Russia's Chechen War

Russia’s Chechen War

Widespread media interest in the Chechen conflict reflects an ongoing concern about the evolution of federal Russia. Why did the Russian leadership initiate military action against Chechnya in December 1994, but against no other constituent part of the Federation? This study demonstrates that the Russian invasion represented the culmination of a crisis that was perceived to have become an increasing threat not only to the stability of the North Caucasus region, but also to the very foundations of Russian security. It looks closely at the Russian Federation in transition, following the collapse of the communist Soviet Union, and the implications of the 1991 Chechen Declaration of Independence in the context of Russia’s democratisation project. Tracey C. German is a graduate in Russian from the University of Edinburgh and was awarded a PhD by the University of Aberdeen on Russia’s conflict with Chechnya. She has lived in Russia and Ukraine, and is currently a Research Manager at the World Markets Research Centre, specialising in the former Soviet Union and its energy sector.

Russia’s Chechen War Tracey C. German

First published 2003 by RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2003 Tracey C. German All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data German, Tracey, C., 1971– Russia’s Chechen war/Tracey C. German. Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Chechnëì (Russia)–History–Civil War, 1994– 2. Chechnëì (Russia)–Relations–Russia (Federation) 3. Russia (Federation)–Relations–Chechnëì (Russia) 4. Chechnëì (Russia)–History–Autonomy and independence movements. 5. Democracy–Russia (Federation) 6. Russia (Federation)–Politics and government–1991– I. Title. DK511.C37 G47 2003 947.5'2–dc21 2002032613 ISBN 0-203-41776-3 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-41920-0 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–415–29720–6 (Print Edition)

Contents

List of tables List of abbreviations Maps Introduction 1 The Russian Federation in transition

vii viii ix 1 6

2 Background to the Chechen declaration of independence in 1991

14

3 The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR (August–November 1991)

34

4 The consolidation of an ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya (1991–93) 55 5 Challenges to internal sovereignty: The roots of power and opposition to the Dudayev regime (1991–93)

76

6 War by proxy? (February–September 1994)

94

7 The decision to invade (October–December 1994)

112

8 Making peace or war?

129

9 Conclusions: One step forward, two steps back

155

Glossary Notes Bibliography Index

164 166 222 243

Tables

2.1 2.2 3.1 3.2 4.1 6.1 6.2

Administrative structure of the USSR National composition of the population 1939–89 Chechen initiatives in the immediate post-coup period (August–November 1991) Russian initiatives in the immediate post-coup period (August–November 1991) Weaponry left in Chechnya, June 1992 Main anti-Dudayev opposition groups The evolution of Russian policy towards the Chechen crisis

15 22 52 53 58 105 111

Abbreviations

ASSR CIS CPSU EC FSK IC KGB KNK KOUNKh LDPR MVD NF NATO NCMD ODChN OKChN OSCE RSFSR SNGS SSR SWB UNPO USSR VDP VLKSM WTO

Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Commonwealth of Independent States Communist Party of the Soviet Union Executive Council of the National Congress of Chechen People Federal Counterintelligence Service Interim Council Committee of State Security Confederation of Peoples of the North Caucasus Chechen Committee for the Management of the Economy Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Ministry of Internal Affairs Chechen National Front North Atlantic Treaty Organisation North Caucasus Military District National Movement of the Chechen People National Congress of the Chechen People Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic Council of National and Civil Accord Soviet Socialist Republic BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Vainakh Democratic Party All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League Warsaw Treaty Organisation

Map 1 Chechnya

Map 2 Ethnolinguistic groups in the Caucasus region Source: The Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, The University of Texas at Austin

Introduction

The Russian invasion of Chechnya in December 1994 represented the culmination of a crisis that was perceived to have become an increasing threat not only to the stability of the North Caucasus region, but also to the very foundations of Russian security. The intervention, intended as a highly visible display of military strength and enduring might, merely emphasised the fundamental structural and behavioural weaknesses of many Russian institutions in the post-Soviet era, notably the presidency, government, parliament and armed forces. Renewed fighting in Chechnya, which began at the end of 1999, has re-focused attention on Russia’s relationship with its constituent parts, particularly in the volatile North Caucasus. It also serves to emphasise the importance of the region to Russia, which is expending vast quantities of resources, both material and human, in a second attempt to subdue the rebellious republic. The protracted crisis has proved to be a significant juncture in the development of the fledgling Russian democracy and illustrates the highly personalised nature of decision-making in the postcommunist era. The aim of this study is to identify and explore the issues behind the evolution of post-Soviet Russia’s conflict with Chechnya and investigate why a political crisis was permitted to deteriorate into a full-scale war. Many motives have been ascribed to the war of 1994–96, ranging from the neoimperialist ambitions of the centre to ethno-nationalist tendencies on the periphery. This study will examine the causes of Russia’s conflict with Chechnya within the context of the Federation’s transition away from communist rule, towards its own distinctive interpretation of the democratic ideal.

A brief portrait of the Chechen nation In order to understand the motivating forces on both sides of the conflict and the origins of the decision to invade, it is necessary to examine the historical relationship of Russia and the myriad peoples of the North Caucasus.1 There is a long and acrimonious history of struggle between the two sides in the contemporary conflict, as the Russians have continually

2

Introduction

struggled to dominate the volatile Caucasus region, which is vital both geopolitically and economically. The region plays a crucial economic role as it is a vital supply route for oil from the Caspian Sea, which provides a source of income for republics across the North Caucasus. However, the complex level of ethnic diversity and myriad peoples of the Caucasus represent a significant threat to the security of Russia’s southern fringes. Even the Russian term ‘Chechen’ is inextricably linked with the incessant hostilities in a history where peace has been the exception – it is derived from the name of the village (Chechen-aul) on the Argun river in the North Caucasus where the first battle was fought between the Russians and Chechens in 1732. The Caucasus have consistently represented frontier territory for Russia, encompassing the vital southern border with the Islamic empires of modernday Turkey and Iran. Both Turkey and Iran are historic opponents for influence in the area, which shares ethnic, religious and cultural affinities with these two Muslim nations. The end of the Cold War and subsequent changes in the global political order have led to a re-drawing of international borders and strategic re-alignments. This has increased the significance of the North Caucasus, which now represents an international border between the Russian Federation and the three independent states of the Transcaucasus, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Russia’s strategic position is threatened by shifting alliances in the region: the former Soviet republic of Georgia has stated its desire to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and Turkey has also increased its role in the region, declaring the North Caucasus to be a foreign policy priority. Oil-rich Azerbaijan has become the focus of substantial interest from the West, which is anxious to maintain secure access to lucrative Caspian hydrocarbons. Thus, Russia is understandably keen to preserve its current borders and maintain its territorial integrity.2 The territory of Chechnya (15,000 square km) lies on the northern side of the Caucasus mountain range. According to the last population census conducted by the Russian authorities in October 2002, there were just over one million people living in Chechnya, a constituent part of the Russian Federation. The Nokhchi people, as the Chechens call themselves, have inhabited their present territory for approximately 6000 years, although that estimate is disputed.3 They are closely related to the neighbouring Ingush (the Nokhchi and Ingush are collectively called Vainakh, meaning ‘Our People’), but both are distinct ethnic groups with separate languages.4 The majority of the Chechen people are nominally Muslim, adhering to a form of Islamic mysticism known as Sufism.5 Islam in Chechnya is represented by two Sufi brotherhoods (tariqats): the Naqshbandiya and Qadiriya. The Naqshbandiya tariqat is relatively orthodox and intellectual, whilst the Qadiriya is more informal, preaching non-violence and practising the zikr with music and dancing, which are prohibited by the purist Naqshbandiya order.6 These two orders remain crucial to Chechen society, uniting

Introduction 3 disparate clans that lack any hierarchical social structure. Sheikh Mansur, the son of a shepherd from the Chechen aul of Aldi, was the first Chechen to utilise the religious orders as a mobilising force against the Russians. In 1784 he proclaimed himself imam (chief of a Sufi Muslim order) and declared a Ghazawat (holy war) against the invading Russian Empire. Notwithstanding initial expansion into the North Caucasus during the 16th century, when Cossack settlers arrived in the Terek Delta and foothills of Chechnya, the Russian incursion did not commence in earnest until the 18th century. Mindful of the strategic importance of this region, Peter the Great renewed Russian activity southwards as part of his ambitious scheme to establish a trading route to India.7 The Tsar encouraged Cossacks in the area to persist with provocations along the North Caucasus borders in the hope of opening the region for Russian colonisation. The Cossack Line defended Russia’s southern borders and exemplified the inexorable advance of Russian imperialism. Cossacks were the vanguard of the expansion southwards during the 17th and 18th centuries, loyal servants of the Tsar who relied on them to colonise the Caucasus.8 Following Peter the Great’s death in 1725, Russia’s imperial expansion was suspended for almost 50 years until Catherine the Great renewed the drive to the south, as rivalry with the Persian and Ottoman empires for influence in the region intensified. The imperial forces met fierce resistance in Chechnya, which became the centre of one of the longest guerrilla campaigns of the 19th century, the Caucasian War (1817–64). The Chechens fought against Russian domination during the War under Imam Shamil after the resistance leaders proclaimed a Ghazawat against the Russians to the north, following the example set by Sheikh Mansur in the 18th century.9 The republic was eventually assimilated into Tsarist Russia in 1859 and many residents were exiled to the Ottoman Empire. Russians began to settle in the lowlands, particularly after oil was discovered near Groznyy in 1893 and thousands of oil workers were sent to the city from European parts of the empire. The Chechen Autonomous oblast was established on November 30th 1922, upon the dissolution of the Mountain People’s Republic, which had included all of the North-east Caucasus apart from Dagestan. It was merged with the Ingush Autonomous oblast in 1934 in an attempt to dilute the indigenous majorities and two years later was raised in status to an ASSR. The Soviet policy of ‘divide-and-rule’ enhanced the tensions between the manifold peoples of the region, as artificial borders divided natural alliances and strengthened individual ethnic identities. The policy of korenizatsiya (indigenisation), first advocated by Lenin, encouraged the development of local languages and culture in an effort to attract the nationalities to the idea of revolution. However, this brand of officially sanctioned nationalism directly contributed to the simmering discontent of the region by instilling a separate ethnic awareness previously not present amongst the numerous tribal groups. In 1944 the Chechens became the largest group on a compact territory to be deported en masse by Stalin for alleged collaboration with the

4

Introduction

Nazis. On February 23rd 1944 over 500,000 Chechens and Ingush were transported to northern Kazakhstan for an exile that lasted 13 years – they were not permitted to return until 1957 following rehabilitation under Khrushchev’s leadership.10 During this 13-year period nothing was published in Chechen, which became a prohibited language, and the term ‘Chechen’, along with the names of other deported nations, disappeared from Soviet textbooks and encyclopedias. Despite these threats, or perhaps because of them, the Chechens have managed to preserve a unique culture and identity. One reason for this resilience is their tight clan structure, the custom of extended families. A clan, or teip, is based on two or three villages claiming descent from a common ancestor with each family headed by an elder, who still commands great respect in contemporary society. Each village can contain anything from 10 to 50 families. A teip is self-sufficient and self-contained with its own Council of Elders, Court of Justice, cemetery, customs, traditions and laws (adats). However, all teips are categorised by a specific tukum, a form of tribe, of which there are nine and according to legend, all tukums share a common family ancestry. Tukums provide the basis for self-administration independent of state institutions.11 Traditional kinship ties, together with the Sufi religious brotherhoods, continue to play a significant role in contemporary Chechnya, providing an organised social structure capable of mobilising individual groups.12

Chapter outline This book focuses on Russo–Chechen relations in the post-Soviet era and attempts to explain reasons for the enduring crisis. Chapter One establishes the impact of Russia’s transitional status on the decision-making process in the wake of the collapse of communism as a viable political system, with particular regard to its influence on the Chechen crisis and its potential for stimulating the escalation of a political argument into violent conflict. The ensuing chapters concentrate on a chronological analysis of the crisis, utilising the case-study approach in an attempt to locate the rationale for the war. Chapter two elucidates the motives behind the 1991 unilateral Chechen declaration of independence in order to gain further insight into the background of the secessionist struggle. Chapter three continues with this chronological theme, investigating the impact of the chaos and institutional vacuum prevalent across the Federation in the immediate post-coup era. Was the apparent inaction of the Russian leadership during the closing months of 1991 typical of systems in transition? To what extent did this facilitate the rapid loss of central control in Chechnya? Chapters four and five examine the circumstances of Chechen ‘independence’ and the republic’s unsuccessful attempts to establish both internal and external aspects of sovereignty, together with Moscow’s evolving policy towards the rebellious republic. Chapter six analyses the reasons behind the dramatic shift in the

Introduction 5 Russian attitude to the Chechen problem during 1994, determining a strengthening in the authoritarian tendencies of the executive as the power of the legislature was undermined. Chapter seven investigates the background to the December decision to invade. Chapter eight examines Russo–Chechen relations during the first Chechen war (1994–96) and investigates the events that led to the Khasavyurt peace accords of 1996. What caused the Russian leadership to renege on this peace deal and launch a new offensive in 1999? Why did they squander the chance for peace and reject political overtures by the Chechens? The final chapter, ‘Conclusions’, examines possibilities for the future of Chechnya and offers conclusions on the state of Russian ‘democracy’ as illustrated by the ongoing conflict.

1

The Russian Federation in transition

Introduction In the wake of the rapid demise of communism as a global ideology, considerable scholarly attention has been focused on the extant democratisation of the former Soviet empire. The progress of the Russian Federation’s democratisation project has not been trouble-free, a fact that is manifest in its evolving relationship with its 89 constituent parts, particularly the Chechen Republic. The nature of Moscow’s relationship with its peripheral regions serves as a key indicator of the health of democracy across the Federation: the level of real autonomy granted to local elites, as well as the accountability and transparency of the relationship is a reliable demonstration of the extent of democratisation. Increasingly, regional trends and relationships have become the crucial factor in any assessment of political stability in Russia, as opposed to interest group and factional clashes within the Kremlin itself. This chapter will examine the process of democratic transition which the Soviet Union, then Russia, underwent as it strove to move from a non-democratic regime towards its aspirations of democracy.

Defining the transition process Democratisation has been defined as ‘the advance of liberal-democratic reform, implying, in particular, the granting of basic freedoms and the widening of popular participation and electoral choice’.1 Over the past century there has been a tendency for an increasing number of countries to pursue supposedly democratic forms of government, Huntington’s so-called ‘Third Wave’, and by 1992 the number of ‘democracies’ was in a majority for the first time, totalling 91 of 183 states.2 The collapse of the outer Soviet empire in 1989 provoked a sense of triumphalism amongst the liberal democracies of the industrialised West, who claimed victory over the communist ideology. This was exemplified by Francis Fukuyama’s manifesto that the fall of the communist empire amounted to the ‘end of history’, on the basis that non-democratic regimes had recognised liberal democracy and the capitalist economic order as ‘the final form of human government’.3 The

The Russian Federation in transition

7

spread of democratic forms of governance was acclaimed as a significant tool in the promotion of global peace and security. Noting that no two democracies have ever fought a war against each other, former US President Bill Clinton argued that support for democratisation would be an antidote to both international war and civil conflict.4 Yet whilst liberal democracy5 is certainly the proclaimed ideal of a large proportion of states in the contemporary world, each country’s notion of democracy varies, depending greatly upon the legacy of the previous regime type, together with the mentality of the current leadership and its ambitions. Democratisation is not a solitary consequential event; it comprises several different stages that occur over an indefinite period of time: the breakdown of undemocratic rule, transition, consolidation and, if successful, the perpetuation of a stable democratic political order. Thus, transition (or ‘transformation’, a term preferred by some observers6) is merely an intrinsic stage in the complex development of a democratic state. A state is deemed to be undergoing transition from the moment critical flaws initially become discernible in the undemocratic regime, until it successfully attains democratic stability, an accomplishment often taking many years. It is imperative to distinguish between the initiation of democratisation as a process and the final objective of consolidating democracy as an institution. There are innumerable potential impediments to the completion of a successful transition: the complex process of democratic transformation encompasses both positive and negative phases, with violent conflict representing an extreme potential outcome. Successful transition requires a certain degree of national unity7, a concord of conflicting interests for the sake of peace. Whilst a certain degree of nationalism or national pride is necessary for the cohesion of a modern state, extreme forms accompanied by violence are destabilising and dangerous. Unfortunately, the fundamental liberalism inherent in democratic ideology promotes the free expression of a wide spectrum of grievances, thereby fostering nationalistic tendencies. Existing underlying ethnic tensions are particularly prone to exacerbation during a transitional period. Previously repressed national groups push for increased autonomy, whilst political leaders exploit these rifts and utilise populist, ethnic slogans in order to win support for their faction. Instead of the moderation and cooperation essential to avoid conflict, extremist rhetoric is employed.

Gorbachev and liberalisation The transformation of the Soviet system was unintentionally inaugurated by the appointment of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1985. He inherited the mantle of power from a series of infirm, elderly leaders and his comparative youth brought a new vigour to Soviet political life. Nevertheless, in 1985 there was no indication of the prodigious impact Gorbachev’s rule was to

8

The Russian Federation in transition

have on the legitimacy of the communist ideal, eventually culminating in the abrupt dismantling of the vast Soviet empire. Initially perestroika (re-structuring) was intended to be a programme of economic reform. By the end of the 1980s it had become apparent that the Soviet Union was experiencing severe economic difficulties. The centre could no longer afford the enormous financial burden of maintaining its Eastern European satellites and simultaneously attempting to compete with the extensive military build-up being conducted by the United States. Living standards across the USSR had fallen dramatically as financial resources were diverted away from public spending into the defence budget. The socialist concept of central planning had generated a weak economy dependent on heavy industry and collective agriculture and unable to compete on world markets. In an attempt to revive the economy Gorbachev chose to concentrate resources on a structural regeneration of the entire socialist system.8 The Soviet leader unveiled his liberalisation project at the XXVIIth CPSU Congress held in February 1986, announcing that ‘now the situation is such that it is impossible to simply limit out measures to partial improvements – what is needed is a radical reform’.9 As the first step in the reform programme he initiated the policy of glasnost (meaning transparency or openness) which was intended to mobilise support from the intelligentsia and public at large for the wider programme of perestroika. Glasnost entailed lifting the controls on public debate and individual expression of opinion. Political prisoners were released, new freedoms were granted to the mass media and a widespread re-evaluation of the Soviet past took place. The Central Committee Plenum of January 1987 was a crucial turning point in the transformation process, as uninhibited discussion and analysis of the Soviet regime were openly encouraged. Gorbachev has described the plenum as ‘the first step on our road towards democracy’, when every speaker ‘criticised the bureaucracy’ and ‘had his hand raised in support of democratisation’.10 By the middle of 1987 serious economic reform was underway, as Gorbachev called for an economy that would retain economic planning, but with decentralisation and a significant role for market forces within the framework. The final part of his liberalisation of the Soviet regime involved the democratisation of political institutions. In March 1989 the first competitive elections took place for the newly established representative legislature, the Congress of People’s Deputies, and the following year the Communist Party agreed to give up its monopoly on power, endorsing the removal of Article Six from the Soviet Constitution. This amendment meant that multi-party elections could be held, seriously undermining the hegemony of the central authorities, but also unintentionally opening the way for further democratisation. Gorbachev is often mistakenly portrayed as a champion of democracy by Western observers, who fail to point out that, although he abandoned much

The Russian Federation in transition

9

of the communist ideology, he retained a firm belief in the socialist ideal and refused to abandon communist institutions.11 He stressed that ‘perestroika is not some kind of illumination or revelation … The essence of perestroika lies in the fact that it unites socialism with democracy and revives the Leninist concept of socialist construction both in theory and in practice’.12 Gorbachev and his reform-minded allies were convinced that socialism could only achieve its full potential through controlled democratisation, maintaining that ‘only through the consistent development of the democratic forms inherent in socialism and through the expansion of selfgovernment can we make progress in production, science and technology, culture and art, and in all social spheres.’13 In his memoirs, Gorbachev himself has described the modest objectives of his reforms: ‘What we had in mind was not a revolution but a specific improvement of the system, which we then believed was possible. We longed for freedom so much that we thought that if we just gave society a breath of fresh air it would revive. We understood freedom in a broad sense, to include actual, not just rhetorical, control of the land by farmers, and of factories by workers, freedom of enterprise, changes in our investment and structural policies and an emphasis on social development.’14 Gorbachev’s programme of liberalisation constituted the beginning of a transition process, which would eventually lead to a rejection of the socialist system that the reforms were merely intended to strengthen. Glasnost in particular triggered the expression of grievances and opinions, which the authorities were unable to control and which fatally weakened the legitimacy of Soviet rule. Having failed to preserve coherence between the pillars of the communist political system, Gorbachev unwittingly initiated a dramatic systemic transformation.

Rising from the ashes: Yeltsin and ‘democracy’ The abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union, following the coup attempt of August 1991, caught the majority of politicians, analysts and the population unawares. There was little time for any preparation and certainly no gradual introduction to the principles of democratic reform. Russia’s transformation from a post-totalitarian state literally occurred overnight. It is doubtful that the liberal opponents of communist rule had been plotting to overthrow the incumbent government, and consequently they had given scant consideration to the enormity of the task suddenly confronting them. Sergei Stankevich, one of Yeltsin’s political advisers, concluded that the collapse of the Soviet regime was a ‘mixed blessing’. In his opinion the democratic opposition ‘had reached a distant shore long before we thought we ever would … We democrats who had been in opposition were suddenly in power, and in many ways we were not prepared. The main weakness was that the idea of what a ‘new Russia’ should be had not been considered at all.’15

10

The Russian Federation in transition

His remarks allude to the institutional vacuum that frequently accompanies democratic transition. Russia’s tentative transition away from the repressive communist system towards the norms of democracy, must be perceived as a new beginning rather than a return to past experiences. The new leadership of the Federation failed to promptly dismantle Soviet institutions such as the KGB, remaining seemingly inert in the months following the attempted coup. It continued to function within the framework of the 1977 Soviet Constitution together with the Soviet era legislature, the Congress of Peoples’ Deputies, for two years, whilst simultaneously attempting to adopt the principles of liberal democracy. Consequently, even though the leadership verbally embraced democratic ideals, it lacked the institutional foundations upon which to construct its aspirations. Yeltsin himself has acknowledged this fact, writing in his memoirs: ‘I cannot say that we had to start from scratch, but almost. Meanwhile, we had to figure out everything from the start. What was a vice president? How should a Russian constitutional court look? There was nothing but blank space because no such institutions had previously existed in Russia … As a result, there emerged beautiful structures and pretty names with nothing behind them.’16 This failure to institutionalise the new political order, combined with structural weaknesses inherited from the Soviet system of power, led to the executive and legislature becoming embroiled in a struggle for supremacy. Each side in this conflict exploited democratic procedures in order to preserve their monopoly on power, resulting in the creation of a ‘democracy’ that perpetuates political irresponsibility and the predominance of personal advantage over accountability to the electorate. Shevtsova has conjectured that Russia’s transition was ‘uniquely difficult’, differentiated from most other post-communist transitions by the total collapse of the state that accompanied the collapse of communism, as well as the lack of elite consensus about methods of reform. She is highly critical of Yeltsin for failing to establish either a coherent institutional order or widespread social support for his programme of reform, concentrating instead on the construction of an undemocratic vertical system of presidential power that granted him vast powers.17 A crucial difference between Russia and the states of post-communist Eastern Europe is that the latter possessed a systemic framework within which to conduct reform, thus safeguarding progress towards democratic consolidation and blocking any regressive movement. The communist system was far more entrenched within Russia and there was a lack of modern democratic traditions, ensuring that no consensus was reached during the initial stages of transition. Consequently, the Russian transition has been determined by the ‘logic of the political battle being fought at the time and not by any long-range plans for state-building.’18 The majority of Russia’s politicians, civil servants and officials were moulded according to the realities of a communist state, thus could not be

The Russian Federation in transition

11

expected suddenly to transform themselves from model Soviet citizens into epitomes of a diametrically opposing set of beliefs. Shevtsova believes this to be the reason behind the atmosphere of continual crisis prevalent during the first three years of the post-Soviet era. In her opinion the extent of ‘elite continuity’ in Russia distinguishes its political transformation from those of other post-communist countries, where opposition leaders emerged from outside the established political order. The anti-Soviet opposition arose from within the existing elite, even from within the Central Committee, and consequently its members were reluctant ‘to carry out a broad-based purge of the elite to which they belonged.’19 This has led some observers to claim that Russia has not been transformed at all. Yuri Burtin, a correspondent for Nezavisimaya Gazeta, maintains that, despite operating within a new political-ideological framework, the Russian apparat has been able to preserve traditional positions and relationships: ‘This system is like a werewolf – it changes its external hide whenever it pleases, but its essence remains the same.’20 This characterisation can also be applied to the Russian population as a whole. Under Soviet rule they were prevented from taking any active role in the political management of the country, and were discouraged from expressing any beliefs that contradicted the official position, notwithstanding the fact that public opinion was disregarded anyway. The passivity manifest in post-communist societies can be construed as a fusion of the previous regime’s legacy, such as repression, and disillusionment with the current situation. Consequently, the mentality and attitudes of ordinary citizens need to undergo a democratic transformation, to enable them to adapt to the countless political, social and economic changes and assume the individual responsibility that is an intrinsic element of democracy.

Growing pains The swing to ultra-liberalism, evident in Russian policy-making following the ‘triumph of democracy’, can be perceived as a consequential backlash against the repression and intolerance of the Soviet era. However, as reforms failed to bring about the promised changes and the high expectations of the immediate post-coup days remained unfulfilled, a selective nostalgia for the ‘glorious socialist past’ became manifest in Russian society. This disillusionment, so typical of transitional periods, was captured by various surveys of public opinion, as well as articles that appeared in the newly unshackled press.21 An article published in Moscow News was highly critical of the Russian leadership, declaring that it had ‘neither succeeded in consolidating society, nor in forming a stable state organisation, nor in finding the right place for Russia in what is called the post-Soviet space. Its successes in the development of market mechanisms are also dubious.’ In the writer’s opinion ‘political forces in Russia have not managed to overcome their obsession with monopolising political power … When the power structure

12

The Russian Federation in transition

monopolises the role of the espouser of the ideas of democracy, a denigration of reformist values is inevitable’.22 The disparaging tone of this article was similar to that adopted by a growing number of commentators, as disillusionment with the slow pace of democratic and economic reform became widespread. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the mere publication of such overt criticism reveals the extent of the democratisation of Russian society. Although the authoritarian tendencies manifest by Yeltsin appear inconsistent with democratic reform, the uncertainty of a transitional period necessitates a strong leader. Otherwise a country risks drifting aimlessly in a political and institutional vacuum. Gennady Burbulis, former presidential aide, summed up Yeltsin’s dichotomous character, equating it with Russian society at large: The tree of power in Russia has two roots: the roots of authoritarianism and of democracy, and this is very much in tune with Yeltsin himself. Yeltsin’s entire life, his entire human experience, was that of being an outstanding representative of the administrative side of a totalitarian system … But at the same time, he is a creative, untamed personality, and in the late eighties he came in contact with the democratic moods of society … So he began to combine these two traditions … These roots are present in Russian society and they are at war within Yeltsin … It’s that war of urges, of roots, that describes us in transition, and Yeltsin personifies it all.23 According to this diagnosis, Russia is suffering from the legacy of decades of Soviet rule. As the Russian nation attempted to ease its way from the centralised command of communist rule to the liberal principles of democracy following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new leadership desperately sought to establish legitimacy. The idealistic aspirations of the immediate post-coup days were destroyed by the communist inheritance of corruption, mistrust and subterfuge. It is probable that the easiest part of the Russian transition was the liberation of the economy, with the introduction of capitalism and market reforms. The political reforms that are an intrinsic part of democratic transition have proven to be far more complicated than anticipated.

Concluding remarks The Chechen crisis developed against this backdrop of transition, as the Federation attempted to ease itself away from its communist past towards democratic ideals. Given that Russia has been undergoing democratisation throughout the duration of its contemporary struggle with Chechnya, it is pertinent to investigate the link between the process and the potential for internal conflict. The persistent crisis is investigated within the context of the Federation’s transition away from communist rule, focusing on the extent

The Russian Federation in transition

13

of any potential correlation between the Russian democratisation project and its violent struggle with a constituent part. In order to gain a deeper insight into the nature of post-communist transition, the ensuing chapters will investigate the nature of the Chechen independence movement and its relationship with the fledgling Russian ‘democracy’. Can the outbreak of violent conflict be attributed to the democratisation itself or is the explanation located within the wider concept of systemic transformation?

2

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence in 1991

Introduction The introduction of Gorbachev’s reformist policies, following his ascent to power in 1985, dramatically transformed the face of Soviet politics, and within six years the Soviet empire was unravelled by the very policies originally intended to reassert the legitimacy of its central authorities.1 His programme of liberalisation was merely intended to rectify several problematic areas in the existing political system, such as a failing economy and corrupt administration, not destroy communist rule. Nevertheless, democratisation, which Gorbachev stated was the aim and also the means of perestroika, irreparably weakened the hegemony of the Communist Party. The advent of glasnost and perestroika, and consequent relaxation of previous restrictions, heralded the appearance of popular fronts demanding greater autonomy for the manifold ethnic groups throughout the Russian Republic (RSFSR) and other constituent republics of the Soviet Union (USSR). Soviet policy towards its myriad nationalities provided the embryonic political structures that were utilised by regional elites promoting ‘republican assertiveness’.2 The burgeoning self-determination movement was permitted free expression throughout Soviet territory, recognised as a useful tool in the fight for supremacy taking place in the Kremlin. However, the participants of this power struggle crucially failed to comprehend the pitfalls inherent in the exploitation of nationalist grievances. By adopting the guise of a democratic state, both the RSFSR and Soviet leaderships merely hastened secessionist tendencies, as regional leaders sought to increase their own personal power by distancing themselves from central control. This chapter will provide an insight into the reasons why the Russian leadership initiated military action against Chechnya in 1994 and no other constituent part of the Federation, by analysing the recent history of the North Caucasian republic. In order to understand the motivating forces on both sides of the conflict and the origins of the decision to invade, it is imperative to explore the evolution of the contemporary relationship between the federal centre and the Chechen nation. This chapter locates an

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence 15 underlying element of the rationale behind the 1994 Russian military invasion in the distinct nature of centre-periphery relations during the Soviet crisis of survival (1985–1991). As the Soviet leadership struggled to maintain its hold on power, regional elites exploited the atmosphere of uncertainty in order to expand their personal positions.

Restructuring the empire The USSR was a multinational federation, comprising of myriad national groups, many of which lacked political recognition as nations. The Union was composed of fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs), national administrative groupings conferred the highest status by the Soviet state (see Table 2.1 below). Within these SSRs there were twenty Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs), eight Autonomous Regions (oblasti) and ten Autonomous Areas (okruga), together with hundreds of smaller administrative units, namely provinces (krai) and regions (rayony). Although the Soviet Constitution guaranteed the right of the SSRs to secede from the Union, 3

Table 2.1 Administrative structure of the USSR Administrative unit

Degree of autonomy

Union Republic (SSR)

•

‘Sovereign socialist state’ of most populous national groups

•

Right of secession

•

Border with foreign country

•

Own constitution, citizenship, legislature, executive and judiciary

•

Permitted to establish universities and pursue cultural 4 and education policies in national language

•

Sub-division of SSR

•

‘National state’ – territory of national minority not large enough to be ascribed SSR

•

Executive, legislative and budgetary powers

•

Permitted to establish universities

•

Designated territory of national minority within SSR or krai

•

Control over local affairs and administration

Province (krai)

•

Large territory of geographic or military significance, in strategically important borderland

Region (oblast)

•

Non-national administrative units

Autonomous Area (okrug)

•

Designated territory of national minority within oblast

Autonomous Republic (ASSR)

Autonomous Region (oblast)

16

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence

which was theoretically a freely entered arrangement, in reality the Soviet leaders did not permit the republics any genuine independence. Compliance with Kremlin directives was ensured by means of force and coercion, whilst a centrally controlled economy facilitated the manipulative use of economic incentives. The migration of Russians to the periphery was also encouraged in order to dilute ethnically homogeneous republics. There is an informed debate regarding the impact of nationalism on the fate of the Soviet Union. Some analysts conjecture that the demise of the Soviet system transpired as a direct result of nationalism.5 Colonel Charles Blandy, an expert on the North Caucasus, maintains that interethnic tensions in the region arose as a direct consequence of perestroika and glasnost. He believes that the relaxations linked to these policies gave people false hope and aspirations that could never be fulfilled.6 This view perceives Gorbachev’s democratisation programme as the stimulus for long-oppressed ethnic groups to demand independence, inevitably leading to the collapse of the Union. His reforms, combined with a failing command economy and subsequent hardships facing the Soviet people, undermined the legitimacy of central control and indirectly stimulated the public expression of discontent. However, others have argued that this interpretation fails to take into account ‘the most important feature of the Soviet demise: the abandonment of the pre-existing socio-economic system in Russia and in most of the other newly independent states that emerged from the Soviet Union’.7 Moshe Lewin contends that ‘it was not … the exit of the nationalities…[that] caused the downfall’, but rather ‘it was the decline and de facto downfall of the regime that gave them the chance to leave’.8 Gorbachev initially took little action regarding the ‘nationalities question’. The revised edition of the Third Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), published in February 1986 at the XXVIIth CPSU Congress, triumphantly stated that the ‘national question, a legacy of the past, has been successfully solved’.9 The Soviet leadership apparently neglected the issue for several years, not changing its approach until 1988. In his memoirs Gorbachev voiced concern about the negative repercussions of his liberal reforms on issues of ethnicity, speculating that ‘democratisation was giving rise to difficult contradictory processes in the spheres of ideology and inter-ethnic relations’.10 As liberalisation undermined the legitimacy of state institutions by encouraging outright criticism of the socialist system without fear of harsh reprisals, mass demonstrations became increasingly common. The emergence of national fronts and organisations, which challenged the monopoly of the Communist Party, mobilised popular support by exploiting issues of ethnicity and territory. These national fronts arose in administrative units across the Soviet Union, from the sovereign Union Republics down to small regions and provinces. During the early years of perestroika regional objections often took the form of environmental protest as manifold indigenous groups attacked decisions made by centrally dominated industrial ministries that crucially failed to take into account either

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence 17 the natural environment or the wishes of the local populace. Ethnic minorities sought to obtain greater control over the development of their region. Thus protests against nuclear power plants became symbolic of wider objections to the intrusion of the Soviet empire into local communities without any regard for the ecological or cultural implications.11 In September 1989, as the discussion on inter-ethnic relations became increasingly prominent, the Central Committee of the CPSU convened a Plenum to debate nationality issues.12 In his report Gorbachev finally admitted that ‘the need for comprehensive, profound changes is long overdue in ethnic relations’, and offered to strengthen the political representation of the republics on a national level. He surmised that ‘unresolved issues have surfaced one after another, errors and deformations that were accumulated over decades have now made themselves felt, and ethnic conflicts have erupted after smouldering for years.’13 In spite of the conciliatory tone this speech did not signify Gorbachev’s intention to revise the USSR’s internal borders, many of which had been artificially created by Lenin and Stalin in order to suppress the threat of secession. He was firmly against national separatism, believing the Union to be greater than the mere sum of its parts. However, his maxim ‘Unity in diversity, not unification’ demonstrated that he was willing to grant the SSRs a limited form of self-determination within the Union structure. In his opinion a revised Union Treaty, defining new principles of centre–periphery power distribution between Moscow and the SSRs, would satisfy the republics’ ambitions of greater autonomy, a sentiment not endorsed during the ensuing debate on the report.14 Demands for increased autonomy were not limited to the SSRs: smaller administrative units were also calling for more independence from the centre. However, it is important to emphasise a manifest difference between the demands of national movements in the SSRs and those in non-union ASSRs, oblasti and other administrative units. Whilst the majority of the SSR leaders were opposed to Soviet rule, they were not calling for complete independence and supported Gorbachev’s vision of a new union based upon greater autonomy. National movements in the ASSRs and regions demanded sovereignty, challenging the Russian domination of republican governments. The nation who held administrative power in a particular region, the titular nation, was in a privileged position, reaping numerous economic and social benefits, such as better housing and employment prospects. Russians were often the titular nation in the ASSRs and regions, as opposed to the SSRs, where the titular nations were usually also the indigenous nation. Thus, those ethnic groups governed by a minority nation (predominantly Russians) within the administrative unit, exploited nationalism in an attempt to achieve self-determination. This was particularly prominent in the North Caucasus, with its numerous ethnic groups, none of whom held power in their republics. Competition between these groups over scarce resources was

18

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence

fierce, and became a method of gaining control in a specific region. During the Plenum debate in September 1989 the First Secretary of the Bashkir ASSR, R.K. Khabibullin, conveyed his republic’s dissatisfaction at becoming ‘an appendage supplying raw materials’ to the centre, which had resulted in poor social development and political representation. He suggested that it should be upgraded to union-republic status, which would represent ‘a powerful momentum for an effective development of production forces and spiritual rebirth of peoples’.15 This echoed the dissatisfaction amongst local leaders who, emboldened by the relatively tolerant atmosphere of glasnost, openly criticised the central authorities, often in an attempt to increase their own legitimacy. As the legitimacy of the repressive central government was rapidly eroded, so-called national groups gained momentum, no longer afraid of suppression by an obviously weakened state. The Russian analyst Andrei Grachev claims that the independence movement was manipulated to defend the jobs and privileges of the nomenklatura and led ‘not to the progress of democracy on one-sixth of the earth, but to the appearance of a dozen miniempires of local apparat elite’.16 Another prominent Russian scholar, Valery Tishkov, has drawn attention to the diffuse and constantly evolving programmes of ‘national movements’. In his opinion they were ‘a mixture of romantic nationalism from the late nineteenth century and cold-blooded calculations of political activists who were bent on gaining power’.17 People with little experience of political life often governed opposition groups. As Tishkov wrote: ‘For the small ethnic groups of the Russian Federation, great importance is attached not so much to local competence and responsibility, as becoming famous throughout the whole Federation and acquiring prestigious titles, which satisfy national pride…For many, ethnic affiliation became a political resource. It was used by those who possessed it to endorse their pretensions of power over their ‘own’ people’.18 In other words, membership of a particular ethnic group was more important than demonstrable political experience. It was inevitable that such vigorous pursuit of personal advancement through the manipulation of nationalistic slogans would result in a confrontation with both the Soviet leadership and local populations. Many national leaders made extravagant promises regarding the future development of their area, depicting the centre as the root of all problems, a relatively simple method of achieving consensus and consolidating popular support.19 They seized on the weakness of the centre to legitimise their own regimes, but lacked both the means and inclination to implement the grandiose plans, subsequently generating disillusionment amongst the populace.

The post-Stalin era and modernisation The programme of liberalisation introduced by Gorbachev across the Soviet Union initially had very little impact on the situation within the Checheno-

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence 19 Ingush ASSR. Despite a long and acrimonious history of conflict, as the Russians continually struggled to dominate the volatile Caucasus region, the Chechens manifested little open dissent to Soviet rule during the post-Stalin era.20 Notwithstanding the deportations of 1944, the notion of a Chechen nation and statehood remained underdeveloped. Loyalty lies primarily with the clan, an extended familial grouping, rather than with an intangible concept of the Chechen nation, and consequently there is a lack of any unifying dynamic.21 Moreover, they were slow to establish national movements, similar to those that had appeared across the Soviet Union following Gorbachev’s ascent to power in 1985. This reticence is particularly remarkable when examined in the context of its relations with the centre, as well as the adverse socio-economic situation. In order to gain an insight into the reasons behind this comparative restraint, it seems pertinent to briefly examine circumstances in the ASSR prior to the liberal thaw that took place at the end of the 1980s. After the death of Stalin in 1953, the censorious atmosphere was gradually relaxed by his successor Nikita Khrushchev, culminating in the latter’s ‘Secret Speech’ to the XXth Party Congress in February 1956 during which he openly referred to Stalin’s deportations for the first time.22 In January of the following year a Presidium decree restored the Checheno-Ingush ASSR within the RSFSR, whilst a second decree established its borders to include three Cossack regions (Naurskiy, Kargalinskiy and Shelkovskiy) that had previously not been part of the republic.23 The Chechen people were rehabilitated and permitted to return from exile in Kazakhstan, notwithstanding a proposal by the Soviet Interior Minister, N.P. Dudorov, to create a Checheno-Ingush autonomous region within the Kazakh SSR so as to prevent a mass exodus of exiled peoples back to the North Caucasus.24 The return of the deportees did aggravate tensions in this region, which could not support such an influx of people who were without homes or employment. Many Chechens returned to the land they had occupied before their long exile, provoking antagonism with those who had subsequently settled there.25 In the decades following rehabilitation a high level of Russification of the Chechen nation was achieved, but not assimilation, as the 1989 census data revealed. From a total population of almost 900,000 Chechens, only one per cent considered Russian to be their mother tongue.26 Although the Chechens constitute one of the largest ethnic groups in both the Russian Federation and its predecessor, the RSFSR, the Chechen elite within the regional administration was extremely underdeveloped, and no Chechen officials held senior positions within government institutions, such as the Committee of State Security (the KGB).27 Professor Dzhabrail Gakaev, a prominent Chechen academic, argues that Chechens were deliberately excluded from taking an active role in the government and administration of the republic, a segregation that, in his assessment, had a detrimental impact upon the economic and cultural re-development of

20

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence

Checheno-Ingushetia, lending the modernisation of the ASSR a ‘deformed character’.28 He states that this lack of Chechens in positions of authority was a policy designed to ‘preserve ignorance … The Chechens are a large national group, the third largest in Russia, but there were no professors, no scientists, no intelligentsia, no working class. There were Russians in these positions in the republic, but very few Chechens or Ingush. If there had been a working class in 1991 then Dudayev would never have stayed in power for so long – they would have demanded work, ways of making a living’.29 Another Chechen academic, Ruslan Khasbulatov, is also highly critical of the attitudes of the communist central authorities towards the ASSR. He maintains that only those Chechens (or Ingush) married to Russian women were considered for leading positions, an allegation that certainly bears up in Dudayev’s case.30 This absence of ethnic Chechens holding positions of responsibility within the Soviet system is also manifest in official statistics produced by the Central Statistical Directorate. In 1979 only 0.02 per cent of the staff of scientific and other academic bodies were Chechen nationals, compared to 67.3 per cent of Russians.31 When compared to population figures, it is clear that the Chechen people are severely underrepresented, as they made up approximately 0.5 per cent of the total population of the RSFSR at that time. Even at lower levels, such as the percentage of the population attending some form of higher education, the Checheno-Ingush ASSR fares badly when viewed against the RSFSR as a whole: 9.93 per cent compared to 20.9 per cent.32 According to an analysis of the Chechen-Ingush economy conducted during the Soviet period, ‘over sixty years of autonomy ChechenoIngushetia has achieved an unprecedented high level of economic, social and cultural development due to the continual attention of the Communist Party and the Soviet government’. The report lauds the progress of the North Caucasian ASSR from ‘ancient ploughs … to highly developed kolkhozi, … from … illiteracy to a flourishing, unique culture that is national in form, socialist in content and international in spirit’.33 This highly idealised piece of Soviet propaganda fails to portray the reality of life for most of the republic’s citizens, as depicted by Dudayev, who alleged that under communist rule the republic was transformed into ‘a cesspool of lawlessness and poverty for the absolute majority of Chechens’.34 Although this is undoubtedly hyperbole, it paints a more representative image than the official report. Years of communist neglect and mismanagement gave rise to a legacy of complex economic and social problems. Levels of income that were well below the national average exacerbated poor standards of living, already amongst the lowest to be found in any of the ethno-republics. In 1985 the average monthly wage in the Checheno-Ingush ASSR was estimated at 158 roubles, compared to the RSFSR average of 199 roubles. By 1991 the gap had further widened – 392 roubles as opposed to 548.35

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence 21 Unemployment in the republic also remained high throughout the Soviet period. The Chechen people traditionally pursued a rural existence heavily dependent on agriculture, whilst ethnic Russians formed the majority of urban dwellers in the republic. Only a very small percentage of the urban middle class originated from the indigenous population and a significant part of the republic’s industrial potential had been developed by the Russian-speaking population. Irina Dement’yeva, a Russian journalist, described Checheno-Ingushetia as a ‘gloomy periphery, characterised by the minimal involvement of the Vainakh population in both the state and economic development of the republic.’36 As mentioned above, native Chechens were severely underrepresented in white-collar occupations such as the oil extraction and refining industry, machinery manufacture, transport and administration, an imbalance that subsequently had a severe impact on the republic’s economy.37 The oil industry was the mainstay of the ASSR’s economy during the Soviet period. Chechen oil contains very few impurities, thus making it ideal for aviation fuel and high-grade lubricants. Whilst there had been a sharp decline in the amount of oil extracted in the republic, falling from 21.6 million tonnes in 1971 to approximately 7 million in 1980, Groznyy remained a major oil-refining centre, processing oil from all over the Soviet Union.38 Despite this, there was still a lack of employment, particularly for unskilled workers. Consequently many Chechens left in search of seasonal work elsewhere in the Union, so-called ‘gastarbeiter’ or migrant workers. Gakaev estimates that up to 100,000 people fit for work left the ChechenoIngush ASSR annually in order to earn a living, particularly in the construction, agricultural and oil sectors.39 These workers would send money back to their families who remained in the republic, enabling them to build large well-equipped houses, in stark contrast to the underdeveloped villages in which they were located. Although the economic situation in the republic was undoubtedly bad, the poor economic statistics for the republic failed to take these migrant workers and the so-called ‘grey economy’ into account. The network of migrant Chechen workers that predominated across Soviet territory also facilitated the establishment of criminal structures in many areas.40 Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union many of these nomadic workers found themselves without employment, unable to cross newly established international borders in their search for work. This lack of occupation led to boredom, resentment and frustration which, when combined with an easy availability of weapons, resulted in an explosive situation. The problem of high unemployment was compounded by a relatively high demographic growth rate of an average three per cent per year during the decades following rehabilitation. Some analysts have speculated that the high birth rate was a conscious attempt to ‘rebuild’ the Chechen population to pre-deportation levels, although it should be noted that Chechens have traditionally always raised large families.41 An examination of USSR census

22

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence

data yields startling results, as Table 2.2 below demonstrates. In the elevenyear period 1959–70 the number of Chechens increased by an extraordinary 120 per cent, compared to an average 10 per cent increase in the total RSFSR population. Socio-economic inequalities played a fundamental role in the exacerbation of centre-periphery tensions and Dr Julia Grigorieva believes that they lie at the root of the contemporary conflict. In her assessment, factors such as high levels of unemployment, population density and birth rate, combined with an underdeveloped infrastructure, promoted extreme instability in the region.42 In an interview in October 1991, Dudayev also highlighted the negative impact of socio-economic factors on political stability, observing that the republic had the highest mortality rate in the Soviet Union, and that a mere eight per cent of the indigenous population was employed by the manufacturing industry.43 The former Russian Prime Minister, Sergei Stepashin, surmised that stability in the North Caucasus ‘is largely defined by the living standards of the population’, citing unemployment, lack of finance and poverty as key determinants. In his opinion, strong familial ties combined with the dire economic situation cause people to ‘lose faith in a better life for their children’, which in turn ‘denigrates the pride of the Caucasians, egging them on to self-assertion through joining bandit formations’.44

Perestroika in Checheno-Ingushetia As mentioned above, Gorbachev’s programme of liberalisation initially had a minimal impact on political life within the Checheno-Ingush ASSR. Early expressions of dissent to official Party doctrine were manifested as a backlash against the version of history propagated by Professor Vitaliy Vinogradov, chief ideologist for the oblast (regional) committee of the CPSU. He insisted that the Chechens and Ingush had willingly joined the Russian Empire during the reign of Catherine the Great in the eighteenth century as an act of ‘voluntary union’, a fallacious interpretation of history that was disseminated throughout the ASSR in dozens of articles, seminars, Table 2.2 National composition of the population 1939–89 (compiled from 1989 census data; 1,000 persons) 1939

1959

1970

1979

1989

RSFSR

108262

117534

130079

137410

147022

Russians

89740

97864

107748

113522

119866

Chechens

400

261

572

712

899

91

56

137

166

215

Ingush

Source: Rossiiskiy statisticheskiy yezhegodnik 1994, p. 30.

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence 23 television and radio broadcasts.45 However, in 1987 Dagestani historians published a series of articles that roundly condemned the ‘Vinogradov theory’. These articles were surreptitiously circulated amongst the small intelligentsia of Checheno-Ingushetia, as both the republican authorities and the KGB considered anti-Vinogradov material to be ‘subversive’ and ‘anti-Soviet’. This repudiation of official propaganda precipitated a crucial shift in public attitudes to communist rule. The evolution of glasnost and subsequent relaxation in printing restrictions across the Soviet Union enabled the debate surrounding Vinogradov’s theory to enter the public arena, provoking widespread criticism of existing party ideology by members of the intelligentsia and society as a whole. The Vinogradov controversy consolidated opposition to the harsh communist control of the republic, thereby exacerbating tension between the authorities and the population. Dissatisfaction with the local ruling elite was initially expressed in the guise of environmental protest, as resistance to the construction of a biochemical plant in the town of Gudermes. Demonstrations commenced during the spring of 1988 following claims by a local construction engineer, Ruslan Ezbulatov, that the chemicals to be produced by the plant would have a detrimental effect on the health of local residents.46 Thousands of concerned citizens attended mass meetings to demand the cessation of building work. Despite efforts by the authorities to intimidate the protestors (notably the institution of criminal proceedings against Ezbulatov on the grounds of conspiracy ‘to inflict economic damage to the state’) demonstrations against the plant quickly spread to Groznyy.47 Thereafter environmental protests rapidly acquired an overtly political character and defiant opposition rallies, voicing resentment of communist domination, became a permanent feature of life in the republic’s capital. The evolution of environmental objections into political agitation was typical of the perestroika period, as ethnic groups started to demand greater autonomy, mobilising themselves within the framework of national movements to oppose faltering Soviet state structures. The National Front (NF) led by Khozh-Akhmed Bisultanov was the first popular front, or ‘informal’ group, to be established in the Checheno-Ingush ASSR. This political organisation emerged during the 1988 protests against the proposed Gudermes biochemical factory with the objectives of ‘the democratisation of public political life, a revival of both Chechen and Ingush history, culture, language and national traditions, as well as the protection of the environment.’48 During 1988–1989 the NF was a leading opposition force in the republic, organising numerous anti-government demonstrations in Groznyy. One of its most significant acts was to demand the abolition of the ‘secret’ prohibition on Chechen and Ingush nationals holding certain posts within the republic’s administration. They publicly denounced Soviet rule of the ASSR and caused serious concern for the local authorities who attempted to halt the heightening tide of dissension by discrediting Bisultanov’s influential

24

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence

movement in numerous TV broadcasts and newspaper articles. Unfortunately these repressive measures inadvertently had the undesired consequence of actually propagating support for the group as the deprecatory transmissions enabled the populace to acquire a substantial amount of information regarding its activities from the media. The formation of the NF was of vital consequence during this stage of Chechen political and national development. It signified the inauguration of ‘bottom-up’ political activism in the republic, as ordinary citizens attempted to transform the unfavourable situation, and inspired the establishment of several other ‘informal’ groups throughout the Checheno-Ingush ASSR, particularly amongst the national intelligentsia who began to actively express their discontent.49 Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, a writer and member of the radical opposition to the republican party leadership, has described the role of these first popular movements as ‘the first stage in the self-organisation of the Chechen nation’. In his opinion the early mass meetings gave people the ability to think and act for themselves, as they ‘cut their teeth on democracy’.50 Elections for the newly established Congress of Peoples’ Deputies, held in the spring of 1989, further stimulated public activism within the political arena in the ASSR, and across the Soviet Union as a whole. As a result of the first ‘competitive’ elections in the history of the USSR, not only did party functionaries, such as the First Secretary of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR V.K. Foteev, gain seats in the Congress, but so too did several independent candidates from the republic. These included Professor Salambek Khadzhiev, the writer Abuzar Aidamirov and the ex-speaker of the regional CPSU committee Lecha Magomadov. This politicisation of the Chechen nation fostered nascent ambitions of statehood, as ethnic Chechens were finally permitted to take a relatively active role in Soviet political life. The mood of optimism was enhanced by the appointment of Doku Zavgayev in July 1989 to the post of First Secretary of the republican Communist Party, the first Chechen to hold the position since the creation of the Soviet Union. Gakaev believes that the republic’s inhabitants interpreted his appointment as ‘a victory for national-patriotic forces’.51 The installation of Zavgayev was particularly significant because it symbolised the ascendancy of regional political ambitions over the imposition of ‘placemen’ from Moscow. The regional CPSU committee had rejected the Central Committee’s choice of candidate, a Russian by the name of N.I. Semenov, in favour of their own nominee, Zavgayev. As a result, the appointment of Zavgayev and subsequent liberal ‘thaw’ triggered further nationalistic sentiments amongst Chechen society. Zavgayev initially allowed a degree of emancipation, reflecting the centre’s liberal policies of glasnost and perestroika. The ban on religion was revoked and several independent newspapers and journals were published, frequently voicing condemnation of the authorities.52 This officially sanctioned religious freedom encouraged the development of organisations such

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence 25 as the North Caucasian Islamic Party ‘Rebirth’ whose inaugural conference was held in the Dagestani capital Makhachkala at the end of August 1990. More than two hundred delegates from Checheno-Ingushetia, as well as the neighbouring republics of Dagestan and Karachai-Cherkessia, attended to discuss the restoration of Sharia law and the opening of medreses, schools for religious instruction. Up until August 1991 ‘Rebirth’ was the sole Islamic party in Checheno-Ingushetia and it represented a very influential opposition force during the Zavgayev era, fomenting religious unrest across the region. Zavgayev’s liberalisation extended to the republic’s power structures and advocates of the Vinogradov concept were replaced by ‘liberal’ academics. Andarbek Yandarov, a professor of philosophy, was appointed head of the ideology directorate, whilst Taimaz Abubakarov, rector of the republic’s pedagogical institute, became minister for the economy, planning and labour. As this academic group increasingly wielded critical influence within the organs of power, previously strict ideological regulation of the republic was relaxed. Despite these apparent relaxations, the division of the republic’s population along socio-ethnic lines combined with high unemployment, as discussed above, continued to contribute to the tensions of the late 1980s and early 1990s. In February 1990 a week of demonstrations in five rayony of Checheno-Ingushetia, the so-called ‘regional revolutions’, resulted in the dismissal of the First Secretaries of Malgobek, Nazran, Sunzhen, NozhaiYurt and Achkoi-Martan rayony. The agitation spread to Shali, with a demand for the immediate dismissal of both the rayon and Communist Party leadership. The protestors’ complaints were based on a cement factory, which they claimed had been poisoning the environment for years, the lack of roads and infrastructure, pollution of water reservoirs, and ‘social injustices’.53 This unrest threatened to undermine the leading role of the Communist Party in the republic, already compromised by the establishment of the so-called ‘informal’ groups. Nevertheless Zavgayev successfully managed to capitalise upon the popular dissatisfaction for his own benefit. According to many local observers, Zavgayev himself instigated the wave of demonstrations with the assistance of the NF, manipulating public opinion in order to consolidate his own power base and install his allies in key positions across the republic.54 The path to sovereignty In March 1990 parliamentary elections for the RSFSR and ChechenoIngush ASSR were held, which again proved to be a victory for local ‘democrats’ in the face of official Party candidates, as many activists from the ‘informal’ movements gained seats in the legislature in place of the established nomenklatura. The majority of deputies from the ASSR belonged to the ‘Democratic Russia’ bloc, which had been set up in Moscow during

26

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence

January 1990 with the primary aim of getting ‘democrats’ elected at both a national and regional level. Whilst the Checheno-Ingush Supreme Soviet continued to be dominated by loyal party functionaries, several opposition members gained seats, including the NF leader Bisultanov. These deputies formed the ‘Democratic Initiative’ parliamentary faction, although their small numbers meant that the group had little substantive influence on proceedings.55 However their presence within the ASSR’s state apparat signified a crucial step forward for the national movements, as representatives of ethnic groups were finally permitted to participate in the administration of their own territories. Moreover, it was not only in the regional administration that there was a conspicuous Chechen presence. Following the 1990 elections, Chechens held office in the Soviet and Russian political structures. Professor Salambek Khadzhiyev, a USSR Supreme Soviet deputy, became the first Chechen in the history of the Soviet state to hold a post within the government when he was named USSR Minister of the Chemical Industry, whilst another academic, Ruslan Khasbulatov, was to become Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. A discernible transformation of the ASSR commenced subsequent to the parliamentary elections of 1990. Nevertheless, Gakaev asserts that Zavgayev committed a fatal error in the post-election period, when he failed to comprehend the complex sequence of changes that were occurring across the republic at that time.56 Zavgayev was a typical product of the communist system, who underestimated the power of the people. In this respect his behaviour was similar to that of Gorbachev. He utilised liberalisation and democratic slogans to consolidate his personal power and extend his own authoritarian rule, whilst continuing the worst traditions of communism. Instead of relying on the support of the populace, he continued to operate within the communist party hierarchy (albeit one now dominated by ethnic Chechens), conducting government business behind closed doors and appointing members of his own family network to important posts. Expectations that his appointment would usher in a new era of openness and impartiality after the corruption of the previous Soviet administration were soon destroyed, fatally undermining his legitimacy. The population had already demonstrated an eagerness to criticise the leadership and organise themselves into opposition groups. During the course of 1990 a change occurred in the essential nature of groups opposed to the communist leadership. Internal divisions weakened the influence of the NF, as it became apparent that, having attained its original objectives, the organisation had failed to maintain its previous momentum with a statement concerning future goals. As its authority declined, other more politically orientated movements were in the ascendancy, seizing the initiative from the NF. In the summer of 1990 a new political force materialised, evolving out of the Chechen association ‘Bart’ (‘Unity’), which had been established the previous year with the aim of increasing political awareness in the republic. ‘Bart’ was quickly renamed the

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence 27 ‘Vainakh Democratic Party’ (VDP) and in May 1990 the new party’s inaugural congress was held. Yandarbiyev, one of the founding members of this movement, stated that the VDP represented ‘the first political party in Chechnya, an alternative to the CPSU, which openly proclaimed its objective to be the creation of an independent, national state…the beginning of the end of Soviet power in Chechnya, the North Caucasus and the entire Soviet empire’.57 Contrary to this radical stance, the VDP initially characterised itself as the ‘constructive opposition’, denouncing the activities of NF ‘extremists’.58 Nevertheless, as the above statement reveals, the primary intention of the VDP was the realisation of national sovereignty and creation of an independent Chechen state. Its leadership contained some of the more radical members of the opposition, including Yusup Soslambekov59 and Lema Usmanov, both of whom were to become powerful allies of the Dudayev regime. The creation of the VDP represented an early move towards the independence of the Chechen nation, as a result of the central role its leadership played in the organisation of the first Chechen National Congress later that year. As it had became obvious that the VDP had failed to fulfil its planned cultural, religious and historical revival, a group of intelligentsia proposed a public forum in order to discuss specific issues related to the development of the Chechen nation. The idea of a National Congress was endorsed by ‘liberal’ members of the republic’s leadership, including Zavgayev, who regarded the national question as an opportunity to reinforce their own dwindling authority.60 The first National Congress of Chechen People (OKChN) was held November 23rd–25th 1990 in Groznyy, with the aim of uniting the various nationalist groups and putting pressure on the local authorities to accelerate political change.61 Delegates attended from all over the republic, having been selected to represent their local community. Each delegate was supposed to represent approximately 1,000 Chechens, whilst each member of the OKChN’s executive, the Executive Council (EC), represented 10 delegates.62 During the course of the congress, deep divisions between opposing factions became apparent. Three conflicting political tendencies existed: the republic’s leadership; the ‘moderate democrats’, including Khadzhiev; and the ‘radicals’ such as Yandarbiyev, Bislan Gantemirov63 and Yaragai Mamodayev64. Apart from the official leadership such as Zavgayev, who spoke at the congress, promising to foster Chechnya’s national revival, the OKChN facilitated the progress of several Chechens who seized the opportunity to augment their personal bases of power. Yandarbiyev, Gantemirov and Mamodayev were all to play crucial roles in Chechnya’s imminent struggle for independence. The Congress declared ‘the struggle for democratic transformation in the republic and for the national rights of the Chechen people’ to be its principal objective.65 Only Chechens were invited to attend the Congress and the

28

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence

primacy of the Chechen race was reinforced by the declaration that ‘persons of non-native nationality’ were ineligible for the posts of KGB Chairman, Minister of Internal Affairs and Procurator of the Republic.66 A resolution encompassing a radical programme for Chechen nationalism was approved, along with measures supporting Chechen language and culture, the Islamic religion and the restitution of losses incurred as a result of deportation. A declaration of the state sovereignty of the Chechen Republic was also adopted and a request made to the Supreme Soviet of Checheno-Ingush ASSR to ratify the decision.67 The OKChN had been established with the approval of the CPSU regional committee and Checheno-Ingush Supreme Soviet. During 1990 and early 1991 there was a substantial degree of co-operation between the OKChN and the official authorities since they were both striving for an identical goal – increased power. Nevertheless, the existence of parallel authorities would eventually lead the two groups into conflict with each other. The official leadership quickly lost control of the OKChN as it developed into an effective political organisation, capable of significant opposition and possessing an extensive base of support. Aleksandr Rutskoi has described the establishment of the OKChN as the beginning of the Chechen tragedy, perhaps an overstatement, but there is little doubt that it precipitated the rise to power of General Dzhokar Dudayev. A report by the Moscow Carnegie Centre asserts that ‘it would be hard to find a person more appropriate as a symbol of the Chechen national revival’.68 Born in 1944, the year of the deportations, Dudayev grew up in exile in Kazakhstan. He eschewed university for a career in the military, serving in Afghanistan and rapidly rising through the ranks to become the first Chechen general. At the time of his initial contact with the Chechen nationalist movement he was commander of a division of strategic bombers based in Tartu, Estonia.69 Dudayev attended the Congress as a guest, but rapidly found himself elected Chairman of the Executive Committee following a speech in which his separatist tendencies were clearly perceptible. Yandarbiyev described the impact of this speech on the assembled delegates: ‘He effectively said then that declaring an independent state was an act of great responsibility, something very difficult, but once we had declared it, we should go to the end. He said, using a saying we have, do not draw your kinzhal [dagger] from its case, do not draw it without cause, but if you draw it, do not put it back without doing battle’.70 This address is perhaps Dudayev’s earliest incitement of the Chechen people, who were already unhappy with the local Communist leadership and traditional domination by Moscow. His radical tendencies made the authorities uncomfortable, and representatives of the regional administration, who were attending the congress, attempted to prevent Dudayev’s installation as EC chairman, claiming that ‘the need for a general is greater in the army where he can increase the glory of the Chechen people’.71 However, it has been suggested that Dudayev was elected leader of the OKChN on account

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence 29 of the fact that he belonged to an insignificant clan. Thus, according to this interpretation, it was hoped that he would be able to act as a mediator for the interests of the more powerful clans without abusing his authority for personal benefit.72 The Supreme Soviet passed the sovereignty resolution on November 27th 1990, two days after the close of the Congress. The document they produced affirmed that the republic was a sovereign state, which was not a component of either the RSFSR or the USSR, a statement that went further than that of any other autonomous republic. It declared that the republic would only sign a union or federal treaty on the basis that it held an equal status with the centre and assigned the republic all the attributes of an independent state, avoiding any reference to the RSFSR or USSR.73 The sovereignty declaration issued by the leadership of Checheno-Ingushetia was seen by many as a politically motivated gesture, designed to consolidate the administration’s power both in Groznyy and Moscow. Andrei Kortunov claims that Zavgayev deliberately manipulated Moscow in the furtherance of his own power. In his opinion, the Chechen leader ‘created important prerequisites for the restoration of ‘Vainakh’ statehood’ with the aim of increasing his legitimacy, simultaneously retaining the support of the Soviet authorities.74

Centre–periphery tensions In reality the sovereignty declaration had very little impact on the republic’s relations with either Union or Russian central authorities, although it did enhance the legitimacy of Zavgayev’s administration in the ASSR. Autonomous republics across the territory of the Soviet Union were making similar declarations, the so-called ‘parade of sovereignties’. Furthermore, in June 1990 the RSFSR Congress of Peoples’ Deputies had voted overwhelmingly in support of Russia’s sovereignty, inspiring local Party leaders openly to discredit central control and claim greater political and economic independence for their republics. Nevertheless, these republics still remained heavily dependent on financial support from the centre. By the end of November 1990 Yeltsin, as Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, appealed to the peoples of the North Caucasus to ‘maintain calm and show wisdom and restraint’, regretfully noting the exacerbation of interethnic tensions in the region and attempts to split up existing state and territorial formations.75 As the liberalisation effort had led to an increase in popular fronts across the Soviet Union, so too in the North Caucasus there was a growing prevalence of organisations unifying the peoples of the region. Regional movements striving for the self-determination of the peoples of the North Caucasus became increasingly influential, particularly those that co-operated with individual national movements, such as the OKChN. Throughout 1991 the leadership of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR, finding itself in competition with an increasingly powerful EC, adopted an evermore

30

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence

confrontational attitude in its relations with the Kremlin. Despite an allocation of additional funds from the Russian government (notably 100 million roubles for the improvement of environmental conditions in Groznyy76), the autonomous republic declared that it would not participate in a referendum scheduled for March 17th on the issue of a directly elected president for the RSFSR. The regional Supreme Soviet approved a resolution on March 11th confirming its refusal to hold the referendum or participate in any future Russian elections.77 This appears to be the first explicit act of defiance by the republic’s official communist party leadership against the central authorities and was symptomatic of deteriorating centre–periphery relations across the Soviet Union. The ASSR was not alone in its refusal to participate however – the North Ossetian, Tatar and Tuvin ASSRs also disregarded the referendum, demonstrating their hostility towards domination by Moscow. The belligerent demeanour of Zavgayev’s administration can also be perceived as a further endeavour to augment its own legitimacy and support within the republic in the face of intensifying opposition from the OKChN leadership, the nascent counter-elite. Zavgayev had assumed the mantle of power in Checheno-Ingushetia borne on a wave of optimism. The unrealistic expectations of the electorate had remained largely unfulfilled and disillusionment with the slow pace of change had soon taken hold. Unsustainably high hopes had been placed in the appointment of an ethnic Chechen to lead the republic under what remained a centrally governed post-totalitarian regime, despite on-going liberalisation. Zavgayev, whilst a Chechen by nationality, was essentially a product of the communist system. As Tishkov has pointed out, the Chechens were educated under the same system as the rest of the Soviet people, hence ‘morals in Moscow are hardly any different to morals in Groznyy’.78 The charged atmosphere of enmity persisted.79 During a session of the republic’s legislature in May 1991, Zavgayev proclaimed that ChechenoIngushetia would not acquiesce to the dictates of the central leadership. Despite this antagonistic stance towards Soviet domination, the Chechen leader still faced stiff opposition within the republic. Political activists picketed the Supreme Soviet building in Groznyy for the duration of the meeting, demanding the dismissal of the republic’s leadership, immediate elections and secession from the RSFSR.80 At the end of May Dudayev, in his new role as Chairman of the OKChN Executive Committee, declared that the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet had lost its legitimacy as a result of the 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty and must dissolve itself. He alleged that the electorate no longer had confidence in the communist leadership and consequently the EC had become the sole valid authority in the republic. The EC Chairman went on to outline proposals for the development of the new republic, which included official recognition of its independence, the creation of its own army and apportionment of part of the USSR’s gold reserves.81

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence 31 The republic’s officially recognised legislature was further undermined by the confirmation of a decision, initially taken at the OKChN’s first Congress of November 1990, to rename Chechnya as the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-Cho (‘The Chechen Area’), in keeping with its historical frontiers. The ASSR’s Supreme Soviet had persistently refused to divide the republic into two parts or change its name, so the Congress, lacking any legal authority, unilaterally declared the change ‘to realise the wishes of the people’.82 It stated that the decision had not been previously ratified because the EC had been hoping to ‘reach an understanding’ with the republic’s leadership, as well as awaiting a decision from the Ingush concerning selfdetermination of their nation. In accordance with the 1990 sovereignty declaration, the EC also insisted that an independent Chechnya would not enter the USSR or RSFSR, an aim that disturbed the Soviet authorities. A CPSU Central Committee resolution issued on June 21st 1991 noted the worrying increase in political movements and parties within the ASSR calling for secession, as well as simultaneous attempts to create parallel structures of power.83 Yandarbiyev recalls a meeting he had in June 1991 with Sergei Stankevich, first deputy chairman of Moscow City Council, during which the latter expressed his concern about the EC’s demand for an independent Chechen state and the potential effect of this on the entire Union. According to Yandarbiyev, Stankevich ‘refuted the right of the Chechen nation to self-determination. He even accused the Chechens of wanting to resolve the issue of their national revival at Russia’s expense.’ The Russian official allegedly insisted that the centre was prepared to offer the ASSR complete political, economic and cultural independence, but on condition that it remained within the RSFSR.84 Ruslan Khasbulatov surmises that the EC’s announcement was not a consequence, but a cause of the Soviet Union’s eventual collapse. In his opinion it dealt a fatal blow to the union, already enfeebled by the independence declarations of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Baltic republics, preparing the ground for the Belovezhskiy Treaty.85 Following the first OKChN Congress, a rift was exposed between representatives of the radical nationalists and liberal-democratic intelligentsia within the EC. Dudayev, supported by Yandarbiyev, Soslambekov, Mamodayev and Gantemirov, led the radicals in their clamorous demands for total independence. The core motivations of the organisation had undergone a fundamental transformation, from the original call for sovereignty to ambitions of secession from both the RSFSR and USSR. This coterie of extremists advocated the creation of an Islamic state and broadcast fervent slogans promoting outright independence. Conversely the traditionalists, led by Lechi Umkhaev, were in favour of a gradual programme of evolving reforms. In June 1991 Umkhaev, leader of the ‘loyal’ opposition and a member of the Checheno-Ingush legislature, spoke out against the intentions of the Dudayev leadership and resigned his post as First Deputy Chairman of the EC.86 Following the triumph of the

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Background to the Chechen declaration of independence

radical nationalists at the second Congress, the majority of the intelligentsia withdrew their support for the organisation, openly opposing the OKChN. Professor Gakaev, a prominent member of the intelligentsia opposition, believes that radical nationalists discredited the idea of a Chechen ‘nation state’, merely utilising the concept to consolidate their own power bases.87 The centre–periphery tensions manifest both within ChechenoIngushetia, as well as in relations between Moscow and Groznyy, were reflected in the confrontation between the RSFSR and USSR, personified by Yeltsin and Gorbachev. In the middle of February 1991 Yeltsin made a televised appeal for Gorbachev to resign, echoing demands by Dudayev and the OKChN for Zavgayev’s resignation. Yeltsin attacked the Soviet leader for failing to fulfil the liberal ‘promises’ that had been made when the policy of perestroika was introduced, accusing him of leading the country into a ‘dictatorship’: ‘It has become perfectly obvious that what he wants is…not to do any essential restructuring but to preserve the system, preserve rigid centralised power, and not to give independence to the republics.’88 As Gorbachev struggled to hold the Soviet Union together and the struggle for supremacy within the Kremlin intensified, the burgeoning selfdetermination movement was permitted free expression throughout the territory of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin himself promoted the liberal ideal of self-determination during his presidential campaign of spring 1991. He magnanimously proclaimed ‘Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow’ and promised to maximise the autonomy of Russia’s constituent republics, thus appearing to express his tacit support for the independence of the republic.89 This strategy proved highly successful in the battle for support – in the Checheno-Ingush ASSR Yeltsin received 80 per cent of the votes, a much higher proportion than in Russia as a whole, despite the fact that the republic had boycotted the March referendum on the appointment of president for the RSFSR.90 The RSFSR presidential elections became the focus of the political struggle taking place within the republic. The conflict between the Zavgayev leadership and the radical opposition, led by Dudayev and the OKChN, revolved around the question of whether elections would be held in the ASSR. The OKChN objected to elections on the grounds that Chechnya was an independent state and therefore had no part to play in the constitutional affairs of the RSFSR. The debate evoked by the election issue demonstrated the extent of Zavgayev’s resolve in his confrontation with the centre. Notwithstanding his espousal of Chechen sovereignty and his refusal to participate in the March referendum, he did not believe in secession, and therefore endorsed the elections. Nevertheless, in an apparent demonstration of autonomy, one week before the elections the Zavgayev administration unexpectedly came out in support of Yeltsin, as opposed to the official Party candidate Ryzhkov, who they had previously supported.

