from Gatwick Airport near London. We checked in and Giaka had a room suitable for him and his wife, when she arrived the next day. Separate rooms were reserved for Giaka’s mother in law and her son. Giaka’s wife was scheduled to arrive the next morning on a direct flight from Malta. A police officer from the Sussex Constabulary Special Branch would meet the aircraft and escort the family to where the Giaka’s could be reunited. Then they would be taken to the hotel. Our plan seemed to be in order and little else could be anticipated other than everything which could still go wrong. That night, Giaka hardly slept anticipating the arrival of his wife. The next morning, we set out for Gatwick Airport. Giaka was told he needed to wait in the car with Reid. A local police officer would meet the plane and bring the Maltese visitors to him outside the airport. Waikart, Knisley, Matthews* and I met the local officer who said he timed his meeting with the plane to the minute so he would not arouse any suspicion. He would escort Giaka’s relatives to our car and they would all be taken to the hotel.

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Chapter 22: Mrs. Giaka Knisley and I watched passengers coming off flights from abroad. The flight from Malta had arrived early, but hopefully, the Special Branch officer factored this into his planning. At that moment, a young woman, obviously pregnant, passed us. An older woman, as well as a young man, accompanied her. We commented on them, but relied on the local officer to be with them and he was nowhere in sight. About three minutes later, the officer came running out of the immigration area saying the flight was early and he had been unable to meet it before the passengers disembarked. Convinced we had seen Giaka’s wife and relatives, the three of us scrambled to locate them. They were nowhere in sight and despite an exhaustive search of the immediate area; we had no success in locating them. Complicating the matter was we had no way to communicate. If Mueller could see this now, I thought, he would have my job!! We had lost Majid’s wife. We found Matthews* and Waikart and split up to begin a systematic search of the airport, one we did not know well. It was complicated by the inability to communicate. The search continued for about 40 minutes before asking Giaka to help in the search. To “disguise” Giaka, Reid gave him a baseball cap, which had a rather long bill on it. He also gave him his sunglasses to keep him from being recognized. As our search continued, Giaka admitted he told his wife not to speak to anyone and to proceed out of the airport to wait for him. With that information, our search moved outside. After a few more fruitless minutes, Giaka was nearly in tears, saying this was a “trick.” He believed the FBI had orchestrated the scenario to get him to the United Kingdom to turn him over to the Scots for trial as a conspirator in the Lockerbie bombing. As the search continued, the hat went higher up on his head and the sunglasses further down on his nose. He was visibly upset, not certain he would ever again see his wife. He thought perhaps she had been arrested. Although his thoughts had no basis in fact, nothing we said convinced him otherwise. As the search entered its second hour, our inability to communicate hampered the search. Where was his family and how could they have disappeared? We split up again and I began a search of the parking garages below the airport. There was no logical reason for them to be there, but the situation defied logic anyway. Giaka went to a pay phone with Reid to call Malta to determine if his wife had caught the plane. After calling and learning she had, his worst fears were confirmed. This was a trick orchestrated by the Americans and the Scots! I went below ground and three levels down spotted the trio Knisley and I had seen almost two hours earlier. There were the young pregnant woman, an older woman and a young man. I wanted to confront them but they seemed to be waiting for someone in the parking garage, looked comfortable and did not seem to be in distress. This garage was below ground level and not visible to anyone driving past the airport. Having no way to communicate, I sprinted back to where I had left Giaka and Reid. Spotting Knisley, I told him where the three Maltese were. I asked him to go keep an eye on them while I looked for Giaka.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation When I found him, he had just finished the call to Malta. By this time Giaka was inconsolable and visibly upset. When told his wife may have been found, he became less agitated. Giaka was unable to keep up with Reid or me as we raced through the airport so we kept pace with him. After what seemed like an eternity, we came upon Knisley who had done more than just keep an eye on them. He became concerned they might try and leave the area where they were. Knisley approached them and, affecting a British accent, told them he worked for the airport and was trying to help them get where they needed to go. Although this was not in the plan, he had at least kept them where Giaka could find them and the reunion could take place. The FBI agents and the British police and intelligence officers involved breathed a huge sigh of relief. We had made difficult something which should have been easy. Now, what would happen when Giaka told his wife she was going to the United States? How would Giaka’s wife’s mother react to the news her daughter, expecting her grandchild, was leaving her home in Malta, to go to the United States? Living in Libya was one thing, but America was another. In less than 24 hours we would know the answer. That night, Giaka and his wife had a quiet supper at the hotel. The night was uneventful and Giaka’s relatives were scheduled to leave Gatwick on a late morning flight the next day. Would there be fireworks before they left? Would they find out what was going on and ask to come to the United States as well? Giaka never said what he and his wife talked about the night he was reunited with her. The next morning, the entire family rode to the airport in one car and said their goodbyes. The Maltese flew to Valetta leaving Giaka alone with his wife, in the United Kingdom. We returned to the hotel and were formally introduced to Mrs. Giaka. She said very little and if she was the least bit inquisitive, this did not show. A day later, we departed for the airport for their flight to the United States. Would the Giaka’s find happiness in the United States? Would he stick to his story about what he witnessed, now almost three years before? How long would it be before he would have the opportunity to testify? What would transpire in the intervening years? We waited almost ten years to find out. Reid and Knisley would accompany them to the United States. I remained in the United Kingdom for my meeting early the next week with the intelligence agencies. While waiting in a small office before boarding the flight to the United States, Giaka seemed to be getting more and more agitated. Although his wife appeared indifferent to what was happening, Giaka was becoming upset. It was not until later we learned he believed we were “staring” at his wife. The reality was we were trying to gauge her reaction to what was going on around her. She seemed to be unfazed by the whole process. Here were a bunch of foreign men with her and her husband, headed for a strange new country and she was taking it better than any of us.

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Chapter 22: Mrs. Giaka Waikart and I watched the Boeing 767 lift off toward the United States. We rode into London until we reached the embassy. That night I had dinner with Waikart and Tony Matthews* at the American Embassy. The trip was a success despite the problems. It could certainly have turned out worse!

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CHAPTER 23: POLITICS AND DEATH IN WASHINGTON Early Sunday morning I took a train to Carlisle, a town in the north of England, close to where the 747 began its breakup in 1988. I had always flown to Scotland and wanted to see some of the English countryside. The next morning Jourdan drove me to the LICC. I walked up to meet with Henderson. Henderson greeted me warmly and there seemed to be no animosity due to the recent events. After discussing Giaka, Henderson told me the Maltese needed to be brought up to date. He knew they would be concerned about being publicly named as the location where the bomb bag started its deadly journey. He proposed the meeting be held in London rather than in Malta and before the last deployment of resources to Malta to wrap up our work. He also thought we should be the ones to do it. While discussing the logistics, Chief Esson sent word he wanted to meet with me, alone. I knew what was coming. I slowly walked down to meet with him. Esson normally had allowed Henderson and I to conduct day-to-day operations independently, but decided to become personally involved. He invited me to sit down and I knew this would be a one way conversation, a follow on to our telephone conversation a few weeks before. Esson said how disappointed he was in the events which had recently transpired with respect to Giaka. He was especially upset that Tom DuHadway and I had withheld information about the “rendition” of Giaka to the United States. He made a point to specify it took place while we were in Lockerbie, “drinking our wine and eating our food.” Although I had told Henderson, I could not tell Esson. I had not said anything until after leaving Lockerbie. I had little to say and apologized, saying I was not in control of all the events which happened in July. So long as other agencies were involved, there were times when I had to accede to their wishes, even if distasteful. This did not help the relationships which had greatly improved over the course of the investigation. I apologized and left the meeting promising to do better in the future, hoping this

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Chapter 23: Politics and Death in Washington incident would not affect the excellent relationships which had been forged. In a few words Esson had made his point. I returned to my meeting with Henderson and did not share all the detail of the meeting with Esson. We continued our discussion of the investigation. Henderson believed the indictments would be announced on a date from November 12-19, 1991. He admitted the final police report would not be done by then, nor would the RARDE report. Both were delayed into December, at the earliest. The next morning Henderson and I flew to London to meet with the BSS and CIA. It would be the last formal intelligence meeting prior to indictments being issued. Henderson and I, who had engaged in long discussions with the prosecutors, agreed the evidence accumulated had implicated Fhimah and Megrahi. While we knew others were involved, evidence to prosecute them did not exist. We were not certain we could ever find it. Even Giaka, later portrayed by the media as an “eyewitness” to the events in Malta on December 21, 1988, did not hold the key to unraveling the entire mystery. The meeting was held in London at the offices of the BSS. I attended, along with Henderson, Matthews* and Dave Bresett from the CIA. The CIA’s Tom Wilson* was also there along with Frank Waikart. Matthews* told us the Lord Advocate believed Mueller was speaking for the United States Government. The deadline which we thought to have been set by the Lord Advocate was allegedly being advocated by Mueller and, ostensibly, the United States Government. I knew better and said this was the first time I had heard this. Henderson and I had agreed no firm date should be set for completing the investigation. We knew the information from Giaka needed to be investigated in Malta and remained hopeful others from Libya would make their way to the west. I also learned FBI Director Sessions had met with the Director General of the BSS in Canada just two months before. Sessions had purportedly said the FBI was concerned about “timescales” as we wanted to arrest and bring to justice those responsible for this crime. It was another example of information not being passed down the line. I knew nothing of this meeting. The Lord Advocate met with the British Prime Minister on August 19, 1991, and they had discussed deadlines in the investigation. The Lord Advocate had allegedly said that “some factions of the FBI have the Director’s ear… (and were) not in agreement with Bob Mueller who speaks for the administration.” I was surprised to hear this as I had been in most of the meetings with Mueller, except when Mueller briefed the President or the Attorney General. At no time did Mueller ever put pressure on me or insinuate the case had to be concluded by any specific date. As far as having the ear of the Director, I doubted Sessions knew a lot about the day to day operations of the case. I had little contact with Sessions and in fact, during the entire case, had participated in only three briefings with him. The first was to get him to sign documents which were being released to the Federal Court in New York hearing the Pan Am civil trial. The

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation other times were when he was briefed on the Gauci identification and lastly when the CIA briefed him on the investigation. I did not have the “ear” of the Director and had never asked him to do anything. Henderson had his own thoughts about the meeting between Mueller and the Lord Advocate. He believed Mueller would oppose a timetable to complete the investigation and was surprised when Mueller seemed to agree with the Advocate about setting a deadline. The Advocate resisted Mueller’s suggestion the Maltese witnesses testify before the FGJ, saying they should only have to appear in court one time, that being at the trial. He also told Mueller FBI Agents and Scottish police officers could present the evidence to the FGJ. Peter Fraser, the Lord Advocate, had apparently told Mueller that if it became public they were convening the grand jury, he would have to say he had a warrant. Fraser had enough probable cause to obtain a petition warrant but would hold the announcement until the FGJ had convened, heard the evidence, and hopefully returned a true bill. Mueller told Fraser he could get a complaint issued in short order if need be, but felt that an indictment followed by the joint announcement of charges would have more weight than separate charges in each country. The British Foreign Office (BFO) wanted to be involved in the charging process as there were foreign policy considerations. Henderson and I were aware of these considerations but cared little about them. Our goal was to conduct a thorough, complete and impartial investigation, regardless whose toes were stepped on. So far, no one had told us how to do our jobs. The BSS believed that once the charges were drawn up and announced, the BFO as well as the United States DOS would have a role to play in the outcome of the case. Crown Office officials had planned to meet with the BFO personnel after the drafting of charges. The Lord Advocate had allegedly told Mueller he would like to prosecute the case in Edinburgh personally. That was the most commitment anyone had heard about where the case should be tried, although the case had been investigated to conform to Scottish rules of evidence. We discussed what Giaka furnished during his lengthy interview. The CIA and BSS agreed that Giaka could answer most of the intelligence questions and the evidentiary things he had provided could be corroborated by others. Matthews* said the BSS would prepare a document outlining the makeup of the JSO and its relationship to the Government of Libya. He thought this document and Giaka’s testimony would complement each other very well. Wilson* provided the best assessment concerning any of the suspects traveling. Neither Fhimah nor Megrahi was allowed to leave Libya, probably because the Libyans knew they were targets of the Lockerbie investigation. He was convinced they would not travel, but could not guarantee it: they might use another passport or name. He did not know if Hijazi*, Fazani* or Al Kafi* would travel but believed that none of those whose names had surfaced in the investigation would be permitted to travel outside Libya. This was disheartening, but

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Chapter 23: Politics and Death in Washington not unexpected. The feasibility of arresting any of the subjects in the near future was extremely low. Wilson* said the appropriate trip wires had been placed with the many intelligence agencies with which the CIA and BSS had liaison. They did not know how effective these would be, but it was better than nothing. Law enforcement agencies could not ask other police agencies to do anything to arrest or detain anyone until after judicial process was obtained. I raised an issue I would continue to press for years after the indictments were obtained: material witness warrants. In the United States a material witness warrant could be issued for witnesses who were reluctant to come to court. This warrant is a judicial process similar to a grand jury subpoena. The person named in the warrant is compelled to appear in court to testify. No one can be compelled to testify against himself, but this process, which was not often used, could be effective in cases where there is doubt about a witness appearing to testify in court. This type of warrant had no standing in international law. Since there was no provision in Scottish law which provided for them, the DOJ opted to not use them. Other intelligence services around the world had asked for briefings on the investigation and we agreed there was value in providing them, after the indictments. Concerns were expressed about the longstanding relationship between Malta and Libya. It was not known how much information the Maltese had shared with their neighbors to the south. It was imperative a high level delegation representing the United States and the United Kingdom provide the Maltese with a briefing so they would not feel they were cut out of the process. It was possible that the Maltese Prime Minister was going to be in New York for a session of the United Nations in October and the briefing could take place then. There was still concern the Libyans could start killing witnesses. The intelligence agencies did not think they would, especially not those living in Malta such as Gauci or Vassallo. However, it was possible the Libyans were unaware how valuable they were as witnesses. Gauci did not want to leave Malta but did not at all seem frightened by the prospect of being a witness in the case. Apparently he did not realize what danger he could be in should the Libyans recognize what he knew. Giaka was secure and safe in the United States, out of the reach of Gaddafi. However, I would feel better when Giaka was placed into the US Marshal’s Witsec Program. The Marshals had never lost a witness in the program so long as the person abided by their rules and regulations. Henderson flew back to Scotland that afternoon. That night I ate dinner with Bresett and Wilson* in London and we discussed the case in detail. I contemplated what was ahead. It was a good thing I did not know what had just transpired in Washington.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation The next day when my plane landed at Dulles Airport, Butch Luker, an FBI agent assigned to the WFO, met me to facilitate my transit through customs and immigration. I never asked for it but it was a courtesy he would occasionally provide. Luker had some bad news. Two days before, Tom DuHadway, the 49-year-old SAC who had been so supportive at WFO until his promotion in the summer of 1991, had died of a heart attack while playing golf. I was unaware that DuHadway had had a heart problem which was being monitored by his doctors. The sudden and tragic death of a man who had become not only a friend but a mentor was a complete shock and was devastating for everyone who knew him.

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CHAPTER 24: MALTA After returning from Scotland, I spoke daily with Henderson. Henderson too was affected by DuHadway’s death. Henderson recalled his sense of humor, his kindness and compassion. He especially remembered the round of golf in Scotland and he too, would miss him. Bresett, Wilson* and I had become obsessed with the idea of getting a subject out of Libya who could be offered a deal if he “turned” on the others. In mid-September, Bresett proposed Giaka prepare a cassette recording which could be sent to Fhimah. He would tell Fhimah that he (Giaka) had “got out” and that Fhimah could too. Perhaps Fhimah could be convinced the JSO would harm him unless he made his way to the West. Bresett wanted to give Fhimah a way to escape, but without burning operations or methods if it failed. It was always possible he would go directly to Megrahi and the plan would fail. Bresett said the plan would only work if done quickly because of the anticipated publicity once the indictments were announced. Meanwhile, Murtagh had created the framework for the upcoming FGJ. He had scheduled grand jury time beginning on September 25. The FGJ would meet on parts or all of twelve days, culminating on November 13, 1991, hopefully with an indictment. The witnesses would include FBI agents who would summarize what we had uncovered, to include potential testimony by both Bollier and Gauci. The main “live” witness would be Giaka. It was beginning to look like Megrahi and Fhimah would be the only targets of the FGJ. No evidence had been developed which could directly tie any of the other Libyans to the bombing. The BSS and Chief Esson had been to a meeting in London earlier that day. They suggested Henderson and I brief the Maltese on the investigation. This process had come a long way, from high level government officials from the United States and United Kingdom providing the briefing to a couple of career,

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation non political, law enforcement officers. We knew more about the investigation than anyone else; but was this the right message to send to a country whose airport was the location from which the bomb had entered the aviation system? Henderson discussed our trip to Malta. We were not sure the Maltese would accept that their airport was the ingestion point for the IED suitcase. Who could blame them? The computer record uncovered in Germany and the investigation conducted in Malta needed to be put into context for them. We had another problem. The Maltese had never been told about Giaka, and his wife was a Maltese citizen. Henderson had consulted with the BSS to determine when the briefing should be given. Whenever it was, I would be a part of it. Henderson and I had started to discuss our upcoming participation at the German Police College in early October to talk about international terrorism, international cooperation and the Lockerbie investigation in general terms. While we would not discuss the investigation itself, we hoped to provide enough information to demonstrate how important it was to cooperate, collaborate and share information. Henderson suggested we travel to Malta on the way back from Germany. Henderson told me he had learned the Lord Advocate would move forward with his plan to publicly announce the warrants in November unless there were specific operational plans in place to arrest one or more of the defendants. We already knew the possibility of such an operation was slim to none. The next day there was a meeting at Mueller’s office attended by FBI, DOJ and CIA officials. The attorneys believed the indictment could be returned by mid-November. The CIA had explored options to lure Fhimah to a neutral country for an interview or an arrest but the chance for success was miniscule. No one wanted to try Fhimah alone, without Megrahi. Issues related to the Montreal Convention were also discussed. Its provisions stipulated that Libya could ask to try the defendants and have the evidence turned over to them. Mueller believed this convention did not apply in this case, since the Government that would be asking for the information had apparently been involved in ordering the attack. Biehl and Murtagh wanted to lock in the testimony of Tony Gauci and show him a new updated photo spread. Most prosecutors are more comfortable when they had an opportunity to watch what a witness says under the pressure of either an interview with them or during a grand jury appearance. However, the prosecutors were reluctant to upset the Scots by requesting to interview Gauci again. Gauci had already provided about 20 statements to Scottish officers. They agreed to postpone the “ideal” photo spread until later. The meeting ended with the disclosure that the indictment, if returned, would come down on November 13. On Saturday, October 6, I left for Frankfurt and met Henderson there early the next afternoon. We boarded the Lufthansa express train from Frankfurt to Bonn, then the capital of Germany. The next morning we met with Manfred

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Chapter 24: Malta Klink and Hartwig Maas of the BKA. Klink and Maas had become friends in the common cause to bring those responsible for the bombing to justice. That afternoon, Mike Baird, the FBI Alat from Bonn, drove us to the German Police College in Muenster, several hours to the north. The next morning, I spoke about FBI extraterritorial jurisdiction and part of the discussion included Lockerbie. Henderson discussed the response of the police at the LICC to the events of December 21, 1988. We were careful not to disclose sensitive information, to include the link to Libya. Henderson and I returned to Bonn on Wednesday, October 9, arriving in the late afternoon. I wanted to discuss what we would tell the Maltese. Before I left the United States, Mueller had told me not to reveal information about Giaka. I could neither confirm nor deny that Giaka or any member of his family was in the United States. The international media had already reported Giaka and his family had been brought from Libya or Malta to the United States or the United Kingdom. Henderson said we would have plenty of time to have the discussion after arriving in Malta. The next morning we took the express train to Frankfurt. We had a Swiss Air flight to Zurich to connect to a flight which would get us to Malta at 2:50 p.m.. However, when we arrived at Frankfurt, air traffic delays had postponed our flight. Fog had settled in over Europe. We arranged to take a Lufthansa flight to Rome which connected to the last flight of the day to Malta. Since the Lufthansa flight was delayed, we had only about ten minutes to catch the connecting flight. Fortunately we made the flight — there would be no more that day, and the meeting with Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Guido DeMarco was scheduled the next morning. On the flight, I again tried to get Henderson to discuss what we would tell the Maltese, but he said we would talk about it later that night. That night, I met John Bevington and Reid, the two FBI agents who would be finishing the investigation with Scottish officers if all went well during the briefing. Reid’s luggage was lost. He was told it would be at least 24 hours before it made its way to Malta. He and Harry Bell were about the same size, and Bell had an extra suit. The Scottish officers wanted to meet at the hotel where Henderson and the other Scots were staying. We met in Henderson’s room at the Chequers Hotel. Over pizza, we began our discussion. Henderson was concerned about the Libyans or the Maltese monitoring what was being said in the room. He turned the radio up so any recording of what was said would be difficult to hear. Henderson wanted to ensure DeMarco there was no evidence any Maltese national was involved in the attack. Henderson also wanted to tell him he did not believe Vassallo had been totally honest during his interviews. We had analyzed the evidence and intelligence and needed to do additional investigation before an indictment could be returned. He would tell DeMarco we had received “intelligence information” indicating that Fhimah and Megrahi had explosives at

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation the LAA offices at Luqa Airport and had brought a large brown hard-sided suitcase into Malta in December 1988. This was information which had come from Giaka. Henderson outlined what he believed needed to be done to solidify the case. We all had input and it seemed there was still much to be done in Malta. Our discussions went on for hours. Henderson wanted to say the inquiry had received intelligence information indicating the bomb had definitely originated in Malta. He agreed not to tell the Maltese about Giaka. I was reluctant to provide any information which could compromise Giaka. Henderson said the inquiry was large and he would tell them the Scots had obtained some “intelligence information.” Henderson would put the “inquiry on his broad shoulders.” I agreed, but was uncomfortable dealing with the whole issue of Giaka, his wife and the Maltese officials. I did not want to lie or be evasive. I had my orders from Mueller and was instructed to say nothing about Giaka or even acknowledge I knew him. I would not be in a comfortable position when speaking with the number two man in Malta. Henderson said he was the person ultimately responsible for the investigation and needed to be able to raise the intelligence issue with the Maltese. He insisted he would take the responsibility for the information “on my broad shoulders.” After the debate we agreed to tell the Maltese that the investigators (without being more specific) had received uncorroborated information concerning explosives at Luqa Airport, a suitcase that might have been smuggled into the airport on December 20, 1988, and the fact that Vassallo might have been at the airport that night. They would be told this had come from unnamed sources but the words “intelligence information” would never be used, and the source would not be the United States. Indeed, it was not intelligence information at all, but “evidence” which had come from Giaka. The next morning, Henderson and I met at DeMarco’s office. With us were the Deputy Chief of Mission from the American Embassy, the Deputy High Commissioner from the British Embassy as well as Bell and Reid. DeMarco, along with his Interior Minister Ugo Bonnici and Police Commissioner George Grech represented the Maltese. Henderson, as the principal briefer, told DeMarco there would be a high level government delegation from the United States and Scotland before the end of the year to provide more information. His intention that day was not to provide a complete briefing, but to request the Maltese to assist in completing the investigation as quickly as possible. DeMarco opened the meeting by promising complete cooperation, but he expressed concern about leaks which had occurred. The Maltese were not happy about information in the press which intimated the bomb had been ingested into the international baggage system at Luqa Airport. Henderson said the police had not leaked information to the media and apologized for what had occurred. He told him this had caused problems for everyone involved in the investigation. Henderson provided the information

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Chapter 24: Malta which we had agreed to the night before. DeMarco wanted to know how we had gotten to Malta. Henderson told him about the clothing and the German airport printout showing a bag had transferred from Air Malta Flight 180 to Pan Am Flight 103. He talked about Gauci and Vassallo. DeMarco was not convinced of the veracity of the information which had been developed. He had heard about the PFLP-GC barometric bomb and had doubts about the MEBO timer. He asked Henderson what other information he possessed. Although I had participated in the discussion, I stayed silent. Henderson said he had received “intelligence information from the Americans” about a brown suitcase coming through Luqa Airport and plastic explosives were maintained at the airport by Fhimah and Megrahi. DeMarco may not have comprehended the significance of what Henderson was telling him and did not ask a follow up question. My blood began to boil, as Henderson had agreed to not bring up the United States as the “source” of the intelligence information. However, I realized it could be a lot worse. At that moment Bonnici suggested that he, De Marco, Henderson and I go into De Marco’s office. We left the others in the conference room, entered the office and DeMarco closed the door. Neither of us could guess what would happen. The office was old but smartly furnished. DeMarco said his office had been the bedroom of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798, when he briefly captured the island for France after recognizing its strategic importance in the Mediterranean. We were impressed with the history, but wondered why we had been asked to meet in private. While he could have asked a number of questions I would have been hesitant to answer, he did not. There were no questions about Giaka, Giaka’s wife or even the investigation. He was satisfied with what he had been told. DeMarco said he was trying to protect the interests of Malta, as any leader would. He asked what he needed to do to bring this whole matter to a rapid conclusion. Henderson said he hoped the remainder of the investigation could be completed in two weeks or less. DeMarco was satisfied. We left Napoleon’s room and he told the Maltese police to assist in completing the investigation. It was good news and Giaka was not compromised. The meeting ended and we went directly to the headquarters of the Maltese police to begin preparations to complete the investigation. The Maltese had not been told a lot, but we believed the political issues of concern to DeMarco were better left to politicians and high ranking government officials to address. All we wanted to do was get our job done, quickly and efficiently.

