Science and Society in the Face of the New Security Threats

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SCIENCE AND SOCIETY IN THE FACE OF THE NEW SECURITY THREATS

NATO Security through Science Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme for Security through Science (STS). Meetings supported by the NATO STS Programme are in security-related priority areas of Defence Against Terrorism or Countering Other Threats to Security. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO STS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action Following a transformation of the programme in 2004 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

Chemistry and Biology Physics and Biophysics Environmental Security Information and Communication Security Human and Societal Dynamics

Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media IOS Press IOS Press

http://www.nato.int/science http://www.springeronline.nl http://www.iospress.nl

Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 7

ISSN: 1574-5597

Science and Society in the Face of the New Security Threats

Edited by

Mary Sharpe St. Edmund’s College, University of Cambridge, UK

and

Abimbola Agboluaje St. Edmund’s College, University of Cambridge, UK

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Science, Society and Security: Developing a Scientific Community to Tackle New Security Threats Cambridge, UK 26–28 September 2004

© 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 1-58603-593-2 Library of Congress Control Number: 2006920168 Publisher IOS Press Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected] Distributor in the UK and Ireland Gazelle Books Falcon House Queen Square Lancaster LA1 1RN United Kingdom fax: +44 1524 63232

Distributor in the USA and Canada IOS Press, Inc. 4502 Rachael Manor Drive Fairfax, VA 22032 USA fax: +1 703 323 3668 e-mail: [email protected]

LEGAL NOTICE The publisher is not responsible for the use which might be made of the following information. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

Science and Society in the Face of the New Security Threats M. Sharpe and A. Agboluaje (Eds.) IOS Press, 2006 © 2006 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Preface The workshop came about as a result of my involvement as a researcher at Cambridge University where I met Chris Donnelly, Senior Fellow at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, a man of great vision, humility and tireless energy in the encouragement of cooperation and new thinking at every level in our ever-changing world. His mentorship has been truly inspiring. He encouraged me in two areas, first to bring together various strands of my previous experience: working as an Advocate inter alia with the Commissioners for Research and Development and Information Technologies at the European Commission in Brussels; with the Cambridge-MIT Institute in Cambridge and with my work at the Judge Business School in Cambridge on the Eurasia Programme of Advanced Leadership and Management for young professionals from the former Soviet Union. Second he helped me network to obtain potential partners who could contribute to and benefit from a forum of discussion about changes in the world of science and security and what was needed to help our societies both locally and globally to survive and flourish. I made contact with my co-Director Dr. Svetlana Saveleva through a former colleague and with a small group of willing organisers, developed a programme that we thought would illustrate the challenges faced by several nations today and provide hope and inspiration though presentations of best practice and new initiatives in a number of diverse locations: UK-US, Turkey, Norway, Baltic States. The event itself took place in the autumnal sunshine of St. John’s College Cambridge. After setting the scene of the scientific and security challenges facing NATO, the Military, the Police, and society in general, we looked at the experience of several countries in particular. This was followed by the break out sessions which were tailored to allow discussion among the different groups representing the wealthier western countries, the former Soviet Union and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. This meant they could better focus on their own areas of cultural and social concern rather than have a mixture in each break out group. The facilitators chosen were experts in the issues and helped generate valuable debate. A mix too of different sectors – public and private, civilian and military, (industry, academia, military, police, intelligence services), national and international – were chosen to promote helpful dialogue, cooperation and highlight case studies of successful inter-sector and interdisciplinary projects. Again this worked well in practice and helped develop an opportunity for a useful network of experts. Everyone had a part to play in the proceedings as a speaker, facilitator, rapporteur or chair person. Consideration was given to providing sufficient time for informal discussion over coffee breaks, lunch, dinner where so many fruitful ideas can be forthcoming. On the last evening a party atmosphere was created in an historic pub in Cambridge where each of the remaining participants had to say a poem, tell a joke or sing a song in their national tongue followed by a translation in English. Expressions of cultural diversity remind us of our common humanity with themes such as love and loss helping to nurture tolerance, understanding and a good laugh.

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My thanks go to Lucie Bratinkova, Gwen Buchan, Rachel Priestman for their help as rapporteurs or general support during the event itself; to Professor Ralph Pettman (International Relations) of Victoria University of Wellington who had to cancel attendance at the eleventh hour due to illness but had been a great help in the lead up to the workshop; Eve Williamson for her patience with typing and general organisation, and to Abimbola Agboluaje who stepped in to help both during the workshop as a rapporteur and then in the post-production phase with making up the CD-Rom and helping to edit this book. My appreciation is also for Fernando Carvalho Rodrigues who gave an insightful after-dinner speech and encouraged me, like Chris Donnelly, to develop my research and new ideas further. Such endorsement from men of utter distinction is humbling, but encouraging. My thanks too for Liz Cowan from NATO, a fellow Scot, for helping me through many a bureaucratic challenge. Mary Sharpe

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Introduction Since the end of the Cold War, the threats to the security of the NATO countries have evolved rapidly both in type and source. The swift developments in science and technology have played a large part in this for better or worse. In turn it has forced changes to the composition and identity of NATO as well as to its organisational functions. The nature of the new threats however has significantly mutated, adding new dimensions, especially since the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York. With the rise of multinational jihad, governments and security agencies in the West have come to accept that not only will there be large-scale, high-impact attacks on human lives and socio-economic systems in their societies, but these attacks are going to be planned and executed from within their borders, sometimes by citizens of their own societies. The discovery of terrorist cells operating in Europe and the peak-hour bomb attacks on commuters in Spain and London have brought home fully the novelty and challenges of the emerging security threats. They throw up questions about the links to and the implications for the security of the current national criminal justice systems, European immigration control coordination, the cooperation between law enforcement agencies and other players. More than ever, it has become apparent that organisational design, security structures and the related military instruments will have to undergo rapid and profound changes to face the new security threats. The essays in this volume demonstrate that countries, regions and organisations such as NATO and the European Union, have to call on new capabilities and bring new players into the process of forestalling terrorist attacks and minimising their impact whenever they do occur. Scientists and technologists have an important role to play. Innovative relationships and adaptable mechanisms of cooperation also have to be fostered amongst established agencies in order to leverage existing capabilities. In addition, it has become crucial to apply systematically the tools and insights of new (in terms of their relevance to security questions) academic disciplines, especially the social sciences, in the effort to understand better the new threats to security and enhance the capability to combat them. For instance, insights into personal and group psychology can aid us not only to manage our own perception of risk as a society but also to understand better the viewpoint of others in different societies where some of these threats originate and where the issues are complex, deep and long term. It is not enough to devise smart technologies to forestall or mitigate threats or encourage NATO partner countries to join such efforts. Rather, an important component of the fight against terrorism is to seek to improve educational opportunities for the poor and for women in particular, foster social-economic systems where the beneficial fruits of modernity can be developed and where the “knowledge worker” rather than the ideologue of multinational jihad becomes the popular role model. Some of these concerns about how political and economic systems can be made to generate opportunities for citizens in place of security threats are relevant not only to NATO Mediterranean Dialogue countries but also to Central Asian ones too. The corruption, weak state capacity and feeble rule of law which undermine economic performance and create social inequalities and political instability not only open up oppor-

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tunities for terrorists to operate freely, they themselves generate threats to security which are as grave as those emanating from distorted religious ideologies. The change in the sources and types of threat to security poses a host of challenges to NATO. Old alliance members are grappling with the task of building new systems of sharing information between national agencies and internationally to counter threats that are embedded in their societies. They are also fostering new relationships (in research, information processing and procurement) with new players such as mobile telephone firms and other technology firms. At the same time, NATO must seek to replicate this emerging architecture of security structures and mechanisms in new member countries as well as partner countries. The world can ill-afford a scenario where terrorist networks adopt and deploy new technologies faster than security agencies can use them to defend societies and economic systems. NATO is thus faced with great pressures to stimulate technological innovations to foil and mitigate terrorist attacks and rapidly transfer these innovations across national frontiers. It is also important to foster simultaneously the scientific capacity of newer members to contribute to such innovations. The most “relevant” types of technology for combating the new threats themselves present challenges and opportunities. They are smart and nimble applications. They render routine administrative processes and the daily run of social and economic life more “terror-proof”, more so than big budget military equipment designed for aerial or land battles with mass armies. They are however also more physically removed from the human beings at whom they are targeted and resemble more readily computer games than real-life combat with deadly and widespread consequences. Critically they also depend upon good intelligence about the targets – a key human component in the whole operation. While this technology perhaps makes it easier for the scientific communities in many countries to target and devise solutions for specific threats, it creates the problem of coordinating diverse suppliers. It also ignores the very real issue of establishing or re-establishing trusting relationships in the aftermath of such conflicts when it is hoped democratic structures can be put in place to allow economic life to develop and flourish. Greater links have to be forged between universities and industry in the richer OECD countries, while at the same time, the main problem in the new NATO countries of East and Central Europe is basic funding for research. The strategies to combat the new security threats encompass a wide range of institutional functions, expertise and actors. Thus it is essential to make the work of multilateral institutions like the EU more security-wise as their policies impinge on western and foreign societies. They should also coordinate their security-related research capabilities with the programmes of explicit security structures like NATO. The advanced research workshop was quite thematically broad and conceptually innovative: first in seeking to explore how science could offer answers to new security threats; second, explore what changes societies must undergo to enable them to combat the new threats, and third what roles NATO can play in the process. The discussions at the workshop and the articles in this volume richly combine the experience and insights of security experts, academics, policy makers and advisers, scientists and academics and business people from diverse regions. These backgrounds also cut across perspectives from within regional, international and national organisations and agencies. This diversity is itself an example of the multi-disciplinary approach that is required to combat the new security threats. The experts have brought their unique insights to bear on the topics of the ARW and have offered a number of fascinating practical recommenda-

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tions. While their viewpoints and conclusions do not always coincide, they have raised new practical and conceptual questions on how society, science and technology interrelate in the face of new security threats. The discussions in the breakout groups were uncharacteristically forthright. These views and the key insights from the discussions at the workshop are succinctly set out in the executive summary.

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Executive Summary The workshop took place in Cambridge, UK from 26–28 September 2004, which explored the challenges faced by the science establishments in the new security environment across a range of NATO countries, and examined possible solutions by looking in closer detail at some national case studies. The proceedings started with a keynote address by Professor Sir Brian Heap, Master of St. Edmund’s College, Cambridge University, and UK representative on the NATO Science Committee, setting out the importance of the NATO Security Through Science programme in the new security environment. A first discussion set the scene, viewing the new security threat in its historical context and looking then at the differing perspectives of industry, academia and the military, to the current security environment. Other sessions discussed: the situation in three different geographical locations – former Soviet Union, Mediterranean Dialogue, western European countries with the US; the issue of breaking down barriers among the scientific communities; between government and industry; amongst ministries, between international agencies and academics; between policy makers and industry. The workshop also studied models that offered potential solutions or some guidance to other countries with similar issues, using case studies for the UK, Turkey and Scandinavia. The participants came from several former Soviet bloc countries (Russia, Armenia, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Hungary and the Czech Republic) some Mediterranean Dialogue countries (Algeria, Jordan), as well as from Germany, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, the USA, and representatives of international institutions (the EU and NATO). The co-directors of the meeting were Mary Sharpe of Cambridge University, UK, and Dr. Svetlana Saveleva, City Hospital Polyclinic, Omsk, Russia.

Observations 1. 2.

3.

4.

It is clear that many scientists are not aware of security issues nor are interested in them. There is a general problem of poor management of research policy and a lack of leadership as to priority areas. This applies at government level down to the institutions themselves. Funding, and security of long term funding in science and technology, is a major issue especially for the poorer countries. It is particularly the younger people who need to have hope of a job who can benefit from it and thus be less attracted to fundamentalist thinking. There is still too much separation between sectors (industry, academia and government). 80% of companies in the UK have no involvement with the universities. The issue of ‘stove piping’ was everywhere within institutions and between different sectors-operational secrecy was at play. The problem was largely one of security clearance and thereby the reluctance to share information and work together.

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5. 6.

Three processes are required: interdisciplinary; inter institutional and multilateral education and activity. Much more networking is essential. One group emphasised the difference between hard and soft science issues: easier to collaborate with scientists and other actors in soft/civil science matters as there was no issue of security clearance. Harder issues attract more funding but there are more difficulties on the timeline due to the time it takes to get security clearance for everyone concerned.

Recommendations 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Need to ‘up’ the political will in certain countries especially in the former Soviet Union so that scientific research in security-related matters is given the help and support required. NATO could be a major facilitator in making this happen. Better executive education could help raise awareness among decision makers of the need to work more closely with other departments and sectors and to prevent duplication and stove piping. This includes participants at meetings being fully aware of their role and what is expected of them so as not to stall progress through ignorance or misinformation. More to be done to encourage the contact between academia and small and medium-sized enterprises. The big companies do well out of collaboration, but the smaller companies need support and encouragement. This is particularly the case in developing countries where the age group most open to extremist influence could have the chance of developing constructive careers. Paradox, we have to be sensitive in suggesting ideas rather than imposing models. It is the imposing of western values without sensitivity to local customs or levels of education that seems to be one of the main roots of the current terrorist threat. Selected scientists within institutions should obtain media training and become more proactive in having science and scientific views put across in the various media. By developing long term relationships with journalists they will raise their institutions’ profile and have a better chance to influence discussion at times of crises. A huge presentation or PR job requires to be done (NATO could help) to have moderate Muslims temper the image of the extremists. Focus too is required on more optimistic outcomes. Societies can be turned around as happened in New York when the community worked with the police force to reduce crime. Same could be done to reduce ongoing threat of terrorist operations.

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List of Participants AGBOLUAJE Dr. Abimbola AL-KHUDHAIRY Dr. Delilah AL TAHAT Jamal BOROS Dr. Bánk BOUKRA Dr. Liess BOWYER Lt. Col. Daren COOMBES Col. (Rtd) Marcus DEARLOVE Sir Richard DONNELLY Chris, CMG DURODIE Dr. Bill FOUHY Inspector Jeff HEAP Professor Sir Brian HUPPERT Professor Herbert LIVINGSTONE David JARULAITIS Dr. Robertas KARAKULLUKCU Memduh KEKELIDZE Temur KELLY Professor Mike KEMP Dr. Michael MALMSTEIN Raul MOGILOWSKI Jűrgen MOORA Evija NEKVASIL Dr. Vladimir SALNIKOVA Dr. Olga SAVELEVA Dr. Svetlana SHARPE Mary, Advocate STARKEY Julian TCHILINGIRIAN Dr. Hratch TORP Jan Erik ZIMMERMANN Dr. Doran

University of Cambridge, UK Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Italy National Defence College, Jordan University of Miskolc, Hungary Public Institute of Research and Field Survey, Algiers Royal Military College, Shrivenham, UK Cranfield University, Shrivenham, UK University of Cambridge, England Defence Academy of the United Kingdom King’s College, London Metropolitan Police, London St. Edmund’s College, Cambridge, UK Royal Society, London Morgan Aquila Ltd, UK Ministry of National Defence, Lithuania ARI Teknokent AS, Turkey National Security Council, Georgia Cambridge-MIT Institute, Cambridge, UK Teraview, Cambridge, UK State Chancellory, Republic of Estonia Embassy of Germany, London Ministry of Defence, Latvia Academy of Science, Czech Republic Omsk State Technical University, Russia Omsk City Dental Polyclinic No1, Russia St. Edmund’s College, Cambridge, UK Ministry of Defence, UK The Judge Business School, Cambridge Norwegian Defence Research Establishmentm, Norway Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich


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Contents Preface Mary Sharpe Introduction Executive Summary List of Participants

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Section One. Setting the Scene NATO’s Science for Peace Programme Brian Heap

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Science and Security in the 21st Century: New Challenges and New Responses Chris Donnelly

7

Tangible Problems for Armies Fighting in the New Security Environment Daren Bowyer

19

The United Kingdom Police Counter-Terrorism Unit Jeff Fouhy

25

Cultural Precursors and Psychological Consequences of Contemporary Western Responses to Acts of Terror Bill Durodie

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Section Two. Other Nations’ Perspectives Key Security Issues in the Caspian Region Hratch Tchilingirian Estonian Research and Development Policy: A Vital Contribution to European Security Raul Malmstein

51

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Lithuanian Scientists – Military Implications of the Challenges Robertas Jarulaitis

61

Hungary on the Road Bánk L. Boros

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A Small Nation Perspective – Norway Jan Erik Torp

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Section Three. Initiatives to Break Down Barriers Amongst Scientific Communities Science and Security in the EU Delilah Al-Khudhairy and Jean-Marie Cadiou

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The Cambridge-MIT Institute as an Example of International Collaboration: The Emerging Lessons E.C. Crawley and M.J. Kelly

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A Strategy for Pre-Preemption: Designing Innovation Agoras to Inspire Progress and Project Stability Memduh Karakullukcu

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The Royal Society and Security Herbert Huppert Government and the Business Community – The Role of Industry in the New Anti-Terrorism Era David Livingstone

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Annex. Examples of Breakout Group Discussions Annex 1: Breakout Group on Eastern Europe: The Way Ahead

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Annex 2: Breakout Group on the Middle East: Discussion Report

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Annex 3: Breakout Group on Western Nations

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Author Index

141

Section One Setting the Scene



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NATO’s Science for Peace Programme Professor Sir Brian HEAP St. Edmund’s College, Cambridge UK Representative on the NATO Science Committee Abstract. A study of history shows us that at approximately every 50 years the world experiences a revolutionary change in the nature of armed conflict provoked by sociological, technological or other external factors (Donnelly 2004). In the past two centuries there was the development of mass conscript armies during the Napoleonic wars, rapid-firing rifled weapons in the mid-19th century, industrialisation of military production before WWI, and nuclear weaponry and their delivery during WWII. Donnelly is of the view that we are in the middle of such a change ushered in by the events of 11 September 2001, the new global power balance after the welcome collapse of the Cold War and bipolar security, the advances in technology, and growing gap between rich and poor nations and the information revolution. As a result we have moved from a Cold War to a Hot Peace with a new threat to global security through the asymmetric conflict particularly in the ‘arc of instability’ stretching from North Africa to Central Asia. The North Atlantic Alliance (NAA) founded originally by 12 nations after the Second World War was preoccupied for some 40 years with the Cold War and the threat posed by the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, NATO reinvented itself by focussing on Partnership with the nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States. It has now expanded to 26 member states and 46 Partner nations and faces a new challenge of defining its role in the 21st century. It currently sees itself as ensuring the joint security through political and military cooperation and collective defence of its member states. In this paper I wish to argue that such a view needs to be transformed. First, ‘security’ means much more than just military might; it includes non-military threats such as incompetent governance, corruption, organised crime, insecure borders, smuggling, illegal migration, ethnic and religious conflict, proliferation of WMDs, shortage of natural resources and of course terrorism. Second, a unique opportunity exists to contribute to world peace through the leadership role that can be exerted by the Ambassadors of NATO in Brussels. The background to my argument emerges from a scientific rather than a purely military perspective based on my experience as UK Representative on the NATO Science Committee.

The Third Dimension In today’s world, science, technology and engineering have become central in the debate concerning many policies. Sadly, this priority has hardly surfaced at NATO which is still dominated by a two dimensional view based on its military and political activities. Hence, NATO’s major publications entitled ‘NATO in the 21st Century’, ‘Understanding the new NATO’, and ‘NATO after Prague’ make no reference to its third dimension – Science. Hence, the media and many others have great difficulty in recognising that NATO has had a third dimension since the 1950s, namely, its highly significant Science Programme dedicated to the use of civil science for peace. The Programme has supported the work of thousands of scientists some of whom have become Noble Prize winners.

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B. Heap / NATO’s Science for Peace Programme

Science, technology and engineering have much to offer today’s NATO particularly at a time when its focus has turned towards international security. The Science Programme’s role has been expressed by the distinguished physicist, Freeman Dyson; ‘the most useful contribution that scientists can make to the abolition of war has nothing to do with technology. The international community of scientists may help to abolish war by setting an example to the world of practical cooperation across barriers of nationality, language and culture’.

Science for Peace Civil science is an effective vehicle for international dialogue. It is able to identify, understand and counter vulnerabilities and threats, it is a means of both finding answers to key questions and connecting nations, and of enabling unemployed scientists in former Soviet Union countries to be engaged in productive research. However, while international terrorism poses a real threat to society, terrorism does not operate in isolation from other global risks such as climate change, poverty, environmental damage and the continuing inequities between more and less developed nations. The NATO Science Programme has been characterized in the past by high quality, non-military, civil science. Various instruments have been used including Fellowship schemes, Collaborative Science and Technology grants, Infrastructure funding, the Science for Peace initiative, together with Advanced Research Workshops (ARW), Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) and Study Visits. Typically, each year the Science Programme involves some 10,000 scientists working together, the publication of about 100 volumes of scientific papers, and it has created over 2,500 Fellowships for Partner country scientists. Recently, it has established an annual prize for the most prestigious and relevant research. One recent ARW held in Lisbon addressed the subject of ‘Suicide Terrorism: the strategic threat and countermeasures’. Suicide terrorism defined as an act of intentionally killing oneself for the sake of killing others has occurred more than 300 times between 2000 and 2003 killing more than 5,300 people in 17 countries. It was noted that Saudi-born and Hamas operatives were often ‘educated above reasonable employment level… a surprising number have graduate degrees and come from high-status families’. Nevertheless, low social esteem and social marginality were contributing factors among others including Palestinian and Chechen suicide bombers. One of the Science Programme’s most successful initiatives has been Science for Peace. Its objectives have been to use high quality science and technology first, to create linkages between scientists in Alliance nations and those in nations of the Former Soviet Union (fSU); second, to use the research outputs to develop ‘spin-off’ companies in the fSU countries; and third, to transfer the outputs to other end-users such as environmental agencies. The Science for Peace Programme has been a stunning success and examples include numerous industrial initiatives and environmental projects concerned with clean water supplies and pollution. However, the long-term future of this Programme is at serious risk from funding cutbacks ordered by Alliance nations. Other successes include the development of internet technologies and communication networks between scientists in Alliance and Central Asian nations, the so-called Virtual Silk Highway. The Silk Highway consists of a satellite-based regional system connecting for the first time by a Turkish-French satellite, three Caucasian and five Central Asian new independent states with one earth station per country. Afghanistan


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has been added to the network. The primary purpose of the Highway is to link scientists together, and to provide education and training in schools and universities. The Highway is governed by the Silk Board and its Executive Committee, which consists of managers from each country, meets with potential funders in attendance (Soros, World Bank, Aga Khan Foundation). No access is given to the military. The NATO Science Committee has agreed to provide funding until 2007 and the success of this venture has been unanimously applauded by all Partners countries. Other examples of collaboration between Alliance and Partner countries include projects with Caucasian, Central Asia and Mediterranean countries.

Security Through Science The new focus of the Science Programme confirmed by the North Atlantic Council of Ambassadors is entitled ‘Security through Science’. Priority topics have been identified, both to pre-empt and defend against terrorism, to counter other threats to security such as resource management, and to address specific priorities identified by Partner countries (see www.nato.int/science). Grants are relatively small in value but they are indicative of priority areas that need support and often lead to the leverage of more substantial funding from other national and international agencies.

Bottlenecks The following need to be addressed. First, the total budget for the NATO Science programme has been cut repeatedly (now less than €20m and declining each year through decisions taken at Ambassadorial level). It represents less than 1% of the total NATO budget. Many Alliance Ambassadors fail to acknowledge the connection between civil science and the security of their citizens; they remain wedded to the view that science, technology and engineering are just for the invention of weaponry. This is further reflected in the decisions of the North Atlantic Council, which have pushed the civil science of NATO towards weapons rather than recognising the immense opportunities of science directed towards improving civil society and the removal of inequities, often the root of terrorism. The argument is used that other bodies such as the European Commission now provide for such collaboration but this ignores the fact that NATO science remains the only formal transatlantic link between basic scientists in North America, Greater Europe and the Partner nations. Needless to say, another section of NATO, the Research and Technology Organisation based in Paris, is tasked with the responsibility of the development of weaponry, both in terms of its utility and protection against its deployment by threatening forces of terrorists. Second, little collaboration exists between NATO, its Science Programme and the current programme of the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. Substantial overlaps exist and insufficient attention has been given to how the funds available to both parties could be used more efficiently to counter international terrorism. Current plans by the Commission to increase funding for this purpose to sums in excess of 1bn euros in Framework 7 make this discussion a most urgent priority. Third, NATO needs to work with the OECD in promoting responsible stewardship among the scientific community to seek ways to avoid potential abuse of dual-use research.

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Comment In conclusion, the model of the NATO Science Programme has great potential to connect nations through their scientific communities. NATO’s transformed Security through Science Programme has a non-threatening image, it uses civil science as a democratic instrument, and it can contribute to trust and security. The transatlantic programme is one of the few that remains to connect scientists in North America, greater Europe and the former Soviet Union. On its western border, it spans the Atlantic. In the east it reaches some 46 Partner nations and includes special initiatives with Russia and the Ukraine, and a growing dialogue with the Mediterranean countries. Important bottlenecks exist that the Ambassadors need to address. They have the opportunity to create a transformed NATO and they miss the opportunity at their peril – and ours – at this moment of revolutionary change in the mode of armed conflict and the attainment of international security.


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Science and Security in the 21st Century: New Challenges and New Responses Chris DONNELLY Senior Fellow, Headquaters of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom Abstract. The new challenges that international terrorism presents to security constitute the latest of the revolutions in the nature of armed conflict that the world experiences approximately every fifty years. Like the ones before it, the current revolution has been driven by a multiplicity of factors. It is mainly characterised by the proliferation of technology, the growing gap between rich and poor countries and the information revolution. The nature of the new threats calls for responses that are non-military. The nature of military forces also has to change to combat these threats. The implications of these changes for NATO and the EU are analysed. Various actors need to form a ‘security community’ in order to effectively combat these threats.

To set the context for discussing the role that science, scientists, and science policy might play in promoting national, regional, and global security, the changing nature of conflict was thoroughly canvassed. The new security environment was clearly described, and the challenges to the contemporary “security community” carefully outlined. (Donnelly)

1. The Changing Nature of Conflict A study of history shows us that approximately every fifty years the world experiences a revolutionary change – a paradigm shift – in the nature of armed conflict, provoked by sociological, technological or other external factors. Examples from the past two centuries would be: the development of effective mass conscript armies during the Napoleonic wars [c 1800]; the introduction of rapid-firing rifled weapons in the mid-19 th Century; the industrialization of military production and relevant infrastructure that preceded WWI; and, the development of nuclear weapons and their global delivery systems during and immediately after at the end of WWII. It seems to me that we are now in the midst of just such a ‘revolutionary’ change, ushered in by the dramatic developments of the last decade and brought into sharp focus on 11 September 2001. The major factors underlying this change, which is still ongoing, I would tentatively identify as follows: − − −

the new global power balance which has emerged following the end of the Cold War, and the consequent impact on the geo-strategic significance of states; the rapid advances of technology; changing attitudes to the use of armed force in Western societies.

C. Donnelly / Science and Security in the 21st Century: New Challenges and New Responses

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1.1. The New Security Scene As far as Europe and North America are concerned, the specific elements of the above factors which have the greatest impact on the current security scene are: − − −

The uncontrollable proliferation of technology. The growing gap between rich and poor countries. The information revolution.

As a result we need to reassess what constitutes security, what are the threats to security, and what should be our responses to those threats, including the particular threat of terrorism. It is this challenge, which today faces our governments with the need to reform their security establishment, including the scientific basis to support that establishment. As is so often the case, it is not a single cause but the combination of new factors which creates the new security conditions and which will generate new security threats. Take, for instance, the issue of technology proliferation mentioned above. Technological advantage in warfare is always transient. It would be unwise to assume that ‘Western’ technological superiority will in all cases translate into overwhelming military superiority. Today, the rapid proliferation of technology means that even small developing countries – especially those run by strong dictatorial regimes – can, by focussing their efforts, acquire weapons and delivery means which can pose a real threat to major powers. When this is coupled with fanaticism the threat is even more evident. Furthermore, the nature of modern weaponry means that, unless the technology gap is truly enormous [as it was between the US and the Taliban or Saddam’s Army], a determined and competent defender today could make a ‘forced entry’ too costly for any country to contemplate. Forces that can be projected and maintained overseas can be ten times more expensive than conscript forces for national defence. Compare for example, the firepower that Canada and Israel can deploy for roughly the same defence expenditure. The West’s capacity for military intervention may be a lot less than is sometimes supposed. The growing gap between rich and poor countries poses a potential security problem in many ways, not just when combined with the problem of proliferation of technology. This gap is most dramatically evident if we compare the statistics for population growth and per capita income for the countries of North Africa and the Middle East with those of Europe, and project these over the next ten years. It is wrong to blame this growing wealth gap on ‘Western’ countries just as it is wrong to conclude that poverty alone produces, or even justifies, terrorism. In fact, in what is now becoming known as the ‘arc of instability’ stretching from North Africa to Central Asia, incompetent government, social injustice and lack of democracy are by far the greatest causes of discontent. But the discontent and desperation generate such serious security problems as illegal migration and drug smuggling and create the breeding grounds for fanaticism that can in turn produce regional instability and terrorism. This is a worsening problem and one that will have to be dealt with on its home ground by proactive measures [which may be military, political or economic] as well as by protective or defensive measures in our countries. This, too, has important implications for our security policy, and for the kind of scientific support which that policy needs. The information revolution is the third general factor that has so changed the security environment. This has several aspects. It is one of the factors which contributes to the proliferation of technology. It can accentuate the ‘poverty gap’ by making it more


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evident. In democracies it has two major implications. Firstly, reliance on information technology can render a society very vulnerable to certain forms of terrorist attack. Secondly, democracies can no longer exert any control over the flow of information and therefore over the media. Yet dictatorships can, if they are sufficiently efficient, manipulate the media to a certain degree and thereby have a considerable influence on public opinion, including in democracies with which they may be in conflict. Governmental information and even military intelligence can no longer compete with the media for speed of information transit. As a result, every action which a democracy takes in pursuance of its security, be it a military operation or not, will in future be played out in a new environment – that of intrusive media attention. Media attention will also have uneven consequences. If we intervene in countries outside Europe, regional onlookers will see what they want to see. Even the televized ruins of the World Trade Center have not served as evidence to justify subsequent American actions. Furthermore, in the future it will be widely understood that all televized imagery [hitherto the basis of international proof] can be faked with computer-generated pictures. Whatever we explain or show about ‘just cause’ or ‘proportionate military response’ to our own publics, we should not expect those among whom we intervene to believe passionately in anything except demonstrated conspiracy, aggression and arrogant use of force. If we do not take account of this and prepare accordingly, then even the best-led military operation will suffer severely, and may prove counter-productive. Added to these general trends we have seen, in the past decade or so, the welcome collapse of the Cold War confrontation and with it, the bipolar security system. It is this which precipitated the sudden and dramatic shift in the security environment. We have gone, in a very short time, from Cold War to Hot Peace. We have witnessed a significant change in what constitutes security.

2. Redefining Security: New Threats and Responses Only a decade ago, ‘national security’ was synonymous with ‘defence’. East and West faced the threat of WWIII, characterized in Europe by the threat of invasion which was feared, with whatever justification, by both East and West. The threat was common, as was the response – mass armies based, in continental countries, on mass mobilization and conscript military service. Deterrence was by conventional defence backed up by the threat of nuclear weapons. ‘Security’ was measured largely in military strength. Today ‘security’ means much more than just military might. In as far as ‘security’ retains its military significance, ‘deterrence’ is by guarantee of effective counterattack [the difficulties and cost of which put a premium on crisis and conflict prevention]. Otherwise, security has become a much broader issue. For most European/EuroAtlantic countries, security today is primarily measured in non-military terms and threats to security are non-military in nature. These threats include – incompetent government, corruption, organized crime, insecure borders, smuggling [weapons, drugs, contraband, people], illegal migration, ethnic and religious conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, shortage of natural resources [eg, water] and, of course, terrorism. All developed nations face these threats. But they face them in different measure, and therefore they will require a different response. This is in marked contrast to Cold War days, where threat and response were more or less the same everywhere. The need

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for differentiated response is the factor which today most complicates the evolution of security alliances [NATO and EU ESDP]. If it is to be worthwhile, an alliance must offer each and every member a clear and unequivocal security advantage. It must repay their financial and political cost. Today, this means that an alliance must meet the now different security needs of each member rather than the common need of the Cold War. Providing an appropriate scientific basis to support a national security contribution to the Alliance is one of the key issues that NATO’s new members now need to tackle. The biggest gap in the perceived new security needs is between the USA and those of Europe. But even within Europe there are serious differences which have significant impact. It is very easy for the UK and Spain to accept that there is no longer any need for investment in conventional territorial defence, and to reform their defence establishments accordingly. It is not so easy to persuade, for example, Poles or Estonians that this is so, and it is not realistic to expect such countries, whose geography and recent history still dominate their security thinking, to abandon traditional military concepts of defence and security in favour of these new ideas. As security is no longer just a military concern, it is no longer just the preserve of Ministries of Defence (MOD) and Ministries of Foreign Affairs [MFA] which have to date been the main ministries involved in security cooperation. It is no longer possible to draw a clear distinction between external security and internal security. Security henceforth requires the coordination of the ‘external’ ministries [i.e. MOD and MFA] and their agencies [armed forces, intelligence services] with those of the ‘interior’ ministries: internal affairs; education; finance; overseas development; transport; environment; health; etc., with their agencies [policing forces, security services, disaster relief agencies, etc.]. Security today takes in social development and it demands the involvement of all elements of society in a way which security in the Cold War days did not. Meeting these new security requirements demands fundamental reform of national structures and patterns of investment, not least in the area of scientific support to security. Likewise it demands the evolution of international institutions on a truly radical scale. As this process develops, national historical and cultural attitudes to the use of force are likely to emerge. Most mainland European countries have, within living memory, had ample proof that it is not wise to rely on military force as the main basis for national security. The US and UK have not “suffered” this historical lesson. This is likely to make for very divergent responses and profound debate over when and how to use force in, for example, prosecuting the War on Terrorism. The difference of opinion in the run up to the recent Iraq operation, at least in some measure, appeared to reflect this factor.

3. Military Implications of New Threats to Security Security, therefore, is now a much broader concept, and government scientific programmes need to take this into account. But despite the foregoing, all acknowledge that ‘security’ must still contain a major military element. However, a security threat today is likely to require a very different military response than in the past. No longer can the threat to the defender be dealt with simply by passive defence or protective measures. These remain essential, but have changed in nature. This is an absolutely crucial factor in determining how to develop an appropriate scientific policy for future security needs.