Background to the Chechen declaration of independence 33

Concluding remarks The framework for an independence struggle was in place. Nationalist and religious forces across the North Caucasus were uniting, ostensibly to revive ethnic cultures so long suppressed by the yoke of communism. Infected by the liberal fever that was rapidly sweeping through the corridors of power, politicians in Moscow did little to stem the advancing tide of resistance to the central authorities, choosing instead to retain their own positions. The instrumental utilisation of ethnicity and nationalism by regional branches of the Communist Party was characteristic of the perestroika years, as local elites throughout the Soviet Union struggled to consolidate their personal power bases. Thus, in the period preceding the declaration of independence, Checheno-Ingushetia did not differ greatly from the majority of other ethnic republics across the USSR, apart from the ascendancy of Dudayev and his radical allies, and the motivating force behind their rise. Moreover, the regional political situation was merely a reflection of events in Moscow, where Yeltsin openly exploited the nationalities issue in his battle for supremacy over Gorbachev. Despite the similarities it shared with the political situation in many other constituent parts of the Soviet Union, the Chechen case is also unique in several respects. Dudayev’s personality and psychological make-up played a significant role in the development of the crisis. He was a product of the Soviet system and must have rigidly adhered Party doctrine in order to attain the rank of general. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that his personality was a distinct aspect of the relations between Moscow and Groznyy. An additional idiosyncrasy of the Chechen relationship with the centre was the republic’s extreme socio-economic predicament. The ASSR’s population was susceptible to extreme nationalistic slogans and unrealistic promises after years of communist rule during which they had suffered low living standards, high levels of unemployment and a lack of investment. Soviet domination was blamed for all of the republic’s ills, with independence offered as an attractive alternative that would provide a quick solution to the enduring economic, political and social problems. Gorbachev’s liberalisation programme critically undermined the legitimacy of Soviet institutions, rendering them susceptible to the increasing pressure from national groups across the Union and incapable of taking decisive action to quell the rebellions without the use of force.

3

The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR (August–November 1991)

Introduction During the latter half of August 1991 the Chechen quest for independence received indirect and unintentional encouragement from an unexpected quarter. The abortive attempt by hard-line conservative elements of the Soviet government to seize power and reinstate highly centralised communist rule backfired, accentuating the transitional nature of the state as it moved away from the constraints of post-totalitarianism. Gorbachev’s democratic experiment had instigated a profound transformation of the Soviet political and economic environment, which far exceeded his intentions of merely revitalising, as well as modernising, the socialist ideals he still believed in. The ascent of Yeltsin and his allies prompted the demise of the Soviet Union, heralding a period of massive upheaval and transition across the vast territory. As the leaders of Union Republics seized the opportunity to liberate themselves from the artificial alliance, several of the smaller autonomous republics (ASSRs) within the RSFSR declared their intention of securing greater independence from the centre. The radical opposition movement in Checheno-Ingushetia, led by Dudayev and the OKChN, exploited the confusion to further its ambitions of national statehood and escape from central domination. This chapter will examine the nature of the impact of the attempted August coup on the relationship between Moscow and Groznyy: can the reasons for the 1994 military intervention be attributed to the nature of the dynamic between a disintegrating Soviet centre and consolidating ethnic periphery? It will also assess whether this particular relationship was a cause or a consequence of burgeoning separatist tendencies.

The communist collapse News of the seizure of power by reactionary communists in Moscow on August 19th 1991 had an immediate impact on the political stability of the

The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR 35 Checheno-Ingush ASSR. The republic’s communist leadership, headed by Zavgayev, was in Moscow at the time for the ceremonial signing of the revised Union Treaty. However, an irresolute Zavgayev failed to issue a prompt condemnation of the Moscow junta, thus depriving his administration of support from the democratically-minded leadership of the RSFSR. For almost three days the official Checheno-Ingush press maintained a damaging silence on the subject of the attempted coup. Taimaz Abubakarov, a member of the regional administration both before and after the unilateral declaration of independence, believes this reticence was the ‘last drop that caused the cup of national patience to overflow’.1 Whilst official Chechnya’s silence visà-vis the coup attempt was not particularly significant for the authorities in Moscow, it was to have a profound impact on local politics within the ASSR where the republican leadership’s policy of ‘no comment’ was perceived as signifying implicit support for the hard-line stance of the Moscow junta. As witnessed in the previous chapter, there was already vehement antagonism towards the hegemony of the Soviet centre within all regional power structures on Chechen territory. The simmering tension was exacerbated by this apparent endorsement from local Communist Party officials for a renewal of strong centralisation. In fact, several representatives of the official regional administration did openly voice emphatic support for the abortive junta, including the chairman of the Groznyy city council, V. Kutsenko. Moreover, the Interior Minister of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR, Umalt Alsultanov, affirmed that his ministry would execute any orders originating from the conspirators in Moscow.2 Nevertheless, such support was minimal within the republic, as the majority of the population persisted with their challenge to communist rule. Dudayev exploited Zavgayev’s misplaced hesitation to consolidate his own power within the republic. He branded the junta’s actions ‘a serious crime against the people and the Constitution’, calling on the Chechen people to support Yeltsin’s anti-coup position and ‘show endurance, determination and courage in defending democracy and human dignity’.3 According to Yandarbiyev, he also convened an emergency meeting of the OKChN Executive Council (EC), which ordered the formation of military detachments across the republic and subsequently demanded Zavgayev’s resignation, as well as the disbanding of the regional Supreme Soviet.4 In response to a joint appeal issued by the OKChN, VDP and other opposition groups, demonstrators assembled in Groznyy’s central square, denouncing the republic’s leadership for its lack of trustworthiness and ambiguous behaviour during the coup. The mutinous atmosphere was heightened by the security services’ arrest of the popular opposition leader Yandarbiyev during the demonstration. His arrest was viewed as a further tacit expression of support for the junta’s decrees by the local authorities and an attempt to curb the ‘democratic’ movement.5 Moscow likewise displayed a hostile attitude towards Zavgayev, who only returned to the republic from Moscow on the third day of the coup attempt, August 21st.6

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The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR

On the day of Zavgayev’s return, the ASSR’s Supreme Soviet belatedly convened an emergency session to discuss the introduction of a state of emergency in the republic. In reality, a state of emergency had been in effect since the first day of the coup, 48 hours earlier, and the official condemnation of the Moscow putschists proved ineffective in the struggle for public support. Meanwhile, demonstrations in support of Yeltsin and ‘democracy’ continued in central Groznyy. The attempt by communist hard-liners in Moscow to re-impose vigorous central control across Soviet territory exacerbated tensions within the ASSR between the official administration and opposition groups, particularly Dudayev’s OKChN, which intensified its demands for the creation of an independent Chechen state. Gakaev has observed that whilst the immediate post-coup days witnessed a ‘cleansing’ of coup supporters from communist administrations across the Soviet Union, in Groznyy the political battle became a confrontation between the opposition and the Supreme Soviet.7 On August 22nd Dudayev and his supporters seized the television station in Groznyy in order to broadcast a speech by the OKChN leader outlining the opposition’s demands. These included the dissolution of the local Supreme Soviet, which had lost public confidence, and the resignation of Zavgayev on the grounds of his ostensible support of the coup. In Yandarbiyev’s opinion this speech was one of the fundamental reasons for the victory over local supporters of the Moscow coup.8 Relations between Dudayev and the Russian President were initially tinged with the latter’s gratitude for the republic’s support.9 Yeltsin perhaps imagined Dudayev to be merely a champion of democracy whose intentions were the preservation of a democratic Federation. However, towards the end of August the RSFSR leadership was obviously becoming increasingly concerned about the political situation within the ASSR. The Russian government, headed by Yeltsin, dispatched a delegation of officials from Moscow to attend an emergency session of the regional parliament in Groznyy. This delegation contained three prominent Chechens who were sent in an early attempt to resolve the worsening political conflict between the Soviet centre and its periphery. Salambek Khadzhiev, Soviet Minister of the Chemical Industry, was apparently considered by the Russian leadership to be a potential replacement for Zavgayev.10 The two other Chechen envoys, Aslanbek Aslakhanov, a member of the Presidium of the RSFSR parliament, and Inga Grebesheva, deputy to the Chairman of the Russian Council of Ministers, publicly warned Zavgayev not to use force to resolve the political crisis in the republic.11 Aslakhanov initiated negotiations between the ASSR’s official legislature, the Supreme Soviet, and the OKChN EC, although these talks quickly became deadlocked without achieving any results. The Supreme Soviet rejected opposition demands for its resignation and expressed confidence in Zavgayev’s leadership, notwithstanding a few deputies who called for decisive action from the First Secretary to counteract the increasing aggression

The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR 37 of the OKChN. Gakaev claims that it was at this point that any opportunity to relieve tension in the republic and neutralise the radical opposition within a centrally managed political and constitutional framework was lost. In his opinion the confrontation could have been avoided if Zavgayev had voluntarily tendered his resignation and new parliamentary elections had been called.12 However, the initiative was squandered and the influence of the radical nationalists, led by Dudayev, was enhanced by the obstinacy of the incumbent ruling elite. Tension continued to escalate during the final week of August as agitators from across Checheno-Ingushetia poured into Groznyy to support the mass protests against Soviet domination. It has been claimed that people were paid up to 100 roubles a day to participate in the anti-communist rally, which was organised by both the OKChN and VDP.13 As the number of people involved continued to grow the demonstrations became increasingly hostile, particularly towards Zavgayev who was viewed as a representative of the Soviet centre. In a symbolic gesture of defiance a statue of Lenin that stood in a central Groznyy square was brought down, dragged through the city streets and thrown into the Sunzha river. Yandarbiyev observed that this act had an explosive effect on the Chechen people, heralding the overthrow of communist rule.14

The threat of disintegration Yeltsin’s encouragement of a loosening of central control during his struggle with Gorbachev for political power precipitated serious problems for postSoviet Russia. Following the de facto collapse of the Soviet regime in the wake of the attempted coup, the system of central control was very weak, and a lack of effective federal institutions facilitated separatist tendencies. The struggle for political supremacy taking place between Gorbachev and Yeltsin was reflected in competition between Soviet and RSFSR institutions, such as the power ministries, for resources and influence. This rivalry resulted in the paralysis and ineffectiveness of both sets of institutions, thereby impairing the ability of the centre to exert its control over peripheral regions. Dudayev described this tendency, stating that ‘as the centre is weak, the periphery is being influenced by a wave of democratisation [initiated] by the strongest leaders who are capable of defending the interests of their people.’15 In a speech on Radio Russia at the end of August Yeltsin emphasised that the disintegration of the centre did not also represent the disintegration of the country, rather a ‘de-communisation’ of all spheres of society, ‘an important concept in this period of transition’.16 In a determined effort to re-establish Moscow’s primacy over the RSFSR’s territory, Yeltsin met with the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of ten out of the sixteen autonomous Russian republics. A joint statement was issued to the media in which the republics stressed their support for the integrity of the RSFSR and the

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The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR

Union Treaty, reaffirming that the Treaty should be signed by them as part of a RSFSR delegation.17 Yeltsin and the Speaker of the RSFSR parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, made it clear that numerically small peoples did not share the same rights as, for example, the Georgian or Baltic nations. Khasbulatov, himself an ethnic Chechen, believes that at this time Dudayev and his supporters viewed their relationship with the Soviet Union as similar to that of the Baltic republics.18 The centre–periphery struggles of Moscow within both the Soviet Union and RSFSR were reflected in the battle for political control taking place in Checheno-Ingushetia. A political vacuum rapidly developed in the republic. The Communist-dominated Supreme Soviet now lacked legitimacy as a result of the failed coup, which had discredited communism as a valid political force. Moreover, Dudayev was still considered to be merely an opposition leader with insufficient popular support to assume control. However, his EC was rapidly becoming the sole group with any control over the ambivalent and unstable political environment, particularly following its creation of a militarised wing, the National Guard. This ‘security’ service had successfully taken control of both the television and radio stations in the republic, together with several key administrative buildings. This was of particular significance, as it enabled the EC to control the content and amount of any information that was disseminated to the population. Dudayev understood the crucial importance of propaganda in the battle for power. The third session of the OKChN was held in Groznyy September 1st–2nd 1991, at which a resolution was adopted declaring the local Supreme Soviet to be illegitimate and powerless, and calling parliamentary and presidential elections for October 27th. This was challenged by Zavgayev who made a statement on Chechen television that evening, accusing the EC of anticonstitutional acts and insisting that the ‘Chechen people will never be under the thumb of adventurists’.19 In response the OKChN leadership proclaimed that it was ‘striving for the construction of a democratic society in which the rights and interests of all peoples are defended irrespective of nationality, political beliefs or religion’.20 The EC also instructed Lechi Magomedov, a Chechen RSFSR deputy, to form a temporary government with the aim of co-ordinating ‘democratic forces’ within the republic in preparation for the October elections. However, the majority of this temporary administration’s members were also representatives of the EC, which meant it was little more than an OKChN mouthpiece. The EC alleged that it had the support of Jordan and the Georgian SSR, as well as the ethnically similar people of neighbouring Ingushetia. In the wake of a meeting with Georgian President Gamsakhurdia, prior to the attempted coup in August, Dudayev proclaimed that relations with the south Caucasian republic would be strengthened. He claimed that an agreement had been reached whereby the Georgian president would represent Chechen interests within the RSFSR and USSR as Chechnya would be

The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR 39 an independent state.21 This was a clear manifestation of the separatist tendencies that the Russian leadership was now beginning to fear, as events in Groznyy spiralled out of their control. It was becoming obvious that Dudayev and the OKChN were not merely intent on replacing a ‘stagnant political leadership’,22 but were in fact attempting to augment their own power and gain independence for the small north Caucasian republic. Despite the growing power of the EC there was still a significant number of people within the republic opposed to Dudayev’s radical course. A meeting of spiritual and religious leaders, organised by allies of the republican Supreme Soviet, condemned the actions of the OKChN and VDP as ‘anti-constitutional’ and ‘amoral’, calling on the Chechen people to ‘listen to the voice of reason…and return to your homes’.23 The demands of this liberal opposition were more moderate, reflecting its conciliatory attitude towards relations with Moscow. They wanted greater autonomy for the Chechen nation, but rejected the notion of outright independence as proposed by the radicals. The official organ of state power in the republic, the Supreme Soviet, was still attempting to perform its duties and on September 3rd it published a belated resolution enacting a state of emergency. This decree was largely ineffective since much of the republic was now under the command of the OKChN leadership, thus it merely served to increase the tension between the legislature and the radical nationalist opposition. In retaliation the EC unilaterally disbanded the parliament and established its own temporary legislative body, decreeing that any laws or resolutions passed by the Supreme Soviet lacked legal authority. In fact, the EC itself lacked any legal basis on which to dissolve the ASSR’s legitimate parliament. Furthermore, its decree met little resistance from the central authorities in Moscow, whose inaction was deemed to indicate tacit recognition of the new Chechen leadership. The political struggle taking place in the Kremlin eclipsed events in the periphery, leading to confusion regarding the jurisdiction of responsibility. Consequently, the EC’s unilateral dissolution of parliament failed to evoke a decisive response from the centre. Three days later, on September 6th, Dudayev’s National Guard, led by Gantemirov, forcibly seized the building where the Supreme Soviet was in session. Zavgayev was forced to sign an ‘act of abdication’ and flee the city, although he later asserted his ‘resignation’ was not legally binding as he had made no official announcement. In his 1995 testimony to the Russian parliamentary commission charged with investigating the causes of the Chechen conflict, Zavgayev claimed that the Supreme Soviet had not dissolved itself, but there had been a ‘massacre’, which had triggered the beginning of the ‘bloody drama that has developed’.24 Yandarbiyev claims that the storming of the building was a spontaneous act by the people, triggered by rumours that Yeltsin had promised military assistance to several Chechen deputies in order to enforce the state of emergency declared by the republican parliament several days earlier. In his

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opinion ‘Soviet power in Chechnya was liquidated by the people themselves’ and most of the insurgents had no allegiance to any particular political organisation: ‘they represented the people. And this was the fundamental strength and guarantee of our success’.25 The communist bureaucracy had seemingly collapsed in the face of staunch opposition from the Chechen people. Nevertheless, without the leadership of radical groups such as the OKChN it is doubtful that ordinary citizens would have successfully mobilised themselves in opposition to the regional communist administration. Yandarbiyev himself proudly declared that the VDP and OKChN ‘saved the republic from the double-headed monster of the Soviet-Russian empire’.26 Zavgayev’s ‘abdication’ essentially meant that political power in the republic was transferred to the EC, which lacked any legal basis on which to assume the mantle of power. Dudayev attempted to justify the actions of the OKChN by claiming that it was acting ‘in accordance with international law’. In his opinion the EC had ‘acquired’ legitimacy as it was recognised by the majority of the republic’s citizens, and was acting in accordance with their wishes for an independent state, as expressed by the numerous assemblies of popular power.27 The chaos, which characterised the immediate post-coup days, enabled Dudayev and the EC to illegally seize power with little resistance from the central authorities. The secessionist movement in Chechnya was empowered by the predominance of liberal tendencies manifested by the Russian elite following the decisive rejection of socialism. The lack of well-defined, effective legitimate political and legal structures made it very difficult for the Russian leadership to take any decisive action to prevent Dudayev’s elimination of central control in the republic. The situation was unlike that in any other constituent part of the RSFSR, yet still the centre failed to take any firm measures to resolve the intensifying conflict. Khasbulatov, who at that time was a loyal member of Yeltsin’s team, welcomed the fall of Zavgayev. In an interview with Vesti on September 7th he accused the former First Secretary of having been ‘a subservient emissary of the central powers’, of having ‘mismanaged and destroyed the wealth of the Chechen-Ingush Republic’, and finally of having supported the Moscow coup.28 He travelled to Groznyy on September 14th, three days after a highlevel Russian government delegation, headed by Gennadiy Burbulis, RSFSR State Secretary, had arrived in an attempt to persuade the Chechen parliament to disband voluntarily and prepare for elections. Members of the Russian parliamentary committee into the causes of the Chechen crisis claim that this delegation was sent to Groznyy with the aim of a ‘quiet replacement of the leaders of the republic’.29 Yeltsin had instructed Burbulis to hold negotiations with the leaders of the OKChN with the object of finding a resolution to the crisis and stabilise a potentially explosive situation. However, four days of talks failed to produce a satisfactory result and Burbulis later claimed that his greatest mistake was ‘trusting Dudayev more than he deserved’.30

The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR 41 Under Khasbulatov’s guidance the regional Supreme Soviet met on September 15th and agreed to dissolve itself after voting to create a Provisional Council of thirteen deputies, led by Hussein Akhmadov, which would only function until parliamentary and presidential elections were held. This ostensible rapprochement partially defused the tense situation in Groznyy and there was a brief respite in the friction between the authorities and the radical opposition.

Court intrigues: speculating motivation There have been suggestions of a power-sharing deal between Khasbulatov and Dudayev. Gakaev has dubbed Khasbulatov the ‘executive director of the Chechen drama’, although ‘a bad one’. He believes that Khasbulatov used Dudayev in a vain attempt to assume control of the republic himself: ‘Dudayev was supposed to play the role of a Trojan horse – he was meant to do the dirty work and get rid of the Zavgayev regime so that Khasbulatov could install his own leader. However, Dudayev did not want anyone else to benefit from the fruits of his labour, he himself wanted to be leader.’31 According to this interpretation, the beginning of the conflict is rooted in the animosity between Khasbulatov and Dudayev. Other analysts also subscribe to this version of events – Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal concur that ‘it now seems clear that Khasbulatov and Dudayev had in fact made a power-sharing deal, and Dudayev simply outmanoeuvred Khasbulatov and decided to take power on his own.’32 In an article in Obshchaya Gazeta published in August 1994 Zavgayev himself maintains that Dudayev was originally a pawn in Khasbulatov’s political intrigues, claiming ‘they tried to use Dudayev, who had never lived in our republic, who did not have strong family connections…as a force capable of cleaning house in the republic to [then] bring to power completely different people – pawns of Khasbulatov, who needed Chechnya as a personal fief.’33 The careers of both men were furthered with the indirect assistance of Zavgayev. In 1990 Dudayev had been promoted to the rank of Air Force general as a result of petitions from influential Chechens within Soviet power structures, including Zavgayev, who believed that the appointment of the first Chechen general in the armed forces was long overdue.34 Zavgayev allegedly also played an influential part in the prominent ascendancy of Khasbulatov. In an interview with Thomas de Waal in January 1995 he asserted: ‘I personally recommended him to Yeltsin. I literally insisted. I asked him a first time, then a second time’.35 When Yeltsin was elected President of the Russian Federation in 1991, Khasbulatov became acting Speaker and subsequently Speaker of the Parliament, a position that afforded him an immense amount of power and influence. Zavgayev’s description of both men is far from complimentary in a later article published in Zavtra in August 1996: ‘The …political and economic

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suffocation of the Chechen Republic was carried from the very beginning by the criminal Dudayev-Yandarbiyev regime and their guardian angels in Moscow such as Khasbulatov.’36 A Russian politician, Sergei Shakhrai, also corroborated the notion of a deal between Dudayev and Khasbulatov in an article that appeared in Rossiiskiye Vesti at the beginning of September 1994: ‘I never hid the fact that Khasbulatov himself brought General Dudayev to power. It is a well-known fact.’37 As a result of his pretensions of power, Khasbulatov undoubtedly played a critical role in relieving the ominous situation in September 1991. He was originally elected to the RSFSR Congress of Peoples’ Deputies to represent a Groznyy constituency and his Chechen origins meant that he still possessed many influential contacts within the republic, vitally important in a society that places great emphasis on the family network. He was able to instigate talks between the official legislature and Dudayev’s EC, perhaps averting a possibly violent escalation of tension at that time, despite the limited results. After Khasbulatov had returned to Moscow, Dudayev simply ignored the agreement and announced that he was dissolving the newly established Provisional Council. The OKChN EC was invested with the powers of a ‘revolutionary committee for the transitional period with all powers’, a move undertaken without any legal authority. A system of dual power arose in the republic, resulting in confusion and a further weakening of central control. Abubakarov describes how, as Economics Minister, he would receive conflicting orders from each side: one set from the EC signed by Dudayev, demanding that the minister implement only his instructions, and one set from the Provisional Council, threatening punishment in the event of insubordination.38 The Provisional Council disregarded Dudayev’s orders and by the end of September a conspicuous split between radical and conservative factions within the temporary legislature provoked further tension. The Provisional Council Chairman, Hussein Akhmadov, maintained close links with the OKChN (he was deputy chairman of the EC), a connection that scarcely concealed the overt political aspirations of the Congress. The conservative wing of the Council, with the support of a considerable part of the Chechen intelligentsia, wanted elections to be postponed until November to enable a formal election campaign to be conducted. Conversely, the radicals, with the support of the OKChN, demanded that elections be held at the end of October as they had originally planned, fearing that Russia may attempt to forcibly resolve the crisis if elections were delayed. Khasbulatov had warned Dudayev and his supporters that, if they unlawfully seized power, the election results would not be recognised. Furthermore, despite protests from other members of the Provisional Council that the electorate had not been consulted, on October 1st the Akhmadov-led group of radical deputies adopted a resolution dividing Checheno-Ingushetia into a sovereign Chechen republic ‘Nokhchi-Cho’ and an autonomous Ingush republic

The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR 43 within the RSFSR. This resolution was not recognised by either the republican or RSFSR authorities, which continued to refer to the republic as Checheno-Ingushetia. Political dissension once again spilled over onto the streets of Groznyy at the beginning of October when Akhmadov, an OKChN puppet, was replaced as Chairman of the Provisional Council by Baudin Bakhmadov, a lawyer with an openly pro-Russian stance. The OKChN National Guard commandeered the KGB building in the capital, appropriating the large arsenal of weapons stored there along with sensitive material about operatives in the region.39 Consequently, Viktor Ivanenko, RSFSR KGB Chairman, temporarily suspended operations in the republic until after the elections, planned for the end of October. The damage that this caused to the influence of the federal authorities resulted in further erosion of its control.

Enter Rutskoi In a further attempt to defuse the escalating crisis and reassert a degree of regulation, a high ranking Russian delegation of ministers arrived in Groznyy on October 6th to hold talks with Dudayev, although they were officially in the republic to attend the third Congress of Ingush People. RSFSR Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi led the group, accompanied by Andrei Dunaev, RSFSR Minister of Internal Affairs and KGB Chairman Ivanenko. Rutskoi conveyed Yeltsin’s demands to the Chechen opposition leader concerning the restoration of constitutional law and order, as well as the conducting of both parliamentary and presidential elections in accordance with federal law. Yeltsin also called for the authorities of the republic’s lawful legislature to be reinstated during the run-up to the elections, and for all illegal armed formations to disarm and hand their weapons over to the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). Following his meeting with Dudayev, Rutskoi voiced his concerns of a repetition of the Nagorno-Karabakh situation, which had rapidly deteriorated into violence, stating: ‘I am afraid that Checheno-Ingushetia will become a second Karabakh. The symptoms are already present. There was a power vacuum after the dissolution of the republic’s Supreme Soviet. And not even a small town can exist if there is a power vacuum.’40 According to Rutskoi, the Chechen leader had announced that he was not willing to submit to Yeltsin’s directives, although he had conceded that ‘affairs in the republic will be carried out in accordance with the law’ and promised not to impede the Provisional Council’s election preparations.41 Yandarbiyev provides a Chechen viewpoint on the negotiations with this delegation, expressing anger that the Russians ignored an earlier promise not to meet with groups opposed to the OKChN. He also claims that although Dunaev was initially in favour of the use of force, he was persuaded by the Chechens’ logical argument that ‘strong-arm tactics would trigger a clash not only with Chechnya, but the entire North Caucasus’.42

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The following day the Provisional Council handed Rutskoi an urgent appeal to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet complaining that the OKChN EC was usurping its authority and urging that it be recognised as the sole legitimate body in the republic: ‘We are convinced that not one honest citizen must take part in the anti-constitutional elections that the OKChN Executive Committee is trying to thrust upon the residents of the republic with only its own interests in mind. Our aim is to organise and conduct on a legal basis republican parliamentary elections…to restore calm and order in the republic.’43 On his return to Moscow Rutskoi delivered a report about the republic’s unstable political situation to the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. He characterised Dudayev’s group as a ‘gang terrorising the population’, alleging that instability in the region had been inspired by the leadership of Georgia in order to create a federal republic of the North Caucasus. The basis for his suspicions was the ‘constant presence’ within ChechenoIngushetia of emissaries from the Transcaucasian republics, as well as the ‘active supply of arms from Georgia’. In conclusion he surmised that ‘intervention by the appropriate bodies and forces, which are capable of disarming [Dudayev’s] gang is essential’.44 Having listened to this incriminating report, the Presidium drafted an uncompromising resolution that censured the EC for appropriating authority, stating that the only legal organ of state power in the republic was the Provisional Council. It condemned the illegal armed formations and ordered them to hand over their weapons by midnight on October 10th.45 Notwithstanding this ultimatum, it remains unclear as to why the Russian leadership waited until after the Chechen elections to take forceful measures. It perhaps remained unconvinced of the seriousness of the situation and the potential challenge to its hegemony in the republic. It is conceivable that the central authorities were confident that support for Dudayev would disappear rapidly in the face of firm verbal warnings. It is also possible that Yeltsin was poorly advised. Dudayev considered this to be ‘a virtual declaration of war on our republic’.46 The EC denounced the actions of the Russian government as ‘gross interference in the internal affairs of the Chechen Republic and a declaration of armed confrontation’ and declared a general mobilisation of all males between the ages of 16 and 55 (later claiming that 62,000 came forward). In addition it recalled Chechen servicemen from the Soviet Armed Forces and instructed the National Guard to be in a state of combat-readiness.47 The republic was preparing to defend itself against the perceived ‘imperialist’ tendencies of the Russian Federation. However, not all Chechens endorsed Dudayev’s deliberately militant stance. A rival opposition rally, led by Bakhmadov in support of the Provisional Council, began to congregate in Groznyy near to the square in which pro-Dudayev supporters were demonstrating. The Chechen Green Movement initiated a conference of numerous opposition groups in support of the preservation of Checheno-Ingush unity to discuss the creation of a

The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR 45 reconciliation commission that would hold talks with the OKChN.48 There were also reports of rallies taking place in rural areas across the republic, protesting against the policies of the EC and the change in the election date. In a statement transmitted by Russian television Khasbulatov claimed that Dudayev ‘represents virtually no one apart from perhaps 200–300 desperate young men armed to the teeth’. In addition he said that ‘literally thousands’ of telegrams were being received in Moscow beseeching the government to restore order in the republic, with the use of force if necessary.49 As the situation deteriorated Dudayev’s tone became slightly less belligerent. In an interview at the end of October he declared that ‘our goal is to rid the people of the fear of national and religious strife and to create here, in a heavenly corner of the world, a democratic state with equal rights for all – regardless of nationality, religion or political convictions.’50 In an imitation of Yeltsin’s own actions, Dudayev manipulated the concept of democracy in order to promote and consolidate his own power base at the expense of his rivals. He claimed that the EC had not intended to gain legislative or executive power, but had been compelled to assume full responsibility for the situation in response to the events of recent days. He went on to accuse the RSFSR leadership of meddling in the republic’s affairs in an attempt to destabilise the situation, depicting Chechnya as a blameless victim of Russian expansionism. Meanwhile, on local television and radio, he exhorted the population to prepare for war because hostile troops were amassing in neighbouring republics, awaiting Yeltsin’s order to invade Chechnya.51 The battle of words attained a new pitch with the intervention of Yeltsin himself. In a message to the EC on October 19th 1991 he condemned its actions as anti-constitutional and demanded a halt to its illegal behaviour. He insisted that parliamentary elections proposed by the Provisional Council for November 17th go ahead as scheduled together with a referendum on the region’s future state structure. He ordered the Congress to submit to the authority of the Provisional Council within three days or he would be forced to ‘defend constitutional order’.52 However, the time for words and threats had passed – the Chechens dismissed Yeltsin’s dictum as yet another insubstantial ultimatum, undaunted by the prospect of military force being used against them. Akhmadov mockingly described Yeltsin’s speech as ‘the last belch of the Russian Empire’.53 In a desperate attempt to impose some kind of control over the mutinous republic, the Russian Prosecutor-General issued a statement banning those organisations and media whose campaigns were intended to ‘incite national hatred, the use of force and the violation of the territorial integrity of the RSFSR’.54 Moreover, it accused representatives of certain organisations in Tatarstan and Checheno-Ingushetia of inciting people to forcefully seize power and violate the country’s territorial integrity. However, this futile gesture did little to re-assert RSFSR authority. The seeds of revolution had been sown and the Chechens were anticipating their independence.

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Symbols of statehood Parliamentary and presidential elections took place on October 27th 1991 as Dudayev had intended, and he became the first popularly elected president of the Chechen Republic, allegedly receiving more than 80 per cent of the votes. The Chechen Central Electoral Committee maintained that a total of 458,144 people from an electorate of almost 640,000 had participated,55 although the celebrations were marred by allegations of voting irregularities throughout the republic. Opposition groups contested the outcome of the elections on the basis that the Electoral Commission was comprised entirely of EC members and it would therefore have been possible to falsify the results. However, the Electoral Commission declared the results of the parliamentary elections in eight districts to be null and void, because of ‘serious violations of electoral law’, meaning that only 33 out of the intended 41 deputies were elected.56 There were also protests about the election campaign, during which armed units subordinate to the EC had blockaded all television and radio stations in the republic, denying other candidates access to vital media coverage.57 In a statement to the Russian parliament, Khasbulatov asserted that only 200,000 from a total Checheno-Ingush population of 1.5 million had taken part in the elections, which in his opinion was counter to democratic norms.58 As the elections were held on territory defined by the arbitrary borders of the Chechen Republic, the residents of six regions of Checheno-Ingushetia were thereby excluded by virtue of changes made without their consent and some reports claimed that voting had taken place at only 70 out of 360 polling stations.59 In some districts the number of votes cast exceeded the number of those registered to vote, an anomaly that a Russian parliamentary investigative commission explained by the fact that members of the Chechen diaspora were permitted to participate.60 The Provisional Council refused to acknowledge the outcome of these controversial elections and declared that any decrees or resolutions issued by the ‘so-called president’ Dudayev and his parliament would lack legal efficacy. It continued with preparations for November elections,61 establishing its own Electoral Committee, and the renewed threat of a system of parallel legislatures heightened existing tensions within the republic. Once again the Russian leadership failed to take any decisive action to defuse the tense situation. In a speech to the RSFSR parliament on the day of the Chechen elections, Yeltsin proclaimed his determination to protect Russia’s territorial integrity: ‘We cannot and will not under any circumstances allow the break-up of Russia, its disintegration into dozens of separate fiefdoms all fighting among themselves. We recognise the right of self-determination, but this cannot be realised at the expense of other peoples’ rights. Any changes in the status of republics and territories within Russia must be constitutional and based on law.’62 He went on to state that the most important criterion for any change in status would be ‘the will of the people’, as expressed in a referendum. The following day a

The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR 47 Chechen deputy, Isa Aliroyev, briefed the Russian legislature on the situation in Checheno-Ingushetia, which, in his opinion, was hindering the construction of a ‘new, democratic Russia’. His report condemned the media’s portrayal of Dudayev as a leader of the national-liberation movement, arguing that there was no such movement in the republic, only ‘deceived people supporting Dudayev without any understanding that they are merely fighting for him to come to power, not for liberation’.63 In conclusion he urged the leadership to act with resolve in order to prevent any further action by Dudayev that would enable him to consolidate his power. Meanwhile, at his first press conference as president on October 28th, Dudayev stressed his conviction that mutual relations between the Chechen Republic and Russia would be forged ‘in accordance with the civilised norms of the international community’, a blatant defiance of Yeltsin’s speech on disintegration, which had explicitly vetoed independence for any constituent part of the Federation. Dudayev’s statement presumed Chechen sovereignty and territorial integrity, and consequently independence. Furthermore, his inaugural presidential decree pronounced Chechnya’s secession from the Russian Federation – on November 1st 1991 he enacted the Law on the State Sovereignty of the Chechen Republic.64 On the same day the Russian parliament belatedly affirmed the illegitimacy of the elections, in an ineffective resolution sponsored by the recently confirmed Speaker of the Russian Parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov.65 However, the Chechen leadership simply disregarded this mandate, which in their view lacked any legal force in an independent state.

Emergency measures The Russian government’s inability to resolve the crisis by peaceful means strengthened the resolve of those politicians who advocated direct military intervention in Chechnya to restore the RSFSR’s jurisdiction. The Chechen unilateral declaration of independence motivated Rutskoi to draw up plans to forcibly overthrow Dudayev. On his instructions an Operative Centre on the Crisis Situation in the Chechen-Ingush Republic was established to prepare a draft decree on the introduction of a state of emergency.66 Yeltsin had left Moscow on November 2nd claiming ‘exhaustion’ and over the coming days proved extremely difficult to locate. When the state of emergency was issued on November 7th 1991, a public holiday in Russia, Yeltsin was at his dacha outside of Moscow and Rutskoi took charge. Major decisions concerning the integrity of the RSFSR were left to his ministers and subordinates to resolve. Russian television announced the imposition of a state of emergency in the Chechen Republic with effect from 5.00 a.m. on November 9th until 5.00 a.m. on December 9th 1991. The decree said that a state of emergency was being initiated as a result of ‘an acute deterioration in the republic caused by

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the illegal actions of Dudayev’s group’.67 In accordance with RSFSR law regarding a state of emergency, an interim administration for the ChechenoIngush Republic was to be instituted on the territory within three days as a special form of government. Akhmed Arsanov, Yeltsin’s representative in the republic, was appointed head of this administration and restrictions were introduced on entry into and exit from the republic, together with a curfew. Dudayev retorted with a declaration of martial law and a decree that lifted the Russian-imposed state of emergency, which he called ‘political provocation and an act of state terrorism’.68 A military ministry within the structure of state power was also created, led by Soslambekov. In violation of the Russian state of emergency, which prohibited mass gatherings, thousands of people congregated in Groznyy’s main square on the morning of November 9th to demonstrate their solidarity with Dudayev and his secessionist stance, proclaiming ‘we are prepared to die in defence of our freedom’.69 The commanders of the MVD troops, ostensibly under Soviet command, later claimed that they were convinced that Dudayev had the support of the Chechen people. The First Deputy RSFSR Interior Minister Vyacheslav Komissarov, in the republic to oversee the implementation of Yeltsin’s decree, said Chechen elders visited him to implore the Russians to return home and leave them to sort out their own problems, otherwise a terrible calamity was unavoidable’.70 According to official reports, a total of 632 Interior Ministry troops were dispatched to the republic, whilst Rutskoi insisted that no soldiers from the Soviet Armed Forces were deployed. Troops landing at the Khankala airbase outside of Groznyy were immediately overpowered by units of Dudayev’s National Guard and proved unable to offer any resistance as their equipment had been erroneously sent to Mozdok, and reinforcements to Vladikavkaz.71 One Russian detachment, which had been successfully ordered into Groznyy to secure key installations, was trapped inside the city’s republican MVD building by Dudayev supporters. The humiliating failure of the Kremlin’s first attempt to regain control of the rebellious republic emphasised the ‘liberal tendencies’, which predominated amongst the Russian political elite at the time. It also caused the leadership to harden its resolve in relation to the crisis, perhaps indirectly influencing the 1994 decision to invade, lest the Russian Federation once again be so publicly shamed by its diminutive opponent. It appears that Rutskoi was the main architect of the inopportune introduction of a state of emergency in Chechnya that merely increased support within the republic for Dudayev and his uncompromising stance on independence. At a press conference on November 9th he maintained that the decree was only drawn up following the arrival of an encoded telegram from Arsanov, Yeltsin’s representative in the republic, in which he ‘practically requested a state of emergency’.72 He has subsequently alleged that the operation was deliberately sabotaged by USSR Minister of the Interior Barannikov on the advice of Gorbachev, in a covert attempt to undermine

The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR 49 Yeltsin’s legitimacy as RSFSR President, as the battle for supremacy between the Soviet and Russian presidents continued.73 Certainly the situation was complicated by the obvious animosity between Yeltsin and Gorbachev. As mentioned above, the existence of parallel Soviet and Russian structures competing for dominance led to the centre’s paralysis and impotency. Valery Tishkov, an eminent Russian historian and anthropologist, states that ‘…the Yeltsin-Gorbachev rivalry, which was about to come to a head, paralysed the activity of the centre and indirectly contributed to promoting Chechen separatism’.74 The Russian Army was not yet in existence and any reinforcements in support of the MVD troops would have to have come from the Soviet Army, which was still subordinate to the President of the USSR. It is conceivable that Gorbachev, who was struggling to maintain his fragile power base, ascertained the possibility of his rival being humiliated by a rebellion within the Russian Federation. In an interview in 1996, Gorbachev recalls: ‘Everyone was playing some kind of game. Rutskoi, brandishing his sword, said, ‘Give me several divisions and I’ll put it down and crush all the separatists and Dudayev’ and so on. Suddenly Shaposhnikov, the Defence Minister, and the Interior Minister Barannikov ring me up and say, ‘Mikhail Sergeyevich, Rutskoi is asking us for troops.’ I say, “No decisions without my agreement, absolutely none”.’75 Yeltsin’s Chief of Staff at the time, Yuriy Petrov, highlighted the detrimental impact of the disorder within Russian governmental bodies on the development of its relations with the regions: ‘Regarding ChechenoIngushetia, there was a lack of information…A lot of people did go there – top officials, members of parliament and the government…But events kept developing, and everyone returned with his own opinion. Evidently some work is needed on the decision-making mechanism.’76 This illustrates the chaos of post-Soviet Russia as it attempted to make the transition away from communism towards a democratic state. The resultant lack of effective political and legal structures facilitated Dudayev’s bid for independence, as the Russian leadership remained paralysed by the essential systemic drift of both Soviet and Russian power within Chechnya, as well as a lack of any clearly defined policy towards it. Thus, weakness at the centre had the unintended consequence of consolidating and reinforcing separatist tendencies on the periphery. The failed attempt to re-assert central control unwittingly strengthened Dudayev’s regime, transforming a manipulative propagandist into a national saviour. Contrary to accepted opinion, Gakaev contends that by the beginning of November support for the EC was weak: ‘Only a miracle could save them. And a miracle occurred’.77 This ‘miracle’ was the introduction of a state of emergency. Confronted by the threat of an impending Russian offensive, opposition groups immediately rallied around the Dudayev leadership and the insubordination of the Provisional Council evaporated. In the eyes of the Chechens, Dudayev’s predictions that the ‘imperialist’ central

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The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR

authorities would once again seek to forcibly crush the spirit of democracy and freedom in the republic had proved correct. Dudayev intentionally fostered a siege mentality amongst the population, and throughout the years of his rule this national paranoia would prove his greatest weapon against the threat of Russian attack. Rumours about a new wave of deportations abounded. Dudayev insisted deportations were about to begin, ‘a 1944 scenario’, with five hundred vehicles, ostensibly for the gathering of the harvest, ready to remove the Chechen population.78 By exploiting such a powerful resource as the collective memory of the deportations, Dudayev was able to unite the nation in his struggle to retain power against subjugation by the ‘mighty’ Russian state. Despite Moscow’s attempted imposition of a state of emergency, Dudayev proceeded with his inauguration ceremony planned for November 9th. In an interview after the ceremony Dudayev echoed Yeltsin’s words on territorial integrity, when he stated that the issue of Chechnya’s status should only be decided by the people themselves in a referendum.79 Nevertheless, at a press conference several days later, Dudayev affirmed his secessionist position, stating that ‘the Chechen Republic will be an independent sovereign state and will build its relations with all its neighbours, including Russia, on the basis of equal rights.’ He went on to claim that the republic had already begun to forge trading links with other states in response to the economic blockade imposed by Russia.80

A triumph for democracy? The resistance that the Russian MVD troops had met in Chechnya engendered the very real threat of a simple police operation to restore law and order becoming a war between the military and the Chechen people. With the spectre of a bloodbath threatening to destroy the Federation’s fragile democracy, the Russian parliament refused to sanction Yeltsin’s imposition of a state of emergency and the troops were withdrawn to neighbouring North Ossetia.81 RSFSR KGB Chairman Viktor Ivanenko called the decree ‘a dramatic error’, while Chechen deputy, Aslanbek Aslakhanov, chairman of the Committee on Legality and Law and Order, criticised Yeltsin for issuing the decree without consulting the parliament, which contained ten deputies from Checheno-Ingushetia. He argued that ‘this decree only enhanced the authority of Dudayev and his supporters in the republic.’82 On November 11th the Russian parliament adopted a resolution recognising the presidential decree as lawful, but failing to endorse it. The deputies urged abstention from the use of force, calling on the Russian president to implement measures to stabilise the political situation throughout the country, and, in particular, to negotiate with the Chechen leaders.83 The deployment of the military to quash resistance to the ruling party was reminiscent of Soviet actions in Baku, Vilnius and Tbilisi, all of which had

The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR 51 resulted in civilian casualties, and the Russian deputies were anxious to avoid similar bloodshed. The North Caucasus region is particularly volatile, due to its high level of ethnic diversity. Fears of inciting the entire region appeared to be well grounded when the KNK announced a general mobilisation of volunteers throughout the North Caucasus ‘to defend the Chechen revolution’ following the state of emergency.84 Having learnt of Yeltsin’s decree, Dudayev called on all Muslim peoples to turn Moscow into a ‘disaster zone’ and issued an appeal to the peoples of the Caucasus: ‘It is necessary to turn every metre of land, every village and town into a fortress, and to break off all kinds of relations with Russia. We will turn the united Caucasus into a united fortress’.85 Initially it appeared that the Russian authorities were willing to negotiate, although they perhaps failed to comprehend the staunch resolve of the Chechen leadership to preserve its ‘independent’ status. On November 16th 1991 Sergei Filatov, First Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, announced that ‘…a provisional agreement has been reached regarding a meeting of authorised delegates without any conditions from either side. It is to take place at a location yet to be agreed upon.’86 This was later contradicted by Dudayev’s aide, Daud Akhmadov, who denied that the Chechen leader had agreed to drop his demand that the federal authorities recognise the president and parliament of Chechnya to be the sole legitimate powers as a pre-condition to talks.87 This dictate continued to cause problems for the negotiating teams over the next three years. Driven by his determination to gain recognition as the legitimate leader of a sovereign nation, Dudayev refused to make any concessions.

Concluding remarks There has been much debate over the rationale behind the Russian leadership’s apparent inaction during the closing months of 1991. Pain and Popov argue that in September 1991 it was still possible to carry out a police operation ‘to disarm illegal armed formations’ without the need for military equipment. Police and state security agencies, subordinate to the central authorities, were still operational within the republic. Dudayev’s fighters were only lightly armed and Dudayev himself had yet to establish a republic-wide support base, having only recently returned to Chechnya after a 20-year absence. Pain and Popov surmise that a police operation against the Dudayev regime in the immediate post-coup period would only have been possible with the support of the democratically-minded section of the state, which at that time could not be relied upon. They assert that a glance at the newspapers of the time confirms the notion that, despite reservations about his ‘not quite legitimate acts’, in the eyes of many Moscow liberals Dudayev was a hero, defending the democratic rights of his people.88 In a later article they identify a ‘decisive rejection of military solutions to ethnic conflicts’ as a fundamental belief of the democratic movement.89

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The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR

As the tables below show, despite a seeming lack of concrete action by the central authorities during the immediate post-coup period, mediation efforts were conducted at increasingly high levels (See Tables 3.1 and 3.2 below). Initially, the Soviet centre mediated between Dudayev and Zavgayev, who headed opposing groups in the periphery. However, later negotiations were conducted between the centre and periphery, after Moscow failed in its efforts to ‘divide and rule’, a strategy typical of both Soviet and post-Soviet federal relations. In the aftermath of the coup Moscow was still grappling with the remnants of the Soviet system. The power struggle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, between the Russian and Soviet governments, eclipsed all other matters, as personal ambition took precedence over responsibility to the electorate. In 1991 the Russian President was still subject to the effective control of a legislature which successfully managed to curb any authoritarian excesses. The failed state of emergency decree demonstrated the pre-dominance of liberal democratic tendencies within the parliament and

Table 3.1 Chechen initiatives in the immediate post-coup period (August– November 1991) Date

Actor

Nature of initiative

Type

19–20 August

Opposition movements such as OKChN and VDP OKChN: Third Congress

Mass demonstrations in support of Yeltsin, denouncing the local Communist Party elite Declared Supreme Soviet to lack legitimacy and called elections for 27th October 1991 Seizure of Supreme Soviet building Zavgayev’s ‘abdication’ Radical faction adopted unlawful resolution dividing Checheno-Ingushetia; not recognised by Soviet authorities. KGB building seized OKChN leader declared mobilisation in response to Russian ultimatum Dudayev inaugurated as President following illegitimate elections on 27th October

Similar to protests across Soviet Union

1–2 September

6 September

1 October

OKChN Dudayev’s National Guard Provisional Council

9 October

Dudayev

9 November

Dudayev

Provocation

The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR 53 Table 3.2 Russian initiatives in the immediate post-coup period (August–November 1991) Date Late August

Actor Chechen members of Soviet administration: • Khadzhiev, Soviet Minister of Chemical Industry • Aslakhanov, Member of Russian parliamentary Presidium • Grebesheva, Deputy Chairman of Russian Council of Ministers

Nature of initiative Negotiations between Chechen Supreme Soviet and radical opposition group OKChN. Zavgayev warned not to use force

Type Mediation

11 September

Russian Government delegation: • Burbulis, RSFSR State Secretary

Attempt to persuade Chechen parliament (Supreme Soviet) to disband and prepare for elections. Possibly also covert attempt to replace republican leaders

Mediation

14–15 September

Speaker of the RSFSR parliament, Khasbulatov

Successful attempt to persuade Supreme Soviet to dissolve itself. Creation of Provisional Council, temporary legislature

Conciliation

6 October

Russian Ministers: • Rutskoi, Vice President of RSFSR • Dunaev, RSFSR Interior Minister • Ivanenko, KGB Chairman

Yeltsin’s demands conveyed to Dudayev, including restoration of Supreme Soviet

Political Intervention

19 October

RSFSR President Yeltsin

Message to Executive Council condemning its actions and demanding immediate cessation

Direct intervention

22 October

RSFSR ProsecutorGeneral

Ban on organisations and activities inciting people to ‘anticonstitutional’ actions

Pressure

24 October

RSFSR President Yeltsin

Appointment of Arsanov as Yeltsin’s envoy to Chechnya

Manipulation

9 November

RSFSR President Yeltsin

Declaration of state of emergency on Chechen territory

Military force

54

The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR

government at that time. In contrast to Yeltsin’s future behaviour when confronted by opposition from the legislature, on this occasion he accepted their rejection and congratulated them on the decision. However, in seeking to gain an insight into the causes of Russia’s subsequent decision to use military force against the rebellious republic, it is necessary to emphasise that Chechnya was not the only republic within the RSFSR that threatened secession during the immediate post-coup period. Similar events were threatening the stability of other republics, such as Ingushetia, North Ossetia and Tatarstan, although none of these declared outright independence. Therefore it is necessary to examine the particular nature of Chechen independence in a further attempt to locate an explanation for the military invasion of 1994.

4

The consolidation of an ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya (1991–93)

Introduction Dudayev’s inaugural presidential decree brought about the secession of the Chechen Republic from Russia, heightening fears of a potential disintegration of the Federation, regardless of the fact that it was the sole constituent part to institute such a tenacious measure. In the wake of the 1991 Chechen declaration of independence, the central authorities failed to re-assert their supremacy, and three years ensued before the Russian leadership took the decision to exert full-scale military pressure on the rebellious republic, ample time for the small territory to arm itself against the perceived ‘imperial’ threat. Article 70 of the RSFSR Constitution, adopted by the Soviet leadership in 1977, stated that ‘the territory of the RSFSR may not be changed without the agreement of the RSFSR itself’,1 a statute that was clearly breached by the unilateral Chechen declaration of independence. Whilst the preservation of the Federation’s territorial integrity was the primary justification given by the Russian leadership for the military incursion of 1994, a further reason offered was the ostensible ‘criminalisation’ of Chechnya as a result of its de facto independence. During his annual State of the Nation address to the Russian legislature in February 1995, Yeltsin accused the Dudayev regime of engaging in criminal activity, which had become its ‘main source of income…and [the] basis for its very existence’. He insisted that the ‘amalgamation of the criminal world and the Chechen authorities had become reality. The Chechen Republic is an arena for the preparation and diffusion of criminal power across Russia.’2 This statement encapsulates one of Yeltsin’s fundamental justifications for the military invasion, thus an examination of the nature of Chechen ‘independence’ is pertinent in order to gain a further insight into the Russian motivations. Can part of the explanation for the initiation of the 1994–96 war be located in the specific circumstances of Chechnya’s self-proclaimed ‘independence’? Was Yeltsin justified in his attempts to legitimise military action on the grounds of Chechen ‘crime’ and demonise an entire nation, or does his statement represent a postfactum rationalisation of what was essentially a systemic drift into war on the part of the federal authorities?

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An ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya

This chapter will provide a portrait of the economic and political situation within the republic following the declaration of independence, together with an analysis of the implications of this for federal security. It will also investigate Russian initiatives to resolve the conflict peacefully prior to the violent confrontation between the executive and legislature in October 1993. Given that the Centre had failed to adequately control the situation within the ASSR prior to August 1991, why did it then remain seemingly inactive for three years in the face of such a blatant violation of its territorial integrity? Although Moscow did attempt to defend its 1994 invasion on the grounds of this violation, it would appear that in 1991 the authorities were willing to avoid military intervention on the basis of a prevailing conviction that a political agreement could still be attained.

Elimination of central control As the situation within the republic began to stabilise towards the end of November 1991, following the failed Russian attempt to impose a state of emergency and the clarification of Dudayev’s seizure of power, the Chechen leader lifted martial law and ordered the withdrawal of the National Guard. However, he maintained the necessity of protecting Chechnya from Russian intervention, and continued with plans to create a Chechen Army, announcing that conscription would commence on November 27th. This was endorsed by the Chechen Defence Law, which the republic’s parliament issued on December 24th, declaring it the duty of all male subjects to complete military service.3 In an interview with the Russian military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda, Dudayev stated that Chechnya would negotiate with the Union for the transfer of weapons and military equipment on its territory to the embryonic Chechen armed forces, following the precedent set by the Union Republics who had requisitioned all armaments located within their borders.4 In retrospect this was a thinly veiled warning to the Soviet troops still stationed within the republic as the Dudayev regime began a comprehensive abrogation of all structures representative of federal power. Dudayev understood that the elimination of all instruments of central control was imperative to attain the ‘independence’ he desired, hence he acted quickly to neutralise Moscow’s hegemony. Initial attacks by the separatists against Soviet military bases on Chechen territory reportedly took place during October 1991. In November of that same year officers from the 173rd Soviet Training Centre in Groznyy sent an entreaty to both Gorbachev and Evgeniy Shaposhnikov, the Soviet Defence Minister, requesting them to protect the rights of servicemen and their families: ‘We turn to you with an urgent request to resolve the issue of defending the rights of service personnel and members of their families, since attacks on sentries guarding military installations, and the theft of cars has not ceased…Incidences of physical violence towards service personnel and members of their families are becoming more frequent…We ask you to

An ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya 57 make a decision on the future of this centre and the expediency of siting military units on the territory of the Chechen Republic’.5 By the beginning of 1992 such violence had become a regular occurrence – during the first three months of the year more than 60 attacks were recorded on federal service personnel in the republic.6 Between February 6th – 9th there was a series of offensives against Russian regiments based in Groznyy, during which thousands of weapons were stolen, together with artillery, transport equipment and cases of ammunition. A Russian delegation led by Pavel Grachev, the first deputy Defence Minister, was sent to Chechnya in December 1991 and February 1992 on the order of Shaposhnikov to examine the situation. During a meeting with the delegation in December Dudayev apparently promised to assist with the withdrawal of Russian units, on the condition that he receive a proportion of their weapons and equipment.7 As a result of this delegation’s investigations, Shaposhnikov sent a special directive to the regiments of the North Caucasus Military District (NCMD) ‘On the safeguarding of weapons and the adoption of additional measures to stabilise the situation in Chechnya’. Despite assertions by Shaposhnikov that he subsequently ordered all weapons and military equipment to be evacuated from Chechnya and sent to central arsenals and storage facilities as a precaution against looting, this instruction was never carried out.8 Dudayev had issued the Russians with an ultimatum to withdraw by June 1st 19929 and on May 28th, Grachev, newly promoted to the position of Russian Defence Minister, ordered the NCMD troops based in Chechnya to hand over 50 per cent of their equipment to the separatists. However, some reports contend that by this time Dudayev’s fighters had already seized as much as 80 per cent of the Russians’ arms and equipment.10 Table 4.1 below gives details of the weaponry ‘given’ to the Chechens by the retreating federal troops, according to official Russian data. Thus, only six months after declaring independence, Dudayev and his armed forces were already well equipped to defend the republic against any potential aggressors. The Russian troops finally withdrew in June 1992, still under constant attack from the Chechens. Their withdrawal signified the destruction of the final pillar of Moscow’s authority in the republic, yet another humiliating defeat for the already demoralised vestiges of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is feasible that the authorities in Moscow failed to take any decisive action in Chechnya at this time because similar incidents were occurring across the territory of the former Soviet Union. Consequently it was not deemed to represent a significant threat to national security, particularly in the atmosphere of chaos that prevailed throughout the post-Soviet political system. The failure of the Russian leadership to take firm measures to prevent the seizure of such a large amount of weapons greatly facilitated the perpetuation of the Dudayev regime. During a conference in 1995 Ramazan Abdulatipov, Chairman of the Russian Council of Nationalities and closely involved in negotiations with the Chechens, noted a dramatic transformation

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An ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya

Table 4.1 Weaponry left in Chechnya, June 1992 Description Armoured equipment T-62 & T-72 tanks Infantry fighting vehicles BMP-1 & BMP-2 Armoured personnel carriers BTR-70 & BRDM-2 Antitank weaponry (total) 9P148 (‘Competition’) 9P185M (‘Bassoon’) 9P151 (‘Mongrel’) Rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPG-7) Artillery (total) BM-21 (‘Grad’ multi-barrelled rocket launcher) 122mm Howitzer D-30 Small Arms (total) AK-47 assault rifles Dragunov sniper rifles (SVD) Automatic grenade launchers (‘Flame’) AKM sub-machine guns (7.62 mm) PM & TT pistols Heavy machine-guns Large calibre machine-guns Ammunition 82 mm shells 122 mm shells for D-30 Hand-held grenades RG-42 F-1 RGD-45 Cartridges 5.45 mm 7.62 mm 12.7 mm 14.5 mm Aviation L-39 L-29 MiG-17 MiG-15 AN-2 Mi-8 helicopters

Quantity 42 36 30 590 2 24 51 113 153 18 30 41,538 18,832 533 138 9307 10,581 678 319 1,000 + 24,000 80,000 72,000 + 2,500 + 11,000,000 + 2,000,000 + 500,000 140,000 111 149 3 2 6 2

Source: Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye, 26.9.96, p. 2.

in Dudayev once the republic was armed. In Abdulatipov’s opinion from that moment there was little hope of achieving a peaceful settlement to the political crisis.11 Being armed greatly increased the confidence of the selfstyled independent Chechen state, providing the leadership with a serious alternative to negotiation and political stratagems.

An ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya 59 In contrast to this pessimistic proclamation, Vladimir Lysenko, a Russian official from the Ministry for Nationalities and Regional Policy, has questioned the outcry regarding the amount of weapons ‘given’ to Dudayev in 1992. During a speech to the State Duma in January 1995 he pointed out that the former Union republics had ‘received’ Soviet weaponry not as a result of any conscious policy by the central authorities, but because it would have been impossible to remove the weapons without the use of force. According to his interpretation, any attempt to prevent the Dudayev regime seizing weapons situated on Chechen territory would have led to bloodshed.12

Formulating ‘state’ structures The reprieve from any impending Russian aggression enabled Dudayev to create and consolidate the structures of his government, whilst simultaneously eradicating the lingering traces of federal control. By the end of November all property on Chechen territory had been nationalised, including the local branch of the Russian Central Bank, and Chechen deputies within Soviet and RSFSR state structures had been recalled by the local parliament.13 The newly elected parliament also voted to cease all payments of taxes into the federal budget, although it continued to receive substantial subsidies from the centre (for further details of this see the section ‘Re-evaluation of national policy’, below). The republic had successfully liberated itself from all forms of central control, categorically stating its intentions of functioning as a fully independent nation. Having dismantled all instruments of Moscow’s dominance, the Dudayev regime began to authenticate its statehood. In March 1992 a new Constitution was ratified confirming the independence of the Chechen Republic, as defined in Article One: ‘The Chechen Republic is a sovereign, democratic state functioning in accordance with constitutional law, created as a result of the self-determination of the Chechen people. It has a supreme right over its territorial and national wealth [and] independently defines its own foreign and domestic policy…The state sovereignty of the Chechen Republic is indivisible.’14 Although Dudayev claimed that his ‘ideal’ state system would be one based on Islamic Sharia law in which a Council of Elders decided matters of vital state interest, the Chechen Republic remained a secular state.15 The formation of state structures was based on a system of patronage, as the president rewarded his loyal disciples by granting them key positions in his new government. Yaragai Mamodayev, a wealthy oil businessman who had financed the OKChN, became Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the economy in May 1992, whilst the twenty-eight year old Bislan Gantemirov was made Mayor of Groznyy and simultaneously head of the city police with control over city property.16 In the future, both of these erstwhile allies of the Chechen President were to lead opposition groups against Dudayev, but at that time

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An ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya

the political environment in Groznyy appeared to be normalising. A factfinding mission to Chechnya by the London-based non-governmental organisation International Alert concluded in its report of October 1992: ‘The Chechen Republic has made impressive beginnings in creating a state and government structure. Chechen society is characterised by a remarkable degree of political openness and freedom of expression.’17 In an interview on the first anniversary of his inauguration as president of the republic Dudayev declared that exemplary progress had been made in the establishment of a democratic, independent Chechen state, despite ‘enormous political, economic and military pressure’ from Russia. He once again compared Chechnya to the former Union republics, claiming that ‘in contrast to other republics and peoples of the former Soviet Union relative stability in both the social and economic spheres has been maintained…During the [past] year a Constitution has been drafted and adopted, whilst numerous fundamental laws have been instituted. We are ruling a sovereign state.’18 However, notwithstanding these confident evaluations, the republic was still confronted with formidable obstacles, particularly within the economic sphere.

Chechnya’s ‘economic black hole’ The struggle for political dominance within the newly established Chechen government was inextricably linked to manipulation of the failing economy. During this uncertain period of transition economic power became equated with political power, resulting in the overt politicisation of the economy. Similar to the situation across post-Soviet Russia, the legitimate economy in Chechnya had been substantially weakened by the collapse of the centralised communist system, thereby encouraging the expansion of the ‘black’ economy. Despite the supposed imposition of banking, finance and transportation blockades against the republic by the Russian authorities, there had been no genuine ‘divorce’ from the central economy and links between federal and republican economic institutions remained in place, facilitating the illegal penetration of the Russian economy by various Chechen groups engaged in a struggle for dominance. Furthermore, social structures within the republic, notably the extended familial network of clans, were reflected in the pattern of economic control as competing power bases sought to dominate key industries. In his ‘presidential programme’ Dudayev outlined a utopian strategy for economic growth that included the nationalisation of all Soviet enterprises on the republic’s territory, together with the creation of gold and currency reserves. This programme contained idealistic statements concerning issues such as the development of industries that were not harmful either to human health or the environment, along with the creation of a sufficient number of jobs to ensure full employment.19 Dudayev also proposed unfeasible economic schemes such as his utopian plan to build a water pipeline

An ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya 61 from the North Caucasus to the Middle East in order to sell Chechen drinking water to the Arab nations.20 However, there was little genuine reform of the enfeebled economy. In spite of the imposition of a 40 per cent tax on profits, there was a lack of any discernible investment in the development of the republic’s infrastructure. Dudayev’s optimistic claims about the economy obscured the desperate plight of ordinary citizens who quickly began to suffer from the new government’s lack of political experience. Revolutionary fervour did not readily translate itself into a clear economic policy. Despite the president’s proud boast that bread in Chechnya was ‘the cheapest in the CIS’, this bread was hard to find and Chechen sources claimed that up to 80 per cent of the population was ‘on the verge of starvation’.21 Overall production in the republic fell by 60 per cent in 1992 as the already high level of unemployment rose dramatically, with some assessments putting it at more than 300,000 (over 30 per cent of the population), largely due to the fact that economic ties with regions of the former Soviet Union had been severed. Workers did not receive their wages, and by mid-1992 the Chechen government owed an estimated 16 billion roubles in benefits and pension arrears.22 A report in Nezavisimaya Gazeta in June 1993 painted a grim picture of the state of the Chechen economy: gross national income was down by 67.8 per cent in comparison with 1991, real per capita income had declined by 75 per cent, total profits in the republic had fallen by 72 per cent and trade turnover by 68 per cent.23 The high levels of unemployment combined with the easy availability of weapons fostered an extremely volatile situation, exacerbated by the fact that the majority of the republic’s educational establishments were closed for economic reasons. Dudayev notoriously told impoverished teachers ‘We need warriors, not students!’, and boys as young as 15 were conscripted into the Chechen armed forces and were therefore primarily engaged in military activities. With a lack of occupation to distract them from their poor standard of living and little hope of any imminent change, the Chechen population was highly susceptible to Dudayev’s extremist rhetoric and persistent denunciation of the Russian authorities. The Chechen president manipulated the image of the ‘evil empire’, blaming it for all the republic’s problems, in order to consolidate his own regime and increase his personal power. Whilst the official figures portray a depressing image of life for the ordinary citizen in the quasi-independent republic, they mask the fact that a large proportion of business there was taking place ‘underground’. Russia’s policy of contrived indifference towards Chechnya drove the republic to extreme measures in pursuit of financial gain, hastening the ‘criminalisation’ of the republic. As mentioned above, economic sanctions had been imposed by the RSFSR government after the failed attempt to re-assert its authority in November 1991. As the blockades began to take effect it became increasingly difficult for ordinary people to make a living, despite Dudayev’s claims

62 An ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya that they had a ‘stimulating effect’ on the economy.24 Cut off from the federal budget and central banking system, with no legal status, Chechnya had become a ‘ghost republic’, as defined by Boris Moskalev: ‘Republics without international recognition exist under a permanent state of emergency and most of their sources of revenue are illegal. Ruling groups deal with the criminal world rather than legitimate foreign governments. They are rapidly merging with criminal networks.’25 A flourishing criminal network had always existed in the Soviet Union, encouraged by its easily corruptible officials and rich natural resources.26 Now however it became an essential feature of the Chechen state, ensuring the protracted survival of the Dudayev regime. Whilst there is no conclusive evidence of the link between criminal groupings and the Chechen government, Handelman concludes that there is circumstantial proof of their mutual dependence: ‘The timing of the Chechen gangs’ transformation from small bands involved in petty extortion and stolen car rackets into sophisticated crime conglomerates trading in guns and drugs coincided with the rise of Chechnya as a financial and political force.’27 Oil remained the only profitable business in the republic. Contrary to Dudayev’s constant promises to transform Chechnya into a ‘second Kuwait’ on the basis of its minimal oil reserves, production almost halved in 1992 in comparison with 1980,28 although as noted above the republic was predominantly a major centre for oil refining. Russia’s economic blockade of Chechnya was followed by an official decision to shut off oil deliveries. Nevertheless, according to information from the Russian Fuel and Energy Ministry, the transit of oil for refining in Groznyy only ceased in 1993, whilst the import of oil from Dagestan continued until November 1994. In his testimony to the Russian parliamentary enquiry on the causes of the Chechen conflict, the former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar explained the matter thus: ‘The Groznyy oil refinery was the largest oil-refining enterprise in Russia, supplying a substantial part of the North Caucasus, Stavropol and Krasnodar krais, as well as others. In this respect, to shut off the oil would have meant, at the very least, depriving these areas of fuel at sowing time, punishing not only Chechnya, but the whole of Russia.’29 Because the Soviet template of a highly centralised economic system was still in place, the Chechen economy remained de facto connected with that of the entire Federation. A further example of the problems caused by the transition away from a centralised command economy to a market-based one is the issue of energy supplies. Of the four power stations located on Chechen territory only two were still operating by the beginning of 1994. These two stations produced less than half of the republic’s energy requirements, with the rest being supplied by Russia. However, there was no expectation that Chechnya would be able to pay its outstanding debt of 17 billion roubles, since the Russian Central Bank had severed all ties with Chechnya in the wake of a massive bank fraud orchestrated by Chechen gangs. Thus, the republic continued to

An ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya 63 receive subsidised energy from the centre at the same price as other members of the Federation paid.30 It could not be excluded from these electricity supplies for technical reasons, because other regions were linked to the network that crossed Chechnya and would also have been cut off. The central authorities had failed to issue Dudayev with a prompt ‘energy ultimatum’ following the latter’s 1991 independence declaration, indirectly facilitating the secessionist regime. Exploiting the attitude of official inaction, the Chechen side allegedly engaged in the illegal export of oil. The Russian MVD estimates that profits of $800–900 million were made from the illegal export of oil in 1993, none of which appeared in the Chechen National Bank or the national budget. A former Chechen official, now living in Moscow, alleged that the republic received billions of dollars from the sale of oil and oil products abroad during 1992–93, although this money was not re-invested in the economy.31 Furthermore, a Chechen deputy in the Russian Duma, Ibragim Suleimanov, has asserted that during Dudayev’s four-year reign 22 million tonnes of oil products were exported annually from the republic, the profits of which went straight into the president’s personal accounts.32 Only the direct complicity of Russian government structures could ensure the acquisition of large quantities of oil by Chechnya and the conveyance of refined products abroad through Russian pipelines. Despite half-hearted attempts by Moscow to impose economic and transportation blockades on the republic, it never sealed its borders and Chechnya remained fully accessible.33 Unsanctioned international flights frequently departed from Groznyy’s commercial airport, permitting unrestricted access to the Russian Federation for many undesirable characters refused entry at more carefully controlled ports. This facilitated a prolific smuggling operation – the MVD claims that counterfeit currency, weapons and drugs were brought into Russia through the Chechen Republic.34 Khasbulatov considers Dudayev to have been amongst the ‘ten most significant exporters of Russian weapons’, arguing that the illegal arms and drugs trade critically destabilised the situation across southern Russia.35 Notwithstanding these allegations, in public Dudayev accused both local authorities and the secret services of allowing drug addiction in the republic to reach ‘such proportions that it threatens the nation’s gene pool’, demanding that ‘all those who are peddling drugs in the republic…must be physically eliminated’.36 One of the most infamous cases of supposed Chechen involvement in criminal activity was massive bank fraud, in which forged promissory notes were used to siphon off millions of roubles from the Russian Central Bank.37 In the Russian Federation during 1993 over nine billion roubles were withdrawn from circulation, identified as counterfeit, with almost four billion worth being attributed to Chechen gangs. The Russian media has frequently cited the following case of financial crime to illustrate the extent of Chechen ‘criminality’. On March 20th–21st 1993 two planes, loaded with

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2.5 billion roubles of Soviet money withdrawn from circulation in Estonia and intended for destruction, allegedly flew from Tallinn to Groznyy. Abubakarov acknowledges that Chechnya did receive assistance from the Baltic Republics, but maintains that it was in the form of legitimate trade, citing the example of 700 million roubles in cash and 30 million roubles’ worth of butter from a Lithuanian firm in exchange for diesel and lubricating oil. In response to the allegation concerning the plane-loads of money from Estonia he states: ‘Why would Chechnya want currency that had been withdrawn from circulation across the entire post-Soviet territory?’38 The lack of regulation and customs-free borders also encouraged poverty-stricken Chechen citizens to turn to illegitimate trade as a means of survival. So-called ‘shuttle flights’ took them from Groznyy to countries in the Middle East and Eastern Europe where they could purchase consumer goods to resell in Chechnya, at prices far below average Russian market rates. Regardless of the fact that the Chechen state did not receive any import taxes from this trade, little was done to prevent it. The illicit trade went some way to alleviating the dire financial situation many Chechens now found themselves in and therefore any resentment towards the government was partially assuaged. Moreover, according to an official from the Chechen department of overseas investment, shuttle trading kept the republic’s economy afloat, with an average monthly turnover of 40 million dollars.39 It is important to note however that this shadowy import trade was not confined to the Chechen Republic – across Russia and the former Soviet Union economic chaos and financial uncertainty were forcing people to turn to shuttle trading in order to make a living. It would be extremely difficult to substantiate reports of criminal activity within the republic, particularly as several observers have alluded to the tacit involvement of many powerful Russian politicians and oligarchs. When Sergei Shakhrai, the deputy Prime Minister dealing with Chechnya, was questioned about the extent of Moscow’s involvement in the nurturing of the Chechen black market, he replied: ‘One hundred per cent’.40 The MVD has published several books on the Chechen crisis, which contain detailed information on criminal activity, although the Ministry’s highly censured involvement in the war implies an obvious degree of bias.41 One such publication concludes that ‘Chechnya under Dudayev became a breeding ground for crime, which began to creep into all areas of the country’, echoing Yeltsin’s 1995 justification for the federal military invasion.42 However, it is important to note that the high level of criminality so often associated with ‘independent’ Chechnya is equally characteristic of post-Soviet Russia, as it attempted a simultaneous transformation of its political system and economy. A former Chechen politician, Yusup Soslambekov, is highly critical of the constant Russian media reports about soaring crime levels in the republic; ‘In reality there was no more crime in Chechnya than in any other region of the Russian Federation.’43 This is corroborated by the testimony

An ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya 65 of a Groznyy resident who concedes that, whilst life under the Dudayev regime was hard, ‘life in Russia was just the same’.44

Religious and regional unity? Religion was an important weapon in Dudayev’s psychological conflict with Russia. He exploited the traditional European fear of Islamic fundamentalism, swearing on the Koran at his inauguration as President and changing the official day of rest from Sunday to Friday. However, these token gestures were motivated more by Dudayev’s desire to win the support of other Muslim nations than a serious intention of transforming the republic into a fundamentalist state.45 Lacking the international recognition it so desperately desired, the Dudayev regime endeavoured to legitimise Chechen independence on the basis of a tenuous adherence to Islam. The Chechen president made several trips abroad in an effort to enlist international support, notably to Turkey, Northern Cyprus and Bosnia, and sent numerous letters to foreign leaders asking for assistance.46 In June 1994 the Chechen media published a declaration by the republic’s leadership to the international Islamic community with a plea to renounce the rigid borders between practising Islamic states: ‘The Chechen Republic declares the openness and transparency of its borders and calls on Dagestan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, the countries of Central Asia, the Arab nations, Pakistan and all Muslim countries and people to follow this example.’47 However, none of these states openly recognised the Chechen Republic as an independent country, fearful of upsetting nuclear Russia.48 Georgia was one of the few states that openly supported the initial Chechen independence struggle. Following the 1991 declaration of independence Dudayev announced a strengthening of relations between the two nations, stating that an agreement had been signed with the Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The idea of a ‘common Caucasian home’, a Union of Caucasian States, was discussed by Dudayev and Gamsakhurdia, who had by then been overthrown, at a meeting in Groznyy in February 1992. They signed a joint communiqué stating their certainty that stabilisation in the Caucasus was impossible without the goodwill of Caucasian peoples toward the peaceful resolution of developing conflicts: ‘Russia’s leadership can and should play a positive role in creating conditions for the normalisation of the situation in the Caucasus. The withdrawal of troops from the territory of the Caucasus is viewed as the first positive step in this direction.’49 However, Gamsakhurdia’s successor, Eduard Shevardnadze, had little time for the selfproclaimed republic, particularly after Chechen mercenaries were instrumental in the success of Abkhazia’s struggle to secede from Georgia. Having failed to secure any international recognition of Chechen sovereignty, Dudayev turned to the Caucasian republics, appealing for unity: ‘We do not forget that the responsibility for the future of our brotherly nations in the Caucasus lies with us. The unity of the Caucasian nations into

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a single society of equal rights is the one correct way forward for the future…In the event of Russian aggression against the Chechen people, the whole Caucasus will resist. And for a long time Russia will not have peace…The whole Muslim world will rise up. Chechnya is the centre of the three-hundred-year old confrontation between the Caucasus and Russia.’50 In an interview in March 1992 Dudayev claimed that economic agreements had been signed with the leaders of several neighbouring Russian regions, including Krasnodar, Rostov-on-Don, Astrakhan and Stavropol, with the intention of establishing a Caucasian Economic Zone.51 Furthermore, on the first anniversary of his inauguration as president, Dudayev expressed his belief that peace in the region would only be achieved if a unified, confederate Caucasus was created, in which each nation had the right to full independence.52 Nevertheless, Dudayev’s impassioned appeals failed to unite the Caucasian republics against the perceived threat of ‘imperial’ Russia. They had witnessed the meagre results of Chechnya’s three years of independence under Dudayev’s virtual dictatorship – the impoverishment of the people, criminalisation of the state and an increasingly violent opposition force. In November 1991 Ingushetia had voted overwhelmingly to remain within the Russian Federation, despite trepidation at the Russian government’s failed attempt to quell the rebellion in Chechnya.53 The Ingush are closely related to the Chechen people and the November 1991 crisis had created a common enemy for the Vainakh people. However, relations between the two republics were exacerbated by Ingushetia’s conflict with North Ossetia in November 1992. Russian troops were deployed to act as ‘peacekeepers’ in the region, arousing suspicions in Chechnya of an imminent invasion.54 Relations with Ingushetia were renewed in 1993 when the presidents of the two nations signed a treaty on the demarcation of mutual boundaries, which recalled their shared Vainakh roots and affirmed a common interest in maintaining peace throughout the North Caucasus.55 Dagestan, Chechnya’s eastern neighbour, had found itself increasingly destabilised by incursions by Chechen militants and constantly emphasised its desire to remain within the Russian Federation. In 1992 the Chechen media accused Dagestan of allowing its territory to be utilised as a staging ground for Russian actions against Chechnya, initiating a sharp response from Chairman of the Dagestani Supreme Soviet, Magomed Ali Magomedov: ‘No matter what anyone says, we will invite troops from Russia when and if we need to, but we do not plan to fight anyone.’56 In September of the same year Stavropol krai closed its borders with Chechnya in an attempt to prevent the illegal transit of arms and unlicensed export of goods. MVD troops worked in conjunction with the police to establish strict controls along the entire perimeter of Russia’s border with the republic – checkpoints were set up on main highways and the transportation of freight was carefully monitored. According to media reports the local population ‘welcomed the Russian military as their protectors’.

An ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya 67 Chechnya had apparently failed in its attempts to incite a united Caucasian resistance against Russian domination, although one channel of opposition still persisted: the KNK. The KNK had become a platform for Dudayev to espouse his panCaucasian ideologies regarding the unity of diverse ethnic groups within a ‘multiethnic federation’ and from which he could launch attacks on the Russian leadership over its policies in the region. However it lacked the support of many regional leaders, with the exception of Abkhazia, partly because of its blatant attempts to become the sole state power in the region. In October 1992 the KNK convened a Congress in Groznyy in an effort to reassert its waning influence.57 In its concluding declaration the Congress suggested that other North Caucasian leaders ‘denounce the Russian Federal Treaty as not in keeping with the national interests of the peoples of the Northern Caucasus’. Nevertheless, leaders of the North Caucasian republics rejected the provocative stance of both the KNK and Dudayev, although this dearth of support did not mean that they advocated Russian military intervention in the region. In the April 1993 referendum held across the Federation on public confidence in President Yeltsin, the North Caucasus proved to be highly critical of his performance. Only 2.4 per cent of the Ingush, 15 per cent of the Dagestanis, 25.9 per cent of those from Karachai-Cherkessia and 35.8 per cent in Kabardino-Balkaria declared that they had confidence in the president, a clear demonstration of the failure of Russian policy in the region.58 Chechnya refused to participate. Russian military interference in the conflict between the Ingush and North Ossetians in November 1992 had increased local fears of a clampdown by the central authorities. In the minds of the North Caucasian leaders the destruction of the Soviet Union was not yet final. There were fears that it could be resurrected at any time by the increasingly authoritarian Yeltsin regime, fears which were heightened by the neo-imperialist rhetoric that resounded in the run-up to the Russian parliamentary elections of December 1993.

The Russian exodus The mass departure of ethnic Russians from the republic following its declaration of independence in 1991 had a profound impact on the economic situation within Chechnya, to some extent precipitating its sharp decline. The majority of these Russians were engaged in the manufacturing sector and oil-related industries, dominating the higher administrative and managerial levels, and their departure resulted in the loss of their expertise and experience.59 According to 1989 census data there were an estimated 300,000 ethnic Russians in Checheno-Ingushetia, although within 18 months of this census 15 per cent had left the republic. In 1991 the outflow of Russians was six times higher than in 1989 – in the last four months of 1991 alone approximately 10,000 left, fearful of Dudayev’s fierce nationalism and belligerent secessionist stance.60

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Those Russians who did not voluntarily leave were often the victims of persecution, particularly vulnerable to the lawlessness permeating the republic. In contrast to the commotion amongst Russian politicians over alleged violations of the human and civil rights of the Russian diaspora in the Baltic states, the plight of those in Chechnya was simply disregarded, a symptom of Russia’s policy towards the republic. Cossacks, who inhabit land incorporated into the Chechen-Ingush ASSR from Stavropol krai in 1957, also claim to have been victimised as a result of Dudayev’s virulent nationalism. In February 1995 the Moscow press published an open letter from 50,000 residents of the Naurskiy and Shelkovskiy regions: ‘With Dudayev coming to power we have become residents of a reservation. During the past three years all Russian agricultural leaders have been driven out…Teaching in schools is only conducted in Chechen…In the name of fifty thousand residents of the region who want to flee from here into the depths of Russia, we beseech you: return us to Stavropol krai.’61 The fact that the dissemination of this letter and many other similar publications coincided with the disastrous Russian invasion infers that it is perhaps distorted propaganda, a palpable attempt to vindicate the behaviour of federal troops in the conflict. Assertions of human rights infringements against the Russian-speaking population in Chechnya were exploited to incite federal troops during the war. There are reports of a publication by the MVD known as the ‘White Book’, which chronicled instances of crime against the Russian population under Dudayev, being widely distributed amongst service personnel serving in the republic.62 Cases of alleged persecution against Russians in Chechnya are also well documented in several other MVD publications and the nationalist-patriotic sections of the Russian media. Stanislav Govorukhin, head of the Russian parliamentary enquiry investigating the origins of the Chechen crisis, makes the alarming judgement that what happened in the republic under Dudayev’s regime with regard to the ‘non-indigenous civilian population’ was nothing less than ‘genocide’.63 Obviously this is an extreme view, but there is little doubt that Russians were driven from their posts in governmental, media, economic and academic spheres, a phenomenon that did not escape the attention of international organisations. During the 48th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights held in Geneva in the spring of 1992 a salient increase in the number of human rights violations occurring on the grounds of ethnicity and nationality across the Russian Federation was noted, particularly in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Dagestan and Tatarstan.64 Predictably, the Chechen leadership rejected the allegations of persecution, insisting that ‘there is an absence of violence and hostility towards other nationalities in the genes of our people.’65 The majority of Russians residing in the North Caucasus region did not consider the Dudayev regime to be concerned with the interests of either the Russian or Chechen populations. During 1995 the Russian Academy of Sciences conducted research into the impact of the Chechen crisis on public

An ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya 69 consciousness in the North Caucasus and the resultant report demonstrated the wide gulf between the perceptions of Russian residents and the indigenous populations. The North Caucasus peoples deemed the Dudayev regime to be completely in tune with the interests of the Chechen people, positively evaluating events from the point of view of the construction of a sovereign state, whilst Russian inhabitants of the region judged events on the basis of social protection and their position as an ethnic minority deprived of political power and with limited social and economic influence. 66 The sheer magnitude of allegations of violations of human rights during Dudayev’s ‘reign’ denotes a certain degree of reality. As noted above, Dudayev intentionally sustained a perpetual state of insecurity and paranoia amongst the Chechen population. In public speeches he repeatedly referred to Russia as an ‘empire of evil’, a message reiterated by the local media who claimed that the Chechens had the right to revenge for their attempted annihilation by Russians over the centuries.67 However, despite these menacing denunciations, there appears to have been a growing recognition amongst Russian society that Dudayev’s attitude was not wholly representative of the aspirations of the entire Chechen nation.68

Mediation attempts The above portrait of the political and economic situation within ‘independent’ Chechnya, whilst not restricted to this republic alone, was certainly an extreme case. The federal leadership was aware of the profoundly destabilising impact events in Chechnya were having on neighbouring republics in southern Russia, but seemingly took little concrete action to rectify the problem. As the aforementioned circumstances, such as crime and an unlawful political leadership, were advanced by the Russian administration to justify its military invasion, it is possible to surmise that prior to December 1994 the situation was still considered to be manageable. Despite the seeming inaction of the federal authorities in response to the unilateral declaration of independence by the self-styled leaders of the Chechen Republic in 1991, vigorous diplomatic efforts were exerted throughout the three-year period prior to military intervention in an attempt to peaceably resolve the crisis. Arbitration took place on two levels – both parliamentary and governmental – as increasingly senior politicians and ministers met with their Chechen counterparts. However, the Russians continually refused to acquiesce to Dudayev’s chief demand: that Yeltsin engage in direct negotiations with him. Driven by his determination to gain recognition as the legitimate leader of a sovereign nation, Dudayev refused to concede this point. However, the President of the Russian Federation could not afford to publicly enter into dialogue with a ‘gangster’ republic that patently violated the norms of the Constitution. Dudayev’s regime had been denied international recognition as a lawfully elected administration when the RSFSR authorities declared the Chechen parliamentary and presi-

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dential elections of October 27th 1991 to be illegal. It is plausible the Russian leadership feared that a meeting between Yeltsin and Dudayev would give the latter legitimacy not only within the Chechen Republic, but throughout the Federation, thereby perhaps indirectly encouraging separatism amongst the leaders of other ethnic republics. Nevertheless, a personal meeting between the two leaders would probably have been sufficient to avert full-scale war.69 Following the adoption of a Constitution confirming the independent status of the Chechen Republic in March 1992, a meeting of Russian and Chechen experts was convened in the Black Sea resort of Sochi in an attempt to initiate a new phase of dialogue. The Chechen delegation at the conference, which was held March 12th–14th 1992, included Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, the radical founder of the VDP, now a member of the republic’s parliament. The mediation process was stalled by the Chechens who made it clear that, in their opinion, the most pressing concern was Russian recognition of the political independence and state sovereignty of the Chechen Republic, an issue that the Kremlin resolutely refused to even consider. A protocol signed by both sides at the Sochi meeting included an incredible demand for ‘the apportioning of the Chechen Republic’s part of the gold, diamond and currency reserves from the former Union fund.’70 The Chechen resolve to maintain complete independence from the Russian Federation was demonstrated that same month by their refusal to sign the Federal Treaty, an agreement that attempted to delineate newly evolving relations between the centre and constituent republics in the post-Soviet era71. Tatarstan also refused to sign the Treaty, forcing Moscow to consider concessions. The negotiation process gathered momentum with the appointment of Sergei Shakhrai as Russian Nationalities Minister in October 1992.72 He was given special responsibility for the North Caucasus region and, under his guidance, discussions between the two sides began in earnest. During a closed meeting of the Russian legislature in December 1992 Shakhrai, in his new role as chairman of the State Committee on Nationalities Policy, initiated a debate regarding the official position toward Chechnya and Ingushetia. The parliament had adopted a decree, confirmed by law on June 4th 1992, regarding the division of Checheno-Ingushetia and the creation of a new Ingush Republic. However, this law had merely exacerbated tension in the region, as it had failed to consider the practicalities of implementation.73 Shakhrai argued convincingly for the need to constitutionally recognise the Ingush Republic,74 stating: ‘Up until now we have had a situation in which only rights were ‘tossed’ to this repressed people, and since the Russian authorities have not concerned themselves with anything else (first and foremost, statehood), the Ingush have started determining for themselves just who they are’.75 At that time Article 71 of the valid Constitution, adopted in 1977, referred to the ‘Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic’.76

An ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya 71 As a result of Shakhrai’s efforts the Russian Constitution was amended to include the words ‘the Ingush Republic within the Russian Federation’, along with ‘the Chechen Republic within the Russian Federation’, recognising each republic as a separate entity. These amendments were included in Yeltsin’s 1993 Constitution, which distinguishes between the ‘Ingush Republic’ and ‘Chechen Republic’.77 For the first time since November 1991 the Congress had taken concrete measures on the Chechen issue. This was a milestone in Russian–Chechen relations – although Chechen independence remained unrecognised, it was the first time that the Russian parliament had formally acknowledged the division of Checheno-Ingushetia, which had been instituted in a unilateral action by a Chechen leadership that lacked any legitimacy. Despite this apparent mood of compromise, there were two issues on which Shakhrai would not yield. In his opinion the ‘virus of separatism’ was a dangerous phenomenon and he opposed any concessions to Chechen demands for secession. He also insisted that Yeltsin should never meet an illegally elected leader. In an article published in September 1994, Shakhrai stated that such a meeting would ‘be a day of national shame for Russia’.78 In his opinion the president of the Russian Federation could not be permitted to enter into dialogue with a man who had come to power as a result of an ‘illegal revolution’. This caused serious problems for the negotiating teams – as mentioned above, Dudayev’s chief objective was recognition by Yeltsin. At the end of 1992 Mamodayev, the Chechen prime minister, held talks in Moscow with representatives of the Russian parliament. Following months of negotiations, the Chechen and Russian sides successfully drafted a ‘Treaty on the Separation of Power and Authority between the State Governing Bodies of the Russian Federation and the Governing Bodies of the Chechen Republic’.79 The draft treaty was published in the local Chechen press on December 31st, immediately arousing fierce debate.80 A joint statement was issued by the Chechen government and parliament, rejecting the treaty on the grounds that it contradicted both the Constitution and the Declaration of Sovereignty. It claimed that Mamodayev’s trip had been undertaken as a private visit and that he did not possess the authority to conduct such negotiations. Nevertheless, the government and parliament did express a willingness to sign an agreement on the regulation of state relations between Chechnya and Russia on the basis of ‘equality and mutual respect of each other’s sovereignty’, once again demanding that Moscow yield to Chechen independence.81 A Russian delegation headed by Shakhrai and Abdulatipov arrived in Groznyy for talks with representatives of the Chechen parliament at the beginning of 1993. These talks revealed perceptible signs of the simmering discontent towards Dudayev’s regime within the republic. Relations between the executive and legislature were becoming increasingly confrontational, reflecting the situation at the centre. According to media reports, the parliament building where the talks took place was full of Dudayev’s National

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Guard, a provocative gesture by the Chechen president who was incensed that he had not been consulted.82 In accordance with the Chechen Constitution (Section Three, Article 62) ‘the determination of the domestic and foreign policy of the Chechen Republic’ was to be conducted by parliament and not the president.83 Thus the Chechen delegation, led by the Parliamentary Chairman Hussein Akhmadov, reached agreement with the Russians on the preparation of a treaty on the delimitation and mutual delegation of powers.84 Shakhrai expressed his satisfaction with the negotiations, observing that ‘an important, mutually agreed-on step has been taken toward normalising the situation. Peace in the North Caucasus means peace throughout the entire Russian Federation.’85 From a Chechen point of view the protocol denoted acquiescence. Commenting on the outcome of the talks, Akhmadov said: ‘We are calling for sovereignty, independence and freedom of action. But we realise that in an interdependent world you have to mesh your own interests…with the interests of others. And this means giving up certain goals and tasks, especially ones that belong only to you. This is stipulated in the protocol…I realise that there are very large forces that do not want our rapprochement, our reconciliation, both within Russia and in the Chechen Republic.’86 A contemptuous Dudayev believed the accord represented the commencement of Chechen submission to the centre and dismissed it with the statement: ‘No political agreements with Russia are possible’. He dissolved parliament by force and accused its entire leadership of treachery and betrayal. The brief period of negotiating success was supplanted by a renewal of conflict and confrontation.

Negotiating deadlock Efforts to peaceably resolve the antagonistic nature of Russian-Chechen relations were further jeopardised in March 1993 when Yeltsin issued a presidential decree ‘On the Reforming of Military Structures and Border and Internal Troops in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation and on State Support for the Cossacks’, which had worrying implications for the stability of the Caucasus region. The decree angered many Russians, particularly those involved with the negotiations, as it appeared to be a renewal of the centre’s traditional policy of ‘divide and rule’ in the region. Abdulatipov declared: ‘[This decree] literally nullified all of Sergei Shakrai’s and my efforts to normalise the situation and returns us to the era of war against Shamil’.87 It was announced that Cossacks were to do military service in specific Cossack units within the armed forces, MVD and border troops, arousing fears of a revival of the historic Cossack Line to defend the southern Russian border.88 These suspicions were verified by a declaration from a Cossack assembly in Stavropol krai, proclaiming the establishment of the Line of Cossacks of the Caucasus. A statement by the assembly insisted that the fundamental reason for the new structure was to unite Cossacks in

An ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya 73 order ‘to protect comrades in the North Caucasian republics’.89 This heralded an exacerbation in confrontation and tension across the region, particularly between Chechens and those Cossacks who inhabited areas within the republic. In a letter to Yeltsin on the tense political situation developing in Moscow, Dudayev accentuated the growing concern felt throughout the North Caucasus at the manipulative empowering of the Cossacks: ‘the battle between the two branches of power could activate a third force, notably the Cossacks, who have been granted privileged powers by the President.’90 At the end of March Dudayev sent a letter to Yeltsin, once more appealing to him to recognise the independent status of Chechnya: ‘The people of the Chechen Republic, having consciously embarked upon the path of sovereignty…are building mutual relations with all peoples and states on the basis of the norms and principles of international law…We are open to dialogue and reasonable compromises.’91 Dudayev assured the President that Russia ‘will acquire…a trustworthy partner and the guarantee of political stability throughout the Caucasus.’ When Yeltsin did not respond Dudayev wrote again. This letter included the Chechen leader’s sentiments on the political situation in Russia. Making no mention of Chechen sovereignty, he advised Yeltsin to dissolve the Supreme Soviet, call elections for a new parliament and adopt a new constitution in September 1993. No doubt Kremlin officials viewed this letter with astonishment – the leader of a seditious republic presuming to offer advice to the legitimate head of the powerful Russian Federation. Unsurprisingly Yeltsin once again failed to respond. As the political situation within both the Chechen Republic and Russian Federation deteriorated, negotiations between the two faltered. The leaders of both governments were engaged in a struggle for supremacy between the legislative and executive branches of power. The conflict between President Yeltsin and his parliament was mirrored by the intensifying strife in Groznyy, as Dudayev forcibly suppressed any opposition to his authority. His efforts to thwart insubordination to his staunchly pro-independence stance became increasingly ludicrous. In June 1993 he decreed that all members of a Chechen delegation who had participated in recent talks with Moscow were to be divested of their Chechen citizenship. The decree included Mamodayev, in exile in Moscow, Aslanbek Aslakhanov, a prominent Chechen-born politician, together with the speaker of the Russian parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov.92

Re-evaluation of national policy It was obvious that the negotiation process was faltering as a result of Russia’s lack of a coherent strategy with regards to centre–periphery relations in general, and the North Caucasus in particular. This lack of clear federal policy is demonstrated by Moscow’s chaotic attitude to economic

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issues. The periphery has remained very reliant upon the centre for financial assistance, receiving large handouts from the federal budget whilst simultaneously manifesting a blatant disregard for Russian tax legislation. It is questionable whether any of the republics or regions could realistically expect to survive outside of the Federation’s economic sphere. An article published in January 1993 in Izvestiya highlighted the imbalance of the new relationship, alleging that four republics within the Russian Federation – Chechnya, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan and Yakutia – essentially paid almost no taxes into the federal budget. Despite its disregard for Russian tax legislation, Chechnya was among one of the largest recipients of subsidies. A similar report in June substantiated these assertions. Whilst Tatarstan had received 38 billion roubles from the Federation in 1992 it had paid a mere 93 million in taxes. A single set of figures given for both Chechnya and Ingushetia disclosed that 48 million roubles was paid by the two republics in taxes, whilst 913 million was received in the form of subsidies.93 Yet when the Chechen finance minister Taimaz Abubakarov announced the budget for 1993, he dismissed as a ‘myth’ claims that Chechnya received substantial funding from the federal coffers, insisting ‘We have not received and are not receiving any allocations from Russia.’94 The disparity between unpaid taxes and subsidies prompted the State Duma to call for the suspension of the financing of these republics and an end to the use of financial concessions as political bargaining tools. In March 1993 the Russian parliament finally enacted a resolution halting the official financing of Chechnya in the form of subsidies for pensions and other benefits.95 By controlling this vital flow of finance into the republic, the federal authorities perhaps believed that there was still a possibility of influencing the course of events. Subsidies could potentially be used to lure Dudayev into negotiations and force concessions out of him, thereby enabling Moscow to retain some kind of leverage over the rebellious republic. This is typical of federal ‘policy’ towards its constituent parts – relations with the regions have always been manipulated by the Russian leadership in its domestic quarrels, and financial concessions are often utilised as political bargaining tools. However, many regional leaders have a clear understanding of their role in Moscow’s power games, and it has been suggested that separatist discourse is used by local elites merely to increase or maintain specific levels of subsidies.96

Concluding remarks It can be seen that the specific nature of Chechen ‘independence’ hindered the mediation process and precluded the possibility of a negotiated settlement. The lack of any genuine reform efforts by the Chechen elite encouraged the expansion of criminal activity in the republic, particularly amongst ordinary citizens who had no other means of earning a living. Moreover, the republic was highly militarised following the withdrawal of

An ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya 75 Soviet troops, which further impeded reconciliation efforts. Dudayev’s attempts to forge international links, as well as pan-Caucasian unity, were viewed by the federal authorities as potential threats to the stability and security of Russia’s southern border, although the situation was apparently not deemed serious enough at this stage to warrant a military resolution. Prior to the 1992 Federal Treaty the Russian leadership had failed to institutionalise a legal framework for federal relations, thereby hindering the future development of a democratic state system. Russian policy towards Chechnya after 1991 impelled it towards criminal activities in order to survive. Whilst there was undeniably a high level of criminal activity within Chechnya, this was the sole means of subsistence for the majority of the republic’s inhabitants who were cut off from the federal budget. Furthermore, Chechnya’s economic plight reflected the situation across the Russian Federation, as the country struggled to come to terms with the dual transition away from a highly centralised communist system towards a more democratic one based on the market values of capitalism. The weakness of official state structures, together with the chaos inherent to the transition process, encouraged fraudulent groups to seize power and resources, hastening the ‘criminalisation’ of the entire Russian state, not just the Chechen Republic. The next chapter will investigate the nature of the political system that emerged in Chechnya as a result of its transition away from communist rule, and the impact this transformation had on the republic’s relationship with the federal authorities, focusing on the crises of power that both Dudayev and Yeltsin were confronted with during 1993.

5

Challenges to internal sovereignty The roots of power and opposition to the Dudayev regime (1991–93)

Introduction Contrary to popular belief, Dudayev never received the unanimous support of the Chechen population as the leader of an independent republic. His opponents rallied behind him in the face of impending Russian military intervention in both 1991 and 1994, but this support was motivated merely by a determination to defend the republic against an external threat, not by any sentiments of loyalty to the Dudayev regime and its ambitions. The opposition desired independence, although not necessarily with Dudayev as their leader nor on his terms. Escalating tension within the republic threatened to destabilise the fragile political equilibrium and Dudayev exploited the strained atmosphere to augment his own authority. Manifold opposition groups made futile attempts to curb the authoritarian excesses of the Chechen president and temper his extreme stance vis-à-vis the federal government, efforts that merely generated further hostilities and provided Dudayev with additional justification to reinforce his brutal regime. Whilst the various opposition movements were united by their desire to move along the path of independence, they held conflicting views about the specific nature of Chechen sovereignty and the formulation of new state structures. An issue of particular contention was whether the political system should be presidential or parliamentary, generating a serious battle between the two branches of power for supremacy. On the surface, the political conflict within Chechnya appeared to be merely between the executive and legislature. However, this struggle masked deep-seated animosities between rival clans who dominated the formal power structures in pursuit of economic goals. The traditional Chechen social order was exploited by particular personalities in order to control economic sources of power, such as the oil industry and chemical-industrial complex. The preceding chapter examined the economic and social situation within independent Chechnya and its evolving relations with the federal authorities, as the republic unsuccessfully sought to verify its external sovereignty. This chapter will examine the factors that hindered Dudayev’s attempts at state-building and the legitimisation of his internal sovereignty.1 It will focus on the nature of the internal

Challenges to internal sovereignty

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political instabilities facing the north-Caucasian republic and their negative impact upon the on-going negotiations with the centre, as the attitudes of both Moscow and Groznyy were dramatically altered in response to domestic challenges.

Origins of the anti-Dudayev opposition: the role of the traditional clan hierarchy In order to gain a greater understanding of the forces that motivate contemporary Chechen society, it is pertinent to include a brief account of the role played by clans or teips, the custom of extended families headed by village elders.2 Jan Chesnov, a Russian anthropologist, has ascribed great importance to the traditional structure of Chechen society: ‘What is a teip from the point of view of a Chechen? First of all, a teip is a group that characterises his or her personality. A Chechen uses as a surname the name of one of his or her immediate ancestors’.3 Great emphasis is placed on kinship and membership of a tightly knit familial grouping, as opposed to the notion of belonging to the Chechen nation as a whole. This traditional social structure, which places great importance on teip relations, facilitated the development of the anti-Dudayev opposition movement. Because there was little tradition of a political culture, loyalty was exclusively directed towards ‘relatives’ belonging to the same clan. Thus opposition leaders were assured of support from their clans in the struggle to overthrow Dudayev. Moreover, the tight clan structure and lack of a vertical hierarchy meant that the Russians were unable to place ‘puppet’ leaders.4 The myriad clans of Chechnya were on an equal level, fiercely resistant to subjugation by an external authority, an attribute that played a crucial role in the evolution of the contemporary crisis. Gammer has characterised the Chechens as maintaining an ‘extreme vigilance over their freedom and the strong rejection of any authority external to the tribe or clan.’5 There is considerable hostility between the numerous teips, principally for influence in a particular area. This friction is centred around two specific features of individual teips. One way in which clans are delineated is by whether they are of purely Chechen origin or contain ‘outsiders’, people from other clans or nations. ‘Pure’ teips include the Benoi, Tsentroi and Kurchiloi, whilst examples of ‘mixed’ teips include the Gonoi, which is related to the Terek Cossacks, and the Dzumsoi, which is of Georgian origin. Khasbulatov’s teip, the Kharachoi, is believed to have Cherkess roots.6 In addition, teips are also distinguished by their location, specifically between the mountains of southern Chechnya and the lowlands of the north. It is estimated that there are approximately 100 mountain clans, with only about 70 in the plains. Mountain clans have always been deemed to be more prestigious than their lowland counterparts, as the mountainous regions are believed to have suffered more under both Tsarist and Soviet

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rule.7 The majority of the radical-nationalists, who initiated the drive for independence, originated from the highland regions of the south, an area that was generally supportive of Dudayev. The northern plains of Chechnya have traditionally been more receptive to Russian rule8 and it was from here that much of the resistance to the Dudayev regime emanated, following the latter’s unilateral declaration of independence. A clear example of the conflict between mountain and lowland teips can be seen in the contest for power that took place in 1991 as Zavgayev, a member of a lowland clan, struggled to retain his authority in the face of fierce opposition from the OKChN, comprised primarily of representatives from mountain clans.9 During Chechnya’s so-called ‘national revival’ of the late 1980s–early 1990s, teip relations were exploited by political leaders in the struggle for power. Teip congresses and assemblies took place in the provinces, convened ostensibly to strengthen family ties and revive ancient traditions long suppressed by the Soviet authorities. Local organisational committees were created, forming the basis of the OKChN, which was instrumental in the overthrow of the ASSR’s incumbent communist leadership in 1991. However, according to a report by Kurginyan et al many of the participants in these teip congresses were motivated purely by a desire to augment their own personal power and influence.10 Sulim Nasardinov observes that the traditional clan and vird structure is still crucial for the regulation of social processes within the republic. Beginning in 1988 within Chechnya ‘[t]he Soviet nomenklatura started giving way to a new elite. The latter was profoundly echeloned in society because it relied on clans. In parallel, a system of religious communities (virds united in tarikats …) was developing. Drawing on finances, the new elite has been ‘raising’ its own clans while the virds were providing them with religious charisma’.11 Dudayev recognised the vital role (and romantic symbolism) of teips and consequently sought to revive the traditional clan hierarchy in a simultaneous effort to consolidate support for his regime and strengthen Chechen statehood.12 Having dissolved all forms of Soviet institutional control, he reestablished the Council of Elders, the Mekhkel, a traditional form of authority composed of respected elders from Groznyy and villages across the republic. Whilst it often played an intermediary role between feuding teips, many Chechens were scornful of Dudayev’s re-establishment of the Council, calling it a ‘puppet organisation’.13 As his popularity plummeted in the face of the worsening economic crisis, Dudayev exploited traditional forms of authority and increased the prominence of Islam in an effort to consolidate popular support for his rule. There is a critical debate surrounding the significance of teips in the development of both the political and societal crisis in Chechnya. Professor Dzhabrail Gakaev, an ethnic Chechen who played a pivotal role in the political opposition to Dudayev’s regime, argues that teip relations continue to play an active role in modern-day Chechnya. In his opinion Dudayev and his allies successfully exploited clan relations and family ties when they seized

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power ‘in order to divide the nation and consolidate their own personal power’.14 He maintains that the Chechen leaders attempted to set the people against one another on the basis of their allegiance to a particular teip or territory.15 Nevertheless, in contrast to the situation in Afghanistan, where inter-tribal conflict predominates, Chechen clans have always succeeded in uniting against any external threat to their nation. Charles Blandy believes that clans acted as a ‘great unifier’ during the 1994–96 war with Russia. He also endorses the view that teip membership is a fundamental determinant in what position an individual holds and their activities during the war of 1994–96.16 However, Valery Tishkov contends that clans had a limited impact on the evolution of the conflict. In his view their role was limited to the allocation of posts in governmental and administrative structures, providing a network of contacts and useful links based on a common background, and he compares the teip system to the ‘old boy’ network prevalent amongst the alumni of certain educational establishments. Whilst Tishkov concedes that a strict teip system exerted considerable influence on Chechen society during historical times, he stresses that other factors, such as Islam and the socalled warrior spirit, were often more efficacious.17 A 1994 analysis of the Chechen situation by the Russian intelligence services (FSK) attached great significance to the clan system, viewing it as the key to Chechen politics and society. This government briefing paper depicted clans as ‘largely closed, internally cohesive and mutually exclusive building blocks, which take hidden but mainly united political decisions, and which give their allegiances as teips to different causes and leaders’.18 Thus the Chechen ‘revolution’ of 1991 was seen as a ‘revolt of excluded teips against the Tyerekhskoi clan, under which Communist Party First Secretary Doku Zavgayev had come to dominate the local Communist and state structures’.19 Zavgayev’s teip not only dominated the government administration, but also the profitable oil industry, provoking rancour amongst other teips. As a result Dudayev was elected OKChN leader partly on the basis of his membership of a relatively insignificant teip and thus represented a compromise between the more powerful clans in the republic. Nevertheless, under Dudayev’s regime a new teip coalition attempted to monopolise government structures and the oil industry, provoking fierce opposition from rival clans. According to the FSK, the opposition movement of 1992–93 encompassed a complicated web of clan rivalries, rather than a substantive political movement opposed to Dudayev’s policies and government.20

Emergent opposition structures Prior to the 1991 unilateral declaration of independence there was already considerable hostility to the extreme stance of the OKChN EC. The liberal opposition were firmly opposed to the notion of outright independence espoused by radical nationalists such as Dudayev and his allies in the EC,

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and their attitude towards Moscow was far more conciliatory, as seen in Chapter Four. Even within the OKChN there was a discernible split between conservative and radical factions, although the radicals ultimately prevailed. The conservative faction of the OKChN had the support of a large proportion of the Chechen intelligentsia, who were opposed to what was viewed by many as a crude usurpation of power by the EC.21 Opposition groups contested the outcome of the October 1991 elections in which Dudayev allegedly received over 90 per cent of the votes, protesting that the election campaign had been unfair and heavily biased in favour of the EC. However, despite the considerable opposition to Dudayev’s leadership, even before his election victory, the Kremlin’s failed attempt to impose a state of emergency within the republic caused the manifold groups to unite behind the ‘president’ against the threat of a Russian invasion. The republic’s former economics and finance minister, Taimaz Abubakarov, claims that serious internal disagreements arose amongst members of the newly elected parliament within weeks of its inauguration, primarily related to future economic and social reform.22 The new regime soon manifested its inability to resolve the deepening economic crisis. Yusup Soslambekov, a parliamentary deputy who was instrumental in the success of the so-called ‘Chechen revolution’, criticised the OKChN and its leaders (himself included) for its lack of any serious political or economic policies: ‘We [the OKChN leaders] had neither political experience nor a concrete programme, but the desire to be free carried us along … In those days all our energy was spent on creating an image of Dudayev as a Chechen national hero’.23 He accused the Dudayev regime of implementing a state policy of ‘demagogy and lawlessness’, which had generated a ‘monstrous situation’ in Chechnya. Personal enrichment and advancement became the priority of government officials, rather than responsibility to an electorate that was unfamiliar with the correct interactions of a democratic state. Abubakarov maintains that the majority of ministers regarded their departments as their own private ‘estates’, yielding substantial sources of income, and they were loath to relinquish ‘their’ assets to the private sector.24 The lack of any appropriate resolution to the economic crisis led to disillusionment amongst the Chechen people, many of whom joined the ranks of the growing opposition. As the high expectations of the population remained unfulfilled by the regime’s inability to meet even their most basic demands, feelings of dissatisfaction and tension rose, a common feature of societies in transition. Support for opposition groups grew as the people became increasingly estranged from the ruling elite whose legitimacy was undermined by its previous grandiose pledges to improve the well-being of the Chechen population. The first indications of a renewed vigour amongst Dudayev’s opponents appeared at the beginning of 1992 in the form of political protests, causing Dudayev to impose a curfew in Groznyy25, whilst the parliament once

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again extended the period of the president’s emergency powers, which they had conferred on him during November of the previous year. The legislature justified its decision by stating that ‘provocative actions by enemies of the republic’ were aggravating difficult circumstances.26 As mentioned above, members of the Chechen intelligentsia formed the bulk of the liberal opposition. This self-titled ‘democratic’ opposition rejected Dudayev’s policy of ‘radical sovereignty’, arguing that sovereignty was not an end in itself, but merely a means of attaining better conditions for the entire nation.27 In February 1992 an opposition bloc called the ‘Democratic Society of Chechnya’ issued an appeal for a united, independent Vainakh republic on the territory of the former Checheno-Ingushetia, accusing certain ‘destructive forces’ of inciting nationalism and separatist tendencies.28 This association, which chiefly comprised representatives of the national intelligentsia, stressed that it had no affiliation to any political party or group, but was intended as a non-aligned ‘third force’.29 The following month another coalition of liberal opposition movements was convened in a ‘round table’ session to discuss the prevailing situation within the republic. The main outcome of the meeting was a petition requesting the Chechen parliament and president to disarm illegal armed formations and introduce a law on the economic development of the republic, accentuating the growing sense of disillusionment with the Dudayev regime.30 The media played an indispensable role in the circulation of antiDudayev propaganda. Harsh critiques of the president and his administration frequently appeared in those sections of the Chechen press that managed to evade harsh state controls. The most prominent mouthpiece of the opposition was Impuls, one of the first independent newspapers to appear in Checheno-Ingushetia during the perestroika era. In an article published by the paper in February 1992, Gakaev warned that the radical policies of the so-called ‘democratic’ regime would inevitably lead to bloodshed and rebuked it for failing to master the basic fact that ‘democracy above all involves the protection of a minority’s rights, not violence. It is respect for the individual, for the human being, irrespective of his nationality, social origin or political inclinations’.31 By the end of March 1992, frustration at the new leadership’s inability to effectively resolve persistent political and economic problems deteriorated into open violence. On March 31st, the day that the majority of regional leaders within the Russian Federation were in Moscow to sign the Federal Treaty, armed supporters of the opposition seized the television and radio stations in Groznyy, demanding the resignation of Dudayev and parliament and calling for fresh elections to be held. A statement widely disseminated by the Co-ordinating Council for the Restoration of Constitutional Order in the Checheno-Ingush Republic32, which was the principal force behind the insurrection, vigorously condemned the new regime and its failure to tackle the country’s economic and social problems:

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This brief attempt to take control was rapidly crushed by the National Guard, as a rally in support of Dudayev was hastily convened in one of the city’s main squares. A state of emergency was declared by the Chechen parliament who inadvertently encouraged Dudayev’s authoritarian tendencies by granting him ‘unlimited emergency powers’.34 In addition, armed formations loyal to the leadership, such as the National Guard, were given the right to take ‘decisive measures’ in order to deal with opponents of the regime. Dudayev made an impassioned appeal to the Chechen people, which exhorted them to ‘rise to the defence of the people’s sacred right to freedom, independence and national dignity’ and vehemently insisted that ‘having gone through cruel trials and hellish torment’ the Chechens ‘have become the fully-fledged masters of their own land’.35 At this juncture the parliament was still nominally supportive of the president, or at least not yet standing in direct opposition to him, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the protest. Another crucial factor in the failure of this rebellion was the lack of consensus amongst the manifold opposition groupings. Many members of the intelligentsia resolutely rejected the use of force in their ideological conflict with Dudayev and his allies. Gakaev, a prominent member of the intelligentsia-led opposition, perceived a clear rift between the more militant formations, who favoured an armed solution to the unrest, and the political opposition, which advocated peaceful negotiations.36 In an address to his supporters, the Chechen president accused Moscow of engineering the insurrection, alleging that Groznyy was the victim of a conspiracy, plotted by Khasbulatov and Zavgayev, to seize control of the republic. The Chechen ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ issued a statement, describing the events of March 31st as an ‘attempted coup d’état’ that was intended to ‘undermine the on-going dialogue between the Chechen Republic and Russian Federation’ and warned that ‘any interference in the internal affairs of the Chechen Republic’ was ‘inadmissible’.37 It is feasible that certain members of the Russian government had contrived to weaken Dudayev’s authority, deliberately choosing the day designated for the ceremonial signing of the new Federal Treaty in order to accentuate the population’s supposed disinclination to continue its self-imposed exile from the Russian Federation. The tone of the Co-ordinating Council’s communiqué is similar to that of denunciations made by Russian politicians during

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the crisis of autumn 1991, highlighting the ‘criminal nature’ of the republic. Perhaps this was a final endeavour by the Russian authorities to covertly reassert its control over the republic, before the expiry of Dudayev’s ultimatum to withdraw all federal troops by June 1992.

Domestic battles Notwithstanding possible Russian interference, the worsening political conflict was increasingly destabilising the republic. Gakaev has characterised independent Chechnya as lacking any form of ‘public authority’, being occupied instead by ‘various mafioso groups who seized power’.38 These groups were engaged in an open battle for influence and resources, which initially appeared to be between the parliament and government, but the reality was far more complicated. Abubarakov describes the situation as ‘covert rivalry between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Chechens [between traditionalists and innovators] over the economic and political re-division of the republic, which they justified under the axiom of defending the interests of a young independent state’.39 Following Yaragai Mamodayev’s appointment in May to the post of Deputy Prime Minister with full control over the economy40, an internal struggle for ascendancy developed between the legislative and executive branches of power, mirroring the evolving discord in Moscow. The ruling elite that now claimed control of Chechnya was not content to remain accountable to a parliament that was proving to be a formidable opponent. The nature of the anti-Dudayev opposition altered, and resistance to the regime began to emanate not only from civic organisations, but also from within political structures, notably the parliament. The legislature made futile attempts to constrain the president’s increasing authoritarianism, thereby acting in a far more democratic manner than the Chechen leader himself. There was particularly fierce rivalry over the control of the oil industry and its potential profits. In an article published by the Chechen newspaper Golos Chechenskoi Respubliki in July 1992 Khadzhiev accused the authorities of squandering millions of dollars that had been received from the sale of oil products. According to the former Soviet minister, at least two million tonnes of oil products remained unaccounted for and he questioned the motives behind the government’s reluctance to publish any information regarding the sale of oil and its by-products.41 The new Deputy Prime Minister, Mamodayev, was particularly interested in any government decisions related to the re-distribution of natural resources, especially oil, an interest that soon led him into fierce conflict with Dudayev and had serious repercussions on the political situation.42 Fiona Hill concludes that, beginning in summer 1992, disputes within the Chechen government intensified as a result of a dispute over the distribution of profits from the sale of Chechen oil and petroleum products. She connects this with the emergence of new political factions within the ruling elite, which consolidated around

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Mamodayev and Gantemirov, the mayor of Groznyy; around Ruslan Utsiev, the head of the Presidential Council on External Economic Relations; and the Minister of the Interior, Sultan Albakov.43 Both Mamodayev and Gantemirov went on to become bitter opponents of the Dudayev regime. In September 1992 the leaders of six political organisations established a further coalition of political parties and movements outwith the parliament opposed to the Dudayev regime, under the banner of the ‘Round Table’.44 Its Co-ordinating Council, which included Khadzhiev, Gakaev, Umkhaev and Bugaev, demanded the resignation of all power structures and the holding of multi-party elections, as well as a referendum regarding sovereignty and the form of power within the republic. At a ‘Round Table’ conference held on October 24th Gakaev, one of the founding members, affirmed that the bloc would pursue its objectives solely through political means and within the constitutional framework. In his opinion its most valuable goal was the ‘union of all healthy democratic forces within the republic with the aim of achieving national and civic accord and the establishment of a sovereign, legitimate, democratic, secular Chechen state’.45 He went on to emphasise that the bloc was willing to enter into dialogue with Dudayev’s regime in an attempt to resolve the prevailing political and economic crises. At the end of 1992 Gakaev headed a delegation, which comprised members of the anti-Dudayev political opposition, in a meeting with toplevel Russian officials, including Khasbulatov and Filatov. This opposition group was categorical in its insistence that the federal authorities discriminate between it and the Dudayev regime. According to Gakaev, his delegation implored the Russian leadership ‘to either acknowledge Dudayev as the legitimate leader [of the Chechen Republic] and hence enter into negotiations with him, in order to bring an end to the suffering of the Chechen population, or to make a statement on behalf of the Russian President and Parliament refusing to recognise the regime in Groznyy under any circumstances.’46 However, the Russian administration was virtually paralysed by the intensifying hostility between its own executive and legislative branches of power, thus once again no decisive measures to resolve the Chechen crisis were taken.47 The deployment of federal troops in the Ingush-Ossetian conflict heightened Chechen fears of an imminent Russian offensive against the republic.48 Dudayev was able to exploit the mood of national paranoia within Chechnya in order to consolidate his own power and boost flagging support for his increasingly unpopular regime. In response to the potential threat Dudayev instituted a state of emergency, claiming that ‘the unprovoked introduction of troops by the Russian Federation’ into the region constituted a ‘genuine threat to the country’s security’. His decree also imposed a rigorous censorship on the media, outlawing the dissemination of any material that contained ‘provocative statements’ or represented ‘disinformation’.49 The introduction of Russian forces in the North Caucasus

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also facilitated the instigation of anti-Russian hysteria and encouraged certain opposition movements to once more unite behind the Chechen president in the face of the ‘imperial’ threat.50 At the beginning of 1993 fears of an imminent invasion again escalated owing to a statement by Sergei Shakhrai, Russian Deputy Prime Minister, that the Russian leadership was prepared to use force to defend its ‘priority interests’ in the Caucasus.51 The concentration of Russian troops along Chechnya’s borders disconcerted the political elite in Groznyy, precipitating a further clampdown on any opposition forces within the republic. Once again the proximity of federal forces afforded Dudayev the pretext to consolidate his own power and restrict the activities of any opponents. A report by the London-based non-governmental organisation, International Alert, which was published after a fact-finding mission to the republic in 1992, concluded that ‘Dudayev’s response to any form of opposition criticism has been to stir up fears of Russian intervention, which frustrates efforts to initiate a rational negotiation process with Russia’.52 Stanislav Govorukhin, head of the Russian parliamentary commission that investigated the Chechen crisis, believes the most important political result of 1993 was the weakening of Dudayev’s regime. It had been swept to power on the strength of its popular nationalist declarations and pledges to improve the economic standing of ordinary citizens, noble intentions that by 1993 had proved impossible to fulfil. Strained relations between the Chechen president and parliament were exacerbated by the creation of the ‘Nokhchicho’ (Chechen State) movement in October 1992, founded to mobilise supporters of Dudayev with the aim of ‘protecting the president from unfounded attacks from opposition parties’. This extremist group advocated a strict ban on the activities of all opposition parties and organisations, the restriction of freedom of speech and other human rights, as well as the constitutional granting of authoritarian powers to Dudayev and simultaneous reduction of the legislature’s authority.53 Talks with Russia became a strategic weapon in the increasing battle between the Chechen executive and legislative branches of power. As discussed in the previous chapter, Mamodayev, the Chechen prime minister, held talks in Moscow at the end of 1992 with representatives of the Russian parliament, without Dudayev’s consent. In a rare demonstration of unity, Dudayev and the head of the Chechen parliament, Hussein Akhmadov, issued a joint communiqué rejecting the resultant treaty on the grounds that it contradicted both the Constitution and the Declaration of Sovereignty. It claimed that Mamodayev’s trip had been undertaken as a private visit and that he did not possess the authority to conduct such negotiations.54 Henceforth Mamodayev was openly critical of the Dudayev leadership for its economic and political incompetence and endorsed the opposition’s demand for the president’s immediate resignation. The January 1993 negotiations between the Chechen parliament and a Russian delegation (discussed in greater detail in the previous chapter) were

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conducted in the shadow of increasing confrontation. According to media reports, the parliament building where the talks took place was full of Dudayev’s National Guard, a provocative gesture by the Chechen president who was incensed that he had not been consulted.55 At the conclusion of the talks Akhmadov asserted ‘I realise that there are very large forces that do not want our rapprochement, our reconciliation, both within Russia and in the Chechen Republic.’56 These talks were conducted without the participation of General Dudayev who later dismissed the talks, vindicating Akhmadov’s remark with his statement ‘No political agreements with Russia are possible’.57 In an ironic parallel to events in Moscow, the Chechen legislature and executive had embarked on a collision course. Sergei Chugayev, a Russian journalist, provides a succinct explanation for the exploitation of negotiations in the political struggle: ‘The Chechen Republic today is extremely interested in normalising relations with Russia, and the political force that succeeds in being the first to achieve this normalisation will greatly benefit. Therefore, one can understand the rather nervous reaction by the president’s allies to the fact that the initiative in this very important matter has ended up in the hands of the parliament.’58 The branch of political power, which managed to successfully conclude an agreement with the federal authorities, would ultimately prevail in the internal struggle for supremacy taking place within the republic. Thus, it is possible to conjecture that attempts to legitimise Chechnya’s internal and external sovereignty were inextricably interlinked.

Advance of the armed opposition In the wake of the failed reconciliation efforts with the federal authorities, political tensions in the republic remained high. In order to consolidate support for the Chechen parliament in its battle with Dudayev and his attempts to effect constitutional changes the parliamentary faction ‘Bako’ (‘Right’), led by deputy Yusup Soslambekov59, initiated the formation of the Council of National and Civil Accord (SNGS). According to Gakaev, the SNGS was established as a co-ordinating structure that could devise an acceptable resolution to the republic’s protracted crisis, including the ‘increasing division of society, the confrontation between existing branches of power and the crisis surrounding the very notion of a Chechen state system’.60 Nevertheless, in spite of these noble intentions, the members rapidly became embroiled in an internal conflict over the Council’s status and the manner in which it would achieve its aims, undermining the group’s legitimacy within the republic.61 The dissatisfaction and frustration seethed until April 14th 1993, when the parliament proclaimed a vote of no confidence in Dudayev’s government, the Council of Ministers, and proposed measures to limit presidential power. The political tension was exacerbated that night by the murder of Dmitriy Grigoryants, a correspondent for the human rights newspaper

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Ekspress-khronika, who had written frequent articles in both the Russian and Chechen press on the corruption and anarchy that pervaded various Chechen government bodies.62 The following day, April 15th, a rally of opposition supporters congregated in the square opposite the parliament building in Groznyy, with the backing of the Chechen Constitutional Court and Groznyy City Assembly. Participants in the rally, which included the opposition coalitions of both SNGS and the Round Table, laid the blame for Grigoryants’s death firmly with the Chechen authorities and adopted a resolution demanding Dudayev’s resignation, the dissolution of all governmental bodies and new elections. The demonstrators also expressed widespread frustration at the economic chaos, which was enveloping the republic. A statement by the Round Table bloc called for the immediate payment of wage and pension arrears, a decisive fight against crime, the restoration of law and order, and the initiation of serious economic reform, including privatisation.63 In addition the opposition demanded that a referendum, as required by federal legislation, be held on June 5th to establish democratically what type of power structure the state should have.64 The Chechen media was permitted to transmit only official information, underlining the consternation within the presidential administration that the rebellion could incite further dissent throughout the republic if openly reported. In accordance with a decree issued by Vice-President Yandarbiyev, the parliamentary newspaper Golos Chechenskoi Respubliki was closed down. Dudayev’s supporters blockaded all media agencies and only official government newspapers were authorised for publication.65 There was an unsuccessful attempt to disperse the opposition demonstrators by the members of the National Guard on the night of April 17th. In a televised statement Dudayev accused the opposition of being sponsored by Russian politicians from the former Chechen-Ingush Republic who, in his opinion, longed to induce a civil war there.66 He declared the rally illegal and urged his supporters to organise their own demonstration in the city. In response to the president’s call, his followers began to gather in Freedom Square in front of the Presidential Palace. Agitators were sent into rural villages to rally support for the president, as the two opposing rallies in Groznyy grew in strength – some estimates put the numbers of demonstrators as high as seven thousand in each camp.67 There was a conspicuous regional split between the two camps. The bulk of Dudayev’s supporters were from the mountainous regions of southern Chechnya, which was a predominantly rural area heavily dependent on subsistence agriculture, in contrast to the relatively more industrialised northern districts from where much of the anti-Dudayev opposition originated. The parliament had the support of a large part of the population and continued to hold sessions, despite the enactment of a presidential decree on April 17th dissolving it.68 The majority of parliamentary deputies believed that Dudayev’s actions were a poorly concealed attempt to stage a coup in order to establish a personal dictatorship and demanded an immediate

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investigation into the president’s conduct. In response, the Chechen leader issued decrees that dissolved the contentious Council of Ministers as well as the imposition of presidential rule and a republic-wide curfew.69 It appears that the anti-Dudayev demonstrations inadvertently enabled the president to introduce the very form of rule that they were attempting to prevent: a dictatorship. As the political stand-off between the Chechen legislative and executive branches of power continued throughout April, the parliament amended the Constitution to deprive Dudayev of any real power. It declared that the presidential decrees of April 17th were unlawful and submitted them to the Constitutional Court for analysis, with a view to preparing impeachment proceedings. Unsurprisingly the Constitutional Court denounced the decrees as anti-constitutional, observing that ‘by making an arbitrary decision to vest himself with unlimited powers, the President of the Chechen Republic has in effect illegally seized the powers of the supreme legislative body’.70 Dudayev responded to this incisive criticism with a decree dissolving the Constitutional Court. The two opposing branches of power continued to act in isolation against each other, hindering the development of a democratic Chechen state and by June 1993 the crisis of power between government and parliament had reached an impasse. The demonstration against the Dudayev leadership was still taking place in Groznyy, although it was surrounded by armed units loyal to the president. On June 4th, the day before the planned national referendum, these troops dispersed the demonstrators, resulting in many fatalities. Dudayev’s National Guard also seized the Groznyy City Assembly building, where most of the referendum ballot papers were being stored, and destroyed them. The following day Dudayev simply dissolved the parliament and introduced direct presidential rule.71 His actions were fiercely condemned by opposition groups, as well as the banished parliament and other administrative departments, although their denunciations were ineffective in the face of Dudayev’s escalating authoritarianism. In the wake of the imposition of presidential rule, a salient transformation of the opposition took place. Political resistance to the Dudayev regime faded, as armed groups became predominant. Gakaev believes that the principal reason for the ineffectiveness of the political opposition was their failure to distinguish themselves from militant groups led by former allies of Dudayev, such as Soslambekov, and consequently deprived themselves of popular support.72 In response to mounting challenges to his internal sovereignty Dudayev became increasingly authoritarian, relying on coercion and force to buttress his regime.

Regional agitation In the wake of this armed offensive by Dudayev’s troops the opposition movement was forced to move its centre of resistance away from the capital

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into the regions of Chechnya, where the leaders were assured of support from their teips. Three districts, Nadterechniy, Urus-Martanovskiy and Gudermeskiy announced their intention of seceding from the ‘criminal regime in Groznyy’, triggering repeated clashes throughout July and August with Dudayev’s troops.73 There were reports that Russia was a major force behind the opposition groupings in the northern districts of the republic. Dudayev’s presidential press service issued a statement claiming that representatives from both Russian and North Ossetian power ministries had been holding talks with leaders of the Chechen opposition regarding the deployment of Russian troops in Nadterechniy District, whilst the Chechen National Security Service alleged that the ‘most aggressive’ opposition groups enjoyed the support of ‘certain forces within the Russian administration’. This conviction was supported by Akhyat Idigov, the new parliamentary speaker, and Yandarbiyev, who maintained that finance for the opposition originated from Moscow, under the direction of Khasbulatov.74 Although there were abundant rumours concerning covert Russian involvement in the opposition groups, there is little objective evidence to support these assertions.75 The Russian parliamentary commission charged with investigating the Chechen conflict perceived the armed struggle between Dudayev’s forces and the opposition as a clash between two groups of Chechen society, one of which had illegally seized power and another that was attempting to overthrow it. The commission advocated the ‘collective right of people to fight against tyranny and the usurpation of power’, asserting that the ‘clear inequality of force’ was compensated ‘by support from Russian state structures’, thereby apparently confirming federal complicity.76 An assassination attempt on the Chechen president at the beginning of August 1993 fuelled claims that Moscow was behind the unrest in the republic. In an interview with Moskovskiye Novosti, Dudayev accused Russian forces of orchestrating recent events, insisting that ‘all acts of subversion are prepared in the offices of Moscow’s special services’ and that Nadterechniy District had ‘nothing to do with the opposition’.77 Moreover, reports from the republic’s military intelligence department also charged the federal authorities with involvement in actions intended to destabilise the Chechen Republic and warned of the threat of large-scale interethnic conflicts in the region. The department expressed their conviction that the Russian leadership, with the assistance of both the secret services and the Cossacks, would attempt to overthrow the ‘current legitimate government of the Chechen republic’ before the end of the year.78 Nevertheless, despite these claims of covert assistance, Russia failed to successfully manipulate the divisive atmosphere of 1993 to its own advantage in order to overthrow Dudayev and re-assert federal control over the republic. In November 1993 Dudayev confirmed that Chechnya had no intention of returning to the Russian Federation and losing its ‘hard-won

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right to sovereignty’. Consequently, the republic would not take part in forthcoming elections for the Federal Assembly. Idigov, the speaker of the Chechen parliament, endorsed the president’s decision not to participate, maintaining that the Chechen parliament was ‘doing a fine job in the area of approving amendments and additions to the Constitution and laws of Chechnya’.79 Several months later Dudayev issued a decree that formally changed the republic’s name. Henceforth Chechnya would be known as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the historical name of the territory, and officials were instructed to cease using the term ‘Chechnya’.80 At the end of 1993 Avturkhanov founded the Interim Council (IC), incorporating the majority of parties and movements that were opposed to the existing Chechen leadership. However, in spite of their resistance to Dudayev’s rule the opposition leaders clearly stipulated their belief that interference by a third party, i.e. Russia, was still deemed impermissible. Antagonism between the Dudayev leadership and opposition groups persisted into 1994. In an open letter published in an independent Chechen newspaper at the beginning of January, the head of the opposition ‘government of popular confidence’, Mamodayev, urged Dudayev to admit that his regime had no future and to immediately resign. He said that ‘the nation … seeks to build a free state, not to merely shut itself off by borders and customs from the rest of the world. It does not want to quarrel with its neighbours, both close and distant. It does not want to be treated with suspicion or estrangement’.81 This message highlights Chechnya’s failure to substantiate its external sovereignty, as well as its reliance on Russia for some form of legitimacy. Dudayev continued to insist that there were no ‘serious opposition forces’ with a constructive programme for emerging from the economic crisis and building a new state. He maintained that separatist groups calling themselves the political opposition were merely members of the former nomenklatura and Communist Party bureaucrats.82 However, at the same time it was reported that opposition forces were surrounding Dudayev’s official residence in Groznyy. According to a report on Russia’s Radio at the beginning of February, General Ibragim Suleimenov, chairman of the Chechen National Salvation Committee, had ordered combat manoeuvres to begin near the president’s residence. Suleimenov would only consider reconciliation with the Dudayev regime if certain conditions were met, including the president’s immediate and unconditional resignation, his trial in an Islamic court and the return of all capital taken out of Chechnya and deposited in overseas bank accounts.83 The various opposition groups realised that their disunity was hindering their efforts to stabilise the situation, and thus began to consolidate their resources. In Nadterechniy District a co-ordinating council was established and immediately endorsed the perpetuation of insubordination to the Dudayev regime. A Russian newspaper report cited the opposition’s conviction that the Chechen leader’s declaration of sovereignty had turned the

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republic into a ‘cesspool of crime’, with the president’s popularity at its lowest level since he seized power and his regime sustained only by the ‘bayonets of armed formations loyal to him’.84

Centre–periphery relations and the new constitution The political battles in Groznyy between Dudayev and his parliament reflected the ongoing conflict in Moscow between the executive and legislature. Both struggles had a profoundly negative impact on relations between the centre and the north Caucasian republic.85 The abundance of disparate opposition groups within Chechnya impeded attempts to resolve the conflict with Moscow by political means, as the Russian leadership was unable to ascertain suitable negotiating partners amongst Dudayev’s opponents. However events in Russia during autumn 1993 also had a negative effect on Russian–Chechen relations.86 While Yeltsin struggled to retain his hold on power there was little chance of any compromise being achieved on the question of Chechnya’s status. Until post-October 1993 there was no effective central authority that could recognise regional power structures, as both sides in the Russian conflict were courting regional elites for their own advantage. Hence local authorities became caught up in the conflict between the federal President and parliament. Moreover, Dudayev exploited the conflict between the Russian executive and legislature, allegedly supporting Yeltsin against his old adversary Khasbulatov. Gakaev asserts that Dudayev sent the beleaguered Russian president a secret telegram during the shelling of the parliament, in which he endorsed Yeltsin’s actions and offered him assistance in the struggle with Khasbulatov.87 Dudayev said he was ‘keeping close track of the development of events in the neighbouring country’ and hoped that ‘the logical development of events in Russia should lead our neighbour to the victory of law and democracy’.88 However, Yeltsin’s approach became more authoritarian with the dismissal of the rebellious parliament and subsequent adoption of a new Constitution that granted him wide-reaching powers. Pavel Baev believes that the October 1993 crisis denotes ‘an important watershed’ in the evolution of post-communist Russia. In his opinion, Russian policy became progressively more assertive and proactive, especially in the wake of December 1993 parliamentary elections and the unexpected success of radical communist and nationalist parties.89 The new parliament had a very limited jurisdiction, particularly in relation to the executive, enabling Yeltsin to rule almost without constraint. In his Presidential Address to the newly elected Federal Assembly in January 1994 Yeltsin emphasised the criminal nature of the Dudayev regime and stated that the basis for the regulation of relations between the federal powers and the Chechen Republic ‘was the conducting of free democratic elections in Chechnya and talks on the demarcation of powers with the federal authorities.’90 He also apologised for the Stalinist deportations,

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declaiming them as ‘monstrous crimes … against whole peoples’ that ‘added shameful pages to our country’s history’. However he then proceeded to make the ominous pronouncement: ‘Russia is returning to its roots, it will regain it lost position … As President of the Russian Federation, I will strictly observe and defend the Constitution … I will respect and preserve the rights and freedoms of Russians, loyally serve their interests, defend the sovereignty, independence, security and territorial integrity of the state …’91 In his opinion the threat of disintegration had faded and only the ‘path of federalism’ could empower Russia in the future. Article Four of the new Constitution provided a legal basis for the preservation of Russia’s territory and Filatov optimistically pronounced that the adoption of this new body of laws would provide the foundation of greater social stability across the country. In his opinion this strengthening of Russian statehood represented the sole possibility for healing the Federation’s ‘sore spots’.92 The new federal state structure included a bicameral chamber, with one chamber, the Federation Council, protecting the interests of the regions. Treaties were signed with several previously recalcitrant republics, notably Tatarstan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Bashkortostan.93 Yeltsin argued that these treaties represented a ‘finetuning’ of the centre’s evolving relationship with its constituent parts, the framework of which had been established by the new Constitution.94 In a meeting with regional administration heads in April 1994, the President expressed his conviction that the political situation in Russia had begun to stabilise, noting that the rights of the regions were possible only under guarantees of the integrity of the country and of its political, economic and legal unity.95

Concluding remarks The principal reason for the failure of any negotiated political settlement of the Chechen crisis was the lack of a unified centre in the republic with which the Russian authorities could conduct negotiations, together with a simultaneous absence of any unity amongst the political elite in Moscow. Even traditional social structures such as teips and the Council of Elders were unable to consolidate the Chechen nation in opposition to a regime that was incapable of providing their basic needs. The sole unifying factor was the potential presence of ‘foreign’ troops on Chechen soil. Dudayev’s reaction to challenges to his legitimacy was to revert to the coercive methods of his Soviet predecessors, such as the imposition of presidential rule. However, Russia itself was experiencing a similar course of events, as an overconfident leadership, swept to power on the strength of its impassioned pledges to transform the country, grappled with a hostile parliament. Events in Moscow and Groznyy appeared to be following the same script, which suggests they are related to the impact of the transition away from communism. In both cases the parliaments, having attempted to limit the authority

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of the executive, were forcibly disbanded by presidents who were determined to monopolise political power. The chaos of post-Soviet Russia allowed the predominance of strong personalities and their authoritarian tendencies to develop virtually unhindered. Once again the process of systemic transformation contributed to a deterioration of relations between Moscow and Groznyy, as domestic challenges to the legitimacy of their respective leaders undermined on-going attempts to achieve a negotiated resolution to the political crisis. There was a perceptible shift in the Russian position regarding the Chechen crisis in the wake of events in October 1993. Yeltsin no longer needed the support of regional leaders in his confrontation with the parliament. Having emerged victorious from the prolonged battle he was more confident in his position and began to take an increasingly hard-line approach towards his opponents. The Russian leader consolidated his power and the ensuing re-establishment of a unified centre renewed the threat to Chechen hopes of independence.

6

War by proxy? (February–September 1994)

Introduction In the wake of the decisive events of 1993 in both Chechnya and Russia, the respective leaderships implemented determined measures to consolidate their political power at the expense of their opponents. However, any analogy between the two leaders’ actions rapidly dissolved, as each president embraced varying degrees of authoritarianism, which precipitated dissimilar outcomes. Despite Yeltsin’s new Constitution granting him heightened powers, the presence of the Russian parliament symbolised a democratic counterbalance to the worst of the president’s authoritarian excesses. Although the powers of the legislature had been severely curtailed by the 1993 Constitution, it still possessed a mandate from the electorate to oppose Yeltsin and express dissatisfaction with his administration.1 Whereas Yeltsin was theoretically restrained by an elected legislature, within Chechnya the political opposition was in effect eliminated by Dudayev, who went on the offensive following the sedition of 1993. He did not tolerate any open dissent to his regime, particularly from within republican structures such as the parliament, which became little more than a coterie of those who endorsed the authority of the Chechen president.2 As noted in the previous chapter, the anti-Dudayev opposition was forced out of Groznyy and became increasingly active in the regions, where they were assured of support from their individual clans. They established bases in towns across Chechnya, particularly on the northern plains of the republic, although this ultimately facilitated covert support from Moscow, as the disparate groups were geographically removed from Dudayev’s sphere of influence. This chapter will argue that the Russian policy of opposing the Dudayev regime by means of providing support for competing factions within the republic constituted a ‘proxy war’. It will examine the events surrounding the decision to lend covert assistance, both economic and military, to the anti-Dudayev opposition groups, and the reasons for the failure of this policy of proxy intervention. Against a background of intermittent negotiations between Moscow and Groznyy, the Russian leadership provided

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clandestine support to internal Chechen opposition groups in an attempt to critically destabilise the Dudayev regime without the need for the actual deployment of federal troops. The majority of observers use the terms ‘force’ and ‘forceful’ as synonyms for a full-scale military invasion. Covert military and economic assistance are apparently not considered to represent ‘forceful intervention’.3 Similarly, the term ‘political process’ is utilised to describe negotiations. There is a vast gulf between these two variants and this chapter will examine the ‘grey area’ of policy options that exists between the two opposing terms, together with the hybrid variant of force and negotiations apparently employed by the Russian leadership from mid-1994 in a further attempt to resolve the Chechen crisis successfully.