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CHAPTER 25: INDICTMENTS By Monday, October 28, the highest levels of the United States Government were involved in the Lockerbie case. It had been briefed to the president. The French, under the leadership of the French Magistrate, Bruguiere, were ready to indict a number of Libyan officials in the 1989 bombing of the French UTA flight. There had been suggestions the British, French and American governments would exert pressure on Libya when the indictments were announced. The indictments, if returned, would be announced on November 14 or 15 and much needed to be done before then. Briefing books and fact sheets would have to be prepared, congressional leaders would have to be notified and FBI Legats informed. Judge Thomas Platt in New York, who was hearing the federal lawsuit by the victim families against Pan Am, would also have to be advised of the indictment. We also needed to consider the impact the indictments could have on the witnesses in Malta and elsewhere. The next few days were frantic. Biehl and Murtagh were trying to complete the FGJ process. Family members on both sides of the Atlantic were calling their contacts in police and diplomatic circles to elicit information. Washington was abuzz with speculation that an indictment was about to be returned. As late as November 1, 1991, we hoped to indict individuals beyond Megrahi and Fhimah but the evidence was not there. Giaka had started his FGJ testimony and the prosecutors asked me to be the final witness to sum up the case. On November 5, the team in Malta had recontacted Vassallo and Gauci. The indictments were days away and none of the prosecutors had the chance to see for themselves what kind of witness either would be; they had to rely on the instincts of the detectives and agents. Vassallo did not recall going to the airport to pick up Fhimah and Megrahi when they came to Malta on December 20, 1988, as Giaka had stated. He did have an entry in his diary which documented their

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Chapter 25: Indictments visit to his residence that day but believed they made their own way there. Vassallo was told of the danger he could be in once warrants were issued. The option of entering the Witsec Program was explained to him and to Gauci, but neither was interested. No one spoke to Gauci about testifying in court, but we all believed he would some day testify, if asked. He was told he had other options including relocating to the United States or the United Kingdom. He had no interest in that either. Several other once-promising leads were explored by the team in Malta. None of them added anything to our case. Now, just days before the indictments would probably be returned, the long, sometimes troubling, investigation in Malta was coming to a close. There would be no other evidence developed before the indictments were announced. On November 6, there was a meeting of the DOS and DOJ. The DOJ was ready to go so long as the Scottish authorities were also ready to announce their petition warrants. Any delay at this point would be only of the Scots’ making. The DOS officials not only wanted to demand Libya turn over the suspects but also wanted them to accept responsibility for the attacks. The first demand would take nearly eight years to fulfill, and the second, longer, if ever. The next morning I received a disturbing call from the FBI liaison representative to the CIA. The CIA was telling its stations overseas that an indictment in the Lockerbie case would never lead to a resolution in a court of law. Allegedly, neither the NSC nor the President cared about a judicial solution. I doubted this was true. A judicial solution was close at hand and would be at least partially satisfactory, as long as the Libyans cooperated by turning their operatives over for trial. Fhimah was considered a low level player; Megrahi was a more significant catch. While these two would be the only ones indicted, we hoped they would tell us who had ordered the attack. Nations of the world still needed to unite against a state sponsor of terrorism. The usual ways of dealing with terrorism include military, economic sanctions, diplomatic, intelligence initiatives and the rule of law. In this case, all but the military option was used. This approach proved to be an effective means of dealing with a rogue state which had used terrorism as a tool of its foreign policy. On Friday, November 8, I testified as the last witness before the FGJ in Washington. I showed the grand jurors a video made by the Scottish police shortly after the bombing which showed the evidence collection efforts by the Scots in their search of the 845-square-mile crime scene. It also showed the impact the bombing had on the village of Lockerbie and its citizens. I summarized the investigation, and it was now up to twenty-three Americans to decide whether or not an indictment would be returned against Megrahi and Fhimah. This part of the investigation was officially over.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Monday, November 11, was a holiday, but I spoke with Henderson about the week ahead. The Lord Advocate and the Chief Constable had told the families some sort of resolution would be reached by the third anniversary of the bombing. Although no one liked putting an “end date” on the investigation, we realized little additional evidence would be developed without direct access to Libya and Libyan witnesses. Henderson agreed there was little more to do without more evidence or the ability to get it. We wanted to show the world what we had been doing the past three years. Henderson was concerned about how much information the prosecutors would release in the United States. He said the petition warrant would be unsealed at a press conference on Thursday, November 14, 1991, at 3:30 p.m., Scottish time. The next morning, Mueller said our indictment would be returned on November 13 and unsealed the next day. He wanted to be sure the press statement said the Scots were having a coordinated announcement. At the outset of this investigation, none of us would have thought it would be possible to come to a joint announcement of charges. We had come a long way in the past three years. Mueller wanted his praise for the Scottish police and their relentless pursuit of evidence to come through loud and clear; he did not want the press release to emphasize the death penalty, as there were countries of the world who would oppose surrendering the defendants to the United States solely because of the punishment they faced if convicted in an American court. The next day, another meeting was held at DOJ to discuss logistics. Acting Attorney General William Barr wanted to contact the families personally to tell them of the indictment before it was publicly announced. The FBI had also considered doing that but we felt that an indictment alone, especially one involving Libya, would fail to satisfy some of the victim families. They wanted results and this partial victory would not be accepted by all of them. There was a great deal of work to be done. The DOS prepared a “white paper” describing the terrorist acts committed by the regime of Moammar Gaddafi. The evidence would be outlined generally for public consumption. The paper, entitled “Libya’s Continuing Responsibility for Terrorism,” was intended to provide context for the allegations contained in the US indictment and the Scottish petition warrant. The paper concluded the act of terrorism against the Pan Am jumbo jet was not an aberration but was part of a pattern of terrorist actions authorized by the Libyan Government. The Gaddafi regime was linked to a number of terror attacks since the 1970s all over the world, to include the murder and attempted murders of Libyan dissidents. The support the Gaddafi regime had provided Palestinian groups through the years had led to attacks by groups such as ANO against Western targets. Besides providing safe haven and financial support, Gaddafi allowed terrorist groups to conduct training exercises within Libya. Twenty-eight examples of Libyan sponsored terrorist attacks from April 1986 until the summer of 1990, were outlined. However, much of the “evidence” against the Gaddafi

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Chapter 25: Indictments regime contained in the paper had never been proven in court. The allegations of Libyan involvement in the Lockerbie bombing would eventually have to meet that standard. I had several telephone conversations with Howard Lang, the Deputy Chief of Mission in Malta. On November 13, the day before the indictments were returned, Lang spoke with DeMarco. Lang was uncomfortable giving this briefing because he had not been privy to all the details of the investigation. We provided him a lengthy document which he used for their discussion. I had concerns about the long-term relationship between the FBI and the Maltese Government, but only so much could be done. I hoped Mueller would go to Malta after the indictments. On November 13, senior officials from the NSC, the CIA and the DOS met at the DOJ. Bush Administration officials had recently briefed advisors of French President Mitterrand about the investigation. The French wondered how the investigation had shifted away from Syria, the state sponsor of the PFLP-GC. Two weeks before, the French Magistrate, Bruguiere, had indicted a number of senior Libyan officials for their role in the downing of the UTA flight. Henderson had speculated the timing was at least partly due to our indictments. The French were contemplating making some public pronouncements on the UTA bombing and perhaps all this pressure would force Gaddafi to surrender the defendants in both cases. We discussed who in the United States Government should be briefed and when. The NSC was planning to notify the leadership of both the intelligence and judicial oversight committees in Congress. The DOS would notify the foreign affairs committee in the Congress and these notifications was already in motion. Acting Attorney General Barr would telephonically advise family members of the indictments at 10:30 a.m. Many others needed to be told and these assignments were made. After the meeting, I pulled Mueller aside to discuss the issues in Malta. Since no one had time to travel there, I suggested he call DeMarco and provide details of the investigation and the indictments which would now be announced in 24 hours. I left the meeting at DOJ and called Lang. While Lang had already briefed DeMarco, he was relieved to know Mueller would also call him that day. DeMarco’s biggest concern was how the announcement of the indictments would affect his country, politically and economically, and how the announcement would affect the witnesses currently living on the island. Although no one could have predicted what would happen in 1991, no harm ever came to Tony Gauci or Vincent Vassallo, both of whom eventually testified at the trial in the Netherlands. We went to the press conference and encountered Director Sessions, Deputy Director Floyd Clarke and Assistant Directors Gow and Bill Baker. It was 11:00 a.m. and the press conference in Scotland had been underway for about

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation 30 minutes. The world was now learning what we had been doing the past three years. Barr, Mueller, Stephens and Director Sessions made their way to the podium. Barr then issued the following statement: On December 21, 1988, a terrorist bomb destroyed Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, murdering 259 persons aboard the plane and 11 persons on the ground. For three years the United States and Scotland have conducted one of the most exhaustive and complex investigations in history. Today we are announcing an indictment in this case. We charge that two Libyan officials, acting as operatives of the Libyan intelligence agency, along with other co-conspirators, planted and detonated the bomb that destroyed Pan Am 103. At this moment Lord Fraser, Chief Prosecutor of Scotland, is announcing parallel charges. I have just telephoned some of the families of those murdered on Pan Am 103 to inform them and the organizations of the survivors that this indictment has been returned. Their loss has been ever present in our minds. The task force created by the United States and Scotland to solve the bombing performed magnificently. The FBI and Scottish police conducted a brilliant and unrelenting investigation. US and Scottish prosecutors guided the investigation with superb skill. Forensic scientists from the United Kingdom and the United States made contributions of the highest order. I cannot say enough about the work of all involved. For their leadership and hard work, I want to pay tribute especially to: Assistant Attorney General Bob Mueller and the staff of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department; US Attorney for the District of Columbia, Jay Stephens and his staff; and Assistant Director Bill Baker, and the skilled agents and staff of the FBI; and in Scotland, to Lord Fraser and the Scottish police, particularly police officials John Boyd, George Esson and Stuart Henderson. This investigation is by no means over. It continues unabated. We will not rest until all those responsible are brought to justice. We have no higher priority. The defendants we indict today are Abdel Basset Ali al Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, officers and operatives of the Libyan Intelligence Agency. These defendants are fugitives from justice. Here is what the indictment charges: The defendants and co-conspirators made a bomb of plastic explosive and a sophisticated timing device and placed it inside a Toshiba portable radio cassette player. The radio and clothing were put into a Samsonite suitcase. On December 20, 1988, the defendants flew from Libya to Malta, where one of them had recently worked for Libyan Arab Airlines and had access to the baggage tags of another airline, Air Malta. By using stolen Air Malta baggage tags, the defendants and their co-conspirators were able to route the bomb-rigged suitcase as unaccompanied luggage. The suitcase was put aboard an Air Malta flight that went to Frankfurt Airport in Germany. At Frankfurt, the suitcase was transferred to Pan Am Flight 103-A, which carried it

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Chapter 25: Indictments to Heathrow Airport in London. At Heathrow, the suitcase containing the bomb was placed aboard Pan Am 103. It exploded about 38 minutes after the airliner departed for New York. Pan Am 103 was at an altitude of six miles when the bomb detonated. Pieces of the jetliner were scattered over an area of 845 square miles. Scottish authorities immediately started conducting the most extensive crime scene investigation ever carried out. They searched the entire 845 square mile area inch-by-inch, month after month — fields, forests, lakes, towns. And they found bits of evidence that proved to be critical to the investigators and forensic scientists in solving the case. After laborious analysis and reconstruction, it was determined that the bomb had been in a suitcase in a large aluminum baggage container in the aircraft’s forward cargo hold. It was found that the bomb was composed of 10 to 14 ounces of plastic explosive. The methodical crime scene investigation yielded a tiny fragment, smaller than a fingernail that had been driven by the blast into the large cargo container. Forensic experts determined that this was part of a circuit board of a Toshiba radio. A fragment of a green circuit board — also smaller than a fingernail — was found in a piece of a shirt that had been in the suitcase containing the bomb. Scientists determined it was part of the bomb’s timing device, and traced it to its manufacturer — a Swiss company that had sold it to a high- level Libyan intelligence official. The path of the deadly suitcase was reconstructed. With the help of many countries, investigators were then able to develop the remainder of the evidence leading to today’s indictment. This has been a case of incredible complexity. As you can see, it required a painstaking, long-term investigation of the utmost diligence and attention to the smallest detail. Although this investigation is continuing and will be pursued unrelentingly until all responsible are brought to justice, today’s indictment is a landmark and sends a powerful message. We have the resolve and the ability to track down — no matter how long it takes — those responsible for terrorist attacks against Americans.

During his press conference, Barr showed charts which depicted some of the evidence which had been collected. During his statement, he only misspoke once saying the timers had been “sold to a high level Libyan intelligence official.” The timer had actually been given to the Libyans in anticipation of getting a larger order. No money ever changed hands for the MEBO timers. Following the press conference, the media stayed behind and asked questions. The press had speculated for years that Iran, through the PFLP-GC, had carried out the attack. Now they wanted to know who these Libyans were. Before the day was out, the pair had been “arrested” in Libya and appeared before cameras in Tripoli. The world got its first view of Megrahi and Fhimah as Libyan officials detained them. Henderson and I did not speak that day, but had speculated what the world reaction would be following the announcements. There were skeptics who did not believe the FBI and the Scottish police could have kept the secret as

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation long as we did. It was the former CIA official, Cannistraro, who had first decided to “out” the direction of the investigation to the media in November 1990. Some speculated the charges against the pair were not credible and the only reason the Libyans had been blamed for the Lockerbie bombing was because it was politically expedient to do so. During the 1980s, Moammar Gaddafi not only sponsored attacks around the world but had allowed Libya to become a safe haven for terrorists such as Sabri al Banna. He also gave moral and financial support to many of the Palestinian terrorist groups of the time. He had plenty of competition from the likes of Hezbollah and various other radical extremists. However, as a state sponsor of terrorism, Gaddafi had distanced himself from Washington and had ostracized the United Kingdom after the death of Yvonne Fletcher. Henderson and I had talked many times about what public speculation would be when once again, the eyes of the world focused on Gaddafi and Libya. We knew we had to get it right because even if the defendants were never surrendered for trial, some would believe the charges were trumped up just to point the finger at Gaddafi and away from others. Henderson and I often discussed the trail of evidence which had been developed leading up to and during the 1991 war with Iraq. Our focus had shifted to Libya by that time, driven entirely by the physical evidence found in the fields around Lockerbie. However, the two of us were acutely aware of politics. The PFLP-GC was sponsored by Hafez al Assad, the president of Syria. Any effort to accuse the PFLP-GC of the bombing would have had political ramifications for Assad and his nation because Syria allowed Ahmed Jibril and his terrorist group to operate from there. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the United States and other Western and Arab countries tried, without success, to convince Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait. The United States had organized a world coalition against Hussein to pressure him to leave Kuwait and avoid war. One of the principal allies in this effort was Syria and Assad. There was no better country to keep the Arab nations united together against Hussein than Syria. It was obvious to us that some observers would say our shift in focus from the Syriansponsored group to Libya was done for the sake of political expediency. But neither Henderson nor I ever discussed with anyone how the evidence would turn out. We were never told to shift focus, to blame one country or another; we only followed the evidence. Dealing with the CIA was an everyday problem for much of the investigation. They stonewalled efforts to interview Khreesat and tried to independently solve the case on their own for almost two years. Too much information was withheld in the early days which may have been helpful. It took the meeting in Washington in October 1990 for us to start working together as a team. Some at the CIA did not understand how the mission of the FBI could blend into theirs. However, some in the FBI were just as shortsighted. Officials in the United Kingdom were impressed with the model which had been created with the Lockerbie investigation, wherein intelligence and evi-

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Chapter 25: Indictments dence were equally shared between intelligence and law enforcement agencies for the good of the investigation and, ultimately, the people.But one senior CIA official was alleged to have said, even after the successes of Lockerbie, that this was the last time the FBI would get such access to CIA information. It would be unfortunate if that attitude should prevail, given the ever increasing dangers of international terrorism. After the press conference ended, members of the Scotbom task force were at the back of the room where the announcements had been made. They had brought Alistair MacGregor, a Scottish officer from Edinburgh, who had been in the United States as a HOLMES operator, with them. MacGregor wondered if the prosecutors in the United States had saved anything for the trial. He was referring to the specificity of the information which had been divulged by Barr. Compared to what the Scottish authorities put into the public record that day, the United States had publicized a significant amount of information. Now, the next move was up to Gaddafi. When he acted, the prosecutors would have to back up their accusations with hard evidence.

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CHAPTER 26: SUSPECTS TALK Lockerbie had received massive publicity in the days after the bombing and had another day in the spotlight with the indictments in November 1991, but the world media shifts its focus pretty fast. I would stay at WFO until July 1992 to conclude what was left of the investigation and oversee the writing of the FBI report, which summarized what we had done the past three years. Other agents on the task force who had put their careers on hold moved onto other jobs. Other events also occurred over the next few months which would require my attention. Things were also changing in Scotland. Chief Esson was closing down the LICC and moving the investigation to police headquarters in Dumfries. The HOLMES link was cut before the end of the year. Henderson, on loan from the Lothian and Borders Constabulary in Edinburgh, was already starting to feel his own time at the LICC was limited. After the indictment was announced, FBI field offices and the police in Scotland were deluged by individuals who had information about the bombing or the two suspects who had been indicted. None of the tips ever turned out to be of value. On the evening of November 27, Peter Jennings of ABC News opened his broadcast with the announcement that the lead story was Pan Am Flight 103. Correspondent Pierre Salinger had interviewed the two indicted defendants in Libya, senior Libyan officials, and Colonel Gaddafi. No one knew it at the time but the Salinger interviews would play a prominent role in the trial years later in the Netherlands. Gaddafi told Salinger his government had been “unfairly accused.” Salinger’s first interview was with Megrahi, who spoke in heavily accented English. Salinger referred to Megrahi as the “alleged mastermind behind the Pan Am 103 bombing.” Although Megrahi was believed to be the more significant of

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Chapter 26: Suspects Talk the two indicted, we did not believe he was the “mastermind.” Unlike Al Qaeda, which operates through cells who may not know each other, the Libyan Government had a rigid hierarchal structure with a clear chain of command. Megrahi was not at the top of that chain. The evidence which we found led only as far as the two defendants and other indictments would not possible unless either they or others within Libya provided eyewitness or documentary evidence which could lead to additional charges. Megrahi denied Salinger’s allegation that he was the Chief of Security for LAA, and told him he was only a dispatcher. Megrahi said he did not know of Abdusamad, “I don’t know his name. Maybe there is a man like this. But I don’t know.” He went onto say, in halting English, “On December 20 or 21, at that time I wasn’t there, believe me. I was here in Tripoli with my family.”. He denied buying any clothing at the shop owned by Tony Gauci, although the passport he provided to Salinger was stamped with the date the indictment alleged the clothing was purchased. He said he was too well known in Malta to be able to use a false passport to identify himself. He said he would not be able to identify a timer unless someone told him what it was. He said he did not know the name MEBO; “I haven’t any link to the company you mention.” He vehemently denied being a part of the Libyan Intelligence Service, saying, “No… I was surprised when they told me that…Even in our society here, you have to feel ashamed to work with the intelligence. It is not acceptable to work in this field.” The video taken by ABC News showed him kissing and hugging his children, passing him off as a family man who would not be involved in the horrific events of December 1988. Fhimah too was interviewed; he spoke in Arabic, which was translated into English. Salinger said the indictment against him relied on an entry Fhimah had made in his diary reminding him to obtain luggage tags from Air Malta. Fhimah said he worked at the airport and “tags in general, even for the Libyan airline, … are on top of counters, available to anyone.” Fhimah too denied any role in the bombing. ABC News reporters went on to interview Ibrahim Bishari, the Libyan foreign minister, as well as Gaddafi. Bishari was alleged to have been the head of the JSO, the Libyan intelligence service. Gaddafi said the United States had been treating him and his country unfairly, but that he believed he could forge a good relationship with President Bush. He was partially right, as the better relationship would be developed with another George Bush; George W. Bush. That would not be for another 15 years and not until many incredible things occurred. By early December, the intelligence agencies had examined their files to seek connections between Libya and the PFLP-GC. They had found information which showed a relationship between Libya and the Palestinian group, but proving it was another matter. Allegedly, Gaddafi had helped fund the group including a $4.7 million payment in 1988. This information had come up earlier,

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation before the indictments. The evidence trail evaporated after leading to Fhimah and Megrahi. Henderson and I spoke about the upcoming and probably “final” international conference. While the FBI and the Scottish police had expended the most time and manpower, the Germans, Swedes, Swiss and Maltese had contributed significantly to the results we had achieved. We wanted to share everything about the investigation with the exception of detail about Giaka. The DOJ still did not want to admit his existence, although we knew he was a poorly kept secret. We knew the next conference would not be filled with the uncertainty which had marked previous meetings, due to the indictment being public. It would be a way to share information and thank each of the countries for their contributions. The Germans, the Maltese, the Swiss and the Swedes had all played key roles at one time or another during the investigation. On the morning of December 10, 1991, Chief Esson opened the conference and turned the agenda over to Henderson. Henderson thanked the attendees for their cooperation during the investigation. He, Gilchrist and Bell provided much more information than was in the indictments. Henderson closed his presentation, reiterating his belief the evidence which had been developed would stand the scrutiny of a court. He thought it strange that there still had been no formal agreement where a prosecution would take place, but there was no doubt that those in Scotland wanted to complete the stellar investigation with a prosecution. The Swiss agreed to continue to work with Bollier to determine if he had additional information. He seemed to add a new twist to the investigation each time someone spoke with him. The Germans agreed to go through the documents of the Stasi, located after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, to see if there were connections to the investigation. This was important because Bollier later recanted his original statements about the recipients of the timers. He said they had not all been given to the Libyans, but some made their way to the Stasi and may have gotten into the hands of Palestinian terrorists. I had little to say. The Scots had done a fantastic job. They had collected the evidence, but neither side would have been successful without the other.

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CHAPTER 27: LOOSE ENDS Bob Bryant asked me to stay at WFO and become involved in the investigation into the bombing of the French UTA Flight 772 over Africa in September 1989, which killed 171 persons including several Americans. Bruguiere had already indicted a number of Libyan officials in connection with this case. Because of the Americans who died, including the wife of the American ambassador to Chad, the United States was also seeking justice. Evidence had been difficult to locate due to the harsh conditions in the desert, but fragments of a timer had been found. It was not, however, a MEBO timer. I took on the role tentatively, knowing my primary responsibility was to be sure the administrative aspects of the Lockerbie investigation were handled and if possible, work with the CIA to attempt to arrest the two subjects. On January 2, 1992, I learned the possible United Nations sanctions against Libya were in peril and agreements which had been reached between nations were unraveling. On January 21, 1992, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 731 as a result of the indictments. It condemned the destruction of both Pan Am Flight 103 as well as that of the French airliner. The U.N. expressed concerns the Libyan Government had not effectively responded to requests to cooperate in the investigations of both attacks. While this particular resolution did not place sanctions on Libya, it urged them to respond to the indictments. They also asked Libya to cooperate with the investigations. Henderson had hinted at the issue of retirement several times in our conversations, but he had yet to set a date. Now, he told me he was retiring on March 14, and would probably stop working a month sooner due to accumulated leave. After 33 years, Henderson had earned his retirement, especially after the past three years. The Scottish Police report was almost finished and Henderson hoped it could be passed before he left police service.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation I had started looking into the investigation of the bombing of the French UTA flight and believed if we could obtain indictments in that case, it could increase the pressure on Libya to surrender the two Lockerbie defendants. The FBI had developed some significant information on the UTA attack. The French had found and we had identified a piece of a timer which was linked to Libya. French authorities had conducted a great deal of investigation in Africa and were believed to have had one or more of the suspects in custody. A meeting with Judge Bruguiere was scheduled for mid-February. We had already asked Giaka about the UTA case and he knew nothing about it or any of those allegedly involved. I knew the French also wanted to interview Giaka, the man we had refused to admit we knew. We did not want to compromise his security or that of his family in Libya. Bruguiere was not universally popular in France; in fact, it was conceivable some officials in the French Government wanted to embarrass him and force him to resign. He was seen as anti-Libya, and his resignation would allow France to again become close to Tripoli. No one knew what interests lay behind this position, unless it related to Libyan oil. There had been a great deal of information in the European press about Giaka’s role in the investigation. Although we had never publicly acknowledged his existence, and did not do so until just before the trial, reporters kept calling him an “eyewitness” to the actual loading of the suitcase onto the Air Malta plane. No one ever corrected these stories as they came up in 1992. This “no denial” caused problems at trial years later when media-fueled expectations were not met. The public believed he fell short as a witness. On February 18, I accompanied the team investigating the UTA 772 case and met in Paris with Bruguiere at his offices located near Notre Dame Cathedral. Bruguiere and members of the DST, FBI agents and French investigators openly shared information. We briefed them and they briefed us on the state of the evidence that related to each other’s investigations. An FBI explosives expert talked about his identification of a piece of circuit board which the French had located at the crash site of the UTA plane in Africa. He had determined the board had been manufactured by a company in Germany and was to be used in a commercially available timer. The German company indicated they made over 14,000 of the circuit boards of the type located in Africa but only 100 of this particular type were manufactured as a timer. We believed the board was in one of a group of timers which had been ordered by a Libyan official (whose name never came up during the Lockerbie investigation). Allegedly, the timers were to be used to turn on airport landing lights, but the expert believed that because these timers were designed to work off a low voltage battery, such as 1.5 volts, there would not be enough power to operate landing lights. Allegedly, 100 of these timers had been delivered to a Libyan official in July 1989, two months before the UTA attack. This official was

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Chapter 27: Loose Ends believed to be a member of the Libyan JSO and had allegedly engaged in activities against Libyan dissidents. He may have been connected to the technical branch of the Libyan JSO. The French were impressed. Bruguiere wanted the forensic experts from each country to compare notes. Little was asked about Lockerbie and the subject of Giaka was never raised. The next afternoon I spoke with Jim Gilchrist in Lockerbie as Henderson was on leave. The Scots were not happy I was attending another meeting with the French. They had not been invited to this meeting because its main purpose was to discuss the UTA bombing, but they were keenly interested to know what was being said about Lockerbie. The Chief Constable and the Lord Advocate were both concerned about my trip to France. I reminded him Henderson had been invited to the previous meeting with the French, but he had declined. In early March, the Maltese provide Sally Novetske, the US Ambassador to Malta, with further information concerning Giaka. The Maltese had expressed their concern over not being told about Giaka and his wife, a Maltese citizen. Allegedly, the Maltese had launched their own inquiry into Giaka and his wife. The British High Commissioner had told them that DPM DeMarco was informed of the existence of Giaka when Henderson and I traveled to Malta in October. DeMarco contended that he was never told about Giaka and he was right, as I had avoided the issue at all cost. The embassy was of the opinion the Maltese should be given more information about Giaka and his wife. There seemed to be a possibility the Libyans could surrender the two defendants to the Maltese Government for trial. The Ambassador believed the United States Government, principally the FBI and the DOJ, should provide more information to the Maltese. Novetske was planning to meet with Mueller in the next week to discuss this issue. It was noted at the DOJ that Malta was the only Western country which did not support the United Nations placing sanctions on Libya. During March 1992, we learned the Libyans had paid Bollier and MEBO a large sum of money. We suspected they were trying to solicit support for the Libyan position relating to Lockerbie. Although Bollier denied this payment was a “bribe,” he began to change his story soon after receiving it. He later said he had made the MST-13 timers for others, including the German Stasi and perhaps Palestinian terrorist organizations. It was difficult for Bollier to completely change his story after he had told the same thing to a Swiss magistrate, the Scottish police and us. He later created information on a website in an attempt to divert blame from the Libyans. This was indeed strange behavior for a man who, of his own volition, had walked into the American Embassy in Vienna several weeks after the bombing to direct the investigation toward the Libyans—long before his timer was identified in the wreckage. On March 22, 1992, I took my last official trip to Scotland and England. The Legat in London had asked me to brief the American Ambassador and the BSS. The BSS meeting was short and no additional evidence or intelligence was

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation shared. The possibilities of “luring” Fhimah or Megrahi out of Libya were dead. I went on to Scotland to meet with Jim Gilchrist, who had assumed the duties of the SIO, and to attend Henderson’s retirement party. Following our meeting, I returned to London, and then Washington. On March 31, 1992, the United Nations reaffirmed Resolution 731 by adopting Resolution 748, which was much stronger. This resolution decreed that the Libyan Government must comply, with no further delay, with Resolution 731. In addition, the United Nations had decided that all States must “deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or over fly their territory if it is destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of Libya….” Other resolutions prohibited the sale of aircraft parts to Libya, effectively grounding LAA, their national carrier, and prohibited the sale of weapons, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, police equipment or spare parts for what they already had. Other sanctions included any advice on technical matters and called for the expulsion of any Libyan official known or suspected to be involved in terrorist activity. On April 1, I received a telephone call from Ambassador Novetske. The Maltese were distressed that the Lockerbie indictments stated the bomb bag had originated in Malta. She said it might not be a good time for Mueller to travel to Malta. She must not have known the DOJ had already made that decision. She then put Howard Lang, her deputy, on the phone. He laid out in greater detail the concerns of the Maltese. The witnesses, principally Gauci and Vassallo, were under enormous pressure because of all the scrutiny to which they had been subjected. He also believed the Maltese would be skeptical of anything they were told at this point. There were meetings on both sides of the Atlantic to discuss, as the Scots would say, “the way forward.” No one had determined where the prosecution would take place. DOJ officials in Washington believed they had a right to conduct a prosecution because 189 Americans had died on the plane and Pan Am was a US carrier. Neither American nor Scottish prosecutors felt ready because they had not physically handled the evidence or interviewed the witnesses but had relied on information provided to them by the police in Scotland and the FBI. After much soul searching, I told Bryant I wanted to wrap up work on Pan Am Flight 103 in the next two months and return to FBIHQ, where I would be able to continue my career. I wanted to see the Scottish Police report and review it. I wanted to see Majid Giaka placed into the Witsec program so he and his family could be protected. The Libyan regime had a long history of tracking down its dissidents around the world and eliminating them. We did not want Giaka to join that list.