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Armies today may have to be deployed in support of domestic police operations. In addition, our armed forces will have to go out to deal with the threat in the countries from which it is generated. Forces today must expect to be projected – i.e., sent abroad – sustained there [perhaps over long periods] and used. This will not be passive peacekeeping or, as in the cold war, deterrence by simply waiting. Troops must expect to fight. This faces armed forces with completely different demands than was the case a decade ago. Most countries in Europe maintained large, mainly static, armed forces, which deterred just by their existence. The West never really expected to have to fight a sustained conventional operation at short notice. Consequently, in the face of increasingly costly weapons and manpower, most NATO nations maintained large national military structures but very low reserves of expensive munitions – an unrealistic balance. Most countries could mobilize forces only in the event of total war. The problems European countries had in deploying forces for the Gulf War and the structural reorganization needed [for example in the British Army] to make a division viable in the field bear witness to this fact. [Warsaw Pact armies, it must be said, maintained a much higher degree of military capability – but in doing so ruined their economies.] When we deployed troops for peacekeeping we did not expect them to have to fight – merely to patrol in blue helmets and white vehicles. Today, the truth is that we are much more likely to have to deploy troops actually to fight than was ever the case during the Cold War. As a result, the kind of forces a country needs to project, maintain and use military power abroad faces most European countries with the need for a total reform of their military systems. Very few of Europe’s current two million men and women under arms can be reckoned useable in this respect. Put bluntly, much of Europe’s defence budgets (including defence science budgets) is spent on maintaining the wrong kind of armed forces for today’s threats. In a war on terrorism, most of Europe’s troops can be used only for certain limited tasks. It is also becoming clear that, for many countries [e.g., Nordic countries, Germany] reform of their defence systems means a serious change in the civil-military relationship. Fundamental defence and security sector reform will therefore, be impossible without accompanying social and scientific reform, often on a large scale. When the armed forces are incorporated into society on the basis of total mobilization [for example, the Norwegian ‘people and defence’ philosophy], military service becomes an essential part of building and maintaining the social structure. Defence and security (including security science) infrastructure becomes an important part of national infrastructure. Furthermore, over the last 50 years, in most Western countries defence expenditure has gradually shifted from being prioritized on national security requirements towards prioritization on social security requirements. This is a particular problem for countries with universal mobilization systems, but it is true at least in part in all countries – note the influence of the US Congress on weapons procurement decisions based on their domestic political impact; when a major arms manufacturer in UK recently protested about MOD procurement cuts its public case was based not on the impact this would have on UK national security, but on lost jobs. Most European countries, therefore, not just Central and East European (C&EE) countries, face the difficult challenge of military and military-related science reform on a massive scale. Armed forces need to be more capable and flexible. This means that they will be more expensive. Therefore, unless defence expenditure is to increase dramatically, they will be smaller. For small countries this means that they will no longer be able to field balanced national armed forces capable of conducting all the functions

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needed in an all-arms military conflict. This implies role prioritization which in turn implies that an alliance approach will be essential. In this respect, NATO and EU ESDP requirements are identical. ESDP cannot in the foreseeable future provide an alternative to NATO because most EU members have not reformed their armed forces to provide credible expeditionary capability. In addition, for independent actions, EU will have to develop C3, intelligence and logistics capabilities it does not currently have. It is here, too, that the ‘Transatlantic Security Gap’ also becomes an issue. Because of the current disparity between US and European force projection capabilities it will be very difficult for the foreseeable future to consider any significant force projection against a contested target without US participation. But if the US is already capable and ready to act, and the technological and training gap is as wide as it is, there is little incentive for many European countries even to try to catch up. The very valuable idea of countries developing small ‘niche’ capabilities could in some cases become an excuse for avoiding the very difficult fundamental military reform that is really needed. One of our most important priorities today is, therefore, to develop reasons and incentives for smaller countries not to ‘pass the security buck’. We also need to think hard about what the results will be if European countries do not grasp this problem and fail to implement real defence reform, with the corresponding reform of their scientific base. This is the outstanding challenge today facing European national defence and security establishments and the international institutions – NATO and EU. Both organizations will have to evolve rapidly and demonstrate that they can indeed offer their members some real security benefit in the new era if they are to survive and flourish. Otherwise, their member nations will not fund them. If the tool cannot do the job required, why pay to keep it? Equally, both organizations will have to collaborate and coordinate their roles, functions and operations. Neither will be able in the near future to do all the tasks necessary. Here too there will have to be prioritization and role sharing, including in the scientific research field. Intelligence sharing and active intelligence and security cooperation are becoming the key elements of this increasingly important collaboration. 4. The Challenge of Terrorism I have attempted to paint this new security environment in some detail so as to put Terrorism in its proper context. Terrorism is only one of the threats to security today, and it is considered a much greater threat in some countries than in others, for obvious reasons. Terrorism has many manifestations. It has been with us for a long time. There are different definitions of the terms, and to counter it requires actions on many different fronts. When we speak of the ‘War on Terrorism’ we should remind ourselves that terrorism is a tactic, a means. Whilst we seek to prevent it, our real target is not the tactic but the perpetrator. Our enemy is those groups and movements which seek to overthrow our social order and which use terrorism and many other tactics [e.g., information warfare] to that end. 11 September brought this into focus. The clear distinction between ‘war’ and ‘non-war’ is now blurred. So, therefore, is the distinction between the role of armies and policing forces also blurred. If we liken this new form of attack on our societies, which includes terrorism, as a disease – say lung cancer – then as we attempt to treat the disease, we can draw on several sources of help. The armed forces are the surgeons. The security forces [police,


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gendarmerie] are the doctors, dispensing medicine, chemotherapy, etc. The overseas aid and crisis prevention agencies are the health workers who try to stop us smoking and help us avoid the causes of the disease. The intelligence and security services are the diagnosticians who should give us early warning of our health problem. Just as in medicine, all these agencies have indispensable roles to play. Just as in medicine, no one agency on its own will be effective – the best effects are achieved when they all collaborate. Military power has an important role to play in the defeat of terrorism. But military force alone cannot defeat a terrorist threat. Military force can at least buy a breathing space. For example, it can deny terrorist groups a safe haven in space or time, as in Afghanistan, without which they cannot easily function. But this breathing space must then be used to tackle the problem at its source, or the military action may come to be ineffective or even counter-productive. Likewise, domestic protection can no longer be assured by passive defensive measures alone. There will be occasions when security can only be achieved by taking the war into the enemy’s camp. The problem facing much of Europe, of course, is that it does not have the military option to do that. It does not have the armed forces it needs to pursue the War on Terrorism by force. The challenge, therefore, is a manifold one: [a] to restructure military forces within an alliance context [virtually identical for NATO and EU] so that they can play a useful role in this new form of warfare; [b] to develop other national security forces [police, gendarmeries, border guards, intelligence and counter-intelligence services, etc.] so that they can cope with the new threat, and provide for their international collaboration; [c] to develop the inter-ministerial cooperation necessary to enable the various ministries and agencies [police, intelligence services, etc.] which now need to cooperate to deal with the threat actually to do so effectively; and [d] to invest more heavily in crisis and conflict prevention, including making overseas and planning part of the national security policy. The armed and security forces themselves need to agree in concert a framework for tackling the new security threats which breaks down old barriers to collaboration. The most widely used framework is a good place to start. This divides the tasks into ‘antiterrorism actions’, ‘counter-terrorism actions’ and ‘consequence management’. ‘Anti-Terrorism’ is defensive – it includes all measures taken to reduce the vulnerability at home or abroad of: people [soldiers, civilians, diplomats, and workers, etc.]; physical objectives; communication systems; social structures, etc. ‘Counter-Terrorism’ includes all proactive or offensive measures. These should aim to: identify and locate, deter, prevent and stop terrorist activities, whether internal or external. ‘Consequence Management’ describes all efforts, preparatory or subsequent, to limit the effect of terrorism; stabilize the situation; repair the damage done. Both military and security forces will need new capabilities for intelligence and new weapons and equipment as well as a much higher degree of collaboration and training to fulfil these new tasks. Countries will need to tailor their defence and security policies to support these new tasks accordingly.

5. Implications for NATO and EU So, how should we begin to address the issue of change – of rethinking our approach to security? A good point would be to readdress the fundamentals of alliance membership in the perspective of new security threats.


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To be a good member of an alliance [be that NATO or a future EU ESDP] a country should be able to do the following: − − −

provide an essential minimum of self-protection; be capable of receiving help from other allies; be capable of providing help to other allies.

What do these mean nowadays? Self-protection no longer means simply self-defence. Some nations do still face a potential external military threat and will feel the need to keep traditional defences in place. For others, classic defence of this sort is not a requirement at all. For some members, the threat of terrorism is very high, for others it is very low. In a modern alliance, there will have to be very significant differences in how members prioritize threats and allocate resources to dealing with them. Likewise the kind of help nations are likely to need from allies will also differ considerably. It will no longer just be classic military help. Interior ministries and other security agencies may now have to be prepared to open their doors to outside help in a way that they have not previously been prepared to do. The concept of what is alliancerelated infrastructure (including science policy) will have to change. So will the understanding of which allied countries are on the ‘front line’ in facing new threats. Very important to realize is that this ‘frontline’ is no longer necessarily a geographical issue. Patterns of intra-alliance investment will have to change, as well as national investments. In providing help to others there are limited options, but much variation within them. Military options, as discussed above, will require forces capable of projection, maintenance and utilization. But armed forces will also have to be capable of being deployed in domestic situations in support of domestic security agencies. Providing forward basing and logistic support will also be very important. However, sharing the burden not only of cost but also of risk and of casualties will remain an important factor in deciding how allies will need to contribute to this function. Expenditure on science in support of national defence and security is part of this equation. Help, however, will not only be military. This does not offer an excuse for not making a military contribution, but is rather a recognition that [a] a response will no longer be purely military; and [b] with the best will in the world it will be some time before many European countries are in a position to make substantive contributions to a projected military force. One way that this process could be speeded up would be for members to develop specialized security capabilities to contribute to a common effort, and to ensure a collaboration by non-military security agencies which nations have hitherto been unwilling to do [as evinced by the EU’s difficulties in developing its ‘third pillar’]. And, as we noted above, collaboration between the EU and NATO will have to improve considerably. Indeed, in respect to the issue of improving collaboration we should not forget that the strategic predicament of the War on Terrorism also offers strategic opportunities. It has already brought Russia notably closer to NATO, and it helps make the prospect of a real Euro-Atlantic Security Community more likely. Engaging Russia so that war with her becomes as unimaginable as between EU states is at least as important a security priority as the more topical war-on-terror emphasis of this paper. But part of this new imperative will be to ensure that the Euro-Atlantic Community does not become perceived as an aggressive, intolerant, but still porous and increasingly detested Fortress Affluent North.


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An additional consideration, which affects the foregoing, is the impact that the source of the new threats to security will have on the evolution of strategic geography. In the Cold War the threat came from a clear direction – from East or West depending on the viewpoint. This geographical orientation created ‘frontline states’, ‘rear-area states’, ‘flanking regions’, etc., all of which had a fundamental impact not only on those nations’ national psychology but also on practical preparation for conflict. The new security environment overturns this hierarchy. Firstly, geography is no longer the sole determinant of the immediacy of a threat. Secondly, inasmuch as geography does play a role, then just as the new threats destroy the clear line between internal and external threats, so they also throw up a new Strategic Alignment with a North-South or North West-South-East alignment. It can be argued that Turkey has replaced Germany as the keystone state for European Security. NATO’s Mediterranean countries, headed by Greece, could be at greatest risk from the spill-over of a conflict in the Middle East. Those nations most willing to project military force, or to threaten to do so, into the Middle East may be the most menaced of all. Now on the one hand this will require a huge effort to avoid political polarization into a ‘North-South’ confrontation and the creation of a new political and cultural divide. On the other hand there is to a certain extent already a new geographical imperative. The old Cold War ‘threat gradient’ has been reversed. We must face the fact that some countries will be playing a more or a less important role in the new security environment than they were in the old. Last, but by no means least, the new security scene as it has developed over the past decade has seen a dramatic change in the ‘role’ of women in security. This is not an issue of ‘political correctness’ or of ‘gender balance’. Rather it is to note the disturbing fact that, of the estimated 4 million casualties of the ‘small wars’ since 1990, threequarters have been women and children. If one measures victims rather than just casualties [e.g., rape victims, refugees, etc.] the proportion is even higher. One can attribute this to many causes, not least being that most of these conflicts have been civil wars. But whatever the cause, this seems to me to be a sufficiently important phenomenon for a government’s science policy programme to address in its own right. Although this may seem to be stretching the limits of the term ‘science’, I do think that this is justified. It is also worth pointing out that, although armed forces today have to do many more tasks than just fighting – tasks which can often be done equally or even better by women than by men – many armies still find it difficult to accommodate women in their ranks. Furthermore, although no-one can deny that women will play at least an equal role in conflict prevention or post-conflict recovery and reconciliation, only a very small percentage of the staff of international institutions or NGOs involved in such programmes are women. How we address this issue needs careful thought. I do not have any clear recommendation to offer here, other than to note that this is an issue which clearly needs our attention.

The Challenge for the ‘Security Community’ In all our countries, the current pace of events faces government departments with enormous burdens of overwork. There is no longer enough time to deal with everyday problems and find enough time for conceptual thinking. After all, the scope of change being forced upon institutions is the greatest that it has ever been in peacetime. Consequently there is a great need to generate ideas, stimulate thinking and debate on all aspects of security sector reform, including the key issue of providing a new sci-

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entific base to support the tackling of new problems. We need to break down boundaries between different elements of the scientific establishment and to expand the frontiers from ‘defence’ to a sensible definition of what is considered ‘security’. Think tanks must become the interface between the brainpower of the academic and scientific communities on the one hand and the overworked policy community, which needs their help, on the other. There is a particular need to increase the size and strength of this ‘security community’ – the body of military and especially of civilian personnel (including scientists) competent in the new security issues and capable [a] of filling posts in national and international institutions; and [b] educating the population to understand the new needs of security so as to ensure their support through the democratic process. This ‘security community’ today is, it is true, moving to address the new security issues. But it is not moving rapidly or profoundly enough, particularly in thinking about how to bring science to serve security better. This is not to criticize those members of the community – particularly not those in think tanks or scientific and academic establishments – the most numerous members of the community. They are doing their best to adapt, to cast-off old approaches, to address new issues. But, many, like the author of this paper, have a lifetime of studying yesterday’s enemies and yesterday’s threats. Today’s threats require people with specializations in new areas of the world, new social phenomena. Above all, they need to be multi-disciplinary, and to encompass scientific skills, which are not just technological, but which can bring the scientific method to issues not previously considered security science issues at all. We need to engage public intellectuals, political philosophers, writers and musicians and, of course scientists of all types, as well as politicians and civil servants in the new community. We need more security specialists in think tanks who are doctors. Likewise we need more doctors in our health services who are also security specialists. Not only will our new strategic community have to address new threats and responses. Because of the nature of these threats and the implications for our societies, they will need to debate and perhaps redefine the issues of nationality, national identity and perhaps the very identity of ‘Europe’ or ‘the West’ – certainly of the Euro-Atlantic Community. As a key element of the ‘security community’, the intelligence, counterintelligence and policing services do face a particular challenge. Not only do they have to recruit and develop specialists with new areas of expertise and new backgrounds, both to study and work in the countries and new environment where information is now needed. They also have to adapt to cope with domestic issues, which, whilst longstanding, have now taken on a new significance. Immigration, ethnic minorities, allegedly disputed national loyalties, xenophobia and social cohesion are problems which are likely to affect most Western societies to an ever greater degree. The change in the nature of the threat today requires a degree of collaboration between [secret] intelligence and security services and their counterparts in [open] policing organizations. Over the years, and for perfectly good reasons, there has developed a very different attitude to information handling between these organizations. This makes it very difficult now for them to work together with the degree of interaction, which is desirable. This is not an issue of trust nor of ‘turf battles’ between rivals seeking to protect their little ‘empires’. Rather it is a deep philosophical and cultural difference that will not be easy to overcome. If this issue affects national agencies, it affects international organizations [e.g., EU Justice & Home Affairs, INTERPOL, EUROPOL] to an even greater degree.


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The immense importance of improving the exchange of information and intelligence cannot be overemphasized. Without scientific improvements in this area we will simply not be able to tackle the new threats to security. Improvements are needed between national agencies and institutions and also between countries. Here NATO could have a unique role to play. NATO is the international institution par excellence for developing networks of trust between individuals from different countries and different agencies. It is precisely on the basis of trust that information and intelligence is most readily shared. It is pointless for governments to legislate for information exchange if the basis of mutual trust is absent. It is now very important that we evaluate how to develop and enhance the model of informal trust-generating mechanisms of the NATO system so that we can improve the capability for scientific exchange to support intelligence. This idea will require some deep thinking and some imaginative institutional amendments to make it work. But work it must.

6. Implications for the Corporate Sector It is at this point that the issue becomes more than an academic one for the corporate sector. The corporate sector has always had an interest in national security, of course, but that interest was general and invested in the social and political basis of the country. Business did not usually involve itself directly except inasmuch as there was business to be done in the field of supplying the defence sector. ‘Security’ for the business world was mostly protection against competition, theft or fraud, and the occasional green ecological protestor. Very large conglomerates have always played a major role, especially in smaller countries, but the main focus was usually on economic and political issues, not security issues. The change in the nature of security, however, has created a new imperative: the need to break down the barriers not only between government agencies but between those agencies and the corporate world. As societies, under the influence of commercial competition, become ever more efficient, ever more information dependent, and ever more ‘globalized’, they also become more vulnerable to disruption, even catastrophic disruption. Business is the first and most immediate institutional victim of terror. Long before terrorism is a threat to governments or to social cohesion it will have put companies – especially small – or medium-sized companies – out of business. Other threats to security, such as organized crime, corruption, and smuggling are equally threats to society because they are first and foremost threats to the health of the business sector. Genuine business needs secure conditions to flourish. The whole concept of security as developed by NATO and the EU was based on economics. But the threat that inspired Schumann to found the basis for the EEC and ultimately the EU was the threat of hot war. Today, security needs to be applied against a much wider range of threats in which business features directly, and not at a second remove as it did in the past. More immediately, business is itself a generator of stability and prosperity and a hedge against the new threats. Much of a country’s scientific activity takes place within a business environment. Therefore security related science of all types is of greater interest to governments as a contribution to national security. Business needs governmental help in order to know in which countries and in which ways the new threats to security will arise. Security becomes a major determining factor in foreign direct investment [which, for example, doubled in Poland in the year after that country joined

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NATO]. Today, business can provide governments with intelligence that they cannot easily get from other sources. Big business may be the actual prime target of cyber crime or terrorism pursued with a political, rather than an economic, motive. All these considerations demand a new relationship between the corporate world and the security sector, especially in the realm of science. Equally, the answers to new security problems will likely lie in the hands of corporations. We need to explore new scientific responses to security in collaboration with business. If we seek security merely by ratcheting up old procedures we risk creating such obstacles to trade and commerce that we destroy the market freedoms, which form the basis of our society and ensure our prosperity. Governments and international institutions, in other words, can no longer solve their security problems without building a new partnership with business. Business can no longer ensure conditions for its secure operation without having a greater input into government policy. The need for partnership works both ways. The challenge we face in the immediate future – for this is a problem which is already with us – is to develop that partnership, to make it work, and to keep it flexible so that we can keep ahead of the threats in what will, from now, on be a rapidly evolving security science environment.

7. Conclusions I began this paper with reference to the revolutionary change in the nature of conflict in which we now find ourselves. Like all revolutions, this one is gradual and uneven, a mix of old and new. Like all revolutions, it will be much easier for a historian of the future to see and evaluate with hindsight than it is for us who are in the middle of it to see where it is going. Our most immediate need, therefore, is to put more effort and more resources into thinking about the future course of this revolution and how to respond to its demands, and on the basis of that thinking, to change the understanding of our populations accordingly. The second most important thing we have to do is, on the basis of this new thinking, to break down the barriers between existing institutions – between governmental departments and agencies themselves; between government and non-governmental agencies [business, scientific and technological, NGOs, academia]; and between the traditional Security Sector [military, police, customs and immigration, etc.] and the rest of society’s mechanisms for dealing with human security. This paper started with a consideration of the need for military and security sector reform, including security related science. But we cannot achieve this essential reform without a corresponding reform of our societies themselves. Just consider the social changes ushered in by the French Revolution or WWI. What we will have to cope with over the next decade is nothing less of an upheaval than these two events provoked. When it comes to considering how well prepared we are to cope with this, I am reminded of my grandfather’s experience during a period of social and military change of a similar magnitude. He was a sergeant in the 6th Inniskillings, an Irish regiment of the British Army, who left the army in 1909. He had spent much of his training in the first decade of the 20 th Century learning how to fight Zulus. I do hope that we are better prepared for what faces us than he was when he reenlisted in the army in 1914.


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Tangible Problems for Armies Fighting in the New Security Environment Lt. Col. Daren BOWYER Royal Military College of Science, Defence Academy of the UK Abstract. I will first identify what I consider to be the key aspects of the New Security Environment – from the military point of view – those which will impact most on the reality of combat operations. And then I shall consider their implications for each of the Components of Fighting Power – The Physical, Conceptual and Moral. The nature of the new threats to security and the breadth of the responses to them together with the rapid progress of information technologies combine to present an array of personal, social and organisational challenges to soldiers, armies and nations.

The New Security Environment – Key Factors The major changes in military history, such as from edged weapons to firearms and from horse and musket to industrialized warfare, are sometimes, in retrospect, dubbed Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs) though they unfolded in a rather more gradual fashion. Industrialization, for example, began in the American Civil War with breachloading weapons, the telegraph and the use of railways for operational mobility, but it was not complete until well into the Second World War. The real significance has come from the sometimes accompanying military-social shifts such as the introduction by Napoleonic France of the “levee en masse” (conscript army). Today the impact of the ‘information age’ radically alters one of the military’s key enablers but beyond the narrowly military there has been a far more wide-ranging paradigm shift in the security environment. I want to highlight the aspects which will create the greatest tangible problems for the military. Conflict today – and tomorrow, will be complex and ill-defined. We have seen in Iraq that high-intensity combat operations, stabilization operations, peace support, policing and the delivery of humanitarian aid may all have to be conducted in the same theatre, with little – if any – spatial or temporal separation. Moreover, the boundary between war and peace will be blurred; and acts of war and acts of crime may be difficult to distinguish one from the other. In the 1990s, intra-state conflict and the fall out of failed states became the greater threat to peace and security than inter-state conflict – for which armies are organised and equipped (both physically and intellectually). Non-state actors and entities are increasingly the predominant players. (Though we must be cautious and consider if this is an enduring situation or a temporary aberration). One implication of all this is that ‘Defence’ and ‘Security’ are no longer synonymous in the way that they were in the Cold War. Our security can no longer be guaranteed simply by military defence of the homeland; the threats are no longer purely military and neither can be our responses to them.

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D. Bowyer / Tangible Problems for Armies Fighting in the New Security Environment

And at the military operational level, everything is likely to be joint (more than one service), combined (more than one nation) and expeditionary (not fought from the security of the home base). This is inevitably the case if we are no longer concerned simply with defending our borders but going further afield to intervene (perhaps preemptively) in those situations that threaten (longer-term) our wider security interests. As my focus here is on the military aspect I will consider how this shift impacts on each of the three ‘Components of Fighting Power’ which act together to provide military effect. They are the Physical Component – what Armies use; the Conceptual Component – how armies think; and the Moral – the human dimension. Physical Component Starting with the Physical Component, some thoughts – in no particular order – about the changes – and challenges that will be presented. This is where the Information Age will have real impact. Information has always been a critical tool in warfare and invariably armies have had too little, or it has been incomplete or inaccurate, or too late; or the right information has been available but in the wrong place – the means of communication have been lacking. Today the challenges are likely to be in having too much information, being unable to analyse it and transmit it as useful intelligence, or in becoming too dependent on it – expecting a complete and accurate picture when this is rarely – despite the much greater means available to us – possible. The technological means for gaining information are of an entirely different order to that available just a few decades ago – satellite imagery, stand-off radar, video feed from drones – and the exploitation of areas of the electro-magnetic spectrum such as mm-waves, the thermal range, and electro-optics, allow us to see more, further and regardless of daylight or weather. But ‘seeing more’ is not ‘knowing more’ and our ability to weed, organise, analyse, store, retrieve and, indeed, transmit – has not kept pace. Yet an expectation has developed of a perfect picture. The more we get, the more we demand and there is a danger that this will paralyse decision making. The expectation of complete (and reliable) information may lead us to make no decisions until all relevant information is ‘in’. And that may mean decisions not made in time. I have mentioned our ability to transmit. Bandwidth, of course, is the problem. There is more and more data to be passed and an ever-increasing number of users – and not just the military – competing for a limited number of channels. When it comes to satellite communications, for example, we have to compete with the other services, coalition partners and the media for available channel space. And we don’t just want to send voice and simple data messages; we’ve become reliant on Powerpoint presentations and high-resolution imagery, that is enormously bandwidth hungry. On operation Granby in 1991 the information rate into theatre was 3½ MBits/second – by Op TELIC in 2003 that had ballooned to 55 MBits/sec. Turning to technology developments, in general. R&D is no longer defence (or government) led but commercially driven. This erodes the advantage that organised military forces of technologically advanced nations once enjoyed over irregulars and non-state entities. Indeed, a relative advantage may now be gained by the sophisticated irregular force or non-state group (especially in information technology) as they are unburdened by the bureaucracy of the national apparatus – they can benefit from more


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reactive procurement. (And the terrorist organisation has no competing demands on his funds – no schools or hospitals or welfare to worry about!). Technology that was once the preserve of the richest states – satellite imagery, computing power, satellite communications, are now widely – and generally affordably – available to non-state bodies. (Consider, for example, how the mass protest at the Seattle G8 summit was coordinated over the internet.) At the same time our dependence on advanced technologies has exposed new vulnerabilities – disruption of the satellite links essential to GPS would have enormous effect and might be effected by a small exo-atmospheric nuclear detonation which could soon, if not yet, be within the capability of a rogue state. And, of course, the vulnerabilities are not just military – major economic disruption could be achieved through computer virus. The ability to deliver rapid effect could allow us to prevent an undesirable situation developing into a crisis. But how do we deliver Rapid Effect? Getting sufficient military capability to a distant theatre is slow if you have to use shipping, and at the moment that part of our forces able to deploy quickly by air lacks both the Lethality, Mobility, Survivability and Sustainability to make it effective against a well-equipped opponent. Lack of strategic deployability is a major weakness for ‘heavy’ armed forces, but go too light and the risk is insufficient effect or insufficient protection, which means casualties, which can mean political defeat. So we are into the business about which you will have heard much, of needing to deliver heavy effect from medium forces. We need something that is strategically more agile than our current heavy force, but capable of delivering an equivalent effect. This is no easy task. (We might, though, question whether we have the ability to make political decisions – especially in coalition – sufficiently quickly to make this relevant. All too often the need for rapid military movement is because decisions to use force have been made too slowly!) Expeditionary operations also impose a large logistic footprint. That needs to be reduced to enhance rapid deployability and also the force’s survivability for it is generally an area of vulnerability (as it has been throughout history). But how? There is a link here to the moral component. Societal expectations of soldiers’ safety, welfare and comfort increase with every conflict and meeting them adds ever more to the logistic burden. Compare the 2 Gulf conflicts. In 1991 the majority of soldiers lived on or beside their vehicles – I slept under a tarpaulin beside my vehicle for 4 months (I didn’t sleep the whole time!) – and we showered from buckets. We were able to phone home occasionally – from phone boxes often clogged with Saudi Reals, and after queuing for hours – once every 2–3 weeks during scheduled R+R breaks in Al Jubail. And that of course would be seen as luxury to those who experienced the World Wars, Korea or even – just a decade earlier – the Falklands. In 2003 during the preparatory phases at least most were in tented camps, welfare phones were a high priority, many soldiers, of course had their own mobiles; and there were passionate complaints in the media by families who thought their sons and daughters were being ill-cared for.

Proliferation What of Weapons of Mass Destruction? Perhaps, and certainly we must acknowledge the risk of terrorists using chemical, biological or radiological weapons (though one I personally feel is in danger of being overplayed). It is less of an issue for the military

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which is relatively well able to protect itself especially against the chemical threat and delivering chemical weapons in a militarily significant concentration and quantity is no easy matter. But also proliferation of small arms and weapons in general is an issue. Why? Because it blurs the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. (An issue I’ll return to when I consider the Moral component.) Another issue for the Physical component is the danger of technology dependence – and all too frequently of lack of reversionary mode. Can orders still be given without PowerPoint? A particularly astute US general involved in the digitization programme once remarked that a map with a hole in it is still a map – a flat screen display is screwed. I’ve already mentioned GPS – essential not just for our locational awareness but a crucial element of so many weapons systems – failure of GPS – accidental or enemyengineered has severe implications for us. I’ll round-up the Physical component with a warning of the seductiveness of ‘precision’ attack/‘clean’ war. Our politicians and the public (and military?) are increasingly unprepared for the reality of war – people die. Armed force should only be used when you are ready to kill people and destroy things – and it won’t be neat. Precision attack may reduce but will not eliminate death and destruction for the innocent. (And let’s not forget the problem of precise delivery to the wrong target – the Chinese haven’t!)

Conceptual Component Turning to the Conceptual component – how the military think about conflict – more than ever we need to consider actions in terms of strategic ends. In the Cold War they were pretty obvious; today when our involvement in conflict is invariably ‘of choice’ rather than for national survival (though with respect to the fight against Islamicinspired terrorism, that may not be so) there is a great need to determine the strategic ends that we seek – and this goes well beyond military planning. An inter-disciplinary approach is essential. This is about national strategy. Do governments have the mechanisms (or breath of vision) to undertake this? And a mindset change is essential. Security is no longer synonymous with Defence but Defence and the armed forces undoubtedly have a big part to play. Are all agencies and ministries open to an inter-disciplinary approach and equipped to deal with it? The ‘New Wars’ that Mary Kaldor and others have postulated need a different mindset. (But we need to be careful here not all wars are ‘new’ – and it was a mistake to assume all conflict would be on the Bosnia model). What is required is an adaptable mindset and the intellectual capacity to identify what kind of conflict is being engaged in. Peace Support and humanitarian intervention operations (PSO), in particular require a different approach to ‘collateral’ damage and casualties. Traditionally the military have put a premium on their own lives, even at the expense of ‘enemy’ noncombatants – to whom they have owed no more than consideration of proportionality and necessity. But a police mentality – that may be more appropriate in PSO – gives priority to those whom they are there to protect. Is that the right value-order in inter-


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vention operations? (is that acceptable to the military and compatible with the requirements of military success?). The question we must ask is “who are ‘enemy non-combatants’” in humanitarian interventions – or operations to achieve regime change – or the ‘Global War on Terror’? It’s a conceptually flawed term. Moral Component This, in my view, is the area in which the impact of the new security environment is greatest and yet least understood. I reiterate the points above about ‘enemy non-combatants’ and acceptability of ‘collateral’. And we must consider ‘New’ combatants – (this connects with my comments on proliferation). We will have to deal with armed militias – wedded to heartfelt (and often prejudiced and bigoted) belief, but lacking both a commitment to the laws of armed conflict and a disciplined military ethos (they have no ‘warrior’s honour’ in Ignatief’s terms). Therefore we are likely to see greater atrocity and less compassion – an enemy not playing by the rules. Add to that the deliberate use of child soldiers. How do you deal with 11/12-year olds with AK47s? I know well one officer who still lives with the trauma of having to. I turn now to a bit of a personal hobby horse – the problem of ‘Moral Distance’. Technology has facilitated ever greater distance between soldier (or sailor/airman) and his target; an advantage sought since the beginnings of warfare, but • • •

It removes the opportunity for compassion. It makes the distinction between combatant and non-combatant harder (opposing the trend of precision weapons to reduce collateral). And, perhaps the desire to distinguish becomes less – killing is easier: the target is dehumanized by becoming just a ‘hot spot’ on a Thermal Imager screen. This trend is exacerbated by the ‘video-game’ culture, and reinforced by use of simulation in training.

Then there is legal uncertainty. Of course soldiers must be held to account for the legality of their actions – and Rules of Engagement should provide a definitive guide. But conflict does not provide the certainty expected by the law. There is a serious need to reassess the liability of soldiers or we risk their lives and their mission effectiveness through their reluctance to use their weapons for fear of prosecution. And there are a range of other human issues that time precludes a full consideration of: the impact of the 24 hour battle, of greater isolation on the less dense battlefield of today (and exacerbated by, for example, NBC protective clothing and masks); there is an ever increasing expectation among soldiers (and their families) of greater protection (MOD being sued for not providing protection against under-vehicle IEDs) and comfort (plus the impact of health and safety legislation). And there is the impact of the all-pervasive media.


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Conclusion So in conclusion, I would make four points: • • •

•

The biggest challenge of the new security environment is in the moral and human dimension. Science and technology are in many ways adding to the challenge rather than reducing it. They do not offer the ‘silver bullet’ that will solve all ills. R&D is commercially-led rather than defence-driven: this reduces our relative advantage over less (technically) sophisticated opponents. So the Defence sector should invest most heavily in those areas where there is no commercial need (probably Protection). And we need to develop the mechanisms and concepts for developing national strategy and embedding defence within that.

And my final point would be a reminder that whatever technical wizardry we equip him with, the soldier remains a human being – with all the frailties, faults and complexities that entails.


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The United Kingdom Police Counter-Terrorism Unit Inspector Jeff FOUHY Detective Inspector, Metropolitan Police, New Scotland Yard Abstract. The reality of terrorist attacks on civilian targets coincides with the rise in the level of accountability required for use of the public resources devoted to security. Allocating resources to combat the usual crimes and potential terrorist attacks is a big challenge for the Metropolitan Police. Other big challenges are how to balance the need for security with the normal freedoms expected in a parliamentary democracy and how to react to potential terrorist attacks in a manner that is commensurate with the level of the threat and that reassures rather than “terrorises” citizens and excessively disrupts the normal functioning of society. The work of other important actors in the society, such as the media, is important to achieving the right balance.

I am Jeff Fouhy. I work for the Deputy Assistant Commissioner in charge of Specialist Operations at New Scotland Yard. I have a number of responsibilities. One of the major ones is to worry and so people accuse me of looking worried most of the time. I worry constantly about what is going to happen next. If you have been watching the United Kingdom, or even the international media in the last week, you must have seen that we have had a lot to worry about. We have had some worries, to say the least, about people getting into places that they shouldn’t get into and doing all sorts of things which has caused great amusement and embarrassment all around. Unfortunately for us it does have a serious edge to it. Here is a very quick overview of what we do.

The Specialist Operations Branch The Specialist Operations Branch is a kind of mini homeland security; it has been around for a long time. We have spent about 30 years playing with the provisional IRA which has now kind of stopped. But we have to assume it is still around, so we still worry about them or whatever groups could emerge from Northern Ireland. Our units are broken down into these areas. There are two detective areas – which is Special Branch and the Anti-terrorist Squad. We have what we call the detective commands which are divided into numbers 14, 16 and 17, the airports and our home branch. This evidently is a fairly widely spread command that deals with all things relating to countering terrorism. As I said, we do worry a lot about problems and people. Another important thing we worry about is how we measure our effectiveness or success. We think about this all the time. We live in a world where we are constantly accountable for every penny we spend and that accountability comes down to if we are spending million of pounds on protecting Parliament and preventing people getting in. The consid-

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J. Fouhy / The United Kingdom Police Counter-Terrorism Unit

erations are the same for Buckingham Palace. If Batman gets in, you are failing. Aren’t you? The money is being wasted, you are no good at it, we will find someone who is good. That was the feeling we were going through last week and no doubt the next time it happens it will arise again, and somebody will say the last time it happened was this, the last time it happened was that, what is being done about these things, how are they being allowed to happen.