The Tatarstan model: federal accord? The beginning of 1994 witnessed a new phase in the evolution of Russian–Chechen relations, with the Russian leadership finally seeming disposed to find a political resolution to the persistent crisis of authority in the north Caucasian republic. Article Four of the new Constitution provided a legal basis for the preservation of Russia’s territory4 and Yeltsin’s determination to safeguard this was exhibited by the eventual conclusion of a Federal Treaty with Tatarstan in February 1994, defining their relations in the post-Soviet environment. This had an immediate catalytic effect on the stalled Russian–Chechen negotiations, eliciting a proposal of a similar treaty with Chechnya, which would divide plenary power between Moscow and Groznyy and set the boundaries of Chechnya’s sovereignty ‘just before the point at which the republic’s status as a state associated with Russia and as a ‘subject of international law’ was recognised’, as in the case of Tatarstan.5 Negotiations were re-commenced, together with preparations for a possible meeting between Dudayev and Yeltsin. Notwithstanding this renewed dynamism in Russian–Chechen relations, there was still formidable animosity to a negotiated settlement from both sides. A meeting held at the end of March between Sergei Filatov, the head of the Russian presidential administration, and Aslambek Akbulatov, Chechnya’s state secretary, was described by the Russian delegation as a ‘serious step’ in the process of preparing negotiations on a bilateral treaty. However, a later report maintained that the meeting had been suspended without reaching a satisfactory conclusion. According to Filatov, the Chechen delegation had broken a preliminary agreement by refusing to recognise that Chechnya was a constituent part of the Russian Federation and to take the interstate treaty between Russia and Tatarstan as a basis for the talks. The Russian stressed that negotiations would only be resumed if these conditions were accepted.6 The Chechen leadership was not keen to establish a relationship similar to that of Tatarstan. In defiance of the Russian stipulation, the First Deputy

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Prime Minister Sultan Geliskhanov announced that the Chechen Republic would not be a subject of the Russian Federation, as it was entirely different from Tatarstan, ‘a completely independent state, a subject of international law’.7 Dudayev verified this position, stressing that he was prepared to negotiate all issues with the Russian administration, apart from sovereignty, which was ‘non-negotiable’.8 This persistent unwillingness to compromise constituted a critical impediment to the possibility of any political settlement. Emil Pain and Arkadiy Popov, former members of the Presidential Analytical Centre in Moscow, are highly critical of Dudayev’s unyielding attitude with regard to any bilateral treaty. In their opinion his inflexibility afforded the Chechen president the opportunity of maintaining not only the ‘advantageous appearance of an “inexorable freedom fighter”, but also the support of Chechen society in a charged atmosphere of a “state of siege”, in which any opposition was easily depicted as a betrayal of national interests’.9 The normalisation of federal relations with Tatarstan prompted the Russian legislature to review the Chechen issue. In March the State Duma adopted a resolution recommending Yeltsin, in accordance with Article 80 of the Constitution, to implement measures in pursuance of a political solution to the conflict, urging him to instruct the government to consult with representatives of the Chechen authorities, as well as with all political movements within the republic.10 The Duma’s resolution provoked Yeltsin’s April instructions to his government ‘to conduct consultations with representatives of the organs of state power, as well as [representatives] of all political parties and movements in the Chechen Republic with the aim of ending the complicated socio-political situation, and on the basis of this to prepare a draft Treaty on the demarcation of authority between federal and Chechen organs of power and the mutual delegation of authority’.11 In response Dudayev stated he would not reject talks with Moscow, insisting that the Chechens ‘have never turned down meetings with the Russian leadership nor political solutions’.12 Nevertheless, despite these seemingly positive steps towards a political resolution of the conflict taken by the federal leadership, there was little tangible progress. It took over three months to form a government delegation for the negotiations, which was eventually dispatched to the republic with negligible results. This delegation was headed by Shakhrai, a choice that would certainly have undermined the potential for any agreement. Whilst Shakhrai was undoubtedly experienced in nationalities policy, he had never concealed his opposition to any endorsement of Dudayev’s legitimacy or Chechen secession and the Chechen president had labelled him an ‘enemy of the Chechen people’. In response to the Duma’s March resolution on relations between Groznyy and the federal authorities, Shakhrai had ominously pronounced that the document was aimed at ‘consolidating the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation’.13 As noted in Chapter Four, he also insisted that Yeltsin should never meet an illegally elected leader,

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believing that the president of the Russian Federation could not be permitted to enter into dialogue with a man who had come to power as a result of an illegal revolution. Thus, it is difficult to understand the logic behind Shakhrai’s appointment as head of the Russian delegation. If the federal authorities were seriously intent on attaining a political resolution of the crisis, why send a delegation led by such a vociferous opponent of any compromise with Dudayev? Pain and Popov are sceptical of the motivation of the central authorities, concluding that ‘Russian political reality at that time was such that the President was forced to create the appearance of negotiations’.14 According to this interpretation, Yeltsin wished to perpetuate the illusion that democratic transition was being successfully pursued, although his communist pedigree encouraged a capacity for authoritarian suppression. Vladimir Shumeiko, chairman of the Federation Council, hinted that the upper chamber of the legislature might put forward a resolution advising Yeltsin to recognise Dudayev as the legitimate president of Chechnya, on condition that the latter signed a Federal Treaty.15 This proposal emphasised one of the principal impediments to a political settlement of the crisis – Yeltsin repudiated any form of personal interaction with the Chechen leader. Both Yeltsin and Dudayev, as a former Soviet general, understood that the direct participation of the Russian president in negotiations would represent nothing less than a clear recognition of Chechen sovereignty and independence. Nikolai Petrov of the Moscow Carnegie Centre believes that war could have been avoided if a face-to-face meeting had taken place. In his opinion, Dudayev had considerable respect for the Russian President: ‘Dudayev was sure that all those surrounding Yeltsin, such as Shakhrai, were enemies of Chechnya, but if Yeltsin were to meet with him it would be possible to sort out their problems’.16

Changing attitudes It became increasingly evident that Russia was no longer interested in negotiating a political solution with the Chechen leadership. Sergei Stepashin, head of the newly re-organised Russian counterintelligence service (the FSK), expressed an uncompromising position towards Chechnya at a meeting in the North Caucasus. He said that ‘in its current state the Chechen Republic represents a threat to the stability of the Russian Federation’ and advocated ‘tough’ dialogue with Dudayev.17 Following visits to the Ossetian-Ingush conflict zone, Dagestan and KabardinoBalkaria, Stepashin resolved to strengthen security bodies in the North Caucasus and establish an extended network of agents in particularly unstable areas. He noted the ‘visible and invisible’ presence of Chechnya in all regions of the North Caucasus and stated that the counterintelligence service had scheduled several major operations within the region ‘in the near future’.18

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On May 17th, the 130th anniversary of the end of the Caucasian War (1817–64), Yeltsin personally addressed the peoples of the North Caucasus on the negative aspects of Moscow’s policies towards the region in the past, although he neglected to make any interpretation of the current state of affairs: ‘At present, when Russia is building a law-governed state and recognises the priority of human values, the possibility has emerged of objectively assessing the Caucasian War as a courageous struggle of the peoples of the Caucasus not only for survival on their own land, but also for the preservation of their self-styled culture, the best traits of the national character.’19 This conciliatory tone was tempered by his reiteration that the Caucasus should be ‘forever with Russia’, stating his conviction that ‘Russia and the Caucasus are inseparably linked notions. One cannot be imagined without the other.’20 A portentous manifestation of Yeltsin’s shifting attitude was his dismissal of Shakhrai as Nationalities Minister later that month, to be replaced by the hard-line Nikolai Yegorov.21 Whilst Shakhrai had never been a popular choice amongst the Chechen leadership, partly due to his Cossack origins, his legal training had furnishing him with invaluable experience of negotiation, consensus-building and compromise. This reshuffle symbolised a crucial juncture in Russian–Chechen relations. Yegorov stated that, whilst he did ‘not intend to do anything revolutionary, especially in the sphere of interethnic relations’, if the situation required it he had ‘enough strength and will’ to use ‘harsh measures’.22 This avowal appeared to manifest the Russian government’s increasing lack of sympathy for a negotiated political settlement to the Chechen crisis. Several further obstacles to the normalisation of relations between Moscow and Groznyy emerged at the end of May. The first hindrance was a Russian proposal to expand the area of North Ossetia and Ingushetia under a state of emergency, thereby including districts that bordered Chechnya. The Chechen leadership pronounced the possible expansion as an ‘act of open, armed aggression’ and responded by placing its own troops on alert.23 Several days later, on May 27th, Dudayev survived an assassination attempt, when the convoy he was travelling in was blown up, killing the republic’s interior minister, his deputy and a driver. Chechen officials immediately accused the Russian secret services of involvement,24 whilst Dudayev blamed opponents of reconciliation with Russia. Speaking on local television, the Chechen president said that the assassination attempt was a ‘carefully organised act of sabotage directed against independent Chechnya’.25 As tension across the North Caucasus region intensified, the negotiating process once again broke down. There was a spate of mass hostage-taking, allegedly perpetrated by Chechen nationals, in towns throughout southern Russia, notably in Mineralnyye Vody during May and June.26 The Chechens demonstrated their ability to strike beyond the borders of their own republic, causing disruption and fear within the Russian Federation. The

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Russian leadership could not appear to submit to such obvious acts of terror and thus talks on a peaceful resolution to the political conflict ceased. In his testimony to an international forum investigating the Chechen conflict, Pain maintains that until June 1994 official Russian policy regarding Chechnya was primarily orientated towards negotiation and a repetition of the Tatarstan variant. However, subsequently the situation changed and the Kremlin opted for a ‘suspension’ of relations with Groznyy, inducing the Presidential Analytical Centre to prescribe two variants: active economic assistance for the Chechen opposition or complete abstinence from action.27 Pain and Popov contend that prior to the early summer of 1994 the Russian leadership ‘relied on the possibility that Chechnya would peacefully adopt a more pragmatic policy’.28 The Russian leaders were confident that the aggregate failures of Dudayev’s political, economic and social policies would undermine his regime, convincing the people to reject him as president in favour of a more moderate candidate who was inclined to compromise with Moscow.

Co-operation or coercion? Notwithstanding faltering negotiation attempts, the situation within Chechnya continued to deteriorate as resistance to the ruling elite intensified. Komsomol’skaya Pravda published contrasting interviews with both Dudayev and the opposition leader Mamodayev. The Chechen president claimed to have the support of 80 per cent of the population and accused the Russian leadership of engineering the unrest in order to create ‘unbearable conditions…so as to arouse people’s indignation and cause the overthrow of the Dudayev regime’. By contrast Mamodayev described the prevailing situation in the republic as one of ‘absolute powerlessness and anarchy’.29 The anti-government opposition coalesced around four distinct personalities, including the disgraced ex-speaker of the Russian parliament Khasbulatov, who had returned to Chechnya at the beginning of March and become embroiled in the political crisis.30 Opposition groups called for a reconciliation of all political forces in the republic and issued an appeal to the government, calling on the Dudayev regime to conduct negotiations with the federal authorities despite the continued confrontation between opposing Chechen factions: ‘Fate has once again given a chance to the Chechen people, perhaps the last. Russia, in the person of the State Duma has for the first time rejected a solution to the Chechen problem by using force, and has proposed peaceful means for settling mutual relations. Missing this chance will be a crime in the eyes of the people and history. Our descendants would not forgive us for this’.31 The opposition Interim Council (IC) based in the northern plains of Chechnya received further support at the beginning of June with the organisation of a Congress of Chechen People in Nadterechniy district. It was

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reported that over 2,000 delegates attended, representing at least 14 districts across the republic, as well as the majority of opposition parties and movements.32 The Congress condemned the ‘criminal regime’ in Groznyy and demanded Dudayev’s resignation, together with the holding of elections before the end of August 1994. It simultaneously acknowledged Avturkhanov’s opposition IC33 as the highest structure of state power in the republic that ‘represented the wishes of the people’, and called upon Khasbulatov to lead a united Chechen opposition movement. This apparent show of concord amongst Chechnya’s disparate opposition groupings34 was undermined by divisions between the delegates over the issue of relations with Russia. The majority supported Avturkhanov’s position, calling for stronger links with the centre, contrary to the intransigence of the more radical opposition movements that advocated the severing of all ties to Moscow. The Chechen authorities responded to this re-activation of the political opposition by depriving Khasbulatov of his right to reside on the territory of the republic. This banishment was also applied to several opposition leaders who were accused of ‘illegal activities’ against the Chechen people and of ‘conspiring with Russian imperialist forces’.35 Furthermore, the head of Chechen state security, Sultan Geliskhanov, ordered the disarmament of all ‘illegal armed formations’ and banned people from travelling around the republic bearing arms, with the exception of officials on duty.36 Attempts to neutralise armed opposition groups precipitated a major clash with government forces in the middle of June. Members of an opposition group led by Ruslan Labazanov, a former ally of Dudayev37, congregated in a central Groznyy square on June 12th to demand the resignation of both the president and the vice-president, Yandarbiyev. The Chechen Department of National Security officially charged Labazanov with destabilising the situation in the republic. The following day government troops surrounded Labazanov’s headquarters in a residential suburb of Groznyy and a fierce battle between the two sides ensued, with little regard for civilians caught in the crossfire. Many people from both sides were killed, but Labazanov managed to escape to his hometown of Argun to the east of Groznyy. The heads of four of his dead fighters were displayed in a Groznyy square, one of whom was his cousin. According to Chechen custom, Labazanov declared a blood feud against Dudayev, vowing to avenge the death of his relative.38 Gakaev believes that were several reasons for Dudayev’s stringent measures against this opposition group. The Chechen president considered Labazanov’s coterie to represent a serious threat to his regime and wished to eradicate any potential rival for popular support, as well as for the lucrative profits from the unregulated sale of oil. In Gakaev’s opinion, the violent suppression of the Labazanov group was intended to ‘terrorise’ Chechen society in order to discourage any further mass support for the anti-government opposition. Furthermore, Dudayev intended to show the Russian

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leadership that there were no ‘organised forces’ within the republic capable of opposing his regime, thereby demonstrating his absolute command of the situation.39 Nevertheless, Dudayev seemingly misjudged the depth of support for such violent action and consequently failed to achieve his objectives. The brutality of the government forces shocked the Chechen populace, heightening support for the opposition even amongst those previously loyal to the Dudayev regime. Labazanov assumed the role of a ‘defender of the Chechen nation against the criminal authorities’, a Chechen ‘Robin Hood’, and his group rapidly attracted new members.40 Opposition leaders alleged that as many as 300 people had died during this latest round of fighting in Groznyy. Characteristically, ‘official Groznyy’ disputed the statistics, maintaining that there had been no more than ten deaths. Dudayev continued to deny the existence of any political opposition to his regime and accused the Russian authorities of helping ‘ordinary criminals’ within the republic in order to achieve its own aims.41 It was in Russia’s interest to maintain the hostilities between Dudayev and the various opposition groups within Chechnya, as it gave the federal authorities a pretext for their unwillingness to deal directly with the Chechen president himself. The federal authorities reacted to the increasing tension in the republic by strengthening the visibility of power structures in the North Caucasus region. Stepashin, the head of the FSK, held a meeting with senior officials in the southern Russian districts of Stavropol and Krasnodar at which he said that ‘offensive measures’ were necessary in the fight against organised crime in the region and that all FSK staff members were to carry guns and be ready to use them.42 It is conceivable that this high profile visit by a Russian security official was intended as a provocative warning to the ‘rebellious Chechens’. This interpretation is lent credence by the fact that the Russian Minister of Defence, Pavel Grachev, also paid at visit to the North Caucasus area at the beginning of July to inspect the NCMD. He proclaimed that the NCMD, which had represented a rearguard in recent years, had now acquired the necessary military capability and readiness to defend Russia’s security.43 From a Chechen point of view this was a threatening statement and also appeared to imply that the Russian leadership already considered military intervention to be a serious policy option. Arming the opposition: the role of Russian power structures Whilst there is some debate about the exact period when the Russian leadership took the decision to resolve the Chechen crisis by force,44 there is substantial evidence indicating that the decision had already been made by early summer 1994. Eyewitness testimony affirms that the Russian armed forces were taking preparatory measures in anticipation of an armed intervention as early as July 1994. A resident of the Chechen district of Urus Martan, Konstatin Ktsoev, claimed that he was accosted several times by

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two officers from the federal military recruiting offices in Vladikavkaz, the capital of neighbouring North Ossetia. According to Ktsoev, the officers urged him to resume military training and dismissed his persistent refusals, threatening him with reprisals and even violence: ‘They suggested that I enlist in the armed forces and promised various perks. They said I would have protection…For them the matter was settled: they knew there would be a war…That was six months before the start of the war’.45 Whilst it is impossible to verify this allegation, information from disparate sources lends credence to the proposition that in early summer the federal authorities were laying the foundations for some kind of military intervention, either in the form of covert support for the opposition or an outright invasion. At the end of July the FSK deputy chairman, Evgeniy Savostyanov, spent several days in Chechnya, ostensibly assessing the situation. Anatoliy Shabad, a Russian Duma deputy who met with local leaders in Groznyy and Nadterechniy district in September 1994, remains convinced that the FSK, under Savostyanov’s leadership, had been planning some sort of operation and training armed opposition groups.46 This is corroborated by evidence from one of Dudayev’s former economic advisors, Ruslan Akhtakhanov, who claims he was given the impression by Filatov that Savostyanov was overseeing the military side of a Russian operation within Chechnya. A native of Znamenskoye, Akhtakhanov claims that many of his acquaintances affirmed Savostyanov’s continual presence either in the town itself or Mozdok, in neighbouring North Ossetia.47 According to several accounts, Filatov, as head of the Russian presidential administration, was working closely with Savostyanov. Filatov undoubtedly played a significant role in the evolution of relations between Moscow and Groznyy throughout 1994. At the end of July he met with Avturkhanov in Moscow, when the issue of Russian support for the antiDudayev opposition was almost certainly discussed in detail. In his memoirs, Yeltsin’s former bodyguard, Aleksandr Korzhakov, claims that during the summer of 1994 Filatov asked him to meet with Avturkhanov, but he declined and Savostyanov was consequently ‘entrusted’ with the Chechen operation. Korzhakov describes this as ‘incredible stupidity’, as Filatov and Savostyanov subsequently managed to persuade the Russian president that Avturkhanov not only possessed considerable influence within Chechnya, but that he controlled the majority of the republic’s regions. In Korzhakov’s opinion ‘they simply lied’.48 According to Khasbulatov, by the summer of 1994 ‘90 per cent of the [Chechen] population was starving’ and the Dudayev regime had lost the bulk of its supporters.49 There is little doubt that support for the Chechen leadership had dissipated, despite an on-going rally of loyal Dudayev followers in Groznyy who were demonstrating against the activities of Khasbulatov within the republic. At a meeting of the opposition IC, led by Avturkhanov, an appeal was unanimously adopted imploring Yeltsin to recognise it as the only body of state authority in Chechnya and to assist it

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in restoring constitutional order in the republic.50 Vanora Bennett perceives a remarkable similitude between the response of the federal centre to the anti-Dudayev opposition and traditional Soviet behaviour: ‘In the timehonoured fashion of Soviet-sponsored factions in every proxy conflict of Cold War days, Avturkhanov’s Provisional Council then began publicly lobbying in Moscow for recognition by Russia as the official Chechen government’.51 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the IC, along with other opposition groups, continued to reject the notion of direct Russian military intervention. It is pertinent to emphasise the fact that the majority of the president’s opponents did not oppose Chechen independence but rather the government’s failure to prevent the economic collapse. This attitude is manifest in a remark by Yusip El’murzaev, a staunch member of the anti-Dudayev opposition based around Urus-Martan. Whilst he was highly critical of Dudayev’s failure to implement effective policies, he declared ‘I am against any forceful interference by Russia. If the army enters Chechnya we will stand against the Russian troops’.52 Regardless of whether the Russian leadership had already sanctioned a forceful resolution to the Chechen crisis prior to autumn 1994, official communications concerning the situation became progressively less accommodating as the futility of negotiations became apparent. The official Russian position vis-à-vis Chechnya had changed markedly by the end of July. Yeltsin’s press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov, released a statement, echoing one made by Khasbulatov in 1991,53 declaring: ‘An increased number of appeals, letters and telegrams from Chechnya, with evidence of numerous incidents of human rights violations and armed clashes resulting in civilian casualties, have lately been received by the president of the Russian Federation and by his administration. The president is carefully studying information about developments in the Chechen Republic. He hopes that the active unification of political forces will steer the Chechen Republic out of its grave economic and political crisis and protect the rights of individuals to peaceful life and work.’54 A pivotal factor in the changing attitude of the Russian leadership was a further hijacking in southern Russia on July 28th.55 At least four hostages were killed in the operation to release them, with many more wounded, provoking an outburst of anti-Chechen hysteria in the Russian media. In contrast to previous incidents, Dudayev allegedly refused to co-operate with the federal authorities to free the hostages and threatened to shoot down any Russian helicopters that violated Chechen airspace,56 contending that all terrorist acts around Chechnya were intended to discredit the republic in the eyes of the international community. The Chechen security services claimed to have evidence that all four terrorist acts in Mineralnyye Vody were planned by the FSK, which was using Chechen criminals who were serving their sentences in Russian prisons.57 The day after the violent hostage-taking, on July 29th, the Russian government released a statement ‘On the situation in the Chechen Republic’,

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proclaiming that, in accordance with the Constitution, the federal authorities would be forced to protect Russian citizens if violence was directed against the population of any nationality in the republic.58 The statement betrayed the government’s hostility towards the Dudayev regime, which it denounced for having attained power through ‘an unconstitutional coup’. It claimed that the situation in the republic was ‘practically out of control…and threatens to result in the worst consequences, including largescale armed conflict.’ According to the government, the republic’s stability was being eroded by the ‘catastrophic’ economic situation, rapid criminalisation, inter-clan rivalry and the current Chechen leadership: ‘Dudayev’s ambitious politics, in which he has attempted to portray Russia as the “aggressor” and “enemy” of the Chechen people, has isolated the Chechen Republic from the Russian Federation.’ Notwithstanding its blatant antipathy towards Dudayev and his allies, the Russian government maintained that it was displaying ‘maximum tolerance and tact’ and commended the ‘sensible forces’ who were fighting for ‘the resumption of elementary law and order in the republic, as envisaged in the constitution’, as well as for ‘the resumption of good relations with Russia’.59 In a television interview Filatov publicly advocated support for ‘healthy forces’ within the republic, identifying the IC as a force which the Russian leadership believed to be capable of ‘restoring constitutional order’.60 Dudayev dismissed the Russian statement as ‘a logical link in the chain of the propaganda campaign against Chechnya’, whilst Mamodayev, the head of the exiled opposition ‘government of popular confidence’, condemned the Russian proclamation for being ‘a year late’, stating that ‘back on 4th June last year, when General Dudayev’s regime engineered the first bloody battle at the town assembly, Chechnya’s legitimate government, democratic forces and people asked everyone to condemn that act of barbarity and break off all relations with those who organised it’. Russia’s failure to implement effective measures had encouraged the Chechen crisis to spread beyond the republic’s borders and threatened to destabilise the situation not only in southern Russia, but in Moscow itself.61

The Khasbulatov effect Throughout August the situation in Chechnya continued to deteriorate as opposition forces repeatedly clashed with government troops and rumours of covert Russian assistance abounded.62 On August 1st Avturkhanov declared that Dudayev’s ‘anti-democratic, criminal-militaristic dictatorship’ had been deposed and that the IC had taken full control of the republic. The Council’s proclamation accused the Dudayev regime of bringing Chechnya to ‘the brink of economic and political catastrophe’ and transforming the republic into ‘the main base for crime in the North Caucasus’.63 Dudayev continued to deny that there were any problems in the republic, stating that ‘we have not heard of any sort of imaginary situations in Chechnya, save for

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the announcements made in Moscow via the media…Here, on the spot, all is in order…The Chechen republic of Ichkeria has no opposition at all in this world. There are only criminals, those who break the law’.64 He labelled the IC’s statement ‘an act prepared by national traitors’, expressing his belief that several people were colluding with the Kremlin and Russian secret services. An extraordinary session of the OKChN, which was convened to discuss the situation in the republic, sharply condemned the opposition forces and adopted an appeal to the peoples of the Caucasus, calling on them to unite ‘in the face of external threat and in the face of aggression by Russia’.65 In the wake of the 1993 failed rebellion, the anti-Dudayev opposition was organised around four main groups spread across Chechen territory (see Table 6.1). Avturkhanov’s IC was based around the town of Znamenskoye, the principal town in Nadterechniy district in the north of Chechnya, and Table 6.1 Main anti-Dudayev opposition groups G roup

Leader

Base

Further Details

Interim Council (IC)

Umar Avturkhanov

Znamenskoye

Beslan Gantemirov

Urus-Martan

‘Nisyo’ (‘Justice’)

Ruslan Labazanov

Argun

Peacemaking Group

Ruslan Khasbulatov

Tolstoy-Yurt

Government of Popular Confidence Parliament of the Chechen Republic in exile

Yaragai Mamodayev

Moscow

Received military and economic assistance from Moscow Gantemirov’s group allied with the IC at the end of August 1994 and Gantemirov became commander-in-chief of their united forces. Lacked support amongst Chechen people because of Labazanov’s criminal past. Khasbulatov, in need of armed support, subsequently formed an alliance with Labazanov’s group, which discredited him in the eyes of many Chechens who considered the latter to be a ‘bandit’. Khasbulatov later formed a brief alliance with the IC and Gantemirov. Political rather than armed opposition to Dudayev regime

Yusup Soslambekov

Moscow

Soslambekov was highly critical of Russian ‘interference’ in domestic Chechen problems

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had little support outside of this region. The main reason for this lack of widespread sympathy was the fact that Avturkhanov endorsed the conclusion of a Federal Treaty and consequently was considered to be a ‘Moscow puppet’, heavily reliant on Russian patronage. A second group was led by Bislan Gantemirov, the former mayor of Groznyy, who had declared a blood feud with Dudayev after several of his relatives were killed during the 1993 demonstrations. Gantemirov’s force was based in Urus-Martan, to the south of Groznyy, and numbered approximately 800 fighters. The smallest group was the one commanded by Labazanov in the town of Argun, east of Groznyy. Despite the numerical insignificance of his armed formation, which had a mere 200 fighters, Labazanov was considered to be ‘Dudayev’s most dangerous enemy’, following his fierce battle with government forces on the streets of Groznyy in June 1994.66 The fourth opposition group, the so-called ‘peacemaking’ group, was established by Ruslan Khasbulatov during August in his native town of Tolstoy-Yurt, in the republic’s northern plains, and had rapidly acquired support amongst the disillusioned Chechen people. According to Khasbulatov, the principal motivation for the formation of this opposition movement was his discovery of plans to deploy federal troops in Chechnya at the end of September.67 The ‘peacemaking’ group’s primary objective was the peaceful transition of power without the forcible overthrow of Dudayev, as well as the creation of an independent state and the normalisation of relations with Russia without the introduction of federal troops onto Chechen territory. The group predominantly comprised leading members of the republic’s Islamic community, including several theologians.68 A radio station called ‘Zhizn’ was set up, together with a television channel of the same name, and supporters of the group travelled around Chechnya promoting its aims ‘at meetings, on buses, in markets and mosques’. At opposition rallies held throughout Chechnya, Khasbulatov addressed the crowds on the necessity of abolishing the institution of the presidency in the republic, which, under Dudayev’s rule, had become synonymous with crime and corruption.69 He was very critical of other opposition forces, particularly the IC’s affinity to the Russian authorities and he denounced Avturkhanov for apparently forgetting that his loyalty lay with the Chechen people not Moscow bureaucrats.70 His disparaging remarks accentuate the animosity and disunity prevalent amongst the various groups opposed to the Dudayev regime. The incessant antagonism between Avturkhanov, Khasbulatov and other opposition leaders hindered the realisation of any consensus with the Dudayev regime and also undermined Russian attempts to indirectly oust the Chechen president. Speaking at a hearing in 1995, Aleksandr Kotenkov, the former administrative head of the North Ossetian-Ingush conflict zone and first deputy Nationalities Minister described how Russian attempts to create a coalition out of the disparate opposition forces were undermined by

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the ambitions and rivalry of individual leaders, such as Labazanov and Avturkhanov.71 In his opinion none of the opposition leaders at that time could compare with Khasbulatov and his ‘peacemaking’ group. He concluded that if Moscow politicians had been prepared to rely on the Russian parliament’s former speaker, it would have been possible to regain control of Chechnya without a full-scale war.72 There is speculation that the prospect of Khasbulatov becoming leader of Chechnya was too much for Yeltsin, who was consequently far more amenable to the idea of a military operation to subdue the republic.73 Vladimir Lysenko, a Russian politician concerned with regional issues, believes that the release of Khasbulatov from incarceration in Lefortovo and his subsequent return to Chechnya represented a turning point in Russian policy towards the republic.74 The Kremlin became increasingly disconcerted by the former parliamentary speaker’s popularity amongst the Chechen people and thus began to subsidise particular opposition groups in a futile attempt to erode Khasbulatov’s position, whilst simultaneously augmenting support for pro-Russian forces. Khasbulatov himself publicly rejected any aspiration to attain the presidency, stating ‘I am not trying to become the president or any other leader of the Chechen Republic and I remain outside of politics’.75 However, he contradicted this disavowal several weeks later with his remark that ‘if the Yeltsinites [sic] make me angry I will, just to spite them, become president or anything else. It is sufficient for me to come out into a square and shout: I want to be the ruler of Chechnya, and the people will at a stroke kick out Dudayev and put me in his place’.76

‘Divide and rule’ – peacekeeping Russian-style In the wake of the violent hijacking at the end of July and the reanimation of Khasbulatov’s political career, the Russian leadership began to implement decisive measures towards the provision of direct, yet covert, assistance to the opposition groupings within the Chechen Republic. A report by the Hague-based Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) insisted ‘It was clear that Moscow gave money to the anti-Dudayev forces…ostensibly for pensions and other social purposes but also for arms purchases. The fighting could provide Russia with the excuse to intervene ‘to restore order’, an order Russia itself had helped to disrupt’.77 Movladi Udugov, the Chechen minister for Information and the Press, accused Russia of assisting the opposition, alleging that ‘Russia has an interest in chaos setting in within Chechnya, since then the Russian authorities will be able to justify any of their actions. That is why Russia is secretly giving a helping hand to some criminal and opposition formations in Chechnya’. He contended that the crime situation in Chechnya was considerably better than in Russia and criticised the federal authorities for ‘deliberately’ disseminating propaganda that depicted the republic as a ‘haven for criminals’. In

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the minister’s view, Moscow was to blame for the failure of the negotiating process, as there were ‘too many decision-making centres’, and he warned of a new ‘Russo–Caucasus war’. 78 Nevertheless, in public Yeltsin continued to firmly oppose the use of force to resolve the crisis. In a television interview on August 11th he stated that ‘intervention by force is impermissible and must not be done. Were we to apply pressure by force against Chechnya this would rouse the whole Caucasus…there would be so much blood that nobody would ever forgive us. It is absolutely not possible’.79 However, these words acquire a hollow resonance when examined against the background of Moscow’s covert financial and military assistance to the anti-Dudayev opposition. A remark made by Yeltsin on August 15th hinted that Russian policy on Chechnya had changed. The Russian president disclosed that ‘certain measures’ were being taken in the republic that he could not divulge, presumably a reference to the decision to cultivate opposition forces with the aim of overthrowing Dudayev.80 Several analysts discerned a significant transformation in the attitude of the federal authorities during August. Leonid Smirnyagin, a member of the Presidential Council, contends that, by September, officials in Moscow had recognised the futility of their attempts to reach a political settlement with Dudayev, who was adopting an increasingly inflexible position vis-à-vis Russia in an effort to consolidate popular support for his regime within Chechnya.81 The Russian parliamentary commission later charged with investigating the causes of the Chechen war, concluded that ‘by autumn 1994 no-one in the upper echelons of power in Moscow even considered compromising with Dudayev’. The commission speculated that the federal leadership ‘naively’ presumed that merely arming the anti-Dudayev opposition, together with the promise of political support, constituted adequate measures to achieve their ultimate objective of reasserting central control over the republic.82 Kotenkov insists that ‘many Dudayevites were actually prepared to betray [the Chechen president] and escape his influence…The collapse of the Dudayev regime’s power structures reached a peak in August’. According to the Russian, several ‘close associates’ of the Chechen leader, including Aslan Maskhadov, met with officials in Moscow to express their view that Dudayev’s reign had almost come to an end and that they were prepared to co-operate with the opposition in order to stabilise the internal situation.83 During August Avturkhanov announced that the IC had formed a parallel government in Nadterechniy district, claiming that it controlled all of Chechnya with the exception of Groznyy and the surrounding districts. A statement issued by this ‘national revival government’ stressed that its main objective was to ‘revive the republic, creating a sound basis for society’s democratic development, economic normalisation and the decisive fight against corruption and crime’.84 In accordance with a secret resolution of the Russian government, adopted on August 25th, the Chechen IC was

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recognised as the ‘only legitimate power structure in Chechnya’.85 Avturkhanov was promised both military and economic support in order to assist his attempt to depose Dudayev; the opposition leader subsequently asserted that Russia had given him 1.5 billion roubles for the purpose of paying wages and pensions to the residents of districts that were loyal to Russia.86 Shakhrai confirmed that the Russian authorities were involved in talks with the IC, as any possibility of political dialogue with Dudayev had been exhausted. The deputy Prime Minister revealed that the government had already granted 1.5 billion roubles for the payment of pensions to the opposition Council, which, according to his information, already controlled ‘a significant part of the territory’. However, he reiterated that ‘there will be no intervention in the settlement of the Chechen problem with the use of force and Russian troops will not be sent into the republic’s territory’.87 In order to co-ordinate activity with the internal Chechen opposition a group was formed within the Russian leadership that included Nikolai Yegorov, Nationalities Minister, his deputy Aleksandr Kotenkov, and FSK Colonel Khromchenko. According to Filatov, who was also involved, the group ‘carried out measures for the normalisation of life on the territory not ruled by Dudayev’,88 although it is indisputable that these measures were not limited to non-military activities. Kotenkov and Khromchenko were allegedly responsible for arms supplies from Russia to Chechnya, as well as for the recruitment of Russian servicemen to participate in military operations in the republic ‘under FSK patronage’.89 The Russian parliamentary commission on the Chechen conflict was unable to elucidate how the support mechanism functioned, but it did manage to establish that secret operations took place, involving high-ranking members of the FSK. These representatives allegedly engaged in the recruitment of Russian servicemen, as well as the supply of money, weapons, transport and communications equipment to opposition groups in Chechnya. The commission ascertained that Kotenkov played a key role in attempts to consolidate the anti-Dudayev opposition forces, as well as in arming them and providing technical support throughout the summer of 1994.90 There was a sharp escalation in tension within the republic at the beginning of September 1994, raising the spectre of civil war. The town of Argun, where Labazanov’s group was based, was the scene of a heavy battle with Dudayev’s troops who finally captured the town as the opposition forces fled to Tolstoy-Yurt. The Chechen armed forces then warned the residents of Znamenskoye in Nadterechniy district ‘to leave the area for the period of an operation to localise the activities of the Russian armed forces, Russian mercenaries and gangs stationed in the district’.91 Units under the command of Gantemirov bombed Groznyy airport, destroying aeroplanes and armoured equipment,92 whilst other opposition forces, with the assistance of federal troops, captured several strategically important villages on the approaches to Groznyy. Dudayev construed this to be a manifestation of Moscow’s desire to initiate a military resolution before the winter months,

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and consequently fighting intensified throughout the entire Groznyy region.93 A further indication of Moscow’s increasing preference for direct military intervention was the placing of NCMD units on a state of heightened alert on September 5th. The NCMD simultaneously took control of all roads leading out of the Chechen Republic, as well as the region’s airspace, an act that provoked Dudayev to impose martial law on September 16th, citing ‘the continuing provocations by the Russian special services and the increasing activities by gangs belonging to opposition formations’. Expressing its fear of civil war in the republic, the Russian government issued an appeal to the Chechen people, calling on them to display ‘restraint and calm’ and not to ‘allow themselves the luxury of destroying themselves for the benefit of arrogant political adventurers’, stating that ‘all power in the Chechen republic must be concentrated in the hands of a united government with the participation of representatives of the clans and the religious authorities of Chechnya. It is now clear…that, in the traditional structure of Chechen society, attempts to concentrate power in one set of hands are leading to an escalation of political tension and an increase in violence’.94 However, this appeal for calm failed to reach its intended audience, as relay stations for Russian television channels had been switched off on Dudayev’s orders. A statement by the acting federal Prosecutor-General on September 10th denounced Dudayev’s regime for ‘destroying constitutional legality and sundering relations with Russia’s other peoples and nationalities’ and called upon both the Russian executive and legislature to ‘immediately employ effective measures to restore legality and law and order in the Chechen republic’, a remark that appears to suggest the use of force.95 However, there was a lack of consensus within Moscow’s political elite regarding the use of force, despite a growing sense of disquiet at the volatile situation in the North Caucasus. In an appeal issued by the Federation Council at the beginning of October regional leaders called for a rejection of violent means in pursuit of any potential resolution to the crisis and denounced the Chechen leaders for sacrificing the nation’s interests to their own personal ambitions.96

Concluding remarks The conclusion of a Federal Treaty with Tatarstan at the beginning of 1994 had raised hopes that a similar political resolution to Moscow’s conflict with Chechnya would be forthcoming. The unwillingness of both sides to compromise undermined mediation efforts and as the negotiating process faltered, the Kremlin apparently took the decision to cultivate the Chechen opposition in an attempt to overthrow the Dudayev regime indirectly. However, this policy of select covert patronage failed to achieve the desired results, partly as a result of the escalating antagonism between the various anti-Dudayev factions. By the end of September 1994 Chechnya seemed to be on the brink of a civil war that threatened to destabilise the entire North Caucasus region, a potential danger that was highlighted by the spate of hijackings in May and June.

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Russian patronage encompassed a wide range of policies, from overt verbal support and political rhetoric in favour of certain opposition groups to covert military sponsorship (see Table 6.2). Table 6.2 The evolution of Russian policy towards the Chechen crisis Phase

Policy

Effectiveness

1991–

Political approach in attempt to reach negotiated settlement

Failure to resolve issue of Chechnya’s status

1993–mid-1994

Overt, verbal support for antiDudayev opposition

1993–

Economic assistance to opposition groups

mid-1994

Covert, predominantly military support

End 1994

Full-scale military invasion

Exacerbated tensions within republic, but failed to accomplish overthrow of Dudayev regime Failed to re-assert federal hegemony

This entire spectrum of options represents the ‘grey area’ between the extremes of federal policy towards the regions, with the Tatarstan model of conciliatory political agreement at one end and the Chechen model of allout war at the other. It can be seen that as each stage failed to resolve the conflict a gradual escalation took place, ultimately resulting in a full-scale military invasion, which can be seen as the ‘logical extension’ of a policy of covert assistance. Nevertheless, this does not signify that a systematic approach of rational choice was applied by the Russian political elite and any attempt to impose a logical order on to what was essentially the chaos of democratic transition must be avoided. The time for negotiations and mediation was patently drawing to a conclusion, although many Russian politicians were still averse to a forcible resolution of the Chechen problem. Despite this opposition from within federal political structures, Yeltsin, ostensibly on the advice of a narrow circle of his closest aides, began to adopt an increasingly uncompromising stance towards the Chechen demands, in a futile attempt to regain control of the divided republic, as well as the support of a disillusioned electorate. The success of nationalist and communist parties in the 1993 Russian parliamentary elections encouraged Yeltsin to espouse more hard-line policies, particularly with regard to federal subjects, thereby provoking a worsening of relations with Groznyy. The following chapter will investigate the months immediately prior to the introduction of troops in an attempt to locate a reason for the dramatic change in the attitude of the Russian leadership, from its policy of contrived indifference on the one hand, to the initiation of a full-scale military invasion on the other.

7

The decision to invade (October–December 1994)

Introduction Throughout 1994 the involvement of the federal authorities in the Chechen conflict had become increasingly high-level. There were several indications of a dramatic shift in the official Russian attitude towards the Chechen problem during 1994, notably government statements, Yeltsin’s speeches and his behaviour on the world stage. Russian officials had frequently declared that Chechnya was an indispensable constituent part of the Russian Federation, stressing the illegal nature of the Dudayev regime, as well as the futility of conducting negotiations with the Chechen leader. Sergei Shakhrai, a deputy Prime Minister and former Nationalities Minister, insisted that ‘the Chechen republic is a subject of the Russian Federation and no matter how singular the development inside the … republic may be, the whole set of methods provided for by the … Federation for administering its territory are applicable to it, including crisis methods’.1 The head of the Russian presidential administration, Sergei Filatov, reiterated this principle when he stated that the internal conflict in Chechnya could no longer be settled by peaceful means.2 Despite emphatically ruling out Russia’s armed involvement in the conflict, Filatov’s statement implied that a military solution was conceivable. However, whilst the use of regular army forces from the Russian Ministry of Defence was rejected, federal officials deliberately clarified the constitutional legality of deploying Interior Troops within Chechnya, thus establishing the possibility of a military resolution to the deteriorating political crisis. This chapter will examine the evolution of Russian policy towards Chechnya during the final months of 1994, which concluded with the inauspicious decision to resolve the conflict by means of direct military intervention rather than political negotiations. It will investigate the nature of the decision-making process within Russian state structures – with regard to the Chechen conflict and the extent of democratic change as reflected by this process – and also examine conceivable motives for the Russian leadership altering its policy of conflict management from covert support of the Chechen opposition to all-out warfare by December 1994.

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Domestic contexts – the domino effect and fundamentalism Prior to a chronological analysis of the events surrounding the decision to invade, it is pertinent to investigate the context within which the Chechen crisis deepened. The Russian leadership was patently concerned about the possibility of the ‘Chechen virus of separatism’ spreading to other republics across the region, the so-called ‘domino effect’, particularly in the volatile North Caucasus. The Russian population of this region considered the military action of 1994 to be a preventative measure against the threat of the ‘domino effect’, in contrast to the indigenous peoples of the North Caucasus, who viewed the federal intervention as an attack against all north Caucasian people.3 However, surrounding territories had shown no desire to follow the Chechen example, despite Dudayev’s impassioned pleas for the Caucasian republics to unite against the perceived threat of ‘imperial’ Russia. They had witnessed the meagre results of Chechnya’s three years of independence under Dudayev’s virtual dictatorship – impoverishment of the people, criminalisation of the state and increased violence – and were unwilling to relinquish the security of federal control.4 Akhsarbek Galazov, the president of North Ossetia, described Dudayev’s predictions that the Chechen conflict would become a ‘new Russian–Caucasian war’ as ‘groundless’, stating that the leaders of republics and regions in the North Caucasus were ‘tired of war’.5 Pavel Baev has observed that Russian policy towards the North Caucasus during 1994 ‘became more and more oriented towards isolating [Chechnya] and securing support from the other republics for the planned tougher measures against it.’6 The federal authorities sought to win the support of north Caucasian political leaders by pledging more attention to their problems. Baev cites the case of North Ossetia, which became a crucial ally for Moscow after it ‘eagerly provided its territory for the basing of Russian troops’. In return ‘the Kremlin refrained from any pressure on President Galazov [the North Ossetian leader] over the issue of the return of Ingush refugees to the Prigorodny rayon’.7 Furthermore, it has been suggested that the leaders of Stavropol and Krasnodar krais, the southern Russian regions bordering Chechnya, had a significant influence on the Kremlin’s decision to utilise military force against the republic. According to Elshan Alekberov, these leaders, incensed at the continual destabilisation of their territories by alleged Chechen cross-border raids and hijackings, petitioned the Russian government to take decisive action to normalise the situation.8 The fragile equilibrium in the region was further destabilised by the exploitation of religious factors. Dudayev invoked a traditional Russian fear of religious extremism in the days prior to the invasion, claiming that Chechnya was being drawn into the sphere of interests of certain Islamic states. According to the Chechen leader, Muslim fighters were arriving in Groznyy from other countries and declaring themselves to be soldiers of Allah not Dudayev, provoking the latter to state his concern ‘over the fact that the situation is running out of control’.9 Dudayev utilised religion as a

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method of uniting the Chechen population and mobilising them against the Orthodox Russians. However, whilst the role of Islam in the exacerbation of the Chechen conflict should not be dismissed, it should also not be overplayed. The claim that Russia was defending itself against the threat of Islamic fundamentalism appears to have been primarily aimed at the West and represents an attempt by the Russian leadership to deflect international criticism of its actions.10

The ‘Party of War’ There has been much discussion about the influence of the so-called ‘Party of War’ on the decision to invade.11 This group had risen to prominence within the Kremlin as a result of Yeltsin’s shift towards a more hard-line modus operandi in the face of increased political opposition from both the communists and nationalist Liberal Democratic Party after the 1993 parliamentary elections.12 It included Pavel Grachev, Minister for Defence, Sergei Stepashin, head of counterintelligence, Nikolai Yegorov, Nationalities Minister, Oleg Lobov, Security Council secretary and Alexander Korzhakov, Yeltsin’s bodyguard and head of Kremlin security. A narrow circle of the President’s closest advisers and ministers appeared to be engaged in a struggle for dominance within the Kremlin, with each participant striving to preserve his position within the ‘corridors of power’. Otto Latsis, a former member of the Presidential Council, contended that this clique of influential officials was independent of both Yeltsin’s official aides and the government, led by Chernomyrdin. Latsis’s conclusion that the war party was independent of Yeltsin’s presidential team is corroborated by other analysts who maintain that ‘the loss of Democratic support during 1994 forced the [presidential] team into a position in which it was a virtual hostage of the political radicals in the more powerful ministries’.13 Latsis verified claims that the Party of War intended to replace Chernomyrdin with their own candidate (Soskovets) once the military operation to subdue Chechnya had been successfully completed. To this end Soskovets was appointed head of an ‘operational headquarters’ to co-ordinate the activities of the various ministries and departments with regards to the ‘normalisation’ of the Chechen crisis.14 If Yeltsin failed to win the 1996 presidential elections, the powerful influence of the radical clique that surrounded him would also be lost. Thus, electoral victory was in the best interests of those surrounding the Russian President. Nevertheless, despite abundant theories that the invasion was intended as a ‘small victorious war’ to increase support for the president in the impending elections, Yeltsin’s decision to send in the armed forces to resolve a political conflict demonstrated an apparent lack of concern for popular opinion.15 His decision to invade may well have been partially motivated by a desire to be re-elected for a second term, although it was ill-judged. The deployment of federal troops within the borders of the

The decision to invade 115 Russian Federation merely served to undermine the legitimacy of the president and his government rather than enhance it.16 Khasbulatov proclaimed the war to be Yeltsin’s ‘private war’, since it was initiated without consulting either the Russian government or parliament and maintained that the President’s decision regarding military intervention was made on the advice of an effective clique of his advisers and ministers, including Grachev, Kulikov, Lobov, Filatov, Yegorov and Korzhakov.17 All of these men were present at the crucial meeting of the Security Council at the end of November when the decision to invade was supposedly made. Lysenko was also highly critical of the Party of War, denouncing their ‘military adventurism’ that would ultimately lead to many civilian casualties.18 Aushev, the Ingush president, stated that ‘by the end of 1994 many influential people within the Russian leadership were yearning for a chance to “make their mark on history”. This was particularly the case with those who had only recently obtained their places in the Kremlin … [Yegorov] wanted to get to the top with lightning speed’.19 The Party of War was partially motivated by a deep sense of frustration at Russia’s loss of international prestige following the collapse of the Soviet empire and a desire for the country to once again play a dominant role within the international arena. Russia’s increasing assertiveness was encapsulated in a statement made by Yeltsin in September of that year: ‘Russia is playing a pivotal role in world changes and its voice is becoming weighty, innovative and timely. We are now not merely listening to what people have to say, but are ever more actively formulating proposals, terms and demands.’20 Echoes of the Cold War were audible in the heightening east–west tension that reached a peak during the latter half of 1994. The Kremlin viewed the planned eastwards expansion of NATO as a significant threat to the country’s security, a hostile ‘collaboration’ by western powers to contain Russia’s influence. In his opening address to the summit of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), held in Budapest at the beginning of December, Yeltsin voiced his vehement opposition to the proposed expansion, highlighting one of the Russian Federation’s greatest concerns.21 In addition to this, Russia’s ever-increasing reliance upon financial aid from the West and the conditions attached to such assistance reinforced the feeling that the nation was being held to ransom. Consequently its behaviour became increasingly antagonistic as it reasserted its political independence.22 It could be argued that the Russian leadership perceived the proposed expansion of NATO to represent a direct threat to national security and subsequently sought to secure its territorial integrity. Whilst it is uncertain who advocated the use of force against Chechnya, each of those present at the Security Council session at the end of November, when the decision to invade was supposedly made, stood to benefit – either in terms of career advancement or from increased resources for their particular ministry.23 There is some debate as to whether the FSK

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or Ministry of Defence first suggested a military incursion into Chechnya. At a hearing in January 1995 on the Chechen crisis before the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Paul Goble, a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, insisted that ‘this policy in Moscow originated with the secret police [FSK], not the army. The army would not have done this on its own.’24 However, Pain and Popov consider it very unlikely that either the FSK or the Ministry of Defence initiated the invasion. In their opinion the difficulties experienced by the first Russian troops deployed in the republic demonstrate that the Defence Ministry had not been involved in the formulation of any military policy. They also contend that the invasion plans could not have originated from the FSK ‘because agencies do not usually come up with new risky proposals three days after the failure of a previous recommendation.’25

October and the spectre of a Chechen civil war Notwithstanding the subsequent debate as to which specific elite grouping advocated military action, during the autumn of 1994 the federal leadership had become increasingly implicated in covert plans for a forcible resolution to the Chechen crisis. Russian patronage of certain pro-Moscow Chechen opposition factions in the republic continued, with both Khasbulatov and Avturkhanov making visits to Moscow at the end of September for alleged meetings with federal officials. Whilst it was claimed that these opposition leaders met with high-level officials, this was vehemently denied by the federal authorities.26 The intensifying hostilities between Dudayev’s forces and the various opposition factions within Chechnya during the autumn aggravated Russian concerns of a potential civil war in the republic. As noted above, the federal authorities were worried that the instability in Chechnya could spill over into neighbouring republics in the North Caucasus region and across the entire Federation. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the threat of a civil war provided the Russian leadership with a pretext for invasion. Both the Russian and Chechen leaderships charged the other with provocation,27 as skirmishes between the government troops and armed militias escalated in frequency and intensity.28 The increasing severity of these battles was undoubtedly associated with growing levels of support from the federal authorities. Instead of merely furnishing Avturkhanov’s Interim Council (IC) with political support, Russian involvement now allegedly encompassed the provision of weapons, military training and ‘volunteers’ or mercenaries. Dudayev told a delegation from the UNPO, a non-governmental organisation, that the fighting was between Russia and his government (as opposed to the civil war that Moscow claimed was taking place) because the opposition groups were created, armed and supplied by Russia.29 Nevertheless, Dudayev continued to pursue his ambitions of a personal meeting with Yeltsin. On October 13th he again wrote to the Russian President,

The decision to invade 117 suggesting a meeting in order to resolve outstanding problems without the use of force, because ‘history and our peoples will not forgive us if we do not demonstrate wisdom and attempt to stop any further development of a military conflict’.30 Emil Pain and Arkadiy Popov, former members of the Presidential Analytical Centre in Moscow, believe that one reason for the covert military support to the anti-Dudayev opposition was the relative successes of the Labazanov and Gantemirov armed formations, including the latter’s seizure of Groznyy airport at the beginning of October. Encouraged by these apparent gains, the federal leadership began to supply the opposition IC with tanks and combat personnel in an attempt to further augment the effectiveness of the local forces. In addition, air support was also provided in the form of helicopter gunships and fighter jets. On September 30th, despite the fact that the opposition forces had no helicopter crews, Groznyy’s airport came under attack from four helicopters, prompting one Moscow newspaper to run an article under the heading ‘Does the opposition have cosmonauts?’31 Notwithstanding mounting evidence to the contrary, the federal authorities consistently denied the involvement of Russian aviation in the Chechen crisis. However, these denials were contradicted by the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian air defence forces, Colonel-General Prudnikov, who stated that ‘not a single plane has landed in Chechnya or left the airspace of the Chechen Republic without our permission’ since he had received orders in August 1994 to ‘close’ the airspace above the republic.32 On October 15th opposition forces, led by Gantemirov and Avturkhanov, stormed Groznyy, quickly taking possession of its eastern and northwestern sectors. However, they abruptly abandoned the assault and fled the city without completing their mission, leading to confusion over their unexpected departure. At the time certain opposition sources insisted that an attack on the city centre had been postponed in order to ‘avoid needless bloodshed’, whilst the head of the IC administration, Zaindi Choltayev, maintained that the assault was merely ‘armed reconnaissance’, which had met scant organised resistance, with the exception of the area around Dudayev’s Presidential Palace in the centre of the city. According to Choltayev, the storming of the Palace would have resulted in heavy casualties among civilians and thus the opposition decided to retreat in order to attempt a final peaceful resolution to the domestic political conflict.33 Khasbulatov contended it was ‘no coincidence that only seven people were killed during the taking of Groznyy on 15th October 1994’.34 He had been involved in on-going negotiations with Dudayev’s commanders, with whom he had apparently achieved ‘normal relations’ in the search for a political solution to the crisis of power in the republic. According to Khasbulatov, on the day of the opposition offensive into Groznyy ‘People came to me and asked: ‘What should we do? Fight with them or not?” Khasbulatov claims that he implored them not to fight and to avoid ‘large-scale bloodshed’, but

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nevertheless his reconciliation attempts were seriously undermined by the opposition’s assault. A further interpretation of the unexpected withdrawal of the Chechen forces is that the opposition leaders were ordered to cease their assault by the Russian authorities who feared that Yeltsin’s former adversary could attain power in Chechnya if Dudayev was ousted. As noted in the previous chapter, the political elite in Moscow was disturbed by Khasbulatov’s increasing popularity as an influential opposition figure in Chechnya. According to Khasbulatov, Avturkhanov telephoned Moscow to advise that his forces had successfully seized the city, encountering little resistance, and to request the deployment of tanks, along with Russian forces. However, the IC leader was told to quit the city, a command that Khasbulatov links to his prominence as an opposition figure in the republic: ‘Moscow was more interested in the degree to which … Khasbulatov’s people had suffered in Groznyy’.35 It is conceivable that the Russian leadership believed that Khasbulatov’s chances of procuring the Chechen presidency would have been considerably strengthened by a successful assault on Groznyy. Once again personal animosities hindered any efforts to attain a peaceful resolution to the Chechen problem. The Russian parliamentary commission charged with investigating the conflict also reasoned that Khasbulatov’s high-profile activities in Chechnya provoked the Kremlin to order the opposition’s immediate withdrawal from Groznyy. The commission concluded that ‘personal ill-will destroyed the possibility of any peaceful resolution of Chechnya’s problems’.36 The lack of any coherent Russian policy vis-à-vis the crisis facilitated ad hoc, idiosyncratic decision-making and subjective leadership. In spite of Khasbulatov’s allegations, the extent of Moscow’s involvement in this opposition attack on Groznyy is unclear. The Russian authorities consistently denied allegations of direct involvement, stressing that federal troops would not interfere in developments within the republic as long as the situation there did not threaten the territorial integrity of the Federation as a whole. However, these assurances did not take into account the use of operatives from the intelligence bureau, the FSK, which was implicated in previous covert operations within the republic. Whilst it is conceivable that it was involved in the abortive storming of Groznyy, Khasbulatov has concluded that the FSK were unaware of the opposition’s plans.37 The events of October 15th exacerbated the threat of a civil war erupting between the disparate armed factions across the republic. Ramazan Abdulatipov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Council, counselled that ‘the armed formations of the opposing forces have started the mass destruction of their own people’ and called on the federal leadership to prevent ‘the catastrophe of a civil war’ without the use of violence.38 His warning came after Dudayev launched a vicious retaliatory attack against Gantemirov’s forces in Urus-Martan, vowing to destroy the opposition if they did not surrender. None of the other opposition groupings came to

The decision to invade 119 Gantemirov’s assistance, highlighting the lack of consensus and cohesion amongst the anti-Dudayev movement.

November manoeuvres The failure of the October assault on Groznyy prompted the federal leadership to further extend and broaden its level of support for the fragmented anti-Dudayev opposition. A report ‘On the Political Situation in the Chechen Republic’ produced by the Presidential Analytical Centre in September outlined several proposals for resolving the crisis, but explicitly cautioned against providing military assistance to the opposition, a warning that went unheeded.39 Since August 1994 it had become increasingly apparent that financial and political assistance to the Chechen opposition would conceivably necessitate a long-term commitment from the Russian government, an expensive option that was particularly unattractive in the pervasive atmosphere of economic instability across the Federation. Accordingly, the leadership ‘was persuaded to support a “quick kill” policy and military intervention’ on the basis that Dudayev’s internal support was extremely weak and the Russian military could achieve a quick victory.40 The collapse of the Dudayev regime appeared to be imminent from September 1994, encouraging the Russian leadership to increase its military assistance to Chechen opposition forces, notably Avturkhanov’s IC. Throughout October and November observers frequently predicted Dudayev’s impending downfall.41 Nevertheless, a delegation of Russian parliamentarians, which visited the republic in September, warned that Dudayev enjoyed far greater support amongst the Chechen populace than the Kremlin thought. Anatoliy Shabad, a member of the delegation, voiced his conviction that Dudayev’s regime was politically exhausted and no longer enjoyed widespread support of people, but he also believed that intelligence reports claiming Dudayev had lost control over the territory were wrong. In his assessment, information regarding the number of soldiers and weapons at Dudayev’s disposal was technically correct, but wrongly incorporated into Russian political planning.42 This sentiment was endorsed by Sergei Yushenkov, chairman of the Duma Defence Committee, who led another Russian delegation to Chechnya at the beginning of December. He subsequently stated that during their visit all of the deputies were convinced that Yeltsin was receiving flawed information about the situation within the republic, particularly regarding the levels of support for the Dudayev regime.43 The federal authorities patently disregarded these cautions and persisted with their covert sponsorship of the opposition. Aleksandr Korzhakov, Yeltsin’s former bodyguard, launched a scathing attack of those within the Kremlin who urged the President to extend military assistance to the antiDudayev opposition on the basis of ‘misinformation’. ‘They cooked up a little fable that he [Avturkhanov] already controlled four-fifths of Chechnya.

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All they needed was a little help: a few tanks, some soldiers. They could take the capital. That would be it – the Dudayev regime would collapse. As a result, the President was misinformed. He approved the operation in November. We sent them tanks and … mercenaries’.44 Perhaps this underestimation of Dudayev’s support base, combined with an exaggeration of the popularity of Avturkhanov’s IC, was the reason why the Russian policy of covert economic and political assistance had thus far failed to achieve its objectives in Chechnya. Avturkhanov lacked support amongst the Chechen people because of his renunciation of complete independence for the republic, which concurrently boosted his reputation within the Kremlin. In his opinion it was ‘unlikely that in the next few decades anyone will proclaim Chechnya’s sovereignty’, as the republic lacked basic economic foundations and he openly expressed his belief that independence was ‘just a sweet fairytale used by Dudayev in order to keep his post’.45 In response to intense lobbying from Avturkhanov the Russian leadership approved the delivery of Russian tanks and combat personnel to the region in mid-November. Previously the opposition forces were only lightly armed, possessing firearms, but very little heavy weaponry. According to some estimates, over 50 tanks, as well as several attack helicopters and combat aircraft, were ‘leased’ to the IC by the federal authorities.46 The FSK commenced the recruitment of servicemen from the Russian armed forces for short-term missions, apparently under the direct supervision of Khromchenko and Kotenkov.47 According to testimony from participants in the events of November 1994, the entire operation was shrouded in secrecy with even the names of the FSK recruiting officers being concealed: ‘The [FSK] officers suggested the volunteers sign a contract with them, in which every officer pledged to take part in the combat operation for a hefty remuneration. The task was to enter Groznyy and support the opposition.’48 Contracts were signed on an individual basis with fees of up to six million roubles ($1500) being offered, as well as compensation of 25 million roubles in the case of injury and 75 million in the case of death. However, the contracts contained no provision of compensation in the case of captivity during the mission. Early discharge was promised and an advance cash payment of one million roubles given to each serviceman after a contract had been signed.49 Preparations for departure were also kept secret. The servicemen were flown to the Russian military base at Mozdok in North Ossetia where tanks were being prepared for the operation, their markings covered in paint.50 However, whilst the federal soldiers involved in the mission had little information regarding the precise nature of their task, the opposition forces in Chechnya made little attempt to conceal the impending attack. Maria Eismont, a correspondent for Segodnya, asserted that the IC in Znamenskoye did not suppress details of their plans and several journalists knew about the storming of Groznyy in advance. She claims to have viewed the plans a month before the attack, in the offices of Zaindi Choltayev.

The decision to invade 121 According to her, the plans were not dated, but were otherwise very detailed, right down to the official televised pronouncement, stating that all power in the republic had been transferred to the IC.51 The first stage of the plan involved air attacks on strategic communications points across Chechnya, including raids against Dudayev’s forces located around Groznyy. Notwithstanding Moscow’s persistent denials that federal forces were involved, witnesses asserted that helicopters displaying Russian markings were engaged in the raids against Dudayev’s troops, although the IC again insisted that the aircraft belonged to the opposition and were manned by Chechen crews.52 Russian military involvement was proving increasingly difficult to conceal. Dudayev condemned Russia for beginning an ‘undeclared second Russian–Caucasian war against Chechnya’,53 an assertion lent substance on November 22nd when a column of armoured vehicles crossed into Chechnya from North Ossetia. According to Eismont, this operation was commanded personally by Kotenkov, the first deputy Nationalities Minister, who had been in Mozdok organising nine battalions from the FSK-recruited Russian soldiers and Chechen volunteers.54 Nikolai Yegorov, the Russian Nationalities Minister, was also ‘in the area of armed conflict’ from the end of November.55 The presence of such a senior Russian official indicated that preparations for some kind of military action were well underway. The culmination of this Russian-sponsored operation was the storming of Groznyy on November 26th. Combined opposition forces, numbering approximately 1,500, attacked the city at dawn from three directions, supported by Russian tanks, armoured vehicles and aircraft.56 According to one Groznyy resident, the attack was announced on Russian television news before it had even begun, implying the involvement of the federal authorities and suggesting the anticipation of an easy victory.57 However, what was intended as a decisive strike against the Dudayev regime rapidly became a humiliating defeat. The Russian ‘volunteers’ were apparently told that special forces would be assigned to them at the start of the assault, although these reinforcements never materialised. One serviceman who participated in the attack claimed that if he had known in advance what sort of infantry support would be available he would never have entered the city, as ‘the opposition consisted of shepherds with assault rifles and their young sons’.58 Discipline amongst the opposition fighters was very poor and, according to one report, ‘as soon as they reached Groznyy many of them broke ranks and started looting kiosks and shops’.59 Salambek Khadzhiev, who had followed Avturkhanov’s group by car from Znamenskoye, described his first impression on entering the city: ‘I arrived in Groznyy about twelve and what I saw there was of course a shock. I saw that there had been a real battle and moreover that the men on the opposition side were not real fighters. They were afraid to shoot. They had never shot in their lives.’60 The various opposition groups spread across the city had no means of communicating with each other. Whilst their commanders had

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been supplied with two-way radios, ‘the frequencies did not match and they were forced to relay instructions and news across the front line by car’.61 By contrast, the Chechen government forces were well-armed, including more than 150 snipers. They were under the command of former Soviet lieutenant Aslan Maskhadov and the various units spread throughout the city had excellent lines of communication both with the command centre and other units.62 The opposition’s tanks quickly reached the centre of Groznyy, but, lacking infantry support, came under heavy fire from the rocketpropelled grenades of Dudayev’s forces, a mistake that was to be repeated frequently by federal troops during the 1994–96 war. The Chechen government forces had taken up positions on the upper floors of Groznyy’s buildings, which enabled them to fire unseen at the beleaguered tanks. Many of the Russian tank crews were killed63 and the survivors were captured, to be paraded on television by Dudayev as incontrovertible evidence of Russian involvement. After a ten-hour battle and the destruction of a large proportion of the opposition forces’ weaponry, those not killed or captured fled the city. The Chechen armed forces reported that a total of 120 people had been captured during the attack, including 58 federal servicemen. Moscow refused to confirm the participation of Russian troops, despite an ultimatum from the Chechen leadership to admit involvement by November 29th in order to prevent the prisoners being ‘most strictly punished’.64 The Russian Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev, described allegations of Russian involvement as pure nonsense, stating ‘I would never have allowed tanks to enter the town since it is totally unprofessional’. He infamously declared that if Russian soldiers were really involved in the Chechen conflict and if paratroopers entered the town, everything would have been over in a couple of hours.65 The Russian leadership was finally forced to admit its involvement in the attack after a highly critical media campaign, which culminated with the publication of details of the federal servicemen who had participated in the operation. The mothers of 18 Russian soldiers held captive in Groznyy appealed to the federal authorities to intervene, saying that they had seen their sons among the prisoners of war shown on television footage. On December 2nd both Izvestiya and Obshchaya Gazeta published messages from Russian officers to the Prosecutor-General, reporting that they had signed contracts with the FSK ‘to take part in a secret military operation on the territory of the Chechen Republic’.66 The media subsequently played a crucial role in the evolution of the conflict. During the war of 1994–96 the Russian authorities saw their positions undermined by media coverage in Moscow, which frequently contradicted official claims and played a major role in shifting public opinion against the invasion. The fiasco of November 26th proved to be a turning point in Russian–Chechen relations. Although Dudayev had been on the verge of losing all popular support for his regime, the involvement of Russian mercenaries in the Groznyy attack allowed the Chechen president to consolidate

The decision to invade 123 his authority in the face of the potential threat from an external source. His persistent warnings of the ‘imperial threat’ from Russia and incitement of national paranoia were vindicated by the participation of federal troops. As Khasbulatov remarked, Dudayev’s forces were no longer ‘bandit formations, but the armed resistance of a people to occupation.’67 Furthermore, Professor Dzhabrail Gakaev perceived a distinct change in the attitude of the Chechen nation towards the Russian authorities after November 26th. During the period from September to December 1994 the Chechen ‘war’ was a battle between two socio-political clan groupings for power and influence, with one side supported by Moscow. However, by December events within the republic were viewed in the context of a historical Russian–Chechen conflict rather than an intra-Chechen civil war.68

Democracy imperilled: the role of the Russian security council Following the opprobrious storming of Groznyy, Yeltsin broadcast an ultimatum demanding the disarmament of ‘all illegal armed groups’ in the republic, including both Dudayev’s forces and the Chechen opposition. In an appeal addressed to the ‘participants in the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic … an inseparable part of our Fatherland’, the Russian President gave ‘all those taking part in armed confrontation’ forty-eight hours to ‘declare a cease-fire, lay down their arms, disband all armed formations and release all citizens who have been taken prisoner and are being detained by force.’ He avowed that if this ultimatum was disregarded ‘a state of emergency will be introduced on the territory … and all the forces and means at the disposal of the state will be used to … restore constitutional legality, law, order and peace in the Chechen republic.’69 This severe diktat was issued after the Russian Security Council had convened to review the situation in Chechnya.70 Although the meeting was held behind closed doors and proceedings have remained veiled in secrecy, there is little doubt that the decision to invade was taken during the session.71 However, as Pain and Popov point out, ‘the Security Council, despite its important appearance, is not an independent decision-making organ’. Its decisions ‘acquire executive standing only after the president … signs an appropriate decree. From both a legal and practical standpoint, the Security Council is an advisory body to the president. If the Security Council adopts a certain decision, it only means that the chairman of the Security Council has signed the document … and that the chairman, this time in the capacity of president, intends to translate this decision into a formal decree, although nothing obliges him to do so. Therefore, the proper question is not how the Security Council reached its ‘decision’ but what its various members … advised President Yeltsin and whose advice he heeded.’72 There have been claims that those who attended the Security Council meeting were presented with a fait accompli. Yuriy Kalmykov, the Russian Justice Minister, maintained that, on arrival at the session, he was informed

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that all the Council members were about to vote on the use of force in Chechnya. ‘From the President’s tone of voice I understood that he had already decided on force to resolve the question and that it was useless to discuss it.’73 In an interview with Komsomol’skaya Pravda Kalmykov again stated that he was presented with a fait accompli, as ‘all the documents had already been prepared, and the Security Council members only had to vote – to either adopt or reject the “force option”. This very much surprised me. I said – let’s discuss things first, I want to speak. But I was told that we would vote first … I had to agree … And I voted in favour. So did everyone. And then we started discussing it.’74 Several other members of the Security Council, who were present at the meeting on November 29th, corroborate Kalmykov’s claims. The Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, maintained that few of those present endorsed military intervention, but that it was impossible to voice their reservations as Yeltsin had already made his decision.75 Vladimir Shumeiko, Federation Council speaker, stated that ‘the Security Council did not take a decision. It was up to the President to decide. As head of state, he takes decisions’.76 A further indication that the Russian leadership had already resolved to use force prior to the Security Council meeting is manifest by the fact that on November 28th Yegorov had drafted an appeal to Yeltsin, ostensibly from the leaders of the North Caucasus, which stated that there was ‘in effect a civil war under way on the territory of the Russian Federation’ and beseeching him to ‘stop the bloody conflict in Chechnya and take all measures for the imposition of constitutional order’. Ruslan Aushev, the President of Ingushetia, says he was summoned to Chernomyrdin’s office that same day and asked to add his name to the petition, which had already been signed by the leaders of seven regions, namely Adygea, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, Stavropol krai, Krasnodar krai and Rostov oblast. Aushev’s concerns about the content of the appeal were dismissed by Chernomyrdin, leading the Ingush leader to conclude that the decision to invade had already been taken.77 This ‘appeal’ was merely an attempt to legitimise the forthcoming invasion. It is clear that decision-making by the Russian Security Council was not particularly transparent or democratic, harking back to the Soviet era when crucial decisions were taken in secret by a narrow circle of ministers and high-ranking officials. The absence of individual accountability facilitates the dominance of personal ambition over the best interests of the state. The Russian parliamentary commission, which was charged with investigating the Chechen conflict, requested the minutes of the November 29th Security Council meeting and also invited the Council’s secretary, Oleg Lobov, to a closed session of the commission. Both requests were refused, leading the commission to surmise that military success over Dudayev was indispensable for the President and his ‘Party of War’ in order to achieve objectives of both a personal and political nature.78 The documents available to the parliamentary commission were insufficient to identify the guilty parties, an

The decision to invade 125 inadequacy compounded by the fact that ministers were not legally required to reveal information to the commission.

December preparations for war Two weeks elapsed between the decision to invade being taken and the actual deployment of federal troops on Chechen territory, two weeks in which both sides persisted with their political rhetoric regarding the possibility of a negotiated settlement, whilst in reality they were engaged in preparations for armed conflict. In a televised appeal Aslan Maskhadov, the Chief of General Staff of the Chechen armed forces, exhorted the Chechen population to ‘rise for the protection of the motherland … In the current conditions all Chechens, regardless of their political convictions, should forget about internal strife and unite in the struggle against the aggressor.’79 Following the November attack on Groznyy, the Chechen leadership, well aware of the likelihood of intervention by federal troops, ordered its forces to begin stockpiling weapons. Paradoxically, according to Shamil Basayev, one of Dudayev’s field commanders, arms were purchased mainly from the NCMD.80 Meanwhile, the Russian authorities were also making final preparations for an invasion of Chechnya. The federal forces were based in Mozdok, in neighbouring North Ossetia, and during the weeks preceding the operation thousands of extra troops arrived in the town from garrisons across the Federation. Muslim Umalatov, a Chechen plenipotentiary representative in Moscow, led a delegation of Russian Duma deputies on an official visit to the republic at the beginning of December. They flew from Moscow via Mozdok, where they were obliged to spend a couple of hours, during which Umalatov claimed to have observed ‘five or six transport aircraft landing, all carrying military cargoes’.81 Aerial bombardments of the republic continued throughout the two-week period, pounding Groznyy and its airport in an apparent attempt to destroy Dudayev’s strongholds. Grachev admitted that Russian planes ‘had made strikes against the facilities of Dudayev’s forces’, although he categorically denied claims that residential blocks in Groznyy had been targeted.82 The Russian leadership continued to issue ultimatums to the Chechen administration, even as federal troops were concentrated on the republic’s borders. This apparent hypocrisy led Latsis to conjecture that Moscow was not expecting or even wanting a response from Dudayev.83 The decision to resolve the Chechen crisis by force had already been made. On November 30th Yeltsin issued a ‘secret’ decree (‘On measures to restore constitutional legality and law and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic’), which instructed a ministerial group led by Grachev ‘to disarm and liquidate military units and maintain a state of emergency’ in the secession-minded republic.84 The parliamentary commission investigating the conflict challenged the reasons for the secrecy surrounding this decree. Dudayev could have had no doubts that military action was imminent after the abortive

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November action and the subsequent massing of Russian troops in Mozdok. Thus, the commission concluded that the decree was not being concealed from the ‘enemy’, but rather from the Russian parliament itself.85 This deliberate reticence was not intended to preclude any potential threat to the effectiveness of the military operation, but was to protect the positions of those who had taken the decision with little consideration for its implications for the Russian populace. By December 1994 the prevalent opinion amongst Russian ministers appears to be similar to that expressed by the deputy Nationalities Minister Vyacheslav Mikhailov: ‘The possibility of talks with Dudayev still remains, although the base for such talks is narrowed and today we can only think of the voluntary surrender of arms.’86 The first Russian ultimatum expired without the initiation of military action and on December 6th Grachev met with Dudayev in the Ingush village of Sleptsovskaya. The Defence Minister announced that he would present the results of the talks to the Russian President, after which the Security Council would ‘make decisive conclusions regarding Russia’s conduct towards Chechnya’, adding that their common military backgrounds had facilitated an understanding between himself and Dudayev.87 Grachev later claimed that Dudayev had ‘realised the hopelessness of his situation if troops were moved to Chechnya. At the same time, he unequivocally indicated that he was a hostage of his entourage and could not comply with the request to unconditionally disarm and disband the armed units.’88 After the talks the Chechen president himself declared ‘Of course there won’t be a war, for what reason would there be war?’ Notwithstanding this optimistic proclamation, a former Chechen minister believes that the two generals merely exploited the meeting to conduct a ‘reconnaissance of the military-political landscape, rather than a search for peace’.89 Prior to this meeting, the Russian government had established yet another plenipotentiary working commission to conduct negotiations with the opposing forces in Chechnya. Mikhailov, the deputy Minister for Nationalities, led this commission, whose objective seemed futile in the atmosphere of mistrust and accusation that occurred in the days following Moscow’s ill-fated support of the armed opposition in the republic. The day after this commission was established Mikhailov said that the federal authorities were prepared to conclude an agreement on the demarcation of powers with Chechnya, similar to those signed with other subjects of the Russian Federation. He stated that the primary condition for negotiations was a cessation of the bloodshed in Chechnya and the disarmament of all opposing factions. He warned that if either side refused to disarm a state of emergency could be introduced in Chechnya and forceful measures taken, indicating the absence of any determination within the federal administration to achieve a negotiated settlement.90 As Grachev had affirmed, the Russian Security Council met on December 7th to discuss the situation in Chechnya. After the meeting a

The decision to invade 127 statement was issued, insisting that ‘there is no such thing as a conflict between Chechnya and Russia. There is only a struggle for power pursued by illegal armed groups in this part of the Russian Federation … It is necessary to take all constitutional measures aimed at disarming and eliminating illegal armed groups.’91 Dudayev deemed this statement to be an ‘imposition of war’ on Chechnya, but added that the republic was ‘prepared for any development of the situation’. In his opinion ‘certain forces in Russia’ intended ‘to kindle a huge conflagration’ in Chechnya that would result in many casualties.92 On December 9th Yeltsin issued a further decree ordering the Russian government ‘to use all means available to the state’ to disarm ‘illegal armed groups’ in Chechnya, declaring that ‘activities aimed at violating the integrity of the Russian Federation, undermining state security, establishing armed groupings and stirring up ethnic and religious strife are illegal and outlawed’.93 This was followed by an address to the Federation’s population regarding the situation in Chechnya, on the day that the Russian incursion commenced: ‘Our aim is to find a political solution to the problem of one of the components of the Russian Federation – the Chechen Republic – and to protect its citizens from armed extremism. But at present the impending danger of a full-scale war in the Chechen Republic stands in the way of peace talks and the free expression of the Chechen people’s will.’94 Once again the influence of specific personalities played a pivotal role in the critical deterioration of Russian–Chechen relations. At the beginning of December Shakhrai, who had been associated with Russian–Chechen negotiations since the beginning of the crisis in 1991, expressed his opposition to any further negotiation with the Chechen leadership: ‘If Dudayev was not prepared for talks over the past 2½ years I do not think he has changed his mind now.’95 Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that Dudayev was not against talks per se; he merely wanted a meeting with top-ranking officials, as this would denote implicit recognition of his presidency. The federal authorities crucially misunderstood the situation, believing that Dudayev was against all forms of political negotiation.