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CHAPTER 28: TIME MAGAZINE Time Magazine published a front page story on April 27, 1992, about the Lockerbie investigation based on the old theory that the DEA had something to do with the bombing. This scenario appealed to those members of the public who enjoyed conspiracy theories, especially on the part of the government. The author, Roy Rowan, was a senior writer for the magazine. Rowan said his four month investigation had disclosed “evidence” that raised new questions about the case. He pointed to the “discovery” of a FBI report from Germany which disclosed the bomb bag may not have been transferred from an Air Malta flight in Frankfurt to Pan Am Flight 103 as charged in the indictment. The bomb-laden bag might have been substituted for an innocent piece of baggage. This was written without foundation or evidence. His last “revelation” was that Jibril and his organization could have been targeting the plane because an intelligence team, led by Tiny McKee, was aboard. Rowan tried to make the “sudden” switch of focus from Iran, the PFLP-GC and others to the indictment of two previously unknown Libyans seem sinister. What he missed was that conjecture and supposition failed to line up with the evidence that was found, and it was evidence that we were tracking. Rowan found it difficult to believe that information existed that did not leak out during the investigation. Rowan quoted from an FBI document in which Lawrence Whitaker, a German-speaking FBI agent, discussed his opinion about what had happened at the Frankfurt Airport. The record showed that a lone bag had been off loaded from Air Malta Flight 180 and was destined to Pan Am Flight 103 on December 21, 1988; this was the consensus of officials at Frankfurt Airport. But Whitaker provided his own analysis. He wrote, “There remains the possibility that no luggage was transferred from Air Malta 180 to Pan Am 103.” Although Rowan reported this suspicion as fact, and Whitaker

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation would be one of the few defense witnesses at trial, the information contained in his report contained only his opinion and was not grounded in fact. Rowan’s article further built upon the allegations of Pan Am’s investigator, Juval Aviv. Aviv stated he worked for the Mossad and had been involved in the Israeli attempt to locate the terrorists responsible for the massacre at the Munich Olympics in 1972. (The Israeli Government never admitted he was part of that organization and his association with the Mossad was never substantiated.) Aviv’s report was problematic, as discussed earlier. It was written in such a way that little could be proved or disproved. Rowan admitted that a number of intelligence officials had discounted Aviv’s report, but said there were a number of findings which he said were well documented. The central character of his article was Monzer al-Kassar who was also featured in the Aviv report. Al-Kassar was allegedly related to Syria’s intelligence chief, Ali Issa Duba, and related by marriage to former Syrian President Hafez al Assad. Al-Kassar’s arms and drug trafficking networks had come to the attention of a “freewheeling CIA unit code named COREA…in Germany… (which) trafficked in drugs and arms in order to gain access to terrorist groups.” As a result, the COREA unit began to utilize al-Kassar to assist in getting hostages released in Lebanon in exchange for allowing him to continue his gun and drug running routes to America. By the fall of 1988, al-Kassar’s operations had come to the attention of Jibril and the PFLP-GC. Jibril had agreed to avenge Iran for the downing of the Iran Air airbus in July 1988, and the Libyan government was in agreement. COREA sounded a lot like the CIA 1 group reported by Aviv. Rowan covered his bases by mentioning numerous terrorist groups and countries. Rowan reported Jibril had dined at an unnamed Paris restaurant and Jibril secured a “reluctant promise of assistance in planting a bomb aboard an as yet unselected American transatlantic flight.” While this information had been contained in Aviv’s report and could not be verified, it made for sinister coincidence in the shadowy world of international terrorism. Rowan reported the Mossad had alerted the United States prior to the bombing that a terrorist attack would be made against an American passenger plane departing from Frankfurt on or about December 18, 1988. Al-Kassar had allegedly figured out the target would be Pan Am Flight 103 and notified the COREA unit. This information, coupled with that provided by a caller to the United States Embassy in Helsinki in early December, supposedly provided substantial proof an attack was about to take place. Rowan then talked about rogue bags and how luggage was placed into the aviation system. Much of what he said was speculation but it was well known that baggage security was not good in 1988. Rowan named Lester Knox Coleman as the primary source for the lawyers defending Pan Am. Coleman was supposed to be hiding, in fear for his life, in a small town in Europe. To the FBI, Coleman was a fugitive who had been indicted for passport fraud in the United States. According to the media, he had been a

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Chapter 28: Time Magazine source of information for the DEA; the DIA and his story had been picked up by NBC reporter Brian Ross, who had also reported the Coleman story as fact. Coleman said that while he was an informant for the DEA, he was aware of drug running from the Middle East which went through Frankfurt Airport and subsequently to the United States. According to him, it was a drug sting gone awry which led to the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. The CIA never publicly acknowledged having any officials on the Lockerbie plane. Matt Gannon, who was married to the daughter of a senior CIA official, had been in Beirut on a temporary basis filling in for the CIA station chief. McKee, who was detailed from the Department of Defense to the CIA, was working to get the hostages returned from Lebanon and prior to his return to the United States, had told his superiors he was returning. There was nothing out of the ordinary in the travel of Gannon or McKee and their reservations were made separately. Although Rowan stated that the CIA had scoured the crime scene looking for the personal effects of McKee, the CIA had never even agreed to a meeting in Scotland because they wanted to always be able to say they had never sent CIA personnel there, at any time. Although the story about large sums of money had circulated through the LICC as well as the FBI in Washington, it had no basis in fact. I had asked Henderson directly if there was any truth to the rumor a large amount of money had been found in or around Lockerbie. Henderson denied it. A large number of nonnegotiable cancelled checks had been found but these were being transferred between banks as part of the normal banking process. As far as CIA agents traveling to Scotland and doing anything at any part of the crime scene, this too defied logic. Debris from the plane had been scattered over 845 square miles. To believe the CIA or any one else could pinpoint a needle in that haystack was beyond comprehension, yet some in the media continued to report it as fact. Despite all the weak points, Rowan’s story and a news broadcast by Brian Ross boosted belief that components of the United States Government had culpability for the bombing. This theory also fit nicely with that which had been offered by Pan Am. The involvement of any government entity, even in an unwitting capacity, would have mitigated Pan Am’s liability. These alternate theories were never substantiated by any credible evidence. Pan Am declared bankruptcy and went out of business in 1991, in large part due to the Lockerbie bombing. While Aviv never admitted he had fabricated his story, it lacked credibility and contained no facts which could be investigated. Coleman’s theories, which had as much to do with his dissatisfaction with the DIA and DEA, were not only discredited but he would admit in a New York courtroom five years later that he had fabricated his story and he apologized to all those he had misled. But the media hype over the initial allegations was much stronger than the admission he had lied, and this was not widely reported.

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CHAPTER 29: LIFE GOES ON I returned to FBIHQ in early July and spent one year at the FBI Executive Development and Selection Program (EDSP), which was responsible for the selection and development of future FBI leaders. It was not an operational position but I enjoyed the change. The phone never rang at night. After a year at the EDSP, I was selected to go to Memphis, Tennessee, as the ASAC. During my three years there I spent many hours on the phone with Biehl and Murtagh at DOJ as well as Chris Murray at WFO. I followed world events which often mentioned the possibility of a trial of the two defendants. On occasion I had conversations with Giaka. In November 1994, The Maltese Double Cross came out. This movie was portrayed as casting new doubts on the outcome of the investigation. It was based on the Aviv Report, the information contained in Coleman’s book, and the theory that Gaddafi had been made a scapegoat to cover up Iranian and Lebanese involvement in the attack as well as a US Government operation gone wrong. The filmmakers also discussed Whitaker’s FBI report that contained his comments there was no evidence of a transfer of unaccompanied baggage from Malta to Frankfurt, and talked about MEBO and its managing director, Edwin Bollier, who originally said he only sold timers to Libya. Francovich also disclosed that Bollier was now saying he had sold the timers to the East German Stasi. In late 1994, the US Air Force declassified a 1991 report which documented information from a source who had never provided information before. The source said Ayatollah Mohtashemi (not further identified but believed to be a high ranking Iranian official) was closely connected with the ANO as well as the “Al Abas” terrorist group. According to the source, Mohtashemi, a long time friend of Abu Nidal, had recently (March 1991) paid ten million dollars in cash and gold to those two terrorist organizations to carry out terrorist activities. He also had paid the same amount to bomb Pan Am Flight 103 in retaliation for the

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Chapter 29: Life Goes On American shoot down of Iran Air Flight 655 in 1988. This source of “unknown reliability” never said who the money was paid to, but implicated Iran in the attack. The only group with a similar name to “Al Abas” was the group headed by Mohammed Abu Abbas, the Palestine Liberation Front, and the group responsible for the 1985 attack on the Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean. While we could not say with certainty that Iran had played any role in the bombing, there was an absence of evidence, something which would be needed in court. While the evidence to convict Gaddafi was lacking, the trail had led to two of his operatives who had been indicted in two countries. This information appeared in the media in January 1995, but failed to note the information had come from a source of “unknown reliability.” It was reported as fact when a Scottish newspaper reported “An Iranian diplomat paid $10 million for a guerrilla group to blast a Pan Am airliner to pieces over Scotland in 1988, killing 270 people.” The article claimed the information had been obtained from US Air Force intelligence files and had been known to the United States and Britain before the indictments were announced. The article, first reported in the Scottish “Daily Record” and picked up by news services around the world, never reported the source who provided the information was of “unknown reliability” which was clearly spelled out in the Air Force document which had been released. Whenever the media failed to provide all the facts, it lent credence to conspiracy theorists. This was another disservice to the general public, especially victims of a crime, particularly one as horrific as the Lockerbie attack. A few days later on February 1, 1995, the Associated Press published a story which intimated the FBI had prepared a “briefing paper” which challenged prosecution evidence the bomb had originated in Malta. This was a rehash of the story which had been a part of the Time article, another spin on the document prepared by Larry Whitaker in Germany. We did have a copy of a computer record showing that a bag had been routed from Air Malta Flight 180 to the build up area where bags for Pan Am Flight 103 were being loaded. Whitaker’s report contained his opinion and nothing more, an agent providing his thoughts to his superiors in Washington for their information. This observation and the documentation which reported it had been made known to the prosecutors prior to the indictments being returned. No case is perfect and all the “blemishes” were made known to the prosecutors before the indictment. But opinions are not facts that can be used in court In May 1995, shortly after the release of “The Maltese Double Cross,” the Scottish Crown Office issued a public statement to counter some of the allegations contained in the film. The Lord Advocate cited the testimony of the former acting Administrator of the DEA, who had testified before the US Congress that the DEA had not done a controlled delivery through Frankfurt Airport during or immediately before December 1988. He said Khaled Jaafar had checked in two bags on Pan Am Flight 103. Both had been recovered and neither contained the

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation bomb nor had any traces of narcotics in them. The film stated Jaafar had been “handled” by his CIA contact at Frankfurt Airport. The Advocate noted his alleged “handler,” Matt Gannon, the CIA employee who had been on the doomed jet, had not been in Frankfurt, but had boarded the plane in London, after arriving on a connecting flight from Cyprus. There was never any connection proven between Gannon and Jaafar. The Advocate discussed, in detail, some of the people who were interviewed on the film, including Oswald Le Winter, a notorious hoaxer who had admitted, under oath, he had never been a CIA agent. In July 1995, another news headline proclaimed that the United States DOS had received an advance warning of the Lockerbie bombing. The Lockerbie victim families had already been jolted with information about the “Helsinki Warning,” in which embassies in the region were alerted that a Finnish woman would carry a bomb aboard a Pan Am flight to New York; the warning had not been conveyed to the general public, in keeping with practice at that time. This practice has been discontinued. This new article indicated the DOS had received an intelligence report in early December 1988, predating the Helsinki Warning, about a dangerous team of Palestinians. This was apparently a reference to a report, done for the DOS in Germany prepared in response to the BKA raids in Neuss, Germany, in October 1988. Members of the PFLP-GC had been arrested, weapons and explosives seized and two members had been charged with bombing US troop trains in Germany in 1987. They were a non-PLO Palestinian terrorist group, they had attacked military facilities, they had obtained a Pan Am schedule as well as that of other airlines and had devices designed to be used against aviation targets. According to the article, the “discovery” of this “new” information somehow cast doubt on the case against the two Libyan defendants; but we had thoroughly examined that aspect long before having indictments issued. The impasse between Libya and the rest of the world continued for most of the 1990s. Proposals were made to hold a trial in Libya, an idea acceptable to no one but Gaddafi. Counterproposals were made to hold them in the International Court in The Hague, in the Netherlands, or at some other neutral site. By June 1997, the Libyan Government was mailing letters to the homes of some of the families of the victims of Pan Am Flight 103. The letters, as reported in the Washington Post, said in part; Libya has made substantial efforts and put forward many initiatives in order to accelerate the investigations, leading to the trial of its two nationals suspected of being involved in the tragic incident of Pan Am Flight 103 over the village of Lockerbie. However, all those efforts have not produced any results, apparently because the government of the United States is neither interested in nor does it care about the victims. Therefore, almost 10 years have been wasted since the incident without making any serious progress toward finding a solution in this case and identify the real perpetrators….We stand ready to enter into serious negotiations as of this

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Chapter 29: Life Goes On moment, regarding the procedures leading to a trial. In awaiting your response, will be pleased to provide you with any further details you require….

The letter ended with a set of three options for a trial at sites other than Scotland or the United States, including a proposal to have the two suspects tried by Scottish judges at the international court of Justice at The Hague in accordance with Scottish law. Family members were quick to comment on this effort. Rosemary Wolfe, the stepmother of Miriam, a 20-year-old student who died on the plane and then the President of Justice for Pan Am 103, one of the groups which represented families whose relatives died in the bombing, was among the first to respond. In an op-ed piece she criticized Gaddafi for attempting to portray himself as the victim. She recognized his efforts to show he was only looking for the truth and was willing to have a trial held at a neutral location. She pointed out that Gaddafi believed both the United States and the United Kingdom had a bias against Libya and neither could receive a fair trial in either country. Wolfe, like many people (including the investigators and prosecutors) felt that only a trial in the United States or Scotland would be acceptable. She asked why Gaddafi had not accepted the offer of the British foreign secretary who said he would allow foreign observers from the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity or any other body to attend the trial in Scotland and observe its impartiality. Anything else would “signal political defeat and the incapability of law enforcement to bring indicted terrorist suspects to justice.” Not all the families agreed. Aphrodite Tsairis, mother of Alexia, who had died in the bombing, was chair of Terrorism Watch: Pan Am 103, a lobbying group formed to push for the extradition of the two Libyan defendants. For four years between 1989 and 1993, she headed the Victims of Pan Am 103, one of the family groups formed after the bombing and probably the one which had the most members and greatest impact. Tsairis authored an op-ed piece entitled, “Call Gadhafi’s Bluff: Hold a Trial at The Hague.” She wrote of her frustration with the ineffective sanctions against Libya, the slow pace of change at the FAA in deploying bomb detection equipment, and the failed foreign policy of the United States. She acknowledged that most of the Pan Am families, President Bill Clinton as well as the Secretary of State wanted a trial to be held only in a Scottish or US court, but she no longer felt that way. Tsairis made it clear she was not interested in monetary awards, but only in justice. She felt it was time to stop the posturing, remember the victims and “ bring about justice.” My years in Memphis went by quickly. In October 1996, I was selected to be the chief of the Operational Support Section at FBIHQ. I was not yet eligible to retire and knew there was still a chance a trial would be held. I returned to FBIHQ in January 1997. Biehl and Murtagh hoped a trial would occur but could not predict whether or when. I threw myself into my work, something I did everywhere I went, usually to the detriment of my family.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation On September 12, 1997, Newsday reported that Lester Coleman admitted he had fabricated the story that a DEA sting operation gone awry had caused the 1988 downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie. Coleman’s allegations had been widely used by the attorneys defending Pan Am against lawsuits by the family groups as well as Roy Rowan in Time magazine. Brian Ross and NBC News had also broadcast the story. He pleaded guilty to five counts of perjury. But the media were not quick to apologize for their errors, and the impression created by his allegations remained widespread. The next year went by slowly. The Lockerbie trial seemed no closer than in 1991. I began to think about my next assignment, but always kept Lockerbie in my thoughts. The original SIO, John Orr, was now the Chief Constable of Strathclyde, the largest Constabulary in Scotland. Orr wanted to find a way to “commemorate” the ten year anniversary of the bombing. I traveled to Edinburgh in September 1998, and then went to Glasgow for a reunion of some of the officers involved in the investigation. I stayed with Stuart and Yvette Henderson. The dinner was set for Friday night September 11, 1998. Tom Jourdan and Doug Gow also attended the dinner. It was one trip to Scotland the American taxpayer did not have to fund. That night, Stuart, Yvette, and I drove to Glasgow for the dinner. The most senior person there was the original Chief Constable, John Boyd, whose foresight and leadership made solving the crime years after he was gone a reality. Others I knew well and recognized immediately included Jim Gilchrist and Harry Bell. John McClain, who had played a key role in the case, as well as Bob House, an officer who had spent considerable time in the United States manning the HOLMES equipment were also there. We were proud about what had been accomplished, yet frustrated over what was left to be completed—a trial. This trip was my only real connection to “Scotbom” during 1998. Meanwhile, I was in charge of the FBI Victim Witness Program, one which managed the FBI attempts to conform to laws passed in the early and mid-1990s mandating what law enforcement was supposed to be doing for victims. I had formed a friendship with Kathryn Turman, the Director of the DOJ OVC. The FBI had not done a very good job in this area, something Turman had been hired to try and fix at not only the FBI but in all federal law enforcement agencies. As she and I began working together, I told her about Lockerbie and the remarkable work done by the police in Scotland. Turman listened and when the time came, she would set the standard for how victims of crime should be treated.

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CHAPTER 30: ZEIST BY WAY OF OKLAHOMA On December 21, 1998, I attended the tenth anniversary of the bombing at the Pan Am Flight 103 memorial service at Arlington Cemetery outside Washington, D.C. along with a number of my colleagues who had worked on the case. Later that afternoon I was appointed the Special Agent in Charge of the FBI office in Oklahoma City. I decided there would be no more transfers or promotions. Oklahoma, the last of the 50 states for me to visit, would be where I would end my career. I reported to Oklahoma City in early March 1999, and Lockerbie was not the first thing on my mind. I wanted to get to know the office and law enforcement community in Oklahoma. The office had several high profile investigations and despite that, some people there were still having problems dealing with the aftermath of the Murrah Building bombing four years earlier. Although no FBI employees had died there and the FBI had not been in the Murrah Building, many of them knew people who died that day. Many had also been involved in the recovery efforts and the investigation which followed. Just a month after my arrival, events which had been in motion for some time thrust me back into the world of Lockerbie. Moammar Gaddafi had surrendered the two defendants who had been charged with the Lockerbie bombing. The attorneys had kept saying it was a possibility, but now it was real. The Libyan News Agency reported on April 5, 1999, that Libya had handed over Megrahi and Fhimah to representatives of the United Nations. They were taken to the Netherlands for a trial which would be held before a Scottish court, sitting in the Netherlands. Many people incorrectly assumed that because war crime tribunals were held at the international court at The Hague, the Lockerbie trial would also be held there. Bill Clinton’s autobiography incorrectly states they had been turned over for a trial at The Hague. The agreement reached was

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation that a Scottish court would convene in the Netherlands and the trial of the defendants would be held under Scottish law before Scottish judges. Scots law is unusual. As in the United States, most criminal trials are jury trials. There is a major difference, however. The United States requires a unanimous verdict. In Scotland, where 15 jurors hear evidence and render a verdict, a decision of 8-7 would sustain a verdict. While the DOJ prosecutors were disappointed the trial would not be held in a US court, they were pleased that a trial would occur and the facts that had been uncovered all those years before would see the light of day and be subjected to judicial review. The two defendants were turned to Scottish custody. Henderson and I had hoped we would be the first law enforcement officers to see them and place them under arrest, but Chief Superintendent Tom McCullough, now the SIO, would have that honor, along with Mike Leslie. Both defendants insisted to the international media they were ready to prove their innocence. Megrahi said, “We want to reaffirm to everyone that we are two simple Libyan nationals. We do not practice politics. We support families and have children. We love our children and we love our families. This is our normal life… we are going to prove our innocence to the world…we are leaving freely and willingly without any pressure in order to appear before the Scottish court in the Netherlands.” They were brimming with enthusiasm and seemed confident in their ability to beat the allegations. Many Arab leaders called for the lifting of sanctions on Libya after the surrender of the two defendants. Media coverage was extensive and reaction among political leaders and family members varied greatly. The Saudi Ambassador to the United States Prince Bandar said, “We hope the brothers [the suspects] will come back safely after they have proven their innocence to the world. At any rate, everyone must know that a defendant is innocent until proven guilty. Unfortunately, the Western media and some Arab media talk as if an indictment is there already. This is untrue and unacceptable.” Although Bandar was wrong in that an indictment had been returned, he was no doubt referring to a conviction, which was less certain. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General said, “This development marks a vital step forward in what has been a long ordeal for all involved, especially the victims who have suffered an irreparable loss…. I am confident the two suspects will receive a fair trial by a Scottish court in the Netherlands. I am also looking forward to the earliest possible resumption of Libya’s normal relations with the rest of the international community.” These sentiments were echoed by many world leaders, in the Arab world and elsewhere. But victim family members had differing views. Some were concerned about aspects of the trial arrangements and feared the real culprits would escape justice. Susan and Daniel Cohen said the prospect of a trial for the two Libyans was no cause for celebration, as they believed it was a victory for Libyan leader Gaddafi. “The world will live to find out that if you make a pact with the devil,

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Chapter 30: Zeist by Way of Oklahoma he comes back at you.” Susan Cohen believed Gaddafi, by turning over the two suspects, had distanced himself from the attack and that now the sanctions would be removed. George Williams, the president of The Victims of Pan Am Flight 103, said that, “if trying these two is the ultimate goal of this trial, then it’s a travesty…. We look for the truth wherever it may lead and we firmly believe that this will go all the way to the top of the Libyan government — Moammar Gaddafi.” Bert Ammerman, a New Jersey high school principal whose brother Tom was killed on the plane, had mixed emotions. He credited the victim family groups for lobbying government officials to seek justice for those killed in the bombing. There was no doubt they had accomplished a great deal, including the passage of the Aviation Security Act of 1990 which enhanced airline security in the United States. They had also been a constant reminder to all the politicians in Washington that they were watching. But Ammerman added, “There will be a few family members [to whom] anything short of Gaddafi being put on trial and being brought to his knees will never be satisfactory. Personally, while I can understand that and sympathize with that, I just don’t ever see that taking place.” Others, like Jim Swire, a British physician who lost his daughter Flora, pointed out that satisfying as a trial might be, it could not “tell us who originated the plot and it’s not going to tell us why British intelligence did absolutely nothing in 1988 to protect our loved ones.” That the two defendants were turned over to Scottish authorities was a remarkable event but now the Scottish prosecutors had to prove what we alleged in 1991. There had never been any doubt the Scots wanted to prosecute this case (even if they had never publicly said so). Normally, the greater the time of the crime to the trial, the more difficult a prosecution becomes. Witnesses die, or forget what they saw years before and evidence could have been lost or misplaced. No doubt this factored into Gaddafi’s thinking when he surrendered the defendants. Perhaps he thought the West was tired of the case, wanted it to go away and the evidence was not all that strong. The sanctions imposed by the United Nations had hurt his country. But only Gaddafi knows why he decided to turn these two men over when he did. He resisted for years, saying it was against Libyan law to turn its citizens over to another country to stand trial. Libya had offered, since the indictments, to hold a trial in Tripoli. They had also cited the Montreal Convention, formally “The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation,” which went into force in January 1973. The United States, the United Kingdom and Libya were signatories and it was designed to make attacks against aviation a thing of the past. Although enacted primarily to halt aircraft hijackings, the crimes aboard aircraft could also have referred to bombs being placed on a plane. The Montreal Convention said parties could establish jurisdiction based on a number of factors. The United States asserted jurisdiction in the Lockerbie

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation case due to America being the country of registry for the aircraft which was bombed. The United Kingdom had jurisdiction as the crime had occurred over its land area. Libya pointed to Article 14 of the Convention, which said any disagreement which could not be settled through negotiation should be settled by an arbiter and submitted to the International Court of Justice sitting at The Hague. This was one of the disagreements which had contributed to the seven year standoff. Gaddafi had insisted he had the right to try the defendants in a Libyan court under the Montreal Convention. There was no way we would have ever turned over, to what we considered a rogue state, sensitive witnesses or information; and as such, a trial would never have been possible in a Libyan court. The Montreal Convention did not specifically mention that a government had the authority to try its own defendants. The surrender put the wheels in motion which would lead to the trial. The Dutch turned the pair over to the Scottish Police at Kamp Van Zeist, an old United States military base which would be converted to a jail and court for the trial. A jail to house the two Libyans for as much as two years, which was how long the experts believed the trial would take, plus time for appeals, was also being constructed. In the interim they were placed in one of the buildings on the compound which was fortified by fencing, barbed wire and a sight few had ever seen: Scottish police officers with automatic weapons guarding it. In all my trips to Scotland I had never seen a weapon in the hands of a Scottish officer, so the sight was unnerving. Kamp Van Zeist would, for all practical purposes, become Scottish territory for the duration of the trial. By June 1999, the trial was becoming a reality. I traveled to Washington to meet with DOJ and Scot officials as well as Majid Giaka. The Scots had named a trial team composed of Lord Hardie, the Lord Advocate, Alastair Campbell, Alan Turnbull, Jonathan Lake and Morag Armstrong. The last four would be the advocates who would be handling most of the examinations. They would be supported by John Dunn. Kathryn Turman was going to involve the OVC. She was planning for the victim relatives, whatever their nationality, to observe the trial for a one week period. She tapped into the United States Crime Victim Fund to help Lockerbie victim families go to the trial or watch it on closed circuit television at sites in Washington, New York, London and Lockerbie. Turman’s achievements set an international standard for the treatment of victims in criminal trials. The Scots were coming to the United States in the next week. Norman McFadyen, of the Crown Office in Edinburgh, who had been involved in the case from almost the first day of the investigation, wanted to meet Giaka. Since I had been the person whom Giaka called for help or advice, Biehl wanted me to pave the way for the interview by the Crown. On the afternoon of June 8, 1999, I met with Biehl, Murtagh and McFadyen. McFadyen was the equivalent of the United States Attorney for

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Chapter 30: Zeist by Way of Oklahoma Edinburgh and as such would oversee the trial but not taking an active role as a participant. We discussed McFadyen’s meeting with Giaka. When Giaka had first met with Henderson in 1991, he worried he would be turned over to the Scots to be charged for involvement in the bombing. In recent years, he had become more concerned about being sent back to Libya. I had to spend a lot of time convincing him that would not happen. The next morning Phil Reid and I met with Giaka and his wife. We paved the way for Scottish prosecutors to meet with him by discussing the upcoming trial. He was told he would testify for one week and perhaps more. After Scottish prosecutors interviewed him, defense lawyers would have the same opportunity. The defendants’ attorneys would be Scottish lawyers and at no time would he have to deal directly with anyone from Libya. We would ensure he was not alone with the attorneys for the defendants. Giaka wondered if he could hide his identity during the trial. I told him I would take it up with the Scottish prosecutors. The US and British would issue a demarche to the Libyan Government, as well as make a public statement which would tell them, in no uncertain terms, that no harm should come to his family when he testified. Giaka raised several other issues including his status in the United States. Although he and I had spoken occasionally since he went into the Witsec program and had seen each other a couple of times, the issue of his citizenship had not been discussed. His children were citizens by birth but neither he nor his wife had been afforded US citizenship. They had “green cards” but Giaka said they were going to expire. He expressed his fear that some deal would be made with the Libyans and he would be sent home to face the wrath of Gaddafi. Giaka was still willing to testify and hoped to do so in Arabic, his native tongue. The prosecutors had already said this would not be a problem. The only other thing he asked concerned getting a permit to carry a weapon as he had purchased several of them for his protection. He said he lived in fear and believed his life was in danger. Giaka had said he had never been arrested for any crime and it would not be good to have him arrested for carrying a weapon, especially right before he was scheduled to testify. This problem was referred to the Marshals. In late July, Giaka called me and said he had been rushed to the hospital in June, shortly after we had last spoken. Nothing was wrong physically, but his doctor urged him to take a stress test, something he was reluctant to do. He again expressed concerns about being sent back to Libya and wondered if any further discussion had been held concerning taking his family with him to the trial. Giaka said he had been given a written guarantee he would be able to take his family with him, but said he did not keep a copy. Although I did not recall such an agreement, after researching the issue, I not only found the written agreement from 1992; I discovered that I had signed it! So Giaka would be taking his family to the trial, no matter the cost or the hardships.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Some things had changed since the indictments in 1991. Giaka was still an important witness because he had seen Megrahi and Fhimah together at the airport in Malta with a large brown hard-sided suitcase in October, November or December 1988. A skillful prosecutor would better be able to pin that time down by introducing the car Giaka saw them get into, Fhimah’s new Hyundai Stellar, which was purchased on December 14, 1988. That would mean he saw the pair after that date and probably on the evening of December 20, 1988. Other than Vassallo’s recollections and diary entry that they had visited him at his residence that night, there was no documentary evidence that Megrahi had been in Malta on December 20-21, 1988. We still believed Megrahi and Abdusamad were the same person but this had not yet been conclusively proven. Giaka was also able to tie Megrahi to the Libyan Intelligence Service and had seen explosives in Fhimah’s desk at Luqa Airport. We needed Giaka to stay alive and psychologically strong so he would testify once the trial started. No one could have guessed how difficult this would become. Giaka called me in October 1999 to say that he wanted to get out of the Witsec program because it was too confining for him and his family. He did not believe the US Government was going to honor its commitment to allow him to bring his family with him to the trial. He was agitated and threatened to tell the judge he knew nothing about the defendants when asked. I did my best to mollify him. After he had vented for a while, I told him I would speak to the Marshals about the agreement. I had bought some time, but this was only the beginning.