Keeping the Balance: Security and Democracy We try to work out patterns for schemes or methods for stopping the likes of Batman. Has everybody seen the Batman? – thankfully there is no video here this morning because I have been subjected to watching the CCTV of Batman climbing into Buckingham Palace, which is a memorable image and when they replay what happened in 2004, that will be there at the end of the year for everyone to see. I remember Batman, the guy who climbed on Buckingham Palace and stood there for four hours before getting bored and coming down. The sequence was quite a lighthearted incident. But from our point of view, it raised the spectre of the constant threat that is represented by the determined suicide attacker. What was in our minds was, well if that man can do it, then somebody far more determined to commit a deed could also do it. This is a big press and public issue. Now, we are constantly looking at ways of protecting places like the Palace, Parliament and Windsor Castle to make them almost impregnable. We could do it, it’s not that difficult and it wouldn’t cost too much money but unfortunately the kind of environment we are operating in stopped us from doing that because these places are functioning buildings. We live in a Parliamentary democracy and these buildings are part of the way it functions; everyone needs to get in and out of them because that’s part of what they represent. The Royal Palace is where the Queen and the Royal family live. They don’t want them turned into impregnable fortresses just surrounded by dogs and as many security people that we can so throw at it. So a balance needs to be achieved. It is part of our role of providing protection in Special Operations to look at how we can achieve the balance.

Technology and the Human Element At the moment it is a mixture of technology, all sorts of gizmos and invisible things going off when somebody passes over a certain line, that sets off an alarm which has a response time to be achieved within a minute and a half or CCTV cameras which pick people up but can’t stop them. So the moment somebody tries to get in, the movement detectors and CCTV give us a lovely picture of what’s going on. But there is a gap between when they set out to actualise whatever they intend to do and when they are intercepted; they can get to wherever they want and climb up in a Batman suit. This gap highlights the human aspect of security. The sort of thing we also worry about in the C-Squad Detective Command is how do we keep the guards guarding without falling asleep and that is a big challenge. Sometimes it fails; I mean it failed probably during the hunt demonstration last week or the week before when protestors got into the House of Commons Chamber. This obviously shouldn’t have happened; we have a red area as far as our security is concerned. We grade the security on a fairly recent innovation by colour coding areas, as in a red


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area – thou shall not get in. If this happens it is complete failure. If they get into an outer area, ok, it is bad but not that bad, and then we have a public/private perimeter area where if you climb up the wall of something, if somebody is not intercepted within say two minutes then that is a failure. What we do with them when we intercept them is another issue, and the issue that arose last week. What do we do with say, somebody dressed in a Batman suit in broad daylight climbing into Buckingham Palace, do we shoot them? Do we hit them with a tazer? What do we do? Or do we just let them get on with it? It is a tough one. A guy dressed in a Robin outfit was there as well and he was doing a follow up run after Batman, and Robin was intercepted and initially he was running and kept running and he was intercepted by an Armed SO-14 Officer who told him first to stop. He didn’t, and then he used the magic words – “stop or I will fire”. That was when he decided to stop and obviously the issue for us is that if he hadn’t stopped and that Officer had fired, what would be the consequences for us? This guy in a Robin suit might die and the ramifications from that will be enormous.

Priorities From a technical point of view, we are looking at non-lethal ways of stopping Robin or anybody else from doing what they want to do. We want to make sure that our reaction is proportional to the level of threat while also showing people that if they do this sort of thing, there will be a consequence to it. To a certain degree, at the moment that intellectual struggle is going on. These issues are also related to how we measure of success and how we justify what is and what is not a success in the counter-terrorism arena. Each year we have to come up with a plan as part of a national counter-terrorist plan; it is more or less the same thing, but the focus is how we are going to deal with a terrorist threat to London. It is a statutory requirement; we spend an awful lot of brainpower coming up with the words to explain to the people of London how the taxpayer’s money is going to be spent. The first priority is to minimise the risk to life and property from terrorist activity in London. We had about ten objectives in the Met Police covering the whole of London. We had two which applied to counter-terrorism, the others applied to organised crime and units on patrol. But as a public priority we had to build on and those carefully chiselled out words, and I will say them again, “to minimise the risk to life and property from terrorist activity in London”. In previous years, it was nice and simple. We aimed to guarantee “no terrorist attacks on London”. No terrorist attacks on London and that’s it; 100% failure or 100% success. I know there are some politics to that; if a terrorist attack occurred, it would have been bad but it would not be the end of the world or the Met. But from our point of view, our measure of success then was nothing, nothing would happen. But it has changed a bit. And this is reflected in how it plays in the media. Every so often, somebody whether it be the Prime Minister or the Commissioner or someone else goes on and says we will try really hard to stop a terrorist attack, but sooner or later someone is going to get through and there will be a consequence to it. We don’t know when it will be, but it may happen. It is a resurrection of the Northern Ireland type of attack. If you remember at the end of that campaign there were lorry bombs blowing up tower blocks in central London. This is creeping back into the public memory; people think that could come back depending on the politics of the situation. So we are not just focussing on Al-Quaeda. We are constantly worrying and asking what else is new. That’s a ques-

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tion I could pose to you here too. We do this on blank pieces of paper every so often; think of a new one, not related to the Middle East – some new campaign, some new way of terrorising and think of how it would look, what the consequence would be and how we can intercept it even if it disrupts whatever else we need to do to prevent it from happening. So we have got priority number one, minimise the risk to life and property from terrorist activity in London. Nice words but when it actually comes down to how you break it down into different units which comprise the Met, that’s where it gets a bit more challenging. The second one is far easier from our point of view; more technical, easier to number crunch on; this is determining “how to maintain an effective response to suspected and actual terrorist incidents”. Now that one has been around forever, we like it. We can count the number of calls to suspected improvised explosive devices, we can count the number of hoaxes, we can count where they are, what they do, what the consequences might be, the level of disruption to London when we start sticking cordons here there and everywhere, what our response times are for it, how quickly we recover from them, how much it costs and how well operationally the police responded to that particular event. We process an average of 280 calls per year up to the situation where we call an Explosive Officer out. We get 10,000 calls to suspect devices, hoaxes or any other thing that says there is a bomb. All calls come in on a 999 system – 10,000 per year. That is a lot. They get filtered down to those where there is thought to be a credible threat depending on the circumstances of the agent’s analysis of what has been said, where it is being said and what the consequences might be. So the calls are graded and at the moment we run at 100% success rate as far as grading and technical analysis of the threat is concerned. Obviously, 100% is fine, but the one that we get wrong which has a real effect, say a dirty bomber at worse case or back to conventional, some kind of improvised explosive devise warning, is a big issue for us. But we look all the time because we are responsible to the people of London through the Met Police Authority and we have to show that the money we spend is well spent.

Keeping the Balance: Security and Business We are always quizzed on how good we are at responding to events. There is also another issue which I would like you to think about, apart from coming up with measures which show how effective you are at counter-terrorism, how do we minimise terrorising people? How do we refrain from helping the terrorist carry out his function to terrorise? I said minimise first and I will stick with minimise because I don’t think we can entirely stop it because the media thrives on providing information which may terrorise people; the media at times seems to feed the frenzy of terror. Our own reaction to threats is important. We look at the kind of 999 calls that come in, we have somebody to record it, we take x amount of time to grade it, it takes another time to send it to the Borough in London where the threats may originate or multi-site if it is a multi-site threat, x amount of time to despatch resources, what time they get there, what time they engage with whatever the threat might be going from or whether it is a stand off period, when the cordons get in, when the traffic breaks down and when the railway gets stopped. We simultaneously consider when and how do we come back from that disruption, from that event and return to normality against the balance of the risk. These are the key quotations that we are looking at. You can’t stop London all the time. You


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can’t stop the tube system every time there is a threat to the tube, so we set a balance between the threat being posed by say a call, or a device or a handbag left on an underground train to the amount of disruptions to the people that are on those trains, stuck in those tunnels till the time when we get the system back up again and move on and try to get back to normality. People get terrorised by either wrong information, lack of information or two different versions of the same information. So what we are trying to do is find a way forward, particularly when we have instant media who are more or less on the case at the same time as we are, and very often we are watching Sky to get a situation report of an incident from a Sky camera. We are using whatever intelligence is available to us and trying to get to a situation where we minimise the terrorist fear in the public, which can be difficult particularly when there is a campaign. We measure as a key, how well the public are engaged in countering terrorism themselves. Any guesses of how that might be done? Quite simple really – we monitor the hot lines, you know the terrorist hot line. I think every country must have something on a variation of a hot line, but basically people have got a free phone number they can ring and we measure the amount of calls coming in on the terrorist hot line. Some of them are nonsense calls but we look at the quality calls which might lead to something of intelligence and that intelligence which might lead to an operation. When there is a threat, the level of calls obviously goes up and if an event occurs, it goes skywards, and then carries off after an amount of time, but we look at the period at which the call level goes up, stays up and then starts to tail down and from that we try to work out a kind of emotional level of public fear. You can ask for reassurance, we spend an awful lot of time in the Met asking people what they want, i.e. what citizens want from a safety point of view and it tends to be “I don’t want to be robbed in the street”, “I don’t want to be mugged at 11 o’clock at night when the pubs turn out” and depending on what is happening in the media, terrorism will come somewhere between midway or towards the bottom. We try to come up with methods of using the media to counter the media drive to fear in trying to minimise the effect of terrorism. That is more or less in terms of priority, how most people think of that one, other than priority one – to minimise risk to life and property. It does go from our point of view towards public reassurance and trying to minimise the fear that people get in their heads that everywhere is going to be subjected to some kind of terrorist attack. I would throw that out as an issue to you for discussion maybe, and if you can come back to me with some sort of magic answer I would really love it, because as I say, every so often we say why are we doing this, how can we measure it because the politicians are forever on us saying “how well are you doing”, “what can you tell us?” And in conclusion, really I would say our biggest problem is that very often we can’t actually tell them anything. Because of the nature of the sort of operational secrecy going on, all we can do is give a peek of a bigger story and try and find a balance, which again is something we are trying to do, between giving more information to people as part of the democratic process who maybe deserve it, without jeopardising ongoing security operations and maybe putting loads of people at risk.



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Cultural Precursors and Psychological Consequences of Contemporary Western Responses to Acts of Terror Bill DURODIE Director, International Centre for Security Analysis, King’s College London, Strand, London WC2R 2LS, UK Abstract. This article explores what the response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 teaches us about Western society today. There has been a wealth of research examining the purported cultural background and psychology of the perpetrators of those events (1). That focus has two main rationales; to identify and deal with potential terrorists, and to begin to tackle what are considered to be the ‘root causes’ of terrorism – usually held to stem from poverty and disaffection across the Third World (2). These approaches offer a somewhat predictable and reassuring explanation of events. They locate the problem of terrorism elsewhere – in the minds, actions and cultures of others. At best, those posing a threat are understood to be reacting in an adverse way to what are held to have been the injustices committed against their forebears during an earlier age of imperial domination. Here, I wish to consider the extent to which some of the issues may be far closer to home, and more contemporary, than we like to envisage. In part, this is due to the particular way in which Western societies perceive and deal with anything that involves risk nowadays (3). If anything, the actual threats posed could be conceived of as weaker today than those presented throughout most of the Cold War, yet society appears to react as if they were stronger. Why is this? And what does this tell us about ourselves? A focus on our increasingly exaggerated perceptions of risk and the adverse consequences this brings, both to the people of the Third World and for Western societies, is a missing element to our analysis of terrorism that we ignore at our peril. Ultimately, if our responses are shaped, in part at least, through the prism of our own domestic fears and insecurities, then the actions taken will prove limited or ineffective, and may serve to confuse matters more. A mystifying mythology is created, which in its turn demands totemic gestures to reassure the public. This process, readily becomes a self-fulfilling fantasy which – far from assuaging our concerns – will only drive them further.

Inverting Questions Just as there are two sides to every coin, so occasionally we need to invert the questions we ask of society if we are to obtain a more balanced and productive take on issues. For example, the recent fashion to re-examine Samuel Huntington’s work on, ‘The Clash of Civilisations’ (4), in the light of 9/11, would do well to be moderated with an equally vigorous examination as to the possibility of a clash within civilisation, rather than between differing cultures. This would need to address the radicalisation of Muslims within western societies, but more importantly, for those wanting to get to the real

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B. Durodie / Cultural Precursors and Psychological Consequences

roots of this phenomenon, to assess and analyse the largely Western origins of antiWestern ideas. In this vein, rather than recording so-called anti-American sentiment across the world today (5), we would do well to examine how such attitudes have developed closer to home. After all, more anti-capitalist protestors come from Seattle than from Gaza. The rejection of once core social values, such as ambition, success and development, and their representation as arrogant, selfish and dangerous, reaches its apogee in relation to the US – the most advanced capitalist nation. This rejection is reflected in a growing self-loathing evident in American culture and that of other Western societies, as expressed for instance in Oscar-winning Michael Moore’s best-seller ‘Stupid White Men’ (6). Another assumption worth exploring in a more rounded way, is that of the need to understand why it is that a small proportion of Asian youth appear to be attracted to fringe Islamist organisations. It may prove more productive to ask, why it is that a small element of Asian youth, and quite a few others beside, fail to find any sense of solidarity or purpose within Western society (7). Surely, it is an indictment of our own culture that its lack of direction and dynamism, fails to attract and inspire ambitious young people? It is not the magnetism of those who supposedly seek to restore a twelfth-century caliphate in the twenty-first century that should concern us. Rather, it is a failing of our own society that it does not project clearly a vision of its own future to argue against those who would have us live in the past. It fails thereby, to command loyalty, or to impart any sense of mission or meaning. Instead of examining the presumed culture and psychology of those who perpetrate acts of terror, this article focuses upon those selfsame factors in relation to our societies and to ourselves. To what extent are we truly facing a new phenomenon, encompassing new technologies with unforeseen consequences? Or, is it we who have changed – including our individual attitudes to danger, the coherence of our institutions and our sense of social solidarity and resilience?

Diminished Selves The extent to which, once core, social affiliations and bonds have been eroded without replacement over recent decades is striking. We should be alert to the possibility of this producing some unexpected consequences. At the formal level, people in advanced Western societies are increasingly unlikely to participate in the political process. Nor are they as likely to be active – or even passive – members of political parties or trade unions in the same way that their forebears were. There is, of course, more to democracy than merely casting your vote, but even when people do vote, it is often on a negative basis – against an incumbent – rather than for their replacement. These trends are also most marked amongst the young. At the informal level, some changes are even more notable. Many have commented on the growing pressures faced by communities, neighbourhoods and families. In ‘Bowling Alone’, the US academic Robert Putnam pointed to the demise of informal clubs and associations (8). Meeting with friends occurs less frequently than previously, too. This loss of, what has sometimes been coined, social capital, has occurred within a remarkably short period of time.


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A generation ago it was quite normal to send children to school on their own, assuming that other adults would act in loco parentis – chastising them if they misbehaved, and helping them if they were in need. Today, across many urban areas, this can no longer be assumed to hold. None of us ever signed a contract saying that we would look after other people’s children. It was simply an unstated and self-evident social good. Sadly, this erosion of communal bonds has, in its turn, made the job of parenting harder still (9). So, as well as being liberated by the erosion of traditional rules and structures over recent decades, we should note that, without anything to replace these, we have also become more isolated from one another and less effective in consequence. Far from this erosion of old community values necessarily giving rise to a new, confident individualism, what we have seen is the emergence of a disconnecting process of individuation. In the past, social networks and norms may have imposed arbitrary or authoritarian structures and rules upon people, but they also provided meaning, conferred identity, and facilitated basic processes, without which we have become greatly diminished as individuals (10). Being less connected has also left people less corrected. It has allowed their subjective impressions of reality to go unchecked, unmediated or unmoderated through membership of a wider group or association. In the past, when confronting difficulties, people would, through their social networks, have been encouraged to view things more objectively, or at least from a different perspective. They could also have envisaged a collective solution to their problems. Nowadays, personal obsessions readily grow into all-consuming worldviews that are rarely open to reasoned interrogation or resolution. We may be more aware than previous generations, but we are also easier to scare, as we are increasingly alone in facing life’s challenges. Notably, it is this erosion of informal social bonds that has led to their having to be replaced by more formal processes of blaming and claiming (11). Thus, a narrowly self-oriented personality and culture has emerged alongside a growing sense of isolation and insecurity. In some ways, we have replaced a culture of unthinking deference by one of unnecessary fear. It seems that confident individuals need a coherent society to fall back on, just as much as a coherent society requires confident individuals to build from.

Risk Aversion Above-all though, this process of individuation has encouraged an exaggeration of the threats and challenges posed by everyday life. This has manifested itself as a growing obsession with, and aversion towards, all-manner of risks, both new and old. Risk has become a dominant prism for viewing the world today, as evidenced by the number of courses, conferences and journals now devoted to the concept. This outlook emerged gradually, but was catapulted to prominence through the break-up of the Cold War order, coinciding with the publication of the German sociologist, Ulrich Beck’s book, Risk Society (12). The Aids-awareness campaigns of the 1980s were an early indicator of changing perceptions of risk. In the UK, these became much clearer in the debacle over bovine spongiform encephalopathy (or BSE), more commonly referred to as ‘mad cow disease’ (13). Since that time there have been a steady stream of risk-related issues im-

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pinging upon public consciousness. These have included campaigns against the presumed adverse consequences of introducing genetically modified organisms into the environment, and concerns over the use of mobile phones held to have possible effects on the brain through so-called non-thermal radiation (14). More recently the MMR (measles-mumps-rubella) triple-vaccine, was accused by some, despite a lack of confirming evidence, to be linked to autism in infants (15). Nor was it just scientific and technological risk-related matters that came to prominence. Age-old activities and problems have also been reinterpreted and reorganised around a heightened consciousness of risk. Bullying in schools, sun-bathing, child abduction, untrustworthy GPs, and the very food we eat, have all, at one time or another, formed part of a growing panoply of issues one can point to, of fears raised over recent years. Risk management as a discipline has therefore become a major discourse and organising activity, in both the public and the private sector (16). Risk managers sit on the board of major companies (17). Even relationships are now increasingly viewed through the distorting and stultifying prism of risk. Despite concerns raised as to the broader implications and consequences of this, there is an almost unstoppable trend to reinterpret all issues – whether personal, social or scientific – in this way. But, rather than the world changing any faster today than in the past, or becoming a more dangerous, unforeseeable or complex place, it may be our diminished, and more isolated, sense of self that has altered our confidence in dealing with change and the problems it gives rise to (18). More on our own, and self-absorbed than previous generations, with an exaggerated sense of threat, it has become normal for people to look for, and expect, professional support in dealing with what would once have been considered to be everyday difficulties. An all-regulating, blame-attaching response to problems and issues ensues that has, in its turn, helped shape a new, more limited, political framework and agenda for a period largely devoid of any broader social vision. In part, this is because a more positive, social and cultural orientation towards change declined over the course of the twentieth century. Radicals who would once have promoted science and technology as a means for challenging vested authority and power, came to associate these with post-war American militarism (19). Combined with the political defeat and exhaustion of the left, best symbolised internationally by the end of the Cold War, this helped foment a more conservative outlook. In their turn, the old right, briefly triumphal about these developments, soon fell out with one another. The only force to have held them together was the threat posed to their interests by the Soviet bloc externally, and organised labour internally. The convergence of left and right reflects the absence of any broader sense of mission or agreed direction for society. The management of risk fulfills the need for a new organising principle. Politicians, concerned as to their legitimacy have then sought to repackage themselves as societal risk managers. They have also increasingly pursued the centre ground, seeking technical, rather than political, means to enhance turnout in elections. But the demise of any polarised or principled political debate also fed declining interest and engagement in the public sphere. More limited aspirations – to promote voting by anyone, for anyone, and to micro-manage the economy, focusing particularly upon privatised concerns such as education and health – have not inspired a new generation of voters. Attempts to include the public more in certain decision-making proc-


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esses by various means have merely reflected and reinforced declining electoral participation rates (20). What’s more, whilst a nervous and atomised public is held to expect greater regulation of risk by the authorities in order to feel protected, there is no way of ever satiating this assumed demand. Rather, the failure to do so appears to confirm a growing sense of human limitations and low expectations. It also feeds suspicion of the very authorities – political, corporate and scientific – that would need to be trusted in order to transcend contemporary difficulties, as well as further undermining social bonds. Increasingly, through these processes, people have learnt and been encouraged to assume the worst or presume a cover-up, even before any crisis has truly emerged.

Cultural Asymmetry – Victims and Heroes It is within this broader cultural context that we need to situate the events of September 11th 2001. Far from being the trigger to a period of insecurity and policy change, these events were a catalyst for wide-ranging trends that lay just beneath the surface of Western society. For the first time, 9/11 allowed Americans en masse to view and perceive of themselves as victims on the world stage. They hardly needed much encouragement. Victims – people who are known by what happens to them – as opposed to heroes – people who are known for what they do – are a key reference point of our times. The fact that the attacks were unprecedented in scale and occurred in the US simply allowed the domestic soul-searching to begin. We should be clear that the real driver for this was the growing sense and exaggeration of risk, caused and accentuated by the individuation of society deriving from a concomitant loss of confidence and purpose. Notably, there has been a shift in conceptualisations of risk in recent years that parallels the demise of active participation in the political sphere. The classical notion of risk comprised an active formulation of ‘taking a risk’, that envisaged positive, as well as possibly negative, outcomes. Contemporary use however, focuses more on the notion of ‘being at risk’, a largely passive viewpoint that externalises threat as somehow being inherently and inevitably out there (21). This historical shift however, retains an important cultural dimension. Accordingly, there are some who retain an understanding of risk-as-opportunity rather than becoming transfixed by risk-as-threat. It was this cultural asymmetry towards risktaking, far more than the resource asymmetries other commentators have focused on, that was crucial in facilitating the events of 9/11. In another age, individuals armed with box-cutters might not have been able to achieve what they did. If we are to prevent similar incidents from happening again, we need to become conscious of quite how much we have changed as individuals and as a society over the short period since the end of the Cold War. These changes increasingly play a determining role in world affairs. Some commentators have described this shift as the advent of what they call an ‘age of anxiety’, or ‘culture of fear’. This culture stems from and further encourages a focus on the personal and private over the political and public. Indeed, political life increasingly focuses on personal issues as a consequence. This narrow, privatised introspection emphasises feelings over facts and image over insight, leading to the advent of what has also been labeled the ‘therapeutic society’ (22). Any sense of a collective good, or the need to maintain one’s composure, has been replaced by an increas-

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ingly narrow and self-obsessed emotionalism that pours itself out because it fails to perceive any common good worth believing in – still less fighting for. Accordingly, those who do believe in something – no matter what – appear as fanatics to contemporary sensibilities and are labeled ‘fundamentalist’. Ironically, their sense of the possibility and need for social solidarity and sacrifice – irrespective of their limited aims – are important elements of resilience we would do well to learn from, rather than seek to eliminate. What’s more, getting obsessed with – or seeking to moderate – the passions and aspirations of others, evades the urgent need to resurrect our own beliefs and capabilities. Another measure of how much it is we who have changed, can be found by examining the literature on human responses in disasters going back over fifty years. In the past, it was generally assumed that people and systems were fairly resilient and could cope. With few exceptions this was found to be true (23). Today, experts tend to assume that individuals and institutions cannot manage without professional support in a crisis. Accordingly, it is now presumed that humanity and society are always vulnerable and in need of long-term, if not life-long assistance. For nearly fifty years the Western allies stood face to face against an enemy known to have a formidable nuclear arsenal, stocks of, capabilities in, and a significant research programme into, chemical and biological weapons. Yet now, in an age when concepts of belief, truth and sacrifice have been so eroded that they no longer hold any purchase, and when confronted by those who are prepared to commit suicide for their cause, we move to reorganise the world as if we had never faced a greater threat. Surely this tells us more about ourselves than about the enemies we face?

Psychosocial Impacts September the 11th 2001 is testimony to the remarkable strength and widespread prevalence of human resilience. As in most disasters, the orderly evacuation of the World Trade Centre reflected a tendency toward spontaneous, rational, and co-operative behaviour (24). Yet, the political presumption of social vulnerability and concomitant need for professional support was not long in the offing. Indeed, the dust had hardly settled from the twin towers when a veritable army of counselors, psychologists and other assorted therapists descended on New York to offer their help. Unsurprisingly, according to their own methods and determinations, these experts found an elevated incidence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) – a term not even listed in psychiatric diagnostic manuals until the 1980s. They also assessed significant rates of depression across the entire population (25). This was even among those who had only been ‘exposed’ to these events through the medium of television. In this regards, it is worth noting that the very act of searching for, and highlighting, this supposed evidence, itself derives from and ultimately reinforces a culture that effectively encourages people to label themselves as being ill. As Tel-Aviv based psychiatrist, Professor Avi Bleich, has indicated, the reported incidence of trauma appears peculiarly elevated. This is especially so when contrasted to the significantly lower levels amongst an Israeli population who have suffered terrorist attacks on an almost daily basis, over a protracted period (26). All this reinforces the points made as to the determining role of cultural and historical factors in shaping our presumption of vulnerability. But the notion of frail individuals still prevails, shap-


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ing both policy and attitudes. Hence, even the Fire Department of New York – whose firefighters on September the 11th 2001 had been the heroes of the hour – subsequently reinvented themselves according to the dominant social outlook, as forgotten victims in need of support and compensation. By the time the anthrax attacks occurred, Americans had become focused on security issues in general, and their own insecurity in particular. Hence, despite targeting politicians and the media, these incidents led to an unprecedented response right across society. This was manifest by the number of people who handled their mail, quite literally, with gloves, as well as in the demands for ciprofloxacin that inundated doctors across America, from those keen to have what was held to be necessary to treat themselves in the highly unlikely eventuality of being exposed. In the first two weeks of October 2001 alone, there were some 2,300 false anthrax alerts across the United States. A number of these incidents led to cases of what is described in the psychiatric literature as mass psychogenic illness, or in more popular terms, people quite literally worrying themselves sick. One notable case occurred on the Maryland subway where 35 people had to be hospitalised after developing real symptoms including drowsiness, irritability, nausea and vomiting, subsequent to their concerns being alerted to the smell of a strange substance, which later turned out to be window cleaning fluid (27). Many other similar incidents occurred. This was not that first time that mass psychogenic illness or something similar has been observed in populations. It is worth reminding ourselves that due to their fears, combined with a lack of knowledge as to how to use the equipment they had been provided with, a small number of Israelis suffocated themselves to death on their own gas masks during the first Gulf War. The figure was more than had died from being hit by one of Saddam Hussein’s Scud missiles (28). And, whilst they eventually habituated themselves to the new circumstances, this same population also suffered from an increased incidence of coronary problems in the early days of that conflict. Whether based on a real threat or not, such responses can pose real strains upon society and its resources in an emergency. An incident in Goiana, in North-East Brazil, in 1987, where an inappropriately discarded hospital Cæsium source was stolen by youths is particularly apposite in this regard. Once the incident became known, it led to 100,000 people presenting themselves to the authorities for examination and treatment. Emergency workers had to commandeer a football pitch to sort out the worriedwell from the truly exposed, who numbered in the end no more than 244, of which only 54 merited treatment. The point is that people’s concerns, genuine or otherwise, are shaped by the purposes and beliefs of their society and more particularly, those of their social and political leaders. This can have a real impact on the demand for resources and hence the ability of the authorities to cope with any particular incident. By the time an emergency actually occurs, it is too late to change such outlooks. Hence, whilst the numerous training exercises we now witness may serve some limited purpose for the authorities, they will have little impact upon social resilience itself.

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Driving Concerns The actions of political leaders and emergency responders at critical times, especially in the initial stages of any incident, send out important signals to the rest of society as to how they are expected to behave. This can drive public concerns rather than assuaging them. Ambulance personnel, for instance, are trained in an emergency, to calm trauma victims down irrespective of the state of their injuries by downplaying the latter, as such actions save lives. Contemporary culture however, is suspicious of expertise and demands a degree of openness and transparency that increasingly precludes the application of such professional judgment. Few have questioned whether sending people in full chemical and biological weapons suits to handle the numerous incidents of white powder scares that occurred in the aftermath of the anthrax cases, was necessarily the most appropriate action to take. And, in a similar vein, questions could be asked as to the UK government’s decision to place armed police outside mainline railway stations in London in the aftermath of September the 11th, or tanks and troops outside Heathrow airport subsequent to an alleged tip-off as to the possibility of a surface-to-air missile attack. Some commentators have suggested that, far from reassuring the public, such steps are counter-productive and project an image of a society that appears to have lost control, or any sense of perspective and proportion. More recent episodes, concerning the systematic cancellation of flights to Washington DC from London and the release of information surrounding the supposed foiling of a plot to use the little-known chemical osmium tetroxide in an explosive device seem to confirm this trend. This points to a growing confusion, or erosion of the divide, between what ought to remain private intelligence, and what is worth putting into the public domain, based upon an assessment of people’s abilities to take effective action based on the information provided. The British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, countenanced against taking action ‘on the basis of a general warning’, in a speech delivered on the 11th of November 2002 at the Banqueting House in London (29). He indicated that this could lead to ‘doing their [the terrorists’] job for them’. Yet, the authorities perceive themselves as being under a great deal of pressure to be seen to be acting. Whether their perceptions of the public mood are accurate, or the actions they take are truly effective, remains to be determined. Phrases such as ‘alert, not alarmed ’, together with the assumption that a terrorist attack is a matter of ‘when, not if ’, or indeed that an attack is ‘inevitable’, are about as general and unspecific as it gets. Such rhetoric presumes itself to be challenging an assumed complacency towards the issue of terrorism, and is presented as, resolute and robust. But the generalised sense of ‘being at risk’ or ‘vulnerable’ that they project reveals an almost resigned air of fatalism towards future events. The use of language to prepare, or alert, the public, also smacks of blame-avoidance rather than determined resolve. It exaggerates the significance of terrorism to society and, in effect, encourages all-manner of potential terrorists, as well as hoaxers, loners and cranks to have a go. It also ignores the understanding the public do have, that determined individuals will always be able to get through, no matter how many technical barriers have been erected against them doing so. Continuously issuing warnings or information that turn out to be factually incorrect, out of date, or too vague to act upon has a number of consequences.


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First, it can literally make people ill. This need not be as dramatic in form as instances of mass psychogenic illness, but it has helped to foment a vaguer underlying anxiety about life and a gradual, passive disengagement from it, that could be tremendously disabling for those seeking to build up social resilience. This is reflected in the large number of surveys that – irrespective of their self-reported basis and the changing basis for assessment – point to increasing levels of stress, depression and trauma, in the aftermath of various incidents. Second, the more likely scenario is that over a period of time, people grow used to ignoring such statements. Again, this could clearly have dramatic consequences. Recent polls suggest that on the whole people are going about their everyday lives ignoring the threat of terror in a pragmatic and resolute fashion. However, this insouciance is likely to be more representative of a growing, broader cynicism and mistrust of authority that now prevails throughout western societies, rather than reflecting any deeply felt inner commitment or resolve. Third, constant warnings readily lead to a self-fulfilling demand for the authorities to do something – distracting them and us from real risks, and diverting social resources accordingly. Amongst other problems, this generates a situation best characterised as information overload. The demand for the public to be vigilant and report any unusual activity, combined with the task of existing and new agencies to sift through these vast amounts of potential intelligence material, clogs up the system, triggering paralysis by analysis, and failing to identify and act upon more plausible threats and risks. Banks, now required to report any ‘suspicious’ transaction to identify possible instances of money-laundering, report a similar trend towards not being able to see the wood for the trees. Sadly, as no serious local authority can afford not to have revised its emergency plans and procedures in the light of these developments, it almost seems that if they do not assess themselves as potentially being on a terrorist hit-list then they can not be taking their responsibilities seriously. A climate has been created whereby whatever measures the government, security and emergency services take, there is an insatiable appetite for more and demands emerging from all quarters, both public and private, to the effect that not enough is being done. The problem is, that many of the measures being put in place are totemic gestures, rather than rational strategies. It is also worth noting the significant element of commercial interests in such matters. Security is big business and indeed, due to our exaggerated sense of insecurity, one of the fastest growing sectors today. Accordingly, there are numerous risk and security consultants, as well as scientists and engineers, of varying abilities and distinctions, who have a financial interest in maintaining both social and individual concern in these matters. These have encouraged companies to develop so-called ‘business continuity strategies’ of dubious worth, focusing particularly on the integrity of their information systems, and the presumed cost of not doing so. All this has led to an inevitable, if perverse, rise of a certain degree of wishfulfillment. One senior executive recently remarked to me that the supply side for respirators or gas-masks was all ready and waiting, what he needed now was for the demand to be ‘stimulated’.

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What If? As all issues are now examined through the prism of risk, there is a growing cultural proclivity to err on the side of caution. This emphasises the negative aspects of particular situations, assuming far-fetched scenarios and acting as if these were true. Extrapolating from worst-case evidence, or even uncorroborated data, has become the norm. This has led to a distinctive shift over recent years from asking scientific ‘What is?’ type questions that call for specific evidence, to asking more speculative or anticipatory ‘What if?’ type questions. The latter appeals to a more general, emotionally-driven response. But once we start focusing upon ‘What if?’, an inexorable logic develops. For instance, once we have asked the question ‘What if there were groups or individuals out there who might want to use a biological agent against us?’, then we are led through a convoluted series of further presumptions, ‘What if they had access to such an agent?’, ‘What if they were willing, and capable, of deploying it?’, and so on. Despite the absence of evidence, and the numerous cumulative assumptions, there is little choice, lest they be accused of complacency, but for the authorities to begin to prepare our capacity to cope with such an attack. Thus it was, that smallpox, a disease recognised by the World Health Organisation as having been eradicated in the 1970s, has come back to the fore. Despite the two known repositories of the virus, in the United States and the former Soviet Union, having had no reported breaches of security, it was possible to speculate otherwise. In fact, smallpox would not pose particularly great problems, but vaccines were demanded so that public health agencies could establish a protective ring around any incident, just in case. But, the ‘What if ’s?’ did not stop there. After all, ‘What if those dispersing the agent had made a point of doing so in a variety of places including airports to ensure effective worldwide dispersal?’ Then, clearly vaccine stocks needed to be sufficient to cover entire populations. In time, we would need to begin a process of actually inoculating first responders and then, in the interest of access and transparency, making the vaccine available to any other person who may wish to have it. Unsurprisingly, what started as a speculative discourse and set of scenarios on one side of the Atlantic, spread like a real disease across to the other side. Other nations followed suit. The next logical step is to ask the same questions with respect to the many other viruses and micro-organisms that could be identified as posing equivalent or significant risks, such as ebola, tularemia, Lassa fever, Marburg fever, e-coli and botulinum, to name but a few. Once the ‘What if?’ questions have started, it is quite literally like knocking over a line of dominoes, except that each step can cost millions, as well as inflicting a tremendous social cost on entire populations who effectively grow accustomed to living in fear. Interestingly, the fear of bioterrorism has tremendous purchase over contemporary society because it also acts as a powerful metaphor for élite concerns as to the corrosion of society from within (30). Rather than analysing such issues at face value, or in their own terms, as a recent report by the Royal Society did in relation to chemical and biological agents (31), a broader historical and cultural perspective is required to understand why individuals and societies feel so vulnerable to what remain largely speculative scenarios.