Concluding remarks From September 1994 it became clear that the official Russian attitude towards the Chechen issue had entered a new phase. During the months preceding the deployment of federal troops in the republic, Russian policy evolved from one of covert intervention to open warfare. It could be argued that the decision to invade cannot be located on a specific date; rather it constitutes a succession of Moscow-backed ‘invasions’, from the Chechenled storming of Groznyy in October to the deployment of federal troops in December. The boundaries between each initiative is indistinct, so that the ‘decision to invade’ represents intensifying federal pressure on the recalcitrant republic over a period of several months.

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Crucial decisions were taken in total secrecy and the decision-making process was restricted to members of the Security Council and the ‘power’ ministries. This lack of openness and transparency did not bode well for the future of the Russian democratisation project. A fundamental task in the establishment of a stable democratic state is the institution of a national decision-making system that is accountable to the electorate, as well as capable of acting both objectively and effectively. This had clearly not been achieved by December 1994. Numerous reasons have been proposed for the initiation of the Russian military operation against a constituent part of the Federation, but they all lay the blame with the executive, demonstrating the widening breach between society and the federal leadership. The Russian parliamentary commission, which investigated the conflict, is highly critical of the ruling elite. The commission concluded that by December 1994 the state security system was in no condition to resolve national problems as it was purely oriented towards the preservation and strengthening of Yeltsin’s power and that of his entourage.96

8

Making peace or war?

Introduction By mid-December the political conflict between the Russian federal authorities and the leaders of the Chechen Republic had deteriorated further and on December 11th 1994 Russian troops were sent into the republic with the objective of restoring ‘constitutional law and order’. On the day that the incursion commenced, Yeltsin made an address to the Russian population regarding the situation in Chechnya: ‘Our aim is to find a political solution to the problem of one of the components of the Russian Federation – the Chechen Republic – and to protect its citizens from armed extremism. But at present the impending danger of a full-scale war in the Chechen Republic stands in the way of peace talks and the free expression of the Chechen people’s will.’1 This proclamation implied the futility of the Mikhailov commission, which was underlined by the fact that talks between this commission and members of both the Dudayev government and Chechen opposition did not begin until December 12th, the day after federal troops had entered Chechnya. Two weeks later Yeltsin made another televised appeal to the Russian people, a gesture intended to justify his decision and gain popular support for the military incursion. He stated that ‘Russian soldiers are protecting the unity of Russia. This is an indispensable condition for the existence of the Russian state … No geographic area has the right to secede from Russia … The regime in Groznyy is illegal and it violates basic norms of the Russian Federation Constitution … The longer the situation in the Chechen Republic goes on, the more destructive an influence it has on stability in Russia. It has become one of the principal internal threats to the security of our state.’2 However, far from safeguarding the stability of the Russian Federation, the protracted conflict merely affirmed the extent of deterioration within federal power structures, initially revealed by the collapse of the communist ideal and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It quickly became apparent that the Russian armed forces were not prepared for counterinsurgency warfare against highly armed and motivated guerrillas. Instead

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of intimidating Dudayev’s separatist regime, the highly visible manifestation of military might merely served to boost their determination to preserve Chechen statehood. This chapter will examine the conflict itself, from the disastrous attempt by federal troops to seize Groznyy in December 1994 up to the signing of the Khasavyurt peace agreement in 1996 and the three years of uneasy peace that followed. The physical battle in Chechnya unfolded against a background of political dissension in Moscow, as campaigning for parliamentary and presidential elections got underway. Cease-fires became vital campaign tools for the Russian leadership, as Chechen separatists sought to keep the war in the public consciousness with defiant acts of mass hostage-taking in Russian towns.

Attacking from all sides On the morning of December 11th 1994 the Russian armed forces (including both MVD and army troops) commenced their invasion of Chechnya, pouring into the republic from three different directions.3 The Northern Column advanced from Mozdok in North Ossetia (where operational headquarters were based), the Western Column crossed Ingushetia from Vladikavkaz in the west and the Eastern Column started in Kizlyar, Dagestan to the east of the seditious republic. The principal objective of this three-pronged attack was to encircle Groznyy, taking control of outlying areas as the troops advanced through the republic towards the capital.4 Local people were allegedly told the military convoys were carrying vital supplies of food, a cynical attempt to win civilian support and forestall resistance to the operation.5 The Northern Column had a relatively easy passage through Chechnya, as it was moving through territory already under IC control. As mentioned above, the northern plains of Chechnya have traditionally been more receptive to Russian rule and it had become the centre of the anti-Dudayev resistance movement. Opposition groupings in the region had been receiving covert support from the Russian authorities for several months prior to the invasion. However, the Western and Eastern Columns found their routes obstructed by local civilians who were enraged by the Russian attack. On December 13th the Western Column, under the command of General Ivan Babichev, ground to a halt in the village of Davidenko, more than 25 miles from of Groznyy. In the face of staunch resistance from local residents Babichev refused to advance any further, unwilling to attack civilians.6 The Eastern Column found itself similarly impeded by human blockades. Senior commanders, mindful of the outcomes of rebellions in Baku, Tbilisi and Vilnius when the military was called upon to forcibly suppress political opposition during the Gorbachev era, refused to turn their weapons on the civilian population. The Northern Column’s progress was halted just outside Groznyy when Chechen fighters sprung an ambush. There was fierce

Making peace or war? 131 fighting around the villages of Dolinsky and Pervomayskoye, which formed part of the second ‘ring’ of the Chechen defence.7 At this point, the Western and Eastern Columns were still a considerable distance from the city and the first Russian troops did not reach Groznyy until December 20th, over a week later than planned. Meanwhile, in spite of being hampered by bad weather, Russian aircraft and artillery launched attacks on key positions in the republic, including Khankala airport, the television tower and the oil refinery. Yeltsin issued another ultimatum on December 17th, calling on the rebels to disarm. This lent credence to the supposition that the invasion was intended to intimidate the Chechens with a demonstration of Russian military might, in the expectation that Dudayev would then be willing to come to the table and achieve a negotiated settlement to the protracted crisis. Kozyrev, a member of the Security Council, claims Grachev had proposed a surgical strike that would seal Chechnya’s borders and blockade Groznyy: ‘[He] said when Russian troops closed in on Chechnya, the Dudayev regime would either collapse or else he would enter negotiations.’8 Although Russian military forces had already crossed the border, officials were still hopeful that a political settlement could be attained, and talks commenced in Vladikavkaz between the Mikhailov commission, the Dudayev government and members of the Chechen opposition.9 The talks were stalled by the failure to reach a consensus on basic definitions of terms such as ‘illegal armed formations’. The Russian side wanted a comprehensive interpretation of this term that would encompass all armed people on Chechen territory, including what the Chechens viewed as ‘legal’ groups, such as units belonging to the republic’s Ministry of Internal Affairs.10 The greatest disagreement was over Moscow’s insistence that the ‘illegal groups’ must be disarmed on the basis of federal law, a demand that was unacceptable to the Chechens, as it suggested implicit recognition of Chechnya as a constituent part of the Russian Federation. The Chechen government delegation protested that Mikhailov manifest himself as a ‘staunch defender of Russian territorial integrity’, thereby impeding the possibility of achieving any form of compromise. A further obstacle, according to the ‘official’ Chechen delegation, was the fact that ‘military actions in the republic continued to unfold irrespective of the course of the negotiations’.11 Ultimately the talks failed because of the Russian President’s persistent refusal to enter into high-level negotiations with Dudayev himself. The Chechen leader had repeatedly said that ‘negotiations must take place at a level at which real decisions are made’, emphasising his desire for a meeting with Yeltsin.12 The probability of such a top-level meeting seemed to be confirmed by Yeltsin, who stated that the federal side was ready to meet Dudayev ‘at a high level’, although no such meeting took place and all attempts to negotiate were subsequently halted. Mikhailov insisted that the talks had broken down because of the ‘ambition and uncompromising attitude of official Groznyy’. In his opinion Dudayev’s entourage contained

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several ‘hawks’ who were not interested in attaining a peaceful solution to the crisis and consequently the official Chechen delegation had not been authorised to sign documents prescribing the disarmament of armed formations. He also denounced the Russian parliament for its failure to establish any form of legal basis for relations between the federal and Chechen authorities. 13 By mid-December Grachev was becoming increasingly concerned about the military’s failure to secure Groznyy and on December 21st he arrived in Mozdok to instigate a purge of senior military commanders.14 The commander of the NCMD, Colonel-General Aleksei Mitukhin, who had been commanding the operation, was returned to Moscow ostensibly for medical treatment and later dismissed. He was replaced by LieutenantGeneral Anatoliy Kvashnin, but only after Colonel-General Eduard Vorobyev had refused the position. Vorobyev, at that time a deputy commander of the Ground Forces, later spoke out against the assault, describing it as a ‘crime’ and alleging that on December 11th he had not even been aware of the planned invasion.15 There was widespread opposition within military circles to Grachev’s ill-fated invasion plans. Russian troops were hesitant about their involvement in what was essentially seen as a political struggle. Babichev’s refusal to advance in the face of staunch civilian resistance was perhaps the most potent symbol of this vacillation. On December 26th three deputy defence ministers were dismissed by Grachev, officially because of MoD restructuring.16 However ColonelGeneral Boris Gromov, Valery Mironov and Georgy Kondratyev were all rumoured to have been dismissed because of their criticism of the Chechen campaign. Gromov in particular had been very vocal in his opposition to the military operation and Kondratyev had expressed his belief that the crisis could not be solved by military means.17 By December 25th Russian troops had reached the suburbs of the city and began to focus on securing strategic positions such as Karpinsky Hill, six miles to the west of Groznyy. The following day Yeltsin attended a Security Council meeting and promised an end to the aerial bombardments, which were leading to many civilian casualties. However in a televised national address to the nation on December 27th his tone was far from compromising. Addressing troops deployed in Chechnya, he urged them to remember that ‘the rampage of gangsterism on Chechen soil endangers our entire country. Your relatives could become its victims.’ 18

New year, new Groznyy? On New Year’s Eve Russian forces launched a massive armoured offensive to seize Groznyy, attacking from the north, east and west of the city. Four assault groups were created: the Northern Battle Group commanded by MajorGeneral Konstantin Pulikovskiy, the North-eastern Battle Group commanded by Lieutenant-General Lev Rokhlin, the Western Battle Group

Making peace or war? 133 commanded by Major-General V. Petruk and the Eastern Battle Group led by Major-General N. Staskov. The plan was to stage a decisive strike against Dudayev’s headquarters at the Presidential Palace, a symbol of Chechen resistance, and take control of other strategic sites, including key government buildings and the railway station. The four groups would move on the city centre in a pincer movement supported by air attacks. The speed of the attack would take the Chechen leadership by surprise, leaving it surrounded and isolated, and limit collateral damage. However the decision to launch the ground assault had allegedly been taken during Grachev’s birthday celebrations and, from the outset, it was doomed to fail.19 The short-sighted planning behind the assault was emphasised by the fact that none of the units had received specialist training in urban warfare.20 According to Andrei Raevsky, the attacking forces comprised of 23,800 men (from both the army and MVD) and over 300 armoured vehicles, including 80 tanks.21 A lack of manpower meant that the federal forces had failed to seal off the city, leaving it open to the south. This facilitated a constant stream of reinforcements and supplies to separatist fighters entrenched in the besieged city. As Russian troops slowly edged into the city from the north, heading for the Presidential Palace, the Eastern and Western Battle groups met such fierce resistance that their commanders decided to dig in. Only the Northern group, under the command of Rokhlin, managed to reach the Presidential Palace. In contrast to the Russian troops, the Chechen fighters were lightly armed with machine guns, grenades and grenade launchers and organised into small, highly mobile units. They were fighting on home ground and thus had a superior knowledge of the city layout. The federal forces were not even provided with suitable maps prior to the assault.22 The Chechens used tactics that were simple, but effective. They waited until the federal forces had reached the centre of Groznyy before separating the tanks from their infantry support and attacking them with grenade launchers and flame throwers.23 The fate of the 131st Motor-Rifle Brigade (the Maikop Brigade) was symbolic of the destruction suffered by the entire Russian military and highlighted the catastrophic failure of the New Year’s Eve assault. The 1,000-strong Brigade entered Groznyy from the north-east with orders to seize the area around the railway station. It met little resistance and achieved its objective easily by mid-afternoon on December 31st, unaware that it had walked straight into an ambush. Separatist fighters surrounded the station and launched a ferocious attack, decimating the brigade: ‘Hundreds of Chechen fighters appeared. They had occupied every floor of the surrounding buildings, the cellars, roofs and every window. Grenadelaunchers and snipers fired non-stop, setting fire to armoured vehicles one after another, picking off soldiers as they fled their burning vehicles.’24 Completely cut off, the remaining troops took shelter in the railway buildings and attempted to defend themselves. When their ammunition began to

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run out, the brigade commander Colonel Ivan Savin decided to attempt a break-out, aware that reinforcements were not going to materialise. However, the troops were unfamiliar with the city and soon became lost, falling prey to snipers. In just under 60 hours almost the entire Maikop Brigade was annihilated, together with 20 of its 26 tanks and over 100 of its 120 armoured vehicles. Seventy-four soldiers and officers were also taken prisoner. Lieutenant Aleksandr Labzenko, commander of the brigade’s antiaircraft unit, believes that the root of the failure lies in the fact that the soldiers ‘had not been taught how to fight in an urban environment and a large proportion of the armour was driven through the narrow streets without the protection of infantry.’25 Tanks and armoured vehicles are not ideal in urban environments – their poor manoeuvrability and visual range mean that they are extremely vulnerable to attack and they are reliant on support from infantry troops. In his testimony to the parliamentary commission investigating the causes of the war, Kondratyev cast doubt over the deployment of tanks: ‘Why did they wage war with tanks in Groznyy? Tanks cannot do battle in cities.’ Originally trained in a tank regiment, he was highly critical of the fact that the Russian tanks were supported and covered by infantry rather than vice versa.26 The Russian government did not immediately acknowledge the scale of the military failure during the New Year’s Eve attack. The official press centre consistently maintained that losses were ‘lower than expected’ and refused to release credible figures, leading the Russian media to speculate that a news blackout had been imposed.27 The federal authorities lost the propaganda war at a very early stage of the campaign. Bodies were left in the streets to be mutilated by dogs, images that were transmitted to a disbelieving populace on Russian media. The authorities did not even inform families of the fate of their sons, causing many mothers to travel to Chechnya themselves in search of their missing children. The New Year’s Eve debacle prompted a revision of tactics, together with a restructuring of the Russian forces. Petruk, the commander of the Western Battle Group, was dismissed, accused of failing to support the 131st Brigade, while Staskov, the commander of the Eastern Group, was accused of cowardice.28 The forces were reorganised into three ‘Joint Groupings’: the Northern Group commanded by Rokhlin, the Western Group commanded by Babichev and the Southeastern Group commanded by LieutenantGeneral Vladimir Popov.29 So-called ‘Stalingrad’ tactics were adopted: the advance on the city was conducted at a deliberately slow pace as each building was secured by small units of mobile troops, a reflection of Chechen tactics. This systematic approach immediately began to achieve results, suggesting that the initial failure was the result of poor planning and intelligence as opposed to a lack of skill. On January 19th, after days of fierce fighting, the Russian flag was raised above the ruins of the Presidential Palace and Yeltsin prematurely

Making peace or war? 135 announced that the military phase of the operation was over. He also pledged that only conscripts with over six months experience would be sent to Chechnya, highlighting the poor training of previous detachments. Separatist fighters were slowly driven from the centre of the city as federal troops continued their cautious building-by-building advance. They finally won control of Groznyy in February 1995 following a heavy aerial and artillery bombardment of the city, which reduced a large proportion of it to rubble. Nevertheless, the city was not completely sealed off until February 22nd, a delay justified by the Russian military as necessary to allow civilians to flee the fighting.30 However, the military had shown little regard for civilians during the fighting. The massive aerial bombardment of Groznyy at the beginning of January, ostensibly to ‘flush out’ rebel fighters, led to large-scale civilian casualties, many of whom were ethnic Russians. Thousands were trapped in the devastated city, hiding in basements, unable to escape. As mentioned above, during the Soviet era a significant part of the republic’s industrial potential had been developed by the Russian-speaking population who formed the majority of urban dwellers, whilst the Chechen people traditionally pursued a rural existence. Those Chechens who did live in the city had already fled to relatives outside of Groznyy, a safety net many of the Russian inhabitants did not have. The city had been almost completely razed by the constant bombardment. All modern infrastructure had been destroyed, including power lines, and water and sewage pipes. By unleashing the Russian military machine against Chechnya, Yeltsin succeeded in uniting the republic’s disparate clans, which until the invasion had been seeking to overthrow the Dudayev regime. Dudayev’s incessant warnings that Russia was seeking to eliminate the Chechen nation had apparently been confirmed. Even those Chechens who had never supported Dudayev now rallied around the President, seeking to defend their homes and families against the perceived ‘imperial threat’: ‘You could say that the whole population here is involved in the defence … There are no formal commanders here. We just work together … We are just ordinary people defending our homes … I don’t want to give the impression that we are fighting for Dudayev. It has gone far beyond Dudayev. We are fighting to defend our homes from barbarians.’31

Military failures Estimates of the size of the Chechen forces vary enormously, ranging from 15,000 to almost 40,000.32 Many senior officers in the Chechen military had served in the Soviet Armed Forces and thus enjoyed a good insight into the likely tactics, strategy and weaknesses of their opponent. Dudayev and his armed forces were equipped with weapons ‘left’ by the withdrawing Soviet army in 1992 (see Chapter Four). The separatist fighters were often trained abroad and supplied with arms brought in over the republic’s porous

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borders. Blandy believes that ‘during active operations, the leaders of the Chechen resistance worked like a well-oiled machine – Yusuf [the foreign minister] obtained and brought over the money from abroad; Dudayev distributed it, whilst Maskhadov fought’.33 Furthermore, the Chechen leadership had been preparing for a Russian invasion since its unilateral declaration of independence in 1991 and on August 12th 1994 Dudayev had ordered the mobilisation of 600,000 men in the republic aged between 16 and 65.34 By contrast, Russian military operations in Chechnya were cited as a glaring example of the lack of combat readiness within the federal armed forces, particularly the army. The poor preparation of the troops was underlined by evidence from Lieutenant-Colonel A. Frolov who was based in the northern area of operations at the beginning of the conflict. He claims that there was no decisive preparation of weapons or equipment, particularly tanks, many of which had been in storage for a long period of time and were almost unserviceable. His discussions with officers and soldiers in Mozdok on the eve of the invasion left him with the impression that the federal troops believed there would be no large-scale military operation against the rebellious republic.35 The experience in Chechnya demonstrated a disregard amongst those in command for lessons learnt in Afghanistan,36 a situation exacerbated by social problems within the organisation such as dedovshchina, a flourishing crime network, and alcohol and drug abuse. In November 1994, less than a month before the Russian invasion, Defence Minister Pavel Grachev signed a confidential directive ‘On the results of training of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 1994 and elaboration of tasks in 1995’ in which he concluded that the Russian army was not prepared for combat: The ability to mobilise does not correspond with the situation that is developing … There are many deficiencies evident in the planning of operations and military actions. Some commanders … and staff are unable to reasonably substantiate the expediency of their decisions. Commanding officers have a poor understanding of their responsibilities … Soldiers are inadequately trained in the handling of established weapons and military equipment and have a low level of specialist training … The task of eradicating accidents and crime has not been resolved.37 The report went on to note a disturbing rise in non-combat deaths, particularly the suicide rate, and the problem of ‘non-regulation relations’ between servicemen, a euphemism for dedovshchina, the Russian phenomenon of hazing that had acquired ‘a more concealed, permanent and dangerous character, leading to a rise in criminal activity’.38 Grachev’s November report succinctly characterised the nature of fundamental problems that had weakened the capabilities of the Russian armed forces. The federal invading

Making peace or war? 137 force was seriously understaffed, a hindrance that can be partially explained by the falling prestige of the armed forces as a result of the intense media coverage of social problems such as dedovshchina, crime, massive wage arrears and poor living conditions. Dedovshchina has many manifestations, but it is primarily a violent form of subordination inflicted upon new recruits, a brutal tradition that flourishes within the military’s hierarchical structure.39 The new conscripts possess few rights within this informal hierarchy and are forced to perform the most menial duties, including cleaning the shoes and weapons of their seniors. Whilst the commanding officers are often mindful of this enforced slavery, they rarely interfere, considering it in their interests to preserve this unofficial military order. Severe beatings are customary, and any recruit who attempts to complain to the authorities often finds himself victimised to a greater extent. Dedovshchina became such a problem in the 101st brigade of the Internal Troops, stationed in Grozny, that in 1997 the Interior Ministry (MVD) decided to reform it, implicit acknowledgement of the impact it can have on combat-readiness. Few young men are willing to serve in an institution renowned for its poor living conditions, lack of financial resources and tradition of institutionalised violence. On the eve of the Russian invasion of Chechnya in December 1994, commanding officers were concerned about the lack of preparation, noting that ‘units were not manned to the necessary levels’.40 As the battle plans of any military formation are drawn up on the basis of a full personnel complement, the low manning levels are a serious impediment. By 1995, out of nearly two million young men eligible to serve, only 420,000 could be called up – the rest had obtained exemption on educational, health or family grounds, whilst a small number were exempt due to ongoing criminal investigations.41 The federal forces in Chechnya were frequently accused of providing the rebels with arms. General Vladimir Semyonov, who was suspended from duty in December 1996 on charges of corruption, was implicated in the sale of military equipment to Chechen separatists. According to a report prepared by the intelligence services Semyonov was involved in the sale of 17 Grad rocket launchers.42 These allegations are corroborated by information from Sergeant Andrei Shvashkovskii, a veteran of the Chechen conflict from the 166th Motor Rifle Brigade, who described the arms trade amongst Russian troops in Chechnya as an ‘open secret’, stating that there was a division of the market according to rank: ammunition and grenades were sold by the rank and file whilst the officer corps dealt in small arms. He said that apart from dollars, vodka was the most common form of currency, as desperate soldiers traded their weapons for alcohol.43 It was reported in 1996 that a group of servicemen from the 106th Motorised Infantry Brigade, stationed in Chechnya, had sold a tank and an infantry fighting vehicle to Chechen rebels. Ekho Moskvy radio quoted an official from military counterintelligence who alleged that the vehicles were sold for

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US$26,000 after a drinking party with the rebels at a Russian checkpoint in the Shali area.44

Into the mountains: the guerrilla war begins By the end of February 1995 the focus of the war had shifted from Groznyy, which was now under Russian control (although the federal troops never succeeded in fully sealing off the city), to the surrounding countryside and southern mountains, the rebels’ battleground of choice. During the spring of 1995 federal troops sought to flush out Dudayev’s army from most major civilian points in Chechnya. The war arrived on the plains in the south and west of the ruined capital, as the federal forces sought to secure key towns such as Argun, Shali and Gudermes. Situated around 10km to the east of Groznyy, Argun was a vital link in the republic’s transport infrastructure with principal rail and road routes traversing the town. The Russians finally gained control of Argun on March 22nd, after weeks of fierce fighting, and the towns of Shali and Gudermes quickly fell the following week.45 The fall of Shali was a great boost to the morale of the federal forces as it had served as the headquarters of the Dudayev regime since mid-January. Furthermore, it signified that control had now been established over a large proportion of territory east of Groznyy. The Russian success at clearing the plains region of rebel fighters was often accomplished at great human cost. There was little question that the federal forces had an overwhelming superiority in terms of firepower, but their grip on the republic was tenuous and they frequently resorted to massive aerial and rocket bombardments of rebel targets.46 Such attacks did not necessitate any close contact with the enemy and produced visible results. Unfortunately it also had a devastating impact on non-combatants, resulting in a huge number of civilian casualties. Anxious to promote a stable political environment and economic security, the international community refrained from harsh criticism of Russia’s actions in Chechnya, despite undeniable evidence of unnecessary aggression and violence against the civilian population. In their annual report, O soblyudenii prav cheloveka i grazhdanina v Rossiisskoi Federatsii v 1994–1995 godakh, the Russian Human Rights Commission, headed by Sergei Kovalyev until March 1995, allege numerous violations of international humanitarian law and international rights were committed by both sides during the conflict. They were highly critical of the federal forces who are accused of premeditated attacks on civilian targets, poor discipline resulting in criminal activity and the unlawful arrest of civilians. The unpredictability of guerrilla warfare and staunch resistance of the rebel fighters encouraged Russian soldiers to view the entire population of Chechnya as the enemy. The assault on Samashki has become one of the most infamous illustrations of Russian brutality during the Chechen conflict. It is also notable as it was the first operation to be conducted solely by MVD troops. The village

Making peace or war? 139 had been a centre of strong resistance for several months: between December 1994 and March 1995 around 30 Russian soldiers had been killed near Samashki, about 20 miles to the west of Groznyy.47 However, by the time the Russian command issued an ultimatum at the beginning of April, ordering the villagers to expel any guerrillas from the village and surrender all weapons, the separatist fighters had been persuaded to leave. Consequently the ultimatum was rejected and, despite an attempt by village elders to prevent an attack, shelling began shortly afterwards, on April 6th. As darkness fell, a detachment of MVD troops stormed the village, encountering a little resistance from the village’s 40-strong self-defence unit. This sparked off a zachistka, a ‘cleansing’, a house-to-house search for guerrillas and arms dumps. The ‘clean-up’ operation was executed with savage ferocity over a 24-hour period, as the Russian troops went on the rampage, leaving at least 103 civilians dead and nearly 200 homes burned. Many of those killed were elderly people shot at point-blank range. The MVD then sealed off the village for three days and refused to permit anyone to enter or leave, even denying access to the Red Cross.48 The carnage at Samashki reinforced the popular opinion that Russia was waging war was against the entire population, in an attempt eradicate the Chechen nation. The next pivotal juncture in the conflict, the audacious raid on Budennovsk in southern Russia, took the war to the wider Russian population, striking deep at the heart of the Federation, and ensured that the Chechen crisis remained at the forefront of public consciousness. By mid1995 the federal troops had established control over northern Chechnya, as well as several key strongholds in the mountains, including Vedeno. The Russians held the upper hand over the exhausted Chechen fighters who were becoming increasingly desperate.49 However, the Russian command failed to capitalise on their advantage and the Chechen collapse was reversed by a daring and dramatic raid on the southern Russian town of Budennovsk in Stavropol krai. On June 14th over 100 separatists, led by Shamil Basayev, launched an attack on Budennovsk, storming several buildings including the main police station and the town hall. They eventually barricaded themselves inside the hospital with hundreds of hostages, including patients and children, and threatened to kill all of them unless federal troops withdrew from Chechnya.50 The stand-off was closely monitored by the Russian media: journalists were granted access to Basayev, who seized the opportunity to justify his actions. The Interior Minister, Viktor Yerin, and deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Yegorov, both well-known hard-liners, were sent to the town with orders to resolve the volatile situation. However their involvement attracted condemnation. Viktor Kurochkin, a Duma deputy who was in Budennovsk at the time, was highly critical of the role played by the socalled power ministries in the debacle. He described the crisis as a ‘mini-Chechnya’ in which operations were led by the ‘very same troika [threesome] that was acting in Chechnya’.51 Despite Kurochkin’s calls for no

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military action to be taken, on June 17th two separate, unsuccessful attempts to storm the hospital were made by special forces and MVD troops, leaving at least 17 dead. The following day Chernomyrdin took charge of the situation and began direct negotiations with Basayev, stating: For the purpose of releasing the hostages held in the town of Budennovsk, the government of the Russian Federation guarantees the immediate cessation of combat activities and bombardment on the territory of Chechnya, from a certain time that will now be agreed with you … Secondly, it appoints a plenipotentiary delegation for negotiations on the peaceful resolution [of the conflict]. The delegation will be led by Vyacheslav Mikhailov and his deputy will be Arkady Volskiy. Negotiations will start immediately on June 18th 1995 … Thirdly, once all remaining hostages have been released, the government will provide transport for Basayev and his group to travel to their destination and guarantee their safe arrival in Chechnya.52 After a day of talks, which were conducted by telephone and broadcast live on national television, Basayev and his fighters left Budennovsk in buses provided by the government, accompanied by over 100 ‘volunteer’ hostages, including nine Duma deputies. The volunteers were all released unharmed at a village near Vedeno and Basayev’s men returned home to be hailed as heroes. The crisis was particularly embarrassing for President Yeltsin who was attending the G7 summit at Halifax (Canada) and had assured the international community that Chechnya was under federal control. There is some debate regarding the planning of the raid. The parliamentary commission, which investigated the Chechen conflict, accused the Russian government of ‘sloppy’ work, alleging it had ignored warnings from the intelligence services about a potential terrorist attack. The commission believes that a lot of preparation had gone into selecting Budennovsk as a target, claiming that whilst only 40–50 fighters entered the town on June 14th, over 150 participated in the offensive, meaning that at least 100 must already have been in the town.53 However, this contradicts Basayev’s own statements regarding the attack. The rebel leader maintains that, whilst the group intended to ‘take the war to Russia’, Budennovsk was not their original destination: the sole reason it became a focus for attack was because the separatists were stopped by traffic policemen as they passed the town.54 The Basayev-led raid on Budennovsk marked a critical turning point in the war, which until then had been conducted along a single trajectory: the use of force in the absence of mediation. The highly public attack against Russian civilians forced the Kremlin to re-evaluate its strategy and seek a negotiated resolution to the conflict. Immediately after the raid, bilateral talks got underway in Groznyy under the auspices of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Both sides appeared inclined to reach a political solution to the protracted crisis and tenative steps were

Making peace or war? 141 taken towards the initiation of a peace process. The Russian delegation was led by the nationalities minister, Vyacheslav Mikhailov, a pragmatic politician who had played a crucial role in negotiations at the end of 1994. The Chechen negotiating team comprised Lechi Magomadov, Aslan Maskhadov, Usman Imaev and A. Zakaev. On July 30th 1995, over a month after the talks had commenced, an armistice agreement was signed, stipulating the implementation of a ceasefire, an exchange of prisoners within a week, the disarmament of the Chechen forces, the gradual withdrawal of most of the federal troops and further talks to find a permanent peace settlement.55 A notable compromise from the Chechen side was the inclusion of a commitment to assist the Russians in tracking down Basayev. However, in order to maintain the impetus of the peace process, a decisive agreement on Chechnya’s political status was deferred until after parliamentary elections were held in December. A Special Observation Committee (SNK) was established with the participation of the OSCE (which had been granted observer status) to organise and implement the military agreements. The SNK included military representatives from both sides, the Committee of National Accord56, local elders and clergy, and the federal Territorial Administration in Chechnya, headed by Nikolai Semenov. Notwithstanding the initiation of the peace process, military operations continued. The conflict evolved into a daily round of skirmishes and ambushes, as the Chechens launched lethal attacks, picking off exposed units of Russian soldiers in mountainous gorges and attacking isolated checkpoints. Disparate bands of partisan fighters posed a serious threat to the Russian military, despite the lack of a centralised system of command. The on-going peace process was derailed in October after an assassination attempt on General Anatoliy Romanov, commander of the federal troops in Chechnya, who was left in a coma after the convoy he was travelling in was ambushed in Groznyy. Russia immediately suspended its participation in the negotiations and the Chechen leadership quickly followed suit, calling for international intervention before the resumption of talks. In a reflection of its tactics following the 1991 declaration of independence, Moscow had once again sought to install a ‘puppet’ leader in Chechnya in order to provoke divisions in the anti-Russian resistance. In December 1994 Khadzhiev had been appointed prime minister of a new Chechen government, which was endorsed by the federal authorities but failed to garner support amongst the Chechen people. Avturkhanov’s Committee of National Accord had also been set up in a further attempt to exert Russian influence over the political situation in the republic and in March 1995 talks had been held in Pyatigorsk on the search for peace. According to Russian observers, the talks were attended by representatives from ‘practically all of the Chechen teips [clans]’, in addition to elders, and religious leaders.57 However, it had become clear during the Budennovsk crisis that neither Khadzhiyev nor Avturkhanov exerted any real authority

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in Chechnya. Both men resigned on October 23rd and Zavgayev, the former head of the republic’s Communist Party, was installed as the new head of the Chechen ‘government’ in November. In an attempt to bolster the legitimacy of the Zavgayev administration, elections were scheduled for December 17th at the same time that parliamentary elections were to be held across Russia. Several days prior to the elections, Zavgayev and Chernomyrdin signed an agreement that established basic principles for relations between the Russian Federation and Chechnya. The accord was a significant step forward and gave the north Caucasian republic considerable autonomy. Notably, it recognised the ‘right of the Chechen Republic to participate in international and foreign economic ties’, granting the Chechen authorities the power to realise such links and to ‘participate in the activity of the corresponding international organisations.’58 This was a remarkable feat – no other republic in the Federation had the right to install its own representatives overseas. Nevertheless, in spite of Zavgayev’s apparent success in procuring important concessions for the republic, the agreement still deemed Chechnya to be part of the Russian Federation, rendering it unacceptable to a large proportion of the Chechen population. Support for independence had risen dramatically since the beginning of the military operation, and, in the eyes of most Chechens, Zavgayev was merely a Moscow stooge with little power within the republic. As a result, notwithstanding claims that Zagayev won 93 per cent of the vote, few Chechens actually voted and there was widespread condemnation of the election, which was besmirched by allegations of vote rigging and bribery.59 The election date had been brought forward to December 14th amid fears of escalating tension in the republic following a public demonstration held in Groznyy on December 11th to mark the first anniversary of the Russian invasion. According to official statistics, 50.43 per cent of the electorate took part. In addition, around 40,000 federal soldiers based in the republic participated, replacing the votes of Chechens who believed that elections were impossible whilst Chechnya was still occupied. Field commanders, including Maskhadov and Basayev, had expressed their opposition to the elections and vowed to disrupt the process, a pledge that was fulfilled by Salman Raduyev. In an operation commanded by Maskhadov, Raduyev and Sultan Geliskhanov led an offensive against the town of Gudermes on election day. Rebel forces also attacked Argun and Achkoi-Martan. Bolstered by his success in the attack on Gudermes and the impact of the Budennovsk raid, Raduyev launched a similar raid on a hospital in Kizlyar in neighbouring Dagestan on January 9th 1996. The offensive signified a further escalation in the long-running conflict and once again threatened to take the war beyond Chechnya’s borders, in line with Dudayev’s threat to spread the conflict throughout the North Caucasus region.60 According to Raduyev, his primary objective had been to destroy the nearby Perevolochnaya helicopter base, but the plans had been altered amid

Making peace or war? 143 suspicion that the Russians had received intelligence reports of the impending attack.61 Around 3,000 hostages were seized in the storming of the hospital, although most of these were released after only one day when Raduyev left Kizlyar with 160 hostages in a convoy of 11 buses and two trucks, heading for the Chechen border. However, just as it was about to cross back into Chechnya, the convoy came under attack and the separatists fled with their hostages to the nearby village of Pervomayskoye, overpowering a Russian police post manned by 37 policemen.62 The Russian leadership had decided to prevent the Chechens from returning to their republic. In the wake of the Budennovsk raid, the leadership had to be seen to act, but it could not afford the ‘collateral damage’ of yet more civilian deaths, particularly on the territory of an ethnically diverse North Caucasian republic that had remained loyal to the Kremlin. Following a five-day stand-off, ostensibly to allow talks to be held, troops from the Russian army, MVD and special forces launched a heavy air and artillery assault, pounding rebel positions in the village. Thirty-eight of the hostages were killed during the attack and after three days Raduyev, together with around 70 of the fighters, managed to break out and return to Chechnya.63 The siege once again highlighted the shortcomings of the Russian military and confirmed that federal policy towards Chechnya was being formulated by the more hard-line elements of the Yeltsin administration.64 The hawks were in the ascendant and negotiations were halted. The audacious raid prompted a transformation of the Chechen forces. The operation had been carried out without the knowledge of Maskhadov or the other field commanders (although it apparently had the full backing of Dudayev), who all condemned the taking of hostages. Maskhadov sought to establish a better command system and more disciplined troops. In an attempt to prevent a similar attack, the rebel fighters were told that they had to have a written and stamped command before leaving on an operation. This strategy immediately paid off. The Chechen forces launched new attacks across the republic and Russia began to lose control of territory previously under its command. Subsequent attacks on Groznyy in March and August 1996 all served to further undermine the Russian position and sap the confidence of the poorly trained conscripts. The new hostage crisis triggered a backlash in both political and public opinion. Boris Nemtsov, the governor of Nizhniy Novogorod and a strong opponent of the war, organised a petition demanding an immediate end to the military operation. He collected over one million signatures, a strong indication of the depth of anti-war sentiment amongst the Russian populace. Other manifestations of this war-weariness included coupons entitled ‘Stop the War in Chechnya’ in national newspapers that readers were encouraged to cut out and send to Yeltsin.65 In Chechnya itself, resistance to the Russian invasion intensified in the wake of the Pervomayskoye siege. At the beginning of February 1996 thousands of Chechen civilians congregated in Groznyy, outside the ruins of the Presidential Palace, demanding the

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withdrawal of Russian troops. Waving green Islamic flags, the demonstrators also attacked the illegitimacy of the Zavgayev regime and remained in the city for a week before dispersing. The rally was a further embarrassment for Yeltsin, who was preparing to present a fresh peace deal to the Security Council.66

A case of campaigns and cease-fires Against this backdrop of popular unrest and political dissension, Yeltsin affirmed on February 15th that he would proceed with presidential elections in August and vowed to end the war in Chechnya ‘within months’. The military operation had had a damaging impact on the President and his government. Yeltsin had lost his majority in the parliamentary elections of December 1995 and faced a tough battle if he was to retain the presidency in June. From the outset of the presidential campaign there was a perceptible change in Russian policy. Cease-fires in particular became a useful campaign tool and numerous cease-fires were announced, in what was viewed by many as vote-winning gestures, an attempt to regain the support of a disaffected electorate. Members of the Zavgayev government and federal forces travelled around Chechen villages, compelling them to sign peace agreements or face attack. In a dramatic reversal of policy, Russian officials said that they would be prepared to open talks with Dudayev, highlighting Yeltsin’s desperation to end the war.67 However, efforts to find a political resolution to the long-running conflict were almost derailed at the beginning of March when separatist fighters launched an assault on Groznyy. On March 31st Yeltsin unveiled his plan for a peaceful resolution to the conflict and declared an immediate cessation to all military activities. In his speech, the President noted that ‘the Chechen crisis is the hardest problem for Russia. There has not been and is no simple way to resolve the conflict.’68 His decree ‘On a Programme To Resolve the Crisis in the Chechen Republic’ called for a gradual withdrawal of federal troops and a widening of the zone of ‘accord, security and peace’ in the republic, apparently a reference to the areas which had already been made to sign peace agreements. The programme, which was to be implemented by federal and republican representatives, also envisaged the holding of ‘free and democratic’ parliamentary elections, the first step in the devolution of power from the centre.69 Yeltsin’s peace plan had already been revealed to Dudayev who was apparently offered a high position in the future government and a guarantee of his own personal safety. In return however, the Chechen leadership had to capitulate, essentially admitting defeat, free all Russian prisoners of war and agree to remain part of the Federation, conditions that Dudayev would never accept.70 His fierce rejection of the peace plan is alleged to have encouraged Russian plans to assassinate him on the basis that without their intransigent leader the Chechens would be more amenable to compromise.

Making peace or war? 145 Despite his rejection of the peace plan, Dudayev was closer than ever to realising his ambition of a meeting with Yeltsin. The Russian President had asked the leader of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiyev, to act as a mediator under the direction of Mikhailov. However, before any substantial progress was made, Dudayev was killed by a rocket on April 21st as he used his satellite telephone near the village of Gekhi-Chu, 18 miles south-west of Groznyy. The satellite signal had guided the rocket, fired by Russian special forces either from a plane or mobile rocket launcher, to the Chechen leader’s exact location.71 The death of Dudayev made it far more probable that a negotiated, political settlement would be achieved. For Yeltsin, a meeting with Dudayev would have entailed a serious loss of face. As noted earlier, there was a considerable amount of animosity between the two leaders and it is feasible that Dudayev’s death, together with the impending presidential elections, induced a slight relaxing of Russian policy. The federal leadership perhaps presumed that the Chechen resistance would collapse without Dudayev at the helm, although tension in the republic increased, with incessant attacks against federal positions by separatist fighters. Following the death of the Chechen leader, vice-president Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev assumed the mantle of acting president. He had been Dudayev’s deputy since April 1993 and was a writer and ideologue who firmly believed in Chechen independence.72 The field commanders immediately pledged their allegiance to him, despite doubts that he would be strong enough to hold the disparate clans together. Less confrontational than Dudayev, Yandarbiyev was considered to be a suitable negotiating partner. With the presidential elections looming, Yeltsin was anxious to find a political resolution to the conflict and on May 27th a Chechen delegation led by Yandarbiyev arrived in Moscow for talks with the Russian leadership. The meeting was highly significant – the first time that Yeltsin had agreed to meet with a Chechen leader since the republic’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1991. Seating arrangements at the meeting were of paramount importance and Yandarbiyev refused to sit at the table with Yeltsin at the head – he would only accept him sitting opposite, as an equal. The Russian president acquiesced, signifying a moral victory for the Chechens and underlining Yeltsin’s desperation to resolve the situation prior to the elections. The talks only dealt with three issues: a cease-fire, disarmament and freeing prisoners and hostages, while the pivotal question of Chechnya’s political status was not addressed. An agreement was signed, according to which a cease-fire was to begin on June 1st and prisoners and hostages were to be handed over within two weeks.73 However, it is pertinent to remember that the Russian President’s decision to meet with Yandarbiyev was made for electoral rather than political or humanitarian reasons. This was highlighted on May 28th, the day after the agreement had been signed, when Yeltsin flew to Chechnya for a four-hour trip as a demonstration of his commitment to peace in the war-torn

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republic. The President had vowed to visit the republic before the end of May as part of his election campaign. During his visit, the first since the Russian invasion began in December 1994, the Chechen delegation was kept closeted in the Kremlin as virtual hostages. The military was sceptical about the possibility for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Grachev expressed his reservations about the talks, stating that Yandarbiyev was too weak to impose his will on the rebel fighters. The last cease-fire, announced on March 31st, had only lasted a couple of days before a renewal of fierce fighting. Senior Russian commanders widely believed that every time they managed to gain the upper hand over the Chechens, the Kremlin imposed a cease-fire, thereby enabling the rebels to regroup. The military did not observe this latest cease-fire and fighting continued across the republic. Nevertheless negotiations continued and on June 10th Maskhadov and Tikhmirov reached a preliminary accord, which called for the withdrawal of Russian troops by July 7th and disarmament of the separatist fighters one month later. Following success in the first round of voting, Yeltsin seized the opportunity to strengthen his uncertain position by recruiting the popular Aleksandr Lebed, ostensibly to assist in the quest for a mutually acceptable resolution to the military conflict. A former army general and outspoken critic of the Chechen conflict, Lebed had turned to politics, coming third in the first round of the presidential elections. During his campaign he had called for Chechnya to be allowed to secede from the Russian Federation if the Chechen people voted for this in a referendum. Lebed believed there could be no winner in a war such as the Chechen conflict, which he perceived to be against the people. In his opinion it would turn them into enemies rather than resolve the situation.74 He was a heroic figure for civilians, although he was neither trusted nor popular within political circles. Lebed was appointed chairman of the Security Council and quickly began to toe the official line on Chechnya: he was to play a key role in the peace process. On June 28th the 245th Motor-Rifle Regiment began its withdrawal from the republic on Yeltsin’s orders. Nevertheless, fighting continued in the republic and the peace deal began to disintegrate. On August 6th, the eve of Yeltsin’s inauguration, Chechen separatists, led by Basayev, attacked Groznyy. The rebels stated that their aim was to embarrass the Russian President before his inauguration: ‘We agreed to meet Yeltsin halfway during the [presidential] elections. We believed him when he said he would stop the war. We not only ceased fighting in our territory, but even allowed elections to be held. But now it turns out Yeltsin has fooled everyone. As soon as he won the elections, he forgot about our war. Now we want to spoil his celebrations and to remind all his guests that the war in Chechnya is continuing and that Chechnya will never give in to force.’75. The federal forces were caught unawares and the rebels took control of the city in a matter of hours. A violent siege ensued, plunging the republic into the worst fighting it had

Making peace or war? 147 seen since early 1995.76 At least 140 federal troops were killed during the assault and subsequent battle to regain control of the city. The peace process seemed irreparable and hopes of a negotiated end to the conflict were frustrated. However, on August 10th Yeltsin appointed Lebed to be his representative in Chechnya and bestowed him with sweeping powers to find a solution to the crisis. The Russian leader acknowledged that mistakes had been made and censured the Zavgayev-led government for serious errors in their dealings with the separatist rebels. Chernomyrdin’s State Commission for Regulating the Chechen Crisis was discharged in line with a presidential decree that stipulated the dissolution of ‘previously existing structures which have not justified their existence.’77 Lebed flew to the North Caucasus to meet with the separatist leaders and negotiate a temporary cease-fire that would enable civilians and the wounded to flee the besieged city. His efforts looked to be in vain on August 19th when General Konstantin Pulikovsky, the acting commander of the armed forces, issued the rebels with an ultimatum to abandon the city within 48 hours or face a renewed attack. Nevertheless, as bombing commenced on August 21st, Lebed successfully brokered a cease-fire with Maskhadov. After meeting with both federal and separatist commanders, he vowed to return with a draft political agreement that would bring an end to the fighting. On August 30th Maskhadov and Lebed finally signed a peace accord in the Dagestani town of Khasavyurt. According to the agreement, a decision on the republic’s political status was to be deferred until 2001, although it recognised the ‘inadmissibility of using armed forces or threatening their usage in the resolution of all issues’.78 The two sides agreed to establish a joint commission within a month to monitor the troop withdrawal, prepare crime-fighting measures, prepare proposals for financial and budgetary relations, and make arrangements for the economic reconstruction of the republic. The ‘Khasavyurt Accords’ were a remarkable achievement – the first viable political solution to the long-running conflict that was acceptable to both sides.79

An uneasy peace Whilst the conclusion of the Khasavyurt Accords was an impressive feat, they failed to settle crucial underlying issues, once more leaving the republic in a vacuum. The question of Chechnya’s status remained unresolved and the republic continued to pursue its secessionist stance, calling for international recognition as a sovereign state. Similar to the situation between 1991 and 1994, the republic retained de facto independence. On January 27th 1997 parliamentary and presidential elections were held, the republic’s third set of elections in six years. Maskhadov secured an easy victory, winning 59.3 per cent of the vote against 23.5 per cent for Basayev and 10.1 per cent for Acting President Yandarbiyev. According to official figures, election turnout was 79.4 per cent, with 407,699 of 513,585 regis-

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tered voters taking part.80 The OSCE, which had monitored the elections, declared them to be free and fair. Many Russian politicians welcomed Maskhadov’s election and some members of the Federation Council (the upper legislative chamber comprised of regional leaders) spoke of their readiness to welcome the Chechen leader into the chamber. North Ossetian President Akhsarbek Galazov stated that ‘Maskhadov has been elected president of the Chechen Republic and we leaders of the North Caucasus and other regions of Russia should treat him just as we treat each other.’81 There was also a healthy degree of realism in the attitude of several Russian officials. Ivan Rybkin, Security Council Secretary, warned against any illusions that all of Chechnya’s problems, or problems in the relationship between Moscow and Groznyy, could be solved ‘in one fell swoop’: ‘A difficult dialogue lies ahead, and the president, the government, and the Security Council are all ready for it.’82 Emil Pain proposed that Chechnya be integrated with the Russian Federation by economic means and that the issue of its political status be resolved at a later date, by granting it most-favoured status. Maskhadov had made a similar suggestion at his first press conference as president, when he stated his intention of building close economic relations with Russia.83 The withdrawal of Russian troops was completed prior to the elections and during the final stage as many as 18,000 Russian soldiers left.84 However, their retreat was interpreted by the Chechens as a sign of capitulation and endorsement of the republic’s de facto independence. On January 14th Interior Minister Anatoliy Kulikov and his Chechen counterpart Kazbek Makhashev signed a temporary agreement regarding co-operation between the two Interior Ministries in terms of fighting crime and exchanging information. Kulikov expressed his hope that the document would ‘help prevent the spread of crime from the territory of the Chechen Republic.’85 The MVD had been tasked with monitoring the borders of the republic in an attempt to prevent the spread of criminal activity, although Kulikov himself admitted that the borders were never fully sealed, stating that it would be impossible to do this: ‘The borders with Chechnya stretch for 745 km and there are no less than 750 roads. You cannot place a barrier on each of them.’86 The federal authorities had never succeeded in sealing the republic prior to 1994. Optimism over Russia’s humiliating withdrawal from Chechnya quickly faded. Maskhadov faced an impossibly difficult task in restoring the republic to some semblance of normality, a task described by one observer as walking ‘along a bridge that is finer than a hair and sharper than a knife.’87 President Mintimer Shaimiev, the leader of Tatarstan, sounded a note of caution: ‘There have been elections, and the next thing we will see is a strong opposition. The opposition will be pressing for independence while he needs to rebuild the country. After a war or revolution … people always expect an improvement in their living standards.’88 The republic was riven by internal conflicts between various clans and warlords opposed to

Making peace or war? 149 Maskhadov, such as Basayev, Raduyev and Gelayev. The first signs of tension were manifest in the days immediately following the election. Following Maskhadov’s success, Basayev had announced that his future support for the new president would be contingent on the policies adopted by the new leadership. Furthermore, at the beginning of February Raduyev proclaimed that he did not recognise the election results and that he would continue the fight for independence: ‘While our leadership has signed an agreement and announced a cease-fire, I and General Dudayev’s army, led by me, de jure, are in a state of war with Russia. We have never signed and will never sign any kind of peace deal … No-one has the right to dictate to us the conditions of our national-liberation struggle … No-one but Allah has the right … We will never forgive Russia for what it has done to Chechnya.’ He vowed to avenge Dudayev’s death and warned that he was preparing for a ‘large-scale war of terrorism and sabotage’: ‘The time will come when Russia will be very sorry.’89 However, it was not just the military leaders who opposed Maskhadov’s election. On February 16th 300 members of Yandarbiyev’s armed guard converged on Groznyy to protest the Chechen leader’s decision to combine the posts of President and Prime Minister. Several weeks later, on March 3rd, around 3,000 people attended a demonstration in the capital at which both Yandarbiyev and Raduyev spoke. Yandarbiyev exhorted the Chechen people to unite and build an independent state, whilst Raduyev renewed his threat to attack Russian cities.90 Once again, the republic’s stability was threatened by the lack of unity between the numerous clans. The ascent of the moderate Maskhadov to power raised hopes that Groznyy and Moscow would achieve a compromise. During the peace negotiations with Lebed in August 1996 Maskhadov had proved willing to make concessions in order to reach a consensus. Whilst he was amenable to compromise, he still shared a desire to free Chechnya of Russian hegemony, although he recognised the inherent difficulties of the radicals’ independence plan. Speaking in April 1996 Maskhadov had pointed out that the principal difference between him and Dudayev was that he is not as dogmatic as Dudayev – he believes that all disputes should be solved ‘peacefully and soberly’.91 On May 12th 1997 the Chechen leader met with Yeltsin in Moscow to sign an agreement ‘On peace and the principles of co-operation’, which rejected the use of force as a means of conflict resolution and prescribed that the relationship between Moscow and Groznyy was to be built upon the principles and norms of international law.92 Although it was only four sentences long, the treaty was a crucial breakthrough in Russo–Chechen relations as it sought to bring an end to ‘400 years of war’. Furthermore, it treated the Chechens as equal negotiating partners. Yeltsin and Maskhadov met again on August 18th. These meetings were a significant achievement, as the Russian President had consistently refused to meet with Dudayev – the fact that he met with Maskhadov

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was a vote of confidence in the newly elected Chechen leader. However, progress was merely made in terms of public displays of co-operation. Behind the scenes little was done to secure the relationship between the two and the Chechen leader’s position was weakened by Russia’s failure to meet its reconstruction and economic obligations. Moscow’s prevarication on Chechnya’s status undermined Maskhadov’s legitimacy and effectiveness in Chechnya. Furthermore, the frequent changes of government in Moscow did not facilitate the development of a coherent policy for Chechnya and the North Caucasus.93 Once again the opportunity to attain lasting peace and stability in Chechnya was squandered. The Russian leadership failed to capitalise on the fact that Maskhadov is a moderate with whom they could negotiate, and the republic descended into anarchy. The economy had been destroyed and there were very few legitimate jobs, schools and hospitals were all closed and pensions and wages went unpaid. The lack of any legitimate means of making a living pushed many towards crime in order to survive in a republic awash with weapons. The prime example of this was the rise in ‘commercial’ hostage-takings: hundreds of people of all nationalities were seized and then held for ransom. Foreign workers who arrived in the republic to assist in the reconstruction effort were highly visible targets and their capture ensured that Chechnya remained in the spotlight. In December 1996 six Red Cross workers were murdered as they slept in Groznyy, leading to the withdrawal of all foreign aid workers from the unstable republic. Two British volunteers, Camilla Carr and Jon James, were kidnapped in July 1997 and held for over a year, and in December 1999 four British-based telecoms engineers were beheaded whilst being held hostage. According to Gakaev, armed groups carved the republic up between them, each group with its own television channel, command centre and justice system.94 It became apparent from the beginning of 1999 that Maskhadov had lost any real authority and was hostage to the demands of powerful warlords, such as Basayev and Raduyev. He was the target of several assassination attempts, the first one against him as Chechen president on 23rd July 1998. In February Maskhadov finally submitted to demands to transform Chechnya into an Islamic state governed by Sharia law, despite his wish to maintain it as secular state.95 In an attempt to preempt hard-line opposition leaders, the president abolished the post of vice-president, revoked the legislative powers of the secular parliament and ordered the drafting of an Islamic constitution. However, his opponents responded by creating a rival Islamic council, the Mekh-Shura, to govern the republic in line with Sharia law.96 Once again internal conflict threatened to undermine Chechnya’s stability. As noted above, prior to the 1994 invasion, Islam did not exist as a political doctrine in the Chechen context. Dudayev manipulated religion as a method of uniting the Chechen population and mobilising them against the Orthodox Russians, although he took few concrete steps to reinforce the

Making peace or war? 151 influence of Islam. Religion began to play a far more important role during the war itself when it was used to emphasise the radical difference between Russians and Chechens. Extreme forms of Islam allegedly accompanied money from the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia.97 The influence of Wahhabism, the type of radical, politicised Sunni Islam practised by the Saudi Royal family, had been growing for several years since the Russian invasion in 1994 and the arrival of foreign mercenaries in the region, although it was probably present in Chechnya prior to 1994, having seeped over the border from Dagestan. One of the most notorious mercenaries is the Saudi-born Khattab, a Wahhabi who arrived in Chechnya in February 1995 along with a group of mujahideen from the Middle East. Khattab was trained in Afghanistan where he is alleged to have fought for five years, from 1988 to 1993. The decline in Maskhadov’s legitimacy, together with the adoption of Sharia law, led to a shift in the attitude of the federal leadership, which until now had been repeating its behaviour of 1991–94 and maintaining an appearance of indifference. In particular, Chechnya’s move towards Islamic rule marked a hardening in Russian policy – it may well have made the leadership far less tolerant and willing to compromise, as it apparently confirmed their worst fears about the spread of extreme forms of Islam in the North Caucasus. This was reinforced by the worsening situation in neighbouring Dagestan. During 1999 there had been numerous skirmishes between federal law enforcement agencies and guerrillas on the administrative border between Dagestan and Chechnya, which intensified as the summer approached. In January, Lebed had ominously warned that ‘several thousand fighters are ready at any moment to invade the border districts of Dagestan and Ichkeria [Chechnya] to begin an armed rebellion … their minimum aim is the overthrow of Maskhadov, the ultimate goal is an exit to the Caspian Sea and Vladikavkaz.’98

A return to war On August 7th Chechen militants, led by Basayev and Khattab, crossed Chechnya’s border into south-western Dagestan and took control of two villages in the isolated and mountainous Botlikh region. Several days later, on August 10th, the ‘Islamic Council’ (Shura) of Dagestan declared the republic to be an independent Islamic state outside the Russian sphere of influence: ‘Placing our hope in the help and mercy of God, we declare that jihad in Dagestan is a fard [religious obligation] for every Muslim. It is the duty of every Muslim to rise up and defend the Islamic state and fight until the infidels are driven completely from Muslim territory.’ Despite lacking any legal recognition of its authority from either republican or federal bodies, the Shura decreed the introduction of war across the entire territory of Dagestan and issued an appeal to the Chechen people for their support in the name of Islam.

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Russia responded to calls from the Dagestani authorities for firm action by sending in MVD and army troops. Once again, the weaknesses of the Russian military were demonstrated as troops struggled to regain control of the Botlikh region, often repeating mistakes that should have been learnt from both the Chechen and Afghan experiences.99 However, whilst Moscow pledged firm action to unseat the invaders, publicly it also affirmed that it was not seeking a resumption of a full-scale war with Chechnya. The Prime Minister, Sergei Stepashin, a longstanding hawk on the Chechen issue, had vowed in July that there would be no new war in Chechnya, as ‘nobody wants to repeat the same mistakes twice’. However, two days after the militant incursion into Dagestan, Stepashin was sacked and replaced by Vladimir Putin, heralding the meteoric rise of the former KGB man.100 The attack against Dagestan represented the most serious threat to the stability and integrity of the Russian Federation since 1994. There were fears that Chechen militants were giving armed support to radical Islamists in Dagestan in a bid to overthrow the republic’s pro-Moscow administration of Magomedali Magomedov. Basayev fuelled these fears when he called for the union of Chechnya and Dagestan, in an apparent echo of history: during the 19th century the legendary Imam Shamil utilised Islam to unite the mountain tribes of the two republics in formidable resistance to imperial Russia.101 At the end of August the Chechen-led guerrillas claimed that they had withdrawn from the Botlikh district on the orders of Basayev who had called for the ‘re-deployment’ of his forces to begin a ‘new phase’ of uprising. Maskhadov consistently denied the involvement of his forces in Dagestan and expressed his hope for improved relations with Russia. The Chechen leader argued that he had appealed to his 15,000-strong forces to stay out of Dagestan and suggested that Russia should recognise his efforts to maintain peaceful relations with Moscow. However, the opportunity for negotiation was destroyed by a series of devastating bomb attacks against civilian targets in Russia during September that were attributed to Chechen rebels (although there is little evidence to support this).102 The attacks provoked the Russian leadership to take decisive action against the alleged perpetrators and on October 1st troops once again crossed the borders into Chechnya, ostensibly to ‘eliminate terrorists’. Statements by the Kremlin were fairly ambiguous regarding the specific objectives of this military action, apart from the fight against international terrorism. Despite a lack of credible evidence, the government successfully achieved domestic political consensus for the renewed military operation in Chechnya. Prior to launching the assault, the Russian authorities had sought to gain unanimous support for a renewed military operation from both the political elites and the general public in a shrewd propaganda campaign. The Chechen people were vilified, repeatedly referred to as ‘bandits’ and ‘criminals’ who threatened the stability of the Federation. This demonisation of an entire nation

Making peace or war? 153 was conducted in order to win popular support for an invasion by depriving the Chechens and their cause of legitimacy, although it ultimately served to unify the hitherto divided Chechen nation. Furthermore, by labelling the separatists as ‘Islamic terrorists’, the Russian leadership was seeking to deflect international criticism of its actions by suggesting that the Chechens are part of a broader Islamic challenge to the West as well.103

Concluding remarks Initially the government had unanimous support for the military operation from across the political spectrum. Liberal parties, which had voiced vehement opposition to the 1994 invasion, lent their support to the actions of the Russian armed forces and Putin, who was considered to be the one politician loyal to their economic interests capable of defeating Primakov or Luzhkov in the impending presidential elections. In addition to this shift in public opinion, the second invasion of Chechnya by federal forces differed from the first one in several other respects. In 1994 there was a strong sense that the Russian armed forces stumbled into the fight as a result of illthought out political decisions, whereas in 1999 the Chechens had allegedly given the Russian government a justifiable reason for sending troops in. The Russian advance went at a very slow pace this time and during the first six weeks of the operation the troops moved no more than 30km through northern Chechnya, in contrast to Grachev’s ill-fated ‘lightning’ attack of Groznyy in December 1994. Instead of storming and destroying villages in house-to-house fighting, the military initially ‘negotiated’ with residents who persuaded rebels to leave. The Russian authorities had learnt a further lesson from its earlier war with Chechnya: the crucial role of the media in modern warfare. The new Ministry for the Press, Television and Radio Broadcasting issued a formal warning to all national radio and television networks against broadcasting any interviews with ‘Islamic rebel leaders’ during the on-going military conflict. The authorities argued that such interviews were in effect helping the militants to wage a ‘massive propaganda war’ to incite ethnic and religious intolerance, and to promote a change in Russia’s borders. At the beginning of the 1994 military operation the Russian media retained a substantial amount of independence and was often openly critical of the federal leadership’s actions. However the authorities had seen their position undermined by media coverage in Moscow, which frequently contradicted official claims that sought to minimise the extent of the casualties and scale of the war. This played a major role in shifting public opinion against the invasion. Having gained an insight into the crucial role of the media (as demonstrated during the NATO operation in Kosovo), the Russian leadership took resolute measures to ensure that the situation was not repeated and consequently the flow of information was rigorously controlled by official sources.

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Trapped in a seemingly endless cycle of violence, Chechnya found itself at war with Russia again. Over a five-year period, from 1994 to 1999, the two sides had gone to war, made their peace and returned to war. Once again political efforts to resolve the protracted crisis were undermined by the role of individual personalities and the uncertainties resulting from the ongoing transition process. Against a background of the shifting political scene in Moscow and serious economic problems, the progress achieved at Khasavyurt in 1996 quickly dissolved, together with the possibility for any further negotiations.

Conclusions One step forward, two steps back

Russia’s renewed military campaign in Chechnya accentuates the federal leadership’s persistent failure to normalise its relations with the separatist republic or formulate a concrete, proactive policy with regard to the entire North Caucasus region. Moreover, the new round of fighting illustrates the extent to which the motives for the 1994–96 war reflect wider, more enduring systemic factors that are deeply embedded in the Russian state-building project. Despite a period of several years in which to establish vital institutional mechanisms for the regulation of centre–periphery relations, there has been little tangible change, thereby precipitating a new round of violent conflict in Russian–Chechen relations. Many motives have been ascribed to Moscow’s initiation of military action against a constituent part of the Russian Federation in 1994, from the influence of the electoral cycle to the geopolitics of oil. However, behind all of these plausible reasons lies the fundamental reality that the country lacked substantive, effective democratic institutions and the constitutional framework necessary to achieve a successfully negotiated settlement. The faltering transition process hindered a political resolution of the Chechen crisis and encouraged issues such as elections and individual personalities to play a crucial role in the decision-making process. Thus, it is possible to conclude that Russia’s war with Chechnya was ultimately engendered by the transitional status of both sides in the conflict. However, it should be noted that the causes of the conflict are attributable to both the democratisation project and the wider concept of systemic transformation. After examining the conflict between Russia and Chechnya, the following conclusions can be drawn: •

The crisis stemmed from the effect of the democratisation process together with the inherent instabilities of systemic change and was precipitated by the regime transformation that commenced with Gorbachev’s ascent to power in 1985. His policy of liberalisation facilitated the emergence of the Chechen independence movement and intensified centrifugal tendencies across the entire territory of the Soviet Union.

156 •

•

•

•

Conclusions The institutional and ideological vacuum, caused by the collapse of communism, encouraged the rise of hard-line elements within the Russian political arena and further impeded the consolidation of a stable democratic system. Moreover, the existence of this institutional vacuum within a multiethnic federation encouraged the manipulation of nationalistic sentiments by political elites in Moscow and Groznyy. The invasion did not indicate a suspension of Russia’s democratisation project, merely an attempt to preserve its territorial integrity and existing borders using measures typical of the previous Soviet regime. The perpetuation of the Soviet mentality, both of political leaders and imperial tendencies, played a significant role in the exacerbation of the crisis, as did the institutional vacuum that is so characteristic of systems transition. Whilst Russia appeared to be in danger of reverting to an overtly authoritarian path during 1993, it has retained some principles of democratic transition, notably the adoption of a new Constitution and the peaceful transfer of power, in contrast to Chechnya’s statebuilding project, which, prior to the 1994 invasion, was heading towards a more dictatorial form of rule. The deteriorating situation was mismanaged by the political elites of both sides who were engaged in a struggle for personal survival, rather than the establishment of democratic norms of behaviour. Furthermore, the weakness of the Centre facilitated the consolidation and strengthening of Dudayev’s ‘illegitimate’ regime. Russia’s elite groupings were sharply divided and proved unable to co-operate, resulting in an atmosphere of persistent political confrontation and a refusal to compromise. The crisis demonstrated the importance of establishing an institutional and legal framework within which centre–periphery issues can be resolved. There was a lack of any conscious policy and the federal attitude towards the crisis was characterised by incremental, ad hoc decision-making, a symptom of the political transformation. The chaotic and incoherent nature of Russian policy towards Chechnya, illustrated by half-hearted economic and transportation blockades accompanied by continued subsidies, merely reflected the chaos at the heart of the Moscow political arena caused by the transition process.

The new elites of both sides in the political conflict patently mismanaged the deteriorating crisis, a predicament that was facilitated by the institutional vacuum within which the various actors were operating. Paradoxically, the weakness of the centre encouraged Dudayev to consolidate and strengthen his position on the periphery and Chechnya gained de facto independence as a result of the Russian transition process. Whilst the on-going negotiation process implied that the federal authorities were proactively managing the crisis situation, in fact the Russian elite was merely responding to individual initiatives in an attempt to secure its own position, rather than attain a political resolution. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that the causes of the

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conflict are not rooted entirely on the side of the Russian political elite: the Dudayev regime also bears a substantial part of the responsibility. Under his rule the republic’s economy virtually collapsed, leaving the population with no viable alternative to make a living apart from resorting to criminal means, which threatened to destabilise the North Caucasus and southern Russia. Moreover, the Chechen leadership persistently spurned any form of compromise with Moscow, principally on the issue of the republic’s status, thereby preventing political reconciliation. The issue of elite changeover constituted a serious impediment to the peaceful resolution of the worsening antagonism between Moscow and Groznyy. The political elites in both Russia and Chechnya were preoccupied with preserving their own individual positions and power bases, rather than resolving constitutional crises such as the status of Chechnya. Nationalism and the politicisation of ethnic identity filled the ideological vacuum left by the widespread rejection of communism in the wake of the abortive 1991 coup, reflecting the need for the establishment of an effective state that was capable of resolving the populace’s economic and security concerns. As market reforms failed to fulfil the unrealistic expectations of the immediate post-coup days, the electorate quickly became disillusioned with the ‘democrats’ and liberal reformers, a common characteristic of societies in transition. This facilitated the rise of more hard-line political figures, who espoused extreme policies to rejuvenate the former superpower, and the socalled ‘Party of War’, both of which were undoubtedly instrumental in the initiation of military action. The events of 1993 represented a watershed in the potential development of a democratic state both in Russia and Chechnya, as domestic political competition provoked internal violence. However, these confrontations arose as a result of systemic change rather than the process of democratisation. As noted above, Russia had failed to institutionalise its new political order and a parallel system of rule had emerged, leading to a persistent crisis of power as the two systems struggled for hegemony. Chechnya meanwhile lacked any effective structures of democratic state power. In the wake of the domestic challenges of 1993, the Chechen leadership moved away from democracy, choosing to intensify its efforts to install a dictatorship, whilst Russia adopted a new Constitution. This signified a certain resolve on the part of the federal leadership to continue along the path of democratic transition, adhering to the tenet that transition cannot occur without the ratification of a new Constitution that embodies the new political convictions of the ruling elite. The perpetuation of the Soviet mentality in all areas of political and civic life played a critical role in the escalation of the Chechen constitutional crisis into an armed conflict. This behavioural precondition aggravated the Russian propensity for intervention; thus some of the explanation for the military intervention of 1994 can be located in the Soviet experience and pre-Soviet past. The Soviet modus operandi was evident in both the conduct

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of Russian political leaders, as well as the neo-imperialist tendencies of the centre. The territorial integrity of the Soviet Union was maintained by harsh central control over the numerous minority peoples, typified by the 1944 deportations of the Chechens. Chapter Three illustrated that there were other less direct but equally influential methods for the centre to intervene in the periphery, such as the deliberate underdevelopment of indigenous elites and the use of official propaganda. A predictable pattern of behaviour emerges from this deeply ingrained imperial tendency of unilateral control, which was central to the purpose, function and role of most Soviet power structures. During the post-Soviet period it was essentially these unreformed power structures that intervened in Chechnya and exacerbated the situation. Thus the transition process once more hindered the possibility of achieving a political resolution to the conflict. The military intervention manifested the extent to which habitual patterns of behaviour are so entrenched within the post-Soviet political administration, as well as illustrated the fragility of the post-Soviet transition process. Furthermore it demonstrated the fundamental need for some form of continuity during a period of rapid change and great uncertainty. Whilst the structures of government and society were undergoing a radical transformation, the modification of deeply rooted attitudes and behaviour was far harder to effect. In addition, the preservation of Soviet-style practices in Russian policy-making favoured Dudayev and the Chechen leadership, who had acquired a clear insight into the Soviet approach as a result of their education and training under communist rule. Thus, they were often able to anticipate Russian reactions and behaviour, and adjust their own accordingly. The escalation of the Chechen crisis demonstrated the failure of the federal authorities to establish effective mechanisms for the control of centre–periphery relations, and facilitates an analysis of the current ‘transitional’ status of Russian state and society. Chechnya’s ‘secession’ represented the first serious challenge to the territorial legitimacy of post-communist Russia and its right to inherit the mantle of power from the Soviet leadership, providing a gauge for the progress of democratisation at a regional level. Centre–periphery relations serve as a good indicator of the real strength of democracy within a state – the actual level of tangible autonomy granted to local elites, together with the accountability and transparency of the relationship between the centre and periphery, testifies to the extent of democratisation within the upper levels of a country’s state structures. As noted above, Russia’s conflict with Chechnya demonstrated the importance of establishing an institutional and legal framework within which centre–periphery issues can be resolved. Limits of power must be clearly demarcated between the federal centre and individual regions, with each side having a clear understanding of the extent of their jurisdiction. The Russian leadership failed to unite in the face of this first challenge to its hegemony in the wake of the de facto collapse of the Soviet Union,

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thereby facilitating the Chechen separatist movement. The rejection of Yeltsin’s November 1991 state of emergency decree by the Russian parliament initially revealed the extent of the disunity at the centre, highlighting the prospect of contradictory policies emanating from dual power structures that were engaged in a struggle for political supremacy. It also emphasised the predominance of ‘liberal’ tendencies within federal power structures at that time, although it should be noted that these professions of belief in the democratic ideal were often merely a mask for the appropriation of greater personal influence. This highlights the impact of the democratisation process on the exacerbation of a political conflict. The liberalism inherent in democratic ideology promotes the free expression of a wide spectrum of grievances, thereby fostering nationalistic and possibly separatist tendencies, which hampers any further democratic change within a multiethnic federation. Internal competition and the lack of clear jurisdictions between federal ministries hindered the development of any coherent policy with regard to the Chechen crisis. Institutional self-survival rather than a clear policy of non-intervention characterised the Russian approach to conflict resolution. This confusion arose as a direct result of the transition away from communist rule, when there has been no successful endeavour to establish a new institutional framework within which democratic aspirations can be converted into tangible mechanisms that will ensure the consolidation of democracy and subsequent stability. The state is severely weakened during the transition process and there is a danger of a reversion to methods of coercive control, particularly if the governmental structures of the previous regime have remained in place. Thus, the weaknesses and failures of Russian institutions with regard to the Chechen conflict were typical of a political system in transition, undergoing systemic change, as opposed to the process of democratisation.