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CHAPTER 31: ABDUSAMAD IS MEGRAHI After the defendants were surrendered, Libya agreed to cooperate with the investigation. Because the United States did not have diplomatic relations with Libya, the FBI would not go there; but the Scots would. This had been a joint effort so far, but it was better for one country to get the information and share it than to fail to obtain the information. This issue arose during the attempts to interview Khreesat and would again a month after the trial began. The Scottish police, led by the new SIO, Tom McCulloch, headed to Tripoli. In early November Biehl sent me a note about the upcoming trial. He still wanted to show a second photo spread to Tony Gauci. Gauci had been interviewed over twenty times and had identified a photograph of Megrahi in 1991. Since Megrahi had appeared on ABC News during the Salinger interview in November 1991, we had a more current photograph of him. Biehl wanted Gauci to be able to identify a better picture of Megrahi. He had been overruled for fear of tainting the first identification. Biehl was relieved when he learned Gauci identified Megrahi at a lineup held at Kamp van Zeist after his surrender in 1999. Biehl was concerned about immigration cards belonging to Abdusamad. He knew I had asked Henderson many times to allow the FBI to use the latest forensic technology on them to find fingerprints which could later be compared with Megrahi’s prints, if we ever got them. Henderson insisted the examination would take place in Scotland. When Biehl asked in 1999 if any fingerprints were found on the immigration cards, he was told the Scots had found some but their technology did not come up with the sixteen points of identification necessary under their law. The FBI was asked to send an examiner to the United Kingdom. He examined the cards and located two of Megrahi’s prints on the Abdusamad card. Biehl said this verification, plus Megrahi’s statement to Salinger that he had been “here in Tripoli with my family” on December 20-21, 1988, corroborated what Giaka had

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation said in his interviews, making him a stronger witness. It was also evidence Megrahi was Abdusamad. In mid-November, McCulloch and his team returned from Libya where they had developed some significant information. He wanted to share what they discovered. I was going back to Washington to meet with Giaka before his interview by the defendant’s attorneys. The Scottish prosecutors said I could be present during their precognition, a Scottish form of determining what it was a witness had to say. On November 16, McCulloch briefed the FBI on his trip to Libya; he believed they had been surveilled there. When the Scots presented a list of persons with whom wanted to speak, they denied knowing who some of them were. It was only after McCulloch told them these men were high ranking Libyan officials did they allow them to be interviewed. The most interesting revelation had to do with their investigation at the Passport Office. The records for Fhimah and Megrahi contained routine information. The file for Abdusamad contained only one document, a letter from the Libyan Intelligence Service to the Passport Office. This single piece of correspondence requested a coded (false) passport for Megrahi and requested it be in the name of Abdusamad. When the presiding magistrate heard this in court, he slapped his forehead as if to say, “I cannot believe anyone could have left this in the file all these years.” He knew what it meant to the investigation and so did we. All the speculation that Megrahi was Abdusamad was conclusively proven. Before the trial was over, there would be more evidence. The next day I met two Scottish defense attorneys at a designated spot in Washington to be taken to see Giaka. Giaka and I had spoken many times before the meeting and the fact that I would be there made Giaka, who was quite anxious, a bit less apprehensive. Giaka had never held back his distrust of and animosity toward Gaddafi. He would do what he could to topple him from power. No one in the FBI or DOJ believed, nor had we seen any evidence he would lie or fail to tell the truth in that quest. The attorney representing Fhimah was Eddie MacKechnie of the firm McGrigor Donald, Solicitors, of Glasgow. Alistair Duff, from McCourt’s firm in Edinburgh, was the attorney of record for Megrahi. As we climbed into the van, which had blacked out windows, for the journey which would lead to the meeting with Giaka, I knew exactly what Giaka would say. The two attorneys may have relied on what they read in the media but they had received the statements he had made to the FBI and the Scottish police. When we arrived where Giaka and his family were staying, we went through a magnetometer, which is normal practice. We were taken to a room which resembled a hotel suite with a kitchen and separate bedroom. Despite the hotel-like appearance, it looked like government space to me.

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Chapter 31: Abdusamad is Megrahi Before Giaka was brought in, he wanted to see me privately. I went to an adjoining suite and met Giaka, his wife and children. Giaka insisted we have coffee while discussing the upcoming interview. As the minutes went by, I told him the attorneys were waiting and he could not keep them waiting forever. Giaka did not seem to care how long they waited, even though he knew they had much to go through and little time to do it. He again asked if he could be disguised at trial as he did not want either the defendants or anyone else to know what he looked like. As Giaka finished his coffee, he called for his wife and the two of them went into a bathroom. When they emerged ten minutes later, he looked like Charlton Heston who portrayed Moses in the movie, the “Ten Commandments.” He wore a long white gown, but his hair and beard were now also white. The disguise would not fool anyone as it appeared he had quickly spray painted his hair and face with white paint. I stifled a laugh but Giaka insisted on wearing it as he believed they would not know what color his hair and beard really were. He said the Marshals had told him they would use a professional to disguise him at trial. While that issue had not yet been resolved with the court, the prosecutors did not believe they would allow him or anyone else to testify in disguise. We crossed the hall to meet with the attorneys. Without a disguise, Giaka looked like anyone else and would blend into society; however, this amateurish disguise would fool no one. The attorneys quickly sized him up but neither said a word. They spent several hours with him and only twice they asked questions where he asked me for help. The attorneys walked out of the meeting knowing that Giaka was not an eyewitness to anything, although the media had reported for years he was an eyewitness to the crime. The truth was far from that and no investigator or prosecutor connected to the case ever made that claim. Giaka provided pieces of evidence which by themselves meant little but, taken with everything else that was known, helped strengthen the circumstantial case. He had said that a senior Libyan official had asked him, after the US bombing of Libya in 1986, if it would be possible to get a bag on a plane bound for the United States or Britain. He knew Megrahi was a member of the Libyan Intelligence Service and Fhimah had kept explosives in his desk at the Luqa Airport in Malta. However, his key piece of evidence was seeing the two defendants together at the airport with a large brown hard-sided suitcase in the fall of 1988. No one knew in 1991 that the information from the Libyan passport office would be available. And certainly, no one would have guessed Megrahi would bring his false passport to the trial with him. As the three of us left him, we did not discuss what Giaka had said or looked like. The attorneys asked me to come to Scotland to be interviewed in advance of my testimony. Since the Scottish prosecutors also wanted to speak with me, I decided to do two things in one trip.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation We were dropped off and I returned to Oklahoma. A few days later I was in Tulsa, when a Deputy US Marshal found me, saying he had just received a fax from Giaka. It was a note written by his wife stating her parents had been subpoenaed to appear in court, in Malta, on November 16. Two defense lawyers for Fhimah and Megrahi interrogated them and asked questions about Majid’s drinking habits (they told the attorneys he did not drink) as well as his frequenting bars where there were prostitutes (they said he never went there). After asking if he had ever been hospitalized for mental problems (they said no), the attorneys told them he had been hospitalized in the United States for mental disorders and that he might no longer be living with his wife. I knew these claims were false. After leaving this line of questioning because Giaka’s wife’s parents could add nothing to what they were asking, they asked questions about what they had done when they took Giaka’s wife to the United Kingdom to meet with Majid. They also inquired if there was any way to find them in the United States. Her parents were unable to answer the questions as they did not know how to contact them or where they lived. The note indicated the lawyers for the two defendants seemed frustrated. A few weeks later, on November 26, I went to Israel for a meeting unrelated to Lockerbie. I planned to stop in Zeist on my way back to the United States and before my trip to Scotland. Biehl wanted me to see the arrangements which had made for the trial. Biehl had volunteered and was selected to be the US representative on the trial team. He would not examine witnesses but knew the case inside and out, and would assist the Scottish prosecutors, most of whom were not involved between 1988 and 1991. Biehl also said when I came through Zeist; he would have a present for me. I arrived in Zeist on December 7. I had previously been to the Netherlands and was impressed with the charm of the smaller cities, but did not care much for the congestion of Amsterdam. Zeist was the antithesis of Amsterdam. It was a small and charming old town. When we met the next morning Biehl said a hearing was scheduled for the two defendants. It would be the first of many to rule on issues which would govern the trial. The defendants would be there and I would be the first US law enforcement officer to see Fhimah and Megrahi. We drove to Kamp van Zeist. Construction was still in progress on the courtroom and permanent jail; the defendants’ initial appearance would be held in the old gymnasium which had been converted into a makeshift courtroom. The Deputy Scottish Lord Advocate, Colin Boyd, was scheduled to handle arguments in the case personally. The attorneys and judges were getting into their “judicial finery” which included powdered wigs, something which I had never seen. Norman McFadyen, who had known Biehl and I since the early days of the investigation, asked us to sit behind the prosecutors in the “well” of the court. As the two defendants came into court, I scanned their faces for guilt or remorse, but saw none. They appeared to be two normal men, like anyone else. However, there was a hint of

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Chapter 31: Abdusamad is Megrahi fear in each of their faces because they had become the focus of the world media. I had a hard time taking my eyes off them. Biehl and I had some concerns about Colin Boyd, who seemed nervous in his court appearance. He had been involved in the FAI, in 1991, in Scotland and knew the case. Boyd was soon thrust into the spotlight when Lord Hardie, the Lord Advocate, stepped down several months later to take a judgeship. The media speculated he had only done so because the case was not winnable. However, Boyd won his points in court and showed he was a skilled and competent prosecutor. By the time the trial began six months later, he had become thoroughly familiar with the case and proved a worthy opponent in court. Boyd was also optimistic about convicting the defendants. I left Zeist on December 9, 1999, flew to Scotland, and stayed with the Hendersons. Henderson, then retired from active police work for over seven years, would have jumped at the chance to play an active role in the trial. We knew that would not happen and wondered if we would have any role at all. After seeing the Scottish prosecutors and the defense lawyers, I headed home. Because of the demands in Oklahoma, I tried to put the Lockerbie trial behind me. However, Giaka was calling every few days. Many of his concerns related to his testimony as well as his fear for his family in Libya. He learned that his family had denounced him in public, probably for their own protection. The Libyan Government may still have believed Giaka was an eyewitness who could tie the defendants to the bombing, and maybe even point to Gaddafi. The Libyans were worried because they had no way of knowing exactly what Giaka knew, and their worry trickled down. Giaka was worried; he relayed his concern to me, and I also worried.

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CHAPTER 32: THE TRIAL The trial began on Wednesday, May 3, 2000. The defendants had been in jail at Zeist for just over a year. The case, dormant for almost ten years, was now ready to be presented to the world. Ranald Iain Sutherland, the presiding judge, was the second most senior judge in all of Scotland. A second justice, John Taylor Cameron, also known as Lord Coulsfield, had served as a judge since 1987. Lord MacLean or Ranald Norman Munro MacLean, the third justice, had been a judge in Scotland since 1990. Lord Abernathy or John Alastair Cameron, a judge since 1992, was the substitute justice. Each had over 30 years of experience in the law. The opinion of Lord Abernathy would be considered in the event any of the three principal justices was unable to participate in the proceedings. Although the defendants had the right to a jury trial, they decided to have their case heard by these senior jurists. The Crown was represented by Colin David Boyd, the Lord Advocate who had assumed that position after Lord Hardie’s resignation in February. Boyd had been involved with the Lockerbie case since the FAI in the early 1990s. He was familiar with the facts of the case. He was assisted by Alastair Campbell and Alan Turnbull, both of whom joined the prosecution team in October 1998. Turnbull and Campbell would present the evidence offered at trial. They would be assisted by Jonathan Lake and Morag Armstrong, both of whom joined the prosecution team after the arrest of the accused in 1999. The defense was comprised of two teams led by Kamal Maghur, a former Supreme Court Justice in Libya. The Scottish legal system did not allow Maghur to participate in the court proceedings. The attorneys representing Megrahi were led by Alistair Duff, a former Procurator Fiscal. Duff would not participate in the examinations in court but was involved in the precognition process. Megrahi’s other attorneys included the lead attorney in court, William Taylor, a

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Chapter 32: The Trial litigator with over 20 years of trial experience. David Burns and John Beckett were junior counsel to Megrahi. The Fhimah defense team was led by Ed MacKechnie who, like Duff, would not be involved in the court proceedings but was an active participant behind the scenes. Richard Keen, the most flamboyant attorney in court, was the lead defense attorney. He was assisted by junior counsels, Jack Davidson and Murdo Macleod. They were all assisted by Stephen Mitchell who advised them on English and International law. The Americans in court quickly noted that Scottish courts operated differently. There were no opening statements, but the indictment was read into the record by the Lord Advocate. The accused entered their pleas of “Not guilty.” Duff told the court the defense would offer a “Special Defense of Incrimination,” allowing the defense to introduce evidence which would point to others as having been responsible for the bombing. He mentioned the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) of Sweden and one of its members, Abu Talb, the PFLPGC cell in Germany and an Iranian, Parviz Taheri, as possibly having involvement in the attack. Many believed the trial could last as long as two years. The trial commenced immediately. A number of current and former Air Traffic Controllers, responsible for the Pan Am flight over specific sectors of British and Scottish airspace, testified about their recollections of that fateful night. A former British Airways shuttle pilot said he saw a large flash of light in the sky and later, explosions on the ground, shortly after 7:00 p.m. on December 21, 1988. On the third day of trial the names of all the victims were read into the court record. The remainder of the week’s testimony came from Lockerbie residents and police officers responding to the scene, describing what they encountered. On Friday, May 5, a number of police officers spoke of the organization of what would become the LICC, to include the establishment of sectors and evidence recovery. Gordon Ferrie, a retired Detective Chief Inspector, testified about the police priorities during the initial response. They were to first recover injured persons, then bodies and finally property and debris, and to treat the “debris” at the crime scene as evidence. This caution was one of the small things which proved essential in the collection of minute pieces of evidence. A number of other current and former police officers testified that day and the defense asked each if they had encountered representatives of the CIA in Lockerbie. No testimony was ever introduced that showed anyone from the CIA or any other intelligence agency was anywhere near Lockerbie after the crash. The day ended with the prosecution and the defense stipulating to a number of items of uncontroversial evidence which would speed up the progress of the trial. Eleven police officers testified on Monday, May 8. The principal witness was Douglas Roxburgh who had been responsible for the Property Store at Dextar, within the village of Lockerbie. The personal effects of passengers, prin-

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation cipally their luggage, were stored in boxes marked for each before being sent to the forensic lab for testing, if necessary. The next day, more police officers testified about items they discovered while searching the crime scene. On May 11, testimony included more police officers, rescuers and others who had found items from the aircraft. Further evidence was not controversial and was admitted without question. This reduced the time necessary for examining witnesses. At the end of the day, the Crown told the court it needed more time to investigate scientific expert information which would be offered by the defense. The court granted a recess for two weeks and would resume on Wednesday, May 24, 2000. When court reconvened, the Lord Advocate informed the court of an article which had appeared in the media during the break, entitled “Lockerbie Report Leaves Trial in Chaos.” Boyd denied the Crown had received any information which would cause “chaos” in the prosecution case. He admitted they had received a forensic report in German which had to be translated but the report would not negatively impact the trial. When the trial resumed on May 24, more police witnesses testified to the discovery and handling of various pieces of property. Mick Charles of the AAIB, who had made the initial disclosure about an explosive device causing the crash, testified to his belief that personnel from the CIA were at the crash site. However, he had no knowledge of that, and no evidence. This would not be the first or the last time the defense would attempt to “prove” through testimony that investigators on the scene “believed” there had been agents from the CIA on site at Lockerbie. These allegations were never substantiated. Testimony through the end of May included information about evidence collection and the discovery of the small fragment which later proved to have come from the Toshiba radio cassette recorder which housed the IED. On May 31, there was extensive testimony about the blast itself and this continued through June 2. By the end of Friday, June 2, the court had heard about the clothing found in the wreckage and the identification of the Samsonite suitcase which had contained the radio cassette recorder. On Saturday June 3, a month after the trial began, I received a telephone call from FBIHQ. Dale Watson, the Assistant Director of the Counter Terrorism Division (CTD), requested I watch “60 Minutes,” an American news program, the next evening. Leslie Stahl was airing a story which could impact the trial. It related to the defection of Ahmad Behbehani, an Iranian, then in a refugee camp in Turkey. “60 Minutes” had managed to interview Behbehani, who told the reporter he had been responsible for all terrorist operations conducted by Iran and had documentary evidence to back up his allegations. He said he had proposed blowing up the Lockerbie plane to Ahmed Jibril in 1988 and Jibril had agreed to take on the attack, in revenge for the shoot down of Iran Air Flight 655. Behbehani’s alleged purpose in coming forward was to get revenge on the Iranian Government for arresting him in a power struggle.

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Chapter 32: The Trial Stahl then interviewed Bob Baer, a former CIA agent who had attempted to access Behbehani for CBS news but was unable to do so. Baer told “60 Minutes” he had been involved in the Lockerbie investigation. He believed Behbehani had something to say but was not certain the US Government wanted to hear it. The story contained no evidence of the claims being made and it looked like another in a long line of fabrications, beginning with Juval Aviv and Lester Coleman. I had never heard Baer’s name during the investigation and doubted he knew any more about the case than what he read in the newspaper. I thought the story would go away quickly, but since the trial was underway, it could be a problem. The next morning I learned Turkish authorities would allow the FBI access to Behbehani, but no later than Thursday of that week. The DOJ requested that Chris Murray from the WFO and I conduct the interview. I had taken the day off but was thousands of miles away, with only a couple of days to get there and no visa. I left Oklahoma early Tuesday morning and spent the day in briefings at FBIHQ while the Turkish Embassy processed my visa application. I participated in a conference call with Richard Clarke at the NSC. My instructions were clear: get the information and do not leave out any detail, no matter how insignificant. This was the only time I knew of anyone from the NSC or the White House taking an active interest and an operational role in any aspect of the case. During the day at FBIHQ, my first question was whether anyone had mentioned this to the Scots? I was told only the United States had been invited. Most of the people with whom I dealt that day were new to the CTD and few knew the history of the investigation. There was a Scottish trial going on and I believed the Scots had a right to investigate Behbehani’s claims. I spent part of the day on the phone with Biehl at Camp Zeist, the DOJ in Washington and the Legat in London. The Scots had already asked Biehl and the Legat if anything was happening to get access to Behbehani. I called the Legat in Turkey, Jim Duffy, and told him it was essential the Scots be able to participate in the interview. Duffy made no promises but said he would work on it. That night I flew to Frankfurt and then Ankara. Duffy met me Wednesday evening. Duffy thought he was being watched by the media — and the Turks had told him that if this story appeared in the news media once more, the interview would never take place. Duffy and I walked in different directions, watching for surveillance. No sign of it. That night I met Murray and two other FBI agents who were experts on Iranian terrorism. Murray had not heard from the Scots, but anticipated them at any time. I went to bed fully expecting to be roused by a telephone call. There were no Scots at the hotel the next morning. The British Embassy had made a formal request to participate in the interview but it was denied. We went to the American Embassy, a short walk from the hotel. At 6:45 a.m., we met with the CIA who said Behbehani had been unable to answer many

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation of the questions posed to him about the structure of Iranian intelligence. Because he had no knowledge of routine information they assessed he had credibility problems, but they had no knowledge of the facts of the Pan Am Flight 103 investigation. They were leaving that to the “experts.” Then we met the Turkish officials, who drove us to where Behbehani was housed. Just then, Duffy’s cell phone began to ring. It was Tom McCulloch, the Scottish SIO. McCulloch was at my hotel and wondered when we would pick him up. I was not in charge of the situation, did not know where we were or where we were going, and could do nothing more to get the Scots in. I could only promise McCulloch I would share with him what we learned. I knew he was upset. When we arrived where Behbehani was, it was difficult to determine if he was a guest or a prisoner. The location was far from the center of Ankara and the air was cool. The interview began after lunch and the setting was surreal. Murray and I, along with an American interpreter, a female FBI employee, sat in a row in front of a single chair. The Turks brought Behbehani into the room, placed him in the chair and departed, although a Turkish observer sat through the interview. The questions were asked in English but Behbehani spoke no English and the interpreter asked the questions, in Farsi. She was fantastic. Aggressive when she had to be, she also knew when to back off. Her approach was masterful and we later commented we could not have done better. Behbehani was younger than we had imagined, overweight and out of shape. We greeted him and began the questioning, in English. His name was Seyed Shahram Beladi Behbehani also known as Sayed Ahmad Behbehani and Haj Mehdi Forqan, born in 1968. He had escaped from prison in Iran and had been imprisoned because the Iranian Government believed he had been in contact with foreign intelligence services. He did not know who blew up the plane nor did he know the type of explosive or timer used. He had never seen any documents related to the attack and had no documents or other proof to substantiate the media claims. Behbehani said he had driven Ahmed Jibril, the leader of the PFLP-GC, to a meeting in Tehran in 1988, after the U.S.S. Vincennes shot down the Iran Air airbus. Jibril met with the former Iranian ambassador to Syria, Mohtashemi. Other Iranians and Syrians were present. He could not recall exactly when the bombing occurred but believed there were two meetings in Iran within 15 days of each other, just before the Lockerbie attack. He never sat in on the meetings but saw a model of a 747 aircraft and assumed it had something to do with the Pan Am attack. He never heard anyone discuss the Lockerbie bombing although later heard from someone (name not recalled) that Jibril had received a payment of $1 million. He speculated this was for the successful Pan Am Flight 103 bombing, but did not know this as fact. Jibril told him Pan Am Flight 103 had been selected as a target because there would be “Jewish Israelis” on the flight. He was unable to explain what

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Chapter 32: The Trial Jibril meant or how he could have known the ethnic and religious makeup of the passengers. Behbehani would have been twenty years old when the Lockerbie bombing occurred. The media had implied Behbehani was in charge of all international terrorism operations in Iran during the 1980s. We doubted the Iranians would have put someone so young in charge of such a significant operation or confided in him about the operation if it was sponsored by Iran. When the other two agents talked with him about general Iranian issues, it was clear he was not nor had he been a high level intelligence officer. The four of us were convinced Behbehani was a fraud. We rode back to the hotel and found McCulloch sitting at an outdoor café along with other Scottish officers and a representative of the British Embassy. It was late afternoon and they may have been there all day. If he was angry, McCulloch did not show it. We spoke for a few minutes and I summarized the interview for him. Behbehani was a fabricator, one of many we had come across during the investigation. He was far too young to have been the person responsible for ordering the Pan Am bombing. If he had any information, he was unable to provide it. He said there was a CD which documented his claims, but said he had no way of getting it, further hurting his credibility. It was possible a man by the same name was formerly in charge of terrorist operations, but this was not the man. Much ado about nothing. I returned to Oklahoma via Zeist. I stopped there to tell Colin Boyd about the events in Turkey. He was not happy either about what had transpired there. On June 5, Dr. Thomas Hayes, the initial principal forensic examiner of the evidence, began his testimony. He had identified a number of items which he believed had been contained in the IED suitcase. He identified a T shirt, a man’s tartan-checked Yorkie trousers, brown tartan-patterned trousers, gray longsleeved Slalom shirt, white Slalom dress shirt, light brown herringbone trousers, brown herringbone tweed jacket, pajamas, a Babygro manufactured in Malta, a cross training shoe, dark blue sweatshirt, umbrella, brown knit cardigan and a light blue cardigan. He had already identified the suitcase as well as the Toshiba radio which had contained the explosive device as having been in the evidence he examined. Hayes’ testimony was essential because it laid out the key evidence which later led to the purchaser of the clothing contained in the IED suitcase. For the rest of the week there was testimony from witnesses regarding circuit boards and Americans who happened to see and take one of the MST-13 timers in Togo, Africa, in 1986. The week ended with Allen Feraday, the forensic examiner who had replaced Hayes upon his retirement, testifying about the timer mechanism of the devices built by Khreesat for the PFLP-GC in Germany in 1988. No witnesses were heard on Friday, June 9, due to translation issues which needed to be rectified. The trial resumed on June 13, with Feraday continuing his testimony. He testified for two days, concluding on Wednesday, June 15, as no testimony was

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation heard on June 14. Feraday was specific about his examination of the radio. He believed the blast had originated from within the Toshiba RT-SF16 radio cassette recorder. He found pieces of the radio in the gray Slalom shirt, a blue/white Slalom shirt as well as the herringbone jacket and trousers. He had found pieces of the instruction manual for the radio in the gray shirt, the Babygro and the blue/white Slalom shirt. He found items from the radio speaker grill blown into three other items of significantly blast-damaged clothing which he believed had been within the IED suitcase. Feraday said he had “no doubt that the fragment of circuit board, evidence identifier number PT/35(b), originated from a circuit board within a MEBO brand MST-13 timer.” The radio still functioned despite being packed with approximately 400 grams of Semtex plastic explosive. Feraday had been able to fit control samples of all the items he said had been within the suitcase into a control sample of the Samsonite suitcase. This included the radio, packed within an original box. In summary, Feraday stated the following as conclusions he had reached. There was an explosion aboard Pan Am Flight 103. The explosion was in the forward baggage hold in container number AVE 4041 PA which was situated next to baggage container number AVN 7511 PA. The blast occurred about 64 centimeters from the fuselage. The luggage which contained the IED had been among those on the second layer of bags in the container. The suitcase was a Samsonite Silhouette 4000, 26 inch, antique copper in color. The suitcase had a lockable latch and there were about 24 other suitcases in the container. Feraday stated there were approximately 13 items of clothing in the IED suitcase. He had discovered 46 other items which had been damaged by the blast but had not been contained within the suitcase. The bomb was within a Toshiba RT-SF16 radio cassette recorder; the owner’s manual was with the radio and may have been in its original packing container. The explosive material had the components of RDX and PETN which are the elements of Semtex, a Czech-made plastic explosive. There was an electric timer and the blast had occurred at 7:03 p.m. on December 21, 1988. Feraday had been thorough. His examinations had taken years and it took him over three months to write his final report.