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Institutional Distractions Speculation dominates the news after every high-profile arrest or incident. But rather than blaming the media for this, as many are prone to doing – thereby feeding a regulatory response – we would do well to examine the actions and statements of other key public institutions and individuals, ahead of such crises. For instance, after the supposed discovery of the Category B agent ricin, in a flat in north London, the Financial Times reported an official as saying; ‘There is a very serious threat out there still that chemicals that have not been found may be used by people who have not yet been identified’ (32). This statement of the obvious remains true whether there is a war on terror or not. But, under a banner headline stating; ‘Chemical weapons factory discovered in a London flat’, it helped set the tone of the debate. Yet, whilst the media are guilty of uncritical reporting, thereby enhancing social presumptions, we should be clear that they alone do not set the tone. This latter rather reflects élite fears and the broader cultural perspective that inclines towards believing the worst. Ironically, as more discretely reported in the Sunday Times at a later date, this particular story transpired to be largely false (33). Analyses by scientists from the UK government’s chemical weapons establishment at Porton Down, found no evidence of ricin manufacture. Yet this aspect of the story was never officially reported or retracted by the authorities and so the assumption amongst the public that it was true, has remained. Presumably, it was felt to be a useful vehicle for keeping the public vigilant. The media both reflect our cautionary climate and, in certain instances, help to amplify it. But it is nervous politicians and officials who are the real drivers as – lacking any vision of their own – they are unable to separate themselves effectively from the broader culture. In the UK for instance, the newly-established Health Protection Agency has issued numerous public health advisories through its ‘cascade system’, to facilitate GPs in the presumed, anticipated task of having to identify the first signs of a chemical or biological attack. This focus not only diverts resources from where they could best be used within the health service, it effectively helps to establish the context and content for future discussion. Worse, the failure to use specific expertise and to assess the real threat posed appropriately, distracts us from the real risks we continue to face, both from terrorism and from other everyday life. As has continuously been demonstrated, real terrorists prefer to use more reliable weapons such as high-explosives and car bombs. Leading scientists continue to identify nature as by far a greater threat to humanity than presumed acts of biological terrorism – although this danger too is prone to being exaggerated. There is little recognition given to the fact that advanced economies are better placed to deal with the consequences and contain the potential of such incidents. Rather, contemporary obsessions prevail, as can be seen by examining new funding priorities and programmes, which dictate an unwarranted distortion of social resources and research priorities towards so-called ‘weapons of mass destruction’.

Psychiatry Lessons Overall, governments have sought to assuage public concerns through the provision of what they consider to be appropriate and accurate information. Ironically, this ap-

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proach, advocated by the new gurus of risk management and communication may serve to make matters worse by feeding the insatiable appetite for fear. It is widely contradicted by a wealth of literature emerging from the field of psychiatry that suggests the provision of information alone – outside an understanding of context and the sense of one’s ability to shape this – can be a potentially futile and counterproductive exercise. It is not so straightforward to reassure anxious people. Even when concerns are correctly identified and targeted, the evidence suggests that – whilst the more extreme manifestation of symptoms may abate temporarily – without tackling the deeper underlying concepts behind them, problems can soon reemerge, manifesting themselves in an exaggerated form (34). The bottom line is the need to challenge people’s core beliefs about a situation head on. But increasingly over recent years, we have become unwilling to do so. As a society we prioritise consensus-seeking over confrontation. The latter appears too dismissive, or judgmental, to contemporary sensitivities. What’s more, this is not a task that can be achieved by individual psychiatrists or therapists, even in the rare instances where these are not affected by the prevailing norms and values. If the surrounding culture continues to provide signals and messages reinforcing concerns, then the expert is likely to be ignored or questioned anyway. The best that can be achieved in such circumstances is to habituate people to the world they now live in, by encouraging an acceptance of uncertainty. But doing so serves to confirm the dominant social script establishing concern about terrorism. The real task would be to remind people that there is far more to life than terrorism. This has not been addressed by the authorities so far. It requires a focus on ends well beyond dealing with immediate problems. This is a political task that far from distracting us from contemporary issues, should inform the very solutions we seek to put in place. By taking a broader, longer-term view, we would become more conscious of the extent to which trauma itself is a social and historical construct. The widely used terminology of post-traumatic stress disorder did not emerge into professional circles until the mid-1980s. At the time, this was to explain the particular problems faced by certain Vietnam veterans in the US. These suffered not so much from their defeat in South-East Asia, as from rejection by their own communities upon their return home. Shunned as pariahs and labelled psychopaths, the PTSD category eventually offered moral exculpation and access to compensation. But whereas older conditions such as ‘shell shock’ and ‘battle fatigue’ had been held to be specific, relating to a soldier’s background and psyche, the new diagnosis was applied more generally – assumed to derive from the fundamentally traumatising experience of war. Originally framed as applying only to extreme events, PTSD spread rapidly like a disease, to encompass relatively common happenings such as accidents, muggings, verbal or sexual harassment, and even workplace disputes. It finally entered the official Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1980 and aid agencies now commonly assume whole populations to suffer from it in advance of detailed analysis. Ironically, most veterans diagnosed with PTSD have had no combat experience, pointing to a self-justifying reconstruction of current problems through a narrative of past trauma. Research also suggests that PTSD is more serious and more common among international relief and development personnel, than for the locals they seek to support (35). These facts indicate the category to be culturally constructed and its


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causes amplified through our particular Western obsession with risk and stress, often in pursuit of remediation or recognition. Studies of those exposed to a range of natural and manmade disasters consistently show that beliefs held prior to an event coupled with one’s understanding of it, account for variation in symptoms far better than the particular characteristics or severity of the experiences encountered. Accordingly, we should also be wary, as indicated earlier, of the figures regularly cited for incidence of trauma amongst the US population post-9/11. These point to the extent to which, even apparently objective data, such as that measuring people’s anxieties in the aftermath of terrorist incidents, is itself a cultural construct based upon assumptions of human vulnerability and their ability to cope. As Furedi has noted, in the past, the dominant social script or narrative would have been one more focused on social and individual resilience and initiative.

Technical Fixations Despite all the evidence pointing to the urgent need for greater clarity of purpose and direction, most activity since 11 September 2001 has focused narrowly upon the technical means to combat terror. The standard fare of conferences and papers revolves around the assumed need for better intelligence, more surveillance, new detection equipment, protective clothing, and computer models to predict behaviour. When the public is engaged it is at the more basic level of identifying means for effectively communicating predetermined messages and information, or to exhort the need for further vigilance under the banal and general slogan of ‘alert, not alarmed’. It is also the case that whatever the government does in these regards there is an insatiable appetite for more. This comes from the posturing of opposition politicians, and the practical demands of emergency responders, as well as the commercial interests of security providers and consultants, who all appeal to the public’s understandable concerns. Some propose the creation of a US-style department of homeland security. Others too, inured by years of cynicism and mistrust in authority are now inclined to assume the worst and presume a cover-up. The urgent need to engage in a broader debate as to social aims and direction, based upon clearly principled beliefs and the desire to engender amongst the population a sense of purpose that would truly make it resilient to acts of terror is continuously put off for some other time, or not even considered. Yet, it is this sense of mission in the world that, having broken down at home, leaves us incredibly unarmed in the face of the limited threat posed by the likes of al Quaeda and, failing that, what increasingly become labelled as their ‘sympathisers’. If the war on terror was ever hoped to help society rediscover a sense of unity and purpose, then what we are actually witnessing could not be any further from such goals. Far from bringing people together, it has proven deeply divisive and revealed the deep cracks that currently run through society and its institutions. What’s more, technical barriers or solutions to the problem of terror only make things worse as they encourage people to become ever more suspicious and mistrustful as to the activity of their neighbours – rather than bringing people together as the times require. Resilience is not a technology that can be bought. Rather it is an attitude reflecting wider patterns of social development and outlook. Accordingly, attempts to develop

44


technical solutions to the problem of terrorism simply end up reflecting and reinforcing existing values. Focusing on the means and losing sight of the ends only builds lack of direction into the system. Presumably, those who are willing to risk their lives fighting fires or combating other emergencies, do so not so that their children can go on to do the same, but for some broader purpose. It is this that we seem to have lost sight of.

Real Resilience The concept of ‘resilience’ – the ability to withstand or recover from adverse conditions – has come of age subsequent to the terrorist attacks of the 11 th of September 2001. Politicians, emergency planners and other officials, now talk of the need to ‘build’, ‘engender’, ‘improve’ or ‘enhance’ resilience in society. Unfortunately, by framing the discussion in the fashionable language of ‘risk’, an element of passivity and inevitability has been built into the solutions proffered. The UK Cabinet Office describes the aim of ‘building resilience’ in terms of reducing susceptibility to challenges ‘by reducing the probability of their occurrence and their likely effects’ (36). The notion that it may be possible to shape conditions, outlooks and perceptions in advance, by setting a clearer political agenda, is not particularly considered. Hence, despite inherent elements of resilience, society continuously seems to down-play such factors, becoming fixated on more immediate problems and undermined by self-doubt. In reality of course, people and systems continue to display a remarkable degree of resilience given the chance (37). Those directly affected by the events of 9/11 have had little choice but to get on with their lives and, with few exceptions that is what they have done. It is also the case that the total financial cost of these events, both structural and in terms of compensation amounted to less than 1% of US gross domestic product in any one year. To put this into perspective it is worth noting that the Enron saga that followed cost a great deal more. Building on such spontaneous responses, rather than undermining them, requires promoting a clearer sense of who we are and what we are for. This would necessitate truly engaging the public in a political debate as to aims and values. It would also force a need to be more judgmental of others than contemporary society allows. And in turn, this would emphasise the need for collective purpose over individual security in order to achieve predetermined social goals. Sadly, a focus on knowing, engaging, judging and acting is not so straightforward today. Despite this being the real role and responsibility of those in positions of authority, there is good reason to anticipate their reluctance to do so. For if we were to characterise resilient people as their having a greater sense of who they are and of what they can achieve together, along with a willingness to judge others and take action accordingly – it is quite possible to question whether the authorities in the UK, the US, or anywhere else nowadays, would view such a project with any degree of optimism. Resilient people are not necessarily easy to manage. They demand more from those in authority than maybe these latter are willing, or able, to provide. Accordingly, it is likely, for the foreseeable future at least, that there will be much talk about the need to engender social resilience, but very little by way of effective action. It is far easier to make glib references to the need to defend ‘our way of life’, ‘our values’, or even ‘freedom and democracy’, than it is to provide real content to


45

such concepts through a concerted campaign to re-engage the public in political discourse. Indeed, few of the authorities concerned with civil defence or homeland security consider it their responsibility to lead on such an agenda. There is, of course, a reason as to why these matters are not being addressed. That is, that there is a failure to recognise that the problem has anything to do with the domestic situation at all. Terrorism is usually perceived as being a problem relating to others, out there. The notion that an absence of direction at home may somehow drive our perception of terrorist acts, as well as undermining resilience and encouraging the perpetrators themselves is a novel one for those in authority. Indeed, there is an even more direct relation between us and the terrorists. That is that terrorism often reflects the dominant forms of social understanding and values it emerges within. When society asserted the need to recognise the independent sovereignty of nation state, terrorists fought politically-motivated national liberation struggles. Now, on the other hand, we live in an age when political debate – beyond the confines of the personal – is weak, or non-existent. One consequence of this is the advent of terrorists without stated aims or goals. What’s more, this nihilistic lashing out against modernity is unrestrained by any sense of moral purpose and draws encouragement from the broader self-loathing evident in western culture. Giving it a name, such as al Quaeda, rather misses the point. Its perpetrators are as likely to be found at home as anywhere else. They include Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma bomber, the Aum Shinrikyo cult, who planted the chemical agent sarin, on the Tokyo subway in 1995, and even the 9/11 hijackers themselves who, far from being poor kids from the Gaza strip were relatively wealthy and well-educated. They had all spent some considerable time attending Western universities and, ultimately reflected our own dominant norms and values. This points to a final problem relating to the war on terror – that is that even if Osama bin Laden and all his acolytes were captured or killed tomorrow, still the problem of terror would not have gone away. This is because a key driver to our perception and response to these events has been our own insecurities. And these are not about to go away. What’s more, by advertising how vulnerable we feel and how frail we have become in relation to any activity, at any time, in any location, we have effectively educated a new generation of the future disaffected, whether terrorists, animal-rights activists, hoaxers, loners or cranks, as to how easy it is to undermine our society using little more than plastic knives and bags of sugar. The sorry truth that lies at the heart of the war on terror is that the West is at war with itself. The acts of 11 September 2001, having been perpetrated by outsiders, served as a useful distraction from addressing where the problems really lie. In fact, those individuals proved so effective because in many ways they reflect our own nihilist culture. It is just that, consciously or not, they have captured this better than we do ourselves.

Conclusions From the preceding discussion a number of tentative conclusions can be drawn: 1.

A focus on our own societies, psychology and culture is a missing element necessary for understanding both our response to recent acts of terrorism and, the particular salience we attribute to them.

46


2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

More research is required to explore the largely Western origins of antihuman, anti-modern and anti-Western ideas, as well as how these then become adopted by others. The erosion of social bonds in our society has left a weak, self-centred form of individualism that may be less capable of withstanding difficulties or of perceiving of a greater common good or purpose. A proper understanding of risk perception has to take into account the determining influence of social factors, such as political disengagement and stasis, as well as being grounded in scientific evidence. The key asymmetry used by terrorists is that of our respective attitudes toward risk-taking. We must reassert the inevitability of risk in all activity and highlight the fact that without taking risks nothing can be gained. Government should neither make fatalistic statements about terrorism, nor offer the promise to protect us from all risks. Above-all there should remain a clear distinction between private intelligence and public information. The public are the primary targets of terrorism and accordingly, the real first responders. Their attitudes and values in advance of such incidents are key to shaping outcomes. People and systems are already resilient. Contrary to popular perception, in an emergency, the public rarely panics – displaying both rational and pro-social behaviour – and vital processes continue to function. Real resilience is an attitude, or mindset. It derives from the quiet confidence of having a broader common purpose, combined with a willingness to judge others and to act when necessary. Building real resilience requires re-engaging the public in an active sense, building from their spontaneous co-operative responses, rather than bypassing these using technical means. Technical solutions, when used as an end in themselves – as opposed to a means to a broader end – can push people apart, promoting mistrust and suspicion and thereby further corroding social bonds. Counter-terrorism strategies and national resilience need to be guided by, and embedded within, a broader framework of aims and values for the whole of society. There is an urgent need to restore the centrality of a principled and positive political agenda for society that opposes the use of fear as a vehicle for winning arguments or building coalitions. Social leaders need to focus society on a broader vision, beyond the immediacy of terrorism. It is only through this that they may hope to secure real loyalty and active engagement in achieving their purposes.

Endnotes _________________________ 1.

2.

See for example; Reich W. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1998, or Hoffman B. Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press, 1999. See for example; von Hippel K. The Roots of Terrorism: Probing the Myths, The Political Quarterly, Special Issue, September 2002, or The Roots of Religious Extremist Terrorism, available at: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/ip/andrewsteele/sept11/papers/root.html.


3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

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Furedi F. Culture of Fear: Risk-taking and the Morality of Low Expectation, Cassell, 1997, and Continuum, 2002. Huntington S.P. The Clash of Civilisations and Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, 1998. see for example; The Pew Global Attitudes Project, available at: http://people-press.org/pgap/. Moore M. Stupid White Men, Penguin, 2002. Durodié B. Sociological Aspects of Risk and Resilience in Response to Acts of Terrorism, World Defence Systems, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 214–216, 2004. Putnam R.D. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, Simon & Schuster, 2000. Furedi F. Paranoid Parenting: Why Ignoring the Experts May be Best for Your Child, Penguin, 2002. Furedi F. Therapy Culture: Cultivating Vulnerability in an Anxious Age, Routledge, 2004. Furedi F. Courting Mistrust: The Hidden Growth of a Culture of Litigation in Britain, Centre for Policy Studies, 1999. Beck U. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, Sage Publications, 1992. Durodié B. Poisonous Dummies: Risk Regulation After BSE, European Science and Environment Forum, 1999, available at: http://www.scienceforum.net/pdfs/Durodie1.pdf. See for example: Burgess A. Cellular Phones, Public Fears and a Culture of Precaution. Cambridge University Press, 2003. See for example: Fitzpatrick M. MMR and Autism: What Parents Need to Know. Routledge, 2004. Power M. The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty, Demos, 2004, available at: http://www.demos.co.uk/catalogue/riskmanagementofeverythingcatalogue/. Hunt B. The Timid Corporation: Why Business is Terrified of Taking Risk, John Wiley & Sons, 2003. Heartfield J. The ‘Death of the Subject’ Explained, Sheffield-Hallam University Press, 2002. See Durodié B. The Demoralization of Science, paper presented to the Demoralization: Morality, Authority and Power conference, University of Cardiff, 4–6 April 2002, available at: http://www.cf.ac.uk/ dmap/papers/durodie.pdf. Durodié B. Limitations of Public Dialogue in Science and the Rise of New ‘Experts’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2003. Op. cit. Furedi F. 1997. Op. cit. Furedi F. 2004. Quarantelli E.L. (ed.) What Is A Disaster?: Perspectives on the Question, Routledge, 1998. Furedi F. Heroes of the Hour, New Scientist, Vol. 182, 8 May 2004. Schuster M.A., Stein B., Jaycox L., Collins R., Marshall G., Elliott M., Jie Zhou A., Kanouse D.E., Morrison J.L., Berry S.H. After 9/11: Stress and Coping Across America, RAND, 2001. Bleich A., Gelkopf M., Solomon Z. Exposure to terrorism, stress-related mental health symptoms, and coping behaviors among a nationally representative sample in Israel, Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 290, pp. 612–620, 2003. Hyams K.C., Murphy F.M., Wessely S. Responding to chemical, biological or nuclear terrorism: the indirect and long-term health effects may present the greatest challenge, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 27, pp. 273–290, 2002. Op. cit. Hyams K.C., Murphy F.M., Wessely S. 2002. Blair T. Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 11 November 2002, available at: http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page1731.asp. Durodié B. Facing the Possibility of Bioterrorism, Current Opinion in Biotechnology, Vol. 15, pp. 264–268, 2004. Royal Society, Making the UK Safer: Detecting and Decontaminating Chemical and Biological Agents, April 2004, available at: http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/files/statfiles/document-257.pdf. Huband M., Burns J., Krishna G. Chemical Weapons Factory Discovered in a London Flat, Financial Times, 8 January 2003. Leppard D. New Government Setback as Ricin Plot Claims Collapse, Sunday Times, 5 October 2003. Durodié B., Wessely S. Resilience or Panic? The Public and Terrorist Attack, Lancet, Vol. 360, pp. 1901–1902, 2002. Pupavac V. Pathologizing Populations and Colonizing Minds: International Psychosocial Programs in Kosovo, Alternatives, Vol. 27, pp. 489–511, 2002. Cabinet Office, Draft Civil Contingencies Bill, June 2003. Op. cit. Furedi F. 2004.


Section Two Other Nations’ Perspectives



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Key Security Issues in the Caspian Region Hratch TCHILINGIRIAN Assistant Director, Eurasia Programme, Judge Institute, University of Cambridge Abstract. In recent years turbulent regional and global developments and crises have presented the international community with major military, political and economic challenges. This brief overview will present the key security and geopolitical issues in the Caspian region – especially southern Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus – which is increasingly becoming a significant area in world affairs, not only for its proximity to the wider Middle East, but especially for its geo-strategic value and energy resources.1 While relatively unknown in Soviet times, the large oil and natural gas reserves in newly independent Central Asian countries, for instance, have attracted considerable international attention.

Security, stability and prosperity are interrelated. Major global developments in recent years underline the fact that internal political stability, economic reforms, equitable distribution of wealth and the rule of law are essential pillars of any new “security architecture”. Indeed, security can no longer be viewed only from a military point of view. Physical security and protection are related to the problems of widespread poverty, ethnic or religious conflicts, political powerlessness, suppression of human rights and civil liberties. These critical and widespread problems have become breeding grounds for various kinds of extremisms. Like other trouble spot areas around the globe, major international and regional security problems affect the Caspian region. Since 2001, the more active US engagement in Central Asia and the Caucasus and the involvement of a number of European and Asian countries in Caspian regional developments have further complicated regional relations, especially the newly independent states’ relations with Russia. In the post 9/11 world, the challenges of security in the wider Caspian basin are not only significant to millions of people living in the region, but also for the larger international community. Currently, the region provides important land and logistical resources to the United States’ “war on terrorism”. Against this background, the fighting in Chechnya and several other inter-ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus add to the security concerns in the region and its immediate neighbourhood, which require continued attention, assessment and containment mechanisms. Unresolved territorial and political disputes in the Caucasus pose significant problems for the mid- and long-term security and stability of this resourcerich region. The list of conflicts includes the Armenian-Azerbaijani war and dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Georgian-Abkhaz war and conflict over the former Soviet Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, the Georgian-Ossetian dispute and tension over South Ossetia, Russia’s war in and for Chechnya and other minor inter-ethnic tensions. While most of these conflicts are inherited from the Soviet Union, they have remained unresolved for over a decade. Of more concern is the increasing militarisation of the region. In addition to rising national military budgets, for instance in Azerbaijan and

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H. Tchilingirian / Key Security Issues in the Caspian Region

Armenia, two rivals in a prolonged conflict, numerous bilateral and multilateral military agreements and operations are in force – such as US bases in Central Asia, US military aid to Georgia, Turkish military aid to Azerbaijan, Russia bases in Armenia, Georgia and Central Asia, NATO PfP, CIS Collective Security, etc.2 In terms of foreign politics and diplomacy, there is an “alphabet soup” of international institutions actively engaged in the region, such as OSCE, PACE, EU, CIS, UN, etc. On the legal-political front, the formal demarcation of the Caspian Sea and the determination of national economic zones remain unresolved among the littoral states (Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Iran). Even as Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have signed inter-state agreements, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Iran have serious differences and legal disputes. Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan – while relatively stable under mostly autocratic regimes, continue to experience inter-state tensions and terrorist threats. There have been periodic border skirmishes between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. While a civil war in Tajikistan ended in 1997, there are tensions with Uzbekistan in Khujand in the fertile Fergana Valley and a breeding-ground for militants belonging to the banned Hizbi Tahrir movement. In Kyrgyzstan there are periodic guerrilla activities in, for instance, the Batken region and Lailek where about a quarter of the population is Uzbek. In late 2004, President Putin alarmingly warned: “We do have up to 2,000 conflicts of the [ethnic and confessional] type [after the break up of the Soviet Union] which are in the dormant stage. If we don’t do anything about them, they could provide a flare up instantaneously.”3 Most analysts would find Putin’s number very high and would question the possibility of the break up of large-scale new violent conflicts in former Soviet space. However, the threat remains real. Local socio-economic factors, internal political disputes, Russian-US relations and multi-lateral interests in the region exacerbate the security situation in this conflict-prone region. Acts of major terrorism have in some cases taken place as an extension of these conflicts or in addition to existing conflicts. The Beslan school tragedy in 2004 was one of the major terrorist incidents in the region. In addition to the loss of hundreds of lives, mostly children, the crisis raised questions about Russia’s preparedness in countering terrorism and the adequacy and effectiveness of its security structures. During 2004, several major terrorists incidents took place in Uzbekistan 4 and minor incidents in other parts of the region. The threats of terrorism remain high in the region, especially in Russia and Central Asia, with growing links between local and international terrorism. The security and military processes are closely connected to the dire socioeconomic situation of the region. All former Soviet countries suffer from serious poverty problems, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Former Soviet societies, for example in the Caspian region, have seen an increased inequality in wealth distribution and economic prosperity. While according to official data social sector indicators have improved in the last decade, experts believe that figures substantially underestimate the decline in fundamental social conditions.5 Only a small percentage of oligarchs and government officials have benefited from “privatisation” of state owned assets and industries, while the vast portion of the population live in extremely poor conditions (e.g., 70–80% of the population of Tajikistan live in poverty). Corruption on all government and state levels and in the judicial system remains rampant. Political institutions are weak, opposition groups virtually eliminated and civil society, with some exceptions, for instance in Georgia, is still trying to make its voice heard. There is growing political and economic exclusion in this region, which could

H. Tchilingirian / Key Security Issues in the Caspian Region

53

have far reaching security implications. For instance, mis-appropriation of oil revenues by energy-rich countries (e.g. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) is an issue with serious economic and social consequences. The problems of political and state leadership present other potential flashpoints. Following the velvet revolutions in Georgia (November 2003) and Ukraine (December 2004), which brought to power new pro-Western governments, there are indications that the US especially is eyeing Belarus, Moldova and eventually Central Asian states for similar change of power. The long term in office of former Communist leaders as heads of “independent” states have been problematic, especially in Central Asia. Whether peaceful or violent, the change of generally autocratic regimes in this part of the world would have vital security implications. Last, but surely not least, environmental issues present another dimension of security. The prevention and containment of serious environmental crises and disasters in the region – for example, a major oil spill in the Caspian Sea – have not been seriously addressed by individual states or multilaterally. In recent years the region has also experienced a number of natural disasters, such as earthquakes, floods, droughts etc. Indeed, the complex security issues in the wider Caspian region require complex, longterm policy approaches and formulations that would actively involve states in the region as well as multi-national organisations and institutions. In conclusion, at least three broader and important processes in the region need to be considered when addressing security issues: 1. 2.

3.

The extreme socio-economic situation that these newly independent states and their societies are faced with; The existing internal political tensions in the various states of the region and their potential consequences, along with the lack of strong state infrastructure and society-wide inclusion; The external political, economic and military pressures facing these states and the increasing geostrategic interests of regional and international players, especially under post-9/11 conditions.

Endnotes 1 2 3 4

5

For instance, a high oil price around the globe has enabled Russia to accumulate over $16.7 billion in its energy-stabilisation fund. Asia Times, 27 January 2005. See, for example, “Armament and Disarmament in the Caucasus and Central Asia”, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 3. http://editors.sipri.se/pubs/CentralAsia.html. RFE/RL Newsline, 17 September 2004. The group Jamaata of Central Asian Mujahedins were blamed for the attacks. According to official security officials in Kazakhstan, Jamaata is linked to Al Qaeda. Another active group is the Hizb-utTahrir al Islam. A number of their cells were exposed in Russia in 2004. See Viktoria Panfilova & Dosym Satpayev, “The Leading CIS Country Damages Its Reputation by Backing Political Losers”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta – Dipkurier, No. 1, January 2005. WPS Monitoring Agency, www.wps.ru/e_index.html. Central Asia: Ten Years of Transition, The World Bank Group (Berlin: 1 March 2002). http://lnweb18. worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/0/7035BF2B6C6043EB85256BA3005E2A5B?OpenDocument.



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Estonian Research and Development Policy: A Vital Contribution to European Security Raul MALMSTEIN Government Councillor to the State Chancellery, Republic of Estonia Abstract. After the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, Estonia has been preoccupied with both the challenges of protecting its security and modernizing its economy. While the threats to its security are only potential and could be managed through membership of international security alliances, Estonia would have to take on the urgent tasks of making its economy modern and competitive largely by itself. The country is confronting these tasks mainly through a robust Research and Development (R&D) drive in science and technology. Successful innovations in these areas that can be applied to fighting the new security threats within societies can allow countries like Estonia to make a far greater contribution to global security relative to their size or national defence budgets. In this paper, I will review Estonia’s R&D strategy, its implementation and the lessons learnt.

Estonian R&D Strategy “Knowledge-Based Estonia” for 2002–2006 The explicit strategic objectives of Estonia’s R&D strategy were to upgrade the country’s knowledge pool and increase the competitiveness of national enterprises. These were clearly felt needs because of the relatively inadequate legacy of the Soviet educational system, its limited interaction with industry and the lack of entrepreneurial attitudes and skills amongst researchers and research institutions. The main aims of the R&D strategy were thus to: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

raise the level of scientific research increase productivity through fostering business innovation and R&D create and foster the growth of new technology-based firms integrate “old” and “new” economies foster cooperation between science and industry modernize public sector services

The strategy identified three main industries on which to concentrate the R&D drive: 1. 2. 3.

Information society technologies Biotechnology Materials’ technologies

Through this strategy, Estonia expected to raise total R&D investment from 0.8 to 1.5 of GDP. Increasing private sector investment in R&D will be crucial to achieving this as it is currently six times below the EU average. By facilitating greater inter-

56

R. Malmstein / Estonian Research and Development Policy

action between science and industry, the Estonian strategy will stimulate the awareness of innovation. Technology programmes have been created and launched in the identified three key areas. The principles of shared responsibilities and coordinated actions guide the implementation of the R&D strategy.

Institutional framework P a rlia m e n t

G o v e rn m en t

G o v e rn m e n t R & D C o u n c il In n o v a tio n S u b C o m m itte e

S c ie n c e S u b C o m m itte e

M in is try o f E c o n o m ic A ffa ir s and C o m m u n ic a tio n s

M in is tr y o f E d u c a tio n a n d R e s e arc h S c ie n c e C o m p e te n c e C o u n c il

T ra d e P ro m o tio n A g e n cy

E N T E R P R IS E E S T O N IA

In v e s tm e n t A g e n c y

R e g io n a l D e v e lo p m e n t A g e n cy

T e c h n o lo g y A gency

T o u ris m A g e n c y

In n o v a tio n

&

e n te rp ris e

p o lic y

s u p p o rt

E s to n ia n S c ie n c e F o u n d a tio n

K re d E x

m e a s u re s

„S tre n g th e n in g k n o w le d g e -b a s e ” ta rg e te d fu n d in g o f re s e a rc h

G ra n t fu n d in g o f re s e a rc h e rs

Implementation of the R&D Strategy The key aspects of implementing Estonia’s R&D Strategy are: 1.

2. 3.

Policy Planning; Implementing the R&D strategy itself involves detailed research and planning. The strategic objectives have to be turned into a carefully phased structure of pilot projects, schemes and programmes. Financing: budget streams have to be carefully planned on a long-term basis to ensure the smooth implementation of the planned measures. Policy Delivery: relevant agencies have to have the capability in place to implement all the programmes and measures connected to the R&D strategy.

The problem of securing cooperation between science and industry and making the two different worlds work together is universal rather than peculiar to Estonia. There are hundreds of policy interventions and actions to solve the problem that one may adopt as a model. But there are no universal solutions to this universal problem; the details of how to secure cooperation between science and industry have to be worked out in every nation. None of the goals of Estonia’s R&D strategy can be achieved by one single tool. The goals themselves have to be reduced to concrete, well-defined problems to which solutions can be thought through, defined and implemented. It is often possible to secure a concrete solution to one concrete problem.

Defining a Concrete Problem The macro-economic framework: Estonia has a high volume of exports, mainly the sub-contracting of technology services, which are price sensitive.


57

Micro-level framework: There is an extremely low level of business R&D. Only 1.5 persons per exporting company are dealing with product development or R&D. Industry and R&D institutions do not cooperate. To approach the solution of this identified problem, we first asked whether it has been defined deeply and clearly enough. Then we asked ourselves where we could look for models to resolve such a problem. Is there any transition economy that has been able to solve this problem through a clearly identifiable strategy? Perhaps, Estonia needs a tailor-made solution because there is nowhere from which we could secure existing, relevant knowledge. We also asked whether we have the money to pay for generating the knowledge from research and planning required to find a unique and/or appropriate solution. The first step was to appoint a dedicated Project Manager and a Project Team in the Ministry of… A high level of commitment of relevant actors was achieved early on. Different sources of relevant information such as the EU Innovation Trend Chart were monitored. Participation in relevant international round-tables such as the MAP Strata project was important. It was also crucial to appoint a professional partner. A programme implementation body, Enterprise Estonia, was put in place from the beginning. An extensive feasibility study was carried to identify and analyze the best international practices. To identify the potential actors with whom collaboration can be arranged in relevant sectors, sixty one interviews were conducted and three seminars were organized. The results of the feasibility study were published and disseminated to the potential interest groups from both industry and research. It was decided to launch Technology Competence Centres (TCC) to support the strategic cooperation between science and industry in Estonia; the TCCs coordinated R&D grant/loan schemes and the Spinno programme.

Managing Conflicts of Interest The response of the academic community was strong from the onset. But the academic side saw the R&D initiative as a means of securing “lump sum” investments to upgrade

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infrastructure and solve other related problems. There was also speculation about the purpose of the programme, conflicting notions about it and lobbying to secure advantages. These problems were resolved through consistent and clear focus on the programme, prompt resolution of arguments and communication, the engagement of independent expertise and organizing frequent brain-storming sessions between academia and industry. It was also important that high levels of competence and trust were maintained within the main implementing organization.

Incentives and Expectations The Estonian TCCs were designed to help the best become better through the creation of long-standing strategic partnerships with R&D institutions, to identify areas and sectors where science-industry cooperation is possible and provide incentives for cooperation. The Estonian TCC programme is a combined approach of Swedish, Austrian and Australian TCC programmes and Estonia’s country-specific conditions. Estonian R&D strategy brings together academic and industry groups with a common and clear research interest and plan. It requires partial investment from industry and top-level managerial ability is crucial to success. The expectation is to achieve a critical mass of international standard scientific competence. The state provides consultancy and cofinancing. In 2003, 1.6 million EUROs was earmarked for the programme. This sum is expected to increase annually, based on the number of centres, actual need and the assessment of the pace of implementation and success of existing schemes. Estonian contribution is leveraged by EU Structural Funds. It is important to create a win-win situation. Industry wins by sharing R&D costs and gaining additional knowledge. Institutions engaged in research and R&D gain by securing more funding, albeit for specific kinds of research, and acquiring experience on practical projects. Academic incomes also rise and the quality of education is improved. The state wins through the expansion of exports, the growth of GDP, improved budget performance etc. Yet, some problems have to be addressed. Scientists understand the benefits but fear losing control of intellectual property rights. Research institutions also fear losing their best scientists to industry. Businesses too can see the benefits but tend to be afraid that the university bureaucracy will “eat” their money and that scientists have out-dated research interests which are irrelevant to their problems.

Conclusion and Lessons The central lesson is that there is no ready-made solution available. It is important to use professional consultants as well as keep abreast of international best practices. It is important to enhance policy making and implementation capabilities. Long-term financial commitment is important for the successful utilization of resources and the successful implementation of the programme. Political commitment and trust are required during the policy-making process. It is crucial to actively involve relevant interest groups and communicate developments. The Big Picture i.e. broader implications, of all policy measures should be understood.


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The challenge of internationalizing Estonian science and higher education remains. This aspiration goes beyond creating R&D enclaves of world-class competence. The private sector needs to become involved in R&D in a more pro-active manner. The entrepreneurship and culture of excellence that the R&D programme is breeding should also evolve to broader social innovation rather than remain the hallmarks of certain sectors of the economy.



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Lithuanian Scientists – Military Implications of the Challenges Dr. Robertas JARULAITIS Deputy Director, Resources and Programmes Department, Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania Abstract. The paper first examines the post-Soviet challenges of the Lithuanian armed forces and security. The major change in the country’s security arrangements has been the cooperation with NATO and the eventual gaining of NATO membership. This process has familiarised Lithuania with cooperation in the area of international security. With the rise of new security threats which need to be countered with innovative applications from the world of scientific research, the contribution of Lithuania to international security can be broadened. This paper surveys the science and technology research assets of Lithuania and their potential contribution to fighting new security threats.