Outlook At the time of writing the brutal military operation shows little sign of abating, although the Russians are no closer to achieving any kind of victory. The federal forces have failed to liquidate rebel strongholds in the Caucasus mountains and military assistance for the separatists continues to find its way through the country’s porous borders. Determined rebel resistance means that low-intensity guerrilla warfare is likely to continue in the republic for the foreseeable future, undermining the stability of the entire region. The crisis has frequently threatened to spill over into neighbouring Georgia, damaging relations between Moscow and Tbilisi. Russia has accused Georgia of harbouring Chechen rebels and foreign Islamist mercenaries, as well as supporting the transit of arms and mercenaries across its territory into Chechnya. Furthermore, the exodus of refugees from war-torn Chechnya into neighbouring republics threatens to upset the delicate

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balance within the ethnically diverse North Caucasus. Over 150,000 Chechen refugees are living in tents in Ingushetia and the Russian authorities have made several unsuccessful attempts to persuade the refugees to return home. However, there is little to encourage their return.1 Many fear that they will come under attack from either the federal forces or the separatists in Chechnya, whilst housing, employment and resources are scarce. Three years of quasi-independence disappointed the Chechens, leaving them with poverty, religious extremism and uncontrollable, corrupt field commanders. Two wars and years of depravation in between have sapped many of the zeal for independence that was so much in evidence during 1991–96. However, although many Chechens were disenchanted with the results of their de facto independence (under the leadership of Dudayev, then Maskhadov), the renewed Russian aggression has merely reinforced the conviction that Moscow is seeking to eliminate the Chechen nation. The Russians may be gaining the physical territory of Chechnya, but they are failing to win the trust and confidence of the Chechen people, a battle they have consistently lost for centuries. Without the ‘hearts and minds’ of the people, there is little chance that the situation will be resolved to the satisfaction of either side. President Putin’s imposition of direct rule over the republic in June 2000 has amounted to little in reality. The installation of a pro-Moscow administration, headed by Akhmed Kadyrov,2 has merely added to existing divisions within Chechen society, heightening the risk of serious internal conflict. Local leaders who collaborate with Moscow are viewed as fair game by separatist fighters who do not hesitate to execute ‘traitors’. During the first six months of 2001 at least 17 administrative heads were killed in Chechnya and many resigned in fear of their lives. According to Shahid Dzhamaldayev, the local leaders resign ‘because they don’t want to be killed like partridges by rebels who can break into anything and kill them at any time.’3 The Russian leadership has continued to stick to the principle that the Federation’s territorial integrity is non-negotiable and therefore Chechnya will remain a constituent part of the Federation. This is unrealistic as the federal government has consistently proved unable to provide adequate levels of resources to reconstruct the republic that it helped destroy. The economy has been destroyed and there are few legitimate employment opportunities. Most institutions of a modern state, including an education system, health care facilities and power network, have been devastated since 1991. Nikolai Koshman, Russian envoy to Chechnya, stated in February 2000 that federal expenditure will be kept to a minimum with the bulk of the restoration project being financed from Chechnya’s own resource base.4 Optimistic plans were drawn up to restore oil production in the republic and use the revenue from the export of this oil to finance the restoration project. In November 2000 state-owned oil company Rosneft was ordered to set up a Chechen subsidiary, Grozneft, to produce and export oil. The Chechen administration holds a 49 per cent stake in Grozneft, with the remaining 51

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per cent held by Rosneft, which believes that the republic will eventually be able to produce 1.5 million tonnes of oil per year. However, in order to maximise output, large sections of pipelines must be repaired and wells restored. During the Russian advance south through the republic in the autumn of 1999, the military deliberately destroyed oil wells and other facilities, meaning that a considerable sum of money had to be spent on extinguishing blazing oil wells. Furthermore, although the republic’s refineries survived the first war (1994–96), they were the target of sustained aerial bombardments during the second round of fighting and are no longer in operation, depriving Chechnya of a legitimate source of income. It is clear that the restoration of the oil complex will not be sufficient to meet the massive cost of reconstructing the republic. The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11th 2001 have had a significant impact on both Russo–Chechen relations and Russia’s relations with the international community. The Kremlin has constantly justified its campaign on the grounds that the country is defending itself against the threat from extreme Islamic terrorists.5 In the wake of the US terror attacks, Putin has made reference to the on-going Chechen conflict and hinted at possible co-operation between Moscow and Washington in the global fight against terrorism. This was apparently borne out by US involvement in Georgia at the beginning of 2002, to which Putin gave his full backing, despite the fact that it represents the military presence of a former adversary in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence.6 Although criticism of the Russian operation in Chechnya became more muted, the international community has continued to urge Moscow to find a political solution to the conflict and the Russian leadership took tentative steps towards a negotiated settlement.7 On 24 September 2001 Putin unexpectedly set a 72-hour deadline for Chechen separatists to surrender their weapons and approach his representatives in the North Caucasus region for talks. Addressing the nation on television, Putin invited Chechen leaders to ‘discuss disarmament of rebel groups and a way to integrate them into civilian life in Chechnya’. He also called on them to sever all contacts with international terrorists, a reference to Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban whom Moscow has accused of assisting Chechen rebels, providing them with arms and training separatist fighters at camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The ultimatum was significant as it represented the first time that the Russian leadership had shown any willingness to negotiate with the Chechen rebels and suggested a shift in Russian policy. Nevertheless, Putin’s offer was viewed as a call for the separatists to capitulate, essentially admitting defeat. This was far from the situation on the ground, where the rebels continue to hold the upper hand over an embattled Russian military, which opposed government plans to negotiate with Chechen leaders. Following preliminary talks in mid-October 2001 between Akhmed Zakayev, the deputy head of the Chechen government, and Viktor Kazantsev, President Vladimir Putin’s envoy in the North

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Caucasus, NCMD chief General Gennady Troshev uncompromisingly stated that he was only interested in the rebels’ surrender of weapons and the handing over to justice of the rebel commanders. Troshev ominously stated that, if Maskhadov failed to disarm his forces, the Russian military ‘would do it for him’. Despite the significance of Moscow’s offer of talks, the proposal amounted to little more than a half-hearted attempt to negotiate. There have been no further attempts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the conflict and the possibility of Chechnya’s reintegration back into the Russian fold is extremely faint. At the beginning of 2002 it was proposed that Russia hold a referendum on Chechnya’s status, offering voters the choice of continuing military operations or excluding the republic from the Federation. A third option proposed the division of Chechnya into two separate parts, with a northern ‘pacified’ area that would receive financial assistance from Moscow and the southern region, which would not receive any reconstruction aid until fighting there had ceased.8 However, little has been done to implement these proposals. Chechen field commanders have urged Russia to seek a political solution and reaffirmed their support for Maskhadov, who ‘controls 90 per cent of Chechen fighting units, which obey any order he gives’.9 Maskhadov’s leadership won a crucial vote of confidence from the head of the UNHCR refugee agency, Ruud Lubbers, who rejected Russian claims that he was a ‘terrorist’ and described the Chechen leader as a key figure in resolving the conflict.10 This affirmation of Maskhadov’s legitimacy in Chechnya was not shared by the Russian leadership, which refused to hold any further negotiations with the Chechen leader on the basis that he did not enjoy the full support of the republic’s population. Maskhadov’s five-year presidential mandate expired on 27th January 2002 and he has vowed that there will not be any elections in the republic until Russian troops leave Chechen territory.

Concluding remarks The conflict is crucial to our understanding of post-Soviet politics and the development of the Russian Federation. Following Yeltsin’s crackdown on parliamentary opposition to his rule, in the autumn of 1993, and subsequent 1994 military invasion of Chechnya, a constituent part of the Federation, many observers feared that Russia’s democratisation project had been prematurely brought to a halt and was to be replaced by some form of neoauthoritarian governance.11 However, in spite of Yeltsin’s seemingly authoritarian tendencies and erratic endorsement of democratic values, the Russian Federation has yet to completely retreat from the path of democratisation. Former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin has criticised those who deemed the invasion of Chechnya to signify the death of democracy within Russia, stating that ‘ … democracy does not mean the absence of power, order and conscious discipline … Of course democracy is

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always an abundance of points of view, positions, opinions … Only there is no need for hysterics and laying claim to a monopoly to speak on behalf of democracy. No-one has such a right, just as there is no right to try and separate the president and the government from democracy.’12 Andrei Kozyrev, a former Foreign Minister, has also denounced those who had proclaimed the return of an authoritarian regime with his statement that ‘confusing democracy with a lack of will and impotence is damaging for democracy itself’.13 His statement highlights one of the fundamental problems associated with the transition process: the absence of effective state institutions. However, it is important to note that this is an inherent difficulty of systemic transformation, not just democratisation. Thus the transformation of the political system from the communist model of rule is largely responsible for the instability and chaos of post-Soviet Russia, as opposed to the introduction of democratic forms of governance. Russia’s persistent failure to formulate a coherent policy vis-à-vis the republic means that a negotiated settlement remains a remote prospect. Nevertheless, Chechen independence is also unfeasible. The Chechen leadership has persistently spurned any form of compromise with Moscow, principally on the issue of the republic’s status, thereby preventing political reconciliation. Even if Russia successfully regains control of the republic, it will be a long time before any semblance of normality can be restored to the region and the thousands of refugees who fled the fighting can be persuaded to return. For the time being, the republic’s undefined status – its refusal to acknowledge federal control, but lack of international recognition – is likely to persist, condemning the entire North Caucasus region to continued instability and violence.

Glossary

Traditional law of Caucasian clans. Mountain village in the Caucasus region. Russian phenomenon of ‘hazing’ – bullying – within the armed forces. It has many manifestations, but is primarily a violent form of subordination inflicted upon new recruits, a brutal tradition that flourishes within the military’s hierarchical structure. Democratisation The advance of liberal-democratic reform, comprising several stages that occur over an indefinite period of time: the breakdown of undemocratic rule, transition, consolidation and, if successful, the perpetuation of a stable democratic political order. Ghazawat (Chechen) holy war or jihad. Glasnost Meaning transparency or openness, this policy was the first step in Mikhail Gorbachev’s programme of reform initiated in 1986. It entailed lifting the controls on public debate and individual expression of opinion. Ichkeria Mountainous territory in southern Chechnya. Incorporated into the official name of the republic in 1994, when Dudayev renamed it the Chechen RepublicIchkeria. Imam Chief of a Sufi Muslim order. Khasavyurt Town in western Dagestan where the 1996 peace accords were signed. Kolkhoz Collective farm. Korenizatsiya Policy of indigenisation advocated by Lenin that encouraged the development of local languages and culture in an attempt to attract the nationalities to the idea of revolution. Krai Province. Large territory of geographic or military significance, near strategically important border. Adat Aul Dedovshchina

Glossary 165 Liberalisation

Mekhkel

Naqshbandiya Nokhchi Oblast Okrug Perestroika Qadiriya

Rayon Shura Sufism Tariqat Teip Tukum Vainakh Wahhabism Wahhabi Zikr

A loosening of restrictions within a non-democratic regime, such as abandoning censorship of the media, and an expansion of civil rights. Council of Elders, a traditional form of authority composed of respected elders from Groznyy and villages across Chechnya. Sufi order or tariqat. Relatively orthodox and intellectual. The Chechen term for ‘Chechen’. Region. Designated territory of national minority in USSR. Also non-national administrative units. Autonomous area within oblast. Russian term meaning ‘restructuring’. Reform policy initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s. Sufi order or tariqat. More informal than the Naqshbandiya, it preaches non-violence and practices the zikr with music and dancing. District. Islamic Council. Form of Islamic mysticism that arrived in the North Caucasus during the eighteenth century. Sufi brotherhood, meaning ‘path towards God’. Vird in Chechen. Chechen clan. A tribe comprising several different teips. There are nine in Chechnya. A Chechen term meaning ‘Our People’ that refers to both the Chechen and Ingush people. Type of radical, politicised Sunni Islam practised by the Saudi Royal family. Follower of Wahhabism. Prayer-dance practised by the Chechens.

Notes

Introduction 1

2

3

4 5

For Chechen accounts of the nation’s history see Yu. A. Aidaev (ed.), Chechentsy: istoriya i sovremennost’ (Moscow: Mir domu tvoemu, 1996); Zaindi Shakhbiev, Sud’ba checheno-ingushskogo naroda (Moscow: Rossiya molodaya, 1996); Lema Usmanov, Nepokorennaya Chechnya (Moscow: Izdatelskiy dom ‘Parus’, 1997). Good overviews of Chechen history are provided in Marie Bennigsen Broxup (ed.), The North Caucasus Barrier (London: Hurst & Company, 1996); Carlotta Gall & Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War (London: Pan Books, 1997); H.J. Taylor, ‘The Origins and Development of Chechen Separatism. Historical Background’, War Studies Journal, Vol. 2, Issue 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 45–55; John B. Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Nevertheless, Armenia remains a staunch Russian ally. It has maintained close relations with Moscow, which has provided it with military support, notably assistance to Armenian separatists in the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. This highlights a lack of coherence in Russian policy – whilst it expends vast amounts of resources to subdue the Chechen separatist movement, it is willing to assist similar movements in other countries in order to assert regional dominance. The first written mention of the Nokhchi people appears in Armenian and Georgian chronicles from the seventh century. See The SBC International Fund, Brief Chechen History, www.sbcif.com/History.html. Whilst the Chechens have maintained a rich tradition of oral history, legends have become mixed with actual events, making it difficult to establish a verifiable history. Moreover, the 1994–96 war led to the destruction of the majority of archaeological and historical sites, as well as the republic’s archives and Groznyy’s Chekhov Library, which contained over three million works, many of which were of historic significance. For further details see Johanna Nichols, ‘Who are the Chechen?’, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1995), pp. 573–77. Sufism first arrived in the North Caucasus region during the eighteenth century. It spread rapidly amongst the Chechens during the nineteenth century as it preached resistance to the Russian Empire. According to Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, ‘sufism in the North Caucasus has always been … a revivalist, radical and even revolutionary force’. Alexandre Bennigsen & S. Enders Wimbush, Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide (London: C. Hurst & Co, 1985), p. 159. See also Anna Zelkina, In Quest for God and Freedom.

Notes 167 6 For further details see Bennigsen & Wimbush, pp. 158–59. The Naqshbandiya order spread to Chechnya from neighbouring Dagestan during the 1830s. It provided the ‘glue’ for Chechen resistance to Russian imperialism, epitomised by General Yermolov, who was appointed Viceroy of the Caucasus in 1827. The Qadiriya order arrived in Chechnya following the end of the Caucasian War in 1864, its central tenet of non-violence proving popular after years of fighting. 7 Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan (London: Frank Cass, 1994). 8 For further details see John Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus (London, 1908); Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnya and Dagestan (London: Frank Cass, 1994); A. M. Prokhorov (ed.), Bolshaya Sovietskaya Entsiklopediya, Vol. 11 (Moscow: Izdatelstvo ‘Sovietskaya entsiklopediya’, 1973), pp. 119–21; A. M. Prokhorov (ed.), Bolshaya Sovietskaya Entsiklopediya, Vol. 29 (Moscow: Izdatelstvo ‘Sovietskaya entsiklopediya’, 1978), p. 174. 9 For a detailed examination of this period see Gammer. Baddeley, who travelled through the Caucasus at the end of the nineteenth century, maintained that the ‘Ghazawat would never have been preached in the Caucasus had the Russians been peaceful and friendly neighbours’, Baddeley, p. 147. See also Bülent Gökay, ‘The Longstanding Russian and Soviet Debate over Sheikh Shamil: AntiImperialist Hero or Counter-Revolutionary Cleric?’ in Fowkes (ed.), pp. 25–64. 10 See William Flemming, ‘The Deportation of the Chechen and Ingush Peoples: A Critical Examination’ in Fowkes (ed.), pp. 65–86; R. Karcha, ‘Soviet Propaganda Concerning the Rehabilitated Peoples of the Northern Caucasus’, Caucasian Review, No. 8 (1959), pp. 3–16; Bugai N F, ‘Pravda o deportatsii chechenskogo i ingushkogo narodov’, Voprosy istorii, No. 7 (July 1990), pp. 32–44; V. V. Cherepanov, ‘Udary v spinu Krasnoi Armii’, Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, No.1 (1997), pp. 60–62. 11 For further details on teips see Jan Chesnov, ‘Chechentsem byt’ trudno. Taipy, ikh proshloe i rol’ v nastoyacshchem’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22.9.94, p. 5 12 For an examination of the role of teips in the military conflict with Russia see Theodore Karasik, ‘Chechen Clan Military Tactics and Russian Warfare’, Central Asia and Caucasus Analyst, March 15th 2000, www.cacianalyst.org/Headline1.htm.

1 The Russian Federation in transition 1 Andrew Heywood, Politics (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), p. 28. 2 Steve Chan, ‘Regime Transition in the Asia/Pacific Region: Democratisation as a Double-Edged Sword’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 1995), p. 56. Giuseppe Di Palma challenges the assumption that there has been a dramatic rise in democratic administrations, with his assertion that ‘the proportion of democracies among independent nations is no greater today than it was after World War I’. Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies (Oxford: University of California Press, 1990), p. 3. 3 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992) 4 Clinton’s 1994 State of the Union address, New York Times, 26.1.94, A17 quoted in Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratisation and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000), p. 15. 5 For the purpose of this study the term liberal democracy refers to a political system that is characterised by political choice, accountability of the state and its

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8

9 10 11 12 13 14

15 16 17 18 19

20

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actors, and the rule of law. Heywood provides a succinct definition of a liberal democracy as ‘a form of democratic rule that balances the principle of limited government against the ideal of popular consent’. Heywood, p. 28. Rose et al. believe it is misleading to describe new democracies as being in transition, as this implies a known start- and end-point. In their opinion the term ‘transformation’ is more consistent with the ‘catalytic process of fundamental and pervasive change’. Richard Rose, William Mishler & Christian Haerpfer, Democracy and its Alternatives (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), p. 7. Within the context of this work both ‘transition’ and ‘transformation’ will be used interchangeably to describe the progress of a state away from its previous non-democratic regime towards the ideal of democratic stability. The idea of national unity as an essential condition for the initiation of transition was identified by Dankwart Rustow who argued that ‘the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt as to which political community they belong to’. He established a link between homogeneity and democracy that implies democratic transition is virtually impossible within a multinational state, such as the Soviet Union, because liberalisation encourages nationalist separatism. Dankwart Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (October), pp. 337–63. In a book published in 1987 explaining his reforms, Gorbachev rejected Western interpretations, which claimed that perestroika had been necessitated by the disastrous state of the Soviet economy. He maintained that it was prompted by a realisation that ‘the potential of socialism had been underutilised’, although he did admit that ‘dissatisfaction with the way things have been going in our country in recent years’ had also played a significant role. Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika (London, 1987), p. 10. Quoted in David Kotz & Fred Weir, Revolution from Above (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 55. Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (London: Bantam Books, 1997), p. 255. See Richard Sakwa, Gorbachev and his Reforms 1985–1990 (New York: Allan, 1990); Martin McCauley, Gorbachev (London: Longman, 1998); Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) Gorbachev (1987), p. 35 (italics in original). Gorbachev (1987), p. 32. Gorbachev (1997), p. 238. For an examination of the problems confronting Gorbachev when he attempted to resolve the dilemma of the former order through the reform efforts of perestroika, see Roland Goetz, ‘Structural Legacy and Systemic Transformation in the Former USSR: Experience with Perestroika’, Aussenpolitik, Vol. 45, No. 2 (1994), pp. 166–75. Quoted in David Remnick, Resurrection (London: Picador, 1998), p. 104. Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia (New York, 1994) quoted in Remnick, p. 39. Lilia Shevtsova, Yeltsin’s Russia: Challenges and Constraints (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), p. 8. Igor Klyamkin & Lilia Shevtsova, This Omnipotent and Impotent Government: The Evolution of the Political System in Post-Communist Russia (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), p. 10. Shevtsova, p 29. For further analysis of the role played by elites in Russia’s democratic consolidation see Graeme Gill, ‘Democratic Consolidation in Russia?’, Acta Politica, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1997), pp. 291–301; Graeme Gill, ‘Elites and the Russian Transition’, Central and East European Studies: Elites and Leadership in Russian Politics (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1998), pp. 134–157. Yuri Burtin, ‘An Alien Power’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1.12.92.

Notes 169 21 Data collected by the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion and Market Research in August 1993 indicated a general dissatisfaction with Russia’s democratic evolution. Only 18 per cent of those polled believed the country to have become more democratic after August 1991, whilst 28 per cent regarded it to be less so. The same survey was also conducted in August 1991, when 33 per cent felt Russian to be more democratic, 21 per cent thought it less so, and 27 per cent said it was the same. Moscow News, 20.8.93, p. 1. An annual survey conducted by the European Commission sought to assess the political and economic climate in a large number of Central and Eastern European countries. In both the 1995 and 1996 reports it was noted that ‘public opinion [in the region] is dominated by an overwhelming dissatisfaction with the way countries put democracy into action’. In November 1994 one thousand people over the age of 15 were surveyed at 157 sampling points across the Russian Federation. There was a very high level of negative opinion with regard to the development of democracy in the country – a mere 8 per cent of those questioned expressed satisfaction, in stark contrast to the 83 per cent who said that they were dissatisfied. Central and Eastern Eurobarometer No 5. Public Opinion and the European Union. March 1995 (Luxembourg: European Commission, 1995), p. 34. The following year, in November 1995, this dissatisfaction had reached its highest level since the Eurobarometer began polling, as 86 per cent of the 1178 people sampled across the Russian Federation voiced discontent with the development of democracy. Central and Eastern Eurobarometer No 6. Public Opinion and the European Union. March 1996 (Luxembourg: European Commission, 1996), p. 35. 22 Moscow News, 20.8.93, p. 4. 23 Quoted in Remnick, p. 83. Klyamkin and Shevtsova also characterise the institution of the presidency as one that is completely personified and embodied in one person. According to their interpretation the Russian political system is a marriage of democratic and authoritarian tendencies, which has yet to be resolved. Klyamkin & Shevtsova, p. 11.

2 Background to the Chechen declaration of independence in 1991 1 For an analysis of Gorbachev’s reforms and the Russian transition see the section ‘Gorbachev and liberalisation’ in Chapter One. 2 For example, the Stalinist regime’s introduction of the registration of nationality (ethnic origin) on internal passports helped establish rigid boundaries between different ethnic groups and was a primary determinant of ethnic self-identification. See Victor Zaslavsky, ‘Success and collapse: traditional Soviet nationality policy’ in Ian Bremmer & Ray Taras, Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 29–42. For an analysis of Soviet nationalities policy see Robert Conquest (ed.), Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice (London: The Bodley Head, 1967); A. Barsenkov, A. Vdovin, V. Koretskiy, Iu. Kukushkin & A. Ostapenko, Towards a Nationalities Policy in the Russian Federation (Aberdeen: Centre for Soviet and East European Studies, 1993) 3 Information within this table taken and adapted from Fiona Hill, ‘Russia’s Tinderbox’: Conflict in the North Caucasus and its Implications for the Future of the Russian Federation, September 1995 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1995), pp. 11–13. 4 Control over higher education was a crucial aspect of Soviet nationalities policy and a strict quota system was in place to regulate university places among applicants of various nationalities. This quota system favoured the local nationality, thus providing an incentive for indigenous elites and middle classes to remain

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12

13 14

15 16 17 18 19

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loyal to the centre. For further information see Zaslavsky in Bremmer & Taras (1993), pp. 29–42. See for example Ian Bremmer & Ray Taras (eds.), New States, New Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); G. D. G. Murrell, Russia’s Transition to Democracy (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1997); Barnett R. Rubin & Jack Snyder, Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building (London: Routledge, 1998); Barkey & von Hagen (eds.); Pearson. Author interview with Colonel Charles Blandy, Conflict Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhurst, Camberley, Surrey, 19th January 1999. David Kotz & Fred Weir, Revolution from Above (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 142. Moshe Lewin, Russia/USSR/Russia: The Drive and Drift of a Superstate (New York: New Press, 1995), p. 271. Pearson, p. 145. Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (London: Bantam Books, 1997), p. 322. The term ‘ecocide’ is used by some observers to describe the sometimes irreversible damage done to several regions. See Murray Feshbach & Alfred Friendly Jnr., Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature Under Seige (New York: Basic Books, 1992). Examples of serious environmental damage include the Chernobyl nuclear power disaster, which increased popular support in Ukraine and Belarus for sovereignty and regional economic control. Environmental protests were also widespread across the Baltics, particularly against the Ignalina nuclear power plant and Mazeikiai oil refinery in Lithuania. In June 1989 Gorbachev expressed his misgivings about the situation and made a televised appeal for calm and co-operation in ethnic relations to assist the development of the USSR. Izvestiya, 2.7.89, p. 1. The first wave of national-ethnic protests took place in Alma-Ata, capital of the Kazakh SSR, in December 1986 and there were subsequent demonstrations in Yerevan (1988), Tbilisi (1989) and Baku (1990), all of which were violently suppressed by the Soviet authorities. Izvestiya, 2.7.89, p. 1. See Gorbachev’s speech at XXVIIth Congress, Izvestiya, 13.2.90, p. 2. A draft of the new Union Treaty between the centre and 15 Union Republics was revealed on November 21st 1990, giving the centre control over war, foreign relations, defence, energy, transport and communications and banking. The republics would be free to choose their own form of government and would own all natural resources and state property on their soil. Nevertheless six republics said they would not sign the new treaty – the three Baltic republics, Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia. A further draft was revealed in March 1991, offering the republics more sovereignty: republics would have control of economic and cultural development, as well as the right to establish diplomatic ties. Central Asian and Caucasus Chronicle (December 1989–January 1990), p. 14. Quoted in Murrell, p. 13. Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union (London: Sage, 1997), p. 48. Valery Tishkov, ‘Ambitsii liderov i nadmennost’ sily’, Svobodnaya mysl’, No. 1 (1995), p. 26. For example, Dudayev promised to turn the Chechen Republic into a ‘second Kuwait’ on the basis of its minimal oil reserves. He also described the republic as ‘fantastically wealthy’, stating that ‘our products are exported to hundreds of countries around the world … Everyone knows the riches that are hidden in the depths of the republic’. Dzhokhar Dudayev, Temnistiy put’ k svobode (Vilnius, 1993), pp. 23–24.

Notes 171 20 A comprehensive list of dissidents compiled by a team of Dutch researchers includes only 2 Chechen nationals: Olim Makhaev, charged with adhering to Islam and attempting to found the United Caucasus Liberation Party, and Khalid Ošaev, a poet and writer. S. P. de Boer, E. J. Driessen & H. L. Verhaar (eds.), Biographical Dictionary of Dissidents in the Soviet Union, 1956–1975 (Boston: Kluwer, 1982) 21 Professor Gakaev believes that because the formation of a Chechen nation has never been fully completed, unscrupulous politicians such as Dudayev and his allies, have been able to exploit family ties to preserve and consolidate their own power. Author interview with Professor Dzhabrail Gakaev, Moscow, 18th February 1999. 22 In his speech he spoke of: ‘The monstrous acts perpetrated by Stalin … we refer to the mass deportation of entire peoples from their homelands, Communists and Komsomol members included, deportations which were not entailed by any military considerations … In February 1944 the Chechen and Ingush peoples were deported wholesale and the Checheno-Ingush ASSR was abolished’. Rech Khrushcheva na zakrytom zasedanii XX sezda KPSS, 24–25 fevralya 1956 g (Munich, 1956), pp. 15–56. 23 These three areas had previously been part of Stavropol krai. Whilst the re-established Checheno-Ingush ASSR gained some territory it also lost several areas in the east, which were attached to the neighbouring Dagestani ASSR. 24 ‘Posle reabilitatsii. Vozvrashcheniye chechentsev i ingushey v Kavkaz’, Istochnik: Vestnik arkhiva prezidenta RF. No. 6 (1996), p. 89. 25 In a report to the CPSU Central Committee in February 1957 Dudorov noted with concern several outbreaks of violence across the region, related to the return of previously exiled peoples. Gosudarstvenyy arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF), f.P-9401, op.2, d.490, l.111–112 cited in Istochnik: Vestnik arkhiva prezidenta RF. No. 6 (1996). Minister of the Interior N P Dudorov’s report to the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers on conflicts in the Checheno-Ingush ASSR between Avars, Dargins and Chechens returned from exile, February 15th 1957. 26 Rossiiskiy statisticheskiy yezhegodnik 1994 (Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1994), p. 33. This is very low, particularly when compared with other ethnic groups within the RSFSR: 14 per cent of Tatars, the second largest national group after Russians, considered Russian to be their mother tongue, along with 22 per cent of the Chuvash, 13 per cent of Buryats and 10 per cent of Bashkirs. However, amongst the ethnic groups of the North Caucasus the proportions fell dramatically: 6 per cent of Ossetians, 2.2 per cent of Kabardins and 1.5 per cent of the Ingush felt Russian was their first language. The only other ethnic group with such low regard for the Russian language was the Tuvins, of whom only 1.3 per cent considered it their native tongue. 27 Author interview with Professor Gakaev, Moscow, 18th February 1999. 28 Dzhabrail Gakaev, Ocherki politicheskoi istorii Chechni (XX vek) (Moscow: Izdatelstvo ChKTs, 1997), p. 107. 29 Author interview with Professor Gakaev, Moscow, 18th February 1999. 30 Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chechnya – mne ne dali ostanovit’ voiny (Moscow: Paleya, 1995), p. 6. Dudayev was the first Chechen to attain the rank of general in the Soviet armed forces and some observers have suggested that his marriage to a Russian woman facilitated promotion. 31 Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR 1922–1982 (Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1982), p. 126. 32 In 1974/75 the RSFSR had a total of 27 million students, whilst ChechenoIngushetia had 113,000. Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR, p.478.

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33 S O Zoyev, Razvitiye ekonomiki checheno-ingushskoi ASSR v period zrelogo sotsialisma (Groznyy: Checheno-Ingushskoe knizhnoye izdatelstvo, 1984), p.4. 34 Quoted in Taimaz Abubakarov, Rezhim Dzhokara Dudayeva. Pravda i vymysel (Moscow: Insan, 1998), p. 13. 35 Rossiiskiy statisticheskiy yezhegodnik 1994 (Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1994), pp. 513–514. 36 Testimony to the First Session of the International Tribunal on Crimes Against Humanity and Military Crimes in the Chechen Republic. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal III: Eyewitness testimony. First Session, Moscow, 21st–25th February 1996, p. 169. 37 Following the 1991 unilateral declaration of independence a large proportion of the Russian-speaking population migrated from the republic, which meant that many managers, administrators and officials left. The remaining Chechens lacked the training and expertise to effectively fill these posts. 38 Zoyev, p. 10. This decline can be partially explained by failing equipment and a lack of investment. 39 Khasbulatov endorses this high figure – according to him, up to 40 per cent of the population could be classed as ‘migrant workers’. Khasbulatov, p. 5. 40 Author interview with Nikolai Petrov, Scholar-in-Residence, Carnegie Moscow Centre, Moscow, 9th February 1999. 41 See Vanora Bennett, Crying Wolf: The Return of War to Chechnya (London: Picador, 1998), p. 270; John B. Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 79. A young Chechen living in Moscow explained that large, extended families provide security and have always played a pivotal role in Chechen society and culture. Moscow, February 1999. 42 Author interview with Dr Julia Grigorieva, Research Fellow, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Moscow, 24th February 1999. 43 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10.10.91, p. 3. 44 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) SU/3578 B/5 [19] 5.7.99 – RIA, Moscow, 2.7.99. 45 See V. B. Vinogradov, M. O. Buzurtanov & S. Ts. Umarov, Naveki vmestye. O dobrovol’nom vkhozhdeniya Checheno-Ingushetii v sostav Rossii (Groznyy, 1980); V. B. Vinogradov & S. Ts. Umarov, K ponimaniyu dorevolyutsionnoi istoriografii vkhozhdeniya Checheno-Ingushetii v sostav Rossii (Groznyy, 1981); V. B. Vinogradov, ‘Rossiya i Severniy Kavkaz (Obzor literaturi za 1976–1985 gody: itogi i perspektivy izucheniya)’, Istorii SSSR, Vol. 3 (May/June 1987), pp. 89–101. 46 However, the biochemical plant was intended to produce lysine, an amino acid that occurs naturally in the body and is manufactured artificially for use in food processing. There is no evidence to suggest that the production of lysine is detrimental to the health of those either involved in the manufacturing process or those who reside in the vicinity of such a plant. Consequently, it can be concluded that objections against the proposed plant on health grounds were merely a pretext for mass demonstrations that were primarily motivated by political antagonisms. 47 Timur Muzaev & Zurab Todua, Novaya Checheno-Ingushetia (Moscow: Panorama, 1992), p. 34. 48 Timur Muzaev, Chechenskaya respublika: Organy vlasti i politicheskiye sily (Moscow: Panorama, 1995), p. 110. 49 For a detailed description and analysis of the numerous popular movements that appeared in the ASSR during the perestroika era see Muzaev & Todua (1992) and Muzaev (1995). 50 Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Chechenia – bitva za svobodu (Lvov: Svoboda narodiv, 1996), p. 15.

Notes 173 51 Gakaev, p. 136. 52 During the three years of Zavgayev’s rule hundreds of mosques were built, an independent Muslim spiritual movement, ‘Muftiyat’, was created, Islamic educational establishments were opened and thousands of Chechens and Ingush were permitted to undertake the ‘Hajj’, the sacred pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. Author’s interview with Professor Gakaev, Moscow, 18th February 1999. Impuls, established in 1990, was one of the first independent newspapers to appear in Checheno-Ingushetia, together with Svoboda (originally known as Novaya Gazeta) and several bulletins produced by ‘informal’ organisations. For further details see Timur Muzaev, Ichkeria: rukovodstvo i politicheskaya struktura (Moscow: Panorama, 1997), pp. 148–62. 53 Izvestiya, 21.2.90, p. 1. 54 Gakaev, p. 137. 55 Muzaev & Todua, p. 36. Yandarbiyev was deeply critical of this parliamentary bloc, claiming that its members, whilst presenting themselves as ‘democrats’, merely conformed with the Russian model of ‘socialist pluralism’. Yandarbiyev, p. 25. 56 Author interview with Professor Gakaev, Moscow, 18th February 1999. 57 Yandarbiyev, p. 23. For a detailed account of the VDP and its activities see Yandarbiyev. 58 Chechenskaya Respublika Ichkeria. Unpublished report by the Moscow Carnegie Centre, 1998, p. 293. 59 Soslambekov returned to Chechnya in 1990, having served a prison sentence for rape whilst a student in Moscow. 60 For example, the chairman of the committee charged with organising the congress, Lechi Umkhaev, was a deputy in the Checheno-Ingush parliament. 61 Carlotta Gall & Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War, (London: Pan Books, 1997), p. 82. 62 A Russian parliamentary commission set up to investigate the causes of the Chechen crisis ascertained that the selection of delegates was based on clan assemblies that had been held in the provinces. G. Anishchenko, A. Vasilevskaya, O. Kugusheva & O. Mramornov, Kommissiya Govorukhina (Moscow: Laventa, 1995), p. 13. 63 Gantemirov had formed a party, Islamic Path, which barely concealed its primary role as a paramilitary organisation. In an interview in October 1991 Dudayev states that he had created a Defence Committee led by Gantemirov to ‘organise security’. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10.10.91, p. 3 64 Mamodayev was a wealthy oil businessman who financed Dudayev’s political campaign. See Gall & de Waal, p. 93. 65 Tishkov (1997), p. 199. 66 Gall & de Waal, p. 82. 67 Khasbulatov asserts that during December 1990 he was sent a file of OKChN documents that included draft decrees and resolutions relating to economic and political independence. He is convinced that they were photocopies of documents created by political movements in the Baltics, with the term ‘Chechen Republic’ inserted. He maintains that some of the documents had not even been re-typed, but merely had alterations stuck on top, and that many still contained the original spelling mistakes, Khasbulatov, p. 9. 68 Chechenskaya Respublika Ichkeria, p. 293. 69 Dudayev was apparently known as the ‘rebellious general’ amongst his Estonian colleagues, who claimed that he was sympathetic to Estonia’s quest for independence from the Soviet Union. When Gorbachev sent troops to halt Baltic secession, Dudayev refused to grant the planes landing rights in Estonia, saying

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80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

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he would not allow the violent overthrow of a democratically elected government. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26.10.91, p. 1. Quoted in Gall & de Waal, p. 82. In his own book, Yandarbiyev says he was convinced that Dudayev was someone ‘capable of imparting new impetus to the national-liberation movement’, p. 33. Yandarbiyev, p. 35. John Colarusso, ‘Chechnya: The War Without Winners’, Current History, Vol. 94, No. 594 (October 1995), p. 331. Although Article 10 of the declaration did refer to the ‘genocide of Chechens, Ingush and other peoples of the USSR’. Gakaev, p. 144. For the full text of the declaration see Dudayev, pp. 376–79. Andrei Kortunov & Andrei Shoumikhin, ‘The Chechen Crisis in Evolution: Implications for Russian Statehood’, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 15 (1996), p. 261. Kortunov & Shoumikhin, p. 261. Yu. V. Nikolaev (ed.), Chechenskaya tragediya. Kto vinovat (Moscow: R.I.A. ‘Novosti’, 1995), p. 12. Nevertheless, 3 regions took part – Nazran, Malgobek and Sunzhenskiy – all of which had a majority of Ingush inhabitants who were hoping for Russian support in the struggle with North Ossetia over Prigorodniy rayon. Tishkov (1995), p. 23. Tensions across the North Caucasus region were exacerbated in April 1991 by the adoption of the Law on the Rehabilitation of Repressed People, which proposed that those peoples who had been subjected to deportation in the 1940s should have their former lands restored or receive compensation. This politically motivated gesture rekindled historical animosities between the diverse ethnic groups inhabiting the area, aggravating territorial disputes. For further details see Hill, p. 36. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18.5.91, p. 3. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28.5.91, p. 3. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28.5.91, p. 3. Postanovleniye sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovietskogo Soyuza ‘O obshchestvenno-politicheshkoi obstanovke v Checheno-Ingushskoi Respubliki’, 21 iyunya 1991, www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/chechnya.pdf. Yandarbiyev, p. 45. Khasbulatov, p. 11. Muzaev & Todua, p. 37. Author interview with Professor Gakaev, Moscow, 18th February 1999. The intelligentsia went on to form its own opposition movement ‘Daimokh’ (‘Fatherland’), led by Umkhaev and Khadzhiev. Yeltsin’s speech was broadcast by Central Television, Moscow on 19th February 1991. Quoted in Komsomol’skaya Pravda, 22.2.91, p. 1. Anishchenko G et al., p. 15. Anishchenko G et al., p. 14.

3 The post-coup period and the collapse of the USSR (August–November 1991) 1 Taimaz Abubakarov, Rezhim Dzhokara Dudayeva: pravda i vymysel (Moscow: Insan, 1998), p. 14. 2 Dzhabrail Gakaev, Ocherki politicheskoi istorii Chechni (XX vek) (Moscow: Izdatelstvo ChKTs, 1997), p. 150. 3 Article 4 of a resolution adopted by the OKChN Executive Committee on 19th August 1991. Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, Chechenia – bitva za svobodu (Lvov:

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7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23

Svoboda narodiv, 1996), p. 54. Snyder identifies ‘exclusionary nationalism’, whereby popular support is mobilised by nationalist doctrine, which ostracises ‘enemies of the nation’, a tactic apparently employed by Dudayev against Zavgayev and the republic’s communist leadership. Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratisation and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000), p. 36. Yandarbiyev, p. 49. Izvestiya, 26.8.91, p. 3. For further details of the anti-coup demonstrations, Yandarbiyev’s arrest and brief detention by the security services see Yandarbiyev, pp. 49–52. A prominent member of the OKChN, Yusup Soslambekov, testified at a hearing in 1996 that ‘from information we [the Chechen radical opposition] received from the White House in Moscow, we knew that … Zavgayev was in the Kremlin and had expressed support for the coup’. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal III: Eyewitness testimony. First Session, Moscow, 21st–25th February 1996 (Moscow: Glasnost, 1996), p. 25. However, he does not provide any further information and it is impossible to verify this statement. There is a lack of material pertaining to Zavgayev’s presence in Moscow during the coup as newspaper publication was suspended. Consequently, information is only available from extremely subjective sources such as the writings of Dudayev, Yandarbiyev and other Chechens and it is only possible to speculate on the motives for Zavgayev’s hesitancy in condemning the coup. It is feasible that travel restrictions, imposed as a result of the coup attempt, meant he was unable to return to the ASSR for 3 days. It is also conceivable that he deliberately chose to remain in Moscow to avoid making decisions or voicing support for either side. Gakaev, p. 151. Yandarbiyev, p. 56. Both Yeltsin and Khasbulatov allegedly congratulated Dudayev on ‘the victory of the democratic revolution’. Pravda, 17.1.95, p. 2. Gakaev claims that Khasbulatov recommended Khadzhiev to replace Zavgayev as Supreme Soviet chairman, but ‘to his credit … he refused to even entertain the idea’. Gakaev, p. 152. Gakaev, p. 151. Author interview with Professor Dzhabrail Gakaev, Moscow, 18th February 1999. Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict In and After the Soviet Union (London: Sage, 1997), p. 201. Yandarbiyev, p. 59. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10.10.91, p. 3. Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 31.8.91, p. 1. Vera Tolz & Melanie Newton (eds.), The USSR in 1991: a record of events (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), p. 619. The leaders of Tatarstan, ChechenoIngushetia, Buryatia, Karbardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia and Tuva were absent from this meeting. Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chechnya – mne ne dali ostanovit’ voiny (Moscow: Paleya, 1995), p. 10. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7.9.91, p. 3. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7.9.91, p. 3. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7.9.91, p. 3. Suzanne Goldenburg, Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder (London: Zed, 1994) p. 185. For the full text of the appeal issued on September 2nd 1991 see I. N. Yeremenko & Yu. D. Novikov (eds.), Rossiya i Chechnya (1990–1997) (Moscow: RAUUniversitet, 1997), pp. 13–14.

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24 G. Anishchenko, A. Vasilevskaya, O. Kugusheva & O. Mramornov, Kommissiya Govorukhina (Moscow: Laventa, 1995), p. 85. Zavgayev’s use of the term ‘massacre’ refers to the death of Kutsenko, chairman of Groznyy city council, who fell to his death from an open window during the storming of the Supreme Soviet session. There is controversy over whether he fell or was deliberately pushed. Some observers claim he was thrown from the window, while others say he jumped in an attempt to escape the chaos. 25 Yandarbiyev, p. 64. 26 Yandarbiyev, p. 59. 27 Dzhokar Dudayev, Temnistiy put’ k svobode (Vilnius, 1993), p. 20. 28 Marie Bennigsen Broxup (ed.), The North Caucasus Barrier (London: Hurst & Company, 1996), p. 226. Moreover, Khasbulatov allegedly sent a telegram to the new leadership of the republic, congratulating it on the ‘overthrow of the communist regime’. Quoted in A Kol’yev, Chechenskaya kapkan (Moscow: Kongress russkikh obshchin, 1997), p. 33. 29 Anishchenko et al., p. 18. 30 Testimony to the parliamentary commission investigating the causes of the Chechen conflict, Anishchenko et al., p. 95. 31 Author interview with Professor Gakaev, Moscow, 18th February 1999. 32 Carlotta Gall & Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War (London: Pan Books, 1997), p. 96. 33 Quoted in Christopher Panico, ‘Conflicts in the Caucasus: Russia’s War in Chechnya’, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism (July 1995), p. 6. 34 Gall & de Waal, p. 81. 35 Quoted in Gall & de Waal, p. 81. 36 Zavtra, No. 36 (September 1996), p. 1. 37 Quoted in Panico, p. 6. 38 Abubakarov, p. 51. 39 Izvestiya, 7.2.97, p. 4. Prior to this action, Akhmadov’s Provisional Council had adopted a resolution on October 4th demanding the cessation of KGB activities on the territory of the Chechen Republic on the grounds that it did not reflect the interests of the people and it had supported the coup. Yeremenko & Novikov, p. 18. 40 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) SU/1197 B/7 [11] 8.10.91 – TASS World Service, Moscow, 6.10.91. 41 Aleksandr Rutskoi, O nas i o sebe (Moscow: Nauchnaya kniga, 1995), p. 159. 42 Yandarbiyev, p. 67. 43 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8.10.91, p. 2. 44 SWB SU/1199 C1/2 [2] 10.10.91 – Russia’s Radio, Moscow, 8.10.91. 45 Izvestiya, 10.10.91, p. 2. 46 SWB SU/1209 B/6 [9] 22/10/91 – All-Union Radio, Radio-1, Moscow, 20.10.91. Moshe Gammer explains how Russian officials in 1839 had similarly attempted to disarm the Chechen people, who deem their weapons to be ‘their pride’, a symbol of ‘their manhood and freedom’: ‘Weapons were handed down through generations from father to son, and were regarded as among a man’s most precious possession. Disarmament was, therefore, a terrible humiliation. Naturally, the Chechens expected more and greater humiliations to follow.’ See Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan (London: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 114. In this context it is easy to understand how the aggrieved Chechens interpreted the Presidium’s ultimatum as an extremely provocative gesture. Despite the prominence of several native Chechens on the presidential team a lack of basic cultural understanding unnecessarily exacerbated the crisis.

Notes 177 47 For the full text of the resolution see Yeremenko & Novikov, pp. 20–21. 48 The demands of the reconciliation commission included a postponement of presidential elections, preservation of the integrity of the Checheno-Ingush Republic, disarmament of armed formations and a lifting of the blockade on the media and government buildings imposed by the EC. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15.10.91, p. 3. 49 Tolz & Newton, p. 711. 50 Pravda, 21.10.91, p. 3. 51 Izvestiya, 21.10.91, p. 1. 52 Izvestiya, 21.10.91, p. 1. 53 Gall & de Waal, p. 98. 54 Izvestiya, 24.10.91, p. 2. 55 According to a resolution issued by the Commission on 29th October, 412,671 had voted for Dudayev – 90.1 per cent of the overall vote. For the full text of this resolution see Dudayev, p. 12. Similar figures are also provided by Lema Usmanov, a Chechen politician, and Yandarbiyev. See Lema Usmanov, Nepokorennaya Chechnya (Moscow: Izdatelskiy dom ‘Parus’, 1997), p. 222; Yandarbiyev, p. 76. Nevertheless, a report by the Moscow-based Carnegie Centre has determined that only 10–12 per cent of the population actually voted, therefore casting grave doubt on the validity of the results. Chechenskaya Respublika Ichkeria. Unpublished report by the Moscow Carnegie Centre, 1998, p. 303. 56 Analysis of the election results is hindered by the fact that full details were not published by the Chechen authorities. However, from information available, it has been ascertained that 55 per cent of candidates for the legislature were independent. Of those elected, eight were from the VDP, six from the Committee of Human Rights, two from the Green Movement and one from the World Democratic Union. Chechenskaya Respublika Ichkeria, p. 303. 57 Izvestiya, 29.10.91, p. 2. 58 SWB SU/1216i [5] 1.11.91 – Central TV, Moscow, 29.10.91. 59 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 29.10.91, p. 3. 60 Anishchenko et al., p. 20. 61 At the beginning of November the Provisional Council held a meeting with the Chechen ‘government’, heads of industry, as well as leaders of both civic organisations and Soviet bodies. As a result the Council agreed to postpone elections until December. Provisional Council representatives were also sent out to every administrative district of the republic to liase with the ‘lawful’ (i.e. Soviet) power structures. Izvestiya, 5.11.91, p. 2. 62 Izvestiya, 28.10.91, pp. 1–2. 63 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 2.11.91, p. 1. 64 Sbornik ukazov prezidenta chechenskoi respubliki c 1 noyabrya 1991 g. po 30 iyunya 1992 g (Groznyy: Kniga, 1993), p. 3. 65 For the full text of this resolution see Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 7.11.91, p. 1. 66 L S Perepelkin, ‘Chechenskaya respublika: sovremennaya sotsial’no-politicheskaya situatsiya’, Etnograficheskoye obozreniye, No. 1 (1994), p. 3. 67 SWB SU/1226 C1/1 [1] 11.11.91 – Russian Television, Moscow, 8.11.91. 68 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12.11.91, p. 3. 69 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 12.11.91, p. 2. 70 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12.11.91, p. 3. 71 Anishchenko et al., p. 22. 72 SWB SU/1226 C1/5 [4] 11.11.91. – All-Union Radio, Radio-1, Moscow, 9.11.91. 73 Rutskoi, p. 162. 74 Tishkov, p. 202. 75 Quoted in Gall & de Waal, p. 100. 76 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14.2.92, pp. 1–2.

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77 Gakaev, p. 160. 78 Dudayev, p. 19. Gakaev maintains that the state of emergency heightened Chechen fears of a repetition of the 1944 deportations. Gakaev, p. 160. 79 SWB SU/1226 C1/4 [3] 11.11.91 – TASS World Service, Moscow, 9.11.91. 80 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12.11.91, p. 3. 81 During a heated debate Rutskoi attempted to justify the decree. Nevertheless, 177 voted against decree, with only 4 in favour, whilst 15 abstained. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12.11.91, p. 1. 82 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12.11.91, p. 3. 83 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 12.11.91, p. 1. 84 SWB SU/1227 C1/5 [6] 12.11.91 – Central Television, First All-Union Programme, Moscow, 10.11.91. 85 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12.11.91, p. 3. 86 SWB SU/1232 B/10 [11] 18.11.91 – TASS World Service, Moscow, 16.11.91. 87 Tolz & Newton, p. 712. 88 Izvestiya, 7.2.95, p. 4. 89 Emil Pain and Arkadiy Popov, ‘Chechnya’ in Jeremy R Azrael & Emil A Pain (eds.), U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), pp. 9–30.

4 The consolidation of an ‘independent’, post-Soviet Chechnya (1991–93) 1 ‘Konstitutsiya RSFSR’ in Konstitutsii (osnovyye zakony) soyuznykh sovietskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik (Moscow: Yuridicheskaya literatura, 1978), p. 65. 2 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 17.2.95, p. 2. 3 G Anishchenko, A Vasilevskaya, O Kugusheva & O Mramornov, Kommissiya Govorukhina, (Moscow: Laventa, 1995), p. 43. 4 Krasnaya Zvezda, 26.11.91, p. 3. Dudayev also issued a decree on December 7th 1991 that declared all armed formations on Chechen territory to be subordinate to him. Sbornik ukazov prezidenta chechenskoi respubliki c 1 noyabrya 1991 g. po 30 iyunya 1992 g (Groznyy: Kniga, 1993), p. 12. This was followed by a resolution from the Chechen parliament declaring that all military units and equipment located on the republic’s territory was under Chechen jurisdiction. For a copy of this resolution see I. N. Yeremenko & Yu. D. Novikov, Rossiya i Chechnya (1990–1997) (Moscow: RAU-Universitet, 1997), p. 44. 5 Izvestiya, 12.1.95, p. 4. In an interview published by Krasnaya Zvezda on November 14th 1991 Lieutenant-General A. Chernyshev, chief of staff of the North Caucasus Military District (NCMD), admitted that military equipment and vehicles had been seized from bases on Chechen territory, although he claimed that the situation had been ‘normalised’ as a result of ‘direct contact with Dudayev, by complaining to him’ that property belonging to the USSR Ministry of Defence had been ‘taken’. Krasnaya Zvezda, 14.11.91, p. 2. However, it should be noted that such incidents were not confined to Chechnya. A similar situation was reported in Azerbaijan, where military property and vehicles belonging to the Soviet Army and local border guard detachments were stolen in Nakhichevan and adjoining rayony. Krasnaya Zvezda, 19.11.91, p. 1. 6 Yu. V. Nikolaev (ed.), Chechenskaya tragediya. Kto vinovat (Moscow: RIA ‘Novosti’, 1995), p. 22. 7 Anishchenko et al., p. 36. 8 Quoted in N. N. Novichkov, V. Snegovskii, A. G. Sokolov & B. Shvarev, Rossiiskiye voorezhennyye sily v chechenskom konflikte: analiz, itogi, vyody (Paris: Kholveg, 1995), p. 12. Khasbulatov claims that he ordered Shaposhnikov to remove all armaments from the rebellious republic at the beginning of 1992 and

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13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22 23

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that Grachev had assured him this had been carried out. Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chechnya – mne ne dali ostanovit’ voiny (Moscow: Paleya, 1995), pp. 23–34. Nevertheless, in his book Dudayev alleges he told the Russian government that its armed forces could stay in the republic as long as they guaranteed not to institute any ‘provocations’ or use force against the Chechen people. Dzhokhar Dudayev, Temnistiy put’ k svobode (Vilnius, 1993), p. 105. Yusup Soslambekov, an erstwhile ally of Dudayev, testified in 1996 that there was no seizure of Russian military bases by the Chechens. He maintains that Dudayev merely took the weapons left behind by the withdrawing troops, and prior to that only possessed small arms taken from the KGB building in September 1991. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal III: Eyewitness testimony. First Session, Moscow, 21st–25th February 1996 (Moscow: Glasnost, 1996), pp. 26 & 30. For further details of the arming of the Chechens see Soviet Federatsii, Chechnya: tragediya Rossii (Moscow: Izdaniye Sovieta Federatsii, 1995), pp. 40–41; Nikolaev, pp. 20–23; Khasbulatov, pp. 23–25; Izvestiya, 12.1.95, p. 4 and 14.1.95, p. 4. Soviet Federatsii, p. 55. ‘Stenogramma vystupleniya na zasedanii gosudarstvennoi dumy 11 yanvarya 1995 goda’ in Vladimir Lysenko, Ot Tatarstana do Chechni (Moscow: Izdaniye instituta sovremennoi politika, 1995), p. 196. Pavel Baev also supports the view that there was little the Russian leadership could have done to prevent the mass seizure of arms without initiating further violence. According to Baev, ‘Chechen paramilitary formations completely blocked several former Soviet military bases and depots and effectively prevented any withdrawal of weapons from Chechenia’. Pavel Baev, ‘Russia’s Policies in the Caucasus’, Former Soviet South Project Briefing Paper (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p. 52. Yeremenko & Novikov, pp. 38–39. Konstitutsiya Chechenskoi Respubliki, (Groznyy: [b.i.], 1992), p. 3. Dudayev, p. 141. Mamodayev was a construction engineer and economist who had worked in the oil industry in the Turkmen SSR before being elected to head the ChechenoIngush ASSR’s construction directorate in 1989. He was a powerful businessman with important connections throughout the republic. Timur Muzaev, Ichkeria: Rukovodstvo i politicheskaya struktura (Moscow: Panorama, 1997), p. 123. For further details about Mamodayev and Gantemirov see S. E. Kurginyan, V. Solokhin & M. Podkopaeva, Sobytiya v Chechne i ikh vozmozhnoye vozdeistviye na uglubleniye sistemnogo krizisa v Rossiya: doklad na klube ‘Soderzhatelnoye edinstvo’, 8th December 1994 (Moscow: Eksperimentalnyy tvorcheskiy tsentr, 1994), p. 6. International Alert, Chechnia: Report of an International Alert fact-finding mission, September 24th–October 3rd 1992 (London: International Alert, 1992) Dudayev, p. 165. Dudayev, p. 8. Izvestiya, 8.2.95, p. 4. Quoted in Dudayev, p. 235. A. G. Gorlov (ed.), Kriminal’nyy rezhim. Chechnya 1991–1995 g.g (Moscow: Kodeks & MVD RF, 1995) p. 24. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8.6.93, p. 3. This economic portrait was complied from federal government data. Dudayev disputed that the Chechen economy was failing. In a 1994 interview he claimed that ‘in a critical time we have stopped the fall in production and collapse of the economy’. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7.7.94, p. 1. In an interview with the Russian newspaper Megapolis-Express in January 1993 Dudayev said: ‘As a matter of fact the blockade – economic, financial and aerial

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– stimulated us into even greater activity’. Quoted in Dudayev, p. 140. This optimism was countered by a letter from the management of an oil refinery in Groznyy to both the Russian and Chechen leaderships, begging the governments to resolve their dispute as the blockades were causing misery for the republic’s population. Quoted in Dudayev, pp. 279–81. Moreover, during a session of the Federation Council held December 16th–17th 1994 Ruslan Aushev, president of the Ingush Republic, attacked the Russian imposition of blockades as anticonstitutional and ‘genocide against the entire population’. Soviet Federatsii, p. 34. Boris Moskalev, ‘The Anatomy of the Chechen Conflict’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 108. Alexander Iskandaryan argues that the entire Caucasian economy and establishment is constituted by an illegal shadow economy, a problem which could be overcome by legalising it. According to him, the Caucasus have always had a ‘trading mentality’ and a well-organised, non-state trade structure, which meant it was in a good position when the Soviet Union collapsed and trade became legal. For an analysis of the North Caucasus shadow economy see Alexander Iskandaryan, ‘Underground Workshop of Russia’, New Times, October 1999, pp. 27–29. For details of the activities of Chechen criminal gangs before 1991 see Handelman, pp. 38–41. Handelman, p. 205. In 1990 Chechen oil amounted to roughly 0.5 per cent of overall Russian oil production. Moskalev, p.106. Anishchenko et al., p. 30. According to one estimate, electricity costs 20–30 times more on world markets than on the internal Russian market. Izvestiya, 14.9.94, p. 4. Abdulatipov described the existing economic situation as postfeudal, stating that ‘Russia has preserved the Soviet patronage economy with only one change: whereas formerly the centre distributed credit and goods, now it distributes only credit unsupported by goods … Russia has never known such favourable conditions for fraudulence’. Moscow News, 2–8.9.94, p. 3. In a report by a Chechen ‘expert commission’, established to investigate alleged abuses of power by Mamodayev, it is claimed that during 1992 over 4.3 million tonnes of fuel oil, 3.2 million tonnes of diesel, 1.6 million tonnes of petrol, 125,000 tonnes of kerosene and 436,000 tonnes of lubricant were exported from Chechnya, predominantly from the Groznyy ‘Checheningnefteprodukt’ refinery. However, the economy saw no financial return from this significant trade. Kurginyan et al., p. 7. This claim is reiterated by the former Soviet minister Salambek Khadzhiev, an ethnic Chechen. Writing in the Chechen newspaper Golos Chechenskoi Respubliki in July 1992, he stated that during the past 6 months over 5.3 million tonnes of oil had been refined by the republic’s factories. Although 3 million tonnes were allocated to Russia, the rest could not be accounted for and he accused the authorities of embezzlement. Yeremenko & Novikov, p. 48. A Kol’yev, Chechenskaya kapkan (Moscow: Kongress russkikh obshchin, 1997), p. 17. This is corroborated by MVD information detailing a 1993 meeting of the Chechen diaspora in Moscow during which Dudayev was asked to account for the money from the sale of oil. Apparently the Chechen president ‘acknowledged’ that $70 million had been invested in foreign bank accounts as a result of the sale of oil. Nikolaev, p. 33. According to one Chechen official, 72 flights took off from Groznyy during April 1994 alone, destined for 17 countries outside of the CIS. Quoted in Izvestiya, 31.5.94, p. 4. One reason for the Russian failure to adequately seal its borders was that the newly established border between Chechnya and Ingushetia

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38 39 40 41 42 43 44

45

was not officially demarcated until the end of 1992. It has also been suggested that too many Russian officials were profiting from the illegal trade taking place for a full embargo to be instituted. For example, during an interview with Anton Surikov, a State Duma advisor to Yuri Maslyukov, (a former Economics Minister) and military analyst for Pravda, it was alleged that the chairman of the Most Group, Vladimir Gusinsky, lent money to Dudayev to finance the smuggling of drugs from Afghanistan via Chechnya and Moscow to Germany, using Russian military planes. However, following the completion of the Russian withdrawal from Eastern Europe in June 1994, the operation was halted and Dudayev supposedly refused to pay back the money he owed. Gusinsky consequently called on his ally Evgeniy Sevostyanov, the head of the Moscow FSB, to exact revenge, which resulted in the FSB-organised operations against Dudayev in November 1994. Author interview with Dr Anton Surikov, State Duma of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 23rd June 1998. For further details of alleged Chechen involvement in criminal activities see ‘The Mechanisms of the Chechen Group’ in Anton Surikov, ‘Crime in Russia: The International Implications’, London Defence Studies Paper 25 (London: Centre for Defence Studies, 1995) Khasbulatov, p. 25. It should be noted that many of the weapons sold were those ‘left behind’ by the withdrawing Soviet armed forces. Handelman asserts that the gun-market in Groznyy was ‘the Commonwealth’s largest black-market clearing house for weapons’. In 1992 it was estimated that 10,000 stolen weapons were moving out of Moscow every week, south towards Groznyy. This would have been possible only if government officials co-operated with organised crime. Handelman, pp. 198–204. SWB SU/1910 B/5 1.2.94 [18] 1.2.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 31.1.94. Soslambekov claims that the Chechen government was aware of the banking fraud and turned to the Russian MVD for assistance, although they got no response. International Tribunal III, p. 26. Abubakarov, Dudayev’s finance and economic minister, also acknowledges Chechen involvement in the robberies, but argues that the Chechens were either ‘geniuses’ or they were operating with the assistance of Russian officials and security services. Abubakarov, p. 107. Abubakarov, p. 109. This official based his figures on a plane filled with 60 passengers, each of whom spent an average of 10,000 dollars on goods to import into the republic. Izvestiya, 31.5.94, p. 4. Quoted in Carlotta Gall & Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War (London: Pan Books, 1997), p. 125. For detailed descriptions by Russian sources of alleged criminal activity see Anishchenko et al., pp. 28–43; Nikolaev, pp. 29–37; Gorlov, pp. 11–28. Gorlov, p. 21. International Tribunal III, p. 29. International Tribunal III, p. 86. Several Russian experts disagree with this claim, including Nikolai Petrov, who believes that ‘crime in Chechnya was far worse than anywhere else’. Author interview with Nikolai Petrov, Scholar-in-Residence, Moscow Carnegie Centre, Moscow, 9th February 1999. It appears that Dudayev took few concrete measures to build up the importance of Islam, compared to Zavgayev, under whom over 200 mosques were built and the ‘Hajj’ tradition re-established. He also contemplated introducing Sharia law, but never did. Dudayev, p. 141. Islam began to play a far more important role during the war itself when it was used to emphasise the radical difference between Russians and Chechens. Extreme forms of Islam allegedly accompanied money from the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia. For further information regarding the role of Islam see Akhmet Yarlykapov, ‘Islamic Fundamentalism in

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the Northern Caucasus: Towards a Formulation of the Problem’, Caucasian Regional Studies, Vol. 4, Issue 1 (1999) http://pubs.carnegie.ru/CRS/puli/crs/eng/ 0401–02.htm; Paul B Henze, ‘Islam in the North Caucasus: the example of Chechnya’, Rand Paper P-7935 (Santa Monica, California, 1995); Alexei Malashenko, ‘Islam in the Northern Caucasus’, Prism, 24th October 1996, www.soros.org/monitor/0027.html; Reza Shah-Kazemi, Crisis in Chechnia: Russian imperialism, Chechen nationalism, militant Sufism (London: Islamic World Report, 1995). Dudayev’s book contains a collection of these missives, which include telegrams to Jordan, Syria, Japan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Finland, China, Lithuania and Iraq on the subject of ‘friendly relations’ and support. Gorlov, p. 50. This did not stop them providing covert assistance, however, often in the forms of arms. There is an extensive Chechen diaspora, particularly in Turkey and Jordan, the descendants of those who fled Russia’s brutal assimilation of Chechnya during the nineteenth century. Groznyy’s Islamic University contained teachers from Chechnya’s diaspora communities across the Middle East, particularly Syria and Jordan, and the republic’s first ‘Foreign Minister’, Shamil Beno, was a Jordanian-born Chechen. For a detailed account of the Chechen diaspora see Vanora Bennett, Crying Wolf: The Return of War to Chechnya (London: Picador, 1998) Izvestiya, 20.2.92, p. 22. Gorlov, p. 50. Dudayev, p. 103. Dudayev, p. 167. Over 70 per cent of the electorate took part in the referendum held on November 30th 1991. Of those who participated 97.4 per cent approved the formation of a separate Ingush republic within the Russian Federation, although there were claims by the organisers of the referendum that Yeltsin had promised that contentious land in North Ossetia would be returned to them if they voted to remain within Russia. Jolanda Hogenkamp, Report of the UNPO Mission to the Republic of Ingushetia and the Chechen-Republic Ichkeria, December 5–12 1994 (The Hague: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation, 1995), p. 18. Nevertheless, by 1993 the Russian power struggles caused the Ingush President to declare the possibility of his republic leaving the Federation, stating that the inaction of the Russian authorities was forcing Ingushetia to look for its own way out of the crisis. Izvestiya, 29.7.93, p. 1. In late October 1992 fighting broke out between the Ossetian and Ingush peoples over the disputed territory of Prigorodniy rayon. Following the Stalinist deportations of 1944, the Soviet authorities redrew the boundaries in the North Caucasus and some Ingush land was incorporated into North Ossetia, including Prigorodniy rayon. Ingush determination to recover this land increased after 1991 and tensions in the area heightened as Ingush inhabitants of the territory who had been harassed by Ossetians fled back to Ingushetia. For further details see Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict In and After the Soviet Union (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 155–82. Despite reports that money was being collected on Groznyy streets ‘to help embattled Ingushetia’, the Chechen leadership accused its neighbour of destabilising the situation on their mutual borders. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18.11.92, p. 1. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 24.7.93, p. 3. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 17.6.92., pp. 1–3. The incursion into Dagestan by Chechen militants in August 1999 has only increased the republic’s desire to remain within the Federation, disproving Russian fears that the conflict would give rise to a united ethno-Islamic front in the northeast Caucasus. Comments made by Dr

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Robert Bruce Ware during the Fifth Annual World Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities held April 13th–15th 2000 in New York. For further details of this Congress and an analysis of the KNK’s influence see Cem Oğuz, ‘The Unity of the North Caucasian Peoples: The Case of the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus’, Perceptions, Vol. 4, No. 2 (JuneAugust 1999), www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/iv-2/oguz.htm. Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 28.4.93, p. 2. For further evidence of the North Caucasian peoples’ mass disaffection with Moscow rule see E. V. Kritskiy, Chechenskiy krizis v massovom soznanii naseleniya severnogo kavkaza (Krasnodar: Rossiiskaya akademiya nauk, 1995) As mentioned in Chapter Two, a significant part of the republic’s industrial potential had been developed by the Russian-speaking population. Native Chechens were severely underrepresented in white-collar occupations such as the oil extraction and refining industry, machinery manufacture, transport and administration, with only a very small percentage of the urban middle class originating from the indigenous population. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 31.7.92, p. 5. Dudayev himself maintains that the majority of Russians left because they were afraid of a repetition of events in other republics, such as the Baltics, where Russians were persecuted. Acknowledging that some Russians were evicted from their homes, he accuses the Russian secret services of attempting to destabilise the republic. He claims that Chechnya was the only republic where equal rights for all nationalities were legally defined and the reason for the lack of Russians within administrative and governments structures was because they had failed to stand in the elections. Dudayev, p. 18 and p. 104. Nikolaev, p. 40. Nevertheless, Dudayev himself had remarked that the Cossacks and Chechens had ‘a lot in common, even in our traditions, dress and customs’, Dudayev, p. 62. Naurskiy, Shelkovskiy and Kargalinskiy were three Cossack regions incorporated into the Checheno-Ingush ASSR in January 1957 following the re-establishment of the latter. The three regions had previously been a part of Stavropol krai. This two-volume publication is a compilation of ‘testimonies’ from Russians who claim to have suffered at the hands of Chechens during Dudayev’s regime. Belaya Kniga: Chechnya, 1991–1995: fakty, dokumenty, svidetelstva (Moscow: Tsentr obshchestvennikh sviazei FSK Rossii, 1995). Anishchenko et al., p. 49. This view is also propounded by another MVD publication, which claims that ‘the authorities of Dudayev’s regime carried out a mass expulsion of non-Chechen citizens from their flats and homes by any criminal means, including murder’. Nikolaev, p. 47 In an article in the right-wing newspaper Zavtra, Mikhail Burlakov claims that this persecution began at the end of the 1980s with Zavgayev’s rise to power. He chronicles numerous cases of alleged murders of Russians, who held key posts in the republic, including two senior lecturers from the Chechen-Ingush State University.Zavtra, No. 27 (July 1995), p. 6. For further details of alleged crimes against Russians see Anishchenko et al., pp. 46–51; Gorlov, pp. 17–28; Nikolaev, pp. 38–49. Izvestiya, 9.3.92, p. 7. Dudayev, p. 62. The research is based on the responses of 4000 inhabitants of Krasnodar and Stavropol krais, Rostov oblast, Adygea, Dagestan, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Karachi-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Chechnya. Nineteen per cent of Russians and 62 per cent of North Caucasians agreed that Dudayev’s regime satisfactorily protected the interests of the republic’s population. Kritskiy, p. 9. Nikolaev, p. 48.

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68 For example, an article in the Russian newspaper Shchit i Myech in January 1995, whilst highly critical of Dudayev’s ‘criminal regime’, does not blame the Chechen nation as a whole, praising ‘the proud spirit and kind heart of the Vainakh people’. Gorlov, p. 54 69 Both Russian and Chechen analysts confirm this. Nikolai Petrov of the Moscow Carnegie Centre believes that the conflict stemmed from a personality clash between Yeltsin and Dudayev, maintaining that if the former had called the Chechen president war would have been avoided. Author interview with Nikolai Petrov, Scholar-in-Residence, Carnegie Centre, Moscow, 9th February 1999. Professor Gakaev supports Petrov’s view, stating: ‘If Yeltsin had invited Dudayev to the Kremlin and recognised him as the legitimate leader of Chechnya, then the war would not have taken place’. Author interview with Professor Dzhabrail Gakaev, Moscow, 18th February 1999. During a Federation Council meeting in January 1995, Ramazan Abdulatipov claimed that during 1992 he had personally requested Yeltsin to meet with Dudayev in order to avoid a ‘tragedy’ across the entire region. Soviet Federatsii, p. 55. This is in contrast to his attitude in an interview given in February 1992 during which he stated that following a recent meeting with Dudayev he had come to the conclusion that ‘in short, we have no common ground for a normal conversation’. Pravda, 19.2.92, pp. 1–2. 70 ‘Protocol on the results of the meeting of Russian and Chechen experts in Sochi 12th–14th March 1992’ quoted in Dudayev, pp. 359–360. A follow-up meeting was held in Moscow May 25th–28th 1992, although little was achieved. 71 The Federal Treaty was signed on March 31st 1992 and was an attempt to define the powers of the Federation and its subjects, although it was not intended to be a substitute for the constitution. It did not grant the republics the right to secede but bound them together while granting them greater powers and freedoms. See Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1996); Gail W. Lapidus (ed.), The New Russia: Troubled Transformation (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995) 72 Shakhrai, from a Cossack family in southern Russia, was a lawyer by profession and his legal training had proved vital to the formation of the fledging Russian state. He was one of the authors of the crucial 1991 Belovezhskiy Treaty concerning the dissolution of the USSR and had become one of Yeltsin’s most trusted advisers. His bargaining skills were utilised not only in the Chechen dispute, but also during talks in 1992 with Ukraine over the controversial issue of the division of the Black Sea fleet. 73 In response to the Law on the Formation of the Ingush Republic, Movladi Udugov, Chechen ‘Minister of Information’ had warned that the law ‘contains more questions that answers. The Ingush are waiting for Moscow to help them. But we think that Russia’s main interest here is not at all in solving the Ingush problem’. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10.6.92, p. 3. For a detailed examination of the Ingush question see Fiona Hill, ‘Russia’s Tinderbox’: Conflict in the North Caucasus and its Implications for the Future of the Russian Federation, September 1995 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1995), pp. 35–36. 74 A radical OKChN-led faction of deputies within the republican parliament had proclaimed the division of Checheno-Ingushetia on October 1st 1991, without consulting either the electorate or other members of the legislature. The resolution could not be considered legitimate since it had not been adopted according to established parliamentary procedure, but by a minority of deputies. See previous chapter for details.