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CHAPTER 33: MEBO AND GAUCI, AGAIN On June 16, the principals of MEBO began to testify. Erwin Meister had been associated with MEBO since 1972. Libya had become an important client and he identified Izz Al Din Hijazi* and Said Fazani* as Libyan officials with whom he dealt. He identified the MST-13 timer as one which had been ordered by and made for either Hijazi* or Fazani* in 1985. The timer was designed by Ueli Lumpert, their technician who had been with the company since about 1974. About 20 of these timers had been built and were delivered to Libya by Bollier personally. Meister described the trip Bollier took to Libya in December 1988 to deliver 40 Olympus timers. Bollier contacted him from Libya and said he was attempting to locate Badri Al Kafi* in Tripoli as the Libyans had refused to take delivery of these timers. Upon returning from Libya, Bollier showed him how one of the Olympus timers had been set. It had been set for Wednesday at 1900 or 1930. Pressed to say the timer was set for a specific date, which is what he had initially said, he responded it had been a long time and he could not recall such specifics. Meister had no recollection of selling timers to the East German Stasi until he found some documents about that in 1994. Meister stated MEBO had no invoices for the timers delivered to the Libyans in 1985. The timers they had delivered to the Stasi were not of the MST-13 type. Edwin Bollier, the next prosecution witness, described the origins of MEBO. He was the only person still in the business. He met Megrahi in the mid1970s and used him to get the Libyans to pay money they owed MEBO. The original order for timers in 1985 was to be for either 5,000 or 15,000 units. He asked Lumpert to produce the prototypes. Although Bollier stated at the trial he had given some of the prototypes of the MST-13 timers to the Stasi, he had not recalled this during his prior interviews by the Swiss magistrate, the FBI and the police in Scotland in 1990 and 1991. He did not recall these dealings until he discovered invoices in his desk in 1993. While on the witness stand from June 20-

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation 23, he described his December 1988 trip to Libya and his purchase of Olympus timers and attempts to sell them. He said the order had been placed by Badri Al Kafi* at the end of November or the beginning of December 1988. Although he went to see Hijazi* and later went to Megrahi’s house to be paid, he saw neither of them while there. Bollier described his meeting with the mysterious “Mustapha.” He saw him in the doorway to the MEBO offices shortly after the bombing. Mustapha told Bollier to go to the authorities and implicate Abdullah Senussi and Gaddafi in the Pan Am attack. This was the reason for his trip to the American Embassy in Vienna in January 1989. By Friday, June 23, the defense cross examined Bollier and branded him a liar. Although they found plenty of ammunition, it was difficult to forget the MEBO device had been located in the wreckage at Lockerbie and Bollier had manufactured these timers for Libyan Government officials. He also had business dealings with Megrahi. The prosecutors called former members of the Stasi to testify. Each testified under a fictitious name to protect themselves and their families. One had dealt with Bollier and MEBO in the 1980s, and had obtained timers from them. He described the timers but none matched the one found at Lockerbie. The timers he received from Bollier had the MEBO name imprinted on them, unlike the MST-13 timers, which were only marked on the inside, on the circuit board. He destroyed the MEBO timers he had upon the fall of Communism. The last representative of MEBO, Ulrich (Ueli) Lumpert testified on June 28, 2000. He worked for MEBO from 1978 until 1994. He had been asked to design what would become the MST-13 timer in the mid-1980s and it was the only time this designation was ever used. He did not know much about the business operations but confirmed he built the MST-13 timer. The MST-13 designation had no symbolism and was a random name given to that particular timer. On June 29, 2000, a translator, Djeloul Hamaz, testified about the passports of Megrahi, Abdusamad and Fhimah. Megrahi had a Libyan passport number 110286, issued May 6, 1986. This passport showed Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed was born in Tripoli in 1952. He was listed as a flight dispatcher and the passport was good until January 4, 1994. It had many travel stamps in it and March 29, 1987, December 7, 1988 and December 17, 1988 were mentioned. It was stamped to show he had been in Malta December 7, 1988, the day the clothing was purchased. Libyan passport number 332351 was registered to Ahmed Khalifa Abdusamad, born in 1957. The passport was issued on June 15, 1987, and expired on June 14, 1990. There was a stamp “from Tripoli” dated December 20, 1988, and another nearly illegible stamp dated December 21, 1988. The Fhimah passport was numbered 933115 and was issued on April 10, 1985, to Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, born in Suk-El Jumaa, in 1956. His passport had

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Chapter 33: MEBO and Gauci, Again been stamped many times including December 20 and December 29, 1988. Other witnesses testified to various hotel and visa records relating to Megrahi. Back in the United States, Giaka was preparing, as best as he could, to testify. The Marshals finally agreed he could take his family with him. While this would strain their resources, they had made an agreement and Giaka would hold them to it. Giaka called me daily about issues which needed to be resolved before he traveled to the Netherlands. The stress was getting to him. On July 11, the trial resumed. One of the first witnesses was Anthony Gauci, the shopkeeper. He testified in Maltese and spoke of nine brothers owning three shops on Tower Road in Malta. He was the shop salesman and his brother, Paul, the business manager. He recalled that around 6:30 p.m. a man had come into his shop and made a number of purchases. The purchase took place about two weeks before Christmas. He then gave a detailed description of the man and the clothing he had purchased. Gauci described a number of visits by Scottish, American and Maltese police officers asking him to look at photographs. In September 1989, he was shown a group of photographs and pointed out one man who had the same hair style, but was too young to have been the purchaser. By September 1990, he had been shown many photographs, including several of Abu Talb, the PPSF terrorist, and had yet to identify the man who had purchased the clothing from him. Gauci identified a statement he had given to the police on Friday, February 15, 1991. On that day he had looked at a photo spread of twelve men and said picture number eight was similar to the man who had purchased the clothes. He said his hair was longer in the picture but the man had the same eyebrows and nose and his chin and shape of his face was similar. He also estimated the photograph was of a man in his thirties and said the purchaser would have been about ten years older. He said of all the pictures he had seen, this was the first picture which resembled the man who bought the clothing. Picture number eight was Megrahi. In late 1998 or early 1999, a friend in Malta had shown a photograph of Megrahi to Gauci from a newspaper and Gauci had commented that he looked like the man who bought the articles from him. In April 1999, after Fhimah and Megrahi had been surrendered, Gauci was taken to the Netherlands and identified Megrahi in a lineup. In court, during his testimony, he pointed to Megrahi and said he “resembles him a lot.” When Keen and Taylor cross examined him, Gauci turned out to be consistent and credible. Harry Bell, the Scottish police officer who led the investigation in Malta, testified on July 12. He spoke of all the photo spreads which had been shown to Gauci. He also said he had shown Gauci a picture of Abu Talb on December 2, 1989, but Gauci did not pick him out. We had determined Talb had been in Malta in October 1988, but not after that. On Friday, July 14, 2000, the prosecution began trying to prove the negative. They started calling witnesses who had been on KM Flight 180 from Malta

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation to Frankfurt on December 21, 1988. They described their luggage and stated they had received it upon arrival in Europe and none of them had a continuing flight to the United States. The judges heard about the check-in system at Luqa Airport. They learned that three flights had all checked in at the same time that KM Flight 180 was open for passenger check in. According to the records of Air Malta, KM Flight 180 had 55 bags checked on it, had closed its doors at 8:38 a.m., left the blocks two minutes later and was airborne at 8:52 a.m.. The flight arrived in Frankfurt at 11:42 GMT and was on the blocks at 11:50, 12:50 p.m. in Frankfurt. Wilford Borg, an official with Air Malta, testified about the flight and general procedures at Luqa Airport. He identified Fhimah’s badge found at the Medtours office, in Fhimah’s desk, in 1991. The badge allowed him access to all areas of the airport until the end of 1988, even after he left LAA. He discussed security in general and said Air Malta luggage tags were kept secured except when being used to check in a flight. His airport personnel had seen the notice from Interpol about the PFLP-GC Toshiba bomb in October 1988. Countering Borg’s testimony, the court heard from others who described the chaos which could occur there during pre flight check in, especially as it related to luggage. During this week the court heard from other KM Flight 180 passengers. They also heard from an official of Toshiba who testified that 20,000 of the black Toshiba RT-SF16 radios had been sent to Libya in October 1988. In March 1989, an additional 9700 more were shipped to Libya. This number represented 76% of all of this type of radio manufactured in the world. The Japanese official testified he dealt with a Libyan company, the Electric General Company, relative to the sale of these recorders. One of the officials in the company was a man by the name of Said Fazani*. Fazani* was the man involved in the original order for MST-13 timers and had asked Giaka about getting a bag on a British flight leaving Malta. Testimony continued through July. The judges heard about the travels of Megrahi and Abdusamad to and from Malta. Other KM Flight 180 passengers testified. They also heard from the woman who had checked Abdusamad in for his return flight from Malta to Tripoli on December 21. He was the only passenger she checked in that morning for the LAA flight, leading to speculation his check in was special. However, this was not proven as she stated that from time to time she only checked in one or two passengers for a flight. She did not recall specifically checking Abdusamad in and did not know him. The judges heard about procedures at Frankfurt Airport during 1988. Luggage from KM Flight 180 was unloaded between 12:48 p.m. and 12:56 p.m. on December 21, 1988. The baggage handlers and coders testified but had to rely on the documentation provided rather than their memories because of the passage of time. Baggage handlers who loaded Pan Am Flight 103A, the flight from Frankfurt to London, testified. Kurt Maier, an employee of Alert, the security

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Chapter 33: MEBO and Gauci, Again company employed by Pan Am in 1988, was unable to testify due to his health. The court heard from others who testified what Meier had told them. He had xrayed ten suitcases, two bags and a box between 4:25 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. on December 21. The employees believed all Alert employees were aware of the Toshiba radio warning which had been published in November 1988. According to a former FAA employee who had interviewed Meier, he was 100% certain there were no explosives in the bags he x-rayed which were placed on Pan Am Flight 103A. Prior to the court adjourning for a three-week holiday, the two sides agreed on a number of pieces of evidence including the fact that Mohammed Abu Talb, the convicted PPSF terrorist from Sweden, had been in Malta in October 1988, departing on October 26. He had obtained clothing from the owner of the Miska Bakery, owned by a group of Palestinians and who had come under suspicion in the early stages of the investigation. The court would later hear from Talb himself.

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CHAPTER 34: THE CIA CABLES Giaka would testify in August, and he wanted me there. I had never lied to him over the ten years we had known each other and had been able to resolve the many issues he raised. I had told him many times since 1991, particularly the past year, this trial was a race and the finish line was now in sight. It was not time to lose focus and quit. I did everything in my power to ensure Giaka made it to Zeist to tell the story he had told us in 1991. The Scottish Court shut down for several weeks and would resume on Tuesday, August 22, 2000. By then, Zeist was crawling with FBI agents. Phil Reid, the agent in charge of the Malta aspects of the investigation, had arrived. He and Hal Hendershot, who was also in Zeist, had interviewed Giaka on the U.S.S. Butte, in the Mediterranean in 1991. Nick Hreiz, the Arabic speaking agent who accompanied Giaka on his first trip to the United States and helped Giaka and his wife acclimate to the United States, was also there. Jim Sobchak, an FBI agent from WFO, who had audited the money paid to Giaka since 1991, was there in case his testimony was needed. Tim Ryan*, who had been working in Zeist during the trial, and Chris Murray were also there. Giaka and his family would be lodged in the building where Fhimah and Megrahi had been held before the prison was constructed. The two story building was located several hundred yards from the prison and court. It was surrounded by a chain link fence and guarded not only by Scottish police officers with automatic weapons, but armed US Marshals. The Giakas would be well protected. The first day testimony resumed was consumed in a discussion of CIA cables documenting their contacts with Giaka in 1988-89 and the question of whether the Fhimah diary had been obtained legally. The next morning, the CIA cables were still a contentious issue. Giaka was on his way to the Netherlands as

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Chapter 34: The CIA Cables the debate continued. Boyd reiterated he had asked the CIA to make the cables available to the defense but no agreement had been reached. Although the FBI and Scots often criticized the CIA for its failure to share information, the Lockerbie trial marked a watershed in its history. They agreed to allow its operatives testify at the trial. To then be asked to provide information from their files was another unusual step. The CIA sent a number of people, who had nothing to do with the trial, to Zeist to resolve this issue. The trial continued as the cable issue was being negotiated outside the courtroom. A Maltese police inspector testified to finding Semtex in Malta in 1986. The explosive material was wrapped in Libyan newspapers. This testimony was elicited to show a connection between Libya and Semtex on the island of Malta in the late 1980s. Murray and I went to see Giaka when he arrived on Thursday, August 24. He was dressed in a pair of loose slacks, a tee shirt and a pair of flip flops was on his feet. Giaka had purchased a new suit for his court appearance but it was still in the United States, as he had been told they could each only bring one small bag. Now we had to buy him some clothes. As we talked during lunch, I noted the television in the suite seemed to have access to a wide range of cable channels — despite our decision they should be limited to local TV to avoid seeing any coverage of the trial. It turns out that Giaka’s wife had noticed that the television was “not working” and since they had a similar system at home, she went on the Internet and found out how to correct the problem the Marshals has been asked to create. Giaka had to be told that once he started to testify, all news broadcasts were out. Giaka prepared lunch and it did not seem that serious news would be an issue. He was watching the old American comedy show, “Gilligan’s Island,” a story about a group of people who had gone out on a three hour boat ride and had become shipwrecked. I told him that was what he had done: he told his wife he was going for a boat ride and ended up in the United States. He knew his code name and I told him a better name would have been Gilligan. Giaka would have talked all night but he needed rest. We left him and went to the court to see how much progress had been made in the battle over the “cables.” When Giaka was turned over to the FBI in 1991, the CIA said he had been a short term undercover operative of theirs. He had furnished little useful information and had never been asked in any detail about Lockerbie. During December 1988 all intelligence agencies were asked to query their sources for information. Although Libya was a potential suspect in the bombing, the FBI had no way of determining what Giaka was asked or when. The CIA documented source contacts in a different manner from that used by the FBI. The information obtained was used for different purposes. The FBI collected information to justify an arrest warrant, electronic surveillance, or a prosecution; the CIA’s was used to sculpt American policy decisions. These did not have to

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation conform to the rigorous standards of a court. As a result, things were documented differently for each agency. I neither asked for nor had I received any documents from the CIA when Giaka came into FBI control in the summer of 1991. When interviewed, he provided more information than any ten other people. Much of it was worthy of a spy novel, but most of it was of intelligence rather than law enforcement use. There were a few nuggets of information related to Megrahi and Fhimah and various activities in Malta. The document written after his interview was shared with the CIA as there was information in it useable to them. However, the issue for the court concerned documents prepared by the CIA in 1988-89, when Giaka was their asset. Giaka had walked into the American Embassy in Malta in August 1988 and offered to provide information for money, but in 1989 his handler noted he had been of little value. He was a CIA source for about one year. When the Lockerbie investigation shifted to Malta in 1989 and early 1990, the CIA examined its source reporting in Libya and Malta. In early 1991, the CIA told us about Giaka, but made no promises he had any information about Lockerbie. When asked, he had told the CIA he knew nothing of the attack. This was long before the focus was on Malta. They did not even know if they could locate him. Henderson and I thought he was another one in a million chance; one which would never materialize. Now, the defense was in court attempting to get access to the cables from the CIA related to Giaka. No one in the FBI knew what was in them. I worried I had not asked the right questions in 1991 and 1992, and these cables seemed be essential to the case. It was unfortunate they had just surfaced as this should have been addressed long before Giaka and his family began their journey to Zeist. In the courtroom, the Crown insisted the cables had nothing to do with the case in chief, but the defense believed they had everything to do with Giaka’s credibility. The CIA had sent a battery of attorneys to deal with this issue. They had taken to meeting with Crown counsel at an off site location so they would not have to be seen by the defense. The issue would not be resolved overnight and Giaka might have to return to the United States without testifying. He would be fit to be tied and the defense was happy to frazzle his nerves. This issue took almost the entire week and continued into Friday, August 25. In the meantime, the trial continued. The court heard from current and former employees of Heathrow Airport in London about the loading of the “Maid of the Seas.” They testified the feeder flight arrived in London at 5:37 p.m. and baggage was transferred to the Boeing 747. It pushed back from the gate at 6:02 p.m., only two minutes past its scheduled departure time. The bags were loaded directly from the Boeing 727 onto the overseas flight and never went to a build up area.

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Chapter 34: The CIA Cables The court heard about Mr. Jaswant Basuta, an American of Indian ancestry, who had missed the flight in London and whose luggage had gone on the flight without him. Basuta had been drinking in the airport bar and lost track of the time; when he got to the gate, it was closed. He heard about the crash while sitting in the bar later that evening. A former Pan Am security manager testified he had raised a number of concerns in 1988 about the screening of luggage and the training of screeners. He was aware that a number of passengers on Pan Am Flight 103 had not been asked appropriate security questions prior to boarding. He too was asked by the defense if he had seen any CIA employees at Lockerbie. He had not. The court heard from more KM Flight 180 passengers and former Heathrow employees. The Heathrow employees were responsible for the loading of Pan Am Flight 103 to the United States. They spoke of the build up area where several bags had come in earlier in the day for the flight and they had placed approximately eight to ten bags on the first layer of bags in the container, AVE 4041 PA. These bags had come from other flights into London. The bag was then filled with luggage from the Frankfurt flight but the container did not hold them all. Their testimony came from their recollections or from statements they had made in 1988 and 1989. At the end of the day, the Lord Advocate stated that several CIA cables had been given to the defense. The defense lawyers were in no way ready to cross examine Giaka because the information contained in the cables had to be investigated. Richard Keen complained he could not believe the Crown considered the cables to be irrelevant. Late Friday afternoon, we learned the court was in a dialogue with the attorneys regarding the cables. No testimony was being heard. The judges said it was possible Giaka could testify Monday depending on the progress the lawyers made over the weekend sorting out the cables. The court then adjourned for the weekend. By Monday, August 28, the CIA cable mess had yet to be resolved and the defense would demand the right to investigate information contained within them. The only thing we knew about the CIA cables, at this juncture, was that they contained personal assessments about Giaka written by his handler in Malta, and were not flattering. However, it is one thing to say someone has no information to provide and another to say he had fabricated information or lied. No one believed the reports said that. The reports said Giaka did not have the information he claimed to have and did not have the ability to get it. The cables never said Giaka had lied but he did embellish his credentials so the CIA would think they were dealing with someone who had access to significant members of the Libyan Intelligence Service. We believed that the CIA had so few sources within Libyan Intelligence that Giaka was better than anyone else they did have. I broke the news to Giaka he would not be testifying, and would have to go home and come back. Giaka took it better than I thought he would. We wished

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Giaka a safe journey and made our own travel plans. I needed to get my secretary Terri Sims and ASAC David Cid a few gifts because they had been covering for me and doing my work while I was gone. The court had a few more items to complete before recessing. On August 29, the defense demanded all information provided by Giaka to the CIA between August 1988, and July 1991. William Taylor accused the Crown of lying about what was being held back and demanded all the cables be surrendered so they could better determine Giaka’s veracity. While Boyd insisted the CIA had provided everything, Taylor and Richard Keen refused to believe there was not more information which had to be surrendered. The CIA had already been more accommodating than usual, but the defense pressed for more. Much of the media circus was concluding because Giaka was on his way back to the United States without testifying, but one of the more significant witnesses of the trial was heard later that week. Her testimony received little or no media coverage. Bogomira Erac, a former employee at Frankfurt Airport, testified about Production Number 1060, her print out of the baggage record from Frankfurt on the day after the Lockerbie crash. She had worked on December 21, 1988, and the next day she and her colleagues realized that the flight had originated in Frankfurt. After printing the baggage record, more for curiosity than anything else, she kept it in her desk for about three weeks. She was later asked by her supervisor to look for baggage records in the computer, but they were purged every week. Her print out was the only record. This was as much a key to the solution of the case as Tony Gauci or the MEBO chip. It was given to the BKA and later the police in Lockerbie. Although each airline maintained its own system of record keeping regarding luggage, the system at Frankfurt Airport tracked the movement of individual bags as they moved around the airport. The record showed that a single bag from Air Malta Flight 180 had been coded into the system as being destined for Pan Am Flight 103. One of the things the prosecution tried to do using the many KM Flight 180 passengers was to ensure they had not only received their luggage, but that none of them had been destined for the United States. Boyd and his team kept plodding through the evidence. They produced it as they found it, made no excuses for it, did not embellish it and presented the facts in a methodical way. To some of the trial watchers, including the Americans, the order did not always seem to make sense. Due to the logistics involved in this unique international trial, lining up witnesses for an orderly presentation of the facts was not as easy. We hoped the judges could understand the case, as that was all that was necessary. However, it was difficult for the media to follow the manner in which it was being presented. On August 30, the judges adjourned the trial to September 21, a break of nearly one month, to give the CIA time to review their files to comply with the demands of the defense. Although the court met the next day, it was only to

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Chapter 34: The CIA Cables discuss the cables, the testimony of Vincent Vassallo and the admissibility of Fhimah’s diary. They expected to get to Giaka by about September 25. I knew Giaka would call me daily to discuss what had gone wrong in Zeist. After all, he had called numerous times before he had ever seen Zeist. Although I stayed in Oklahoma City the next 30 days, Giaka never called one time. Perhaps the initial trip over was the worst part.

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CHAPTER 35: “STAR” WITNESS On Thursday, September 21, the court reconvened. Colin Boyd told the court the CIA cable issue had been resolved and they had located all cables related to Giaka between August 1988, and July 1991. The CIA also found documents which referenced the defendants, the activities of Abu Nada (owner of Miska Bakery in Malta), Abu Talb, the PPSF and the PFLP-GC. Any cable regarding the payment of monies was also disclosed. The defense had already seen 25 cables and 35 or 36 new ones had been found. Boyd characterized them as relating to what Giaka had told the CIA about Megrahi or Fhimah, payment negotiations, Talb, Vassallo and one cable which related to Giaka’s credibility. Boyd said the cooperation of the CIA had been unprecedented for any prosecution anywhere. Keen believed the CIA was still withholding cables relating to Giaka’s credibility and about money. The attorneys were convinced Giaka had only mentioned their clients because he thought he would receive a large pay off. Keen wondered why Giaka failed to identify the drawing of the unknown person who had bought the clothing at Gauci’s shop in 1988; the drawing was shown to him while on the CIA payroll, sometime after September 1989. He was acquainted with Megrahi and if the drawing was a likeness of Megrahi, Giaka should have identified him. Keen accused the CIA of withholding evidence concerning Talb and Dalkamouni of the PFLP-GC. He demanded they provide evidence concerning the involvement of Talb and the PFLP-GC in the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103. His colleague, Bill Taylor, demanded the CIA be compelled to turn over to the defense all materials related to Talb’s involvement in the bombing. The court ruled against them as the judges and Lord Advocate agreed an intelligence agency’s files may be filled with rumor and gossip which would be a far cry from the evidence needed in court. Giaka would testify Tuesday, September 26.