The transfer from a Partnership for Peace (PfP) status into a fully-fledged NATO membership was followed by a lot of changes in Lithuania. The greatest challenge for the Armed Forces of Lithuania was the reform and transformation from the principle of “total defence” to “collective defence”. The implementation of this reform is still in progress. Lithuanian Armed Forces are preparing mobile, swiftly re-deployable units capable of participating in Article 5 operations. Lithuanian military forces have been attending international operations since 1994. Today, they are participating in peacekeeping missions in the Balkan region, military operations in the Persian Gulf and Central and South Asian regions where they are confronted with higher security risks. Therefore, application of new technologies becomes a crucial factor in such missions. It is important for Lithuania to have the opportunity of participating alongside NATO researchers in developing the new technologies that would ensure greater security of our militaries. The second essential factor that demands the development of new technologies for greater protection is the growing threats from international terrorism. Lithuanian science history has a long tradition related to the 425 year-old Vilnius University. Short-term history includes the Soviet Union period (until 1990) and PostSoviet Union period. Until 1990, the system of applied research in Lithuania was well developed (humanities, social, physical, technological sciences) and mostly served the needs of the Soviet Union. After regaining independence in 1990 when the flow of funds from the East terminated, the main objectives for Lithuanian scientists were to safeguard the research potential of the country, to direct the research towards fulfilling the needs of Lithuanian industry and to integrate the Lithuanian research system into the international one. Lithuania possesses a wide and diverse scientific research base spread across a wide range of civilian institutions. Presently about 15 main technical universities and

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R. Jarulaitis / Lithuanian Scientists – Military Implications of the Challenges

research institutions in Lithuania are involved in research work. Separate research groups from these institutions work in the field of defence technologies. They participate in NATO Science for Peace (SfP) projects and collaborative projects within programmes implemented by other states. The main universities involved in research work are:

Institute of Materials Science and Applied Research of Vilnius University The main branches of activities: − Development of fluorescence sensors for detection of hazardous biological and chemical compounds. − Development of holographic techniques for characterisation of semiconductor compounds and structures.

− 2D-to-3D image recovery and noisy signal processing. − Solid-state sources of light for speciality applications. − Speech and language technology.

Institute of Defence Technologies of Kaunas University of Technology Activity areas: − Cryptographic one-way Functions Construction based on Non-Commutative Groups and Dynamic Chaos Systems. − Laser Trainers for Rifles with Full Simulation of Single Shots and Serials. − Laser Simulators for Infantry Tactical Training. − 60 mm and 120 mm Mortar Training Equipment. *Infrared Aiming Systems Mortar Training Equipment.

Semiconductor Physics Institute Activity areas: − New materials and nanotechnology (for security needs and Medical Diagnostics) − Electromagnetic waves interaction with material, fluctuations and chaos (masking technologies for electronic warfare). − Sensors and energy saving technologies (recognition of explosives, hazard gases, etc.)


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Institute of Biochemistry Activity areas: − − − − − − − − −

Investigation of the structure and function of enzymes, enzymatic electron transfer development of biosensors. Biosensors and biosensor arrays for the on-line determination of hazardous and biologically active compounds. Study of carcinogenesis and evaluation of the biological activity of compounds. Biochemical studies of explosives and their degration products. Synthesis, structure and functioning of biomolecules, bio-active substances, and their assemblies in the homogeneous phases and the interfaces. Investigation of biodiversity of microbial degradation of arenes and heterocyclic compounds. Studies of the functioning and regulation of signalling systems in eucariotic cells. Investigation of T4 type phages of enterobacteria. Synthesis of various organic substances, development of technological production methods for miscellaneous applications.

Institute of Physics

For military: − Polymer sensors of toxic and explosive materials. − Stand-off system for pollution control based on tuneable infrared lasers.

Institute of Cardiology of Kaunas University of Medicine Activity areas: − Development of computerised systems for evaluation of functional state of humans. − Hardware and software for medical data registration and analysis.

This is how we can group Lithuanian institutions that co-operate in the field of defence research and technology:


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Academy of Science Council of Science 2 Universities

Representatives of Industry

Research Institutes

3

4

1

5 7

8 NATO Science Programmes

6

NATO: RTA/RTO

NATO: CNAD

Research and Technology Agency/ Research and Technology Organisation

Ministry of National Defence Ministry of Education and Science Ministry of Economy

Conference of National Armaments Directors

The Ministry of National Defence supports the participation of our researchers in the activities of NATO organisations such as the RTA, RTO and NATO Science Programmes. Lithuanian representatives to these organisations have been involved in the activities of the Defence Research Board and Council.

Lithuanian R&D Organisational Structure GOVERNMENT MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

STATE STUDIES AND SCIENCE FOUNDATION

Lithuanian Science Council Universities

R&D Institutions

Vilnius University

Semiconductor Physics Institute

Kaunas University of Technologies

Institute of Biochemistry

Vilnius Gediminas Technical University Vytautas Magnus University Kaunas University of Medicine

Lithuanian Science Academy

Institute of Chemistry

RESOURCES AND PROGRAMMES DEPARTMENT R&D Programs

Defence Research Board

Istitute of Biotechnologies Institute of Physics

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

NATO RTO NATO Science for Peace

Defence Research Council

Bilateral/multilateral cooperation

Other

Research institutions in Lithuania are subordinated to the Ministry of Education and Science.


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The Government has established the National Research and Science Studies Foundation. The Science Council selects the most promising projects to be funded from the State’s budget. Some of the projects are linked with development of defence technologies. The Government of the Republic of Lithuania has developed the High Technologies Development Programme (approved in 2003) to provide funding to 14 research projects in the following fields: − − − − −

Biotechnology (2 projects) Laser Technology (3 projects) Information Technology (3 projects) Mechatronics (3 projects) Other high technologies (3 projects)

The Ministry of National Defence (MoND) acts as a co-ordinator of co-operation in the field of defence technologies between Lithuanian Scientific Research institutions and NATO RTO bodies as well as in bilateral co-operation. Resources and Programmes Department of MoND leads this co-ordination with the contribution of the Procurement Service under the leadership of the Under-Secretary for Procurement and Infrastructure. MoND does not initiate research programmes, therefore the most effective way of conducting security-related research is to get our researchers involved in the programmes implemented by NATO and NATO countries. MoND supports the participation of Lithuanian researchers in NATO activities for the development of new defence technologies. Lithuanian scientists actively participate in international projects carried out together with NATO research institutions. The Ministry of National Defence is implementing a Support Programme designed to renovate research centres (2002–2006). These are the priority areas: laser research, materials science & sensors, gene engineering & biotechnology, mechatronics, crisis medicine. The process has already begun and research centres equipped with modern equipments have started to run a series of new projects. After joining NATO, Lithuania for the first time faced on Long-Term Requirements in Force Proposals Package. These requirements anticipate co-operation with other NATO countries conducting research in the field of appropriate defence technologies. They induced the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence to look for areas in which existing research potentials could be used. With the assistance of Lithuanian scientists, including recommendations of the Defence Research Council, MoND has identified the following potential scientific areas for further development in defence R&D: − − − −

Detection of toxic and hazardous materials (solid-state gas sensors, biosensors for chemical biological agent detection, monoclonal antibodies for new bio-detection technologies); High power pulse technology (monitoring and diagnostics of high power microwave pulses, resistive sensors for high-power microwave pulse measurement, protectors against electro-magnetic pulses); Opto-electronic and laser technologies (electro-optic devices and processing, high power photo-exitation, lasers for satellite ranging and detection, chemical biological agents detection); Biotechnology.

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Summarising the implications of the challenges we should acknowledge that the concept of supporting scientific activity for the sake of education and “pure” research remains. However, there is no longer the wider Soviet market to subsidise the costs of such activities. Lithuanian scientific researchers are therefore learning hard lessons – the need to find customers and sponsors for their research programmes. The reality of competition means that various institutes now have to learn to corner “niche” specialisms. Also, the scientists have to learn that business skills are just as important as science and technology. They have to learn to market their capabilities, communicate their skills and consider what applications their activities can support. In the defence field, the most significant change is that there is NO funding or support of any consequence for such programmes. Lithuania is embarking upon an ambitious and challenging defence modernisation and reform programme. The nature of our current defence capabilities and commitments means that – for at least the next few years – Lithuania will be buying “off-the shelf”. We will be playing catch-up with our allies in the defence science and technology field. Limited financial resources, and the fact that we are only developing core capabilities, do not incentivise our policy makers to invest in research and development programmes. If compared with other NATO countries as far as the average of defence expenditure for R&D is concerned, Lithuania unfortunately stands on one of the lowest steps. To anticipate co-operation in R&D NATO has tried to add some focus to this by setting Long Term Requirements (LTR’s). However, we would question whether it is an effective mechanism. Not all NATO allies can afford to develop all of the national capabilities suggested. Perhaps a better approach would be to establish a clearing-house mechanism to help foster co-operative programme development. The most effective thing MoND of Lithuania can do in the short-term is to consider the development of some form of capabilities “data-base” for the scientific and technical communities and support the marketing efforts that are developing. For Lithuania, as a new NATO and EU member, the military will rely mainly on civilian led and funded research and development programmes in the short to medium term. The Lithuanian MoND will need to act as an information broker with other national defence science and research programmes, to try and encourage wider partnerships and attract external funding. It is necessary to help researchers to find partners who are capable of conducting R&D together with their counterparts from other countries. Enlarging the role of the MoND as co-ordinator could enhance this co-operation.


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Hungary on the Road Bánk L. BOROS Lecturer in international relations and security policy, University of Miskolc, Hungary Abstract. Hungary’s potential to contribute to international security through science and technology research faces a number of daunting obstacles. As elsewhere in the transition countries of Europe, there is a squeeze on budgets for both defence and science and technology research. But the major challenges are attitudinal; politicians and the science establishment have to overcome the legacy of the Soviet era. Political elites need to take a more active interest in defence issues and academics, especially social scientists, need to develop a research agenda that escapes the ideological constraints of the past.

New Threats – New Perceptions In order to reach an adequate understanding of the state of security-related Hungarian science, one must first examine it within the broader context of the post-Cold War international security environment. “Traditional” security threats diminished with the disappearance of the bipolar international system. The fear of a large scale war fought by conventional or even nuclear forces, the “Mutually Assured Destruction”, and the imminence of a WW III were all gone for good, or at least, became an unimaginably distant possibility. The major powers, with the lead of the “first among equals”, the United States – remained on the empty battlefield possessing enormous military and other securityrelated assets without matching challenges. (Or to put it the other way around, the new and at that time not-clearly-identified/prioritized challenges were not met by existing military tools.) The growth of “out of area” engagements applied not only to NATO but also to other alliances, international organizations and nation states as well. From the very beginning of the 1990s, different challenges became apparent – the Gulf War, the Balkan wars, genocide in different parts of the globe – that contributed to the debates assessing security threats that remained after or emerged from the ashes of the Cold War. These new or newly-prioritized threats have become well-known. They are the subject of various national and international security documents and the studies of different scholars from all over the world. These threats include terrorism, genocide, ethnic conflict, organized crime, migration, failed or ‘rogue’ states, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), human rights abuses and environmental challenges, to name just a few. Although there is a firm consensus among politicians and scholars on the sort of issues that could be labeled as a serious threat to national or international security, it seems more and more obvious, especially after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, that the perception of threats from different actors on the world stage diverge considerably. The

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B.L. Boros / Hungary on the Road

international system, certain regions of the world, and individual nation states face different kinds of threats. On the one hand, these divergences derive from the given and clearly different geographical, social, economic, political and historical circumstances that characterise all communities. On the other hand, an aspect of threat perception is more psychological and less tangible by nature. National as well as personal security is usually taken for granted by those whose work does not involve dealing with security issues. This is true not only of individual citizens but also rather worryingly of some professionals e.g. politicians whose awareness should be on a higher level due to their important decision-making roles. Only when something happens will the majority of a certain population realise the value of security and the threats that endanger it. This was evidently the case for the United States before September 11th, 2001 and but only a little less so for Western Europe before the March 11, 2005 Madrid attack. After 9/11, the problem of national security became a hot topic for both the public and officials and almost immediately changed the priorities of American threat assessments. After 9/11, the US perceived threat to national security as primarily a question of terrorism. (This fact calls for a thorough examination of the relations between national interest and the broadly defined new ‘global’ threats, but this is not the subject of this paper.) Today, the United States is virtually the only (super) power that possesses both the capability and the political will to define major security issues and how they are to be addressed and even make several nations join in its efforts to address them. The vast majority of states have accepted and endorsed the adaptation of this “theoretical” approach (war against terror) of threat assessment in the ‘new’ security environment. If we assume that different circumstances shape different perceptions of security challenges and that we tend to neglect certain threats until they are imminent (or until catastrophic events have occurred) then we could accept Robert Kagan’s thesis on the existence of differences between European and American threat assessments. Either because there is real difference in the threats that the two shores of the Atlantic face or merely because of differing perceptions of threats, today we can point to a divergence in the assessments of security threats. In my own view, there is a similar split between the new and old members of the Atlantic Alliance. At least, this could be true of Hungary.

Hungary: Dominant Legacy and Difficulties of Transition The legacy of the communist system, including its education and socialization process in Hungary determined in large both the attitudes and practices of the nation’s elite towards foreign and security policy. As the result of the peace treaties following WWI, Hungary lost more than two thirds of its territory and population; its place as a potential European power was thus diminished. After WWII, the country was occupied by the Red Army and this resulted in – in practice – a complete subordination to the Soviet Union. Hungary lost the independence to conduct both its internal and external affairs; foreign and security policy was determined by Moscow until the very end of the 1980s. Hungary lived under the security umbrella provided by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Given that Hungary is a small country without vast natural resources and that it has only a small and poorly equipped military force compared to those of the West or the “East”, the culture of and interest in security policy among the intellectual elite has not


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been developed. Those who were formally in charge of national security or military policy and who received their education and training under the communist regime are now struggling to overcome the legacy of Soviet dominance; some of them simply cannot adapt themselves to the new circumstances. Hungary’s post-communist generation also lacks an interest in security issues. However, the country has made great progress in attracting attention thanks primarily to the new disciplines offered in higher education and the stable and rapid progress of Hungary’s (re) integration into Europe and into relevant international organizations. In the future, this younger generation – not affected by the former system’s spirit – could hopefully form a base for serious and responsible rethinking of the country’s foreign and security policy – which, one could say, is still “under construction”. There is another problem of the approach to foreign affairs (and security) of newly democratic Hungary that is closely related to the lack of interest and/or know-how in this field. The indispensable dialogues that could result in a strong and clearly defined basis for a new independent Hungarian foreign and security policy have not taken place between the new politicians that have emerged aside the remaining former communists to form a half-new political elite. There has not been any attempt to start a debate to determine Hungarian national interest or to establish a long-term policy for foreign affairs. From the early 1990s, the new Hungarian foreign policy has been a projectbased enterprise with ad hoc decision making. Rejoining Europe and membership of the Transatlantic community was more a short term goal than a result of a thoroughlydebated strategy. The Hungarian politicians and scholars who drove the process lack the strategic vision or the will to even start a dialogue on its goals or rationales. In addition to the problems presented above, the economic consequences of the transition from a planned economy to a market-based one have clearly affected the process of Hungarian defence reform. During the last 14 years, all Hungarian governments raised the question of transforming the Hungarian Defence Forces to meet the standards that are demanded by both the new geopolitical environment and the new alliance commitments of the country. But the defence sector remained neglected and the ambitious reforms turned to restrictions and cutbacks of military plans. Politicians, either in power or in opposition, have been pre-occupied with domestic issues and the unwillingness to allocate adequate resources, partly a reflection of the lack of available funds, led to the failure of the planned reorganization. But despite all the setbacks, some improvements were made and an interesting duality has emerged within the Hungarian Defence Force (HDF): while the majority of the Hungarian forces remained more or less untouched – or faced cutbacks – some units were established to be fully interoperable with allied forces. These professionals are well equipped, trained and educated to be able to serve in multinational commands and operations but they make up only 15–20 percent of the HDF’s total strength. Although Hungary finally abandoned conscription in 2004 – as an integral part of the military reform – significant, but not new, obstacles arose from the budget deficit and foreign debts of the country. Despite the firm commitments during the end of the 1990s to raise its defence spending above 2% of GDP (the lowest point in this period was 1.2% in 1996), Hungary’s defence budget for 2005 will again only equal 1.2 percent of the gross domestic product. The vast majority of this budget will be spent on personnel and maintenance; funds are still not allocated for serious research and development activities. As mentioned above, the culture and establishment of modern, western-style security policy has not been created. The logic of defence planning has been turned upside

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down in Hungary; instead of defining the national interest first then designing adequate missions to suit them followed by the planning of the necessary tools and at the end allocating the required resources, the practice is exactly the opposite. And if there is not sufficient funding for the hardware of defence then it is difficult to imagine that the software, such as science and education, will be adequately funded.

The Science Sector The current structure of the relevant Hungarian scientific and academic community derives from the characteristics of post-Communist Hungary. Under the communist regime both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ science attracted considerable attention and sufficient resources. Hard scientists were well-educated and, as the required tools were available, they were able to produce significant scientific achievements. Soft sciences (e.g. social sciences) in order to spread the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of security-related issues were ideologically determined and completely cut off from any other points of view. Along with the fall of the previous system, the existing scientific life and institutions almost completely collapsed. As the subordination of the defence sector to the USSR came to an end, the lack of funding and the absence of an independent national defence industry reduced the status and relevance of the scientific community. Soft sciences, such as security studies, in theory received a great boost from the newly acquired knowledge from the West and were reformed in their substance accordingly, but they have never gained a real opportunity to provide the relevant background to or become an important part of the decision-making processes. Except for the establishment of the National Defence University, the institutional framework of security studies have not come into existence. Although separate NGOs, foundations or institutes were created to formally deal with issues related to security, as these organizations are politically determined in nature, they are principally destined to provide partisan backing for internal political struggles. In the field of education, there are only weak initiatives to incorporate securityrelated issues into the curriculum; security studies as a separate discipline is almost non-existent in Hungary. Those, who deal with security as a profession, either move with the flow of domestic politics or try to follow the patterns imported from Western scholars and as a result, Hungarian defence or security studies have no reputation at all – neither on the national, nor on the international level. Finally as it is typical almost of the whole scientific and educational community in Hungary, proper funding is either absent or allocated according to partisan political criteria, or is obtained from different foreign sources.

The Road Ahead Despite reaching its short-term foreign policy goals (accession to NATO and the European Union) Hungary’s foreign and security policy is still struggling with both the heritage of communism and the consequences of economic and political changes. There are two main broad obstacles that should be addressed as soon as possible in order to establish a modern and serious defence policy system in Hungary with a flour-


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ishing scientific and academic background. First, the post-communist political culture itself and second, the failure of defence reform. Until the political elite is willing or able to recognize the importance of the defence sector (regardless of the country’s size and capabilities) and the need to acquire the political experience of working within international institutions and alliances as responsible members, there’s little hope for significant change. Politicians both in power or in opposition should agree on the nation’s national interest and understand the bipartisan nature of security (and foreign) policy deriving from that consensus. Along with the need for change in general political priorities, there’s the acute problem of defence reform. Hungary is still short of a coherent concept for adapting its defence posture to the new security environment created by the end of the Cold War, the events of 9/11 and to the institutional frameworks of both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Hungary should reverse the current practice of bottom-up planning discussed above and break with the budget-determined way of restructuring. After addressing several concerns of the Hungarian security and defence establishment we could conclude that the ultimate challenge lies not in the absence of hardware – such as the budgetary conditions – but rather with the outdated software that still runs the system. First of all, we need to change both the political and the professional mentality towards security: then, and only then, will there be any chance of establishing a supportive atmosphere for security-related science in Hungary.



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A Small Nation Perspective – Norway Jan Erik TORP Director, Analysis Division, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment Abstract. Over the last 15 years, the international security situation has changed dramatically. The possibility of a global and possibly nuclear war – that was very unlikely even in the era of the Cold War – now seems almost unthinkable. At the same time, however, new security threats are facing a modern and globalised society. The lines between “outside” and “inside” the state are being continually redrawn in the process, and in many cases, they are being completely erased. This paper will highlight some important research topics that should be of importance in order to support efforts to respond to the changed security environment.i

The changed security environment mentioned above has had (and continues to have) great consequences for military forces in Europe, North America and many other places in the world. The disappearance of the Cold War implies that there is less need for large mobilisation-based territorial defence forces. The increased threats from international terrorism has on the one hand led to an increased demand for expeditionary military forces that can engage security threats anywhere in the world. On the other hand there is also an increased emphasis on protecting the home turf from international terrorism. The change from territorial defence forces to lighter and more expeditionary forces is the core of what is commonly described as “military transformation”, especially in NATO. Military transformation is a very important but demanding task for many nations inside and outside of NATO. It is beyond the scope of this short paper to address the role of research in military transformation. In NATO, the requirements for nations are for instance specified in the Prague Capability Commitments (PCC) and in the bi-annual Defence Requirement Review (DRR) process. It should be noted, however, that research in such fields as security policy studies, operational analysis and economy may be a key to successful military transformation. In particular, the importance of making sound cost estimates of future defence structures cannot be overstated. Such estimates are vital in order to ensure that future defence structures are sustainable and well balanced against the expected available funding. In the following paragraphs the focus will be on how research can play a role in improving national homeland defence. Some key topics that should be addressed are: • • • • • •

Terrorism research (actor focused – importance of language skills) Counterterrorism Protection of Critical National Infrastructure Computer Network Operations Protection against Weapons of Mass Destruction National organisation of civil protection and emergency planning.

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J.E. Torp / A Small Nation Perspective – Norway

First, it is vital to have an in-depth understanding of the new threat. Research on the motivation and ideology of terrorist groups is important in order to understand the root causes of the threat, but also target selection, restraints (or lack of such) in the use of weapons of mass casualty etc. Empirical studies of terrorist attacks are also important in order to learn about terrorist tactics and use of weapons and other types of measures. Such research is also important in order to track changes in patterns of attacks and to predict possible future changes.ii

Terrorism Research There is not a very sharp border between research about terrorist actors and intelligence gathering. Also, much of the research about terrorism “either falls into the trap of being ideologically biased, purely psychological, speculative commentary, or built on data of uncertain quality”.iii It is therefore of particular importance that the research is objective and adheres to the principles of academic quality. Experiences from terrorism research at FFI have shown that extensive language skills have been a key to numerous valuable sources for the research. For the research group at FFI, that specialises in terrorism motivated by radical Islamism, knowledge of languages such as French, German, Spanish, Arab, Urdu and Russian has given access to sources that are not easily available to many other researchers.

Counterterrorism Research should also play a vital role in support of robust countermeasures to terrorism. The research needed in this area will have to cover a large number of topics ranging from ways to remove the root causes of terrorism to the development of technical equipment to help improve for instance airport security. Except for some selected topics that are described in the following, this short paper will not elaborate on the various topics that need to be covered or the various disciplines that should be involved. The demand for research in this area is great. However, since the terrorist threat will pose similar challenges to most countries (although the probability for attacks may vary significantly between them), research in this area is well suited to international collaboration.

Protection of Critical National Infrastructure A modern society is strongly dependent on reliable and well functioning infrastructures. Examples of such infrastructures are: • • • • • • •

Electrical power supply system Telecommunications Transportation (road, rail, air, sea) Water supply Fuel and oil supply Banking/finance Police, health care, fire fighting.


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If such infrastructures cease to function, especially for prolonged periods of time, the consequences to society may be severe. In order to provide safety and security to its citizens, a country needs to make sure that critical infrastructures can survive challenges ranging from natural disasters to terrorist attacks. Since many infrastructures from time to time are exposed to extreme weather, random technical breakdowns and occasional vandalism, they are often protected to a certain level. This level is, however, most often dimensioned to withstand random threats of well-known types, and not systematic attacks and sabotage from terrorists or a military opponent. The current trend of privatisation and de-nationalisation of critical national infrastructures has amplified this problem. While a government (monopoly) company often did build more robustness and redundancy into such systems than strictly necessary, private enterprises are only concerned with the well-known, day-to-day threats to the systems. In order to save money, there is a trend towards centralising the operation of infrastructures. For instance telephone switchboards, electrical power plants, lighthouses and water reservoirs may no longer have any permanent manning. In an effort to save costs, it is being replaced by one or a few operations centres and advanced information and communication systems. In a globalised world, these operations centres may not even be located in the same country as the rest of the infrastructure. Empirical studies show that terrorists very rarely attack critical national infrastructures.iv The reasons for this may be that attacks on such targets rarely cause any spectacular effects or mass casualties. This does, however, not give any guarantee against terrorist attacks against infrastructures in the future, and since these infrastructures are also exposed to other types of threats, it is very important to ensure their robustness. To assess the vulnerability of the various critical national infrastructures in a country is therefore an important research task. In contrast to other counter terrorist measures, such research is not well suited for international collaboration. The reason for this is firstly that a critical infrastructure may be of varying importance between different countries. The water supply system may for instance be much more critical for a warm and arid country than for a country with abundant water supplies. Secondly, detailed information about the different infrastructures is often (and should be!) classified information that is difficult to share with other countries, even for research purposes. To make things even more difficult, critical infrastructures are very often dependant upon each other. A telephone network may for instance depend on the electrical power supply system to function well, while the electric power supply system may depend on telecommunications in order to operate properly. Relevant questions that should be addressed in research on critical infrastructures are: • How vulnerable are the different infrastructures (in a country)? • What are the threats to it? • What measures could be taken to reduce the vulnerability in the infrastructures? • What would these measures cost? • What to do first? Prioritisation and cost/effectiveness analyses. Computer Network Operations As mentioned above, modern infrastructures are becoming more and more dependent on advanced information and communication systems. This development is progressing

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fast, and we have not yet seen the end of it. At the same time it is clear that these systems may themselves be vulnerable to attacks. This fact is well known to most PC-users from the increasing spread of computer viruses, where some of them can harm the computer seriously. The bad news is that the threat from these everyday threats may become low compared to what an actor with some knowledge and resources may be able to achieve. Our estimate is that at least 20 countries are developing offensive CNO (Computer Network Operations) capabilities.v The extent to which nonstate actors such as terrorists or criminals possess these capabilities is not known, but it may be easier to achieve these capabilities than many other capabilities that such actors might be feared to develop. It may be argued that most of the important SCADA (System Control and Data Acquisition) systems are closed systems that are not connected to the Internet, and therefore not vulnerable to CNO. Experience shows, however, that there are many motivations to connect such systems to the Internet, and that many actually are connected to the “cyberspace” in some way. There is a great need for research in the area of protecting critical information systems.

Protection Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Protection against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) also needs to be commented upon, because of the damage potential of such weapons. WMD is often defined to consist of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Experience has showed that terrorists are very conservative in their choice of weapons, and only a small number of terrorist incidents with the use or planned use of CBRN weapons are known. Terrorist attacks, such as those in New York and Washington 11 September 2001 and in Madrid 11 March 2004 has shown that mass casualties can be achieved with more conventional means. There are, however, signs that CBRN weapons are getting increased attention by terrorists – to some extent probably driven by the attention protection against such weapons have, especially in the USA. Given the potential grave consequences use of such weapons may have, research on protective measures should have priority.

Civil Protection and Emergency Planning The last research area that will be mentioned is the way crises are managed in states. There are several different approaches to this, each associated with advantages and disadvantages. In Norway (and also in Sweden), crisis management are organised according to the principles of responsibility, similarity and closeness. Responsibility means that the lines of responsibility should be the same in a crisis situation as under normal circumstances. Similarity implies that the crisis organisations should be as similar to the everyday organisation as possible. Lastly, the closeness principle prescribes that a crisis should be handled at the lowest level possible. The principles above imply that there will be no particular organisation with responsibility for crisis management. There are no interior forces (gendarmerie, carabineri); in fact there is no ministry of the interior at all. This model will have some advantages over organisations where authority is transferred to a dedicated crisis management group when a crisis evolves beyond a certain limit. On the other hand, it may in


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some instances take time to sort out who are responsible for a handling a crisis situation, especially if the particular crisis situation is very different from any everyday event (as may be the case for the most serious crisis situations). Research is needed in order to assist in developing good crisis management organizations, although the implementation of such organisations will in most cases be a highly political issue. It has been shown above that the changed security environment represents a number of challenges to nations. Many of the problems we are faced with are well suited for research, and the need for research is great. In most cases, such research – as well as the actual implementation of measures – is a government responsibility, since commercial actors in most cases will have their attention directed towards day-to-day problems at the lower end of the crisis scale. Given the limited resources many countries are willing to spend in this area, correct prioritisation of the research is an important topic in itself.

Endnotes i

ii

iii iv

v

The author volunteered to give a presentation at the workshop on a relatively short notice when Björn Sundelius had to withdraw his paper with the title “The Scandinavian Model”. This paper is based on security related research in Norway, in particular at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. A number of reports from this research can be found at http://www.mil.no/felles/ffi/start/FFI-prosjekter/ Alfover/_TERRA/Publikasjoner/. About half of the reports are in English, the rest are in Norwegian language. Lia og Skjølberg (2000) “Why Terrorism Occurs – A Survey of Theories and Hypotheses on the Causes of Terrorism”. See http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00004/Lia-R-2000-02769_4938a.pdf. Lia (2000) “Is Civilian Infrastructure Likely Targets for Terrorist Groups in Peace Time? Some Preliminary Conclusions On Terrorism as a Security Policy Challenge in Norway” (in Norwegian). See http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00004/Lia-R-2000-01703_4935a.pdf. CNO consists of CNA = Computer Network Attack, CNE = Computer Network Exploitation, CND = Computer Network Defence.


Section Three Initiatives to Break Down Barriers Amongst Scientific Communities



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Science and Security in the EU Delilah AL-KHUDHAIRY and Jean-Marie CADIOU Joint Research Centre, European Commission Via E. Fermi, Ispra 21020, (VA) Italy Abstract. Since the events of 9/11/2001, security concerns have become of notably greater importance in policy agendas. In December 2003, the European Union (EU) defined its first security strategy (A Secure Europe in a Better World adopted by EU heads of State and Governments). This marked an important step towards a convergence of views on security within the EU and also provided the basis for the development of a new European security culture. In 2004, the European Commission launched a Preparatory Action in the field of security research entitled ‘Enhancement of the European industrial potential in the field of security research’ with a view to improving the security of European citizens, reinforcing European technological and industrial potential in security-related areas, and establishing a comprehensive European Security Research Programme from 2007 onwards. Effective security policies depend critically on assessing what scientific and technological knowledge is available, what knowledge is needed and how that knowledge can be put into effective use. The challenge is to understand how science and technology can contribute towards tackling threats and security challenges. This paper provides an overview of the recent developments in the EU’s approach to security research.

Introduction Following the events of “September 2001” and “March 2004” in the US and Spain respectively, security considerations have been at the forefront of European and international agendas. The need to enhance security worldwide is now recognised by all governments and industries. Recent European Union (EU) and Community initiatives and activities confirm Europe’s commitment to addressing security-related concerns and increasingly diffuse threats that range from direct terrorist attacks, attacks on critical infra-structures, and the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. This paper provides a concise overview of the recent developments in the EU’s approach to security research.

1. European Security Agenda Since the events of September 2001 security concerns have been at the forefront of both international and European agendas. As a consequence, the EU initiated new legislative actions and other measures dedicated to the fight against terrorism. In December 2003, the EU defined its first Security Strategy (A Secure Europe in a Better World, adopted by EU Heads of State and Government at the European Council on 12th December 2003). This marked an important step towards a convergence of

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D. Al-Khudhairy and J.-M. Cadiou / Science and Security in the EU

views on security within the EU and also provided the basis for the development of a new European security culture, including European security-related research in an enlarged Europe. The European Security Strategy (ESS) identified the main security challenges and threats for Europe that need to be addressed, among them: • • • •

terrorism; organised crime; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; regional conflicts and their consequences.

In early 2004, the Commission proposed an annual policy strategy for 2005 focussing on the objective of internal and external stability, with particular emphasis on the European Neighbourhood.i Further European initiatives and activities following the events of March 2004ii in Spain confirm Europe’s commitment to addressing internal and external security threats ranging from direct terrorist attacks (including attacks on critical infra-structures and the potential use of weapons of mass destruction), to organised crime and global instability. All EU Member States increasingly recognize the need for security co-operation and co-ordination among them and also the importance of developing further and using effectively European capabilities and resources. Security relevant EU structures and mechanisms are being put in place or strengthened to integrate and coordinate efforts at European level (for example: European Defence Agency,iii EU Satellite Centre,iv EUROPOL, Community Mechanism for Civil Protection etc.). The signing of the new European Treaty on 18 June 2004 was a further landmark towards a more consolidated institutional setting of the enlarged EU, including for the EU’s external and internal security.v The proposed financial perspectives for 2007–2013 also underpin this European Security Agenda.vi As part of the EU action plan on combating terrorism of March 2004, the European Commission adopted in October 2004 four communicationsvii proposing new EU measures to enhance European prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks, respectively on terrorist financing, prevention and consequence management, and critical infrastructure protection. The EU’s initiatives and activities depicted briefly herein entail addressing security-related needs both within the enlarged EU and outside its borders. This necessitates drawing upon all the instruments and measures found across the EU’s wide spectrum of internal and external policies and mainstreaming security objectives into them. The main objectives are • •

firstly, to enhance the protection of the territory, population, and critical infrastructures of the EU, and, secondly, to support EU missions and activities outside the EU, including peace keeping, confidence building, conflict prevention, and external relations instruments including in the European Neighbourhood.

2. European Security Research In parallel and strongly interconnected with the described security agenda, the EU established new guidelines for future policy to support Security Researchviii and made further progress towards a genuine European Security Research Programme (ESRP):


•

•

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A group of personalities in the field of security research presented its report ‘Research for a Secure Europe’ proposing key orientations, principles and priorities for a future European Security Research Programme with additional funding of at least 1 billion Euro per annum.ix In parallel, the Commission launched in the first half of 2004 a Preparatory Action in the field of security (PASR),x entitled ‘Enhancement of the European industrial potential in the field of security research 2004–2006’, with a view to: (1) Contribute to the improvement of the security of European citizens through addressing Europe’s challenges and threats as set out in the European Security Strategy, and to reinforcing European technological and industrial potential in these areas, and (2) Establish a comprehensive ESRP from 2007 onwards.