Notes 185 75 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12.12.92, p. 3. 76 Konstitutsiya RFSFR, (Moscow, 1979), p. 22. 77 Article 65, Constitution of the Russian Federation, Vladimir V. Belyakov & Walter J. Raymond (eds.) (Lawrenceville, Virginia: Brunswick Pub. Co., 1994), p. 36. 78 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27.9.94, p. 3. 79 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15.1.93, p. 3. 80 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15.1.93, p. 3. 81 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 6.1.93, p. 3. 82 Izvestiya, 18.1.93, p. 1. 83 Konstitutsiya Chechenskoi Respublika, p. 16. 84 Nikolaev, p. 65. 85 Izvestiya, 18.1.93, p. 2. It should be noted that a few days before this delegation had arrived in Groznyy, Shakrai had issued an ominous statement warning that the Russian leadership was prepared to use force to defend its ‘priority interests’ in the Caucasus. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15.1.93, p. 3. 86 Izvestiya, 18.1.93, p. 2. 87 Moskovskiye Novosti, 11.4.93, p. A2. According to this decree, the Transcaucasian Border District was discontinued and the North Caucasus Border District formed instead, as a component of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defence’s border troops, underlining Moscow’s preoccupation with the security of its southern borders. The formation of the NCMD of Ministry of Defence troops was accelerated and the creation of mobile general-purpose forces within the Russian armed forces was commenced. It was stated that at the first stage the intention was to use the NCMD troops to create an immediatereaction force, including both large and small units on constant alert. This reflected the trend in the reform of the armed forces towards the creation of mobile forces, which could be rapidly deployed. The revised military doctrine, published in November 1993, stated that the creation of such forces was a ‘priority’. Krasnaya Zvezda, 4.11.93, p. 3. 88 The Cossacks were the vanguard of the Russian expansion southwards during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, loyal servants of the Tsar who relied on them to colonise the Caucasus. According to Sebastian Smith, ‘instead of relying on homesick armies to garrison the Caucasus, Moscow was always able to settle its new lands with Cossacks. They made each conquest permanent.’ Sebastian Smith, Allah’s Mountains: Politics and War in the Russian Caucasus (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), p. 37. 89 Izvestiya, 14.7.93, p. 4. 90 Gorlov, p. 148. 91 Yeremenko & Novikov, p. 54. 92 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4.6.93, pp. 1–3. 93 Segodnya, 25.6.93, p. 2. For further information regarding budgetary federalism see Alastair McAuley, ‘The Determinants of Russian Federal-Regional Fiscal Relations: Equity or Political Influence?’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1997), pp. 431–44.; Nikolai Petrov, ‘Russia’s Regions or Regions’ Russia? Prospective Realignment of the Nation’s Political Subdivisions’, Briefing Papers, No. 3 (March 1999), http://pubs.carnegie.ru/english/briefings/1999/issue03–99.asp. 94 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5.1.93, p. 3. 95 Anishchenko et al., p. 28. 96 Abdulatipov criticised the existing budgetary system, stating that ‘regional leaders are eagerly running around Moscow in search of credit. Moscow gives credit to those it likes and refuses to give it to those it does not like. This complete dependence on officials makes all talk about regional freedom and sovereignty sheer demagogy.’, Moscow News, 2–8.9.94, p. 3.

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5 Challenges to internal sovereignty: the roots of power and opposition to the Dudayev regime (1991–93) 1 Internal sovereignty has been defined as ‘the notion of a supreme power/ authority within the state, located in the body that makes decisions that are binding to all citizens, groups and institutions within the state’s territorial boundaries’. External sovereignty ‘relates to a state’s place in the international order and its capacity to act as an independent and autonomous entity’. Andrew Haywood, Politics (London: Macmillan Press, 1997), p. 143. 2 Every Chechen belongs to a particular village, family and religious brotherhood (a tariqat or vird). A clan is based on two or three villages claiming descent from a common ancestor with each family headed by an elder, who still commands great respect in contemporary society. There are around 165 teips in modern-day Chechnya and they continue to play a significant role that includes supporting weaker members, such as the unemployed. For a detailed description of Chechen teips see S. E. Kurginyan, V. Solokhin & M. Podkopaeva, Sobytiya v Chechne i ikh vozmozhnoye vozdeistviye na uglubleniye sistemnogo krizisa v Rossii: doklad na klube ‘Soderzhatelnoye edinstvo’, 8th December 1994 (Moscow: Eksperimentalnyi tvorcheskii tsentr, 1994); Jan Chesnov, ‘Chechentsem byt’ trudno. Taipy, ikh proshloe i rol’ v nastoyashchem’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22.9.94, p. 5. 3 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22.9.94, p. 5. 4 Vladimir Batyuk identified the grooming of local elites as a classic Moscow policy following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Author’s interview with Vladimir Batyuk, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of USA and Canada Studies (ISKRAN), Moscow, 25th June 1998. 5 Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnya and Daghestan (London: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 21. 6 Kurginyan et al., p. 9. 7 Kurginyan et al., p. 9. 8 The territory north of the Terek river was transferred to Checheno-Ingushetia in 1957 following the rehabilitation of the deported nations and the ASSR’s restoration within the RSFSR. Three Cossack regions (Naurskiy, Kargalinskiy and Shelkovskiy), which had previously been part of Stavropol krai, were assimilated into the republic. Thus many inhabitants of the area consider the land to be historically Russian and feel greater allegiance to Moscow than to Groznyy. 9 Kurginyan et al., p. 11. 10 Kurginyan et al., p. 5. 11 Sulim Nasardinov, ‘Will Chechnya Become Fundamentalist?’, Moscow News, 26.5–1.6.95, p. 2 quoted in John B. Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 147. Vird is the Chechen word for tariqat, an Arabic term meaning ‘path towards God’. Virds or tariqats are religious brotherhoods connected to Sufism, a mystical form of Islam that predominates in the North Caucasus. There is an overlap of clan and religious loyalties, which contributes to the social order within Chechnya. For an historical portrait of the role of observes that the traditional clan and vird structure is still crucial for the regulation of social processes within the republic virds see Vanora Bennett, Crying Wolf: The Return of War to Chechnya (London: Picador, 1998), pp. 250–84. 12 Observers of the Chechen situation noted the increasing influence of the Council of Elders, particularly at the time of the Russian invasion. It was reported that in December 1994, immediately prior to the deployment of federal troops, there were a total of 7,000 village elders in Chechnya who had made the parliament building in Groznyy their headquarters. Dunlop, p. 147. 13 One Chechen voiced his disdain for the Council, stating that ‘If it was a real Mekhkel … of course we would respect it. Chechens have to respect their elders.

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21

22

23 24 25

26

27 28 29 30 31

But this Mekhkel is in Dudayev’s pocket. No-one will take any notice of it.’ Quoted in Bennett, p. 253. Author’s interview with Professor Dzhabrail Gakaev, Moscow, 18th February 1999. Dzhabrail Gakaev, Ocherki politicheskoi istorii Chechni (XX vek) (Moscow: Izdatelstvo ChKTs, 1997), p. 387. Author’s interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Blandy, Conflict Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhurst, Camberley, Surrey, 19th January 1999. Author’s interview with Dr Valery Tishkov, Director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 8th February 1999. Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power (London: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 336. Apparently this clan based in the northern plains has a history of co-operation with Russia that goes back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Lieven, p. 336. For further details see Lieven, pp. 336–339. The FSK paper apparently recommended that, during the summer of 1994, the Russian government increase the supply of arms and money to the opposition ‘Provisional Council’ and also that Russian agents use bribes and mediation to establish a solid alliance of clans against the Dudayev regime, with promises of a share of the spoils in the event of victory. Also Russia Briefing Vol. 2, No. 8 (27th August 1994), pp. 4–5. Gakaev states that the liberal anti-Dudayev opposition comprised various organisations, including ‘Daimokh’ (Fatherland) led by Lechi Umkhaev and Gersolt Elmurzaev, the Movement for Democratic Reform led by Salambek Khadzhiev, the Association of the Intelligentsia led by Magomaev and Munaev, Civil Accord led by Shakhmirza Bekhoev, ‘Marsho’ (Freedom) led by Abdula Bugaev and the Republican Party led by Lecha Magomadov. Gakaev, pp. 200–201. He claims that many problems arose because Chechnya was attempting to conduct a simultaneous reform of both its economy and political-administrative structure within the context of a newly created state. Taimaz Abubakarov, Rezhim Dzhokhara Dudayeva: pravda i vymysel (Moscow: Insan, 1998), p. 62. Interview with Soslambekov in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19.11.93, p. 3. Abubakarov, p. 62. Presidential Decree No. 26 ‘On the Appointment of a Commandant for the City of Groznyy and Measures to Uphold the Curfew’ February 11th 1992 in Sbornik ukazov prezidenta chechenskoi respubliki c 1 noyabrya 1991g po 30 iyunya 1992g (Groznyy: Kniga, 1993), pp. 62–63. For the full text of parliamentary resolution No. 87 ‘On the Endowment of the President of the Chechen Republic with Emergency Powers’ 8th February 1992 see I. N. Yeremenko & Yu. D. Novikov, Rossiya i Chechnya (1990–1997) (Moscow: RAU-Universitet, 1997), p. 41. Gakaev, p. 204. For the full text of this appeal by the intelligentsia see Gakaev, pp. 252–254. This opposition bloc included the Movement for Democratic Reform led by Khadzhiev and Gakaev, the Association of Intelligentsia and other similar organisations. Gakaev, p. 256. L. S. Perepelkin, ‘Chechenskaya respublika: sovremennaya sotsial’nopoliticheskaya situatsiya’, Ethnograficheskoye obozreniye, No. 1 (1994), p. 4. Gakaev, p. 262. Yandarbiyev, a radical ally of Dudayev, insists that the Russian secret services managed to secure control of the bulk of the Chechen media, effecting a dramatic transformation in their depiction of the internal political situation. According to this interpretation of events, prior to November 1991 the Chechen media displayed a very positive attitude towards the OKChN, Dudayev

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and other groups supportive of the radicals’ demands. However, by mid-1992, this position had changed and several newspapers openly expressed their sympathies for the anti-Dudayev opposition, as a result of ‘infiltration by members of the Russian secret services’. Yandarbiyev, p. 104. This group was formed at the beginning of February 1992 by leaders of the opposition who were in favour of armed resistance to the Dudayev regime. Its chairman was Vakhid Itaev, a writer and former leader of the Movement for the preservation of Checheno-Ingushetia. For further details see Timur Muzaev, Ichkeria: rukovodstvo i politicheskaya struktura (Moscow: Panorama, 1997), pp. 68–69. Izvestiya, 1.4.92, p. 2. Izvestiya, 1.4.92, p. 2. For the full text of this parliamentary resolution see Yeremenko & Novikov, p. 43. Abubakarov claims that Dudayev was not overtly concerned by this attempted rebellion, noting that the Chechen leader ‘felt more confident in extremely critical situations than during ordinary times’. Apparently there was very little discussion about any potential resolution of the crisis. Dudayev had ordered Gantemirov, Groznyy’s mayor and one of the founders of the National Guard, to sort out the problem and the latter announced that everything was ‘under control, the necessary measures have been taken and the opposition will be routed in an hour or so’. Abubakarov, p. 93. Izvestiya, 1.4.92, pp. 1–2. Those who supported armed resistance included Umar Avturkhanov and Abdula Bugaev, founders of the political party ‘Marsho’, whilst the advocates of a political solution included Gakaev, Khadzhiev and Umkhaev. According to Gakaev, the armed opposition had a solid base of support amongst the population of the northern plains, particularly Nadterechniy district. Gakaev, p. 204. Yeremenko & Novikov, p. 46. Gakaev, p. 387. Abubakarov, p. 63. In his opinion the parliament would have been hostile to any government that advocated property reform. In January 1992 Dudayev had offered the post to Salambek Khadzhiev, the former Soviet Minister of the Chemical Industry who had recently returned to Groznyy. Khadzhiev turned the offer down because Dudayev was insisting of the retention of a state-controlled economy. In an interview in 1996 Khadzhiev explained his decision: ‘I told him I wouldn’t take part in this because he had a typically stateist conception of things. He was a typical military man: force, order and submission! … I said we should reassure the people that we were heading for independence and that we had in the first place to deal step by step with the economy but not in the way that he wanted, keeping everything in the state sector. I said that the only way ahead was to liberalise the economy very quickly and switch on all the energy locked up in the people in the private sector … But he had a typical old way of thinking, that everything should be firmly in the hands of the commander of the division. I said that was not realistic’. Quoted in Carlotta Gall and Tom de Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War (London: Pan Books, 1997), p. 107. Quoted in Yeremenko & Novikov, p. 48. For a detailed account of the antagonism between Mamodayev and Dudayev see Abubakarov, pp. 66–75. From November 1991 Mamodayev had led the Committee for the Management of the Economy (KOUNKh, the temporary government of the OKChN until now), which comprised powerful businessmen and economic leaders from the republic. There was also a parallel government structure, the Council of Ministers, headed by Dudayev, which discussed issues of a political nature. This dual system of power rapidly engendered antagonism between the two groups over jurisdiction and resources. In May 1992 KOUNKh

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48

49 50 51 52

53 54 55

was disbanded and a new Council of Ministers, led by Mamodayev, was established. Many of Mamodayev’s powerful business allies from KOUNKh were included in the new government. See Muzaev, pp. 166–68. Fiona Hill, ‘Russia’s Tinderbox’: Conflict in the North Caucasus and its Implications for the Future of the Russian Federation, September 1995 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1995), p. 83. The groups involved included ‘Daimokh’, ‘Marsho’, Civic Accord, ‘Niyso’ (Justice), ‘Nokhch-Mokhk’ (The Chechen Land) and the National Front, several of which represented the radical anti-Dudayev opposition. For in-depth descriptions of these movements, their aims and other opposition groups see Muzaev (1997). Gakaev, pp. 365–66. Gakaev, p. 238. The conflict between the Russian parliament and presidency had intensified due to a combination of personal factors and structural weaknesses inherited from the Soviet system of power. Yeltsin failed to achieve any form of consensus in the parliament, which continually blocked his measures. The root of the problem lay in the fact that whilst the president was responsible for policy-making, the legislature had control over the implementation and administration of these policies. By the end of 1992 tension between the two was very high, as the parliament refused to confirm Gaidar as Prime Minister, criticising his harsh ‘shock therapy’ reform programme that had brought the Russian economy to the verge of collapse. In late October 1992 fighting broke out between the Ossetian and Ingush peoples over the disputed territory of Prigorodniy rayon. Following the Stalinist deportations of 1944, the Soviet authorities redrew the boundaries in the North Caucasus and some Ingush land was incorporated into North Ossetia, including Prigorodniy rayon. Ingush determination to recover this land increased after 1991 and tensions in the area heightened as Ingush inhabitants of the territory who had been harassed by Ossetians fled back to Ingushetia. For further details see Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict In and After the Soviet Union (London: Sage, 1997), pp. 155–82. Sbornik ukazov prezidenta chechenskoi respubliki c 1 iyulya 1992g po 31 dekabrya 1992g (Groznyy: Kniga, 1993), pp. 30–31. See A. Kol’yev, Chechenskaya kapkan (Moscow: Kongress russkikh obshchin, 1997), pp. 11–12. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15.1.93, p. 3. Chechnia: Report of an International Alert fact-finding mission, September 24th–October 3rd 1992 (London: International Alert, 1992), p. 50. Nevertheless, these fears may well have some justification. According to Tishkov, large numbers of troops were deployed in North Ossetia ‘with no military justification’ and these troops headed straight for the Chechen border on the pretext of ‘Ingush aggression’. Tishkov cites Yegor Gaidar, who declared in February 1995 during testimony to the Duma’s Commission on the Investigation of Events in the Chechen Republic, that ‘the question of using force arose in November 1992 when the continuation of the campaign in the zone of the Ingush-Ossetian conflict, including against Chechnya, was discussed’. Tishkov, p. 213 Muzaev, p. 73. It was led by Salman Raduev, Gudermes District prefect, and El’za Sheripova, Chechen Prosecutor General. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 6.1.93, p. 3. However, Mamodayev was not relieved of his government post until May 1993. Izvestiya, 18.1.93, p. 1.

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56 The negative impact of the executive-legislature conflict was highlighted prior to the arrival of the Russian delegation in the republic. The government plane carrying the delegation was obliged to circle over Groznyy for almost an hour without receiving permission to land. It later transpired that the order not to accept the plane from Moscow had originated from within the presidential administration and only last-minute intervention by the leadership of the Chechen parliament saved the talks. On the Russians’ departure Shakhrai received a telegram from Dudayev in which the Chechen said he could not guarantee Shakhrai’s safety and that there were rumours about preparations for an attempt on his life by either the Ingush or Ossetians. Izvestiya, 18.1.93, p. 2. 57 During an interview in January 1993 the opposition leader Salambek Khadzhiev gave unexpected support to Dudayev’s rejection of the proposed treaty because it implied Chechnya’s unconditional inclusion within the Russian Federation. In Khadzhiev’s opinion this issue could only be resolved by means of a republicwide referendum. The War in Chechnya, International Tribunal III: Eyewitness testimony. First Session, Moscow, 21st-25th February 1996 (Moscow: Glasnost, 1996), p. 183. 58 Izvestiya, 18.1.93, p. 2. Dudayev attempted to re-capture the initiative by personally writing to Yeltsin and asking him to recognise the independent status of Chechnya. ‘The people of the Chechen Republic, having consciously embarked upon the path of sovereignty … are building mutual relations with all peoples and states on the basis of the norms and principles of international law … We are open to dialogue and reasonable compromises.’ Dudayev assured the President that Russia ‘will acquire … a trustworthy partner and the guarantee of political stability throughout the Caucasus’. When Yeltsin did not respond Dudayev wrote again, warning him of the perils inherent in a conflict between the executive and legislative branches of power. He prophetically suggested that Yeltsin dissolve the Supreme Soviet, call new elections and adopt a new constitution. For copies of these letters see A. G. Gorlov (ed.), Kriminal’nyy rezhim Chechnya, 1991–1995g.g (Moscow: Kodeks & MVD RF, 1995), pp. 146–51. 59 During 1990–91 Soslambekov had been a leader of the VDP and was instrumental in the 1991 ‘Chechen revolution’, subsequently becoming a member of the Chechen parliament. However he joined the anti-Dudayev opposition in January 1992 and was an advocate of armed resistance. For further biographical details see Muzaev, pp. 131–32. Another former ally of Dudayev who lent his support to the opposition was Beslan Gantemirov, the mayor of Groznyy and one of the founders of the Presidential Guard. He pronounced Dudayev’s government to be ‘an authoritarian regime of a fascist persuasion’. Quoted in Kol’yev, p. 24. 60 Gakaev, p. 387. 61 According to Gakaev, the leaders of ‘Daimokh’ and ‘Marsho’ disputed the notion of creating an independent emergency structure as a ‘third force that would constitutionally effect a change in a discredited system of power’. In their opinion such a force should be led by someone with respect and authority who was not connected to any political party or group. Representatives of ‘Bako’ were aiming to resolve the crisis through a reform of the existing regime, notably a strengthening of the legislature. This objective threatened to turn the SGNS into a mere weapon in the parliament’s battle over the redistribution of power, consequently undermining the bloc’s legitimacy. ‘Daimokh’ representatives pulled out of the coalition at the end of February 1993, stating that the only way to resolve the crisis was democratic elections, not a ‘cosmetic reconstruction of the existing regime’. Gakaev, p. 388. 62 According to reports in the Russian press, Grigoryants was shot in his Groznyy apartment at point-blank range with an automatic rifle and then his throat was

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69 70 71 72 73

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75

slit. His killers made no attempt to disguise the murder as an attempted burglary, leading to the conclusion that it was a politically motivated assassination. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20.4.93, p. 1. Marsho, 6.6.93, quoted in Gakaev, p. 403. For further details of the opposition groups and their demands see Muzaev and Gakaev, pp. 200–203 and pp. 403–406. Gall & de Waal, p. 119. On 25th April the parliament declared that a referendum to ascertain the electorate’s confidence in both the president and parliament would be held on June 5th 1993. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20.4.93, p. 1 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20.4.93, p. 1. This statement appears to be specifically directed at Khasbulatov, the Russian parliamentary speaker who had been a strong advocate of the ineffectual state of emergency decree in 1991. Likewise the Round Table coalition accused Dudayev’s regime of ‘forcing the Chechen nation to the edge of a civil war’. In a statement published in the political newspaper ‘Marsho’, the bloc denounced the president for dividing the nation into two rival camps, and triggering a civil war that took ‘the traditional Vainakh form of revenge killings’. Marsho, 6.6.93, quoted in Gakaev, pp. 403–406. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20.4.93, p. 1 However, the parliament did not have the unanimous support of its deputies. Nine of the 41 parliamentarians agreed with Dudayev’s action and stepped down in a show of support for the president, including the deputy speaker Isa Idigov and VDP chairman Yandarbiyev. Muzaev, p. 168. In terms of armed support, Dudayev’s opponents had the backing of the Groznyy city police and an armed militia consisting of volunteers from several districts. The republic’s MVD, National Security Service and the Shali Tank Regiment all declared neutrality, although opposition leaders claimed that these groups would support the opposition in the event of an armed confrontation, a claim confirmed by sources within the aforementioned organisations. Dudayev still commanded loyalty from the National Guard, the ‘Presidential Berets’ battalion and various semi-official ‘special units’. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20.4.93, p. 1 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20.4.93, p. 1 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8.6.93, p. 3. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8.6.93, p. 3. Gakaev, p. 203. Hill, p. 85. Nadterechniy District, in Chechnya’s northern plains, became the centre of the resistance movement led by Umar Avturkhanov, mayor of the district and one of the founders of the opposition party ‘Marsho’. The June 5th referendum actually took place in this district, where the outcome was a resounding vote of no confidence in either the president or parliament. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8.6.93, p. 3. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5.8.93, p. 2. In a memorandum to Dudayev the forensic medicine department of the Chechen armed forces made the bizarre suggestion that Khasbulatov was under the influence of a ‘poisonous substance’, which was destroying his liver. In the opinion of these medical experts, Khasbulatov’s ‘appearance and the character of the … speaker’s recent spontaneous afflictions’ corroborated this. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19.8.93, p. 3. Several Russian publications allege that large sums of money were sent from Moscow to Groznyy on several occasions, immediately prior to action by Dudayev’s opponents. In March 1992 the Russian Ministry of Finance sent 150 million roubles in cash to Groznyy, an act repeated in August of the same year when a further 500 million roubles arrived in the republic. At the end of 1992, during his visit to Moscow, Chechen ‘Prime Minister’ Mamodayev collected 2.5 billion roubles. Finally, on the eve of the April 1993 revolt, a further sum was

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sent from Moscow. When a Russian deputy attempted to ascertain the source of this money, he was informed by the Central Bank that Vladimir Shumeiko, deputy chairman of the federal government, had ordered the payments. Several observers claim that this money found its way into the pockets of the opposition. See Kurginyan et al., p. 14; Kol’yev, pp. 23–24; G. Anishchenko, A. Vasilevskaya, O. Kugusheva & O. Mramornov, Kommissiya Govorukhina (Moscow: Laventa, 1995), p. 28. Anishchenko et al., pp. 57–58. Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) SU/1783 B/5 [8] 2.9.93 – Moskovskiye Novosti, 29.8.93, p. A12. This allegation was contradicted by Avturkhanov who said that an extensive propaganda campaign had ensured the backing of the majority of the district’s 48,000 residents and that the opposition had ‘never been so strong as it is now’, outlining plans to send a local delegation to explain the aims and goals of opposition groups to the Chechen diaspora in Turkey. SWB SU/1783 B/6 [9] 2.9.93 – Interfax, Moscow, 23.8.93. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19.8.93, p. 3. In support of these allegations the department cited several examples of ‘provocative acts’, including: the blowing up of a bridge across the Aksay river linking Chechnya with Dagestan by unidentified men; the collection of signatures in support of the closure of Dagestan’s border with Chechnya; increased activity with regard to the arming of Cossack military groups in Stavropol krai, Terek and North Ossetia. The Chechen leadership was particularly sensitive towards the Cossack issue following Yeltsin’s decree of March 1993 ‘On the Reforming of Military Structures and Border and Internal Troops in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation and on State Support for the Cossacks’, which had aroused fears of a revival of the historic Cossack Line to defend the southern Russian border. For further details see the previous chapter. Segodnya, 6.11.93, p. 2. However, opposition groups were in favour of the elections and The World Democratic Union turned to Russia’s Central Electoral Commission for assistance in holding the elections on December 12th. A series of explosions in central Groznyy at the end of November were seen as a further attempt by Russian forces to undermine the Dudayev regime and reinstate federal control. For further details of these explosions see Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23.11.93, p. 1. SWB SU/1904 B/8 [31] 25.1.94 – Izvestiya, Moscow, 19.1.94. SWB SU/1904 B/8 [32] 25.1.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 16.1.94. SWB SU/1913 B/6 [11] 4.2.94 – Russia’s Radio, Moscow, 2.2.94. SWB SU/1918 B/1 [1] 10.2.94 – Russia’s Radio, Moscow, 7.2.94. Suleimenov had previously refused to renounce the use of force in the political conflict with Dudayev’s regime. He stated that the National Salvation Committee was well armed and had reached agreement on joint actions with other militant groups. SWB SU/1907 B/9 [24] 28.1.94 – Russia’s Radio, Moscow, 24.1.94. SWB SU/1928 B/5 [16] 22.2.94 – Segodnya, Moscow, 19.2.94. At a session of the Russian Federation Council in December 1994 its chairman, Vladimir Shumeiko, expressed his belief that the Chechen crisis had not been resolved prior to October 1993 because of the presence of Khasbulatov in the corridors of power. He maintained that Khasbulatov, as one of the architects of the November 1991 state of emergency decree, constituted a serious hindrance to any political resolution of the conflict between Moscow and Groznyy. See Soviet Federatsii, Chechnya: tragediya Rossii (Moscow: Izdaniye Sovieta Federatsii, 1995), p. 18. Khasbulatov himself claims that tensions in the Chechen Republic were exploited by Russian politicians embroiled in the executive–legislature struggle. He believes that following the Fourth Congress of March 1992, when Yeltsin attempted to re-assert control over the Russian parliament, ‘the Dudayev

Notes 193

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87 88 89 90

91 92 93 94 95

regime was seen as an instrument in the battle with the Supreme Soviet and its chairman’. Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chechnya – mne ne dali ostanovit’ voiny (Moscow: Paleya, 1995), p. 24. During his report to the fifteenth session of the Federation Council in January 1995, Ramazan Abdulatipov, a Dagestani deputy who had participated in negotiations with the Chechens, expressed his opinion that the internal political struggles of both sides had a very negative impact on the negotiation process. Abdulatipov maintains that he asked the leaders of the Russian executive on several occasions to appoint someone to take sole responsibility for the negotiations with Groznyy, requests that were disregarded. In his opinion the ‘inconsistent actions of federal power structures hampered the normalisation process … Parliamentary responses were exhausted; a political resolution by the President was necessary’. For details of his report see Soviet Federatsii, pp. 54–57. The parliamentary commission that investigated the causes of the Chechen conflict concluded that, following Yeltsin’s dismissal of the Russian Constitutional Court on September 21st 1993, there was a lack of any higher organ of judicial power for the defence of the constitutional system across the Federation, a deficiency that hindered the resolution of the Chechen crisis. Anishchenko et al., p. 26. Author’s interview with Professor Dzhabrail Gakaev, Moscow, 18th February 1999. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23.9.93, p. 3. Pavel Baev, ‘Russia’s Policies in the Caucasus’, Former Soviet South Project Briefing Paper (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p. 6. According to the Russian political analysts Emil Pain and Arkadiy Popov, this section was inserted into the Presidential Address by Shakhrai, who went on to pursue a bitter anti-Dudayev policy that included consultations with all political groups in Chechnya, including the opposition. This policy was later incorporated into a special Duma resolution adopted in March 1994. Emil A. Pain & Arkadiy A. Popov, ‘Chechnya’, in Jeremy R. Azrael & Emil A. Pain (eds.), U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1996) p. 18. Nikolai Petrov, an analyst at the Moscow Carnegie Centre, considers Shakhrai to be a forceful advocate of a strong centralised state, who was not interested in reaching any real compromise. Author interview with Nikolai Petrov, Scholar-in-Residence, Moscow Carnegie Centre, Moscow, 9th February 1999. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12.1.94, p. 1. SWB SU/1934 B/10 [26] 1.3.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 22.2.94. For details and the texts of these treaties see M. N. Guboglo (ed.), Federalizm vlasti i vlast’ federalizma (Moscow: Inteltekh, 1997). Edward W. Walker, ‘The Crisis in Chechnya’, The Centre for Slavic and East European Studies Newsletter (Spring 1995), http://garnet.berkley.edu/~bsp/caucasus/crisisin.html. SWB SU/1978 B/2 [2] 22.4.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 20.4.94.

6 War by proxy? (February–September 1994) 1 The parliamentary elections held in December 1993 shifted the balance of power within the Duma away from radical liberal reformers such as Yegor Gaidar towards the Communist Party and nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, both of which were strongly opposed to the Yeltsin regime. Nevertheless, the new parliament took a far more moderate position than its predecessor and refrained from any direct confrontation with the president. For a detailed analysis of the 1993 parliamentary elections see Stephen White, Alex Pravda & Zvi

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3

4

5

6 7 8

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Gitelman, Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994); Lilia Shevtsova, Yeltsin’s Russia: Myths and Reality (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); Richard Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1996). At the beginning of 1994 the Chechen Prosecutor-General instituted criminal proceedings against 22 leading members of the anti-Dudayev opposition. A. Kol’yev, Chechenskaya kapkan (Moscow: Kongress russkikh obshchin, 1997), p. 24. ‘Military force’ has been defined as a state’s ability to influence other states … directly or indirectly by the use of armed force and the … waging of armed conflict’. The term ‘military force’, as applied in the Russian military doctrine, is not limited to the armed forces of a state, but also encompasses its ‘militaryindustrial complex … and the moral strength of both the people and soldiers’. According to this interpretation, military force is a means of ‘providing a state’s political leadership with freedom of choice when making political decisions, as well as an extreme course of action when peaceful methods have failed to eliminate a military threat to that country’s vital interests’. Anatoliy Klimenko, ‘Metodologicheskiye osnovy formirovaniya voennoi doktriny Rossii’, Voennyy parad, No. 6/36 (November–December 1999), p. 89. Article 4 pronounced that ‘the sovereignty of the Russian Federation shall apply to its entire territory’ and that the Constitution and federal laws ‘shall have supremacy throughout the entire territory of the Russian Federation’. The most significant point was the statement that ‘the Russian Federation shall ensure the integrity and inviolability of its territory’, underlining Yeltsin’s determination to preclude the possible disintegration of the Federation. Konstitutsiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, www.cityline.ru/politika/doc/krf.html. Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict In and After the Soviet Union (London: Sage, 1997), p. 214. In February 1994 Shakhrai urged the Chechens to remain within the Federation on a treaty basis, saying that the federal administration would give top priority to the problem of normalising relations with the republic. He endorsed the Tatarstan treaty as the ‘locomotive’ of federal relations and suggested that similar treaties could be concluded with each individual subject of the Russian Federation, becoming the building blocks of a new federation, with the division of power between the centre and republics defined by a voluntary delegation of power by Moscow. He expressed his conviction that ‘the Tatarstan example demonstrates that, in terms of the centre’s relations with the Federal subjects, neither one-sided declarations and pressure nor decisions taken by the Constitutional Court are effective’. Segodnya, 25.2.94, p. 9. However, Shakhrai later maintained that the treaties had been conceived as a temporary measure merely intended to placate the most troublesome of the republics to prevent them emulating the example of Chechnya. Fiona Hill, ‘Russia’s Tinderbox’: Conflict in the North Caucasus and its Implications for the Future of the Russian Federation, September 1995 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1995), p. 34. In an address to the Chechen people at the end of May 1993, Khasbulatov had emphasised that, in his opinion, agreement between Russia and Chechnya represented the only solution to the republic’s protracted crisis: ‘New people must come to power … and they must raise the country. This will be impossible without close relations with Russia … The new leadership must sign a federal treaty’. Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 28.5.93, p. 1. SWB SU/1958 B/4 [9] – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 24.3.94. Yu. V. Nikolaev (ed.), Chechenskaya tragediya. Kto vinovat (Moscow: RIA ‘Novosti’, 1995), p. 67. SWB SU/1937 B/9 [25] 4.3.94 – Radio Moscow, Moscow, 1.3.94.

Notes 195 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23

24

25 26

Izvestiya, 9.2.95, p. 4. Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 29.3.94, p. 1. Nikolaev, p. 68. SWB SU/1968 B/5 [10] 11.4.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 8.4.94. SWB SU/1958 B/4 [8] 29.3.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 25.3.94. Izvestiya, 9.2.95, p. 4. SWB SU/1961 B/9 [21] 1.4.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 30.3.94. Author interview with Nikolai Petrov, Scholar-in-Residence, Moscow Carnegie Centre, Moscow, 9th February 1999. SWB SU/1992 B/6 [11] 9.5.94 – Russia’s Radio, Moscow, 6.5.94. Stepashin also reasoned that the Ossetian–Ingush conflict suited Dudayev since it allowed the latter to perform the role of potential peacemaker or participant in events. The Russian minister was highly critical of reconnaissance activity by foreign operatives in the North Caucasus, which various states, ‘including Turkey and the United States’, considered ‘vital to their immediate interests’. Izvestiya, 17.5.94, p. 4. However, it should be noted that Moscow’s concern regarding Dudayev’s relations with other republics within Russia apparently contradicted the assertion that Chechnya was an integral part of the Federation. The insinuation that Dudayev was ‘interfering’ in the internal matters of other regions and republics implies that the Russian leadership was paradoxically treating the Chechen president as an outside power that was attempting to ‘project its sovereignty’ onto a foreign state rather than as a regional leader interacting with other leaders. SWB SU/2002 B/2 [10] 20.5.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 18.5.94. Yeltsin made this address during a visit to the town of Nalchik, capital of the North Caucasian republic of Kabardino-Balkaria. SWB SU/2002 B/2 [10] 20.5.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 18.5.94. A Cossack and former collective farm boss from the southern region of Krasnodar, Yegorov was a staunch nationalist and authoritarian who strongly advocated the use of force to resolve the Chechen crisis. SWB SU/2005 B/2 [2] 24.5.94 – Russia TV, Moscow, 22.5.94. SWB SU/2008 B/3 [7] 28.5.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 26.5.94. On May 30th Yeltsin signed a decree that officially extended the state of emergency in parts of North Ossetia and Ingushetia disputed as Chechen territory, eliciting a sharp response from Groznyy. A high-ranking official from the Chechen state security department accused the Russian MVD of deploying troops on the border, whilst the head of the Chechen ‘Foreign Ministry’ warned that Groznyy would be ‘ready to take adequate measures to repel the aggression’. SWB SU/2012 B/3 [9] 2.6.94 – Editorial report. Speaking on Ekho Moskvy radio, Udugov alleged that part of the explosive device found at the scene was of the type used by Russian secret services ‘for sabotage and terrorist goals’, adding that there were no such devices in Chechnya. SWB SU/2009 B/7 [5] 30.5.94 – Ekho Moskvy, Moscow, 29.5.94. Nevertheless, four Chechen citizens were arrested several weeks later and charged with the assassination attempt. Whilst it is conceivable that these actions were the result of the widespread hostility towards Dudayev’s regime within the republic itself, the possibility of Russian involvement in the form of covert support for internal opposition groups should not be disregarded. SWB SU/2009 B/7 [6] 30.5.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 28.5.94. The first hijacking had taken place in December 1993 when four masked men had raided a secondary school in Rostov-on-Don, commandeered a bus, then a helicopter and flew around southern Russia for four days, claiming that the helicopter was loaded with explosives. The hijackers’ demands included medical treatment for AIDS in Iran and $10 million. They were finally arrested when the

196

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28 29 30

31 32

33

34

Notes

Russian pilots redirected the helicopter to Makhachkala in Dagestan, instead of Khasavyurt where the gang had wanted to be taken. There were no further incidents until May 26th 1994, when four armed men seized about 30 hostages on a schoolbus travelling from Mineralnyye Vody to Vladikavkaz. According to the Russian authorities the hijackers demanded drugs, a helicopter without a crew, $10 million, four sub-machine guns, four flak jackets, a grenade launcher and a night sight. The hijackers were quoted as saying that if their demands were not met, they would ‘throw a child’s head out of the bus window every hour’. Hostages were gradually released in return for morphine and negotiations throughout the night resulted in at least four million dollars being handed over to the hijackers. On May 27th the hijackers were provided with a helicopter and apparently flew to Bachi-Yurt in eastern Chechnya, where an operation by Chechen special forces resulted in the capture of three hijackers and disappearance of the fourth. SWB SU/2008 B/5 [11] 28.5.94 – Editorial report. A second similar incident took place at the end of June and once again Dudayev ordered his forces to co-operate, resulting in the arrest of the hijackers. However, there was one positive outcome from the hijackings: Russian and Chechen officials agreed to pool their efforts to fight terrorism, culminating in the signing of an agreement between the Chechen interior minister and the deputy chairman of the Russian Regional Interior Department. Testimony to the First Session of the International Tribunal on Crimes Against Humanity and Military Crimes in the Chechen Republic held in Moscow, 21st25th February 1996. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal III: Eyewitness testimony. First Session, Moscow, 21st–25th February 1996 (Moscow: Glasnost, 1996), p. 214. Emil A Pain & Arkadiy A Popov, ‘Chechnya’, in Jeremy R Azrael & Emil A Pain (eds.), U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1996), p. 19. Komsomol’skaya Pravda, 4.5.94, p. 3. According to a newspaper report Khasbulatov received an enthusiastic reception on his return to the republic ostensibly to visit his elderly mother. Dudayev also gave the ex-speaker of the Russian parliament a relatively warm welcome, returning to Khasbulatov the Chechen citizenship of which he had been stripped in June 1993. Izvestiya, 5.3.94, p. 2. The other principal opposition leaders were Umar Avurkhanov and his Interim Council, Bislan Gantemirov, Groznyy’s former mayor, and Ruslan Labazanov. A detailed examination of these groups can be found in section 7.6. This petition was signed by Mamodayev and the chairman of the Constitutional Court, Ikhvan Gerikhanov. SWB SU/1973 B/3 [12] 16.4.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 12.4.94. For further details of this Congress see Nikolaev, pp. 26–27; Gakaev, p. 425; G. Anishchenko, A. Vasilevskaya, O. Kugusheva & O. Mramornov, Kommissiya Govorukhina (Moscow: Laventa, 1995), p.57; Timur Muzaev, Chechenskaya Respublika: organy vlasti i politicheskiye sily (Moscow: Panorama, 1995), pp. 44–45. This body was established in December 1993 at a meeting of opposition leaders in Nadterechniy District. Umar Avturkhanov was elected chairman, whilst the Council’s armed forces were placed under the command of Bislan Gantemirov, former mayor of Groznyy and erstwhile supporter of Dudayev. There were four main centres of opposition to the Dudayev regime, with divergent ambitions and intentions. The first was the Interim Council led by Avturkhanov and based in the Nadterechniy district in the northern plains; the second group was headed by Gantemirov, the former mayor of Groznyy, and was located in Urus-Martan; the third had its headquarters in Argun, to the east of

Notes 197

35 36 37

38 39 40

41

42 43 44

the capital, and was led by Labazanov; the final group was established by Khasbulatov on his return to his native republic in the summer of 1994. For a more detailed description and analysis of these groups see section 6.6, later in this chapter. SWB SU/2017 B/1 [1] 8.6.94 – Ostankino Mayak Radio, Moscow, 6.6.94. The list included Doku Zavgayev and Yaragai Mamodayev. SWB SU/2021 B/3 [7] 14.6.94 – Ekho Moskvy Radio, Moscow. 11.6.94. According to a documentary film produced by the ‘Information Centre of the Chechen Republic’, Labazanov represented a serious threat to the Dudayev regime because, during his time in office as head of the presidential bodyguard, he had had access to documents pertaining to the republic’s oil industry. Once he started to openly oppose the president at the beginning of 1994 there were allegedly several attempts to ‘eliminate’ him by forces loyal to Dudayev. Voina v Chechne: dokumentalnyy film [videorecording]. Directed by Aleksandr Arsnovskii (Groznyy: Informatsionnyy tsentr Chechenskoi Respubliki, 1997) Voina v Chechne: dokumentalnyy film [videorecording]. See also Gakaev, pp. 424–425; Muzaev, pp. 75–76; Carlotta Gall & Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War (London: Pan Books, 1997), pp. 140–42. Gakaev, p. 424. Labazanov’s political opposition group ‘Niyso’ (‘Justice’) was established in May 1994, calling for Dudayev’s resignation along with the dismissal of the entire Chechen government. The group’s headquarters were destroyed by a bomb blast later that month, an attack blamed on Dudayev. For further details see Timur Muzaev, Chechenskaya Respublika: organy vlasti i politicheskiye sily (Moscow: Panorama, 1995). In an interview with Segodnya, Labazanov claimed that ‘at least half of the Chechen people with the exception of those whom Dudayev has managed to intimidate’ were supporting him. Labazanov explained that the objective of his ‘Niyso’ movement was ‘to return to the people the billions robbed by Dudayev, to restore justice in Chechnya’. In Labazanov’s opinion, there was no longer the chance of Dudayev being removed from power peacefully. ‘We proposed to the president the holding of a ‘round table’, in reply to which troops, tanks and artillery were thrown at us’. Segodnya, 4.8.94, p. 2. SWB SU/2024 B/8 [20] 17.6.94 – Ostankino Mayak Radio, Moscow, 15.6.94. In the wake of the violent clash between government and opposition forces, Dudayev conducted a purge of the republic’s security forces on the basis of their ‘paralysis’ when confronted with ‘criminal groups’. Many heads of the power structures were dismissed, including the Prosecutor-General, several ministers and the commanders of local militia units. Dudayev then issued an order, stating that ‘[t]he heads of all power structures are to carry out a thorough investigation into officials in the bodies of law, order and security who are responsible for ensuring the safety of top officials, law and order, and for the observance of legislative discipline. The toughest measures are to be taken against them, … including the bringing of criminal charges’. SWB SU/2033 B/4 [16] 28.6.94 – NTV, Moscow, 25.6.94. SWB SU/2044 B/3 [10] 11.7.94 – Editorial report. SWB SU/2040 S1/1 [1] 6.7.94 – Russia TV, Moscow, 1.7.94. Pavel Baev believes that the ‘solution’ to the Chechen problem was drafted by a ‘narrow circle of close Yeltsin aides and ‘power ministers’ some time during spring 1994’, and that this solution included an extension of support for the antiDudayev opposition, together with a gradual intensification of the existing economic blockade and an increase in military pressure. Pavel Baev, ‘Russia’s Policies in the Caucasus’, Former Soviet South Project Briefing Paper (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), p. 52. John Colarusso asserts that the decision to invade Chechnya had been taken by this point and that

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47

48 49

50 51

Notes

moves were already been made to limit potential criticism from the international community. According to him, on August 3rd 1994 representatives from the Russian embassy in Washington met with American officials to discuss the need to invade Chechnya, together with the possibility of linking this action with America’s projected invasion of Haiti by means of reciprocal endorsements at the United Nations. John Colarusso, ‘Chechnya – The War without Winners’, Current History, Vol. 94, No. 594 (October 1995), p. 333. However, Tishkov considers that there is ‘insufficient evidence as to whether the federal authorities had developed a plan for a forceful resolution to the conflict’. In his opinion ‘no such plan existed until early autumn’. Tishkov considers the federal government’s decision in September 1994 to construct the Kizlyar–Karlan–Yurt railway, which stretched 78 kilometres into Chechen territory, would not have been taken if a plan to forcefully resolve the conflict had existed at that point. Tishkov, p. 216. However, it should be noted that the term ‘forceful’ could be used to describe active Russian measures to resolve the crisis through any form of ‘non-political’ action – either full-scale military invasion or covert military support for the antiDudayev opposition. The actual deployment of federal troops could be regarded as a logical extension of the on-going policy of clandestine involvement. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal II: Working Meeting, Stockholm, 15th–16th December 1995 (Moscow: Glasnost, 1996), p. 116. In a statement to an international tribunal, Shabad claims that during a meeting with the Chechen justice minister, Usman Imaev, he was advised of an alleged statement by an FSK lieutenant, who was in Dudayev’s custody. According to the Chechen officials, the Russian maintained that Savostyanov was in Znamenskoye, a town in Nadterechniy district, discussing plans to seize Groznyy with troops led by Avturkhanov and Labazanov. Shabad later visited Avturkhanov’s headquarters in Znamenskoye and discovered that the building also contained an office assigned to ‘the representative of the Russian FSK in the Chechen Republic’. In a subsequent conversation with Shabad, Savostyanov openly acknowledged the presence of this representative. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal III, pp. 99–100. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal IV: Eyewitness testimony. Second Session, Moscow, 20th-24th April 1996. Third Session, Prague, 24th-26th May 1996 (Moscow: Glasnost, 1997), p. 65. Immediately prior to the Russian military invasion of December 1994 many of the federal troops were assembled in Mozdok. For further details of Savostyanov’s alleged involvement in the Chechen crisis see chapter four. Aleksandr Korzhakov,Boris Yeltsin: ot rassveta do zakata (Moscow: Izdatelstvo ‘Interbuk’,1997), pp. 371–72. Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chechnya – mne ne dali ostanovit’ voiny (Moscow: Paleya, 1995), p. 25. In a television interview on July 20th Khasbulatov called for Dudayev’s resignation, accusing the Chechen president and his entourage of causing an ‘utterly abnormal relationship’ between Moscow and Groznyy, and that people expected ‘concrete actions’ from him [Khasbulatov] in order ‘to put a stop to this evil’. SWB SU/2054 B/5 [24] 22.7.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 21.7.94. It was reported on July 26th that Dudayev had lost the support of the Shalinskiy tank regiment, the main strike unit of the Chechen armed forces, which had declared that it would not hinder the opposition and the Interim Council from coming to power in the republic and would support them if necessary. SWB SU/2058 B/1 [2] 27.7.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 26.7.94. SWB SU/2057 B/1 26.7.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 24.7.94. Vanora Bennett, Crying Wolf. The Return of War to Chechnya (London: Picador, 1998), p. 315.

Notes 199 52 Viktor Kurochkin, Missiya v Chechne (Moscow, 1997), p. 16. This position was also prevalent amongst the Chechen diaspora. A statement by the diaspora in Moscow expressed support for the opposition IC, as well as approval of the ‘material, moral and legal assistance that Russia is giving the … Council’. However, it called upon the federal authorities to prevent any military intervention and to use only political means in order to normalise relations with Chechnya. SWB SU/2069 B/5 [8] 9.8.94 – ‘Russia’ TV, Moscow, 7.8.94. 53 In a statement on Russian TV in October 1991 Khasbulatov claimed that ‘literally thousands’ of telegrams were being received in Moscow beseeching the government to restore order in the republic, with the use of force if necessary. Vera Tolz & Melanie Newton (eds.), The USSR in 1991: a record of events (Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), p. 711. 54 SWB SU/2058 B/1 [3] 27.7.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 25.7.94. 55 Four armed Chechens seized a bus with forty passengers in Mineralnyye Vody and drove to the airport, demanding $15 million and two helicopters. There were reports of a quarrel between the FSK chief Stepashin and his counterpart in the Russian Interior Ministry, Viktor Yerin, over command of the release operation, a conflict that led to confusion and probably contributed to the deaths. For further details see Bennett, pp. 316–17; Kurginyan et al., p. 17; Elshan Alekberov, ‘The Hidden Meaning behind the Chechen War’, SAIS Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1995), p. 158. 56 Officials from Chechnya’s justice ministry later denied obstruction during the hostage operation. In a statement issued by the Chechenpress agency on August 3rd 1994, it was claimed that the Chechen authorities who received information about the seizure of hostages offered practical help to the Russian secret services. Furthermore, the Chechen communication asserted that a headquarters to assist the Russian authorities was set up in the republic, four helicopters with special groups on board were prepared and when it was confirmed that the terrorists were Chechens, a group of elders was prepared to mediate with them. The ministry accused the Russians of refusing ‘our services and suggestions and as a result innocent people died’. SWB SU/2066 B/4 [10] 5.8.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 3.8.94. 57 SWB SU/2062 B/3 [9] 1.8.99 – NTV, Moscow, 29.7.94. The FSK firmly denied any involvement in the hijackings and rejected the Chechen accusation as ‘absolutely groundless’. The deputy head of the FSK press service Vladimir Tomarovskiy said: ‘Unfortunately, we are forced to note another incorrect … statement made by Chechen officials. We would not like to make any political insinuations, but all this does not facilitate the normalisation of relations between the republic and Russia’. SWB SU/2062 B/3 [9] 1.8.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 29.7.94. The opposition IC issued a statement in which it blamed Dudayev for the hijack, saying that during the years of his rule the Chechen Republic had been turned into a ‘criminal region, which has a negative effect on the whole North Caucasus’. SWB SU/2062 B/4 [10] 1.8.94 – Ostankino Channel I TV, Moscow, 29.7.94. 58 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 2.8.94, p. 1. 59 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 2.8.94, p. 1. 60 Kurginyan et al., p. 17. 61 SWB SU/2062 B/2 [5] 1.8.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 30.7.94. 62 Clashes between government and opposition forces took place across the republic, notably in Nadterechniy district during the night of August 5th/6th when at least three members of the Chechen state security department were killed. There was a further clash in Nadterechniy district between Dudayev’s forces and the opposition on August 16th. The Chechen authorities alleged that the opposition armed group was accompanied by a convoy of lorries carrying

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66 67

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weapons, which was heading or Nadterechniy district from the direction of Mozdok in neighbouring North Ossetia. SWB SU/2077 B/1 [3] 18.8.94 – Radio Russia, Moscow, 16.8.94. Over the weekend of August 13th–15th there was a series of explosions in Groznyy, outside several government offices, as well as near the airport. As fighting intensified, the Chechen government called on all ‘illegal armed groups’ to surrender their weapons, threatening harsh reprisals for non-compliance. The government also introduced a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment for the dissemination of anti-government material. SWB SU/2069 B/3 [5] 9.8.94 – ‘Russia’ TV, Moscow, 7.8.94. Dudayev decreed a general mobilisation of the male population aged between 16 and 65 years old, which, the president hoped, would boost his armed forces by 600,000. I. N. Yeremenko & Yu. D. Novikov, Rossiya i Chechnya (1990–1997) (Moscow: RAU-Universitet, 1997), p. 69. The Russian government responded to the mobilisation with concern, releasing a statement in which it expressed alarm at recent developments in the republic, but confirmed it was not planning to use force to resolve the crisis. However, the government also reserved the right to use ‘necessary adequate measures to prevent the threat to life and security of Russian citizens, ensure public order, measures against crime and the disarmament of illegal armed units’. Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 16.8.94, p. 1. According to the IC, Dudayev’s rule had led to ‘a de facto ban on the activity of parliament, all independent parties and sociopolitical organisations; the introduction of total ideological control over the republic mass media; the armed suppression of the opposition, the persecution of its leaders and activists; an orgy of embezzlement of public funds and street gangsterism; the impoverishment of the Chechen people and the destruction of age-old Chechen traditions, the launch of genocide against our own people and the spilling of fraternal blood’. Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 3.8.94, p. 1. SWB SU/2065 B/ [3] 4.8.94 – Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, 2.8.94. This congress was convened in Groznyy on August 10th and was attended by about 1,500 delegates from all of Chechnya’s 17 districts. It expressed total support for Dudayev’s government and granted the president the right to declare an attack, ‘a holy war against the infidel’. The final resolution adopted by the congress criticised Russia for ‘mass-scale media diversion in the Russian Federation’ and condemned the Russian leadership for ‘an open intervention of Russia’s special services in the internal affairs of the Chechen Republic’. SWB SU/2072 B/2 [4] 12.8.94 – Editorial report. Christopher Panico, ‘Conflicts in the Caucasus: Russia’s War in Chechnya’, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism (July 1995), p. 13. Khasbulatov’s testimony to the international tribunal investigating the conflict. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal IV, p. 51. In an interview with Izvestiya Khasbulatov stated his intention of promoting a peaceful settlement between the Chechen government and the opposition. He suggested that ‘the opposition and the president, firstly, should not use arms, secondly, sit at the negotiating table. Thirdly it is necessary to secure Dudayev’s voluntary resignation, guaranteeing him security in the future.’ Dudayev claimed that Khasbulatov’s return to Groznyy was connected to a desire to regain power in Moscow, asserting that ‘Khasbulatov is getting ready to open his administration in Russia and create an alternative government’. In his opinion, Khasbulatov was going to unite with ex-vice-president Aleksandr Rutskoi and ex-Chechen communist leader Doku Zavgayev to achieve this goal. SWB SU/2071 B/3 [8] 11.8.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 9.8.94. For a full list of the group’s founding members and comprehensive details of its programme see Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chechnya – mne ne dali ostanovit’ voiny (Moscow: Paleya, 1995), pp. 32–33.

Notes 201 69 These rallies were held in conjunction with other opposition groups led by Gantemirov and Labazanov. Labazanov had declared his firm support for Khasbulatov’s ‘mission’, which, in his opinion, did not ‘call for bloodshed in Chechnya or for a certain regime’. SWB SU/2078 B/2 [4] 19.8.94 – NTV, Moscow, 17.8.94. However, Gantemirov doubted the sincerity of Khasbulatov’s statements. 70 Khasbulatov, p. 33. Avturkhanov himself had rejected the possibility of any future alliance with Labazanov, whom he labelled a ‘criminal’. Izvestiya, 6.8.94, p. 2. 71 Filatov had voiced his concern at the absence of solidarity amongst the various opposition groups, despite their common objective. In his opinion this weakened the anti-Dudayev movement as a whole and warned that it may lead to a ‘fierce struggle for power after Dudayev’s resignation’. SWB SU/2088 B/2 [7] 31.8.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 29.8.94. Gakaev believes that the various opposition forces were vulnerable as they were so fragmented and lacked a unified command, arguing that by acting autonomously the groups risked being defeated ‘one by one’. Gakaev, p. 427. Gantemirov had rejected Khasbulatov’s proposal for his ‘peacemaking’ group to establish control over all opposition forces: ‘I personally will not go for any such agreement with anybody since I have created this detachment at the cost of enormous hardship and I could not hand over the fate of the detachment into anybody’s hands’. SWB SU/2087 B/2 [7] 30.8.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 27.8.94. Furthermore, the former Chechen prime minister, Mamodayev, expressed his fear that Chechnya would experience an ‘internal Afghanistan’, as a result of splits in the opposition that might be reflected in the country as a whole. SWB SU/2063 B/2 [5] 2.8.94 – Editorial report 72 Anishchenko et al., pp. 59–60. 73 Several commentators have alluded to the influence of the so-called ‘Khasbulatov’ factor on the decision to take military action. Eismont alleges that Khasbulatov’s presence as a powerful political figure in the republic meant that the Kremlin was not prepared to recognise the Chechen opposition as ‘the only legitimate power in the republic’. Eismont, p. 2. The Govorukhin-led parliamentary commission supports the contention that the possibility of Yeltsin’s former adversary assuming the mantle of power in Chechnya was anathema to the Russian leadership. Anishchenko et al., pp. 60–61. Tishkov provides an in-depth analysis of Khasbulatov’s indirect influence on the Russian resolution to use force, claiming that the former parliamentary speaker played a significant role in Yeltsin’s decision. See Tishkov, pp. 216–19. 74 Vladimir Lysenko, Ot Tatarstana do Chechni (Moscow: Izdaniye instituta sovremennoi politiki, 1995), p. 186. 75 SWB SU/2080 B/2 [5] 22.8.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 19.8.94. 76 SWB SU/2090 B/3 [10] 2.9.94 – Radio Russia, Moscow, 1.9.94. 77 Jolanda Hogenkamp, Report of the UNPO Mission to the Republic of Ingushetia and the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, December 5–12 1994 (The Hague: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation, 1995), p. 25. 78 SWB SU/2054 B/5 [23] 22.7.94 – Editorial report. See also Segodnya, 21.7.94, p. 2. 79 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 12.8.94, p. 1. At the beginning of August Filatov had also denied the existence of any plans for Russian military intervention in Chechnya, whilst a government statement had rejected the use of force to resolve the crisis, but reserved the right to use ‘necessary measures’ to prevent any threat to the lives and security of Russian citizens. Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 16.8.94, p. 1. During a visit by a delegation of Chechen elders to Moscow, the Russian Nationalities Minister, Nikolai Yegorov, assured them that Russia would not deploy troops in the republic, stating his conviction that the Chechen people were capable of

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87 88

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90 91 92 93

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coping with their problems without outside interference. He also affirmed that Russia was ready to co-operate with Chechnya in order to resolve the crisis by peaceful means. SWB SU/2088 B/2 [5] 31.8.94 – Radio Russia, Moscow, 29.8.94. Quoted in Edward W. Walker, ‘The Crisis in Chechnya’, The Centre for Slavic and East European Studies Newsletter (Spring 1995), http://garnet.berkley.edu/ ~bsp/caucasus/crisisin.html, p. 2. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal IV, p. 146. Anishchenko et al., p. 57. Anishchenko et al., pp. 90–91. SWB SU/2072 B/4 [5] 12.8.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 11.8.94. Quoted in Eismont, p. 2. Filatov apparently proposed that Avturkhanov should receive money, which he would distribute as pensions and wages to all residents of Chechnya with the aim of generating increased public support for the anti-Dudayev opposition. The details of Filatov’s speech are included in testimony given by Sergei Kovalev, the former human rights plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation, to an international tribunal investigating the conflict. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal III, pp. 243–244. SWB SU/2085 B/3 [11] 27.8.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 26.8.94. Argumenty i Fakty, No. 9 (March 1995), p. 3 quoted in Tishkov, p. 215. According to Viktor Kurochkin, a Duma deputy, Filatov never attempted to conceal his links with Avturkhanov and there were numerous rumours that a trio of Shakhrai, Filatov and Zavgayev provoked the war. Kurochkin, p. 14. In a speech on the Chechen crisis at the end of the summer, Filatov advocated support for opposition groups, particularly Avturkhanov’s IC. His address echoed previous government proclamations, depicting a republic in which crime was rampant and Dudayev as a leader who had ‘catastrophically’ lost both control of the situation and popular support. The FSK continued to categorically deny any involvement in the Chechen crisis, reaffirming that Moscow did not intend to interfere in the internal conflict. However, according to Eismont, Moscow supplied a substantial quantity of weaponry and ammunition to Avturkhanov, including heavy armoured vehicles and artillery installations. In addition, aircraft belonging to the NCMD were put at the disposal of the IC. Eismont, p. 2. Avturkhanov himself announced in September 1994 that his forces had bought a large batch of Mi-24 and Mi-28 helicopters ‘from a CIS republic’. SWB SU/2116 B/4 [12] 3.10.94 – Ekho Moskvy Radio, Moscow, 29.9.94. Anishchenko et al., pp. 58–59. The commission considered Kotenkov’s evidence to be very significant, as he had been privy to a great deal of information whilst serving as the administrative head of the North Ossetian–Ingush conflict zone. SWB SU/2094 B/1 [2] 7.9.94 – Editorial report, 7.9.94. Kol’yev, p. 25. Yossef Bodansky, ‘Current Estimate: Russia’s Chechen Crisis still Escalating’, Strategic Policy, Vol. 24, No. 1 (31 January 1996), p. 20. Bodansky also maintains that Dudayev’s forces launched ‘daring attacks on Russian units in the rear, inflicting heavy casualties on training units and non-combatants. The sudden surge in losses compelled Yeltsin to rush the military into action in mid-Winter’. Nevertheless, Russian ministers continued to deny any plans for military action in the republic. At the beginning of September Pavel Grachev, the Defence Minister, stated that Russian troops had not influenced the situation in Chechnya in any way and would not do so. He officially declared that the troops under his command were carrying out tasks intended to protect the Russian state from foreign aggression. Viktor Yerin, the Russian Interior Minister, also denied charges by ‘official Groznyy’ that MVD troops were involved in events in

Notes 203 Chechnya. SWB SU/2092 B/10 [18] 5.9.49 – Ostankino Channel 1 TV, Moscow, 2.9.94. 94 SWB SU/2092 B/8 [15] 5.9.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 3.9.94. 95 SWB SU/2098 B/3 [8] 12.9.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 10.9.94. 96 Yeremenko & Novikov, pp. 71–72.

7 The decision to invade (October–December 1994) 1 SWB SU/2104 B/5 [16] 19.9.94 – ‘Russia’ TV, Moscow, 16.9.94. Shakhrai later expressed his confidence that the institution of the presidency in Chechnya would be abolished, enabling the republic to once again become a parliamentary constituent within Russia. His statement drew attention to the official animosity towards Dudayev, emphasising the crucial role of personalities in the evolution of the conflict. 2 SWB SU/2116 B/2 [5] 3.10.94 – Interfax, Moscow, 30.9.94. 3 E. V. Kritskiy, Chechenskiy krizis v massovom soznanii naseleniya severnogo kavkaza (Krasnodar: Rossiiskaya akademiya nauk, 1995), p. 7. 4 In November 1991 Ingushetia had voted overwhelmingly to remain within the Russian Federation and had proceeded to form a unique relationship with the centre that granted it genuine political and economic autonomy, along with generous financial aid. Dagestan, Chechnya’s eastern neighbour, had found itself increasingly destabilised by incursions by Chechen militants and constantly emphasised its desire to remain within the federation. 5 SWB SU/2165 B/6 [15] 29.11.94 – Interfax, Moscow, 26.11.94. However, the KNK adopted a resolution on December 4th, pledging assistance to the Chechens if Russia invaded. The resolution declared that if Russian troops invaded, the republics of the North Caucasus would begin to sever the Federal Treaty and other bilateral agreements with Russia. Ruslan Aushev, the president of Ingushetia, stated his opposition to the Russian use of force and assured Dudayev that the Ingush would make every effort to prevent Russian armoured equipment passing through the republic’s territory. SWB SU/2177 B/8 [17] 13.12.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 12.12.94. 6 Pavel Baev, ‘Russia’s Policies in the Caucasus’, Former Soviet South Project Briefing Paper (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997), pp. 19–20. 7 Baev, p. 20. 8 Elshan Alekberov, ‘The Hidden Meaning behind the Chechen War’, SAIS Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1995), p. 159. 9 SWB SU/2173 B/8 [23] 8.12.94 – RIA news agency, Moscow, 6.12.94. 10 Islam began to play a far more important role during the war itself when it was used to emphasise the radical difference between Russians and Chechens. Extreme forms of Islam allegedly accompanied money from the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia. For further information regarding the role of Islam see Paul B. Henze, ‘Islam in the North Caucasus: the example of Chechnya’, Rand Paper P-7935 (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1995); Reza ShahKazemi, Crisis in Chechnia: Russian imperialism, Chechen nationalism, militant Sufism (London: Islamic World Report, 1995) 11 Snyder views the Party of War to represent a form of ‘counterrevolutionary nationalism’. He argues that the ‘entrenched interests of these elites and their institutions were threatened by the chaotic conditions of Russia’s poorly institutionalised democracy, and thus they sought to reestablish their authority on the popular but nondemocratic basis of a neo-imperial Russian nationalism’. Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratisation and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2000), p. 240. For a detailed examination of

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15 16

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18 19 20 21 22

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the Party of War see John B. Dunlop, ‘The ‘Party of War’ and Russian Imperial Nationalism’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 43, No. 2 (March/April 1996), pp. 29–34; Aleksandr Tsipko, ‘Novyy god – novyy vybor?’, Rossiiskaya Federatsiya, No. 1 (1995); Michael McFaul, ‘Eurasia Letter: Russian Politics after Chechnya’, Foreign Policy, No. 99 (Summer 1995), pp. 149–65; Graeme Herd with Ene Rôngelep & Anton Surikov, ‘Crisis for Estonia? Russia, Estonia and a Post-Chechen Cold War’, London Defence Studies Paper 29 (London: Centre for Defence Studies, 1995). For an analysis of Yeltsin’s split from the democrats see Herd et al., p. 17. Herd et al., p. 15. Testimony to the Second Session of the International Tribunal on Crimes Against Humanity and Military Crimes in the Chechen Republic held in Moscow. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal IV, pp. 90–91. For further details of this central authority see Timur Muzaev, Chechenskaya Respublika: organy vlasti i politicheskiye sily (Moscow: Panorama, 1995), p. 34. The Ingush president , Ruslan Aushev, claims that Yeltsin wanted to ‘approach the elections without the ‘Chechen thorn in his side”. Izvestiya, 10.12.96, p. 2. This sense of dissatisfaction with the Russian leadership is reflected in an opinion poll of more than one thousand people conducted by Komsomol’skaya Pravda in Moscow in December 1994. In response to the question ‘How has the Chechen crisis influenced the ratings of politicians?’ a mere 8 per cent of those surveyed expressed their approval of Yeltsin, whilst 63 per cent condemned him. Pavel Grachev, the Minister of Defence widely perceived as responsible for the violent war, came off worst: only 3 per cent approved of his actions, whilst 70 per cent disapproved. The only politician to receive a positive result was the human rights campaigner Sergei Kovalyev who was dismissed as head of the Duma Commission on Human Rights as a result of his constant criticism of Yeltsin’s actions in connection with the situation in Chechnya: 28 per cent expressed their approval, whilst only 21 per cent disapproved. A basic analysis of this poll produces the impression of an electorate that has little confidence in the country’s leadership. Survey data published in Komsomol’skaya Pravda, 18.1.95, pp. 1–2. Testimony to the Second Session of the International Tribunal on Crimes Against Humanity and Military Crimes in the Chechen Republic held in Moscow. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal IV, p. 55. Korzhakov had established a shadowy ‘analytical centre’, which allegedly had a significant influence on presidential policy despite lacking any legitimate basis for existence. The centre was financed directly from Korzhakov’s presidential security service budget and prepared reports that were utilised by Yeltsin, as well as government ministries and the military. See Herd et al., pp. 20–23. Vladimir Lysenko, Ot Tatarstana do Chechni (Moscow: Izdaniye instituta sovremennoi politiki, 1995), p. 169. Izvestiya, 10.12.96, p. 2. On November 30th Yeltsin appointed Yegorov, the Russian Nationalities Minister, to the additional position of plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Federation President in the Chechen Republic. The Independent, 24.9.94. The Independent, 7.12.94. This renewed international aggressiveness was also evident at the beginning of December when Russia used its veto in the United Nations Security Council to block a resolution that would have halted Serbia’s supply of fuel to Serbs fighting in Bosnia and Croatia. Its delegation pressed for the lifting of sanctions and more concessions to the Serbian government, in direct opposition to accepted American policy. These episodes manifested the Russian leadership’s evolving strategy both domestically and within the global arena. The invasion of

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23

24

25 26

Chechnya can be seen as a symptom of this changing attitude, a sign of its growing intolerance and heightened sense of insecurity. According to an analysis of the decision-making process surrounding the invasion, the large-scale military operation against Chechnya was supported by Grachev, Stepashin, Yerin, Shakhrai, Sergei Shoigu, the Emergencies Minister, and various members of the presidential administration. Grachev was hoping to exploit a successful military outcome in order to improve his deteriorating public image and re-assert his dominance over a disunited General Staff. The Defence Minister was facing harsh public criticism over allegations of corruption within the Russian forces returning from Eastern Europe. The first deputy defence minister, General Matvei Burlakov, was being investigated for allegedly selling weapons and equipment while the Russian troops withdrew from Germany. Dmitriy Kholodov, an investigative journalist who had revealed these misdemeanours, was assassinated at the end of November and many suspected the military’s involvement in his death. General Aleksandr Lebed has stated his belief that the Chechen war was a direct result of Grachev’s involvement in illegal arms trading. For details of his allegations see Harold Elletson, The General Against the Kremlin (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1998), pp. 222–23. Yeltsin’s former bodyguard, Aleksandr Korzhakov, is highly critical of Grachev who allegedly ‘promised the president that the operation in Chechnya would be carried out with lightning speed’. Korzhakov, p. 147. Stepashin had been humiliated by the abortive semi-covert FSK operation to seize Groznyy at the end of November and a military operation presented him with an opportunity to redeem his department. His deputy, Savostyanov, who had organised the November operation, was dismissed by Yeltsin at the beginning of December, thereby partially protecting Stepashin. Yerin allegedly had doubts about a possible military operation in Chechnya, but he also needed to re-establish his waning authority, whilst Shakhrai had always endorsed military intervention. Russia Briefing, Vol. 2, No. 12 (22nd December 1994), p. 1. Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Crisis in Chechnya. Hearings before the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe. One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session. 19th and 27th January 1995, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 32. Pain & Popov, p. 18. It subsequently emerged that Avturkhanov was in Moscow at the same time as Khasbulatov, although the purpose of their visits was shrouded in secrecy. Khasbulatov arrived in Moscow on 20th September ‘in order to provide the leadership of Russia with correct information about the events in Chechnya’, stating his willingness to ‘accept any help if it is aimed at resolving the situation’. He urged the federal authorities to supply the Chechen Interim Council with ‘moral, financial and military assistance’, but stressed that the introduction of Russian troops into the republic was ‘out of the question’. A leaked intelligence report, dated September 29th, described Khasbulatov’s visit to the Turkish embassy in Moscow on the previous day. According to the report, Khasbulatov allegedly told the head of the diplomatic mission that he had been received by Filatov in the Kremlin, Shakhrai in the government and Oleg Lobov in the Russian Federation Security Council. These meetings ostensibly resulted in the Russian leadership granting Khasbulatov the necessary authority to carry out a special confidential mission in the countries of the Near and Middle East with the objective of convincing the governments of these states, as well as leaders of the local Chechen diaspora, that it was futile to support the Dudayev regime and that they should instead assist the armed opposition. Segodnya, 8.10.94, p. 2. It should be noted that the Russian authorities refuted these allegations.