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Chapter 35: “Star” Witness Giaka and his family arrived in the Netherlands on September 24. When Reid and I saw him the next afternoon, he was in a good frame of mind but apprehensive. Giaka smoked one cigarette after another. He had been taken to the court earlier that day after the attorneys departed and had seen what it looked like, to help calm his fears. We left him reasonably early so he could get some sleep before testifying. We told him to tell the truth, and if he did not know something, to say that; and if he did not remember, to say that as well. There was no crime in not remembering. However, Giaka had a good recollection of what he had seen in the late 1980s and his story had never wavered, no matter who asked, whether it was the FBI, Scottish police, prosecutors or the defense lawyers. Questions before a judge should not cause him to change his story. No one could predict how he would react, however, when facing his former colleagues. The next day, September 26, was a beautiful day and security was especially tight as the “star” witness was getting ready to testify. Pierre Salinger and other reporters had implied since the indictments in 1991 that Giaka had witnessed the actual placement of the bag on the plane. Other reports had him ready to identify not only the two defendants, but to provide damaging testimony to implicate Gaddafi. If he did have that kind of information, he would have indeed been a star witness, the way some in the media portrayed him. We knew exactly what Giaka offered to the trial. The defense attorneys had no idea, other than what they had read and heard in the media, until prosecutors turned over his statements which contained no mention of seeing the defendants placing a bag on the plane or ever talking about it. No one felt the need to correct the false record created by the media and would let the trial speak for itself. Once he began to testify, none of us who were potential witnesses could see him nor could we watch his testimony. In court, Giaka was placed behind a screen so he could be seen by the court officers, judges and attorneys as well as the defendants, but not anyone in the public gallery. Giaka gave his evidence in Arabic as he had requested. He was not dressed in a white gown nor was his beard colored. He was neatly dressed in a dark suit. He said his name was Abdul Majid Abdul Razkaz Abdul Salam Giaka but preferred to be called Abdul Majid. Alastair Campbell began the examination by asking him questions about his background, to make him comfortable. Campbell took him through his involvement with the Libyan JSO. Giaka said that in December 1985, he was named the Assistant Station Manager for LAA at Malta and assumed those duties in March 1986. He described the structure of the JSO and talked about a number of their operatives and officials, including Megrahi. He knew Said Fazani* was the head of the Operations Administration of the JSO. He knew both defendants. Megrahi was formerly the head of the airline security section for LAA and Fhimah was his (Giaka’s) boss at Luqa Airport. At one time Fazani* was the boss of Megrahi.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation In August 1988, he went to the American Embassy in Malta. Giaka was not happy with his life in the JSO or what was being done in Libya. He and Fhimah had been ordered to Libya to answer charges levied by a female passenger about how she was treated, and this upset him. When he first contacted the US Embassy, he inquired about going to the United States, but agreed to furnish information to the Americans, whom he assumed worked for the CIA. He discussed in detail the sham surgery the CIA had arranged for him so that he would not have to serve in the Libyan military when he quit the JSO, as he told the CIA he wanted to do. (The Crown raised the issue because the defense knew about it and would bring it out if they did not.) One thing had never made sense about this. If he quit the JSO, he would not have had access to the intelligence services, so he would be a less valuable source. His initial meetings with the CIA dealt with the movements through Malta of various Libyan officials. He described the ten kilos of “TNT” Fhimah kept locked in his desk at the airport. It had been delivered to Fhimah by Megrahi. In December 1986, Megrahi told Giaka he was to take charge of the explosive material when Fhimah left his position at the airport. Giaka did not know why explosives were kept there. He later gave the explosives to Mr. Lafi, a Libyan diplomat, based in Malta, because he did not want to be responsible for them. He described the events at Luqa Airport on an evening in December 1988. He had gone there to meet an incoming flight and saw Vincent Vassallo, the man who later worked with Fhimah at Medtours. He saw Fhimah and Megrahi then also. He did not recall the exact date but said Fhimah’s new car was at the airport, probably driven there by Vassallo. It was the first time he had seen the car. Testimony later showed the vehicle had been purchased by Fhimah on December 14, 1988. He described Fhimah and Megrahi as coming in from Tripoli on an Air Malta flight. They were together and Fhimah took a brown hard-sided suitcase off the baggage carrousel and took it past the customs entry point, which he thought was unusual. Megrahi introduced him to Abu Agila Al Mahmudi* at that time. Campbell told Giaka that details of this visit had not been recorded on any of the CIA cables. Giaka believed he had given the information to the CIA at the time and faulted them if they did not document it. When the FBI first interviewed Giaka, he could not recall exactly when this sighting occurred. He described seeing Fhimah and Megrahi at the airport with the suitcase sometime during October, November or December, 1988. It was only his recollection of seeing Fhimah’s new car which allowed us to believe it was after December 14. His sighting of the two defendants with the brown suitcase was significant because it placed Megrahi in Malta the day before the IED suitcase left on its journey. This was something we had had difficulty proving in 1991, but it corroborated the notes in Vassallo’s diary that Fhimah and Megrahi had been at his home in Malta on the night of December 20, 1988. It was not until 1999 that the Abdusamad passport was discovered, with Megrahi’s

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Chapter 35: “Star” Witness picture on it and the entry stamp of December 20, 1988. It was discovered because along with his “Megrahi” passport, Megrahi had also brought to the Netherlands with him the Abdusamad passport, number 332351, and it bore Megrahi’s photograph. The Crown attorneys did not press Giaka’s failure to tell the CIA in 1988 about this travel. No one at the time had any way of knowing it may have been connected to Pan Am Flight 103. Giaka had met his CIA handler in the morning of December 20, 1988. He had not yet been to the Luqa Airport and Fhimah and Megrahi’s travel to Malta had not yet occurred. He next met his CIA handler about one month later and this travel was not fresh in his mind; he either did not report it, or the CIA case officer failed to document it. One reason he failed to tell anyone from the CIA what he knew about Lockerbie was that he had never been able to put any of the pieces together. He did not know the Lockerbie bomb had begun its trip from the airport where he worked and never suspected his coworkers at LAA. Campbell asked Giaka about Said Fazani* and his trip to Malta in June or July 1986, shortly after the American bombing of Tripoli in April. Fazani* asked Giaka about the feasibility of getting an unaccompanied bag on a British plane leaving Malta. England would have been a natural target because the American planes that bombed Libya in 1986 had been launched from there. Giaka told Fazani* he did not know, but would send him a report. When he later told Megrahi about the conversation, Megrahi told him “don’t rush things.” Giaka submitted a report saying it was possible and sent it through Megrahi. Giaka closed out his direct examination by saying the CIA contacted him in July 1991, and he traveled from Libya to Tunisia to Malta and then onto a boat where he was interviewed by the FBI. One of the last things he heard in Malta came from Fazani*, who told him that neither Fhimah nor Megrahi could leave Libya because they were wanted by the Americans. Campbell finished his direct examination. It had not taken long, but he only wanted to elicit a few facts. He wanted to prove Megrahi was a member of the JSO. He also wanted to show that the Libyans, in the person of Said Fazani*, were interested in putting a bag on a plane, possibly to avenge the United States bombing of Tripoli in 1986. Fhimah and Megrahi knew of and maintained explosives, which he called TNT, but may have been Semtex, at the LAA offices at Luqa Airport. He also described seeing Fhimah and Megrahi together at Luqa Airport, probably on December 20, 1988, carrying a large brown hard-sided suitcase. The testimony was brief, concise and to the point. By itself, the information would have been innocuous, but taken with everything else known, it could also be damning. Giaka had not been an eyewitness. He had never claimed to be. Neither was he a “star” witness and we had not claimed him to be. What he said during his testimony was the same thing he told us in 1991. It had not changed. Now the defense would try and trip him up. We were shocked at how Scottish lawyers were allowed to treat a witness.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Bill Taylor started right in on Giaka by attacking his lack of education. In response to Giaka’s claim to have been an auto mechanic, he told him, “You don’t have to be very bright to mend a car.” He asked Giaka where he lived in Malta and Giaka told him “the Country Hotel.” Taylor told him he thought it was a little rundown. Giaka disagreed but Taylor said it was a matter of taste. Anything to belittle him. During his testimony, Giaka looked behind the Crown attorneys where Murtagh and Biehl were seated. Taylor accused him of looking to them for support. Giaka may have spent some time watching Court TV and noticed that American lawyers object when their witnesses were harassed or badgered. It rarely occurred in this Scottish court. The questioning went on and Taylor told Giaka he was a liar, and said that a liar needed to have a good memory. He proceeded to discuss the sham arm surgery. It was an opportunity for the defense to slam Giaka and his reason for going to the Americans, but it was irrelevant to what Giaka claimed to have seen in 1988. After his first day on the stand, the European media was consistent in its reporting. They reported Abdul Majid Giaka, a 40-year-old Libyan, witness number 684, was currently in the United States Federal Witsec program. He had been escorted to the trial by as many as 30 United States Marshals. His voice and face were scrambled on the monitors in the court and took the stand behind the bulletproof glass wall which separated the courtroom in Zeist. He was in plain view of the defendants, something he had feared since 1991. The media reported Giaka was “expected to provide the strongest link yet between the defendants and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.” The next morning, Taylor went after Giaka again. Giaka had difficulty understanding him and asked him to repeat a question. Taylor, with indifferent arrogance, refused and had to be ordered by the court to repeat it. Taylor went to work with the cables. He was going to use what the CIA had written against him even though Giaka had no way of knowing what they contained. Taylor told him he was seen by the agency on September 4-5, 1989, concerning Pan Am Flight 103. Although he had testified as to Fazani’s* comment about getting a bag on an airplane in 1986, he had failed to mention this conversation to the CIA. He never told the agency about Megrahi’s comment about not rushing things. The logical explanation was that Giaka did not recall it at the time and his conversations with the CIA in 1989 about Lockerbie were not as probative or penetrating as the interviews conducted by the FBI. We had an advantage by 1991, when we interviewed Giaka. We had a wealth of information about Lockerbie and were able to ask questions not available to the CIA handlers who spoke with him in 1989. Taylor went into Giaka’s finances. He had told the CIA in October 1988 he had saved about $30,000 from his salary. Taylor accused him, with no evidence or foundation, of being a smuggler and made other derogatory comments.

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Chapter 35: “Star” Witness Taylor caught him in a contradiction. He said during his testimony he had been introduced to Abu Agila Al Mahmudi* by Megrahi, yet during his lengthy interview with the FBI in 1991, said he did not know him. Taylor said he had never mentioned the brown suitcase to the CIA during any of his debriefings. It is possible the issue had not occurred to him until during the lengthy FBI interview. Taylor read the contents of one of the cables into the record. He said that Giaka was to be told on “September 4, 1989, that he would only get his $1000 per month until the end of 1989, unless he comes up with substantial and defined access to information of intelligence value, all salary and financial support would be stopped.” The Crown finally objected, saying Giaka could not be responsible for what the CIA wrote about him. It was hard to imagine how a reasonable person could infer that someone who seemed in dire need of money and support would “go off the CIA payroll” for nearly two years and then magically turn up with an incredible story which would put him back in their good graces. If this were the case, he would have done it faster and come up with a much better story. What he provided was useless without the context of other evidence that was not available until later. Taylor discussed other undated CIA cables, written when he was living in Libya, prior to being brought out to be interviewed by the FBI. Taylor accused Giaka of arranging the meeting with the DOJ; nothing was further from the truth. Once the investigation began to focus on Malta, Megrahi, and later Fhimah, the CIA reviewed its files and cable traffic. They discovered Giaka had been a source and might be able to shed light on the events in Malta. He had not been a source for some time and had left Malta for Tripoli where they had no access to him. They tried to locate him so he could be interviewed. This all took place after the FBI and CIA began sharing information to solve the case. Taylor concluded his cross examination but left the impression he believed Giaka was nothing but a liar. Richard Keen, Fhimah’s attorney, then launched his offensive. He began by asking Giaka about his wife, who had worked as an employee of Air Malta. She had worked at Luqa Airport in 1988, as did he. While he never said it directly, Keen implied Giaka may have been involved in the Lockerbie bombing. This was something we thought would be a focus of the defense. Keen asked what he did for work, in the United States, and Giaka replied he was “under witness protection” and was being paid a regular income to support him and his family. Prosecutor Campbell objected again. Keen asked Giaka about claims he had made that the leader of Malta and Gaddafi were both Masons. Giaka did not want to tell the court who told him that, but it was a minor point that Keen continued to press. Giaka’s point in saying that in 1991 had been to illustrate the close connection between the Libyan and Maltese leadership. Keen went onto ask what else he had told his “American masters.” Giaka objected to this characterization. Keen asked Giaka if he was related to the former king of Libya, King Idris. Giaka denied he was

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation related; Keen then said, “Mr. Giaka, you are a liar!” When Giaka again denied being related to King Idris and denied ever having claimed to be, Keen again called him a liar. Keen continued to berate him, citing information contained in the CIA cables, information Giaka had never seen. The CIA had allegedly reported that Giaka had a close relationship with Abdullah Senussi and Izz Al Din Hijazi*. Giaka denied he ever claimed that. Keen asked about his claim of explosives maintained at the LAA offices and asked exactly where they were kept. Keen interpreted the cables as saying Giaka had reported the explosives had been maintained at the LAA offices in Valetta, away from the airport. Although the information about the explosives had been reported to the CIA, Keen asked why he had never reported that explosives had been kept in a drawer where smokers used cigarettes. It was a fair question. Keen ended the day by asking Giaka if he recalled trying to “sell himself” to British intelligence. No one knew where that question came from or why it had been asked. The next morning, September 28, Giaka took the witness stand again. No one on the prosecution side had spoken with him so they did not know his state of mind. He certainly could not have been happy with the way the questioning was being conducted. Keen opened the session by asking him how long he had stayed in the court building the night before. He said he noted that Giaka had not departed until after 7:00 p.m.. Giaka said it was true, but that he he had spoken with no one from the court. He only left when the US Marshals told him he could. Keen continued his barrage. He asked why he had not told the CIA about Megrahi and Fhimah getting into Fhimah’s new car when he observed them at Luqa Airport. Giaka could not explain this, but neither the court nor the attorneys noted that Giaka had been debriefed by the CIA earlier that day, before he had seen Fhimah and Megrahi, and was not seen by them again for about one month. The events of December 20 probably did not seem important to him a month later and were either not reported or recorded. Keen closed his questioning by asking Giaka about his source of money. He implied Giaka had been promised a $4 million reward for information concerning the bombing. Giaka denied it and said he had never been promised anything for his testimony. The defense never was able to introduce one scintilla of evidence that money had ever been mentioned to him. Crown prosecutor Campbell did a short redirect and asked him if he knew, prior to being interviewed by the FBI, what type bag had been used to destroy Pan Am Flight 103. He said he did not. Giaka was finished with his testimony and the news media, expecting great things and eyewitness testimony, sharply criticized him, particularly in Europe. The FBI, the DOJ, the Scottish police and prosecutors had known exactly what Giaka could and could not testify to. He had never been an eyewitness to

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Chapter 35: “Star” Witness any active events which led to the bombing but he had seen certain things which, when taken in context with other things, became significant. The media focused too much attention on Giaka and not enough on the many other pieces of circumstantial evidence which led to the indictments in 1991. That day, FBI agent Hal Hendershot testified about his interviews with Giaka in the Mediterranean in July 1991, and later in Washington. Taylor seemed more concerned about Hendershot’s presence during an attempted interview of Abu Talb in Sweden in 1990. He asked Hendershot if Talb had spit in his face, something Hendershot did not recall and which Talb later denied in court. Jim Sobchak, a Special Agent accountant with the FBI, testified about the amount of money the FBI had paid to or spent on Giaka since he had come to the United States. They spent approximately $110,000 for expenses and subsistence. He had been given no money for information. Most of the money was expended when Giaka first came to the United States and was entirely reliant on the FBI for support. When Giaka finished his testimony, he stayed in the court building until a break and then was returned to where he was staying with his family. That evening, we visited him to check on his mental condition prior to returning to the United States. He seemed to have held up well despite the barrage of attacks on his character. He had survived the worst the defense had to offer and it would be up to the judges to determine how much of what he said they would believe. Giaka’s value as a witness had diminished since 1991, because the Scots had located evidence which proved Megrahi was Abdusamad. When Megrahi brought a passport containing his picture, Abdusamad’s name and passport number 332351 on it, to the trial, that also helped. But Giaka linked Megrahi to the Libyan Intelligence Service and he had seen Fhimah and Megrahi together at Luqa Airport, probably on the night of December 20, 1988, carrying the suitcase. There might never have been a US indictment of the two Libyans without the information provided by Giaka. While not a “star witness,” he had given up a lot in order to testify.

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CHAPTER 36: THE PROSECUTION WRAPS UP The next morning, Friday, September 29, 2000, the court resumed to determine if Fhimah’s dairy had been legally obtained. Harry Bell was the first witness. He said the investigation in Malta had been shut down twice, once in December 1989, and again in October 1990, both due to media leaks. He was asked about a wiretap which was found at the Miska Bakery. Bell stated that the device had nothing to do with the police in Malta or Scotland. Although no FBI agent ever testified about this, they too would only have said they knew nothing about the wiretap. Bell went to the Medtours office on April 18, 1991. Fhimah was not yet a suspect in the investigation. Vincent Vassallo gave Fhimah’s diary to him, after having taken it from either the desktop or top drawer of the desk which at one time had belonged to Fhimah. Bell told Vassallo he (Vassallo) had the authority to provide the diary to the police. Police officer Peter Avent corroborated Bell’s testimony. Albert Galea, a Maltese police officer, testified via video link. Galea said the FBI and Scottish police had conducted a “search” of the premises of Medtours and that it was in conformity with Maltese law. Phil Reid also testified, saying Vassallo gave permission for the diary to be seized. Vassallo testified that the investigators had opened drawers in the office without his consent. The court showed him a statement he had made before a Maltese magistrate, stating he had given permission to the officers to conduct the search. George Grech, the Maltese Police Commissioner, testified that no search warrant was needed to search the Medtours office. A Maltese deputy Attorney General and a Maltese magistrate each testified that the evidence seized at Medtours in April 1991 would have been admissible in Malta under the circumstances described. The judges announced they would make a decision about the admissibility of the diary the next morning.

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Chapter 36: The Prosecution Wraps Up On October 5, the judges announced that the seizure of the diary was admissible under Scots law and could be introduced at trial, an obvious blow to Fhimah’s defense team. When the trial resumed, Bell took the stand again and testified about finding the diary. The defense again accused him of searching Medtours illegally, which Bell denied. Vassallo took the stand and described the operation of Medtours. It belonged to Fhimah (60%) and him (40%). He first met Megrahi on the night of December 20, 1988, but said he did not pick him up at the airport. He denied being at the airport that night, contradicting what Giaka had told the court. He testified Bell had mentioned the reward which could be paid for information about the bombing when he located the diary. The next witness was the translator, Djeloul Hamaz, who testified as to what was written in Fhimah’s 1988 diary. He said there was a notation in the diary which said “Take/collect taggs [written in English] from the airport (Abdul Baset/Abdusalam).” The next morning a professor of linguistics testified about the meaning of the diary entry. He believed the December 15 notation in the diary related to taking or picking up [luggage] tags from the airport. Frank Skroski, who headed the US Marshal Witsec program, testified about money paid to Giaka since he was admitted to the program in 1992. An amount between $31,384 and $44,555 per year was expended to sustain Giaka and his family. He was not aware of any reward paid to Giaka, and his office would have processed that money if there were any such payments. The remainder of testimony on October 6 was intended to clear up unfinished business. Parviz Taheri, who had been named by the defense in their opening statement as being one of the Special Defenses, testified. Taheri, an Iranian now living in Sweden, had been aboard Pan Am Flight 103A from Frankfurt to London. A check-in clerk from Pan Am recalled that he had seemed nervous and after the crash he was interviewed by the BKA. They discovered in his diary the address of 28 Sandweg in Frankfurt. This was where a large amount of explosives and other items stored by the PFLP-GC had been found in October 1988. Taheri told the court that in 1988 he had looked at 40 or 50 places to rent for a food “take away” business. He had written down a number of addresses in his diary where he had tried to rent space, and believed this was one of them. He did not know any “Arabs” and had no connection to terrorism. He stuck by his story, despite Bill Taylor’s best efforts. On October 10, the director of the General Passport and Nationality Department in Libya testified that a “coded” passport, that is, one which does not bear the true name of the bearer, had been issued for Ahmed Khalifa Abdusamad based on a letter from the Libyan ESO dated June 15, 1987. They requested that a passport for Mohamed El Megrahi be issued in the name of Abdusamad. The passport number was 332351, and it was one of the documents Megrahi brought to the trial with him. It had been turned over to his attorneys; and the Crown, when it learned of its existence, requested it be turned over to

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation them. It also contained a photograph of Megrahi. It was the passport that Abdusamad (Megrahi) had used at the Holiday Inn in Malta on December 20, 1988 — even though Megrahi had told Salinger in 1991 he did not know Abdusamad and had been in Tripoli with his family on December 20-21, 1988. The passport proved otherwise. The trial continued several more days in October as the prosecution closed out other avenues. On October 23, the court was told the Crown had received new information which was complex in nature and might impact the defense case. The Crown needed time to sort it out; the court recessed. When the Court reconvened on November 8, the Crown indicated it was sending a letter to the Government of Syria asking them to investigate allegations it had received. In the meantime, more police officers testified to finding and later identifying the luggage belonging to Khaled Jaafar. The last witness of the day was Lebanese-born Hassan El Salheli, who lived in Germany. Salheli was the man with whom Khaled Jaafar had lived for about six weeks in November and December 1988, prior to the bombing. Investigators were told in 1989 that Salheli and his brother had been boyhood friends of Jaafar, but the investigation and the testimony indicated otherwise. Jaafar knew one of Salheli’s brothers in Lebanon and wanted to relocate to Germany in 1988. Jaafar, an American citizen, was in love with a girl he met in Lebanon and his father did not want him to marry her. Salheli gave his direct examination on November 8, and was cross examined the next day. His testimony was concise. He had learned from his brother that Jaafar wanted to stay in Germany and Salheli helped him try to relocate, but had been unsuccessful. Jaafar was with him most of the time he was in Germany as he had no means of transportation. He saw him off at the train station prior to his going to Frankfurt to catch the Pan Am flight. The next day on cross examination Bill Taylor attacked Salheli as if he were a hostile witness who had given false testimony against his client. He accused him of lying when his in-court testimony did not match what he told the BKA in 1989. (Salheli had listed in an application to live in Germany that he had been an unemployed barber.) Taylor said, “[You] described yourself as someone without qualifications. You cut people’s hair and you were so successful you were unemployed now?” The comment had no bearing on the case; it was aimed to make Salheli look foolish, but many believed it worked the other way around. It could only be assumed Taylor’s purpose was to show the court that all other persons of Middle East extraction must have been responsible for the Lockerbie bombing. He never elicited any information which made that point. On November 10, the prosecution called a witness who had observed Taheri on December 21 in line in Frankfurt waiting to board Pan Am Flight 103A. She said he acted nervous and exhibited odd behavior. Since this was one of the Special Defenses, the prosecution was preemptively introducing testimony to mitigate that.

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Chapter 36: The Prosecution Wraps Up The last witness of the day was Mohamed Abu Talb, the convicted PPSF terrorist from Sweden. Some people claimed Talb was the man identified by Tony Gauci as having purchased the clothing contained in the IED suitcase. But Gauci had not identified Talb as that man. Meanwhile, there was no evidence which put Talb on the island of Malta on the date the clothing was believed to have been purchased (December 7) or even the alternate date selected by the defense (November 23). There was no evidence he was in Malta the day the IED suitcase began its journey. Talb was another of the Special Defenses proffered by the defense at the start of the trial. Talb was born in Egypt and lived with his wife in Sweden before he was arrested and given a life sentence for a series of bombings which took place in Scandinavia in the mid-1980s. He was a member of the PPSF, a Palestinian terrorist group dedicated to freeing the Palestinian people. He knew Abu Nada, the owner of the Miska Bakery in Malta. He traveled to Malta between October 19 and 26, 1988, but had not returned there. While in Malta he had discussions with a man about importing clothing from Malta to Sweden and took a few samples with him, but the venture went no further. His wife’s sister in law had delivered a new baby on December 22, 1988, and he had been ill and was confined to Sweden during December 1988. When court resumed on November 14, the Crown asked Talb if he had played any role in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and he adamantly denied it. He said he had been convicted for bombings which had taken place in Stockholm, Copenhagen and Amsterdam between 1983 and 1986, which had killed one person. He identified others who had been arrested and charged with him including Martin Imandi, Mahmud Said al Mougrabi and his brother, Mustapha al Mougrabi. Talb said he had not been involved in those bombings but had been convicted. On cross examination, he admitted knowing who Ahmed Jibril was but said he did not know him personally. He had heard of Dalkamouni, the German PFLP-GC leader, but did not know him either. Keen and Taylor each tried to cross him up, first by asking him to corroborate things which had not occurred. Talb denied having spit in the face of the American FBI agent Hal Hendershot, something Hendershot did not recall either. Talb said it was not in his character to do that. Keen accused Talb of telling the Americans he had passed a bomb to someone in West Germany between October and December 1988. It was a lie which Talb had no trouble refuting. Talb concluded his testimony the next morning. While he had refused to answer some questions, the court debated what sanctions it could impose on a citizen of another country who was already serving a life sentence for murder. The court could hold him in contempt, but there were no realistic sanctions it could impose. The court told him he was required to answer questions but did not have to incriminate himself in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. Talb had answered most of the questions put to him. He said that if he knew anything

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation about the Pan Am bombing, he would tell the court. It was doubtful anyone believed that. He said he was not guilty of the bombings for which he had been convicted. Keen asked another question. What happened to the “radio cassette bomb the US Government claimed he admitted getting from West Germany?” The question was quickly rescinded as there was no basis for it having been asked. The next day, November 16, the Crown told the court they would conclude their case in a week. The trial, expected to last two years, was six months old. However, the defense had dozens of witnesses who could be called. Most of them were unknown to the FBI agents and Scottish police officers who had worked the case. That day, the Crown delivered another significant witness. Mansour Omran Ammar Saber. Saber was one of the two Libyans arrested in Senegal in February 1988, carrying an MST-13 timer made by MEBO. Saber testified he worked at the office of airport security at the Tripoli Airport, confirming what we had been told in 1991. Saber had been detained upon arrival in the Dakar Airport and was beaten upon his arrest. He did not know the second man detained with him, Mohamed Abdou Salam al Marzook, who went by many names, including Muhammad Ali al Nayil. Marzook was an alleged member of the Libyan JSO who had been involved in international terrorist activities. Saber denied knowing either Marzook or Ahmed Khalifa Niasse, another Libyan allegedly involved in the plot to smuggle weapons into Senegal. Saber recalled being beaten and little else. He did not know how the MST-13 timers had been brought into Senegal. He had never heard of MEBO and told the Senegalese he was employed by a bank in 1988. There was no cross examination by the defense. BKA witnesses testified the rest of the day as to what they found during the Autumn Leaves investigation in Germany in 1988. The next day, the Autumn Leaves evidence was concluded but the court heard an expert testify about the timing device which had been part of the PFLP-GC radio. He said it would have caused the bomb to explode on the Frankfurt to London leg of the flight if the bomb had gone onto the aircraft in Frankfurt. The court also heard from a CIA witness who had written the report on the Senegal timer. He described his technical observations and concluded the MST-13 timers were extremely accurate, more so than the barometric devices built by the PFLP-GC. On November 20, the prosecution called its last two witnesses. The first was Pierre Salinger, a reporter for ABC News. In November 1991, he had received permission to interview Megrahi and Fhimah, in Libya, shortly after the indictments. Tapes of the original interviews had been seized by the NSY in London shortly after the interviews and would be played for the court. Salinger authenticated his interviews of the two accused. Megrahi was interviewed on November 26, 1991, and Fhimah a day later. Megrahi’s interview was in English and Fhimah’s through an interpreter. The video tape was as good as the defendants testifying, without benefit of a cross examination. Megrahi said he had not been

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Chapter 36: The Prosecution Wraps Up on the island of Malta on December 20 and 21 as the indictment alleged. He said he had been in Tripoli with his family. He did not know Abdusamad, never heard of MEBO and had never been a member of the Libyan Intelligence Service. Fhimah said luggage tags were available all over at Luqa Airport; anyone could pick them up. The Crown had already proven Megrahi had a false passport in the name of Abdusamad and had been in Malta on the day the IED suitcase left there. Connections to MEBO were established through the testimony of Bollier and Giaka testified as to his affiliation with Libyan intelligence. Fhimah, on the other hand, did not tell a lie, on camera, which could be positively refuted. The defense tried to show that the interview had been manipulated by the Libyan Government, and when Salinger was excused, he protested. “That’s all?” He said. “You’re not letting me tell the truth. Wait a minute. They’re not letting me tell the truth. I know exactly who did it. I know exactly how it was done. You have to do that here.” The court showed him the door. If Salinger knew how Lockerbie was carried out and had facts to substantiate his claim, he never reported the story. The court again called Djeloul Hamaz, the translator, to testify to what Fhimah had said in Arabic during his interview with Salinger. The process went on the remainder of the afternoon. The prosecution rested.