As a follow-up, the Commission adopted on 7 September 2004 a Communicationxi entitled ‘Security Research: the Next Steps’, subscribing to the main thrust of the recommendations and orientations of the Group of Personalities report. It recommended establishing a European Security Research Advisory Board to advise on the content and implementation of the ESRP, and to submit an ESRP in early 2005 to be integrated into the 7th Framework Programme of Community Research (FP7) from 2007 onwards. 3. Joint Research Centre Contribution to the Implementation of the European Security Agenda The general mission of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) is to provide customer-driven scientific and technical support for the conception, development and monitoring of EU policies. As a service of the European Commission, the JRC functions as a reference centre for science and technology policy for the Union. Close to the EU policymaking process, it serves the common interest of the EU Member States, while being independent of special interests, whether private or national. In the context of the European Security Agenda and the development of European Security Research, the JRC’s contribution is a capability-driven, research approach, which addresses two key objectives, within its general mission of supporting EU policymaking: (1) Supporting the development of a European area of Freedom, Security and Justice, and protecting Europe from threats related to terrorism and organised crime; (2) Contributing to the development of global stability and security by supporting humanitarian aid and development cooperation policies, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the future instruments for Stability and European Neighbourhood Policy, and monitoring the threat from chemical/biological/ radiological nuclear (CBRN) weapons and illicit trafficking in conventional weapons and dual-use goods and technologies. These objectives are in line with the key priorities defined in EU policy areas covering External Relations and Justice and Home Affairs,xii as well as security challenges identified in the European Security Strategy, which consist of (1) addressing key security threats including terrorism, proliferation of WMD, failed states, regional conflicts and international organised crime (2) bringing together EU’s wide range of political,

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military and economic instruments as well as improving coordination between EU policies relating to External Relations and Justice and Home Affairs in order to address global and regional challenges to peace and security. Building on its expertise, inter alia, in the areas of non-proliferation/nuclear safeguards and anti-fraud, compliance monitoring and cybersecurity, the JRC, in particular, its Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen (IPSC), will in the coming years further develop, apply and assess the use of relevant technologies (including space, smart/embedded sensors, advanced seals, open sources, Web and data mining) in order to support security and antifraud related capability needs. The IPSC will also develop its expertise and networks in information, communication and modelling technologies, as well as software engineering in support of its core areas of applications. The JRC will address the multi-faceted and complex concerns relating to the European Security Agenda through supplementing its in-house capabilities and capacities with those available in the wider EU R&D community. The JRC will collaborate with its extensive network of universities, public research institutions and industry to build new collaborative programmes, which contribute towards attaining the Lisbon target of enhancing Europe’s competitive R&D environment and industry, as well as its dynamic knowledge-based economy. The JRC will achieve this through participating in the relevant instruments of the 6th Framework programme, and playing a key role in the development of PASR and ESRP, and the European Communities Space programme including Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES).xiii The JRC will pursue these objectives and contribute to the implementation of the European Security Agenda by providing selected contributions in each of the following six priority application areas: 1)

2) 3)

4)

5) 6)

Fight against terrorism: Use of open source data mining and web technologies for prevention of terrorist attacks, fight against terrorist financing, protection of critical infra-structures and support to consequence management following terrorist attacks; Organised crime: high-tech crime, Internet crime, identity theft, e-identity solutions, privacy enhancing technologies; Integrated border management: detection technologies and biometrics for effective border control, and assessment of general border permeability for planning purposes by means of geospatial instruments; Transport security: security in land and maritime environments, including container security by means of electronic seals and risk analysis based on open source data mining; Energy security: energy supply security (oil, gas and electricity) and protection of relevant distribution infrastructure; Global stability and security: development cooperation & crisis response instruments (political and humanitarian); non-proliferation of conventional weapons, nuclear security, CBRN and dual-use materials and technologies; European Neighbourhood Policy instruments; Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) including European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

Closing Comments The fast changing pace and uncertain nature of security challenges and threats necessitates new ways of addressing our approach to science and technology, creating new


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knowledge that in turn creates new capabilities such as threat detection and enhanced situation awareness, and understanding whether existing advanced information technologies such as data mining and data analysis can be used to create effective and powerful tools for fighting terrorism for example. Key components in improving the security of the citizen will also depend on integrating existing knowledge across seemingly unrelated disciplines such as natural and human sciences. Bringing together researchers from many traditional disciplines and the private industrial sector that typically have not collaborated, as well as the interaction of those researchers and the private industrial sector with the end users of the resulting science and technology remain crucial for European Security Research and for the implementation of the European Security Agenda. This said, there are also clear limits to what science and technology can do. Science and technology are important tools that need to be put in an overall security context and their effective application also depend on various political, institutional and societal factors.

Acknowledgment The authors are grateful to Dirk Buda for his comments and contributions to this paper.

Endnotes I

“Annual Policy Strategy for 2005”, 25 February 2004, COM (2004) 133: identifies three policy priorities including: • •

II

III IV V VI

VII

(a) European Council declaration on Combating Terrorism of 25 March 2004, establishment of EU action plan on combating terrorism and the appointment of an EU coordinator for anti-terrorism (Mr. Gijs de Vries) http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/79637.pdf. (b) Establishment, in June 2004, of a Commission inter-service and a high-level group on the fight against terrorism. Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004. Its task include the promotion of defence capabilities and European defence relevant R&D. Operational since 2002 in Torrejon, Spain and dedicated to analysis of earth observation space imagery in support of Common Foreign and Security Policy. European Council – 17/18 June 2004 – Presidency conclusions 10679/2/04 Rev2, http://ue.eu.int/ uedocs/cmsUpload/81742.pdf. Financial perspectives 2007–20013, 14 July 2004, COM (2004) 487 Final: lays out four principles along which financial instruments will be rationalised: (1) sustainable growth (2) Citizenship including solidarity in the area of external borders, asylum and immigration, solidarity and rapid reaction (3) Europe as a global partner including policy driven instruments (pre-accession, EU Neighbourhood; development cooperation) and instruments responding to crisis (instrument for stability, humanitarian aid, external aspects of internal policies). Commission Communications adopted on 20th October 2004 on: • • • •

VIII

the objective of stability and security through efforts to improve security; a new external responsibility, with emphasis to the new neighbourhood dimension.

Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Terrorist Attacks COM (2004) 700 Final Communication on Terrorist Financing COM (2004) 701 Final The Protection of Critical Infrastructures Against Terrorist Attacks COM (2004) 702 Final Enhancing the Prevention and Consequence Management of Terrorist Attacks COM (2004) 703 Final.

Science and Technology, the key to Europe’s future – guidelines for future EU policy to support research COM (2004) 353.

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IX

X XI XII XIII


The report of the Group of Personalities presented on 15 March 2004 identified a capability-oriented approach to first, addressing EU’s political objectives and its security needs, and second to identifying the technology areas that need to be developed to provide the necessary capabilities. The Group of Personalities also identified a list of European capabilities that call for improvement, as well as a general framework for the definition of future European research priorities and investments that entail establishing sets of mission and capability needs and identifying the specific technologies needed to meet those needs. The Group of Personalities, established in October 2003, was drawn from European Governments, academia and industry. Commission Communication COM (2004) 72 Final. Commission Communication entitled Security Research: the Next Steps, COM (2004) 590 Final. Communications in the area of “Freedom, Security and Justice”: COM (2004) 101 Final and COM (2004) 487 Final. The JRC is already participating in relevant actions such as the GMOSS network and RESPOND, which focus on applications of space technologies to security capabilities and missions.


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The Cambridge-MIT Institute as an Example of International Collaboration: The Emerging Lessons a

E.C. CRAWLEY a and M.J. KELLY b Massachusetts Institute of Technology b University of Cambridge

Abstract. We describe the mission, strategic goals, processes, programmes and initial outcomes of a joint $100M project between Cambridge University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The central focus is knowledge exchange between and within organisations, and particularly between universities and industry. Our work is carried out with three thrusts, education for innovation, knowledge integration around research and new forms of university engagement with industry.

Introduction The Cambridge-MIT Institute is a company limited by guarantee under English law, and owned equally by Cambridge University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. CMI was established in 2000, and is publicly funded to the level of $100M by the UK Government in pursuit of its mission, namely To enhance the competitiveness, productivity and entrepreneurship of the UK economy… By improving the effectiveness of knowledge exchange between university and industry, educating leaders, creating new ideas, and developing programmes for change in universities, industry and government… Using an enduring partnership of Cambridge and MIT, and an extended network of participants. Its initial phase will be completed in 2006, although there is already a commitment to continue CMI to ensure that the lessons are fully learned and disseminated throughout the UK, in pursuit of its mission. While the mission was clear from the outset, the detailed projects and modus operandi took over two years to develop. It was originally agreed that the four thrusts would be (i) an undergraduate exchange, (ii) integrated research, (iii) professional practice and (iv) a National Competitiveness Network to engage other UK universities interested in the entrepreneurial outputs from universities. So much new ground was being broken, and there were no role models to emulate. Everyone involved underestimated the initial efforts that were required to get two great universities with different internal systems of organisation, educational styles and industrial hinterlands to work closely and effectively in pursuit of the mission. That said, a number of initial investments have paid

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E.C. Crawley and M.J. Kelly / The Cambridge-MIT Institute as an Example

great dividends, and all the major projects fitted into the structure that we subsequently introduced into CMI in 2003.

Strategic Review and Goals At the beginning of 2003, as new executive directors, we conducted a deep strategic review, the result being a clear urging that we should undertake ‘bold experiments at the academic-industrial interface’ and report back to our sponsors on the reasons for successes and failures, so as to emulate the one and avoid the second. This process has attracted parliamentary approval [Report of the Public Accounts Committee 2004 see: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmpubacc/502/50202.htm]. We contacted about thirty stakeholders representing key industrial players, the universities, other bodies involved with the academic-industrial interface. In depth interviews were synthesised, and a 36-hour meeting of 40 professionals involved at the interface helped refine the mission, and the strategic goals, which were finally promulgated as: To improve the effectiveness of university – industry knowledge exchange, by: 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Engaging in bold experiments designed to understand and improve knowledge exchange: testing key hypotheses, studying the innovations, and codifying and disseminating the outcomes Setting these experiments in the context of research programs aimed at creating important new ideas, developed with a consideration for use Creating educational materials and programs, and educating a generation of learners with better skills and empowered to exchange knowledge Supporting competitive application of knowledge and innovation in existing companies Supporting the more robust creation and growth of entrepreneurial ventures Influencing government and industrial policy and practice broadly related to knowledge exchange, and Enhancing university policy and practice related to knowledge exchange

while striving to build a sustainable and enduring partnership of Cambridge and MIT. Our main output is to be codified models in these various areas of activity. What have we tried to do? Has it worked, and is the model scalable and replicable elsewhere?

Processes CMI has developed some processes that are peculiar to its position as a small organization capable of rapid deployment of funds where the need is identified. Solicitation: Although we have a unique position to decide in what to invest, we resorted to the Call for Proposals methodology for the major investments over the last two years. For research, our Knowledge Integration Communities (see the next section for further details), we issued a two-stage call. We were four-times oversubscribed, and yet we used a three-level evaluation of all 167 proposals we received, involving MIT academics, the UK advisory board members and a team of CMI academic staff.


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One quarter of the proposals were short-listed into various sectors representing the future of aviation, drug discovery, communications, computing, etc. We think that our smartest investment in the process was to anoint a CU and MIT leader in each sector and ask them to convene a two-day workshop with the various proposers, the purpose of which was to craft a single £1M/year proposal with the elements of research, educational reform, industrial engagement, engagement with public authorities, and embedded experiments in knowledge exchange. It was in these workshops that the successful bidders went into a virtuous upward spiral of realistic ambition, and hard but firm decisions were made within that community of where the initial focus should be made. Those that followed this path were funded, while those who tried to circumvent this process came in with proposals that were considered weaker by the three-level assessment team. We followed this two-stage process with later calls that focused on educational reform and specific projects on knowledge exchange. For those wanting to establish substantial international collaborations involving the higher education sector, we strongly recommend this approach. Assessment: If CMI is to have an impact on the UK economy, it is important that we have some measure of how effective we are being, and since having impact on that scale is a longterm process, we have developed short-term measures of success as proxies for that ultimate impact. In each of the different aspects of our work, we have developed tools for measuring impact. Students on short-term courses are questioned before, at the end and six-months after the courses, and we have extracted a measure of ‘self-efficacy’, the extent to which alumni have benefited from the courses in terms of being more confident about using the new material. For our major research programmes, we are developing an on-line reporting form that will provide data on the way interactions with industry are growing in intensity and breadth. Finally, we are importing the US-style visitation committee, and we will have an independent and international panel review our activities once a year over a three-year period to assess the value-for-money and the extent to which we are on mission. We think we will have substantial evidence of our worth and anticipated impact within the next two-three years, and suggest that a serious element of such assessment be an integral part of international collaborations. Reliable inferences about our distinctive impact require us to study counterfactuals, and we are investing to compare some of our research communities, as described below, with other institutions with a similar brief to conduct collaborative research for industrial applications. Delivering the Deliverables: For many public sponsors of academic research, much effort is taken to ensure that the ‘best’ research is funded, but apart from a brief final report there are few explicit expectations on the academics to exploit. For CMI, with the need to have an impact on the UK economy, we have given greater attention to seeing that we do actually deliver deliverables. • •

The new educational reforms are to be evaluated and, where successful, embedded in the two universities and made available to other UK universities. The new research programmes are building a serious industrial community around them so that in future they become self-sustaining through a publicprivate partnership, where the academics also have access to public funds

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•

through traditional routes, but the momentum and cohesion of the programmes is maintained within the academic-industrial community. In new activities involving industrial outreach, it is the success of knowledge exchange between the academics and industry that will sustain them. Again, we highly recommend this extra level of commitment for international collaborations.

Publicity: We have given greater attention than most public funding agencies to publicity, and retain a team to keep the novelty and emerging results well in front of the public eye. We have found the academic teams willing to have their work exposed in this way, and it serves the CMI mission to get knowledge of what we are doing in front of the relevant potential users and partners within the UK. When approaching potential partners, or widening our reach within the UK Government, we are finding a higher level of positive impression of our work at the starting point of our engagement. Networks: CMI has its own National Competitiveness Network, of partner universities with entrepreneurial intent, which we use as a tool for disseminating our various lessons. In addition there are several existing networks in the UK whose role is to work in one or other of the areas on which we are having an impact. Our work on education for the formation of engineers is closely linked into the Learning and Teaching Support Network for Engineering. Our access to SMEs in our research domain will be mediated by the local Cambridge Network, and also through membership organizations in different sectors, such as for pharmaceuticals etc. We are meeting with the Regions and Devolved Governments, and may well use their networks as well. The Programmes With knowledge exchange as the primary focus, we have undertaken work in three areas: (i) Education for Innovation We have initiated many education reforms. So far 140 students at Cambridge have spent the third year of their four-year degree at MIT and vice-versa. There are many detailed arrangements about fees, financial supplements and university regulations that have been agreed. The real educational benefit is a pedagogical experiment that will blend the two different styles of teaching and assessment of learning in mechanical engineering. The Cambridge style of lectures, small group teaching and one close-book examination at the end of the academic year encourages students to learn and manipulate knowledge. The MIT style of three-week modules ending with graded assignments encourages quick understanding of new material. Both are attractive attributes and this year an experiment at CU and MIT will try a hybrid teaching combination to assess whether students can develop both sets of skills. We have developed a suite of six taught Masters degrees that are two-thirds technical in content and one-third focuses on business, management and entrepreneurial content. Although the technical content varies from biosciences through nanotechnology to sustainable engineering, the business courses are taken in common, and an interesting alumni group is being generated as a consequence.


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The most exciting areas of new research is happening at the interface of two or more disciplines, and we are examining if new hybrid disciplines might emerge now, just as biochemistry emerged in the 1930s. We are exploring two areas, nano- and microtechnology, and the space where systems engineering, computational biology and post-genomic biology and medicine meet. In both cases, this is a joint CU-MIT endeavour, and the results will be deployed in both universities if the work is successful. We have also developed a short course for budding student entrepreneurs, taught in part by practitioners, and permanent self-efficacy is a key legacy for those who have taken part. We have also begun a major look at the formation of engineers. The knowledge explosion over recent years has been met at most universities by pressure to increase the content of lectures, at the expense of developing the skills that characterize a successful engineer in practice, namely conceiving, designing, implementing and operating systems-level solutions to systems-posed problems. We think that team working to deadlines should be an integral feature of some part of the undergraduate experience. (ii) Knowledge Integration around Research Taking areas of emerging technology where the UK has or could have a major international share, we have crafted five Knowledge Integration Communities. These are in the areas of aviation (The Silent Aircraft Initiative), biology (Next Generation Drug Discovery), communications (The Communications Innovation Institute), computing (Pervasive Computing) and management (The CU-MIT Centre for the Management of Competitiveness and Innovation). We have gathered all the stakeholders to craft, own and run coordinated programmes of research with a consideration of use, education reform, outreach to industry and to public bodies. We have asked that the communities undertake new forms of knowledge exchange, and CMI has a team observing the communities in action in this area in particular. We think that having all the people involved from undergraduate student, through graduate student, post-doc, and both junior and senior academic staff, working and meeting regularly with the equivalent hierarchy in industry, and by having end-to end stakeholder engagement, ideas will flow more rapidly from the bench to the market place, and a new generation of informed graduates will be a feature of the output. Research and teaching have become disengaged in the UK with more kudos and sanction associated with research – we hope to reverse this trend that is detrimental to the overall effectiveness of universities. Early signs are encouraging. (iii) New Forms of Industrial Engagement In the UK, and many other countries, 80% of companies have no formal interactions with universities. Within our Special Interest Groups (SIG) activity, we are trying to extend the reach of the universities by gathering senior executives in sectors, such as construction, ground transportation and retail, and working with them on factors known to academics at CU and MIT that might disrupt the operations of their sector as a whole. Chief among these disruptive factors are the impact of the next generation of IT, changing social patterns and mores, regulations that impact on adjacent sectors etc. Note that none of these represent the central focus of the sectors, but they may have a great impact, as for example in the way that on-line booking is transforming the travel agency business this decade. In our extensive work already with the Regions and the Devolved Administration, we have identified skill shortages that will need to be remedied if they are to effectively

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discharge the increased responsibilities being given them by Central Government. CMI is trying to craft courses that might fill this skills gap. It has already begun a set of courses that improve the professionalism of those involved with technology licensing out of UK universities.

Initial Outcomes Many projects are in their early stages: nevertheless some lessons are emerging. CMI itself is a model of a small, holistic, strategic, agile organization with deep university connections, having resources to support university-industry collaboration and ongoing interactions with investigators. It is also a model of an international collaboration of universities on a broad front of research and education activities addressing problems at a national level. It is a model of a national initiative set up independently from the government, but aligned with its needs: we have dealt with issues such as start-up, governance, strategy process, internal processes, IP, and programme assessment. We have undertaken national and programmatic assessment frameworks to deepen understanding of reasons for success and failure, and for strengthening evidence needed to guide policy. Finally, CMI is an agent of change not only within both partner universities, but also within the organisations with which we partner. (i) Education for Innovation: As we distil the essential ambition of our educational reforms, we can see that we are developing an education that will place innovation much further up the set of values we impart. We see successful innovators as having three sets of abilities: (i) a deep conceptual understanding of the subject(s) they study, (ii) an ability to work in teams to a deadline in an specified context, and (iii) a deep sense of self-confidence. People do not make innovations based on a superficial understanding of the subject matter. Innovation with impact happens in an organisational context, whether an industry, an arts organisation, a charity, etc, and an ability to work effectively within that context is a skill. Finally, those who take the risks are not rash, but they calculate from a position of inherent self-confidence in being able to do the basics of what is required. We have innovations that attach to all three competences. Our boot-camp course for budding student entrepreneurs has resulted in several companies being set up by the alumni, most in lower-tech at this early stage. The local biotech companies strongly approve of the subject mix that we are giving our MPhil students – they know both the technology and the market on entry and can immediately become very useful. Curriculum development and more general educational reforms take longer to establish to the extent of having robust metrics of success. (ii) Knowledge Integration around Research: If we can produce a community of end-to-end stakeholders, including those from academia (scientists, engineers, social scientists and policy analysts), industry, and public bodies, we have the hope of developing new technologies in a more efficient and effective way than if we relied solely on technologists. Choices that are technology neutral will be properly informed by market needs, social acceptability and compliance with regulation. If our KICs are eventually owned by the sectors, with CU and MIT as an


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academic axis, this will be a signal success of our initiative. We have specific examples of initiatives emerging from the KIC that would not happen without the community. We have noticed that some of our earlier projects that undertook more conventional joint research are beginning to emulate our KICs as they see clearly the added value of having the community of stakeholders fully engaged, and the need to get research results into undergraduate curricula as a way of bringing enthusiastic and informed students into the community. (iii) New Forms of Industrial Engagement It is too soon to measure the success of some of our initiatives here, other than to have been short-listed to run a UK network on ground transportation at the request of the companies involved in our SIG in this sector. Our course that trains technology licensing professionals within UK universities have been oversubscribed and has attracted independent public funding in recognition of the need it fulfils.

The International Dimension At several levels the international dimension of our project has had a real impact. For individual projects the mix of US and UK participation in educational developments, knowledge integration around research and new engagement with industry means that better practice is adopted at each stage. Ideas for improvement are flowing both ways. There is a healthy mix of UK and US inputs at every level. The cultural differences between academics working in the UK and the US are a source of creative tension. Meetings in the UK dealing with a UK-centric topic are leavened considerably by the inputs from MIT faculty. Major corporations that have bilateral links with both Cambridge and MIT are very clear about the added benefits of having both universities working together through CMI. Over time, the deeper level of engagement that is possible under the umbrella of CMI (as opposed to a single collaboration on one project by two academics) is enabling more ambitious experiments aimed at producing global best practice are becoming feasible. The benefits of the international collaboration have been acknowledged in the CMI submissions to Her Majesty’s Government on matters of policy.

Summary CMI has crafted a number of experiments to make more effective the way industry and academia exchange knowledge. The progress of these experiments are being monitored closely so that the specific reasons for success can be articulated clearly, and the lessons from failure can be promulgated so that they are not repeated. We have new experiments underway, such as launching KICs in response to demands from without academia, rather than lead by academia as has been the case to date. We are also aware of new experiments we need to undertake to secure for example an understanding of the conditions needed for high-growth of high technology companies. We need also to understand the way that the organisation, administration and values of universities can help or hinder the national economies. Although, we have focused here on projects that improve knowledge transfer as a means of enhancing competitiveness and productivity,

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space does not allow a fuller description of projects targeted at student entrepreneurs, mid-career entrepreneurs, and the celebration of entrepreneurship within universities. Both Cambridge and MIT are learning from the experience of working closely across such a broad range of activities. What we realise is that we are developing global best practice in much of what we are doing, which explains why we have given briefings to senior academics, industrialists and policy makers from more than a dozen countries to date.


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A Strategy for Pre-Preemption: Designing Innovation Agoras to Inspire Progress and Project Stability Memduh KARAKULLUKCU Managing Director, ARI Teknokent, Istanbul Technical University Technology Park Abstract. This paper takes a look at the spectre of terrorism in the Islamic societies of the Middle East through the experience of a model of social engineering on which the Science Park of the Istanbul Technical University (“ARI Teknokent”) is being designed, the Agora. The Agora concept refers to a zone or process of experimentation that successfully “incubates” positive values and then diffuses them to the institutions of the larger society. The Science Park brings together capitalists and academics for the purpose of creating a dynamic mechanism of spreading knowledge and technology. While foreign capital and knowledge are sought-after, care is taken to ensure that the project is rooted locally. Such Agoras offer a model for combating terrorism. They can be used to diffuse knowledge and economic progress, thus depriving the terrorist of recruits.

The global community is at a juncture in history where the enormous disparities that have emerged in the last two centuries among individuals, both across and within nations, with respect to their ability to partake in humanity’s progress are arguably giving rise to large-scale security and safety threats. The unprecedented interconnectedness across the globe exacerbates the risks posed by such threats, some involving human intentionality like terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs, and some simply stemming from disparities in income and social organization as witnessed during the SARS episode. The basic paradigm that motivates the following discussion is that large disparities in the individuals’ actual and, more importantly, self-perceived ability to participate in humanity’s progress constitute a root cause of the new systemic security risks faced around the globe. These risks are symptoms of the current disequilibria brought about by the rapid progress in human knowledge. The prescriptive dimension of the discussion is shaped by the presumption that efforts to reduce the disparities among individuals’ actual and self-perceived ability to engage in progress will serve as essential steps on the path to a new equilibrium. Building on that premise, there is an urgent need for creative analysis and innovative mechanisms to facilitate and to motivate the flow of currently disillusioned or untapped human talent into the existing networks of constructive global activity. Designing strategies or more broadly shaping an ideology for constructive engagement around the world can prove to be the most robust approach to preventing the emergence of security threats in the first place.

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M. Karakullukcu / A Strategy for Pre-Preemption

The doctrine of preemption that has dominated security discussions in recent years takes the occurrence of harm as the ‘event of concern’ but a more prudent analysis should shift the ‘event of concern’ further back in time to the emergence of the motivation for the destructive process. What is required is a strategy for “pre-preemption” that targets the motivation for the security threats because the current preemption paradigm may simply be inadequate to forestall all destructive activity in a world where the number of such threats may be growing at an alarming rate. The underlying challenge is to determine the optimal point of focus on the timeline for the emergence of security threats as those threats evolve. Pre-preemption would reposition the optimal focus back in time to the point of motivation. That would admittedly entail analysis and mechanisms that would lie outside the realm of conventional security apparatus. Nevertheless such a shift appears to be the more prudent course of action as the security risks become more fragmented, less predictable and potentially more destructive. The discussion below describes the design and implementation of a particular pre-preemption strategy in the context of a technology park – The Technical University Complex situated in Istanbul. As one of the key pillars of humanity’s progress in the 21st century is technology and innovation, generating mechanisms to orient developing or less developed societies to participate in the networks of technology creation is certainly a step in the right direction. Instilling in the able young segments of the populations a realistic hope of being successful players in global technology networks and creating the environment for such success are essential steps to preempt disillusionment of the most active segments of those societies. However, transforming whole societies with intricate institutional heritages, value systems and potentially outmoded perceptions of the world is a formidable task. Instead, it is argued below that designing experimentation zones, “agoras”, around a group of constituents willing and able to experiment with new institutions and values is a more promising strategy. Once those experiments bear fruit, the successful values and institutions can propagate across the society through envy, aspiration and systematic policy initiatives. Although design of the agoras is an experimental process, certain guidelines should be observed in the design. It is argued below that reliability and predictability of institutional structures, the adoption of fair norms to regulate the interaction across constituents and offering equal access for all segments of the society are critical elements in the design. International private and public entities as well as supranational bodies like NATO can serve a critical role in these agoras as active partners in spurring success but more importantly as the non-assertive guarantors of the long-term reliability of the institutional structures in these agoras. The first section describes the context at Istanbul Technical University that motivates this analysis and discusses technology creation and innovation as a promising platform for motivating the young and competent segments of the regional population. The second section addresses the framework for analyzing the impediments to orienting a society to be a confident player in networks of innovation. The discussion in the third section advances the agora as a way to overcome those impediments. The fourth section makes preliminary inferences about the design of such communities. The final section discusses the possible role of supranational institutions like NATO in the design of the agora and concludes.


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The Emerging Community for Innovation: ARI Teknokent Science Park and Istanbul Technical University (ITU) Established in 1773, ITU is Turkey’s oldest technical university. It has been at the centre of the country’s engineering efforts throughout since its founding and still trains over a third of graduate engineering students in the country. It has a population of nearly 20,000 students and 2,000 faculty members. Due to its size and history, ITU is arguably the key institutional centre for engineering training and research in the Istanbul region and in Turkey. ITU has undertaken an ambitious reform programme between 1996 and 2004 (Sağlamer and Karakullukçu (pls, include a bibliography)). Among myriad reforms, the administration undertook an initiative to enhance the traditional university functions of teaching and research by forming organic links with technology-based and Research & Development-driven entrepreneurship. The effort resulted in the establishment of the city’s largest science park, ARI Teknokent, in 2003. The 90 hectare science park area adjacent to the central university campus in central Istanbul currently hosts nearly 60 companies and has brought 2000 technology workers into the ITU community of engineering students and faculty. The goal is to develop the science park to host 15,000–20,000 domestic and international technology workers by 2009. The resulting community together with ITU will comprise nearly 40,000 young people, all associated with and motivated by the different stages and aspects of the technology creation process. The conceptual framework defining the role of the science park has evolved substantially since its inception. The initial objective was to create a zone that could enhance ITU’s traditional role in teaching and research where students and faculty would benefit from closer interaction with businesses. The science park was essentially perceived as a support mechanism for the traditional functions of the university. However, the remarkable demand from local and international technology companies, the students and the faculty soon called for a rethink of this basic conceptual model. The businesses were gradually accepted as natural partners of the university in accessing international networks for technology and innovation. During the reform process prior to the establishment of the science park, ITU had already oriented itself to become a significant node in the international network-centric world of science and technology. The administration had made significant efforts to position itself and the university’s constituents as active members of numerous international science and technology networks. (Karakullukcu 2004). However, it became evident that a technical university needs to become a part of a larger community of innovation involving entrepreneurs to claim its place in the prominent networks of technology creation around the world. The multi-layered cooperation between academia and the businesses in the successful economic models around the world transformed the presumed role of the science park from a support mechanism for the university to an essential partner in the global positioning of the ITU community. In the final phase of the conceptual evolution of the framework, the underlying model of a network of academic-entrepreneurial technology zones with relatively uniform profiles appeared to be simplistic. Innovation and technology-focused communities around the globe cannot evolve completely independently from the institutional and cultural heritages of their host societies and their respective designs for success will inevitably reflect the underlying diversity. Therefore, a more layered conceptuali-

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zation was required to allow for dynamic and diverse technology zones with distinct and evolving characteristics. Being part of a network and cooperating with other technology hubs around the world is critical. However, as part of the new conceptualization focusing on the diversity of the network nodes, ARI Teknokent leadership deemed the ability of individual hubs to create a distinct culture for motivating the best human talent in their hinterland to be equally pivotal for success. The emphasis of the conceptual framework shifted from the prior dominant focus on compatibility with international networks to a balanced focus between i) mobilizing the local talent and ii) making it compatible with the international networks. In retrospect, the framework of analysis for the interaction between ARI Teknokent and ITU has evolved rapidly in a short period of time. The initial categories of academia and business in technology creation have been replaced by a new concept of social ordering that positions these different groups simply as complementary and sometimes interchangeable partners of innovation. Secondly, the success of the emergent community of innovation and technology creation is now measured equally by its ability to mobilize innovation in the society at large as by its compatibility with its counterparts around the world. ARI Teknokent basically favours compatible heterogeneity rather than seamless uniformity as its paradigm for global networks of innovation. With that precept in place, the objective becomes the transformation of the society at large that will mobilize the academically and commercially motivated young people to become engaged in the international networks of technology-creation. Instilling in the young people of the country and the region the ability and the confidence to participate in humanity’s technology-based progress has become the challenge confronting the emerging ARI Teknokent-ITU community.

A Framework for Describing the Dynamics of Social Transformation The challenge assumed by the ARI Teknokent-ITU community is no less than a search for a strategy of pre-preemption as discussed before. However, transforming a society to mobilize its youth to become engaged players in the technology-creation processes can be a remarkably difficult task. Even the more successful societies around the globe are feeling the pressure of sustaining the active participation of their youth in these processes (NII, Lisbon Strategy, ADHR 2003 etc.). The ambitious attempt to design the blueprint for the intended social transformation programme should be guided by a fairly disciplined intellectual framework that can capture the forces which impede the desired changes. The framework should also pinpoint existing institutions that can be leveraged to obtain the desired outcomes. The outline of such a framework is aptly sketched by a leading economic historian as follows: “What is the deep underlying force driving the human endeavor – the source of the human intentionality that comes from consciousness? It is the ubiquitous effort of humans to render their environment intelligible – to reduce the uncertainties of that environment.


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Humans attempt to use their perceptions about the world to structure their environment in order to reduce uncertainty in human interaction. But whose perceptions matter and how they get translated into transforming the human environment are consequences of the institutional structure, which is a combination of formal rules, informal rules and their enforcement characteristics. This structure of human interaction determines who are the entrepreneurs whose choices matter and how such choices get implemented by the decision rules of that structure. Institutional constraints cumulate through time, and the culture of a society is the cumulative structure of rules and norms (and beliefs) that we inherit from the past that shape our present and influence our future. Institutions change, usually incrementally, as political and economic entrepreneurs perceive new opportunities or react to new threats affecting their well-being. Institutional change can result from change in the formal rules, the informal norms, or the enforcement of either of these. The political-economic structure of the society and the way it evolves is the key to whose choices matter and how they conspire to shape policies”. We rephrase this framework to focus the discussion: i)

Human intentionality for change is driven by the desire to reduce the uncertainties in the environment. The nature of the uncertainty shapes the motivation for social ordering and change. The dominant uncertainty may stem from threat of civil strife or war, or drought and famine in some societies or may be linked to an expected loss of competitive advantage due to decreasing investment in R&D or an aging population in others. Therefore, uncertainties resulting from a variety of sources including the state of a society’s economic development or its security context direct human intentionality for shaping social structures. ii) The prescriptions for implementing change to reduce uncertainty are inevitably shaped by the perceptions, beliefs, models, theories and ideologies of the individuals. For example, if an individual’s perception of her society is predicated on the accepted preeminence of political power over science and technology, then her preferred mechanism for change will inevitably involve changing political structures. If, on the other hand, the perception points to a quasi-independent science and technology generation process that can shape and be shaped by political structures, then the targeted reforms will involve a wider set of institutional structures. iii) Perceptions, models, beliefs and ideologies are translated into institutions, appropriately defined as formal and informal rules and their enforcement characteristics. The institutions define the rules of conduct in the society motivated by the initial drive to reduce uncertainty and shaped by the perceptions of individuals. The institutions also define how to choose among prescriptions for social rules shaped by different perceptions and beliefs. Defined as such, institutions constitute a pivotal mechanism that can block or enable social change. iv) The accumulation of perceptions and institutions constitute the aggregate culture of the society. The overall framework is circular in the sense that the aggregate culture shapes the perceptions of the individuals who are expected to shape the institutions which over time shape the culture. This circular framework of perceptions-institutions-culture in a continuously changing context of uncertainty is the paradigm that we build on in the following discussion.