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27 A statement by the Russian government accused the Dudayev regime of ‘hoping to provoke the Russian Federation into sending in regular army units in a last desperate attempt to unite the dwindling ranks of his supporters in the face of a mythical outside threat’. The federal government construed Dudayev’s military actions against ‘his own people’ as a rejection of any peaceful resolution to the crisis. SWB SU/2113 B/4 [11] 29.9.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 27.9.94. In response Dudayev denounced the Russian authorities for masterminding the destabilisation of Chechnya: ‘Everything that has been going on here for the past three years now is planned, fabricated and prepared in Kremlin and Moscow offices’. In Dudayev’s opinion, the aim of such operations was to provoke the Chechens into a civil war in order to formally justify Russian aggressions against the republic. SWB SU/2122 B/4 [12] 10.10.94 – Editorial report. 28 Avturkhanov claimed that during September alone the forces of the IC engaged in seven battles with Dudayev’s troops who were now ‘demoralised’, having been ‘driven back virtually inside the centre of Groznyy where our commandos are successfully conducting subversive operations in broad daylight’. Izvestiya, 15.10.94, p. 4. 29 Jolanda Hogenkamp, Report of the UNPO Mission to the Republic of Ingushetia and the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, December 5–12 1994 (The Hague: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation, 1995), p. 26. 30 Letter quoted in Viktor Kurochkin, Missiya v Chechne (Moscow, 1997), p. 13. 31 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1.10.94, p. 1. The covert involvement of Russian aviation was substantiated by information from a delegation of Duma deputies who visited the North Caucasus at the beginning of December. One of the deputies, Vladimir Lysenko, said that on the flight between Nazran and Mozdok they had travelled on two Russian helicopters without identification marks. ‘And when we landed at Mozdok airport, a lot of helicopters were standing there with their numbers and Russian flags painted over.’ SWB SU/2170 B/3 [11] 5.12.94 – Ostankino Radio Mayak, Moscow, 3.12.94. 32 SWB SU/2168 B/6 [14] 2.12.94 – Interfax, Moscow, 30.11.94. This statement also highlights the ineffectiveness of the Russian economic blockade on the republic, which was supposedly imposed following Chechnya’s unilateral declaration of independence in 1991. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the borders were never sealed and the republic remained fully accessible. It has been suggested that too many Russian officials were profiting from the illegal trade taking place for a full embargo to be instituted. 33 SWB SU/2130 B/4 [12] 19.10.94 – Interfax, Moscow, 17.10.94. 34 Ruslan Khasbulatov, Chechnya – mne ne dali ostanovit’ voiny (Moscow: Paleya, 1995), p. 37. In a statement at the time of the offensive Khasbulatov said: ‘In all the days running up to this, we, together with Dudayev’s field commanders, were busy looking for a normal solution. There was a definite agreement that during those days they would pull out of the game, make clear their role in the distribution of forces and not offer any resistance … The talks were reasonably successful’. SWB SU/2129 B/7 [19] 18.10.94 – NTV, Moscow, 16.10.94. 35 Khasbulatov, p. 38. Khasbulatov states that he discovered this information on a visit to Mozdok in North Ossetia on October 16th to meet with FSK general Evgeniy Savostyanov, as well as Avturkhanov and Gantemirov. 36 G. Anishchenko, A. Vasilevskaya, O. Kugusheva & O. Mramornov, Kommissiya Govorukhina (Moscow: Laventa, 1995), p. 60. This antipathy towards Khasbulatov had been evident since his release from Lefortovo in February 1994. Concluding a televised discussion in May 1994 with Sergei Shakhrai, who had just resigned as deputy Prime Minister, the interviewer stated that ‘the interview shows quite clearly that on the Russian political Olympus there are figures who fear the prospect of Ruslan Khasbulatov’s return to politics more than they fear

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38 39

40 41

42

43 44

45 46

the prospect of endless crisis in Russo–Chechen relations’. Quoted in SWB SU/2005 B/1 [1] 24.5.94 – NTV, Moscow, 22.5.94. Several days after the abortive storming Khasbulatov spoke with a leader of the local FSK in Znamenskoye who informed him that ‘the order to leave the city on October 15th was not given by Savostyanov, he did not know about it’. Nevertheless, whilst the FSK may not have been commanding the operation, it was certainly in regular contact with the opposition leaders. On October 16th Khasbulatov flew to Mozdok to meet with Savostyanov who informed him that Avturkhanov and Gantemirov had requested the deployment of Russian troops and tanks into Groznyy. Khasbulatov, pp. 37–38. SWB SU/2136 B/5 [18] 26.10.94 – RIA news agency, Moscow, 24.10.94. The report advised the Russian leadership to take advantage of the fact that three years of Dudayev rule had devastated the public infrastructure and to begin immediate reconstruction in those regions of Chechnya whose authorities and populations openly declared themselves to be part of the Russian Federation. According to Pain and Popov, this strategy would have allowed the local population to make a rational choice as to which regime they preferred. Pain & Popov, p. 16. See also Izvestiya, 9.2.95, p. 4. However, as noted above, the work of this official centre was overshadowed by Korzhakov’s shadowy analytical centre, which was simultaneously providing Yeltsin with conflicting advice. Whilst Korzhakov had no formal policy-making role, his long friendship with the President allowed him ‘to play a leading role in the development of Russian policy’. See Herd et al., p. 25. Russia Briefing, Vol. 2, No. 12 (22nd December 1994), p. 1. In an interview with Itar-Tass on 24th October Khasbulatov said that ‘after the bloody clash between the opposition and official Groznyy in the Urus-Martan district on 19th October, practically the whole population has stood up against Dzhokhar Dudayev’s regime … Dudayev has lost nearly all of his supporters, while those 20 tanks he has can hardly resist the opposition troops’. At the same time he noted that if the IC had more ways and means ‘there would be more chances for toppling Dudayev’s regime’, emphasising that ‘in reality, people back the opposition’. SWB SU/2136 B/4 [14] 26.10.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 24.10.94. Several weeks later, on November 14th, Khasbulatov once again predicted the fall of the Dudayev regime ‘maybe within the next few days’. SWB SU/2153 B/1 [3] 15.11.94 – RIA news agency, Moscow, 14.11.94. In his testimony to the Russian parliamentary commission investigating the Chechen conflict Khasbulatov argued that ‘by mid-November 1994 Dudayev no longer enjoyed the support of most Chechens and we [his peacemaking group] were holding intensive negotiations with his commanders … Dudayev had lacked a unified state-administrative structure since August, with the sole exception of military units.’ Quoted in Anishchenko et al., p. 91. Testimony to the First Session of the International Tribunal on Crimes Against Humanity and Military Crimes in the Chechen Republic held in Moscow. The War in Chechnya, International Tribunal III: Eyewitness testimony. First Session, Moscow, 21st–25th February 1996, p. 114. SWB SU/2170 B/6 [14] 5.12.94 – Ostankino Radio Mayak, Moscow, 3.12.94. Quoted in Tsar Boris: The Court of Intrigue. BBC Television documentary shown 10th January 1998, 7p.m., BBC2. Filatov claimed that he had met with Avturkhanov to discuss their plans and subsequently advised Yeltsin on the feasibility of a covert military operation within the republic. SWB SU/2122 B/4 [13] 10.10.94 – ‘Russia’ TV, Moscow, 6.10.94. Pavel Baev, ‘Russia’s Policy in the North Caucasus and the War in Chechenia’, Former Soviet South Project Briefing Paper, No. 2 (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, March 1995), p. 6.

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47 Maria Eismont, ‘The Chechen War: How It All Began’, Prism (8th March 1996), www.chechnya.org/history/recent.html, p. 3. Recruitment of servicemen from the armed forces was supervised by the FSK, because it was the only organisation that could legally conduct a covert operation within the Russian Federation. 48 Statements given by Captain Andrei Rusakov, First Lieutenant Alexei Rastopka and Captain Aleksandr Shikhalev quoted in The War in Chechnya: Necessity of Holding an International Tribunal, VI Round Table, Moscow, 15th July 1995 (Moscow: Glasnost, 1995), p. 119. 49 Only one copy of the contract was signed and this was taken by the FSK officers ‘for reasons of confidentiality’, although it meant that the servicemen had no tangible evidence of their recruitment. Some left at home specially drafted appeals to the Prosecutor General with a request for the payment of 150 million roubles to their families in the event of their deaths. The War in Chechnya: Necessity of Holding an International Tribunal, pp. 119–20. 50 The War in Chechnya: Necessity of Holding an International Tribunal, p. 120. See footnote 6 for further eyewitness information regarding the use of ‘camouflaged’ Russian military equipment. 51 Testimony to the First Session of the International Tribunal on Crimes Against Humanity and Military Crimes in the Chechen Republic. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal III, p. 61. The lack of secrecy surrounding the opposition’s plans was also manifest by its threat of an imminent attack on Groznyy. On November 21st Ruslan Martagov, spokesman for the IC, warned that ‘by the end of November Groznyy will be seized and the Chechen leadership should have no illusions about that’. He went on to claim that the opposition was fully in control of the situation in the republic and any resistance by government troops was doomed. SWB SU/2160 B/4 [8] 23.11.94 – Editorial report. 52 On November 24th ten helicopters launched an air strike against the Shali tank regiment stationed 19 miles outside Groznyy. The General Staff of the Chechen armed forces promised rewards of $10,000 to anyone who reported the names of the pilots involved in the bombing raids, maintaining that ‘Russia’s military actions against Chechnya are becoming increasingly extensive’ and that Moscow was using ‘troops from the North Caucasus Military District (NCMD), Interior Ministry and Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) troops, military aircraft and helicopter gunships based in Mozdok, North Ossetia’. SWB SU/2162 B/5 [17] 25.11.94 – Editorial report. 53 SWB SU/2159 B/4 [10] 22.11.94 – 2x2 TV, Moscow, 19.10.94. Dudayev’s statement refers to the Caucasian War (1817–64), when imperial Russia engaged in a long struggle for dominance of the region. The war has come to symbolise the fierce resistance of the Chechen people to subjugation by an external authority. 54 Eismont, p. 3. See also Kurginyan et al., p. 20. 55 SWB SU/2168 B/4 [8] 2.12.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 1.12.94. 56 A statement from a Russian participant in the assault affirms that there were 78 Russian ‘volunteers’ and 26 tanks. According to Ruslan Soslambekov, a Chechen who witnessed the attack on Groznyy, Gantemirov’s troops moved into the city from the south, Labazanov from the east and Avturkhanov from the north. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal III, p. 7. Khasbulatov verifies this, stating that, according to his information from Khadzhiev, the battle plan envisaged the introduction of forces from Tolstoi-Yurt in the north and Urus-Martan in the south-west. Each column was to include 20 tanks. He also claims that he futilely attempted to dissuade Khadzhiev, Avturkhanov and Gantemirov from attacking the city. Khadzhiev apparently said that the decision had already been made in Mozdok and it was too late to do anything. Khasbulatov, pp. 41–43. 57 Ekaterina Yakimenko, who was in Groznyy at the time of the offensive, maintained that on November 25th the 9 o’clock Russian television news announced:

Notes 209

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61 62 63

64

65

66 67 68 69

‘It has just been reported that at 9 p.m. a storm of Groznyy began. The town will be taken in two hours.’ The attack began shortly afterwards. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal III, p. 86. During the attack Khasbulatov’s peacemaking group broadcast reports, claiming that ‘Groznyy will be captured during the next few days’. SWB SU/2164 B/2 [11] 28.11.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 25.11.94. SWB SU/2171 B/4 [10] 6.12.94 – Editorial report. Carlotta Gall & Thomas de Waal, Chechnya: A Small Victorious War (London: Pan Books, 1997), p. 156. Quoted in Gall & de Waal, p. 156. Khadzhiev had joined forces with Avturkhanov during November and was in Znamenskoye to assist with the organisation of the attack. On November 25th the IC appointed Khadzhiev to the post of prime minister and instructed him to form a new cabinet of ministers. SWB SU/2165 B/5 [13] 29.11.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 25.11.94. Gall & de Waal, p. 156. Khasbulatov, p. 43. A Russian serviceman who participated in the operation claimed that of the 78 ‘volunteers’ only 20 survived and were captured. The bodies of the dead servicemen were allegedly found by FSK officers who tried to secretly bury them in a mass grave in an attempt to conceal any evidence of Russian involvement. However, the military prosecutor, Igor Zubov, prevented this and instituted criminal proceedings against the FSK, but was soon removed from the investigation. The War in Chechnya: Necessity of Holding an International Tribunal, p. 121. Russian soldiers who took part later claimed that they had suspected that ‘our government was deliberately sending us to our deaths’. All identifying documents and personal effects were collected from them in Mozdok before the start of the operation. Secondly, after completing the attack on Groznyy, they were under orders to proceed to an assembly point at a nearby airport. However, they subsequently discovered that the airport was one of the most strongly defended positions of Chechen government forces. SWB SU/2171 B/4 [10] 6.12.94 – Editorial report. The Chechen authorities said that if Russia met this deadline it would negotiate the possibility of a handover of the prisoners. However, according to reports from Gantemirov’s group on November 27th, Dudayev’s supporters were ‘seizing young men of Russian nationality in Groznyy, forcibly putting them into military uniform and compelling them to confess they are Russian mercenaries’. SWB SU/2165 B/4 [10] 29.11.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 27.11.94. SWB SU/2165 B/5 [13] 29.11.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 28.11.94. LieutenantGeneral Vladimir Potapov, Chief of General Staff of the NCMD, declared that not a single soldier or officer on regular service in the Russian armed forces had participated in the action, stating ‘I responsibly declare that any information about Russian regular servicemen who allegedly have been taken prisoners of war in Groznyy is a malicious slander …’ SWB SU/2164 B/5 [18] 28.11.94 – Interfax, Moscow, 26.11.94. SWB SU/2169 B/5 [16] 3.12.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 2.12.94. Khasbulatov, p. 41. Dzhabrail Gakaev, Ocherki politicheskoi istorii Chechni (XX vek) (Moscow: Izdatelstvo ChKTs, 1997), p. 208. SWB SU/2166 B/3 [10] 30.11.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 29.11.94. Dudayev responded by stating that ‘The people regard the statement itself as yet another act of violence, intimidation and blackmail’. Furthermore, the Chechen ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ described Yeltsin’s appeal as a declaration of war, declaring that ‘the Russian leadership is continuing its policy of violence and the destruction of the Chechen people’. The Ministry appealed for support

210

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71 72 73 74 75 76 77

78 79 80 81 82 83 84

Notes

from Islamic states, a petition that was rejected by Muslim countries who considered the conflict to be Russia’s internal affair. The opposition Interim Council lent its full support to Yeltsin’s ultimatum and assured the federal authorities it was ready to lay down its arms. SWB SU/2167 B/5 [13] 1.12.94 – Ostankino Radio Mayak, Moscow, 29.11.94. The Security Council, which was established in 1992, makes decisions affecting Russian interests and national security. For an in-depth examination of the Security Council see Jan Adams, ‘The Russian National Security Council’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 43, No. 1 (January/February 1996), pp. 35–42; Ellen Jones & James H. Brusstar, ‘Moscow’s Emerging Security Decisionmaking System: The Role of the Security Council’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 345–74. The members of the Security Council at that time were: President Boris Yeltsin, chairman; Viktor Chernomyrdin, Prime Minister; Oleg Lobov, Security Council secretary; Vladimir Shumeiko, speaker of the Federation Council; Ivan Rybkin, speaker of the State Duma; Minister of Defence Pavel Grachev; Minister of the Interior Viktor Yerin; FSK Chairman Sergei Stepashin; Evgeniy Primakov, chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Service; Minister of Finance Vladimir Panskov; Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev; Chief of the Border Guards General Andrei Nikolaev; Minister for Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu; and, Sergei Shakhrai, deputy Prime Minister. Even the Russian parliamentary commission, which was charged with investigating the Chechen conflict, was unable to acquire access to the minutes of the November 29th meeting. Pain & Popov, p. 18. Quoted in Gall & de Waal, p. 159. Komsomol’skaya Pravda, 20.12.94, p. 3 quoted in John B. Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya. Roots of a Separatist Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 207. Tsar Boris: The Court of Intrigue. BBC Television documentary shown 10th January 1998, 7 p.m., BBC2. Tsar Boris: The Court of Intrigue. BBC Television documentary shown 10th January 1998, 7 p.m., BBC2. Aushev says he was shocked by the appeal and told Chernomyrdin that it amounted to a declaration of war. The Russian Prime Minister responded: ‘Not at all. They will just impose constitutional order’. The following day Aushev claims he rang Yeltsin’s office to warn him that he had been given ‘incorrect information. If this decision is taken it will be fraught with deaths and bloodshed.’ Yeltsin replied that his information was complete and the conversation was ended. Izvestiya, 10.12.96, pp. 1–2. Anishchenko et al., p. 62. SWB SU/2172 B/3 [8] 7.12.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 6.12.94. Apparently, several hours before the Chechen airfields were destroyed by Russian planes, two transport aircraft of ‘unidentified origin’ loaded with arms landed. Eismont, p. 4. Testimony to the Third Session of the International Tribunal on Crimes Against Humanity and Military Crimes in the Chechen Republic held in Prague. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal IV, p. 256. SWB SU/2172 B/1[1] 7.12.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 5.12.94. Testimony to the Second Session of the International Tribunal on Crimes Against Humanity and Military Crimes in the Chechen Republic held in Moscow. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal IV, pp. 90–91 This decree was not made public until four months after its implementation. It was published in April 1995 by the Russian journal Novoye Vremiya. Lema

Notes 211

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96

Usmanov, Nepokorennaya Chechnya (Moscow: Izdatelskii dom ‘Parus’, 1997), p. 224. Grachev was invested with ‘authority to co-ordinate the activities of federal bodies of the executive authorities and security forces in the implementation of the plan of measures for the restoration of constitutional legality and law and order in the Chechen Republic’ and all orders and instructions given by the Defence Minister were ‘binding to the bodies of executive authorities, bodies of internal affairs system, bodies of counterintelligence, units of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs … and the Border Guards … enterprises, organisations and institutions, as well as officials taking part in the implementation of the plan’. For the full text of this decree see Diane Curran, Fiona Hill & Elena Kostritsyna, The Search For Peace in Chechnya: A Sourcebook 1994–1996 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1997), pp. 148–149. Anishchenko et al., p. 63. Nikolaev, p. 70. Oleg P. Orlov & Aleksandr V. Cherkasov, Rossiya–Chechnya: tsel’ oshibok i prestuplenii (Moscow: Memorial, 1998), p. 34. Pavel Grachev, ‘Russia’s Integrity Protected’, Speech to leadership of Russian Armed Forces at Collegium of Defence Ministry, Moscow, 28th February 1995. Military News Bulletin, No. 3 (March 1995), p. 12. Taimaz Abubakarov, Rezhim Dzhokhara Dudayeva: pravda i vymysel (Moscow: Insan, 1998), p. 168. SWB SU/2171 B/3 [6] 6.12.94 – Editorial report. SWB SU/2173 B/5 [17] 8.12.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 7.12.94. SWB SU/2174 B/7 [26] 9.12.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 7.12.94. SWB SU/2176 B/1 [1] 12.12.94 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 9.12.94. SWB SU/2177 B/4 [9] 13.12.94 – Russia TV, Moscow, 11.12.94. SWB SU/2169 B/6 [20] 3.12.94 – RIA news agency, Moscow, 1.12.94. Anishchenko et al., p. 70.

8 Making peace or war? 1 SWB SU/2177 B/4 [9] 13.12.94 – Russia TV, Moscow, 11.12.94. 2 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 28.12.94, p. 1. Yeltsin’s address was televised on December 27th. 3 Estimates vary as to the size of the combined force. Grachev maintained that for the first stage of the operation ‘a group of forces with an overall strength of 23,8000 officers and men was created. The group included 19,000 troops of the Armed Forces, 4,700 interior [MVD] troops, 80 tanks, 208 ICVs and APCs [armoured troop carriers], and 182 artillery pieces and mortars. Later on, as the operation progressed, reserves were added to the groups of forces.’, Speech to the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces at the Collegium of the Defence Ministry, Moscow, 28.2.95, ‘Military News Bulletin’ No. 3 (March 1995), p. 11. For the Russian order of battle and details of the composition of each battle group see Charles Blandy, David Isby, David Markov and Steven J Zaloga, The Chechen Conflict: A microcosm of the Russian Army’s past, present and future, ‘Jane’s Intelligence Review Special Report No 11’, 1996, pp. 12–13. 4 Grachev outlined the four stages of the intended operation at a speech in March 1995. During the first stage of seven days (from November 29th to December 6th) the battle groups were to be formed and moved in from three directions. Frontline aviation and combat helicopters were to be moved to frontline airfields by December 1st. The air space over the republic was to be fully sealed off. In the second stage of two days (December 7th to 9th) troops were to advance towards Groznyy along five axes, circling the city with two rings – an outer ring around

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6 7

8 9

10 11

12

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the republic’s border and an inner ring enclosing Groznyy. Key buildings in the city, such as the Presidential Palace, government buildings, television and radio stations were to be secured in the third stage of three days (December 10th to 13th). During the final stage, the situation was to be stabilised over a 5–10 day period. Speech to the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces at the Collegium of the Defence Ministry, Moscow, 28.2.95, ‘Military News Bulletin’ No. 3 (March 1995), pp. 10–11. Edgar O’Ballance, Wars in the Caucasus, 1990–1995 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p. 181, Timothy L. Thomas, ‘The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya: II. Military Activies 11–31 December 1994’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 1995), p. 270. See Lieven, pp. 103–105, Gall & de Waal, pp. 174–76. Timothy Thomas believes the Chechen strategy was to offer varying degrees of resistance in a series of concentric rings that protected Groznyy: ‘The first ring consisted of civilian opposition to the advancing Russians and harassment by Chechen fighters … The second ring of the strategy focused on an area approximately 20–30 kilometres out from Groznyy. Here Chechen fighters offered real resistance, to include Grad rocket attacks and offensive assaults on Russian positions. This defensive belt slowed up the attack from the east and west, and hindered the attack from the north … The third ring, and its core, was the city of Groznyy.’ Thomas, p. 274. Quoted in Tsar Boris: Court of Intrigue. BBC television documentary shown on January 10th 1998, 7 p.m., BBC2. The Russian commission was initially intended to assume the role of mediator between the opposing Chechen factions, although the delegation from the Dudayev government, led by Abubakarov, claimed that it received no prior information that an IC delegation would also be present. The ‘official’ Chechen group would only agree to the presence of the IC if it was included within the Russian delegation, a condition that Mikhailov would not concede. The IC similarly attempted to impose certain conditions on the negotiations, including the dismissal of Dudayev, the immediate transfer of power to the IC and the holding of ‘free, democratic’ parliamentary and presidential elections. Mikhailov’s commission responded that the stipulations resembled an ultimatum and affirmed that the main task of the talks was to achieve a cease-fire and disarmament. For a detailed account of the Vladikavkaz talks from a Chechen perspective see Abubakarov, pp, 168–74, whilst the Russian point of view is presented in Soviet Federatsii, Chechnya: tragedia Rossii (Moscow: Soviet Federatsii, 1995), pp. 21–24. Abubakarov, p. 174. Abubakarov, p. 174. Dudayev described the talks as a ‘farce’ and said it was ‘impermissible to bomb communities’ while simultaneously holding talks. He urged the Chechen population to fight the Russians, proclaiming that ‘the land here must burn under their feet. It is a war for life, not for death. The present regime in Russia has not left the citizens of Chechnya any other alternative.’ SWB SU/2179 B/5 [5] 15.12.94 – Interfax, Moscow, 14.12.94. Grachev accused the Dudayev regime of ‘playing for time’ and doing everything possible ‘to sidetrack the negotiations’. Speech to the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces at the Collegium of the Defence Ministry, Moscow, 28.2.95, ‘Military News Bulletin’ No. 3 (March 1995), p. 12. Quoted in The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal III, p. 31. According to several sources, Dudayev persisted with his appeal for a peaceful settlement of the conflict even after Russian troops had crossed the border into the republic. Soslambekov insisted that ‘Dudayev, right up to the start of the war, was calling for negotiations with the [Russian] President and Prime Minister, via the media

Notes 213

13 14

15

16 17

18 19

20

21

and personal letters’. Yeltsin’s bodyguard, Korzhakov, verified Dudayev’s persistence, relating a telephone conversation he had at the beginning of December with Maskhadov, who at that time was one of Dudayev’s aides. Maskhadov apparently told Korzhakov that the Chechen leader had called the Presidential Administration in Moscow eight times during 1994, stating that he was ready for dialogue and requesting the dispatch of an official delegation to hold talks regarding a political resolution. When Korzhakov subsequently asked Yeltsin if he had been informed of these calls, the Russian President declared that he had no knowledge of them. Aleksandr Korzhakov, Boris Yeltsin: ot rassveta do zakata (Moscow: Izdatelstvo ‘Interbuk’,1997), p. 371. SWB SU/2185 B/6 [15] 22.12.94 – 2x2 TV, Moscow, 21.12.94. Stasys Knezys & Romanas Sedlickas, The War in Chechnya (College Station, Texas: Texas A & M University Press, 1999), p. 74. In March 1995 Grachev was highly critical of the military commanders during the first stage of the operation, which, according to him, ‘revealed a number of considerable defects in the command and control process … some officers lost their command skills in controlling their full strength units’. Speech to the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces at the Collegium of the Defence Ministry, Moscow, 28.2.95, ‘Military News Bulletin’ No. 3 (March 1995), pp. 10–11. According to Vorobyev, ‘we had two options. We could start a huge artillery barrage, which would have been difficult because of the weather – it was terribly foggy and visibility was zero. We would be shooting into the fog, essentially, destroying civilians … The second way was a rapid ground invasion. But the troops we had were just not prepared for this. They were badly trained, they barely knew one another. The truth is, they would have needed a month, even three months, to prepare. To throw them into battle … was a crime.’ Quoted in Remnick, p. 282. The senior commander also stated that following talks with intelligence groups, regional commanders and the opposition, he came to the conclusion that the army was not in a fit state for the operation. Novichkov et al., p. 178. SWB SU/2188 B/1 [1] 29.12.94 – Interfax, Moscow, 27.12.94. See Izvestiya, 10.12.94, p. 4. Other senior commanders resigned their government posts in protest at the invasion. Major-General Aleksandr Tsalko and Colonel Vladimir Smirnov left their posts at federal power bodies in mid-December. SWB SU/2188 B/2 [2] 29.12.94 – Kuranty, Moscow, 2.12.94. Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 28.12.94, p. 1. Yeltsin’s address was televised on December 27th. Izvestiya, 12.1.95, p.1. During a report to the Security Council on December 21st Grachev stated that an attack on Groznyy was being prepared, but that it would not be implemented until January 15th 1995. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 29.12.94, p. 1. Training in urban warfare was rare in the Russian armed forces. According to General Mikhail Surkov, deputy chairman of the Duma Defence Committee ‘street fighting tactics are absent from the manuals of the Russian armed forces. Exercises simulating urban warfare are rarely carried out and our army has no experience of the real thing.’, Kommersant, 16.8.96, p. 3. According to Felgenhauer, successful urban warfare requires ‘well-trained and heavily armed infantry led by professionally trained officers … The last thing needed are lightly armoured airborne tanks.’ Felgenhauer, p. 8. Andrei Raevsky, ‘Russian Military Performance in Chechnya: An Initial Evaluation’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December 1995), p. 682. Other reports cite a figure of 38,000 for total Russian forces assembled near Groznyy, with 230 tanks. Pavel Felgenhauer, ‘The Chechen Campaign’, www.amina.com/article/chapter3.html, p. 7.

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22 Lieutenant-Colonel A Frolov, who was based in the northern area of operations at the beginning of the conflict, recounts how commanders were only issued with maps on a scale of 1:100,000, rather than the 1:25,000 maps that are vital when attacking a city. Izvestiya, 11.1.95, p. 4. 23 For a detailed eye-witness account of the storming of Groznyy, see Izvestiya, 11.1.95, pp. 1–2. The rebel fighters would block the streets with burning cars in order to halt the advancing columns of Russian troops. Snipers then fired grenades from nearby houses, aware that the poorly armoured APCs had additional fuel tanks by the rear doors. The crew either abandoned the burning vehicle to be shot at by snipers or remained inside. 24 Izvestiya, 11.1.95, p. 4. For further details of the attack against the Maikop Brigade see Gall & de Waal, pp. 2–11, Knezys & Sedlickas, pp. 99–101. 25 Izvestiya, 11.1.95, p. 4. 26 Anishchenko et al., p. 98. 27 Izvestiya, 5.1.95, p. 1. In an interview at the beginning of 2002, a senior army officer claimed that the military had systematically downplayed its losses throughout the conflict: ‘We know the truth about these losses but we are forbidden to say what it is … Every day soldiers and officers are dying, but we have to deny it all.’, Izvestiya, 18.1.02, p. 2. It has been estimated that around 7,500 Russian soldiers died during the 1994–96 conflict, whilst Chechen combat fatalities are estimated at around 4,000. Civilian losses, both Chechen and Russian, are thought to exceed 35,000. John B. Dunlop, ‘How Many Soldiers and Civilians Died During the Russo–Chechen War of 1994–1996?’ presented at the Fifth Annual World Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, Columbia University, New York, 13th–15th April 2000. 28 Felgenhauer, pp. 7–8. 29 Richard Woff, ‘Who’s who in the Chechen Operation’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 7, No. 4 (April 1995), p. 159. 30 According to the Chief of Staff of the Joint Forces in Chechnya, ColonelGeneral Leonty Shevtsov, ‘such a decision was dictated by motives of humaneness because it allowed the peaceful population of Groznyy to escape to the mountains’. Quoted in Gregory J. Celestan, ‘Wounded Bear: The Ongoing Russian Military Operation in Chechnya’ August 1996, http://leavwww.army.mil/fmso/geo/pubs/chech.htm. 31 A Chechen volunteer in the town of Alkhan-Yurt quoted in Lieven, p. 18. In an interview in January 1995, Magomet, a Chechen fighter, said that he was not interested in politics – he had voted for Yeltsin and never supported Dudayev – but that he had been compelled to take up arms in order to protect his home and family. Izvestiya, 11.1.95, p. 1. Earlier in the month, Izvestiya had described a typical Chechen fighter as being ‘25 years old, wearing jeans and carrying a Kalashnikov’, although the remainder were a mixture of ‘15 year olds … with grenade launchers’ and ‘old men in fur hats with pistols’. See Izvestiya, 6.1.95, p. 2. Gakaev believes that ‘many Chechen volunteers who took up arms did not support the Dudayev regime, but the actions of the federal troops left them with no other choice’. Gakaev, p. 437. 32 Russian military intelligence estimated that by mid-February 1995 Chechen fighters numbered over 5,000. Nikolaev claims there were 20,000–30,000 Chechen fighters, including over 6,000 mercenaries from the Baltics, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Turkey and other countries. Nikolaev, p. 80. The Govorukhin Commission estimated that at the beginning of the military operation, Chechen forces in Groznyy numbered around 15,000 with around 60 guns and mortars, 30 ‘Grad’ grenade launchers. Govorukhin, p. 71. For details of the structure of the Chechen militia see Moskovskiye Novosti, 18–25.8.96, p. 6.

Notes 215 33 Charles Blandy, ‘Chechnya After Dudayev’, Conflict Studies Research Centre Occasional Paper (Camberley, May 1996) p. 3. For further details of the funding of the separatists and the supply of arms from abroad see Charles Blandy, ‘Chechen Caravan Trails’, Conflict Studies Research Centre Occasional Paper April 1996 (Camberley, 1996). 34 I. N. Yeremenko & Yu. D. Novikov, Rossiya i Chechnya (1990–1997) (Moscow: RAU-Universitet, 1997), p. 69. According to some reports, the Chechens had commenced war preparations as early as summer 1993. Three lines of defence had been formed around Groznyy and several regions had their defences strengthened on the basis of the direction of possible offensives by federal troops. Novichkov et al., pp. 22–23. 35 Novichkov et al., pp. 26–27. 36 For an in-depth analysis of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan see Olivier Roy, ‘The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War’, Adelphi Papers No 259, Summer 1991 (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), Aleksandr Liakhovskii, Tragedia i Doblest Afghana (Moscow, 1995), Carl van Dyke, ‘Kabul To Grozny: A Critique of Soviet (Russian) Counter-Insurgency Doctrine’, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 1996), pp. 689–705. 37 Novichkov et al., p. 18. See also Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 27.1.95, p. 1. 38 Novichkov et al., p. 19. 39 Viktor Suvorov states that ‘the night after the new intake has arrived is a terrible one in every barracks …’ He claims that new recruits are flogged with belts, made to sleep in the toilet blocks and that ‘any … useable article will immediately be seized’. Viktor Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army (London, 1982), p. 223. One former sergeant described how, on his arrival at his permanent unit in Afghanistan, everything from cigarettes to clothing was seized from the new recruits by longer-serving soldiers: ‘The very first day they took our new overcoats away from us and also our gloves and our new pants that had been issued to us.’ Andrei Alexiev, Inside the Soviet Army in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1988), p. 36. 40 Viktor Baranets, Poteryannaya armiya (Moscow, 1998), p. 233. 41 Krasnaya Zvezda, 6.5.95, p. 2. 42 The Sunday Times, 9.12.96. 43 Moskovskiye Novosti, 28.7–4.8.96, p. 4. 44 SWB SU/2559 B/8 [26], 13.3.96 – Itar-Tass, Moscow, 11.3.96. 45 For a detailed description of the battle for these towns see Gall & de Waal, pp. 247–55, Lieven, pp. 121–23, Smith, pp. 175–77, Knezys & Sedlickas, pp. 127–47. 46 Lieven expresses astonishment when ‘on visiting Shali again in May 1995, after its “fall”, I found not merely that the town was not much damaged, but that the Russians had not garrisoned it and did not control it. Instead they had stationed themselves on the outskirts, and limited themselves to the occasional armoured patrol.’ A local rebel commander told Lieven that the Russians ‘didn’t conquer Shali in any real sense and they don’t rule it. What they did was to use their armour to conquer the land around Shali and force us to withdraw, but they didn’t conquer the people.’ Lieven, pp. 127–28. 47 Seely, p. 270. 48 For further details of the events at Samashki see Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, ‘Partisan War in Chechnya on the Eve of the WWII Commemoration’, Russia, Vol. 7, No. 8 (May 1995). 49 Anton Surikov maintains that by mid-1995 Dudayev’s forces were almost ‘completely defeated’, and several groups had fled to the mountains where they were hiding without weapons, ammunition or any means of communication. Author interview with Dr Anton Surikov, State Duma of the Russian Federation, Moscow, June 23rd 1998.

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50 Their exact demands were that the federal authorities allow them to conduct a press conference; an amnesty for all illegal armed groups in Chechnya; free elections in the republic and the withdrawal of all federal troops. M. A. Smith, ‘A Chronology of the Chechen Conflict – Part 2’, Conflict Studies Research Centre, January 1996 (Camberley, 1996), pp. 3–4. 51 Testimony to the international tribunal investigating the Chechen conflict. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal II: Working Meeting, Stockholm, 15th–16th December 1995 (Moscow: Glasnost, 1996), pp. 192–193. 52 Quoted in Smith, p. 5. For a copy of the government decree on the seizure of the hostages see Diane Curran, Fiona Hill & Elena Kostritsyna, The Search For Peace in Chechnya: A Sourcebook 1994–1996 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1997), pp. 152–54. 53 Yuriy Baturin, the Russian Presidential Assistant For National Security, admitted that on the eve of the attack the intelligence service (FSB) had warned about the threat of possible terrorist acts on Russian territory. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26.12.96, p. 2. Furthermore, according to eye-witnesses, the separatists appeared to be well acquainted with the town. Anishchenko et al., p. 73. 54 Basayev has said that his original destination was Moscow, although there are also claims he was heading for Abkhazia. According to Anton Surikov, Basayev said his armed group were on their way to the separatist region in order to regroup and rearm as ‘it was impossible for them to be in Chechnya at that time’. However, ‘because of corrupt traffic police they had to stop in Budennovsk’. Basayev led the so-called Chechen Battalion in Abkhazia from 1992 to 1993, supporting local separatists in their battle for independence from Georgia. Author interview with Dr Anton Surikov, State Duma of the Russian Federation, Moscow, June 23rd 1998. 55 For a copy of the peace accord see Curran et al., pp. 174–75. The Chechens were permitted to form self-defence detachments of between 15 and 25 men, until law enforcement agencies were established in the republic. Russia would keep two brigades of troops in Chechnya, one from the MVD and one from the army. 56 This was created in March 1995 as a temporary government. Led by Avturkhanov, the Committee had 45 members, comprising representatives from the IC and deputies from the former Supreme Soviet of Checheno-Ingushetia, including former chairman Doku Zavgayev. However, it failed to garner widespread support amongst the Chechen people, as it was considered to be an instrument of Moscow’s creation. For further details, see Nikolaev, p. 109. 57 Nikolaev, p. 110. 58 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 14.12.95, p. 4. 59 Ruslan Akhtakhanov, an economic advisor to Dudayev, claims that certain areas of the republic were not even aware that elections had taken place. He cites the example of Samashki, whose residents only discovered that there had been elections one week after the event, when Zavgayev made a televised address to the nation, thanking the Chechen people for their support. According to Akhtakhanov, no voting took place in Samashki, but the residents were made to give their details to unknown officials who promised that they would receive 100,000 roubles as part of the federal government’s assistance to rebuild the republic. The money never appeared and Akhtakhanov asserts that ‘the population of the republic did not vote’. Testimony to the international tribunal investigating the Chechen conflict. The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal II: Working Meeting, Stockholm, 15th–16th December 1995 (Moscow: Glasnost, 1996), pp. 67–68. 60 In an appeal for the Caucasian republics to unite against Russia, Dudayev warned that ‘[i]n the event of Russian aggression against the Chechen people, the whole Caucasus will resist. And for a long time Russia will not have peace … The

Notes 217

61 62

63 64

65 66 67

68 69

70 71

72

whole Muslim world will rise up. Chechnya is the centre of the 300-year old confrontation between the Caucasus and Russia.’ Gorlov, p. 50. Izvestiya, 13.1.96, p. 1. For a detailed account of events see Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11.1.96, p. 1. On January 16th masked gunmen seized a Turkish ferry with 180, predominantly Russian, passengers as it was about to leave the Black Sea port of Trabzon and forced it to sail towards the Bosphorus. The hijackers threatened to blow up the ship if Raduyev and his fighters in Pervomayskoye were not allowed to go free. The hijackers and their leader, Mohammed Tokçan, were Turkish nationals of Chechen and Abkhaz origin, and they had all fought alongside the Chechens in Abkhazia. As mentioned above, Turkey has a large Chechen diaspora: around five million Turks can trace their roots back to the North Caucasus region. In December 2001 the Russian authorities jailed Raduyev for life for the raid, although there were claims that he was not given a fair trail. He was arrested in March 2000, the most senior Chechen commander to have been captured to date. For an in-depth analysis of the Kizlyar-Pervomayskoye raid see Blandy Charles, ‘The Significance of Pervomayskoye’, Conflict Studies Research Centre Occasional Paper (Camberley, April 1996). Boris Belenkin and Aleksandr Cherkasov chronicle events at Kizlyar and Pervomayskoye, accusing both the Russian and Chechen leaderships of deliberately waging a campaign of disinformation. Boris Belenkin & Aleksandr Cherkasov, U nas tam nye okazalos’ podvodnoi lodki (Moscow: Memorial, 1996). See also Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (a supplement of Nezavisimaya Gazeta), 11.18–1.97, p. 2. See Komsomolskaya Pravda, 9–16.2.96, p. 1. Popular support for the invasion had always been weak, as it was witnessed for the first time without the intervention of a heavy-handed Soviet censor by an increasingly critical public. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7.2.96, p. 1. Once the demonstrators had left, the Russian military destroyed the remains of the Presidential Palace, which was a powerful symbol of Chechen resistance. In a television interview, Grachev expressed his willingness to meet with Dudayev if it would help end fighting. However, the Defence Minister apparently changed his mind after meeting with Zavgayev. SWB SU/2551 B/9 [27] 4.3.96 – NTV, Moscow, 2.3.96. Curran et al., p. 20. For a copy of the decree see Yeremenko et al., pp. 141–42. The Russian military largely ignored the cease-fire order and on April 16th the Chechen fighters launched a lethal ambush against the 245th Motor-Rifle Regiment in the Shatoi district. 73 Russian soldiers were killed and 52 wounded in the attack led by the field commander Ruslan Gelaev. ‘Okhota na volkov’, Ogonek, No. 19, May 1996, p. 42. For a detailed analysis of how the Chechen leader was assassinated see ‘Okhota na volkov’, Ogonek, No. 19 (May 1996), pp. 40–45. There are numerous conspiracy theories about who was responsible for his death and the timing of it. Colonel-General Pavel Deneikin, head of the air force, and General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, commander of the Russian military operations in Chechnya, both denied that federal forces had anything to do with his death. Furthermore, rumours abound that he is still alive in hiding. These rumours are supported by the fact that he was buried in a secret location and no journalists were permitted to attend his funeral. At the beginning of March 2002 Russian public television RTR aired images of what it claimed was the corpse of Dudayev. Agence France Press, 3.3.02, Moscow. For a collection of his nationalistic writings and poetry about Chechnya see Yandarbiyev Zelimkhan, Chechnya – bitva za svobodu (Lvov: Svoboda narodiv [sic], 1996).

218

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73 Yeremenko et al., p. 151. Gakaev claims that there was contact between Russian military intelligence and Chechen field commanders. Thus the ceasefire agreement was signed not just with Yandarbiyev, but also with the field commanders. Gakaev, p. 194. 74 Gakaev, p. 212. For a detailed description of Lebed’s role in the peace process see Elletson, pp. 260–279. 75 Quoted in The Times, 8.8.96, p. 1. For details of the separatist assault and their successful tactics see Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye (supplement to Nezavisimaya Gazeta), 25–31.1.97, p. 2. 76 There was renewed criticism of the state of the Russian armed forces in the wake of the August attack on Groznyy. Pavel Felgenhauer, a defence analyst, spoke of how MVD troops ‘passively defended checkpoints … all they did was demand immediate help without even trying to conduct active combat or intelligence operations.’ Felgenhauer claims that columns of armoured vehicles were sent into the city without any knowledge of the enemy’s location because of a lack of intelligence reports. In addition, the artillery and air force had no clear idea of the location of their own troops and the enemy. He criticised the lack of specific training for reinforcements sent to Chechnya, stating that most of the federal forces had virtually no combat training. This meant that the combat readiness of the Russian troops was steadily declining, in contrast to the Chechen fighters whose combat readiness was continually growing. Segodnya, 25.12.96, p. 2. 77 SWB SU/2692 B/5 [15] 1.8.96 – Interfax, Moscow, 14.8.96. 78 For the full text of the Khasavyurt Accords see Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 3.9.94, p. 3. For an analysis of the Russian reaction to the Khasavyurt Accords see Charles Blandy, ‘Chechen Connections: From Khasavyurt to Moscow’, Conflict Studies Research Centre Occasional Paper (Camberley: September 1997). 79 One of the principal reasons for this success was the mutual respect between Lebed and Maskhadov, both of whom had made a career in the Soviet Armed Forces. In an interview conducted in January 1997, Lebed praised the Chechen commander as a ‘model officer. He commanded the best artillery regiment in the Soviet army … I can understand him. He is a very calm person who knows how to make decisions and take responsibility for them. He is not afraid of taking risks.’ Lebed was speaking on the Ekho Moskvy radio station, 1508 GMT, 28.1.97, FBIS-SOV-97–019, Daily Report, 28.1.97. Having successfully negotiated a peace deal with the separatist leaders, Lebed, whose unpopularity within political circles is well documented, fell victim to the power struggles within the Kremlin and was dismissed on October 17th amid increasing political opposition to his peace plan. 80 Other presidential candidates included former parliamentary chairman Yusup Soslambekov, commander of the northwestern front, Vakha Arsanov, who represented the National Independence Party of Chechnya, and first deputy prime minister Movladi Udugov. Curran et al., p. 59. 81 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 13.2.97, p. 2. Gennadiy Seleznev, chairman of the State Duma, also stated his conviction that the Chechen leader should participate in the Federation Council and expressed his relief at the election of Maskhadov who was ‘more convenient’ because he is ‘well-known in Russia. Maskhadov took part in all the talks, both with the Security Council and the prime minister.’ Interview on Ekho Moskvy radio station, , 1722 GMT, 28.1.97, FBIS-SOV97–020, Daily Report, 28.2.97. 82 Rossiiskiye Vesti, 30.1.97, p. 1. 83 Rossiiskiye Vesti, 30.1.97, p. 1. 84 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9.1.97, p. 3. The 205th Brigade was the last to leave the republic, with over 4,500 troops and around 400 armoured vehicles. 85 Segodnya, 1.1.97, p. 2.

Notes 219 86 Trud, 12.3.97, p. 1. Kulikov went on to claim that the sale of petroleum products refined illicitly in the republic was a widespread problem. He also asserted that ‘approximately 40,000 Russian and 10,000 international passports have been stolen in the region. A considerable number of the cars stolen in the country are to be found in Chechnya … That is why we are compelled to prevent crime from spreading beyond Chechen territory.’ 87 Quoted in Charles Blandy, ‘Chechen Connections: An End to Conflict in Chechnya?’, p. 1. 88 SWB SU/2843 B/10 (25), 14.2.97 – NTV, Moscow, 12.2.97. 89 Raduyev was speaking on the ‘Sovershennaya Sekretno’ (Top Secret) programme shown on the Russian Television Network, 2005 GMT, 8.2.97, FBIS-SOV97–027, Daily Report, 8.2.97. 90 Curran et al., p. 63. 91 Gakaev, p. 212. 92 For the full text of the agreement see Izvestiya, 14.5.97, p. 1. 93 Between the beginning of 1998 and August 1999 Russia had six different prime ministers. 94 Gakaev, p. 218. There were four principal groupings of power, centred around Maskhadov, Basayev, Ududgov and Raduyev. For details of the different armed factions see Gakaev, pp. 219–220. 95 At the end of 1996 Movladi Udugov, the Chechen Minister of Information, had spoken of the possibility of adopting Sharia law in Chechnya: ‘The fact that Islam has been declared our state religion should not frighten or confuse anyone. Which model will be adopted here is as yet hard to say. It is necessary to thoroughly study the experience of other countries … We would like to take all that is best from other countries, taking the principles of Islam as the basis … Socalled Roman Law, which is practised extensively throughout the world, is unnatural to the Chechen nature.’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30.11.96, p. 2. 96 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10.2.9, p. 5. 97 Blandy believes that ‘Wahhabism in the North Caucasus is a divisive, powerseeking mechanism with a tendency to interfere with and polarise the attitudes of the Muslim peoples of the [region] … The funding by Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states of the Wahhabi presence in the North Caucasus only serves to exacerbate the apprehensions of the Kremlin, furthering the development of a fortress mentality and increasing the Russian reluctance to loosen constitutional ties.’ Charles Blandy ‘A Beleaguered President’, Conflict Studies Research Centre Occasional Brief 61 (July 1998), p. 17. For further information regarding the role of Islam see Professor Konstantin Matveev, History of Islam in the North Caucasus (London: Book Extra, 2001); Paul B. Henze, ‘Islam in the North Caucasus: the example of Chechnya’, Rand Paper P-7935 (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1995); Reza Shah-Kazemi, Crisis in Chechnia: Russian imperialism, Chechen nationalism, militant Sufism (London: Islamic World Report, 1995). Claims that the Chechen separatists received arms and training in Afghanistan and Pakistan were apparently corroborated when many Chechens were found to be amongst the Taliban fighters during the US military operation in 2001. 98 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14.1.99, p. 1. 99 Despite repeated assertions by the military leadership that the rebels would be defeated quickly, there was evidence that it was fighting a difficult battle. It was reported on August 19th that the military had used up all the reservists from the NCMD and was calling on elite paratroopers from Ulyanovsk and Pskov to use against the mountain stronghold of Tando, which implied that the aerial bombardment had not achieved its objectives. The Defence Minister, Igor

220

100 101 102

103

Notes Sergeyev, flew to Dagestan on August 18th, indicating that the operation was in need of command from the very top. The profile of the new Prime Minister was given a considerable boost by his role in the conflict and his popularity rating soared. The Botlikh and Tsumada regions, where the clashes took place, were only a few valleys away from Gimry and Akhulgo, where Shamil fought two of his most famous battles in the 1830s. In March 2002 the controversial media tycoon Boris Berezovsky released evidence apparently linking the Russian security services (FSB) to the fatal bombings. At a press conference in London he showed part of a French documentary entitled ‘Assassination of Russia’, which claimed that the FSB deliberately blew up the buildings to create a pretext for renewed military action against Chechnya. Furthermore, Berezovsky alleged that Putin was fully aware of the FSB’s involvement. At the time the businessman, who lives in selfimposed exile in Western Europe, was being investigated by the Russian authorities for providing funds to Chechen separatists, an allegation he acknowledged to be true. According to Berezovsky, he gave US$2m to Basayev. However, he said that they were both in government at the time and the money was to finance reconstruction. This argument has become particularly pertinent in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the US of September 11th 2001. The possibility of Islamic terrorists being behind attacks on New York and Washington D.C. bolstered Russia’s defence of its brutal military operation.

Conclusions: one step forward, two steps back 1 Although life in the refugee camps is little better than within Chechnya. In March 2002 Ingushetia suspended food deliveries to the refugees, stating that it was owed US$17m by Russia for supplies. Agence France Presse, 1.3.02, Moscow. 2 Mufti Kadyrov, Chechnya’s senior religious leader, is the republic’s Kremlinappointed leader. His pro-Moscow administration is distrusted by most of the Chechen population and lacks widespread legitimacy. Kadyrov himself has been the victim of several assassination attempts and has been condemned to death by Maskhadov’s regime as a traitor. 3 Quoted in The Moscow Times, 7.6.2001, p. 3. Furthermore, 41 pro-Russian Chechens were murdered during the first three months of 2002. 4 SWB SU/3758 B/4 [12] 8.2.00 – Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Moscow, 3.2.00. 5 From the outset of the operation in 1999, the Russian leadership has accused Georgia of harbouring Chechen fighters. In November 2001 Putin said that its southern neighbour was home to ‘international terrorist camps’. Agence France Presse, 30.11.01, Moscow. His allegations were apparently corroborated at the beginning of 2002, when several mercenaries from Saudi Arabia and Jordan were arrested in Georgia and accused of trying to establish ‘an illegal guerrilla group in the Pankiski Gorge’. The arrested men allegedly had links with Khattab. Agence France Presse, 9.2.02, Tbilisi. On 30th January 2002 the Russian and Georgian secret services signed a co-operation agreement that envisaged the two sides conducting joint operations in the volatile Gorge region. Agence France Presse, 31.1.02, Tbilisi. 6 At the end of February 2002 it was announced that the US was sending hundreds of elite troops to the Caucasian state to assist the Georgian military bring the Pankisi Gorge region under control. The move was seen as a new front in the global war on terrorism and appeared to bolster Russia’s defence of its brutal military operation. Georgia is the only foreign country bordering Chechnya and the renewed conflict has heightened concerns over the trans-

Notes 221

7

8 9 10 11

12 13

parency of the Chechen sector of its frontier with Russia. Since the outbreak of hostilities in 1999, over 7,000 Chechens have crossed the border and are concentrated in the Akhmeta district, which was already home to a substantial number of Vainakh people, particularly in the Pankisi Gorge adjacent to Russia. The 40mile long Gorge quickly became a notorious centre of crime that was no longer under the control of the Georgian authorities. In January 2002 a Kremlin spokesman rejected US charges that Russia was using excessive force against civilians in Chechnya, stating ‘[o]ur experience in Chechnya and the US experience in Afghanistan shows that it is very difficult to reach terrorists without making civilians suffer, but both Russia and the US strive for it’. Agence France Presse, 11.1.02, Moscow. Agence France Presse, 30.1.02, Moscow. Agence France Presse, Sleptsovsk, Russia, 9.12.01. The Chechen Armed Forces Commanders Council comprises seven top commanders and Chechen vice-president Vakha Arsanov. Agence France Presse, 26.1.02, Moscow. This view was shared by the head of a Council of Europe delegation on Chechnya, who stated that Maskhadov was essential for peace. Speaking at an International Tribunal on the conflict, Sergei Grigoriants stated: ‘The war in Chechnya has become an insurmountable obstacle to the co-operation of democratic forces in Russia and the present Russian leadership … The authoritarian regime currently in Russia is in effect a natural stage in [the country’s] historical development. We could not expect anything else after the centuries-long monarchy and horrendous communist totalitarian regime … Russia is progressing along another road, not an idyllic road of development from authoritarianism to democracy.’ Sergei Grigoriants, ‘Word of Introduction’, The War in Chechnya: International Tribunal II: Working Meeting, Stockholm, 15th–16th December 1995 (Moscow: Glasnost, 1996), p. 108. SWB SU/2179 B/5 [8] 15.12.94 – Russia TV, Moscow, 13.12.94. SWB SU/2179 B/9 [10] 15.12.94 – Ostankino Channel 1 TV, Moscow, 13.12.94.

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Primary source material Interviews Batyuk, Vladimir, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of USA and Canada Studies (ISKRAN), Moscow, June 25th 1998. Blandy, Colonel Charles, Conflict Studies Research Centre, RMA Sandhurst, Camberley, Surrey, January 19th 1999. Gakaev, Professor Dzhabrail, Leninskii Prospekt, Moscow, February 18th 1999. Goussev, Leonid, Research Fellow, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) & unpaid adviser to Agrarian Party Duma deputy, Aberdeen, June 7th 1999. Grigorieva, Dr Julia, Research Fellow, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Moscow, February 24th 1999. Petrov, Nikolai, Scholar-in-Residence, Carnegie Centre, Moscow, July 1st 1998 and February 9th 1999. Surikov, Dr Anton, advisor to the Russian State Duma & military analyst for Pravda, Russian State Duma, Moscow, June 23rd 1998. Tishkov, Professor Valery, Director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, June 30th 1998 and February 8th 1999.

Official reports/documents Amnesty International, Brief Summary of Concerns about Human Rights Violations in the Chechen Republic 1996. Belaya Kniga. Chechnya, 1991–1995: fakty, dokumenty, svidetelstva (Moscow: Tsentr obshchestvennikh svyazei FSK Rossii, 1995) Belaya Kniga – chast’ 2. Chechnya, 1991–1995: fakty, dokumenty, svidetelstva (Moscow: Tsentr obshchestvennikh svizei FSK Rossii, 1995) Central & Eastern Eurobarometer No 6. Public Opinion and the European Union (19 Countries’ Survey). March 1996 (Luxembourg: European Commission, 1996) Central & Eastern Eurobarometer No 5. Public Opinion and the European Union (18 Countries’ Survey). March 1995 (Luxembourg: European Commission, 1995) Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Hearing on Chechnya before the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe. One Hundred Fourth

Bibliography 223 Congress, First Session. 1st May 1995 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995) Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Crisis in Chechnya. Hearings before the Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe. One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session. 19th & 27th January 1995 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995) The Council of Europe [Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights], Report on the Human Rights Situation in Chechnya 1995 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1995) Hogenkamp, Jolanda, Report of the UNPO Mission to the Republic of Ingushetia and the Chechen Republic-Ichkeria, December 5–12 1994 (The Hague: Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation, 1995) Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, ‘Partisan War in Chechnya on the Eve of the WWII Commemoration’, Russia, Vol. 7, No. 8 (May 1995). Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, ‘Russia’s War in Chechnya: Victims Speak Out’, Russia, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January 1995). ICRC activities in the Russian Federation/northern Caucasus, Fact Sheet, 16 December 1996 (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1996) ICRC activities in the Russian Federation/northern Caucasus, Fact Sheet, 6 September 1996 (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1996) ICRC activities in the Russian Federation/northern Caucasus, Update, 10 January 1996 (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1996) International Alert, Chechnia: Report of an International Alert fact-finding mission, September 24th–October 3rd 1992 (London: International Alert, 1992) Konstitutsiya Chechenskoi Respubliki.(Grozny: [b.i.], 1992) Konstitutsii (osnovyye zakony) soyuznikh sovietskikh sotsialisticheskikh respublik (Moscow: Iuridicheskaya literatura, 1978) Muehlemann, Ernst, ‘Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe – information report on the situation in Chechnya’, Human Rights Law Journal, Vol. 17, No. 3–6 (15 October 1996), pp. 229–33. Narodnoye khozyaistvo SSSR 1922–1982 (Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1982) O sobludenii prav cheloveka i grazhdanina v Rossiiskoi Federatsii v 1994–1995 godakh – Doklad kommissii po pravam cheloveka pri prezidente Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Prinyat na zasedanii kommissii 5 fevralya 1996 g (Moscow: [s.n.], 1996) Postanovleniye sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovietskogo Soyuza ‘O postanovlenii byuro Checheno-Ingushskogo reskoma KPSS’, 19 iyulya 1991, www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/chechnya3.pdf. Postanovleniye sekretariata TsK Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovietskogo Soyuza ‘O obshchestvenno-politicheshkoi obstanovke v Checheno-Ingushskoi Respubliki’, 21 iyunya 1991, www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/chechnya.pdf. Rossiiskiy Statisticheskiy Yezhigodnik 1995 (Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1995) Rossiiskiy Statisticheskiy Yezhigodnik 1994 (Moscow: Finansy i Statistika, 1994) Rossiya v tsifrakh 1995: kratkiy statisticheskiy sbornik (Moscow: Gosudarstvenyy komitet Rossiiskoi Federatsii po statistike, 1995) Sbornik ukazov prezidenta chechenskoi respubliki c 1 noyabrya 1991g po 30 iyunya 1992g (Groznyy: Kniga, 1993) Sbornik ukazov prezidenta chechenskoi respubliki c 1 iyulya 1992g po 31 dekabrya 1992g (Groznyy: Kniga, 1993)

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Memoirs/Eyewitness accounts Abdulatipov, Ramazan, O federativnoi i natsional’noi politike rossiiskogo gosudarstva (Moscow, 1995) Abubakarov, Taimaz, Rezhim Dzhokhara Dudayeva: pravda i vymysel (Moscow: Insan, 1998) Baranets, Viktor, Poteryannaya armiya (Moscow: Kollektsia ‘Sovershenno sekretno’, 1998) ——Yeltsin i yego generaly (Moscow: Kollektsia ‘Sovershenno sekretno’, 1998) Dudayev, Dzhokhar, Temnistii put’ k svobode (Vilnius, 1993) Gakaev, Dzhabrail, Ocherki politicheskoi istorii Chechni (XX vek) (Moscow: Izdatelstvo ChKTs, 1997) Gorbachev, Mikhail, Memoirs (London: Bantam Books, 1997) Grachev, Pavel, ‘Russia’s Integrity Protected’, Military News Bulletin, No. 3 (March 1995), pp. 9–15. Khasbulatov, Ruslan, Chechnya – mne ne dali ostanovit’ voiny (Moscow: Paleya, 1995) ——The Struggle for Russia, edited by Richard Sakwa (London: Routledge, 1993) Korzhakov, Aleksandr, Boris Yeltsin: ot rassveta do zakata (Moscow: Izdatelstvo ‘Interbuk’,1997) Lysenko, Vladimir, Ot Tatarstana do Chechni (Moscow: Izdaniye instituta sovremennoi politiki, 1995) Muzaev, Timur, Ichkeria: rukovodstvo i politicheskaya struktura (Moscow: Panorama, 1997) ——Chechenskaya Respublika: organy vlasti i politicheskiye sily (Moscow: Panorama, 1995) Muzaev, Timur & Todua, Zurab, Novaya Checheno-Ingushetia (Moscow: Panorama, 1992) Rutskoi, Aleksandr, O nas i o sebe (Moscow: Nauchnaya kniga, 1995) Usmanov, Lema, Nepokorennaya Chechnya (Moscow: Izdatelskiy dom ‘Parus’, 1997) Yandarbiyev, Zelimkhan, Chechnya – bitva za svobodu (Lvov: Svoboda narodiv [sic], 1996) Yeltsin, Boris, Zapiski prezidenta (Moscow: Ogonek, 1994) ——The View from the Kremlin, translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (London: HarperCollins, 1994) Zorin, Vladimir, Chechnya: Kremnistyy put’ k miru (Moscow: Violanta, 1997)

Bibliography 225 Newspapers Izvestiya Kommersant Daily Komsomol’skaya Pravda Krasnaya Zvezda Moskovskiye Novosti Nezavisimaya Gazeta Pravda Rossiiskaya Gazeta Rossiiskiye Vesti Segodnya Zavtra

Other media sources BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Hosking, G., Giles, Colonel R., Russia Five Years On – The Military, Radio Three, 9 January 1997, 21.25. Roxburgh, Angus, Roxburgh’s Russia, Radio 4, July 1997. Tsar Boris: The Court of Intrigue, BBC Television documentary shown 10th January 1998, 7 p.m., BBC2. Voina v Chechne: dokumentalnyy film [videorecording]. Directed by Aleksandr Arsnovskiy (Groznyy: Informatsionnyy tsentr Chechenskoi Respubliki, 1997)

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Index

Abdulatipov, Ramazan 72 Abubakarov, Taimaz 25, 42, 74, 80, 83 Akhmadov, Daud 51 Akhmadov, Hussein 41, 42, 45, 72, 86 Aliroyev, Isa 47 Alsultanov, Umalt 35 Argun 138, 142 Arsanov, Akhmed 48 Aslakhanov, Aslanbek 36, 73 Aushev, Ruslan 124 Avturkhanov, Umar 90, 102, 105, 108–9 Basayev, Shamil 125, 139–40, 142, 147, 151–2 bin Laden, Osama 161 Bisultanov, Khozh-Akhmed 23 Budennovsk 139–40 Catherine the Great 3, 22 Caucasian War 3 Caucasus 2, 65–6 Chechen Autonomous Oblast 3 Checheno-Ingushetia 19–22; communist rule 35, 51; declaration of independence 50, 55; division 42–3, 70–1; economic development 19–22, 33; elections 25–6; environmental protest 23, 25; impact of 1991 Moscow coup attempt 34–5; Islam 25, 31; liberalisation 22–5, 155–6; migrant workers 21; National Front 23; opposition to Soviet rule 35, 51; perestroika 22–5; regional revolutions 25; rise of opposition groups 23–5, 35–6; Soviet policy 19–21; Supreme Soviet 26, 30, 38–9, 41; unemployment 20–2, 33 Chechen National Salvation Committee 90 Chechens: army 133, 135–6, 143; attacks against Chechnya’s Russian population 56–7; birth rate 21–2; civilian

opposition to Russian invasion 130–1, 142, 143–4; deportations 3–4, 50, 92; history 2–4, 22–3; independence 142, 147–51, 160; international support 44, 51, 65–6, 161; migrant workers 21; military tactics 133, 141, 143; opposition to Dudayev regime 44–5, 73, 86–8, 119; population 2,19, 21–2; refugees 159–60; rehabilitation 4, 19; relations with North Caucasian republics 44, 51, 66–7, 113, 124; resistance to Russian rule 2–4, 49–50; Russification 19; social structure 4, 19, 60, 77–9; within Soviet political structures 26; in Soviet Union 19–20; storming of Budennovsk 139–40; support for Dzhokhar Dudayev 85, 87, 122–2, 131, 135, 143–4 Chechnya: armed opposition 109–10, 116–19; army 133, 135–6, 143; bank fraud 63–4; civilian casualties 132, 135, 138–9, 143; constitution 59, 72; crime 61–5; economy under Dudayev regime 60–5, 80; elections 46, 142, 147; hostage-taking 98–9, 103, 139–40, 142–4, 150; internal dissent 83–91, 109–10, 116–19, 149–54; Islam 2–3, 65, 113–14, 150–1, 152; Maskhadov regime 147–54, 160–1; National Guard 39; nationalisation of federal property 59; negotiations with Russia 40, 53, 69–73, 85–6, 95–7, 119, 126, 131–2, 140–1, 144–7, 149–150, 156, 161–2; oil industry 3, 21, 62, 63, 83–4, 160–1; opposition groups 83–8; peace agreements with Russia 141, 142, 144–7; pipelines 2; power struggles 83–8, 135; Provisional Council 41–3, 44, 46; relations with North Caucasian republics 44, 51, 66–7, 113, 124, 142, 148, 151–5; religion 2–3, 65, 113–14,

244

Index

150–1, 152; renaming 90; Russian blockades 60–4, 73–4; Russian control 137, 138, 141–2, 143; Russian imperialism 3–4; Russian invasion 130–47, 152–3; Russian military withdrawal 146, 148; Russians living in 56–7, 67–9, 135; Russian-sponsored government 141–2, 147, 160; secession 47, 50; sovereignty 47, 50; Soviet imposition of state of emergency 47–50; Soviet withdrawal 57; subsidies 74; supply of arms 44, 161; unemployment 61; weapons 43, 56–8 Chernomyrdin, Viktor 140, 142, 147, 162–3 Choltayev, Zaindi 117, 120 civilian casualties 132, 135, 138–9, 143 Clinton, Bill 6 Committee of National Accord 141 Confederation of Peoples of the North Caucasus 51, 67 Cossacks 3, 68, 72–3 Council of National and Civil Accord 86 Dagestan 66, 130, 142, 151–3; Chechen incursions 66, 151–3 dedovshchina 136–7 democracy: in Chechnya 157; and security 7 Democratic Society of Chechnya 81 democratisation 6–7, 155, 163; Huntington’s ‘Third Wave’ 6 deportations 3–4, 50, 92 Dudayev, Dzhokhar 28, 33, 41–2, 46, 51; appeals to international community 65–6; assassination attempts 89, 98; attitude to Chechnya’s ethnic Russian population 68–9; corruption of regime 80; death 145; economic programme 60–1; inauguration 50; National Congress of the Chechen People (OKChN) 28, 30, 38–9; opposition to 44–5, 73, 81–6, 86–8, 99–101, 119; power-sharing deal with Ruslan Khasbulatov 41–2; presidential rule 88; regime 59–60, 78, 156; relations with Boris Yeltsin 36, 69–70, 73, 97, 116–17, 131, 144–5; support for 85, 87, 122–2, 135, 143–4; teip 77–9; views on independence 60 environmental protest 16–17, 23, 25 ethnicity 15–8, 33, 155–6; manipulation of 18, 157

Federal Treaty 70, 92, 95–6 FSK 79, 116, 118, 122 Fukuyama, Francis 6 Gakaev, Dzhabrail 19, 32, 83, 84; on teips 78–9 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad 38, 65 Gantemirov, Bislan 27, 59, 105–6, 109, 117 Geliskhanov, Sultan 100, 142 Georgia 159; Chechen refugees 159–60; relations with Chechnya 38–9, 4, 65; Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s regime 38, 65 glasnost 8, 14, 16, 24 Gorbachev, Mikhail 7–9; and liberalisation 7–9, 14–18, 32, 155; reforms 14–18, 33; power struggles 14–18, 32–3, 37; views on democracy 8–9 Govorukhin, Stanislav 68 Grachev, Pavel 57, 101, 122, 126, 132, 136 Grebesheva, Inga 36 Grigoryants, Dmitriy, murder of 86–7 Grozneft 160–1 Groznyy: bombing of 131–2; Chechens retake 146–7; New Year assault 130–5; opposition attack on 117–19, 121– 3; Presidential Palace 133, 143; Russian control of 132–5, 138, 146–7; see also Chechnya Gudermes 138, 142 hostage-taking 98–9, 103, 139–40, 142–4, 150 human rights 138–9 Huntington, Samuel 6 Idigov, Akhyat 89, 90 Imaev, Usman 141 Ingush Autonomous Oblast 3 Ingushetia 66, 67, 98; conflict with North Ossetia 67, 84, 98 Interim Council 90, 99–100, 103, 105–6, 108–9 Interior Ministry (MVD): troops 48–9, 137, 138–9, 148 Islam 2–3, 25, 31, 65, 113–14, 150–1, 152 Kadyrov, Akhmed 160 Kalmykov, Yuriy 123–4 KGB 43 Khadzhiev, Salambek 26, 36, 84, 141 Khasavyurt Accords 147 Khasbulatov, Ruslan 36, 38, 40–2, 46, 73, 118; as leader of Chechen opposition group 91, 99, 102, 106, 107; power-

Index 245 sharing deal with Dzhokhar Dudayev 41–2; and Boris Yeltsin 118 Khattab 151 Khrushchev, Nikita 4; rehabilitation of Chechens 19 Kizlyar 130, 142 KNK see Confederation of Peoples of the North Caucasus korenizatsiya 3 Korzhakov, Aleksandr 102, 119–20 Kostikov, Vyacheslav 103 Kulikov, Anatoliy 148

Nokhchicho movement 85 North Caucasus 2–4; and Chechnya 44, 51, 66–7, 113, 124, 142, 148, 151–5; liberalisation in 29; national movements 29; rebellions 3; refugees 159–60; Russian colonisation 3, 22–3 North Caucasus Military District (NCMD) 57, 101; leadership 132 North Ossetia: conflict with Ingushetia 67, 84, 98; relations with Chechnya 44, 51, 66–7, 113, 124, 142, 148; Russian base at Mozdok 120, 125, 130

Labazanov, Ruslan 100–2, 109, 117 Lebed, Aleksandr 146, 147, 151 liberalisation: in Checheno-Ingushetia 222–5, 155–6; ethnicity 15–18, 33, 155–6; in Soviet Union 16–18 Lysenko, Vladimir 59

OKChN see National Congress of the Chechen People oil industry 3, 21, 62, 63, 83–4, 160–1; pipelines 2 opposition groups: lack of unity 106–7, 118–9, 123; regionalisation of 88–9, 94; Russian support of 107–11, 116–123 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 141–2

Magomedov, Lechi 38, 141 Maikop (131st) Brigade 133–4 Mamodayev, Yaragai 27, 59, 71, 73, 83, 85, 90, 99, 105 Mansur, Sheikh 3 Maskhadov, Aslan 108, 125, 141, 142, 147–8; commander of Chechen troops 122, 152; opposition to 149–54; as president of Chechnya 147–54, 162; relations with Vladimir Putin 161; relations with Boris Yeltsin 149–50; views on independence 149 media: role of 81, 87, 122, 134, 139, 153 Mekhkel 78 migrant workers 21 Mikhailov, Vyacheslav 126, 131–2, 141 Mountain Peoples’ Republic 3 Naqshbandiya 2–3 National Congress of the Chechen People (OKChN) 27–8, 31–2, 40; Chechen independence 30–2; and Dudayev 28, 30, 38–9 National Front 23 National Guard 39 nationalism 3–4, 16–18; 33; manipulation of 18 nationalities policy 3–4 NATO 115 negotiations 40, 53, 69–73, 85–6, 95–7, 119, 126, 131–2, 140–1, 144–7, 149–150, 156, 161–2 Nemstov, Boris 143 Nisyo 105–6 Nokhchi 2

parade of sovereignties 29 Party of War 114–16 peace agreement 141, 142, 144–7 perestroika 8, 14, 16, 24; in ChechenoIngushetia 22–5 Pervomayskoye 131, 143 Peter the Great 3 propaganda war 134, 152–3 Provisional Council 41–3, 44, 46 Putin, Vladimir 152, 161; on Chechnya 161; relations with Aslan Maskhadov 161 Qadiriya 2–3 Raduyev, Salman 142–3, 149 regional policy 6, 29–32, 73–4, 91–2, 158–9 Romanov, Anatoliy 141 Rosneft 160–1 Round Table group 84, 87 Russia: Chechen policy 46–8, 49, 53, 60, 62–3, 69–75, 95–9, 101–3, 109–11, 116–23, 131, 150, 151, 156–9, 161, 162; constitution 55, 70–1, 92, 94, 95; decision to invade 114–16; elections 32, 114, 144, 145–6; ethnic unrest 14, 32–33; international relations 115, 138, 161; invasion of Chechnya 130–47, 152–3; negotiations 40, 53, 69–73, 85–6, 95–7, 119, 126, 131–2, 140–1, 144–7, 149–150, 156, 161–2; NATO 115; officials on Chechnya 104, 110, 112,

246

Index

126, 160; Party of War 114–16; peace agreements 141, 142, 144–7; power struggles 73, 83, 84, 91, 94, 114–16, 156–7, 158–9; preparations for invasion 119, 125–7; propaganda war 134, 152–3; regional policy 6, 29–32, 73–4, 91–2, 158–9; Security Council 115–16, 123–5, 126, 128, 132, 148; subsidies 74; terrorism 152–3, 161; transition in 7–13, 32, 49, 155–9, 163 Russians: armed forces 133–5, 136–8; army’s revision of tactics 134; casualties 134; control of Chechnya 137, 138, 141–2, 143; corruption 137–8; dedovshchina 136–7; draft evasion 137; failure to take Groznyy 133–5; mercenaries in Chechnya 120; Maikop (131st) Brigade 133–4; military opposition to invasion 132; military opposition to peaceful resolution of crisis 146; popular opposition to war 143; problems within armed forces 136–8; support for invasion 134, 143, 152; withdrawal from Chechnya 146, 148 Samashki 138–9 Savostyanov, Evgeniy 102 Security Council 115–16, 123–5, 126, 128, 132, 148 Semyonov, Vladimir 137 Shabad, Anatoliy 102 Shaimiev, Mintimer 145, 148 Shakhrai, Sergei 70–1, 96–7, 98, 109 Shali 138 Shamil, Imam 3, 152 Shumeiko, Vladimir 97 Soslambekov, Yusup 27, 48, 80, 86, 105 Soviet mentality in Russian decisionmaking 156–8 Soviet Union: Chechens in 19–20; Chechen policy 19–21; collapse 9–10, 31, 32–3, 34–5, 37; coup attempt 34–5; elections 8, 32; environmental protest 16–17, 23, 25; korenizatsiya 3; liberalisation 16–18; nationalism 3–4, 16–18; 33; nationalities policy 3–4; opposition to Communist Party 16–17, 22–5, 33; parade of sovereignties 29; power struggles 37–41, 48–9; separatism 16–8; titular nation 17; Union Treaty 17, 38 Stepashin, Sergei 97, 101, 152

sufism 2–3 supply of arms 43, 44, 56–8, 161 Supreme Soviet 26, 30, 38–9, 41 Taliban 161 tariqat 2–3 Tatarstan 54, 70, 92, 95–6 teip 4, 60, 77–9; in opposition to Dudayev regime 77–9 Tishkov, Valery 18; on teips 78–9 titular nation 17 transition 7; impediments 7, 157–8; institutional vacuum 10–11, 49, 156–9, 163; and nationalism 7, 157–8; in Russia 7–13, 32, 49, 155–9, 163 tukum 4 Udugov, Movladi 107 Umkhaev, Lechi 31, 84 Union Treaty 17, 38 Usmanov, Lema 27 Vainakh 2 Vainakh Democratic Party (VDP) 27 Vedeno 139 Vinogradov, Vitaliy 22 Vinogradov theory 22–3 Wahhabism 151 Yandarbiyev, Zelimkhan 24, 35, 39; as acting president 145, 147; peace talks with Russia 145–6 Yegorov, Nikolai 98, 139 Yeltsin, Boris 12, 32; on Chechen crisis 108, 123, 127, 129, 131, 132, 144, 145–6; decision to invade 114–16, 123–5; elections 32, 114, 144, 145–6; justification for invasion 55, 91–2, 129; and Ruslan Khasbulatov 118; and the North Caucasus 29, 32, 67, 98; relations with Dzhokhar Dudayev 36, 69–70, 73, 97, 116–17, 131, 144–5; relations with Aslan Maskhadov 149–40; State of Nation address 55; and transition process 9–11; views on independent Chechnya 55; views on selfdetermination 46 Zagayev, Doku 24, 26, 30, 35, 39, 142 Zakayev, Akhmed 161