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CHAPTER 37: CLOSING ARGUMENTS The next morning, the Crown asked for a two-week recess to learn if the Syrian Government would respond to their letter. Before the court recessed, Keen asked them to consider a motion to the effect that Fhimah had no case to answer and requested a directed verdict of not guilty. The court agreed to a oneweek recess. On November 28, Keen again made a submission that Fhimah had no case to answer. The Crown had not shown any connection between Fhimah and the “TNT.” There had been no evidence presented he had stolen luggage tags. There had been no evidence presented showing that Fhimah belonged to the Libyan Intelligence Services. Keen added there was nothing incriminating about Fhimah or Megrahi bringing a brown suitcase into Malta. There had been no eyewitness or documentary evidence placing Fhimah at Luqa Airport on December 21 and there was no forensic evidence which tied Fhimah to the Lockerbie bombing. There was no evidence Fhimah was aware Megrahi had traveled on a false passport or was aware there may have been a conspiracy to bomb an aircraft. Although Keen made a persuasive argument for a directed verdict, some wondered how Megrahi’s team felt about the open admission of Megrahi’s false passport. The court would render an opinion the next day. On November 29, the court met briefly but rejected Keen’s submission. The prosecution had not received a response from Syria and the defense was told to begin its case on December 5, 2000. Megrahi would go first. Bill Taylor began a limited defense on December 5. Joseph Mifsud, a Maltese meteorologist, was called to dispute Gauci’s testimony that it was raining on the day Megrahi was alleged to have bought the clothing contained within the IED suitcase(December 7). The defense had always contended the purchase had occurred on a date when there was no documentary evidence Megrahi had been on Malta, specifically November 23, 1988. Mifsud testified

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Chapter 37: Closing Arguments there had been constant rain at the Luqa Airport on December 8, 1988, but on the previous day there had only been light rain, a trace in the morning. There could be differences in rain accumulation on different places on the island. The forecast for December 7 was a 90% chance of showers, but no rain. The judges would have to decide whether to believe the recollections of Gauci, who said it had been raining in the late afternoon when the clothing and umbrella were purchased. But Gauci had also testified that it had stopped raining by the time the purchaser returned to the shop to pick up his package. The defense wanted to call Marwan Khreesat, the PFLP-GC bomb builder, whose interview by the FBI had caused much debate in 1989 and 1990. The Jordanian Government wanted nothing to do with the trial. Khreesat did have a brief meeting with the prosecutors in Jordan prior to the trial; he refused to testify. In order to introduce into evidence what he told the FBI, the defense called FBI agent Ed Marshman to the stand. Marshman testified using his FD302 interview, which he wrote in 1989. Marshman went through what Khreesat told him he had done as he built devices for the PFLP-GC. Khreesat and Dalkamouni had obtained timetables for several airlines including Pan Am, Swissair and KLM for the PFLP-GC. Khreesat was sent to Europe to infiltrate the Palestinian terrorist organization. His handler had told him he could make bombs for them, but not to make any of them functional. The trial recessed until January 8, 2001 to see what other witnesses the defense would call and see if there was any response from the Syrian Government. The Syrian aspect of the case related to Mobdi Gobden, whose name had surfaced shortly after the bombing. He lived in Yugoslavia and may have been involved in a plot to attack aviation with Dalkamouni and the PFLP-GC in Germany in October 1988. These new allegations came from his survivors, as he had died during the late 1990s. Supposedly he had maintained information which showed a PFLP-GC link to the bombing and the document was allegedly in the hands of the Syrian Government. The Syrians said they did not have information linking the PFLP-GC to the bombing. It was another in a string of circumstances that proved no connection to Lockerbie. The court said they were never certain they would get the information out of Syria to substantiate the initial claims, and the issue was dropped. On January 8, the court resumed hearing testimony from its third and final witness, another FBI agent. Lawrence Whitaker, a member of the Scotbom Task Force and a German speaker, took the stand. He would have to defend his assessment of the baggage procedures at Frankfurt Airport which had been leaked to the press and made public. In September 1989, he had been dispatched along with a Scottish officer to Frankfurt to examine baggage handling procedures. He documented his observations in a communication he sent back to Washington. He and the Scottish officer watched various baggage handlers and saw how they coded bags into the Frankfurt baggage system. He noted that one handler had not entered infor-

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation mation into the baggage record system as was required. Whitaker reported this to the BKA and his superiors in Washington. Neither defense attorney had any further questions. With that, the defense rested its case. They had called three witnesses, two of them FBI agents. After raising the specter of Special Defenses at the outset of the trial, the defense did not call any witnesses to bolster them. They may have reasoned the Crown had not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. They may have been reading news stories which indicated the Crown’s case had been dealt a serious blow when Giaka testified. Giaka had been unable to identify the defendants as having planted the bomb, something many expected. The case had been built on a string of circumstances. The world would have to believe in the tenacity, honesty and integrity of the hundreds of law enforcement officers who had scoured the fields around Lockerbie and later the world to find bits of evidence, to put a case together. The trial results would test that. The next day, January 9, Alastair Campbell made closing remarks for the Crown. Before he did, he reduced the final charges against the defendants to murder and withdrew the conspiracy charges. He said that evidence had been found in an extensive crime scene in Scotland. All KM Flight 180 passengers had received their luggage. In October 1988, 20,000 RT-SF16 radios had been sent to Libya. He discussed the testimony of Gauci and noted December 1988 was the first time Megrahi had used his coded passport since the previous December. It was also the last time it was ever used. He discussed the relationship of Megrahi to Bollier and MEBO. Campbell went on to discuss the entry in Fhimah’s diary reminding him to take “taggs” from the airport. He reminded the judges of the travel of Fhimah and Megrahi on December 20, 1988 to Malta from Libya, the explosives at the LAA office, the brown suitcase and finally the events of December 21. Megrahi had called Fhimah at 7:11 a.m., probably rode to the airport with him, received priority check in and put the suitcase into the aviation system with the stolen Air Malta tag. His presentation ended with the details provided by Salinger. Megrahi had lied to him, saying he did not belong to the Libyan Intelligence Service, was not in Malta December 20-21, 1988 and did not know MEBO. Campbell said the evidence showed all that information to have been lies. In a few hours, Campbell had summarized the case, then it really was a simple one. Bill Taylor made the opening rebuttal on behalf of Megrahi. He attacked the prosecution premise that the IED suitcase had been introduced at Luqa Airport. He said there had been no proof offered that Megrahi had belonged to the Libyan Intelligence Service. He said Megrahi lied during his interview with Salinger because he was under government orders to do so. In October 1988, the PFLP-GC wanted to destroy aircraft and had gotten a Pan Am timetable. They

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Chapter 37: Closing Arguments had also obtained Lufthansa luggage tags. The difference between the PFLP-GC device and the one which destroyed the “Maid of the Seas” was minimal. He stated that the Stasi could have had the MST-13 timers, that Abu Talb was linked to people in Malta and that it was not possible to dismiss the PFLP-GC in this case. Taylor reasoned no terrorist would have gone into a small shop like Gauci’s to purchase clothing and in any case certainly would have removed the labels. Luqa Airport was no place to put a bomb into the aviation system, as the airport was too small. And he said it was not possible the Pan Am suitcase was ingested into the system in Malta. The next day, court was only in session for half a day. Taylor spent the morning discussing the various discrepancies at Frankfurt from the airline security procedures to the coding and handling of incoming bags. When he concluded, the court recessed until Tuesday, January 16. When court reconvened, Taylor alleged that the IED suitcase could have belonged to George “Gordie” Williams, a young United States military officer on the plane. He also implied it could have belonged to Khaled Jaafar. He tried to show it was possible a rogue bag could have been introduced into the luggage system. Then Taylor attacked Gauci’s identification of Megrahi as the clothes purchaser. He called Bollier and Meister unreliable witnesses, saying that the Stasi had obtained at least two MST-13 timers but Meister and Bollier wanted to put the blame on Libya to try and divert attention from the Stasi. (Apparently Taylor failed to consider it would have made little sense to anger an old and steady customer, Libya, for an organization which was extinct, Stasi, by the time Bollier was first interviewed.) He spent the remainder of the day attacking Giaka. He said Giaka had never provided any information about the Lockerbie bombing despite being asked about it a number of times. The next morning, Taylor told the court the evidence against his client, Megrahi, was only circumstantial. He asked for him to be acquitted. His argument had taken all or parts of four days. Richard Keen, on behalf of Fhimah, followed and was much briefer in his submission, using a presentation almost identical to that when he had asked for a directed verdict for his client in November. He closed by saying there was no evidence with which to convict Fhimah. At the end of the day January 17, 2001, the judges said they would recess the court, return to Scotland to review the evidence and would provide a progress report of their findings on January 30, 2001. With that, the trial was over. The work of hundreds of law enforcement professionals, veteran intelligence officers, dedicated prosecutors and the prayers of the victim families rested with three senior Scottish judges. No one could predict what their reaction to the evidence would be.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Of all the Americans, Dana Biehl had the best grasp on what was happening as he was in the courtroom daily. However, some believed he had been there so long he had almost become a Scot, so that if they were confident, so was he. When Biehl sent emails back to his regular “customers,” he was almost always confident the judges would rule in the favor of the Crown.

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CHAPTER 38: JUDGMENT DAY On January 30, 2001, the judges reconvened the court and made a terse announcement, “we will be in a position to announce a verdict tomorrow.” Lord Sutherland said that due to security, court would convene at a later hour, 11:00 a.m.. With those few words, word traveled quickly. Rumors started. Many had thought that more time would be allowed to enable families to come and hear the verdict. Were the judges announcing the verdict quickly because they would acquit the defendants and did not want them to spend more time in jail? Did they want to announce the verdict before a large number of families could make the trip to Zeist? That day, many of us boarded airplanes. Some family members were already there. Others made plans to go to the remote closed-circuit viewing sites established in New York, Washington, London and Lockerbie, so they could see, in real time, the judgment of the court. Justice was delayed, but they hoped it would not be justice denied. The judges filed into the court shortly after 11:00 a.m. in the Netherlands, which was inconvenient for the American families who had to be in place in the eastern United States before 5:00 a.m. Bob Mueller, now the acting Deputy Attorney General, and Neil Gallagher, were with many of the families in Washington. The announcement was brief and to the point. Megrahi was found guilty and Fhimah was acquitted. Both decisions had been unanimous. Even after sentence was imposed on Megrahi in the afternoon, everyone wanted to read the opinion of the court. That afternoon the court released the 82-page written opinion of the judges. It recounted the facts of the case. They agreed Pan Am Flight 103 had been destroyed by a bomb which had been placed in baggage container AVE 4041 PA and its destruction caused the deaths of 259 passengers and crew along with 11 residents of Lockerbie. The evidence had shown the bomb had been con-

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation tained within a 26 inch Silhouette 4000 suitcase made by Samsonite. The IED was in a Toshiba RT-SF16 radio cassette player. The judges documented the items of clothing which had been identified as having been contained within the suitcase and these were spelled out in detail. The clothing had been in the suitcase, along with the Toshiba radio. The judges recounted the meticulous investigation conducted to identify the clothing contained in the suitcase. They would discuss the testimony of Tony Gauci later in their report but seemed satisfied his recollections of the sale of clothing to a Libyan purchaser were accurate. The next area of agreement was in locating and later identifying a piece of charred cloth which had contained a fragment of a green colored circuit board which had been blasted into it. Although the defense had challenged the fragment on several bases, the judges believed there were no grounds for the challenges. The defense had argued the fragment, PT-35, was questionable due to a problem of pagination in the forensic report of Dr. Thomas Hayes. The defense believed he should have drawn a diagram of the fragment which was his normal practice. They had also asked the court if the fragment had been first identified in May 1989, why communications about it were not written until months later. The court ruled the fragment had been located as the testimony of Dr. Hayes had indicated and the objections of the defense could not overcome the facts of its recovery and identification. The court recounted the efforts by the police to identify the fragment including its identification by an FBI “officer named Thurman” in June 1990. They discussed the investigation which led to MEBO and subsequently to Meister and Bollier. They were convinced the bombing had been caused by the MST-13 timer built by MEBO. The court explained how the suitcase could have made its way into the luggage container known as AVE 4041. They discussed Pan Am’s procedures to place bags into the luggage system and the security measures in place at Heathrow Airport. It was conceivable a rogue bag could have been placed into the baggage system at Heathrow, but no evidence had been introduced to substantiate that claim. They discussed the baggage procedures at Frankfurt Airport including security measures in place in 1988, and the x-ray system which scanned interline luggage. They also discussed the unloading of Air Malta Flight 180 on December 21, 1988. Bogomira Erac’s computer records of baggage transactions for December 21 were discussed. She retained the printout which was later given to investigators. The court determined the computer printout gave rise to the inference that one item of baggage that arrived on KM Flight 180, was transferred to Pan Am Flight 103A. It was established at trial that no KM Flight 180 passenger had been booked on a flight to the United States and all had retrieved their checked luggage that day. The judges examined the arguments of the defense relating to the records of Frankfurt Airport but believed they were not persuasive. They

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Chapter 38: Judgment Day concluded an unaccompanied bag had been transferred from KM Flight 180 to Pan Am Flight 103A. They discussed check-in procedures and security arrangements in place in 1988 at Luqa Airport. They wrote that the “arrangements seem to make it extremely difficult for an unaccompanied and unidentified bag to be shipped on a flight out of Luqa.” However, they went on to say evidence had shown that there were times when the check in process was chaotic and crowded and the lines were not orderly, suggesting it was possible for a bag to be slipped into the system without detection. They also noted that a total of three flights were checking in at the same time on December 21. The court stated the “absence of any explanation of the method by which the primary suitcase might have been placed on board KM 180 is a major difficulty for the Crown case, and one which has to be considered along with the rest of the circumstantial evidence in the case.” They discussed evidence concerning the two accused. There were three important witnesses, Giaka, Bollier and Gauci, who impacted the case against Megrahi. The court described Giaka’s background including how he ended up in Malta aboard a United States Navy ship. They discussed the CIA cables and concluded that Giaka had overstated his importance to the CIA to improve his standing with them. The judges believed his reason for contacting the Americans in the first place was financial. They were concerned about Giaka being a paid informer and believed the criticism which had been raised in court was warranted. The court recounted each piece of evidence presented by Giaka. They found his claims regarding the “TNT” at the Air Malta office to be unreliable although they noted he had reported this to the CIA prior to December 21, 1988. The next area of concern was Giaka’s sighting of Fhimah and Megrahi at the Luqa Airport in October, November or December 1988. The court noted Fhimah’s new car had been purchased on December 14, and if true, his sighting of them was probably on December 20, 1988. However, they discounted his story because they believed it had grown from a simple sighting at the airport to taking a brown Samsonite suitcase off the baggage carrousel. The court also noted that although Giaka said he had seen Vassallo at the airport that night, Vassallo had denied being there. The most significant reason to reject his testimony concerning this sighting was the fact he did not report it to the CIA and, if he did, it would have been “inexplicable” for the CIA to have failed to appreciate the significance of the information and not report it. The judges failed to consider that Giaka had seen his CIA handler in the morning of December 20, 1988, prior to his trip to the airport. He did not see him again for a month and it is certainly possible this seemingly innocuous sighting at the airport was forgotten by then. No one had any idea that Malta had played any role in the Lockerbie bombing at that time.

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation The third matter they considered related to Giaka’s alleged conversation with Said Fazani* in 1986. Because he failed to tell this to the CIA, particularly after the Lockerbie crash and the fact he had been asked about Pan Am Flight 103, the judges were skeptical whether or not this incident was true. They concluded their opinion of him by stating, “We are unable to accept Abdul Majid as a credible and reliable witness on any matter except his description of the organization of the JSO and the personnel involved there.” The court discussed issues related to the MST-13 timers and the testimony of Bollier, Meister and Ulrich Lumpert. They believed all three, especially Bollier, had proven to be unreliable witnesses. They cited conflicts in what they had told the police at varying times during the investigation. They discussed events described by Bollier regarding his travel to Libya with the 40 Olympus timers in December 1988. The fact one timer had been set for a particular time and date could not be established by the facts and as a result, they rejected this testimony. They also rejected Bollier’s claim he had been approached by a mysterious stranger outside his office and told to implicate Libyan officials in the bombing. Bollier’s recollection and location of an invoice showing MST-13 timers had been delivered to the Stasi, years after he was first interviewed in this case, were also rejected by the court. They did find that part of Bollier’s testimony was credible and did not reject him outright. They accepted he had received an order for MST-13 timers and had them built and delivered at least 20 to Libyan officials in three batches. Although Bollier said he had given some of the MST-13 timers to the Stasi, the court found no evidence this had occurred. They did not totally discount that possibility or the assertion that some of those timers could have found their way to the PFLP-GC. However, they had seen no evidence of that in court. The discovery of MST-13 timers in Africa was documented in the court papers. The court accepted that MEBO had rented space in Zurich to Megrahi and Badri Al Kafi*. The last witness they considered was Tony Gauci. They considered his various identifications of Megrahi as the person who purchased the clothing found in the IED suitcase. They discussed his statements to the police over the course of years as well as the many photo line ups he had seen. They noted that in February 1991 Gauci had said that, of all the photographs he had been shown, “this one, number eight [Megrahi] is the only one really similar to the man who bought the clothing, if he was a bit older…” The court also discussed the identification Gauci had made to a Maltese police officer in 1998 of a newspaper photograph of Megrahi as being the purchaser of the clothing. The court rejected the defense contention that Gauci was a poor witness. They deemed him to be entirely credible, trying to tell the truth to the best of his recollection. They believed he was credible on the issue of his list of clothing sold plus the fact the purchaser was a Libyan. They did, however, go into detail of his identification of Megrahi as the purchaser. When they considered the date of the

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Chapter 38: Judgment Day purchase of the clothing, they first examined the testimony of the Maltese meteorologist, Major Mifsud. The court believed it could have rained on December 7, based on his testimony, lending credibility to the purchase having occurred on that date. They concluded the purchase took place on December 7. The court also concluded that Gauci’s selection of Megrahi was done with care and deliberation. They noted discrepancies in his description of the purchaser, but believed he tried to diligently identify the person who made the purchase. The judges concluded he had properly identified Megrahi. The court discussed the Special Defenses raised by the defense. The three Special Defenses raised at the outset of the trial were the PPSF and Abu Talb, the PFLP-GC and finally, Parviz Taheri. They addressed Taheri first and quickly. The defense had not suggested Taheri had been responsible for the bombing and the judges concurred. They next discussed the PFLP-GC. They recounted the intense investigation of the cell in Germany and the fact they had the means to destroy civil aviation through the use of a barometric bomb. They concluded there had been no evidence introduced that the PFLP-GC had the type of timer which had destroyed Pan Am Flight 103. The court also discussed evidence suggesting that the PFLP-GC might have introduced a bomb onto the plane through Khaled Jaafar. The court found that Jaafar only had two bags and both had been recovered, intact, at Lockerbie. Their last focus was the PPSF and Abu Talb. They discussed Talb’s convictions for the bombings in Copenhagen and Amsterdam as well as his activities on behalf of the PPSF. They documented his travel to Cyprus and Malta in 1988. They concluded that although there was a great deal of suspicion regarding Talb’s travel, there was no evidence to connect him or the PPSF to the Lockerbie bombing. The court concluded the bomb had been loaded into a suitcase which was dispatched from Malta and then went on to Frankfurt and London. The clothing contained in the bag had been purchased in Gauci’s shop on December 7, 1988, by a Libyan. The trigger for the explosion was a MST-13 timer and Libyan officials had played a role in the planning of the attack. They discussed the specific evidence against each of the accused, Fhimah first. The primary evidence against him came from the two entries in his 1988 diary, discussed above. The court considered Fhimah’s travels to Malta as well as the telephone call from the Holiday Inn to his flat on the morning of December 21. They also considered that no one had remembered seeing Fhimah at Luqa Airport on the morning of December 21. The court concluded that although it was unusual for Fhimah to have gotten the luggage tags, there was no indication he knew (if he in fact did take them) they would be used on a suitcase intended to destroy an aircraft. The Crown no longer suggested Fhimah was a member of the Libyan JSO and the court had rejected Giaka’s claim of seeing Fhimah and

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Megrahi at the airport with a brown Samsonite suitcase. As a result, the court acquitted Fhimah. The court turned its attention to Megrahi. Because Fhimah had been acquitted, the diary could no longer be used in evidence against Megrahi. The court said a major factor in the case against Megrahi was the identification by Gauci. They realized the identification was not a perfect one but accepted Megrahi was a member of the JSO. He worked in airline security, stayed at a hotel near Mary’s House and had done business with Bollier. Megrahi had denied knowing MEBO in his interview with Salinger but the court rejected that claim. The court noted Megrahi had also told Salinger he was not in Malta on December 20-21, and they rejected that as well. The court found Megrahi guilty of the crime of murder. Megrahi was sentenced in the afternoon. His twenty-year sentence was a shock as the penalty was not proportionate to the crime. Those who had been in court earlier in the day were still smarting as Fhimah left for his unimpeded trip to Tripoli. He arrived to a hero’s welcome and Gaddafi had a camel roast in his honor. Gaddafi also said that within a few days he would tell the world the truth about Lockerbie and his agent, Megrahi, would be freed. That was in early February 2001, and as of 2006, the world was still waiting for his “truth.” The evidence never implicated Gaddafi personally but he ran such a tight operation, it remains likely he personally authorized the attack, even if he did not know all the details. The world changed dramatically between the time of Megrahi’s conviction and his appeal a year later. The events of September 11, 2001, changed the way people looked at terrorism. Megrahi remained at Zeist for another year until his appeal was heard, and rejected. Megrahi was immediately flown to Glasgow, Scotland, and was incarcerated at the Barlinnie Prison. His sentence was later adjusted and he was given 27 years in prison. In 2005 he was transferred to another Scottish prison amid reports he had been getting favorable treatment while in prison, angering some of the victims’ relatives.

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CHAPTER 39: LIBYA RESPONDS One chapter of the case was concluded. A Libyan intelligence officer had been convicted of one of the most significant terrorist crimes in history; but no one ever said Megrahi and Fhimah had carried it out alone. Gaddafi had agreed, if his agents were convicted, to pay reparations to the families, renounce terrorism, admit responsibility and cooperate to identify the others involved in the bombing plot. He apparently had not thought the evidence would point to him again, as it had after the bombing of the La Belle Disco in Germany in 1986. After the conviction, world pressure mounted to force Gaddafi to follow through with his commitment. In August 2003, Gaddafi gave an interview to Time Magazine in a story captioned, “Gaddafi’s Confession?” He said his country was ready to accept responsibility, under international law, for the bombing. He said his government would pay $2.7 billion to the families of the victims. In exchange, the world should lift the sanctions and the United States would end its own sanctions and remove Libya from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. However, he said during the interview, “Is it not unbelievable that a responsible country, a member of the U.N., would do such an act? Libya was a leading country to condemn such acts….” Gaddafi said he was a natural ally with the United States in the war on Islamic extremism and would be a better ally than a certain oil-rich oil monarchy, an obvious reference to Saudi Arabia. Gaddafi insisted his nation was no longer supporting terrorist groups and had no weapons of mass destruction. He became flustered when the reporter asked him if he too could be on a list of Arab leaders to be toppled. He acknowledged this was a possibility. After numerous stops and starts, the Libyan letter was finally delivered to the United Nations in August 2003. In it, Libya said it “accepts responsibility for the actions of its officials.” It was far less than was required but Libya agreed to transfer $2.7 billion, $10 million per family, to a bank for payment. The money

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation was scheduled to be paid contingent on the United States lifting its own sanctions and removing Libya from the State Sponsor of Terrorism list. One of the reasons the deal had been so slow in developing was that the families of the predominantly French victims who had been aboard the French plane, UTA Flight 772, when it exploded over Africa in 1989, had become upset over their compensation settlement with Libya. The 171 families had been paid a total of about $30 million. The Libyan Government had not accepted responsibility for that attack either, but had paid the claim in part because the French had convicted a number of senior Libyan officials for it, in absentia. On September 12, 2003, the United Nations voted to remove the sanctions against Libya although the United States abstained from voting. Ironically, on the front page of the “Arab News” on Sunday, December 21, 2003, the 15th anniversary of the Lockerbie bombing, the headline read, “Libya Renounces Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Gaddafi, who had embarked on an aggressive campaign to develop and build weapons of mass destruction, had now come full circle. He had been negotiating with both the Blair and Bush Governments to rid himself of all weapons of mass destruction. He said he would welcome international inspectors. Gaddafi noted he had attempted to develop such capability but was now committed to dismantling these programs immediately. The media reported the agreements had been reached shortly after the United States and United Kingdom, principally, had gone to war with Iraq, partly because Saddam Hussein refused to dismantle and surrender his weapons of mass destruction. Numerous governments, including those of France, Germany, China and Japan welcomed the news. Was Gaddafi really becoming a good guy or was he afraid of what might happen to him if he continued on his current path? Had he seen the pictures of Saddam Hussein as he was captured by the United States military barely two weeks before? Hussein had no weapons of mass destruction. Hussein had never carried out a documented terrorist attack against the United States and the Gaddafi regime had already been convicted of several, either in a criminal court or in the court of public opinion, including the attacks at the La Belle Disco, Pan Am Flight 103 and UTA Flight 772. Perhaps Gaddafi saw the handwriting on the wall. In February 2004, the Libyan Prime Minister Shokri Ghanem told the BBC that Libya’s decision to pay compensation in the Lockerbie bombing case was not an admission of guilt. Libya had only agreed to pay compensation to improve relations with Western countries and to secure the lifting of sanctions against Libya. He went on, “we thought it was easier for us to buy peace and that is why we agreed a compensation [sic].” He made these claims on BBC at the same time the British were trying to identify the person responsible for the death of the British police woman, Yvonne Fletcher, in London, in 1984. The shot came from the Libyan Embassy and shortly thereafter, the Libyan Government recalled

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Chapter 39: Libya Responds their officials from the embassy, including the shooter. No one had ever been charged in her death. When Ghanem’s comments were reported by the media, the White House announced it would hold off on lifting the travel ban to Libya. The Libyan Government quickly retracted what Ghanem had to say, going back to the stock answer; they were responsible for the actions of their officials. The White House then lifted the ban on travel to Libya, angering many Lockerbie victim families. In a story which received little publicity in the United States at the time, Gaddafi, while addressing the Arab League in February 2003, became embroiled in an exchange of insults with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah. Gaddafi told the summit he had disapproved of US troops being stationed in Saudi Arabia in 1991. The Crown Prince allegedly told Gaddafi his nation had been threatened and he was ready to “cooperate with the devil to protect it.” Abdullah accused Gaddafi of being an agent of colonialism, telling him he had been brought to power by the United States. The public exchange of insults led to rioting in the streets of Libya and the Libyan Government recalled its ambassador to Saudi Arabia for “consultation.” The exchange was shown live on most Arab satellite television stations and caused a rift between the two countries. In early June, 2004, the media in the United States reported a plot against Crown Prince Abdullah had been alleged by two of the individuals involved in the plot. One was Abduraham Alamoudi, described as an American Muslim leader jailed in Virginia on Federal charges related to his illicit financial dealings with Gaddafi’s government. The second source of the information was identified as Mohamed Ismael, a Libyan intelligence officer, currently in Saudi custody. The pair had allegedly been involved in a plot to kill Abdullah and Gaddafi was involved. The media reported Alamoudi and Ishmael had provided significant information about the alleged plot against Abdullah In September 2004, the media reported Gaddafi had reached a settlement with the 160 non-American victims of the La Belle Disco bombing in Berlin in 1986. His Government agreed to pay $35 million in damages to those who were injured. The attack killed two US military personnel and a Turkish woman. The American victims had an additional legal action pending against the Libyan Government. In May 2006, the United States removed the Government of Libya from its list of State Sponsors of terrorism.