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The Complexity of Achieving Comprehensive Social Change: Introducing the Agora as an Alternative Strategy Mobilizing the youth in a society to engage in the global networks of technologycreation would require a substantive transformation in most societies. However as the framework developed above implies, there are complex factors that may impede such expansive social change. Social change will transform the nature of uncertainty and will face resistance In most developing societies, the nature of uncertainty faced by the individuals is quite distinct from the developed economy settings. Furthermore, the process of transformation would introduce new uncertainties. Changing the structures of these societies to align them with the knowledge-driven, technology-based economies in the world would pose unprecedented uncertainties for large numbers of people who are accustomed to the traditional value-creation practices. Even the prospect of limiting or eliminating obvious defects like the informal economy implies changes that would impact vast segments of the society in unforeseen ways. The transformation that would be motivated by a desire to reduce uncertainty in our framework may ironically be stalled by the population’s aversion to increased uncertainty. Only those who are trained to function within the new realm of uncertainty and who are confident about their ability to succeed in the international market-place will support such a change. The percentage of the latter segment is typically inadequate to trigger and to maintain the targeted transformation in most developing economies. Institutions and culture are inertial The incremental, inertial nature of institutions and culture will also slow down or impede change in the society. As indicated before, institutions determine whose policy prescriptions define the rules and norms of the society. Even if a certain subset of a society advocates the right policies for mobilizing the human resources for innovation, the existing institutional structures are likely to resist their impact on the formal and informal rules of the society until that subset grows to be a strong coalition. Similarly, the path-dependence of the culture implies that the perceptions and beliefs of new generations will be shaped predominantly by the historically determined perceptions that underpin existing structures. Culture may serve as a strong inertial force against social change. Agora as an alternative strategy In brief, transforming traditional structures to globally networked components of a knowledge society will impose new uncertainties and the inertial nature of institutions and culture will resist a fundamental social reorientation. Therefore, attempts to overhaul the perceptions, institutions and culture of a whole society are too ambitious to be a realistic strategy for success. A more promising approach would be to create well-defined zones of experimentation, agoras, for change and experimentation. What cannot be achieved at the whole society scale may be achieved at a smaller scale by creating communities of change. Furthermore, given the complexity of social institutions and culture, the reform process cannot be predefined with any accuracy and would demand intense experimentation before a workable strategy for change emerges. Instead of using the whole society as


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the context for failed trials, it is much wiser to use smaller communities as zones of experimentation for reforms. The accumulation of experiences in each agora can eventually shape the perceptions and beliefs of their constituents and be the breeding ground for constructive ideologies and a new culture of progress. The final step of this strategy would be the propagation of successful experiments in these spaces to the wider society. As the perceptions, institutions and culture that are shaped in these agoras will be closely associated with their success, it will be much easier to spread the emerging values and mechanisms to the broader social context through society-wide envy and aspiration for such success. Active policy initiatives and media strategies can and should complement these natural processes to aid the fast propagation of the promising institutions and values. The suggested approach is basically to design zones at a distance from the inertial institutional and cultural social context to allow a fast-track shaping of a new set of functioning mechanisms and values that can then be used to reorient the perceptions of the individuals in the broader society by leveraging the individual’s aspiration for success. The strong inertial circularity between perceptions, institutions and culture can thus be broken and a society-wide reform progress can be propelled by the individuals’ desire for success. In this framework, an agora in the innovation context can be defined as the cohabitation zone of internationally networked players in the technology-generation process experimenting with and being shaped by new institutions and a new culture of innovation. The design of such an agora is a multidimensional effort which should take into account the context of uncertainty, the perceptions of individuals, the institutions and the culture. It should also take into account the scalability of its experiments as well as the society-wide adoptability of its successful initiatives. Sketching the Design for an Innovation Agora There are numerous aspects to address in designing an innovation agora that will be a leading node in international networks of technology creation as well as an experimentation hub for reorienting the perceptions, institutions and culture of its host society to engage the young segments of the host population in the global technology-generation process. The following is merely a proposed sketch for such a design to motivate further discussion and deliberation. The proposed outline is as follows: i)

Designing mechanisms to reduce the uncertainty that pervades the host society to enable constituents to make long-term investment in human capital and R&D activity. Uncertainty is a driving force in shaping perceptions, institutions and culture in the framework described above and any fundamental reform effort should pay attention to the uncertainty embedded in the context. ii) Carefully selecting the initial group of stakeholders in the agora to ensure a critical mass of players who are firmly linked to the international networks of innovation. Although the agora will evolve through experimentation to be a unique zone of innovation, the starting point of its composition is crucial for ensuring that it is not crushed by the institutional and cultural gravity of its host society at the outset. iii) Designing dynamic institutions, which will eventually shape the culture of the agora, that encourage experimentation to create capacity for high caliber inter-

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national innovation and for local human resource mobilization. The latter aim implies the need for ownership by the host society, which will be linked to the perceived accessibility and fairness of the agora as well as the sensitivity of the emerging agora culture to national priorities. Taking each element in order, we propose some basic guidelines to sketch the innovation agora. i) Reducing Uncertainty Taking part in the technology-generation process involves either many years of investment in one’s human capital to be a researcher or a long-term financial investment and risk-taking to be a successful entrepreneur. Given the long-term risks inherent in the whole technology-generation and innovation process, further economic, political or legal, uncertainty in the social context effectively makes it impossible for members of these societies to take part in these processes. Therefore, the innovation agora should be designed to buffer its constituents as much as possible from the uncertainties of its host society. Political and legal risks: The political and legal risks may involve uncertainty with regard to taxation, state incentives, corporate governance norms, bankruptcy procedures, intellectual property rules or may, in the extreme, entail a termination of the agora. As these experimentation zones are intended as national structures to be owned and adopted by the larger society, creating international havens beyond the purview of national authorities is neither possible nor desirable. Instead, risk of such interference should be mitigated using means that would deter the political authorities from arbitrarily changing the rules which could adversely impact the processes in these agoras. Such means could include: • • • •

Economic success that mobilizes social support for the emerging zone. International recognition of the agora as a successful experiment which would elicit strong international reaction in response to arbitrary political interference. The presence of respected private and public international players in the agora. Their presence would increase the cost of arbitrary political meddling in the agora. Vocal and respected leadership who can effectively articulate the adverse implications of political interference and who can advocate the interests of the innovation community.

Economic risks: The volatility of an economy is another core source of uncertainty for local innovators who are predominantly tied to the local economy. The volatility can impact these firms both through demand fluctuations and through financing costs. Therefore, the innovation agora should facilitate and create mechanisms for its stakeholders to be active participants in global product and capital markets. Such orientation will buffer the constituents against the economic uncertainties of the host society. ii) Selection of initial constituents The composition of the innovation agora at the outset will be critical for its ensuing evolution. A structure that does not have the initial resilience against the existing iner-


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tial institutions and norms of the host society is unlikely to survive to become a selfsustaining robust environment for innovation and experimentation. On the other hand, an agora that is cut-off from its host society may be at risk of losing its ability to mobilize the local human resources. Therefore, the initial composition should serve the dual objectives of internationally-compatible innovation and mobilization of the local human resources. At the same time, the constituents should be open to and engaged in experimentation, which will ensure the sustainable success of the agora. International compatibility and resistance to distorting national norms: Both the individual and the institutional constituents of the agora should have prior exposure to and engagement with the best practices, institutional mechanisms and norms associated with successful technology generation zones around the world. Such familiarity is likely to serve as a strong anchor against the distorting norms of the host society. Furthermore, corporations’ strong links to international product and capital markets and the researchers’ strong ties with leading global academic entities will remove the dependence on local structures and thus mitigate the infiltration of unwarranted local distortions into the agora. Mobilization of local human resources: As emphasized before, mobilization of local human resources is considered equally important as the agora’s compatibility with international networks of innovation. The initial composition should reflect that overriding perspective by involving a significant share of local players and by selecting international players that are interested in tapping the human resources of the host society. Creating a community of businesses that are willing to engage the young segments of the host society at the outset is critical for achieving social ownership of the agora in the long-run. Parallel to the strategic determination of the initial composition of businesses, the initial leadership should be exceptionally alert to the sensitivities of the host society and promote the zone as an easily accessible zone of technology engagement for the motivated local youth. Openness to experimentation: Achieving compatibility with international norms of technology-generation and mobilizing local human resources cannot be achieved from the onset. The agora has to achieve these objectives as the context evolves through continuous experimentation. Therefore, a third dimension that needs to be focused on in determining the initial composition of the agora is the constituents’ openness to experimentation. The selection process should reflect that preference by emphasizing organizational flexibility and adaptability as important criteria in admitting businesses to the agora. iii) Creating a dynamic design for innovation and social engagement The initial composition of the agora is critical to ensure resilience against the potentially distorting norms of the host society. However, achieving permanence at the forefront of knowledge creation and commercialization as well as mobilizing the untapped local human capital demand an institutional design that can evolve through time. As the intertemporal changes in the context are by definition uncertain, the design should focus on fundamental norms and integrate them into the institutional structure and the culture of the agora.

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Sustaining the agora’s position at the forefront of knowledge creation and commercialization demands establishing and monitoring standards that can guide the admission of constituents, the institutional experimentation for innovation undertaken in the agora, and the performance of the leadership. Such a monitoring process should include benchmarking each one of these pillars with respect to available international standards, using the market as a reliable assessor of the constituents’ and the agora’s performance, and assigning a substantive supervision role to the administration. The second objective of the agora, which is mobilizing the local human capital, requires a separate set of norms that should also be integrated into the agora’s institutional mechanisms and its culture. Equal access, fairness of internal regulations and sensitivity to the host society’s values are essential norms for guiding the agora’s institutions and culture. The agora should offer, and be perceived as offering, equal access to all able local players. Implementing strict and transparent institutional structures that will situate the agora in the public psyche as an accessible community of innovation is critical for motivating the young segments of the population. The agora should also be perceived as a fair community especially for the local new-comers to the global innovation networks. To be more specific, the local entrepreneurs and researchers should be given an additional layer of protection in the agora for their dealings with the large global players. This can be achieved via the provision of low-cost advisory service for intellectual property and corporate law. At the other extreme, the agora can form an independent body that can address potential disputes among stakeholders in the agora. Such a body could serve as an accessible and low-cost platform for assessing the potential frictions in the relationship between the entrepreneurs and the researchers and the big institutional players. The availability of this mechanism would encourage them to engage in the agora with more confidence. Although the large technology players may be averse to such institutional innovations, attracting high caliber local talent to the agora would be an immense benefit for everyone in the technology community. Finally, the agora has to be sensitive to the host society’s values. If the technology community is perceived as a haven for international capital, social resistance will rapidly build up rendering it very difficult to attract local human capital. The leadership of the agora has a critical role to play in this regard by acting as the interface between the agora and the community at large.

The Role of NATO in the Agora The key role of a respected supranational entity like NATO in the design described above is to make the zone resistant to arbitrary local political interference and to enhance the long-term credibility of the agora as a reliable investment community for global players in technology. This objective can be achieved through NATO’s armlength involvement in the agora, which would signal firmly to everyone that the zone is perceived as a strategically important initiative by the world community and that undue meddling will be noticed. The credibility will also encourage local young researchers and entrepreneurs to engage in long-term R&D initiatives which are typically ruled out in the current global context due to the uncertainties stemming from the distortions in most developing host societies. By lending its credibility to the agora, NATO can also help place the agora in


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the radar screen of global financial institutions thereby allowing the local entrepreneurs to gain access to international financial resources. Independence from the local capital markets will further decrease the uncertainty faced by participating entrepreneurs. NATO can assume a more substantive engagement in the agora as a consumer of the technology generated in this community. By being a key client, NATO can provide the initial push for the emergence of clusters around specific areas of technology expertise in these agoras. However, it should be emphasized that a successful cluster can emerge only if the agora’s design is functioning successfully as described above. NATO can at best be a catalyst, not the actual owner of a development strategy for the agora. Nevertheless, the presence of these zones could allow NATO to leverage its technology consumer role to significant effect in these communities. NATO can clearly serve a pivotal enabling role for the success of the agoras. However, it is essential that NATO’s involvement is limited to arm’s length interaction; it should not become a dominant player in the agora. If the agora is perceived by the host society as a NATO instrument of influence or as a haven for international capital, the society is unlikely to own the initiative as its own. Since mobilizing the local human resources is a key objective of the whole project, social ownership should not be compromised. Therefore, the public diplomacy dimension of NATO’s presence in such a community will be of paramount significance. Finally, NATO itself should become a flexible player in the agora to facilitate, encourage and monitor experimentation. If NATO’s own institutional structures interfere with the agora’s experimentation process, then NATO’s presence could become counterproductive. Therefore, if NATO subscribes to the strategy of using the agoras as dynamic experimentation zones to engage the youth in the global networks of technology generation, it is essential that NATO evolves to be an agile institutional innovator that can effectively contribute to the experimentation in these agoras. As asserted at the outset, facilitating and motivating the flow of currently disillusioned human talent into the existing networks of constructive global activity may well be the most promising strategy to prevent the emergence of security threats around the world. Based on that premise, there is clearly a need for innovative institutional thinking. Agoras that are designed around technology can indeed emerge as the instruments of a new ideology for engaging larger segments of the global society in humanity’s progress. Like most innovations, the success of the agoras will undoubtedly demand serious thinking, numerous attempts, failures, adjustments but above all persistence and determination for success. However, regardless of the challenges that may lie ahead, human capacity for innovation is our only real asset to pre-preempt each and every risk that the the global community will face. Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Douglass C. North, Princeton University Press 2005.



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The Royal Society and Security Professor Herbert HUPPERT Director of the Institute of Theoretical Geophysics, University of Cambridge Abstract. The thrust of the Royal Society’s work on security in the United Kingdom is concerned with how to make the UK “safer”. Though the work is concerned only with the UK, its findings and recommendations are relevant to other countries and regions. Two of them are of particular importance. Many government agencies are involved with security-relevant work; there is a need for coordination if duplication is to be prevented. Coordination will enhance the capacity of the UK to respond effectively to attacks. The coordination must involve the private sector that has diverse skills and technologies that could be critical in combating the new security threats.

Well, I would like to thank Mary for inviting me here and for all of you listening, I hope for more than a minute. I find myself in a rather unusual situation. As a Professor, I am much more used to talking about my scientific research, about the eruption of volcanoes, about the formation of ice on the arctic oceans and on the centre of the earth. But to talk about security and defence matters is rather new to me. Now how come I got into this position, why did Mary invite me? Well, the Royal Society puts out one or two Reports on policy each year and they asked me about a year and a half ago whether I would chair the Working Group that produced a Report (copies of which I have here) on detection and decontamination of chemical and biological agents. The way the Royal Society works is that it chooses as the chairman of its Working Groups somebody who knows very little about the subject. The aim is that he or she does not have an axe to grind and he or she can look quite easily at all the input and not have a biased opinion. As far as lack of knowledge was concerned, they could have not have made a better choice than me. I fitted that aspect perfectly!

“Making the UK Safer”: The Royal Society and Security Things in the defence world are of course always changing, but the latest change which we have heard mentioned again and again is of course September 11th. Nevertheless, the Royal Society has had a very long interest in this area and it had two Working Groups previously which reported about twelve years ago and five years ago respectively. But it was thought that chemical and biological agents were such a problem now that it would be worthwhile getting a group together to look at this matter again. There were 14 Scientists on this Working Group, 7 of whom had had a lot of previous experience in matters of security and defence and then there were another 7 who had very little experience; the idea was to bring in fresh ideas and new capable scientific thoughts and then I am afraid there was a 15th person who had no knowledge whatso-

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H. Huppert / The Royal Society and Security

ever. We very much enjoyed getting together, learning from each other and putting forward this Report which is entitled “Making The UK Safer”. The point of “safer” really is important. Our Committee felt very strongly that the UK is safe at the moment but it could be made safer. There is an analogy, I believe, in the fact that we have been driving cars for a very long time even though, as we all know, there have been some accidents. In the 1950’s people drove quite happily, then we introduced seatbelts, then we introduced very tough drink driving laws, then airbags are coming in and I am sure they will soon be compulsory. Of course, the number of people seriously injured or killed in accidents has gone down and down. But in ten years there will be yet more safety measures. In the same way the Committee believes quite strongly that Great Britain can make itself safer and defend itself better against the environment that is outside. I might as an aside just say, some of you may know this, that there was a confidential Committee that was assembled in 1947, just after the war, to look at how to make Britain as safe as possible. They put out a report which had a lot of interesting things in it, but the thing that I think is most interesting and pertinent to what we are talking about today was that the report said that against a suicide bomber, there was absolutely no defence. The Committee felt that if somebody wanted to fly into the Houses of Parliament (they actually gave that as an example, so they were quite far sighted) there was no way to defend ourselves. But of course we have to defend ourselves, we have to defend ourselves as best as we possibly can and there is no doubt in the conversations that I have had with the Government that this is their aim too, to defend us as best as we possibly can.

The Imperative to Coordinate The major suggestion in this Report is that there be a new Co-ordinating Centre set up. In this there are echoes of what has already been said this morning. It is not necessarily about having a political supremo as was said a little bit before, that is something that I think the Royal Society should not offer an opinion on. It should not offer an opinion on politics but on science which it can back up. The suggestion is to have a Coordinating Centre that’s run by a really capable Scientist that can bring and co-ordinate all the disparate work that is done in Britain at the moment. Let me tell you there is a huge amount, as the Committee saw different groups working and “stove piping”, as it has been called here, exists, as these groups are certainly not talking with each other. I can give you examples of where one Group is investigating the efficiency of certain pieces of equipment and another Group knows nothing about it and it buys the equipment which the first group, funded by the same people – the Government – has shown as quite inappropriate. Another thing that we said was clearly very important was to look at matters of health and to reduce the disruption if there was some incident. Of course this is not the time to talk in detail about an 80-page report, but there is quite a lot of work being done on that, and again the Centre would co-ordinate that sort of work. One of the reasons that I think my Working Group spent so much time and effort and gave so selflessly of their time, was that we could see, and discussed quite early on, that there is really no difference to a large extent between a terrorist incident and an accidental incident. Whether terrorists let out some harmful chemicals or whether two big super tankers have a smash in the middle of the M1 and cause huge amounts of problems, it needs to be responded to in very much the same way and I think that is


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another reason why it is worthwhile having a Co-ordinating Centre, so that people can know exactly where the information is to be gained and where the expertise is. We found, and this is slightly in contrast to something that was said earlier this morning, that there is a huge amount of ability and knowledge amongst UK Scientists that has not been tapped. It is true amongst academic Scientists; it is true amongst industry Scientists. In academia there are people who are working on problems that are really very similar to the ones that we would face after an attack and yet they do not think of their work as relevant to security and there is not much information about what they are doing. For example I have a very good friend who knows a lot about pollution, what happens if you release pollution from an industrial site, how the wind will take it away. He is an expert on boundary lay and meteorology. It is not very far to go from pollution to the next problem of poisonous gas or some biological incident. Yet, he has never really thought about those, he has never been approached – that is more important. We found in our Working Group discussions, Tapping Existing Sources of Expertise, an individual who is the Director of Research of a huge company who could make wonderful contributions to the question of decontamination, how do you decontaminate people, how do you decontaminate vehicles, how do you decontaminate buildings both inside and outside? This guy, a Physical Chemist, was so impressive when we said to him at the end of our interview with him for about an hour and a half “Have you ever been approached by the Government in case of a terrorist incident”, he said “No, not at all”. “Have any of your competitor companies been approached?” He said, “No, although they are competitors, we talk about these things and they haven’t”. So there is a huge amount of information there and I could give you lots of other examples. What the Committee felt was the most important bit of science, and there is really a hardcore scientific chapter to this report, in fact most non-Scientists say “Gee, the science is rather tough in chapter 6” and I say “That’s what you expect of the Royal Society – not to have some flabby stuff but hardcore science” and what we say in our opinion is the most important new development would be a hand held detector, very small like a mobile phone, that is small enough to hold in the hand but also could be taken by a robot, by some mechanical device so that we would save the lives of individuals, and that could detect in a generic way. I am sure if you all think back to exercises, there are exercises of what happens if there is anthrax, what happens if there is Riesin, but that’s not what’s going to happen, what is most likely to happen is that there will be a cocktail of various situations and you want to know exactly what it is. I am sure you will all remember the problems in the Moscow Theatre; because they used gas that they weren’t allowed to use, they didn’t tell the hospital, so the hospital treated the patients incorrectly. It is really very important to have a generic detector, not the one that can detect just the chemical that you think is going to be used.

A Counter-Terrorism “One-Stop Shop” We felt very strongly that we want, and the Committee used this word, a ‘one-stop shop’, one place where everything can be known and that people both inside and outside know. As an example, after the September 11th event, the US Army Chief said immediately to one of his aides, call the CDC (the Centre for Disease Control in Atlanta) we want their guys up here to see if there is any biological component. He knew exactly whom to contact. I wonder if there is anybody who would know in this country if the same thing happened, whom to contact. Let me say I have put this question to

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somebody from the Government, I know under Chatham House Rules I am not meant to mention organisations, but I presume the Government is big enough and amorphous enough that I can mention them, and they said “Ah, I know, I would know exactly what to do”. So I asked, “Does anybody else know that you know?” and they said, “No I don’t think so”, and then I think because they were embarrassed and I hope I can say this, they looked me in the eye and said, “I’ll tell you who doesn’t know and that is Ken Livingstone, he hasn’t the slightest idea”. Now I haven’t asked Ken Livingstone so I don’t know but there it is. We have talked a lot about money and it will need some money to have this centralised group, but the Committee is fairly firm in the belief that it needs relatively little money, mainly because a lot of money is already being spent five times over in different groups that are in a sense doing the same thing. If you have a procurement group that is buying the wrong sort of equipment because you are already paying money to another group to say what the right sort of equipment is, then you are wasting both sets of money, you might use either of them and you would save some money, and that is where the money would be found for this Centre. Another example I would like to give you is in decontamination. After the anthrax attacks, America has already spent £800 million dollars and shifted 3,000 tonnes of contaminated waste from buildings, many of which are still not operational and still not used. Now a lot of that money could be save just by talking to this individual I mentioned to you before from a big chemical company, who knows an enormous amount about decontamination. The other interesting thing, especially to be said in England, is that there are lots of places that have more anthrax because of the wool industry, there are lots of anthrax bores that are put off by the wool industry up in the Midlands. Some of these places were declared unsafe and were closed. So it is really very important to understand the science. An important idea I want to bring in of course, and Mary will back me up, I know this, is to understand the psychology and how people react. To put it in a nice way, how safe is safe? How do you explain to people and the media, as has been brought up a number of times, that a building is sufficiently safe that you can enter it? That it is safe compared to driving on a road for example, that it is safe compared with some other building that already has some other contaminants in it and that really is an important idea, which the Americans haven’t got over and I think we need to. I would just like to end with two points, one is a medical point. Clearly, medical aspects play a large role and in fact, in the same strange way I have been asked to give a grand round as it is called (that’s apparently a big talk) at St Thomas’ Hospital on Wednesday. The doctors there don’t know that I faint at the sight of blood, so if any of them are sick there is going to be big trouble. The NHS can and does already play an important role, there is a wonderful programme that’s been taken from the military that some of the NHS doctors already have, and the aim is to have all of the NHS doctors to have, so that if people ring up and there are a number of people all in the same area saying that they or their grandfather or someone is vomiting, that this goes to a central area. There are similarities between the military and the civilian aspect, and that was pointed out nicely in our last talk, but there are also some huge differences, in particular if Darren doesn’t mind my saying, on the battlefield it is expected that a number of people will die. They are all tough characters and if necessary they will put on suits and they will keep on going, knowing that there is a fair chance that they will die. Very few civilians have that attitude and luckily for us, if it turns out that a number of tanks are contaminated they are often left on the battlefield and they are just left there. It is very difficult to leave cars that are contaminated in the middle of London and just leave them there.


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Some of you may think London is a battlefield, but it is a different sort of battlefield. People sometimes say to me what about Portendown, aren’t they terrific; I thought they were the world leaders, in fact when I was interviewed once by the radio they said, “Isn’t Portendown better than anywhere else in the world”. It is, it is extremely good but it concentrates on military matters and detection and decontamination are different to the military than they are to civilian. What that means, and I have spoken to the Head of Portendown and he will agree with this, is that some of the ideas that the military have developed over 80 years, it is almost 80 years since it has been set up, can be used in the civilian environment very profitably, but at the moment it comes back to something we have talked about before – the funding. Portendown is not funded to do civilian work. The MOD owns Portendown and one of the things that we feel and there has been a very high level Committee talking about, is that this needs to be changed. And then finally, I have spoken to a lot of CSA’s, Chief Scientific Advisers, of various Governments and Ministers since this Report has come out and I would say in general that they are very pleased with the Report. They believe that it has expressed some ideas that they would like to put over. Possibly the best conversation I had was with a Minister of Government whom I thought understood exactly what I was saying, and I understood what they were saying, but at the end they said to me “Scientifically, you are giving the best advice possible, politically things are slightly different and we are not at the moment able to set up this Co-ordinating Centre because it might not be, politically, the correct thing to do?” Then I said “But scientifically it is the best” and they said “You are right, it is scientifically the best, I’m a politician, you’re a Scientist, what do you want to do”. Well I felt that if we changed chairs each of us could have argued each other’s case, which is very good. I thought it spoke well of the Minster that they could understand the scientific point of view but politics always has a good say in the end.



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Government and the Business Community – the Role of Industry in the New Anti-Terrorism Era David LIVINGSTONE Morgan Aquila Ltd, Director Abstract. As the fight against terrorism takes central stage in a new paradigm of conflict, there needs to be a careful re-assessment of how an effective division of effort between universities, national laboratories, defence, commercial industry and the military can be developed to deal with critical new challenges. What, for instance, are the real incentives for government, the science and technology community and private industry to co-operate, more than these different actors have in the past? How can these incentives be harmonised with dramatically differing strategic objectives for each of them? How can any disincentives be overcome when there is a change in strategy?

One of the key principles of a healthy business environment, and the business plans that respond to it, is that there must be a vision of where future revenue streams will emanate from, in other terms there must be a clear idea of a business stream’s longterm viability. The aiming point needs to be a clear definition of what the “market space” is, and what it will be (that is, how it is likely to develop, in the longer term). So far, in this shift in the threat paradigm, this has been a conundrum. The tactic of terrorism has been with modern Western societies for some considerable time, but not on the scale represented by the attack on the United States, or the more recent Madrid or London attacks. Former terrorist attacks were also not brought to the public instantly and in such dramatic style by the ubiquitous 24-hour visual media. An important consideration is whether we have seen a strategic swing away from accepted modern notions of conflict and security (see article by Chris Donnelly in this volume) on a scale which will force an overall change in the relations between society and security, and in which industry will play a major part. In the Counter Terrorism/Homeland Security environment, is there now a requirement to conduct a critical review of industry’s strategic vision of the future, and of the capabilities it will be required to bring into being? Such a review, if properly conducted with the right level of effort and the right safeguards, can perhaps initiate a debate on whether the new security threats present significant market opportunities to explore. If there is a market, then industry will surely “supply” it. How Is the Industrial Stakeholder Perceived? How does society see the industrial stakeholder, who will manufacture the equipment that will provide part of the response to terrorism? Is he (or she) the dollar-grabbing,

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D. Livingstone / Government and the Business Community

unscrupulous deal-maker who is out to make just a fast profit and disappear, leaving the customer financially embarrassed with some kind of solution that doesn’t work, tied in to a long term service contract that will bleed the customer’s coffers over a number of decades, and where any variation of the contract will bring outrageous financial burdens? Or must the industrialist increasingly be seen as a person who bears corporate, social and individual responsibilities, who has to find the right balance between delivering value to shareholders, achieve compliance with legal and ethical norms and promote the development and retention of the most important element of his or her business, the employee? This paper will argue that the culture of industry will need to change in accordance with the demands of the new security threats; this is very likely to involve a shift away from large-volume fixed price and long-term procurements to a true environment of invention and innovation, and where ‘speed to market’ is a compelling driver. However, it is critical that there is an underpinning and generally held view on how the world has changed to act as the catalyst that will trigger a united response across the stakeholder defence and security spectrum. Although a trigger such as this may indeed be only a high-level vision, it can provide a framework which will give the stakeholder set a common sense of the required changes in responses to threats, and a picture of the overall effect. As a corollary, it is interesting to note that there is currently no accepted international definition of what a terrorist is, although everyone knows what a terrorist does. No matter what this response to the threat is called, there can be little doubt that the world is facing a different sort of conflict than it did in the days of the Cold War. The headmark of a Soviet-originated threat to NATO, China and other strategic theatres evaporated at the end of the 1990s, to be replaced, after a span of a decade, with a set of disruptive challenges1 that former national and international defence structures were not entirely structured to combat.

Which Threat? As a case study, if an assessment is made of the UK national defence2 arrangements in the mid 1990s, (and separate from the long-running campaign against Irish Republican Terrorism (IRT) and other extremist movements) it was still predicated on Spetznaz special forces’ operations engaged in Deep Operations in support of a Soviet attack on Western Europe. In the European Theatre, the United Kingdom was essentially the logistic centre of gravity for the NATO response, with pre-positioned supplies ready to be shipped rapidly to the continental front line, and with air- and sea-heads ready to receive, process and despatch reinforcements arriving from across the Atlantic. Security operations on UK home soil (much like other NATO nations) were designed to ensure the security of the strategic supply chains from interference by the enemy, principally through the security of Key Points and through Military Support to the Mounting of Operations, keeping open the supply arterials that would feed the theatre of operations on mainland Europe. Security in the UK was to be provided by a combination of police and military forces, operating within a Police/Military Joint Tactical Doctrine – the police to provide the legal jurisdiction, and the military to provide the manpower and firepower muscle. In strict terms, enemy special forces – even if they were operating in uniform, in operations ‘short of general war’ – were committing a crime,


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and therefore had to be arrested by police officers and brought to trial. Or that was the theory. Thus, in those days there was an identifiable threat, which had known capabilities, and a known balance between risk and response. Life on the front line was straightforward, symmetrical – and relatively stable. So the demise of the military threat from the Warsaw Pact left the UK homeland security space (reflected across NATO) in a state of uncertainty, without a headmark to drive towards – once the Soviet structures were seen, and confirmed, to be dissolving. In the UK, Police operations, with support from the MOD under the auspices of Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP),3 continued to provide capability against the Irish Republican Threat threat, and against other less publicised terrorist campaigns (such as those undertaken by international groups operating in and from the UK) and home grown single issue groups such as Animal Rights Extremists. Military forces acted in concert with public authorities to confront particular challenges – both of human and natural origins. The UK Home Office developed its concept of Integrated Emergency Management, the sensible policy of addressing the effects rather than the causes of a disaster, but still the security of the national soil was left without clearly fixed targets. So the UK Strategic Defence Review (SDR) carried out by the Labour administration of 1997–8 4 was going to pose a particular challenge to the conservative elements in Government and its Departments of State. The Spetznaz had gone, to be replaced by an absence of threat and ideas of everlasting peace – such as the (transient) theory on the final legitimacy of liberal democracy as a system of government and the ‘end of history’.5 And in some government financiers’ eyes there was an economically justifiable reason to dismantle as much of the national defence infrastructure as possible to reap to the highest possible peace dividend. After all who needed a Home Defence militia? But in central Government there was still some unease, and so, to inform the SDR committees on Integrated Contingency Planning (ICP)6 a notional threat was agreed between the MOD and the other Government Departments through the Cabinet Office, which was contrived to drive an examination as to whether this UK based military capability was indeed then surplus to requirements. The threat was predicated around organised, state sponsored, well-trained, terrorist organisations, having fundamental religious beliefs as an underpinning casus belli. And for added interest, these groups might conceivably have had some rudimentary weapons of mass destruction. The name of Bin Laden was mentioned in some quarters as an example of the potential threat. ICP, as a contingent planning process, survived SDR scrutiny as a complement to IEM, although it still had few, if any operational forces attached. Any uncertainty about the strategic threat dissolved with the attack on the Twin Towers. Very suddenly the output of the ICP working groups of the SDR came to life. Once again, there was a headmark on which to focus a response – but where was this response going to come from? Quite correctly, the SDR (of 1997–8) and its New Chapter (of 2002) defined the task of the military as overseas operations in support of the counter terrorist strategy, a task to which the UK armed forces are now fully committed (even over committed according to some). The remainder of the response, in terms of political, diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence and law enforcement measures7 therefore fell, and continues to fall, to the wider public safety stakeholder set. The nature of the new threat, and its new brand of terror, including its desire to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction, means that society is facing once again an example of asymmetrical warfare whereby the adversary ignores his enemy’s strengths and instead targets his weaknesses. Interestingly, the September 11th terrorists seem to

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have chanced upon (or was this by design?) found a way to combine, using the catalyst of suicide tactics, two ‘Western strengths’ (procedure-free air travel, and a propensity to build very tall buildings to highlight an impression of success), to bring disaster of unanticipated style and proportion.

Asymmetrical Threats Unsettling as it sounds, asymmetry is not new, and examples of these imbalances are found whenever man has sought to do harm to man. Chariots versus foot-soldiers, submarines versus ships, kamikaze suicide planes versus aircraft carriers; zeppelins and doodlebugs are a few examples from history. But in the end there has been a ‘solution’ to each of these threats, to rebalance the battle-space. And in most cases the solution has consisted of a readjustment in the balance of people, process and technology to combat the new order of threat. In the case of that “underhand, unfair and damned un-English” weapon, the submarine, (“The [UK] Government”, added Royal Naval Rear Admiral A.K. Wilson, “should treat all submariners as pirates in wartime and hang all crews”), the asymmetry represented by the U-Boat in both World Wars was firstly rebalanced by the process of convoying groups of ships, developing sonar technology, and training people to man the sonar sets. And when the asymmetrical nature of submarines evolved through schnorkels, engagement of convoys in the mid-Atlantic gap, and the wolf pack strategy, so along came the counter to this with the use of airborne radar (technology), long range maritime air patrols (process) by airmen from RAF Coastal Command (people). Even the interdiction of the submarine in its home ports of La Rochelle or St Nazaire, by specifically designed bombs (technology), launched from heavy bombers (process), (by another set of people) from Bomber Command was another cocktail of integrated solution. And, 104 years on from Admiral Wilson’s commentary, the optimum method of neutralizing a submarine threat is now through a globally integrated system of intelligence sources that cue the interdiction of the target by another submarine armed with the right detector gear, with the right type of heavy torpedo, using the right tactics operated by a different set of people – submariners themselves. Nobody would now consider submarine warfare as asymmetric; there has been a rebalancing of the battlespace. Care has to be exercised when investigating the answer to the new anti-terrorist rebalancing conundrum, as a concept of Homeland Security, which tends to imply a ‘whole society’ response (because the scene of action has moved away from battlefields, into the anonymity of a mass population), cannot be treated in isolation from other security related policies which accompany it. These may be military policies designed for traditional war, or the policies of law enforcement and other public safety communities, along with the legal frameworks that allow all of these to perform their duties. An analysis should therefore span the entire threat spectrum, of not only armed conflict but also address that part termed as public safety. Although not all of such threats to the citizen imply mortal danger, they are still threats, and are part of a wider environment that allows citizens to carry on with their lawful purposes. Once we have established society’s current readiness to respond to these threats, we can look to how to increase readiness in a more coherent fashion, without undue risk of technological failure, or through the adoption of inappropriate processes or the use of people in an improper way.