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CHAPTER 40: POSTSCRIPT Colin Boyd, in his summation to the court following Megrahi’s conviction, said more than 400 parents had lost a son or daughter in the attack. In minutes, 65 women had gone from wives to widows, 11 men lost their wives and 45 parents lost their only child. The passengers came from 21 countries and their average age was 27. A quarter of the victims were under the age of 20, and 16 were under ten. A small Scottish town and the families of 270 victims were shattered that cold December night. The world changed forever in the way it looked at international terrorism. We live on a dangerous planet, not made safer because Saddam Hussein was removed from power or Moammar Gaddafi gave up his weapons of mass destruction. Oklahoma City, East Africa, Washington, New York, Pennsylvania, Bali, Madrid, London, Egypt, Jordan and India are just a few of the places which have seen what a few can do to many. Terrorism will not be eradicated in our lifetimes. It will take visionary politicians, religious and community leaders as well as all the parents of the world to say, “Enough!” A long term solution is indeed the only solution and so far the leadership necessary to solve the problem, on all sides, is not there. Until the root causes of terrorism, which include, poverty, injustice, and intolerance, are eradicated, the problem will continue and will remain for intelligence and law enforcement agencies to solve. More accurately, to pick up the pieces. Lockerbie was a watershed event. Agencies which had never worked together, from a number of countries, molded an international coalition to solve this heinous crime. It is this model which must be replicated today. No matter what the reason behind a terrorist act, a crime committed for a political or social reason, the operative word is “crime.” Crimes must be investigated by law enforcement agencies; and crimes are preventable. The lessons which emanated from the Lockerbie investigation, or the “Lockerbie model” as it is described by

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Chapter 40: Postscript the BSS, are as important today as they were in 1988-91. In some ways they are more important because acts of terrorism are not only becoming more common, they are more deadly. The cost to the world of the events of September 11 have amounted to nearly one trillion US dollars. Money being used to keep us safe could be better used to pay for medical treatment for children and to raise the standards of living around the world. The lessons of Lockerbie are many. The international coalition from numerous countries combined the evidence found by the police and information collected by intelligence agencies to solve a terrible crime. It is this model which must be replicated today to prevent acts of terrorism. Intelligence and police agencies have a common goal. It is to help protect their country from crime and other threats. Terrorism is a crime and is preventable by the collection, analysis and sharing of information. The events of September 11, 2001 could have been prevented if individuals in law enforcement and intelligence agencies had examined what they had collected and if they had been more imaginative, a serious shortcoming in the pre September 11 world. Islamic fundamentalist terrorists hijacked a plane in Algiers in December 1994 and planned to force the Air France pilots to fly the plane, filled with explosives, into the center of Paris. Fortunately, French commandos terminated their threat before it could be carried out. Three months later the first parts of the Al Qaeda manual were found on a computer in England and many of their targets and methods of operation were identified. Targets included skyscrapers and the manual showed their willingness to kill large numbers of people. In early 2000, several Al Qaeda members, some with suspected links to the 1998 Embassy bombings in Africa, were spotted in the Far East and were surveilled, but their trail was lost. Several of them traveled to the United States and took flight lessons. They lived under their true names in San Diego yet were never interviewed by the FBI because information was never shared by the intelligence community which knew about them. By the time information was shared, the September 11 plot was nearly underway. In July 2001, an FBI agent in Phoenix, Arizona, expressed his concern about possible Al Qaeda members taking flight lessons in the United States, suggesting they be identified and interviewed; but nothing was done. This information may not have prevented the attacks of September 11, but an incredible amount of information is collected and seen by law enforcement and intelligence agencies that could help prevent attacks — if they work together, and collaborate to not only collect and analyze the information but to share it. In addition to the sharing of intelligence and criminal information, the sharing of techniques and ideas between law enforcement and intelligence agencies is also beneficial. Each major case which has occurred in the past 20 years has left a trail of lessons for future investigators. Not only are there indicators which were missed before the attack but things which worked and those which did not should be shared. Training is an important component of any anti

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation terrorism program. In the United States, terrorist experts represent the DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance in the State and Local Antiterrorism Training (SLATT) program. These experts share their expertise with the 800,000 state, local and tribal law enforcement officers in the United States to help prevent acts of terrorism. Outside the United States, the DOS Anti Terrorism Assistance program uses American experts to teach effective preventive measures to a number of countries around the world. In each case these experts share their knowledge and expertise to help these officers identify and then prevent acts of terrorism. In addition to collecting, analyzing and sharing information, law enforcement agencies need to pay attention to all detail. The piece of evidence which solved the Lockerbie case would fit on one’s finger. If this piece of evidence or any other had been overlooked in the 845 square mile crime scene, it is doubtful success would have been achieved. Tenacity is important in any protracted investigation. Most criminal investigations are not completed in an hour, as they are on television. This case took three years before we were comfortable enough to seek indictments and it took nearly ten more years before the trial could be completed. Motivating investigators in these long-term investigations is key to any law enforcement leader. This is often difficult because of the long hours, often in trying circumstances. In the Lockerbie case, Stuart Henderson had a large chart on the wall in his office which depicted each of the victims of the crash. It was a reminder each day to all who entered his office of the somber task at hand. In Washington, we kept two simple pictures on the wall. One was of a baby shoe which belonged to one of the victims. We were all parents and it served as a constant reminder why we went to work each day. The second picture was of the tail of Pan Am Flight 103. It was emblazoned with the American flag. Although Henderson and I disagreed on many things during the investigation, we agreed the target of the attack was the United States. As Americans, it made our long, often fruitless, days fulfilling as we looked for answers. Finally, we can not overlook the victims. Two hundred and seventy men, women and children had left behind hundreds if not thousands of people who loved them. Law enforcement agents often tend to forget the victims in the quest for justice. I learned a great deal from the police at Lockerbie. They treated each of the victims as if they were family. Personal property, when deemed non evidentiary, was sent back to the victim family, often personally delivered by a Scottish officer. Clothing was washed and ironed by the people of Lockerbie. The police always had time to speak with family members when they took time to visit Lockerbie. Kathryn Turman, the head of the OVC at the DOJ, did more for victim families in this case than anyone. She ensured they were able to observe the trial either personally in the Netherlands or at remote viewing sites. She brought and continues to bring compassion to working with victims, now as the head of the Victim-Witness Program at the FBI.

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Chapter 40: Postscript Law enforcement agents often tend to forget how valuable victims can be. The Lockerbie families helped get legislation passed in 1990 which made aviation travel safer. They can also be helpful to police officers in everyday police work and this aspect should not be overlooked. Terrorism is not going away. Law enforcement must learn to deal with it more effectively. They need to be prepared. They need to share and collaborate. Until the world finds leaders who can solve the myriad problems we face, terrorists will go on — and law enforcement and intelligence professionals must be better, smarter and faster than they are.

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INDEX

Barham, Dave, 34, 42 Barr, William (Bill), 162–165, 167 Basset, Abdul, 69, 164 Basuta, Jaswant, 209 Bates, Craig, 109 Beckett, John, 195 Behbehani, Sayed Ahmad, 196-199 Bell, Harry, 49, 67, 82, 92, 98–101, 109, 113, 116– 117, 125, 129, 132, 157–158, 170, 182, 203, 220–221 Bevington, John, 157 Biehl, Dana, 1–2, 64, 66, 72, 86, 89, 90, 125, 132,145, 156, 160, 178, 181, 186, 189, 192, 193, 197, 216, 230 Bird, Chris, 42, 47, 58 Bishari, Ibrihim, 126, 169 Black September Organization, 23 Bolcar, Keith, 66 Bollier, Edwin, 64, 68–69, 73–82, 84–86, 88–93, 95–97, 105–107, 116, 124, 127–128, 130, 132, 155, 170, 173, 178, 201–202, 225, 228–229, 232–234, 236 Bonner, Robert, 65 Bonnici, Ugo, 158–159 Borg, Wilford, 204 Boyd, Colin David, 3, 16–19, 27, 29, 38, 42, 46, 164, 182, 192–194, 196, 199, 207, 210, 212, 240 Boyd, John, 3, 16–19, 27, 29, 38, 42, 46, 164, 182, 192–194, 196, 199, 207, 210, 212 Bresett, Dave, 74, 93, 102, 104, 108, 119–121, 123, 151, 153, 155 British Foreign Office, 152 British Security Service (BSS or MI5), 10, 24, 63–64, 68, 71, 73, 94, 96, 102, 104, 107, 110, 116, 121, 134, 136, 139, 143, 151–153, 155– 156, 173, 241 Bruguiere, Jean Louis, 79, 96–97, 102, 108–112, 160, 163, 171–173 Bryant, Bob, 122, 125, 131–132, 134, 171, 174 Buckis, Meg, 66 Bundesamt fur Verfassungsschutz, 10–11

A Abas, Abu, 178 Abassi, Ahmed, 12, 44 Abassi, Hashem, 12, 43, 54 Abbas, Mohammad Abu, 179 Abdullah, Crown Prince, 239 Abdusamad, Ahmed Khalifa, 87–89, 91–93, 96, 99, 101, 106, 111, 114–116, 127–130, 138, 169, 188–190, 202, 204, 214, 219, 221, 225 Abernathy, Lord, 3, 194 ABH Company, 127 Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), 8, 14, 39, 76– 77, 162, 178 Achille Lauro, 179 Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), 20, 33, 196 Air Malta Flight 180, 83, 106, 124, 159, 175, 179, 210, 232 Alamoudi, Abduraham, 239 Amal militia, 7 Ammerman, Bert, 185 Annan, Kofi, 184 Arafat, Yasser, 8 Armstrong, Ian, 42 Armstrong, Morag, 186, 194 Aryan Nations, 23 Assad, Hafez al, 10, 28, 75, 103–104, 166, 176 Autumn Leaves, 11, 39, 43–44, 47, 55, 121, 224 Avent, Peter, 220 Aviv, Juval, 11, 52–53, 64–66, 176–178, 197 Avritt, Jerry Don, 15

B Badi*, Mohammed Hassan, 116, 129 Baer, Bob, 197 Baird, Mike, 157 Baker, Bill, 83, 120, 142–144, 163–164 Baker, James, 119 Bandar, Prince, 184

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), 10–13, 28–29, 34, 41–43, 47, 50, 53–55, 57, 59, 65, 72, 80, 91, 117–118, 121–122, 124, 157, 180, 210, 221– 222, 224, 228 Bundesnachrichtendienst, 10–11 Burns, David, 195 Bush, George Herbert Walker, 35, 75, 104 Bush, George W., 24, 31, 169

Department of Justice, 1–2, 31, 42, 64, 80, 102, 110, 114, 117–119, 123–125, 135, 139–146, 153, 156, 161–163, 170, 173–174, 178, 182, 184, 186, 190, 197, 217–218, 242 Department of State, 14, 24–27, 37, 41, 101, 114, 132, 152, 161–163, 180, 242 Depue, John, 42 Dextar, 20, 42, 195 Directorate of Territorial Security (DST), 97, 108–109, 112, 172 Dorch, Tim, 42 Drug Enforcement Administration, 8, 53, 65– 66, 80, 175, 177, 179, 182 Duba, Ali Issa, 176 Duff, Alistair, 190, 194–195 Duffy, Jim, 197–198 DuHadway, Tom, 65, 67, 71–72, 83, 117, 120, 122–125, 131–134, 150, 154–155 Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary, 3, 16 Dunn, John, 186

C Cameron, John Alastair, 194 Cameron, John Taylor, 194 Campbell, Alastair, 186, 194, 213–215, 217–218, 228 Cannistraro, Vince, 71–72, 104, 107, 119, 166 Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), 85, 94, 126 Central Ammunition Depot (CAD), 20, 33 Central Intelligence Agency, 6, 8, 10, 24, 26–28, 31, 34, 40, 43–44, 48, 51–53, 56, 58–61, 63– 66, 68, 71, 73–74, 76, 84, 86–87, 93–96, 98, 102, 104–105, 108, 110, 114–115, 117–125, 131, 134–137, 141–143, 146, 151–153, 156, 161, 163, 166–167, 171, 176–177, 180, 195– 197, 206–210, 212, 214–218, 224, 233–234 Cheney, Dick, 120 Chornyak, Bill, 91, 125 Christian*, 120 Cid, David, 210 Claire, Jean Francois, 108, 110, 112 Clarke, Floyd, 163 Clarke, Richard, 197 Clinton, Bill, 181, 183 Cohen, Daniel, 184 Cohen, Susan, 184 Coleman, Lester Knox, 64–66, 176–178, 182, 197 Colin, Jean, 126 Colvert, Barry, 81 Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), 25 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 7 Connor, Pat, 42 Corea, 65–66, 176 Coulsfield, Lord, 3, 194 Counterterrorism Center (CTC), 71, 108, 142 Courier, 65–66 Coyle, Patricia, 36, 128 Cretton*, Hans, 88, 104–107, 113 Criminal Investigative Division (CID), 24, 83

E Elias, Abu, 54–55, 57 Erac, Bogomira, 50, 210, 232 Esson, George, 46, 57–58, 78, 96, 117, 124–125, 130–131, 134, 136, 142, 144, 150–151, 155, 164, 168, 170 External Security Organization (ESO), 117, 126–128, 221

F Fanning, Bob, 73–77, 79–80, 85, 88, 96 Fanning, Pat, 88 Fatah, 8 Fatal Accident Inquiry (FAI), 78, 93, 193–194 Fazani*, Said, 68, 89, 115, 127, 129, 137–138, 152, 201, 204, 213, 215–216, 234 Federal Aviation Administration, 14, 30, 72, 181, 205 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1–3, 7–8, 10, 17, 20–31, 33–35, 37–38, 40–44, 49, 51–53, 58–61, 63–68, 70–73, 75, 79–81, 83–88, 92– 98, 102, 105, 107–109, 111, 114–117, 119–125, 129–132, 135–137, 140, 143–145, 147–148, 151–152, 154–157, 160–168, 170, 172–179, 182–183, 189–190, 197–198, 201, 206–208, 213–220, 223–224, 227–228, 232, 241– 242 Feraday, Allen, 60, 62, 86–87, 90, 95, 105, 107, 117, 199–200 Ferrie, Gordon, 195 Fhimah, Lamin Khalifa, 1, 3–4, 91–92, 94–95, 98–102, 104, 106, 108–111, 113–116, 118–120, 124, 127–130, 136–142, 144, 151–152, 155– 157, 159–161, 164–165, 169–170, 174, 183, 188, 190–192, 195, 202–204, 206, 208, 211– 215, 217–221, 224–226, 228–229, 231, 233, 235–237

D Dalkamouni, Hafez, 11–13, 42–43, 48, 53–55, 63, 72–73, 118, 212, 223, 227 Davidson, Jack, 195 DeBello*, Mary, 106, 108 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 65–66, 177 DeMarco, Guido, 157–159, 163, 173

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Index Fletcher, Yvonne, 119, 125, 166, 238 Forqan, Haj Mehdi, 198 Francovich, Allan, 178 Fraser, Donald, 94, 101 Fraser, Lord Peter, 85, 118, 120, 144, 152 Fuad, Abu, 44, 54

Hezbollah (Party of God), 6–7, 47, 52, 166 Hijazi*, Izz al din, 69, 76, 89, 115, 127, 129, 152, 201–202, 218 HOLMES, 19–20, 48, 79, 167–168, 182 House, Bob, 125, 182 Hreiz, Nick, 125, 206 Humert*, Peter, 74–75, 88, 104, 106 Hussein, Hafez, 12 Hussein, Saddam, 8–9, 75, 103, 166, 238, 240

G Gaddafi, Moammar, 2, 4–5, 10, 52, 76, 83, 98, 104, 116, 118–119, 121, 153, 162–163, 166– 169, 178–181, 183–187, 190, 193, 202, 213, 217, 236–240 Galea, Albert, 220 Gallagher, Neil J., 25, 27, 30, 35–36, 41, 48, 51, 58–59, 63–64, 67, 80–81, 94, 97, 108, 110– 112, 119, 123–124, 131, 136, 139, 231 Gannon, Matt, 57, 177, 180 Gauci, Paul, 49, 130–132, 203 Gauci, Tony, 49, 59, 61–62, 69, 73, 82–83, 94– 95, 125, 129–130, 132, 142, 145–146, 152– 153, 155–156, 160, 162–163,169, 174, 189, 203, 212, 223, 233–236 General Accounting Office (GAO), 25 Ghadanfar, Abdel, 12–13, 42, 63, 118 Ghanem, Shokri, 238–239 Giaka, Abd al Majid (aka Majid, Abdul al), 3, 89, 102, 104, 122–125, 130–131, 134–148, 150–153, 155–160, 170, 172–174, 178, 186– 193, 203–204, 206–219, 221, 225, 228– 229, 233–235 Gilchrist, Jim, 57, 70, 79–81, 83, 92–93, 104, 125, 130, 170, 173–174, 182 Gobden, Mobdi, 44, 54, 57, 227 Gow, Douglas, 27, 29–31, 35, 41, 58, 67, 131, 136, 163, 182 Grech, George, 101, 116, 158, 220 Greene, Steve, 65–66

I Ibrahim*, Abdusalem, 126, 129 Idris, King, 217 Imandi, Martin, 223 Interfor Incorporated,, 52 Iran Air Flight 655, 9, 179, 196 Irish Republican Army, 27 Isa, Mohamed Al-Lafi, See Lafi. Islamic Jihad, 7, 28 Ismael, Mohamed, 239

J J. Edgar Hoover Building,, 36, 80 Jaafar, Khaled Nazir, 29, 36, 39, 41–43, 46, 52, 55, 65–66, 179, 222, 229, 235 Jallud, Abd al Salam, 100, 118, 121 Jamahiriya Security Organization (JSO), 69, 117–118, 120, 135, 137–139, 145, 152, 155, 169, 173, 213–215, 224, 234–236 Jennings, Peter, 168 Jibril, Ahmed, 10–11, 13, 28, 48, 52, 54–55, 75, 103–104, 121, 166, 175–176, 196, 198, 223 Johnson, David, 125, 132 Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), 24 Jourdan, Tom, 64, 67, 70, 87, 92, 101, 103–104, 108–109, 111, 114, 122–123, 125, 129, 131, 150, 182

H Habash, George, 10 Haj, 198 Hamaz, Djeloul, 202, 221, 225 Hardie, Lord, 186, 193–194 Harris, Joanne, 91 Hayes, Thomas, 107, 199, 232 Heinz, Karl, 75–76 Helsinki Warning, 15, 180 Hemberger, Herr, 42 Hendershot, Hal, 29, 31, 34, 41–42, 67, 70, 76, 123–124, 129, 135, 137, 139, 206, 219, 223 Henderson, Stuart, 2, 3, 29, 46, 57, 58, 60, 64, 66–74, 77–97, 100–136, 150–174, 177, 182, 184, 187, 189, 193, 208, 242 Henderson, Yvette, 103, 182 Herbslaub, 11 Heroes Program, 132 Heston, Charleton, 191

K Kadourah, Martin, 13 Kafi*, Badri 119, 69, 84, 88–89, 93–94, 111, 127, 129, 152, 201–202, 234 Kamp Van Zeist, 1, 186 Kassar, Monzer al, 176 Keen, Richard, 195, 203, 209–210, 212, 217–218, 223–224, 226, 229 Kelso, John, 30–31, 35, 42, 58 Kennedy, Angus, 42 Ker-Frisbie, 8 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 6 Khreesat, Marwan, 11–13, 43–44, 48, 51–55, 58, 60, 81, 118, 131, 136, 142, 166, 189, 199, 227 King*, Dick, 87–88 Klink, Manfred, 57, 91, 117, 124, 157 Knisley, Larry, 30, 65–66, 70, 135, 146–148

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Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Korean Air Flight 858, 26 Korsgaard, Walter, 30

MEBO, 62, 64, 66, 68–71, 82–86, 88–89, 96–97, 105–107, 115–116, 126–127, 129–130, 132, 159, 165, 169, 171, 173, 178, 200–202, 224– 225, 228, 232, 234, 236 Medtours, 93, 95, 98–100, 102, 106, 116, 127, 129, 204, 214, 220–221 Megrahi (Mohamed El), Abdel Baset Ali al, 1, 3–4, 73, 82–84, 86–89, 92–94, 96, 98–102, 105–106, 108–109, 111, 113–116, 118–120, 124, 127–130, 132, 136, 138–139, 141–142, 144, 151–152, 155–157, 159–161, 164–165, 168–170, 174, 183–184, 188–192, 194, 201– 204, 206, 208, 212–219, 221, 224–226, 228–229, 231, 233–234, 236–237, 240 Meister et Bollier, 64 Meister, Erwin, 64, 68, 84–85, 88, 90, 93–97, 116, 132, 201, 229, 232, 234 Mifsud, Joseph, 226, 235 Mills, Darrell, 27 Milne, Nicky, 91 Miska Bakery, 67, 72, 205, 212, 220, 223 Mitchell, Stephen, 195 Mitterrand, Francois, 163 Mohmed, Abdelbaset Ali, 202 Mohtashemi, Ayatollah, 178, 198 Morsbach, Ulrich, 42 Moses, 191 Mossad, 28, 53, 176 Mougrabi, Mahmud Said al, 223 Mougrabi, Mustapha al, 223 Mueller, Robert S. (Bob), 64–65, 79, 83, 85, 114, 118, 120, 122, 125, 133, 142–147, 151–152, 156–158, 162–164, 173–174, 231 Murray, Chris, 2, 178, 197–198, 206–207 Murtagh, Brian, 2, 64, 66, 72, 86, 89, 95, 125, 132, 145, 155–156, 160, 178, 181, 186, 216 Mustapha (LNU), 129

L La Belle Disco, 92, 126, 237–239 Laden, Osama bin, 118 Lafi, Mohamed (aka Mohamed al-Lafi Isa) 138, 214 Lake, Jonathan, 186, 194 Lang, Howard, 163, 174 Leavy, Thomas, 64 Leslie, Mike, 184 Le Winter, Oswald, 180 Libyan People’s Bureau (LPB), 69 Lockerbie Incident Control Centre (LICC), 31, 34, 50, 64, 70, 88, 91–92, 95, 97, 104, 108, 110, 123, 125, 128, 130–131, 134, 150, 157, 168, 177, 195 Lothian and Borders Constabulary, 126, 168 Luker, Butch, 154 Lumpert, Ueli, 68–69, 85, 116, 127, 130, 132, 201– 202, 234

M Maas, Hartwig, 42, 47, 157 MacDougall, James, 42, 71, 90, 125, 132–133 MacGregor, Alistair, 167 MacKechnie, Eddie, 190, 195 MacLean, Ranald Norman Munro, Lord, 3, 194 Macleod, Murdo, 195 MacQuarrie, James, 15 Maghur, Kamal, 194 Mahmudi*, Abu Agila, 89, 115, 127, 129–130, 214, 217 Maid of the Seas, 15, 62, 208, 229 Maier, Kurt, 204 Majid, Abdul, See Giaka, Abd al Majid Major, John, 19, 25, 57, 118, 121, 235 Maltese Double Cross, 178–179 Marshall, Maurice, 107 Marshman, Ed, 66, 80–81, 93, 145, 227 Marzook, Mohamed Abdou Salam El, (aka Marzuq, Muhammad al, and Nayil, Muhammad Ali al) 61–62, 69, 82, 120, 126, 224 Matthews*, Tony, 116, 134, 139, 143, 146–147, 149, 151–152 McClain, John, 182 McCulloch, Tom, 189–190, 198–199 McDonald, Jeffrey, 2 McFadyen, Norman, 42, 71, 90, 132–134, 186, 192 McKee, Beulah, 57, 175, 177 McKee, Charles, 57, 175, 177

N Nada, Abu, 67, 212, 223 National Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 10 National Security Agency (NSA), 31, 74 National Security Council (NSC), 161, 163, 197 New Scotland Yard (NSY), 27, 38, 47, 114, 116, 224 Newell, Paul, 41–42, 46 Niasse, Ahmed Khalifa, 224 Noonan, Karen, 36, 128 Noriega, Manuel, 79 Normand, Andrew, 42 Novetske, Sally, 173–174

O Orkin*, John Scott, 60 Orr, John, 2, 29, 38, 41–42, 50, 70, 94–95, 182

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Index Stahl, Leslie, 196–197 Stasi, 170, 173, 178, 201–202, 229, 234 State and Local Antiterrorism Training (SLATT), 242 Stephens, Jay, 83, 118, 120, 122, 125, 130, 132– 133, 142, 146, 164 Stethem, Robert Dean, 7 Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC), 22, 114 Strathclyde, 17, 29, 49, 126, 182 Sutherland, Ranald Iain, Lord, 3–4, 194, 231 Swire, Flora, 185 Swire, Jim, 185 Swissair Flight 330, 11

P Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza Shah, 6 Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), 179 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 180 Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), 195, 203, 205, 212, 223, 235 Phelan, Peter, 42 Plaskett, Thomas, 52 Platt, Judge Thomas, 160 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 10 Popular Front for the Liberation of PalestineGeneral Command (PFLP-GC), 10–11, 13, 28, 33–35, 38–39, 41–44, 46–48, 50, 52– 53, 57, 59–60, 62–63, 70, 73–75, 83, 103– 105, 114, 117–118, 121, 128, 159, 163, 165–166, 169, 175–176, 180, 195, 198–199, 204, 212, 221, 223–224, 227–228, 234–235 PT-35, 58–60, 62, 66, 68, 84, 86, 96–97, 105, 107, 124, 146, 232 Pugh, Bonnie Barnes, 97 Puzzle Piece, 135

T Taheri, Parviz, 195, 221–222, 235 Talb, Mohammad Abu, 195, 203, 205, 212, 219, 223, 229, 235 Taylor, William, 194, 203, 210, 212, 216–217, 219, 221–223, 226, 228–229 Terrorist Research and Analytical Center (TRAC), 22, 30 Terwilliger, George, 142 Thatcher, Margaret, 104 Thornburgh, Richard, 120, 133 Thurman, Tom, 35, 60–62, 86, 105, 146, 232 Tsairis, Alexia, 181 Tsairis, Aphrodite, 181 Turman, Kathryn, 2, 182, 186, 242 Turnbull, Alan, 186, 194 TWA Flight 800, 21

R Reagan, Ronald, 6, 10, 31, 118 Reid, Phil, 1–3, 29, 67, 72, 82, 92, 98–102, 106, 109–111, 116–117, 123–124, 129, 131, 135, 137, 139, 146–148, 157–158, 187, 206, 213, 220 Ringgold, Al, 108, 112 Ringgold, Marcia, 112 Ross, Brian, 177, 182 Rowan, Roy, 175–177, 182 Roxburgh, Douglas, 195 Royal Armament Research Defense Establishment (RARDE), 33, 38, 40, 48, 86, 90, 95, 107, 111, 114, 130, 151 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), 24 Ryan*, Tim, 206

U Ulster Defense League, 28 UTA Flight 772, 79, 97, 111, 118, 171, 238

V

S

Vassallo, Vincent, 92–93, 95, 98–102, 106, 109, 113, 116, 119, 124, 129–130, 132, 138, 142, 145–146, 153, 157–160, 163, 174, 188, 211– 212, 214, 220–221, 233 Vincent*, Sally, 36–37

Sabir, Mansur Umram (aka Saber, Mansour Omran Ammar), 61, 69, 120, 126, 224 Safi*, Mustafa al, 129 Salinger, Pierre, 121–122, 168–169, 189, 213, 222, 224–225, 228, 236 Scotbom, 91, 119, 144, 167, 182, 227 Senussi, Abdullah, 121, 126, 202, 218 Sessions, William S., 29, 38, 83, 120, 151, 163– 164 Shamikh*, Nassir al, 127, 129 Sims, Terri, 210 Skinner, Sam, 120 Skroski, Frank, 221 Smith, Brad, 114 Sobchak, Jim, 206, 219 Soukup, Otmar, 124

W Wagner, Raymond, 15 Waikart, Frank, 125, 132, 134, 143, 146–147, 149, 151 Watson, Dale, 196 Weather Underground Organization, 23 Webster, William H., 29, 52 Westrate, Dave, 66 Whitaker, Larry, 175, 178–179, 227–228 Williams, George, 185

249

Scotbom: Evidence and the Lockerbie Investigation Williams, “Gordie”, 229 Williamson, Willie, 104–105, 125 Wilson*, Tom, 93, 108, 151–153, 155 Wolfe, Miriam, 181 Wolfe, Rosemary, 181

World Trade Center, 21, 25

Y Yorkie Clothing Company, 49 Yunis, Fawaz, 7–8, 114, 134, 141

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