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So what is needed is a capability model that, from one end, goes from pickpocketing, through serious crime and terrorism, through traditional deployed military operations, to the recovery from a nuclear exchange at the other extreme of the scale, and which measures the spectrum against the readiness of a nation to respond to those threats. Figure 1 is a view of what a Utopian secure society may look like, with an x-axis that shows threat – from pickpocketing through to a nuclear exchange between nation states – and a y-axis that shows society’s readiness to combat those threats. With ‘perfect security’ if a citizen was pickpocketed then the full weight of the law, and its criminal detection apparatus, would be levied against detecting and prosecuting the perpetrator. At the other end of the scale, we would have a society that was fully prepared at all times and in all respects to combat the threat and effects of a nuclear exchange. However, Fig. 2 is a model that shows what a typical national threat/readiness posture might look like taking into account the resources required to combat the threats – figuratively in the post Cold War, pre Al Quaeda period. Public safety readiness, particularly law enforcement, can be seen to be peaking at serious offences against the person such as murder and kidnap (after all, is a full police response normally deployed after a pickpocketing incident?). Readiness declines at a point where combating the threat would be outside the capability of the civil agencies, or where generation of this capability would be too costly to contemplate taking into account its unlikely nature. There is an overlap here, where, under police/military arrangements, a military response might be deployed to assist the civilian agencies, classically in counter terrorism operations such as bomb disposal or specialist operations against terrorist current operations (as in Iranian Embassy at Princes Gate in London

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in 1980), or in the event of a crisis (floods, fuel tankers, fire strikes). Military readiness then has a corresponding curve where maximum capability is generated for peace keeping or peace enforcement operations with diminution of capability as the threat heads towards high intensity conflict (where this diminution would be addressed by urgent operational requirements as a particular conflict approaches), tailing to a limited capability to survive a nuclear exchange where there would be a long warning period to regenerate capability – of course, at some financial cost. In Fig. 3 we can observe the effects of the emergence of an asymmetric Al-Quaeda type threat, based within a society, that is essentially ‘at peace’. The readiness required curve from the public safety capability has to rise to cater for the new threat conditions, purely because the over-committed military has limited resource to bulge backwards – and anyway, in simple terms, the new order of terrorism is still viewed (certainly in UK eyes) as only a crime. This leads to two phenomena shown at Fig. 4; the first being a pull-through of military technology and processes into the capability area now required from the public safety agencies. Examples of this could include gas masks, CB (Chemical and Biological) suits and chemical agent detectors for the police and fire brigades. The second phenomenon is seen in the area under the curve that has no previous “owner” which now represents the new capabilities required to increase capability against the new order of threat. Examples of the latter might include the introduction of ID cards, enhanced border protection, integration of stove-piped intelligence data bases, an exponential growth of biometric-related identity projects,8 computer network defence initiatives, and recruitment of more security agency personnel (all combinations of people, processes and technologies). And, in the UK, to finance some Government initiatives there has been some extra funding for counter terrorism capability for the public safety agencies,9 supported by the formation of new organisations to make strategic response


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Figure 4.

to the threat more coherent – such as the new Health Protection Agency10 – and the drafting of enabling primary legislation.11

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Cost/Benefit Judgements But what is certain is that any resource will always be finite, so the question is how do we extend that national resilience/homeland security curve, either in real or virtual terms, to minimise the area where there is no current capability? The requirement to get the greatest return on investment will determine how Government makes its cost/benefit judgements, but a few principles can be identified: Firstly, there is no prospect of solving new capability requirements through brute force provided by manpower alone, as this would be prohibitively expensive; even by the end of the Cold War, isolated pockets of best practice had been working on alternative solutions to the value-for-money conundra. The human resources that would be required for the physical guarding of critical national infrastructure, or to ‘hire in’ sufficient intelligence analysts to sift the volumes of data extracted from global intelligence sources would be simply too enormous. So physical security has to evolve from the Cold War structures of the defence of static sites, and take the established models of threat, vulnerability and risk forward to a wider environment of the security of the societal base that the likes of Al Quaeda seem to be targeting and within which it operates, and from where its people are recruited. So can process and technology be the cost effective force multipliers in the public safety arena to compensate for the lack of people? They can be, but only if accurately focused on helping provide what the public safety agencies need in terms of time. Characteristically, arrest or disruption of terrorist cells happens only shortly before their operations are planned to ‘go’ or indeed have happened already. To give society a greater margin of safety, public safety agencies are forced to put in place the technologies and processes to help the right people shorten this time gap, by providing the instruments to gain more certain intelligence – that is, evidence – that allows an arrest or interdiction operation to occur many days or weeks before the planned terrorist event. Deterrence needs to increase, in order to deflect the threat, by making life so uncomfortable for the terrorist that either he goes elsewhere, or is forced into procedural errors that will make him show his hand earlier that would have formerly been the case. Secondly, the new solutions in security need a systems-of-systems approach. There is no single programme that will solve all a nation’s new security needs, but the scope of the challenge – the depth and breadth of the new terror threat – dictates that it is not a matter of buying the right bit of kit. Point solutions – single programmes or pieces of equipment, no matter how capable in isolation – will not annul those deficiencies in capability, or fill the gaps between various capabilities, that the terrorist will seek to exploit. A system-of-systems approach will also demand interoperability, in designing from the outset capability for people, processes and technologies that co-operate with each other, that allow the sharing of information, that deliver synergies in information acquisition and analysis, and coordinate decisive action based on what arises. And to do that any new capabilities need to be based on common standards in infrastructure, applications, process and people, so that they can be easily integrated to raise security across the piece without excessive time or financial penalties. This is where strong governance has a real role to play in demanding absolute standards to enable the longterm acquisition of coherent capability. And yet it is also the case that the pace of technology presents challenges as well as opportunities. If technology is to be harnessed as a tool against disruptive challenges it needs to be developed incrementally, so that today’s solution is open to tomorrow’s improvements. In other words, spiral development is a key in that coherence is needed


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to ensure that the terrorist organisation cannot find the weaknesses he needs to exploit to retain his only winning strategy, which is through asymmetry. And so the long-term nature of the current militant Islamic threat requires adequate capability now, but better capability later.12 Near term solutions obviously need to be effective, but still should be designed with the long-term solutions in mind. Solutions will need to be compatible with two things; first, the trajectory of technological advances as we currently know them, and second, with the need to adapt or evolve if the threat makes an unexpected deviation from established assumptions. Security architectures need to be truly upgradeable, and based on open architectures that can rapidly cater for the unexpected. To complement this, we need ever more effective ways of scanning the threat horizon to be able to guide our decisions, on where to focus our research effort and develop our technological countermeasures to emerging disruptive challenges. In addition to using experts, academia and history (people and process), does technology have a role to play in this voyage of exploration? For example, is there a role for using ‘virtual’ toolsets to help focus our thoughts and plans on how to address a variety of disasters, whether man-made or natural – to investigate the possible outcomes, and even, during consequence management following a real incident, to act as a decision aid in developing appropriate responses? An example of such a tool could be a synthetic environment, that replicates the core functions of a nation, and that characterises the people, processes and technologies that make up its Critical National Infrastructure, both in physical and virtual domains, that could help scope the boundaries of what must be protected to preserve life, Governance and national infrastructure, which at the moment remain less than fully charted across society as a whole. By extension, it could also have an enabling role in better early warning, through systematic horizon scanning and the early identification of issues, key pillars of a capability-building programme.13 The various technologies to achieve this are probably already in existence (and were used in the UK Foot and Mouth epidemic),14 all that remains to be done is to fashion a programme of development and system integration. And the true benefit of a synthetic approach is that no matter how far the security agencies are resourced to fill the strategic gap, the unaffordable void can still be filled with tools to allow decision makers to plan for, and react to, a wide variety of threats that simply cannot be exercised in a representative way because of the scale of the event. The effects of a disease, of an improvised nuclear device, of a chemical attack on a mass transit system – how, apart from simulation, can these be fully exercised replicate the challenges of scale that a true life incident of this nature will present? According to NATO doctrine, which can make an intellectual leap into the civilian domain, any operational capability has to have a support infrastructure of C4I – command, control, communications, computers and intelligence. With ‘total capability’ against every disruptive challenge probably unforeseeable and unaffordable, it may be appropriate to revisit the concept of C4I to see if it can competently address the need to rapidly restore normality after a disaster, whilst learning from the incident and putting further capability in place – a doctrinal loop, say, on catastrophe. Absorbing the first blow whilst maintaining strategic command and control and communications, and retaining the use of computers and maintaining intelligence analysis engines can be termed readiness, but there is something missing which allows some intellectual drift on the concept of ‘resilience’ per se. With the addition of ‘continuity’ and ‘consequence management’ to C4I we may now have a truer picture on a resilient infrastructure: this would bring the focus of an integrated system on not only addressing the

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g

Threat - Point of Affordability Point of affordability has moved back in time

Cost of Countering Threat1 Threat Perception

11 Sept 01 T1

T2

Time 1 = or cost of reassuring society 4

Figure 5.

preparation required for disaster, but when disaster strikes in whatever manner, on the need for society to rebound, and to learn from the experience. C6I. Does this therefore represent an accurate structure of true resilience? But would society have moved towards a state of increased resilience, even in the absence of the September 11th attacks? Perhaps there can be no clear answer to this.

Perceived Threat and Cost of Countering It Figure 5 shows a conceptual relationship between ‘perceived threat’ and ‘cost of countering the threat’. The notional threat here is that which a citizen feels as he or she goes about their lawful day-to-day business in a society. Over time perceived threat reduces – reflection, perhaps, of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Northern Ireland Peace Process in the UK, and other internal political initiatives such as putting more law enforcement officers on the streets. Meanwhile, the cost of countering the threat also reduces over time, in common with any other capability involving people, processes and technologies. At some time in the future (T1) the two curves will intersect, at which time it would make economic sense to ‘buy some security’ as it would then be affordable. The rapid emergence, in such startling fashion, of a new and violent order of threat, and the depiction of the incidents in the media, has the effect of changing the threat perception curve to make it intersect the cost curve earlier than T1, at T2, and the more the threat perception, the earlier the ‘buy security’ decision is made. So this has the effect of turning the UK Entitlement Card (initially presented as an anti-Fraud device) into the UK Identity Card whose rationale is increasingly portrayed as an anti-terrorism measure. Anti-illegal immigration measures such as e-Borders,


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which would probably have happened anyway at some stage as a socio-economic measure in a growing environment of rising migration, gains additional impetus, and earlier funding from Government, as it acquires an anti-terrorism cachet. And also the retrieval of a large number of laptops from the Tora Bora, showing that the AK-47 wielding, turban-clad adversary is more sophisticated in Information Technology than previously thought, probably indicates that there is some more thinking to be done on strategic computer network defence in the future. The emergence of a new and uncertain regime of threats, and the political need to reassure and protect society against these, has provoked a review of resilience, from Governments through the commercial sector and now to the private citizen.15 Following the events in the UK of 2001 and before – the foot and mouth crisis, the fuel tanker strike, fire brigade strikes and widespread floods in northern England – there was a toplevel governmental impetus to assume greater responsibility for the citizen and start getting resilience right. The events of Autumn 2001 in New York and Washington would seem to have catalysed the response to a new security paradigm where the headmark provided by Moscow for 40 years has been replaced by one that could provide focus for a similar period. The decade between the two was a time of uncertainty, during which most security infrastructures managed to survive despite the lack of a strategic threat to the UK home base. But rather like General Galtieri of Argentina in 1982, who mistimed his Falklands venture for just before Britain disposed of its warwinning aircraft carriers – what would have happened if the Twin Towers were to have been attacked in the year 2011, when the world would have been at peace for 20 years, and a world of liberal democracies would have been encouraging a global dismantling of national security capabilities for two whole decades? The need to get the counter terrorism capability balance right has now, in many nations’ instance, been recognised by the highest echelons of Government, and the evidence needed by industry to confirm the emergence of a new market (in Homeland Security capability) is now beginning to emerge. Having identified the strategic capability gap, and associated with it a customer set, industry now has the vital headmark that allows it to make sense of the potential market, and to trigger off the drafting of the corresponding business case that will shape its long term strategic planning to supply the market. The capability gap is now scoped, and so whether through ID cards, border control, computer network defence systems or whatever, it can anticipate the release of (particularly financial) resource by the customer set to bring new capabilities into existence. In some cases industry achieves increased confidence when it sees the drafting of new primary legislation by governments, or through an organisational response by the formation of new Departments of State, such as, in the UK, the Serious and Organised Crime Agency, or by the amalgamation of a number of smaller agencies, in the UK’s instance, the new Health Protection Agency. The rebalancing of people (and their organisations) and process (and the business change required to address security issues) needs to be followed by the procurement of the third party in the triumvirate – technology. And the delivery of technology is where the interest of private sector industry primarily lies.

Can Industry Lay Down Rules? So can industry lay down any rules, or preferences, on how it would like to see the development of the global and systemic response to the new threat paradigm?

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Firstly, there should be a system-of-systems approach, conceived at the highest level. A scattergun approach, a project here and a bit of kit there, is an unattractive business environment for the larger scale commercial enterprises that inevitably commands some of the richest intellectual capital (partly because of the wages it can afford to pay). This is because the cost of capturing business revenues (per dollar/euro/pound sterling) becomes higher, and therefore the return on sales-and-marketing investment decreases. This is a key factor in deciding whether to commit to the process of capturing business, which is an overhead, and industry tends to dislike disproportionate overhead. Identifiable large-scale end-to-end programmes, which have sensible milestones, which are led by governments with clear strategic and coherent intent makes good sense to industry. The certainty provided in this environment makes it easier to commit critical investments, such as research and development resources, that underpin the evolution of appropriate technologies. The issue of fixed financial milestones is a much underrated key, as a commercial venture’s chief financial concern is to generate the cash (“Cash is King!”) which allows employees to be paid, allows re-investment to improve product and performance, and allows the servicing of debt. Unless very cash rich already, a commercial organisation may find that the risks associated with an environment of poor cash flow is a prohibitive bar to market entry, when it makes its assessment of a strategic business case. Secondly, intended capability needs to be compatible with the trajectory of technology as we know it, but with acknowledgement that the systems of tomorrow may well have to adapt to combat as yet unknown threats. In this early stage of this complex and multi-generational effort against pan-national terrorism, it is difficult to predict the course of events and how terrorist tactics will evolve. It is significant that, in the few years since 2001, Al Qua’ida has transformed from a relatively tightly knit, closely controlled organisation into what is now an international brand name in terrorism, and whose tactics have become less centrally controlled, in which the movement’s tactics are limited only by the imagination of the followers. So when an unexpected event or tactic is encountered at some time in the future, the need to develop a new response from a completely different technological departure point would involve time (society’s enemy) and the waste of considerable invested resources. Therefore, there is a decision to be made to commit some investment, payable at the front end of a programme, to future-proof the systems and processes – by designing in truly open architectures that make them adaptable to future deviations from the anticipated. From an ‘old school’ industrial perspective, this is not an optimum path. It is not in industry’s absolute financial interests to encourage this open systems approach because ultimately ‘there is less money in it’, compared to a closed system’s approach which involves severe penalties, on the overall response, in time and materials, when new capability is needed from existing systems and software. The nature of the development of the asymmetric threat is markedly different from the classical, and more ponderous, Cold War industrial/military philosophy, in which intelligence provides an assessment of enemy military capability, which industry is then tasked to provide the means to defeat. The old forms of procurement, of concept studies, scoping studies, feasibility studies, prototyping, and then production will be simply too slow to react to an adversary relatively unencumbered by bureaucracy. Within the asymmetric environment, capability development has to move with speed (much like the way anti-submarine measures were brought into service during the two World Wars in such rapid fashion, driven by a ‘can-do’ and where commercial risk was effectively underwritten by Government. The requirement to observe a terrorists tactic, to orientate, decide and then act


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will be measured in terms of weeks or months rather than in years which was formerly the case. But there is a financial downside in this. Centres of excellence in technological developments, which will need to rapidly bring capability into the hands of the operational response, may have to be retained as discreet units, even in the absence of identified projects as the mutations in terrorist modus operandi may be unpredictable in terms of an overall ‘programme timeline’. The retention of these expert people, waiting for the new tactics to suddenly emerge, will constitute higher overhead (bad for the ‘bottom line’) and either must be absorbed by industry or paid for by the customer-inwaiting. If the financial resource is not found, then there will be compelling financial reasons why such centres of excellence, which will probably have delivered brilliantly, must ultimately be dispersed, leading to a diminution of cohesive technical expertise, to the detriment of the overall counter terrorist effort. The possibility of higher overhead, and how to manage this, may only be one of a number of changes to previously strict financial regimes, and it is increasingly important that those with limited experience in industrial circles, have some view of the traditional motivators in commerce, which in their fundamental nature must remain, no matter the exterior catalysts.

Challenges for Industry Industry has three important stakeholders to balance. The first is the shareholder, who has invested in the company and wishes to see a return on that investment through growth in earnings per share. Industry will do this by identifying the market, by winning the business (probably against competition) and then will aim for increasing its reputation by superior programme execution. If it can achieve this it will be reflected in good financial results in terms of profit, cash flow and backlog, and a growth in the future business pipeline. This is symptomatic of a well run, competitive and ambitious organisation which will be looked upon favourably by appropriate analysts on the financial markets, who will make good reports which in turn drive up the share price. Along with this there is that difficult area of profit, which has classically provided a bone of contention in any supplier/customer relationship. But a balance needs to be struck between achievement of short term profit, and the ability to generate profit over a number of years. Compare the following and make the business decision: 1. 2.

“We are in programme ‘x’ for 20 years although the margins are a bit thin” against, “We’ve got the business and the profit is good, but we have to re-compete after 5 years”.

Business does not like uncertainty. Therefore, it can be said that within a long term capability development programme it will make better sense for industry, science and technology communities, and government to establish concomitantly longer term partnerships. These need to be based on trust, rather than have more formal or even adversarial customer/supplier arrangements in shorter-term programmes, where a succession of projects are recompeted for time after time. The growing together of the stakeholder community in an environment of common endeavour reduces the penalties on all, of having to go through the difficult and disruptive process of forming new relationships and programme consortia at regular intervals. A repetitive bidding regime is expensive, and

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makes for less certain financial projections, although as a moderating influence, industry should always aver to competition and benchmarking where this really does make sense, or where it is demanded from customers or regulatory authorities driving for value for money. Secondly, a commercial organisation needs to execute its responsibility to wider society. It is increasingly being compelled to conform to legal, cultural, environmental and ethical norms and make sound judgements on where it can provide sociological stimulus to create wider employment, attract investment to a geographical area leading to the creation of well-being within a community. These softer requirements are becoming more prevalent, and it is unlikely that industry will be able to wholly duck these responsibilities under the guise of contributing to the “War on Terror”. 16 And finally, a good industrial organisation must bear a heavy responsibility to the employees in its care – its workforce – through development of its people, providing stable employment by fostering employees’ welfare and by apportioning due reward for performance. It is often said that people are an organisation’s greatest asset, but one suspects that this is only said as a lip service. The uncertainties of asymmetric warfare demand that the brightest and most innovative responses are given the greatest opportunity to prosper, and be given the tools and environment to maximise their potential. So, as long as these relatively simple needs are taken into account, strategic industry will be able to fully commit, along with its partners in government and the Science and Technology (S&T) community, to any business stream, not least that of antiterrorist capability development. But this is not about the micro-management of that development. There will always be a plethora of companies simply delighted to market their ‘kit’ to resolve point deficiencies in capability, and this should not be discouraged. Many of these smaller enterprises will be the very source of invention and innovation required to feed the systems integrators that lie above them in the industrial pecking order. The long and complicated road ahead needs engagement by the whole of the industrial stack, just as during previous disruptive challenges, such as the Second World War. And resolution of the crisis certainly needs to attract the interest of the big systems integration houses that can provide the critical top level programme management skills to make sure that there are no residual vulnerabilities when the capability is rolled out. If there are vulnerabilities, then the terrorist will find them, and exploit them. Overall, some critical enablers that encourage the engagement of industrial capability can thus be identified: 1.

2.

The willingness of government to develop, commit to and foster long term relationships. Although there has been a movement towards this, the path has not been easy. A chief failing has been the lack of a proper understanding of industry by the government, and how to harmonize the development of capability with the need of an organisation that has commercial, social and human resource responsibilities. Clarity in strategic vision, and the willingness of government to trust industry to help form part of that integrated team (that must also involve academia and the S&T community). With defence and security structures still in place that reflect the more set piece environment of the Cold War, there has yet to be a true change to a blended spectrum of response which incorporates all elements of society addressing threats, from pickpockets through to a nuclear exchange of cold war proportions. In this there is no doubt that government must take


3.

4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

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the lead and show an understanding of how the principle of security needs to be transformed. The generation of relatively stable, coherent and adequately funded capability development programmes that allow industry to conduct strategic business planning, which will include self-funded research and development, with confidence. Although there will be cyclical periods of activity when a new terrorist tactic comes to light, and lulls as the threat reduces, government has to find ways to provide long term stability. This will inevitably require an element of central procurement, strategically managed by a single agency that has the hand on the counter terrorism tiller. The requirement for programmes to have fixed and identifiable milestones which can enable good cash flow. There is no avoiding this fundamental commercial enabler to successfully managed finance. ‘Cash is King’ is the phrase heard often at business schools and every other school of finance that knows its subject. A collective environment of gainshare, in which industry and other stakeholders can exploit technologies and processes into wider markets. This will reduce the financial burdens placed on the Homeland Security customer and will make industry more willing to engage with the counter terrorism market. Spin-offs from the American Space Programme as an example are legion. Ballpoint pens that can write upside down, non-stick frying pans and “space blankets” used in treatment of casualties et al., these have brought some good third party revenues to those parties that chose to invest in an apparently stove-piped programme. The promise of success in adjacent markets is another factor which can help underwrite a business plan. Open and honest data sharing within the government/industrial/academic and scientific team, with a reduction in the privacy and secrecy barriers that have traditionally hindered the exchange of information between these stakeholders. The key enabler to this will be a wider and more flexible vetting environment, with better transfer of security credentials between stakeholders, and a clearer recognition of clearances between agencies, and between allied states. The appropriate sharing of risk, where innovation is encouraged, and where superior performance is duly recognised. The acknowledgment that, in terms of liability, industry cannot be expected to expose itself to punitive damages should, despite everyone’s best efforts, ‘the bomber get through’. It does not make sense for a commercial enterprise to risk suffering crippling, awarded through the courts, for the sake of financial rewards that could be relatively small compared to any payout, or even the premiums associated with those insurance policies designed to protect the company. The issue of liability may have some way to run, particularly in US-based corporations. It sits firmly in the old way of thinking, and not of the new.

If these factors are incorporated into a new mindset of common endeavour between the stakeholders, then there will arise a greater ability to support a more flexible and reactive, and indeed proactive, response to the new threat environment. The solution to the emerging asymmetrical threat lies in the thrust of the security rapier, and not in the blow of the traditional defence axe. The change in conflict paradigm from its last manifestation, that of the industrialisation of armaments, to that of global irregularity,

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demands a new behaviour from industry and the stakeholders allied to it, based on rapidity, flexibility and innovation. The challenge is new, complex, and multi generational, and demands change from the former days of relative industrial stability. Those industries that have the vision to respond will succeed.

Endnotes 1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14 15 16

“Technical failures, climate, industrial action, human or animal disease, economic shocks, international events, organised transnational crime, violent ’globalisation’ protestors, animal rights… the most challenging form of asymmetric risk is International Terrorism and its wider effects.” Sir David Omand – Cityforum Round Table on Homeland Security 23 Oct. 2003. National Defence – a combination of Civil Defence and Military Home Defence. MACP as a component of Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA – Military Task 2.1), the other components being MACC (Military Aid to the Civil Community) and MACM (to the Civil Ministries). Ultimately Cmd 3399 Jul. 1998. Francis Fukuyama – The End of History and the Last Man (1992). ICP – The MOD policy for military operations on UK soil from MACA to Post Nuclear Strike Recovery. Secretary of State for Defence – Introduction to the SDR: A New Chapter. According to the International Biometrics Group, the global market in biometrics in 2003 was $928M. 2007 projections show $4,035M – a consolidated annual growth rate of 34%. HM Treasury Comprehensive Spending Review 2004 Section 6. An amalgamation of the Public Health Laboratory Service, the Centre for Applied Microbiology Research, the National Focus for Chemical Incidents (including the Regional Service Provider Units), the National Poisons Information Service, and NHS staff responsible for emergency planning and response. Such as the Anti Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, the Civil Contingencies Bill introduced to the House of Commons 7th Jan. 2004, and Identity Cards: The Next Steps (Cm 6020). Ibid. Sir David Omand – Cityforum Round Table on Homeland Security 23 Oct. 2003. European Parliament: Temporary Committee on Foot and Mouth Disease 26th Mar and 8th April 2002, UK Govt response number 9 et seq. Preparing for Emergencies. What You Need to Know. HMG August 2004. A phrase not enjoyed by the author. War is a strategy, terrorism is a tactic.

Annex Examples of Breakout Group Discussions



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Annex 1: Breakout Group on Eastern Europe: The Way Ahead Summary of Proceedings The key question addressed was what actions are possible and what barriers exist to block or hinder those actions. It is important to consider security as a means to improve society and bring people together; however, if you join NATO, you have to follow their rules, which may not necessarily fit your needs. Lithuania expends 2% of its GDP on Security; NATO’s contribution is only 1.25% of that. The Czech Republic found the Norwegian contribution to the workshop particularly useful. It demonstrated self-sufficient research within a Defence Research establishment. There was little outsourcing. Lack of funds is the biggest problem for the Czech Republic. It is necessary to have a clearance classification to be allowed to work in the security area, and development is only possible if you join an international research network. The need was to formulate realistic, specific, well-targeted priorities, and find areas, which are developed and have something to offer that can be shared. Georgia does not use its scientific potential. It needs greater Government/scientific collaboration, but lacks a formulated security policy. It would be helpful to adopt the UK model of industry, Government, scientific collaboration. It needs advice and practical help from the UK and targeted funding, which at present is not usefully prioritised. Estonia has no border agreement with Russia – its major security issue. Issues are political not scientific, and the Republic only spends marginally on defence. There are budget contributions from the EU for research and development. Its issues, however, are political and competitive, and it feels NATO is not interested in the practical problems that it faces. Framework Programmes 6 and 7 (FP6 and FP7) have security-related budgets, but it is essential for Estonia to develop a security policy. It needs advice from UK experts plus knowledge transfer. Latvia has problems similar to those of Estonia and Lithuania. It hopes to secure a clearer research direction by obtaining more international collaboration. Security is not a national issue, but Latvia has a scientific contribution to make, e.g. applied laser theory. Better management of its scientific resources is critical, and there is a need for its scientists to establish links with the policy sector. These are complex issues which need urgent attention. Russia, because of recent terrorist attacks, has a much greater awareness of the need for security among the general public. Education is of major importance – particularly of doctors, scientists and the media. There is a need to develop courses in helping people to understand and cope with security threats and to use the influence of the media in positive ways.

Annex 1: Breakout Group on Eastern Europe: The Way Ahead

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Hungary has no members of its academic community working on security issues. Action is needed to force the scientific community to develop this area, and to link with social scientists on joint solutions to the problems faced. In order to motivate the scientists and the Government, money needs to be assigned to specific projects, targeting research programmes which encourage networking across institutions. Political lobbying is essential for this outcome to be achieved, e.g. use the Royal Society booklet as a means to define threats, identify technologies, and encourage appropriate technology transfer. It needs to: discourage the brain-drain to international universities by attracting young people into the security sphere. Develop networks that foster regional and international cooperation, composed of members of the scientific community who retain responsibility for their own country’s development; develop soft and hard research projects, both classified and unclassified, which attack real problems, do not waste time and have mechanisms that encourage fast development and application. Supporting regional cooperation could be a stepping-stone to building an international research network. NATO is too unrealistic in its funding levels to foster international links, e.g. joint university qualification programmes between Estonia and Finland.

Conclusion The priority for Eastern Europe is to increase funding for the development of international research networks in the security area. Government policy in all the countries represented need revising to encourage this level of cooperation, and a less rigid approach to classified areas of research and those allowed to work within them. Involving social scientists in joint projects with scientists would be beneficial, and regional networks could provide a stepping-stone to develop stronger international links. Funding was generally lacking, but NATO’s budgets were seen as too limited to be helpful in this area. Only the EU offered realistic support, but the Catch 22 was the bureaucracy of their systems, and the need to have created the network before you could apply.


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Annex 2: Breakout Group on the Middle East: Discussion Report In this session, we started out by introducing a number of questions pertaining to the Middle East region, terrorism and counter-terrorism. • • • •

What are the problems of national science and academic establishments, including social sciences and humanities? What are the problems and priorities-what do we know about key players at the state and sub-state levels? Which are the most important problems in terms of research relevant to security? How can models be found to coordinate relations between institutions, governments and businesses?

In regard to the analyses of the problems, approaches to resolving identified difficulties. Recommendations of the breakout session group are found below. Pragmatic approaches to information exchange as opposed to intelligence sharing are required. (Information can be defined as generating and processing data and intelligence as use/application of data). Intelligence sharing has been between agencies of government which are secretive and do not share intelligence with civilians. The agencies are often protective of the information they are holding. Concerning knowledge in this field, the American University in Lebanon has done a lot of research on Hezbollah – but there are no cooperative arrangements through which the results could be transferred to governments. But we need to consider the problems in the way of cooperation – will it be free discussion or somebody imposing specific issues to be discussed? There are many students in universities but there is a low capacity to produce knowledge. The raw material is present but there is no model to generate knowledge from it. The security apparatuses are taking over universities and manipulating research. The challenge in the Middle East is how to reorganise the relationship between these organs. What is the ideal model? The problem is enormous but it centres on relations between the military and civilian elites. The relations are not organised, they are not official, rather they are informal and depend on personal ties. When the fight against terrorism began in Algeria, there were people in the universities who had been studying terrorism. The military have troops and weapons but no knowledge and there is a mentality that prevents them from tapping into the resources of the university. Centres of Strategic Studies/Institute of National Security should be created. Academics should be asked by the services to give an opinion or idea about security questions. If the military could be committed to funding research, linkages will develop between the services and academia. The military needs to be convinced that a lot of the research in

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universities is relevant to their operations. There is a need to develop institutional mechanisms to foster research. Most Arab regimes have ideas to create institutions/mechanisms to manipulate research. We need to redraw the functions of these institutions. The High Council for Science and Technology (in Jordan) manipulates money for research; there is no research at all. Administrative costs take up 90 percent of the funds. Intelligence departments and the military try to do something and activist professors and deans are also eager to launch initiatives but they do not know what sort of activity could be fruitful. Jordan in alliance with NATO could be able to fashion an agenda for generating the sort of research needed by governments and the security apparatus. There is an International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism. Jordan and Israel are involved with this institution. There is a competition for power between intelligence officers and academics. Intelligence officers are protective of their turf, they will not let academics in. * * * Building on the introductory comments, we continued our discussion by looking at what are the commonalities and differences concerning applied policy research on Islamic terrorism? This seemed appropriate as we had already identified the political impediments (q.v.) – and established that the institutions are already there. Many of us agree that the challenge is to modernise the institutions in the Middle East. There are many reasons why institutions do not function properly but the critical issue is the prevailing value system, which is not conducive to production and efficiency. We have to identify the various causes and start modelling and analysing them. We then wanted to know, whether the problems identified related to commonalities/general factors? We concluded that an important question we should consider is the nature of political power. Money is needed for research, but will the funds come from private or public sources? The state is often the source of money for research but the nature of political power is such that autonomous centres of power will never be allowed. The state gives money and determines the limits within which science will operate. State officials are aware that science is “counter-power.” Algeria is a military country; the military determines your future and past. But things are changing, the army is withdrawing from politics. The main problem is not one of money. As was suggested in the course of the discussion, removing military power will not solve the problem; we are essentially dealing with multi-causes. And solving one problem will not be enough. There are problems at the societal level too. The only credible civil society movement is Hamas. But is it possible to think of one mechanism that could effectively address all the problems? Nevertheless, a lot of governments are dealing with challenges to the status quo; it is very difficult to get information about government counter-terrorism activities. Accordingly, we focused on the relative secrecy of governments. Some of us believe that there are objective reasons. Officials think “If I make information about terrorism public, it would be stupid because it is intelligence, they are my tools, I cannot make them available on the Internet”. While this is certainly true, we cannot ignore the relative success of the Western experience in this field, where a lot of states make policy by announcing policies. Algeria used to get this information from other Arab countries, from the United Kingdom through Jordan or Saudi Arabia. The question of mindset and mentality is most important. The generals come from a background of fighting for


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liberation, they have no time for rationalising the experience of terrorism: Middle Eastern countries cannot introduce the necessary changes on their own. More critically, the point was raised that Middle Eastern States utilise and benefit from terrorism. It’s a Hobbesian war of all against all. The Middle East needs a unifying policy framework. Terrorism needs horizontal, functional rather than political solutions. Even if we accept the political and cultural impediments touched upon above, maybe we can propose a productive approach by attacking the problem on a structural level. Hence it would be desirable to know what requirements and needs we can think about, regardless of political realities at tactical, methodological levels. Is it possible to envisage regionally applicable solutions and deliverables? Can we, for example, deal with the problems through infra-state solutions? The members of our group were pessimistic concerning an inter-state approach: If you rely on the state in the Middle East, very little in terms of finding a workable solution is to be expected. Moreover, “infra-state” does not necessarily mean NGOs. NGOs in Jordan are manipulative; they are under the control of the royal family. External funds for civic groups are channeled through the royal family; nothing reaches the people. These days, American and European NGOs have been incorporated into the structures of corruption. In fact, as some members of our group suggested, what is needed is a duplication of the Hamas Da’waa (sophisticated sub-state social services system), but with a different content. Hamas Da’waa methods are the most convenient for the social structure and atmosphere of the region. These structures can be utilized to maximum effect, as they depend on personal power and personal trust in order to provide actual value; they can even be used to disrupt religious mentalities. The elementary shift in this structure, once realized, would need to be one of providing value for being a rational, secular person. State power in the Middle East tends to be corrupt and tyrannical and, as an act of self-preservation, attempts to monopolise secularism. The Hamas model, on the other hand, enjoys credibility in civil society, it is innovative and, in its original manifestation, it has managed to monopolize religion. Ideally, as both Middle Eastern state and infra-state models deal with inherent difficulties and are, for one reason or another, blemished in the eyes of key players in the region, a third force is needed, one that is clean, daring and focused on secular revolution based on secular trustworthy persons.



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Annex 3: Breakout Group on Western Nations Brainstormed Issues • • • • • • • • • •

New security systems in the US are bringing a technology-driven approach to Europe. Department of Homeland Security – have matters improved? This raises question of whether the institutions are still isolated from the technology/systems. Lack of integrated approach across different areas – good for the industry participants. Where does UK funding come from to pull-through of end-product? This is perceived as easier in the US. EU Procurement rules make it more complex and difficult to develop new products. IPR protection can restrict sharing of new technology. Transfer of Technology between countries is also an issue of national security – in particular transfer out of US into the international counter terrorist community. DTI has recently insisted on licensing transfer of knowledge – raises major issues and bureaucratic hurdles.

• • •

Procrastination can be a problem on the defence side particularly. UK industry has to wrestle with both the Mod and the DTI. How to prioritise which technology is to be invested in? Which existing projects are to be dropped?

• •

Importance of having an intelligent customer. How do we insure that there is adequate education for those having to operate in a more complex market in the future given existing difficulties? This involves education on both the science and the context – reduction in UK army numbers puts this under particular pressure for the army. Academia can contribute in developing longer term forecasting of possible threats.

• • • •

Is there a gap in forward thinking in the more medium term? Confidentiality agreements restrict information sharing on a collaborative basis and can raise ownership disputes over new rights – how can this be made more flexible?

138


•

Collaborative programmes may be a way forward for brainstorming on future threats but this may not be suitable for developing new technology over multiple states and parties.

•

RTO have initiated a series of long term scientific studies on a collaborative basis for example. Are they useful studies, particularly when looked at with hindsight?

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

What about some solutions? Education, Prioritisation/co-ordination/stovepiping, Cross border barriers to information sharing and co-operation, Funding and Security issues. Sponsorship by a politician? E.g. shadow homeland security minister. Strong political support is needed. The media can also put pressure on the politicians and stimulate real action. An issue is the lack of experience of the media in this area – although with clever handling this could be tapped in to as an issue of great current interest. How do we scare the politicians into action on security without scaring the public? Need for mature and balanced reporting on both sides is clear to ensure a proper perception of risk and to avoid media focus on hype. A homeland security minister in the UK is considered useful in ensuring greater co-ordination but not on the model of the US Department for Homeland security in the US. Currently combined army and police responses are operationally co-operative, but the minister would act as a driver for cross governmental coherence. An example now in the UK is the Nuclear Reaction Force. What about the barriers to cross border trade and collaboration with for example Pakistan? Secondment of scientists and experts to educate other countries. The engagement between science and people is needed both technology and manpower. International conventions on security exist and could form a starting point. Airlines have a higher financial interest in cross border security and could these initiatives gain sponsorship from the aviation industry?

Challenges Identified • • •

Education and preparing people for the future. Stove-piping and the importance of co-ordination between departments, and between departments and industry. Who sets priorities? Barriers to cross-border trade & technology transfer – EU Procurement Rules, security concerns, DTI etc.


• • • • •

Payment – who pays for different projects? Collective payments in NATO and elsewhere. Funding and ownership issues-is it defence or is it security? Communications between national governments and EU Institutions. UK has many agencies an departments between whom there are overlapping areas of responsibility: for a range of security issues eg MoD, Defra, the Scottish Executive, Health and Protection Agencies. Who is running the show?

Potential Solutions • • •

139

Homeland Security Co-ordinator. Education of media and MPs. Overseas assistance both technical and expert missions.


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Author Index Al-Khudhairy, D. Boros, B.L. Bowyer, D. Cadiou, J.-M. Crawley, E.C. Donnelly, C. Durodie, B. Fouhy, J. Heap, B.

81 67 19 81 87 7 31 25 3

Huppert, H. Jarulaitis, R. Karakullukcu, M. Kelly, M.J. Livingstone, D. Malmstein, R. Sharpe, M. Tchilingirian, H. Torp, J.E.

107 61 95 87 113 55 v 51 73




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